Guillaume Faye’s Sex & Deviance

Guillaume Faye’s Sex & Deviance

By Christopher Pankhurst 

Ex: http://www.counter-currents.com

Guillaume Faye
Sex and Deviance
London: Arktos, 2014

Recent events have underlined once again that Islam is dangerously incompatible with what many refer to as Western values. The murder of several employees of the French magazine Charlie Hebdo is a violent reminder of this fact.

But it is interesting that some commentators (myself included ^[3]) are starting to notice that the “Western values” represented by the likes of Charlie Hebdo are actually completely at odds with anything that could be considered authentically European. Arktos Media’s new translation of Guillaume Faye’s Sex and Deviance is a welcome and timely contribution to this ongoing discussion. Faye is clear that Islam’s anachronistic attitudes towards sex and sexuality are explosively at odds with Western sexual mores, and furthermore that the West’s current sexual mores are themselves a deviation from traditional Western values. His insistence that the individualism of Christianity is at the root of the West’s present sexual ennui is likely to make this book as controversial with social conservatives as it will be with the Islamophiliac left.

Faye’s central concern is the decline of the family and the consequent reduction in the European birth rate. This is the touchstone to which all of his judgments return. If something is judged to be harmful to the birth rate then it is harmful per se. But this focus leads to some surprising conclusions, particularly his relaxed attitude to homosexuality, a subject of some division on the outer reaches of the right. Faye says that his judgement is guided by the Aristotelian mean and this allows him to seek a balanced and healthy path between, on the one hand sexual moralism, and on the other sexual incontinence.

Faye places the family at the center of his discussion because it is the necessary and best developed means of continuing the lineage. The irresistible trend of recent decades has been to undermine the stability of the family in favor of individualistic pleasure seeking. This has resulted in fewer marriages and fewer births as individuals rotate amongst a series of sterile sexual relationships. The properly conjugal element in sexual relationships has largely disappeared and this is something that fatally disrupts the social primacy that should be accorded to reproduction. For Faye, “The couple is not an isolated romantic duo but the central pillar in the architectural structure of a family” (26).

But in order to strengthen this structure he does not advocate a return to conservative family values as such. Or rather, he does and he doesn’t. What he wants is a candid recognition that there are several different types of love (sexual, familial, romantic, etc.) and that they have become confused and conflated in detrimental ways. He regards the bourgeois family as the model of a balanced and secure framework within which to rear children. But crucially, he is alive to the necessary hypocrisies that exist within that model and that allow it to function. In this sense, he argues for a distinction between conjugal love and sexual love, the latter (in the form of adultery or prostitution) being necessary for the former to function well. Not surprisingly, he thinks that such an outlet for sex outside of marriage is more necessary to men than women, although he allows for the latter case.

To some this will smack of a deft form of doublethink, allowing for conjugal fidelity to be maintained by excluding sexual infidelity from the reckoning. A smart excuse for priapic intellectuals. But it must be admitted that there is a strong element of pragmatic sexual Realpolitik to it. What made it possible in centuries past was the strong taboo against discussing sexual matters openly. This is why (as Faye correctly notes) divorce was always much more scandalous than adultery; it was socially unacceptable, whereas infidelity remained outside the purview of society. In the present context where no one can ever shut up about their own sexual concerns for more than five minutes at a stretch, it is difficult to see how such a form of necessary hypocrisy could endure. What is essential for its operation is a certain discretion concerning sexual matters, so that they do not emerge into explicit discourse. And this is surely why so many taboos are enforced so strictly. Once an explicit argument is made for such a system then its hidden aspects are brought to the fore, destroying the division between private and public. None of which means that adultery is any less prevalent now, simply that its effects are experienced as devastating rather than being kept out of mind.

In his discussion of homosexuality Faye carefully distinguishes between the practice itself and the promotion of homosexuality as an ideological norm that is being used to undermine the family. Although he sees male (though interestingly, not female) homosexuality as a pathology, it is not in itself a particularly harmful one. By contrast, the ideological exploitation of homosexuality, and issues such as gay marriage, are pernicious dogmas that actively undermine and devalue the importance of the family: “Homosexual unions will always remain a marginal phenomenon with few demographic effects, practically none of which will have any influence on the biological composition of Europeans. Moreover, as is the case with everything that is against nature, the homosexual couple does not last. Gay marriage only poses a problem because it is part of an ideological (not biological) dissolution of the natural order” (60).

 

 

As evidence for the pathological nature of homosexuality, Faye notes the narcissism of the various “pride” marches held around the world: “Why be ‘proud’ of being homosexual or bisexual?” he asks, noting that such displays betray a “deep infantilism. One can be proud of what one has become, of what one does, of one’s capacities, but to declare oneself proud of one’s sexual orientation is to set the bar for pride pretty low” (51). Despite this, Faye is entirely tolerant of any sort of homosexual or bisexual practice carried out in private. His concern is only with the ideological use to which such tendencies are being put. Regardless of whatever views one might have on the subject, Faye’s arguments are consistent, honest and balanced. It is telling, and very depressing, that his discussion of homosexuality is prefaced with the following remark: “In saying these things, of course, I am conscious of contravening the laws which limit freedom of expression in France” (46).

When Faye describes homosexuality as “against nature” he does so from a biological, rather than a moral perspective. But Christianity is quite different. It sees homosexuality as morally wrong because the individual is deviating from nature. And here Faye identifies the fundamental problem with Christianity, and the root cause of our present sexual confusion. Faye points out that Christianity condemns individual lapses such as homosexuality but is perfectly content with collective lapses such as racial blending. In fact, Christianity has nothing to say about the racial mixing of different peoples and Faye contrasts this with his own preferred Aristotelian view which tolerates individual predilections such as homosexuality, but forbids collective aberrations such as relations between distinct peoples. The problem with the Christian viewpoint is that it sees man as superior and distinct from the rest of nature. Faye terms this “anthropological irrealism” (263). Rather than existing within a wider contextualizing spectrum of natural evolution, man is seen as a special case. It is an error that, in its secular form, has led to the present obsession with equality. All people are sacred and therefore all people are equal. In that case, then, communal concerns become irrelevant when considering who to marry; instead, one should just follow one’s heart and marry whomever one becomes infatuated with, regardless of any wider considerations.

The other religion that Faye pays close attention to is Islam. For the purpose of his discussion, the important distinction between the two is that Christianity is an insidious corrosive that rots from within, whereas Islam is a wholly alien faith that can only cause explosive conflict. Faye is clear that the reason for Islam’s radically alien character is racial rather than spiritual. Religion emerges from a particular people and embodies their existing characteristics. What shouldn’t be surprising is that the importation of large numbers of Muslims who have very, very different notions of gender relations into post-feminist, sexually-liberationist European countries will be a disaster. That political leaders of all stripes are unable (or unwilling) to see this is to their eternal shame.

No doubt, if Faye had written his book a couple of years later he would have made some reference to the Rotherham scandal. Over a period of 16 years at least 1400 (a conservative estimate) white girls were sexually abused (including being drugged and raped, and trafficked) by Pakistani men whilst the authorities did their best to cover up the crimes. The reason for the cover up essentially boils down to a fear of being called racist. Some social workers insisted that the rapists were actually the girls’ boyfriends (despite the fact that the girls were children and the men were clearly several years older), whilst a Home Office researcher who did make reference to the rapists’ ethnicity was warned never to do so again and was sent on a diversity course as penance. The whole sordid affair illustrates Faye’s assertion that, “the media only emphasize ‘sex monsters’ of Gallic origin. The goal is to provide aid and comfort to the propaganda which says that sex crimes (and other crimes) ‘come from all milieus’” (206). Post-Rotherham we can confidently add that politicians and police will actively assist the media in covering up such crimes. The attested reality of Rotherham suggests that Faye is not overestimating the scale of the problem.

Despite some of Faye’s controversial views it is obvious that his concern is largely for protecting such victims from unnecessary predation. He writes, “we should consider the daily unhappiness of these young girls and adolescent boys . . . who get up every morning to go to school and who have to confront the barbarians, sensing that they are not protected by the authorities of their own country (marshmallows who have abdicated all responsibility) and without the young men of their own nation – unmanly, fearful, unworthy of their ancestors – daring to defend them” (164). He also makes the valuable observation that, “the life of a woman, especially a young woman, counts for more than that of a man . . . simply because she is a mother, in charge of reproduction and the upbringing of offspring” (119).

Such observations reveal Faye to be in total opposition to the prevailing orthodoxy, an orthodoxy that will do nothing to protect our women and children, and that will, in an outrageous inversion, identify you as a hateful extremist if you speak in favor of such protection.

This is a radical book in many respects. Even its insistence on a division between private and public is radically at odds with a social norm that has outsourced domestic life to various media, social networks and other technologies. Above all, Faye has written a book that seeks to redress the imbalance of modern sexual mores and to install the family once more at the heart of such considerations. It also seeks to reinstate the virtue of communal considerations above purely individual ones. These aspirations transcend any ideology, whether of the left or the right, because they are attuned with biology and nature. Such wisdom is surprisingly hard to come by nowadays; Sex and Deviance should be read by anyone who seeks it.

 

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URL to article: http://www.counter-currents.com/2015/01/guillaume-fayes-sex-deviance/

URLs in this post:

[1] Image: http://www.counter-currents.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/SexandDeviance.jpg

[2] Sex and Deviance: http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/1910524190/ref=as_li_tl?ie=UTF8&camp=1789&creative=390957&creativeASIN=1910524190&linkCode=as2&tag=countecurrenp-20&linkId=U4DBX4LTNESMW3ZA

[3] myself included: http://www.counter-currents.com/2015/01/je-ne-suis-pas-charlie/

Articles de Guillaume Faye en espagnol

Un blog avec les articles de Guillaume Faye en espagnol:

http://ejefuturo.hautetfort.com/

The New Jewish Question of Guillaume Faye

The New Jewish Question of Guillaume Faye

By Michael O'MEARA

Ex: http://www.counter-currents.com/

Guillaume Faye
La nouvelle question juive  
Chevaigné: Editions du Lore, 2007

“I don’t know whether God loves or hates the English; I only know that they must be driven out of France.”— Saint Joan

In his critique of this controversial book, the Swiss “revisionist” scholar Jürgen Graf, now exiled in Russia, writes that Guillaume Faye has permanently discredited himself “in racial nationalist and nationalist circles worthy of the name.”[1] The reason: His “dishonest” and defamatory attack on those who challenge the Holocaust story and on those who uphold the traditional “Judeophobic” orientation of the nationalist right.

“The New Jewish Question” (henceforth NJQ) may indeed mark the end of Faye’s career as a leading identitarian and nationalist ideologue among certain segments of the racially conscious community—though by no means all of it, maybe not even the majority of it. For the sharp differences pitting the Holocaust-debunking exile against the militant anti-Islamic Frenchman reflect differences that divide nationalists throughout Europe, as long-standing historical-theoretical identities closely associated with the anti-liberal wing of the nationalist right clash with the electoral imperatives of national-populist parties endeavoring to stem the pro-immigrant policies of their respective states.[2] The white man’s future may well hinge on how these differences are resolved.

The Argument

Faye’s anti-revisionism is part of a larger argument related to what he claims is the changing Jewish relationship to white society.

Central to this change is the Third World colonization of the European heartland—and all the world-destroying effects that have followed in its wake.

Since the late 1990s, as the colonizers became bolder and more assertive, attacks on French Jews (in the form of vandalized synagogues, school violence, murders, etc.) have steadily risen. The Mainstream Media routinely denounce the “radical right,” but these attacks are largely the work of Muslim immigrants. Still of “low intensity,” Faye claims they are symptomatic of a new, more virulent anti-Semitism, which mixes anti-Zionist politics with the Koran’s traditional ethnocidal aversion to the Jews, threatening in this way to move Europe ever closer to Eurabia.

In appraising this new phenomenon, Faye, who has long been persecuted by Jewish advocacy groups for his nationalism, professes to be neither pro- nor anti-Jewish. His single avowed concern as a writer and activist is the survival of Europe. In his treatment of the NJQ, he thus fully acknowledges that the Jews are not “white” (i.e., not of Aryan or European Christian descent) and that their relationship to European society has often been negatively affected by their “schizophrenic” attitude toward Europeans (or what Kevin MacDonald more forthrightly calls their ethnocentric “double standard”).[3] He also acknowledges that the Jewish Question was once “pivotal to the issue of European, especially French, identity, for, historically, the Jews were seen as the métèque [i.e., the ‘wog,’ the ‘wop,’ the offensive foreigner] who threatened the corruption of the nation’s blood and morals” (p. 23).

Given the present Third-World inundation, the Jews, he argues, can no longer seriously be taken as either an alien menace or a métèque, especially considering that more and more of them are allegedly beginning to doubt the wisdom of open borders. Not a few nationalists and identitarians have consequently abandoned their traditional anti-Semitism. The Vlaams Belang, Europe’s most successful nationalist formation, has, for example, formed a tacit alliance with the Jewish community of Flanders in order to stem the nation’s Islamization; he also cites the Jews’ role in Jared Taylor’s American Renaissance and could have mentioned Griffin’s BNP, Fini’s National Alliance, Kjaersgaard’s Danish People’s Party, and many others.

Anti-Jewish sentiment nevertheless persists on the nationalist right, in Faye’s view distorting its movement and distracting it from its principal tasks.

He also claims that nationalist and far right anti-Semites have, in face of the invasion, altered their view somewhat, seeing Jews less as an immediate physical threat than a pernicious influence—as Zionism and elite social engineering—responsible for policies, immigration preeminently, that threaten white survival. Contemporary anti-Jewish ideology, as a result, now rests on three general tenets: That (1) the Jews dominate the world through the cultural and financial powers they wield; that (2) they are the principal force promoting white decadence; and that (3) they immunize themselves to criticism through their manipulation of the Holocaust Story. Much of the NJQ seeks to refute these tenets, revealing not just their alleged political inappropriateness to the nationalist cause, but their role in occultating the challenges facing it. More specifically, the NJQ seeks to sever all association with historic anti-Semitism, the Third Reich, and everything else that might alienate whites from joining nationalists in repelling the Muslim advance. In the name of political realism, then, Faye makes a case for abandoning principles and positions that Graf, among others, considers essential to the nationalist project.

Decadence

The poorly researched and poorly argued case Faye makes in support of his argument, especially regarding the third tenet, is amply demonstrated in Graf’s review and need not be rehashed here. Two larger and equally serious questions raised by Faye do, however, deserve revisiting: Namely (1) are the Jews, traditional purveyors of anti-ethnic and anti-racial principles, the cause of the white man’s present decline, and (2) are the Jews, as the most powerful group in society, the principal enemy in the battle for white survival?

In respect to the first question, Faye says that though white or European decadence may have been promoted by certain Jewish intellectuals, its real origins lie in the inner recesses of the European soul—specifically in the secular and religious distillations of Christianity. Jews, in other words, have only exacerbated tendencies already indigenous to white life.

The French Catholic Church, he points out, dwarfs French Jewish efforts in promoting not just open borders, race mixing, and pro-immigrant policies, but cosmopolitanism, universalism, and a self-denying love of the Other.

Faye’s argument here is certainly correct in claiming that the ultimate responsibility for our race replacement lies with ourselves and that Christianity, along with its various secular offshoots (egalitarianism, individualism, universalism, etc.), has had a terrible effect on white identity, helping foster processes destructive of both the race’s organic and cultural substratum.

The problem with this aspect of his argument is that Catholicism, like other forms of Christianity, is a temporal institution subject to history. And as a historical subject, it has been different things in different periods. Thus it was that Bishop Turpin in La Chanson de Roland confronted the “Saracens” as a “Christian” warrior bearing the arms of the Frankish hero cult, while antebellum Episcopalians defended the legitimacy of negro slavery with chapter and verse. Even if the argument is only that the deep structure of Christian belief harbors an anti-white or anti-ethnic impetus, it still doesn’t explain why for centuries it served an opposite purpose. Finally, and most importantly, it was the secularization of Christian belief, associated with modernization, that provoked (or, at least, marked the beginning of) the “crisis of Western man” and the subsequent assault on the unique worth of his specific being—and not Christianity itself.[4]

In a similar way, this historical factor also affects the anti-Semitic argument. When Jew-hatred shed its religious forms in the latter part of the nineteenth century, becoming an “anti-Semitism” (implying a critique of Jewish behavior) instead of an anti-Judaism (implying a critique of Jewish religion), it did not explain why the Jews’ anti-gentile disposition (which, after all, had been around since the Hellenistic Age) was suddenly becoming hegemonic. Many of the great anti-Semites (e.g., Proudhon, Dühring, Drumont, Sombart, etc.) consequently directed their critique not just against the Jews but against those white elites who collaborated with them and especially against the emerging social-economic order which fostered such collaboration and made Jewish subversion possible. (Hence also the prominence of anti-Semites in nineteenth- and twentieth-century anti-modernist movements). The point here is that this people “that shall dwell alone” may have evolved a psychology destructively opposed to white society—a psychology, given its biological foundation, that transcends historical contingencies—but in itself this doesn’t explain why in one period Jews were fleeing pogroms and in another managing the White House.

Faye is much more convincing when he emphasizes those larger processes that turned Europeans against themselves, noting that the history leading to the white man’s present self-destruction—the history whose distant origins reside in the Renaissance, the Reformation, and the French Revolution and whose most imposing forms were philosophically expressed in the Enlightenment, politically in liberalism, and economically in capitalism—was part of a long, complex chain of causes and effects that cannot seriously be attributed to a Jewish conspiracy. Egalitarianism, human rights, materialism, individualism, and the categorical imperative, moreover, may all have been promoted by Jewish intellectuals at the white man’s expense, but to think that they are not preeminently products of European culture is possible only through an ignorance of that heritage. The sources of what Faye calls the present decay lie, as a consequence, as much in ourselves as elsewhere.[5] Since Jews, then, are only the occasional instrument of this historical subversion, they are no worse than the multitude of whites who also serve the subversive forces. To blame them for the predicament we’re in is not only false, Faye insists, but dishonorable.

There is a truth in this, just as vulgar or obsessive anti-Semitism which attributes all the white man’s woes to the “highly-ethnocentric, Christian-hating” Jews is something of a bugaboo, justifying its critics’ contempt. But there is nevertheless sound reason for seeing the forces assaulting white life and culture as Judaic in spirit—in the sense that they either stem directly from the Jews’ innate hostility to white existence, reflect the white man’s embrace of Jewish behavioral norms, represent what it means to be “modern” in Yuri Slezkine’s use of the term and “postmodern” in the current multicultural sense, or constitute part of the Jews’ historic campaign against Europe’s traditions, aristocracies, symbols, and transcendent values.[6] Relatedly it is hardly coincidental that for millennia European peoples designated the esprit juif—the spirit of “rule breakers, border crossers, and go-betweens”—as not just alien to their own, but destructive to their unique “synthesis of spirituality and virility.” (The more extreme forms of this designation went so far as to link Jews with “those cosmic forces which are destructive and evil and inimical to human life.”) This still doesn’t make the Jews the chief source of white decadence, and Faye is certainly correct in emphasizing that Europeans have never needed them to engage in ethnomasochist behavior—for the entire course of modern, especially twentieth-century, history has been cause enough. But it does suggest that white and Jewish spirits are fundamentally opposed and that the hegemony of the latter cannot but have a distorting effect on white being. Indeed, it is the white man’s alienation from his spirit that causes him, as Heidegger says, to “fall out of being” and thus into decay, decline, and decadence.[7]

Revealingly, Faye ignores the fact that anti-Semitism appears in virtually every period of European history. He understands the Jewish Question only as a facet of nineteenth- and early twentieth-century developments and does so without actually examining the nature of our increasingly Hebraicized world. Moreover, it is only the Jews’ “schizophrenia,” the divided loyalties they harbor toward Europe, that he sees as arousing European hostility and provoking gentile opposition. Though acknowledging the often negative offshoots of this “schizophrenia,” he also claims it is nowhere near as threatening as the menace posed by Islam and that it is frequently mitigated by the Jews’ identification with “Western Civilization.” Faye thus joins those nationalists who seek “freedom from history” in order to pursue anti-immigrant politics without being associated with the demobilizing tags of anti-Semitism, Nazism, and extremism, dismissing, in effect, the contention that it is the anathematization of these earlier expressions of European being that empowers and legitimatizes the system’s anti-European policies.

It would be historically unserious, I believe, to dispute Faye’s claim that the Jews are not wholly responsible for the white man’s decline. But at the same time it is quite another thing to then claim, as Faye does, that the Jewish Question is today passé and of no political interest to the struggle for white survival. There’s a difference he ignores between discarding the baggage of past failures and avoiding the challenges the past poses for the present. A case in point is the Holocaust Story, whose misrepresentation, as Graf, among many others, points out, is used to defame Europe’s greatest people, the Germans, demonizing not only their history and ethnos, but that of all Europeans. A European or white nationalist movement to stave off the race’s destruction by accepting this defamation and demonization, along with the lies, propaganda, and repression accompanying them, might arguably enhance its electoral prospects, but the proponents of such a system-accommodating movement never seem to concern themselves with the kind of “nationalism” it would represent or the sort of goals it could possibly achieve—or if it would actually be able to address the real sources of European decay. Following Heidegger, I would go further and argue that Europe and the “West” will never be reborn without the spiritual rebirth of the Germans and that this is impossible as long as they are forced to cower in the shadow of the Holocaust Story.

The Enemy

Of even greater concern for Faye is his belief that nationalists and identitarians fixated on the Jewish Question ignore the real enemy: The non-white, Muslim-led hordes encamped on Europe’s southern border who threaten to replace the indigenous European population.

Confronted with six million non-whites inside France and the millions to arrive in the near future, Faye argues that 600,000 French Jews (the

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Guillaume Faye's Archeofuturism: Two Reviews

And yet one more review of . . .
Guillaume Faye’s Archeofuturism

Brett STEVENS

Ex: http://www.counter-currents.com/

Click here for more discussions of Archeofuturism

Click here for writings by Guillaume Faye, including an excerpt from Archeofuturism

Guillaume Faye
Archeofuturism: European Visions of the Post-Catastrophic Age
Arktos Media Ltd., 2010

As humans, we study our world to estimate the best responses to its demands. We then make a choice, and act on it, then observe the results to see if our estimations were correct. If they were not, we correct while trying to learn from the error. That is well and good, when buying a cement mixer — but what about a whole civilization?

Sometime 400 years ago, as our civilization prospered, the decision was made to modernize. This came about through a belief in the equality of all human beings and a drive toward external mechanisms, namely technology and political control systems. Guillaume Faye, the seasoned rising star of the New Right movement in Europe, explores our correction of this mistake in his landmark book Archeofuturism: European Visions of the Post-Catastrophic Age.

One of the more important things I’ve read this year, this book upholds an offhand feel throughout; an honest, end-of-the-night, when the wine and cigarettes are low and people are too tired to do anything but blurt out the big ideas that haunt them in their dreams feel. The content is dynamic, especially the first half, but the real force of power here is the style, an excitedly taboo-breaking, honest and hopeful look at re-creating ourselves so we have a future. This is not a book of resentment, but of joyful charging ahead.

A large influence on this stylistic breathlessness is the composition of the book, which is a collection of essays and a short sci-fi story to show us these ideas in practice. The second section, a thorough and high-energy explication of where Nouvelle Droite beliefs lead, the reasons for them and finally, how they can be better applied toward a theory of the future, will interest new right and deep ecologists the most as it joins the ideas of both into not a resistant/revolutionary culture but a remaking/revolutionary one.

Archeofuturism, Faye writes, escapes the boutique right-wing airy intellectualism of GRECE, which he critiques in the first book. Pointing out the failure of “ambiguous and incomprehensible ideological axes,” he proposes instead a transition from the rearward-looking “conservative” outlook to one that acknowledges what was lost, and the current state of disaster in the West, and plans for rebuilding afterward.

In his new theory of Archeofuturism, Faye proposes a “vitalist constructivism” that implements a quasi-feudal, national but not jingoistic, united Europe that applies the traditional spirit and learning to a future in which technology plays a central role. His unstated point is that the tool must again serve the man, after centuries of the reverse; he appeals to a sense of both the pragmatic in finding historically valid solutions through tradition, and the spirit of tradition, which is one of a constructive, upward society.

He proposes that we adopt this new outlook through a voluntaristic method, first changing our values, then our art, and then finally our political expectations at about the same time a “convergence of catastrophes” (environmental, political, economic) devastate Europe. Faye’s call is for Europeans to return to being “soldiers of the Idea” again, and for them to take up not a corrective action, but a constructive desire to rebuild and build it bigger, better and more exciting than before.

This fusion of both conservative and revolutionary thought takes the best of liberalism and the best of conservatism and takes them out of their handily domesticated roles as token opponents. He points out that our current ideological menu is carved from “soft ideology,” or that which passively deals with splitting up the wealth of an industrialization binge. He emphasizes a number of points all conservatives and pro-Europid readers can enjoy:

• Modernism is an attachment to the past. According to Faye, modernism is backward-looking as it tries to un-do conditions of nature that offend our egalitarian sentiment. What defines modernity is egalitarianism, or the idea that we’re all equal (in political power, in ability, in right to property). As a result, we’re constantly trying to force equality on nature while it resists us.
• Extreme leftism is a token act which reinforces the power of the modern nation-state. This point struck me as the most controversial, yet most sensible. If you are in power, and want to stay there, you need to give your citizens petty acts of rebellion that feel extreme but are in fact a repetition of the dominant philosophy. The state and its corruptors benefit from equality because it keeps smarter voices from rising above the herd.
• The modern world exists in a state of “soft totalitarianism” where those with unpopular opinions are simply ostracized, which in a liberal capitalist democracy effectively starves them into submission. He praises the American method of “soft imperialism” and shows how this is the future: indirect rule, with a reward/threat complex administered by social and business factors; the “1984″ vision is obsolete.
• Romanticism. Faye writes convincingly of his efforts to join “Cartesian classicism,” or a sense of space as being equal in all directions, with “Romanticism” which he expresses here as the idea that will or will to power can change the world radically even if small in stature. The joining of these two represents the expression of both ancient philosophy and a new type of “freedom” for humanity.
• Roots and method of modernity. Modern society consists of secularized evangelism, Anglo-Saxon mercantilism, and Enlightenment individualism, its methods are economic individualism, allegory of Progress, cult of quantitative development and abstract “human rights.” It is amazingly refreshing to see this spelled out so clearly and simply.
• Multiple factors doom modernism which was always unrealistic. “Europe is turning into a third world country,” he writes, summing up the disasters. If you see this book in a store, pick it up to read page 59 for an insightful list of modernity’s failings.
• Heterotelia. Following Nietzsche’s example, Faye needed a concept that explains how what we intend does not always result in a perpetuation of that state when put into practice. For example, political equality ends in inequality through social instability; multiculturalism ends in race war; letting economy lead ends in poverty because speculative finance is easier than generating real wealth. He explains our past failings and the need to be alert in the future through heterotelia, which means that “ideas do not necessarily yield the expected results.”
• Ethno-masochism. Faye illustrates how the West, in a suicidal bid to become morally/socially impressed with itself, has inflicted upon itself the unworkable scheme of multiculturalism and in doing so, has imported Islam, an “imperial theocratic totalitarianism.” Unlike many new right writers, he endorses the idea of European culture as superior in addition to being worth saving for its unique virtues.
• North versus South. History begins with anthropology, Faye writes, so we must see the conflict in humanity as one between Northern peoples who are prosperous, and the “third world” Southerners who are attempting to colonize the North on the back of its technology and liberal egalitarianism. He suggests a Eurosiberia stretching from the UK to the borders of China, and claims East-West conflict is less likely as a source of conflict.

Against this cataclysm Faye posits Archeofuturism, or a futurism equally balanced by the spirit of traditionalism, which is (a) learning from the past and (b) a type of reverence for life that emphasizes family, punishment being more important than prevention, duties coming before rights, solemn social rites, the aristocratic principle and a “freedom” defined not as the ability to act randomly, but as a sense of having a place and being freed from a chaotic society with excessive pointless competition. This synthesis of the best of capitalism, socialism and our monarchic past fully lives up to the title of this book.

Good luck finding a short review of this book. The first half of it is packed chock-full of interesting ideas that like new melodies can infect the head for days as it dissects them and their context. The second half both addresses common objections and provides background, and takes the form of a short science fiction story in the tradition of Asimov and Heinlein that explains how technology will help humans evolve. The concepts are mind-blowing and more daring than anything sci-fi has attempted since The Shockwave Rider, and this icing on the cake makes reading this book have a natural rhythm from the extreme, to the professorial, to the radical yet calming.

History is like a supertanker ship; it takes miles to begin to turn around and there are no brakes. The egalitarian experiment in Europe is only a few centuries old yet has wreaked utter havoc on all the subtler parts of existence, things that most people don’t notice because they are easily distracted by shiny objects. Faye brings these alive, shows us exactly why they are endangered, and then shows us a plausible and gradual (e.g. non apocalyptic, non-Utopian) solution toward which we can move if we believe life is worth saving. Clearly he does, and it infuses this book with a fervor and wisdom that few attain.

Source: http://www.amerika.org/books/archeofuturism-european-visi...

Another review of . . .
Guillaume Faye’s Archeofuturism

Michael WALKER

Ex: http://www.counter-currents.com/

Click here for more discussions of Archeofuturism

Click here for writings by Guillaume Faye, including an excerpt from Archeofuturism

Guillaume Faye
Archeofuturism: European Visions of the Post-Catastrophic Age
Arktos Media Ltd., 2010

In the 1980s Guillaume Faye was one of the best known member of GRECE and by far their most popular speaker. With humour, panache, invective and contempt thrown in at just the right moment-the dismissive “l’acteur Reagan” the contemptuous and venomous “monsieur Henri Levi surnommé le grand”, he had his audiences rolling in the aisles with delight. Every time I heard him speak at a GRECE conference he received a standing ovation.

GRECE was not only a school of thought, it was also a sort of social club, linking like-minded persons on a cultural, political and social level. However, its concentration on theory made the temptation in hard times great indeed to retreat from direct confrontation and reduce all issues to the level of academic debate. Faye explicates these and other criticisms in Archeofuturism (now available for the first time in English from the Arktos Press at the same time as it has become hard to obtain in the original French).

Structure

Archeofuturism suffers from coming from the pen of a man more at home before a gathering than a keyboard. It is unbalanced and paradoxically, given the content, in some respects extremely provincial and theoretical in its approach and design. At the same time, it owes nothing to the respectability and detachment from reality which can make cowards of many writers.

This is not to say that the book lacks structure. It has a very definite if unorthodox structure. It consists of three theses as Faye calls them: (1) the end of civilization as we know it owing to what Faye calls a “convergence of catastrophes”; (2) the necessity for revolution, notably in the European mindset, (3) propositions for the post-catastrophic world (and the title of his book expresses the essence of Faye’s solution).

The last chapter is a piece of science fiction, a story of a world in which the conflict of technics and tradition has been resolved by reconciling the two, and this is the underlying thread of Faye’s entire argumentation, that we must learn to reach back to our furthest yesterday and to the longest future.

Positions

One issue is the conflict between tradition and progress. On the one hand, technology is necessary as a tool of our will to power, something which Faye believes essential to the survival of the European. On the other hand, scientific and technical progress may prove and often does prove, destructive of tradition. Are religions just fables? It is hard to die for a fable. How is such belief possible in a world of scientific rationalism and progress?

Faye believes strongly that the world is hurtling towards multi-faceted disaster, less a clash of civilizations, although he seems to write at times in a similar vein to Huntington, with his view of Islam especially as a challenge in itself to the hegemony of European civilization, than what he terms a “convergence of catastrophes.” Like Huntington, Faye regards Islam as a single cultural, religious, political bloc with a an expansionist will.

On homosexuality :

. . . it is not a matter of advocating any repression of homosexuality, of banning homosexual couples or socially penalizing gay people; simply, the prospect of legalizing of a form of marriage for homosexuals would have a highly destructive symbolic value. Marriage and legal heterosexual unions enjoy forms of protection and public benefits that are accorded to couples capable of having children and hence of renewing the generations and thus of being of objective service to society. Legalising homosexual unions and awarding them financial privileges means protecting sterile unions. (pp. 106–107)

On demographics:

It is necessary to reflect on the issue of immigration, which represents a form of demographic colonization of Europe at the hands of mostly Afro-Asiatic peoples. . . . Three generations later, the colonization of Europe represents a form of revenge against European colonization . . . are we to accept or reject a substantial alteration oif the ethno-cultural substrate of Europe? The basis of intellectual honesty and the key to ideological success lie in the ability and courage to address the real problems, instead of attempting to avoid them. (p. 49)

On distraction:

The system only makes use of brutal censorship in very limited areas: it generally resorts to intellectual diversion, i.e. distraction, by constantly focusing people’s attention on side issues. What we are dealing with here is not simply the usual brutalization of the population via the increasingly specific mass-media apparatus of the society of spectacle — a veritable audiovisual Prozac-but rather a concealment of essential political problems (immigration, pollution, transportation policies, the aging of the population, the financial crisis of the social budgets expected to occur by 2010 etc. (p. 92)

Archeofuturism

It is a sad paradox, and one about which Faye is acutely aware in his book, that the European New Right in general has failed to make an impact at the very time that the march of events might have been expected to play into its hands: the end of the cold war, the decline of political Manicheanism (East versus West) , the decline of nationalism as a relevant political alternative to liberalism. Faye offers a number of explications for this failure. They can be summarized as a lack of media “savvy”, romantic isolationism, minimization of catastrophe, cultural relativism and a lack of understanding of and worse, interest in, economics (Faye alone among spokesmen of GRECE had written a treatise on economics).

Faye’s response is to deviate from the consensus among the new right and to insist on European exceptionalism. He returns to what might be called a traditional belief of the radical right when he claims, as he does here, that European civilization is superior to others and that as a superior civilization it has a duty to resist the challenge of immigration in general and Islam in particular. Cultural and racial superiority was the premise (sometimes asserted, sometimes unspoken) of all movements of the twentieth and nineteenth centuries which sought to preserve or halt a decline in the domination of the white man over the political destiny of the globe.

European radical right movements after the Second World War focused their propaganda very much on the restoration of national prestige and glory and a rejection of immigrants and outsiders.  GRECE stressed from the beginning the importance of what it called “the right to be different” arguing less in terms of European superiority than in terms of European uniqueness, Europe’s right to the nurture of its own identity and destiny. The great enemy was seen not so much as military or political threats as such, as the forces which sought to attenuate, reduce, trivialize and ultimately abolish differences. The great enemy in this respect was neither Islam nor communism but “the American way of Life,” the manifest destiny to reduce all peoples to consumers, whose sole struggles were ones of economic competition.

This developed in the course of time within GRECE into a position of ethnopluralism, which Faye and others subsequently denounced as cultural relativism. Simply put, it is the argument that all cultures are worthy of respect within their own terms and no culture is inherently superior to another. The obvious critique of such a position is that it ultimately disarms all willingness to disallow, challenge or oppose other cultures. Opposition even in its politest non-military form, can only be conducted on the premise that in some way one is superior or equipped with superior arguments or in the area of culture and religion, possesses a truer, superior culture and religion and one thereby and therewith seeks an opponent’s defeat.

There is another aspect — that of economic survival. A major criticism which Faye has of GRECE is that it ignores or glosses over demographic and economic warfare against the European. Faye argues that at a time of emergency, when Europe is threatened with being overwhelmed by non-Europeans whose demographics are reducing the significance of the European by the hour, it is a form of suicide to indulge in culturally relativist reflections and debate.

Faye spends no time in fleshing out his arguments about superiority and in what respects the European is “superior.” This is a pity because it would provide the book with a stabilizing effect. As it is, Faye assures us that he believes the European is superior and rushes on the next point. What Faye implies although I did not find it in this book explicitly stated, is that when we talk about the right of a people not only to an identity but to a destiny, there is likely to be a conflict between the destiny of a people compelled to expand and conquer and the right of another (conquered) people to an identity.

The notion of a “right” be it to identity or destiny is problematic: where does our “right” come from? A Nietzschean, as Faye claims to be, can answer this question. It could be baldly stated as the right to survival — the impulse of nature which all beings have the “right” to practice. Rights to be different are likely to conflict with the rights of others to be different. The right to conflict is therefore the right to survival of identity and it is Faye’s point that such a right can only be preserved by those who actively engage in the politics (as all politics in Faye’s view must be) of conflict. A defense of the identity of the European necessitates entering into a state of conflict with the prevailing hegemony.

Faye candidly states that he made the same mistake as other GRECE members in the expression of cultural relativism and an accompanying primary and fundamental anti-Americanism which took precedence over the ethnic question and the challenge of non-white immigration to Europe, (and presumably, the decline in relative numbers and influence of the Caucasian in North America). The “ethnopluralist” approach is exemplified by Alain de Benoist’s Europe-Tiers Monde: Même Combat where de Benoist argues that Europe and the Third World (even the term seems a little outdated today) are natural allies against the American and Soviet ways of life. Faye stresses that GRECE (and he willingly includes himself here) ignored the reality of the Islamic threat and that ethnopluralism paved the way for an inactive, “head in the sand” response to the long term significance of massive Mohammedan immigration into Europe.

Faye’s stress on the superiority of Europe in place of the right of Europeans to be different indeed avoids the danger of degenerating into an ineffective and compromising inactive pluralism. On the other hand, it shifts the focus of intent significantly towards a provocative, inevitably conflict laden project which is dear to Faye: the Eurasian Imperium. Faye is for better or for worse an imperialist. His vision of the future as outlined in this book is one of a vast Eurasian bloc, stretching from Lisbon to Vladivostok.

The implied direction, never explicitly stated of the archeofuturist project, is combat and conquest in a world divided into major power blocs jockeying for position. “Like in the Middle Ages or Antiquity, the future requires us to envisage the Earth as structured in vast, quasi-imperial unity in mutual conflict or cooperation.” (p. 77). Seen in this light, Faye’s admiration for atomic power implied in this work (and more explicitly indicated elsewhere, dramatically in his comic book Notre avant guerre, where he gleefully depicts a degenerate Europe being destroyed in mushroom clouds ) and futuristic technology in general is the ghost in the machine of Faye’s project.

However, unlike most modernizers, Faye does not duck the dilemma of reconciling a world of modern technology with a world of tradition, be it racial, political or other. How does one reconcile advanced technology and its implications with the preservation of continuity with the past? Faye faces this problem head on and if his solution is seems questionable and Utopian, he deserves the credit of highlighting the dilemma. Practically all radical rightists of whatever hue, fail to address the issue at all. Faye’s solution is what he calls “archeofuturism” the title of his book and the project to which he believes European revolutionaries (and Faye believes we must be revolutionaries to save European civilization and not conservatives) the assimilation of the future with the past, building a future not as modern or post modern but archeo-modern, a modernism acutely aware of and with its roots in a deep and profound past.

There will be a small elite of rulers with access to the highest forms of modern technology while the majority of less gifted will make do with crude forms of technical accomplishment-a completely two tier society in fact. This may sound familiar and not perhaps pleasantly so. It is this reviewer’s belief, one shared by many, that the ultimate aim of the ruling elite is the same: the division of mankind into two groups-the elite and the great majority of outsiders who no longer have a say in how public affairs are administered. This seems difficult to reconcile with Faye’s expressed support for populist initiatives. Be that as it may, this writer’s strength is his ability to fire the right questions rather than provide well prepared answers.

The “post catastrophic” world will be one, Faye believes, divided between the futuristic achievements of an elite and the archaic conditions and status of the majority, it will be archeofuturistic. Before we examine this idea more closely, it is worth taking a moment to consider the notions of growth and progress which Faye dismisses as overhauled. His chapter revealingly entitled “For a Two-Tier World Economy” opens with the bald assertion: “Progress” is clearly a dying idea, even if economic growth may be continuing”.

Anti-Growth

Faye’s rejection of what he calls “the paradigm of economic development” is simple:

An intellectual revolution is taking place: people are starting to perceive, without daring to openly state it, that the old paradigm according to which the life of humanity on both an individual and collective level is getting better and better every day thanks to science, the spread of democracy and egalitarian emancipation is quite simply false. . . . Today, the perverse effects of mass technology are starting to make themselves felt: new resistant viruses, the contamination of industrially produced food, shortage of land and a downturn in world agricultural production, rapid and widespread environmental degradation, the development of weapons of mass destruction in addition to the atomic bomb-not to mention that technology is entering its Baroque age. (pp. 162–63).

The last comment excepted (which is pure Spengler), this writing must strike the impartial reader as familiar. It is a fairly good example of the pessimism of environmentalist writers in general and it has been said many times before. Faye knows or should know, that there are very many people who are deeply aware of the heavy price which we are paying for making Progress our Baal. Faye is entirely right in my opinion, as thousands of others before him have been right, to question the cost but anyone expecting Faye to so much as nod with respect in the direction of the many organizations, groups, campaigns and initiatives to reverse this trend, will be disappointed.

On the contrary, Faye contemptuously dismisses the French Green movement in these words, “the political platform of the Green movement contain no real environmentalist suggestions, such as the transport of lorries by train instead of on highways, the creation of non-polluting cars (electric cars, LPG, etc.) or the fight against urban sprawl into natural habitats, liquid manure leaks, ground water contamination, the depletion of European fish stocks, chemical food additives, the overuse of insecticides and pesticides, etc. Each time I have tried to bring these specific and concrete issues up with a representative of the Greens, I got the impression that he was not really interested in them or that he had not really studied them” (p. 145). It is not clear (possibly a fault of the translator’s) whether Faye is referring to one or several spokesmen. Be that as it may, it is not my experience at all that environmentalists are not interested in these issues.

Futurism

Faye gives the impression throughout the book less of someone proposing ideas in a book for a wide readership as enjoying a discussion with someone who was with him in the days of GRECE over a “ballon de rouge” in a Paris café. Despite his provincialism, Faye has a sound instinct for homing in on some of the genuinely important issues of our time and viewing them in a global perspective, even when (and this is often the case here) his global perspective is obscured by the incidental historical luggage which weighs his book down. The reader should not be deterred by the book’s incidental references from letting Faye lead to key issues of our time and demanding our response to core questions.

The greatest quality of this book is that it gives a voice to the growing sense of frustration that is felt among persons form all walks of life that we are living in a transitory period, that the “end of history” is an utter illusion and that old structures are insufficient to contain the force of history. Faye cites the unlikely figure of Peter Mandelson as an “archeofuturist without knowing it” as someone who has recognized that democracy as we know it from the Mother of Parliaments is tired and no longer able to cope with the challenges which European man and indeed humankind is facing.

Faye’s examination of the real issues behind the palaver of most contemporary politicians is refreshing. Here is a taste:

The new societies of the future will finally abolish the aberrant egalitarian mechanism we have now, whereby everyone aspires to become an officer or a cadre or a diplomat, even though all evidence suggests that most people do not have the skills to fulfill those roles. This model engenders widespread frustration, failure and resentment. The societies that will be vivified by increasingly sophisticated technologies, in contrast, will ask for a return to the archaic and inegalitarian and hierarchical norms, whereby a competent and meritocratic minority is rigorously selected to take on leading assignments.

Those who perform subordinate functions in these inegalitarian societies will not feel frustrated: their dignity will not be called into question, for they will accept their own condition as something useful within the organic community-finally freed from the individualistic hubris of modernity, which implicitly and deceptively states that each person can become a scientist or a price.

“Individualistic hubris” indeed sums up for this reviewer one of the great malaises of our time: the exaggerated importance which mediocre individuals attach to their own boring lives. Faye at his best is very good indeed.

For all its failings this book is a valuable contribution to the growing awareness of persons of European descent of their time of crisis. It  provides a highly readable and often acute observations about what Faye stresses are the real issues of our time but the question nags steadily: to what extent has Faye provided a strategy for Europeans in the face of those issues? The answer is that there is no strategy, unless by “strategy” we mean a positioning (for example in favor of European federalism vis-à-vis reactionary nationalism or friendly competitiveness with the United States rather than blanket hostility to the American way of life).

Perhaps someone much younger than either Faye or this reviewer will read this book and know that they are able to provide that response. In that case, this book will have shown itself to be of the past and the future, in a word archeofuturistic.

Source: http://www.amerika.org/texts/archeofuturism-by-guillaume-...

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vendredi, 21 janvier 2011 | Lien permanent

A Serious Case: Guillaume Faye's Archeofuturism

A Serious Case:
Guillaume Faye’s Archeofuturism

F. Roger Devlin

Ex: http://www.counter-currents.com/

Guillaume Faye,
Archeofuturism: European Visions of the Post-Catastrophic Age
Arktos Media Ltd., 2010

“The modern world is like a train full
of ammunition running in the fog.”
—Robert Ardrey

Most thought described as “conservative” is a kind of political hygienics: it takes its bearings by what is natural, normal, or best in the social order. One hazard of its focus on right order is to leave us unprepared in extraordinary situations. Thus, we all know otherwise intelligent conservatives who would continue, even as blood was running in the streets, to talk of the need for electing fiscally responsible Republicans to office. The best treatment for this sort of blindness is a crash course in political pathology such as the book under review.

Author Guillaume Faye was for many years a luminary of Alain de Benoist’s Group for the Research and Study of European Civilization. Beginning from the principle “no Lenin without Marx,” Benoist conceived his activities as part of a Gramscian (or Cochinian) strategy to undermine the hegemony of liberalism. In the early 1980s, remembers Faye, each issue of his journal Eléments was “an ideological barrage that sparked outraged reviews from the mainstream press,” and people sat up and took notice of the Colloques parisiens his organization sponsored. The well-educated men of this “New Right,” as it came to be called, looked down on the young Front National as a “microscopic group of good-for-nothings,” and even barred “that pirate-faced old soldier” Jean-Marie Le Pen from their meetings.

Yet within a few years the tables were turned, as dissatisfied New Rightists flocked to the Front. Any misgivings they had about Le Pen’s vulgarity were outweighed by the impression that his organization was where something was happening. Faye, too, eventually concluded that the New Right had become a mere literary salon: “from 1986 I began to feel that a clique spirit and literary pagan romanticism were prevailing over historical will. . . . In order to prove effective, ideological and cultural action must be supported by concrete political forces which it integrates and extends.”

Archeofuturism marks the author’s return to the political arena after an absence of twelve years. Its first chapter is devoted to a friendly critique of his former colleagues. For example, he finds in New Right publications an overemphasis upon folkloric aspects of European heritage such as “Breton bonnets” and “Scandinavian woodcarvings.” Such charming but innocuous traditions have their equivalents among all peoples on earth. Faye would rather maintain “the creative primacy of Western civilization” represented by our tradition of scientific research, philosophy and engineering, as well as our unparalleled artistic and literary “high” culture.

Faye also considers the New Right wedded to a faulty political paradigm in which “America”—conceived narrowly as the Hollywood/Wall Street/Foggy Bottom axis—is the enemy. This way of thinking is well-expressed in the title of Benoist’s book Europe-Third World: the Same Struggle. Benoist invites the entire non-American world (even Muslims!) to “a fruitful exchange of dialogue among parties clearly situated in relation to one another.” In other words: multiculturalism with one place at the table reserved for White Europeans. Faye rightly dismisses this as “a Disneyland dream.”

Starting from what Faye considers a correct Nietzschean assessment of primitive Christianity as an egalitarian, leveling and ethno-masochistic movement, the New Right launched an ill-considered attack on the folk Catholicism of ordinary Frenchmen. Meanwhile, they ignored their proper target: a return to the “bolshevism of antiquity” among the high clergy, marked by immigrationism and self-ethnophobia. This is the tendency some have called the “degermanization of Christianity.” The New Right would have done better to ally itself with Catholic traditionalists in combating it rather than alienating its natural allies.

Lastly, while the New Right professed admiration for the German jurist Carl Schmitt, it never made any practical application of his Ernstfall concept: the “serious case” which cannot be met within the normal framework of constitutional law. When Hannibal is at the gates of Rome, when the Royal Guards mutiny—no appeal can be made to law. Such contingencies can only be met with the virtue of prudence, i.e., the ability to make sound judgments about what to do in particular cases.

This blind spot may be fatal, for Faye is convinced that the liberal regime is driving Western civilization toward an Ernstfall the like of which the world has never seen. He describes it as a “convergence of catastrophes.” Elements include: the failure of multiracialism, the disintegration of family structures, disruption in the transmission of cultural knowledge and social disciplines, the replacement of folk culture by the passive consumption of industrially produced “mass culture,” increasing crime and drug use, the decay of community, anti-natalism, nuclear proliferation and the re-emergence of viral and microbial diseases resistant to antibiotics, public debt, and the privileging of speculative profits, i.e., the construction of our economy atop the stilts of investor confidence rather than upon the solid ground of production.

Furthermore, liberal ideology has propounded a utopian ideal of universal “development,” whereby every last African hellhole is supposed to become an affluent, tolerant, democratic, and efficient consumerist society. The nations of the South were won over to this project, dazzled by the deceptive prospect of economic growth. They set in motion a process of industrialization that has devastated the natural environment, undermined their traditional cultures, and created social chaos, including urban jungles like Calcutta and Lagos. Resentment at the broken promise of “development” runs deep; the resurgence of religious fanaticism is one of its expressions.

Under the banner of “inclusion,” the liberal regime is now importing legions of immigrants who will function as the “fifth column” of an aggressive South. “The ethnic war in France has already started,” writes Faye in 1998, seven years before les émeutes des banlieues.

These are the lines of catastrophe which Faye expects to converge in about the second decade of this century. His prophecy is reminiscent of Andrei Amalrik’s 1969 essay Will the Soviet Union Survive Until 1984?—which, of course, proved uncannily accurate. Still, the wise reader will not want to overstress Faye’s time frame; much is clear about the crisis we face, but not even the angels in heaven know the day or the hour.

The author emphasizes that the impending meltdown presents us with opportunities: “When people have their backs against the wall and are suffering piercing pains, they easily change their opinions.” The stormy century of iron and fire that awaits us will make people accept what is currently unacceptable. The right today must position itself to be perceived as “the alternative” when the inevitable crisis hits. This means discrediting leftist pseudo-dissent, which is merely a demand for the intensification of official ideology and praxis. It also means acquiring the monopoly over alternative thought: not by imposing a party-line, but by uniting all healthy forces on a European level and abandoning provincial disputes and narrow doctrines.

Faye’s book is intended as “a sort of mental training for the post-catastrophic world.” The title Archeofuturism refers to the principles appropriate to reconstructing our civilization. “Archaic” must be understood according to the root sense of the Greek noun archè: both “foundation” and “beginning.” The archai are anthropological values which “create and are unchangeable;” they refer to the central notion of “order.”

Such foundational values include:

the distinction of sex roles; the transmission of ethnic and folk traditions; spirituality and priestly organization; visible and structuring social hierarchies; the worship of ancestors; rites and tests of initiation; the re-establishment of organic communities (from the family to the folk); the de-individualization of marriage [and] an end to the confusion between eroticism and conjugality; the prestige of the warrior caste; inequality of social status—not the unjust and frustrating implicit inequality we find today in egalitarian utopias, but explicit and legitimated inequalities; duties that match rights, hence a rigorous justice that gives people a sense of responsibility; a definition of peoples—and of all established groups or social bodies—as diachronic communities of destiny rather than synchronic masses of individual atoms.

Faye calls these “the values of justice.” We need not doubt they will return once the hallucinations of equality and individual emancipation have dissipated, for they follow from human nature itself.

The real danger is that we may end up having them imposed on us by Islam rather than reasserting them ourselves from our own historical memory. For Islam is the symbolic banner of Southern revanchisme, and the mindset of the South remains archaic. It takes for granted the primacy of force, the legitimacy of conquest, ethnic exclusivity, aggressive religiosity, machismo, and a worship of leaders and hierarchic order. Muslim employment of liberal cant—complaints of “discrimination” and “intolerance”—are the merest fig leaf for a Machiavellian “strategy of the fox” against Europe. In order to oppose the invaders, we must revert to an archaic mindset ourselves, abandoning the demobilizing handicap of “modern” humanitarianism.

Faye is perhaps at his best explaining the behavior and motivations of the “petty, inglorious princes who pretend to be governing us.” For example, he notes the increasing importance of “consultation” in French political life; authorities “consult” representatives of various approved interest groups, such as labor unions and non-White ethnic blocs, and then formulate policy on the basis of the lowest common denominator of agreement between them. The real point of this, of course, is to avoid the risks and responsibilities of actual leadership. (Try to imagine De Gaulle behaving this way.) But it is presented to the public as a wonderful new way of “modernizing democracy.”

A related symptom is the rise of negative legitimization, or what the author calls the “big bad wolf tactic”:

Politicians no longer say, “Vote for us, because we’ve got the right solutions and we’ll improve your living conditions.” That is positive legitimization. Instead they say (implicitly) “Vote for us, since even though we’re a bunch of good-for-nothings, bunglers and bullies, at least we will protect you from fascism.”

Four years after these words were written Le Pen made the presidential run-offs and, sure enough, all the bien pensants showed up at the polls with clothespins on their noses to support the crook Chirac!

Egalitarian reform serves as a convenient pretext for the elites to enact measures whose practical effect is to entrench their own position. Thus, they have sabotaged the French educational system by eliminating selectivity and discipline. But it is only these which give the talented outsider an honest chance against the untalented insider. As Pareto put it: the more rigorous the (rationally planned) selection in a social system, the greater the turnover in the elite. Without objective standards, on what grounds can one argue against elite self-perpetuation?

But the regime’s most breathtaking hypocrisy is found in its demonization of the National Front. The Front has broken the tacit ground-rules of the managerial regime by “engaging in politics where it has been agreed that one should only engage in business”; it has sought popular trust with a view to implementing a program, where the established parties “communicate” and maneuver with a view to re-election. Timid careerists denounce the Front as a threat to the Republic because they fear it as a threat to themselves.

Faye considers the National Front a genuinely revolutionary party. Yet he apparently has never been a member, and is not really a French nationalist. In his view, Le Pen’s romantic and backward-looking devotion to the French state embodies a great deal of latent Jacobinism. It is this state, after all, which has “naturalized” millions of Afro-Asiatic “youths” who do not see themselves as French at all. Moreover, a nation state, even run on patriotic principles, would be an entity too small to defend the French ethnos effectively in the contemporary world. Would a federal European state be any more capable of doing so? “I believe it would,” says Faye, “provided it is exactly the opposite of the European state currently being built.”

Those who believe that an imperial and federal European state would “kill France” are confusing the political sphere with the ethno-cultural one. The disappearance of the Parisian regime would in no way threaten the vigor and identity of the people of France. Moreover, a European federal state would breathe new life into autonomous regions: Brittany, Normandy, Provence, etc.

The European Union is a ghastly bureaucratic mess, but it is also one of the “forces in being.” Why turn our backs on it or work to destroy it when we can instead hijack it and turn it to our own purposes? Faye calls for the transformation of the EU into “a genuinely democratic and no longer bureaucratic European government with a real parliament and a strong and decisive central power.” He describes this position as European Nationalism, and dreams of a Eurosiberian Federation extending from Brest to the Bering Strait.

While Faye disagrees with Benoist’s interpretation of America as an enemy (hostes), he continues to view her as a rival and opponent (inimicus). This American reviewer does not grasp why the case for including a chastened post-imperial United States in a Northern Federation would be any weaker than the case for including Russia.

The Eurosiberian Federation is to be characterized by a two-tier economy. The elite (20% of the population) will continue to live according to the techno-scientific economic model based on ongoing innovation. They would form part of a global exchange network of about one billion people, including the elites of other civilizational blocs. As Faye notes, “the essence of technological science is not connected to egalitarian modernity, but has its roots in the ethno-cultural heritage of Europe, and particularly ancient Greece.”

Among the first exploits of this new elite shall be exploring the “explosive possibilities of genetic engineering.” These include inter-species hybrids, man-animal chimeras, semi-artificial “biolithic” creatures, and decerebrated human clones. Faye is utterly contemptuous of moral or religious scruples in this domain, which he oddly attributes to the ideology of liberal modernity more than to Christianity.

The remainder of humanity would live in archaic, neo-traditional communities. The techno-scientific portion of humanity would be under no obligation to help (i.e., “develop”) everybody else. Nor would they have any right to interfere in their affairs.

In sum, for the elite: promethean achievement, linear time and futuristic technology; for the rest: neo-feudalism, cyclic time and timeless, “archaic” values.

But it is not clear how the elite could avoid “interfering” in the affairs of people they are supposed to govern. Moreover, how would the elite perpetuate itself? It seems clear that Faye does not intend a hereditary aristocracy. Perhaps there is some sort of test or initiatory ordeal for prospective members. But then families would be divided between the classes, which would involve many difficulties. In the fictional portrayal of his ideal future society which closes the book, Faye refers in passing to something called “the Party.” This reviewer would need to hear a lot more about this shadowy organization before signing on to Faye’s proposals. The two-tiered economy is altogether the least satisfactorily worked out part of the book.

Yet the author is aware that men never get what they plan for: somewhat grandiloquently, he calls this heterotelia. And he distinguishes “worldview” (an idea of civilization as a goal and some values) from “ideology” and “doctrine” (applications to society and what tactics to use). So we can follow him for the first mile.

Archeofuturism should have a bracing effect on anyone more accustomed to reading the despondent Cassandras of paleoconservatism. “Realism,” he reminds us, “is often disheartened fatalism.”

Those who blame others, enemies and the political climate for their own failures do not deserve to win. For it is in the logic of things for enemies to oppress you and circumstances to prove hostile. The mistake lies in exorcising reality by adopting the morals of intention as opposed to those of consequences.

We must reject the pretext that radical thought would be “persecuted” by the system. The system is foolish. Its censorship is as far from stringent as it is clumsy, striking only at mythic acts of provocation and ideological tactlessness. Talent always prevails over censorship, when it is accompanied by daring and intelligence. A right wing movement can only prove successful through the virtue of courage.

There is no excuse for being taken by surprise when the liberal regime disregards its own principals in order to fight us (as the British establishment is doing with the BNP). Of course we should publicize and ridicule their inconsistencies, but it is silly to be indignant over them: repression simply means that the regime recognizes us as an Ernstfall, a mortal threat, and that is precisely what a serious right ought to be. Attempts to shut us down are symptoms of growing success and should strengthen our resolve.

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samedi, 18 décembre 2010 | Lien permanent

Guillaume FAYE: Why We Fight

English translation

of "Pourquoi nous combattons" and "Wofür wir kämpfen"

Now available !

Product Description

Identitarians and others making up the European resistance lack a doctrine that truly serves as a political and ideological synthesis of who they are - a doctrine that speaks above parties and sects, above rival sensibilities and wounded feelings, that brings the resistance together around clear ideas and objectives, uniting them in opposition to the Europeans' dramatic decline.
Our people today face the gravest peril in their entire history: demographic collapse, submission to an alien colonisation and to Islam, the bastardisation of the European Union, prostration before American hegemony, the forgetting of our cultural roots, and so on. In the form of an introductory text and a dictionary of 177 key words, Guillaume Faye, one of the most creative writers of the European 'Right', makes a diagnosis of the present situation and proposes a program of resistance, reconquest, and regeneration. He holds out the prospect of a racial and revolutionary alternative to the present decayed civilisation.


The manifesto's principal objective is thus to unify the resistance by developing a common doctrine that unites everyone and every tendency seeking to constitute a European network of resistance - a doctrine that goes beyond the old sectarian quarrels and superficial divisions. All relevant subjects, including politics, economics, geopolitics, demographics, and biology are broached. As it was for the Nineteenth-century Left with Marx's Communist Manifesto, Why We Fight is destined to become the key work for Twenty-first century identitarians. This edition of Why We Fight contains the complete text of the original French edition, as well as additional material that was added for the German edition. Also included is an original Foreword by translator Michael O'Meara, author of New Culture, New Right, as well as a Foreword by Dr. Pierre Krebs, Chairman of the Thule-Seminar in Germany.

Additional Information

Author	Guillaume Faye
Full Title	Why We Fight: Manifesto for the European Resistance
Binding	Softcover
Publisher	Arktos
Pages	278
ISBN	978-1-907166-18-1
Language	English
Short Description	Guillaume Faye's manifesto and ideological dictionary, aimed at the 'European Resistance'. Radical, thought provoking and at times extremely controversial. A book that can't be read without forming an opinion about it.
Table of Contents	FOREWORDS Prophet of the Fourth Age (Dr. Michael O’Meara) It’s About The Primordial Fire (Dr. Pierre Krebs) A Note from the Editor 1. PREFACE AND PRECAUTION Unite on the Basis of Clear Ideas Against the Common Enemy Beware of False Friends 2. PRELIMINARY ELEMENTS The Logic of Decline -Ethnic Colonisation -The Blocked Society France or Europe? Economic Principles -For Nuclear, Not Petroleum Energy -The Imposture of the ‘New Economy’ -Toward a Planetary Economic Crisis? 3. STRATEGIC PRINCIPLES America and Islam Against Europe The Dangers of European ‘Disarmament’ Notions of the ‘Menace from the South’ and the ‘Domestic Front’ Toward a Eurosiberian Strategic Doctrine: The ‘Giant Hedgehog’  4. METAPOLITICAL DICTIONARY From Aesthetics to Xenophilia 5. CONCLUSION Why Are We Fighting? INDEX
About the Author	With a doctorate in political science from Paris' Institute of Political Science, the essayist Guillaume Faye was one of the principal theoreticians of the French Nouvelle Droite in the 1970s and '80s prior to his growing sympathy for the identitarian movement. He has also been a journalist at Figaro-Magazine, Paris-Match, Magazine-Hebdo, Valeurs Actuelles, and a radio commentator. For several years he was the editor of J'ai tout compris (I Understood Everything), a private newsletter.

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mardi, 10 mai 2011 | Lien permanent

Toutes les vidéos de Guillaume Faye:

Toutes les vidéos de Guillaume Faye:

http://ekouter.net/tag/Guillaume%20Faye

 

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jeudi, 05 novembre 2015 | Lien permanent

Guillaume Faye at the NPI Conference, Washington

 

Why We Will Win

The National Policy Institute

Guillaume Faye's speech from *Become Who We Are*, October 31, 2015.

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dimanche, 22 novembre 2015 | Lien permanent

Strasbourg : conférence de Guillaume Faye

Strasbourg : conférence de Guillaume Faye sur la colonisation de l’Europe le 13 février

Guillaume Faye tiendra une conférence à Strasbourg le 13 février prochain. Il sera l’invité de la quatrième édition du Cercle Eugène Ricklin.

Le Cercle Eugène Ricklin recevra donc, le vendredi 13 Février 2015 à 19 heures (Strasbourg), Guillaume Faye qui abordera l’épineux sujet de “La Colonisation de l’Europe, situation et solutions.” Participation aux frais : 5 euros.

 

Les inscriptions se font par mail ([e-mail]), en précisant le nombre d’accompagnants.

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mardi, 20 janvier 2015 | Lien permanent

Guillaume Faye - Le laxisme généralisé en France

Guillaume Faye - Le laxisme généralisé en France

EspritVif Media

http://www.gfaye.com/

https://www.amazon.fr/Comprendre-lIsl...

00:32 Les attaques sur les policiers et la guerre civile.
07:44 Les professeurs agressés et laxisme d'état.
16:22 Les élections françaises, américaines et la Russie.
22:43 Quelle possibilité pour l'avenir, quelle visibilité ?
31:00 Sur la médiocrité des politiques.

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lundi, 07 novembre 2016 | Lien permanent

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