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Rechercher : BONNAL SCHILLER

Interview with Greg Johnson

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Interview with Greg Johnson

ex.: http://www.counter-currents.com/

1. Being a man of ideas, has literature played an important role in your life? What would you say were the texts that proved key in your personal and intellectual development? And why?

History and philosophy played more of a role in shaping my outlook than literature. In fact, I can’t name a single work of fiction, qua fiction, that has shaped my worldview. But works of fiction have provided me with concrete and vivid exemplifications of otherwise abstract ideas. I love philosophical novels. Plato’s dialogues, of course, qualify both as literature and philosophy.

Plato has had the greatest influence on my outlook, particularly the Republic, but also the Gorgias, Phaedrus, Symposium, Euthydemus, Euthyphro, Apology, Crito, and Phaedo. Rousseau’s philosophical novel Emile also influenced my thinking profoundly. I love Ayn Rand’s The Fountainhead and Atlas Shrugged, but classical liberalism, capitalism, and even individualism ultimately undermine aristocratic and heroic values.

The philosophers who have shaped me the most are Plato, Aristotle, Plotinus, Machiavelli, Vico, Rousseau, Kant, Hegel, Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, William James, Heidegger, Guénon, Evola. Alan Watts has had a huge impact as well, as have the Tao te Ching and the Upanishads.

Wagner’s music dramas are in a class by themselves, as texts somewhere between philosophy and literature/myth, married to some of the greatest music ever written. They are profound, and have influenced me profoundly.

Savitri Devi is also hard to categorize. She combines philosophy, history, religion, politics, and myth. She too has had a great influence on me.

As for literature proper: The writers I loved most as a child are ones I still love today: Poe, Tolkien, Kipling, and old illustrated compendiums of Greek and Norse mythology. Frank Herbert’s Dune books have also remained favorites. I like them more every time I return to them.

Later on I came to love Homer, Shakespeare, Blake, Goethe, Schiller, Baudelaire, Dickinson, Oscar Wilde, Yeats, Wallace Stevens, and Philip Larkin as poets and dramatists.

In terms of novels and stories, my favorite writers came to include Dostoevsky, Hugo, Flaubert, D. H. Lawrence, H. P. Lovecraft, Flannery O’Connor, and Yukio Mishima.

There are also “non-greats” whose voices I consistently enjoy: Edith Sitwell, Truman Capote, Evelyn Waugh.

I read a lot of Ray Bradbury, Kurt Vonnegut, and Aldous Huxley in my teens. Someday I want to revisit them. I think Bradbury will stand the test of time.

Literary criticism is very important to me. My favorite critics are D. H. Lawrence, Ezra Pound, Camille Paglia, and H. L. Mencken.

I have very little time to read fiction now, unfortunately. The last novel I read was Mister! I read too much non-fiction and spend too much time staring at the computer screen. I just can’t add more reading on top of that. So my primary form of intellectual recreation is watching movies and operas and listening to music.

2. I first became aware of you following your appointment as editor of The Occidental Quarterly. However, I understand you had already been active as a dissident writer for a number of years, during which you wrote under various pen names. What, in your particular case, made you opt in favor of pen names? And why did you decide eventually to do away with them?

When I wrote under pen names, I was working for people who would fire me if they knew my real views.

When I took the TOQ job, I was told I would have to use my own name. At the time, I was explained that since TOQ is the would-be flagship of the intellectual wing of the Anglophone movement, it would not be suitable to edit it under a pen name. I accepted that argument at face value and took the plunge. At that point, I crossed the Rubicon. After about a year, all my old professional “friends” and contacts simply melted away.

At the Counter-Currents/North American New Right site, I am consolidating all of my writings under two names: Greg Johnson for all the political articles and Trevor Lynch for most of the movie and television reviews.

3. The internet and ‘the real world’ are often presented as diametrical opposites, with the former cast as phony and the latter as the only thing that counts. But, isn’t the internet as real as the so-called real world? I say this because behind the keyboards and in front of the screens sit real people, whose behaviour in the ‘real world’ is both a cause and a result of what happens on the internet. I am aware of the argument against: many real people adopt fake online identities, but, ultimately, in the long run it is next to impossible for people not to betray their own thoughts and feelings online. Fake identities aside, is not the internet perhaps the most honest record of what is actually on people’s minds? Is not ‘the real world’ in fact phonier, since many don’t say what is on their minds in face-to-face situations for fear of social disapproval, professional consequences, or ostracism?

There have been recent studies that suggest that people lie more on the internet than in real life. But to some extent I agree with you: the internet is like the voting booth, and in its privacy and anonymity people can be more honest about controversial matters. In more mundane matters, usually connected to online dating and banal narcissism, the internet is a vast sewer of lies and imposture.

All this relates to the “ethics” of pen names. To me, it is purely a matter of individual discretion. I recommend pen names to those who want to communicate ideas but can’t under their own names. After all, it is the ideas that matter in the end, not the authors.

Yes, cowardly and dishonorable people often hide behind pen names. But narcissistic jackasses also write under their own names. To me, the most important consideration is to get as much truth as possible circulating out there. The labels and brands are less important than the content.

4. Your tenure as TOQ editor saw a number of innovations: an active online presence was developed and articles and reviews appeared that covered a much wider spectrum of cultural spaces than ever before. What were your aims for the TOQ during this period?

My aim was to make TOQ a metapolitical journal for a North American New Right, the goal of which was to lay the foundations of the White Republic. There were, however, limitations built into TOQ from the beginning that made that difficult.

A problem was that the journal did not have clearly articulated goals. There were basic topics and parameters in the founding documents, which were drawn up by Sam Francis, Louis Andrew, William Regnery, and Kevin Lamb: TOQ was to deal with biological race differences as well as the Jewish Question. TOQ was not to bash homosexuals. TOQ was to be neutral on religion.

The de facto editorial line, however, can be divined from the interview published with Alain de Benoist. Only about half the actual interview was published. Everything critical of scientific materialism and Christianity was dropped. Benoist, I imagine, was quite disgusted. I certainly was when I learned about it. (I plan to publish the discarded portions in the first volume of North American New Right.)

Now, to his credit, the original Editor Kevin Lamb frequently crossed these boundaries. When I took over as Editor, I quickly learned that I had to edit as if I had a scientific materialist over one shoulder and a religious fundamentalist over the other. I too went beyond those strictures. I made some improvements in the design and editing of the journal, but ultimately I did not do anything radically different than Lamb.

5. The term ‘metapolitics’ is often used within the intellectual class, and no doubt there are some who think it is all pretentious nonsense. Please explain this term for the layman, and why metapolitics is important. Why not just straight politics?

Metapolitics deals with foundational questions connected to politics, questions from history, philosophy, religious studies, the arts, and the human sciences.

One way of understanding the distinction between metapolitics and politics is in terms of values.

A political leader has to appeal to the existing values and attitudes of his constituency. The reason why White Nationalist politics is premature is that it offends the values of the electorate. (David Duke’s one win was a fluke. It won’t be allowed to happen again.) We can’t get what we want, because our people don’t want what we want. They think our goals are immoral. They also think they are incoherent and impractical.

They think these things, because our enemies have carefully laid the metapolitical foundations for the power they enjoy. They control academia, the school system, publishing, the arts, the news and entertainment media, and they have remade the American mind to their liking. My aim is to change people’s sense of what is politically desirable and right, and their sense of what is politically conceivable and possible.

That means that we have to explore ideas that would offend the majority of people.

6. So metapolitics is not the province of impractical bookworms, then. How does it relate to politics?

Metapolitics is about laying the foundations for political change. There are three levels to our struggle. (1) The metapolitical struggle to change values, culture, worldviews. (2) The metapolitical struggle to create a white community, and not just a virtual community, but an actual, real world, face-to-face community. A counter-culture needs to be embodied in a counter-community. (3) The political struggle for actual political power. In the end, we want political power, because we want to make the survival and flourishing of our people the law of the land, a matter of explicit policy, indeed the fundamental law and policy.

But metapolitics is not compatible with political activity within the present system and at the present time. Why? Because the prevailing metapolitical consensus rejects White Nationalism as immoral and impossible. This means that pushing our agenda in the present system is ultimately futile. Any gains will be at tremendous cost and will be easily reversed. You can swim against the current, but it is exhausting, and as soon as you run out of energy, the current will sweep you back to where you started. You can’t build the political superstructure before you lay the metapolitical foundations.

This is not to say that it is impossible for a deep-cover White Nationalist to pursue political power. I hope a lot of them are.

Nor is it impossible for system politicians to support initiatives that White Nationalists can support. For me, the only political issue in the United States that I care about is immigration, and there is reason for hope on that front. Politicians who are close to the right bank of the mainstream are pushing initiatives that might slow or halt the onslaught of illegal immigration. It is far short of what White Nationalists want—namely, a race-based immigration policy—but it would give us time by putting back the date when Whites become a minority in the United States. Given how disorganized and kook-infested the White Nationalist movement is in the United States, we need all the time we can get. Thus if it is possible for a White Nationalist to push immigration policy in the right direction, I say do it, so long as you do not divert our community’s resources into the political mainstream.

What I reject utterly is the idea that White Nationalists—a tiny, despised, poorly funded, poorly led minority—should divert any of our scare political capital into the mainstream at the cost of building up our own institutions and community. The mainstream is capable of taking care of itself. We need to take care of ourselves. If we don’t articulate our message and build our community, nobody else will.

We can’t buy mainstream politicians. They would flee from and denounce us if they knew who we are. Thus spending our political capital on people like that and expecting White Nationalist results is analogous to taking one’s capital to Las Vegas and playing craps as opposed to building one’s own business that will provide long-term steady income.

Gambling, of course, is more fun than hard work, and the political system, like Las Vegas, is full of people who will be your friend and stroke your ego as long as you have money to blow. But the house always wins in the end, so White Nationalists who put their capital behind system politicians end up cleaned out, burned out, and useless to our cause.

7. Does not the inherent need for dissimulation in politics make it incompatible with free enquiry and open intellectual debate?

Yes, I will grant that. And if I thought that the time for political struggle were at hand, and if I thought that someone had come up with the perfect “Noble Lie,” I would fall right in line.

But White Nationalist politics is premature. Yet the main impediment I encounter is giddy people thinking that the time for political struggle is at hand, and the only thing standing in the way of that are people like me who insist on talking about things like the problems of Christianity, European idears like fascism and (horrors!) National Socialism, etc. After all, these ideas won’t play in Peoria! They tell us that we need to shut down such discussions so our enemies don’t use them to scare away the voters.

Well, it doesn’t take a Ph.D. to see where this is going. The first thing we need to do is stop publishing articles that might offend mainstream Republican types. So we can’t publish articles about Black Metal, because that is “Satanic,” or Traditionalism because it is “occult,” or paganism because it is pagan. And we can’t be critical of capitalism either.

But you can’t stop there. Nothing offends Christian fundamentalists more than Darwinism, so scientific race studies and evolutionary psychological studies of the Jews are out too. Why talk about race and Jews at all, for that matter? Isn’t that divisive? Why not just get people riled up about “unfairness” and “double standards” against “European Americans” based on our “skin color”? Maybe we should just talk about restoring the Constitution.

In short, why not just close up shop? That is the ultimate end of this lemming-like stampede into the safe, respectable oblivion of mainstream conservatism.

The trouble with the mainstream, though, is that our enemies have done the metapolitical engineering work necessary to divert the conservative mainstream away from the turbines of political power and into the irrigation ditches of irrelevance.

So until the time is ripe for political struggle, I think that it is best to have the most open and free-wheeling intellectual debate possible. That is the only way we will create an intellectually exciting and morally credible metapolitical movement.

Besides, you can’t put the genie back in the bottle or the toothpaste back in the tube. For instance, even if I shut up tomorrow about the damaging effects Christianity has had on our racial survival, our enemies could still use that to scare Christians about Godless or Satanic racists. So we might as well keep the conversation going.

Besides, racially-conscious Christians will never reform their churches unless we constantly scourge them to do it. Otherwise, they tend to be far more interested in shutting down criticism in our camp than in confronting anti-White hatred in their churches.

Maybe metapolitical debate is folly from the point of view of political expediency. But as William Blake put it, the fool, if he persists in his folly, becomes wise. So we will persist.

We aren’t going to shut up and blend in, so people in the mainstream had better figure out ways of making us work to their advantage, if only by using us as boogey men to make them seem moderate by comparison.

8. Revolutionising the collective consciousness is probably one of the most difficult tasks that can be attempted, because for the most part people are not conscious of how they thinking is pre-determined by implicit rules and taken-for-granted notions that, because they seem self-evident truths, act to make ideology invisible. Truly unfettered intellectual debate feels threatening because it seeks to break out of that cognitive cage. Worse, this cage is so insidious that it even affects those who already are outside of the mainstream. What are the most common everyday manifestations you have encountered of the barriers to unfettered intellectual debate?

I can think of three.

First, there are people who read Counter-Currents/North American New Right and TOQ before them who imagine themselves being confronted with quotes from these publications on the campaign trail, or in a press conference, or on trial, or during pillow talk. (Not that they are politicians or otherwise likely to be interviewed by the press, but they have vivid imaginations.) They imagine themselves being tried before the court of today’s public opinion for holding heretical beliefs. And they are scared.

Well, they should be scared. That is the whole necessity for metapolitical struggle in the first place: to change prevailing public opinion. And to change public opinion, one must first have the courage to disagree with it, to buck it, to say things that might offend the public and that demagogues and lawyers can easily twist into a noose before a baying lynch mob.

A second perennial confusion is what Guillaume Faye calls the misapplication of the “apparatus logic” of a political party to an intellectual movement or publication. I try to survey the full variety of intellectual and cultural currents on the racialist right. Well of course somebody out there disagrees strongly with everything that I publish. Only a schizophrenic could hold Darwinian evolutionism and Guénonian devolutionism in the same mind, for instance.

But I routinely hear from people saying that I shouldn’t have published something, or that I need to remove something potentially offensive from the site. My standard reply is: If you don’t agree with something, write a rebuttal and we will publish that too.

Frequently, the reaction is incomprehension and anger. I realized that I am dealing with people who think in terms of a single intellectual orthodoxy in which offending opinions are not debated but simply made to disappear. It is the mentality that gave us the Inquisition and the Gulag.

Third, there is the related confusion that I call “representation logic”: the idea that everything published in a magazine represents the views of everybody else in the magazine, or everybody who subscribes to it, or everybody who donates to it. The consistent application of that sort of thinking would shut down all intellectual discussion.

For example, when I published Derek Hawthorne’s review of Jack Donovan’s Androphilia, I had one reader write in and say that he could not be part of the North American New Right because he wasn’t homosexual—as if everybody else who reads the site or writes for it were! Another fellow wondered if we were all “Satanists” because I published something by Julius Evola on Aleister Crowley. It doesn’t work that way.

9. When my essay about Black Metal appeared at TOQ Online, it elicited the highest number of comments ever seen for a TOQ article. Why do you think TOQ readers felt so strongly about such an obscure form of music? And why do you think people who obviously never heard the music felt entitled to have such strong opinions about it?

First of all, let me say that I thought very highly of that article. I was proud to have it appear in our pages. I knew nothing about Black Metal, so I was very happy to find such a sophisticated and well-informed perspective on it.

I wish I could find similarly high quality articles on the Neofolk scene and other white subcultures. We need to know what is out there and what works. We need to establish connections with these communities. Your article is a model of the sort of work that I want to publish in North American New Right (hint, hint).

I would have thought that White Nationalists would have been delighted to discover such a vast musical subculture in which radical white racial consciousness is the norm. Unfortunately, that was often not the case. I received more criticism for that article than anything else I published.

Christians (and gallant atheists who throw their honesty in the mud so Christians need not dirty their feet) were shocked at the associations with Satanism, paganism, and National Socialism. Others with premature fantasies of political activism were worried about how it would play in Peoria. Most of it was just bad faith posturing.

10. After editing TOQ, you founded a publishing house, Counter-Currents. What are your aims with this new enterprise? What can we expect from, and what would you like to make happen with, Counter-Currents in the next five to ten years?

Counter-Currents publishes North American New Right, which is a metapolitical journal that aims at laying the foundations for a white ethnostate in North America. North American New Right has two formats.

First, there is our webzine, at the Counter-Currents website, www.counter-currents.com, which publishes something new every day. The reason we publish online is because it increases the availability and thus the impact of an article, and it makes it immediately available to the public. Our goal is to save the world, after all. If something contributes to that end, it is worth publishing right away.

Second, we will publish an annual print volume, which contains the best of the website and additional articles, reviews, interviews, etc. This will be a handsome book along the lines of the journals Tyr or Alexandria: The Journal of Western Cosmological Traditions. The first volume, for 2010, will go to press in March 2011.

We also plan to publish around six books a year. Our format is to publish short books that can be read in a day, say in the range of 120 to 160 pages, with 200 being the upper limit. All our books will be published in limited numbered, hardcover editions of 100 copies plus standard hardcover and paperback editions.

Our first two volumes are Michael O’Meara’s Toward the White Republic and Michael Polignano’s Taking Our Own Side. Forthcoming volumes include works by Julius Evola, Alain de Benoist, Kerry Bolton, and Edmund Connelly.

Counter-Currents/North American New Right focuses on philosophy, political theory, religion, history, the arts, and popular culture with a White Nationalist metapolitical slant, and a special emphasis on whites in North America, since this is where we are located. We do not focus on science, policy studies, or the daily news cycle. We are not a political activist group, but a politically aware publishing house.

11. During the summer you wrote “Learning from the Left,” to which I responded with an article of my own, “Learning from the Right,” both on The Occidental Observer. In my article, I enumerated what I considered to be the failed strategies of the right. What are, in your opinion, the failed strategies of the right? And, having learnt from them, what do you propose should be the Right’s focus/approach in the coming decade?

I will speak specifically of the American scene.

I think the greatest failure of the post-WW II racial right is not dealing with the Jewish Question, whether through ignorance or cowardice. Instead, the tendency has been to use euphemisms, circumlocutions, and proxies to speak about the enemy: liberals, socialists, cultural Marxists, etc. But you cannot fight an enemy whom you refuse to name and understand. Is it any surprise that people have not been eager to follow leaders who reek of cowardice and moral confusion?

Next is the failure to identify what we are fighting for, again whether through ignorance or cowardice. We are fighting for the survival of white people in North America. Again, the tendency has been to use euphemisms, circumlocutions, or proxies: the Constitution, free enterprise, Christianity. The most preposterous one that I have heard is the claim that we are “the descendants of non-duophysite Christians as of 1492.” Of course this is not a definition of anything, just a euphemism for white Europeans, not Arabs or Jews. But why not just come out and say that? Is it any surprise that a movement where this passes for cleverness has gotten nowhere?

The third great failure is ceding the whole realm of culture and ideas to the Jews and trying to fight a merely political battle, which leads inevitably to the buffoonery of cornpone populism as an attempt to make an end run around the establishment’s lock on thinking people. But it just hasn’t worked. It might have worked 60 years ago, but it didn’t. But today Jews control the whole realm of explicit culture, for the thinking and unthinking alike.

Whites in North America will not be able to regain control of our destiny until we (1) openly avow and defend our racial identity and interests, (2) openly identify the leading role of the organized Jewish community in setting our race on the path to degradation and death, and (3) lay the metapolitical foundations for political power, which includes (a) spreading our message through the whole realm of culture and ideas and (b) fostering a concrete, real-world, racially-conscious white community.

12. As an intellectual, your theatre of war is the realm of ideas. Yet, people are seldom, if ever, persuaded through reason. Those who adopt dissident views adopt them because they were already innately pre-disposed toward them, and events facilitated a process of becoming truer to themselves. What does that mean for dissident intellectuals, from a political-strategical point of view?

Rational persuasion does not presuppose a blank slate model or an idea of reason as “pure” and unconditioned by factors other than truth. Maybe all reasoning is in the end is getting people to become aware of what they are already predisposed to believe. Which is implies that those people who lack that predisposition will never believe, no matter how good your argument may be.

Well, if that is so, then universalism is out. Democracy is out. Egalitarianism is out. But that sounds fine to me.

If we can persuade 5% of our people of the truth of our cause and get another 20% to identify with the program in essentially irrational or sub-rational ways, we can dominate the rest. Perhaps we can win the loyalty of 50% by delivering prosperity, security, and peace. Even if 25% can never get with the program, no matter what we do, because they have innate predispositions to reject it, they would just have to grumble and put up with the New Order. If their attitudes are genetic, then our eugenics program can target those traits and try to make them less prevalent in every future generation.

These numbers are arbitrary, but I think they communicate an important truth: a small minority of true believers, if it wins the allegiance of a somewhat larger minority of people who merely hold the right opinions without good reasons, can dominate the whole of society, essentially buy the loyalty of the majority, and completely disempower its die-hard opponents.

The real question for me is how to gain that second group, the larger minority of people who hold the right opinions but not necessarily for rational reasons. That is why metapolitics has to go beyond reason—beyond philosophy, beyond science—and engage myth, religion, and art.

One of my aims for Counter-Currents/North American New Right is to foster and promote a white artistic movement. I have done some writing on this topic, but my ideas are not yet ready for publication. The essence of the program, though, has two main parts.

First, we need to expose young, racially-conscious white artists to the great exemplars of the past. You don’t have to go back too far before one discovers that practically all great thinkers and artists are “right wing extremists” by present-day standards. Beyond that, many of the greatest artists of the 20th century were on our side as well. That is a tradition that we need to recover.

Second, we need to gather together white artists and foster them by creating a community of artists and critics. Critics can play an important role, even critics who are not artists themselves. Eventually, this will become the topic of a series of articles and reviews, which I then will bundle into a book.

13. The typical Right winger excels at critiquing what is wrong with modern Western society, but falls well short when it comes to imagining a future society in which the Right’s intellectual traditions comprise the mainstream of culture. William Pierce’s single broadcast, “White World,” set against his hundreds of other broadcasts, epitomizes this condition. Surely the future must not simply be a futile (and impossible) return to the 1930s. The Left, on the other hand, has always had a utopian vision. Describe a future society where Savitri Devi’s texts are canonical university textbooks, read without controversy.

This is why I think we need to cultivate artists. Artists project worlds. Harold Covington’s Northwest Quartet novels, for example, are enormously effective at communicating ideas. His novel The Hill of the Ravens is set in a future Northwest Republic, as are parts of A Distant Thunder.

Of course film is even more effective at communicating ideas than books. Film really is the realization of Wagner’s idea of the Gesamtkunstwerk.

Savitri Devi was politically to the right of Hitler. I guess the best image of a world where she is read without controversy is the final chapter of her Impeachment of Man: “Race, Economic, and Kindness: An Ideal World.”

14. Finally, how would you like to be remembered in 100 years? And how do you think you will be remembered by the enemy?

In truth, my initial reaction to your question is that I would like to be forgotten.

Human egoism is such an ugly thing. Narcissism is such a devastating personality trait in our movement—particularly the histrionic, “drama queen” variety. But there is a normal, healthy desire to be remembered that gets trampled and crushed by pathological narcissists stampeding toward what they imagine to be the stage of history and the spotlight of eternal glory. Of course in reality they end up telling the same stories to ever-dwindling meet, eat, and retreat groups; posturing on Facebook; or telling lies on internet forums.

I am less concerned with how I am remembered than by whom: I hope our people are alive and flourishing in a hundred years, and many centuries after that. As for our enemies: Frankly, I hope they lose their will to survive, suffer a demographic collapse, and eventually disappear. That is the sort of world in which I would like to be remembered.

I want to accomplish the goals I have set out above, and I would like them to contribute to that world. I want to leave the world a better place than I found it. I want to be part of the chain that carries what is best in our race and civilization onward and upward. Whether I am remembered or forgotten, I will still have played that role; it will be part of the permanent record of the cosmos, as unalterable as the laws of mathematics. That is more important than living on in other people’s memory.

Source: http://www.wermodandwermod.com/newsitems/news241120100028...

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dimanche, 05 décembre 2010 | Lien permanent

Gottfried Benn und sein Denken

Gottfried Benn und sein Denken

Bewährungsprobe des Nationalismus

Arno Bogenhausen

Ex: http://www.hier-und-jetzt-magazine.de/

benn.jpgEine neuerschienene Biographie des Dichterphilosophen gibt uns Anlaß, über das Verhältnis von nationalem Bekenntnis und geistigem Solitär nachzudenken. Gunnar Decker, der mit seiner Arbeit weit mehr bietet als Raddatz („Gottfried Benn, Leben – niederer Wahn“) und auch gegenüber Helmut Lethens gelungenem Werk („Der Sound der Väter“) einen Zugewinn erbringt, ist als Angehöriger des Jahrgangs 1965 eindeutiger Nachachtundsechziger, damit weniger befangen und im Blick getrübt als die Vorgänger. Bei ihm finden sich Unkorrektheiten wie die beiläufige Bemerkung: „Es gehört zur Natur der Politik, daß sie jeden, egal wie gearteten, Gedanken konstant unter Niveau verwirklicht.“ Dennoch sind auch für ihn Benns Berührungen mit dem Nationalsozialismus und die folgende „aristokratische Form der Emigration“ im Offizierskorps der Deutschen Wehrmacht ein Grund zu längerer Reflexion; allein drei der sechs Kapitel sind den Jahren des Dritten Reiches gewidmet.

Benns Hinwendung zum NS, die 1933 in Rundfunkreden, Aufsätzen und dem Amt des Vizepräsidenten der „Union nationaler Schriftsteller“ zum Ausdruck kam, ist unbestritten. Sie war nicht äußerer Anpassung geschuldet, sondern beruhte auf der Überzeugung, an einer historisch folgerichtigen Wende zu stehen. Der Verächter des Fortschrittsgedankens und jeder programmatischen Erniedrigung des Menschen hoffte, „daß ein letztes Mal im Nachklang ferner dorischer Welten Staat und Kunst zu einer großen, einander begeisternden Form fänden“ (Eberhard Straub). Am 23. 9. 1933 schrieb er einer Freundin in die Vereinigten Staaten, „daß ich und die Mehrzahl aller Deutschen … vor allem vollkommen sicher sind, daß es für Deutschland keine andere Möglichkeit gab. Das alles ist ja auch nur ein Anfang, die übrigen Länder werden folgen, es beginnt eine neue Welt; die Welt, in der Sie und ich jung waren und groß wurden, hat ausgespielt und ist zu Ende.“
Diese Haltung wird ihm bis heute zum Vorwurf gemacht. Es beginnt 1953 mit Peter de Mendelssohns Buch „Der Geist der Despotie“, in dem zugleich Hamsun und Jünger in Moralin getaucht werden. Sehr schön liest sich bei Decker, warum die Vorwürfe ihr Thema verfehlen: „Auf immerhin fast fünfzig Seiten wird Benns Versagen behandelt, das letztlich in seinem Unwillen gegen ein moralisches Schuldeingeständnis gründet. Das überzeugt den Leser nur halb, denn de Mendelssohn argumentiert fast ausschließlich moralisch – und da fühlt Benn sich immer am wenigsten gemeint. In diesem Buch klingt einem ein Ton entgegen, wie später bei den 68ern mit ihrer ebenso ekstatischen wie pauschalen Anklage der Vätergeneration. Oder auch – auf anderer Ebene – wie bei manchem DDR-Bürgerrechtler, dem die DDR abhanden gekommen ist und der darum aus seinem Bürgerrechtssinn eine Ikone macht, die er pflegt.“
Benn hat seinen zahllosen Interpreten, die nach Erklärungen suchten, ihre Arbeit kaum erleichtert. Tatsächlich sind weder gewundene Rechtfertigungsversuche noch tiefenpsychologische Studien, wie sie Theweleit betrieb, vonnöten, um das angeblich „Unverständliche“ zu deuten. Der Denker selbst hat 1950 in öffentlicher Ansprache eine ganz schlichte, in ihrer Einfachheit allen Theorienebel beiseite fegende Aussage getroffen: „Es war eine legale Regierung am Ruder; ihrer Aufforderung zur Mitarbeit sich entgegenzustellen, lag zunächst keine Veranlassung vor.“

Das eigentliche Problem liegt somit nicht in Benns Entscheidung, mit der er – auch unter Intellektuellen – nun wirklich nicht alleine stand, sondern in der Unfähigkeit der Verantwortlichen, mit ihr umzugehen. Klaus Mann stellte als inzwischen ausländischer Beobachter nicht ohne Befriedigung fest: „seine Angebote stießen auf taube bzw. halbtaube Ohren … Benn hört vor allem deshalb auf, Ende 1934, Faschist zu sein oder zu werden, weil es keine passende Funktion für ihn gibt im nationalsozialistischen Züchtungsstaat.“
Vom NS-Ärztebund, der diskriminierende Anordnungen erließ, über fanatische Zeitungsschreiber, die ihm ungenügende völkische Gesinnung attestierten, bis zu Funktionären, denen der Expressionismus insgesamt undeutsch vorkam, schlug ihm Ablehnung entgegen. Seine virile Unbefangenheit in sexuellen Angelegenheiten wurde ihm 1936 von einem Anonymus im „Schwarzen Korps“ verübelt: „er macht auch in Erotik, und wie er das macht, das befähigt ihn glatt zum Nachfolger jener, die man wegen ihrer widernatürlichen Schweinereien aus dem Hause jagte.“ Benn sah sich danach zu der ehrenwörtlichen Erklärung gezwungen, nicht homophil zu sein. Die Parteiamtliche Prüfungskommission zum Schutze des nationalsozialistischen Schrifttums hielt der Deutschen Verlags-Anstalt vor, „völlig überholte Arbeiten“ zu publizieren und übermittelte der Geheimen Staatspolizei, Gedichte Benns zeugten von „pathologischer Selbstbefleckung“, weshalb zu bedenken sei, „ob der Verleger nicht zur Rechenschaft gezogen werden soll“. Ein mit der „Säuberung“ der Kunst befaßter Maler-Autor warf ihm „Perversitäten“ vor, die an „Bordellgraphik und Obszönitätenmalerei“ erinnerten; es sei angebracht, seine Aufnahme in das Offizierskorps „rückgängig zu machen“. Boshafte Unterstellungen gipfelten darin, seinen Familiennamen auf das semitische „ben“ zurückzuführen und ihm eine jüdische Herkunft anzudichten. Lediglich seinem Fürsprecher Hanns Johst, der bei Himmler intervenierte, verdankte Benn, nicht mit weiterreichenden Maßnahmen überzogen zu werden.

Worum es hier geht, ist nicht die Beweinung eines „dunklen Kapitels deutscher Geschichte“. Benn selbst schrieb 1930 an Gertrud Hindemith: „Vergessen Sie nie, der menschliche Geist ist als Totschläger entstanden und als ein ungeheures Instrument der Rache, nicht als Phlegma der Demokraten, er galt dem Kampf gegen die Krokodile der Frühmeere und die Schuppentiere in den Höhlen – nicht als Puderquaste“. Die Agonalität des Lebens war ihm vertraut, und angesichts der Praxis heutiger Bürokratien, die mißliebige Geister einer durchaus größeren Drangsal überantworten, als sie ihm widerfuhr, soll auch nicht leichthin der Stab über eine „offene Diktatur“ gebrochen werden. Daß aber die einmalige Gelegenheit vertan wurde, eine Persönlichkeit dieses Grades für den neuen Staat zu gewinnen, war kaum verzeihlich. Jene Nationalsozialisten, die Benn schlechthin verwarfen, begaben sich – man muß es so hart sagen – auf das Niveau des Bolschewismus herab. In kleinbürgerlich-egalitären Horizonten und ideologisch miniaturisierten Maßstäben befangen, erkannten sie nicht, daß ihnen ein Großer gegenüberstand, dessen Werk – was immer man im einzelnen ablehnen mag – den Deutschen zur Ehre gereichte. (Dasselbe gilt für eine Reihe weiterer, die alles andere als vaterlandslose Gesellen waren, aber ins Abseits gerieten; man denke nur an George, Jünger, Niekisch, Schmitt und Spengler, von dem übrigens Benn schon 1946 schrieb, er „wäre heute genauso unerwünscht und schwarzbelistet wie er es bei den Nazis war“.)
Das traurige Bild, das der Nationalsozialismus in diesem Punkte abgab, wird besonders deutlich im Vergleich mit dem faschistischen Italien, das es verstand, die vitalen Impulse des Futurismus aufzunehmen und in seine vorbildliche Pluralität zu integrieren. Benn versuchte in mehreren Aufsätzen, die futuristische Idee auch den Berliner Staatsmännern schmackhaft zu machen. Als Marinetti, der Verfasser des Futuristischen Manifestes, in seiner Eigenschaft als Präsident des italienischen Schriftstellerverbandes Berlin besuchte und ihm zu Ehren ein Bankett gegeben wurde, hielt Benn in Vertretung für Hanns Johst die Laudatio. Doch sein Mühen blieb vergeblich. Unterlagen doch selbst die weit weniger buntscheckigen Expressionisten, um deren Bewertung zunächst noch ein innernationalsozialistischer Richtungsstreit tobte, den Dogmatikern des Volkstümlichen.
Nach der sog. „Niederschlagung des Röhm-Putsches“ schreibt Benn seinem Lebensfreund Friedrich Wilhelm Oelze: „Ein deutscher Traum, wieder einmal zu Ende.“ Später wird er die Gebrechen des nationalsozialistischen Staates so beschreiben: „Ein Volk will Weltpolitik machen, aber kann keinen Vertrag halten, kolonisieren, aber beherrscht keine Sprachen, Mittlerrollen übernehmen, aber faustisch suchend – jeder glaubt, er habe etwas zu sagen, aber keiner kann reden, – keine Distanz, keine Rhetorik, – elegante Erscheinungen nennen sie einen Fatzke, – überall setzen sie sich massiv ein, ihre Ansichten kommen mit dicken Hintern, – in keiner Society können sie sich einpassen, in jedem Club fielen sie auf“.
Dennoch schließt sich Benn nach 1945 nicht den Bewältigern an. Seine Rückschau bleibt auf wenige Anmerkungen beschränkt und verfällt zu keiner Zeit in Hyperbeln. „Der Nationalsozialismus liegt am Boden, ich schleife die Leiche Hektors nicht.“ Die von den Siegern geschaffene Nachkriegsordnung analysiert er nicht weniger beißend: „Ich spreche von unserem Kontinent und seinen Renovatoren, die überall schreiben, das Geheimnis des Wiederaufbaus beruhe auf ‚einer tiefen, innerlichen Änderung des Prinzips der menschlichen Persönlichkeit’ – kein Morgen ohne dieses Druckgewinsel! –, aber wo sich Ansätze für diese Änderung zeigen wollen, setzt ihre Ausrottungsmethodik ein: Schnüffeln im Privat- und Vorleben, Denunziation wegen Staatsgefährlichkeit … diese ganze bereits klassische Systematik der Bonzen-, Trottel- und Lizenzträgerideologie, der gegenüber die Scholastik hypermodern und die Hexenprozesse universalhistorisch wirken“.
Anwürfe seiner „jüngsten Vergangenheit“ wegen lassen ihn kalt. Einem denunzierenden Journalisten teilt er mit: „Über mich können Sie schreiben, daß ich Kommandant von Dachau war oder mit Stubenfliegen Geschlechtsverkehr ausübe, von mir werden Sie keine Entgegnung vernehmen“. Und entschuldigt hat er sich nie.

Völlig falsch wäre es, Benns Haltung gegenüber dem NS als die eines Linksstehenden begreifen zu wollen. Was ihn von parteiförmigen Nationalsozialisten unterschied, läßt sich in derselben Weise von seinem Verhältnis zu den linksgerichteten Elementen sagen: eine erhabene Position gegenüber geistiger Konfektionsware und ein Bestehen auf der ehernen Reinheit des Wortes, das nicht im trüben Redefluß der Gasse untergehen soll. Im Todesjahr schreibt er: „Im Anfang war das Wort und nicht das Geschwätz, und am Ende wird nicht die Propaganda sein, sondern wieder das Wort. Das Wort, das bindet und schließt, das Wort der Genesis, das die Feste absondert von den Nebeln und den Wassern, das Wort, das die Schöpfung trägt.“
Bereits 1929 erregte Max Hermann-Neiße mit einer Rezension in der linksgerichteten „Neuen Bücherschau“ Aufsehen, in der er Benn anläßlich des Erscheinens seiner „Gesammelten Prosa“ so charakterisierte: „Es gibt auch in dieser Zeit des vielseitigen, wandlungsfähigen Machers, des literarischen Lieferanten politischer Propagandamaterialien, des schnellfertigen Gebrauchspoeten, in ein paar seltenen Exemplaren das Beispiel des unabhängigen und überlegenen Welt-Dichters, des Schöpfers eines nicht umfangreichen, aber desto schwerer wiegenden Werkes, das mit keinem anderen zu verwechseln ist.“ In dieser Distanz zur politischen Reklame liege aber nicht – und dies ist der entscheidende Punkt – ein Mindermaß an Radikalität, sondern vielmehr eine Größe, die weit über das kleinliche Tagesgeschehen hinausgehe: „Er macht den Schwindel nicht mit. Den hurtige, auf billigen Erfolg versessene Schreiber dieser niveaulosen Epoche schuldig zu sein glauben, sich dümmer stellen, als sie sind, und mit biederer Miene volkstümlich zu reden, wenn einem der Schnabel ganz anders und viel komplizierter wuchs. Und bleibt mit einem Stil, der das Gegenteil von populär ist, zuverlässiger, weiter gehend und weiter wirkend Revolutionär, als die wohlfeilen, marktschreierischen Funktionäre und Salontiroler des Propagandabuntdrucks. Statt des gewohnten ‚kleinen Formats’ der Sekretäre eines politischen Geplänkels um Macht- und Krippenvorteile spricht hier ein Rebell des Geistes, ein Aufruhrphilosoph, der in Kulturkreisen denkt und mit Jahrhundertputschen rechnet.“ Hermann-Neißes Darstellung rief bei den Kollegen des Redaktionskollegiums, den KPD-Funktionären Kisch und Becher, Empörung hervor. Beide traten unter verbalen Kanonaden aus der Schriftleitung aus, womit sie nachträglich bewiesen, zu eben jenen zu gehören, die kritisiert worden waren.
Zu einem gleichartigen Vorfall kam es zwei Jahre später, als Benn eine Rede zum sechzigsten Geburtstag Heinrich Manns auf einem Bankett des Schutzverbandes Deutscher Schriftsteller hielt und wenig später einen Essay über den Literaten veröffentlichte. Obgleich er viel Lobenswertes an ihm fand, bewies er erneut seinen klaren Blick, indem er feststellte, „daß harmlose junge Leute bei ihm den Begriff des nützlichen Schriftstellers ausliehen, mit dem sie sich etwas Rouge auflegten, in dem sie ganz vergehen vor Opportunismus und Soziabilität. Beides, was für Verdunkelungen!“ Nun war es so weit: beginnend mit dem schriftstellernden Architekten Werner Hegemann wurde das Etikett des „Faschisten“ an Benns tadellosen Anzug geklebt.
Der so Entlarvte antwortete mit einem Artikel in der „Vossischen Zeitung“ und mokierte sich, ob es ein Verbrechen sei, den Dichter als Dichter und nicht als Politiker zu feiern. „Und wenn man das in Deutschland und auf einem Fest der schriftstellerischen Welt nicht mehr tun kann, ohne von den Kollektivliteraten in dieser ungemein dreisten Weise öffentlich angerempelt zu werden, so stehen wir allerdings in einer neuen Metternichperiode, aber in diesem Fall nicht von seiten der Reaktion, sondern von einer anderen Seite her.“
Noch Jahre später, als Benn im Reich schon auf verlorenem Posten stand, versäumten es marxistische Ideologen nicht, ihn zu attackieren. 1937 brachte Alfred Kurella, der es einmal zum DDR-Kulturfunktionär bringen sollte, im Emigrantenblatt „Das Wort“ seine „Entrüstung“ über Benn zum Ausdruck und stellte fest, der Expressionismus sei „Gräßlich Altes“ und führe „in den Faschismus“.
Benn hatte seine weltanschauliche Verortung schon im Januar 1933 auf den Punkt gebracht, als eine linkstotalitäre Phalanx unter Führung Franz Werfels in der Deutschen Akademie den Antrag stellte, man müsse gegen Paul Fechters „Dichtung der Deutschen“ mit einem Manifest vorgehen. (Decker hierzu: „Nimmt man heute Paul Fechters Buch zur Hand, schüttelt man erstaunt den Kopf … Das große Skandalon, den Haß, die Geistfeindschaft, den Rassismus, gegen die eine ganze Dichterakademie glaubte protestieren zu müssen, sucht man in dem Buch vergeblich.“) Damals schrieb Benn in einer eigenen Manifestation: „Wer es also unternimmt, den denkenden, den forschenden, den gestaltenden Geist von irgendeinem machtpolitisch beschränkenden Gesichtswinkel aus einzuengen, in dem werden wir unseren Gegner sehen. Wer es gar wagen sollte, sich offen zu solcher Gegnerschaft zu bekennen und Geisteswerte wie etwas Nebensächliches oder gar Unnützes abzutun, oder sie als reine Tendenzwerte den aufgebauschten und nebelhaften Begriffen der Nationalität, allerdings nicht weniger der Internationalität, unterzuordnen, dem werden wir geschlossen unsere Vorstellung von vaterländischer Gesinnung entgegensetzen, die davon ausgeht, daß ein Volk sich … trägt … durch die immanente geistige Kraft, durch die produktive seelische Substanz, deren durch Freiheit wie Notwendigkeit gleichermaßen geprägte Werke … die Arbeit und den Besitz, die Fülle und die Zucht eines Volkes in die weiten Räume der menschlichen Geschichte tragen.“
In dieser Formulierung ist Benns Verständnis der Nation als eines geistig begründeten Raumes fokussiert. Unter Berufung auf die Großen der Vergangenheit (Schiller und Herder werden namentlich genannt) plädiert er schließlich für „unser drittes Reich“, weit oberhalb der von Klassen-, Massen- und Rassenpolitik durchfurchten Ebene.
Benn dachte nach 1933 nicht daran, Deutschland zu verlassen, und seine Meinung von denen, die es taten, war nie eine gute. 1949 schrieb er an Oelze: „Wer heutzutage die Emigranten noch ernst nimmt, der soll ruhig dabei bleiben … Sie hatten vier Jahre lang Zeit; alles lag ihnen zu Füßen, die Verlage, die Theater, die Zeitungen hofierten sie … aber per saldo ist doch gar nichts dabei zutage gekommen, kein Vers, kein Stück, kein Bild, das wirklich von Rang wäre“. Noch gegen Ende seines Lebens konstatierte er in Gegenwart von Freunden, die über die Grenzen gegangen waren, Emigration sei eine ganz und gar nutzlose Sache.
1948, als alle versuchen, sich als gute Schüler der Demokratie zu erweisen, wagt er es, im „Berliner Brief“ ebendieser „Vermittelmäßigungsmaschinerie“ für die künstlerische Existenz eine Absage zu erteilen: sie sei „zum Produktiven gewendet absurd. Ausdruck entsteht nicht durch Plenarbeschlüsse, sondern im Gegenteil durch Sichabsetzen von Abstimmungsergebnissen, er entsteht durch Gewaltakt in Isolation.“ Decker kommentiert lakonisch, es handle sich um „eine feine Unterscheidung, die ihm bis heute noch keiner widerlegt hat“, und: „Da ist er wieder, der Barbar, ohne den das Genie nicht vorkommt“.
Benns Geistesverwandtschaft mit Ernst Jünger ist hier unverkennbar, wenngleich vieles in Perspektive und Stilistik (im weitesten Wortsinne) die beiden trennt. Sie korrespondieren sparsam, doch bemerkt Benn 1950, „wie sehr sich seine und meine Gedankengänge z. T. berühren“, und berichtet über einen Besuch Jüngers – den wohl längsten, den er je zuhause gestattete: „Wir tranken ganz reichlich, und dabei kamen wir uns näher und wurden offen miteinander.“ So hat Decker recht, wenn er resummiert: „Sie haben gemeinsame Themen und im Alter eine ähnlich stoische Haltung zur Welt. Sie sehen in der Parteien-Demokratie einen untauglichen Versuch, das Überleben der Menschheit an der Schwelle zum 21. Jahrhundert zu sichern, verachten die Politik und kultivieren den Mythos als Erneuerung der Menschheit. Jüngers ‚Waldgänger’ und erst recht sein ‚Anarch’ sind Benns ‚Ptolemäer’ und dem ‚Radardenker’ verwandt.“
Der „Ptolemäer“, ein 1949 publizierter Essay, bekennt sich schon im Titel zu einem „erdzentrierten“, statischen Weltbild, dem jede Aufwärtsbewegung fremd ist. Diese treffliche Erkenntnis ist gleichwohl nicht mit Resignation zu verwechseln, sondern ruft zum Dasein nach eigenem Gesetz: „halte auch du dich in dem Land, in das dich deine Träume ziehen und in dem du da bist, die dir auferlegten Dinge schweigend zu vollenden“. Während die Masse im Strudel der Nichtigkeiten taumelt, ist es das Amt weniger, sich zu bewähren. In einer Vision des monologisierenden Sprechers findet sich das schöne Bild: „Die Orden, die Brüder werden vor dem Erlöschen noch einmal auferstehen. Ich sehe an Wassern und auf Bergen neue Athos und neue Monte Cassinos wachsen, – schwarze Kutten wandeln in stillem, in sich gekehrtem Gang.“

Als Exponent autonomen Künstlertums steht Benn beispielhaft gegen jede Art von Unterwerfung des Geistes unter politische Zwecke (was die Symbiose auf gleicher Höhe nicht ausschließt, also keineswegs eine apolitische Geistigkeit fordert). Damit ist er von der Ochlokratie unserer Tage ebenso weit entfernt wie von totalitären Systemen. „Was er nicht erträgt, ist eine falsche Gläubigkeit, die das Wesen der Kunst verkennt und diese auf ihre Nebenzwecke reduziert … Und eben inmitten von Konsum und Unterhaltung, den großen Verdurchschnittlichungsmächten, die aus der Verbindung von Kapitalismus und parlamentarischem System hervorgehen, schwindet das Wissen um diese elementare Gewalt der Kunst, die eine geistige Gegenwelt behauptet“ (Decker).
Heute ist der deutsche Nationalismus Äonen davon entfernt, die Hebel der Macht zu bedienen. Insofern stellt sich die Frage, ob er mit der Erfahrung der letzten siebzig Jahre gelernt habe, dem großen Einzelnen bedingungslose Freiheit zuzugestehen, nicht als praktische. Gegebenenfalls wird man einer geschichtlichen Verantwortung nur dann gerecht werden können, wenn nicht allein die „Banalität des Guten“ zugunsten einer „neuen deutschen Härte“ überwunden ist, sondern auch fatale Dummheiten nicht wiederholt werden – von denen Talleyrand bekanntlich gesagt hat, sie seien schlimmer als Verbrechen.

Decker, Gunnar: Gottfried Benn. Genie und Barbar, Aufbau-Verlag, Berlin 2006, 544 S., 26,90 €

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lundi, 03 janvier 2011 | Lien permanent

PRESSESCHAU 1/März 2010

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Deutsche Bewegung

Deutsche Bewegung, von W. Dilthey geprägte und durch den Pädagogen H. Nohl eingeführte Bezeichnung für die Blütezeit der deutschen Geistesgeschichte zwischen 1770 und 1830. Nach den Epochen überwiegender Fremdbestimmung (Renaissance, Humanismus, Barock, Klassizismus) stelle sie die erste Epoche eigenständiger deutscher Selbstverwirklichung nach dem Mittelalter dar: in der Dichtung (Sturm und Drang, Klassik, Romantik), der Philosophie (deutscher Idealismus), der Entdeckung der geschichtlichen Welt und des deutschen Mittelalters (J. Möser, J.G. von Herder, Romantik), der Neubegegnung mit der Antike (J.J. Winckelmann, Goethe, Schiller, Hölderlin), der Sprachdeutung und -erforschung (J.G. Hamann, Herder, J. Grimm, W. von Humboldt), der Entstehung des Nationalbewußtseins (J.G. Fichte, E.M. Arndt, F.L. Jahn), der Staatsauffassung (W. von Humboldt, Freiherr vom Stein). Die Epoche hat die Entwicklung der europäischen Geistesgeschichte nachhaltig beeinflußt.

Literatur: H. Nohl: Die Deutsche Bewegung. Vorlesungen und Aufsätze zur Geistesgeschichte von 1770–1830, herausgegeben von O.F. Bollnow und F. Rodi (1970).

(Brockhaus-Enzyklopädie, 19., völlig neubearb. Aufl., Bd 5, Mannheim 1988)

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Schwarzes Erdbeben
Von Claus Wolfschlag
Der alte weiße Mann ist ein Übel, weshalb sich die europäische Welt auch in eine „bunte“, eine „farbige“ Welt umzuwandeln habe. Vor einigen Tagen ermöglichte es die Frankfurter Rundschau in einem Interview dem Schweizer Soziologen Jean Ziegler, die These von der angeblichen Schuld des weißen Mannes neu in den Ring zu werfen.
http://www.sezession.de/12376/schwarzes-erdbeben.html#more-12376

Armeeführung unter Terrorverdacht
Ideologische Schlacht um die Zukunft der Türkei
Von Boris Kálnoky
Plante das Militär einen Putsch, oder sind die Vorwürfe gegen die verhafteten Generäle haltlos? Derzeit wird die gesamte türkische Armeeführung von 2004 unter Terrorverdacht verhört. Details der Verfahren werden gezielt über islamische Medien verbreitet, die der Regierung von Recip Tayyip Erdogan nahestehen.
http://www.welt.de/politik/ausland/article6555130/Ideologische-Schlacht-um-die-Zukunft-der-Tuerkei.html

Despot in Rage
Gaddafi ruft zum Dschihad gegen die Schweiz auf
Muammar al-Gaddafis Angriffe gegen die Schweiz werden immer schriller: Nach monatelangen diplomatischen Querelen ruft Libyens Staatschef nun zum Heiligen Krieg gegen die Alpenrepublik auf. Als Begründung nennt er das Minarett-Verbot der Eidgenossen – und fordert einen „Kampf mit allen Mitteln“.
http://www.spiegel.de/politik/ausland/0,1518,680418,00.html

Hier noch ein älterer Artikel, in dem es ebenfalls um Gaddafi geht ...
„Wenn ihr so viele tausend Ausländer ins Land laßt, braucht ihr zu eurem Schutz irgendwann einen Diktator.“
http://www.tagesspiegel.de/meinung/kommentare/art141,2823203

Medien-Streit
Auf den Stinkefinger folgt das Hakenkreuz
Als „Betrüger in der Euro-Familie“ betitelt der „Focus“ das verschuldete Griechenland, zeigt dazu Aphrodite mit dem Stinkefinger. Die griechische Presse reagiert empört mit einer Montage der Göttin Viktoria auf der Siegessäule mit einem Hakenkreuz. Nun folgen Proteste und eine Beschwerde beim deutschen Botschafter.
http://www.welt.de/politik/deutschland/article6534983/Auf-den-Stinkefinger-folgt-das-Hakenkreuz.html

Jetzt wird die Nazikeule erst richtig rausgeholt ...
Griechen erheben Nazi-Vorwürfe gegen Deutsche
Am Tag des Generalstreiks lenkt die griechische Regierung ihr Augenmerk auf Deutschland: Griechenland sei für die Nazi-Besatzung im Zweiten Weltkrieg nicht entschädigt worden, sagt Vize-Regierungschef Theodoros Pangalos. Und stellt – vor dem Hintergrund horrender Staatschulden – Forderungen.
http://www.welt.de/wirtschaft/article6536961/Griechen-erheben-Nazi-Vorwuerfe-gegen-Deutsche.html

Öl befeuert den Falkland-Konflikt
Von Thomas Kielinger
Argentinien ist wütend über Bohrungen rund um britisches Territorium und will die Vereinten Nationen einschalten – Proteste gegen London
http://www.welt.de/die-welt/politik/article6566828/Oel-befeuert-den-Falkland-Konflikt.html

Kampf gegen Terror
Bushs Folter-Juristen bleiben ohne Strafe
http://www.tagesspiegel.de/politik/international/Terrorkampf-Terror-CIA-Folter;art123,3036511

Kommentar
Die Deutschen haben recht mit ihrer Euroskepsis
Von Jörg Eigendorf
Die Deutschen glauben immer weniger an die Europäische Union. Und sie liegen richtig. Vor dem Hintergrund der Griechenlandkrise zeigt sich deutlich: Die EU ist eine Schönwetterveranstaltung. Unfähig, Spielverderber zur Vernunft zu bringen. Und diese Krise trifft die Menschen direkt in ihrem Geldbeutel.
http://www.welt.de/debatte/kommentare/article6544740/Die-Deutschen-haben-recht-mit-ihrer-Euroskepsis.html

DAS GROSSE ZITTERN UM DIE EUROPÄISCHE GEMEINSCHAFTSWÄHRUNG
Experte: Zusammenbruch des Euro nur eine Frage der Zeit
http://www.bild.de/BILD/politik/wirtschaft/2010/02/13/euro-zusammenbruch/experte-nur-noch-eine-frage-der-zeit.html

Herman ist Europas 1. Präsident
http://www.bild.de/BILD/politik/2010/01/02/herman-van-rompuy/ist-europas-erster-praesident.html

Du bist Terrorist:
http://www.dubistterrorist.de/
http://rettedeinefreiheit.de/
http://www.spiegel.de/media/0,4906,15385,00.swf

Was will man uns damit sagen ...
Verbrecher in Deutschland sind männlich
http://www.op-online.de/nachrichten/deutschland/verbrecher-deutschland-sind-maennlich-643938.html

Profildebatte in der CDU
Frustrierte Rechte machen gegen Merkel mobil
Von Philipp Wittrock
Angela Merkel hatte gehofft, die leidige Profildebatte in der CDU sei beendet. Doch jetzt formiert sich eine neue Basis-Initiative: Enttäuschte Rechtskonservative wettern gegen den „Linkstrend“ bei den Christdemokraten – und sammeln eifrig Unterstützer.
http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/0,1518,678809,00.html

Konservativ ist in der CDU fast ein Schimpfwort
http://www.welt.de/politik/deutschland/article5850528/Konservativ-ist-in-der-CDU-fast-ein-Schimpfwort.html

Hamburg: CDU stürzt ab
Von Insa Gall; Florian Hanauer
Umfrage zur Halbzeit der Legislaturperiode – 69 Prozent unzufrieden mit Arbeit des Senats
Zur Halbzeit der Legislaturperiode ist die Hamburger CDU in der Gunst der Wähler regelrecht abgestürzt. Würde am Sonntag gewählt, verlören die Christdemokraten im Vergleich zur Bürgerschaftswahl 2008 ganze 11,6 Prozentpunkte und kämen nur noch auf 31 Prozent. Damit lägen CDU und SPD erstmals seit dem Machtwechsel 2001 wieder gleichauf, denn auch die Sozialdemokraten erhalten 31 Prozent.
http://www.welt.de/die-welt/regionales/article6513797/CDU-stuerzt-ab.html

Angebot an Sponsoren
NRW-CDU verkauft Gesprächstermine mit Rüttgers
Von René Pfister
Jürgen Rüttgers gerät durch eine Finanzaffäre unter Druck: Nach SPIEGEL-Informationen bietet die nordrhein-westfälische CDU zahlungskräftigen Sponsoren exklusive Gesprächstermine mit dem Ministerpräsidenten an – für Tausende Euro.
http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/0,1518,679130,00.html

Gespräche gegen Geld
Rüttgers opfert seinen Generalsekretär
Die Sponsoring-Affäre droht dem nordrhein-westfälischen Ministerpräsidenten Rüttgers schwer zu schaden – nur zweieinhalb Monate vor der Landtagswahl. Jetzt nahm Hendrik Wüst, Generalsekretär der Landes-CDU, alle Schuld auf sich und trat zurück.
http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/0,1518,679547,00.html

Deutsche Kanzlerin Merkel ein Stasi-Spitzel?
http://www.schweizmagazin.ch/2009/04/13/deutsche-kanzlerin-merkel-ein-stasi-spitzel/

Miserables Zeugnis: Sarrazin giftet gegen Merkels „gefährliche“ Politik
Gegen Merkels Regierungskurs hagelt es schon länger Kritik von allen Seiten. Die Wirtschaftsweisen warfen der Kanzlerin gar eine „Münchhausen“-Politik vor, weil sie behauptet hatte, die Staatsverschuldung lasse sich durch Wachstum abbauen. Merkel ließen die Vorhaltungen stets kalt. Doch jetzt schießt auch die Bundesbank gegen sie. Vorstandsmitglied Sarrazin attackierte sie scharf.
http://www.handelsblatt.com/politik/deutschland/miserables-zeugnis-sarrazin-giftet-gegen-merkels-gefaehrliche-politik%3B2490228

Hier schreibt ein ganz Schlauer ...
Landtagswahlen in NRW: Zu Besuch bei den Islamhassern
Mit Parolen gegen Moscheen, Muslime und Migranten versucht die Partei Pro NRW in den Landtag einzuziehen. Mit Neonazis will man nichts zu tun haben, gibt sich als Bürgerbewegung aus. Eine moderne Rechte oder ein Häuflein von gestern? Ein Besuch beim Parteitag. Von Lenz Jacobsen
http://www.stern.de/politik/deutschland/landtagswahlen-in-nrw-zu-besuch-bei-den-islamhassern-1545093.html

Ganz NRW unter der Lupe
Tunnel, Bahnen, Brücken – alles wird geprüft
Der Pfusch-Verdacht beim Ausbau der U-Bahn in Düsseldorf ruft Landesregierung, Behörden und Staatsanwaltschaft auf den Plan. Landesweit sollen sämtliche Großprojekte im U- und Straßenbahnbau der vergangenen 40 Jahre überprüft werden, außerdem Brücken und Tunnel.
http://www.rp-online.de/panorama/deutschland/Tunnel-Bahnen-Bruecken-alles-wird-geprueft_aid_824286.html


Die besoffene Margot Käßmann: Wasser predigen, Wein trinken
Von Robin Classen
Die Ratsvorsitzende der Evangelischen Kirche in Deutschland (EKD), Margot Käßmann, wurde am Samstagabend, mitten in der Fastenzeit, mit 1,54 Promille im Blut von der Polizei angehalten. Ohne mit dem Finger auf die Verfehlungen von Mitmenschen deuten zu wollen; schließlich ist Irren und Sündigen menschlich; ist es doch von Zeit zu Zeit notwendig, auf bestimmte Merkwürdigkeiten hinzuweisen. Merkwürdigkeiten, wie die doch auffällige Häufung an Verfehlungen, mit der Margot Käßmann seit ihrer Amtseinführung im Oktober 2009 gestraft wurde. Ob hier böse Geister am Werk sind?
http://www.blauenarzisse.de/v3/index.php/anstoss/1377-die-besoffene-margot-kaessmann-wasser-predigen-wein-trinken

Verhütungsmittel
Bremen fordert Gratis-Pille für Hartz-IV-Empfänger
Um die Zahl der ungewollten Schwangerschaften bei Hartz-IV-Empfängerinnen zu reduzieren, setzt sich das Bremer Gesundheitsressort für die staatliche Finanzierung der Verhütungsmittel ein. Wird der Vorschlag gebilligt, folgt eine entsprechende Bundesratsinitiative.
http://www.welt.de/politik/deutschland/article6433278/Bremen-fordert-Gratis-Pille-fuer-Hartz-IV-Empfaenger.html

Hartz-IV-Debatte: Soziale Wärme durch weniger Geld
Von Felix Menzel
Die Hartz-IV-Debatte ist in vollem Gang. FDP-Chef Guido Westerwelle hat jetzt noch einmal in der BILD am Sonntag nachgelegt und gefordert, Arbeitslose sollten Schnee schippen. Außerdem müsse der Staat aufpassen, daß sie das Geld für ihre Kinder nicht „in einen neuen Fernseher“ investieren. Um dies zu verhindern, sollten Bildungsgutscheine und Ganztagsschulen an die Stelle von finanziellen Zuwendungen treten.
http://www.sezession.de/12497/hartz-iv-debatte-soziale-waerme-durch-weniger-geld.html

Dem Steuerzahler ein Notwehrrecht!
Von Thorsten Hinz
In der letzten Zeit habe ich merkwürdige Anwandlungen, von denen meine gesetzestreue, biedere Seele bis vor kurzem nicht wußte, daß sie überhaupt möglich sind: Ich entwickle Verständnis für die Steuerhinterzieher, die ihr Geld in die Schweiz verfrachtet haben und nun zittern. Knapp 500 Millionen Euro sollen durch Selbstanzeigen bereits zusammengekommen sein, doch nicht mal Schadenfreude will deswegen bei mir aufkommen.
http://www.jungefreiheit.de/Single-News-Display-mit-Komm.154+M55265042f25.0.html


Der Polizist Bernd Merbitz ...
Von Götz Kubitschek
... ist einer der Verantwortlichen dafür, daß aus dem geplanten Trauermarsch der Jungen Landsmannschaft Ostdeutschland am 13. Februar in Dresden eine Standkundgebung wurde. Merbitz, seines Zeichens Polizeipräsident von Sachsen, begründete das passive Vorgehen der Polizei gegen die Blockierer von links mit einem Hinweis auf deren Gewaltlosigkeit.
Diese Einschätzung teilen weder wir (die wir vor Ort waren), noch etwa die Deutsche Polizeigewerkschaft, die sich mittels einer Pressemitteilung indirekt, aber vehement gegen ihren Polizeipräsidenten stellt.
http://www.sezession.de/12665/der-polizist-bernd-merbitz.html#more-12665
http://www.dpolg-sachsen.de/aktuelles/150210-presserklaerung/index.html

Dresden: Bomben vor 65 Jahren
Keinen Raum den Faschisten
http://www.sueddeutsche.de/kultur/67/503291/text/

Nachtrag zu Dresden: Fundstück aus dem Jahre 1963:
Sodom in Sachsen
LUFTKRIEG
Sieben Tage und acht Nächte lang stand die Stadt in Flammen. Ihre Menschen wurden verbrannt, erschlagen, vergiftet. Die berstenden Mauern begruben 135 000 Tote, 75 000 mehr als in Hiroshima.
http://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print/d-45143910.html

Düsseldorf
Neuer Gastprofessor
Avi Primor holte Joschka Fischer
http://www.rp-online.de/duesseldorf/duesseldorf-stadt/nachrichten/Avi-Primor-holte-Joschka-Fischer_aid_822059.html

Afghanistan-Debatte
Lammert schließt Linke von Bundestagssitzung aus
In der Bundestagsdebatte über den Afghanistan-Einsatz der Bundeswehr ist es zu einem Eklat gekommen. Bundestagspräsident Norbert Lammert schloß die Linksfraktion von der Sitzung aus, weil sie mit Protestplakaten gegen den Einsatz demonstriert hatte. Über den Einsatz darf die Oppositionspartei aber wieder abstimmen.
http://www.welt.de/politik/deutschland/article6568721/Lammert-schliesst-Linke-von-Bundestagssitzung-aus.html

Debatte um katholischen Mißbrauch
Die Grünen, der Sex und die Kinder
Mißbrauch von Kindern als Folge der sexuellen Revolution? Auf Bischof Mixas Äußerungen folgte zu Recht Entrüstung. Ganz vorne dabei: die Grünen – und die hatten zum Thema Sexualität und Kinder einst Abenteuerliches zu sagen. Eine kleine Zeitreise von Jan Fleischhauer
http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/0,1518,678961,00.html

Elton John: „Jesus war ein schwuler Mann“
http://www.promiflash.de/elton-john/201002191815-elton-john-jesus-war-ein-schwuler-mann

Frankfurter Städel erforscht seine NS-Vergangenheit
http://www.welt.de/die-welt/kultur/article6499295/Frankfurter-Staedel-erforscht-seine-NS-Vergangenheit.html

Stadt Offenbach
Demo gegen NPD geplant
Jusos und andere Gruppen mobilisieren
http://www.fr-online.de/frankfurt_und_hessen/nachrichten/stadt_offenbach/2350146_Demo-gegen-NPD-geplant-Jusos-und-andere-Gruppen-mobilisieren.html

„Bewegung Morgenlicht“
Ein-Euro-Jobber nach Anschlägen in Frankfurt in U-Haft
http://www.faz.net/s/RubFAE83B7DDEFD4F2882ED5B3C15AC43E2/Doc~EAD3668DAC79D4F90B7AC22B05F7658F1~ATpl~Ecommon~Scontent.html?rss_googlenews

Deutsch-jüdische Symbiose
Von Ellen Kositza
Als ich gestern früh beim Müllrausbringen, ungekämmt und angetan mit u.a. einer Kittelschürze und übergroßen Schuhen von Kubitschek, in die ich schnell geschlüpft war, auf dem Weg zur „Gelben Tonne“ im Schnee ausrutschte und hinfiel, war mein erster Gedanke ziemlich absurd (...)
http://www.sezession.de/12623/deutsch-juedische-symbiose.html#more-12623

Melita Maschmann – Ein Nachruf
Von Karlheinz Weißmann
Es gibt den Fall, daß Menschen unserer Aufmerksamkeit entgleiten, auch dann, wenn sie in der Öffentlichkeit eine Rolle spielten, auch dann, wenn man ihren Lebenslauf mit Interesse verfolgt hat. Irgendwann verschwinden sie, ziehen sich freiwillig zurück, aus Altersgründen, weil sie ihre letzten Jahre in Ruhe verbringen wollen, beschränken sich auf eine private Existenz.
http://www.sezession.de/12456/melita-maschmann-ein-nachruf.html

Bundesrepublikanische Probleme ...
Geschichte
Kapelle mit Baumaterial aus Hitlers Berghof?
http://salzburg.orf.at/stories/424682/

Tondokument
Wie Hitlers Stimme wirklich klang
Ein finnischer Radiotechniker zeichnete 1942 heimlich ein Männergespräch auf: Darin erklärt Hitler einem finnischen General den Kriegsverlauf. Bis heute ist dies die einzige bekannte Aufnahme, auf der man den „Führer“ im normalen Gesprächston hört. SPIEGEL TV über ein außergewöhnliches Tonband.
http://www.spiegel.de/sptv/magazin/0,1518,319655,00.html

Hochinteressant (auch inhaltlich!) ...
Adolf Hitler secret recording 1942, part 1
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wkLKfClUiHQ&feature=channel

Adolf Hitler secret recording 1942, part 2
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kLlCEQ2wVsA&feature=channel

Adolf Hitler secret recording 1942, part 3
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PTdsvkWBGlo&feature=channel

Debatte um nationale Identität in Frankreich ...
Weder ein Volk noch eine Sprache
Von Alain de Benoist
„Waterloo“, „Begräbnis der politischen Klasse“, „bedingungslose Kapitulation“, „gravierende politische und ideologische Niederlage“: Die Kommentare zum Abschluß der im vergangenen Oktober von Staatspräsident Nicolas Sarkozy ausgerufenen „großen Debatte über die nationale Identität“ fallen eindeutig und einhellig aus. Echte Ergebnisse hat diese Debatte nicht gebracht, und ob der beschlossenen Maßnahmen weiß man kaum, ob man lachen oder weinen soll.
http://www.jungefreiheit.de/Single-News-Display-mit-Komm.154+M51268507178.0.html

Große Überraschung ...
Integrationsbeauftragte Böhmer
„Alarmierend hoher Migrantenanteil bei Hartz IV“
Die Integrationsbeauftragte Maria Böhmer ist beunruhigt über die hohe Migranten-Quote unter den Hartz-IV-Beziehern und mahnt bessere Sprachkenntnisse und eine gute Bildung an. Auch Kanzlerin Merkel beschäftigt das Thema Hartz IV. Sie verlangt Verbesserungen – doch der FDP ist das zu wenig.
http://www.welt.de/politik/deutschland/article6477554/Alarmierend-hoher-Migrantenanteil-bei-Hartz-IV.html

Frankfurt am Main: Abschied von der Integration
Frankfurt kommt nicht zur Ruhe. Nachdem letzte Woche der Hessische Rundfunk Enthüllungen über den Bau der dritten Moschee im Stadtteil Hausen an die breite Masse der Bevölkerung verbreitete (PI berichtete), und somit die Aussagen der damaligen BI Hausen – heute PI-Frankfurt – bestätigte, wurde von der Fraktion der Freien Wähler im Römer am 10. Februar 2010 nun eine Expertise zum Integrationskonzept von Dr. Nargess Eskandari-Grünberg vorgestellt.
http://www.pi-news.net/2010/02/frankfurt-am-main-abschied-von-der-integration/#more-118870

Kriminalität
Bande terrorisiert Hamburger Hochhaussiedlung
Von André Zand-Vakili
Straßenschlägereien, Drogenhandel, Raub und lebensgefährliche Raserei – die Kriminalität am Hamburger Mümmelmannsberg gerät außer Kontrolle. Eine „multi-ethnische Bande“ terrorisiert seit Jahren die Hochhaussiedlung. Die Polizei scheint machtlos, denn die meist jungen Intensivtäter sind gut organisiert.
http://www.welt.de/vermischtes/article3693816/Bande-terrorisiert-Hamburger-Hochhaussiedlung.html

Offenbach
Für Polizei und Staatsanwaltschaft sind türkische Kickbox-Zwillinge Schutzgelderpresser
Brutale Sponsoren-Suche
Von Thomas Kirstein
Offenbach – Das als „Fight Club“ firmierende Kampfsportstudio in der Großen Marktstraße stellt auf seiner aufwendigen Internet-Seite viele derjenigen vor, die sich als Sponsoren verdient machen.
Folgt man der Offenbacher Staatsanwaltschaft und der Kriminalpolizei, dann haben sie nicht freiwillig finanzielle Beiträge geleistet. Vielmehr sollen die meist türkischstämmigen Betreiber von Spielotheken, Wettbüros, Kiosken, Gaststätten, Telecafés und einem Hotel durch massiven Druck seitens zweier Landsleute und ihrer Helfershelfer zu regelmäßigen Zahlungen genötigt worden sein – aus anfänglich 50 Euro im Monat wurden bald 300.
Klarer Fall von Schutzgelderpressung, meinen Ankläger und Ermittler. Als Drahtzieher und Hauptakteure gelten die als Kampfsport-Trainer tätigen Zwillinge Deniz und Devrim Akarsu, beide 1977 in Offenbach geboren und türkische Staatsbürger.
http://www.op-online.de/nachrichten/offenbach/brutale-sponsoren-suche-636353.html

Raubüberfall mit unerwartetem Finale
Wir berichten immer wieder über Fälle von Migrantengewalt, bei denen sich das Opfer vermeintlich wehrlos seinem Schicksal ergibt. Etwas anders verlief am Samstag ein Raubüberfall im Bonner Stadtteil Pützchen. Dort holte sich ein „südländischer“ Täter von seinem Opfer eine blutende Nase.
http://www.pi-news.net/2010/02/raubueberfall-mit-unerwartetem-finale/
http://www.general-anzeiger-bonn.de/index.php?k=loka&itemid=10490&detailid=703394


Schweinfurt
„Ehrenmord“?: Türkin stirbt durch Attacke des Vaters
http://www.zeit.de/newsticker/2010/2/24/iptc-bdt-20100224-201-24004588xml

Eine ganz normale Woche in München
„Dank“ der Political Correctness ist es bekanntlich ziemlich schwierig herauszufinden, welcher Nationalität ein Straftäter angehört, da die Medien die entsprechenden Informationen meist verschweigen. Auf der Seite der Polizei München ist das – noch – anders, hier hat man keine Hemmungen, die (traurigen) Tatsachen beim Namen zu nennen. Jeden Tag außer samstags werden dort Straftaten veröffentlicht. Ein PI-Leser hat sich einmal die Mühe gemacht und die Veröffentlichungen der vergangenen Woche hinsichtlich Nationalität bzw. Migrationshintergrund analysiert.
http://www.pi-news.net/2010/02/eine-ganz-normale-woche-in-muenchen/

Massenschlägerei bereichert Fasnachtsumzug
Im bernischen Langenthal kam es beim örtlichen Karneval zu einem politisch inkorrekten Zwischenfall: Ausscherende Fasnächtler hatten einen Wagen mit Minarett und Initiativplakat gezimmert (Foto). Auf der Spitze stand offenbar ein „echter Muezzin“, denn er habe nach Bericht der „Berner Zeitung“ während des Umzugs „gröbere Sprüche“ gemacht und „blöd heruntergeplärrt“ – wie sich das eben gehört. Ungehörig fanden es jedoch südländische Jugendliche, die sich empörten, einen Streit anfingen und dabei ein paar eidgenössische Fäuste ernteten.
http://www.pi-news.net/2010/02/massenschlaegerei-bereichert-fasnachtsumzug/

Fasnachtsschlägerei: Jetzt sprechen die „Freaks“
Noch immer wird der fasnächtliche Minarettwagen und die anschließende Massenschlägerei in Langenthal (PI berichtete) in den Schweizer Medien heftig diskutiert. Vor allem die Frage, von wem der Streit zwischen einer Gruppe junger Dachdecker aus der Region und 20 jugendlichen Ausländern ausging, steht im Raum. Ein Ausländer sagte der „Berner Zeitung“, die Dachdecker wollten bewußt prügeln und seien mit Schlagringen bewaffnet gewesen. Alles gelogen, meinen die Dachdecker gegenüber PI.
http://www.pi-news.net/2010/02/fasnachtsschlaegerei-jetzt-sprechen-die-freaks/#more-120807

Gene lassen uns Gesichter erkennen
Von Pia Heinemann
London – Offenbar ist die Fähigkeit, ein Gesicht zu erkennen, nichts, was wir im Laufe der Kindheit erlernen.Wissenschaftler des University College in London berichten in PNAS über Hinweise darauf, daß in den Genen jedes einzelnen verankert ist, wie gut Gesichter erkannt werden können.Und offenbar ist die Arbeit, die das Gehirn beim Erkennen von Gesichtern leisten muß, wesentlich höher und komplizierter als bei anderen kognitiven Prozessen, etwa der Worterkennung. Die Wissenschaftler haben für ihre Studie eineiige und zweieiige Zwillinge getestet. „Gesichtserkennung ist eine Fähigkeit, die wir jeden Tag benötigen“, sagt Hirnforscher Brad Duchaine.
http://www.welt.de/die-welt/wissen/article6514900/Gene-lassen-uns-Gesichter-erkennen.html

Verkehrskonzept Speedway
Die elektrische Autobahn
Von Jürgen Pander
In seiner Diplomarbeit hat Designer Christian Förg das Reichweiten-Problem von Elektroautos gelöst – und gleich noch ein zukunftsweisendes Verkehrssystem entwickelt. Speedway heißt das Projekt. Die Prüfer an der FH München bewerteten es mit der Note 1,0.
http://www.spiegel.de/auto/aktuell/0,1518,678168,00.html

Abrisse in Wien
Historische Schutzzone in der Leopoldstadt in Auflösung begriffen
http://www.idms.at/index.php/meldungen-nach-bundesland/meldungen-wien/97-wien2/173-historischeschutzzoneinderleopoldstadtinaufloesungbegriffen

Weißrußland erklärt Rammstein zum Staatsfeind
http://www.stern.de/kultur/musik/weissrussland-erklaert-rammstein-zum-staatsfeind-1545542.html

Rammstein darf in Weißrußland auftreten
http://www.merkur-online.de/nachrichten/stars/rammstein-darf-weissrussland-auftreten-644355.html

Jud Süß ausgepfiffen und ausgebuht
http://www.moviepilot.de/news/jud-suess-ausgepfiffen-und-ausgebuht-105462
http://film-insider.de/info/94417/

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jeudi, 04 mars 2010 | Lien permanent

L'héritage de Sparte

Leonidas_in_Sparta.jpg

 

Archives de SYNERGIES EUROPÉENNES - CRITICON (Munich) - ORIENTATIONS (Bruxelles) - Février 1990

L'héritage de Sparte:

Hommage à la Prusse de la Grèce antique

par Gerd-Klaus KALTENBRUNNER,

Si la Prusse-Brandebourg fut le "pôle nord" et l'Autriche le "pôle sud" de l'histoire allemande mo-derne, la politique et la civilisation hellé-niques furent marquées pendant des siècles par l'opposition entre Athènes et Sparte. L'Autriche et la Prusse ne furent pas seulement des constructions étatiques: elles ont également in-carné une manière d'être, un état d'esprit, un style, une éthique. Il en est de même pour Athènes et Sparte. Ce dualisme resta d'ailleurs bien vivace longtemps après que les deux cités-Etats grecques eurent perdu leur puissance et même leur indépendance. A l'instar de l'ancien Empire allemand, qui comprenait une multitude d'Etats dont certains étaient de taille mi-cro-sco-pique, la Grèce antique ne formait pas une unité politique; c'était une mosaïque de villes et de confédé-rations, toutes jalouses de leur indépen-dance. Cer-taines de ces poleis  jouèrent, en leur temps, un rôle éminent, politiquement ou cultu-rellement. Citons par exemple les villes grecques d'Asie mineure, Ephèse, Milet et Smyrne, les colonies grecques de la Mer Noire, de Sicile ou d'Italie du Sud. Sur le continent hellénique, ce furent Corinthe et Thèbes, Argos et Némée, Eleusis et Delphes, sans oublier les nombreuses villes-Etats de la Mer Egée: la Crète, Chypre, Rhodes, Samos, Lesbos, Delos, Chios, etc...

Chacun de ces noms renvoie à une facette de l'"hel-lénité", incarne un aspect unique, irré-ductible, de la culture grecque. Pourtant, seules Athènes et Sparte ont acquis une dimension historique mondiale. C'est qu'elles furent, avant tout, des "idées" au sens plato-nicien, c'est-à-dire susceptibles, selon les circons-tances, de se réactualiser, de se réincarner sans cesse. Elles ne furent pas des concepts abstraits mais des modèles vivants d'existence historique pouvant à tout moment orienter l'histoire réelle. La Guerre du Pélo-ponnèse, cette "guerre mondiale grec-que" selon la formule magistrale de Thucydide, constitue l'épiphanie de cette opposition, où se résorbe l'insurmontable dualité Sparte-Athènes. Pour Platon mais aussi pour Rousseau et, plus récemment, pour Maurice Barrès, Sparte était l'archétype de l'"Etat vrai". Or, cet arché-type sert depuis longtemps de repoussoir à une politologie qui s'est dégradée en "science de la démocra-tie" au service de l'"esprit du temps".

Sparte ou Spartacus?

On peut, bien entendu, être spartakiste, puisque ce terme ne renvoie pas à un groupe d'extrême-droite mais à un mouvement communiste (le communisme passant déjà pour une forme de démocratie). Etre spartakiste, cela n'a plus rien de dégradant. Le sparta-kisme, c'est de gauche, donc c'est bien. Le mot n'évoque-t-il pas l'es-clave Spartacus, originaire, non de Sparte, mais de Thrace, qui avait organisé la révolte contre ses maîtres romains? Sparte, en revanche, voilà le diable. La "spartitude", c'est synonyme de ru-desse, de dureté, de vexations inutiles... Mais que valent les beaux discours sur la "démo-cratie" quand survient l'Ernstfall:  le cas d'ur-gen-ce, la situation périlleuse, exception-nelle? L'ins-tant où la question n'est plus de savoir si l'on va se permettre un peu plus ou un peu moins de confort "démocratique"? Où le défi existen-tiel se résume en deux mots: se battre ou dispa-raî-tre...

Combien pèsent, sur le plateau de la balance, les so-phismes libéraux-démocratiques le jour où les armées ennemies franchissent la frontière, saluées par des cin-quièmes colonnes qui déroulent joyeusement le drapeau de l'étranger et s'ali-gnent pour la collabora-tion? A ce moment-là, la seule alternative n'est-elle pas: Aut Spartiates aut Spartacus  (Etre Spartiate ou Spartakiste)?

Aujourd'hui, au nom de Sparte, qui se souvient du mythe d'Hélène, la plus belle femme du mon-de? Qui se souvient que Castor et Pollux, le cou-ple inséparable des deux frères héros qui recevra plus tard une patrie céleste en devenant la constellation zodiacale des Gé-meaux, étaient d'o-ri-gine spartiate et furent honorés à Sparte? On a oublié que Cythère, île fortunée dédiée à Aphro-dite, faisait partie du territoire de Sparte. Révolu est le temps où les écoliers découvraient, le coeur bat-tant, les légendes de l'Antiquité classi-que et s'enthousiasmaient de ce que Sparte, pour-tant située au centre de la plaine de l'Eurotas, ait renoncé, jusqu'à la période hellénistique, à se construire des remparts. Si les Spartiates n'ont pas voulu ériger des fortifica-tions artificielles et des forteresses, c'est parce qu'à Sparte, les hommes, c'était l'Etat. Ces hoplites, qui misaient sur la force de leurs poings et de leurs armes, savaient que chacun était une pierre d'un rempart vi-vant: l'esprit de défense de la Polis. Qui se rappelle en-fin ce que rapportaient Aris-tote, Plutarque et d'autres écrivains antiques: nulle part ailleurs, dans aucun autre Etat grec, la femme n'avait autant de droits civils et publics que dans cette cité dorienne qui exaltait comme nulle autre la fraternité virile?

La Gérousie

On oublie souvent, semble-t-il, que Sparte fut le pre-mier Etat au monde à posséder une sorte de tribunal constitutionnel. Il s'agit des cinq épho-res ou "gardiens des lois" qui pouvaient même traduire les rois (il y en avait toujours deux à la tête de la polis) devant leur ju-ridiction. Il faut rappeler que Sparte, justement parce que sa constitution était "spartiate", a toujours su étouf-fer dans l'oeuf l'émergence de tyrans populaires, ce qui ne fut pas le cas des autres cités-Etats grecques. Soucieux de donner une expression politique à la sa-gacité, à l'expérience et à la sa-gesse des Anciens, les Spartiates créèrent la Gé-rousie: aucune affaire impor-tante de l'Etat ne pouvait être tranchée sans l'assentiment préala-ble de ce Conseil des Anciens qui, avec les deux rois représentant le couple de Gémeaux mythologi-ques, Castor et Pollux, comprenait trente mem-bres au total. Pour siéger à la Gérousie, il fallait avoir au moins soixante ans. L'appartenance à ce corps, incarnation politique du principe de sénio-rité, était définitive: seule la mort pouvait y met-tre fin. Il ne fait guère de doute que la stabilité politique de Sparte, pendant des siècles, était due en partie à cette institu-tion, capable de dé-jouer à temps tous les projets préci-pités, les ini-tiatives inconsidérées ou les idées non mû-ries.

Mais ni la belle Hélène ni les dioscures siégeant au firmament étoilé ni la sagesse du Conseil des Anciens n'ont aujourd'hui droit de cité lorsqu'il est question de Sparte. Même le poète Tyrtée, qui vivait au VIIième siècle avant notre ère et dont les éloges de Sparte sont nombreux, paraît oublié. Et pourtant, Tyrtée était Athénien de naissance. On dit qu'il boitait et avait été maître d'école. Ce n'est que plus tard qu'il devint pa-né-gyriste de Lacédémone et citoyen spartiate. Plus de deux mille ans après, le Souabe Hegel allait bien à Berlin où il devint... philosophe de l'Etat prussien! C'est dans la guerre, disait Hegel, que se manifeste la cohésion de chacun avec l'ensemble. Et il ajoutait que la guerre était l'esprit et la forme où se focalisait l'essentiel de la sub-stance éthique d'un peuple ou d'une nation.

Quant à Tyrtée, j'hésite à le citer car, s'il vivait de nos jours, ses éloges de l'héroïsme spartiate lui vaudraient certainement d'être marqué du signe infamant d'"extrémiste de droite". Une de ses élégies, consa-crée aux héros de la deuxième guerre médique, paraî-trait presque obscène à des oreilles pacifistes, à l'instar du fameux vers d'Ho-race selon lequel "il est doux et honorable de mourir pour la patrie" (Carmina  III, 2, 13), ou encore de Hölderlin dont on s'obstine —sans suc-cès— à faire un Jacobin en puissance:

"Sois grande, ô ma patrie,

Et ne compte point les morts;

pour toi, ma bien-aimée

Aucun mort ne sera de trop!".

Le Romain Horace et l'Allemand Hölderlin sont en fait des fils posthumes de Tyrtée, Spartiate d'adoption, qui, dès le VIIième siècle avant no-tre ère, proclamait son mépris pour l'homme, fût-il par ailleurs de qualité ou de haut rang, qui ne fît pas ses preuves sur un champ de bataille. Voici les premiers vers d'une élégie à laquelle se réfère explicitement Platon dans son dia-logue Des Lois  (629, a-e):

"Je ne ferais nulle mention ni ne tiendrais compte d'un homme,

Quand il serait couronné à la course ou à la lutte,

Aurait la taille et la force d'un cyclope,

serait aussi rapide que le vent de Thrace,

Serait plus beau que Tithonos

Et plus riche que, jadis, Midas et Kinyras;

quand il serait de sang plus noble que Pélops, fils de Tantale,

et aurait la magie du verbe d'Adraste,

et serait grand en toutes choses,

s'il n'est pas grand dans la tourmente du combat!

Car il ne sera pas brave à la guerre

Celui qui ne supporte pas de regarder la tuerie sanglante

Et n'attaque pas l'adversaire

en l'affrontant de près.

C'est la vraie vertu, le plus beau et le meilleur des prix

Que le jeune sang puisse un jour conquérir (1)".

L'Etat guerrier

Les vers de Tyrtée, Spartiate d'adoption, nous rap-pel-lent sans équivoque possible que Sparte fut un Etat guerrier au sens le plus vrai du terme. Un Etat enca-serné, a-t-on pu dire, un Etat pratiquant l'élitisme eu-géniste et dont certains as-pects évoquent le commu-nisme de guerre. Le mo-dèle de la politeia  selon Pla-ton, aristocrate athénien mais spartanophile. Une synthèse appa-remment perverse entre prussianisme et so-cia-lisme. Et le cauchemar de tous les libéraux, de Wil-helm von Humboldt à Karl Popper et à Hen-ri Marrou.

Il ne faut pas s'illusionner: toutes ces descrip-tions, même exagérées dans les détails, même caricaturales (et caricaturées pour les besoins de la polémique) ont un fond de vérité. Athènes exceptée, aucun autre Etat antique ne nous est mieux connu que celui des Spar-tiates qui se nom-maient eux-mêmes Lacédémoniens (le Spartiate était l'homme libre, citoyen à part entière). Les anecdotes les plus effarantes reposent sur de so-lides témoignages. Il est hors de doute que Spar-te, même et surtout à une époque avancée de l'his-toire an-tique, était, comparée à Athènes, un Etat extrême-ment archaïque, rude et xénophobe. Et il est indéniable que jusqu'à la fin, cet Etat a veillé jalousement et or-gueilleusement à préser-ver cette différence-là. Inutile de broder sur l'orgueil ostentatoire, sur la morgue du Spartiate, fût-il citoyen ordinaire. Chaque Spartiate était moi-tié roi moitié brigand. Les textes authen-ti-ques de Tyrtée lui-même sont là pour infirmer toute tentative de banalisation. Tyrtée nous mon-tre sans conteste un Etat où le guerrier l'empor-tait sur le bel esprit et le marchand. Toute la cul-ture était axée sur la chose mi-litaire et l'idéal était le sous-officier d'active. Quand une mère avait perdu son fils à la bataille, elle refusait la-co-niquement (c'est le cas de le dire) toutes con-do--léances: "Je n'ignorais pas qu'il était mortel", et ce que proclame solennellement le choeur de la pièce de Schiller Die Braut von Messina:  "La vie n'est pas le bien suprême" (acte 4, scène 10), était, à Sparte, le b.a.-ba de la formation po-li-tique de n'importe quelle recrue. L'épigramme du lyrique Simonidès dédié aux Spartiates tom-bés aux Thermopyles exprime lapidai-rement ce que l'on attendait du soldat:

"Passant, va dire à Sparte

Que tu nous as trouvés, gisants

Conformément à ses lois".

Vouloir minimiser a posteriori la sévérité spar-tiate est une entreprise vouée à l'échec. La civi-lisation lacédé-monienne n'était guère littéraire mais très athlétique. A Sparte, la poésie fut un produit d'importation, comme en témoigne l'exem-ple des trois grands poètes, Tyrtée, Ter-pandros et Thaletas: le premier venait d'Athènes, le second d'Antissa (Ile de Lesbos), le troisième de Crète. Sparte les fit venir comme poètes offi-ciels, un peu comme la Prusse prendra à son service les Souabes Hegel et Schelling, le Baron de Stein, origi-naire de Nassau, le Hessois Sa-vigny et le Saxon Ranke. La cuisine était aus-tère, c'était le cauchemar des gosiers corinthiens, crétois ou sybarites. Les dis-tributions collectives de "soupe au sang" étaient considérées, hors de Sparte, comme un vomitif.

Un système d'éducation terrible

A sept ans révolus, les enfants appartenaient à l'Etat qui prenait en charge leur éducation. Les garçons, no-tamment, devaient gravir, échelon par échelon, les étapes de la hiérarchie dans les formations de la jeu-nesse d'Etat. La musique et la poésie étaient considé-rées comme des acces-soires de la pédagogie d'Etat. L'autonomie du sens et du goût esthétiques n'était guère prisée: la danse réduite à un exercice gymnique, la poé-sie au rôle d'auxiliaire de l'éducation politique et la musique à un instrument de drill et de dres-sage. Outre le chant choral, musique militaire et chansons de marche au son de la flûte (qui jouait dans l'Antiquité, on le sait, le rôle de nos tam-bours et trompettes): tel était le parnasse spar-tiate.

La vertu suprême était le patriotisme poussé jus-qu'au sacrifice et la subordination des intérêts in-dividuels au salut de l'Etat. Obéissance, endurcis-se-ment des corps et des âmes, frugalité et dis-cipline faisaient partie des règles de vie les plus na-turelles. La discipline, surtout, imprégnait et mo-delait toutes choses: celle des enfants et des adul-tes, discipline à l'école, discipline à table, discipline du corps et de l'esprit, de la concep-tion à la tombe: c'était l'art de gouverner à la spartiate. Est-il besoin de souligner que dans cet-te polis dorienne, la pédérastie, amours "inver-ses d'homme à homme", comme disait Hans Blü-her, était omniprésente? Force est de la considé-rer comme une devotio lacedaemonia,  spéci-fique d'un Etat organisé en Männerbund  (con-frérie virile). Dans ce domaine comme dans d'au-tres, n'enjolivons rien.

Le Taygète

Même observation à propos d'une loi que Plu-tarque fait remonter à Lycurgue, le législateur semi-légendaire de Lacédémone: à sa naissance, l'enfant est examiné par les Anciens du clan. S'il est jugé sain, bien fait et vigoureux, il est dé-claré digne d'être éduqué. Si en re-vanche, le Con-seil des Anciens le trouve malingre et mal constitué, l'enfant est "exposé" au fond d'un précipice rocailleux du Taygète. Car "ils pensaient que pour un être incapable, dès le début de sa vie, de se développer et de devenir sain et fort, il vaut mieux ne pas vivre du tout car il ne sera utile ni à lui-même ni à l'Etat" (Lycurgue, 16).

De l'eugénisme spartiate à l'avortement libéral

Cette loi est à mes yeux la seule dans la constitution de Sparte qui devrait trouver grâce auprès des tenants ac-tuels de l'ordre libéral-dé-mo-cratique, quoique pour des raisons opposées: les Lacédémoniens formés à l'école de Lycurgue avaient une pensée eugéniste alors que nos parasites obéissent à des motivations essentielle-ment individualistes et hédonistes: ce n'est pas pour "améliorer la race", c'est pour augmenter leurs chances d'"épanouissement personnel" qu'ils souscri-vent à l'adage selon lequel "être né ne confère aucun droit à la vie": de nos jours, le "citoyen adulte" ne se laisse nullement prescrire si l'enfant venu au monde doit vivre ou non. Le Conseil des Anciens, institution "réactionnaire", a été remplacé, en ce qui concerne le sort du nouveau-né ou du foetus, par l'auto-détermi-na-tion du "conseil parental" et, si ur-gence il y a, par le droit de la mère dans le sein de laquelle se développe, tel un abcès, le fruit de ses en-trailles. La possibilité, admise par la société, de prati-quer, comme à Sparte, l'"exposition" de l'enfant (à ce détail près que l'opération est chronologiquement avancée au stade du foetus) contraste favorablement avec les méthodes "barbares" de Sparte où la mort n'était même pas intra-utérine. L'avancement progres-sif du meurtre silencieux à une période comprise entre le premier et le si-xième mois de la grossesse, et son remplace-ment, au niveau du vocabulaire, par un doux eu-phémisme, l'"interruption de grossesse" (IVG), sont considérés comme des acquis d'une civili-sation qui paraît avoir définitivement surmonté Sparte. C'est ainsi qu'en Allemagne par exem-ple, on considère comme un "progrès" le meurtre d'enfants par le Ge-bärstreik  ou "grève des ventres" bien que cette grève-là fasse cha-que année mille fois plus de victimes en-fantines que n'en fit, en sept siècles d'histoire spartiate, l'exposition rituelle sur le Taygète...

 

La liberté de la femme

La sympathie du démocrate sincère est toujours allée à Athènes, jamais à Sparte. L'homme de par-ti, l'honnête homme respectueux de l'ordre libéral-démocratique, se voudrait Périclès, au moins en miniature. Personne, en revanche, ne souhaite passer pour un héritier ou un disciple de Lycurgue! Athènes est synonyme, on le sait, de Lumière, de Culture, de Démocratie et Périclès est la superstar de ces divinités éthérées. Par contre, la Sparte de Lycurgue passe pour avoir été pire que la Prusse frédéricienne, pres-que une préfiguration an-tique de l'Etat national-so-cialiste!

"Louons ce qui nous affaiblit et nous désarme! Mé-fions-nous de ceux qui nous parlent d'union, de force, de grandeur, de discipline, de cohésion! Ou nous ris-querions de glisser vers le fascisme —et Hitler de re-venir!". C'est à peu près le discours que tient, la main sur le coeur, l'Occident démocratiste et bien-pensant. L'objur-gation, tantôt articulée du bout des lèvres tantôt hurlée, se gonfle démesurément dans le bour-don-ne-ment des médias. Il existe donc bien ce que j'ap-pe-lerais une réaction émotionnelle antispar-tia-te. Elle nour-rit la lutte contre tout ce qui, de près ou de loin, pourrait évoquer l'ascèse, l'hé-roïsme ou la disci-pline. Se recommander de Spar-te, admirer Sparte comme paradigme d'éta-tici-té sévère, certes, mais puis-sante et capable, voilà qui, aujourd'hui, choque. Comme pou-vait choquer, voici cinq siècles, le fait de nier la tri-nité divine ou l'incarnation du Christ.

Et pourtant, sur les traces de Plutarque et de Platon, j'ai rassemblé ici quelques bons points en faveur de Sparte. Il faut tout d'abord signaler que dans cette Sparte au "conservatisme" rigide, les femmes pou-vaient faire tout ce qui leur était strictement interdit à Athènes-la-libérale. A La-cé-dé-mone, les femmes étaient beaucoup plus libres que les hommes. Non seulement en amour mais en affaires. Elles jouissaient de droits in-connus partout ailleurs. Au IIIième siècle, par exem-ple, les femmes spartiates possédaient plus de richesses (y compris des biens fonciers éten-dus) que leurs maris, leurs frères ou leurs amants (Plutarque, Agis,  5, 23, 29). Aristote, déjà, reprochait à Ly-curgue de n'avoir pas extir-pé le "dérèglement et le matriarcat" des femmes spartiates (Politique,  2, 1270a, 6). A l'étranger habitué à un strict et exclusif patriarcat, la ville de Sparte offrait presque le spectacle d'un Etat "exotique", dominé par les femmes (Plu-tarque, Numa,  25,3): "Les femmes spartiates ont sans doute été assez irrévérencieuses et se sont sans doute comportées de façon extrêmement virile, surtout à l'égard de leurs maris puisqu'à la maison, elles déte-naient un pouvoir sans partage et qu'à l'extérieur elles intervenaient en toute liberté dans les affaires d'Etat les plus impor-tantes". Et pourtant, elles n'avaient rien de spa-dassins hirsutes et grivois: leur charme un peu abrupt était proverbial dans toute l'Hellade. Leur li-berté semblait excessive même aux Athéniens les plus "progressistes" et les plus "éclairés".

La rigueur d'un Etat guerrier résolument viril était adoucie par la grâce souriante, la malice, l'élégance spontanée de ses jeunes femmes qui, contrairement à leurs soeurs d'Athènes, avaient accès aux exercices sportifs et gymniques. Com-me les hommes, les fem-mes lacédémo-nien-nes étaient célèbres pour leur sens de la répartie et leur laconisme (le mot, d'ailleurs, nous est resté: Sparte est située au centre de la Laco-nie). Plu-sieurs anecdotes témoignent de cette vivacité de l'esprit, de cette concision propres aux Spartia-tes. Comme une étrangère disait à Gorgo, épou-se de Léo-nidas, roi de Sparte: "Vous autres La-cédémoniennes êtes bien les seules à pouvoir dominer vos maris", Gorgo répliqua avec su-perbe: "Après tout, c'est nous, et nous seules, qui les mettons au monde!" (Plutarque, Lycur-gue,  14, conclusion).

Sans Sparte, pas d'Athènes

Mais concluons. Nous venons d'inscrire le nom de Léonidas. Nous avions, au début de ce texte, cité Si-mo-nidès célébrant les Lacédémoniens morts aux Ther-mopyles face à la supériorité numérique des Perses: "Voyageur, va dire à Spar-te...". Disons-le la-conique-ment: si l'on con-si-dère la civilisation grecque comme le fon-dement permanent de la culture euro-péenne, on ne peut ignorer Sparte. Toute la culture de la Grèce classique, que l'on identifie volontiers à Athènes, n'aurait jamais pu s'épanouir si un peuple de guerriers, comparativement prosaïque, discipliné, en odeur de quasi barbarie, n'avait pas combattu jusqu'à la mort, pour sauver l'Hel-lade, aux Thermopyles, à Sa-la-mine et à Platée. Les victoires militaires, qui ne fu-rent possibles que grâce à la présence spartiate, ont alors conquis, préservé et élargi cet espace où purent s'épanouir librement le théâtre grec, la philo-so-phie grecque, la science grecque et même la démocratie grec-que. C'est ce qu'il faut se garder d'oublier.

Regardons Sparte, presque étrangère dans sa rudesse. Cette société a pu pervertir jusqu'à la caricature des traits qui ont existé, à un degré moindre, dans toute polis grecque. Mais surtout, Sparte, qui incarnait au plus haut point toutes les potentialités de la polis, nous rappelle brutale-ment combien toute l'Antiquité clas-si-que nous apparaîtrait étrangère si nous cessions d'y pro-jeter notre propre humanisme. Sparte nous fait éga-lement saisir le sens du mot "politeia" à l'état chi-miquement pur: l'Etat, "le plus froid de tous les mons-tres froids", comme l'affirme le Zarathoustra de Nietzsche. On peut ne pas aimer Sparte. Mais qui-con-que se sent une attirance pour l'héritage grec doit se souvenir que toutes ces merveilles, toute cette splen-deur, tout ce qui, en nous, "parle" et nous en-thou-siasme (au sens étymologique du terme), que tout cela n'a pu s'épanouir et se déployer que dans un monde soustrait à la menace du despotisme oriental par le sacrifice suprême de quelques dizaines de milliers d'hommes.

Mais Sparte nous remet aussi en mémoire les fonde-ments de la culture européenne sur les-quels on fait si volontiers l'impasse aujourd'hui: l'espace où cette cul-tu-re a pu éclore n'était certes pas défendu par des déserteurs ou des objecteurs de conscience! Il était dé-fendu par des soldats résolus face à la supériorité nu-mérique écrasante de l'adversaire. Les meilleurs guer-riers, la plus belle discipline militaire, étaient à Lacé-démone. Après la victoire sur les Perses, aucun équi-libre harmonieux ne put s'établir entre les deux types de société grecque qu'incarnaient respective-ment Spar--te et Athènes. Peut-être fut-ce là la grande tragédie de la Grèce antique. Culturellement, Sparte fut une im-passe. Mais Athènes elle-même, la "voie" athénienne, nous le pres-sentons aujourd'hui, pouvait-elle se poursuivre en ligne droite jusqu'à nous?

Peut-être, après tout, la culture n'est-elle qu'un inter-mède, un gaspillage stérile d'énergie sur l'arrière-plan des espaces cosmiques infinis. Un certain défaitisme gagne autour de nous. Il déclare publiquement que l'orientalisation de l'Eu-rope, si elle s'était accomplie beaucoup plus tôt, nous aurait épargné bien des maux. Pour ce genre de discours, les victoires grecques sur les Perses ne signifient donc rien. Mais c'est déjà une autre histoire. Il reste que Sparte nous rap-pelera tou-jours, de façon lancinante, une vérité éternelle, large-ment occultée de nos jours: sans un certain degré de "spartitude", non seulement aucun Etat n'est possible, mais aucune civilisation ne peut vivre et… survivre.

Il faut redécouvrir notre héritage lacédémonien.

Gerd-Klaus KALTENBRUNNER.

(texte paru dans Criticón, n°100, März-Juni 1987; traduction française: Jean-Louis Pesteil; adresse de Criticón: Knöbelstraße 36/V, D-8000 München 22; prix de l'abonnement annuel (six numéros): DM 57; étudiants: DM 38).

Note

(1) Dans le dialogue de Platon, Clinias ajoute: "C'est un fait que (ces poèmes) sont venus jusque chez nous, im-portés de Lacédé-mone" (ndt).  

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Herder's Critique of the Enlightenment: Cultural Community versus Cosmopolitan Rationalism

Gemaelde_von_Johann_Friedrich_Tischbein_1795.jpg

Herder's Critique of the Enlightenment: Cultural Community versus Cosmopolitan Rationalism

Brian J. Whitton

Recent continental social theory has seen the emergence of a body of literature which represents a radical challenge to the primary concerns and assumptions of traditional Western social and political thought. While this challenge involves a number of aspects and embraces a heterogeneous group of thinkers, one theme common to them all is their opposition to the attempts of traditional scientific, social, and political disciplines to construct general theoretical programs as aguides to the practical actualization of a rational order within human society, however defined. What is most objectionable about this general project for such thinkers, included among them figures like Foucault, Lyotard and Derrida, is its implicit assumption of the possibility of establishing a hierarchy in the forms of knowledge - an ordering of discourses in accordance with theri relative approximation to the objetive principles of an ultimate discourse of reason or truth. Their special sensivity to language, and their shared belief in the infinite creative potencial of human linguistic activity, led these thinkers to arrack such "totalizing" rationalist discourses as legitimating forms of exclusionary practices which repress the full diversity of discursive interpretations of the real implicit in human linguistic activity in favor of one dominant, repressive discourse. Far from being unique to the postmodernist writters of the late twentieth century, however, this type of relativistic critique of totalizing discourses has some notable antecedents in modern social thought. The purpose of this article is to examine one such precursor of this form of critique presented in the writtings of the eighteenth century theorist, Johann Gottfried von Herder.

In his theory of history Herder presents a radical critique of the rationalist discourse of cosmopolitan human development advanced by the Enlightenment thinkers of his day, one wich is predicated upon a profound sentitivity to the importance of language in the process of historical human development. In the first part of this article I will outline Herder's critique of the Enlightenment perspective and the main features of the particularistic conception of human cultural community which he develops in opposition to it. In so doing I will suggest some interesting parallels wich can be drawn between Herder's relativistic conception of cultural community and the ideas on language abd human cultural development presented in the recent writtings of the postmodernist, Francois Lyotard. I then proceed to advance certain criticisms of the relativistic vision of human cultural development and community advanced in Herder's thought.

I

Before considering Herder's thought in detail, I will briefly outline some of the main themes of Lyotard's recent book, The Postmodern Condition. This will provide the basis for a comparison of the theories of Herder and Lyotard later in the paper. Central to an understanding of Lyotard's work is his view of language games as the defining aspect of any social system. He argues that:

"language games are the minimun relation required for society to exist; even before he is born . . . the human child is already positioned as the referent in the story recounted by those around him, in relation to which he will inveitably char his course . . . the question of social bond is itself a language game."

According to Lyotard each culture is constituted by such language games and it is the knowledge forms to which these give rise which govern the life of the culture. In his work he distinguishes two major knowledge forms arising from these language games in the course of human history. These are, first, the traditional popular narrative form and, second, the modern scientific form. Narrative knowledges, identified as synonymous with traditional tribal cultures, are distinguished by their inmmediacy with the life of the culture and the spontaneous manner by which they legitimate its institutions of authority. As the determinant of criteria of social competence and how those criteria are applied, of "what has the right to be said and done in the culture," such narrative knowledge forms are integral to the culture, "legitimated by the simple fact that they do what they do." Popular narrative kwoledge, Lyotard notes, "does not give priority to the question of its own legitimation. . . . It certifies itself in the pragmatics of its own transmission without havin recourse to argumentation and proof."

This traditional knowledge form is in direct contrast to the scientific form of modern Western culture. What sets the latter apart first and foremost according to Lyotard is its claim to objective legitimation, its supposed capacity to establish the truth of its propositions through the objetive processes of verification and falsification. In accordance with this claim to objective legitimation, it is only those discourses capable of objective validation which are appropriated into the corpus of acceptable knowledge withon the modern cultural order. Here Lyotard discerns the inherent hegemonic tendency of the scientific knowledge form. He notes that "scientific knowledge requires that one language game, denotation, be retained and all other excluded. [For this knowledge form] a statement's truth-value is the criterion determining its acceptability. This principle renders problematic the status of the traditional narrative form of knowledge within modern society.

"The scientist questions the validity of narrative statements and concludes that they are never subject to argumentation or proof. He classifies them as belonging to a different mentality: savage, primitive, underdeveloped, backward. . . .At best, attempts are made to throw some rays of light into this obscurantism, to civilize, educate, develop."

According to Lyotard, where the traditional knowledge form of popular narrative lends itself to the expression of a diversity of narrative discourses or different narrative understandings of the world, the modern scientific form is, by its very nature,  exclusionary of discursive diversity.

It is at this point that Lyotard notes the paradoxical nature of the scientific knowledge form upon which Western culture is predicated. For the latter, he argues, is itself dependet upon a form of narrative for its ultimate legitimacy.

"Scientific knowledge cannot know and make know that it is true knowledge without resorting to the other, narrative kind of knowledge, which from its point of view is no knowledge at all. Without such recourse it would be in the position of presupposing its own validity . . . [of] proceeding on prejudice."

The main forms which this recourse to narrative assumes is the appeal to the meta-narrative - the legitimating story of the subject wich unforlds itself in the process of history to discover its being in the knowledge of science. Only through the invocation of this epic story of the self-realizing subject, in its dual forms of the unfolding of the absolute idea (Hegel) and the emancipation of the concrete subject of humanity (the Enlightenment), has the culturally limited language game of modern science succeeded in sustaining its claim to superiority over other knowledge forms in modern society.

However, for Lyotard the advend of the present postmodern condition spells the death of this legitimating metanarrative within the represive dominance of the scientific knowledge form. The processes of delegitimation associated with the emerging postmodern era have, he maintains, seen the decline of the unifying power of the grand narrative and the violence it has visited upon the plurarity of language games. In place of the old "objetivizing" pragmatics of modern science, Lyotard notes the beginnins of the development of a new social pragmatics within postmodern society containing the possibility for a new relativistic idea and practice of justice -- one bases upon a "recognition of the hereromorphous nature of language games . . . [and] a renunciation of terror, which assumes that they are isomorphic and tries to make them so." 

 

II

The broad themes elaborated above which preoccupy the thought of Lyotard bear a marked similarity to the idea implicit in Herder's philosophy of history. The emphasis upon the essentially pluralistic nature of cultural forms of knowledge, the critique of the universal narrative as the legitimating form a particular, hegemonic cultural discourse which obstructs the free expression of alternative cultural discourses -- these are central features of the particularistic conception of cultural development which Herder elaborates within the broader context of his critical encounter with the Enlightenment conception of history dominant in his day. In turning now to examine Herder's thought, I shall first provide a brief account of the Enlightenment conception of history which forms the focus of Herder's criticisms. I then proceed to outline Herder's theory of the historical development of the Volk or nation as it emerges from his critique of the rationalist, cosmopolitan perspective of the philosophes. Having done this I shall be in a position to indicate the similarities in the work of Herder and Lyotard and to offer some criticisms of the relativistic conception of historical human development which Herder advances as the basic alternative to the Enlightenment perspective.

In the writings of some prominent thinkers of the French Enlightenment, we find articulared a highly optimistic view of human history as the linear progression of humanity towards a condition of inevitable perfectibility. For thinkers like Condorcet and Turgot, history is understood as the story of the progressive advancement of humanity towards an enlightened condition of human association ultimately embracing the whole of humankind, based upon the principles of reason. Of particular importance for our concerns are those more basic assumptions upon which this cosmopolitan conception of history rested. Underlying this optimistic view of human history is the distinctive rationalist conception of human nature characterizing the philosophy of the Enlightenment. According to this view, human beings have access to certain timeless, immutable principles or laws intrinsic to their nature. Moreover, as Becker notes, it was thought that, by the use of their natural reason, these principles could be grasped by people and applied to human affairs enabling them to "bring ther ideas and conduct and hence the institutions by which they lived, into harmony with the universal, natural order." On this view, then, human history involved the progressive apprehension of these constant and universal principles of human nature previously obscured by superstition and custom by which the affairs of all people may be rationally organized.

A logical corollary of this rationalist conception of history as the inexorable progression of humandkind to a cosmopolitan condition of rational perfectibility was the tendency of Enlightenment philosophers to demean or deride those cultures, past and present, which lacked consciousness of the principles of the enlightened reason. Such cultures tended to be seen as lesser stages in the development towards this enlightened perfect end. Hence, in the view of Condorcet, it was the good fortune of the barbarous, unenlightened cultures of his day that they could acquire these rational principles of Enlightenment directly from the enlightened culture of European society. "The progress of these peoples [he notes] is likely to be more rapid and certain because they can receive from us . . . these simple truths and infallible methods which we have acquired only after long error."

In elaborating this theory of history as the evolution of the Volk community, Herder presents a thoroughgoing critique of the basic assumptions of this Enlightenment conception of history. At the heart of this critique is Herder's opposition to the way this rationalist perspective abstracts historical human development from all connection with the contingent elements fo human historical linguistic and cultural practice. Against the static, ahistorical concepction of human nature espoused by the philosophy of the Enlightenment, Herder opposes a radical new development account of human nature and reason. Here the notion of human nature as something existing apriori, independient of contigent historical circumstances, is rejected. Human nature, Herder argues, is "not the vessell of an absolute, unchanging happiness as the defined by the philosophers; everywhere it attracts the measure of happiness of which it is capable; it is a pliant clay which assumes a different shape under different . . . circumstances." Human nature is an ever-changing, constantly developing substance altering in response to diverse historical needs and circumstances.

In terms of this new, dinamic historical conception of human development, Herder stresses the historical specificity of the human condition. Humans must develop through struggle within their natural and social environment. Among the influences affecting their development, Herder identifies climate, or their geographical location, which exercises a definite influence on their conscious development. "The spirit has varied in direct proportion to climate and its effects."

But by far the most crucial element for Herder in this dynamic process of human historical transformation is language. He notes that "the whole structure of man's humanity is connected by a spiritual genesis," a connection which takes the form of the elaboration of the uniquely human capacity for speech. As an attribute specific to human beings, language is seen by Herder as the central expression of a uniquely human, reflective consciousness. In developing their language, individuals give shape to their inner conscious nature, formulating their ideas and preconceptions through reflection on their experiences of the external world. Hence

"the more experience man gains, the more he learns to know diverse things from diverse aspects, he richer grow his language. The more he repeats what he has learnt and the words he has gained in doing so, the more permanent and fluent his language becomes. The more the differentiates and classifies the more it becomes organizes."

According to Herder, the process of conscious linguistic development outlined here, the elaboration of the unique human power of conscious discourse, is conceivable only as a social process. The conscious development of the individual is part and parcel of his inclusion in a broader linguistic community, and inherited stream of words and images which he must accept on trust. The ideational form of language constitutes the natural force integrating people within a dynamic historical community of cultural development which Herder identifies as the Volk o nation. Moreover, rather than a substantive stucture standing over and above the individual, the Volk community forms a spiritual unity whose historical evolution  involves the conscious integration of the individual and the social in the progresive expression of a unique national, cultural consciousness embodied in the linguistic products of the nation.

What are the specific features of this conception of cultural community which Herder develops in opposition to the Enlightenment theory of cosmopolitanism and, in particular, what are the specific processes by which the cultural personality of the Volk community is historically actualized? Here Herder stress social education, understood in broad terms as the molding process of socialization and tradition. In the course of assimilating their language during everyday social activity, individuals incorporate their cultural heritage. They are brought into connection with the history, poetry, and religion of the nation and the social wisdom embodied in these cultural forms. The famliy unit assumes a vital role in this educational process. Acording to Herder, paternal love makes possible an education which is social and continuous, acting as a major instrument for the transmission of the values and prejudicesof succesive generations. The parent, herder argues, is the natural instructor of the child. "Each individual is son or daughter. . . . He or she receives from the earliest moments of life part of the cultural treasures of ancestral heritage. . . [which he or she] in turn passes on." Through parental instruction the individual is brought into communion with the "ways of feeling and thinking of his progenitors. . . . He repeats, with every newly acquired word, not only sounds but certain ways of looking at the world."

By virtue of this process of social education borne by family, teachers, and friends, there is established through the successive generations of the Vold community a "chain of unity and continuity in which each link . . . [receives and transmits] the cultural heritage of the Volk [in a process which entails] language and its continuous growth". The national language, as the medium of the transmission of the cultural spirit of the Volk, connects its members in a organic community embracing the ideas, wisdom, and values of past, present, and future generations. Moreover, this historical transmission of the cultural heritage of the Volk community involves a definite dialectical dimension in its operation. Herder notes that parents "never teach their children language without the concurrent inventive activity of the child." The process of cultural education is a complex one wherein each generation, in receiving the prejudices of the Volk language, subjects them to reappraisal and re-evalutation in accordance with its own historical needs and circumstances. "The generations renew themselves in a continuous flux . . . . In spite of the linear, prescriptive tendencies of tradition, each son continues to write in his own particular way." It is through this historical transformation of the Volk language that traditional conceptions and beliefs are continually synthesized with those of the new generations. "The opposites assist and promote one another . . . [and] by their reconciliation there emerges a new world." Thus the national language forms the living, psycological medium within which the national culture is perpetuated, transformed, and reiched over time. As such it constitutes the central agency in the historical extension of the creative powers of humans as conscious, self-constitutive members of the Volk.  

There are a number of points arising from this highly original account of human cultural development which it is important to note here. The first of these is Herder's emphasis upon the natural, internally generated nature of this dynamic condition of cultural community. The historical transmission of the national culture is both genetic and organic in nature, "genetic by virtue of the manner in which the transmission takes place [that is, through paternal instruction] and organic by virtue of the [dialectical] manner in which that which is being transmitted is assimilated and applied." The primary agents of national development (notably the national languague and the powers of the synthesizing mind) represent for Herder naturally evolving forces developing within  abd through the members of the Volk as opposed to what he considers the artificial, externally imposed economic and political forces operating on and uniting people from without. Indeed it is a basic tenet of Herder's thought that human communities, if they are to be effective and lasting in nature, must be predicated upon these natural, immediate cultural forces which link "minds through ideas, hearts through inclinations and impulses . . . and generations through examples, modes of living and education."

A second major aspecto of Herder's theory flowing from its naturalistic cultural conception of human community is his stress upon the essential plurality of human values and their relativity to specific nationa, historical communities. For Herder each distinct nation contains within itself ots own perfection independent of comparation with that of other cultures, a standard defined in accordance with its specific cultural traditions and values. Further, the image of what is morally right or wrong varies frpm cultura to culture, making all comparison between different cultures unprofitable. In his view:

"when the inner sense of happiness has altered, this or that attitude has changed; when the external circumstances . . . fashion and fortify this new sentiment, who can then compare the different forms of satisfaction perceived by different senses in different worlds. . . .Each nation has its own centre of happiness within itself, just as every sphere has its own centre gravity."

To engage in the critical judgment of past cultures in terms of the ideals and values of one's own time, as the Enlightenment historians tended to do, is, on this view, fundamentally problematic. According to Herder each historical culture represents a distinctive and unique manifestation of that which is specifically human. "From the shapeless rocks with which the Chinese ornaments his garden, to the . . .  ideal beauty of Greece, the plan of a reflective human understanding is everywhere observable."

In accordance with this pluralistic, culture-relative conception of human values, Herder stresses the necessity for any adequate understanding of the diverse cultures of human history to grasp the distinctive assumptions and prejudices implicit in the cultural consciousness of any given national community. However, such knowledge is not easily acquired, as Herder was well aware. Historical understanding of this type required the cultivation of one's capacity for sympathetic identification with the culture under consideration. Individuals must

"enter into the spirit of a nation before . . . [they] can share even one of its thoughts or deeds. . . . [They] must penetrate deeply into this century, this reigion, this entire history and feel it inside  . . . [themselves] - then only will . . . [they] be in a position to understand."

Only by entering into the life of a culture, its beliefs and prejudices expressed in its cultural products, Herder maintained, can its intrinsic value and historical significance be grasped.

Lacking this capacity for sympathetic identification with the cultural consciousness of civilizations other than their own, the philosophes are criticized for their fundamental insensitivity to these crucial elements of human cultural community. Instead they are seen to engage in a mechanized form of thinking which abstracts human development and community form its life blood: the sensuous world of human cultural diversity. For Herder the inevitable consequence of this simplistic historical perspective is the creation of an abstract cosmopolitanism, a "paper culture" predicated upon an idealized conception of eighteenth-century European cultural life. He notes how

"the general philosophical, philanthropic tone of our century wishes to extend our own ideal of virtue and happiness to each distant nation, to even the remotest age of history. . . . [It] has taken words for works, enlightenment for happiness, greater sophistication for virtue and, in this way, invented the fiction of the general amelioration of the world."

This condition, the philosophes believed, would ultimately embrace all of mankind with the progress of enlightenment.

From Herder's standpoint, however, the actualization of a general philosophy of this kind, with its "rational axioms of human behaviour, . . .   commonplaces about what is right and good; views of all times and all peoples for all times and all peoples," could only have disastrous consequences. Such a cosmopolitan condition, he believed, could take no other form than subjection of the great diversity of national cultures to the limited cultural standards of European society. Herder is particulary sensitive to the way in which such abstract, rationalist principles as equality, liberty, and fraternity may be invoked to justify a condition of manifest domination of one culture over the many. "The garment of generalities which characterize our [enlightened] philosophy can conceal oppressions and infringements of the . . . freedom of men and countries, of citizens and peoples." A cosmopolitan world of the type proposed by the philosophes would, Herder believed, be a world where all spontaneous, creative drives of the different cultural communities would be stifled in favor of an externally imposed European cultural ideal and human life reduced to a dull, routine existence. Within this artificial condition where the internal cultural ties binding people in a dynamic creative unity are suppressed, the natural basis of conscious human creativity would cease to exit and all meaningful human development be excluded. For Herder, a cosmopolitan society would be no more than a patched up fragile structure wholly devoid of life whose component parts would be conected through mechanical contrivances instead of bonds of human sentiment.

Herder's own particularistic conception of a cultural community as we have presented it, with its emphasis upon the naturally generated character of the Volk as an organic condition of cultural beloging, represents his humanistic alternative to the "inhuman" implications perceived as implict in the abstract cosmopolitan perspective. In opposition to the philosophes' belief in the infinite perfectibility of human nature Herder asserts the naturally limited potential of human beings for meaningful associations and creative interaction.

"Neither our head nor our heart is formed for an infinitely increasing store of thougths and feelings. . . .That mind which embraces much within its sphere of activity as part of itself achieves happiness whilst one which over-extends its feelings is bound to dissipate them into mere words and reaps nothing by misery."

Only when people possess this feeling of oneness with the national group do they feel at ease and free to develop their creative powers. Once they lose this sense of communion with the Volk community, human beings become alienated and are no longer able to act in an unself-conscious creative manner. Hence, to attempt to extend the realms of human socialization beyond the organic, cultural unity of the Volk is to overstep the natural limits constraining the development of conscious affinity among people.

This conception of the natural human condition as one of conscious integration in the cultural life of the Volk, o nation, was to form an important influence upon the later development of the political ideology of nationalism through its incorporation in the theorical writings of such later German thinkers as Fitche, Jahn and Arndt. However, as it is outlined in Herder's theory of cultural community this notion of cultural nationality is an essentially tolerant one, free of the aggressive tendencies of later political versions. In effect Herder's theory of cultural nationality is, first and foremost, a theory of freedom of all national groups to express their cultural identities to the fullest extent. Against the Enlightenment preocupation with the prospective emergence of a unified, integrated world predicated upon a single set of universal laws, Herder look a world of infinite cultural diversity and his writings represent a celebration of cultural divesity as the source of all that is rich and progressive in human life.

Viewed from this perspective Herder's acount of the historical development of the Volk community forms part of a larger vision within his thought involving a process of spiritual evolution which embraces humankind as a whole. The essence of his larger dimension of Herder's work is captured in his notion of Humanität --- the common human essence manifest iin the cultural forms of each national community. Herder observes that, while human cultural existence may be modified in a thousand different ways, "within itself a unique variation on the theme of humanity and corresponding tendency to develop this variant to its fullest extent. Thus, despite the vast panorama of cultural change and diversity in human history, Herder contends that the divine mind has everywere combined the greatest possible multiplicity with unity. Humanität has been dispersed all over the earth. 

"Since one form of mankind and one region could no encompass it, it has been distributed in a thousand forms, changing shape like an eternal Proteus throughout the continents and centuries. And even it it does no strive towards the greater hapiness of the individual. . . nonetheless a plan of progresive endeavour becomes apparent."

The progresive unfolding of this common human essence would appear to involve a seemingly unending process as, with each new national community, there emerge new and unique expressions of Humanität. Ultimately, then, within Herder's relativistic cultural perspective the historical elaboration of the diverse cultural forms constitutes and endless drama, "God's epic throught all the centuries . . . a fable with a thousand variations full of meaning."

 

III

The preceding analisis brings out clearly the nature of Herder's arguments against the universalistic claims and assumptions of the Enlightement conception of history, rooted as they are in a profound belief in the intrinsic value of human cultural diversity. I want now to indicate more explicitly the important areas of commonality between the theory of cultural community presented above and the relativistic conception of human cultural development formulated by Lyotard.

What both Herder and Lyotard are attacking in ther writtings, albeit at very different stages of its historical development, is the paradigm of cultural knowledge arising from the philosophy of the Enlightenment. Moreover, despite the important differences in their historical backgrounds, the basic character and aims of their critiques of the Enlightenment paradigm of knowledge are remarkably similar. At the core of both critiques is a rejection of the pretensions to objectivity of this paradigm and, consequent upon this, its claim to constitute a higher form of knowledge than those cultural forms of knowledge differing from it by virtue of its capacity for rational legitimation. Proceeding from a view of the inherently relative, pluralistic nature of human cultural knowledge as an arbitrary linguistic construct, both Herder and Lyotard reject such claims to objectivity as based upon an artificial reification of a particular, limited cultural form to the status of universality.

In Herder's theory, this claim to epistemological superiority advanced by the Enlightenment philosophers is seen to be based on their erroneous belief in the existence of a set of eternal, abstract rational principles inherent in human nature, existing independently of the contingent, formative processes of history. As conceived by the critical reason of the philosophes, these rational principles were thought to transcend the superstitions and myths of earlier ages, forming the measure against which earlier, unenlightened cultures were judged and ultimately found wanting. In elaborating his historical, culture-relative conception of human development, Herder seeks to expose the contingent nature of the claims of this Enlightenment culture to universal validity and, in so doing, to reveal the true basis of this "universalistic" discourse in the reified categories of a limited European culture.

Similarly, in Lyotard's theory the claim of the modern scientific knowledge form to epistemological superiority is predicated upon the purported ability of the scientific language game to verify its knowledge claims by reference to objective principles of verification or proof. Moreover, it is their inability to stand up to the rigors of objective testing based on these scientific principles which determines the inadmissibility of the knowledge forms of traditional cultures to the body of knowledge accepted as legitimate and meaningful by the modern scientific culture. However, in a manner similar to Herder, Lyotard emphasizes the perilous nature of the claims of the modern scientific discourse to universal objectivity. As only one of many knowledge forms historically generated within the arbitrary language games of human cultures the modern scientific knowledge form is ultimately unable to validate its claims to objectivity in its own terms. Rather, its claims to epistemological superiory are seen to rely upon an appeal to a more fundamental, legitimating discourse of the same narrative form which its own denotative paradigm specifically excludes. This legitimating discourse turns out to be the meta-narrative of the historical emancipation of the rational human subject-- the same universalistic discourse of the Enlightenment which is the focus of Herder's critique.

For both Herder and Lyotard then, the success of the claims of the Enlightenment knowledge form to objective legitimation is made possible only through its reification, by its abstraction from the reality of its origins in those constitutive processes of linguistic cultural practice which represent the common source of all forms of knowledge. The hegemonic status of this modern cultural discourse is sustainable only insofar as it suppresses its own contingent, culture-relative nature -- an act of denial which inevitably entails the repression of those other, historically diverse cultural forms which present to it the true face of its own limited arbitrary nature. It is only with the demise of this modern rationalist cultural form, they believe, that the opressive implications of the demand for the objective validation of knowledge threatening the perpetuation of diverse cultural perspectives will be overcome.

While their critiques of the Enlightenment paradigm of knowledge thus exhibit remarkable similarities, it is also important to note the significant differences in the perspectives of Herder an Lyotard -- differences which emerge most clearly in theier respective views concerning the process of the breakdown of this hegemonic cultural discourse and the nature of the relativistic world deriving drom this disintegrative process. In outlining these points of divergence in their thought, some consideration needs to be given to the very different cultural milieux within which the basic conceptions of language and culture embraced by these two thinkers are formed. For it is the manner in which these contemporary influences shape their understanding of language and culture as the central medium of creative human development which acounts, in large part, fot the differences alluded to here.

In Herder's case the critique which he directs against the cultural knowledge form of the Enlightenment is properly situated as part of a larger current of German intellectual thought of the time, centering around the radical ideas of the Sturm und Drang. This movement of literary and artistic criticism, which included among its number figures like the young Goethe and Schiller, was to prove the source of some of the central ideas associated with the German Romantic movement. But, as Taylor has observed, its most distinctive characteristic eas the overriding aspiration of the Sturmer und Dranger to recapture the fundamental unity of human experience rent asunder by the dichotomizing reason of the Enlightenment. In opposition to the latter's "artificial" bifurcation of human experience into the antithetical categories of thought and feelings, reason and emotions, and humanity and nature, they aspired to an ideal conception of life as the harmonious unity of humans with themselves (their spiritual nature) and their larger natural and social world. The attainment of this unity with one's world was of foremost importance for the Sturmer insofar as it constituted the indispensable condition for human spiritual self expression --- the essential requirement for the realization of humans' authentic being. Moreover, it was language and the cultural creations generated by human linguistic activity which were identified as the essential medium whereby this creative, expresive unity achieved its actualization. In the natural creations of human language, the Sturmer believed, one could discern the aesthetic expression of the harmonious community of people with the greater spiritual whole which formed their world.

Through their personal literary creatuibs the different members of the Sturm und Drang sought to articulate their profound sense of the contemporary fragmentation of this creative, spiritual unity of human existence consequent upon the impact of the culture of the Enlightenment upon the existing social order. This pessimistic assessment of the character of contemporary cultural life also encouraged a more general tendency among many of the Sturmer to identify with the traditional life forms of the lower orders of German society as the embodiment of their ideal. The social world of the German peasants, farmers, and crafts-people, their customs and cultural traditions deriving from a simple life of interaction with nature largely untouched by the "artificiality" affecting the higher social orders of German society, seemed to epitomize, for many of thr Sturmer, that harmonious, spiritually fulfilling existence to which they themselves aspired. Accordingly, in their writtings, we find the first expression of the idealized conception of the common people o Volk and the celebration of German folklore and language which were to become dominant themes of the later German Romantic movement.

These general themes of the Sturm und Drang received powerful expression in Herder's thought. We have seen how he constructs a distinctive philosophy of history which identifies the natural organic unity of the individual and the larger cultural community as the essential condition for the realization of those creative, spiritual powers distinguishing humans as conscious linguistic beings. Moreover, for Herder, the perpetuation of this process of creative cultural development presupposes the preservation of that immediate, spontaneous unity of human beings with the Volk and its traditional cultural forms facilitated by the cohering, integrative power of the naturally evolving national language. Insofar as it threatens to fragment this natural, harmonious unity the artificial Enlightenment knowledge form can have no place within this historical proccess of cultural development. By eroding the organically evolved customs and traditions underpinning the historical process of cultural development, this divisive knowledge form would effectively destroy the foundations upon which the continued expression of the diverse cultural life forms of the species is dependent. Accordingly, Herder is uncompromising in his total rejection of the "unnatural" cultural paradigm of the Enlightenment in favor of the preservation of a prerationalistic world in which the multiplicity of traditionally evolved cultures receives full expression.

Writing at a much later stage in the development of the Enlightenment knowledge form and responding to very different cultural  influences, Lyotard's vision of a evolving, relativistic, postmodern condition of cultural diversity contrasts markedly with Herder's perspective. In his writtings we find no notion of a possible return a premodern, nonscientific order embracing the traditional cultures of narrative knowledge. In fact, Lyotard's is a more dialectical approach, one shaped by his sensitivity to the impact of the information revolution upon contemporary Western society. It is his assessment of the latter's implications for the nature of life within modern society -- an assessment strongly colored by the Nietzschean influences pervading his thought -- which is the major factor shaping his conception of this emerging postmodern world.

[History and Theory, Vol. 27, No. 2 (May, 1988) , pp. 146-168]

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Ernst Jünger: The Resolute Life of an Anarch

ernst_juenger_1935.jpg

Ernst Jünger: The Resolute Life of an Anarch 8

by Keith Preston

Ex: http://www.attackthesystem.com

Perhaps the most interesting, poignant and, possibly, threatening  type of writer and thinker is the one who not only defies conventional categorizations of thought but also offers a deeply penetrating critique of those illusions many hold to be the most sacred. Ernst Junger (1895-1998), who first came to literary prominence during Germany’s Weimar era as a diarist of the experiences of a front line stormtrooper during the Great War, is one such writer. Both the controversial nature of his writing and its staying power are demonstrated by the fact that he remains one of the most important yet widely disliked literary and cultural figures of twentieth century Germany. As recently as 1993, when Junger would have been ninety-eight years of age, he was the subject of an intensely hostile exchange in the “New York Review of Books” between an admirer and a detractor of his work.(1) On the occasion of his one hundreth birthday in 1995, Junger was the subject of a scathing, derisive musical performed in East Berlin. Yet Junger was also the recipient of Germany’s most prestigious literary awards, the Goethe Prize and the Schiller Memorial Prize. Junger, who converted to Catholicism at the age of 101, received a commendation from Pope John Paul II and was an honored guest of French President Francois Mitterand and German Chancellor Helmut Kohl at the Franco-German reconciliation ceremony at Verdun in 1984. Though he was an exceptional achiever during virtually every stage of his extraordinarily long life, it was his work during the Weimar period that not only secured for a Junger a presence in German cultural and political history, but also became the standard by which much of his later work was evaluated and by which his reputation was, and still is, debated. (2)


Ernst Junger was born on March 29, 1895 in Heidelberg, but was raised in Hanover. His father, also named Ernst, was an academically trained chemist who became wealthy as the owner of a pharmaceutical manufacturing business, finding himself successful enough to essentially retire while he was still in his forties. Though raised as an evangelical Protestant, Junger’s father did not believe in any formal religion, nor did his mother, Karoline, an educated middle class German woman whose interests included Germany’s rich literary tradition and the cause of women’s emancipation. His parents’ politics seem to have been liberal, though not radical, in the manner not uncommon to the rising bourgeoise of Germany’s upper middle class during the pre-war period. It was in this affluent, secure bourgeoise environment that Ernst Junger grew up. Indeed, many of Junger’s later activities and professed beliefs are easily understood as a revolt against the comfort and safety of his upbringing. As a child, he was an avid reader of the tales of adventurers and soldiers, but a poor academic student who did not adjust well to the regimented Prussian educational system. Junger’s instructors consistently complained of his inattentiveness. As an adolescent, he became involved with the Wandervogel, roughly the German equivalent of the Boy Scouts.(3)


It was while attending a boarding school near his parents’ home in 1913, at the age of seventeen, that Junger first demonstrated his first propensity for what might be called an “adventurist” way of life. With only six months left before graduation, Junger left school, leaving no word to his family as to his destination. Using money given to him for school-related fees and expenses to buy a firearm and a railroad ticket to Verdun,  Junger subsequently enlisted in the French Foreign Legion, an elite military unit of the French armed forces that accepted enlistees of any nationality and had a reputation for attracting fugitives, criminals and career mercenaries. Junger had no intention of staying with the Legion. He only wanted to be posted to Africa, as he eventually was. Junger then deserted, only to be captured and sentenced to jail. Eventually his father found a capable lawyer for his wayward son and secured his release. Junger then returned to his studies and underwent a belated high school graduation. However, it was only a very short time later that Junger was back in uniform. (4)


Warrior and War Diarist


Ernst Junger immediately volunteered for military service when he heard the news that Germany was at war in the summer of 1914. After two months of training, Junger was assigned to a reserve unit stationed at Champagne. He was afraid the war would end before he had the opportunity to see any action. This attitude was not uncommon among many recruits or conscripts who fought in the war for their respective states. The question immediately arises at to why so many young people would wish to look into the face of death with such enthusiasm. Perhaps they really did not understand the horrors that awaited them. In Junger’s case, his rebellion against the security and luxury of his bourgeoise upbringing had already been ably demonstrated by his excursion with the French Foreign Legion. Because of his high school education, something that soldiers of more proletarian origins lacked, Junger was selected to train to become an officer. Shortly before beginning his officer’s training, Junger was exposed to combat for the first time. From the start, he carried pocket-sized notebooks with him and recorded his observations on the front lines. His writings while at the front exhibit a distinctive tone of detachment, as though he is simply an observer watching while the enemy fires at others. In the middle part of 1915, Junger suffered his first war wound, a bullet graze to the thigh that required only two weeks of recovery time. Afterwards, he was promoted to the rank of lieutenant.(5)


At age twenty-one, Junger was the leader of a reconnaissance team at the Somme whose purpose was to go out at night and search for British landmines. Early on, he acquired the reputation of a brave soldier who lacked the preoccupation with his own safety common to most of the fighting men. The introduction of steel artifacts into the war, tanks for the British side and steel helmets for the Germans, made a deep impression on Junger. Wounded three times at the Somme, Junger was awarded the Iron Medal First Class. Upon recovery, he returned to the front lines. A combat daredevil, he once held out against a much larger British force with only twenty men. After being transferred to fight the French at Flanders, he lost ten of his fourteen men and was wounded in the left hand by a blast from French shelling. After being harshly criticized by a superior officer for the number of men lost on that particular mission, Junger began to develop a contempt for the military hierarchy whom he regarded as having achieved their status as a result of their class position, frequently lacking combat experience of their own. In late 1917, having already experienced nearly three full years of combat, Junger was wounded for the fifth time during a surprise assault by the British. He was grazed in the head by a bullet, acquiring two holes in his helmet in the process. His performance in this battle won him the Knights Cross of the Hohenzollerns. In March 1918, Junger participated in another fierce battle with the British, losing 87 of his 150 men. (6)


Nothing impressed Junger more than personal bravery and endurance on the part of soldiers. He once “fell to the ground in tears” at the sight of a young recruit who had only days earlier been unable to carry an ammunition case by himself suddenly being able to carry two cases of missles after surviving an attack of British shells. A recurring theme in Junger’s writings on his war experiences is the way in which war brings out the most savage human impulses. Essentially, human beings are given full license to engage in behavior that would be considered criminal during peacetime. He wrote casually about burning occupied towns during the course of retreat or a shift of position. However, Junger also demonstrated a capacity for merciful behavior during his combat efforts. He refrained from shooting a cornered British soldier after the foe displayed a portrait of his family to Junger. He was wounded yet again in August of 1918. Having been shot in the chest and directly through a lung, this was his most serious wound yet. After being hit, he still managed to shoot dead yet another British officer. As Junger was being carried off the battlefield on a stretcher, one of the stretcher carriers was killed by a British bullet. Another German soldier attempted to carry Junger on his back, but the soldier was shot dead himself and Junger fell to the ground. Finally, a medic recovered him and pulled him out of harm’s way. This episode would be the end of his battle experiences during the Great War.(7)


In Storms of Steel


Junger’s keeping of his wartime diaries paid off quite well in the long run. They were to become the basis of his first and most famous book, In Storms of Steel, published in 1920. The title was given to the book by Junger himself, having found the phrase in an old Icelandic saga. It was at the suggestion of his father that Junger first sought to have his wartime memoirs published. Initially, he found no takers, antiwar sentiment being extremely high in Germany at the time, until his father at last arranged to have the work published privately. In Storms of Steel differs considerably from similar works published by war veterans during the same era, such as Erich Maria Remarque’s All Quiet on the Western Front and John Dos Passos’ Three Soldiers. Junger’s book reflects none of the disillusionment with war by those experienced in its horrors of the kind found in these other works. Instead, Junger depicted warfare as an adventure in which the soldier faced the highest possible challenge, a battle to the death with a mortal enemy. Though Junger certainly considered himself to be a patriot and, under the influence of Maurice Barres (8), eventually became a strident German nationalist, his depiction of military combat as an idyllic setting where human wills face the supreme test rose far above ordinary nationalist sentiments. Junger’s warrior ideal was not merely the patriot fighting out of a profound sense of loyalty to his country  nor the stereotype of the dutiful soldier whose sense of honor and obedience compels him to follow the orders of his superiors in a headlong march towards death. Nor was the warrior prototype exalted by Junger necessarily an idealist fighting for some alleged greater good such as a political ideal or religious devotion. Instead, war itself is the ideal for Junger. On this question, he was profoundly influenced by Nietzsche, whose dictum “a good war justifies any cause”, provides an apt characterization of Junger’s depiction of the life (and death) of the combat soldier. (9)


This aspect of Junger’s outlook is illustrated quite well by the ending he chose to give to the first edition of In Storms of Steel. Although the second edition (published in 1926) ends with the nationalist rallying cry, “Germany lives and shall never go under!”, a sentiment that was deleted for the third edition published in 1934 at the onset of the Nazi era, the original edition ends simply with Junger in the hospital after being wounded for the final time and receiving word that he has received yet another commendation for his valor as a combat soldier. There is no mention of Germany’s defeat a few months later. Nationalism aside, the book is clearly about Junger, not about Germany, and Junger’s depiction of the war simultaneously displays an extraordinary level detachment for someone who lived in the face of death for four years and a highly personalized account of the war where battle is first and foremost about the assertion of one’s own “will to power” with cliched patriotic pieties being of secondary concern.


Indeed, Junger goes so far as to say there were winners and losers on both sides of the war. The true winners were not those who fought in a particular army or for a particular country, but who rose to the challenge placed before them and essentially achieved what Junger regarded as a higher state of enlightenment. He believed the war had revealed certain fundamental truths about the human condition. First, the illusions of the old bourgeoise order concerning peace, progress and prosperity had been inalterably shattered. This was not an uncommon sentiment during that time, but it is a revelation that Junger seems to revel in while others found it to be overwhelmingly devastating. Indeed, the lifelong champion of Enlightenment liberalism, Bertrand Russell, whose life was almost as long as Junger’s and who observed many of the same events from a much different philosophical perspective, once remarked that no one who had been born before 1914 knew what it was like to be truly happy.(10) A second observation advanced by Junger had to do with the role of technology in transforming the nature of war, not only in a purely mechanical sense, but on a much greater existential level. Before, man had commanded weaponry in the course of combat. Now weaponry of the kind made possible by modern technology and industrial civilization essentially commanded man. The machines did the fighting. Man simply resisted this external domination. Lastly, the supremacy of might and the ruthless nature of human existence had been demonstrated. Nietzsche was right. The tragic, Darwinian nature of the human condition had been revealed as an irrevocable law.


In Storms of Steel was only the first of several works based on his experiences as a combat officer that were produced by Junger during the 1920s. Copse 125 described a battle between two small groups of combatants. In this work, Junger continued to explore the philosophical themes present in his first work. The type of technologically driven warfare that emerged during the Great War is characterized as reducing men to automatons driven by airplanes, tanks and machine guns. Once again, jingoistic nationalism is downplayed as a contributing factor to the essence of combat soldier’s spirit. Another work of Junger’s from the early 1920s, Battle as Inner Experience, explored the psychology of war. Junger suggested that civilization itself was but a mere mask for the “primordial” nature of humanity that once again reveals itself during war. Indeed, war had the effect of elevating humanity to a higher level. The warrior becomes a kind of god-like animal, divine in his superhuman qualities, but animalistic in his bloodlust. The perpetual threat of imminent death is a kind of intoxicant. Life is at its finest when death is closest. Junger described war as a struggle for a cause that overshadows the respective political or cultural ideals of the combatants. This overarching cause is courage. The fighter is honor bound to respect the courage of his mortal enemy. Drawing on the philosophy of Nietzsche, Junger argued that the war had produced a “new race” that had replaced the old pieties, such as those drawn from religion, with a new recognition of the primacy of the “will to power”.(11)


Conservative Revolutionary


Junger’s writings about the war quickly earned him the status of a celebrity during the Weimar period. Battle as Inner Experience contained the prescient suggestion that the young men who had experienced the greatest war the world had yet to see at that point could never be successfully re-integrated into the old bougeoise order from which they came. For these fighters, the war had been a spiritual experience. Having endured so much only to see their side lose on such seemingly humiliating terms, the veterans of the war were aliens to the rationalistic, anti-militarist, liberal republic that emerged in 1918 at the close of the war. Junger was at his parents’ home recovering from war wounds during the time of the attempted coup by the leftist workers’ and soldiers’ councils and subsequent suppression of these by the Freikorps. He experimented with psychoactive drugs such as cocaine and opium during this time, something that he would continue to do much later in life. Upon recovery, he went back into active duty in the much diminished Germany army. Junger’s earliest works, such as In Storms of Steel, were published during this time and he also wrote for military journals on the more technical and specialized aspects of combat and military technology. Interestingly, Junger attributed Germany’s defeat in the war simply to poor leadership, both military and civilian, and rejected the “stab in the back” legend that consoled less keen veterans.


After leaving the army in 1923, Junger continued to write, producing a novella about a soldier during the war titled Sturm, and also began to study the philosophy of Oswald Spengler. His first work as a philosopher of nationalism appeared the Nazi paper Volkischer Beobachter in September, 1923.


Critiquing the failed Marxist revolution of 1918, Junger argued that the leftist coup failed because of its lacking of fresh ideas. It was simply a regurgitation of the egalitarian outllook of the French Revolution. The revolutionary left appealed only to the material wants of the Germany people in Junger’s views. A successful revolution would have to be much more than that. It would have to appeal to their spiritual or “folkish” instincts as well. Over the next few years Junger studied the natural sciences at the University of Leipzig and in 1925, at age thirty, he married nineteen-year-old Gretha von Jeinsen. Around this time, he also became a full-time political  writer. Junger was hostile to Weimar democracy and its commercial bourgeiose society. His emerging political ideal was one of an elite warrior caste that stood above petty partisan politics and the middle class obsession with material acquisition. Junger became involved with the the Stahlhelm, a right-wing veterans group, and was a contributer to its paper, Die Standardite. He associated himself with the younger, more militant members of the organization who favored an uncompromised nationalist revolution and eschewed the parliamentary system. Junger’s weekly column in Die Standardite disseminated his nationalist ideology to his less educated readers. Junger’s views at this point were a mixture of Spengler, Social Darwinism, the traditionalist philosophy of the French rightist Maurice Barres, opposition to the internationalism of the left that had seemingly been discredited by the events of 1914, irrationalism and anti-parliamentarianism. He took a favorable view of the working class and praised the Nazis’ efforts to win proletarian sympathies. Junger also argued that a nationalist outlook need not be attached to one particular form of government, even suggesting that a liberal monarchy would be inferior to a nationalist republic.(12)


In an essay for Die Standardite titled “The Machine”, Junger argued that the principal struggle was not between social classes or political parties but between man and technology. He was not anti-technological in a Luddite sense, but regarded the technological apparatus of modernity to have achieved a position of superiority over mankind which needed to be reversed. He was concerned that the mechanized efficiency of modern life produced a corrosive effect on the human spirit. Junger considered the Nazis’ glorification of peasant life to be antiquated. Ever the realist, he believed the world of the rural people to be in a state of irreversible decline. Instead, Junger espoused a “metropolitan nationalism” centered on the urban working class. Nationalism was the antidote to the anti-particularist materialism of the Marxists who, in Junger’s views, simply mirrored the liberals in their efforts to reduce the individual to a component of a mechanized mass society. The humanitarian rhetoric of the left Junger dismissed as the hypocritical cant of power-seekers feigning benevolence. He began to pin his hopes for a nationalist revolution on the younger veterans who comprised much of the urban working class.


In 1926, Junger became editor of Arminius, which also featured the writings of Nazi leaders like Alfred Rosenberg and Joseph Goebbels. In 1927, he contributed his final article to the Nazi paper, calling for a new definition of the “worker”, one not rooted in Marxist ideology but the idea of the worker as a civilian counterpart to the soldier who struggles fervently for the nationalist ideal. Junger and  Hitler had exchanged copies of their respective writings and a scheduled meeting between the two was canceled due to a change in Hitler’s itinerary. Junger respected Hitler’s abilities as an orator, but came to feel he lacked the ability to become a true leader. He also found Nazi ideology to be intellectually shallow, many of the Nazi movement’s leaders to be talentless and was displeased by the vulgarity,  crassly opportunistic and overly theatrical aspects of Nazi public rallies. Always an elitist, Junger considered the Nazis’ pandering the common people to be debased. As he became more skeptical of the Nazis, Junger began writing for a wider circle of readers beyond that of the militant nationalist right-wing. His works began to appear in the Jewish liberal Leopold Schwarzchild’s Das Tagebuch and the “national-bolshevik” Ernst Niekisch’s Widerstand.


Junger began to assemble around himself an elite corps of bohemian, eccentric intellectuals who would meet regularly on Friday evenings. This group included some of the most interesting personalities of the Weimar period. Among them were the Freikorps veteran Ernst von Salomon, Otto von Strasser, who with his brother Gregor led a leftist anti-Hitler faction of the Nazi movement, the national-bolshevik Niekisch, the Jewish anarchist Erich Muhsam who had figured prominently in the early phase of the failed leftist revolution of 1918, the American writer Thomas Wolfe and the expressionist writer Arnolt Bronnen. Many among this group espoused a type of revolutionary socialism based on nationalism rather than class, disdaining the Nazis’ opportunistic outreach efforts to the middle class. Some, like Niekisch, favored an alliance between Germany and Soviet Russia against the liberal-capitalist powers of the West. Occasionally, Joseph Goebbels would turn up at these meetings hoping to convert the group, particularly Junger himself, whose war writings he had admired, to the Nazi cause. These efforts by the Nazi propaganda master proved unsuccessful. Junger regarded Goebbels as a shallow ideologue who spoke in platitudes even in private conversation.(13)


The final break between Ernst Junger and the NSDAP occurred in September 1929. Junger published an article in Schwarzchild’s Tagebuch attacking and ridiculing the Nazis as sell outs for having reinvented themselves as a parliamentary party. He also dismissed their racism and anti-Semitism as ridiculous, stating that according to the Nazis a nationalist is simply someone who “eats three Jews for breakfast.” He condemned the Nazis for pandering to the liberal middle class and reactionary traditional conservatives “with lengthy tirades against the decline in morals, against abortion, strikes, lockouts, and the reduction of police and military forces.” Goebbels responded by attacking Junger in the Nazi press, accusing him being motivated by personal literary ambition, and insisting this had caused him “to vilify the national socialist movement, probably so as to make himself popular in his new kosher surroundings” and dismissing Junger’s attacks by proclaiming the Nazis did not “debate with renegades who abuse us in the smutty press of Jewish traitors.”(14)


Junger on the Jewish Question


Junger held complicated views on the question of German Jews. He considered anti-Semitism of the type espoused by Hitler to be crude and reactionary. Yet his own version of nationalism required a level of homogeneity that was difficult to reconcile with the subnational status of Germany Jewry. Junger suggested that Jews should assimilate and pledge their loyalty to Germany once and for all. Yet he expressed admiration for Orthodox Judaism and indifference to Zionism. Junger maintained personal friendships with Jews and wrote for a Jewish owned publication. During this time his Jewish publisher Schwarzchild published an article examining Junger’s views on the Jews of Germany. Schwarzchild insisted that Junger was nothing like his Nazi rivals on the far right. Junger’s nationalism was based on an aristocratic warrior ethos, while Hitler’s was more comparable to the criminal underworld. Hitler’s men were “plebian alley scum”. However, Schwarzchild also characterized Junger’s rendition of nationalism as motivated by little more than a fervent rejection of bourgeoise society and lacking in attention to political realities and serious economic questions.(15)


The Worker


Other than In Storms of Steel, Junger’s The Worker: Mastery and Form was his most influential work from the Weimar era. Junger would later distance himself from this work, published in 1932, and it was reprinted in the 1950s only after Junger was prompted to do so by Martin Heidegger.


In The Worker, Junger outlines his vision of a future state ordered as a technocracy based on workers and soldiers led by a warrior elite. Workers are no longer simply components of an industrial machine, whether capitalist or communist, but have become a kind of civilian-soldier operating as an economic warrior. Just as the soldier glories in his accomplishments in battle, so does the worker glory in the achievements expressed through his work. Junger predicted that continued technological advancements would render the worker/capitalist dichotomy obsolete. He also incorporated the political philosophy of his friend Carl Schmitt into his worldview. As Schmitt saw international relations as a Hobbesian battle between rival powers, Junger believed each state would eventually adopt a system not unlike what he described in The Worker. Each state would maintain its own technocratic order with the workers and soldiers of each country playing essentially the same role on behalf of their respective nations. International affairs would be a crucible where the will to power of the different nations would be tested.


Junger’s vision contains a certain amount prescience. The general trend in politics at the time was a movement towards the kind of technocratic state Junger described. These took on many varied forms including German National Socialism, Italian Fascism, Soviet Communism, the growing welfare states of Western Europe and America’s New Deal. Coming on the eve of World War Two, Junger’s prediction of a global Hobbesian struggle between national collectives possessing previously unimagined levels of technological sophistication also seems rather prophetic. Junger once again attacked the bourgeoise as anachronistic. Its values of material luxury and safety he regarded as unfit for the violent world of the future. (16)


The National Socialist Era


By the time Hitler took power in 1933, Junger’s war writings had become commonly used in high schools and universities as examples of wartime literature, and Junger enjoyed success within the context of German popular culture as well. Excerpts of Junger’s works were featured in military journals. The Nazis tried to coopt his semi-celebrity status, but he was uncooperative. Junger was appointed to the Nazified German Academcy of Poetry, but declined the position. When the Nazi Party’s paper published some of his work in 1934, Junger wrote a letter of protest. The Nazi regime, despite its best efforts to capitalize on his reputation, viewed Junger with suspicioun. His past association with the national-bolshevik Ersnt Niekisch, the Jewish anarchist Erich Muhsam and the anti-Hitler Nazi Otto von Strasser, all of whom were either eventually killed or exiled by the Third Reich, led the Nazis to regard Junger as a potential subversive. On several occasions, Junger received visits from the Gestapo in search of some of his former friends. During the early years of the Nazi regime, Junger was in the fortunate position of being able to economically afford travel outside of Germany. He journeyed to Norway, Brazil, Greece and Morocco during this time, and published several works based on his travels.(17)


Junger’s most significant work from the Nazi period is the novel On the Marble Cliffs. The book is an allegorical attack on the Hitler regime. It was written in 1939, the same year that Junger reentered the German army. The book describes a mysterious villian that threatens a community, a sinister warlord called the “Head Ranger”. This character is never featured in the plot of the novel, but maintains a forboding presence that is universal (much like “Big Brother” in George Orwell’s 1984). Another character in the novel, “Braquemart”, is described as having physical characteristics remarkably similar to those of Goebbels. The book sold fourteen thousand copies during its first two weeks in publication. Swiss reviewers immediately recognized the allegorical references to the Nazi state in the novel. The Nazi Party’s organ, Volkische Beobachter, stated that Ernst Jünger was flirting with a bullet to the head. Goebbels urged Hitler to ban the book, but Hitler refused, probably not wanting to show his hand. Indeed, Hitler gave orders that Junger not be harmed.(18)


Junger was stationed in France for most of the Second World War. Once again, he kept diaries of the experience. Once again, he expressed concern that he might not get to see any action before the war was over. While Junger did not have the opportunity to experience the level of danger and daredevil heroics he had during the Great War, he did receive yet another medal, the Iron Cross, for retrieving the body of a dead corporal while under heavy fire. Junger also published some of his war diaries during this time. However, the German government took a dim view of these, viewing them as too sympathetic to the occupied French. Junger’s duties included censorship of the mail coming into France from German civilians. He took a rather liberal approach to this responsibility and simply disposed of incriminating documents rather than turning them over for investigation. In doing so, he probably saved lives. He also encountered members of France’s literary and cultural elite, among them the actor Louis Ferdinand Celine, a raving anti-Semite and pro-Vichyite who suggested Hitler’s harsh measures against the Jews had not been heavy handed enough. As rumors of the Nazi extermination programs began to spread,  Junger wrote in his diary that the mechanization of the human spirit of the type he had written about in the past had apparently generated a higher level of human depravity. When he saw three young French-Jewish girls wearing the yellow stars required by the Nazis, he wrote that he felt embarrassed to be in the Nazi army. In July of 1942, Junger observed the mass arrest of French Jews, the beginning of implementation of the “Final Solution”. He described the scene as follows:


“Parents were first separated from their children, so there was wailing to be heard in the streets. At no moment may I forget that I am surrounded by the unfortunate, by those suffering to the very depths, else what sort of person, what sort of officer would I be? The uniform obliges one to grant protection wherever it goes. Of course one has the impression that one must also, like Don Quixote, take on millions.”(19)     


An entry into Junger’s diary from October 16, 1943 suggests that an unnamed army officer had told  Junger about the use of crematoria and poison gas to murder Jews en masse. Rumors of plots against Hitler circulated among the officers with whom Junger maintained contact. His son, Ernstl, was arrested after an informant claimed he had spoken critically of Hitler. Ernstl Junger was imprisoned for three months, then placed in a penal battalion where he was killed in action in Italy. On July 20, 1944 an unsuccessful assassination attempt was carried out against Hitler. It is still disputed as to whether or not Junger knew of the plot or had a role in its planning. Among those arrested for their role in the attemt on Hitler’s life were members of Junger’s immediate circle of associates and superior officers within the German army. Junger was dishonorably discharged shortly afterward.(20)


Following the close of the Second World War, Junger came under suspicion from the Allied occupational authorities because of his far right-wing nationalist and militarist past. He refused to cooperate with the Allies De-Nazification programs and was barred from publishing for four years. He would go on to live another half century, producing many more literary works, becoming a close friend of Albert Hoffman, the inventor of the hallucinogen LSD, with which he experimented. In a 1977 novel, Eumeswil, he took his tendency towards viewing the world around him with detachment to a newer, more clearly articulated level with his invention of the concept of the “Anarch”. This idea, heavily influenced by the writings of the early nineteenth century German philosopher Max Stirner, championed the solitary individual who remains true to himself within the context of whatever external circumstances happen to be present. Some sample quotations from this work illustrate the philosophy and worldview of the elderly Junger quite well:


“For the anarch, if he remains free of being ruled, whether by sovereign or society, this does not mean he refuses to serve in any way. In general, he serves no worse than anyone else, and sometimes even better, if he likes the game. He only holds back from the pledge, the sacrifice, the ultimate devotion … I serve in the Casbah; if, while doing this, I die for the Condor, it would be an accident, perhaps even an obliging gesture, but nothing more.”


“The egalitarian mania of demagogues is even more dangerous than the brutality of men in gallooned coats. For the anarch, this remains theoretical, because he avoids both sides. Anyone who has been oppressed can get back on his feet if the oppression did not cost him his life. A man who has been equalized is physically and morally ruined. Anyone who is different is not equal; that is one of the reasons why the Jews are so often targeted.”


“The anarch, recognizing no government, but not indulging in paradisal dreams as the anarchist does, is, for that very reason, a neutral observer.”


“Opposition is collaboration.”


“A basic theme for the anarch is how man, left to his own devices, can defy superior force – whether state, society or the elements – by making use of their rules without submitting to them.”


“… malcontents… prowl through the institutions eternally dissatisfied, always disappointed. Connected with this is their love of cellars and rooftops, exile and prisons, and also banishment, on which they actually pride themselves. When the structure finally caves in they are the first to be killed in the collapse. Why do they not know that the world remains inalterable in change? Because they never find their way down to its real depth, their own. That is the sole place of essence, safety. And so they do themselves in.”


“The anarch may not be spared prisons – as one fluke of existence among others. He will then find the fault in himself.”


“We are touching one a … distinction between anarch and anarchist; the relation to authority, to legislative power. The anarchist is their mortal enemy, while the anarch refuses to acknowledge them. He seeks neither to gain hold of them, nor to topple them, nor to alter them – their impact bypasses him. He must resign himself only to the whirlwinds they generate."

“The anarch is no individualist, either. He wishes to present himself neither as a Great Man nor as a Free Spirit. His own measure is enough for him; freedom is not his goal; it is his property. He does not come on as foe or reformer: one can get along nicely with him in shacks or in palaces. Life is too short and too beautiful to sacrifice for ideas, although contamination is not always avoidable. But hats off to the martyrs.”


“We can expect as little from society as from the state. Salvation lies in the individual.” (21)


Notes:


1. Ian Buruma, “The Anarch at Twilight”, New York Review of Books, Volume 40, No. 12, June 24, 1993. Hilary Barr, “An Exchange on Ernst Junger”, New York Review of Books, Volume 40, No. 21, December 16, 1993.

2. Nevin, Thomas. Ernst Junger and Germany: Into the Abyss, 1914-1945. Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1996, pp. 1-7. Loose, Gerhard. Ernst Junger. New York: Twayne Publishers, 1974, preface.

3. Nevin, pp. 9-26. Loose, p. 21

4. Loose, p. 22. Nevin, pp. 27-37.

5. Nevin. p. 49.

6. Ibid., p. 57

7. Ibid., p. 61

8. Maurice Barrès (September 22, 1862 - December 4, 1923) was a French novelist, journalist, an anti-semite, nationalist politician and agitator. Leaning towards the far-left in his youth as a Boulangist deputy, he progressively developed a theory close to Romantic nationalism and shifted to the right during the Dreyfus Affair, leading the Anti-Dreyfusards alongside Charles Maurras. In 1906, he was elected both to the Académie française and as deputy of the Seine department, and until his death he sat with the conservative Entente républicaine démocratique. A strong supporter of the Union sacrée(Holy Union) during World War I, Barrès remained a major influence of generations of French writers, as well as of monarchists, although he was not a monarchist himself. Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Maurice_Barr%C3%A8s

9. Nevin, pp. 58, 71, 97.

10. Schilpp, P. A. “The Philosophy of Bertrand Russell”.  Reviewed Hermann Weyl, The American Mathematical Monthly, Vol. 53, No. 4 (Apr., 1946), pp. 208-214.

11. Nevin, pp. 122, 125, 134, 136, 140, 173.

12. Ibid., pp. 75-91.

13. Ibid., p. 107

14. Ibid., p. 108.

15. Ibid., pp. 109-111.

16. Ibid., pp. 114-140.

17. Ibid., p. 145.

18. Ibid., p. 162

19. Ibid., p. 189.

20. Ibid., p. 209.

21. Junger, Ernst. Eumeswil. New York: Marion Publishers, 1980, 1993.


Bibliography


Barr, Hilary. “An Exchange on Ernst Junger”, New York Review of Books, Volume 40, No. 21, December 16, 1993.

Braun, Abdalbarr. “Warrior, Waldgaenger, Anarch: An Essay on Ernst Junger’s Concept of the Sovereign Individual”. Archived at http://www.fluxeuropa.com/juenger-anarch.htm

Buruma, Ian. “The Anarch at Twilight”, New York Review of Books, Volume 40, No. 12, June 24, 1993.

Hofmann, Albert. LSD: My Problem Child, Chapter Seven, “Radiance From Ernst Junger”. Archived at http://www.flashback.se/archive/my_problem_child/chapter7.html


Loose, Gerhard. Ernst Junger. New York: Twayne Publishers, 1974.


Hervier, Julien. The Details of Time: Conversations with Ernst Junger. New York: Marsilio Publishers, 1986.


Junger, Ernst. Eumeswil. New York: Marsilio Publishers, 1980, 1993.


Junger, Ernst. In Storms of Steel. New York: Penguin Books, 1920, 1963, 2003.


Junger, Ernst. On the Marble Cliffs. New York: Duenewald Printing Corporation, 1947.


Nevin, Thomas. Ernst Junger and Germnay: Into the Abyss, 1914-1945. Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1996.


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jeudi, 12 septembre 2013 | Lien permanent

Pensare come una montagna

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Pensare come una montagna

di Luisa Bonesio

Fonte: Geofilosofia
 

1. Volti di montagna

“Pensare come una montagna”: una proposizione che fa sobbalzare ogni buon filosofo accademico o gridare allo scandalo di un palese antiumanesimo gli zelanti neoilluministi come Luc Ferry, eppure non estranea, nel suo spirito, al “sentire cosmico”, come l’anima “immota e chiara come la montagna prima del meriggio”, o la “saggezza selvatica” (1) dello Zarathustra nietzschiano. “Pensare come una montagna”, motto del fondatore dell’ecologia profonda Aldo Leopold, tuttavia è anche una proposizione che rischia di non venire intesa in tutte le sue possibilità nemmeno da chi fa della difesa dell’ambiente la sua bandiera, e nemmeno comprensibile nella retorica di molto alpinismo. Nondimeno, credo che si debba riflettere attentamente su questa espressione provocatoria, ben al di là dell’intenzionalità con cui fu pronunciata.

Nell’ampiamente nota storia della “invenzione” moderna dei paesaggi alpestri, che avviene sotto il segno congiunto dell’estetica e degli interessi naturalistici, si nota uno strabismo nel modo di considerare la montagna: all’interesse degli artisti, e poi dei touristi, fa da contraltare una sorta di cecità estetica dei locali. Famosi gli esempi dell’ascesa di Petrarca al Monte Ventoso, in cui gli abitanti del luogo tentano ripetutamente di dissuadere il poeta e suo fratello dall’impresa; e la testimonianza di Cézanne: “Il contadino che vuol vendere le sue cose al mercato non ha mai visto la montagna Sainte-Victoire [...]. Sa cosa viene seminato là o qui lungo la strada, come sarà il tempo l’indomani, se la montagna Sainte-Victoire porterà o no il suo cappello [...] ma che gli alberi sono verdi e che questo verde è un albero, che questa terra è rossa, e questo detrito rosso sono colline, credo veramente che la maggior parte non lo senta non sapendo nulla al di fuori della propria inconsapevole inclinazione verso ciò che è utile” (2). Il che è molto simile a quanto accadde ai primordi della scoperta alpinistica: furono uomini “venuti da fuori”, cittadini, stranieri a “conquistare” quelle vette alla cui ombra vivevano le guide locali. In questa iniziale divaricazione degli sguardi - quelli “disinteressati”, estetici e artistici, e poi del cliché turistico da un lato, e quelli “volti all’utile”, di quelli che il geografo Cosgrove (3) chiamerebbe gli “insiders”, si prefigura la vicenda successiva e il destino moderno delle montagne, e delle Alpi in particolare.

Per andare in montagna, per guardarla esteticamente e “con sentimento”, occorre poterla “vedere”, “metterla a fuoco”. Con Petrarca - per quanto da Rudatis la sua modesta ascesa sia potuta essere sminuita, da un punto di vista alpinistico, come “una turlupinatura” - s’intravede il modo moderno di guardare la natura, la curiosità di scoprire paesaggi mai visti prima, il desiderio di godere la bellezza multiforme degli spettacoli naturali ma anche delle proprie sensazioni al loro cospetto, indipendentemente dalla conoscenza scientifica che potrebbe spiegarli. La scoperta della montagna si inscrive in questa più ampia vicenda dell’affermazione moderna della soggettività, della valorizzazione estetica del sentimento, dell’emozione individuale. La natura da un lato è scrutata e violata con ogni mezzo dalla scienza, assoggettata alla calcolabilità in vista del suo sfruttamento; viene oggettivata, misurata, analizzata, tradotta in cifre ed equazioni, ridotta a pura materialità disanimata passibile di manipolazione; ma dall’altro, in assoluta complementarità, trova una valorizzazione nel sentimento privato dei singoli, che si dilettano delle sue scene, paurose o pittoresche, sublimi o idilliache, in cui proiettare le proprie sensazioni e i propri stati d’animo. Nella grande stagione iniziale dell’estetica settecentesca come nuova disciplina filosofica, sapere di ciò di cui non si può dare spiegazione concettuale, conoscenza di un piacere che rischia sempre di chiudersi nel solipsismo, nella contemplazione solitaria, al pari di tutti gli aspetti disumani e selvaggi della natura, non ancora addomesticati dalla civiltà, la montagna è la grande protagonista del moderno sentimento del paesaggio.

Prima che Paccard e Balmat aprissero la via alle spedizioni scientifiche di Horace Bénédict de Saussure, e poi alle innumerevoli ascensioni ed escursioni, è proprio l’estetica a “inventare” la via alla montagna, nella forma delle poetiche del sublime. La natura impervia, se non ostile e minacciosa, dei monti esercita una sua specifica fascinazione, analoga a quella dell’oceano in tempesta, di uno spettacolo di grandezza e di potenza che eccede i limiti umani. La smisuratezza della montagna intimorisce, ma al tempo stesso fa piacevolmente sperimentare all’uomo la propria capacità di tradurre in godimento estetico, grazie alla sensibilità e alla cultura, qualsiasi aspetto della natura, anche il più terribile e minaccioso, affermando così, in ultima istanza, ancora una volta la propria superiorità. Ed è anche, se non nelle intenzioni dei filosofi e degli artisti settecenteschi, certamente negli effetti storici, un modo per sottomettere ancora una volta la natura alla misura umana, nei suoi aspetti più soggettivistici e idiosincratici, riducendola a semplice correlato emotivo o a occasione per provare sempre nuove situazioni. E’ da notare come qui sia la radice prima, anche se ormai inconsapevole, della ricerca di quell’“estremo” che caratterizza così fortemente un approccio sempre più in voga alla montagna.

Quando la via alla montagna è così aperta, dalla letteratura e dalle arti, su di essa comincia a focalizzarsi l’attenzione e la curiosità di un pubblico che, mutando i tempi, da colto e poco numeroso, assume dimensioni sempre maggiori fino a diventare quello di massa dei giorni nostri. Parallelamente all’invenzione
(4) estetica della montagna, ne avviene un’altra, non meno rilevante, di ordine scientifico e naturalistico: mi limito a ricordare le menzionate spedizioni pionieristiche di Saussure sul Monte Bianco, e in seguito i vari viaggi di Alessandro Volta nelle Alpi svizzere. La cultura occidentale torna in tal modo a guardare le montagne, iscrivendole in un sistema di rappresentazioni che le correla alla soggettività, al sentire del singolo: così che, quando si daranno le condizioni sociali ed economiche, oltre che ideologiche, per un consumo “di massa” della natura come paesaggio e luogo di salubrità, il turismo non farà che usare, ridotte a slogan, le parole dell’estetica del pittoresco e del sublime, degradando a kitsch la natura selvaggia e retorizzando, spesso fino al caricaturale, le virtù salutari del clima. Oggi noi siamo in grado di cogliere appieno gli effetti di questa vicenda di uso “estetico” delle montagne, con le differenze innegabili che esistono fra singole regioni o località. A questa inscrizione nella logica cittadina come spazio turistico o sportivo, si aggiunge una più generale inscrizione - che non è sempre forzosa, ma spesso auspicata dagli stessi abitanti - nella grande logica globale, mediante vie di comunicazione, trasporto di energia, assedio dell’industria e dei suoi rifiuti. Contro i fianchi delle montagne battono sempre più insistentemente le mareggiate dell’industrialismo, della logica di massa, dell’assalto a uno degli ultimi territori differenziati del continente europeo, che fino a qualche generazione fa era rimasto in un equilibrio intatto, di tipo preistorico (5).

Se la codificazione estetica delle montagne è stata l’occasione per estrarle da quell’aura di leggendarie paure e di diffidente tenuta a distanza, essa, però, le ha inevitabilmente “tradotte” in un sistema di rappresentazioni in cui esse non “parlano”, né tantomeno “pensano”, né sfiora la mente dell’homo tecnicus la preoccupazione di comprendere che cosa possa voler dire “pensare” come loro. Per molti versi, le montagne “sono” così come la ha costruite un’operazione immaginale che ha l’età della modernità: imponenti, sublimi, terribili, minacciose, affascinanti... Chi potrebbe resistere alla tentazione di appropriarsene, almeno in immagine, o per impresa sportiva, o per partecipazione al grande rito collettivo delle vacanze? Il valore estetico finisce con il diventare sempre più un valore economico e del consumo, cui nulla sembra potersi sottrarre nel nostro mondo, e quindi finisce con l’essersi trasformato, da sguardo alla gloria delle montagne in strumento del loro stravolgimento. Non si guardano più i monti per intenderne il nomos, non se ne contempla il volto per imparare a conoscerlo e ad accordarsi con esso, ma dei monti e delle valli si fanno scenari e pretesti di svago o di titanismi.

Ma quei locali che ai cittadini apparivano così indifferenti al bello, perché gravati dal duro e sapiente compito del sopravvivere in montagna, e che invece ne erano stati i consapevoli partners nel cooperare alla formazione di quei paesaggi tanto ambiti, forse avevano consapevolezza di cosa potrebbe voler dire “pensare come una montagna”: là dove la distruzione moderna, l’abbandono, lo stravolgimento non hanno agito del tutto, là si vede (ammesso che si sia ancora in grado) come quella lentezza, quell’immobilità tanto sbeffeggiata dai contemporanei, sia stata una delle cifre più profonde dell’abitare la montagna. Altro ritmo, altro tempo in cui si salvaguardava (e si esprimeva) l’estraneità di questi luoghi alla logica del novum, del consumo, dell’accelerazione: niente di meno futuristico delle montagne, con buona pace di varie utopie architettoniche (da Viollet-le-Duc a Bruno Taut) che hanno maggior parentela con l’opprimente assurdità della geometria aliena delle Montagne della follia di H.P. Lovecraft
(6) che con un pensiero consono ai luoghi, una sapienza della località, una consapevolezza del genius loci. Domandarsi se gli attuali abitanti delle montagne abbiano conservato questa sapienza dell’equilibrio con il proprio luogo è altrettanto importante dell’interrogarsi sulle modalità di accostarsi ai monti da parte dei turisti e degli appassionati.

2. “Le culminazioni dell’alpe” Abbiamo già visto come non necessariamente quelli “che vanno in montagna” coincidano con quelli “che stanno in montagna”: o almeno, ne siano, almeno inizialmente, profondamente diversi gli intenti. Ancora oggi, per lo più, un caricatore d’alpe ha del territorio montano una visione assai diversa da quella dell’escursionista o del turista, sia in termini di conoscenza che di individuazione dei suoi possibili usi; così come un cercatore di cristalli all’epoca della scoperta del Monte Bianco rispetto a un artista che ne immortalava le vedute. Sicuramente anche il modo di “vedere” le montagne dei monaci tibetani o di quanti si recano in pellegrinaggio sul Kailash (o su qualsiasi altra montagna sacra) è diverso da quello degli occidentali che vi si recano per le loro ascese.

Nella cultura del Novecento esistono significative posizioni di critica i miti della modernità - progresso, democraticismo, economicismo, fede nella scienza e nella tecnica, materialismo -, in cui il turismo viene interpretato come una forma massificata e priva di consapevolezza dell’accostarsi alla natura. Il turismo e il mito della natura incontaminata appaiono come uno dei segni della decadenza spirituale della nostra epoca, oltre che fenomeni che finiscono col distruggere o compromettere l’ambiente naturale, senza peraltro assicurare durevolmente quei benefici che fungono ormai per lo più da alibi e retorica per la commercializzazione di qualcosa che non dovrebbe poter essere considerato una merce. Questo punto di vista non vuole ripristinare un passato improbabile, ma, al contrario, richiamare l’attenzione sul fatto che ogni luogo richiede comportamenti e misure specifiche che ne rispettino il nomos sapendone riconoscere il significato.

Una declinazione particolare di questa attitudine di rifiuto dello svilimento delle montagne nella logica consumistica o sportiva è ravvisabile nell’interpretazione della pratica alpinistica come disciplina ascetica e spirituale. L’alpinismo di chi si rifà a valori spirituali e metafisici si distacca recisamente da ogni interpretazione della disciplina in senso agonistico e sportivo. Lo sport è infatti una delle manifestazioni della civiltà di massa e del culto della forma fisica fine a se stessa che caratterizza il nichilismo contemporaneo, viceversa significativamente poco preoccupato della salute spirituale -, costitutivamente volto all’agonismo, o addirittura al superomismo - dunque prodotto estremo della volontà i potenza che pretende di essere metro di tutte le cose, visibili e invisibili, signoria sulla terra che, faustianamente, non tollera alcun limite alle sue conquiste, ma è sempre proteso ad affermarsi in nome di quel titanismo con cui ha cambiato la faccia della terra
(7).

Se l’ascensione viene considerata per le possibilità spirituali e iniziatiche che offre, la sacralità della montagna, testimoniata dal suo universale simbolismo come corrispondente di stati interiori trascendenti o sede di divinità, o di eroi trasfigurati, insomma luogo di partecipazioni a forme di vita più alta, diventa luogo di manifestazione simbolica di significati trascendenti, come l’esperienza stessa della montagna alla nostra più profonda interiorità, purché venga realizzata adeguatamente, suggerisce.

Questo modo di accostarsi alla montagna respinge sia l’atteggiamento “lirico”, ossia sentimentale in senso banalizzante e retorico - il cliché della montagna-panorama secondo gli standard del pittoresco e di un certo lirismo ottocentesco - estraneo sia agli abitanti dei monti che ai veri alpinisti; sia l’atteggiamento “naturistico”, che come abbiamo già visto, è piuttosto un sintomo di decadenza spirituale, una sorta di misticismo primitivistico della natura che rimane segnato da un carattere di reazione e di evasione dalla negatività della vita quotidiana; sia l’atteggiamento per cui il valore di un’ascesa è visto nella sensazione e nell’eroismo fisico, in cui il rischio è l’esasperazione di una fisicità fine a se stessa, un ideale della prestazione agonistica che di fatto è già ampiamente sviluppato nel carattere di lavoro che permea tutti gli aspetti della vita sociale, ma non può essere in sé considerato la base per conquistare una spiritualità superiore. Questo punto merita attenzione, dal momento che qui si può far rientrare, oltre alla caccia all’emozione, all’eccitante, all’“estremo”, al “no limits”, anche una certa esasperazione degli aspetti e dei supporti tecnici dell’arrampicare. In secondo luogo, è da notare come a questo orizzonte di esasperazione sportiva si scateni appartenga la corsa al primato, la competizione, la rincorsa alla scoperta di nuove montagne, che è anche l’escogitazione delle “vie”, delle difficoltà, ecc. Come se alla montagna non ci si potesse accostare che con un atteggiamento di competizione, di sfida, di appropriazione (significativo il gesto del piantare la bandiera sulla vetta), di “conquista”. Anche questo aspetto, in realtà, è perfettamente coerente con l’affermazione del soggettivismo che contrassegna l’epoca moderna: come nella scienza non vi deve essere, per definizione, alcun aspetto che possa sottrarsi all’indagine, come il cammino della cosiddetta civiltà prevede la sottomissione e l’affermazione della libertà umana sui vincoli della natura, analogamente e come logica conseguenza, non deve restare dominio o recesso del mondo naturale nel quale l’uomo non porti la propria presenza appropriante, non “firmi” - di solito con ingombranti rifiuti - il suo passaggio.

Quando le vette sono tutte conquistate, dunque, inizia la retorica della “sfida” al pericolo, alla difficoltà, ai limiti, con tutte le sue infinite, per quanto ripetitive, varianti. Nella visione e nella pratica più diffusa della “sfida” al pericolo e alle difficoltà agisce un paradigma superomistico che ha poco a che vedere con l’effettiva concezione nietzschiana dell’oltreuomo, ma molto con una certa vulgata che afferma i valori, che un tempo erano quelli dell’ascesi e della fortificazione dello spirito, in un contesto completamente secolarizzato e con un’intenzione del tutto profana: si tratta di superare i propri limiti di resistenza fisica, di vincere le paure, di lottare contro la montagna per dimostrarsi metaforicamente e letteralmente alla sua altezza, si affrontano sacrifici, pericoli, si rischia la vita in una sorta di eroismo solitario, ma il fine è semplicemente quello di un’affermazione di sé, una specie di narcisismo eroicizzante. Semplificando per far emergere con chiarezza l’essenziale, si potrebbe dire che in quest’ottica non conta la montagna per quello che è, ma come supporto, occasione e oggetto dell’impresa di un singolo. Portato alle sue estreme, ma del tutto coerenti, conseguenze, si tratta sempre di quell’atteggiamento di riduzione di tutto l’esistente alle ragioni o alle sensazioni soggettive: si tratta pur sempre di un accostarsi estetico o estetizzante - cioè tale da privilegiare la sensazione, l’emozione, il sentimento individuale, l’autorappresentazione fino al punto di non “vedere” più la montagna, ridotta ormai a scenario delle imprese umane-troppo umane. Anzi, a rigore non è più in gioco “la montagna” (come qualsiasi altro paesaggio), ma una finzione rappresentativa e fortemente artificiale, in cui non si mette in gioco la propria vita, ma si fa, piuttosto “teatro”: è l’atteggiamento “di chi cerca la natura per eseguire in essa l’ultima possibile recita in un mondo per il resto totalmente umanizzato. [...] Ovunque, in montagna, in viaggio nei deserti, sulle spiagge, come nel paesaggio urbano l’individuo si comporta sempre più da attore che recita, seguendo un copione che suggerisce non solo i comportamenti ma anche i luoghi giusti, gli ambienti adatti a esprimersi, secondo i modi che tornano a vantaggio dell’economia consumistica”
(8).

Quello che ancora una volta rimane inascoltata è l’eco contenuta nell’emozione e nell’intuizione che portano verso la montagna: grandezza che richiama a qualcosa che non è più umano, che è primordiale, inaccessibile, enigmatico, immutabile
(9). Se si “pensasse come una montagna”, si lasciassero risuonare questi richiami, cercando di trasformarli in meditazione, contemplazione, si potrebbe avviare una realizzazione spirituale corrispondente all’esperienza della montagna: si tratterebbe di recare l’illuminazione di una visione simbolica adeguata sull’esperienza della montagna, trasformando la vita quotidiana, diventando quelli che non ritornano mai dalle vette in pianura (10). Non tornare in pianura, ossia a quelle che Nietzsche chiamava le “bassure” della vita comune che cerca le sue piccole sicurezze e il suo confortevole benessere, significa in realtà che non vi sarebbe più né andare né tornare, una volta “realizzata” la Montagna nel proprio spirito, tradotto il simbolo in realtà. E’ superfluo sottolineare quanto una visione del genere, pur in un’attività che superficialmente sembrerebbe essere la stessa di ogni alpinista, si distacchi, nei suoi aspetti ascetici e conoscitivi, ma anche in quelli del comportamento verso la montagna, da ogni pratica sportiva che della montagna faccia solo un pretesto, una palestra o un palcoscenico di avventure narcisistiche e di comportamenti consumistici: è, come ha detto efficacemente Rudatis, “la scalata che va oltre tutte le scalate (11).

Questo significato forte dell’ascensione conduce a riflettere sul pericolo di degradazione simbolica che le montagne corrono nei nostri tempi. Oggi che tutte - o quasi - le montagne sono state conquistate materialmente, esiste il rischio che anche questo volto della natura perda il residuo significato simbolico, e dunque le montagne siano “abbassate” e rese equivalenti a tutto il resto. E’ quanto si è già verificato, anche solo a livello del consumo estetico, nella inesorabile progressiva appropriazione immaginale, prima dalla rappresentazione artistica e letteraria, poi dal mondo della vita sociale che li fruisce come luoghi turistici e, così facendo, li consuma secondo la logica moderna della ricerca incessante della novità, che spinge inesorabilmente alla “scoperta” e all’appropriazione di paesaggi e aspetti della natura sempre diversi
(12). In questa forma del consumo estetico-turistico di massa è racchiuso un enorme pericolo, di ordine economico e di ordine simbolico (13). Ma se è dalla perdita del valore simbolico che deriva ogni altro fenomeni di degrado, materiale, immaginario ed estetico, la riflessione circa i modi di “valorizzare” le montagne può ricevere una nuova luce: valorizzare dovrebbe voler dire: salvaguardare il valore intrinseco della montagna, non svenderla o tramutarla nella caricatura di una periferia metropolitana; e preservare l’intangibilità delle montagne, salvaguardarne il carattere appartato e selvatico, mediante zone di rispetto, una viabilità non corriva verso le spinte commerciali, una rinnovata educazione alla loro grandezza .

Una montagna vista innanzitutto nel suo carattere “alto”, impervio, selettivo, ascensionale e solitario non può favorire comportamenti di facile appropriazione, di consumo e distruzione indiscriminata, di annessione indifferente. Una montagna come axis mundi, luogo sacrale, cratofania o santuario, o anche semplicemente come luogo di una singolarità irripetibile, se davvero compreso come tale, non può essere considerata come un bene di cui disporre indiscriminatamente, neppure nell’immaginario. Ma anche una montagna compresa come luogo delle culture che vi sono insediate, come sempre più precario retaggio tradizionale sopravvivente nell’estrema modernità, non dovrebbe essere cancellata nella sua identità con gli alibi della valorizzazione commerciale, che è l’acido più corrosivo nei confronti del senso di appartenenza. 

3. Mons silvaticus L’orizzonte di tutte queste considerazioni è la questione epocale dell’identità dei luoghi, della loro salvaguardia e del loro significato. Rilke, alla svolta del secolo, affermava la necessità di sottrarre alla consuetudine le nostre immagini della natura e dei paesaggi, logorate dalle molte rappresentazioni letterarie e iconografiche, fino ad essere diventate un cliché che impedisce lo sguardo su ciò che veramente è. Lasciare che la natura ci ridiventi straniera, per coglierne l’effettiva estraneità al mondo delle nostre rappresentazioni, e, misurando questa distanza, lasciar essere la differenza, accettare che tutto quanto vi è di comune fra uomini e cose si ritiri nella “profondità comune donde traggono nutrimento le radici di ogni divenire” (14). L’esigenza di lasciare che la natura si ritragga nell’enigmaticità e quindi riconquisti, nella distanza, la sua aura, è la sostanza delle posizioni di difesa della Wilderness, gli aspetti selvatici del paesaggio terrestre, non certo per amore di esotismo, ma nel nome di un’estrema difesa delle radici selvatiche della stessa umanità, di quella radicatezza senza la quale la cultura è messa a repentaglio. La selvatichezza è il terreno vitale in cui crescono le culture attente alla necessità di non interrompere la comunicazione con l’altro, e dunque consapevoli della loro dipendenza dall’altro: sia nel senso della sopravvivenza e prosperità materiale, che in quello simbolico, della differenza in relazione alla quale soltanto può sussistere identità. Quando la dimensione della selvatichezza viene attaccata e distrutta, la terra feconda in cui si radicano le civiltà si trasforma nel deserto di cui parla la filosofia del Novecento. Desolazione di un luogo andato in rovina, sia negli aspetti naturali che nelle realizzazioni della cultura: solitudo, in cui l’uomo è rimesso alla via senza uscita della propria stoltezza. La desertica ripetitività del sempre uguale è il destino di chi pensa che la natura, soprattutto nei suoi aspetti indomiti, sia un fastidioso contrattempo sul cammino della progettualità umana.

La Wildnis è la questione dell’intera civiltà terrestre nell’epoca della tarda modernità. Occorre perciò salvaguardare attivamente la fisionomia singolare dei luoghi riconoscendone le radici selvatiche: senza la presenza e la simbolizzazione dell’estraneazione incarnata nel lato ombroso della civiltà, nel selvatico appunto, la costruzione umana è destinata a somigliare a una torre di Babele cui venga meno il fondamento. La presunta razionalità che vige nell’ordine metropolitano, assieme a tutte le sue realizzazioni, assomiglia sempre più a una sopravvivenza fantasmatica di cui l’immaginario legato alla realtà virtuale è un’eloquente manifestazione.

Ma le radici selvatiche, di cui la montagna è emblema e riserva, non potrebbero essere lasciate disseccare senza un più generale svigorimento simbolico. Si potrebbe dire che quando i simboli cominciano a diventare muti, le foreste cominciano a essere ridotte a riserva di legname o ad ostacolo all’espansione cittadina e le montagne a parco di divertimenti. È per questo che la montagna deve tornare a poter essere vista come l’emblema dello spazio elevato e sacro, del luogo dell’aprirsi, reale e simbolico, di una dimensione la cui alterità e distanza, anche fisica, dall’usuale, mostra una dimensione di verticalità essenzialmente estranea al mondo del nichilismo. In ogni luogo, oltre agli elementi visibili, oggetto dell’indagine geografica e storico-artistica, vi sono elementi non obiettivabili, non suscettibili di quantificazione scientifica, e nondimeno simbolicamente essenziali. Nel riconoscimento della profonda simbolicità delle manifestazioni della natura è racchiusa ogni possibilità di armonizzazione con la morfologia ambientale e di suo sapiente assecondamento, che si traduce sempre anche in opera di bellezza.

La tarda modernità tende a esotizzare sempre più “la natura”, “il selvatico”, il “tradizionale”, rescindendoli come riserve o come mere citazioni, quando non come oggetti dell’industria culturale o turistica. D’altra parte, però, si assiste alla diffusione di un desiderio di appartenenza, o di “ritorno” alla “natura” che per molti versi è un fenomeno di provenienza urbana. Ritorno dunque “sentimentale”, avrebbe detto Schiller, e non “ingenuo”: come è ogni vero ritorno
(15). Ma già in questo è forse possibile intravedere il ridestarsi di una memoria e l’affiorare di una consapevolezza differenziale nell’omologazione contemporanea. Gli sviluppi in senso sempre più immateriale della tecnica, l’uso di sistemi di comunicazione che rendano obsoleto il proliferare di grandi strade, assieme a una chiara comprensione dei limiti da rispettare, potrebbero rendere meno utopica e nostalgica la difesa dell’individualità dei luoghi, e nella fattispecie della montagna, sottraendola al tempo stesso alla prospettiva della mera esteticità o di un devastante consumo sportivo. Ritornare, dunque, con nuova consapevolezza, nei pressi delle radici selvatiche e rocciose della civiltà, prima che tutto sia distrutto nichilisticamente - ossia anche per superficialità, tracotanza o rassegnazione o appagamento nell’integrazione (16) - per salvaguardarne almeno la memoria: primo, indispensabile, passo verso quel riorientamento che solo potrebbe salvare la terra.

Quest’opera della memoria non è volta a fabbricare un ricordo, né un ennesimo simulacro di un “regno perduto”: è piuttosto un’opera di meditazione sul volto della terra a venire che procede da uno scavo nelle rovine del presente, si immerge nella solitudo dell’oggi come in un controluce che ne rivela i tratti essenziali, o in un’algidezza in cui si trasfigura il crescente irrigidimento della vita nell’ascesi della riflessione, in cui le “montagne da pascolo” del turismo possano riassumere il sembiante di Mons Victorialis, di luogo solstiziale dello spirito. Le radici selvatiche, le forme dell’elevatezza e della distanza, quelle che Evola chiamava “le culminazioni dell’alpe”, sono per noi l’ultimo punto di vista differenziale dal quale comprendere il mondo e metterlo in prospettiva. Che si possa anche solo per un momento sostare nel silenzio della montagna e intenderne la voce, è una delle estreme possibilità di salvaguardia di questo mondo. Ma chi lo potrà fare non sarà né turista, né sportivo, né collezionista di record o di imprese estreme, ma qualcuno che avrà compreso la legge del luogo e si sarà messo in consonanza con essa: montanaro, pastore, boscaiolo o incamminato sulla via del Sé, tutti attenti e responsabili della conservazione delle condizioni di appartatezza, della costitutiva ed essenziale distanza, tutte figure del “pensare come una montagna”, della consapevolezza che essa deve tornare segreta e salva come un vero Montsalvat: monte della salvazione, perché montagna della selvatichezza.

Note:



1. Cfr. L. Bonesio, La saggezza selvatica di Zarathustra, “Letteratura Tradizione”, 5, 1998.
2. Cit. in J. Ritter,
Paesaggio. Uomo e natura nell’età moderna
, a cura di M. Venturi Ferriolo, Guerini e Associati, Milano 1994, pp. 68-69.
3. D. Cosgrove,
Realtà sociali e paesaggio simbolico
, a cura di C. Copeta, Unicopli, Milano 1990.
4. Per il termine “invenzione”, nella sua duplice accezione di scoperta e produzione di qualcosa che non c'era, cfr. Ph. Joutard,
L'invenzione del Monte Bianco
, tr. it. di P. Crivellaro, Einaudi, Torino 1993.
5. Cfr. F. Fedele,
Inventare le Alpi: archeologie, abitanti, identità, in Appartenenza e località: l’uomo e il territorio
, a cura di L. Bonesio, SEB, Milano 1996.
6. “A poco a poco, però, (le cime) si innalzarono minacciose nel cielo occidentale permettendoci di distinguere diverse cime nude, squallide e nerastre e di cogliere lo strano senso di fantastico che ispiravano viste così nella luce rossastra dell’Antartico con lo sfondo suggestivo di nuvole iridescenti di polvere di ghiaccio. Da quello spettacolo derivava un senso di stupenda segretezza e di potenziale rivelazione. Era come se queste cuspidi da incubo fungessero da piloni di uno spaventoso ingresso nelle sfere proibite dei sogni, nei complessi golfi del passato remoto, dello spazio e dell’ultradimensionalità” (H.P. Lovecraft,
Le montagne della follia, tr. it. di G. De Luca, Sugarco, Milano 1983, p. 39). “L’effetto era quello di una città ciclopica di architettura ignota all’uomo o all’immaginazione umana, con un vasto aggregato di costruzioni nere come la notte costruite con mostruose perversioni delle leggi geometriche. C’erano coni tronchi, talvolta disposti a terrazza o scanalati, sormontati da alti steli cilindrici, che qua e là si slargavano a bulbo e spesso terminavano in una serie di dischi dentellati e assottigliantisi...” (Ivi, pp. 40-41). La descrizione della città in rovina sulle montagne antartiche prosegue con tutti i dettagli di “sagome deformate da un’odiosità ancora maggiore” (Ibidem).

7. “L’impulso di natura plutonica non sorge più alla ricerca dell’oro, ma di energie capaci di trasformarsi in utopie, dai combustibili fossili fino all’uranio. Mossi da tale ricerca, non si agisce secondo criteri di economia, ci si comporta invece come lo scialacquatore che dissipa l’intera eredità per perseguire un’idea fissa. Nei sogni di Plutone non vi sono tesori nascosti, ma il vulcano. E’ attratto dall’Everest non per la vista che può offrire, ma per il record che gli consente di raggiungere. La biblioteca non è per lui il luogo delle Muse, ma uno spazio di lavoro, completo di arredo tecnico. Trascura di onorare i morti, ma va a frugare dentro alle tombe più antiche” (E. Jünger, La forbice, tr. it. di A. Iadicicco, Guanda, Parma 1996, p. 157).
8. E. Turri,
Il paesaggio come teatro. Dal territorio vissuto al territorio rappresentato, Marsilio, Venezia 1998, p. 132. Sono tutti atteggiamenti, come si può constatare, che derivano da un'esasperazione di aspetti della personalità in senso soggettivistico, limitati a un'idea povera e in sostanza ampiamente consumistica dell'affermazione di sé e a un mondo che “comporta la riduzione dello scenario a un paesaggio del tutto denaturalizzato, che anche nei suoi aspetti selvaggi è ricondotto, fittiziamente, alla nuova e totale teatralizzazione del mondo” (Ivi
, p. 133).
9. Un significativo esempio di questo arrampicare attento a connotazioni simboliche ed esoteriche sono gli scritti di D. Rudatis, in particolare
Liberazione
, Nuovi Sentieri, Belluno 1985.
10. J. Evola,
Spiritualità della montagna, in Meditazioni delle vette, Il tridente, La Spezia 19863, ora raccolto in J. Evola-Samivel, Il sorriso degli dèi. Note su uomini di montagna e montagne degli dèi, Barbarossa, Milano 1996. Sia pure in un più ampio contesto di pensiero, le riflessioni di Evola su questo tema, insieme con quelle dell'accademico del CAI Domenico Rudatis, sono del massimo interesse. Un’utile raccolta di scritti appartenenti a questa prospettiva è il volumetto di AA.VV., Il regno perduto. Appunti sul simbolismo tradizionale della montagna
, Il cavallo alato, Padova 1989.
11. D. Rudatis,
Sulla via del senso cosmico
, “Annuario CAAI”, 1990, p. 14.
12. Cfr. J. Ritter,
op. cit.
, n. 57.
13. In un contributo molto significativo da questo punto di vista, Evola annovera tra i sintomi di decadenza spirituale l’approccio “discendente” alla montagna rappresentato dallo sci (di discesa): “Laddove l’alpinismo è caratterizzato dall’
ebrezza dell’ascesa come conquista, lo sciismo è caratterizzato dall’ebrezza della discesa, della velocità e quasi diremmo della caduta” (J. Evola, Ascendere e discendere, in Meditazioni delle vette, cit., p. 71). La caratterizzazione evoliana dello sci può facilmente essere estesa, oggi, a tutti gli sport che perseguono “tecnica, giuoco ed ebbrezza della caduta”: in essi si esprime lo spirito della modernità, “spirito ebbro di velocità, di ‘divenire’, di un moto accelerato, incomposto, fino a ieri celebrato come quello di un progresso, laddove esso, sotto molti aspetti, altro non è che quello di un franare e di un precipitare” (Ivi, pp. 71 e 72).

14. R.M. Rilke, Del paesaggio e altri scritti, tr. it. di G. Zampa, Cederna, Milano 1949, p. 33.
15. Sul tema del viaggio e del ritorno in patria, cfr. la lettura heideggeriana di Hölderlin (M. Heidegger,
La poesia di Hölderlin
, a cura di L. Amoroso, Adelphi, Milano 1988).
16. Jünger ha sottolineato come il carattere devastante del nichilismo contemporaneo provenga dal buon adattamento dell’“ultimo uomo” di nietzschiana memoria a condizioni di vita impossibili per una civiltà “normale” (nel senso che la Tradizione attribuisce a questo aggettivo). Cfr., ad esempio, E. Jünger,
Oltre la linea, in M. Heidegger-E. Jünger, Oltre la linea, tr. it. di F. Volpi e A. La Rocca, Adelphi, Milano 1989.

 


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samedi, 21 août 2010 | Lien permanent | Commentaires (2)

Ernst Jünger: The Resolute Life of an Anarch

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Ernst Junger: The Resolute Life of an Anarch

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by Keith Preston - http://attackthesystem.com/

Perhaps the most interesting, poignant and, possibly, threatening  type of writer and thinker is the one who not only defies conventional categorizations of thought but also offers a deeply penetrating critique of those illusions many hold to be the most sacred. Ernst Junger (1895-1998), who first came to literary prominence during Germany’s Weimar era as a diarist of the experiences of a front line stormtrooper during the Great War, is one such writer. Both the controversial nature of his writing and its staying power are demonstrated by the fact that he remains one of the most important yet widely disliked literary and cultural figures of twentieth century Germany. As recently as 1993, when Junger would have been ninety-eight years of age, he was the subject of an intensely hostile exchange in the “New York Review of Books” between an admirer and a detractor of his work.(1) On the occasion of his one hundreth birthday in 1995, Junger was the subject of a scathing, derisive musical performed in East Berlin. Yet Junger was also the recipient of Germany’s most prestigious literary awards, the Goethe Prize and the Schiller Memorial Prize. Junger, who converted to Catholicism at the age of 101, received a commendation from Pope John Paul II and was an honored guest of French President Francois Mitterand and German Chancellor Helmut Kohl at the Franco-German reconciliation ceremony at Verdun in 1984. Though he was an exceptional achiever during virtually every stage of his extraordinarily long life, it was his work during the Weimar period that not only secured for a Junger a presence in German cultural and political history, but also became the standard by which much of his later work was evaluated and by which his reputation was, and still is, debated. (2)

 

Ernst Junger was born on March 29, 1895 in Heidelberg, but was raised in Hanover. His father, also named Ernst, was an academically trained chemist who became wealthy as the owner of a pharmaceutical manufacturing business, finding himself successful enough to essentially retire while he was still in his forties. Though raised as an evangelical Protestant, Junger’s father did not believe in any formal religion, nor did his mother, Karoline, an educated middle class German woman whose interests included Germany’s rich literary tradition and the cause of women’s emancipation. His parents’ politics seem to have been liberal, though not radical, in the manner not uncommon to the rising bourgeoise of Germany’s upper middle class during the pre-war period. It was in this affluent, secure bourgeoise environment that Ernst Junger grew up. Indeed, many of Junger’s later activities and professed beliefs are easily understood as a revolt against the comfort and safety of his upbringing. As a child, he was an avid reader of the tales of adventurers and soldiers, but a poor academic student who did not adjust well to the regimented Prussian educational system. Junger’s instructors consistently complained of his inattentiveness. As an adolescent, he became involved with the Wandervogel, roughly the German equivalent of the Boy Scouts.(3)

 

          It was while attending a boarding school near his parents’ home in 1913, at the age of seventeen, that Junger first demonstrated his first propensity for what might be called an “adventurist” way of life. With only six months left before graduation, Junger left school, leaving no word to his family as to his destination. Using money given to him for school-related fees and expenses to buy a firearm and a railroad ticket to Verdun,  Junger subsequently enlisted in the French Foreign Legion, an elite military unit of the French armed forces that accepted enlistees of any nationality and had a reputation for attracting fugitives, criminals and career mercenaries. Junger had no intention of staying with the Legion. He only wanted to be posted to Africa, as he eventually was. Junger then deserted, only to be captured and sentenced to jail. Eventually his father found a capable lawyer for his wayward son and secured his release. Junger then returned to his studies and underwent a belated high school graduation. However, it was only a very short time later that Junger was back in uniform. (4)

 

Warrior and War Diarist

 

Ernst Junger immediately volunteered for military service when he heard the news that Germany was at war in the summer of 1914. After two months of training, Junger was assigned to a reserve unit stationed at Champagne. He was afraid the war would end before he had the opportunity to see any action. This attitude was not uncommon among many recruits or conscripts who fought in the war for their respective states. The question immediately arises at to why so many young people would wish to look into the face of death with such enthusiasm. Perhaps they really did not understand the horrors that awaited them. In Junger’s case, his rebellion against the security and luxury of his bourgeoise upbringing had already been ably demonstrated by his excursion with the French Foreign Legion. Because of his high school education, something that soldiers of more proletarian origins lacked, Junger was selected to train to become an officer. Shortly before beginning his officer’s training, Junger was exposed to combat for the first time. From the start, he carried pocket-sized notebooks with him and recorded his observations on the front lines. His writings while at the front exhibit a distinctive tone of detachment, as though he is simply an observer watching while the enemy fires at others. In the middle part of 1915, Junger suffered his first war wound, a bullet graze to the thigh that required only two weeks of recovery time. Afterwards, he was promoted to the rank of lieutenant.(5)

 

At age twenty-one, Junger was the leader of a reconnaissance team at the Somme whose purpose was to go out at night and search for British landmines. Early on, he acquired the reputation of a brave soldier who lacked the preoccupation with his own safety common to most of the fighting men. The introduction of steel artifacts into the war, tanks for the British side and steel helmets for the Germans, made a deep impression on Junger. Wounded three times at the Somme, Junger was awarded the Iron Medal First Class. Upon recovery, he returned to the front lines. A combat daredevil, he once held out against a much larger British force with only twenty men. After being transferred to fight the French at Flanders, he lost ten of his fourteen men and was wounded in the left hand by a blast from French shelling. After being harshly criticized by a superior officer for the number of men lost on that particular mission, Junger began to develop a contempt for the military hierarchy whom he regarded as having achieved their status as a result of their class position, frequently lacking combat experience of their own. In late 1917, having already experienced nearly three full years of combat, Junger was wounded for the fifth time during a surprise assault by the British. He was grazed in the head by a bullet, acquiring two holes in his helmet in the process. His performance in this battle won him the Knights Cross of the Hohenzollerns. In March 1918, Junger participated in another fierce battle with the British, losing 87 of his 150 men. (6)

 

            Nothing impressed Junger more than personal bravery and endurance on the part of soldiers. He once “fell to the ground in tears” at the sight of a young recruit who had only days earlier been unable to carry an ammunition case by himself suddenly being able to carry two cases of missles after surviving an attack of British shells. A recurring theme in Junger’s writings on his war experiences is the way in which war brings out the most savage human impulses. Essentially, human beings are given full license to engage in behavior that would be considered criminal during peacetime. He wrote casually about burning occupied towns during the course of retreat or a shift of position. However, Junger also demonstrated a capacity for merciful behavior during his combat efforts. He refrained from shooting a cornered British soldier after the foe displayed a portrait of his family to Junger. He was wounded yet again in August of 1918. Having been shot in the chest and directly through a lung, this was his most serious wound yet. After being hit, he still managed to shoot dead yet another British officer. As Junger was being carried off the battlefield on a stretcher, one of the stretcher carriers was killed by a British bullet. Another German soldier attempted to carry Junger on his back, but the soldier was shot dead himself and Junger fell to the ground. Finally, a medic recovered him and pulled him out of harm’s way. This episode would be the end of his battle experiences during the Great War.(7)

 

In Storms of Steel

 

Junger’s keeping of his wartime diaries paid off quite well in the long run. They were to become the basis of his first and most famous book, In Storms of Steel, published in 1920. The title was given to the book by Junger himself, having found the phrase in an old Icelandic saga. It was at the suggestion of his father that Junger first sought to have his wartime memoirs published. Initially, he found no takers, antiwar sentiment being extremely high in Germany at the time, until his father at last arranged to have the work published privately. In Storms of Steel differs considerably from similar works published by war veterans during the same era, such as Erich Maria Remarque’s All Quiet on the Western Front and John Dos Passos’ Three Soldiers. Junger’s book reflects none of the disillusionment with war by those experienced in its horrors of the kind found in these other works. Instead, Junger depicted warfare as an adventure in which the soldier faced the highest possible challenge, a battle to the death with a mortal enemy. Though Junger certainly considered himself to be a patriot and, under the influence of Maurice Barres (8), eventually became a strident German nationalist, his depiction of military combat as an idyllic setting where human wills face the supreme test rose far above ordinary nationalist sentiments. Junger’s warrior ideal was not merely the patriot fighting out of a profound sense of loyalty to his country  nor the stereotype of the dutiful soldier whose sense of honor and obedience compels him to follow the orders of his superiors in a headlong march towards death. Nor was the warrior prototype exalted by Junger necessarily an idealist fighting for some alleged greater good such as a political ideal or religious devotion. Instead, war itself is the ideal for Junger. On this question, he was profoundly influenced by Nietzsche, whose dictum “a good war justifies any cause”, provides an apt characterization of Junger’s depiction of the life (and death) of the combat soldier. (9)

 

This aspect of Junger’s outlook is illustrated quite well by the ending he chose to give to the first edition of In Storms of Steel. Although the second edition (published in 1926) ends with the nationalist rallying cry, “Germany lives and shall never go under!”, a sentiment that was deleted for the third edition published in 1934 at the onset of the Nazi era, the original edition ends simply with Junger in the hospital after being wounded for the final time and receiving word that he has received yet another commendation for his valor as a combat soldier. There is no mention of Germany’s defeat a few months later. Nationalism aside, the book is clearly about Junger, not about Germany, and Junger’s depiction of the war simultaneously displays an extraordinary level detachment for someone who lived in the face of death for four years and a highly personalized account of the war where battle is first and foremost about the assertion of one’s own “will to power” with cliched patriotic pieties being of secondary concern.

 

Indeed, Junger goes so far as to say there were winners and losers on both sides of the war. The true winners were not those who fought in a particular army or for a particular country, but who rose to the challenge placed before them and essentially achieved what Junger regarded as a higher state of enlightenment. He believed the war had revealed certain fundamental truths about the human condition. First, the illusions of the old bourgeoise order concerning peace, progress and prosperity had been inalterably shattered. This was not an uncommon sentiment during that time, but it is a revelation that Junger seems to revel in while others found it to be overwhelmingly devastating. Indeed, the lifelong champion of Enlightenment liberalism, Bertrand Russell, whose life was almost as long as Junger’s and who observed many of the same events from a much different philosophical perspective, once remarked that no one who had been born before 1914 knew what it was like to be truly happy.(10) A second observation advanced by Junger had to do with the role of technology in transforming the nature of war, not only in a purely mechanical sense, but on a much greater existential level. Before, man had commanded weaponry in the course of combat. Now weaponry of the kind made possible by modern technology and industrial civilization essentially commanded man. The machines did the fighting. Man simply resisted this external domination. Lastly, the supremacy of might and the ruthless nature of human existence had been demonstrated. Nietzsche was right. The tragic, Darwinian nature of the human condition had been revealed as an irrevocable law.

 

In Storms of Steel was only the first of several works based on his experiences as a combat officer that were produced by Junger during the 1920s. Copse 125 described a battle between two small groups of combatants. In this work, Junger continued to explore the philosophical themes present in his first work. The type of technologically driven warfare that emerged during the Great War is characterized as reducing men to automatons driven by airplanes, tanks and machine guns. Once again, jingoistic nationalism is downplayed as a contributing factor to the essence of combat soldier’s spirit. Another work of Junger’s from the early 1920s, Battle as Inner Experience, explored the psychology of war. Junger suggested that civilization itself was but a mere mask for the “primordial” nature of humanity that once again reveals itself during war. Indeed, war had the effect of elevating humanity to a higher level. The warrior becomes a kind of god-like animal, divine in his superhuman qualities, but animalistic in his bloodlust. The perpetual threat of imminent death is a kind of intoxicant. Life is at its finest when death is closest. Junger described war as a struggle for a cause that overshadows the respective political or cultural ideals of the combatants. This overarching cause is courage. The fighter is honor bound to respect the courage of his mortal enemy. Drawing on the philosophy of Nietzsche, Junger argued that the war had produced a “new race” that had replaced the old pieties, such as those drawn from religion, with a new recognition of the primacy of the “will to power”.(11)

 

Conservative Revolutionary

 

Junger’s writings about the war quickly earned him the status of a celebrity during the Weimar period. Battle as Inner Experience contained the prescient suggestion that the young men who had experienced the greatest war the world had yet to see at that point could never be successfully re-integrated into the old bougeoise order from which they came. For these fighters, the war had been a spiritual experience. Having endured so much only to see their side lose on such seemingly humiliating terms, the veterans of the war were aliens to the rationalistic, anti-militarist, liberal republic that emerged in 1918 at the close of the war. Junger was at his parents’ home recovering from war wounds during the time of the attempted coup by the leftist workers’ and soldiers’ councils and subsequent suppression of these by the Freikorps. He experimented with psychoactive drugs such as cocaine and opium during this time, something that he would continue to do much later in life. Upon recovery, he went back into active duty in the much diminished Germany army. Junger’s earliest works, such as In Storms of Steel, were published during this time and he also wrote for military journals on the more technical and specialized aspects of combat and military technology. Interestingly, Junger attributed Germany’s defeat in the war simply to poor leadership, both military and civilian, and rejected the “stab in the back” legend that consoled less keen veterans.

 

After leaving the army in 1923, Junger continued to write, producing a novella about a soldier during the war titled Sturm, and also began to study the philosophy of Oswald Spengler. His first work as a philosopher of nationalism appeared the Nazi paper Volkischer Beobachter in September, 1923.

Critiquing the failed Marxist revolution of 1918, Junger argued that the leftist coup failed because of its lacking of fresh ideas. It was simply a regurgitation of the egalitarian outllook of the French Revolution. The revolutionary left appealed only to the material wants of the Germany people in Junger’s views. A successful revolution would have to be much more than that. It would have to appeal to their spiritual or “folkish” instincts as well. Over the next few years Junger studied the natural sciences at the University of Leipzig and in 1925, at age thirty, he married nineteen-year-old Gretha von Jeinsen. Around this time, he also became a full-time political  writer. Junger was hostile to Weimar democracy and its commercial bourgeiose society. His emerging political ideal was one of an elite warrior caste that stood above petty partisan politics and the middle class obsession with material acquisition. Junger became involved with the the Stahlhelm, a right-wing veterans group, and was a contributer to its paper, Die Standardite. He associated himself with the younger, more militant members of the organization who favored an uncompromised nationalist revolution and eschewed the parliamentary system. Junger’s weekly column in Die Standardite disseminated his nationalist ideology to his less educated readers. Junger’s views at this point were a mixture of Spengler, Social Darwinism, the traditionalist philosophy of the French rightist Maurice Barres, opposition to the internationalism of the left that had seemingly been discredited by the events of 1914, irrationalism and anti-parliamentarianism. He took a favorable view of the working class and praised the Nazis’ efforts to win proletarian sympathies. Junger also argued that a nationalist outlook need not be attached to one particular form of government, even suggesting that a liberal monarchy would be inferior to a nationalist republic.(12)

 

In an essay for Die Standardite titled “The Machine”, Junger argued that the principal struggle was not between social classes or political parties but between man and technology. He was not anti-technological in a Luddite sense, but regarded the technological apparatus of modernity to have achieved a position of superiority over mankind which needed to be reversed. He was concerned that the mechanized efficiency of modern life produced a corrosive effect on the human spirit. Junger considered the Nazis’ glorification of peasant life to be antiquated. Ever the realist, he believed the world of the rural people to be in a state of irreversible decline. Instead, Junger espoused a “metropolitan nationalism” centered on the urban working class. Nationalism was the antidote to the anti-particularist materialism of the Marxists who, in Junger’s views, simply mirrored the liberals in their efforts to reduce the individual to a component of a mechanized mass society. The humanitarian rhetoric of the left Junger dismissed as the hypocritical cant of power-seekers feigning benevolence. He began to pin his hopes for a nationalist revolution on the younger veterans who comprised much of the urban working class.

 

In 1926, Junger became editor of Arminius, which also featured the writings of Nazi leaders like Alfred Rosenberg and Joseph Goebbels. In 1927, he contributed his final article to the Nazi paper, calling for a new definition of the “worker”, one not rooted in Marxist ideology but the idea of the worker as a civilian counterpart to the soldier who struggles fervently for the nationalist ideal. Junger and  Hitler had exchanged copies of their respective writings and a scheduled meeting between the two was canceled due to a change in Hitler’s itinerary. Junger respected Hitler’s abilities as an orator, but came to feel he lacked the ability to become a true leader. He also found Nazi ideology to be intellectually shallow, many of the Nazi movement’s leaders to be talentless and was displeased by the vulgarity,  crassly opportunistic and overly theatrical aspects of Nazi public rallies. Always an elitist, Junger considered the Nazis’ pandering the common people to be debased. As he became more skeptical of the Nazis, Junger began writing for a wider circle of readers beyond that of the militant nationalist right-wing. His works began to appear in the Jewish liberal Leopold Schwarzchild’s Das Tagebuch and the “national-bolshevik” Ernst Niekisch’s Widerstand.

 

Junger began to assemble around himself an elite corps of bohemian, eccentric intellectuals who would meet regularly on Friday evenings. This group included some of the most interesting personalities of the Weimar period. Among them were the Freikorps veteran Ernst von Salomon, Otto von Strasser, who with his brother Gregor led a leftist anti-Hitler faction of the Nazi movement, the national-bolshevik Niekisch, the Jewish anarchist Erich Muhsam who had figured prominently in the early phase of the failed leftist revolution of 1918, the American writer Thomas Wolfe and the expressionist writer Arnolt Bronnen. Many among this group espoused a type of revolutionary socialism based on nationalism rather than class, disdaining the Nazis’ opportunistic outreach efforts to the middle class. Some, like Niekisch, favored an alliance between Germany and Soviet Russia against the liberal-capitalist powers of the West. Occasionally, Joseph Goebbels would turn up at these meetings hoping to convert the group, particularly Junger himself, whose war writings he had admired, to the Nazi cause. These efforts by the Nazi propaganda master proved unsuccessful. Junger regarded Goebbels as a shallow ideologue who spoke in platitudes even in private conversation.(13)

 

The final break between Ernst Junger and the NSDAP occurred in September 1929. Junger published an article in Schwarzchild’s Tagebuch attacking and ridiculing the Nazis as sell outs for having reinvented themselves as a parliamentary party. He also dismissed their racism and anti-Semitism as ridiculous, stating that according to the Nazis a nationalist is simply someone who “eats three Jews for breakfast.” He condemned the Nazis for pandering to the liberal middle class and reactionary traditional conservatives “with lengthy tirades against the decline in morals, against abortion, strikes, lockouts, and the reduction of police and military forces.” Goebbels responded by attacking Junger in the Nazi press, accusing him being motivated by personal literary ambition, and insisting this had caused him “to vilify the national socialist movement, probably so as to make himself popular in his new kosher surroundings” and dismissing Junger’s attacks by proclaiming the Nazis did not “debate with renegades who abuse us in the smutty press of Jewish traitors.”(14)

 

Junger on the Jewish Question

 

Junger held complicated views on the question of German Jews. He considered anti-Semitism of the type espoused by Hitler to be crude and reactionary. Yet his own version of nationalism required a level of homogeneity that was difficult to reconcile with the subnational status of Germany Jewry. Junger suggested that Jews should assimilate and pledge their loyalty to Germany once and for all. Yet he expressed admiration for Orthodox Judaism and indifference to Zionism. Junger maintained personal friendships with Jews and wrote for a Jewish owned publication. During this time his Jewish publisher Schwarzchild published an article examining Junger’s views on the Jews of Germany. Schwarzchild insisted that Junger was nothing like his Nazi rivals on the far right. Junger’s nationalism was based on an aristocratic warrior ethos, while Hitler’s was more comparable to the criminal underworld. Hitler’s men were “plebian alley scum”. However, Schwarzchild also characterized Junger’s rendition of nationalism as motivated by little more than a fervent rejection of bourgeoise society and lacking in attention to political realities and serious economic questions.(15)

 

The Worker

 

Other than In Storms of Steel, Junger’s The Worker: Mastery and Form was his most influential work from the Weimar era. Junger would later distance himself from this work, published in 1932, and it was reprinted in the 1950s only after Junger was prompted to do so by Martin Heidegger.

In The Worker, Junger outlines his vision of a future state ordered as a technocracy based on workers and soldiers led by a warrior elite. Workers are no longer simply components of an industrial machine, whether capitalist or communist, but have become a kind of civilian-soldier operating as an economic warrior. Just as the soldier glories in his accomplishments in battle, so does the worker glory in the achievements expressed through his work. Junger predicted that continued technological advancements would render the worker/capitalist dichotomy obsolete. He also incorporated the political philosophy of his friend Carl Schmitt into his worldview. As Schmitt saw international relations as a Hobbesian battle between rival powers, Junger believed each state would eventually adopt a system not unlike what he described in The Worker. Each state would maintain its own technocratic order with the workers and soldiers of each country playing essentially the same role on behalf of their respective nations. International affairs would be a crucible where the will to power of the different nations would be tested.

Junger’s vision contains a certain amount prescience. The general trend in politics at the time was a movement towards the kind of technocratic state Junger described. These took on many varied forms including German National Socialism, Italian Fascism, Soviet Communism, the growing welfare states of Western Europe and America’s New Deal. Coming on the eve of World War Two, Junger’s prediction of a global Hobbesian struggle between national collectives possessing previously unimagined levels of technological sophistication also seems rather prophetic. Junger once again attacked the bourgeoise as anachronistic. Its values of material luxury and safety he regarded as unfit for the violent world of the future. (16)

 

The National Socialist Era

 

By the time Hitler took power in 1933, Junger’s war writings had become commonly used in high schools and universities as examples of wartime literature, and Junger enjoyed success within the context of German popular culture as well. Excerpts of Junger’s works were featured in military journals. The Nazis tried to coopt his semi-celebrity status, but he was uncooperative. Junger was appointed to the Nazified German Academcy of Poetry, but declined the position. When the Nazi Party’s paper published some of his work in 1934, Junger wrote a letter of protest. The Nazi regime, despite its best efforts to capitalize on his reputation, viewed Junger with suspicioun. His past association with the national-bolshevik Ersnt Niekisch, the Jewish anarchist Erich Muhsam and the anti-Hitler Nazi Otto von Strasser, all of whom were either eventually killed or exiled by the Third Reich, led the Nazis to regard Junger as a potential subversive. On several occasions, Junger received visits from the Gestapo in search of some of his former friends. During the early years of the Nazi regime, Junger was in the fortunate position of being able to economically afford travel outside of Germany. He journeyed to Norway, Brazil, Greece and Morocco during this time, and published several works based on his travels.(17)

 

Junger’s most significant work from the Nazi period is the novel On the Marble Cliffs. The book is an allegorical attack on the Hitler regime. It was written in 1939, the same year that Junger reentered the German army. The book describes a mysterious villian that threatens a community, a sinister warlord called the “Head Ranger”. This character is never featured in the plot of the novel, but maintains a forboding presence that is universal (much like “Big Brother” in George Orwell’s 1984). Another character in the novel, “Braquemart”, is described as having physical characteristics remarkably similar to those of Goebbels. The book sold fourteen thousand copies during its first two weeks in publication. Swiss reviewers immediately recognized the allegorical references to the Nazi state in the novel. The Nazi Party’s organ, Volkische Beobachter, stated that Ernst Jünger was flirting with a bullet to the head. Goebbels urged Hitler to ban the book, but Hitler refused, probably not wanting to show his hand. Indeed, Hitler gave orders that Junger not be harmed.(18)

         

Junger was stationed in France for most of the Second World War. Once again, he kept diaries of the experience. Once again, he expressed concern that he might not get to see any action before the war was over. While Junger did not have the opportunity to experience the level of danger and daredevil heroics he had during the Great War, he did receive yet another medal, the Iron Cross, for retrieving the body of a dead corporal while under heavy fire. Junger also published some of his war diaries during this time. However, the German government took a dim view of these, viewing them as too sympathetic to the occupied French. Junger’s duties included censorship of the mail coming into France from German civilians. He took a rather liberal approach to this responsibility and simply disposed of incriminating documents rather than turning them over for investigation. In doing so, he probably saved lives. He also encountered members of France’s literary and cultural elite, among them the actor Louis Ferdinand Celine, a raving anti-Semite and pro-Vichyite who suggested Hitler’s harsh measures against the Jews had not been heavy handed enough. As rumors of the Nazi extermination programs began to spread,  Junger wrote in his diary that the mechanization of the human spirit of the type he had written about in the past had apparently generated a higher level of human depravity. When he saw three young French-Jewish girls wearing the yellow stars required by the Nazis, he wrote that he felt embarrassed to be in the Nazi army. In July of 1942, Junger observed the mass arrest of French Jews, the beginning of implementation of the “Final Solution”. He described the scene as follows:

 

“Parents were first separated from their children, so there was wailing to be heard in the streets. At no moment may I forget that I am surrounded by the unfortunate, by those suffering to the very depths, else what sort of person, what sort of officer would I be? The uniform obliges one to grant protection wherever it goes. Of course one has the impression that one must also, like Don Quixote, take on millions.”(19)

         

An entry into Junger’s diary from October 16, 1943 suggests that an unnamed army officer had told  Junger about the use of crematoria and poison gas to murder Jews en masse. Rumors of plots against Hitler circulated among the officers with whom Junger maintained contact. His son, Ernstl, was arrested after an informant claimed he had spoken critically of Hitler. Ernstl Junger was imprisoned for three months, then placed in a penal battalion where he was killed in action in Italy. On July 20, 1944 an unsuccessful assassination attempt was carried out against Hitler. It is still disputed as to whether or not Junger knew of the plot or had a role in its planning. Among those arrested for their role in the attemt on Hitler’s life were members of Junger’s immediate circle of associates and superior officers within the German army. Junger was dishonorably discharged shortly afterward.(20)

 

Following the close of the Second World War, Junger came under suspicion from the Allied occupational authorities because of his far right-wing nationalist and militarist past. He refused to cooperate with the Allies De-Nazification programs and was barred from publishing for four years. He would go on to live another half century, producing many more literary works, becoming a close friend of Albert Hoffman, the inventor of the hallucinogen LSD, with which he experimented. In a 1977 novel, Eumeswil, he took his tendency towards viewing the world around him with detachment to a newer, more clearly articulated level with his invention of the concept of the “Anarch”. This idea, heavily influenced by the writings of the early nineteenth century German philosopher Max Stirner, championed the solitary individual who remains true to himself within the context of whatever external circumstances happen to be present. Some sample quotations from this work illustrate the philosophy and worldview of the elderly Junger quite well:

 

“For the anarch, if he remains free of being ruled, whether by sovereign or society, this does not mean he refuses to serve in any way. In general, he serves no worse than anyone else, and sometimes even better, if he likes the game. He only holds back from the pledge, the sacrifice, the ultimate devotion … I serve in the Casbah; if, while doing this, I die for the Condor, it would be an accident, perhaps even an obliging gesture, but nothing more.”

 

“The egalitarian mania of demagogues is even more dangerous than the brutality of men in gallooned coats. For the anarch, this remains theoretical, because he avoids both sides. Anyone who has been oppressed can get back on his feet if the oppression did not cost him his life. A man who has been equalized is physically and morally ruined. Anyone who is different is not equal; that is one of the reasons why the Jews are so often targeted.”

 

“The anarch, recognizing no government, but not indulging in paradisal dreams as the anarchist does, is, for that very reason, a neutral observer.”

 

“Opposition is collaboration.”

 

“A basic theme for the anarch is how man, left to his own devices, can defy superior force - whether state, society or the elements - by making use of their rules without submitting to them.”

 

“… malcontents… prowl through the institutions eternally dissatisfied, always disappointed. Connected with this is their love of cellars and rooftops, exile and prisons, and also banishment, on which they actually pride themselves. When the structure finally caves in they are the first to be killed in the collapse. Why do they not know that the world remains inalterable in change? Because they never find their way down to its real depth, their own. That is the sole place of essence, safety. And so they do themselves in.”

 

“The anarch may not be spared prisons - as one fluke of existence among others. He will then find the fault in himself.”

 

“We are touching one a … distinction between anarch and anarchist; the relation to authority, to legislative power. The anarchist is their mortal enemy, while the anarch refuses to acknowledge them. He seeks neither to gain hold of them, nor to topple them, nor to alter them - their impact bypasses him. He must resign himself only to the whirlwinds they generate.”

 

“The anarch is no individualist, either. He wishes to present himself neither as a Great Man nor as a Free Spirit. His own measure is enough for him; freedom is not his goal; it is his property. He does not come on as foe or reformer: one can get along nicely with him in shacks or in palaces. Life is too short and too beautiful to sacrifice for ideas, although contamination is not always avoidable. But hats off to the martyrs.”

 

“We can expect as little from society as from the state. Salvation lies in the individual.” (21)

 

Notes:

 

1. Ian Buruma, “The Anarch at Twilight”, New York Review of Books, Volume 40, No. 12, June 24, 1993. Hilary Barr, “An Exchange on Ernst Junger”, New York Review of Books, Volume 40, No. 21, December 16, 1993.

 

2. Nevin, Thomas. Ernst Junger and Germany: Into the Abyss, 1914-1945. Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1996, pp. 1-7. Loose, Gerhard. Ernst Junger. New York: Twayne Publishers, 1974, preface.

 

3. Nevin, pp. 9-26. Loose, p. 21

 

4. Loose, p. 22. Nevin, pp. 27-37.

 

5. Nevin. p. 49.

 

6. Ibid., p. 57

 

7. Ibid., p. 61

 

8. Maurice Barrès (September 22, 1862 - December 4, 1923) was a French novelist, journalist, an anti-semite, nationalist politician and agitator. Leaning towards the far-left in his youth as a Boulangist deputy, he progressively developed a theory close to Romantic nationalism and shifted to the right during the Dreyfus Affair, leading the Anti-Dreyfusards alongside Charles Maurras. In 1906, he was elected both to the Académie française and as deputy of the Seine department, and until his death he sat with the conservative Entente républicaine démocratique. A strong supporter of the Union sacrée(Holy Union) during World War I, Barrès remained a major influence of generations of French writers, as well as of monarchists, although he was not a monarchist himself. Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Maurice_Barr%C3%A8s

 

9. Nevin, pp. 58, 71, 97.

 

10. Schilpp, P. A. “The Philosophy of Bertrand Russell”.  Reviewed Hermann Weyl, The American Mathematical Monthly, Vol. 53, No. 4 (Apr., 1946), pp. 208-214.

 

11. Nevin, pp. 122, 125, 134, 136, 140, 173.

 

12. Ibid., pp. 75-91.

 

13. Ibid., p. 107.

 

14. Ibid., p. 108.

 

15. Ibid., pp. 109-111.

 

16. Ibid., pp. 114-140.

 

17. Ibid., p. 145.

 

18. Ibid., p. 162.

 

19. Ibid., p. 189.

 

20. Ibid., p. 209.

 

21. Junger, Ernst. Eumeswil. New York: Marion Publishers, 1980, 1993.

 

Bibliography

 

Barr, Hilary. “An Exchange on Ernst Junger”, New York Review of Books, Volume 40, No. 21, December 16, 1993.

 

Braun, Abdalbarr. “Warrior, Waldgaenger, Anarch: An Essay on Ernst Junger’s Concept of the Sovereign Individual”. Archived at http://www.fluxeuropa.com/juenger-anarch.htm

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dimanche, 14 juin 2009 | Lien permanent

Eugen Rostenstock-Huessy und die Deutsche Revolution

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Erich Ritter von Kuehnelt-Leddhin - http://www.monarchieliga.de

Eugen Rosenstock-Huessy und die Deutsche Revolution

Rosenstock-Huessy zu hören, war sicherlich immer leichter als ihn zu lesen, denn sein brillanter Geist und sein großes Wissen verleiteten ihn stets dazu, panoramisch zu wirken, und in der Konversation mit ihm konnte man sich nicht seiner Persönlichkeit entziehen. Er hatte nach Amerika emigrierend zuerst den Versuch gemacht, einen gesicherten Platz in Harvard zu finden, doch der dem Christentum zuneigende Philosoph Alfred Whitehead warnte ihn, daß seine Universität völlig kommunistisch orientiert sei. Ein „Begräbnis erster Klasse in der theologischen Fakultät“ ausschlagend, begab er sich schließlich in das damals weniger „fortschrittliche“ Dartmouth College, in dem zu dieser Zeit ältere Traditionen noch lebendig waren.

Ich hatte während meiner amerikanischen Professuren 1937 - 1947 nur zweimal Gelegenheit, Rosenstock-Huessy zu sehen. Bei diesem Zusammentreffen hatte ich in New York die Zeit, mit ihm eingehend über den Nationalsozialismus zu sprechen. Es war ein sehr ruhiges, leidenschaftsloses Gespräch, obwohl Rosenstock keineswegs als Phlegmatiker angesehen werden konnte und Hyperbeln keineswegs abhold war. Doch erregte das Thema ihn nicht über Gebühr, und er behandelte den Nationalsozialismus, der ihn doch in doppelter Weise um seine Heimat gebracht hatte, mit christlicher Gelassenheit, vielleicht aber auch, weil ihn dieses mörderisch-skurrile Phänomen nicht vordergründig interessierte.

Es waren dies Gelegenheiten gegen Ende des Krieges oder knapp nach dem Krieg: ich kann das nicht mehr genau feststellen, da ich kein Tagebuch führe. Ich muß allerdings auch gestehen, daß wir, obwohl geeint durch den christlichen Glauben, nur zu oft auf verschiedenen Gleisen fuhren; die ganze Art des Schauens, Wägens und Beurteilens waren öfters anders, wobei aber er, der amerikanischer Staatsbürger wurde, viel weniger von seiner neuen Heimat beeinflußt wurde, als ich, der Ausländer, der zufällig in Amerika „gelandet“ war und in fast jeder Nacht von der Heimkehr träumte. Er war zwar der um 21 Jahre ältere, doch war ich in diesem Zwiegespräch wahrscheinlich der „amerikanisiertere“.

Natürlich sah auch Rosenstock im „Umbruch“ von 1933 eine wahre Zäsur in der Geschichte des Herzens von Europa, aber doch nicht eine Revolution und als solche figuriert die Machtübernahme auch nicht in Rosenstocks „Die europäischen Revolutionen“, auch der Marcia su Roma der Faschisten nicht, der historisch-genetisch, aber keineswegs charakterlich-inhaltlich mit dem Nationalsozialismus eine gemeinsame Wurzel besitzt. Mit der Entstehungsgeschichte dieser beiden, viel zu oft in einen Topf geworfenen Bewegungen fing auch unser Gespräch an.

Ich erwähnte, daß 1896 unter der Führung von Klofáč, Střibrný und Franke eine Gruppe von tschechischen Sozialdemokraten sich von der Sozialdemokratischen Partei trennten und eine Nationalsozialistische Partei gründete, die alsbald auch im Wiener Reichsrat vertreten war. Diese Nationalsozialisten bejahten weiter den Sozialismus, waren aber zugleich davon überzeugt, daß dieser zumindestens in der Gegenwart nicht auf internationaler, sondern nur auf nationaler Grundlage realisierbar war. Als tschechische Nationalisten bekämpften sie höchst natürlich die deutsche Minderheit in den drei Ländern der heiligen Wenzelskrone, eine Minderheit, die aber augenscheinlich reicher und auch industriell entwickelter und kapitalkräftiger war. Wichtig war auch bei dieser Parteigründung ihr geschichtliches Leitbild: die Bewegung und der Kampf der fanatischen Hussiten, also der Taboriten im 15. Jahrhundert. Sie waren die ersten nationalen Sozialisten gewesen, die das deutsche (katholische) Element in einem richtigen Genozid auszurotten versucht hatten - ein einzigartiges Ereignis im spätmittelalterlichen christlichen Europa. Mit ihnen hatten die tschechischen Nationalsozialisten ihr Image d'Epinal. Einst die tschechische Nationalschande unter den Gebildeten, war diese totalitäre paramilitärische Bewegung nunmehr im Zeitalter des Nationalismus umbewertet worden. Schon in der Mitte des 19. Jahrhunderts sahen Tschechen in den hussitischen Taboriten wahre Nationalhelden; Jan Hus war es freilich als wahrer Märtyrer schon früher gewesen.

Die nationalistische Welle, die Rosenstock so sehr bedauerte, nahm im Rahmen der Nationaldemokratie einen Parteiencharakter an und verrichtete in ganz Europa ihr Zerstörungswerk. Die Donaumonarchie bot ihr dazu eine ideale Gelegenheit. Es waren aber die Deutschen des Habsburgerreiches, die eigentlich in dieser ursprünglich eher romantischen Bewegung die Vorkämpfer waren. Dieser Nationalismus war natürlich eine Folge der Französischen Revolution als auch der Befreiungskriege.

In Österreich entstand eine deutschnationale Bewegung, die unter die Führung von Georg v. Schönerer geriet. Einem kleinen Teil der deutschen Arbeiterschaft in Böhmen, Mähren und Schlesien war diese aber viel zu „bürgerlich“ und daher kam es 1903 zur Geburt der D.A.P., der „Deutschen Arbeiterpartei“. In dieser wurde schon wenige Jahre später der Vorschlag gemacht, sie in „Nationalsozialistische Arbeiterpartei“ umzubenennen, doch wurde dieser Plan zuerst einmal fallengelassen, denn man fürchtete von Kritikern, vor allem von „Schönererianern“ als Nachahmer der tschechischen Nationalsozialisten ausgelacht zu werden. Das aber sollte sich später ändern.

Rosenstock hörte meinem Bericht aufmerksam, ja gespannt zu, gerade weil er viel eher Geschichtsphilosoph als Geschichtsforscher war. Er schien aufgeregt, als ich ihm weiter berichtete, wie ein sozialistischer italienischer Journalist jahrelang als Freund des unglückseligen Cesare Battisti im österreichischen Trient weilte, wo er in aller Wahrscheinlichkeit von diesem Reichsratsabgeordneten Battisti erfuhr, daß im „Hohen Haus“ in Wien Nationalsozialisten als Vertreter der tschechischen Arbeiterklasse Sitz und Stimme hatten. Der Journalist war von dieser nationalistisch-sozialistischen Synthese derart beeindruckt, daß er später nach seiner Ausweisung durch die österreichischen Behörden nicht nur ein Büchlein über die Aussichtslosigkeit der irridentistischen Bewegung im Trentino, sondern auch ein Buch über Jan Hus und die Revolution, die durch seinen tragischen Tod entfacht wurde, in Rom anno 1913 veröffentlichte. Es hieß Giovanni Hus il Vendico und ist wissenschaftlich eigentlich wertlos, historisch aber doch voll Bedeutung, denn es zeigt, in welcher Richtung die Gedanken dieses Publizisten der äußersten Linken sich bewegten.

Sein radikal anarcho-sozialistischer Vater hatte ihm einen spanischen Taufnamen gegeben, nach dem Revolutionär Mexikos, Benito Juárez. Rosenstock erriet gleich, daß es sich um Benito Mussolini handelte, der 1919 den Faschismus ins Leben rief, wobei er den Namen einer alten linken Bauernbewegung aus Mittelitalien kopierte. Die Fascas, wie wir wohl alle wissen, sind ein rein republikanisches Symbol, der Faschismus war auch republikanisch, sozial-sozialistisch, aber nationalistisch im romanisch-britischen, d.h. staatlichen und nicht im ethnischen, also germano-slawischen Sinn. Trotz gemeinsamer Wurzel haben jedoch Faschismus und Nationalsozialismus einen verschiedenen Grundcharakter. Der Nationalsozialismus, wie wir sehen werden, ist die ältere Bewegung, und den Nationalsozialismus als „Faschismus“ zu bezeichnen, ist eine rein moskowitische Sprachregelung, die aber von linken Sympathisanten im Westen mit lakaienhafter Ergebenheit sorgfältig befolgt wird. Die Realisierung der faschistischen Vision war selbstverständlich nicht die Dyarchie von 1922 bis 1943, sondern die Repúbblica Sociale Italiana.

Für Rosenstock war natürlich der Unterschied zwischen dem Fascismo und dem Nationalsozialismus äußerst interessant. Immer betonte er „Jedes Volk macht seine Revolution. Wir beide stimmten aber darin überein, daß der Faschismus ohne den Triumph des Nationalsozialismus ein relativ unbedeutendes mediterran-exotisches Phänomen geblieben wäre, das im Anfang allenthalben auf überraschende Sympathien stieß, nicht zuletzt, weil die bessere Organisation in Italien das Leben der Touristen auf mannigfache Art erleichterte. Daher die Begeisterung eines Liberalen wie Lloyd George oder eines Sozialisten wie George Bernard Shaw für den Duce. Ich kannte schließlich auch amerikanische Demokraten, die sich für den Faschismus erwärmten und möchte da auf George D. Herron hinweisen, eines fanatischen „Demokratisten“, der Wilsons linke Hand in der Außenpolitik war, seinerzeit den österreichischen Friedensvorstoß im Februar 1918 zunichte gemacht hatte, aber 1925 als glühender Verehrer des Fascismo starb. Alles wurde anders durch den Einfluß von Hitler und den enormen Eindruck, den ab 1938 die deutsche Tüchtigkeit auf Mussolini machte. Er wurde dann zum Kopisten. Das hätte allerdings nicht so kommen müssen.

Wir sprachen auch von Hannah Arendt, die große Unterschiede zwischen den beiden Bewegungen gemacht hatte, und da war Rosenstock wahrlich in seinem Element, denn nationale Unterschiede waren für ihn stets von großer Bedeutung und über diese hatte er ja immer nachgedacht und geschrieben, besonders aber über die Gegensätze im französischen und deutschen Volkscharakter. Wir debattierten damals auch die Frage, inwieweit der Faschismus eine verzweifelte „südliche“ Reaktion eines doch recht anarchisch veranlagten Volkes in einem industriell-technischen Zeitalter auf Ordnung, Gehorsam, Pünktlichkeit und den Reichtum im Norden Europas war. Von dort kamen ja die geldkräftigen Touristen, die den Werken Botticellis, Leonardos und Michelangelos als auch der antiken Vergangenheit Roms ihre Verehrung darbrachten, sich aber über die Zugverspätungen, schlecht funktionierenden Badezimmer, die Taschendiebe und Bettler entrüsteten. Diese Problematik fehlte jedoch bei den Deutschen völlig.

Wir kamen dann wieder auf die Vorgeschichte des Nationalsozialismus zu sprechen. Die D.A.P., die Deutsche Arbeiterpartei, ursprünglich nur in den drei nordwestlichen Ländern der Habsburgermonarchie vertreten, bereitete sich langsam auch in der Alpen- und Donauregion aus. Im Nordwesten gab es lediglich den Kampf gegen die Tschechen, die „blutsaugerischen“ Unternehmer und Banken als auch gegen einen grundbesitzenden Adel, der nicht national, sondern heimatlich-vaterländisch dachte. Fragte man einen typischen Vertreter des Hochadels, ob er sich deutsch oder tschechisch fühle, antwortete er in der Regel scharf: „böhmisch!“, „mährisch!“ oder „schlesisch!“, wenn nicht „österreichisch“! Doch in Innerösterreich, vor allem in Wien, gab es den „Antisemitismus“, der eigentlich eher bei den Tschechen als bei den Deutschböhmen vorhanden war, und in Wien war es, wo die D.A.P. im Mai 1918 ihren ersten Kongreß außerhalb des Nordwestens abhielt. Auf diesem Kongreß erfolgte die Namensänderung: die D.A.P. wurde in D.N.S.A.P., „Deutsche Nationalsozialistische Arbeiterpartei“, umgetauft. Damals war Hitler noch an der Westfront, aber in Aussig, dem Hauptsitz der DAP-DNSAP, wurden schon zahlreiche Zeitschriften, Bücher, Pamphlete, Plakate gedruckt, viele mit dem Hakenkreuz verziert. Das Wiener Programm der DNSAP war demokratisch, sozialistisch und als Folge des demokratischen Mehrheitsprinzips gegen unpopuläre Minderheiten gerichtet, als da sind: der Adel, die Reichen, die Juden, die Kleriker. Für die Banken wurden „demokratische Kontrollen“ gefordert, ebenso für die Aufstiegsmöglichkeiten in der Armee. Die Habsburgermonarchie mit ihrer nationalen Vielfalt wurde in Bausch und Bogen abgelehnt und ein „großdeutsches“ Reich gefordert. Es war dies das Programm einer typischen Linkspartei.

Im November zerfiel die Monarchie, in den ersten Wahlen der Tschechoslowakei bekam die DNSAP 42.000 Stimmen und im Frühjahr 1919 brachte der Ingenieur Rudolf Jung die ganze Literatur der DNSAP zu Hitler nach München, der ursprünglich eine „sozialrevolutionäre“ Partei gründen wollte - und auf Anraten Jungs die rote Fahne wählte. Es gab nun mit einer Namensumstellung vier deutsche nationalsozialistische Parteien: eine österreichische, deutsche und sogar eine polnische (mit dem Sitz in Bielitz) - dazu die ursprüngliche, die „tschechoslowakische“, die Národně socialistická strana československá. In den tschechischen Lexika figurierten die tschechischen und die deutschen Nationalsozialisten immer zusammen! Von dieser böhmisch-mährischen Wurzel wußte Rosenstock ein wenig, hatte ihr aber keine Bedeutung zugemessen, sah aber in der „Deutschen Revolution“ (einem Begriff, dem er nur sehr zögernd zustimmte) eine Entwicklung analog jener der Französischen Revolution, einer Revolution, die sich nach dem Sturz der Bastille ohne Unterlaß radikalisierte. Und das tat auch die Deutsche Revolution. Das Wort von Theodor Heuss: „Alles war daran nicht falsch, aber das Ganze war falsch“, war in dieser Diskussion nicht gefallen, doch vielleicht- ich sage „vielleicht“ - war dies auch die Ansicht Rosenstocks. Man darf da nicht vergessen, daß er einmal, 1926, Mitbegründer eines Arbeitslagers für Arbeiter, Bauern und Studenten gewesen war. Ich meinte aber, daß in der deutschen - in der „legalen Revolution“, um einen Ausdruck Carl Schmitts zu gebrauchen - eine gewisse linke Fatalität steckte, wobei der Historiker, der die Geschichte wirklich kennt, das Wort „Unabänderlichkeit“ sehr ungern in den Mund nimmt. Rosenstock, der stark am Rhythmus der Revolutionen festhielt, war über meine stete Rückkehr zu den Begriffen „links“ und „rechts“ nicht allzu glücklich und zwar gerade, weil er das sprachliche Element in der Geschichte für sehr wichtig hielt. Er schwelgte manchmal geradezu in der Sprachanalyse.

Ich versuchte „links“ und „rechts“ als echte Antithesen darzustellen und solche berühren sich in ihren Extremen nie. Der Glaube an die Extremberührung - les extrêmes se touchent - ist eine fausse idée claire, denn extrem groß und klein, nah und fern, schwer und leicht, gut und böse wachsen nie zusammen. Nun aber ist die linke Vision vom idealen Staat stets ein Gebilde von einer Sprache, einer Rasse, einer Nation, einer Partei, einem Führer, einer Sitte, einer Klasse, eines Einkommens, einer Schulform, eines Bildungsniveaus, eines Gesetzes, also eines zentralistischen Staates, der keine Abweichungen von der Norm duldet. In ihm regiert (in der Theorie) das Volk, zumeist versinnbildlicht durch einen Mann, der kein Vater, sondern ein „Bruder“ ist - Big Brother. Nun ist dies ein anti-personalistischer Traum, also ein Alptraum.

Rosenstock, der gerne in Kategorien dachte, wußte jedoch nicht, warum ich unbedingt dieser Vision ein linkes Etikett aufkleben wollte. Ich betonte daraufhin, daß ich ebenso wie er selbst eine solche unnatürliche Ordnung verdamme, und in allen Sprachen - sowohl im Sanskrit, in den ural-altaischen Idiomen als auch in der Bibel – „links“ einen negativen und „rechts“ einen positiven Charakter tragen. Im Deutschen ist, zum Beispiel, „rechts“ mit dem Recht, mit richtig, rechtlich, gerecht, redlich verwandt. Im Italienischen ist sogar die Linke (la sinistra) vom Unglücksfall (il sinistro) nur im Genus verschieden. In der Heiligen Schrift werden nicht nur beim Jüngsten Gericht die Erlösten auf die rechte und die Verdammten auf die linke Seite Christi gestellt.

Dabei kam man gleich auf die psychologischen Grundlagen von „links“ und „rechts“ zu sprechen. Ich betonte, daß der Linke auf das Zwillingspaar Gleichheit und Nämlichkeit (identity, sameness) eingestellt ist. Wir alle haben mit dem Tierreich einen Trieb zur Nämlichkeit gemeinsam: wir sind manchmal tatsächlich in der Stimmung, mit Menschen unserer Kultur, Sprache, Rasse, Geschlecht, Alter, politischer Überzeugung, Religion, künstlerischem Geschmack usw. zusammenzukommen. Wenn dies zu einer Dauerhaltung wird, entsteht Misogynie (oder Misandrie), Xenophobie, Rassismus, geistige Verengung, Kleinkariertheit, Intoleranz und dergleichen mehr. Glücklicherweise hat jedoch der Mensch auch den entgegengesetzten Trieb, den er mit dem Tierreich nicht teilt, und das ist ein diversitärer Trieb, der sich in einer Freude am Wandel und an der Verschiedenheit, die sich nicht nur in der Begegnung mit andersdenkenden Menschen, sondern vor allem in der Reiselust äußert, das heißt ganz andere Erdbewohner zu treffen, andere Speisen zu essen, eine fremde Musik zu hören, ungewohnte Pflanzen zu sehen, ein neues Klima zu erfahren, eine exotische Architektur zu studieren und Kunstprodukte zu genießen, die uns überraschen. Einem Hund kann man dasselbe Futter tagaus-tagein vorsetzen, wir aber brauchen als Menschen „Abwechslung“.

Die Natur ist variabel und frei, daher auch voller Ungleichheiten. Das Blumenbeet und das Kartoffelfeld müssen „angelegt“ werden. Wollen wir eine gerade Gartenhecke, so müssen wir sie brutal mit einer Schere immer wieder schneiden. Und deshalb besteht auch ein unüberbrückbarer Gegensatz zwischen Gleichheit, Nämlichkeit und Freiheit. Gleiche sind wir nur in der Tyrannis, am wenigsten sind wir „Gleiche vor Gott“, denn wenn Judas Iskarioth dem heiligen Johannes, dem Täufer gleich wäre, müßte das Christentum gleich abtreten. Die Linke steht also für Gleichheit, Nämlichkeit und die „gleichmacherische“ Knechtschaft. Nationalsozialismus und kommunistischer Internationalsozialismus sind einander weitgehend ähnlich, denn sie sind beide extrem links, beide Erben der Französischen Revolution und also keineswegs „Extreme, die sich berühren“. Es war also gar nicht so zufällig, daß der Zweite Weltkrieg nur auf Grund der deutsch-sowjetischen Allianz möglich wurde. Rosenstock hörte mir aufmerksam zu. In seine Systematik war das nicht allzu leicht einzuordnen. Er bestand darauf, daß die Existenz ein Kreuz sei, das in vier Richtungen weise: in die Zukunft, aber auch in die Vergangenheit, nach außen und nach innen. Sie sei weder linear noch zirkular. Für Rosenstock war diese Kreuzform der Existenz von zutiefst christlicher Symbolbedeutung. Irgendwie war er doch ein Mystiker, der sich weder auf die evangelische, noch auf die katholische Seite schlagen wollte, aber auch nicht wie Wilhelm Röpke als „erasmisch“ bezeichnet werden wollte. Dafür war Rosenstock zutiefst vom Ostchristentum fasziniert und machte Rom für den kirchlichen Bruch zwischen Ost und West hauptverantwortlich. Dem Taufschein nach war Rosenstock ein evangelischer Christ geworden und seine christliche Schau war stets präsent. Für Karl Muth, katholisch und aufgeschlossen, aber kein „Modernist“, hatte er die größte Verehrung.

Rosenstock wußte natürlich nicht nur von der gemeinsamen fränkisch-karolingischen Wurzel Frankreichs und des Römisch-Deutschen Reichs, sondern bekräftigte sie immer wieder, doch wies er andererseits auch auf die deutschfranzösischen Unterschiede hin. Organisation ist ein französisches Wort, schrieb er, das aber von Kant übernommen wurde, und Organisation war die Stärke des Nationalsozialismus vom Beginn an, während sie sich in der Französischen Revolution erst entwickelte und in ideologisch gefärbten Angriffskriegen später ihren konkretesten Ausdruck fand. In Frankreich, aber vielleicht noch mehr in Deutschland, bestätigte sich dann das Rosenstock-Wort, daß man vom rechten Pfad abkommen kann, wenn man am geraden Weg bleibt und in Deutschland verlief alles erbarmungslos gradlinig. Das Reich ging gradlinig in den Untergang - ohne den Common Sense, der die „Angelsachsen“ auszeichnet. Freilich: Die Franzosen können genau so pèlerins de l'absolu - ein Bloy-Wort - wie die Deutschen sein! Es gibt da eben ein „absolutistisches“ Rückgrat von Europa, das mit Gibraltar beginnt und über Spanien, Frankreich, Deutschland und Polen nach Rußland führt. In dieser Region gilt das „Alles oder Nichts“ und dort werden auch von den Grundprinzipien die letzten, ja mörderisch-logischen Schlußfolgerungen gezogen.

Rosenstock wies in dieser Beziehung auf Descartes und Kant hin, zwei „lieblose Junggesellen“, wie er sich ausdrückte, die in einer blutlosen Geistigkeit lebten. Sehr analog war Rosenstocks Kritik an John Dewey und Konfuzius, die in ihrer Philosophie keinen Raum für die Leidenschaften, für das Unerwartete und Unfaßbare übrigließen, doch überraschte mich ein wenig der Umstand, daß Rosenstock die Vortragsserie Deweys in China nach dem Ersten Weltkrieg nicht erwähnte, diesen Beitrag des amerikanischen Instrumentalismus zum chinesischen Pragmatismus, der in der Folge fast umweglos zu Maos „zündenden Platitüden“ in seinem roten Büchlein und indirekt auch zu den unsagbaren Schrecken der sogenannten „Kulturrevolution“ geführt hat.

Schon die Wahlschlachten der Nationalsozialisten im demokratischen Rahmen zeichneten sich genau so durch eine hervorragende Organisation aus wie ihr Regieren und darin standen sie auch den blutrünstigen französischen Demokraten nicht nach, die aber allerdings nicht wie die National- und Internationalsozialisten ihre Untaten in entlegenen Lagern und Kellern ausführten, sondern am hellichten Tag mit voller Beteiligung und zum Gaudium des Volkes. Nicht umsonst waren der sadistische Marquis de Sade und der masochistische Neurotiker Rousseau die intellektuellen Väter der Französischen Revolution gewesen. Frankreich und Deutschland! Man vergesse da nicht den französischen Beitrag zur grundlegenden Modernisierung Preußens, durch die Réfugiés, den auch Friedrich II. in seinem Ersten Testament anerkannte, und die Bewunderung des linken Frankreich für das fortschrittliche und aufgeklärte Preußen. Danton nannte Preußen den natürlichen Alliierten Frankreichs und das Comité du Salut bezeichnete die Allianz Frankreichs mit Österreich im Jahre 1756 als größten Unsinn der Bourbonen. Diese Sympathien führten schließlich zum Basler Sonderfrieden.

Es war ganz natürlicherweise dieser aufgeklärte, fortschrittliche, religiös äußerst geschwächte Norden und Osten der Weimarer Republik, in dem die Nationalsozialisten ihre erdrückende Mehrheit bekamen und Spenglers These vom Preußischen Sozialismus - diesmal im nationalen Gewand - ihre Bestätigung fand. Dies bezeugt ganz eindeutig die Wahlkarte. Das will aber nicht bedeuten, daß der deutsche Süden restlos unschuldig ist. August M. Knoll stellte richtig fest, daß Hitler der Mann war, der den österreichischen Wahnsinn in den Dienst des deutschen Schwertes stellte.

Über Preußen und Österreich hatte meines Wissens Rosenstock kaum Aussagen gemacht. Für ihn war der Nationalsozialismus ein Stück rasanter Dummheit. Man erinnere sich da an das alte Witzwort: „Selig sind die Armen im Geiste, denn ihrer ist das Dritte Reich“. Rosenstock aber schrieb: „Hitler war die Antwort des von allem Denken enthobenen Volkes. Angebrüllt werden ist besser als objektiv ausgedacht werden. Denn das Böse, das aus den Herzen kommt, hat Luther gesagt, ist immer noch lebensspendender als das Gute, das aus dem Kopf stammt. Das ist natürlich auch eine Kritik an der Demokratie, um die man nicht herumkommt, wenn man sich an Plato erinnert, der die Tyrannis als Folge der Demokratie sah, und auch nicht Aristoteles vergißt, der uns ermahnt hatte, in der Demokratie ein Regierungssystem zu sehen, in dem die Stimmen gezählt und nicht gewogen werden. Stimmt man mit den Erkenntnissen der Antike überein, darf man sich nicht an Rosenstocks Feststellung stoßen, daß die Masse der Deutschen das Denken nie erlernt hatte, was aber natürlich für alle Massen auf dem weiten Erdenrund zutrifft. Und Masse, wie Rosenstock hervorhob, kommt vom lateinischer Massa, d.h. Teig, und ein Teig läßt sich nun einmal kneten. Dies hatte der Nationalsozialismus mit dem deutschen Volk vor und nach der „Machtübernahme“ gründlichst getan.

Doch die Nationalsozialisten taten eben noch etwas - nicht ganz anderes wohl aber Dazugehörendes: sie füllten den Alltag des modernen Menscher aus, was ja auch die Kommunisten in Rußland taten und was Rosenstock „anerkennend“ bemerkte. Das ist natürlich ein Problem der Moderne und erinnert auch an einen Ausspruch von Karl Kraus, der mit Ironie gesagt hatte daß wenn man dem Menschen die Politik wegnimmt, ihm gar nichts mehr übrigbliebe als sein Innenleben. In der Sowjetunion war es tatsächlich nicht nur die Arbeit, die daseinsausfüllend wirken sollte, sondern auch die marxistische Heilslehre, die in der Zweiten Revolution des Jahres 1917 von der RSDAP, der Russischen Sozialdemokratischen Arbeiterpartei, in Szene gesetzt wurde. (Erst 1918 nannten sich die radikalen Vertreter der RSDAP „Kommunisten“.) Die Wichtigkeit der Arbeit, ja, die Heiligung der Arbeit hat auch das katholische, in Spanien gegründete Opus Dei erkannt.

Für die Nationalsozialistische Arbeiterpartei waren konstruktive Volksgenossen eben auch nur die „Arbeiter der Stirne und der Faust“, die Werktätigen im roten Jargon. Für die Arbeit muß es allerdings auch eine Muße geben und dafür war dann Kraft durch Freude, wobei die Freude da nicht Selbstzweck war, sondern nur der Kraft diente.

Es war aber bei weitem eben nicht nur die Arbeit, sondern vor allem die weltanschauliche Ausfüllung eines doch größtenteils religiösen Vakuums, das von größter Bedeutung war. Was das Leben des Menschen in der Vergangenheit ausfüllte, war zwar oft harte, aber kreative Handarbeit, wenn nicht gar künstlerische oder kunstverwandte Schöpfung, wie z.B. beim Schneider, Schuster, Tischler, Baumeister. Dazu kamen früher vier hochwichtige Elemente: Religion, Familienleben, vaterländische Begeisterung und noch zivile Vereinigungen. Alles das wurde kollektiviert, in Frage gestellt, bedroht, an den Rand gedrängt. Der „Sinn des Lebens“ entfloh, die Treuebindungen nach oben und unten zerbrachen. Dafür gab es Parteien und Parteiungen mit Wahlschlachten, wahre Orgien von Treueerschütterungen und Treuebrüchen. Die alle Bürger verbindenden Loyalitäten zerbrachen. Vergessen wir nicht, daß allein schon das Wort „Partei“ („Teil“) auf einen Zwist hinweist. Das gewählte Staatsoberhaupt, anders als der Monarch, wurde von einem Teil des Volkes gewünscht, von den anderen abgelehnt, wenn nicht gehaßt oder verachtet.

In dieses Vakuum stieß eine Ideologie vor, die in einem archaischen Land wie Rußland nur ein sehr kleines Segment der Bevölkerung ergriff, in den modernen deutschen Landen ebenso wie in Frankreich am Ende des 18. Jahrhunderts jedoch ein sehr großes. Hier, in einer von der Monotonie geplagten Gesellschaft war auf einmal durch die Synthese „der beiden Jahrhundertkräfte“ (Pfitzner), durch Nationalismus und Sozialismus, den Massen ein neuer Lebensinhalt geboten worden. Und da war nach 1933 eine Regierung vorhanden, die energisch handelte, die eine dynamische, aufregende Politik betrieb, die nach Jahren der Erniedrigung die ganze Welt in Atem hielt. „Viele Deutsche wurden Nazis“, schrieb Rosenstock, „denn schlechte Entscheidungen sind besser als gar keine“. Als es dann am Ende des „Tausendjährigen Reiches“ und nach dem Zusammenbruch offenbar wurde, daß die schlechten Entscheidungen unsagbar dumm und zugleich verbrecherisch waren, verlor die braune Masse bis auf kleine Minderheiten ihren Glauben.

Über die Untaten zeigte sich Rosenstock-Huessy nicht erstaunt. Er zitierte mir gegenüber Dostojewskij: „Wenn es Gott nicht gibt, dann ist alles erlaubt!“ Ich aber treffe manchmal, wenn auch sehr selten, Nationalsozialisten, die von ihrem Glauben nicht loskommen, weil es ihnen vor dem Nichts graut, aber öfters ehemalige Braune, die zu keiner Alternative gefunden haben und bitter die Jahre beklagen, in denen sie vor Begeisterung lichterloh gebrannt hatten und bereit gewesen waren, für ihre Ersatzreligion jedes Opfer zu bringen, denn der Mensch ist nun einmal ein ideologisch-religiöses Wesen; er lebt nicht durch Brot allein, er ist nicht nur auf den Genuß ausgerichtet, sondern auch auf Askese und Opfer. „Alles in der Welt läßt sich ertragen, nur nicht eine Reihe von schönen Tagen!“, wie schon Goethe sagte.

Eine Hinwendung zur Religion löst für solche Menschen dieses Problem, aber die Gnade des Glaubens läßt sich nicht „verordnen“ und eine Bekehrung zur Liberaldemokratie ist zumeist eine eitle Hoffnung. Heute stehen wir sogar dem Neologismus der „Demokratieverdrossenheit' gegenüber, und Professor Allan Bloom hat uns in seinem amerikanischen Beststeller The Closing of the American Mind gestanden, daß die großen Europäer stets rechts standen. Wer könnte sich auch einen nicht jugendlich-enthusiastischen, sondern reifen Sokrates, Plato, Aristoteles, Dante, Shakespeare, Leibniz, Vico, Pascal, Kant, Schiller, Goethe, Hegel, Schelling, Kierkegaard, Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, Spengler, Freud, Solowjew oder Berdjajew als Protagonisten unserer heutigen Demokratie oder des Sozialismus vorstellen? Die liberale, parlamentarische Demokratie ist ja auch keine geschlossene Ideologie, sondern eigentlich nur ein Rahmen, in den durch Wahlen ein Bild eingelegt wird. Und auf Grund dieses vorher nicht festgelegten Bildes regiert dann nicht „das Volk“, eine reine Abstraktion, sondern die Vertreter einer Mehrheit über eine Minderheit.

In seinem großen Werk Die europäischen Revolutionen spricht er, sich an Polybius anlehnend, von einem historisch wiederholten Kreislauf von der Monarchie über die Aristokratie zur Demokratie, betont aber ganz richtig, daß diese Staatsformen nie in völliger Reinheit, sondern stets mit anderen gemischt vorkommen. Rosenstocks Denken war eigentlich zu elitär, um sich für die - sagen wir - betont demokratische Staatsform zu erwärmen. Er hatte die Erfahrung der Krisen und der Wandlung der Weimarer Republik hinter sich. Das glaubte ich aus unserer Diskussion herauszuhören. Politische Denker wie Rousseau und Thomas Paine hielt er für ein ganz großes Unglück. Seine Bejahung Amerikas widerspricht dem nicht, da das Wort „Demokratie“ weder in der Unabhängigkeitserklärung, noch in der Verfassung der USA aufscheint, und die Gründerväter der Union, die sich in der Verfassung nicht einmal als Republik bezeichnet, überzeugte Antidemokraten waren. Drüben machte sich erst nach 1828 der Einfluß der Ideen der Französischen Revolution massiv bemerkbar. Ob Rosenstock in Dartmouth, wo er lehrte, antidemokratische Äußerungen machte? Leicht möglich. Wie Rosenstock einmal betonte, zeichnet sich die geistige Welt der amerikanischen Universitäten durch einen völligen Mangel an Originalität aus; es bleibe die Rolle von importierten Europäern im Professorat, den stark konformistischen Charakter der dortigen Hochschulen zu durchbrechen. Er gab aber auch zu, daß es europäisch-kontinentale Gedankengänge gäbe, die den Amerikanern nicht immer gut tun.

Rosenstock wurde amerikanischer Staatsbürger, bezeichnete sich aber nicht als Refugee, vielleicht weil ihm die Gesellschaft der meist linksdralligen Emigraille nicht sympathisch war, und stellte fest, daß ihm das preußische Kultusministerium bis zur Kriegserklärung Hitlers an Amerika monatlich 150 Dollar schickte. In seinen Büchern benützte er zwar die „Wir-Form“ für Amerikaner, doch paßte er in die amerikanische Szene eigentlich nicht hinein. Sein enormes Wissen schreckte die Amerikaner, sie verstanden ihn wenig, doch muß man gestehen, daß Georg Müller in seinem Nachwort zu Rosenstock Ja und Nein recht hatte, als er schrieb, wie schwierig es sei, eine systematische Einführung zur Ideenwelt Rosenstocks zu verfassen. Dem muß man wohl zustimmen, zugleich aber protestierte Rosenstock in seiner Soziologie, daß man ihn als „unsystematisch“ betrachte. Auch ich muß sagen, daß ich selbst es mühevoll finde, immer und überall dem roten Faden seiner Gedankenwelt nachzuspüren. In Dartmouth hatte er jedoch eine Gruppe von Jüngern um sich. Er hatte sie zweifellos fasziniert.

In vielerlei Beziehung war Rosenstock sehr deutsch. Ich glaube - beweisen kann ich es nicht -, daß seine Exilierung ihn doch so schmerzte, daß er deswegen an einer öffentlichen Distanzierung zu seiner Heimat Abstand nahm. Man kann sich gar nicht vorstellen, welch ungeheurer Blödsinn in Amerika, das ja eine gigantische Insel im Weltmeer ist, über Deutschland gesagt, geschrieben und auch gefilmt wurde. Die ganze psychologische Kriegsführung war eine Fortsetzung der Propaganda des Ersten Weltkrieges, und die marxistischen Emigranten, wie Gustav Stolper festgestellt hatte, waren daran furchtbar schuldig. Rosenstock war für interne Propagandazwecke nicht benützbar und dasselbe konnte man von Brüning sagen, dem ich erst drüben begegnet bin und der einen ganz großen Eindruck auf mich machte. Die Linke griff ihn wegen seiner Passivität wütend an.

Was in Deutschland geschehen war, entsetzte, aber überraschte ihn eigentlich nicht. Er bekräftigte, daß „die Massen keinen Rückblick und keinen Sinn für die Zukunft haben“. Auch bestand er darauf, daß jede Revolution ihre Abwehr viel grausamer gestalte als jede vorhergehende (oft nur angebliche) Unterdrückung. Sicherlich waren die Französische und die Russische Revolution zu einer Zeit liberaler Reformen ausgebrochen und die Weimarer Republik war viel eher chaotisch als repressiv. Die russische Revolution zerstörte übrigens nicht die Monarchie, sondern eine demokratische Republik unter der Führung Kerenskis, eines hellen Narren und verkappten Sozialrevolutionärs. Wir stehen hier einfach sowohl primitiven Leidenschaften als einem Sieg von Ideen gegenüber. „Ideas Have Consequences“, um den Titel eines amerikanischen konservativen Buches zu zitieren. Die Mischung von Leidenschaften mit Ideen führen jedoch allzuleicht zur Unerbittlichkeit. Der Sturz monarchischer Patriarchalität hat überall nur die entsetzlichsten Folgen gehabt Nicht nur in Europas drei Kaiserreichen, sondern auch in Spanien, Jugoslawien, Rumänien, Bulgarien, China, Iran, Afghanistan, Äthiopien; sie hat auch Portugal, Italien, Griechenland und Brasilien nichts Gutes gebracht.

Der „Restauration“ in Deutschlands Westen nach 1945 stand Rosenstock mit einer gewissen Skepsis gegenüber, denn er empfand sich als ein wichtiger Anreger des Kreisauer Kreises vor 1933, dessen Ideen keine Verwirklichung fanden. Auch entdeckte er, daß die deutsche Jugend an derselben Sterilität litt wie die amerikanische. An einer Universität im Herzen Europas hätte es Rosenstock wahrscheinlich nicht leicht gehabt. Revolution und Krieg hatten ihm eigentlich doch übel mitgespielt. Er hat Deutschland nach dem Krieg zwar wiedergesehen, war aber doch fern von der Heimat in Vermont im 85. Lebensjahr gestorben - ein Riese, der in unsere kleinkarierte Welt nicht mehr hineingepaßt hat.

Lire la suite

vendredi, 15 mai 2009 | Lien permanent

Réflexions sur la figure esthétique et littéraire du dandy

Tissot_James_Jacques_A_Dandy-full;init_.jpg

 

Réflexions sur la figure esthétique et littéraire du “dandy”

 

Intervention de Robert Steuckers au séminaire de “SYNERGON-Deutschland”, Basse-Saxe, 6 mai 2001

 

Avant d’entrer dans le vif du sujet, je voudrais formuler trois remarques préliminaires:

◊ 1. J’ai hésité à accepter votre invitation à parler de la figure du dandy, car ce type de problématique n’est pas mon sujet de préoccupation privilégié.

 

◊ 2. J’ai finalement accepté parce que j’ai redécouvert un essai aussi magistral que clair d’Otto Mann, paru en Allemagne il y de nombreuses années (i. e. : Dandysmus als konservative Lebensform) (*). Cet essai mériterait d’être à nouveau réédité, avec de bons commentaires.

 

◊ 3. Ma troisième remarque est d’ordre méthodologique et définitionnel. Avant de parler du “dandy”, et de rappeler à ce sujet l’excellent travail d’Otto Mann, il faut énumérer les différentes définitions du “dandy”, qui ont cours, et qui sont contradictoires. Ces définitions sont pour la plupart erronées, ou superficielles et insuffisantes. D’aucuns définissent le dandy comme un “pur phénomène de mode”, comme un personnage élégant, sans plus, soucieux de se vêtir selon les dernières modes vestimentaires. D’autres le définissent comme un personnage superficiel, qui aime la belle vie et pérégrine, oisif, de cabaret en cabaret. Françoise Dolto avait brossé un tableau psychologique du dandy. D’autres encore soulignent, quasi exclusivement, la dimension homosexuelle de certains dandies, tel Oscar Wilde. Plus rarement on assimile le dandy à une sorte d’avatar de Don Juan, qui meuble son ennui en collectionnant les conquêtes féminines. Ces définitions ne sont pas celles d’Otto Mann, que nous faisons nôtres.

 

L’archétype: George Bryan Brummell

 

Notre perspective, à la suite de l’essai d’Otto Mann, est d’attribuer au dandy une dimension culturelle plus profonde que toutes ses superficialités “modieuses”, épicuriennes, hédonistes, homosexuelles ou donjuanesques. Pour Otto Mann, le modèle, l’archétype du dandy, reste George Bryan Brummell, figure du début du 19ième siècle qui demeurait équilibrée. Brummell, contrairement à certains pseudo-dandies ultérieurs, est un homme discret, qui ne cherche pas à se faire remarquer par des excentricités vestimentaires ou comportementales. Brummell évite les couleurs criardes, ne porte pas de bijoux, ne se livre pas à des jeux sociaux de pur artifice. Brummell est distant, sérieux, digne; il n’essaie pas de faire de l’effet, comme le feront, plus tard, des figures aussi différentes qu’Oscar Wilde, que Stefan George ou Henry de Montherlant. Chez lui, les tendances spirituelles dominent. Brummell entretient la société, raconte, narre, manie l’ironie et même la moquerie. Pour parler comme Nietzsche ou Heidegger, nous dirions qu’il se hisse au-dessus de l’«humain, trop humain» ou de la banalité quotidienne (Alltäglichkeit).

 

Brummell, dandy de la première génération, incarne une forme culturelle, une façon d’être, que notre société contemporaine devrait accepter comme valable, voire comme seule valable, mais qu’elle ne génère plus, ou plus suffisamment. Raison pour laquelle le dandy s’oppose à cette société. Les principaux motifs qui sous-tendent son opposition sont les suivants : 1) la société apparaît comme superficielle et marquée de lacunes et d’insuffisances; 2) le dandy, en tant que forme culturelle, qu’incarnation d’une façon d’être, se pose comme supérieur à cette société lacunaire et médiocre; 3) le dandy à la Brummell ne commet aucun acte exagéré, ne commet aucun scandale (par exemple de nature sexuelle), ne commet pas de crime, n’a pas d’engagement politique (contrairement aux dandies de la deuxième génération comme un Lord Byron). Brummell lui-même ne gardera pas cette attitude jusqu’à la fin de ses jours, car il sera criblé de dettes, mourra misérablement à Caen dans un hospice. Il avait, à un certain moment, tourné le dos au fragile équilibre que réclame la posture initiale du dandy, qu’il avait été le premier à incarner.

 

Un idéal de culture, d’équilibre et d’excellence

 

S’il n’y a dans son comportement et sa façon d’être aucune exagération, aucune originalité flamboyante, pourquoi la figure du dandy nous apparaît-elle quand même importante, du moins intéressante? Parce qu’elle incarne un idéal, qui est en quelque sorte, mutatis mutandis, celui de la paiedeia grecque ou de l’humanitas romaine. Chez Evola et chez Jünger, nous avons la nostalgie de la magnanimitas latine, de l’hochmüote des chevaliers germaniques des 12ième et 13ième siècles, avatars romains ou médiévaux d’un modèle proto-historique perse, mis en exergue par Gobineau d’abord, par Henry Corbin ensuite. Le dandy est l’incarnation de cet idéal de culture, d’équilibre et d’excellence dans une période plus triviale de l’histoire, où le bourgeois calculateur et inculte, et l’énergumène militant, de type hébertiste ou jacobin, a pris le pas sur l’aristocrate, le chevalier, le moine et le paysan.

 

A la fin du 18ième siècle, avec la révolution française, ces vertus, issues du plus vieux fond proto-historique de l’humanité européenne, sont complètement remises en question. D’abord par l’idéologie des Lumières et son corrolaire, l’égalitarisme militant, qui veut effacer toutes les traces visibles et invisibles de cet idéal d’excellence. Ensuite, par le Sturm und Drang et le romantisme, qui, par réaction, basculent parfois dans un sentimentalisme incapacitant, parce qu’expression, lui aussi, d’un déséquilibre. Les modèles immémoriaux, parfois estompés et diffus, les attitudes archétypales survivantes disparaissent. C’est en Angleterre qu’on en prend conscience très vite, dès la fin du 17ième, avant même les grands bouleversements de la fin du 18ième : Addison et Steele dans les colonnes du Spectator et du Tatler, constatent qu’il est nécessaire et urgent de conserver et de maintenir un système d’éducation, une culture générale, capables de garantir l’autonomie de l’homme. Une valeur que les médias actuels ne promeuvent pas, preuve discrète que nous avons bel et bien sombré dans un monde orwellien, qui se donne un visage de “bon apôtre démocratique”, inoffensif et “tolérant”, mais traque impitoyablement toutes les espaces et résidus d’autonomie de nos contemporains. Addison et Steele, dans leurs articles successifs, nous ont légué une vision implicite de l’histoire culturelle et intellectuelle de l’Europe.

 

L’idéal de Goethe

 

Le plus haut idéal culturel que l’Europe ait connu est bien entendu celui de la paideia grecque antique. Elle a été réduite à néant par le christianisme primitif, mais, dès le 14ième siècle, on sent, dans toute l’Europe, une volonté de faire renaître les idéaux antiques. Le dandy, et, bien avant son émergence dans le paysage culturel européen, les deux journalistes anglais Steele et Addison, entendent incarner cette nostalgie de la paideia, où l’autonomie de chacun est respectée. Ils tentent en fait de réaliser concrètement dans la société l’objectif de Goethe: inciter leurs contemporains à se forger et se façonner une personnalité, qui sera modérée dans ses besoins, satisfaite de peu, mais surtout capable, par cette ascèse tranquille, d’accéder à l’universel, d’être un modèle pour tous, sans trahir son humus originel (Ausbildung seiner selbst zur universalen und selbstgenugsamen Persönlichkeit). Cet idéal goethéen, partagée  anticipativement par les deux publicistes anglais puis incarné par Brummell, n’est pas passé après les vicissitudes de la révolution française, de la révolution industrielle et des révolutions scientifiques de tous acabits. Sous les coups de cette modernité, irrespectueuse des Anciens, l’Europe se retrouve privée de toute culture substantielle, de toute épine dorsale éthique. On en mesure pleinement les conséquences aujourd’hui, avec la déliquescence de l’enseignement.

 

A partir de 1789, et tout au long du 19ième siècle, le niveau culturel ne cesse de s’effondrer. Le déclin culturel commence au sommet de la pyramide sociale, désormais occupé par la bourgeoisie triomphante qui, contrairement aux classes dominantes des époques antérieures, n’a pas d’assise morale (sittlich) valable pour maintenir un dégré élevé de civilisation; elle n’a pas de fondement religieux, ni de réelle éthique professionnelle, contrairement aux artisans et aux gens de métier, jadis encadrés dans leurs gildes ou corporations (Zünfte). La seule réalisation de cette bourgeoisie est l’accumulation méprisable de numéraire, ce qui nous permet de parler, comme René Guénon, d’un “règne de la quantité”, d’où est bannie toute qualité. Dans les classes défavorisées, au bas de l’échelle sociale, tout élément de culture est éradiqué, tout simplement parce que chez les pseudo-élites, il n’y a déjà plus de modèle culturel; le peuple, aliéné, précarisé, prolétarisé, n’est plus une matrice de valeurs précises, ethniquement déterminées, du moins une matrice capable de générer une contre-culture offensive, qui réduirait rapidement à néant ce que Thomas Carlyle appelait la “cash flow mentality”. En conclusion, nous assistons au déploiement d’une barbarie nantie, à haut niveau économique (eine ökonomisch gehobene Barbarei), mais à niveau culturel nul. On ne peut pas être riche à la mode du bourgeois et, simultanément, raffiné et intelligent. Cette une vérité patente : personne de cultivé n’a envie de se retrouver à table, ou dans un salon, avec des milliardaires de la trempe d’un Bill Gates ou d’un Albert Frère, ni avec un banquier ou un fabricant de moteurs d’automobile ou de frigidaires. Le véritable homme d’esprit, qui se serait égaré dans le voisinage de tels sinistres personnages, devrait sans cesse réprimer des baillements en subissant le vomissement continu de leurs bavardages ineptes, ou, pour ceux qui ont le tempérament plus volcanique, réprimer l’envie d’écraser une assiette bien grasse, ou une tarte à la façon du Gloupier, sur le faciès blet de ces nullités. Le monde serait plus pur —et sûrement plus beau— sans la présence de telles créatures.

 

La mission de l’artiste selon Baudelaire

 

Pour le dandy, il faut réinjecter de l’esthétique dans cette barbarie. En Angleterre, John Ruskin (1819-1899), les Pré-Réphaélites avec Dante Gabriel Rossetti et William Morris, vont s’y employer. Ruskin élaborera des projets architecturaux, destinés à embellir les villes enlaidies par l’industrialisation anarchique de l’époque manchesterienne, qui déboucheront notamment sur la construction de “cités-jardins” (Garden Cities). Les architectes belges et allemands de l’Art Nouveau ou Jugendstil, dont Henry Vandervelde et Victor Horta, prendront le relais. A côté de ces réalisations concrètes  —parce que l’architecture permet plus aisément de passer au concret—  le fossé ne cesse de se creuser entre l’artiste et la société. Le dandy se rapproche de l’artiste. En France, Baudelaire pose, dans ses écrits théoriques, l’artiste comme le nouvel “aristocrate”, dont l’attitude doit être empreinte de froideur distante, dont les sentiments ne doivent jamais s’exciter ni s’irriter outre mesure, dont l’ironie doit être la qualité principale, de même que la capacité à raconter des anecdotes plaisantes. Le dandy artiste prend ses distances par rapport à tous les dadas conventionnels et habituels de la société. Ces positions de Baudelaire se résument dans les paroles d’un personnage d’Ernst Jünger, dans le roman Héliopolis : «Je suis devenu le dandy, qui prend pour important ce qui ne l’est pas, qui se moque de ce qui est important » («Ich wurde zum Dandy, der das Unwichtige wichtig nahm, das Wichtige belächelte»). Le dandy de Baudelaire, à l’instar de Brummell, n’est donc pas un personnage scandaleux et sulfureux à la Oscar Wilde, mais un observateur froid (ou, pour paraphraser Raymond Aron, un “spectateur désengagé”), qui voit le monde comme un simple théâtre, souvent insipide où des personnages sans réelle substance s’agitent et gesticulent. Le dandy baudelérien a quelque peu le goût de la provocation, mais celle-ci reste cantonnée, dans la plupart des cas, à l’ironie.

 

Les exagérations ultérieures, souvent considérées à tort comme expressions du dandysme, ne correspondent pas aux attitudes de Brummell, Baudelaire ou Jünger. Ainsi, un Stefan George, malgré le grand intérêt de son œuvre poétique, pousse l’esthétisme trop loin, à notre avis, pour verser dans ce qu’Otto Mann appelle l’«esthéticisme», caricature  de toute véritable esthétique.Pour Stefan George, c’est un peu la rançon à payer à une époque où la “perte de tout juste milieu” devient la règle (Hans Sedlmayr a explicité clairement dans un livre célèbre sur l’art contemporain, Verlust der Mitte, cette perte du “juste milieu”). Sedlmayr mettait clairement en exergue cette volonté de rechercher le “piquant”. Stefan George le trouvera dans ses mises en scène néo-antiques. Oscar Wilde ne mettra rien d’autre en scène que lui-même, en se proclamant “réformateur esthétique”. L’art, dans sa perspective, n’est plus un espace de contestation destiné à investir totalement, à terme, le réel social, mais devient le seule réalité vraie. La sphère économique, sociale et politique se retrouve dévalorisée; Wilde lui dénie toute substantialité, réalité, concrétude. Si Brummell conservait un goût tout de sobriété, s’il gardait la tête sur les épaules, Oscar Wilde se posait d’emblée comme un demi-dieu, portait des vêtements extravagants, aux couleurs criardes, un peu comme les Incroyables et les Merveilleuses au temps de la révolution française. Provocateur, il a aussi amorcé un processus de mauvaise “féminisation/dévirilisation”, en se promenant dans les rues avec des fleurs à la main. A l’heure des actuelles “gay prides”, on peut le considérer comme un précurseur. Ses poses constituent tout un théâtre, assez éloigné, finalement, de ce sentiment tranquille de supériorité, de dignité virile, de “nil admirari”, du premier Brummell.

 

Auto-satisfaction et sur-dimensionnement du “moi”

 

Pour Otto Mann, cette citation de Wilde est emblématique : « Les dieux m’ont presque tout donné. J’avais du génie, un nom illustre, une position sociale élevée, la gloire, l’éclat, l’audace intellectuelle ; j’ai fait de l’art une philosophie et de la philosophie un art; j’ai appris aux hommes à penser autrement et j’ai donné aux choses d’autres couleurs... Tout ce que j’ai touché s’est drapé dans de nouveaux effets de beauté; à la vérité, je me suis attribué, à juste titre, le faux comme domaine et j’ai démontré que le faux, tout comme le vrai, n’est qu’une simple forme d’existence postulée par l’intellect. J’ai traité l’art comme la vérité suprême, et la vie comme une branche de la poésie et de la littérature. J’ai éveillé la fantaisie en mon siècle, si bien qu’il a créé, autour de moi, des mythes et des légendes. J’ai résumé tous les systèmes philosophiques en un seul épigramme. Et à côté de tout cela, j’avais encore d’autres atouts». L’auto-satisfaction, le sur-dimensionnement du “moi” sont patents, vont jusqu’à la mystification.

 

Ces exagérations iront croissant, même dans l’orbite de cette virilité stoïque, chère à Montherlant. Celui-ci, à son tour, exagère dans les poses qu’il prend, en pratiquant une tauromachie fort ostentatoire ou en se faisant photographier, paré du masque d’un empereur romain. Le risque est de voir des adeptes minables verser dans un “lookisme” tapageur et de mauvais goût, de formaliser à l’extrême ces attitudes ou ces postures du poète ou de l’écrivain. En aucun cas, elles n’apportent une solution au phénomène de la décadence. En matière de dandysme, la seule issue est de revenir calmement à Brummell lui-même, avant qu’il ne sombre dans les déboires financiers. Car ce retour au premier Brummell équivaut, si l’on se souvient des exhortations antérieures d’Addison et Steele, à une forme plus moderne, plus civile et peut-être plus triviale de paideia ou d’humanitas. Mais, trivialité ou non, ces valeurs seraient ainsi maintenues, continueraient à exister et à façonner les esprits. Ce mixte de bon sens et d’esthétique dandy permettrait de dégager un objectif politique pratique : défendre l’école au sens classique du terme, augmenter sa capacité à transmettreles legs de l’antiquité hellénique et romaine, prévoir une pédagogie nouvelle et efficace, qui serait un mixte d’idéalisme à la Schiller, de méthodes traditionnelles et de méthodes inspirées par Pestalozzi.

 

Retour à la religion ou “conscience malheureuse”?

 

La figure du dandy doit donc être replacée dans le contexte du 18ième siècle, où les idéaux et les modèles classiques de l’Europe traditionnelle s’érodent et disparaissent sous les coups d’une modernité équarissante et arasante. Les substances religieuses, chrétiennes ou pré-chrétiennes sous vernis chrétien, se vident et s’épuisent. Les Modernes prennent le pas sur les Anciens. Ce processus conduit forcément à une crise existentielle au sein de l’écoumène civilisationnel européen. Deux pistes s’offrent à ceux qui tentent d’échapper à ce triste destin : 1) Le retour à la  religion, ou à la tradition, piste importante mais qui n’est pas notre propos aujourd’hui, tant elle représente un continent de la pensée, fort vaste, méritant un séminaire complet à elle seule. 2) Cultiver ce que les romantiques appelaient la Weltschmerz, la douleur que suscitait ce monde désenchanté, ce qui revient à camper sur une position critique permanente à l’endroit des manifestations de la modernité, à développer une conscience malheureuse, génératrice d’une culture volontairement en marge, mais où l’esprit politiquepeut puiser des thématiques offensives et contestatrices.

 

Pour le dandy et le romantique, qui oscille entre le retour à la religion et le sentiment de Weltschmerz, cette dernière est surtout ressentie de l’intérieur. C’est dans l’intériorité du poète ou de l’artiste que ce sentiment va mûrir, s’accroître, se développer. Jusqu’au point de devenir dur, de dompter le regard et d’éviter ainsi les langueurs ou les colères suscitées par la conscience malheureuse. En bout de course, le dandy doit devenir un observateur froid et impartial, qui a dominé ses sentiments et ses émotions. Si le sang a bouillonné face aux “horreurs économiques”, il doit rapidement se refroidir, conduire à l’impassibilité, pour pouvoir les affronter efficacement. Le dandy, qui a subi ce processus, atteint ainsi une double impassibilité : rien d’extérieur ne peut plus l’ébranler; mais aucune émotion intérieure non plus. Pierre Drieu La Rochelle ne parviendra jamais à un tel équilibre, ce qui donne une touche très particulière et très séduisante à son œuvre, tout simplement parce qu’elle nous dévoile ce processus, en train de se réaliser, vaille que vaille, avec des ressacs, des enlisements et des avancées. Drieu souffre du monde, s’essaie aux avant-gardes, est séduit par la discipline et les aspects “métalliques” du fascisme “immense et rouge”, en marche à son époque, accepte mentalement la même discipline chez les communistes et les staliniens, mais n’arrive pas vraiment à devenir un “observateur froid et impartial” (Benjamin Constant). L’œuvre de Drieu La Rochelle est justement immortelle parce qu’elle révèle cette tension permanente, cette crainte de retomber dans les ornières d’une émotion inféconde, cette joie de voir des sorties vigoureuses hors des torpeurs modernes, comme le fascisme, ou la gouaille d’un Doriot.

 

Blinder le mental et le caractère

 

En résumé, le processus de deconstruction des idéaux de la paideia antique, et de déliquescence des substantialités religieuses immémoriales, qui s’amorce à la fin du 18ième siècle, équivaut à une crise existentielle généralisée à tous les pays occidentaux. La réponse de l’intelligence à cette crise est double : ou bien elle appelle un retour à la religion ou bien elle suscite, au fond des  âmes, une douleur profondément ancrée, la fameuse Weltschmerz des romantiques. La Weltschmerz se ressent dans l’intériorité profonde de l’homme qui fait face à cette crise, mais c’est aussi dans son intériorité qu’il travaille silencieusement à dépasser cette douleur, à en faire le matériel premier pour forger la réponse et l’alternative à cette épouvantable déperdition de substantialité, surplombée par un économicisme délétère. Il faut donc se blinder le mental et le caractère, face aux affres qu’implique la déperdition de substantialité, sans pour autant inventer de toutes pièces des Ersätze plus ou moins boîteux à la substantialité de jadis. Baudelaire et Wilde pensent, tous deux à leur manière, que l’art va offrir une alternative, plus souple et plus mouvante que les anciennes substantialités, ce qui est quasiment exact sur toute la ligne, mais, dans ce cas, l’art ne doit pas être entendu comme simple esthétisme. Le blindage du mental et du caractère doit servir, in fine, à combattre l’économicisme ambiant, à lutter contre ceux qui l’incarnent, l’acceptent et mettent leurs énergies à son service. Ce blindage doit servir de socle moral et psychologique dur aux idéaux de combat politique et métapolique. Ce blindage doit être la carapace de ce qu’Evola appelait l’«homme différencié», celui qui “chevauche le tigre”, qui erre, imperturbé et imperturbable, “au milieu des ruines”, ou que Jünger désignait sous le vocable d’«anarque». “L’homme différencié qui chevauche le tigre au milieu des ruines” ou “l’anarque” sont posés d’emblée comme des observateurs froids, impartiaux, impassibles. Ces hommes différenciés, blindés, se sont hissés au-dessus de deux catégories d’obstacles : les obstacles extérieurs et les obstacles générés par leur propre intériorité. C’est-à-dire les barrages dressés par les “hommes de moindre valeur”  et les alanguissements de l’âme en détresse.

 

Figures tchandaliennes de la décadence

 

La crise existentielle, qui débute vers le milieu du 18ième siècle, débouche donc sur un nihilisme, très judicieusement défini par Nietzsche comme un “épuisement de la vie”, comme “une dévalorisation des plus hautes valeurs”, qui s’exprime souvent par une agitation frénétique sans capacité de jouir royalement de l’otium, agitation qui accélère le processus d’épuisement. La mise en schémas de l’existence est l’indice patent que nos “sociétés”ne forment plus des “corps”, mais constituent, dit Nietzsche, des “conglomérats de Tchandalas”, chez qui s’accumulent les maladies nerveuses et psychiques, signe que la puissance défensive des fortes natures n’est plus qu’un souvenir. C’est justement cette “puissance défensive” que l’homme “différencié” doit, au bout de sa démarche, de sa quête dans les arcanes des traditions, reconstituer en lui. Nietzsche énumère très clairement les vices du Tchandala, figure emblématique de la décadence européenne, issue de la crise existentielle et du nihilisme: le Tchandala est affecté de pathologies diverses, sur fond d’une augmentation de la criminalité, de célibat  généralisée et de stérilité voulue, d’hystérie, d’affaiblissement constant de la volonté, d’alcoolisme (et de toxicomanies diverses ajouterions-nous), de doute systématique, d’une destruction méthodique et acharnée des résidus de force. Parmi les figures tchandaliennes de cette décadence et de ce nihilisme, Nietzsche compte ceux qu’il appelle les “nomades étatiques” (Staatsnomaden) que sont les fonctionnaires, sans patrie réelle, serviteurs du “monstre froid”, au mental mis en schémas et, subséquemment, générateurs de toujours davantage de schémas, dont l’existence parasitaire engendre, par leur effroyable pesanteur en progression constante, le déclin des familles, dans un environnement fait de diversités contradictoires et émiettées, où l’on trouve

 

-         le “disciplinage” (Züchtung) des caractères pour servir les abstractions du monstre froid,

-         la lubricité généralisée comme forme de nervosité et comme expression d’un besoin insatiable et compensatoire de stimuli et d’excitations,

-         les névroses en tous genres,

-         les fascinations morbides pour les mécanismes et pour les enchaînements, limités, de sèches causalités sans levain,

-         le présentisme politique (Augenblickdienerei) où ne dominent plus, souverainement, ni longue mémoire ni perspectives profondes ni sens naturel et instinctif du bon droit,

-         le sensibilisme pathologique,

-         les doutes inféconds procédant d’un effroi morbide face aux forces impassables qui ont fait et feront encore l’histoire-puissance,

-         une peur d’arraisonner le réel, de saisir les choses tangibles de ce monde.

 

Victor Segalen en Océanie, Ernst Jünger en Afrique

 

Dans ce complexe de froideur, d’immobilisme agité, de frénésies infécondes, de névroses, une première réponse au nihilisme est d’exalter et de concrétiser le principe de l’aventure, où le contestataire quittera le monde bourgeois tissé d’artifices, pour s’en aller vers des espaces vierges, intacts, authentiques, ouverts, mystérieux. Gauguin part pour les îles du Pacifique. Victor Segalen, à sa suite, chante l’Océanie primordiale et la Chine impériale qui se meurt sous les coups de l’occidentalisme. Segalen demeure breton, opère ce qu’il appelait le “retour à l’os ancestral”, dénonce l’envahissement de Tahiti par les “romances américaines”, ces “parasites immondes”, rédige un “Essai sur l’exotisme” et “Une esthétique du divers”. Le rejet des brics et brocs sans passé profond ont valu à Segalen un ostracisme injustifié dans sa patrie : il reste un auteur à redécouvrir, dans la perspective qui est nôtre.

 

Le jeune Jünger, encore adolescent, rêve de l’Afrique, du continent où vivent les éléphants et d’autres animaux fabuleux, où les espaces et les paysages ne sont pas meurtris par l’industrialisation, où la nature et les peuples indigènes ont conservé une formidable virginité, permettant encore tous les possibles. Le jeune Jünger s’engage dans la Légion Etrangère pour concrétiser ce rêve, pour pouvoir débarquer dans ce continent nouveau, perclus de mystères et de vitalité. 1914 lui donnera, à lui et à toute sa génération, l’occasion de sortir d’une existence alanguissante. Dans la même veine, Drieu La Rochelle parlera de l’élan de Charleroi. Et plus tard, Malraux, de “Voie Royale”. A “gauche” (pour autant que cette dichotomie politicienne ait un sens), on parlera plutôt d’ “engagement”, où ce même enthousiasme se retrouvera surtout lors de la Guerre d’Espagne, où Hemingway, Orwell, Koestler, Simone Weil s’engageront dans le camp des Républicains, et Campbell dans le camp des Nationalistes, qui fut aussi, comme on le sait, chanté par Robert Brasillach. L’aventure et l’engagement, dans l’uniforme du soldat ou des milices phalangistes, dans les rangs des brigades internationales ou des partisans, sont perçus comme antidotes à l’hyperformalisme d’une vie civile sans couleurs. “I was tired of civilian life, therefore I joined the IRA”), est-il dit dans un chant nationaliste irlandais, qui, dans son contexte particulier, proclame, avec une musique primesautière, cette grande envolée existentialiste du début du 20ième siècle avec toute la désinvolture, la verdeur, le rythme et la gouaille de la Verte Eirinn.

 

Ivresses? Drogues? Amoralisme?

 

Mais si l’engagement politique ou militaire procure, à ceux que le formalisme d’une vie civile, sans plus aucun relief ni équilibre traditionnel, ennuie, le supplément d’âme recherché, le rejet de tout formalisme peut conduire à d’autres attitudes, moins positives. Le dandy, qui quitte la pose équilibrée de Brummell ou la critique bien ciselée de Baudelaire, va vouloir expérimenter toujours davantage d’excitations, pour le seul plaisir stérile d’en éprouver. La drogue, la toxicomanie, la consommation exagérée d’alcools vont constituer des échappatoires possibles: la figure romanesque créée par Huysmans, Des Esseintes, fuira dans les liqueurs. Thomas De Quincey évoquera les “mangeurs d’opium” (“The Opiumeaters”). Baudelaire lui-même goûtera l’opium et le haschisch. Ce basculement dans les toxicomanies s’explique par la fermeture du monde, après la colonisation de l’Afrique et d’autres espaces jugés vierges; l’aventure réelle, dangereuse, n’y est plus possible. La guerre, expérimentée par Jünger, quasi en même temps que les “drogues et les ivresses”, cesse d’attirer car la figure du guerrier devient un anachronisme quand les guerres se professionnalisent, se mécanisent et se technicisent  à outrance.

 

Autre échappatoire sans aucune positivité : l’amoralisme et l’anti-moralisme. Oscar Wilde fréquentera des bars louches, exhibera de manière très ostentatoire son homosexualité. Son personnage Dorian Gray devient criminel, afin de transgresser toujours davantage ce qui a déjà été transgressé, avec une sorte d’hybris pitoyable. On se souviendra de la fin pénible de Montherlant et on gardera en mémoire l’héritage douteux que véhicule encore aujourd’hui son exécuteur testamentaire, Gabriel Matzneff, dont le style littéraire est certes fort brillant mais dans le sillage duquel de bien tristes scénarios se déroulent, montés en catimini, dans des cercles fermés et d’autant plus pervers et ridicules que la révolution sexuelle des années 60 permet tout de même de goûter sans moralisme étriqué à beaucoup de voluptés gaillardes et goliardes. Ces drogues, transgressions et sexomanies bouffonnes constituent autant d’apories, de culs-de-sac existentiels où aboutissent lamentablement quelques détraqués, en quête d’un “supplément d’âme”, qu’ils veulent “transgresseur”, mais qui, pour l’observateur ironique, n’est rien d’autre que le triste indice d’une vie ratée, d’une absence de grand élan véritable, de frustrations sexuelles dues à des défauts ou des infirmités physiques. Décidément, ne “chevauche pas le  Tirgre” qui veut et on ne voit pas très bien quel “Tigre” il y a à chevaucher dans les salons où le vieux beau Matzneff laisse quelques miettes de ses agapes sexuelles à ses admirateurs un peu torves...

 

Ascèse religieuse

 

L’alternative véritable, face au monde bourgeois, des “petits jobs” et des “petits calculs”, moqués par Hannah Arendt, dans un monde désormais fermé, où aventures et découvertes ne sont plus que répétitions, où la guerre est “high tech” et non plus chevaleresque, réside dans l’ascèse religieuse, dans un certain retour au monachisme de méditation, dans le recours aux traditions (Evola, Guénon, Schuon). Drieu la Rochelle évoque cette piste dans son “Journal”, après ses déceptions politiques, et rend compte de sa lecture de Guénon. Les frères Schuon sont exemplaires à ce titre : Frithjof part à la Légion Etrangère, arpente le Sahara, fait connaissance avec les soufis et les marabouts du désert ou de l’Atlas, adhère à une mystique soufie islamisée, part ensuite dans les réserves de Sioux aux Etats-Unis, laisse une œuvre picturale étonnante et époustouflante. Son frère, nommé le “Père Galle”, arpente les réserve améridiennes d’Amérique du Nord, traduit les évangiles en langue sioux, se retire dans une trappe wallonne, y dresse des jeunes chevaux à la mode indienne, y rencontre Hergé et se lie d’amitié avec lui. Des existences qui prouvent que l’aventure et l’évasion totale hors du monde frelaté de l’occidentisme (Zinoviev) demeure possible et féconde.

 

Car la rébellion est légitime, si elle ne bascule pas dans les apories ou ne débouche pas sur un satanisme de mauvais aloi, comme dans certaines sectes néo-païennes, plus ou moins inspirées par les faits et gestes d’un Alistair Crowley. Ce dérapage s’explique : la rébellion, faute de cause, devient hélas service à Satan, lorsque le mal en soi  —ou ce qui passe pour le “mal en soi”—  est devenu l’excitation existentielle considérée comme la plus osée. Dans un monde désenchanté, comme le nôtre, livré aux plaisirs stupides et passifs fournis par les médias, ce satanisme, avec son cortège sinistre de gesticulations absurdes et infécondes, séduit des esprits faibles, comme ceux qui traînent, par puritanisme mal digéré et mal surmonté, dans les salons où agit Matzneff et “passivent” ses voyeurs d’admirateurs. Ce n’est en tout cas pas l’attitude que souhaitait généraliser Brummell.

 

Robert STEUCKERS,

Forest/Flotzenberg, Vlotho im Weserbergland, mai 2001.

 

Note:

(*) : Otto MANN, “Dandysmus als konservative Lebensform” in: Gerd-Klaus KALTENBRUNNER (Hrsg.), Konservatismus International, Seewald Verlag, Stuttgart, 1973, ISBN 3-51200327-3, pp.156-170.

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