mercredi, 19 janvier 2011
Global Demos: Critical analysis of global democracies
Jure G. Vujić :
Global Demos: Critical analysis of global democracies
Ex: http://www.new-antaios.net/
„Memoire-speech“ of Jure Vujic, at the international scientific Conference of The Political science research centre (Zagreb): „European Union and Global Democracy“, Zagreb, May 29, 2008. Hotel Dora, Dorijan Hall.
Jure Vujić,avocat, diplomé de droit à la Faculté de droit d’Assas ParisII, est un géopoliticien et écrivain franco-croate. Il est diplomé de la Haute Ecole de Guerre „Ban Josip Jelačić“ des Forces Armées Croates et de l’Academie diplomatique croate ou il donne des conférences regulières en géopolitique et géostratégie. Il est l’auteur des livres suivants: „Fragments de la pensée géopolitique“ ( Zagreb, éditions ITG),“La Croatie et la Méditerrannée-aspects géopolitiques“( éditions de l’Académie diplomatique du Ministère des Affaires Etrangères et des intégrations européennes de la République de Croatie) „Le terrorisme intellectuel-Bréviaire hérétique“ ( Zagreb, éditions Hasanbegovic), „Place Maréchal Tito“-Mythes et réalités du titoisme“ ( Zagreb, éditions Uzdanica), „Anamnèses et transits“ ( Zagreb-Bruxelles, éditions NSE), „Nord-Sud l’honneur du vide“ ( Zagreb-Bruxelles, éditions NSE), „Eloge de l’esquive“ ( Zagreb, éditions Ceres), „Le silence des anges– Apocryphe du generač Ante Gotovina“( Zagreb 2009.). Il est également l’auteur d’une centaine d’articles en philosophie, politologie, géopolitique et géostratégie. Il collabore avec le Centre d’Etudes Politologiques de Zagreb.
The non-existent “global demos”
As an introduction, i’d like to refer you to the title of the book by Pierre Rosanvallon “le peuple introuvable”, the non existent people, to affirm that “just as global people is non existent – so is global democracy non-existent.” from its ancient origin up to now democracy, as political order, has always been established in a limited territory or community, as Greek polis was before and as national state is in the modern age of liberal democracy. In the Westphalian international system, democracy exists when people group themselves as distinct nations living in discrete territories ruled by sovereign states Liberal democracies also have multiple political parties participating in ‘free and fair’ competitive elections, an independent mass media, educated citizens, and the rule of law. Globalization, however, has promoted non-national, i.e. supra-national institutions and communities with transborder mutual relations. Globality has transcended territory and state sovereignty. Suprastate democracy of regional and transworld regimes has shown many democratic deficits, as well. EU and UN are more bureaucratic than democratic institutions. On the other hand, globalization has opened greater space for democratic activity outside public governance institution through different unofficial channels, such as global marketplace, global communications, and global civil society.[1] Globalization erodes the ability of nation-states to exercise the effective control over the political agenda; globalization eliminates the social correctives to the market economy. States are losing their control over: financial flows and transnational organization of production, and information flows,
Over the last years or so, ‘global governance’ has emerged as a (neo-)liberal research agenda in international relations theory. Global governance refers to the way in which global affairs are managed, but Critics argue that global governance mechanisms support the neo-liberal ideology of globalization and reduce the role of the state.
Today we see a new phenomen, government by “Mediacracy” as a new form of government, dominated by mass media .Spectacl societe becomes the global spectacle society and global videosfere where the realty disolve in global simulakrum of Baudrillard. Habermas named this fenomen „social refeudalisation“.
The global „laborat thought“.
Within this context and according to Habermas[2]. the EU should evolve towards “European nation states” whose objective is to serve as a separate geopolitical block and a balance vs. the American superpower describe by Habermas as a “vulgar superpower.” Habermas develops a concept of “euro– patriotism,” which would later be renamed and reformulated through the political concept of “constitutional patriotism” — a follow up to civil society examined by Dolf Sternberger and Hannah Arendt. This political concept implies the revival of democratic principles as well as post-national forms of “democratic loyalty.”
However, even Habermas’ concept of “constitutional patriotism” is of a constructivist nature precisely because it endorses the idea of political affiliation based on abstract ethical and constitutional principles and not rooted in the organic heritage coupled with historical and national experiences of different national cultures and traditions. Habermas’ constructivist thought, as well as the preceding constructivist thought of Socrates and Rousseau, represent the experimental side of postmodernity of a new “thought laboratory.” Julien Benda, very much in the footsteps of this thought laboratory, dreamt of a united Europe along the lines of exclusively rational and mechanistic principles. In the global “laboratory”, the trend of hybrid identity, “readymad identity” expresses the global proces of „de-culturisation“.
National „Eros“ against „Global Thanatos“: searching postmodern Appolonian
imperiality
Habermas insisted that Europeans denounce and renounce on every aspect of human passion. The cleavage between “supranational reason” and national passion is often a subject of debate regarding the issue of the political construction of Europe. According to Joseph Walter ” the national implies the figure of Eros; it is rooted in a pre-modern world and it goes directly to the heart. It manipulates emotions and exalts the romantic vision of social and creative organisations, which are able to match the existential quest located in a given timeframe and space.” Supranational, by contrast, is a synonym of “civilization.” It represents the postmodern figure requiring reason in neoclassical humanism aiming at demystifying Eros.
By using Oswald Spengler, it must be pointed to the dichotomy between culture and civilization. Culture is an organic and differentiated social category and also of a local and well-defined nature. We are, however, witnessing the Nietzschean phenomenon of transvaluation of all values, whereby globalism acquires the status of civilization and is thus designed to tame the unpredictable and archaic vestigis of primitive cultures. We are miles away from the dialectics of Apollo and from the Dionysian constructive chaos. Instead, globalism becomes part o the deconstructive chaos manipulating peoples and living cultures as if they were made out of clay. The absence of the Apollonian pole and figures as models of lightness and modesty, as well as the absence of the ecumenical nature of imperium, lead a demos to accept social fragmentation and dissolving forces of Eros, which are melting down into a uniformed and undifferentiated process o of globalistic and constructivist demos. Habermas, as an archetype of a super rationalist man, no longer believes in his own post-nationalist visions. Along with Derrida he emphasizes the “power of emotions,” as for instance during the call for mobilisation against war.
In the same vein, the utopia of “constitutional patriotism” does not contribute to the stability of Europe’s political identity. Likewise, citizens’ solidarity cannot be based solely on the principles of a single moralistic and universalistic belief. Without a commonly defined firm ethnic, religious and cultural identity, it is impossible to build up a strong Europe both from the inside and from the outside.
The global geoconstructivism and Democratic expansionism
This opinion comes partly from its Enlightenment liberal heritage of rationalist challenge to religious and communal solidarities as ‘backward’. It is reinforced powerfully by the image of “bad nationalism. So global democracy is not only a system of government, it is a war against anti-democracy. Democratic expansionism in the name of monoteism of market implies, in global perspective, a planetary civil war between democrats and anti-democrats. When the democrats have won, the planet will be democratic: from their perspective a war of conquest is logical.
Global territory is being formatted by regional and international powers into sectors such as “disobedient countries” – war machinery zones, “amiss countries-rogues states” – para-governmental zones and “emerging markets” – global financial machinery and those which R. Cooper entitled “prehistoric chaotic zones” in which postmodern powers are obliged to intervene to establish peace and stability. Such experimental geoconstructivism encounters certain religious, national, ethnical or other forms of resistance due to its mechanistic-constructivistic nature which does not consider organic-historical continuums and the categories of time and space.
As general wisdom has it, democracy requires a demos, a group of individuals who have enough in common to want to and to be able to decide collectively about their own affairs. there is no European or global demos but only separate national demoi. This is a precondition for what representative democracy is all about, accepting to be in a minority one day, expecting to be part of a majority another. National sovereignty must be defended not as a reactionary reflex but as the ultimate guarantee of democracy itself.
The abstract and constructivist separation between demos and ethnos does not allow the process of singling out identity which would at the same time envelope both the national and communitarian identity and which would enable the growth of post-nationalist political cultures in Europe. This identity would combine Herder’s culture-oriented d concept of national identity and Renan’s civic and political concept of national identity anchored in a “daily plebiscite.” The entire history of Europe demonstrates that Europe has only been able to affirm itself by reactive means i.e. by the “external enemy.” In some periods this attitude of flaming “national Eros” permitted the defence of identity of Europe. The reactualisation of Gumilev concept of “passionarity” is necessary to explained and promote the vital energy and power of european democratic and popular soul in thee current state of birocratical Europe wich described as deep structural inertia.
Horizontal demoi-cracy and vertical brusselisation
The legacy of the European Eros is still alive toady, albeit in a latent form and facing the growth and domination of the liberal-capitalist global “Thanatos,” which in the wake of cultural and political uniformity is causing poverty and creating cleavages between the South and the North, as well as creating global pollution and giving birth to the culture of death at planetary level. In an epoch when real ecological catastrophes have become a real threat, when poverty and the disappearance of rooted cultures and nations is under way, the preservation of “national and regional Eros” could have a role of a post– national maieutics in the formation of the European supranational identity which would contain and encompass diverse European “demos” (without uniformed fusion) in order to protect itself against the metastasis of the liberal and capitalist “Thanatos,”. Given the fact that in our mythology Eros remains a flip side of Thanatos, it is necessary to argue that the non-existent and fictitious global demos, designed for the formation of demos and demoi-cracy, as e new matrix of the neo-imperial thought, must be formulated, according to Nicolaidis, along horizontal divisions of responsibility and sovereignty of states and in stark opposition to the vertical “brusselisation” of nations-states. Such European “demo-krateo” would be rooted in common cultural identity, mutual respect, peaceful confrontation, and division of different identities.
From theological state to global post-democracy
The creation of the modern world is based on substituting one type of foundation for another, moving from a transcendent, magical-theological foundation to a rational, constructivist, immanent one.: Dispite the proces of secularisation of politics, the “religious formula” – defined as the power of attraction of “The divine One” or “The Immemorial One” – continues to serve, in various disguises, as a formal model. Liberal democracy’s [3]. Gauchet says that : “Three “liberal idols” – “progress”, “nation” and “science”, maintain this “transitional concurrence of opposites”. But these three idols are based on beliefs, extending the form of religious belief without realising it. So this “happy coincidence” has a “hidden dimension that robs its agents of a crucial part of the history they are living”: “The two sides of the coin are opposed, but at the same time, one side is shaped by the other – the religious One”. the “crisis of liberalism” is inevitable, as “the new idols will very quickly be hit by disbelief ”: “this will be the frightful experience of the 20th century”
Nietzsche is the first to prophesy liberalism’s crisis: “What I relate is the history of the next two centuries”, he wrote. Despite accelerating the detheologisation of western thought by proclaiming that God is dead and shattering the liberal idols by making himself an apostle of integral relativism, he remains troubled by the “religious formula”. “By dint of positive espousal of the thirst for power and the eternal return, one still finds, after complete destructuration, […] something like The One and something like a cosmos” .Bergson, Husserl and Heidegger would not escape this nostalgia for pre-rational authenticity.
The arrival of the “organisation age” leading to the advent of a “world without masters”. imperialist enterprises are just “narcissistic constructions”, symbolic strategies to deal with the problems of national identity and collective anxiety. Marx called this liberal phas of capitalism’s “orgiastic age”. The separation of civil society and State becomes inevitable: societies, torn apart by the struggle of the vested interests organising themselves against the State. This “detheologisation of history” is borne out not only in Sorel’s historical catastrophism but also in the crisis of tradition as an idea, the overvaluation of an absolutised present ‚or again, by Tönnies and Durkheim’s theory on the disappearance of community ties in favour of contractual ones.
The turn of the XX. century State certainly finds its learned theorists in Jellinek, Esmein, Hauriou or Carré de Malberg, who recognise the realisation of the modern political order in the abstract, impersonal power of legislatorial-administrative structures: the real sovereignty lies with the formal institutions of the State machinery and the civil service that assures its continuity and efficiency. On the horizon of this “return of the entitled individual” is the outline of a new individualism (depicted by Ibsen, Georges Palante, Henry Michel), a “libertarian stance” that does not flow into any kind of collective, and drastically violates the principle of “The One”. Globalism promotes single word model of constructivistical unity ” ; unity of power, unity of the seen and unseen, unity of the social order, continuity of the historical order[4] .This proces of cultural, social and political uniformisation called Désenchantement du monde, in which the fascination with unity was linked with religious belief only in certain of its belated forms, attributed to contamination of the unifying ethos of logos. “
The contemporary thought confronted a quite new situation: the near complete eclipse of the political, as a multifarious tradition of civic discourse, by a new order—the pseudo-consensual management of mass society. of apathetic democracies—which he later more aptly dubbed post-democracies—into sharper focus. Post-democracy designate a state conducted by democratic rules, but whose application is progressively limited. The English conservative journalist Peter Oborne presented a documentary of the 2005 general election, arguing that it had become anti-democratic because it targeted a number of floating voters with a narrow agenda.
This proces of degradation of democracy rules explains the transformation of national democraties of XX. Century buil on the model of sovreingn nation-states to a running evolution within the market democracies called neoliberal post-democracy during the 21st century. This proces od democracy denaturation calls attention on recognised democracies that are losing some of their foundations do evolve toward an Aristocratic regime. Our global Post-democracy [5].are characterised with: non fair representative elections and with the impossibility to get balanced real debates. Hereby, while thus contradicting pluralist assumptions, it seems to be an accepted presumption, that the common good were something to be determined objectively and that conflicts of interest were not to be handled within democratic processes but instead within administrative proceedings
CONCLUSION
Democracy must now not only change its institutional form, it must also rethink its political subject.In this way, the european demos most to be stransformed on responsible demoi with particulary vizion of world , weltanshang of incluzive democracy which. constitutes the highest form of Democracy since it secures the institutional preconditions for political (or direct) democracy, economic democracy, democracy in the social realm and ecological democracy. More specifically, a Constitution celebrating the EU as demoi-cracy requires three consecutive mouves away from mainstream Constitutional thinking. First from common identity to the sharing of plural identities; secondly from a community of identity to
a community of geopolitical projects founded on great continental spaces; and finally from multi-level governance to multi-centred and multipolar governance.
Let me finish by congratulating CPI on organising this conference, which provided a forum for exchanging views on a fundamental topic such as “EU and global democracy”.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
CROUCH, C., 2004, Post-democracy, First Edition.
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HABERMAS, J., 1989. « A kind of settling of damages », in WEBER N. S. (éd), The New Conservatism. Cultural Criticism and The Historians’Debate, Cambridge : Polity Press.
HABERMAS, J., 1996. « The European Nation-State : its achievements and its limits. On the past and future of Sovereignty and Citizenship », in BALAKRISHNAN, G. (éd.), Mapping the Nation, London : Verso.
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MULLER, J.W., 2004. « Europe : le pouvoir des sentiments. L’euro-patriotisme en question », La République des idées, avril-mai.
NICOLAIDIS, K., 2006. « Notre Demoi-cratie européenne : La constellation transnationale à l’horizon du Patriotisme Constitutionnel », Politique Européenne, n° 19, printemps.
RAMBOUR, Muriel, 2005. Postnationalisme et intégration politique communautaire. Réflexions sur l’avenir de l’État-nation face à la construction européenne, Lille, Atelier national de reproduction des thèses.
STERNBERGER, D, 1990. Verfassungspatriotismus, Frankfurt : Insel.
STIGLITZ E,2002„ La grande desillusion, Paris Fayard.
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Articles:
-: Globalisation et deficit de legitimite democratique: faut-il souhaiter une democratie cosmopolitique?, Francois Boucher, Universite Laval, archives Phares, volume 7, 2007.
- Jan-Werner Muller „Europe: Le pouvoir des sentiments: l’euro-patriotsime en question, La Republique des Idees, 2008.
–Ingolf Pernice, Franz Mayer, „ De la constitution composee de l’Europe“, Walter Hallstein-Institut, Revue trimestrielle de droit europeen 36, 2000.
Review: Marcel Gauchet, L’Avènement de la démocratie, Paris, Gallimard, “Bibliothèque des sciences humaines”, 2007 ; vol. I, La Révolution moderne, 207 p., 18,50 € et vol. II, La Crise du libéralisme.
[1] E. Stiglitz, La grande desillusion, Paris Fayard, 2002.
[2] J. Habermas, Apres l’Etat-nation, Paris Fayard, 2000.
[3] Marcel Gauchet, L’Avènement de la démocratie, Paris, Gallimard, “Bibliothèque des sciences humaines”, 2007
[4] Ibid., str.52–55
[5] Post-democracy, Colin Crouch, First Edition, 2004.
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