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jeudi, 27 février 2020

Philosophy as a Way of Life

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Philosophy as a Way of Life

Natella Speranskaya
Ex: https://medium.com

The Philosophy has long ceased to be a way of life, a manner of being, it has become a field of research, a “philosophical speech”; it no longer thinks of the basic principles, it no longer deals with the transformation of thinking, the formation of the mind and soul, the inner transformation of man. The ancient Greek was engaged in philosophy, which was for him an existential choice, a form of life, a way of thinking. And reading the works of Heraclitus, Pherecides, or Empedocles was for him a “spiritual exercises” (Pierre Hadot), a strong-willed personal practice.

The philosophical writings of thinkers of the Hellenistic and Roman era were not aimed at informing, but at forming and transforming the thinking of readers. Pythagoras, Plato, and Aristotle did not philosophize in front of their students to provide them with as much information as possible, they were engaged exclusively in the formation of minds, opening up to their listeners other ontological levels, other modes of being they pushed them to an internal transformation comparable to that experienced by initiates in the mysteries.

9782253943488-475x500-1.jpgAs Pierre Hadot rightly points out, the texts of early thinkers were not a statement of a certain system (for the first time the idea of systematic philosophy will appear only in the medieval scholar Francisco Suarez), they were “spiritual exercises” aimed at transforming the individual. Philosophy in Antiquity was a mode of existence that required the philosopher to be internally transformed and personally involved in every moment of his life. Spiritual exercises involved the whole Mind. Nevertheless, modern historians of philosophy continue to approach the philosophy of Antiquity with the standards of the Middle Ages and Modern times, i.e. they persist in seeing it as a theoretical and abstract activity, but not as a practice. Philosophy has ceased to be thought of as a way of life. Hadot believed that this was a consequence of the absorption of philosophy by Christianity.

In the scholastics of the Middle Ages, theology and philosophy were at a considerable distance from each other, and philosophy was relegated to the rank of “the Handmaid of Theology”. It was only during the Renaissance that we rediscovered Seneca, Epictetus, and later Marcus Aurelius, and then also Cicero, and Epicureanism, and realized that philosophy can be a way of life. Andre van der Braak also writes that philosophy ceased to be a way of life with the rise of Christianity. He points out that Nietzsche sought to revive the Greek approach to philosophizing as a way of life. We can add that the same goal was pursued by Michel Foucault and Ludwig Wittgenstein.

When we begin to read the texts of ancient thinkers, we should once and for all abandon the habit of applying to them the value system of modernity. “Before that, I considered philosophical texts — whether they are texts of Aristotle, or St. Thomas, or Bergson-as if they are timeless and words always have the same meaning that does not depend on the epoch. I realized that we need to take into account the evolution of thoughts and mentalities over the centuries, “ admits Pierre Hadot. The texts of ancient philosophy and the texts of modern philosophy cannot be perceived in the same way. Hadot believes that the philosophical texts of Antiquity were always intended for limited public and had very specific recipients-either a group of students or a specific follower to whom they were written. For example, according to the testimony of Porphyry, Plotinus wrote his work in response to the questions asked by the audience. The teaching of philosophy for three centuries, that is, from Socrates to the first century, was almost always presented in a question-and-answer scheme. Dialogue as a philosophical genre has almost disappeared today, replaced by systematic treatises. Hadot himself is very skeptical about the possibility of reviving the Dialogic character of ancient philosophy in our days.

PH-philo.jpgTo know that Pierre Hadot means by “spiritual exercises”, need to find out what he invests in the concept of “Spirit.” Spirit he calls what Plotinus called Intellect, Nous, the Highest Reality. Nous is that which is between the One and the plurality. Pierre Hadot: “I would define spiritual exercises as voluntary, personal practices intended to bring about a transformation of the individual, a transformation of the self.” Before to stop the choice on the epithet of “spiritual”, he considered various options: intellectual exercises, ethical exercises, mental exercises, soul exercises, and finally, in his intention to talk about the philosophical tradition in Greco-Roman antiquity, Hadot stopped at «spiritual exercises». Then he explained at length than these spiritual exercises are not exactly (for example, they are not synonymous with “theological” or “religious”, since the latter are no more than a part of them).

If Pierre Hadot had stopped at the adjective “ethical”, he would have had to go into lengthy explanations. How do we interpret the word “ethics”? Commonly it is believed that ethics is a doctrine of morality, of virtue, however, let’s turn our attention to the Greek word ἦθος, ethos (“character”, “disposition”, “temper”), and especially to the famous dictum of Heraclitus: ἦθος ἀνθρώπῳ δαίμων (which can be translated as: “A man’s character is his daimon”). Daimon, i.e. the intermediary between the divine world and the human world (without the negative connotations that appeared in the post-antique era). The word ἦθος also has the meaning of “whereabouts”. And what are these whereabouts, if not the intermediate midpoint where a person and a deity meet/merge and/or collide? The middle, according to Aristotle, is that which always chooses virtue. This is her whereabouts. When the immoralist Nietzsche attacked modern morality, he did it in the name of “virtue in the Renaissance style, virtù, virtue free of moralic acid.”

71sddGtqu+L.jpgAccording to the Hadot, the formation of minds was the basis of the Humanities. Can philosophy be attributed to the Humanities? Andrii Baumeister emphasizes that the term “Humanities” appeared in the Renaissance, in the XV century, but the philosophy is much older. In this case, can philosophy be considered a humanitarian science? The Humanities focus on man, on an anthropocentric understanding of the world, while philosophy can act as a path that leads beyond the “ Human, All Too Human”. (Nietzsche).

The philosopher Peter Kingsley was able to revive the Greek approach to philosophy as a way of life. “As I was drawn back into the world of the Presocratics, as I became absorbed into the ancient Greek texts they had left behind, I soon started discovering something different. These so-called philosophers weren’t theoretical thinkers or speculators, and they were nothing like rationalists in the modern sense. Many of them were immensely powerful spiritual beings. Greek texts which I was soon to realize had been misunderstood and mistranslated for centuries reveal when the distortions and mistaken interpretations are blown away, extraordinary spiritual teachings and extremely potent meditation techniques that can still be applied and practiced nowadays. I practiced them myself and was transformed. I had been brought into direct contact with the lineage and teachings of the ancient Masters who, at the dawn of our civilization, helped shape the Western world and bring our culture into being, “ says Peter Kingsley.

“He recounts a conversation in the Classics Department at UCLA after a talk on Parmenides. A faculty member complained that Kingsley is too dogmatic, that his interpretation is no better than anyone else’s. Kingsley responded: “But you and I are not the same. You read Parmenides so that you can change his meaning to suit yourself. I read Parmenides so that he can change me,” John Bussanich writes.

PH-citadelle.gifThe very concept of “philosophy” should receive a different meaning. Remember Nietzsche’s words: “The very fact that Dionysus is a philosopher, and that therefore Gods also philosophize, seems to be a novelty which is not unensnaring”? It is known that Nietzsche called himself a disciple of the philosopher Dionysus. It is certain that by philosophizing, the man enters into the sphere of the divine. Much earlier, in the Renaissance, Pico della Mirandola had said something similar: “The sacred names of Apollo, if anyone examines their meanings and hidden mysteries, will sufficiently show that that god is no less philosopher than prophet.”

You can only be a philosopher if you are the one who carries out the action, for thought is action. Get rid of the misconception that a philosopher is a boring know-it-all who communicates with the world through endless scientific studies. Similarly, we should banish the other idea that the mindless fuss that most people produce is an action.

Philosophy implies active intervention in an endlessly lasting cosmogonic act by transforming the external world, subtly influencing it by identifying the paradigmatic structures that underlie the universe; philosophy is an attempt to transfer “archetypal images” from mundus imaginalis to the material world, the world of forms.

A philosopher is not a profession, it is impossible to become one. This is a kind of ontological task that a person either implements or allows it to fade away. There is an old beautiful legend about the Angel of Death, whose wings are dotted with countless eyes. When an Angel arrives too early, it only touches the person with its wing and, so that the person does not forget about this meeting, gives him an additional pair of eyes. An eye that looks into pre-being. So, philosophy is such a “gazing” into pre-being. The philosopher receives his second pair of eyes at the same time as the first, but these eyes do not open immediately. Sometimes this requires a teacher, a book, a sudden shock, a collision with death, an experience of the numinous. In ancient times, Mysteries were used for this purpose.


Russian philosopher, cultural scientist, a specialist in Antiquity, curator of Janus Academy.

jeudi, 25 janvier 2018

Massimo Pigliucci’s Cognitive Dissonance on Illegal Immigration & the Fall of the Roman Empire


Massimo Pigliucci’s Cognitive Dissonance on Illegal Immigration & the Fall of the Roman Empire

Massimo Pigliucci is an evolutionary biologist and professor of philosophy at the City University of New York. He has played an important role in the popularization of a modern Stoicism in recent years (see his useful collection of materials for practicing Stoicism on his blog [2]).

While some of the renewed interested in Stoicism, like Buddhism, has a somewhat commercial flavor, I for one think this is a very good development. Stoicism is a powerful antidote to the individualist and egalitarian excess that has so dominated the West since the 1960s. In contrast to this, Stoicism posits that our good and our duty is to live in natural harmony as part of a wider, hierarchical whole which is our society and the universe. Pigliucci said on one podcast [3]:

The Stoics had a recurring phrase which was that you should be “living according to Nature.” Living according to Nature doesn’t mean that you should go naked in the woods and hug trees. It means you should understand how the world works: both the world at large, the cosmos itself, and in particular human nature. You should have the best understanding possible of the kind of being that a human is. And, for the Stoics, the two most important aspects of a human being is that we are a social animal, that we are interdependent on each other, and that we are capable of reason. …

When something happens to you, that you don’t like … one of the ways you should put things in perspective is to think of yourself as an organ of a larger organism. You are the foot, and the larger organism has to go home, and in order to do it has to step through mud. You as a foot are not going to like [that], it doesn’t feel good. But it is what you do as a foot because you are part of a larger organism. …

There are both social roles and biological roles that we play in our lives, and our lives are going to be much better if we play those roles better. Doing so means understanding what those roles are, understanding how you fit in the rest of the world.

MPigbook.jpgThere is a lot of wisdom here. At the very least, it leads one to ask questions: What is the role of a young man with regard to the fitness and well-being of the species? What is the role of a young woman? What is the role of a European in a context of decline? And so on. Stoicism represents one powerful way in which postmodern Westerners, conquered by liberalism, can learn to stop being so frivolous, narcissistic, and selfish, and begin living our lives in a mindful and communitarian fashion.

We stress here that Pigliucci has highlighted that Stoicism involves investigation into “human nature … the kind of being that a human is” and recognition that we should fulfill our “social and biological roles.” Stoicism, as an ancient philosophy, can and must then be powerfully supplemented by the insights and discoveries of modern Darwinian evolutionary science, notably in the fields of evolutionary psychology, psychometrics, and genetics/heredity.

All this begs the question: what are the implications of human biodiversity for an enlightened cosmopolitics [4]? Could this entail that we should have demographic policies aimed at maximizing the harmony and cognitive quality of our societies? Certainly, Plato and Aristotle advocated extremely [5]muscular policies in this direction [5], even if in practice, for lack of science and technology, the eugenic ideal in antiquity remained a largely negative and ineffectual phenomenon.

I raise all this because Pigliucci is also an opponent of both President Donald Trump and of his immigration policies, notably the building of a wall on the Mexican border to reduce illegal immigration. This is despite the fact that he recognizes the analogy between late-Roman barbarian invasions and modern mass immigration to North America and Western Europe. Pigliucci argued during a lecture [6] (actually, a good NEET should isolate this 90-second segment and share it on Twitter), citing the popular classicist Mary Beard, that the Roman Empire did not fall, as is often said, due to a collapse of morals, but because of massive illegal immigration by northern barbarians:

The Roman Empire – if you want to have any direct analogy to what is happening today – … very likely collapsed because of forced immigration from the outside, from people who had no better way of living. Very few people are aware that the so-called barbarians the Visigoths, the Goths, and so forth actually wanted to become Roman citizens. The first waves of barbarians were immigrants! These people were coming in with their families. … The analogy there is actually with the current waves that we are seeing these days in the news of immigration, not just in the United States but in Europe. … These are the people that so-to-speak bring “the end of the world.” Not because they’re going to conquer you, not because they’re evil or anything like that, but because when millions of people are in need of resources, they’ll move.

So far, so good. According to Pigliucci (and Mary Beard): Cleander did nothing wrong [7]! Pigliucci then adds:

And there is no freaking barbed wire or wall or anything like that which is going to stop them. Nobody has ever stopped them in the history of humanity, and no wall, even one built by Donald Trump, will ever stop them.

Pigliucci, as far as I can see, seems then to be suffering from a severe case of cognitive dissonance concerning immigration. I am perfectly ready to concede that Trump is a legitimately repulsive figure for many people – one need only consider his style, his personality, his environmental policies, his friends in the Big-Business and Israel-Lobby wings of the Republican Party. However, one must also recognize that Trump represents an instinctive and very real attempt by the historic American people, what is left of it, against precisely the kind of mass immigration which, Pigliucci says, destroyed Rome. Does the Trump phenomenon not merit some consideration in that regard?

It does no good to say that immigration is a force of nature and therefore no policy can prevent it. We cannot prevent all traffic accidents, but that does not prevent us from trying to minimize them. Furthermore, the policies of Israel, Japan, or Hungary all clearly show that immigration can be reduced to negligible levels if there is the political will to do so. President Barack Obama and Chancellor Angela Merkel both, clearly, showed no will to enforce the laws of their country and the will of their citizens concerning illegal immigration. And both have rightly paid a price as a result of this, with natural backlash in the form of the rise of nativist populism. Finally, we note that Trump – despite being hobbled by his own open-borders Republican Party and the liberal Establishment – has succeeded in reducing illegal immigration to the lowest level in 17 years [8]. This shows that a government’s mere expression of a will to enforce immigration laws was sufficient to significantly dissuade would-be illegal immigrants!


Pigliucci is perhaps motivated by apparently generous concerns: that after all, no immigrant moves unless there is a compelling reason to do so, most commonly severe economic discomfort in his own land. However, a “humanitarian” immigration policy is no good if it harms American society as a whole. Immigration cannot be accepted if it harms the community – for instance, if it undermines that common national identity so necessary to civic solidarity or if it lowers the average quality of the citizenry.

For, as the Ancients incessantly affirmed, what matters is the good of the community, of the whole. Our beloved Marcus Aurelius himself says so again and again: “What brings no benefit to the hive brings none to the bee” (Meditations, 6.54), “What causes no harm to the city causes no harm to the citizen” (5.22), and we should do whatever is “opportune and advantageous to the community . . . directed to this single end, the common benefit and harmony” (7.5). I for one have not given up on the ability of reason and dialogue to produce salvatory fruits for the West and indeed for humanity in this century.

Article printed from Counter-Currents Publishing: https://www.counter-currents.com

URL to article: https://www.counter-currents.com/2018/01/massimo-pigliuccis-cognitive-dissonance-of-illegal-immigration-the-fall-of-the-roman-empire/

URLs in this post:

[1] Image: https://www.counter-currents.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/81wNxUL6nJL._UX250_.jpg

[2] practicing Stoicism on his blog: https://howtobeastoic.wordpress.com/

[3] said on one podcast: https://youtu.be/qcEiF6_Uevo?t=21m4s

[4] cosmopolitics: https://www.counter-currents.com/2017/02/whats-wrong-with-cosmopolitanism/

[5] Plato and Aristotle advocated extremely : https://www.amazon.com/Greek-Origins-Biopolitics-Reinterpretation-Interventions/dp/1138659436

[6] Pigliucci argued during a lecture: https://youtu.be/5XG7oUbjLj0?t=1h7m27s

[7] Cleander did nothing wrong: https://youtu.be/ecMfU3910WY?t=6m37s

[8] reducing illegal immigration to the lowest level in 17 years: http://www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/statements/2017/apr/25/donald-trump/illegal-immigration-lowest-17-years-trump-said/

mardi, 09 janvier 2018

LE STOÏCISME - Vaincre nos émotions


LE STOÏCISME - Vaincre nos émotions

Le stoïcisme, courant philosophique grec et romain, se présente comme une doctrine panthéiste et matérialiste. Né au IVè siècle avant JC avec Zénon de Citium, le stoïcisme se développa jusqu’à la fin du IIIème siècle après JC.
Dans le stoïcisme, le bonheur désigne l’indépendance vis-à-vis des circonstances extérieures et le détachement à l’égard des choses. La maîtrise de nos représentations et l’exercice du jugement permettent d’y accéder. C’est une philosophie de la liberté intérieure.

dimanche, 02 octobre 2016

Marcus Aurelius on Tribe & Passion


Marcus Aurelius on Tribe & Passion

The Meditations [2] of Marcus Aurelius are a remarkable spiritual diary and, in general, a sure way for the modern reader to imbue himself with the practical wisdom of our ancient forefathers [3]. That said, I do not believe we should uncritically defer to anything, and on two points in particular, I believe comment and criticism are warranted.

Firstly, a pervasive theme of Marcus’ is his struggle to control his judgment and emotions, in particular anger, and thus be as detached and “philosophical” as possible. The goal is to accept non-judgmentally all that Nature — which is the law of the universe — gives us and to ensure harmony with the world and the rule of reason within oneself.

Marcus makes these comments particularly with regard to his colleagues and subordinates: do not get angry with their inevitable failures and ignorance, he tells himself, but rather try to make them see the light:

How cruel it is not to let people strive after what they regard as suitable and beneficial to themselves. And yet, in a sense, you are not permitting them to do so whenever you grow angry at their bad behavior. For it is surely the case that they are simply drawn towards what they consider to be suitable and beneficial to themselves. “Yes, but they are wrong to think that.” Well, instruct them, then, and show them the truth, without becoming annoyed. (6, 27) (Numbering refers to the book and paragraph in the Meditations.)

philosophie,philosophie antique,antiquité romaine,rome antique,marc-aurèle,philologie classiqueAnd elsewhere: “Even if you burst with rage, they will do the same things none the less for that” (8, 4). More generally, Marcus affirms that “an intelligence free from passions is a mighty citadel” (8, 48).

The potential problem in these affirmations is that one might be led to believe that Marcus is suggesting becoming a kind of harmless, emotionless monk. However, I believe these comments should not be misunderstood. Marcus does affirm that, when push comes to shove, coercion is justified: “Try to persuade them, but act even against their will the principles of justice demand it” (6, 50).

Marcus honors Diogenes, who was a great philosopher of an evidently very different temperament, for he sought to moralize society by repeatedly shaming and ridiculing the immoral and the ignorant through various shock tactics. Diogenes once reputedly criticized Plato saying: “Of what use is a philosopher who doesn’t hurt anybody’s feelings?’ Marcus’ ostentatiously tranquil way is evidently not the only one available to us.

“Freedom from passions” furthermore must be understood in a wider sense, of one’s reason being invulnerable to not just emotions, but also pleasure and pain. The Romans in particular perfected this with an unbelievable gravitas in the defense of honor and duty: Seneca following Nero’s order to kill himself, in accordance with tradition, by slitting his wrists in a hot bath; Marcus Atilius Regulus who was captured and released by the Carthaginians, urged the Roman Senate to continue the war, and then returned to Carthage to fulfill his parole, where he was tortured to death; or indeed the famous soldier at Pompeii [4] who, having not been relieved, stoically remained at his post until he was buried by the ashes.

These sacrifices may seem futile, but they reflect the supreme manliness of the Roman tradition, a virility which reflected the discipline and sacrifice necessary to maintaining that greatest of world empires. In our age, the Roman example shames us for our cowardice. Marcus’ “mighty citadel” is a model for defending our people and the truth, whatever the personal consequences might be. When we are cowards, we should think of our forefathers, whether religious reformers or scientific innovators, who were willing to risk being burned at the stake to affirm the truth.

Having said all this, perhaps Marcus is too categorical in dismissing emotion. Plato argued that emotions were meant to be the powerful subordinate allies of reason. For example, anger is an emotion propitious to the extermination of one’s enemies. (Then again, Marcus was a fairly effective military commander in his continuous and often brutal campaigns against the Germans. So perhaps I am in no position to talk, but I share my reaction.)

Certainly in both elite and mass politics nothing is possible without the inspiration of emotions, in particular appeal to our deep-seated tribal and spiritual longings. Practically, the fact is that Christianity displaced ancient philosophy and the old Pagan religion by appealing to emotion. The philosopher may protest that this is irrational, but all the same, ancient philosophy died and only lived on in the Middle Ages, to the extent it did, in Christianity, because Christianity could better appeal to that irrational part of us, particularly among the masses.

Marcus writes that one should not aim for “Plato’s ideal state . . . For who can change the convictions of others?” (9, 29) The answer, to the degree men can be socio-culturally programmed and moralized, is of course education and religion. In the ancient world, the ability to do so in a vast realm like the Roman Empire was limited. In the modern era however, fascists have emphatically and convincingly argued that there are enormous possibilities for mass education and civil-religion, especially given the new technological and material means enabling mass communication and mass ceremony.

Secondly, and this is a more critical comment, Marcus’ Meditations are a striking example of pre-Christian universalism in Western thought. As Kevin MacDonald has stressed, both universalist and ethnocentric trends are evident in the Western tradition. While Diogenes declared himself a “cosmopolitan,” Plato’s masterwork The Republic [5] powerfully makes the case for ethnocentric morality [5].

Marcus adheres to Stoic cosmopolitanism, a kind of dual citizenship. He writes: “As [emperor], my city and fatherland is Rome; as a human being, it is the universe; so what brings benefits to these is the sole good for me” (6, 44). He elsewhere defines himself as “a citizen of this great city [the universe]” and argues that one should not be dissatisfied with a short life, playing only a small part in this vast play (12, 36).

I do not believe this is problematic. The laws of Nature are the same for all creatures and, in this sense, all human must seek to be in harmony with them. This is a message which will resonate as much with the Jeffersonian deist as the esoteric National Socialist, and indeed perhaps with almost all of the world’s religions. Since Darwin in particular however, we as evolutionary thinkers understand natural selection and survival of the fittest as fundamental principles and imperatives of life. These principles must be recognized and lived up to if we and indeed any creatures capable of conscious morality and reason are to survive and thrive, for all this, whatever the spiritual beyond, rests upon a biological foundation and genetic prerequisites.


I believe all of this is compatible with ethnocentric morality: solidarity with one’s kin is a natural principle, and Nature expresses herself uniquely in every creature. (What is required of a donkey to be in harmony with the universe is not the same as what is required of a man, and so forth in the infinite diversity of humans and other living creatures.) More generally, the world would in fact be a better place if all societies recognized genetic homogeneity and quality as social goods in and of themselves. While I am no expert on moral philosophy, I do not believe the Kantian moral imperative necessarily undermines nationalism, perhaps the contrary in fact.

More problematic however is the following:

Say to yourself at the start of the day, I shall meet with meddling, ungrateful, violent, treacherous, envious, and unsociable people. They are subject to these defects because they have no knowledge of good and bad. [. . .] [H]is nature is akin to my own — not because he is of the same blood and seed, but because he shares as I do in mind and thus in a portion of the divine. (2, 1)

This comment needs to be understood in the context of Marcus’ attempt to get along with inadequate and unsociable colleagues, arguing that frustration is inevitable but improvement is possible through appeal to a common reason. Elsewhere Marcus is more explicit still: “how close is the kinship which unites each human being to the human race as a whole, for it arises not from blood and seed but from our common share in reason” (12, 26).

The assertion that “his nature is akin to my own – not because he is of the same blood and seed, but because he shares as I do in mind and thus in a portion of the divine” is of course partly true today (all humans have some capacity for reason) and was probably truer still in the Roman Empire of Marcus’ day, which was far less racially diverse than are the United States and even much of Western Europe in our time. (That the Empire had intermingled Europeans and Semites in uneven quantities cannot be compared with societies made up of people from different ends of different continents with no contiguous clinal link at all, e.g. Western Europeans, Sub-Saharan Africans, East Asians . . .).

As evolutionary thinkers however, we are cognizant of the fact that intelligence and personality are significantly heritable [6], and thus they in fact do ultimately stem from “blood and seed.” There is a large body evidence that different racial groups have differing average levels of intelligence (also varying by kind of intelligence, e.g. verbal, spatial . . .) and, more importantly, different average temperaments. Reason is the same for all but in different brains manifests itself in different degrees and is inflected with different motivations.

This has enormous implications for political morality: ethno-genetically heterogeneous societies are disharmonious both because of each ethnic group’s differing preferences and in the lack of identification/solidarity between the groups (the latter made especially problematic when the different groups, inevitably, become socially unequal due to differing behavior). This prevents, in multiethnic societies, the possibility of a collectively rational and solidary cohesive community, which must be the organic unit of human history.

One might answer: reason is the same for all creatures, even if their capacity for it differs. Perhaps if one could strip emotions away, but that would also vary by individual and group. It is obvious that reason manifests itself differently in different groups, who find different things intellectually interesting and emotionally compelling. (For instance, northern Europeans seem prone to a kind of selfless piety, only among sub-Saharan Africans have I observed this quite spontaneous phenomenon [7], and Jews more than any other group seem to get a kick out of criticizing the host population’s real and imagined flaws.)

Put another way: Reason is the same for all? Quite. If so I invite our colored cousins to answer the question: Is the slow bit steady disappearance of the European peoples reasonable? Is this event in the higher interests of the human race and universal consciousness and morality? I observe that in arguing against us, these same people resort to moral principles founded in the West (“international law,” “human rights,” “democracy” . . .) and use Western technology which thus far, only the East Asians have shown any talent for emulating, let alone inventing. Furthermore, innumerable millions of colored people throughout the world are so convinced of their own inability to create a good society that their only plan for improving their lot in life is to . . . move to our societies! And then, I should add, the process repeats itself within countries, with the notorious dialectic between forced integration and white flight. Well, colored cousins, these antics will not work when you run out of white people.


In their heart of hearts, all must know that the disappearance of the Europeans is a supremely immoral act, and some colored people might even be endowed with sufficient reason to overcome their ethnic pride in acknowledging this. And some will come to the conclusion that the defense of ethnic European interests is reasonable and in the universal interest. But only an infinitesimal number, for such is the power of the call of the blood [8].

But all that is none of our business, for you should not “allow your happiness to depend on what passes in the souls of other people” (2, 6). We take our own side. Inspired by the best of our magnificent tradition [9], including the formidable Stoicism of Marcus Aurelius and the other great men of the West whose wisdom and character put us to shame, we must become Eurocentric Hereditarians.

Article printed from Counter-Currents Publishing: http://www.counter-currents.com

URL to article: http://www.counter-currents.com/2016/09/marcus-aurelius-on-tribal-passion/

URLs in this post:

[1] Image: http://www.counter-currents.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/MarcusAurelius.jpg

[2] Meditations: http://amzn.to/2cF2GNZ

[3] practical wisdom of our ancient forefathers: http://www.counter-currents.com/2016/09/the-prayers-of-marcus-aurelius/

[4] soldier at Pompeii: http://i.ytimg.com/vi/okLaQ0u1aq4/maxresdefault.jpg

[5] The Republic: http://www.theoccidentalobserver.net/2016/08/platos-racial-republic/

[6] intelligence and personality are significantly heritable: http://www.nature.com/ng/journal/v47/n7/full/ng.3285.html

[7] this quite spontaneous phenomenon: https://twitter.com/TheAmerikaner/status/775338414405214208

[8] the call of the blood: http://www.counter-currents.com/2015/12/the-call-of-the-blood/

[9] our magnificent tradition: http://www.theoccidentalobserver.net/2016/04/the-testament-of-a-european-patriot-a-review-of-dominique-venners-breviary-of-the-unvanquished-part-1/