What Would Evola Do?

What Would Evola Do?

By John Morgan

Ex: http://www.countercurrents.com

The follow is the text of the talk that Counter-Currents editor John Morgan delivered to The New York Forum on May 20, 2017.

Tonight I thought I’d talk about Julius Evola, since yesterday (May 19) was his 119th birthday, and I have overseen the publication of many of Evola’s texts in English. Evola’s the sort of figure who people seem to either love or hate, although he’s someone more often referenced than actually read on the Right, which is unfortunate. And really, in order to appreciate Evola, you need to be willing to step back from the everyday world and look at just about everything from the exact opposite perspective that we’re conditioned to look at them these days, and that’s not easy for most people. So in that sense, Evola most definitely isn’t a thinker for everyone. And to be fair, he made it clear in his work that he wasn’t interested in addressing himself to the masses. He wanted to speak to the spiritual elite which he believed was the real driving force behind culture and history. So from a modern perspective, the sort of ideas that Evola propagated are about as far removed from our present-day reality as possible, and yet I think he remains relevant to us, as I’ll get into later. Certainly, the mainstream media thinks Evola is relevant. I’m sure you’re all familiar with the article ^[2] The New York Times ran in February, which tried to suggest that Steve Bannon is supposedly some sort of disciple of Evola, and which resulted in my inbox becoming clogged with messages from people sending me the link and asking, “Did you see this?”

I have to address this briefly, as it became the source of a lot of annoying rumors. As much as I would like to believe that the White House Chief of Staff is an Evolian, an objective look at the facts quickly dispels this idea. It’s true that Bannon mentioned Evola once in passing in a talk he gave to the Vatican ^[3] in 2014 where he was speaking about “the global tea party movement,” but to read any significance into it is really making a mountain out of a molehill. Here is everything Bannon has ever said about Evola publicly:

When Vladimir Putin, when you really look at some of the underpinnings of some of his beliefs today, a lot of those come from what I call Eurasianism; he’s got an advisor [Alexander Dugin] who hearkens back to Julius Evola and different writers of the early twentieth century who are really the supporters of what’s called the traditionalist movement, which really eventually metastasized into Italian Fascism. A lot of people that are traditionalists are attracted to that.

All this proves is that Bannon has heard of Evola. It no more indicates that Bannon is a traditionalist than Obama referencing Mao in passing means that he is a Maoist. And it isn’t even an accurate statement, since it certainly can’t be said that traditionalism led to Fascism, as it didn’t even exist prior to the advent of Fascism in Italy in 1922, so clearly Bannon doesn’t even have a good understanding of it, nor is he speaking of it favorably.

Bannon went on to say:

One of the reasons is that they [the traditionalists] believe that at least Putin is standing up for traditional institutions, and he’s trying to do it in a form of nationalism – and I think that people, particularly in certain countries, want to see the sovereignty for their country, they want to see nationalism for their country. . . I’m not justifying Vladimir Putin and the kleptocracy that he represents, because he eventually is the state capitalist of kleptocracy. However, we, the Judeo-Christian West, really have to look at what he’s talking about as far as traditionalism goes – particularly the sense of where it supports the underpinnings of nationalism – and I happen to think that the individual sovereignty of a country is a good thing and a strong thing.

What he said is a bit confusing, since he’s equating Evola and traditionalism with Fascism, and then in turn with Putin, which is pretty ridiculous in itself, but it seems that what he means by “tradition” is “family values” and conservative canards of that sort which wax lyrical about the wonders of the 1950s or the nineteenth century (or I guess these days even the 1980s, which, as an American in his 40s who lived through Reagan’s America, is still baffling to me). What Evola meant by capital-T Tradition was something very different from the lower case-t traditions so beloved by conservatives, but I’ll get into that later.

So really, given that this is the sole reference to Evola that Bannon has ever made, while he is most likely the first major American political figure who has even heard of Evola, it’s nevertheless pretty clear that Evola doesn’t have any real significance for him, and still less for Trump. All it really demonstrates are the failing standards of journalism in America and the increasing stupidity of the Left. It’s just yet another attempt by them to try to link Trump’s administration to fascism. On the plus side, it did have the interesting effect of sending Evola’s main work, Revolt Against the Modern World ^[4], to the number one spot ^[5] in Amazon’s “New Age” category for a couple of months. Although I don’t want to sound as if I’m belittling Bannon, since he does have some fascinating interests, including one report I read which claimed that Bannon has studied the Hindu Bhagavad Gita ^[6] and cited it on occasion – something which Evola would certainly have approved of.

But before I get into what Evola has to tell us today, I want to tell a bit about his background. Evola never wrote much about himself, but he did pass on a few things, and scholars have pieced together some of the rest. He was born in 1898 as Giulio Evola in Rome, where he was to live for his entire life, but as an adult he assumed the ancient Roman form of his name, Julius. He’s often referred to as “Baron” Evola, although as far as has been determined, he held no actual title and never used one himself, and thus it seems to be an honorific bestowed by his admirers in reference to his aristocratic origins – Evola’s family originally came from the Sicilian nobility.

He studied engineering at university, although he refused to take a degree since he considered doing so too bourgeois – which is the exact opposite of the attitude of most American university students today, where they’d be happy to forego all the studying and just get the degree. By then, the First World War had broken out, and Evola served as an artillery officer in the Italian army. He didn’t stick with engineering, however, and after the war he soon became the leading exponent of the Dadaist avant-garde art movement in Italy. In fact, I don’t know if this is still the case, but I have heard that at least at one time, one of Evola’s paintings ^[7] used to be on display in the entrance hall of the Modern Art Museum in Rome.

Not much is known about Evola during this period, but he sometimes hinted at having led a rather bohemian existence. He did write about taking psychedelic drugs at this time, which was one of the experiences which led him to take an interest in mysticism. We also know that he was friends with the Russian Satanist and occultist Maria de Naglowska, who wrote a series of books on sex magick, some of which Evola wrote introductions for – so read what you want into that. Evola was also an avid mountain climber.

The 1920s saw Evola pass through several phases which ended with him coming around to the traditionalist perspective that would remain more or less the same for the rest of his life. He found the nihilism inherent in avant-garde circles untenable, and soon became interested in the Idealist philosophical tradition. It was here that he first encountered the idea that the world which we experience through our senses isn’t the “real” world, something which is also a fundamental teaching of many of the ancient religious and mystical traditions. He also developed the idea of what he termed the “Absolute Individual,” and he called the system of thought surrounding it “Magical Idealism.” Already drawing on Asian sacred doctrines, Evola identified the Absolute Individual with certain Taoist notions, in that the Absolute Individual is a type of man who frees himself from the limitations of the individual ego and attains a transcendent, impersonal perspective akin to what is usually attributed to the gods. He wrote several large books on this theme, which were his first publications.

Evola ultimately found Western philosophy too narrow, however, and before long he became much more interested in occult and religious doctrines, especially, but not only, those of the East. In 1927, Evola was one of the founding members of the UR Group, which many scholars and practitioners have agreed was one of the most serious attempts to study and practice occult techniques anywhere in modern times. Evola’s involvement was short-lived, however, and he left the group the following year.

The 1920s were also, of course, the time when Mussolini and the Fascists took power in Italy. Evola greeted the rise of the Fascists favorably. Early on, the Italian Fascists were strongly Nietzschean and hostile to Christianity, as was Evola himself, as he considered Christianity to be a foreign, weak, Judaic element that had imposed itself on essentially pagan and imperial Europe, and he believed that the egalitarianism and universalism of Christianity’s teachings opened the door for liberalism and Communism. This argument is not unique to Evola, and I’m sure many of you have heard it reiterated elsewhere.

By the late 1920s, however, Mussolini recognized that he needed to reconcile with the Catholic Church if he was going to retain power. Alarmed by this development, Evola published perhaps his most controversial book, Pagan Imperialism, where he called for Fascist Italy to reject Christianity and return to its roots in the ancient traditions of the Roman Empire. The book didn’t have the desired effect, however, as Mussolini signed a pact with the Vatican in 1929, which among other things established it as an independent state. In addition to the book being blacklisted by the Vatican, Evola also earned himself a lot of enemies, including many prominent people within the Fascist Party itself, and for years he only went out in public accompanied by bodyguards. Evola regretted this book in later years, not because of the backlash against it but because he felt that the ideas he had expressed in it weren’t yet mature enough. While Evola always considered Christianity to be something inappropriate for Europeans, his stance on it softened, and in later years it’s clear from his writings that while it wasn’t his ideal, he recognized that a Christian Europe was far preferable to a secular or a Communist one.

By the end of the 1920s, Evola had also discovered the thinker who was to have a more decisive influence on his life than any other: René Guénon. Guénon was a French metaphysician who was, from the standpoint of religious studies, very possibly the most important thinker of the twentieth century.  He wrote dozens of books describing the worldview that he saw as being common to all the world’s religious and esoteric traditions, and cataloguing and explaining their sacred symbols.

Guénon decried all forms of progressivism, and upheld the teachings found in many of the world’s religious traditions which teach that, contrary to the modern view, civilizations begin in a state of perfection and then gradually decay into degeneracy, and that the forms of technical and scientific progress that modern man is so proud of are in fact mere illusions, and that while he gains greater power over the material world, man is in fact becoming weaker and sicker in a physical and spiritual sense.

Another of Guénon’s crucial insights was the idea of Tradition. This idea of Tradition holds that at the core of all the world’s religious and mystical traditions, there is a single metaphysical reality which reveals itself to men at certain crucial points in time, and that it assumes different outward forms depending on the place and time that it manifests itself and solidifies as religion. This may sound suspiciously New-Agey, but Guénon was quite strict on the fact that he did not believe that one could combine several different traditions into one, but had to accept each on its own terms as a metaphysical whole, and also he believed that esoteric knowledge could only be conveyed by properly initiated authorities, and as a result he rejected all of what we would call “New Age” thought as subversive and counter-traditional.

As I mentioned before, it’s important to distinguish between Tradition and tradition in the usual sense. A tradition, as in for example giving gifts to loved ones at Christmas, might be a positive form of cultural continuity, and it might even be connected to the metaphysical in some way (in this case, to the celebration of a holy day), but these lesser traditions form the outermost layer of tradition, and can change with time, whereas the core of Tradition is eternal and unchanging throughout time.

The last important element of Guénon’s worldview that is important to mention is the cycle of ages. All the ancient civilizations, including both the Nordic and Greco-Roman traditions, had a sense of time as occurring in a sequence that begins with a Golden Age, and then passes through a series of gradually declining ages until it reaches a final age of darkness after which everything is destroyed, and then the entire cycle repeats itself. Guénon and Evola, consistently with most other modern spiritual figures, identified the age we are living in now as the final age, or Kali Yuga, as it is called in both Hinduism and Buddhism. In the ancient Scandinavian religion, the equivalent age was the Wolf Age. Lest this seems like just some metaphysical mumbo-jumbo, let me quote a few examples from the Hindu scriptures that describe the characteristics of Kali Yuga:

In Kali Yuga, wealth alone will be considered the sign of a man’s good birth, proper behavior, and fine qualities. And law and justice will be applied only on the basis of one’s power.

Men and women will live together merely because of superficial attraction, and success in business will depend on deceit. Womanliness and manliness will be judged according to one’s expertise in sex.

A person’s propriety will be seriously questioned if he does not earn a good living. And one who is very clever at juggling words will be considered a learned scholar.

He who can maintain a family will be regarded as an expert man, and the principles of religion will be observed only for the sake of reputation.

Cities will be dominated by thieves, the Vedas will be contaminated by speculative interpretations of atheists, political leaders will virtually consume the citizens, and the so-called priests and intellectuals will be devotees of their bellies and genitals.

When irreligion becomes prominent in the family, the women of the family become corrupt, and from the degradation of womanhood comes unwanted population.

These are just a few of many such examples. Whatever one thinks of Hinduism as a religion, this description certainly seems uncannily accurate in our present world.

To get back to Evola, he quickly came to see Guénon as the definitive scholar of esotericism, and many of Guénon’s basic ideas were to form the basis of Evola’s work for the rest of his life. He was no uncritical disciple, however, and there were significant differences in their respective approaches to Tradition. Evola, for instance, identified the Primordial Tradition from which all the other religions later emerged as being the same thing as the Hyperborean, Aryan, masculine, and solar tradition, and saw later religions, especially the Abrahamic religions of Judaism, Christianity, and Islam, as lunar, feminine, degenerated forms of it. He still believed that they were legitimate vehicles for esoteric knowledge, but that they were lesser forms of religion than, for example, Hinduism, Buddhism, Zoroastrianism, or the pre-Christian religions of Europe. By the same token, Evola was not a neo-pagan. While he respected the pagan European religions and frequently referenced them in his work, he thought their time had passed and that there was no meaningful way to resurrect them in the modern world – in fact, he thought that people who try to bring them back were actually counter-traditional.

But while Evola saw religion as the key to overcoming the problems of the modern world, he didn’t understand it in the sense of going to church on Sundays or following the Ten Commandments. He thought that those outer forms of religion were necessary for the normies, but Evola’s interest was always in the spiritual elite, and the aspects of religion that most interested him were those that could be used to overcome the self and to increase one’s power to a godlike state – essentially the same as the goal of the Absolute Individual that he had written about earlier, but relying on the practices of the mystics and ascetics of the ancient religions. And while the idea of aiming at becoming a god may sound crazy to modern ears, I should point out that many of the pre-Christian religious texts maintain that such a thing is indeed possible for a very few superior, self-realized individuals.

I’ve scarcely done justice to Evola’s esoteric thought, but it’s so massive and complex that there’s no way I can give a comprehensive overview of it in the time I have tonight. Those who are interested in learning more about it should consult Evola’s books on the subject – most of the major ones have already been translated – and especially his main work, Revolt Against the Modern World, where he really outlines his entire worldview. The Path of Cinnabar ^[8], his autobiography, also gives a good overview of his ideas.

Introducing Evola’s concept of Tradition, however, is necessary for understanding his relationship with politics, which is what I want to talk about now. As I said, Evola was on the outs with the Fascists after he published Pagan Imperialism. But Evola saw Fascism – not just Italian Fascism, but all the fascist movements of Europe – not as something Traditional in the true sense, since fascism by its very nature was something very modern and revolutionary, but at least as something which preserved certain elements of the traditional world, and which could possibly serve as a bridge toward an eventual restoration of Tradition. For Evola, Tradition could only be maintained in a civilization which had a legitimate hierarchy, in which the priesthood and the warrior class stood in a privileged position over the lower classes. To a Traditionalist, the only legitimate form of government can be a monarch and a nobility ruling in tandem with a priesthood, since, as all sacred traditions have held, the King acts as the bridge between the spiritual and the material worlds. This is necessary so that these upper castes can act as the guardians of Tradition and make sure that the society as a whole continues to be guided by it.

In a time when Europe was torn between Communism on one side and liberal democracy on the other, it was clear to Evola that fascism was by far the best alternative. To Evola, Communism and democracy, especially as represented by the United States, were just two sides of the same coin, since both civilizations have equality as their goal and both allow no place for the sacred to enter into politics. He also saw Fascism as flawed, especially in its socialist aspects – Evola had no tolerance for any form of socialism, whether nationalist or internationalist – but he nevertheless believed that it had the potential to become something better, especially if it were to become guided by Traditional principles.

Evola had no illusions that he could convert the entire Fascist movement into a Traditionalist one, but he did hope that he might be able to help to forge a Traditionalist elite within the Party by influencing some of its intellectuals and leaders. And indeed, Evola did succeed in winning friends among the Fascist elite who were receptive to his message, and in the 1930s Evola was able to begin publishing articles in some of the official Fascist newspapers and journals. He never joined the Fascist Party, however, and in fact referred to his standpoint as “supra-fascist”: transcending what Fascism was already offering. A quote which seems to encapsulate Evola’s attitude toward Fascism is, “To the extent that Fascism follows and defends our principles, so far can we consider ourselves Fascists. So far and no further.” (A quote which I’ve paraphrased to describe my own attitude toward both Trump and the Alt Right.)

Evola didn’t limit himself to Italy, and he forged contacts with fascist and nationalist movements all over Europe during the 1930s. He held Romania’s Iron Guard and its leader, Corneliu Codreanu, in particularly high esteem, respecting them for combining Romanian Orthodox mysticism and rites with their political activities. He also had many contacts among the radical Right in Germany, although during the 1930s the National Socialists kept their distance from him, as they were suspicious of his aristocratic ties (the Nazis saw the old German aristocracy and the Kaiser as an obstacle to their own revolutionary aims). And in fact, Evola didn’t think very highly of the Nazis, either. If you read what he wrote about them, especially in his post-war book, Notes on the Third Reich ^[9], he doesn’t have much good to say about them, apart from admitting that the milieu they emerged from in the 1920s had had potential, and that he had respect for the SS for being an order along the lines of what he had desired to see in Italy. But the Third Reich itself he faulted for being too populist and bourgeois, and he disliked the Nazis’ scientific, dogmatic approach to race and their obsession with racial purity. If you compare what he says about the Nazis with his book on Italian Fascism, Fascism Viewed from the Right ^[10], it’s quite clear that he believed that Fascism was the more dynamic and less reactionary of the two movements, and he appreciated the fact that Italy had retained its monarchy, whilst Germany was led only by a “bohemian Corporal,” to quote von Hindenburg.

The early 1940s saw the pinnacle of Evola’s involvement with Italian Fascism when he published a book called Synthesis of a Doctrine of Race. In this book, Evola outlined his idea of the various races of humanity as being like Platonic ideal types, and held that character was as important as biological factors in determining one’s racial essence. While Evola by no means discounted the importance of biology – this is something that his critics often get wrong – he did believe that it was possible for someone of purely Aryan blood to exhibit characteristics one usually finds among Jews or blacks, and that the converse was possible as well. Mussolini himself read the book and was very impressed with it, as he had been looking for a form of racial ideology which Fascism could adopt that would be distinct from Nazi race theory. He invited Evola for a meeting and tasked him with helping to develop a uniquely Fascist form of racialism.

Evola’s involvement with Fascism was cut short in July 1943, when Mussolini was overthrown by his own Fascist Grand Council after the Allies invaded the southern tip of Italy. Evola travelled to Germany and joined with those Fascist leaders who sought to reconstitute a new Fascist state in northern Italy, plans which came to fruition when Mussolini was rescued from prison by Otto Skorzeny in September. Evola was present at Hitler’s headquarters with other Italian leaders when Mussolini was brought there, and he assisted in setting up what became known as the Italian Social Republic. Evola returned to Rome and remained there until it was occupied by the Allies in June 1944. According to Evola’s diary, secret service men came to his mother’s door looking for him, and his mother delayed the men while Evola escaped out the back and then travelled north.

Evola found the Italian Social Republic disappointing, as it was even more strongly socialist in nature than Fascism’s original incarnation. But by this time, in the aftermath of their defeat in Russia and the imminent invasion of the Reich itself by the Allies, the National Socialists in Germany were becoming a lot less strict about picking their allies. Some researchers have claimed that Evola, acting on the Germans’ behalf, made use of his many contacts in the fascist and nationalist groups across Europe to keep many of them engaged in the war. We also know that in 1944, the SS brought Evola to Vienna, where they had archived the many esoteric and Masonic texts they had confiscated during their sweep across Europe. Evola was tasked with cataloging the materials and determining exactly what it was they had. And this was the work that Evola was engaged in during late 1944 and early 1945, while Allied bombers streaked overhead. Evola relates how, during this period, he “tested his fate” by going on solitary walks through the city during air raids, when everyone else was cowering in shelters. And on March 12, 1945, a Russian bomb exploded near Evola on one of these walks, injuring his spine, and he was confined to a wheelchair for the rest of his life.

After the war, Evola never again engaged with practical politics in any way, but he remained unapologetic for his views on Fascism and National Socialism, and even in his post-war writings he always restated that they had been superior to anything in our contemporary world. He also became something of a guru to the various Right-wing and neo-fascist groups which emerged in Italy in the first three decades after the war. Indeed, in 1951 he was charged with conspiring to revive Fascism. He was ultimately acquitted of the charges, and as part of his defense, he said, “My principles are only those which were accepted and seen as normal by every well-born person everywhere in the world prior to 1789.”

Although he remained on friendly terms with political activists, it seems that Evola himself gave up on the idea of a political solution to the problems of our age after 1945. His advice, as he offered in post-war writings such as his book Men Among the Ruins ^[11], was to establish orders of elite individuals who could preserve Traditional principles and pass them down through a chain of initiations until an age would return in which their seeds could again bear fruit. But Evola had no interest in the democratic party politics of our age.

Evola continued to write after the war, but his life otherwise remained unremarkable due to the constraints of his injury. He died at his apartment in Rome on June 11, 1974. But he had already left his mark on the Italian political scene. The leader of the neo-fascist Italian Social Movement, Giorgio Almirante, famously remarked of Evola that he was “our Marcuse, only better.”

So what does Evola have to say to us today? Would he tell us to vote for Trump or Le Pen? Would he tell us to build bombs and blow up the local shopping mall? Would he tell us to find a cave in a mountain somewhere and meditate for the rest of our lives?

Evola never developed anything like a political program or a plan of action, so in that sense I don’t think he has anything to offer. Evola always addressed the individual who has higher aspirations. So where I think he has value is in helping a Right-inclined individual to cope with living in a liberal, degenerate age.

First of all, I would say that, regardless of what one thinks of the heavy-duty metaphysics underlying his ideas, the concept of Tradition is a valuable one regardless. In our time, when politics is getting pettier than it has ever been before, I think it’s important that we keep in mind that our final goal is not simply ending immigration or voting out the liberals. Ultimately, we stand for a set of principles that have guided our civilization from its origins and that stand above everyday politics. Even if we could send out all of the non-whites from America and Europe tomorrow, the rot that is afflicting all of our minds and souls would still be there. We have to try to put ourselves in the mindset of our ancestors and what made them great. Our approaches might change, but the principles we stand for are timeless. When I’ve tried to think about what it is that most fundamentally distinguishes the various and sundry strands of the Right from the liberals, what it ultimately comes down to is that we believe that there is an essential meaning to things. There is something essential in being an American or a German or an Italian, and that’s why not just anyone can become one, just as there is something essential in being a man or a woman . . . and similarly, there is an essential difference between being a white person engaged in the life of your civilization as opposed to being a pop culture, fast food junkie sleepwalking through history who happens to have white skin.

Second, Evola was certainly hostile to political movements that relied on the masses rather than an elite, and even Fascism was woefully inadequate for him, which means that he no doubt wouldn’t have thought very highly of the populism of our time. But rather than being a dogmatist, I think Evola is just being realistic here. I’ve been involved with the Right in some capacity for about twenty years now, and there’s an ever-growing list of saviors that the Right has latched onto, developed unrealistic expectations for, and then become disillusioned with. Twenty years ago there was Jörg Haider. Ten years ago there was Ron Paul. Three years ago there was Putin. Last year, of course, we had Trump. I don’t mean to suggest that these people aren’t worth supporting or that there is no difference between them and their opponents. Nevertheless, we have to bear in mind that none of these people are Rightists in the true sense, and could not act as true Rightists even if they wanted to be, so any support we give to them or people like them is simply to choose the least bad option, not a good option. The system as it is currently constituted will never allow a candidate with genuine Right-wing principles to attain real power. This is something that Evola recognized and why he held himself aloof from the endless games and maneuverings and compromises of party politics, and this is why we should try not to pin our hopes and dreams to any of democracy’s shooting stars, but recognize that we’ve got to keep working in the shadows regardless of whatever’s happening on stage.

And lastly, the idea that we are living in Kali Yuga and that everything is inevitably doomed to collapse may seem like quite a black pill. But as I said before, I think it does accurately describe our situation. And also I think some people who claim to be Traditionalists tend to be too pessimistic when it comes to this, and actually overlook what Evola actually said about the possibilities of our time. In later life, Evola advocated for what he terms apoliteia, by which he meant disengagement from political affairs. But if you really examine what he says on the subject, he never advised that one shouldn’t become involved in politics. Rather, what he meant is that one shouldn’t become attached to whatever result might come from such activities. In this, again, Evola is being consistent with what many of the sacred texts have to say on this. So in other words, sure, get involved with a political party or join the military or vote for Trump or whatever, but do so because it helps you to attain the goals that you set for yourself rather than because you have staked everything on its success and will be shattered if it fails. In Kali Yuga, political restoration may not be possible, but the opportunity still remains for the individual to triumph over modernity in his own way. Besides which, the fact that we may lose the battle doesn’t mean that we are absolved of the responsibility of fighting it and standing for what is true.

The best illustration of this that I know of comes from the Bhagavad Gita. At the opening, a Prince, Arjuna, is preparing to fight a battle against an opposing army. Although he knows his cause is just, he hates war, and knows that there are members of his own family on the other side who he may have to kill in order to win. The god Krishna is acting as his advisor. Just before the battle, Arjuna loses his resolve, and tells Krishna that he will put down his weapons and go into the forest to meditate instead of fighting. Krishna basically says to him, “Stop being such a pussy! You’re a kshatriya (the Hindu warrior caste)! It’s your job to do your duty and fight for justice. Meditating in the forest is for brahmanas (priests).” The rest of the Gita is Krishna explaining the entire metaphysics of existence, and Arjuna’s place in it, and at the end, of course Arjuna does his duty.

And that’s how I see those of us here tonight. In spite of the million other things you could have been doing in this enormous and hyperactive city tonight, you decided to come here and meet with a group of some of the most hated people in America to listen to a lecture on Julius Evola. That clearly indicates that there’s something in you that has decided that there are more important things than just doing what everyone else expects you to do. So really, we’re already creating the “order” that Evola called for in order to preserve Tradition in the face of degeneracy. So let’s not despair about the latest headlines, but keep our heads up in the knowledge that, whatever happens, we are the ones who stand for what is timeless, and our day of victory will come, whether it is tomorrow or a thousand years from now.

Thank you.

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URL to article: https://www.counter-currents.com/2018/05/what-would-evola-do-2/

URLs in this post:

[1] Image: https://www.counter-currents.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/5-19-18-1.jpg

[2] article: https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/10/world/europe/bannon-vatican-julius-evola-fascism.html

[3] talk he gave to the Vatican: https://www.buzzfeed.com/lesterfeder/this-is-how-steve-bannon-sees-the-entire-world?utm_term=.qjWj7aJzb#.pjOBl849J

[4] Revolt Against the Modern World: http://amzn.to/2qTdDpP

[5] number one spot: http://alt-right-news.blogspot.com/2017/02/evola-soars-to-top-of-amazon-charts.html

[6] Bhagavad Gita: http://amzn.to/2qTebfv

[7] paintings: http://www.juliusevola.net/paintings.html

[8] The Path of Cinnabar: http://amzn.to/2qT6iqs

[9] Notes on the Third Reich: http://amzn.to/2qe14Ci

[10] Fascism Viewed from the Right: http://amzn.to/2qTddja

[11] Men Among the Ruins: http://amzn.to/2ry5Oqd

Interview mit John Morgan

Alternativen zur Moderne

Interview mit John Morgan, Verlag Arktos

von Johannes Schüller

Ex: http://www.blauenarzisse.de

BN-​Gespräch. John Morgan leitet „Arktos”. Johannes Schüller sprach mit ihm über rechte Alternativen in den USA, Identitäre weltweit und das Arktos-​Programm.

Blaue Narzisse: Arktos ist der erste englischsprachige Verlag der Neuen Rechten. Das Spektrum der veröffentlichten Bücher reicht weit. Es lassen sich sowohl Bücher des Yoga-​Gurus Sri Sri Ravi Shankar finden als auch Ernst von Salomons Freikorps-​Roman Die Geächteten. Was ist eigentlich das ideologische Fundament Ihres Verlags?

John Morgan: Arktos hat keine spezifische Ideologie. Als wir mit unserer Arbeit begannen und ich den „Über Uns”-Text für unsere Webseite schrieb, dachte ich auch über den roten Faden nach, der all unsere Tätigkeiten verbindet. Ich entschied mich für „Alternativen zur Moderne”. Denn im Kern wollen wir Texte veröffentlichen, die die Grundlagen unserer gegenwärtigen Zivilisation hinterfragen, sei es politisch, spirituell, kulturell oder auf andere Weise. Darüber hinaus wäre es schwierig, ein durchgängiges Thema zu all unseren Publikationen zu finden.

Dennoch gibt es gewisse Dinge, die für Arktos von besonderem Interesse sind. Denn wir sind zum Beispiel der erste englischsprachige Verlag, der Vertreter der europäischen Neuen Rechten sowie ihrer Vordenker aus der Konservativen Revolution veröffentlicht. Die traditionalistische Schule von René Guénon und Julius Evola liegt außerdem in unserem Fokus. Und da wir in den ersten fünf Jahren unseren Sitz in Indien hatten, konnten wir auch dort viele Kontakte knüpfen. Deshalb veröffentlichen wir auch weiterhin auf den Hinduismus und Indiens politische Situation bezogene Bücher. Wir sind stets daran orientiert, unseren Horizont zu erweitern und neue, ebenso wichtige Aspekte einzubeziehen. Denn wir fühlen uns nicht auf die bisherigen Themen beschränkt.

Sie kommen aus dem US-​Bundesstaat Michigan und gehörten 2009 zu den Gründern von Arktos. Gibt es eine Neue Rechte oder identitäre Gegenkultur in den Vereinigten Staaten? Zu den bekanntesten zählt sicher der sogenannte Paläokonservatismus?

Ich komme aus Michigan, zuvor war ich jedoch in New York. Nun lebe ich in Budapest, nachdem ich einige Jahre in Indien verbracht habe. Trotzdem bin ich nach wie vor in der amerikanischen „Szene” aktiv. Ich denke, es gibt tatsächlich eine Kultur der Neuen Rechten in Amerika, wenngleich sie sich sehr von der europäischen Variante unterscheidet. Denn sie ist mehr oder weniger auf einzelne Internetseiten, Veröffentlichungen und einen kleinen Personenkreis beschränkt. Ich bin sicher, Sie kennen sie: Dazu gehören unter anderem das Projekt Counter-​Currents, das Radix Journal, das National Policy Institute und die Vierteljahresschrift Occidental Observer.

Die identitäre Idee dagegen hat in Amerika bis jetzt nicht Fuß gefasst, obwohl die amerikanischen Zirkel der Neuen Rechten an den europäischen Entwicklungen interessiert sind. Das Problem ist, dass die Amerikaner keinen richtigen Sinn für Identität außerhalb des Konsums haben. Dadurch bleibt es schwierig, eine Bewegung auf Grundlage einer „amerikanischen Identität” zu begründen, ohne sich etwas ausdenken zu müssen.

Die Paläokonservativen dagegen stellen eine interessante Bewegung in den USA dar. Sie unterscheiden sich stark von der Neuen Rechten, aber es gibt auch Überschneidungen. Sie repräsentieren quasi das, was vor einem Jahrhundert als Mainstream-​Konservatismus galt und jetzt durch den Neokonservatismus ersetzt wurde. Letzterer wurde vor allem von der Regierung George W. Bushs vertreten.

Trotzdem bleiben die Paläokonservativen heute ebenso unbeachtet wie die Neue Rechte. Mit Ausnahme des bekannten Autors Pat Buchanan sind sie in Amerika außerhalb akademischer Kreise gänzlich unbekannt. Es gibt also durchaus vielversprechende Entwicklungen in den USA, doch im Moment sind die Gruppen klein und nicht sehr einflussreich.

Sie veröffentlichen auch Autoren wie den libanesischen Diplomaten Abir Taha, den österreichischen Identitären Markus Willinger oder den amerikanischen Schriftsteller Tito Perdue. Existiert so etwas wie eine „Identitäre Internationale”, die ähnlich organisiert ist wie die alte Kommunistische Internationale?

(Lacht) Das wäre schön, aber bestimmte Sachen funktionieren nicht so. Denn es gibt keine internationale Organisation, die all diese Dinge koordiniert. Ich halte das für eine gute Sache, denn die Kommunistische Internationale war stets sehr diktatorisch und ideologisch orientiert. Was identitäre und neurechte Bewegungen betrifft, erachte ich es sogar als besser, wenn jedes Land und jede Region seine einzigartigen Lösungen und Strategien für die eigenen Probleme entwickelt. Schließlich kämpft die Neue Rechte für Dezentralisierung, nicht für eine Rückkehr zu fehlgeschlagenen, totalitären Ideen.

Auf die von Ihnen genannten Autoren sind wir natürlich stolz, doch sie sind alle sehr verschieden. Sie verbindet nichts außer der Fakt, dass sie von Arktos veröffentlicht wurden. Denn es gibt gewiss keine Hintergrundorganisation, die die Tätigkeit des Verlags steuert oder uns befiehlt, wen wir veröffentlichen sollen.

Ist trotzdem nicht zum Beispiel die regelmäßige Konferenz „Identitarian Ideas” ein erster Schritt, um die internationale Neue Rechte zu vereinen?

Im Juni 2013 fand in Stockholm die fünfte Konferenz „Identitarian Ideas” statt, ich war einer der Sprecher. Die nächste Konferenz wird wieder diesen Juni stattfinden. Arktos nahm daran teil, obwohl es sich nicht um eine Arktos–Veranstaltung handelte. Organisiert hat sie wie immer die schwedische, metapolitische Organisation „Motpol”. Der Gedanke hinter den „Identitarian Ideas” war nie, die „internationale Neue Rechte zu vereinen”. Selbst wenn wir das versuchen würden, hätten wir nur beschränkte Möglichkeiten. Es handelt sich um eine schwedische Konferenz, die sich an einem schwedischen Publikum orientiert. Motpol lädt immer Referenten aus vielen verschiedenen Ländern ein, dadurch können sie ihre Ideen einer schwedischen Zielgruppe vorstellen. Internationale Gäste sind natürlich stets Willkommen. Die meisten der Gespräche finden auch auf Englisch statt.

Inwiefern war die Konferenz damit erfolgreich?

Gewiss war es erfolgreich, wenngleich die Konferenz im letzten Jahr die Kapazitäten erschöpfte. Zugleich war aber auch eine sehr große und interessante Bandbreite von Referenten vertreten.

Welche Bücher und Autoren wollen Sie in den nächsten Jahren veröffentlichen? Wie sind Ihre Pläne für die Zukunft?

Natürlich wollen wir zuerst mehr Bücher veröffentlichen! Kaum eine Woche vergeht, in der wir nicht über mögliche neue und interessante Projekte nachdenken. Und wir haben ohnehin eine seitenlange Liste voller Dinge, die wir irgendwann einmal umsetzen wollen. Selbstverständlich wird es auch mehr Bücher unserer prominenten Autoren geben, also von Alain de Benoist, Guillaume Faye, Alexander Dugin und Julius Evola.

Außerdem werden wir Arbeiten zu identitären Themen publizieren. Wir sitzen zudem gerade über weiteren Romanen von Tito Perdue, der zweifelsohne zu den interessantesten englischsprachigen Romanschriftstellern gehört. In naher Zukunft wird es außerdem ein Buch des deutschen Filmemachers Hans-​Jürgen Syberberg geben. Und wir werden Texte über die Rechte in Indien veröffentlichen.

In Kürze erscheint darüber hinaus The Shock of History von Dominique Venner. Es handelt sich zugleich um das erste ins Englische übersetzte Buch Venners. Viele weitere Projekte werden noch folgen. Von Arktos können Sie neue und aufregende Bücher erwarten!

Mr. Morgan, thanks a lot!

Zur Internetseite des Verlags Arktos geht es hier.

Bild: John Morgan

John Morgan: The Fourth Political Theory

The Fourth Political Theory

An interview with John Morgan

Natella Speranskaya:  How did you discover the Fourth Political Theory? And how would you evaluate its chances of becoming a major ideology of the 21st century?

JM:  I have been interested in the work of Prof. Dugin since I first discovered English translations of his writings at the Arctogaia Web sites in the late 1990s. So I had already heard of the Fourth Political Theory even before my publishing house, Arktos, agreed to publish his book of the same name. In editing the translation of the book, I became intimately familiar with Prof. Dugin’s concept. According to him, the Fourth Political Theory is more of a question than an ideology at this point. It is easier to identify what it is not, which is opposed to everything represented by liberalism, and which will transcend the failures of Marxism and fascism. In recent decades, many people have been heralding the “death of ideology.” Carl Schmitt predicted this, saying that the last battle would take place between those who wish to reject the role of politics in civilization, and those who understand the need for it. The death of ideology, I believe, is simply the exhaustion of those political systems that are founded on liberalism. This does not mean that politics itself has ended, but only that a new system is required. The Fourth Political Theory offers the best chance to take what is best from the old ideologies and combine them with new ideas, to create the new vision that will carry humanity into the next age. Although we can’t say with certainty what that will look like, as of yet. But it should be obvious to everyone that the current ideology has already run its course.

NS:  Leo Strauss when commenting on the fundamental work of Carl Schmitt The Concept of the Political notes that despite all radical critique of liberalism incorporated in it Schmitt does not follow it through since his critique remains within the scope of liberalism”. “His anti-Liberal tendencies, – claims Strauss, - remain constrained by “systematics of liberal thought” that has not been overcome so far, which – as Schmitt himself admits – “despite all failures cannot be substituted by any other system in today’s Europe. What would you identify as a solution to the problem of overcoming the liberal discourse? Could you consider the Fourth Political Theory by Alexander Dugin to be such a solution? The theory that is beyond the three major ideologies of the 20th century – Liberalism, Communism and Fascism, and that is against the Liberal doctrine.

JM:  Yes, definitely. The unsustainably and intellectual poverty of liberalism in Europe, and also America, is becoming more apparent with each passing day. Clearly a new solution is needed. Prof. Dugin’s Fourth Political Theory, as he has explained in his book of the same title, is more of a question than an ideology at this point, and it is up to those of us who are attempting to defy unipolar hegemony to determine what it will be. So, yes, we need a new ideology, even if we cannot yet explain exactly what it will be in practice. I think Prof. Dugin’s idea of taking Heidegger’s Dasein as our watchword is a good one, because we are so entrenched in the liberal mindset – even those of us who want to overcome it – that it is only be re-engaging with the pure essence of the reality of the world around us that we will find a way out of it. The representational, virtual reality of postmodernism which surrounds most of us on a daily basis has conditioned us to only think about liberalism on its own terms. Only by renewing our contact with the real, non-representational world, and by disregarding all previous concepts and labels, can we find the seeds for a new way of apprehending it.

NS:  Do you agree that today there are “two Europes”: the one – the liberal one (incorporating the idea of “open society”, human rights, registration of same-sex marriages, etc.) and the other Europe (“a different Europe”) – politically engaged, thinker, intellectual, spiritual, the one that considers the status quo and domination of liberal discourse as a real disaster and the betrayal of the European tradition. How would you evaluate chances of victory of a “different Europe” over the ”first” one?

JM:  Speaking as an American outsider, I absolutely see two Europes. The surface Europe is one that has turned itself into a facsimile of America – the free market, democracy, multiculturalism, secularism, pop culture, sacrificing genuine identity for fashions, and so on. The other Europe is much more difficult to see, but I have the good fortune of having many friends who dwell within it. This is the undercurrent that has refused to accept the Americanization of Europe, and which also rejects the liberal hegemony in all its forms. They remain true to the ancient spirit of Europe’s various peoples and cultures, while also dreaming of a new Europe that will be strong, independent and creative once again. We see this in the New Right, in the identitarian movement, and in the many nationalist groups across Europe that have sprung up in recent years. As of now, their influence is small, but as the global situation gets worse, I believe they will gain the upper hand, as more Europeans will become open to the idea of finding new solutions and new ways of living, disassociated from the collapsing hegemonic order. So I estimate their chances as being very good. Although they must begin acting now, even before the “collapse,” if they are to rescue their identities from oblivion, since the “real” Europe is fast being driven out of existence by the forces of liberalism.

NS:  “There is nothing more tragic than a failure to understand the historical moment we are currently going through; - notes Alain de Benoist – this is the moment of postmodern globalization”. The French philosopher emphasizes the significance of the issue of a new Nomos of the Earth or a way of establishing international relations. What do you think the fourth Nomos will be like? Would you agree that the new Nomos is going to be Eurasian and multipolar (transition from universum to pluriversum)?

JM:  Yes, I do agree. In terms of what it will look like, see my answer to question 4 in the first set of questions.

NS:  Do you agree that the era of the white European human race has ended, and the future will be predetermined by Asian cultures and societies?

JM:  If you mean the era of the domination of White Europeans (although of course that comprises many diverse and unique identities in itself), and those of European descent such as in America, over the entire world, then yes, that era is coming to an end, and has been, gradually, since the First World War. As for the fate of White Europeans in our own homelands, that is also an open question, given the lack of genuine culture and diminishing reproductive rates of Whites around the world, coupled with large-scale non-White immigration into our homelands. While I welcome the end of White hegemony, which overall hasn’t been good for anyone, most especially for Whites themselves, as an American of European descent I do fear the changes that are taking place in our lands. As the thinkers of the “New Right” such as Alain de Benoist have said, if we stand for the preservation of the distinct identities of all peoples and cultures, then we must also defend the identities of the various European peoples and their offshoots. I would like to see European peoples, including in America, develop the will to resist this onslaught and re-establish our lands as the true cradles of our cultures and identities. Of course, in order to do this, White peoples must first get their souls back and return to their true cultures, rejecting multiculturalism and the corporate consumer culture that has grown up in tandem with neo-colonialism, both of which victimize Whites just as much as non-Whites. Unfortunately, few White Europeans around the world have come to this understanding thus far, but I hope that will change.

As for whether the future belongs to Asians, that I cannot say. Certainly India and China are among the most prominent rising powers. But at the same time, they face huge domestic challenges, demographically and otherwise. Whether they will be able to sustain the momentum they have now is uncertain. Having lived in India for the last four years, while it is a land I have come to love, I have difficulty seeing India emerging as a superpower anytime soon. The foundations just aren’t there yet.  Likewise, I find it troubling that India and China continue to understand “progress” in terms of how closely they mimic the American lifestyle and its values. Until Asian (and other) nations can find a way to develop a sustainable and stable social order, and until they forge a new and unique identity for themselves in keeping with their traditions that is disconnected from the Western model, I don’t see them overtaking the so-called “First World.”

NS:  Do you consider Russia to be a part of Europe or do you accept the view that Russia and Europe represent two different civilizations?

JM:  As a longtime student of Dostoevsky, I have always believed that Russia is a unique civilization in its own right. Although clearly Russia shares cultural affinities and linkages with Europe that cannot be denied, and which bring it closer to Europe than to Asia, it retains a character that is purely its own. I have always admired this aspect of Russia. Whereas Western Europe sold its soul in the name of material prosperity in its rush to embrace the supposed benefits of the Industrial Revolution and modernity as quickly as possible, Russia developed its own unique path to modernity, and has always fought hard to maintain its independence. It seems to me, as a foreigner, that as a result, Russia retains a much stronger connection to the spiritual and the intangible aspects of life than in the West, as well as a more diverse, as opposed to purely utilitarian, outlook. The German Conservative Revolutionaries understood this, which is why they sought to tilt Germany more towards Russia politically and culturally, and away from England and the United States (such as Arthur Moeller van den Bruck advocated). Similarly, in today’s world, New Rightists, traditionalists and so forth would do well to look toward Russia and its traditions for inspiration. 

NS:  Contemporary ideologies are based on the principle of secularity. Would you predict the return of religion, the return of sacrality? If so, in what form? Do you consider it to be Islam, Christianity, Paganism or any other forms of religion?

JM:  I think we already see this happening to an extent. In the nineteenth and for most of the twentieth century, the prevailing view was skepticism and scientism, with religion primarily relegated to its moralistic aspects. But beginning in the 1960s in North America and Western Europe, we have seen a renewal of interest in religion and the transcendental view of life on a large scale. This development was, of course, presaged by the traditionalist philosophers, such as René Guénon and Julius Evola, who understood modernity perhaps better than any other Europeans of their time. But unfortunately, this revival in practice has tended toward New Age modes of thought, or else mere identity politics and exotericism as we see with the rise of fundamentalist Christianity in America, rather than in genuinely traditional spirituality. As such, most spirituality in the Western nations today is an outgrowth of modernity, rather than something that can be used to oppose and transcend it. But the fact that more traditionalist books are being made available, and that we see more groups dedicated to traditional spirituality and esotericism than ever before, is a promising trend.

As for the form that this revival will ultimately take, that depends on the location. For much of the world, of course, people are likely to return to and revitalize the traditions that grew out of their own civilizations, which is as it should be. We already see efforts in this direction at work in some parts of the so-called “Third World.” But in Western Europe, and especially America, it is a more difficult question. The Catholic Church today doesn’t hold much promise for those of a traditional mindset. Guénon himself abandoned his native Catholicism and began to practice Islam because he had come to believe that Catholicism was no longer a useful vehicle for Tradition. And of course today, things are much worse than they were in Guénon’s time. Protestantism, besides being counter-traditional, is in even poorer shape these days. And while I am very sympathetic to those who are seeking to revive the pre-Christian traditions of Europe, or adopt traditions from other cultures, this ultimately isn’t a good strategy for those who are engaged in sociopolitical activity alongside spiritual activities. The vast majority of Europeans and Americans still identify with Christianity in some form, and this will need to be taken into account by any new political or metapolitical movement that emerges there.

In America, unlike Europe, we have no real tradition of our own. This is both a blessing and a curse. It’s a blessing because our culture has always been tolerant of allowing and even embracing the presence of alternative forms of spirituality. (Interest in Hinduism, for example, began in America already in the Nineteenth century with such figures as Thoreau and Emerson, and with the arrival of Hindu teachers from India such as Protap Chunder Mozoomdar and Swami Vivekananda.) But it is also a curse because there is no particular, universal spiritual tradition that underlies American civilization which can be revived. Christianity remains dominant, but certainly the popular forms of it that exist in America today are unacceptable from a traditional standpoint. At the same time, most Americans are unlikely to accept any form of spirituality which they perceive to be different from or in opposition to Christianity. So it is a difficult question.

The best solution may be to exclude advocating any specific religion from our efforts in the West for the time being, and leave such decisions to the individual. Of course, we should encourage everyone who supports us to integrate the traditional worldview into their own lives, in whatever form that may take, and to oppose secularism on the grounds of the resacralization of culture. Perhaps once the process of the collapse of the current global and cultural order is further along, and as the peoples’ faith in the illusions of progress, materialism and nationalism inculcated by modernity are shattered, the new form or forms of religion that must take root in the West will become more readily apparent.

 

John Morgan: Theory of multipolar world

Theory of multipolar world

An interview with John Morgan

Natella Speranskaya: The collapse of the Soviet Union meant the cancellation of the Yalta system of international relations and the triumph of the single hegemon - the United States, and as a consequence, transformation of the bipolar world order to the unipolar model. Nevertheless, some analysts are still talking about a possible return to the bipolar model. How do you feel about this hypothesis? Is there a likelihood of emergence of a power capable of challenging the global hegemon?

John Morgan:  I’m not certain about a return to the bipolar model anytime soon. While we have seen the rise of new powers capable of challenging American hegemony in recent years – China, India, Iran, and of course the return of Russia to the world stage – none of them are capable of matching the pervasive influence of the American economy and its culture, nor of projecting military power around the world as NATO has been doing. At the same time, we can plainly see now that America and its allies in Western Europe have already passed their economic limits, now racking up unprecedented debt, and their power is beginning to wane. This process is irreversible, since the post-1945 American lifestyle is unsustainable on every level. America may be able to coast for a few more years, or at most decades, but the “American century” that began at the end of the Second World War will probably be over by mid-century at the latest. Rather than the return of a bipolar world, I think we will see the emergence of the multipolar one, as Prof. Dugin has suggested, in which several nations wield significant power but none reigns supreme above all. In order to protect their interests, stronger nations will need to forge alliances with weaker ones, and sometimes even with other strong nations. But I think the era of the superpower is rapidly coming to an end. 

 

NS:  Zbigniew Brzezinski openly admits that the U.S. is gradually losing its influence. Here it is possible to apply the concept of "imperial overstretch", introduced by renowned historian Paul Kennedy. Perhaps, America has faced that, what was previously experienced by the Soviet Union. How do you assess the current state of the U.S.?

 

JM:  As an American, I have witnessed this firsthand. I don’t think the American era is over just yet; it still possesses awesome military might, and will most likely retain this advantage for a little while longer. But the persuasive powers of a country whose defense spending comprises nearly half of all global military expenditures each year are obviously on the wane. My understanding of the collapse of the Soviet Union is that it occurred more because of domestic economic problems rather than as a direct result of its military failure in Afghanistan in the 1980s, even if that exacerbated the problem. Similarly, while the many wars the U.S. has engaged in over the past decade have unquestionably weakened it, it is the ongoing financial crisis, brought about by America’s reliance on debtor spending, that is the most important factor in the decline of American power. And actually, America’s military adventures have brought little in terms of benefits. The Iraq War has really only served to strengthen Iran and Syria’s position. Afghanistan remains a sinkhole in which America stands little to gain, apart from ongoing humiliation as the failure of its policies there is as plain as day. Nations like Iran and North Korea have been emboldened, since they know that America isn’t interested in challenging them militarily, at least for the time being. This has no doubt been a large factor in the increasing use of drones by the U.S., as well as its return to waging proxy wars against enemy regimes through concocted “rebel” movements, as it did during the Cold War against the Soviets, and as we have seen in Libya and now in Syria. Regardless, the primary factor in American decline is definitely its economic predicament. But if it returns to its earlier policies of attempting to spread democracy and the free market through war, this will only hasten its end. Obama seems to be aware of this and has sought to keep America from engaging directly in wars at all costs, but we don’t know who his successor will be.

 

NS:  The loss of global influence of the U.S. means no more, no less, as the end of the unipolar world. But here the question arises as - to which model will happen the transition in the nearest future? On the one hand, we have all the prerequisites for the emergence of the multipolar world, on the other – we face the risk of encountering non-polarity, which would mean a real chaos.

 

JM:  This is an interesting question, but I think it is difficult to answer definitively at the present time. The United States as a whole has still not acknowledged the fact of its own inevitable decline, and for the time being I expect it to continue to attempt to maintain the unipolar world for as long as it possibly can. Once the fact of the death of the hegemonic system can no longer be denied, I can see several possible directions. The U.S. may adopt some sort of primitive, imperialistic nationalism and attempt to restore its position through military means. Or, it may become too overwhelmed with its own domestic problems, as they increase, and perhaps disengage from the world stage, opening up possibilities for new geopolitical orders that have been restricted by American power for nearly a century. But since we do not yet know how severe the coming economic and political collapse will be, or what its impact will be globally, we cannot know whether it will lead to multipolarity or non-polarity. We can only attempt to set the stage for the former and hope that circumstances permit it.

 

NS:  The project of "counter-hegemony," developed by Cox, aims to expose the existing order in international relations and raise the rebellion against it. For this, Cox calls for the creation of counter-hegemonic bloc, which will include those political actors who reject the existing hegemony. The basis of the unipolar model imposed by the United States, is a liberal ideology. From this we can conclude that the basis of the multipolar model just the same has to be based on some ideology. Which ideology, in your opinion, can take replace the counter-hegemonic one, capable of uniting a number of political actors who do not agree with the hegemony of the West?

 

JM:  I agree with Prof. Dugin that the three ideologies which dominated the twentieth century have already exhausted themselves as paradigms for the nomos of the Earth. What I imagine and hope to see will be the emergence of blocs which may be similar to the Holy Roman Empire and other ancient empires, in which there will be loose confederations of nations and communities where there is indeed an overarching central political authority (perhaps a monarchy, as Evola prescribed) that will defend the sovereignty of its subjects, but in which most of the political power will rest with local, communal authorities. They may not have a specific ideology in themselves. However, there may be variations in how this is realized within the various communities which comprise them. Some peoples may choose to return to some variant of socialism or nationalism, or perhaps even some sort of pre-modern form of social organization. And these communities should be free to choose the particular form of their social organization, in accordance with their unique traditions. Liberalism, however, which depends for its survival on the consumption of all attainable resources, will completely die, I believe, since before long everyone will understand that it only leads to short-term gains followed by total destruction on every level.   

 

NS:  If we project the multipolar model on the economic world map, then we’ll get the coexistence of multiple poles, and at the same time, will create a complete matrix for the emergence of a new economy - outside of Western capitalist discourse. In your opinion, is the concept of “autarky of big spaces”, suggested by List, applicable for this?

 

JM:  I have not studied Friedrich List in any detail, so I’m not familiar with this concept, although of course I am in favor of the development of a new economic order to supplant the current, capitalist model. I do know that List opposed the justification of individual greed favored by the English liberal economists, in contrast to an economic model that considers the needs of the community/nation as a whole, as well as the impact one’s actions have on future generations. Given that the destructiveness of the current economic order is the result of its shameful neglect of these two factors, List’s conception is much better.

 

NS:  We are now on the verge of paradigmatic transition from the unipolar world order model to the multi-polar one, where the actors are no more nation-states, but entire civilizations. Recently in Russia was published a book "Theory of multipolar world," written by the Doctor of Political and Social Sciences, Professor Alexander Dugin. This book lays the theoretical foundation, basis, from which a new historical stage can start, and describes a number of changes both in the foreign policy of nation-states and in today's global economy, which involve a transition to the multipolar model. Of course, this also means the emergence of a new diplomatic language. Do you believe that multipolarity is the natural state of the world and that transition to the multipolar model is inevitable?

 

JM:  Yes, and my company, Arktos, will soon be making an English edition of this vital text available. I absolutely agree that multipolarity is both necessary and desirable. If we survey human history, this was always how the world was ordered in ages which we, as traditionalists, consider to have been far superior to the way the world is today. It is only from the unique, and degenerative, conditions of modernity that unipolarity has emerged in recent centuries, first in the efforts of the European colonial powers to dominate the planet, and culminating, of course, in American hegemony, which is the direct heir to the European colonial project. As we can see with our own eyes, hegemony hasn’t been good for anyone, neither for those peoples who have enjoyed its ephemeral material benefits nor for those who have been dominated by it. The unipolar idea is what brought the “Third World” into existence and perpetuates it (since, today, it has even conquered these peoples culturally and psychologically). Simultaneously, it has deprived those nations which pursued it, both in America and Europe, of security, stability, sustainability, and most importantly, of any form of genuine culture or identity, replacing it with plastic consumer culture and identities. Ultimately, unipolarity has victimized everything in human civilization that is good while offering nothing apart from the purely material benefits temporarily reaped by those in charge of it in return, and even that will soon cease. We can only hope that multipolarity will re-emerge, since it is obvious to anyone who looks at the world with an open mind that unipolarity is rapidly coming to an end.