Potential military action against Iran and the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict

Ex: FLUX ON-LINE

 

Dr. David Shahnazaryan

 

The purpose of this article is not to analyze the situation around Iran and all the possible scenarios.We just would like to present some considerations in view of the dangerous developments around the Islamic Republic, as Washington and Tehran remain locked in the ongoing standoff with no end in sight.

Despite some recent positive trends and moves,which have reduced the risk of a possible military action against Iran, the situation around the Islamic Republic remains quite explosive. U.S. attempts to put together a new coalition of nations to counter what it sees as a renewed maritime threat from Iran, the deployment of warships in the Persian Gulf, the seizure of oil tankers and destruction of military drones have created a situation, when hostilities are more likely to betriggered by the so-called ‘war by accident’, rather than by a political decision of one of the major involved partis.

Given the large number of key players and stakeholders in this process, involving both public and non-public actors, it is not ruled out that one of the players may attempt to provoke a hostility that could be portrayedas ‘war by accident’.

In case of the worst possible scenario –if hostilities and war breakout – it is obvious that ground operation against Iran is practically impossible, first of all, because of geography–we mean mountain ranges along some of its border, deserts in the east,swamps in the south  and Turkey in the east that would not let US troops use its land to invade Iran.

But it is also evident that the geography of the military operation theater would expand significantly across the region. Military operations may embracecountries that would be involved in war inadvertently. As a result, the number of nations involved in hostilities would increase dramatically and the hostilities would extend throughout the Middle East- from Syria to the UAE, from Iran to Saudi Arabia, and so on.

In the event of hostilities against  Iran, it is more than likely that it would take Tehran from four to six months to developa nuclear weapon.Some experts are tendingto consider the situation around the Islamic Republic to be much more complicated than the Caribbean Crisis, saying the latter involved two partiesonly  and it was  much easier for them to seek a way out, while in the case of Iran, as already mentioned, the evident and non-evident key actors are many.

It is more than obvious that in the event of hostilities or war, it would be impossible to calculate all the scenarios, but one thing is clear: massive airstrikes against Iran would triggera large influx of refugees from that country. Most likely, Turkey would close its borders, and those flows would head north to the borders with Armenia and Azerbaijan.

This would pose a serious threat not only to Armenia and Azerbaijan but also to Russia. Some Russian military experts have already argued that Russia would have to increase and consolidate the number of its frontier troops on the Armenia-Iran border, take also control of Azerbaijan-Iran border, as well as the actual border between Nagorno-Karabakh and Iran.

In the event of such developments, it may be difficult for Azerbaijan to sit on different geopolitical chairs at the same time and official Baku would be more likely to allow  Russia to take control of its  border with Iran (including its exclave Nakhichevan) as the large flow of refugeeswould become a source of serious domestic political instability.

The hostilities against Iranwould produce no winners, neither military nor political. All would lose. But there is no doubt that Russia would get the biggest political dividends, and maybe China as well. Possible hostilities against Iran would greatly enhance Russia’s role and none other than Moscow could assume the part of a mediator. China might also show assistance to Moscow.

The Russia-Iran relations are already acquiring strategic allied qualities. As evidence,we can point out the recently signed agreement on expanded military cooperation between Iran and Russia. Iran is pursuing closer ties with the Russia-led Eurasian Economic Union (EEU). The sides are completing a set of procedures necessary for the entry into force of aninterim agreement establishing a free trade zone between Iran and the EEU, which is to begin operatingstaring October 27, 2019.

Given Turkey’s growing multilateral cooperation with Russia, it is safe to say that the Moscow-Ankara-Tehran triangle will become decisive, with Russia gaining significant influence in it. Thistrilateral cooperation may have a different meaning and impact, also in a variety of processes in a much larger region.

 Potential military action against Iran and the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict

Opportunities and potential scenarios ofhow interests and influences may change in the Middle East are a subject of constant discussions  in the context of Iran-related  developments, while the South Caucasus, where there are big conflict-generating  potential and  serious factors threatening  stability and security, and first of all, the Nagorno-Karabakh (NK)conflict, as a rule, is being ignored. The negotiation process under the auspices of the OSCE Minsk Group co-chairing countries – Russia, the United States and France –is now in a stalemate.

Given the bellicose, belligerent rhetoric, resumed after a pause by Azerbaijani president and some other top officials, as well as Armenian prime minister’s contradicting speeches along with his defense minister’s statements containing  aggressive elements, it is not ruled out that in the event of a possible large military action against  Iran,Azerbaijan may try to resort to hostilities in Nagorno-Karabakh presenting it as a justified response to contradicting and incomprehensive statements, even to the OSCE Minks Group co-chairs, coming from the current Armenian authorities, and their short-sighted policy.

 

It should be noted that significant changes have taken place in the NKconflict negotiation process under the auspices of the OSCE Minsk Group co-chairing countries. After the so-called ‘four-day war’ in 2016 April, thefocus in the discussions was placed exclusively on the ways to ease tensions and on the OSCE Minsk Group co-chairs proposals to maintain the ceasefire agreement, signed back on May 12, 1994.

They include the deployment of a larger OSCE monitoring group on the contact line, the installation of special electronic equipment to record ceasefire violations along the line of contact, and the creation of mechanisms for an international investigation of ceasefire breaches by the sides of the NKconflict. Azerbaijan has so far refused to accept these proposals of the OSCE Minsk Group co-chairing countries, ignoring the mediators’ calls.

After the change of power in Armenia in April-May 2018,these issues were pushed out from the negotiation agenda, and are no longer mentioned in the OSCE Minsk Group co-chairs’ official statements. By the way, starting in 2013 and until 2016, these proposals werepresented to the conflicting parties as a demand.

Instead, the focus in the discussions in the negotiation process shifted to the conflict settlement issues, which obviouslyis not promising, and that is why, as mentioned above, the negotiations have appeared in an uncertain, almost deadlocked situation.

Such a change in the agenda seems to satisfy Azerbaijan, and the current deadlock does not, to put it mildly, contribute to the maintenance of the ceasefire by the parties to the NKconflict, which, by the way, is their international obligation.

t should be noted that while earlier the mediators considered the conflict management, ceasefire and security maintenance to be their task, now after the famous ‘elevator’ verbal agreement reached between Pashinyan and Aliyev on September 28, 2018, in Dushanbe, to open a direct Armenian-Azerbaijani communication line,the ceasefire maintenance has shifted to the Pashinyan-Aliyev format.This change has been already stated in the OSCE Minsk Group co-chairs’ statements. These realities have significantly diminished the role of mediators in maintaining the ceasefire and restraining the rise of tensions.

Now it will be quite difficult, almost impossible in this situation to persuade Azerbaijan, or force it to return to the previous agenda, as the Azerbaijani authorities have got an opportunity to ignore the agenda that was not benefiting them.In case of an outbreak of hostilities in NK conflict, the active involvement of new political players, in the first place of Russiaand also the US, Turkey and Iran, would becomeinevitable.

Can OSCE Minsk Group co-chairing countries establish stability on the line of contact in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict zone without the consent of parties of the conflict?

Azerbaijan has consistently opposed proposals to reduce the tension on the line of contact. The implementation of these measures can only be achieved with the consent of theparties of NKconflict. However, the OSCE Minsk Group co-chairing states have the opportunity to make the situation in the NKconflict zonemanageable and stable without the consentof the conflicting parties.

Given the fact that the OSCE Minsk Group co-chairing states – Russia, the United States and France – are permanent members of the UN Security Council, and are the most important geopolitical centers, all three technically are capable of establishing satellite control over the contact line, and as amatter of fact,they use this opportunity regularly to follow all the movements and changes on the line of contact in the NKconflict zone.

Consequently, these three mediating states can exercise political will and, without the consent of the parties to the conflict, come out with a joint official statementto say that they will exchange information regularly from satellite monitoring and will periodically discussand  analyze all the changes in the military situation in the conflict zone and possible undesirable developments.

The exchange of satellite monitoring information, discussions and analyses among the OSCE Minsk Group co-chairing states could serve as a serious deterrent to offensive plans of the sides to the conflict. Such a form of cooperation will substantially reduce the risk of resumption of large-scale hostilities and will become a strong positive impetus for furthering the NKpeace process.

At present, there are threats to global security in the region, and potential hostilities against Iran may spur a new war in Nagorno-Karabakh, and on the contrary, the outbreak of hostilities in NKconflict zone may trigger an escalation of the tension around Iran.In this context, the task of de-escalating and reducing the risk of new large-scale hostilities in the NKconflict zone is becoming more relevant for the wide regionMiddle East-South Caucasus.

Dr. David Shahnazaryan,

Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary, Ambassador of the President of Armenia on Special Missions and Special Representative of the President of Armenia 1992-1995, the Head of the National Security 1994-1995, former two-term deputy in the Armenian parliament from 1991-1995 and 1995-1999.

India’s Civilisational Identity and the World Order

Ex: FLUX ON-LINE

 

Author: Zorawar Daulet Singh

As the neo-liberal world order declines, non-Western powers are uniquely equipped to manage the power transition and contestations over the basic tenets of the emerging system. India’s civilisational ethos of reconciling different ideas will be of immense value in navigating the uncertainty and turmoil at a critical juncture of world history.

Many in India bewail the decline of the so-called liberal world order. Yet, few ask whether India was even a part of that order or actually shared all the norms and values that underpinned it. As a consequence, much of the debate dwells on the assertion that, as a liberal democracy, India’s foreign policy and geopolitical choices must logically follow suit. In practice, this meant that India would share the burden of democracy promotion elsewhere in the world as well as join a camp of other democracies. Yet, that has not occurred as I have discussed previously (Singh 2018). But, for most, India’s choices are seen as pragmatic rather than as a result of a civilisational tradition.

Different from Liberal West

On the surface, India would seem like the ideal candidate for membership in a coalition of democracies. The Indian Constitution, along with a largely uninterrupted period of liberal democratic practice, has laid a normative framework that has been difficult to challenge by any serious political force. On human rights, freedom of speech, equality of opportunity, private property rights, political participation and peaceful transfer of power between competing parties or groups, and rule of law and access to justice, India is very much part of a liberal political tradition.

Yet, when India interacts with the world, other values and beliefs also come into play. This is because Indian thought is constituted by a variety of ideas, and being a liberal democracy is merely one of those identities. The Indian world view is a hybrid one, shaped by a combination of liberalism, a belief in a plural multi-civilisational world order, a unique colonial experience and postcolonial identity, an aspiration for regional leadership with a corresponding geopolitical identity, and Westphalian values of sovereignty and non-interference. Collectively, these have created a distinct world view and a prism through which India perceives and interacts with the world.

The Western tradition could not be more different. As American historian Eric McKittrick put it in the 1950s,

With nothing to push against it, [liberalism]¹ thinks in absolutes; the occasional shadows which cross its path quickly lengthen into monsters; every enemy is painted in satanic terms, and it has no idea how it would behave if the enemy were either bigger or different. (Desch 2008: 10)

One study found that, between 1871 and 1965, “Liberal states waged 65 percent of non-major power wars (which almost always are against weaker states).” Another study found a similar pattern, with “Liberal states starting 100 percent of these wars of choice” (Desch 2008: 16). Extending this pattern to the last three decades would reveal a similar conclusion. There was, and still is, an ideological hubris and an ambition to change opposing systems in the Western mind. None of these facets are part of the Indian psyche and world view, and this makes superimposing concepts such as democracy promotion highly problematic in India’s case.

So, what makes India different? India’s social and political journey has been a process of competition, compromise, and adjustment between different ideas. The constitutional commitment to internal diversity and pluralism has shaped the outlook towards international politics too. Coexistence with ethnic, religious, and ideological diversity at home has often meant coexistence with alternative systems abroad. There is an innate illiberalism in American liberalism that does not prevail in Indian culture, which by historical tradition and experience is not so easily threatened or overwhelmed by rival “others.”

The introduction of civilisational values transforms this conversation. The biggest difference between India and the West is that the Western mind assigns little value to nationalism, culture, and civilisation. These are usually seen as anachronisms and obstacles in the path of homogenisation of political communities. Civilisation is seen as regressive and antithetical to the order and modernity that democracy and neo-liberalism are intended to bring. But, for India, it is a core value that enables rather than hinders its domestic order, social stability, and development.

 

If we are going to address the puzzle of why India’s domestic system as a democracy does not impact its outlook and behaviour towards other states and the world order in general, we must also ask: What impact does India’s longer civilisational history and culture have on its foreign policy? This question needs to be addressed seriously. There might be a strong case to be made that India’s civilisational history allows for a more complex relationship and interplay with rival ideologies and moral frameworks. The prolonged ability to negotiate differences and handle ambiguities conditions Indian political and cultural thought as well as its international relations. It was on this basic foundation that other values and norms have been absorbed into Indian thinking; specifically, the Westphalian concept of sovereignty and India’s unique colonial experience that fostered and further strengthened nationalism and created a distinct geopolitical identity for India.

One key distinction between India and Western approaches is that the latter promote democracy by providing moral, diplomatic, and financial support to individuals and organisations that are openly resisting or challenging the political status quo in a state. India rarely enters into such interference that might defy the ruling regime and undermine the sovereignty of a state. India works with the legitimate government of the day to offer different types of assistance. India’s interventions are in concert with the recipient—to strengthen the recipient state and its people—while the Western approach is fundamentally one of changing the target state and its institutions in concert with a section of the polity. It is about creating or exploiting a divide between the state and the people.

This difference in approaches can only be explained by the absence of a historical determinism in Indian strategic and philosophical thought, which, unlike Western liberal or radical Marxist ideas, has never had a proselytising historical tradition nor an ideological vision of the world that insists on universality as a necessary prerequisite for a world order and geopolitical cooperation. It is no accident that India’s democracy has managed to survive in a region with diverse regimes and political systems. It is also instructive that India was among the first to embrace non-alignment and carve out its own path when confronted with rival ideologies, neither of which were entirely appealing to India’s identity, culture, and ethos. Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s multi-alignment is another version of that same philosophy, that India can find common ground and derive stable and mutually beneficial ties with a variety of different civilisational states and political systems.

Changing World Order

For the past decade, it is increasingly clear that the neo-liberal order, or at least the dominant variant of it that we had become familiar with, along with some of its institutions are losing their effectiveness to supply public goods and govern a more complex globalised system. The demands and range of interests of the global South and non-Western world will not only require major reforms of these institutions, but more likely the establishment of new institutions to fill the governance void. The process has already begun. It is also clear that India will be at the forefront of collaboration with other rising powers and some of the traditional great powers in experimenting with new regional institutions and norms to supply public goods and order around Asia.

Only when there is clarity about the type of world we would like to see emerge can we put forward ideas or concepts and practise them in our foreign policy. Do we seek a multipolar polycentric world order where different civilisational states are going to manage the international system in a less hierarchical way, which is another way of saying the democratising of international relations? This is the dominant voice of India. If the central strategic task is transitioning from a unipolar neo-liberal world order for the privileged few to a multipolar interdependent world order with many civilisational states as members of such an open and inclusive international community, then we need a reformed vision to accommodate the diversity and pre-empt the chaos that could ensue from the power transition that is already under way. And, there is no automatic correlation between regime types and this reformed world order.

This is not an abstract insight. All we have to do is look at India’s foreign policy during the phase when its identity as a democracy was at its peak: the post-2000 era. This is the period of deep engagement with the United States and its allies. And yet, when it came to ideas on world order, international security, global governance, reforming the Bretton Woods institutions, etc, India formed partnerships with a variety of rising or re-emerging powers and civilisations, often with different political systems that were unsatisfied with the prevailing order and the position of these states within that order. Over the past decade, this trend has become even stronger: BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa), Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), and Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) are all manifestations of this. These international and regional networks or institutions have been established not because its members are ordered in identical ways internally, but because many of these states had similar ideas of world order, and it made sense to collaborate in transitioning the world towards those images.

The good news is that the basic framework of a liberal international order (as distinct from the ascendance and decline of neo-liberal ideology over the past few decades) is already extensive in its ability to assimilate diverse rising powers with different political systems. The challenge is renewing that basic structure of an open and rule-based system, while making the necessary adjustments to expand the institutional and normative capacity to accommodate a larger swathe of the non-Western world. As Ikenberry (2011: 65) correctly points out, “The world is not rejecting openness and markets; it is asking for a more expansive notion of stability and economic security.” It is neo-liberalism as a global ordering concept that has unravelled and been discredited in the past decade, not just because it failed to address the problem of growth and sustainable development, but also because it sought to negate the self-images of several resurging non-Western civilisations. But, an open global economic order with rules to guide interdependence is still very much a worldwide demand.

The alternatives to an open world order—spheres of influence, closed regional blocs, neocolonial mercantilist networks, or, in essence, a fragmented order—are not appealing to rising powers because they seek wider regional and global access. Having benefited from global interdependence, they want that basic normative framework of an open system to survive. Indeed, one of the deep ironies of contemporary international relations is that rising powers, such as India, China and others, have today become the vanguards or champions for a reformed rule-based economic order that can enable their domestic transformations to continue, while the established liberal great powers have become revisionist and conservative in their orientation.

Finally, a word of caution: India has to be extremely careful about uncritically lapping up the “democracy promotion” discourse, which is often aimed at polarising Asia and the world, and denying many states the flexibility of pursuing more complex foreign policies and balance of power strategies (Singh 2018). In the 1950s, Jawaharlal Nehru went to the extent of instructing his diplomats to avoid phrases such as the “free world,” “iron curtain,” or any politically-charged binary that could let it appear that India was parroting Western Cold War rhetoric that potentially positioned it at a disadvantage vis-à-vis other major powers. Modi’s June 2018 speech at the Shangri- La Dialogue in Singapore echoed this approach (MEA 2018). Rejecting the idea that India has a singular identity that then must automatically place it in one coalition or bloc, the Prime Minister spoke of a multitude of groups and partners where the common link was not democracy or shared domestic political systems, but converging material interests or shared ideas and norms of the world order or overlapping concepts of security.

Again, what allows for such multi-directional interactions and plurality in India’s foreign policy is a civilisational conception of the world order as an open and inclusive community of states. Such a philosophy is anathema for liberal absolutism and its drive for universality, which shapes much of the tragedy of Western geopolitics.

Source: https://www.vision-gt.eu

Brexit. Finissons-en !

par Michel Carlier

Ex: http://www.ieri.be

Le pénible feuilleton du Brexit commence à devenir lassant. Plus personne n’y comprend rien ! Et pour cause. Le désamour entre le continent et le Royaume-Uni ne date pas d’hier. C’est une longue histoire qui remonte à près d’un demi-siècle, époque de De Gaulle à Paris et de MacMillan à Londres. Je ne reviendrai pas là-dessus. En 1973, le Royaume-Uni, le Danemark et l’Irlande entrent dans le Marché commun européen où ils rejoignent les Six États fondateurs, les trois du Benelux, la République fédérale d’Allemagne, la France et l’Italie signataires du traité de Rome du 25 mars 1957. Deux ans plus tard, je suis à Madrid, en ma qualité de diplomate belge. L’ambassadeur d’Irlande en Espagne que je connaissais bien me dit un jour : « Les Six ont commis une lourde erreur en laissant entrer les Britanniques dans le marché commun. Vous verrez, ils sont entrés non par pour construire l’Europe, mais pour la détruire ». J’étais stupéfait de ce propos que je jugeais excessif. À l’époque, il est vrai, les continentaux - en particulier ceux du Benelux - vivaient dans l’euphorie de l’entrée de trois États dans la communauté économique européenne (CEE). Un premier élargissement qui démontrait que ce qui avait été créé par le traité de Rome était devenu une réalité attractive à laquelle les peuples - y compris celui des îles britanniques jaloux de son identité et fier d’avoir bâti un empire mondial - adhéraient spontanément. C’était le temps de l’enthousiasme et des grandes envolées lyriques. Mais l’enchantement ou l’illusion n’ont guère duré. Ce furent les années Thatcher avec le fameux « I want my money back » et celles qui suivirent avec les vetos britanniques aux candidats belges (Dehaene en 1994 et Verhofstadt en 2004) au poste de président de la commission européenne. Le premier se présentait à la succession de Jacques Delors et fut écarté à Corfou par le veto britannique de John Major et le second à celle de Romano Prodi. Cette fois, Verhofstadt se heurta au veto du premier ministre britannique Tony Blair.

Tout au long des décennies que nous venons de vivre avec les Britanniques dans notre communauté économique européenne devenue Union européenne (UE) en 1993, les gouvernements de Londres ont tous pratiqué la politique de l’ubiquité : un pied dedans et l’autre dehors. Ceci, après avoir signé tous les traités. Dont ceux de Maastricht (7/2/1992) et de Lisbonne (13/12/2007). Mais, de toute évidence, dans les îles, le cœur n’y était pas. Au chœur des continentaux qui chantait les louanges du fédéralisme européen, les dirigeants britanniques - tous partis confondus - répondaient en brandissant les vertus de la souveraineté territoriale et financière et en dénonçant la perversion, évidente à leurs yeux, des Continentaux qui leur faisaient face et ne cédaient pas à la tentation du grand large. En 2003, ce divorce évident éclata au grand jour lors de l’invasion de l’Irak décidée par G.W Bush et Tony Blair, contre l’avis d’États membres comme la France, l’Allemagne ou la Belgique. Et puis, comme d’habitude, on a remis un semblant d’ordre à force de compromis boiteux, jusqu’à ce que le référendum du 23 juin 2016 livre son verdict inattendu : 51,9 % des électeurs en faveur d’un retrait du Royaume-Uni de l’UE. Ce n’était que la suite logique de tant d’années de présence-absence au sein d’une Union poursuivant des objectifs diamétralement opposés à ceux que l’on souhaitait à Westminster et au 10 Downing street. Depuis ce coup de tonnerre de juin 2016, on assiste à une pièce sans fin et sans but. Les députés des Communes offrent au monde un piteux spectacle et imposent aux Continentaux des choix impossibles. Alors, que peut-il se passer ? Ou bien, il n’y aura pas de Brexit. Chose qui me paraît probable vu l’incroyable imbroglio qui prévaut outre-manche, avec un parlement qui accumule les votes contradictoires et un gouvernement sans majorité. En fait, l’opacité dans laquelle on s’enfonce s’épaissit à vue d’œil. À tous égards, y compris sur la question de l’immigration que trop de gens préfèrent ne pas aborder, à tort. Sur le continent, on préfère ne pas se prononcer. Sauf pour affirmer que l’accord May-Barnier n’est pas négociable. Et pourtant, il faudra bien négocier avant la date du Brexit encore fixée au 31 octobre 2019.

Enfin, je crois que, dans l’intérêt de tous, il est plus que temps d’en finir avec cette affaire qui, depuis trois ans et demi, accapare les énergies et paralyse l’UE qui se trouve bloquée et incapable d’initiatives et de progrès. J’ajoute qu’il faut être attentif à un fait que beaucoup semblent vouloir ignorer. Dans l’hypothèse plausible d’un non Brexit, Londres ne se bornera pas à reprendre sa place autour de la table comme si rien ne s’était passé depuis le référendum de 2016. Les continentaux partisans du maintien du R-U doivent savoir que les gouvernants britanniques n’hésiteront pas à imposer leur vision sur l’avenir de l’Union. Et, ce projet sera à l’opposé de celui défendu par les Fédéralistes. Londres posera ses conditions. Parmi elles : le maintien des dérogations déjà accordées et l’assurance de l’abandon de tout projet institutionnel visant à accroître les compétences de la Commission et du parlement. Dans cette hypothèse, un coup d’arrêt définitif sera porté au grand rêve des Européens convaincus. Ce sera l’adieu à l’Europe puissance. En clair, les Fédéralistes européens n’ont guère le choix. S’ils persistent dans leur grand projet de construction européenne, ils ne peuvent plus se laisser freiner par ceux qui ne veulent pas de cette Europe unie et indépendante. À quelques semaines de la date fixée, il serait utile que nos dirigeants aient cela à l’esprit lors de leurs discutions avec Johnson et ses ministres. Et, puisque ceux-ci brandissent la menace d’une sortie sans accord, qui entraînerait - selon les Cassandre de service - un cataclysme épouvantable, il serait opportun, je crois, de ne pas s’en tenir à la posture du déni de négocier. L’avenir de l’UE est une affaire tellement sérieuse que ce serait criminel de le sacrifier sur l’autel du maintien en son sein et à tout prix d’un État qui ne partage pas, ou si peu, l’idée même de construction européenne.

S.E.M. Michel Carlier

Ambassadeur honoraire de S.M. le Roi des Belges

19 septembre 2019

NB. Le 24 septembre 2019, la Cour suprême du Royaume-Uni déclarait illégale la décision du gouvernement de Johnson de fermer durant 5 semaines le parlement de Westminster. Nouveau camouflet pour le Premier ministre dont les oppositions réclament aussitôt la démission. Réuni à nouveau dès le 25 septembre, le parlement persiste dans la cacophonie. Johnson résiste et met au défi ses adversaires de déposer une motion de censure. En outre, il renouvelle sa proposition d’organiser rapidement des élections anticipées.