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mercredi, 19 avril 2017

If Trump Loses Bannon, Trump Loses the Presidency

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If Trump Loses Bannon, Trump Loses the Presidency

Ex: http://www.americanthinker.com 

I bet big on Donald Trump in the 2016 elections, rather famously.  Now I will be shorting Trump stock for the foreseeable future until Bannon, and Bannon-ism, returns to policy dominance in the White House.

Should Trump ever lose Bannon entirely, Trump is a lame duck.  Some media suggest that Trump could replace Bannon with Jared Kushner.  Jared Kushner is to Steve Bannon what Dan Quayle was to JFK. 

 

Bannon – uniquely among the Trump team – threads together the policy weaves of the Trump electoral majority, a majority dependent upon newfound GOP support from the working class, especially in the northern half of the country, but also the southern upcountry and Appalachia.

Three issues allowed Trump to distinguish himself, both in the GOP primaries and in the general election, to appeal to these GOP skeptic voting constituencies: 

  1. No preachy politics.  These voters want neither Southern Baptists nor Hollywood celebrities lecturing them about morality nonstop.  They generally take a more libertine approach on marijuana, especially amongst the younger cohorts in this constituency.  (Many of these communities were moonshine communities back in the day, especially the Appalachian communities.  You will find a not too surprising overlap between marijuana and moonshine communities historically.)  The Appalachian communities and their kindred constituencies cast decisive votes in more places than West Virginia, Tennessee, Indiana, and Kentucky.  Appalachia dips into Pennsylvania and Ohio, helped make Virginia competitive, tipped the balance in North Carolina, and shares a lot in common in political mindset with places like the Minnesotan Iron Range, the northern woods of Wisconsin, the peninsula of Michigan, and the countryside of Iowa.  They are often Christian but more likely to be Saturday party-goers than Sunday church-goers.
  1. No more dumb war.  Voters from the ancestral regions of the Union draftees after the Civil War – from northern Maine to the Minnesota Iron Range – have, ever since, instinctively viewed war with suspicion.  Study the voting patterns of this kind of county, and you will find that sudden surges turn out to oppose various wars.  The heart of "isolationism" was a Midwestern phenomenon in the same regions that tilted so heavily toward Trump in the election.  It is not a coincidence that areas with historic antiwar tendencies – from east Tennessee to western Wisconsin, from rural Iowa to northern Maine – were some of the biggest pro-Trump trending areas in the country, nor that two states that formed the heart of antiwar politicians in the past (like Ohio's Taft) bolted so heavily toward Trump.  Trump used his war-skeptical views to outflank the war-loving Hillary on both the working-class left and right, giving him the keys to his electoral majority, heisting Bernie primary voters along the way.  Betray this group with another Mideast war, and Trump endangers his electoral majority permanently.  That is where Bannon's inclusion in national security decisions remained critical for Trump's own political future. 
  1. No more job-killing deals.  The global-focused economy of finance and real estate enriched the urban port cities at the expense of the rural- and middle-America small-town heartland, who make our food and make our products.  Trump, despite profiting from that largely coastal port-city world, promised to reverse that economic bargain.  Trade, immigration, and infrastructure all allowed him to carve out distinguishing traits, while also promising a protective government that does not over-rely on regulatory bureaucracy in areas of health, education, and energy.  Tax reform took its role, as did Obamacare reversal, but it all fit into a different fabric of policy ideals from traditional Republican economics, meant to appeal to a GOP-skeptic northern working class rightly skeptical of Ryan economics and McCain foreign policy.

Bannon understands, intricately, each of these issues and, as important, the intimate way each of these issues connects the new constituencies of the Trump electoral majority.  Bannon also understands the adversary – an alliance of Deep-State, administrative-regulatory-state, professional-class career bureaucrats and their media lapdogs and allies.  Bannon also enjoys another unique attribute: actually overcoming them, in the public area of persuasion (the extraordinary rise of Breitbart against a media blackout of the site) and the electoral arena of actual elections (feeding the Tea Party, then fueling Trumpism).

Bannon politically is to Trump what Carville was to Clinton, Atwater was to Poppy Bush, and Kevin Phillips was to Nixon, but he also enjoys a consigliere-type skill set for actual policy that gives strategic substance to Trump's gut-driven, emotive decision-making.  Trump's instinctive ingenuity and persuasive mastery cannot substitute for Bannon's integration of policies and constituencies in actually governing.

Kushner's apparent deference to the war-mongering elements of the national-security establishment and the bank-adoring financiers of Wall Street reveals that he suffers from the same delusional understanding of politics and policy that got the GOP so hated by its own base over the last half-decade.  Kushner looks to the approval of Goldman Sachs; Bannon looks to the approval of those who hate Goldman Sachs.

Lose Bannon, lose the country.  Lose Bannon, lose the presidency.  Trump needs to bet on Bannon, or it will be time to no longer bet on Trump. 

Read more: http://www.americanthinker.com/articles/2017/04/if_trump_...
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samedi, 18 mars 2017

José Javier Esparza "De la nueva Derecha a la "alt-right"

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José Javier Esparza

"De la nueva Derecha a la "alt-right"

Ponencia de José Javier Esparza en el Seminario de metapolítica 2017:
"De la nueva Derecha a la "alt-right"
www.seminariometapolitica.wordpress.com

mercredi, 22 février 2017

A Review of The Great Purge: The Deformation of the Conservative Movement

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Where Conservatism Went Wrong:
A Review of The Great Purge: The Deformation of the Conservative Movement

Review:

Paul E. Gottfried & Richard B. Spencer (eds.)
The Great Purge: The Deformation of the Conservative Movement [2]
Arlington, Va.: Washington Summit Publishers, 2015

All political movements need a history, and such histories, if well-constructed, almost always coalesce into myth. Once mythologized, a movement’s past can inform its present members about its reason for being, its need for continuing, and its plans for the future. And this can be accomplished quickly – and without the need for study or research – in the form of what Edmund Burke called “prejudice.” “Prejudice,” Burke says [3], “is of ready application in the emergency; it previously engages the mind in a steady course of wisdom and virtue, and does not leave the man hesitating in the moment of decision, skeptical, puzzled, and unresolved.”

Prejudice is a time-saver, in other words, and it puts everyone on the same page. These are two invaluable things for any movement which aims to effect political change. For those who wish to participate in any of the various factions of the Alt Right and learn its history and myth, they do not need to go much farther than The Great Purge: The Deformation of the Conservative Movement.

Edited by Paul Gottfried of the H. L. Menken Club and Richard Spencer of Radix Journal, The Great Purge discusses the march of the once-mighty American conservative movement towards the abject irrelevance it faces today. This took about fifty years, but the villains of this inquisition managed to purge conservatism of its conservatives and replace them with a globalist elite which kowtows to political correctness. The villains, of course, are National Review founder and publisher William F. Buckley (an unflattering photo of whom graces the book’s cover) and a cabal of refugees from the Left known as “neoconservatives.” The Great Purge, as Spencer tells us, is less a “full chronicling of these purges,” and more a “phenomenological history of conservatism. It seeks to understand how its ideology . . . functioned within its historic context and how it responded to power, shifting conceptions of authority, and societal changes.”

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The book presents seven essays, with a foreword by Spencer and an afterward by VDARE.com founder and former National Review writer Peter Brimelow. In between, we have essays from established Dissident Right luminaries such as Gottfried, William Regnery, and John Derbyshire. Sam Francis, perhaps one of the godfathers of the Alt Right, who passed away in 2005, contributes a comprehensive and quite useful philosophical treatise on how mainstream conservatism devolved into the toothless friend of the Left it has become today. Rounding out the remainder is American Revolutionary Vanguard founder Keith Preston, professor and writer Lee Congdon, and independent author and scholar James Kalb.

So, according to myth, William F. Buckley founded his conservative magazine National Review in the mid-1950s and revitalized a flagging conservative ideology. At the time, liberalism in its various forms enjoyed near-complete hegemony in academia, enough to prompt scholar Lionel Trilling by mid-century to announce that conservatism, at least as it had been embodied by what we now call the Old Right, was dead. Buckley, along with other conservative thinkers such as Russell Kirk and popular authors like Ayn Rand, proved that reports of conservatism’s death were a tad overstated. Thanks to Buckley, conservatism now had the intellectual heft to resist the Left, both foreign and domestic. As Spencer describes it, this entailed promoting free-market capitalism over Soviet Communism, erecting the Christian West as a bulwark against Soviet atheism, and pushing for an aggressive foreign policy both to thwart Soviet militarism and promote the interests of Israel. The New Right was born.

Enter the neocons. Disenchanted by the manifest failures of Communism, these former Leftists, led by Irving Kristol and Norman Podhoretz, began testing the waters in conservative circles by the 1970s. The neocons shared much of the New Right’s anti-Soviet belligerence and loyalty towards Israel. Having given up on the New Deal and other big-government initiatives, the neocons were equally uncomfortable with free-market capitalism. Sam Francis quotes Irving Kristol at length, describing how the welfare state should not be eradicated, but altered to create a “social insurance state.”

Most importantly, the neocons promoted a Wilsonian “global and cosmopolitan world order” which sought to greatly increase America’s role in foreign affairs, often through military interventionism. In particular, democracy was the great talisman which could civilize the world – whether the world wanted to be civilized or not. Bolstered by their faith in the Democratic Peace Theory, which posits that democracies do not wage war upon each other, the neocons transferred the messianic fervor of Communism to democratization and never looked back. Lee Congdon’s entire essay. “Wars to End War,” rails against such “morality-driven foreign policy” and how it co-opted conservatism almost completely. “Pluralism, (human) rights, and democracy,” as stated by Charles Krauthammer, became something of a rallying cry for the neocons. Against such high-minded egalitarianism, which opened the door for feminism, gay rights, race-mixing, and other by-products of democratic freedom, the traditional conservative arguments began to crumble.

Congdon quotes Pat Buchanan as defending true conservatism when he wrote in 2006 that America is bound together by “the bonds of history and memory, tradition and custom, language and literature, birth and faith, blood and soil.” This is an outright rejection of the neocon claim of America being a “proposition nation” in which citizens are “bound by ideals that move us beyond our backgrounds,” to quote George W. Bush from his first inaugural address. Essentially, if you believed in putting America first, or had no interest in foreign wars, or took the libertarian ideal of limited government seriously, or (most importantly) professed a tribal or familial fealty to the white race, then you had no place among the neocons or in the New Right.

And there to police you and expunge you into the wilderness, if need be, was none other than Mr. Buckley himself.

Both Paul Gottfried and William Regnery provide first-hand accounts of the purges, as well as some historical perspective on them. For example, according to Gottfried, Buckley banished the John Birch Society from respectable conservatism in the 1960s not because of anti-Semitism, but because the Birchers expressed insufficient hawkishness against the North Vietnamese and in the Cold War in general. This point is echoed later in the volume by Keith Preston. It seems that any anti-Semitic aspect in the early victims of the purge was purely incidental.

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That didn’t remain the case, of course. What I find most striking and ironic about The Great Purge is that the “racist” infractions of many of the purge victims were so slight, so indirect, and so buried in one’s past that to summarily expurgate a person on those grounds required almost Soviet levels of behind-the-scenes machinations and ruthlessness. Gottfried explains that his offense was to merely assume a leadership role in the H.L. Menken Club, which gives a platform to people “who stress hereditary cognitive differences.” For this, the Intercollegiate Studies Institute (ISI) severed all ties with him. Another example is Joe Sobran, who was labeled an anti-Semite by Buckley and banished from the National Review in the late 1980s because, as Gottfried explains, Sobran “noticed the shifting meaning of ‘anti-Semite,’ from someone who hates Jews to someone who certain Jews in high places don’t like.”

William Regnery relates how he had been banished from the ISI as well, an organization to which his grandfather, father, and uncles had very close ties for many years. Regnery’s offense? He spoke at an American Renaissance study group in 2005 and promoted “building a sense of racial unity.” For this, he faced an anonymous charge from ISI and was tried among his peers, only one of whom voted to keep him on. Seventeen voted to expel him, and expelled he was.

Another person who pops up a lot in The Great Purge is Jason Richwine, a junior researcher who lost his job at the Heritage Foundation in 2013. It was discovered that his approved doctoral thesis from years earlier contained a fully supported statistic which pointed to the lower than average IQ of many immigrant groups. For this, and for fear of causing too much consternation among Leftist elites, the Heritage Foundation determined that Richwine had to go, his permanently sullied reputation notwithstanding. Certainly, mainstream conservatives know how and when to eat their own – unlike the Left, of course. As Regnery aptly points out, “Media Matters would never have cashiered a researcher on the strength of conservative ire.”

This only cracks the surface of the damage the Bill Buckley mentality has done to the Right over the years. John Derbyshire and Peter Brimelow relate how their more deliberate infractions got them evicted from the movement. Keith Preston describes how, despite the New Right’s professed desire to limit government, it did absolutely nothing to stop its near-exponential growth. In The Great Purge, Buckley and his epigones are called nearly every name in the book, from cowardly to cannibalistic, yet Regnery attributes much of this betrayal to something a little more mundane: complacency. Buckley and his people were simply unwilling to give up their cushy lifestyles in order to combat the Left in any meaningful way. As a result, they put tight leashes on anyone who did.

Perhaps the biggest surprise in this volume is the thirty-five page essay from Sam Francis, which was written back in 1986. Francis, who suffered his own purge from The Washington Times in the 1990s thanks to Dinesh D’Souza, provides a philosophical vocabulary to explain the fall of conservatism in America. It was the slow usurpation of the Old Right, in other words “traditionalist and bourgeois ideologies, centering on the individual as moral agent, citizen, and economic actor” by a “managerial elite” which did in conservatism. This “managerial humanism,” according to Francis, espoused

a collectivist view of the state and economy and advocated a highly centralized regime largely unrestrained by traditional legal, constitutional, and political barriers. It rejected or regarded as backward, repressive, or obsolete the institutions and values of traditional and bourgeois society – its loyalties to the local community, traditional religion and moral beliefs, the family and social and political differentiation based on class, status, and property – and it articulated an ideal of man “liberated” from such constraints and re-educated or redesigned into a cosmopolitan participant in the mass state economy of the managerial system.

This certainly is an apt description of the Left, and as more and more neocons joined the conservative movement, the more apparent it became that they were bringing this managerial humanism along with them. This cultural shift, of course, had deleterious effects across the board for the Right, not least of which was separating it from its stated purpose and weakening its resolve to combat change. In characteristic form, Francis ends his essay with a prediction, this one quite dire:

If neoconservative co-optation and the dynamics of the continuing managerial revolution deflect the American Right from [its] goal, the result will not be the renaissance of America and the West but the continuation and eventual fulfillment of the goals of their most ancient enemies.

If The Great Purge has any flaws, it’s of omission, which isn’t really a flaw since Spencer copped to it in his Foreword. This book is not a history, but rather a collection of reminiscences and musings on the state of the Right. So, it’s not surprising that many things are left out. Still, I wish more detail had been provided in places. It is possible, for example, that there was more to the Sobran affair than what Gottfried and others provide. Sobran’s split with Buckley may have spoken as much to Buckley’s sincere philo-Semitism and his desire not to appear anti-Semitic as it did to Sobran’s desire (or need) to speak out against Israel. The whole thorny issue of whether or not this constitutes anti-Semitism was covered thoroughly (and perhaps ad nauseum) in In Search of Anti-Semitism [4], Buckley’s 1992 recounting of the affair. But it would have been nice to hear a different perspective from one who was around back then.

Further, The Great Purge seems to let Buckley off the hook for not banishing the John Birch Society because of anti-Semitism, yet fails to mention (at least in my reading) any mention of Buckley’s early purge of writers from The American Mercury, which was, in Buckley’s words, “anti-Semitic.” Therefore, Buckley showed his philo-Semitic stripes early on, and that may have informed some of his attitude vis-a-vis the John Birch Society.

The Jewish Question in general is also never explored. While not absolutely necessary to the subject, I’m sure it would have been interesting at the very least, given how eighty to ninety percent of the neoconservatives named in the book are obviously Jewish. Really, it’s impossible not to notice the nigh-homogeneous ethnic makeup of the neocons who appear over and over in The Great Purge like a gang of irrepressible supervillains. Such a list renders parenthesis-echoing utterly superfluous: Irving Kristol, Norman Podheretz, Charles Krauthammer, David Frum, Daniel Bell, Nathan Glazer, Seymour Lipset, Ben Wattenberg, Elliott Abrams, Michael Ledeen, Max Boot, David Gerlenter, Allen Weinstein, William Kristol, Robert Kagan, and Paul Wolfowitz.

You could practically host a baseball game with such a lineup. And is it all a huge coincidence? Well, I guess we’ll just have to wait for the sequel to find out.

In the meantime, however, The Great Purge does a magnificent job of myth-making for the Alt Right. It spells out our origins and purpose, and describes the challenges and betrayals the older generation of conservatives had to face while remaining true to the nationalist, traditionalist, and racialist ideals which made Western civilization great to begin with. Most importantly, The Great Purge shows what happens when you give up on winning and instead compromise with the enemy. You eventually become him. And at no point will your pettiness and spite become more apparent than when you turn on your own.

Article printed from Counter-Currents Publishing: http://www.counter-currents.com

URL to article: http://www.counter-currents.com/2017/02/where-conservatism-went-wrong/

URLs in this post:

[1] Image: https://www.counter-currents.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/2-20-17-1.jpg

[2] The Great Purge: The Deformation of the Conservative Movement: http://amzn.to/2meCuPd

[3] says: https://books.google.co.in/books?id=92AIAAAAQAAJ&pg=PA130&lpg=PA130&dq=%22and+does+not+leave+the+man+hesitating+in+the+moment+of+decision%22&source=bl&ots=OGHbkM9vXL&sig=Ghby2bcwjX2pVS70u5d-hm4ouMc&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwjU6p2Y5p7SAhXG1RQKHVPkD0MQ6AEIMTAG#v=onepage&q=%22and%20does%20not%20leave%20the%20man%20hesitating%20in%20the%20moment%20of%20decision%22&f=false

[4] In Search of Anti-Semitism: http://amzn.to/2kEivgE

jeudi, 26 janvier 2017

Etats-Unis : qu’est-ce que l’ « Alt-Right » ?

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Georg Immanuel Nagel :

Etats-Unis : qu’est-ce que l’ « Alt-Right » ?

On sait que l’élection de Donald Trump à la présidence des Etats-Unis a été un séisme politique d’ampleur globale. Mais le changement serait encore plus radical et plus profond si nous assistions, dans un futur proche, à un renforcement continu du mouvement dit de « Alt-Right ». Cette dénomination recouvre un courant intellectuel de droite aux facettes multiples, dont les adhérents constituent le seul groupe perceptible sur l’échiquier politique américain à avoir soutenu ouvertement Trump et à l’avoir ovationné.

Il faut cependant préciser qu’il n’y a aucun lien organique entre cette « Alt-Right » et Donald Trump, dont la rhétorique et les exigences sont bien plus inoffensives et bien moins idéologisées que celles de cette droite alternative. Cependant, Hillary Clinton, la candidate battue de ces élections présidentielles, n’a pas pu s’empêcher d’essayer d’identifier Trump à la « Alt-Right ». Ce genre de calomnies se nomme la « culpabilisation par association » dans le langage politique anglo-saxon. Mais cette tentative a eu des effets contraires à ceux espérés. Hillary Clinton a tenu un très long discours où elle a cité longuement tous les « méchants » qui soutenaient son adversaire. Elle faisait usage, dans ce discours, des injures politiques habituelles de la gauche et de l’extrême-gauche (« raciste », « homophobe », « sexiste », etc.).

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Hillary Clinton n’a pas obtenu la réaction qu’elle escomptait. Donald Trump n’a nullement été freiné dans son élan, sans doute parce qu’il n’y avait pas moyen de prouver qu’il avait un lien quelconque avec les animateurs des cercles qualifiables de « Alt-Right ». Du coup, grâce à la maladresse d’Hillary Clinton, le mouvement de la droite alternative a été connu dans toute l’Amérique et est devenue l’objet de vastes débats. Les pages de la grande toile de ces groupes alternatifs très peu connus ont été visitées à grande échelle : elles ont battu tous leurs records de fréquentation et les médias « mainstream » se sont mis à parler des initiatives, colloques et conférences de la « Alt-Right » et ont invité leurs représentants à répondre à des entretiens. Métapolitiquement parlant, on peut parler d’un tournant historique et peut-être même décisif.

L’Alt-Right ne se borne pas à fustiger le Zeitgeist, l’esprit du temps, marqué par le gauchisme. Elle brocarde aussi l’établissement conservateur conventionnel et les vieux Républicains. Elle considère que ces derniers se soumettent trop facilement aux diktats du politiquement correct, ce qui a pour corollaire qu’ils n’osent pas aborder les vrais problèmes de la société américaine, qu’ils ne se hasardent pas à adopter un « race realism », un « réalisme racialiste ». Cette réticence fait du mouvement conservateur conventionnel un « tigre de papier », condamné à échouer à tout bout de champ, parce qu’il abandonne continuellement ses propres positions et ses propres intérêts pour ne pas devoir subir les pressions habituelles, lesquelles ont évidemment recours à l’insulte classique de « racisme ».

Le philosophe et politologue Paul Gottfried avait naguère, bien avant le buzz déclenché par le discours anti-Alt Right d’Hillary Clinton, réclamé l’avènement d’une « droite alternative », différente du « conservatism mainstream ». Son appel à une « droite alternative » a été entendu : plusieurs publicistes l’ont repris, dont Richard Spencer, le fondateur de la boîte-à-penser « National Policy Institute ». Aussitôt Spencer baptise « Alternative Right » le magazine en ligne qu’il crée dans le sillage du discours de Gottfried, lui conférant aussi le diminutif de « Alt Right ». Tout le mouvement contestataire de l’idéologie libérale-gauchiste dominante et du conservatisme timoré reçoit alors le terme générique de « Alt Right ».

La droite alternative voulue par Gottfried au départ, lancée par Spencer dans la foulée, reproche, pour l’essentiel, aux conservateurs traditionnels de ne pas se poser comme les défenseurs des Américains de souche européenne, alors que ceux-ci constituent leur unique base électorale potentielle. C’est en fait le cas dans tous les Etats européens aliénés par le multiculturalisme où les minorités ethniques étrangères votent presque toujours pour les partis de gauche.

ramz-6UkAAvi9e.pngL’Alt Right américaine est constituée d’une variété de groupes très différents les uns des autres. D’une part, nous avons des revues et des maisons d’édition qui ne se distinguent guère des nouvelles droites française ou germanophones, dans la mesure où elles entendent se poser comme des initiatives sérieuses et intellectuelles. D’autre part, nous avons des personnalités qui s’adonnent à la moquerie et à la satire. Citons, en ce domaine, le comique « RamZPaul » (photo), les séries de caricatures « Murdoch Murdoch ». L’humour que répandent ces initiatives-là est, bien sûr, politiquement incorrect, et de manière explicite ! Parfois, il est espiègle et seulement accessible aux « initiés ». Les tenants de gauche de la « religion civile » américaine y sont fustigés à qui mieux-mieux, sans la moindre pitié. Personne n’oserait un humour pareil sous nos latitudes européennes.

Cette audace est possible grâce à la constitution américaine qui interdit explicitement de punir, par le truchement de lois régissant les opinions, l’expression libre et sans entrave de celles-ci, alors qu’en Europe les législations liberticides sont acceptées sans sourciller. Ainsi, les publications scientifiques des milieux de l’Alt Right sont autorisées, même si elles abordent des sujets brûlants comme l’anthropologie biologique. Sur ce chapitre, les productions du groupe « American Renaissance » sont particulièrement intéressantes pour nous, Européens, qui ne bénéficions plus d’une liberté de recherche en ce domaine spécifique du savoir.

Georg Immanuel Nagel,

Article paru dans zur Zeit, Vienne, n°3/2017, http://www.zurzeit.at .

dimanche, 19 juin 2016

De opkomst van alt-rechts

De opkomst van alt-rechts

Ex: http://www.erkenbrand.nl

costume-romaine-f9.jpgHet oude rechts heeft de slag om de samenleving verloren. Het is zo volledig door links verdreven dat tegenwoordig bijna iedereen, bewust of onbewust, meegaat in het linkse dogma van de gelijkheid. En dan meer en meer de gelijkheid van uitkomsten. Ieder verschil in macht en middelen wordt door de bien pensants als een ondraaglijk gevolg van onderdrukking gezien. En de grote boeman, de rechtgeaarde blanke man, heeft de plicht zijn “privileges” te onderkennen en zijn thuisland te delen met de onuitputtelijke stroom zielige bruine mensen van over de hele wereld. Zo doet hij boete voor de zondes en successen van zijn voorvaderen tot hij opgaat in de grote smeltkroes.

Veel van dit “progressieve” denken wordt uitgewerkt op Amerikaanse universiteiten, in bloedserieuze richtingen als gender studies, en gefinancierd door het grote geld. Groepen klagende minderheden en paarsharige feministen uit welgestelde families schreeuwen als giftige sneeuwvlokjes ieder tegengeluid weg en eisen dat hun hele campus een safe space wordt waar ze niet ge-triggered kunnen worden. De overheid, media en grote bedrijven zijn op hun hand en houden zich koste wat kost aan het Narrative, het grote Verhaal van Onderdrukking en Ongelijkheid. De rest van het Westen neemt de hele retoriek letterlijk over – vandaar dat in Nederland bijvoorbeeld het woord blank steeds vaker door wit wordt vervangen.

Maar het zijn ook de Verenigde Staten waar de laatste jaren een nieuwe, onverschrokken vorm van rechts is verrezen: de alt-right, kort voor alternative right.
 
Dit alt-rechts, om het gelijk maar te vertalen, is een losse, maar doelgerichte vereniging van onder meer (blank) nationalisme, traditionalisme, (paleo)conservatisme en identitarisme onder één vlag. Een wezenlijk kenmerk is de volledige minachting en verwerping van de gevestigde orde, wiens globalistische progressivisme wordt begrepen als onversneden anti-blank. Zonder blikken of blozen streeft alt-rechts naar het vervangen van deze orde en behartigt het de eigen etnische belangen: het veiligstellen van een toekomst voor Westerse, blanke beschaving en volken in eigen, homogene landen. Hierover wordt niet onderhandeld. Ander speerpunten zijn rasrealisme en traditionele samenlevingsvormen, maar ook flinke kritiek op de sociaal-culturele activiteiten, overmatige invloed en vriendjespolitiek van joden in het Westen.

Hoewel alt-rechts al enkele jaren bestaat is het pas sinds vorig jaar (eind 2015) doorgebroken. Een belangrijke katalysator is de presidentiële kandidatuur van Donald Trump, die als een sloopbal onbekommerd linkse taboes doorbreekt en de zorgen van blanke Amerikanen bespreekbaar maakt. Trump is voor deze beweging echter niet een idool of verlosser, maar een middel: de man die slechts de deur opent naar het herstel van Westerse, blanke beschaving en volken.

De doorbraak van alt-rechts zal echter vooral komen doordat de werkelijkheid steeds moeilijker te ontkennen wordt. Door de rap opeenvolgende gebeurtenissen en ontwikkelingen in de wereld, zoals de groeiende multiculturele “verrijking” en de migranteninvasie in Europa, ontwaken mensen bij bosjes uit de “progressieve”, linkse droom. Ze hebben zoals dat heet de rode pil geslikt, een verwijzing naar de film The Matrix. “Welcome to the real world.”
 

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De kracht van alt-rechts ligt in zijn sarrende, grappende houding en handelwijze – niet zuur en pessimistisch, maar juist genietend van de strijd. In tegenstelling tot “fatsoenlijk” rechts weigert het te spelen volgens de spelregels van links en heeft het een immuniteit opgebouwd tegen diens holle retoriek. Het is vooral actief op internet, in het bijzonder op Twitter en Facebook, waar het ontwaakte mensen opvangt en iedereen die de missie in de weg staat genadeloos hoont en bevecht, onder meer met treffende, provocerende memes. Hierin is de groene kikker Pepe vaak de ster.

Het zijn niet alleen uitgesproken “progressieven” die het bij alt-rechtse acties moeten ontgelden. De eerste doelwitten waren en zijn juist de zelfverklaarde “conservatieven” die niets weten te conserveren en vandaag de dag nauwelijks meer van de “progressieven” te onderscheiden zijn. Overal worden ze door alt-rechts opgejaagd en belachelijk gemaakt, steevast met de spotnaam cuckservative. Het woord cuck is kort voor cuckold en verwijst naar een bedrogen echtgenoot die andermans kinderen opvoedt: koekoeksjongen. De vergelijking wordt zo gemaakt met de grote, zelfverslaande ontvankelijkheid die dergelijke “conservatieven” hebben voor niet-Westerse immigratie, “kleurenblindheid” en abstracte, universele waarden.

Een van de grondleggers en bekendste gezichten van de alt-rechtse beweging is Richard B. Spencer, een representatieve intellectueel van eind dertig. Hij is naast voorzitter van het National Policy Institute ook de oprichter en eindredacteur van Radix Journal. Andere vlaggenschepen zijn Counter-Currents van Greg Johnson en de schalkse website The Right Stuff. Maar de leukste manier om kennis te maken met alt-rechts zijn misschien wel de speelse en slimme videocommentaren van YouTuber RamZPaul.

Alt-rechts trekt zich zoals gezegd weinig aan van de retoriek en de hopeloos gekleurde journalistiek van de gevestigde orde. Het groeit razendsnel, in het hele Westen, en is meer en meer ook buiten het web actief aan het netwerken. Als er één beweging is die de kracht heeft om als tegencultuur de hegemonie van links te doorbreken en de belegerde Westerse, blanke beschaving en volken werkelijk te steunen, dan is het deze wel.

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Thema-avonden

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