TWO STUDIES ON NEO-EURASIANISM

TWO STUDIES ON NEO-EURASIANISM

by Martin A. Schwarz

Ex: http://www.eurasia-rivista.org

Marlene Laruelle: Russian Eurasianism: An Ideology of Empire. Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Press/Johns Hopkins University Press, 2008, 288 p.

Alexander Höllwerth: Das sakrale eurasische Imperium des Aleksandr Dugin. Eine Diskursanalyse zum postsowjetischen Rechtsextremismus. Soviet and Post-Soviet Politics and Society, Vol. 59. Stuttgart: Ibidem Verlag 2007. 735 p.

Different strands of Russian Eurasianism (Laruelle, part 1)

Marlene Laruelle, a young but prolific French-American scholar, who has already published books about the classic Eurasianism and about its precursor in the 19th century, has now written “Russian Eurasianism. An ideology of Empire”, one of the first comprehensive academic studies of Neo-Eurasianism, or at least in the West. In difference to other works of this kind, the author sticks to her principles of impartiality, which does not mean that she does not present her own theories about history and function of Eurasianism as an “ideology of Empire”, but, in her own words “this book analyzes Neo-Eurasianism without judging it, for two reasons. First, I do not think one may, either methodologically or ethically, judge and analyze at the same time. Knowledge is a prerequisite of argument, but the former must precede the latter. Second, as Pierre-André Taguieff has remarked, ‘There is no need to put words into an author’s mouth or demonize him in order to critically examine theses that one believes must be opposed.’” (Laruelle, p. 13)
 
After a brief introduction in which she points to the relevance of the subject, her different approach (as mentioned), and the specific weight of the personalities she choose for presentation, the first chapter is devoted to the original Eurasianism from 1920-1930. This is a rather brief outline, as she has already written a book on the subject (L’Idéologie eurasiste russe ou comment penser l’empire, Paris 1999) , and brings not many new or original informations about a movement, which was the “conservative revolution” á la Russe, borrowing from Fascism and Bolshevism, but denouncing their short-comings and “Western” features. Two things though seem to be central for Laruelle’s understanding of the Eurasianists: the notion of a “geographic identity” for Russians, instead of the Western self-understanding of a “historic” and therefore progressive understanding of the identity of nations (which of course was transferred as “historical materialism” to Russia, and also was promoted by liberals and – inverted – by nostalgic monarchists). Therefore the geographic orientation of Eurasianism lies at the core of the movement, but was paradoxically developed in the Western exile: “The Eurasianist doctrine must be grasped in its fundamentally provocative character. It was born of the malaise of young nationalists who were reluctant to integrate into the host culture and who refused to resign themselves to the thought that links with homeland were definitely broken. Their rejection of Europe can only be understood if we remember that it was elaborated in the West by those Russians who, culturally speaking, were the most Europeanized.” (p. 25) While it is undeniable true, that Eurasianism as self-affirmation could only become self-knowledge in the encounter and subsequently (at least partial) rejection of Western ideologies, Laruelle shows a tendency to psychologize the phenomenon: “(Eurasianism) attempts to theorize what is above all an experience and a feeling: the experience of young men in exile who feel humiliated by the defeat of the Whites and try to understand the reality of the motherland and stay in touch with it.” (p. 47)
 
Another paradox or ambiguity can be found in the Eurasianist re-evaluation of the Far Eastern part of Russian history and culture, the Mongolic and Islamic one. „(…) before Eurasianism in the 1920s, no Russian intellectual movement displayed a real openness to the Turko-Mongol world. Asia was only ever highlighted under the aspects of Aryanism; it was a mere detour to reinforced claims of Europeaness.“ (p. 4) While this heritage was now used by the Eurasianists as an argument for the distinction of Russia not only to Western Europe but also to Pan-Slavism, the religions and cultures of Buddhism and Islam as such were denigrated in favor of a militant Orthodox Christianity. As the final parts of this book are dedicated to the relation between (neo-)Eurasianism and Islam, this question has not to be answered at this point.
 
After this brief, not very differentiated presentation of the original Eurasianists, Laruelle looks more in detail in the thinking of the three most influential neo-Eurasianists. These are, in her words “the theories of ethnogenesis elaborated by the Orientalist Lev N. Gumilëv (1912-92); the fascistic geopolitics of the fashionable theorist Aleksandr Dugin (1962-); the philosopher Aleksandr Panarin’s (1940-2003) defense of a multipolar world.” (p. 2)
 
Lev Gumilëv, the missing link – or rather: not missing link – between “old” and “new” Eurasianism enjoys nearly universal popularity in Russia. His theories of Ethnogenesis are generally excepted and taught in schools and universities, often without reference to the Eurasianist Weltanschauung, although they are deeply connected with their organic understanding of peoples and societies. While Gumilëv shares with the Eurasianists the idea that the individual draws the meaning from the totality, Gumilëv’s theory of ethnos is definitively on the more biologistic and deterministic side of possible variations of this idea. One that, as I must say, does not fit well with the ideas of an supra-natural origin of culture, which is the normal religious concept, and also especially stressed by the representatives of integral traditionalism (René Guénon, Julius Evola, and others), whose ideas were introduced to neo-Eurasianism by Aleksandr Dugin and Geidar Dzhemal. As Laruelle writes, “he [Gumilëv] takes up the original Eurasianists’ organicism and radicalizes it, using numerous biological or even genetic metaphors with far-reaching political implications”, although “he does not, strictly speaking, develop a political theory; and […| he cannot be considered a partisan of conservative revolution.” (p. 82) Instead he stressed (as must remembered: in the time of Soviet stagnation of the Brezhnev era) very social conservative norms: endogamy, family life, respect for the elderly, the nation, and rejection of any challenge to the powers that be, all necessary for the survival of the ethnos. Laruelle considers him – understandably – “the least intellectually relevant and the least original (Neo-)Eurasianist.” (p. 82) As Gumilëv was neither in touch with Western intellectuals nor in tune with Soviet science , “his thought, the product of intellectual solitude, was fundamentally autistic” (p. 82), This result, if true, is by the way in striking contradiction to his notion of the supremacy of the collective ethnos as a sovereign whole, and also a total contrast to the very mercurial and alert ideologue of Neo-Eurasianism, Aleksandr Dugin, well-known in the West and very present in Russian media.
 
Before devoting space to Dugin, Laruelle discusses Aleksandr Panarin, whom she clearly favors. She calls him intellectually superior to Dugin and Gumilëv, or to be exact: she writes that “many”, but unnamed “Russian scholars” (p. 86) did consider him to be. Be this at it may, Panarin was in the Yeltsin era a promoter of “people’s capitalism” (p. 87) and in the Putin era an advocate of “the restoration of both Orthodox spirituality and Stalinist statehood.” (p. 88) Maybe he could be considered as flexible or opportunist as Dugin? Nevertheless he presented a “civilized Eurasianism”, “civilized” here being the indicator of “the exact opposite to Dugin’s variety.” (p. 88) Nevertheless Panarin became a member of the Central Council of Dugin’s Eurasian Party in 2002, and planned to write a foreword to a book by Dugin, but as Laruelle writes, “death put an end to this unlikely cooperation.” (p. 89) Panarin’s work was marked by the search for a third way, “between the West’s egalitarian universalism and the ethnic particularism of the non-European world.” (p. 93) Panarin’s model for an Eurasian Empire in his words, as quoted by Laruelle: “The principle of cultural pluralism, as well as attention and tolerance for different ethnocultural experiences are combined with a monist political authority that tolerates no opposition.” (p. 97) One of the intriguing but also problematic ideas of Panarin was the need for a combination of the Eurasian religions into something, what he calls the “Great Tradition” (p. 98), especially a fusion between Orthodox Christianity and Islam. In his quoted words: “We need a new, powerful world-saving idea that would ensure a consensus between Orthodox and Muslim culture for the benefit of a common higher goal.” (p. 99) Later he seemed to have abandoned this attempt in favor of an Orthodox supremacism and a renewed pan-Slavism, according to Laruelle in reaction to the NATO bombardment of Serbia. (p. 100)
 
The chapter on Aleksandr Dugin in titled “Aleksandr Dugin: A Russian Version of the European Radical Right?“ and was published before as a study by the Woodrow Wilson Institute in Washington, DC. While the title indicates the direction and the somewhat limited approach to the multi-faceted Dugin, it can be said that this attempt to analyze the influences of the New Right and the „Traditionalist school“ on Dugin’s theories is of much superior quality than the ramblings of the ubiquous Andreas Umland and his school of Dugin bashing. Like the New Right in Western Europe Dugin has attempted to adopt the teachings of Carl Schmitt, Karl Haushofer, Ernst Niekisch and Moeller van den Bruck, the so-called “Conservative Revolution” in Germany’s Weimar period, to the present situation of Russia, which largely means the attempted forced Westernization through Globalization and the counter-measures of the re-establishment of state power. This “conservative revolution” intellectual heritage is accompanied by two more currents, the New Right or rather: Nouvelle Droite, and the „integral Tradition“, both not so much of German but French and Italian origins, although the thinking of Alain de Benoist not only has a strong „Conservative Revolutionary“ foundation, but was also influenced by Armin Mohler, the personal link between Ernst Jünger and Carl Schmitt, and Alain de Benoist. Additionally and largely unrelated to Benoist was the Belgian European activist Jean Thirirat, whose model of an „European nation“ has preformed Dugin’s „Eurasian nation“ as much as the French Nouvelle Droite’s think tank GRECE and their meta-political approach did for the somehow fluctuating style of Dugin’s intellectual enterprises. Therefore Laruelle is not mislead, when she writes: “Dugin distinguishes himself from other figures in the Russian nationalist movements precisely through his militant Europeanism, his exaltation of the Western Middle Ages, and his admiration for Germany. All these ideological features contrast strongly with the ethnocentrism of his competitors.“ (p. 128)
 
Even more on the point is her acknowledgment of the influence of René Guénon and Julius Evola, and their minor intellectual allies and successors, on Dugin. She calls „Traditionalism“ the „foundation of Dugin’s thoughts“. While it can correctly be said, that the notion of a primordial Tradition as the common origin of all the religious-cultural traditions of Eurasia, can not be found in the writings of the „founding fathers“ of Eurasianism and was directly alien to some of their ideas – the rambling against the „Roman-Germanic civilization“ - , nevertheless Dugin could find only here the organic and integral solution to some of the most urgent problems of Russia’s Eurasian (com)position between Orthodoxy, Islam, Buddhism and other more minor elements: the transcendent – esoteric - unity of the exoteric different heirs of one primordial Tradition. Which is why – in our not Laruelle’s view – and without considering possible personal idiosyncrasy and political opportunism, his brand of neo-Eurasianism must be considered superior to those of his „competitors“, take for example the ill-fated attempt of Panarin’s Islam/Orthodoxy „melting pot“. Dugin’s claim of post-Guénonism because of his attempt to „Russify“ Guénon and to criticize the lack of references to Orthodox Christianity (p. 123), should be seen rather as a complementary effort. Similar is his attempt to reconcile Evolian „paganism“ (p. 123), or rather Aryanism, with Russian Christianity, with its strong national element. And not only of theoretically value is the distinction between Traditional Islam – as represented in the Sufi traditions and in Shiite Iran – and the Western-allied Wahhabite branch. In this context Laruelle makes reference to the important symposium “Islamic Threat or Threat against Islam?” (p. 118) which intended to establish a Russian-Muslim strategic partnership.

A „discourse analysis“ of Aleksandr Dugin (Höllwerth)

Alexander Höllwerth’s doctor thesis in Salzburg (Austria) on the „sacred Eurasian empire of Alexander Dugin“ impresses by it sheer quantity of more than 700 pages. The reader expects to gain access to fundamental texts of Russian neo-Eurasianism, otherwise only available in Russian. This expectation is fulfilled only partially because the author does give way to much space to his own objections, considerations and assumptions. A part called „contextualisations“, which brings nothing new, but gives an oversight of the historical Eurasianist movement, follows the book’s methodological reflections (reaching from Foucault’s discourse notion to Buruma’s occidentalism model).
 
Höllwerth then summarizes the literature from Stephen Shenfield („Russian Fascism“) to Andreas Umland (who is the editor of this volume and wrote its preface) on the biography of Aleksandr Dugin. He gives his estimation of the relationship between the subject of the book and the current Russian regime. Höllwerth states that Dugin is one of the few prominent intellectuals in Russia whom it is allowed to criticize the Kremlin without being banned from public discourse into the small niches of opposition media (which are rather the domain of Dugin’s enemies, the Western orientated liberals). Dugin has written in 2005 that the “acting of Putin can be evaluated as an artificially masked continuation of the pro-American, liberal, pro-oligarch strategy of Yeltsin, as a camouflage of the decline of Russia and its geopolitical spheres of influence.” (Höllwerth, p. 182) But this harsh assessment was followed by a phase of “reconciliation”. One could consider this as an evaluation of differing politics by a principled intellectual, the changes being on the side of the Kremlin and not on the side of the commentator. Höllwerth tends to mystify this point of view, but with the help of Dugin himself or rather his edition of Jean Parvulesco’s book “Putin and the Eurasian Empire” which differentiates between “Putin-1”, the real Putin, and “Putin-2”, the metaphysical Putin, the “mysterious builder of the Great Eurasian Empire of the End” (p. 184), the agent or tool of the great Eurasian conspiracy, a vulgarized or at least popularized variation of the initiation as described by René Guénon, but assuming in the sketch of Parvulesco rather counter-initiative features.
 
But what is the real and not “metaphysical” influence of Aleksandr Dugin, according to Höllwerth? “The attempt to estimate the ‘real political influence’ of Dugin is confronted with the difficulty to separate the plane of staging from the plane of factuality. This difficulty, with which the external scholar is confronted, seems to be part of a conscious strategy: the meaning of Dugin’s staging does, metaphorically put, not be to let the viewer look behind the scenery of the staging, but to focus his attention on the staging itself. (…) ‘Behind the scenery’ activities in connection with the Dugin phenomenon (secret services, political string-pullers, etc.) can not be excluded, are even probable, but should not lead to ambitious speculations based on few evidences.” (p. 194 f.) By the way, a sensationalist piece of work, based on such “ambitious speculations based on few evidences” was published by the same publishing house, which did not dare to include it in their scientific series and did flank it with cautious remarks. (Vladimir Ivanov: Alexander Dugin und die rechtsextremen Netzwerke. Fakten und Hypothesen zu den internationalen Verflechtungen der russischen Neuen Rechten. Stuttgart: Ibidem Verlag, 2007) And of course also with a preface by the inevitable Andreas Umland. A work to be put on the same shelve with Jean Parvulesco’s political fiction, but one has to admit that it has better entertainment value than Höllwerth’s rather sour work.
 
With page 197 starts the real discourse-theoretical body of the book, being also the real achievement of Höllwerth: „Dugin’s construction of world and reality“. Which is itself parted into three: Space, Order, Time, or also: Geopolitics, State, and History. But through these 500 pages goes one leitmotif: Höllwerth tries to reduce the complexity of Dugin’s system of synthesis and distinction to simple dualisms; we and the other, Eurasia (=Russia) against the West, Empire against democracy, etc., which are in return recognized as redundant repetitions of one and only mantra of power. After Dugin’s philosophy and policy has passed through Höllwerth’s mechanism of discourse analysis we arrive at exactly the same result, a more temporizing genius like Andreas Umland did achieve with one piece of paper and only two quotes of Dugin out of context: the exposure of a dangerous enemy of freedom and democracy. Vade retro, Dugin! But with Höllwerth’s help the Western reader can uplift himself by dining from a broad protruding self-affirmation of Western values with a more than saturating scientific apparatus.
 
The most compelling aspect of Höllwerth’s de- and reconstruction of Dugin’s discourse is its stringent structure. Also the obvious inclusion of the most important Western and Eastern authors must be noted. The confrontation with the matadors of Western liberalism (Jürgen Habermas, Sir Karl Popper, Bassam Tibi, Jean-François Lyotard) could be seen as helpful. But the extensive reproduced arguments of Dugin’s counter-parts are put on the same level of discourse with Dugin, even where Höllwerth notes the metaphysical character of Dugin’s traditionalists argument. The resulting impossibility of a dialogue between equals is construed by Höllwerth as a deficit of Dugin’s discourse.
 
Another example of Höllwerth’s inadequate approach: Höllwerth did indeed – and this is rather remark- and laudable - read the French metaphysician René Guénon. But only to point out the deviations of Dugin from the Guénon traditionalist “standard”, which is rather pointless, because Höllwerth himself has already classified Dugin correctly as Russian Evolianist (p. 355 ff.) and most of Höllwerth’s arguments seemingly advocating Guénon could also been directed against Julius Evola, and on this subject a large intra-traditionalist discussion could be cited. More than once Höllwerth argues that Dugin postulates a metaphysical dichotomy of East and West, while Guénon did stress the common original unity and only accepted a difference East-West since the decline of the West beginning with the modern era. But the West is the Occident, the sphere of sunset, by definition, and essential before the temporal decline began. So Dugin and Guénon are both correct, if they are read correctly!
 
Not unrelated is another important objection, which may indeed be problematic if true. This is the dependency of Dugin not only from Western authors in general, but also in his understanding of Eastern, meaning mainly Russian-Orthodox authors. Höllwerth tries to argue this in detail in some examples (for example: p. 664 ff.), this unfortunately cannot be assessed by me, due to my lack of knowledge of the Russian sources. But one thing is clear, this argument of Western influence can cut in two directions. Höllwerth points out that in one of Dugin’s best known texts “The metaphysics of national-bolshevism” Dugin does refer to Sir Karl Popper’s view of Platon, (p. 320 ff.) but everything the ideologue of the “open society” does characterize negatively is affirmed by Dugin, therefore he arrives at the holistic, total state of the philosophical rulers and the caste of watchers, this not through an adequate study of Platon, but as the reverse of an one-sided caricature made by Popper. If we see the Western history of philosophy not as a footnote to Platon, as was famously said, but as the decline from Platon to Popper, which really was the case, we can still see a partial truth in Höllwerth’s criticism of Western dependency by Dugin, but we have also to recast it into a much greater blame against the West, not to have remained true to its origin.
 
The adherence of Dugin to a kind – and which kind - of nationalism or a nation-transcending form of Eurasianism would be another question which would need a deeper consideration than Höllwerth provides. The question of nation can in the East not be separated from the confession. From the point of view of metaphysics and tradition (in the sense of René Guénon) most of the values attributed to the Russian nation should be rather connected with the Russian-Orthodox church. The formulation of the “angels of peoples” by the great Russian philosophers and theologians are thought from the premise of the identity nation=religion and correct for all authentic traditions but certainly not for nations in the modern Western sense, where Evola’s and Guénon’s critique of nationalism is totally applicable. Höllwerth’s attempt to find a contradiction between Dugin and the different strands of thought which convene in his own – traditionalist, conservative revolutionary, Orthodox and Russian – can therefore not be followed so easy.
 
Russia’s Eurasian mission, which lies in the simple fact to be Eurasia in the excellent sense (there is a incomplete Eurasia possible without China or India or Western Europe, but without Russia it makes to sense to speak from Eurasia), is not necessarily a chauvinism of thinking of itself as the hub of the world, but a fact of geopolitics, which can be confirmed by a look at the world map. If the space called Russia would be not be populated by Russians, there would be another people populating this space, and it would have to adopt to the stated property of large space, and would become exactly “Russian” in this way. Thus it becomes clear, why Höllwerth can quote Dugin’s definition of the being (Wesen) of the Russians as space (extension) (p. 401). All this is to keep in mind, when Höllwerth agitates himself on Dugin’s corresponding affirmation, that Russia is the whole (of Eurasia).

The difference between land (Eurasia) and sea (Anglo-America), coincident with rise and decline, Orient and Occident (in the afore mentioned sense of temporal difference by same origin in the metaphysical North, p. 212 ff.) would demand another thorough study. Höllwerth makes a lot out of the seemingly different use of the term “Nomos of the earth” (Nomos der Erde) by Carl Schmitt and Aleksandr Dugin. While Schmitt did mean the search for a new principle of international law for the whole globe, Dugin exclusively uses the phrase as synonym with “Nomos of the land” as contrasted with “Nomos of the sea” (p. 249). This dichotomy of laws according to the different Nomos is not the only problem of mediation, the intra-Eurasian and therefore more urgent is the juristic mediation of the different tradition, when according to Dugin the law is not universal but traditional (for each tradition) (p. 475 ff.). The “integral traditionalism” is exactly the only possible foundation to preserve the differences of the traditions while acknowledging their common and in this sense universal origin (the primordial Tradition). The “universalism” of traditionalism allows to stress the discerned internally and the common ground externally. Especially Hindu tradition and Islam have traditionally absolutely no problems in recognizing the other traditions as varieties of the one Tradition. (But Dugin may not evaluate these two as much as would be desirable, especially in their function of beginning and closing the cycle of mankind.) Finally it becomes absurd when Höllwerth in his “discourse analysis” regards the universalism of all traditions as structurally equivalent to the arrogant “universalism” of Western liberalism. On the one hand, favored by Dugin, the land-bound traditions take all part in the whole of Tradition (analogue to the classic model of idea by Platon), on the other hand, the Western universalism, championed by Höllwerth, is nothing more than a particular, very late development deviation from one specific tradition, the rejection of Western Christianity in its own boundary, and its violent expansion on the way of the world’s seas, postulating itself as the only valuable, and this exactly because it is anti-traditional (“enlightened”)!
 
Coping with Dugin’s philosophical and geopolitical notion of sacredness, Höllwerth seems to misled by a point of view, which he seems to have adopted from Mircea Eliade, a founder of the modern science of comparative religion (p. 209, p. 529 f.). A partial truth, the difference of profane and sacred, is been used as absolute segregation. There exist sacred places (and times), and on this the sacred geography (and sacred history) is founded, whose importance for Dugin’s geopolitics Höllwerth does carve out – much to his credit, as this level of argument is overlooked to often as pure rhetoric. But are there also in a strict sense profane things? “Come in, here do dwell Gods, too”, Heraclitus did say. Or, speaking with Guénon: there exists no profane thing, but only a profane point of view. Dugin seems to look at all questions also – certainly not only – in a metaphysical perspective, and in general he is able to explain why a certain political action is seen as necessary in this metaphysical perspective by him. This opens here the possibility of misuse through the sacralization of the profane, as on the other hand the profanization of the sacred in the West. The Western man is the one who takes the utilitarism as the measure for all things. The pure action – of which Julius Evola speaks - , which principle of not-clinging to the fruits of action has been affirmed by Dugin, the exact opposite of utilitarism, can only be seen as measure for the validity of Dugin’s decisions. To say, that he may not always be in the right in his metaphysical decisions is a different thing than saying he is guided by profane utility, as the sacred point of view does not make a saint. Höllwerth´s grasp of this problems is flawed because of his attempt to arrange the perceived oppositions into mirrored congruencies, instead of acknowledgment their structurally inequality, which would lead to the necessarily conclusion of the metaphysical superiority of the Eurasian tradition over its Western descent and rival.

Eurasianism and Islam (Laruelle, continuation)

In the last two chapters of her book Marlene Laruelle gives attention to the Muslim Eurasianists, first between the Muslim minorities of the Russian federation and then outside. This topic, though well-known by specialists, did not grasp the attention of a broader public as much as for example Dugin’s role in relation to the Kremlin. Therefore Laruelle’s retelling of the sometime short-lived organizational and personal development is very helpful, but can obviously not been retold in this review. In general there are two kinds of involvement of the Muslim minorities, one in specific Islamic Eurasianist parties, and the other the involvement of Islamic representatives in the general Eurasianist movement. There are two rival organizations representing the Muslim citizens of the Russian Federation, who were headed by two personal rivals, Mufti Talgat Tadzhuddin, who died shortly ago, and Mufti Ravil Gainutdin. The first was a member of Dugin’s party, close to the Kremlin, and a friend of the Russian patriarch Alexis II (p. 156), who coincidentally also died shortly ago. Gainutdin on the other hand keeps more distant to the Orthodox Church and the Kremlin (p. 158), and supports one of the more important Eurasianists rival of Aleksandr Dugin, Abdul-Vakhed V. Niizaov and his Eurasianist Party of Russia. (p. 161) The author summarizes the differences of the Muftis, which also reflect the differences of Dugin and Niizaov: “Tadzhuddin and Gainutdin embody two poles of traditional Russian Eurasianism: on the one hand, Russian nationalism and Orthodox messianism; and on the other hand, a more secular patriotism, which combines great-power ambitions with an acknowledgment of Russia’s multiethnic and multireligious character. Thus Eurasianism has become one of the crystallization points between the various Islamic representative bodies (…)” (p. 161 f.) Alongside these two mainstream bodies of Islam in Russia, there exist many smaller groups. One deserves special mention, the Islamic Commitee of Russia, lead by a former ally of Aleksandr Dugin, who broke with him on several issues, Geidar Dzhemal. The philosopher Dzhemal is an Azeri Shiite (Shiism being the dominant branch of Islam in Azerbaijan), with a close relation to the Islamic Republic of Iran, what separates Dzhemal from the other mentioned Muslim representatives. Strangely this fact is not mentioned by Laruelle. What she stresses, is the importance Dzhemal gives to Islam for securing Russia’s future: “Dzhemal […] states: ‘Russia’s only chance to avoid geopolitical disappearance is to become a Islamic state.’ Thus the movement remained on the borderline of Eurasianism, because it talked of conversion rather than cultural symbiosis ” (p. 147) Dugin’s apparently strong opposition to any conversions on the other hand is self-contradictory given his heavy reliance of his “Traditionalist” foundation on the teaching of René Guénon, also known as Sheikh Abd al-Wâhid Yahya. But it cannot neglected that the Orthodox-Islamic tension in the Eurasianist movement is as much ethnic as religious. The Turkic people can claim to represent “Eurasia” even more than Russians do. “In this view, the Russian people are European and party alien to Eurasia, as opposed to the Turkic people, who are considered to better illustrate the great meeting between Europe and Asia. Russia is no longer understood as a great power but as the most backward part of Europe, by contrast with the dynamism of the Far East and China.” (p. 169) A certain ambiguity in this question goes back to the classic Eurasianist movement of the Twenties of the last century, as Laruelle earlier in a different context has already stated: “Eurasianism’s place within the Russian nationalist spectrum has remained paradoxical due to the fact that it can be interpreted in either a ‘Russocentric’ or a ‘Turkocentric’ way. However, the paradox is not simply in the eye of the outside beholder; it has also divided the Neo-Eurasianists, who have accused each other of advocating the supremacy of one people over another.” (p. 5)
 
Naturally there is no question on which side the Eurasianist interpretation leans in the cases of Turkish Eurasianism outside of Russia, which is the final topic of this manifold book. In Kazakhstan one can state a “Eurasianism in Power” (p. 171), but a pragmatic Eurasianism this is, without any of the eschatological or traditionalist features of Dugin’s world-view. But Kazhakh Eurasianism as a whole is a multifaceted movement: “’Eurasianist’ Kazakh nationalism has several embodiments: a literary tradition introduced by Olzhas Suleimenov; a highly pragmatic variety used by the presidential administration; and a type of Eurasianist rhetoric that merely masks a much more traditional view of the nation and its right to exist, and mentions Russia only in the negative.” (p. 172) Suleimenov being a friend and ally of Lev Gumilëv (p. 175) and an apologist of “multiethnicity, tolerance, and diversity”, as characteristics of Eurasia. (p. 175) Also present in this intellectual Eurasianism seems to be a religious syncretism, “embracing all the religions that have ever (co)existed in the steppe. For example, the Kazakh Eurasianists make a great deal of archaeological traces of Nestorian Christianity, Zoroastrianism, Buddhism, and Shamanism, trying to go beyond the classic Orthodox-Islamic dualism.” (p. 176) President Nazarbaev proposed a “Union of Eurasian States” already in 1994 (p. 177) and embodies a mainly “economically based Eurasianism, whose integrationists ideas are popular among those who have suffered from the breakdown of links between the former Soviet republics.” (p. 177) But Nazarbaev is nothing less than an ideology-free technocrat, he has written even a book “In the stream of history”, in which he claims the Aryan and sedentary origin of Kazakhstan, predating the Mongol nomadic arrival. (p. 186) Additionally, the country’s Muslim character of the country is stressed, and Nazarbaev is proud of the global Islamic relevance Muslim scholars of Kazhakh origin like Al-Farabi and Al-Buruni.
 
Finally the only example of Eurasianism beyond the border of the former Soviet Union, studied by Laruelle, is the case of Turkey. Here the Eurasianist claim of the Turkish people goes along with the implication, “that Russia and Turkey are no longer competing for the mythical territory of Inner Asia – which both Eurasianists and pan-Turkists claim as their people’s ancestral homeland – but are Eurasian allies.” (p. 171) Laruelle starts by postulating common ideological roots of Eurasianism and Turkism, the “official Turkish state discourse on the nation’s identity” (p. 193), in romanticism and “Pan-“Ideologies (p. 188), but this seems to be rather a feature of Pan-Slavism than of Eurasianism with its re-evaluation of the non-Russian strands of the Empire. A similar development in the development from Turkism to Avrasyanism seems to be lacking. Rather it can be seen as a turning the back to the West, to which Mustafa Kemal, the so-called Atatürk (Father of the Turks), wanted to direct the aspirations of the Turks. The author states the original competition between the Turkish Avrasyian tendency and the Russian Eurasianist movements, similar to the natural antagonistic relation of nationalisms. But the interesting developments are the recently “attempts (…) to turn the two ‘Eurasias’ into allies rather than competitors” and parallel “a Dugin-style ideologization of the term in response to American adcendancy.” (p. 198) The few pages Laruelle dedicates to these developments are rather brief, and she has in the mean time published a more extensive study (Russo-Turkish Rapprochement through the Idea of Eurasia: Alexander Dugin’s Networks in Turkey, Jamestown Foundation, Occasional Paper, 2008), which itself has been overtaken by the dismantling of large parts of these „networks“ through the Ergenekon affair, but which is definitively outside the scope of this review.
 
The different manifestations of Eurasianism in this book leave the author and the reader with the question of the unity of Eurasianists idea. Laruelle states that Eurasianism is “a classic example of a flexible ideology. This explains its success, its diversity, and its breadth of coverage.” (p. 221) Without arguing about sheer words the author cannot be followed in her strict subsumption of Eurasianism under the term nationalism. At least a more nuanced view of nation in a more traditional sense, common to both Orthodox and Islamic thinking, in difference to the Western concept of nation-state (as I discussed in the part on Höllwerth) would have to be considerated instead of stating that the Eurasianists “concept of ‘civilization’ is only a euphemism for ‘nation’ and ‘empire.’” (p. 221).

 

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Article printed from eurasia-rivista.org: http://www.eurasia-rivista.org

URL to article: http://www.eurasia-rivista.org/two-studies-on-neo-eurasianism/19891/

Выпуск № 5. Контргегемония

 

http://www.geopolitica.ru/magazine/

Дугин А. Г.

Контргегемония............................................................7

Дугин А. Г.

Контргегемония в теории многополярного мира....27

Мелентьева Н. В.

Контргегемония по горизонтали и по вертикали

(пролегомены к Евразийской версии).......................55

Савин Л. В.

О некоторых аспектах контргегемонии.....................80

Сперанская Н. В.

Стратегия контргегемонии....................................... 87

Стивен Гилл

Грамши и глобальная политика:

К пост-гегемонистской программе исследований...96

Роберт У. Кокс

Грамши, гегемония и международные отношения:

очерк о методе............................................................121

Часть II. 

Дугин А. Г.

Взгляд на мир с позиции моря.................................151

Джон Хобсон

Конструирование евроцентризма

и теория международных отношений

как евроцентристский конструкт..............................181

Димитрис Константакопулос

Самоубийство Европы:

триумф империи Ллойда Бланкфейна,

или как Германия уничтожает Грецию, 

Европу... и Германию

(при поддержке греческого правительства)............224

Entrevista a Alexander Dugin

Entrevista a Alexander Dugin: El Occidente actual debe ser aniquilado y la humanidad debe ser reconstruida en un terreno diferente

Ex: http://paginatransversal.wordpress.com

[Aecio] Excelente entrevista que realiza la revista lituana Radikaliai a Alexander Dugin, donde con un toque más personal se habla del posible colapso del mundo occidental, la Cuarta Teoría Política y sus fundamentos, la situación actual del Eurasianismo de la mano de Rusia y la visión del mundo post-moderno que nos depara.

Mindaugas Peleckis: Estimado profesor ¿podríamos iniciar la conversación con su muy interesante biografía? Antes que nada ¿es cierto lo que está escrito en Wikipedia y otras fuentes oficiales? ¿Qué es verdad y qué no lo es? Padre que trabajaba en la GRU; nazi del círculo dirigido por E. Golovin; muchas perturbaciones políticas; un buen amigo del Sr. Putin…

Alexander Dugin: Todo es pura mentira. Ni Putin, ni nazi, ni padre en el GRU y así sucesivamente. Mi biografía es mi bibliografía (cf. J.Evola). No cambio nada en Wikipedia por dos razones:

1) Hay un grupo de administradores Wiki liberales que restablecerán de inmediato todas las mentiras para conservar la imagen peyorativa de mi persona (la guerra cibernética – es sólo una democracia, no es nada personal, pero la democracia es siempre una mentira).

2) El individuo (Yo mismo) no importa. Para mí, sólo importa la misión.

Hasta ahora no me siento inclinado a hablar de mi persona. Lea mis libros, forme su opinión personal acerca de mis ideas (primero) y la personalidad del autor (segundo – es opcional).

M. P.: De todas maneras lo principal a discutir en esta entrevista son sus ideas, las cuales considero bastante interesantes y de importancia global a medida que el mundo occidental parece estar colapsando. ¿Lo es? El fin de la civilización occidental se predijo bastante tiempo atrás. ¿Cuánto tiempo tenemos que esperar? ¿Hay algo que tiene que suceder? ¿La Tercera Guerra Mundial? ¿Revolución mundial? ¿Nada (significando el colapso como un proceso natural)?

A. D.: Yo más bien creo que no pasará nada, nada en absoluto. Eso es algo que es realmente terrible. La eternidad es el momento perpetuo del aburrimiento. Heidegger estudió en su obra “Die Grundbegriffen der Metaphysik” el fenómeno del aburrimiento profundo. Como la función existencial del Dasein moderno. El gnóstico Basílides describió al mundo después del fin como completamente equilibrado, el mundo sin ningún acontecimiento. Eso no quiere decir que no haya más eventos, significa más bien que no vivimos los acontecimientos como eventos. El colapso duradero es bien analizado por el escritor inglés Alex Kurtagić.

El verdadero problema viene cuando nadie percibe que es un problema. Así que estamos aquí. El Occidente es el centro del aburrimiento. No explota, más bien implosiona cada vez más y más profundo.

Tienen razón en que durará para siempre. El fin del mundo es la imposibilidad del mundo a acabarse. El mundo sin fin ya no es más el mundo, es la suma de los fragmentos sin sentido del todo inexistente. Estamos viviendo en las hipótesis 6-9 de “Parménides” de Platón – hay multitudes (πολλά), pero no hay ninguna unidad (ἓν). Tal mundo no puede existir (según los neoplatónicos). Estoy bastante de acuerdo con ellos, no con los medios de comunicación y la cultura prêt a porter o con los intelectuales hegemónicos.

M. P.: Usted publicó muchos libros – ni siquiera puedo contarlos ¿usted podría?. Recuerdo el primero que leí – era sorprendente- en 1999, sobre conspirología. ¿Usted cree en una conspiración global seria como Bilderberg/Masones/ Illuminati o cualquier otro que esté realmente pasando en este momento? Si es así, por favor explique cómo funciona y qué debemos esperar más adelante.

A. D.: No recuerdo la cantidad de mis libros, recuerdo su calidad. La calidad es muy diferente, ya que los libros fueron escritos para públicos diversos. La conspirología es descrita por mí como una especie de sociología primitiva. Para la sociología, hay un punto muy importante: lo que la sociedad piensa sobre lo que está sucediendo a su alrededor es importante, no menos de lo que sucede realmente o lo que los expertos científicos piensan. Así que estudiando las teorías de conspiración estudiamos la mente de la gente, los mitos, la cultura, los miedos, las estructuras gnoseológicas y cognitivas. La gente cree en conspiraciones. Eso significa que “existen” o ” subsisten ” (de acuerdo a la ontología diferenciada de Alexius Meinong).

M. P.: Se le considera como el padre del Eurasianismo y de la Cuarta Teoría Política. ¿Podría explicar los fundamentos de sus ideas?

A. D.: El Eurasianismo no ve a Rusia como país, sino como una civilización. Por lo tanto, debe compararse no con países europeos o asiáticos, si no con Europa o el islam o las civilizaciones hindúes. Rusia-Eurasia consiste en elementos modernos y pre-modernos, de culturas y etnias europeas y orientales. Esta identidad particular debe ser reconocida y reafirmada en el marco de un nuevo proyecto de integración. El eurasianismo niega la universalidad de la civilización occidental y la unidimensionalidad del proceso histórico (dirigida hacia el liberalismo, la democracia, los derechos humanos, la economía de marcado y así sucesivamente).

Hay diferentes culturas con diferentes antropologías, ontologías, valores, tiempos y espacios. El Occidente no es otra cosa que el mundo hipertrofiado e insolente con megalomanía. Es el caso más abyecto del hybris. La humanidad debe luchar contra Occidente con el fin de poner sus pretensiones en los límites legítimos. El mundo debe convertirse en lo que es -la provincia, el caso aislado histórico, la elección – no el destino universal y normativo o el objetivo común.

La Cuarta Teoría Política es la teoría que afirma:

1) Las tres principales ideologías políticas modernas (liberalismo, comunismo/socialismo, fascismo /nacionalsocialismo) ya no son adecuadas – así que tenemos que descartarlas todas, lo que significa no más liberalismo, socialismo, fascismo (chequee lo del fascismo y compare con lo que dicen de mí);

2) Necesitamos construir la Cuarta Teoría Política más allá, descartando las tres, y esta debe ser no-moderna (puede ser post-moderna, puede ser pre-moderna);

3) El sujeto de la Cuarta Teoría Política es el Dasein que Heidegger ha descrito en sus obras (no el individuo como en el liberalismo, ni la de clase como en el marxismo, ni la raza/estado como en el nacionalsocialismo/fascismo) – El Dasein debe ser liberado del modo inauténtico de la existencia;

4) El Dasein es plural y depende de la cultura, por lo que el mundo debe ser multipolar (cada cultura, etnia o religión tiene su propio Dasein – no son necesariamente contradictorios pero sí son diferentes)

5) Hacemos un llamado a la revolución mundial existencial de los Daseins – Daseins de las sociedades humanas unidas por la lucha contra hegemónica – en contra de la globalización occidental y el universalismo liberal, así como en contra de la dominación de Estados Unidos.

M. P.: La Unión Euroasiática se estableció hace varios años. Ahora parece que está en el limbo, aunque se puede ver que la parte oriental del mundo (China, Irán, etc.) es cada vez más fuerte mientras la occidental se debilita. ¿Sucede así? ¿Cuál es la situación actual con la Unión Euroasiática y cual que es su predicción para el futuro?

A. D.: La Unión Euroasiática es nuestra idea tomada por los burócratas de Putin. Creo que es la única manera de asegurar el futuro de Rusia y una condición indispensable para la multipolaridad. Rusia debe estar en el lado de las potencias no occidentales. Hay muchos problemas con la Unión Euroasiática, objetiva y subjetivamente. La hegemonía de Estados Unidos y la quinta columna en Rusia la sabotean activamente, y la ineficacia de la burocracia rusa empeora la situación. No obstante, se llevará a cabo, porque debe hacerse.

M. P.: Guerras y revoluciones suceden en todas partes actualmente… Malí, Siria, Palestina, Túnez… ¿Qué piensa acerca de la situación en el Magreb/Oriente Medio? ¿Terminará en un baño de sangre y con otros diez años de guerra?

A. D.: No, nunca va a terminar. Es el proyecto caótico patrocinado por el Occidente que está perdiendo su poder para controlar las sociedades no occidentales por otros medios. La sangre será derramada más y más. Sólo cuando todos los musulmanes apunten sus armas contra los occidentales y se unan a la batalla eurasianista final contra la hegemonía esta se detendrá. El Imperio sigue dividiendo, pero ya no puede controlar todo efectivamente. Así que empieza a dividir y eso es todo. No puede gobernar, sólo matar. Así que tenemos que devolver el golpe.

M. P.: ¿Cuál es su opinión sobre el Islam e Irán?

A. D.: Admiro Irán y admiro el Chiísmo y el Sufismo. Es una tradición espiritual que lucha en contra de la modernidad apuntando a su centro. Hay muchos tipos de Islam. Me gustar el Islam tradicional y tengo algunas dudas sobre la versión wahabista. Es una versión modernista y universalista del Islam, además que parece funcionar acorde a los intereses de Estados Unidos como una especie de unidad sub-imperialista. Así que apoyo el tradicionalismo en todas las religiones. Sin embargo, amo con mi corazón a Irán y a la tradición chií.

M. P.: ¿Qué mundo futuro (cercano y lejano) te gustaría ver? ¿Cuál es su visión?

A. D.: En la situación actual estamos desprovistos de futuro. Entiendo el futuro existencialmente como el horizonte de la auténtica existencia del Dasein, como Ereignis (acontecimiento/ser parte de), la llegada del último Dios (letzte Gott). Pero este futuro es incompatible con el Logos en descomposición de la historia occidental. El Occidente actual (Estados Unidos y parte de Europa) debe ser aniquilado y la humanidad debe ser reconstruida en un terreno diferente – en frente de la cara de la Muerte y el Abismo.

Debe haber un nuevo comienzo de la filosofía o… nada de nada. La misma nada como ahora, no se percibe más como tal. Así que el futuro no vendrá por sí mismo. Tenemos que hacerlo. Pero antes hay que destruir lo que es o parece ser.

M. P.: Como veo en Facebook y páginas de Internet, hay un montón de gente dispuesta a algún cambio revolucionario de paradigma en su mente, e incluso quizás a revoluciones físicas. ¿Son cambios reales que vienen a nuestro mundo? ¿Podría predecir cuándo y cómo?

A. D.: El cambio de paradigma es absolutamente necesario. No veo suficientes hombres y mujeres dispuestos a cambiarse a sí mismos y el mundo que los rodea. Pero veo algo. Es demasiado pequeño para la esperanza, pero demasiado grande para la desesperación. Me gustaría ver medidas más decididas y concretas. Es bueno que algunos comiencen a despertar. Obviamente el odio a Occidente, a la globalización, al consumismo, a los medios de comunicación, a las mentiras democráticas, a la basura de los derechos humanos, a la dictadura del capitalismo, a la llamada “sociedad civil” y a la dominación estadounidense es cada vez mayor. Así que debemos ir más allá. La vigilia significa la revolución y la guerra. Es poco probable que comience ahora. Pero deberían comenzar ahora mismo, porque mañana será demasiado tarde.

M. P.: Deseándole todo lo mejor y dándole las gracias por las respuestas, la última pregunta por ahora: ¿cuáles son las principales ideas en las que está trabajando actualmente?

A. D.: Algunos proyectos actuales son:

-El manual de Relaciones Internacionales para las universidades rusas.
-La teoría de mundo multipolar (publicada, pero aún en desarrollo).
-El desarrollo de la Cuarta Teoría Política.
-Estudios de Heidegger en el campo de la filosofía (He escrito dos libros sobre Heidegger ya y seguiré trabajando sobre el mismo tema).
-El tradicionalismo (Henri Corbin, el círculo Eranos – Recientemente he comprado todos los números de la Eranos Jahrbuch en Suiza).
-La sociología de la imaginación (en el estilo de G.Durand – Hice hace dos años el doctorado sobre el tema).
-Nuevos libros de geopolítica (geopolítica histórica de Rusia, las regiones del mundo, y así sucesivamente).
-Platonismo y neoplatonismo, eurasianismo (por supuesto).
-La teología ortodoxa.
-Antropología Social y etnosociología.
-Economía (vías alternativas).
-Estudios conservadores.

También:

-La enseñanza en la Universidad Estatal de Moscú (siendo jefe del departamento de Sociología de Relaciones Internacionales) – Relaciones Internacionales, Geopolítica, Etnosociología, Sociología.
-Conferencias (en todo el mundo)
-Asesorar al Gobierno ruso y el Parlamento (siendo miembro oficial del consejo de asesores del jefe del Estado del Parlamento, S. Narishkin).
-Dirigir el Movimiento Eurasiático Internacional

M. P.: Gracias.

A. D.: De nada

Fuente: The Four Political Theory

Dugin und Heidegger

Dugin und Heidegger

von David Beetschen

Ex: http://www.blauenarzisse.de

Alexander Dugins „Vierte politische Theorie“ sorgte für kontroverse Debatten. Um den Kern seiner propagierten authentischen Existenz zu erfassen, muss man sich mit Heideggers Seinsfrage auseinandersetzen.

Treffend hat Markus Willinger in seinem Artikel über „Dugins Alternative“ erwähnt, dass der Kern der Theorie nicht klar herausgeschält wird. Insbesondere umschreibt er nicht genau die Basis, auf der das Subjekt der vierten politischen Theorie gründet.

Das Sammelbecken der antiliberalen Strömungen

Die vierte politische Theorie ist als Sammelbecken konzipiert für alle Menschen, die sich gegen Globalisierung und Amerikanismus wenden, der als Leitkultur fungiert. Um dies zu verwirklichen, versucht diese Theorie die Kräfte zu bündeln, also die Menschen, die sich für die zweite und dritte politische Theorie einsetzen, wie auch für alle anderen antiliberalen Strömungen.

Dies bedeutet aber nicht, dass die vierte politische Theorie ein Synkretismus der ersten drei darstellt, oder lediglich eine gegenaufklärerische Bewegung. Die vierte politische Theorie darf nicht mit einer der anderen verwechselt werden, insbesondere nicht mit der zweiten oder dritten.

Die Theorie schält die positiven Aspekte der anderen drei Theorien heraus: beim Liberalismus die „Freiheit“, dahingehend, dass man keine Tyrannei will. Bei der zweiten den Aspekt der Solidarität und bei der dritten die von Rassismus, Chauvinismus und Xenophobie befreite Idee des Ethnos. Ein wichtiger Punkt ist, dass Dugin selbst dazu aufruft, antifaschistische und antikommunistische Ressentiments beiseite zu legen, da diese nichts anderes seien als Instrumente in den Händen der Liberalen.

Das Subjekt der vierten politischen Theorie

Die vierte politische Theorie hat als neues politisches Subjekt nach dem Individuum, der Klasse, der Rasse und dem Staat eine Heideggersche Kategorie erhalten. Hierzu soll der Terminus „Dasein“ genutzt werden, der von Heidegger in seiner Fundamentalontologie anstelle von „Mensch“ gebraucht wird, um sich von der traditionellen Philosophie und ihren Vorurteilen abzugrenzen.

So soll „Dasein“ der Philosophie die Möglichkeit bieten, an die unmittelbaren Lebenserfahrungen des Einzelnen anzuknüpfen. Um sich insbesondere von Kants Erkenntnistheorie abzugrenzen, ging Heidegger nicht von einem „erkennenden Subjekt“ aus, sondern von einem „verstehenden Dasein“.

Nach der Definition von „Dasein“ soll hier nun nicht die ganze Fundamentalontologie Heideggers ausgebreitet, sondern direkt das aufgegriffen werden, was für die vierte politische Theorie wichtig ist und dies ist Heideggers „Man“. Dieses „Man“ bildet den Lebenshintergrund des Daseins, in allen kulturellen, gesellschaftlichen und geschichtlichen Aspekten, in die das „Dasein“ durch die „Geworfenheit“ eingebettet ist.

„Dasein“ und „eigentliches Sein“

Dieser Lebenshintergrund in Form der Kultur gibt dem Menschen gewisse Möglichkeiten, die er ohne sie nicht hätte. Jedoch kann die Kultur das Denken und Handeln des Daseins vorbestimmen, ohne dass ihm dies wirklich bewusst wird, wodurch es bestimmten Verhaltensmustern und Weltanschauungen ausgesetzt ist. Heidegger nannte diese Situation des Ausgeliefertseins „uneigentliche Existenz“.

Diesen Zustand konstatiert Heidegger als Ausgangspunkt, in welchen der durchschnittliche Mensch hineingeboren wird. Die Vorherbestimmung der kulturellen und gesellschaftlichen Verhaltensangebote nimmt dem „Dasein“ sein „eigentliches Sein“ weg. Wer ihm das wegnimmt, sind „die Anderen“, wobei hier keine spezifische Person gemeint ist, sondern das „Dasein“ in seiner Alltäglichkeit als „Man“.

Folgender Satz soll die Idee dahinter vergegenwärtigen: „Wir genießen und vergnügen uns, wie man genießt; wir lesen, sehen und urteilen über Literatur und Kunst, wie man urteilt; wir ziehen uns aber auch vom ‚großen Haufen‘ zurück, wie man sich zurückzieht.“ Diese Überlegungen brachten Heidegger dazu, folgenden radikalen Schluss zu ziehen: „Jeder ist der Andere und Keiner er selbst.“

Möglichkeit des authentischen Lebens

Als Gegenkonzept zur Fremdbestimmung des Daseins führt Heidegger das „eigentliche Selbstsein“ ins Feld, das eine „existenzielle“ Modifikation des „Man“ sei. Hierfür stellt er dem „Man“ die „Jemeinigkeit“ (dies ist jenseits von ich und wir) entgegen, wobei er nach einem möglichen Weg für ein authentisches Leben sucht, dem Weg vom „eigentlichen Selbst-​sein-​können“.

Um diesen Weg zu finden, macht Heidegger eine Analyse des Verhaltens des Daseins in Bezug auf seine Existenzialien. Diese umriss er bei einer phänomenologischen Analyse des Daseins, um dessen Struktur und Verhalten geistig zu begegnen. So sind nach ihm die Existenzialien des Daseins:

1. Die „Geworfenheit“ – der Mensch ist in sein kulturelles Überlieferungsgeschehen hineingeworfen;
2. Der „Entwurf“ – Das Dasein versteht die Welt, ergreift Möglichkeiten darin oder ergreift sie nicht;
3. Die Verfallenheit an die Welt – Das Dasein ist „bei“ den Gegenständen und Personen, die ihm als unmittelbarer Orientierungspunkt dienen.

Durch die Verbindung dieser drei Punkte in einer Einheit erkennt Heidegger das „Sein von Dasein“ und definiert es als „Sich-vorweg-schon-sein-in-(der-Welt) als Sein-​bei (innerweltlich begegnendem Seienden)“. Nun definiert Heidegger, daraus ableitend, die Possibilitäten, die sich als eigentliche Existenz erweisen und kommt dabei auf zwei verschiedene Lösungen, die in Bezug auf seine Zeitlehre stehen. Hierfür ist ein anderer Terminus sehr wichtig, die „Sorge“, was die Heideggersche Abkürzung für das „Sein des Daseins“ ist.

Die Bestimmung des Daseins

Diese Sorge hat jedoch weder mit der Besorgnis etwas zu tun, noch mit der Sorglosigkeit, sondern ist eine Seinsweise des Menschen, die primär im praktischen Umgang mit seiner Umwelt liegt, worauf er auch eine theoretische Erfassung derselben vornehmen kann, aber nicht bloß im erkennenden Anschauen derselben endet.

Heidegger versucht nun, die Bestimmung des Daseins als ein „Sein zum Tode“ hin genauer zu betrachten. Er kommt dabei zum Schluss, dass die Zeitlichkeit des Daseins ihm erst die Möglichkeit biete, sich auf den Tod hin einzustellen, wobei er schlussendlich subsumiert: „Zeitlichkeit ist der Sinn der Sorge.“ Diesen Sinn findet er in drei Ekstasen, die er in Bezug auf die „Sorge“ ordnet:

1. „Schon-​sein-​in-​der-​Welt“ = Gewesenheit;
2. „Sein-​bei“ = Gegenwart;
3. „Sich-​vorweg-​sein“ = Zukunft.

Hiermit wurde nun die Basis gelegt, um das „eigentliche Selbst-​sein-​können“ zu finden und auf die beiden Lösungen zu stoßen, die Heidegger so darstellte:

1. Die erste Möglichkeit liegt in der zeitlichen Ekstase des Zukünftigen, auf das sich das „Dasein“ hin „entwirft“, durch die Ausrichtung des Lebens auf von ihm selbst geprüfte und als erstrebenswert erachtete Interessen.
2. Die zweite Möglichkeit fußt auf der zeitlichen Ekstase der „Gewesenheit“, wobei sich das „Dasein“ seine Idole in der Vergangenheit sucht und die vergangene Möglichkeit des „eigentlichen Selbst-​sein-​können“ nicht nachmacht, sondern wiederholt, worin nun die Chance für das gegenwärtige Dasein liegt, selber das „eigentliche Selbst-​sein-​können“ auszuleben.

Die Fremdbestimmung des Daseins überwinden

An diesem Punkte setzt die vierte politische Theorie ein, die genau darum besorgt ist, dass dem Menschen die Möglichkeit bleibt, das „eigentliche Selbst-​sein-​können“ zu entfalten, indem der Mensch die Taten der gewesenen „Helden“ wiederholen kann. Um die Worte Dugins zu benutzen, steht die vierte politische Theorie für „Dasein“ ein, um ihm die Chance auf eine authentische Existenz zu gewähren, um die letzten Überbleibsel zu retten, „which makes man an existential being.“

Aus diesen Betrachtungen leitet sich ab, dass die Welt multipolar werden muss und die unipolare Hegemonie des Amerikanismus abschütteln sollte. Ja, sie muss die Kultur der „Fremdbestimmung des Daseins“ überwinden, wenn sie die „connection to the roots of …being“ wiederfinden will. Hier erscheint auch wieder die Vision Eurasien, wenn die Forderung nach dem Schmittschen „Großraum“ auftaucht. In diesen Großräumen könnten sich die Kulturen souverän selbständig organisieren, verteilt auf die Kontinente, fern aber von jedem Imperialismus.

Der Feind ist der Liberalismus, nicht eine andere traditionelle Kultur

Auch die Religionen, insbesondere in Form der Schule der Integralen Tradition, spielen eine essentielle Rolle für die Theorie, da auf der Grundlage der „inneren Einheit der Religionen“ eine Basis für ein inner– und außereurasisches Verständnis für die anderen Glaubensgemeinschaften gelegt wird. Es gibt keine Feindschaft mit Juden oder Moslems, sondern der Liberalismus wird als gemeinsamer Gegenspieler aufgefasst, der die Kulturen bedroht. Dies ist sicher ein wesentlicher Unterschied zu den identitären Blöcken, die gerne offen gegen den Islam auftreten.

Die vierte politische Theorie ist nicht als Dogma aufzufassen, sondern als eine Einladung Dugins an die oben genannten Gruppen, sich in der Bewegung einzufinden und konstruktive Kritik daran zu üben. So ist Dugins Buch The Fourth Political Theory nicht die Konzeption eines abgeschlossenen Systems, sondern ein Stein des Anstoßes, eine Frage, die Dugin gekonnt in den Raum stellt.

Anm. d. Red.: Alexander Geljewitsch Dugin wurde am 7. Januar 1962 in Moskau als Sohn eines sowjetischen Drei-​Sterne-​Generals und einer Ärztin geboren. Er spricht neun Sprachen, besitzt einen Doktortitel in Geschichts– und einen in Politikwissenschaft, ist verheiratet, hat zwei Kinder und gehört den Altorthodoxen an. Als Professor besitzt er einen Lehrstuhl für die Soziologie der internationalen Beziehungen an der Moskauer Staatsuniversität und fungiert seit längerer Zeit als Berater Putins in geopolitischen Fragen.

Beispiele bestehender Gruppierungen, die sich auf Dugins Theorie beziehen: Global Revolutionary Alliance, New Resistance, Eurasian Youth Union, International Eurasian Movement, Journal of Eurasian affairs, Eurasian Artists Association.

La geopolítica existencial de Carlo Terracciano

por Alexander Dugin

E: http://paginatransversal.wordpress.com

La elección de Carlo Terracciano

Creo que Carlo Terracciano es uno de los más importantes geopolíticos europeos de los últimos decenios. Estoy convencido de que va a ser reconocido como uno de los clásicos  autores modernos de esta disciplina. Tuve la oportunidad de conocer a Carlo Terracciano personalmente, y siempre he admirado la rectitud de su posición ideológica en la vida: La geopolítica era para él una elección existencial, vivió en plena conformidad con sus principios, lo que demuestra algo impensable en nuestra época: Una actitud personal romana, olímpica – la lealtad, el apego total a la causa, la integridad moral completa sin tener en cuenta los efectos de las presiones de la modernidad.

Carlo Terracciano era un hombre de ideas y un hombre de acción, al mismo tiempo. En su caso, la teoría y la práctica se fusionaron en algo indivisible. ¿Cuál era su idea principal y cuál fue su acto esencial?

El nacimiento de la geopolítica de la espuma del mar

Carlo Terracciano heredó la tradición geopolítica del continentalismo europeo. En sus escritos (recopilados en una serie de artículos en “Nel Fiume della storia”), traza la génesis ideológica de esta escuela. El imperialista británico H. Mackinder fue el primero en articular la principal ley geopolítica – oposición dualista entre la civilización del Mar (talasocracia) y la civilización de la Tierra (telurocracia). Mackinder mismo era un brillante representante de la talasocracia y se encargó de transmitir la tradición de la estrategia talasocrática, el procedimiento de la percepción geopolítica de Gran Bretaña a los Estados Unidos. Mackinder fue uno de los fundadores de la London School of Economics, contribuyó a la aparición de “Chattem House”, el Real Centro de Estudios Estratégicos e inspiró el primer equipo del CFR (Consejo de Relaciones Exteriores), publicando en «Foreign Affairs» sus posteriores artículos. De él al americano A. Mahan se puede trazar la línea recta de la geopolítica atlantista, pasando por el realismo americano (con algo de “liberalismo muscular”, transnacionalismo y globalización) hasta llegar a Kissinger, Brzezinski, D. Rockefeller, por un lado, y los neocons en el otro.

La hegemonía planetaria de Estados Unidos y la idea de talasocracia global con el Gobierno Mundial deriva de la visión planetaria de Mackinder, llevada a sus límites lógicos. El mundo puede llegar a ser realmente global, sólo cuando el poder del Mar definitivamente acabe con el poder de la Tierra (o viceversa). Ese fue el objetivo de la vida de Mackinder. Y ahora vemos que muchos de sus proyectos se cumplen: insistía en el desmantelamiento de Rusia, en la creación de un “cordón sanitario” en Europa del Este, en la necesidad de derrotar a Alemania y Rusia, y todo esto de alguna manera se realizó a finales del siglo XX, proporcionando así las condiciones para el surgimiento de un mundo unipolar y la hegemonía global de EE.UU. Este imperio talasocrático se convierte en una realidad ante nuestros ojos.

Respuesta Continental

 

Pero en el primer cuarto del siglo XX, el desafío conceptual de H. Mackinder fue contestado por los geopolíticos que se ubicaron en el lado de la telurocracia. Se trataba, en primer lugar, de la escuela alemana de Karl Haushofer, quien comenzó a desarrollar una base geopolítica telurocrática, Geopolítica-2 (mientras que la geopolítica talasocrática anglosajona se puede llamar “Geopolítica-1″). Así se sentaron las bases para la tradición continentalista.

La escuela de Haushofer ofreció a Alemania realizar su naturaleza telurocrática y unificar Europa sobre la base continental; para lograrlo era necesario concluir una alianza con la Unión Soviética y fortalecer los lazos con Japón y así destruir la talasocracia mundial – la alianza de Inglaterra, EE.UU. y Francia. La consolidación de todas las potencias terrestres era la única manera de deshacerse de las potencias marítimas y la tentación de organizar el espacio mundial bajo su modelo talasocrático. Este concepto fue desarrollado por el proyecto de una nueva división del mundo sobre la base de las Pan-ideas – cuatro áreas que iban a ser integradas económicamente, políticamente y estratégicamente a lo largo del meridiano – de norte a sur. Haushofer había creado un importante baluarte conceptual de la Geopolítica-2, con el cual se sentaban las bases para el continentalismo europeo en el que Alemania fue concebida como el centro de la telurocracia europea (un hecho natural reconocido por el propio Mackinder).

Tras la derrota de Alemania y las potencias del Eje en la Segunda Guerra Mundial la geopolítica telurocrática ha sido desacreditada durante mucho tiempo y se perdió entre las sombras. Autores americanos han llegado a sugerir que habría que distinguir la anglosajona «Geopolitics» de la alemana «Geopolitik», identificando la primera como un “método completamente aceptable de análisis de la ciencia política en el ámbito de las relaciones internacionales”, y la segunda como”Fantasías imperialistas”. En estas definiciones de lo que es “científico” y lo que no, vemos sólo el típico doble rasero y la clásica propaganda política de los ganadores. Las potencias marítimas derrotaron a las potencias terrestres, y establecieron una disciplina colonial – en particular en el campo de la ciencia, porque el conocimiento, como Michel Foucault ha mostrado, es sinónimo de poder.

Sin embargo, la escuela continentalista de la geopolítica telurocrática continuó existiendo en Europa en condiciones marginales también después de la Segunda Guerra Mundial. Los ejemplos son las obras del general austríaco Jordis von Lohausen, el teórico belga y fundador del movimiento pan-europeo “Joven Europa” Jean Thiriart (a quien, casualmente, Carlo Terracciano encontró por primera vez en Moscú en mi apartamento en 1992) y el destacado filósofo francés Alain de Benoist. La característica principal de esta continental Gepolítica 2 es la visión del mundo desde el punto de vista de la Tierra. De esto podemos deducir fácilmente el papel de cada jugador en la “gran guerra de los continentes.” Los que están en el lado de la Tierra están automáticamente contra el mar, es decir, contra el mundo anglosajón, en contra de la dominación de EE.UU. y en contra de la globalización occidental  (mundialismo).

Testimonio telurocrático de Carlo Terracciano

Carlo Terracciano era un sucesor directo de la tradición geopolítica continentalista, el teórico más notable y persistente practicante de la Geopolítica-2. Su obra es quizás el ejemplo más completo y coherente de esta tradición. No se limita a seguir reciclando teorías pre-existentes, sino que aplica los principios básicos de la geopolítica telurocrática para analizar la situación actual en el mundo. No dejó una sombra de duda en su elección personal: habla en nombre de todo el continente de Europa, de la telurocracia. En las condiciones de ocupación y dominación atlantista talasocrática es un gesto viril de la rebelión espiritual y cognitiva. Así Terracciano lleva a cabo un acto simbólico importante: lo que constituye el polo subjetivo, dotado de la voluntad y de la mente, que surge del vertedero de la Europa post-moderna, convirtiéndose en un proyecto alternativo revolucionario de los países de Europa. Ésta posible pero aún no realizable Europa surge – aunque sea sólo en teoría – de entre las ruinas de la modernidad agonizante. Terracciano es una especie de testigo geopolítico, en sus escritos y acciones testifica que la victoria del Mar no es absoluta y que en Europa permanece una red de decidida resistencia geopolítica continentalista y que esta red es plenamente consciente de la naturaleza, finalidad y participaciones en la gran guerra de los continentes. Por lo tanto, Carlo Terracciano está salvando la geopolítica continental europea tradicional, preparando así el restablecimiento teórico de Europa.

Terracciano como Eurasiatista

Además, el momento decisivo en la evolución de las teorías Carlo Terracciano fue su encuentro con la tradición geopolítica eurasiatista restablecida en Rusia desde finales de los 80. La escuela moderna eurasiatista rusa de la geopolítica fue fundada a finales de los años 80 como una reflexión geopolítica post-soviética en la visión de mundo de Mackinder, como una especie de respuesta al desafío talasocrático. La lógica constituyente de la construcción de la geopolítica Eurasiatista era muy similar a la génesis de la geopolítica alemana de la escuela de Haushofer. Pero en el caso de Rusia, la simetría era aún más perfecta: Mackinder identificó como el principal enemigo del poder marítimo al Heartland, cuyo control garantiza a la talasocracia la dominación del mundo. Los eurasiatistas rusos en los últimos años 80 aceptaron el marco principal del mapa geopolítico y acordaron reconocer la esencia de la historia de Rusia en la telurocracia. La Rusia es el Heartland, así Geopolítica-2 es la causa rusa. Así se sentaron las bases del moderno neo-eurasismo.

La geopolítica euroasiática rusa se reunió con el continentalismo europeo en 1992 – durante una visita conjunta a Moscú de Carlo Terracciano y Jean Thiriart. Jean Thiriart fue el autor del concepto de “Imperio Euro- soviético de Vladivostok a Dublín” y Carlo Terracciano en esa época escribió su obra programática “En la espuma de la historia” (“Nel fiume della Storia”). Desde entonces el continentalismo europeo y el eurasismo ruso se convirtieron casi en la misma  línea geopolítica. Algo similar se describe en el concepto de Haushofer del proyecto continental del bloque geopolítico “Berlín-Moscú-Tokio”. La misma idea fue revivida en el plano teórico en los años 90 en Rusia. El estrecho diálogo geopolítico ruso – europeo comenzó entonces en Moscú y sigue creciendo hasta la actualidad. Al mismo tiempo, otros geopolíticos europeos, en particular Alain de Benoist y Claudio Mutti, visitaron Moscú, entrando en la misma dirección de consideraciones geopolíticas. En Francia, unos puntos de vista muy similares fueron desarrollados por el excelente escritor tradicionalista Jean Parvulesco.

Carlo Terracciano tuvo en esa amistad eurasiática el papel principal. Con una energía apasionada comenzó a desarrollar la tendencia eurasiatista, invitando a la unión en un bloque continental telurocrático de todos aquellas fuerzas inconformistas contra el status quo. Su obra, aunque se ha desarrollado en el ámbito de una élite intelectual y de escuelas geopolíticas, ha tenido un impacto considerable. Las ideas son importantes, y cualquier acción política siempre se inicia con el proyecto, el programa, la estrategia.

Islam y telurocracia

El análisis de la situación actual ha llevado a Carlo Terracciano a la conclusión de que muchos países islámicos y la civilización islámica en su conjunto debe ser considerada como una aliada crucial en la alianza telurocrática en la lucha común contra la hegemonía estadounidense y la globalización plutocrática. Por lo tanto, la importancia del factor islámico se ha convertido en un componente vital del neocontinentalismo moderno. Terracciano debe considerarse como uno de sus fundadores. El Islam es un Poder telurocrático – esta fue la conclusión a la que llegó Carlo Terracciano. Se convirtió desde entonces en una especie de axioma geopolítico para el eurasismo contemporáneo.

Terracciano hizo una serie de viajes y dio una serie de conferencias en los países islámicos – Irán, Siria, etc, promoviendo por todas partes la geopolítica euroasiática continentalista. Ideas y acciones, como siempre en el caso de Carlo Terracciano no difirieron.

Nacional comunismo

La formación de puntos de vista geopolíticos han estado acompañados por Terracciano con los correspondientes cambios ideológicos y políticos. La apelación a los criterios geopolíticos, los conceptos y la evaluación del significado crucial de telurocracia exigió la revisión de los fundamentos políticos del patriotismo clásico europeo, que por lo general se refiere a la “Tercera Posición” (anti-liberalismo y anti-comunismo), en el espíritu de Evola, Heidegger y Yockey. Si aceptamos el punto de vista de la potencia terrestre, la Unión Soviética pasó inmediatamente de ser uno de los dos enemigos de Europa (junto con el Occidente capitalista liberal, personificada en los EE.UU.) a ser un aliado. Esto requiere una revisión radical de la “Tercera Posición” y la transición a una fusión entre el europeísmo y el sovietismo, el nacional-bolchevismo. Por una evolución semejante a mediados de los 80′ pasó el máximo teórico de la europea “Nouvelle Droite” Alain de Benoist. A diferencia de muchos otros “nacional revolucionarios” Carlo Terracciano, sin dudarlo, aceptó la dirección ideológica nacional-comunista y se convirtió en uno de los líderes del comunismo nacional en Italia. El Anti-sovietismo y el anticomunismo (sobre todo ahora, después de la caída de la Unión Soviética) se convirtieron en obsoletos y sirven como herramientas en las manos de talasocracia, los liberales y los globalistas. Así que cada ciudadano europeo coherentemente revolucionario debe resueltamente terminar con eso y cooperar activamente con todas las fuerzas de izquierda que luchan contra la hegemonía estadounidense y el capitalismo liberal, que encarnan la esencia de la talasocracia y la civilización del mar. Este giro a la izquierda de Terracciano fue la conclusión lógica de su análisis geopolítico, y él ha dado pasos más decisivos en esta dirección uniéndose así con la tradición de la “Joven Europa” (siguiendo el ejemplo de Claudio Mutti, amigo y colega de Carlo Terracciano ), y convirtiéndose en un pionero de las nuevas tendencias nacional-comunistas y eurasiatistas en la política moderna italiana y europea. Para esta posición política Carlo Terracciano consagró todo un libro bajo el expresivo nombre de “Comunismo Nacional”.

La justicia social es un valor de la sociedad tradicional. La jerarquía basada en el principio material y la estratificación de clases, que constituye la base del capitalismo, es el mal absoluto y debe ser abolida. La lucha contra el liberalismo, el capitalismo y la oligarquía global por la libertad, la justicia y el orden social basado en la solidaridad y la ayuda mutua es la principal tarea de los nacional-revolucionarios. No se puede tolerar compromiso alguno con la burguesía y sus valores mercantilistas, materialistas y egoístas. El hombre es un ser social. La tradición es una causa del ser colectivo, una causa social. Con el fin de afirmar la sociedad tradicional y aplicarla a escala mundial, es necesario destruir la cosmópolis capitalista fundada en la veneración incondicional del “becerro de oro”. Y en este caso las fuerzas de izquierdas que luchan por la justicia social, son aliadas y amigas, así como las fuerzas de la derecha, que defienden los valores tradicionales – como la espiritualidad, la fe y la fidelidad a las raíces (de hecho, todos éstos valores son incompatibles con el capitalismo y el espíritu comercial).

Tradicionalismo y la geopolítica de lo Sagrado

Por último, el aspecto crucial del pensamiento de Carlo Terracciano se asocia con el tradicionalismo y la Tradición. Terracciano siguió el camino trazado por Julius Evola, viéndose a sí mismo como portador de las tradiciones espirituales de Occidente, que se remontan a las profundidades de la antigüedad, al neoplatonismo greco-romano. Era respetuoso frente al Islam y el hinduismo, sentía simpatía por la ortodoxia griega y rusa, pero hasta el final de sus días se abstuvo de aclarar sus puntos de vista religiosos con una confesión concreta. Él era un tradicionalista y un fuerte partidario de los antiguos valores indoeuropeos. Estos valores, a su juicio, tenían que estar en el centro de la guerra santa que él libró contra el mundo moderno.

La tradición está ligada a la tierra. La modernidad está vinculada al mar. Telurocracia significa Tradición, la modernidad significa talasocracia. Así la geopolítica de Terracciano obtiene una dimensión sagrada. No es sólo un instrumento técnico para el correcto análisis político o la planificación estratégica, sino una ideología, una elección espiritual, una llamada para una batalla sagrada escatológica, un Endkampf, que nos exige movilizar todo nuestro ser.

Muy buen guerrero

Carlo Terracciano nos da un ejemplo de cómo debería ser la vida de un auténtico geopolítico en el campo de la ciencia, la teoría, la existencia, la ontología, la escatología. Esta es la movilización total del alma, el pago completo de las creencias de todo el contenido de la vida heroica y trágica.

Hoy en día muchos se quejan de que no hay más lugar para los actos heroicos y luchas, todo está condenado a perder desde el principio, nada puede dar resultados empíricos. Esto sólo demuestra debilidad, cobardía y bajeza. Si creemos en algo y nuestra fe es suficientemente fuerte, somos siempre capaces de cambiar el mundo. No hay enemigo imbatible para el ardiente espíritu humano. Carlo Terracciano nos da el ejemplo de un hombre que hasta su último aliento defendió sus creencias. Sus creencias son nuestras creencias. Su lucha es nuestra lucha. Y la lucha de aquellos que vendrán después de nosotros.

Confieso que no me interesa qué clase de hombre era Carlo Terracciano, aunque sus amigos afirman que era genial, amable, honesto. No importa. Es subjetivo. Objetivamente, él era un héroe. El verdadero héroe del continente, de la civilización de la tierra, de Eurasia. Y eso es mucho más importante. Sólo la idea sí importa. Y otra cosa también tiene importancia – la vida humana arrojada al fuego de una gran fe y una gran causa.

Un tradicional proverbio japonés dice: No sólo es bueno el guerrero que sirve honestamente a un buen Estado, bueno es el guerrero que sirve honestamente a cualquier estado – entre ellos el muy malo, y este servicio honesto es el que convierte al mal estado en uno bueno. Carlo Terracciano era un guerrero muy bueno. El guerrero de Europa.

Texto original: Open Revolt

Traducido para TM por Felix W.

Fuente: Tribulaciones Metapolíticas

Multipolarism as an Open Project

Alexander Dugin

Ex: http://www.eurasianaffairs.net

 Professor of the Moscow State University, Doctor of political sciences, founder of the contemporary Russian school of Geopolitics, leader of the International Social Movement “Eurasian Movement”, Moscow, Russian Federation.

 

I. Multipolarism and “Land Power”

Geopolitics of the Land in the Global World

In the previous part we discussed the subject of globalism, globalization, and mondialism in a view considered to be generally accepted and “conventional”. Geopolitical analysis of the phenomenon of the subject of globalism, globalization, and mondialism has showed that in the modern globalism we only deal with one of the two geopolitical powers, namely, with a thalassocracy, a “Sea Power” that from now on claims for uniqueness, totality, and normativeness and strives to pretend to be the only possible civilization, sociological and geopolitical condition of the world.

Therewith, the philosophy of globalism is based upon the internal surety with universalism of exactly the Western-European value system thought to be the summary of all the diverse experience of the human cultures on all stages of their history.

And finally, in its roots, globalization has an active ideology (mondialism) and power structures that spread and bring this ideology into use. If taking into account that the latter are the most authoritative intellectual US centers (such as CFR and neoconservatives), structures of the US Supreme Military Command and their analysts (Owens, Sibrowsky, Barnett, Garstka), international oligarchs (such as George Soros), a number of international organizations (The Bilderberg Club, Trilateral Commission, etc.), and innumerous amount of analysts, politicians, journalists, scientists, economists, people of culture and art, and IT sector employees spread all over the world, we can understand the reason why this ideology seems to be something that goes without saying for us. That we sometimes take globalization as an “objective process” is the result of a huge manipulation with public opinion and the fruit of a total information war.

Therefore, the picture of global processes we described is an affirmation of the real state of affairs just in part. In such a description, there is a significant share of a normative and imperative volitional (ideological) wish that everything should be quite so, which means, it is based upon wrenches and, to some extent, striving to represent our wishful thinking as reality.

In this part, we will describe an absolutely different point of view on globalization and globalism that is impossible from inside the “Sea Power”, i.e. out of the environment of the nominal “Global World”. Such a view is not taken into account either in antiglobalism or in alterglobalism because it refuses from the most fundamental philosophical and ideological grounds of Eurocentrism.  Such a view rejects the faith in:

•  universalism of the Western values, that Western societies, in their history, have passed the only possible way all the other countries are expected to pass;
• progress as an indisputable forwardness of historical and social development;
• that it is limitless technical, economical, and material development, which is the answer for the most vital needs of all humankind;
• that people of all cultures, religions, civilizations, and ethnoses are principally the same as the people of the West and they are governed by the same anthropological motives;
• absolute superiority of capitalism over other sociopolitical formations;
• absence of any alternative for market economy;
• that liberal democracy is the only acceptable form of political organization of the society;
• individual freedom and individual identity as the superior value of human being;
• liberalism as a historically inevitable, higher-priority, and optimal ideology.

In other words, we proceed to the position of the “Land Power” and consider the present moment of the world history from the point of view of Geopolitics-2, or the thalassocratic geopolitics as an episode of the “Great Continent War”, not as its conclusion.

Of course, it is difficult to refuse that the present moment of historical development demonstrates a number of unique features that, if desired, can be interpreted as the ultimate victory of the Sea over the Land, Carthage over Rome and Leviathan over Behemoth. Indeed, never in history the “Sea Power” was such a serious success and stretched might and influence of its paradigm in such a scale. Of course, Geopolitics-2 acknowledges this fact and the consequences included. But it clearly realizes that globalization can be also interpreted otherwise, namely, as a series of victories in combats and battles, not as the ultimate win in the war.

Here, a historical analogy suggests itself: when German troops were approaching to Moscow in 1941, one could think that everything was lost and the end of the USSR was foredoomed. The Nazi propaganda commented the course of the war quiet so: the “New Order” is created in the occupied territory, the authorities work, economical and political hierarchy is created, and the social life is organized. But the Soviet people kept on violently resisting – at all the fronts as well as in the rear of the enemy, while systematically moving to their goal and their victory.

Now, there is precisely this moment in the geopolitical stand of the Sea and the Land. Information policy inside the “Sea Power” is built so as no-one has any doubt that globalism is an accomplished fact and the global society has come about in its essential features, that all the obstacles from now on are of a technical character. But from certain conceptual, philosophical, sociological, and geopolitical positions, all of it can be challenged by suggesting an absolutely different vision of the situation. All the point is in interpretation. Historical facts make no sense without interpretation. Likewise in geopolitics: any state of affairs in the field of geopolitics only makes sense in one or another interpretation. Globalism is interpreted today almost exclusively in the Atlantist meaning and, thus, the “sea” sense is put into it. A view from the Land’s position doesn’t change the state of affairs but it does change its sense. And this, in many cases, is of fundamental importance.

Further, we will represent the view on globalization and globalism from the Land’s position – geopolitical, sociological, philosophical, and strategical.

Grounds for Existence of Geopolitics-2 in the Global World

How can we substantiate the very possibility of a view on globalization on the part of the Land, assuming that the structure of the global world, as we have shown, presupposes marginalization and fragmentation of the Land?

There are several grounds for this.

1. The human spirit (conscience, will, faith) is always capable to formulate its attitude to any ambient phenomenon and even if this phenomenon is presented as invincible, integral, and “objective”, it is possible to take it in a different way – accept or reject, justify or condemn. This is the superior dignity of man and his difference from animal species. And if man rejects and condemns something, he has the right to build strategies to overcome it in any, most difficult and insuperable, situations and conditions. The advance of the global society can be accepted and approved but it can be rejected and condemned as well. In the former case, we float adrift the history, in the latter one – we seek a “fulcrum” to stop this process. History is made by people and the spirit plays the central part here. Hence, there is a theoretical possibility to create a theory radically opposite to the views that are built on the base of the “Sea Power” and accept basic paradigms of the Western view on the things, course of history, and logic of changing sociopolitical structures.
2. The geopolitical method allows to identify globalization as a subjective process connected with a success of one of the two global powers. Be the Land ever so “marginal and fragmentized», it has serious historical grounds behind itself, traditions, experience, sociological and civilization background. The Land’s geopolitics is not built on a void place; this is a tradition that generalizes some fundamental historical, geographical, and strategical trends. Therefore, even on the theoretical level, estimation of globalization from the position of Geopolitics-2 is absolutely relevant. Just as well as there is the “subject” of globalization in its center (mondialism and its structures), the Land Power can and does have its own subjective embodiment. In spite of a huge scale and massive forms of the historical polemics of civilizations, we, first of all, deal with a stand of minds, ideas, concepts, theories, and only then – with that of material things, devices, technologies, finances, weapons, etc.
3. The process of desovereignization of national states has not yet become nonreversible, and the elements of the Westphalian system are still being partly preserved. That means that a whole range of national states, by virtue of certain consideration, can still bank on realization of the land strategy, i.e. they can completely or partially reject globalization and the “Sea Power’s” paradigm. China is an example of it; it balances between globalization and its own land identity, strictly observing that the general balance is kept and that only what consolidates China as a sovereign geopolitical formation is borrowed from the global strategies. The same can be also said about the states the US have equaled to the “Axis of Evil” — Iran, Cuba, North Korea, Venezuela, Syria, etc. Of course, the threat of a direct intrusion of US troops hangs over these countries like the sword of Damocles (on the model of Iraq or Afghanistan), and they are continuously subject to more politic network attacks from inside. However, at the moment their sovereignty is preserved what makes them privileged areas for development of the Land Power. It is also possible to refer here a number of hesitant countries, such as India, Turkey and others, which, being significantly involved into the globalization orbit, preserve their original sociological features, getting out of accord with the official precepts of their governing regimes. Such situation is characteristic of many Asian. Latin-American and African societies. 
4. And, finally, the most general. — The present state of Heartland. The world dominance, as we know, and thus, reality or evanescence of monopolar globalization depends on it. In 1980-90-s, Heartland fundamentally reduced its influence area. Two geopolitical belts – Eastern Europe (whose countries were within the “Socialist Block”, “Warsaw Pact», Comecon, etc.) and the Federative Republics of the USSR consistently withdrew from it. By the mid 1990-s, a bloody testing for a possibility of further breakdown of Russia into “national republics” had started in Chechnya. This fragmentation of Heartland, down to a mosaic of marionette dependent states in place of Russia, had to become the final accord of construction of the global world and the “end of history”, after which it would be much more difficult to speak about the Land and Geopolitics-2. Heartland is of central importance in the possibility of strategical consolidation of all Eurasia and, thus, the “Land Power”. If the processes that took place in Russia in 1990-s had moved in a groove and its disintegration kept on, it would be much more difficult to challenge globalization. But since late 1990-s — early 2000-s, a turning-point has taken place in Russia, disintegration was stopped; moreover, the federal authorities have restored control over the rebellious Chechnya. Then V. Putin implemented a legal reform of the Federation subjects (excision of the article about “sovereignty”, governors’ appointment, etc.) that has consolidated the power vertical all over Russia. The CCI integration processes have started gathering pace. In August 2008, in the course of the five-day conflict of Russia with Georgia, Russia took its direct control over territories beyond the borders of the Russian Federation (Southern Ossetia, Abkhazia), and acknowledged their independence, in spite of a huge support of Georgia on the part of the US and the NATO countries and pressure of the international public opinion. Generally, since early 2000-s Russia as Heartland has ceased the processes of its self-disintegration, has reinforced its energetics, has normalized the issues of energy supply abroad, has refused from the practice of unilateral reduction of armaments, having preserved its nuclear potential. Whereby, influence of the network of geopolitical agents of Atlantism and Mondialism on the political authority and strategical decision making has qualitatively diminished, consolidation of the sovereignty has been understood as the top-priority issue, and integration of Russia into a number of globalist structures menacing its independence has been ceased. In a word, Heartland keeps on remaining the foundation of Eurasia, its “Core” — weakened, suffered very serious losses, but still existing, independent, sovereign, and capable to pursue a policy, if not on a global scale, then on a regional one. In its history, Russia has several times fallen yet lower: the Domain Fragmentation on the turn of the 13^th century, The Time of Troubles, and the events of 1917-1918 show us Heartland in a yet more deplorable and weakened condition. But every time, in some period, Russia revived and returned to the orbit of its geopolitical history again. The present state of Russia is difficult to recognize brilliant or even satisfactory from the geopolitical (Eurasian) point of view. Yet in general — Heartland does exist, it is relatively independent, and therefore, we have both a theoretical and practical base to consolidate and bring to life all the pre-conditions for development of a response to the phenomenon of monopolar globalization on the part of the Land.

Such an answer of the Land to the challenge of globalization (as a triumph of the “Sea Power”) is Multipolarism, as a theory, philosophy, strategy, policy, and practice.

Multipolarism as a Project of the World Order from the Land’s Position

Multipolarism represents a summary of Geopolitics-2 in actual conditions of the global process evolution. This is an extraordinarily capacious concept that demands a through consideration.

Multipolarism is a real antithesis for monopolarity in all its aspects: hard (imperialism, neocons, direct US domination), soft (multilateralism) and critical (alterglobalism, postmodernism, and neo-Marxism) ones.

The hard monopolarity version (radical American imperialism) is based upon the idea that the US represents the last citadel of the world order, prosperity, comfort, safety, and development surrounded by a chaos of underdeveloped societies. Multipolarism states the directly opposite: the US is a national state that exists among many others, its values are doubtful (or, at least, relative), its claims are disproportional, its appetites are excessive, methods of conducting its foreign policy are inacceptable, and its technological messianism is disastrous for the culture and ecology of the whole world.  In this regard, the multipolar project is a hard antithesis to the US as an instance that methodically builds a unipolar world, and it is aimed to strongly disallow, break up, and prevent this construction.

The soft monopolarity version does not only act on behalf of the US, but on behalf of “humanity”, exclusively understanding it as the West and the societies that agree with universalism of Western values. Soft monopolarity does not claim to press by force, but persuade, not to compel, but explain profits peoples and countries will obtain from entering into globalization. Here the pole is not a single national state (the US), but Western civilization as a whole, as a quintessence of all the humanity.

Such, as it is sometimes called, “multilateral” monopolarity (multilateralism, multilateralization) is rejected by Multipolarism that considers Western culture and Western values to represent merely one axiological composition among many others, one culture among different other cultures, and cultures and value systems based on some absolutely different principles to have the full right for existence. Consequently, the West in a whole and those sharing its values, have no grounds to insist on universalism of democracy, human rights, market, individualism, individual freedom, secularity, etc. and build a global society on the base of these guidelines.

Against alterglobalism and postmodern antiglobalism, Multipolarism advances a thesis that a capitalist phase of development and construction of worldwide global capitalism is not a necessary phase of society development, that it is despotism and an ambition to dictate different societies some kind of single history scenario. In the meantime, confusion of mankind into the single global proletariat is not a way to a better future, but an incidental and absolutely negative aspect of the global capitalism, which does not open any new prospects and only leads to degradation of cultures, societies, and traditions. If peoples do have a chance to organize effective resistance to the global capitalism, it is only where Socialist ideas are combined with elements of a traditional society (archaic, agricultural, ethnical, etc.), as it was in the history of the USSR, China, North Korea, Vietnam and takes place today in some Latin-American countries (e. g., in Bolivia, Venezuela, Cuba, etc.).

Further, Multipolarism is an absolutely different view on the space of land than bipolarity, a bipolar world.

Multipolarism represents a normative and imperative view on the present situation in the world on the part of the Land and it qualitatively differs from the model predominated in the Yalta World in the period of the “Cold War”.

The Bipolar World was constructed under the ideological principle, where two ideologies – Capitalism and Socialism – acted as poles. Socialism as an ideology did not challenge universalism of the West-European culture and represented a sociocultural and political tradition that threw back to the European Enlightenment. In a certain sense, Capitalism and Socialism competed with each other as two versions of Enlightenment, two versions of progress, two versions of universalism, two versions of the West-European sociopolitical idea.

Socialism and Marxism entered into a resonance with certain parameters of the “Land Power”, and therefore they did not win where Marx had supposed, but where he excluded this possibility – in an agricultural country with the predominant way of life of a traditional society and imperial organization of the political field. Another case of an (independent) victory of Socialism – China – also represented an agricultural, traditional society.

Multipolarism does not oppose monopolarity from the position of a single ideology that could claim for the second pole, but it does from the position of many ideologies, a plenty of cultures, world-views and religions that (each for its own reasons) have nothing in common with the Western liberal capitalism.  In a situation, when the Sea has a unified ideological aspect (however, ever more going to the sphere of subauditions, not explicit declarations), and the Land itself doesn’t, representing itself as several different world-view and civilization ensembles, Multipolarism suggests creating a united front of the Land against the Sea.

Multipolarism is different from both the conservative project of conservation and reinforcement of national states. On the one hand, national states in both colonial and post-colonial period reflect the West-European understanding of a normative political organization (that ignores any religious, social, ethnical, and cultural features of specific societies) in their structures, i.e. the nations themselves are partially products of globalization. And on the other hand, it is only a minor part of the two hundred fifty-six countries officially itemized in the UN list today that are, if necessary, capable to defend their sovereignty by themselves, without entering into a block or alliance with other countries. It means that not each nominal sovereign state can be considered a pole, as the degree of strategical freedom of the vast majority of the countries acknowledged is negligible. Therefore, reinforcement of the Westphalian system that still mechanically exists today is not an issue of Multipolarism.

Being the opposition of monopolarity, Multipolarism does not call to either return to the bipolar world on the base of ideology or to fasten the order of national states, or to merely preserve the status quo. All these strategies will only play in hands of globalization and monopolarity centers, as they have a project, a plan, a goal, and a rational route of movement to future; and all the scenarios enumerated are at best an appeal to a delay of the globalization process, and at worst (restoration of bipolarity on the base of ideology) look like irresponsible fantasy and nostalgia.

Multipolarism is a vector of the Land’s geopolitics directed to the future. It is based upon a sociological paradigm whose consistency is historically proven in the past and which realistically takes into account the state of affairs existing in the modern world and basic trends and force lines of its probable transformations. But Multipolarism is constructed on this basis as a project, as a plan of the world order we yet only expect to create.

2 Multipolarism and its Theoretical Foundation

The absence of the Multipolarism Theory

In spite of the fact that the term “Multipolarism” is quite often used in political and international discussions recently, its meaning is rather diffuse and inconcrete. Different circles and separate analysts and politicians insert their own sense in it. Well-founded researches and solid scientific monographs devoted to Multipolarism can be counted on fingers[1]. Even serious articles on this topic are quite rare[2]. The reason for this is well understood: as the US and Western countries set the parameters of the normative political and ideological discourse in a global scale today, according to these rules, whatever you want can be discussed but the sharpest and most painful questions. Even those considering unipolarity to have been just a “moment[3]” in the 1990-s and a transfer to some new indefinite model to be taking place now are ready to discuss any versions but the “multipolar” one. Thus, for example, the modern head of CFR Richard Haass tells about “Non-Polarity” meaning such stage of globalization where necessity in presence of a rigid center falls off by itself[4]. Such wiles are explained by the fact that one of the aims of globalization is, as we have seen, marginalization of the “Land Power”. And as far as Multipolarism can only be a form of an active strategy of the “Land Power” in the new conditions, any reference to it is not welcome by the West that sets the trend in the structure of political analysis in the general global context. Still less one should expect that conventional ideologies of the West take up development of the Multipolarism Theory.

It would be logical to assume that the Multipolarism Theory will be developed in the countries that explicitly declare orientation upon a multipolar world as the general vector of their foreign policy. The number of such countries includes Russia, China, India, and some others. Besides, the address to Multipolarism can be encountered in texts and documents of some European political actors (e.g., former French minister of Foreign Affairs Hubert Vidrine[5]). But at the moment, we can as well hardly find something more than materials of several symposiums and conferences with rather vague phrases in this field. One has to state that the topic of Multipolarism is not properly conceptualized also in the countries that proclaim it as their strategical goal, not to mention the absence a distinct and integral theory of Multipolarism.

Nevertheless, on the base of the geopolitical method from the position of the “Land Power” and with due account for the analysis of a phenomenon called globalism, it is quite possible to formulate some absolute principles that must underlie the Multipolarism Theory when the matter comes to its more systemized and expanded development.

Multipolarism: Geopolitics and Meta-Ideology

Let’s blueprint some theoretical sources, on whose base a valuable theory of Multipolarism must be built.

It is only geopolitics that can be the base for this theory in the actual conditions. At the moment, no religious, economical, political, social, cultural or economical ideology is capable to pull together the critical mass of the countries and societies that refer to the “Land Power” in a single planetary front necessary to make a serious and effective antithesis to globalism and the unipolar world. This is the specificity of the historical moment (“The Unipolar Moment”[6]): the dominating ideology (the global liberalism/post-liberalism) has no symmetrical opposition on its own level. Hence, it is necessary to directly appeal to geopolitics by taking the principle of the Land, the Land Power, instead of the opposing ideology. It is only possible in the case if the sociological, philosophical, and civilization dimensions of geopolitics are realized to the full extent.

The “Sea Power” will serve us as a proof for this statement. We have seen that the very matrix of this civilization does not only occur in the Modem Period, but also in thalassocratic empires of the Antiquity (e.g., in Carthage), in the ancient Athens or in the Republic of Venice. And within the Modern World itself atlantism and liberalism do not as well find complete predominance over the other trends at once. And nevertheless, we can trace the conceptual sequence through a series of social formations: the “Sea Power” (as a geopolitical category) moves through history taking various forms till it finds its most complete and absolute aspect in the global world where its internal precepts become predominant in a planetary scale. In other words, ideology of the modern mondialism is only a historical form of a more common geopolitical paradigm. But there is a direct relation between this (probably, most absolute) form and the geopolitical matrix.

There is no such direct symmetry in case of the “Land Power”. The Communism ideology just partly (heroism, collectivism, antiliberalism) resonated with geopolitical percepts of the “ground” society (and this just in the concrete form of the Eurasian USSR and, to a lesser degree, of China), as the other aspects of this ideology (progressism, technology, materialism) fitted badly in the axiological structure of the “Land Power”. And today, even in theory, Communism cannot perform the mobilizing ideological function it used to perform in the 20^th century in a planetary scale. From the ideological point of view the Land is really split into fragments and, in the nearest future, we can hardly expect some new ideology capable to symmetrically withstand the liberal globalism to appear. But the very geopolitical principle of the Land does not lose anything in its paradigmatic structure. It is this principle that must be taken as a foundation for construction of the Multipolarism Theory. This theory must address directly to geopolitics, draw principles, ideas, methods and terms out of it. This will allow to otherwise take both the wide range of existing non-globalist and counter-globalist ideologies, religions, cultures, and social trends. It is absolutely unnecessary to shape them to transform into something unified and systematized. They can well remain local or regional but be integrated into a front of common stand against globalization and “Western Civilization’s” domination on the meta-ideological level, on the paradigmatic level of Geopolitics-2 and this moment – plurality of ideologies – is already laid in the very term “Multi-polarism” (not only within the strategical space, but also in the field of the ideological, cultural, religious, social, and economical one).

Multipolarism is nothing but extension of Geopolitics-2 (geopolitics of the Land) into a new environment characterized with the advance of globalism (as atlantism) on a qualitatively new level and in qualitatively new proportions. Multipolarism has no other sense.

Geopolitics of the Land and its general vectors projected upon the modern conditions are the axis of the Multipolarism Theory, on which all the other aspects of this theory are threaded. These aspects constitute philosophical, sociological, axiological, economical, and ethical parts of this theory. But all of them are anyway conjugated with the acknowledged – in an extendedly sociological way – structure of the “Land Power” and with the direct sense of the very concept of “Multipolarism” that refers us to the principles of plurality, diversity, non-universalism, and variety.

3 Multipolarism and Neo-Eurasianism

Neo-Eurasianism as Weltanschauung

Neo-Eurasianism is positioned nearest to the theory of Multipolarism. This concept roots in geopolitics and operates par excellence with the formula of “Russia-Eurasia” (as Heartland) but at the same time develops a wide range of ideological, philosophical, sociological and politological fields, instead of being only limited with geostrategy and application analysis.

What is in the term of “Neo-Eurasianism” can be illustrated with fragments of the Manifesto of the International “Eurasian Movement” “Eurasian Mission»[7]. Its authors point out five levels in Neo-Eurasianism allowing to interpret it in a different way depending on a concrete context.

The first level: Eurasianism is a Weltanschauung.

According to the authors of the Manifesto, the term “Eurasianism” “is applied to a certain Weltanschauung, a certain political philosophy that combines in itself tradition, modernity and even elements of postmodern in an original manner. The philosophy of Eurasianism proceeds from priority of values of the traditional society, acknowledges the imperative of technical and social modernization (but without breaking off cultural roots), and strives to adapt its ideal program to the situation of a post-industrial, information society called “postmodern”.

The formal opposition between tradition and modernity is removed in postmodern. However, postmodernism in the atlantist aspect levels them from the position of indifference and exhaustiveness of contents. The Eurasian postmodern, on the contrary, considers the possibility for an alliance of tradition with modernity to be a creative, optimistic energetic impulse that induces imagination and development.

In the Eurasianism philosophy, the realities superseded by the period of Enlightenment obtain a legitimate place – these are religion, ethnos, empire, cult, legend, etc. In the same time, a technological breakthrough, economical development, social fairness, labour liberation, etc. are taken from the Modern. The oppositions are overcome by merging into a single harmonious and original theory that arouses fresh ideas and new decisions for eternal problems of humankind. (…)

The philosophy of Eurasianism is an open philosophy, it is free from any forms of dogmatism. It can be appended by diversified areas – history, religion, sociological and ethnological discoveries, geopolitics, economics, regional geography, culturology, various types of strategical and politological researches, etc. Moreover, Eurasianism as a philosophy assumes an original development in each concrete cultural and linguistic context: Eurasianism of the Russians will inevitably differ from Eurasianism of the French or Germans, Eurasianism of the Turks from Eurasianism of the Iranians; Eurasianism of the Arabs from Eurasianism of the Chinese, etc. Whereby, the main force lines of this philosophy will, in a whole, be preserved unalterable.(…)

The following items can be called general reference points of the Eurasianism philosophy:

• differentialism, pluralism of value systems against obligatory domination of a single ideology (in our case and first of all, of the American liberal democracy);
• traditionalism against destruction of cultures, beliefs and rites of the traditional society;
• a world-state, continent-state against both bourgeois national states and “the world government”;
• rights of nations against omnipotence of “the Golden Billion” and neo-colonial hegemony of “the Rich North”;
• an ethnos as a value and subject of history against depersonalization of nations and their alienation in artificial sociopolitical constructions;
• social fairness and solidarity of labour people against exploitation, logic of coarse gain, and humiliation of man by man.»[8]

Neo-Eurasianism as a Planetary Trend

On the second level: Neo-Eurasianism is a planetary trend. The authors of the Manifesto explain:

«Eurasianism on the level of a planetary trend is a global, revolutionary, civilization concept that is, by gradually improving, addressed to become a new ideological platform of mutual understanding and cooperation for a vast conglomerate of different forces, states, nations, cultures, and confessions that refuse from the Atlantic globalization.

It is worth carefully reading the statements of the most diverse powers all over the world: politicians, philosophers, and intellectuals and we will make sure that Eurasianists constitute the vast majority. Mentality of many nations, societies, confession, and states is, though they may not suspect about it themselves, Eurasianist.

If thinking about this multitude of different cultures, religions, confessions, and countries discordant with “the end of history” we are imposed by atlantism, our courage will grow up and the seriousness of risks of realization of the American 21^st century strategical security concept related with a unipolar world establishment will sharply increase.

Eurasianism is an aggregate of all natural and artificial, objective and subjective obstacles on the way of unipolar globalization, whereby it is elevated from a mere negation to a positive project, a creative alternative. While these obstacles exist discretely and chaotically, the globalists deal with them separately. But it is worth just integrating, pulling them together in a single, consistent Weltanschauung of a planetary character and the chances for victory of Eurasianism all over the world will be very serious.»[9]

Neo-Eurasianism as an Integration Project

On the next level, Neo-Eurasianism is treated as a project of strategical integration of the Eurasian Continent:

“The concept “the Old World” usually defining Europe can be considered much wider. This huge multicivilization space populated with nations, states, cultures, ethnoses and confessions connected between each other historically and spatially by the community of dialectical destiny. The Old World is a product of organic development of human history.

The Old World is usually set against the New World, i.e. the American continent that was discovered by the Europeans and has become a platform for construction of an artificial civilization where the European projects of the Modern, the period of Enlightenment have taken shape. (…)

In the 20^th century Europe realized its original essence and had gradually been moving to integration of all the European states into a single Union capable to provide all this space with sovereignty, independence, security, and freedom.

Creation of the European Union was the greatest milestone in the mission of Europe’s return in history. This was the response of “the Old World” to the exorbitant demands of the “New” one. If considering the alliance between the US and Western Europe – with US domination – to be the Atlantist vector of European development, then the integration of European nations themselves with predomination of the continental countries (France-Germany) can be considered Eurasianism in relation to Europe.

It becomes especially illustrative, if taking into account the theories that Europe geopolitically stretches from the Atlantic to the Urals (Ch. de Gaulle) or to Vladivostok. In other words, the interminable spaces of Russia are also valuably included in the field of the Old World subject to integration.

(…) Eurasianism in this context can be defined as a project of strategical, geopolitical, economical integration of the North of the Eurasian Continent realized as the cradle of European history, matrix of nations and cultures closely interlaced between each other.

And since Russia itself (like, by the way, the ancestors of many Europeans as well) is related in a large measure with the Turkish, Mongolian world, with Caucasian nations, through Russia – and in a parallel way through Turkey – does the integrating Europe as the Old World already acquire the Eurasianism dimension to full extent; and in this case, not only in symbolic sense, but also in geographical one. Here Eurasianism can be synonimically identified with Continentalism.[10]»

These three most general definitions of Neo-Eurasianism demonstrate that here we deal with a preparatory basis for construction of the Multipolarism Theory. This is the ground view on the sharpest challenges of modernity and attempt to give an adjust response to them taking into account geopolitical, civilization, sociological, historical and philosophical regularities.

---

[1]  Murray D.,  Brown D. (eds.) Multipolarity in the 21st Century. A New World Order. Abingdon, UK: Routledge, 2010; Ambrosio Th. Challenging America global Preeminence: Russian Quest for Multipolarity. Chippenheim, Wiltshire: Anthony Rose, 2005; Peral L. (ed.) Global Security in a Multi-polar World. Chaillot

Paper. Paris: European Institute for Security Studies, 2009; Hiro D. After Empire: The Birth of a Multipolar World. Yale: Nation Books , 2009.

[2] Turner Susan. Russia, Chine and the Multipolar World Order: the danger in the undefined// Asian Perspective. 2009. Vol. 33, No. 1. C. 159-184; Higgott Richard Multi-Polarity and Trans-Atlantic Relations: Normative Aspirations and Practical Limits of EU Foreign Policy. – www.garnet-eu.org. 2010. [Electronic resource] URL: http://www.garnet-eu.org/fileadmin/documents/working_papers/7610.pdf (дата обращения 28.08.2010); Katz M. Primakov Redux. Putin’s Pursuit of «Multipolarism» in Asia//Demokratizatsya. 2006. vol.14 № 4. C.144-152.

[3] Krauthammer Ch. The Unipolar Moment// Foreign Affairs. 1990 / 1991 Winter. Vol. 70, No 1. С. 23-33.

[4] Haass R. The Age of Non-polarity: What will follow US Dominance?’//Foreign Affairs.2008. 87 (3). С. 44-56.

[5] Déclaration de M. Hubert Védrine, ministre des affaires étrangères sur la reprise d’une dialogue approfondie entre la France et l’Hinde: les enjeux de la resistance a l’uniformisation culturelle et aux exces du monde unipolaire. New Delhi — 1 lesdiscours.vie-publique.fr. 7.02.2000.  [Electronic resource] URL: http://lesdiscours.vie-publique.fr/pdf/003000733.pdf

[6] Krauthammer Ch. The Unipolar Moment. Op.cit.

[7] Евразийская миссия. Манифест Международного «Евразийского Движения». М.: Международное Евразийское Движение, 2005.

[8] Ibid

[9] Ibid.

[10] Ibid.

This entry was posted in Journal of Eurasian Affairs, vol.1, Num.1, 2013 by eurasianaffairs. Bookmark the permalink.

Alexander Dugin on Syria and the New Cold War

Ex: http://www.attackthesystem.com

Alternative Right

An interview with Alexander Dugin on the Syrian crisis.

 

Prof. Dugin, the world faces right now in Syria the biggest international crisis since the downfall of the Eastern Block in 1989/90. Washington and Moscow find themselves in a proxy-confrontation on the Syrian battleground. Is this a new situation?

Dugin: We have to see the struggle for geopolitical power as the old conflict of land power represented by Russia and sea power represented by the USA and its NATO partners. This is not a new phenomenon; it is the continuation of the old geopolitical and geostrategic struggle. The 1990s was the time of the great defeat of the land power represented by the USSR. Mikhail Gorbachev refused the continuation of this struggle. This was a kind of treason and resignation in front of the unipolar world. But with President Vladimir Putin in the early years of this decade, came a reactivation of the geopolitical identity of Russia as a land power. This was the beginning of a new kind of competition between sea power and land power.

How did this reactivation start?

Dugin: It started with the second Chechen war (1999-2009). Russia by that time was under pressure by Chechen terrorist attacks and the possible separatism of the northern Caucasus. Putin had to realize all the West, including the USA and the European Union, took sides with the Chechen separatists and Islamic terrorists fighting against the Russian army. This is the same plot we witness today in Syria or recently in Libya. The West gave the Chechen guerrillas support, and this was the moment of revelation of the new conflict between land power and sea power. With Putin, land power reaffirmed itself. The second moment of revelation was in August 2008, when the Georgian pro-Western Saakashvili regime attacked Zchinwali in South Ossetia. The war between Russia and Georgia was the second moment of revelation.

Is the Syrian crisis now the third moment of revelation?

Dugin: Exactly. Maybe it is even the final one, because now all is at stake. If Washington doesn´t intervene and instead accepts the position of Russia and China, this would be the end of the USA as a kind of unique superpower. This is the reason why I think Obama will go far in Syria. But if Russia steps aside and accepts the US-American intervention and if Moscow eventually betrays Bashar al-Assad, this would mean immediately a very hard blow to the Russian political identity. This would signify the great defeat of the land power. After this, the attack on Iran would follow and also on northern Caucasus. Among the separatist powers in the northern Caucasus there are many individuals who are supported by the Anglo-American, Israeli and Saudi powers. If Syria falls, they will start immediately the war in Russia, our country. Meaning: Putin cannot step aside; he cannot give up Assad, because this would mean the geopolitical suicide of Russia. Maybe we are right now in the major crisis of modern geopolitical history.

So right now both dominant world powers, USA and Russia, are in a struggle about their future existence…

Dugin: Indeed. At the moment there is no any other possible solution. We cannot find any compromise. In this situation there is no solution which would satisfy both sides. We know this from other conflicts, such as the Armenian-Azeri or the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. It is impossible to find a solution for both sides. We witness the same now in Syria, but on a bigger scale. The war is the only way to make a reality check.

Why?

Dugin: We have to imagine this conflict as a type of card game like Poker. The players have the possibility to hide their capacities, to make all kinds of psychological tricks, but when the war begins all cards are in. We are now witnessing the moment of the end of the card game, before the cards are thrown on the table. This is a very serious moment, because the place as a world power is at stake. If America succeeds, it could grant itself for some time an absolutely dominant position. This will be the continuation of unipolarity and US-American global liberalism. This would be a very important moment because until now the USA hasn´t been able to make its dominance stable, but the moment they win that war, they will. But if the West loses the third battle (the first one was the Chechen war, the second was the Georgian war), this would be the end of the USA and its dominance. So we see: neither USA nor Russia can resign from that situation. It is simply not possible for both not to react.

Why does US-president Barrack Obama hesitate with his aggression against Syria? Why did he appeal the decision to the US-Congress? Why does he ask for permission that he doesn´t need for his attack?

Dugin: We shouldn´t make the mistake and start doing psychological analyses about Obama. The main war is taking place right now behind the scenes. And this war is raging around Vladimir Putin. He is under great pressure from pro-American, pro-Israeli, liberal functionaries around the Russian president. They try to convince him to step aside. The situation in Russia is completely different to the situation in USA. One individual, Vladimir Putin, and the large majority of the Russian population which supports him are on one side, and the people around Putin are the Fifth column of the West. This means that Putin is alone. He has the population with him, but not the political elite. So we have to see the step of the Obama administration asking the Congress as a kind of waiting game. They try to put pressure on Putin. They use all their networks in the Russian political elite to influence Putin´s decision. This is the invisible war which is going on right now.

Is this a new phenomenon?

Dugin: (laughs) Not at all! It is the modern form of the archaic tribes trying to influence the chieftain of the enemy by loud noise, cries and war drums. They beat themselves on the chest to impose fear on the enemy. I think the attempts of the US to influence Putin are a modern form of this psychological warfare before the real battle starts. The US-Administration will try to win this war without the Russian opponent on the field. For this they have to convince Putin to stay out. They have many instruments to do so.

But again: What about the position of Barrack Obama?

Dugin: I think all those personal aspects on the American side are less important than on the Russian side. In Russia one person decides now about war and peace. In the USA Obama is more a type of bureaucratic administrator. Obama is much more predictable. He is not acting on his behalf; he simply follows the middle line of US-American foreign politics. We have to realize that Obama doesn´t decide anything at all. He is merely the figurehead of a political system that makes the really important decisions. The political elite makes the decisions, Obama follows the scenario written for him. To say it clearly, Obama is nothing, Putin is everything.

You said Vladimir Putin has the majority of the Russian population on his side. But now it is peace time. Would they also support him in a war in Syria?

Dugin: This is a very good question. First of all, Putin would lose much of his support if he does not react on a Western intervention in Syria. His position would be weakened by stepping aside. The people who support Putin do this because they want to support a strong leader. If he doesn´t react and steps aside because of the US pressure, it will be considered by the majority of the population as a personal defeat for Putin. So you see it is much more Putin´s war than Obama´s war. But if he intervenes in Syria he will face two problems: Russian society wants to be a strong world power, but it is not ready to pay the expenses. When the extent of these costs becomes clear, this could cause a kind of shock to the population. The second problem is what I mentioned already, that the majority of the political elite are pro-Western. They would immediately oppose the war and start their propaganda by criticizing the decisions of Putin. This could provoke an inner crisis. I think Putin is aware of these two problems.

When you say the Russians might be shocked by the costs of such a war, isn´t there a danger that they might not support Putin because of that?

Dugin: I don´t think so. Our people are very heroic. Let us look back in history. Our people were never ready to enter a war, but if they did, they won that war despite the costs and sacrifices. Look at the Napoleonic wars or World War II. We Russians lost many battles, but eventually won those wars. So we are never prepared, but we always win.

Duguin: profeta de Eurasia

Duguin: profeta de Eurasia

Alberto Buela

Alexander Duguin (Moscú, 1952) se ha transformado hay en el más significativo geopolitólogo ruso. Inscripto en la ideología nacional bolchevique del estilo de Ernst Nietkisch sostiene un socialismo de los narodi. Esto es, un socialismo de los pueblos, despojado de todas las taras modernas como su materialismo, su ateísmo y su ilustración.

Su teoría geopolítica es la construcción de un gran espacio euroasiático con centralidad en Rusia.

En este libro que comentamos, traducción al portugués de Aganist the west (2012),  se va a ocupar en primer lugar de qué entiende por Occidente, que a partir del nacimiento de la modernidad, pasando por sus distintas etapas - Renacimiento, Nuevo Mundo, Reforma, Revolución francesa, Revolución bolchevique, Transformación tecnológica, Globalización – se ha ido transformando en el criterio normativo del mundo.

El proceso de modernización tiene dos caras, una exógena que no emerge de las necesidades de los pueblos y otra, endógena, que es un principio interno que no puede ser negado. La primera ha servido para la colonización y dominio de los pueblos, en tanto que la segundo surgió como una necesidad natural.

En cuanto a la globalización: representa el último punto de realización práctica de las pretensiones fundamentales de Occidente a la universabilidad de su experiencia histórica y de sus valores.

A la tesis de “Rusia, país europeo” va a oponer la tesis “Rusia-Eurasia como una civilización opuesta tanto Occidente como a Oriente”.

Apoyándose en la idea “gran espacio”(1939) de Carl Schmitt y teniendo como antecedente la Doctrina Monroe (1823) propone recuperar la idea de imperio.

Sostiene que la Doctrina Monroe nació como una idea anticolonialista y se fue transformando en una propuesta colonialista. Para nosotros, americanos del sur, tal Doctrina fue siempre colonialista cuyo enunciado real fue desde un comienzo: América para los norteamericanos.[1]

El concepto de imperio que se propone va más allá de los contextos históricos o políticos en que se haya dado y no se limita solo a una dimensión física ni a la presencia de un emperador. Eso si, el imperio exige un estricto centralismo administrativo y una amplia autonomía regional: El imperio es la mayor forma de humanidad y su mayor manifestación.

Cuando entre los imperios nombra el imperio comunista de la URSS y al imperio liberal de los EUA, y los pone a la misma altura que los imperios romano o autro-húngaro, Duguin no realiza la distinción entre imperio e imperialismo. Así, el imperio impone pero deja valores que le son propios (lengua, instituciones), mientras que el imperialismo es la imposición de un Estado sobre los otros para su explotación lisa y llana. El imperialismo deja solo desolación, en tanto que el imperio abre un mundo desconocido a sus dominados.

 

Un comentario especial merece su caracterización del conservadorismo, donde se ve la influencia de Alain de Benoist, seguramente el más original pensador francés vivo. El conservador no quiere conservar el pasado por ser pasado, según se lo define habitualmente, sino que pretende conservar del pasado lo constante, lo perenne. Y eso, porque no tiene una visión diacrónica de la historia sino sincrónica. El sentido del ser, de lo que es y existe no se apoya para él en la ideas de movimiento (pasado, presente, futuro) donde las cosas nos hacen un llamamiento desde el futuro bajo la idea de progreso, como sucede con el iluminismo, el modernismo y, hoy, el progresismo, sino que el sentido de las cosas hay que buscarlo en lo constante, en lo que permanece. El ser tiene una primacía sobre el tiempo; lo comanda y predetermina su estructura: el tiempo se da en el seno del ser como acontecimiento apropiador del ser.[2]

La conclusión política del conservadorismo ha dado lugar a la “cuarta teoría política”, pues así como en el siglo XX se dieron la primera teoría política con el liberalismo, la segunda con el marxismo, la tercera con el nazismo hoy, a comienzos del siglo XXI, hace su aparición la “cuarta teoría política” que hunde sus raíces en la revolución conservadora alemana del período entre guerras y que tuvo como exponentes, entre otros, a Moeller van der Bruck, Carl Schmitt, los hermanos Jünger, Martín Heidegger, von Solomon, von Papen, Werner Sombart, Stefan George que no se pudo plasmar en una práctica política concreta.

El imperio eurasiano propuesto por Duguin con Rusia como centro y cabeza que: debe pensar y obrar imperialmente, como un poder mundial que tenga opinión sobre todo hasta los lugares más distantes del planeta, tiene “carácter civilizatorio”  nos parece ambicioso, pero no inverosímil.

Nosotros creemos, y hemos intentado mostrar a través de múltiples trabajos, que las ideas de gran espacio y de imperio, en este caso, se unifican en la idea de “ecúmene”, que como la Hélade para los griegos, la romanitas para los romanos, o la hispanidad para los españoles, designan los grandes de tierra habitados por hombres que comparten entre sí, lengua, usos, costumbres, creencias y enemigos comunes. Y en este sentido sostenemos que el mundo es un pluriverso compuesto por varias ecúmenes entre las que se destaca, para nosotros, la iberoamericana.

Finalmente, toda la última parte del libro va ha estar ocupada en asuntos internos y temas casi exclusivamente rusos, de los que no nos encontramos capacitados para juzgar: la relación de Rusia con Ucrania, la filosofía del narod y su patriotismo erótico, el arcano roxo de Rusia, la estructura sociogenética de Rusia e intereses y valores post Tskhinvali.

Queremos felicitar a los traductores brasileños por este trabajo, que acerca al mundo luso e hispano hablante a un geopolitólogo de valía, prácticamente desconocido en nuestra común ecúmene cultural.

---

[1]Cfr. El excelente trabajo del mejicano Carlos Fuentes: La doctrina Monroe

[2]Cfr. Martín Heidegger: Tiempo y ser(1962), que no hay que confundir con Ser y tiempo de 1927.

The Wise Counsellor

By Israel Shamir

 

Ex: http://www.granews.info

[A Review of The Fourth Political Theory, by Alexander Dugin. Arktos, London 2012]

Ideas do not flow easily westwards. It is a norm that Western ideas are being spread in the East, not vice versa. Russia, the heir to Byzantium, is an “East”, among other great “Easts” of Dar ul-Islam, China, India; of them, Russia is the nearest to the West, and still very different. This is probably the main reason why Dugin, this important contemporary Russian thinker makes his belated entrance into Western awareness only now.

Alexander Dugin, a youngish, stylish, slim, neat, hip and bearded don at the Moscow U, is a cult figure at his homeland; people throng to his lectures; his plentiful books cover a vast spectre of subjects from pop culture to metaphysics, from philosophy to theology, from international affairs to domestic politics. He is fluent in many languages, a voracious reader, and he made the Russians aware of many less known Western thinkers. He is ready to wade deepest waters of mystical and heterodox thought with mind-boggling courage. He thrives on controversies; adored and hated, but never boring.

He is a scholar and a practitioner of Mysticism, akin to Mirchea Eliade and Guenon; a church-going adherent of traditionalist Orthodoxy; an ardent student of conspiracy theories from Templers and the Holy Grail to Herman Wirth’s Arctogaia; he is a master of tools sharpened by Jean Baudrillard and Guy Debord; but first and foremost, he is a dedicated fighter for liberation of mankind from the vise of liberal tyranny in American-dominated New World Order, or even from Maya, the post-modernist post-liberal virtuality - by political means.

Like Alain Soral and Alain de Benoist, he considers the Left or Right dichotomy obsolete. What matters is Compliance with or Resistance to the New World Order. Dugin is all for Resistance. For this purpose, he cross-breeds political ideas like one cross-breeds ferocious fighting dogs. Faith, Tradition, Revolution, Nationalism and Communism are the ingredients. If Chavez were a nuke-armed Liberation Theology priest versed in Heidegger, it would be a near thing.

Dugin tried his hand in radical politics together with Eduard Limonov, the national-bolshevik poet, with Jamal Hyder, the Islam reformer; he was an ideologist for the Red-Browns, as an alliance of hardcore Communists and Nationalists in 1990’s Russia was called; now he is chaperoning a small Eurasian movement. 

But he is not a politician by nature: like Confucius, he’d prefer to be a wise councillor to the ruler. In that, he succeeded as little as Confucius. He outlined an ideology for Putin; Putin used his words but dismissed his thoughts. Dugin was very critical of Putin for his half-baked measures, but still he supported the President when Moscow Liberals began their Fronde. In his books, he offers a blueprint for a future development of his homeland. Bearing in mind his influence, it is important to learn; and even more so if we remember that the Russians once showed the way for mankind, even if this way was eventually deserted.

Intellectually curious, Dugin has checked every concept, every idea of the East and West, even the banned and forgotten ones, as long as it could serve the Resistance. He used Communist ideas as well as those of radical traditionalists for whom Hitler and Mussolini were not sufficiently radical. He weaves theology, politics and metaphysics into a single meta-narrative. His style is lucid and pleasant.

The Fourth Political Theory as published by Arktos bears the same title as one of Dugin’s recent and more important books, but it is quite a different book altogether; it would be aptly called Dugin Reader, or Essential Dugin. It was specially prepared for a Western English-speaking reader. A good thing, too: as one who writes in Russian and English I witness that a Russian political philosophical text can’t be rendered into English directly for political cultures are too far apart. As is, the book provides a good starting point for discovery of Dugin the political thinker.

The Fourth Political Theory of the book’s title stands against three most prominent paradigms (political theories) of last century, namely Liberalism, Marxism (including Communism and Socialism) and Fascism (including National Socialism). In a century-long struggle, liberalism defeated the other two, and claimed its kingdom is forever (“End of History”). The Fourth Theory (or rather, a paradigm) is proposed to overcome and bury it. Dugin does not present a ready-made Fourth Theory to supplant the three, but rather points out some directions for its creation and practical implementation. This new theory should not explain the world, but change it. It should inspire a Crusade against West-centered liberalism, like the WW2 was a Crusade against Nazism. In other words, it is not so much a theory, rather a fighting doctrine, a call to rebuild our world.

‘The enemy is more important than friend, choose him carefully for this choice will influence your decisions”, said Dugin’s mentor Carl Schmitt. Dugin’s enemy No. 1 is Liberalism, in his view, a form of social Darwinism for the richest to survive and flourish, while the rest suffer and die spiritually and physically.

Liberalism is the greatest Evil of our days by virtue of its unavoidability, its choiceless imposition since 1990s; it is the dead end and Destiny to be defied, according to Dugin. Liberalism and its “freedom of” leads to disintegration of society; it “frees” man of family, of state, of gender, and even of his humanity. Liberalism will eventually lead to supplantation of man by genetically modified cyborgs, says Dugin.

The Fourth Paradigm should incorporate the best features of its three predecessors and reject their faults. Thus, Marxism’s tenet of historical materialism or belief in inevitability of progress, economism or belief in primacy of economics, its anti-spirituality and anti-ethnicity should be rejected, while its critique of capitalism should be retained, as well as the founding myth of return to the Lost Paradise of creative labour.

Dugin is ready to consider good points of Fascism and National Socialism, and for this reason he is sometimes branded “Nazi” by unfair critics, a misnomer, for he is definitely non-racist. In this book he preaches against racism, not only against rude biological racism of the Third Reich, but against racist unipolar civilisation, racist glamour and fashion, cultural racism, even of racist exclusion of political correctness. By expurgating racist component of National Socialism, this political theory is rendered “safe” and its positive aspects may be considered, he says. Such a positive aspect is love of people, of volk, an erotic love of men and women constituting people, ethnocentrism, acceptance of “ethnos in its environment” as a subject of history.

Though the Fourth Theory is brandished as a weapon against liberalism, some positive aspects could be taken even there. Dugin approves of freedom while rejecting individualism. Human freedom - yes, he says, individual freedom - no. He submits the concept of individual rights to scathing critique: liberalism approves of individual rights because they are puny; these are rights of a small man. Human freedom is freedom for a great man, for people, and it should be unlimited, he says.

Dugin thrives to cure faults of Communism and National Socialism, perhaps cross-breed these theories, aiming somewhere between anti-Hitlerites Strasser brothers and Ernst Niekisch on one side, and National Communists on the other side. This meeting ground of yesterday’s Far Left and Far Right should be fertilised by Myth and Tradition, desecularised, and Dasein-centered, at first.

Still, there are features of all three predecessors that are not acceptable for Dugin, and first of all belief in progress and linear development. A flyball governor, a device that prevents a steam engine’s blow up by cutting down fuel supply as it steams up, is the thing mankind needs for its endeavours. Instead of a monotonic process, there should be circular, cyclic process, what others would call a sustainable development.

Dugin intends to cure a deep ontological problem of alienation and denial of Being, in terms of Martin Heidegger, who said that the ancient Greeks confused Being-in-itself (Sein) and the human experience of Being-in-the-world (Dasein), and this small confusion, in fullness of time, caused technical progress and ushered in Nothingness. This is what Dugin wants to overcome by bringing forth Being-in-the-world as the most admirable actor of history. For liberals, the most important is Individual, for Communists it is a social Class, for Nazis it was a Race, for Fascists – a State, and for Dugin and his Fourth Paradigm – Being-in-the-world. Thus the deep night of alienation can be turned into a bright day of Being, says Dugin.

If Communist and National Socialist philosophies were based on Hegel, philosophy of Dugin as well as that of Dugin’s enemies, neocon liberals of Leo Strauss, is based on Heidegger. A contemporary wit described Stalingrad battle thus: “Leftist Hegelians fight Rightist Hegelians”. Perhaps we shall see People’s Heideggerians fighting against Elitist Heideggerians? …

Some of Dugin’s geopolitical thoughts are included in the book. He is an enemy of globalisation, and seeks independent life and development for big regions: Europe, North America, Russia, China etc. He thinks it is important to release Europe from the American yoke. Let America be free to live the way she likes beyond the ocean, but she should desist from interfering overseas and from forcing its way of life upon others.

As for Russia, he sees his homeland as a possible base of resistance to the NWO, together with other countries that defy the US diktat. He does not think today’s Russia is ready for the great challenge, it is evasive and of two minds; still this is the best we have. Its nuclear shield may defend the first saplings of new ideas from the rough justice of the world sheriff.

The Fourth Political Theory is a good beginning in delivering Dugin’s ideas to the Western reader. After all, even Heidegger’s rejection of Western nihilism is also a Western idea.

John Morgan: The Fourth Political Theory

The Fourth Political Theory

An interview with John Morgan

Natella Speranskaya:  How did you discover the Fourth Political Theory? And how would you evaluate its chances of becoming a major ideology of the 21st century?

JM:  I have been interested in the work of Prof. Dugin since I first discovered English translations of his writings at the Arctogaia Web sites in the late 1990s. So I had already heard of the Fourth Political Theory even before my publishing house, Arktos, agreed to publish his book of the same name. In editing the translation of the book, I became intimately familiar with Prof. Dugin’s concept. According to him, the Fourth Political Theory is more of a question than an ideology at this point. It is easier to identify what it is not, which is opposed to everything represented by liberalism, and which will transcend the failures of Marxism and fascism. In recent decades, many people have been heralding the “death of ideology.” Carl Schmitt predicted this, saying that the last battle would take place between those who wish to reject the role of politics in civilization, and those who understand the need for it. The death of ideology, I believe, is simply the exhaustion of those political systems that are founded on liberalism. This does not mean that politics itself has ended, but only that a new system is required. The Fourth Political Theory offers the best chance to take what is best from the old ideologies and combine them with new ideas, to create the new vision that will carry humanity into the next age. Although we can’t say with certainty what that will look like, as of yet. But it should be obvious to everyone that the current ideology has already run its course.

NS:  Leo Strauss when commenting on the fundamental work of Carl Schmitt The Concept of the Political notes that despite all radical critique of liberalism incorporated in it Schmitt does not follow it through since his critique remains within the scope of liberalism”. “His anti-Liberal tendencies, – claims Strauss, - remain constrained by “systematics of liberal thought” that has not been overcome so far, which – as Schmitt himself admits – “despite all failures cannot be substituted by any other system in today’s Europe. What would you identify as a solution to the problem of overcoming the liberal discourse? Could you consider the Fourth Political Theory by Alexander Dugin to be such a solution? The theory that is beyond the three major ideologies of the 20th century – Liberalism, Communism and Fascism, and that is against the Liberal doctrine.

JM:  Yes, definitely. The unsustainably and intellectual poverty of liberalism in Europe, and also America, is becoming more apparent with each passing day. Clearly a new solution is needed. Prof. Dugin’s Fourth Political Theory, as he has explained in his book of the same title, is more of a question than an ideology at this point, and it is up to those of us who are attempting to defy unipolar hegemony to determine what it will be. So, yes, we need a new ideology, even if we cannot yet explain exactly what it will be in practice. I think Prof. Dugin’s idea of taking Heidegger’s Dasein as our watchword is a good one, because we are so entrenched in the liberal mindset – even those of us who want to overcome it – that it is only be re-engaging with the pure essence of the reality of the world around us that we will find a way out of it. The representational, virtual reality of postmodernism which surrounds most of us on a daily basis has conditioned us to only think about liberalism on its own terms. Only by renewing our contact with the real, non-representational world, and by disregarding all previous concepts and labels, can we find the seeds for a new way of apprehending it.

NS:  Do you agree that today there are “two Europes”: the one – the liberal one (incorporating the idea of “open society”, human rights, registration of same-sex marriages, etc.) and the other Europe (“a different Europe”) – politically engaged, thinker, intellectual, spiritual, the one that considers the status quo and domination of liberal discourse as a real disaster and the betrayal of the European tradition. How would you evaluate chances of victory of a “different Europe” over the ”first” one?

JM:  Speaking as an American outsider, I absolutely see two Europes. The surface Europe is one that has turned itself into a facsimile of America – the free market, democracy, multiculturalism, secularism, pop culture, sacrificing genuine identity for fashions, and so on. The other Europe is much more difficult to see, but I have the good fortune of having many friends who dwell within it. This is the undercurrent that has refused to accept the Americanization of Europe, and which also rejects the liberal hegemony in all its forms. They remain true to the ancient spirit of Europe’s various peoples and cultures, while also dreaming of a new Europe that will be strong, independent and creative once again. We see this in the New Right, in the identitarian movement, and in the many nationalist groups across Europe that have sprung up in recent years. As of now, their influence is small, but as the global situation gets worse, I believe they will gain the upper hand, as more Europeans will become open to the idea of finding new solutions and new ways of living, disassociated from the collapsing hegemonic order. So I estimate their chances as being very good. Although they must begin acting now, even before the “collapse,” if they are to rescue their identities from oblivion, since the “real” Europe is fast being driven out of existence by the forces of liberalism.

NS:  “There is nothing more tragic than a failure to understand the historical moment we are currently going through; - notes Alain de Benoist – this is the moment of postmodern globalization”. The French philosopher emphasizes the significance of the issue of a new Nomos of the Earth or a way of establishing international relations. What do you think the fourth Nomos will be like? Would you agree that the new Nomos is going to be Eurasian and multipolar (transition from universum to pluriversum)?

JM:  Yes, I do agree. In terms of what it will look like, see my answer to question 4 in the first set of questions.

NS:  Do you agree that the era of the white European human race has ended, and the future will be predetermined by Asian cultures and societies?

JM:  If you mean the era of the domination of White Europeans (although of course that comprises many diverse and unique identities in itself), and those of European descent such as in America, over the entire world, then yes, that era is coming to an end, and has been, gradually, since the First World War. As for the fate of White Europeans in our own homelands, that is also an open question, given the lack of genuine culture and diminishing reproductive rates of Whites around the world, coupled with large-scale non-White immigration into our homelands. While I welcome the end of White hegemony, which overall hasn’t been good for anyone, most especially for Whites themselves, as an American of European descent I do fear the changes that are taking place in our lands. As the thinkers of the “New Right” such as Alain de Benoist have said, if we stand for the preservation of the distinct identities of all peoples and cultures, then we must also defend the identities of the various European peoples and their offshoots. I would like to see European peoples, including in America, develop the will to resist this onslaught and re-establish our lands as the true cradles of our cultures and identities. Of course, in order to do this, White peoples must first get their souls back and return to their true cultures, rejecting multiculturalism and the corporate consumer culture that has grown up in tandem with neo-colonialism, both of which victimize Whites just as much as non-Whites. Unfortunately, few White Europeans around the world have come to this understanding thus far, but I hope that will change.

As for whether the future belongs to Asians, that I cannot say. Certainly India and China are among the most prominent rising powers. But at the same time, they face huge domestic challenges, demographically and otherwise. Whether they will be able to sustain the momentum they have now is uncertain. Having lived in India for the last four years, while it is a land I have come to love, I have difficulty seeing India emerging as a superpower anytime soon. The foundations just aren’t there yet.  Likewise, I find it troubling that India and China continue to understand “progress” in terms of how closely they mimic the American lifestyle and its values. Until Asian (and other) nations can find a way to develop a sustainable and stable social order, and until they forge a new and unique identity for themselves in keeping with their traditions that is disconnected from the Western model, I don’t see them overtaking the so-called “First World.”

NS:  Do you consider Russia to be a part of Europe or do you accept the view that Russia and Europe represent two different civilizations?

JM:  As a longtime student of Dostoevsky, I have always believed that Russia is a unique civilization in its own right. Although clearly Russia shares cultural affinities and linkages with Europe that cannot be denied, and which bring it closer to Europe than to Asia, it retains a character that is purely its own. I have always admired this aspect of Russia. Whereas Western Europe sold its soul in the name of material prosperity in its rush to embrace the supposed benefits of the Industrial Revolution and modernity as quickly as possible, Russia developed its own unique path to modernity, and has always fought hard to maintain its independence. It seems to me, as a foreigner, that as a result, Russia retains a much stronger connection to the spiritual and the intangible aspects of life than in the West, as well as a more diverse, as opposed to purely utilitarian, outlook. The German Conservative Revolutionaries understood this, which is why they sought to tilt Germany more towards Russia politically and culturally, and away from England and the United States (such as Arthur Moeller van den Bruck advocated). Similarly, in today’s world, New Rightists, traditionalists and so forth would do well to look toward Russia and its traditions for inspiration. 

NS:  Contemporary ideologies are based on the principle of secularity. Would you predict the return of religion, the return of sacrality? If so, in what form? Do you consider it to be Islam, Christianity, Paganism or any other forms of religion?

JM:  I think we already see this happening to an extent. In the nineteenth and for most of the twentieth century, the prevailing view was skepticism and scientism, with religion primarily relegated to its moralistic aspects. But beginning in the 1960s in North America and Western Europe, we have seen a renewal of interest in religion and the transcendental view of life on a large scale. This development was, of course, presaged by the traditionalist philosophers, such as René Guénon and Julius Evola, who understood modernity perhaps better than any other Europeans of their time. But unfortunately, this revival in practice has tended toward New Age modes of thought, or else mere identity politics and exotericism as we see with the rise of fundamentalist Christianity in America, rather than in genuinely traditional spirituality. As such, most spirituality in the Western nations today is an outgrowth of modernity, rather than something that can be used to oppose and transcend it. But the fact that more traditionalist books are being made available, and that we see more groups dedicated to traditional spirituality and esotericism than ever before, is a promising trend.

As for the form that this revival will ultimately take, that depends on the location. For much of the world, of course, people are likely to return to and revitalize the traditions that grew out of their own civilizations, which is as it should be. We already see efforts in this direction at work in some parts of the so-called “Third World.” But in Western Europe, and especially America, it is a more difficult question. The Catholic Church today doesn’t hold much promise for those of a traditional mindset. Guénon himself abandoned his native Catholicism and began to practice Islam because he had come to believe that Catholicism was no longer a useful vehicle for Tradition. And of course today, things are much worse than they were in Guénon’s time. Protestantism, besides being counter-traditional, is in even poorer shape these days. And while I am very sympathetic to those who are seeking to revive the pre-Christian traditions of Europe, or adopt traditions from other cultures, this ultimately isn’t a good strategy for those who are engaged in sociopolitical activity alongside spiritual activities. The vast majority of Europeans and Americans still identify with Christianity in some form, and this will need to be taken into account by any new political or metapolitical movement that emerges there.

In America, unlike Europe, we have no real tradition of our own. This is both a blessing and a curse. It’s a blessing because our culture has always been tolerant of allowing and even embracing the presence of alternative forms of spirituality. (Interest in Hinduism, for example, began in America already in the Nineteenth century with such figures as Thoreau and Emerson, and with the arrival of Hindu teachers from India such as Protap Chunder Mozoomdar and Swami Vivekananda.) But it is also a curse because there is no particular, universal spiritual tradition that underlies American civilization which can be revived. Christianity remains dominant, but certainly the popular forms of it that exist in America today are unacceptable from a traditional standpoint. At the same time, most Americans are unlikely to accept any form of spirituality which they perceive to be different from or in opposition to Christianity. So it is a difficult question.

The best solution may be to exclude advocating any specific religion from our efforts in the West for the time being, and leave such decisions to the individual. Of course, we should encourage everyone who supports us to integrate the traditional worldview into their own lives, in whatever form that may take, and to oppose secularism on the grounds of the resacralization of culture. Perhaps once the process of the collapse of the current global and cultural order is further along, and as the peoples’ faith in the illusions of progress, materialism and nationalism inculcated by modernity are shattered, the new form or forms of religion that must take root in the West will become more readily apparent.

 

Grossraum: International Conference of Global Revolutionary Alliance

La Russie aux temps postmodernes

La Russie aux temps postmodernes

par Georges FELTIN-TRACOL

 

Penseur néo-eurasiste influencé par les œuvres de René Guénon et de Julius Evola, polyglotte émérite à l’insatiable curiosité, Alexandre Douguine incarne pleinement ce que le communiste italien Antonio Gramsci qualifiait d’« intellectuel organique ». L’auteur d’une abondante bibliographie qui va de la géopolitique à l’étude sociologique des musiques contemporaines vient de publier la traduction française de sa Quatrième théorie. Il faut en saluer la parution tant ses écrits demeurent rares et méconnus dans le monde francophone. La sortie de cet essai est un grand événement éditorial !

 

Lecteur attentif d’Arthur Moeller van den Bruck, de Claude Lévi-Strauss, de Georges Sorel, Alexandre Douguine s’est aussi inspiré des travaux de Martin Heidegger, Francis Fukuyama, Carl Schmitt, Gilles Deleuze ou Guy Debord.

 

Pragmatique partant d’un constat accablant, le fondateur du Mouvement international eurasien se demande : « Comment faire de la politique quand il n’y a pas de politique ? Il n’existe qu’une seule solution : refuser les théories politiques classiques, tant vaincues que triomphantes, et faire preuve d’imagination, saisir les réalités du nouveau monde global, déchiffrer correctement les défis du monde postmoderne et créer quelque chose de nouveau, au-delà des affrontements politiques des XIXe et XXe siècles (p. 12). » Prenant par conséquent acte de la victoire de la pensée libérale qu’il appelle “ Première théorie ” et des échecs du communisme, « Deuxième théorie », et du « fascisme » (au sens très large du mot), « Troisième théorie », Alexandre Douguine esquisse une « Quatrième théorie politique » « non pas comme un travail ou une saga d’auteur, mais comme la direction d’un large spectre d’idées, d’études, d’analyses, de prévisions et de projets. Tout individu pensant dans cette optique peut y apporter quelque chose de soi (p. 13) ».

 

Cela fait très longtemps qu’Alexandre Douguine était en quête d’une nouvelle solution politique. Dès 1994, il en exposait les prémices théoriques dans un entretien passé inaperçu paru dans le n° 119 nouvelle série du magazine Le Crapouillot (mai – juin 1994), intitulé « Créer l’Europe des ethnies (pp. 9 – 13) ». Estimant que « le temps de la gauche anti-capitaliste est définitivement passé (art. cit., p. 9) », Douguine prévoyait l’entrée « dans l’ère de la droite anti-capitaliste – donc nationaliste, identitaire, différencialiste et organiciste (art. cit., p. 9) ». Il ajoutait plus loin que « nous sommes en présence de la naissance de la nouvelle idéologie anti-libérale, qui unira, en son sein, trois tendances politiques collectivistes, à savoir : le nationalisme, le socialisme et la démocratie, en opposition à la tendance libérale qui est essentiellement individualiste (art. cit., p. 12) ».

 

Contre le libéralisme postmoderne

 

Une nouvelle vision du monde s’impose, car le début du XXIe siècle marque l’achèvement de l’ère moderne ainsi que l’obsolescence de ses trois grandes théories mobilisatrices au profit d’une fluidité croissante et d’une mutation majeure de la doctrine libérale elle-même. Ce changement s’opère néanmoins dans un monde saturé d’idées libérales qui, du fait de leur réussite même, engendrent un « post-libéralisme » ou un « libéralisme 2.0 », promoteur d’une « société de marché globale (p. 21) ». C’est parce que « le libéralisme, mettant toujours l’accent sur la minimalisation du politique, a décidé, après sa victoire, de supprimer de façon générale la politique (p. 11) » que « le monde global doit être dirigé seulement par les lois économiques et la morale universelle des “ droits de l’homme ”. Toutes les décisions politiques sont remplacées par des techniques (p. 21) ». Ce « post-libéralisme » commence même à modifier la nature humaine. Douguine désigne donc clairement « le libéralisme et ses métamorphoses (p. 37) » postmodernistes (terme à préférer à celui de « post-moderne ») comme l’ennemi principal à abattre. Émanation des Lumières, « l’individualisme est devenu le sujet normatif à l’échelle de toute l’humanité. Apparaît alors le phénomène de la mondialisation, et le modèle de la société post-industrielle commence à se manifester, l’époque du postmoderne commence. Désormais, le sujet individuel n’apparaît plus comme le résultat d’un choix mais comme une certaine donnée générale obligatoire. La personne est libérée de  “ l’appartenance ”, l’idéologie “ des droits de l’homme ” devient communément acceptée (du moins – en théorie) et, dans les faits, obligatoire. L’humanité, composée d’individus, tend naturellement vers l’universalité, devient globale et unifiée. Ainsi naît le projet d’« État mondial » et de “ gouvernement mondial ” (le globalisme) (p. 20) ». Ses méfaits, réels, insidieux et profonds, dévastent tout autant les milieux naturels pollués que les psychismes. Il relève que « la logique du libéralisme mondial et de la mondialisation nous tire vers l’abîme de la dissolution postmoderniste dans la virtualité. Notre jeunesse a déjà un pied dans cet abîme : les codes du globalisme libéral s’introduisent de plus en plus efficacement au niveau de l’inconscient, dans les habitudes, la publicité, le glamour, les technologies, les modèles de réseau. La perte de l’identité, non seulement nationale ou culturelle mais aussi sexuelle et bientôt humaine, est désormais chose commune. Et les défenseurs des droits de l’homme, sans remarquer la tragédie de peuples entiers sacrifiés selon les plans cruels du “ nouvel ordre mondial ”, hurleront demain à la violation des droits des cyborgs ou des clones (p. 54) ». L’égalitarisme prôné par le « libéralisme 2.0 » est l’ultime réductionnisme de l’Occident globalitaire anomique.

 

Ce dispositif total, néo-totalitaire, de nivellement général bénéficie d’un redoutable modèle attractif : les États-Unis d’Amérique. Fille de la Modernité et matrice d’un postmodernisme « ultra-moderne », « l’Amérique prétend désormais à une diffusion universelle d’un code unitaire, qui pénètre dans la vie des peuples et des États par des milliers de voies différentes – comme le réseau global – à travers la technologie, l’économie de marché, le modèle politique de la démocratie libérale, les systèmes d’information, les clichés de la culture de masse, l’établissement du contrôle stratégique direct des Américains et de leurs satellites sur les processus géopolitiques (p. 47) ».

 

Décomposition des droites et des gauches

 

Contre cette « Hydre de Lerne » postmoderniste, un regard critique sur l’histoire des idées politiques est indispensable afin de concevoir une théorie novatrice. Alexandre Douguine prévient qu’elle « ne peut être une tâche individuelle pas plus que celle d’un petit cercle d’individus. L’effort doit être synodique, collectif. Les représentants d’autres cultures et d’autres peuples (d’Europe, ainsi que d’Asie), qui se rendent compte également de façon aiguë de la tension eschatologique du moment présent (p. 32) ». On y décèle ici la double influence de l’« impersonnalité active » chère à Evola et du sobornost de l’Orthodoxie. Il espère que la Quatrième théorie politique sera « une alternative au post-libéralisme, non pas comme une position par rapport à une autre, mais comme idée opposée à la matière; comme un possible entrant en conflit avec le réel; comme un réel n’existant pas mais attaquant déjà le réel (p. 22) ».

 

À cette fin, il devient utile de dresser la généalogie et la taxinomie des idées politiques modernes. L’anti-conformisme de la démarche de Douguine est déjà ancienne puisque cela fait longtemps qu’il propose de comprendre les auteurs de l’ultra-gauche d’un œil révolutionnaire-conservateur et de commenter les penseurs de l’« extrême droite » à l’aune de Marx, de Toni Negri et d’autres théoriciens gauchistes. Tout en reprenant la distinction classique entre la « droite » et la « gauche », Douguine dynamite en réalité cette dichotomie familière en discernant trois idéologies de « gauche » : les « vieilles gauches » avec les marxistes, les sociaux-démocrates et les zélateurs travaillistes d’une pseudo-« troisième voie » du Britannique Giddens, gourou de Tony Blair; les « nouvelles gauches » qui rassemblent sous ce label les néo-gauchistes, les altermondialistes et les postmodernistes genre Negri; et les « nationalistes de gauche », à savoir les tendances nationales-bolcheviques, nationales-communistes et « nationales-gauchistes ». Quant à la « droite » que Douguine préfère nommer « conservatisme » parce que c’« est un “ non ” adressé à ce qui est autour. Et au nom de quoi ? Au nom de ce qui était avant (p. 86) », il distingue :

 

— le conservatisme fondamental où l’on retrouve les écoles de la Tradition et les monothéismes dits « intégristes », y compris un certain islamisme;

 

— le libéral-conservatisme qui « dit “ oui ” à la tendance principale qui se réalise dans la modernité mais s’efforce de freiner à chaque nouvelle étape de la réalisation de ces tendances (p. 92) »;

 

— les forces conservatrices-révolutionnaires qui « ne veulent pas seulement geler le temps à la différence des libéraux-conservateurs ou encore revenir dans le passé (comme les traditionalistes) mais arracher à la structure de ce monde les racines du mal et annihiler le temps en tant que propriété destructrice de la réalité, réalisant le dessein secret, parallèle et insoupçonné de la Divinité elle-même (p. 97) ».

 

Douguine analyse finement l’approche contre-révolutionnaire (Maistre, Bonald, etc.) pour qui « le postmoderne avec sa dérision suive son cours, qu’il dissolve les paradigmes déterminés, l’ego, le super-ego, le logos, que le rhizome et les masses schizophréniques ainsi que la conscience morcelée entrent en jeu et que le néant entraîne derrière lui tant le contenu du monde, alors s’ouvriront des portes secrètes et les archétypes ontologiques anciens, éternels, apparaîtront à la surface et de façon terrible mettront fin au jeu (pp. 99 – 100) ».

 

Après avoir déterminé idéalement ces tendances politiques, Alexandre Douguine les recherche sur la scène politique russe avec d’inévitables mélanges contextuels. Le Parti communiste de la Fédération de Russie de Guennadi Ziouganov est sans conteste national-communiste alors que le mouvement Rodina (« Patrie ») fut inconsciemment national-gauchiste. Si l’opposition à Vladimir Poutine, malgré Limonov, verse plus ou moins dans le libéralisme et l’occidentalisme, Russie unie défend une conception sociale-conservatrice. Enfin, son eurasisme radical puise à la fois dans la Tradition et dans la Révolution conservatrice. Mais toutes les formations politiques russes communient dans un ardent patriotisme, ce que ne comprennent pas les observateurs occidentaux…

 

Il ne fait guère de doute que l’eurasisme constitue, aux yeux d’Alexandre Douguine, le cœur de la Quatrième théorie politique. Discutant des thèses culturalistes du « choc des civilisations » de Samuel Huntington, il dénie à la Russie tout caractère européen. Par sa situation géographique, son histoire et sa spiritualité, « la Russie constitue une civilisation à part entière (p. 167) ». Déjà dans son histoire, « la Russie – Eurasie (civilisation particulière) possédait tant ses propres valeurs distinctes que ses propres intérêts. Ces valeurs se rapportaient à la société traditionnelle avec une importance particulière de la foi orthodoxe et un messianisme russe spécifique (p. 146) ». Et quand il aborde la question de la Russie et de son peuple-noyau, les Russes issus des Slaves orientaux, Alexandre Douguine déclare son amour à son peuple et à sa terre. « Peuple du vent et du feu, de l’odeur du foin et des nuits bleu sombre transpercées par les gouffres des étoiles, un peuple portant Dieu dans ses entrailles, tendre comme le pain et le lait, souple comme un magique et musculeux poisson de rivière lavé par les vagues (p. 302) », les Russes incarnent un peuple tellurique.

 

Un conservatisme rénové

 

Via l’eurasisme s’élabore une nouvelle approche du conservatisme, un conservatisme repensé, révolutionnaire et adapté à la phase post-moderne des temps. Alexandre Douguine affirme que « le conservateur aime ce qui est grand et dans l’homme, il aime ce qui est grand et élevé (p. 111) ». Il est logique que « le conservatisme, défendant l’éternité, défend également l’éternité de l’homme, de l’homme en tant que structure douée de signes intangibles et d’une vie inaliénable. L’Homme est un concept conservateur (p. 110) ». La modernité libérale et le postmodernisme post-libéral nient au contraire l’homme singulier pour mieux valoriser un homme abstrait doté de droits fallacieux ou extravagants (voir la dernière lubie lyssenkiste en date avec la pseudo-théorie du genre).

 

« Pluralisme gnoséologique, [… l’eurasisme est] une forme spécifique de conservatisme, qui se différencie des autres versions de conservatisme proches (à la différence du libéral-conservatisme), par le fait qu’elle trouve une alternative au moderne non pas dans le passé, ou dans un renversement conservateur révolutionnaire exceptionnel, mais dans les sociétés cœxistant avec la civilisation occidentale mais géographiqement et culturellement distinctes d’elle (p. 101). » Fort de ce constat, Douguine se permet de « déconstruire » la démocratie dans sa pratique libérale hypocrite. Il remarque d’abord que « le principe de prise de décisions collectives constitue le fondement de la démocratie (p. 58) » et que « la démocratie constitue la forme d’organisation politique la plus ancienne, la plus archaïque, la plus primitive et, si l’on veut, la plus barbare (p. 57) ». Ne craignant pas de se mettre à dos les belles âmes occidentalocentrées, il assène que « la démocratie ne reconnaît aucunement l’égalité des individus. Elle comporte une limite très stricte qui sépare ceux qui ont le droit de participer à l’extase politique de la décision de ceux qui ne le peuvent pas (p. 58) ». L’octroi du droit de vote aux étrangers va à l’encontre de cette stricte différenciation et favorise plutôt « la tyrannie [qui] remplace la démocratie en tant que forme d’organisation politique plus contemporaine où pour la première fois se manifeste très clairement un individu distinct, dans notre cas le tyran (pp. 59 – 60) ».

 

L’émergence d’une nouvelle figure tyrannique résulte de l’occidentalisation du monde. « Puisque modernisation et occidentalisation constituent des synonymes (Occident = moderne), il est impossible de mener une modernisation séparée de l’Occident et de ne pas copier ses valeurs (pp. 127 – 128). » Pis, « la fosse noire et vide de sens du postmoderne réalisé brille au centre de l’Occident global, les États-Unis et les pays de l’Alliance transatlantique (p. 138) ». Or, « pour combler le vide, la Russie a besoin d’une nouvelle idée politique. Le libéralisme ne convient pas, tandis que le communisme et le fascisme sont inacceptables (p. 13) ». Dès lors, « seule une croisade mondiale contre les États-Unis, l’Occident, la mondialisation et leur expression politico-idéologique, le libéralisme, peut constituer une réponse adéquate (p. 55) », d’où l’importance d’une Quatrième théorie politique particulièrement adaptée à la Russie.

 

« La lutte contre la métamorphose postmoderniste du libéralisme en postmoderne et un globalisme doit être qualitativement autre, se fonder sur des principes nouveaux et proposer de nouvelles stratégies (p. 22). » C’est le but tactique de l’eurasisme et de la Quatrième théorie politique. Contre le « nomadisme de l’asphalte (p. 258) » célébré par les médiats occidentaux globalitaires ultra-individualistes et ochlocratiques, Alexandre Douguine, en chrétien orthodoxe vieux-croyant conséquent, désigne l’atlantisme, « mal absolu (p. 258) », comme l’hérésie contemporaine contre laquelle le combat doit être implacable. « Pour les eurasistes, le moderne est un phénomène spécifique à l’Occident tandis que les autres cultures doivent démasquer les prétentions à l’université de la civilisation occidentale et construire leur société sur leurs valeurs internes (p. 101). »

 

De l’empire au grand espace

 

Guidé par les travaux de Johann Gottfried von Herder, Friedrich Ratzel, Jean Parvulesco et Raymond Abellio, Alexandre Douguine veut que « l’eurasisme se positionne fermement non pas en faveur de l’universalisme, mais en faveur des “ grands espaces ”, non pas en faveur de l’impérialisme, mais pour les “ empires ”, non pas en faveur des intérêts d’un seul pays, mais en faveur des “ droits des peuples ” (p. 207) ». Dans un monde enfin multipolaire, chaque pôle d’influence mondiale s’édifiera autour d’un grand espace géo-culturel particulier.

 

Homme de Tradition qui se réfère à l’ethnosociologie, à la géopolitique et à la théologie, Alexandre Douguine se défie des concepts d’État et de nation. Si le premier, malgré sa froideur intrinsèque, reste pour lui nécessaire, le second ne correspond pas à l’esprit des steppes eurasiennes. Mais sa critique ne coïncide pas avec celle des libéraux. En effet, pour un libéral, « la “ nation ” désignait l’ensemble des citoyens de l’État, dans lequel s’incarne le contact des individus qui le peuplent, unis par un territoire de résidence commun, ainsi que par un même niveau de développement de l’activité économique (p. 41) ». Quant à l’État-nation, il « représentait une sorte de “ corporation ” ou d’entreprise, créée selon l’accord mutuel de ses participants et qui peut être théoriquement dissoute pour les mêmes raisons (p. 42) ». Or, répondant aux discours tenus par des « nationaux-souverainistes » russes, Douguine affirme que le destin de la Russie n’est pas de devenir une nation, mais de rester un empire. « Entre l’Empire et le “ grand homme ” (homo maximus), il existe une homologie directe. L’Empire est la société maximale, l’échelle maximale possible de l’Empire. L’Empire incarne la fusion entre le ciel et la terre, la combinaison des différences en une unité, différences qui s’intègrent dans une matrice stratégique commune. L’Empire est la plus haute forme de l’humanité, sa plus haute manifestation. Il n’est rien de plus humain que l’Empire (p. 111). » « L’empire constitue une organisation politique territoriale qui combine à la fois une très forte centralisation stratégique (une verticale du pouvoir unique, un modèle centralisé de commandement des forces armées, la présence d’un code juridique civil commun à tous, un système unique de collecte des impôts, un système unique de communication, etc.) avec une large autonomie des formations sociopolitiques régionales, entrant dans la composition de l’empire (la présence d’éléments de droit ethno-confessionnel au niveau local, une composition plurinationale, un système largement développé d’auto-administration locale, la possibilité de cœxistence de différents modèles de pouvoir locaux, de la démocratie tribale aux principautés centralisées, voire aux royaumes) (pp. 210 – 211). »

 

L’idée d’empire est plus que jamais d’actualité dans les faits, car, si l’Union européenne demeure un « empire hésitant (p. 218) », Alexandre Douguine souligne avec raison que les élites étatsuniennes raisonnent, elles, dans ces termes avec le Benevolent empire. Idem chez les islamistes qui rêvent, eux, d’un califat universel et dont « le projet islamique en tant que réponse à la mondialisation américaine coïncide pleinement avec la définition de l’empire. […] Il s’agit d’un projet d’empire mondial alternatif (pp. 217 – 218) ».

 

L’empire correspond de nos jours à la notion géopolitique de civilisation. « La mise en évidence de la civilisation en qualité de sujet de la politique mondiale au XXIe siècle permettra de mener une “ globalisation régionale ”, une unification des pays et des peuples qui se rapportent à une seule et même civilisation (p. 187). » En clair, faire des civilisations des « grands espaces ». Théorisé par Carl Schmitt, l’un des plus grands penseurs du XXe siècle, « le “ grand espace ” ne constitue qu’une autre dénomination de ce que nous comprenons sous le terme de civilisation dans son sens géopolitique, spatial et culturel. Un “ grand espace ” se distingue des États-nations existant aujourd’hui précisément en ceci qu’il se construit sur le fondement d’un système de valeurs et d’une parenté historique, ainsi que par le fait qu’il unit plusieurs, voire un grand nombre d’États différents liés par une “ communauté de destin ”. Dans différents grands espaces, le facteur d’intégration peut varier : dans un cas, la religion peut jouer ce rôle, dans un autre, l’origine ethnique, la forme culturelle, le type sociopolitique ou la situation géographique (p. 188) ».

 

Arme géopolitique anti-mondialiste par excellence, « le “ grand espace ” découle d’une stratégie anticoloniale et présuppose (d’un point de vue purement théorique) une alliance volontaire de tous les pays du continent s’efforçant d’affirmer collectivement leur indépendance (p. 194) ». Ainsi peut-on soutenir, concernant la politogenèse européenne, que « les continentalistes affirment que les États-Unis et l’Europe ont non seulement des intérêts divergents, mais également des valeurs divergentes (p. 140) » parce qu’avec les grands espaces civilisationnels, « il n’y aura aucun étalon universel, ni matériel, ni spirituel. Chaque civilisation recevra enfin le droit de proclamer librement ce qui constitue pour elle la mesure des choses. Ici, ce sera l’homme, là, la religion, ailleurs, l’éthique, ailleurs enfin, la matière (p. 191) ». Si l’Union européenne paraît dans l’impossibilité de former un grand espace impérial conscient de son destin, Douguine appelle cependant les Européens à ne pas céder au fatalisme et au pessimisme. Certes, « aujourd’hui l’axe Paris – Berlin – Moscou apparaît plus que jamais fantomatique mais […] de ces mêmes fantômes naissent parfois de grands phénomènes (pp. 229 – 230) ». Il souhaite en revanche que la C.E.I. (Communauté des États indépendants) et les autres organisations de coopération comme l’Organisation du traité de sécurité collective (O.T.S.C.), la Communauté économique eurasiatique (C.E.E.), l’Organisation de coopération centre-asiatique (O.C.C.E.) et l’Union de la Russie et du Bélarus jettent les bases solides de « l’empire eurasiste du futur (p. 223) » capable d’affronter l’Occident financiariste et mondialiste.

 

Dans cette lutte à venir (mais qui a dès à présent commencé avec les actions médiatiques des bandes pétassières des Pussy Riots et des FemHaine ou les attaques anti-russes des cloportes du Congrès étatsunien), la Russie est à l’avant-poste de la bataille. Toutefois, Douguine se désole que « la position du pouvoir russe contemporain envers l’Occident (dans son incarnation actuelle) demeure indéterminée. Le pouvoir a rejeté un occidentalisme direct sans pour autant occuper une position alternative (slavophile, eurasiste). Le pouvoir s’est figé, de même que quelquefois un ordinateur cesse de fonctionner. Ni dans une direction, ni dans l’autre (p. 165) ». Il déplore que les blindés ne se soient pas entrés dans Tbilissi à l’été 2008. Ces atermoiements sont préjudiciables à la Russie qui, en tant que Troisième Rome potentiel, pourrait déjà pratiquer une diplomatie multipolaire, « même si actuellement seuls l’Iran, le Venezuela, la Syrie, la Bolivie, le Nicaragua, la Corée du Nord, la Biélorussie et, avec prudence, la Chine, la défendent (p. 163) ».

 

Dépassement des idéologies modernes et formulation nouvelle d’un conservatisme traditionnel et impérial, « la Quatrième théorie apparaît donc comme un projet de “ croisade ” contre le postmoderne, la société post-industrielle, le projet libéral réalisé dans la pratique, le globalisme et ses fondements logistiques et technologiques (p. 23) ». C’est une déclaration de guerre qu’il convient d’apprécier ! L’assomption de l’Europe passe bien par la Quatrième théorie politique.

 

Georges Feltin-Tracol

 

• Alexandre Douguine, La Quatrième théorie politique. La Russie et les idées politiques du XXIe siècle, avant-propos d’Alain Soral, Ars Magna Éditions, Nantes, 2012, 336 p., (B.P. 60 426, 44004 Nantes C.E.D.E.X. 1). Pour recevoir le livre, écrire à l’éditeur, en accompagnant cette demande d’un chèque de 32 € franco.

 

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Article printed from Europe Maxima: http://www.europemaxima.com

 

URL to article: http://www.europemaxima.com/?p=2958

An interview with Manuel Ochsenreiter

The Fourth Political Theory

An interview with Manuel Ochsenreiter

Ex: http://www.granews.info/

 

Natella Speranskaya: How did you discover the Fourth Political Theory? And how would you evaluate its chances of becoming a major ideology of the 21st century?
 
 
Manuel Ochsenreiter: Since a certain time I try to follow the developments in Russia, especially Prof. Alexandr Dugin. So it is not a coincidence to get in touch with the Fourth Political Theory. You are asking about the chances. Let me say it like this: The west is actually trapped in its own liberalism. It seems right now that there is no way out because the liberal mainstream political opinion doesn´t accept any alternative ideas. It is like digesting yourself with the same acid over and over again. In my opinion, the Fourth Political Theory could be a medical cure for that sick intellectual situation. It can be a way out of the liberal hamster wheel. And more and more people are looking for such an exit.
 
 
Natella Speranskaya: Leo Strauss when commenting on the fundamental work of Carl Schmitt The Concept of the Political notes that despite all radical critique of liberalism incorporated in it Schmitt does not follow it through since his critique remains within the scope of liberalism”. “His anti-Liberal tendencies, – claims Strauss, - remain constrained by “systematics of liberal thought” that has not been overcome so far, which – as Schmitt himself admits – “despite all failures cannot be substituted by any other system in today’s Europe. What would you identify as a solution to the problem of overcoming the liberal discourse? Could you consider the Fourth Political Theory by Alexander Dugin to be such a solution? The theory that is beyond the three major ideologies of the 20th century – Liberalism, Communism and Fascism, and that is against the Liberal doctrine.
 
 
Manuel Ochsenreiter: First of all, the liberal doctrine is a totalitarian doctrine. Convinced liberals hate to hear that. They even would deny that it is a “doctrine”. But the reality is: The world wide liberalism and the postmodernism of “values” seem to be more totalitarian than communism, fascism or any –isms before. Liberalism doesn´t accept alternative ideas coexisting beside it. It shows its ugly totalitarian face every day all over the world and its sharpest sword is hypocrisy. The liberal “tolerance”, one of the most mentioned and beloved liberal values just enjoy other liberals. There is no tolerance towards non-liberals. The west showed a couple of times in the past towards some countries who didn’t adjust to this liberal world order, what that can mean at the end: If other societies, people, and countries are not convinced by NGOs, “civil society” and other forms of “western help”, they will be convinced by drones and Cruise missiles. The liberal west tells the beloved stories about “human rights” violations to convince the western societies about the necessity of such military operations. Liberals liberate with money or bombs. The choice is upto the “backwarded” aim. But at the end, everybody knows the “open society” (Karl Popper) means in reality “open market”, “free speech” means “liberal speech” and “freedom of choice” means “McDonalds or Burger King”. There is even a liberal “new speech” for these things: Military ground offensives are now “humanitarian zones”, air raids are “installing a no-flight zone” and ugly primitive Russian girls urge the west to shout “Free Pussy riot!”.
 
 
Every established intellectual, politician or media company moves inside this totalitarian liberal system. For example you will not find any established political party in the German parliament that doesn´t claim to be “also liberal”. Our universities “research” about “identities”, “gender”, and “culture” to change this or that. The new liberal types of human being don´t have a heritage, homeland or cultural identity. Even the gender can be changed. We could consider that as a type of slapstick comedy if it wouldn´t be so serious, because it means a type of destruction of basics and values, which might be hard to repair.
 
 
So Prof. Dugin’s theory shows an emergency exit out of this totalitarian system. It is like opening a window to let some fresh air into the western paralyzed intellectual environment. But the liberalism is not a weak ideology which would wait for its defeat.
 
 
Natella Speranskaya: Do you agree that today there are “two Europes”: the one – the liberal one (incorporating the idea of “open society”, human rights, registration of same-sex marriages, etc.) and the other Europe (“a different Europe”) – politically engaged, thinker, intellectual, spiritual, the one that considers the status quo and domination of liberal discourse as a real disaster and the betrayal of the European tradition. How would you evaluate chances of victory of a “different Europe” over the ”first” one?
 
 
Manuel Ochsenreiter: This reminds me to the “old Europe” and the “new Europe” Donald Rumsfeld was talking about in 2003. The “old Europe” was the one that refused to support the US in the Iraq war, especially Germany and France, and the “new Europe” joined the „coalition of the willing“. But of course you mean something else with your question. There is certainly a “different Europe”. We wouldn´t be talking if it didn´t exist. In all the European countries you see certain types of intellectual resistance against the liberal totalitarian system. I would even call this type of Europe the “real” one. Because the official “Europe” is just a weird construction that denies traditions and differences, everything what makes the rich nature of Europe and the Europeans.
 
 
The “real Europe” is everywhere, where intellectuals, journalists, and politicians turn their back to Brussels and the liberal system. You find it in a huge amount of magazines, newspapers, internet forums, and political organizations all over the continent. They do it without any powerful support from other countries, just with their idealism. There are no NGOs or other institutions that fund that important work. But this shows exactly that type of these new political grassroots.  
 
 
Natella Speranskaya: “There is nothing more tragic than a failure to understand the historical moment we are currently going through; - notes Alain de Benoist – this is the moment of postmodern globalization”. The French philosopher emphasizes the significance of the issue of a new Nomos of the Earth or a way of establishing international relations. What do you think the fourth Nomos will be like? Would you agree that the new Nomos is going to be Eurasian and multipolar (transition from universum to pluriversum)?
 
 
Manuel Ochsenreiter: Western liberal propaganda always claims: “Even if we wanted, we couldn´t do something else because it would result in violence and war!” They spread panic and fear among the people. You have to imagine, our German politicians tell us that even if we Europeans would abolish the Euro currency, we might end up in a war. The postmodern globalization is presented as the only single way for the future. I spoke about liberal hypocrisy before. The truth is that the way of globalization is a painful and bloody one as we can see in many countries with western “liberation” attempts. It is a hamster wheel of wars and more wars. The longer it goes the more blood is spilt. This logic is as simple as cruel.
 
 
Why is it like this? After the downfall of the Soviet Union and the communist eastern block, western political scientists (Charles Krauthammer, Francis Fukuyama and many others) welcomed more or less the “unipolar moment”; one world with one pole which was the west. This idea was like a western “idyll”. With “Western democracy” and “western freedom” spreading all over the world also to the last little corner, mankind will face a long-term, a “final” period of peace and prosperity. Although we see every day in the news the evidence of failure of this ideology, the west still works on it. As I already said, since the end of the Cold war and the geopolitical attempts of the west to install this unipolar idea, we witness the chaotic and violent results of this sort of geopolitics.
 
 
A multipolar international order is not just the answer. It is a logical result. The question is how will this multipolar order be organized? A well-organized multipolar world would not just bring stability, but would also be a great intellectual chance of cultural exchange on a really high level. It recognizes the value of “difference” while the west today propagandizes worldwide equality and unity. The local and regional cultures would have the chance of free development, tradition, and cultural identity (both is denied by the western ideology) that could prosper. The actual western hegemony with the means of NGOs and media tries to push down these things, but not forever. And of course Eurasia will play an important role.
 
 
Natella Speranskaya: Do you agree that the era of the white European human race has ended, and the future will be predetermined by Asian cultures and societies?
 
 
Manuel Ochsenreiter: Today’s Europe is losing its human substance. It shows once more that the liberal ideology is a suicidal idea. On the one hand it fights against families and promotes for example abortion; on the other hand it campaigns extremely for mass immigration. The consequence is extinction of the Europeans. How long it takes is pure mathematics. How much the face of Europe already has changed you can witness in any European capital between Lisbon and Athens. We cannot say that the quality of the human resources really become better by immigration even if we would consider that as a neutral or even “positive” development as the liberals do. In contradiction, we face a lot of problems with immigrant communities. The liberal ideology refuses to see the reasons where they are: in ethnic backgrounds. They just speak about an alleged “discrimination” of the migrant communities and about the alleged social injustice the migrants are facing. Politics denying ethnic differences deny the reality.
 
 
Of course this development weakens Europe. We are busier more and more with “integration”, what means with ourselves. You have really to be an anti-realist to see a benefit in that suicidal development. But this exactly is told by the liberal dogma. This means automatically that other entities and cultures who don´t suffer under such development will have an advantage against a weak Europe.
 
 
Natella Speranskaya: Do you consider Russia to be a part of Europe or do you accept the view that Russia and Europe represent two different civilizations?
 
 
Manuel Ochsenreiter: I don´t see a contradiction. I personally consider Russia as a European country, of course with diverse ethnic groups. And of course it has its own culture, traditions, and identity. But every European country has its own culture and traditions. The only difference is, we Europeans are told nonstop by the Brussels propaganda that we are all somehow “the same”. The Russians have the benefit not being bombarded by that ridiculous nonsense. For me as a German, Russia should be our close friend and ally. We share a lot of interests, we share a common history of course with ups and downs – at least Moscow is closer to us than Washington. A close relationship to Russia would be in the national interest of Berlin and Moscow.
 
 
Natella Speranskaya: Contemporary ideologies are based on the principle of secularity. Would you predict the return of religion, the return of sacrality? If so, in what form? Do you consider it to be Islam, Christianity, Paganism or any other forms of religion?
 
 
Manuel Ochsenreiter: When people start worshipping their bank accounts, the horoscopes in the yellow press magazines or their luxury cars what does that tell us about the alleged absence of religion? When it is forbidden to deny liberalism as it used to be forbidden to deny the existence of god in the Middle Ages? The “secularity” in today’s Europe just refers to the power of the organized religion, but obviously not to the needs of the people. When the religion disappears they find something else. In Berlin housewives are running into Buddhist temples because they adore the eternal smile of the Dalai Lama or the haircut of Richard Gere. Of course they don´t understand anything about the spirituality of Buddhism. Trendy Businessmen do some yoga exercises. Others start doing esoteric things. But this is also an element of liberalism: superficiality. While this is happening, the organized churches are more and more weakened themselves by the liberal virus. Sometimes it is really hard to see the difference between a protestant bishop and a liberal teacher. It is somehow ironic that God comes back to Europe in these days as a Muslim migrant. All of a sudden people go on the streets to protest against blasphemy. And this takes place at the same time when “Christian” clerics in Germany seriously support the blasphemy group “Pussy riot”.
 
 
So we see on the one side the spiritual needs of the people, but on the other side also today’s Christian churches’ refusal to serve those needs. Of course there are also some exceptions. But the general situation especially in Germany and other central and western European countries is like that.
 
 
I personally don´t believe that a new type of paganism might be a dominant religious power in Europe. Why? Because it would be a pure artificial concept for the people. The strength of the churches in the past was their ties to the traditional daily life of the people. Especially Catholicism perfected to adopt and integrate old pagan traditions in its system. If Europe recovers, I am sure that maybe a new type of European Christianity would also recover. It would be a logic thing. When liberalism starts to disappear, it´s totalitarian system will also disappear. Even the Bishops of liberalism like George Soros would lose their power. But if Europe falls, the last of the “three Romes” will be Moscow – and the only resistance against the liberalist doctrine in Europe will be done by the Muslim communities while the organized Christians celebrate their own downfall. 

La Russie, l’Occident et l’Allemagne

 

La Russie, l’Occident et l’Allemagne

 

Extrait d’un entretien accordé par Alexandre Douguine au magazine allemand “Zuerst”

 

Q.: Monsieur Douguine, l’Occident ne se trouve-t-il pas dans une mauvaise situation?

 

AD: Absolument. Mais la situation dans laquelle se débat l’Occident est différente de celle en laquelle se débat la Russie. Regardez l’Europe: l’UE se trouve dans un état de crise profonde; la rue en Grèce se rebelle ouvertement, l’Europe centrale et septentrionale croupit sous les charges sociales, politiques et économiques apportée par l’immigration de masse depuis ces dernières décennies. Même les Etats-Unis sont plongés dans une crise profonde. Mais, pourtant, c’est cette crise qui va faire se corser la situation. Car dans de telles situations d’instabilité et de précarité, ce sont toujours les partisans de lignes dures qui finissent par avoir le dessus. Aux Etats-Unis, actuellement, on évoque ouvertement une guerre contre l’Iran, même si à New York un bon paquet de citoyens américains manifestent contre Wall Street. On ne discute plus que du moment idéal pour commencer la prochaine guerre. Lénine disait en son temps: hier, c’était trop tôt, demain ce sera trop tard.

 

Q.: Vous defendez l’idée d’une alliance eurasiatique. Cette idée n’implique-t-elle pas que les Etats européens se détachent progressivement de l’UE bruxelloise, un processus à prévoir pour le moyen voire le long terme, et se donnent de nouvelles orientations. Est-ce là une hypothèse réaliste?

 

AD: La Russie est l’allié naturel d’une Europe libre et indépendante. Il n’y a donc pas d’autres options. Bien sûr, l’Europe actuelle n’envisage pas cette option, car elle est systématiquement refoulée par le fan-club transatlantique des égéries des “Pussy riots”. Mais cela pourrait bien vite changer. Qui imaginait, au début de l’été 1989, que le Mur de Berlin allait tomber en automne? Une poignée d’esprits lucides que l’établissement considérait comme fous ou dangereux.

 

Q.: Comment voyez-vous l’avenir des relations germano-russes, tout en sachant que celles-ci ont été jadis bien meilleures?

 

AD: Il y a beaucoup de liens entre l’Allemagne et la Russie. Nous avons une longue histoire commune. On aime à l’oublier aujourd’hui, surtout dans le vaste Occident. Lors de la signature de la convention de Tauroggen en 1812, le Lieutenant-Général prussien Johann David von Yorck a négocié de son propre chef un armistice entre le corps prussien, contraint par Napoléon de participer à la campagne de Russie, et l’armée du Tsar Alexandre. La Russie a soutenu la révolte prussienne contre les Français, ce qui a permis de lancer la guerre de libération des peuples contre Napoléon. La diplomatie russe a permis aussi en 1871 que le Reich allemand de Bismarck puisse devenir réalité  sur l’échiquier européen. La Russie a toujours soutenu le principe d’une Allemagne forte sur le continent européen. Otto von Bismarck recevait souvent l’appui de Saint-Pétersbourg. Ce ne sont là que deux exemples: la liste des coopérations germano-russes est longue et, à chaque fois, les deux protagonistes en ont bénéficié. Sur le plan culturel, les relations sont tout aussi étroites: philosophes russes et allemands s’appréciaient, se sentaient sur la même longueur d’onde. Mais nous nous sommes également opposés dans des guerres sanglantes mais, Dieu merci, cette époque est désormais révolue.

 

Q.: Et aujourd’hui?

 

L’Allemagne est le pilier porteur de l’économie européenne. L’économie européenne, c’est en réalité l’économie allemande. L’idée sous-jacente de l’économie allemande diffère considérablement de l’idée qui sous-tend la praxis économique du capitalisme occidental et britannique. En Allemagne, on mise sur l’industrie, de même que sur une création de valeurs réelles par le biais de la production de biens et non pas sur le capitalisme financier et bancaire qui, lui, ne repose sur rien de matériel. Aujourd’hui l’Allemagne est contrôlée par une élite exclusivement imprégnée d’idéologie “transatlantique”, qui empêche tout rapprochement avec la Russie. En Russie, on a aujourd’hui des sentiments pro-allemands. Poutine, on le sait, passe pour un grand ami de l’Allemagne. Mais malgré cela, le gouvernement de Berlin, et aussi l’opposition à ce gouvernement, essaie d’intégrer encore davantage l’Allemagne dans une UE en mauvaise posture, tout en renonçant à de larges pans de la souveraineté allemande. Pour l’Allemagne, une telle situation est dramatique!

 

Q.: Dans quelle mesure?

 

AD: L’Allemagne est aujourd’hui un pays occupé, déterminé par l’étranger. Les Américains contrôlent tout. L’élite politique allemande n’est pas libre. Conséquence? Berlin ne peut pas agir pour le bien du pays comme il le faudrait, vu la situation. Pour le moment, l’Allemagne est gouvernée par une élite qui travaille contre ses propres intérêts. Nous, les Russes, pouvons aider l’Allemagne parce que nous comprenons mieux la situation de votre pays, en état de servilité, et parce que nous travaillons à créer des réseaux germano-russes en divers domaines. Nous pourrions travailler avec divers groupes au sein de la République Fédérale, nous pourrions améliorer nos relations culturelles. Je crois fermement qu’un jour se recomposera une Allemagne libre, forte et autonome en Europe, qui lui permettra de jouer un rôle d’intermédiaire entre l’Est et l’Ouest du sous-continent. Le rôle que jouent actuellement les vassaux de l’eurocratie bruxelloise et de Washington ne permet pas de forger un vrai destin pour l’Allemagne.

 

Q.: Monsieur Douguine, nous vous remercions de nous avoir accordé cet entretien.

 

Entretien paru dans le magazine “Zuerst!”, Oktober 2012, http://www.zuerst.de/ ).

Een interview met Alexander Doegin

Een interview met Alexander Doegin

Inleiding

In februari 2012 reisde professor Alexander Doegin naar New Delhi, India, om er deel te nemen aan het 40ste Wereldcongres van het International Institute of Sociology, waarvan het thema dit jaar in volgend teken stond: “After Western Hegemony: Social Science and its Publics.”

Professor Doegin was zo vriendelijk om wat tijd vrij te maken voor enkele vragen vanwege medewerkers van Arktos die eveneens op het congres aanwezig waren. 

We hebben in dit interview gepoogd om professor Doegin enkele van zijn basisconcepten te laten verduidelijken om zodoende de verwarring en de desinformatie weg te nemen die rond hem en zijn beweging, de Eurazische Beweging, en haar zijtak in de Engelstalige wereld, de Global Revolutionary Alliance, hangen. Het interview werd afgenomen door Daniel Friberg, CEO, en John B. Morgan, hoofdredacteur van Arktos.

Dit interview werd gepubliceerd op het moment dat professor Doegin als spreker aanwezig was op Identitarian Ideas 2012, georganiseerd door de Zweedse organisatie Motpol in Stockholm op 28 juli 2012, en verliep tegelijk met de publicatie, door Arktos, van professor Doegins boek The Fourth Political Theory (http://www.arktos.com/alexander-dugin-the-fourth-political-theory.html ^[5]). Dit is het eerste boek van de hand van professor Doegin in het Engels.

In het Westen leeft de perceptie dat u een Russische nationalist bent. Voelt u zich hierdoor aangesproken?

Het concept van de natie is een kapitalistisch, westers concept. Daartegenover staat het Eurazisme, dat zich richt op culturele en etnische verschillen, en niet op éénmaking op basis van het individu, zoals het nationalisme vooropstelt. Wij verschillen van het nationalisme, doordat we een pluraliteit van waarden verdedigen. Wij verdedigen ideeën, niet onze gemeenschap; ideeën, niet onze maatschappij. Wij dagen de postmoderniteit uit, maar niet enkel namens de Russische natie. De postmoderniteit is een gapende leegte. Rusland vormt slechts een deel van de globale strijd. Het is zeker en vast een belangrijk deel, maar het vormt niet het uiteindelijke doel. Voor onze medestanders in Rusland kunnen we Rusland niet redden, zonder tegelijkertijd de wereld te redden. Net zoals we de wereld niet kunnen redden, zonder Rusland te redden.

Het gaat niet enkel om een strijd tegen het westerse universalisme. Het gaat om een strijd tegen alle, ook islamitische vormen van universalisme. We aanvaarden geen enkele politiek die universalisme wil opdringen aan anderen – westers, noch islamitisch, noch socialistisch, noch liberaal, noch Russisch. Wij zijn niet de verdedigers van het Russische imperialisme of revanchisme, maar wel van een globale visie en multipolariteit die gebaseerd zijn op de dialectiek van de beschaving. Onze tegenstanders beweren dat de veelheid aan beschavingen noodzakelijkerwijs leidt tot een clash. Deze bewering is fout. De globalisering en de Amerikaanse hegemonie leiden zonder uitzondering tot bloedige inmenging en geweld tussen beschavingen, waar er vrede, dialoog, of conflict zouden kunnen zijn, afhankelijk van de historische omstandigheden. Maar het opleggen van een heimelijke hegemonie leidt tot conflicten en, onvermijdelijk, erger in de toekomst. Ze hebben het dus over vrede, maar voeren oorlog. Wij verdedigen de gerechtigheid – niet oorlog of vrede, maar gerechtigheid en dialoog en het naturlijk recht van elke cultuur om haar identiteit te bewaren en te streven naar wat ze wil zijn. Niet enkel historisch, zoals in het multiculturalisme, maar ook in de toekomst. We moeten onszelf bevrijden van die zogezegde universalismen.

Welke rol dicht u Rusland toe bij het organiseren van de antimoderne krachten?

Het opzetten van antiglobalistische, of eerder antiwesterse, bewegingen en stromingen in heel de wereld bestaat uit verschillende stappen. Het gaat er fundamenteel om mensen te verenigen in hun strijd tegen het status quo. Dus, wat bedoel ik precies met status quo? Het gaat hier om een reeks met elkaar verbonden fenomenen die een belangrijke shift van moderniteit naar postmoderniteit met zich meebrengen. Het wordt vormgegeven door een shift van de unipolaire wereld, op de eerste plaats in de vorm van de invloed van de Verenigde Staten en West-Europa, naar een zogenaamde niet-polariteit, zoals ze zichtbaar wordt in de huidige impliciete hegemonie en in de revoluties die erdoor worden georchestreerd via handlangers, zoals bijvoorbeeld de oranje revoluties. Het hoofddoel van het Westen achter deze strategie is de definitieve controle over de planeet, niet enkel door middel van directe interventie, maar ook via een universalisering van zijn waarden, normen en ethiek.

Het status quo van de liberale hegemonie van het Westen is wereldomvattend geworden. Het gaat om de verwestersing van de hele mensheid. Dat betekent dat zijn normen, zoals de vrije markt, vrijhandel, liberalisme, parlementaire democratie, mensenrechten, en absoluut individualisme universeel zijn geworden. Deze normenset wordt verschillend geïnterpreteerd in verschillende regio’s van de wereld, maar het Westen beschouwt zijn specifieke interpretatie als vanzelfsprekend en de verspreiding ervan als onvermijdelijk. Dit is niets meer of minder dan een kolonisering van de geest. Het gaat hier om een nieuwe vorm van kolonialisme, een nieuwe vorm van macht, en een nieuwe vorm van controle, die in de praktijk wordt gebracht door middel van een netwerk. Iedereen die aangesloten is op het globale netwerk wordt onderworpen aan zijn code. Dit maakt deel uit van het postmoderne Westen, en wordt in snel tempo globaal doorgevoerd. De prijs die door een natie moet worden betaald om deel te kunnen uitmaken van het globale netwerk van het Westen is het aanvaarden van deze normen. Dit is de nieuwe hegemonie van het Westen. Het is een opschuiven van de open hegemonie van het Westen, zoals het kolonialisme en het openlijke imperialisme van het verleden, naar een meer impliciete, subtielere versie.

Om deze globale bedreiging van de mensheid te bestrijden is het belangrijk om alle verschillende krachten te verenigen, die zichzelf vroeger als anti-imperialistisch zouden hebben omschreven. Vandaag de dag moeten we onze vijand beter begrijpen. De vijand van vandaag leeft in het verborgene. Hij handelt door gebruik te maken van de normen en waarden van het westerse ontwikkelingspad en door de pluraliteit van andere culturen en beschavingen te negeren. Vandaag roepen we iedereen op die de geldigheid erkent van de specifieke waarden van niet-Westerse beschavingen, en waar er andere vormen van waarden bestaan, om op te staan tegen deze poging tot globale universalisering en verborgen hegemonie.

We kunnen in dezen spreken van een culturele, filosofische, ontologische en eschatologische strijd, omdat we in het status quo de essentie van het Donkere Tijdperk, of het grote paradigma terugvinden. Maar we moeten ook evolueren van een zuiver theoretische benadering naar een praktisch, geopolitiek niveau. En op dit geopolitiek niveau behoudt Rusland het potentieel, de middelen en de wil om deze uitdaging aan te gaan, omdat de Russische geschiedenis van oudsher instinctief gericht was tegen dezelfe horizon. Rusland is een grote macht, bij wie er een acuut bewustzijn heerst van wat er gaande is in de wereld, en bij wie men zich terdege bewust is van de eigen eschatologische missie. Het is daarom evident dat Rusland een centrale rol zou spelen in deze anti-status quo-coalitie. Rusland heeft zijn identiteit verdedigd tegen het katholicisme, het protestantisme en het moderne Westen tijdens de tsaristische periode, en tegen het liberale kapitalisme tijdens de Sovjettijd. Nu zien we een derde golf van deze strijd – de strijd tegen de postmoderniteit, het ultraliberalisme, en de globalisering. Maar dit keer is Rusland niet meer in staat om enkel en alleen te teren op zijn eigen mogelijkheden. Het kan niet langer alleen maar vechten onder het banier van het Orthodoxe Christendom. Het opnieuw invoeren van of het vertrouwen op de marxistische doctrine is evenmin een optie, aangezien het marxisme zelf één van de hoofdwortels van de destructieve ideeën van de postmoderniteit vormt.

Rusland is vandaag slechts één van de vele deelnemers aan deze globale strijd, en het kan deze strijd niet alleeen aan. We moeten alle krachten die zich tegen de westerse normen en het daarmee verbonden economische systeem verzetten, verenigen. We moeten derhalve allianties smeden met alle linkse sociale en politieke bewegingen die het status quo van het liberale kapitalisme in vraag stellen. We moeten tevens allianties smeden met alle identitaire krachten in eender welke cultuur die de globalisering om culturele redenen verwerpen. Vanuit dit standpunt moeten islamitische bewegingen, hindoebewegingen, of nationalistische bewegingen uit de hele wereld als bondgenoten aanzien worden. Hindoes, boeddhisten, christenen, en heidense identitairen in Europa, Amerika of Latijns-Amerika, of andere cultuurtypes, moeten samen één front vormen. De idee hierachter is dat ze allemaal aan één zeel moeten trekken tégen de ene vijand en het ene kwaad, en vóór een veelheid van concepten van wat goed is.

Waar we tegen zijn, zal ons verenigen, en waar we voor zijn, verdeelt ons. Daarom moeten we de nadruk leggen op wat we bestrijden. De gezamenlijke vijand verenigt ons, terwijl de positieve waarden, die elk van ons verdedigt, ons verdelen.  Daarom moeten we strategische allianties aangaan om de huidige wereldorde omver te werpen, wier kern kan omschreven worden als een mix van mensenrechten, anti-hiërarchisch sentiment, en politieke correctheid – alles wat het gezicht van het Beest, de anti-Christ of, in een andere context, de Kali-Yuga uitmaakt.

Hoe past traditionalistische spiritualiteit in de Eurazische agenda?

Er bestaan geseculariseerde culturen, maar in hun kern blijft de geest van de Traditie, religieus of anderssoortig, bestaan. Door de veelheid, de pluraliteit, en het polycentrisme van culturen te verdedigen, doen we een beroep op de principes van hun essentie, die we enkel in de spirituele tradities kunnen vinden. Maar wij proberen deze houding te koppelen aan de nood aan sociale gerechtigheid en aan de vrijheid om maatschappijen van elkaar te laten verschillen in de hoop op betere politieke regimes. De idee hierachter is het koppelen van de geest van de Traditie aan de eis van sociale gerechtigheid. En wij willen ons niet tegen deze sociale krachten keren, omdat dát precies de strategie van de hegemoniale macht is: links en rechts verdelen, culturen verdelen, etnische groepen verdelen, Oost en West, moslims en christenen verdelen. We roepen rechts en links op zich te verenigen, en zich niet af te zetten tegen traditionalisme en spiritualiteit, tegen sociale gerechtigheid en tegen sociaal dynamisme. We staan dus rechts noch links. Wij zijn tegen de liberale postmoderniteit. Het is onze bedoeling om alle fronten te verenigen en onze tegenstanders niet toe te laten ons te verdelen. Blijven we verdeeld, dan kunnen ze ons makkelijk beheersen. Verenigen we ons, dan is hun rijk onmiddellijk uit. Dat is onze globale strategie. En wanneer we de spirituele traditie met sociale gerechtigheid verbinden, dan slaat de paniek de liberalen onmiddellijk om het hart. Daar zijn ze onnoemelijk bang voor.

Welke spirituele traditie zou iemand die zich wenst in te zetten voor de Eurazische strijd moeten volgen, en vormt dit een essentieel element?

Men moet ernaar streven om een levend onderdeel van de maatschappij te worden waarin men leeft, en de traditie volgen die daar toonaangevend is. Ikzelf ben bijvoorbeeld Russisch-Orthodox. Dat is mijn traditie. In andere omstandigheden kunnen sommige individuen evenwel een ander spiritueel pad kiezen. Wat belangrijk is, is dat men wortels heeft. Er bestaat geen universeel antwoord. Indien iemand deze spirituele basis verwaarloost, maar zich toch wil inschakelen in de strijd, is het goed mogelijk dat hij of zij gaandeweg een diepere betekenis vindt. Het is onze overtuiging dat onze vijand dieper wortelt dan in het zuiver menselijke. Het Kwaad ligt dieper dan de mensheid, hebzucht of uitbuiting. Zij die aan de zijde van het Kwaad vechten, zijn zij die geen spirituele basis hebben. Zij die zich tegen die basis verzetten, kunnen haar in de strijd tegenkomen. Of misschien niet. Het blijft een open vraag – er bestaat geen verplichting. Het valt aan te raden, maar het is geen noodzakelijke voorwaarde.

Wat vindt u van Europees Nieuw-Rechts en Julius Evola? En, meer bepaald, van hun beider afkeer van het Christendom?

Het is aan de Europeanen om te beslissen welke soort spiritualiteit zij willen doen herleven. Voor ons, Russen, is dat het Orthodoxe Christendom. Wij beschouwen onze traditie als authentiek.  Wij beschouwen onze traditie als een voortzetting van de vroegere, voorchristelijke tradities van Rusland, zoals die tot uiting komen in onze verering van heiligen en iconen, naast andere aspecten. Daarom is er geen tegenstelling tussen onze eerdere en latere tradities. Evola keert zich af van de christelijke traditie van het Westen. Wat interessant is, is zijn kritiek op de desacralisering van het westerse christendom. Dit strookt precies met de orthodoxe kritiek op het westerse christendom. Het is duidelijk dat de secularizering van het westerse christendom de mensheid liberalisme oplevert. De secularizering van de orthodoxe religie geeft ons communisme. Individualisme staat tegenover collectivisme. Voor ons ligt het probleem niet aan het christendom zelf, zoals in het Westen. Evola ondernam een poging om de Traditie te herstellen. Nieuw-Rechts tracht eveneens de westerse traditie te herstellen, wat heel goed is. Maar als Russisch-Orthodoxe kan ik niet beslissen welk pad Europa moet volgen, aangezien we verschillende waardensystemen hebben. Wij willen de Europeanen niet vertellen wat ze moeten doen, en we willen niet dat de Europeanen dat met ons doen. Als Eurazisten aanvaarden we elke oplossing. Aangezien Evola Europeaan was, kon hij discussiëren en voorstellen doen over de juiste oplossing voor Europa. Éénieder van ons kan slechts zijn of haar persoonlijke mening formuleren. Maar ik ben wel tot de conclusie gekomen dat we meer gemeen hebben met Nieuw-Rechts dan met de katholieken. Ik deel veel visies van Alain de Benoist. Ik beschouw hem als de grootste intellectueel in het Europa van vandaag. Dat is niet het geval voor de moderne katholieken. Zij willen Rusland bekeren, en dat botst met onze plannen. Nieuw-Rechts wil het Europese heidendom niet opleggen aan anderen. Ik beschouw Evola ook als een meester en als een symbolische figuur van de eindrevolte en de grootse wederopleving, net zoals Guénon. In mijn ogen zijn deze beide heren de essentie van de Westerse traditie in deze donkere tijd.

Eerder zei u dat Eurazisten zouden moeten samenwerken met bepaalde jihadistische groepen. Maar deze hebben de neiging om universalistisch te zijn, en hun doel is het opleggen van de islamitische wet aan de hele wereld. Wat zijn de toekomstkansen van een dergelijke coalitie?

Jihadi’s zijn universalisten, net zoals seculiere westerlingen die globalizering nastreven. Maar zij zijn niet identiek, want het westerse project probeert alle anderen te domineren en zijn hegemonie overal op te leggen. Het valt ons elke dag direct aan via de globale media, via modeverschijnselen, door voorbeelden te stellen voor de jeugd, enzovoort. We worden ondergedompeld in deze globale culturele hegemonie. Het salafistisch universalisme is een soort marginaal alternatief. Men mag hen niet over dezelfde kam scheren als zij die streven naar globalisering. Zij vechten ook tegen onze vijand. Wij willen van geen enkele universalistische stroming weten, maar er zijn universalisten die ons vandaag aanvallen en winnen, en er zijn ook nonconformistische universalisten die de hegemonie van het Westen, de liberale universalisten, bevechten, en derhalve hic et nunc tactische bondgenoten zijn.  Vooraleer hun project van een wereldomvattende islamitische staat kan worden gerealiseerd, zullen we nog vele veldslagen en conflicten uitvechten. En de globale liberale dominantie is een feit. Daarom roepen we iedereen op om samen met ons te strijden tegen deze hegemonie, dit status quo. Ik heb het liever over de realiteit van vandaag, dan over wat de toekomst zou kunnen brengen. Iedereen die zich kant tegen liberale hegemonie is nu onze medestander. Dat heeft niets vandoen met moraliteit, wel met strategie. Carl Schmitt zei ooit dat politiek begint met het onderscheid tussen vrienden en vijanden. Er bestaan geen eeuwige vrienden en geen eeuwige vijanden. Wij vechten tegen de bestaande universele hegemonie. Iedereen vecht daartegen voor zijn of haar eigen waardensysteem.

Om de samenhang te bewaren moeten we ook werk maken van een verlenging, verbreding, en van een bredere alliantie. Ik loop niet hoog op met de salafisten. Het zou veel beter zijn om samen te werken met traditionele Sufi’s, bijvoorbeeld. Maar ik werk liever samen met de salafisten tegen een gemeenschappelijke vijand dan energie te verspillen door hen te bevechten en de grotere berdreiging te negeren.

Wie voor de globale liberale hegemonie is, is de vijand. Wie ertegen is, is een vriend. De eerste is geneigd om deze hegemonie te aanvaarden; de andere revolteert.

Wat is, in het licht van de recente gebeurtenissen in Libië, uw persoonlijke opvatting over Khaddafi?

President Medvedev beging een ware misdaad tegen Khaddafi en hielp mee met het in de stijgers zetten van een hele reeks interventies in de Arabische wereld. Dit was een echte misdaad, begaan door onze President. Aan zijn handen kleeft bloed. Hij is een collaborateur van het Westen. De verantwoordelijkheid voor de misdaad - die de moord op Khaddafi effectief was - ligt gedeeltelijk bij hem. Wij Eurazisten verdedigden Khaddafi, niet omdat we fans of supporters van hem of zijn Groene Boekje waren, maar om principiële redenen. Achter de opstand in Libië ging westerse hegemonie schuil, en die legde een bloedige chaos op. Toen Khaddafi viel, werd de westerse hegemonie sterker. Dat was onze nederlaag. Maar niet de eindnederlaag. Deze oorlog kent vele fasen. We verloren een veldslag, maar niet de oorlog. En misschien ontstaat er wel iets nieuws in Libië, want de situatie is momenteel heel onstabiel. Zo versterkte de Irakoorlog bijvoorbeeld de invloed van Iran in de regio, in tegenstelling tot wat de westerse hegemonisten oorspronkelijk hadden uitgestippeld.

Gezien de situatie in Syrië momenteel, herhaalt het scenario zichzelf. Al is het wel zo dat, met Poetin terug aan de macht, de situatie er veel beter voor staat. Hij is op zijn minst consequent in zijn steun aan President al-Assad. Mogelijk is dit niet voldoende om een westerse interventie in Syrië af te houden. Ik pleit ervoor dat Rusland zijn bondgenoot daadkrachtiger zou steunen met wapens, financiële middelen, enzovoort. De val van Libië was een nederlaag voor Rusland. De val van Syrië zou opnieuw een mislukking zijn.

Wat denkt u van Vladimir Poetin, en hoe is uw verstandhouding met hem?

Hij was veel beter dan Jeltsin. Hij redde Rusland in de jaren ’90 van de volledige ineenstorting. Rusland stond op de rand van de catastrofe. Vóór de komst van Poetin hadden liberalen westerse stijl het voor het zeggen in de Russische politiek. Poetin herstelde de soevereiniteit van de Russische staat. Daarom werd ik een aanhanger van hem. Maar na 2003 zette Poetin zijn patriotische, Eurazische hervormingen stop, schoof hij de ontwikkeling van een echte nationale strategie opzij, en begon met het accomoderen van de economische liberalen die van Rusland een deel van het globaliseringsproject wilden maken. Daardoor verloor hij aan legitimiteit, en werd ik steeds kritischer ten opzichte van hem. In bepaalde gevallen werkte ik samen met mensen uit zijn entourage om hem te steunen in bepaalde beleidsdomeinen, en in andere domeinen stond ik lijnrecht tegenover hem. Toen Medvedev werd uitverkoren als zijn opvolger was dat een catastrofe, omdat de mensen rond hem allemaal liberalen waren. Ik was tegen Medvedev. Ik kantte me tegen hem, deels vanuit een Eurazistisch standpunt. Nu komt Poetin terug. Alle liberalen zijn tegen hem, en alle prowesterse krachten zijn tegen hem. Maar hijzelf heeft zijn houding tegenover hen nog niet verduidelijkt. Maar hij moet absoluut de steun van het Russische volk opnieuw verwerven. Anders kan hij onmogelijk verder doen. Hij bevindt zich in een kritische situatie, al lijkt hij dat niet te vatten. Hij twijfelt nog om de patriotische kant te kiezen. Hij denkt nog steun te kunnen vinden bij de liberalen, wat volkomen verkeerd is. Ik sta tegenwoordig minder kritisch tegenover hem dan vroeger, maar ik denk dat hij zich in een lastig parket bevindt. Indien hij verder aarzelt, zal hij mislukken. Ik heb recent een boek gepubliceerd, Putin Versus Putin, want zijn grootste vijand is hijzelf. Omdat hij twijfelt, verliest hij steeds meer de steun van het volk. Het Russische volk voelt zich bedrogen door hem. Hij is zoiets als een autoritaire leider zonder autoritair charisma. Ik heb in bepaalde gevallen met hem samengewerkt, maar heb mij ook tegen hem gekant in andere gevallen. Ik heb contact met hem. Maar er cirkelen zovele krachten rond hem. De liberalen en de Russische patrioten rondom hem zijn niet bepaald briljant te noemen, op intellectueel vlak. Daarom kan hij enkel vertrouwen op zichzef en zijn intuïtie. Maar intuïtie mag niet de enige bron van politieke beleidskeuzes en strategie zijn. Indien hij terug aan de macht komt zal hij gedwongen worden om terug te keren naar zijn vroeger antiwesters beleid, omdat onze maatschappij van nature antiwesters is. Rusland heeft een lange traditie van opstand tegen vreemde indringers en van hulp aan anderen die tegen onrechtvaardigheid strijden, en het Russische volk ziet de wereld door deze lens. Het zal geen genoegen nemen met een leider die bestuurt zonder rekening te houden met deze traditie.

Bron: http://www.counter-currents.com/2012/07/interview-with-alexander-dugin/.

 

Dugin Gets in the Ring

Whither the Fourth Political Theory?

By Colin Liddell

 

Ex: http://www.alternativeright.com/

 

The Fourth Political Theory

 

 

 

is a book that is clearly not short on ambition. I haven’t actually read it, but I already know more or less what is in it from past writings by its author Professor Alexander Dugin, as well as the lengthy video presentation he gave of his ideas at the Identitarian Ideas conference held earlier this year in Stockholm.

 

Dugin believes there have been three great ideologies in modern history – Liberalism, Communism, and Fascism/National Socialism – and that we are now seeing the formation of the Fourth, which is still waiting to be properly christened and so is known by an ordinal. In the footsteps of Locke, Marx, and Mussolini, we now have Dugin.

I greatly respect and like Dugin. With his Tolstoyan beard and aura of an old church father, he’s a personable and reassuring presence. But I also know how the academic world works, and how it finds all sorts of clever ways to serve different masters, and Professor Dugin is certainly well-connected to a lot of people in the Russian establishment. Is it a coincidence that his ideas support the existence of the Russian Orthodox Church or the multi-ethnic imperialism that is the unavoidable basis for a strong Russian state?

But onto the Fourth Political Theory, with its Millenialist feel of being the fourth and final horseman of the ideological apocalypse. OK, the Theory straps a cushion to its forehead by claiming to be a work in progress, so that any blows landed on it will be softened, but already much of the groundwork has been clearly laid. The road isn’t finished, but we can more or less see where it is headed under the guidance of Professor Dugin.

The Theory supposedly arises from the criticism and deconstruction of the previous three theories, which history has already revealed to be full of flaws and responsible for a great deal of suffering and confusion. Dugin seems happy enough to ride along with modern Liberalism’s historical demolition of Marxism and Fascism, as this makes it a tidy knuckle-to-knuckle, winner-takes-all match between his Fourth Theory and the still undefeated champion, Liberalism.

Seconds out – Ding! Ding! Ding!

Despite past attempts by the Second and Third Theories to claim the crown of modernity, Dugin believes that Liberalism has triumphed here and has managed to irrevocably present itself as the only truly “modern” way. It has also succeeded in presenting itself as the “natural order,” rather than a mere ideology.

To destroy Liberalism, Dugin strikes as these points. But rather than trying to claim that the Fourth Theory is more modern than Liberalism, his strategy is to try to get away from the whole idea of modernity itself by appealing to pre-modern values and conceptualizing them as post-modern eternal values. There is more than a touch of his Old Believer Russian Orthodoxy here.

This is not so much a heavy punch to the ribs of Liberalism as a bit of fancy footwork to avoid Liberalism’s nasty left hook. Modernity is not so easily discarded, as Dugin seems to believe. It operates as the measure of ideological victory, without which no battle can take place. His call to discard modernity is therefore a call for a defensive ceasefire or a time out.

Another key point for Dugin to attack is the subjects or agents of the other three theories. The economic classes of Marxism are presented as outmoded; Fascism’s state as something of a bourgeois innovation; and National Socialist race as a “kind of construction” and not very useful.

Although his punches are only glancing ones here, it does not matter, as these two systems are supposedly punch-drunk losers propping up the bar, muttering “I coulda been a contender.” Where Dugin is more effective is in battering Liberalism’s all-important individual.

This is his mighty opponent’s soft spot and Dugin makes hay here and even gets into position to unleash his KO, but this is where his attack comes unstuck. While all the previous systems have strong subjects/agents that human beings can all feel passionate about – race, nation, class, and our own beloved selves – the Fourth Theory substitutes Heidegger’s flat-footed and abstruse “Dasein” concept. You couldn’t imagine the Bastille being stormed or Stalingrad being held for the sheer pleasure of “being there”!

As a philosophical phrase that says very little by saying too much, it is appropriate that it is then extrapolated into a kind of blanket multi-polarity and call for a true multiculturalism (depoliticized in the case of Russia) and even multi-chronology. Regarding this latter concept, Dugin calls for a world where societies can exist that operate on different temporal patterns, such as cyclical, linear, or more complex. He also calls for the rejection of universal values and comparisons. This is clearly heavily defensive boxing, aimed at avoiding the clever jabs and looming thump that Liberalism is aiming at Putin’s Russia.

The Ascendant Order

Dugin’s interpretation of the previous three theories has a kind of grace, regularity, and ascendant pattern to it. There is natural and elegant progression from the individual to class, and from class to the state (or race). While the other three ideologies nobly struggled in the ring of modernity, and had subjects/agents that could inspire the masses, the Fourth Political Theory has a snatch of Heidegger embroidered on its boxing shorts and seems to be climbing through the ropes with its towel flying through the air behind it.

Perhaps the problem is ideology itself. While Dugin is happy to abandon notions of modernity, he is less happy to abandon ideology. This is only to be expected from an academic who eats, sleeps, and breathes ideology. So, do we actually need it?

Ideology has a progressive nature that does not endear it to many on the Right, but progress is essential in any system that is not based on pure stagnation. Even a cyclical system needs progress to get to the point of its collapse and rebirth. Ideology creates progress through competing with the status quo, or by helping a rising system to become manifest. Therefore, in addition to each ideology having a subject or an agent, history also demonstrates that it needs some kind of enemy or rival: Liberalism’s enemy was the old order; Marxism’s was Liberalism; Fascism’s was Marxism; and Neo-Liberalism’s was Fascism and Marxism.

The problem of the Neo-Liberal world order is that there seems no longer to be any enemy, thus endless stagnation looms. Progress will only arise when Neo-Liberalism in its turn becomes the defeated enemy. On this basis, a strong case exists for the necessity of a Fourth Ideology. But after this, will we need a fifth or sixth, and so on into infinity? The chances are that our technologically enhanced world cannot handle this kind of vast, intense dialectical struggle many times more, so it is essential that the Fourth Political Theory should internalize the engine of progress that has previously come from ideological conflict.

Escaping the Dialectical

As it now stands, the Fourth Political Theory is more a reflection of Russo-centric concerns, and also seems inconsistent with the broader ideological framework that Dugin has outlined. In order for it to gain wider credibility it will have to take on board some of the following points:

Firstly, it should be entirely divorced from any agenda that reflects specific political or religious goals or interests, such as those elements of Russian political pragmatism I constantly detect in Dugin’s work.

Secondly, modernity should not be abandoned. If we are to have an ideological battle, we need winners and losers, and we need a common standard by which to judge them. Communism understood this and so did Fascism, and both were ahead of Liberalism on points for most of their bouts. “Da Sein” and multi-chronology is a form of retreatism.

Thirdly, dismissing Communism and Fascism is premature. Although both were defeated, neither was a purely ideological defeat. Fascism’s defeat was mainly military, while Communism’s was economic. To use boxing terminology one last time, you could say that both were lucky knock outs. These two contestants should be readmitted to the ideological battle until they are defeated ideologically. Neo-liberalism is not capable of doing this. Only a later political theory will be capable of this.

Fourthly, the Fourth Political Theory should be adjusted to fit more neatly into Dugin’s grand pattern of ideological evolution. Only when this is done will it be successful. History shows that Marxism opposed but also used elements of Liberalism. Fascism opposed but also used elements of Marxism and to a lesser extent Liberalism. Therefore it seems likely that the Fourth Political Theory should oppose but also include elements of Fascism and to a lesser extent Marxism.

Fifthly, the Fourth Political Theory needs to find an appropriate subject/agent, one with an existence that the masses can relate to, and one that fits into the ascendant pattern of individual, class, and state/race. The only subject that fits this bill is humanity itself.

Sixthly, to avoid the dangers of endless stagnation and further dialectical struggles resulting in Armageddon, the Fourth Political Theory will need to internalize the progressive impetus.

A. Dugin, C. Preve e M. Fini, presentano "Eurasia" a Milano

A. Dugin, C. Preve e M. Fini, presentano "Eurasia" a Milano

1 + 2

 

Interview with Alexander Dugin

 

Interview with Alexander Dugin http://www.wermodandwermod.com/

Introduction

In February 2012, Professor Alexander Dugin traveled to New Delhi, India to attend the 40th World Congress of the International Institute of Sociology, the theme of which was “After Western Hegemony: Social Science and its Publics.” Professor Dugin was kind enough to take some time away from the conference to answer a few questions by representatives of Arktos who attended the event. 

In this interview, we attempted to have Professor Dugin clarify some of his basic beliefs in order to dispel the confusion and misrepresentations that exist about him and his movement, the Eurasian Movement, and its offshoot, the Global Revolutionary Alliance, in the English-speaking world. The interview was conducted by Daniel Friberg, CEO of Arktos, and John B. Morgan, Editor-in-Chief.

This interview is being released in conjunction with Prof. Dugin’s appearance at Identitarian Ideas 2012, being held by the Swedish organization Motpol in Stockholm on July 28, 2012, and the simultaneous release of Prof. Dugin’s book The Fourth Political Theory by Arktos (http://www.arktos.com/alexander-dugin-the-fourth-political-theory.html). This is the first book by Prof. Dugin to appear in the English language.

There is a perception in the West that you are a Russian nationalist. Do you identify with that description?

The concept of the nation is a capitalist, Western one. On the other hand, Eurasianism appeals to cultural and ethnic differences, and not unification on the basis of the individual, as nationalism presumes. Ours differs from nationalism because we defend a pluralism of values. We are defending ideas, not our community; ideas, not our society. We are challenging postmodernity, but not on behalf of the Russian nation alone. Postmodernity is a yawning abyss. Russia is only one part of this global struggle. It is certainly an important part, but not the ultimate goal. For those of us in Russia, we can’t save it without saving the world at the same time. And likewise, we can’t save the world without saving Russia.

It is not only a struggle against Western universalism. It is a struggle against all universalisms, even Islamic ones. We cannot accept any desire to impose any universalism upon others – neither Western, Islamic, socialist, liberal, or Russian. We defend not Russian imperialism or revanchism, but rather a global vision and multipolarity based on the dialectic of civilization. Those we oppose say that the multiplicity of civilizations necessarily implies a clash. This is a false assertion. Globalization and American hegemony bring about a bloody intrusion and trigger violence between civilizations where there could be peace, dialogue, or conflict, depending on historical circumstances. But imposing a hidden hegemony implies conflict and, inevitably, worse in the future. So they say peace but they make war. We defend justice – not peace or war, but justice and dialogue and the natural right of any culture to maintain its identity and to pursue what it wants to be. Not only historically, as in multiculturalism, but also in the future. We must free ourselves from these pretend universalisms.

What do you think Russia’s role will be in organizing the anti-modern forces?

There are different levels involved in the creation of anti-globalist, or rather anti-Western, movements and currents around the world. The basic idea is to unite the people who are fighting against the status quo. So, what is the status quo? It is a series of connected phenomena bringing about an important shift from modernity to post-modernity. It is shaped by a shift from the unipolar world, represented primarily by the influence of the United States and Western Europe, to so-called non-polarity as exemplified by today’s implicit hegemony and those revolutions that have been orchestrated by it through proxy, as for example the various Orange revolutions. The basic intent behind this strategy is for the West to eventually control the planet, not only through direct intervention, but also via the universalization of its set of values, norms, and ethics.

The status quo of the West’s liberal hegemony has become global. It is a Westernization of all of humanity. This means that its norms, such as the free market, free trade, liberalism, parliamentarian democracy, human rights, and absolute individualism have become universal. This set of norms is interpreted differently in the various regions of the world, but the West regards its specific interpretation as being both self-evident and its universalization as inevitable. This is nothing less than a colonization of the spirit and of the mind. It is a new kind of colonialism, a new kind of power, and a new kind of control that is put into effect through a network. Everyone who is connected to the global network becomes subjected to its code. It is part of the postmodern West, and is rapidly becoming global. The price a nation or a people has to pay to become connected to the West’s globalization network is acceptance of these norms. It is the West’s new hegemony. It is a migration from the open hegemony of the West, as represented by the colonialism and outright imperialism of the past, to an implicit, more subtle version.

To fight this global threat to humanity, it is important to unite all the various forces that would, in earlier times, have been called anti-imperialist. In this age, we should better understand our enemy. The enemy of today is hidden. It acts by exploiting the norms and values of the Western path of development and ignoring the plurality represented by other cultures and civilizations. Today, we invite all who insist on the worth of the specific values of non-Western civilizations, and where there other forms of values exist, to challenge this attempt at a global universalization and hidden hegemony.

This is a cultural, philosophical, ontological, and eschatological struggle, because in the status quo we identify the essence of the Dark Age, or the great paradigm. But we should also move from a purely theoretical stance to a practical, geopolitical level. And at this geopolitical level, Russia preserves the potential, resources and inclination to confront this challenge, because Russian history has long been intuitively oriented against the same horizon. Russia is a great power where there is an acute awareness of what is going on in the world, historically speaking, and a deep consciousness of its own eschatological mission. Therefore it is only natural that Russia should play a central part in this anti-status quo coalition. Russia defended its identity against Catholicism, Protestantism and the modern West during Tsarist times, and then against liberal capitalism during Soviet times. Now there is a third wave of this struggle – the struggle against postmodernity, ultra-liberalism, and globalization. But this time, Russia is no longer able to rely on its own resources. It cannot fight solely under the banner of Orthodox Christianity. Nor is reintroducing or relying on Marxist doctrine a viable option, since Marxism is in itself a major root of the destructive ideas constituting postmodernity.

Russia is now one of many participants in this global struggle, and cannot fight this fight alone. We need to unite all the forces that are opposed to Western norms and its economic system. So we need to make alliances with all the Leftist social and political movements that challenge the status quo of liberal capitalism. We should likewise ally ourselves with all identitarian forces in any culture that refuse globalism for cultural reasons. From this perspective, Islamic movements, Hindu movements, or nationalist movements from all over the world should also be regarded as allies. Hindus, Buddhists, Christians, and pagan identitarians in Europe, America, or Latin America, or other types of cultures, should all form a common front. The idea is to unite all of them, against the single enemy and the singular evil for a multiplicity of concepts of what is good.

What we are against will unite us, while what we are for divides us. Therefore, we should emphasize what we oppose. The common enemy unites us, while the positive values each of us are defending actually divides us.  Therefore, we must create strategic alliances to overthrow the present order of things, of which the core could be described as human rights, anti-hierarchy, and political correctness – everything that is the face of the Beast, the anti-Christ or, in other terms, Kali-Yuga.

Where does traditionalist spirituality fit into the Eurasian agenda?

There are secularized cultures, but at the core of all of them, the spirit of Tradition remains, religious or otherwise. By defending the multiplicity, plurality, and polycentrism of cultures, we are making an appeal to the principles of their essences, which we can only find in the spiritual traditions. But we try to link this attitude to the necessity for social justice and the freedom of differing societies in the hope for better political regimes. The idea is to join the spirit of Tradition with the desire for social justice. And we don’t want to oppose them, because that is the main strategy of hegemonic power: to divide Left and Right, to divide cultures, to divide ethnic groups, East and West, Muslims and Christians. We invite Right and Left to unite, and not to oppose traditionalism and spirituality, social justice, and social dynamism. So we are not on the Right or on the Left. We are against liberal postmodernity. Our idea is to join all the fronts and not let them divide us. When we stay divided, they can rule us safely. If we are united, their rule will immediately end. That is our global strategy. And when we try to join the spiritual tradition with social justice, there is an immediate panic among liberals. They fear this very much.

Which spiritual tradition should someone who wishes to participate in the Eurasianist struggle adopt, and is this a necessary component?

One should seek to become a concrete part of the society in which one lives, and follow the tradition that prevails there. For example, I am Russian Orthodox. This is my tradition. Under different conditions, however, some individuals might choose a different spiritual path. What is important is to have roots. There is no universal answer. If someone neglects this spiritual basis, but is willing to take part in our struggle, during the struggle he may well find some deeper spiritual meaning. Our idea is that our enemy is deeper than the merely human. Evil is deeper than humanity, greed, or exploitation. Those who fight on behalf of evil are those who have no spiritual faith. Those who oppose it may encounter it.  Or, perhaps not. It is an open question – it is not obligatory. It is advisable, but not necessary.

What do you think of the European New Right and Julius Evola? And in particular, their respective opposition to Christianity?

It is up to the Europeans to decide which kind of spirituality to revive. For us Russians, it is Orthodox Christianity. We regard our tradition as being authentic.  We see our tradition as being a continuation of the earlier, pre-Christian traditions of Russia, as is reflected in our veneration of the saints and icons, among other aspects. Therefore, there is no opposition between our earlier and later traditions. Evola opposes the Christian tradition of the West. What is interesting is his critique of the desacralization of Western Christianity. This fits well with the Orthodox critique of Western Christianity. It is easy to see that the secularization of Western Christianity gives us liberalism. The secularization of the Orthodox religion gives us Communism. It is individualism versus collectivism. For us, the problem is not with Christianity itself, as it is in the West. Evola made an attempt to restore Tradition. The New Right also tries to restore the Western tradition, which is very good. But being Russian Orthodox, I cannot decide which is the right path for Europe to take, since we have a different set of values. We don’t want to tell the Europeans what to do, nor do we want to be told what to do by the Europeans. As Eurasianists, we’ll accept any solution. Since Evola was European, he could discuss and propose the proper solution for Europe. Each of us can only state our personal opinion. But I have found that we have more in common with the New Right than with the Catholics. I share many of the same views as Alain de Benoist. I consider him to be the foremost intellectual in Europe today. That it is not the case with modern Catholics. They wish to convert Russia, and that is not compatible with our plans. The New Right does not want to impose European paganism upon others. I also consider Evola to be a master and a symbolic figure of the final revolt and the great revival, as well as Guénon. For me, these two individuals are the essence of the Western tradition in this dark age.

In our earlier conversation, you mentioned that Eurasianists should work with some jihadist groups. However, they tend to be universalist, and their stated goal is the imposition of Islamic rule over the entire world. What are the prospects for making such a coalition work?

Jihadis are universalists, just as secular Westerners who seek globalization are. But they are not the same, because the Western project seeks to dominate all the others and impose its hegemony everywhere. It attacks us directly every day through the global media, fashions, by setting examples for youth, and so on. We are submerged in this global cultural hegemony. Salafist universalism is a kind of marginal alternative. They should not be thought of in the same way as those who seek globalization. They also fight against our enemy. We don’t like any universalists, but there are universalists who attack us today and win, and there are also non-conformist universalists who are fighting against the hegemony of the Western, liberal universalists, and therefore they are tactical friends for the time being. Before their project of a global Islamic state can be realized, we will have many battles and conflicts. And global liberal domination is a fact. We therefore invite everybody to fight alongside us against this hegemony, this status quo. I prefer to discuss what is the reality at present, rather than what may exist in the future. All those who oppose liberal hegemony are our friends for the moment. This is not morality, it is strategy. Carl Schmitt said that politics begins by distinguishing between friends and enemies. There are no eternal friends and no eternal enemies. We are struggling against the existing universal hegemony. Everyone fights against it for their own particular set of values.

For the sake of coherence we should also prolong, widen, and create a broader alliance. I don’t like Salafists. It would be much better to align with traditionalist Sufis, for example. But I prefer working with the Salafists against the common enemy than to waste energy in fighting against them while ignoring the greater threat.

If you are in favor of global liberal hegemony, you are the enemy. If you are against it, you are a friend. The first is inclined to accept this hegemony; the other is in revolt.

In light of recent events in Libya, what are your personal views on Gaddafi?

President Medvedev committed a real crime against Gaddafi and helped to initiate a chain of interventions in the Arab world. It was a real crime committed by our President. His hands are bloodied. He is a collaborator with the West. The crime of murdering Gaddafi was partly his responsibility. We Eurasianists defended Gaddafi, not because we were fans or supporters of him or his Green Book, but because it was a matter of principles. Behind the insurgency in Libya was Western hegemony, and it imposed bloody chaos. When Gaddafi fell, Western hegemony grew stronger. It was our defeat. But not the final one. This war has many episodes. We lost the battle, but not the war. And perhaps something different will emerge in Libya, because the situation is quite unstable. For example, the Iraq War actually strengthened Iran’s influence in the region, contrary to the designs of the Western hegemonists.

Given the situation in Syria at present, the scenario is repeating itself. However, the situation, with Putin returning to power, is much better. At least he is consistent in his support for President al-Assad. Perhaps this will not be enough to stop Western intervention in Syria. I suggest that Russia assist our ally more effectively by supplying weapons, financing, and so forth. The fall of Libya was a defeat for Russia. The fall of Syria will be yet another failure.

What is your opinion of, and relationship to Vladimir Putin?

He was much better than Yeltsin. He saved Russia from a complete crash in the 1990s. Russia was on the verge of disaster. Before Putin, Western-style liberals were in a position to dictate politics in Russia. Putin restored the sovereignty of the Russian state. That is the reason why I became his supporter. However, after 2003, Putin stopped his patriotic, Eurasianist reforms, putting aside the development of a genuine national strategy, and began to accommodate the economic liberals who wanted Russia to become a part of the project of globalization. As a result, he began to lose legitimacy, and so I became more and more critical of him. In some circumstances I worked with people around him to support him in some of his policies, while I opposed him in others. When Medvedev was chosen as his heir, it was a catastrophe, since the people positioned around him were all liberals. I was against Medvedev. I opposed him, in part, from the Eurasianist point-of-view. Now Putin will return. All the liberals are against him, and all the pro-Western forces are against him. But he himself has not yet made his attitude toward this clear. However, he is obliged to win the support of the Russian people anew. It is impossible to continue otherwise. He is in a critical situation, although he doesn’t seem to understand this. He is hesitating to choose the patriotic side. He thinks he can find support among some of the liberals, which is completely false. Nowadays, I am not so critical of him as I was before, but I think he is in a critical situation. If he continues to hesitate, he will fail. I recently published a book, Putin Versus Putin, because his greatest enemy is himself. Because he is hesitating, he is losing more and more popular support. The Russian people feel deceived by him. He may be a kind of authoritarian leader without authoritarian charisma. I’ve cooperated with him in some cases, and opposed him on others. I am in contact with him. But there are so many forces around him. The liberals and the Russian patriots around him are not so brilliant, intellectually speaking. Therefore, he is obliged to rely only upon himself and his intuition. But intuition cannot be the only source of political decision-making and strategy. When he returns to power, he will be pushed to return to his earlier anti-Western policies, because our society is anti-Western in nature. Russia has a long tradition of rebellion against foreign invaders, and of helping others who resist injustice, and the Russian people view the world through this lens. They will not be satisfied with a ruler who does not govern in keeping with this tradition.

Unthinking Liberalism: A. Dugin’s The Fourth Political Theory

Unthinking Liberalism:
Alexander Dugin’s The Fourth Political Theory

by Alex KURTAGIC

Ex: http://www.counter-currents.com/

Alexander Dugin
The Fourth Political Theory, London: Arktos, 2012

Arktos recently published what we can only hope will be the first of many more English translations of Alexander Dugin’s work. Head of the sociology department in Moscow State University, and a leading Eurasianist with ties to the Russian military, this man is, today, influencing official Kremlin policy.

The Fourth Political Theory is a thoroughly refreshing monograph, combining clarity of analysis, philosophical rigor, and intellectual creativity. It is Dugin’s attempt to sort through the confusion of modern political theory and establish the foundations for a political philosophy that will decisively challenge the dominant liberal paradigm. It is not, however, a new complete political theory, but rather the beginning of a project. The name is provisional, the theory under construction. Dugin sees this not as the work of one man, but, because difficult, a collective heroic effort.

The book first sets out the historical topology of modern political theories. In Dugin’s account, liberalism, the oldest and most stable ideology, was in modernity the first political theory. Marxism, a critique of liberalism via capitalism, was the second. Fascism/National Socialism, a critique of both liberalism and Marxism, was the third. Dugin says that Fascism/National Socialism was defeated by Marxism (1945), that Marxism was defeated by liberalism (1989), leaving liberalism triumphant and therefore free to expand around the globe.

According to Dugin, the triumph of liberalism has been so definitive, in fact, that in the West it has ceased to be political, or ideological, and become a taken-for-granted practice. Westerners think in liberal terms by default, assuming that no sane, rational, educated person could think differently, accusing dissenters of being ideological, without realizing that their own assumptions have ideological origins.

The definitive triumph of liberalism has also meant that it is now so fully identified with modernity that it is difficult to separate the two, whereas control of modernity was once contested by political theory number one against political theories two and three. The advent of postmodernity, however, has marked the complete exhaustion of liberalism. It has nothing new to say, so it is reduced endlessly to recycle and reiterate itself.

Looking to identify what may be useful to salvage, Dugin proceeds to break down each of the three ideologies into its component parts. In the process of doing so, he detoxifies the two discredited critiques of liberalism, which is necessary to be able to cannibalize them. His analysis of liberalism follows Alain de Benoist. Because it is crucial, I will avail myself of de Benoist’s insights and infuse some of my own in Dugin’s explication of liberalism.

Dugin says that liberalism’s historical subject is the individual. The idea behind liberalism was to “liberate” the individual from everything that was external to him (faith, tradition, authority). Out of this springs the rest: when you get rid of the transcendent, you end up with a world that is entirely rational and material. Happiness then becomes a question of material increase. This leads to productivism and economism, which, when the individual is paramount, demands capitalism. When you get rid of the transcendent, you also eliminate hierarchy: all men become equal. If all men are equal, then what applies to one must apply to all, which means universalism. Similarly, if all men are equal, then all deserve an equal slice of the pie, so full democracy, with universal suffrage, becomes the ideal form of government. Liberalism has since developed flavors, and the idea of liberation acquires two competing meanings: “freedom from,” which in America is embodied by libertarians and the Tea Party; and “freedom to,” embodied by Democrats.

Marxism’s historical subject is class. Marxism is concerned chiefly with critiquing the inequities arising from capitalism. Otherwise, it shares with liberalism an ethos of liberation, a materialist worldview, and an egalitarian morality.

Fascism’s historical subject is the state, and National Socialism’s race. Both critique Marxism’s and liberalism’s materialist worldview and egalitarian morality. Hence, the simultaneous application of hierarchy and socialism.

With all the parts laid out on the table, Dugin then selects what he finds useful and discards the rest. Unsurprisingly, Dugin finds nothing useful in liberalism. The idea is to unthink it, after all.

Spread out across several chapters, Dugin provides a typology of the different factions in the modern political landscape—e.g., fundamental conservatism (traditionalism), Left-wing conservatism (Strasserism, National Bolshevism, Niekisch), conservative revolution (Spengler, Jünger, Schmitt, Niekisch), New Left, National Communism, etc. It is essential that readers understand these so that they may easily recognize them, because doing so will clarify much and help them avoid the errors arising from opaque, confused, contradictory, or misleading labels.

Liberal conservatism is a key category in this typology. It may sound contradictory on the surface, because in colloquial discourse mainstream politics is about the opposition of liberals vs. conservatives. Yet, and as I have repeatedly stated, when one examines their fundamentals, so-called “conservatives” (a misleading label), even palaeoconservatives (another misleading label), are all ideologically liberals, only they wish to conserve liberalism, or go a little slower, or take a few steps back. Hence, the alternative designation for this type: “status-quo conservative.”

Another key category is National Communism. This is, according to Dugin, a unique phenomenon, and enjoys a healthy life in Latin America, suggesting it will be around for some time to come. Evo Morales and Hugo Chavez are contemporary practitioners of National Communism.

Setting out the suggested foundations of a fourth political ideology takes up the rest of Dugin’s book. Besides elements salvaged from earlier critiques of liberalism, Dugin also looks at the debris that in the philosophical contest for modernity was left in the periphery. These are the ideas for which none of the ideologies of modernity have had any use. For Dugin this is essential to an outsider, counter-propositional political theory. He does not state this in as many words, but it should be obvious that if we are to unthink liberalism, then liberalism should find its nemesis unthinkable.

But the process of construction begins, of course, with ontology. Dugin refers to Heidegger’s Dasein. Working from this concept he would like the fourth political theory to conceptualize the world as a pluriverse, with different peoples who have different moralities and even different conceptions of time. In other words, in the fourth political theory the idea of a universal history would be absurd, because time is conceived differently in different cultures—nothing is ahistorical or universal; everything is bound and specific. This would imply a morality of difference, something I have proposed as counter-propositional to the liberal morality of equality. In the last consequence, for Dugin there needs to be also a peculiar ontology of the future. The parts of The Fourth Political Theory dealing with these topics are the most challenging, requiring some grounding in philosophy, but, unsurprisingly, they are also where the pioneering work is being done.

Also pioneering, and presumably more difficult still, is Dugin’s call to “attack the individual.” By this he means, obviously, destabilizing the taken-for-granted construct that comprises the minimum social unit in liberalism—the discrete social atom that acts on the basis of rational self-interest, a construct that should be distinguished from “a man” or “a woman” or “a human.” Dugin makes some suggestions, but these seem nebulous and not very persuasive at this stage. Also, this seems quite a logical necessity within the framework of this project, but Dugin’s seeds will find barren soil in the West, where the individual is almost sacrosanct and where individualism results from what is possibly an evolved bias in Northern European societies, where this trait may have been more adaptive than elsewhere. A cataclysmic event may be required to open up the way for a redefinition of what it is to be a person. Evidently the idea is that the fourth political theory conceptualizes a man not as an “individual” but as something else, presumably as part of a collectivity. This is probably a very Russian way of looking at things.

The foregoing may all seem highly abstract, and I suspect practically minded readers will not take to it. It is hard to see how the abstract theorizing will satisfy the pragmatic Anglo-Saxon, who is suspicious of philosophy generally. (Jonathan Bowden was an oddity in this regard.) Yet there are real-world implications to the theory, and in Dugin’s work the geopolitical dimension must never be kept out of sight.

For Dugin, triumphant liberalism is embodied by Americanism; the United States, through its origins as an Enlightenment project, and through its superpower status in the twentieth and twenty-first century, is the global driver of liberal practice. As such, with the defeat of Marxism, it has created, and sought to perpetuate, a unipolar world defined by American, or Atlanticist, liberal hegemony. Russia has a long anti-Western, anti-liberal tradition, and for Dugin this planetary liberal hegemony is the enemy. Dugin would like the world to be multipolar, with Atlanticism counterbalanced by Eurasianism, and maybe other “isms.” In geopolitics, the need for a fourth political theory arises from a need to keep liberalism permanently challenged, confined to its native hemisphere, and, in a word, out of Russia.

While this dimension exists, and while there may be a certain anti-Americanism in Dugin’s work, Americans should not dismiss this book out of hand, because it is not anti-America. As Michael O’Meara has pointed out in relation to Yockey’s anti-Americanism, Americanism and America, or Americans, are different things and stand often in opposition. Engaging with this kind of oppositional thinking is, then, necessary for Americans. And the reason is this: liberalism served America well for two hundred years, but ideologies have a life-cycle like everything else, and liberalism has by now become hypertrophic and hypertelic; it is, in other words, killing America and, in particular, the European-descended presence in America.

If European-descended Americans are to save themselves, and to continue having a presence in the North American continent, rather than being subsumed by liberal egalitarianism and the consequent economic bankruptcy, Hispanization, and Africanization, the American identity, so tied up with liberalism because of the philosophical bases of its founding documents, would need to be re-imagined. Though admittedly difficult, the modern American identity must be understood as one that is possible out of many. Sources for a re-imagined identity may be found in the archaic substratum permeating the parts of American heritage that preceded systematic liberalism (the early colonial period) as well as in the parts that were, at least for a time, beyond it (the frontier and the Wild West). In other words, the most mystical and also the least “civilized” parts of American history. Yet even this may be problematic, since they were products of late “Faustian” civilization. A descent into barbarism may be in the cards. Only time will tell.

For Westerners in general, Dugin’s project may well prove too radical, even at this late stage in the game—contemplating it would seem first to necessitate a decisive rupture. Unless/until that happens, conservative prescriptions calling for a return to a previous state of affairs (in the West), or a closer reading of the founding documents (in America), will remain a feature of Western dissidence. In other words, even the dissidents will remain conservative restorationists of the classical ideas of the center, or the ideas that led to the center. Truly revolutionary thinking—the re-imagining and reinvention of ourselves—will, however, ultimately come from the periphery rather than the center.

 

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Article printed from Counter-Currents Publishing: http://www.counter-currents.com

URL to article: http://www.counter-currents.com/2012/09/unthinking-liberalism/

Aleksandr Dugin: Liberalism, Communism, Fascism, and the Fourth Political Theory

Aleksandr Dugin: Liberalism, Communism, Fascism, and the Fourth Political Theory

The Fourth Political Theory

 

Het boek wordt voorgesteld op 28 juli 2012 in Stockholm (voor Europa) en in Brazilië (voor het Amerikaanse continent).

 

 

Table of Contents:

A Note from the Editor
Foreword by Alain Soral
Introduction: To Be or Not to Be?

1. The Birth of the Concept
2. Dasein as an Actor
3. The Critique of Monotonic Processes
4. The Reversibility of Time
5. Global Transition and its Enemies
6. Conservatism and Postmodernity
7. ‘Civilisation’ as an Ideological Concept
8. The Transformation of the Left in the Twenty-first Century
9. Liberalism and Its Metamorphoses
10. The Ontology of the Future
11. The New Political Anthropology
12. Fourth Political Practice
13. Gender in the Fourth Political Theory
14. Against the Postmodern World
Appendix I: Political Post-Anthropology
Appendix II: The Metaphysics of Chaos

Civilization as political concept

Interview with the leader of the International “Eurasian Movement”, a philosopher, and a  professor at Moscow State University Alexander Dugin

Interviewed by the Global Revolutionary Alliance’s own Natella Speranskaja 

Ex: http://www.granews.info/

- The crisis of identity, with which we faced after the Cold War and the collapse of the communist world, is still relevant. What do you think is capable of lifting us out of this crisis  – a religious revival or creation of a new political ideology? Which of the options are you  inclined to yourself?

- After the collapse of communism came the phase of the “unipolar moment” (as Charles Krauthammer called it). In geopolitics, this meant the victory of unilateralism and Atlanticism, and because the pole was left alone, the West has become a global phenomenon. Accordingly,  the ideology of liberalism (or more accurately, neo-liberalism) is firmly in place crushing the two alternative political theories that existed in the twentieth century – communism and fascism . The Global liberal West has now defined culture, economics, information and technology, and politics. The West’s claims to the universalism of it’s values, the values of Western modernity and the Postmodern era, has reached its climax. 

Problems stemming from the West during the “unipolar moment” has led many to say that this “moment” is over, that he could not yet be a “destiny” of humanity.That is, a “unipolar moment” should be interpreted very broadly – not only geopolitical, but also ideologically, economically, axiologically, civilization wide. The crisis of identity, about which you ask, has scrapped all previous identities – civilizational, historical, national, political, ethnic, religious, cultural, in favor of a universal planetary Western-style identity  – with its concept of individualism, secularism, representative democracy, economic and political liberalism, cosmopolitanism and the ideology of human rights.Instead of a hierarchy of identities, which have traditionally played a large role in sets of collective identities, the “unipolar moment” affirmed a flat one-dimensional identity, with the absolutization of the individual singularity.  One individual = one identity, and any forms of the collective identity (for example, individual as the part of the religious community, nation, ethnic group, race, or even sex) underwent dismantling and overthrow. Hence the hatred of globalists for different kind of “majorities” and protection of minorities, up to the individual.

The Uni-polar Democracy of our moment - this is a democracy, which unambiguously protects the minority before the face of the majority and the individual before face of the group.  This is  the crisis of identity for those of non-Western or non-modern (or even not “postmodern”) societies,since this is where customary models are scrapped and liquidated. The postmodern West with  optimism, on the contrary, asserts individualism and hyper-liberalism in its space and zealously  exports it on the planetary scale.

However, it’s not painless, and has caused at all levels it’s own growing rejection.  The problems, which have  appeared in the West in the course of this “uni-polar moment”, forced many to speak, that this “moment’s” conclusion, has not succeeded in becoming “the fate” of humanity.  This, therefore,  was the cost of the  possibility of passage to some other paradigm…

So, we can think about an alternative  to the “unipolar moment” and, therefore, an alternative to liberalism, Americanism, Atlanticism, Western Postmodernism, globalization, individualism, etc. That is, we can, and I think should,  work out plans and strategies for a “post-uni polar world “, at all levels – the ideological and political, the economic, and religious, and the philosophical and geo-political, the cultural and civilizational, and technology, and value.

In fact, this is what I call multi-polarity. As in the case of uni-polarity it is not only about the political and strategic map of the world, but also the paradigmatic philosophical foundations of the future world order.  We can not exactly say that the “uni-polar moment” has finally been completed. No, it is still continuing, but it faces a growing number of problems. We must put an end to it – eradicate it. This is a global revolution, since the existing domination of the West, liberalism and globalism completely controls the  world oligarchy, financial and political elites.

So they just will not simply  give up their positions. We must prepare for a serious and intense battle.   Multi-polarity will be recaptured by the conquered peoples of the world in combat and it will be able to arise only on the smoking ruins of the global West.  While the West is still dictating his will to the rest, to talk about early multipolarity  – you must first destroy the Western domination on the ground.   Crisis – this is much, but far from all.

- If we accept the thesis of the paradigmatic transition from the current unipolar world order model to a new multi-polar model, where the actors are not nation-states, but  entire civilizations, can it be said that this move would entail a radical change in the very human identity?

- Yes, of course. With the end of the unipolar moment, we are entering a whole new world. And it is not simply a reverse or a step back, but it is a step forward to some unprecedented future, however, different from the digital project of “lonely crowds”, which is reserved for  humanity by globalism. Multi-polar identity will be the complex nonlinear collection of different identities – both individual and collective, that is varied for each civilization (or even inside each civilization).

This is something completely new that  will be created.

And the changes will be radical. We can not exclude that, along with known identities, civilizations, and offering of  new ways … It is possible that one of these new identities will become the identity of “Superman” – in the Nietzschean sense or otherwise (for example, traditionalist) …  In the “open society” of globalism the individual is, on the contrary, closedand strictly self-identical.

The multi-polar world’s anthropological map will be, however, extremely open, although the boundaries of civilizations  will be defined clearly. Man will again re-open the measurement of inner freedom – “freedom for”, in spite of the flat and purely external  liberal freedom – “freedom from” (as John Mill), Which is actually,  not freedom, but its simulacrum, imposed for a more efficient operation of the planetary masses by a small group of global oligarchs.

- Alexander Gelevich Dugin, you are the creator of the theory of a multi-polar world, which laid the foundation from which we can begin a new historical stage. Your book“The theory of a multi-polar world” has been and is being translated into other languages. The transition to a new model of world order means a radical change in the foreign policy of nation-states, and in today’s global economy, in fact, you have created all the prerequisites for the emergence of a new diplomatic language. Of course, this is a challenge of the global hegemony of the West. What do you think will be the reaction of your political opponents when they realize the seriousness of the threat posed?

- As always in the vanguard of  philosophical and ideological ideas, we first have the effect of bewilderment, the desire to silence or marginalize them. Then comes the phase of severe criticism and rejection. Then they begin to consider. Then they become commonplace and a truism. So it was with many of my ideas and concepts in the past 30 years. Traditionalism, geopolitics, Sociology of imagination , Ethnosociology, Conservative Revolution , National Bolshevism, Eurasianism, the Fourth Political Theory, National-structuralism, Russian Schmittianism, the concept of the three paradigms, the eschatological gnosis, New Metaphysics and Radical Theory of the Subject , Conspiracy theories, Russian haydeggerianstvo , a post-modern alternative , and so on – perceived first with hostility, then partially assimilated, and finally became part of mainstream discourse in academia and politics of Russia, and in part, and beyond.

Each of these directions has their fate, but the diagram of their mastering is approximately identical. So it will be also with the theory of a multipolar world   It will be hushed up, and then demonized and fiercely criticized, and then they will begin to look at it closely, and then accepted. But for all this it is necessary to pay for it and to defend it in the fight.  Arthur Rimbaud said that “the spiritual battle as fierce and hard, as the battle of armies.” For this we will have to struggle violently and desperately. As for everything else.

- In the “Theory of a multipolar world,” you write that in the dialogue between civilizations the responsibility is born by the elite of civilization. Do I understand correctly, it should be a “trained” elite, that is, the elite, which has a broad knowledge and capabilities, rather than the present “elite”? Tell me, what is the main difference between these elites?

- Civilizational elite – is a new concept. Thus far  it does not exist. It is a combination of two qualities – deep assimilation of the particular civilizational culture (in the philosophical, religious, value levels) and the presence of a high degree “of drive,” persistently pushing people to the heights of power, prestige and influence. Modern liberalism channels passion exclusively in the area of economics and business, creating a preference for a particular social elevator and it is a particular type of personality (which is an American sociologist Yuri Slezkine called “mercurial type”) .

The Mercurial elite of globalism, “aviakochevniki” mondialist nomadism, sung by Jacques Attali, should be overthrown in favor of radically different types of elites. Each civilization can dominate, and other “worlds”, not only thievish, mercurial shopkeepers and  cosmopolitans.  Islamic elite is clearly another – an example of this we see in today’s Iran, where the policy (Mars) and economics (Mercury) are subject to  spiritual authority, of the Ayatollah (Saturn).

But the “world” is only a metaphor. Different civilizations are based on different codes. The main thing is that the elite must be reflected in the codes themselves, whatever they may be. This is the most important condition. The will to power inherent in any elite, shall be interfaced with the will to knowledge, that is intellectualism and activism in such a multipolar elite should be wedded. Technological efficiency and value (often religious) content should be combined in such an elite. Only such an elite will be able to fully and responsibly participate in the dialogue of civilizations, embodying the principles of their traditions and engaging in interaction with other civilizations of the worlds.

- How can you comment on the hypothesis that the return to a bipolar model is still possible?

- I think not, practically or theoretically. In practice, because today there is no country that is comparable to the basic parameters of the U.S. and the West in general. The U.S. broke away from the rest of the world so that no one on its own can compete with them. Theoretically, only the West now has a claim to universality of its values, whereas previously Marxism was regarded as an alternative. After the collapse of the Soviet Union it became clear that universalism is only  liberal, capitalist. To resist Western imperialism there can only be a coalition of large spaces – not the second pole, but immediately multiple poles, each of them with its own strategic infrastructure and with a particular civilizational, cultural and ideological content.

- How real is the sudden transition to a non-polar model? What are the main disadvantages of this model?

- Passage to a non-polar model, about which leaders are increasingly talking of in the Council on Foreign Relations (Richard Haass, George Soros,etc.), means the replacement of the facade of a uni-polar hegemony, the transition from the domination based on military and strategic power of the United States and NATO (hardware ) to dispersed domination of the West as a whole (software). These are two versions – hard-hegemony and soft-hegemony. But in both cases the West, its civilization, its culture, its philosophy, its technologies, its political and economic institutes and procedures come out as the standard universal model.  Over the long term, this will indicate  the transfer of power to a “world government”, which will be dominated by all  the same Western elites, the global oligarchy. It will then  discard it’s  mask and will act directly on behalf of the transnational forces. In some sense non-polarity is worse than uni-polarity, though, it would seem hard to believe.

Non-polarity itself, and even more sharply and rapidly, will not yet begin. For this, the world must go through the turmoil and trials until a desperate humanity itself cried for the world elite with a prayer for salvation. Prior to that, to weaken the power of the United States, world disasters occur, and war. Non-polar world under the control of a world government, consisting of direct representatives of the global oligarchy,  is expected by many religious circles as the coming “of the kingdom of the Antichrist.”

As for the “shortcomings” of such a model, I believe that it is just  “a great parody of” the sacred world empire, which  Rene Guenon warned of in his work The Reign of Quantity and the Signs of the Times. This will be a global simulacrum.  To recognize these “deficiencies” will  not be so easy, otherwise opposition “to the antichrist” would be too simple a matter, and the depth of his temptation would be insignificant.

The true alternative is a multi-polar world, everything else – evil in the truest sense of the word.

- The “counter-hegemony” by Robert Cox, who you mention in your book aims to expose the existing order in international relations and raise the rebellion against it. To do this, Cox called for the creation of counter-hegemonic bloc, which will include political actors who reject the existing hegemony. Have you developed the Fourth Political Theory as a kind of counter-hegemonic doctrine that could unite the rebels against the hegemony of the West?

- I am convinced that the Fourth Political Theory fits into the logic of building counter-hegemony, which Cox spoke of. By the way, also inthe proximity of critical theory in the MO theory, and multi-polar world is a wonderful text by Alexandra Bovdunova ,voiced at the Conference on the Theory of a multipolar world in Moscow, Moscow State University on 25-26 April 2012 .

4PT is not a complete doctrine, this is still the first steps toward the exit from the conceptual impasse in which we find ourselves in the face of liberalism, today rejected by more and more people around the world, in the collapse of the old anti-liberal political theories – Communism and Fascism. In a sense, the need for 4PT – is a sign of the times, and really can not be disputed by anyone. Another matter, what will be 4PT in its final form. The temptation appears to build it as a syncretic combination of elements of previous anti-liberal doctrines and ideologies …

I am convinced that we should go another way. It is necessary to understand the root of the current hegemony. This coincides with the root of modernity as such, and it grows from the roots of modernity in all three pillars of political theories – liberalism, communism and fascism. To manipulate them to find an alternative to modernity and liberalism, respectively, and of the liberal hegemony of the West, is in my view, pointless. We must move beyond modernity in general, beyond the range of its political actors – individual, class, nation, state, etc.

Therefore 4PT as the basis of a counter-hegemonic planetary front should be constructed quite differently. Like the theory of a multipolar world 4PT operates with a new concept – “civilization”, but 4PT puts special emphasis on the existential aspect of it. Hence the most important, the central thesis of 4PT that its subject is the actor -  Dasein. Every civilization, its Dasein, which means that it describes a specific set of existentials. On their basis, should be raised a new political theory  generalized at the following level into a “multipolar federation Of Dasein” as the concrete structure of counter – hegemony. In other words, the very counter-hegemony must be conceived existentially, as a field of war between the inauthentic globalization (global alienation) and the horizon of authentic  peoples and societies in a multipolar world (the possibility of overcoming the alienation  of civilizations).

- When we talk about cognitive uprising, however first of all, our actions should be aimed at the overthrow of the dictatorship of the West?

- The most important step is the beginning of the systematic preparation of a global revolutionary elite-oriented to multi-polarity 4PT. This elite must perform a critical function – to be a link between the local and global. At the local level we are talking about the masses and the clearest exponents of their local culture (religious leaders, philosophers, etc.). Often, these communities do not have a planetary perspective and simply defend their conservative identity before the onset of toxic globalization and Western imperialism.

Raising the masses and the traditionalist-conservatives  to a realized uprising in the context of a complex union of a counter-hegemonistic block is  extremely difficult. Simple conservatives and their supportive mass, for example, of the Islamic or Orthodox persuasion are unlikely to realize the necessity of  alliances with the Hindus or the Chinese. This will be the play  (and they are already actively playing it) of the globalists and their principle of “divide and conquer!” But the revolutionary elite, which is the elite, even within a particular traditionalist elite of society, should take the , heartfelt deep and deliberate feelings of local identity and correlate it within a total horizon of multi-polarity, and  4PT.

Without the formation of such a elite the revolt against the  post-modern world and the overthrow of the dictatorship of the West will not take place. Every time and everywhere   the West has a problem, he will come to the aid of anti-Western forces, which, however, will be motivated by narrow bills to specific civilizational neighbors – most often, just as anti-Western as they are. So it will be and already is the instrumentalization of globalists of various conservative fundamentalist and nationalist movements. Islamic fundamentalists to help the West is one. European nationalists – is another. So a “unipolar moment” extends not only to exist in itself, but also playing the antagonistic forces against him. The overthrow of the dictatorship of the West will become possible only if this strategy  will be sufficient enough to create or make appear a new counter-hegemonic elite. A initiative like Global Revolutionary Alliance – the unique example of really revolutionary and effective opposition to hegemony.

- You have repeatedly said that Eurasianism is a strategic, philosophical, cultural and civilizational choice. Can we hope that the political course chosen by Vladimir Putin (establishment of a Eurasian Union ) Is the first step towards a multipolar model?

- This is a difficult question. By himself, Putin and, especially, his environment, they act  more out of inertia, without calling into question the legitimacy of the existing planetary status quo. Their goal – to win his and Russia’s  rather appropriate place within the existing world order. But that is the problem: a truly acceptable place for Russia is not and can not exist, because the “uni-polar moment”, as well as the globalists stand for the desovereignization of Russia, eliminating it as an independent civilization, and strategic pole.

This self-destruction seems to suit, Dmitry Medvedev and his entourage (INSOR) for he was ready to reboot and go for almost all of it. Putin clearly understands the situation somewhat differently, and his criteria of “acceptability” is also different. He would most of all psychologically  arrange  a priority partnership with the West while maintaining the sovereignty of Russia. But this is  something  unacceptable under any circumstances to the unipolar globalists -  practically or theoretically.

So Putin is torn between multipolarity, where he leads the orientation of  sovereignty and Atlanticism, where he leads the inertia and the tireless work of a huge network of influence that permeates all of the structure of Russian society. Here’s the dilemma. Putin makes moves in both directions – he proclaims multi-polarity, the Eurasian Union, to protect the sovereignty of Russia, even spoke of the peculiarities of Russian civilization, strengthening vertical power, shows respect (if not more) to Orthodoxy, but on the other hand, surrounds himself with pro-American experts (eg, “Valdai Club”), rebuilds, education and culture under the globalistic Western models, has a liberal economic policy and suffers comprador oligarchs, etc.

The field for maneuver Putin is constantly shrinking. The logic of the circumstances pushes him to a more unambiguous choice. Inside the country this uncertainty of course causes growing hostility, and his legitimacy falls.

Outside the country  the West only increases the pressure on Putin to persuade him towards globalism and the recognition of “unilateralism”, specifically – to cede his post to the Westerner Medvedev. So Putin, while continuing to fluctuate between multipolarity and Westernism, loses ground and support here and there.

The new period of his presidency will be very difficult. We will do everything we can to move it to a multipolar world, the Eurasian Union and 4PT. But we are not alone in Russian politics – against us for influence in Putin’s circles we have an army of liberals, agents of Western influence and the staff of the global oligarchy. For us, though, we have the People and the Truth. But behind them – a global oligarchy, money, lies, and, apparently, the father of lies. Nevertheless, vincit omnia veritas. That I have no doubt.

Entretien avec Alexandre Douguine

Entretien avec Alexandre Douguine

Propos  recueillis  par le magazine allemand “Zuerst”

( http://www.zuerst.de )

Q.: Monsieur Douguine, la Russie subit un feu roulant de critiques occidentales, surtout depuis  la  réélection de Vladimir Poutine à la présidence  de la fédération de Russie. Les politiciens etl es médias prétendent que les élections ont été truquées, que Poutine n’est pas un démocrate et qu’il bafoue les “droits de l’Homme”...

AD: Vladimir Poutine, qu’on le veuille ou non, apprtient aux vrais grands sur la scène politique internationale. Pourtant, il faut dire que la  politique qu’il préconise est très spéciale, ce que bon nombre de politiciens et de médiacrates occidentaux ne sont apparemment pas capables de comprendre. D’une part, Poutine est un libéral, un homme politique résolument tourné vers l’Occident; d’autre part, il est un défenseur acharné de laa  souveraineté et de l’indépendance russes. C’est pourquoi il s’oppose de front aux Etats-Unis et à  leurs intérêts géopolitiques. Poutine est donc simultanément libéral-démocrate et souverainiste. Il est ensuite un réaliste politique absolu, une personnalité politique non fantasque. Poutine serait par voie de  conséquence  le partenaire idéal de tout pays occidental qui accorderait à la  souveraineté une valeur identitque et aussi élevée. Mais les pays  d’Occident ont abandonné depuis longtemps les valeurs du réalisme politique...

Q.: Que voulez-vous dire par là?

AD: Voyez-vous, ce que croit l’Occident aujourd’hui, c’est qu’un jour toutes  les démocraties libérales abandonneront leur souveraineté et se fonderont dans une sorte de “super-nation” sous l’hégémonie américaine. Telle est bien l’idée  centrale de la globalisation à l’oeuvre aujourd’hui. Ce projet est irréalisable avec un Vladimir Poutine car il s’y oppose et défend la souveraineté russe. Ensuite, il ne reconnaît pas la  prétention américaine à exercer cette hégémonie en toute exclusivité. C’est là qu’il faut chercher la vraie raison des attaques acharnées que commet l’Occident contre lui et de sa diabolisation. C’est aussi la  raison pour laquelle l’Occident soutient de manière aussi spectaculaire l’opposition russe: il s’agit d’acquérir de l’influence et de consolider l’hégémonie occidentale.

Q.: D’après vous donc, Poutine fait tout ce qu’il faut faire...

AD: Bien sûr que non. Il a commis  des erreurs, notamment lors des dernières élections pour le Parlement. Elles n’ont pas été aussi transparentes qu’elles auraient dû l’être.

Q.: La critique occidentale s’adresse surtout aux élections présidentielles...

AD: Pourtant, lors de ces élections-là, c’était le contraire: elles ont été parfaitement transparentes. La  grande  majorité des électeurs  soutient Poutine, voilà tout, même si l’Occident ne peut ni ne veut le comprendre. L’étranger ne soutient qu’une minorité pro-américaine, ultra-libérale et hostile à toute souveraineté russe, pour qu’elle s’attaque à Poutine. Tel est l’enjeu. Voyez-vous, Poutine peut être bon ou mauvais en politique intérieure, cela n’a pas d’importance pour l’Occident. La mobilisation de ses efforts pour maintenir l’idée de souveraineté  —et pas seulement la souveraineté russe—  et l’existence d’un monde  multipolaire fait qu’il est la cible de toutes les attaques occidentales.

Q.: L’Ukraine aussi subit désormais de lourdes attaques médiatiques en provenance de l’Occident. C’est surtout la détention de Ioulia Timochenko  que critiquent les médias. Est-ce que l’enjeu en Ukraine est le même qu’en Russie?

AD: La situation en Ukraine est complètement différente, même si les critiques occidentales visent également la souveraineté du pays.

Q.: Le président ukrainien Viktor Ianoukovitch est considéré par les agences médiatiques occidentales comme “pro-russe”...

AD: C’est pourtant faux. Ianoukovitch tente de maintenir un équilibre politique entre la  Russie et l’Union Européenne. Bien sûr, il n’estp as aussi pro-occidental que ne l’était Mme Timochenko. Ce qui dérange l’Occident, c’est que Ianoukovitch s’est à nouveau rapproché de la Russie. C’est contraire aux intérêts atlantistes. Ioulia Timochenko est aujourd’hui le symbole de ce que l’on a appelé  la “révolution orange”  —que l’Occident a soutenu matériellement et idéologiquement en Ukraine. C’est pour cette raison  que les forces atlantistes la considèrent comme une héroïne.

Q.: Ce que l’on critique surtout, ce sont les conditions de  détention de Ioulia Timochenko. On dit que ces conditions bafouent lourdement les règles convenues quant aux droits de l’Homme...

AD: L’Occident utilise les droits de l’Homme à tour de bras pour pouvoir exercer influence et chantage sur les gouvernements qui lui déplaisent. Si l’on parle vrai et que l’on dévoile sans détours ses plans hégémoniques et ses véritables intérêts politiques, on obtient moins de succès que si l’on adopte un langage indirect et que l’on évoque sans cesse les droits de l’Homme. Voilà ce qu’il faut toujours avoir en tête.

Q.: Vous venez d’évoquer la “révolution orange” qui a secoué l’Ukraine en 2004. Les protestations et manifestations contre Poutine à Moscou, il y a quelques mois et quelques semaines, ont-elles, elles aussi, été une nouvelle tentative de “révolution colorée”?

AD: Absolument.

Q.: Pourquoi ces manifestations se déroulent-elles  maintnenant et pourquoi cela ne s’est-il pas passé auparavant?

AD: Il me paraît très intéressant d’observer le “timing”. Il y a une explication très simple. Le Président Dmitri Medvedev est considéré en Occident comme une sorte de nouveau Gorbatchev. L’Occident avait espéré que Medvedev aurait introduit des réformes de nature ultra-libérales lors de son éventuel second mandat présidentiel et se serait rapproché des Etats-Unis et de l’UE. Mais quand Medvedev a déclaré qu’il laisserait sa place de président à Poutine et qu’il redeviendrait chef du gouvernement, la “révolution” a aussitôt commencé en Russie.

Q.: Les protestations et manifestations visaient cependant les fraudes supposées dans le scrutin et le manque de transparence lors des présidentielles...

AD: Non, ça, c’est une “dérivation”. Il s’agissait uniquement d’empêcher tout retour de Poutine à la présidence. Une fois de plus, bon nombre d’ONG et de groupes influencés par l’Occident sont entrés  dans la danse. Cela a permis d’accroître l’ampleur des manifestations, d’autant plus que certains déboires el a politique de Poutine ont pu être exploités. La politique de Poutine n’a pas vraiment connu le succès sur le plan social et il restait encore quelques sérieux problèmes de corruption dans son système. C’était concrètement les points faibles de sa politique. Mais répétons-le: la révolte contre Poutine a été et demeure inspirée et soutenue par l’étranger et n’a finalement pas grand chose à voir avec ces faiblesses politique: il s’agissait uniquement de barrer la  route au souverainisme qu’incarne Poutine.

Q.: D’après vous, Medvedev serait pro-occidental...

AD: La politique russe est plus compliquée qu’on ne l’imagine en Occident. Laissez-moi vous donner une explication simple: d’une  part, nous avons le souverainiste et le Realpolitiker Poutine, d’autre part, nous avons les “révolutionnaires (colorés)” et les atlantistes ultra-libéraux soutenus par l’Occident. Medvedev se situe entre les deux. Ensuite, les oligarques comme, par exemple, Boris Abramovitch Beresovski qui vit à Londres, jouent un rôle important aux côtés des révolutionnaires ultra-libéraux.

Q.: A ce propos, on ne fait qu’évoquer la figure de Mikhail Khodorkovski, sans cesse arrêté et emprisonné. Dans les médias occidentaux, il passe pour un martyr du libéralisme et de la démocratie. Comment jugez-vous cela?

AD: Il représente surtout le crime organisé en Russie. Dans un pays occidental, on n’imagine pas qu’un individu comme Khodorkovski ne se retrouverait pas aussi en prison. Il est tout aussi criminel que les autres oligarques qui ont amassé beaucoup d’argent en très peu de temps.

Q.: Et pourquoi les autres ne sont-ils pas en prison?

AD: C’est là que je critiquerai Poutine: les oligarques qui se montrent loyaux à son égard sont en liberté.

Q.: Quelle a été la faute de Khodorkovski?

AD: Khodorkovski n’a fait que soutenir les positions pro-occidentales, notamment quand il a plaidé pour un désarmement de grande envergure de l’armée russe. Il a soutenu les forces libérales et pro-occidentales en Russie. Pour Khodorkovski, le “désarmement” de la  Russie constituait une étape importante dans l’ouverture du pays au libéralisme et à l’occidentalisation. Il fallait troquer l’indépendance et la souveraineté contre un alignement sur les positions atlantistes. Alors qu’il était l’homme le plus riche de Russie, Khodorkovski a annoncé qu’il était en mesure d’acheter non seulement les parlements mais aussi les électeurs. Il est même allé plus  loin: il a fait pression sur Poutine pour faire vendre aux Américains la plus grosse entreprise pétrolière russe, “Ioukos”.

Q.: Khodorkovski était donc opposé à Poutine en bien des domaines?

AD: Effectivement. Khodorkovski a ouvertement déclaré la guerre à Poutine. Et Poutine a réagi, fait traduire l’oligarque en justice, où il a été condamné, non pas pour ses vues politiques mais pour les délits qu’il a commis. Pour l’Occident, Khodorkovski est bien entendu un héros. Parce qu’il s’est opposé à Poutine et parce qu’il voulait faire de la Russie une part du “Gros Occident”. Voilà pourquoi de nombreux gouvernements occidentaux, les agences médiatiques et les ONG prétendent que Khodorkovski est un “prisonnier politique”. C’est absurde et ridicule. Ce qui mérite la critique, en revanche, c’est que dans notre pays un grand nombre d’oligarques sont en liberté alors qu’ils ont commis les mêmes délits que Khodorkovski. Ils sont libres parce qu’ils n’ont pas agi contre Poutine. Voilà la véritable injustice et non pas l’emprisonnement que subit Khodorkovski.

Q.: Peut-on dire que, dans le cas de Khodorkovski, Poutine a, en quelque sorte, usé du “frein de secours”?

AD: Oui, on peut le dire. Avant que Khodorkovski ait eu la possibilité de livrer à l’étranger le contrôle des principales ressources de la Russie, Poutine l’a arrêté.

Q.: Vous  parlez de groupes et d’ONG pro-occidentaux qui soutiennent en Russie les adversaires de Poutine et qui, en Ukraine et aussi en Géorgie, ont soutenu les “révolutions colorées”. Qui se profile derrière ces organisations?

AD: Celui qui joue un rôle fort important dans toute cette agitation est le milliardaire américain Georges Soros qui, par l’intermédiaire de ses fondations, soutient à grande échelle les groupements pro-occidentaux en Russie; A Soros s’ajoutent d’autres fondations américaines comme par exemple “Freedom House” dont les activités sont financées à concurrence de 80% par des fonds provenant du gouvernement américain. “Freedom House” finance par exemple la diffusion de l’ouvrage de Gene Sharp, politologue américain auteur de “The Politics of non violent Action”, auquel se réfèrent directement les “révolutionnaires colorés” d’Ukraine. Beaucoup d’autres groupements et organisations sont partiellement financés par le gouvernement américain ou par des gouvernements européens en Russie ou dans des pays qui firent jadis partie de l’Union Soviétique. Nous avons affaire à un véritable réseau. Toutes les composantes de ce réseau sont unies autour d’un seul objectif: déstabiliser la Russie pour qu’à terme le pays deviennent une composante de la sphère occidentale.

Q.: Est-ce là une nouvelle forme de guerre?

AD: On peut parfaitement le penser. Les révolutions colorées représentent en effet une nouvelle forme des guerre contre les Etats souverains. Les attaques produisent des effets à tous les niveaux de la société. Dans cette nouvelle forme de guerre, on ne se pas pas en alignant et avançant des chars ou de l’artillerie mais en utilisant toutes les ressources des agences de propagande, en actionnant la pompe à finances et en manipulant des réseaux avec lesquels on tente de paralyser les centres de  décision de l’adversaire. Et l’une des armes les plus importantes dans le nouvel arsenal de  cette nouvelle forme de guerre, c’est la notion des “droits de l’Homme”.

Q.: Monsieur Douguine, nous vous remercions de nous avoir accordé cet entretien.

Zuerst Magazin: Interview mit Alexandr Dugin

Zuerst Magazin: Interview mit Alexandr Dugin

ex: http://www.zuerst.de/

Herr Dugin, Rußland wird seit Monaten mit einem Trommelfeuer westlicher Kritik überzogen – vor allem nach der Wiederwahl Wladimir Putins zum Präsidenten der Russischen Föderation. Politiker und Medien behaupten, die Wahlen seien gefälscht gewesen, Putin sei kein Demokrat und verletze die Menschenrechte…

Dugin: Wladimir Putin gehört wohl zu den wirklichen Größen in der internationalen Politik. Seine Politik ist zudem sehr speziell, das mögen viele Politiker und Journalisten im Westen vielleicht nicht verstehen. Einerseits handelt es sich bei Putin um einen liberalen, durchaus pro-westlichen Politiker, andererseits ist er ein starker Verfechter der russischen Souveränität und Unabhängigkeit. So tritt er gegenüber den USA und ihrer geopolitischen Interessen stark auf. Er ist also gleichzeitig liberal-demokratisch und souveränistisch. Putin ist zudem ein absoluter politischer Realist und kein Phantast. Putin wäre eigentlich der perfekte Partner für jedes westliche Land, welches sich ebenfalls der Souveränität einen so hohen Stellenwert einräumt. Aber der Westen hat längst dem politischen Realismus eine Absage erteilt.

Wie meinen Sie das?

Dugin: Sehen Sie, der Westen glaubt heute doch, daß alle liberalen Demokratien unter Aufgabe ihrer Souveränität zu einer Art Supernation unter US-Führung verschmelzen sollen. Das ist doch die Idee der Globalisierung. Doch das ist mit Wladimir Putin nicht zu machen, er wehrt sich dagegen und verteidigt die russische Souveränität. Zudem erkennt er nicht den Hegemonialanspruch der USA an. Das ist der wahre Grund, weshalb er aus dem Westen so scharf attackiert und dämonisiert wird. Und das ist auch der Grund, weshalb der Westen so massiv die Opposition in Rußland unterstützt – es geht um Einfluß und westliche Hegemonie.

Macht Putin also Ihrer Ansicht nach alles richtig?

Dugin: Natürlich nicht. Fehler wurden beispielsweise bei den vergangenen Parlamentswahlen gemacht. Diese waren nicht so transparent, wie sie hätten sein sollen und müssen.

Die westliche Kritik richtete sich aber vor allem auf die Präsidentenwahlen…

Dugin: Da war ja genau das Gegenteil der Fall: Diese Wahlen waren sehr transparent. Die große Mehrheit der Wähler unterstützt nun einmal Putin, auch wenn es der Westen nicht verstehen kann oder will. Nur eine Minderheit, die pro-amerikanisch, ultra-liberal und anti-souveränistisch eingestellt ist, wurde vom Ausland unterstützt, damit sie Putin angreift. Darum geht es. Sehen Sie, Putin kann in der Innenpolitik gut oder schlecht sein, das spielt für den Westen keine Rolle. Sein Eintreten für die Souveränität – und nicht nur für die von Rußland – sowie für eine multipolare Welt macht ihn zum Angriffsziel des Westens.

Auch die Ukraine ist schweren medialen Angriffen aus dem Westen ausgesetzt. Vor allem die Inhaftierung von Julia Timoschekow wird kritisiert. Geht es dort um die gleichen Dinge wie in Rußland?

Dugin: Die Situation in der Ukraine ist eine völlig andere, obgleich die Kritik aus dem Westen ebenfalls auf die Souveränität des Landes abzielt.

Der ukrainische Präsident Wiktor Janukowytsch gilt in den etablierten westlichen Medien als „pro-russisch“…

Dugin: Das ist aber falsch. Janukowytsch versucht das politische Gleichgewicht zwischen Rußland und der Europäischen Union zu halten. Natürlich ist er nicht so pro-westlich, wie es Timoschenkow war. Aber was den Westen stört, ist daß Janukowytsch sich wieder an Rußland angenähert hat. Das widerspricht den transatlantischen Interessen. Julia Timoschenkow hingegen ist heute ein Symbol für die sogenannte „Orangene Revolution“ – die vom Westen materiell und ideologisch unterstützt wurde - in der Ukraine. Im Westen gilt sie deswegen als Heldin.

Vor allem die Haftbedingungen von Julia Timoschenkow stehen in der Kritik. Es ist die Rede davon, daß diese einen schweren Verstoß gegen die Menschenrechte darstellen…

Dugin: Der Begriff der Menschenrechte wird vom Westen immer wieder gerne dafür genutzt, um auf mißliebige Regierungen Einfluß auszuüben. Spricht man über Hegemonie und Interessen, hat man für seine Politik weniger Unterstützung als wenn man über die Menschenrechte spricht. Das ist der Punkt.

Sie erwähnten die „Orangene Revolution“ in der Ukraine im Jahr 2004. Waren die Proteste und Demonstrationen gegen Putin in Moskau vor einigen Wochen ebenfalls ein Versuch einer solchen „Farbrevolution“?

Dugin: Absolut.

Warum erst jetzt und nicht schon früher?

Dugin: Das Timing ist sehr interessant. Und es gibt dafür eine sehr einfache Erklärung. Präsident Dmitri Medwedew wurde vom Westen als eine Art zweiter Gorbatschow betrachtet. Die Hoffnung des Westens war, daß Medwedew in einer zweiten Amtszeit als Präsident entscheidende ultra-liberale Reformen umsetzen würde und sich der EU und den USA annähern. Als aber Medwedew erklärte, er werde das Präsidentenamt für Putin freimachen und stattdessen wieder Regierungschef werden, war das der Start für die „Revolution“ in Rußland.

Die Proteste und Demonstrationen richteten sich doch angeblich gegen die mutmaßlichen Wahlfälschungen und gegen die fehlende Transparenz bei den Präsidentenwahlen…

Dugin: Nein, das ist Unsinn. Es ging einzig und allein darum, eine Rückkehr Wladimir Putin ins Präsidentenamt zu verhindern. Und wieder mischten dabei viele westlich beeinflußte Gruppen und Nichtregierungsorganisationen mit. Dabei wurde dieser Protest gegen Putin noch ausgeweitet, was durch die Mißerfolge Putins natürlich einfacher wurde. Er war vor allem in sozialen Belangen nicht sehr erfolgreich und es gibt nach wie vor große Probleme mit der Korruption im System Putins. Das sind tatsächliche Schwachpunkte seiner Politik. Aber nochmals: Die Revolte gegen Putin war und ist inspiriert und unterstützt von ausländischen Kräften und hat nichts mit diesen Schwachpunkten zu tun – es geht einzig und allein um Putins souveränistische Ausrichtung, die bekämpft werden soll.

Medwedew gilt als pro-westlich?

Dugin: Die russische Politik ist etwas komplizierter, als man im Westen allgemein annimmt. Lassen Sie es mich so erklären: Wir haben auf der einen Seite den Souveränisten und politischen Realisten Wladimir Putin, auf der anderen Seite sind die ultra-liberalen, vom Westen geförderten „Revolutionäre“ und Transatlantiker. Zwischen diesen beiden Positionen steht Medwedew. Übrigens spielen auch die Oligarchen wie beispielsweise Boris Abramowitsch Beresowski, der in London lebt, auf Seiten der ultra-liberalen Revolutionäre eine wichtige Rolle.

In diesem Zusammenhang wird auch immer wieder der inhaftierte Michail Chodorkowski genannt. In den westlichen Medien gilt er mittlerweile als eine Art liberaler, demokratischer Märtyrer. Wie sehen Sie das?

Dugin: Er steht für das organisierte Verbrechen in Rußland. Es ist kaum vorstellbar, daß ein Mann wie Chodorkowski in einem westlichen Land nicht in Haft säße. Er ist genauso kriminell wie die vielen anderen Oligarchen, die in sehr kurzer Zeit und sehr viel Geld gekommen sind.

Warum sitzen dann die anderen nicht im Gefängnis?

Dugin: Das ist wieder ein Kritikpunkt an Putin: Die Oligarchen, die ihm gegenüber loyal sind, sind auf freiem Fuß.

Was war Chodorkowskis Fehler?

Dugin: Chodorkowski machte sich zunehmend für pro-westliche Positionen stark, sprach sich unter anderem für eine starke Abrüstung der russischen Armee aus. Er unterstützte westlich-liberale Kräfte in Rußland. Für Chodorkowski war eine russische „Entwaffnung“ ein wichtiger Weg, das Land für die westlich-liberale Entwicklung zu öffnen. Unabhängigkeit und Souveränität sollten gegen eine größere Bindung an den Westen eingetauscht werden. Als reichster Mann Rußlands verkündete Chodorkowski sogar, er könne nicht nur Parlamente, sondern auch Wahlergebnisse kaufen. Chodorkowski ging sogar noch weiter: Er erpreßte Putin damit, daß er das größte Erdölunternehmen Rußlands „Jukos“ an die Amerikaner verkaufen würde.

Damit stand Chodorkowski also im Widerspruch zu Putin…

Dugin: Genau das ist der Punkt. Chodorkowski hat Putin quasi öffentlich den Krieg erklärt. Und Putin reagierte und ließ den Oligarchen vor Gericht stellen, wo er natürlich nicht wegen seiner politischen Ansichten, sondern wegen seiner Verbrechen verurteilt wurde. Für den Westen ist Chodorkowski natürlich ein Held. Denn er wollte es mit Putin aufnehmen und Rußland zum Teil des Westens machen. Daher behaupten nun verschiedene westliche Regierungen, Medien und NGOs, Chodorkowski sei ein politischer Häftling. Und genau das ist Unsinn. Kritik verdient aber die Tatsache, daß so viele andere Oligarchen bei uns noch immer frei herumlaufen, obwohl sie die gleichen Verbrechen begangen haben wie Chodorkowski. Diese sind nur deshalb frei, weil sie nicht gegen Putin agieren. Genau das ist die große Ungerechtigkeit und nicht die Haftstrafe Chodorkowskis.

Hat Putin bei Chodorkowskis sozusagen die Notbremse gezogen?

Dugin: Genau so kann man das sagen. Bevor Chodorkowskis die Möglichkeit hatte, die Kontrolle der wichtigsten Ressourcen Rußlands an das Ausland zu vergeben, hat ihn Putin gestoppt.

Sie sprechen von den pro-westlichen Gruppen und NGOs, die in Rußland die Putin-Gegner unterstützen und in der Ukraine, aber auch in Georgien die „bunten Revolutionen“ unterstützt haben. Wer steht hinter diesen Organisationen?

Dugin: Eine wichtige Rolle spielt hierbei der US-Milliardär George Soros, der über seine Stiftungen pro-westliche Gruppen in Rußland massiv unterstützt. Dazu kommen andere US-Stiftungen, wie beispielsweise „Freedom House“, die ihrerseits mit etwa 80 Prozent mit Geldern der US-Regierung finanziert wird. „Freedom House“ sorgt für die Verbreitung der Schrift The Politics of Nonviolent Action des US-Politologen Gene Sharp, auf die sich die Revolutionäre in der Ukraine explizit berufen. Viele andere Gruppen und Organisationen, teilweise direkt von der US-Regierung oder den europäischen Regierungen finanziert, engagieren sich in Rußland und in den Ländern der ehemaligen Sowjetunion. Es gibt es regelrechtes Netzwerk. Sie alle eint ein Ziel: die Destabilisierung Rußlands, damit das Land ein Teil des westlichen Systems wird.

Ist das eine neue Form des Krieges?

Dugin: So kann man das betrachten. Die bunten Revolutionen sind eine neue Form des Krieges gegen souveräne Staaten. Die Angriffe wirken auf allen Ebenen der Gesellschaft. In diesem neuen Krieg kämpft man nicht mit Kanonen, sondern mit Propaganda, Geld und weit verzweigten Netzwerken, mit denen man versucht, die Entscheidungszentren des Gegners lahmzulegen. Eine der wichtigsten Waffen dieses neuen Krieges ist der Begriff der „Menschenrechte“.

Herr Dugin, vielen Dank für das Gespräch.

Julius Evola e o Tradicionalismo Russo

Julius Evola

e o Tradicionalismo Russo

 por Aleksandr Dugin

Ex: http://legio-victrix.blogspot.com/

1) A Descoberta de Evola na Rússia

Os trabalhos de Julius Evola foram descobertos nos anos 60 pelo grupo de intelectuais esotéricos e anti-comunistas conhecidos como “os dissidentes da direita”. Eles compunham um pequeno círculo de pessoas que conscientemente se negavam a participar da “vida cultural” da URSS e que, ao invés disso, tinham escolhido uma vida subterânea para si. A disparidade entre o cultura Soviética presente e a verdadeira realidade Soviética foi quase que totalmente o motivo que os levou a buscar os princípios fundamentais que poderiam explicar as origens daquela terrível idéia absolutista. Foi pela sua recusa do Comunismo que eles descobriram certos trabalhos de autores anti-modernos e tradicionalistas: acima de tudo, os livros de Rene Guenon e Julius Evola. Duas personalidades centrais animavam este grupo – o filósofo islâmico Geidar Djemal e o poeta não-conformista Eugene Golovine. Graças a eles, esses “dissidents da direita” souberam os nomes e as idéias do dois maiores tradicionalistas do século. Nos anos 70, uma das primeiras traduções de um trabalho de Evola (A Tradição Hermética) apareceu e foi distribuída dentro de um grupo, de acordo com os métodos do Samizdat [1]. No entanto, as traduções originais eram particularmente ruins em qualidade, porque elas foram feitas por amadores incompetentes muito distantes do grupo de verdadeiros intelectuais tradicionalistas.

Em 1981, uma tradução do Heidnische Imperialismus apareceu de maneira similar, como o único livro desse tipo disponível na Livraria Lenin em Moscow. Desta vez, a distribuição pelo Samizdathavia se tornado muito maior e a qualidade da tradução era muito melhor. Pouco a pouco eles distanciaram a verdadeira corrente tradicionalista do anti-comunismo, e a aproximaram do anti-modernismo, extendendo a sua negação da existência Soviética para a rejeição do mundo moderno, de maneira muito próxima à visão tradicionalista integral. Deve notar-se que as idéias tradicionalistas em questão, neste ponto particular, foram completamente removidas dos outros grupos de “dissidentes da direita”, que geralmente eram Cristãos ortodoxos, monarquistas e nacionalistas. Nesta época, Evola era mais popular entre aqueles interessados no espiritualismo em sentido amplo: praticantes de yoga, teosofistas [2], psiquistas [3], e daí em diante.

Durante a Perestroika, todos os tipos de dissidência anti-comunista se manifestaram e dos “dissidentes da direita” vieram as ideologias políticas e culturais da Direita atual: nacionalistas, nostálgicos, anti-liberais e anti-Ocidentais. Neste contexto e depois do desenvolvimente de idéias estritamente tradicionalistas, como resultado do Glasnost, os nomes de Guenon e Evola foram introduzidos no conjunto cultural russo. Os primeiros trabalhos de Evola apareceram nos anos 90, nas amplamente lidas partes da mídia conhecidamente “patriótica” ou “conservadora” e o assunto do tradicionalismo tornou-se tema de virulentas polêmicas e era um assunto importante para a Direita Russa como um todo. Periódicos como Elementy, Nach Sovremennik, Mily Anguel, Den, etc, começaram a publicar fragmentos dos escritos de Evolas, ou artigos inspirados nele, ou em que seu nome e citações apareciam.Pouco a pouco o campo “conservador” veio a ter uma estrutura ideológica que produziu cisões entre os velhos nostáligcos e monarquistas da Direita e os mais abertos não conformistas e participantes da Direita menos ortodoxa (algumas vezes chamados de “novye pravye”, em russo, pode-se estar inclinado a fazer um paralelo com a “nouvelle droite”, mas foi um fenômeno bem diferente como um todo em relação com a ND européia). Pode-se categorizar este segundo grupo de patriotas como sendo parte da “Terceira Via” ou “Nacional-Revolucionários” e por aí em diante. O ponto de separação se dá exatamente sobre a aceitação ou rejeição da idéias de Evola, ou talvez mais apropriadamente, da idéias de Evola que não poderiam ser consideradas naturalmente “conservadoras” ou “reacionárias”, como a idéia de “Revolução Conservadora” e de “Revolta Contra o Mundo Moderno”.

Recentemente, o primeiro livro “Heidnische Imperialismus” teve 50.000 cópias publicadas. Até mesmo um programa de televisão voltado a Evola foi feito por uma canal popular. Então, pode-se ver que a descoberta de Evola pela Rússia foi feita em uma escala bastante ampla. Ele, que uma vez constitui o núcleo intelectual hiper-marginal da Rússia, antes da Perestroika, se tornou agora um fenômeno político e ideológico considerável. Mas é bem claro que Evola escreveu seus livros e formulou suas idéias num contexto temporal, cultural, histórico e étnico bem diferente. Isso, então, torna-se um problema: quais partes da filosofia de Evola são relevantes para a Rússia moderna e quais partes precisam ser trabalhadas, melhoradas ou mesmo rejeitadas, nessas circunstâncias? Esta pergunta necessita de uma rápida análise comparando e contrastando o tradicionalismo sagrado de Evola e o fenômeno político estritamente russo.


2) Contra o Ocidente Moderno

Desde o começo, se torna óbvio que a rejeição do mundo mercenário profano moderno, manifestado na Civilização Ocidental durante os últimos séculos, é comum tanto para Evola quanto para a totalidade da tradição intelectual da Eslavofilia Russa. Autores russos como Homyakov, Kirievsky, Aksakov, Leontiev e Danilevsky (entre os filósofos), assim como Dostoevsky, Gogol e Merejkovsky (entre os romancistas), criticaram o mundo Ocidental quase na mesma linguagem em que o fez Evola. Pode-se observar que todos eles possuiam o mesmo ódio pelo governo dos mafiosos, ou seja, o sistema democrático moderno, e que eles consideravam este sistema como degradação espiritual e profanação total. Similarmente, pode-se observar o mesmo diagnóstico para essas doenças do mundo moderno - a Franco-Maçonaria Profana, o judaismo depravado, o avanço da plebe, a deificação da “razão” – em Evola e na cultura “conservadora” russa. Obviamente, a tendência reacionária aqui é comum a ambos, então a crítica de Evola do Ocidente está totalmente de acordo com, e é aceitável para a linha de pensamentos do conservadorismo russo.

Mais freqüentemente do que não [freqüentemente], pode-se ver que as críticas de Evola estão mais proximamente relacionadas com a mentalidade russa do que com uma mais amplamente européia – o mesmo tipo de generalização, a invocação freqüente de objetivos mitológicos e místicos, a noção distinta de que o mundo espiritual interno é organicamente separado das realidades imediatas modernas da perversão e do desvio. Em geral, a tradição conservadora russa de hodiernamente explicar eventos históricos num sentido mitológico, é de alguma forma, obrigatória. O apelo ao sobrenatural/irracional, aqui, está em perfeita congruência com o pensamento russo, que faz da explicação racional a exceção, e não a regra.

Pode-se notar a influência que os conservadores russos exeerceram em Evola: nos seus trabalhos ele freqüentemente cita Dostoevsky, Merejkovsky (quem ele conhecia pessoalmente) e muitos outros autores russos. Na outra mão, as frequëntes referências que ele faz à Malynsky e Leon de Poncins carregam parcialmente a tradição contra-revolucionária tão típica do Ser europeu. Pode-se citar também as referências que ele faz a Serge Nilus, o compilador do famoso “Protocolos dos Sábios de Sião”, que Evola reeditou na Itália.

Ao mesmo tempo, fica claro que Evola conhecia relativamente pouco sobre os meios conservadores russos, e, de fato, ele nem mesmo estava particularmente interessado neles, devido à sua idiossincrasia anti-cristã. A respeito da tradição Ortodoxa ele fez apenas alguns insignificantes comentários. Mesmo assim, a semelhança entre a sua posição sobre a crise do mundo moderno e o anti-modernismo do autores russos é dada, amplamente, pela comunidade de reações orgânicas – Grandes Homens e “indivíduos”, no caso de Evola e heróis, no caso dos russos. Mas graças à espontaneidade das convergências anti-modernas, a gravidade dos desacordos de Evola, se tornam muito mais interessantes e muito mais críticos.

Em qualquer nível, as interpretações de Evola se encaixam perfeitamente no quadro de ideologia moderna da “novye pravye”, [isso ocorre] tão amplamente, que ela [novye pravye] agrega mais à sua visão da degradação da modernidade, aplicando, algumas vezes, as suas idéias [de Evola] mais globalmente, mais radicalmente e mais profundamente. Deste modo, as teorias de Evola são muito bem aceitas na Rússia moderna, onde o anti-Ocidentalismo é um fator político-ideológico extremamente potente. 

3) Roma e a Terceira Roma

Um aspecto particular do pensamento de Evola é sentido pelos russos como de uma extrema e iminente importância: sua exaltação do Ideal Imperial. Roma representa o ponto principal da visão-de-mundo de Evola. Este poder sagrado vivente, que se manifestou por todo o Império era, para Evola, a própria essência da herança do Ocidente tradicional. Para Evola, as ruínas do Palácio de Nero e dos prédios romanos eram como um testamento direto de uma santidade orgânica e física, da qual a integridade e continuaidade fora aniquilada pelo “castelo” kafkiano [4] do Vaticano Católico Guelfo.

A sua linha de pensamento Guibelina era clara: Imperium contra a Igreja, Roma contra o vaticano, a sacralidade iminente e orgânica contra as abstrações sentimentais e devocionais da fé, implicitamente dualista e Farisaica[5].

Mas uma linha de pensamento similar, aparentemente, é naturalmente sentida pelos russos, de quem o destino histórico sempre esteve profundamente ligado ao [Ideal] do Imperium. Esta noção estava dogmaticamente enraizada na concepção Ortodoxa da filosofia staret[6] – “Moscow: A Terceira Roma” – Deve-se tomar nota que a “Primeira Roma” nesta interpretação cíclica Ortodoxa não era a Roma Cristã, mas a Roma Imperial, porque a “Segunda Roma” (ou “a Nova Roma”) era Constantinopla, a capital do Império Cristão. Então a mesma idéia de “Roma” mantida pelos Ortodoxos Russos, corresponde ao entendimento de sacralidade como a importância daquilo que é Sagrado e assim, a necessária e inseparável “sinfonía” entre autoridade espiritual e o reino temporal. Para a ortodoxia tradicional, a separação católica entre o Rei e o Papa é inimaginável e beira a blasfêmia, este conceito é até mesmo chamado de “heresia Latina”.

Mais uma vez, pode-se ver a perfeita convergência entre o dogma de Evola e o pensamento comum da mentalidade conservadora russa. E outra vez mais, a clara exaltação espiritual do Imperium nos livros de Evola, é de inestimável valor para os russos, pois isto é o que eles veem como a sua verdadeira identidade tradicional. O “imperialismo sinfônico”, ou melhor, “Imperialismo Guibelino”.

Existe um outro detalhe importante que merece ser mencionado aqui. É sabido que o “Autor do Terceiro Reich” Artur Müller van den Bruck, foi profundamente influenciado pelos escritos de Fiodor Dostoievsky, para quem o conceito de “Terceira Roma” era vitalmente significativo. Pode-se ver mesma visão escatológica de van den Bruck do “Último Império”, nascido da convergência metafórica entre as idéias dos montanistas paracléticos[7] e as profecias de Joachim de Flora[8].

Van den Bruck, de quem as idéias eram algumas vezes citadas por Evola, adaptou o seu conceito de “Terceira Roma” da tradição Ortodoxa russa, e aplicou na Alemanha, onde ele foi ulteriormente trabalhado espiritual e socialmente pelos Nacional-Socialistas. Um fato interessante é que Erich Müller, o protegé de Nikisch[9], que fora grandemente inspirado por van den Bruck, comentou certa vez que o Primeiro Reich havia sido Católico[10], o Segundo Reich, Protestante[11], o Terceiro Reich deveria ser, exatamente, Ortodoxo!

Mas o próprio Evola participou amplamente nos debates intelectuais dos círculos revoluionários-conservadores alemães (ele era membro do “Herrenklub” de von Gleichen, que era a continuação do “Juniklub” fundado por van den Bruck), onde assuntos similares eram discutidos de uma maneira muito vívida. Agora é fácil ver outra maneira em que a mentalidade conservadora russa está ligada às teorias de Evola. Obviamente, não é possível dizer que as suas idéias, nesses problemas particulares, eram idênticas, mas ao mesmo tempo, existem conexões extraordinárias entre os dois que podem ajudar a explicar a assimilação das idéias de Evola para a mentalidade russa, que possui visões muito menos “extravagantes” do que aquelas pertencentes à Europa Conservadora Tradicional, que é majoritariamente Católica e Nacionalista nos dias de hoje, e raramente Imperialista.

***

[1] Samizdat foi um sistema na antiga URSS em que os livros oficialmente “impermissíveis” circulavam pelo país; estes eram cópias de cópias e não tinham boa qualidade, mas eles tendiam a chegar ao seu objetivo.

[2] Um escola religiosa/filosófica fundada pela ocultista russa Helena Blavatsky.

[3] Um conceito teosófico relacionado à todos os fenômenos mentais; C.G. Jung também o discutiu ocasinalmente.

[4] Para aqueles que não estão familiarizados com o trabalho de Kafka, esta é uma referência para o seu livro chamado “O Castelo”, que é sobre um homem que contrai o que deveria ser uma trabalho relativamente fácil num lugar distante, fazendo o levantamento das terras de um nobre local, mas que não consegue começar ou muito menos completar o seu trabalho, devido à burocracia imposta pelo seu próprio empregador (que ele nunca conhece pessoalmente, apenas por um representante ou representante de um representante) e que se frustra muito pelo fato de que o imenso e opressivo castelo do Conde pode ser visto de qualquer parte da cidade, mas ele não consegue nunca ir até lá para começar a sua tarefa. Obviamente, esta é uma acusação metafórica contra a totalidade do sistema judaico-cristão e como ele se relaciona com uma aparentemente impossível salvação. Da mesma forma, “Guelfo” se refere à uma coalisão alemã/italiana da Idade Média que apoiava a casa real de Guelfo contra a Dinastia Imperial Alemã dos Guibelinos, que era hostil ao Papa e ao Catolicismo.

[5] Referete aos Fariseus, hipocrisia, duplicidade, falsidade, fingimento.

[6] Os starets eram conselheiros espirituais, mas não sacerdotes: Rasputin poderia ser considerado como um.

[7] Os montanistas foram os precursors das seitas pentecostais modernas, i.e., aqueles que acreditam em revelações divinas pessoais e falar em linguas diferentes.

[8] de Flora era o Abade de Corazzo que completou um ensaio bastante presciente sobre a “era da razão”, por volta de 1200, onde ele escreveu “no novo dia, homens não dependerão da fé, porque tudo será fundamentado no conhecimento e na razão.”

[9] Ernst Nikisch, um nacionalista alemão da mesma época.

[10] o Sacro Império Romano-Germânico

[11] a Prússia sob o governo de Frederico, o Grande