L’aide américaine à DAESH se confirme

L’aide américaine à DAESH se confirme : des Marines et des hélicoptères Apaches chez les djihadistes

Auteur : Al Manar

Ex: http://zejournal.mobi

Les Irakiens continuent de détecter des contacts entre les Américains en Irak et Daesh (Etat islamique-EI) dans les régions que celui-ci occupent.

Contrairement aux allégations américaines de combattre cette milice wahhabite takfiriste dans le cadre de la coalition internationale, de plus en plus d’accusations sont proférées par des dirigeants irakiens sur des liens qu’ils entretiennent avec elle.

Selon le site d’information Arabi-Press, deux nouveaux faits ont été révélés cette semaine par le chef des forces de mobilisation populaire qui comptent dans ses rangs les jeunes volontaires irakiens, depuis la prise de Mossoul et d’al-Anbar par Daesh.

Ces agissements coincident avec les avancées de l’armée irakienne et de ses supplétifs des forces paramiltaires populaires dans ces régions. Mercredi, le ministère irakien de la Défense a affirmé avoir libéré deux régions situées entre les deux provinces Diyala et Salaheddine, Albou Baker et Albou Awwad.

Selon Thamer al-Khafaji qui s’exprimait pour la correspondante du site d’information Arabi-Press, trois Marines américains ont été parachutés dans la province de Babel ,  et deux hélicoptères d’origine inconnue ont atterri dans deux régions de la province de Diyala, à deux moments différents.

S’agissant des parachutistes, ils ont été vus à l’aube de mercredi dernier, en train de se jeter à partir d’un hélicoptère Apache dans la région al-Obaidate, dans le caza de Moussayyab, au nord de la province de Babel.

Concernant le deuxième évènement, il est question d’abord d’un Apache qui avait été vu  dans la nuit de mardi à mercredi en train d’atterrir dans les parages du village al-Safra , dans le prolongement de la région al-Azim, au nord de Diyala

Quelques heures plus tard, mercredi matin un hélicoptère d’origine inconnu est descendu à son tour au sud de la région de Bahraz du côté de Kanaane, au sud de la province de Diyala. Il y est resté quelques 15 minutes avant de décoller de nouveau.

Nombreux sont les responsables locaux dans cette province qui ont assuré avoir vu des hélicoptères non identifiés atterrir dans les bastions de Daesh au nord-est de Diyala et avoir largué des armes et des approvisionnements.

Un législateur irakien, Hamed al-Zameli a rapporté pour l’agence Fars news que l’actuel gouvernement de Bagdad reçoit quotidiennement des rapports des forces de sécurité dans la province d’al-Anbar sur des parachutages d’armes pour Daesh. Et d’accuser les Etats-Unis de vouloir provoquer le chaos en Irak en soutenant l’Etat islamique.

D’autres députés irakiens se plaignent de cette situation.
« Nous avons découvert des armes fabriquées aux Etats-Unis, dans les pays européens et en Israël dans les zones libérées du contrôle de l’EI dans la région Al-Baqdadi », écrit le site d’information al-Ahad, citant Khalaf Tarmouz, le chef du Conseil provincial d’al-Anbar. Tarmouz a également dit que des armes fabriquées en Europe et en Israël ont aussi été découvertes à Ramadi.

« Les Etats-Unis lâchent des armes pour l’EI avec l’excuse qu’ils ne savent pas où sont les positions de l’EI et s’efforcent de tordre la réalité avec ce genre d’allégations », dit-il.

Selon InfoWars, en décembre, les médias étatiques iraniens avaient affirmé que l’armée de l’air états-unienne avait largué pour la seconde fois des armes dans les zones tenues par l’Etat islamique.

En novembre, des sources des services de renseignement irakiens ont dit que les Etats-Unis approvisionnent activement l’EI en armes. « Les services de renseignement irakiens ont répété que les avions militaires états-uniens avaient largué plusieurs cargaisons d’aide pour les terroristes de l’EI afin de les aider à résister au siège de l’armée irakienne, des forces de sécurité et du peuple », explique un rapport.

En octobre, les sources de la coalition avaient reconnu ce qu’elles ont considéré être un parachutage prétendument erroné d’armes qui sont tombées aux mains des combattants de l’Etat islamique à l’extérieur de Kobané en Syrie.

En juillet (2014), Infowars faisait état de la grande quantité d’armes états-uniennes capturées par l’EI.

En plus des véhicules de combat et de l’artillerie acquise précédemment par l’armée irakienne, la mine d’armement provenant des bases US incluait plus de 50 batteries d’artillerie de 155mm M-198 et 4000 mitrailleuses PKC.

- Source : Al Manar

Houellebecq, Islam, & the Jews: A Review of Michel Houellebecq’s Soumission

Houellebecq, Islam, & the Jews:
A Review of Michel Houellebecq’s Soumission

By Guillaume Durocher 

Ex: http://www.counter-currents.com

Michel Houellebecq’s latest novel, Soumission ^[2], has attracted enormous attention. The book portrays the coming to power of an Islamist president in France in 2022 and has predictably been condemned as Islamophobic. The timing of the Charlie Hebdo massacres – a few disgruntled French-born Muslims murdering left-liberal cartoonists and Jews – could not have been better in terms of boosting sales. Indeed, Soumission is already that rarest of things: a succès européen (rather than our usual pan-European cultural fair of Hollywood blockbusters and degenerate Anglo pop music). Translated versions have already become instant best-sellers in Italy and Germany. Evidently, Houellebecq has struck a nerve going to the heart of contemporary European Man’s fears and aspirations.

Anglophones have however largely been left out of the fun, being stuck getting dribs and drabs of information from news and book reviews, as there is as yet no English translation. I hope this review proves useful in this respect.

One can fairly ask the question: Did we really need another existentially subjective French novel about an alienated, ineffectual, sexually accomplished bookish fellow? If Soumission is any indication, the answer is an unambiguous “yes.”

A first, not unimportant point: Soumission is an easy and highly enjoyable read. One can breeze through it in a weekend or so. You’ll chuckle away at a joke or wry observation, delivered with a certain deadpan objectivity, on almost every page. Many consider Houellebecq’s writing to be “dark,” including his trademark highly graphic sex scenes, but I tend to think it’s just matter-of-fact. It seems to me one can only be “shocked” if one is in denial about a few basic realities about oneself, but maybe I am asking too much of my fellow featherless bipeds. It is true that the points in Houellebecq’s dialectic – whether on the safety of Paris’ Chinatown in case of a race war, the emptiness of casual sex or the slow decay of the body – are made with a rare biting force.

Soumission is among other things a marketing coup. The title translates as “submission,” which of course is one of the translations of the Arabic Islām. The rise to power of the Muslim Brotherhood in France taps into deep fears in Western Europe regarding the steady growth of the Islamic population, which given enough time will eventually become majoritarian in many countries.

But the work is not an apology for Identitarianism, nor is it even Islamophobic. On the contrary, the author uses the fantasy of an Islamic regime in France as a critique of the West’s feminist, individualist, “social democratic,” liberal-egalitarian degeneracy, his usual target. One wonders if any of his readers will be disappointed by the bait-and-switch. Houellebecq is not defending the White Man, but attacking the Last Man, the effeminate, cowardly, isolated, depressed, and yet terribly comfortable consumer-slaves we have become.

Politics by no means overwhelms the novel but rather forms the background to the protagonist’s musings. But, from the little we are told, France’s joining the House of Islam proves highly salutary, and the administration of President Mohammed Ben Abbes is an enlightened one. Even if we cannot automatically assume that the protagonist’s statements necessarily reflect the author’s views or that the narrator is completely reliable, it seems fair to say that Soumission can be read as Houellebecq’s portrayal of a possible ideal polity. Which raises the question: What are the characteristics of this polity? What destiny for nationalists, Identitarians and Jews?

A Return to Tradition

The Muslim takeover, far from being a bloodthirsty or even really an authoritarian event, is achieved democratically. Ben Abbes and Front National (FN) leader Marine Le Pen make it to the second round of the presidential elections, prompting the mainstream parties to back the Muslim Brotherhood to prevent a nationalist victory. Islam achieves power through the sheer apathy of the postmodern, nihilist, and feckless Westerner.

The new regime slowly but steadily changes the society and its mores. Patriarchy is restored as women no longer teach, and girls begin spontaneously dressing modestly, curbing a male desire which had been constantly taunted by short skirts and our pornographic advertising and pop culture. Many public universities become Islamic and only allow Muslim teachers, although secular ones are allowed on the side. Non-Muslims do fine as dhimmitude, we are told, is “flexible” in its interpretation (p. 155).

Well-known French politicians and journalists are amusingly skewered. The media is inbred while the drastic budget cuts for public education (l’Éducation nationale) has highly positive effects. Evidently Houellebecq believes France’s current cultural-ideological superstructure is basically parasitic and destructive. Democracy is no more than the competition of two rival gangs and at best an impression.

Ben Abbes having gutted the education budget, schooling becomes mandatory only up to the age of 12, apprenticeships are promoted and higher education becomes an entirely private affair. State aid to giant corporates is abolished, welfare is reduced by 85%, taxes on craftsmen and small businessmen are sharply reduced, while family allowances are massively increased on the condition that the wife is not working. The result? A flowering optimism not seen since the Trentes glorieuses and a huge fall in unemployment as women drop out of the workforce. Crime nosedives as social conservatism reigns.

The family resumes its central role in the economy (family businesses) and society as the location of intergenerational transmission. G. K. Chesterton, Hillaire Belloc and their Distributist theories of an ownership society are explicitly mentioned as models. (Is Houellebecq aware of Belloc’s Judeo-criticism ^[3]?)

In short, Houellebecq’s Utopia is a traditional society of personal responsibility and organic hierarchy rather than a hopelessly over-bureaucratized society of hapless, coddled cogs over-determined by the double domination of mega-corporate oligopoly and an overbearing Nanny State.

The Destiny of the Identitarian

Identitarians and nationalists have mixed portrayals. Marine Le Pen is a stately figure. Jean-Marie Le Pen is described by the protagonist as “an idiot, more or less completely uncultivated” (p. 103). It’s not clear whether this is Houellebecq’s view. In any case, Le Pen père took the characterization in stride, responding with reference to the writer’s wretched appearance: “Houellebecq writes that I am an idiot and uncultivated. One can get the wrong impression, I always thought he was a homeless drunk!”

The Identitarians are sometimes portrayed as a kind of mirror image of violent jihadis, the two sides being involved in occasional bloodshed and electoral shenanigans. Both the Front National and the Muslim Brotherhood take the more “responsible,” route of peaceful democratic politics. Ben Abbes scolds the impatient jihadis: Why use violence now? Simply wait, and the hollow Occident will naturally turn to Islam.

In the book, the destiny of both the militant Identitarian and the depoliticized liberal is to embrace Islam. After all, pleads one Identitarian-turned-Muslim, do they not agree on the scourges of atheism and feminism, and the need for patriarchy?

The portrayal of nationalists and Identitarians is ultimately not hostile, but has a certain understanding for those calling themselves “Indigenous Europeans.” The humble goy protagonist ruefully notes as his Jewish girlfriend leaves for Israel, fearing violence: “There is no Israel for me” (p. 112).

The Disappearance of the Jews

The Jews gradually disappear throughout the course of the book with the rise of Muslim power: first the student union in the university, then the kosher aisle in the supermarket, and so on. Houllebecq repeatedly has the 44-year-old protagonist sexually desecrating his pretty young Jewess, the main love interest. She and her parents leave for Israel with the rise of the Ben Abbes regime (though no persecutions are portrayed or really implied).

A third party describes the Muslim president’s attitude thus:

[H]e really believes that massive conversions are possible with the Christians – and nothing proves that this is impossible – he no doubt has very few illusions concerning the Jews. What he hopes deep down I believe is that they will decide themselves to leave France – to emigrate to Israel. (p. 157)

Apparently Ben Abbes does not believe Jews are compatible with his Utopia.

At the end of the novel the protagonist, happily reconciled to the new regime, worries about his former girlfriend’s future: “She would live her own life, I knew it, in much more difficult conditions than mine. I sincerely hoped her life would be happy – even though I did not believe it very much” (p. 299). Her challenges are not made explicit however.

The new regime’s foreign policy is touched upon. France creates a new “Roman Empire” by re-centering the European Union southwards, with Morocco and Turkey joining, and others still in the wings. France “retakes the ambition of De Gaulle, that of a great Arab policy,” no longer participating in the United States’ destruction of the Islamic World under Zionist influence. The Gulf petro-monarchies, having become too unpopular due to collaboration with Washington, “are starting to think that an ally like Europe, less organically linked to Israel, could be for them a much better choice . . .” (p. 158–59). Now why would one Houellebecq’s characters suggest that America is “organically linked to Israel”?

Insofar as Ben Abbes’ administration can be taken as a portrayal of Houellebecq’s ideal regime, the implications are indeed rather anti-Judaic: as the forces of disintegration at work in the West are overcome, the Jews (coincidentally or not) disappear. Is the author not implying that Jewish influence is not compatible with a regenerated, patriarchal, hierarchical France? What to make of the fact that France’s return to grandeur in the world  is achieved by leading a new foreign policy independent of Israelite influence? Nonetheless, Houellebecq leaves himself more than sufficient plausible deniability to avoid the charge of anti-Semitism.

Eugenic Themes

The novel makes several intriguing inegalitarian and eugenicist points. The protagonist explains early on:

A few private lessons I gave in the hope of increasing my standard of living had soon convinced me that the transmission of knowledge was most of the time impossible; the diversity of intelligences, extreme; and that nothing could eliminate or even attenuate this fundamental inequality. (p. 18)

Later on the alleged eugenic effect of polygamy is presented as the most prominent benefit of the practice, driving mankind’s self-realization:

In the case of mammals, given the gestation time of females, to be contrasted with the almost unlimited reproductive abilities of males, selective pressure exerts itself above all on males. Inequality between males – if some were granted the enjoyment of several females, others would necessarily be deprived of it – should not be considered as a perverse effect of polygamy, but indeed its actual goal. Thus the destiny of the species fulfilled itself. (p. 269)

Later still, this eugenic effect is described as concerning especially intelligence, which is where selective pressure among human males is most prominent (p. 292). Women, in choosing men, have this effect, while men only select for beauty in their choice of mate. Although he amusingly adds that culture plays a role: “One can even, to a certain extent, persuade them [women] of the high erotic value of university professors . . .” (p. 294).

The demographic obsession is present throughout the novel. The postmodern world is selecting for those predisposed to religion, as only they breed. The new regime assures its hegemony by focusing on education: “he who controls the children controls the future, end of story” (p. 82). Islam will conquer the world through the womb; even China and India will eventually fall, for they have “allowed themselves to be contaminated by Western values” of materialism and individualism (p. 271).

A Soralian Vision?

Now, one can be forgiven for thinking that Houellebecq is engaging in some “epic trolling” of any of his readers with nationalist or Identitarian leanings. Instead of the advertised attack on Islamic immigration, one in fact gets a critique of Western liberal degeneracy through the prism of a positive portrayal of Islam. The heights of chutzpah are reached when one character explains:

One had to admit the obvious: having reached such a repugnant degree of decomposition, Western Europe was no longer in any condition to save itself – no more than Ancient Rome had been in the fifth century of our era. The massive arrival of immigration populations imbued of a traditional culture still marked by natural hierarchies, the submission of women, and the respect due to elders constituted a historic opportunity for Europe’s moral and familial rearmament, opened the perspective of a new golden age for the old continent. (p. 276)

This kind of argument, even if it is part of a dialectic, can only be very troubling for Identitarians, who incidentally are portrayed in the book as wanting “Race war now!” while we are still the overwhelming majority in mother Europa. This is not an irrational attitude if a war must occur: there is no question that we grow demographically weaker with every generation in the face of the fatal triad of sub-replacement fertility, displacement-level immigration, and miscegenation.

In any case, Houellebecq’s positively showing Islam as a force for Tradition in a book marketed to Identitarians reveals him to be a man of peace. The French nationalist and anti-Judaic activist Alain Soral warmly welcomed the book ^[4] and the author as “a great French writer and a guy possessed by the eternal French genius.” Soral goes so far as to argue that the narrative indicates Houellebecq has been reading from his Égalité et Réconciliation website and his Kontre Kulture bookstore. (Although Soral adds he does not want a Muslim president, but rather a Putin or a Chávez.)

Soral is against both immigration to Europe and forced remigration out. One can criticize this position, given the threat against us of irreversible genetic damage and ultimately extinction in Europe. But there is a legitimate sense in which we must be careful and not macho in fantasizing about civil war. We are much weaker today than we were in 1914 or 1933. There is clearly a tendency within Western oligarchies – among neoconservatives, Zionists, representatives of the Surveillance State and Military-Industrial Complex, etc – of actively promoting a clash of civilizations between the West and Islam in order to strengthen Liberal-Atlanticist power elites and destroy the enemies of Israel. Identitarians must not prove their useful idiots.

Houellebecq and the Right

Houellebecq is not a White Nationalist; he is a ruthless chronicler of European Man’s descent into degeneracy under Liberal hegemony. Soumission positively portrays and compellingly shows the case, on a personal, emotional and subjective level, for organic hierarchy, transcendental values and even eugenics. Clearly this is a work of the Right.

The book is completely unrealistic on numerous counts. There is no prospect of an Islamic takeover in 2022 or even decades after that, given the numbers still in our favor. Muslim political organization in France is nil, their ethnic lobbies being effectively emanations of the state and of (often Jewish-led) “antiracist” groups. This is an important point: Muslims, for the most part, do not have political agency (in contrast to Jews ^[5] and Liberals, who have it in spades). There is no evidence Islamic polygamy is eugenic, and a lot of evidence that their institutionalized cousin-impregnating is highly dysgenic and evidently the exogamous polygamy of Sub-Saharan Africa has not had positive results. (Although could polygamy, in the right conditions, be eugenic?) These are trivial observations however. The point of the novel is not realism but a fantasy allowing one to play with ideas and argue a morality.

More relevant would be to point out that Islam – though an amusing way of criticizing feminism and liberalism – is not our way. Nor should the Roman Empire be glorified as a model, given that it eventually ruined its Latin core through miscegenation and deracination. The case for close association with Morocco or Turkey is lost on me, given for example that the Islamic World’s scientific output since the end of its Golden Age is close to nil.

Having said all this, I would argue that Houellebecq’s novel is useful to nationalists and Identitarians. Islam, I am convinced, is not our primary enemy because Muslims for the most part have no political agency. The enemy would be those who opened the floodgates and continue to marginalize European nationalists: the Zionist and/or Liberal elites who are in varying proportions hegemonic across the West.

Recognizing this, Houellebecq’s work is an invitation to Identitarians to be creative and not misidentify their enemy, to not overlook possible alliances. We need to be forward-looking and creative in our approach, which does not mean selling out. Soumission’s protagonist is obsessed with the 19th-century French novelist Joris-Karl Huysmans, particularly of his use of rare or forgotten French words as neologisms. Perhaps this is trivial, but I was struck by the similarity between this usage and the wider notion of archeofuturism.

For having made the Right-wing diagnostic, having identified a past as less degenerate, how do we go from A to B? One cannot simply start up a time machine and undo the fall of medieval Christendom, the American Civil War, or the Great European Civil War of 1914–1945. One cannot, as some might want to, simply pick up where Jefferson or Hitler left off. We must come to terms with our defeats. If Identitarianism is purely backward-looking – wishing merely to preserve Europe like a kind of mummified museum – then it will fail. I believe Houellebecq is calling on us not to cling to the past or simply charge against the wave of destruction, but to ride it, to move forward to seize the contradictions that will in turn destroy it, so that in that mysterious dialectical process we overcome the current age and ensure our salvation.

Article printed from Counter-Currents Publishing: http://www.counter-currents.com

URL to article: http://www.counter-currents.com/2015/02/michel-houellebecq-soumission/

URLs in this post:

[1] Image: http://www.counter-currents.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/Fu8QH0.jpg

[2] Soumission: http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/2081354802/ref=as_li_tl?ie=UTF8&camp=1789&creative=390957&creativeASIN=2081354802&linkCode=as2&tag=countecurrenp-20&linkId=LLYJKOSV4DUNKEHP

[3] Belloc’s Judeo-criticism: http://www.theoccidentalobserver.net/2014/09/reflections-on-hilaire-bellocs-the-jews-1922-part-one-of-three/

[4] Alain Soral warmly welcomed the book: http://www.dailymotion.com/video/x2fu3qw

[5] Jews: http://www.theoccidentalobserver.net/2014/05/as-happy-as-god-in-france-the-state-of-french-jewish-elites-part-1/

Stendhal, politique para-moderne

Stendhal, politique para-moderne

par Georges FELTIN-TRACOL

 

Collaborateur régulier aux sites dissidents Europe Maxima, Euro-Synergies et Synthèse nationale, Claude Bourrinet est un penseur impertinent. C’est aussi un remarquable biographe. Vient de paraître sous sa signature un excellent Stendhal dans la collection « Qui suis-je ? ».

 

Henri Beyle (1783 – 1842) choisit le nom de plume de Stendhal. Il « n’était pas antimoderne, […], mais plutôt contre moderne. Fils de la Révolution, donc de la rupture, de l’arrachement, d’un certain déracinement, il prenait ce que la nouvelle ère proposait de mieux pour accroître sa puissance d’exister, sans en partager la vulgarité et la bassesse (p. 110) ». Toute son œuvre en témoigne comme nous le démontre avec brio Claude Bourrinet. Politiquement jacobin (républicain de salut public), Stendhal est surtout un admirateur de Napoléon. « Il voue à l’empereur un véritable culte, car il l’identifie à une France qui était encore grande. Napoléon “ fut notre seule religion ”, le plus grand conquérant après Alexandre et César, la restauration de l’Antiquité, un tyran italien chu dans un monde contemporain si minable, un aigle qui survole son temps par la pensée. Napoléon, c’est l’Italie, le bonheur (p. 42). »

 

Cette admiration envers le vainqueur d’Austerlitz se comprend aisément. « L’existence, pour Stendhal, est une dynamique, une énergétique. Quelle que soit la source de la puissance, l’excès et la surabondance affirment la sensation de vivre (p. 22). » Si « le beylisme est un vitalisme (p. 56) », c’est en outre « un aristocratisme, un “ espagnolisme ”, ennemi irréductible de la société de masse et de la modernité dévorante. Le courage froid de ne pas mendier la reconnaissance collective est plus précieux que celui, furieux, du champ de bataille (p. 55) ». On est très proche du Napoléon, « professeur d’énergie », dans Les déracinés de Maurice Barrès. Quelle aurait été l’influence de Stendhal sur Barrès, en particulier à l’époque du « culte du Moi » ? Une belle et riche étude en vue. Stendhal estime que « l’Empire, continuation de la Révolution offre la vision d’une communauté humaine centrée autour des vertus de sacrifice, d’émulation, de combat, de force, de patrie (pp. 42 – 43) ». Voilà pourquoi il est para-moderne puisqu’il tente une improbable conciliation entre les vertus enfantées par Napoléon et les valeurs sociales d’Ancien Régime.

 

Napoléon pour modèle d’être

 

« Stendhal a bien conscience, après la chute de l’Empire, que le temps n’est plus aux lauriers, mais aux travaux utiles, à l’économie, au commerce, au “ libéralisme ”, aux chambres des représentants, à la médiocrité bourgeoise, à l’égoïsme réducteur, à l’ennui. C’est la fin de l’honneur militaire, le temps du producteur, le règne de l’opinion (p. 42). » Il est évident que, pour lui, « la politique, d’abord, doit dominer l’économique. Avec Bonaparte, un Rothschild n’aurait pas été possible. Les lois institutionnelles sont indépendantes des exigences du commerce et de la bourse. En outre, ce qui présente véritablement une valeur humaine, sociale et politique, c’est justement ce qui échappe à la loi d’airain du travail et du besoin (pp. 81 – 82) ». Par conséquent, il considère que « le seul critère moral susceptible de souder la société autour de valeurs transcendantes est l’héroïsme, militaire, intellectuel, humain. En bon héritier de l’Empire, Stendhal choisit le rouge du dépassement de soi, de l’abnégation et du panache gratuit, contre le noir de l’argent, de la tartuferie et du moralisme (p. 82) ». Fuyant une société française d’après-guerre vile, il part pour l’Italie qu’il connaît bien et qu’il aime afin de retrouver un idéal d’humanité martiale. « L’Italie est le Sud fécondé par la sauvagerie barbare. L’idéal politique de Stendhal est la cité à dimension humaine, autogérée, libre et guerrière, adonnée aux arts et à l’esprit, audacieux, héroïque (p. 65). » Mais toujours garde-t-il à l’esprit l’exemple de Napoléon. D’ailleurs, « devenir napoléonien. S’étourdir quand il est nécessaire, se contraindre quand c’est utile, être toujours soi. Une bonne conduite suppose que l’on soit en même temps modeste et exigeant. Il s’agit de “ chevaucher le tigre ”. Les autres sont des objets, des cibles de mon intention, ou de mon attention, ou tout simplement des êtres indifférents. Le besoin existe de se lier avec eux, mais il faut pouvoir s’en défaire. Emprunter un lieu, une place, en visiteur, voilà la vraie politique. La tactique est une nécessité vitale (p. 47) ». Dans cette perspective, la vie italienne se révèle un parfait adjuvant. « La politique moderne était le jeu des opinions communes, donc une tendance à l’égalitarisme chloroformant par le consensus arithmétique, tandis que l’italianité est l’affirmation du Moi par la volonté, l’énergie et la force (p. 67). » Cependant, Stendhal « cherchera à se libérer de la politisation des rapports humains, qui infeste tout, y compris la vie privée. Cela étant, qu’est-ce que la modernité, sinon le sérieux et le ressentiment qui s’infiltrent partout ? (p. 25) ».

 

Contre l’industrialisme

 

Claude Bourrinet a le grand mérite de nous rappeler que Stendhal rédigea en 1825 un pamphlet de 24 pages contre l’« industrialisme » intitulé D’un nouveau complot contre les industriels. Il se montre aussi un très virulent contempteur de l’« Amérique, hyperAngleterre (p. 101) ». Il observe là-bas que « l’individualisme inquiet, qui doit sans cesse prouver sa légitimité, est la clé de voûte de cette société asociale de pionniers (p. 102) ». Bref, « le Nouveau Monde est devenu pour lui le danger le plus redoutable de l’homme différencié, c’est-à-dire de l’homme civilisé (p. 99) ». L’auteur de La Chartreuse de Parme remarque qu’il n’y a « aucun attachement à un terroir. Tout doit être converti en dollars. Il n’y a pas de paysan en Amérique, partant, pas de pays (p. 102) ». C’est au fond le choc frontal de deux visions antagonistes du monde. « Une modernité industrielle, conformiste, uniformatrice, morose, contre une autre modernité, romantique, subtile, passionnée, émancipée. La société américaine, dans son radicalisme utilitariste, essentialise les tares de l’industrialisme britannique par le biblisme (p. 100). » Stendhal paya chère cette altière attitude, lui qui juge qu’« être dissemblable, quitte à être dissonant, est un art, une culture, une ascèse, un abandon, un je-ne-sais-quoi. C’est être un homme (p. 85) », un homme appelé Stendhal ! Nul doute que le fin lettré que fut Maurice Bardèche aurait aimé ce livre.

 

Georges Feltin-Tracol

 

---

 

Article printed from Europe Maxima: http://www.europemaxima.com

 

URL to article: http://www.europemaxima.com/?p=4193

Stratégie de puissance russe dans le cyberespace

Stratégie de puissance russe dans le cyberespace

Ex: http://www.infoguerre.fr 

Sous couvert de protéger les données personnelles, le président Russe Vladimir Poutine, signe en juillet une nouvelle loi qui oblige les entreprises à héberger d’ici septembre 2016 les données personnelles des résidents russes à l’intérieur des frontières du pays. Cette loi va directement impacter les services en ligne fournis par l’étranger, en particulier certains services américains populaires en Russie tels que Facebook, Twitter et Google. Ces derniers vont devoir installer des datacenters sur le sol russe s’ils souhaitent continuer à fournir légalement leurs services sur ce territoire. Apple, de son côté, va voir ses iPad, iPhone et iMac interdits sur le territoire russe d’ici 2015. En effet, il n’est guère possible d’utiliser ces outils sans les relier à iCloud ou iTunes, services contenant des données personnelles hébergées aux USA et potentiellement accessibles par la NSA. En août, il est même demandé à Apple et à SAP de fournir le code source de leurs systèmes afin de vérifier qu’ils ne contiennent pas de système d’espionnage. Localement, le FSB avait obligé en juin certaines entreprises à chiffrer les données personnelles de leurs clients. Les révélations d’Edouard Snowden et son exil temporaire en Russie ont sans doute accéléré ces prises de décisions protectionnistes contre les risques d’espionnage provenant de l’Ouest. Poutine considére qu’internet est un projet de la NSA, et malgré des contraintes techniques importantes, il va tout mettre en oeuvre pour garantir son indépendance technique, en particulier en étudiant la possibilité de débrancher le pays du reste du réseau en cas d’urgence.

Protectionnisme économique et autonomie numérique

Ces nouvelles contraintes pour les services occidentaux permettront à l’homme le plus riche de Russie, Alicher Ousmanov, de développer encore ses parts de marché. M. Ousmanov, proche de Poutine, est le propriétaire de mail.ru, concurrent directe de gmail. Il a pris le contrôle en septembre de vkontakte, leader en Russie des réseaux sociaux devant Facebook et Twitter. Du côté des autres services et technologies, la Russie n’est pas à la traîne : Yandex, majoritairement russe, distance Google et Ozon est le concurrent de Amazon. Sputnik, projet de moteur de recherche totalement russe porté par Rostelecom garantira une indépendance et un contrôle total par l’état. Le développement de l’économie actuelle basée en grande partie sur les matière premières passera par le développement des nouvelles technologies. Poutine annonce que déjà 8,5% du PIB est généré par l’économie en ligne. A son arrivée au pouvoir en 99, il y avait 2 millions d’internautes en Russie, aujourd’hui ce sont 75 millions de personnes qui sont connectées.

Des machines à écrire pour contrôler les réseaux sociaux

Bien que ne possédant pas de smartphone et n’étant pas un internaute averti, M. Poutine a bien compris le risque lié à l’usage de ces nouveaux moyens de communication par un nombre aussi important de personnes, il devra garder la maîtrise de l’information dans son pays. Au mois d’août, c’est une loi concernant les blogs ayant plus de 3.000 lecteurs inscrits qui en oblige sa déclaration auprès du ministère de la communication. Le même mois une autre loi oblige l’identification des utilisateurs utilisant le WIFI public ou d’entreprise. Peut-être est-ce lié à l’augmentation importante (600%) des utilisateurs souhaitant être anonyme en utilisant le réseau tor ? Déjà en février, une loi permettait de couper les sites internet sur simple décision de justice. Cette dernière, mise en avant pour la protection de l’enfance a été utilisée dès le mois de mars pour couper des sites contestataires au régime. La Russie a bien compris les avantages qu’elle peut tirer de ces nouvelles technologies pour mener à bien sa guerre de l’information tout en limitant les risques qu’elle peut générer.

Articles similaires :

1. La stratégie énergétique russe contrecarrée par la ruée vers le gaz de schiste
2. Cyberespace : arène d’affrontements informationnels et enjeu d’affrontements normatifs
3. La nouvelle stratégie spatiale de la Russie
4. Entre stratégie et Guerre de l’Information, les Anonymous peuvent-ils tomber le masque ?
5. Edito : La stratégie informationnelle du Vatican face au Web 2.0

«Regime change» – les perpétuels échecs des Etats-Unis

par Albert A. Stahel, Institut für strategische Studien, Wädenswil

Ex: http://www.horizons-et-debats.ch

Selon l’orientation politique prédominante à la Maison Blanche – républicaine ou démocrate – il est devenu habituel que dans les administrations respectives, les néoconservateurs de droite ou les libéraux de gauche exigent régulièrement, dans le monde entier, la chute de dirigeants embarrassants et leur remplacement par des gouvernements démocratiques.

Ce «regime change» (changement de régime), propagé et promu par les Etats-Unis, a commencé en avril 1992 avec la chute du président afghan Mohammed Najibullah, qui a eu comme résultat non pas la démocratie afghane mais la guerre civile entre les différents partis moudjahidin. Une guerre qui déboucha sur la destruction de Kaboul et ensuite sur la prise du pouvoir par les Talibans qui finirent par assassiner Najibullah à Kaboul le 27 septembre 1996. D’autres «regime changes» se sont succédés selon le même modèle.

En décembre 2001, le régime taliban à Kaboul fut liquidé suite à la guerre aérienne des Etats-Unis et l’avancée de l’Alliance du Nord. Depuis lors, la guerre persévère sans relâche tandis qu’on assiste à une véritable éclosion de la culture et du trafic de drogues.

Le 5 octobre 2000 à Belgrade, le président serbe Slobodan Milosevic fut contraint, par des manifestations de masse, à démissionner. Aujourd’hui encore la Serbie demeure dans un état d’instabilité.

Le 9 avril 2003, Saddam Hussein fut renversé pendant l’agression et l’occupation de l’Irak par les Etats-Unis et la soi-disant coalition de bonnes volontés avant d’être exécuté, le 30 décembre 2006, par les nouveaux maîtres. Les conséquences de cet événement persistent jusqu’à nos jours: le démantèlement du régime de Saddam Hussein a rendu plus forte l’influence iranienne au sein de l’Irak aboutissant finalement à la création de l’EI en Irak occidental.

Le 23 novembre 2003 en Géorgie, Edouard Chevardnadze fut renversé par la révolution des roses. Son successeur suivit l’orientation politique des Etats-Unis; et en 2008, il déclara une guerre indirecte contre la Russie qui déboucha sur la division du pays.

Le 14 janvier 2011, le dictateur tunisien Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali fut expulsé par les manifestants et se réfugia en Arabie saoudite. Comme conséquence, les islamistes et les adhérents de Ben Ali se combattent toujours à la quête du pouvoir et la Tunisie continue à être considérée comme un Etat instable.

Le 11 février 2011, Hosni Moubarak, dirigeant de l’Egypte pendant de nombreuses années, fut renversé par des manifestations de masse. Suite à cet événement, Mohamed Morsi, Frère musulman, fut élu président mais renversé, lui aussi, le 3 juillet 2013, par un coup d’Etat militaire du maréchal Abdel Fattah al-Sissi. Ce dernier a été élu président en 2014, alors que ces forces de sécurité mènent une guerre d’usure contre les islamistes en Egypte et au Sinaï.

En mars 2011 en Syrie, encouragés par des organisations néoconservatrices américaines, turques et saoudiennes, des manifestations massives furent déclenchées contre le régime de Bachar el-Assad. Aujourd’hui, une guerre civile ravage la Syrie, dominée entre autres par les organisations salafistes telles l’EI et Jabhat al Nosra. Des millions d’êtres humains ne cessent de s’enfuir de ce pays détruit.
Soutenues par la guerre aérienne des Etats-Unis, du Royaume Uni et de la France, les milices libyennes se sont emparées du pouvoir et ont, le 20 octobre 2011, castré le dirigeant libyen Khadafi sur le capot d’une voiture avant de le tuer. Aujourd’hui, la Libye passe pour un Etat décomposé où fait rage une guerre civile brutale.

Le 22 février 2014, en Ukraine, Victor Ianoukovitch, le président élu, fut destitué par le Parlement suite à des manifestations de grande envergure à Kiev; il s’est réfugié en Russie. Le président russe Vladimir Poutine a profité de la déstabilisation de l’Ukraine pour annexer la Crimée. Dorénavant, dans l’est de l’Ukraine, les séparatistes se battent contre les milices et l’armée de Kiev. L’Ukraine est divisée en deux parties.

Ces divers exemples amènent à la conclusion que la politique américaine du «regime change» n’a mené à la démocratie dans aucun pays. Tout au contraire: aujourd’hui, les guerres civiles et le chaos prédominent dans la quasi-totalité de ces Etats.

Les Etats-Unis auraient mieux fait d’investir les fonds utilisés pour ces interventions dans la résolution de leurs propres problèmes pour assainir leurs infrastructures délabrées, leurs mauvais systèmes de formation et de santé et le système de pensions mal en point.     •

Source: Institut für Strategische Studien, www.strategische-studien.com du 17/1/15

(Traduction Horizons et débats)

MYTHS AND MENDACITIES: THE ANCIENTS AND THE MODERNS

MYTHS AND MENDACITIES:  THE ANCIENTS AND THE MODERNS

Tomislav Sunic
(The Occidental Quarterly, vol. 14, no. 4, Winter 2014–2015)

When discussing the myths of ancient Greece one must first define their meaning and locate their historical settings. The word “myth” has a specific meaning when one reads the ancient Greek tragedies or when one studies the theogony or cosmogony of the early Greeks. By contrast, the fashionable expression today such as “political mythology” is often laden with value judgments and derisory interpretations. Thus, a verbal construct such as “the myth of modernity” may be interpreted as an insult by proponents of modern liberalism. To a modern, self-proclaimed supporter of liberal democracy, enamored with his own system-supporting myths of permanent economic progress and the like, phrases, such as “the myth of economic progress” or “the myth of democracy,” may appear as egregious political insults.

For many contemporaries, democracy is not just a doctrine that could be discussed; it is not a “fact” that experience could contradict; it is the truth of faith beyond any dispute. (1)

Criticizing, therefore, the myth of modern democracy may be often interpreted as a sign of pathological behavior. Given this modern liberal dispensation, how does one dare use such locutions as “the myth of modern democracy,” or “the myth of contemporary historiography,” or “the myth of progress” without being punished?

Ancient European myths, legends and folk tales are viewed by some scholars, including some Christian theologians, as gross re-enactments of European barbarism, superstition, and sexual promiscuity. (2)  However, if a reader or a researcher immerses himself in the symbolism of the European myths, let alone attempts to decipher the allegorical meaning of the diverse creatures in those myths, such as, for instance, the scenes from the Orphic rituals, the hellhole of Tartarus, the carnage in the Iliad or in the Nibelungenlied, or the final divine battle in Ragnarök, then those mythical scenes take on a different, albeit often a self-serving meaning. (3) After all, in our modern so-called enlightened and freedom-loving liberal societies, citizens are also entangled in a profusion of bizarre infra-political myths, in a myriad of hagiographic tales, especially those dealing with World War II victimhoods, as well as countless trans-political legends which are often enforced under penalty of law. There-fore, understanding ancient and modern European myths and myth-makers, means, first and foremost, reading between the lines and strengthening one’s sense of the metaphor.

In hindsight when one studies the ancient Greek myths with their surreal settings and hyperreal creatures, few will accord them historical veracity or any empirical or scientific value. However, few will reject them as outright fabrications. Why is that? In fact, citizens in Europe and America, both young and old, still enjoy reading the ancient Greek myths because most of them are aware not only of their strong symbolic nature, but also of their didactic message. This is the main reason why those ancient European myths and sagas are still popular. Ancient European myths and legends thrive in timelessness; they are meant to go beyond any historical time frame; they defy any historicity. They are open to anybody’s “historical revisionism” or interpretation. This is why ancient European myths or sagas can never be dogmatic; they never re-quire the intervention of the thought police or a politically correct enforcer in order to make themselves readable or credible.

The prose of Homer or Hesiod is not just a part of the European cultural heritage, but could be interpreted also as a mirror of the pre-Christian European subconscious. In fact, one could describe ancient European myths as primal allegories where every stone, every creature, every god or demigod, let alone each monster, acts as a role model representing a symbol of good or evil. (4) Whether Hercules historically existed or not is beside the point. He still lives in our memory. When we were young and when we were reading Homer, who among us did not dream about making love to the goddess Aphrodite? Or at least make some furtive passes at Daphne? Apollo, a god with a sense of moderation and beauty was our hero, as was the pesky Titan Prometheus, al-ways trying to surpass himself with his boundless intellectual curiosity. Prometheus unbound is the prime symbol of White man’s irresistible drive toward the unknown and toward the truth irrespective of the name he carries in ancient sagas, modern novels, or political treatises. The English and the German poets of the early nineteenth century, the so -called Romanticists, frequently invoked the Greek gods and especially the Titan Prometheus. The expression “Romanticism” is probably not adequate for that literary time period in Europe because there was nothing romantic about that epoch or for that matter about the prose of authors such as Coleridge, Byron, or Schiller, who often referred to the ancient Greek deities:

Whilst the smiling earth ye governed still,
And with rapture’s soft and guiding hand
Led the happy nations at your will,
Beauteous beings from the fable-land!
Whilst your blissful worship smiled around,
Ah! how different was it in that day!
When the people still thy temples crowned,
Venus Amathusia!  (5)

Many English and German Romanticists were political realists and not daydreamers, as modern textbooks are trying to depict them. All of them had a fine foreboding of the coming dark ages. Most of them can be described as thinkers of the tragic, all the more as many of them end-ed their lives tragically. Many, who wanted to arrest the merciless flow of time, ended up using drugs. A poetic drug of choice among those “pagan” Romanticists in the early nineteenth-century Europe was opi-um and its derivative, the sleeping beauty laudanum. (6)

Myth and religion are not synonymous, although they are often used synonymously—depending again on the mood and political beliefs of the storyteller, the interpreter, or the word abuser. There is a difference between religion and myth—a difference, as stated above, depending more on the interpreter and less on the etymological differences between these two words. Some will persuasively argue that the miracles per-formed by Jesus Christ were a series of Levantine myths, a kind of Oriental hocus-pocus designed by an obscure Galilean drifter in order to fool the rootless, homeless, raceless, and multicultural masses in the dying days of Rome.(7)

Some of our Christian contemporaries will, of course, reject such statements. If such anti-Christian remarks were uttered loudly today in front of a large church congregation, or in front of devout Christians, it may lead to public rebuke.

In the modern liberal system, the expression “the religion of liberalism” can have a derisory effect, even if not intended. The word “religion” derives from the Latin word religare, which means to bind together or to tie together. In the same vein some modern writers and historians use the expression “the religion of the Holocaust” without necessarily assigning to the noun “religion” a pejorative or abusive meaning and without wishing to denigrate Jews. (8)

However, the expression “the religion of the Holocaust” definitely raises eyebrows among the scribes of the modern liberal system given that the memory of the Holocaust is not meant to enter the realm of religious or mythical transcendence, but instead remain in the realm of secular, rational belief. It must be viewed as an undisputed historical fact. The memory of the Holocaust, however, has ironically acquired quasi-transcendental features going well beyond a simple historical narrative. It has become a didactic message stretching well beyond a given historical time period or a given people or civilization, thus escaping any time frame and any scientific measurement. The notion of its “uniqueness” seems to be the trait of all monotheistic religions which are hardly in need of historical proof, let alone of forensic or material documentation in order to assert themselves as universally credible.

The ancestors of modern Europeans, the ancient polytheist Greeks, were never tempted to export their gods or myths to distant foreign peoples. By contrast, Judeo -Christianity and Islam have a universal message, just like their secular modalities, liberalism and communism. Failure to accept these Islamic or Christian beliefs or, for that matter, deriding the modern secular myths embedded today in the liberal system, may result in the persecution or banishment of modern heretics, often under the legal verbiage of protecting “human rights” or “protecting the memory of the dead,” or “fighting against intolerance.” (9).

There is, however, a difference between “myth” and “religion,” although these words are often used synonymously. Each religion is history-bound; it has a historical beginning and it contains the projection of its goals into a distant future. After all, we all measure the flow of time from the real or the alleged birth of Jesus Christ. We no longer measure the flow of time from the fall of Troy, ab urbem condita, as our Roman ancestors did. The same Christian frame of time measurement is true not just for the Catholic Vatican today, or the Christian-inspired, yet very secular European Union, but also for an overtly atheist state such as North Korea. So do Muslims count their time differently—since the Hegira (i.e., the flight of Muhammad from Mecca), and they still spiritually dwell in the fifth century, despite the fact that most states where Muslims form a majority use modern Western calendars. We can observe that all religions, including the secular ones, unlike myths, are located in a historical time frame, with well-marked beginnings and with clear projections of historical end-times.

On a secular level, for contemporary dedicated liberals, the true un-disputed “religion” (which they, of course, never call “religion”) started in 1776, with the day of the American Declaration of Independence, whereas the Bolsheviks began enforcing their “religion” in 1917. For all of them, all historical events prior to those fateful years are considered symbols of “the dark ages.”

What myth and religion do have in common, however, is that they both rest on powerful symbolism, on allegories, on proverbs, on rituals, on initiating labors, such as the ones the mythical Hercules endured, or the riddles Jason had to solve with his Argonauts in his search for the Golden Fleece. (10) In a similar manner, the modern ideology of liberalism, having become a quasi-secular religion, consists also of a whole set and subsets of myths where modern heroes and anti-heroes appear to be quite active. Undoubtedly, modern liberals sternly reject expressions such as “the liberal religion,” “the liberal myth,” or “the liberal cult.” By contrast, they readily resort to the expressions such as “the fascist myth” or “the communist myth,” or “the Islamo-fascist myth” whenever they wish to denigrate or criminalize their political opponents. The modern liberal system possesses also its own canons and its own sets of rituals and incantations that need to be observed by contemporary believers— particularly when it comes to the removal of political heretics.

Myths are generally held to be able to thrive in primitive societies only. Yet based on the above descriptions, this is not always the case. Ancient Greece had a fully developed language of mythology, yet on the spiritual and scientific level it was a rather advanced society. Ancient Greek mythology had little in common with the mythology of today’s Polynesia whose inhabitants also cherish their own myths, but whose level of philosophical or scientific inquiry is not on a par with that of the ancient Greeks.

Did Socrates or Plato or Aristotle believe in the existence of harpies, Cyclops, Giants, or Titans? Did they believe in their gods or were their gods only the personified projects of their rituals? Very likely they did believe in their gods, but not in the way we think they did. Some modern scholars of the ancient Greek mythology support this thesis: “The dominant modern view is the exact opposite. For modern ritualists and indeed for most students of Greek religion in the late nineteenth and throughout the twentieth century, rituals are social agendas that are in conception and origin prior to the gods, who are regarded as mere human constructs that have no reality outside the religious belief system that created them.” (11).

One can argue that the symbolism in the myths of ancient Greece had an entirely different significance for the ancient Greeks than it does for our contemporaries. The main reason lies in the desperate effort of the moderns to rationally explain away the mythical world of their ancestors by using rationalist concepts and symbols. Such an ultrarational drive for the comprehension of the distant and the unknown is largely due to the unilinear, monotheist mindset inherited from Judaism and from its offshoot Christianity and later on from the Enlightenment. In the same vein, the widespread modern political belief in progress, as Georges Sorel wrote a century ago, can also be observed as a secularization of the biblical paradise myth. “The theory of progress was adopted as a dogma at the time when the bourgeoisie was the conquering class; thus one must see it as a bourgeois doctrine.” (12)

The Western liberal system sincerely believes in the myth of perpetual progress. Or to put it somewhat crudely, its disciples argue that the purchasing power of citizens must grow indefinitely. Such a linear and optimistic mindset, directly inherited from the Enlightenment, prevents modern citizens in the European Union and America from gaining a full insight into the mental world of their ancestors, thereby depriving them of the ability to conceive of other social and political realities. Undoubtedly, White Americans and Europeans have been considerably affected by the monotheistic mindset of Judaism and its less dogmatic offshoot, Christianity, to the extent that they have now considerable difficulties in conceptualizing other truths and other levels of knowledge.

It needs to be stressed, though, that ancient European myths have a strong component of the tragic bordering on outright nihilism. Due to the onslaught of the modern myth of progress, the quasi-inborn sense of the tragic, which was until recently a unique character trait of the White European heritage, has fallen into oblivion. In the modern liberal system the notion of the tragic is often viewed as a social aberration among individuals professing skepticism or voicing pessimism about the future of the modern liberal system. Nothing remains static in the notion of the tragic. The sheer exuberance of a hero can lead a moment later to his catastrophe. The tragic trait is most visible in the legendary Sophocles’ tragedy Oedipus at Colonus when Oedipus realizes that he is doomed forever for having unknowingly killed his father and for having un-knowingly had an incestuous relationship with his mother. Yet he struggles in vain to the very end in order to escape his destiny. Here is the often quoted line Nr. 1225, i.e., the refrain of the Chorus:

Not to be born is past all prizing best; but when a man has seen the light this is next best by far, that with all speed he should go thither whence he has come. (13)
The tragic consists in the fact that insofar as one strives to avoid a catastrophe, one actually brings a catastrophe upon himself. Such a tragic state of mind is largely rejected by the proponents of the liberal myth of progress.

MYTHS AND THE TRAGIC: THE COMING OF THE TITANIC AGE

Without myths there is no tragic, just like without the Titans there can be no Gods. It was the twelve Titans who gave birth to the Gods and not the other way around. It was the titanesque Kronos who gave birth to Zeus, and then, after being dethroned by his son Zeus, forced to dwell with his fellow Titans in the underworld. But one cannot rule out that the resurrection of the head Titan Kronos, along with the other Titans, may reoccur again, perhaps tomorrow, or perhaps in an upcoming eon, thus enabling the recommencement of the new titanic age. After all Prometheus was himself a Titan, although, as a dissident Titan, he had decided to be on the side of the Gods and combat his own fellow Titans. Here is how Friedrich Georg Jünger, an avid student of the ancient Greek myths and the younger brother of the famous contemporary essayist Ernst Jünger, sees it:

Neither are the Titans unrestrained power-hungry beings, nor do they scorn the law; rather, they are the rulers over a legal system whose necessity must never be put into doubt. In an awe -inspiring fashion, it is the flux of primordial elements over which they rule, holding bridle and reins in their hands, as seen in Helios. They are the guardians, custodians, supervisors, and the guides of order. They are the founders unfolding beyond chaos, as pointed out by Homer in his remarks about Atlas who shoulders the long columns holding the heavens and the Earth. Their rule rules out any confusion, any disorderly power performance. Rather, they constitute a powerful deterrent against chaos. (14)

Nothing remains new for the locked-up Titans: they know every-thing. They are the central feature in the cosmic eternal return. The Titans are not the creators of chaos, although they reside closer to chaos and are, therefore, better than the Gods—more aware of possible chaotic times. They can be called telluric deities, and it remains to be seen whether in the near future they may side up with some chthonic monsters, such as those described by the novelist H. P. Lovecraft.

It seems that the Titans are the necessary element in the cosmic balance, although they have not received due acknowledgment by contemporary students of ancient and modern mythologies. The Titans are the central feature in the study of the will to power and each White man who demonstrates this will has a good ingredient of the Titanic spirit:

What is Titanic about man? The Titanic trait occurs everywhere and it can be described in many ways. Titanic is a man who completely relies only upon himself and has boundless confidence in his own powers. This confidence absolves him, but at the same time it isolates him in a Promethean mode. It gives him a feeling of independence, albeit not devoid of arrogance, violence, and defiance. (15)

Today, in our disenchanted world, from which all gods have departed, the resurgence of the Titans may be an option for a dying Western civilization. The Titans and the titanic humans are known to be out-spoken about their supreme independence, their aversion to cutting deals, and their uncompromising, impenitent attitude. What they need in addition is a good portion of luck, or fortuna.
 
Notes:

1. Louis Rougier, La mystique démocratique (Paris: Albatros, 1983), p. 13.
2. Nicole Belmont, Paroles païennes: mythe et folklore (Paris: Imago, 1986) quotes on page 106 the German-born English Orientalist and philologist Max Müller who sees in ancient myths “a disease of language,” an approach criticized by the anthropological school of thought. His critic Andrew Lang writes: “The general problem is this: Has language—especially language in a state of ‘disease,’ been the great source of the mythology of the world? Or does mythology, on the whole, represent the survival of an old stage of thought—not caused by language—from which civilised men have slowly emancipated themselves? Mr. Max Müller is of the former, anthropologists are of the latter, opinion.” Cf. Andrew Lang, Modern Mythology (New York: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1897), p.x.
3. Thomas Bullfinch, The Golden Age of Myth and Legend (London: Wordsworth Editions, 1993).
4.See the German classicist, Walter F. Otto, The Homeric Gods: The Spiritual Significance of Greek Religion, trans. Moses Hadas (North Stratford, NH: Ayer Company Publishers, 2001). Otto is quite critical of Christian epistemology. Some excerpts from this work appeared in French translation also in his article, “Les Grecs et leurs dieux,” in the quarterly Krisis (Paris), no. 23 (January 2000).
5. Friedrich Schiller, The Gods of Greece, trans. E. A. Bowring.  ttp://www.bartleby.com/270/9/2.html
6. Tomislav Sunic, “The Right Stuff,” Chronicles (October 1996), 21–22; Tomislav Sunic, “The Party Is Over,” The Occidental Observer (November 5, 2009).  http://www.theoccidentalobserver.net/authors/Sunic-Drugs.html
7.Tomislav Sunic, “Marx, Moses, and the Pagans in the Secular City,” CLIO: A Journal of Literature, History, and the Philosophy of History 24, no. 2 (Winter 1995).
8.Gilad Atzmon, The Wandering Who? A Study of Jewish Identity Politics (Winchester, UK: Zero Books, 2011), 148–49.
9. Alain de Benoist, “Die Methoden der Neuen Inquisition,” in Schöne vernetzte Welt (Tübingen: Hohenrain Verlag, 2001), p. 190–205.
10. Michael Grant, Myths of the Greeks and Romans (London: Phoenix, 1989), p. 289–303.
11. Albert Henrichs, “What Is a Greek God?,” in The Gods of Ancient Greece, ed. Jan Bremmer and Andrew Erskine (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2010), p- 26.
12. Georges Sorel, Les Illusions du progrès (Paris: Marcel Rivière, 1911), p. 5–6.
13. Sophocles, Oedipus at Colonus, in The Complete Plays of Sophocles, ed. and trans. R. C. Jebb (New York: Bantam Books, 1979), p. 250.
14. Friedrich Georg Jünger, Die Titanen (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1944), p. 89–90.
15. Ibid., 105.

Une démocratie pour notre siècle

par Arthur De Grave

Ex: http://fortune.fdesouche.com

Affaiblissement du politique, sécession des élites, émergence d’une culture participative… Le consensus qui existait jusqu’alors autour du régime représentatif est en train de voler en éclats sous nos yeux. Une démocratie est à réinventer pour le siècle qui s’ouvre.

Inutile de tourner autour du pot : notre démocratie représentative – ce système où une minorité élue gouverne – est à bout de souffle.

Dès le départ, le concept était plutôt fragile : si un Athénien du Ve siècle av. J.-C. se retrouvait à notre époque, il s’étonnerait qu’on puisse appeler notre régime démocratie. A Athènes, le pouvoir était aux mains des citoyens eux-mêmes, qui prenaient une part active aux décisions : la démocratie est alors directe et participative.

On l’oublie souvent : l’idée même que la démocratie puisse être autre chose que participative ne s’est imposée que très récemment, vers la fin du XIXe siècle. Notre Athénien parlerait d’oligarchie élective (en grec, oligos signifie “petit nombre”). Le problème, c’est qu’au fil du temps, les tendances oligarchiques du régime représentatif se sont renforcées aux dépens de son vernis démocratique.

Professionnalisation de la vie politique, reproduction des élites gouvernantes, consanguinité entre sphères politiques et économiques, corruption, creusement des inégalités… La liste est bien connue. Mais il faut plutôt y voir les symptômes que les causes du problème. Ces dernières sont à chercher ailleurs.

Au fil du temps, les tendances oligarchiques du régime représentatif se sont renforcées aux dépens de son vernis démocratique

D’un côté, les gouvernés ne font plus aucune confiance à ceux qui n’ont plus de “représentants” que le nom. De l’autre, les élites gouvernantes, s’il est vrai qu’elles se sont toujours méfiées du « flot de la démocratie »1, ne prennent même plus la peine de s’en cacher. En guise d’illustration, les récentes déclarations de monsieur Juncker (« il ne peut y avoir de choix démocratique contre les traités européens ») ou de madame Merkel, qui préfèrent opposer au nouveau gouvernement grec – démocratiquement élu – le train sans fin des réformes nécessaires.

Comment en sommes-nous arrivés là ? Remontons le temps, vers la fin du siècle dernier, quand le politique a cessé d’être considéré comme l’élément central de la vie en commun.

TINA, TINA, TINA (AD LIB.)2

Je suis né en 1986. J’avais trois ans quand le mur de Berlin est tombé. Deux ans plus tard, l’Union Soviétique s’effondrait, par ce qu’on a voulu nous faire voir comme une sorte de nécessité historique. C’était, paraît-il, la fin de l’Histoire, la vraie. Le triomphe de la lumière de la rationalité – économique, nécessairement économique – sur les ténèbres de l’idéologie.

J’ai grandi dans un monde où il n’y avait pas d’alternative. J’ai grandi dans un monde où la politique pouvait être remisée au placard puisque nous étions désormais placés sous le haut patronage de la Raison économique. Le pilote automatique était enclenché, nous pouvions regagner nos couchettes. Étudiant, je me désintéressais à peu près totalement de la vie politique. Comme beaucoup de gens de ma génération, je n’ai vu dans la politique qu’un enchaînement de combats un peu vains et un empilement sans fin de mesures technocratiques. Dans ce marigot qu’était devenue la vie politique, la gauche était condamnée à devenir une copie vaguement délavée de ses anciens adversaires conservateurs. Se convertir, ou mourir. C’est ce qu’on appelle, paraît-il, un aggiornamento.

LA RAISON (DU PLUS FORT EST TOUJOURS LA MEILLEURE)

There is no alternative, nous répétait sans cesse le nouveau clergé. Cette partition rend de jour en jour un son de plus en plus faux. Je suis entré dans l’âge adulte alors que l’Europe commençait à sombrer. Si la victoire de Syriza en Grèce et celle, probable, de Podemos en Espagne suscitent tant d’espérances au sein d’une jeunesse européenne qui avait fini par se résigner à un siècle de paupérisation et d’humiliation, c’est qu’elle signe le grand retour du politique. Mieux : elle révèle que le politique n’avait jamais disparu, que le pilote automatique n’était rien d’autre qu’un mensonge.

Ce qui passe depuis trente ans pour la marche naturelle des choses n’était en fait qu’un programme admirablement exécuté. Sous la rationalité autoproclamée se cachait bien une idéologie, qu’on l’appelle « économisme » ou « orthodoxie libérale ».

D’un côté, les tenants de la rationalité économique stricte, (…) de l’autre, les peuples européens qui commencent à gronder, enrageant de subir cette étrange condition d’auto-colonisés.

Ce qui nous conduit aujourd’hui à l’aube d’une crise politique majeure. La crise, étymologiquement, c’est ce moment paroxystique où deux issues mutuellement exclusives se cristallisent : la vie, ou la mort. La liberté, ou la sujétion. Bref, les positions se polarisent, et le statu quo ne peut être maintenu. D’un côté, les tenants de la rationalité économique stricte qui se crispent et campent sur leurs positions ; de l’autre, les peuples européens qui commencent à gronder, enrageant de subir cette étrange condition d’auto-colonisés.

L’issue de ce combat est incertaine, mais quelle qu’elle soit, pour le système représentatif, il est à peu près certain que le pronostic vital est engagé. Qu’en sortira-t-il ? Ou bien quelque chose de pire, ou bien quelque chose meilleur.

UNE DÉMOCRATIE POUR NOTRE SIÈCLE

Le système représentatif n’a pas fondamentalement évolué depuis l’époque de la rotative et de la machine à vapeur. La dernière innovation en politique ? 1944 : le droit de vote des femmes. Notre conception du rapport entre gouvernant et citoyen – vertical, hiérarchique – n’a pas changé depuis le siècle dernier : vote tous les X ans et tais-toi le reste du temps.

Dans un monde où chacun est connecté avec tous, où les systèmes participatifs bouleversent la plupart des domaines de notre vie quotidienne, le concept même de représentation est devenu franchement poussiéreux. Quand tout – médias, éducation, finance, etc. – devient peu ou prou participatif, pourquoi le système politique devrait-il, lui, échapper à la règle ?

Une première génération d’outils collaboratifs susceptibles de permettre un début de rééquilibrage entre systèmes participatif et représentatif existe déjà : Avaaz, change.org, LiquidFeedback, Parlement & Citoyens, Democracy OS, Loomio… Il ne s’agit que de simples outils, qui ne suffiront pas seuls à raviver la flamme démocratique. Internet a prouvé par le passé qu’il pouvait être l’instrument de notre émancipation comme celui de notre soumission (voir notamment ici et ici). Nous avons probablement déjà fait quelques pas de trop dans la seconde direction.

C’est dans les marges, à la lisière du politique, qu’une nouvelle vision du monde s’élabore
Le principal obstacle à l’établissement d’une démocratie participative n’est cependant pas technique : il est culturel. Le changement ne viendra ni des formations partisanes du passé, ni des hommes et femmes politiques d’aujourd’hui. C’est dans les marges, à la lisière du politique, qu’une nouvelle vision du monde s’élabore. Faire cadeau d’outils collaboratifs à des gens qui gardent une conception césariste du pouvoir, c’est, comme disaient nos grands-mères, donner de la confiture aux cochons3.

Le vent tourne : le parti espagnol Podemos, le premier, a su intégrer les réseaux sociaux et les modes d’organisation horizontaux pour évoluer vers une forme démocratique participative. Peut-être ne s’agit-il que de premières étincelles d’un embrasement plus vaste ? Il n’y a pas si longtemps, nous nous demandions avec David Graeber si la dette ne jouerait pas le rôle de catalyseur de la prochaine grande révolte. Ce cycle vient peut-être de commencer. Les Grecs ont secoué le joug. Nous sommes sortis de la torpeur dans laquelle les berceuses chantées par les économistes orthodoxes nous avaient plongés. Il est maintenant temps de se lever.

_________________________________________________________________

Notes :

1. Emile Boutmy, fondateur de l’Ecole libre des sciences politiques,mieux connue sous le nom de Sciences Po, écrivait en 1872 :« Contraintes de subir le droit du plus nombreux, les classes qui se nomment elles-mêmes les classes élevées ne peuvent conserver leur hégémonie politique qu’en invoquant le droit du plus capable. Il faut que, derrière l’enceinte croulante de leurs prérogatives et de la tradition, le flot de la démocratie se heurte à un second rempart fait de mérites éclatants et utiles, de supériorités dont le prestige s’impose, de capacités dont on ne puisse pas se priver sans folie »

2. TINA, acronyme de There is no alternative. La formule, attribuée à Margaret Thatcher, signifie que le capitalisme de marché est l’unique voie possible.

3. Ou, comme le dit un proverbe populaire russe similaire : « Invite un cochon à ta table, il posera les pieds dessus »

OUISHARE

A Hole in Being: Notes on Negativity

A Hole in Being:
Notes on Negativity

By Greg Johnson 

Ex: http://www.counter-currents.com

G. W. F. Hegel and his able interpreter Alexandre Kojève claim that the essence of consciousness is “negativity,” that man lives “outside himself,” that man “negates” or “nihilates” nature, that man is a “nothingness” or a “hole in being,” that man is “time that negates space.” What does this mean?

First, let’s consider the claim that man contains a negativity or absence within him. Imagine you are holding a rock in your hand. A rock is a paradigmatic natural object. It is an inert lump of matter. A rock is complete and self-contained. To say that the rock is self-contained is to say that it does not need anything from outside of itself in order to go on being a rock. A plant, by contrast, is not self-contained; it needs things outside of itself—water, nutrients, sunlight—in order to go on being a plant. Without these things, it is reduced to a mass of inert matter, like the rock.

To say that the plant is not self-contained and self-sufficient is to say that it has an absence or lack within it; its need is a hole in it that must be filled by something from outside it. The rock, because it has no needs, is wholly self-sufficient and self-contained; it has no absences within it.

Another way of understanding this is to say that what makes the plant whole lies outside of its skin, outside of the space that it inhabits and occupies; what makes the plant whole is literally outside it; the plant is outside of itself, displaced from the physical space that it occupies; another way of putting this is to say that the plant is “ecstatic,” for the word “ecstatic” literally means “out-standing,” being outside of or beside oneself.

The rock, by contrast, is not ecstatic; because it needs nothing from outside itself to make it complete, all that it is lies within the physical space it occupies. To understand a plant as a whole, one cannot simply look at the plant, for what the plant is, is not wholly within its skin; the things that make the plant a whole are found outside it, in the needs which are fulfilled from the environment in which it dwells.

When Hegel/Kojève claim that man contains negativity and absence in him, they mean, first of all, that man has needs and desires, that man is not wholly self-sufficient and self-contained. Human beings lie outside of themselves, outside of their skins, for it is only outside of ourselves that we find those things which fulfill our needs and make us complete.

Next, let’s consider the ideas of “negating” and “nihilating” nature. When a plant or an animal finds something from the external world that fulfills its needs, it must remove that thing from the outside world and transform and incorporate it into itself. Hegel and Kojève refer to this activity as “negating,” i.e., saying “no.”

A plant transforms sunlight, nutrients, and water into something that they are not; it in effect says “no” to them as they are given and transforms them into something it can use; it says “no” to their objective, external being and makes them part of itself.

When a cow eats the plant, it says “no” to the plant as an objective, external being and incorporates it into itself.

When a human being takes a rock and transforms it into a paperweight or an example, we say “no” to its objective, external being and incorporate it into the network of human meanings and purposes.

Now what does it mean to say that man is “time” that negates “space”? To understand this, we must appreciate an essential difference between human beings and other kinds of beings. All living things, save for human beings, have needs which are given by nature and which are satisfied within the natural world. Animals may say “no” to given nature, but it is only to satisfy their natural needs, so the process of negation is situated within and bounded by the order or economy of nature.

This is not the case with human beings. Human beings have naturally given needs. But we also have needs which are not given by nature and which cannot be satisfied by given nature. Human beings, unlike all other living things, can say “no” to their own naturally given needs—to their animal natures—and to the entire economy of the natural world. Among the strongest human needs are for physical survival and biological propagation. But Human beings say “no” to the real in the name of the unreal or the unrealized, of the ideal or the idealized.

Human beings have the power of language, reason, speech, abstraction, invention, creativity, logos—what Hegel calls the realm of the concept—which allows them to create needs, ideals, and plans which are not based on nature and cannot be satisfied by it. They can be satisfied only by the transformation of the natural world through work. It is here that the dimension of time enters in.

Hegel claims that:

Man = Negativity = Time = Concept

To say that the concept = time is to say that the concept is a plan, a blueprint for a process of transforming what is given in the present into what is desired in the future. To say that man = time is to say that man’s unique mode of being, man’s unique mode of negativity, is the transformation of the natural world through our projects. Man, therefore, is time that negates.

But what does it mean to say that man is time that negates space? By space, Hegel/Kojève mean nature, given being, inert reality, which is to be changed in light of our concepts and plans. Hegel/Kojève use “space” to designate given being, because given beings, unlike living beings, are wholly self-contained and self-sufficient; because they need nothing outside of themselves to be complete, all that they are is found within their given spatial location.

To say that man is time that negates space, is, therefore, to say that man is time that negates given being in the light of his concepts and plans. We say “no” to what is given now in the name of the not yet, what is conceived in the mind and realized through the transformation of given nature.

There is a phrase from Jean-Paul Sartre that is often quoted by people who want to argue that French philosophy is all a bunch of gobbledygook:

Man is what he is not and is not what he is.

On the surface this does sound like nonsense, but it actually makes a great deal of Kojèvian sense.

To say that man is what he is not, is to say that human beings are not just lumps of inert given being; human beings have physical-material-animal bodies, but the body is simply the site at which a potential of infinity of plans and projects burst out in all directions, toward myriad possible futures.

Human beings are what they are not because they live in their plans and projects, encountering their given reality as incomplete in light of all the things they want to achieve.

Human beings are not what they are—i.e., the given matter within our skins—because what we are is radically incomplete, and can be completed only by completing our plans and projects, and since we always have uncompleted plans and projects, which are cut off only by death, man is always incomplete, a hole in being that will never be fully filled.

 

---

Article printed from Counter-Currents Publishing: http://www.counter-currents.com

URL to article: http://www.counter-currents.com/2015/02/a-hole-in-being/

URLs in this post:

[1] Image: http://www.counter-currents.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/book-transforming-itself-into-a-nude-woman-1.jpg

Marche pour la Syrie

Marche pour la Syrie

Bruxelles - 15.03.15

Avec le soutien du "Front européen pour la Syrie"