Réponses de Robert Steuckers à la Table Ronde, “Quel avenir pour les peuples d’Europe?”

Réponses de Robert Steuckers à la Table Ronde, “Quel avenir pour les peuples d’Europe?” au colloque du Château Coloma, 3 mars 2012

Q.: Quelles réactions positives voyez-vous aujourd’hui parmi les peuples européens?

RS: Des réactions positives? Je n’en vois pas beaucoup. J’en retiens deux, marginales sur le plan géographique mais significatives, et, mutatis mutandis, dignes d’être imitées: la mobilisation populaire en Islande et la colère de la foule en Grèce. Il y a d’abord la réaction islandaise, celle de ce petit peuple insulaire de 350.000 habitants, qui a inventé une véritable représentation démocratique dès l’aube de son histoire et forgé la première littérature moderne et profane de notre continent. Dans ce pays, les responsables de la crise de 2008, les infects banksters qui ont commis l’acte abject et méprisable de spéculer, sont traduits en justice, de même que Haarde, le Premier Ministre qui a couvert leurs vilénies, tandis que notre “Commission Dexia” patine et qu’on ne verra pas de sitôt l’incarcération, pourtant dûment méritée, de Dehaene à Lantin ou à Jamioulx. En Islande, ses homologues ès-abjection sont derrière les barreaux ou devant les juges. Parallèlement à cette saine réaction, les Islandais ont refusé de rembourser les banques étrangères qui ont participé à la ruine de leur pays et se sont donné une constitution nouvelle où la spéculation est expressément décrite comme un délit et où tous les transferts de souveraineté sont d’emblée condamnés ou, éventuellement, soumis à référendum. Les Islandais ont fait montre de volonté politique: ils ont prouvé qu’un retour au politique était possible dans un monde occidental où règne la dictature subtile du “tout-économique”. Résultat: l’Islande connaît un redéploiement économique assez spectaculaire.

Dans le reste de l’Europe, c’est l’apathie.

En Grèce, nous avons vu, ces jours-ci, des émeutes plus violentes encore que celles qui ont secoué Athènes l’an passé. Le peuple refuse le diktat des banques, du FMI et de l’eurocratie. La RTBF comme la VRT ont interrogé des quidams dans la rue; trois de ceux-ci ont lancé: “C’est bientôt votre tour!”. C’est prophétique et réaliste tout à la fois. En effet, la faiblesse, la lâcheté et la veulerie du monde politique, qui n’ose faire cueillir les escrocs et les banquiers par la police dès potron-minet, en filmant la scène à titre de petite mise au pilori, ne peuvent avoir qu’une seule conséquence à moyen terme: la faillite totale de l’Etat et l’hellénisation/paupérisation de notre société. Malgré cette colère de la rue à Athènes, les Grecs, contrairement aux Islandais, ont dû accepter, tout comme les Italiens d’ailleurs, un gouvernement d’économistes, de banquiers, de technocrates qui n’ont aucun atome crochu avec la population et, forcément, aucune légitimité démocratique. La dictature a donc fait sa réapparition en Europe, non plus une dictature acclamative ou issue des urnes comme il y en a eu dans l’histoire récente de notre continent, mais une dictature sans acclamations populaires, sans légitimité électorale, qui s’apprête à ruiner toutes les familles grecques et italiennes. Mais où sont les protestataires anti-dictateurs, comme ceux qui s’agitaient contre Franco ou contre les Colonels grecs dans les années 60 et 70?

En France, les grandes leçons du gaullisme des années 60 sont bien oubliées. Aucune réaction saine n’est à attendre du sarközisme néo-libéral. En Espagne, le mouvement des indignés est certes fort sympathique, mais quelles seront ses suites? L’Espagne, vient de nous dire Jean David, compte aujourd’hui quatre millions de chômeurs, avec un nouveau gouvernement libéral, qui fera la politique du FMI, et préconisera des mesures anti-populaires comme le font déjà anticipativement, chez nous, un Decroo (le fils de son papa) ou un Reynders (qui, dit-on, brigue un haut poste à la BNP à Paris).

Le mouvement des indignés espagnols montre que toute contestation juvénile est désormais noyée dans ce que le regretté Philippe Muray nommait le “festivisme”. On transforme une protestation, dont les enjeux sont pourtant vitaux pour l’ensemble de la population, en un happening de style Woodstock, ce qui n’inquiète ni les banksters ni leurs serviteurs néo-libéraux. Le danger du “gauchisme”, comme on disait naguère, ne vient nullement de sa nature “contestataire”, antagoniste à l’égard des pouvoirs en place, mais de ses propensions au “festivisme”, tel qu’il a été défini par Muray. La culture festiviste, envahissante, tablant sur les émotions ou sur les désirs, tue de fait les réflexes politiques, basés sur le sérieux de l’existence, sur l’agonalité (Ernst Jünger, Armin Mohler) et sur la prise en compte, pessimiste et prévoyante, des risques et du pire (Clément Rosset). Les exemples abondent pour signaler le glissement des idées en apparence révolutionnaires de mai 68 dans la farce festiviste: l’itinéraire d’un Daniel Cohn-Bendit le prouve amplement, ce pseudo-révolutionnaire du Nanterre de 1968, qui avait mêlé verbiage pseudo-marxiste et obsessions sexuelles, est aujourd’hui un allié du néo-libéral thatchérien Guy Verhofstadt quand il s’agit, dans l’enceinte du Parlement européen, de vitupérer tout réflexe politique naturel, émanant du peuple réel; ou toute tentative de l’un ou l’autre ponte en place, comme Sarközy, d’utiliser un réflexe populaire naturel pour mener une politique quelconque, par pur calcul politicien et qui, si elle était réellement traduite dans la réalité, serait efficace ou écornerait les intérêts du banksterisme.

Le philosophe néerlandais Luk van Middelaar parlait, pour la France, d’une culture philosophique du “politicide”, qui s’est développée parallèlement à l’idéologie étatique rigide que la république a toujours tenté de faire triompher dans son propre pré carré. De Sartre aux contestataires de Mai 68, en passant par Michel Foucault ou par le néo-nietzschéanisme exigeant la libération joyeuse et immédiate des “machines à désirer”, par le nouveau néokantisme post-marxisant qui découvrait subitement l’horreur du goulag chez ses anciens alliés soviétiques dans les années 70 ou par l’hypermoralisme hystérique des médias dominants ou par la promotion médiatique d’une “république compassionnelle”, les intellectuels français ont perpétré en permanence un “assassinat du politique” qui ne peut mener qu’à une impasse. Celle dans laquelle nous nous trouvons (Luk van Middelaar, Politicide – De moord op de politiek in de Franse filosofie, van Gennep, Amsterdam, 1999).

Il faut par conséquent une bataille métapolitique pour éradiquer les affres du festivisme et contrer les effets délétères de l’apathie en laquelle somnolent la plupart de nos concitoyens.

Q.: A quels dangers serait soumise une Europe redevenue “populiste” au sens positif du terme?

RS: Dresser la liste des dangers qui nous menacent risque d’être un exercice fort long. Si nous prenons la spéculation en cours contre l’euro, phénomène emblématique de l’absence de souveraineté et de vigueur politiques au sein de l’Europe eurocratique, nous constatons que toutes les spéculations hostiles à la monnaie commune européenne ont une origine outre-Atlantique, proviennent du secteur bancaire spéculatif américain. J’en conclus que la spéculation contre les Etats et les monnaies, dont l’Asie avait connu un précédent en 1997, est un mode (relativement) nouveau de guerre indirecte. Saddam Hussein voulait facturer son pétrole en euro. Ahmadinedjad a envisagé de le faire à son tour pour le pétrole et le gaz iraniens. Les puissances du BRIC (Russie, Chine, Inde, Brésil) emboîtent le pas. L’euro constituait donc le danger le plus grave pour les Etats-Unis à court et à moyen termes, car il était sur le point de détrôner le roi-dollar. L’Europe, puissance civile et pacifique (Zaki Laïdi), aurait, sans coup férir, damé le pion à l’hegemon Il fallait dès lors frapper cet instrument de souveraineté européenne à son “ventre mou” méditerranéen. Les pays méditerranéens, ceux du groupe PIGS (Portugal, Italie, Grèce, Espagne), sont effectivement les plus fragiles, les plus aisés à faire basculer pour entraîner un effet domino et affaiblir simultanément les pays économiquement plus forts de l’ancienne zone mark (oui, la Belgique est menacée, on le sait; l’Autriche a perdu un “A” et les Pays-Bas sont inquiets car ils connaissent leurs points faibles, leurs éventuels talons d’Achille). L’Allemagne est encore en mesure de résister vu ses accords gaziers avec la Russie et les marchés qu’elle développe à grande échelle en Chine. L’Allemagne demeure forte parce qu’elle est davantage liée aux puissances du groupe BRIC, parce qu’elle a misé subrepticement sur une carte eurasienne sans renier avec fracas son option atlantiste officielle. Les anciens chanceliers Schmidt et Schröder se sont hissés à la position “catéchonique” de garants de cet axe énergétique Berlin/Moscou, avatar actuel des accords Rathenau/Tchitchérine, signés à Rapallo en 1922.

Pour revenir à la Grèce, aujourd’hui ruinée, on évoque fort souvent l’insouciance du personnel politique grec, qui a pratiqué une politique démagogique où l’Etat-Providence était particulièrement généreux et peu regardant (plusieurs centaines d’aveugles disposent de leur permis de conduire...) ou le gouffre financier qu’a constitué l’organisation des jeux olympiques de 2004 mais on omet curieusement de mentionner le coût exorbitant qu’ont entraîné les incendies de forêts et de garrigues que le pays a subi deux années de suite. Le feu a ravagé les campagnes et s’est avancé jusque dans les banlieues des villes dans des proportions hors du commun. De même, la Russie de Poutine, récalcitrante face aux diktats du “nouvel ordre mondial”, a subi sur son territoire des incendies de grande envergure, inédits dans l’histoire.

Ces incendies sont-ils dû à des hasards naturels, un peu vite mis sur le compte de l’hypothétique “réchauffement climatique”? Ou bien sont-ils les effets d’une nouvelle forme de “guerre indirecte”? La question peut être posée.

De même, on parle, avec le projet HAARP, de l’éventualité de provoquer artificiellement des catastrophes sismiques ou autres. Le tsunami qui a réduit à néant le nucléaire japonais l’an passé (et conduira à court terme au démantèlement total du secteur nucléaire de l’Empire du Soleil Levant) ou les tempêtes extrêmement violentes que la France a subies il y a quelques années, immédiatement après l’enthousiasme soulevé par la possibilité d’un Axe Paris/Berlin/Moscou, sont-ils des hasards ou non? Telles sont des questions à étudier avec toute l’attention voulue, comme le fait “Kopp-Verlag” en Allemagne.

L’arme de la grève sauvage a été utilisée contre Chirac en 1995, après des essais nucléaires à Mururoa. On sait que certains syndicats français, noyautés par des éléments trotskistes ou lambertistes, pendants économico-sociaux des “nouveaux philosophes” agissant dans l’espace médiatique, sont soutenus par la CIA (ou l’ont été par l’ex-OSS quand il a fallu mettre les anciens alliés communistes échec et mat). La France vit en permanence sous l’épée de Damoclès d’une paralysie totale, qui pourrait être due, par exemple, à une grève des routiers, qui bloquerait toutes les routes de l’Hexagone et toutes les voies d’accès à celui-ci. Dans de telles conditions, pas besoin de révolution orange en France...

Reste effectivement le danger des “révolutions colorées”, à l’instar de celle qui a réussi en Géorgie en 2003 et a porté Sakashvili au pouvoir. L’instrument des révolutions colorées est désormais connu et ne fonctionne plus de manière optimale, en dépit d’un personnel très bien écolé, recruté au départ du mouvement serbe OTPOR. En Ukraine, les conséquences de la “révolution orange” de 2004, soit un rapprochement du pays avec les structures atlantistes et eurocratiques, sont annulées sous la pression du réel géographique. L’Ukraine est liée aux espaces déterminés par les grands fleuves (Dniestr, Dniepr, Don) et par la Mer Noire. Elle est aussi liée territorialement à l’espace russe du Nord. La dernière tentative de “révolution orange” en Russie cet hiver, pour faire tomber Poutine, s’est soldée par un échec: les sondages créditent le Premier Ministre russe de 66% des intentions de vote! Pire pour les “occidentistes”, la majorité absolue des voix va non seulement vers le mouvement de Poutine mais aussi, au-delà des deux tiers de votes que les sondages lui attribuent, à des formations politiques d’inspiration communiste ou nationale (Ziouganov et Jirinovski) et non pas vers les tenants d’une ré-occidentalisation de la Russie, avec son cortège de “Gay-Prides” festivistes, d’oligarques et de politiciens véreux et falots.

Les “printemps arabes”, autre manière de mobiliser les foules pour libérer les marchés potentiels —que constituent les Etats arabo-musulmans—  des structures étatiques traditionnelles et des corruptions claniques, ont fonctionné en Tunisie et, partiellement seulement, en Egypte. En Syrie, cela n’a pas marché et on prépare au pays d’El-Assad un avenir libyen...

Les pays européens sont finalement à ranger parmi les Etats de faible personnalité politique. Outre la spéculation contre l’euro, quel instrument garde-t-on au placard pour la faire fléchir si jamais il lui prenait de branler dans le manche? L’ambassadeur américain Jeremy Rivkin a été trop bavard: il a révélé la nature de l’instrument dont on ferait usage pour déstabiliser les sociétés des Européens de l’Ouest, si ceux-ci devenaient trop récalcitrants. On leur balancerait les déclassés des banlieues dans les pattes. Jeremy Rivkin évoque, sans circonlocutions inutiles, la possibilité de mobiliser les masses immigrées des banlieues pour faire tomber ou pour désarçonner un gouvernement rebelle, surtout en France. Sarkozy doit savoir mieux que personne qu’il a été porté au pouvoir suite aux émeutes des banlieues françaises de novembre 2005. Elles avaient servi à éliminer Chirac, adepte de l’Axe Paris/Berlin/Moscou. Elles pourraient tout aussi bien servir à le faire tomber, lui aussi, s’il ne reste pas sagement dans le sillage de l’hegemon américain et fidèle à son alliance privilégiée avec la Grande-Bretagne de Cameron. Faye avait prédit, à la grande fureur du président français actuel, que la France ne pourrait pas se payer indéfiniment des émeutes de banlieues, surtout si elles éclataient simultanément dans plusieurs grandes agglomérations de l’Hexagone, non plus seulement dans le fameux département n°93, près de Paris, mais aussi à Lyon, Marseille et Lille. Les réseaux salafistes, comme les réseaux lambertistes, sont prêts à faire le jeu de l’hegemon, au détriment des Etats-hôtes, a fortiori si l’Arabie Saoudite, matrice financière wahhabite des mouvements salafistes, est une alliée inconditionnelle de Washington.

La méfiance à l’égard de certains réseaux salafistes ne relève donc pas du “racisme” ou de l’“islamophobie”, comme le vocifèrent les médias aux ordres ou le pensent certains magistrats croupions, dont la corporation est dénoncée comme inculte, à l’instar de tous les juristes modernes sans culture générale, par François Ost, ancien recteur des Facultés universitaires Saint-Louis de Bruxelles. Cette méfiance à l’égard des salafistes relève d’une simple analyse du terrain politique, où il faut établir l’inventaire des éléments en place: quelles sont les forces dangereuses qui pourraient, dans un avenir prévisible, disloquer la machine étatique, dont je suis citoyen, et plonger la société, en laquelle je vis, dans le chaos? Quelles sont les forces en présence dans ma société qui pourraient servir de levier, à toutes mauvaises fins utiles, à l’hegemon pour la déstabiliser ou l’affaiblir?

Q.: Quels sont les ennemis intérieurs et extérieurs des peuples européens dans le contexte actuel?

RS: Commençons par les ennemis extérieurs, les ennemis intérieurs n’étant que des instruments à leur service. L’ennemi extérieur est bien entendu l’hegemon qui refuse de nous élever à son rang, comme on le ferait en toute bonne logique avec des alliés fidèles à la façon romaine, et nous plonge en permanence dans l’assujetissement, brisant chaque fois, à l’aide d’instruments subtils propres aux nouvelles formes de guerre indirecte, tout nouvel élan économique ou politique de notre Europe. Cet hegemon est une thalassocratie, une puissance essentiellement maritime, une puissance qui domine les “res nullius” que sont les océans et l’espace circumterrestre, tout en imposant des règles internationales fluctuantes, chaque fois interprétées en sa faveur. Je veux bien évidemment parler des Etats-Unis d’Amérique, tels que les a décrits une figure comme Carl Schmitt. Ce n’est pas la place ici de rappeler les réflexions profondes et pertinentes que Carl Schmitt a émises sur la fabrication arbitraire et perfide de règles juridiques internationales floues et boiteuses car tributaires de l’esprit “wilsonien”, destinées à faire avancer les pions de l’impérialisme américain dans le monde ou sur le processus délétère de fluidification et de liquéfaction des certitudes et des traditions diplomatiques que ces règles perfides ont fait éclore. Plus accessibles me semblent les directives émises par un stratégiste américain, Nicholas J. Spykman, dans un bref vademecum en annexe de son ouvrage de 1942, America’s Strategy in World Politics.

Pour lui, l’Europe de son temps possède dix atouts qui la rendent supérieure aux Etats-Unis. Ces dix atouts, que j’énonce par ailleurs (cf. “Panorama théorique de la géopolitique”, in Orientations n°12, été 1990/hiver 1990-91), lui avaient été inspirés par un géopolitologue allemand de l’école de Haushofer, une certain Robert Strauss-Hupé, émigré aux Etats-Unis après la prise du pouvoir par les nationaux-socialistes parce qu’il avait quelque ascendance juive. Les atouts que doit avoir une superpuissance de l’acabit des Etats-Unis pour Spykman ou les atouts que possédait l’Europe sous hegemon germanique selon Strauss-Hupé sont notamment, je n’en cite ici que trois, l’excellence d’un système scolaire et universitaire, la cohésion ethnique et une économie plus ou moins autarcique (ou semi-autarcique auto-centrée comme le préciseront plus tard les Français François Perroux et André Grjébine) qui permet l’émergence et la consolidation d’un bloc économique concurrent des Etats-Unis et capable de conquérir et de conserver longtemps des marchés en Asie, en Afrique et en Amérique latine.

Pour démolir l’enseignement, il y a eu mai 68, avec son cortège de nouvelles pédagogies abracadabrantes et son laxisme implicite, suivi d’une offensive, classée à “droite”, du néo-libéralisme qui a imposé des schémas pédagogiques visant l’acquisition facile de savoirs purement utilitaires au détriment des humanités traditionnelles, totalement battues en brèche. Une fois de plus, ici, le festivisme gauchiste à la sauce 68 n’a jamais cessé de marcher de concert avec le néo-libéralisme utilitariste pour ruiner les acquis de notre civilisation et que leur antagonisme fictif, souvent médiatisé pour faire croire à des alternances démocratiques, ne servait qu’à leurrer les masses. Pour briser la cohésion ethnique, on a d’abord coupé l’Europe occidentale de ses réservoirs habituels de main-d’oeuvre supplétive en Europe orientale, on a ensuite freiné tous les processus d’intégration et d’assimilation avec l’aide des réseaux wahhabite/salafiste inféodés à l’allié saoudien (qui promettait aussi un pétrole bon marché à condition que l’Europe s’ouvre à toutes les immigrations musulmanes); on s’apprête, avec l’ambassadeur Rivkin, à inciter les nouveaux banlieusards déboussolés, toutes couleurs et toutes confessions confondues, à bloquer le fonctionnement total de l’Etat et de la société en générant des troubles civils dans les grandes agglomérations; en Allemagne, Erdogan et Davutoglu menacent de faire jouer, au détriment de l’Etat allemand, les “sociétés parallèles” turques, étant bien entendu que le néo-libéralisme a eu pour effet de favoriser, de “booster”, toutes les ‘économies diasporiques”, dont les réseaux turcs, axés, dans un premier temps, sur le trafic de l’héroïne; enfin, la pratique permanente du “politicide”, surtout en France, ne permet aucune restauration du “politique”, au sens où l’entendait le regretté Julien Freund. Sans restauration du politique, nous risquons le déclin total et définitif.

On s’aperçoit clairement que l’hegemon, qui entend freiner tous nos élans, aligne tout un éventail d’alliés circonstantiels, qui ne sont en aucun cas l’ennemi principal mais bien plutôt les instruments de celui-ci. La rébellion turque, mise en exergue par les médias depuis le “clash” entre Erdogan et son homologue israélien à Davos et depuis l’affaire de la flotille humanitaire turque amenant des médicaments aux Palestiniens de Gaza, est un “show”, destiné à gruger les masses arabo-musulmanes. Outre cette mise en scène, la politique turque n’a guère changé à l’égard de son environnement, en dépit du discours néo-ottoman de Davutoglu qui évoque les notions de “zéro problème avec les voisins” et de solidarité musulmane. En Syrie, depuis août 2011, la Turquie est bel et bien alignée sur l’hegemon américain: Erdogan, Gül et Davutoglu ont tenté de faire fléchir El-Assad, en lui suggérant de prendre dans son gouvernement des ministres appartenant aux “Frères Musulmans” et de ne plus favoriser les Alaouites, adeptes d’un islam à fortes connotations chiites, et de renoncer à la laïcité de l’Etat, préconisée par l’idéologie baathiste qui refuse toute discrimination entre musulmans (sunnites, chiites, alaouites, druzes, etc.) ou à l’égard des chrétiens arabes/araméens. Le pari baathiste sur la laïcité de l’Etat syrien, sans violence institutionnelle aucune à l’égard des communautés réelles composant la population syrienne, est plus souple que ne le fut le kémalisme turc, avant son éviction par l’AKP d’Erdogan. Aujourd’hui, c’est par la Turquie (par l’Irak et la Jordanie) que transitent les armes pour les opposants syriens et pour les mercenaires “afghans” ou “libyens” qui affrontent l’armée loyaliste syrienne. Par railleurs, la géopolitique implicite de la Turquie n’est pas assimilable à une géopolitique européenne cohérente: les “directions” qu’entend prendre la géopolitique turque sous-jacente ne vont pas dans le même sens qu’une bonne géopolitique européenne qui serait enfin devenue générale et cohérente: la Turquie, par exemple, entend reprendre indirectement pied dans les Balkans, alors que ceux-ci devraient constituer exclusivement un tremplin européen vers la Méditerranée orientale et le Canal de Suez. Enfin, l’actuel territoire turc constitue une zone de transit pour une immigration proche-orientale, moyen-orientale et asiatique tentant de s’introduire dans l’espace Schengen. La Turquie, en dépit des subsides considérables qu’elle reçoit de l’Europe eurocratique, ne garde pas ses frontières et laisse passer vers l’Europe des centaines de milliers de futurs clandestins. La police et la flotte grecques sont débordées. Les finances de l’Etat grec ont été déstabilisées par ce combat à la Sisyphe, tout comme par les incendies de grande ampleur que la Grèce a subi ces derniers étés, et non pas tant, comme veulent le faire accroire les médias véhiculant le discours néo-libéral dominant, par la mauvaise gestion des budgets olympiques de 2004 et par quelques milliers de pauvres grecs véreux et madrés qui escroquaient leur système national de sécurité sociale. Pour endiguer ce gigantesque flot de réfugiés, pire que ceux de Lampedusa aux portes de la Sicile et de Fuerteventura dans les Canaries, l’eurocratie ne débloque qu’un très petit budget pour l’envoi de 200 malheureux gendarmes qui doivent surveiller une frontière qui va des rives pontiques de la Thrace à toutes les îles de l’Egée jusqu’à Rhodes et à toutes les parties de l’archipel du Dodécannèse. L’agence Frontex, chargée en théorie de verrouiller les frontières extérieures de l’espace Schengen pour éviter tous les déséquilibres qu’apporterait une immigration débridée, ne reçoit en réalité aucun appui sérieux et se révèle une “coquille vide”.

On sait que toutes les menées salafistes ou wahhabites sont en dernière instance téléguidées par le tandem américano-saoudien et s’avèrent idéales pour perpétrer des opérations de guerre indirecte, dites de “low intensity warfare”, ou des actions “fausse-bannière” (false flag operations). On tue un Pim Fortuyn non pas tant parce qu’il serait “islamophobe” mais parce qu’il souhaitait supprimer la participation néerlandaise aux opérations en Afghanistan. On recrute un tueur dans la diaspora marocaine de Molenbeek pour éliminer le Commandant Massoud afin que ce combattant efficace ne prenne pas le pouvoir suite à la chute des talibans, programmée par le Pentagone. On envoie un Jordanien fondamentaliste pour prendre la direction de la rébellion tchétchène sur le tracé d’un oléoduc qui pourrait amener le brut russe et kazakh en Mer Noire, etc. La Russie, fournisseur principal d’hydrocarbures à l’Europe, est fragilisée dans la Caucase du Nord par les fondamentalistes tchétchènes et daghestanais mais aussi et surtout, comme le signale l’observateur allemand Peter Scholl-Latour, par une intervention wahhabite potentielle (et donc indirectement américaine) dans deux républiques musulmanes de la Fédération de Russie, le Tatarstan et le Baschkirtostan. Si ces deux républiques basculent dans le désordre civil ou si des fondamentalistes y arrivent au pouvoir, le territoire de la Fédération de Russie serait littéralement coupé en deux à hauteur de l’Oural, extrême nord excepté, soit au-delà de la limite méridionale de la zone des toundras. L’Europe serait réduite à ce qu’elle était au début du 16ième siècle, avant le déferlement des troupes d’Ivan le Terrible et de Fiodor I au 16ème siècle qui, parties de la région de Moscou, conquièrent tout le cours de la Volga et déboulent à Astrakhan en 1556. Kazan, la capitale tatar, était tombée en 1552. Peter Scholl-Latour rappelle que les Tatars ne sont que fort rarement séduits par le “wahhabisme” saoudien ou par l’idéologie égyptienne des Frères Musulmans d’Hassan al-Banna et de Sayyid Qutb et leur préfèrent une sorte d’islam modernisé, compatible avec la modernité européenne et russe, que l’on appelle le “yadidisme” ou la “voie tatar”, dont le penseur est actuellement Rafael Chakimov. Ce dernier s’insurge contre les volontés wahhabites de vouloir à tout prix imiter les moeurs et coutumes de l’Arabie des 7ème et 8ème siécles. Les adeptes de Chakimov sont peut-être majoritaires aujourd’hui au Tatarstan mais ils avaient dû prendre en compte les menées de la mosquée “Yoldiz Madrassa”, dans la ville industrielle de Naberechnié Khelny, animée par des enseignants tous issus du monde arabe. Ils ont été expulsés parce que certains de leurs étudiants avaient rejoint les rebelles tchétchènes. L’avenir est ouvert sur les rives de la Kama, affluent de la Volga qui prend ses sources loin au nord, à la limite de la toundra circumarctique. L’hegemon mondial et ses alliés saoudiens pourraient y semer le trouble en luttant contre le “yadidisme” tatar ou en réactivant une forme ou une autre de pantouranisme (pour connaître la question dans tous ses détails et en dehors de toute polémique politique, cf. L’islam de Russie – Conscience communautaire et autonomie politique chez les Tatars de la Volga et de l’Oural depuis le XVIIIe siècle, sous la direction de Stéphane A. Dudoignon, Dämir Is’haqov et Räfyq Möhämmätshin, éd. Maisonneuve & Larose, Paris, 1997; Peter Scholl-Latour, Russland im Zangengriff – Putins Imperium zwischen Nato, China und Islam, Propyläen Verlag, Berlin, 2006).

Passons maintenant aux ennemis intérieurs: j’en citerai trois. D’abord le système bancaire, totalement parasitaire et instaurateur d’une véritable ploutocratie (mot que réhabilitent à Paris Pierre-André Taguieff et Jean-François Kahn), qui n’a plus rien, mais alors plus rien de démocratique. A ce système bancaire s’ajoute d’autres instances parasitaires comme les chaînes de supermarchés, qui spéculent sur les denrées alimentaires et sont responsables de leur cherté, plus élevée que dans les pays voisins; pour bon nombre de produits de première nécessité, les prix varient du simple au double entre notre pays et l’Allemagne, par exemple. Le secteur énergétique, entièrement aux mains de la France, nous oblige à payer un gaz et une électricité à des prix incroyablement exagérés: chaque ménage hexagonale ne paie que 62% de notre facture énergétique, ou, autres chiffres, si le ménage hexagonal paie 100%, nous payons 160,97%!! Les déséquilibres provoqués par le gigantisme de ces structures privées, semi-privées ou para-étatiques doivent être impérativement corrigés par des moyens adéquats, si nous ne voulons pas voir s’effondrer définitivement les structures les plus intimes de nos sociétés. Le second ennemi est l’idéologie néo-libérale et ses relais, dont le premier animateur fut, rappellons-le, l’ancien premier ministre Guy Verhofstadt, qui dirigea le gouvernement “arc-en-ciel”, mélange de néo-libéralisme et de gauchisme festiviste. Cette idéologie est un ennemi intérieur dangereux dans la mesure où elle étouffe, en se parant d’un masque “boniste”, toutes les possibilités d’une révolte constructive. Ensuite, pour épauler la ploutocratie et le néo-libéralisme, nous avons, troisième ennemi, les diasporas manipulables. Elles sont telles parce qu’on les déclare telles, par la bouche de l’ambassadeur Rivkin ou par la voix du tandem Erdogan/Davutoglu.

L’objectif est donc de juguler le développement exponentiel du secteur parasitaire/ploutocratique en lui imposant des limites et des contrôles, en le soumettant à une fiscalité juste (le “mulcto” ou “multo” de la  République romaine) et à des directives à soubassement éthique, qu’il ne pourrait transgresser sans commettre automatiquement un délit punissable. Le néo-libéralisme et tout le cortège de  ses dérivés doit être perçu comme une idéologie “politicide”  et dès  lors dangereuse pour la sûreté de l’Etat et de l’Europe tout entière. Quant aux diasporas manipulables, elles sont, surtout depuis les menaces d’Erdogan et de Davutoglu, des “cinquièmes colonnes” passibles des juridictions d’exception. On ne sauvera pas notre civilisation sans des mesures drastiques.

R. Steuckers: Spreekbeurt - Antwerpen - 2011

 

Spreekbeurt - Antwerpen - 2011

Nouveaux textes sur http://robertsteuckers.blogspot.com/

Nouveaux textes sur

http://robertsteuckers.blogspot.com/

 

De l'humanisme italien au paganisme germanique: avatars de la critique du christianisme de la Renaissance à l'époque contemporaine:

http://robertsteuckers.blogspot.com/2012/01/de-lhumanisme-italien-au-paganisme.html

Les visions d'Europe à l'époque napoléonienne - Aux sources de l'européisme contemporain!

http://robertsteuckers.blogspot.com/2012/01/les-visions-deurope-lepoque.html

Les concepts de Toynbee

http://robertsteuckers.blogspot.com/2012/01/les-concepts-de-toynbee.html

Sur l'identité européenne

http://robertsteuckers.blogspot.com/2012/01/sur-lidentite-europeenne.html

Pourquoi nous opposons-nous à l'OTAN?

http://robertsteuckers.blogspot.com/2012/01/pourquoi-nous-opposons-nous-lotan.html

Pensées buissonnières d’un Européen

Pensées buissonnières d’un Européen

par Georges FELTIN-TRACOL

Croate et éminemment Européen, Jure (Georges) Vujic a écrit au cours des décennies 1990 et 2000 dans les revues dissidentes Vouloir et Nouvelles de Synergies européennes. Maîtrisant l’anglais, l’allemand et le français, il a fait paraître chez Avatar, une maison d’éditions bien connue pour son goût avisé de l’anti-conformisme radical, un ouvrage profond et essentiel au titre singulier : Un ailleurs européen. Hestia sur les rivages de Brooklyn.

C’est un essai d’une très grande richesse, dense en réflexions et qui exige du lecteur une intense concertation. Il peut être (un peu) déstabilisé par de nombreuses références puisque l’auteur établit des rapprochements (paradoxaux ?) entre les penseurs des droites radicales européennes (Maurice Bardèche, Julius Evola, Charles Maurras, Abel Bonnard, Pierre Drieu La Rochelle, Donoso Cortès, Oswald Spengler, etc.) et les théoriciens du post-structuralisme et du déconstructivisme tels que Jacques Derrida, Gilles Deleuze, Félix Guattari, Michel Foucault, Jean Baudrillard, Massimo Cacciari… Jure Vujic avertit que « sa démarche n’était pas celle d’un collage minutieux, travail de ciseaux et de papiers. Plus qu’une synthèse de fragments de théories et de pensées, il s’agissait pour [lui] à l’image d’une partition musicale inachevée de dégager quelques lignes de réflexions à la fois “ transversales ” et “ asymétriques ”, au travail de composition qui puisait dans le passé et s’inscrivait dans le présent (p. 11) ». En écrivant Un ailleurs européen, il a en effet « éprouvé le désir à la fois vif et anxieux de dresser un bilan intellectuel, à l’aube du troisième millénaire de notre société globale. Une remise en cause pouvait à [son] sens n’être que bénéfique (p. 11) ».

Contre le globalitarisme planétaire

Jure Vujic s’intéresse par conséquent tout autant à la littérature qu’à la géopolitique, aux effets néfastes de la « société du spectacle » qu’à l’avènement de la « cyber-crétinisation globale »… C’est au scalpel qu’il opère ce dur constat. Il estime ainsi que « l’intellectuel sous nos cieux devrait vivre avec le sentiment tragique qu’il ne peut rien ou presque rien pour son peuple (p. 119) ». Pourquoi ? Parce que « l’époque contemporaine et le mythe de la société transparente sont indéniablement propices au foisonnement des pensées “ faibles ”, fragmentées ainsi qu’à un certain “ polythéisme des valeurs ”, car il n’est plus possible de parler au sujet de l’histoire comme de quelque chose d’unitaire (p. 77) ».

Après avoir critiqué l’ère des « idéologies solubles », il examine avec une rare pertinence les concepts antithétiques d’aristocratie et d’élite. Il soutient que « l’aristocratie est par essence méritocratique (p. 111) ». En revanche, « une élite suppose un groupe d’hommes qui manifeste une capacité spécifique dans l’accomplissement d’une tâche donnée, une fonction donnée (p. 111) », d’où par ces temps de fluidité maximale, des « élites liquides » qui se coulent parfaitement dans le grand dessein globalitaire indifférencié.

Vujic conteste avec force les processus de globalisation et de mondialisation. « La globalisation, écrit-il très justement, ne s’est jamais fixée pour but philanthropique de créer une utopie d’une communauté mondiale pacifique et fraternelle. Elle n’est qu’un processus avancé de libéralisation des marchés, de délocalisation et de dérégulation des économies ainsi qu’un instrument de conquête capitaliste dans la marche au plus grand profit (p. 56). » Il observe que l’actuelle globalisation n’est que la manifestation actuelle de ce « capitalisme [qui] est un solvant remarquable pour toutes les idéologies solubles et gazeuses qui n’ont plus de prise sur le mental et l’imaginaire collectif (p. 116) ». « La globalisation rend désormais caduques les oppositions entre ici et ailleurs, entre tradition et modernité (p. 179) » parce que « l’idéologie globale est par essence totalitaire, affectée d’un évolutionnisme pathogène car par la voie du manu militarisme et du manu monétarisme, elle entend effacer et niveler toutes les diversités, les réalités naturelles et plurielles afin de soumettre les peuples aux sacerdoces des lois du monothéisme du marché (p. 56) ».

L’auteur dénonce aussi la collusion existant dans les coulisses de l’« actualité discrète » entre les mondialistes financiaristes de Davos, de la Trilatérale et de Bilderberg, et les altermondialistes gauchistes de Porto Allegre. Mondialistes en costume et altermondialistes en haillons ne constituent que les deux faces d’une même pièce ! « D’un point de vue culturel, Davos et Porto Allegre ne sont que l’alter ego, les deux forces prétendument opposées d’un seul et unique processus de mondialisation qui se propage à l’échelon planétaire, articulé autour d’une dualité complémentaire, le nivellement uniformisateur d’un côté et la micro-hétérogénéité anarchique de l’autre côté (p. 139). » Les gauchistes et l’extrême gauche sont dorénavant les auxiliaires zélés de la Ploutocratie mondialisée depuis que « le discours révolutionnaire a cédé le pas devant une stratégie réformiste qui rejoint le discours globalisant et rassurant d’une croissance soutenue des pontifes de Davos (p. 137) ». Il n’est donc guère surprenant qu’au lieu d’exiger une révolution radicale, « le Mouvement des Sans-Terre, l’organisation Via Campesina, le mouvement A.T.T.A.C., les rescapés de mouvements maoïstes, les crados anarcho-libertaires, les bolchos en tout genre et les étudiants ratés des campus de la nouvelle gauche, ont planché, répartis en cent ateliers, pour affirmer une plus grande participation de la société civile dans le commerce international (p. 136) ». Leurs homologues cravatés font de même dans des séminaires tenus dans les hôtels les plus huppés de la planète…

L’Occident, tueur de l’Europe

En dépit de quelques divergences portant sur des détails ou sur les moyens à utiliser, l’entente entre ces deux pôles hyper-modernes est complète ! Tous sont les rejetons du « libéralisme [qui] constitue dans le monde moderne l’idéologie dominante, une école, une chapelle, une secte planétaire avec ses gourous, ses cénacles, sa hiérarchie de prévôts, ses cultes et ses idoles (p. 35) ». Se produit ainsi la marchandisation globale du monde ! Et le tsunami libéral emporte tout sur son passage puisque « l’essence du libéralisme est de négocier, de traiter, négoce de l’argent et de l’opinion (p. 40) ». L’auteur en profite pour critiquer au passage le soi-disant conservatisme ou l’esprit d’ordre des libéraux : « le libéralisme n’est qu’une solution bâtarde qui ne cultive sous le nom d’ordre que le statique équilibre des pouvoirs savamment dosé (p. 40) ».

Cette déferlante globalitaire a des effets sur les sociétés humaines en général et sur l’Europe en particulier. « La tradition est inversée. L’Europe ne raconte plus l’Occident. C’est l’Occident qui conte l’Europe (p. 177). » « L’Europe d’hier s’est irrémédiablement retournée en son contraire, l’Occident contemporain (p. 19). » Assujettie à l’idéologie libérale-occidentiste, « l’Europe s’est peu à peu transformée en super-usine occidentale qui produit à l’excès une idéologie économiciste de marché, des valeurs exclusivement consuméristes, une prolifération sans frein de développement technologique, de progrès infini, et s’est fait le porte-drapeau d’une morale totalitaire planétaire, qui s’est donnée pour but de réaliser le rêve utopique d’une “ unité intégrale ” mondiale (pp. 18 – 19) ». Dans cette déchéance majeure, magistrale catagogie d’un destin, « l’Union européenne constitue un mécanisme régional politico-économique, un maillon dans la chaîne du globalisme qui assoit sa primauté planétaire par le biais d’une cartellisation régionale du monde (p. 55) ». Il devient dès lors cohérent que « dans le contexte panoptique de la pensée unique dominante, l’action de penser librement et en toute indépendance est indéniablement “ subversif ” (p. 15) ». L’Europe se rapproche de l’Amérique où « par leur politique de creuset, de melting pot, les États-Unis contribueront à générer une nation d’extravertis grégaires, dépersonnalisés, décervelés, uniformisés et purgés de tous les instincts hérités du Vieux Monde; il en résultera sur le plan politique, l’émergence d’une démocratie qui entrave le libre jeu et le développement de talents, mais au contraire favorise l’ostracisme et l’élimination silencieuse de tous les éléments non conformistes (p. 49) ». Il se prépare un redoutable hiver des libertés; on en décèle déjà les prémices dans l’Italie du Goldman Sachs’ boy Monti : les persécutions envers Casa Pound et les réfractaires au nouveau monde marchand ont commencé avec l’embastillement de militants et des manipulations crypto-policières comme la fusillade de Florence de la mi-décembre 2011…

À la différence de la liberté des Modernes et des « Hyper-Modernes » qui n’est en fait qu’un subtil esclavage mental et comportemental, Jure Vujic considère que « la vraie liberté c’est la soumission au devoir être à ce qui doit “ être ”, un devoir qui préexiste au choix de l’homme, un devoir qui existe en soi et en eux (pp. 35 – 36) ». S’affirmer européen procède de cette liberté fondamentale.

« L’unité du continent européen est une nécessité (p. 151) », mais elle ne doit pas favoriser le nivellement des différences. Considérant que « l’État est “ agonal ” par essence ou il n’est pas (p. 93) », l’auteur rappelle que « la polis en tant que communauté civique ne constitue pas la réunion d’éléments identiques, mais, au contraire, repose sur la diversité de ses composantes, qu’il convient de sauvegarder (pp. 160 – 161) ». Il s’appuie sur un exemple précis : « la Grèce antique et l’Europe gothique [c’est-à-dire des cathédrales du XIIIe siècle] étaient comme des prismes que divisait un unique rayon de lumière spirituelle en une variété de couleurs vives. Les contrastes étaient évidents mais un même sentiment religieux de surnaturel unissait les êtres, les idéaux et les symboles (p. 46) ». Certes, « la civilisation européenne est peut-être mort-née. C’est pourquoi, plutôt que de penser le devenir de l’Europe en terme de “ renaissance ”, il conviendrait mieux de s’attendre comme l’a remarqué Paul Valéry à un “ avenir sans la moindre figure ” (p. 189) ». Plus exactement, le temps n’est-il pas venu d’abandonner le Logos et de redécouvrir le mythe ? « Le mythe devrait être réinstallé dans l’histoire collective des peuples. Non pas le mythe conçu comme l’image archaïque et stationnaire, passéiste, d’une figure fondatrice, mais comme le vecteur de nouvelles potentialités créatrices à l’œuvre dans l’inconscient collectif et individuel des peuples (p. 143). » Il importe en outre de « remonter à l’essence, à la source spirituelle de la pensée européenne, c’est la reconnaître dans sa solidarité comme dans sa diversité (p. 13) ».

Au fond, Jure Vujic s’adresse à « ceux qui ont une vision de l’Europe [qui] sont ces nouveaux Européens qui se battent pour reconquérir et réintégrer cette essence spirituelle. Il s’agit d’une communauté silencieuse et agissante pour laquelle la notion de la culture européenne constitue une “ forme ” absolue qui s’inscrit dans le cadre d’une “ expérience rafraîchie de cette idée dans son antique sainteté ” (p. 16) ». Hestia délaissera les rivages de Brooklyn quand les Européens retrouveront enfin leur sens du sacré.

Georges Feltin-Tracol

• Jure Vujic, Un ailleurs européen. Hestia sur les rivages de Brooklyn, Avatar Éditions, coll. « Polémiques », 2011, B.P. 43, 91151 Étampes C.E.D.E.X., 23 €.

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Article printed from Europe Maxima: http://www.europemaxima.com

URL to article: http://www.europemaxima.com/?p=2362

Desafios Pós-modernos: Entre Fausto & Narciso

Desafios Pós-modernos: Entre Fausto & Narciso

Por Robert Steuckers (1987)

Ex: http://yrminsul.blogspot.com/

Tradução: para o inglês por Greg Johnson
[Para o português pela Equipe Yrminsul]

Parte 1

Nos termos de Oswald Spengler, nossa cultura Europeia é o produto de uma “pseudomorfose, isto é, do acréscimo de mentalidade estrangeira sobre nossa nativa, original e inata mentalidade. Spengler chama a mentalidade inata de “a Faustiana”.

O Confronto entre a mentalidade Inata e a Adquirida

A mentalidade estrangeira é teocêntrica, a “mágica” perspectiva nascida no Oriente Próximo. Para a mentalidade “mágica”, o ego se curva respeitosamente perante a substância divina, como um escravo diante de seu senhor. No âmbito desta religiosidade, o indivíduo deixa-se guiar pela força divina que ele absorve através do batismo ou iniciação.

Não há nada comparável ao antigo espírito Faustiano europeu, diz Spengler. O Homo europeanus, apesar do verniz mágico / Cristão cobrindo o nosso pensamento, tem uma religiosidade voluntarista e antropocêntrica. Para nós, o bom é não permitir-se guiar passivamente por Deus, mas sim, reconhecer e realizar a nossa própria vontade. "Para ser capaz de escolher", esta é a base fundamental da religiosidade nativa Europeia. No cristianismo medieval, esta religiosidade voluntarista aparece, perfurando a crosta do “magismo" importado do Oriente Médio.

Por volta do ano 1000, este voluntarismo dinâmico aparece gradualmente na arte e em épicos literários, juntamente com uma sensação de espaço infinito dentro do qual o auto de Fausto seria, e pode, se expandir. Assim, para o conceito de um espaço fechado, no qual o eu se encontra bloqueado, se opõe o conceito de um espaço infinito, no qual um aventureiro graceja por diante.

Do Mundo "Fechado" ao Universo Infinito

De acordo com o filósofo americano Nelson Benjamin [1], o velho sentido helênico de physis (natureza), com todo o dinamismo que isso implica, triunfou no final do século 13, graças ao averroísmo, que transmitiu a sabedoria empírica dos gregos (e de Aristóteles, em particular) para o Ocidente. Aos poucos, a Europa passou do "mundo fechado" para o universo infinito. Empirismo e nominalismo suplantou uma escolástica que havia sido inteiramente discursiva, auto-referencial e auto-fechado (self-enclosed). O Renascimento, seguindo Copérnico e Bruno (o trágico mártir do Campo dei Fiori), renunciou o geocentrismo, tornando-o seguro para proclamar que o universo é infinito, uma intuição essencialmente faustiana de acordo com os critérios de Spengler.


No segundo volume da História do Pensamento Ocidental, Jean-François Revel, que anteriormente oficiou no Ponto e, infelizmente, ilustrou a ideologia ocidentalista Americanocêntrica, escreve bastante pertinente: "É fácil entender que a eternidade o infinito do universo anunciada por Bruno poderia ter tido, sobre os homens cultos da época, o efeito traumatizante da passagem da vida no útero para o projeto vasto e cruel de um vortex frígido e sem limites”. [2]

O medo "mágico", a angústia causada pelo colapso da certeza reconfortante do geocentrismo, causou a morte cruel de Bruno, que se tornaria, no total, uma apoteose terrível. . . Nada poderia refutar o heliocentrismo, ou a teoria da infinitude dos espaços siderais. Pascal dizia, em resignação, com o acento de arrependimento: "O silêncio eterno desses espaços infinitos me assusta."

Do Logos Teocrático à Razão Fixa

Para substituir o pensamento mágico de "logos teocrático," o crescente e triunfante pensamento burguês, seria elaborado um pensamento centrado na razão, uma razão abstrata perante a qual é necessário se curvar, como as pessoas do Oriente Próximo se curvam diante de seu deus. O aluno "burguês" desta “razão mesquinha", virtuoso e calculista, ansiosos para suprimir os impulsos de sua alma ou do seu espírito, encontra assim uma finitude confortável, um espaço fechado e seguro. O racionalismo deste tipo virtuoso humano não é o aventureiro, audacioso, ascético e criativo descrito por Max Weber [3], o qual educa o homem interior, precisamente para enfrentar a infinitude afirmada por Giordano Bruno. [4]

A partir do final da Renascença, Duas Modernidades são justapostas

O racionalismo mesquinho denunciado por Sombart [5] domina as cidades por rigidificarem o pensamento político, restringindo construtivos impulsos ativistas. O genuíno racionalismo Faustiano e conquistador descrito por Max Weber, impulsionaria a humanidade europeia para fora dos seus limites territoriais iniciais, dando o impulso principal para todas as ciências do concreto.

A partir do final da Renascença, assim descobrimos, por um lado, uma modernidade rígida e moralista, sem vitalidade, e, por outro lado, uma modernidade aventureira, conquistadora e criativa, assim como estamos hoje no limiar de uma pós-modernidade suave ou de uma pós-modernidade vibrante, auto-confiante e potencialmente inovadora. Ao reconhecer a ambiguidade dos termos "racionalismo", "racionalidade", "modernidade" e "pós-modernidade", entramos em um nível de domínio das ideologias políticas, até mesmo um militante Weltanschauungen.

A racionalização saturada com arrogância moral descrita por Sombart em seu famoso retrato do "burguês", gera os messianismos moles e sentimentais das grandes narrativas tranquilizantes das ideologias contemporâneas. A racionalização conquistadora descrita por Max Weber provoca as grandes descobertas científicas e o espírito metódico, o refinamento engenhoso da conduta de vida e crescente domínio do mundo externo.

Esta racionalização conquistadora também tem seu lado negativo: Desencanta, drena e esquematiza excessivamente o mundo. Embora especializados em um ou outro domínio da tecnologia, a ciência, ou o espírito, sendo totalmente investidos ali, os "Faustianos" da Europa e América do Norte muitas vezes levam a um nivelamento de valores, um relativismo que tende a mediocridade porque nos faz perder o sentimento do sublime, da mística telúrica, e isola cada vez mais os indivíduos. No nosso século, a racionalidade elogiada por Weber, se positiva no início, entrou em colapso com um americanismo quantitativista e mecanizado que instintivamente levou como forma de compensação, para o suplemento espiritual do charlatanismo religioso combinando o proselitismo mais delirante e a religiosidade lamurienta.

Esse é o destino do "faustinianismo" quando cortado dos seus fundamentos míticos, das suas mais antigas memórias, de seu solo mais profundo e fértil. Este rompimento é sem dúvida o resultado da pseudomorfose, o enxerto "mágico" no tronco Fausto / europeu, um enxerto que falhou. O "Magismo" não poderia imobilizar a unidade perpétua Faustiana; para isso, deve-se - e isso é mais perigoso – cortá-la de seus mitos e de sua memória, condená-la a esterilidade e dessecação, como observado por Valéry, Rilke, Duhamel, Céline, Drieu, Morand , Maurois, Heidegger, ou Abellio.

Racionalidade Conquistadora, Racionalidade Moralizante, Dialética do Iluminismo, as "Grandes Narrativas" de Lyotard

A racionalidade conquistadora, se arrancada de seus mitos fundadores, da sua base étnico-identitária, da sua matriz indo-europeia, cai - depois de ataques impetuosos, inertes, vazios - nas armadilhas de um racionalismo mesquinho e na ideologia imatura das "grandes narrativas" do racionalismo e do fim da ideologia. Para Jean-François Lyotard, a "modernidade" na Europa é essencialmente a "Grande Narrativa" do Iluminismo, na qual os heróis do conhecimento trabalham pacificamente e moralmente para alcançarem um final ético-político feliz: a paz universal, onde não haveria nenhum antagonismo. [6] A "modernidade" de Lyotard corresponde à famosa "Dialética do Iluminismo" de Horkheimer e Adorno, os líderes da famosa "Escola de Frankfurt". [7] Na visão deles, a ação do político ou o trabalho do homem de ciência, deve ser submetido a uma razão racional, um corpo ético, uma autoridade moral fixa e imutável, a uma catequese que retarda a sua unidade, que limita o seu ardor Faustiano. Para Lyotard, o fim da modernidade, portanto, o advento da "pós-modernidade", é a incredulidade - progressiva, astuta, fatalista, irônica, zombeteira - em relação a esta metanarrativa.

Incredulidade também significa um possível retorno do dionisíaco, o irracional, o carnal, o turvo, e áreas desconcertantes da alma humana reveladas por Bataille ou Caillois, tal como previsto e esperado pelo professor Maffesoli, [8] da Universidade de Estrasburgo, e pelo alemão Bergfleth [9], um jovem filósofo não-conformista; ou seja, é possível que vejamos um retorno do espírito fáustico, um espírito comparável com o qual nos legou o gótico ardente, de uma racionalidade conquistadora que tem sido reconectada com a velha e dinâmica mitologia européia, como Guillaume Faye explica em Europa e Modernidade. [10]

Notas

1. Benjamin Nelson, Der Ursprung der Moderne, Vergleichende Studien zum Zivilisationsprozess [A Origem da Modernidade: Estudos Comparativos do Processo de Civilização] (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1986).

2. Jean-François Revel, Histoire de la pensée occidentale [História do Pensamento Ocidental], vol. 2, La philosophie pendant la science (XVe, XVIe et XVIIe siècles) [Filosofia e Ciência (Séculos XV, XVI, e XVII)] (Paris: Stock, 1970). Cf. também a obra-prima de Alexandre Koyré, Do Mundo Fechado ao Universo Infinito (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1957).

3. Cf. Julien Freund, Max Weber (Paris: P.U.F., 1969).
Paul-Henri Michel, La cosmologie de Giordano Bruno [A Cosmologia de Giordano Bruno] (Paris: Hermann, 1962).
Cf. essentially: Werner Sombart, Le Bourgeois. Contribution à l’histoire morale et intellectuelle de l’homme économique moderne [The Bourgeois: Contribuição à História Moral e Intelectual do homem econômico moderno] (Paris: Payot, 1966).

4. Jean-François Lyotard, A condição pós-moderna: Um Relatório sobre Conhecimento, trad. Geoff Bennington e Brian Massumi. (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984).

5. Max Horkheimer eTheodor Adomo, A Dialética do Esclarecimento, trad. Edmund Jephcott (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2002). Cf. também Pierre Zima, L’École de Francfort. Dialectique de la particularité [A Escola de Frankfurt: Dialética do Particularidade] (Paris: Éditions Universitaires, 1974). Michel Crozon, “Interroger Horkheimer” [“Interrogando Horkheimer”] e Arno Victor Nielsen, “Adorno, le travail artistique de la raison” [“Adorno: o trabalho artístico da Razão”], Esprit, Maio 1978.

6. Cf. principalmente Michel Maffesoli, L’ombre de Dionysos: Contribution à une sociologie de l’orgie [Sombra de Dionísio: contribuição a uma Sociologia da Orgia] (Méridiens, 1982). Pierre Brader, “Michel Maffesoli: saluons le grand retour de Dionysos” [Michel Maffesoli: Vamos Saudar o Grande Retorno de Dionísio], Magazine-Hebdo no. 54 (Setembro 21, 1984).

7. Cf. Gerd Bergfleth et al., Zur Kritik der Palavernden Aufklärung [Para uma Crítica da Razão Palavreada] (Munich: Matthes & Seitz, 1984). Nesta notável pequena antologia, Bergfleth publicou quatro textos fatais para a rotina "Moderno-Frankfurtista": (1) “Zehn Thesen zur Vernunftkritik” [“Dez Teses Sobre a Crítica da Razão”]; (2) “Der geschundene Marsyas” [“O Abuso de Mársias”]; (3) “Über linke Ironie” [“Sobre a Ironia Esquerdista”]; (4) “Die zynische Aufklärung” [“O Iluminismo Cínico”]. Cf. também R. Steuckers, “G. Bergfleth: enfant terrible de la scène philosophique allemande” [“enfant terrible da cena filosófica alemã”], Vouloir no. 27 (Março 1986). Na mesma edição, ver também, “Bergfleth: critique de la raison palabrante” [“Bergfleth: Crítica da Razão Palavreada”] e “Une apologie de la révolte contre les programmes insipides de la révolution conformiste” [“Uma Apologia para a Revolta Contra os Programas Insípidos da Revolução Conformista”]. Ver também M. Froissard, “Révolte, irrationnel, cosmicité et . . . pseudo-antisémitisme,” [“Revolta, irracionalidade, cosmicity e. . . pseudo-anti-semitismo”], Vouloir nos. 40–42 (Julho–Agosto 1987).

8. Guillaume Faye, Europe et Modernité [Europe e Modernidade] (Méry/Liège: Eurograf, 1985).

Desafios Pós-Modernos:
Entre Fausto & Narciso, Parte 2

A Metanarrativa Encistada. . .

Uma vez que a metanarrativa Iluminista foi estabelecida - "encistada"- na mente ocidental, as grandes ideologias seculares progressivamente apareceram: o liberalismo, com sua idolatria da "mão invisível", [1] e do Marxismo, com seu forte determinismo e metafísica da história, contestada no alvorecer do século 20 por Georges Sorel, a figura mais sublime do socialismo militante europeu. [2] Após Giorgio Locchi [3], quem ocasionalmente chama a metanarrativa de "ideologia" ou "ciência" - pensamos que este complexo "metanarrativa / ideologia / ciência” não há mais regras por consenso, mas por constrangimento, na medida em que há uma resistência muda (especialmente na arte e na música [4]) ou um desuso geral da metanarrativa como uma das ferramentas de legitimação.

A metanarrativa liberal-iluminista persiste por golpe de força e propaganda. Mas na esfera do pensamento, poesia, música, arte, ou letras, esta metanarrativa não diz e nem inspira nada. Ela não impulsionou uma grande mente por 100 ou 150 anos. Já no final do século 19, o modernismo literário expressou uma diversidade de línguas, uma heterogeneidade de elementos, uma espécie de caos desordenado que o "fisiologista" Nietzsche analisou [5] e que Hugo von Hoffmannstahl chamou de “die Welt der Bezuge” (o mundo das relações).

Estas inter-relações e sobredeterminações onipresentes nos mostram que o mundo não é explicado por uma história simples, limpa e arrumada, nem submete-se à regra de uma autoridade moral desencarnada. Melhor: eles nos mostram que as nossas cidades, nosso povo, não podem expressar todas as suas potencialidades vitais no âmbito de uma ideologia determinada e instituída uma vez para tudo e para todos, nem podemos indefinidamente preservar a instituições resultantes (o corpo doutrinário derivado da "metanarrativa do Iluminismo ").

A presença anacrônica da metanarrativa constitui um freio sobre o desenvolvimento do nosso continente em todas as áreas: ciência (informática e biotecnologia [6]), economia (o apoio dos dogmas liberais dentro da CEE), militares (o fetichismo de um mundo bipolar e servilismo em relação aos Estados Unidos, paradoxalmente um inimigo econômica), cultural (a mídia concussiva afavor de um cosmopolitismo que elimina a especificidade Faustiana e visa o advento de uma grande aldeia de convívio global, executa os princípios da "sociedade fria" à maneira dos queridos Bororos para Lévi-Strauss [7]).

A Rejeição do Neo-Ruralismo, Neo Pastoralismo…

A desordem confusa do modernismo literário no final do século 19 teve um aspecto positivo: o seu papel era para ser o magma que, gradualmente, torna-se o criador de uma nova luta Faustiana [8] É Weimar a arena do criativo e fértil confronto do expressionismo, [9] neo-marxismo, e a "revolução conservadora" [10] - que nos legou, com Ernst Jünger, uma idéia de modernidade "pós-metanarrativa" (ou pós-modernidade, se chama "modernidade" da Dialética do Iluminismo, posteriormente teorizada pela Escola de Frankfurt). O modernismo, com a confusão que inaugurou, devido ao progressivo abandono da pseudo-ciência do Iluminismo, corresponde um pouco com o niilismo observado por Nietzsche. Niilismo deve ser superado, ultrapassado, mas não por um retorno sentimental, então negado, por um passado completo. O niilismo não é superado pela Wagnerismo teatral, fulminado por Nietzsche, tal como hoje o naufrágio da "Grande Narrativa" marxista não é superado por um pseudo-rústica neoprimitivismo.[11]

Em Jünger- o Jünger do Tempestades de Aço, O Trabalhador, e Eumeswil – não se encontra referência alguma sobre o misticismo do solo: apenas uma admiração sóbria pela perenidade do camponês, indiferente a perturbações históricas. Jünger nos diz da necessidade de equilíbrio: se houver uma recusa total do rural, do solo, da dimensão estabilizadora da Heimat, o futurismo construtivista Faustiano já não terá uma base, um ponto de partida, uma opção reserva. Por outro lado, se é dada muita ênfase na base inicial, no ponto de lançamento, sobre o nicho ecológico que dá origem ao povo Faustiano, então eles estão envoltos em um casulo e privados de influência universal, prestados cegos para a chamada do mundo, impedidos de saltarem para a realidade em toda sua plenitude, o "exótico" incluído. O regresso tímido à pátria priva o faustinianismo de sua força de difusão e relega seus "vasos humanos" para o nível dos "eternos camponeses a-históricos" descrito por Spengler e Eliade. [12] O equilíbrio consiste em desenhar internamente (a partir das profundezas do solo original) e difundir externamente(em relação ao mundo exterior).

Apesar de toda nostalgia para o "orgânico", rural, ou pastoral –apesar do sereno, idílico e da beleza estética que recomendam Horace ou Virgil - Tecnologia e Trabalho são a partir de agora as essências do nosso mundo pós-niilista. Nada escapa por muito tempo da tecnologia, tecnicidade, mecânica, ou da máquina: nem o camponês que ara com o seu tractor, nem o padre que conecta um microfone para dar mais impacto para sua homilia.

A Era da “Tecnologia”

A tecnologia mobiliza totalmente (Total Mobilmachung) e impulsiona o indivíduo para uma infinitude inquietante, em que nós não somos nada mais que engrenagens intercambiáveis. A metralhadora, nota o guerreiro Jünger, dizima o bravo e o covarde com uma igualdade perfeita, como no total material de guerra inaugurado em 1917 em batalhas de tanques da Frente francesa. O “Ego” Faustiano perde sua introversão e se afoga em um vórtice incessante de atividade. Este Ego, tendo modelado o rendilhado de pedra e pináculos do Gótico exuberante, caiu no quantitativismo Americano, ou, confuso e hesitante, adotou as inundações de informações do século XX, sua avalanche de fatos concretos. Isso foi nosso niilismo, nossa indecisão congelada, devido à um subjetivismo exacerbado, que nos mira na bagunça enlameada dos fatos.

Cruzando a “linha”, como Heidegger e Jünger dizem,[13] a mônada Faustiana (sobre o quê Leibniz[14] falou) cancela seu subjetivismo e encontra o puro poder, puro dinamismo, no universo da Tecnologia. Com a chegada Jüngeriana, o círculo é fechado de novo: como o universo fechado da “magia” foi substituído pelo pequeno e não-autêntico mundo da burguesia – sedentário, tímido, embalsamado na esfera utilitária – assim o dinâmico “Faustiano” universo é substituído com uma arena Tecnológica, despojando esse tempo de subjetivismo.

A Tecnologia Jüngeriana varre a falsa modernidade da metanarrativa Iluminada, a hesitação modernismo literário do fim do século XIX, e a trompe-l’ oeil do wagnerismo e do neopastoralismo. Mas essa modernidade Jüngeriana, perpetuamente mal entendida desde a publicação do Der Arbeiter (O Trabalhador) em 1932, permanece como uma escritura morta.

Notas:

1. Na fundação teológica da doutrina da “mão invisível”, ver Hans Albert, “Modell-Platonismus. Der Neoklassische Stil des ökonomischen Denkens in Kritischer Beleuchtung” [“Platonismo Modelo: O Estilo Neoclássico de Pensamento Econômico em Elucidação Crítica”], em Ernst Topitsch, ed., Logik der Sozialwissenschaften [Lógica das Ciências Sociais] (Köln/Berlin: Kiepenheuer & Witsch, 1971).
2. Há abundante literatura francesa em Georges Sorel. Não obstante, é deplorável que a biografia e a análise valiosas como a de Michael Freund não foi traduzida: Georges Sorel, Der revolutionäre Konservatismus [Georges Sorel: Conservadorismo Revolucionário] (Frankfurt a.M.: Vittorio Klostermann, 1972).
3. Cf. G. Locchi, “Histoire et société: critique de Lévi-Strauss” [“História e Sociedade: Crítica de Lévi-Strauss”], Nouvelle Ecole, no. 17 (Março 1972) and “L’histoire” [“História”], Nouvelle Ecole, nos. 27–28 (Janeiro 1976).

4. Cf. G. Locchi, “L’idée de la musique’ et le temps de l’histoire” [“A ‘Idéia de Música’ e os Tempos de História”], Nouvelle Ecole, no. 30 (Novembro 1978) e Vincent Samson, “Musique, métaphysique et destin” [“Música, Metafísica, e Destino”], Orientations, no. 9 (Setembro 1987).

5. Cf. Helmut Pfotenhauer, Die Kunst als Physiologie: Nietzsches äesthetische Theorie und literarische Produktion [Arte como Fisiologia:: A estética Teoria e Produção Lietrária de Nietzsche] (Stuttgart: J. B. Metzler, 1985). Cf. no livro de Pfotenhauer book: Robert Steuckers, “Regards nouveaux sur Nietzsche” [“Novas visões sobre Nietzsche”], Orientações, no. 9.
6. Biotecnologia e as mais recentes inovações biocybernéticas, quando aplicadas para a operação da sociedade humana, fundamentalmente põe em questão as mecânicas e teóricas fundações da “Grande Narrativa” do Iluminismo. Menos rígido, leis mais flexíveis, porque adaptadas às vias profundas da psicologia e da fisiologia humana, restauraria um dinamismo às nossas sociedades e as colocaria sincronizadas com as inovações tecnológicas. A Grande Narrativa – que está sempre ao redor, apesar do seu anacronismo – bloqueia a evolução das nossas sociedades; o pensamento de Habermas, cujo categoricamente recusa cair no passo com os descobrimentos epistemológicos de Konrad Lorenz, por exemplo, ilustra perfeitamente a genuína rigidez reacionária do neo-Iluminismo nas suas derivações Franfurtianas e neo-liberais. Para entender a mudança que está tomando lugar independentemente da reação liberal-Frankfurtiana, veja o trabalho do bio-cyberneticista Alemão Frederic Vester: (1) Unsere Welt—ein vernetztes System, dtv, no. l0,118, 2º ed. (München, 1983) e (2) Neuland des Denkens. Vom technokratischen zum kybernetischen Zeitalter (Stuttgart: DVA, 1980). A restauração do pensamento social holista (ganzheitlich) pela biologia moderna é discutida, mais notavelmente, em Gilbert Probst, Selbst-Organisation, Ordnungsprozesse in sozialen Systemen aus ganzheitlicher Sicht (Berlin: Paul Parey, 1987).

7. G. Locchi, “L’idée de la musique’ et le temps de l’histoire.”

8. Para enfrentar a questão do modernismo literário no século XIX, ver: M. Bradbury, J. McFarlane, eds., Modernism 1890–1930 (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1976).

9. Cf. Paul Raabe, ed., Expressionismus. Der Kampf um eine literarische Bewegung (Zürich: Arche, 1987)—Uma antologia útil dos principais manifestos expressionistas.

10. Armin Mohler, La Révolution Conservatrice en Allemagne, 1918–1932 (Puiseaux: Pardès, 1993). Ver principalmente o texto A3 entitulado “Leitbilder” (“Idéias Norteadoras”).

11. Cf. Gérard Raulet, “Mantismo e as Condições Pós Modernas” e Claude Karnoouh, “O Paraíso Perdido do Regionalismo: A Crise da Pós Modernidade na França,” Telos, no. 67 (Março 1986).

12. Cf. Oswald Spengler, The Decline of the West, 2 vols., trans. Charles Francis Atkinson (Nova Iorque: Knopf, 1926) para a definição do “camponês a-histórico” ver vol. 2. Cf. Mircea Eliade, The Sacred and the Profane: The Nature of Religion, trans. Willard R. Trask (San Diego: Harcourt, 1959). Para o lugar dessa visão do “camponês” na controvérsia contemporânea em relação ao neo-paganismo, ver: Richard Faber, “Einleitung: ‘Pagan’ und Neo-Paganismus. Versuch einer Begriffsklärung,” em Richard Faber e Renate Schlesier, Die Restauration der Götter: Antike Religion und Neo-Paganismus [The Restoration of the Gods: Ancient Religion and Neo-Paganism] (Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, 1986), 10–25. Esse texto foi revisado na França por Robert Steuckers, “Le paganisme vu de Berlin” [“Paganismo como é visto em Berlim”], Vouloir no. 28–29, Abril 1986, pp. 5–7.

13. Na questão da “linha” em Jünger e Heidegger, cf. W. Kaempfer, Ernst Jünger, Sammlung Metzler, Band 20l (Stuttgart, Metzler, 1981), pp. 119–29. Cf também J. Evola, “Devant le ‘mur du temps’” [“Frente à ‘Parede do Tempo’”] em Explorations: Hommes et problems [Explorations: Men and Problems], trans. Philippe Baillet (Puiseaux: Pardès, 1989), pp. 183–94. Vamos tomar essa oportunidade para lembrar que, contrariamente às idéias aceitadas em geral, Heidegger não rejeita a tecnologia de uma maneira reacionária, nem em sobre ser perigoso em si mesmo. O perigo é devido ao erro de pensar no mistério de sua essência, preservando os homens de retornar à um mais originário desocultamento e de ouvir o chamado da verdade mais primordial. Se a idade da tecnologia parece ser a forma final do Esquecimento do Ser, em que a ansiedade adequada ao pensamento aparece como uma abstinência de ansiedade na garantia e objetivação do ser, é também desse extremo perigo que a possibilidade de um novo começo é concebível uma vez que a metafísica da subjetividade é completa.

14. Para avaliar a importância de Leibniz no desenvolvimento do pensamento orgânico Alemão, cf. F. M. Barnard, Herder’s Social and Political Thought: From Enlightenment to Nationalism (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1965), 10–12.

DESAFIOS PÓS MODERNOS:
ENTRE FAUST & NARCISUS,
PARTE 3

O Babbitt com o paradoxo Sartreano

Em 1945, o tom do debate tecnológico foi estabelecido pelas ideologias vitoriosas. Nóspoderíamos escolher o liberalismo Americano (a ideologia do Sr. Babbitt) ou o Marxismo, uma alegada versão burguesa da metanarrativa. A Grande Narrativa assumiu responsabilidade, caçou qualquer filósofo ou movimento “irracionalista”, [1] manteve uma polícia do pensamento, e, finalmente, brandindo o bicho-papão do feroz barbarismo, inaugurou uma área completamente vazia.

Sartre e seu elegante existencialismo parisiense deve ser analisado na luz da sua restauração. Sartre, crente no seu “ateísmo”, sua recusa em privilegiar um valor, não acreditou nas fundações do liberalismo ou Marxismo. Por fim, ele não estabeleceu a metanarrativa (na sua versão mais recente, o Marxismo vulgar dos partidos Comunistas[2]) como uma verdade, mas como um “inevitável” imperativo categórico, pelo qual se deve militar caso não se quer ser um “bastardo”, i.e., um desses desprezíveis seres que veneram “ordens petrificadas”[3] Isso é o paradoxo por inteiro do sartreanismo: por um lado, nos estimula não adorar “ordens petrificadas”, o quê é propriamente faustiano, e, por outro lado, nos determina “magicamente” a adorar uma “ordem petrificada” do Marxismo vulgar, já derrubada por Sombart e De Man. Portanto, pelos anos cinqüenta, a idade dourada do sartreanismo, o consenso é de fato um constrangimento, uma obrigação ditada pelo pensamento cada vez mais midiatizado. Mas um consenso alcançado pelo consentimento, pela obrigação de acreditar sem discussão, não é um consenso eterno. Por isso, o contemporâneo esquecimento do sartreanismo, com seus excessos e exageros.

O Anti-Humanismo Revolucionário de Maio de 1968

Com o Maio de 68, o fenômeno de uma geração, “humanismo”, o atual rótulo da metanarrativa, foi agredido e destruído pelaas interpretações francesas de Nietzsche, Marx e Heidegger. [4] No sulco da revolta estudantil, acadêmicos e popularizadores tanto proclamaram o humanismo uma ilusão “petite-bourgeois”. Contra o Ocidente, o navio geopolítico da metanarrativa Iluminista, os rebeldes de 68 alçados a montagem das barricadas, tomando lados, algumas vezes com um ingênuo romantismo, em toda luta dos anos 70: Vietnã espartana contra o imperialismo americano, guerrilhas latino-americanas (“Ché”), o separatismo basco, o patriotismo irlandês, ou os palestinos.

A irritabilidade faustiana, incapacitada de ser expressada por modelos autóctones, foi transposta para uma exótica: Ásia, Arábia, África, ou Índia. O Maio de 68, em si mesmo, pela sua fixação resoluta na Grande Política, pelo seu ethos de guerrilha, pela sua opção de luta, apesar de tudo tomou uma dimensão muito mais importante que os bloqueios tensos do sartreanismo ou a grande regressão do contemporâneo neo-liberalismo. Na direita, Jean Cau, escrevendo seu maravilhoso livro sobre Che Guevara[5], entendeu essa questão perfeitamente, considerando que a direita, a qual é fixada em seus dogmas e memórias da esquerda, não queria ver.

Com a geração de 68 – combativa e politizada, consciente das grandes questões geopolíticas e econômicas do planeta – os último fogos históricos queimaram no espírito público francês antes do grande surgimento da pós-história e pós-política representadas pelo narcisismo do neoliberalismo contemporâneo.

A tradução dos escritos da “Escola de Frankfurt” anunciam o Advento do Neo-Liberalismo Narcisista

A primeira fase do ataque neo-liberal contra o anti-humanismo político do Maio de 68 foi a redescoberta dos escritos da Escola de Frankfurt: nascida na Alemanha, antes da chegada do Nacional Socialismo, amadureceu durante o exílio da California de Adorno, Horkheimer, e Marcuse, e estabeleceu-se como um objeto de veneração na Alemanha Ocidental do pós-guerra. Em Dialektik der Aufklärung, um pequeno e conciso livro que é fundamental para entender a dinâmica do nosso tempo, Horkheimer e Adorno clamam que há duas “razões” no pensamento Ocidental que, no sulco de Spengler e Sombart, somos tentados a nomear “razão faustiana” e “razão mágica”. O molde, para os dois antigos exílios na Califórnia, é o pólo negativo da “razão complexa” na civilização Ocidental: essa razão é puramente “instrumental”; é usada para acrescentar o poder pessoal daqueles que utilizam. É razão científica, a razão que doma as forças do universo e coloca nas mãos de um líder ou de um povo, um partido ou um Estado. Com isso, de acordo com Herbert Marcuse, é de Prometeu, não Narcisista/órfico.[6] Para Horkheimer, Adorno, e Marcuse, esse é o tipo de racionalidade que Max Weber teorizou.

Por outro lado, a “razão mágica”, de acordo com a terminologia genealógica de Spengler, é, amplamente falada, a razão da metanarrativa de Lyotard. É uma autoridade moral que dita uma conduta ética, alérgica à uma expressão de poder, e assim a qualquer manifestação da essência da política.[7] Na França, a redescoberta da teoria da razão de Horkheimer-Adorno próximo do fim dos anos 1970 inaugurou a era da despolitização, a qual, substituindo disconexão generalizada por história concreta e tangível, deu-se para a “era do vazio” descrita tão bem pelo professor de Grenoble Gilles Lipovetsky.[8] Segundo a efervescência militante do Maio de 68, chegou uma geração a qual atitudes mentais são caracterizadas justamente por Lipovetsky como apatia, indiferença (também para a metanarrativa na sua forma crua), abandono (dos partidos políticos, especialmente do Partido Comunista), dessindicalização, narcisismo, etc. Para Lipovetsky, essa resignação e abdicação generalizada constitui uma oportunidade de ouro. Essa é a garantia, ele fala, que a violência irá recuar, portanto nenhuma “totalitarismo”, vermelho, preto, ou marrom, será possível de ganhar poder. Essa fácil mudança fisiológica, unida à uma indiferença narcisista, constitui a idade “pós-moderna”.

Há Várias Definições Possíveis de “Pós-Modernidade”

Por outro lado, se nós compreendemos – contrário ao costume de Lipovetsky – “modernidade” ou “modernismo” como expressões da metanarrativa, assim como quebra a energia faustiana, a pós-modernidade irá necessariamente ser um retorno para a política, uma rejeição de criacionismo para-normal e suspeita anti-política que emergiu depois do Maio de 68, no sulco de especulações na “razão instrumental” e “razão objetiva” descritas por Horkheimer e Adorno.

A complexidade da situação “pós-moderna” fez ser impossível dar uma única definição de “pós-modernidade” que possa ser exclusiva. No limiar do século XXI, várias pós-modernidades se tornam incultas, lado a lado, diversos modelos sociais pós-modernos potenciais, cada uma com base em valores fundamentalmente antagônicos, preparados para o confronto. Essas pós-modernidades diferem – na linguagem ou no seu ‘estilo’ – das ideologias que as procedem; elas são, não obstante, unidas com os eternos, antiqüíssimos, valores que permanecem sobre elas. Conforme a política entra na esfera histórica pelas confrontações binárias, confrontos de clãs opostos e a exclusão das minorias, ousam evocar a dicotomia possível do futuro: uma pós-modernidade neo-liberal Ocidental Americana contra uma brilhante pós-modernidade faustiana e nietzscheana.

A “Geração da Moral” & a “Era do Vazio”

Essa pós-modernidade neo-liberal foi triunfantemente proclamada, com delírio messiânico, por Laurent Joffrin em sua imposição da revolta dos estudantes de Dezembro de 1986 (Un coup de jeune [Um golpe da Juventude], Arlea, 1987). Para Joffrin, quem previu [9] a morte da extrema esquerda, do proletarianismo militante, o Dezembro de 86 é o precursor de uma “geração da moral”, combinada em uma mentalidade levemente de esquerda, coletivismo de preguiça cultural, e egoísmo neo-liberal, narcisista, e pós-político: o modelo social dessa sociedade hedonista centrada na praxis comercial, que Lipovetsky descreveu como a Era do Vácuo. Um vazio político, um vazio intelectual, e um deserto pós-histórico: essas são as características do espaço bloqueado, o horizonte fechado característico do neo-liberalismo contemporâneo. A pós-modernidade constitui um impedimento preocupante para a grande Europa que deve emergir assim que tenhamos um futuro viável e preso a lenta decadência anunciada pelo desemprego massivo e pelas demografias declinantes que espalham devastação sob a luz abatida das ilusões consumistas, a grande mentira dos anunciantes, e os sinais de néon que louvam os méritos de uma fotocopiadora japonesa ou de uma linha aérea americana.

Por outro lado, a pós-modernidade que rejeita e velha metanarrativa anti-política do Iluminismo, com suas metamorfoses e metástases; que afirma a audácia de um Nietzsche ou de um ideal metálica de um Jünger; que cruza a “linha”, como Heidegger estimula, deixando para trás o dandismo estéril de tempos niilístas; a pós-modernidade que reune o aventuroso, para um programa político ousado concretamente implica a rejeição dos blocos de poder existentes, a construção de uma economia autárquica e Eurocêntrica, enquanto luta selvagemente e sem concessões contra todos estilos antigos de religiões e ideologias, desenvolvendo o eixo principal de uma diplomacia independente de Washington; a pós-modernidade que carregará voluntariamente seu programa e negar as negações da pós-história – essa pós-modernidade terá nossa total adesão.

Nesse breve ensaio, eu gostaria de provar que há uma continuidade na confrontação das mentalidades “faustiana” e “mágica”, e que essa continuidade antagônica é refletida no debate decorrente da pós-modernidade. O Ocidente centro-americano é o realce do “magismo”, com o seu cosmopolitismo e facções autoritárias.[10] A Europa, a herdeira do faustianismo muito abusado pelo pensamento “mágico”, reafirmar-se-á a si mesma com uma pós-modernidade que recapitulará os temas inexpressivos, recorrentes mas sempre novos, do intrínseco faustianismo para a alma Européia.

Notas:

1. O clássico entre os clássicos na condenação do “irracionalismo” é a suma de György Lukács, The Destruction Of Reason, 2 volumes (1954). Esse livro tem objetivo de ser um tipo de Discourse on Method para a dialética do Iluminismo-contra-Iluminismo, Racionalismo-Irracionalismo. Através de uma técnica de fusão que traz uma breve semelhança à um panfleto estalinista, amplo setor da cultura alemã e européia, de Schelling à neo-Thomismo, são culpados de preparar e apoiar o fenômeno Nacional Socialista. É uma visão paranóica de cultura.

2. Para entender a racionalidade fundamental do Comunismo de Sartre, deve-se ler Thomas Molnar, Sartre, philosophie de la contestation (Paris: La Table Ronde, 1969). Em Português: Sartre, Ideologia do Nosso Tempo (New York : Funk & Wagnalls, 1968).

3. Cf. R.-M. Alberes, Jean-Paul Sartre (Paris: Éditions Universitaires, 1964), 54–71.

4. Na França, a pontaria polêmica numa rejeição final do anti-humanismo de 68 e seus fundamentos filosóficos nietzscheano, marxista, e heideggerianos, é encontrado em Luc Ferry e Alain Renault, French Philosophy of the Sixties: An Essay on Anti-Humanism, trans. Mary H. S. Cattani (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1990) e seu apêndice ’68–’86. Itinéraires de l’individu [’68-’86: Routes of the Individual] (Paris: Gallimard, 1987). Contrariamente à essas defendidas em primeiro a esses dois trabalhos, Guy Hocquenghem em Lettre ouverte à ceux qui sont passés du col Mao au Rotary Club [Open Letter to those Went from Mao Jackets to the Rotary Club] (Paris: Albin Michel, 1986) deplorou a assimilação do hiper-politismo da geração de 68, para a onda liberal contemporânea. De um ponto de vista definitivamente polêmico e com o objetivo do debate restaurador, assim como é, no campo da abstração filosófica, deve-se ler Eddy Borms, Humanisme—kritiek in het hedendaagse Franse denken [Humanism: Critique in Contemporary French Thought (Nijmegen: SUN, 1986).

5. Jean Cau, o ex-secretário de Jean-Paul Sartre, agora classificado como polemista da “direita”, que se delicia em desafiar as manias e obsessões dos conformistas intelectuais, não hesitou em prestar homenagem à Che Guevara e dedicar um livro à ele. Os “radicais” da burguesia o acusaram “body snatching”! Os admiradores de Cau da extrema direita também não apreciaram sua mensagem. Para eles, os sandinistas nicaraguenses, que não obstante admiravam Abel Bonnard, e o “fascista” americano Lawrence Dennis, são emanações do Mal.

6. Cf. A. Vergez, Marcuse (Paris: P.U.F., 1970).

7. Julien Freund, Qu’est-ce que la politique? [O Quê é Política?] (Paris: Seuil, 1967). Cf Guillaume Faye, “La problématique moderne de la raison ou la querelle de la rationalité” [“O Problema Moderno da Razão ou a Questão da Racionalidade”] Nouvelle Ecole no. 41, Novembro de 1984.

8. G. Lipovetsky, L’ère du vide: Essais sur l’individualisme contemporain [The Era of the Vacuum: Essays on contemporary individualism] (Paris: Gallimard, 1983). Logo depois que esse ensaio foi escrito, Gilles Lipovetsky publicou um segundo livro que reforçou seu ponto de vista: L’Empire de l’éphémère: La mode et son destin dans les sociétés modernes [Império do Efêmero: Estilo e seu Destino nas Sociedades Modernas] (Paris: Gallimard, 1987). Quase simultaneamente, François-Bernard Huyghe and Pierre Barbès protestaram contra a opção “narcisista” em La soft-idéologie [A Ideologia Suave] (Paris: Laffont, 1987). Desnecessário dizer, minhas visões estão fechadas para aqueles dos dois últimos escritores.

9. Cf. Laurent Joffrin, La gauche en voie de disparition: Comment changer sans trahir? [A Esquerda em Processo de Desaparecimento: Como Mudar Sem Trair?] (Paris: Seuil, 1984).

10. Cf. Furio Colombo, Il dio d’America: Religione, ribellione e nuova destra [O Deus da América: Religião, Rebelião, e a Nova Direita] (Milano: Arnoldo Mondadori, 1983).

Fontes:

http://www.counter-currents.com/2010/12/postmodern-challenges-between-faust-and-narcissus-part-1/

http://www.counter-currents.com/2010/12/postmodern-challenges-between-faust-and-narcissus-part-2/

http://www.counter-currents.com/2010/12/postmodern-challenges-between-faust-and-narcissus-part-3/

Dittatura dell'economia e società mercantilistica

Stefano Vaj

Dittatura dell'economia e società mercantilistica

 

Predominio della sotto funzione mercantile – Determinismo economico - Lo spirito di calcolo - La priorità del benessere economico individuale - La decadenza dello Stato

 

La società in cui viviamo la nostra esistenza conosce oggi come carattere qualificante quella situazione di unidimensionalità che si è convenuto chiamare “dittatura dell'economia” e che può essere ricondotta all'ipertrofia patologica di una funzione sociale nel quadro di un predominio culturale degli ideali bor­ghesi. Caratteristica a sua volta distintiva di questa ipertrofia nell'insieme dei suoi effetti secondari, è la tendenza a fagocitare successivamente le varie espressioni della realtà umana. Nietzsche scriveva già, in una pagina di Aurora: “La nostra epoca che parla molto di economia è ben soffocante; essa soffoca lo spirito”.

Non è nuovo del resto come le classi politiche di tutte le nazioni europee pongano oggi al centro del proprio interessamento il problema dei consumi, in vista della creazione di un'immensa classe media ipergarantita comprendente tutta la popolazione ed unificata dal livello di vita. La cultura, in questo mo­dello sociale, deve necessariamente spogliarsi di quei caratteri che possono ostacolarne la distribuzione consumistica generalizzata, mentre la politica viene ridotta alla gestione. È superfluo sottolineare il carattere estraneo all'autentica civiltà europea di questa centralità del fatto economico nella sfera sociale.

Le tre funzioni sociali millenarie delle culture indoeuropee, funzione politi­co-sacrale, funzione guerriera, funzione produttiva, presupponevano infatti un ordinamento gerarchico tra le stesse; ordinamento che in particolare compor­tava un predominio dei valori inerenti alle prime due funzioni. Ora, non sol­tanto la funzione produttiva si trova oggi dominata da una delle sue sottofun­zioni, l'economia, ma quest'ultima è ancora a sua volta dominata dalla sua sot­tofunzione mercantile. Così che tutto l'organismo sociale è patologicamente sottomesso ai valori espressi dalla funzione mercantile.

Il liberalismo, storicamente, non ha altro significato che l'aver gettato le basi teoriche per questa usurpazione della sovranità da parte del dato economi­co. Ideologicamente esso si configura, similmente al marxismo stesso, come uno degli svariati riduzionismi contemporanei. Gli uomini all'interno della specula­zione neoliberale moderna non possono essere compresi, se non ridotti a fattori astratti che intervengono su un mercato: clienti, consumatori, unità di mano d'opera, ecc...

Le specificità culturali, etniche, politiche, umane, tutto ciò che si oppone all'intercambiabilità, costituiscono altrettante “anomalie provvisorie” in vista del progetto da realizzare: il mercato mondiale, senza frontiere, senza razze, senza singolarità. Quello che Julius Evola chiamava americanismo, la fine della storia in una visione commerciale planetaria, costituisce probabilmente oggi la principale minaccia, in quanto questa utopia è ancora più estremista di quella dell'egualitarismo “comunista”, e più realizzabile perché più pragmatica. Si può dire sotto questo aspetto che la società americana è più democratica di quanto l'Unione Sovietica non sia comunista, e che questo democratismo mon­dialista, nella sua versione europea, costituisce per noi veramente l'ultimo fla­gello.

La nostra quindi è la “società dei mercanti”, ma non bisogna pensare che sia particolarmente basata sullo scambio ed il commercio. Quando noi parliamo oggi di “società dei mercanti” ci riferiamo non solo e non tanto a strutture socio-economiche, ma a una mentalità collettiva , un insieme di valori che carat­terizza oltre all'economica tutte le altre istituzioni. I valori del “mercante”, utili ed indispensabili al suo solo livello, determinano il comportamento di tutte le sfere sociali e dello Stato stesso.

Non intendiamo con questo lanciare anatemi contro il denaro ed il profitto e non siamo certo moralizzatori in preda all'odio per l'economia, o fautori di un nuovo riduzionismo opposto pregiudizialmente alla funzione mercantile in quanto tale.

Noi sosteniamo semplicemente che i valori e la funzione economica sono da accettarsi, ma in quanto subordinati ad altri valori; e significativo è anche come il privilegiare sistematicamente l'economia ed il benessere individuale porti a breve termine, oltre che all'instaurazione di un sistema inumano ed alla deculturalizzazione dei popoli, persino ad una cattiva gestione economica.

“società dei mercanti” significa quindi società dove i valori non sono che mercantilistici. A scopo di chiarezza possiamo, con Guillaume Faye, Segretario del Dipartimento Studi e Ricerche del G.R.E.C.E., classificare schematica­mente in tre grandi partizioni i principi che di questi valori si fanno ispiratori: la mentalità determinista, lo spirito di calcolo, la sistematica priorità del benessere economico individuale.

La mentalità determinista è utile solo in campo economico, in quanto serve a massimizzare gli utili con l'agganciare la propria attività, come variabile di­pendente, ad alcune regole e funzioni: curve dei prezzi, leggi di mercato, con­giunture, andamento monetario, ecc... Ma, adottata dall'insieme complesso di una società tende inevitabilmente a diventare un alibi per non agire, per non rischiare. Quando l'insieme dell'economia nazionale e, ancora peggio il potere politico, si sottomettono e si lasciano condurre da sistemi teorici deterministici costruiti all'uopo, rinunciando ad osare e a ricercare soluzioni creativamente, la società si “gestisce” solo a breve termine, e resta irrimediabilmente sotto l'e­gemonia di previsioni economiche pseudoscientifiche ritenute ineluttabili (la mondializzazione della concorrenza internazionale, l'industrializzazione pro­gressiva del terzo mondo, la necessaria evoluzione verso la “crescita zero”, ecc). Tutto ciò mentre paradossalmente non si tiene conto delle più elementari tra le evoluzioni politiche a medio termine: per esempio l'oligopolio dei deten­tori del petrolio.

Le nazioni mercantilistiche rinunciano così alla loro libertà politica e le gestioni liberali degli stati non sanno andare che nel senso di ciò che esse cre­dono essere meccanicamente determinato, in quanto razionalmente formulato, dimenticando che alla fine è l'uomo a stabilire le regole del gioco. Nel secolo della prospettiva, della previsione statistica e informatica, ci si lascia andare all'immediato e si è più ciechi dei monarchi dei secoli passati. Si procede come se le evoluzioni sociali, demografiche, geopolitiche non avessero alcun effetto. Così la società mercantilistica, sottomessa alle evoluzioni ed alle volontà esterne, per il fatto di credere al determinismo storico, rende i popoli europei oggetti della storia .

 

Un'altra chiave interpretativa della mentalità mercantilistica è lo spirito di calcolo, anch'esso adatto alla funzione mercantile ma inapplicabile alla totalità dei comportamenti collettivi. Lo spirito di calcolo non afferma, come potrebbe sembrare, che il denaro è diventato la norma generale, ma più semplicemente che ciò che non si può misurare non “conta”più, ha solo una “realtà” par­ziale. Egemonia quindi del quantificabile sul qualificabile, sostituzione sistema­tica del meccanico all'organico che applicano a tutto l'unica griglia del costo economico teorico. Si pretende di “calcolare”tutto: si programmano le ore di lavoro, il tempo libero, i salari, la frequenza dei rapporti sessuali, i consumi, la produzione artistica. In infortunistica si calcola persino un preciso “costo della vita umana”, legato alla produttività ipotetica unitaria media lungo l'arco della esistenza personale.

Ma tutto ciò che sfugge al calcolo dei costi, ovvero a nostro avviso le cose più importanti, è trascurato. Gli aspetti non quantificabili economicamente della vita umana e dei fatti socioculturali, come le conseguenze sociali dello sradicamento dovuto ai movimenti migratori, diventano indecifrabili e vengono quindi ritenuti insignificanti. L'individuo “calcola” la propria esistenza ma, perdendo di vista le sue radici, non ha più il senso della propria identità. Gli stati non prendono in considerazione che gli aspetti “calcolabili” della loro azione. Una regione muore di anemia culturale? Che importa, se per il turismo di massa il suo tasso di crescita è positivo.

Questa superficialità appartiene principalmente a quella “gestione tecno­cratica”, che costituisce la grottesca caricatura mercantilistica della funzione sovrana, e che tende ad assimilare le nazioni a grandi società anonime (vera definizione delle società per azioni) di cui i governi costituiscono il consiglio di amministrazione. In questa ottica, ogni politica estera che non ha lo scopo di procurare sbocchi commerciali immediati, ad esempio la difesa, non ha senso. Persino l'economia vi si trova danneggiata in quanto questo mercantilismo a breve termine non è certo in grado di sostituire una vera politica economica.

Terzo aspetto infine della società mercantilistica è, come dicevamo, la prio­rità sistematica del benessere economico individuale che ingenera direttamente un “ deperimento politico dello stato” attraverso la sua trasformazione in stato-­provvidenza, stato dolcemente tirranico. Arnold Gehlen, definisce la “dittatura del benessere individuale” come la situazione in cui l'individuo, costretto a entrare nel sistema provvidenzialista dello stato, vede la sua personalità disinte­grarsi nell'accerchiamento consumistico, in cui perde ogni padronanza del pro­prio destino. Il neoliberalismo opera così un doppio riduzionismo: da una parte lo stato e la società non sono ritenuti dover rispondere ad altro che ai bisogni economici della gente; d'altro lato questi sono ricondotti esclusivamente al “tenore di vita” individuale - cosa peraltro già molto diversa dal concetto di “qualità della vita”. E da qui discende anche la preminenza, in seno alla fun­zione economica stessa del “sociale” e del “consumistico” sulla produzione e sull'innovazione creatrice.

In questo quadro emerge chiaramente quindi come, per un liberale, la sola ineguaglianza tra i popoli e tra gli uomini è la differenza circa il potere di ac­quisto: per cui sarà sufficiente, per raggiungere l'“égalité”, diffondere nel mondo l'idea mercantilistica. Ed ecco riconciliarsi l'umanitarismo universalista e gli “affari”, la giustizia e gli interessi, “Bible and business”, secondo una frequente espressione di Jimmy Carter. Il fatto che i particolarismi culturali, etnici, linguistici siano degli ostacoli per questo tipo di società spiega il motivo per cui l'ideologia moralizzatrice dei liberalismi politici spinga all'internaziona­lismo, alla mescolanza dei popoli e delle culture, all'integrazione razziale ed alle diverse forme di centralismo antiregionalista.

La società mercantilistica ed il modello americano minacciano dunque tutte le culture della terra. In Europa ed in Giappone la cultura è stata ridotta ap­punto a un way of life , che è l'esatto opposto di uno stile di vita. La personalità dell'uomo è “cosificata”, ovvero assorbita dai beni economici posseduti, che soli strutturano la sua individualità; si cambia di “personaggio” quando cam­bia la moda e non si è più caratterizzati né dalle origini (commercializzate nel folklore ) né dalle opere, ma solo dal consumo. Nel sistema contemporaneo i tipi dominanti sono il consumatore, l'assicurato, l'assistito, neppure il produttore o l'imprenditore, giacché il mercantilismo diffonde un tipo di valori per cui ven­dere e consumare appare più importante che produrre. E non vi è niente di più livellatore che la funzione del consumo: il produttore, o l'imprenditore, si dif­ferenzia per le sue azioni, mette in gioco delle capacità personali; il consumo invece è l'attività passiva , la non attività per eccellenza, a cui tutti possono in­differentemente accedere.

Ma un'economia di consumo non può alla fine che risultare inumana per­ché l'uomo è un essere attivo, un costruttore. Fanno in questo senso sorridere amaramente le accuse di sapore biblico di certa sinistra culturale sull'essere e l'avere, sulla “maledizione del danaro” e sulla “volontà di potenza” della civiltà europea. La società contemporanea, pur conservando a tratti una vitali cancerogena e decadente, per noi solo preoccupante, non afferma assoluta­mente nessuna volontà, né a livello di destino globale, come neppure sul mero piano di una vera strategia economica.

Stefano Vaj

 

Gli eroi sono stanchi

Guillaume Faye

Gli eroi sono stanchi

La giovinezza nelle società tradizionali e nel mondo moderno

La gioventù come laboratorio sperimentale del consumismo

La concezione organica dell'uomo.

Ex: http://www.uomolibero.com/

Ogni epoca ha la mitologia che si merita. La nostra ha fatto della gioventù il suo idolo onnipresente, a cui riserva un culto permanente e ossessionante. E come se la preoccupazione essenziale dei nostri contemporanei fosse di essere giovani, o, non essendolo, di atteggiarsi a tali. Ed è l'abuso di questo termine che genera (o per lo meno dovrebbe generare) il sospetto.

Bisogna infatti porsi riguardo alla gioventù la stessa domanda di Jean Baudrillard riguardo al nuovo: in un mondo in cui tutto si vuole nuovo, com'è che c'è così poco rinnovamento? Parimenti, proprio quando la giovinezza assume un significato magico, com'è che i valori dominanti che guidano la mentalità collettiva dei giovani (il benessere materiale minimale, l'umanitarismo, l'assistenza, ecc.) sono valori così « da vecchi » ? Come render conto del paradosso di una società che porta la gioventù sugli scudi e che rifiuta, nella sua ideologia come nei suoi valori, il gusto del rischio, della sfida, del combattimento?

Ma, in primo luogo, che cos'è la giovinezza?

Etologicamente, essa costituisce la fase di formazione dell'uomo adulto, più esattamente il passaggio dall'infanzia all'età matura. La fisiologia umana conosce durante questo periodo, che va pressapoco dai diciotto ai venticinque anni, la sua fase di massimo dinamismo. L'uomo, essere dalla gioventù persistente, vive in questa fase della sua esistenza, del bisogno di curiosità e di avventura, bisogno che può arrivare fino al sacrificio della vita. Quando entra nell'età matura, l'uomo è capace (è ciò che lo distingue dall'animale) di conservare queste qualità della giovinezza che sono la sete d'esperienza e il gusto del rischio, poiché è un essere mai finito.

Niente di strabiliante, stando così le cose, se molte culture hanno rappresentato l'«uomo tipo » come individuo giovane.

È l'età dei kuroi che si possono ammirare al museo del Partenone; è anche l'età dei guerrieri cinesi delle incisioni dell'epoca Ming.

Anche nelle società tradizionali, quelle che precedono la rivoluzione industriale, gli uomini non accedevano più tardi alle responsabilità. Non c'era transizione fra l'infanzia e l'età adulta. A Roma, si passava in un sol colpo dalla veste pretesta alla toga virile a diciotto anni. Nel Medioevo, da quando un apprendista cominciava a lavorare, quale che fosse la sua età, era integrato nel mondo degli adulti. I generali di Napoleone Bonaparte avevano spesso tra i venti e i venticinque anni, esattamente come i comandanti della battaglia di Cunaxa, descritta da Senofonte, che conducevano in battaglia le truppe di Sparta. I valori della gioventù erano organicamente integrati all'insieme sociale, allo stesso titolo di quelli dell'età matura e della vecchiaia, che rappresentavano la riflessione e l'esperienza. Gli uni controbilanciavano gli altri, senza conflitto. Certo la gioventù si ritrovava durante le feste tradizionali, ma non in quanto «classe d'età» (nel senso in cui oggi si ha una « terza età »). Si trattava spesso di riunire i giovani da sposare o quelli che arrivavano all'età di portare le armi. Giovinezza significava tutto il contrario di quanto significa oggi: non una seconda infanzia prolungata, ma l'ingresso nel mondo degli uomini, nel mondo vero. Per farla breve, non c'era giovinezza, ma la « giovanilità » penetrava i valori sociali.

È a partire dall'epoca romantica, e poi soprattutto con la rivoluzione industriale, che la gioventù, considerata come classe e come valore, fa la sua apparizione.

L'allungamento medio della durata della vita obbliga a differire l'età della presa di responsabilità. Un'età intermedia appare progressivamente fra l'infanzia e la vita professionale. Nelle società. tradizionali, a basso indice di scolarizzazione, era la comunità che trasmetteva il sapere agli individui, mischiando tutte le classi di età. A partire dal diciannovesimo secolo, l'educazione obbligatoria e il servizio militare vanno a far fronte comune con la famiglia ridotta al suo nucleo per isolare la gioventù in maniera funzionale. Al contempo, si constata che la società avvia un processo gerontocratico: le occupazioni vengono strutturate a carriera; si fissano soglie d'età per l'esercizio delle responsabilità.

Dal 1890 le opere sugli adolescenti si fanno sempre più numerose. La giovinezza adolescenziale diviene un valore, connotata da temi avventurosi e guerrieri. Lo scoutismo nasce sotto forme decisamente paramilitari. Il servizio militare obbligatorio trasforma gli eserciti europei in raggruppamenti delle gioventù nazionali e non più in truppe professionali d'età mista. Dappertutto si vedono sbocciare dei movimenti della gioventù che indossano l'uniforme e che si vogliono portatori di una rigenerazione sociale e politica. Nei collegi e nei licei la gioventù imparerà a vivere insieme e a riconoscersi come categoria a parte.

Fra il 1890 e il 1910, la letteratura comincia ad appassionarsi alla adolescenza e le inchieste sulla gioventù si succedono sulla stampa: se ne contano cinque in Francia nel solo 1912. Raymond Radiguet e Colette illustrano, nei loro romanzi, il culto della gioventù « perdonabile di ogni suo eccesso », mentre Montherlant osserva nel 1926 che si va sviluppando un nuovo fenomeno, « l'adolescentismo », nuovo rivale del femminismo. Nel frattempo il culto dello sport e dell'olimpismo nasce e si sviluppa, appoggiato su di un'esaltazione della giovinezza, spesso intesa come portatrice d'un rinnovamento pagano. Per liberare la gioventù dal giogo borghese della famiglia, Gide lancia il suo famoso «Famiglie, io vi odio », e i regimi totalitari ed autoritari che nascono in Russia, in Germania, in Italia, in Grecia, in Ungheria, ecc. si considerano tutti delle «dittature della gioventù ».

La modernità delle nuove tecniche, quella dei pionieri dell'aviazione o degli eroi della velocità dell'automobile, è interpretata come di competenza della gioventù, come d'altra parte — quasi paradossalmente — un certo desiderio di ritorno alla natura, ben rappresentato da movimenti come il Wandervogel in Germania. C'è, in entrambi i casi, la medesima pulsione di purezza selvaggia ed aggressiva, la medesima rivendicazione da' parte della gioventù di un reinvestimento di una funzione creatrice e guerriera dimenticata dal mondo borghese.

Un'inversione di senso si produce però grosso modo dopo la seconda guerra mondiale. Progressivamente, all'«adolescentismo » va a sostituirsi l'era dei teen agers. La gioventù «precipita» nella funzione mercantile: a livello di ideologia e discorsi, essa conosce il suo trionfo, ma nei fatti, i valori giovanili crollano. Essere giovane non significa più donare la propria vita per una causa, ma « consumare » una sottocultura fabbricata per i giovani.

Similmente ai loro eserciti, funzionali e burocratici — a dispetto della giovane età di reclutamento — le società occidentali s'impegnano ad addomesticare i giovani utilizzando il dinamismo formale dell'ideale di gioventù ereditato dall'anteguerra. Due movimenti paradossali sono osservabili a partire dagli anni cinquanta: la gioventù perde le sue organizzazioni, le sue istituzioni, spesso considerate troppo « militari » dalla società dei consumi; l'ideologia esalta più che mai la gioventù in quanto frangia sociale munita di diritti (si denuncia il «razzismo anti giovani ») e di una cultura propria, quella dei teen agers di ispirazione americana. La gioventù diviene un surrogato del proletariato, e gli epigoni della scuola di Francoforte lanciano il tema della lotta generazionale. Da un lato, la società si individualizza e la gioventù fisicamente organizzata scompare; dall'altro, l'ideologia e la cultura costruiscono ciò che non è altro che un simulacro della giovanilità.

L'arrivo sul mercato delle numerose classi di età del dopoguerra, è coinciso, nei paesi occidentali, con la nascita di una « cultura per i giovani », apparsa per la prima volta negli Stati Uniti. Lanciata negli anni cinquanta da una serie di films dei quali James Dean è l'eroe, poi proseguita per trent'anni con mode di abbigliamento (i jeans), musicali (il rock, il pop, la disco, ecc.), alimentari ed ideologiche, questa cultura della gioventù, d'obbiedienza anglo-americana e a vocazione internazionale, ha avuto per funzione quella di staccare le giovani generazioni dalle loro culture nazionali e di includerle nella « nuova società dei consumi » dominata dai canoni culturali americani. Veniva così creata una nuova « classe internazionale », che costituiva di fatto la prima categoria di consumatori integralmente « occidentali ». L'idea di gioventù, ereditata dall'anteguerra, veniva così sfruttata come veicolo commerciale e, più o meno consciamente, svuotata del suo significato e privata di ogni energia rivoluzionaria. Le nuove generazioni nate dopo il trauma della guerra offrivano, rispetto ai genitori, il vantaggio di essere più facilmente avulse dalle loro tradizioni specifiche. La cultura dei giovani, cosiddetta contestatrice e liberatrice, fu così il primo grande tentativo di massificazione e di omogeneizzazione culturale ed economica esercitato su di una generazione « cavia ». Il processo è culminato alla fine degli anni sessanta — è l'epoca di Woodstock — nel momento in cui i giovani di vent'anni, erano i più numerosi. Successivamente il fenomeno subisce una pausa, ma la gioventù resta sempre il laboratorio sperimentale dell'occidentalismo, delle sue mode, dei suoi costumi.

È dunque necessario guardare con un minimo di critica e di sospetto alle dottrine della « guerra delle generazioni », sostenute per esempio da Marcuse, e sulla validità dei movimenti contestatari che mobilitavano la gioventù fino alla metà degli anni settanta. Questi, così come le culture underground pretenziosamente « di rottura» col mondo borghese, sono state non solo recuperate dal Sistema, ma molto peggio, gli hanno fornito nuovo fiato. In effetti, la funzione dell'«ideologia della rottura » fra le generazioni era di integrare la gioventù, con un processo di acculturazione, a una nuova forma di capitalismo mondiale, tecnocratico e non più patrimoniale, basato su di uno stile « americanomorfo» e su costumi permissivi, atti a staccare i giovani dalle specifiche morali etno-nazionali.

I discorsi antiborghesi e l'aspetto rivoluzionario della controcultura non devono alimentare illusioni: essi veicolano un'ideologia di stordimento e modelli comportamentali che conducono diritto filato all'iperindividualismo e al culto del benessere materiale minimale. Theodor Adorno ha avuto almeno il merito di mostrare che le musiche ritmiche costituiscono niente più che una parvenza di rivolta, e hanno per vero scopo quello di smobilitare la gioventù prima di condizionarla al consumismo.

In queste condizioni, non c'è da stupirsi che le teorie della guerra tra le generazioni, i movimenti contestatari e lo stile ribelle delle controculture conoscessero il loro declino in questo inizio degli anni ottanta: una volta realizzata l'integrazione nell'«americanosfera » esse non servono più se non sotto forme sempre più asettiche, quasi accademiche e in realtà conservatrici. Un'autentica controcultura delle giovani generazioni, in continuo rinnovamento, e che veicolasse temi realmente mobilitanti dell'eroismo e dell'avventura, farebbe paura alla cultura umanitaristico-borghese. Va meglio l'individualismo della falsa rottura e della pseudo-marginalità, nel quale si riconoscono i giovani « omologati » d'oggi e i loro genitori di quarant'anni, i vecchi teen-agers degli anni sessanta, che immaginano di essere restati giovani, mentre non lo sono stati mai.

Molti studi sociologici contemporanei, fra cui quelli del Centro di Comunicazione Avanzata, attestano della nascita fra i giovani di due nuovi tipi di mentalità: l'«omologazione » — o integrazione — che è maggioritario, e la « sfasatura » — o disadattamento — ancora minoritaria, ma in costante aumento fra i soggetti al di sotto dei vent'anni.

Gli « omologati » ritornano al Sistema, dopo averlo combattuto, perché si rendono conto più o meno consciamente, che esso veicolava i loro stessi valori. Disincantati quanto alle virtù del « rivoluzionarismo », questi nuovi piccoli borghesi hanno conservato della « sinistra » le idee umanitarie, ecologistiche e pacifiste. L'avvenire auspicato è quello di un mondo in cui la « pace » debba essere preservata ad ogni costo. I valori dominanti non sono più la rivoluzione sociale, e nemmeno l'ambizione personale dei « giovani quadri dinamici », bensì la sicurezza e la tranquillità di una vita privata senza costrizioni, fatta di libertà estetizzante, di molto tempo libero e di redditi « sufficienti ». I grandi problemi sociali o nazionali non interessano più gli omologati, anche se — grandi fruitori di mass media — piangono sulla Polonia e approvano sempre Amnesty International. Se militano, lo fanno per la « qualità della vita », al fine di costruire una società sedata e conviviale. Il dinamismo e la potenza nazionale sono biasimati da questi nuovi adepti di un petainismo freddo. Amanti dei magnetoscopi e delle riviste pratiche, riservano il loro immaginario avventuroso ai palmizi di un Club Méditerranée, e vivono la liberazione sessuale per procura. Hanno bisogno di un circondanio televisivo, musicale e umano, rassicurante e sorridente. La vita, per loro, è in primo luogo, la vita privata, il nido o il bozzolo, lontano dal furore delle militanze e delle vere competizioni.

Gli « sfasati », che rappresentano già il 20% dei giovani fra i 15 e i 25 anni, sono, a differenza degli « omologati », non coinvolti. Non contestano e non approvano « si disinteressano ». Neppure utopisti, si chiudono nel loro narcisismo costituendo, il più delle volte, dei micro gruppi frammentari provvisti ognuno di un proprio stile. La loro creatività è spesso notevole, ma è indirizzata verso la sfera individuale o la ricostruzione di piccoli mondi fatti di parvenze e di sogni. Bambini perenni e adulti disillusi al tempo stesso, questi giovani divengono schizofrenici: lavorano per vivere — spesso con impieghi volanti — ma la loro vera vita è altrove. Essi sono mentalmente assenti sia dal proprio lavoro che dalla propria società. Eternamente alla ricerca dell'evasione, spingono il loro psichismo di sognatori in una marginalità culturale e in una indifferenza ideologica che non impediscono il loro inserimento sociale effettivo. In fin dei conti bisogna ben « consumare », ed essi non ne fanno certo a meno. Lo Stato-Provvidenza non ha da lamentarsi di questi nuovi giovani, la cui schizofrenia interiore lascia piena libertà d'azione a qualsiasi dittatura amministrativa di tipo materno. Il calo d'ambizioni, la dipendenza ombelicale e il neo-tribalismo prefigurano una mentalità adattissima alle strutture economiche di una società mercantile socializzata, a fonte tasso di disoccupazione, a bassa progressione di reddito, e dominanta da un'assistenza burocratica generale.

Ecco ben evidente l'«implosione dei sensi » di cui parla Baudrilland: all'abbondanza dispersa degli stili, dei ghiribizzi feticisti e dei valori intimisti, risponde un gran silenzio: dalla gioventù non viene nessun discorso, nessun progetto, nessun ideale.

In questa era in cui la « rande muta non è più l'esercito, ma la gioventù, tutti parlano, come per compensazione, di gioventù. Viviamo una nevrosi della gioventù.

Essa diviene una qualità a se stante, puramente estenionizzata, nel momento stesso in cui cessa di essere una disposizione dello spirito. Apparente e fisica, questa falsa gioventù si vuole eterna, la qual cosa ben si adatta ad una società fissata sul presente. Un'autentica cultura giovanile presupponebbe, al contrario, che l'adolescenza costituisca un passaggio verso il mondo adulto, uno stato transitorio. Il vero adulto — il vir dei Romani, il kalòs kàgathòs dei Greci — faceva coabitare in sé una giovinezza dionisiaca e una padronanza apollinea, ma soprattutto non intendeva « restare » giovane, proprio per poter attualizzare, in quanto adulto padrone di se stesso, quella parte del suo animo che, qualsiasi cosa succedesse, restava sempre creativa e giovanile. Noi siamo ben lontani da questa concezione organica dell'uomo...

All'infantilizzazione del mondo adulto corrisponde ciò che bisogna ben chiamare, con un barbaro neologismo, l'«adultizzazione » dei bambini e dei giovani in generale. Il bambino-re degli anni cinquanta e sessanta è diventato un giovane vissuto, ma i suoi genitori sono rimasti rimbecilliti e continuano a leggere Topolino. Giocano a fare i giovani e immaginano che sia sufficiente averne i vestiti, l'atteggiamento o il linguaggio per restare tali.

Questi tratti puerili della cultura di massa sono compensati da un'ostentazione generale dell'« esprit de sérieu ».

La liberalizzazione dei costumi, seriosamente prognammata come una nuova morale, nasconde male l'irrigidimento dei comportamenti. Le etichette sociali e il funzionalismo capillare della vita quotidiana spengono ogni gioiosità, ogni spontaneità dei rapporti sociali. Il canto, il riso, la mimica, il bisticcio, non caratterizzano più le relazioni umane, apparentemente « senza costrizioni », ma in realtà imprigionate in circuiti rigidi. Le feste della gioventù sono le danze tristi o le copulazioni elettroniche con i simulatori delle « guerre spaziali », successori dei sorpassati flippers.

La sparizione della giovanilità nei rapporti sociali corrisponde d'altra parte all'intellettualismo che domina la nostra epoca. Lo spirito geometrico supera ovunque quello dotato di acume, e questo, insieme con la « sfera letteraria », di cui parla Aldous Huxley, è stato inghiottito dalla « cultura matematica ». I giovani d'oggi sono allo stesso tempo formati, in maniera pensino esagerata, alla matematica, e completamente neopnimitivi nel loro linguaggio, nel loro comportamento, nel loro stile di abbigliamento, nei loro gusti musicali, ecc. Contemporaneamente, l'ascesa dello spirito iperanalitico distrugge ogni freschezza comportamentale nell'insieme della società. La gioventù moderna rischia fortemente di essere l'avanguardia di una nuova borghesia, barbara adepta del confort e delle comodità elettroniche, limitata dal pragmatismo tecnologico e smussata nella sensibilità a contatto con la sottocultuna americana.

Tutto accade come se, per compensare l'invecchiamento demografico e l'installarsi dei valori senescenti dell'egualitanismo di massa, l'ideologia sociale avesse creato un simulacro di giovinezza e avesse incarcerato la gioventù in un mondo artificiale, per prevenire un'autentica rivolta contro questo stato di fatto.

Ma l'artificio può niginansi contro chi lo maneggia. Gli ideatori della falsa gioventù stiano in guardia: finché ci sarà qualcuno che veglia, tutto è sempre possibile. La gioventù, un giorno o l'altro, può sentirlo. Come il fiume della vita, essa ritorna sempre ad ogni generazione.

E quelli che vegliano ci sono. Essi seminano. Non per questo mondo. Non per questa gioventù, ma per l'altra, quella che viene.

 

Guillaume Faye

 

The Sunic Journal Robert Steuckers on Europe vs. the Turks

The Sunic Journal

Robert Steuckers on Europe vs. the Turks

R. Steuckers: "Vitalist Thinking is incorrect"

Archive de SYNERGIES EUROPEENNES - 1998

Interview with Robert Steuckers

“Vitalist Thinking is incorrect”

by Jürgen Hatzenbichler


This year is the thirtieth anniversary of the 1968 revolution. What value does the “New Left” have for a rightist discourse today?

Steuckers: First, it has to be said that although the “New Left” demonstrated, rioted and mobilised the factories in Paris in May 1968, one million counter-demonstrators were also on the streets, there to put an end to the events. Furthermore, the “right” won in May; de Gaulle returned in June. One must keep in mind that the so-called “anti-authority movement” could only start the occupation of the institutions in 1988, after the assumption of power by Mitterand. Although between 1968 and 1981 the “New Left” carried a lot of weight in France, the “liberal-conservative Right” remained in power and was able to develop its “Weltanschauung”. One should also know, in order to understand ’68, that de Gaulle had changed his programme completely after the War in Algeria: he was anti-imperialist and anti-American, he visited Russia in 1965 and left NATO. In a speech in Cambodia, he depicted France as the leading anti-imperialist Power and as a partner for countries that were neither “americanist” nor communist. He also developed contacts with South America, which lead to the French aviation industry being able to drive out the Americans there. In Quebec in 1967, he exclaimed “free Quebec”, which was a direct provocation for the Americans, who didn’t tolerate it. Thus the May of ’68 was partly brought about by the American secret service, so that France would refrain from its anti-imperialist function.

In the German-speaking world 1968 is subsequently linked to “political correctness”. What impact did the revolution have in the francophone world?

Steuckers: Moralism appeared more strongly in Germany and with the German Left than in France. In France there are two concepts. There is May ’68: the student movement as a revolutionary movement. But there is also the “thought of ‘68”, la pensée ’68. When one speaks of it, one means a way of thinking like Foucault, Derrida, Deleuze and Guattari among others, who were especially inspired by Nietzsche. Nowadays “political correctness” criticises these philosophers because they think “lebensphilosophisch”, because they are “vitalists”.

This method of “deconstruction” criticises the modern age above all…

Steuckers: …yes, against the “Enlightenment”. Here I would like to highlight an “accent” of Michel Foucault. Foucault is of course regarded as a leftist philosopher, but at the start of his career, which he began with an article that appeared in 1961, he developed a thesis, which stated that the enlightenment was not at all the emancipation of humanity, but instead the beginning of omnipotent observation and punishment. When this article appeared, Foucault was branded a reactionary by certain guardians of virtue. It’s well known that Foucault was a homosexual… He said: “I must commit myself to the outsiders, I must play for the left, otherwise my career is lost.” Nevertheless, his thesis is valid: the enlightenment means observation and punishment. He further criticised the enlightenment as the “ground” for the French Jacobin state. For Foucault, enlightenment society embodies a new panoptical prison, in the middle of which stands a tower, from which all prisoners can be observed. The model of the enlightenment also embodies a “transparent” society without mystery, without a private sphere or personal feelings. Political correctness has seen that these thoughts are extremely dangerous for enlightenment states/ regimes. Foucault is branded a vitalist.

Which ideas of the “New Left” are still relevant?

Steuckers: I’ll have to answer this question in a roundabout way: what does the current “New Left” want? Does the “New Left” want to disseminate the ideas of Foucault, be against societies that want total surveillance and punishment? I can’t answer for the left. But what I do see is that the “New Left” never thinks nowadays, but merely wants to push through political correctness.

The left-right schema is now called into question by some rightists. Is the abolition of these opposites relevant?

Steuckers: I think that for several decades the right has repeated the same obloquies too often. Though I see that today in Germany certain philosophical currents are reading Foucault together with Carl Schmitt and Max Weber. This is very important; it is the kernel of a new conservative revolution, because it is anti-enlightenment. Though I don’t reject the entire enlightenment myself; not the enlightenment King of Prussia, Friedrich II for example. Nor do I reject everything from Voltaire – who was an enlightenment philosopher and gave an excellent definition of identity when he said: “There is no identity without memory.” I don’t reject everything, but I gladly reject political correctness, which claims to be heir to the enlightenment, but sold us a corrupt enlightenment. It has to be said, anti-enlightenment ideas are available on both the right and left. On the other hand, a certain “right”, above all the techno-conservative powers, no longer poses the question of values. These conservatives want an enlightenment profile like the politically correct left.

Can one say that in such a society, which sees everything in terms of economics and consumption, the intellectuals of the left and right are the last defenders of meaning and value?

Steuckers: The American debate answered this very well, when the philosopher John Rawls posed the question of justice. If the enlightenment ends in consumerism, neither community nor justice is possible. There are seemingly conservative and progressive values and here a debate over the deciding questions of tomorrow is possible, but the organised groups of “political correctness” will do everything to prevent it.

Where on the right do you see the possible divisions between a value conservative attitude and a reactionary position?

Steuckers: Nowadays a “value conservative” attitude cannot remain structurally conservative. This attitude defends the values that hold a community together. If structural conservatives, meaning economic liberals, absolutely avoid posing the question of values, then the dissolution of communities is pushed forward. Then we have the danger that states, and even an eventual global community, become totally ungovernable.

What value does the “Nouvelle Droite” have in today’s intellectual discourse?

Steuckers: Nowadays it no longer has a solitary position. It should back the American communitarians more and lead the debate against globalisation and for identity-building values. Outside of Europe and America: to observe those non-western civilizations, like China and the Asiatic states, which have twice rejected the enlightenment ideology of “human rights”; first in Bangkok then in Vienna. These societies have set out to ensure that “human rights” are adapted to their own civilizations, because, as the Chinese have said, humans are never merely individuals but are always imbedded within a society and culture.

Boreas Rising

Boreas Rising:
White Nationalism & the Geopolitics of the Paris-Berlin-Moscow Axis, Part 1

By Michael O'MEARA

Ex: http://www.counter-currents.com/ 

 “History is again on the move.”
—Arnold Toynbee

For a half-century, we nationalists stood with the “West” in its struggle against the Asiatic Marxism of the Soviet bloc. There was little problem then distinguishing between our friends and our foes, for all evil was situated in the collectivist East and all virtue in the liberal West.

Today, things are much less clear. Not only has the Second American War on Iraq revealed a profound geopolitical divide within the West, the social-political order associated with it now subverts our patrimony in ways no apparatchik ever imagined. Indeed, it seems hardly exaggerated to claim that Western elites (those who Samuel Huntington calls the “dead souls”)[1] have come to pose the single greatest threat to our people’s existence.

For some, this threat was discovered only after 1989. Yet as early as the late forties, a handful of white nationalists, mainly in Europe, but with the American Francis Parker Yockey at their head, realized that Washington’s postwar order, not the Soviet Union, represented the greater danger to the white biosphere.[2] Over the years, particularly since the fall of Communism, this realization has spread, so that a large part of Europe’s nationalist vanguard no longer supports the West, only Europe, and considers the West’s leader its chief enemy.[3]

For these nationalists, the United States is a kind of anti-Europe, hostile not only to its motherland, but to its own white population. The Managerial Revolution of the thirties, Jewish influence in the media and the academy, the rise of the national security state and the military-industrial complex have all had a hand in fostering this anti-Europeanism, but for our transatlantic cousins its roots reach back to the start of our national epic. America’s Calvinist settlers, they point out, saw themselves as latter-day Israelites, who fled Egypt (Europe) for the Promised Land. Their shining city on the hill, founded on Old Testament, not Old World, antecedents, was to serve as a beacon to the rest of humanity. America began—and thus became itself—by casting off its European heritage. The result was a belief that America was a virtuous land, dedicated to liberty and equality, while Europe was mired in vice, corruption, and tyranny. Then, in the eighteenth century, this anti-Europeanism took political form, as the generation of 1776 fashioned a new state based on Lockean/Enlightenment principles, which were grafted onto the earlier Calvinist ones. As these liberal modernist principles came to fruition in the twentieth century, once the Christian, Classical vestiges of the country’s “Anglo-Protestant core” were shed, they helped legitimate the missionary cosmopolitanism of its corporate, one-world elites, and, worse, those extracultural, anti-organic, and hedonistic influences hostile to the European soul of the country’s white population.[4]

This European nationalist view of our origins ought to trouble white nationalists committed to a preserving America’s European character, for, however slanted, it contains a not insignificant kernel of truth. My intent here is not to revisit this interpretation of our history, but to look at a development that puts it in a different racial perspective. So as not to wander too far afield, let me simply posit (rather than prove) that the de-Europeanizing forces assailing America’s white population are only superficially rooted in the Puritan heritage. The Low Church fanatics who abandoned their English motherland and inclined America to a biblical enterprise, despite their intent, could not escape their racial nature, which influenced virtually every facet of early American life. Indeed, the paradox of America is that it began not simply as a rejection but also as a projection of Europe. Thus, beyond their ambivalent relationship to Europe, Americans (until relatively recently) never had any doubt that their race and High Culture were European. As such, they showed all the defining characteristics of the white race, taming the North American continent with little more than rifles slung across their backs, and doing so in the European spirit of self-help, self-reliance, and fearlessness. As Francis Parker Yockey writes: “America belongs spiritually, and will always belong to the [European] civilization of which it is a colonial transplantation, and no part of the true America belongs to the primitivity of the barbarians and fellaheen outside of this civilization.”[5]

As long, then, as Americans were of Anglo-Celtic (or European) stock, with racially conscious standards, their Calvinist or liberal ideology remained of secondary importance. Our present malaise, I would argue, stems less from these ideological influences (however retarding) than from a more recent development—the Second World War—whose world-transforming effects were responsible for distorting and inverting our already tenuous relationship to Europe. For once our motherland was conquered and occupied (what the apologists of the present regime ironically refer to as its “liberation”) and once the new postwar system of transnational capital was put in place, a New Class of powers with a vested interest in de-Europeanizing America’s white population was allowed to assume command of American life. The result is the present multiracial system, whose inversion of the natural order negates the primacy of our origins and promises our extinction as a race and a culture. The only possibility of escaping its annihilating fate would seem, then, to be another revolutionary transformation of the world order—one that would throw the existing order into crisis and pose an alternative model of white existence. The “Paris-Berlin-Moscow Axis” formed during the recent Iraq war, I believe, holds out such a possibility.

Genesis of an Axis

As part of its Mobiles Géopolitique series, the Franco-Swiss publisher L’Age d’Homme announced in April 2002 the release of Paris-Berlin-Moscou: La voie de l’indépendance et de la paix (Paris-Berlin-Moscow: The Way of Peace and Independence). Authored by Henri de Grossouvre, the youngest son of a prominent Socialist party politician, and prefaced by General Pierre Marie Gallois, France’s premier geostrategic thinker, Paris-Berlin-Moscou argued that Europe would never regain its sovereignty unless it threw off American suzerainty and did so in alliance with Russia.

In recommending a strategic alliance between France, Germany, and Russia for the sake of a Eurasian federation stretching from the Atlantic to the Pacific, Grossouvre’s thesis seemed entirely utopian. For although the prospect of such an alliance had long animated the imagination of revolutionary nationalists, it seemed more fantasy than possibility, even when proposed by a well-connected and reputable member of the governing elites. Fantasy, however, rather unexpectedly took hold of the international arena. Within months of the book’s publication, its thesis assumed a life of its own, as the new Likudized administration in Washington started beating the drums for another war on Iraq.

The axis and the war it sought to avoid will be looked at in the following sections. Here, a few words on Grossouvre’s book are in order, for, besides being one of those novel cases where life seemed to imitate art, it stirred the European public, was extensively reviewed, led to the organization of several international conferences attended by diplomats, military leaders, and parliamentarians, and culminated in a website with over two thousand pages of documentation.[6] Its effect on the European—especially on the anti-liberal—spirit has been profound. If the axis it proposes is stabilized as an enduring feature of the international order (and much favors that), a realignment as significant as 1945 could follow.

Paris-Berlin-Moscou begins by acknowledging the common values linking America and Europe, the so-called Atlantic community, as well as the US role in guaranteeing European security during the Cold War. On both these counts, the author’s establishment ties are evident, for no anti-liberal views the Atlantic relationship in quite such uncritical terms. Nevertheless, in arguing that these two factors no longer justify Europe’s dependence on the United States, he breaks with the prevailing system (or at least what was the prevailing system) of strategic thought.

In Grossouvre’s view, Europe’s geopolitical relationship to the United States was fundamentally altered between 1989 and 1991, when Eastern Europe threw off its Soviet yoke, Germany reunified, and Russia called off the Communist experiment begun in 1917. Then, as Europe’s strategic dependence on the US came to an end, so too did its heteronomy.[7] Moreover, it is only a matter of time, Grossouvre predicts, before Russia recovers, China develops, and US power is again challenged. In the meantime, US efforts to perpetuate its supremacy, defend its neo-liberal system of global market relations, and stifle potential threats to its dominance are transforming it into a force of international instability. But even if this were not the case, Grossouvre contends that Europeans would still need to separate themselves from America’s New World Order (NWO), for their independence as a people is neither a luxury nor a vanity, but requisite to their survival.[8] For as Carl Schmitt contends, it is only in politically asserting itself that a people truly exists—conscious of its place in history, oriented to the future, and secure in its identity.[9]

Europe’s ascent—and here Grossouvre most distinguishes himself from the reigning consensus—will owe little to the European Union (EU). Although its GNP is now approaching that of the US; its share of world imports and exports is larger; its manufacturing capacity and productivity are greater; its population is larger, more skilled, and better educated; its currency, the euro, sounder; and its indebtedness qualitatively lower, the EU does not serve Europe in any civilizational sense.[10] Its huge unwieldy bureaucracy serves only Mammon, which means it lacks a meaningful political identity and hence the means to play an international role commensurate with its immense economic power. It indeed caricatures the “European idea,” representing a technocratic economism without roots and without memory, focused on market exchanges and financial orthodoxies that are closer in spirit to America’s neo-liberal model than to anything native to Europe’s own tradition. (As one French rightist argues, “Every time the technocrats in Brussels speak, they profane the idea of Europe.”)[11] The EU’s growth has, in fact, gone hand in hand with the weakening of its various member states—and the corresponding failure to replace them with a continental or federal alternative.[12] Given its current enlargement to twenty-five members, political unity has become an even more remote prospect, particularly in that many of the new East European members lack any sense of the European idea.

A strong centralized state, however, is key to Europe’s future. Since the Second World War, power is necessarily continental: Only a Großraum (large space), a geopolitically unified realm animated by a “distinct political idea,” has a role to play in today’s world.[13] Yet even with the dissolution of the East-West bloc, a continental state is not likely to emerge from the EU’s expanding market system. If earlier state-building is any guide (think of Garibaldi’s Italy, Kara-George’s Serbia, Pearse’s Ireland, or Washington’s America), political unification requires a vision, a mobilizing project, emanating from a history of blood and struggle. As Jean Thiriart writes: “One does not create a nation with speeches, pious talk, and banquets. One creates a nation with rifles, martyrs, jointly lived dangers.”[14] For Grossouvre, this mobilizing vision is De Gaulle’s Grande Europe: a political-civilizational Großraum pivoted on a Franco-German confederation (encompassing Charlemagne’s Francs de l’Ouest et Francs de l’Est), allied with Russia, and forged in opposition to the modern Carthage.

The three great continental peoples, he believes, constitute the potential “core” around which a politically federated Europe will coalesce. Like De Gaulle, who refused to accept his country’s defeat in 1940 and who fought all the rest of his life against the conquerors of 1945, Grossouvre views the entwined cultures of the French, Germans, and Russians as fundamentally different from les Anglo-Saxons (the English and the Americans), whose thalassocratic, Low Church, and market-based order favors a rootless, economic definition of national life. Accordingly, for most of her history, with the tragic exception of the 1870–1940 period, France’s great enemy was “perfidious Albion,” not Germany.[15] Then, after 1945, this larger historical relationship was resumed, as numerous cooperative ventures succeeded in blunting nationalist antagonisms—to the point that war between them is now inconceivable.[16] Finally, in 1963, when De Gaulle and Konrad Adenauer signed the Treaty of Elysée, their reconciliation was formalized on the basis of an institutionalized system of social, economic, and political collaborations. Their supranational commitment to Europe has since had a powerful synergetic effect, influencing virtually every significant measure undertaken in the name of continental unity. The complementary nature of these closely related peoples has, in fact, triumphed over the political disunity that came with the Treaty of Verdun (843).[17] While a confederation between France and Germany is probably still on the distant horizon, the history of the last 60 years suggests that their national projects are converging.[18] Until then, they are likely to continue to speak with a single voice, for France and Germany are more than two states among the EU’s twenty-five. In addition to being the crucible of European civilization, their combined populations (142 million), their economic power (41 per cent of the EU), and, above all, their capacity to transcend national interests make them special—the nucleus, the motor, the vanguard of a potentially united Europe. Whatever political organization the EU eventually achieves will undoubtedly be one of their doing.

A somewhat different convergence is also under way in the East. The fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and Germany’s ensuing reunification shifted Europe’s center of gravity eastward. The EU’s enlargement to Eastern Europe this year moved it even farther in this direction. The consolidation of Europe’s eastward expansion hinges, though, on Russia, whose white, Christian people, as the historian Dieter Groh argues, represents one of the great primeval stirrings of the European conscience.[19] (It was the Roman Catholic Church, in its schism with Orthodox Christianity in 1054, not Russia’s history, culture, or racial disposition that kept it from being recognized as a European nation.) France has ancient ties with Russia and today shares many of the same geopolitical interests. But it is Germany that is now most involved in Russian life. She is Russia’s chief trading partner, her banks are the chief source of Russian investment capital, and her 1800 implanted entrepreneurs the leading edge of Russian economic development.[20] Thanks to these ties, along with bimonthly meetings between Russia’s Vladimir Putin and Germany’s Gerhard Schröder, Russia is presently engaged in numerous joint ventures with the EU. Together, they have put seven communications satellites into orbit, developed a global positioning system (Galileo) to rival the American one (GPS), signed numerous agreements in the field of aerospace research, given one another consultative voice in the other’s military operations, upgraded and expanded the roads, canals, and railways linking them, brokered a series of deals related to gas and energy, and established an elaborate system of cultural exchanges. Visa-free travel between Russia and the EU is expected by 2007. And though Russia is too big to be integrated into the EU, she is nevertheless developing relations with it that portend ones of even greater strategic significance.

Russia also sees its future in Europe. Since the collapse of Communism and the imposition of what critical observers characterize as a “Second Treaty of Versailles,” it has been on life-support.[21] The economy is in shambles, the state discredited, society afflicted with various pathologies, and its former empire shattered. The appointment of Vladimir Putin in 1999 and his subsequent election as president in 2000 and again in 2004 represent a potential turnaround (even if he is not the ideal person to lead Russia). Full recovery is probably still far off, but it has begun and Europe—its capital, markets, and expertise—is necessary to it. Putin also believes Europe’s growing estrangement from America’s unilateral model of hegemony will eventually lead it into a collective security pact with Russia.[22] Having distanced himself from the pro-American regime of the corrupt Yeltsin, whose liberal market policies were an excuse to plunder the accumulated wealth of the Russian people, and having had his various efforts at rapprochement rebuffed by the Bush administration (which continues to encroach on Russia’s historical spheres of interest), this Deutsche im Kreml now looks to exploit his German connections to gain a wedge in European affairs.[23]

His Eurocentric policies are already assuming strategic form, for Russia’s vast oil reserves have the potential of satisfying all of Europe’s energy needs. (As russophobes say, Russia will build her hegemony in Europe with pipelines.) To consolidate these emerging East-West exchanges, Russia has recently received a €400 million grant to modernize its institutional, legal, and administration apparatus to accord with the EU’s. At the same time, tariffs on Russian imports have been slashed (50 percent of Russian exports now go to the EU) and the EU is sponsoring Russia’s admission to the World Trade Organization. Putin’s arrest of the oligarch Mikhail Khodorkovsky, one of the principal proponents of US-style “casino capitalism,” and the seizure of his massive Yukos oil concern, the resignation of the last Yeltsin holdovers, especially Alexander Voloshin; and an ongoing series of internal reforms, however incomplete, represent further steps toward a restoration of Russian state power.[24] Finally, Russia possesses the military capacity, even in its debilitated state, to guarantee Europe’s security, for in a period when America’s “new liberal imperialism” runs roughshod over European concerns, threatening endless conflicts detrimental to their interests, Russia suddenly becomes a credible defense alternative.[25]

Grossouvre concludes that an axis based on France’s political leadership, Germany’s world class economy, and Russia’s military might represent the potential nucleus of a future Eurasian state. Five distinct advantages, he argues, would follow from such a rapprochement: It would guarantee Europe’s independence from America, correct certain imbalances in the globalization process, enhance the EU’s security, solve its energy needs, and complement the different qualities of its allied members. If such an axis draws the chief continental powers into a more enduring alliance, it will inevitably reshape the international order, making the white men of the North—the Boreans—the single most formidable force in the world.[26] It should come as no surprise, then, that Grossouvre’s most strident critics are to be found in those former left-wing Jewish ranks (as represented by Bernard-Henri Lévy, André Gluckmann, Alain Finkielkraut, etc.), who, like our home-grown neocons, champion the raceless, deculturated policies of Washington’s New World Order.

Notes

1. Samuel P. Huntington, Who Are We? The Challenge to America’s National Identity (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2004), pp. 264ff.

2. Francis Parker Yockey, The Enemy of Europe (Reedy, W.V,: Liberty Bell Publications, 1981). In this same period, a related argument can be found in the works of Maurice Bardèche, Julius Evola, Otto Strasser, and, later, Jean Thiriart.

3. For example: Claudio Finzi, “‘Europe’ et ‘Occident’: Deux concepts antagonistes,” Vouloir (May 1994); Guillaume Faye, Le système à tuer les peuples (Paris: Copernic, 1981).

4. For example, Robert de Herte (Alain de Benoist) et Hans-Jürgen Nigra (Giorgio Locchi), “Il était une fois l’Amérique,” Nouvelle Ecole 27–28 (Fall 1975); Robert Steuckers, “La menace culturelle américaine” (January 16, 1990), http://foster.20megsfree.com ^[2]; Reinhard Oberlercher, “Wesen und Verfall Amerikas” (n.d.), http://www.deutsches-kolleg.org ^[3]

5. Francis Parker Yockey, “The Destiny of America” (1955), http://www.counter-currents.com/2011/06/the-destiny-of-america/ ^[4]

6. See http://www.paris-berlin-moscou.org ^[5]

7. Emmanuel Todd, Après l’empire: Essai sur la décomposition du système américain (Paris: Gallimard, 2002); Charles A. Kupchan, The End of the American Era: U.S. Foreign Policy and the Geopolitics of the 21st Century (New York: Knopf, 2002).

8 Henri de Grossouvre, Paris-Berlin-Moscou: La voie de l’indépendence et de la paix (Lausanne: L’Age d’Homme, 2002), p. 47.

9 Carl Schmitt, The Concept of the Political, tr. by G. Schwab (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996), p. 53.

10 Robert Went, “Globalization: Can Europe Make a Difference?,” EAEPE 2003 conference paper, http://eaepe.infomics.nl/papers/Went.pdf ^[6]

11. Louis Vinteuil, “Discours sur l’Europe” (July 20, 2004), http://www.voxnr.com

12. Pierre-Marie Gallois, Le consentement fatal: L’Europe face aux Etats-Unis (Paris: Seuil, 2001).

13. In 1943, at the height of the Second World War, Pierre Drieu La Rochelle wrote: “The national era has come to an end and an age of [continental] empires is dawning.” See Révolution Nationale: Articles 1943–44 (Paris: L’Homme Libre, 2004), p. 7. Theoretically, the notion of a European Großraum was worked out in Carl Schmitt, Der Nomos der Erde im Völkerrecht des Jus Publicum Europaeum (Cologne: Greven Verlag, 1950); its most impressive programmatic formulation is Jean Thiriart, Un empire de 400 millions d’hommes: L’Europe (Brussels, 1964).

14. Jean Thiriart, For the European Nation-State (Paraparaumu, NZ: Renaissance Press Pamphlet,  n.d.).

15. Pauline Schnapper, La Grande Bretagne et l’Europe: Le grand malentendu (Paris: Eds. Presses de Sciences Po, 2000); Christian Schubert, Grossbritannien: Insel zwischen den Welten (Munich: Olzog, 2004).

16. Brigitte Sauzay, “L’Allemagne et la France: Quel avenir pour la coopération?” (n.d.), http://geogate.geographie.uni-marburg.de ^[7]

17. This treaty divided Charlemagne’s empire, separating the Germanic tribes of the West from those of the East. In one respect, the fratricidal history of nineteenth and twentieth century nationalism was a history of this separation.

18. Blanine Milcent, “La ‘Françallemagne’ attendra,” L’Express, December 11, 2003.

19. Dieter Groh, Russland und das Selbstverständis Europas (Neuwied: Luchterhand Verlag, 1961). Also see Georges Nivat, Russie-Europe: La fin du schisme (Lausanne: L’Age d’Homme, 1993); Andreas-Renatus Hartmann, “Die neue Nachbarschaftspolitik der Europäischen Union” (April 16, 2004), http://www.boschlektoren.de ^[8]

20. Klaus Thörner, “Das deutsche Spiel mit Russland” (February 2003), http://www.diploweb.com

21. Nikolai von Kreitor, “Russia and the New World Order” (1996). Published years before the Iraq war, Kreitor’s article is perhaps the single most important analysis to have been made of the international situation leading up to the war. My views here are much indebted to it.

22. Wladimir Putin, “Russland glaubt an die große Zukunft der Partnerschaft mit Deutschland,” Die Zeit (April 10, 2002).

23. Alexander Rahr, “Ist Putin der ‘Deutsche’ im Kreml?” (September 2002), http://www.weltpolitik.com ^[9]

24. Jacques Sapir, “Russia, Yukos, and the Elections” (February 2004), worldoil.com ; “Poutine restaure l’Etat: Un entretien avec Jacques Sapir,” Politis 774 (November 6, 2002); Wolfgang Strauss, “Putin oder Chodorkowski: 14. März, eine Niederlage Amerikas” (March 29, 2004), http://staatsbriefe.de ^[10]

25. One sign of this capacity is the fact that in 2003, Russia became the world’s number one arms exporter. See P. Schleiter, “Defense, securité, relations internationales” (April 25, 2004), http://www.polemia.com ^[11]; also Yevgeny Bendersky, “Keep a Watchful Eye on Russia’s Military Technology” (July 21, 2004), http://www.pinr.com ^[12]

26. The notion of a possible northern imperium of white men is taken from Guillaume Faye, Le coup d’Etat mondial: Essai sur le Nouvel Impérialisme Américain (Paris: L’Æncre, 2004), pp. 183ff. On the myth of the Boreans (or Hyperboreans), see Jean Mabire, Thulé: Le soleil retrouvé des hyperboréens (Lyon: Irminsul, n.d.).

Boreas Rising:
White Nationalism & the Geopolitics of the Paris-Berlin-Moscow Axis, Part 2

A Defensive Alignment

The Paris-Berlin-Moscow axis arose in reaction to the Second American War on Iraq. It needs thus to be understood in the context of that war, which the Bush administration treated as the second phase of its war on terror, the first being the invasion of Afghanistan and the assault on the Taliban regime harboring bin Laden’s al-Qa’ida (both of which, incidentally, were, via the CIA and Pakistan’s ISI, made in the USA).[1] However much it resembled the Anglo-Afghan and Russo-Afghan wars of the nineteenth century, the American assault on Afghanistan did not provoke the kind of opposition that Iraq would, for there was still enormous sympathy for the US after “9/11.” “Victory,” moreover, came quickly, as it had for all former conquerors. The Taliban were chased from Kabul and the warring tribes associated with the US-supported Northern Alliance, which did most of the fighting on the ground, soon gained control of the countryside. While Afghanistan has since reverted to a pre-state form of regional, tribal rule (ideal for narco-terrorists) and most al-Qa’ida fighters succeeded in dispersing, the Bush administration was nevertheless able to broadcast publicly satisfying TV images of swift, forceful action.[2]

Buoyed up by the nearly effortless rout of the medieval Taliban, Bush adopted the policies recommended by his neoconservative advisers,[3] whose neo-Jacobin assertion of American power not only has nothing to do with fighting Islamic terrorism, but cloaks a Judeo-liberal vision of global domination which threatens to turn the entire Middle East into something akin to Israel’s occupation of the West Bank. Key to their vision is Iraq, whose threat to Israel has been repackaged by such Jewish propaganda mills as the Project for the New American Century as a threat to US security. Besides promoting a peculiar blend of liberal statist and Zionist strategic concerns that represents a turn (not a break) in US foreign policy, the Krauthammers, Wolfowitzes, and other sickly neocon types advising the administration seek to “Sharonize” Washington’s strategic culture. To this end, military force is designated the option of choice, and a moralistic Manichaeanism which pits the US and Israel against the world’s alleged evils is used to legitimate the most dishonorable policies.[4] As the former wastrel of the Bush dynasty signed on to this Likud-inspired agenda, he began making a case for extending his antiterror crusade to Mesopotamia. Iraq’s “Hitler-like tyrant,” he claimed, had links with al-Qa’ida and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) capable of reaching the United States.

While America’s TV-besotted masses had little difficulty swallowing his unsubstantiated argument, the rest of the world balked.[5] At this point in early 2002, the two shores of the Atlantic began pulling apart. German chancellor Gerhard Schröder was the first major European figure to oppose Bush’s war plans. He was soon joined by French president Jacques Chirac. In July 2002 they issued a joint declaration formally rejecting the US proposal, stating that the UN’s embargo and its inspectors were doing their job and that the proposed attack would only distract from the “real war on terror.” By September, Russia (whose economic situation required the good graces of Washington) hinted that it too would veto a UN resolution sanctioning war. Then, on February 10, 2003, Putin joined Chirac and Schröder in issuing a declaration condemning what one senior US intelligence officer later called “an avaricious, premeditated, unprovoked war against a foe who posed no immediate threat.”[6]

The Paris-Berlin-Moscow axis thus originated as a temporary coalition organized around a single point of agreement. Convinced that Bush had failed to make his case for war, the French, Germans, and Russians thought the evidence for al-Qa’ida links and WMD was unconvincing (we know now, by the government’s own admissions, that it was a tissue of lies, distortions, and manipulations).[7] Their coalition was nevertheless more than a response to a momentary disturbance in the world system. As one high-level Russian analyst characterized it, the coalition was a “rebellion against a unilateral America unwilling to accommodate European interests.”[8] As such, it announced a possible geopolitical power shift from the Atlantic to Eurasia.

Globalism at Gunpoint

Since the Cold War’s end, international relations have undergone changes as fundamental as those following the world-historical realignment of 1945.[9] The neoconservatives influencing Bush, in their preemptive crusade for what is tendentiously labeled “global democracy,” have been anxious to take advantage of these “shifting tectonic plates in international politics . . . before they harden again.”[10] As Robert Kagan and William Kristol, two of the chief neocon publicists, argue: There is a danger today that an unassertive US will lose control of the world order it created in 1945. Beginning with the fall of the Soviet Union, when the field was cleared of possible rivals, they believe the US should have consolidated its “benevolent hegemony,” turning the unipolar moment into the unipolar era. Instead, George I and Clinton allegedly failed to exploit the moment, further ensnaring the US in multilateral relations that compromised its power and interests.[11]

Against this trend, the Bush administration has carried out what some characterize as a “revolution in foreign policy.” Without abandoning Washington’s objective of developing a global market system based on American-style liberal-democratic principles, it now employs hegemonist methods, codified in the new Bush Doctrine, that change the way the US asserts its power abroad.[12] In this vein, the administration dismisses international laws and institutions, as it asseverates America’s unilateral right to alter the world system however it wishes, including attacking and overthrowing states deemed a threat to its security. Traditional strategies of deterrence and containment have consequently been supplanted by a proactive policy of prevention and preemption, just as ad hoc coalitions are given precedence over established alliances and collective security arrangements, regime change over negotiations with “failed” states, and ideological goals over previous notions of the national interest.[13]

The entire tenor of American power has thus altered, but against those who claim Bush has abandoned the core assumptions of the liberal internationalist tradition, the conservative Andrew J. Bacevich points out that his foreign policy innovations are largely methodological in character. For the past half century, no matter which party occupied the White House, US policy has pursued a single overarching goal: “global openness”—as in Hay’s “Open Door” imperialism—which promotes the movement of goods, peoples, and fashions into and out of world markets for the sake of US capitalist concerns.[14] Moreover, in assuming responsibility for this integrated international trading system—this “empire”—the US wins the right not only “to sell Big Macs and Disney products round the world,” but to govern the system itself.

While Bacevich’s argument is an excellent foil to those seeking to portray Bush as a revolutionary—somehow different from the Democrats who have manipulated the United States into most of the 20th century wars and played a leading role in semantically transforming “democracy” and “human rights” into the totalitarian double-speak of the NWO—Bacevich nevertheless ignores the different ways in which the two parties implement their liberal internationalist principles. Republicans, especially since Reagan, are inclined to see the growth of US national power as the precondition for sustaining their imperial system, while Democrats look to the universalization and institutionalization of their liberal principles. This disposes Republicans to a unipolar model of liberal internationalism based on military supremacy, unlike Democrats, who favor a world-government model emphasizing the economic facets of globalization and the need for international regulation. (Lately, though, the Democratic world-government types, if such influential liberal internationalists as those associated with Richard Haas of the Council on Foreign Relations and Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the Brookings Institution are any guide, seem increasingly disposed to the unipolar model; John Kerry’s neocon cloning of Bush’s foreign policy also suggests a shift toward the Republican vision.) But whether pursued by Republicans or Democrats, this liberal internationalist agenda, with its emphasis on the antitraditional and anti-Aryan forces of free trade, free markets, and open societies, has been a bane to white people everywhere—for it wars against “the fundamental value of blood and race as creators of true civilization.”[15]

In pressing into areas which were off-limits during the Cold War, Washington’s imperial market system has become increasingly aggressive. Under Clinton, the Weinberger/Powell Doctrine of avoiding military engagements unless absolutely necessary was discarded, as the “unipolar moment” ushered in by the Soviet collapse was treated as a blank check for “intervening practically wherever and whenever it chose.” In this spirit, Clinton’s Secretary of State contemplated invading Iraq and disparaged the principle of national sovereignty. Her distinction between war and the use of military force has since reoriented US policy, as military interventions overseas cease being labeled wars and become armed forms of “humanitarianism.”[16] Finally, the Clinton Doctrine of Enlargement, in championing the worldwide spread of US-style democracy and free markets (that is, the globalist assault on national identity and national institutions), privileged unilateralism (rechristened “assertive multilateralism”) over containment and disarmament.[17]

Although he avoided Bush’s swaggering brand of leadership, Clinton was only slightly less coercive in promoting the totalitarian ideology of openness.[18] It is hardly irrelevant that Iraq was bombed nearly every day of his administration, that Bosnia was turned into a US military protectorate, and that unilateral military action, in one of the great “war crimes” of the 20th century, was taken against Serbia. Though smaller in scale than Operation Iraqi Freedom, the terrorist air assault on this proud little country (whose historical role was the defense of the white borderlands) aimed at “spreading democracy” for the sake of openness. Symptomatic of the “openness” Washington favors, the Albanian Liberation Front (UCK), an Islamic, drug-smuggling, terrorist mafia with links to al-Qa’ida, was armed and trained by Clinton’s government and a quarter million Christian Serbs, whose nationalist aspirations represented an affront to the New World Order, were ethnically cleansed from Kosovo.[19] These interventions by the Clintonistas also played a leading role in destabilizing the international state system, giving rise to new stateless groups whose megaterrorism is historically unprecedented. The horror of 9/11 and the unfathomable massacre of Russian children at Beslan, not to mention numerous lesser affronts to our humanity, have roots in Clinton’s Yugoslavian intervention. Bush has simply accelerated this process, which is nourishing new, more nihilistic forms of terrorism.[20]

Although he came into office complaining of Clinton’s immodest foreign policy, Bush II has actually gone further, introducing methods which removed the existing restraints on Washington’s use of military force and whatever reservation it might have in violating national sovereignty.[21] Like Clinton, he is a man beholden to alien and dishonorable interests, and inspired by a juvenile notion of power. His “faith-based foreign policy,” like the alley-cat policies of his predecessor, privileges the liberalization of global trade relations, imposes the cosmopolitan imperatives of his corporate supporters on virtually every issue pertinent to the nation’s biocultural welfare, rejects the American tradition of “isolationism,” and runs roughshod over whoever resists an order hostile to ethnocultural particularisms (unless they take innocuous folkloric forms). He might differ with Clinton in favoring a missile defense system, a different approach to China, and a Likudnik rather than a Laborite Zionism, but he is no less committed to a global system of market democracies “open to trade and investment, and policed by the United States.” As one Marxist puts it: “Playboy Clinton, Cowboy Bush, same policy.”[22] With his “Judeo-Protestant” rhetoric of American exceptionalism and his willingness to remove the velvet glove from America’s mailed fist, Bush’s “jackbooted Wilsonianism” differs from that of his predecessor mainly in linking economic globalization to “military modernization.”

As the neoconservatives Thomas Barnett and Henry Gaffney argue, the Bush Doctrine ought to be viewed as a necessary complement to the globalizing process. They claim that before 9/11 globalization (which much of the world identifies with Americanization) was mainly economic, thought best left to business. The collapse of the Twin Towers has since (allegedly) triggered a more serious reflection on America’s role as globalism’s “system administrator.” In their view, bin Laden’s al-Qa’ida, Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, and all the “rogue states”—Bush’s “axis of evil”—act as “dangerous disconnects” from a world based on interdependence and a single framework of economic governance. (Although they refrain from taking their argument to its logical conclusion, globalization here is inadvertently revealed as the harbinger of global terror.)[23] Faced with these threats to its one-world system, the market not only needs to be policed, the US has a responsibility to maintain its harmonious functioning. Bush’s unilateralist use of force, in applying military power whenever violent “disconnects” interrupt the international flow of labor, raw materials, and energy, Barnett and Gaffney argue, aims at ensuring the security and operability of the globalizing process.[24] But what they do not mention is that once economic globalization is joined with “military globalization,” the globalizing process is not so much ensured as altered, becoming less a neutral extension of economic trends (not that it ever was simply that) and more a classic expression of imperial power. In Iraq, for instance, the American army had no sooner occupied Baghdad than its neoconservative viceroy, Paul Bremer, began to dismantle the Iraqi state, privatize the economy, open the borders to unrestricted imports (unless they came from France or Germany), and, within two weeks of his arrival, had declared that Iraq was “now open for business.”[25]

September 11, then, did not change the long-range goal of US foreign policy (global openness), only the way in which it was pursued. The restraints on military force, already compromised under Clinton, were formally thrown off and a proactive doctrine of preemption superseded the more reactive methods of containment and disarmament. At the same time, Clinton’s human rights rhetoric and “humanitarian” militarism were jettisoned for the bellicose language of “strategic vital interests” and “imperial responsibilities.” It would be misleading, however, to think the transatlantic rift was due solely to Bush’s militaristic assertion of US global interests. Long before 9/11, real policy differences had begun to emerge: over trade; agriculture; armament exports; relations with Cuba, Iran, and Korea; the Palestinian-Israeli conflict; the Echelon economic espionage system monitoring European faxes, e-mails, and phone calls; the Kyoto Protocol; globalization; the abrogation of the ABM treaty; the euro and the dollar, etc. All these differences, in one way or another, reflected Europe’s unwillingness to remain a pawn on Washington’s global chessboard.[26] In the year leading up to Iraq, as Europe sought to check Bush’s unilateralist moves, the transatlantic relationship went into crisis, forcing France and Germany to assert their autonomy sooner than they might otherwise have intended.[27]

Notes

 

1. Alexandre del Valle, Islamisme et Etats-Unis: Une alliance contre l’Europe (Laussanne: L’Age d’Homme, 1999).

2. Justin Raimondo, “Afghanistan: The Forgotten War” (June 21, 2004), http://antiwar.com; Elaine Sciolino, “NATO Chief Offers Bleak Analysis,” New York Times, July 3, 2004.

3. Louis R. Browning, “Bioculture: A New Perspective for the Evolution of Western Populations,” The Occidental Quarterly 4(1) (Spring 2004).

4. There is still no satisfactory treatment of neocon foreign policy. One of the better recent ones, although highly flawed, especially in ignoring its Jewish roots, is Stefan Halper and Jonathan Clarke, America Alone: Neo-Conservativism and the Global Order (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004). On neoconservatism’s racial basis, see Kevin MacDonald, “Understanding Jewish Influence III: Neoconservatism As a Jewish Movement,” The Occidental Quarterly 4(2) (Summer 2004). The previous, and in many ways, still existing strategic basis of U.S. policy is perhaps best represented by Zbigniew Brzezinski, The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives (New York: Basic Books, 1997). On the larger historical contours of U.S. foreign policy, see Walter A. McDougall, Promised Land, Crusader State: The American Encounter with the World since 1776 (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1997).

5. John Le Carré, “The United States Has Gone Completely Mad,” London Times, January 15, 2003. With some irony, one Russian general, Leonid Ivashov, characterized the U.S. media coverage of the war debate (and not simply that of Fox News) as something one might expect in a “police state.” See Johannes Voswinkel, “Schmallippig im Kreml,” Die Zeit (15/2003). For one of the more interesting critiques of the controlled media’s role in mobilizing the population behind Bush’s crusade, see David Miller, “Caught in the Matrix” (April 26, 2004), http://www.scoop.co.nz ^[2]

6. The anonymous author of Imperial Hubris (2004), quoted in Julian Borgen, “Bush Told He Is Playing into Bin Laden’s Hands,” The Guardian, June 19, 2004.

7. Andrew Buncombe, “Carter Savages Bush and Blair,” The Independent, March 27, 2004; David Corn, The Lies of George W. Bush (New York: Three Rivers Press, 2004); F.-B. Huyghe, “Pour en finir avec les ADM” (February 2004), http://vigirak.com ^[3]; the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, “WMD in Iraq” (January 2004), http://www.ceip.org ^[4]

8. Viatcheslav Dachitchev, “La Turkie doit-elle faire partie de l’Europe?” (July 8, 2004), http://www.voxnr.com ^[5]

9. Gabriel Kolko, “The U.S. Must Be Contained: The Coming Elections and the Future of American Global Power” (March 12, 2004), http://www.counterpunch.org ^[6]; Robert L. Hutchins, “The World after Iraq” (April 8, 2003), http://www.cia.gov

10. Norm Dixon, “What’s behind War on Terrorism? (September 2002), www.globalresearch.ca ^[7]

11. Robert Kagan and William Kristol, “The Present Danger,” The National Interest 59 (Spring 2000).

12. The Bush Doctrine was elaborated in three key documents, which can be accessed at http://www.whitehouse.gov ^[8].  They are: “Presidential Speech of 17 September 2001,” “President Bush Delivers Graduation Speech at West Point” (June 1, 2002), “The National Security Strategy of the United States of America” (September 2002).

13. François Géré, “La nouvelle stratégie des Etats-Unis” (May 2002), http://www.diploweb.com ^[9]; Ivo H. Daalder and John M. Lindsay, America Unbound: The Bush Revolution in Foreign Policy (Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 2003), p. 13; Chalmers Johnson, “Sorrows of Empire” (November 2003), http://www.fpif.org ^[10]

14. Andrew J. Bacevich, American Empire: The Realities and Consequences of U.S. Diplomacy (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2002).

15. Julius Evola, Three Aspects of the Jewish Problem (N.P.: Thomkins & Cariou, 2003), p. 36.

16. Thomas W. Lippman, Madeleine Albright and the New American Diplomacy (Boulder: Westview Press, 2004). In his treatment of the subject, James Mann suggests (correctly, in my view) that the move to military assertiveness begins, haphazardly, with George I. See Rise of the Vulcans: The History of Bush’s War Cabinet (New York: Viking, 2004), pp. 179–97.

17. Phillipe Grasset, “Finalement, Clinton sera-t-il réélu?” (June 25, 2004), http://www.dedefensa.org ^[11]

18. Nikolai von Kreitor, “American Political Theology” (n.d.), http://foster.20megsfree.com ^[12]; Mann, Rise of the Vulcans, pp. 214–15.

19. Michael A. Weinstein, “Containment or Concessions: The Eclipse of Regime Change” (June 28, 2004), http://www.yellowtimes.org ^[13]; Hunt Tooley, “The Bipartisan War Machine” (September 17, 2003), http://www.mises.org ^[14]; Pierre M. Gallois, La sang du pêtrole: Bosnie (Lausanne: L’Age d’Homme, 1996).

20. Brendan O’Neill, “Beslan: The Real International Connection” (8 September 2004), http://www.spiked-online.com ^[15]; David Halberstam, War in a Time of Peace: Bush, Clinton and the Generals (New York: Scribner, 2001).

21. Bacevich, American Empire, p. 199; Daalder and Lindsay, America Unbound, pp. 36–40.

22. Samir Amin, “Le contrôle militaire de la planète” (February 17, 2003), http://www.alternatives.ca ^[16]

23. “Globalization inevitably generates global terror. For if the U.S. claims the entire planet as its sphere of vital interests, then all the territory of the U.S. becomes a possible sphere of vital interests for global terrorists.” See Alexander Dugin, “Premiers signes de l’apocalypse” (October 18, 2004), http://www.voxnr.com ^[17]

24. Thomas Barnett and Henry Gaffney, “Operation Iraqi Freedom Could Be the First Step toward a Larger Goal: True Globalization,” Military Officer 1(5) (May 2003); also Thomas Barnett, The Pentagon’s New Map: War and Peace in the 21st Century (New York: Putnam, 2004). Cf. Alain Joxe, “Les enjeux stratégiques globaux après la guerre d’Iraq” (May 27, 2003), http:www.ehess.fr ^[17]

25. Naomi Klein, “Baghdad Year Zero: Pillaging Iraq in Pursuit of a Neocon Utopia,” Harper’s Bazaar (September 2004).

26. Charles A. Kupchan, “The End of the West,” The Atlantic Monthly (November 2002).

27. Europe’s growing alienation from the U.S. is thus not just about the latter’s unilateralist bullying. In addition to the above cited issues, it also touches on the drug-running, mafia, terrorist, and espionage networks that the U.S. operates in Europe. For example, see Rémi Kaufer, L’arme de la désinformation: Les multinationales américains en guerre contre l’Europe (Paris: Grasset, 1999); Xavier Rauffer, Le grand réveil des mafias (Paris: Lattés, 2003); Karl Richter, Tödliche Bedrohung USA: Waffen und Szenarien der globalen Herrschaft (Tübingen: Hohenrain Verlag, 2004); Alexander del Valle, Guerres contre l’Europe (Paris: Syrtes, 2001); Robert Steuckers, “Espionage par satellites, guerre cognitive, manipulation par les mafias” (November 2003), http://www.centrostudaruna.it; Thierry Meyssen, “Propagande états-unien” (January 2, 2003), http://www.reseauvoltaire.net ^[18]

Boreas Rising:
White Nationalism & the Geopolitics of the Paris-Berlin-Moscow Axis, Part 3

A Promising Rapprochement

In the last instance, the US-European rift of 2002–2003 followed from the Cold War’s end, which destroyed the rationale for the transatlantic alliance and hence the restraints on European autonomy. For without the Red Army on the Elbe, Europe was no longer obliged to take orders from the West Wing. Because NATO has outlived its usefulness and Bush’s unipolar security system made no accommodation to Europe’s post-Cold War status, the more self-confident Europeans have begun to distance themselves from Washington.

However headline-capturing, their modest assertion of autonomy has nevertheless been carried out in ways that are thoroughly inadequate to Europe’s independence, based as they are on principles of jurisprudence and ethics, rather than on more consequential forms of power. In Robert Kagan’s now famous characterization, Europeans are from Venus and Americans from Mars, with the former acting as if the world were governed by abstract Kantian principles, ignorant of or unwilling to acknowledge the violent Hobbesian reality which Americans, especially after 9/11, have been forced to confront.[1] In other words, Europeans look to negotiations, diplomacy, and international law to resolve international disputes, while Americans emphasize the importance of military force. These differing “perspectives and psychologies of power,” the anti-white Kagan suggests, explain something of what divides the two shores of the Atlantic.[2] But perhaps more debilitating than Europe’s “Kantianism” (which will not last) is the fact that its increasingly autonomous foreign policy is less an expression of its political identity (although it is that) than a symptom of its liberal evasion of what such an identity ought to entail.

In France, for instance, which is the sole continental country to have defended the European idea in the last half century, as well as maintained a nuclear arsenal and professional army worthy of a “power,” opposition to US unilateralism has been framed largely in liberal internationalist terms that draw attention away from the state’s failed domestic policies. Since De Gaulle’s death, France has been in decline. The population is aging, millions of inassimilable Muslim immigrants are colonizing its lands, and virtually all the major institutions are in need of reform. Having eyes only for the “poor immigrant,” the metastasizing state bureaucracy imposes unrealistic social laws that hamper production and serve as a force for national decline. At the same time, the historical sources of nationalism have been dissolved, the native French dispirited by the institutionalization of multiculturalism, and the country’s extraordinary military and diplomatic apparatus, the necessary basis of both French and European power, if not neglected, then underfunded.[3] The hoopla that comes with France’s resistance to Bush simply focuses attention away from these failures and toward geopolitical developments that are potentially key to Europe’s future, but whose import is limited by the state’s misconceived domestic policies. As Julius Evola puts it: “The measure of freedom is power.”[4] And because Europeans are now uncomfortable with the exercise of power, their freedom is necessarily limited.

It is worth recalling that Jacques Chirac was responsible for the totalitarian mobilization against the presidential candidacy of the nationalist Jean Marie Le Pen in 2002.[5] Like much of the European governing class, he is a product of the same plutocratic system that subordinates national interests to international finance, indifferent to everything associated with his people’s blood and soil.[6] Such a system, as our own experiences reveal, is incapable of producing anything other than mediocrities. In this spirit, Chirac’s opposition to Washington’s unipolar order orients to a multipolar model based on liberal market principles hostile to Europe’s unique bioculture. As Guillaume Faye points out, Chirac’s opposition to the Iraq war was motivated less by his Gaullist nationalism (which he routinely betrays) than by his pacifist and Third World politics.[7] With the 2007 presidential elections in view, his foreign policy seems, in fact, aimed at the new Muslim electorate, which thrives on his anti-American, Third World, and multilateralist posturing.[8]

Faye also claims that American power is ultimately a reflex of Europe’s refusal of power.[9] Like many commentators, he stresses that US power in this period is greatly exaggerated and goes unchecked mainly for want of challengers. Revealingly, Chirac has, for all his opposition to Bush, done little to rearm Europe and what he does do he does for the worst of reasons, neglecting Grande Europe in the name of a legalistic idealism that contradicts the biocultural foundations of European life. Rather than fixating on the illegalities and incivilities of American unilateralism (which has proven to be a paper tiger in Iraq), he and other establishment leaders would make a greater contribution to Europe’s destiny if they devoted more attention to its military, restored the basis of its national identity, and addressed the real dangers coming from the South. Worse, they wholeheartedly subscribe to the American model of ethnopluralism, communitarianism, and multiculturalism. Just as US leaders think nothing of sending troops halfway around the world to fight a war whose immediate beneficiary is Israel, ignoring the more serious security threat posed by the Third World’s incessant assaults on the country’s southern border, European elites (and the demonstrators massed behind them) trumpet their solidarity with the Islamic Middle East, whose immigrants are presently rending the fabric of European life. There are good reasons for opposing Bush’s war, but the liberal ones motivating Chirac cannot but come back to haunt the continent.

Germany’s relationship with the US is significantly different than France’s, but no less infused with noxious anti-identitarian influences. Germany was virtually remade by the Americans after 1945 and throughout the Cold War remained subservient to them. Yet Germany is slowly beginning to throw off her tutelage. Schröder nevertheless adheres to values and policies that qualify as examples of Kagan’s Kantianism (i.e., pure liberalism). More than Chirac, he upholds Washington’s earlier liberal internationalism, criticizing Bush for violating its principles.[10] (As one journalist for the Süddeutsche Zeitung writes: “We [Germans] owe a great debt to the US for contributing to our transformation into truly democratic citizens after World War II. . . . They [Americans] must forgive us if we have difficulty letting go some of the lessons we have learned.”)[11] It was thus his pacifism—his Social Democratic opposition to power per se—rather than any geopolitical ambition for a powerful Europe that seems to have prompted his opposition to the Iraq war.[12] And in this, alas, he resembles much of the German population, which prefers bourgeois comforts to those virtues that made earlier generations great. Finally, Schröder, like Chirac, supports Turkey’s admission to the EU and panders to the new “German Turk” electorate. He might therefore have been the first German chancellor since Hitler to frontally oppose Washington, but he has no intention of letting the old anti-liberal dream of white renaissance out of the bag.[13]

Despite the mediocre stature of these politicians, which makes them ill-suited to the great tasks at hand, I would argue that the “force of things”—the realities of power and the dictates of survival—is greater than those charged with carrying them out.[14] This seems especially evident in Europe’s rapprochement with Russia. For as France and Germany become increasingly alienated from the US, they lean eastward—even though French and German elites have much more in common with their American than their Russian counterparts.[15]

A rapprochement between the three great European peoples promises great things. As Karl Haushofer once said: “The day when Germans, Frenchmen, and Russians unite will be the last day of Anglo-Saxon [i.e., liberal] hegemony.”[16] Bush—and this is why his administration seems destined to achieve world-historical significance—has brought about what a century of US geostrategists have sought to prevent. Conversely, it is hardly coincidental that even at the Cold War’s height, a wing of the French military looked to Russia as a possible ally. In 1955, the prominent geostrategist, Admiral Raoul Castex, published an article titled “Moscou, rempart de l’Occident?” (Moscow, rampart of the West?), in which he wondered if Russia might not one day become “the vanguard of the white world’s defense.”[17] Today, in a period when Grande Europe—from Dublin to Vladivostok—is at peace, white nationalists in Europe and America again pose Castex’s question and again affirm the possibility that Russia has a leading role to play in the white race’s defense. Indeed, the question now possesses a qualitatively greater weight than it did a half century ago, before the Third World hordes, abetted by the West’s liberal elites, began their colonization of our lands. Russia, moreover, is not just the last white nation on earth, but the only one to have shown the slightest interest in defending its ethnoracial identity. (Our russophobic nationalists might be reminded that the former Soviet Union was the sole white power to define nationality racially.) Its heritage of nationalism, socialism, and anti-liberalism also lends it something of that “Prussian socialism” which Spengler and Yockey saw as the one viable antidote to Western liberalism.[18] In courting Russian support in their conflict with the US, French and German elites might think Putin will be converted to their misconceived Kantianism, but in the great racial-civilizational battles that lie ahead, it is far more likely that Russia’s ethnonationalism will prevail.[19]

America’s Future

Since the rise to world power of the United States, white America has been in decline. For most of the twentieth century, but especially since the end of the Second World War, the country’s overlords have taken one step after another to de-Europeanize its white population. To this end, white culture and identity have been socially re-engineered. White communities, schools, and businesses have been forced to integrate with races previously considered inferior and inimical. And, for the last 40 years, whites have been expected to replace themselves with Third World immigrants. As the biocultural identity of white Americans gives way to a universal, transnational, and global one (the ideological analogue of the New World Order), they are further alienated from who they are.[20] Against this de-Europeanization and the postnational, multiracial regime succeeding it, the small, isolated pockets of white resistance confront a seemingly impossible task—similar to the one King Canute faced when he tried to hold back the ocean tide. Because of this, I would argue that only a catastrophe will save white America. Only a catastrophic collapse of the political, institutional, and cultural systems associated with imperial America—call it the managerial state, liberal democracy, corporate capitalism, the NWO, or whatever label you prefer—holds out any possibility that a small, racially conscious vanguard of white Americans will succeed in defending their people’s existence.[21] With the Iraq war, Bush—”this Buster Keaton of the apocalypse”—has opened a Pandora’s box of catastrophes. He, in fact, has done more to discredit, weaken, and vilify the existing systems of liberal subversion than any previous president, inadvertently creating conditions that should give white Americans another chance to regain control of their destiny. In this spirit, his administration acts as “a lightning rod for catastrophes.”  As one foreign observer notes: “The paradox of the present situation is that the worse the crisis becomes, the more Washington reinforces the position that evokes so much resistance.”[22] Indeed, his “war on terror creates more monsters than its destroys.”[23] Lacking the cognitive and normative tools to deal with a complex area like the Mideast, the president ends up managing the Iraqi occupation “by the seat of his pants.”[24] And as he does, the real dangers threatening the country are totally ignored: the dangers posed by the mestizo and Asiatic colonization of our lands, the growth of US Muslim communities, the denationalization of the economy and the looming fiscal crisis of the state, the Zionist domination of the political and information systems, the replacement of truth with propaganda and disinformation, the deculturation and miscegenation of our people, and the unrelenting assault on everything associated with the “freedoms” he allegedly defends in Mesopotamia. Instead of inaugurating a new era of unchallenged American power and enhancing national security, Bush seems set on preparing their demise.[25] Since the murderous terror of 9/11, his administration has shattered the myth of American military omnipotence, tarnished the country’s moral authority, alienated its allies, squandered its once formidable diplomatic powers, created the basis of an anti-US realignment, and undermined America’s image not only as a force for democracy and order, but as a secure economic haven. This latter tendency is now causing overseas investors to think twice about sending their capital to the US, which, combined with the ballooning expenses of the Iraq war, is hastening the dollar’s decline and the country’s economic deterioration. But more than undermining American power and prestige, the Bush administration has discredited the liberal civilizational model associated with the United States, provoking, in the process, a worldwide revulsion against the “American way of life.”[26]

The simple-minded, dishonorable, and raceless character of Bush’s government—riddled with Israeli spies and unsavory influence peddlers and premised on the belief that truth is irrelevant to its political calculus—seems to epitomize nothing so much as the debilitated state of our governing classes and their inability to serve as a nation-bearing stratum. That for the first time in American history Europe is not the focus of US strategic thinking, but rather Israel, should say it all.[27] It would be misleading, though, to think the failures at the highest level of state are simply the result of an unusually incompetent administration or its alien controllers. For even the “opposition” party produces candidates who are but variants of the reigning mediocrity.[28] This suggests that the system itself is bankrupt. Not coincidentally, the telltale signs of blockage, symptomatic of regimes heading toward the abyss (or “staying the course,” as George II says), appear now with increased frequency. The great bard of our decline, H. Millard, likens America to a runaway train. “The Israel firsters, neurotics, low IQ PTA types, political opportunists, easily susceptible dupes, genocidal blenders, party loyalists, war profiteers, and opportunists of various stripes” who are at the controls either have no idea of what they are doing or an unwillingness to profess it publicly.[29]

Contrary to the pipedreams of both our conservatives and liberals, there will be no going back.[30] Like the Soviet Union in the 1980s, the US has become bogged down in a protracted war at the very moment its economy is in steep decline. The slash-and-burn policies Bush has introduced will also be extremely difficult to retract, no matter who captures the White House in 2008. But even if there were a desire to retract them, the means are lacking. For example, in 1956, when Dwight Eisenhower warned France and England not to retake the Suez Canal, after Egypt nationalized it, he was able to threaten the stability of their national currencies. Today, the dollar is itself threatened.[31] For all the fabled shock and awe of US power in this period, the country is qualitatively weaker than it was a generation ago, when it was able to rein in the largest European empires. This erosion of its economic, diplomatic, moral, and even military power, combined with the near universal opposition to its increasingly unilateral and militaristic foreign policy, cannot but provoke a geopolitical realignment. The prospect of the Iraq war spreading to Iran and elsewhere will simply compound these destabilizing forces.[32] Increased conflict abroad, growing dissent at home, and deep division within the government itself are also likely to foster decisional paralysis, further exacerbating the crisis.

But however this crisis plays out, America and Europe seem set on a collision course.[33] Already wary of Washington, France and Germany (along with Spain, Belgium, and Italy, once Berlusconi goes) will eventually have no choice but to reposition themselves in opposition to it, for their strategic imperatives are increasingly at odds. This is certain to trigger new conflicts and new alignments, compelling Europeans to reaffirm their sovereignty—and their distinct strategic identity. As they do, their cooperation is bound to deepen and their nationalist consciousness to grow. At the same time, certain mentalities will be forced to change and certain taboos to fall, including the postmodern ones that leave Europe powerless. The collapse of the Cold War alliance system also throws open the strategic-political parameters of the international arena. The future, as a consequence, now holds out several possible alternatives. The Paris-Berlin-Moscow axis may still lack credibility, but this is probably less important than the effect it has had—and will continue to have—on the European spirit. It thus promises a possible renewal. The big question is whether or not Europeans have the will and acumen to realize it.

Fundamental to virtually all schools of geopolitical thought is the notion that the augmentation of power in one part of the world inevitably comes at the expense of another part. If the Paris-Berlin-Moscow axis continues to affect the continent and shift power out of the Atlanticist camp, this cannot but destabilize the United States, for without its omnipotent dollar and its domination of global markets, it will no longer be able to consume more than it produces, to live on credit, to afford the social-welfare measures that buy off the Africans and tame the Mexicans, to sustain the social-engineering schemes discriminating against the talents and energies of its white majority, to afford the police, the drugs, the TVs, and the computer toys that narcotize its cretinized masses. The institutionalization of such an axis is also likely to dislodge America’s dominant place in the world system, setting off economic disruptions that will make it impossible for whites to live in the old way, to lose themselves in vacuous material comforts, to accept the lies that fly in the face of reality. Once this point is reached, European-Americans will be forced to act like people elsewhere who are suddenly thrown into a do-or-die situation.[34]

Like the “American Century” Henry Luce announced in 1941, the “New American Century” of Washington’s current generation of schemers and chiselers promises an even greater holocaust of our people. The future they envisage might indeed be called the New Anti-White Century. For like the order issuing from their Second World War, the one planned for the period following Iraq will not serve white America, only the alien, plutocratic, and cosmopolitan interests aligned in the current Washington-London-Tel Aviv axis.

No one should be surprised, then, that when the inevitable collapse comes, white America’s front fighters will not mourn the eclipse of the so-called American Century, for they are nationalists not in the nineteenth century sense. They do not fight for the petty-statism of the so-called “nation-state”—which is now made up of peoples from many different nations. The American, German, and French states—none of these entities any longer represent the descendants of those who founded them. As Sam Francis puts it, “the state has become the enemy of the nation.”[35] And as a thousand years of European history demonstrate, whenever the state and the nation come into conflict, the latter inevitably proves the stronger. I think it is no exaggeration to claim that only on the ruins of the existing political order will white America be reborn—and reborn not as another constitutional “nation-state” which elevates abstract rights above biocultural imperatives, but as a northern imperium of white peoples who, as Bismarck exhorted, “think with their blood.”

Those who would dismiss the Paris-Berlin-Moscow axis as a temporary happenstance, a product of convenience, inflated with purely speculative significance, should be reminded that the 21st century will decide if white people have a future or not. From this perspective, collapse and realignment are necessities—and necessities have a way of engendering the imagination appropriate to them. For when the world’s population reaches ten billion, when China, India, and all Asia challenge the white man’s dominance, when the colored multitudes crossing our borders are magnified by ten or a hundred, when oil is depleted and raw materials are used up, when all the forests have been cut down and all the cultivable lands claimed, and—hopefully—when the Paris-Berlin-Moscow axis has established an alternative realm of white existence, the ensuing chaos cannot but sunder whatever misbegotten allegiance white Americans have had to the present system. Then, in alliance with their kinsmen in Europe and Russia, they—if they are to survive as a people—will have no choice but to accept that they are made not in the multihued images of a deracinated humanity, but in that of the luminous Boreans, whose destiny opposes the darkening forces of Bush’s America.

Let us prepare for the coming collapse.

Notes

1. Robert Kagan, Of Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order (New York: Knopf, 2003), p. 3. Actually, the unreferenced metaphor originates with Denis MacShane, “Europe and America Need Each Other More Than Ever,” http://www.post-gazette.com ^[2]

2. Kagan, Of Paradise and Power, p. 28.

3. Guillaume Faye, La colonisation de l’Europe: Discours vrai sur l’immigration et l’Islam (Paris: L’Æncre, 2000); Nicolas Baverez, La France qui tombe (Paris: Perrin, 2004).

4. Julius Evola, Imperialismo pagano: Il fascismo dinanzi al pericolo euro-cristiano (Padua: Ar, 1996), p. 45.

5. Yves Daoudal, Le tour infernal: 21 avril–5 mai (Paris: Godefroy de Bouillon, 2003).

6. Yves-Marie Laulan, Jacques Chirac et le déclin français 1974–2002 (Paris: François-Xavier de Guilbert, 2001); Emmanuel Ratier, Le vrai visage de Jacques Chirac (Paris: Facta, 1995).

7. Faye, Le coup d’Etat mondial, p. 113.

8. Omer Taspinar, “Europe’s Muslim Streets,” Foreign Policy (March–April 2003).

9. As Schröder says: “Es gibt nicht zu viel Amerika, es gibt zu wenig Europa.” See “Die Krise, die Europa eint: Ein Gespräch mit Gerhard Schröder,” Die Zeit (14/2003). Cf. Philippe Grasset, “Le dilemme stratégique des U.S.A: Sa faiblesse militaire” (June 15, 2004), http://www.dedefensa.org

10. Günter Maschke, “Vereinigte Staaten sind die Macht der Unordnung,” Deutsche Stimme (June 2003).

11. Quoted in Richard Lambert, “Misunderstanding Each Other,” Foreign Affairs (March–April 2003).

12. Alexander Rar, “Europa ist Zerspaltet” (December 15, 2003), http://evrazia.org ^[3]

13. Edouard Husson, “Crise allemande, crise européenne?” (March 2003), http://www.diploweb.com ^[4]

14. As Joseph de Maistre said of the revolutionaries of 1789: “Ce ne sont point les hommes qui mènent la révolution, c’est la révolution qui emploie les hommes.” See Considérations sur la France (Lyon: Vitte, 1924), p. 7.

15. Maja Heidenreich, “Europa und Russland: Eine rückblickende und analysierende Darstellung” (n.d.), http://www.boschlektoren.de/ ^[5]

16. Quoted in Sacha Papovic, “De la dialectique géopolitique” (August 2003), http://www.voxnr.com.

17. Cited in “Russie-France-Allemagne” ( n.d.), http://www.paris-berlin-moscou.org ^[6]

18. Oswald Spengler, Preussentum und Sozialismus (Munich: Beck, 1919); K. R. Bolton, ed., Varange: The Life and Thoughts of Francis Parker Yockey (Paraparaumu, NZ: Renaissance Press, 1998), pp. 36–38. Also N. N. Alexeiev, “Raisons spirituelles de la civilisation eurasiste” (1998), http://www.voxnr.com ^[7]

19. W. Joseph Stoupe, “The Inevitability of a Eurasian Alliance” (August 17, 2004), http://atimes.com ^[8]

20. James Kurth, “The War and the West,” Orbis (Spring 2002).

21. Guillaume Faye, Avant-Guerre: Chronique d’un cataclysme annoncé (Paris: L’Æncre, 2002).

22. Philippe Grasset, “Comment Rumsfeld devient le garante de l’aventure irakienne” (May 11, 2004), http://www.dedefense.org ^[9]

23. François-Bernard Huyghe, Quatrième guerre mondiale: Faire mourir et faire croire (Paris: Rocher, 2004), p. 9.

24. D. Priest and T. E. Ricks, “Growing Pessimism on Iraq: Doubts Increase within U.S. Security Agencies,” The Washington Post, September 29, 2004.

25. Philippe Grasset, “La destruction méthodique de la puissance américaine” (September 27, 2004), http://www.dedefensa.org ^[10]; Guatam Adhikari, “The End of the Unipolar Myth,” International Herald Tribune, September 27, 2004.

26. Philippe Grasset, “Comment l’américainisme est en train d’apparaître pour ce qu’il est: un problème de civilisation” (September 1, 2004), http://www.dedefensa.org ^[10]

27. Brent Scowcroft, George I’s national security adviser, has publicly criticized George II for being “inordinately influenced by Israel’s Prime Minister Ariel Sharon. ‘Sharon just has him wrapped around his little finger’, Scowcroft said. ‘I think the president is mesmerized.’“ See “Key GOP Figure Raps Bush on Mideast,” San Francisco Chronicle, October 17, 2004.

28. Ehsan Ahari, “How Bush, Kerry Are One and the Same” (September 2, 2004), http://www.latimes.com ^[11]

29. H. Millard, “Ridin’ the Runaway Train Named America” (2004), http://www.newnation.org ^[12]

30. Françoise Vergniolle de Chantal, “Les débats américains sur la relations transatlantiques” (2004), http://robert-schuman.org ^[13]

31. Ian Williams, “Deterring the Empire” (May 13, 2003), http://www.alternet.org ^[14]

32. David Wood, “U.S. to Sell Precision-Guided Bombs to Israel” (September 23, 2004), http://www.newhousesnews.com ^[15]

33. Ian Black, “The Transatlantic Drift,” The Guardian, September 20, 2004; Philippe Grasset, “L’UE: Une stratégie de rupture avec l’Amérique” (September 20, 2004), http://www.dedefensa.org ^[10]

34. Faye, Avant-Guerre.

35. Sam Francis, “When the State Is the Enemy of the Nation” (July 19, 2004), http://www.vdare.com ^[16] This is not to say that the state is inherently the enemy of the nation—only that this is the case with the existing liberal state. On the difference between statism and nationalism, see Walker Connor, Ethnonationalism: The Quest for Understanding (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994).

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Article printed from Counter-Currents Publishing: http://www.counter-currents.com

Quel "nationalisme" pour les années 90 et le XXIème siècle?

Quel «nationalisme» pour les

 

années 90 et le XXIème siècle ?

 

par Robert STEUCKERS

 

Archives de SYNERGIES EUROPEENNES - 1991

 

Dans nos régions, nous avons coutume d'opposer deux formes de nationalisme, le nationalisme de culture (ou nationalisme populaire : volksnationalisme) et le nationalisme d'État (staatsnationalisme). Le nationalisme culturel/populaire tient compte essentiellement de l'ethnicité, en tant que matrice historique de valeurs précises qui ne sont pas transposables dans un autre humus. Le nationalisme d'État met l'ethnicité ou les ethnicités d'un territoire au service d'une machine administrative, bureaucratique ou militaire. Pour cette idéologie, l'ethnicité n'est pas perçue comme une matrice de valeurs mais comme une sorte de carburant que l'on brûlera pour faire avancer la machine. L'État, dans la perspective du staatsnationalisme, n'est pas une instance qui dynamise les forces émanant de la Volkheit mais un moloch qui les consomme et les détruit.

Les nationalismes culturels/populaires partent d'une vision plurielle de l'histoire, du monde et de la politique. Chaque peuple émet des valeurs qui correspondent aux défis que lui lance l'espace sur lequel il vit. Dans les zones intermédiaires, des peuples en contact avec deux grandes aires culturelles combinent les valeurs des uns et des autres en des synthèses tantôt harmonieuses tantôt malheureuses. Les nationalismes d'État arasent généralement les valeurs produites localement, réduisant la diversité du territoire à une logique unique, autoritaire et stérile.

 

Valoriser l'histoire, relativiser les institutions

 

Par tradition historique, noua sommes, depuis l'émergence des nationalismes vers l'époque de la révolution française, du côté des nationalismes culturels contre les nationalismes d'État. Mais au-delà des étiquettes désignant les diverses formes de nationalisme, noua adhérons, plus fondamentalement, à des systèmes de valeurs qui privilégient la diversité plutôt qu'à des systèmes d'action qui tentent de la réduire à des modèles simples, homogénéisés et, de ce fait même, stérilisés. Toute approche plurielle des facteurs historiques et politiques implique une relativisation des institutions établies ; celles-ci ne sont pas d'emblée jugées éternelles et indépassables. Elles sont perçues comme exerçant une fonction précise et doivent disparaître dès que cette fonction n'a plus d'utilité. Les approches homogénéisantes imposent un cadre institutionnel que l'on veut intangible. La vitalité populaire, par définition plurielle dans ses manifestations, déborde tôt ou tard ce cadre rigide. Deux scénarios sont alors possibles : a) les mercenaires au service du cadre répriment la vitalité populaire par violence ou b) le peuple met à bas les institutions devenues obsolètes et chasse ou exile les tenants têtus du vieil ordre.

Qu'en est-il de cette opposition entre pluralité et homogénéisation à la veille du XXIème siècle ? Il me semble inopportun de continuer à répéter tel quel les mots d'ordre et les slogans nés lors de l'opposition, au début du XIXème siècle, entre «nationalismes de culture» (Verlooy, Jahn, Arndt, Conscience, Hoffmann von Fallersleben) et «nationalismes d'État» (jacobinisme, bonapartisme). Pour continuer à exprimer notre opposition de principe aux stratégies d'homogénéisation, qui ont été celles du jacobinisme et du bonapartisme, noua devons choisir, aujourd'hui, un vocabulaire moderne, dérivé des sciences récentes (biocybernétique, informatique, physique etc.). En effet, les «nationalismes d'État» ont pour caractéristique d'avoir été forgés sur le modèle des sciences physiques mécanicistes du XVIIIème siècle. Les «nationalismes culturels», eux, ont voulu suggérer un modèle d'organisation politique calqué sur les principes des sciences biologiques émergentes (J.W. Ritter, Carus, Oken, etc.). Malgré les progrès énormes de ces sciences de la vie dans le monde de tous les jours, certains États (Belgique, France, Italie, URSS, Yougoslavie, «démocraties socialistes», Algérie, etc.) fonctionnent toujours selon des critères mécanicistes et demeurent innervés par des valeurs mécanicistes homogénéisantes.

 

Les leçons d’Alvin Toffler

 

Le nationalisme, ou tout autre idéologie, qui voudrait mettre un terme à cette anomalie, devra nécessairement être de nature offensive, porté par la volonté de briser définitivement les pouvoirs anciens. Il ne doit pas vouloir les consolider ni remettre en selle des modèles passés de nationalisme statolâtrique. La lecture du dernier livre d'un écrivain américain célèbre, Alvin Toffler, nous apparaît utile pour comprendre les enjeux des décennies à venir, décennies où les mouvements (nationalistes ou non) hostiles aux établissements devront percer sur la scène politique. Entendons-nous bien, ces mouvements, dans la mesure où ils sont hostiles aux formes figées héritées de l'ère mécaniciste/révolutionnaire, sont authentiquement «démocratiques» et «populistes» ; nous savons depuis les thèses de Roberto Michels que le socialisme a basculé dans l'oligarchisation de ses cadres. Nous savons aussi que ce processus d'oligarchisation a affecté le pilier démocrate-chrétien, désormais connecté à la mafia en Italie et partout éloigné du terreau populaire. Si bien que les élus socialistes ou démocrates-chrétiens eux-mêmes se rendent compte que les décisions sont prises, dans leurs partis, en coulisse et non plus dans les assemblées générales (les tripotages de Martens au sein de son propre parti en sont une belle illustration).

Ce phénomène d'oligarchisation, de gigantisme et de pyramidalisation suscite l'apparition de structures pachydermiques et monolithiques, incapables de capter les flux d'informations nouvelles qui émanent de la réalité quotidienne, de la Volkheit en tant que fait de vie. Je crois, avec Alvin Toffler, que ce hiatus prend des proportions de plus en plus grandes depuis le milieu des années 80 : c'est le cas chez nous, où le CVP s'effrite parce qu'il ne répond plus aux besoins des citoyens actifs et innovateurs ; c'est le cas en France, où les partis dits de la «bande des quatre» s'avèrent incapables de résoudre les problèmes réels auxquels la population est confrontée. Toffler nous parle de la nécessité de provoquer un «transfert des pouvoirs». Ceux-ci, à l'instar de ce qui s'est effectivement produit dans les firmes gigantesques d'Outre-Atlantique, devront passer, «des monolithes aux mosaïques». Les entreprises géantes ont constaté que les stratégies de concentration aboutissaient à l'impasse ; il a fallu inverser la vapeur et se décomposer en un grand nombre de petites unités à comptabilité autonome, opérationnellement déconcentrées. Autonomie qui les conduira inévitablement à prendre un envol propre, adapté aux circonstances dans lesquelles elles évoluent réellement. Les mondes politiques, surtout ceux qui participent de la logique homogénéisante jacobine, restent en deçà de cette évolution inéluctable : en d'autres termes, ils sont dépassés et contournés par les énergies qui se déploient au départ des diverses Volkheiten concrètes. Phénomène observable en Italie du Nord, où les régions ont pris l'initiative de dépasser le monolithe étatique romain, et ont créé des réseaux alpin et adriatique de relations interrégionales qui se passent fort bien des immixtions de l'État central. La Vénétie peut régler avec la Slovénie ou la Croatie des problèmes relatifs à la région adriatique et, demain, régler, sans passer par Rome, des problèmes alpins avec la Bavière, le Tyrol autrichien, la Lombardie ou le canton des Grisons. Ces régions se dégagent dès lors de la logique monolithique stato-nationale pour adopter une logique en mosaïque (pour reprendre le vocabulaire de Toffler), outrepassant, par suite, les niveaux hiérarchiques établis qui bloquent, freinent et ralentissent les flux de communications. Niveaux hiérarchiques qui deviennent ipso facto redondants. Par rapport aux monolithes, les mosaïques de Toffler sont toujours provisoires, réorientables tous azimuts et hyper-flexibles.

 

La «Troisième Vague»

 

Caractère provisoire, réorientabilité et hyper-flexibilité sont des nécessités postulées par les révolutions technologiques de ces vingt dernières années. L'ordinateur et le fax abolissent bon nombre de distances et autonomisent d'importantes quantités de travailleurs du secteur tertiaire. Or les structures politiques restent en deçà de cette évolution, donc en discordance avec la société. Toffler parle d'une «Troisième Vague» post-moderne qui s'oppose à la fois au traditionalisme des mouvements conservateurs (parfois religieux) et au modernisme homogénéisant. Aujourd'hui, tout nationalisme ou tout autre mouvement visant l'innovation doit être le porte-voix de cette «Troisième Vague» qui réclame une révision totale des institutions politiques établies. Basée sur un savoir à facettes multiples et non plus sur l'argent ou la tradition, la «Troisième Vague» peut trouver à s'alimenter au nationalisme de culture, dans le sens où ce type-là de nationalisme découle d'une logique plurielle, d'une logique qui accepte la pluralité. Les nationalismes d'État, constructeurs de molochs monolithiques, sont résolument, dans l'optique de Toffler, des figures de la «Seconde Vague», de l'«Âge usinier», ère qui a fonctionné par monologique concentrante ; preuve : devant les crises actuelles (écologie, enseignement, organisation du secteur de santé, transports en commun, urbanisme, etc.), produites par des étranglements, des goulots, dus au gigantisme et à l'éléphantiasis des structures datant de l'«âge usinier», les hommes politiques, qui ne sont plus au diapason, réagissent au coup par coup, c'est-à-dire exactement selon les critères de leur monologique homogénéisante, incapable de tenir compte d'un trop grand nombre de paramètres. Les structures mises en place par les nationalismes d'État sont lourdes et inefficaces (songeons à la RTT ou la poste), alors que les structures en mosaïques, créées par les firmes qui se sont déconcentrées ou par les régions nord-italiennes dans la nouvelle synergie adriatique/alpine, sont légères et performantes. Tout nationalisme ou autre mouvement innovateur doit donc savoir s'adresser, dès aujourd’hui, à ceux qui veulent déconcentrer, accélérer les communications et contourner les monolithes désormais inutiles et inefficaces.

 

Les «lents» et les «rapides»

 

Toffler nous parle du clivage le plus important actuellement : celui qui distingue les «lents» des «rapides». L'avenir proche appartient évidemment à ceux qui sont rapides, ceux qui peuvent prendre des décisions vite et bien, qui peuvent livrer des marchandises dans les délais les plus brefs. Les pays du Tiers-Monde appartiennent évidemment à la catégorie des «lents». Mais bon nombre de structures su sein même de nos sociétés «industrielles avancées» y appartiennent également. Prenons quelques exemples : l'entêtement de plusieurs strates de l'establishment belge à vouloir commercer avec le Zaïre, pays hyper-lent parce qu'hyper-corrompu (tel maître, tel valet, serait-on tenté de dire...) relève de la pure aberration, d'autant plus qu'il n'y a guère de profits à en tirer ou, uniquement, si le contribuable finance partiellement les transactions ou les «aides annexes». Quand Geene a voulu infléchir vers l'Indonésie, pays plus rapide (dont la balancé commerciale est positive !), les flux d'aides belges au tiers-monde, on a hurlé au flamingantisme, sous prétexte que l'Insulinde avait été colonie néerlandaise. Pour toute perspective nationaliste, les investissements doivent, comme le souligne aussi Toffler, opérer un retour au pays ou, au moins, se relocaliser en Europe. Deuxième exemple : certains rapports de la Commission des Communautés européennes signalent l'effroyable lenteur des télécommunications en Belgique (poste, RTT, chemin de fer, transports en commun urbains, etc.) et concluent que Bruxelles n'est pas la ville adéquate pour devenir la capitale de l'Europe de 1992, en dépit de tout ce que Martens, les banques de l'établissement, la Cour, etc. ont mis en œuvre pour en faire accepter le principe. Hélas pour ces «lents», il y a de fortes chances pour que Bonn ou Strasbourg emportent le morceau !

 

Partitocratie et apartheid

 

Des démonstrations qui précédent, il est facile de déduire quelques mots d'ordre pour l'action des mouvements innovateurs :

- lutte contre toutes les formes d'oligarchisation issues de la partitocratie ; ces oligarchisations ou pilarisations (verzuiling) sont des stratégies de monolithisation et d'exclusion de tous ceux qui n'adhérent pas à la philosophie de l'un ou l'autre pilier (zuil). Sachons rappeler à Paula d'Hondt que ce ne sont pas tant les immigrés qui sont des exclus dans notre société, qui seraient victimes d'un «apartheid», mais qu'une quantité impressionnante de fils et de filles de notre peuple ont été ou sont «exclus» ou «mal intégrés» à cause des vices de fonctionnement de la machine étatique belge. Ne pas pouvoir être fonctionnaire si l'on n'est pas membre d'un parti, ou devoir sauter plus d'obstacles pour le devenir, n'est-ce pas de l'«apartheid» ? Conclusion : lutter contre l'apartheid de fait qu'est la pilarisation et rapatrier progressivement les immigrés, après les avoir formés à exercer une fonction utile à leur peuple et pour éviter précisément qu'ils soient, à la longue, victimes d'un réel apartheid, n'est-ce pas plus logique et plus humain que ce qui est pratiqué actuellement à grands renforts de propagande ?

- abattre vite toutes les structures qui ne correspondent plus au niveau actuel des technologies ; un nationalisme de culture, parce qu'il parie sur les énergies inépuisables du peuple, n'est forcément pas passéiste.

- s'inscrire, notamment avec la Lombardie et la Catalogne, dans les stratégies interrégionales en mosaïques ; tout en sachant que l'obstacle demeure la France, dont le conseil constitutionnel vient de décider que le peuple corse n'existait pas ! Ne dialoguer en France qu'avec les régionalistes et renforcer par tous les moyens possibles le dégagement des régions de la tutelle parisienne. Solidarité grande-néerlandaise avec la région Nord-Pas-de-Calais et grande-germanique avec l'Alsace. Pour la Wallonie, si d'aventure elle se dégage de la tutelle socialiste et maçonnique (pro-jacobine), solidarité prioritaire avec les cantons romans de la région Nord-Pas-de-Calais et avec la Lorraine, en tant que régions originairement impériales et romanes à la fois (la Wallonie traditionnelle, fidèle à sa vocation impériale, a un devoir de solidarité avec les régions romanes de l'ancien Reich, la Reichsromanentum, victime des génocides perpétrés par Louis XIV en Lorraine et en Franche-Comté, où 50% de la population a été purement et simplement massacrée ; les énergies de la Wallonie post-socialiste devront se porter le long d'un axe Namur/Arlon/Metz/Nancy/Genève). Appui inconditionnel aux régionalismes corse, breton, occitan et basque, si possible de concert avec les Irlandais, les Catalans, les Lombards et les Piémontais. Forcer les Länder allemands à plus d'audace dans les stratégies de ce type.

- diplomatie orientée vers les «rapides». Ne plus perdre son temps avec le Zaïre ou d'autres États corrompus et inefficaces. Les relations avec ce pays ne sont entretenues que pour défendre des intérêts dépassés, que l'on camoufle souvent derrière un moralisme inepte.

- combattre toutes les lenteurs intérieures, même si nous ne souhaitons pas que Bruxelles devienne la capitale de l'Europe. Si les institutions européennes déménagent ailleurs, les projets de Martens s'effondreront et son régime autoritaire, appuyé notamment sur la Cour et non sanctionné par la base de son propre parti, capotera. L'effondrement du CVP, comme son tassement annoncé, permettra l'envol d'un néo-nationalisme futuriste, tablant sur la longue mémoire et sur la vitesse. Car l'une n'exclut pas l'autre. Un peuple qui garde sa mémoire intacte, sait que l'histoire suit des méandres souvent imprévus et sait aussi quelles réponses ses ancêtres ont apportées aux défis insoupçonnés de l'heure. La mémoire garantit toujours une réponse modulée et rapide aux défis qui se présentent. L'ordinateur n'est-il pas précisément un instrument performant parce qu'il est doté d'une mémoire ? Donc, le nationalisme culturel/populaire, plurilogique, est un bon logiciel. Gardons-le et sachons l'améliorer.

 

Robert STEUCKERS

Source : Alvin Toffler, Les Nouveaux Pouvoirs : Savoir, richesse et

 

violence à la veille du XXlème siècle, Fayard, 1991, 658 p., 149 FF.

 

Ce texte de R. Steuckers a d'abord été publié en langue néerlandaise dans la revue «RevoIte» (été 1991). Il entrait dans le cadre d'un débat sur le nationalisme en Flandre.

Articles de R. Steuckers sur "centrostudilaruna.it"

Articles de Robert Steuckers sur http://www.centrostudilaruna.it/

 La décision dans l’œuvre de Carl Schmitt

Les thèmes de la géopolitique et de l’espace russe dans la vie culturelle berlinoise de 1918 à 1945

L’œuvre de Herman Wirth (1885-1981)

Evola and Spengler

Atlantis, Kush, and Turan: Prehistoric Matrices of Ancient Civilizations in the Posthumous Work of Spengler

La lecture évolienne des thèses de H.F.K. Günther

L’itinéraire d’Edgar Julius Jung

L’utopie conservatrice de Knut Hamsun

Les mentions de l’œuvre de Christoph Steding dans les écrits d’Evola

La contribution à Il Regime Fascista de Wilhelm Stapel

La “Révolution Conservatrice” en Allemagne (1918-1932)

Religiosité indo-européenne

L’influence d’Oswald Spengler sur Julius Evola

Paganisme et philosophie de la vie chez Knut Hamsun et David Herbert Lawrence

L’itinéraire de Knut Hamsun

Introduction à l’œuvre de Ludwig Ferdinand Clauss (1892-1974)

La Perfección de la Técnica. Friedrich-Georg Jünger (1898-1977)

Géopolitique et spiritualité du principe “Reich”

Espionnage par satellites, guerre cognitive, manipulation par les mafias: les embûches extérieures à la construction européenne

Geopolitica e spiritualità del principio “Reich”

Annulation magique de la crise et “méthode physiognomique” chez Ernst Jünger

Révolution Conservatrice, forme catholique et ordo æternus romain

L’itinerario di Knut Hamsun

Robert Steuckers sur "Méridien Zéro" - Paris 16juin 2011

Robert Steuckers sur "Méridien Zéro"

Paris, 12 juin 2011

G. Faye: Why we fight

Why We Fight

Guillaume Faye
Why We Fight: Manifesto of the European Resistance
Translated by Michael O’Meara
Arktos Media, 2011

People

An ethnic ensemble — biological, historical, cultural — with a territory, its fatherland, in which it is rooted.

‘The people’ — the very term is suspect to the cosmopolitan Left, which sees it as bordering on the politically incorrect — is not any statistical ‘population’; it’s an organic community embracing a transcendent body made up of ancestors, the living, and their heirs. Though marked with a certain spirituality, a people is diachronically rooted in the past and projects itself into the future — it’s submerged in biological and genetic matter, but at the same time it’s a historical, and spiritual, reality.

It’s belonging to a specific people that distinguishes a man and makes him human. Though modern Western egalitarian doctrines reduce peoples to indifferent socioeconomic aggregates, peoples actually constitute the organic bases of the human race; similarly, such doctrines conceive of the ideal man as an individual ‘emancipated’ from his organic attachments — like an undifferentiated cell in a human magma.

It’s necessary to recall, especially for certain Christians, that a people’s attachment is incompatible with Christianity’s present cosmopolitanism. The claim, for example, that ‘I am closer to an African Catholic than I am to a non-Christian European’ is a universalistic claim that relegates a people’s nation to something of secondary significance. This is, indeed, the great drama of European Christianity, marked as it is by Pauline universalism. A Catholic attached to his people and conscious of the biological and cultural dangers threatening them might instead say, ‘I respect all the Christians of the world, but hic et nunc I fight for my people above all, whatever their religion’.

The Jesuit spirit might resolve the contradiction in reference to the Old Testament’s Hebraic tradition: ‘Babel — the mélange of disparate peoples — is a punishment from God, Who wants His peoples to be separate and diverse — humanity is one in Heaven, but multiple on Earth’.

Arab Islam has no difficulty reconciling the notion of people (the ‘Arab nation’) with that of its universalism. The Jews, on their side, have similarly reconciled a ferocious defence of their ethnicity — their singularity — with their religion, however theoretically monotheistic and universalist it may be. At no moment have Judaism and Islam, unlike the Christian Churches today, engaged in doubting, guiltstroking diatribes against ‘xenophobia’ and ethnocentrism. They are not masochistic . . .

* * *

Like every anthropological notion, ‘people’ lacks mathematical rigour. A people doesn’t define itself as a homogeneous biocultural totality, but as a relationship. It’s the product of an organic alchemy that brings various ‘sub-peoples’ together. The Bretons, Catalans, Scots, etc., can be seen thus as the sub-peoples of a larger people — the Europeans.

* * *

We ought to highlight the ambiguity that touches the notion of the people. The universalist ideology of the French Revolution confused the idea of the people with that of an ‘ensemble of inhabitants who jurisdictionally possess nationality’, whatever their origin. Given the facts of mass immigration and naturalisation, the notion of the French people has been greatly diluted (as have the British or German peoples, for the same reason). This is why (without broaching the unresolvable issue of what constitutes a ‘regional people’ or a ‘national people’), it’s advisable to dialectically transcend semantic problems — and affirm the historic legitimacy of a single, European people, historically bound, whose different national families resemble one another in having, for thousands of years, the same ethnocultural and historical origins. Despite national, linguistic, or tribal differences, haven’t African Blacks, even in Europe, been called on by Nelson Mandela or the Senegalese Mamadou Diop to ‘think like one people’? From Nasser to al-Qadhafi, by way of Arafat, haven’t Arabs been urged to see themselves as an Arab people? Why don’t Europeans have the same right to see themselves as a people?

As for ‘regional peoples’, it’s necessary to oppose Left-wing regionalists, self-professed anti-Jacobins and anti-globalists, who unhesitatingly accept the concept of French or American jus soli — who confuse citizens and residents, and who recognise as Bretons, Alsatians, Corsicans, etc., anyone (even of non-European origin) who lives in these regions and chooses to accept such an identity.

* * *

In belonging to a people, its members are emotionally inclined to define themselves as such, which implies political affiliation. For this reason, we say that a people exists at that point where biological, territorial, cultural, and political imperatives come together. But in no case does mere cultural or linguistic attachment suffice in making a people, if they have no common biological roots. Alien immigrants from people X who are installed on the territory of people Y — even if they adopt cultural elements of their host people — are not a part of Y. As De Gaulle thought, there might be minor exceptions for small numbers of compatible (White) minorities, capable of being assimilated, but this could never be the case for, say, French West Indians.

Similarly, in defining the notion of a people, territorial or geopolitical considerations must also be taken into account. A people is not a diaspora: the Jews felt obliged to reconquer Palestine as their ‘promised land’ because, as Theodor Herzl argued, ‘without a promised land, the Jews are just a religious diaspora, a culture, a union, but not a people’.

There’s a good deal of talk today, on the Left and the Right, about people being ‘deterritorialised’. In reality, there’s nothing of the kind. Every healthy people, even if they possess an important diaspora (Chinese, Arabs, Indians, etc.), maintains close relations with its fatherland.

* * *

Modernist gurus have long claimed that the future belongs not to peoples, but to humanity conceived as a single people. Again, there’ll be nothing of the kind. Despite globalisation and in reaction to it, the Twenty-first century will more than ever be a century of distinct peoples. Only Europeans, submerged in the illusions of their decadence, imagine that blood-based peoples will disappear, to be replaced by a miscegenated ‘world citizen’. In reality what is at risk of disappearing are Europeans. Tomorrow will be no twilight of peoples.

On the other hand, the twilight of several peoples is already possible. One often forgets that Amerindians or Egyptians have disappeared — hollowed out internally and overrun. For history is a cemetery of peoples — of weak peoples — exhausted and resigned.

* * *

A caution is necessary here: Right and Left-wing theoreticians of ‘ethnopluralism’, opposed to humanity’s homogenisation, speak of ‘the cause of peoples ^[3]’, as if every people must be conserved. In reality, the system that destroys peoples — the title of one of my books that was misunderstood by certain intellectuals — only threatens unfit peoples, i.e., present-day Europeans. It also threatens those residu peoples, whose fate is of interest only to museum-keepers. It seems perfectly stupid and utopian to believe that every people can be conserved in history’s formaldehyde. What a pacifistic egalitarian vision.

The main threat to the identity and existence of great peoples occurs, in contrast, through the conjunction of deculturation and the colonising invasion of alien peoples — which we’re presently experiencing. The Western globalist ‘system’ will never threaten strong peoples. Are Arabs, Chinese, or Indians threatened? On the contrary. It reinforces their identity and their desire to conquer, by provoking their reaction to it.

The people in danger — largely because of its own failings — is our people, for reasons as much biological as cultural and strategic. That’s why it’s necessary to replace the egalitarian ideology of ‘the cause of peoples’ with the ‘cause of our people’.

* * *

There are three possible positions: first, peoples don’t exist, or no longer exist — it’s an obsolete category — only humanity counts (the thesis of universalistic egalitarianism); second, all peoples ought to exist and be conserved (the utopian — also egalitarian — ethnopluralist position — completely inapplicable to our age); and third, only strong, wilful peoples can subsist for long historical periods — periods of selection in which only the most apt survive (the voluntarist, realist, inegalitarian thesis). We obviously support the third position.

What’s essential is reappropriating the term ‘people’ and progressively extending it to the entire Eurosiberian Continent. The present understanding of ‘European’ by the reigning ideology at Brussels is inspired by French Jacobin ideology. This ideology makes no reference to an ethno-historical Great European people, only to a mass of disparate residents inhabiting European territory. This tendency needs to be radically replaced.We propose that European peoples become historical subjects again and cease being historical objects. In the tragic century that’s coming, it’s especially crucial that Europeans become conscious of the common dangers they face and that, henceforth, they form a selfconscious community of destiny. This is well and truly a matter of forging a ‘new alliance’ that — through resurrection, metamorphosis, and historical transfiguration — will lead to a refounding of a Great European people and, in the midst of decline, succeed — not without pain, of course — in giving birth again to the phoenix.

Available from Arktos Media ^[4]

---

Article printed from Counter-Currents Publishing: http://www.counter-currents.com

Robert Steuckers: Answers given to the Scandinavian Group "Oskorei"

Robert Steuckers:

Answers Given to the Scandinavian Group and Internet Forum “Oskorei / motpol.nu”)

 

Picture: Walking along Heidegger's path in Todtnauberg, Germany, July 2010 (Photo, copyright: AnaR).

 

Why did you found « Synergies Européennes » ?

 

Initially I had no intention to found any group or subgroup in the broad family of New Right clubs and caucuses. But as, for many reasons, cooperation with the French branch around Alain de Benoist seemed to be impossible to resume, I first decided to retire completely and to devote myself to other tasks, such as translations or private teaching. This transition period of disabused withdrawal lasted exactly one month and one week (from December 6^th, 1992 to begin January 1993). When friends from Provence phoned me during the first days of 1993 to express their best wishes for the New Year to come and when I told them what kind of decision I had taken, they protested heavily, saying that they preferred to rally under my supervision than under the one of the always mocked “Parisians”. I answered that I had no possibility to rent places or find accommodations in their part of France. One day after, they found a marvellous location to organise a summer course. Other people, such as Gilbert Sincyr, generously supported this initiative, which six months later was a success due to the tireless efforts of Christiane Pigacé, a university teacher in political sciences in Aix-en-Provence, and of a future lawyer in Marseille, Thierry Mudry, who both could obtain the patronage of Prof. Julien Freund. The summer course was a success. But no one had still the idea of founding a new independent think tank. It came only one year later when we had to organise several preparatory meetings in France and Belgium for a next summer course at the same location. Things were decided in April 1994 in Flanders, at least for the Belgians, Italians, Spaniards, Portuguese and French. A German-Austrian team joined in 1995 immediately after a summer course of the German weekly paper “Junge Freiheit”, that organized a short trip to Prague for the participants (including Sunic, the Russian writer Vladimir Wiedemann and myself); people of the initial French team, under the leading of Jean de Bussac, travelled to the Baltic countries, to try to make contacts there. In 1996, Sincyr, de Bussac and Sorel went to Moscow to meet a Russian team lead by Anatoly Ivanov, former Soviet dissident and excellent translator from French and German into Russian, Vladimir Avdeev and Pavel Tulaev. We had also the support of Croatians (Sunic, Martinovic, Vujic) and Serbs (late Dragos Kalajic) despite the war raging in the Balkans between these two peoples. In Latin America we’ve always had the support of Ancient Greek philosophy teacher Alberto Buela, who is also an Argentinian rancher leading a small ranch of 600 cows, and his old fellow Horacio Cagni, an excellent connoisseur of Oswald Spengler, who has been able to translate the heavy German sentences of Spengler himself into a limpid Spanish prose. The meetings and summer courses lasted till 2003 and the magazines were published till 2004. Of course, personal contacts are still held and new friends are starting new initiatives, better adapted to the tastes of younger people. In 2007 we started to blog on the net with “euro-synergies.hautetfort.com” in seven languages with new texts every day and with “vouloir.hautetfort.com” only in French with all the articles in our archives. This latest initiative is due to a rebuilt French section in Paris. These blogging activities bring us more readers and contacts than the old ways of working. Postage costs were in the end too high to let the printed stuff survive. The efforts of our American friend Greg Johnson, excellent translator from French into English, has opened us new horizons in the world, where English is more largely known than other European languages, except Spanish. The translations of Greg can be read on “counter-currents.com”. Tomislav Sunic with all his connections in the New World, in England and Scandinavia has played a key role in this step forward. He will force me to write in English in the next future, just as you do now, and to abandon my habit to write mainly in French and sometimes in German, languages that I master better that English. The next long interview in English will be the one that Pavel Tulaev submitted to me some days ago (January 2011). In fact, when I entered as a full member the New Right groups in September 1980, after having been drilled during a special summer course in Provence in July 1980 in the frame of the so-called “Temistoklès Savas Promotion” (T. Savas was a Greek friend who had just died in a motorbike accident in the Northern Greek mountains), I promised to Prof. Pierre Vial, who was at that time one of the main leaders of the celebrated GRECE-group, to lead a metapolitical battle till my last breath. So things are still going on as they ought to.

 

The marvellous water bridge of Rocquevafour were formerly the GRECE Summer Courses were given

Now the very purposes of “Synergies Européennes” or “Euro-Synergies” were to enable all people in Europe (and outside Europe) to exchange ideas, books, views, to start personal contacts, to stimulate the necessity of translating a maximum of texts or interviews, in order to accelerate the maturing process leading to the birth of a new European or European-based political think tank. Another purpose was to discover new authors, usually rejected by the dominant thoughts or neglected by old right groups or to interpret them in new perspectives.

 

“Synergy” means in the Ancient Greek language, “work together” (“syn” = “together” and “ergon” = “to work”); it has a stronger intellectual and political connotation than its Latin equivalent “cooperare” (“co” derived from “cum” = “with”, “together” - and “operare” = “to work”). Translations, meetings and all other ways of cooperating (for conferences, individual speeches or lectures, radio broadcasting or video clips on You Tube, etc.) are the very keys to a successful development of all possible metapolitical initiatives, be they individual, collegial or other. People must be on the move as often as possible, meet each other, eat and drink together, camp under poor soldierly conditions, walk together in beautiful landscapes, taste open-mindedly the local kitchen or liquors, remembering one simple but o so important thing, i. e. that joyfulness must be the core virtue of a good working metapolitical scene. When sometimes things have failed, it was mainly due to humourless, snooty or yellow-bellied guys, who thought they alone could grasp one day the “Truth” and that all others were gannets or cretins. Jean Mabire and Julien Freund, Guillaume Faye and Tomislav Sunic, Alberto Buela and Pavel Tulaev were or are joyful people, who can teach you a lot of very serious things or explain you the most complicated notions without forgetting that joy and gaiety must remain the core virtues of all intellectual work. If there is no joy, you will inevitably be labelled as dull and lose the metapolitical battle. Don’t forget that medieval born initiatives like the German “Burschenschaften” (Students’ Corporations) or the Flemish “Rederijkers Kamers” (“Chambers of Rhetoric”) or the Youth Movements in pre-Nazi Germany were all initiatives where the highest intellectual matters were discussed and, once the seminary closed, followed by joyful songs, drinking parties or dance (Arthur Koestler remembers his time spent at Vienna Jewish Burschenschaft “Unitas” as the best of his youth, despite the fact that the Jewish students of Vienna considered in petto that the habits of the Burschenschaften should be adopted by them as pure mimicking). Humour and irony are also keys to success. A good cartoonist can reach the bull’s eye better than a dry philosopher.

 

Provence village of Lourmarin where three Summer courses of "Synergies Européennes" were held

 

How do you view the proper relationship between the national state and the European Community?

 

Well, it depends which national state you are talking about. Some states have a strong political personality, born out of their own history. Others are remnants of former greater empires, like many states in Central Europe, which once upon a time were parts of the Austrian-Hungarian Habsburgs Empire. France, Britain and Sweden, for instance, have such a well-defined strong personality. Belgium, the country in which I was born, is a more or less artificial state, being a remnant entity of the Austrian-Hungarian Empire and of the medieval German Holy Roman Empire but having been strongly under the influence of France due to the use of French language in the Southern part of the kingdom and among the elites, even in Flemish speaking provinces. Croatia has been part of the Hungarian Crown’s Lands within the Austrian-Hungarian Empire and still desires to have closer links with Austria, Germany and Italy. Bosnia cultivates both the nostalgia of the Austrian-Hungarian Empire and of the Ottoman Empire. The Netherlands has certainly a stronger identity than Belgium or Croatia but this identity has the tendency to develop in two very different directions: a see-oriented direction towards Britain and the United States, or a land-oriented direction towards Germany and Flanders in Belgium. Countries with a weaker identity have the tendency to be more pro-European than the ones that have this strong history born personality I’ve just mentioned. But on the other hand Britain is experimenting nowadays a process of devolution, especially in Scotland and in a lesser extent in Wales. France is still theoretically the embodiment of a strongly centralised state but regional and local identities are flourishing as an alternative to the official universalistic ideology of the “République”, leading to a compelled acceptation of mass immigration imposed to the native populations, that, as a result, instinctively take up local or regional roots, which look more genuine and gentle, being seen as in complete accordance with one’s “deepest heart”.

 

To theorise the “proper relationship” between the national state and the European Union, you have to look out for a functioning model, in which several types of identities, be they linguistic or confessional, are overlapping and displaying a kind of mosaic patchwork on a smaller scale than Europe, which is obviously such a patchwork, especially in its central continental areas. The only functioning model we have is the Swiss model. This democratic model was born in an intersection area in the middle of the European continent, where three main European languages and one local language meet as well as two different Christian faiths, Protestantism and Catholicism, Swiss Protestantism being once more divided between Lutherans in German speaking Basle and Calvinist in French speaking Geneva, with remnants of Zwingli’s Protestantism around Zurich. Most German speaking Swiss are otherwise Roman Catholics, while most French speaking Swiss are Protestants except in the Canton of Jura. To coordinate optimally all these differences, what could lead to endless conflicts, the Swiss political system invented a form of federalism that allowed people to live in peace while keeping their differences alive. This could be a model for all European states and for regions within these states. The federal level in Switzerland is a “slim” and efficient level. Most matters are left in the hands of local politicians and officials. Moreover the Swiss system foresees the referendum as a decision making instrument at both federal and cantonal levels. The people can introduce a claim at local or national level, leading to the organisation of a referendum for all kind of matters: the building of a bridge, ecological problems, introduction or suppression of a railway or a bus connection, etc. In 2009 and in 2010, two referendums took place at federal level: the first one was introduced by a rightist populist party to forbid the building of minarets in Swiss cities and towns, in accordance to the very old ecological and town-planning laws of the Swiss Confederation, mostly accepted or introduced by leftist “progressive” political forces in former times. In November 2010, also very recently, people voted to expel all criminal foreigners out of the country, avoiding in this way the most painful effects of mass immigration. Such people’s initiatives would be impossible in other European countries, despite the fact that expelling criminals cannot be considered as “racist” (as non criminal foreigners cannot be expelled) or as hostile to particular religious faiths, as no religion tolerates crimes as acceptable patterns of behaviour.

 

Therefore, the possible adoption of this Swiss model, beyond its latest anti-immigration aspects, would allow other European peoples to vote in order to coin a policy-making decision about actual problems and so to avoid being arrogantly ordained by ukases imagined by the fertile fantasy of Eurocratic eggheads in Brussels. The adoption of the Swiss model implies of course to reduce most of the biggest states in Europe into smaller entities or to adopt a federal system like in Spain, Austria, Belgium or Germany, plus the possibility to organise referendums like in Switzerland, as this is not the case in the otherwise complete federal states I’ve just mentioned. This is a lack of democracy. The main problem would be France, where this kind of federalism and of democracy has never been introduced. Nevertheless, the demand for the referendum system is growing in France, as you can read it on www.polemia.com, where former New Right exponent Yvan Blot is currently resuming all his ideas, suggestions and critics about this topic.

 

Picture: The Splügenpass at the Italian-Swiss boarder where Synergon's Summer Course 1996 was held (Photo: RS)

 

The introducing of a general federal system in Europe with broad devolution within the existing states is not accepted everywhere. In Italy, where the federalist Lega Nord is continuously successful in the Northern provinces of the country, partisans of a strong state argue that a balkanization in the disguise of a general federalisation would weaken many state’s instruments that have been firmly settled in former times and enable the present-day state foundations or practices to avoid absorption by globalist American-lead agencies or concerns. This is of course an actual risk. So all the state institutions having been developed in Europe to enhance autarky (self-sufficiency) at whatever level possible must be kept out of any dissolution process implied by any form of devolution.

 

A policy consisting of introducing a referendum to avoid people being crushed by too centralised states or by eurocrats, of a devolution allowing this genuine form of democracy to be established everywhere and of keeping alive all institutions aiming at self-sufficiency was perhaps the hope of Solzhenitsyn for his dear old Russia. Such a policy ought to be made secure according to historical Russian and Swiss models, but cannot of course be implemented by the current political personnel. Needless to say that such a personnel is corrupt but not only that. It is brainwashed and duped by all kind of silly ready-made ideologies or blueprints, invented mostly in American think tanks, their European counter-parts and the main media agencies. To summarize it, these ideologies aim at weakening the societies by mocking their traditional patterns of behaviour, at generalizing the ideological assets of neo-liberalism in order to let globalization be thoroughly implemented in every corner of the world and at reducing Europe to remain once for ever a disguised colony of the United States.

 

Therefore, there is the need to replace such a deceiving personnel by new teams in every European country. These new teams cannot be the usual populist alternative parties as they are mostly unaware of the dangers of neo-liberalism, i.e. the new universalistic ideology suggested and imposed by the most dangerous think tanks of the left and of the establishment: from the camouflaged Trotskites within the social-democratic parties to the “new philosophers” in France, who paved the way to a subtle mixture of “political correctness”, apparent libertarianism, an apparently vehement and staunch defence of the human rights, avowed antifascism and anticommunism (communism being the result of a worship of mostly German “thought masters” (“maîtres-à-penser”) like Hegel  or Marx). The usual populist parties never managed to develop a discourse about and against this real danger jeopardizing Europe’s future. They were each time trapped by one aspect or another of this subtle mixture, especially all the anticommunist aspects.

 

A “new team” should give following answer to the now well-established official ideology of the main medias:

-          A defence of the social systems in Europe or of an adaptation/modernization of them, erasing the corruptions that deposited during several decades; the model would be of course the partnership existing since the foundation of the Federal Republic of Germany between workers and bosses; the investment model called the “Rhine Model” by the French thinker Michel Albert, where the capital is permanently invested in new technologies, in Research & Development, in academic think tanks, etc. The defence of the so-called socialist social systems in Europe aims essentially at preserving the families’ patrimony (especially modest working-class families because it gives them a safe security net in case of recession), at securing the future of the school and academic networks (now disintegrating under the iron heel of the banksters’ neoliberalism) and at securing a free and good functioning medical system in all European countries. It has often been said that the “non merchant sectors” were suffering due to all kind of imposed shortages (in the name of an alleged economic efficiency) and to the poor salaries earned by teaching or medical personnel. The “anti-shopkeeper” mentality of the so-called “right” or “new right” is an old heritage linking us to the ideals of the Scotsman Thomas Carlyle and the American poet Ezra Pound. If we want to translate these core ideas into a political programme, we’ll have to elaborate in each European country a specific defence of the “non merchant sectors”, as a civilization is measured not by material and transient productions but by the excellence of its medical and academic systems. We always were defenders of the primacy of culture against the iron heel of banks and economics.

The Varese Lake, Lombardia, where Synergon's Seminar 1995 and Synergon's Summer Course 2000 was held

 

-          The notion of human rights, as they are propagated by the mainstream medias and by the official American think tanks, is a would-be universalistic ideology, aiming at replacing all the old messianic faiths, be they a religious bias or a Hegelian or Marxist tinted ideology (“the main narratives” of Jean-François Lyotard). But the mainstream notion of human rights are not merely an ideology, it is an instrument fabricated by strategists at the time of President Jimmy Carter, in order to have a constant opportunity to meddle in the affairs of alien countries, in order to weaken them (a strategy already suggested by Sun Tzu). The Chinese could observe very early that drift from a pious reference to human rights towards manipulation and subversion and reacted in arguing that every civilization should be permitted to adapt the notion of human rights to its own core cultural patterns. If the Chinese have the right to adapt, why wouldn’t we Europeans not be entitled to give our own interpretation of human rights within the frame of our own civilization? And above all to be allowed to make a clear distinction, when human rights are evoked, between what is genuine in the true defence of citizens’ rights and obligations and what is the result of an offensive attack perpetrated by an alien “soft power” in order to destabilize our countries’ policy in whatever matters. We should have the courage to denounce every abuse in the manipulating of the human rights’ topic when they are solemnly summoned up only in order to promote any American imperialist project in Europe, as, for instance, the war against Yugoslavia in 1999 was. The justification put forward to start this war was the so-called breach of human rights committed by the Serbian government against the Albanians composing the majority of Kosovo’s population. But in the end it brought to power an infamous gang in this American-backed secessionist province of Kosovo, currently accused of trafficking human organs, weapons and prostitutes. Where are the rights of the people having been bereft of their organs by force or of the poor girls attracted by seducing work contracts in Western Europe, then beaten, locked up in some dreary cellar and finally forced to be on the game? All the media orchestrated humbug about human rights promoted by Carter, Clinton and Albright ended exactly in the worst breaches in common law, that were deleterious for thousands and thousands of victims. The American discourse about human rights is deceitfulness and cant and nothing else. The real purpose was to establish a gigantic military base in Kosovo, namely “Camp Bondsteel”, in order to replace the abandoned bases in Germany after the Cold War and the German reunification and to occupy the Balkans, an area which, since Alexander the Great, allows every audacious conqueror to control Anatolia and all areas beyond it, namely Iraq and Persia. A “new team” in Europe should ceaselessly stigmatize and vilify these abuses and clearly tell the public opinion of their respective countries what are the real purposes behind each American human rights policy. The “new team” should work a bit like Noam Chomsky in the United States, who indefatigably reveals what is Washington’s hidden agenda in every part of the world.

 

To adopt a Swiss model with referendum at local and national level, to reject vehemently the anti-autarky policies induced by the neo-liberal ideology and economical theory, to reject also the mainstream bias of “political correctness” and to perceive the real geopolitical and strategic intentions hidden behind each American step are not capabilities that the political personnel in Europe can currently display. Therefore you won’t have a proper relationship between the national states (and the people as an ethnic reality) and the highest institutions of the European Union, as long as a fooled political pseudo-elite is ruling these latest. You need “new teams” to induce a “proper relationship”.            

 

What is your analysis of the current European Union and it’s future and potential?

 

The answer to the question you ask here could be the stuff of a whole book. Indeed to answer it properly and in a complete way, you need to evoke the all story of the European integration process, starting with the founding act of the CECA/EGKS, i.e. the “European Community of Coal and Steel”, in 1951. After that you had the “Treaty of Rome” in 1957, launching the so-called “Common Market” and, later, the “Treaty of Maastricht” and the “Treaty of Lisbon”.  It seems useless to resume now the entire history of the European “Eurocratic” institutions, especially at a present time when they are totally degenerated by liberal and neo-liberal ideas that of course weaken them and make them in a certain way superfluous. The core idea at the very beginning was to create an “autonomous market”, leading to a certain autarky, which was absolutely possible when the six founding countries possessed large parts of Africa and could so exploit the most important industrial and mineral resources. The decolonization and the support that the United States provided to the independence movements in Africa bereft Europe of a direct access to the main resources. The core idea of an autarky within a certain “Eurafrican” commonwealth has no real significance anymore. This new situation could already have been foreseen in October 1956 when the United States tolerated (and indirectly supported) the Soviet invasion of Hungary despite the opinion of their main allies in Europe and condemned the French-British intervention in Egypt. The year 1956 announced the fate of Europe: the European powers had no right to intervene within Europe itself, as Hungary had freed itself from Soviet yoke and as the treaties signed after 1945 foresaw the withdrawal of all Soviet troops out of the country after some months. The European powers, including Britain, had no right anymore to intervene in Africa in order to keep order.

 

The decolonization process left Europe without a necessary “Ergänzungsraum”, i. e. a “complementary space”, that could be administrated from European capitals and give African people the efficiency of well drilled executives, what they lack since then, precipitating the whole Black continent into a terrible misery. But autarky doesn’t mean the direct access to mineral resources: it means first of all “food autarky”. Few European countries are (or were at the end of the 80s, just before the collapse of the Soviet block) really independent at food level or are now able to produce food excesses. Only Sweden, Hungary, France and Denmark were. For the excellent French demographist Gaston Bouthoul Denmark is the best example of a well-balanced agriculture. This small Scandinavian country is able to produce food excesses that make of it an “agricultural superpower” in Europe: one should simply remember that Danish peasants furnished 75% of the food for the German Wehrmacht during WW2. Without the Danish food excesses, Hitler’s armies wouldn’t have resisted so long in Russia, in Northern Africa and in the West (Italy).

Perugia, Umbria (Italy) where the common "New Right" Conference (with Dr. Marco Tarchi, Dr. Alessandro Campi, Alain de Benoist, Michael Walker and Robert Steuckers) was held in February 1991 and where Synergon's Summer Course 1999 took place

 

The core idea of autarky survived quite long within the European institutions. We should remember the last plan trying to materialise autarky, the so-called “Plan Delors”, proposing a policy of large scaled public works and of favouring telecommunications and public transports within the EU area. The EU has no future if it remains what American economists called “a penetrated system” at the time of the Weimar Republic in Germany when American big business tried a disguised colonisation of the defeated Reich through the Young and Dawes Plans. The EU is now a penetrated system where not only American multinationals are carving important segments of the inner European market but also the new Chinese State’s companies and where the textile industry is now entirely dependant from delocalized factories settled in Turkey or Pakistan. Unemployment reaches astronomical figures in Europe because of delocalisation.

 

Recently the German weekly magazine “Der Spiegel” has published figures showing that Europe is experimenting now a real decay. More and more European countries are leaving the hit parade of the 20 most important economies on the world. The results of the PISA inquiry about the levels reached by school systems reveals also a general decay of the European standards. University teacher and former student and translator of Carl Schmitt, Julien Freund, thought us in his important book “La fin de la Renaissance” (1981) that decay comes when you begin to hate yourself, to despise what you are and to abhor your own past. The whole “Vergangenheitsbewältigung” not only in Germany but in all European countries, where children and teenagers are subtly induced to loathe themselves and their fatherlands, has repercussions on the general economics of the entire continent. The EU can only survive when it finds its ideological roots again, i. e. the very notion of autarky. Otherwise the process of decay will amplify tremendously and lead to the complete disappearance of the European peoples and civilisation. In this process the EU area may become, as a kind of new “Eurabia” or Euro-Turkey or Afro-Europe, an appendix of a “Transatlantic Union” under US leadership. 

 

Well, let us now turn to the real question, the question that matters. Are we socialists or not? If we are, what’s the difference between us and the conventional socialists or social democrats?  What’s the difference between the synergist anti-liberal with his New Right background and the Marxist or Post-Marxist we find in all the parliaments in Europe and of course in the European Parliament where they constitute the second main group after the Christian Democrats of the EPP? Well, the conventional socialists would say that they get their inspiration from their holy icon Marx and from his followers of the 2^nd International, even if a born-again Marx would fiercely mock their liberal and permissive bias with the acidity he always used to lash verbally his foes. The problem is that the socialism of the direct heirs of the 2^nd International is a type of socialism without a frame, consisting mainly of irresponsible promises emitted by cynical politicians in order to grasp as many mandates or seats as possible. Long before Marx wrote his well-known communist manifesto, there was an economical genius in Germany called Friedrich List, who opposed the free trade ideology of Britain at that time. Free trade meant in the first half of the 19^th Century a generalized colonial system in the entire world, where Britain would have been the world only workshop or factory, while the rest would have remained underdeveloped only producing raw materials for the Sheffield or Manchester mills. Included all European countries of course. List asserted that every country had the genuine right to develop its own territorial assets. As the British fleet was the instrument enabling the British Crown to be ubiquitous and reach the harbours on all shores where it could get the raw materials and sell the products of England’s factories, List suggested an inner development of all countries in the world by inner colonization (fertilization and cultivation of all abandoned lands), building of railways and canals in order to boost communications. List inspired the German government under the leading of Bismarck, the small Belgian kingdom which was an economical power having experimented an actual industrial revolution immediately after Britain, the French positivists for the necessity of starting an inner agricultural colonization of the former Gallic mainland and above all the US government that had to face the huge problem of developing the gigantic land space between the Atlantic and the Pacific. List is the intellectual father of the Transcontinental Railway and of the canals linking the Lakes and the Saint Lawrence River. He is the real intellectual father of the industrial power of the United States. On the other hand he inspired anti-colonialists in the former Third World, especially India and China: Gandhi, who wanted the Indians to cultivate cotton and weave their own clothes with it, and Dr. Sun Ya Tsen, founder of the Chinese Republic in 1911, were more or less inspired by List’s theories and practical suggestions. The Chinese National-Republican economist Kai Sheng Chen, who theorized the very important notion of  “armed economy”, was a pupil of List and of Ludendorff, who adapted the peaceful ideas of List in the context of WW1. Taiwan and South Korea have proved that Kai Sheng Chen’s ideas can be successfully realized.

 

In the present-day United States the caucus around Lyndon LaRouche has produced an excellent analysis of the opposition between the Free Trade system and List’s practical views of a world of free autarkic areas. You can find a long documentary on the Internet about this dual interpretation given by the LaRouche’s group. Many Europeans would of course object that LaRouche’s vision of the economical history of the Western World during these two last centuries is quite over-simplified. Of course it is. But the core of this interpretation is correct and sound, whereas the over-simplification made of the all corpus a good didactical instrument. There is indeed an opposition between Free Trade (neo-liberalism, reaganomics, thatcherite economics, Chicago Boys, Hayek’s theories, etc.) and List’s idea of a harmonious juxtaposition of autarkies on the world map. The LaRouche caucus never quotes List (as far as I know) and says Lincoln and McKinley were opponents to the Free Trade, a position that, according to Lyndon LaRouche, explains their assassinations. Both were killed after a plot aiming at cancelling all political steps towards a North American autarkist system. Teddy Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson were supporters of the Free Trade system and of a British-American alliance along the lines theorized by an almost forgotten proponent of geopolitics, Homer Lea, author of a key book, “The Day of the Saxons”. Lea, having got a degree in West Point, had been dismissed for medical reasons and turned to pure theory, advocating an eternal alliance of Britain and the United States. We can read in his book today the general principles of a control of the South Asian “rimlands” by both Anglo-Saxon sea powers, especially Afghanistan, and of a control of the Low Countries and Denmark to avoid any push forward of Germany in the direction of the North Sea or any push forward of France in the direction of the harbours of Antwerp and Rotterdam.

 

The LaRouche caucus aims obviously at emphasizing the role in history of some icon figures of America like Abraham Lincoln of Franklin Delano Roosevelt. Nevertheless Free Trade and Continental Autarky are truly a couple of opposites that you cannot deny, even if the binary antagonism isn’t certainly so sharp as explained by LaRouche’s team. For instance, it is true that F. D. Roosevelt started his career as a US President by launching the huge project of the “Tennessee Valley”, foreseeing the building of a series of colossal dams to tame the violent waters of the Tennessee, Mississippi and Missouri rivers. The New Deal and the “Tennessee Valley Project” were distinctly continental purposes but they were torpedoed by the proponents of Free Trade, who in the end imposed a new Free Trade policy, an alliance with Britain, despite the fact that Chamberlain tried to create an inner Commonwealth autarky. This shift in Roosevelt’s policy lead to war with Japan and Germany because the failure of the New Deal policy implied to choose for exportations and to abandon the project of developing the inner Northern American market. If you have to prevent other areas in the world to develop their own closed markets, you must destroy them, according to the good old colonial logics, and get them as exportation markets. So the United States were doomed to destroy the European system of the Germans and the “Co-Prosperity Sphere of East Asia” under the leadership of Japan.

 

To summarize our position, let us remember that Russia developed and came out of underdevelopment under the “Continental Project” of Serguei Witte and Arkady Stolypin, who were either dismissed after a gossip campaign or assassinated by a crazy revolutionist. China after its communist isolation under Mao turned to a form of autarkist model under Deng Xiao Ping, leading the country to an unchallenged economical success. Putin in Russia is trying, with less success, to adopt the same guidelines. But the “Continental Autarkists” are assembling nowadays under the direction of the informal Shanghai Group or of the BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India, China). Europe and the United States will have to adapt in order to avoid complete decay. The key idea to successfully perform this adaptation is the good old project of Friedrich List. And the American can refer to one of his most brilliant students: Lawrence Dennis, who coined a project for “continental autarky”, being influenced by the “continentalist” school of South America, where he lived for a quite long time as a diplomat.

 

The Flemish village of Munkzwalm where many technical meetings and several Spring Courses were held between 1989 and 1995

 

Q.: Is it important for the pro-European activist to be familiar with geopolitics?

 

Of course. If you are a pro-European activist, you should perceive Europe as a geopolitical entity, surrounded by possible foes and having to control militarily its periphery, for instance by preventing the North African states to become sea powers again or to prevent any alien power to provide them sea power tools or missiles able to strike the Mediterranean coasts of Europe. The whole history of Europe is the history of a long defence battle against Barbary Coast pirates and their Ottoman rulers. Once this danger eliminated, Europe could develop and prosper. Nowadays mass immigration within the boarders of European countries replace the external danger of Barbary Coast piracy or of Ottoman threat by introducing parallel economical circuits and mafia systems of drug bosses, the so-called “diaspora mafias”, who weaken the whole social system by literally milking money from the well established European social security system and by earning colossal fortunes from drug dealing (Moroccan cannabis which amounts to 70% of the entire European consumption or Central Asian heroin dispatched by Turkish mafias). The type of danger has changed but comes always from the very next periphery of Europe. Racialist as well as so-called anti-racist arguments are preposterous in such matters, as you don’t need to develop a “racialist argumentation” to criticize mass immigration: you simply have to stress the fact that international authorities like the UNESCO or the UNO have urged the EU to finance alternative crops in Morocco, in order to replace the huge fields of cannabis in the Northern parts of the country by useful plantations. But the money given by the EU has been used to triple the area where cannabis crops are cultivated! So Morocco, the Moroccan citizens or the European citizens of Moroccan origin who trust drugs from the Rif area are lawbreakers in front of the EU, UNESCO and UNO policy. Anti-racist arguments, caucuses and legislations, trying to crush all people criticizing mass immigration, are in fact tools in the hand of the secret lobbies and the drug bosses that try to weaken Europe and to maintain our homelands in a permanent state of debility and decrepitude.

 

For you Swedes, as fellow countrymen of Rudolf Kjellén and Sven Hedin, geopolitics is of course a genuine part of your political and cultural heritage. Moreover the Russian Yuri Semionov, author of a tremendously interesting book on Siberia, was a refugee in Sweden in the Thirties. In Swedish libraries you must find a lot about the first theories on geopolitics (as it was Kjellén who coined the word), about the travelogues of Hedin, explorer of Central Asia and Tibet, and maybe about Semionov’s works. At the very beginning of the so-called New Right project, geopolitics was still taboo. There was certainly an implicit geopolitics among diplomats or generals, which was not genuinely different from the former geopolitical endeavours of the previous decades, but the very word was taboo. You couldn’t talk about geopolitics without being accused of trying to resume Nazi geopolitics, which had been set once for all as “esoteric”. Karl Haushofer, the German pupil of Kjellén, had been depicted as a crazy mystical mage having disguised his belonging to a so-called secret society of the “Green Dragon” behind a weak discourse about history, geography and international affairs. When you read Haushofer and his excellent “Zeitschrift für Geopolitik” (which survived him under the name of “Geopolitik” in the Fifties), you find comments on current affairs, reasonable reflections about frontiers within and outside Europe, interviews of foreign diplomats and excellent analyses about the Pacific area but no pseudo-Chinese or neo-Teutonic esoteric humbug. At the end of the Seventies, things changed. In the United States, Colin S. Gray decided to break definitively the taboo on geopolitics. As an Anglo-Saxon proponent of geopolitics, Gray was of course a pupil of Sir Halford John MacKinder, of Homer Lea and of their pupil Spykman. But he explained that Haushofer’s geopolitics was a continental reaction against MacKinder’s sea power geopolitics. Haushofer was so rehabilitated and could be studied again as a normal proponent of geopolitics and not as a mystical crackpot.

 

In the group of students, who followed the works of the New Right groups in Brussels at the end of the Seventies and was lead by late Alain Derriks, we had of course purchased a copy of Gray’s book but, at the same time, we discovered the book of an Italian general, Guido Giannettini, “Dietro la Grande Muraglia” (“Beyond the Great (Chinese) Wall”). This book was extremely well written, offered simultaneously a historical approach and present-day analyses, and opened wide perspectives. Giannettini had observed how the whole international chessboard had been turned upside down in 1972, when Kissinger and Nixon had coined a new implicit alliance with communist China. Formerly, the American lead Western world had faced a giant Eurasian communist block, embracing China and the USSR, even when the relationship between Moscow and Beijing wasn’t optimal anymore or could even become sometimes frankly antagonist (with a clash between both armies along the River Amur in Far Eastern Siberia). After the defeat of Germany in 1945, Europe had been divided, according to the rules settled at Teheran and Yalta, into a Western part dominated by NATO and an Eastern part under the direction of the Warsaw Pact. At that time Euro-nationalists around my fellow countryman Jean Thiriart, rejected both systems and pleaded for an alliance with China and the Arab world (Egypt, Syria and Iraq) in order to loose the choking entanglement of both NATO and Warsaw Pact. In Thiriart’s clearly outlined strategy for his Europe-wide but tiny movement, Chinese and Arabs would have had for task to keep Americans and Soviets busy outside Europe, so that the pressure would be lighter to bear in Europe and lead, if possible, to a successful liberation movement, aiming at restoring Europe’s independence and sovereignty. When Americans and Chinese joined their forces to contain and encircle Soviet Russia, the wished Euro-Chinese alliance to disentangle Yalta’s yoke in Europe became a sheer impossibility. On the other side, the Arabs were too weak and not interested in a European revival, as they feared a come back of the colonial powers in their area, as during the Suez affair in October 1956. Giannettini’s option for a Euro-Russian block became the only possible choice. Thiriart agreed. So did we. But our views about a possible future Euro-Russian alliance were confused at the very beginning: we couldn’t accept the occupation of Eastern Europe and even less the partition of Germany that is, geographically speaking, the core of Europe. On the other hand, the American disguised occupation was also for us an unacceptable situation, especially after De Gaulle’s breach with NATO and the new independent course in international affairs that it induced, according to Dr. Armin Mohler. After the Israeli victory of June 1967 with the help of Mirage III fighters and bombers, France’s new world policy lead to the exportation of Dassault jet fighters in Latin America, South Africa, India and Australia. It could have generated a new European based aeronautical industry, as in 1975 the Scandinavian and Low Countries air forces had the choice between the Mirage IV, the Saab Viggen jet, a new model produced by a future common French-Swedish project, or the American F-16. European independence was only possible if Europe could build an independent aeronautical industry, based on merges between already existing aeronautical companies. The fact that after corruption affairs the Scandinavian and Low Countries armies opted for the American F-16 jet ruined the possibility of a jointed independent European aeronautical industry. It was the purchase of the F-16 jets and the subsequent ruin of a possible French-Swedish fighter project that induces our small group to reject definitively all forms of pendency in front of the Western hegemonic power. But what else if the Iron Curtain seemed to be not removable and if the inner European situation was apparently a stalemate, bound to remain as such eternally?

 

Other readings helped us to improve our views. I’ll quote here two key books that shifted unequivocally our viewpoints: Prof. Louis Dupeux’ doctor paper on German “national bolshevism” at the time of the Weimar Republic in the Twenties and Prof. Alexander Yanov’s UCLA paper on the Russian “New Right” in the last years of Soviet rule, at the end of Brezhnev’s era and just before Gorbachev’s perestroika. Dupeux helped us to understand the relevancy of the Soviet-German tandem in the Twenties, starting with the Rapallo Treaty of 1922 (between Rathenau and Chicherin). This relevancy could explain us the cause of the ephemeral Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact of August 1939. A European-Russian tandem could therefore offer the possibility of independence and Continental-Eurasian strength. But such a tandem was impossible under communist rule. But was communism as monolithic as it was described in the Western press and medias? In his paper Yanov divided Soviet-Russian political thought into two categories and each of these two categories again in two others: the Zapadniki (the Westerners) and the Narodniki (the proponents of Russian identity). You could find dissident Zapadniki in the emigration and pro-regime Zapadniki within the Soviet institutions (i. e. Marxist of the old school as Marxism was a Western importation). You could also find dissident Narodniki in the emigration, such as Solzhenitsyn, and pro-regime Narodniki in the Soviet-Russian academic world, such as the writer Valentin Rasputin, who wrote “rural” novels criticizing the reckless industrialisation and “electrification” of old traditional Russian villages or areas. For Yanov the Russian New Right was incarnated in all the Narodniki, be they dissidents or not, and all Narodniki were of course dangerous compeers and rascals as they challenged dominant Western as well as Soviet principles. So our position, and the one staunchly defended in Germany by former Gulag prisoner Wolfgang Strauss (arrested during the East German riots of June 1953), was to hope for a Narodniki political or metapolitical revolution in Russia and in Eastern Europe, giving the possibility to create an International of Narodniki, from the Atlantic coasts to the Pacific Ocean, challenging the Western hemisphere and its liberal leftist ideology. Meanwhile after Reagan’s election in November 1981 the missile crisis swept all over Europe. The piling up of missiles on both sides of the Iron Curtain risked in case of war to destroy definitively all European countries. The reaction was passionate especially in Germany: more and more puzzled voices required a new neutrality status, to avoid implication in a military system of warmongers, and pleaded for a withdrawal from NATO, as the Treaty’s Organisation was lead by an external hegemonic power, which didn’t care for the safety of Europe and was ready to unleash a horrible nuclear apocalypse upon our countries. A neutrality status, as suggested by General Jochen Löser in Germany (in “Neutralität für Mitteleuropa”), implied also to promote a kind of “Third Way” system, which would have been a synthesis between state socialism and market capitalism. “Wir Selbst” of Siegfried Bublies (Koblenz) was the leading magazine, which backed a policy of NATO withdrawal and Central European neutrality, a “Third Way” (for instance the one theorized by the Slovak economist Ota Sik), a reconciliation with Russia (according to Ernst Niekisch or Karl-Otto Paetel as dissidents both of the Weimar Republic and of the Third Reich), the devolution movements in Western and Eastern Europe, and the new dissidents in the Soviet dominated block. The magazine had been created in 1979 and remained till the very beginning of the 21^st Century the main forum for alternative thought with a humanist touch in all Europe. I mean “humanist” in the sense given to this word by the main non Westernized dissidents of Eastern Europe, being no Narodniki in the narrow sense of this expression. The years 1982 and 1983 were determined by the pacifist revolt throughout Europe, especially in Germany around an interesting thinker like air force Lieutenant-Colonel Alfred Mechtersheimer, and in the Low Countries but also in Britain, where huge demonstrations were held to prevent the dispatch of American missiles. Our small group supported the pacifist movement against the conventional positions of many other Rightist or even New Right clubs (including de Benoist at that time, who accused us of being the “Trotskites” of the movement, positioning himself as a kind of Stalin-like Big Brother!). The new pacifism and neutralism ceased to thrive when Gorbachev declared he intended to launch a glasnost and perestroika policy to soften the Soviet rule. Once Gorbachev promised a new policy, we could only wait and see, without abandoning all necessary scepticism. 

 

During the second half of the Eighties, we hoped for a new world, in which the Iron Curtain would one day disappear and the dominant systems would gently evolve towards a “Third Way”. In 1989, when the Berlin Wall was suppressed, we all thought very naively that the liberation of Europe and of Russia was imminent. The Gulf War and the dissolution of Yugoslavia, the invasion of Iraq and of Afghanistan proved that Europe was in fact totally unable to take an original decision in front of the world events, with the slight exception of the short French, German and Russian opposition to the invasion of Iraq in 2003, an opposition naively hailed as the new “Paris-Berlin-Moscow Axe” but an Axe that couldn’t of course prevent the unlawful invasion of Saddam Hussein’s country. So we still are in a desolate state of subjugation despite the fact that Europe now counts 27 states in full membership.

 

Let us come back to geopolitical theory. In 1979, when we discovered Giannettini’s book, I read General Heinrich Jordis von Lohausen’s book “Mut zur Macht”, which was a very good summary and actualisation of Kjellen’s ideas, as well as of all notions formerly defined by Haushofer and his broad team (Walter Pahl, Gustav Fochler-Hauke, Otto Maull, Walter Wüst, R. W.  von Keyserlingk, Erich Obst, etc.). I wrote a small paper for my end examination of “International Affairs”, which was read with interest by the teacher, who found Lohausen’s positions interesting but still “dangerous”. Geopolitics in June 1980, date when I passed the examination with brio (18/20! Thank you, dear General von Lohausen!), was still taboo in “poor little Belgium”. It wouldn’t last a long time before this “dangerousness” would definitively belong to the past. The French intellectual world produced successively many excellent geopolitical studies: I’ll only quote here Yves Lacoste’s journal “Hérodote”, the accurate maps of Michel Foucher, the encyclopaedic studies of Hervé Coutau-Bégarie and the courses of Ayméric Chauprade (who, as a teacher in the French High Military Academy, was recently sacked by Sarközy because he couldn’t accept the coming back of France in the commanding structures of NATO as a full member state). In the Anglo-Saxon world, the best books on the matter are those produced by the British publishing house “I. B. Tauris” (London).

 

You cannot concentrate only on geopolitics as a mean strategic way of thinking. To use the tools properly you need an accurate knowledge in history that the shelves in Anglo-Saxon bookshops offer you in abundance. Then to be a good proponent of geopolitics you need to study lots of maps, especially historical maps. I therefore collect historical atlases since I got the first one in my life, the official one you had to buy when you reached the third year in the secondary school. When I was 15, I bought my very first German book, volume two of the “DTV-Atlas zur Weltgeschichte”, at Brussels’ flea market. The book lies now since about forty years on my desk! Indispensable tools are also the atlases of the British University teacher Colin McEvedy, which were translated into Dutch for Holland’s schools. McEvedy sees history as a regular succession of collisions between “core peoples” (Indo-Europeans, Turkish-Mongolic tribes, Semitic nomads of the Arabic peninsula, etc.), which he perceives as balls moving on a kind of huge billiard table, which is Eurasia with all its highways across the steppes. By reading McEvedy’s comments on the maps he draws we can understand history as permanent systolic and diastolic movements of “core peoples” (together with assimilated alien tribes or vanquished former foes) against each other, in order to control land, highways or sea accesses to them. And what is European history if not a long process of resisting more or less successfully Mongolic or Turkish assaults in the East and Hamito-Semitic incursions in the South? Next to McEvedy, the most interesting historical atlas in my collection is the one that a Swiss professor produced, namely Jacques Bertin’s “Atlas historique universel – Panorama de l’histoire du monde”, where you’ll find even more precise maps than the ones of McEvedy. Also, the German DTV-Atlas (which exists in an English version published at Penguin’s publishing house in Britain), McEvedy’s works and Bertin’s panorama are the tools that I use since many years. They have been my paper companions since I was a teenager.

 

What is your analysis of the actual and ideal relationship of Europe and Russia, Turkey and the United States?

 

To answer your question here in a complete and satisfying way, I should rather write a couple of thick books instead of babbling some insufficient explanations!  Indeed your question asks me in fact to summarize in some short sentences the whole history of mankind. I suppose that, for historical reasons, Swedes don’t perceive Russia and Turkey as citizens of Central or Western Europe would perceive these countries. Swedes must remember the attempt of King Charles XII to restore what was seen as the “Gothic Link” between the Baltic and the Black Sees by becoming the heir of the Polish-Lithuanian State in decay at his time: therefore he had to wage war against Russia and try to obtain the Turkish alliance. During the Soviet-Finnish war of winter 1939-40, Swedes were terribly worried because the move of Stalin’s Red Army to recuperate Finland as a former Tsarist province implied a future Soviet control of the Baltic See reducing simultaneously Swedish sovereignty and room for manoeuvre in these waters. It was also jeopardizing the fragile independence of the Baltic States.

 

Vlotho, Low Saxony (Germany) where a lot of meetings, conferences and Summer courses took place

 

Russia still wants to have access to the Atlantic via the Baltic see routes but in a less aggressive way than in Soviet times, when a messianic ideology was running the agenda. After the disappearing of the Iron Curtain, we are back to the situation we had in 1814. Once Napoleon Bonaparte had been eliminated and together with him the tone-downed Bolshevism of his time, i. e. the blood drenched French revolution ideology, Europe was a more or less united block nicknamed in Ancient Greek language the “Pentarchy” (The “Five Powers”), stretching from the Atlantic to the Pacific coasts. We often forget nowadays that Europe was a strategic united block between 1814 and 1830, i. e. only during fifteen years. This unity allowed the pacification of Spain in 1822-23, the Greek independence from the Ottoman Empire in 1828 and later the crushing of Barbary Coast piracy by the landing of French troops in present-day Algeria in 1832. But the “Pentarchy” ceased to be a harmonious symphony of allied traditional powers when Belgium become independent from the King of Holland: indeed, Britain (in order to destroy the sea power of Holland, the industrial capacities in present-day Belgium’s Walloon provinces and the potentialities of the Indonesian colonial realm of the United Low Countries Kingdom) and France (aiming at recuperating Belgium and the harbour of Antwerp as well as a portion of the Mosel Valley in Luxemburg, leading to the very middle of German Rhineland in Koblenz) supported the rather incoherent Belgian independence movement while the other powers (Prussia, Austria and Russia) supported the Dutch King and his United Kingdom of the Low Countries. France, which started in the Thirties of the 19^th Century to carve its African Empire not only in Algeria but also in present-day Gabon and Senegal, and Britain, which was already a world empire whose cornerstone was India, became very soon Extra-European realms deriving their power from wealthy colonies and were therefore not more interested in the strategic unity of Europe, as the genuine civilisation area of all the people of our Caucasian kinship. The competition between European powers to get colonies implied that colonial rivalries could perhaps end in inner European conflicts, what happened indeed in 1914. The spirit of 1814 was kept alive by the “Drei Kaisersbund”, the “Alliance of the three Emperors” (United Germany after 1871, Austria-Hungary and Russia), which unfortunately started to disintegrate after Bismarck’s withdrawal in 1891 and due to the French-Russian economical-financial alliance under Tsar Alexander III (cf. the limpid book of Gordon Craig and Alexander L. George, “Zwischen Krieg und Frieden. Konfliktlösung in Geschichte und Gegenwart”, C. H. Beck, Munich, 1984; this book is a history of European diplomacy from the Treaty of Vienna in 1814 to WW1, where the authors describe the gradual disintegration of the “Pentarchy”, leading to the explosion of 1914; both authors remember also that Nixon and Kissinger tried to re-establish a kind of “Pentapolarity”, with China, Japan, the United States, Europe and Soviet Russia, but the attempt failed or was reduced to nought by the new human rights’ diplomacy of Carter. The only possible present-day “Pentapolarity” is represented by the “BRIC”-system, with Brazil, Russia, Iran, India, China and maybe, in a next future, post-Mandela South Africa).

 

Sababurg Castle, along the "Märchenstrasse" ("Fairy Tales Road"), Hessen (Germany), where the German friends usually held their regular meetings

 

In the first decade of the 20^th Century, the “Entente” was not an obvious option at the very beginning: Russia and Britain were still rivals in Central Asia and on the rimland of South Asia; Britain and France were rivals in Sudan as Britain couldn’t tolerate a French military settlement on the Nile River (the Fashoda incident in 1898), a situation which would have cut the British possessions in the Southern part of Africa from the Egyptian protectorate in the North; we should remember here that Cecil Rhodes’ project was to link Cape Town to Cairo by a British managed Trans-African railway, after the elimination of the German colony of Tanganyka or a possible occupation of Belgian Katanga. Even if already grossly decided in 1904, the French-British-Russian alliance, known as the Entente, was far to be a sure fact before the fatidic year of 1914. The Anglo-Russian dispute in Persia had still to be settled in 1907. Moreover the three Entente powers hadn’t yet shared their part of the pie on the rimlands, as France had to accept first the de facto English protectorate in Egypt. In return for this acceptation, Britain accepted to support France’s interests in Morocco against the will of the German Emperor, who wanted to extend the Reich’s influence to the Sherifan Kingdom in North Africa, threatening to close the Mediterranean and to reduce to nought the key strategic importance of Gibraltar. For all these reasons, it is obviously not sure that Russian efficient ministers as Witte or Stolypin would have waged a war, as Russia was still economically and industrially to weak to sustain a long term war against the so-called Central Powers, i.e. Austria, Germany and the Ottomans, especially as China and Japan could possibly take advantage in the Far East of a debilitated Russia on the European stage.

 

The problem is that we Europeans cannot escape the necessity of using the Siberian raw materials and the gas and oil of the Caucasian, Central Asian and Russian fields. The weakness of Europe lays in its lack of raw materials (nowadays 90% of the rare earths, indispensable for high tech electronic devices, have to be bought in China). Europe could save itself from the Ottoman entanglement by conquering America and by circumnavigating Africa and arriving in the Indian harbours without having to pass through Islam dominated areas. Europeans aren’t visceral colonialists: they carved colonial empires despite their will, simply to escape an Ottoman-Muslim invasion.

 

The European-Turkish relationship has always been conflictual and remains today as such. It is not a question of race or even of religion, although both factors ought of course to be taken reasonably into account. Religion played certainly a key role as the Seldjuks had turned Muslim before attacking and beating the Byzantine Empire in 1071 but one forgets too often that at the same time other Turkish tribes, known as the Cumans, attacked Southern Russia and moved in the direction of the Low Danube without having turned Muslim: their faith war still Pagan-Shamanic. They nevertheless coordinated their wide scale action with their Muslim cousins. Muslim and Pagan-Shamanic Turks took the Pontic area (Black Sea as Pontus Euxinus) in a tangle: the Pagan Cumans in the North, the Muslim Seldjuks in the South. It is neither a question of race as present-day Turkey is a mix of all possible neighbouring peoples, tribes and ethnic kinships. It isn’t a joke to say that you have now Turks of all colours, like on an advertisement panel of Benetton! The European Danubian, Balkanic (Bosnians, Greeks, Albanians) and Ukrainian contribution to the ethno-genesis of the present-day Turkish population is really important, as are the parts of converted local Byzantine Greeks or Armenians or as are also the Sunni Indo-European Kurds. The Arab-Syrian influence is also clear in the South. The Turkish danger is that the Turks, whatever their real origin may be, still see themselves as the heirs of all the Hun, Mongolic and Turkish tribes that moved westwards to the Atlantic. Sultan Mehmed, who took Constantinople in 1453, kept in his mind the idea of the general move of Turkish tribes westwards but added to his geopolitical vision the one that moved the Byzantine general Justinian, who wanted at the beginning of the 7^th Century to conquer again all the Mediterranean area till the shores of the Atlantic. Mehmed’s vision was also a merge of Turkish and Byzantine geopolitics. In his own eyes, he was the Sultan and the Byzantine Basileus at the same time and wanted to become also Pope and Emperor, once his armies would have taken both Rome (“the Red Apple”) and Vienna (“the Golden Apple”). Mehmed even thought that one day such a shift as a “translatio imperii ad Turcos” could happen, like there had been a “translatio imperii ad Francos” and “ad Germanos”, just after the definitive crumbling down of the Roman Empire.  

 

The idea of moving westwards is still alive among Turks. The strong Turkish desire to become a full member of the EU means the will to pour the Anatolian demographic overpopulation into the demographically declining European states and to transform them in Muslim Turkish dominated countries. This statement of mine is not a mean reflection of an incurable “Turkophobic” obsession but is purely and simply derived from an analysis of Erdogan’s speech in Cologne in February 2008. Erdogan urged the Turkish immigration in Germany and in other European countries not to assimilate, as “assimilation is a crime against mankind” because it would wipe out the “Turkishness” of Turkish people, and urged also to create autonomous Turkish communities within the European states, that would welcome the new immigrants by marriage of by so-called “family gathering”. Later Erdogan and Davutoglu threaten to back the Turkish mafias in Europe, would the authorities of the EU postpone once more the admission of Turkey as a full member state. Every serious political personality in Europe has to reject such a project and to struggle against its possible translation into the everyday European reality. A migration flood of totally uneducated workforces into Europe would lead to high joblessness and let the social security systems collapse definitively. It would mean the end of the European civilisation.

 

The Turks are plenty aware of the key position their country has on the world map. Would I be a Turk, I would of course staunchly support Erdogan and Davutoglu. But I am not and cannot identify myself to such an alien vision of geopolitics. I wouldn’t care if all the efforts of the new Turkish geopolitics would be directed towards the Near East, as the Near East needs a hegemonic regional power to get rid of the awful chaos in which it is now desperately squiggling. It wouldn’t perhaps not be so easy for the Turks to become again the hegemonic power in an Arab Near East as conflicts were frequent between Ottomans and Arab nationalists, especially since the end of the 19^th Century when Sultan Abdulhamid started a centralisation policy, which was achieved by the strongly nationalist Young Turks in power since 1908. Arab liberal nationalists contended this new Young Turkish nationalist rule, which was not more genuinely Islamic, universal and Imperial-Ottoman but strictly Turkish national, stressing the superiority of the Turks within the Ottoman Empire, reducing simultaneously the Arabs to second-class citizens. The challenging Arab nationalists were severely crushed at the eve of WW1 (public hangings of Arab liberal intellectuals were common in Syrian or Lebanese towns at that time). But a renewed Turkish policy in the Near East cannot in principle collide frontally with the vital and paramount European interests, except of course if it would dominate the Suez Canal zone and control this essential portion of the sea route leading from West Europe to the Far East: one should not forget that the Zionist idea, i. e. the idea of settling Jews in the area between Turkish Anatolia and Mehmet Ali’s successful Egypt of the first half of the 19^th Century, that was supported by France, was an idea shaped in the late 1830s in the English press and not in the mind of Rabbis in Eastern European ghettos. The idea had already been evoked by Prince Charles de Ligne during the war between the Ottoman Empire and the coalition of Russia and Austria in the 1780s as a means to weaken the Turks and to create a focal point of troubles on another front, far from the Balkans, Crimea and the Caucasus; Napoleon wanted also to settle Jews in Palestine in order to prevent a future Turkish domination in the Suez area, as the French at that time, by supporting the Mameluks of Egypt against their Turkish masters, already had the intention to dig a canal between the Mediterranean and the Red Sea. Zionism is also not a genuine ideology born in Jewish ghettos but an idea forged artificially by the British to use the Jews as mere puppets. This role of Israel as a simple puppet state explains also why the relationship between Turkey and Israel are worsening now as the renewed Ottoman diplomacy of Davutoglu induces the Turkish state to resume his previous influences in the Arab Near East or Fertile Crescent. This could lead to a complete reverse of alliances in the region: voices in the United States are pleading for a new Iranian-American tandem between Mesopotamia and the Indus River which would fade or dim the usual alliance between Ankara, Washington and Tel Aviv. Such a shift would be as important as the Nixon-Kissinger renewed diplomacy of 1971-72, when suddenly China, the former “rogue state”, turned instantaneously to be the best ally of the States. It would also rule out many oversimplifying ideologists who have opted for cartoonlike pro-Zionist, pro-Palestinian (or pro-Hamas or pro-Hizbollah) or pro-Iranian positions in order to support either a Western Alliance or an Anti-Western/Anti-American coalition on the international chessboard. Things might or even may be completely turned upside down within a single decade. The Anti-American pro-Iranian ideologist of today may become a pro-Zionist Anti-American tomorrow if he wants to remain Anti-American and if he is not turned still crazier by the crumbling down of his too schematic worldview as many Western Maoists did in the 1970s, when their former anti-American anti-imperialist perorations coined on the Chinese model of Mao’s cultural revolution became totally outdated and preposterous once Kissinger had forged an alliance with communist China, that wasn’t ready anymore to support Maoist zealots and puppets in the Western world. Indeed, the United States would better than now contain Russia, China and India in case of a renewed alliance with Teheran. And using the quite wide influence sphere of the “Iranian civilization” (as the former Shah used to say), they could extend more easily their preponderance in Central Asia, in the Fertile Crescent, in Lebanon (with the Shiite minority armed by the Hizbollah) and in the Gulf where Shiite minorities are important. But Iran would then become a too powerful ally, exactly like China, the new ally of 1972, does. And before Iran would become a new China and develop naval capacities in the Gulf and in the Oman Sea, i. e. in one of the main areas of the Indian Ocean, like China wants to control entirely the Southern Chinese Sea in the Pacific, Europe would have to unite with Russia and India to contain a pro-American Iran! Stephen Kinzer, former “New York Times” bureau chief in Turkey, celebrated analyst of Iran’s turmoil in 1953 (the Mossadegh case) and International relations teacher at Boston University, pleads in his very recent book “Reset Middle East” for a general alliance on the Near East, Middle East and South Asian rimlands between Turks, Iranians and Americans (which would include also Pakistan and so re-establish the containing bolt that the Bagdad Treaty formerly was). When you are interested in geopolitics you should have fine observing skills and foresee all possible shifts in alliances that could occur in a very near future. It is also obvious that if Washington continues to treat Teheran as a “rogue state”, the Iranians will be compelled to play the game with Russia that remains nevertheless historically a foe of the Persians. Each Russian-Persian tandem would split in its very middle the rimland’s room that was organised by the Bagdad Treaty of the Fifties and give the Russians indirectly a broad “window” on the Indian Ocean, which is a state of things totally contrary to the principles settled by Homer Lea in 1912 and since then cardinal to all the Anglo-Saxon sea powers.  

 

The relationship with the United States is a quite complex one. Two main ideas must be kept in mind if you want to understand our position:

1)       Like the British historian Christopher Hill brilliantly demonstrated in his books “The World Turned Upside Down – Radical Ideas During the English Revolution” and “Society and Puritanism in Pre-Revolutionary England”, the core ideas that lead to the foundation of the British Thirteen Colonies in the Northern part of the New World was “dissidence” in front of all the European political systems inherited from the past. Later Clifford Longley in “Chosen People – The Big idea that Shapes England and America” produced an very accurate historical analysis of this Biblical idea of a Chosen People that leads Britons and Americans to perceive themselves not as a particular people of the European Caucasian family but as a “lost tribe of Israel”. Longley explains us that state of affairs by writing that Britons and Americans don’t have an identity, as other European people have, but thinks that they have a particular destiny, i. e. to build an aloof “New Jerusalem” and not a concrete defensive Empire of the European people, that would be born out of the genuine historical traditions of the subcontinent and simultaneously the legitimate, syncretic, Continental and Insular (Britain, Ireland, Sicily, Crete, Cyprus, etc.) heir of the Roman Empire and of the medieval Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation. The very idea of incarnating a “New Jerusalem” leads to despise the “non chosen”, even if they are akin people having importantly contributed to the ethno-genesis of the English or American nation (Dutch, Flemings, Northern Germans as Hanovrian or Low Saxons, Danes and Norwegians). Kevin Phillips, former Republican strategist in the United States and political commentator in leading American papers, in his fascinating book “American Theocracy – The Peril and Politics of Radical Religion, Oil and Borrowed Money in the 21^st Century”, criticizes the new political theology induced by the several Bush’s Administrations between 2000 and 2008, that have bereft the Republicans from the last remnants of traditional diplomacy, leading to what he calls an “Erring Republican Majority”. Indeed each chosen people’s theology introduced in the events of the international chessboard destroys all the traditional ways of practising diplomacy, as surely as French Sans-Culottes’ Republicanism or Bolshevism did or Islam Fundamentalism does. Europe, as a continent that has a long memory, cannot admit a scheme that rejects vehemently all the heritages of the past to replace them by mere artificial myths, that were moreover imported from the Near East in Roman times and have received a still faker interpretation in the decades just after Reformation.

 

2)       The second main fact of history to keep in mind in order to understand the complex Euro-American relationship is the effect the Monroe Doctrine had on the international chessboard from the second quarter of the 19^th Century onwards. In principle the Monroe Doctrine aimed at preventing European interventions in the New World or the Western Hemisphere as the Spanish “creole” countries had rebelled against Madrid and gained their independence and as the British had burnt Washington in 1812, after having invaded the States from Canada, and the Russians were still formally in California and Alaska. Monroe feared a general intervention of the “Pentarchy” powers everywhere in the new World that would have prevented the former Thirteen Colonies to develop and would synchronously have choked any attempt to rise as a Northern American continental and bi-oceanic power. Indeed the young Northern American Republic faced at that time a huge Eurasian block that seemed definitively indomitable, with British room projections in India and Southern Africa. The American historian Dexter Perkins in his book “Hands off: A History of the Monroe Doctrine” (1955) explains us that President Monroe got the audacity to challenge the European/Eurasian block at a time when the United States couldn’t actually assert any well-grounded power on the international chessboard. Monroe’s bold affirmation created US power in the world, simply because a pure will, expressed in plain words, can really anticipate actual power, be the very first step towards it. It is not a simple matter of chance that Carl Schmitt stressed the uttermost importance of the Monroe Doctrine in the genesis of the geopolitical shape of present-day world. Jordis von Lohausen says in his book “Mut zur Macht” that if Monroe wanted to preserve the New World from any European intervention, he wanted simultaneously to keep this New World for the USA themselves as sole hegemonic power. But if the New World is united under the leadership of Washington, it must control the other banks of the Oceans in a way or another to prevent any concentration of power able to disturb US hegemony or to regain authority in Latin America, be it directly political (like during the attempt of Maximilian of Hapsburg to create a European-dominated Empire in Mexico in 1866-67 with the support of France, Belgium, Spain and Austria) or indirectly by trade and economical means (as Germany did just before the two World Wars). So in the end effect, the Monroe Doctrine implies that the United States have to control the shores of Western Europe and of Morocco and the ones of Japan, China, Indochina and the Philippines in order to survive a the main superpower in the world.

 

The critical attitude we always have developed in front of the US American fact derives from these two core ideas. We cannot accept a Biblical ideology refusing to take into account our real roots and reducing all the institutions generated by our history to worthless rubbish. We can neither accept an affirmation of power that denies us the right to be ourselves a power on political, military and cultural levels. Would America get rid of the former British dissident ideology and adopt the principles of continental autarky, as Lawrence Dennis taught to do, there wouldn’t be any problem anymore. It would even be of great benefit for the US American population itself.

 

In your many articles you have exhibited an impressive knowledge of European thinkers from Hamsun and Evola to Spengler and Schmitt. Do you consider some of them more important, and a good starting-point for the pro-European individual?

 

The study of our “classical” heritage of authors is a must if we want to create a real alternative worldview (“Weltanschauung”). Moreover, Evola, Spengler and Schmitt are more linked to each other than we would imagine at first glance. Evola is not only the celebrated traditional thinker who is worldwide known as such. He was an intrepid alpinist who climbed the Northern wall of the Lyskamm in the Alps. His ashes were buried in the Lyskamm glacier by his follower Renato del Ponte after he had been cremated in Spoleto (a town that remained true to Emperor Frederick Hohenstaufen) after his death in 1974. Evola was a Dadaist at the very beginning of his career as an artist, a thinker and a traditionalist. His was totally involved in the art avant-gardes of his time, as he himself declared during a very interesting television interview in French language that you can watch now on your internet screen via “you tube” or “daily motion”. This position of him was deduced from a thorough rejection of Western values as they had degenerated during the 18^th and 19^th Centuries. We have to get rid of them in order to be “reborn”: the Futurists thought we ought to perform promptly this rejection project in order to create a complete new world owing absolutely nothing to the past; the Dadaists thought the rejection process should happen by mocking the rationalist and positivist bigotry of the “stupid 19^th Century” (as Charles Maurras’ companion Léon Daudet said). Evola after about a decade thought such options, as throwing rotten tomatoes at scandalized bourgeois’ heads or as exhibiting an urinal as if it was a masterwork of sculpture, were a little childish and started to think about an exploration of “the World of Tradition” as it expressed itself in other religions such as Hinduism, the Chinese Tao Te King, the first manifestations of Indian Buddhism (“the Awakening Doctrine”), the Upanishads and Tantric Yoga. For the European tradition, Evola studied the manifestations and developed a cult of Solar Manly Tradition being inspired in this reasoning by Bachofen’s big essay on matriarchal myth (“Mutterrecht”). Thanks to the triumph of the Solar Tradition, a genuine Traditional Europe could awaken on the shores of the Mediterranean and especially in the Romanized part of the Italic peninsula, invaded by Indo-European tribes having crossed the Alps just before the Celts did after them. Besides, he was the translator of Spengler and reviewed a lot of German books written by authors belonging to what Armin Mohler called the “Konservative Revolution”. In Italy Evola is obviously very well known, even in groups or academic work teams that cannot be considered as “conservative-revolutionist”, but the role he played as a conveyer of German ideas into his own country is often neglected outside Italy. But still today people rediscover in Latin countries figures of the German “Konservative Revolution” through the well-balanced reviews Evola once published in a lot of intellectual journals from the 1920s to the 1960s. As his comments on these books and publications were very well displayed on didactical level, he can also be still very helpful to us today.

 

Evola was also a diplomat trying to link again to Italy the countries having belonged to the Austrian-Hungarian empire. He was active in Prague, in Vienna (a City he loved) and in Budapest. He also had contacts with the Romanian Iron Guard, which he admired as a kind of citizens’ militia controlling severely the bends of petty politics limping towards corruption and “kleptocracy”. Even if he was mobilized when he was still a very young man as an artillery officer in the Italian army during WW1, Evola disapproved the war waged against traditional Austria and didn’t agree with the Futurists, d’Annunzio and Mussolini who were hectic interventionist warmongers. He was aware that the destruction of the Holy Roman Imperial Tradition in the centre of Europe would be a catastrophe for European culture and civilization. And it was indeed a catastrophe that we still can grasp today: a contemporary author like Claudio Magris, born in Trieste, explains it very well in his books, especially in “Danube”, a kind of nostalgic travelogue, written during peregrinations from one place to another in this lost Empire of former times, now torn into many scattered pieces belonging to thirteen different countries.

 

Carl Schmitt in several books or articles expresses the nostalgia of a kind of “Empire’s secret Chamber” regulating the general policy of a “greater room” (“Grossraum”): for him the members of such a Chamber, if it ever becomes reality, would find inspiration from Bachofen’s ideas and their interpretations, from Spengler pessimistic decay philosophy and from the analyses of all possible teams devoted to geopolitics (Haushofer and others). Carl Schmitt just as Evola was also deeply interested in art avant-gardes.

 

My interest for Hamsun comes from the implicit anthropology you find in his works: the real man is a peasant running an estate. He is free: what he owns is his own production; he is never defined or bound by others, i. e. by alien capitalists or by State’s servants or by foreign rulers or by the eager members of a ruling and crushing party (Orwell’s pigs in “Animal Farm”). The general urbanization process that started in the historical cities of Europe (especially Paris, London and Berlin) and in the new hectic cities of the United States lead to the emerging of an enslaved mankind, unable to coin its own destiny with the only help of his own inner and physical forces. Spengler and Eliade both say also that true mankind is incarnated in the “eternal peasant”, who is the only type of man that can generate genuine religion. David Herbert Lawrence’s most important book for us is without any doubt “Apocalypse”: this English author laments the disappearing of “cosmic forces” in man’s life, due to the bias inaugurated by Reformation, Deism (mocked by Jonathan Swift), 18^th Century Enlightenment and political extremism derived from the blueprints (Burke) of the French Revolution. Man became gradually detached from the cosmic frame in which he was embedded since ever. He’s lost also all his links to the natural communities in which he was born, like the poor immigrant Hamsun was in Chicago or Detroit, limping from one miserable job to another, bereft of all youth friends and family members. The cosmic frame Lawrence was talking about receives a comprehensive and understandable translation for the humble in the aspect of a religious liturgy and calendar (or almanac), expressing symbolically the rhythms of nature in which each man or woman lives. Although Flanders has been urbanized since the Middle Ages and had important industrial cities like Bruges and Ghent, the anthropological ideal of the 19^th Century romantic or realist Flemish literature is the one of the independent peasant (“Baas Gansendonck” in Hendrik Conscience’s novel, the unfortunate and stubborn Father figure in Stijn Streuvels’ “Vlaschaard”, the heroes of Ernst Claes’ and Felix Timmermans’ rural novels and short stories, etc.). In Russian literature too, the rural element of the population is perceived as doomed under any communist or Westernized regime but simultaneously perceived as the only force able to redeem Russia from its horrible past. Solzhenitsyn pleaded for a general liberation of the Russian peasantry in order to restore the Ukrainian “Corn Belt” in the “Black Earth” area, giving Russia back the agricultural advantages it potentially had before the total destruction of the “Kulaks” by the Bolsheviks.

 

But we can talk for hours and hours, write full pages of interpretations of our common literary heritage; I cannot answer your question thoroughly as it would need writing a good pile of books. Let us conclude by saying Tradition or literary “ruralism” (be it Flemish, Scandinavian or Russian) are good things provided you don’t remain glued into it. Futurism is a dynamic necessity also, especially in societies like ours, where the countryside isn’t the only life frame anymore. Marinetti and more recently Guillaume Faye stressed the fact that in order to be able to compete on the international chessboard we have the imperious task to get rid of archaisms. But if Faye is obviously more futurist that “archaist”, I plead for a good balance between immemorial past and audacious future (like Claes did in his marvellously filmed novel “Mira”, in which a backward rural community refuses the building of a bridge that would link the village to the next important town; the young sensual prostitute Mira, treated as a witch by the village bigots, having just come back from Paris, where she was on the game, falls in love with the handsome engineer, the bridge is built and the village dwellers linked to the rest of the people’s community without abandoning their roots – the ideal balance between past and future, between demure morality and forgiven sin, is realised). To put it in realistic arguments: we need both a sound rural population (crushed nowadays by the EU-ukases) and a high tech engineering elite (able to create super-weapons) to become a re-born superpower, which would not be unnecessarily aggressive or feverish  “imperialist” (in the bad sense of the word), but calmly civilian (Zaki Laïdi) and simply powerful by its plain presence in the world. Mentally, we, as the forerunners of the needed “new teams” in present-day messy and derelict Europe, should be real and staunch “archeo-futurists”, mastering our roots and planning boldly our future. The rest is only mean and petty trifles.    

(Answers given in Forest-Flotzenberg, March 2011). 

El debate sobre la "Nouvelle Droite"

URKULTUR Nº 5.- EL DEBATE SOBRE LA "NOUVELLE DROITE".

Ex: http://urkultur-imperium-europa.blogspot.com/

REVISTA DIGITAL: Enlace con issuu.com

[Vínculos con el documento en pdf para imprimir, arriba a la derecha de este blog]

Editorial.

Sebastian J. Lorenz

La Nueva Derecha en Europa: una revisión crítica.

Diego L. Sanromán

La Nueva Derecha del año 2000.

Alain de Benoist y Charles Champetier

El balance de la Nueva Derecha.

Guillaume Faye

Declaraciones de Robert Steuckers sobre la Nueva Derecha.

Marc Lüdders

Los fundamentos filosóficos de la Nueva Derecha.

Michael Toriguian

Nueva Derecha y Revolución Conservadora: una síntesis ideológica.

Sebastian J. Lorenz

La apropiación de la «Revolución Conservadora» por la Nueva Derecha.

Roger Griffin

La Nueva Derecha y la reformulación metapolítica.

Miguel Ángel Simón

La influencia de la Nueva Derecha en los partidos neopopulistas europeos.

Joan Antón Mellón

Guillaume Faye's Archeofuturism: Two Reviews

And yet one more review of . . .
Guillaume Faye’s Archeofuturism

Brett STEVENS

Ex: http://www.counter-currents.com/

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Click here for writings by Guillaume Faye, including an excerpt from Archeofuturism

Guillaume Faye
Archeofuturism: European Visions of the Post-Catastrophic Age
Arktos Media Ltd., 2010

As humans, we study our world to estimate the best responses to its demands. We then make a choice, and act on it, then observe the results to see if our estimations were correct. If they were not, we correct while trying to learn from the error. That is well and good, when buying a cement mixer — but what about a whole civilization?

Sometime 400 years ago, as our civilization prospered, the decision was made to modernize. This came about through a belief in the equality of all human beings and a drive toward external mechanisms, namely technology and political control systems. Guillaume Faye, the seasoned rising star of the New Right movement in Europe, explores our correction of this mistake in his landmark book Archeofuturism: European Visions of the Post-Catastrophic Age.

One of the more important things I’ve read this year, this book upholds an offhand feel throughout; an honest, end-of-the-night, when the wine and cigarettes are low and people are too tired to do anything but blurt out the big ideas that haunt them in their dreams feel. The content is dynamic, especially the first half, but the real force of power here is the style, an excitedly taboo-breaking, honest and hopeful look at re-creating ourselves so we have a future. This is not a book of resentment, but of joyful charging ahead.

A large influence on this stylistic breathlessness is the composition of the book, which is a collection of essays and a short sci-fi story to show us these ideas in practice. The second section, a thorough and high-energy explication of where Nouvelle Droite beliefs lead, the reasons for them and finally, how they can be better applied toward a theory of the future, will interest new right and deep ecologists the most as it joins the ideas of both into not a resistant/revolutionary culture but a remaking/revolutionary one.

Archeofuturism, Faye writes, escapes the boutique right-wing airy intellectualism of GRECE, which he critiques in the first book. Pointing out the failure of “ambiguous and incomprehensible ideological axes,” he proposes instead a transition from the rearward-looking “conservative” outlook to one that acknowledges what was lost, and the current state of disaster in the West, and plans for rebuilding afterward.

In his new theory of Archeofuturism, Faye proposes a “vitalist constructivism” that implements a quasi-feudal, national but not jingoistic, united Europe that applies the traditional spirit and learning to a future in which technology plays a central role. His unstated point is that the tool must again serve the man, after centuries of the reverse; he appeals to a sense of both the pragmatic in finding historically valid solutions through tradition, and the spirit of tradition, which is one of a constructive, upward society.

He proposes that we adopt this new outlook through a voluntaristic method, first changing our values, then our art, and then finally our political expectations at about the same time a “convergence of catastrophes” (environmental, political, economic) devastate Europe. Faye’s call is for Europeans to return to being “soldiers of the Idea” again, and for them to take up not a corrective action, but a constructive desire to rebuild and build it bigger, better and more exciting than before.

This fusion of both conservative and revolutionary thought takes the best of liberalism and the best of conservatism and takes them out of their handily domesticated roles as token opponents. He points out that our current ideological menu is carved from “soft ideology,” or that which passively deals with splitting up the wealth of an industrialization binge. He emphasizes a number of points all conservatives and pro-Europid readers can enjoy:

• Modernism is an attachment to the past. According to Faye, modernism is backward-looking as it tries to un-do conditions of nature that offend our egalitarian sentiment. What defines modernity is egalitarianism, or the idea that we’re all equal (in political power, in ability, in right to property). As a result, we’re constantly trying to force equality on nature while it resists us.
• Extreme leftism is a token act which reinforces the power of the modern nation-state. This point struck me as the most controversial, yet most sensible. If you are in power, and want to stay there, you need to give your citizens petty acts of rebellion that feel extreme but are in fact a repetition of the dominant philosophy. The state and its corruptors benefit from equality because it keeps smarter voices from rising above the herd.
• The modern world exists in a state of “soft totalitarianism” where those with unpopular opinions are simply ostracized, which in a liberal capitalist democracy effectively starves them into submission. He praises the American method of “soft imperialism” and shows how this is the future: indirect rule, with a reward/threat complex administered by social and business factors; the “1984″ vision is obsolete.
• Romanticism. Faye writes convincingly of his efforts to join “Cartesian classicism,” or a sense of space as being equal in all directions, with “Romanticism” which he expresses here as the idea that will or will to power can change the world radically even if small in stature. The joining of these two represents the expression of both ancient philosophy and a new type of “freedom” for humanity.
• Roots and method of modernity. Modern society consists of secularized evangelism, Anglo-Saxon mercantilism, and Enlightenment individualism, its methods are economic individualism, allegory of Progress, cult of quantitative development and abstract “human rights.” It is amazingly refreshing to see this spelled out so clearly and simply.
• Multiple factors doom modernism which was always unrealistic. “Europe is turning into a third world country,” he writes, summing up the disasters. If you see this book in a store, pick it up to read page 59 for an insightful list of modernity’s failings.
• Heterotelia. Following Nietzsche’s example, Faye needed a concept that explains how what we intend does not always result in a perpetuation of that state when put into practice. For example, political equality ends in inequality through social instability; multiculturalism ends in race war; letting economy lead ends in poverty because speculative finance is easier than generating real wealth. He explains our past failings and the need to be alert in the future through heterotelia, which means that “ideas do not necessarily yield the expected results.”
• Ethno-masochism. Faye illustrates how the West, in a suicidal bid to become morally/socially impressed with itself, has inflicted upon itself the unworkable scheme of multiculturalism and in doing so, has imported Islam, an “imperial theocratic totalitarianism.” Unlike many new right writers, he endorses the idea of European culture as superior in addition to being worth saving for its unique virtues.
• North versus South. History begins with anthropology, Faye writes, so we must see the conflict in humanity as one between Northern peoples who are prosperous, and the “third world” Southerners who are attempting to colonize the North on the back of its technology and liberal egalitarianism. He suggests a Eurosiberia stretching from the UK to the borders of China, and claims East-West conflict is less likely as a source of conflict.

Against this cataclysm Faye posits Archeofuturism, or a futurism equally balanced by the spirit of traditionalism, which is (a) learning from the past and (b) a type of reverence for life that emphasizes family, punishment being more important than prevention, duties coming before rights, solemn social rites, the aristocratic principle and a “freedom” defined not as the ability to act randomly, but as a sense of having a place and being freed from a chaotic society with excessive pointless competition. This synthesis of the best of capitalism, socialism and our monarchic past fully lives up to the title of this book.

Good luck finding a short review of this book. The first half of it is packed chock-full of interesting ideas that like new melodies can infect the head for days as it dissects them and their context. The second half both addresses common objections and provides background, and takes the form of a short science fiction story in the tradition of Asimov and Heinlein that explains how technology will help humans evolve. The concepts are mind-blowing and more daring than anything sci-fi has attempted since The Shockwave Rider, and this icing on the cake makes reading this book have a natural rhythm from the extreme, to the professorial, to the radical yet calming.

History is like a supertanker ship; it takes miles to begin to turn around and there are no brakes. The egalitarian experiment in Europe is only a few centuries old yet has wreaked utter havoc on all the subtler parts of existence, things that most people don’t notice because they are easily distracted by shiny objects. Faye brings these alive, shows us exactly why they are endangered, and then shows us a plausible and gradual (e.g. non apocalyptic, non-Utopian) solution toward which we can move if we believe life is worth saving. Clearly he does, and it infuses this book with a fervor and wisdom that few attain.

Source: http://www.amerika.org/books/archeofuturism-european-visi...

Another review of . . .
Guillaume Faye’s Archeofuturism

Michael WALKER

Ex: http://www.counter-currents.com/

Click here for more discussions of Archeofuturism

Click here for writings by Guillaume Faye, including an excerpt from Archeofuturism

Guillaume Faye
Archeofuturism: European Visions of the Post-Catastrophic Age
Arktos Media Ltd., 2010

In the 1980s Guillaume Faye was one of the best known member of GRECE and by far their most popular speaker. With humour, panache, invective and contempt thrown in at just the right moment-the dismissive “l’acteur Reagan” the contemptuous and venomous “monsieur Henri Levi surnommé le grand”, he had his audiences rolling in the aisles with delight. Every time I heard him speak at a GRECE conference he received a standing ovation.

GRECE was not only a school of thought, it was also a sort of social club, linking like-minded persons on a cultural, political and social level. However, its concentration on theory made the temptation in hard times great indeed to retreat from direct confrontation and reduce all issues to the level of academic debate. Faye explicates these and other criticisms in Archeofuturism (now available for the first time in English from the Arktos Press at the same time as it has become hard to obtain in the original French).

Structure

Archeofuturism suffers from coming from the pen of a man more at home before a gathering than a keyboard. It is unbalanced and paradoxically, given the content, in some respects extremely provincial and theoretical in its approach and design. At the same time, it owes nothing to the respectability and detachment from reality which can make cowards of many writers.

This is not to say that the book lacks structure. It has a very definite if unorthodox structure. It consists of three theses as Faye calls them: (1) the end of civilization as we know it owing to what Faye calls a “convergence of catastrophes”; (2) the necessity for revolution, notably in the European mindset, (3) propositions for the post-catastrophic world (and the title of his book expresses the essence of Faye’s solution).

The last chapter is a piece of science fiction, a story of a world in which the conflict of technics and tradition has been resolved by reconciling the two, and this is the underlying thread of Faye’s entire argumentation, that we must learn to reach back to our furthest yesterday and to the longest future.

Positions

One issue is the conflict between tradition and progress. On the one hand, technology is necessary as a tool of our will to power, something which Faye believes essential to the survival of the European. On the other hand, scientific and technical progress may prove and often does prove, destructive of tradition. Are religions just fables? It is hard to die for a fable. How is such belief possible in a world of scientific rationalism and progress?

Faye believes strongly that the world is hurtling towards multi-faceted disaster, less a clash of civilizations, although he seems to write at times in a similar vein to Huntington, with his view of Islam especially as a challenge in itself to the hegemony of European civilization, than what he terms a “convergence of catastrophes.” Like Huntington, Faye regards Islam as a single cultural, religious, political bloc with a an expansionist will.

On homosexuality :

. . . it is not a matter of advocating any repression of homosexuality, of banning homosexual couples or socially penalizing gay people; simply, the prospect of legalizing of a form of marriage for homosexuals would have a highly destructive symbolic value. Marriage and legal heterosexual unions enjoy forms of protection and public benefits that are accorded to couples capable of having children and hence of renewing the generations and thus of being of objective service to society. Legalising homosexual unions and awarding them financial privileges means protecting sterile unions. (pp. 106–107)

On demographics:

It is necessary to reflect on the issue of immigration, which represents a form of demographic colonization of Europe at the hands of mostly Afro-Asiatic peoples. . . . Three generations later, the colonization of Europe represents a form of revenge against European colonization . . . are we to accept or reject a substantial alteration oif the ethno-cultural substrate of Europe? The basis of intellectual honesty and the key to ideological success lie in the ability and courage to address the real problems, instead of attempting to avoid them. (p. 49)

On distraction:

The system only makes use of brutal censorship in very limited areas: it generally resorts to intellectual diversion, i.e. distraction, by constantly focusing people’s attention on side issues. What we are dealing with here is not simply the usual brutalization of the population via the increasingly specific mass-media apparatus of the society of spectacle — a veritable audiovisual Prozac-but rather a concealment of essential political problems (immigration, pollution, transportation policies, the aging of the population, the financial crisis of the social budgets expected to occur by 2010 etc. (p. 92)

Archeofuturism

It is a sad paradox, and one about which Faye is acutely aware in his book, that the European New Right in general has failed to make an impact at the very time that the march of events might have been expected to play into its hands: the end of the cold war, the decline of political Manicheanism (East versus West) , the decline of nationalism as a relevant political alternative to liberalism. Faye offers a number of explications for this failure. They can be summarized as a lack of media “savvy”, romantic isolationism, minimization of catastrophe, cultural relativism and a lack of understanding of and worse, interest in, economics (Faye alone among spokesmen of GRECE had written a treatise on economics).

Faye’s response is to deviate from the consensus among the new right and to insist on European exceptionalism. He returns to what might be called a traditional belief of the radical right when he claims, as he does here, that European civilization is superior to others and that as a superior civilization it has a duty to resist the challenge of immigration in general and Islam in particular. Cultural and racial superiority was the premise (sometimes asserted, sometimes unspoken) of all movements of the twentieth and nineteenth centuries which sought to preserve or halt a decline in the domination of the white man over the political destiny of the globe.

European radical right movements after the Second World War focused their propaganda very much on the restoration of national prestige and glory and a rejection of immigrants and outsiders.  GRECE stressed from the beginning the importance of what it called “the right to be different” arguing less in terms of European superiority than in terms of European uniqueness, Europe’s right to the nurture of its own identity and destiny. The great enemy was seen not so much as military or political threats as such, as the forces which sought to attenuate, reduce, trivialize and ultimately abolish differences. The great enemy in this respect was neither Islam nor communism but “the American way of Life,” the manifest destiny to reduce all peoples to consumers, whose sole struggles were ones of economic competition.

This developed in the course of time within GRECE into a position of ethnopluralism, which Faye and others subsequently denounced as cultural relativism. Simply put, it is the argument that all cultures are worthy of respect within their own terms and no culture is inherently superior to another. The obvious critique of such a position is that it ultimately disarms all willingness to disallow, challenge or oppose other cultures. Opposition even in its politest non-military form, can only be conducted on the premise that in some way one is superior or equipped with superior arguments or in the area of culture and religion, possesses a truer, superior culture and religion and one thereby and therewith seeks an opponent’s defeat.

There is another aspect — that of economic survival. A major criticism which Faye has of GRECE is that it ignores or glosses over demographic and economic warfare against the European. Faye argues that at a time of emergency, when Europe is threatened with being overwhelmed by non-Europeans whose demographics are reducing the significance of the European by the hour, it is a form of suicide to indulge in culturally relativist reflections and debate.

Faye spends no time in fleshing out his arguments about superiority and in what respects the European is “superior.” This is a pity because it would provide the book with a stabilizing effect. As it is, Faye assures us that he believes the European is superior and rushes on the next point. What Faye implies although I did not find it in this book explicitly stated, is that when we talk about the right of a people not only to an identity but to a destiny, there is likely to be a conflict between the destiny of a people compelled to expand and conquer and the right of another (conquered) people to an identity.

The notion of a “right” be it to identity or destiny is problematic: where does our “right” come from? A Nietzschean, as Faye claims to be, can answer this question. It could be baldly stated as the right to survival — the impulse of nature which all beings have the “right” to practice. Rights to be different are likely to conflict with the rights of others to be different. The right to conflict is therefore the right to survival of identity and it is Faye’s point that such a right can only be preserved by those who actively engage in the politics (as all politics in Faye’s view must be) of conflict. A defense of the identity of the European necessitates entering into a state of conflict with the prevailing hegemony.

Faye candidly states that he made the same mistake as other GRECE members in the expression of cultural relativism and an accompanying primary and fundamental anti-Americanism which took precedence over the ethnic question and the challenge of non-white immigration to Europe, (and presumably, the decline in relative numbers and influence of the Caucasian in North America). The “ethnopluralist” approach is exemplified by Alain de Benoist’s Europe-Tiers Monde: Même Combat where de Benoist argues that Europe and the Third World (even the term seems a little outdated today) are natural allies against the American and Soviet ways of life. Faye stresses that GRECE (and he willingly includes himself here) ignored the reality of the Islamic threat and that ethnopluralism paved the way for an inactive, “head in the sand” response to the long term significance of massive Mohammedan immigration into Europe.

Faye’s stress on the superiority of Europe in place of the right of Europeans to be different indeed avoids the danger of degenerating into an ineffective and compromising inactive pluralism. On the other hand, it shifts the focus of intent significantly towards a provocative, inevitably conflict laden project which is dear to Faye: the Eurasian Imperium. Faye is for better or for worse an imperialist. His vision of the future as outlined in this book is one of a vast Eurasian bloc, stretching from Lisbon to Vladivostok.

The implied direction, never explicitly stated of the archeofuturist project, is combat and conquest in a world divided into major power blocs jockeying for position. “Like in the Middle Ages or Antiquity, the future requires us to envisage the Earth as structured in vast, quasi-imperial unity in mutual conflict or cooperation.” (p. 77). Seen in this light, Faye’s admiration for atomic power implied in this work (and more explicitly indicated elsewhere, dramatically in his comic book Notre avant guerre, where he gleefully depicts a degenerate Europe being destroyed in mushroom clouds ) and futuristic technology in general is the ghost in the machine of Faye’s project.

However, unlike most modernizers, Faye does not duck the dilemma of reconciling a world of modern technology with a world of tradition, be it racial, political or other. How does one reconcile advanced technology and its implications with the preservation of continuity with the past? Faye faces this problem head on and if his solution is seems questionable and Utopian, he deserves the credit of highlighting the dilemma. Practically all radical rightists of whatever hue, fail to address the issue at all. Faye’s solution is what he calls “archeofuturism” the title of his book and the project to which he believes European revolutionaries (and Faye believes we must be revolutionaries to save European civilization and not conservatives) the assimilation of the future with the past, building a future not as modern or post modern but archeo-modern, a modernism acutely aware of and with its roots in a deep and profound past.

There will be a small elite of rulers with access to the highest forms of modern technology while the majority of less gifted will make do with crude forms of technical accomplishment-a completely two tier society in fact. This may sound familiar and not perhaps pleasantly so. It is this reviewer’s belief, one shared by many, that the ultimate aim of the ruling elite is the same: the division of mankind into two groups-the elite and the great majority of outsiders who no longer have a say in how public affairs are administered. This seems difficult to reconcile with Faye’s expressed support for populist initiatives. Be that as it may, this writer’s strength is his ability to fire the right questions rather than provide well prepared answers.

The “post catastrophic” world will be one, Faye believes, divided between the futuristic achievements of an elite and the archaic conditions and status of the majority, it will be archeofuturistic. Before we examine this idea more closely, it is worth taking a moment to consider the notions of growth and progress which Faye dismisses as overhauled. His chapter revealingly entitled “For a Two-Tier World Economy” opens with the bald assertion: “Progress” is clearly a dying idea, even if economic growth may be continuing”.

Anti-Growth

Faye’s rejection of what he calls “the paradigm of economic development” is simple:

An intellectual revolution is taking place: people are starting to perceive, without daring to openly state it, that the old paradigm according to which the life of humanity on both an individual and collective level is getting better and better every day thanks to science, the spread of democracy and egalitarian emancipation is quite simply false. . . . Today, the perverse effects of mass technology are starting to make themselves felt: new resistant viruses, the contamination of industrially produced food, shortage of land and a downturn in world agricultural production, rapid and widespread environmental degradation, the development of weapons of mass destruction in addition to the atomic bomb-not to mention that technology is entering its Baroque age. (pp. 162–63).

The last comment excepted (which is pure Spengler), this writing must strike the impartial reader as familiar. It is a fairly good example of the pessimism of environmentalist writers in general and it has been said many times before. Faye knows or should know, that there are very many people who are deeply aware of the heavy price which we are paying for making Progress our Baal. Faye is entirely right in my opinion, as thousands of others before him have been right, to question the cost but anyone expecting Faye to so much as nod with respect in the direction of the many organizations, groups, campaigns and initiatives to reverse this trend, will be disappointed.

On the contrary, Faye contemptuously dismisses the French Green movement in these words, “the political platform of the Green movement contain no real environmentalist suggestions, such as the transport of lorries by train instead of on highways, the creation of non-polluting cars (electric cars, LPG, etc.) or the fight against urban sprawl into natural habitats, liquid manure leaks, ground water contamination, the depletion of European fish stocks, chemical food additives, the overuse of insecticides and pesticides, etc. Each time I have tried to bring these specific and concrete issues up with a representative of the Greens, I got the impression that he was not really interested in them or that he had not really studied them” (p. 145). It is not clear (possibly a fault of the translator’s) whether Faye is referring to one or several spokesmen. Be that as it may, it is not my experience at all that environmentalists are not interested in these issues.

Futurism

Faye gives the impression throughout the book less of someone proposing ideas in a book for a wide readership as enjoying a discussion with someone who was with him in the days of GRECE over a “ballon de rouge” in a Paris café. Despite his provincialism, Faye has a sound instinct for homing in on some of the genuinely important issues of our time and viewing them in a global perspective, even when (and this is often the case here) his global perspective is obscured by the incidental historical luggage which weighs his book down. The reader should not be deterred by the book’s incidental references from letting Faye lead to key issues of our time and demanding our response to core questions.

The greatest quality of this book is that it gives a voice to the growing sense of frustration that is felt among persons form all walks of life that we are living in a transitory period, that the “end of history” is an utter illusion and that old structures are insufficient to contain the force of history. Faye cites the unlikely figure of Peter Mandelson as an “archeofuturist without knowing it” as someone who has recognized that democracy as we know it from the Mother of Parliaments is tired and no longer able to cope with the challenges which European man and indeed humankind is facing.

Faye’s examination of the real issues behind the palaver of most contemporary politicians is refreshing. Here is a taste:

The new societies of the future will finally abolish the aberrant egalitarian mechanism we have now, whereby everyone aspires to become an officer or a cadre or a diplomat, even though all evidence suggests that most people do not have the skills to fulfill those roles. This model engenders widespread frustration, failure and resentment. The societies that will be vivified by increasingly sophisticated technologies, in contrast, will ask for a return to the archaic and inegalitarian and hierarchical norms, whereby a competent and meritocratic minority is rigorously selected to take on leading assignments.

Those who perform subordinate functions in these inegalitarian societies will not feel frustrated: their dignity will not be called into question, for they will accept their own condition as something useful within the organic community-finally freed from the individualistic hubris of modernity, which implicitly and deceptively states that each person can become a scientist or a price.

“Individualistic hubris” indeed sums up for this reviewer one of the great malaises of our time: the exaggerated importance which mediocre individuals attach to their own boring lives. Faye at his best is very good indeed.

For all its failings this book is a valuable contribution to the growing awareness of persons of European descent of their time of crisis. It  provides a highly readable and often acute observations about what Faye stresses are the real issues of our time but the question nags steadily: to what extent has Faye provided a strategy for Europeans in the face of those issues? The answer is that there is no strategy, unless by “strategy” we mean a positioning (for example in favor of European federalism vis-à-vis reactionary nationalism or friendly competitiveness with the United States rather than blanket hostility to the American way of life).

Perhaps someone much younger than either Faye or this reviewer will read this book and know that they are able to provide that response. In that case, this book will have shown itself to be of the past and the future, in a word archeofuturistic.

Source: http://www.amerika.org/texts/archeofuturism-by-guillaume-...

Postmodern Challenges: Between Faust & Narcissus

Robert STEUCKERS (1987):

Postmodern Challenges:
Between Faust & Narcissus, Part 1

Translated by Greg Johnson

Ex: http://www.counter-currents.com/

In Oswald Spengler’s terms, our European culture is the product of a “pseudomorphosis,” i.e., of the grafting of an alien mentality upon our indigenous, original, and innate mentality. Spengler calls the innate mentality “the Faustian.”

The Confrontation of the Innate and the Acquired

The alien mentality is the theocentric, “magical” outlook born in the Near East. For the magical mind, the ego bows respectfully before the divine substance like a slave before his master. Within the framework of this religiosity, the individual lets himself be guided by the divine force that he absorbs through baptism or initiation.

There is nothing comparable for the old-European Faustian spirit, says Spengler. Homo europeanus, in spite of the magic/Christian varnish covering our thinking, has a voluntarist and anthropocentric religiosity. For us, the good is not to allow oneself to be guided passively by God, but rather to affirm and carry out our own will. “To be able to choose,” this is the ultimate basis of the indigenous European religiosity. In medieval Christianity, this voluntarist religiosity shows through, piercing the crust of the imported “magism” of the Middle East.

Around the year 1000, this dynamic voluntarism appears gradually in art and literary epics, coupled with a sense of infinite space within which the Faustian self would, and can, expand. Thus to the concept of a closed space, in which the self finds itself locked, is opposed the concept of an infinite space, into which an adventurous self sallies forth.

 

From the “Closed” World to the Infinite Universe

According to the American philosopher Benjamin Nelson,[1] the old Hellenic sense of physis (nature), with all the dynamism this implies, triumphed at the end of the 13th century, thanks to Averroism, which transmitted the empirical wisdom of the Greeks (and of Aristotle in particular) to the West. Gradually, Europe passed from the “closed world” to the infinite universe. Empiricism and nominalism supplanted a Scholasticism that had been entirely discursive, self-referential, and self-enclosed. The Renaissance, following Copernicus and Bruno (the tragic martyr of Campo dei Fiori), renounced geocentrism, making it safe to proclaim that the universe is infinite, an essentially Faustian intuition according to Spengler’s criteria.

In the second volume of his History of Western Thought, Jean-François Revel, who formerly officiated at Point and unfortunately illustrated the Americanocentric occidentalist ideology, writes quite pertinently: “It is easy to understand that the eternity and infinity of the universe announced by Bruno could have had, on the cultivated men of the time, the traumatizing effect of passing from life in the womb into the vast and cruel draft of an icy and unbounded vortex.”[2]

The “magic” fear, the anguish caused by the collapse of the comforting certitude of geocentrism, caused the cruel death of Bruno, that would become, all told, a terrifying apotheosis . . . Nothing could ever refute heliocentrism, or the theory of the infinitude of sidereal spaces. Pascal would say, in resignation, with the accent of regret: “The eternal silence of these infinite spaces frightens me.”

 

From Theocratic Logos to Fixed Reason

To replace magical thought’s “theocratic logos,” the growing and triumphant bourgeois thought would elaborate a thought centered on reason, an abstract reason before which it is necessary to bow, like the Near Easterner bows before his god. The “bourgeois” student of this “petty little reason,” virtuous and calculating, anxious to suppress the impulses of his soul or his spirit, thus finds a comfortable finitude, a closed off and secured space. The rationalism of this virtuous human type is not the adventurous, audacious, ascetic, and creative rationalism described by Max Weber[3] which educates the inner man precisely to face the infinitude affirmed by Giordano Bruno.[4]

 

From the end of the Renaissance, Two Modernities are Juxtaposed

The petty rationalism denounced by Sombart[5] dominates the cities by rigidifying political thought, by restricting constructive activist impulses. The genuinely Faustian and conquering rationalism described by Max Weber would propel European humanity outside its initial territorial limits, giving the main impulse to all sciences of the concrete.

From the end of the Renaissance, we thus discover, on the one hand, a rigid and moralistic modernity, without vitality, and, on the other hand, an adventurous, conquering, creative modernity, just as we are today on the threshold of a soft post-modernity or of a vibrant post-modernity, self-assured and potentially innovative. By recognizing the ambiguity of the terms “rationalism,” “rationality,” “modernity,” and “post-modernity,” we enter one level of the domain of political ideologies, even militant Weltanschauungen.

The rationalization glutted with moral arrogance described by Sombart in his famous portrait of the “bourgeois” generates the soft and sentimental messianisms, the great tranquillizing narratives of contemporary ideologies. The conquering rationalization described by Max Weber causes the great scientific discoveries and the methodical spirit, the ingenious refinement of the conduct of life and increasing mastery of the external world.

This conquering rationalization also has its dark side: It disenchants the world, drains it, excessively schematizes it. While specializing in one or another domain of technology, science, or the spirit, while being totally invested there, the “Faustians” of Europe and North America often lead to a leveling of values, a relativism that tends to mediocrity because it makes us lose the feeling of the sublime, of the telluric mystique, and increasingly isolates individuals. In our century, the rationality lauded by Weber, if positive at the beginning, collapsed into quantitativist and mechanized Americanism that instinctively led by way of compensation, to the spiritual supplement of religious charlatanism combining the most delirious proselytism and sniveling religiosity.

Such is the fate of “Faustianism” when severed from its mythic foundations, of its memory of the most ancient, of its deepest and most fertile soil. This caesura is unquestionably the result of pseudomorphosis, the “magian” graft on the Faustian/European trunk, a graft that failed. “Magianism” could not immobilize the perpetual Faustian drive; it has—and this is more dangerous—cut it off from its myths and memory, condemned it to sterility and dessication, as noted by Valéry, Rilke, Duhamel, Céline, Drieu, Morand, Maurois, Heidegger, or Abellio.

 

Conquering Rationality, Moralizing Rationality, the Dialectic of Enlightenment, the “Grand Narratives” of Lyotard

Conquering rationality, if it is torn away from its founding myths, from its ethno-identitarian ground, its Indo-European matrix, falls—even after assaults that are impetuous, inert, emptied of substance—into the snares of calculating petty rationalism and into the callow ideology of the “Grand Narratives” of rationalism and the end of ideology. For Jean-François Lyotard, “modernity” in Europe is essentially the “Grand Narrative” of the Enlightenment, in which the heroes of knowledge work peacefully and morally toward an ethico-political happy ending: universal peace, where no antagonism will remain.[6] The “modernity” of Lyotard corresponds to the famous “Dialectic of the Enlightenment” of Horkheimer and Adorno, leaders of famous “Frankfurt School.”[7] In their optic, the work of the man of science or the action of the politician, must be submitted to a rational reason, an ethical corpus, a fixed and immutable moral authority, to a catechism that slows down their drive, that limits their Faustian ardor. For Lyotard, the end of modernity, thus the advent of “post-modernity,” is incredulity—progressive, cunning, fatalistic, ironic, mocking—with regard to this metanarrative.

Incredulity also means a possible return of the Dionysian, the irrational, the carnal, the turbid, and disconcerting areas of the human soul revealed by Bataille or Caillois, as envisaged and hoped by professor Maffesoli,[8] of the University of Strasbourg, and the German Bergfleth,[9] a young nonconformist philosopher; that is to say, it is equally possible that we will see a return of the Faustian spirit, a spirit comparable with that which bequeathed us the blazing Gothic, of a conquering rationality which has reconnected with its old European dynamic mythology, as Guillaume Faye explains in Europe and Modernity.[10]

Notes

1. Benjamin Nelson, Der Ursprung der Moderne, Vergleichende Studien zum Zivilisationsprozess [The Origin of Modernity: Comparative Studies of the Civilization Process] (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1986).

2. Jean-François Revel, Histoire de la pensée occidentale [History of Western Thought], vol. 2, La philosophie pendant la science (XVe, XVIe et XVIIe siècles) [Philosophy and Science (Fifteenth-, Sixteenth-, and Seventeenth-Centuries)] (Paris: Stock, 1970). Cf. also the masterwork of Alexandre Koyré, From the Closed World to the Infinite Universe (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1957).

3. Cf. Julien Freund, Max Weber (Paris: P.U.F., 1969).

4. Paul-Henri Michel, La cosmologie de Giordano Bruno [The Cosmology of Giordano Bruno] (Paris: Hermann, 1962).

5. Cf. essentially: Werner Sombart, Le Bourgeois. Contribution à l’histoire morale et intellectuelle de l’homme économique moderne [The Bourgeois: Contribution to the Moral and Intellectual History of Modern Economic Man] (Paris: Payot, 1966).

6. Jean-François Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge, trans. Geoff Bennington and Brian Massumi. (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984).

7. Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adomo, The Dialectic of Enlightenment, trans. Edmund Jephcott (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2002). Cf. also Pierre Zima, L’École de Francfort. Dialectique de la particularité [The Frankfurt School: Dialectic of Particularity] (Paris: Éditions Universitaires, 1974). Michel Crozon, “Interroger Horkheimer” [“Interrogating Horkheimer”] and Arno Victor Nielsen, “Adorno, le travail artistique de la raison” [“Adorno: The Artistic Work of Reason”], Esprit, May 1978.

8. Cf. chiefly Michel Maffesoli, L’ombre de Dionysos: Contribution à une sociologie de l’orgie [The Shadow of Dionysus: Contribution to a Sociology of the Orgy] (Méridiens, 1982). Pierre Brader, “Michel Maffesoli: saluons le grand retour de Dionysos” [Michel Maffesoli: Let us Greet the Great return of Dionysos], Magazine-Hebdo no. 54 (September 21, 1984).

9. Cf. Gerd Bergfleth et al., Zur Kritik der Palavernden Aufklärung [Toward a Critique of Palavering Reason] (Munich: Matthes & Seitz, 1984). In this remarkable little anthology, Bergfleth published four texts deadly to the “moderno-Frankfurtist” routine: (1) “Zehn Thesen zur Vernunftkritik” [“Ten Theses on the Critique of Reason”]; (2) “Der geschundene Marsyas” [“The Abuse of Marsyas”]; (3) “Über linke Ironie” [“On Leftist Irony”]; (4) “Die zynische Aufklärung” [“The Cynical Enlightnement”]. Cf. also R. Steuckers, “G. Bergfleth: enfant terrible de la scène philosophique allemande” [“G. Bergfleth: enfant terrible of the German philosophical scene”], Vouloir no. 27 (March 1986). In the same issue, see also M. Kamp, “Bergfleth: critique de la raison palabrante” [“Bergfleth: Critique of Palavering Reason”] and “Une apologie de la révolte contre les programmes insipides de la révolution conformiste” [“An Apology for the Revolt against the Insipid Programs of the Conformist Revolution”]. See also M. Froissard, “Révolte, irrationnel, cosmicité et . . . pseudo-antisémitisme,” [“Revolt, irrationality, cosmicity and . . . pseudo-anti-semitism”], Vouloir nos. 40–42 (July–August 1987).

10. Guillaume Faye, Europe et Modernité [Europe and Modernity] (Méry/Liège: Eurograf, 1985).

Postmodern Challenges:
Between Faust & Narcissus, Part 2

The Encysted Metanarrative . . .

Once the Enlightenment metanarrative was established—“encysted”—in the Western mind, the great secular ideologies progressively appeared: liberalism, with its idolatry of the “invisible hand,”[1] and Marxism, with its strong determinism and metaphysics of history, contested at the dawn of the 20th century by Georges Sorel, the most sublime figure of European militant socialism.[2] Following Giorgio Locchi[3]—who occasionally calls the metanarrative “ideology” or “science”—we think that this complex “metanarrative/ideology/science” no longer rules by consensus but by constraint, inasmuch as there is muted resistance (especially in art and music[4]) or a general disuse of the metanarrative as one of the tools of legitimation.

The liberal-Enlightenment metanarrative persists by dint of force and propaganda. But in the sphere of thought, poetry, music, art, or letters, this metanarrative says and inspires nothing. It has not moved a great mind for 100 or 150 years. Already at the end of the 19th century, literary modernism expressed a diversity of languages, a heterogeneity of elements, a kind of disordered chaos that the “physiologist” Nietzsche analyzed[5] and that Hugo von Hoffmannstahl called die Welt der Bezuge (the world of relations).

These omnipresent interrelations and overdeterminations show us that the world is not explained by a simple, neat and tidy story, nor does it submit itself to the rule of a disincarnated moral authority. Better: they show us that our cities, our people, cannot express all their vital potentialities within the framework of an ideology given and instituted once and for all for everyone, nor can we indefinitely preserve the resulting institutions (the doctrinal body derived from the “metanarrative of the Enlightenment”).

The anachronistic presence of the metanarrative constitutes a brake on the development of our continent in all fields: science (data-processing and biotechnology[6]), economics (the support of liberal dogmas within the EEC), military (the fetishism of a bipolar world and servility toward the United States, paradoxically an economic enemy), cultural (media bludgeoning in favor of a cosmopolitanism that eliminates Faustian specificity and aims at the advent of a large convivial global village, run on the principles of the “cold society” in the manner of the Bororos dear to Lévi-Strauss[7]).

 

The Rejection of Neo-Ruralism, Neo-Pastoralism . . .

The confused disorder of literary modernism at the end of the 19th century had a positive aspect: its role was to be the magma that, gradually, becomes the creator of a new Faustian assault.[8] It is Weimar—specifically, the Weimar-arena of the creative and fertile confrontation of expressionism,[9] neo-Marxism, and the “conservative revolution”[10]—that bequeathed us, with Ernst Jünger, an idea of “post-metanarrative” modernity (or post-modernity, if one calls “modernity” the Dialectic of the Enlightenment, subsequently theorized by the Frankfurt School). Modernism, with the confusion it inaugurates, due to the progressive abandonment the pseudo-science of the Enlightenment, corresponds somewhat to the nihilism observed by Nietzsche. Nihilism must be surmounted, exceeded, but not by a sentimental return, however denied, to a completed past. Nihilism is not surpassed by theatrical Wagnerism, Nietzsche fulminated, just as today the foundering of the Marxist “Grand Narrative” is not surpassed by a pseudo-rustic neoprimitivism.[11]

In Jünger—the Jünger of In Storms of Steel, The Worker, and Eumeswil—one finds no reference to the mysticism of the soil: only a sober admiration for the perennialness of the peasant, indifferent to historical upheavals. Jünger tells us of the need for balance: if there is a total refusal of the rural, of the soil, of the stabilizing dimension of Heimat, constructivist Faustian futurism will no longer have a base, a point of departure, a fallback option. On the other hand, if the accent is placed too much on the initial base, the launching point, on the ecological niche that gives rise to the Faustian people, then they are wrapped in a cocoon and deprived of universal influence, rendered blind to the call of the world, prevented from springing towards reality in all its plenitude, the “exotic” included. The timid return to the homeland robs Faustianism of its force of diffusion and relegates its “human vessels” to the level of the “eternal ahistoric peasants” described by Spengler and Eliade.[12] Balance consists in drawing in (from the depths of the original soil) and diffusing out (towards the outside world).

In spite of all nostalgia for the “organic,” rural, or pastoral—in spite of the serene, idyllic, aesthetic beauty that recommend Horace or Virgil—Technology and Work are from now on the essences of our post-nihilist world. Nothing escapes any longer from technology, technicality, mechanics, or the machine: neither the peasant who plows with his tractor nor the priest who plugs in a microphone to give more impact to his homily.

 

The era of “Technology”

Technology mobilizes totally (Total Mobilmachung) and thrusts the individual into an unsettling infinitude where we are nothing more than interchangeable cogs. The machine gun, notes the warrior Jünger, mows down the brave and the cowardly with perfect equality, as in the total material war inaugurated in 1917 in the tank battles of the French front. The Faustian “Ego” loses its intraversion and drowns in a ceaseless vortex of activity. This Ego, having fashioned the stone lacework and spires of the flamboyant Gothic, has fallen into American quantitativism or, confused and hesitant, has embraced the 20th century’s flood of information, its avalanche of concrete facts. It was our nihilism, our frozen indecision due to an exacerbated subjectivism, that mired us in the messy mud of facts.

By crossing the “line,” as Heidegger and Jünger say,[13] the Faustian monad (about which Leibniz[14] spoke) cancels its subjectivism and finds pure power, pure dynamism, in the universe of Technology. With the Jüngerian approach, the circle is closed again: as the closed universe of “magism” was replaced by the inauthentic little world of the bourgeois—sedentary, timid, embalmed in his utilitarian sphere—so the dynamic “Faustian” universe is replaced with a Technological arena, stripped this time of all subjectivism.

Jüngerian Technology sweeps away the false modernity of the Enlightenment metanarrative, the hesitation of late 19th century literary modernism, and the trompe-l’oeil of Wagnerism and neo-pastoralism. But this Jüngerian modernity, perpetually misunderstood since the publication of Der Arbeiter [The Worker] in 1932, remains a dead letter.

Notes

1. On the theological foundation of the doctrine of the “invisible hand” see Hans Albert, “Modell-Platonismus. Der neoklassische Stil des ökonomischen Denkens in kritischer Beleuchtung” [“Model Platonism: The Neoclassical Style of Economic Thought in Critical Elucidation”], in Ernst Topitsch, ed., Logik der Sozialwissenschaften [Logic of Social Science] (Köln/Berlin: Kiepenheuer & Witsch, 1971).

2. There is abundant French literature on Georges Sorel. Nevertheless, it is deplorable that a biography and analysis as valuable as Michael Freund’s has not been translated: Michael Freund, Georges Sorel, Der revolutionäre Konservatismus [Georges Sorel: Revolutionary Conservatism] (Frankfurt a.M.: Vittorio Klostermann, 1972).

3. Cf. G. Locchi, “Histoire et société: critique de Lévi-Strauss” [“History and Society: Critique of Lévi-Strauss”], Nouvelle Ecole, no. 17 (March 1972) and “L’histoire” [“History”], Nouvelle Ecole, nos. 27–28 (January 1976).

4. Cf. G. Locchi, “L’idée de la musique’ et le temps de l’histoire” [“The ‘Idea of Music’ and the Times of History”], Nouvelle Ecole, no. 30 (November 1978) and Vincent Samson, “Musique, métaphysique et destin” [“Music, Metaphysics, and Destiny”], Orientations, no. 9 (September 1987).

5. Cf. Helmut Pfotenhauer, Die Kunst als Physiologie: Nietzsches äesthetische Theorie und literarische Produktion [Art as Physiology: Nietzsche’s Aesthetic Theory and Literary Production] (Stuttgart: J. B. Metzler, 1985). Cf. on Pfotenhauer’s book: Robert Steuckers, “Regards nouveaux sur Nietzsche” [“New Views of Nietzsche”], Orientations, no. 9.

6. Biotechnology and the most recent biocybernetic innovations, when applied to the operation of human society, fundamentally call into question the mechanistic theoretical foundations of the “Grand Narrative” of the Enlightenment. Less rigid, more flexible laws, because adapted to the deep drives of human psychology and physiology, would restore a dynamism to our societies and put them in tune with technological innovations. The Grand Narrative—which is always around, in spite of its anachronism—blocks the evolution of our societies; Habermas’ thought, which categorically refuses to fall in step with the epistemological discoveries of Konrad Lorenz, for example, illustrates perfectly the genuinely reactionary rigidity of the neo-Enlightenment in its Frankfurtist and current neo-liberal derivations. To understand the shift that is taking place regardless of the liberal-Frankfurtist reaction, see the work of the German bio-cybernetician Frederic Vester: (1) Unsere Welt—ein vernetztes System, dtv, no. l0,118, 2nd ed. (München, 1983) and (2) Neuland des Denkens. Vom technokratischen zum kybernetischen Zeitalter (Stuttgart: DVA, 1980). The restoration of holist (ganzheitlich) social thought by modern biology is discussed, most notably, in Gilbert Probst, Selbst-Organisation, Ordnungsprozesse in sozialen Systemen aus ganzheitlicher Sicht (Berlin: Paul Parey, 1987).

7. G. Locchi, “L’idée de la musique’ et le temps de l’histoire.”

8. To tackle the question of the literary modernism in the 19th century, see: M. Bradbury, J. McFarlane, eds., Modernism 1890–1930 (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1976).

9. Cf. Paul Raabe, ed., Expressionismus. Der Kampf um eine literarische Bewegung (Zürich: Arche, 1987)—A useful anthology of the principal expressionist manifestos.

10. Armin Mohler, La Révolution Conservatrice en Allemagne, 1918–1932 (Puiseaux: Pardès, 1993). See mainly text A3 entitled “Leitbilder” (“Guiding Ideas”).

11. Cf. Gérard Raulet, “Mantism and the Post-Modern Conditions” and Claude Karnoouh, “The Lost Paradise of Regionalism: The Crisis of Post-Modernity in France,” Telos, no. 67 (March 1986).

12. Cf. Oswald Spengler, The Decline of the West, 2 vols., trans. Charles Francis Atkinson (New York: Knopf, 1926) for the definition of the “ahistorical peasant” see vol. 2. Cf. Mircea Eliade, The Sacred and the Profane: The Nature of Religion, trans. Willard R. Trask (San Diego: Harcourt, 1959). For the place of this vision of the “peasant” in the contemporary controversy regarding neo-paganism, see: Richard Faber, “Einleitung: ‘Pagan’ und Neo-Paganismus. Versuch einer Begriffsklärung,” in Richard Faber and Renate Schlesier, Die Restauration der Götter: Antike Religion und Neo-Paganismus [The Restoration of the Gods: Ancient Religion and Neo-Paganism] (Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, 1986), 10–25. This text was reviewed in French by Robert Steuckers, “Le paganisme vu de Berlin” [“Paganism as Seen in Berlin”], Vouloir no. 28–29, April 1986, pp. 5–7.

13. On the question of the “line” in Jünger and Heidegger, cf. W. Kaempfer, Ernst Jünger, Sammlung Metzler, Band 20l (Stuttgart, Metzler, 1981), pp. 119–29. Cf also J. Evola, “Devant le ‘mur du temps’” [“Before the ‘Wall of Time’”] in Explorations: Hommes et problems [Explorations: Men and Problems], trans. Philippe Baillet (Puiseaux: Pardès, 1989), pp. 183–94. Let us take this opportunity to recall that, contrary to the generally accepted idea, Heidegger does not reject technology in a reactionary manner, nor does he regard it as dangerous in itself. The danger is due to the failure to think of the mystery of its essence, preventing man from returning to a more originary unconcealment and from hearing the call of a more primordial truth. If the age of technology seems to be the final form of the Oblivion of Being, where the anxiety suitable to thought appears as an absence of anxiety in the securing and the objectification of being, it is also from this extreme danger that the possibility of another beginning is thinkable once the metaphysics of subjectivity is completed.

14. To assess the importance of Leibniz in the development of German organic thought, cf. F. M. Barnard, Herder’s Social and Political Thought: From Enlightenment to Nationalism (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1965), 10–12.

Postmodern Challenges:
Between Faust & Narcissus, Part 3

The Babbitt with the Sartrean paradox

In 1945, the tone of ideological debate was set by the victorious ideologies. We could choose American liberalism (the ideology of Mr. Babbitt) or Marxism, an allegedly de-bourgeoisfied version of the metanarrative. The Grand Narrative took charge, hunted down any “irrationalist” philosophy or movement,[1] set up a thought police, and finally, by brandishing the bogeyman of rampant barbarism, inaugurated an utterly vacuous era.

Sartre and his fashionable Parisian existentialism must be analyzed in the light of this restoration. Sartre, faithful to his “atheism,” his refusal to privilege one value, did not believe in the foundations of liberalism or Marxism. Ultimately, he did not set up the metanarrative (in its most recent version, the vulgar Marxism of the Communist parties[2]) as a truth but as an “inescapable”categorical imperative for which one must militate if one does not want to be a “bastard,” i.e., one of these contemptible beings who venerate “petrified orders.”[3] It is the whole paradox of Sartreanism: on the one hand, it exhorts us not to adore “petrified orders,” which is properly Faustian, and, on another side, it orders us to “magically” adore a “petrified order” of vulgar Marxism, already unhorsed by Sombart or De Man. Thus in the Fifties, the golden age of Sartreanism, the consensus is indeed a moral constraint, an obligation dictated by increasingly mediatized thought. But a consensus achieved by constraint, by an obligation to believe without discussion, is not an eternal consensus. Hence the contemporary oblivion of Sartreanism, with its excesses and its exaggerations.

The Revolutionary Anti-Humanism of May 1968

With May ’68, the phenomenon of a generation, “humanism,” the current label of the metanarrative, was battered and broken by French interpretations of Nietzsche, Marx, and Heidegger.[4] In the wake of the student revolt, academics and popularizers alike proclaimed humanism a “petite-bourgeois” illusion. Against the West, the geopolitical vessel of the Enlightenment metanarrative, the rebels of ’68 played at mounting the barricades, taking sides, sometimes with a naive romanticism, in all the fights of the 1970s: Spartan Vietnam against American imperialism, Latin-American guerillas (“Ché”), the Basque separatists, the patriotic Irish, or the Palestinians.

Their Faustian feistiness, unable to be expressed though autochthonous models, was transposed toward the exotic: Asia, Arabia, Africa, or India. May ’68, in itself, by its resolute anchorage in Grand Politics, by its guerilla ethos, by its fighting option, in spite of everything took on a far more important dimension than the strained blockage of Sartreanism or the great regression of contemporary neo-liberalism.  On the right, Jean Cau, in writing his beautiful book on Che Guevara[5]  understood this issue perfectly, whereas the right, which is as fixated on its dogmas and memories as the left, had not wanted to see.

With the generation of ’68—combative and politicized, conscious of the planet’s great economic geopolitical issues—the last historical fires burned in the French public spirit before the great rise of post-history and post-politics represented by the narcissism of contemporary neoliberalism.

The Translation of the Writings of the “Frankfurt School” announces the Advent of Neo-Liberal Narcissism

The first phase of the neo-liberal attack against the political anti-humanism of May ’68 was the rediscovery of the writings of the Frankfurt School: born in Germany before the advent of National Socialism, matured during the California exile of Adorno, Horkheimer, and Marcuse, and set up as an object of veneration in post-war West Germany. In Dialektik der Aufklärung, a small and concise book that is fundamental to understanding the dynamics of our time, Horkheimer and Adorno claim that there are two “reasons” in Western thought that, in the wake of Spengler and Sombart, we are tempted to name “Faustian reason” and “magical reason.” The former, for the two old exiles in California, is the negative pole of the “reason complex” in Western civilization: this reason is purely “instrumental”; it is used to increase the personal power of those who use it. It is scientific reason, the reason that tames the forces of the universe and puts them in the service of a leader or a people, a party or state. Thus, according to Herbert Marcuse, it is Promethean, not Narcissistic/Orphic.[6] For Horkheimer, Adorno, and Marcuse, this is the kind of rationality that Max Weber theorized.

On the other hand, “magical reason,” according to our Spenglerian genealogical terminology, is, broadly speaking, the reason of Lyotard’s metanarrative. It is a moral authority that dictates ethical conduct, allergic to any expression of power, and thus to any manifestation of the essence of politics.[7] In France, the rediscovery of the Horkheimer-Adorno theory of reason near the end of the 1970s inaugurated the era of depoliticization, which, by substituting generalized disconnection for concrete and tangible history, led to the “era of the vacuum” described so well by Grenoble Professor Gilles Lipovetsky.[8] Following the militant effervescence of May ’68 came a generation whose mental attitudes are characterized quite justly by Lipovetsky as apathy, indifference (also to the metanarrative in its crude form), desertion (of the political parties, especially of the Communist Party), desyndicalisation, narcissism, etc. For Lipovetsky, this generalized resignation and abdication constitutes a golden opportunity. It is the guarantee, he says, that violence will recede, and thus no “totalitarianism,” red, black, or brown, will be able to seize power. This psychological easy-goingness, together with a narcissistic indifference to others, constitutes the true “post-modern” age.

 

There are Various Possible Definitions of “Post-Modernity”

On the other hand, if we perceive—contrary to Lipovetsky’s usage—“modernity” or “modernism” as expressions of the metanarrative, thus as brakes on Faustian energy, post-modernity will necessarily be a return to the political, a rejection of para-magical creationism and anti-political suspicion that emerged after May 68, in the wake of speculations on “instrumental reason” and “objective reason” described by Horkheimer and Adorno.

The complexity of the “post-modern” situation makes it impossible to give one and only one definition of “post-modernity.” There is not one post-modernity that can lay claim to exclusivity. On the threshold of the 21st century, various post-modernities lie fallow, side by side, diverse potential post-modern social models, each based on fundamentally antagonistic values fundamentally antagonistic, primed to clash. These post-modernities differ—in their language or their “look”—from the ideologies that preceded them; they are nevertheless united with the eternal, immemorial, values that lie beneath them. As politics enters the historical sphere through binary confrontations, clashes of opposing clans and the exclusion of minorities, dare to evoke the possible dichotomy of the future: a neo-liberal, Western, American and American-like post-modernity versus a shining Faustian and Nietzschean post-modernity.

 

The “Moral Generation” & the “Era of the Vacuum”

This neo-liberal post-modernity was proclaimed triumphantly, with Messianic delirium, by Laurent Joffrin in his assessment of the student revolt of December 1986 (Un coup de jeune [A Coup of Youth], Arlea, 1987). For Joffrin, who predicted[9] the death of the hard left, of militant proletarianism, December ’86 is the harbinger of a “moral generation,” combining in one mentality soft leftism, lazy-minded collectivism, and neo-liberal, narcissistic, and post-political selfishness: the social model of this hedonistic society centered on commercial praxis, that Lipovetsky described as the era of the vacuum. A political vacuum, an intellectual vacuum, and a post-historical desert: these are the characteristics of the blocked space, the closed horizon characteristic of contemporary neo-liberalism. This post-modernity constitutes a troubling impediment to the greater Europe that must emerge so that we have a viable future and arrest the slow decay announced by massive unemployment and declining demographics spreading devastation under the wan light of consumerist illusions, the big lies of advertisers, and the neon signs praising the merits of a Japanese photocopier or an American airline.

On the other hand, the post-modernity that rejects the old anti-political metanarrative of the Enlightenment, with its metamorphoses and metastases; that affirms the insolence of a Nietzsche or the metallic ideal of a Jünger; that crosses the “line,” as Heidegger exhorts, leaving behind the sterile dandyism of nihilistic times; the post-modernity that rallies the adventurous to a daring political program concretely implying the rejection of the existing power blocs, the construction of an autarkic Eurocentric economy, while fighting savagely and without concessions against all old-fashioned religions and ideologies, by developing the main axis of a diplomacy independent of Washington; the post-modernity that will carry out this voluntary program and negate the negations of post-history—this post-modernity will have our full adherence.

In this brief essay, I wanted to prove that there is a continuity in the confrontation of the “Faustian” and “magian” mentalities, and that this antagonistic continuity is reflected in the current debate on post-modernities. The American-centered West is the realm of “magianisms,” with its cosmopolitanism and authoritarian sects.[10] Europe, the heiress of a Faustianism much abused by “magian” thought, will reassert herself with a post-modernity that will recapitulate the inexpressible themes, recurring but always new, of the Faustianness intrinsic to the European soul.

Notes

1. The classic among classics in the condemnation of “irrationalism” is the summa of György Lukács, The Destruction of Reason, 2 vols. (1954). This book aims to be a kind of Discourse on Method for the dialectic of Enlightenment-Counter-Enlightenment, rationalism-irrationalism. Through a technique of amalgamation that bears a passing resemblance to a Stalinist pamphlet, broad sectors of  German and European culture, from Schelling to neo-Thomism, are blamed for having prepared and supported the Nazi phenomenon. It is a paranoiac vision of culture.

2. To understand the fundamental irrationality of Sartre’s Communism, one should read Thomas Molnar, Sartre, philosophie de la contestation (Paris: La Table Ronde, 1969). In English: Sartre: Ideologue of Our Time (New York : Funk & Wagnalls, 1968).

3. Cf. R.-M. Alberes, Jean-Paul Sartre (Paris: Éditions Universitaires, 1964), 54–71.

4. In France, the polemic aiming at a final rejection of the anti-humanism of ’68 and its Nietzschean, Marxist, and Heideggerian philosophical foundations is found in Luc Ferry and Alain Renaut, French Philosophy of the Sixties: An Essay on Anti-Humanism, trans. Mary H. S. Cattani (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1990) and its appendix ’68–’86. Itinéraires de l’individu [’68-’86: Routes of the Individual] (Paris: Gallimard, 1987). Contrary to the theses defended in first of these two works, Guy Hocquenghem in Lettre ouverte à ceux qui sont passés du col Mao au Rotary Club [Open Letter to those Went from Mao Jackets to the Rotary Club] (Paris: Albin Michel, 1986) deplored the assimilation of the hyper-politicism of the generation of 1968 into the contemporary neo-liberal wave. From a definitely polemical point of view and with the aim of restoring debate, such as it is, in the field of philosophical abstraction, one should read Eddy Borms, Humanisme—kritiek in het hedendaagse Franse denken [Humanism: Critique in Contemporary French Thought (Nijmegen: SUN, 1986).

5. Jean Cau, the former secretary of Jean-Paul Sartre, now classified as a polemist of the “right,” who delights in challenging the manias and obsessions of intellectual conformists, did not hesitate to pay homage to Che Guevara and to devote a book to him. The “radicals” of the bourgeois accused him of “body snatching”! Cau’s rigid right-wing admirers did not appreciate his message either. For them, the Nicaraguan Sandinistas, who nevertheless admired Abel Bonnard and the American “fascist” Lawrence Dennis, are emanations of the Evil One.

6. Cf. A. Vergez, Marcuse (Paris: P.U.F., 1970).

7. Julien Freund, Qu’est-ce que la politique? [What is Politics?] (Paris: Seuil, 1967). Cf Guillaume Faye, “La problématique moderne de la raison ou la querelle de la rationalité” [“The Modern Problem of Reason or the Quarrel of Rationality”] Nouvelle Ecole no. 41, November 1984.

8. G. Lipovetsky, L’ère du vide: Essais sur l’individualisme contemporain [The Era of the Vacuum: Essays on contemporary individualism] (Paris: Gallimard, 1983). Shortly after this essay was written, Gilles Lipovetsky published a second book that reinforced its viewpoint: L’Empire de l’éphémère: La mode et son destin dans les sociétés modernes [Empire of the Ephemeral: Fashion and its Destiny in Modern Societies] (Paris: Gallimard, 1987). Almost simultaneously François-Bernard Huyghe and Pierre Barbès protested against this “narcissistic” option in La soft-idéologie [The Soft Ideology] (Paris: Laffont, 1987). Needless to say, my views are close to those of the last two writers.

9. Cf. Laurent Joffrin, La gauche en voie de disparition: Comment changer sans trahir? [The Left in the Process of Disappearance: How to Change without Betrayal?] (Paris: Seuil, 1984).

10. Cf. Furio Colombo, Il dio d’America: Religione, ribellione e nuova destra [The God of America: Religion, Rebellion, and the New Right] (Milano: Arnoldo Mondadori, 1983).

Hommage à Saint-Loup

Hommage à Saint-Loup

Pierre VIAL

Ex: http://tpprovence.wordpress.com/

Il y a vingt ans aujourd’hui disparaissait Saint-Loup. En la mémoire de ce héros, nous publions un texte de Pierre Vial, L’Homme du Grand Midi, paru dans Rencontres avec Saint-Loup, publié par l’association des Amis de Saint-Loup. C’est du même ouvrage que sont extraits les illustrations de Marienne.

L’Homme du Grand Midi

J’ai découvert Saint-Loup en décembre 1961. J’avais dix-huit ans et me trouvais en résidence non souhaitée, aux frais de la Ve République, pour incompatibilité d’humeur avec la politique qui était alors menée dans une Algérie qui n’avait plus que quelques mois à être française. On était à quelques jours du solstice d’hiver – mais je ne savais pas encore, à l’époque, ce qu’était un solstice d’hiver, et ce que cela pouvait signifier. Depuis j’ai appris à lire certains signes.

Lorsqu’on se retrouve en prison, pour avoir servi une cause déjà presque perdue, le désespoir guette. Saint-Loup m’en a préservé, en me faisant découvrir une autre dimension, proprement cosmique, à l’aventure dans laquelle je m’étais lancé. à corps et à cœur perdus, avec mes camarades du mouvement Jeune Nation. Brave petit militant nationaliste, croisé de la croix celtique, j’ai découvert avec Saint-Loup, et grâce à lui, que le combat, le vrai et éternel combat avait d’autres enjeux, et une toute autre ampleur, que l’avenir de quelques malheureux départements français au sud de la Méditerranée. En poète – car il était d’abord et avant tout un poète, c’est-à-dire un éveilleur – Saint-­Loup m’a entraîné sur la longue route qui mène au Grand Midi de Zarathoustra. Bref, il a fait de moi un païen, c’est-à-dire quelqu’un qui sait que le seul véritable enjeu, depuis deux mille ans, est de savoir si l’on appartient, mentalement, aux peuples de la forêt ou à cette tribu de gardiens de chèvres qui, dans son désert, s’est autoproclamée élue d’un dieu bizarre – « un méchant dieu », comme disait 1’’ami Gripari.

J’ai donc à l’égard de Saint-Loup la plus belle et la plus lourde des dettes – celle que l’on doit à qui nous a amené à dépouiller le vieil homme, à bénéficier de cette seconde naissance qu’est toute authentique initiation, au vrai et profond sens du terme. Oui, je fais partie de ceux qui ont découvert le signe éternel de toute vie, la roue, toujours tournante, du Soleil Invaincu.

Chaque livre de Saint-Loup est, à sa façon. un guide spirituel. Mais certains de ses ouvrages ont éveillé en moi un écho particulier. Je voudrais en évoquer plus particulièrement deux – sachant que bien d’autres seront célébrés par mes camarades.

Au temps où il s’appelait Marc Augier, Saint-Loup publia un petit livre, aujourd’hui très recherché, Les Skieurs de la Nuit. Le sous-titre précisait : Un raid de ski-camping en Laponie finlandaise. C’est le récit d’une aventure, vécue au solstice d’hiver 1938, qui entraîna deux Français au-delà du Cercle polaire. Le but ? « Il fallait,se souvient Marc Augier, dégager le sens de l’amour que je dois porter à telle ou telle conception de vie, déterminer le lieu où se situent les véritables richesses. »

Le titre du premier chapitre est, en soi, un manifeste : « Conseil aux campeurs pour la conquête du Graal. » Tout Saint-Loup est déjà là. En fondant en 1935, avec ses amis de la SFIO et du Syndicat national des instituteurs, les Auberges laïques de la Jeunesse, il avait en effet en tête bien autre chose que ce que nous appelons aujourd’hui « les loisirs » – terme dérisoire et même nauséabond, depuis qu’il a été pollué par Trigano.

Marc Augier s’en explique, en interpellant la bêtise bourgeoise : « Vous qui avez souri, souvent avec bienveillance, au spectacle de ces jeunes cohortes s’éloignant de la ville, sac au dos, solidement chaussées, sommairement vêtues et qui donnaient à partir de 1930 un visage absolument inédit aux routes françaises, pensiez-vous que ce spectacle était non pas le produit d’une fantaisie passagère, mais bel et bien un de ces faits en apparence tout à fait secondaires qui vont modifier toute une civilisation ? La chose est vraiment indiscutable. Ce départ spontané vers les grands espaces, plaines, mers, montagnes, ce recours au moyen de transport élémentaire comme la marche à pied, cet exode de la cité, c’est la grande réaction du XXe siècle contre les formes d’habitat et de vie perfectionnées devenues à la longue intolérables parce que privées de joies, d’émotions, de richesses naturelles. J’en puise la certitude en moi-même. À la veille de la guerre, dans les rues de New York ou de Paris, il m’arrivait soudain d’étouffer, d’avoir en l’espace d’une seconde la conscience aiguë de ma pauvreté sensorielle entre ces murs uniformément laids de la construction moderne, et particulièrement lorsqu’au volant de ma voiture j’étais prisonnier, immobilisé pendant de longues minutes, enserré par d’autres machines inhumaines qui distillaient dans l’air leurs poisons silencieux. Il m’arrivait de penser et de dire tout haut : « Il faut que ça change… cette vie ne peut pas durer » ».

Conquérir le Graal, donc. En partant à ski, sac au dos, pour mettre ses pas dans des traces millénaires. Car, rappelle Marc Augier, « au cours des migrations des peuples indo-européens vers les terres arctiques, le ski fut avant tout un instrument de voyage ». Et il ajoute : « En chaussant les skis de fond au nom d’un idéal nettement réactionnaire, j’ai cherché à laisser derrière moi, dans la neige, des traces nettes menant vers les hauts lieux où toute joie est solidement gagnée par ceux qui s’y aventurent ». En choisissant de monter, loin, vers le Nord, au temps béni du solstice d’hiver, Marc Augier fait un choix initiatique.

« L’homme retrouve à ces latitudes, à cette époque de l’année, des conditions de vie aussi voisines que possible des époques primitives. Comme nous sommes quelques-uns à savoir que l’homme occidental a tout perdu en se mettant de plus en plus à l’abri du combat élémentaire, seule garantie certaine pour la survivance de l’espèce, nous avons retiré une joie profonde de cette confrontation [...]. Les inspirés ont raison. La lumière vient du Nord… [...] Quand je me tourne vers le Nord, je sens, comme l’aiguille aimantée qui se fixe sur tel point et non tel autre point de l’espace, se rassembler les meilleures et les plus nobles forces qui sont en moi ».

Dans le grand Nord, Marc Augier rencontre des hommes qui n’ont pas encore été pollués par la civilisation des marchands, des banquiers et des professeurs de morale.

Les Lapons nomades baignent dans le chant du monde, vivent sans état d’âme un panthéisme tranquille, car ils sont : « en contact étroit avec tout un complexe de forces naturelles qui nous échappent complètement, soit que nos sens aient perdu leur acuité soit que notre esprit se soit engagé dans le domaine des valeurs fallacieuses. Toute la gamme des croyances lapones (nous disons aujourd’hui « superstitions » avec un orgueil que le spectacle de notre propre civilisation ne paraît pas justifier) révèle une richesse de sentiments, une sûreté dans le choix des valeurs du bien et du mal et, en définitive, une connaissance de Dieu et de l’homme qui me paraissent admirables. Ces valeurs religieuses sont infiniment plus vivantes et, partant, plus efficaces que les nôtres, parce qu’incluses dans la nature, tout à fait à portée des sens, s’exprimant au moyen d’un jeu de dangers, de châtiments et de récompenses fort précis, et riches de tout ce paganisme poétique et populaire auquel le christianisme n’a que trop faiblement emprunté, avant de se réfugier dans les pures abstractions de l’âme ».

Le Lapon manifeste une attitude respectueuse à l’égard des génies bienfaisants, les Uldra, qui vivent sous terre, et des génies malfaisants, les Stalo, qui vivent au fond des lacs. Il s’agit d’être en accord avec l’harmonie du monde :

« passant du monde invisible à l’univers matériel, le Lapon porte un respect et un amour tout particuliers aux bêtes. Il sait parfaitement qu’autrefois toutes les bêtes étaient douées de la parole et aussi les fleurs, les arbres de la taïga et les blocs erratiques… C’est pourquoi l’homme doit être bon pour les animaux, soigneux pour les arbres, respectueux des pierres sur lesquelles il pose le pied. »

C’est par les longues marches et les nuits sous la tente, le contact avec l’air, l’eau, la terre, le feu que Marc Augier a découvert cette grande santé qui a pour nom paganisme. On comprend quelle cohérence a marqué sa trajectoire, des Auberges de Jeunesse à l’armée européenne levée, au nom de Sparte, contre les apôtres du cosmopolitisme.

Après avoir traversé, en 1945,  le crépuscule des dieux. Marc Augier a choisi de vivre pour témoigner. Ainsi est né Saint-Loup, auteur prolifique, dont les livres ont joué, pour la génération à laquelle j’appartiens, un rôle décisif. Car en lisant Saint-Loup, bien des jeunes, dans les années 60, ont entendu un appel. Appel des cimes. Appel des sentiers sinuant au cœur des forêts. Appel des sources. Appel de ce Soleil Invaincu qui, malgré tous les inquisiteurs, a été, est et sera le signe de ralliement des garçons et des filles de notre peuple en lutte pour le seul droit qu’ils reconnaissent – celui du sol et du sang.

Cet enseignement, infiniment plus précieux, plus enrichissant, plus tonique que tous ceux dispensés dans les tristes et grises universités, Saint-Loup l’a placé au cœur de la plupart de ses livres. Mais avec une force toute particulière dans La Peau de l’Aurochs.

Ce livre est un roman initiatique, dans la grande tradition arthurienne : Saint-Loup est membre de ce compagnonnage qui, depuis des siècles, veille sur le Graal. Il conte l’histoire d’une communauté montagnarde, enracinée au pays d’Aoste, qui entre en résistance lorsque les prétoriens de César – un César dont les armées sont mécanisées – veulent lui imposer leur loi, la Loi unique dont rêvent tous les totalitarismes, de Moïse à George Bush. Les Valdotains, murés dans leur réduit montagnard, sont contraints, pour survivre, de retrouver les vieux principes élémentaires : se battre, se procurer de la nourriture, procréer. Face au froid, à la faim, à la nuit, à la solitude, réfugiés dans une grotte, protégés par le feu qu’il ne faut jamais laisser mourir, revenus à l’âge de pierre, ils retrouvent la grande santé : leur curé fait faire à sa religion le chemin inverse de celui qu’elle a effectué en deux millénaires et, revenant aux sources païennes, il redécouvre, du coup, les secrets de l’harmonie entre l’homme et la terre, entre le sang et le sol. En célébrant, sur un dolmen, le sacrifice rituel du bouquetin – animal sacré car sa chair a permis la survie de la communauté, il est symbole des forces de la terre maternelle et du ciel père, unis par et dans la montagne –, le curé retrouve spontanément les gestes et les mots qui calment le cœur des hommes, en paix avec eux-mêmes car unis au cosmos, intégrés – réintégrés – dans la grande roue de l’Éternel Retour.

De son côté, l’instituteur apprend aux enfants de nouvelles et drues générations qui ils sont, car la conscience de son identité est le plus précieux des biens : « Nos ancêtres les Salasses qui étaient de race celtique habitaient déjà les vallées du pays d’Aoste. » et le médecin retrouve la vertu des simples, les vieux secrets des femmes sages, des sourcières : la tisane des violettes contre les refroidissements, la graisse de marmotte fondue contre la pneumonie, la graisse de vipère pour faciliter la délivrance des femmes… Quant au paysan, il va s’agenouiller chaque soir sur ses terres ensemencées, aux approches du solstice d’hiver, et prie pour le retour de la la lumière.

Ainsi, fidèle à ses racines, la communauté montagnarde survit dans un isolement total, pendant plusieurs générations, en ne comptant que sur ses propres forces – et sur l’aide des anciens dieux. Jusqu’au jour où, César vaincu, la société marchande impose partout son « nouvel ordre mondial ». Et détruit, au nom de la morale et des Droits de l’homme, l’identité, maintenue jusqu’alors à grands périls, du Pays d’Aoste. Seul, un groupe de montagnards, fidèle à sa terre, choisit de gagner les hautes altitudes, pour retrouver le droit de vivre debout, dans un dépouillement spartiate, loin d’une « civilisation » frelatée qui pourrit tout ce qu’elle touche car y règne la loi du fric.

Avec La Peau de l’Aurochs, qui annonce son cycle romanesque des patries charnelles, Saint-Loup a fait œuvre de grand inspiré. Aux garçons et filles qui, fascinés par l’appel du paganisme, s’interrogent sur le meilleur guide pour découvrir l’éternelle âme païenne, il faut remettre comme un viatique, ce testament spirituel.

Aujourd’hui, Saint-Loup est parti vers le soleil.

Au revoir camarade. Du paradis des guerriers, où tu festoies aux côtés des porteurs d’épée de nos combats millénaires, adresse-nous, de tes bras dressés vers l’astre de vie, un fraternel salut. Nous en avons besoin pour continuer encore un peu la route. Avant de te rejoindre. Quand les dieux voudront.

Pierre Vial

Source : Club Acacias.

A Serious Case:
Guillaume Faye’s Archeofuturism

F. Roger Devlin

Ex: http://www.counter-currents.com/

Guillaume Faye,
Archeofuturism: European Visions of the Post-Catastrophic Age
Arktos Media Ltd., 2010

“The modern world is like a train full
of ammunition running in the fog.”
—Robert Ardrey

Most thought described as “conservative” is a kind of political hygienics: it takes its bearings by what is natural, normal, or best in the social order. One hazard of its focus on right order is to leave us unprepared in extraordinary situations. Thus, we all know otherwise intelligent conservatives who would continue, even as blood was running in the streets, to talk of the need for electing fiscally responsible Republicans to office. The best treatment for this sort of blindness is a crash course in political pathology such as the book under review.

Author Guillaume Faye was for many years a luminary of Alain de Benoist’s Group for the Research and Study of European Civilization. Beginning from the principle “no Lenin without Marx,” Benoist conceived his activities as part of a Gramscian (or Cochinian) strategy to undermine the hegemony of liberalism. In the early 1980s, remembers Faye, each issue of his journal Eléments was “an ideological barrage that sparked outraged reviews from the mainstream press,” and people sat up and took notice of the Colloques parisiens his organization sponsored. The well-educated men of this “New Right,” as it came to be called, looked down on the young Front National as a “microscopic group of good-for-nothings,” and even barred “that pirate-faced old soldier” Jean-Marie Le Pen from their meetings.

Yet within a few years the tables were turned, as dissatisfied New Rightists flocked to the Front. Any misgivings they had about Le Pen’s vulgarity were outweighed by the impression that his organization was where something was happening. Faye, too, eventually concluded that the New Right had become a mere literary salon: “from 1986 I began to feel that a clique spirit and literary pagan romanticism were prevailing over historical will. . . . In order to prove effective, ideological and cultural action must be supported by concrete political forces which it integrates and extends.”

Archeofuturism marks the author’s return to the political arena after an absence of twelve years. Its first chapter is devoted to a friendly critique of his former colleagues. For example, he finds in New Right publications an overemphasis upon folkloric aspects of European heritage such as “Breton bonnets” and “Scandinavian woodcarvings.” Such charming but innocuous traditions have their equivalents among all peoples on earth. Faye would rather maintain “the creative primacy of Western civilization” represented by our tradition of scientific research, philosophy and engineering, as well as our unparalleled artistic and literary “high” culture.

Faye also considers the New Right wedded to a faulty political paradigm in which “America”—conceived narrowly as the Hollywood/Wall Street/Foggy Bottom axis—is the enemy. This way of thinking is well-expressed in the title of Benoist’s book Europe-Third World: the Same Struggle. Benoist invites the entire non-American world (even Muslims!) to “a fruitful exchange of dialogue among parties clearly situated in relation to one another.” In other words: multiculturalism with one place at the table reserved for White Europeans. Faye rightly dismisses this as “a Disneyland dream.”

Starting from what Faye considers a correct Nietzschean assessment of primitive Christianity as an egalitarian, leveling and ethno-masochistic movement, the New Right launched an ill-considered attack on the folk Catholicism of ordinary Frenchmen. Meanwhile, they ignored their proper target: a return to the “bolshevism of antiquity” among the high clergy, marked by immigrationism and self-ethnophobia. This is the tendency some have called the “degermanization of Christianity.” The New Right would have done better to ally itself with Catholic traditionalists in combating it rather than alienating its natural allies.

Lastly, while the New Right professed admiration for the German jurist Carl Schmitt, it never made any practical application of his Ernstfall concept: the “serious case” which cannot be met within the normal framework of constitutional law. When Hannibal is at the gates of Rome, when the Royal Guards mutiny—no appeal can be made to law. Such contingencies can only be met with the virtue of prudence, i.e., the ability to make sound judgments about what to do in particular cases.

This blind spot may be fatal, for Faye is convinced that the liberal regime is driving Western civilization toward an Ernstfall the like of which the world has never seen. He describes it as a “convergence of catastrophes.” Elements include: the failure of multiracialism, the disintegration of family structures, disruption in the transmission of cultural knowledge and social disciplines, the replacement of folk culture by the passive consumption of industrially produced “mass culture,” increasing crime and drug use, the decay of community, anti-natalism, nuclear proliferation and the re-emergence of viral and microbial diseases resistant to antibiotics, public debt, and the privileging of speculative profits, i.e., the construction of our economy atop the stilts of investor confidence rather than upon the solid ground of production.

Furthermore, liberal ideology has propounded a utopian ideal of universal “development,” whereby every last African hellhole is supposed to become an affluent, tolerant, democratic, and efficient consumerist society. The nations of the South were won over to this project, dazzled by the deceptive prospect of economic growth. They set in motion a process of industrialization that has devastated the natural environment, undermined their traditional cultures, and created social chaos, including urban jungles like Calcutta and Lagos. Resentment at the broken promise of “development” runs deep; the resurgence of religious fanaticism is one of its expressions.

Under the banner of “inclusion,” the liberal regime is now importing legions of immigrants who will function as the “fifth column” of an aggressive South. “The ethnic war in France has already started,” writes Faye in 1998, seven years before les émeutes des banlieues.

These are the lines of catastrophe which Faye expects to converge in about the second decade of this century. His prophecy is reminiscent of Andrei Amalrik’s 1969 essay Will the Soviet Union Survive Until 1984?—which, of course, proved uncannily accurate. Still, the wise reader will not want to overstress Faye’s time frame; much is clear about the crisis we face, but not even the angels in heaven know the day or the hour.

The author emphasizes that the impending meltdown presents us with opportunities: “When people have their backs against the wall and are suffering piercing pains, they easily change their opinions.” The stormy century of iron and fire that awaits us will make people accept what is currently unacceptable. The right today must position itself to be perceived as “the alternative” when the inevitable crisis hits. This means discrediting leftist pseudo-dissent, which is merely a demand for the intensification of official ideology and praxis. It also means acquiring the monopoly over alternative thought: not by imposing a party-line, but by uniting all healthy forces on a European level and abandoning provincial disputes and narrow doctrines.

Faye’s book is intended as “a sort of mental training for the post-catastrophic world.” The title Archeofuturism refers to the principles appropriate to reconstructing our civilization. “Archaic” must be understood according to the root sense of the Greek noun archè: both “foundation” and “beginning.” The archai are anthropological values which “create and are unchangeable;” they refer to the central notion of “order.”

Such foundational values include:

the distinction of sex roles; the transmission of ethnic and folk traditions; spirituality and priestly organization; visible and structuring social hierarchies; the worship of ancestors; rites and tests of initiation; the re-establishment of organic communities (from the family to the folk); the de-individualization of marriage [and] an end to the confusion between eroticism and conjugality; the prestige of the warrior caste; inequality of social status—not the unjust and frustrating implicit inequality we find today in egalitarian utopias, but explicit and legitimated inequalities; duties that match rights, hence a rigorous justice that gives people a sense of responsibility; a definition of peoples—and of all established groups or social bodies—as diachronic communities of destiny rather than synchronic masses of individual atoms.

Faye calls these “the values of justice.” We need not doubt they will return once the hallucinations of equality and individual emancipation have dissipated, for they follow from human nature itself.

The real danger is that we may end up having them imposed on us by Islam rather than reasserting them ourselves from our own historical memory. For Islam is the symbolic banner of Southern revanchisme, and the mindset of the South remains archaic. It takes for granted the primacy of force, the legitimacy of conquest, ethnic exclusivity, aggressive religiosity, machismo, and a worship of leaders and hierarchic order. Muslim employment of liberal cant—complaints of “discrimination” and “intolerance”—are the merest fig leaf for a Machiavellian “strategy of the fox” against Europe. In order to oppose the invaders, we must revert to an archaic mindset ourselves, abandoning the demobilizing handicap of “modern” humanitarianism.

Faye is perhaps at his best explaining the behavior and motivations of the “petty, inglorious princes who pretend to be governing us.” For example, he notes the increasing importance of “consultation” in French political life; authorities “consult” representatives of various approved interest groups, such as labor unions and non-White ethnic blocs, and then formulate policy on the basis of the lowest common denominator of agreement between them. The real point of this, of course, is to avoid the risks and responsibilities of actual leadership. (Try to imagine De Gaulle behaving this way.) But it is presented to the public as a wonderful new way of “modernizing democracy.”

A related symptom is the rise of negative legitimization, or what the author calls the “big bad wolf tactic”:

Politicians no longer say, “Vote for us, because we’ve got the right solutions and we’ll improve your living conditions.” That is positive legitimization. Instead they say (implicitly) “Vote for us, since even though we’re a bunch of good-for-nothings, bunglers and bullies, at least we will protect you from fascism.”

Four years after these words were written Le Pen made the presidential run-offs and, sure enough, all the bien pensants showed up at the polls with clothespins on their noses to support the crook Chirac!

Egalitarian reform serves as a convenient pretext for the elites to enact measures whose practical effect is to entrench their own position. Thus, they have sabotaged the French educational system by eliminating selectivity and discipline. But it is only these which give the talented outsider an honest chance against the untalented insider. As Pareto put it: the more rigorous the (rationally planned) selection in a social system, the greater the turnover in the elite. Without objective standards, on what grounds can one argue against elite self-perpetuation?

But the regime’s most breathtaking hypocrisy is found in its demonization of the National Front. The Front has broken the tacit ground-rules of the managerial regime by “engaging in politics where it has been agreed that one should only engage in business”; it has sought popular trust with a view to implementing a program, where the established parties “communicate” and maneuver with a view to re-election. Timid careerists denounce the Front as a threat to the Republic because they fear it as a threat to themselves.

Faye considers the National Front a genuinely revolutionary party. Yet he apparently has never been a member, and is not really a French nationalist. In his view, Le Pen’s romantic and backward-looking devotion to the French state embodies a great deal of latent Jacobinism. It is this state, after all, which has “naturalized” millions of Afro-Asiatic “youths” who do not see themselves as French at all. Moreover, a nation state, even run on patriotic principles, would be an entity too small to defend the French ethnos effectively in the contemporary world. Would a federal European state be any more capable of doing so? “I believe it would,” says Faye, “provided it is exactly the opposite of the European state currently being built.”

Those who believe that an imperial and federal European state would “kill France” are confusing the political sphere with the ethno-cultural one. The disappearance of the Parisian regime would in no way threaten the vigor and identity of the people of France. Moreover, a European federal state would breathe new life into autonomous regions: Brittany, Normandy, Provence, etc.

The European Union is a ghastly bureaucratic mess, but it is also one of the “forces in being.” Why turn our backs on it or work to destroy it when we can instead hijack it and turn it to our own purposes? Faye calls for the transformation of the EU into “a genuinely democratic and no longer bureaucratic European government with a real parliament and a strong and decisive central power.” He describes this position as European Nationalism, and dreams of a Eurosiberian Federation extending from Brest to the Bering Strait.

While Faye disagrees with Benoist’s interpretation of America as an enemy (hostes), he continues to view her as a rival and opponent (inimicus). This American reviewer does not grasp why the case for including a chastened post-imperial United States in a Northern Federation would be any weaker than the case for including Russia.

The Eurosiberian Federation is to be characterized by a two-tier economy. The elite (20% of the population) will continue to live according to the techno-scientific economic model based on ongoing innovation. They would form part of a global exchange network of about one billion people, including the elites of other civilizational blocs. As Faye notes, “the essence of technological science is not connected to egalitarian modernity, but has its roots in the ethno-cultural heritage of Europe, and particularly ancient Greece.”

Among the first exploits of this new elite shall be exploring the “explosive possibilities of genetic engineering.” These include inter-species hybrids, man-animal chimeras, semi-artificial “biolithic” creatures, and decerebrated human clones. Faye is utterly contemptuous of moral or religious scruples in this domain, which he oddly attributes to the ideology of liberal modernity more than to Christianity.

The remainder of humanity would live in archaic, neo-traditional communities. The techno-scientific portion of humanity would be under no obligation to help (i.e., “develop”) everybody else. Nor would they have any right to interfere in their affairs.

In sum, for the elite: promethean achievement, linear time and futuristic technology; for the rest: neo-feudalism, cyclic time and timeless, “archaic” values.

But it is not clear how the elite could avoid “interfering” in the affairs of people they are supposed to govern. Moreover, how would the elite perpetuate itself? It seems clear that Faye does not intend a hereditary aristocracy. Perhaps there is some sort of test or initiatory ordeal for prospective members. But then families would be divided between the classes, which would involve many difficulties. In the fictional portrayal of his ideal future society which closes the book, Faye refers in passing to something called “the Party.” This reviewer would need to hear a lot more about this shadowy organization before signing on to Faye’s proposals. The two-tiered economy is altogether the least satisfactorily worked out part of the book.

Yet the author is aware that men never get what they plan for: somewhat grandiloquently, he calls this heterotelia. And he distinguishes “worldview” (an idea of civilization as a goal and some values) from “ideology” and “doctrine” (applications to society and what tactics to use). So we can follow him for the first mile.

Archeofuturism should have a bracing effect on anyone more accustomed to reading the despondent Cassandras of paleoconservatism. “Realism,” he reminds us, “is often disheartened fatalism.”

Those who blame others, enemies and the political climate for their own failures do not deserve to win. For it is in the logic of things for enemies to oppress you and circumstances to prove hostile. The mistake lies in exorcising reality by adopting the morals of intention as opposed to those of consequences.

We must reject the pretext that radical thought would be “persecuted” by the system. The system is foolish. Its censorship is as far from stringent as it is clumsy, striking only at mythic acts of provocation and ideological tactlessness. Talent always prevails over censorship, when it is accompanied by daring and intelligence. A right wing movement can only prove successful through the virtue of courage.

There is no excuse for being taken by surprise when the liberal regime disregards its own principals in order to fight us (as the British establishment is doing with the BNP). Of course we should publicize and ridicule their inconsistencies, but it is silly to be indignant over them: repression simply means that the regime recognizes us as an Ernstfall, a mortal threat, and that is precisely what a serious right ought to be. Attempts to shut us down are symptoms of growing success and should strengthen our resolve.

Visages de l’archéofuturisme

Guillaume Faye

Ex: http://lecheminsouslesbuis.wordpress.com/

Dans la dernière partie de son livre “l’Archéofuturisme”, Guillaume Faye décrit la société archéofuturiste telle qu’elle pourrait être, en se basant sur des informations scientifiques ne relevant pas de l’imagination littéraire mais sur des innovations qui ont fait l’objet de brevets déposés à la fin du XXe siècle. Je me suis amusé , en glanant les diverses infos essaimées dans le courant du texte,  à recomposer l’ appareil d’Etat et l’organisation de la société…

Après la « Grande Catastrophe » qui a vu sombrer dans le chaos l’ancien système politico-économique du fait de la convergence de désastres de toutes natures, ont subsisté des bulles de survie, sortes de baronnies qui se sont ensuite rapprochées les unes des autres. La nouvelle structure regroupait dans une Communauté des Etats Européens, les anciennes régions de l’Europe Occidentale dotées d’une très large autonomie. Mais de graves problèmes internationaux resurgirent avec de nouvelles menaces. La Russie et ses pays satellites proposèrent alors à la Communauté des Etats européens de fusionner pour assurer l’unité et la défense des « peuples apparentés »: la Fédération Eurosibérienne était née.

La Fédération comporte 125 états autonomes comme les Etats autonomes de Bretagne ou d’Ile de France, la République Romaine et le Royaume d’Albanie, etc. qui s’entendent sur les « questions principales »: quel est l’ennemi commun ? Quel est l’ami commun ? Ils sont représentés face au Gouvernorat impérial installé à Bruxelles, par le Directorat central de la Fédération.

Les litiges internes entre les États de la Fédération sont résolus par un Conseiller plénipotentiaire auprès du Tribunal-Inter-États de Saint Petersbourg et son Prévôt auquel il doit rendre compte, et qui dépend aussi du Gouvernorat impérial de Bruxelles où sont ses bureaux.

Dans la Fédération, on tente de concilier deux principes: l’autorité absolue et la rapidité de décision de l’autorité politique centrale, le Gouvernorat élu par le Sénat Impérial; et une grande liberté d’organisation laissée aux Régions-Etats.

Chacune des Régions-Etats autonomes est libre dans les domaines où elle n’est pas soumise aux compétences du Gouvernorat Impérial, d’organiser ses institutions comme elle l’entend. Elle doit simplement, par les moyens qu’elle désire, désigner un nombre de députés fixé en proportion de sa population au Sénat Fédéral d’Empire.

L’ idéologie officielle de la Fédération est le « constructivisme vitaliste ».

La nouvelle économie techno-scientifique n’est plus, comme autrefois au XXe siècle, destinée à toutes les zones de la Terre ni à tous les humains. Seulement 10 % de l’ humanité en bénéficient, en général regroupés dans les villes, beaucoup moins étendues et peuplées qu’autrefois. Dans la fédération, 20% de la population vit dans une économie industrielle techno-scientifique; ce qui a permis de repeupler les zones rurales désertées et résolu les problèmes de pollution et de gaspillage énergétique.

L’innovation scientifique est très dynamique bien qu’elle ne repose plus sur un énorme marché mondial et ne concerne donc qu’une minorité de la population, les autres étant revenus à une économie rurale, artisanale et pastorale de type médiéval. L’explication de ce dynamisme est simple: le volume global de l’investissement et des budgets publics et privés n’ont plus à se préoccuper des besoins de toutes natures de 80% de la population vivant dans des communautés néo-traditionnelles, selon un système socio-économique archaïque, qui se débrouillent seules et librement pour leur production et leurs échanges, et pour nombre desquelles le solstice d’été est un moment fort

La Fédération Eurosibérienne pratique le libre-échange intérieur, mais ses frontières extérieures sont protégées par des barrières douanières très élevées. Les flux financiers et spéculatifs internationaux n’existent plus.

Dans l’élite, 18% des naissances sont assurées par l’ingénierie génétique: gestations en incubateurs, sans grossesse pour les femmes, avec « amélioration programmée du génome ». Mais cette technique est rigoureusement prohibée dans les communautés néo-traditionnelles et, ailleurs, soumise à l’approbation du Comité Eugénique Impérial. Les enfants issus de cette procréation artificielle sont souvent consacrés « pupilles d’Empire » et placés dans des centres d’éducation qui les transforment en cadres ultra-performants. Seuls les dirigeants et les cadres de la Fédération ont accès au réseau d’informations, l’ EKIS « Euro Kontinent Information Service ». Le système des médias, ouvert à tous, en cours au XXe siècle, a entièrement disparu car, pense-t-on, il aboutissait paradoxalement à la désinformation, à la désagrégation de l’esprit public et créait des paniques.

Les véhicules électriques sont généralisés, les automobiles interdites aux particuliers avec retour aux tractions hippomobiles, prohibition des véhicules à moteur dans les communautés rurales néo-traditionnelles, abandon des autoroutes sur le tracé desquelles ont été construites des lignes de chemin de fer classiques rapides pour le transport des camions et des containers (« ferroutage »), limitation progressive des transports aériens au profit des planétrains, introduction de dirigeables-cargos pour le fret et les transports civils, restauration du réseau des canaux, utilisation mixte des énergies nucléaires et éoliennes pour les transporteurs maritimes, etc.

 

(dessins de Schuiten)

 

 

Guillaume Faye's Archeofuturism in English Version ! A Must !

Guillaume Faye's Archeofuturism in English Version ! A Must !

This book is the most fundamental work by Guillaume Faye. Faye believes that the future of the Right requires a transcendence of the division between those who wish for a restoration of the traditions of the past, and those who are calling for new social and technological forms - creating a synthesis which will amplify the strengths and restrain the excesses of both: Archeofuturism. Faye also provides a critique of the New Right; an analysis of the continuing damage being done by Western liberalism, political inertia, unrestrained immigration and ethnic self-hatred; and the need to abandon past positions and dare to face the realities of the present in order to realise the ideology of the future. He prophesises a series of catastrophes between 2010 and 2020, brought about by the unsustainability of the present world order, which he asserts will offer an opportunity to rebuild the West and put Archeofuturism into practice on a grand scale.

Product Description

Archeofuturism, an important work in the tradition of the European New Right, is finally now available in English. Challenging many assumptions held by the Right, this book generated much debate when it was first published in French in 1998. Faye believes that the future of the Right requires a transcendence of the division between those who wish for a restoration of the traditions of the past, and those who are calling for new social and technological forms - creating a synthesis which will amplify the strengths and restrain the excesses of both: Archeofuturism.

Faye also provides a critique of the New Right; an analysis of the continuing damage being done by Western liberalism, political inertia, unrestrained immigration and ethnic self-hatred; and the need to abandon past positions and dare to face the realities of the present in order to realise the ideology of the future. He prophesises a series of catastrophes between 2010 and 2020, brought about by the unsustainability of the present world order, which he asserts will offer an opportunity to rebuild the West and put Archeofuturism into practice on a grand scale.

Archeofuturism, an important work in the tradition of the European New Right, is finally now available in English. Challenging many assumptions held by the Right, this book generated much debate when it was first published in French in 1998. Faye believes that the future of the Right requires a transcendence of the division between those who wish for a restoration of the traditions of the past, and those who are calling for new social and technological forms - creating a synthesis which will amplify the strengths and restrain the excesses of both: Archeofuturism.

Faye also provides a critique of the New Right; an analysis of the continuing damage being done by Western liberalism, political inertia, unrestrained immigration and ethnic self-hatred; and the need to abandon past positions and dare to face the realities of the present in order to realise the ideology of the future. He prophesises a series of catastrophes between 2010 and 2020, brought about by the unsustainability of the present world order, which he asserts will offer an opportunity to rebuild the West and put Archeofuturism into practice on a grand scale.

This book is a must-read for anyone concerned with the course that the Right must chart in order to deal with the increasing crises and challenges it will face in the coming decades.

Guillaume Faye was one of the principal members of the famed French New Right organisation GRECE in the 1970s and '80s. After departing in 1986 due to his disagreement with its strategy, he had a successful career on French television and radio before returning to the stage of political philosophy as a powerful alternative voice with the publication of Archeofuturism. Since then he has continued to challenge the status quo within the Right in his writings, earning him both the admiration and disdain of his colleagues.

'Archeofuturism is thus both archaic and futuristic, for it validates the primordiality of Homer's epic values in the same breath that it advances the most daring contemporary science.' --Michael O'Meara, from the Foreword

Additional Information

Author	Guillaume Faye
Full Title	Archeofuturism: European Visions of the Post-Catastrophic Age
Binding	Hardback
Publisher	Arktos Media (2010)
Pages	249
ISBN	978-1-907166-10-5
Language	English
Short Description	This book is the most fundamental work by Guillaume Faye. Faye believes that the future of the Right requires a transcendence of the division between those who wish for a restoration of the traditions of the past, and those who are calling for new social and technological forms - creating a synthesis which will amplify the strengths and restrain the excesses of both: Archeofuturism. Faye also provides a critique of the New Right; an analysis of the continuing damage being done by Western liberalism, political inertia, unrestrained immigration and ethnic self-hatred; and the need to abandon past positions and dare to face the realities of the present in order to realise the ideology of the future. He prophesises a series of catastrophes between 2010 and 2020, brought about by the unsustainability of the present world order, which he asserts will offer an opportunity to rebuild the West and put Archeofuturism into practice on a grand scale.
Table of Contents	Foreword by Michael O'Meara A Note from the Editor Introduction 1. An Assessment of the Nouvelle Droite 2. A Subversive Idea: Archeofuturism as an Answer to the Catastrophe of Modernity and an Alternative to Traditionalism 3. Ideologically Dissident Statements 4. For a Two-Tier World Economy 5. The Ethnic Question and the European 6. A Day in the Life of Dimitri Leonidovich Oblomov – A Chronicle of Archeofuturist Times

Culture et nature: un même combat pour "Synergies"

 

 

Archives de SYNERGIES EUROPEENNES - 1994

Culture et nature: un même combat pour «Synergies»

 

En 1971, j'adhérais, sous le numéro 1063, à la SEPANSO (Société pour la Protection de la nature dans le Sud-Ouest). A cette époque, nous étions encore peu nombreux à nous préoccuper d'écologie et ce sont nos actions qui ont contribué à la prise de conscience actuelle en faveur de l'environnement. C'est dire que le combat des responsables de SYNERGIES pour défendre la nature n'a rien de nouveau ni d'un intérêt de mode.

 

L'homme, le plus grand prédateur que la Terre ait jamais connu, dévaste à son profit immédiat, et sans mesure, une nature qui a construit son équilibre au cours de millions d'années. En se multipliant sans limite, en se donnant une puissance et une audace toujours plus grandes, avec ses besoins insatiables, l'homme consomme, détruit, envahit et pollue tout ce qui a le malheur de présenter le moindre intérêt pour notre appétit physiologique, technique ou financier. Ce comportement ressemble un peu à celui des termites. Nous avons transformé la Terre en gruyère, l'atmosphère en étuve et l'eau en cloaque: nous sommes donc une termitière frénétique qui crée des objet artificiels en détruisant le donné naturel.

 

Lorsque l'on prend conscience de la folie que représente le “progrès”, on devient un combattant mobilisant ses énergies pour obliger sa propre espèce à se contrôler, à maîtriser cette pulsion frénétique, acquisitive et destructrice, à limiter ses besoins, à se contraindre à respecter la vie végétale et animale, à respecter les millions et les millions d'années de maturation qui résident au sein de tous ces êtres vivants. Ce respect est la condition première à tout équilibre.

 

A l'opposé d'un certain message de la Genèse, où Yahvé dit à Adam de soumettre la Terre à son bon vouloir et à ses convenances, nous affirmons que la Terre et la Vie ne sont la propriété de personne; rien sur cette Terre ne peut être arraisonné définitivement et enclos, soustrait au Tout et régi selon des lois différentes de la loi globale, tellurique ou “gaïenne” (de “Gaia”, la Terre). La Terre est un perpétuel chantier, où les transformations s'effectuent lentement, où êtres et formes évoluent ou involuent, subissent la loi de l'entropie. Or, ayant remplacé l'unité des religions cosmiques par une dualité créationniste, les religions récentes ont dégagé dangereusement l'homme de sa filiation avec la Nature, l'ont soustrait à ses responsabilités et l'ont conduit à la catastrophe imminente qui nous guette.

 

SYNERGIES a donc décidé de participer à la lutte planétaire pour la sauvegarde de la nature, sans laquelle nous ne pourrions vivre biologiquement, poétiquement et spirituellement. Après avois aidé une revue écologique (Le Recours aux forêts)  à se développer et à prendre un créneau, à monter sur la brèche pour ce combat nécessaire, le Directoire de Synergies a décidé d'aller plus loin et de créer une «AMICALE ÉCOLOGIQUE EUROPÉENNE». Cette amicale n'aura pas vocation à se lancer dans des opérations spectaculaires, à imiter Greenpeace, mais devra simplement relier et informer les membres de SYNERGIES qui s'intéressent aux problèmes écologiques ou qui militent dans des organisations ou des partis écologiques partout en Europe. Nous ne souhaitons pas créer un parti vert de plus, mais former une agence d'information pour soutenir l'action au quotidien de ces militants persévérants, qui trouverons dans les travaux que nous publierons ou traduirons des argumentaires pour étayer leur combat et leurs discours. Nous croyons que l'écologie ne doit pas s'enfermer dans des approches politiciennes car l'écologie concerne tout le monde, indistinctement: il s'agit de sauver notre biosphère en danger de mort.

 

Ainsi donc, que ceux d'entre nous qui soutiennent notre démarche nous le fassent savoir afin que nous les tenions au courant des progrès de cette «AMICALE ÉCOLOGIQUE EUROPÉENNE».

 

Gilbert SINCYR.

Questions to Robert Steuckers: In order to precise the positions of SYNERGIES EUROPEENNES

Archives de SYNERGIES EUROPEENNES - 2004

Questions to Robert Steuckers:

In order to precise the positions of Synergies Européennes

Interview by Pieter Van Damme, for an end of course dissertation

The following is a translation of an interview with Robert Steuckers founder of Synergies Européennes. S.E. is an excellent pan European organization with a very fine history of activism that was born as a result of a split from Alain DeBenoist's GRECE quite some time back.

***

Q: To what extent can "national-bolshevism" be included in the "third way", between liberalism and Marxism?

RS : National-bolshevism does not refer to any economic theory or project of society: this is too often forgotten. This composed term has been used to denominate the (temporary, indeed) alliance between the traditional cadres of German diplomacy, eager to release the Reich defeated in 1918 from the Western enterprise, and the leading elements of German communism, eager to find a weight ally in the West for the new-born USSR. With Niekisch – ancient cadre of the Council Republic of Monaco, crushed by the nationalist Freikorps [Franc Corps] under the mandate of Noske's social-democrat power – national-bolshevism assumes a more political shade, but in the majority of cases its self-denomination chooses the "national-revolutionary" label. The concept of national-bolshevism becomes a polemical concept, used by journalists to indicate the alliance between the extreme wings on the political chessboard. Niekisch, in the times when he was considered as a leading figure of national-bolshevism, was no more politically active, strictly speaking; he was the editor of newspapers appealing to the fusion of the national and communist extreme wings (the extremities of the political "horse-shoe", said Jean-Pierre Faye, author of the book Les langages totalitaires [Totalitarian languages]. The notion of "Third Way" made its appearance within this literature. It had different avatars, as a matter of fact mixing nationalism to communism, or some libertarian elements in the nationalism of the young people of Wandervogel to some communitarian options elaborated by the left, as it is the case, for instance, of Gustav Landauer. [1]

These ideological mixes were initially elaborated within the internal debate of then existing national-revolutionary factions; then after 1945, when there was hope that that some third way would become the way of Germany, torn between East and West, and when such Germany would be no more the place of the European divide, as on the contrary the bridge between the two worlds, managed by a political model combining the best qualities of the two systems, ensuring both freedom and social justice at a time. On a different level, the name of "third way" was sometimes used to called the German techniques of economic management which differed from Anglo-saxon techniques, although from within the same market liberalism. The latter techniques are considered to bee to much speculative in their progress, too little careful of the social continuum structured by non-market sectors (health and social welfare, teaching and university). In this German view of the 1950s and 1960s, market liberalism must be consolidated by respect and support to the "concrete orders" of the society, as to become an "order-liberalism". Its functioning will be optimal once the sectors of welfare and education do not limp, do not engender social misguidance due to the negligence of the non-market sectors by a political power too much subdued to banking and financial circuits.

The French economist Michel Albert, in his famous work Capitalisme contre capitalisme [Capitalism against capitalism], translated in many languages, opposes indeed such order-liberalism to the neo-liberalism en vogue after the coming to power of Thatcher in the United Kingdom and Reagan in the United States. Albert calls order-liberalism as the "Rhenish-model", defining it as a model loath to stock market speculation as a way to maximise profits without structural investments, and as a model attentive to the preservation of education "structures" and a social welfare apparatus, sustained by a solid hospitalising network. Albert, order-liberal follower of the German way, re-evaluates non-market sectors under attack after the coming of neo-liberalism. The French "nouvelle droite" [ND, new right], preferably working within a dream-like framework, though masked by the adjective "cultural", did not take into account this fundamental distinction made by Albert in a book nevertheless hugely diffused through all European countries. If the ND had to opt for an economic strategy, it should have started with the defence of existing structures (that are also cultural achievements), in concert with gaullists, socialists and ecologists struggling to defend them, and should have criticised those politicians who – following the neo-liberal and Anglo-Saxon fashion – give speculative trends a free rein. Neo-liberalism dislocates non-market achievements (that is cultural practical achievements) and any ND, claiming the supremacy of culture, should act in defence of such non-market structures. Due to the mediocrity of the leading personnel of the Parisian ND, this work was not undertaken. [2]


Perroux, Veblen, Schumpeter and the heterodoxes

Anyway, economics in France operates – with Albertini, Silem and Perroux – a distinction between "orthodoxy" and "heterodoxy". As "orthodoxies" (plural) it means the economic techniques applied by European powers: 1) Marxist Soviet-style planned economy, 2) free, unrestrained market economy, the Anglo-Saxon fashion (pure liberalism or classic liberalism, deriving from Adam Smith, present neo-liberalism being but an avatar of the former), 3) economics offering some mix between the two former techniques, such as it was theoretically expressed by Keynes at the beginning of the XX century and adopted by most social-democrat governments (British labourites, the German SPD, the Austrian SPÖ, Scandinavian socialists). As heterodoxy the French political science means every economic theory not deriving from pure principles, that is from disembodied rationality, as on the contrary from peculiar, real and concrete political histories. In this perspective, heterodoxes are the heirs of the famous German "historical school" of the XIX century, of Thorstein Veblen's institutionalism and of Schumpeter's doctrines. Heterodoxes do not believe in universal models, as against the three dominating forms of orthodoxy. They think that there exist as many economics and economic systems as national and localhistories. Together with Perroux and beyond their particular differences and divergences, the heterodoxes think that the historical character of structures is in itself worth being given due respect, and that economic problems must be solved respecting such structures' own dynamics.

More recently, the notion of "Third Way" was brought again to the fore with the coming to power of Tony Blair in the United Kingdom, after about twenty years of thatcherian neo-liberalism. Apparently, as a principle, Blair comes closer to the German third way; as a matter of fact, he is but trying to make the British working class accept the achievements of liberalism. His "third way" is a placebo, a set of buffer measures and devices against the unpleasant social effects of neo-liberalism, but it does not reach the core of the matter: it is only a timid shift towards some keynesian position, that is towards one more orthodoxy, already practised by labourites but presented to the voters through a much more "workerist" and muscular language. Blair would have really launched a third way had he centred his policies on a deeper defence of the non-market sectors of the British society and on some forms of protectionism (once already favoured by a more muscular keynesism, a keynesism oriented to order-liberal - or order-socialist, order-labourite – trends). [3]

Q: What is the role of Marxism, or bolshevism, in this framework?

RS : Soviet-style Marxism failed everywhere, its role is finally brought to nothing, even in the countries that experienced the market economy. The sole nostalgia left, that comes to the light in every discussion with people emigrated from those countries, goes to the excellence of the educational system, able to communicate a classical corpus, and to the schools of music and dance, local expressions of the Bolshoy; this nostalgia can be found even in the smallest villages. The ideal thing would be to couple such education network, impermeable to the spirit of 1968, to an heterodox economic system, clearing the way to cultural variety, without the control of a rigid ideology preventing the blossoming of the new, both on the cultural and economic plan.

Q : Did Synergy then quit organic solidarism or not?

RS : No, it did not. Since it is just heterodoxies – plural, so that they can answer to the imperatives of the autonomous contexts – that represent ipso facto organic reflexes. Heterodox theories and practices stem from an organic humus, as against orthodoxies elaborated in the test-tube, indoor, outside of any concrete context. Because of their defence of dynamic structures engendered by the peoples and their own institutions, and of the non-market and welfare sectors, heterodoxies immediately imply solidarity among the members of a political community. The third way brought forward by heterodox doctrines is forcedly an organic and solidarist third way. The problem you seem to rise here is that a good number of right-wing groups and small couches wrongly used and equivocated the terms "organic" and "solidarist", or "community", never making reference to the complex corpus of heterodox economic science. It was easy then for Marxist critics, for instance, to label the militants of those movements as jokers or cheaters, manipulating empty words without any real and concrete meaning.

Participation et interest in the times of De Gaulle

The concrete and actual example to which the ND could have made reference was the set of reform attempts in De Gaulle's France during the 1960s, with the "participation" of the workers in the enterprises and their "interest" to the reaped benefits. Participation and interest are the two pillars of the gaullian reform of the market liberal economy. Such reform does not go in the direction of Soviet-style rigid planning, although a Planning Office was forecast, as in the direction of the anchorage of the economy within a given population, in this case the French population. In parallel, this orientation of the French economy towards participation and interest is coupled with the reform of the representative system, where the national assembly (i.e. the French parliament) should be sided until the end of its term by a Senate where would sit not only the elected representatives of the political parties, but also the representatives of the professional associations and the regions, directly chosen by the people without the parties acting as a go-between. In this sense De Gaulle spoke about a "Senate of the professions and the regions".

For minute history, this reform by De Gaulle was by no means taken into account by the French right-wing and by the ND, partly coming from them, since those right-wings found themselves in the camp of the partisans of a French Algeria and therefore rejected, altogether irrationally, every manifestation of the gaullian power. This undoubtedly explains the total absence of any reflection upon these gaullian social projects in the ND literature. [4]

Q : The economic visions of the conservative revolutionaries seem to me to be rather confused, and apparently have but one common denominator, the rejection of classical liberalism!

RS : Economic ideas in general, and introductory manuals to the history of economic doctrines give a very small room to heterodox currents. These manuals – that are imposed to the students in their first years, and that are destined to give them a sort of Ariadne's thread to keep their way through the succession of economic ideas – almost do not include anymore the theories of the German historical school and their many avatars in Germany and elsewhere (in Belgium at the end of the XIX century Emile de Laveleye, genial scholar and vulgariser of the theses of the German historical school). The only notable exception are the manuals of Albertini and Silem, quoted above. From Sismondi to List, from Rodbertus to Schumpeter, a different vision of economics is developed, focusing on the context and accepting the infinite variety of the ways of realising the political economy. These doctrines do not reject so much liberalism, since some of their bearers qualify themselves as "liberals", as the refusal of acknowledging the contextual and circumstantial differences in which economic policy must concretise. Pure "liberalism", rejected by the conservative revolutionaries, because is a kind of universalism. It believes that it can find application everywhere in the world without taking into account the variable factors of the climate, the population, its history, the kinds of cultivation that are traditionally practised, etc. This universalist illusion is shared by the other two pillars (Soviet-Marxist and Keynesian-socialdemocratic) of economic orthodoxy. The universalist illusions of orthodoxy notably led to neglecting food cultivation in the Third World, to the spreading of monocultures (which exhaust the soil and do not cover the whole of food and vital requirements of a single population) and, ipso facto, to famines, among which those of Sahel and Ethiopia stay printed in memory. In the corpus of the ND, the interest to the context in economics produced a series of studies on the works of the MAUSS (Anti-Utilitarian Movement in Social Sciences), whose leading figures, labelled as "leftists", explored a range of interesting problematics and analysed in deep the notion of "gift" (that is, the forms of traditional economy not based on the axioms of interest and profit). Promoters of this institute were notably Serge Latouche and Alain Caillé. Within the framework of the ND, it was especially Charles Champetier who dealt with such themes. And with an incontestable vivacity. Anyway, despite the congratulations he deserved for his exploratory work, it must be said that the simple transplant of the corpus of the MAUSS into that of the ND was impossible, and rightly so, since the ND did not prepare any clear-cut study about the contextualist approaches in economics, both from right-wing and left-wing labelled doctrines. Notably no documentary search, aimed at reinserting into the debate the historical (hence contextualist) process, had been realised upon the German historical schools and their avatars, true economic valve of a conservative revolution that is not limited, obviously, to the time-space running from 1918 to 1932 (to which Armin Mohler had confined himself, in order not to sink into some unmastered exhaustiveness).

The roots of the conservative revolution trace back to German romanticism, to the extent that it was a reaction against the universalist "geometricism" of Enlightment and the French Revolution: they nevertheless encompassed all the works of the XIX century philologists who widened our knowledge about antiquity and the so-called «barbarian» worlds (as the Persian, German, Dacian and Maurian peripheries of the Roman Empire by Franz Altheim), the historical school in economics and the sociologists related to it, the aesthetic revolution started by the English pre-Raphaelites, by John Ruskin, by the Arts & Crafts movement in England, by Pernstorfer in Austria, by Horta's architecture and the Van de Velde furniture-makers in Belgium, etc. The mistake of the Parisian journalists, who spoke at random about the "conservative revolution" without possessing a true German culture, without really sharing the competence of the Northern European soul (and neither those of the Iberian or Italian soul), was to reduce this revolution to its sole German expressions during the tragic, hard and exhausting years after 1918. In this sense the ND lacked cultural and temporal depth, it did not have enough reach in order to magisterially impose itself upon the dominant non-culture. [5]

Coming straight back to economic issues, let us say that a conservative revolution is revolutionary to the extent that it aims at defeating the universalist models copied from revolutionary geometricism (according to Gusdorf's expression); and it is conservative to the extent that it aims at returning to the contexts, to the history that let them emerge and made them dynamic. In the domain of urbanism as well, every conservative revolution aims at erasing the filth of industrialism (the project of the English pre-Raphaelites and of their Austrian disciples around Pernerstorfer) or geometrical modernism, in order to rejoin the traditions of the past (Arts & Crafts) to make new unheard-of forms blossom (MacIntosh, Horta, Van de Velde).

The context in which an economy develops is not exclusively determined by the economy itself, as by a lot of different factors. Hence the new-right criticism to economicism, or to "all-economism". Unfortunately this criticism did not remark the philosophical relationship of the non-economic (artistic, cultural, literary) process with the economic process of the historical school.

Q : Is it correct to say that Synergon, as against the GRECE, gives less attention to purely cultural activity, to the benefit of concrete political events?

RS : We do not give less attention to cultural activity. We give as much. But as you remarked, we do give a heightened attention to the events of the world. Two weeks before his death, the spiritual leader of Briton independentist, Olier Mordrel, who followed our work, called me on the phone, knowing his death was near, in order to sum up things, to hear one last time the voice of someone whom he felt intellectually close to – though never mentioning at all his state of health, because it was not the case either to pity himself or let himself be pitied. He told me: «What makes your reviews indispensable is your constant reference to real life». I was much enticed by this homage from an elder man, who had been anyway very niggard of praises and regards. Your question indicates that you undoubtedly felt – sixteen years later and through the readings concerning the themes of your dissertation – the same state of things as Olier Mordrel did at the eve of his passing. The judgement of Olier Mordrel seemed to me to be all the more interesting, in retrospect, since he is a privileged witness: having returned from his long exile in Argentine and Spain, he became rather soon accustomed to the ND, just before this came under the lights of the media. Then he saw its apogee and the beginning of its decline. And he attributed this decline to its incapacity of learning the real, the living, and the dynamics operating in our societies and in history.

Resorting to Heidegger

This will of learning or, in Heidegger's words, to reason in order to operate the unveiling of the Being and thus get out of nihilism (of the oblivion of Being), immediately implies to indefatigably review the facts of the present and past worlds (the latter being always able to come back again on the front, potentially, despite their temporary sleep), but also to encourage them in a thousand new ways in order to arouse new ideological and political constellations, to mobilise and strumentalise them in order to destroy and erase the heaviness stemming from institutionalised geometricism. Our path clearly proceeds from the will to add concreteness to the philosophical visions of Heidegger, whose language, too complex, has not yet engendered any revolutionary (and conservative!) ideology or praxis. [6]

Q : Is it correct to affirm that Synergies Européennes represents the actual avatar of the national-revolutionary doctrinal corpus (of which national-bolshevism is a form)?

RS : I feel there is in your question, in some way, too mechanic a vision of the ideological path leading from the conservative revolution and its national-revolutionary currents (since the Weimar epoch) and the present action of European Synergies. You seem to perceive in our movement a simple transposition of Weimar national-revolutionary corpus in our times. Such transposition would be anachronistic, and stupid as such. Anyway, within this corpus, Niekisch ideas are interesting to analyse, as well as his personal path and memories.

Nevertheless, the most interesting text of this movement stays that co-signed by the Jünger brothers, Ernst and most of all Friedrich-Georg, titled Aufstieg des Nationalismus [The Rise of Nationalism]. For the Jünger brothers, in this work as in other important articles or letters of that time, "nationalism" is a synonymous of "peculiarity" or "originality" – peculiarity and originality which must stay as such, never allowing to be obliterated by some universalist scheme or by some empty phraseology which its users pretend to be progressive or superior, valid for every time and place, a discourse destined to replace all languages and poetries, all epopees and histories. Being a poet himself, Friedrich-Georg Jünger, in this text-manifesto of the national-revolutionaries of the Weimar years, opposes the straight lines, the rigid geometries typical of the liberal-positivist phraseology, to the windings, meanders, labyrinths and serpent-like layouts of the natural, organic data. In this sense, this a sort of prefiguration of the thinking of Gilles Deleuze, with his rhizome creeping everywhere in the territorial plan, in the space, which is the Earth. Similarly, the hostility of nationalism, as it was conceived by the Jünger brothers, to the dead and petrified forms of liberal and industrial societies can be understood only in parallel to the analogous criticism by Heidegger and Simmel.

In the majority of cases, the present so-called national-revolutionary circles – often led by false wise men (very conceited), big tasteless faces or frustrated people who seek an uncommon way to emerge – as a matter of fact limited themselves to reproduce, like xerographers, the phraseology of the Weimar era. This is at the same time insufficient and clownish. This discourse must be used as an instrument, as a material - but together with more scientific philosophical or sociological materials, more generally admitted into scientific institutions - and obviously compared to moving reality, to marching actuality. The small couches of false sages and frustrated people, ill with acute "fuehreritis", were clearly unable to perform such task.

Beyond Aufstieg des Nationalismus

As a consequence, it seems to me impossible today to uncritically reconnect to the ideas of Aufstieg des Nationalismus and to the many reviews of the times of the Weimar Republic (Die Kommenden, Widerstand d'Ernst Niekisch, Der Aufbruch, Die Standarte, Arminius, Der Vormarsch, Der Anmarsch, Die deutsche Freiheit, Der deutsche Sozialist, Entscheidung by Niekisch, Der Firn, also by Niekisch, Junge Politik, Politische Post, Das Reich by Friedrich Hielscher, Die sozialistische Nation by Karl Otto Paetel, Der Vorkämpfer, Der Wehrwolf, etc.).

When I say "uncritically" I do not mean that this doctrinal corpus should be treated by a dissolving criticism, that it should be rejected as immoral or anachronistic, as it is done by those who try to change the colour of their skin or "bypass the customs". I mean that we must attentively read them again, but carefully taking into account the further evolution of their authors and the dynamics they aroused in other camps than that of close revolutionary nationalism. An example: Friedrich Georg Jünger publishes in 1942 the final version of his Die Perfektion der Technik [The perfection of Technique], which lays the foundations of the whole post-war German ecological thinking, at least in its non-political aspects – being as such depreciated and stupidly caricature-like. Later Friedrich Georg launches the review of ecological reflection Scheidewege, which continues to be published after his death in 1977. Aufstieg des Nationalismus must be therefore read again in the light of those later publications, and the national-revolutionary and soldiery message of the 1929s (already containing some ecological intuitions) must be coupled to the biologizing, ecological and organic corpus extensively commented on the pages of Scheidewege. In 1958 Ernst Jünger – together with Mircea Eliade and with the collaboration of Julius Evola and the German traditionalist Leopold Ziegler - founds the review Antaios, whose aim is to dive the readers into the great religious traditions of the world. Later, Martin Mayer studied Jünger's works in all these aspects and clearly showed the links connecting this thinking – covering a whole century – to a quantity of different intellectual worlds, such as surrealism – always forgotten by the national-revolutionaries of Nantes and elsewhere and by the Parisian ND, who consider themselves as infallible oracles but do not seem to know very much, once one takes the trouble to scratch a little the surface of things! Because of their Parisian coquetry, they try to have a German look, a "prussianhelmet" look, that suits all those "zigomars" as a London bowler-hat to an orang-outang! Meyer thus recalls the painting work of Kubin, the close relation between Jünger and Walter Benjamin, the esthetical distance and nonchalance connecting Jünger to the dandies, to the aesthetes and to a great number of romantics, the influence of Léon Bloy upon that German writer who died at the age of 102, the contribution of Carl Schmitt to his progress, the capital dialogue with Heidegger started in the second post-war period, the impact of Gustav Theodor Fechner's philosophy of nature, etc.

In France the national-revolutionaries and the anachronistic and caricature-like NDs should equally remember the closeness of Drieu La Rochelle to Breton's surrealists, notably when Drieu took part into the famous "Barrès trial" staged in Paris during the first world war. The uncritical transfer of the German national-revolutionary discourse of the 1920a in nowadays reality is misguided , often ridiculous device, deliberately ignoring the immeasurable extent of the post-national-revolutionary path of the Jünger brothers, of the worlds they explored, elaborated, interiorised. The same remark is valid notably for the ill reception of Julius Evola, solicited in the same misguided and caricature-like way by those neurotic pseudo-activists, those sectarian of the satano-sodomistic saturnalias based in the mouths of the Loire, or those pataphysical and porno-videomaniac metapolitologists, generally coming to nothing else but jest or parody. [7]

Q : Why does Synergies give so much attention to Russia, apart from the fact that this country belongs to the Eurasian ensemble?

RS : The attention we give to Russia proceeds from the geopolitical analysis of European history. The first intuition that moved our efforts for about a quarter of century was that the Europe where we were born, the Europe of the division sanctioned by the conferences of Teheran, Yalta and Postdam, was no place to live; it condemned our peoples to exit from history, to live into an historical, economic and political stagnation, which in time means death. Blocking Europe at the height of the Austrian-Hungarian border, cutting the Elba at the height of Wittenberg, depriving Hamburg of its Brandenburger, Saxon and Bohemian hinterland – all these are strangling strategies. The Iron Curtain divided industrial Europe from complementary territories and from that Russia which, at the end of the XIX had become the supplier of commodities to Europe, the extension of its territories towards the Pacific Ocean, the indispensable fortress locking up the European territory from the assaults it had to suffer until the XVI century from the peoples of the steppe. The English propaganda painted the Tsar as a monster in 1905 at the time of the Russian-Japanese war, it encouraged sedition in Russia in order to put the brake to this pre-communism European-Russian synergy.

Communism, financed by New York bankers as it had been the case of the Japanese fleet in 1905, served to build chaos in Russia and to hinder optimal economic relations between Europe and the Russian-Siberian space. Exactly as the French revolution, supported by London (see Olivier Blanc, Les hommes de Londres [London's Men], Albin Michel), ruined France, annihilated all its efforts to create its own Atlantic fleet and turn outwards instead of turning to our own territories, made of the mass of French (and Northern African) recruits cannon fodder for the City during the Crimean war, in 1914-1918 and in 1940-45. An outward-oriented France, as Louis XVI wished indeed, would have reaped immense benefits, would have ensured itself a solid presence in the New World and Africa since the XVIII century, and probably would not have lost its Indian agencies. A France turned towards the blue line of he Vosges provoked its own demographic implosion, committed a biological suicide. The worm was in the fruit: after the loss of Canada in 1763, a mistress elevated to the rank of marquise said: «Phoow! Why care about some square miles of snow!» and «After us, the Flood». Great political foresight! It could be compared to that of a meta-politiologist of the 11th arrondissement, who looks down on the few reflections by Guillaume Faye about "Eurosiberia"! At the same time, this declining French monarchy clang to our imperial Lorraine, snatched it from its natural imperial family, a scandal to which the governor of the Austrian Netherlands, Charles de Lorraine, had no time to find remedies; Grand Master of the Teutonic Order, he wanted to finance its re-conquest paying on his own money a well-trained and equipped army of 70,000 men, accurately chosen. His death put an end to this project. This prevented the European armies from disposing of the Lorraine fortress to put an end, some years later, to the revolutionary comedy that blooded Paris and was about to commit the Vendean genocide. Everything to the great benefit of Pitt's services!

At the present stage of our researches, we realise in the first place that the project of recasting and indefectible Euro-Russian alliance is not an anomaly, a whim or an original idea. On the contrary! It is a recurring imperial care since Charles the Great and Otto I! Forty years of Cold War, European division and mediatic dejection tele-guided by the United States made two or three generations of Europeans forget about the achievements of their history.

The roman limes on the Danube

Afterwards, our readings led us to realise that Europe, since the Carolingian era, wanted itself as the heir of the Roman empire and aspired to reconstruct the latter all along the ancient Danubian limes. Rome had the Danube under check from its source to its mouth in the Black Sea by deploying a major and strictly organised river fleet, by building works of art (among which bridges of colossal dimension in those times, with pillars 45 meters high above the bed of the river), improving the technique of boat-bridges for its assaulting legions to cross, by concentrating to the Pannonian pass many well trained legions armed with advanced materials, as well as in the province of Scythia, corresponding to Doubroudja south of the Danube. The aim was to contain the invasions coming from the steppes mostly at the level of the two passage points with no important relieves, that is the Hungarian plain (the "puszta") and the mentioned Doubroudja, at the junction between present Romania and Bulgaria. No empire could blossom in Europe, in the ancient times and in the high Middle Ages, if those passage points were not locked for the non-European peoples of the steppe. Consequently, within the framework of the Holy Alliance of Prince Eugene (see below), it was necessary to get rid of the Turkish Ottoman enterprise, an irruption alien to Europeanness come from the South-East. After the studies of the American Edward Luttwak on the military strategy of the Roman Empire, we realise this one was not simply a circum-Mediterranean empire, centred around the Mare Nostrum, as also a Danubian, or Rhenish-Danubian empire, with a river crossing the whole Europe, where not only a military fleet but also a civilian and commercial fleet cruised, allowing exchanges with the German, Dacian or Slavic tribes of Northern Europe. The coming of the Huns to the Pannonian pass upsets this order in the ancient world. The alien character of the Huns does not allow to turn them into Foederati, as it was the case of the German and Dacian peoples.

The Carolingians wanted to restore the free circulation on the Danube by advancing their pawns in the direction of Pannonia, occupied first by the Avars, then by the Magiars. Charles the Great starts the excavation of the Rhine-Danube channel later called as Fossa Carolina. It is thought that it was used, for a very short time, to envoy troops and materials towards the Noricum and the Pannonia. Charles the Great, in spite of its privileged links with the Roman Pope, ardently looked for being recognised by the Byzantine Basileus and even thought about giving him one of his daughters as a wife. Aix-la-Chapelle, the capital of the German Empire, is built as a cast of Byzantium. His marriage project failed, with no other apparent reason than the personal attachment of Charles to his daughters, whom he wanted to keep with himself by making them abbesses of the great Carolingian abbeys, without the least demureness. This fatherly attachment, then, did not allow to seal a dynastic alliance between the Western German Empire and the Eastern Roman Empire. The Carolingian era finally closed with a check, because of an ill-omened constellation of powers: the French kings, then the Carolingians (and the Pipinides before them) became allied (sometimes unconditionally) to the Roman Pope, enemy of the Irish-Scottish Christianism that sends missions in Danubian southern Germany, and to Byzantium, legal heir of the Roman imperiality. The Papacy would later use the energies of Germany and France against Byzantium, having no other goal than to assert his own supremacy. On the contrary, it should have persisted in the work of peaceful penetration of the Irish-Scottish into the Danubian east, from Bregenz and Salzburg, favouring the peaceful transition from paganism to Irish Christianism instead of giving free hand to zealots payed by Rome like Boniface, since the Irish-Scottish variant of Christianism was not opposed to Byzantine orthodoxy and thus a modus vivendi could be arranged from Ireland to Caucasus. This synthesis would have allowed an optimal setting of the European continent, which would make impossible the return of the Mongolian peoples and the Turkish invasions of the X and XI centuries. Then the Spanish reconquista would have been advanced by six centuries! [8]

After Lechfeld in 955, the organisation of the Pannonian pass

These reflections upon the check of the Carolingians, exemplified by the sterile and criminal bigotry of his descendent Lois the Pious, show that there can be no consistent European civilisation bloc without mastering and organising the territory at the mouths of the Rhine in the Black Sea. Besides, what is absolutely significant, Otto I rises to imperial dignity after the battle of Lechfeld in 955, that allows to regain access to Pannonia after the elimination of the partisans of the Magyar kahn Horka Bulcsu and the rise of the Arpads, who promise to lock up the Pannonian pass as it was done by the Roman legions in the time of the glorious Urbs. Thanks to the German army of emperor Otto I and to the loyalty of the Hungarians to the Arpads' promise, the Danube becomes again either German-Roman or Byzantine (eastward of the "cataracts" of the Iron Door). If Pannonia is no more a passage for the Asian nomads who can dislocate the whole continental political organisation in Europe, ipso facto, imperiality is geographically restored.

Otto I, married to Adelaide, the heiress of the Lombard kingdom in Italy, means to reorganise the Empire by ensuring his check upon the Italian peninsula and negotiating with the Byzantines, despite all the reticence of the Papacy. In 967, twelve years after Lechfeld, five years after his crowning, Otto receives a message from the Byzantine Basileus, Nicephore Phocas, and proposes a joint alliance against the Saracens. This will be tacitly realised with Nicephore's successor, more pliant and far-sighted, Ioannes Tzimisces, who authorises the Byzantine Princess Theophana to marry the son of Otto I, the future Otto II, in 972. Otto II will not be up the task, undergoing a terrible defeat by the Saracens in Calabria in 983. Otto III, son of Theophana who becomes regent awaiting for his majority, will not get to consolidate his double German and Byzantine heritage

The forthcoming reign of Konrad II will be exemplar under this perspective. This salic emperor lives in good relations with Byzantium, whose lands east of Anatolia begin to be dangerously harassed by the Seljuchides raids and the Arabs inroads. The Ottonian heritage in Pannonia and Italy, together with peace with Byzantium, allowed a veritable renaissance in Europe, accompanied by a remarkable economic expansion. Thanks to the victory of Otto I and the inclusion of Arpads' Pannonia in the European imperial dynamics, our continent's economy knew a phase of expansion, demographic growth continued (population increased by 40% between the year 1000 and 1150), the tillage of forests goes at full speed ahead, Europe progressively gains weight on the northern Mediterranean shores and the Italian cities start their formidable process of expansions, while the Rhenish towns become important metropolis (Cologne, Magonza, Worms with its superb roman cathedral).

This expansion and the quiet yet strong reign of Konrad II show that Europe cannot know economic prosperity and cultural expansion unless the space between Moravia and the Adriatic is secured. Otherwise, it is decline and marasmus. Such is the capital historical lesson learnt by Europe's gravediggers: in 1919 at Versailles they want to segment the course of the Danube into as many antagonist states as possible; in 1945, they want to establish a divide on the Danube at the height of the ancient border between Noricum and Pannonia; between 1989 and 2000 they want to set a zone of permanent troubles in the European south-east in order to prevent the East-West suture and they invent the notion of an insuperable civilisation gap between the Protestant-Catholic West and the Orthodox-Byzantine East (see the theses of Samuel Huntington).

In the Middle Ages it is the Rome of Papacy which sinks this expansion by contesting the temporal power of the German Emperors and by weakening thus the European building altogether, deprived of a powerful and well articulated secular arm. The care of the Emperors is to co-operate in harmony and reciprocity with Byzantium, in order to restore the strategic unity of the Roman Empire before the East-West divide. But Rome is the enemy of Byzantium, even before being the enemy of the Muslims. To the tacit but very badly articulated alliance between the German Emperor and the Byzantine Basileus, the Papacy will oppose the alliance between the Holy Siege, the Norman kingdom of Sicily and the kings of France, an alliance which also supports all the seditious movements and the particular and lowly material interests in Europe, once they sabotage the imperial projects.

The imperial dream of the German Emperors

The Italian dream of the Emperors, from Otto III to Frederick II Hohenstaufen, aims at uniting under the same supreme authority the two great communication waterways in Europe: the Danube at the centre of the lands and the Mediterranean at the junction of three continents. Against the national-socialist or folkist ("völkisch") interpretations of Kurt Breysig and Adolf Hitler himself, who never ceased to criticise the Italian orientation of the Middle Age German Emperors, one is forced to realise that the space between Budapest (the ancient Aquincum of the Romans) and Trieste on the Adriatic, having the Italian peninsula and Sicily as their extension, allows – if these territories are united by the same political will – to master the continent and face any external invasion: those of the nomads from the steppe and from the Arabian desert. The Popes contested the Emperors the right to manage for the sake of the continent the Italian and Sicilian affairs, which they deemed to be their own personal apanages, subtracted from any continental, political and strategic logic: by acting this way, and with the complicity of the Normans of Sicily, they weakened their enemy, Byzantium, but at the same time Europe altogether, which could neither gain its foothold in Africa nor sooner free the Iberian peninsula, nor defend Anatolia against the Seljukides, nor help Russia facing the Mongolian invasions. The situation demanded the federation of all forces into a common project.

Because of the seditious plots of the Popes, French kings, Lombard rioters, scrupleless feudals, our continent could not be "membered" from the Baltic to the Adriatic, from Denmark to Sicily (as it was equally wished by another far-sighted spirit of the XIII century, The King of Bohemia Ottokar II Premysl). Since then Europe has not been able to finish any great design in the Mediterranean (hence the slowness of the reconquista, left to the sole Hispanic peoples, and the failure of the Crusades). Europe was so frail on its eastern side that it has been in danger, after the disasters of Liegnitz and Mohi in 1241, to be completely conquered by the Mongols. This fragility – that could have been fatal – was the result of the weakening of the imperial institute due to the intrigues of the Papacy.

About the necessary alliance of the two European imperialities

In 1389 the Serbs are crushed by the Turks in the famous battle of Blackbirds Field [Kosovo Polje], dramatic prelude to the definitive fall of Constantinople in 1453. Europe then gets repelled, its back against the Atlantic and the Arctic. The sole reaction of the continent comes from Russia, a country thus inheriting ipso facto the Byzantine imperiality since the very moment the latter ceases to exist. Moscow becomes then the "Third Rome"; it inherits from Byzantium the title of the Eastern imperiality. There were two empires in Europe, the Western Roman Empire and the Eastern Roman Empire; and again there are two, despite the fall of Constantinople: the Sacred Roman-German Empire and the Russian Empire. The latter goes directly to the offensive, bite the lands conquered by the Mongols, destroys the Tatar kingdoms of the Volga, pushing ahead towards the Caspian. As a consequence, tradition and geopolitics are compelling: the alliance wanted by the German Emperors after Charles the Great between Aix-la-Chapelle and Byzantium must be pursued – but from now on by an imperial German-Russian alliance. The Western (German) Emperor and the Eastern (Russian) Emperor must act de concert in order to push back the enemies of Europe (the two-headed strategic space, as the bicephalous eagle is) and free our lands from the Ottoman and Muslim encircling, with the support of the local kings: kings of Spain, Hungary, etc. Here is the historical, metaphysical and geopolitical reason of every German-Russian alliance.

This alliance will work, despite the French betrayal. France was hostile to Byzantium on behalf of the anti-imperial Popes of Rome. It will take part to the destruction of the fortresses of the Empire in the West and will ally with the Turks against the rest of Europe. Hence the irresolvable contradictions of the French "nationalists": they simultaneously appeal to Charles Martel (an Austrasian of our countries between the Mose and the Rhein, invoked to save ill-organised Neustria and Aquitaine, which – decaying and prey to any kind of dissent – could not withstand the Arab invasion); and those same French nationalists validate the crimes of betrayal of felon kings, cardinals and ministers: Francis I, Henry II, Richelieu, Louis XIV, Turenne – that is, zealots of the Revolution, as if the Austrasian Charles Martel had never existed!

The Austrian-Russian alliance works with the Holy Alliance erected at the end of the XVII century by Eugene of Savoy, who pushes back the Ottomans on all borders, from Bosnia to the Caucasus. The geopolitical intent is to consolidate the Pannonian pass, to activate a Danubian river fleet, to organise a deep defence of the border by units of Croatian, Serbian and Rumanian peasant-soldiers supported by German and Lorrainian colons, to free the Balkans and, in Russia, to take back Crimea and put under check the northern shores of the Black Sea, in order to enlarge the European space to its full Pontian territory. In the XVIII century Leibniz will reiterate this necessity to include Russia into a great European alliance against the Ottoman push. Later, the Holy Alliance of 1815 and the Pentarchy of the beginning of the XIX century will be an extension of the same logic. Bismarck's alliance of the three emperors and his concerted policy with Saint Petersburg, which he never abandoned, are but modern applications of the views of Charles the Great (never realised) and of Otto I, the veritable founder of Europe. Since these alliances ceased to operate, Europe entered a new phase of decline, notably to the benefit of the United States. The Versailles Treaty in 1919 aims at the neutralisation of Germany, while its pendant, the Trianon Treaty, sanctions the partition of Hungary, deprived of its extension in the Tatra mountains (Slovakia) and of its union with Croatia created by king Tomislav, a union later established by the Pacta Conventa in 1102, under the leadership of the Hungarian king Koloman Könyves ("The one who had a crazy love for books"). Versailles destroyed what the Romans had united, restores what the troubles of the dark centuries had imposed on the continent, destroys the work of the Crown of Saint-Etienne who had harmoniously restored the Roman order while respecting the Croatian and Dalmatian peculiarities.

Versailles was above all a crime against Europe since that necessary Hungarian-Croatian harmony in this key geographical zone was destroyed, thus precipitating Europe into a new era of idle troubles to which a new emperor, one day, must necessarily put an end. Wilson, Clemenceau and Poincaré, France and the United States bear the responsibility of this crime in the face of history, as well as the brainless bearers of this ethics of conviction (and consequently of irresponsibility) brought by this laicism of French-revolutionary rehash. Beyond its professed exterior hostility to the Catholic religion, this pernicious ideology acted exactly in the same way as the simoniac Popes of the Middle Ages: it destroyed the optimal organising principle of our Europe, its adepts being blinded by smoky principles and filthy interests, deprived of any historical and temporal depth. Their principles and interest were completely unfit for providing the assizes of a political organisation, let alone an empire.

In the face of this disaster, Arthur Moeller van den Bruck, leading figure of the conservative revolution, launches the idea of a new alliance with Russia, despite the establishment in power of Leninist bolshevism, since the principle of the alliance between the two emperors must stand up and against the desacralisation, horizontalisation and profanation of politics. Count von Brockdorff-Rantzau will apply this diplomacy, what shall lead to the German-Soviet anti-Versailles: the Rapallo agreement signed by Rathenau and Chicherin in 1922. From there we come back to the problematic of "national-bolshevism", that I already evoked in the course of this interview.

In the 1980s, when the development of military strategies, armaments and most of all inter-continental ballistic missiles leads to the acknowledgement that no nuclear war is possible in Europe without the total destruction of the conflicting countries, there appeared the necessity to get out of the impasse and to negotiate in order to bring Russia back into European concerted policy. After perestroika, started in 1985 by Gorbachev, the thaw is announced, hope revives: but it will be soon followed by delusion. The succession of inter-Yugoslav conflicts will block Europe again between the Pannonian pass and the Adriatic, while the mediatic propaganda offices, led by CNN, invent a thousand reasons to deepen the gap between Europeans and Russians.

Block of the European dynamics between Bratislav and Trieste

These historical explanations must lead us to understand who the self-nominated defenders of an Europe without Russia (or against Russia) really are – the papist or masonic gravediggers of Europe, and that their action condemns our continent to stagnation, decline and death, as it did stagnate, decline and waste away from the Huns invasions to the restauratio imperii by Otto I, after the battle of Lechfeld in 955. After the reorganisation of the Hungarian plain and its inclusion in the European orbit, the economic and demographic growth of Europe followed soon. A similar renaissance is whatthey wanted to prevent after the thaw which followed Gorbachev's perestroika, since this geopolitical rule granting prosperity is always valid (for instance, the Austrian economy tripled its commercial turnover in a few years after the dismantling of the Iron Curtain along the Austrian-Hungarian border in 1989). Our enemies know very well the ways of European history. Much better than our own coward and decaying political personnel. They know the point to strike us, block us, strangle us is always there – between Bratislava and Trieste. In order to prevent the reunion of the two Empires and a new period of peace and prosperity, which would make Europe shine from thousands lights and would condemn our competitors to a second-rank role, simply because they do not possess the wide rage of our potentialities, the fruit of our differences and our peculiarities.

Q : What are the concrete positions of European Synergies concerning institutions like the parliament, people's representation, etc. ?

RS : The vision of European Synergies is democratic albeit hostile to all forms of partitocracy – since partitocracy, supposedly "democratic" is in fact the perfect denial of democracy. At the theoretical level European Synergies makes reference to a Russian liberal of the beginning of the century, militant of the Cadet party: Moshe Ostrogovsky. The analysis left by this Russian liberal in the face of the bolshevist revolution lays on an obvious acknowledgement: every democracy should be a system imitating the movement of things in the City. Electoral mechanisms logically aim at giving representation to the effervescences acting within the society, day by day, without subverting anyway the immutable order of politics. As a consequence, the instruments of representations, that is the political parties, must too represent the passing effervescences and never aim to eternity. The malfunctioning of parliamentary democracy stems from the fact that political parties become a rigidly permanent presence within the society, enrolling more and more mediocre people in their ranks. In order to put a remedy to this inconvenient, Ostrogovski suggest that democracy laid on "ad hoc" parties, timely requesting urgent reforms or precise amendments, then proclaiming their dissolution in order to free their personnel, which could the forge new petitioner movements – thus allowing to redistribute the cards and to share the militants into new (similarly provisional) formations. Parliaments would then gather citizens who never would get encrusted in political professionalism. Legislative periods would be shorter, or – as in the beginning of Belgian History or in the United Kingdom of Netherlands from 1815 to 1830 – a third of the assembly would be changed every third part of the legislative period, thus allowing an accelerated circulation of political personnel and the elimination (sanctioned by the urns) of those who proved incompetent; this circulation today exists no more, which – apart from the issue of census vote – gives us a less perfect democracy than in those times. The problem is to prevent the political careers of individuals who would end by knowing no more of real public life.

Weber & Minghetti: for maintaining the separation of the three powers

Max Weber too made some pertinent observations: he noted that the socialist and christian-democrat parties (the German Zentrum) install incompetent figures into the key positions; those take their decision in spite of any good sense, are animated by the ethics of conviction instead of responsibility, and demand the division of political or civil servant posts according to the simple pro-rata of votes, without having to prove their real competence in exercising their functions. The Italian XIX century liberal minister Minghetti very soon perceived how this system would put an end to the separation of the three powers, since the parties and their militants, armed by the ethics of conviction, source of all demagogies, wanted to control and manipulate justice and destroyed every compartimentation between the legislative and the executive powers. The democratic equilibrium among the three powers – originally put as water-tight compartments in order to warrant the citizens' freedom, as devised by Montesquieu – can neither work nor exist anymore, in such a context of hysteria and demagogy. Here we stand today.

European Synergies does not therefore criticise the parliamentary institution in itself, but clearly displays its aversion to any malfunctioning, to any private intervention (parties are private associations, as a matter of facts and as Ostrogovsky recalls) in the recruitment of political personnel, civil servants, etc., to any kind of nepotism (co-optations of the members of the family of a political man or civil servant to a political or administrative post). Only the examination by a totally neutral jury should allow the access to a charge. Any other means of recruitment should be treated as a grave offence.

We also believe that parliaments should not be the simple representative chambers where would sit the chosen members of political parties (that is, of private associations, demanding discipline without authorising any right to tendencies or any personal initiatives by the deputy). Not very citizen is the member of a party, as a matter of fact the majority of them does not own any affiliation card. As a consequence, parties generally represent no more than 8-10% of the people, and 100% of the parliament! The excessive weight of the parties should be corrected by the representation of professional associations and unions, as it was envisaged by De Gaulle and his team when they spoke about the "senate of professions and regions".

The constitutional pattern that Professor Bernard Willms (1931-1991) favoured lays on a three chambers assembly (Parliament, Senate, Economic Chamber). Half the Parliament would be recruited among candidates chosen by the parties and personally elected (no votes for the lists); the other half would be formed by the representatives of the corporative and professional councils. The Senate would be essentially a regional representative organ (like the German or Austrian Bundesrat). The Economic Chamber, similarly organised on a regional basis, would represent the social bodies, including the unions.

The problem is to consolidate a democracy leaning upon the "concrete bodies" of society, and not only upon private associations of ideological and arbitrary nature, as the parties. This idea is close to the definition of "concrete bodies" given by Carl Schmitt. However, every political entity lays on a cultural heritage, which must be taken into account, according to the analysis of Ernst Rudolf Huber, disciple of Carl Schmitt. For Huber a consistent State is always a Kulturstaat, and the state apparatus has the duty to preserve this culture, expression of a Sittlichkeit [ethicity] exceeding the simple limits of ethics to include a wide range of artistic, cultural, structural, agricultural and industrial productions, whose fecundity must be preserved. A more diversified representation, going beyond that 8-10% of party members, allows indeed to better guarantee this fecundity, spread through the whole social body of the nation. The defence of the "concrete bodies" implies the trilogy "community, solidarity, subsidiarity" – the conservative answer, in the XVIII century, to the project of Bodin, aimed at destroying the "intermediate bodies" of the society, i.e. the "concrete bodies" leaving but the individual-citizen alone against the state Leviathan. The ideas of Bodin have been realised by the French revolution and its ghost of the geometrical society – a realisation that started just from the uprooting of professional associations by the Le Chapelier law of 1791. Nowadays the updated resort to the trilogy "community, solidarity, subsidiarity implies giving the maximum of representativity to the professional associations, to the real masses, and to reduce the absolute power of parties and functionaries. In the same way, Professor Erwin Scheuch (Cologne) proposes today a set of concrete measures in order to free the parliamentary democracy from all misguidings and corruption that suffocate it. [9]

Bibliographical notes

[1] More on this subject: see 1) Thierry MUDRY, Le ‘socialisme allemand': analyse du télescopage entre nationalisme et socialisme de 1900 à 1933 en Allemagne, in: Orientations, n 7, 1986; 2) Thierry MUDRY, L'itinéraire d'Ernst Niekisch, in: Orientations, n 7, 1986.

[2] More on this subject: 1) Robert STEUCKERS, "Repères pour une histoire alternative de l'économie", in: Orientations, n 5, 1984; 2) Thierry MUDRY, "Friedrich List: une alternative au libéralisme", in: Orientations, n 5, 1984; 3) Robert STEUCKERS, "Orientations générales pour une histoire alternative de la pensée économique", in: Vouloir, n 83/86, 1991; 4) Guillaume d'EREBE, "L'Ecole de la Régulation: une hétérodoxie féconde?", in: Vouloir, n 83/86, 1991; 5) Robert STEUCKERS, L'ennemi américain, Synergies, Forest, 1996/2ième éd. (. (contains some reflections on the ideas of Michel Albert); 6) Robert STEUCKERS, "Tony Blair et sa ‘Troisième Voie' répressive et thérapeutique", in: Nouvelles de Synergies européennes, n 44, 2000; 7) Aldo DI LELLO, "La ‘Troisième Voie' de Tony Blair: une impasse idéologique. Ou de l'impossibilité de repenser le ‘Welfare State' tout en revenant au libéralisme", in: Nouvelles de Synergies eruopéennes, n 44, 2000.

[3] More on this subject: Guillaume FAYE, "A la découverte de Thorstein Veblen", in: Orientations, n 6, 1985.

[4] More on this subject: Ange SAMPIERU, "La participation: une idée neuve?", in: Orientations, n 12, 1990-91.

[5] More on this subject: Charles CHAMPETIER, "Alain Caillé et le MAUSS: critique de la raison utilitaire", in: Vouloir, n 65/67, 1990.

[6] More on this subject: Robert STEUCKERS, "La philosophie de l'argent et la philosophie de la Vie chez Georg Simmel (1858-1918)", in: Vouloir, n 11, 1999.

[7] More on this subject: 1) Robert STEUCKERS, "L'itinéraire philosophique et poétique de Friedrich-Georg Jünger", in: Vouloir, n 45/46, 1988; 2) Robert STEUCKERS, Friedrich-Georg Jünger, Synergies, Forest, 1996.

[8] More on this subject: Robert STEUCKERS, "Mystères pontiques et panthéisme celtique à la source de la spiritualité européenne", in: Nouvelles de Synergies européennes, n 39, 1999.

[9] More on this subject: 1) Ange SAMPIERU, "Démocratie et représentation", in: Orientations, n 10, 1988; 2) Robert STEUCKERS, "Fondements de la démocratie organique", in: Orientations, n 10, 1988; 3) Robert STEUCKERS, Bernard Willms (1931-1991): Hobbes, la nation allemande, l'idéalisme, la critique politique des ‘Lumières', Synergies, Forest, 1996; 4) Robert STEUCKERS, "Du déclin des ours politiques", in: Nouvelles de Synergies européennes, n 25, 1997 (on the theses of Prof. Erwin Scheuch); 5) Robert STEUCKERS, "Propositions pour un renouveau politique", in: Nouvelles de Synergies européennes, n 33, 1998 (at the end of the article, about the theses of Ernst Rudolf Huber); 6) Robert STEUCKERS, "Des effets pervers de la partitocratie", in: Nouvelles de Synergies européennes, n 41, 1999.

Bibliography:

Jean-Pierre CUVILLIER, L'Allemagne médiévale, deux tomes, Payot, tome 1, 1979, tome 2, 1984.
Karin FEUERSTEIN-PRASSER, Europas Urahnen. Vom Untergang des Weströmischen Reiches bis zu Karl dem Grossen, F. Pustet, Regensburg, 1993.
Karl Richard GANZER, Het Rijk als Europeesche Ordeningsmacht, Die Poorten, Antwerpen, 1942.
Wilhelm von GIESEBRECHT, Deutsches Kaisertum im Mittelalter, Verlag Reimar Hobbing, Berlin, s.d.
Eberhard HORST, Friedrich II. Der Staufer. Kaiser - Feldherr - Dichter, W. Heyne, München, 1975-77.
Ricarda HUCH, Römischer Reich Deutscher Nation, Siebenstern, München/Hamburg, 1964.
Edward LUTTWAK, La grande stratégie de l'Empire romain, Economica, 1987.
Michael W. WEITHMANN, Die Donau. Ein europäischer Fluss und seine 3000-jährige Geschichte, F. Pustet/Styria, Regensburg, 2000.
Philippe WOLFF, The Awakening of Europe, Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1968.

R. Steuckers: itinéraire métapolitique et idiosyncratique

Archives de SYNERGIES EUROPEENNES - 2004

Itinéraire métapolitique et idiosyncratique

Réponses de Robert Steuckers
au questionnaire d’un étudiant, dont le mémoire de fin d’études porte sur l’anti-américanisme dans les milieux néo-droitistes, nationaux-révolutionnaires  et extrême-droitistes en Belgique
[Fait à Forest/Flotzenberg, août 2004].

Photo: Beloeil, Parc du Chäteau du Prince de Ligne, 20 août 2007 /  Copyright: AnaR

1. Comment vous définissez-vous au niveau idéologique?

Première remarque : la notion d’idéologie n’est pas adéquate en ce qui me concerne. L’idéologie fonctionne selon un mode constructiviste, elle procède de ce que Joseph de Maistre nommait l’“esprit de fabrication”, elle tente de plaquer des concepts flous, soi-disant universellement valables, relevant du « wishful thinking », sur un réalité effervescente, qui procède, elle, qu’on le veuille ou non, d’une histoire, d’une réalité vivante, d’un flux vivant, souvent violent, rude, âpre. D’emblée, nous avons voulu une immersion dans ce flux, certes cruel, où le moralisme des systèmes idéologiques dominants n’a pas sa place, et non pas le repli frileux dans les espaces idéologisés, strictement contrôlés, qui ronronnent des ritournelles et qui ânonnent des poncifs dans le triste espace politico-intellectuel belge (français, allemand, etc.). Cette option implique un ascétisme rigoureux : celui qui refuse sinécures et prébendes, celui qui s’astreint à lire et à archiver sans état d’âme, sans désir vénal de voir ses efforts rémunérés d’une façon ou d’une autre. Un ascétisme aussi qui n’est jamais qu’une transposition particulière, et peut-être plus rigoureuse, de l’option de Raymond Aron qui se déclarait « spectateur désengagé ». Aprés plus de trente ans de combat métapolitique assidu, je ne regrette pas mon option première, celle de l’adolescent, celle de l’étudiant. Je n’ai tué ni l’enfant, ni l’adolescent, ni l’étudiant qui est en moi. Je garde les mêmes sentiments, la même moquerie, le même mépris pour le monde politique et intellectuel de ce pays qui crève sous la sottise des politicards véreux, qui se prétendent « démocrates ». « L’enfant qui joue aux dés », disait Nietzsche, grand poète. Et je ris. Tout à la fois de bon coeur et méchamment. Mélange des deux. Comme les enfants.

Pour revenir au terme « idéologie », je vous rappelle que l’objet de mon mémoire à l’institut de traducteurs-interprètes portait justement sur l’ « idéologie », comme articulation de la domination des préjugés. Ce petit ouvrage d’Ernst Topitsch et de Kurt Salamun (« Ideologie als Herrschaft des Vorurteils »)  —dont j’ai fait une traduction raisonnée et commentée—  démontrait comment tout discours idéologique masquait le réel, travestissait les réalités historiques, camouflait derrière des discours ronflants ou moralisants des réalités bien plus prosaïques et vénales. Topitsch, Salamun et Hans Albert, leur maître à penser, s’inscrivaient dans une tradition philosophique mettant l’accent sur le pragmatisme et la raison. Par conséquent, j’ai toujours estimé qu’il ne fallait jamais raisonner et analyser les faits de monde au travers du prisme d’une doctrine idéologique, quelle qu’elle soit. Au contraire l’attitude politique et intellectuelle qu’il convient de recommander est celle de Tite-Live, de Tacite et des « tacitistes » espagnols, dont faisait partie notre compatriote Juste-Lipse : recenser les faits, comparer, retenir des points récurrents, écrire des « annales d’empire », afin de pouvoir trancher vite en cas d’urgence, de décider sur base de faits d’histoire et de géographie, qui sont toujours récurrents. En effet, l’homme politique ne peut raisonner qu’en termes de temps et d’espace, puisqu’il est jeté, comme tous ses semblables, dans ce monde troublé, en perpétuelle effervescence, hic et nunc. L’idéologue est celui qui croit trouver des recettes soustraites aux affres du temps et de l’espace. Impossible. Il est donc un escroc intellectuel. Et un piètre politique. Il inaugure des ères de ressac, de déclin, de décadence, de déchéance.

A cette option « tacitiste », j’ajouterai la marque de Johann Gottfried Herder, théoricien au 18ième siècle d’une vision « culturaliste » de l’histoire, opposée aux schématismes de l’idéologie des « Lumières ». La vision herdérienne de l’histoire a eu un impact politique considérable en Flandre, en Allemagne, dans tous les pays slaves et scandinaves, en Irlande. Elle estime que le patrimoine culturel d’un peuple est un éventail de valeurs impassables, que l’homme politique ne peut négliger, ni mettre « à disposition », comme le dit Tilman Meyer, pour satisfaire une lubie passagère, une mode, un schéma idéologique boiteux, qui n’aura aucun lendemain ou, pire, inaugurera une ère de sang et d’horreur, comme à partir de Robespierre.

Ma position, face à la question qui interpelle tout publiciste quant à ses options idéologiques, est donc la suivante : je ne m’inscris nullement dans le cadre étroit, artificiel et fabriqué d’une « idéologie », mais dans le cadre d’une histoire européenne, qu’il faut connaître et qu’il faut aimer.

2. Quels sont les penseurs les plus importants pour vous?

J’estime que tous les penseurs politiques sont importants et que l’homme engagé, sur le plan métapolitique comme sur le plan politique, doit avoir une solide culture générale. On mesure pleinement le désastre aujourd’hui, quand on voit des huitièmes de savant se pavaner grossièrement sur la scène de la politique belge et européenne. Des huitièmes de savant passés maîtres évidemment dans l’art de hurler des slogans idéologisés, qui valent ce qu’ils valent, c’est-à-dire rien du tout. S’il est un penseur important à approfondir ou à redécouvrir aujourd’hui, c’est sans nul doute Carl Schmitt. Que des dizaines de politologues, dans le monde entier, et surtout près de chez nous aux Pays-Bas, sont en train de faire revivre. Mais Carl Schmitt a commencé à écrire à seize ans, a produit son dernier article à l’âge de 91 ans. Sa culture classique et sa connaissance des avant-gardes du 20ième siècle étaient immenses. Au-delà de son oeuvre qui insiste, comme vous le savez, sur l’esprit de décision, sur les constitutions, sur la notion de « grand espace », etc., nous découvrons au fil des pages, et surtout de son journal, Glossarium, —paru seulement après sa mort, à sa demande—, une connaissance très vaste de la culture européenne, non seulement politique, mais aussi littéraire et artistique. Ce constat, après lecture du Glossarium de Schmitt ou des Journaux de Jünger, m’induit à refuser cette facilité, très courante chez bon nombre de publicistes, qui consiste à sélectionner quelques figures, à les isoler du vaste contexte dans lequel elles ont émergé, à les simplifier, à en faire de vulgaires sources de slogans à bon marché, à les couper de leurs sources, souvent innombrables. Ce vain exercice de sélection et de simplification conduit trop souvent à des discours creux, tout comme l’exaltation des schémas idéologiques.

Je plaide par conséquent pour une connaissance réelle de toute la trajectoire de la pensée européenne, pour une connaissance des trajectoires arabo-musulmanes ou asiatiques, comme l’ont fait des auteurs comme Henry Corbin pour le monde iranien ou la mystique islamique, Thierry Zarcone pour cet étonnant mélange de soufisme et de chamanisme qui structure le monde turc, comme Giuseppe Tucci pour les mondes chamaniques et bouddhistes d’Asie centrale, etc. Aucune personnalité du monde intellectuel, aussi pertinente soit-elle, aucune époque, aussi riche soit-elle, ne sauraient être isolées des autres. L’Europe et le reste du monde ont besoin de retrouver le sens de la chronologie, le sens du passé: c’est la réponse nécessaire aux épouvantables  ravages qu’a fait le progressisme en jugeant, de cette manière si impavide qui est la sienne, tout le passé comme un ensemble hétéroclite de méprisables reliquats, juste bons à être oubliés. La leçon du Prix Nobel de littérature V. S. Naipaul est à ce titre fort intéressante : on ne peut gommer le passé d’un peuple; toute conversion, aussi complète puisse-t-elle paraître, ne saurait oblitérer définitivement ce qu’il y avait « avant ». Naipaul nous enseigne à respecter le passé, à nous méfier des « convertis » aux discours tapageurs, tissés de haine. Pour moi, cette haine est certes le propre des talibans, que l’on a vu à l’oeuvre à Bamiyan en Afghanistan, est le propre des tueurs musulmans d’Indonésie, bien évidemment, mais aussi, chez nous, le propre du mental des tristes avataras de l’idéologie des Lumières: les ruines de l’abbaye de Villers-la-Ville et le trou béant de la Place Saint Lambert à Liège l’attestent, pour ne pas mentionner les autres sites en ruines depuis la révolution française, dont l’historien René Sédillot a dressé le bilan affligeant. La rage d’éradiquer, la frénésie de détruire sont bel et bien le propre de certaines conversions, de certaines idéologies, notamment de celles qui tiennent, ici chez nous, aujourd’hui, le haut du pavé.

Il nous faut donc retrouver le sens des humanités, comme on disait à la Renaissance, c’est-à-dire renouer avec nos antiquités et dire, avec Goethe, que « rien d’humain ne doit nous demeurer étranger ». Les faux « humanistes » professionnels, qui écervèlent les jeunes générations depuis mai 1968, et tiennent le pouvoir aujourd’hui, trahissent cet humanisme en usurpant justement le terme « humanisme », pour en faire, avec la complicité des médias, le synonyme de leurs forfaitures. Nos faux « humanistes », parlementaires ou « chiens de garde » du système dans les médias, vont à contre-sens de ceux qui ont donné à V. S. Naipaul un Prix Nobel que cet écrivain indo-britannique a très largement mérité. Quand, comme ces politiciens et ces médiacrates incultes, on pense que le discours, que l’on développe, est une panacée universelle indépassable, qu’elle incarne le « multiculturalisme », l’imposture éclate au grand jour: pour ces gens « tout ce qui est humain, c’est-à-dire tous les héritages situés » leur est étranger; leur « multiculturalisme » n’est ni multiple, puisqu’il vise l’homologation universelle, ni culturel, car toute culture est située, animée d’une logique propre, que le respect des choses humaines nous induit à préserver, à maintenir et à cultiver, comme nous l’enseigne Naipaul.

Donc il faut tout lire, tout découvrir et re-découvrir. Chacun selon ses choix (Goethe: « Ein jeder sieht, was er im Herzen trägt »), chacun selon ses rythmes.

3. Ce qui est frappant dans votre anti-américanisme de « droite », c’est qu’il est le pendant négatif de votre européanisme radical et qu’il est aussi multiforme : puisqu’il critique les aspects sociaux, culturels, économiques, géopolitiques et législatifs (questions de droit international) des Etats-Unis?

D’abord, je perçois dans votre question une anomalie fondamentale due sans doute aux mauvaises habitudes lexicales et sémantiques nées de la Guerre Froide. L’anti-américanisme n’est pas le propre des gauches. Historiquement parlant, c’est faux. L’anti-américanisme est une très vieille idée « conservatrice ». Petit rappel: l’inquiétude face à la proclamation de la doctrine de Monroe dans l’Europe de la Restauration était réelle. Ainsi, Johann Georg Hülsemann, le ministre autrichien des affaires étrangères en 1823, au moment où le Président américain Monroe proclame sa célèbre doctrine, avertit l’Europe du danger que représentent les principes dissolvants de l’américanisme. Tocqueville voit émerger une « démocratie », atténuée, jugulée ou contrôlée par des lobbies, forte de sa pure brutalité et de ses discours simplistes, dépourvus de toutes nuances et subtilités. L’aventure mexicaine de Maximilien a l’appui d’une Europe conservatrice qui veut remplacer outre Atlantique une Espagne qui n’est plus capable, seule, d’assurer là-bas sa mission. En 1898, les forces conservatrices européennes sont du côté de l’Espagne agressée et scandaleusement calomniée par les médias imprimés (déjà les mêmes tactiques de diabolisation outrancière!). Quand Sandino et ses partisans se dressent au Nicaragua contre l’emprise économique américaine, les forces conservatrices catholiques sont à ses côtés. La littérature française d’inspiration conservatrice fourmille de thématiques anti-américaines et dénonce le quantitativisme, la frénésie et l’économisme de l’American Way of Life.

Hülsemann décrit l’opposition de principe entre l’Amérique et l’Autriche-Hongrie comme un choc imminent, opposant des « antipodes ». Il avait vu clair. En effet, les politiques menées au nom d’une continuité millénaire, comme celle qu’incarnait l’Empire austro-hongrois, héritier de l’impérialité romaine-germanique, et celles menées au nom de la nouveauté intégrale, qui entend rompre avec tous les passés, comme l’incarnent les Etats-Unis, sont irréconciliables dans leurs principes, surtout si l’on veut transposer la nouveauté américaine dans le contexte européen et danubien. Dans cette lutte duale, et métaphysique, je suis évidemment du côté des continuités, quelles qu’elles soient et où qu’elles s’incarnent sur la planète.

Pour ce qui concerne la Russie, elle a été, dès la fin de l’ère napoléonienne, le bouclier de la Tradition dans le concert des puissances européennes, avec le dessein de ne plus laisser se déchaîner l’hydre révolutionnaire, qui, à cause de ses obsessions idéologiques et de sa volonté de transformer le réel de fond en comble, met fin aux guerres de « forme », idéologise les conflits et entraîne la disparition de la distinction entre civils et militaires, comme le montre les horreurs commises en Vendée. Dostoïevski, pourtant révolutionnaire décembriste au début de sa carrière, s’est, avec la maturité, parfaitement rendu compte de la mission « katéchonique » de son pays. Son Journal d’un écrivain explicite les grandes lignes de sa vision politique et géopolitique. Le traducteur allemand de ce Journal d’un écrivain n’est autre que la figure de proue de la « révolution conservatrice », Arthur Moeller van den Bruck. Ce dernier, sur base d’une connaissance très profonde de l’oeuvre de Dostoïevski, énonce la théorie russophile de la « révolution conservatrice » : la Russie est éternelle dans son refus des mécanismes révolutionnaires et du rationalisme étriqué qui en découle. Même si, en surface, elle devient « révolutionnaire », elle ne le sera jamais dans ses tréfonds. Donc l’Allemagne conservatrice doit s’allier à la nouvelle Russie soviétique pour se dégager de la cangue politique et économique que lui impose l’Occident libéral. Pour Moeller van den Bruck, le soviétisme n’est qu’un « habit », qui revêt, momentanément, une Russie « illibérale » qui ne peut se trahir. Cette idée revient à l’avant-plan dans le sillage de mai 68: en Occident, les derniers restes de bienséance traditionnelle, les institutions qui reflètent le fond ontologique de l’homme, sont battus en brèche par la nouvelle idéologie, alors qu’au même moment, en Union Soviétique, on assiste à un retour à de nouvelles formes de slavophilie traditionnelle.

Dans l’espace néo-droitiste allemand, cette renaissance slavophile faisait germer l’espoir d’une nouvelle alliance russe, pour secouer le joug américain, faire quitter le territoire allemand par les Britanniques et voir les Français retraverser le Rhin.

Dans l’espace néo-droitiste français, surtout sous l’impulsion indirecte du créateur de bandes dessinées Dimitri, l’image d’une humanité russe fruste mais honnête, intacte en son fond ontologique, agitait aussi les esprits. Pour certains, qui allaient évoluer vers un néo-national-bolchevisme, et redécouvrir, à la suite de la thèse de doctorat du Prof. Louis Dupeux, l’oeuvre d’Ernst Niekisch  —le national-bolchevique du temps de la révolution spartakiste et de la République de Weimar—,  la société soviétique était un modèle de décense face à un Occident perverti par l’idéologie soixante-huitarde, la permissivité générale et la déliquescence des moeurs.

Pour d’autres, mieux ancrés dans les rouages étatiques en Occident, l’affaire des missiles, le retour à l’idéologie d’un occidentalisme missionnaire des droits de l’homme, d’une idéologie de l’Apocalypse (l’Armaggedon, disait-on), l’évolution de la praxis politique internationale des Etats-Unis était inadmissible. Elle signifiait une immixtion totale. Elle assimilait l’ennemi au Mal absolu, ravivait en quelque sorte les guerres de religion, toujours horribles dans leur déroulement. Elle n’admettait plus la neutralité librement choisie d’Etats, pourtant en théorie libres et souverains, et assimilait la modération à de la tiédeur, de la lâcheté ou de la trahison. On a revu le même scénario pendant la guerre d’Irak: la diplomatie appartenait au passé, annonçaient les nouveaux bellicistes anti-européens à la Kagan; le monde devait suivre l’ « Empire » et punir tous les récalcitrants, posés d’office comme « immoraux ». Finalement, Staline et sa diplomatie des rapports bilatéraux entre Etats apparaissait comme un modéré, qui avait arrondi les angles d’une praxis internationale révolutionnaire et bolchevique, également apocalyptique, binaire et manichéenne.

Cette pratique des rapports bilatéraux permettait aux petites puissances des deux blocs en Europe d’amorcer, du moins en théorie et au nom de la liberté des peuples et des Etats de disposer d’eux-mêmes, des relations bilatérales sans l’intervention des deux superpuissances. Ce créneau théorique, notre ministre des affaires étrangères de l’époque, Pierre Harmel, a tenté de l’occuper. Il a voulu dégager les pays européens, au nom d’une idée d’ « Europe Totale », de l’étreinte mortelle du duopole américano-soviétique. Cette oeuvre de paix lui a valu d’être traité de « crypto-communiste ». Les atlantistes, comme le remarque Rik Coolsaet, qui entend s’inscrire dans la tradition harmélienne de notre diplomatie, ont torpillé cette initiative belge et ramené notre pays dans l’ordre atlantique. Cette immixtion intolérable dans notre liberté d’action postule, bien évidemment, pour tous les patriotes, de considérer l’atlantisme comme l’ennemi numéro un et les atlantistes comme des traitres, non seulement à la patrie belge, mais aussi aux patries flamande et wallonne et à la Grande Patrie européenne. La caballe contre Harmel, menée avec des complicités intérieures, surtout socialistes, constitue une intolérable ingérence dans les affaires européennes.

L’affaire Harmel a rebondi vers 1984, quand éclate à l’OTAN le scandale Kiessling. Le général allemand Kiessling voulait raviver la « Doctrine Harmel », qu’il défendait avec brio dans les colonnes de la presse ouest-allemande. Il souhaitait un partage des tâches plus équitable au sein de l’OTAN et l’accès d’officiers européens aux commandements réels. Les services américains ont considéré que cette exigence de justice et d’équité constituait une révolte inacceptable de la part d’un minable « foederatus » du nouvel empire thalassocratique. De toutes pièces, on a monté une caballe contre le Général Kiessling, en poste au SHAPE à Mons, arguant qu’il avait des rapports homosexuels avec son chauffeur. Au même moment, avec beaucoup de courage, Rik Coolsaet, haut fonctionnaire au ministère des affaires étrangères, ose, à son tour, réhabiliter la Doctrine Harmel, dans un livre qui comptera plusieurs rééditions. La tradition européiste reste donc malgré tout bien présente dans notre pays. Dans le cadre de votre travail, ou dans tout développement ultérieur de celui-ci, il serait bon que vous procédiez à une étude parallèle de l’européisme officiel de Harmel et de l’européisme « marginal » de Thiriart.

Le cadre de l’anti-américanisme de mes publications s’inscrit donc dans cette critique conservatrice de l’américanisme, bien étayée depuis les écrits de Hülsemann. Pour Hülsemann, qui écrit juste après la proclamation de la Doctrine de Monroe, l’américanisme peut tranquillement se développer derrière la barrière océanique que constitue l’Atlantique. Mon objectif n’est donc pas de critiquer tel ou tel aspect de la vie politique, sociale ou économique des Etats-Unis, car ils sont libres de développer les formes sociales qu’ils souhaitent voir advenir dans leur réalité quotidienne. Pour répondre à la deuxième partie de votre question, je dirais que si nous avons quelques fois critiqué certains aspects de la société américaine, c’est dans la mesure où ces aspects peuvent s’exporter en d’autres espaces de la planète, comme le craignait Hülsemann. Dans L’ennemi américain, j’ai surtout choisi de développer et de solliciter les arguments de Michel Albert dans son célèbre ouvrage Capitalisme contre capitalisme. Michel Albert, dont l’inspiration est essentiellement « saint-simonienne », défend le capitalisme ancré dans un espace donné, patrimonial et investisseur, soucieux de la survie des secteurs non marchands et démontre la nocivité des doctrines importées depuis le monde anglo-saxon, qui privilégient la spéculation boursière et ne se soucient nullement des dimensions non marchandes, nécessaires à la survie de toute société. Par conséquent, toute critique de tel ou tel aspect de la société américaine doit porter uniquement sur leurs aspects exportables et dissolvants. S’ils sont dissolvants, ils ne faut pas qu’ils soient importés chez nous. S’ils ne le sont pas et permettent au contraire de fortifier notre société, il faut les adopter et les adapter. Au cas par cas.

La géopolitique américaine a entièrement pour vocation de contrôler les rives européenne et africaine de l’Atlantique et les rives asiatiques du Pacifique, afin qu’aucune concentration de puissance économique ou impériale ne puisse s’y consolider. En réponse à ce défi, nous devons, malgré les innombrables difficultés, oeuvrer pour qu’un jour l’émergence de blocs soudés par l’histoire, en Europe et en Asie, redevienne possible. Autre nécessité, pour y parvenir: manifester une solidarité pour les continentalistes latino-américains, qui entendent se dégager de l’emprise nord-américaine. Le panaméricanisme n’est jamais que le camouflage du colonialisme de Washington, dans une vaste région du monde aux réflexes catholiques et traditionnels, qui respectent le passé européen. Dans le cadre de l’église catholique, il y a eu assez de voix pour plaider pour l’indépendance ibéro-américaine, des voix qui ont pris tantôt une coloration idéologique de droite, tantôt une coloration idéologique de gauche, notamment au temps de la « théologie de la libération ». Ces colorations n’ont pas d’importance de fond: ce qui importe, c’est l’indépendance continentale ibéro-américaine. Car si cette indépendance advient, ou si les Etats-Unis éprouvent de manière constante des difficultés à maintenir leur leadership, la cohésion du « nouveau monde » face à l’Europe et à l’Asie recule, à notre bénéfice commun.  

Quand vous évoquez les aspects « législatifs » de notre critique de l’américanisme, vous voulez sûrement mentionner notre critique des principes non traditionnels de droit international que les Etats-Unis ont imposés à la planète depuis Wilson. Depuis le Président Wilson, sous l’impulsion des Etats-Unis, le droit international devient un mixte biscornu de théologie à bon marché, de principes moraux artificieux et d’éléments réellement juridiques qui ne servent que de decorum. Théologie, principes moraux et éléments de droit que l’on va modifier sans cesse au gré des circonstances et des intérêts momentanés de Washington. Les bricolages juridico-idéologiques des Kellogg et Stimson, manipulés contre les intérêts vitaux du Japon dans les années 20 et 30, les manigances de l’Administration Clinton dans l’affaire yougoslave en 1998-1999, les appels à détruire définitivement les principes de la diplomatie traditionnelle avant l’invasion de l’Irak au printemps 2003, attestent d’une volonté d’ensauvager définitivement les moeurs politiques internationales. Position évidemment inacceptable. L’oeuvre de Carl Schmitt nous apprend à critiquer cette pratique barbare de Washington, véritable négation des principes policés de la civilisation européenne, établis au cours du 18ième siècle, après les horreurs des guerres de religion. Dans l’idéologie américaine, les théologies violentes et intolérantes du puritanisme religieux s’allient aux folies hystériques de l’idéologie révolutionnaire française. Cette combinaison calamiteuse a contribué à ruiner la culture européenne et son avatar moderne, la civilisation occidentale. Sur base de leur excellente connaissance de l’oeuvre de Carl Schmitt, Günter Maschke, en Allemagne, et Nikolaï von Kreitor, en Russie, travaillent actuellement à élaborer une critique systématique de la pratique bellogène qui découle de ce « mixtum compositum » théologico-juridique.

4. Il y a chez vous, et c’est lié à vos études je suppose, un grand intérêt pour le monde germanique, à la fois au niveau historique et géopolitique, mais aussi au niveau de l’histoire des idées politiques et notamment au travers de la révolution conservatrice. Qu’en est-il?

Certes, mais, quantitativement, le « monde germanique », comme vous dites, est celui qui, au cours de l’histoire européenne, a produit le plus de textes politiques, philosophiques et idéologiques, tout simplement parce que la langue allemande est la langue européenne la plus parlée entre l’Atlantique et la frontière russe. Peut-on comprendre réellement les grands courants idéologiques contemporains en Europe et dans le monde, tels le marxisme, le freudisme, l’existentialisme, etc., sans se référer aux textes originaux allemands et sans connaître le contexte, forcément germanique, dans lequel ils ont d’abord émergé. J’ai toujours été frappé de constater combien étaient lacunaires les productions soi-disant marxistes ou freudiennes d’individus ne maîtrisant pas l’allemand. La même remarque vaut pour les conservateurs ou néo-droitistes ou nationaux-révolutionnaires qui se piquent de connaître les protagonistes allemands de « leur » idéologie, tout en ne sachant pas un traître mot de la langue tudesque. Le premier résultat de cette ignorance, c’est qu’ils transforment cet univers mental en une panoplie hétéroclite de slogans décousus, d’imageries naïves, de transpositions plus ou moins malsaines, panoplie évidemment détachée de son contexte historique, essentiellement celui qui s’étend de 1815 à 1914. La « révolution conservatrice », que vous évoquez dans votre question, est certes importante, dans le sens où elle exprime cette sorte de « néo-nationalisme » des années 20, sous la République de Weimar, soit un ensemble de courants idéologiques non universalistes, opposés au marxisme de la social-démocratie ou au libéralisme économique, ensemble assez diversifié qu’ont défini des auteurs comme Armin Mohler ou Louis Dupeux (Zeev Sternhell préférant parler, pour la France, de « droite révolutionnaire »). Cependant, si Mohler, par exemple, a dû opérer une coupure temporelle et limiter sa recherche aux années qui vont de la défaite allemande de 1918 à l’avènement de Hitler au pouvoir en janvier 1933, cet ensemble de courants  idéologiques n’est évidemment pas hermétiquement fermé aux époques qui l’ont précédé et à celles qui l’ont suivi. Cette « révolution conservatrice » de 1918-1932 a des racines qui plongent profondément dans le 19ième siécle : notamment via la lente réception de Nietzsche dans les milieux parapolitiques, via les mouvements sociaux non politiques de « réforme de la vie », dont les plus connus restent le mouvement de jeunesse « Wandervogel » et le mouvement de l’architecture nouvelle, Art Nouveau ou Jugendstil, notamment l’école de Darmstadt et, chez nous, celles de Horta et de Henry Vandevelde (tous deux également très actifs en Allemagne). Ces mouvements sociaux étaient plutôt socialistes, voyaient l’avènement du socialisme d’un oeil bienveillant, mais, simultanément, offraient à ce socialisme naissant, une culture que l’on pourrait parfaitement qualifier d’ « archétypale », offraient des référents germanisants, celtisants ou néo-médiévaux, mettaient l’accent sur l’organique plutôt que sur le mécanique. La social-démocratie autrichienne de la fin du 19ième siècle présente ainsi des références qui sont davantage schopenhaueriennes, wagnériennes et nietzschéennes que marxistes. Sous le national-socialisme, certaines trajectoires intellectuelles se poursuivent sans être censurées. Et ces mêmes trajectoires se prolongent dans les années fondatrices de la République Fédérale, jusque très loin dans les années 60 et sous des étiquettes non nationalistes et non politiques.

Par ailleurs, la « révolution  conservatrice » n’est pas un monde exclusivement allemand. Les passerelles sont très nombreuses : l’influence de Maeterlinck, par exemple, est prépondérante dans la genèse d’une nouvelle pensée organique en Allemagne avant 1914. J’ai déjà évoqué brièvement l’influence de l’école belge de Horta en Allemagne, et vice-versa, l’influence des écoles de Vienne et de Darmstadt, voire de Munich, sur l’Art Nouveau en Belgique, à Nancy et à Paris. La philosophie de Henri Bergson joue également un rôle capital dans la genèse de la révolution conservatrice. Un homme comme Henri De Man se situe lui aussi dans cette zone-charnière entre le socialisme vitaliste et populaire de la sociale-démocratie d’avant 1914 et les théories économiques non libérales du « Tat-Kreis » révolutionnaire-conservateur. Les influences des Pré-Raphaëlites anglais, de l’architecture théorisée par Ruskin, du mouvement « Arts & Crafts » en Grande-Bretagne ont influencé considérablement les théoriciens allemands du Jugendstil, d’une part, et l’architecture organique d’un Paul Schulze-Naumburg avant, pendant et après le national-socialisme, d’autre part. L’expressionnisme, mouvement complexe, diversifié, influence l’époque toute entière, une influence qui retombe forcément aussi sur l’espace intellectuel « révolutionnaire conservateur ».  On ne saurait négliger l’influence des grands courants ou des grandes personnalités scandinaves telles Kierkegaard, Hamsun, Strindberg, Ibsen, Munch, Sibelius, Nielsen, etc. L’Espagne est présente aussi, par l’intermédiaire d’Ortega y Gasset, très apprécié en Allemagne, surtout chez les protagonistes catholiques de la « révolution conservatrice », dont Reinhold Schneider, qui a atteint le sommet de sa célébrité dans les années 50. Entre l’oeuvre de l’Anglais D. H. Lawrence et cet ensemble « révolutionnaire conservateur », d’une part, et le monde artistique contestataire et organique de l’époque, d’autre part, est-il possible d’établir une césure hermétique? Non, évidemment. La Russie, avec ses penseurs slavophiles, avec Leontiev et Dostoïevski, ensuite via l’émigration blanche à Berlin, pèse, à son tour, d’un poids prépondérant sur l’évolution des penseurs « révolutionnaires conservateurs ». La France, outre Bergson, influence les jeunes néo-nationalistes, dont Ernst Jünger, qui sont de grands lecteurs de Léon Bloy, de Maurice Barrès, de Charles Péguy, de Charles Maurras (en dépit de l’anti-germanisme outrancier de celui-ci).

La « révolution conservatrice » n’est donc pas vraiment une spécialité germanique, mais l’expression allemande, localisée dans le temps de la République de Weimar, d’un vaste mouvement européen. Il convient donc d’étudier les passerelles, de mettre en exergue les influences réciproques des uns sur les autres, de ne pas isoler cette « révolution conservatrice » de ses multiples contextes, y compris celui de la social démocratie d’avant 1914.

Connaissant la langue allemande, j’ai pris cet ensemble « révolutionnaire conservateur » comme tremplin, pour entamer une quête dans toute la culture européenne des 19ième et 20ième siècles. J’ai également utilisé les travaux de Zeev Sternhell (La droite révolutionnaire et Ni gauche ni droite) ainsi que les classifications du Professeur français René-Marill Albérès, spécialiste de l’histoire littéraire européenne. Albérès est justement l’homme qui m’a aidé à bien percevoir les innombrables passerelles entre courants littéraires provenant de toutes les nations européennes. Partant, la maîtrise des classifications d’Albérès, ajoutées à celle de Mohler, de Sternhell et de Dupeux (et du national-révolutionnaire historique Paetel), me permettait d’opérer une transposition vers la sphère des idéologies politiques.

Pour terminer ma réponse, je dirais que cet ensemble de courants idéologiques ne relève nullement du passé: le retour « postmoderne » à une architecture moins fonctionnelle, la nécessité ressentie de voir triompher un urbanisme de qualité à l’échelle humaine (comme le voulaient Horta et l’école de Darmstadt), la sensibilité écologique qui doit davantage à Bergson, Klages, Friedrich-Georg Jünger, D. H. Lawrence, Jean Giono et tant d’autres qu’aux soixante-huitards et marxistes recyclés dans la défense d’une nature à laquelle ils ne comprennent généralement rien, le mouvement altermondialiste qui cherche à jeter les bases d’une économie nouvelle, la guerre en Irak qui a fait prendre conscience de l’inanité de l’interventionnisme systématique des Etats-Unis (à l’instar de Carl Schmitt), l’engouement généralisé pour les grands courants religieux et mystiques, le goût du public pour l’aventure et les épopées, notamment sur les écrans de cinéma, montrent tous que les filons philosophiques, qui ont donné naissance à la « révolution conservatrice », qui l’ont irriguée et ont suscité de nouvelles veines, qui sont ses héritières, demeurent vivants.  

5. Dans vos revues, il y a beaucoup de traductions d’articles provenant du monde germanophone, mais aussi latin (hispanique et italien) et, plus original encore, de l’Europe slave, en particulier de la Russie. D’une certaine façon, ne peut-on pas considérer votre revue comme une sorte de « Courrier International » de la pensée européiste?

En effet, le poids prépondérant de thématiques germanisantes au début de l’histoire de Vouloir, faisait dire, à quelques néo-droitistes parisiens jaloux, qui n’ont pas digéré entièrement l’anti-germanisme maurrassien en dépit de leurs dénégations et de leur germanomanie de pacotille, que mes publications étaient des « revues allemandes en langue française ». J’ai donc suivi des cours accélérés en langues espagnole, italienne et portugaise, de façon à acquérir une connaissance passive de ces langues et de traduire, avec l’aide d’amis et de mon ex-épouse, les articles de nos innombrables amis hispaniques et italiens. D’autres, que je remercie, m’ont aidé à traduire des articles du polonais et du russe. L’objectif a donc toujours été de dire « non » aux enfermements; « non » à un enfermement dans le carcan très étroit du belgicanisme institutionnel (ce qui n’est évidemment pas le cas de notre culture, qui a un message serein à offrir à tous), « non » à un enfermement dans le carcan de la francophonie officielle, « non » au carcan de l’eurocratisme, « non » au carcan de l’atlantisme. Par ailleurs, « non » aux carcans idéologiques et politiques, « non » aux deux carcans du « démocratisme chrétien » et du « laïcisme libre(!!!!!)-penseur » à la belge. La masse de textes, de thématiques diverses et variées, qu’offraient les éditeurs et les revues allemandes permettait de rebondir dans tous les domaines et dans tous les espaces culturels européens et d’éviter toute forme d’enclavement idéologique.

Au fond, je vais confesser ici pour la première fois que cette idée est très ancienne chez moi: elle vient de la victoire électorale du FDF aux élections communales de 1970. Flamand de Bruxelles, littéralement assis sur deux cultures, cette victoire électorale a fait pâlir mon père, l’angoisse se lisait sur le visage de cet homme de 57 ans, qui craignait la minorisation des Flamands de Bruxelles, un homme simple qui n’avait pas envie de subir l’arrogance d’une bourgeoisie et d’une petite bourgeoisie qui se piquait d’une culture française (qu’elle ne connaissait évidemment pas en ses réels tréfonds), un pauvre petit homme qui devinait aussi, instinctivement, que ce francophonisme de brics et de brocs, plus braillard que créateur de valeurs culturelles véritables, barrait la route de beaucoup aux cultures néerlandaise, allemande et anglaise, auxquelles les Flamands ont un accès plus aisé. Ensuite, ce qui le rendait malade, c’était les rodomontades des « traitres » : les Flamands de souche, installés à Bruxelles, qui croyaient s’émanciper, échapper à la culture, souvent rurale, qu’avaient abandonnée leurs parents en venant travailler dans la grande ville. Tout cela était confus dans la tête de mon père, qui aimait les Wallons, quand ils étaient authentiques. Il avait travaillé à Liège, comme beaucoup de Limbourgeois. Il aimait les Ardennais et surtout les Hesbignons, dont les Limbourgeois du Sud sont si proches et auxquels ils sont si souvent liés par des liens matrimoniaux. Et les Wallons du quartier, où nous vivions, n’avaient cure du bête « francophonisme » des nouveaux francophonissimes originaires de Flandre ou de Campine, qui n’avaient rien de wallon, qui agaçaient les vrais Wallons. Et les Ardennais de Bruxelles, comme mon père du Limbourg, ne reniaient pas leur culture catholique et rurale, qu’ils ne retrouvaient évidemment pas dans les rodomontades émancipatrices des zélotes du nouveau parti de Lagasse et de « Spaakerette ». Dans ma tête d’adolescent, tous ces affects paternels s’entrechoquaient, provoquaient des réflexions, sans doute fort confuses, mais qui allait être à la base de toutes mes entreprises ultérieures et surtout de ma décision d’étudier les langues germaniques. Car que proposaient les braillards du FDF, dont l’insupportable Olivier Maingain perpétue la triste tradition? Rien d’autre qu’un réductionnisme intellectuel, inacceptable en notre pays, carrefour entre quatre grandes langues européennes. Le multilinguisme est une nécessité et un devoir: à quatorze ans, j’en étais bien conscient. Mon père aussi. J’allais donc devoir, adulte, me battre contre l’ineptie qui venait de triompher, par la grâce des dernières élections. Il fallait commencer la bataille tout de suite. A cette heure, je n’ai pas encore déposé les armes.

Mais, il fallait que je me batte en français car le vin avait été tiré, j’étudiais dans cette langue, depuis ma première primaire, sans renier mes racines; il me fallait donc utiliser la langue de Voltaire pour commencer le travail de reconquista qu’il s’agissait d’entreprendre, non pas tant contre le FDF, manifestation éphémère, politicienne et périphérique d’un « francophonisme » bizarre, mixte monstrueux d’ « illuminisme » révolutionnaire et de « postmaurrasisme panlatiniste » (qui ne voulait pas s’avouer tel), mais contre tous les simplismes et réductionnismes que le (petit) esprit, se profilant derrière sa victoire, amenait dans son sillage. Toute cette bimbeloterie francophonisante finissait par m’apparaître comme des « plaquages » artificiels, des agitations superficielles sans fondements. La culture rurale matricielle me paraissait seule authentique (quelques mois plus tard, Mobutu évoquait l’authenticité zaïroise, banalisait le terme d’ « authenticité » et je ne pouvais m’empêcher de lui donner raison...). Cette notion d’authenticité était valable pour la Flandre et le Brabant thiois, pour la Wallonie et les Ardennes. Elle était valable aussi pour la seule région d’Europe que je connaissais à l’époque: le haut plateau franc-comtois dans le département du Doubs, les Franches Montagnes, fidèles à la tradition burgonde, fidèles à l’Espagne et à l’Autriche contre le Roi-Soleil, comme l’écrivait, dans un opuscule anti-jacobin, un certain Abbé Mariotte, auteur d’une petite histoire de la Franche-Comté, que je lisais avidement, avec amour, chaque été, quand nous étions là-bas, à l’ombre du clocher de Maîche. Une authenticité que m’avait fait découvrir un cadeau du concierge permanent du formidable manoir qui nous hébergeait à Maîche: Le loup blanc de Paul Féval, roman chouan et bretonnant, qui accentuait encore plus cette volonté d’aller aux racines les plus profondes, ici les racines celtiques d’Armorique, comme là le « saxonnisme » de Walter Scott, avec Ivanhoe et Robin des Bois. L’homme était donc tributaire de (et non déterminé par) l’appartenance au terroir de ses ancêtres et le nier ou l’oublier équivalait à basculer dans une sorte de folie, de démence maniaque, qui s’acharnait à éradiquer passé, souvenirs, liens, traces... jusqu’à rendre l’homme totalement anémié, vidé de tout ce qui fait son épaisseur, son charme, sa personnalité. Un tel homme est incapable de créer de nouvelles formes culturelles, de puiser dans son fonds archétypal: les portes sont ouvertes alors pour faire advenir une « barbarie technomorphe ».

1970, l’année de mes quatorze ans et l’année du triomphe du FDF, a déterminé mon itinéraire de façon radicale: au-delà des agitations politiciennes, jacobines, modernistes, toujours aller à l’authentique, avoir une démarche « archéologique » et « généalogique », sortir du « francophonisme » d’enfermement, s’ouvrir au monde et d’abord au monde proche, tout proche, qui commence à Aix-la-Chapelle, qui nous ouvre à l’Est, comme la langue française, non reniée et cultivée, ouvre au Midi. Quelques semaines après la victoire électorale du FDF, je m’en vais d’ailleurs, muni d’un catalogue du « Livre de Poche », quémander au Frère Marcel, une liste de bons livres à lire: il m’a fait découvrir Greene et surtout Koestler, sources de mon engouement pour la littérature anglaise. Mais aussi tous les classiques de la littérature française à l’époque: Cesbron, Mauriac, Bazin, Troyat...

Le « germanisme » était présent, comme la matrice culturelle du Flamand de Bruxelles, du fils d’immigré limbourgeois. Mais le germanisme était ouvert, tant au français (qui n’est pas le « francophonisme ») qu’à la latinité, que nous faisait aimer notre professeur de latin, l’inoubliable Abbé Simon Hauwaert. Balzac, Stendhal, Baudelaire et Flaubert sont d’ailleurs des exposants ante litteram de la « révolution conservatrice », en sont la matrice à bien des égards, dans leur critique incisive du « bourgeoisisme »: donc, une fois de plus, pas de frontière entre un espace français, qui serait hermétique, et un espace germanique, qui serait tout aussi hermétique. Par ailleurs, ce sont le baron Caspar von Schrenck-Notzing, directeur de Criticón (Munich), qui me fait découvrir l’Espagne de Balthazar Gracian, puis Günther Maschke (et Arnaud Imatz), qui me font découvrir Donoso Cortès. C’est par des études allemandes, ou traduites en allemand, que je découvre d’Annunzio et Pessoã. Plus tard, j’allais constater que la culture italienne est très ouverte à l’Allemagne et à l’Autriche, qu’elle traduit bien plus que l’édition parisienne, sans perdre la moindre once de sa latinité. Un exemple à suivre...

La lecture conjointe de Herder et de Heidegger allait donner des assises philosophiques à ce magma informel de l’adolescent.

6. Justement, une spécificité importante de votre démarche réside dans votre philo-slavisme et votre anti-soviétisme modéré qui s’est manifesté dès le début de votre itinéraire (à l’époque, où, sous l’impulsion de Ronald Reagan, on renoue avec la Guerre Froide la plus glaciale) et que vous partagez, quoique dans une autre optique, avec le PCN. Qu’en dites-vous aujourd’hui?

Entre 1970, que je viens de vous évoquer, et le début de l’aventure de Vouloir, treize années se sont écoulées. La Guerre Froide s’enlise. Le duopole n’a rien d’autre à proposer qu’une partition définitive du monde entre deux camps, animés chacun par une idéologie hostile aux matrices culturelles et aux authenticités fécondes, décrétées « archaïsmes » ou « fascismes » (à la suite notamment des hypersimplifications d’un Georges Lukacs). Derrière cette partition du monde, se profile une histoire européenne pluri-millénaire, où les horizons sont toujours vastes, où l’on ne bute pas sur un « Rideau de fer », à 350 km à vol d’oiseau de Bruxelles. Où l’on pouvait aller à Prague, à Varsovie et à Budapest, sans passer à travers un champ de mines, surveillé par des miradors. Le dégel avait fait espérer un assouplissement et voilà, soudain, que le reaganisme réactive la Guerre Froide, éloignant la possibilité d’une réconciliation européenne. La déception est immense, surtout, j’imagine, pour ceux qui avaient espéré que la « Doctrine Harmel », voire l’Ostpolitik de Brandt, allaient porter des fruits. La division européenne apparaît dès lors comme l’oeuvre d’un « talon d’acier », une anomalie scandaleuse, qu’il fallait combattre, à la suite de Thiriart et de son mouvement « Jeune Europe », afin de retrouver le dynamisme européen en direction du Sud-Est et des profondeurs du continent asiatique, conquis vers 1600 avant JC par les cavaliers iraniens, puis, à partir du 16ième siècle, par les Cosaques des Tsars. C’était un idéal d’ « Europe Totale », mixte de Harmel et de Thiriart. Et, derrière eux, se profilaient tout à la fois 1) un projet « démocrate-chrétien » (en réalité « conservateur » au sens metternichien du terme) de rééditer, cette fois sous le signe d’une pensée inspirée de « Rerum Novarum », la « Sainte-Alliance » conservatrice de 1814, Europe de l’Est voire Russie comprises, ou 2) une vision plus pragmatique, géopolitique et technique, comme celle d’Anton Zischka, inspirateur majeur du jeune Thiriart. Elle impliquait d’étudier les dynamiques à l’oeuvre dans ces espaces immenses. Une telle étude postule non seulement de connaître les atouts économiques de l’espace euro-sibérien, dans le sillage de Youri Semionov, mais aussi, à la suite de l’historien italien des religions, Giuseppe Tucci, l’héritage spirituel de ces peuples à la charnière de l’Europe et de l’Asie. Parmi les multiples aspects de cet héritage spirituel, la slavophilie et l’oeuvre de Leontiev, partisan d’une alliance avec les forces asiatiques contre un Occident « libéral-manchesterien » qui a trahi la  Russie lors de la Guerre de Crimée. Raison pour laquelle mes amis et moi, nous n’avons cessé de nous intéresser à ces thématiques.

Le PCN, dans ses démarches, ne semble pas fort s’intéresser à la pensée organique russe. Or peu avant que la Guerre Froide ne reprenne sous Reagan, le dissident Yanov, établi en Californie, sort un ouvrage universitaire intitulé The Russian New Right, où il démontre que la pensée slavophile et néo-orthodoxe, fondamentalement anti-occidentale, et l’oeuvre de Soljénitsyne, impulsent, tant chez les établis que chez les dissidents de l’ex-URSS, une nouvelle révolution conservatrice, ou « nouvelle droite », avec des écrivains comme Valentin Raspoutine ou Youri Belov. Quant aux tenants de l’idéologie occidentaliste, on les retrouvait aussi, d’après Yanov, dans les deux camps. A Moscou, Alexandre Prokhanov, que j’allais rencontrer en 1992, était à l’époque directeur de la revue Lettres soviétiques. Il avait publié, pour la première fois dans une publication soviétique officielle, un numéro consacré à Dostoïevski, qui avait été mis à l’écart à l’ère soviétique la plus sourcilleuse. Prokhanov innovait. Je me suis procuré un exemplaire de cette revue à la « Librairie de Rome » à Bruxelles. Au même moment, Etudes sociales, autre publication émanant de l’Académie soviétique des sciences, réhabilitait le passé païen russe, dans un optique très semblable à celle de la « nouvelle droite ». Ces textes attestaient d’un changement et d’un abandon graduel des vieilles lunes progressistes du marxisme institutionnalisé, abandon qu’aucune officine « marxiste » belge ou française ne jugeait bon de faire. Les archaïsmes étaient toujours de mise chez nos communistes locaux. Leur déphasage par rapport aux legs de l’histoire et au réel ne faisait que s’accentuer. Rien n’a changé sur ce chapitre.

Ce chassé-croisé d’occidentalisme et de slavophilie chez les dissidents comme chez les établis, et le succès des néo-slavophiles, notamment dans l’orbite cinématographique, laissaient espérer une transformation lente de l’URSS en une nouvelle Russie conservatrice, capable de damer le pion à la superpuissance libérale, vectrice de toutes les déliquescences morales et spirituelles, fautrice du déclin intellectuel généralisé de l’Occident et matrice de la vulgarité marchande. Ce que nous haïssions dans le communisme s’estompait et ce que nous n’avons cessé de haïr, du plus profond de nos tripes, dans le libéralisme ne cessait de s’amplifier, jusqu’à atteindre l’effroyable monstruosité qu’il a acquise aujourd’hui, un monde où le banquier, être infect et infécond, inculte et vulgaire, accumulateur et comptable, vaut plus que le joueur d’accordéon du coin de la rue, être touchant de sincérité et de spontanéité. Chez nous, les acteurs de théâtre sont sûrs de crever de misère quand ils ne pourront plus monter sur les planches. En Italie, les professeurs d’université s’étaient mobilisés à l’époque contre les MacDo, qui finançaient Reagan et recevaient en échange le droit de s’établir dans tous les coins et recoins de l’américanosphère. Ces professeurs voulaient organiser un boycott général de la chaîne de « fast food »; chez nous, quand les étudiants de Gand ont voulu faire de même, par solidarité avec le corps académique italien, la minable crapule assurant la gérance d’une de ces auges de la mal-bouffe a eu le culot d’appeler les flics, qui ont verbalisé, et le corps académique, veule et lâche, n’a rien dit. On mesure aujourd’hui l’étendue du désastre. L’empoisonneur avait la « liberté » de commercer... et on ne pouvait y porter atteinte. La chaîne de ces fast-foods avait acquis le droit, grâce à Reagan, qu’elle avait financé, d’abaisser l’âge requis pour travailler dans le secteur de la restauration: depuis lors, les lycéens travaillent pour gagner l’argent de leurs cartes de GSM et le niveau d’instruction et d’éducation ne cesse de baisser; le monde sans relief des « petits jobs et boulots », stigmatisé par Hannah Arendt, est devenu la référence suprême.

Face à cette involution, perceptible dès le début des années 80, la société soviétique, malgré son caporalisme, sa froide rigueur idéologique, sa langue de bois, laissait entrevoir une renaissance, un dépassement de l’horreur économique par un retour aux valeurs qui avaient enthousiasmé les premiers slavophiles du 19ième siècle, ces disciples russes de Herder. Ensuite, sous les coups du néo-libéralisme triomphant, l’Europe perdait et le sens de l’Etat et le respect de ses héritages culturels. Face au « Dieu Argent », désormais honoré sans plus aucune retenue morale ou éthique en Occident, dans l’ « américanosphère » (Faye), Moscou semblait conserver un sens de l’Etat, avec une armée qui respectait des traditions russes (donc européennes), et un appareil culturel et académique, dont le Bolchoï, par exemple, était un fleuron. Les titres académiques semblaient mieux respectés qu’en Europe ou en Amérique. Le « fast food » est la manifestation sociale la plus tangible de cet avènement du « tout-économique », qui nous a tant scandalisé à l’époque, jusqu’à en devenir, je le concède, une véritable obsession récurrente, qu’atteste la littérature néo-droitiste et nationale-révolutionnaire.

Ensuite, Reagan et ses conseillers étaient bien conscients du fait qu’un discours exclusivement néo-libéral ne pouvait consolider leur pouvoir ni constituer une propagande efficace. Ils ont alors puisé dans le registre de l’idéologie religieuse puritaine, l’héritage américain des « Founding Fathers » et des « Pèlerins du Mayflower », où l’accent est souvent mis sur l’Apocalypse, jugée imminente, portée par le « Mal absolu », qu’il s’agit de combattre et d’éradiquer. Ce langage réactive les affects qui préfigurent les guerres de religion, alors que la pensée d’un Hobbes et toute l’évolution de la pensée politique européenne après les horreurs de la guerre de Trente Ans visaient justement à éviter de tels débordements. Le reaganisme met un terme définitif aux « formes » de la guerre et de la diplomatie traditionnelles. Cet infléchissement était inacceptable, même dans une optique conservatrice traditionnelle. Il ne faut pas se leurrer: si Reagan a été décrit par les gauches comme un « néo-conservateur », cette  manière de percevoir les choses est fondamentalement erronée. Le puritanisme apocalyptique des « Pères Fondateurs » et des Puritains du 17ième siècle est le contraire diamétral des options « tacitistes » et « machiavéliennes », de la tradition régalienne européenne en général. Ce n’est d’ailleurs pas un hasard si le retour, après Cromwell, du Roi en Angleterre ait contraint ces zélotes, à l’idéologie bibliste, à franchir l’Atlantique, où, espérait-on en Europe, ils allaient pouvoir vivre leurs utopies irréalistes et anti-historiques en vase clos.

Les Etats-Unis sont spécialisés dans le bricolage idéologico-théologique quand il s’agit de créer des vulgates médiatisables pour faire passer leur volonté dans les faits. Avec Reagan, nous avions, outre le néo-libéralisme, qui dissout toutes les formes politiques et culturelles, l’idéologie de l’Apocalypse, qui entend faire table rase des legs de l’histoire, et, surtout, une interprétation messianique des « droits de l’homme », impliquant un interventionnisme tous azimuts, qui flanquait tous les principes de la diplomatie traditionnelle par terre! Le Général Jochen Löser s’est dressé, à l’époque, et avec vigueur, contre ce mixte idéologico-théologico-économique, qui revient aujourd’hui à l’avant-plan avec Bush junior; avec l’armement moderne, cette nouvelle idéologie agressive risquait de déclencher une guerre d’annihilation totale en Europe centrale. Si les Etats-Unis maniaient une telle idéologie, la fidélité à l’alliance atlantique pouvait être remise en question. Harmel s’était proposé d’assouplir la « Doctrine Hallstein », rigide et pérennisant par son intransigeance la césure européenne, afin de mettre lentement fin à la chape pesante qu’était le duopole né à Yalta. La « Doctrine Harmel » était aussi un retour à la diplomatie traditionnelle, laquelle devait recevoir à nouveau la préséance. Löser et Kiessling entendaient y revenir au début des années 80, juste avant la perestroïka de Gorbatchev. Ce débat n’est pas clos: au printemps 2003, quand les troupes anglo-américaines entrent pour la deuxième fois en Irak, et que les Européens s’insurgent en arguant que toutes les voies diplomatiques n’avaient pas été exploitées, Robert Kagan, idéologue au service de la politique de Bush junior, annonce clairement, sans circonlocutions inutiles, que la diplomatie, « c’est du passé » et que l’avenir appartient à ceux qui ne s’en soucient nullement. La « Vieille Europe » est donc celle de la diplomatie, à l’idéologie « machiavello-tocquevillienne » et « tacitiste ». La « Nouvelle Europe » est celle qui va renier cet héritage pour suivre aveuglément le nouvel « Empire » qui agit arbitrairement selon ses intérêts immédiats.

Je ne crois pas que le PCN ait vraiment mis tous ces éléments dans la balance: il m’a donné la triste impression de se muer en un calque maladroit du stalinisme (revu par la propagande américaine du temps de la Guerre Froide), attitude typique des mouvements politiques marginaux qui cherchent à attirer l’attention sur eux par des prises de position qui font bêtement scandale.

7. Autre point commun avec le PCN et, par-delà cette formation, avec Jean Thiriart, vous avez fait, vous aussi, votre pèlerinage à Moscou. Quelles sont les perspectives avec les Russes et notamment avec Alexandre Douguine et l’actuel président russe Vladimir Poutine, de créer cet empire européen que vous appelez de vos voeux?

Je n’ai pas souvenir que le PCN, ou l’un de ces dirigeants, ait fait le « voyage à Moscou ». Fin mars, début avril 1992, je m’y suis effectivement rendu avec Alain de Benoist et Jean Laloux (secrétaire de rédaction de la revue Krisis). Les activités principales de ce voyage ont été 1) une conférence de presse où nous avons présenté les grandes lignes de la « nouvelle droite »; 2) un débat, dans les locaux de la revue moscovite Dyeïnn (« Le Jour ») avec Ziouganov et Volodine, exposants du parti communiste russe. Le dialogue a tourné autour de la notion de « Troisième Voie » en économie, c’est-à-dire, pour moi, ce que Perroux, Albertini et Silem ont nommé les « voies hétérodoxes », héritières de l’école historique allemande de Schmoller, Rodbertus, etc. Douguine et Prokhanov étaient les deux organisateurs de ces rencontres. Douguine a fait du chemin depuis lors. Il appuie aujourd’hui Vladimir Poutine, qui, à ses yeux, tente de redresser une Russie ruinée par le clan Eltsine et les oligarques.

Quelques mois plus tard, Thiriart, Schneider, Battarra et Terracciano se retrouvaient à leur tour à Moscou. En 1996, une équipe de « Synergies européennes », composée de Sincyr, Sorel et de Bussac, visite à son tour Moscou et rencontre d’autres personnalités, dont l’ex-dissident, le sorélien Ivanov, l’anthropologue Avdeev, et d’autres. Ces hommes oeuvrent dans d’autres perspectives. L’hispaniste Toulaev s’est joint à eux. Notre ami autrichien Gerhoch Reisegger s’est également rendu à plusieurs reprises à Moscou, ramenant de ses voyages des informations d’ordres économique et factuel très intéressantes. Wolfgang Strauss continue à publier une chronique permanente sur cet espace idéologique russe, dans les colonnes de la revue Staatsbriefe, qui paraît à Munich sous la direction du Dr. Sander. Tous les aspects de la pensée non conformiste —hétérodoxe—  russe nous intéressent.

Quant à savoir si Poutine emportera le morceau, il me semble que la réponse se situe dans les extraits du dernier ouvrage de Reisegger que nous avons traduits. La consolidation du poutinisme dépend de l’organisation des transports (routes et chemins de fer), des gazoducs et oléoducs de l’Asie centrale, de la Sibérie, de concert avec l’Inde, le Japon et la Chine. Si une synergie parvient à s’établir, l’Eurasie demeurera eurasiatique. Sinon, les Américains préparent d’ores et déjà la riposte: le stratège Thomas Barnett propose aujourd’hui à l’établissement américain d’abandonner l’alliance européenne, de laisser l’Europe périr dans ses contradictions et de miser sur l’Inde et la Chine, voire sur une Russie détachée de l’Europe, afin de conserver les atouts américains en Asie centrale, acquis par la conquête de l’Afghanistan et la satellisation de l’Ouzbékistan. Barnett apporte la réponse américaine au projet de Henri de Grossouvre, soit le projet de créer un Axe Paris-Berlin-Moscou.

8.Après plus de vingt ans d’activités politiques et intellectuelles, quel est le bilan que vous tirez? Notamment sur les Etats-Unis et l’Europe?

Premier bilan, évidemment, comme Thiriart et de Benoist, et même comme Faye, c’est d’avoir constaté l’immense, l’incommensurable bêtise du « milieu identitaire ». En hissant la préoccupation au niveau européen, Thiriart avait voulu dépasser l’étroitesse des « petits nationalismes ». Avec son option « métapolitique », de Benoist avait voulu briser le cercle infernal des répétitions et des rengaines. Ils se sont tous deux heurtés à une incompréhension générale, hormis quelques notables exceptions qui ont tenté de poursuivre le combat. Thiriart n’a pas trop bien su emballer sa marchandise.Ses textes, denses, toujours au moins partiellement actuels, figuraient certes au milieu de dessins satiriques de toute première qualité, mais les écrits des autres « journalistes », dans la feuille du mouvement, laissaient vraiment à désirer et étalaient les fantasmes habituels du « petit nationalisme » ou de l’« extrême droite » au mauvais sens du terme. Thiriart a vraiment tout essayé pour gommer définitivement ces dérives: il avouait, dans un entretien accordé à l’avocat espagnol Gil Mugarza, n’avoir pas pu enrayer les multiples expressions de cette « psychopathologie » politique. Les hommes de notre temps ne raisonnent plus en termes de temps et d’espace, mais se laissent aveugler par les idéologies, les « blueprints » de Burke, déviance encore accentuée par la propagande médiatique, qui atteint désormais des proportions incroyables. Ignorant tout de la géographie, nos contemporains ne comprennent pas les enjeux spatiaux, seuls enjeux réels des conflits qui ensanglantent la planète. Leurs horizons sont vraiment limités, alors que l’on n’a jamais autant parlé de « mondialisme » ou d’« universalisme ».

Alain de Benoist, pour sa part, a tenté d’élargir et d’européaniser l’horizon culturel du milieu nationaliste français, dans lequel, dès l’adolescence, il avait fait ses premiers pas. Il lui a présenté des thématiques inhabituelles, fort intéressantes au départ, mais, en bout de course, force est de constater qu’il en a trop fait, qu’il a jonglé avec une quantité de choses diverses que ce public ne pouvait pas assimiler à la vitesse voulue. Alain de Benoist changeait trop souvent de sujet et son propre public, au sein du GRECE, ne suivait pas la cadence. Il s’en désolait, tempètait, rouspétait; on l’écoutait poliment, mais, au fond, on semblait lui dire, par le regard: « Cause toujours, tu m’intéresses! ». D’où, ce que j’appelle le « mouvement brownien » des brics et brocs culturels et cultureux agités par de Benoist. Henry de Lesquen parlait, à son propos, de prurit « noviste ». Deux handicaps marquaient la démarche du « Pape de la nouvelle droite »: une incapacité —en fin de course, et non pas, curieusement, au début de sa trajectoire—  à opérer une synthèse et à se concentrer sur l’essentiel; bref, la dispersion et la confusion; ensuite, un désintérêt pour l’histoire et ses dynamiques, au profit d’une sorte d’idolâtrie pour les idées toutes faites, pour les corpus moraux plus ou moins bien échafaudés, pour le clinquant de concepts immédiatement médiatisables (dans l’espoir d’être enfin accepté, comme figurant ou comme acteur, dans le « PIF » ou « paysage intellectuel français »). Enfin, l’homme est tenaillé par l’inquiétude, par d’inexplicables angoisses, par un doute incapacitant, aux dimensions qui laissent pantois. Si Thiriart a été une cohérence au milieu des incohérences de l’extrême droite belge et italienne de son époque, de Benoist, lui, a démarré dans la cohérence pour se disperser dans un fatras de thématiques différentes et divergentes, dans un capharnaüm conceptuel qu’il est désormais incapable de maîtriser. Il m’apparaît aujourd’hui comme une sorte d’âne de Buridan, qui n’a pas à choisir entre deux picotins d’avoine, mais est perdu au milieu d’une foultitude de picotins, tous aussi alléchants, et ne sait plus où donner de la tête.

Ne cédons pas à cette aigreur, que l’on retrouve aussi chez un Guillaume Faye, qui la tourne en cynisme avec son sens du canular qui est inégalable, ou chez un Christian Bouchet, qui ne mâche pas ses mots pour fustiger l’inculture du « milieu identitaire ». Cette inculture n’est pourtant pas le propre de ce milieu mais bien le lot général de notre temps. La gauche n’est plus aussi « intellectuelle » qu’elle ne l’a été. Sachons que l’OSS visait, dès l’entrée en guerre des Etats-Unis en 1941-42, à faire perdre à l’Europe son leadership intellectuel. L’effervescence de mai 68 et les pédagogies démissionnaires qui en découlent, en dépit de l’excellence de ce que Luc Ferry appelle la « pensée 68 » (avec Deleuze, Guattari, Foucault, Lévi-Strauss, etc.), a donné le coup de grâce aux établissements d’enseignement en Europe. La vague néo-libérale a simplement parachevé l’horreur. La méditation, la lecture, l’étude, la recherche sont des activités qui prennent du temps, qui empêchent de gagner vite beaucoup d’argent, pour pouvoir consommer tout aussi rapidement. Et empêcher l’adolescent ou l’étudiant de gagner de l’argent, même au détriment de ses études, relève, au regard du mental contemporain, d’un « archaïsme », méchant et pernicieux, d’un « fascisme » rétrograde. Au bout d’une décennie à peine, on a des instituteurs, des régents et des licenciés mal formés, qui ont moins lu, qui n’ont pas de passions littéraires bien étayées, qui ont butiné bêtement autour de toutes les loupiotes médiatiques faites de variétés de plus en plus vulgaires (Loft, Star Academy, etc.), qui ont gagné des sous pour se payer de la bimbeloterie high tech ou des fringues ridicules et, partant, ne se sont pas constitué de bibliothèques personnelles. L’influence des sous-cultures et des modes est de plus en plus désastreuse. A cela s’ajoute que le milieu identitaire est tout aussi indiscipliné que le reste de la société, que les « egos » y sont encore plus surdimensionnés, générant à la pelle des personnalités caractérielles. Très difficile dès lors de faire éclore dans un tel milieu une conscience historique prospective et volontariste, comme le voulait Thiriart, ou d’entamer une longue bataille métapolitique, comme le voulait de Benoist.

Pourtant, de nouvelles initiatives voient le jour. Elles sont au moins portées par des hommes au caractère plus trempé. De vrais travailleurs. Qui multiplient les initiatives et sont très présents sur internet. Cette nouvelle génération semble ouverte sur le monde. Elle est européiste, même en France, car la France contemporaine, qui se veut championne des abstractions universalistes les plus délirantes, l’a déçue. L’avenir nous dira ce que ce travail parviendra à réaliser. Deux éceuils à éviter: se méfier des modes, ne pas y succomber (comme Ulysse face au chant des sirènes); ne pas tomber dans la dispersion.

Ensuite, force est de constater que les Etats-Unis ont gagné la guerre: en Europe en 1945 (mais ça, tout le monde le sait déjà), dans les Balkans en 1999, ce qui leur permet de contrôler l’espace-tremplin de l’Europe vers le Moyen-Orient, utilisé par Alexandre le Grand puis par les Ottomans, en Afghanistan en 2001, ce qui leur permet de contrôler l’Asie centrale, en Irak en 2003, où ils se sont emparé des principales réserves énergétiques du monde, en Afrique centrale et occidentale, ce qui leur permettra de contrôler les ressources pétrolières inexploitées du continent noir. Cette série de victoires est due à leur avance technologique, notamment sur le plan satellitaire. Pire: la riposte européenne ne sera guère possible car en s’emparant d’Avio en Italie, de Santa Barbara Blindados en Espagne, de l’usine de sous-marins allemand, bientôt de Rheinmetall, les consortiums américains, dont le fameux Groupe Carlyle, ont mis la main, par des coups en bourse, sur les entreprises qui forgent les armes européennes. Le Général allemand Franz Ferdinand Lanz a déclaré à ce propos: « Toute armée dépendant d’une industrie militaire étrangère est une armée de deuxième classe ». « Dans tous les cas de figure, l’armée est l’expression et la garante de la souverainté d’un Etat ». « Seules les puissances qui disposent d’un potentiel stratégique produit par une industrie militaire indépendante, sont en mesure de s’affirmer, même modestement, sur la scène internationale ». Cette fois, il n’y a pas lieu de parler de la simple souveraineté d’un Etat, mais de celle de tout un continent, de toute une matrice de civilisation. L’Europe est donc aujourd’hui une « impuissance » édentée.

9. Dans vos revues, au cours des années 80, vous avez défendu des positions neutralistes; est-ce la même logique qui vous fait défendre un monde multipolaire ou constitués de grands blocs qui ne pratiqueraient pas entre eux la politique d’ingérence et d’immixtion, qui semble dominante aujourd’hui?

Entendons-nous d’abord sur le terme « neutralisme ». Le neutralisme n’est pas une idéologie démissionnaire, un pacifisme bêlant comme celui des gauches qui manifestaient contre l’installation des missiles américains, au début des années 80. Le neutralisme, pour moi, est armé et même surarmé. L’exemple est helvétique et suédois, autrichien et yougoslave. Il s’agissait d’organiser une armée de citoyens, capable de mailler totalement le territoire. Il impliquait la fusion armée/nation. Sur le plan diplomatique, il s’interdisait de participer à des alliances, comme l’OTAN, par exemple, et mettait l’accent sur l’indépendance et la souveraineté nationales. Parallèlement à ce neutralisme classique, de type suisse, il y avait aussi le gaullisme, ou la sanctuarisation nucléaire du territoire national. Cette option neutraliste ou gaullienne impliquait aussi de conserver des usines d’armement nationales et de créer les conditions d’une autarcie militaire. La Suède y parvenait. L’Europe, à plus grande échelle, aurait parfaitement pu réussir sa déconnexion, par rapport aux blocs atlantique et soviétique. C’est aussi ce que réclamait les Tchèques lors du printemps de Prague: rappelez-vous le Paris-Match de l’époque, avec cette jeune fille pragoise, blonde et fort maigre, qui, devant les chars soviétiques qui entraient dans la ville, portait sur la poitrine un écriteau, avec ce seul mot: « Neutralitu ». Elle exprimait le désir de la population tchèque et slovaque de se dégager du bloc soviétique sans pour autant vouloir se noyer dans le bloc capitaliste. Un mouvement neutraliste, de part et d’autre du Rideau de Fer, suite logique d’une application graduelle de la « Doctrine Harmel », aurait rendu à l’Europe son indépendance et sa puissance.

En 1984, quand j’ai rencontré le Général Löser, lors de la Foire du Livre de Francfort, il venait de sortir un livre programmatique, appelant ses compatriotes, les ressortissants des trois Etats du Bénélux, les Hongrois, les Tchèques, les Slovaques et les Polonais à se dégager des blocs. Ce livre s’intitulait justement Neutralität für Mitteleuropa. Löser, ancien Commandeur de la 24ième Panzerdivision de la Bundeswehr et rescapé de Stalingrad, était aussi un théoricien militaire qui s’alignait sur les stratèges Spannocchi (Autriche), Brossolet (France gaullienne), sur leurs homologues yougoslaves, suisses et suédois. Sa neutralité n’était pas une neutralité désarmée, mais, au contraire, une neutralité vigilante et citoyenne, centrée sur elle-même et non aliénée par l’appartenance à un bloc, dominé par une superpuissance, qui oblitérait les spécificités nationales et tenait sa part d’Europe sous tutelle.

Le monde est effectivement multipolaire. On ne peut réduire l’inépuisable diversité humaine à deux blocs ou à un monde global unifié,comme le voudrait le « nouvel ordre mondial » de Bush-le-Père et de son théoricien Francis Fukuyama (qui a révisé ses positions depuis ses euphories du début des années 90). Les Etats-Unis veulent imposer leur modèle et utilisent, pour y parvenir, l’idéologie des « droits de l’homme », indéfinie, mise à toutes les sauces, manipulable à l’envi (on l’a vu au Kosovo, où elle a servi à mettre en place un régime de mafieux et de maquereaux). L’idée d’un « nouvel ordre mondial », outre ses aspects missionnaires, part du principe d’un genre humain indifférencié ou de l’idée d’un genre humain amnésique, épuré de tous les legs de l’histoire, dévalorisés a priori comme s’ils n’étaient que de vulgaires scories. Or les hommes ont été appelés à créer des formes, variées et différentes, sur la Terre. Ce sont ces formes qui font l’humanité, qui permettent de dépasser le stade purement animal et générique de l’espèce. Par conséquent, l’espace politique de la Terre n’est pas un « uni-versum », mais un « pluri-versum ». Le respect du passé, des formes, des continuités, comme nous l’enseigne Naipaul, postule de respecter ces acquis, de ne pas vouloir revenir à un stade purement générique et de ne pas vouloir éradiquer purement et simplement, avec une rage frénétique, ce qui a été, est et demeurera. L’acceptation de la nature « pluri-verselle » de l’échiquier mondial implique de reconnaître la multiplicité des pôles politiques dans le monde. C’est donc bien une option « multipolaire ».

Face à la volonté américaine d’établir un « nouvel ordre mondial », la Chine, notamment, a suggéré des « amendements ».D’abord, elle a souhaité une adaptation de la notion de « droits de l’homme » à chaque aire civilisationnelle de la planète. Chaque aire de civilisation adapterait ainsi la déclaration universelle des droits de l’homme à ses propres spécificités culturelles, et la Chine, par exemple, lui donnerait une connotation « confucéenne ». La Chine a demandé à l’Occident de « respecter l’étonnante pluralité des valeurs et des systèmes sociaux, économiques et politiques », de « renoncer à toutes manoeuvres coercitives d’unification ou d’uniformisation ». Les Chinois estiment, à juste titre, que: « ces dix mille choses peuvrent croître de concert, sans se géner mutuellement, et les taos peuvent se déployer parallèlement sans se heurter ». C’est l’esprit de la « Déclaration des Droits de l’Homme de Bangkok », proclamée le 2 avril 1993. La Chine a tenté de faire front, de s’opposer à la volonté américaine d’homogénéisation de la planète. Elle s’est expressément référée à la notion de « pluralité ». Sa volonté était aussi d’imposer un modèle des relations internationales, reposant sur les « cinq principes de la coexistence pacifique »: 1) le respect mutuel de la souveraineté et de l’intégrité territoriale des Etats; 2) le principe de non-agression; 3) le refus de toute immixtion dans les affaires intérieures d’Etats tiers; 4) l’égalité des partenaires sur l’échiquier international; 5) le respect des besoins vitaux de chacun (auxquels il est illicite de porter atteinte). Ces cinq principes, me semble-t-il, résument parfaitement nos propres positions « multipolaristes ». Ils sont l’expression d’une antique sagesse, qu’il serait sot de ne pas écouter.

10. Votre vision d’une Europe impériale est donc tout-à-fait antinomique de tout impérialisme à l’intérieur ou à l’extérieur de celle-ci. Qu’en est-il?

Le débat qui porte sur l’Europe impériale, sur les impérialismes intérieur et extérieur est sans fin. La notion d’Empire en Europe remonte aux Romains. La personnalité collective, porteuse de cet Empire, est le « Senatus Populusque Romanus », soit le Sénat et le Peuple romains. Par la « Translatio Imperii », elle passe aux Francs de Charlemagne (« Translatio Imperii ad Francos »), puis, avec Othon Ier, à l’ensemble des peuples germaniques (« Translation Imperii ad Germanos »). Ou plus exactement, aux ressortissants des territoires relevant du « Saint Empire Romain de la Nation Germanique ». Cela a été tout théorique, surtout après l’élimination de la descendance de Frédéric II de Hohenstaufen. Outre les vicissitudes dynastiques du Saint Empire, le noyau territorial concret de cet ensemble, forgé depuis César (Caesar / Kaiser), implique d’unir le continent européen autour de trois bassins fluviaux, le Rhône (conquis depuis Marius), le Rhin et le Danube, plus le Pô en Italie du Nord. C’est à partir de ces trois bassins, et des territoires qui se situent entre eux, et à partir de la plaine nord-européenne aux fleuves parallèles, de l’Yser au Niémen, que l’Europe doit se former. C’est, disait le géopolitologue autrichien, le Général-Baron Jordis von Lohausen, la paume de la main « Europe », dont les doigts sont les espaces périphériques: scandinave, ibérique, italique, balkanique, britannique. Sans une cohésion solide de cette paume, pas d’unification européenne possible. Et sans cette unification, c’est l’anarchie et la dissolution. Or c’est ce désordre et cette dispersion qui ont été le lot de l’Europe au cours de l’histoire post-romaine. Napoléon a voulu l’unifier à partir de la frange occidentale de la paume, l’espace gaulois, dont les bassins fluviaux portent vers l’Atlantique et non pas vers le cœur du continent, dont l’artère majeure est le Danube, symbole fluvial de l’Europe comme forme de vie. La tentative napoléonienne est donc grevée d’une impossibilité physique et géographique. L’ « hegemon » ne pouvait être français, à cause des faits géographiques et hydrographiques, qui sont évidemment incontournables. Hitler est prisonnier de la vision « ethniste », qui domine en Allemagne à son époque. Il se vaut libérateur et émancipateur, fondateur d’un nouvel ordre social, plus juste et plus efficace pour les ouvriers et les paysans. Il séduit. Incontestablement. Mais quand ses troupes entrent en Bohème tchèque, à Prague, elles réduisent ipso facto à néant le principe cardinal de la politique allemande, depuis la « prussianisation » protestante du « Reich ». En entrant dans l’espace linguistique tchèque, les armées de Hitler remettaient en question le fondement même du Reich protestantisé, et donc particulariste, et la propre propagande ethniste du national-socialisme. Une contradiction qui n’a jamais pu être surmontée, avant la  fin du deuxième conflit mondial. De Gaulle, après 1945, et surtout dans les années 60, veut assumer une sorte de leadership, mais sa France, bien que souveraine et membre du Conseil de sécurité de l’ONU, n’est plus prise au sérieux: la défaite de 1940 est toujours dans les têtes, le pays paraît pauvre et archaïque (cf. les études d’Eugen Weber sur la France rurale), ne séduit pas les Nord-Européens qui le regardent avec commisération, les défaites coloniales d’Indochine et d’Algérie écornent son prestige. La France gaullienne, en dépit de ses efforts, ne sera pas le « Piémont » d’une Europe dégagée des blocs. Le retour à une Europe impériale ne sera possible que s’il y a unanimité des Européens, sans autre « hegemon » que la volonté organisée et structurée des européistes de toutes nationalités.

Il est évident que le colonialisme de papa, essentiellement capitaliste dans son essence, est inacceptable dans la situation actuelle. En Indochine, par exemple, l’imbroglio de 1940 à 1946, entre Japonais, Français de Vichy et de Londres, Britanniques, Américains, Indochinois de droite et Vietminh, semblait insoluble. Les Japonais avaient appuyé les mouvements d’émancipation anticolonialistes; les Américains avaient pris le relais. Il était évident que la seule solution raisonnable, pour la France de Londres, qui appartenait au camp des vainqueurs, aurait été de négocier directement avec le Vietminh, plus nationaliste que communiste au lendemain de l’occupation japonaise. Un accès graduel mais rapide à l’indépendance des territoires indochinois aurait permis de sauver une certaine présence française, donc européenne, de se faire le champiuon de l’émancipation coordonnée des peuples extra-européens, dans ce territoire hautement stratégique, où se situent les embouchures des grands fleuves asiatiques, qui prennent leurs sources sur les flancs de l’Himalaya (Fleuve Rouge, Mékong, ...). Les hésitations, l’illusion de vouloir perpétuer un empire colonial du 19ième siècle dans les conditions très différentes d’après 1945 a empêché les uns et les autres de trouver une solution rapide et harmonieuse.

La défaite de Dien Bien Phu encourage ensuite la rébellion algérienne, qui couvait depuis les événements sanglants de Sétif en 1945. Mais, l’Algérie se trouvant aux portes de l’Europe, l’histoire de sa conquête et de sa colonisation est fort différente de celle de l’Indochine. Si la présence française en Extrême-Orient est due à la course effrénée de toutes les puissances européennes pour se tailler une fenêtre sur le Pacifique, la conquête de l’Algérie, après 1830, provient d’une volonté européenne d’imposer à la France une tâche « réparatrice », après les guerres révolutionnaires et napoléoniennes. La France avait été l’alliée des Ottomans et des Barbaresques contre la légitimité impériale; elle s’était mise ainsi au ban des nations européennes. Comme la piraterie barbaresque ne cessait de sévir au début du 19ième siècle, l’Europe de la Sainte-Alliance a décidé d’y mettre un terme et de charger la France de cette mission. La présence d’une puissance européenne en Afrique du Nord se justifiait par la nécessité de sécuriser la Méditerranée, de garantir la libre circulation des navires européens et d’éviter les rafles d’esclaves sur les côtes chrétiennes de la Méditerranée. Si la France n’avait pas imposé son système jacobin aberrant en Algérie, la révolte n’aurait pas été aussi sauvage et la décolonisation aurait sans doute pu s’opérer dans l’harmonie. En dépit de cela, l’Europe aurait dû se montrer solidaire des Européens d’Algérie, appuyer la France et les colons espagnols et italiens d’Algérie. L’Espagne avait un droit d’intervenir en Oranie, où la population européenne de souche espagnole était majoritaire. L’Europe, et surtout l’Espagne (avant même la France), a le droit d’entretenir des troupes en Afrique du Nord en représailles des agressions sarazines et barbaresques, qui ont duré  plus d’un millénaire. On ne peut transposer l’idée d’une libération nationale et anticoloniale, comme elle s’est exprimée en Indochine, en Afrique du Nord, puisque l’intervention française est la réponse européenne à des agressions répétées et particulièrement horribles. Au nom du Testament de Charles-Quint, qui doit constituer le bréviaire de tout homme politique qui se respecte en Belgique, en Allemagne, en Autriche, en Hongrie, en Croatie, en Italie et en Espagne, les zones d’Afrique du Nord doivent être tenues constamment sous surveillance. La présence espagnole à Ceuta et Melilla est ainsi entièrement justifiée, ne peut être soumise à révision, même si nos concitoyens de souche marocaine ne le comprennent pas.

Toute démarche impériale offensive, en dehors de la zone initiale d’un Empire, est justifiable si elle est dictée par des motifs stratégiques et géopolitiques. En revanche, elle est injustifiable si elle est dictée par des motifs économiques. De même, autre facteur dont il faut tenir compte: la  proximité spatiale. En Indochine, la France est une « raumfremde Macht » (une puissance étrangère à l’espace), exactement comme l’Allemagne avait été une « raumfremde Macht » en Micronésie avant 1918, ce que reconnaissait pleinement le géopolitologue Haushofer. En Afrique du Nord, aucune puissance européenne riveraine de l’Atlantique et de la Méditerranée n’est une « raumfremde Macht », puisque toutes ont subi les agressions sarazines ou barbaresques pendant près d’un millénaire. L’Europe a le droit inaliénable de protéger ses abords, même en constituant des glacis hors de son espace propre. En Europe même, aucun colonialisme intérieur n’est acceptable.

Les Etats-Unis sont en train de créer un OTAN-Sud comprenant tous les pays arabes d’Afrique du Nord, du Maroc jusqu’à l’Egypte, Libye comprise, afin de pénétrer l’Afrique subsaharienne et d’y puiser les richesses du sous-sol, non encore pleinement exploitées. L’OTAN-Sud arabophone a donc deux fonctions: 1) parachever l’encerclement de l’Europe; 2) contrôler l’Afrique subsaharienne et servir de verrou entre l’Europe et celle-ci. Ce projet n’est possible que sans présence européenne en Afrique du Nord, d’où la bienveillance américaine à l’égard des terroristes algériens en lutte contre la France jadis, à l’égard du Maroc contre l’Espagne à la fin des années 50, enfin, à l’égard de l’agression marocaine contre Perejil et l’Espagne en juillet 2002. Les Etats-Unis misent sur le trop-plein démographique nord-africain, sur le « Youth Bulge » comme disent leurs stratèges, afin d’y recruter des mercenaires pour bloquer l’Europe par le Sud et engager des troupes le long des nouveaux oléoducs qui achemineront le brut africain vers les côtes de l’Atlantique, si des troubles ou des rébellions enflamment la région. L’émergence imminente d’un OTAN-Sud aurait dû inciter les autorités européennes à la vigilance. L’Europe perd toutes ses cartes en Afrique.

La question de l’impérialisme extérieur est donc bien trop complexe pour la réduire à ces schémas  binaires dont se gargarisent les belles âmes de gauche.

11. Actuellement, il semble que l’anti-américanisme soit à la mode. Quelles sont vos critiques à l’égard de celui-ci et de l’anti-Bushisme médiatique?

Si l’anti-américanisme a le vent en poupe actuellement, c’est dû essentiellement à une décennie et demie d’interventions américaines dans le monde. La disparition de la « Soviétie », et donc la fin de la Guerre Froide, avait fait espérer, surtout en Europe, l’avènement d’une longue ère de paix, de reconstruction, de fraternité, où les deux parties de l’Europe se seraient lentement mais sûrement resoudées. Les Etats-Unis ont déçu cet espoir. C’est la raison majeure de l’anti-américanisme réel et sincère qui déferle sur la planète et surtout sur l’Europe. Mais il existe aussi un « anti-américanisme » fabriqué, notamment dans les milieux « altermondialistes ». Christian Harbulot, officier et stratége français, spécialiste de la « guerre cognitive », constate que l’ouvrage théorique majeur, censé exprimer la sensibilité altermondialiste, Empire de Hardt et Negri, évoque lourdement la nécessité d’organiser une « résistance » en « réseaux », dont la caractéristique majeure serait d’être non territorialisée. Cette idée est devenu le « joujou » de la nouvelle gauche actuelle. Or, on ne peut résister sans avoir de base territoriale, sans restructurer des souverainetés territorialisées, de préférence à l’échelle continentale. Par conséquence, une « résistance » déterritorialisée ne débouche sur rien, comme le constate très justement Harbulot. La gauche est aussi très excitée parce que Bush est républicain. Or les démocrates, que cette gauche juge plus pacifiques, sont tout aussi bellicistes, comme l’a prouvé l’Administration Clinton, en déclenchant la guerre dans les Balkans. Kerry, nouvelle figure de proue démocrate, accepte le fait de la guerre en Irak et appartient vraisemblablement au même groupe étudiant de Yale, la fameuse société « Skull & Bones », dont les Bush ont fait partie et qui semble être le noyau dur, dont sont issus les dirigeants américains actuels. La gauche ne tient pas un raisonnement géopolitique mais « moraliste ». Or on ne riposte pas à une agression militaire, permanente et planétaire, par des déclarations moralisantes. Elles ont toujours eu, ont et auront un effet nul.

L’anti-bushisme se borne à ridiculiser le Président américain, à dire qu’il est un « idiot », alors que la démarche impériale qu’il poursuit a été jusqu’ici couronnée de succès. Certes, c’est au détriment de l’Europe, de la Russie et du nationalisme arabe laïc, mais, objectivement, cette stratégie, assortie de culot et d’audace, foulant aux pieds le droit international, paie. Les lamentations ne servent donc à rien et l’anti-bushisme à la Michael Moore n’est finalement qu’une dérivation, qui sert à dire : « Voyez, nous sommes réellement démocrates, nous tolérons la critique, nous admettons que l’on soit outrancièrement irrévérencieux à l’égard du Président ». Pendant ce temps, les chars tirent sur Bagdad, les grandes entreprises logistiques comme Halliburton entrent en action, les satellites espions ne cessent pas de fonctionner.

12. Les mouvements d’extrême-gauche sont aussi souvent très anti-américains. Que pensez-vous de leurs thèses?

Les mouvements d’extrême-gauche devraient se livrer à un petit travail d’anamnèse. La gauche extrême, qui existe aujourd’hui, est l’héritière de ceux qui scandaient, en Allemagne et à Paris entre 1967 et 1969: « Ho Ho Ho Chi Minh!». Or cet homme politique vietnamien, qui a dégagé son pays des tutelles japonaise, française et américaine, a d’abord négocié avec Washington dans le dos des Français, immédiatement après la seconde guerre mondiale. Ho Chi Minh a d’abord été un agent américain, avant de devenir un ennemi de Washington dans le Sud-Est asiatique. Après le départ des troupes américaines en 1975, les relations américano-vietnamiennes se sont rapidement « normalisées », prouvant que, malgré l’horreur de la guerre du Vietnam (bombardements sur Hanoï, défoliation des forêts tropicales indochinoises par l’agent orange, etc.), des passerelles entre les deux pays existaient, tout comme d’ailleurs, entre la Chine de Mao et les Etats-Unis, notamment par l’intermédiaire de brillants journalistes sinologues.

Ce qui caractérise les diverses extrêmes gauches, c’est l’absence de rétrospective historique, c’est l’amnésie, c’est une propension agaçante à raisonner en termes figés, à ériger des mythologies propagandistes au rang de vérités historiques. J’ai toujours trouvé de bonnes analyses factuelles dans les publications et chez les auteurs dits d’« extrême gauche », mais les conclusions étaient trop souvent erronées, car elles partaient de raisonnements détachés du flux de l’histoire, lequel ne s’arrête pas. On a assisté plus d’une fois à des débats stériles pour tenter d’interpréter les nouvelles donnes qui surgissaient sur l’échiquier international. Je me rappelle surtout des discussions sans fin (et sans objet) au moment du rapprochement sino-soviétique en 1972, puis, dans la foulée, entre partisans du Vietnam devenu entièrement communiste et partisans du Cambodge de Pol Pot. Tout cela a fini par lasser le public. L’extrême gauche relève donc, le plus souvent, d’un rituel sans impact politique réel. Tout comme l’extrême droite d’ailleurs, qui cultive d’autres fantasmes.

Aujourd’hui, les thèses les plus intéressantes débattues dans le petit espace de l’extrême gauche internationale sont indubitablement celles de Noam Chomsky. L’analyse géopolitique n’y est pas clairement énoncée. L’option moraliste et internationaliste de ce corpus ne permet pas d’incarnation politique réelle, puisqu’elle entend se situer au-delà des Etats nationaux, tout en admettant que les nations du tiers-monde, mais elles seules, ont un droit à l’auto-détermination. L’Europe est généralement assimilée, ni plus ni moins, au camp « impérialiste », alors qu’elle est sous tutelle et ne dispose d’aucune marge de manœuvre réelle! Tous les faits énoncés par Chomsky, Chossudovsky, etc. doivent être inclus et assimilés dans les analyses géopolitiques classiques, qui se hissent bien évidemment au-dessus des étiquettes et clivages idéologiques. La fusion des deux corpus pourrait donner à terme un outil politique efficace. Quant à l’altermondialisme, je le répète, il ne peut se laisser piéger par le leurre qu’on lui agite sous le nez, à savoir cette idée de « réseaux » sans ancrage territorial.

13. Quelle est votre opinion sur la Guerre Froide? A-t-elle été une mascarade et, si oui, pourquoi les Etats-Unis ont-ils poussé à la chute de l’URSS?

La Guerre Froide est un répit. Il s’agissait d’assiéger, de « contenir » l’URSS, soit, dans le langage du géopolitologue britannique Mackinder, de coincer la puissance maîtresse du « Heartland » continental, de l’enserrer dans un jeu d’alliances, dont les maillons se situent sur l’ « anneau extérieur littoral », afin qu’elle ne puisse conquérir cette frange périphérique et maritime du vaste continent eurasien. Auparavant, il s’était agi d’utiliser les forces du « Heartland » pour harceler les puissances organisatrices de la « Forteresse Europe », dont l’Allemagne, pièce géographique centrale de la « Zwischeneuropa », et du Japon, organisateur de la « sphère de coprospérité est-asiatique ». Les Etats-Unis, ont bien assimilé la dialectique théorisée par Mackinder pour affaiblir toutes les puissances d’Eurasie. Après les ennemis principaux, Allemands et Japonais, il fallait mettre hors jeu l’allié principal, le « spadassin continental » soviétique (« kontinentaler Haudegen », dixit Ernst von Reventlow). Pour y parvenir, il fallait organiser le « containment », l’encerclement de l’ancien allié, maître de la « Terre du Milieu », en organisant sur les « franges continentales » (ou « rimlands »), des systèmes d’alliance, tels l’OTAN, l’OTASE, le CENTO, etc. L’objectif était évidemment d’éviter tout rapprochement germano-soviétique, ou euro-soviétique, après 1945. Le terme « mascarade » ne me paraît dès lors pas adéquat. La Guerre Froide est la suite logique des deux premières guerres mondiales. L’intention des puissances thalassocratiques anglo-saxonnes a toujours été, depuis les préludes de la Guerre de Crimée au 19ième siècle, de détruire la puissance russe, de la faire imploser. En 1941, après la défaite de la France, l’Allemagne est le danger primordial. Il faut dès lors la détruire en utilisant le potentiel militaire et démographique de la seconde puissance du continent: en l’occurrence, l’URSS de Staline. Une fois le danger allemand écarté, on passe à l’étape suivante: détruire la Russie. Le même scénario s’observe au Moyen-Orient, où les Etats-Unis ont armé Saddam Hussein contre l’Iran, puis désigné l’Irak comme ennemi du genre humain, pour qu’il ne puisse exercer aucun contrôle de type hégémonique dans la région. Après 1945, la France, alliée, est évincée de ses positions extra-européennes en Indochine, avec la complicité des Etats-Unis, qui se retournent ensuite contre leurs alliés communistes vietnamiens du départ. La dernière phase consiste à organiser des « abcès de fixation » sur les franges extérieures de la Fédération de Russie, aux frontières déjà complètement démembrées depuis la chute de l’Union Soviétique. L’imbroglio tchétchène, qui s’étend à l’Ingouchie, à l’Ossétie et au Daghestan, en est un exemple d’école. Ces processus n’étonnent que ceux qui prennent les vérités de propagande anti-hitlériennes, anti-staliniennes, anti-nasseriennes, anti-irakiennes pour des faits objectifs et imaginent que les services américains croient à leur propre propagande: en fait, ils ne font que manipuler un discours, qu’ils savent parfaitement construit et amplifié par les grands médias internationaux, undiscours qui sert à réaliser des buts géopolitiques, définis depuis des décennies sinon des siècles.

14. Comment voyez-vous l’évolution des Etats-Unis au cours de ces prochaines années?

Je ne possède pas de boule de cristal, me permettant de voir l’avenir. La seule chose que l’on puisse dire avec suffisamment de certitude, au vu de l’évolution actuelle de la situation internationale, c’est que les Etats-Unis cherchent, au Moyen-Orient et en Afrique Noire, à s’emparer du maximum de ressources pétrolières, de gagner la bataille des énergies pour conserver les rentes que leur offre le pétrole, afin de les investir dans les recherches de haute technologie. Ainsi, les Etats-Unis pourront forger les armes et les technologies satellitaires qui leur permettront de conserver leur leadership pendant un siècle ou deux. Ils s’assureront une domination très confortable sur les autres et pérenniseront leur puissance. Je me méfie des discours récurrents, qui apparaissent dans les médias et qui prévoient le déclin imminent des Etats-Unis.

15. Pourquoi les atlantistes en Europe, mais aussi aux Etats-Unis ne militent-ils pas pour la création des Etats-Unis d’Occident, comme le suggère « Xavier de C*** » dans son livre « L’Edit de Caracalla ou plaidoyer pour des Etats-Unis d’Occident », paru chez Fayard en 2002?

Les atlantistes européens sont des internationalistes qui croient à la propagande de Washington. Mais les vrais détenteurs du pouvoir américain, qui orchestrent cette propagande « mondialiste » ne le sont que d’une certaine façon. Ils croient à l’ancrage américain. Imaginez la situation qui émergerait, si l’Europe votait toujours pour des pacifistes ou si son poids démographique contribuait à faire élire exclusivement des présidents européens, qui feraient une géopolitique européenne et non plus américaine. Les programmes géopolitiques américains, définis depuis si longtemps, ne pourraient plus être mis en œuvre. L’écoumène atlantiste ne serait plus américanocentré. Le protestantisme puritain deviendrait minoritaire, sous le poids du catholicisme européen et latino-américain. Ce « Xavier de C***»  ignore que le moteur religieux de l’américanisme est ce protestantisme dissident, puritain et fanatique des « Founding Fathers ». Son projet « caracallien »  minorise ipso facto ce puritanisme, donc fait perdre à l’Amérique sa spécificité fondatrice. C’est un projet d’atlantiste européen naïf et non pas un projet puritain-américain réaliste, car un tel projet n’imaginerait pas une fusion globale où il ne serait plus qu’un facteur périphérique et marginalisé.