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dimanche, 01 février 2015

500 US-Söldner kämpfen für Kiew in der Ostukraine

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500 US-Söldner kämpfen für Kiew in der Ostukraine
 
Ex: http://www.unzensuriert.at

Kenner der ukrainischen Innenpolitik vertreten bereits seit einem knappen Jahr mit vollster Überzeugung eine These: Das neue Regime in Kiew lässt sich durch US-Söldner militärisch unterstützen. Bereits rund um die blutigen Scharfschützeneinsätze am Maidan-Platz im Februar 2014 waren Informationen aufgetaucht, dass eine Privatarmee unter Anleitung des US-Geheimdienstes CIA die Finger im Spiel hatte.

Nun lässt der deutsche Politikwissenschaftler Michael Lüders neuerlich mit Hinweisen auf Söldnereinsätze in der Ukraine aufhorchen. Wie er in einem Interview mit dem Fernsehsender PHOENIX mitteilte, sollen bis zu 500 Söldner der „Sicherheitsfirma“ Adacemi, vormals Blackwater, in der Ostukraine im Einsatz sein.

Unterstützung für einsatzschwache Ukraine-Armee

Die Academi-Söldner sollen offensichtlich die militärische Schmutzarbeit für das Regime in Kiew besorgen. Auf die eigenen Streitkräfte setzt die ukrainische Regierung offenbar keine allzu großen Hoffnungen. Zuletzt war sogar die Rede davon, dass bis zu 25 Prozent des Verteidigungsbudgets in der Ukraine in dunklen Kanälen versickert ist.

samedi, 31 janvier 2015

U.S. Escalation in Ukraine Is Illegitimate

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U.S. Escalation in Ukraine Is Illegitimate and Will Make Matters Worse

By

Ex: http://www.lewrockwell.com

Steven Pifer, a senior fellow at Brookings, writes “The West, including the United States, needs to get serious about assisting Ukraine if it does not wish to see the situation deteriorate further. That means committing real money now to aid Ukraine’s defense.” (

He’s dead wrong. No matter who is in the right or wrong in Ukraine, the U.S. shouldn’t intervene further. It shouldn’t have intervened in the first place.

Escalation by the U.S. and European powers will make matters worse. As a general rule, U.S. interventions make matters worse and fail to achieve even their advertised goals, about which one may also be rightly skeptical. See, for example, this 1994 article arguing a case for the futility of U.S. interventions.

U.S. interventions tend to intensify wars, resulting in more and worse civilian casualties and refugees, more and greater destruction, and more and greater military casualties.

U.S. interventions result in a more powerful state at home. Wars and related interventions on any scale establish precedents for greater powers of the state. The idea of using the state to eradicate or ameliorate evils takes root. This idea leads to government that knows no ideological limits, because evils are everywhere both here and abroad. As time passes, the state then applies its enhanced powers in whatever spheres of American life turn out to be politically favorable. The result after many interventions and decades is a warfare-welfare-regulatory state, a spying-police state, and a state with a massive propaganda apparatus. The departments of the federal government control every significant sector of American life.

Intervention after intervention by government embeds the idea that we the people need the government for the sake of our safety and security. This is a totally false idea.

In the case of Ukraine, U.S. intervention over the past has already gone wrong. (There is evidence that U.S. intervention goes back for 70 years.) It has led to sanctions on Russia. This policy is completely wrong. Confrontation with Russia is completely against the interests of Americans. What good does it do to create a world of hostile relations, a world divided, a world with some nations cut off and isolated from others, and a world in which great powers are rivals over a set of lesser nations? The benighted policy of sanctions has already resulted in inducing Russia to solidify relations with China, Greece, Turkey and Iran. As such state-to-state actions go in this world of states, these moves are not remarkable; but in a context in which the U.S. regards these new economic and military relations as hostile, we are seeing the genesis of Cold War II. This is bad, and it’s the direct result of U.S. intervention in Ukraine, the U.S. position on Ukraine and the sanctions on Russia. These sanctions are really unthinkable.

Advice like that of Steven Pifer, which seeks to expand the U.S. role in Ukraine into military confrontation with Russia, could not be more wrong. Its main result will be to escalate the conflict into one between two major powers. The Ukrainian people, east, west, north and south, will suffer.

The two sides are both going outside for help, as often happens in civil wars. The U.S. should stop being one of those outsiders providing aid, arms or help to one of the battling sides. This recommendation does not hinge on Russia’s actions. It doesn’t hinge on Crimea, on the downing of MH17, or on Russian tanks, artillery or personnel, volunteers or regulars. It doesn’t hinge on borders, the history of Ukraine and Russia, Neo-Nazis, democracy, or perceived rights and wrongs. Non-intervention is based on the idea that the U.S. government should not be in the business of righting evils that it identifies, domestic or foreign.

At a fundamental level, a philosophy of law and government is the issue. Each of us as persons, if we so choose, can identify evils and decide what to do about them. No one of us has willingly or voluntarily deputized government persons to do this for us. There are no documents, contracts, or legal instruments that I or anyone else have signed that have chosen government personnel as our agents and instructed them to intervene in Ukraine. There are no such signed and valid contracts that have given them the power to extract taxes from us to pursue their quests, visions and crusades. In other words, such interventions are not legitimate. They are not legitimated. They are thought to be and said by many persons to be legitimated by the Constitution and various rituals still pursued to this day, but they are not. The customs of many who support government and its attendant interventions do not make for or justify laws that are applicable to the many others who demur and dissent from the powers being imposed on them. Might does not make right. Majority rule does not make right. Legalisms propounded by might are not necessarily lawful, although they may accidentally be so. There really is no lawful link between you and me and a government action like intervening in Ukraine.

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The U.S. intervenes in a hundred or more countries with various forms of “aid”, Ukraine being one of them. To quote one article:

“Since 1992, the government has spent about $5.1 billion to support democracy-building programs in Ukraine, Thompson said, with money flowing mostly from the Department of State via U.S. Agency for International Development, as well as the departments of Defense, Energy, Agriculture and others. The United States does this with hundreds of other countries.

“About $2.4 billion went to programs promoting peace and security, which could include military assistance, border security, human trafficking issues, international narcotics abatement and law enforcement interdiction, Thompson said. More money went to categories with the objectives of ‘governing justly and democratically’ ($800 million), ‘investing in people’ ($400 million), economic growth ($1.1 billion), and humanitarian assistance ($300 million).”

This article is making the point that the assistance was humanitarian and that it didn’t lead in a direct line to the coup d’etat against the democratically-elected government of Ukraine that has led to the current conflict, with its attendant miseries imposed on the population of that country. But whether or not that assistance or even earlier links of the CIA to elements in Ukraine contributed to Maidan, what these interventions purportedly do is to fight what the U.S. government regards as evils and institute various goods. Fighting evils is, however, precisely what the U.S. government has no business doing and should not be doing.

What these interventions do is to establish beachheads of the U.S. government in a long list of foreign countries. This often includes military beachheads. These beachheads provide options for the U.S. government that can be exercised in the future, including the options of further aid, further intervention and escalation when conflicts occur. These beachheads tie the U.S. government to foreign governments so that the U.S. government can exercise influence on those governments. Foreign governments become dependent on foreign aid, IMF loans, World Bank projects and other such infusions. But foreign governments then gain influence over the U.S. government. The U.S. institutions that benefit from the programs and links to foreign governments become dependent for their own livelihoods on these activities. They become proponents for a larger U.S. government that’s responsive to foreign demands and interests. The U.S. becomes more likely to become a proponent of foreign interests and to intervene further.

The Pentagon and U.S. military, lacking great purposes after the Cold War, readily embraced interventions along three lines: drug interdiction, fighting terrorism, and training foreign military forces, both here and abroad. The public relations or propaganda arms of the U.S. now say that these programs, which bring thousands of foreign military personnel to the U.S. for education, help instill American values and establish contacts between the U.S. and foreign military personnel. (See, for example, here.)

The military portion of the military-industrial complex promotes its own size and scope, so as to retain its access to resources extracted from taxpayers. It defines new missions and propagandizes them as important or essential. Interventions are its business. This is the case in Ukraine and other trouble spots. The military battens on trouble spots as do its suppliers. Promotions are helped by active duty, combat and missions engaged in, even if they are not missions accomplished. These interventions do no good to Americans who are outside the military-industrial orbit.

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Pifer’s article is co-written with Strobe Talbott. Steven Pifer is a Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution’s Center on the United States and Europe. He is Director of Brookings’ Arms Control Initiative. Strobe Talbott is President of the Brookings Institution. Six other members of the establishment join them in their recommendation, which includes supplying Ukraine with lethal aid, radar, anti-armor weapons, etc. These persons are “former U.S. representative to NATO Ivo Daalder, former undersecretary of defense Michèle Flournoy, former U.S. ambassador to Ukraine John Herbst, former deputy undersecretary of defense Jan Lodal, former NATO European commander James Stavridis and former U.S. European Command deputy commander Charles Wald.

All of these seem to have learned zip from previous escalations, such as occurred constantly throughout the Vietnam War. Their so-called expertise in foreign affairs is impossible to detect in their recommendation. Pifer is certainly not living up to his title relating to arms control. These members of the U.S. elite have not learned a thing from the escalation in Iraq that graduated from sanctions to outright aggressive war, from the escalation in Afghanistan which went from getting bin Laden to taking down the Taliban government, from the ongoing escalation in Syria that has produced ISIS and now is totally in confusion, from the escalation in Libya that wrecked the country and from the escalation in Yemen, a country now undergoing a change in government that the U.S. didn’t foresee. Along similar lines, there was no need for Americans to fight communism in Vietnam and there is no need for the U.S. government to fight the devils it perceives are operating in Ukraine.

vendredi, 30 janvier 2015

Tsipras blasts EU's Ukraine policy in Moscow

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Tsipras blasts EU's Ukraine policy in Moscow

Syriza leader supports 'referendums' in Ukraine

Distancing himself from the international recognition of Ukraine's government by the EU, the US and the UN, Tsipras rejects the legitimacy of the interim government on the grounds that fascist elements are serving in it

Syriza's leader Alexis Tsipras meets Valentina Matviyenko, who chairs Russia's upper house

Syriza's leader Alexis Tsipras meets Valentina Matviyenko, who chairs Russia's upper house Syriza leader Alexis Tsipras lambasted western policy on Ukraine and expressed support for separatist referendums in the Ukraine during an official visit to Moscow, upon the invitation of the Russian government.

"We believe the Ukrainian people should be sovereign and should decide with a democratic manner and with referendums on its future," Tsipras said, as quoted by the state-run Athens News Agency, of the breakaway referendums that are leading to the country's partition.

A Syriza party source told EnetEnglish that Tsipras has repeatedly said that whatever happens in Ukraine must be in line with international law, and that the support for referendums refers only to a possible federalisation of Ukraine. But that clarification was absent from yesterday's remarks.

While Tsipras said he was visiting Russia in his dual capacity as Greek main opposition leader and the European Left party's candidate for the presidency of the European Commission, it is unclear whether the pro-secessionist stance is the official policy of the European Left.

Distancing himself from the international recognition of Ukraine's government by the EU, the US and the UN, Tsipras clearly rejected the legitimacy of the interim government on the grounds that fascist elements are serving in it.

"It is a regression for us to see fascism and the neonazis entering European governments again and for this to be accepted by the EU," Tsipras stressed.

Filling out his complete rejection of the international community's handling of the Ukraine crisis, Tsipras denounced international sanctions against Moscow, which he said will "only harm Europe". He added that the EU "is shooting itself in the foot with this strategy, and we ask for there not to be any military operation or activity and for there to begin a dialogue and diplomacy toward finding a solution".

But he also maintained that Ukraine must become a bridge between the EU and Russia, and not an area of division.

Tsipras and his delegation stressed that Russia is an integral part of Europe, which stretches "from the Atlantic to the Urals". Greece and Russia, he said, are linked with a "tradition of common struggles of our peoples, common religious convictions, with common political and cultural roots in our history."

His contacts in Moscow included talks with Valentina Matviyenko, who chairs Russia's upper house of parliament and is a close associate of President Vladimir Putin. She had also served as Russian ambassador to Athens.

Energy

Matviyenko expressed hopes for closer ties with Athens, in the areas of economy and energy primarily.

"Greece views Russia as a strategic partner and we are interested in developing ties, in various sectors and directions, both bilateral and multilateral, including parliamentary exchanges," said Matviyenko, who also bemoaned the fact that Greek Parliament Speaker Evangelos Meimarakis has yet to accept her invitation to pay an official visit to Moscow.

Taking a jab at the west's sanctions on Moscow, she also expressed regret over the fact that she cannot visit Greece, because she is on a list of Russian officials barred from EU entry.

For years, many Greek foreign policy analysts have argued that closer ties with Russia should be part of a multipronged Greek foreign policy, but relations have chilled in the last four years of the Greek economic crisis, and particularly after the 2009 Greek elections that brought George Papandreou to power.

Papandreou departed sharply from the policy of his predecessor, Kostas Karamanlis, who had pursued much closer cooperation with Moscow, especially in the area of energy. That departure included an abandonment of the Burgas-Alexandroupoli and the South Stream pipelines. The latter, especially, had evoked the ire of Greece's EU and US partners.

When Papandreou visited Moscow before Athens in 2010 accepted its bailout mechanism and memorandum, Putin advised him to go to the IMF for funding.

While the last two years of Prime Minister Samaras' administration have been marked by a decided distance from Moscow, in February Greece's gas distributor Depa was able to close a deal with Gazprom for a 15% reduction in gas rates, effective retroactively, from July 2013.

That development came a month after Samaras' official talks with Putin, in January, before the outbreak of the Ukraine crisis, which served to break the ice somewhat between the two sides.

"Naturally, we are aware of the difficulties that Greece is facing, but I will note that our trade grew by 16% last year. Naturally, we are also impressed with the results in the tourism sector: 1.2 million Russians visited Greece in 2013. We have some investment projects as well," Putin said at the time.

mardi, 20 janvier 2015

Je suis Vania

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jeudi, 18 décembre 2014

Ukrainian Nationalism, Socialism, & the Resistance to Imperialism in the 20th Century: From Franko to Stoyan

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Ukrainian Nationalism, Socialism, & the Resistance to Imperialism in the 20th Century: From Franko to Stoyan

By Matthew Raphael Johnson

Ex: http://www.counter-currents.com 

Introduction

In no way can a brief article do any justice to a complex idea like the Ukrainian nation. While this author has dedicated his academic life to these and related topics, its poor treatment in the press and distortion by certain emigre circles calls for a certain clarification. One that will not doubt please no one. However, this article purports to be nothing but a scattered set of ideas on a colossal topic penetrated by only a few.

National movements develop a scheme of history. Historical schools in the last two centuries have differed on what form of organization is the prime mover in history: national, urban, or civilizational, or economic. National histories have chosen among them to construct the best narrative. Of course, all histories do this, as the pure “abstract theorist” of fantasy does not exist anywhere.

The specific Ukrainian idea historically is worthwhile. It begins at Kievan Rus (really before that, with a Slavic civilization going far back in time) and does not veer off into Suzdal or Moscow. Rather, the powerful, but short-lived, state of Galicia was far superior as an example. Perfectly situated on Central European trading routes and blessed with endless salt marshes, the constant and usually violent confrontations between noble and crown led to a fairly balanced system. Two monarchs in particular, Roman and Daniel, ruing during the high middle ages, brought Galicia to the height of its power.

Suzdal was seen as a foreign state of Finns and northern tribes including Lapps and Permians which sacked Kiev under the prince of Vladimir, Andrei, in 1169. Andrei, nicknamed “Bogolyubsky,” was half Cuman[1] though his mother. Instead, the Ukrainian idea is slowly absorbed into Lithuania, which had called itself the gatherer of Rus’ before Moscow did. Tver had called itself the Third Rome before Moscow, and some have argued that Novgorod, Suzdal and even Ohrida claimed that title.

From the fall of the Galician state under the Mongols to the concomitant growth of Rus-Lithuania, gradual Polonization led to the creation of the Uniat, or “Greek Catholic” church, a symbol of colonial rule that attracted the ire of the Cossacks. The Cossack host is normally seen in the early modern era as having two sides: the first, the Hetmanate, or those groups fighting Polish or Turkish forces in that part of Ukraine and the Sich (or fortress) Cossacks at Zaporozhya. The latter had a tendency to be very populist, while the former was split between pro-Russian and pro-Polish wings (see below).

The broader point is that the idea of Kievan Rus and that of Moscow have little in common. The Ukrainian view, of both Orthodox and Uniat backgrounds, is that Kiev is best represented by the royal state of Galicia under Roman and Daniel, and then the decentralized Russian state of Lithuania, where the overwhelming majority of its population was Russian and Orthodox. Only after the Treaty of Lublin (1569) did Poland slowly absorb the Lithuanian elements as the Russian nobility fled to Moscow’s territory.

For historians such as Mykola Kostamarov in the 19th century to Mikhail Hrushevsky and Petro Doroshenko in the 20th, that approach has been dominant. The argument is that there is no quick transfer of the crown from Kiev to Suzdal to Moscow. That scheme of history, formalized in the 19th century by Katkov and even earlier by Karamazin, is still worthwhile and contains some truth, but it suffers by refusing to take Russian-Lithuania into account. Only in understanding, however vaguely, that scheme of history does the Ukrainian nationalist movement make any sense.

Two Ukraines, Two Hetmans: Pavel Teterya and Pavel Skoropadsky

Two figures, distant from one another in time although bearing the same title, serve to show the problematic aspects of Ukrainian nationalism and the eternal question of Ukraine’s orientation. Pavel Teterya, Cossack Hetman (monarch, war leader) of Polish Ukraine (that is, the Right Bank) died circa 1670. He was condemned by many, possibility a majority of Ukrainians at the time, for a pro-Polish outlook based on a strongly aristocratic political orientation. The Ukrainian idea for him was western, European, and can become a part of a federated structure with other ethnic groups including Poland. Ukraine was for Teterya and many like him, an integral part of Central, not Eastern Europe.

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Another Hetman, Pavel Skoropadsky,[2] came to power just as Germany was signing the Versailles treaty. He is condemned equally with Teterya, but due to a pro-Russian, rather than a pro-western, stance. Neither man can be considered anti-Ukrainian in the least, but the means to ensure independence and cultural flourishing were very different. Both realized that Ukraine was too exposed to both east and west to ever be “independent.”

Teterya believed in a strong Ukrainian, Cossack nobility modeled on the Confederations within the Polish Senate. Seeking a cohesive elite, the preservation of noble and church property were essential for the maintenance of some kind of autonomy. Since a totally free independence was out of the question in the 1660s, Teterya sought a confederation of equality with Poland and Lithuania based on the Treaty of Hadiach (1658), negotiated by his predecessor, Ivan Vyhovsky.

This treaty, never made into law, described a political vision with Ukraine in a confederate union with Poland and Lithuania on the following conditions: that Orthodoxy and Catholicism be legally equal, that Polish and Jewish colonists be expelled, that Cossack nobles have the same rights as Polish ones, and that the Hetman be an office of strength, one that can quickly react to any vitiation of the agreement. This was accepted by Poland and the pro-western faction of Cossacks. The Russian invasion and the consequent Treaty of Andrusovo (1667) put an end to that, as this treaty divided Ukraine into Polish and Russian halves.

Russian agents spread the world that Teterya’s consultation with the Poles means that he wanted the Polish oligarchical system of “government” to be imposed on all Ukraine. They spread rumors that he had converted to Catholicism, which at the time was the same as to cease being Ukrainian. Most of his career was spent fending off rebellion and invasion from all sides, and he died a broken, miserable man. Even the date of his death is uncertain.

The Reds having briefly taken most of Ukraine by 1918, were overthrown by Pavel Skoropadsky (died 1945) who then ruled Ukraine as Hetman for a short time after World War I. German forces, brought into Ukraine due to Lenin’s signing of the Brest-Litovsk Treaty (1918), approved the coup and offered limited support to the Hetman. The problem was that neither Bolsheviks nor the “western” camp in Ukraine were satisfied.

In war-torn Ukraine, suffering from total dislocation, chaos, warfare, and death, Skoropadsky put Ukraine on a solid, independent footing. A former officer in the tsarist army, he mixed the best of Russian, German, and Ukrainian traditions in government. Every Ukrainian family under the Hetman was guaranteed 25 acres as a minimum which was inalienable. This land could not be taken away as debt repayment.

He created a peasant land bank that permitted peasants to buy land at subsidized rates. He created a firm monetary regime that was accepted throughout the nation for the first time. He massively increased education at all levels and created a brand new police force for the collection of taxes. Given the chaos of the age, the state under the previous Rada (that is, Council or parliament) failed to project power outside of Kiev. Skoropadsky realized that, in order for the country to survive, he needed a strong state, a rational army on the Russian model, and a navy. He succeeded on all counts.

His policies were so successful that he was able to loan the White army of General Denikin 10 million rubles and, at the same time, finance the newly independent state of Georgia. Ukraine was totally self-sufficient in food, and exported a full 35% of the total harvest in 1918. The most impressive achievement of all is that the Hetman did this only between April and December of 1918. Such clear political genius created for him numerous enemies.

Ukrainian “nationalists,” in league with both Poland and Lenin, overthrew Skoropadsky near the end of 1918, forcing him to flee to Germany. Ukraine was then governed by the ineffectual Directory, modeled after the French Revolutionary council of the same name, making the country ripe for the Red takeover. Since Symon Petliura (died 1926), the head of this “nationalist” government, refused to fight with the White forces, he went to Poland for military assistance. This absurd alliance was rejected by nearly all, since Poland had made it clear that it sought to annex much of Ukraine to itself. However, for a brief time, Poland and Petliura had defeated both Whites and Reds.[3]

Petliura_Symon.jpgPetliura was a member of the “Poltava” Masonic organization, as were several of the major Ukrainian nationalists in the 19th and early 20th century. This was also the organization that initially gave birth to the elite Decembrist movement. It is not, however, to conclude from this that Petliura was in any way “illumined” but that he was a member and recruited within its ranks.

Petliura, a Mason and ostensible Ukrainian nationalist, cooperated with the Poles against the Reds, and cooperated with the Reds against Skoropadsky, a policy almost designed to destroy the strong foundation for independence Skoropadsky had skillfully laid. These “nationalists” ensured the genocide of Ukraine that both the Poles and Reds would unleash.

The Directory was split between Petliura’s “republican” faction and V. Vinnychenko’s “communist” faction. Like Stepan Bandera (see below) Petliura was a “social nationalist,” believing in a “labor Ukraine” that is governed by both workers and peasants. The real problem was poverty: Petliura held that the present, war-torn condition of Ukraine was a breeding ground for opportunism. This means that the poor, the war-weary and the exhausted will accept any government promising some level of stability. That was not the role either the Rada or Directory was able to play. Only two factions were capable of this: Skoropadsky or the Bolsheviks.

The narrative above summarizes much about Ukrainian life. The Teterya movement was western, aristocratic, and pro-Polish. Other major figures promoting this view were Hetmans Ivan Vyhovsky and Ivan Mazepa. This is the proverbial “western” approach of Ukrainian nationalists. Petliura was clearly in this camp as well, as were most Ukrainian Masons.

The other faction is represented by Gogol or Skoropadsky. Hetmans such as Damian Mnohohrishny (d. 1703) or Ivan Briukhovetsky (d. 1688) were pro-Russian, but did not accept any form of direct rule from Moscow. Neither faction wanted anything other than an autonomous or (later) independent Ukraine, but the question was the source of identity and the means of its achievement.

Ivan Franko

Ivan_franko_by_trush.jpgThe era of Skoropadsky came on the heels of Ivan Franko’s death in 1916. Franko was one of the more interesting figures in the Ukrainian national-socialist movement in the early 20th century. Constantly reassessing the nature of the state, Franko made arguments for a national form of state socialism while, in other contexts, direct condemnations of the state in general. The state, at its worst, is an unfairly privileged institution which enshrines political and economic inequality as the “common good.”

He accepted Marxism on four specific points: that dialectics, rather than linear logic, is the best way to understand the social nature of logic. The dialectical method, almost always misunderstood and mangled, is the constant interplay of the ideal and its physical manifestation. In other words, any ideal of the nation is constantly being contrasted to the daily grind of social or civic life. Movement is then the perception of the gap between the two.

Secondly, he accepted Marx’s concept of surplus value. There are two ways to view this: the first is that the act of production has to produce more value that it took to make the product. The surplus value is then what is absolutely required in order to a) replace and maintain capital and b) provide a profit for the capitalist. The profit for the owner of capital is the second element of surplus value. The two both require surplus value, but their social distinctions are very clear. The productivity of labor and its manifestation in wages is another example of how dialectical logic is superior to its Anglo-American linear and bourgeois competitor. Its significance is that, given the massive increases in productivity then and now, man need only work a few hours a week to ensure all basic needs are met.

Third, that history can be understood as being set in motion by changes in the means of production. As those profiting from capital continually use labor to better increase production in both quality and quantity, technology changes. History is then this dialectical adjustment among labor, technology and the classes that benefit from both. Finally, he accepted the idea of labor as the sole source of value, something uniting both Locke and Marx.

He rejected Marx on the questions of materialism, the domination of the state and, finally, the fact that centralization of capital has not occurred. Small business has not been destroyed in the west the way Marx had predicted. Franko held that civilization can never be reduced to matter in motion. Thought, social exchange, symbolism, ideals and hopes for the future are not produced by material things. These goods are in fact, not material at all.[4]

Marx was useful, but since he rejected the importance of ethnic ties, he was ultimately rejected. The broader point is that any true nationalism, being based on solidarity, cannot then enshrine competition in economics. For Franko, capitalism was based on three things: the demand of capital for labor at the lowest possible price, to buy raw materials and other necessaries at the lowest possible price and finally, to sell the product to the public at the highest possible price.

The modern state, however, is different from government. It is not based on solidarity, but comes into existence through force. This force is that of the wealthier elements of the population using their private security as “government.” The modern state is a machine that cannot command loyalty. The ethnic group, the folk certainly can, but the relations between the folk and the state are normally in opposition.[5] Later in his career, Franko would reject anarchism because the human race had been too brutalized by the machine. Self-government and the capitalist division of labor were not only incommensurable, but polar opposites.

Franko’s view was that independence is a necessity for both solidarity and economic reform. Colonialism was a problem in part because it automatically condemned the profits from labor in the country to be shipped out of it. Colonization made no sense unless the colonizer was getting something out of it. For Franko, the colonization of the poorer by the richer was justified by progress and social Darwinism. The only thing now included in this concept of progress was moral progress.

Franko’s view of history was progressive, but a progress based on moral liberty. Economic development is one thing, but if it does not lead to the emancipation from labor (or at least drudgery), then it is not worthwhile. Progress itself is ambiguous as it has opposing effects on specific human peoples and places. The division of labor, which is main driving force of development, together with the disparity of strength, character and abilities creates and exacerbates inequality among people. Like most nationalists, Franko argues that national belonging must be based on some sort of substantial equality. Nothing can justify the rule of a small handful of rich people and millions of the exploited poor.

Franko’s understanding of history is the growth process of human free activities to expand the limits of the possible. However, man is not abstract: this liberation from necessity and drudgery is also mostly at the level of families and communities, not individuals.

It is essential that defining community through which people able to exercise their pursuit of happiness, Ivan Franko emphasizes the nation as an integral organic and natural part of the historical process. Franko could not be clearer in his book, Beyond the Limits of the Possible:

Anything that goes beyond the frame of the nation is either hypocrisy from people of internationalized ideals which serve to provide cover for ethnic domination of one nation over another. Either that, or a sickly sentimentalism and fiction that could only serve to express one’s alienation from his own people.[6]

The left is failing, so Franko argued, because it has nothing but economic demands to hold society together. This is completely insufficient. The nation is “a natural expression of the soul.” In this sense, the nation is an essential part of one’s individual makeup. Without it, mass society develops: a gaggle of undifferentiated, mostly superfluous “voters” and “consumers.” Each person is responsible for changing himself away from the mass, it’s just that the mass is much easier: there is no freedom or identity to live up to. The nation is as much subjective as objective. He rejected anything that turned man into a machine, which is what he saw modernity doing.

The “savage” is the moral superior of the “Enlightened” English colonialist, since the Enlightenment itself came from England’s exploitation of much of the world. Progress is hence dependent on colonialism, the factory system and the ideology of materialism that turns man into a machine. The problem with Darwin was that freedom is nowhere to be found. The world is a mechanized unit. Therefore, in the human world, there must be something that does not evolve, namely our consciousness and freedom. Franko’s atheism (which waxed and waned throughout his career) was not compatible with the mechanism of Darwin’s theory. For him, the dialectic of freedom and necessity in nature always tormented his work and never found a solution.

Even worse, Franko found no home on either the “right” or the “left” in Ukraine’s complex politics of the early 20th century. As Petliura and Vinnychenko never resolved their differences, Franko’s loathing of the left was based on the fact that they rejected the nation. What sort of society could be based merely on economic self-interest? After all, that’s all socialism was claiming. Without the “national,” the “socialist” is vapid, empty economism.

Since Franko was a socialist and atheist, the Orthodox or ethnic “right” had no interest in him. Since he believed in ethnic solidarity and moral regeneration, the “left” offered nothing to him either. As a secular man, Franko remains in the minority among Ukrainian nationalists, but his poetry and prose electrified activists regardless.

Stepan Bandera and the OUN

The famous Ukrainian nationalist Stepan Bandera (died 1959) argued that the nation is a genetic unity. It is based on shared biological foundations because it is based on intermarriage and hence, genetic similarity. People normally do not marry those who do not speak their language, which in the present climate in America, is a controversial statement. This difference in genetic constitution implies that economics and life choices will differ among peoples in that they are – at their most rooted biological level – different from one another. As genetics interact with the topography and political history of a people, a real, distinct ethnos is formed.

For Bandera, the family is the first community and the primal one. This slowly develops into a sense of mutual interdependence, one founded on a sense of solidarity that becomes the root of nationhood . This is especially pronounced if the group is undergoing external pressure from a marauding foe or a rapacious empire. This solidarity is, importantly, the root of a basic egalitarianism in economic life. Labor, as Hegel argued, is national in the sense that the division of labor is the transformation of individual interest into the collective.

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A common goal requires working in a climate of sacrifice and virtue. Like Ivan Franko and many others, nationalism for Bandera is a cultural unity leading to solidarity. In turn, this sense of family belonging alters the nature of work and hence, economic life. In many respects, this is an excellent ethical understanding of the folk-ethnos.

The state is essential here due to the size, power and militancy of the myriad enemies Ukraine faced in the first half of the 20th century. The state protects the ethnos and guarantees independence both economic and political. The state, as the instrument of the ethnos, guides investment and focuses resources on that which Ukraine can produce well. The point at which the state develops interests of its own, which might come close to adding some actual content to the “civic nation.” This, in truth, is just a mystification of state power without an ethnic or moral focus other than its own survival.[7]

Some object to Bandera’s insistence on ideological uniformity, seemingly innocent of the extreme levels of genocide the country had suffered. Apart from being a common and universal goal of all those with political power, Bandera sought a unified Ukraine as a means of self-defense and economic development. It was either that sort of militancy or national destruction. As of 2014, it is the latter, showing the fate of all “civic nations.”

Bandera accepted a limited state (since ethnic states are limited by definition), but one strong enough to maintain independence under the worst of conditions. While the concept irritates western minds that generally have no identity at all, the Ukrainian context fully justifies his combativeness.[8] For him, the state was a moral unity that, at its best, protects and facilitates both the material and spiritual life of the people (as opposed to a party).

The reality is that Bandera argued for a simple platform that sought primarily to fight the USSR, and only later to build a strongly integralist state that is capable of maintaining what would be a highly fragile independence. He rejected the idea that political factions, even together, represent “the people.” The nation is a unity while its negation is the party or faction which invariably represents some frustrated faction of an elite seeking power. Imperialism is when an ethnos decides to take other territories outside of itself. Mutual respect can only exist when each group remains on its traditional territory.

The nation generates its own ideological and philosophical forms. It does this by synthesizing historical experience and the cultural defense mechanisms that have been erected to deal with war, colonial occupation, genocide and poverty, all of which Ukraine has had more than its share. These are precious expressions of the human desire for freedom (though not egotistical self-assertion) and are crucial towards creating a strong foundation upon which an integral foundation can be erected.

In this sense, the nation is organic in that it is a natural outgrowth of the family and genetic principle, as well as the division of labor and the need for human beings to cooperate. Cooperation cannot occur without the nation. The role of the political or philosophical leader is to synthesize all of these into a program that is wide enough to contain many different tendencies, but narrow enough to be a source for policy.[9] Bandera argued that the moral norm is universalism, but such a view can only be expressed through the many nations that each form an aspect of it. There is no universal truth without particular truths.

Vasyl Stus and the Nature of the Motherland

ukrainian_poet_vasyl_stus.jpgUkrainian anti-Soviet dissident Vasyl Stus (died 1985) made the claim that only in suffering is the self ever really known. Each man, in Stus’ view, creates a “shell,” a sort of protective coating that protects him from the world of the spirit. This is a defensive mechanism to avoid all that which cannot be quantified. The spirit cannot be mechanized, it cannot be reduced to slogans or ideological manifestos. Therefore, it is avoided.

On occasion, this shell is broken when suffering is imposed upon it. The practical life of the external world is exposed as disguised contempt and the self discovers it has no anchor. Suffering forces the person to become fully known, to live entirely according to internal, ideal principles rather than external results.

The world has gone mad, therefore, we are forced to turn inward. The problem is that, for many, if not most, there is nothing to turn to. There is no inner self, but rather a superficial set of masks that are changed as circumstances dictate. Here, avoiding suffering seems to be the only purpose. It comes at the expense of personhood. This is the “mass man,” one incapable of rising above the pleasure-pain nexus. They are already dead.

Looking around, Stus came to realize that “success” was identical with both mediocrity and amorality. In the Soviet Union, the most absurd policies and ideas needed to be defended and justified. The problem was the long lines of volunteers to do just that. When pain becomes that which should be avoided at all costs, amorality is the necessary consequence. He watched professional frauds loudly trumpeted by the Soviet press solely because they supported the KGB’s agenda. Talentless hacks were being called “geniuses” while the truly gifted were dying in frozen Gulag cells. Certain things do not change.

Stus is significant because he connected the symbols of home, mother, nation (motherland), nature and freedom as essentially one thing. If Jean-Paul Sartre was to “solve” the existential issue in Marxism (or his own version of socialism) then Stus, who actually lived under it, created his own “solution” – our home, our motherland. The earth sustains man in that our ancestors are buried in it while we eat what grows out of it. The soil of one’s motherland literally becomes part of our body.

Freedom cannot exist without our home. There is no abstract man, nor is there abstract freedom: it is always a service to something. For Stus, fighting the USSR was the only service he knew. In 1965, a movie was shown in Kiev, one by Sergei Paradzhanov, Shadows of Forgotten Ancestors.[10] This led to a protest against the recent spate of arrests against dissidents and Ukrainian nationalists currently taking place. Stus was one of a handful that spoke out after the screening, knowing full well what will happen to him as a result. Once he publicly denounced the KGB’s tyranny, he was removed from the university where he was pursuing its graduate studies for “systematic violations of the norms of behavior of graduate students and staff members of research institutions” (from Kostash, 1998).

The Ukrainian dissident movement during the Cold War was normally an aspect of the nationalist movement. The Ukrainian ethnos, of course, was defined in many different ways, but there was a radical disjuncture between an artificial ideology such as Marxism on the one hand, and the organic development of custom and language, on the other. The latter is fluid, having stood the test of time. The former is rigid and doctrinaire, leading of course, to the existence of the dissident.

The fact that the Gulag loudspeakers during Stus’ time there were proudly announcing the signing of the Helsinki Accords on human rights was a vivid reminder of the nature of ideology. That the Soviet Union was so insane as to beam this into a Gulag population shows just how inverted and carnivalesque things had become. The world was mad, so the only thing that a man deprived of his home could do is go inside. To enter one’s inner world is the last line of defense against insanity.

Dmytro Pavlychko

P84_1.jpgOne useful but largely ignored approach to nationalism comes from the work of Dmytro Pavlychko (b. 1929). His “The Ukrainian National Idea” (2002) defines nationalism simply as the single highest form of meaningful social integration. Nationalism must be ethnic, since that is the source of culture. In addition, the struggles of a people are fundamental aspects of the folk and its subjective sense of unity. It is, as Bandera also suggests, forms of self-defense that have become ritualized as aspects of social behavior. This is the sign of a healthy society in the same sense that a strong immune system is a sign of a healthy body.

In his lecture of 2002 at the Kiev-Mohyla Academy, Pavlychko defined nationalism this way:

It is difficult to ascertain what the national idea refers to generally, because it can be understood as a complex unity containing ones mother tongue, customs, rituals, etc. . . It is the language of each people that serves as the foundation for identity, as well as its cultural and spiritual tradition. It also contains historical memory, its general mentality, its economic development, topography and general folkways. The national idea combines the essential identity of a people and the requirements for their autonomous and free development, none of which are independent of the state.[11]

The last sentence is crucial. It is the summary of his thought in general. Nationalism is the synthesis of two distinct sets of ideas, that of the ethnic identity and purpose as well as how these are protected and nurtured. The state, in traditionally German and Slavic sense, is both the nature of this unity and the form of its protection. The “state” is both the constitution of the state, that is, its traditional sense of justice, and the more formal institutions of coercion.

Historical facts have forged a unity in the face of constant pressure, violence and the very real possibility of destruction. Language too is born from the violence of history. No people on the globe have been free of foreign occupation or devastating warfare. It is these periods where one’s “otherness” is made quite clear, and thus, is the source of ethnic identity.

Each ethnos will create structures appropriate to itself, since conditions vary so radically. Law and state structures emanate from custom and history. Importantly, as soon as this connection between law and the ethnos is severed, the state loses its legitimacy. In saying that “none [of these things] are independent of the state,” he is speaking from a typically Ukrainian point of view. While national-anarchism was very common in 19th-century Ukraine, its precarious geographic position and its tough neighborhood make statelessness impossible. The state must exist for both Pavlychko and Bandera because all the custom and history in the world will not save the people from Stalin, or worse, western capitalism.

Suffering reveals the truth that happiness is not in possessions, urban “sophistication” or the bureaucratic pecking order. It is to be found in simplicity, something that has long been a part of Ukrainian ethnic thought since at least Kulish. This is what the enemies of nationalism fail to grasp: that ethnicity is born in the fires of pain and suffering. It is a function of what this writer has called elsewhere the “structures of resistance.”

The more evil the ruling system becomes, the more isolated the ethnos. The contradiction between the outer, disordered regime and the internal memory of the folk become extreme. What this can do is re-orient priorities, force people to find happiness in simplicity, and spiritualize daily life. Post-communist Ukraine, he states, works from the foundation only of money and power, the only “universal values” in the present global order.

Pavlychko’s idea is that the Ukrainian sense of self had existed as a medieval construct. Just as the Anglo-Norman shaped the subjectivity of the Gaels, the unia and Polish occupation shaped the Ukrainian idea. The Cossacks and Brotherhoods were the mainstays of the Orthodox Church under the violent thumb of the Polish nobility, and hence, these institutions are manifestations of ideas that became a part of the Ukrainian sense of self. Suffering can be cleansing and generate an awareness of reality rather than the image.

The academic hacks who condemn nationalism as “mythical” have no difficulty accepting abstract concepts such as the individual, the “global community,” or “international civilization” as perfectly real and obvious. This absurdity shows that the academic elite are tied to capital, since this is their creation. For Pavlychko, there is no such thing as an “international morality” and certainly no planetary “civilization.”

National belonging is a prerequisite for a solid doctrine of rights. Since rights do not hang in midair, they must have an origin that is not entirely reducible to mere expressions of utility or self-interest. Cosmopolitanism can generate no doctrine of rights, since it has no substantive qualities at all. The abstract “individual” or “universal values” can generate nothing concrete, since those slogans are themselves vapid and vacuous.

The distinction between truth and the world of media-generated images is what suffering can make clear. Foreign occupation and constant war forces the more civic minded of the ethnos to be isolated and impoverished. Only from this vantage point can the system be seen for what it truly is. The bureaucratic mentality is one that will serve anyone with power. Hence, these functionaries, since they benefit from the system, cannot judge it. Those who they exclude in the name of “tolerance” and “openness” see them as the frauds they are, but it is only through such exclusion can the truth be fully understood. 

Darius Stoyan and Donstov’s School

In the work of Darius Stoyan, a young graduate student at Taras Shevchenko University (as of 2013), the main concern is to justify the primordial origins of the folk. He writes that the nation derives from the Latin word for “tribe.” The tribe, not self-sufficient, slowly develops into a larger confederation of similar peoples until a nation is formed. Stoyan agrees with the conception that this development is hastened by the existence of a violent enemy or foreign occupation. People suffering this way are automatically excluded as a group and hence, their resistance becomes identical with the nation.

Put differently, ethnicity has always existed, as the ancient annals of Scotland, Ireland and Greece testify. However, it was not necessarily politicized, nor part of the subjective mentality of the common folk.[12] It was merely there, a unity within which social interaction can be mutually comprehensible. The growth of the modern state and the arrogance of bureaucratic empires created the politicized version of ethnicity known as “nationalism.”

Nationalism for Stoyan is comprised of the people, living in a specific territory, forging bonds and affective ties through the constant struggle with neighbors, powerful empires and nature herself. A spiritual essence is formed that becomes the center of the ethnic consciousness and marks them off from others close by. Religion, language and economic forms further differentiate the peoples. Intermarriage becomes inevitable since families must have significant commonalities to function, similar to nations.[13] He writes,

The national concept is manifest in the supreme principle of unity and actualized through the human will determined to create unity from the raw material of the ethnic experience. It has its own values developed by the creative interaction of people living in the same area speaking the same language.[14]

Following the work of Dmytro Dontsov, the stress here is on the common will of the leadership in forging a nation. As mentioned above, however, the severe circumstances of Ukraine throughout the entirety of the 20th century – and even more so today – makes such militancy justifiable. The “raw material” (which is my translation) is the historical folk-ethnicity of the population, often taken for granted or seen as so normal that it does not require comment. A militant leadership comes into existence, as Bandera shows, at times when the very existence of the nation is at stake. Militant organization, the forcible creation of unity in the face of extermination, is the issue here. In 2014, the same conditions apply.

Nations have existed as ethno-linguistic units throughout history, as has the imperial desire to destroy such identity. Empires are defined as those entities that unify nations in the interests of the ruling group. Empires are not nations themselves, but federations answering to a common center. The point is that there is no empire without nations, and they come to define each other. There is no civic life without linguistic and cultural unities.[15]

Since a non-alienated mankind seeks solidarity, justice, protection and communal belonging (which are all tightly related), nations are a natural and normal social form. Empires, however, are the products of greed and alienation. Solidarity creates the standards for progress, success and organization that abstract theory cannot hope to provide.

Nationalism became the weapon of choice against the economic aggression of the industrial world. Industrialization is inherently international since imperial empires existed before either capitalism or industrialism. Europe after World War II became an economic, rather than a cultural entity. The Bretton Woods system demanded the rejection of nationalism and mercantilism as a condition for access to credit. The post-war order was, in part, based on the implication that only the economy has rights over the population.

In Stoyan’s analysis of nationalism, he summarizes the concept in several ways. It is a subjective principle of identity, but its objective elements are equally significant. Culture is really the manifestation of a historical unity. Culture, in other words, is a product of history acting within the variables such as geography or available resources.

Conclusions

Stus placed the ethnic question as a matter of personal suffering. Prosaic gratification takes the place of virtue and calls itself “progress.” Those fighting it are rounded up. Modern man can only think in binary terms: individual and society, while the nation and community are syntheses of these terms. Love ends in tragedy just as Teterya and Skoropadsky’s love for the motherland led to their exile. Most of all, Stus argued that tyranny and collectivization requires a mass, not real persons.

The USSR, as Stus wrote from prison, is a “twilight” world where nothing is as it seems. The senses deceive, since the term “liberty” or “equality” is everywhere affirmed, but denied everywhere in practice. Nationalism is little more than those structures erected to protect the population from irrationality, colonial rule and exploitation. Nationalism is to see the archetype in both nature and culture and seek its realization in our nominal world. Poets can do this, so long as they suffer enough. To get what one wants is to avoid the archetype, it is not needed when desires are met. Just before his 1985 murder, Stus proclaimed that his very existence was an act of protest. Socialism did not know what to do with such people except put them in prison. One was either a proletarian New Man or he was not. The “nots” ended up as “zeks.”

The nation is a community, the individual can only be collectivized. Collectives and communes are as different as individuals from persons. The individual is an ego, a person is an acculturated being. Suffering forces one to discover the fundamentals of existence. It forces self-knowledge, but it is always dangerously close to despair.

The examples detailed above have shown that both nationalism and sovereignty are the cornerstone of international politics. Even the most predatory empire needs to use these symbols when it is in their interests. Even more, as the economies of the small Slavic states continue to spin out of control, internationalism, neoliberalism and empire are seen more and more to be illegitimate and in fact, rapacious. Belarus and Russia are exceptions, showing basically healthy economies based entirely on a rejection of IMF demands.

This writer agrees that the most successful economic policies come from a strong state and ethnic unity. Examples include Japan, Russia, South Korea, Taiwan and Belarus. All of these states are examples of economic successes based around the rejection of neoliberalism and in favor of state-centered investment policies and long-term employment. The death of neoliberalism—outside of Washington and Harvard—will be missed by few.

Notes

1. The Cuman or Polovtsy were a Turkic tribe and a long-time enemy of the Slavs.

2. Sometimes, modern Ukrainian spells his name Skoropadskyi (Скоропадські). Of course, Pavel is the Slavic for “Paul.” The name is of ancient Ukrainian-Lithuanian background. He was related to the earlier Hetman of Ukraine Ivan I Skoropadsky (d. 1722) through Ivan’s daughter, who married Petro Tolstoy, producing another Ivan, from which Pavel is his grandson. This means Pavel is the great-great-grandson of Ivan I and hence, has at least a hereditary claim to the Hetmanate, something desired by the famous revolutionary Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky and many others.

3. This is sometimes called the Polish-Soviet War and lasted from 1919 to 1921. See Davies, Norman Richard (1972). White Eagle, Red Star: the Polish-Soviet War, 1919–20. Random House

4. Франко, Іван. Соціалізм і соціал-демократизм. Originally published in «Житє і слово» in 1897 (Volume 6, number 4, pps 265-292). This article was banned in Soviet Ukraine.

5. Франко, Іван. Формальний і реальний націоналізм. This article was not published until 1936 abroad. The essential argument is that nationalism requires socialism.

6. Ivan Franko, ‘Beyond the Limits of the Possible’, from Ralph Lindheim and George S.N. Luckyj, eds., Towards an Intellectual History of Ukraine (Toronto 1996)

7. Посівнич, Микола. Степан Бандера — життя, присвячене свободі. Літопис УПА, 2008, III (N. Posivnych, from the Collected Works of the UPA, vol 3).

8. Ibid.

9. Кук, Василь. Життя і діяльність Степана Бандери: документи й матеріали / Редактор і упорядник — Микола Посівнич. Тернопіль: Астон, 2008 (Vasyl Kuk)

10. This film was released in the US in 1967. Not only did Stus get arrested due to his support of this film and its director, but the producer himself, Paradzhanov, was sentenced to five years hard labor as a result of his work. Technically, the film was condemned due to its purely realistic and romantic approach to the Hutsul people (a Slavic tribe in the Carpathians), but it shows an ethnic group in the full flower of its customs. This was why it needed to go.

11. Pavlychko, D. The Ukrainian National Idea. Inaugural Lecture honorary doctorate of Kyiv-Mohyla Academy, 2002 (translation mine).

12. The concept of “subjective awareness” is a red herring. Ideology is always the domain of intellectuals and activists. Most of the common folk take their unities for granted, since much else occupies their time. Using this as an argument that nationalism is a recent phenomenon is just poor reasoning.

13. Stoyan, D. (2012a) Шевченка в історіософській концепції Ю. І. Вассияна. Publications of the Dmytro Dontsov Research Center.

14. Stoyan, D. (2012) Проблема визначення поняття «нація» в контексті філософської спадщини Ю.Вассияна. Publications of the Dmytro Dontsov Research Center (translation mine)

15. See two articles of his: Stoyan, D. (2012) Проблема визначення поняття «нація» в контексті філософської спадщини Ю.Вассияна. Publications of the Dmytro Dontsov Research Center; and Stoyan, D. (2012a) Шевченка в історіософській концепції Ю. І. Вассияна. Publications of the Dmytro Dontsov Research Center.

Bibliography

Almond, Mark (2008) “On Ukrainian Nationalism.” Russia Behind the Headlines, 28 November (rbth.ru/articles/2008/11/28/281108_nationalism.html [2])

Beiner, R. (2003) Liberalism, Nationalism, Citizenship: Essays on the Problem of Political Community. UBC Press

Hobsbawm, E. (1991) Nations and Nationalism Since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality. Cambridge University Press.

(Hobsbawm was a Jewish communist called an “authority on nationalism” by the entire academic establishment. Most of his work was promoting Marx and Marxism globally. He did not possess the qualifications to grasp nationalism nor the intellectual honesty to pursue it. He sought only to destroy it while downplaying his ethnic identity). 

Кук, Василь (Vasyl Kuk, 2008). Життя і діяльність Степана Бандери: документи й матеріали. (Редактор: Микола Посівнич). Астон.

Посівнич, Микола. Степан Бандера — життя, присвячене свободі. Літопис УПА, 2008, III (N. Posivnych, from the Collected Works of the UPA, vol 3).

Pavlychko, D. The Ukrainian National Idea. Inaugural Lecture honorary doctorate of Kyiv-Mohyla Academy, 2002 (Інаугураційна лекція почесного доктора Києво-Могилянської Академії, виголошена 1 вересня 2002 року)

Originally published in the journal Young Ukraine (Молодь України” 2002 10 and 12 вересня, 113-114). http://newright.primordial.org.ua/pavlychko.htm [3]

Павличко Д. (2012) Українська національна ідея : ст., виступи, інтерв’ю, док. Дмитро Павличко. Вид-во Соломії Павличко «Основи»

Stoyan, D. (2012) Проблема визначення поняття «нація» в контексті філософської спадщини Ю.Вассияна. Publications of the Dmytro Dontsov Research Center.

Stoyan, D. (2012a) Шевченка в історіософській концепції Ю. І. Вассияна. Publications of the Dmytro Dontsov Research Center.

Tismaneanu, V (2009) Fantasies of Salvation: Democracy, Nationalism, and Myth in Post-Communist Europe. Princeton University Press

Франко, Іван. Соціалізм і соціал-демократизм. (“Socialism and Social Democracy”) Originally published in «Житє і слово» in 1897 (Volume 6, number 4, pps 265-92)

Франко, Іван. Формальний і реальний націоналізм. (“Formal and Real Nationalism”) Published in the Lv’iv Newspaper Forward «Назустріч» in 1936. It also appears in his Collected Works, 1980, vol 27, pps 355-63

Kostash, Myrna (1998) “Inside the Copper Mountain.” In: The Doomed Bridegroom: A Memoir. New West Press, 34-70

Davies, Norman Richard (1972). White Eagle, Red Star: the Polish-Soviet War, 1919–20. Random House

Dmytro Doroshenko (1957) “A Survey of Ukrainian Historiography.” Annals of the Ukrainian Academy of Arts and Sciences in the US, 5-6(4): 262-74

Serhii Plokhy (2005) Unmaking Imperial Russia: Mykhailo Hrushevsky and the Writing of Ukrainian History. University of Toronto Press

 


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[3] http://newright.primordial.org.ua/pavlychko.htm: http://newright.primordial.org.ua/pavlychko.htm

samedi, 13 décembre 2014

Gibt es im Schwarzen Meer Elefanten?

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Gibt es im Schwarzen Meer Elefanten?

F. William Engdahl

Nein, ich spreche nicht von den rosa Elefanten, die einem manchmal erscheinen können, wenn man ein bisschen zu tief ins Glas geschaut hat. Im Jargon der Ölindustrie sind Elefanten neu entdeckte Ölfelder mit mehr als 100 Millionen Barrel förderbarem Rohöl. Manche Geologen westlicher Ölgesellschaften behaupten, solche »Elefanten« seien mittlerweile ausgerottet, und das wiederum sei ein Zeichen dafür, dass die Ölreserven der Welt weitgehend erschöpft seien. Die Realität zeigt jedoch immer deutlicher das Gegenteil.

Der renommierte niederländische Erdöl-Ökonom Peter Odell hat einmal gesagt, das Öl gehe uns nicht aus, sondern uns fließe ständig neues Öl entgegen … wo immer wir danach suchten. Jetzt gibt es offenbar im Schwarzen Meer reihenweise Elefanten mit Milliarden Barrel Rohöl.

Rumänien, das oft als der kranke Mann in der EU betrachtet wird, hat kürzlich entdeckt, dass es vielleicht gar nicht so arm ist wie gedacht. 2011 erhielt das Geologie-Büro Purvin & Gertz den Auftrag, potenzielle Ölfelder vor der Küste zu erkunden. Damals entdeckten Israel, Zypern und andere Länder gerade riesige Öl- und Gasfelder im östlichen Mittelmeer.

Die Tests ergaben für Rumänien gute geophysikalische Aussichten in den Gewässern vor der Küste. 2012 gaben der US-Ölkonzern ExxonMobil und die rumänische Ölgesellschaf OMV Petrom die Ergebnisse für Domino-1, Rumäniens erste Aufschlussbohrung in 930 Metern Tiefe, bekannt. Bestätigt wurde ein Erdgaslager von rund drei Billionen Kubikfuß (Tcf, nach dem englischen »trillion cubic feet«), der größte Erdgasfund in der Geschichte des Unternehmens.

Durch mögliche Territorialstreitigkeiten mit Bulgarien wurde die weitere Entwicklung in dem Gebiet gebremst. Aufmerksamkeit erregte allerdings, dass Domino-1 nur eine von fünf geologisch ähnlichen Strukturen vor der rumänischen Schwarzmeerküste ist.

Mehr lesen:

http://info.kopp-verlag.de/hintergruende/geostrategie/f-william-engdahl/gibt-es-im-schwarzen-meer-elefanten-.html

vendredi, 12 décembre 2014

Crimes de guerre du gouvernement de Kiev?

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Crimes de guerre du gouvernement de Kiev?

Le 4 décembre , au cours d’une adresse à la nation depuis la salle des fêtes du Kremlin, Vladimir  Poutine a fait un discours qui a scandalisé la plupart des médias européens et américains qui l’ont, de nouveau, présenté comme un dangereux autocrate menaçant la paix du monde. Pourtant, Poutine s’est contenté de défendre les intérêts de la Russie. Mais il semblerait que, pour les dirigeants occidentaux, le patriotisme russe soit le seul au monde à ne pas être autorisé. En revanche, les exactions du gouvernement ”démocratique” de Kiev contre les populations civiles russophones de l’est sont non seulement minimisées, voire ignorées et jamais condamnées mais encouragées. En ne les dénonçant pas, les gouvernements européens, complices passifs ou actifs, se déshonorent.  

 Le nouveau gouvernement ukrainien, marionnette de la CIA?

Le gouvernement ukrainien envoie son armée et ses mercenaires pour massacrer les populations civiles, avec plus de 100 morts par jour. Mais il est béni par le ”démocratisme” occidental. Pourtant la démarche est la même que celle de Bachar el-Assad. Poutine a d’abord rappelé, ce qui est une évidence, que la crise ukrainienne a été provoquée par Washington et l’UE en favorisant un quasi coup d’État anti-russe en Ukraine. Le gouvernement actuel de Kiev, entre les mains de Iatseniouk et Porochenko peut être considéré comme un gouvernement obéissant aux ordres de Washington.  « Même sans la Crimée et l’Ukraine, les Etats-Unis et leurs alliés auraient inventé autre chose pour freiner les opportunités de la Russie. Et cette manière de faire ne date pas d’hier » a déclaré Poutine.  Son analyse est sensée.

La preuve évidente de la soumission du gouvernement de Kiev à Washington est l’incroyable décision – unique au monde – d’ouvrir les rangs des ministres aux étrangers, en particulier ceux qui sont pro-américains. C’est dire le degré d’obéissance du président Porochenko et de son Premier ministre Iatseniouk  aux instructions de Washington. Trois nouveaux ministres ont été dans l’urgence naturalisés ukrainiens : Natalia Iaresko, aux Finances, qui a fait sa carrière…au département d’État de Washington. Aivaras Arbomavicius, lituanien, devient ministre de l’Économie ; on sait que l’élite des pays baltes, hyper atlantiste, est travaillée par la russophobie – tout comme en Pologne et en Géorgie. Sandro Kvitachvili, ancien ministre de la Santé de Géorgie, devient celui de l’Ukraine.    

Le gouvernement ukrainien, présenté comme un modèle de démocratie, est en réalité autoritariste et coutumier des coups de force : le nouveau cabinet a été intronisé sans aucun discours de politique générale, au mépris de l’usage constitutionnel. Il faut dire que ” le pays est en guerre” et qu’il y a urgence. Effectivement, une armée ukrainienne, aussi brutale que peu professionnelle, est en train, dans l’indifférence occidentale, de faire la guerre aux populations civiles du Donbass.

Guerre aux populations civiles

Ce qui est soigneusement dissimulé, c’est que le pouvoir de Kiev, issu de la ”révolution” de Maïdan (coup d’État), poussé par ses sponsors occidentaux, commet au su et au vu de tous ce qu’il faut bien qualifier de crimes de guerre – au sens des conventions internationales – en bombardant à l’artillerie les populations civiles ukrainiennes russophones (et pas seulement !) de Donetsk et du Donbass, sous prétexte de lutte militaire contre les milices séparatistes pro-russes. La situation des populations civiles dans le Donbass, en proie à l’hiver rigoureux qui s’installe, est dramatique, sous les tirs d’artillerie aveugles de l’armée de Kiev. Le ravitaillement n’est plus assuré, les gens se réfugient dans les caves, des centaines d’immeubles et de maisons sont détruits. Selon l’ONU le conflit a  déjà fait, d’après le bilan de novembre, 4.300 morts, à 90% civils. Le viol des trêves et des cessez-le-feu par les soldats et miliciens  de Kiev est  permanent. 

Kiev entend venger la Crimée par une « opération antiterroriste ». (1) L’armée est épaulée par des bandes de mercenaires payées par des oligarques protégés de Washington, pour reconquérir le Donbass. Le régime de Porochenko a cessé de verser les salaires et les retraites, ce qui a fait basculer dans le camp séparatiste pro-russe les populations qui étaient encore favorables à l’Ukraine.

Dores et déjà, le maintien dans l’Ukraine des provinces sud-est de ce pays est définitivement compromis. Peut-on rester fidèle à un régime et à un pays qui vous envoie des obus ? Au départ, favorables à une simple autonomie par rapport à Kiev et nullement extrémistes, les populations sont scandalisées par le comportement des troupes ukrainiennes qui sont, en réalité, les véritables ”terroristes” et qui bombardent même les écoles. On notera la scandaleuse discrétion des ONG et autres associations humanitaires internationales (on sait qui les oriente) sur le sort tragique des populations ukrainiennes de l’est. On notera aussi que les médias occidentaux, pour excuser ces massacres, parlent de ”frappes collatérales”, de bavures involontaires en sorte.

Est-ce l’armée russe qui tue des civils ? En 1999, était-ce l’aviation russe qui bombardait Belgrade et les villages de Serbie ? Depuis la fin de la Deuxième guerre mondiale, en Europe, (sans parler des autres régions du monde) d’où proviennent les opérations militaires ?    

Dans cette affaire, où le gouvernement ukrainien viole allègrement la Charte de l’ONU, on remarquera le silence de cette dernière. Elle s’explique par la position du secrétaire général, le Coréen Ban Ki-moon, créature des Américains. Pour dire les choses clairement, ce n’est pas M. Poutine mais l’actuel gouvernement ukrainien, issu d’un coup d’État habilement maquillé sous le rimel de la ”démocratie”, qui tombe sous le coup du droit pénal international. MM. Porochenko et Iatseniouk, tout comme M. Milosevic jadis, pourraient parfaitement être inculpés de crimes de guerre auprès du Tribunal international de La Haye. Qui pensera à porter plainte ? C’est juridiquement possible. Il faut le faire.

La France molle et l’Allemagne soumise

 François Hollande, éternellement indécis, ne sait pas sur quel pied danser. D’un côté il veut calmer le jeu et apaiser la Russie, conscient de la catastrophe que représente pour la France le report aux calendes grecques de la livraison des BPC Vladivostok et Sébastopol. De l’autre, il n’ose pas désobéir aux pressions antirusses de l’UE et de Washington pour le blocus et les sanctions, au mépris de la souveraineté de la France. Au contraire, Mme Merkel a durci (contrairement à l’intérêt économique de l’Allemagne) sa position contre Moscou, évidemment sous double pression américaine et polonaise. Hollande qui n’a, en cette matière comme dans aucune autre, pas la moindre stratégie et qui se contente de l’attentisme mou, a déclaré, au cours de sa récente visite au Kazakhstan, s’adressant implicitement à Poutine : « nous devons essayer d’engager un processus de désescalade, d’abord verbal, ensuite des mouvements qui se produisent en Ukraine ». Mais c’est au gouvernement ukrainien qu’il devrait dire cela, seul responsable de l’”escalade” et qui a violé le protocole de Minsk de septembre 2014 d’arrêt des combats ! 

En rentrant d’Asie centrale, le 7 décembre, Hollande a brièvement rencontré Poutine à l’aéroport de Vnoukovo, près de Moscou. Ce dernier a été d’une extrême amabilité et il compte sur la France pour désamorcer la tension et faire lever les sanctions. Malheureusement, Angela Merkel, de manière irresponsable, depuis le G20 de Brisbane agit comme si, sur injonction du Department of State, elle voulait continuer de provoquer la Russie et d’entretenir cette ”nouvelle guerre froide”, calamité pour l’Europe et uniquement profitable aux USA et à la Chine. Dans une interview à Die Welt am Sonntag, elle vient d’accuser Moscou  de « déstabiliser l’Europe de l’est », notamment, en plus de l’Ukraine, la Moldavie et la Géorgie. Pures inventions auxquelles s’ajoute cette déclaration qui laisse pantois : elle s’inquiète des « tentatives de la Russie pour accroître son influence dans les Balkans ».

Donc la Russie, pays européen, n’est pas autorisée à exercer une influence en Europe ? Même auprès des slavo-orthodoxes ? Les USA, eux, – et la Chancelière ne s’en inquiète pas – sont parfaitement autorisés non seulement à ”exercer une influence” en Europe mais à imposer une domination voyante et directe, qui passe par les bombes (Serbie), les traités inégaux, l’interventionnisme financier ou militaire (Pays baltes, Pologne, Géorgie, Ukraine), le lobbying agressif et les pressions les plus diverses. Mme Merkel retrouve ce tropisme allemand de la soumission à Washington avec lequel Schroeder avait voulu rompre. Elle reprend la fable de l’”impérialisme russe”. Franchissant un pas supplémentaire dans la provocation antirusse, le député européen polonais Iachek Sarius Volski a appelé le gouvernement français à livrer les BPC ”Mistral” à la marine ukrainienne ! 

Quoi qu’il en soit, une plainte pour crimes de guerre auprès du TPI  contre les responsables du gouvernement de Kiev doit être envisagée par les victimes et les instances habilitées. On verra bien si elle est reçue et cela ferait avancer les choses et bouger les lignes.

Note:

(1) À propos de la Crimée, terre russe qui est revenue à la Fédération de Russie sans violence militaire et à la suite d’un référendum : comparons avec le nord de l’île de Chypre, envahie militairement par la Turquie et annexée. Cela n’a donné lieu à aucun scandale international. Au contraire, on a continué à négocier pour l’entrée de la Turquie dans l’UE, qui occupe un de ses États membres ! Deux poids, deux mesures.    

mercredi, 10 décembre 2014

What Eastern Europe Can Teach the West

What Eastern Europe Can Teach the West

A report from Ukraine and Hungary

By John Morgan

Ex: http://neweuropeanconservative.wordpress.com

Introductory Note: Our audience should keep in mind that this article was written on May 2, 2014, and was written from a limited perspective. Therefore, it does not take into account the many negative consequences of the Ukrainian revolution which occurred in later months due to the anti-Russian chauvinism of the Western Ukrainian government. However, despite this issue, John Morgan presents many valid points on philosophical and strategic matters, and it is for that reason that we choose to republish it here. – Daniel Macek (Editor of the “New European Conservative”)

John.pngBefore I begin, I want to make a disclaimer. I’ll be discussing a number of groups that I’ve had contact with, but I don’t want that to be seen as an unqualified endorsement of any of their programs or policies. I think that all of them are interesting, but I’m not here to act as a spokesman or promoter for any of them.

I’ll begin by describing two scenes that I witnessed in January of this year. The first was in Kiev, in the Ukraine, the night I first arrived, as I was approaching the Maidan, or Independence Square, in the center of the city. From far away, I could smell the smoke wafting from the many barrel fires used by those camped out on the Maidan for warmth and for cooking. As I got closer, I could hear the sounds from the speakers attached to the stage that had been set up by the revolutionaries. As I was to learn later, the revolutionary committee maintained a 24/7 schedule on the Maidan. Whether one ventured there at 4:00 in the afternoon or 4:00 in the morning, there was always something happening: either a speaker, a musical performance, a patriotic drama, or some such thing. This was true of the entire Maidan: It was just as bustling in the middle of the night as during the middle of the day. The protesters wanted to make sure that the government understood that their rage was not a passing phenomenon.

When I reached the square, I could see that it had been transformed into an enormous, self-sufficient city of tents and other makeshift structures. This miniature city-within-a-city extended for many blocks in both directions, to the barricades that had been hastily set up against the police the previous month and that were still being guarded by volunteers. Occupy Wall Street had nothing on these guys. Hundreds of activists had been living there for over a month, in the middle of winter, and would continue to do so for many weeks thereafter, knowing full well that the police might attack them at any moment and possibly even kill them. Some of them are still camped there as I speak. Flags and patriotic slogans festooned everything. There was no doubt in my mind, as I surveyed the scene, that change was inevitable.

The other image I want to convey is something I saw only a few days later, in Budapest, Hungary. I was invited to the Annual Congress of the nationalist party Jobbik, or the Movement for a Better Hungary, the only party in Hungary today that stands as a serious rival to the ruling Center-Right party, Fidesz. The Congress was held in an indoor sports arena on the western outskirts of the city.

When I arrived, the first startling fact was that, unlike most events of a similar nature that I’d attended in Western Europe or the U.S., there were no protesters. It came as a surprise to me that views considered “extreme” in the West are usually considered normal in the East. The second startling thing was the size of the audience. This wasn’t a hundred or so people, as is typical for nationalist-related events I attend. This was an entire arena that could seat thousands. In addition to the bleachers, the floor had been filled with chairs. Both were filled to capacity.

The day’s program consisted of speakers and musical acts, with many of the speakers and performers beginning their presentations with the cry of “Talpra, Magyar!” which was always echoed by the audience. This means, “Arise, Hungarians!” and are the opening words of the poem, “National Song,” that was written by the Hungarian poet Sandor Petofi for the 1848 revolution. The enthusiasm of the participants was palpable: They were motivated to save their people. And this is no marginal phenomenon. Three months later, in the national parliamentary elections, Jobbik went on to win over 20 percent of the vote and establish itself as the second-most powerful party in the nation.

 

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My immediate reaction to the events both in Kiev and Budapest was the same: “Something like this could never happen in Western Europe or the United States.” But the main thing that these experiences taught me is that concern for the future of our people, which I was accustomed to seeing consigned to the margins of society, is no fringe subculture in Eastern Europe. There, nationalism—by which I mean genuine nationalism, and not what masquerades under that name in America today under the auspices of Fox News and such—is still very much a mainstream phenomenon.

What Is Happening in Ukraine

I don’t want to discuss the politics of the Ukrainian situation in great detail, since there has already been so much written and said about it. The one comment I’ll make is that, outside of Ukraine, it is always framed as a dispute over geopolitics: Russia or the EU. I can say only that, while that was certainly a catalyst, that was not the main issue for most of the people I talked to. For them, the Maidan movement was about getting rid of the Yanukovich regime, which was seen pretty much universally, as far as I could tell, as corrupt, anti-democratic, and self-serving. And certainly, the activists I talked with were more interested in ensuring the existence of an independent Ukraine as opposed to one that was merely a vassal of Washington, Brussels, or Moscow.

I was invited to speak to the Kiev revolutionary council by some friends in the nationalist party Svoboda, or “Freedom,” who were familiar with my work with Arktos. In the last election in 2012, Svoboda won more than 10 percent of the national vote, and is likely to do much better in the upcoming election, so, like Jobbik, it is more than a marginal phenomenon. Svoboda’s platform is one of anti-liberalism and anti-Communism, as well as opposition to immigration, and it calls for a return to spiritual and traditional values. (As a side note, I’ll mention that I was informed that the term “European values” is code for “traditional values” in Ukraine, which is understood to mean those values that prevailed before Communism and, later, liberal rule.)

My speech was held in the Kiev city council building, which is just off the Maidan. Members of Svoboda had stormed and occupied the building a month earlier, in early December, and it had been converted into a revolutionary headquarters. Different areas of the building had been assigned to the various political parties involved in the Maidan, and Svoboda itself occupied the main hall. Once the guards at the entrance let me in, I was greeted by the strong smell of a building in which many men were living, but which obviously hadn’t been cleaned for some time. I went there several times, both during the day and at night, and people were always busy at work on something related to the Maidan. For me, it was a unique, inspirational experience to be at the nerve center of a revolution in progress.

In the main hall, chairs had been set up auditorium style so that those volunteering on the Maidan could sit and rest during breaks. Films were projected on a screen at the front of the hall, most of them about activists who had been tortured or killed by the police. Off to one side of the hall, next to a Christmas tree, was a collection of sleeping bags, where Svoboda’s volunteers got some rest whenever they could.

Many of these people came from other parts of Ukraine, and had been away from their families and friends for weeks, just to serve the cause of the Maidan. The walls were adorned with the flags of the various parties, as well as the image of Stepan Bandera, the founder of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists that had opposed the Soviets in the mid-twentieth century, and who continues to serve as an inspiration to nationalist activists today. Once again, I was impressed by the austerities these people were willing to undergo for the sake of their people.

My own talk was on “European Values and European Patriotic Movements.” In essence, I said that the most important issue facing the Maidan wasn’t Ukraine’s geopolitical orientation, but rather how best it could orient itself to combat liberalism. To underscore my point, I outlined some of the many horrors that liberalism has wrought in North America and Western Europe in recent decades. My talk seemed to be well-received, and many people approached me afterwards with questions. It became apparent that while some Ukrainians still aspire to the mirage of the lifestyle that they imagine we have here in America and Western Europe, many of them also understand that America today represents something that should be avoided at all costs.

I’ll mention another anecdote from that evening. After my talk, a rumor started to spread through the Maidan that the police were going to storm it that very night. This turned out to be false, but we had no way of knowing that. An old man who had listened to my speech approached me and asked, “Aren’t you afraid of being beaten?” At first I laughed, but upon reflection, I realized that what he was suggesting was a real possibility. As one of my Ukrainian friends had told me, “Once they find out you have an American passport, they’ll let you go, but if they come charging in here with truncheons they’re not going to bother to ask you first.”

 

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I realized that I had never had to think about such a thing before. I’ve been publicly associated with what could be loosely termed the “New Right” for about seven years now, but I’d never had to worry about much more than being heckled by antifa or getting an occasional nasty e-mail. But here I was faced with the prospect of actual, physical violence. Had the police attacked that night, would I have been able to stand firm, as so many others did at the Maidan, in the face of the possibility of being injured or killed? I hope and believe that the answer is yes, although I have no way of knowing for certain until the moment actually comes.

This brought home for me the fact that activism for us in the West tends to be something very abstract, a battle waged in the pages of journals or in online comments sections rather than on the streets. In the East, it still has a very palpable, existential character, with real and immediate consequences. I think this is something that we would do well to keep in mind as we go about our activities. Identity is not an idea, but something we embody and live, and as such, it should be something visible in the world around us, insofar as we have the ability to affect it. The struggle in the world of ideas is important, certainly, but ultimately this is not merely a debate, but an attempt to reshape and redefine the world—a world that is always going to fight back.

No matter how one looks at it, there are certainly aspects of what has been happening in Ukraine since the revolution that are worrisome—as in any revolution, I suppose. Nevertheless, when viewed from the perspective of European nationalism, I think the fact that, regardless of whatever one thinks of the ends they were pursuing, thousands of ordinary Ukrainians were willing to give up their time and comforts for the sake of living in tents for months, and to risk their lives for the sake of their nation—and certainly without the sense that they were being manipulated by outside forces—is something that should inspire anyone looking for real nationalist activism in the world today.

The Story of Jobbik

The story of Jobbik is much less dramatic, since it is a traditional political party pursuing power through the democratic process in Hungary, and the political situation there is quite stable at the moment. What makes Jobbik particularly interesting is the degree of its success and the ideas it propagates. Thus far I have encountered nothing like it in European politics. Jobbik was founded just over a decade ago, in 2003, and when it fought its first election in 2006, it won less than 2 percent of the vote. As I mentioned before, in this month’s election Jobbik won more than 20 percent of the vote, which, in terms of sheer numbers, ranks it as the most successful nationalist party in Europe apart from the National Front in France.

I believe Jobbik has attained this success by appealing to the growing dissatisfaction of many Hungarians with their membership in the European Union, since exiting the EU is one of the planks of the party’s platform. Increasingly, Hungarians are beginning to see the EU as nothing more than a way for the major Western European powers to amass cheap labor while Hungarians see few benefits in return. Likewise, many Hungarians, especially in the countryside, are beginning to worry about the gradual erosion of their traditional values and customs. Jobbik stands for a return to those values, and plans to increase incentives for Hungarians who are working abroad to come home, and to ensure that immigration, which is currently not a major factor in Hungarian society, stays that way. Jobbik also makes an issue out of the international capitalist system, which it claims is the primary force eroding all cultures and traditions in the world today. Jobbik favors a return to a more locally-based economic model.

Much of the rest of Jobbik’s program is highly unorthodox. Jobbik favors stronger ties with Turkey, Russia and Germany, all of which have been Hungary’s historical enemies, but which Jobbik sees as essential for constructing a bulwark against the continuing encroachment of American and Western European liberalism, under the auspices of NATO and the EU. Notable in this regard is Jobbik’s close cooperation with the Eurasia Movement in Russia of Professor Alexander Dugin, which is worth discussing in its own right.

Professor Dugin has long been an unofficial adviser to Vladimir Putin and the Kremlin, in addition to his prodigious work as an author (my own Arktos publishes his books in English) and as a professor at Moscow State University. All of his work is directed at combating the prevalence and proliferation of liberalism throughout the world, and is unique in that he is one of the few to attempt to apply the ideas of the European “New Right,” as embodied by such thinkers as Alain de Benoist, to geopolitics. The spiritual traditionalism and perennial philosophy that was originally taught by figures such as René Guénon and Julius Evola is also central to his thought. Many of Jobbik’s writings, programs and public statements show the influence of Professor Dugin and his work.

One of the most controversial aspects of Jobbik’s program is its desire for alliances with Asia and the Middle East, and the Islamic world in particular. Jobbik views the anti-Islamic stance assumed by many other nationalist parties in Europe as an error. Jobbik’s leader, Gábor Vona, said in a widely publicized statement last year that the Islamic world is the best hope in the world today to combat liberalism—although what is usually left out is the rest of that sentence, in which he said, “and I say that as a Catholic.” This statement alarmed many, but it has usually been misrepresented, since Mr. Vona has made it clear elsewhere that he doesn’t favor immigration from Islamic countries into Europe, doesn’t favor the Islamicization of Europe, and doesn’t think Turkey belongs in the EU.

Jobbik’s attitude is consistent with the metaphysical perspective of the aforementioned traditionalism of Guénon and Evola, which holds that all traditional religions share a common core and that all stand in opposition to liberalism and the excesses of the modern world. I don’t think it’s possible to understand Jobbik without some understanding of traditionalism. After Jobbik’s congress in January, I spoke with a man who was introduced to me as one of their top ideologues, who said to me, “Politics is nothing; traditionalism is everything!”

One of the party’s major magazines, Magyar Hüperión, contains translated essays by the central thinkers of traditionalism (including Guénon, Evola and Frithjof Schuon), along with articles on politics from a traditionalist perspective. Traditionalism is one of the major elements of Jobbik’s worldview, so one can understand Mr. Vona’s statements only in those terms. When he calls Islam one of the major forces that can combat liberal values—as can all traditional faiths—he does so in reference to Islam as a religion, rather than as a call for an alliance with the more radical and distasteful elements of political Islamism and jihad.

Why Not Here?

Why can’t nationalist movements be successful here? I think the answer is simply that the cultural foundations for such movements are still present in Eastern Europe while they have long since been eroded here. Whatever one may think about the Soviet Union, for half a century the Iron Curtain prevented Cultural Marxism and the worst excesses of liberalism from penetrating into the East. Thus, those societies remained ethnically cohesive and retained a strong sense of national identity, and even their religious institutions, while officially suppressed, only grew in strength by being cast into a dissenting role. Those are the factors upon which any sense of a national or ethnic culture must be founded. This is not to say that liberal trends that threaten to cancel out this advantage are not taking root in Eastern Europe. They are–particularly in the urban areas. But the rot hasn’t yet proceeded to the point where change has become impossible.

So the question is: What can Eastern Europe teach the West? Since the vital foundations of identity, culture and religion have already largely evaporated in any real sense, what is left for us? The situation is dire.

Nevertheless, I think Eastern Europe, and also what I have seen taking place in my own publishing house Arktos, can be instructive. My conclusion is that if any progress is to be made, we need to approach the problem culturally, and in terms of ideas, rather than politically. Any political movement is doomed to failure unless it can reflect the desires of a large number of its community. At the moment, what we are offering is not what most of our people desire. For that to change, we have to influence the culture. This is what the European “New Right” has been saying for nearly half a century now. Little attempt has been made to put this into practice, but I think this is the way forward. More importantly, I think we need to inspire the passions and imaginations of our people, which we have also been failing to do.

The Identitarian movement, which has been extremely popular among the youth in Europe in recent years is, in my view, the first spark of such a development. The Identitarians have shed the old language and hang-ups of conservatism without sacrificing its values, and are winning popularity by adopting many of the tactics of the radical Left: street-level activism, snazzy videos, and the like. In short, it’s cool. Also, the Identitarians have recognized what the core issue really is: identity, going beyond mere politics and ideology to something visceral. People can feel what it is to be a Hungarian or a Frenchman—it is something obvious. It’s not something that needs to be expressed in words or concepts.

 

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Identitarianism is good for Europe, and I have hope for it; the problem is how to transfer it to the United States. What sense of identity do the majority of those of European descent have in America today? Perhaps here in the South, something still remains of the venerable Southern tradition that could still be revived. But the situation in the rest of the country seems hopelessly tragic.

Identity has become a matter of consumerism: your identity is the slogan on your shirt or which television series you like. Appeals to the benefits of the American identity of the 1950s or earlier, for most Americans today, is something as foreign and unappealing as asking them to assume the identity of ancient Egyptians. Some have suggested “white nationalism” as a solution to this problem. For me, this is insufficient, first because it’s a slippery concept in itself, and also because I find it hard to become enthusiastic about the idea that I’m “white.” A Hungarian or a Pole or a Swede has an entire history and tradition to look back on. “Whiteness,” to my mind, is too vague.

If Americans don’t have an identity to draw on, what remains? We still have the remaining factors of culture and religion to consider. Again, Eastern Europe is still rich in these things, and they are what form the basis of nationalist politics there. In America today, all we have is consumer culture and liberal platitudes. The heady days of America’s early years, which produced such wonders as Transcendentalism and the American Renaissance in literature, are long gone. And most of what passes for “religion” these days is either thoroughly compromised by liberalism or else thoroughly moronic—often both.

But what I have observed through my dealings with Arktos’ readers is that there is a great hunger, especially among young people, for new perspectives on culture, politics, and religion that are suffused with the authentic values of the traditional West, to give them something to aspire to. What they want, I believe, are new ideas and myths to inspire them and to give them a sense of purpose.

This does not mean merely conservatism in a new guise; what is wanted is more radical thinking, in the sense of going beyond the limits of what is normally considered Right-wing. In some cases, it may even involve synthesizing ideas and approaches more traditionally identified with the Left. Likewise, conservatism in the West has decayed to the point that even much of what would normally have been traditional or “Right-wing” in Western thought in previous eras now seems new and revolutionary if presented in the proper way.

It should be clear by now that the ideals that first took root in the 1960s and that have dominated our society ever since are becoming more and more shopworn. The reality that young people see around them today is full of evidence of the failures of the attempts to enact these ideals. More to the point, they are growing tired of hearing these same old catchwords trotted out again and again. I firmly believe that the cultural vigor of the West as a whole is passing, if it hasn’t already passed, from the Left to the Right. By this I don’t mean the Republican Right, which is just as liberal as its opposition, but rather what Evola termed the “true Right”—the Right founded on the timeless principles and traditions of our people.

If we continue to offer fresh perspectives in an intriguing manner, and if people continue to respond to them, I think the rest will follow. It is not enough to offer a critical, purely negative view of our civilization as presently constituted. We must offer a positive, constructive alternative vision of what we want that can be attractive to people, and that indicates to ourselves where we want to be heading.

In our own modest way in Arktos, we are trying to offer the appetizers to inspire a greater hunger in our people for a more authentic mode of living and being. Books about the realities of race and of social trends are important, and we must continue to promote them. However, I think it is even more important to offer new ideas in politics, culture, philosophy and religion, and also to produce more creative works that reflect our worldview: fiction, poetry, art, music, videos, and hopefully one day even fully-fledged films. Nothing can inspire people more than a creative vision with which they can readily identify. I hope many more groups will follow in Arktos’ footsteps in this regard.

I’ve mentioned religion, and I think I should delve into this briefly. This isn’t universal, but I have noticed a distinct attraction among many young people towards more traditional forms of spirituality and the sorts of books that Arktos publishes in this area. Traditionalism is certainly part of that. I think this is only natural, since religion at its best offers one of the last refuges of authenticity amidst a society that has become mostly plastic and virtual. And certainly many of the most highly motivated movements and activists I have known on the Right have drawn their sense of purpose, at least in part, from a sense of the spiritual.

This is particularly true of Jobbik. I think the sacred must be an integral part of any attempt to forge a new nationalist culture. This is not to say that we should attempt to propagate a specific religion, as I think such an effort could create divisions, but the cultivation of authentic forms of spirituality, provided that they are consistent with our own norms and values, is a worthy undertaking. A spiritual sense of purpose is the most highly effective way to inoculate oneself against the diseases and temptations of the liberal world.

john-morgan-alain-de-benoist.jpgPhoto: John Morgan with Alain de Benoist

Hopefully, all this will lead to something corporate America learned was the key to power decades ago: the creation of a subculture, and the identity that follows from that. And, given the right circumstances, a subculture can very quickly influence the prevailing culture. If this happens, it might not even be necessary to have a political movement as such—the perspectives we offer will become commonplace and second-nature—in effect, an identity, and society will be inevitably transformed as a result. I realize this may sound overly idealistic, but the power of ideas and cultural forms should never be underestimated.

In conclusion, then, I’ll say that what Eastern Europe has shown me is that the political struggle is only the outward form of a battle that is really more cultural, and culture rests on what lies within each individual who participates in it. In order to be willing to sacrifice the comforts of home and camp out in the freezing cold, or to risk being hit by a policeman’s baton, a solid sense of identity is required.

Unfortunately, what Eastern European nationalists are born and instilled with is something that we must strive to create for ourselves, if we want to form the basis of something capable of transforming the societies we live in. And once we have achieved that for ourselves, we will provide an example that others will strive to imitate. As that great politician Gandhi once said, “If we could change ourselves, the tendencies in the world would also change. As a man changes his own nature, so does the attitude of the world change towards him. We need not wait to see what others do.” I think we can do this.

————–

Morgan, John. “What Eastern Europe Can Teach the West.” American Renaissance, 2 May 2014. <http://www.amren.com/features/2014/05/what-eastern-europe-can-teach-the-west/ >.

 

dimanche, 07 décembre 2014

Abandon de South Stream?

South_Stream_map.png

Abandon de South Stream?

L'Europe perdante sur tous les tableaux

par Jean Paul Baquiast

Ex: http://www.europesolidaire.eu

Le chantier South Stream avait été lancé en décembre 2012, bien avant le conflit russo-ukrainien à l'initiative des groupes russe Gazprom et italien ENI. L'objectif du projet South Stream était au départ de diversifier les routes du gaz russe en contournant l'Ukraine par où transite actuellement près de la moitié des livraisons russes vers l'Union européenne.
 
 
South Stream devait relier sur 3.600 km la Russie à la Bulgarie en passant sous la mer Noire, et via la Serbie, la Croatie, la Slovénie et la Hongrie, arriver en Autriche. Le coût de la construction du gazoduc qui avait été évalué à 23 milliards d'euros par le russe Gazprom, majoritaire dans la société South Stream aux côtés de ENI et EDF notamment, a finalement été estimé à 32 milliards d'euros. South Stream devait entrer en service en 2016.

Aujourd'hui, Gazprom veut substituer à South Stream un nouveau gazoduc vers la Turquie, d'une même capacité de 63 milliards de M3 par an. Ce projet a été entériné par Moscou à la suite d'une visite de Vladimir Poutine à Ankara le 1er décembre. Moscou justifie l'arrêt du projet South Stream dans sa configuration initiale par l'opposition de Bruxelles au passage du gazoduc sur le territoire de ses Etats membres, et notamment sur celui de la Bulgarie. L'Union européenne, de l'avis général, a cédé aux pressions américaines visant à bloquer South Stream au profit de voies à construire que contrôleront les intérêts américains. Mais le parcours de celles-ci n'a pas encore été déterminé, compte tenu de rivalités entre les Etats européens susceptibles d'être traversés. Son financement n'est pas encore négocié.

Vladimir Poutine, à Ankara, a indiqué que le gazoduc de substitution à South Stream allait voir le jour. Il viendra doubler le Blue stream, qui achemine déjà le gaz russe vers la Turquie en passant sous la mer Noire. Un système de distribution de gaz sera construit à la frontière gréco-turque. Le marché turc est, pour Gazprom, le débouché le plus important après l'Allemagne.

Dépendante par ailleurs à 50 % du gaz russe, la Turquie veut s'en affranchir en construisant 80 centrales thermiques (dont une vingtaine au charbon) et trois centrales nucléaires. Le géant russe Rosatom a emporté l'appel d'offres pour construire la première de celle-ci, celle d'Akkuyu, dans la région de Mersin, au sud. Ce contrat est d'une valeur de 20 milliards de dollars. Autant de milliards dont Areva devra faire son deuil, à supposer qu'elle ait eu des espoirs en ce sens.

Un abandon qui pourrait ne pas être définitif

Cependant, les dommages que ressentirait l'Union européenne d'un abandon par la Russie du projet South Stream seraient tels que les ministres de l'Energie des pays participant au projet South Stream se réuniront mardi 9 décembre à Bruxelles afin d'évaluer la situation. "Les opérations préparatoires n'ont pas été interrompues. Une nouvelle date a été fixée: celle du 9 décembre, pour une rencontre des ministres de l'Energie de South Stream. Cette rencontre aura lieu et permettra, je l'espère, de régler certaines questions, y compris concernant le 3e paquet énergie. Par ailleurs, il faut espérer que les relations entre l'Union européenne et la Russie se normaliseront finalement » a déclaré le premier ministre bulgare Boïko Borissov lors d'une conférence de presse conjointe avec le président de la Commission européenne Jean-Claude Juncker.

Selon lui, son gouvernement n'a pas reçu de note officielle sur l'abandon du projet par la Russie. Ceci permettrait de se mettre d'accord sur la réalisation du projet South Stream. La question du 3e paquet énergie désigne une des subtilités qui empêche l'Europe de se comporter « normalement » sur le marché international de l'énergie. Le Troisième paquet de libéralisation du marché de l'énergie interdit aux sociétés de production de gaz de posséder les gazoducs de transport sur le territoire de l'Union européenne.

Lune de miel entre la Turquie et la Russie

En attendant, l'effet des « sanctions » à l'encontre de la Russie, imposées par les Etats-Unis à l'Europe, se révèle doublement négatif pour cette dernière. Non seulement elle perd les bénéfices économiques et politiques que devait, malgré son coût, lui apporter le projet South Stream, mais elle voit la Turquie se rapprocher, sans doute durablement de la Russie, alors que ses propres relations avec Ankara se sont sérieusement refroidies du fait de la mise en sommeil de négociations visant à permettre l'entrée de la Turquie dans l'Union.

Apparemment, la Russie ne craint pas que, sous l'influence turque, des mouvements autonomistes musulmans se renforcent en son sein ou à sa périphérie. Des engagements turcs destinés à les prévenir auraient été obtenus, tant et si bien que de nouvelles mosquées financées par la Turquie pourraient être construites en Crimée. En échange, Ankara abandonnerait ses efforts pour obtenir la chute de Bashar al Assad en Syrie, lequel Bashar est, rappelons-le, un allié stratégique de la Russie au Moyen-Orient.

La Turquie n'est pas seulement une puissance islamique dont les européens pouvaient à juste titre redouter l'influence sur leurs populations, mais une puissance économique. Qu'elle se tourne durablement vers la Russie, et peut-être aussi à cette occasion vers la Chine, membre du BRICS et de l'Organisation de coopération de Shanghai, entraînera des pertes considérables pour les européens. Au plan de leurs intérêts économiques, notamment allemands et français, mais aussi au plan politique. L'Union européenne sera ainsi de plus en plus isolée, alors que dans le même temps la diplomatie américaine négocie tous azimuts avec les Etats arabes du Golfe, mais aussi avec la Turquie et désormais la Syrie, sur le point de rentrer en grâce.

* Voir sur ces sujets l'article récent de Philippe Grasset
http://www.dedefensa.org/article-notes_sur_le_volte-quart_du_ma_tre_du_faire_a_kido__04_12_2014.html

 

Jean Paul Baquiast

jeudi, 04 décembre 2014

UCRANIA: LA LÓGICA EUROPA FRENTE A LA LÓGICA DE YALTA

ukr7407.jpg

UCRANIA: LA LÓGICA EUROPA FRENTE A LA LÓGICA DE YALTA.

Enrique Ravello
Ex: http://www.enricravellobarber.eu
 
Hace unos seis meses que la revuelta de la plaza de Maidán en Kiev, dio comienzo a una crisis en Ucrania, que lejos de haberse solucionado, se agrava y se prolonga en el tiempo, con el peligro de convertirse en una situación enquistada, que provoque inestabilidad crónica en esa zona crítica de Europa: quizás sea precisamente por esto, por lo que nadie parece interesado en terminar con las revueltas, hoy convertidas en conflicto pre-bélico.
 
Desde el inicio de los acontecimientos, venimos leyendo análisis que generalmente pecan de superficiales, reduciendo las complejas cuestiones que se dirimen en Ucrania a una simplista cuestión de “separatismos”, “unionismos” y “nacionalismos” (ucraniano frente a Rusia, o pro-ruso frente a Ucrania) y llegando a unas conclusiones siempre desde la perspectiva local e interesada, jugando con las ideas a las que remiten estos términos en la posición del analista –y no en la realidad del conflicto-; las frases: “Ucrania no es Cataluña” o “Ucrania sí es Cataluña” o “Rusia no es España” o “Crimea no es Cataluña”, dan muestras de lo miope de las posiciones y de la ausencia de un análisis real de la crisis ucraniana –y continental- sobre la que nadie ha querido o no ha sabido entrar en profundidad.
 
El juego real
 
En Ucrania se está jugando la partida de la estabilidad continental, el control de Estados Unidos, la posibilidad o no de que Europa occidental gane autonomía política y estratégica, y la repetición o no de la situación creada en Yalta frente a la alternativa de la creación y consolidación de un eje euro-ruso.
 
El escenario real es éste:
Se trata de un juego a tres bandas: Estados Unidos, Rusia y Alemania (que intenta que su posición sea unánime en la UE, algo que no logra conseguir).
 
Rusia y Alemania, que estarían de acuerdo en una Ucrania independiente, íntegra territorialmente (con el reconocimiento para una amplia autonomía de las minorías rusas) y neutral –es decir fuera de la OTAN– que sirviera de puente entre Europa occidental y Moscú.
Estados Unidos que busca la inestabilidad en esta zona para impedir esta posibilidad, actuando de forma manipuladora sobre el nacionalismo ucraniano –entre otras cosas– y que busca una Ucrania no sólo integrada en la UE, sino parte de la OTAN, con lo que se asegura la presencia militar en la frontera con Rusia, y eleva la sumisión y dependencia de la UE hacia la OTAN.
 
Sin embargo –como siempre ocurre– el esquema no es tan sencillo, tanto Alemania/UE, como Rusia, tienen contradicciones y tensiones internas que dificultan este entendimiento Berlín- Moscú.
 
Alemania no logra unificar la postura de la UE, de hecho Reino Unido comparte la estrategia norteamericana, y desde la llegada al poder de Sarkozy y hoy con Hollande, Francia ha dejado de apostar por una política autónoma en clave europea, para ser cada vez más una correa de transmisión de los intereses del Pentágono.
 
Tampoco en Rusia las posiciones son uniformes, desde 2011 observamos una tensión interna, con el aumento de influencia de una corriente que podríamos llamar “neosoviética”, que tiende a perpetuar la situación generada en Yalta: es decir reparto del continente europeo con EEUU y, por lo tanto, la reducción de Europa a la sumisión política a ambas potencias.
 
Referéndums y minorías rusas
 
El pasado 15 de marzo, viajé a Crimea junto a varios líderes del FPÖ, FN, VB, entre ellos Johann Gudenus, vice-presidente del FPÖ, Aymerich Chauprade, eurodiputado del FN, Franz Cleyermans, parlamentario del VB y otros eurodiputados polacos, italianos, letones y griegos, como observador internacional del referéndum que se celebraba en Crimea. La mayoría rusa de la región lo había convocado para volver a formar parte de Rusia y no seguir siendo una región de una Ucrania cada vez más hostil con la población rusa y cada vez más enfrentada con Moscú. Este referéndum dio una mayoría clara a favor de la reintegración a Rusia, terminando así con la anomalía generada por el dirigente soviético, el ucraniano, Nikita Kruschev, que en 1954 como muestra de “desestalinización”, “premió” (?) a Ucrania concediéndole varios territorios rusos: como siempre el comunismo, ignorando las realidades etno-culturales, las consecuencias ya las conocemos todos.
 
Semanas después otras regiones rusas bajo soberanía ucraniana (autoproclamadas Nueva Rusia), por obra y capricho de Kruschev, se revelaban contra Kiev y organizaban también consultas para unirse a Rusia. Si esta vez los resultados también han sido claros, ha variado el clima político: la respuesta de Kiev ha sido movilizar el ejército para ocupar esos territorios, con la aparente tolerancia de Moscú, que quizás piensa en sacrificar la voluntad política de esos compatriotas suyos, en aras a intentar o bien un diálogo con Alemania (lógica euro-rusa), o bien una alianza con el nuevo gobierno de Kiev (lógica de Yalta).
 
Elecciones en Ucrania: revolución naranja en diferido
 
Si el referéndum de Crimea, fue el segundo elemento de la crisis ucraniana, el primero fue la revuelta de la plaza Maidán contra el gobierno de Viktor Yanukovich.
 
Este fin de semana se han celebrado elecciones en Ucrania para cubrir el “vacío legal” generado tras la huida de Yanukovich y escoger “gobierno legítimo”, la victoria ha sido para el magnate oligarca, Petor Poroshenko; Vital Klitschko, su aliado, alcalde de Kiev y excampeón mundial de boxeo, ha dicho que su primer objetivo será desmantelar las barricadas de la plaza Miadán porque “ya han cumplido su función”, efectivamente, sin saberlo ni quererlo, las movilizaciones y duros sacrificios personales de los miembros de Svodoba y de Pravy Sektor, han servido para llevar a Kiev a un oligarca que pondrá a Ucrania a los pies del Mundialismo y el FMI y que -con su aproximación a la misma- contribuirá a una UE más sumisa a los Estados Unidos y más alejada de Rusia. Una jugada equivocada.
 
Al final, la llamada “revolución naranja” ideada y financiada por el especulador George Soros, ha triunfado, en su segundo intento.
 
La vía de solución: reforzar el eje euro-ruso.
 
La elección presidencial en Ucrania abre una nueva fase del conflicto. Por un lado, el papel del presidente Poroshenko, será el de la sumisión a la estrategia norteamericana de expansión de la influencia en la zona y acercamiento a la UE, entendida como prolongación norteamericana. Alemania y su canciller Merkel, intentará evitar un posicionamiento anti-ruso de la UE y la adopción de medidas sancionadoras a Moscú, porque sabe que la primera víctima de las mismas, es la propia Alemania, que quedaría tocada en materias de aprovisionamiento energético y perdería el importante mercado ruso.
 
Queda por ver si Rusia apuesta por la estratégica neosoviética -que pasa por un entendimiento tácito, pactando zonas de influencia con Estados Unidos- o por acercarse a Berlín y fortalecer el eje Rusia-Alemania /UE. Esperemos que en el Kremlin, se imponga esta segunda opción, el acercamiento euro-ruso no sólo beneficia a Moscú, también es la garantía de una independencia económica y política de una Europa que ha de dejar definitivamente de ser un mandato de los Estados Unidos.
 
 
Enric Ravello Barber.

jeudi, 27 novembre 2014

Der Westen auf dem Marsch in den 3. Weltkrieg

 

Der Westen auf dem Marsch in den 3. Weltkrieg

Brandstifter und Drahtzieher hinter der Ukrainekrise


Manuel Ochsenreiter im Gespräch mit Michael Friedrich Vogt


Das Massaker in Odessa, bei dem unbewaffnete und friedliche Demonstranten für Rußland aus ihren Zelten vor dem Gewerkschaftshaus vertrieben wurden, ins Gewerkschaftshaus vor faschistischen Hooligans flüchteten und dort im Beisein der ukrainischen Polizei massakriert und dann das Haus mit Molotowcocktails in Brand setzen, um die Hinrichtungen zu verbergen, durch dieses Massaker hat der Westen seine Maske endgültig fallen lassen.

Und die BRD-Medien? Das entsetzlich grausame Massaker an unbewaffneten prorussischen Demonstranten und an vollkommen unbeteiligten Frauen, Kindern, Personal des Gewerkschaftshauses und zufälligen Passanten wurde von den westlichen Medien totgeschwiegen oder zynisch verdreht. Sie machten sich bewußt zu Helfern der faschistischen Mörderbanden. Alle ukrainischen Politiker in Kiew lobten das Massaker an den unschuldigen Bürgern. Und die terroristischen Schläger erhielten einen finanziellen Bonus.

Gut informierte Quellen vermuten, daß zu den Donbass-Kämpfern auch die für »schmutzige Kriege« zuständige NATO-trainierte Ukrainische Nationalversammlung--Selbstverteidigung des ukrainischen Volkes gehört, die seit der Auflösung der Sowjetunion für die NATO als eine Art Gladio-B in Tschetschenien und Georgien und jetzt auch zuhause in der Ukraine russische Soldaten und Zivilisten tötet. Lokale Medien berichten, daß die Donbass-Einheit aus ungefähr 800 Schlägern von der Art bestehen wird, die am 2. Mai in Odessa unschuldige Zivilisten massakrierten. Fast alle unsere westlichen Politiker und Medien decken solche Leute wissentlich und bezahlen dieses ganze Desaster. Die Maidan-Aktivisten wurden nachweislich vom "Westen" ausgebildet, bezahlt und hochgeputscht. Selbst die Verbrecher des Odessamassakers sind sich offenbar gar nicht darüber im Klaren, daß sie nur als willfährige  Handlanger der US-amerikanischen und kapitalistischen Interessen des Westens benutzt werden. Sie verstehen gar nicht, daß sie selbst ihr geliebtes Vaterland Ukraine für deren Interessen in den Schlund der Hölle stoßen und unglaubliche Schuld auf sich laden.

Der „Rechte Sektor" -- Faschisten und Neonazis -- das sind die neuen Partner von Brüssel und Berlin. Ein eigenartiges Bündnis, das Christdemokraten und Sozialdemokraten da mit eindeutigen Faschisten eingehen. Und wenn dann Repräsentanten der BRD wie Außenministerdarsteller Steinmeier zu Recht als Kriegstreiber angegangen werden, drehen sie durch.

Das Muster ist stets dasselbe und uralt. Ob Libanon, Irak, Afghanistan, Bosnien, Libyen, Syrien oder Iran, Georgen und jetzt zum wiederholten Male die Ukraine. Der Westen bedient sich des Bodensatzes der jeweiligen Gesellschaft, hetzt Bevölkerungs- oder Volksgruppen gegen einander auf, greift mit eigenen Killertruppen ein, destabilisiert die Länder zum Zwecke der direkten oder indirekten Machergreifung und bringt so Chaos, Zerstörung und zigtausendfaches Leid und nennt das Ganze „Freiheit" und „Demokratie".

Der international weitgereiste Auslands-, Nahost- und Osteuropaexperte Manuel Ochsenreiter deckte die Hintergründe auf und zeigt erschreckende Parallelen einer Jahrzehnte während Blutspur des Westens auf ...
... und die Handlanger- und Mittäterschaft diverser BRD-Regierungen.

Website:
http://www.ManuelOchsenreiter.com

lundi, 24 novembre 2014

Au coeur du nationalisme ukrainien

Jean-Luc Schaffhauser :

Au cœur du conflit ukrainien

sur

http://www.tvlibertes.com

dimanche, 23 novembre 2014

Se revela la existencia de un “pacto secreto” de los investigadores con el Gobierno holandés sobre la tragedia del MH17

Ex: http://www.elespiadigital.com  

Países Bajos se niega a revelar detalles acerca del 'pacto secreto' existente entre los miembros de la investigación del MH17 tras una petición que apela a la Ley de Libertad de Información, informa el diario 'Elsevier'.

El Gobierno neerlandés se ha negado a divulgar y revelar detalles acerca de 17 informes secretos debido a un pacto existente entre los miembros del equipo de investigación conjunta (JIT, por sus siglas en inglés) de la catástrofe del MH17, publica el periódico 'Elsevier'.

Este diario remitió una petición directa al Ministerio de Seguridad y Justicia de Países Bajos, acogiéndose a la ley de la libertad de información, para la desclasificación de las características del acuerdo del JIT sobre la investigación junto con los 16 documentos restantes relacionados con el suceso, obteniendo una respuesta negativa.

Parte del acuerdo entre los cuatro países y el servicio de la Fiscalía neerlandesa establece que todos y cada uno de los miembros del grupo tienen derecho a mantener silencio si así lo desean, de modo que determinada información puede mantenerse secreta si alguno de los involucrados así lo cree necesario. Este equipo está formado por Holanda, Bélgica, Australia y Ucrania, que actualmente investigan la catástrofe.

Una de las razones que el Ministerio de Seguridad y Justicia de Holanda esgrime para actuar de esta forma hace referencia a la protección tanto de las tácticas y técnicas que se han utilizado para la exploración de los restos del avión malasio como a la identidad de las personas que participan en la misma.

"Simplemente, no sabemos si Países Bajos está comprometido con la justicia", afirma Pieter Omtzigt, un miembro del parlamento neerlandés que ya ha realizado numerosas peticiones informativas similares. 

Malasia, pese a no ser parte de este 'pacto secreto', es el único país que ha negociado directamente con las autodefensas del este de Ucrania. "Debemos ser incluidos en el JIT, pues de lo contrario será difícil para nosotros cooperar en la investigación [...] deben incluirnos en el equipo, ya que ahora mismo somos unos meros participantes", dijo este miércoles Khalid Abu Bakar, inspector general de la Policía malasia.

Análisis: EEUU retuvo imágenes satélites de la caída MH17

Por Gordon Duff*

Las fotos de satélite publicadas el domingo por la agencia de noticias rusa, Itar-Tass demuestran claramente que el vuelo de MH17de Malasia Airlines, estrellado en el este de Ucrania el 17 de julio de 2014, fue derribado por un avión de combate de Kiev.

El hecho de que las fotos habían estado en la posesión de los Estados Unidos y el Reino Unido durante meses, demuestra que la junta de Kiev es responsable de derribar el avión y matar a 298 pasajeros y miembros de la tripulación, 196 de ellos procedentes de los Países Bajos.

De hecho, desde hace meses, las pruebas han venido demostrando que el derribo del MH17 por Kiev es una de las muchas operaciones de la bandera falsa organizadas durante el conflicto de Ucrania. Sin embargo, cuando las acusaciones contra Kiev ganaron sustancia y el Gobierno holandés se encargó de la investigación del caso que duró más de un año sin ninguna promesa de una conclusión definitiva.

Durante todo este tiempo que EE.UU. estaba acusando a Rusia de ataques y represalias mortales, estas fotos estaban en las manos de los líderes de la OTAN.

Así reseñaba la agencia TASS la noticia el pasado 14 de noviembre:

El canal Uno de la televisión de Rusia dijo el viernes que tenía una foto supuestamente hecha por un satélite espía extranjero en los últimos segundos que pasó el vuelo MH17 de Malasia en el cielo de Ucrania.

El canal Uno, mostró a Iván Andriyevsky, el vicepresidente primero de la Unión Rusa de Ingenieros, con una foto enviada por un tal George Beatle, quien se había presentado como un controlador de tránsito aéreo con un récord de 20 años de trabajo.

De acuerdo con Beatle, el Boeing de Malasia fue derribado por un avión de combate que lo siguió. En primer lugar, el Boeing fue atacado con armas de fuego y luego la cabina fue alcanzada por un misil aire-aire, su motor derecho y el ala derecha se vieron afectados por un misil guiado por buscadores de calor. El correo electrónico tenía como adjunto una instantánea del lanzamiento de un misil desde por debajo del ala izquierda y que tenía como objetivo dar contra la cabina de Boeing. “Vimos un disparo lanzado desde una órbita más baja. Dichas tomas fotográficas se hacen típicamente con el propósito de vigilancia de aire y de tierra”, dijo Andriyevsky. “Coordenadas en la foto demuestran que se ha hecho por un satélite británico o norteamericano. Hemos analizado esta foto a fondo para encontrar signos de falsificación.


En los meses que siguieron a la catástrofe aérea, los EE.UU. y sus aliados de la OTAN han afirmado en repetidas ocasiones que el vuelo, conocido simplemente como MH17, fue derribado por un misil que atribuyeron su control primero a los separatistas prorrusos cerca de Donetsk y luego a las fuerzas rusas desplegadas a lo largo de las fronteras.

La situación se puso aún más ofuscada cuando el informe de Holanda al respecto salió, limpio de todas las referencias en cuanto a la causalidad y, por algo aún más extraño.

Cuando los informes de los operadores de radar en la región indicaron que un avión de combate de Kiev había estado siguiendo MH17, este alegó que todos los aviones que tenía en la zona eran aviones de ataque a tierra, incapaz alcanzar la altitud de un avión de pasajeros. Sin embargo, los informes filtrados desde Kiev afirmaron que los únicos aviones que tenía Kiev en la zona eran combatientes de ataque a tierra Su-22.

Más tarde, se filtró que el avión que siguió al MH17 fue un SU-22, una aeronave de alas giratorias. Sin embargo, docenas de sitios web de aviación habían sido hackeados y la información sobre el SU-22 había sido alterada para mostrar que este avión era incapaz de volar por encima de 21.000 pies y de superar la velocidad de 500 millas por hora.

La fotografía de satélite, muestra el misil que fue disparado a MH17, así como el claro contorno de un SU-22. Una revisión del informe de la Fuerza Aérea de Estados Unidos sobre el SU-22 cuenta una historia muy diferente de sus capacidades.

 

“El SU-17M4 fue ofrecido a clientes de exportación con una mejoría y bajo la denominación de SU-22M4. La producción duró desde 1983 a 1990. A Su-17M4 se le concedió una velocidad máxima de 1.155 millas por hora (Mach 1.7) y un alcance de combate de 715 millas. El techo de vuelo se limitaba a 46.590 pies, mientras el régimen de ascenso se ha registrado hasta los 45. 275 pies por minuto”.

Como se ve claramente en la imagen de satélite, el MH17 volaba a 500 millas por hora a la altura de 31.000 pies cuando SU-22 le apuntó con cañón de 30 mm y terminó con él disparándole un misil aire - aire hacia la cabina del piloto.

A finales de julio, mientras se difundían las historias de un misil de defensa tierra aire lanzado para derribar el MH17 se señaló que los únicos misiles en la región estaban en la posesión del Gobierno de Kiev. Con el fin de apoyar su afirmación de que Rusia era responsable, el Gobierno de Ucrania lanzó fotos de satélite como prueba de sus alegaciones de no tener fuerzas en la región.

El sitio web ruso, Russia Today escribió el 1 de agosto de 2014:

“El Ministerio ruso de la Defensa ha revelado mediante un comunicado que las imágenes de satélite publicadas por Kiev como prueba de que no tenía baterías antiaéreas desplegadas alrededor del lugar del accidente del MH17, tienen las fechas alteradas y pertenecen a los días después de la tragedia MH17. Las imágenes que según Kiev fueron tomadas por sus satélites al mismo tiempo que las tomadas por los satélites rusos, no son ni de Ucrania ni auténticas.

El Ministerio de la Defensa añadió que las imágenes fueron aparentemente tomadas por un satélite estadounidense de reconocimiento KeyHole, debido a que los dos satélites de Ucrania que están actualmente en órbita, Sich-1 y Sich-2, no estaban colocados sobre la región de Donetsk de Ucrania que supuestamente estamos viendo en las fotos.

Además, afirma que el clima y la iluminación que se ven en las imágenes son imposibles para la fecha y hora que ocurrió la tragedia. Al menos, una de las imágenes publicadas por Ucrania muestra signos de haber sido alterada por un editor de imágenes, añade el comunicado”.


Hasta el momento, no ha habido respuesta alguna por parte de los EE.UU. Si, como afirma Andriyevsky, las fotos de satélite son manipuladas, la junta de Kiev no es la única culpable. Se sabía desde hace tiempo que EE.UU. tenía fotos de satélite y registros detallados de radar AEGIS que podrían demostrar exactamente lo que sucedió.

Ahora está claro por qué fueron retenidas estas imágenes de satélite; fue porque no apoyaban la política de Estados Unidos de sancionar a Rusia a favor de régimen de Kiev, ahora claramente culpable del terrorismo de estado a escala internacional.

Por otra parte, las fotos satelitales de MH17 son una clara muestra de que los EE.UU. también tienen fotos que muestran el destino de Boeing 777 del vuelo MH370 de Malasyian Airlines, el avión que desapareció el 8 de marzo de 2014 de la faz de la tierra sin dejar rastro.

Sólo podemos preguntarnos por qué han sido guardadas estas informaciones y a qué otro plan, a qué otro complot de terror podría servir el destino de MH370.

* Gordon Duff es un veterano de la guerra de Vietnam, de Infantería de combate estadounidense, y el editor en jefe del Veterans Today. Su carrera incluye una amplia gama desde trabajar en el banco internacional hasta hacer de asesor en la lucha contra la insurgencia y tecnologías de defensa así como el representante diplomático de la ONU para el desarrollo económico y humanitario. Gordon Duff ha viajado a más de 80 países. Sus artículos se publican en todo el mundo y se traducen a varios idiomas. 

lundi, 17 novembre 2014

The Ukraine, As We Know It, Is Gone Forever

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An Interview with "The Saker"

The Ukraine, As We Know It, Is Gone Forever

by MIKE WHITNEY
Ex: http://www.counterpunch.org

The Saker is an ex-military analyst who was born in Europe to a family of Russian refugees. He now lives in Florida where he writes the Vineyard of the Saker blog and is a regular contributor to Russia Insider. The international community of Saker Blogs includes, besides the original Saker blog, French, German, Russian, Oceania and Serbian members and will soon include a Latin American member. – Mike Whitney

Mike Whitney: Is the United States responsible for the troubles in Ukraine?

The SAKER: Yes, absolutely, there’s no doubt about it. While it’s true that the Ukrainian people were unhappy with the corrupt Yanukovich regime, the coup itself was definitely CIA orchestrated. The EU was also involved, especially Germany, but they didn’t play nearly as big a role as the U.S. The taped phone messages of (US Undersecretary of State) Victoria Nuland show who was really calling the shots behind the scenes.

Mike Whitney: What role did the Obama administration play in Kiev’s decision to launch a war on its own people in the east of Ukraine?

The Saker: A central role. You have to understand that there is no “Ukrainian” power in Kiev. Poroshenko is 100% US-run as are the people around him. The head of the notorious Ukrainian secret police (the SBU), Valentin Nalivaichenko, is a known CIA agent. It’s also true that the US refers to Poroshenko “our Ukraine insider”. All of his so called “decisions” are actually made by U.S. officials in Kiev. As for Poroshenko’s speech to Congress a few weeks ago, that was obviously written by an American.

Mike Whitney: The separatists in the East have been very successful in repelling the Ukrainian army and their Neo Nazi counterparts in the security services. What role has Russia played in assisting the Novorussia militias?

The Saker: Russia’s role was critical. While Russian troops were not deployed across the border, Moscow did allow volunteers and weapons to flow in. And while the assistance was not provided directly by the FSB (Russia’s Federal Security Service) or the military, it was provided by various private groups. Clearly, the Kremlin has the power to help-out when it choses to do so. In one instance, there appears to have been direct artillery support from across the Russian border (in the so-called “southern cauldron”), but most of the aid has been covert. Besides the covert assistance, Russia has also provided intelligence, logistical and political support for the Novorussians. Without Russia’s support, the Novorussians never would have been able to turn the tide in the war.

Mike Whitney: Did Putin send Russian troops to Crimea and illegally seize the area or is that a fiction that’s been propagated in the western media?

The Saker: It’s actually a technicality. Yes, Putin did send Russian troops to Crimea, but no, they never exceeded the limits allowed under current agreements between Russia and the Ukraine. Remember that the Black Sea Fleet was already headquartered in Sevastopol, so there were plenty of troops available locally. Also, there was a large group of local volunteers who perform essential operations. Some of these volunteers were so convincing that they were mistaken for Russian Special Forces. But, yes, at the critical moment, Putin did send additional special forces to Crimea.

Was the operation legal? Well, technically it didn’t violate treaty agreements in terms of numbers, but did it violate Ukraine’s sovereignty. The reason Moscow did this was because there was solid evidence that Kiev was planning to move against Crimea. (possibly involving Turkey and Crimean Tatars) If Putin had not taken the initiative, the bloodbath in Crimea could have been worse than it’s been in Novorussia. Also, by the time Putin made the decision to protect Crimea, the democratically-elected President (Yanukovich) had already been removed from office, which created a legal vacuum in Kiev. So the question is: Should Putin have abided by the laws of a country that had been taken over by a gang of armed thugs or should he have tried to keep the peace by doing what he did?

What Putin chose to do was allow the people of Crimea to decide their own future by voting freely in a referendum. Yes, the AngloZionist propaganda says that they were forced to “vote at the barrel of a gun”, but that’s nonsense. Nobody disputes the fact that an overwhelming majority of Crimeans (95%) wanted to leave Ukraine and join Russia. All the “polite armed men in green” did was make it possible for the people to exercise their right of self-determination, something that the junta in Kiev never would have permitted.

Mike Whitney: What influence does Obama have on Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko’s decision-making? Is Washington actually running the show?

The Saker: Yes, totally. Obama gives the orders and Poroshenko obeys.

Just as they do everywhere, the US uses local oligarchs to colonize a country. Take for example Russia between 1991 and 1999. It was run by oligarchs behind a drunken figurehead. (Boris Yeltsin) Everyone knew that Russia had become a American colony and that the US could do whatever it wanted. It’s the same today.

Yanukovich was no more pro-Russian than any other Ukrainian President. He’s just an oligarch who’s been replaced by another oligarch, Poroshenko. The latter is a very intelligent man who knows that his survival depends on his complete obedience to Uncle Sam.

 

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I wouldn’t put it past the US to dump Poroshenko and install someone else if it suits their purposes. (Especially if the Right Sector takes power in Kiev.) For now, Poroshenko is Washington’s man, but that could change in the blink of an eye.

Mike Whitney: How close is the Obama administration to achieving its goal of establishing NATO bases (and, perhaps, missile sites) in Ukraine? What danger does this pose for Moscow?

The Saker: The only place where NATO bases really make sense is in Crimea, and that option is no longer available. But there’s more to this issue than meets the eye, that is, if the US continues to pursue this provocative policy of establishing NATO bases on the Russian border, then Russia will withdraw from the INF Treaty (Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty) and deploy advanced versions of the SS-20 (Soviet Nuclear Ballistic Missile) closer to Europe. The point is, US meddling could lead to a confrontation between nuclear-armed adversaries.

Mike Whitney: The European Commission has created a number of obstacles to prevent Russia from building the Southstream pipeline which will diversify export routes for natural gas from Russia to central and southern Europe. Critics have said that the Obama administration is behind the move, and that powerful US energy giants want to either block or control the flow of energy from Russia to Europe. Is this the broader context of the troubles in Ukraine, that is, are we really seeing an energy war unfold in real time?

The Saker: This is an important part of the equation, but not the central one. The central one is the mistaken belief (put forward by Zbigniew Brzezinski) that without the Ukraine Russia cannot be a superpower, and the equally mistaken belief (put forward by Hillary Clinton) that Putin wants to re-create the Soviet Union. For the AngloZionists, the Ukraine is a zero-sum game in which the US must either control the Ukraine or destroy it, but not allow Russia to have it. The problem with this theory is that Russia doesn’t really want or need the Ukraine. What Russia wants is a stable, dependable and neutral partner with which it can do business. Even now, while the Novorussians are demanding full independence, Russia has been pushing a different plan altogether. Moscow wants a unitary Ukraine in which each region would have de-facto autonomy but still be part of the same state.

Powerbrokers in the West are so maniacally obsessed with controlling the Ukraine, they can’t imagine that Russia doesn’t want the same thing. But Russia doesn’t want the Ukraine. It has no need for a broken, dysfunctional, failed state with massive social problems, that will require billions upon billions of dollars to rebuild.

Sure, there are cultural, historical, religious and even family ties between Russia and the Ukraine, but that does not mean they want to run the place. Russia already got what it wanted, Crimea. As for the rest, Moscow’s attitude is, “You broke it, you own it.”

Mike Whitney: What’s the endgame here? Will Poroshnko succeed in keeping Ukraine together and further isolate Russia from Europe or will Ukraine splinter along political lines? Or is there another scenario that you see as more likely?

The Saker: Crimea is gone forever. So is Novorussia. But in the case of the latter, there might be a transitional phase in which Kiev retains some degree of sovereignty over areas in the east.

In the near term, there could be more fighting, but eventually there will be a deal in which Novorussia will be given something close to independence. One thing is certain, that before reaching an agreement on final status, two issues will have to be settled:

1– There must be regime change in Kiev followed by de-Nazification.

Neither Russia nor Novorussia will ever be safe as long as the Nazis are in power in Kiev. That means that these russophobic, nationalist freaks will have to be removed before final status issues can be resolved. The Russians and the Novorussians are somewhat divided on this issue. While the Novorussians want their independence and say “To hell with the Nazis in Kiev”, the Kremlin wants regime change and sees it crucial for their national security. We’ll have to wait and see how this plays out in the future.

2– There will have to be a conference of donors.

The Ukraine is basically dead, it’s been reduced to rubble. It will take years to rebuild, and immense sums of money. The US, EU and Russia will all have to contribute. If the AngloZionists persist in their maximalist position and continue to support the Nazi junta in Kiev, the Russians will not pay a single kopeck. Russian aid will go exclusively to Novorussia.

Sooner or later the US and EU will realize that they need Russia’s help. And when they finally figure that out, they’ll work together to reach a comprehensive political agreement. Right now, they’re more preoccupied with punishing Putin (through economic sanctions and political isolation) to prove that no one can defy the Empire. But that kind of bullying behavior won’t change the reality on the ground. The West needs Russia’s cooperation, but Russia isn’t going to cooperate without strings attached. The US will have to meet certain conditions before Moscow agrees to a deal.

UKRAINE: “Gone forever”

Though it’s too early to tell, I think the Ukraine as we know it, is gone forever. Crimea will remain part of Russia, while Novorussia will become independent and probably end up in some kind of association status with Russia. As for the rest of the Ukraine, there’s bound to be a confrontation between the various oligarchs and Nazis, after which the pragmatists will appear and lead the way to a settlement. Eventually, there will be some kind of accommodation and a new state will emerge, but I can’t imagine how long it will take for that to happen.

If you want a more systematic analysis of the points above, please see my analysis (here: http://vineyardsaker.blogspot.com/2014/09/the-russian-response-to-double.html)

MIKE WHITNEY lives in Washington state. He is a contributor to Hopeless: Barack Obama and the Politics of Illusion (AK Press). Hopeless is also available in a Kindle edition. He can be reached at fergiewhitney@msn.com.

mercredi, 05 novembre 2014

EU-Staaten als Vasallen

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„Die Sanktionen gegen Russland dienen ausschließlich den US-Interessen“

Die US-Regierung hat die berechtigten Proteste der ukrainischen Bevölkerung gegen ihre korrupte Regierung verwendet, um einen gewalttätigen Regime-Wechsel in Kiew herbeizuführen. Die CIA operiert weltweit im Interesse der Wall Street, die Regierung in Washington ist offenbar längst nicht mehr Herr der Lage der Machtstrukturen im eigenen Land. Es ist völlig unverständlich, warum sich die EU und die Bundesregierung dem globalen Diktat der USA unterwerfen.

Mathias Bröckers und Paul Schreyer haben ein äußerst lesenswertes Buch geschrieben: „Wir sind die Guten. Ansichten eines Putinverstehers oder wie uns die Medien manipulieren“. In diesem Buch analysieren die beiden die Entwicklung in der Ukraine und erklären die Vorgänge als Teil einer globalen US-Strategie, Zugriff auf wichtige Rohstoffmärkte zu erhalten. Wladimir Putin ist den Amerikanern ein Dorn im Auge, weil er sich dem Einfluss der multinationalen Konzerne in Russland widersetzt. Die Deutschen Wirtschafts Nachrichten haben mit Mathias Bröckers gesprochen.

Deutsche Wirtschafts Nachrichten: In Ihrem Buch schreiben Sie, dass nicht die diskriminierenden homophoben Gesetze den Westen auf den Plan gerufen haben, sondern handfeste wirtschaftliche Interessen. Warum ist Putin dem Westen ein Dorn im Auge?

Mathias Bröckers: Unter Jelzin hatten die anglo-amerikanischen Konzerne Verträge über die Öl- und Gas-Exploration gemacht, die ihnen über Jahrzehnte sämtliche Profite und keinen Cent für die russische Staatskasse einbrachten. Dass Putin diese Ausbeutung stoppte und die russischen Ressourcen wieder unter nationale Kontrolle brachte, ist der eigentliche Grund, warum er im Westen zur Unperson wurde.

Deutsche Wirtschafts Nachrichten: Sie schreiben, dass die USA und die CIA die „orangene Revolution“ vom Zaun gebrochen haben. Wie muss man sich das vorstellen?

Mathias Bröckers: Die USA haben nach Aussage ihrer Chefdiplomatin Nuland fünf Milliarden Dollar in die „Demokratieförderung“ der Ukraine investiert. Damit wurden regierungskritische Institutionen, NGOs und Medien gefördert – doch die absolut berechtigten Proteste der Bevölkerung gegen ihre korrupte Regierung wurden dabei nur als Trittbrett genutzt, um die Eliten auszuwechseln und eher amerikafreundliche Oligarchen ans Ruder zu bringen. Weder der Oligarchenwechsel 2004 noch der zehn Jahre später haben zu irgendeiner „Demokratisierung“ geführt.

Deutsche Wirtschafts Nachrichten: Präsident Janukowitsch wurde, so schreiben Sie, „mit Unterstützung des Westens…weggeputscht“. Die Killer vom Maidan seien nicht von der damaligen ukrainischen Regierung oder von Russland angeheuert worden. Wer steckt hinter der Eskalation auf dem Maidan?

Mathias Bröckers: Dass der Massenmord auf dem Maidan bis heute nicht untersucht und aufgeklärt ist, spricht Bände. Diese Morde waren der Auslöser für die gewaltsame Vertreibung Janukowitschs, dessen Polizei sich wochenlang weitgehend defensiv verhalten und die Regierungsgebäude gegen die Demonstranten geschützt hatte. Weder er, noch die EU-Minister, mit denen er gerade einen Vertrag über seinen Rücktritt und Neuwahlen ausgearbeitet hatte, konnten irgendein Interesse an einer solchen Eskalation haben. Deshalb kann der unbekannte Auftraggeber der Scharfschützen nur aus Kreisen kommen, die keinen friedlichen Übergang, sondern eine Zuspitzung des Konflikts beabsichtigten.

Broeckers_Wir-sind-die-Guten_300CMYK.jpgDeutsche Wirtschafts Nachrichten: Sie schreiben, dass hinter der „Organisation dieses Bürgerkriegs“ auch private Truppen des US-Militärkonzerns Academi, vormals Blackwater, stecken. Welche Belege gibt es für deren Aktivitäten?

Mathias Bröckers: Verschiedene große Medien haben darüber berichtet, die Firma selbst hat es dementiert, was aber nicht weiter überrascht. Berater der CIA und des FBI  sind seit längerem in Kiew aktiv und der Einsatz solcher Söldner für die schmutzigen Jobs, ohne die „Regime Changes“ meist nicht zu bewerkstelligen sind, gehört zum üblichen Modus Operandi. Gäbe es nur den Hauch eines Beweises, dass Russland oder Janukowitsch für diese Morde verantwortlich waren, wäre er uns längst im Breitbandformat vorgeführt worden. Da das nicht geschehen ist, fällt der Verdacht eher auf die CIA, die auch dafür sorgte, dass einige Militante des „rechten Sektors“ in polnischen Lagern ausgebildet wurden.

Deutsche Wirtschafts Nachrichten: Hat der deutsche Außenminister davon nicht das Geringste gewusst? War er ahnungslos, eine Marionette? Wie weit war die deutsche Bundesregierung oder der BND in den „Putsch“ involviert?

Mathias Bröckers: In dem geleakten „Fuck the EU“-Telefonat hatte Frau Nuland die von den USA vorgesehenen Marionetten der Regierung Jazenjuk ja schon benannt. Der von der deutschen Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung geförderte Boxer Klitschko war da nur zweite Garnitur. Als neuer Bürgermeister von Kiew hat er gerade die letzten echten Demonstranten, die mehr als einen Oligarchenwechsel verlangen, vom Maidan entfernen lassen. Wenn der BND da involviert war, dann allenfalls im Windschatten der US-Geheimdienste. Ob die deutsche Regierung im Hintergrund Politik im Interesse ihrer Bevölkerung treibt, oder nur als Vasall der US-Politik agiert, ist schwer zu sagen. Die schwachsinnige Sanktionspolitik, mit der sich Deutschland und die EU ins eigene Knie schießen, folgt jedenfalls ausschließlich US-Interessen.

Deutsche Wirtschafts Nachrichten: Sie schildern ausführlich, warum Putin ausdrücklich nicht die Wiederherstellung der UdSSR will. Kann man Putin trauen – immerhin ist er ein ausgebildeter KGB-Mann…

Mathias Bröckers: Russland ist das größte Flächenland der Erde und verfügt über ein Drittel aller bekannten Ressourcen (Öl, Gas, Mineralien). Wer so groß und so reich ist, muss keine Kolonien erobern. Weder die marode Ostukraine, noch die wirtschaftlich unbedeutende Krim. Über den strategisch unverzichtbaren Marinestützpunkt dort hatte Putin mit Janukowitsch den Pachtvertrag gerade über 30 Jahre verlängert – bei einem friedlichen Regierungsübergang in Kiew wäre ein Referendum und der Anschluss an Russland völlig unnötig gewesen. Als aber die rechten Milizen nach dem Putsch zum „Marsch auf die Krim“ aufriefen, musste Putin handeln. Dass ein feindliches Militärbündnis den wichtigsten Seehafen unter Kontrolle nimmt, kann keine Regierung der Welt dulden.

Deutsche Wirtschafts Nachrichten: Warum ist Russland eine Weltmacht – und warum fürchten die Amerikaner, den Einfluss zu verlieren?

Mathias Bröckers: Amerika ist die militärische Supermacht und Russland ist der Rohstoffriese der Welt. Wer über ein Drittel aller Rohstoffe verfügt und wie Russland unter Putin in der Lage ist, sie selbst zu fördern und zu vermarkten, ist automatisch ein Player im Great Game. Und wer, wie die USA, die globale „Full Spectrum Dominance“ will, muss einen solchen Player unter Kontrolle bringen.

Deutsche Wirtschafts Nachrichten: Kann es sein, dass die Amerikaner im Grunde wissen, dass mit Russland (Rohstoffe) und China (Wirtschaftsmacht) eine multipolare Welt nicht verhindert werden kann?

Mathias Bröckers: „Nur weil wir den größten Hammer haben verwandelt sich nicht jedes Problem in einen Nagel“ hat Obama neulich gesagt, was eine gewisse Einsicht anzudeuten scheint. Russland ist mit den BRICS-Staaten gerade dabei, sich vom Petrodollar abzukoppeln, sie gründen ihre eigenen Rating-Agenturen und eine Entwicklungsbank als Alternative zum IWF. Diese Entwicklung lässt sich einfach nicht verhindern.

Deutsche Wirtschafts Nachrichten: Welche Rolle spielt die CIA in der Ukraine? Agiert sie im Auftrag der Regierung oder haben sich die Geheimdienstler verselbständigt – eine Argumentation, die wir ja im Zuge der NSA-Debatte auch schon gehört haben?

Mathias Bröckers: Die CIA hat schon immer in erster Linie für die Wall Street agiert und nicht für die Regierung. Das Konzept der „Peacetime Operations“, der verdeckten Operationen für Regimewechsel, das der „Vater“ der CIA, Allen Dulles – ein Wall Street Anwalt – entwickelte, diente stets den Geschäfts- und Konzerninteressen. Und so ist es auch jetzt wieder: Als erste Amtshandlung nach dem Putsch wurde der Sohn von Außenminister Biden als Vorstand der größten ukrainischen Gasgesellschaft installiert.

Deutsche Wirtschafts Nachrichten: Sie schreiben, dass die Amerikaner „ihre imperiale Ambition hinter ökonomischer Effizienz“ verstecken. Haben die USA immer noch den Anspruch einer Weltherrschaft?

Mathias Bröckers: Wenn man den aktuellen Doktrinen des Pentagon folgt, durchaus – nur werden jetzt verstärkt „multilaterale“ Anstrengungen gefordert, weil der Spaß zu teuer wird und die USA maßlos überschuldet sind. Deshalb kommt jetzt zum Beispiel die Forderung auf, dass sich die Bundeswehr am Kampf gegen ISIS im Irak beteiligt. Selbst in ihrer eigenen Kolonie – und nichts anderes ist der Irak nach dem US-Überfall – will die einzige Weltmacht nicht mehr für Ordnung sorgen und andere dafür einspannen.

Deutsche Wirtschafts Nachrichten: Sie legen in Ihrem Buch sehr umfassend dar, dass die Berichterstattung in den deutschen Medien von teilweise krasser Einseitigkeit gegen Russland getragen ist. Wir tun uns schwer mit der Vorstellung, dass dies auf eine direkte Manipulation „von oben“ zurückzuführen ist. Wie viel ist Gedankenlosigkeit, Unkenntnis – und wie viel wird gezielt manipuliert?

Mathias Bröckers: Da muss „von oben“ gar nicht viel kommen, der Herdentrieb funktioniert auch so. Was aus dem Ticker kommt, wird verbraten. Da macht zwei Tage die „russische Invasion“ weltweit Schlagzeilen – und dann meldet die Tagesschau kleinlaut auf ihrem Twitter-Account, dass es sich bei „Invasion“ um einen Übersetzungsfehler der Agentur Reuters gehandelt hätte.

Deutsche Wirtschafts Nachrichten: Warum sind die öffentlich-rechtlichen Sender nicht besser? Gibt es eine Kommunikation zwischen den Eigentümervertretern (Politik) und den Chefredaktionen? Oder ist der Großteil nicht eher „vorauseilender Gehorsam“?

Mathias Bröckers: Eher letzteres. Wobei die Besetzung von Chefredaktionen und Ressortleitungen natürlich parteibuchmäßig läuft und freie Geister wenn überhaupt eher nur in den unteren Etagen zu finden sind.

Deutsche Wirtschafts Nachrichten: Auch Putin setzt gewaltig auf Propaganda, in Russland wie auch im Westen. In Russland gibt es so gut wie keine freie Presse mehr. Viele „Putin-Versteher“ im Westen sind außerdem im Kern Verschwörungstheoretiker und haben zum Teil eine paranoide, selektive Wahrnehmung. Wie kann der Leser heute noch erkennen, wem er glauben kann?

Mathias Bröckers: „Putinversteher“ sind in meinen Augen eher Leute, die ihre Vernunft noch nicht an der Garderobe abgegeben haben, sondern die die Motive und Absichten des anderen analysieren. Verstehen heißt ja nicht verehren. Paranoide Verschwörungs-Theoretiker sind doch eher diejenigen, die permanent einen neuen Super-Bösen bezichtigen – wie etwa der Nato-Sprecher Rasmussen. Der hatte schon 2003 gesagt: „Saddam Hussein hat Massenvernichtungswaffen. Das glauben wir nicht, das wissen wir.“ Und genauso weiß er auch jetzt wieder alles – wer diesem Herrn glaubt, ist nicht zu retten.

***

Was geht Deutschland die Ukraine an? Und wie kommt es, dass ein  gescheitertes Abkommen mit der EU zu einer der gefährlichsten Krisen geführt hat, die Europa in den vergangenen Jahrzehnten erlebte? Alles Putins Schuld? Oder ist die Wahrheit hinter diesem Konflikt, der nun den Frieden eines ganzen Kontinents bedroht, doch komplexer? Und welche Rolle spielen eigentlich die Medien? Sind sie noch unabhängige Berichterstatter oder längst selbst zur Partei geworden? Mathias Bröckers und Paul Schreyer schauen hinter die Kulissen eines politischen Spiels, das tödlicher Ernst geworden ist.

Der Spiegel-Bestseller „Wir sind die Guten. Ansichten eines Putinverstehers oder wie uns die Medien manipulieren“ ist unter der ISBN 978-3-86489-080-2 im Buchhandel, direkt beim Verlag oder bei Amazon bei Amazon erhältlich (208 Seiten, 16,99 Euro).

Mathias Bröckers ist freier Journalist, der unter anderem für die taz und Telepolis schreibt. Er wurde 1954 in Limburg an der Lahn geboren. Ab 1973 studierte er an der FU Berlin Literaturwissenschaft, Linguistik und Politikwissenschaft (M.A.) Er gehörte zur Gründergeneration der taz und war dort bis 1991 Kultur- und Wissenschaftsredakteur. Danach war er für die Zeit und die Woche als Kolumnist sowie als Rundfunkautor tätig und fungierte als Mitglied der Sachbuch-Jury der Süddeutschen Zeitung. Neben Radiosendungen, Kabarettprogrammen und Beiträgen für Anthologien veröffentlichte Mathias Bröckers zahlreiche Bücher. Seine Werke "Die Wiederentdeckung der Nutzpflanze Hanf" (1993) und "Verschwörungen, Verschwörungstheorien und die Geheimnisse des 11.9." (2002) wurden internationale Bestseller. (Foto: Bröckers)

Mathias Bröckers ist freier Journalist, der unter anderem für die taz und Telepolis schreibt. Er wurde 1954 in Limburg an der Lahn geboren. Ab 1973 studierte er an der FU Berlin Literaturwissenschaft, Linguistik und Politikwissenschaft (M.A.) Er gehörte zur Gründergeneration der taz und war dort bis 1991 Kultur- und Wissenschaftsredakteur. Danach war er für die Zeit und die Woche als Kolumnist sowie als Rundfunkautor tätig und fungierte als Mitglied der Sachbuch-Jury der Süddeutschen Zeitung. Neben Radiosendungen, Kabarettprogrammen und Beiträgen für Anthologien veröffentlichte Mathias Bröckers zahlreiche Bücher. Seine Werke “Die Wiederentdeckung der Nutzpflanze Hanf” (1993) und “Verschwörungen, Verschwörungstheorien und die Geheimnisse des 11.9.” (2002) wurden internationale Bestseller. (Foto: Bröckers)

Выпуск XXIII 2014 Украина. Coup d’état

Выпуск XXIII 2014

Украина. Coup d’état

 
 
РЕАЛИЗМ — МНИМЫЙ И ПОДЛИННЫЙ
Александр Дугин
ФЕДЕРАЛИЗАЦИЯ УКРАИНЫ
КАК ИНСТРУМЕНТ РАЗРЕШЕНИЯ ПОЛИТИЧЕСКОГО КРИЗИСА
Михаил Бакалинский
ОККУПАЦИЯ УКРАИНЫ: КАПИТАЛИЗМ, МАСС-МЕДИА
И ТЕХНОЛОГИИ УПРАВЛЯЕМОГО БУНТА
Леонид Савин
БОЛЕЗНЬ УКРАИНЫ И ЛЕКАРСТВО ЕВРОПЫ:
НЕОЛИБЕРАЛИЗМ И НЕОФАШИЗМ ОБЪЕДИНИЛИСЬ
Эрик Драйтзер
ВЕНГЕРСКИЙ ВЗГЛЯД НА УКРАИНСКИЕ СОБЫТИЯ
Иштван Саваи
СТОИТ ЛИ УМИРАТЬ ЗА ЛЬВОВ?
Роберт Потоцкий
Марцин Домагала
МАЙДАН И ПРОЗАПАДНАЯ ДЕЯТЕЛЬНОСТЬ ВНУТРИ РПЦ
Евгений Широков
КАК СИТУАЦИЮ НА УКРАИНЕ ВИДЯТ С ПОЗИЦИЙ ЗАКАРПАТЬЯ
Петр Гецко
СЕРБСКИЙ НАРОД — БРЕСТКАЯ КРЕПОСТЬ, КОТОРАЯ
ЖДЕТ ПОБЕДЫ РОССИИ (ВЗГЛЯД НА УКРАИНУ ИЗ БЕЛГРАДА)
Стеван Гайич
МОМЕНТ САРАЕВО ДЛЯ УКРАИНЫ
Кристоф Леман
ТАЙНЫЕ НЕОНАЦИСТЫ И СТРЕЛЬБА НА МАЙДАНЕ
Уильям Энгдаль
УКРАИНА 2014: ЖИЗНЬ НИКОГДА НЕ БУДЕТ ТОЙ ЖЕ
Мариус Вакарелу
УКРАИНСКИЙ ПОЛИТИЧЕСКИЙ КРИЗИС:
МЕЖДУ ЗАПАДОМ И РОССИЕЙ
Марина Выскуб
БЫВШАЯ УКРАИНА НА ПОРОГЕ НЕОНАЦИСТСКОЙ РЕВОЛЮЦИИ
Эдуард Попов
УКРАИНА — CЛУЧАЙ ДЛЯ КИТАЙСКОГО УЧАСТИЯ
Аньдун Пэн
 
 
Файл в формате pdf: 

dimanche, 02 novembre 2014

Le conflit en Ukraine et la géopolitique américaine

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Le conflit en Ukraine et la géopolitique américaine

par Jean-Claude Empereur
Ex: http://www.europesolidaire.eu
 
Le conflit qui se déroule depuis plusieurs mois en Ukraine est une parfaite illustration d'une constante de la géopolitique anglo-saxonne : s'opposer par tous les moyens à la constitution d'un bloc continental euro-russe.

Cette stratégie très ancienne, elle remonte en effet  au XVIIIème siècle a été théorisée   dès 1904   par J. H.  Mackinder et complétée, beaucoup plus tard, par N. Spykman, s'est manifestée dans la politique de « containement » , d'endiguement, définie  pendant la guerre froide par  John Foster Dulles et appliquée  sans interruption  depuis lors. Elle est sous jacente dans la pensée de Zbigniew Brzezinski telle qu'elle est exprimée dans « Le grand échiquier ». L'arrimage de l'Ukraine à l'Occident, son intégration dans l'Otan et dans L'Union Européenne  sont alors conçus comme des moyens de déstabilisation et, à terme, de dislocation de la Russie.

Elle vise à organiser un cordon sanitaire  continu depuis le Royaume-Uni jusqu'au Japon en passant par le Moyen Orient et l'Asie du Sud Est.
Elle a été conçue, bien avant la naissance de l'Union Soviétique, et s'est poursuivie voire même renforcée après sa chute.
 
Fondamentalement, c'est  une stratégie d'interdiction de puissance et d'indépendance tournée contre l'avènement d'une « Grande Europe ».

Cette politique  entraine  plusieurs conséquences :

1.    Maintien de l'isolement de la Russie post-soviétique  toujours considérée chez certains responsables politiques américains comme étant potentiellement  l'ennemi principal par :
·      la diabolisation de ses dirigeants, Vladimir Poutine, en particulier,
·      le renforcement  technologique et militaire (bouclier anti missile, cyber défense etc.)
·     l'élargissement ou plus précisément l'épaississement territorial du cordon sanitaire (extension  continue de l'OTAN, et recherche d'un contact direct avec la frontière russe, contrairement aux engagements qui semblent avoir été pris vis-à-vis du gouvernement soviétique  lors de la chute du Mur de Berlin).

2.    Renforcement en réaction à cet encerclement   des liens terrestres continentaux entre la Russie et la Chine (réseaux d'hydrocarbures, réseaux ferroviaires, TGV Pékin Moscou, nouvelle route de la soie).

3.    Justification et sur-légitimation des liens naissants encore fragiles entre les BRICS en particulier par une stratégie de dédollarisation dans les échanges entre les différents partenaires préfigurant un contre-encerclement de revers : les assiégeants devenant assiégés.

 L'Europe, solidaire, puissante, indépendante et souveraine que nous appelons de nos vœux doit se construire en rupture avec cette situation en relançant le projet de partenariat euro-russe.

Ce partenariat prenant appui sur la continuité territoriale, la profondeur stratégique,  la tradition et l'unité  culturelles, l'immensité et la diversité des ressources doit fonder l'un des éléments essentiels de la vision géopolitique d'un Europe redevenue souveraine.

Dans  cette perspective il ne s'agit pas, bien entendu, de passer d'une soumission à l'autre, mais de retrouver autonomie et liberté de manœuvre.

Au-delà de ce partenariat strictement  continental une alliance plus vaste dans un cadre euro-BRICS doit être envisagée.

Une fois de plus le comportement chaotique et ambigu de la diplomatie des membres de l'Union Européenne traduit l'absence totale de vision géopolitique de celle-ci.  Pourtant cette compétition multipolaire acharnée - le véritable visage de la mondialisation - n'est autre que la  confrontation permanente des différentes visions géopolitiques des grands acteurs mondiaux.

Jean-Claude Empereur

lundi, 27 octobre 2014

William Engdahl on the Ukraine

 

William Engdahl on the Ukraine

dimanche, 26 octobre 2014

Jean-Michel Vernochet à propos de l’Ukraine : conférence et interview

 

 

C’est avec grand plaisir que le Cercle des Volontaires a pu rencontrer et interviewer Jean-Michel Vernochet, à l’occasion de la conférence « La Russie face à l’OTAN », organisée ce mois-ci par l’association « France – Russie- Convergence », à Saint Gély du Fesc près de Montpellier.

 

Cet ancien grand reporter au Figaro magazine et membre de l’académie de géopolitique retrace dans son dernier livre « Ukraine, l’engrenage » (sorti chez Sigest) l’émergence du conflit ukrainien, déclenché essentiellement par l’expansionnisme américain via l’OTAN, et sa confrontation de plus en plus ouverte aux puissances émergentes que représente la Russie et la Chine en vue d’instaurer son Nouvel Ordre Mondial.

 

Ukraine l'engrenageAutant dire que nous avons ici a faire à un livre d’une grande qualité, puisqu’il parvient à expliquer la réalité géopolitique actuelle,sans entrer dans des simplifications réductrices, et tout en restant facile d’accès grâce a un style clair et agréable .

 

La dislocation des nations européennes, l’abandon du dollar, la guerre des ressources, la résistance de Poutine, le jeu des alliances, et surtout, la cascade d’événements qui ont eu lieu en Ukraine dès novembre 2013, tous les liens de causalité sont décrits, remis dans leur contexte global et expliqué en détail.

 

Un livre à ne pas rater si vous souhaitez parfaire vos connaissances en géopolitique.

 

Théo Canova

 

 

 

Voici notre interview (05’48) :

 

 

Voici la conférence « La Russie face à l’OTAN », et les questions du public (01h21) :

 

 

Les égarés

L’outil indispensable pour qui veut comprendre les crimes commis par les djihadistes d’Irak et du Levant. Ouvrage qui contient des informations inédites sur les alliances secrètes entre le sionisme, le wahhabisme et l’ultracapitalisme et leurs sources messianiques communes.

 

samedi, 25 octobre 2014

The Ukraine, Corrupted Journalism, and the Atlanticist Faith

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The Ukraine, Corrupted Journalism, and the Atlanticist Faith
 

The European Union is not (anymore) guided by politicians with a grasp of history, a sober assessment of global reality, or simple common sense connected with the long term interests of what they are guiding. If any more evidence was needed, it has certainly been supplied by the sanctions they have agreed on last week aimed at punishing Russia.

One way to fathom their foolishness is to start with the media, since whatever understanding or concern these politicians may have personally they must be seen to be doing the right thing, which is taken care of by TV and newspapers.

In much of the European Union the general understanding of global reality since the horrible fate of the people on board the Malaysian Airliner comes from mainstream newspapers and TV which have copied the approach of Anglo-American mainstream media, and have presented ‘news’ in which insinuation and vilification substitute for proper reporting. Respected publications, like the Financial Times or the once respected NRC Handelsblad of the Netherlands for which I worked sixteen years as East Asia Correspondent, not only joined in with this corrupted journalism but helped guide it to mad conclusions. The punditry and editorials that have grown out of this have gone further than anything among earlier examples of sustained media hysteria stoked for political purposes that I can remember. The most flagrant example I have come across, an anti-Putin leader in the (July 26) Economist Magazine, had the tone of Shakespeare’s Henry V exhorting his troops before the battle of Agincourt as he invaded France.

One should keep in mind that there are no European-wide newspapers or publications to sustain a European public sphere, in the sense of a means for politically interested Europeans to ponder and debate with each other big international developments. Because those interested in world affairs usually read the international edition of the New York Times or the Financial Times, questions and answers on geopolitical matters are routinely shaped or strongly influenced by what editors in New York and London have determined as being important. Thinking that may deviate significantly as can now be found in Der Spiegel, the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Die Zeit and Handelsblatt, does not travel across German borders. Hence we do not see anything like a European opinion evolving on global affairs, even when these have a direct impact on the interests of the European Union itself.

The Dutch population was rudely shaken out of a general complacency with respect to world events that could affect it, through the death of 193 fellow nationals (along with a 105 people of other nationalities) in the downed plane, and its media were hasty in following the American-initiated finger-pointing at Moscow. Explanations that did not in some way involve culpability of the Russian president seemed to be out of bounds. This was at odds right away with statements of a sober Dutch prime minister, who was under considerable pressure to join the fingerpointing but who insisted on waiting for a thorough examination of what precisely had happened.

The TV news programs I saw in the days immediately afterwards had invited, among other anti–Russian expositors, American neocon-linked talking heads to do the disclosing to a puzzled and truly shaken up audience. A Dutch foreign policy specialist explained that the foreign minister or his deputy could not go to the site of the crash (as Malaysian officials did) to recover the remains of Dutch citizens, because that would amount to an implicit recognition of diplomatic status for the “separatists”. When the European Union en bloc recognizes a regime that has come into existence through an American initiated coup d’état, you are diplomatically stuck with it.

The inhabitants and anti-Kiev fighters at the crash site were portrayed, with images from youtube, as uncooperative criminals, which for many viewers amounted to a confirmation of their guilt. This changed when later reports from actual journalists showed shocked and deeply concerned villagers, but the discrepancy was not explained, and earlier assumptions of villainy did not make way for any objective analysis of why these people might be fighting at all. Tendentious twitter and youtube ‘news’ had become the basis for official Dutch indignation with the East Ukrainians, and a general opinion arose that something had to be set straight, which was, again in general opinion, accomplished by a grand nationally televised reception of the human remains (released through Malaysian mediation) in a dignified sober martial ceremony.

Nothing that I have seen or read even intimated that the Ukraine crisis – which led to coup and civil war – was created by neoconservatives and a few R2P (“Responsibility to Protect”) fanatics in the State Department and the White House, apparently given a free hand by President Obama. The Dutch media also appeared unaware that the catastrophe was immediately turned into a political football for White House and State Department purposes. The likelihood that Putin was right when he said that the catastrophe would not have happened if his insistence on a cease-fire had been accepted, was not entertained.

As it was, Kiev broke the cease-fire – on the 10th of June – in its civil war against Russian speaking East Ukrainians who do not wish to be governed by a collection of thugs, progeny of Ukrainian nazis, and oligarchs enamored of the IMF and the European Union. The supposed ‘rebels’ have been responding to the beginnings of ethnic cleansing operations (systematic terror bombing and atrocities – 30 or more Ukrainians burned alive) committed by Kiev forces, of which little or nothing has penetrated into European news reports.

It is unlikely that the American NGOs, which by official admission spent 5 billion dollars in political destabilization efforts prior to the February putsch in Kiev, have suddenly disappeared from the Ukraine, or that America’s military advisors and specialized troops have sat idly by as Kiev’s military and militias mapped their civil war strategy; after all, the new thugs are as a regime on financial life-support provided by Washington, the European Union and IMF. What we know is that Washington is encouraging the ongoing killing in the civil war it helped trigger.

But Washington has constantly had the winning hand in a propaganda war against, entirely contrary to what mainstream media would have us believe, an essentially unwilling opponent. Waves of propaganda come from Washington and are made to fit assumptions of a Putin, driven and assisted by a nationalism heightened by the loss of the Soviet empire, who is trying to expand the Russian Federation up to the borders of that defunct empire. The more adventurous punditry, infected by neocon fever, has Russia threatening to envelop the West. Hence Europeans are made to believe that Putin refuses diplomacy, while he has been urging this all along. Hence prevailing propaganda has had the effect that not Washington’s but Putin’s actions are seen as dangerous and extreme. Anyone with a personal story that places Putin or Russia in a bad light must move right now; Dutch editors seem insatiable at the moment.

There is no doubt that the frequently referred to Moscow propaganda exists. But there are ways for serious journalists to weigh competing propaganda and discern how much veracity or lies and bullshit they contain. Within my field of vision this has only taken place a bit in Germany. For the rest we must piece political reality together relying on the now more than ever indispensable American websites hospitable to whistleblowers and old-fashioned investigative journalism, which especially since the onset of the ‘war on terrorism’ and the Iraq invasion have formed a steady form of samizdat publishing.

In the Netherlands almost anything that comes from the State Department is taken at face value. America’s history, since the demise of the Soviet Union, of truly breathtaking lies: on Panama, Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, Venezuela, Libya and North Korea; its record of overthrown governments; its black-op and false flag operations; and its stealthily garrisoning of the planet with some thousand military bases, is conveniently left out of consideration. The near hysteria throughout a week following the downed airliner prevented people with some knowledge of relevant history from opening their mouths. Job security in the current world of journalism is quite shaky, and going against the tide would be almost akin to siding with the devil, as it would damage one’s journalistic ‘credibility’.

What strikes an older generation of serious journalists as questionable about the mainstream media’s credibility is editorial indifference to potential clues that would undermine or destroy the official story line; a story line that has already permeated popular culture as is evident in throwaway remarks embellishing book and film reviews along with much else. In the Netherlands the official story is already carved in stone, which is to be expected when it is repeated ten-thousand times. It cannot be discounted, of course, but it is based on not a shred of evidence.

The presence of two Ukrainian fighter planes near the Malaysian airliner on Russian radar would be a potential clue I would be very interested in if I were investigating either as journalist or member of the investigation team that the Netherlands officially leads. This appeared to be corroborated by a BBC Report with eyewitness accounts from the ground by villagers who clearly saw another plane, a fighter, close to the airliner, near the time of its crash, and heard explosions coming from the sky. This report has recently drawn attention because it was removed from the BBC’s archive. I would want to talk with Michael Bociurkiw, one of the first inspectors from the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) to reach the crash site who spent more than a week examining the wreckage and has described on CBC World News two or three “really pock-marked” pieces of fuselage. “It almost looks like machine gun fire; very, very strong machine gun fire that has left these unique marks that we haven’t seen anywhere else.”

I would certainly also want to have a look at the allegedly confiscated radar and voice records of the Kiev Air Control Tower to understand why the Malaysian pilot veered off course and rapidly descended shortly before his plane crashed, and find out whether foreign air controllers in Kiev were indeed sent packing immediately after the crash. Like the “Veteran Intelligence Professionals for Sanity”, I would certainly urge the American authorities with access to satellite images to show the evidence they claim to have of BUK missile batteries in ‘rebel’ hands as well as of Russian involvement, and ask them why they have not done so already. Until now Washington has acted like a driver who refuses a breathalyzer test. Since intelligence officials have leaked to some American newspapers their lesser certainty about the American certainties as brought to the world by the Secretary of State, my curiosity would be unrelenting.

To place European media loyalty to Washington in the Ukraine case as well as the slavish conduct of European politicians in perspective, we must know about and understand Atlanticism. It is a European faith. It has not given rise to an official doctrine, of course, but it functions like one. It is well summed up by the Dutch slogan at the time of the Iraq invasion: “zonder Amerika gaat het niet” (without the United States [things] [it] won’t work). Needless to say, the Cold War gave birth to Atlanticism. Ironically, it gained strength as the threat from the Soviet Union became less persuasive for increasing numbers among European political elites. That probably was a matter of generational change: the farther away from World War II, the less European governments remembered what it means to have an independent foreign policy on global-sized issues. Current heads of government of the European Union are unfamiliar with practical strategic deliberations. Routine thought on international relations and global politics is deeply entrenched in Cold War epistemology.

This inevitably also informs ‘responsible’ editorial policies. Atlanticism is now a terrible affliction for Europe: it fosters historical amnesia, willful blindness and dangerously misconceived political anger. But it thrives on a mixture of lingering unquestioned Cold War era certainties about protection, Cold War loyalties embedded in popular culture, sheer European ignorance, and an understandable reluctance to concede that one has even for a little bit been brainwashed. Washington can do outrageous things while leaving Atlanticism intact because of everyone’s forgetfulness, which the media do little or nothing to cure. I know Dutch people who have become disgusted with the villification of Putin, but the idea that in the context of Ukraine the fingerpointing should be toward Washington is well-nigh unacceptable. Hence, Dutch publications, along with many others in Europe, cannot bring themselves to place the Ukraine crisis in proper perspective by acknowledging that Washington started it all, and that Washington rather than Putin has the key to its solution. It would impel a renunciation of Atlanticism.

Atlanticism derives much of its strength through NATO, its institutional embodiment. The reason for NATO’s existence, which disappeard with the demise of the Soviet Union, has been largely forgotten. Formed in 1949, it was based on the idea that transatlantic cooperation for security and defense had become necessary after World War II in the face of a communism, orchestrated by Moscow, intent on taking over the entire planet. Much less talked about was European internal distrust, as the Europeans set off on their first moves towards economic integration. NATO constituted a kind of American guarantee that no power in Europe would ever try to dominate the others.

NATO has for some time now been a liability for the European Union, as it prevents development of concerted European foreign and defense policies, and has forced the member states to become instruments serving American militarism. It is also a moral liability because the governments participating in the ‘coalition of the willing’ have had to sell the lie to their citizens that European soldiers dying in Iraq and Afghanistan have been a necessary sacrifice to keep Europe safe from terrorists. Governments that have supplied troops to areas occupied by the United States have generally done this with considerable reluctance, earning the reproach from a succession of American officials that Europeans do too little for the collective purpose of defending democracy and freedom.

As is the mark of an ideology, Atlanticism is ahistorical. As horse medicine against the torment of fundamental political ambiguity it supplies its own history: one that may be rewritten by American mainstream media as they assist in spreading the word from Washington.

There could hardly be a better demonstration of this than the Dutch experience at the moment. In conversations these past three weeks I have encountered genuine surprise when reminding friends that the Cold War ended through diplomacy with a deal made on Malta between Gorbachev and the elder Bush in December 1989, in which James Baker got Gorbachev to accept the reunification of Germany and withdrawal of Warsaw Pact troops with a promise that NATO would not be extended even one inch to the East. Gorbachev pledged not to use force in Eastern Europe where the Russians had some 350,000 troops in East Germany alone, in return for Bush’s promise that Washington would not take advantage of a Soviet withdrawal from Eastern Europe. Bill Clinton reneged on those American promises when, for purely electoral reasons, he boasted about an enlargement of NATO and in 1999 made the Czech Republic and Hungary full members. Ten years later another nine countries became members, at which point the number of NATO countries was double the number during the Cold War. The famous American specialist on Russia, Ambassador George Kennan, originator of Cold War containment policy, called Clinton’s move “the most fateful error of American policy in the entire post-cold-war era.”

Historical ignorance abetted by Atlanticism is poignantly on display in the contention that the ultimate proof in the case against Vladimir Putin is his invasion of Crimea. Again, political reality here was created by America’s mainstream media. There was no invasion, as the Russian sailors and soldiers were already there since it is home to the ‘warm water’ Black Sea base for the Russian navy. Crimea has been a part of Russia for as long as the United States has existed. In 1954 Khrushchev, who himself came from the Ukraine, gave it to the Ukrainian Socialist Republic, which came down to moving a region to a different province, since Russia and Ukraine still belonged to the same country. The Russian speaking Crimean population was happy enough, as it voted in a referendum first for independence from the Kiev regime that resulted from the coup d’état, and subsequently for reunification with Russia.

Those who maintain that Putin had no right to do such a thing are unaware of another strand of history in which the United States has been moving (Star Wars) missile defense systems ever closer to Russian borders, supposedly to intercept hostile missiles from Iran, which do not exist. Sanctimonious talk about territorial integrity and sovereignty makes no sense under these circumstances, and coming from a Washington that has done away with the concept of sovereignty in its own foreign policy it is downright ludicrous.

A detestable Atlanticist move was the exclusion of Putin from the meetings and other events connected with the commemoration of the Normandy landings, for the first time in 17 years. The G8 became the G7 as a result. Amnesia and ignorance have made the Dutch blind to a history that directly concerned them, since the Soviet Union took the heart out of the Nazi war machine (that occupied the Netherlands) at a cost of incomparable and unimaginable numbers of military dead; without that there would not have been a Normandy invasion.

Not so long ago, the complete military disasters of Iraq and Afghanistan appeared to be moving NATO to a point where its inevitable demise could not to be too far off. But the Ukraine crisis and Putin’s decisiveness in preventing the Crimea with its Russian Navy base from possibly falling into the hands of the American-owned alliance, has been a godsend to this earlier faltering institution.

NATO leadership has already been moving troops to strengthen their presence in the Baltic states, sending missiles and attack aircraft to Poland and Lithuania, and since the downing of the Malaysian airliner it has been preparing further military moves that may turn into dangerous provocations of Russia. It has become clear that the Polish foreign minister together with the Baltic countries, none of which partook in NATO when its reason for being could still be defended, have become a strong driving force behind it. A mood of mobilization has spread in the past week. The ventriloquist dummies Anders Fogh Rasmussen and Jaap de Hoop Scheffer can be relied upon to take to TV screens inveighing against NATO member-state backsliding. Rasmussen, the current Secretary General, declared on August 7 in Kiev that NATO’s “support for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine is unwavering” and that he is looking to strengthen partnership with the country at the Alliance’s summit in Wales in September. That partnership is already strong, so he said, “and in response to Russia’s aggression, NATO is working even more closely with Ukraine to reform its armed forces and defense institutions.”

In the meantime, in the American Congress 23 Senate Republicans have sponsored legislation, the “Russian Aggression Prevention Act”, which is meant to allow Washington to make the Ukraine a non-NATO ally and could set the stage for a direct military conflict with Russia. We will probably have to wait until after America’s midterm elections to see what will become of it, but it already helps provide a political excuse for those in Washington who want to take next steps in the Ukraine.

In September last year Putin helped Obama by making it possible for him to stop a bombing campaign against Syria pushed by the neocons, and had also helped in defusing the nuclear dispute with Iran, another neocon project. This led to a neocon commitment to break the Putin-Obama link. It is hardly a secret that the neoconservatives desire the overthrow of Putin and eventual dismemberment of the Russian Federation. Less known in Europe is the existence of numerous NGOs at work in Russia, which will help them with this. Vladimir Putin could strike now or soon, to preempt NATO and the American Congress, by taking Eastern Ukraine, something he probably should have done right after the Crimean referendum. That would, of course, be proof of his evil intentions in European editorial eyes.

In the light of all this, one of the most fateful questions to ask in current global affairs is: what has to happen for Europeans to wake up to the fact that Washington is playing with fire and has ceased being the protector they counted on, and is instead now endangering their security? Will the moment come when it becomes clear that the Ukraine crisis is, most of all, about placing Star Wars missile batteries along an extensive stretch of Russian border, which gives Washington – in the insane lingo of nuclear strategists – ‘first strike’ capacity?

It is beginning to sink in among older Europeans that the United States has enemies who are not Europe’s enemies because it needs them for domestic political reasons; to keep an economically hugely important war industry going and to test by shorthand the political bona fides of contenders for public office. But while using rogue states and terrorists as targets for ‘just wars’ has never been convincing, Putin’s Russia as demonized by a militaristic NATO could help prolong the transatlantic status quo. The truth behind the fate of the Malaysian airliner, I thought from the moment that I heard about it, would be politically determined. Its black boxes are in London. In NATO hands?

Other hindrances to an awakening remain huge; financialization and neoliberal policies have produced an intimate transatlantic entwining of plutocratic interests. Together with the Atlanticist faith these have helped stymie the political development of the European Union, and with that Europe’s ability to proceed with independent political decisions. Since Tony Blair, Great Britain has been in Washington’s pocket, and since Nicolas Sarkozy one can say more or less the same of France.

That leaves Germany. Angela Merkel was clearly unhappy with the sanctions, but in the end went along because she wants to remain on the good side of the American president, and the United States as the conqueror in World War II does still have leverage through a variety of agreements. Germany’s foreign minister, Frank-Walter Steinmeier, quoted in newspapers and appearing on TV, repudiated the sanctions and points at Iraq and Libya as examples of the results brought by escalation and ultimatums, yet he too swings round and in the end goes along with them.

Der Spiegel is one of the German publications that offer hope. One of its columnists, Jakob Augstein, attacks the “sleepwalkers” who have agreed to sanctions, and censures his colleagues’ finger-pointing at Moscow. Gabor Steingart, who publishes Handelsblatt, inveighs against the “American tendency to verbal and then to military escalation, the isolation, demonization, and attacking of enemies” and concludes that also German journalism “has switched from level-headed to agitated in a matter of weeks. The spectrum of opinions has been narrowed to the field of vision of a sniper scope.” There must be more journalists in other parts of Europe who say things like this, but their voices do not carry through the din of vilification.

History is being made, once again. What may well determine Europe’s fate is that also outside the defenders of the Atlanticist faith, decent Europeans cannot bring themselves to believe in the dysfunction and utter irresponsibility of the American state.

 

Karel van Wolferen is a Dutch journalist and retired professor at the University of Amsterdam. Since 1969, he has published over twenty books on public policy issues, which have been translated into eleven languages and sold over a million copies worldwide. As a foreign correspondent for NRC Handelsblad , one of Holland’s leading newspapers, he received the highest Dutch award for journalism, and over the years his articles have appeared in The New York Times , The Washington Post , The New Republic , The National Interest , Le Monde , and numerous other newspapers and magazines.

UPDATE 2: Scott Horton has a podcast interview of Karel van Wolferen regarding his article at: http://scotthorton.org/interviews/2014/08/15/081514-karel-van-wolferen/

mardi, 21 octobre 2014

Ukraine, EIIL (Daesh), Parapluies de Hong Kong, ...

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Ukraine, EIIL (Daesh), Parapluies de Hong Kong, ...

dimanche, 19 octobre 2014

La battaglia sull’Istmo di Perekop

La battaglia sull’Istmo di Perekop

Autore:

Ex: http://www.centrostudilaruna.it

300px-Isthmus_of_Perekop_map.pngNell’autunno del 1920 la guerra civile russa era ormai avviata verso la sua inevitabile conclusione, con le armate bianche che cedevano, una dopo l’altra, davanti alla pressione dell’Armata rossa forgiata da Trotzkij e da lui diretta con spietata energia.

A parte le prime formazioni di Cosacchi antibolscevichi, come quella del generale Krasnov, che si appoggiava sull’aiuto dei Tedeschi (prima che la Germania uscisse sconfitta dalla prima guerra mondiale) e a parte l’esercito dei volontari cecoslovacchi, i quali, nell’estate del 1918, si erano impadroniti quasi senza colpo ferire di gran parte della ferrovia transiberiana e della regione degli Urali, tre furono le principali armate bianche che, nel corso del 1919, avevano costituito un serio pericolo per il potere bolscevico:

a) l’esercito siberiano dell’ammiraglio Kolčiak, autoproclamatosi “supremo reggitore” dello Stato russo e riconosciuto quale capo nominale di tutte le armate bianche, il quale, nei primi mesi dell’anno, si era spinto in direzione di Kazan’ e di Mosca. L’Armata rossa lo aveva però contrattaccato il 28 aprile e, in maggio, aveva sfondato le sue linee, dapprima respingendolo al di là degli Urali; poi, in agosto, dopo aver preso Celjabinsk ed Ekaterinburg, lanciando una nuova offensiva sul fronte Tobolsk-Kurgan e procedendo assai velocemente lungo la transiberiana, tanto da occupare Omsk già il 14 novembre. Kolčak venne consegnato, il 15 gennaio, dai Cecoslovacchi a un governo provvisorio filo-sovietico formatosi a Irkutsk e da questo processato e fucilato il 7 febbraio; il suo corpo venne buttato in un buco scavato nel ghiaccio del fiume Angara.

b) L’esercito bianco del generale Denikin, che nell’estate del 1919 aveva riportato successi spettacolari e, dalla regione del Kuban, aveva invaso l’Ucraina, spingendosi fino a Orel, sulla via adducente a Mosca da sud. Esso era stato a sua volta contrattaccato dall’Armata rossa a partire dal 10 ottobre e costretto a una precipitosa e drammatica ritirata. Alla fine dell’anno, i suoi resti erano tornati, assai mal ridotti, sulle posizioni di partenza della primavera, fra Kursk ed Ekaterinoslav; Denikin, sfiduciato, aveva passato le consegne al generale Wrangel, il quale aveva dedicato i mesi invernali a riorganizzare le truppe e i servizi logistici.

c) Il terzo attacco ai centri vitali del potere bolscevico era stato sferrato nell’autunno del 1919 dal generale Judenič il quale, con il sostegno della flotta inglese, era sbarcato nel Golfo di Finlandia e aveva marciato direttamente sulla vecchia capitale imperiale, Pietrogrado. La minaccia era stata seria, perché si era profilata contemporaneamente all’avanzata di Denikin dall’Ucraina, (mentre le forze di Kolčiak erano già in piena dissoluzione); ma anch’essa era stata affrontata e sventata con la massima energia dall’Armata rossa, che era passata decisamente al contrattacco, il 22 ottobre, e aveva costretto le forze di Judenič a interrompere la marcia su Pietrogrado e a reimbarcarsi in tutta fretta.

Così, all’inizio del 1920, a parte le bande degli atamani Semënov e Kalmykov, rispettivamente a Čita e Khabarovsk, al di là del lago Bajkal – ove era sorta, a fare da cuscinetto fra i Rossi e un corpo di spedizione di 70.000 soldati giapponesi, una effimera Repubblica dell’Estremo Oriente -; il piccolo esercito del barone Ungern-Sternberg nella Mongolia Interna; alcune forze cosacche nell’Asia centrale e nella regione del Caucaso; e alcune bande ucraine operanti nella zona di Kiev, restavano ora due soli avversari cospicui per l’Armata rossa: l’esercito polacco del maresciallo Pilsudski, pronto ad attaccare nella primavera del 1920, e quello dei Russi “bianchi” del generale Wrangel, attestato nell’Ucraina meridionale.

In Estremo Oriente, la guerriglia contro le ultime forze “bianche” e contro gli stessi Giapponesi venne condotta da bande di partigiani, sia bolscevichi che anarchici; mentre l’offensiva scatenata da Pilsudski nel maggio venne respinta e l’Armata rossa, passata a sua volta all’attacco, venne battuta in maniera decisiva sotto le mura di Varsavia, in agosto: sicché, il 18 marzo 1921, si giunse alla pace di Riga fra Polonia e Unione Sovietica. Abbiamo già narrato questi avvenimenti in due lavori precedenti: Trjapicyn in Siberia orientale: breve la vita felice di un “bandito” anarchico; e Chi ha voluto la guerra sovietico-polacca del 1920? Una questione storiografica ancora aperta.

Pertanto, nell’autunno del 1920, Trotzkij era ormai libero di concentrare le forze maggiori dell’Armata rossa contro l’ultimo esercito “bianco” ancora attestato in territorio russo e dotato di una buona capacità combattiva: quello del barone Wrangel. Anche le bande anarchiche di Machno, fino ad allora ostili ai bolscevichi, siglarono una tregua e accettarono anzi di passare sotto il comando del generale Frunze, in vista di una offensiva finale contro i Bianchi. Un ambasciatore inviato a Machno da Wrangel, per esplorare le possibilità di una alleanza tattica in funzione antibolscevica, era stato impiccato; il capo anarchico non sapeva, allora, che subito dopo la liquidazione dell’ultima armata “bianca” sarebbe venuta anche la sua ora.

wrangel

 

 

Pyotr Nikolayevich Wrangel (27 agosto 1878 – 25 aprile 1928)

Wrangel non godeva dell’appoggio delle popolazioni ucraine, per le stesse ragioni che avevano provocato la sconfitta di Kolčak, Denikin e Judenič: la diffidenza dei contadini e l’esiguità delle classi medie che, sole, avrebbero potuto costituire una base sociale determinante; e ciò nonostante che Wrangel, ammaestrato dalla disfatta degli altri generali “bianchi”, avesse promesso ai contadini una riforma agraria radicale, a spese della grande proprietà terriera.

I bolscevichi, con i loro metodi brutali di requisizioni forzate e con l’esercizio di una spietata dittatura, mascherata sotto l’apparenza di autonomia dei Soviet, avevano destato anch’essi notevoli diffidenze da parte dei contadini e suscitato malumori perfino tra i marinai e nella classe operaia (come si sarebbe visto nella rivolta di Kronstadt, repressa da Tuchacevskij nel marzo 1921). Essi erano però più abili a livello propagandistico, sfruttando slogan come «tutto il potere ai Soviet» e «la terra a chi la lavora»; e dipingendo tutti i Bianchi, senza alcuna sfumatura, come gli strumenti della restaurazione monarchica e aristocratica.

Una valutazione imparziale di quegli avvenimenti esige che si riconoscano a Wrangel delle capacità militari e organizzative veramente eccezionali: possedeva più costanza di Denikin e più senso politico di Kolčak; e, pur non facendosi illusioni sull’esito finale di una lotta così ineguale, era capace di infondere coraggio e determinazione ai suoi uomini, demoralizzati da tante sconfitte e ridotti a lottare con una crescente penuria di materiali da guerra ed equipaggiamenti; cui si aggiunsero – alla metà di ottobre – delle condizioni climatiche precocemente ed eccezionalmente rigide, che aumentarono le loro sofferenze.

Riteniamo si possa sostanzialmente concordare con il giudizio che di Wrangel ha dato lo storico inglese W. H. Chamberlin nella sua ormai classica Storia della Rivoluzione russa, 1917-1921 (titolo originale: The Russian Revolution, 1917-1921, 1935; traduzione italiana di Mario Vinciguerra, Torino, Einaudi, 1966, pp. 728, 740-42):

«Wrangel contribuì a infondere nuova energia nelle file dei Bianchi. Lavorando giorno e notte riorganizzò totalmente l’amministrazione militare e civile nella piccola zona sotto la sua autorità, e trasformò quelle truppe dalla massa informe di profughi cui s’erano ridotti a un’efficiente forza combattiva. Alcune delle misure prese a quello scopo dai suoi luogotenenti furono estremamente brutali. Ad esempio, il generale Kutepov fece impiccare in pubblico ufficiali e soldati colti in stato di avanzata ubriachezza nelle strade di Simferopol'; ma nel complesso questi provvedimenti raggiunsero il loro scopo. Lo spiriti bellicoso delle truppe, che era quasi svanito durante la lunga e tremenda ritirata da Orel a Novorossijsk, fu restaurato. Uno scrittore sovietico esprime il seguente apprezzamento sullo stato dell’esercito di Wrangel nella primavera e nell’estate del 1920: “Qualitativamente era la migliore forza combattente d cui avesse mai disposto la controrivoluzione russa e internazionale nella sua lotta contro le Repubbliche sovietiche”.

Questo giudizio è confermato dal corso delle operazioni militari. Le truppe di Wrangel non solo tennero a bada ma respinsero forze sovietiche considerevolmente superiori, e soccombettero solo quando, per effetto della pace conclusa con la Polonia, esse furono letteralmente schiacciate dal numero delle forze sovietiche […].

Wrangel fu l’ultimo capo del movimento bianco organizzato in Russia. Trovandosi fin da principio di fronte a una forte disparità di forze, la sua disfatta era quasi inevitabile. Pochi degli uomini di stato antibolscevichi più autorevoli ebbero voglia di entrare nel suo governo. Egli non fece miracoli. Con un piccolo esercito e una base di operazioni inadeguata, non poteva tener testa indefinitamente all’enorme esercito rosso, che attingeva i propri soldati da quasi tutta la Russia. Coi suoi precedenti di ufficiale aristocratico, non poteva superare il grande abisso di sospetto e di ostilità che sempre sussistettero tra il movimento e le masse dei contadini, e fu la causa fondamentale della sua disfatta.

Ma, tenuto conto di questi inevitabili fattori negativi, Wrangel si batté valorosamente. Aveva ereditato un relitto di esercito e seppe rifoggiarlo in forza combattente che inferse ai Rossi alcuni fieri colpi. Wrangel non poteva salvare quella vecchia Russia di cui s’era fatto campione e rappresentante, ma la sua attività militare, che tenne una quantità di truppe rosse impegnate in Ucraina e nel Kuban, non fu certo l’ultima ragione per cui l’esercito rosso mancò davanti a Varsavia di quella estrema riserva d’energia che avrebbe creato una Polonia sovietica ed esteso il bolscevismo molto oltre le frontiere russe. Visto da questo lato, l’epilogo del movimento bianco, impersonato da Wrangel, fu una fortuna per la Polonia e forse per altri stati di nuova formazione dell’Europa orientale come fu funesto per il governo sovietico e per l’Internazionale comunista».

Una prima offensiva contro le forze di Wrangel, lanciata l’8 gennaio 1920, aveva portato i reparti dell’Armata rossa fino a ridosso della Crimea, centro nevralgico dei Bianchi, con i suoi porti affollati di navi russe e delle potenze dell’Intesa. Sarebbe errato, tuttavia, vedere Wrangel come una semplice creazione degli Alleati; in realtà, dopo la sconfitta di Denikin, i governi di Londra e Parigi avevano rinunciato alla speranza di assistere a una caduta del regime sovietico in tempi brevi e, di fatto, avevano ritirato il loro appoggio militare e finanziario ai Bianchi, limitandosi solo a vaghe promesse e ad un certo sostegno logistico.

I Francesi, in particolare – che avevano investito grossi capitali in Russia prima e durante la prima guerra mondiale, avevano puntato quasi tutte le loro carte sulla Polonia di Pilsudski; e, dopo la vittoria di quest’ultimo davanti a Varsavia, si disinteressarono sostanzialmente del destino di Wrangel. Come se non bastasse, la loro flotta, stanziata a Odessa, era stata scossa dagli ammutinamenti degli equipaggi nel 1919, per cui il governo francese non si illudeva di poter prolungare la propria influenza politico-militare nell’area del Mar Nero.

Ci furono invece delle trattative interalleate che sembrarono sfociare in una spedizione militare italiana in Georgia, all’inizio dell’estate 1919; ma poi non se ne fece più nulla, specialmente a causa dell’instabilità dei governi italiani tra la fine della prima guerra mondiale e l’ascesa del fascismo. Nel caso specifico, fu l’opposizione di Nitti al progetto che lo fece cadere, e con esso cadde il ministero Orlando, che lo aveva preparato e si accingeva a porlo in atto.

Quanto agli Inglesi, essi avevano puntato su Kolčak, cui avevano fornito non solo abbondante materiale da guerra e ingenti risorse finanziarie, ma anche consiglieri militari; e, dopo la sua sconfitta, avevano rinunciato all’idea di poter rovesciare il regime sovietico mediante l’azione degli eserciti “bianchi”.

Sapendo di non poter più vincere la guerra civile sul campo, Wrangel – che era un uomo intelligente e che possedeva uno spiccato senso realistico – studiò il modo di ritardare l’investimento della sua cittadella crimeana e di intavolare eventualmente trattative coi bolscevichi, attraverso i buoni uffici delle potenze occidentali; ma, per poterlo fare, desiderava raggiungere una posizione strategica migliore, che rendesse più forte anche la sua posizione politica.

Pertanto, nell’estate, egli effettuò alcuni sbarchi sulla costa orientale del Mar d’Azov, investendo il territorio del Kuban e minacciando di congiungersi con il cosiddetto Esercito della rigenerazione russa, che si era stabilito nella regione settentrionale del Caucaso. Il collegamento non riuscì, nonostante le forze bianche riportassero, nel mese di agosto, una serie di successi inaspettati; per cui, in settembre, le truppe di Wrangel dovettero reimbarcarsi.

Aspettandosi ora una nuova, grande offensiva dell’Armata rossa, Wrangel attestò il suo esercito nella Tauride settentrionale e, intanto, provvide a fortificare potentemente l’istmo di Perekop, un vero e proprio “collo di bottiglia”, mediante il quale si accede, da nord-ovest a sud-est, alla penisola di Crimea.

In effetti, l’offensiva sovietica scattò il 28 ottobre, contemporaneamente alla fine delle grandi operazioni sul teatro polacco; e, dopo una lotta accanita, terminò com’era inevitabile: con l’irruzione dei Rossi fino agli accessi dell’istmo. In questa battaglia Wrangel aveva potuto mettere in linea non più di 35 uomini, contro circa 137.000 dell’Armata rossa.

Ai primi di novembre, dunque, le due armate si fronteggiavano sull’istmo, davanti a Perekop, dove i Bianchi era asserragliati dietro il cosiddetto Vallo Turco, una triplice linea di difesa munita di trincee, filo spinato, nidi di mitragliatrici e postazioni d’artiglieria. Molti consideravano le difese dell’istmo semplicemente imprendibili; ma, come vedremo, le forze della natura diedero ai Sovietici, che già godevano di una schiacciante superiorità numerica, anche un inatteso vantaggio strategico, allorché il vento rese transitabile il passaggio di terra dalla Penisola Čongar alla Penisola Lituana, respingendo le acque basse del mare; mentre le gelide temperature permisero al fondo fangoso di solidificarsi in una solida crosta di ghiaccio.

Scrive lo storico americano W. Bruce Lincoln nel suo libro I Bianchi e i Rossi. Storia della guerra civile russa (titolo originario: Red Victory, 1989; traduzione italiana di Francesco Saba Sardi, Milano, Mondadori, 1991, 1994, pp. 396-401):

Mikhail Frunze (2 febbraio 1885 – 31 ottobre1925)

Mikhail Frunze (2 febbraio 1885 – 31 ottobre1925)

«Solo lentamente i soldati di Wrangel cedettero terreno sotto l’enorme pressione dell’Armata Rossa durante la prima settimana di aspri combattimenti, e l’assalto finale di Frunze non fu coronato dal trionfo che si era atteso. Le forze di Bljücher e di Budënnyi erano avanzate di oltre 120 chilometri in tre giorni nel deciso tentativo di raggiungere la ferrovia in modo da tagliare la strada alla ritirata di Wrangel in Crimea, ma le unità rosse più a est dovettero disputare al nemico ogni pollice di terra e avanzarono assai più lentamente. “Sono stupefatto dell’enorme energia con cui il nemico resiste – comunicò Frunze a Mosca. – è indubbio che il nemico ha combattuto più validamente e tenacemente di quanto avrebbe fatto ogni altro esercito”. Fu così che i reparti di Wrangel in ritirata vinsero la corsa per la Crimea, e i disperati sforzi di allievi ufficiali e unità di seconda linea impedirono ai fucilieri di Bljücher di impadronirsi del Passo di Salkovo e di fare sfondare la prima linea di difesa a Perekop. Ma i Bianchi pagarono assai cari i loro momentanei successi. Aprendosi la strada nella Tauride settentrionale, le forze di Frunze catturarono quasi 20.000 prigionieri, un centinaio di pezzi da campo, un gran numero di mitragliatrici, decine di migliaia di granate e milioni di cartucce. “L’esercito rimase intatto – commentò in seguito Wrangel -, ma le sue capacità combattive non furono più quelle di prima”, né d’altra parte era riuscito a conservare quelle fonti alimentari per le quali aveva rischiato tanto: oltre 36.000 tonnellate di cereali del raccolto autunnale accantonate dalla sua sussistenza nei magazzini ferroviari di Melitopol e di Geničesk caddero nelle mani di Frunze.

Quesri aveva perduto l’occasione di riportare una vittoria decisiva non essendo riuscito ad accerchiare l’esercito di Wrangel prima che raggiungesse la Crimea; costretto pertanto a dare l’assalto alla fortezza peninsulare, aumentò le proprie forze e inviò i ricognitori che si erano di recente aggiunti ai suoi rafforzati reparti aerei a fotografare le linee nemiche. Alla fine della prima settimana di novembre, aveva ammassato 180.771 uomini appoggiati da quasi 3.000 mitragliatrici, oltre 600 pezzi d’artiglieria e 23 treni corazzati con cui affrontare i 26.000 regolari bianchi e le 16.000 male armate riserve che guarnivano le difese della Crimea.

Frunze decise di sferrare l’attacco principale contro il Vallo Turco, una barriera ottomana del XVIII secolo lungo la quale Wrangel aveva creato nidi ben protetti di mitragliatrici e piazzole di artiglieria, in modo da assicurare fuoco incrociato a complemento delle fitte barriere di filo spinato che costituivano la prima linea di Perekop, dietro la quale i residui treni corazzati dei Bianchi erano in grado di muoverei avanti e indietro lungo la recente diramazione ferroviaria Sebastopoli-Jušun-Amjansk, coprendo con i loro pezzi gli approcci del vallo. La 51a Divsione di Bljücher ebbe l’ordine di guidare l’attacco, e il suo comandante ne concentrò i fucilieri in ordine talmente serrato, che in certi punti aveva un uomo ogni metro e una mitragliatrice a sostegno di ogni 17 uomini. Alla sinistra di Bljücher, di fronte alle paludi salmastre di Sivaš e al ponte di Čongar un po’ più a est, Frunze schierò la Kornarmija di Budënnyi, la IV Armata Rossa e i partigiani di Machno, tenendo di riserva la maggior parte di tre armate. Stando ai resoconti sovietici, erano tutti reparti animati da alto spirito combattivo, decisi a celebrare il 7 novembre il terzo anniversario della rivoluzione bolscevica infliggendo una disfatta all’ultima cospicua forza bianca sul suolo russo.

Nonostante gli uomini e le armi che Frunze aveva radunato in vista della battaglia, i difensori della Crimea non si erano lasciati infettare dal sentimento di sconfitta che alla fine del 1919 aveva minato Denikin e i Bianchi a Novorossijsk. Wrangel aveva cominciato i preparativi per un’evacuazione in massa, ma così silenziosamente e in tempi così lunghi da mascherare l’intento. “Le misure da noi prese avevano placato le ansie che si erano qua e là manifestate”, commentò in seguito. “Dietro le linee, tutto restava tranquillo perché ciascuno credeva nell’imprendibilità delle fortificazioni di Perekop”, ed era una convinzione tutt’altro che infondata. I giornali di Crimea parlavano ancora in tono fiducioso delle difese dell’istmo di Perekop, del ponte di Čongar e della costiera intermedia. “Le fortificazioni di Sivaš e di Perekop sono talmente solide, che il Comando supremo rosso non dispone né degli uomini né delle macchine per sfondarle, assicurava il 4 novembre il foglio “Vremja” (“Tempi”). Tutte le forze armate del Sovdepja messe assieme non bastano a intimidire la Crimea”. Wrangel, forse ancora speranzoso di riuscire a bloccare Frunze, ma intento soprattutto a guadagnare il tempo necessario per portare a termine un’evacuazione ordinata, unificò la I e la II Armata sotto gli ordini del generale Kutepov, il migliore e il più tenace dei reparti combattenti che gli restassero. Universalmente noto per la feroce crudeltà nei confronti di bolscevichi e loro simpatizzanti, e ampiamente sospettato di di aver intascato colossali bustarelle in cambio di permessi di esportazione e importazione quando aveva comandato la guarnigione di Novoriossijsk, Kutepov continuava ciò nonostante a godere della piena fiducia di Wrangel quale ufficiale “in grado di affrontare qualsiasi situazione, un uomo dal grande valore militare e di eccezionale tenacia nella realizzazione dei compiti affidatigli.” Kutepov avrebbe difeso il Vallo Turco come nessun altro avrebbe potuto fare; e se non ci fosse riuscito, Wrangel avrebbe saputo senz’ombra di dubbio che la fine era giunta.

La mattina del 7 novembre, dopo aver impartito gli ultimi ordini per l’attacco, Frunze si recò al quartier generale di Budënnyi dove con questi e Vorošilov compilò un telegramma di congratulazioni a Lenin nel terzo anniversario della rivoluzione bolscevica, promettendogli la vittoria conclusiva a celebrazione della stessa. “In nome degli eserciti del fronte meridionale, ormai pronti a sferrare il colpo finale contro la tana della belva mortalmente ferita, e in nome delle rinnovate aquile delle grandi armate di cavalleria, salute – esordiva il testo. – La nostra ferrea fanteria, la nostra audace cavalleria, la nostra invincibile artiglieria e i nostri rapidi aviatori dalla vista acuta… libereranno quest’ultimo lembo di terra sovietica da ogni nemico”, si prometteva a Lenin. Forse più di ogni altra unità in azione nella Russia meridionale, la 51a Divisione di Bljücher meritava tutti quei superlativi, ed era sul suo assalto frontale contro il Vallo Turco che Frunze, Vorošilov e Budënnyi contavano per irrompere nel bastione crimeano di Wrangel. Ma ad aiutare la loro causa più di quanto avrebbe potuto fare ogni atto di valore, per quanto grande, furono l’imprevedibile e l’inaspettato. La natura, le cui forze avevano inflitto tanti tormenti al popolo della Russia bolscevica durante i due aspri inverni precedenti, questa volta si schierò dalla parte dei Rossi, aprendo loro nuove, insospettate vie d’attacco.

Forse solo due o tre volte nel corso di una generazione, un forte vento investe da nordovest la Crimea, spingendo verso est le basse acque che coprono i bassifondi salini del Sivaš e lasciando allo scoperto la sottostante, putrida fanghiglia. Il 7 novembre 1920, imperversò un vento talmente furioso, accompagnato da temperature così basse che la notte del 7-8 novembre il fondo melmoso del Sivaš, così di rado scoperto, si gelò formando una superficie tanto solida da reggere uomini e cavalli. Alle 22, mentre gran parte della 51a Divisione di Bljücher si apprestava ad assalire le posizioni di Kutepov lungo il Vallo Turco, la 15a e la 52a Divisione di fucilieri, in una con la 153a Brigata di fucilieri e di cavalleria della 51a Divisione, approfittando dell’insperato vantaggio. Una pesante nebbia grava sulla zona, impedendo alle sentinelle di Wrangel sulla Penisola Lituana di avvistare i reparti rossi impegnati nell’attraversamento dei sei chilometri del Sivaš. Ben presto, i piedi e gli zoccoli di uomini e cavalli trasformarono in gelida fanghiglia il fondo marino indurito, obbligando i reparti successivi a rallentare l’avanzata, in pari tempo aumentando le probabilità di scoperta; ciò nonostante, tutti i reparti raggiunsero la terraferma senza essere avvistati proprio mentre il vento cambiava direzione e l’acqua cominciava a crescere.

All’alba dell’8 novembre, gli infangati soldati di Frunze assalirono le deboli forze che Wrangel aveva lasciato sulla Penisola Lituana a difesa da un eventuale quanto improbabile attacco anfibio. Quello che i comandanti di entrambe le parti avevano immaginato essere un angolino dimenticato nella battaglia per la Crimea, ne divenne la chiave di volta allorché Kutepov ordinò contrattacchi a sostegno dei difensori della Penisola Lituana proprio mentre la 51a muoveva all’assalto del Vallo Turco. Per tutta la giornata, le sorti della battaglia rimasero incerte, e il destino dei Rossi e dei Bianchi parve ugualmente in bilico. Se l’assalto di Bljücher fosse fallito sarebbe stato facilissimo, per Kutepov, volgersi contro i ridotti reparti rossi che lo minacciavano alle spalle della Penisola Lituana e liquidarli, ora che le acque marine avevano rioccupato il Sivaš e Frunze non poteva né inviar loro rinforzi né richiamarli. D’altro parte, se l’attacco di Bljücher fosse stato coronato da successo, e i Rossi fossero avanzati oltre la Penisola Lituana, il grosso di Kutepov rischiava l’accerchiamento ad opera di un nemico assai più forte. Le sorti della battaglia dipendevano dallo sfondamento del Vallo Turco e dalla capacità delle truppe rosse sulla Penisola Lituana di resistere finché Bljücher ci fosse riuscito.

Dopo aver differito l’assalto per parecchie ore a causa della fitta nebbia, Bljücher aprì il bombardamento d’artiglieria contro il Vallo Turco proprio mentre le unità che avevano superato il Sivaš raggiungevano la Penisola Lituana. Quattro ore più tardi, le sue fanterie vennero avanti. In un primo momento il fuoco d’appoggio, per quanto pesante, non parve sufficiente a ridurre la tempesta di proiettili che artiglierie e mitragliatrici di Kutepov scagliarono addosso agli attaccanti: in alcuni reggimenti di Bljücher, le perdite ammontarono al sessanta per cento degli effettivi, e tre successive ondate di fanteria furono respinte dal fuoco nemico. Solo alle tre e mezza del mattino del 9 novembre, il quarto assalto condotto dalla 51a Divisione ebbe ragione del Vallo. “Fu come se una montagna mi cadesse dalle spalle – confessò poi Frunze. – Con la presa di Perekop scomparve il pericolo che le due divisioni tagliate fuori dalle acque refluenti del Sivaš venissero annientate.”

Il sollievo di Frunze accompagnò l’inizio delle più buie ore di Wrangel, il quale la sera del 9 novembre, alla notizia che il Vallo Turco era caduto, scrisse: “Il generale Kutepov mi riferì che, alla luce degli ultimi sviluppi, vale a dire la penetrazione del nemico nelle nostre posizioni di Perekop e il pericolo di un accerchiamento, aveva impartito l’ordine di ripiegamento sulla seconda linea fortificata… Eravamo sull’orlo del disastro… Erano già stati superati i limiti della capacità dell’esercito di resistere e le fortificazioni non potevano più bloccare il nemico. Erano necessarie urgenti misure per salvare l’esercito e la popolazione civile.” In netto contrasto con la ritirata di Denikin da Novorossijsk dell’anno prima, così malamente condotta, Wrangel, pur sperando nella vittoria, aveva elaborato precisi piani di evacuazione e disponeva pertanto di sufficienti riserve di carbone e nafta per tutte le navi in mano ai Bianchi. A questo punto diede fondo a tutte le sue risorse. “La minima esitazione, il più piccolo errore, potrebbe rovinare tutto”, ammonì. L’11 novembre ordinò che tutte le navi dei Bianchi accostassero alle zone di imbarco precedentemente scelte, vale a dire Evpatorija, Sebastopoli e Jalta, e altre ancora a Feodosija e a Kerč. Poi, mentre Kutepov conduceva azioni di retroguardia per rallentare l’avanzata rossa, Wrangel portò a termine i preparativi. Innanzitutto i malati e i feriti, poi i funzionari governativi, i civili e le forze armate, dovevano essere evacuati prima dell’arrivo dei Rossi. Il giorno dopo Wrangel impartì gli ultimi ordini. Le truppe dovevano rompere il contatto con il nemico e raggiungere i più vicini porti d’imbarco, lasciandosi alle spalle armamenti e materiali pesanti, mentre “tutti coloro che hanno partecipato con l’esercito a questa salita al Calvario – vale a dire i familiari dei soldati e quelli dei funzionari civili, nonché – chiunque altro possa correre pericolo se catturato dal nemico”, doveva avviarsi ai punti d’imbarco con i militari.

L’abilità di cui Wrangel diede prova nel mantenere il controllo di truppe e civili, fu brillantemente comprovata dal fatto che l’evacuazione ebbe luogo con panico e disordine minimi. Nel tardo pomeriggio del 14 novembre, Sebastopoli era ormai vuota e Wrangel, avuta notizia che anche l’evacuazione di Evpatorija era stata portata a termine, salì a bordo dell’incrociatore “Generale Kornilov” che l’avrebbe portato in esilio. A Jalta, la stessa scena si ripeté alle nove del mattino successivo e quello seguente ebbe luogo anche a Feodosija e, di lì a poche ore, a Kerč. Alle sedici del 16 novembre 1920, gli ultimi Bianchi, 145.693 uomini, donne e bambini erano a bordo di 126 navi in rotta verso Costantinopoli.»

Con l’evacuazione della Crimea e la scomparsa dell’ultimo consistente esercito antibolscevico, la sorte della guerra civile era definitivamente segnata. Uno dopo l’altro, l’Armata rossa spense gli ultimi focolai di resistenza nell’immenso territorio russo.

Le bande di Machno vennero spazzate via dall’Ucraina meridionale; l’ataman Petljura, che si era alleato coi Polacchi, vide infranto il suo sogno di una Ucraina occidentale indipendente; Ungern-Sternberg venne sconfitto e fucilato in Mongolia; le Repubbliche caucasiche furono riconquistate (Batum fu presa il 19 marzo 1921); i Giapponesi, preceduti dagli Americani, sgombrarono la Siberia e, nel 1922, la Repubblica dell’Estremo Oriente si sciolse e fu riassorbita dall’Unione delle Repubbliche Socialiste Sovietiche (che assunse tale denominazione nel dicembre 1922, in occasione del X Congresso panrusso dei Soviet).

Prima ancora della sconfitta finale di Wrangel, anche la regione russa settentrionale di Arcangelo e Murmansk era stata evacuata dagli Inglesi che avevano puntato sul generale Miller, ma la cui posizione era divenuta insostenibile dopo la sconfitta di Kolčak. Infine, nell’Asia centrale, venne infranto il sogno di Enver pascià, ex membro del triumvirato dei “Giovani Turchi” che aveva governato l’Impero ottomano durante la prima guerra mondiale (e che aveva personalmente deciso il genocidio degli Armeni nel 1915-16), di creare un vasto dominio delle genti turaniche e turche fra il Turkestan cinese e il bacino del Mar Caspio.

Così, con la sola eccezione della Finlandia e delle tre piccole Repubbliche baltiche (Estonia, Lettonia e Lituania), destinate a una effimera indipendenza sino allo scoppio della seconda guerra mondiale; e con la perdita, altrettanto temporanea, di alcune regioni di confine a favore della Polonia e della Romania, l’Unione Sovietica ritornò in possesso, entro la fine del 1922, di tutti i territori che avevano fatto parte del vecchio Impero zarista. Del quale ereditò automaticamente anche la politica espansionista, sia verso l’Europa che verso l’Asia; ma, questa volta, non sotto l’influsso della ideologia panslavista, bensì all’ombra della bandiera rossa e del credo internazionalista di Marx e Lenin.

lundi, 13 octobre 2014

Le conflit Euro-Russe vu comme le résultat d’un chevauchement entre deux unions économiques

 Free_Trade_Areas

Le conflit Euro-Russe vu comme le résultat d’un chevauchement entre deux unions économiques : leçons à tirer pour un monde multipolaire naissant

Ex: http://www.leap2020.net

Le projet Euro-BRICS croit fermement au fait que l’émergence d’un monde multipolaire est une tendance forte qu’il faut accueillir et encadrer plutôt que craindre et endiguer. En effet, LEAP base son travail sur une méthode de prospective originale – l’Anticipation Politique[1]- qui se donne pour mission de contribuer à détecter les tendances irrésistibles, d’identifier les chemins porteurs d’avenir parmi ces tendances et de définir les stratégies d’adaptation permettant aux entités de trouver leur voie vers ces avenirs positifs. L’un de nos prédicats est que tenter de contenir les tendances lourdes aboutir à la violence, qu’elle soit économique sociale ou militaire.

LEAP, et que le projet Euro-Brics, considère la crise Ukrainienne comme un événement briseur de tendance lourde, perturbant l’émergence pacifique et organisée d’un monde multipolaire, et entraînant brusquement l’Europe et la planète vers une polarisation conflictuelle entre Ouest et Est, entre anciens leaders mondiaux et puissances émergentes, et à terme entre Etats-Unis et Chine.

C’est pour cette raison que le LEAP et le projet Euro-BRICS tentent de comprendre les dynamiques à l’?uvre derrière cette crise. Ainsi, une première discussion en ligne a eu lieu en Mai, réunissant les universitaires du réseau Euro-BRICS et donnant lieu à deux résultats :

  • la publication d’une déclaration conjointe visant à promouvoir les idées 1/ d’un partage de responsabilités de la crise entre l’Europe et la Russie, 2/ comme condition préalable à la reprise de négociations constructives entre  Européens et  Russes, et entre pro-Européens et pro-russes en Ukraine, 3/ en utilisant le cadre Euro-BRICS comme facilitateur diplomatique (cf  les trois propositions stratégiques de notre déclaration conjointe)
  • la compréhension du conflit Euro-Russe sur l’Ukraine comme résultat d’un chevauchement entre deux unions économiques, et la nécessité d’analyser plus en détail cette caractéristique de la crise Ukrainienne.

La crise Ukrainienne est née d’une gestion catastrophique des négociations d’accords de  libre-échange entre l’Ukraine et la Russie d’une part, et entre l’Ukraine et l’Europe d’autre part. La double-offre simultanée s’est transformée en une prise de décision impossible pour l’Ukraine, et cela pour deux raisons :

  • Le marché proposé par l’Europe était exclusif : si l’Ukraine signait avec l’Europe, elle n’était plus autorisée à signer avec la Russie[2]
  • En novembre 2013, l’Europe rejetait la proposition de l’Ukraine de procéder à des négociations trilatérales (Ukraine, Europe, Russie) dans le but de rendre les deux offres compatibles et bénéfiques à toutes les parties en jeu[3].

Ce comportement de la part de l’Europe met en exergue un trait caractéristique de cette crise : il s’agit d’un conflit territorial entre deux voisins. D’un côté, l’Union Européenne, une zone de libre-échange engagée dans un processus critiquable d’extension sans fin[4]. De l’autre côté, le projet Union Economique Eurasiatique de la Russie, entrant subitement en compétition avec le précédent.

D’autant plus que l’offre russe est devenue un vrai compétiteur comme en témoignent les pays candidats qui ont finalement préféré le deal Russe au deal Européen. En effet, au cours des mois précédant l’éruption de la crise Ukrainienne, d’autres pays auxquels avaient été proposés les deux marchés, ont choisi l’option russe, au plus grand désarroi de l’Europe : l’Arménie en particulier[5], mais aussi la Biélorussie en plein milieu de la crise Ukrainienne[6].

Le fait est que l’Union  Economique Eurasiatique de la Russie est construite sur la base, non seulement de l’ex-URSS, mais aussi de la Communauté des Etats Indépendants librement co-créée après l’effondrement de l’Union Soviétique. La tentative de l’Europe de détourner l’Ukraine, l’Arménie, l’Azerbaïdjan, la Biélorussie, la Géorgie et la Moldavie de cette évolution constitue inévitablement une source de conflit dans lesquels les droits de trois parties au moins sont remis en question :

  • Le droit des Européens à l’auto-détermination en ce qui concerne les limites de leur union est ignoré (il a été régulièrement demandé par une grande partie des acteurs civils et politiques  que tout nouvel élargissement soit soumis à un référendum)
  • Le droit des Ukrainiens à rester unis et indépendants dans le cadre de partenariats équilibrés et synergiques entre ses deux voisins (étant donnée la double nature de l’Ukraine, l’accord exclusif vers lequel l’Europe poussait l’Ukraine ne pouvait aboutir qu’à la division ou à la guerre civile)
  • Le droit des Russes à créer les conditions de leur sécurité et de leur prospérité par l’intégration à-l’européenne de leur voisinage géographique, historique et culturel.

Il ne s’agit bien sûr pas d’être naïf. Il est légitime que le développement d’une union économique centrée sur la Russe suscite quelques inquiétudes du côté de ses voisins frontaliers – que ce soit l’Europe ou la Chine d’ailleurs. Mais le droit de la Russie à s’organiser suivant ces logiques doit être affirmé pour permettre à cette évolution d’être encadrée par des négociations constructives afin d’obtenir une configuration mutuellement bénéfique et porteuse de paix.

Le monde multipolaire est constitué de telles régions  et le défi consiste à admettre le droit de ces régions à exister et à construire les outils de leur pérennité, mais aussi la nécessaire invention du cadre global susceptible de garantir la coexistence pacifique de ces régions. De grandes questions se posent : Comment définir les limites de chaque région ? Ces limites devraient-elles prendre en compte les zones « tampons » (comme l’Ukraine aurait dû le rester), dans quels cas et pourquoi ? Comment organiser les relations pacifiques trans-régionales ? Les accords de libre-échange ne devraient-ils pas être réservés aux relations économiques intra-régionales ? A quoi peuvent servir les organisations de l’ancien système international  (par exemple l’OMC qui a réellement besoin de reconsidérer les principes du système économique mondial du 21ème siècle[7] ) ?…

La crise Ukrainienne, si elle n’est pas correctement résolue, est de bien mauvais augure pour l’avenir des interactions entre unions régionales. Qu’en sera-t-il du chevauchement potentiel entre Mercosur et ALENA ? ALENA et Union Européenne ? etc… Le monde se dirige-t-il aveuglement vers une situation de type pré-1ère guerre mondiale ? Ou l’Europe et la Russie, accompagnées des acteurs principaux du monde multipolaire émergent – les BRICS, peuvent-elles tirer parti  de leur expérience historique douloureuse et commune afin d’éviter un nouveau scénario tragique ?

Il est dommage que la fondatrice de la méthode d’intégration régionale, l’Europe, n’ait pas  été capable d’anticiper, ou au moins de gérer de façon rationnelle, cette inévitable confrontation. Aujourd’hui, il appartient à l’Europe et aux BRICS de réfléchir ensemble aux principes et aux outils pouvant engendrer un monde multipolaire harmonieusement articulé, respectant le droit de chaque région à son union économique (et politique). Les BRICS, de leur côté, peuvent évidemment travailler sur ces  thèmes, mais tant qu’au moins la moitié du monde occidental (Europe) sera en désaccord avec les nouveaux principes et règles qu’ils mettront en place, les tensions augmenteront entre les anciennes et les nouvelles puissances mondiales.

Voilà  quelques unes des questions dont nous souhaitons débattre au cours de notre prochaine réunion Euro-BRICS en ligne.

 
Notes

[1]
                  Le concept d’Anticipation Politique a été inventé par Franck Biancheri, notre très regretté directeur des études, élaboré gdans le cadre d’un partenariat avec la Sorbonne en 2009, formalisé par Marie-Hélène Caillol dans son Manuel d’Anticipation Politique, pour être désormais enseigné par la  FEFAP

[2]
                 « De nombreux décideurs estiment que l’UE doit redoubler d’efforts pour coopérer avec la Russie dans la région au lieu de proposer aux pays du Partenariat oriental des accords commerciaux mutuellement exclusifs qui créent un sentiment de rivalité entre Bruxelles et Moscou ». Source : Council on Foreign Relations, 14/03/2014

[3]
                  « Le 21 novembre 2013,… un décret du gouvernement ukrainien a suspendu les préparations à la signature de l’accord d’association; à la place, il proposait de créer un comité commercial tripartite entre l’Ukraine, l’UE et le Russie qui résoudrait les questions commerciales entre les différentes parties. Le Premier Ministre Mykola Azarov a publié ce décret pour “garantir la sécurité nationale de l’Ukraine” et en tenant compte des possible ramifications commerciales avec la Russie (et d’autres pays de la CEI) si l’accord était signé au Sommet de Vilnius des 28-29 novembre… L’UE a rejeté les négociations trilatérales et a demandé à Yanoukovitch de s’engager à signer l’Accord d’Association, ce qu’il a alors refusé ». Source : Ukraine-European Union Association Agreement, Wikipedia

[4]
                   L’élargissement aux pays d’Europe orientale dans la foulée de la chute du Mur de Berlin était légitime mais a été mené trop vite et trop loin. Il a nuit à la fois au processus d’intégration politique de l’UE (révélé par l’extrème faiblesse de l’Europe dans la gestion des conséquences de la crise actuelle) et à la bonne intégration des pays d’Europe orientale (révélé par les taux de participation affligeants de ces pays aux dernières élections euopéennes). Suite à l’extension accélérée aux pays de l’ex-URSS dans les années 90, la perspective d’un élargissement déraisonnable (vers l’Ukraine et la Turquie en particulier) a contribué au rejet par les français et les néerlandais du Traité constitutionnel en 2005. Le message a été entendu à l’époque et tout processus d’élargissement stoppé… Mais seulement pour quelques temps : en effet, les accords de libre-écxhange négociés avec l’Ukraine et autres, par une Europe qui se résume finalement elle-même à une zone de libre-échange, correspondent en fait à de l’élargissement caché.

[5]
                  Source : EUObserver, 04/09/2013

[6]
                  Source : Wall Street Journal, 29/05/2014… dans lequel le traitement de l’information est particulièrement révélateur.

[7]
                   Surtout depuis que l’Inde a mis son veto à l’Accord sur la facilitation des échanges mondiaux, ce qui a mis fin au processus de globalisation tel que nous le connaissions. Source : The Guardian, 22/08/2014

 

 

dimanche, 28 septembre 2014

Hilarious German Satire of Anti-Russian Propaganda

Hilarious German Satire of Anti-Russian Propaganda

While the German media has been at least as propagandistic as the US/UK media in its resurrection of wild, Cold War-style rhetoric over the Ukraine situation, cracks are beginning to appear. Satire, humor, and ridicule have always been among the best forms of social critique, and the below clip lampooning the information war over Ukraine is among the very best. When people laugh at government propaganda, truth begins to break through. It was true with the Soviet Union and it is true today in the west.  Watch and enjoy — turn subtitles on at the “cc” button on bottom frame:

samedi, 27 septembre 2014

Un virage à 180° dans la «crise ukrainienne»?

 

donetsk.jpg

Un virage à 180° dans la «crise ukrainienne»?

par Jean-Paul Baquiast

Ex: http://www.europesolidaire.eu

Notre vieil ami le chroniqueur et ancien diplomate indien M K Bhadrakumar a publié le 24 septembre dans le Indian Punchline un article bien intéressant (lien ci-dessous). S'il se trouvait vérifié, mais généralement l'auteur est très bien informé, il annoncerait une nouvelle de grande importance

Obama, alors qu'il vient de présenter à l'ONU la Russie comme la deuxième menace existentielle contre la paix du monde (voir Russia today http://rt.com/news/190392-russia-lavrov-obama-threat-speech/ ), se serait engagé dans un kolossal rétropédalage. L'Ouest, c'est-à-dire en fait Obama, viendrait de décider de ne plus soutenir le gouvernement de Kiev et son président Poroshenko dans la lutte homérique contre Moscou à laquelle ils se seraient engagés ces derniers mois, de leur propre chef mais aussi sous la pression amicale continue de l'Amérique, comme nous l'avions montré dans différents articles.

A Washington mardi 23, lors d'une réunion conjointe, Obama aurait déclaré qu'il recommandait à Poroshenko de rétablir de bonnes relations avec Moscou, tant sur le plan diplomatique qu'économique. Pour conforter l'infortuné (c'est le cas de le dire) Poroshenko dans cette nouvelle voie, Obama ne lui aurait promis que $50 millions pour faire face aux dettes de l'Ukraine, alors que celles-ci avaient été estimées au bas mot à $55 milliards sinon $100 milliards. Autant dire seulement permettre au roi du chocolat d'acheter quelques tonnes de ce produit. 

Selon l'article, ce changement de cap aurait été préparé depuis quelques semaines par des discussions entre Obama et ses « alliés » européens. Ceux-ci ne voyaient pas favorablement la perspective d'une Union économique entre l'UE et l'Ukraine, déjà reportée à 2015, pour la raison qu'elle eut été le mariage entre l'aveugle et la presque paralytique. De plus ils ressentaient de plus en plus mal, non seulement la perspective d'être poussés par l'Amérique dans une guerre avec la Russie,comme plus immédiatement les sanctions contre la Russie dont ils étaient les premiers à souffrir.

Mais pourquoi Obama renoncerait-il (au moins momentanément) à abattre la Russie via le chantier ukrainien provoqué et alimenté par ses soins depuis des mois? Pour mieux se consacrer à la guerre qu'il vient de déclarer à l'Etat islamique, lequel il est vrai représente une menace autrement plus sérieuse que la Russie, notamment concernant les relations avec les Etats pétro-arabes du Golfe, et les intérêts américains au Proche et Moyen Orient. Dans cette guerre, le soutien actif de la Russie, qui affronte les mêmes menaces, sera fort utile. Tout laisse penser qu'Israël a aussi joué un rôle pour calmer le jeu et permettre à Obama de mieux se consacrer à ses bombardements en Irak et en Syrie.

Si cela se vérifiait (un grand SI), il faudrait remercier les égorgeurs de daesh, sans les absoudre pour autant, de leur rôle indirect dans le rétablissement d'une relation normale entre l'Amérique, l'Europe et l'Eurasie.

Bref, affaire à suivre.

Source  http://blogs.rediff.com/mkbhadrakumar/2014/09/24/west-beats-retreat-in-ukraine/