This has occurred primarily in France, Scandinavia, Austria, Switzerland, Belgium, and the Netherlands. No such breakthroughs have been seen in Britain, Germany, or Spain. These parties have in several cases participated in coalition governments, but only as junior partners unable to truly dominate the political agenda.
Their growth has clearly been driven by popular anger at official attitudes towards mass immigration, national identity, and the EU (as well as certain economic issues such as bailouts, foreign aid, and globalization).
While paleoconservatives tend to embrace these parties, most racialists regard them with suspicion because of their admission of non-whites, their attitudes towards Jewry, their focus on Islam, and their appeal to liberal principles against it.
Ideologically, these parties have both liberal and New Right elements. The liberal rhetoric is quite well known, even infamous, on the right. Thus the Sweden Democrats claim their party’s principles are based upon the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (a UN document). Marine Le Pen claims to defend French state secularism against Islamification. Geert Wilders demands “no tolerance for the intolerant” and positions himself as the truest defender of liberalism, gays, women, etc.
The influence of the New Right is less well known but is present in some, if not all movements. Thus Fillip Dewinter of Vlaams Belang describes non-white immigration to Europe as colonization. Both he and Le Pen speak of European rather than Western Civilization, a distinction not often found outside the New Right. Dewinter goes so far as to speak of its superiority. This is all the sort of terminology used by Guillaume Faye. Similarly Le Pen denounces globalism and the EU as totalitarian. Denouncing liberalism, or in this case liberal institutions and practices, as totalitarian is straight out of the Alain de Benoist playbook. Similarly, the pro-Russian orientation of the Front National and other parties can be regarded as evidence of New Right influences.
These liberal and anti-liberal themes exist in state of tension in these parties’ discourses. But the liberal element is in fact less objectionable than one might think.
Consider the fact that when whites begin to awaken in the United States, they will first do so by demanding a seat at the multicultural table. Something analogous to this has already happened in Europe, but with the appeal being to liberal nostrums other than multiculturalism, which is strongly attacked.
Europeans have already begun taking their own side.
As the demographic situation worsens and the number of Europeans enraged by it increases, the populists will grow in strength. Having established their credibility with the electorate, they will soon be able to use more explicitly ethnocentric and less liberal rhetoric without fear of marginalization.
We mentioned that they oppose multiculturalism. It is certainly a good thing that Europeans have not been reduced to demanding inclusion into multiculturalism. But what the populists propose instead, namely assimilation, is just as bad.
The only real alternative to “multiculturalism” (meaning multiracialism) is not assimilation, but mass deportation, also known as repatriation, expulsion, banishment, or even ethnic cleansing. This is a drastic measure that we know to be necessary, but it is perceived as unnecessary, not to mention cruel and unusual, by most people. In short, it is unpopular, and we are referring to populist parties, with all the drawbacks that entails.
If implemented, however, it would be popular. The economic, cultural, and even psychological benefits would be very great, not to mention addressing the existential threat our people currently faces.
Ultimately the only question that truly matters about these parties is whether or not, given the opportunity, they would expel all non-white communities from their respective nations. I think they will, regardless of what they say now. The popular demand for such measures will be orders of magnitude greater than it is now.
Furthermore, let us assume for a moment, as has been alleged, that the leaders of these parties have sold out their people to the elite and care only for gaining and retaining office. Even if this is true (and for the most part we can only guess about these politicians’ true attitudes), they would still have selfish reasons to pursue this policy.
One can take it for granted that national populists will never receive significant support from non-whites. They cannot out pander the panderers-in-chief, i.e., the center left parties, and for obvious reasons, anti-immigration nationalism is unappealing to immigrants and their descendants (although there are some bizarre exceptions). It therefore follows that eliminating this irreconcilable portion of the electorate from the voting rolls will increase nationalists’ prospects of re-election.
A similar consideration may well lead to either quiet support or only token opposition from center-right parties that face the same dilemma that US Republicans currently face. This dilemma is of course, the hostility of the large welfare-dependent colored populations towards their beloved free market economic nostrums, i.e., the only thing that truly matters to these bourgeois conservatives.
One should also bear in mind that if national populists are ever elected to real power, it is because the people are sufficiently angry to accept radical measures. They will have a mandate to eliminate the ethnic chaos. Anything other than deportation will not fulfill that mandate and will result in nothing but a slower but continuous growth in the non-white population, thus in ultimate political defeat.
Finally, we must turn to the manner in which these movements identify friends and enemies. This concerns Europe, Jewry, Islam, and other non-whites.
Their basic stance towards the EU is one of hostility, combined with a demand for withdrawal from it. While they are correct to oppose the present EU, they are incorrect to oppose the idea of Pan-European government. This, however, is a problem that can wait until they are in a position to shape foreign policy. Advocacy of a European Imperium or Euro-Siberia is something better done at diplomatic conferences than on the campaign trail, as it is simply too esoteric to be compatible with populism. If foreign policy can wait, then winning power is rightly their first priority.
As to their stance on that most controversial issue, the Jewish question, aside from the anomalous Geert Wilders, we can rule out sincere philo-Semitism as a motive for their abandoning anti-Semitic rhetoric and adopting a pro-Israel stance.
As Kevin MacDonald has pointed out, Jews have not offered any significant support to the national populist parties. The explanation for their Zionist rhetoric lies largely in providing an alibi to voters skittish of anything regarding the Third Reich.
One might add that that it also ensures that the full hysterical force of the Jewish community is not unleashed against them. Remember when Jörg Haider (known for his sympathetic references to the Third Reich), joined the Austrian government, causing a minor international crisis with Austria facing diplomatic sanctions? Nothing of this kind has happened since.
It is difficult to say for certain whether the leaders of these parties know the truth about the Jews, but I suspect that they do. After all they have personal experience of antifa attacks, demonization from the controlled media, exclusionary electoral pacts, etc. They are obviously capable of deducing who is behind these actions, not to mention who lobbies the hardest for open borders and the abolition of national identities.
One therefore has good reason to think that if non-whites were ever expelled from Europe, the Jews would be next on the list. This would only be a short step further, and has been the fate of their people since antiquity, although for it to happen on a pan-European scale would be historically unprecedented. It is therefore quite possible that the national populists will, to a certain extent, “sneak up on the Jews,” due to the latter’s generally passive and sullen reactions to attempts at “outreach,” the fact that their influence is more limited than in the US, as well as Islamic anti-Semitic sentiments. These confusions may prove paralyzing for the Jews.
More precisely, the national populists will only challenge organized Jewry when they are strong enough to do so and win. Deception is part of politics. Who would not forgive their present Zionist rhetoric, were they to actually end up expelling the Jews?
As to the Muslims, it is much more simple. They are Europe’s oldest enemy, the largest, and most cohesive and culturally alien immigrant group. Going after them is simply good politics, especially given their anti-liberal and religious rather than ethno-racial identity.
As to the other non-whites and the future problems they will pose, this is a good point to emphasize a crucial point I have been trying to make, namely the difference between electoral campaigns and policy. As things stand now, European racialists are in a bind, as Negroes and Orientals have not yet caused the same degree of popular outrage as the bellicose Muslims. When that changes as Europe becomes more like the US, i.e., with around 40 million Negroes rather than 4 to 8 and a more “market-dominant” Oriental population, then attitudes change will too. They are populists, thus their motto about the people could well be, “I am their leader, so I must follow them.”
This is fine for now, but when the time of crisis arrives, nationalist leaders must be willing to show real leadership and lead from the front. This means political courage, in addition to the obvious cunning and stoicism in the face of intimidation that they already show. If they have all this, then their chances of prevailing over the gutless pseudo-leaders of Europe are very good. One cannot look at the current European economic crisis and see anything other than desperation, cowardice, impotence, and blinkered incompetence among the so-called leaders of Europe.
Certainly, the electoral rhetoric of these parties is disagreeable to racialists in many ways. But they have not yet had the chance to truly control policy. If gaining that opportunity is possible, then a rather heretical electoral campaign does not matter. Words matter less than deeds, and the national populist parties’ willingness to act has not yet been truly tested. What the populists say about non-Muslim non-whites is less important than what they do about them.
So despite the generally negative value we can attribute to current national populist discourses, one can nonetheless take away several positives from the whole phenomenon. First of all, Europeans have begun to take their own side. Secondly, nationalists have for the first time in generations established themselves as a credible political force and a real part of European political life
This latter point is crucial, because when Europe’s demographic situation begins to worsen, there will be a plausible alternative to the system parties and an outlets for Europe’s rage. A skinhead groupsucule is simply not organizationally capable of harnessing that popular rage like these ever-so-professional and apparently bourgeois parties are.
When this happens, these parties’ stances will harden rather than soften. The anti-white ideology is already on the retreat, and system politicians such as Merkel, Cameron, and Sarkozy are only playing catch-up in denouncing multiculturalism.
Much has been gained and nothing really lost. As to the ideological heresies, they are not immutable, and campaign rhetoric costs nothing. One can only hope that because Europeans have begun taking their own side, nationalist leaders will be soon be strong enough to speak the truth more clearly, and be benefited rather than be harmed by it.