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lundi, 12 mai 2014

US Presence in Eurasia and Its Impact on Security and Military Arrangements of This Region


US Presence in Eurasia and Its Impact on Security and Military Arrangements of This Region

Ex: http://www.geopolitica.ru
The Eurasian region has been gaining in importance due to a variety of reasons. These reasons can be divided into the three main categories of economics, military – security (including strategic and geopolitical), and the international environment.


Four major components delineate the overall security approach that the United States has adopted in its international relations. They include recognition of the enemy and the risk posed by “others” (including the former Soviet Union, Communism, Muslims, China, and so forth), geopolitics, strategy, and realism.[1] These components have been highlighted by a great number of experts in international relations.[2] They construct a framework for the United States’ international relations in which such principles as the definitive existence of the enemy and the need to confront it on the basis of the formulated laws of the United States and the West, in general, create the bedrock for the establishment of relations with other countries.[3] At the present time, the United States, in particular, and the West, in general, are moving their strategic focus toward the main heartland of the earth, or Eurasia. However, in its core, this sensitive region is host to two major perceived enemies of the United States, i.e. China and Russia, as well as smaller enemies, including India and the World of Islam.

Eurasia accounts for more than 70% of the population, gross national product (GNP), and economic exchanges of the world.[4] This region also contains what is being described in economic and security arguments as the new Silk Road. It is also home to different routes used for economic exchanges, transfers of energy, and the establishment of security, as well as promoting cultural and tourism exchanges, especially with Asia tourism as its main axis.[5] In view of the specific conditions that currently govern this region, it is expected in less than 10 years from now to become the main focus of international politics and take the center stage in future political conquests by the West.

US Presence in the Region: Reasons and Tools

The Eurasian region has been gaining in importance due to a variety of reasons. These reasons can be divided into the three main categories of economics, military – security (including strategic and geopolitical), and the international environment. Here is a list of the reasons behind this and the tools being used to promote the US presence in Eurasia:

1.      BRICS: The group of countries known as BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) is considered to be one of the most securitized areas of political economics in the world, as its member states are collectively expected to account for 20% of the economic output of the world during the next 20 years. Three of the countries that constitute the BRICS group, i.e. India, China, and Russia, are located in Eurasia.[6]

2.      Oil reserves: The United States has started to boost its domestic oil and gas production. As a result, it will have no need to import exogenous oil in the future and, as a result, future fluctuations in global energy prices will not be able to have a rapid and direct impact on the US economy.[7] As a result, the United States will have a winning trump card in its hand and will certainly use it against the European Union and China.

3.      NATO: Continued expansion of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) into Eurasia will further increase the influence of the United States in the heartland of the world and, thus, pave the way for an increased military presence of the United States and the European Union in this region.

4.      Islamism: After Samuel Huntington and a number of other Western thinkers offered their theories in the 1980s about the ideological threats posed to Western civilization by Islam and other Eastern rites and religions, especially the Chinese Shinto[8], the West, in general, and Europe, in particular, started to pay more attention to this part of the world. As a result, the Western countries have been waging military conflicts in the Middle East while getting engaged in an economic confrontation with the countries of East Asia. The popular uprisings in the Arab world have led to the establishment of national states in many Islamic and Arab countries in the Middle East and triggered new waves of the institutionalism of political Islam. Therefore, at the moment, the modern and secular states in Eurasia are not solely faced with the liberal-democratic model of the West, but see in front of them a complete set of various models of governance. The political developments that followed the Arab Spring and, finally, the crisis in Syria have shown that instrumental use of religious radicalism can work as a double-edged sword that may even target the national interests of the European countries as well. This is why the West has been making revisions in its previous plans to use fundamentalism against China in the Eurasian region.

5.      Russia: The ability that Russia has for knocking major international equations off balance, especially in continental Europe, has caused that country to be perceived by the West as a major threat against the new international order.

US military bases ME_2.jpg

Military and Security Issues in Eurasia

The United States implements its supervision over various countries in the world through an integrated network of military bases and their related facilities that are scattered all across the globe. The United States is currently running 737 bases in which its Air Force, naval forces, and the US Army, as well as Washington’s intelligence and espionage activities, are managed throughout the world.[9] On the whole, a total of 255,065 US military personnel are currently deployed to various countries. In Eurasia, the United States is running operational bases in the Middle East, Central Asia, Indonesia, the Philippines, and Japan. Most of these bases are used for the purpose of espionage activities and collecting intelligence. The largest portion of the US’ military forces outside the United States is stationed in Washington’s military bases in Southeast Asia. In Central Asia, about 1,000 people are now posted at the US airbase in Manas(Kyrgyzstan), and 38 people are manning the US’Krtsanisi base in Georgia.

As put by the secretary of the World Peace Council (WPC), in Central Asia, the raison d’être for the establishment of the United States’ military bases is not to use them simply to achieve Washington’s military goals or directly intervene in other countries. These bases, on the other hand, have always been used to promote the economic and political goals of the capitalistic system that rules the United States of America, he added. The American companies, as well as the US administration, have shown keen interest in the establishment of a safe corridor for the transfer of oil from US-controlled reserves in order to guarantee that they will be taken advantage of in the long run. They have shown this interest by embarking on the construction of oil and natural gas transfer pipelines which are supposed to carry oil and gas resources of the Caspian Sea and Central Asia through Afghanistan and Pakistan onwards to the Arabian Sea. This region (Central Asia and Caspian Sea) is home to more than 6% of the proven oil reserves of the world, as well as about 40% of global natural gas resources.[10]

The distribution of the US military bases in the region is such that they have practically surrounded the Middle East region. Situated at the center of that siege is the Islamic Republic of Iran as the heartland of the Middle East. This deployment of forces is currently moving toward the mainland of Russia and China. If the existing US military bases in Eastern Asia were added to the above list, we would see that the US military has actually laid siege to an entire region, that is, Eurasia, which contains all the modern energy transfer and economic routes. The US Navy has also been used to support this siege.

Global Defense Expenses

The highest level of defense expenses in the world can be seen in the North America region, which accountsfor 42% of the total defense expenses in the world. Russia and Eurasia collectively account for only 4.4% of the world’s defense expenses.

Graphical representation of global defense expenses sorted by regions in 2013 (the military balance, 2013)[11]

North America 42%

Europe 17.6%

Russia and Eurasia 4.4%

Asia & Australia 19.9%

Top Countries of the World in Terms of the Number of Military Staff

In terms of the number of military personnel, China, the United States, India, North Korea, Russia, South Korea, Pakistan, Turkey, and Vietnam are the top nine countries of this ranking in the world. Also, in terms of the total number of military personnel, China ranks the first with a wide margin as compared to the next eight countries on the list. China is followed by the United States and India, which have almost similar numbers of military personnel and respectively rank the second and third in this regard.

According to figures released by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the United States is credited for having the world’s largest military budget, which accounts for about 48% of the total money spent on military affairs in the world. According to the latest figures, the total annual military budget of the United States stands at $711 billion.

The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) has announced that the United States, China, Russia, Britain, Japan, India, France, Germany, Italy, and Saudi Arabia are the world’s ten top countries in terms of the volume of their military budgets. However, the United States is still far ahead of the other countries in terms of military spending, as its military budget is four times higher than that of China and more than total military budgets of the next nine countries that succeed the United States on this list. Of course, the United States has been trying to reduce its military budget in recent years as a direct result of the budget deficit that has hit the country during the past few years. On the other hand, major European military powers such as Italy, France, and Britain have been also reducing their military budgets as well. On the contrary, however, the military spending in China has moved in an opposite direction to major global trends between 2011 and 2012. As a result, it has increased about 8% during that period and has risen more than 47% since 2008. The military budget of China saw an increase of 10.7% in 2013 to hit $119 billion. The country’s military budget had already seen an 11% increase in 2012 as well.[12]

New Military and Security Arrangements in Eurasia

A.     Underlying Advantages of Big Regional Armies

The sharp increase in the military budgets of China, Russia, and other Asian countries is not only due to an economic factor, but it is also an outcome of their threat perception of their immediate neighbors. Another important factor that has prompted these countries to increase their military spending is the presence of superpowers, in addition to NATO forces, in their surrounding environment.

It should be noted that NATO and American forces rely more on naval and air forces, which are in turn backed by marine and land bases. Also, according to a prominent theory of international relations, one of the main reasons behind the rise of the Western powers since the 1400s has been the expansion of their naval forces and the subsequent rise in their power and ability to conquer new colonies. This was firstly true about the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, and Britain, followed by the United States, which greatly expanded its military might following the end of World War I. As a result, marine geopolitics has played a great role in the expansionist efforts of these governments. Therefore, in order to compare the military and strategic powers of different countries, especially with a futuristic approach, most analyses focus on the historical background of these countries and the tools that they use to enforce their maritime power.

It should be noted that during the recent wars it has waged in the region, the United States has scored military victories through the efficient use of its powerful Air Force, which enjoys strong logistical support, as well as the behind-the-scenes support of its advanced intelligence and espionage facilities and equipment. It was due to this heavy reliance on the Air Force that the US Army did not have to deploy infantry forces to engage in land wars. The US Air Force, for its part, is supported by the country’s naval ships and destroyers, which are positioned in free waters, as well as in common territorial waters and air bases. It also has the advantage of using advanced and heavy military equipment in its operations. It is well known that the American military is quite capable of scoring rapid victories in wars, but is not similarly capable of winning in peace, meaning that it is not capable of maintaining the territories it has conquered.


At the same time, the Russian and Chinese armies are more focused on land forces and, therefore, enjoy powerful infantry forces, as well as special equipment that has been engineered to perform well in land wars on both large and small scales (including guerrilla warfare). The main advantage of the Russian army is its extensive use of missile technology, which has posed a serious challenge to the military might of rival countries by producing some of the most modern air defense weapons. The main advantage of the US military is the use of integrated intelligence and reconnaissance systems which provide the ground for better management of the war theater. More than anything else, China is known for the great number of its military forces. As a result, and due to the renovation of the Chinese army and its equipment in recent decades, the country has been rising as a serious military force at the global level during the past years.

B.     Reliance on the Navy

The Eurasian regional powers’ increased attention to the seas has been quite evident. There has been remarkable competition and differences between Japan and China over adjacent seas and disputed islands. Such competition and disputes have also existed between Japan and Russia, Russia and China, and among the Southeast Asian Tigers (which include South Korea, Singapore, Malaysia, and Indonesia). Military experts and analysts of geopolitical issues are of the opinion that the extensive military activities by the powerful Chinese Navy in the South China Sea, as well as in the East China Sea, which contains the islands that are disputed with Japan, South Korea and Taiwan, have prompted the United States to send more naval forces to this restive part of the world. The new tug of war between the two military superpowers of the world, i.e. the United States and China, has turned the Southeast Asian waters into a live and permanent exhibition of both countries’ naval forces.

During the past two decades, China has taken great strides to strengthen its national army, especially its naval forces, so that the Chinese Navy is now among the most powerful naval forces in the world.

Many analysts are now concerned that the US effort to establish its domination over the entire Southeast Asia region and the rivalry that exists in this regard between Washington and Beijing will finally lead to escalation of the situation in that region and even end in all-out naval warfare.

C.     Regional Powers and Role of Regionalism

Modern international relations are more and more moving toward regionalism. The main outcome of this trend in Eurasia has been the increasing importance of regional powers. Apart from Russia and China, which have been established as dominant powers in this region, the roles played by such countries as India, Pakistan, Iran, and Turkey should not be easily ignored. The promotion of regionalism in Eurasia will be characterized with a dominant role for Russia as the main regional hegemonic power, which will also play a very important role in the formation of regional alliances. Iran will also play a prominent security and anti-security role, especially through the challenge that it poses to this regional hegemonic power, as well as to other regional and transregional hegemonic powers.

The regional role played by China has gone well beyond a purely economic role and has taken on serious security and military aspects, especially following the establishment of Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). On the whole, regional countries will move toward the conclusion of a collective regional security treaty[13], which was previously hoped to be negotiated within the framework of the SCO. However, this organization has been already challenged by Russia and Turkey. Russia is of the opinion that a “collective security treaty” should be aimed to serve as a counterbalance to NATO. Unlike the SCO, which is characterized by the dominant role of China and is being managed according to this pattern, such a proposed security treaty would be based on the regional influence of Russia.[14]

In the meantime, the political activities of another major regional power, namely, Turkey, should not be ignored. Using various means, Turkey is trying to increase its influence on the geopolitical arrangement of Eurasia. Following the rise of the idea of Neo-Ottomanism, Turkey has been trying to organize its regional and transregional plans and strengthen them by encouraging the signing of pacts among various states.[15] The establishment of the Organization of the Eurasian Law Enforcement Agencies with Military Status in 2013, which has Turkey, Kyrgyzstan, the Azerbaijani Republic, and Mongolia as its members; the establishment of the Cooperation Council of Turkic Speaking States in 2009, whose members are the Azerbaijani Republic, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Turkey; as well as the introduction of the Eurasia Army, which includes the military forces of the Azerbaijani Republic, Turkey, Kyrgyzstan, and Mongolia, and which is supposed to replace the Association of the European and Mediterranean Police Forces and Gendarmeries with Military Status, are among the major efforts made by Turkey in this regard.[16]

On the whole, Eurasia will experience a remarkable spurt in the military and security fields during the next decade. A collection of economic, military, and security forces have come together in this region, which is also seeing an increasing presence of the superpowers as well. The rise of the Eastern powers has also drawn more attention to the revival of the cultural and historical identities of the countries located in this region and, therefore, this region is expected to become a focus for international attention in the near future. Islamism, Orientalism, traditionalism, Indigenism, fundamentalism, native nationalism, and emerging identities, in addition to the continued growth of the middle class in the Eurasian countries, have given, and will continue to give, birth to powerful social and political currents. From the military and security viewpoints, under the influence of these issues and historical events, and as a result of the experiences gained in the past few decades, major regional powers such as the governments of Russia and China, as well as other regional powers like India, Turkey, and Iran, will be playing a more prominent role compared to the past and this will increase the need for the establishment of new regional security treaties.

[1]Dalby, Simon. American security discourse: the persistence of geopolitics. Political Geography Quarterly, Volume 9, Issue 2, April 1990, p. 171-188

[2]Acharya, Amitav, The Relevance of Regions, ASEAN, and Western IR’s false universalisms, August 10, 2011, www.theory-talks.org/2011/08/theory-talk-42.html; Grovogui, Siba.IR as Theology, Reading Kant Badly, and the Incapacity of Western Political Theory to Travel very far in Non-Western Contexts. August 29, 2013. www.theory-talks.org/2013/08/theory-talk-57.html

[3]Xuetong, Yan. Chinese Realism, the Tsinghua School of International Relations, and the Impossibility of Harmony. November 28, 2012. www.theory-talks.org/2012/11/theory-talk-51.html

[4] Brzezinski, Zbigniew. (1997) Geostrategy for Eurasia, 76 Foreign Affairs. p. 50

[5]Hosseini, S. M., New Silk Roads, Policy Paper; Institute for Humanities Research affiliated with Academic Center for Education, Culture and Research; 2011

[6]  Jerry Cohen, Benjamin. Currency Wars and Reviving the ‘Political’ in International Political Economy. 5.9.2008. www.theotytalk.org

[7]Sieminski, Adam . International Energy Outlook . EIA, July 25, 2013

[8] Huntington, Samuel, Clash of Civilizations Theory: Huntington and His Critics, translated by MojtabaAmiriVahid, Tehran, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2005

[9]Dismantling the Empire: America's Last Best Hope (American Empire Project), Metropolitan Books, 2010

[10]www.yjc.ir/fa/news/4291513; Dufour, Jules. The Worldwide Network of US Military Bases, The Global Deployment of US Military Personnel. Global Research, December 24, 2013. www.globalresearch.ca/the-worldwide-network-of-us-military-bases/5564

[11] The Military Balance, 2013

[13]Allison, Roy. Regionalism, Regional Structures and Security Management in Central Asia.International Affairs. Volume 80, Issue 3, May 2004. pp 463-483

[15]Hosseini S. M. et al, European Union in Foreign Policy of Turkey under Justice and Development Party; Central Eurasia Research Center, Fall and Winter 2012-2013, pp. 21-38

jeudi, 01 mai 2014

The Crimea and the Eurasianist idea as resistance geopolitics


The Crimea and the Eurasianist idea as resistance geopolitics

Ex; http://www.geopolitica.ru
Professor Bruno De Cordier from the Department of Conflict and Development Studies of Gent University examines the perception and realities behind an aspired ‘great space’.
“I know one thing and I’ll tell you: if Russia survives this period and is eventually saved, it will be as a Eurasian entity and through the Eurasianist idea”, said the Russian ethnographer, historian and geographer Lev Gumilyev in an interview which he gave shortly after the demise of the USSR and briefly before passing away himself in the summer months of 1992.  Back then, it were dire years of decay, unraveling and loss of self-esteem in Russia and the rest of the enormous space that used to be the USSR shortly before. Even the existence of the Russian Federation, the USSR’s core entity, had become uncertain with the rise of separatism in the North Caucasian republics of Dagestan and Chechnya and with the rise of local and provincial potentates on which Yeltsin’s Kremlin hardly had any real influence left. So now, Crimea is set to join Russia. How things can turn.
The 1990s trauma
I have been thinking often of Gumilyev and his Eurasianist idea lately, for it indeed explains quite a lot of what had been going on. In brief, it states that the old USSR and the tsarist imperial space that preceded it are essentially grafted in an old cultural sphere in which Slavic and Turkic cultures, Orthodox Christianity, and Sunni and Shi’ite Islam have been cohabiting and interacting for centuries. The core of this sphere, of this ‘great space’ as the Russian political scientist Alexander Dugin calls it, is Russia which, indeed, geographically spreads out over the European and Asian continents and has, through the adoption of Byzantine Christianity in the 980s – after contact first established with Greek bishops on the Crimea by the way – and its incorporation in the system of the Khanate of the Golden Horde (1240-1502), is anchored in the Orient as well as in the West. The whole notion that Russia thus forms a separate sphere around which crystalizes a greater Eurasia, seems also to be present and well alive at the grassroots up to this day.
In a survey conducted among the Russian population in spring 2007 for example, the thesis that Russia is a Eurasian entity in its own right with its own societal and developmental ways, was agreed upon by almost three-quarters of the respondents.[1] Of course, it is more an indicator yet it’s also reflecting a reality. In a similar but much more recent survey last year about the question how Russia will look like in fifty years’ time, the largest share of respondents after the ‘don’t-know/no-answer’ category answered, that its technology and sciences will be quite similar to that of the West but that Russian society and culture will be entirely different from it.[2] Furthermore, as another survey conducted last fall learns, the share of those in Russia who regret the demise of the USSR is high: 57 percent, understandably higher among age categories with active memories of that period (which involves still a fair share of people of active age), yet still amounting to up to one-third among the categories of respondents who were not yet born in 1991 or who were too young to have active memories.[3]
The impact of what we could call the ‘1990s trauma’ caused by the dire years following the unraveling and eventually demise of the USSR should really not be underestimated. In a matter of a couple of years, a decent human capital, a high level of social safety, and a fair level of social infrastructure were squandered and destroyed to make way for a particularly rapacious form of capitalism – dubbed ‘market reforms’ by foreign consultants and scores of profiteers – an acute identity crisis, a dramatic demographic downturn and general degradation and loss of status. The mid-nineties were actually the period when I started to work in Eurasia. Back then, I understood already that all this was going to backlash one day. And indeed it did. Since the beginning of this century, not a small part of public opinion and opinion makers and officials blames an abstract ‘West’  – where certainly the US is being increasingly negatively perceived[4] – and, especially, local and regional liberals in Eurasia itself.
Economic great space
So, what are the different fibers still connecting Russia with its wider historical sphere, and with the rest of the region formerly known as the USSR, in particular? Let us first take a look at the economic substructure, starting with foreign trade. Officially, in the year 2013, almost 21 percent of Russia’s overall foreign trade was with other former states of the USSR, without the three Baltic countries. Some three-quarters of its trade within Eurasia was, in that particular order, with Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan. The latter two are also part of both the customs’ union and the Eurasian Economic Community which are being led and promoted by Moscow. Attempts to also integrate Ukraine in these structures actually sparked the protest movement in Kiev last year. Furthermore, more than 50 percent of Russia’s external commerce takes place with the EU, almost 10 percent with China and some 3 percent with the US. Russia’s external trade pattern is thus primarily oriented towards the EU, which also implicates something else by the way: that economies and corporations from the EU need the Eastern European market.
Hence economic sanctions against Moscow will first of all affect an EU which has primarily acted as an extension and aid of the US in the whole episode of the Ukraine crisis. For those keen on stressing the importance of energy policies, well, there is also the position and activities of Gazprom in Eurasia.  This parastatal corporation, which is closely connected to the Kremlin, controls about one-third of the world’s production of natural gas and also has interests and activities in other sectors like transport, oil, banking and media. It is actively present in all former Soviet countries including the Baltics who actually depend on it for most of their supply in natural gas. Gazprom also participates, in one form or another, in oil extraction and in upgrading infrastructure in gas- and oil-exporting countries like Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan. Gazprom’s sheer weight explains why Russia, together with Iran and Qatar, has taken the lead in mid-2001 in the establishment of the so-called Forum of Gas-Exporting Countries. The structure, which currently has 11 member states and in which Kazakhstan is an observer, is to be a blueprint of some sort of ‘gas OPEC’.
Migrant workers and oligarchs
Let us go back to society and everyday life. One of the most important sociocultural vectors of Russian influence in greater Eurasia is, of course, the Russian language. The historical aversion against it is by far not as strong as it was in the Baltics and Central Europe in the nineties or as it is in Western Ukraine at the moment. Despite the righteous promotion of local or national languages other than Russian in the 1988-91 period, the Russian language still, or again, has official or semi-official status in Ukraine (although its future in ‘rump Ukraine’ is uncertain), Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. The use of Russian in the societies concerned usually goes well beyond the people of Russian origin and ethnicity. Even in countries where it does no longer have official status, such as Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan, it is still the idiom of the political and intellectual elites, part of the more urbanized population segments, ethnic minorities and it often serves as the language of inter-ethnic communication. Its position also sustains the influence of the Russian mass media, popular culture and opinion makers.
A very important binding agent in Eurasia, one situated on the interface of the grassroots and macro-economics, is seasonal as well as permanent labor migration to Russia. The vast majority of some one and a half million of guest workers who officially stayed in Russia in the year 2011 came from other countries of Eurasia.  The largest group, some 510,000, were from Uzbekistan.  Additionally, in the same year, some 280,000 guest workers were from Tajikistan, 193,000 from Ukraine, 110,000 from Kyryzstan, 80,000 from Moldova, 71,000 from Armenia, 68,000 from Azerbaijan and 53,000 from Georgia. Besides the old USSR countries, the second-largest country of origin of labor migrants in Russia is China. Kazakhstan and Belarus have also become host countries for migrant workers form southern Eurasia.
They visibly form a large portion of the bazaar traders, construction workers, cleaners and maintenance and catering personnel in the metropolises as well as of the seasonal workers in the agricultural sector. Many have double citizenship.  The infrastructure of the recent winter games in Sochi, for instance, has largely been built by workers from southern Eurasia and Moldova. This sort of migration feeds a remittance economy, which in countries like Armenia, Moldova and Tajikistan for instance, contributes a large GDP share amounting from 21 to 48 percent. The remittances of the hundreds of thousands of migrant workers, a majority of them men, are a vital financial lifeline for their families and areas of origin. Socially and psychologically, the impact of migration and the remittance economy is a mixed bag. They have revitalized regions but also disrupted local societies, yet do ensure a permanent interaction at the basic popular level within Eurasia.
At the other end of the social pyramid, there is something peculiar going on. A number of industrialists and oligarchs from Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan and Georgia with connections to the upper echelons of power in Russia are based in Moscow or Saint-Petersburg. Through patronizing sociocultural associations and through media, several of them try to build a political base among the diasporas in Russia of their respective countries or origin. On the mid-term, this is important since several of the personalities concerned have ambiguous if not outright tense relationships with the regimes, or with specific personalities or fractions therein, in their respective countries. Personally, I consider it likely that Moscow will try to steer or recuperate regime change in some Eurasian  countries – Uzbekistan for example – with unreliable or fractionalized regimes and a large potential for social unrest, before pro-Western of Western-backed figures and networks do so.  In this sense, the personalities concerned as well as they movements and networks form ‘replacement elites’.
Military imperialism?
The navy base in Sebastopol was a hotspot and departure point in Russia’s recent intervention in, or, depending on how you look at it, invasion, of the Crimean peninsula. Yet how can one characterize Moscow’s military cooperation with the rest of Eurasia?  Since fall 2002, the institutional framework has been the Collective Security Treaty Organization, a sort ‘contra-NATO’ which, beside Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan, has Armenia, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan as its members. Serbia, amongst others, is an observer to the organization. With the exception of Georgia and, increasingly, also Azerbaijan, Eurasia’s respective national armed forces are still psychologically and technically quite oriented towards Russia and purchase most of their military technology and weaponry from it. The Russian armed forces, for their part, have bases and military advisors in Tajikistan, Armenia and Kyrgyzstan. Additionally, they co-manage the space launch facility of Baykonur is Kazakhstan and radar stations in Belarus and, until last year, also in Gabala in Azerbaijan. And since mid-1992, Russia has also a 9,200 strong peacekeeping force in Transnistria, an area seceded from Moldova in 1990. Beyond the territory of the old USSR, Russia has one naval base on the Mediterranean, in the Syrian port of Tartus. To put things in perspective, the US has some nine-hundred bases or other forms of military presence outside of its territory, including in Eurasia.
Since about a decade, Russia has also become, like the USSR used to be, a donor of various forms of development and humanitarian aid.[5] It has channeled its aid, for instance, multilaterally through a number of UN organizations and also donated aid to contexts of high political and symbolic significance, such as Syria, Serbia and the Serbian minority in Kosovo. The bulk of Russia’s foreign aid, however, is destined for Eurasia. During the 2007-13 period, about 57 percent went to Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Armenia and South Ossetia. The latter brings up the existence and the role of Eurasia’s so-called quasi-states, areas that seceded in one form or another between 1989 and 1993, which have many if not all characteristics and attributes of states but that are not recognized as such by other countries and the UN, or only by a handful of countries.[6] There are currently four such entities in the former USSR:  the enclave of Nagorno-Karabakh in Azerbaijan, previously-mentioned Transnistria, and South Ossetia and Abkhazia which both seceded from Georgia in the early nineties and officially declared themselves independent after the 2008 South Ossetia War. In some way, the Crimea also fits into this category.[7]
The said four quasi-states largely sustain on an informal economy, on financial and other material aid, pensions and migrant remittances from Russia. In most of these entities, there is also a strong identification with and favorable opinion of Russian among local public opinion. Just like Kosovo, which is in fact a protectorate, is an important pivot and hold of NATO-US presence in the Balkans,  they form a core element of Moscow’s presence in greater Eurasia. In that sense, Transnistria, in particular, along with Sebastopol and the Baltic exclave of Kaliningrad (an old part of Prussia which was annexed by the USSR after the Second World War and is still part of the Russian Federation), is perceived to be a necessary outpost of Eurasian resistance on the western frontier against a NATO that is perceived to be increasingly aggressive and expansionist. A few days after the Crimean referendum, the parliament of Transnistria, which like the peninsula has a Russian or at least Russia-speaking majority, proposed to also accede to the Russian Federation.[8]
Bismarck and the ‘neo-USSR’
So, to conclude, Moscow definitely has aspirations in this enormous space between the Baltic Sea and Alaska. But contrary to the American neo-empire these aspirations of dominance are not planetary.[9] Following Russia’s military intervention on the Crimea, which was, amongst others, legitimized by the necessity to protect the peninsula’s Russian population, some suggested that Kazakhstan, with its large Russian minority of about one quarter of the population and in the majority in a number of districts bordering Russia itself, might be next in line. This is quite improbable though. When one looks at the pattern of Russian military intervention over the last few years, one notices that these have taken places in countries  – South Ossetia and Georgia, where Russians form barely 1.5 percent, and now Ukraine and the Crimea – which have been the setting of so-called ‘color revolutions’ which eventually largely championed a pro-NATO and generally pro-Western societal and political project.
Much more than something driven and inspired by aggressive expansionism or access to resources, the recomposing of a greater Eurasia is perceived to be a necessary resistance movement against forces and centers of power the eventual aim of which is nothing less than the dismantling of Russia itself, or its reduction to a submissive and obedient entity.[10] To prevent this, a ‘great space’ has to be formed that takes the lead in the formation of the multi-polar world order which has to succeed to American neo-imperial hegemony. There will eventually be no replica of the USSR. The customs’ union between Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan is definitely meant to be a blueprint for more in-depth integration or reintegration in Eurasia though, quite similar to the way the Prussian Zollverein from 1839 laid the bases for the unification of the German states and principalities which was achieved by Otto von Bismarck by the year 1871. And this design is certainly not less legitimate than the EU, the Gulf Cooperation Council or the US’ free-trade area for the Americas are. Whether the national elites involved, especially those of Kazakhstan, will eventually be willing to transfer power to a supra-national entity in the near future remains to be seen. Yet the perception of a process and threat of externally steered chaos, regime change and further balkanization of Eurasia, and, especially, the objective interests and advantages of a more multi-polar world order could definitely offer the necessary psychological impetus to do so.
[1]Аналитический Центр Юрия Левады-YuriLevadaAnalyticalCentre, «Л.А. Седов: Россия и мир», 2007, http://www.levada.ru/press/2007081001.html
[2]Аналитический Центр Юрия Левады-YuriLevadaAnalyticalCentre,  «Россия-2063», 2013, http://www.levada.ru/22-08-2013/rossiya-2063
[3]Аналитический Центр Юрия Левады-YuriLevadaAnalyticalCentre, «Россияне о распаде СССР», http://www.levada.ru/14-01-2014/rossiyane-o-raspade-sssr
[4]Аналитический Центр Юрия Левады- YuriLevadaAnalyticalCentre, «Россияне об отношении к другим странам», www.levada.ru/11-10-2013/rossiyane-ob-otnoshenii-k-drugim-stranam
[5]For more on Russia and a donor of aid, see the study by Oxfam International which is available both in Russian and English at http://www.oxfam.org/en/policy/russia-humanitarian-aid-donor
[6]For a more in-depth examination of quasi-states in the former USSR and elsewhere, see the excellent special issue of Diplomatie: affaires strategiques et relations internationales by Francois Grunewald and Anne Rieu, ‘Entre guerre et paix: les quasi-etats’, Diplomatie: affaires strategiques et relations internationales, №30, 2008.
[7]The first to recognize Crimea’s referendum on independence besides Russia itself were Nagorno-Karabakh, South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Kazakhstan, Armenia and the Bolivarian republic of Venezuela had followed at the time of writing.
[8]Joris Wagemakers ascertains the existence of an outright resistance identity among both the authorities and much of the population of Transnistria. For those interested, see Joris Wagemakers, ‘National identity in Transnistria: a global-historical perspective on the formation and evolution of a ‘resistance identity’’. Journal of Eurasian Affairs, 1(2), 2014, pp. 50-55.
[9]I use the term neo-empire because unlike the Roman, Frankish, Napoleonic and British empires, to name a few examples, it does not consider nor calls itself one and actively maintains an illusion of equality between itself and its subjects.
[10]The fact that well before to the Ukraine and Crimea crisis, the person of Vladimir Putin and Russia on the whole have been demonized for months with almost hysterical international media campaigns supported by a some transnational corporations, celebrities and foreign parliamentarians about a non-issue like the arrest of a nihilist rock band, and about the so-called persecution of homosexuals, has certainly strengthened this perception.

dimanche, 20 avril 2014

Une alliance pour l’endiguement du pouvoir mondialiste


Une alliance pour l’endiguement du pouvoir mondialiste

Auran Derien
Ex: http://metamag.fr
Trois situations apparaissent qui pourraient ouvrir un chemin aux  Européens. Il y a toujours des alternatives. Si l’on veut mettre en fonctionnement des systèmes de paiement sans dollar pour le commerce international, il n’y a rien d’impossible. Une civilisation cherche à naître, malgré le pouvoir actuel en place.
L’exemple chinois 

La Chine a déposé une plainte à l’OMC (Organisation Mondiale du Commerce) contre les pratiques mensongères étatsuniennes, l’humeur de ses dirigeants les incitant à modifier les tarifs douaniers sans aucune justification. La tournée européenne du président chinois a été l’occasion de formuler une proposition de partenariat bilatéral UE - Chine en quatre volets : paix, croissance, réformes et civilisation. Herman Van Rompuy, président du Conseil européen, n’a évidemment pas été à la hauteur dans sa réponse. Il a menti une fois de plus en affirmant que l’Europe allait sortir de la récession. Chacun sait que la Commission de Bruxelles fait régresser l’Europe par des destructions massives de son économie appelées réformes. destinées à abaisser les peuples au niveau des Tchandalas de l’Inde.
La Chine, elle, s’active. Elle achète moins de devises. Au mois de mars  le yuan avait baissé par rapport au dollar signifiant ainsi que le pays ne se laisserait pas faire dans le cadre de la guerre des monnaies. Il a été publié à la même époque que la croissance économique chinoise avait ralentie, mais que la Banque Centrale intervenait lorsque cela lui paraissait nécessaire sans s’adonner aux productions massives de monnaie à l’inverse des anglo-saxons. Elle fournit juste ce qu’il faut de liquidités pour continuer à investir (notamment dans les chemins de fer) et développer le commerce.

La Bundesbank, après la visite du Président Chinois fin mars, a annoncé la signature d’un mémoire qui prévoit la création à Francfort d’un centre de compensation pour les paiements en Yuan. L’Allemagne est le pays d’Europe dont le commerce avec la Chine est le plus important. Il est prévisible que cela sera un point de départ pour réduire l’usage de la monnaie américaine dans le commerce Europe-Chine. Cependant, il ne suffit pas d’oublier le dollar, il conviendrait aussi de larguer les banques qui en promeuvent l’usage. 

Du côté Russe

La Russie est partante pour diminuer le poids des anglo-saxons en cessant d’utiliser le dollar, en particulier dans le commerce des matières premières. Les deux personnages à l’origine de la nouvelle orientation russe sont Sergey Glaziev, conseiller économique de la Présidence et Igor Sechin, PDG de Rosneft, la principale entreprise pétrolière russe. Le Président de la banque publique VTB a affirmé que les entreprises à capitaux publics spécialisées dans la vente d’armes pouvaient démarrer la signature de contrats en roubles ou en monnaies de leurs acheteurs, sans passer par le dollar. La direction du Centre d’échanges de Saint-Pétersbourg a été confiée à Igor Sechin qui avait déclaré courageusement, en Octobre 2013 au Forum Mondial de l’Energie tenu en Corée, que le temps était venu de mettre en place des mécanisme d’échange pour le gaz naturel entre tous les pays concernés et que les transactions soient enregistrées en monnaies de chacun . Il est question par exemple de signer des accords de swap biens - pétrole entre l’Iran et la Russie. 

Il est fondamental maintenant que d’autres puissances suivent la Russie et la Chine dans cette politique d'émancipation. La Chine incite aussi les autres pays du BRICS (Brésil, Russie, Inde, Chine et Afrique du Sud) à éliminer le dollar de leurs transactions et donne l’exemple, en ouvrant deux centres de traitement du commerce en yuan, à Londres et maintenant Francfort.

Des Européens soumis aux Européens éveillés ?

Les Européens doivent secouer leur torpeur. L’Asie, mise en selle pour que les multinationales y produisent à bas prix des produits vendus en Europe aux prix européens, ne ruine pas directement l’Europe. Les responsables sont les hommes politiques mondialistes qui ont liquidé toute protection pour s’enrichir de ces trafics. Mais désormais la Chine, la Russie, l’Iran, le Vénézuela, le Brésil, l’Inde…et d’autres certainement ouvrent les yeux. L’Occident est entre les mains d’une finance mondialiste et il est fondamental de s’émanciper pour faire prospérer une autre civilisation.
Dès 2017, a affirmé le Boston Consulting Group à la fin du mois de février 2013, l’Asie (hors Japon) sera la région la plus riche du monde. Il sera essentiel que les banques spécialisées dans la gestion de fortune soient laissés de côté, même si la volonté de ces fanatiques consiste justement à convaincre les nouveaux riches de les laisser administrer leurs actifs. Rien de grand n’est jamais sorti de la finance anglo-saxonne, sinon de grandes guerres. Depuis le XVIIIème siècle, toutes les guerres ont eu des banquiers comme responsables en chef. Il faut enfin que cela cesse.

samedi, 19 avril 2014

Sommaire TP Mag n°59

Sommaire: "Terre & Peuple Magazine", n°59




mardi, 01 avril 2014

President Xi calls on China, Germany to build Silk Road economic belt

President Xi calls on China, Germany to build Silk Road economic belt

(Xinhua) - Ex: http://www.chinadaily.com


President Xi calls on China, Germany to build Silk Road economic belt
Chinese President Xi Jinping (center) visits Port of Duisburg of Germany March 29, 2014. [Photo/Xinhua]


DUSSELDORF, Germany - Chinese President Xi Jinping Saturday called on China and Germany to work together to build the Silk Road economic belt.

Xi made the remarks during a visit to Port of Duisburg, the world's biggest inland harbor and a transport and logistics hub of Europe.





The Chinese leader expressed the hope that Port of Duisburg will play a bigger role in the China-Germany and China-Europe cooperation.

Xi witnessed the arrival of a cargo train at the railway station in Duisburg from the southwestern Chinese city of Chongqing. The train had travelled all the distance along the Chongqing-Xinjiang-Europe international railway.

The Chinese president, accompanied by Vice German Chancellor and Minister of Economics and Energy Sigmar Gabriel, was warmly welcomed by Hannelore Kraft, premier of the State of North Rhine-Westphalia, and Soren Link, mayor of the city of Duisburg.

Kraft and Link, in their speeches at the welcome ceremony, said the state and the city will grasp the opportunities that the initiative on the Silk Road economic belt brings to them, and step up the cooperation with China.

The U.S. Empire Is Trying Desperately To Contain the Eurasian Alliance


The U.S. Empire Is Trying Desperately To Contain the Eurasian Alliance of Russia, China, Central Asian Nations, Iran, Iraq, Syria, Pakistan


Ex: http://www.lewrockwell.com

The U.S. and its puppets, especially the E.U. and Nato, have been trying to weaken the rebuilding Russian empire as much as possible to contain it, while maintaining the  U.S. Global Empire.

This has become a vital, crucial goal because of the rapid growth of Chinese power and the ever closer Alliance of Russia, China, Iran, Iraq, Syria, Central Asia, Pakistan, etc.

The U.S. and E.U. are desperate to stop Russia from rebuilding its vast Central Asian states within the Russian Federation and this new Alliance, especially because of the vast Caspian Sea oil and gas. The E.U. is highly dependent on Russia for gas and on Russia, Iraq, Iran and the pro-Russian Caspian Sea powers, especially Kazakhstan. The Russian move into the Black Sea is another major step in that direction. Kazakhstan publicly supported the Russian move to reunite with the Crimea. Kazakhstan is the great prize, with 30% of its population  Russian and a vast border with Mother Russia. Russia is probably not at this time trying to reunite Kazakhstan with Russia, since that would involve many more problems, but simply to keep it as a close ally, as the Ukraine was until the violent overthrow of the Kiev government by the U.S. supported coup.

Russia, Iran, Iraq, and their Central Asian allies are close to a vast oligopoly on the oil and gas exports of the world, especially to the E.U., U.K., China, India, etc.

Saudi Arabia is desperate to break the growing Iran-Iraq-Syria-Hizbollahp-Russian-Central Asian power block. Right now it is trying desperately to build its own military forces to offset the U.S. withdrawal from the region, but that is absurd. In the long term, Saudi Arabia will align with Russia-China-Iran-Central Asia or be overthrown from within by those who will become reasonable.

China, now firmly in the Russian-Central Asia-Iran-Iraq block with gas lines from Russia, etc., is moving forcefully into all of the South China Sea to control oil and gas there. The U.S. is desperate to stop that, but China keeps moving out.

All of that puts the dying U.S. Empire on a collision course with the vast Russian-Chinese-Iranian-Central Asian Alliance. Pakistan has become very anti-U.S. because of the U.S. attacks in Pakistan and is allying more and more with China. Even India is working more and more closely with Iran and its allies to get the gas they need. Just yesterday the president of Iran spoke in Afghanistan calling for a great regional entente, working together more and more closely. That is the likely route for Iranian oil and gas to India.

Ultimately, the U.S. Empire must withdraw from its vast over-stretch to save itself financially and economically, politically and militarily.

The E.U. knows that, so Germany’s Prime Minister talks privately with Putin in German and Russian about the American Global Crisis. [She knows Russian and he knows German, so it's easy.] Germany, the E.U. and Russia are moving toward a long run understanding once the crippled U.S. implodes financially or withdraws to save itself. The CEO of Siemens, the giant and vital German technology corporation, has just visited with Putin in Russia and made public statements of strong plans to continue working with Russia very closely. Other German CEO’s have done the same, acting as informal reassurances from the Prime Minister that her public words going along with the U.S. more or less do not mean any kind of break with the close relations with Russia.

samedi, 29 mars 2014

Eurasisme, Alternative à l'hégémonie libérale

Eurasisme, Alternative à l'hégémonie libérale


jeudi, 20 mars 2014

Der Westen, Russland, China und die Ukraine


«Rechtzeitig die bereits brennende Lunte aus dem Benzinfass nehmen»

Der Westen, Russland, China und die Ukraine

Ex: http://www.zeit-fragen.ch

von Willy Wimmer, Staatssekretär des Bundesministers der Verteidigung a.D., Mitglied des Deutschen Bundestages 1976–2009

Die Nachrichten wegen der Ukraine überschlagen sich und der schöne Schein von Sotschi mit den glänzend gestimmten Sportlern ist schneller zerstoben, als das allen lieb sein konnte.
Dennoch sollten wir in der Flut der Nachrichten über Ereignisse gut 700 Kilometer von Berlin entfernt die Meldung über ein fürchterliches Massaker in der chinesischen Stadt Kunming nicht übersehen oder falsch einordnen. Kunming als Hauptstadt der chinesischen Provinz Yünnan beeindruckt eigentlich durch seinen Charme, der an lebenslustige Gebiete am Mittelmeer erinnert. Am letzten Wochenende kam der Tod nach Kunming, als fast 30 Menschen ermordet und mehr als 100 Menschen schwer verletzt wurden. Weit weg?
Erinnern wir uns an den Vorabend des völkerrechtswidrigen Krieges gegen die Bundesrepublik Jugoslawien, dessen Beginn sich in diesen Tagen zum 15. Male jährt. Über Monate hatte es im chinesischen Westen Anschlag über Anschlag gegeben. Tote und Verletzte waren die Folge. Prominente Schauspieler aus Hollywood eröffneten eine Kampagne wegen Tibet. Es war so dramatisch, dass eine kriegerische Auseinandersetzung wegen Tibet erwartet wurde. Nicht nur im Spiegel konnte jeder lesen, dass wohl amerikanische Dienste hinter den Ereignissen im Westen Chinas stünden.
Das, was losbrach, waren die Bombenangriffe auf Belgrad, mitten im europäischen Kerngebiet, und das Vehikel war die albanische Terrororganisation UÇK, auf die die Vereinigten Staaten und später die gesamte Nato gesetzt hatte, um ihre Ziele in der Bundesrepublik Jugoslawien durchzusetzen.

Zeichen an der Wand sind häufiger zu sehen, als uns lieb sein kann. Das bedeutet für uns, dass wegen der gleichzeitig stattfindenden Umbrüche in der Ukraine das Gesamtbild nicht aus den Augen gelassen werden darf.

Es ist etwas ganz Grosses im Gange, das uns alle zerreissen kann. Wer heute Russland aus den G 8 schmeissen will, der hat keine Hemmungen, morgen China mit dem Rauswurf aus der Welthandelsorganisation zu drohen und die Drohung auch wahrzumachen. Es ist Endspiel-Zeit, und es ist geradezu spektakulär, wie der amerikanische Aussenminister John Kerry sich als Schutzengel des Völkerrechtes aufspielt.

Dennoch ist das amerikanische Verhalten seit dem völkerrechtswidrigen Krieg gegen Belgrad und die folgenden, ebenfalls klassischen Aggressionskriege gegen den Irak u. a., keine Ausrede für andere, in amerikanische Muster der letzten Jahrzehnte zu verfallen. Aber tun sie das? Man ist heute schnell bei der Hand, den russischen Präsidenten Putin mit Adolf Hitler zu vergleichen, wie es in diesen Tagen ein ehemaliger tschechischer Aussenminister getan hat. Fürst Schwarzenberg hat gut reden, waren es doch die Russen, die gnadenlos unter Adolf Hitler ihr Blut vergiessen mussten. Peinlicher geht es nicht mehr.

Aber die Ukraine wird uns um die Ohren fliegen, auch wenn es seit Joschka Fischer einen Nato-Modus zu geben scheint, wenn Ziele angeleuchtet werden. Janukowitsch ist weg, und wer will ihm eine Träne nachweinen? Bei den Protzvillen? Als wenn das bis zum Ringen um das Assoziierungsabkommen irgend jemanden in Brüssel, Berlin, London oder Washington gestört hätte. In der Staatskasse noch knapp 300 000 Euro? Wo waren die peniblen Brüsseler Schlaumeier bei der Überprüfung der Kiewer Daten vor dem angepeilten Abkommen zwecks grösserer Nähe der Ukraine zur Europäischen Union?

Von ganz neuer Qualität dürfte jedoch sein, dass nicht nur die US-amerikanische Staatssekretärin Nuland den Überlegungen zur Manipulation der neuen Regierung in der Ukraine freien Lauf gelassen hat. Hier wurde zum ersten Mal in der neueren Geschichte eine Regierung, die nach Bekundungen aller – von der OSZE bis zum Europa-Rat – durch faire und freie Wahlen zustande gekommen war, aus dem Amt geputscht, und alle Abkommen zur Krisenbeilegung wurden beiseite gefegt.

Das geschah wohlgemerkt auch und gerade durch Kräfte, die einen gesamteuropäischen Aufschrei der Abscheu hätten hervorrufen müssen. Noch in der Nacht der Machtergreifung wurde gegen die russischsprachigen Bewohner der Ukraine mobil gemacht. Man hatte nichts Eiligeres zu tun, als ihnen die Zerstörung ihrer Bürgerrechte in Aussicht zu stellen. Es war eben auch der ­politische Mob, der anschliessend drohte, durch die gesamte Ukraine zu fegen.

Wegen des unmittelbar drohenden Finanzkollapses der Ukraine droht sich dort ein Furor breitzumachen, der zwar heute nach dem Westen ruft, aber dem Heulen und Zähneknirschen drohen, wenn ihn die westeuropäische und amerikanische Realität erreicht.
Washington scheint zu den letzten Mitteln vor einer Kriegserklärung an die Russische Föderation greifen zu wollen, wenn man die Herren Obama und Kerry hört. Wäre es wegen der Dimension des von der Ukraine ausgehenden Urknalls für ganz Europa nicht sinnvoller gewesen, die Fäden zusammenzuhalten? Schliesslich war es Moskau, das der maroden Ukraine noch mehr Geld nachwerfen wollte, als der in diesen Dingen äusserst penible Westen.

Und Putin? Hätte er zuwarten sollen, bis die Kiewer Machtübernahme die russische Grenze erreicht hätte? Die Träger des neuen Geistes waren alle auf dem Weg. Was in Teufels Namen hat nach der Kiewer Machtübernahme die neuen Machthaber dazu veranlasst, nun jeden wichtigen Amtsträger im ganzen Land aus dem Amt zu jagen und durch eigene Günstlinge zu ersetzen? Der russische Präsident Putin hat durch die Form seiner Reaktion diesem Tun ein Halt-Signal gesetzt, für das man ihm vielleicht noch einmal sehr dankbar sein wird. Die Souveränität und territoriale Integrität auch der Ukraine stehen ausser Frage. Rechtzeitig die bereits brennende Lunte aus dem Benzinfass zu nehmen, wie es Putin gemacht hat, sollte dann als Chance begriffen werden, wenn das russische Handeln nicht als Gefährdung der eigenen westlichen Absichten gesehen wird.    •

Westeuropäische Medien wie gleichgeschaltet unter US-Oberbefehl?

Offener Brief an die Staats- und Regierungschefs der EU zur Sitzung vom 6. März 2014

Sehr verehrte Damen,
sehr geehrte Herren,
nach den Standards, die in der Europäischen Union bei schwierigen Entwicklungen üblich sind, müssten die Staats- und Regierungschefs bei ihrem Treffen in Brüssel wegen der Lage in der Ukraine festlegen, dass
1.    zu den neuen Machthabern in Kiew auf der Regierungsebene keine Kontakte stattfinden, solange es ernsthafte und begründete Zweifel an der Rechtmässigkeit der neuen Organe in Kiew gibt,
2.    so lange davon ausgegangen werden muss, dass in hohen und höchsten Ämtern der neuen Organe in Kiew sich Personen befinden, deren politische Haltung in ganz Europa Abscheu wegen ihres Gedankengutes hervorruft, sollte ein Boykott der EU […] über die Organe in Kiew so lange verhängt werden, bis diese Personen nicht mehr den im Amt befindlichen Organen in Kiew angehören. Für die Bundesregierung in Berlin ist es nicht akzeptabel, dass vor dem Bundesverfassungsgericht in Karlsruhe ein Verbot der NPD durchgesetzt werden soll, während man gleichzeitig in Kiew mit denen unter einer Decke steckt, die engste Kontakte zur NPD pflegen.
Es ist in hohem Masse bedauerlich, dass in Westeuropa die Medien auf die krisenhafte Entwicklung so reagieren, als wären sie gleichgeschaltet und unterstünden amerikanischem Oberbefehl. […]
In der letzten Woche drohten die Flammen des Maidan in Kiew auf die ganze Ukraine überzugreifen. Eine im Bürgerkrieg versinkende Ukraine hätte ganz Europa mit in den Untergang gerissen. Diese Gefahr ist immer noch nicht vom Tisch, weil die wirtschaftlichen Gefahren erst noch auf alle zukommen. Das besonnene und deutliche Auftreten der russischen Regierung unter Präsident Putin hat Europa und der Welt eine Chance gegeben, Souveränität und territoriale Integrität der Ukraine zu erhalten und uns vor dem Furor eines Bürgerkrieges in der Ukraine zu bewahren.
Die Russische Föderation hat in den Jahren, die mit dem ordinären Angriffskrieg der Nato gegen die Bundesrepublik Jugoslawien vor fast genau 15 Jahren und zu einem friedensbedrohenden und völkerrechtswidrigen Verhalten der USA auch in anderen Teilen der Welt führten, sich zum Völkerrecht und seinen tragenden Grundsätzen bekannt. Ohne dieses Völkerrecht und vor allem die Charta der Vereinten Nationen wird das Schicksal Europas mehr denn je ungewiss sein. […]

Willy Wimmer, Staatssekretär des Bundesministers der Verteidigung a.D., Mitglied des Deutschen Bundestages 1976–2009

dimanche, 16 mars 2014

The War on Russia in its Ideological Dimension


The War on Russia in its Ideological Dimension

Ex: http://www.geopolitica.ru
The coming war as concept
The war against Russia is currently the most discussed issue in the West. At this point it is only a suggestion and a possibility, but it can become a reality depending on the decisions taken by all parties involved in the Ukrainian conflict – Moscow, Washington, Kiev, and Brussels.
I don’t want to discuss all the aspects and history of this conflict here. Instead I propose to analyze its deep ideological roots. My conception of the most relevant events is based on the Fourth Political Theory, whose principles I have described in my book under the same name that was published in English by Arktos Media in 2012.
Therefore I will not examine the war of the West on Russia in terms of its risks, dangers, issues, costs or consequences, but rather in an ideological sense as seen from the global perspective. I will therefore meditate on the sense of such a war, and not on the war itself (which may be either real or virtual).
Essence of liberalism
In the modern West, there is one ruling, dominant ideology – liberalism. It may appear in many shades, versions and forms, but the essence is always the same. Liberalism contains an inner, fundamental structure which follows axiomatic principles:
-   anthropological individualism (the individual is the measure of all things);
-  belief in progress (the world is heading toward a better future, and the past is always worse than the present);
-   technocracy (technical development and its execution are taken as the most important criteria by which to judge the nature of a society);
-   eurocentrism (Euro-American societies are accepted as the standard of measure for the rest of humanity);
-   economy as destiny (the free market economy is the only normative economic system – all the rest types are to either be reformed or destroyed);
-   democracy is the rule of minorities (defending themselves from the majority, which is always prone to degenerate into totalitarianism or “populism”);
-  the middle class is the only really existing social actor and universal norm (independent from the fact of whether or not an individual has already reached this status or is on the way to becoming actually middle class, representing for the moment only a would-be middle class);
-   one-world globalism (human beings are all essentially the same with only one distinction, namely that of their individual nature – the world should be integrated on the basis of the individual and cosmopolitism; in other words, world citizenship).
These are the core values of liberalism, and they are a manifestation of one of the three tendencies that originated in the Enlightenment alongside communism and fascism, which collectively proposed varying interpretations of the spirit of modernity. During the twentieth century, liberalism defeated its rivals, and since 1991 has become the sole, dominant ideology of the world.
The only freedom of choice in the kingdom of global liberalism is that between Right liberalism, Left liberalism or radical liberalism, including far-Right liberalism, far-Left liberalism and extremely radical liberalism. As a consequence, liberalism has been installed as the operational system of Western civilization and of all other societies that find themselves in the zone of Western influence. It has become the common denominator for any politically correct discourse, and the distinguishing mark which determines who is accepted by mainstream politics and who is marginalized and rejected. Conventional wisdom itself became liberal.
Geopolitically, liberalism was inscribed in the America-centered model in which Anglo-Saxons formed the ethnical core, based upon the Atlanticist Euro-American partnership, NATO, which represents the strategic core of the system of global security. Global security has come to be seen as being synonymous with the security of the West, and in the last instance with American security. So liberalism is not only an ideological power but also a political, military and strategic power. NATO is liberal in its roots. It defends liberal societies, and it fights to extend liberalism to new areas.
Liberalism as nihilism
There is one point in liberal ideology that has brought about a crisis within it: liberalism is profoundly nihilistic at its core. The set of values defended by liberalism is essentially linked to its main thesis: the primacy of liberty. But liberty in the liberal vision is an essentially negative category: it claims to be free from (as per John Stuart Mill), not to be free for something. It is not secondary; it is the essence of the problem.
Liberalism fights against all forms of collective identity, and against all types of values, projects, strategies, goals, methods and so on that are collectivist, or at least non-individualist. That is the reason why one of the most important theorists of liberalism, Karl Popper (following Friedrich von Hayek), held in his important book, The Open Society and Its Enemies, that liberals should fight against any ideology or political philosophy (ranging from Plato and Aristotle to Marx and Hegel) that suggests that human society should have some common goal, common value, or common meaning. (It should be noted that George Soros regards this book as his personal bible.) Any goal, any value, and any meaning in liberal society, or the open society, should be strictly based upon the individual. So the enemies of the open society, which is synonymous with Western society post-1991, and which has become the norm for the rest of the world, are concrete. Its primary enemies are communism and fascism, both ideologies which emerged from the same Enlightenment philosophy, and which contained central, non-individualic concepts – class in Marxism, race in National Socialism, and the national State in fascism. So the source of liberalism’s conflict with the existing alternatives of modernity, fascism or communism, is quite obvious. Liberals claim to liberate society from fascism and communism, or from the two major permutations of explicitly non-individualistic modern totalitarianism. Liberalism’s struggle, when viewed as a part of the process of the liquidation of non-liberal societies, is quite meaningful: it acquires its meaning from the fact of the very existence of ideologies that explicitly deny the individual as society’s highest value. It is quite clear what the struggle opposes: liberation from its opposite. But the fact that liberty, as it is conceived by liberals, is an essentially negative category is not clearly perceived here. The enemy is present and is concrete. That very fact gives liberalism its solid content. Something other than the open society exists, and the fact of its existence is enough to justify the process of liberation.
Unipolar period: threat of implosion
In 1991, when the Soviet Union as the last opponent of Western liberalism fell, some Westerners, such as Francis Fukuyama, proclaimed the end of history. This was quite logical: as there was no longer an explicit enemy of the open society, therefore there was no more history as had occurred during the modern period, which was defined by the struggle between three political ideologies (liberalism, communism and fascism) for the heritage of the Enlightenment. That was, strategically speaking, the moment when “unipolar moment” was realized (Charles Krauthammer). The period between 1991 and 2014, at the midpoint of which Bin Laden’s attack against the World Trade Center occurred, was the period of the global domination of liberalism. The axioms of liberalism were accepted by all the main geopolitical actors, including China (in economic terms) and Russia (in its ideology, economy, and political system). There were liberals and would-be liberals, not-yet liberals, not-liberal-enough liberals and so on. The real and explicit exceptions were few (such as Iran and North Korea). So the world became axiomatically liberal according to its ideology.
This has been the most important moment in the history of liberalism. It has defeated its enemies, but at the same time it has lost them. Liberalism is essentially the liberation from and the fight against all that is not liberal (at present or in what has the potential to become such). Liberalism acquired its real meaning and its content from its enemies. When the choice is presented as being between not-freedom (as represented by concrete totalitarian societies) or freedom, many choose freedom, not understanding it in terms of freedom for what, or freedom to do what… When there is an illiberal society, liberalism is positive. It only begins to show its negative essence after victory.
After the victory of 1991, liberalism stepped into its implosive phase. After having defeated communism as well as fascism, it stood alone, with no enemy to fight. And that was the moment when inner conflicts emerged, when liberal societies began to attempt to purge themselves of their last remaining non-liberal elements: sexism, politically incorrectness, inequality between the sexes, any remnants of the non-individualistic dimensions of institutions such as the State and the Church, and so on. Liberalism always needs enemy to liberate from. Otherwise it loses its purpose, and its implicit nihilism becomes too salient. The absolute triumph of liberalism is its death.
That is the ideological meaning of the financial crises of 2000 and of 2008. The successes and not the failures of the new, entirely profit-based economy (of turbocapitalism, according to Edward Luttwak) are responsible for its collapse.
The liberty to do anything you want, but restricted to the individual scale, provokes an implosion of the personality. The human passes to the infra-human realm, and to sub-individual domains. And here he encounters virtuality, as a dream of sub-individuality, the freedom from anything. This is the evaporation of the human, and brings about the Empire of nothingness as the last word in the total victory of liberalism. Postmodernism prepares the terrain for that post-historic, self-referential recycling of non-sense.
The West is in need of an enemy
You may ask now, what the Hell does all of this have to do with the (presumable) coming war with Russia? I am ready to answer that now.
Liberalism has continued to gain momentum on a global scale. Since 1991, it has been an inescapable fact. And it has now begun to implode. It has arrived at its terminal point and started to liquidate itself. Mass immigration, the clash of cultures and civilizations, the financial crisis, terrorism, and the growth of ethnic nationalism are indicators of approaching chaos. This chaos endangers the established order: any kind of order, including the liberal order itself. The more liberalism succeeds, the faster it approaches its end and the end of the present world. Here we are dealing with the nihilistic essence of liberal philosophy, with nothingness as the inner (me)ontological principle of freedom-from. The German anthropologist Arnold Gehlen justly defined the human as a “deprived being,” or Mangelwesen. Man in himself is nothing. It takes all that comprises its identity from society, history, people, and politics. So if he returns to his pure essence, he can no longer recognize anything. The abyss is hidden behind the fragmented debris of feelings, vague thoughts, and dim desires. The virtuality of sub-human emotions is a thin veil; behind it there is pure darkness. So the explicit discovery of this nihilistic basis of human nature is the last achievement of liberalism. But that is the end, and the end also for those who use the liberalism for their own purposes and who are beneficiaries of liberal expansion; in other words, the masters of globalization. Any and all order collapses in such an emergency of nihilism: the liberal order, too.
In order to rescue the rule of this liberal elite, they need to take a certain step back. Liberalism will reacquire its meaning only when it is confronted once more with non-liberal society. This step back is the only way to save what remains of order, and to save liberalism from itself. Therefore, Putin’s Russia appears on its horizon. Modern Russia is not anti-liberal, not totalitarian, not nationalist, and not communist, nor is it yet too liberal, fully liberal-democrat, sufficiently cosmopolite, or so radically anti-communist. It is rather on the way to becoming liberal, step by step, within the process of a Gramscian adjustment to global hegemony and the subsequent transformation this entails (“transformismo” in Gramscian language).
However, in the global agenda of liberalism as represented by the United States and NATO, there is a need for another actor, for another Russia that would justify the order of the liberal camp, and help to mobilize the West as it threatens to break apart from inner strife. This will delay the irruption of liberalism’s inner nihilism and thus save it from its inevitable end. That is why they badly need Putin, Russia, and war. It is the only way to prevent chaos in the West and to save what remains of its global and domestic order. In this ideological play, Russia would justify liberalism’s existence, because that is the enemy which would give a meaning to the struggle of the open society, and which would help it to consolidate and continue to affirm itself globally. Radical Islam, such as represented by al-Qaeda, was another candidate for this role, but it lacked sufficient stature to become a real enemy. It was used, but only on a local scale. It justified the intervention in Afghanistan, the occupation of Iraq, the overthrow of Gaddafi, and started a civil war in Syria, but it was too weak and ideologically primitive to represent the real challenge that is needed by liberals.
Russia, the traditional geopolitical enemy of Anglo-Saxons, is much more serious as an opponent. It fits the needed role extremely well – the memory of the Cold War is still fresh in many minds. Hate for Russia is an easy thing to provoke by relatively simple means. This is why I think that war with Russia is possible. It is ideologically necessary as the last means to postpone the final implosion of the liberal West. It is the needed “one step back.”
To save the liberal order
Considering the different layers of this concept of a possible war with Russia, I suggest a few points:
1. A war with Russia will help to delay the coming disorder on a global scale. The majority of the countries that are involved in the liberal economy, and which share the axioms and institutions of liberal democracy, and which are either dependent upon or directly controlled by the United States and NATO, will forge a common front once more behind the cause of the liberal West in its quest to oppose the anti-liberal Putin. This will serve to reaffirm liberalism as a positive identity when this identity is beginning to dissolving as a result of the manifestation of its nihilistic essence.
2. A war with Russia would strengthen NATO and above all its European members, who will be obliged once more to regard American hyperpower as something positive and useful, and the old Cold War stance will no longer seem obsolete. Out of a fear of the coming of the “evil Russians”, Europeans will again feel loyal to the United States as their protector and savior. As a result, the leading role of the U.S. in NATO will be reaffirmed.
3. The EU is falling apart. The supposed “common threat” of the Russians could prevent it from an eventual split, mobilizing these societies and making their peoples once again eager to defend their liberties and values under the threat of Putin’s “imperial ambitions”.
4. The Ukraine junta in Kiev needs this war to justify and conceal all the misdeeds they carried out during the Maidan protests on both the juridical and constitutional levels, thus allowing them to suspend democracy, that would impede their rule in the southeastern, mostly pro-Russian districts and would enable them to establish their authority and nationalistic order through extra-parliamentary means.
The only country that doesn’t want war now is Russia. But Putin cannot let the radically anti-Russian government in Ukraine to dominate a country that has a population that is half-Russian and which contains many pro-Russian regions. If he allows this, he will be finished on the international and domestic levels. So, reluctantly, he accepts war. And once he begins on this course, there will be no other solution for Russia but to win it.
I don’t like to speculate regarding the strategic aspects of this coming war. I leave that to other, more qualified analysts. Instead I would like to formulate some ideas concerning the ideological dimension of this war.
Framing Putin
The meaning of this war on Russia is in essence the last effort of globalist liberalism to save itself from implosion. As such, liberals need to define Putin’s Russia ideologically – and obviously identify it with the enemy of the open society. But in the dictionary of modern ideologies there are only three primary iterations: liberalism, communism and fascism. It is quite clear that liberalism is represented by all the nations involved in this conflict except for Russia (the United States, the NATO member states, and Euromaidan/the Kiev junta). This leaves only communism and fascism. Therefore Putin is made out to be a “neo-Soviet revanchist” and “a return of the KGB”. This is the picture that is being sold to the most stupid sort of Western public. But some aspects of the patriotic reaction emanating from the pro-Russian and anti-Banderite population (i.e., the defense of Lenin’s monuments, Stalin portraits and memorials to the Soviet involvement in the Second World War) could confirm this idea in the minds of this public. Nazism and fascism are too far removed from Putin and the reality of modern Russia, but Russian nationalism and Russian imperialism will be evoked within the image of the Great Evil that is being drawn. Therefore Putin is being made out to be a “radical nationalist”, a “fascist” and an “imperialist”. This will work on many Westerners. Under this logic, Putin can be both “communist” and “fascist” at the same time, so he will be depicted as a “National Bolshevik” (although this is a little bit too complicated for the postmodern Western public). It is obvious that in reality, Putin is neither – he is not a communist nor a fascist, nor both simultaneously. He is a political pragmatist in the realm of International Relations – this is why he admires Kissinger, and why Kissinger likes him in return. He has no ideology whatsoever. But he will be obliged to embrace the ideological frame that he has been assigned. It is not his choice. But such are the rules of the game. In the course of this war on Russia, Putin will be framed in this way, and that is the most interesting and important aspect of this situation.
The main idea that liberals will try to advance to define Putin ideologically will be as the shadow of the past, as a vampire: “Sometimes they come back.” That is the rationale behind this attempt to prevent the final implosion of liberalism. The primary message is that liberalism is still alive and vital because there is something in the world that we all must be liberated from. Russia will become the object from which it must be liberated. The goal is first to liberate Ukraine, and by extension Europe and the rest of humanity, who will likewise be depicted as being under threat, from Russia, and in the end Russia itself will be said to be in need of rescue from its own non-liberal identity. So now we have an enemy. Such an enemy gives to the liberalism its raison d’etre once more. So Russia is being made out to be a challenger from the pre-liberal past thrown into the liberal present. Without such a challenge there is no more life in liberalism, no more order in the world, and everything associated with them will dissolve and implode. With this challenge, the falling giant of globalism acquires new vigor. Russia is here to save the liberals.
But in order for this to happen, Russia is being ideologically framed as something pre-liberal. She must be either communist, fascist or at perhaps National Bolshevist Russia. That is the ideological rule. Therefore, in fighting with Russia, or in considering to fight her, or in not fighting her, there is a deeper task – to frame Russia ideologically. It will be done from both the inside and the outside. They will try to force Russia to accept either communism or extreme nationalism, or else they will simply treat Russia as if it were these things. It is a framing game.
Post-liberal Russia: The first war of the Fourth Political Theory
In conclusion, what I propose is the following:
We need to consciously counter any provocation to frame Russia as a pre-liberal power. We need to refuse to allow the liberals to save themselves from their fast-approaching end. Rather than helping them to delay it, we need to accelerate it. In order to do this, we need to present Russia not as a pre-liberal entity but as a post-liberal revolutionary force that struggles for an alternative future for all the peoples of the planet. The Russian war will be not only be for Russian national interests, but will be in the cause of a just multipolar world, for real dignity and for real, positive freedom – not (nihilistic) freedom from but (creative) freedom for. In this war, Russia will set an example as the defender of Tradition, conservative organic values, and will represent real liberation from the open society and its beneficiaries – the global financial oligarchy. This war is not against Ukrainians or even against part of the Ukrainian populace. Nor is it against Europe. It is against the liberal world (dis)order. We are not going to save liberalism, per their designs. We are going to kill it once and for all. Modernity was always essentially wrong, and we are now at the terminal point of modernity. For those who rendered modernity and their own destiny synonymous, or who let that occur unconsciously, this will mean the end. But for those who are on the side of eternal truth and of Tradition, of faith, and of the spiritual and immortal human essence, it will be a new beginning, Absolute Beginning.
The most important fight at present is the fight for the Fourth Political Theory. It is our weapon, and with it we are going to prevent the liberals from realizing their wish of framing Putin and Russia  in their own manner, and in so doing we will reaffirm Russia as the first post-liberal ideological power struggling against nihilistic liberalism for the sake of an open, multipolar and genuinely free future.

lundi, 10 mars 2014

Pourquoi les Allemands n’ont guère envie de se fâcher avec Poutine


Pourquoi les Allemands n’ont guère envie de se fâcher avec Poutine

Ex: http://aucoeurdunationalisme.blogspot.com

La Russie fournit un tiers du gaz naturel et du pétrole [consommé par] l’Allemagne. Et leurs économies sont si imbriquées que l’idée même de sanctions effraient les champions de l’exportation.
Sanktionen nein danke ! S’il est un patronat qui veut éviter toute sanction économique contre Moscou, c’est bien l’allemand. Les deux économies sont tellement imbriquées que Berlin aurait énormément à perdre. Les échanges entre l’Allemagne et la Russie s’élèvent à près de 80 milliards d’euros (4 fois plus que la France).
L’hebdomadaire Wirtschaftswoche résumait cette semaine : “Plus de 6.000 entreprises, de la multinationale aux PME, sont présentes en Russie, où elles ont investi directement plus de 20 milliards. 300.000 emplois dépendent en Allemagne de ces échanges“. Berlin est le deuxième fournisseur de Moscou, après Pékin (la France, 8ème).
D’ailleurs jeudi 6 mars, alors que la crise ukrainienne battait son plein et que le Kremlin ne semblait pas disposé à faire baisser la tension, Sigmar Gabriel, ministre de l’économie et Vice chancelier est allé à Moscou, en voyage officiel et a rencontré Poutine. Cette visite “prévue de longue date“, a-t-on précisé à Berlin, portait sur la “politique énergétique et de développement économique“. Elle va tout à fait dans le sens de la diplomatie allemande : pas de coup de menton, un pragmatisme qui respecte les intérêts bien compris de chacun.
Des sanctions qui pourraient coûter cher
Car la Russie pourvoit aux besoins énergétiques de notre voisin : elle lui fournit 31% de son gaz naturel (contre moins de 10% en France) et 35 % du pétrole qu’elle consomme. En échange, l’Allemagne lui vend des biens pour une valeur d’une quarantaine de milliards d’euros, essentiellement des machines-outils, de la chimie et des automobiles. Metro, Volkswagen, BMW ou Daimler sont des acteurs de poids.
Tout au long de la semaine, la presse Outre Rhin y est allée de ses avertissements contre les sanctions, comparées par exemple à “un poison coulant dans le sang“, par le quotidien Süddeutsche Zeitung. “Chaque sanction a son prix“, mettait en garde le quotidien des affaires Handelsblatt, en écho à l’hebdomadaire Focus qui parlait de “spirale des sanctions“.
L’économiste star, Wener Sinn, patron de l’institut de Munich IFO, estimait, quant à lui que les représailles économiques contre Moscou mettraient en danger la transition énergétique allemande, qui rend le pays “encore plus dépendant des importations russes“.
Schröder fait du [lobbying] pro-russe
Le 3 mars, l’ex chancelier Gerhard Schröder était à l’ambassade d’Allemagne à Paris devant un parterre de politiques et d’hommes d’affaires français. Soucieux de pacifier le débat, il a émis des doutes sur l’utilité des armes économiques. “A quoi servirait d’appeler au boycott de la Russie, alors que l’on ignore qui va en pâtir le plus ?“, avait notamment déclaré ce proche de Poutine, qui appelle le patron du Kremlin son “ami” et qui l’a invité à la fête de ses 60 ans.
Il n’est pas le seul Allemand proche de Moscou. Plusieurs politiques et hommes d’affaires de premier plan se sont reconvertis dans le lobbying pour la puissance orientale. Dernier en date, Peter Löscher, ancien président de Siemens qui vient tout juste d’être embauché par un oligarque.

L’Inde soutient la Russie dans la crise ukrainienne


L’Inde soutient la Russie dans la crise ukrainienne

Ex: http://www.dedefensa.org

Notre estimé MK Bhadrakumar attire notre attention sur une intervention du conseiller de sécurité nationale du gouvernement indien Shivshankar Menon (notamment rapportées par le Times of India de ce 7 mars 2014). Menon estime que la Russie a des “intérêts légitimes” en Crimée, ce qui revient, pour le moins, à “comprendre” avec une nuance presque approbatrice la position russe en Crimée et vis-à-vis de la crise ukrainienne.

Cette position indienne est doublement surprenante, d’une part parce qu’elle marque un engagement inhabituel de ce pays dans une crise majeure, contre le bloc BAO et les USA, d’autre part parce qu’elle surpasse largement le “soutien” ambiguë de la Chine à la Russie. La Chine favorise en général les coups d’arrêt à l’hégémonie du bloc BAO, ce qui implique un certain soutien à la Russie, mais se montre intraitable sur la question du principe de la souveraineté, ce qui porte une ombre sur ce soutien dans la circonstance présente, – et bien qu’il reste à savoir qui est investi et protecteur de ce principe lorsqu’on mesure les circonstances ayant mené à la chute de Ianoukovitch ... (Selon MK Bhadrakumar, «China is indulging in doublespeak. Its propaganda apparatus queers the pitch for the West’s confrontation with Russia and, in fact, blatantly admits that Moscow is also fighting China’s cause by resisting western hegemony, while at the same time, Beijing’s diplomacy marks a careful distance from the Russian stance and takes to the high ground of ‘principles’.»)

La position indienne est une marque de plus des bouleversements en cours dans la situation internationale, avec surprises et désordre à mesure... Voici comment Bhadrakumar salue cette prise de position de son pays, lui qui est rarement tendre pour l’équipe au pouvoir, le 7 mars 2014 sur son Indian PunchLine) :

«The National Security Advisor Shivshankar Menon’s remark to the effect that Russia has “legitimate interests” in the Ukraine developments, as much as other interests are involved, is a statement of fact at its most obvious level.

»Russia’s interests in a stable, friendly Ukraine are no less than what India would have with regard to, say, Nepal or Bhutan. Delhi simply cannot afford to have an unfriendly government in Kathmandu or Thimpu, and it is hard to overlook the gravity of Russian concerns that ultra-nationalists staged a violent coup in Kiev. But Menon’s statement inevitably becomes a big statement, not only because he is a profoundly experienced and thoughtful scholar-diplomat but also given the high position he holds and his key role as an architect of India’s foreign policy in the recent years. Simply put, he is India’s voice on the world stage.

»To be sure, what Menon said will reverberate far and wide and would have been the content of many coded cables relayed by the antennae atop the chancelleries in Chanakyapuri to the world capitals yesterday. The point is, what Menon said is one of the most significant statements made by Delhi in a long while regarding the contemporary international situation. No doubt, the Ukraine is a defining moment in the post-cold era world politics and by reflecting on its templates, Menon voiced India’s concern over the dangerous drift in world politics...»

dimanche, 09 mars 2014

L'Allemagne, future puissance européenne tournée vers l'Est?


L'Allemagne, future puissance européenne tournée vers l'Est?
Conséquence de l’affaire Ukraine-Crimée

Michel Lhomme
Ex: http://metamag.fr
Que se passe-t-il ? L'Otan ne forme même plus des officiers loyaux dans ses cours ! Les nouvelles autorités euro compatibles de Kiev voient, en effet, leur armée se réduire de jour en jour. Hier, c’était le chef de la marine ukrainienne, l’amiral Denis Berezosvki, qui prêtait allégeance aux autorités pro-russes de Crimée. Puis, le gouvernement de Crimée a annoncé le ralliement de la 204ème brigade d’aviation de chasse des forces aériennes d’Ukraine dotée d’avions de chasse MiG-29 et d’avions d’entraînement L-39. Selon les autorités de Crimée, 800 militaires déployés sur la base aérienne de Belbek sont passés dans le camps du « peuple de Crimée ». Au total 45 avions de chasse et 4 avions d’entraînement se trouvent sur l’aérodrome. Précédemment dans la journée, les autorités de Crimée avaient annoncé que plus de 5 000 militaires des troupes de l’Intérieur, du service de garde-frontière et des forces armées d’Ukraine étaient passés aussi sous leur commandement. On parle donc de 22.000 militaires ukrainiens et plusieurs dizaines de systèmes de missiles sol-air S-300, passés sous l'autorité du gouvernement de la république autonome de Crimée. C'est pour Poutine, sans faire même couler le sang, un exploit et pour l'Otan, un sérieux revers et surtout un beau manque de loyauté après tous les cocktails servis !
Ainsi, toute la journée du 4 mars, on a suivi de part et d'autre la frégate Hetman  Sahaydachny, vaisseau amiral des forces navales d'Ukraine, entrer dans le détroit des Dardanelles. Quel pavillon battait-elle ? Pavillon ukrainien ? Pavillon russe ? A un moment, la presse russe avait indiqué que la frégate  refusait de suivre les ordres de Kiev et arborait le pavillon de Moscou. De son côté, le ministère de la Défense ukrainien démentait les allégations selon lesquelles le Hetman Sahaydachny aurait pris le parti de la Russie. On en est donc là à une guerre de pavillons en Mer Noire ! 


Craignant un coup d'Etat comme à Kiev, les habitants de Crimée ont créé des comités d'autodéfense et pris le commandement des unités militaires locales. Le Conseil suprême de Crimée avait déjà décidé, fin février, de tenir un référendum sur l'élargissement des pouvoirs de la république autonome ukrainienne de Crimée. Initialement fixée au 25 mai, la date du référendum a depuis été avancée au 30 mars. Par ailleurs, le premier ministre de Crimée, Sergueï Aksenov a renouvelé sa demande d'aide légitime et légale au président russe Vladimir Poutine. L’Otan quant à elle ne devrait pas intervenir en Crimée, mais selon le politologue russe, Alexandre Douguine, une filiale d’Academi (les ex-Blackwater d'Irak), Greystone Limited, aurait déjà débuté son déploiement en Ukraine. Les mercenaires arriveraient par groupe, en civil, avec de lourds paquetages, à l’aéroport de Kiev, d’où ils seraient envoyés vers Odessa. C'est eux que l'on évoquait hier.
L'Allemagne nouvelle puissance européenne d'équilibre 

Que se passera-t-il ? Les médias surenchérissent et dramatisent mais cela s'éclaircit et rappelle ironiquement l'épopée syrienne terminée par une victoire diplomatique russe et une humiliation des Etats-Unis et de la France. La France menace la Russie de sanctions, mais Laurent Fabius est  coincé: la Russie lui a fait immédiatement savoir, par ambassadeurs interposés, que cela entraînerait de facto la suspension immédiate de ses contrats militaires avec Paris, soit la suspension immédiate de la commande faite à la France en 2011 de deux bâtiments BPC (bâtiment de projection et de commandement) de type Mistral, plus une option pour deux autres. La France à genoux économiquement n'a plus les moyens de ses menaces.


Petit à petit, l'unanimité européenne face à la Russie se lézarde. Londres est de plus en plus eurosceptique et pense aussi à son économie : qui paiera la partition de l'Ukraine ? Londres tient un double langage. Alors que David Cameron menaçait Vladimir Poutine il y a quelques jours de «conséquences économiques, politiques, diplomatiques et autres» (sic), une note confidentielle du Ten Downing Street a fuitée permettant réellement de douter de sa sincérité. On y lit que le Royaume-Uni «ne doit pas, pour l'instant, soutenir de sanctions commerciales contre la Russie ou lui bloquer la City». Le texte recommande également de «décourager» toute discussion de représailles militaires notamment à l'Otan !
Au sein de l'Union Européenne, ce sont donc les Allemands devenus pro-russes qui mènent la danse ! Pourquoi ? L'Allemagne est d'abord le premier exportateur vers la Russie. 35% du gaz et 35% du pétrole consommés en Allemagne viennent de Russie. L'Allemagne sait que la Crimée est, pour la Russie, non négociable. Comment ne pourrait-elle pas le savoir ? Enfin, et ce n'est pas négligeable dans les relations internationales, l'Allemagne n'a pas apprécié les propos de Nuland mais surtout l'espionnage par Prism des conversation téléphoniques d'Angela Merkel. N'oublions pas qu'Angela Merkel parle russe (Poutine parle aussi couramment allemand) et qu'elle a été élevée en RDA. Elle connaît presque intimement le caractère et la valeur de chef d'état de Poutine.
La crise ukrainienne risque d'avoir par ricochets un drôle d'effet collatéral, un effet choc pour l'Union Européenne. Elle accélère le rapprochement à l'est de l'Allemagne, une Allemagne qui se tournera donc de plus en plus vers l'Est et non vers la France. Or, sans le couple franco-allemand, l'UE n'est plus rien. Il est inutile de rappeler les liens historiques entre l'Allemagne et la Russie et d'évoquer ici la reconnaissance allemande toujours forte envers l'Union Soviétique de Gorbatchev qui a rendu possible la réunification. Les liens entre l'Allemagne et la Russie sont naturels et stratégiques: la Russie est maintenant incontournable pour l'Allemagne puissance. Enfin, le potentiel des relations économiques avec la Russie est pour l'Allemagne sans commune mesure  avec ce qu'elle peut attendre maintenant de son partenaire français en voie de paupérisation et de déliquescence manifeste. Tous les politiciens et les hommes d'affaires allemands en sont bien conscients. Ils misent maintenant tous sur l'essor d'un marché à l'Est qu'ils connaissent en plus très bien. La partition de l'Ukraine pourrait même être carrément négociée secrètement avec la Russie, la partie non russophone offrant ainsi à Berlin sur un plateau d'argent une main d'œuvre très bon marché et plus proche de la main d'œuvre chinoise qui, par ailleurs, se renchérit !

Alors, la France dans tout ça ?... 

Le porte-parole du Quai d’Orsay sait-il au moins que la pointe extrême de la Crimée abrite Sébastopol, le grand port militaire russe fondé par Catherine II en 1783 ?  Sans doute mais il feint l'ignorance pour tomber dans la caricature grossière et  outrancière de Poutine. Dans toute la crise, la France a été  indécrottable dans l'idéologie et Bernard-Henri Lévy, l'émissaire à peine voilé de Fabius. 

La France n'a en fait plus aucune vision des relations internationales sauf des obsessions idéologiques, des idées fixes. C'est là l'effondrement des compétences diplomatiques pour paraphraser le texte de notre collaborateur Raoul Fougax. Il en va de même aux Affaires étrangères comme à l'Intérieur ou à l'Education. La France voit des Hitler partout, même sous les sofas des Ambassadrices ! Elle ne peut du coup rien récolter sauf quelques lauriers jaunis pour les Droits de l'Homme. La France s'est ainsi coupé de l'Allemagne pragmatique. C'est donc l'Allemagne et non la France qui conforte à l'Est sa place d’interlocuteur européen privilégié de la Russie.

vendredi, 28 février 2014




Ex: http://www.geopolitica.ru
Russian emigre philosopher and geopolitician Pyotr Nikolaevich Savitsky (1895-1968) was a leading figure of the classical Eurasianist movement that flourished after the Bolshevik Revolution and during the inter-war years. In this excerpt from a 1925 essay, Savitsky expounds the Eurasianist worldview, one based on traditional spiritual values rather than the modern materialists’ reign of quantity.
Eurasianists join those thinkers who reject the existence of universal progress…If a line of evolution runs differently through various spheres, then there can be no general ascending movement, no gradual and unbending general improvement; one or another cultural medium, improving in one area (from one point of view), often degrades in another and from another point of view. This position is applicable, in particular, to the European cultural medium: it has bought its scientific and technical “perfection,” from the point of view of the Eurasianists, with ideological and most of all religious impoverishment. The duality of its achievements is distinctly expressed in relation to the economy. Over the course of long centuries in the history of the Old World, there existed a certain singular correlation between the ideological-moral-religious principle on the one hand and the economic principle on the other. More precisely, there existed some ideological subordination of the latter principle to the former.
Namely the permeation of the whole approach to economic issues by the religious-moral moment allows some historians of economic theories (for example, the old mid-nineteenth century German-Hungarian historian Kautz, whose works up to now haven’t lost a certain significance) to unite into one group – by their relation to economic problems – such varying texts as Chinese literary fragments, the Iranian code of the Vendidad, the Mosaic law, the works of Plato, Xenophon, Aristotle and the medieval Western theologians. The economic philosophy of these texts is in a well-known sense the philosophy of a “subordinate economy;” the connection between satisfaction of our economic requirements with the general principles of morality and religion is emphasized within all of them as something necessary and proper.
The economic philosophy of the European “new era” is opposed to these views. Not always by direct words, but more often by the foundations of worldview, the new European economic philosophy asserts the cycle of economic phenomena as something self-sufficient and of autonomous value, containing and drawing from within itself the objectives of human existence. It would be a sign of spiritual blindness to negate the enormity of those purely cognitive achievements and successes in understanding and viewing economic phenomena that the new political economy has accomplished and accumulated. Yet acting as an empirical science and indeed in a certain and greater degree being such, in a whole host of its attitudes, the new political economy has influenced intellects and epochs as a metaphysic…
Just as the economic ideas of the ancient legislators, philosophers and theologians are tied to certain metaphysical conceptions, the economic ideas of the new economists are also tied to them. But if the metaphysics of the first was a philosophy of “subordinate economics,” then the metaphysics of the second is a philosophy of “militant economism.” The latter is in some way the ideological price that the new Europe has paid for the quantitatively tremendous economic growth she has experienced in modernity, especially in the last century. There is something instructive in this picture – both at the close of the Middle Ages and in the course of the new era, the ancient wisdom of moral testament, immemorial and restraining the egotistical instincts of man through words of exhortation and denunciation, the philosophy of “subordinate economics” is crumbling under the offensive of the new modern ideas, with the theory and practice of militant economism conceitedly asserting itself.
Historical materialism is the most consummate and dramatic expression of the latter. There is far from an accidental link between the philosophy of subordinated economics on the one hand and militant economism on the other, as we observe in empirical reality, with a certain attitude to questions of religion. If the philosophy of subordinated economics always serves as an appendage to one or another theistic worldview, then historical materialism is ideologically bound to atheism.
Like a wolf in fairy tales, the atheistic essence once hiding in historical materialism has now cast off the diversionary sheepskin of empirical science that had covered it: the atheist worldview is perpetrating its historical triumph in Russia, and state power in the hands of atheists has become an instrument for atheist propaganda. Not examining the question of historical responsibility for what has happened in Russia and not wishing to relieve anyone of this responsibility, the Eurasianists at the same time understand that the essence Russia assimilated and implemented, due to the susceptibility and excitability of her spiritual being, is not a Russian essence at its source and spiritual origin. The Communist witches’ Sabbath ensued in Russia as the completion of a more than two-hundred year period of europeanization.
To admit that the spiritual essence of Communist rule in Russia is, in a special manner, the reflected ideological essence of Europe’s new era is to make an assertion that is empirically founded to a high degree. (Here we must consider the following: the origin of Russian atheism in the ideas of the European Enlightenment; the importation of socialist ideas into Russia from the West; the connection of Russian Communist “methodology” with the ideas of French Syndicalists; and the significance and “cult” of Marx in Russia.) But having seen the ideological essence of European modernity in the form that was brought to its logical conclusion, Russians, not accepting Communism and at the same time not having lost the ability to think logically, cannot return to the basis of Europe’s latest ideology.
In the consciousness of the Eurasianists, there flows from the experience of the Communist Revolution a certain truth, simultaneously old and new – a healthy social community can be based only upon the indissoluble tie of man with God. An irreligious community and an irreligious sovereignty must be rejected; this rejection predetermines nothing in relation to concrete legal-constitutional forms, and there may exist as such a form, in the conception of the Eurasianists, of “separation of Church and state,” for example. Yet essentially, it is nevertheless highly significant that perhaps the first government by a consistently atheistic Communist power that had turned atheism into the official faith proved to be an “organized torment,” in the prophetic words of the profound nineteenth-century philosopher Konstantin Leontiev, a system of shock and destruction of “the common good” (in the name of which Communist power was established) and such an outrage upon the human person that all images pale and all words are powerless in the portrayal of a terrible, unprecedented and blasphemously bestial reality.
And we reiterate: the circumstance that the first consistently atheist power proved itself the dominion of the bestial is hardly an accident. Historical materialism, and the atheism that supplements it, deprives man’s primarily animal instincts of their restraint (including the primarily economic instincts, which amount to robbery). The basic defining force of social existence in the conditions of materialism and atheism’s ideological dominance turns out to be hate and delivers its deserved fruits: torment for everyone. And sooner or later it cannot but bring the final fruit – torment to the tormenters.
Russia enacted the triumph of historical materialism and atheism, but those laws that manifested in the course of her Revolution concern far from her alone. The cult of primarily economic interest and every sort of animal primacy has also germinated abundantly in the consciousness of peoples outside of Russia, and neither can it be the basis for a long-lived and successful society beyond her borders. The destructive forces gathering in these conditions will sooner or later overcome the power of social creation here, as well. One has to approach the problem in all its depth and breadth. The pressure of the materialist and atheist outlook must be opposed with an ideological essence overflowing with valuable and weighty content. There can be no hesitation. With still unheard-of directness and unbending resolve, on the broadest front and everywhere, it is necessary initiate and lead the struggle with everything associated even in the slightest degree with materialism and atheism. The evil must be traced back to its roots; we need to literally uproot it. It would be a superficial and powerless attempt to fight only with the most pronounced manifestations of historical materialism and atheism, or Communism alone. The problem is set deeper and at a more essential level. War must be declared upon militant economism wherever it might reveal itself. In the name of our religious worldview we must gather our forces, and with ardent feeling, clear thought and the fullness of understanding, combat the specific spirit of the new Europe.
Since the Continent has arrived at that historical and ideological frontier where it is at present, we can assert with great probability that in some period of the future, one of two outcomes will occur. Either the cultural medium of the new Europe will perish and scatter as smoke in tortuously tragic upheaval, or that “critical,” in the terminology of the Saint-Simonians, epoch that began in Europe with the close of the Middle Ages should come to an end and be replaced by an “organic” age, an “age of faith.” Past a certain measure, one cannot trample with impunity ancient wisdom, for in it is truth – not on the basis of elevating primarily selfish human instincts into the higher principle upheld in the philosophy of militant economism, but on the basis of an enlightened religious feeling of restraint and control of these instincts, thereby achieving a practicable higher measure of the “common good” on earth. A society given over to exclusive concern for worldly goods will sooner or later be deprived of them; such is the terrible lesson that shows through from the experience of the Russian Revolution.
The Eurasianists attempt to conclusively and thoroughly clarify and comprehend this experience, extract all the lessons streaming out of it, and be fearless in the matter. This is in contradistinction to those who have in confusion and timidity reeled from Communism’s beastly image, yet have not refused that which composes the basis or root of Communism; those who seizing the plough, look back; who try and pour new wine into old skins; who, having seen the new truth of Communism’s repulsiveness, are not strong enough to denounce the old abomination of militant economism, whatever forms the latter might assume.
Private faith is insufficient – the believing person should be conciliar. The Eurasianists are men of Orthodoxy. And the Orthodox Church is the lamp that illuminates them; they call their compatriots to Her, to Her Sacraments and Her Grace. And they are not troubled by the terrible sedition that has arisen in the heart of the Russian Church through the incitement of the atheists and theomachists. Spiritual strength will be sufficient, the Eurasianists believe; the struggle leads to enlightenment.
The Orthodox Church is the realization of higher freedom; its principle is concord, as opposed to the principle of authority that dominates in the Roman Church that separated from her. And it seems to the Eurasianists that in the stern matters of the world, one cannot make do without stern authority, but in matters of spirit and the Church, only grace-filled freedom and concord are good instructors. In some spheres of its worldly affairs, Europe demolishes the efficacy of authority and introduces a tyrannical power. The Orthodox Church has for long centuries been a light only to those nations who stayed faithful to her; she shined with the truths of her dogma and with the exploits of her ascetics.
At present, perhaps, a different period approaches: the contemporary Orthodox Church, continuing the succession of the ancient Eastern Church, received from her a whole unprejudiced approach to forms of economic life (so contradictory to the techniques of the Western Church, for example, which for long centuries fought against the collection of interest) and to the achievements of human thought. And therefore, it may be that within the framework of the new religious epoch, namely the Orthodox Church in the greatest measure is called to consecrate the achievements of the latest economic technology and science, having purified them from the ideological “superstructure” of militant economism, materialism and atheism, just as in her time, in the age of Constantine, Theodosius and Justinian, within the framework of a genuine and inspired “age of faith,” the ancient Church was able to consecrate a quite complex and developed economic way of life and considerable freedom in theological and philosophical thought. In contemporary economic life and empirical science, whatever its development, there is nothing that would exclude the possibility of their existence and prosperity in the depths of the new epoch of faith. The combination of modern technology with the ideology of militant economism and atheism is in no way either obligatory or unavoidable.
From the religious outlook, economic technology, whatever the limit of its possibilities might be, is a means of realizing the Testament laid by the Creator into the foundation of the human race: “and have dominion over the fish of the sea, and over the fowl of the air, and over every living thing that moveth upon the earth.” Empirical science, from the religious point of view, is the uncovering of a picture of God’s world – whereby through the advance of knowledge, the wisdom of the Creator is ever more fully and completely revealed…

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vendredi, 21 février 2014

Soviet-Afghan War Lesson


Soviet-Afghan War Lesson: Political Problems Never Settled by Force

By Sergey Duz
The Voice of Russia

Ex: http://www.lewrockwell.com

25 years ago, the almost 10-year long deployment of the limited contingent of Soviet forces in Afghanistan drew to a close. Experts have since been at variance about the assessment of the Afghan campaign, but they invariably agree that it was the biggest-scale (and actually quite ambiguous, obviously for that reason) foreign policy action throughout the post-war history of the Soviet Union.

The last Soviet soldier left Afghanistan on February 15th 1989 as part of the Soviet 40th Army, which was the backbone of the limited contingent. The Soviet troops withdrew under the command of the 40th Army legendary commander, Lieutenant-General Boris Gromov. He managed to brilliantly carry out the withdrawal, with the US now trying to use his experience to more or less decently pull out of Afghanistan following the more than 20 years of actually useless occupation of that country. This is what an expert with the Centre for Modern Afghan Studies, Nikita Mendkovich, says about it in a comment.

“The Americans will have to rely heavily on intercontinental delivery means, because the troops are being evacuated to another region, to another continent. Back in 1989, it was largely a ground-force operation. The Soviet troops pulled out by land via Central Asia. The basic problem of any operation of this kind is security. Huge masses of troops and a great number of military vehicles are moving along the roads, so they should be guaranteed against likely attacks. To attain the objective, one can either reinforce local garrisons that will remain deployed in Afghanistan after the pull-out of the bulk of the troops and will cover the withdrawal, or reach agreement with the enemy not to attack the leaving troops, because this is not in the enemy’s interests”.

There are both similarities and numerous differences between the Soviet and American campaigns in Afghanistan. The main difference is that the Soviet Union did manage to achieve its goal, whereas with the United States it is no go. The Soviet troops were to render assistance to the Afghan government in settling the home policy situation. Secondly, the Soviet troops were to prevent external aggression. Both objectives were fully attained.

The Soviet political leadership felt that the revolution of April 1978 had no right to lose. Ideological reasoning was reinforced by geopolitical considerations. This predetermined Moscow’s decision to send troops, says editor-in-chief of the National Defence magazine, Igor Korotchenko, and elaborates.

“The Afghan campaign was inevitable if seen from the perspective of defending the Soviet Union’s national interests. It may seem odd, but Afghans are still nostalgic about the times when Soviet troops were deployed in their country. Even former field commanders can’t help but show some sort of liking for the Soviet Union, for the Soviet Army. We were no invaders; we helped build a new Afghanistan. The Soviet troops built tunnels, ensured the operation of water-supply systems, planted trees, built schools and hospitals, and also production facilities. The Soviet troops were indeed performing their international duty, they accomplished quite a feat. When the Soviet troops pulled out, Najibullah had a strong Afghan Army under his command. He remained in control of the situation in Afghanistan for 12 or 18 months. His regime fell when the Soviet Union cut short its material supply for Kabul. The current Afghan regime of Karzai will certainly prove short-lived; it’s no more than a phantom. The US troops will hardly pull out with their heads held high, the way the Soviet soldiers did”.

But then, some people disagree that all Afghans were happy about the Soviet military presence. The Soviet Prime Minister Alexei Kosygin pointed out the danger of the Soviet troops getting drawn into guerrilla warfare. He said in late 1979 that the invasion of Afghanistan “would trigger drastically negative many-sided consequences”. “This would essentially become a conflict not only with imperialist countries, but a conflict with the proper Afghan people. Now, people never forgive things like that”, Kosygin warned, and proved correct. This is what the chairman of the Common Afghan Centre in St. Petersburg, Naim Gol Mohammed, says about it in a comment.

“The people of Afghanistan have their own traditions, mentality and culture. The belligerent Pashtun tribes have never taken orders from anyone. These tribes never take to foreign troops. The locals revolted against the Soviet troops. The Soviet troop withdrawal in 1989 was followed by a period of anarchy. Government agencies were non-operational. The Soviet Union supplied Afghanistan with whatever was required quite well. But once the Soviet troops were out, the supplies were brought to a halt. That was bad. But the Soviet Union made the right decision, for it is impossible to defeat Afghans on their own soil”.

Quite a few experts insist that however tragic or pointless the Soviet military campaign in Afghanistan may seem, it had largely influenced the shaping of the new Russia’s optimal foreign policy. Moscow is perfectly aware today that no use of force can help resolve political problems, that these can only have a negotiated settlement. Moscow is trying to put the idea across to the main geopolitical players today. This is the most important lesson that should be learned from what experience the Soviet Union gained in Afghanistan.

Reprinted from The voice of Russia.

lundi, 03 février 2014

A. Chauprade: sur l'Ukraine

Ayméric Chauprade:

L'Ukraine, nouvelle étape dans la stratégie de domination américaine

par realpolitiktv

lundi, 13 janvier 2014




Ex: http://www.eurasi-rivista.org

È uscito il numero XXXII (4-2013) della rivista di studi geopolitici “Eurasia” intitolato:



Ecco di seguito l’elenco degli articoli presenti in questo numero, con un breve riassunto di ciascuno di essi.



IL SECOLO CINESE? di Claudio Mutti




All’interno delle «Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Weltgeschichte» del grande filosofo tedesco la riflessione sulla base geografica della storia mondiale trova una significativa collocazione propedeutica alla stessa storia filosofica del mondo, la cui importanza non è stata ancora sufficientemente colta. Hegel poneva a fondamento dello svolgimento storico mondiale il rapporto tra i popoli e la condizione naturale nella quale questi hanno localizzazione. Secondo l’impostazione storico-idealistica di Hegel, tempo e spazio hanno nella storia e geografia universale il loro correlato fenomenico dal quale i popoli avviano la propria esistenza. Da un punto di vista filosofico il rapporto tra spirito e natura costituisce la struttura teoretica portante su cui Hegel basa l’emancipazione di un popolo dalla condizione di mero «ente naturale» a soggetto storico all’interno della storia mondiale. Dal geografo e collega Carl Ritter,il filosofo tedesco ha tratto i princìpi interpretativi per la comprensione delle possibilità di sviluppo che le differenze geografiche offrono ai popoli, la rappresentazione geologica della superficie terrestre, la sua divisione in continente euroafrasiatico ed aree insulari, e infine la contrapposizione tra terra e mare. Questi rappresentano solo alcuni dei molti aspetti della geografia hegeliana, forieri di sviluppi successivi per la teoria geopolitica. 




La Cina oggi: una panoramica dei dati essenziali e delle dinamiche in atto contribuisce alla comprensione della più grande realtà asiatica.



La signora Qi Han è incaricata d’Affari dell’Ambasciata della Repubblica Popolare Cinese in Italia. “Eurasia” la ringrazia per aver gentilmente concesso di pubblicare il testo del discorso da lei pronunciato in occasione del Forum Eurasiatico di Verona (17-18 ottobre 2013). 

RITORNO ALLA VIA DELLA SETA di Giuseppe Cappelluti

 Dal mito alla realtà. Dopo secoli di oblio la Via della Seta, storico ponte tra l’Occidente e la Cina, sta tornando ad essere una direttrice primaria del commercio internazionale. Lungo i suoi itinerari si è tuttavia prefigurata l’ennesima disputa tra eurasiatismo ed euro-atlantismo: da un lato il percorso attraverso Russia e Kazakistan, più rapido e stimolato dal rafforzamento dell’integrazione eurasiatica, dall’altro quello attraverso il Caucaso e il Mar Caspio voluto dall’Unione Europea.


 L’ascesa della Cina si è imposta come una realtà della quale tener conto, in tutte le dimensioni proprie della geopolitica. Ma per coglierne la portata e le conseguenze per la vita internazionale occorre collocarla in un contesto preciso: quello attualmente attraversato dalle relazioni internazionali e caratterizzato dal braccio di ferro in corso tra il tentativo statunitense di imporre al mondo il proprio “dominio a pieno spettro” e l’emergere di un equilibrio di potenza multipolare. Nelle righe che seguono cercheremo di dare sommariamente conto dell’azione politica della Cina popolare su diverse scacchiere (dall’America Latina all’Africa) evidenziandone finalità ed effetti. Di particolare rilievo risulta l’impulso dato allo sviluppo dei rapporti economici Sud-Sud con mutuo beneficio, che promettono di erodere il potere ricattatorio esercitato dalle centrali finanziarie legate all’Angloamerica nei confronti dei paesi in via di sviluppo. Si accennerà al complesso rapporto che viene a stabilirsi concretamente tra l’aspirazione cinese ad una crescita armonica e pacifica e il vincolo sistemico indotto dagli Stati Uniti con la corsa agli armamenti e con il susseguirsi di gravissimi crisi regionali che contribuiscono ad attizzare le tensioni tra le Potenze.                         



La crescita della potenza economica cinese ha avuto principalmente due ripercussioni internazionali. L’una, di carattere commerciale, sta già modificando le dinamiche dei flussi di capitale nel pianeta ed è quella più dibattuta dalla stampa europea ma troppo spesso accentuata, se non deformata da giudizi raramente in sintonia con la realtà dei fatti. L’altra, di carattere strategico, mantiene ritmi di trasformazione più lenti, non tanto per il ritardo con cui la Repubblica Popolare Cinese è giunta ad affrontare nel concreto i temi salienti della guerra informatica e della modernizzazione militare quanto piuttosto per l’enorme potenziale accumulato dal Pentagono nel decennio compreso tra il 1998 e il 2007. Eppure dal momento che le dimensioni commerciale e militare sono interdipendenti, all’inversione di tendenza nella prima potrebbe presto seguirne un’altra nella seconda. Il debutto della prima portaerei cinese, la Liaoning, nel settembre 2012 aveva lanciato un dado sul tavolo: la sfida a quello strapotere aeronavale statunitense che, assieme al primato internazionale del dollaro, costituisce l’architrave dell’egemonia nordamericana sul resto del mondo.



L’arsenale strategico cinese è oggetto di varie congetture. Qui viene presentato un quadro sintetico delle varie stime relative all’arsenale nucleare, dovute ai più importanti enti occidentali di analisi strategica.



 Le origini, la storia e l’organizzazione dei partiti democratici. Le lotte comuni assieme ai comunisti nell’epopea della liberazione contro i giapponesi, e nella guerra civile nel periodo della dittatura del Guomindang. La collaborazione di essi col Partito Comunista Cinese nell’amministrazione del Paese e le rappresentanze dei partiti indipendenti nelle alte istituzioni statali. Paralleli col sistema partitico della nostra Italia 1945-1994. Nell’articolo è adottato il sistema di traslitterazione Pinyin di nomi e toponimi.



Negli ultimi anni il problema dell’informazione e dei mezzi di comunicazione di massa si è fatto stringente anche in Cina. Come seconda potenza mondiale e come nazione pienamente inserita nel processo di globalizzazione economica e digitale, il colosso asiatico è ormai entrato sotto la lente d’ingrandimento della famigerata osservazione internazionale. Si tratta di una realtà complessa, che spesso risente delle contraddizioni o delle forzature che il punto di vista politico e geografico dell’osservatore reca necessariamente con sé. Tuttavia, è stato lo stesso Xi Jinping ad annunciare un piano di riforme che risolvano in modo più efficace le complicate questioni legate alla corruzione, agli intrecci impropri tra politica e stampa e alla regolamentazione della rete multimediale. Una sfida da cui dipende l’immagine della Cina nel mondo e, dunque, la sua capacità di guadagnare legittimazione e consenso internazionali.


HUKOU. LA RESIDENZA IN CINA di Maria Francesca Staiano

La RPC è caratterizzata da un sistema di registrazione permanente della residenza (Hukou) che esclude i residenti non regolari, soprattutto i lavoratori migranti, dal godimento delle prestazioni sociali, come l’accesso ai servizi di istruzione, di sanità, di previdenza sociale e di sicurezza sul lavoro. Ciò ha generato una divaricazione netta tra la popolazione urbana e i migranti che provengono dalle zone rurali. Il sistema dello Hukou deriva da una tradizione storica-culturale antica ed è stato modificato varie volte dal Governo cinese. Oggi, la questione dello Hukou è nell’agenda del terzo plenum del Partito Comunista della RPC e quanto mai attuale. La Cina si trova ad affrontare la sfida di un esercito di lavoratori migranti che, sostenendo l’economia cinese, pretendono gli stessi diritti dei cittadini urbani.



Lo “sdoganamento” del Myanmar apparentemente favorisce l’intrusione occidentale nell’area del Sud-Est asiatico, ma la stabilizzazione dell’ex Birmania è funzionale agli interessi di sicurezza della Cina. La strategia geoeconomica del PCC appare ancora una volta vincente. Il secolo asiatico vedrà Pechino protagonista?

LA CINA IN ROMANIA di Luca Bistolfi

La Cina è vicina, e molto, anche in Romania. Da anni ormai, semplici cittadini, operai, imprenditori e multinazionali di servizi e infrastrutture provenienti dalla Città Proibita hanno adottato il Paese carpatico quale meta di investimenti a lunga durata. Nel bellum omnium contra omnes i romeni se ne vanno dal loro Paese e ad esser assunti sono i cinesi, sempre più a basso costo e non meno sfruttati. Un risultato, fra i tanti, è che anche le aziende italiane, andate per suonare, sono state suonate. Sempre dai cinesi. E la Romania, ancora una volta, piange.



Negli ultimi tre decenni, la Repubblica Popolare Cinese ha adottato politiche e misure che, modificando fortemente la struttura socioeconomica del paese, hanno inaugurato una fase di costante crescita economica. La Cina rappresenta oggi un interessante mercato in  crescente espansione in cui il turismo costituisce uno dei fulcri centrali dell’industria nazionale. Il mercato turistico cinese rappresenta una grande opportunità per l’Europa e per il sistema di offerta italiano in particolare. L’articolo analizza i dati, i ritmi di sviluppo, le tendenze, i profili dei turisti cinesi, individuando criticità e opportunità.



Affari, ma non solo: anche più tempo libero, voglia di esplorare il mondo, curiosità sempre crescente, desiderio di evasione, necessità di staccarsi dalla frenetica vita delle grandi megalopoli asiatiche. E, soprattutto, maggiore disponibilità economica. Sono questi alcuni fattori che stanno alla base di un fenomeno  sempre in crescita e che sta raggiungendo cifre davvero importanti. Si tratta del turismo cinese, dei viaggi interni alla Cina o all’estero che sempre più abitanti della Terra di Mezzo decidono di compiere per piacere.  Dove si posiziona il nostro Paese all’interno di questa filiera? Quali passi sono stati già compiuti, da quali sbagli è bene trarre insegnamento e quali piccole accortezze sono richieste agli operatori del settore per accogliere al meglio gli ospiti in arrivo dalla Repubblica Popolare? L’articolo offre un breve excursus sull’evoluzione del fenomeno turistico, andando alle radici della pratica del viaggiare per poi arrivare velocemente ai giorni nostri. Espone alcune cifre che definiscono un’idea generale del fenomeno e si chiude con uno sguardo particolare su quanto è possibile fare per trarre maggiori guadagni da tale tendenza, impossibile da trascurare.


La recente traduzione in cinese delle opere del giurista tedesco e la crescita delle pubblicazioni dedicategli in Cina rappresentano un elemento di novità sotto un duplice punto di vista. Da un lato contribuiscono sul piano ermeneutico ad arricchire la storia della ricezione della filosofia schmittiana del diritto sotto un più generale aspetto teoretico-dottrinale nel dibattito scientifico mondiale; dall’altro, queste pubblicazioni sono rilevanti come inedita introduzione di un autore europeo ormai classico all’interno della specificità politico-culturale della più grande nazione asiatica. Un recente saggio di Qi Zheng fornisce una panoramica su questo dibattito scientifico in Cina e al contempo ci dà la possibilità di intravedere i limiti attuali della ricezione cinese di un pensatore che, come spiega la stessa Qi Zheng, come nessun altro ha causato tante controversie in Cina.



La globalizzazione costituisce il fenomeno più rilevante degli ultimi decenni: ingrediente ormai irrinunciabile di ogni riflessione, rimane, ciononostante, un concetto ancora generico e impreciso. Tuttavia, dopo le apologetiche profezie dei sostenitori della globalizzazione, il risultato degli ultimi anni è  stato un modello di sviluppo che ha come componente intrinseca l’accentuazione delle diseguaglianze, la precarizzazione del lavoro ed il senso d’insicurezza dei cittadini. La crescita incontrollata della speculazione finanziaria, la delocalizzazione delle imprese, che diventano multinazionali o transnazionali, e l’impotenza dei governi nazionali nel gestire un fenomeno così complesso, sono le priorità cui la politica, riappropriandosi delle proprie prerogative, dovrebbe cercare di dare una risposta.

LA LETTONIA VERSO L’EURO di Giuseppe Cappelluti

Il 1 gennaio 2014 sarà una data storica per la Lettonia: il Paese baltico, infatti, diventerà il diciottesimo membro di Eurolandia. Per ragioni sia economiche sia geopolitiche (la volontà di sancire l’appartenenza all’Occidente in funzione antirussa) l’adozione dell’euro è stata uno dei principali obiettivi del governo di centrodestra, ma il Paese è tutt’altro che entusiasta. L’accettazione della Lettonia nell’Eurozona, dopo tutto, è stata vincolata all’adozione di rigide misure di austerità, e non manca chi, memori dei cinquant’anni di occupazione sovietica, teme per la propria sovranità nazionale. Alcuni economisti, d’altro canto, non vedono di buon occhio alcuni provvedimenti recentemente approvati in materia fiscale e temono che il Paese si trasformi in un ponte verso i paradisi fiscali, o peggio che diventi esso stesso un paradiso fiscale.

LE MANI SULL’ASIA CENTRALE di Giuseppe Cappelluti

La Cina è oggi uno dei maggiori interlocutori commerciali degli “stan” dell’Asia Centrale, e i suoi interessi nell’area sono in forte crescita. Emblematici delle strategie geopolitiche di Pechino verso il Centrasia sono i rapporti con Kazakhstan e Kirghizistan. Se fino a poco più di vent’anni fa la Cina era totalmente assente dagli orizzonti kazachi, la sempre più massiccia presenza cinese nell’economia dell’Aquila della Steppa, non più limitata al tradizionale settore degli idrocarburi, ne ha fatto uno dei più importanti partner commerciali e strategici. Inoltre, pur non mancando timori per un possibile boom dell’immigrazione cinese, gli interessi tra i due Paesi sono reciproci, a partire dalle questioni legate alla sicurezza e dalle nuove infrastrutture che collegheranno Cina e Russia attraverso il Kazakhstan. Il Kirghizistan, al contrario, interessa essenzialmente per la sua posizione geografica, mentre la sua futura adesione all’Unione Doganale non è propriamente una buona notizia per quello che un tempo fu il Celeste Impero. Ma nei due Paesi le mosse cinesi suscitano non pochi sospetti: legittimi interessi o espansionismo geoeconomico?

LA GUERRA CIVILE DEL TAGIKISTAN (1992-1997) di Andrea Forti

Nonostante la durata, cinque anni, e l’elevato numero di vittime (dai cinquanta ai centomila morti) la guerra civile del Tagikistan rimane, agli occhi del grande pubblico occidentale (e non solo), uno dei conflitti meno conosciuti del convulso periodo immediatamente successivo alla fine della Guerra Fredda, oscurato dai contemporanei ma ben più mediatici conflitti nella ex-Jugoslavia, in Algeria o in Somalia. La guerra civile tagica, nonostante l’oblio che ormai circonda questa drammatica pagina di storia, è di grande interesse sia per lo studio dei conflitti nati dal dissolvimento dell’Unione Sovietica che per eventuali comparazioni con conflitti attualmente in corso, come quello in Siria che oppone le forze governative alla ribellione islamista.

COMUNITÀ RELIGIOSE IN SIRIA di Vittoria Squillacioti

La Siria odierna è un paese complesso dal punto di vista etnico e religioso. Per comprendere quali siano effettivamente le differenze che caratterizzano la sua popolazione è necessario tenere presente le variabili della lingua, della confessione religiosa e dell’eventuale collocazione geografica delle diverse comunità, tre variabili che agiscono profondamente nella definizione delle diverse identità e appartenenze. Nel variegato mosaico siriano riscontriamo così la presenza dominante dei musulmani, ancorché suddivisi tra sunniti, sciiti, ismailiti, alawiti, drusi e yazidi, ma anche diverse varietà del cristianesimo ed una comunità ebraica.


In seguito al deciso rifiuto da parte dell’Arabia Saudita del seggio nel Consiglio di Sicurezza delle Nazioni Unite, per il quale era stata eletta come membro non permanente, ci si interroga sugli attuali rapporti del Regno dei Saud con storici alleati, rivali di sempre e timido dissenso interno, per scoprire che, nonostante a prima vista possa sembrare il contrario, il vento del cambiamento è ancora lontano dalla Culla dell’Islam.


Nel novembre del 1869 venne inaugurato il Canale di Suez. Ci era voluto quasi un decennio di massacranti lavori per portare a compimento quest’opera ciclopica, dopo che già in fase di progettazione non erano mancate le polemiche. La necessità di mettere in collegamento il Mar Mediterraneo ed il Mar Rosso era chiara a tutti, ma la modalità con cui conseguire tale obiettivo era oggetto di discussione. Vi fu chi propose di aprire un canale fra il Mar Rosso ed il delta del Nilo (come era già stato fatto all’epoca dei Faraoni e della dominazione araba dell’Egitto), chi insistette per un collegamento ferroviario Alessandria-Il Cairo-Mar Rosso e chi spinse per tagliare l’istmo di Suez, anche se si riteneva che fra i due mari vi fosse un dislivello di alcuni metri che avrebbe richiesto la costruzione di complesse chiuse. La Compagnia Universale del Canale di Suez presieduta dallo spregiudicato Ferdinand de Lesseps, il genio ingegneristico di Luigi Negrelli e l’iniziale opposizione britannica furono i soggetti più importanti nella fase iniziale dell’ambiziosa opera di scavo.



Enrica Garzilli è, dal 1995, direttrice delle riviste accademiche “International Journal of Sanskrit Studies” e “Journal of South Asia Women Studies”. È stata quindi Research Affiliate al P.G.D.A.V. College, una delle più antiche istituzioni dell’Università di Delhi. Dal 1991 al 2011 ha vinto la Senior Fellowship presso il Center for the Study of World Religions dell’Università di Harvard (1992–94), ha compiuto quattro anni di studi post-laurea in storia, informatica e giurisprudenza, ha insegnato come Lecturer di sanscrito all’università di Harvard e servito come direttore editoriale della Harvard Oriental Series-Opera Minora, è stata Visiting Researcher alla Harvard Law School (1994–96) e docente presso le università di Macerata, Perugia e Torino. Collabora in qualità di esperta alla RSI – Radiotelevisione Svizzera e a riviste e giornali italiani.


Li Hongwei è caporedattore dell’edizione in lingua inglese del quotidiano di approfondimento cinese “Global Times”. Fondato nel 1993 dall’editore del “Quotidiano del Popolo”, il “Global Times” ha raggiunto una popolarità internazionale a partire dal 2009, quando fu lanciata l’edizione in lingua inglese che ha raggiunto i lettori di tutto il mondo, accreditandosi come riferimento imprescindibile per conoscere analisi e opinioni della società cinese. La presente intervista è stata rilasciata ad Andrea Fais, collaboratore di “Eurasia” e di “Global Times”.


Luciano Pignataro, La Cina contemporanea da Mao Zedong a Deng Xiaoping (1949-1980) (Andrea Fais)

Tiziano Terzani, Tutte le opere (Stefano Vernole)

Carlo Terracciano, L’Impero del Cuore del Mondo (Andrea Fais)

Massimo Cacciari, Il potere che freno (Claudio Mutti)

mercredi, 18 décembre 2013

Milestones of Eurasism


Milestones of Eurasism

By Alexander Dugin 

Ex: http://www.counter-currents.com

Eurasism is an ideological and social-political current born within the environment of the first wave of Russian emigration, united by the concept of Russian culture as a non-European phenomenon, presenting–among the varied world cultures–an original combination of western and eastern features; as a consequence, the Russian culture belongs to both East and West, and at the same time cannot be reduced either to the former or to the latter.

The founders of eurasism:

  • N. S. Trubetskoy (1890–1938)–philologist and linguist.
  • P. N. Savitsky (1895–1965)–geographer, economist.
  • G. V. Florovsky (1893–1979)–historian of culture, theologian and patriot.
  • G. V. Vernadsky (1877–1973)–historian and geopolitician.
  • N. N. Alekseev – jurist and politologist.
  • V. N. Ilin – historian of culture, literary scholar and theologian.

Eurasism’s main value consisted in ideas born out of the depth of the tradition of Russian history and statehood. Eurasism looked at the Russian culture not as to a simple component of the European civilization, as to an original civilization, summarizing the experience not only of the West as also–to the same extent–of the East. The Russian people, in this perspective, must not be placed neither among the European nor among the Asian peoples; it belongs to a fully original Eurasian ethnic community. Such originality of the Russian culture and statehood (showing at the same time European and Asian features) also defines the peculiar historical path of Russia, her national-state program, not coinciding with the Western-European tradition. 


Civilization concept

The Roman-German civilization has worked out its own system of principles and values, and promoted it to the rank of universal system. This Roman-German system has been imposed on the other peoples and cultures by force and ruse. The Western spiritual and material colonization of the rest of mankind is a negative phenomenon. Each people and culture has its own intrinsic right to evolve according to its own logic. Russia is an original civilization. She is called not only to counter the West, fully safeguarding its own road, but also to stand at the vanguard of the other peoples and countries on Earth defending their own freedom as civilizations. 

Criticism of the Roman-German civilization

The Western civilization built its own system on the basis of the secularisation of Western Christianity (Catholicism and Protestantism), bringing to the fore such values like individualism, egoism, competition, technical progress, consumption, economic exploitation. The Roman-German civilization founds its right to globality not upon spiritual greatness, as upon rough material force. Even the spirituality and strength of the other peoples are evaluated only on the basis of its own image of the supremacy of rationalism and technical progress.

The space factor

There are no universal patterns of development. The plurality of landscapes on Earth produces a plurality of cultures, each one having its own cycles, internal criteria and logics. Geographical space has a huge (sometimes decisive) influence on peoples’ culture and national history. Every people, as long as it develops within some given geographical environment, elaborates its own national, ethical, juridical, linguistic, ritual, economic and political forms. The “place” where any people or state “development” happens predetermines to a great extent the path and sense of this “development”–up to the point when the two elements became one. It is impossible to separate history from spatial conditions, and the analysis of civilizations must proceed not only along the temporal axis (“before,” “after,” “development” or “non-development,” and so on) as also along the spatial axis (“east,” “west,” “steppe,” “mountains,” and so on). No single state or region has the right to pretend to be the standard for all the rest. Every people has its own pattern of development, its own “times,” its own “rationality,” and deserves to be understood and evaluated according to its own internal criteria.

The climate of Europe, the small extension of its spaces, the influence of its landscapes generated the peculiarity of the European civilization, where the influences of the wood (northern Europe) and of the coast (Mediterraneum) prevail. Different landscapes generated different kinds of civilizations: the boundless steppes generated the nomad empires (from the Scythians to the Turks), the loess lands the Chinese one, the mountain islands the Japanese one, the union of steppe and woods the Russian-Eurasian one. The mark of landscape lives in the whole history of each one of these civilizations, and cannot be either separated form them or suppressed.

State and nation

The first Russian slavophiles in the 19th century (Khomyakov, Aksakov, Kirevsky) insisted upon the uniqueness and originality of the Russian (Slav, Orthodox) civilization. This must be defended, preserved and strengthened against the West, on the one hand, and against liberal modernism (which also proceeds from the West), on the other. The slavophiles proclaimed the value of tradition, the greatness of the ancient times, the love for the Russian past, and warned against the inevitable dangers of progress and about the extraneousness of Russia to many aspects of the Western pattern.

From this school the eurasists inherited the positions of the latest slavophiles and further developed their theses in the sense of a positive evaluation of the Eastern influences.

The Muscovite Empire represents the highest development of the Russian statehood. The national idea achieves a new status; after Moscow’s refusal to recognize the Florentine Unia (arrest and proscription of the metropolitan Isidore) and the rapid decay, the Tsargrad Rus’ inherits the flag of the Orthodox empire. 

Political platform

Wealth and prosperity, a strong state and an efficient economy, a powerful army and the development of production must be the instruments for the achievement of high ideals. The sense of the state and of the nation can be conferred only through the existence of a “leading idea.” That political regime, which supposes the establishment of a “leading idea” as a supreme value, was called by the eurasists as “ideocracy”–from the Greek “idea” and “kratos,” power. Russia is always thought of as the Sacred Rus’, as a power [derzhava] fulfilling its own peculiar historical mission. The eurasist world-view must also be the national idea of the forthcoming Russia, its “leading idea.”

The eurasist choice

Russia-Eurasia, being the expression of a steppe and woods empire of continental dimensions, requires her own pattern of leadership. This means, first of all, the ethics of collective responsibility, disinterest, reciprocal help, ascetism, will and tenaciousness. Only such qualities can allow keeping under control the wide and scarcely populated lands of the steppe-woodland Eurasian zone. The ruling class of Eurasia was formed on the basis of collectivism, asceticism, warlike virtue and rigid hierarchy.

Western democracy was formed in the particular conditions of ancient Athens and through the centuries-old history of insular England. Such democracy mirrors the peculiar features of the “local European development.” Such democracy does not represent a universal standard. Imitating the rules of the European “liberal-democracy” is senseless, impossible and dangerous for Russia-Eurasia. The participation of the Russian people to the political rule must be defined by a different term: “demotia,” from the Greek “demos,” people. Such participation does not reject hierarchy and must not be formalized into party-parliamentary structures. “Demotia” supposes a system of land council, district governments or national governments (in the case of peoples of small dimensions). It is developed on the basis of social self-government, of the “peasant” world. An example of “demotia” is the elective nature of church hierarchies on behalf of the parishioners in the Muscovite Rus’. 

The work of L. N. Gumilev as a development of the eurasist thinking

Lev Nikolaevic Gumilev (1912–1992), son of the Russian poet N. Gumilev and of the poetess A. Akhmatova, was an ethnographer, historian and philosopher. He was profoundly influenced by the book of the Kalmuck eurasist E. Khara-Vadan “Gengis-Khan as an army leader” and by the works of Savitsky. In its own works Gumilev developed the fundamental eurasist theses. Towards the end of his life he used to call himself “the last of the eurasists.” 

Basic elements of Gumilev’s theory

  • The theory of passionarity [passionarnost’] as a development of the eurasist idealism;
  • The essence of which, in his own view, lays in the fact that every ethnos, as a natural formation, is subject to the influence of some “energetic drives,” born out of the cosmos and causing the “passionarity effect,” that is an extreme activity and intensity of life. In such conditions the ethnos undergoes a “genetic mutation,” which leads to the birth of the “passionaries”–individuals of a special temper and talent. And those become the creators of new ethnoi, cultures, and states;
  • Drawing the scientific attention upon the proto-history of the “nomad empires” of the East and the discovery of the colossal ethnic and cultural heritage of the autochthone ancient Asian peoples, which was wholly passed to the great culture of the ancient epoch, but afterwards fell into oblivion (Huns, Turks, Mongols, and so on);
  • The development of a turkophile attitude in the theory of “ethnic complementarity.”

0_9b9e1_f9f45d79_L.jpgAn ethnos is in general any set of individuals, any “collective”: people, population, nation, tribe, family clan, based on a common historical destiny. “Our Great-Russian ancestors–wrote Gumilev–in the 15th, 16th and 17th centuries easily and rather quickly mixed with the Volga, Don and Obi Tatars and with the Buriates, who assimilated the Russian culture. The same Great-Russian easily mixed with the Yakuts, absorbing their identity and gradually coming into friendly contact with Kazakhs and Kalmucks. Through marriage links they pacifically coexisted with the Mongols in Central Asia, as the Mongols themselves and the Turks between the 14th and 16th centuries were fused with the Russians in Central Russia.” Therefore the history of the Muscovite Rus’ cannot be understood without the framework of the ethnic contacts between Russians and Tatars and the history of the Eurasian continent.

The advent of neo-eurasism: historical and social context

The crisis of the Soviet paradigm

In the mid-1980s the Soviet society began to lose its connection and ability to adequately reflect upon the external environment and itself. The Soviet models of self-understanding were showing their cracks. The society had lost its sense of orientation. Everybody felt the need for change, yet this was but a confused feeling, as no-one could tell the way the change would come from. In that time a rather unconvincing divide began to form: “forces of progress” and “forces of reaction,” “reformers” and “conservators of the past,” “partisans of reforms” and “enemies of reforms.” 

Infatuation for the western models

In that situation the term “reform” became in itself a synonym of “liberal-democracy.” A hasty conclusion was inferred, from the objective fact of the crisis of the Soviet system, about the superiority of the western model and the necessity to copy it. At the theoretical level this was all but self-evident, since the “ideological map” offers a sharply more diversified system of choices than the primitive dualism: socialism vs. capitalism, Warsaw Pact vs. NATO. Yet it was just that primitive logic that prevailed: the “partisans of reform” became the unconditional apologists of the West, whose structure and logic they were ready to assimilate, while the “enemies of reform” proved to be the inertial preservers of the late Soviet system, whose structure and logic they grasped less and less. In such condition of lack of balance, the reformers/pro-westerners had on their side a potential of energy, novelty, expectations of change, creative drive, perspectives, while the “reactionaries” had nothing left but inertness, immobilism, the appeal to the customary and already-known. In just this psychological and aesthetic garb, liberal-democratic policy prevailed in the Russia of the 1990s, although nobody had been allowed to make a clear and conscious choice.

The collapse of the state unity

The result of “reforms” was the collapse of the Soviet state unity and the beginning of the fall of Russia as the heir of the USSR. The destruction of the Soviet system and “rationality” was not accompanied by the creation of a new system and a new rationality in conformity to national and historical conditions. There gradually prevailed a peculiar attitude toward Russia and her national history: the past, present and future of Russia began to be seen from the point of view of the West, to be evaluated as something stranger, transcending, alien (“this country” was the “reformers’” typical expression). That was not the Russian view of the West, as the Western view of Russia. No wonder that in such condition the adoption of the western schemes even in the “reformers’” theory was invoked not in order to create and strengthen the structure of the national state unity, but in order to destroy its remains. The destruction of the state was not a casual outcome of the “reforms”; as a matter of fact, it was among their strategic aims.

The birth of an anti-western (anti-liberal) opposition in the post-Soviet environment

In the course of the “reforms” and their “deepening,” the inadequacy of the simple reaction began to be clear to everyone. In that period (1989–90) began the formation of a “national-patriotic opposition,” in which there was the confluence of part of the “Soviet conservatives” (ready to a minimal level of reflection), groups of “reformers” disappointed with “reforms” or “having become conscious of their anti-state direction,” and groups of representatives of the patriotic movements, which had already formed during the perestroika and tried to shape the sentiment of “state power” [derzhava] in a non-communist (orthodox-monarchic, nationalist, etc.) context. With a severe delay, and despite the complete absence of external strategic, intellectual and material support, the conceptual model of post-Soviet patriotism began to vaguely take shape.


Neo-eurasism arose in this framework as an ideological and political phenomenon, gradually turning into one of the main directions of the post-Soviet Russian patriotic self-consciousness. 

Stages of development of the neo-eurasist ideology

1st stage (1985–90)

  • Dugin’s seminars and lectures to various groups of the new-born conservative-patriotic movement. Criticism of the Soviet paradigm as lacking the spiritual and national qualitative element.
  • In 1989 first publications on the review Sovetskaya literatura [Soviet Literature]. Dugin’s books are issued in Italy (Continente Russia [Continent Russia], 1989) and in Spain (Rusia Misterio de Eurasia [Russia, Mystery of Eurasia], 1990).
  • In 1990 issue of René Guénon’s Crisis of the Modern World with comments by Dugin, and of Dugin’s Puti Absoljuta [The Paths of the Absolute], with the exposition of the foundations of the traditionalist philosophy.

In these years eurasism shows “right-wing conservative” features, close to historical traditionalism, with orthodox-monarchic, “ethnic-pochevennik” [i.e., linked to the ideas of soil and land] elements, sharply critical of “Left-wing” ideologies.

2nd stage (1991–93)

  • Begins the revision of anti-communism, typical of the first stage of neo-eurasism. Revaluation of the Soviet period in the spirit of “national-bolshevism” and “Left-wing eurasism.”
  • Journey to Moscow of the main representatives of the “New Right” (Alain de Benoist, Robert Steuckers, Carlo Terracciano, Marco Battarra, Claudio Mutti and others).
  • Eurasism becomes popular among the patriotic opposition and the intellectuals. On the basis of terminological affinity, A. Sakharov already speaks about Eurasia, though only in a strictly geographic–instead of political and geopolitical–sense (and without ever making use of eurasism in itself, like he was before a convinced atlantist); a group of “democrats” tries to start a project of “democratic eurasism” (G. Popov, S. Stankevic, L. Ponomarev).
  • O. Lobov, O. Soskovets, S. Baburin also speak about their own eurasism.
  • In 1992–93 is issued the first number of Elements: Eurasist Review. Lectures on geopolitics and the foundations of eurasism in high schools and universities. Many translations, articles, seminars.

3rd stage (1994–98): theoretical development of the neo-eurasist orthodoxy

  • Issue of Dugin’s main works Misterii Evrazii [Mysteries of Eurasia] (1996), Konspirologija [Conspirology] (1994), Osnovy Geopolitiki [Foundations of geopolitics] (1996), Konservativnaja revoljutsija [The conservative revolution] (1994), Tampliery proletariata [Knight Templars of the Proletariat] (1997). Works of Trubetskoy, Vernadsky, Alekseev and Savitsky are issued by “Agraf” editions (1995–98).
  • Creation of the “Arctogaia” web-site (1996) – www.arctogaia.com [2].
  • Direct and indirect references to eurasism appear in the programs of the KPFR (Communist Party], LDPR [Liberal-Democratic Party], NDR [New Democratic Russia] (that is left, right, and centre). Growing number of publications on eurasist themes. Issue of many eurasist digests.
  • Criticism of eurasism from Russian nationalists, religious fundamentalists and orthodox communists, and also from the liberals.
  • Manifestations of an academic “weak” version of eurasism (Prof. A. S. Panarin, V. Ya. Paschenko, F.Girenok and others) – with elements of the illuminist paradigm, denied by the eurasist orthodoxy – then evolving towards more radically anti-western, anti-liberal and anti-gobalist positions.
  • Inauguration of a university dedicated to L. Gumilev in Astan [Kazakhstan].

4th stage (1998–2001)

  • Gradual de-identification of neo-eurasism vis-à-vis the collateral political-cultural and party manifestations; turning to the autonomous direction (“Arctogaia,” “New University,” “Irruption” [Vtorzhenie]) outside the opposition and the extreme Left and Right-wing movements.
  • Apology of staroobrjadchestvo [Old Rite].
  • Shift to centrist political positions, supporting Primakov as the new premier. Dugin becomes the adviser to the Duma speaker G. N. Seleznev.
  • Issue of the eurasist booklet Nash put’ [Our Path] (1998).
  • Issue of Evraziikoe Vtorzhenie [Eurasist Irruption] as a supplement to Zavtra. Growing distance from the opposition and shift closer to the government’s positions.
  • Theoretical researches, elaborations, issue of “The Russian Thing” [Russkaja vesch’] (2001), publications in Nezavisimaja Gazeta, Moskovskij Novosti, radio broadcasts about “Finis Mundi” on Radio 101, radio broadcasts on geopolitical subjects and neo-eurasism on Radio “Svobodnaja Rossija” (1998–2000).

5th stage (2001–2002)

  • Foundation of the Pan-Russian Political Social Movement EURASIA on “radical centre” positions; declaration of full support to the President of the Russian Federation V. V. Putin (April 21, 2001).
  • The leader of the Centre of Spiritual Management of the Russian Muslims, sheik-ul-islam Talgat Tadjuddin, adheres to EURASIA.
  • Issue of the periodical Evraziizkoe obozrenie [Eurasist Review].
  • Appearance of Jewish neo-eurasism (A. Eskin, A. Shmulevic, V. Bukarsky).
  • Creation of the web-site of the Movement EURASIA: www.eurasia.com.ru [3]
  • Conference on “Islamic Threat or Threat to Islam?.” Intervention by H. A. Noukhaev, Chechen theorist of “Islamic eurasism” (“Vedeno or Washington?,” Moscow, 2001].
  • Issue of books by E. Khara-Davan and Ya. Bromberg (2002).
  • Process of transformation of the Movement EURASIA into a party (2002).

Basic philosophical positions of neo-eurasism

pour-une-theorie-du-monde-multipolaire.jpgAt the theoretical level neo-eurasism consists of the revival of the classic principles of the movement in a qualitatively new historical phase, and of the transformation of such principles into the foundations of an ideological and political program and a world-view. The heritage of the classic eurasists was accepted as the fundamental world-view for the ideal (political) struggle in the post-Soviet period, as the spiritual-political platform of “total patriotism.”

The neo-eurasists took over the basic positions of classical eurasism, chose them as a platform, as starting points, as the main theoretical bases and foundations for the future development and practical use. In the theoretical field, neo-eurasists consciously developed the main principles of classical eurasism taking into account the wide philosophical, cultural and political framework of the ideas of the 20th century.

Each one of the main positions of the classical eurasists (see the chapter on the “Foundations of classical eurasism”) revived its own conceptual development.

Civilization concept

Criticism of the western bourgeois society from “Left-wing” (social) positions was superimposed to the criticism of the same society from “Right-wing” (civilizational) positions. The eurasist idea about “rejecting the West” is reinforced by the rich weaponry of the “criticism of the West” by the same representatives of the West who disagree with the logic of its development (at least in the last centuries). The eurasist came only gradually, since the end of the 1980s to the mid-1990s, to this idea of the fusion of the most different (and often politically contradictory) concepts denying the “normative” character of the Western civilization.

The “criticism of the Roman-German civilization” was thoroughly stressed, being based on the prioritary analysis of the Anglo-Saxon world, of the US. According to the spirit of the German Conservative Revolution and of the European “New Right,” the “Western world” was differentiated into an Atlantic component (the US and England) and into a continental European component (properly speaking, a Roman-German component). Continental Europe is seen here as a neutral phenomenon, liable to be integrated–on some given conditions–in the eurasist project.

The spatial factor

Neo-eurasism is moved by the idea of the complete revision of the history of philosophy according to spatial positions. Here we find its trait-d’union in the most varied models of the cyclical vision of history, from Danilevsky to Spengler, from Toynbee to Gumilev.

Such a principle finds its most pregnant expression in traditionalist philosophy, which denies the ideas of evolution and progress and founds this denial upon detailed metaphysical calculations. Hence the traditional theory of “cosmic cycles,” of the “multiple states of Being,” of “sacred geography,” and so on. The basic principles of the theory of cycles are illustrated in detail by the works of Guénon (and his followers G. Georgel, T. Burckhardt, M. Eliade, H. Corbin). A full rehabilitation has been given to the concept of “traditional society,” either knowing no history at all, or realizing it according to the rites and myths of the “eternal return.” The history of Russia is seen not simply as one of the many local developments, but as the vanguard of the spatial system (East) opposed to the “temporal” one (West). 

State and nation

Dialectics of national history

It is led up to its final, “dogmatical” formulation, including the historiosophic paradigm of “national-bolshevism” (N. Ustryalov) and its interpretation (M. Agursky). The pattern is as follows:

  • The Kiev period as the announcement of the forthcoming national mission (IX-XIII centuries);
  • Mongolian-Tatar invasion as a scud against the levelling European trends, the geopolitical and administrative push of the Horde is handed over to the Russians, division of the Russians between western and eastern Russians, differentiation among cultural kinds, formation of the Great-Russians on the basis of the “eastern Russians” under the Horde’s control (13th–15th centuries);
  • The Muscovite Empire as the climax of the national-religious mission of Rus’ (Third Rome) (15th–end of the 17th century);
  • Roman-German yoke (Romanov), collapse of national unity, separation between a pro-western elite and the national mass (end of the 17th-beginning of the 20th century);
  • Soviet period, revenge of the national mass, period of the “Soviet messianism,” re-establishment of the basic parameters of the main muscovite line (20th century);
  • Phase of troubles, that must end with a new eurasist push (beginning of the 21st century).

Political platform

Neo-eurasism owns the methodology of Vilfrido Pareto’s school, moves within the logic of the rehabilitation of “organic hierarchy,” gathers some Nietzschean motives, develops the doctrine of the “ontology of power,” of the Christian Orthodox concept of power as “kat’echon.” The idea of “elite” completes the constructions of the European traditionalists, authors of researches about the system of castes in the ancient society and of their ontology and sociology (R. Guénon, J. Evola, G. Dumézil, L. Dumont). Gumilev’s theory of “passionarity” lies at the roots of the concept of “new eurasist elite.”

The thesis of “demotia” is the continuation of the political theories of the “organic democracy” from J.-J. Rousseau to C. Schmitt, J. Freund, A. de Benoist and A. Mueller van der Bruck. Definition of the eurasist concept of “democracy” (“demotia”) as the “participation of the people to its own destiny.”

The thesis of “ideocracy” gives a foundation to the call to the ideas of “conservative revolution” and “third way,” in the light of the experience of Soviet, Israeli and Islamic ideocracies, analyses the reason of their historical failure. The critical reflection upon the qualitative content of the 20th century ideocracy brings to the consequent criticism of the Soviet period (supremacy of quantitative concepts and secular theories, disproportionate weight of the classist conception).

The following elements contribute to the development of the ideas of the classical eurasists:

The philosophy of traditionalism (Guénon, Evola, Burckhardt, Corbin), the idea of the radical decay of the “modern world,” profound teaching of the Tradition. The global concept of “modern world” (negative category) as the antithesis of the “world of Tradition” (positive category) gives the criticism of the Western civilization a basic metaphysic character, defining the eschatological, critical, fatal content of the fundamental (intellectual, technological, political and economic) processes having their origin in the West. The intuitions of the Russian conservatives, from the slavophiles to the classical eurasists, are completed by a fundamental theoretical base. (see A. Dugin, Absoljutnaja Rodina [The Absolute Homeland], Moscow 1999; Konets Sveta [The End of the World], Moscow 1997; Julius Evola et le conservatisme russe, Rome 1997).

The investigation on the origins of sacredness (M. Eliade, C. G. Jung, C. Levi-Strauss), the representations of the archaic consciousness as the paradigmatic complex manifestation laying at the roots of culture. The reduction of the many-sided human thinking, of culture, to ancient psychic layers, where fragments of archaic initiatic rites, myths, originary sacral complexes are concentrated. Interpretation of the content of rational culture through the system of the ancient, pre-rational beliefs (A. Dugin, “The evolution of the paradigmatic foundations of science” [Evoljutsija paradigmal’nyh osnovanij nauki], Moscow 2002).

The search for the symbolic paradigms of the space-time matrix, which lays at the roots of rites, languages and symbols (H. Wirth, paleo-epigraphic investigations). This attempt to give a foundation to the linguistic (Svityc-Illic), epigraphic (runology), mythological, folkloric, ritual and different monuments allows to rebuild an original map of the “sacred concept of the world” common to all the ancient Eurasian peoples, the existence of common roots (see A. Dugin Giperborejskaja Teorija [Hyperborean Theory], Moscow 1993.

A reassessment of the development of geopolitical ideas in the West (Mackinder, Haushofer, Lohhausen, Spykman, Brzeszinski, Thiriart and others). Since Mackinder’s epoch, geopolitical science has sharply evolved. The role of geopolitical constants in 20th century history appeared so clear as to make geopolitics an autonomous discipline. Within the geopolitical framework, the concept itself of “eurasism” and “Eurasia” acquired a new, wider meaning.

From some time onwards, eurasism, in a geopolitical sense, began to indicate the continental configuration of a strategic (existing or potential) bloc, created around Russia or its enlarged base, and as an antagonist (either actively or passively) to the strategic initiatives of the opposed geopolitical pole–“Atlantism,” at the head of which at the mid-20th century the US came to replace England.

The philosophy and the political idea of the Russian classics of eurasism in this situation have been considered as the most consequent and powerful expression (fulfilment) of eurasism in its strategic and geopolitical meaning. Thanks to the development of geopolitical investigations (A. Dugin, Osnovye geopolitiki [Foundations of geopolitics], Moscow 1997) neo-eurasism becomes a methodologically evolved phenomenon. Especially remarkable is the meaning of the Land – Sea pair (according to Carl Schmitt), the projection of this pair upon a plurality of phenomena – from the history of religions to economics.

The search for a global alternative to globalism, as an ultra-modern phenomenon, summarizing everything that is evaluated by eurasism (and neo-eurasism) as negative. Eurasism in a wider meaning becomes the conceptual platform of anti-globalism, or of the alternative globalism. “Eurasism” gathers all contemporary trends denying globalism any objective (let alone positive) content; it offers the anti-globalist intuition a new character of doctrinal generalization.

The assimilation of the social criticism of the “New Left” into a “conservative right-wing interpretation” (reflection upon the heritage of M. Foucault, G. Deleuze, A. Artaud, G. Debord). Assimilation of the critical thinking of the opponents of the bourgeois western system from the positions of anarchism, neo-marxism and so on. This conceptual pole represents a new stage of development of the “Left-wing” (national-bolshevik) tendencies existing also among the first eurasists (Suvchinskij, Karsavin, Efron), and also a method for the mutual understanding with the “left” wing of anti-globalism.

“Third way” economics, “autarchy of the great spaces.” Application of heterodox economic models to the post-Soviet Russian reality. Application of F. List’s theory of the “custom unions.” Actualization of the theories of S. Gesell. F. Schumpeter, F. Leroux, new eurasist reading of Keynes.

Source: Ab Aeterno, no. 3, June 2010.


Article printed from Counter-Currents Publishing: http://www.counter-currents.com

URL to article: http://www.counter-currents.com/2013/12/milestones-of-eurasism/

dimanche, 08 décembre 2013




by Martin A. Schwarz

Ex: http://www.eurasia-rivista.org

Marlene Laruelle: Russian Eurasianism: An Ideology of Empire. Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Press/Johns Hopkins University Press, 2008, 288 p.

Alexander Höllwerth: Das sakrale eurasische Imperium des Aleksandr Dugin. Eine Diskursanalyse zum postsowjetischen Rechtsextremismus. Soviet and Post-Soviet Politics and Society, Vol. 59. Stuttgart: Ibidem Verlag 2007. 735 p.

Different strands of Russian Eurasianism (Laruelle, part 1)

Marlene Laruelle, a young but prolific French-American scholar, who has already published books about the classic Eurasianism and about its precursor in the 19th century, has now written “Russian Eurasianism. An ideology of Empire”, one of the first comprehensive academic studies of Neo-Eurasianism, or at least in the West. In difference to other works of this kind, the author sticks to her principles of impartiality, which does not mean that she does not present her own theories about history and function of Eurasianism as an “ideology of Empire”, but, in her own words “this book analyzes Neo-Eurasianism without judging it, for two reasons. First, I do not think one may, either methodologically or ethically, judge and analyze at the same time. Knowledge is a prerequisite of argument, but the former must precede the latter. Second, as Pierre-André Taguieff has remarked, ‘There is no need to put words into an author’s mouth or demonize him in order to critically examine theses that one believes must be opposed.’” (Laruelle, p. 13)
russian-eurasianism--an-ideology-of-empire.jpgAfter a brief introduction in which she points to the relevance of the subject, her different approach (as mentioned), and the specific weight of the personalities she choose for presentation, the first chapter is devoted to the original Eurasianism from 1920-1930. This is a rather brief outline, as she has already written a book on the subject (L’Idéologie eurasiste russe ou comment penser l’empire, Paris 1999) , and brings not many new or original informations about a movement, which was the “conservative revolution” á la Russe, borrowing from Fascism and Bolshevism, but denouncing their short-comings and “Western” features. Two things though seem to be central for Laruelle’s understanding of the Eurasianists: the notion of a “geographic identity” for Russians, instead of the Western self-understanding of a “historic” and therefore progressive understanding of the identity of nations (which of course was transferred as “historical materialism” to Russia, and also was promoted by liberals and – inverted – by nostalgic monarchists). Therefore the geographic orientation of Eurasianism lies at the core of the movement, but was paradoxically developed in the Western exile: “The Eurasianist doctrine must be grasped in its fundamentally provocative character. It was born of the malaise of young nationalists who were reluctant to integrate into the host culture and who refused to resign themselves to the thought that links with homeland were definitely broken. Their rejection of Europe can only be understood if we remember that it was elaborated in the West by those Russians who, culturally speaking, were the most Europeanized.” (p. 25) While it is undeniable true, that Eurasianism as self-affirmation could only become self-knowledge in the encounter and subsequently (at least partial) rejection of Western ideologies, Laruelle shows a tendency to psychologize the phenomenon: “(Eurasianism) attempts to theorize what is above all an experience and a feeling: the experience of young men in exile who feel humiliated by the defeat of the Whites and try to understand the reality of the motherland and stay in touch with it.” (p. 47)
Another paradox or ambiguity can be found in the Eurasianist re-evaluation of the Far Eastern part of Russian history and culture, the Mongolic and Islamic one. „(…) before Eurasianism in the 1920s, no Russian intellectual movement displayed a real openness to the Turko-Mongol world. Asia was only ever highlighted under the aspects of Aryanism; it was a mere detour to reinforced claims of Europeaness.“ (p. 4) While this heritage was now used by the Eurasianists as an argument for the distinction of Russia not only to Western Europe but also to Pan-Slavism, the religions and cultures of Buddhism and Islam as such were denigrated in favor of a militant Orthodox Christianity. As the final parts of this book are dedicated to the relation between (neo-)Eurasianism and Islam, this question has not to be answered at this point.
After this brief, not very differentiated presentation of the original Eurasianists, Laruelle looks more in detail in the thinking of the three most influential neo-Eurasianists. These are, in her words “the theories of ethnogenesis elaborated by the Orientalist Lev N. Gumilëv (1912-92); the fascistic geopolitics of the fashionable theorist Aleksandr Dugin (1962-); the philosopher Aleksandr Panarin’s (1940-2003) defense of a multipolar world.” (p. 2)
Lev Gumilëv, the missing link – or rather: not missing link – between “old” and “new” Eurasianism enjoys nearly universal popularity in Russia. His theories of Ethnogenesis are generally excepted and taught in schools and universities, often without reference to the Eurasianist Weltanschauung, although they are deeply connected with their organic understanding of peoples and societies. While Gumilëv shares with the Eurasianists the idea that the individual draws the meaning from the totality, Gumilëv’s theory of ethnos is definitively on the more biologistic and deterministic side of possible variations of this idea. One that, as I must say, does not fit well with the ideas of an supra-natural origin of culture, which is the normal religious concept, and also especially stressed by the representatives of integral traditionalism (René Guénon, Julius Evola, and others), whose ideas were introduced to neo-Eurasianism by Aleksandr Dugin and Geidar Dzhemal. As Laruelle writes, “he [Gumilëv] takes up the original Eurasianists’ organicism and radicalizes it, using numerous biological or even genetic metaphors with far-reaching political implications”, although “he does not, strictly speaking, develop a political theory; and […| he cannot be considered a partisan of conservative revolution.” (p. 82) Instead he stressed (as must remembered: in the time of Soviet stagnation of the Brezhnev era) very social conservative norms: endogamy, family life, respect for the elderly, the nation, and rejection of any challenge to the powers that be, all necessary for the survival of the ethnos. Laruelle considers him – understandably – “the least intellectually relevant and the least original (Neo-)Eurasianist.” (p. 82) As Gumilëv was neither in touch with Western intellectuals nor in tune with Soviet science , “his thought, the product of intellectual solitude, was fundamentally autistic” (p. 82), This result, if true, is by the way in striking contradiction to his notion of the supremacy of the collective ethnos as a sovereign whole, and also a total contrast to the very mercurial and alert ideologue of Neo-Eurasianism, Aleksandr Dugin, well-known in the West and very present in Russian media.
Before devoting space to Dugin, Laruelle discusses Aleksandr Panarin, whom she clearly favors. She calls him intellectually superior to Dugin and Gumilëv, or to be exact: she writes that “many”, but unnamed “Russian scholars” (p. 86) did consider him to be. Be this at it may, Panarin was in the Yeltsin era a promoter of “people’s capitalism” (p. 87) and in the Putin era an advocate of “the restoration of both Orthodox spirituality and Stalinist statehood.” (p. 88) Maybe he could be considered as flexible or opportunist as Dugin? Nevertheless he presented a “civilized Eurasianism”, “civilized” here being the indicator of “the exact opposite to Dugin’s variety.” (p. 88) Nevertheless Panarin became a member of the Central Council of Dugin’s Eurasian Party in 2002, and planned to write a foreword to a book by Dugin, but as Laruelle writes, “death put an end to this unlikely cooperation.” (p. 89) Panarin’s work was marked by the search for a third way, “between the West’s egalitarian universalism and the ethnic particularism of the non-European world.” (p. 93) Panarin’s model for an Eurasian Empire in his words, as quoted by Laruelle: “The principle of cultural pluralism, as well as attention and tolerance for different ethnocultural experiences are combined with a monist political authority that tolerates no opposition.” (p. 97) One of the intriguing but also problematic ideas of Panarin was the need for a combination of the Eurasian religions into something, what he calls the “Great Tradition” (p. 98), especially a fusion between Orthodox Christianity and Islam. In his quoted words: “We need a new, powerful world-saving idea that would ensure a consensus between Orthodox and Muslim culture for the benefit of a common higher goal.” (p. 99) Later he seemed to have abandoned this attempt in favor of an Orthodox supremacism and a renewed pan-Slavism, according to Laruelle in reaction to the NATO bombardment of Serbia. (p. 100)
The chapter on Aleksandr Dugin in titled “Aleksandr Dugin: A Russian Version of the European Radical Right?“ and was published before as a study by the Woodrow Wilson Institute in Washington, DC. While the title indicates the direction and the somewhat limited approach to the multi-faceted Dugin, it can be said that this attempt to analyze the influences of the New Right and the „Traditionalist school“ on Dugin’s theories is of much superior quality than the ramblings of the ubiquous Andreas Umland and his school of Dugin bashing. Like the New Right in Western Europe Dugin has attempted to adopt the teachings of Carl Schmitt, Karl Haushofer, Ernst Niekisch and Moeller van den Bruck, the so-called “Conservative Revolution” in Germany’s Weimar period, to the present situation of Russia, which largely means the attempted forced Westernization through Globalization and the counter-measures of the re-establishment of state power. This “conservative revolution” intellectual heritage is accompanied by two more currents, the New Right or rather: Nouvelle Droite, and the „integral Tradition“, both not so much of German but French and Italian origins, although the thinking of Alain de Benoist not only has a strong „Conservative Revolutionary“ foundation, but was also influenced by Armin Mohler, the personal link between Ernst Jünger and Carl Schmitt, and Alain de Benoist. Additionally and largely unrelated to Benoist was the Belgian European activist Jean Thirirat, whose model of an „European nation“ has preformed Dugin’s „Eurasian nation“ as much as the French Nouvelle Droite’s think tank GRECE and their meta-political approach did for the somehow fluctuating style of Dugin’s intellectual enterprises. Therefore Laruelle is not mislead, when she writes: “Dugin distinguishes himself from other figures in the Russian nationalist movements precisely through his militant Europeanism, his exaltation of the Western Middle Ages, and his admiration for Germany. All these ideological features contrast strongly with the ethnocentrism of his competitors.“ (p. 128)
Even more on the point is her acknowledgment of the influence of René Guénon and Julius Evola, and their minor intellectual allies and successors, on Dugin. She calls „Traditionalism“ the „foundation of Dugin’s thoughts“. While it can correctly be said, that the notion of a primordial Tradition as the common origin of all the religious-cultural traditions of Eurasia, can not be found in the writings of the „founding fathers“ of Eurasianism and was directly alien to some of their ideas – the rambling against the „Roman-Germanic civilization“ - , nevertheless Dugin could find only here the organic and integral solution to some of the most urgent problems of Russia’s Eurasian (com)position between Orthodoxy, Islam, Buddhism and other more minor elements: the transcendent – esoteric - unity of the exoteric different heirs of one primordial Tradition. Which is why – in our not Laruelle’s view – and without considering possible personal idiosyncrasy and political opportunism, his brand of neo-Eurasianism must be considered superior to those of his „competitors“, take for example the ill-fated attempt of Panarin’s Islam/Orthodoxy „melting pot“. Dugin’s claim of post-Guénonism because of his attempt to „Russify“ Guénon and to criticize the lack of references to Orthodox Christianity (p. 123), should be seen rather as a complementary effort. Similar is his attempt to reconcile Evolian „paganism“ (p. 123), or rather Aryanism, with Russian Christianity, with its strong national element. And not only of theoretically value is the distinction between Traditional Islam – as represented in the Sufi traditions and in Shiite Iran – and the Western-allied Wahhabite branch. In this context Laruelle makes reference to the important symposium “Islamic Threat or Threat against Islam?” (p. 118) which intended to establish a Russian-Muslim strategic partnership.

A „discourse analysis“ of Aleksandr Dugin (Höllwerth)

Alexander Höllwerth’s doctor thesis in Salzburg (Austria) on the „sacred Eurasian empire of Alexander Dugin“ impresses by it sheer quantity of more than 700 pages. The reader expects to gain access to fundamental texts of Russian neo-Eurasianism, otherwise only available in Russian. This expectation is fulfilled only partially because the author does give way to much space to his own objections, considerations and assumptions. A part called „contextualisations“, which brings nothing new, but gives an oversight of the historical Eurasianist movement, follows the book’s methodological reflections (reaching from Foucault’s discourse notion to Buruma’s occidentalism model).
Höllwerth then summarizes the literature from Stephen Shenfield („Russian Fascism“) to Andreas Umland (who is the editor of this volume and wrote its preface) on the biography of Aleksandr Dugin. He gives his estimation of the relationship between the subject of the book and the current Russian regime. Höllwerth states that Dugin is one of the few prominent intellectuals in Russia whom it is allowed to criticize the Kremlin without being banned from public discourse into the small niches of opposition media (which are rather the domain of Dugin’s enemies, the Western orientated liberals). Dugin has written in 2005 that the “acting of Putin can be evaluated as an artificially masked continuation of the pro-American, liberal, pro-oligarch strategy of Yeltsin, as a camouflage of the decline of Russia and its geopolitical spheres of influence.” (Höllwerth, p. 182) But this harsh assessment was followed by a phase of “reconciliation”. One could consider this as an evaluation of differing politics by a principled intellectual, the changes being on the side of the Kremlin and not on the side of the commentator. Höllwerth tends to mystify this point of view, but with the help of Dugin himself or rather his edition of Jean Parvulesco’s book “Putin and the Eurasian Empire” which differentiates between “Putin-1”, the real Putin, and “Putin-2”, the metaphysical Putin, the “mysterious builder of the Great Eurasian Empire of the End” (p. 184), the agent or tool of the great Eurasian conspiracy, a vulgarized or at least popularized variation of the initiation as described by René Guénon, but assuming in the sketch of Parvulesco rather counter-initiative features.
But what is the real and not “metaphysical” influence of Aleksandr Dugin, according to Höllwerth? “The attempt to estimate the ‘real political influence’ of Dugin is confronted with the difficulty to separate the plane of staging from the plane of factuality. This difficulty, with which the external scholar is confronted, seems to be part of a conscious strategy: the meaning of Dugin’s staging does, metaphorically put, not be to let the viewer look behind the scenery of the staging, but to focus his attention on the staging itself. (…) ‘Behind the scenery’ activities in connection with the Dugin phenomenon (secret services, political string-pullers, etc.) can not be excluded, are even probable, but should not lead to ambitious speculations based on few evidences.” (p. 194 f.) By the way, a sensationalist piece of work, based on such “ambitious speculations based on few evidences” was published by the same publishing house, which did not dare to include it in their scientific series and did flank it with cautious remarks. (Vladimir Ivanov: Alexander Dugin und die rechtsextremen Netzwerke. Fakten und Hypothesen zu den internationalen Verflechtungen der russischen Neuen Rechten. Stuttgart: Ibidem Verlag, 2007) And of course also with a preface by the inevitable Andreas Umland. A work to be put on the same shelve with Jean Parvulesco’s political fiction, but one has to admit that it has better entertainment value than Höllwerth’s rather sour work.
With page 197 starts the real discourse-theoretical body of the book, being also the real achievement of Höllwerth: „Dugin’s construction of world and reality“. Which is itself parted into three: Space, Order, Time, or also: Geopolitics, State, and History. But through these 500 pages goes one leitmotif: Höllwerth tries to reduce the complexity of Dugin’s system of synthesis and distinction to simple dualisms; we and the other, Eurasia (=Russia) against the West, Empire against democracy, etc., which are in return recognized as redundant repetitions of one and only mantra of power. After Dugin’s philosophy and policy has passed through Höllwerth’s mechanism of discourse analysis we arrive at exactly the same result, a more temporizing genius like Andreas Umland did achieve with one piece of paper and only two quotes of Dugin out of context: the exposure of a dangerous enemy of freedom and democracy. Vade retro, Dugin! But with Höllwerth’s help the Western reader can uplift himself by dining from a broad protruding self-affirmation of Western values with a more than saturating scientific apparatus.
The most compelling aspect of Höllwerth’s de- and reconstruction of Dugin’s discourse is its stringent structure. Also the obvious inclusion of the most important Western and Eastern authors must be noted. The confrontation with the matadors of Western liberalism (Jürgen Habermas, Sir Karl Popper, Bassam Tibi, Jean-François Lyotard) could be seen as helpful. But the extensive reproduced arguments of Dugin’s counter-parts are put on the same level of discourse with Dugin, even where Höllwerth notes the metaphysical character of Dugin’s traditionalists argument. The resulting impossibility of a dialogue between equals is construed by Höllwerth as a deficit of Dugin’s discourse.
Another example of Höllwerth’s inadequate approach: Höllwerth did indeed – and this is rather remark- and laudable - read the French metaphysician René Guénon. But only to point out the deviations of Dugin from the Guénon traditionalist “standard”, which is rather pointless, because Höllwerth himself has already classified Dugin correctly as Russian Evolianist (p. 355 ff.) and most of Höllwerth’s arguments seemingly advocating Guénon could also been directed against Julius Evola, and on this subject a large intra-traditionalist discussion could be cited. More than once Höllwerth argues that Dugin postulates a metaphysical dichotomy of East and West, while Guénon did stress the common original unity and only accepted a difference East-West since the decline of the West beginning with the modern era. But the West is the Occident, the sphere of sunset, by definition, and essential before the temporal decline began. So Dugin and Guénon are both correct, if they are read correctly!
Not unrelated is another important objection, which may indeed be problematic if true. This is the dependency of Dugin not only from Western authors in general, but also in his understanding of Eastern, meaning mainly Russian-Orthodox authors. Höllwerth tries to argue this in detail in some examples (for example: p. 664 ff.), this unfortunately cannot be assessed by me, due to my lack of knowledge of the Russian sources. But one thing is clear, this argument of Western influence can cut in two directions. Höllwerth points out that in one of Dugin’s best known texts “The metaphysics of national-bolshevism” Dugin does refer to Sir Karl Popper’s view of Platon, (p. 320 ff.) but everything the ideologue of the “open society” does characterize negatively is affirmed by Dugin, therefore he arrives at the holistic, total state of the philosophical rulers and the caste of watchers, this not through an adequate study of Platon, but as the reverse of an one-sided caricature made by Popper. If we see the Western history of philosophy not as a footnote to Platon, as was famously said, but as the decline from Platon to Popper, which really was the case, we can still see a partial truth in Höllwerth’s criticism of Western dependency by Dugin, but we have also to recast it into a much greater blame against the West, not to have remained true to its origin.
The adherence of Dugin to a kind – and which kind - of nationalism or a nation-transcending form of Eurasianism would be another question which would need a deeper consideration than Höllwerth provides. The question of nation can in the East not be separated from the confession. From the point of view of metaphysics and tradition (in the sense of René Guénon) most of the values attributed to the Russian nation should be rather connected with the Russian-Orthodox church. The formulation of the “angels of peoples” by the great Russian philosophers and theologians are thought from the premise of the identity nation=religion and correct for all authentic traditions but certainly not for nations in the modern Western sense, where Evola’s and Guénon’s critique of nationalism is totally applicable. Höllwerth’s attempt to find a contradiction between Dugin and the different strands of thought which convene in his own – traditionalist, conservative revolutionary, Orthodox and Russian – can therefore not be followed so easy.
Russia’s Eurasian mission, which lies in the simple fact to be Eurasia in the excellent sense (there is a incomplete Eurasia possible without China or India or Western Europe, but without Russia it makes to sense to speak from Eurasia), is not necessarily a chauvinism of thinking of itself as the hub of the world, but a fact of geopolitics, which can be confirmed by a look at the world map. If the space called Russia would be not be populated by Russians, there would be another people populating this space, and it would have to adopt to the stated property of large space, and would become exactly “Russian” in this way. Thus it becomes clear, why Höllwerth can quote Dugin’s definition of the being (Wesen) of the Russians as space (extension) (p. 401). All this is to keep in mind, when Höllwerth agitates himself on Dugin’s corresponding affirmation, that Russia is the whole (of Eurasia).

The difference between land (Eurasia) and sea (Anglo-America), coincident with rise and decline, Orient and Occident (in the afore mentioned sense of temporal difference by same origin in the metaphysical North, p. 212 ff.) would demand another thorough study. Höllwerth makes a lot out of the seemingly different use of the term “Nomos of the earth” (Nomos der Erde) by Carl Schmitt and Aleksandr Dugin. While Schmitt did mean the search for a new principle of international law for the whole globe, Dugin exclusively uses the phrase as synonym with “Nomos of the land” as contrasted with “Nomos of the sea” (p. 249). This dichotomy of laws according to the different Nomos is not the only problem of mediation, the intra-Eurasian and therefore more urgent is the juristic mediation of the different tradition, when according to Dugin the law is not universal but traditional (for each tradition) (p. 475 ff.). The “integral traditionalism” is exactly the only possible foundation to preserve the differences of the traditions while acknowledging their common and in this sense universal origin (the primordial Tradition). The “universalism” of traditionalism allows to stress the discerned internally and the common ground externally. Especially Hindu tradition and Islam have traditionally absolutely no problems in recognizing the other traditions as varieties of the one Tradition. (But Dugin may not evaluate these two as much as would be desirable, especially in their function of beginning and closing the cycle of mankind.) Finally it becomes absurd when Höllwerth in his “discourse analysis” regards the universalism of all traditions as structurally equivalent to the arrogant “universalism” of Western liberalism. On the one hand, favored by Dugin, the land-bound traditions take all part in the whole of Tradition (analogue to the classic model of idea by Platon), on the other hand, the Western universalism, championed by Höllwerth, is nothing more than a particular, very late development deviation from one specific tradition, the rejection of Western Christianity in its own boundary, and its violent expansion on the way of the world’s seas, postulating itself as the only valuable, and this exactly because it is anti-traditional (“enlightened”)!
Coping with Dugin’s philosophical and geopolitical notion of sacredness, Höllwerth seems to misled by a point of view, which he seems to have adopted from Mircea Eliade, a founder of the modern science of comparative religion (p. 209, p. 529 f.). A partial truth, the difference of profane and sacred, is been used as absolute segregation. There exist sacred places (and times), and on this the sacred geography (and sacred history) is founded, whose importance for Dugin’s geopolitics Höllwerth does carve out – much to his credit, as this level of argument is overlooked to often as pure rhetoric. But are there also in a strict sense profane things? “Come in, here do dwell Gods, too”, Heraclitus did say. Or, speaking with Guénon: there exists no profane thing, but only a profane point of view. Dugin seems to look at all questions also – certainly not only – in a metaphysical perspective, and in general he is able to explain why a certain political action is seen as necessary in this metaphysical perspective by him. This opens here the possibility of misuse through the sacralization of the profane, as on the other hand the profanization of the sacred in the West. The Western man is the one who takes the utilitarism as the measure for all things. The pure action – of which Julius Evola speaks - , which principle of not-clinging to the fruits of action has been affirmed by Dugin, the exact opposite of utilitarism, can only be seen as measure for the validity of Dugin’s decisions. To say, that he may not always be in the right in his metaphysical decisions is a different thing than saying he is guided by profane utility, as the sacred point of view does not make a saint. Höllwerth´s grasp of this problems is flawed because of his attempt to arrange the perceived oppositions into mirrored congruencies, instead of acknowledgment their structurally inequality, which would lead to the necessarily conclusion of the metaphysical superiority of the Eurasian tradition over its Western descent and rival.

Eurasianism and Islam (Laruelle, continuation)

In the last two chapters of her book Marlene Laruelle gives attention to the Muslim Eurasianists, first between the Muslim minorities of the Russian federation and then outside. This topic, though well-known by specialists, did not grasp the attention of a broader public as much as for example Dugin’s role in relation to the Kremlin. Therefore Laruelle’s retelling of the sometime short-lived organizational and personal development is very helpful, but can obviously not been retold in this review. In general there are two kinds of involvement of the Muslim minorities, one in specific Islamic Eurasianist parties, and the other the involvement of Islamic representatives in the general Eurasianist movement. There are two rival organizations representing the Muslim citizens of the Russian Federation, who were headed by two personal rivals, Mufti Talgat Tadzhuddin, who died shortly ago, and Mufti Ravil Gainutdin. The first was a member of Dugin’s party, close to the Kremlin, and a friend of the Russian patriarch Alexis II (p. 156), who coincidentally also died shortly ago. Gainutdin on the other hand keeps more distant to the Orthodox Church and the Kremlin (p. 158), and supports one of the more important Eurasianists rival of Aleksandr Dugin, Abdul-Vakhed V. Niizaov and his Eurasianist Party of Russia. (p. 161) The author summarizes the differences of the Muftis, which also reflect the differences of Dugin and Niizaov: “Tadzhuddin and Gainutdin embody two poles of traditional Russian Eurasianism: on the one hand, Russian nationalism and Orthodox messianism; and on the other hand, a more secular patriotism, which combines great-power ambitions with an acknowledgment of Russia’s multiethnic and multireligious character. Thus Eurasianism has become one of the crystallization points between the various Islamic representative bodies (…)” (p. 161 f.) Alongside these two mainstream bodies of Islam in Russia, there exist many smaller groups. One deserves special mention, the Islamic Commitee of Russia, lead by a former ally of Aleksandr Dugin, who broke with him on several issues, Geidar Dzhemal. The philosopher Dzhemal is an Azeri Shiite (Shiism being the dominant branch of Islam in Azerbaijan), with a close relation to the Islamic Republic of Iran, what separates Dzhemal from the other mentioned Muslim representatives. Strangely this fact is not mentioned by Laruelle. What she stresses, is the importance Dzhemal gives to Islam for securing Russia’s future: “Dzhemal […] states: ‘Russia’s only chance to avoid geopolitical disappearance is to become a Islamic state.’ Thus the movement remained on the borderline of Eurasianism, because it talked of conversion rather than cultural symbiosis ” (p. 147) Dugin’s apparently strong opposition to any conversions on the other hand is self-contradictory given his heavy reliance of his “Traditionalist” foundation on the teaching of René Guénon, also known as Sheikh Abd al-Wâhid Yahya. But it cannot neglected that the Orthodox-Islamic tension in the Eurasianist movement is as much ethnic as religious. The Turkic people can claim to represent “Eurasia” even more than Russians do. “In this view, the Russian people are European and party alien to Eurasia, as opposed to the Turkic people, who are considered to better illustrate the great meeting between Europe and Asia. Russia is no longer understood as a great power but as the most backward part of Europe, by contrast with the dynamism of the Far East and China.” (p. 169) A certain ambiguity in this question goes back to the classic Eurasianist movement of the Twenties of the last century, as Laruelle earlier in a different context has already stated: “Eurasianism’s place within the Russian nationalist spectrum has remained paradoxical due to the fact that it can be interpreted in either a ‘Russocentric’ or a ‘Turkocentric’ way. However, the paradox is not simply in the eye of the outside beholder; it has also divided the Neo-Eurasianists, who have accused each other of advocating the supremacy of one people over another.” (p. 5)
Naturally there is no question on which side the Eurasianist interpretation leans in the cases of Turkish Eurasianism outside of Russia, which is the final topic of this manifold book. In Kazakhstan one can state a “Eurasianism in Power” (p. 171), but a pragmatic Eurasianism this is, without any of the eschatological or traditionalist features of Dugin’s world-view. But Kazhakh Eurasianism as a whole is a multifaceted movement: “’Eurasianist’ Kazakh nationalism has several embodiments: a literary tradition introduced by Olzhas Suleimenov; a highly pragmatic variety used by the presidential administration; and a type of Eurasianist rhetoric that merely masks a much more traditional view of the nation and its right to exist, and mentions Russia only in the negative.” (p. 172) Suleimenov being a friend and ally of Lev Gumilëv (p. 175) and an apologist of “multiethnicity, tolerance, and diversity”, as characteristics of Eurasia. (p. 175) Also present in this intellectual Eurasianism seems to be a religious syncretism, “embracing all the religions that have ever (co)existed in the steppe. For example, the Kazakh Eurasianists make a great deal of archaeological traces of Nestorian Christianity, Zoroastrianism, Buddhism, and Shamanism, trying to go beyond the classic Orthodox-Islamic dualism.” (p. 176) President Nazarbaev proposed a “Union of Eurasian States” already in 1994 (p. 177) and embodies a mainly “economically based Eurasianism, whose integrationists ideas are popular among those who have suffered from the breakdown of links between the former Soviet republics.” (p. 177) But Nazarbaev is nothing less than an ideology-free technocrat, he has written even a book “In the stream of history”, in which he claims the Aryan and sedentary origin of Kazakhstan, predating the Mongol nomadic arrival. (p. 186) Additionally, the country’s Muslim character of the country is stressed, and Nazarbaev is proud of the global Islamic relevance Muslim scholars of Kazhakh origin like Al-Farabi and Al-Buruni.
Finally the only example of Eurasianism beyond the border of the former Soviet Union, studied by Laruelle, is the case of Turkey. Here the Eurasianist claim of the Turkish people goes along with the implication, “that Russia and Turkey are no longer competing for the mythical territory of Inner Asia – which both Eurasianists and pan-Turkists claim as their people’s ancestral homeland – but are Eurasian allies.” (p. 171) Laruelle starts by postulating common ideological roots of Eurasianism and Turkism, the “official Turkish state discourse on the nation’s identity” (p. 193), in romanticism and “Pan-“Ideologies (p. 188), but this seems to be rather a feature of Pan-Slavism than of Eurasianism with its re-evaluation of the non-Russian strands of the Empire. A similar development in the development from Turkism to Avrasyanism seems to be lacking. Rather it can be seen as a turning the back to the West, to which Mustafa Kemal, the so-called Atatürk (Father of the Turks), wanted to direct the aspirations of the Turks. The author states the original competition between the Turkish Avrasyian tendency and the Russian Eurasianist movements, similar to the natural antagonistic relation of nationalisms. But the interesting developments are the recently “attempts (…) to turn the two ‘Eurasias’ into allies rather than competitors” and parallel “a Dugin-style ideologization of the term in response to American adcendancy.” (p. 198) The few pages Laruelle dedicates to these developments are rather brief, and she has in the mean time published a more extensive study (Russo-Turkish Rapprochement through the Idea of Eurasia: Alexander Dugin’s Networks in Turkey, Jamestown Foundation, Occasional Paper, 2008), which itself has been overtaken by the dismantling of large parts of these „networks“ through the Ergenekon affair, but which is definitively outside the scope of this review.
The different manifestations of Eurasianism in this book leave the author and the reader with the question of the unity of Eurasianists idea. Laruelle states that Eurasianism is “a classic example of a flexible ideology. This explains its success, its diversity, and its breadth of coverage.” (p. 221) Without arguing about sheer words the author cannot be followed in her strict subsumption of Eurasianism under the term nationalism. At least a more nuanced view of nation in a more traditional sense, common to both Orthodox and Islamic thinking, in difference to the Western concept of nation-state (as I discussed in the part on Höllwerth) would have to be considerated instead of stating that the Eurasianists “concept of ‘civilization’ is only a euphemism for ‘nation’ and ‘empire.’” (p. 221).


Article printed from eurasia-rivista.org: http://www.eurasia-rivista.org

URL to article: http://www.eurasia-rivista.org/two-studies-on-neo-eurasianism/19891/

lundi, 11 novembre 2013

“Rusia es la Tercera Roma”

El 16 de octubre de 2013 se publicaba esta entrevista en el prestigioso medio italiano BARBADILLO, laboratorio di idee nel mare del web. Alfonso Piscitelli entrevistaba a Adolfo Morganti, presidente de la asociación italiana IDENTITÀ EUROPEA, que estudia y promueve la construcción de una Europa fiel a sus raíces clásicas y cristianas. El tema central que aborda la entrevista es Rusia, pero la cultura del entrevistador y del entrevistado logran que sea todo un diálogo ameno y provechoso. Hemos creído oportuno traducirla y publicarla en RAIGAMBRE para el público hispanohablante

La asociación Identità Europea tiene en los históricos Franco Cardini y Adolfo Morganti, editor del “Il Cerchio”, a sus exponentes más importantes. Hace años que promueve iniciativas que reclaman una reflexión sobre las raíces del continente europeo (raíces clásicas y cristianas) y sobre su destino. Recientemente “Identità Europa” ha organizado en San Marino un Congreso sobre “Europa en la época de las grandes potencias, desde 1861 a 1914”, en el ámbito de ese discurso se ha abordado también la naturaleza compleja de las relaciones entre Italia y Rusia. Replanteamos el argumento a menudo descuidado por los historiadores contemporáneos, con el presidente de Identità Europea, Morganti.

Alfonso Piscitelli.: En la segunda mitad del XIX se articulaba una red compleja de alianzas entre naciones europeas continentales: la Triple Alianza (Alemania, Austria, Italia) y por un cierto tiempo el Pacto de los Tres Emperadores (Alemania, Austria, Rusia). ¿Fue el intento de superar los nacionalismos en orden a una cooperación continental?

Adolfo Morganti: Era la tentativa de superar los límites y los conflictos cebados por el nacionalismo jacobino, pero al mismo tiempo eran fuertes las tensiones estratégicas que se localizaban en el área balcánica con Rusia, que patrocinaba los movimientos nacionalistas del pueblo eslavo y Austria que contenía estas pulsiones subrayando el aspecto supranacional del Imperio de los Habsburgo. Sarajevo no fue una sorpresa, como localización del foco de la primera guerra mundial.

A. P.: E Italia, ¿cómo se movía sobre el plano internacional?

A. M.: Todos conocemos el impulso profundo que el arte italiano dio a Rusia: un impulso evidente en San Petersburgo. Menor fue la intensidad de las relaciones marítimas entre Italia y el Mar Negro, que han plasmado la estructura económica misma de aquellas regiones. Sobre el plano diplomático, después de la intervención piamontesa en la Guerra de Crimea, las relaciones con Rusia indudablemente tenían que recuperarse: en efecto, por largo tiempo, Rusia representó algo extraño y distante, en los mismos años en los que Italia establecía una alianza con Austria y Hungría.

A. P.: Con el enemigo por excelencia de la época del Risorgimento [Austria].

A. M.: Más tarde, con el viraje que supuso 1914, obviamente la situación cambió las tornas: los rusos vinieron a ser aliados en el curso de la Primera Guerra Mundial, pero las relaciones gubernamentales y diplomáticas no fueron tan frecuentes y orgánicas como lo fueron, en cambio, las relaciones económicas.

A. P.:: ¿Crees que hoy Rusia deba ser incluida en la identidad europea, a la que alude el nombre de tu asociación?

A. M.: Con seguridad, la parte europea de Rusia debe ser considerada un elemento importante en el discurso sobre la Europa contemporánea. A partir de su conquista de Siberia, relativamente reciente, Rusia ha adquirido una vocación más amplia: la de Eurasia; pero Europa es impensable sin su área oriental, así como la identidad cristiana del continente es impensable sin contemplar el papel de la ortodoxia. Rusia, por una parte es Europa y reconocida como tal (y desde un punto de vista existencial hoy defiende los valores europeos incluso más que muchos estados de la Comunidad Europea), por otra parte, se atribuye una misión y una identidad que rebasa los confines de la misma Europa.

A. P.: El diálogo ortodoxo se ha reanudado a lo grande en los años sesenta con Pablo VI, con la recíproca retirada de excomuniones y el abrazo con el patriarca Atenagoras.

A. M.: Generando entusiasmos y resistencias a las dos bandas: resistencias que en el ámbito ortodoxo amenazaron con producir un cisma, que más tarde se hizo realidad.

A. P.: Y el hecho de que Juan Pablo II fuese un eslavo, un polaco (no extraño al “humus cultural” del nacionalismo polaco), ¿ha facilitado o ha creado alguna fricción y malentendidos entre las dos partes?

A. M.: Ciertamente, cuando la primera jerarquía católica de la Rusia post-soviética fue elegida por Juan Pablo II, la presencia de prelados polacos fue relevante y esto creó notables problemas de coexistencia con los ortodoxos. La misma acción de los franciscanos en Rusia era vista como una fuerza de penetración católica en el área del cristianismo ortodoxo. Ahora, con el cambio de jerarquía, en que la presencia de Italia está representada autorizadamente por el actual Obispo de Moscú, estos problemas casi se han disuelto.

A. P.: Si recuerdo bien, fue Ratzinger quien determinó una nueva relación, promoviendo el cambio de jerarcas.

A. M.:: Exactamente.

A. P.: Un recordatorio siempre es útil… ¿por qué se originó y por qué persiste la división entre cristianos católicos y cristianos ortodoxos?

A. M.: Hay toda una serie de diferencias dogmáticas que dividen a católicos y ortodoxos: la cuestión del “filioque” (de la procesión del Espíritu Santo), la diversas valoraciones de ultratumba (los ortodoxos no conciben el purgatorio), el diverso modo de entender la confesión. Son diferencias importantes, pero en la historia del cristianismo tales divergencias no han impedido necesariamente la unidad de las iglesias: por caso, pensemos que, durante una época en la historia, el cristianismo irlandés calculaba la Pascua de manera diferente al cristianismo continental. Ya hemos tenido otras situaciones de diversidad, que no afectan a la unidad subyacente. En el caso ortodoxo vino, en cambio, una separación profunda, pero no ocultemos que el cisma maduró sobre la cuestión del primado del Obispo de Roma, primado de honor, según los ortodoxos; primado jerárquico, según los católicos.

A. P.: También hay temas fuertes que unen a los dos mundos espirituales, pensemos en la gran devoción a la Madre de Dios; y en lo que atañe al tema mariano no podemos olvidar que al inicio del siglo XX, la profecía de Fátima está estrechamente ligada al tema de Rusia. ¿Qué ideas te has hecho a propósito de esto?

A. M.: La profecía de Fátima veía en Rusia el centro de una gran apostasía, que luego se verificó con el comunismo; pero las profecías son un terreno resbaladizo. Sin lugar a dudas, el gran gigante ruso constituye un escenario fundamental para la articulación de las fuerzas en la confrontación entre tradición y modernidad, entre el cristianismo y la tentativa ilustrada de disolverlo o reducirlo a la esfera privada, está a los ojos de todos.

A. P.:  ¿Es verdad o solo es una simplificación decir que el espíritu cristiano de Rusia está atraído particularmente por el Evangelio de San Juan y por el Apocalipsis?

A. M.: Es un enfoque para la escatología en general. Pero este enfoque es compartido con la milenaria tradición católica: en el ámbito católico hasta lo que no ha mucho se hacía en las llamadas meditaciones sobre los “Novísimos” (muerte, juicio universal, infierno y paraíso) era intensa; después (por usar un eufemismo) no ha sido valorada al máximo…

A. P.: Y el tema típicamente ruso de la Tercera Roma, ¿puede todavía jugar el papel de idea movilizadora en el ánimo de Rusia y en el ánimo de los europeos que miran con atención a Rusia?

A. M.:: Rotundamente: sí. Rusia es la Tercera Roma, tanto para los rusos creyentes como para los laicos. Los laicos ven en el poder de Moscú la continuación efectiva de una autoridad imperial a través de todas las modificaciones históricas posibles. Para el creyente, el concepto de Tercera Roma tiene una resonancia ulterior, pero todos los sujetos político-culturales rusos comparten el sentido de esta misión histórica, sean comunistas o nacionalistas, religiosos o laicos.

A. P.: Sin embargo, en el inmenso territorio ruso existen también otras tradiciones religiosas: el ministro de defensa Shoigú es un budista de la zona siberiana.

A. M.: También hay regiones de la Federación Rusa de mayoría hebrea y zonas en las que se arraigó el islam chiíta (principalmente en la parte ocupada por población turcófona) o sunnita. Desde los tiempos del imperio zarista, la multiplicidad de tradiciones religiosas no ha creado problemas de convivencia.

A. P.: ¿Podría decirnos su valoración personal de la figura de Vladimir Putin?

A. M.: ¡Putin es un ruso! En cuanto tal, él continúa encarnando esta misión de Rusia, cristiana e imperial. El hecho de que Putin sea más creyente o menos es indiferente. Su misión personal es la de proteger a Rusia y Rusia tiene esta identidad (imperial y cristiana) y no otra alguna…

(Traducción al español por Manuel Fernández Espinosa)

Fuente original en italiano: L’intervista. L’editore Adolfo Morganti: “Mosca è ancora la Terza Roma”

Fuente: Raigambre

vendredi, 25 octobre 2013

Eurasian Union: Substance and the Subtext


Eurasian Union: Substance and the Subtext

Ph.D., Professor of the School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, India.
Ex: http://www.geopolitica.ru

The Eurasian Union has come to the present stage in its evolution within a remarkably compressed time-frame. Although the idea was first mooted by the Kazakh president Nursultan Nazarbaev in 1994, it hibernated for long years.[1] It was only in late 2011 that Vladimir Putin revived the idea; visualised it as one of the major centres of economic power alongside the EU, the US, China and APEC; and initiated the process of its implementation. In November 2011, the presidents of Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus signed an agreement to establish the Eurasian Economic Space (EES) that would graduate towards the Eurasian Union. The EES came into existence on 1 January 2012. The paper proposes to examine the origin of the idea and assess its implementation todate with an analysis of the substance and subtext of the organization.

Eurasian Union: The Origins

On 3 October 2011, Vladimir Putin published a signed article in the daily newspaper Izvestia titled “New Integration Project in Eurasia: Making the Future Today.” Putin was the Russian Prime Minister at that time and set to take over the Russian Presidency. The article can thus be interpreted as the assignment he set for himself in his second tenure. On the ground, the “Treaty on the Creation of a Union State of Russia and Belarus” already existed. The Treaty envisaged a federation between the two countries with a common constitution, flag, national anthem, citizenship, currency, president, parliament and army. On 26 January 2000, the Treaty came into effect after the due ratifications by the Russian Duma and the Belarus Assembly. It provided for political union of the two, creating a single political entity. Whether the Treaty laid down a proto Eurasian Union remains to be seen.

The European Union (EU) announcement in 2008 of its Eastern Partnership Programme (EPP) may also have inspired the Russian drive towards reintegration of the Eurasian space. The EPP was initiated to improve political and economic relations between the EU and six "strategic" post-Soviet states -- Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine -- in the core areas of democracy, the rule of law, human rights, the promotion of a market economy, and sustainable development.[2]  There was much debate over whether to include Belarus, whose authoritarian dictatorship disqualified it. The eventual invitation to Belarus was the concern over an excessive Russian influence in that country.

The US plan to deploy the NATO missile defence system in Poland and Czech Republic was already a source of concern for the Russians. China was emerging as a serious player in the region through its heavy investments in energy and infrastructure. The Russian determination to keep the post-Soviet states away from the US, the EU and China made the Eurasian project a priority in its foreign policy. The Treaty between Russia and Belarus intended to keep the latter into the Russian fold.[3]

 Eurasianism: The Idea

Eurasianism as an idea predates the Soviet Union. The Russian identity has been contested by the Occidentalists, the Slavophils and the Eurasianists. The latter claim Russia as the core of the Eurasian civilization. Today, the former Soviet states accept the Russian centrality but not the core-periphery division bet Russia and the rest.

Within Russia itself, the Eurasianists always considered the Soviet Union to be a Greater Russia. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Eurasian political project is to reunite the Russians from the former Soviet territories and ultimately to establish a Russian state for all the Russians. Aleksander Dugin is an ideologue and activist for neo-Eurasianism in Russia. His political activities are directed at restoring the Soviet space and unification of the Russian-speaking people. The South Ossetian President Eduard Kokoity is a sworn Eurasianist himself and eager to make his country a part of Russia.

Organization and Accomplishments

The Eurasian Economic Commission (EEC), the governing body of the EES is set up in Moscow for the time being. Kazakhstan has already staked its claim to host its permanent headquarters. The formula under which the 350-member body would be filled allots Russians 84 percent of staff, the Kazakhs 10 percent and the Belarusians a mere 6 percent. The formula has been worked out on the basis of the population in the three countries. The expenses towards accommodation and infrastructure would be borne by Russia.

The EEC will be eligible to make decisions with regard to customs policies, as also the issues relating to macroeconomics, regulation of economic competition, energy policy, and financial policy. The Commission will also be involved in government procurement and labour migration control.[4] The right of the EEC to sign contracts on behalf of all of them is contested.

The Supreme Eurasian Union Council will be the apex body of the group. The vice- premiers of the three countries would be leading their countries’ delegations in this body. There are differing opinions on the powers of its apex body.

Eurasian Union is an economic grouping. Its objective is to expand markets and rebuild some of the manufacturing chains destroyed by the collapse of the Soviet Union. The Customs Union of Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus had set the process toward this goal and the Eurasian Union is a continuation of the same process.[5]

The EEC has made some progress, in the meantime. It has simplified the trade rules, eliminated border customs and facilitated free movement of goods, services and capital. It has also encouraged migration of labour among its signatories. The trade among the three is estimated to have gone up by forty percent last year alone. Russia has benefitted from cheaper products and labour force from the rest of the two and several hundred Russian enterprises have re-registered in Kazakhstan to avail cheaper tax rates. Kazakhs and Belarusians have found a large market for their products in Russia.

Major hurdles still remain. A common currency has not been agreed to. The pace of economic integration is yet another point of debate among the three. Belarus would not be comfortable with market integration, which would require economic reforms. Eventually, the economic reforms could lead to political reforms and even changes in political system. Belarus is least prepared for such an eventuality.

Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan         

Within Russia, the Eurasianism still holds an appeal; and not just among the marginal groups. The Eurasian Union is perceived as an expression of Eurasianism that would lead to the state of Russia for all Russians. There are calls to invite countries like Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Finland and even China and Mongolia to join the Eurasian Union. At the leadership level, Putin may also prefer ruling over an expanded space encompassing the entire or most of the former Soviet territory.

The Russian raison d’état for the Eurasian Union cannot be traced to such feelings alone. The missionary zeal to reach out to the neighbours involves subsidizing them. As a general rule, economic integration must necessarily involve mutual benefits for all the parties - even when the benefits are not in equal measure. An economic arrangement does not only eliminate tariffs and other restrictive trade barriers among the signatories, it also formulates and implements tariffs and trade barriers against the non-signatories. Facilitating trade among themselves and restricting trade with the outsiders is the dual track of any economic group. 

As regional integration proceeds in much of the world (not just through the EU but also via NAFTA, ASEAN and Washington’s proposed Trans-Pacific Partnership, among others), the post-Soviet space remains largely on the sidelines. A lack of horizontal trading links and isolation from global markets contribute to the region’s persistent underdevelopment. By reorienting members’ economies to focus on the post-Soviet space, a Eurasian Union would create new barriers between member states and the outside world.[6] Russia is particularly worried about the Chinese forays into its neighbourhood. And the EU Eastern Partnership Programme threatens to encroach into the space that Moscow considers its own sphere of influence.

A second powerful reason for Russia to reach out to its neighbours is that the neighbours are steadily making Russia their home. The influx of migrants from the former Soviet territories has generated a lot of resentment and will soon become a serious political issue. In the circumstances, helping to improve the economic situation beyond the Russian borders and assimilate the new arrivals in a common citizenship is being considered. The then president Dmitry Medvedev explicitly linked the issue of immigrants to the expansion of the state borders. He spoke of the time when the giant state had to comprise different nationalities that created “Soviet People”. "We should not be shy when bringing back the ideas of ethnic unity. Yes, we are all different but we have common values and a desire to live in a single big state," he said.[7]

Russia is not single-mindedly committed to the Eurasian Union. It has initiated and nurtured several other multi-lateral organizations and become a member of scores of others initiated by others. The Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) consisting of Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan[8] is one such. So is the Commonwealth of Independent States comprising most of the post-Soviet countries. It is a member of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization that is clearly a China-led group. The Quadrilateral Forum comprising Russia, Tajikistan, Afghanistan and Pakistan is a Russian project.

It has not shied away from making deals with the EU, either. In 2003, it entered into an agreement with the EU to create four common spaces: 1. of freedom, security and justice; 2. cooperation in the field of external security; 3. economy; and 4. research, education and cultural exchange. Since the formalisation of the Customs Union, Putin has insisted that the EU formalise its relations with the Customs Union before a new basic treaty between the EU and Russia could be formalised. At the EU-Russia Summit in June 2012, he also sought the EU support for the Kazakh and Belarusian bids to join the WTO.[9]

Kazakhstan has formulated and pursued a “multivector” foreign policy since independence. It seeks good relations with its two large neighbours as also with the West. Its operational idiom, therefore, is “diversify, diversify and diversify”.

Its relations with the US are centred on counter-terrorism. In Central Asia, it is now the most favoured US partner in the war on terror. It has welcomed the US-sponsored New Silk Road. The Aktau Sea port is expected to emerge as the capital city on this cross-Caspian Road as the central point for transportation, regional educational cooperation and tourism. The Transportation and Logistics Centre is being developed in the city. Aktau hopes to play a role within the New Silk Road that Samarkand played in the Old Silk Road.[10]

Its relations with Europe are as good. Its bilateral cooperation with the EU dates back to 1999, when it entered into the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement with it. The European Commission has agreed to support its application for membership of the WTO. On 1 January 2010, Kazakhstan became the first post-Soviet state to assume the chairmanship of the 56-member Vienna-based Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. Its trade with the EU accounts for as much as the trade of all the Central Asian countries put together. France has a trade agreement with it that is worth $2 billion under which France would help build a space station and cooperate on nuclear development.

It is its close ties – in fact, too close ties – with China that explains its active membership of the Eurasian Union. China’s presence in the country is pervasive. In 2005, the Asatu-Alashanku oil pipeline between the two countries went into use. The second stage of the same from Kenkyiak to Kumkol is already in works. A gas pipeline is being discussed. In the same year, China bought Petrokazakhstan that was the former Soviet Union’s largest independent oil company. At $4.18 billion, it was the largest foreign purchase ever by a Chinese company. In 2009, it gained a stake in the MangistauMunaiGas, a subsidiary of the KazMunaiGas, which is the Kazakh national upstream and downstream operator representing the interests of the state in the petroleum sector. Even as economic ties get stronger, there could be a point of friction between the two regarding the Uighur-based East Turkestan Islamic Movement in the Xinjiang province of China. There are 180,000 Kazakhs of Uighur descent, which is a source of discomfort to China.

Belarus is a landlocked country and dependent on Russia for import of raw materials and export to the foreign markets. Its dependence on Russia is aggravated by the fact that the US has passed the “Belarus Democracy Act”, which authorizes funding for pro-democracy Belarusian NGOs and prevents loans to the government. The EU has imposed a visa ban on its president Alexander Lukashenko. Even as the Belarus’s dependence on Russia is overwhelming, their bilateral relations have gone through severe frictions. In 2004, there was a gas dispute as Russia stopped the gas supply for six months before a compromise on the price was worked out.

In 2009, the two fought what has come to be called “milk wars”. Moscow banned import of Belarusian dairy products, claiming that they did not meet Russian packaging standards, a non-tariff measure allowed under the common customs code. The disagreement cost Belarus approximately $1 billion. The real problem was that Belarusian farmers were heavily subsidized, meaning that the cost of milk production in Belarus was substantially lower than that in Russia. As a result, Russian dairy producers were on the verge of bankruptcy and looked to their government for support. In response to Russian action, Belarus introduced a ban on the purchase of Russian agricultural machinery, accusing Russia of not providing leasing for Belarusian tractors (a major source of income for Belarus).[11]

Destination Ukraine?

Ukraine is the raison d’être for the entire Eurasian project, according to many. “Once past the verbal hype, it becomes clear that in fact it [Eurasian Union] has nothing to do with Eurasia and has everything to do with a single country, which, incidentally, is situated in Europe of all places: Ukraine,” according to an analyst.[12] Its key task is to draw Kiev into the integration project.

The primary reason for Russian stake in Ukraine is the Ukraine-Russia-Turkmen gas pipeline. Till the break-up of the Soviet Union, it was a domestic grid. Today, the gas trade between Turkmenistan, Russia and Ukraine is not just a commercial proposition, but an illustration of triangular dependencies of the three countries. The key issues in terms of transit are that all Turkmenistan’s gas exports outside Central Asia pass through Russia, which puts the latter in complete control of around three-quarters of Turkmenistan’s exports. Russia’s position vis-à-vis Ukraine is extremely vulnerable in that more than ninety percent of its gas exports to Europe pass through that country.

Thus, Ukraine is the transit point as well as the choke point of the Turkmen and Russian exports. It has also been a leaking point of the deliveries. In early 1990s, there were serious disruptions as Ukraine pilfered the gas for its own domestic use. Since then the gas deliveries have become an important issue in the political and security relationship between Russia and Ukraine, having featured in the package of agreements which have included issues such as the future of the Black Sea Fleet and Ukrainian nuclear weapons. There was a serious stand-off between the two in 2009, when the Russians cut off natural gas supplies to Ukraine over price dispute. A compromise was reached only after Ukraine agreed to pay more for the gas that was, till then, subsidised.[13]

The second most important Russian stake in Ukraine is that Ukraine’s Crimea peninsula hosts a Russian navy base whose lease term was extended for twenty-five years in 2010 by a special agreement between Presidents Dmitry Medvedev and Viktor Yanukovych, despite an unresolved gas dispute. This facility provides Moscow with strategic military capabilities in an area that Russia once considered crucial for the security of its southwestern borders and its geopolitical influence near the “warm seas.”[14] In return for the extension of the lease, Russia agreed to a thirty percent drop in the price of natural gas it sold to Ukraine.

A third reason for Russian interest in Ukraine could be that the latter represents a promising market of 45 million potential consumers, in the context where Russia seeks to diversify its own economy and export destinations.

Russian diplomacy to retain control over Ukraine and the US diplomacy to extend its control over the same have repeatedly to come to a clash. Till recently, Ukraine was pointedly excluded from both the EU and the NATO expansions[15]; as also from the list of possible invitees. Since the “Orange Revolution”, the situation has radically changed. How the energy pipeline politics plays out in the changed circumstances remains to be seen.

For its part, Ukraine has not closed its options between the EU and the Eurasian Union. Its prime minister Mykola Azarov, speaking at a meeting to discuss “Ukraine at the Crossroads: The EU and/or the Eurasian Union: Benefits and Challenges” said, “Ukraine has never contrasted one economic organization with the other and we cannot do that from many points of view. We are in ‘between’ and we must have friends both here and there.”[16]


There is no Eurasian Union todate. And yet, it has been the subject of intense scholarly scrutiny as also of prescriptive analysis. Its future membership, the direction of its evolution and the gamut of its activities must remain speculative in the meanwhile.

In lieu of the final conclusions, some tentative recapitulation of the above is in order. The Russians aim to retain the former Soviet space within their own sphere of influence, seeking to diminish the US, Chinese and the EU presence out of it to the extent possible. The Kazakhs are keeping all their options open: seeking a central role in the US-sponsored war on terror and the New Silk Road, permitting pervasive Chinese presence in their economy, promoting bilateral and institutional ties with the EU, and becoming a member of the Eurasian Union. “Diversify” is the name of the Kazakh game. Belarus is landlocked and dependent on Russia for its trade exports and imports, and the Belarus president is persona non grata in much of the West. Under the circumstances, the Eurasian Union is a solution to much of its problems.

Ukraine has signed a Memorandum of Understanding on trade cooperation with Eurasian Economic Commission. Much will depend on whether and when Ukraine decides to join the Eurasian Union.

Published in Journal of Eurasian Affairs

[1] The Kazakh people like to point out that Kazakhstan’s president Nursultan Nazabaev was the first leader to propose the Eurasian Union in 1994. Chinara Esengul, “Regional Cooperation”, March 27, 2012. http://www.asiapathways-adbi.org/2012/03/does-the-eurasian-union-have-a-future/

[2] Kambiz Behi and Daniel Wagner, “Russia’s Growing Economic Influence in Europe and beyond”,  23 July 2012. 


[3]  On 30 September 2011, Belarus withdrew from the EU initiative citing discrimination and substitution of the founding principles. Three days thereafter, it refuted its decision to withdraw. The EU-Russia competition was obviously at work in quick turnarounds in Belarusian position.

[4] Retrieved from news.mail.ru and kremlin.ru in Russian. Quoted in Wikipedia, “Eurasian Union”.

[5] The Customs Union came into existence on 1 January 2010. Removing the customs barriers among them, the countries took the first step towards economic integration.

[6]Jeffrey Mankoff, “What a Eurasian Union Means for Washington”, National Interest  http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/what-eurasian-union-means-washington-6821

[7] Gleb Bryanski, “Putin, Medvedev Praise Values of the Soviet Union”, Reuters, 17 November 2011,  http://in.reuters.com/article/2011/11/17/idINIndia-60590820111117   

[8] In June 2012, Uzbekistan decided to suspend its membership of the CSTO.

[9] http://www.euractiv.com/europes-east/putin-promotes-eurasian-union-eu-news-513123 “Putin Promotes Eurasian Union at the EU Summit”, 5 June 2012

[11] Behi and Wagner, n. 2

[12] Fyodor Lukyanov, gazeta.ru. 17 September 2012. Quoted in http://www.telegraph.co.uk/sponsored/russianow/opinion/9548428/eurasian-union-explanation.html   

[13] The Ukrainian prime minister at that time, Yulia Tomashenko, has since been sentenced to seven years in prison for abusing the authority and signing the deal.

[14]  Georgiy Voloshin, “Russia’s Eurasian Union: A Bid for Hegemony?”, http://www.geopoliticalmonitor.com/russias-eurasian-union-a-bid-for-hegemony-4730

[15] Putin was reported to have declared at the NATO-Russian Summit in 2008 that if Ukraine were to join the NATO, he would consider annexing the Eastern Ukraine and Crimea in retaliation.



lundi, 21 octobre 2013

La geopolítica rusa del siglo 21

por Alfredo Jalife-Rahme

Ex: http://paginatransversal.wordpress.com

La Jornada, Bajo la Lupa – Entre los prominentes invitados al seminario internacional del Centro de Estudios de la Transición/Centro de Estudios Geoestratégicos de la UAM-X estuvo Sivkov Konstantin Valentinovich, primer vicepresidente de la Academia de Problemas Geopolíticos y doctor en ciencias militares.

Konstantin es segundo de a bordo de Leonid Ivashov, anterior jefe del departamento de asuntos generales en el Ministerio de Defensa de la URSS. Cobra mayor relieve su postura a raíz del triunfo diplomático de Rusia en Siria (ver Bajo la Lupa, 22/9/13).

Ivashov es muy conocido en los multimedia internacionales y sus puntos de vista suelen ser polémicos (v.gr. el terrorismo internacional no existe: su despliegue beneficia a la oligarquía global) y considera que mientras el imperio de Estados Unidos se encuentra al borde del colapso, corresponde a los BRICS la misión de reconfigurar el mundo (Réseau Voltaire, 15/6/11).

De la ponencia de Konstantin, La geopolítica de la URSS y Rusia, me enfocaré en la parte de Rusia.

A su juicio, la lucha geopolítica global basada en la ideología fue cambiada a la confrontación de civilizaciones: la civilización occidental (euro-estadunidense) confronta las civilizaciones ortodoxa, islámica, confuciana (china). Resalta la similitud con la tesis huntingtoniana del choque de civilizaciones que lleva a la inevitabilidad del conflicto de la civilización occidental con el resto (del planeta).

Identifica cuatro de los más importantes factores al desarrollo de la geopolítica mundial:

1. Formación intensiva de un único sistema mundial de poder dominado por EEUU.

2. Intenso crecimiento poblacional y presión al ecosistema por consumismo occidental.

3. Desequilibrio global industrial y de materias primas: el mayor potencial industrial se concentra en EEUU/Europa/Japón, mientras los recursos de materias primas se concentran en Rusia y en los países del tercer mundo, y

4. El carácter independiente de las trasnacionales como sujeto geopolítico

La activación de los cuatro actores genera una crisis global por la contradicción entre el consumismo y la escasez de materias primas. Define a Rusia como una entidad geopolítica cuya base es Eurasia.

Su inmenso potencial intelectual, su posición del centro euroasiático y su potencial militar significativo pone en duda la durabilidad del modelo unidireccional sin remover (sic) a Rusia como sujeto de la geopolítica” a la que habría que demoler como a su antecesora URSS.

Arguye que la etapa más lúgubre de la historia de Rusia en la década de los 90 del siglo 20 (nota: la era entreguista Yeltsin) encontró a la élite política rusa bajo el control total (¡supersic!) de EEUU.

Ocurre el desmantelamiento científico de Rusia y la privatización de sus joyas geoestratégicas, llegando hasta el asesinato de sus principales científicos, mientras las principales empresas de petróleo/gas e infraestructura de transporte acabaron en manos de compradores (sic) domésticos y trasnacionales.

Así la geopolítica de Rusia operó bajo el control directo de los servicios de espionaje de EEUU: capitulación total. ¡Uf!

Peor aún: el liderazgo ruso fomentó la de-sintegración interna. Pero no contaron con la resistencia oculta de los bajos niveles de la jerarquía y las protestas de la población que hicieron fracasar el esquema desintegrativo que permitió la llegada al poder de Putin, con su equipo proveniente de las fuerzas armadas y los servicios de seguridad, como nuevo estadio de la geopolítica rusa.

Considera que el fracaso de las campañas de Irak y Afganistán, la liberación de Sudamérica de la hegemonía de EEUU, en particular Venezuela, y el fracaso de la operación (¡supersic!) Primavera Árabe, debilitaron la influencia de EEUU en Rusia cuando Occidente exhibió sus pies de barro.

Rusia se libera así de su subordinación a los dictados de EEUU en la esfera de la geopolítica global y comienza un regreso suave a los principios de la geopolítica soviética, pero con diferentes bases conceptuales e ideológicas.

Juzga que los instrumentos más importantes de la influencia geopolítica rusa fueron creados con el único plan de una red de oleo/gasoductos.

A partir de la derrota de EEUU en Irak, Rusia operó un acercamiento con China cuando estableció sus tres proyectos geopolíticos exitosos: el Grupo de Shanghai, los BRICS y la Unión Euroasiática. El Grupo de Shanghai genera el espacio euroasiático de Bielorrusia a China mediante una unión económica.

Los BRICS han cortado en términos económicos el asa Anaconda (nota: del nombre de la ominosa serpiente constrictora más grande del mundo) rompiendo una profunda brecha en el sistema de zonas, la influencia de EEUU que cubre a Rusia.

En una entrevista a Pravda.ru (15/9/11), Konstantin explica el significado del cerco a Rusia por EEUU y su despliegue misilístico en la periferia inmediata rusa, parte del proyecto Anaconda: Rusia es todavía percibida por EEUU como el principal adversario estratégico y su tarea consiste en neutralizar las armas nucleares de Rusia y empujarlo fuera de las principales áreas de los océanos mundiales, aun del mar Negro.

La Unión Euroasiática (Rusia, Bielorrusia y Kazajstán) cubre 85 por ciento del territorio de la ex URSS y es el precursor de mayor integración en el espacio postsoviético.

Rusia se pronuncia por la multipolaridad, en cooperación particular con Europa continental que desea sacudirse la hegemonía de EEUU.

Juzga que los cambios tectónicos en la geopolítica global asociados a la transferencia del centro económico de gravedad a la región Asia/Pacífico, sumado de la crisis financiera occidental, implican la inevitabilidad de una seria reorganización del panorama geopolítico, acoplado con la amenaza de conflictos militares de gran escala (sic).

Aduce que el triunfo presidencial de Putin significó una fuerte derrota para las fuerzas occidentales internas en Rusia, lo cual disminuyó considerablemente su impacto en la geopolítica rusa, ya que el control occidental del país es un factor crítico para la restauración y conservación de la dominación del mundo por Occidente.

Los vectores prioritarios de la geopolítica rusa: 1. Al oeste: desarrollo de relaciones igualitarias con Europa y normalización de relaciones con EEUU, para prevenir el desliz a una nueva guerra fría. 2. Al sur: la zona del Cáucaso, medioriente y noráfrica, donde Rusia aspira a normalizar la situación militar y política y frenar los conflictos militares, sobre todo en Siria (¡supersic!) 3. En Sudamérica (nota: no Norteamérica ni Centroamérica: desarrollo de relaciones económicas), y 4. En Asia: el más importante hoy (¡supersic!) para Rusia donde se compromete a un mayor reforzamiento de buenas relaciones con sus grandes vecinos China e India, Vietnam, las dos (sic) Coreas, y la normalización de relaciones con Japón.

Llama la atención que Konstantin no haya citado la invasión de Georgia a Osetia del Sur y la vigorosa respuesta rusa que, a mi juicio, cambió dramáticamente al mundo (El mundo cambió en el Cáucaso; Bajo la Lupa, 20/8/08).

Ahora al unísono de Rusia, la misma serpiente constrictora Anaconda ha reaparecido en el océano Pacífico, donde tiene en la mira a la apetecible China, muy difícil de digerir.

Fuente: alfredojalife.com

Twitter: @AlfredoJalife

Facebook: AlfredoJalife

dimanche, 20 octobre 2013

La geopolítica existencial de Carlo Terracciano


por Alexander Dugin

E: http://paginatransversal.wordpress.com

La elección de Carlo Terracciano

Creo que Carlo Terracciano es uno de los más importantes geopolíticos europeos de los últimos decenios. Estoy convencido de que va a ser reconocido como uno de los clásicos  autores modernos de esta disciplina. Tuve la oportunidad de conocer a Carlo Terracciano personalmente, y siempre he admirado la rectitud de su posición ideológica en la vida: La geopolítica era para él una elección existencial, vivió en plena conformidad con sus principios, lo que demuestra algo impensable en nuestra época: Una actitud personal romana, olímpica – la lealtad, el apego total a la causa, la integridad moral completa sin tener en cuenta los efectos de las presiones de la modernidad.

Carlo Terracciano era un hombre de ideas y un hombre de acción, al mismo tiempo. En su caso, la teoría y la práctica se fusionaron en algo indivisible. ¿Cuál era su idea principal y cuál fue su acto esencial?

El nacimiento de la geopolítica de la espuma del mar

Carlo Terracciano heredó la tradición geopolítica del continentalismo europeo. En sus escritos (recopilados en una serie de artículos en “Nel Fiume della storia”), traza la génesis ideológica de esta escuela. El imperialista británico H. Mackinder fue el primero en articular la principal ley geopolítica – oposición dualista entre la civilización del Mar (talasocracia) y la civilización de la Tierra (telurocracia). Mackinder mismo era un brillante representante de la talasocracia y se encargó de transmitir la tradición de la estrategia talasocrática, el procedimiento de la percepción geopolítica de Gran Bretaña a los Estados Unidos. Mackinder fue uno de los fundadores de la London School of Economics, contribuyó a la aparición de “Chattem House”, el Real Centro de Estudios Estratégicos e inspiró el primer equipo del CFR (Consejo de Relaciones Exteriores), publicando en «Foreign Affairs» sus posteriores artículos. De él al americano A. Mahan se puede trazar la línea recta de la geopolítica atlantista, pasando por el realismo americano (con algo de “liberalismo muscular”, transnacionalismo y globalización) hasta llegar a Kissinger, Brzezinski, D. Rockefeller, por un lado, y los neocons en el otro.

La hegemonía planetaria de Estados Unidos y la idea de talasocracia global con el Gobierno Mundial deriva de la visión planetaria de Mackinder, llevada a sus límites lógicos. El mundo puede llegar a ser realmente global, sólo cuando el poder del Mar definitivamente acabe con el poder de la Tierra (o viceversa). Ese fue el objetivo de la vida de Mackinder. Y ahora vemos que muchos de sus proyectos se cumplen: insistía en el desmantelamiento de Rusia, en la creación de un “cordón sanitario” en Europa del Este, en la necesidad de derrotar a Alemania y Rusia, y todo esto de alguna manera se realizó a finales del siglo XX, proporcionando así las condiciones para el surgimiento de un mundo unipolar y la hegemonía global de EE.UU. Este imperio talasocrático se convierte en una realidad ante nuestros ojos.

Respuesta Continental


carlterr44.jpegPero en el primer cuarto del siglo XX, el desafío conceptual de H. Mackinder fue contestado por los geopolíticos que se ubicaron en el lado de la telurocracia. Se trataba, en primer lugar, de la escuela alemana de Karl Haushofer, quien comenzó a desarrollar una base geopolítica telurocrática, Geopolítica-2 (mientras que la geopolítica talasocrática anglosajona se puede llamar “Geopolítica-1″). Así se sentaron las bases para la tradición continentalista.

La escuela de Haushofer ofreció a Alemania realizar su naturaleza telurocrática y unificar Europa sobre la base continental; para lograrlo era necesario concluir una alianza con la Unión Soviética y fortalecer los lazos con Japón y así destruir la talasocracia mundial – la alianza de Inglaterra, EE.UU. y Francia. La consolidación de todas las potencias terrestres era la única manera de deshacerse de las potencias marítimas y la tentación de organizar el espacio mundial bajo su modelo talasocrático. Este concepto fue desarrollado por el proyecto de una nueva división del mundo sobre la base de las Pan-ideas – cuatro áreas que iban a ser integradas económicamente, políticamente y estratégicamente a lo largo del meridiano – de norte a sur. Haushofer había creado un importante baluarte conceptual de la Geopolítica-2, con el cual se sentaban las bases para el continentalismo europeo en el que Alemania fue concebida como el centro de la telurocracia europea (un hecho natural reconocido por el propio Mackinder).

Tras la derrota de Alemania y las potencias del Eje en la Segunda Guerra Mundial la geopolítica telurocrática ha sido desacreditada durante mucho tiempo y se perdió entre las sombras. Autores americanos han llegado a sugerir que habría que distinguir la anglosajona «Geopolitics» de la alemana «Geopolitik», identificando la primera como un “método completamente aceptable de análisis de la ciencia política en el ámbito de las relaciones internacionales”, y la segunda como”Fantasías imperialistas”. En estas definiciones de lo que es “científico” y lo que no, vemos sólo el típico doble rasero y la clásica propaganda política de los ganadores. Las potencias marítimas derrotaron a las potencias terrestres, y establecieron una disciplina colonial – en particular en el campo de la ciencia, porque el conocimiento, como Michel Foucault ha mostrado, es sinónimo de poder.

Sin embargo, la escuela continentalista de la geopolítica telurocrática continuó existiendo en Europa en condiciones marginales también después de la Segunda Guerra Mundial. Los ejemplos son las obras del general austríaco Jordis von Lohausen, el teórico belga y fundador del movimiento pan-europeo “Joven Europa” Jean Thiriart (a quien, casualmente, Carlo Terracciano encontró por primera vez en Moscú en mi apartamento en 1992) y el destacado filósofo francés Alain de Benoist. La característica principal de esta continental Gepolítica 2 es la visión del mundo desde el punto de vista de la Tierra. De esto podemos deducir fácilmente el papel de cada jugador en la “gran guerra de los continentes.” Los que están en el lado de la Tierra están automáticamente contra el mar, es decir, contra el mundo anglosajón, en contra de la dominación de EE.UU. y en contra de la globalización occidental  (mundialismo).

Testimonio telurocrático de Carlo Terracciano

Carlo Terracciano era un sucesor directo de la tradición geopolítica continentalista, el teórico más notable y persistente practicante de la Geopolítica-2. Su obra es quizás el ejemplo más completo y coherente de esta tradición. No se limita a seguir reciclando teorías pre-existentes, sino que aplica los principios básicos de la geopolítica telurocrática para analizar la situación actual en el mundo. No dejó una sombra de duda en su elección personal: habla en nombre de todo el continente de Europa, de la telurocracia. En las condiciones de ocupación y dominación atlantista talasocrática es un gesto viril de la rebelión espiritual y cognitiva. Así Terracciano lleva a cabo un acto simbólico importante: lo que constituye el polo subjetivo, dotado de la voluntad y de la mente, que surge del vertedero de la Europa post-moderna, convirtiéndose en un proyecto alternativo revolucionario de los países de Europa. Ésta posible pero aún no realizable Europa surge – aunque sea sólo en teoría – de entre las ruinas de la modernidad agonizante. Terracciano es una especie de testigo geopolítico, en sus escritos y acciones testifica que la victoria del Mar no es absoluta y que en Europa permanece una red de decidida resistencia geopolítica continentalista y que esta red es plenamente consciente de la naturaleza, finalidad y participaciones en la gran guerra de los continentes. Por lo tanto, Carlo Terracciano está salvando la geopolítica continental europea tradicional, preparando así el restablecimiento teórico de Europa.

Terracciano como Eurasiatista

Además, el momento decisivo en la evolución de las teorías Carlo Terracciano fue su encuentro con la tradición geopolítica eurasiatista restablecida en Rusia desde finales de los 80. La escuela moderna eurasiatista rusa de la geopolítica fue fundada a finales de los años 80 como una reflexión geopolítica post-soviética en la visión de mundo de Mackinder, como una especie de respuesta al desafío talasocrático. La lógica constituyente de la construcción de la geopolítica Eurasiatista era muy similar a la génesis de la geopolítica alemana de la escuela de Haushofer. Pero en el caso de Rusia, la simetría era aún más perfecta: Mackinder identificó como el principal enemigo del poder marítimo al Heartland, cuyo control garantiza a la talasocracia la dominación del mundo. Los eurasiatistas rusos en los últimos años 80 aceptaron el marco principal del mapa geopolítico y acordaron reconocer la esencia de la historia de Rusia en la telurocracia. La Rusia es el Heartland, así Geopolítica-2 es la causa rusa. Así se sentaron las bases del moderno neo-eurasismo.

La geopolítica euroasiática rusa se reunió con el continentalismo europeo en 1992 – durante una visita conjunta a Moscú de Carlo Terracciano y Jean Thiriart. Jean Thiriart fue el autor del concepto de “Imperio Euro- soviético de Vladivostok a Dublín” y Carlo Terracciano en esa época escribió su obra programática “En la espuma de la historia” (“Nel fiume della Storia”). Desde entonces el continentalismo europeo y el eurasismo ruso se convirtieron casi en la misma  línea geopolítica. Algo similar se describe en el concepto de Haushofer del proyecto continental del bloque geopolítico “Berlín-Moscú-Tokio”. La misma idea fue revivida en el plano teórico en los años 90 en Rusia. El estrecho diálogo geopolítico ruso – europeo comenzó entonces en Moscú y sigue creciendo hasta la actualidad. Al mismo tiempo, otros geopolíticos europeos, en particular Alain de Benoist y Claudio Mutti, visitaron Moscú, entrando en la misma dirección de consideraciones geopolíticas. En Francia, unos puntos de vista muy similares fueron desarrollados por el excelente escritor tradicionalista Jean Parvulesco.

Carlo Terracciano tuvo en esa amistad eurasiática el papel principal. Con una energía apasionada comenzó a desarrollar la tendencia eurasiatista, invitando a la unión en un bloque continental telurocrático de todos aquellas fuerzas inconformistas contra el status quo. Su obra, aunque se ha desarrollado en el ámbito de una élite intelectual y de escuelas geopolíticas, ha tenido un impacto considerable. Las ideas son importantes, y cualquier acción política siempre se inicia con el proyecto, el programa, la estrategia.

Islam y telurocracia

El análisis de la situación actual ha llevado a Carlo Terracciano a la conclusión de que muchos países islámicos y la civilización islámica en su conjunto debe ser considerada como una aliada crucial en la alianza telurocrática en la lucha común contra la hegemonía estadounidense y la globalización plutocrática. Por lo tanto, la importancia del factor islámico se ha convertido en un componente vital del neocontinentalismo moderno. Terracciano debe considerarse como uno de sus fundadores. El Islam es un Poder telurocrático – esta fue la conclusión a la que llegó Carlo Terracciano. Se convirtió desde entonces en una especie de axioma geopolítico para el eurasismo contemporáneo.

Terracciano hizo una serie de viajes y dio una serie de conferencias en los países islámicos – Irán, Siria, etc, promoviendo por todas partes la geopolítica euroasiática continentalista. Ideas y acciones, como siempre en el caso de Carlo Terracciano no difirieron.

Nacional comunismo

carloTerr.jpegLa formación de puntos de vista geopolíticos han estado acompañados por Terracciano con los correspondientes cambios ideológicos y políticos. La apelación a los criterios geopolíticos, los conceptos y la evaluación del significado crucial de telurocracia exigió la revisión de los fundamentos políticos del patriotismo clásico europeo, que por lo general se refiere a la “Tercera Posición” (anti-liberalismo y anti-comunismo), en el espíritu de Evola, Heidegger y Yockey. Si aceptamos el punto de vista de la potencia terrestre, la Unión Soviética pasó inmediatamente de ser uno de los dos enemigos de Europa (junto con el Occidente capitalista liberal, personificada en los EE.UU.) a ser un aliado. Esto requiere una revisión radical de la “Tercera Posición” y la transición a una fusión entre el europeísmo y el sovietismo, el nacional-bolchevismo. Por una evolución semejante a mediados de los 80′ pasó el máximo teórico de la europea “Nouvelle Droite” Alain de Benoist. A diferencia de muchos otros “nacional revolucionarios” Carlo Terracciano, sin dudarlo, aceptó la dirección ideológica nacional-comunista y se convirtió en uno de los líderes del comunismo nacional en Italia. El Anti-sovietismo y el anticomunismo (sobre todo ahora, después de la caída de la Unión Soviética) se convirtieron en obsoletos y sirven como herramientas en las manos de talasocracia, los liberales y los globalistas. Así que cada ciudadano europeo coherentemente revolucionario debe resueltamente terminar con eso y cooperar activamente con todas las fuerzas de izquierda que luchan contra la hegemonía estadounidense y el capitalismo liberal, que encarnan la esencia de la talasocracia y la civilización del mar. Este giro a la izquierda de Terracciano fue la conclusión lógica de su análisis geopolítico, y él ha dado pasos más decisivos en esta dirección uniéndose así con la tradición de la “Joven Europa” (siguiendo el ejemplo de Claudio Mutti, amigo y colega de Carlo Terracciano ), y convirtiéndose en un pionero de las nuevas tendencias nacional-comunistas y eurasiatistas en la política moderna italiana y europea. Para esta posición política Carlo Terracciano consagró todo un libro bajo el expresivo nombre de “Comunismo Nacional”.

La justicia social es un valor de la sociedad tradicional. La jerarquía basada en el principio material y la estratificación de clases, que constituye la base del capitalismo, es el mal absoluto y debe ser abolida. La lucha contra el liberalismo, el capitalismo y la oligarquía global por la libertad, la justicia y el orden social basado en la solidaridad y la ayuda mutua es la principal tarea de los nacional-revolucionarios. No se puede tolerar compromiso alguno con la burguesía y sus valores mercantilistas, materialistas y egoístas. El hombre es un ser social. La tradición es una causa del ser colectivo, una causa social. Con el fin de afirmar la sociedad tradicional y aplicarla a escala mundial, es necesario destruir la cosmópolis capitalista fundada en la veneración incondicional del “becerro de oro”. Y en este caso las fuerzas de izquierdas que luchan por la justicia social, son aliadas y amigas, así como las fuerzas de la derecha, que defienden los valores tradicionales – como la espiritualidad, la fe y la fidelidad a las raíces (de hecho, todos éstos valores son incompatibles con el capitalismo y el espíritu comercial).

Tradicionalismo y la geopolítica de lo Sagrado

Por último, el aspecto crucial del pensamiento de Carlo Terracciano se asocia con el tradicionalismo y la Tradición. Terracciano siguió el camino trazado por Julius Evola, viéndose a sí mismo como portador de las tradiciones espirituales de Occidente, que se remontan a las profundidades de la antigüedad, al neoplatonismo greco-romano. Era respetuoso frente al Islam y el hinduismo, sentía simpatía por la ortodoxia griega y rusa, pero hasta el final de sus días se abstuvo de aclarar sus puntos de vista religiosos con una confesión concreta. Él era un tradicionalista y un fuerte partidario de los antiguos valores indoeuropeos. Estos valores, a su juicio, tenían que estar en el centro de la guerra santa que él libró contra el mundo moderno.

La tradición está ligada a la tierra. La modernidad está vinculada al mar. Telurocracia significa Tradición, la modernidad significa talasocracia. Así la geopolítica de Terracciano obtiene una dimensión sagrada. No es sólo un instrumento técnico para el correcto análisis político o la planificación estratégica, sino una ideología, una elección espiritual, una llamada para una batalla sagrada escatológica, un Endkampf, que nos exige movilizar todo nuestro ser.

Muy buen guerrero

Carlo Terracciano nos da un ejemplo de cómo debería ser la vida de un auténtico geopolítico en el campo de la ciencia, la teoría, la existencia, la ontología, la escatología. Esta es la movilización total del alma, el pago completo de las creencias de todo el contenido de la vida heroica y trágica.

Hoy en día muchos se quejan de que no hay más lugar para los actos heroicos y luchas, todo está condenado a perder desde el principio, nada puede dar resultados empíricos. Esto sólo demuestra debilidad, cobardía y bajeza. Si creemos en algo y nuestra fe es suficientemente fuerte, somos siempre capaces de cambiar el mundo. No hay enemigo imbatible para el ardiente espíritu humano. Carlo Terracciano nos da el ejemplo de un hombre que hasta su último aliento defendió sus creencias. Sus creencias son nuestras creencias. Su lucha es nuestra lucha. Y la lucha de aquellos que vendrán después de nosotros.

Confieso que no me interesa qué clase de hombre era Carlo Terracciano, aunque sus amigos afirman que era genial, amable, honesto. No importa. Es subjetivo. Objetivamente, él era un héroe. El verdadero héroe del continente, de la civilización de la tierra, de Eurasia. Y eso es mucho más importante. Sólo la idea sí importa. Y otra cosa también tiene importancia – la vida humana arrojada al fuego de una gran fe y una gran causa.

Un tradicional proverbio japonés dice: No sólo es bueno el guerrero que sirve honestamente a un buen Estado, bueno es el guerrero que sirve honestamente a cualquier estado – entre ellos el muy malo, y este servicio honesto es el que convierte al mal estado en uno bueno. Carlo Terracciano era un guerrero muy bueno. El guerrero de Europa.

Texto original: Open Revolt

Traducido para TM por Felix W.

Fuente: Tribulaciones Metapolíticas

samedi, 12 octobre 2013

Multipolarism as an Open Project


Multipolarism as an Open Project

 Professor of the Moscow State University, Doctor of political sciences, founder of the contemporary Russian school of Geopolitics, leader of the International Social Movement “Eurasian Movement”, Moscow, Russian Federation.


I. Multipolarism and “Land Power”

Geopolitics of the Land in the Global World

In the previous part we discussed the subject of globalism, globalization, and mondialism in a view considered to be generally accepted and “conventional”. Geopolitical analysis of the phenomenon of the subject of globalism, globalization, and mondialism has showed that in the modern globalism we only deal with one of the two geopolitical powers, namely, with a thalassocracy, a “Sea Power” that from now on claims for uniqueness, totality, and normativeness and strives to pretend to be the only possible civilization, sociological and geopolitical condition of the world.

Therewith, the philosophy of globalism is based upon the internal surety with universalism of exactly the Western-European value system thought to be the summary of all the diverse experience of the human cultures on all stages of their history.

And finally, in its roots, globalization has an active ideology (mondialism) and power structures that spread and bring this ideology into use. If taking into account that the latter are the most authoritative intellectual US centers (such as CFR and neoconservatives), structures of the US Supreme Military Command and their analysts (Owens, Sibrowsky, Barnett, Garstka), international oligarchs (such as George Soros), a number of international organizations (The Bilderberg Club, Trilateral Commission, etc.), and innumerous amount of analysts, politicians, journalists, scientists, economists, people of culture and art, and IT sector employees spread all over the world, we can understand the reason why this ideology seems to be something that goes without saying for us. That we sometimes take globalization as an “objective process” is the result of a huge manipulation with public opinion and the fruit of a total information war.

Therefore, the picture of global processes we described is an affirmation of the real state of affairs just in part. In such a description, there is a significant share of a normative and imperative volitional (ideological) wish that everything should be quite so, which means, it is based upon wrenches and, to some extent, striving to represent our wishful thinking as reality.

In this part, we will describe an absolutely different point of view on globalization and globalism that is impossible from inside the “Sea Power”, i.e. out of the environment of the nominal “Global World”. Such a view is not taken into account either in antiglobalism or in alterglobalism because it refuses from the most fundamental philosophical and ideological grounds of Eurocentrism.  Such a view rejects the faith in:

  •  universalism of the Western values, that Western societies, in their history, have passed the only possible way all the other countries are expected to pass;
  • progress as an indisputable forwardness of historical and social development;
  • that it is limitless technical, economical, and material development, which is the answer for the most vital needs of all humankind;
  • that people of all cultures, religions, civilizations, and ethnoses are principally the same as the people of the West and they are governed by the same anthropological motives;
  • absolute superiority of capitalism over other sociopolitical formations;
  • absence of any alternative for market economy;
  • that liberal democracy is the only acceptable form of political organization of the society;
  • individual freedom and individual identity as the superior value of human being;
  • liberalism as a historically inevitable, higher-priority, and optimal ideology.

In other words, we proceed to the position of the “Land Power” and consider the present moment of the world history from the point of view of Geopolitics-2, or the thalassocratic geopolitics as an episode of the “Great Continent War”, not as its conclusion.

Of course, it is difficult to refuse that the present moment of historical development demonstrates a number of unique features that, if desired, can be interpreted as the ultimate victory of the Sea over the Land, Carthage over Rome and Leviathan over Behemoth. Indeed, never in history the “Sea Power” was such a serious success and stretched might and influence of its paradigm in such a scale. Of course, Geopolitics-2 acknowledges this fact and the consequences included. But it clearly realizes that globalization can be also interpreted otherwise, namely, as a series of victories in combats and battles, not as the ultimate win in the war.

Here, a historical analogy suggests itself: when German troops were approaching to Moscow in 1941, one could think that everything was lost and the end of the USSR was foredoomed. The Nazi propaganda commented the course of the war quiet so: the “New Order” is created in the occupied territory, the authorities work, economical and political hierarchy is created, and the social life is organized. But the Soviet people kept on violently resisting – at all the fronts as well as in the rear of the enemy, while systematically moving to their goal and their victory.

Now, there is precisely this moment in the geopolitical stand of the Sea and the Land. Information policy inside the “Sea Power” is built so as no-one has any doubt that globalism is an accomplished fact and the global society has come about in its essential features, that all the obstacles from now on are of a technical character. But from certain conceptual, philosophical, sociological, and geopolitical positions, all of it can be challenged by suggesting an absolutely different vision of the situation. All the point is in interpretation. Historical facts make no sense without interpretation. Likewise in geopolitics: any state of affairs in the field of geopolitics only makes sense in one or another interpretation. Globalism is interpreted today almost exclusively in the Atlantist meaning and, thus, the “sea” sense is put into it. A view from the Land’s position doesn’t change the state of affairs but it does change its sense. And this, in many cases, is of fundamental importance.

Further, we will represent the view on globalization and globalism from the Land’s position – geopolitical, sociological, philosophical, and strategical.

Grounds for Existence of Geopolitics-2 in the Global World

How can we substantiate the very possibility of a view on globalization on the part of the Land, assuming that the structure of the global world, as we have shown, presupposes marginalization and fragmentation of the Land?

There are several grounds for this.

  1. The human spirit (conscience, will, faith) is always capable to formulate its attitude to any ambient phenomenon and even if this phenomenon is presented as invincible, integral, and “objective”, it is possible to take it in a different way – accept or reject, justify or condemn. This is the superior dignity of man and his difference from animal species. And if man rejects and condemns something, he has the right to build strategies to overcome it in any, most difficult and insuperable, situations and conditions. The advance of the global society can be accepted and approved but it can be rejected and condemned as well. In the former case, we float adrift the history, in the latter one – we seek a “fulcrum” to stop this process. History is made by people and the spirit plays the central part here. Hence, there is a theoretical possibility to create a theory radically opposite to the views that are built on the base of the “Sea Power” and accept basic paradigms of the Western view on the things, course of history, and logic of changing sociopolitical structures.
  2. The geopolitical method allows to identify globalization as a subjective process connected with a success of one of the two global powers. Be the Land ever so “marginal and fragmentized», it has serious historical grounds behind itself, traditions, experience, sociological and civilization background. The Land’s geopolitics is not built on a void place; this is a tradition that generalizes some fundamental historical, geographical, and strategical trends. Therefore, even on the theoretical level, estimation of globalization from the position of Geopolitics-2 is absolutely relevant. Just as well as there is the “subject” of globalization in its center (mondialism and its structures), the Land Power can and does have its own subjective embodiment. In spite of a huge scale and massive forms of the historical polemics of civilizations, we, first of all, deal with a stand of minds, ideas, concepts, theories, and only then – with that of material things, devices, technologies, finances, weapons, etc.
  3. The process of desovereignization of national states has not yet become nonreversible, and the elements of the Westphalian system are still being partly preserved. That means that a whole range of national states, by virtue of certain consideration, can still bank on realization of the land strategy, i.e. they can completely or partially reject globalization and the “Sea Power’s” paradigm. China is an example of it; it balances between globalization and its own land identity, strictly observing that the general balance is kept and that only what consolidates China as a sovereign geopolitical formation is borrowed from the global strategies. The same can be also said about the states the US have equaled to the “Axis of Evil” — Iran, Cuba, North Korea, Venezuela, Syria, etc. Of course, the threat of a direct intrusion of US troops hangs over these countries like the sword of Damocles (on the model of Iraq or Afghanistan), and they are continuously subject to more politic network attacks from inside. However, at the moment their sovereignty is preserved what makes them privileged areas for development of the Land Power. It is also possible to refer here a number of hesitant countries, such as India, Turkey and others, which, being significantly involved into the globalization orbit, preserve their original sociological features, getting out of accord with the official precepts of their governing regimes. Such situation is characteristic of many Asian. Latin-American and African societies. 
  4. And, finally, the most general. — The present state of Heartland. The world dominance, as we know, and thus, reality or evanescence of monopolar globalization depends on it. In 1980-90-s, Heartland fundamentally reduced its influence area. Two geopolitical belts – Eastern Europe (whose countries were within the “Socialist Block”, “Warsaw Pact», Comecon, etc.) and the Federative Republics of the USSR consistently withdrew from it. By the mid 1990-s, a bloody testing for a possibility of further breakdown of Russia into “national republics” had started in Chechnya. This fragmentation of Heartland, down to a mosaic of marionette dependent states in place of Russia, had to become the final accord of construction of the global world and the “end of history”, after which it would be much more difficult to speak about the Land and Geopolitics-2. Heartland is of central importance in the possibility of strategical consolidation of all Eurasia and, thus, the “Land Power”. If the processes that took place in Russia in 1990-s had moved in a groove and its disintegration kept on, it would be much more difficult to challenge globalization. But since late 1990-s — early 2000-s, a turning-point has taken place in Russia, disintegration was stopped; moreover, the federal authorities have restored control over the rebellious Chechnya. Then V. Putin implemented a legal reform of the Federation subjects (excision of the article about “sovereignty”, governors’ appointment, etc.) that has consolidated the power vertical all over Russia. The CCI integration processes have started gathering pace. In August 2008, in the course of the five-day conflict of Russia with Georgia, Russia took its direct control over territories beyond the borders of the Russian Federation (Southern Ossetia, Abkhazia), and acknowledged their independence, in spite of a huge support of Georgia on the part of the US and the NATO countries and pressure of the international public opinion. Generally, since early 2000-s Russia as Heartland has ceased the processes of its self-disintegration, has reinforced its energetics, has normalized the issues of energy supply abroad, has refused from the practice of unilateral reduction of armaments, having preserved its nuclear potential. Whereby, influence of the network of geopolitical agents of Atlantism and Mondialism on the political authority and strategical decision making has qualitatively diminished, consolidation of the sovereignty has been understood as the top-priority issue, and integration of Russia into a number of globalist structures menacing its independence has been ceased. In a word, Heartland keeps on remaining the foundation of Eurasia, its “Core” — weakened, suffered very serious losses, but still existing, independent, sovereign, and capable to pursue a policy, if not on a global scale, then on a regional one. In its history, Russia has several times fallen yet lower: the Domain Fragmentation on the turn of the 13th century, The Time of Troubles, and the events of 1917-1918 show us Heartland in a yet more deplorable and weakened condition. But every time, in some period, Russia revived and returned to the orbit of its geopolitical history again. The present state of Russia is difficult to recognize brilliant or even satisfactory from the geopolitical (Eurasian) point of view. Yet in general — Heartland does exist, it is relatively independent, and therefore, we have both a theoretical and practical base to consolidate and bring to life all the pre-conditions for development of a response to the phenomenon of monopolar globalization on the part of the Land.

Such an answer of the Land to the challenge of globalization (as a triumph of the “Sea Power”) is Multipolarism, as a theory, philosophy, strategy, policy, and practice.

Multipolarism as a Project of the World Order from the Land’s Position

Multipolarism represents a summary of Geopolitics-2 in actual conditions of the global process evolution. This is an extraordinarily capacious concept that demands a through consideration.

Multipolarism is a real antithesis for monopolarity in all its aspects: hard (imperialism, neocons, direct US domination), soft (multilateralism) and critical (alterglobalism, postmodernism, and neo-Marxism) ones.

The hard monopolarity version (radical American imperialism) is based upon the idea that the US represents the last citadel of the world order, prosperity, comfort, safety, and development surrounded by a chaos of underdeveloped societies. Multipolarism states the directly opposite: the US is a national state that exists among many others, its values are doubtful (or, at least, relative), its claims are disproportional, its appetites are excessive, methods of conducting its foreign policy are inacceptable, and its technological messianism is disastrous for the culture and ecology of the whole world.  In this regard, the multipolar project is a hard antithesis to the US as an instance that methodically builds a unipolar world, and it is aimed to strongly disallow, break up, and prevent this construction.

The soft monopolarity version does not only act on behalf of the US, but on behalf of “humanity”, exclusively understanding it as the West and the societies that agree with universalism of Western values. Soft monopolarity does not claim to press by force, but persuade, not to compel, but explain profits peoples and countries will obtain from entering into globalization. Here the pole is not a single national state (the US), but Western civilization as a whole, as a quintessence of all the humanity.

Such, as it is sometimes called, “multilateral” monopolarity (multilateralism, multilateralization) is rejected by Multipolarism that considers Western culture and Western values to represent merely one axiological composition among many others, one culture among different other cultures, and cultures and value systems based on some absolutely different principles to have the full right for existence. Consequently, the West in a whole and those sharing its values, have no grounds to insist on universalism of democracy, human rights, market, individualism, individual freedom, secularity, etc. and build a global society on the base of these guidelines.

Against alterglobalism and postmodern antiglobalism, Multipolarism advances a thesis that a capitalist phase of development and construction of worldwide global capitalism is not a necessary phase of society development, that it is despotism and an ambition to dictate different societies some kind of single history scenario. In the meantime, confusion of mankind into the single global proletariat is not a way to a better future, but an incidental and absolutely negative aspect of the global capitalism, which does not open any new prospects and only leads to degradation of cultures, societies, and traditions. If peoples do have a chance to organize effective resistance to the global capitalism, it is only where Socialist ideas are combined with elements of a traditional society (archaic, agricultural, ethnical, etc.), as it was in the history of the USSR, China, North Korea, Vietnam and takes place today in some Latin-American countries (e. g., in Bolivia, Venezuela, Cuba, etc.).

Further, Multipolarism is an absolutely different view on the space of land than bipolarity, a bipolar world.



Multipolarism represents a normative and imperative view on the present situation in the world on the part of the Land and it qualitatively differs from the model predominated in the Yalta World in the period of the “Cold War”.

The Bipolar World was constructed under the ideological principle, where two ideologies – Capitalism and Socialism – acted as poles. Socialism as an ideology did not challenge universalism of the West-European culture and represented a sociocultural and political tradition that threw back to the European Enlightenment. In a certain sense, Capitalism and Socialism competed with each other as two versions of Enlightenment, two versions of progress, two versions of universalism, two versions of the West-European sociopolitical idea.

Socialism and Marxism entered into a resonance with certain parameters of the “Land Power”, and therefore they did not win where Marx had supposed, but where he excluded this possibility – in an agricultural country with the predominant way of life of a traditional society and imperial organization of the political field. Another case of an (independent) victory of Socialism – China – also represented an agricultural, traditional society.

Multipolarism does not oppose monopolarity from the position of a single ideology that could claim for the second pole, but it does from the position of many ideologies, a plenty of cultures, world-views and religions that (each for its own reasons) have nothing in common with the Western liberal capitalism.  In a situation, when the Sea has a unified ideological aspect (however, ever more going to the sphere of subauditions, not explicit declarations), and the Land itself doesn’t, representing itself as several different world-view and civilization ensembles, Multipolarism suggests creating a united front of the Land against the Sea.

Multipolarism is different from both the conservative project of conservation and reinforcement of national states. On the one hand, national states in both colonial and post-colonial period reflect the West-European understanding of a normative political organization (that ignores any religious, social, ethnical, and cultural features of specific societies) in their structures, i.e. the nations themselves are partially products of globalization. And on the other hand, it is only a minor part of the two hundred fifty-six countries officially itemized in the UN list today that are, if necessary, capable to defend their sovereignty by themselves, without entering into a block or alliance with other countries. It means that not each nominal sovereign state can be considered a pole, as the degree of strategical freedom of the vast majority of the countries acknowledged is negligible. Therefore, reinforcement of the Westphalian system that still mechanically exists today is not an issue of Multipolarism.

Being the opposition of monopolarity, Multipolarism does not call to either return to the bipolar world on the base of ideology or to fasten the order of national states, or to merely preserve the status quo. All these strategies will only play in hands of globalization and monopolarity centers, as they have a project, a plan, a goal, and a rational route of movement to future; and all the scenarios enumerated are at best an appeal to a delay of the globalization process, and at worst (restoration of bipolarity on the base of ideology) look like irresponsible fantasy and nostalgia.

Multipolarism is a vector of the Land’s geopolitics directed to the future. It is based upon a sociological paradigm whose consistency is historically proven in the past and which realistically takes into account the state of affairs existing in the modern world and basic trends and force lines of its probable transformations. But Multipolarism is constructed on this basis as a project, as a plan of the world order we yet only expect to create.

2 Multipolarism and its Theoretical Foundation

The absence of the Multipolarism Theory

In spite of the fact that the term “Multipolarism” is quite often used in political and international discussions recently, its meaning is rather diffuse and inconcrete. Different circles and separate analysts and politicians insert their own sense in it. Well-founded researches and solid scientific monographs devoted to Multipolarism can be counted on fingers[1]. Even serious articles on this topic are quite rare[2]. The reason for this is well understood: as the US and Western countries set the parameters of the normative political and ideological discourse in a global scale today, according to these rules, whatever you want can be discussed but the sharpest and most painful questions. Even those considering unipolarity to have been just a “moment[3]” in the 1990-s and a transfer to some new indefinite model to be taking place now are ready to discuss any versions but the “multipolar” one. Thus, for example, the modern head of CFR Richard Haass tells about “Non-Polarity” meaning such stage of globalization where necessity in presence of a rigid center falls off by itself[4]. Such wiles are explained by the fact that one of the aims of globalization is, as we have seen, marginalization of the “Land Power”. And as far as Multipolarism can only be a form of an active strategy of the “Land Power” in the new conditions, any reference to it is not welcome by the West that sets the trend in the structure of political analysis in the general global context. Still less one should expect that conventional ideologies of the West take up development of the Multipolarism Theory.

It would be logical to assume that the Multipolarism Theory will be developed in the countries that explicitly declare orientation upon a multipolar world as the general vector of their foreign policy. The number of such countries includes Russia, China, India, and some others. Besides, the address to Multipolarism can be encountered in texts and documents of some European political actors (e.g., former French minister of Foreign Affairs Hubert Vidrine[5]). But at the moment, we can as well hardly find something more than materials of several symposiums and conferences with rather vague phrases in this field. One has to state that the topic of Multipolarism is not properly conceptualized also in the countries that proclaim it as their strategical goal, not to mention the absence a distinct and integral theory of Multipolarism.

Nevertheless, on the base of the geopolitical method from the position of the “Land Power” and with due account for the analysis of a phenomenon called globalism, it is quite possible to formulate some absolute principles that must underlie the Multipolarism Theory when the matter comes to its more systemized and expanded development.

Multipolarism: Geopolitics and Meta-Ideology

Let’s blueprint some theoretical sources, on whose base a valuable theory of Multipolarism must be built.

It is only geopolitics that can be the base for this theory in the actual conditions. At the moment, no religious, economical, political, social, cultural or economical ideology is capable to pull together the critical mass of the countries and societies that refer to the “Land Power” in a single planetary front necessary to make a serious and effective antithesis to globalism and the unipolar world. This is the specificity of the historical moment (“The Unipolar Moment”[6]): the dominating ideology (the global liberalism/post-liberalism) has no symmetrical opposition on its own level. Hence, it is necessary to directly appeal to geopolitics by taking the principle of the Land, the Land Power, instead of the opposing ideology. It is only possible in the case if the sociological, philosophical, and civilization dimensions of geopolitics are realized to the full extent.

AD4pt-greece.jpgThe “Sea Power” will serve us as a proof for this statement. We have seen that the very matrix of this civilization does not only occur in the Modem Period, but also in thalassocratic empires of the Antiquity (e.g., in Carthage), in the ancient Athens or in the Republic of Venice. And within the Modern World itself atlantism and liberalism do not as well find complete predominance over the other trends at once. And nevertheless, we can trace the conceptual sequence through a series of social formations: the “Sea Power” (as a geopolitical category) moves through history taking various forms till it finds its most complete and absolute aspect in the global world where its internal precepts become predominant in a planetary scale. In other words, ideology of the modern mondialism is only a historical form of a more common geopolitical paradigm. But there is a direct relation between this (probably, most absolute) form and the geopolitical matrix.

There is no such direct symmetry in case of the “Land Power”. The Communism ideology just partly (heroism, collectivism, antiliberalism) resonated with geopolitical percepts of the “ground” society (and this just in the concrete form of the Eurasian USSR and, to a lesser degree, of China), as the other aspects of this ideology (progressism, technology, materialism) fitted badly in the axiological structure of the “Land Power”. And today, even in theory, Communism cannot perform the mobilizing ideological function it used to perform in the 20th century in a planetary scale. From the ideological point of view the Land is really split into fragments and, in the nearest future, we can hardly expect some new ideology capable to symmetrically withstand the liberal globalism to appear. But the very geopolitical principle of the Land does not lose anything in its paradigmatic structure. It is this principle that must be taken as a foundation for construction of the Multipolarism Theory. This theory must address directly to geopolitics, draw principles, ideas, methods and terms out of it. This will allow to otherwise take both the wide range of existing non-globalist and counter-globalist ideologies, religions, cultures, and social trends. It is absolutely unnecessary to shape them to transform into something unified and systematized. They can well remain local or regional but be integrated into a front of common stand against globalization and “Western Civilization’s” domination on the meta-ideological level, on the paradigmatic level of Geopolitics-2 and this moment – plurality of ideologies – is already laid in the very term “Multi-polarism” (not only within the strategical space, but also in the field of the ideological, cultural, religious, social, and economical one).

Multipolarism is nothing but extension of Geopolitics-2 (geopolitics of the Land) into a new environment characterized with the advance of globalism (as atlantism) on a qualitatively new level and in qualitatively new proportions. Multipolarism has no other sense.

Geopolitics of the Land and its general vectors projected upon the modern conditions are the axis of the Multipolarism Theory, on which all the other aspects of this theory are threaded. These aspects constitute philosophical, sociological, axiological, economical, and ethical parts of this theory. But all of them are anyway conjugated with the acknowledged – in an extendedly sociological way – structure of the “Land Power” and with the direct sense of the very concept of “Multipolarism” that refers us to the principles of plurality, diversity, non-universalism, and variety.

3 Multipolarism and Neo-Eurasianism

Neo-Eurasianism as Weltanschauung

Neo-Eurasianism is positioned nearest to the theory of Multipolarism. This concept roots in geopolitics and operates par excellence with the formula of “Russia-Eurasia” (as Heartland) but at the same time develops a wide range of ideological, philosophical, sociological and politological fields, instead of being only limited with geostrategy and application analysis.

What is in the term of “Neo-Eurasianism” can be illustrated with fragments of the Manifesto of the International “Eurasian Movement” “Eurasian Mission»[7]. Its authors point out five levels in Neo-Eurasianism allowing to interpret it in a different way depending on a concrete context.

The first level: Eurasianism is a Weltanschauung.

According to the authors of the Manifesto, the term “Eurasianism” “is applied to a certain Weltanschauung, a certain political philosophy that combines in itself tradition, modernity and even elements of postmodern in an original manner. The philosophy of Eurasianism proceeds from priority of values of the traditional society, acknowledges the imperative of technical and social modernization (but without breaking off cultural roots), and strives to adapt its ideal program to the situation of a post-industrial, information society called “postmodern”.

The formal opposition between tradition and modernity is removed in postmodern. However, postmodernism in the atlantist aspect levels them from the position of indifference and exhaustiveness of contents. The Eurasian postmodern, on the contrary, considers the possibility for an alliance of tradition with modernity to be a creative, optimistic energetic impulse that induces imagination and development.

In the Eurasianism philosophy, the realities superseded by the period of Enlightenment obtain a legitimate place – these are religion, ethnos, empire, cult, legend, etc. In the same time, a technological breakthrough, economical development, social fairness, labour liberation, etc. are taken from the Modern. The oppositions are overcome by merging into a single harmonious and original theory that arouses fresh ideas and new decisions for eternal problems of humankind. (…)

The philosophy of Eurasianism is an open philosophy, it is free from any forms of dogmatism. It can be appended by diversified areas – history, religion, sociological and ethnological discoveries, geopolitics, economics, regional geography, culturology, various types of strategical and politological researches, etc. Moreover, Eurasianism as a philosophy assumes an original development in each concrete cultural and linguistic context: Eurasianism of the Russians will inevitably differ from Eurasianism of the French or Germans, Eurasianism of the Turks from Eurasianism of the Iranians; Eurasianism of the Arabs from Eurasianism of the Chinese, etc. Whereby, the main force lines of this philosophy will, in a whole, be preserved unalterable.(…)

The following items can be called general reference points of the Eurasianism philosophy:

  • differentialism, pluralism of value systems against obligatory domination of a single ideology (in our case and first of all, of the American liberal democracy);
  • traditionalism against destruction of cultures, beliefs and rites of the traditional society;
  • a world-state, continent-state against both bourgeois national states and “the world government”;
  • rights of nations against omnipotence of “the Golden Billion” and neo-colonial hegemony of “the Rich North”;
  • an ethnos as a value and subject of history against depersonalization of nations and their alienation in artificial sociopolitical constructions;
  • social fairness and solidarity of labour people against exploitation, logic of coarse gain, and humiliation of man by man.»[8]

Neo-Eurasianism as a Planetary Trend

On the second level: Neo-Eurasianism is a planetary trend. The authors of the Manifesto explain:

«Eurasianism on the level of a planetary trend is a global, revolutionary, civilization concept that is, by gradually improving, addressed to become a new ideological platform of mutual understanding and cooperation for a vast conglomerate of different forces, states, nations, cultures, and confessions that refuse from the Atlantic globalization.

It is worth carefully reading the statements of the most diverse powers all over the world: politicians, philosophers, and intellectuals and we will make sure that Eurasianists constitute the vast majority. Mentality of many nations, societies, confession, and states is, though they may not suspect about it themselves, Eurasianist.

If thinking about this multitude of different cultures, religions, confessions, and countries discordant with “the end of history” we are imposed by atlantism, our courage will grow up and the seriousness of risks of realization of the American 21st century strategical security concept related with a unipolar world establishment will sharply increase.

Eurasianism is an aggregate of all natural and artificial, objective and subjective obstacles on the way of unipolar globalization, whereby it is elevated from a mere negation to a positive project, a creative alternative. While these obstacles exist discretely and chaotically, the globalists deal with them separately. But it is worth just integrating, pulling them together in a single, consistent Weltanschauung of a planetary character and the chances for victory of Eurasianism all over the world will be very serious.»[9]

Neo-Eurasianism as an Integration Project

On the next level, Neo-Eurasianism is treated as a project of strategical integration of the Eurasian Continent:

“The concept “the Old World” usually defining Europe can be considered much wider. This huge multicivilization space populated with nations, states, cultures, ethnoses and confessions connected between each other historically and spatially by the community of dialectical destiny. The Old World is a product of organic development of human history.

The Old World is usually set against the New World, i.e. the American continent that was discovered by the Europeans and has become a platform for construction of an artificial civilization where the European projects of the Modern, the period of Enlightenment have taken shape. (…)

In the 20th century Europe realized its original essence and had gradually been moving to integration of all the European states into a single Union capable to provide all this space with sovereignty, independence, security, and freedom.

Creation of the European Union was the greatest milestone in the mission of Europe’s return in history. This was the response of “the Old World” to the exorbitant demands of the “New” one. If considering the alliance between the US and Western Europe – with US domination – to be the Atlantist vector of European development, then the integration of European nations themselves with predomination of the continental countries (France-Germany) can be considered Eurasianism in relation to Europe.

It becomes especially illustrative, if taking into account the theories that Europe geopolitically stretches from the Atlantic to the Urals (Ch. de Gaulle) or to Vladivostok. In other words, the interminable spaces of Russia are also valuably included in the field of the Old World subject to integration.

(…) Eurasianism in this context can be defined as a project of strategical, geopolitical, economical integration of the North of the Eurasian Continent realized as the cradle of European history, matrix of nations and cultures closely interlaced between each other.

And since Russia itself (like, by the way, the ancestors of many Europeans as well) is related in a large measure with the Turkish, Mongolian world, with Caucasian nations, through Russia – and in a parallel way through Turkey – does the integrating Europe as the Old World already acquire the Eurasianism dimension to full extent; and in this case, not only in symbolic sense, but also in geographical one. Here Eurasianism can be synonimically identified with Continentalism.[10]»

These three most general definitions of Neo-Eurasianism demonstrate that here we deal with a preparatory basis for construction of the Multipolarism Theory. This is the ground view on the sharpest challenges of modernity and attempt to give an adjust response to them taking into account geopolitical, civilization, sociological, historical and philosophical regularities.

[1]  Murray D.,  Brown D. (eds.) Multipolarity in the 21st Century. A New World Order. Abingdon, UK: Routledge, 2010; Ambrosio Th. Challenging America global Preeminence: Russian Quest for Multipolarity. Chippenheim, Wiltshire: Anthony Rose, 2005; Peral L. (ed.) Global Security in a Multi-polar World. Chaillot

Paper. Paris: European Institute for Security Studies, 2009; Hiro D. After Empire: The Birth of a Multipolar World. Yale: Nation Books , 2009.

[2] Turner Susan. Russia, Chine and the Multipolar World Order: the danger in the undefined// Asian Perspective. 2009. Vol. 33, No. 1. C. 159-184; Higgott Richard Multi-Polarity and Trans-Atlantic Relations: Normative Aspirations and Practical Limits of EU Foreign Policy. – www.garnet-eu.org. 2010. [Electronic resource] URL: http://www.garnet-eu.org/fileadmin/documents/working_papers/7610.pdf (дата обращения 28.08.2010); Katz M. Primakov Redux. Putin’s Pursuit of «Multipolarism» in Asia//Demokratizatsya. 2006. vol.14 № 4. C.144-152.

[3] Krauthammer Ch. The Unipolar Moment// Foreign Affairs. 1990 / 1991 Winter. Vol. 70, No 1. С. 23-33.

[4] Haass R. The Age of Non-polarity: What will follow US Dominance?’//Foreign Affairs.2008. 87 (3). С. 44-56.

[5] Déclaration de M. Hubert Védrine, ministre des affaires étrangères sur la reprise d’une dialogue approfondie entre la France et l’Hinde: les enjeux de la resistance a l’uniformisation culturelle et aux exces du monde unipolaire. New Delhi — 1 lesdiscours.vie-publique.fr. 7.02.2000.  [Electronic resource] URL: http://lesdiscours.vie-publique.fr/pdf/003000733.pdf

[6] Krauthammer Ch. The Unipolar Moment. Op.cit.

[7] Евразийская миссия. Манифест Международного «Евразийского Движения». М.: Международное Евразийское Движение, 2005.

[8] Ibid

[9] Ibid.

[10] Ibid.

This entry was posted in Journal of Eurasian Affairs, vol.1, Num.1, 2013 by eurasianaffairs. Bookmark the permalink.

mercredi, 09 octobre 2013

The Western Challenge to Eurasian Integration


The Western Challenge to Eurasian Integration

by Nikolai Malishevski

Ex: http://www.strategic-culture.org

Recently, official Warsaw and not-so-official Stockholm have taken a number of steps to reinforce their successes in the East in order to gain new bargaining chips for the upcoming Eastern Partnership summit in Vilnius in November 2013, which will be devoted to developing a unified policy on the East for European countries. According to a statement by EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Catherine Ashton, this summit will be «an opportunity to deepen the relations» between the EU and the member countries of the Eastern Partnership. The fact that the heads of all the EU member states plan to attend also speaks to that.

The Eastern Partnership, initiated by Washington and Brussels, was formed at the suggestion of Warsaw and Stockholm after the failure of the Georgian aggression in Ossetia. Essentially it has become a kind of continuation of GUAM, which demonstrated its military and political inadequacy in August 2008. The participation of Belarus and Armenia (which are not members of GUAM) is an attempt at a kind of «revenge» for the military and political defeat of Georgia. You could call the Eastern Partnership a tool for energy colonialism, turning Russia into a mere supplier of raw materials to the West, «pushing» it into the northeast of the Eurasian continent and creating a «sanitary» energy collection zone along its borders from the Black Sea to the Baltic. It's not for nothing that many in Russia consider the Eastern Partnership a kind of 'calque' from Adolf Hitler's concept of gaining Lebensraum in the East.

The main players in the project are Sweden in the north, Poland in the west, and NATO member Turkey in the south… Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova have been assigned to Poland, with its neosarmatism and the sympathies of Catholics. To Turkey with its neoturanism, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Armenia have been assigned (and to some extent the Central Asian republics - unofficially, through the personal business interests of their leaders in Ankara, as in Kyrgyzstan, for example). The Scandinavians, with the support of international structures like the Soros Foundation, are taking an avid interest in Karelia, the Kola Peninsula, the islands of the Gulf of Finland and their mineral and forest resource, as well as opposing Russia’s plans in the Arctic.

North. Overseen by Sweden, acting through Finland, which is conveniently located close to the «northern capital»« St. Petersburg. Operations are conducted using the following tools: 

a) Swedish-speaking citizens of Finland who have close ties with the Finnish political elite, the public servants, and who openly express anti-Russian revanchist views, such as Mikael Storsjo, the publisher of the terrorist site Caucasus Center and chairman of the Pro-Caucasus Association, who was convicted of illegally dispatching dozens of terrorists, including relatives of Basayev; 

b) media structures such as the Sweden-based Web center of the site Caucasus Center (the site itself, which has been declared a terrorist resource by the UN, was operating there as well until it was moved to Finland in 2004) and anti-Russian Finnish media activists (Kerkko Paananen, Ville Ropponen, Esa Makinen, Jukka Malonen, etc.) who support the «white ribbon opposition» in Russia; 

c) public structures such as the Pro-Caucasus Association, which is registered in Sweden, the Finnish-Russian Civil Forum (Finrosforum, Suomalais-venalainen kansalaisfoorumi), and U.S-oriented human rights organizations like the Helsinki Group, Amnesty International, etc..

Financing comes from the north, which borders directly on Russia via Finland (from which, in a similar calque, the «export of revolution» and money for it from American and European bankers came even before 1917), and there is an attempt to unite all anti-Russian forces in Europe and Russia itself - from Chechen terrorists, for whom «Turkish transit» is organized to the motley «white ribbon» opposition (supporters of Nemtsov, Navalny, Limonov, Kasparov, etc.).

West. Poland, which does not share a border with Russia (except for the Kaliningrad enclave), operates along the perimeter of a broad geopolitical «arc». From Kaliningrad in the north (already called «Królewiec» by Warsaw diplomats on the official site of the Consulate General of Poland), through Belarus and Ukraine, which are being considered as potential «friendly» territories in the east, to the Crimea in the south. 

With regard to Ukraine and Moldova, the ambitions of Warsaw, which has taken a course toward the creation of a fourth Rzeczpospolita and has its own vision of the future of the lands on Ukraine's right bank, to a great extent coincide with those of Romania and Hungary. Catholic Poland is essentially coordinating its policy with coreligionist Hungary, as their points of view on a number of issues coincide and complement one another, allowing them to develop a common strategy. With regard to Belarus, something similar (with some reservations) is happening with the Latvians and Lithuania, including support via Scandinavia for the pro-Western opposition in Minsk, which has found understanding from the «white ribbonists» and public servants who sympathize with them in Russia.

In the first half of 2013 the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR), the «thought factory for the European Union» which conducts analyses on foreign policy and security, distinguished Poland in five areas of foreign policy. Poland was recognized as a leader in implementing joint projects in the framework of NATO and the Common Foreign and Security Policy and was praised for its (visa) policy with regard to Russia, Ukraine and Moldova and for its foreign policy for «the most activity for the democratization» of Belarus. Polish Foreign Minister Radosław Sikorski, after a discussion of the implementation of «Eastern Partnership» programs at a meeting of EU foreign ministers in Brussels, reported (18.02.2013) that his country's eastern policy has met with numerous successes, saying, «Note that we are talking with our Eastern partners about association agreements and not about war. At present, the East is a place where Europe is conducting successful policy. In only remains to formalize these successes in the form of bilateral agreements».

South. In the south Warsaw operates in unison with Ankara, since the sympathy of the Tatar population of the Crimea toward NATO member Turkey facilitates the mutual understanding of local Turks and NATO member Poland. In 2013 several events took place, such as a press conference for the protection of the rights of Crimean Tatars, in which not only the chairman of the Union of Polish Tatars, Selim Chazbiewicz; the head of the communications department of the Crimean Tatar Majlis, Ali Khamzin; and others took part, but also influential Polish politicians such as Lech Wałęsa and former Minister of Internal Affairs Jadwiga Chmielowska. Previously in Simferopol a visa application center and a Consulate General of the Republic of Poland were opened which today demonstrate noticeable activity in the public and cultural life of the autonomous region and Sevastopol, especially in the area of collaborating with the Crimean Tatar Majlis and discrediting the Russian movement. And Poland became the second country after Russia whose consulate in the Crimea received the status of a consulate general. 

From Turkey, via Finland and its citizens of Swedish origin, transit has been organized for extremists who kindle the flame of separatist jihad in the «southern underbelly» of Russia (including the terrorists of Shamil Basayev's battalion of Chechen suicide attackers «Riyad-us Saliheen»).  The Scandinavians coordinate activities with the Turks in the media sphere as well. For example, the Web administrator of the terrorist site Caucasus Center, Islam Matsiev, came to Finland from Turkey. On the Turkish side, Basayev's IHH foundation is collecting funds in Turkey, Dubai, the U.S., England and France to finance the international terrorist network called the «Caucasus Emirate», whose mouthpiece is Caucasus Center (the official representative in Turkey is Musa Itayev, and in Finland it is Islam Makhauri, the brother of Rustam Makhauri - the «Minister of Defense of the Caucasus Emirate», Doku Umarov's personal bodyguard and the representative of terrorist Ali Taziev («Magas».). 

The level of an event held in Washington in late June 2013 at one of the oldest and most authoritative «think tanks» in the U.S., the Heritage Foundation, dedicated to the future of the Eurasian Union and «protecting vitally important interests of the U.S. and its allies in this sphere» with the participation of diplomats, scholars and analysts, goes to show that Western strategists are no longer hiding the fact that they are wary of and closely observing events in the former Soviet Union. And they are not idle in doing so, but are actively building their own toolkit for resisting the rebirth and integration of Eurasia.


mardi, 08 octobre 2013

Entrevista a Geidar Dzhemal

Ex: http://paginatransversal.wordpress.com & Nakanune.ru

Los ministros de exteriores de Rusia, EE.UU. y Siria están discutiendo la posibilidad de destruir las armas químicas, lo que le quita motivos a los EE.UU. para llevar a cabo el ataque con misiles. El cabeza del Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores ruso Serguei Lavrov en cuestión de nada se ha convertido en uno de los políticos más populares e influyentes, después de “haber atrapado” hábilmente a sus colegas estadounidenses en las redes que ellos mismos habían colocado. Sin embargo, ello no significa que el conflicto esté resuelto o próximo a solucionarse. En el mundo quedan bastantes fuerzas influyentes dispuestas a atacar a Siria, pero también la influencia de Rusia, China e Irán se hace cada vez más patente. Sobre quién se opone al ataque exterior, sobre los que se enfrentan a ellos, sobre el papel desempeñado por Serguei Lavrov y John Kerry y la diplomacia secreta, y sobre cómo se va a transformar la región del Próximo Oriente ha hablado con Nakanune.ru el politólogo, filósofo, presidente del Comité Islámico de Rusia Geidar Dzhemal.

Nakanune.ru – En el “Foro de Valdai” uno de los expertos dijo que la cuestión siria es el asunto diplomático más complejo desde los tiempos de la caída del telón de acero. ¿Está de acuerdo con semejante valoración?

Geidar Dzhemal - No es así en absoluto. En los tiempos del “telón de acero”, en mayor o menor medida, existía cierto enfrentamiento entre el campo socialista y el mundo capitalista. Ahora asistimos al simulacro del enfrentamiento y la confabulación real a nivel de la diplomacia secreta, porque la decisión de no atacar a Siria la tomaban a la vez Obama, Putin, Irán y, claro está, también China que está entre los bastidores, que no alza la voz, pero el factor de cuya presencia es muy real en todos los sentidos. Todos los sujetos mencionados estaban interesados en que el ataque no se llevara a cabo. Entre los interesados en que sí se produjera estaban la Unión Europea, la euroburocracia, el Fondo Monetario Internacional y algunos personajes en el escenario del Gran Oriente Próximo, quienes estaban interesados en la derrota de Asad por motivos de prestigio u otros, como es el caso, por ejemplo de Arabia Saudí y de Turquía. Para ellos la derrota o el conflicto con Occidente, con Obama sobre el tema de Siria equivalía a la bajada del rating de su régimen en casa, lo que iba a crearles problemas en política interior. Para Arabia Saudí además es importante el hecho de que no está atada al actual inquilino de la Casa Blanca, sino al segmento radical republicano de la clase política de los EE.UU., que está orientado hacia una política nacional-imperial, del tipo del Imperio Romano. En tal caso Arabia Saudí se convierte en el país clave en la región o conserva este estatus. Esos clientes: la burocracia de la UE, los especuladores del FMI, los sauditas y los turcos se orientaban nítidamente hacia el ataque contra Asad. Además de ellos existen también los círculos que entienden perfectamente que en cuanto a la imagen, la renuncia al ataque significa rebajar el estatus de Occidente como centro de la civilización, como árbitro, como el modelo-matriz global de la civilización contemporánea, es decir que el Occidente deja de ejercer la hegemonía. Pero a Obama esto le trae sin cuidado porque persigue otros objetivos.

Nak – ¿Cuáles?

GD – Obama quiere conservar los EE.UU. como el centro emisor del dólar, que emite la moneda de cambio para la economía mundial, que no tiene alternativas, y así poder conservar el papel de árbitro para los EE.UU. Pero también comprende que el papel de arbitraje de los EE.UU. no puede conservarse ejerciendo el imperialismo romano de tipo arcaico, sino poniendo el sistema mundial del dólar al servicio de la recuperación de la economía real en los Estados Unidos y algunos otros aspectos. Para eso hace falta replegarse de la serie de conflictos iniciados por la administración republicana. Es su objetivo personal, no se trata del superobjetivo de la élite estadounidense que está dividida en varios clanes.

Nak – Con Obama la cosa está clara ¿pero cómo interactúan Irán, Rusia y China?

GD- Estos países forman un bloque unido, dentro del cual, por supuesto, hay diferentes posturas y estatus, pero en este bloque, aunque le sorprenda a la opinión pública, domina la República Popular China. Siguiendo su costumbre, RPCh. actúa desde detrás de los bastidores, como figura en la sombra, que presuntamente se une a las propuestas de Moscú en el Consejo de Seguridad de la ONU, pero en realidad el factor principal, que determina la dirección de este bloque es China, al menos para Rusia. Precisamente China posee las palancas de influencia política, conexiones necesarias al sistema mundial, el recurso político-militar y económico, que permite a la actual dirección de Pekín tener una política independiente propia.

Irán es un país totalmente autosuficiente al día de hoy, prácticamente único en el Próximo Oriente que mantiene su seguridad alimentaria, que no pueden romper las sanciones, y que además forma parte de los diez países de mayor potencial militar. Irán prácticamente no tiene análogos, pero el hecho se suele olvidar, lo siguen percibiendo como si fuera un país tercermundista de Oriente Próximo. Irán es una civilización independiente con 2,5 mil años de historia que ejerció su influencia sobre la formación de la conciencia europea, de la civilización europea hace dos mil años, porque las capas culturales iranís formaron al Imperio Romano tardío y ejercieron influencia sobre toda la región mediterránea. La tradición religiosa persa, su tradición preislámica moldeó el rostro de toda la posterior civilización occidental. Irán es un país muy poderoso e influyente, al que no lograrán aislar las sanciones de ningún tipo. Ayer 17 empresas iranís por decisión judicial fueron liberadas de las sanciones en la Unión Europea, antes hubo otros casos similares. De facto, sin airearlo están desmontando las sanciones, teniendo en cuenta que además tenían un carácter en gran medida declarativo, porque incluso en los momentos más duros del aislamiento de Irán y de las presiones externas las empresas estadounidenses seguían sacando petróleo de Irán, sin hablar de China, que seguía comerciando con Irán abiertamente.

Así que no es correcto comparar la situación actual con la de la “cortina de hierro”, hoy todos los enfrentamientos dentro del sistema tienen un carácter simulado y procuran camuflar la confabulación real, la diplomacia secreta, que por supuesto también existía durante el período del enfrentamiento entre los dos campos, pero no hasta ese punto. Entonces este sistema estaba polarizado y era más sólido que ahora. En la actulidad hay más de dos factores, cada uno de los cuales tira para su lado, hoy, como mínimo son tres y, posiblemente, más. Actualmente el sistema es más blando, por eso la necesidad de la diplomacia secreta es mayor, y como bien dijo el ministro de exteriores de Francia Laurent Fabius, hoy no existe ni la unipolaridad, ni la bipolaridad, ni la multipolaridad. Hoy existe la ceropolaridad, lo que significa que ningún país, incluyendo a los EE.UU., Unión Europea y la RPCh. puede ejercer la influencia definitiva sobre el transcurso de los acontecimientos. Ninguno. Lo que significa que ha aumentado la necesidad de la diplomacia secreta, porque en la época bipolar, la URSS y los EE.UU. se turnaban y podían ejercer cada uno por separado su influencia en el curso de los acontecimientos.

Por ejemplo, gracias a la URSS los EE.UU. perdieron la guerra en Vietnam. Gracias a la URSS y la a confabulación de la diplomacia secreta en Francia en 1968 no se hundió el régimen capitalista y los comunistas no llegaron al poder – ese fue el pacto entre Moscú y Washington. Hay bastantes ejemplos así. Pero si en el primer plano está la diplomacia secreta y la confabulación, entonces hablar del triunfo de la así llamada diplomacia “blanca”, es decir de la diplomacia abierta, oficial, es simplemente ridículo. Esto se hace para la opinión pública, para los espectadores, para crear un espacio unívoco, no es más que eso.

Nak – A muchos les había sorprendido que los EE.UU. hicieran caso de la propuesta de Rusia y suspendieran el ataque por aire. Ahora Serguei Lavrov y John Kerry está discutiendo sobre la cuestión de las armas químicas. Algunos expertos aseguran que Lavrov sobre esa ola se ha convertido en un político de nivel mundial. ¿Qué lugar en esta combinación ocupa la cuestión de las armas químicas?

GD – En este caso puede observar cómo un show simulado lleva a las valoraciones exageradas e igualmente simuladas. En primer lugar, la iniciativa sobre las armas químicas, como todos recordarán, se debía a Kerry, quien siguiendo las órdenes de su jefe Obama apareció y anunció que “si fuera posible que Asad renunciara a su arsenal químico, entonces, tal vez, nosotros consideraríamos la posibilidad de no llevar a cabo el ataque, pero Asad no lo hará nunca – es imposible”. Está claro que los políticos de semejante nivel oficial nunca hablan por hablar, no se ponen a divagar sobre lo que podría suceder. Está claro que fue una bola lanzada que había que recoger. En seguida tras esta declaración Lavrov dijo: “le tomamos la palabra a los EE.UU.”. Pero los Estados Unidos no podían dirigirse directamente a Rusia y decir: “Por qué no hacemos una jugada que nos quite la responsabilidad de asestar el ataque, porque había una “línea roja” con respecto a las armas químicas, y nos están empujando fuerzas, atadas a la UE y al FMI, para meternos en este asunto. Vamos a hacer juntos esta jugada”. Entonces ya no sería la diplomacia secreta.

Nak – ¿Y cómo ha trabajado en este caso la diplomacia secreta?

GD – La diplomacia secreta es cuando esta iniciativa de Kerry, expresada en modo conjuntivo con gran dosis de duda, se le pasa a Irán. Irán habla con Asad, después de lo cual se dirige, en secreto, a Rusia, y le propone intervenir con la iniciativa de poner las armas químicas bajo control. Y aunque la primera frase fue vocalizada por Kerry, pero Rusia dice que “le toma la palabra a los EE.UU.”. Son juegos de niños. Por otro lado, está totalmente claro que Irán no podría tomar iniciativa sin los EE.UU., porque cómo iban a saber los iranís que el consentimiento de Asad en entregar las armas químicas realmente suspendería el ataque contra Siria. Para eso hacen falta garantías secretas, pero sólidas. Resulta que Irán mantiene la comunicación directa con los EE.UU. y esas garantías fueron dadas – si las iniciativas son presentadas como la “toma de la palabra”, entonces los EE.UU. tienen la posibilidad de no atacar a Siria. A continuación Irán ya seguro se lo dice a Rusia, Lavrov recibe el encargo, y junto con Kerry los dos toman el pelo a la opinión pública mundial, como dos héroes, dos caballeros, que han salvado el mundo de la guerra, del abismo que se habría abierto de haber sido asestado el ataque con misiles. Está claro que se trata de un show, sin el cual la diplomacia actual no puede funcionar, porque la política actual se ha convertido en puro simulacro, debido a que el 5% del peso pertenece a los diplomáticos “blancos” y el 95% a varios escalones de la trastienda secreta, cuando todas las cuestiones se resuelven entre los bastidores fuera de alcance de la opinión pública. Y, por cierto, la cosa no ha empezado ayer. Y si alguien afirma que no es más que conspirología, entonces, perdonen, pero en 1918 el camarada Lenin hizo público el acuerdo diplomático secreto de la Entente, anterior a la Primera Guerra Mundial. Así que vayan a decir que todo es conspirología y que se lo había inventado.

Nak – ¿La acusación de los Estados Unidos de que estuvimos suministrando armas químicas a Siria de la que durante toda la semana se estuvo defendiendo Serguei Ivanov, también forma parte del espectáculo diplomático?

GD – Todo lo que se hacía entonces era transparente para ambos bandos. En la última etapa los EE.UU. y la URSS formaban un iceberg – si los EE.UU. representaban la cúspide que se elevaba por encima del agua, la parte de abajo era la URSS y viceversa. El sentido de esta metáfora es que todos los asuntos de los EE.UU. tenían una parte subacuática en forma del campo socialista, todos los asuntos de la URSS tenían una parte subacuática representada por los EE.UU. y el “mundo libre”. La CIA y el KGB eran como la cinta de Moebius, también hoy lo conservan, aunque en mucho menor medida, porque el KGB realmente era el protagonista de la guerra invisible, del “frente invisible”, a diferencia del FSB que no tiene semejante nivel. Ambos bandos tenía su red de agentes del mismo valor. Así que todo lo que hacía la CIA era transparente para el KGB y viceversa. Existía la línea telefónica directa – el “teléfono rojo”. Así que todas esas acusaciones son una tontería.

Nak – ¿Y si hablamos del intercambio de artículos de Putin y McCain, qué significado tiene?

GD – El significado de este pique es que Putin abiertamente cuestiona las pretensiones de los EE.UU. al estatus de la autoridad moral mundial, pero la polémica de Obama con Putin es inadmisible, porque Obama se apoya en Putin, quien le entrega el pase. En particular, con el asunto del ataque a Siria Putin le ha proporcionado a Obama la posibilidad de conservar la influencia política, autoridad, estatus y las perspectivas de los demócratas para las elecciones de 2014 al proporcionarle la excusa para no meterse en el conflicto sirio. Por eso Obama no puede mantener semejante polémica con Putin, máxime, cosa muy probable, que en el fondo de su alma está de acuerdo con Putin.

Nak – ¿Por qué lo piensa?

GD – Obama es demócrata-cosmopolita, que ha nacido no se sabe dónde y estudió en un colegio musulmán en Indonesia. Su padre real es un keniata musulmán, y su padrastro con el que vivió en sus años ya más conscientes es un musulmán indonesio. Es un hombre que ha vivido fuera de los Estados Unidos y no es tan idiota como McCain, quien representa el producto completo del sistema aislacionista estadounidense de conciencia y quien, por lo visto, descubrió el extranjero por primera vez al ser enviado al frente en Vietnam. Y dado que Obama no fue formado por la matriz estadounidense, por cierto, de las más precarias del planeta, creo que para sus adentros está plenamente de acuerdo con Putin. Al mismo tiempo, los EE.UU. no podían dejarlo sin respuesta, pero confiaron la respuesta a McCain, un payaso, quien representa el lado republicano del establishment político, pero que incluso en este lado no es tomado en serio. Es una figura odiosa. Es como Zhirinovsky, pero sin reflexión. Zhirinovsky hace el tonto conscientemente, a sabiendas, pero McCain lo hace totalmente en serio, convencido de que es el portavoz de la profunda verdad estadounidense, lo cual lo convierte en todavía más absurdo y cómico. Es decir que McCain es un payaso que no sabe que es un payaso.

Nak – ¿Y le encargan a él la respuesta?

GD – Le encargan la contestación que se convierte así en una payasada, desprovista de toda convicción, de toda fuerza, que deja paso a insultos personales. Putin les dice a los Estados Unidos, “no sois excepcionales, así que quedaros tranquilos, porque no tenéis autoridad moral para ser los árbitros del proceso mundial”. Y McCain le contesta: “y tú eres un cabrón, un tirano”. A lo mejor es un tirano ¿pero acaso es una respuesta? Cualquiera que hay leído la carta y la respuesta pensará “que la peste se lleve a vuestras dos casas”. En cualquier caso es una respuesta de payaso, porque Putin toca los temas fundamentales, hablando de los Estados Unidos en general – él no dice quién es Obama, qué es la constitución norteamericana, en qué cree o no cree Obama y su predecesor. Pero McCain como un clown contesta: “chavales, este tipo os gobierna mal, no cree en vosotros”. Vaya estupidez. Qué más da en lo que cree o no cree Putin. ¿Acaso la situación cambiaría, si apareciera, por ejemplo, Prójorov, quien cree de otra manera? La respuesta por sí misma es propia de un colegial de provincia, desprovisto del pensamiento sistémico y que simplemente se dedica a tirar de los pelos a las niñas durante el recreo o a meterse con alguno más débil del curso inferior. No es la respuesta de un hombre que esté conectado a algún significado, que domine aunque sea en el modelo estadounidense de pensamiento. Fue hecho a propósito. McCain, quien es un don nadie, que representa el bando republicano, hostil a Obama, es llamado a responder a un artículo fundamental que causó una gran conmoción en los Estados Unidos. Es una respuesta asimétrica, pero no a favor de los EE.UU. A lo mejor es una forma de pago a Putin de parte de los Estados Unidos y de Obama – una respuesta tan inadecuada.

Nak – ¿Con la situación creada es posible pronosticar cómo se va a desarrollar la situación en torno a Siria? El ataque fue suspendido, parece que se han puesto de acuerdo sobre las armas químicas ¿pero y después qué?

GD – Es bastante difícil pronosticar. Creo que Asad durará hasta las próximas elecciones. La suspensión del ataque como resultado aumenta poderosamente el peso y la importancia de Irán en Oriente Próximo. Irán se convierte realmente en la superpotencia regional que, siguiendo los canales diplomáticos secretos, es reconocida como tal por los Estados Unidos, que con Obama contribuyeron bastante a su paso al primer plano. En particular, las propias sanciones son un potente medio para fortalecer a Irán: reforzar su estabilidad política interior, solidaridad, preparación defensiva. Las experiencias adversas han demostrado a todo el mundo que Irán es autosuficiente e incluso si se le aísla y se le rodea con alambre de espino o con un muro según el modelo israelí, este muro no va a ayudar, porque en un territorio de 1 millón 600 mil kilómetros cuadrados los recursos agrícolas y demás de Irán son suficientes para mantener a flote a la población de cien millones de personas, aunque incluso no llegan a cien. A lo mejor no estarán prosperando y tendrán que apretarse el cinturón, pero no tendrán especiales problemas. En el mundo hay pocos centros que pueden ser autosuficientes.

Nak – ¿Quién más aparte de Irán?

GD – Los EE.UU. y Canadá podrían subsistir en aislamiento, Unión Europea podría sobrevivir, tiene la posibilidad de mantener a su población a flote. China ha alcanzado este nivel, es exportadora de la producción agrícola. China ha logrado tener la autosuficiencia agrícola y es su principal baza. Todo el siglo XX el imperialismo ha luchado para que ningún pueblo, salvo Occidente poseyera la autosuficiencia agrícola. Allá donde había países del tercer mundo exportadores de alimentos, les llevaban la ayuda humanitaria, gracias a sus presidentes colocados a traición que daban el visto bueno. La ayuda humanitaria, que se repartía allí gratis, acababa con la agricultura como ocurrió, por ejemplo, con Bangladesh. Al país llevaron el arroz en cantidades gigantescas que repartían gratis y así destruyeron a la agricultura. Y si no podían hacerlo de esta manera, entonces establecían tales impuestos para los granjeros, como ocurrió en Egipto con Mubárak, que éstos abandonaban el campo y se iban a subsistir a las ciudades, porque con aquellos impuestos era imposible trabajar – los precios de compra eran ridículos y los impuestos enormes.

Nak – ¿Se trata de una política programada de Occidente?

GD – Era una directriz del FMI. Incluso América Latina tiene problemas con la alimentación. A principios del siglo pasado Argentina era un poderoso país agrícola que suministraba carne al mundo entero. Después aquello fue destruido. Prácticamente todos los países se encuentran sumidos en el caos agrícola y dependen de unos pocos monopolios que controlan el producto agrícola mundial. Más concretamente el mercado del grano está controlado por 5 Compañías Transnacionales, que controlan el 85% del mercado mundial de trigo. Tan solo están China e Irán que pueden subsistir por su cuenta pese a todo, al igual que la Unión Europea, los EE.UU. y Canadá. Rusia se autoabastece tan solo en un 30%. Imagínese que mañana aíslan a Rusia, declaran sanciones contra ella la colocan bajo boicot. Ello significaría que el 70% de la población se iba a quedar sin alimentos. La gente tendría que abandonar las ciudades y lanzarse al campo para conseguir allí patatas, raíces, zanahorias o lo que sea. Se trata simplemente del colapso agrícola que siempre lleva a la destrucción de la vertical del poder etc., porque cuando no hay nada que comer comienza el caos. Por algún motivo nadie habla de ello. Todo el mundo habla del dinero, del petróleo, de la industria ligera y pesada, pero nadie dice que la seguridad alimentaria es el tema Nº1. Y en Irán está asegurada, por eso el desenlace de la situación en Siria lleva a que, tras unos años de pruebas muy duras Irán expulsará a Arabia Saudí, Turquía y Egipto del podio, sobre el que habían permanecido como los líderes de la región y países Nº1.

Nak – ¿O sea que en la región va a haber una seria transformación?

GD - Queda claro que Egipto ahora no está en ninguna parte ni en el sentido moral, ni político, ni económico. La autoridad de Arabia Saudí disminuye notablemente a raíz de cómo ha terminado el asunto con el ataque contra Siria. Se sabe que el ministro de seguridad de Arabia Saudí Bandar bin Sultán, estrechamente vinculado a la CIA y miembro del clan más influyente dentro de la dinastía saudita, quien hace poco estuvo visitando a Putin para convencerlo sobre Siria – está rabioso, histérico, al ver los resultados a los que ha llevado el espectáculo puesto en escena por Kerry y Lavrov, por Obama y Putin, con el esencial papel de intermediario desempeñado por Irán. Las campanas doblan por Arabia Saudí y su papel en la región. Irán se convierte en el país Nº1 y a continuación crece la inestabilidad alrededor de Irán y de sus fronteras porque hay en marcha la movilización de los sunitas radicales contra este país chiita. En realidad este es el esquema previsto desde el principio. Mientras tanto en el mundo la crisis prosigue su marcha, el mundo se desliza hacia la gran guerra con esta configuración. Ha sido asestado un golpe al FMI, ha sido asestado un golpe contra el predominio mundial del capital bancario especulativo en su conjunto. De momento está ganando Obama con su máquina impresora de dólares y la RPCh. con su 30% de las reservas mundiales de oro almacenadas. Lógicamente, el conflicto entre ellos también es inevitable, porque el dólar por un lado y el oro, por el otro, son como dos osos metidos en la misma guarida.


(Traducido del ruso para por Arturo Marián Llanos)

Fuente: Nakanune.ru