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lundi, 07 décembre 2015

Große Zahlen am unteren Rand der Gesellschaft, ein wachsendes kulturfremdes Proletariat

sarrazin-schwarz-DW-Politik-Jaenschwalde.jpg

Große Zahlen am unteren Rand der Gesellschaft, ein wachsendes kulturfremdes Proletariat

Thilo Sarrazin

Ex: http://www.achgut.com

Monatelang strömten täglich 8.000 bis 10.000 Flüchtlinge und illegale Einwanderer über deutsche Grenzen. Bis Mitte November wurden 1 Million Asylbewerber registriert. Das zuständige Bundesamt hat aber in diesem Jahr bis Oktober wegen Überlastung nur 330.000 Erstanträge angenommen und von diesen lediglich 200.000 Anträge beschieden, davon 60 Prozent negativ. Der Bearbeitungsstau ist also ungeheuer. Von den Abgelehnten dürfen die meisten trotzdem bleiben, denn die Zahl der Abschiebungen ist minimal und beläuft sich in diesem Jahr nur auf ca. 15.000.

Rechtzeitig zum ersten Advent gab es nun gute Nachrichten: Mazedonien lässt nur noch Syrer, Iraker und Afghanen durch, die Zahl der täglichen Neuankünfte sank auf knapp 2.000. Die Hoffnung auf eine Weihnachtsruhe beim Migrantenstrom breitet sich aus. Immer routinierter werden die Verfahren zur Registrierung und regionalen Verteilung der Asylbewerber. Die Hersteller von Behelfsunterkünften erfahren einen Boom. In Berlin wird sogar das alte Tempelhofer Flugfeld für die Aufstellung solcher Unterkünfte zur Verfügung gestellt. Nein, unbehauste und frierende Asylbewerber wird es zu Weihnachten 2015 in Deutschland nicht geben. Das immerhin hat die deutsche Verwaltung geschafft.

Aber wir wissen weiterhin nicht genau, wer da gekommen ist - außer, dass die meisten junge Männer sind, viele keinen Ausweis haben, nur wenige Englisch können oder eine in Deutschland brauchbare berufliche Bildung haben. Nach neuen Umfragen halten die Unternehmen die Neuankömmlinge nur als Hilfsarbeiter für einsatzfähig, 60 Prozent erklären aber, dass sie keine Hilfsarbeiter brauchen.

Weiterhin will niemand von Obergrenzen für Asylbewerber sprechen. Das Wort Kontingent wird jetzt immerhin schon mal in den Mund genommen.

Wie ein Mantra trägt die Bundesregierung die Forderung nach einer “europäischen Lösung” vor sich her. Aber spätestens seit den Terroranschlägen in Paris ist die Aussicht auf einen europäischen Verteilungsmodus in ganz nebelhafte Ferne gerückt. Frankreich hat seine Grenzen auf unabsehbare Zeit für weitere Einwanderung geschlossen. In Italien oder Griechenland möchte sowieso kein Asylbewerber bleiben. Schweden hat erklärt, die Grenze der Belastungsfähigkeit erreicht zu haben, Osteuropa scheidet gänzlich aus, so bleiben Österreich und Deutschland.

Angela Merkel sagte im Bundestag, eine “solidarische Verteilung von Flüchtlingen” auf die Mitgliedstaaten der EU sei nicht “irgendeine Petitesse, sondern berührt die Frage, ob der Schengenraum auf Dauer aufrechterhalten werden kann”. Die große Türöffnerin und Hüterin der Willkommenskultur beginnt öffentlich erkennbar damit, an einer Hintertür zu zimmern, durch die sie das Gefängnis ihrer Festlegungen nach Bedarf verlassen kann. Eine “Drohung” sei das natürlich nicht, nur eine “Sorge”. Ihre Aussage, dass Mauern und Zäune keine Lösung seien, wiederholte sie nicht.

Niemand weiß, wie es weiter gehen soll:

- In der großen Koalition gelingt es offenbar nicht, schärfere Regeln zum Familiennachzug durchzusetzen. Wenn eine Million Asylbewerber bleiben dürfen, werden daraus schon auf diesem Wege - durch Kettenwanderung und natürliche Fruchtbarkeit - in einigen Jahren fünf Millionen werden. Kommen im nächsten Jahr 500.000, so werden daraus irgendwann 2,5 Millionen etc. So entstehen im Nu sehr große Zahlen am unteren Rand der Gesellschaft, ein wachsendes kulturfremdes Proletariat.

- Wohin das führen kann, sieht man an den französischen Banlieues. Dort wächst eine Fremdheit heran, die sich in Feindseligkeit gegen die aufnehmende Gesellschaft wendet. Es ist die gegenwärtige Lebenslüge Frankreichs und ganz Europas, dass der Terrorismus allein ein Produkt des IS sei. Er ist auch ein perverser Lebensausdruck der gescheiterten muslimischen Jugend in Europa.

- Immerhin nimmt so die Einsicht zu, dass aus gläubigen Muslimen nicht automatisch säkulare Europäer werden, sondern dass der Zusammenprall der Kulturen mit noch größerer Wahrscheinlichkeit in wachsenden Fundamentalismus führt. Der Parteivorsitzende der Grünen, Chem Özdemir, wies in diesen Tagen mit bemerkenswerter Offenheit darauf hin, dass die europäischen Muslime aus dem Zugriff der fundamentalistischen Strömungen in ihren Heimatländern gelöst werden müssen. Aber auch er weiß offenbar keinen Rat, wie das geschehen soll. In einer freien Gesellschaft dürfen auch Salafisten für ihren Glauben werben, und man wird auch nicht verbieten können, dass die Türkei Imame in Deutschland bezahlt und Saudi-Arabien Moschee-Gemeinden in Deutschland finanziell unterstützt.

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Schengen wird nicht mit einem Knall zerplatzen, es wird eine stillen Tod auf Raten sterben. Das hat bereits begonnen: 

- Die Hoffnung, man könne sich auf einen Verteilungsmodus für Asylbewerber einigen, hat sich als Illusion erwiesen.

- Ebenso die Erwartung, die Griechen oder Italiener könnten die Außengrenzen Europas wirksam schützen oder würden dies auch nur wollen.

- In den nächsten Wochen wird die Hoffnung sterben, man könne die Türkei zum Wächter der europäischen Grenzen machen.

Was tun, wenn im Frühling 2016 die Migrantenströme wieder zunehmen:

- Wird man dann einen Zaun an der deutschen Grenze zu Österreich gebaut haben? Wohl kaum.

- Wird man die Bundeswehr zum Schutz der Grenze einsetzen? Vielleicht.

- Wird man zulassen, dass militärische Gewalt gegen Grenzverletzer eingesetzt wird? Sehr unwahrscheinlich.

Es ist schon ein bisschen pervers: Die Bundeswehr soll im vom Bürgerkrieg zerrissenen Mali auf “Friedensmission” gehen, sie soll Aufklärungsflüge in Syrien fliegen, sie bildet kurdische Kämpfer im Irak aus. Nur die Grenzen des eigenen Landes verteidigen, das soll sie offenbar nicht.

Dafür - und nur dafür - wurde sie aber einst geschaffen.

Zuerst erschienen in der Zürcher Weltwoche

vendredi, 04 décembre 2015

Prof. P. Gottfried: Die deutsche Nation

Die deutsche Nation

von Prof. Dr. Paul Gottfried
Ex: http://www.blauenarzisse.de

Prof. Paul Gottfried stellt in diesem Beitrag das Denken von Bernard Willms und insbesondere sein Buch „Die deutsche Nation“ vor.

willms.pngDer den Freitod wählende Staatsdenker und weltbekannte Hobbes-​Sachkenner Bernard Willms (19311991) zählte zu den eigenständigsten Promovierten von Joachim Ritter. Wie Ritter, der eine beträchtliche Reihe von namhaften konservativ ausgerichteten Gelehrten promoviert hat, wurde Willms von Hegels Rechtsphilosophie stark angetan. In einem beweisbaren Sinn versinnbildlicht Hegel einen Fixpunkt für Willms’ politische und weltanschauliche Orientierung. Gewiss wurde Willms von anderen Staatsdenkern, insbesondere Fichte, Hobbes und Carl Schmitt und nicht zuletzt von Heideggers Seinsphilosophie unauslöschlich geprägt.

Besät ist sein Band Die deutsche Nation mit weitgehenden Hinweisen auf Fichte und Hobbes (ganz von Heideggers Vorstellung der „Seinsvergessenheit“ zu schweigen). Diese Vordenker sind in Hülle und Fülle herangezogen, als es versucht wird, eine „politisch organisierte“ Lebensform und eine zum Selbstbewußtsein wachgerufene deutsche Volksnation in Verbindung zu bringen. Zusätzlich wartet Willms mit Auszügen aus Fichtes „Reden an die deutsche Nation“ auf. Ebenso wie im frühen neunzehnten Jahrhundert, als gegen Napoleon mobilisierte Patrioten auf eine deutsche Erweckung abzielten, bedürfen bis heute die Deutschen eines Programms der Nationalerziehung, damit sie es dazu bringen können, eine „Fremdherrschaft“ loszuschütteln.

Der Vernunftstaat

Die unübersehbaren Hegelschen Begrifflichkeiten bei Willms treten aus seinem Ansatz hervor, die Gründung oder Bewahrung einer nationalen Allgemeinheit auf das Werden und Wirken eines Staates zu beziehen. Nach seiner aus Hegel entlehnten Formulierung hängt die Beschützung einer „Kulturnation“ vom geeigneten Staatsgefüge ab. Beides macht ein „wirklichkeitsbezogenes“ Gespann. Willms borgt Hegels Wendung des „Vernunftstaates”, um die erwünschte Zusammenfügung von Denken und Geschichtsnotwendigkeit zu kennzeichnen. Er verweist auf eine in Nachkriegsdeutschland in Schwung gekommene Absicht, eine wiederhergestellte Nation der Dichter und Denker anzustreben. Diesen Idealisten fehlte es allerdings an einem geübten Verhältnis zur Geschichte. Ohne eine staatliche und staatserzieherische Unterstützung verlief der Plan, Deutschland als eine reine Kulturnation zurückzubringen, im Sande.

Gemeinsame Selbstbehauptung

Auch zu beachten ist, dass Willms dem Hegelschen Gedankengang folgend eine „verwirklichte Nation” als eine ausgeprägt „begriffene Allgemeinheit” erfasst. Egal auf welche Weise sie urzeitig oder urwüchsig sich zusammenfaßte, ist die neuzeitliche Nationalgemeinschaft nur als eine ausgedachte Volksidentität zu verwirklichen. Und die Zeit fordert dringlich, dass eine Staatsregierung, die die dazugehörige Nationalität gewährleistet, ins Leben gerufen wird. Willms richtet sich an deutsche Patrioten, die eine aus der Vergangenheit entstandene und auf die Zukunft hinausgreifende kollektive Existenz geistig sowie emotional behaupten. Nicht ein dumpfes Gefühl der Zusammengehörigkeit sondern eine gemeinsame Selbstbehauptung, der sich alle einzelnen Mitglieder anschließen, und die eine vereinigende Staatsform annimmt, prägt die zum Nationalstaat gehobene Volksgemeinschaft der Neuzeit aus.

Ein Schwerpunkt, der bei Willms kaum zu übersehen ist, stellt seine Thematisierung der Neuzeit dar. Von den medialen Seitenhieben auf ihn als einen abstoßenden Reaktionär absehend, erachtet sich Willms als Vollblutvertreter der Moderne. Immer wieder streitet er den Linken ihre Vereinnahmung der Moderne ab. Er konstatiert, dass die Moderne dem Wesen nach nicht in erster Linie mit einer Konsumgesellschaft oder mit dem Kultus der sogenannten Menschenrechte gleichzustellen ist. Die „Neuzeit“ habe vielmehr Erscheinungen hervorgebracht wie die protestantische Reformation, der Aufstieg einer gebildeten, selbstbewussten Bürgerschaft, das Schaffen des Nationalstaates und eines überall im Westen geltend gemachten Völkerrechts.

Liberale Demokratie und deutscher Idealismus

Ebenso hervorstechend bei seiner Zeitanalyse ist ein anderer von Willms vorgetragener Gegensatz, zwischen den nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg den Geschlagenen aufgezwungenen „liberaldemokratischen“ Leitsätzen und dem zur gegenwärtigen Stunde in Mißkredit geratenen „deutschen Idealismus“. Beide Weltanschauungen nehmen für sich in Anspruch, die Neuzeit zu vollführen, aber Willms stellt fest, dass nur die letztere das Gütesiegel trägt. Die zur Staatsreligion aufgewertete liberaldemokratische Grundlehre führt dazu, einer einstigen Nation sowohl ihre Selbstverwirklichungsmöglichkeit wie ihre Selbstachtung abzunehmen. Statt ein Durchdenken ihres Nationsdefizits zu erwecken, hat die liberaldemokratische Gängelführung zur Folge, die Deutschen sich selbst zu entfremden und ihren Siegern unterzuordnen. Die Sache erschwerend gibt diese Einstellung einer genießerischen Lebensweise Nahrung, als sie darauf gerichtet ist, die Deutschen von der Wiedererlangung einer Nationalidentität dauernd abzulenken.

Willms bezeichnet gezielt die „deutsche Philosophie“, den Idealismus von Kant bis Heidegger, als den Weg für seine selbstentfremdete Nation ins Freie. Dadurch versteht er die Wiederaneignung einer Selbstidentität über einen punktuellen Denkprozess. Ein Grundzug der Moderne, betrachtet von der Sichtweise der deutschen Idealisten her, war die Vorpräparierung eines bedachten nationalen Eigenwesens, deren Ergebnis auf eine Allgemeinheit übertragbar war. Eine Idee von dieser Ausprägung entsprang der Zukunftsvision und dem Geschichtssinn der Philosophen, die für die Deutschen eine Nationalgemeinschaft vorgreifend umrissen. Das Ergebnis war nur insoweit möglich, als das betreffende Denken eine historische Notwendigkeit philosophisch widerspiegelt.

willms35.JPGWer national ist, wird als Antidemokrat beschimpft

Die liberaldemokratische Herrschaft, die mit der französischen Besatzung während der napoleonischen Zeitepoche verglichen wird, verweigert den Deutschen ein wahres Recht, die „Nationalfrage“ zur Diskussion zu stellen. Diesem Denkverbot zuwiderzuhandeln, tut jeder Freidenker auf die Gefahr hin, sich als „Antidemokrat“ stempeln zu lassen. Dennoch riet Willms seinen Mitbürgern einen „demokratischen“ Kurs nicht kategorisch ab.

In Die deutsche Nation nimmt Willms eine Reihe von antinationalen Strömungen ins Visier, einschließlich der moralisierenden antideutschen Geschichtsschreibung, des Kollektivschuldfimmels und der Anstrengungen der Eliten den Deutschen ein erfundenes „weltgemeinschaftliches“ Eigenwesen unterzuschieben. Unter seinen Zielscheiben befindet sich ebenso eine auf die Spitze getriebene Konsumgesellschaft. Hier beruft sich Willms auf Rousseau und Fichte, die von der Zucht der gesetzten Staatsbürger als ausgesprochenes Charakteristikum der wohlgeordneten Gemeinschaft sprachen.

Die Jugend und die Mobilisierung der Nationalidentität

Auch klagt Willms die jüngere Generation an, die samt und sonders „gehäufte irrationalistische Ausbrüche aus dem Zirkel der Sinnlosigkeit” zum Schaden der deutschen Nation entladen. Zu einer „Mobilisierung der Nationalidentität” würden diese Gestrauchelten nicht im entferntesten taugen.

Meine beliebtesten Stellen aus dem Buch Die deutsche Nation beinhalten jedoch Willms’ Ansatz, gestützt auf die Wertkritik von Max Weber und Carl Schmitt, die liberaldemokratische Höchstwertsetzung auseinanderzunehmen. Ohne mit demokratischen Spielregeln vorliebzunehmen, drängen die „Gesinnungsdemokraten“ dazu, ihrem Verfahren eine unbestreitbare Heiligkeit zu verleihen. Mit einer nüchternen Wertung der jeweiligen Existenzlage hat das nichts zu tun. Die Zeitwirklichkeit kann so aufgefasst werden, dass wegen zweier verlorener Kriege eine von ihren Eroberern vorgeschriebene Staatsform den Deutschen aufgedrängt wurde, zusammen mit einem geschmälerten außenpolitischen Spielraum.

Der Höchstmaßstab für politisches Handeln

Statt eine verhaltene Haltung dem Unausweichlichen gegenüber anzunehmen, münzen die Gesinnungsdemokraten den Willensakt ihrer Besieger in eine Staatskirche um. Willms macht uns klar, dass diese Anbetung keinem philosophisch oder geschichtlich begründeten Standpunkt entspricht. Wie Weber stellt er fest, dass weder Menschenrechte noch wechselnde Parteiregierungen, sondern das Weiterbestehen einer Nation den „Höchstmaßstab” für politisches Handeln bildet. Willms weist darauf hin, dass Weber, der altliberal ausgerichtet war, nicht von einem ausufernden Deutschnationalismus angetrieben war. Der berühmte Soziologe war bestrebt, die von ihm begriffenen politischen Verhältnisse der Neuzeit darzulegen.

Durch seine akademische Laufbahn hindurch besetzte Willms eine Professur an der Universität Bochum. Dort konnte er sich seinem freimütigen Schreiben und scharfsinnigen Referaten unbehelligt hingeben. Ebenso augenfällig war sein Erfolg beim Platzieren seiner Buchtexte bei ansehnlichen Verlagshäusern, wie Suhrkamp, Kohlhammer und Bertelsmann. Seit seinem Tod werden Willms’ vielfältige Schriften totgeschwiegen, wenn nicht verunglimpft. Wenn Willms nicht seine Lebensjahre verkürzt hätte, dann hätte er schon erkannt, dass ihm der Zeitgeist unverkennbar abgewandt ist. Als geschichtlich orientierter Denker musste er aber wissen, dass der Zeitgeist nicht von selbst her handelt. Die sachbezogene Frage heißt nicht, wer über den Ausnahmefall entscheidet, sondern wer die „liberaldemokratische” Deutungshöhe zur Ausschließung der Nichtangepassten besetzt.

jeudi, 03 décembre 2015

Sarrazin und der Glaube an den Staat

Sarrazin und der Glaube an den Staat

von Felix Menzel

Ex: http://www.blauenarzisse.de

Sarrazinddddd.jpeg

Am Montagabend sprachen Thilo Sarrazin und der Politikprofessor Werner Patzelt in Dresden vor 500 begeisterten Zuhörern. Es ging um die Krise des Staates.

Es war schon immer ein Erlebnis, wenn Thilo Sarrazin in Dresden referierte. Zu seiner Buchvorstellung zu Deutschland schafft sich ab kamen 2.500 Bürger. Dem ehemaligen Vorstandsmitglied der Bundesbank gelang es schon damals, die Menschen mit seinen Hochrechnungen zum demographischen Niedergang der Deutschen aufzurütteln. Nun dürfte es aufgrund des Asyl-​Ansturms auf Europa noch schlimmer kommen, als von ihm vor fünf Jahren prognostiziert.

Handelt Merkel bewußt gegen die Interessen der Deutschen?

Man merkt Sarrazin nun eine gewisse Fassungslosigkeit über die Politik der Bundeskanzlerin Angela Merkel an. Er betont, daß er „keine Logik“ im Handeln der Kanzlerin erkennen könne. Verwaltungstechnisch schaffe es Deutschland, mehrere Millionen Asylbewerber zu registrieren, ihnen ein Dach über dem Kopf zu organisieren und sie zu ernähren. Aber wo ist das Ziel eines solch unsinnigen Kraftaktes, fragt sich Sarrazin genauso wie sicherlich fast alle der anwesenden Zuhörer. Folgerichtig stellt er dem Publikum die Frage: „Weiß Merkel es nicht besser oder handelt sie bewußt gegen die Interessen der Deutschen?“ Das ist es, was die Dresdner Bürger bewegt. Sowohl Sarrazin als auch Patzelt erhalten an diesem Abend reichlich Beifall, der wohl die Erleichterung der Zuhörer zum Ausdruck bringen soll, daß es wenigstens noch einige wenige kluge Beobachter des politischen Geschehens gibt, die den Durchblick haben und den Mut zum freien Sprechen aufbringen.

Das offizielle Thema dieser Diskussionsveranstaltung lautete „Meinungsfreiheit“. Sarrazin sprach jedoch hauptsächlich über die Asylkrise. Patzelt dagegen hielt einen äußerst wortgewandten Vortrag über die „Politische Korrektheit“. Seiner Meinung nach ist es richtig, auf korrektes Auftreten und Reden zu achten. Dies sei eine zivilisatorische Errungenschaft und diene gerade dem Erhalt von Kultur und Demokratie. In der Bundesrepublik Deutschland hätten wir allerdings einen Punkt erreicht, an dem die „Haltung der Kritik nicht mehr möglich“ sei, weil der richtige Grundansatz der Politischen Korrektheit nicht redlich gemeint sei, sondern taktisch mißbraucht werde.

Sittenlosigkeit oder Tyrannei?

Zunächst gehe es den Gutmenschen darum, politisch Andersdenkenden die Begriffe wegzunehmen. Schon das Beschreiben von Problemen werde so unmöglich. Die Ausgrenzung hat damit jedoch erst begonnen. Patzelt erklärte Stufe für Stufe, wie die Meinungsfreiheit eingeschränkt werde. Es sei inzwischen so weit gekommen, daß die „Korrekten“ den normalen Bürgern die Fragen schon weggenommen hätten. Beim Thema „Einwanderung“ sei dies besonders auffällig. Und wenn dann doch aufgrund massiver Probleme in der Wirklichkeit nicht länger um den heißen Brei herumgeredet werden könne, würden die Einwände und Ängste mit einer arroganten, angeblichen Sachkompetenz wegerklärt. In solchen Fällen werden dann also (pseudo-)wissenschaftliche Studien angeführt, die belegen sollen, daß Zuwanderung enorme ökonomische Gewinne für die Volkswirtschaft bringe oder Ausländer ja gar nicht krimineller als Deutsche seien, obwohl ein Blick in die Polizeiliche Kriminalstatistik genügt, um das Gegenteil zu beweisen.

Der nächste Schritt zur Verhinderung von Kritik sei es dann, den Gegnern Etiketten anzuheften und ihnen damit schwere Glaubwürdigkeitsverluste zu bescheren. „Rechtspopulist“ und „Rassist“ seien derzeit besonders beliebt zur Markierung der „Bösen“, mit denen niemand sprechen dürfe. Die finale Stufe sei es schließlich, wenn von einem „Extremismus der Mitte“ gefaselt werde. Für diese Strategie der Ausgrenzung Beispiele zu finden, gelang Patzelt mühelos, sprachen doch sogar die ranghöchsten Vertreter der Bundesrepublik von einem „Helldeutschland“, das gegen ein „Dunkeldeutschland“ zu verteidigen sei. Dem Dresdner Politikprofessor ist das Thema der Meinungsfreiheit und Politischen Korrektheit so wichtig, weil es hier um die Frage gehe, ob wir „Sittenlosigkeit oder Tyrannei“ zulassen. Beides sei strikt abzulehnen.

Sarrazin: „Ich habe an den Staat geglaubt.“

Obwohl an diesem Abend aufgrund der Länge der Vorträge nur wenig Zeit zur gemeinsamen Diskussion blieb, war diese dennoch äußerst aufschlußreich, da sich Sarrazin und Patzelt nun endlich zur Frage der deutschen Rechtsbrüche durch die Bundesregierung äußerten. Sarrazin hatte hier seinen stärksten Moment, als er beschrieb, wie er früher immer an den Staat glaubte und nun erleben müsse, wie das Recht inzwischen ähnlich „wie in absoluten Monarchien und Diktaturen“ genutzt werde. Merkel und ihre Regierung hätten die „freie Interpretation des Staatsrechts“ auf die Spitze getrieben.

Patzelt stimmte zu: Das Recht könne entweder als „Schranke“ fungieren oder eben als „Taxi“, wenn es nur noch darum gehe, mit ihm an ein bestimmtes Ziel zu kommen. Dann hätten wir es jedoch mit „Willkür oder Ignorieren“ zu tun. Es sei beunruhigend, wie die Staatsführung ständig in den Notmodus umschalte und meine, in ihm Alleingänge begehen zu können, die sowohl der Demokratie als auch der Gewaltenteilung widersprechen. Der Staat sei so in eine Vertrauenskrise geschlittert, die durch die überzogene Politische Korrektheit noch weiter verschärft werde. Denn, so betonte Patzelt: „Wenn der Streit blockiert oder vergiftet wird, ist der Demokratie das Lebenselexier entzogen.“

Bereits unsere Kinder könnten in die Minderheit geraten

Wohin das führt, kann niemand mit Sicherheit sagen, aber einige Prognosen von Sarrazin und Patzelt hören sich sehr plausibel an: In seiner typisch technokratischen Herangehensweise erklärte Sarrazin noch einmal, daß sich die Sozialleistungen für Einheimische verschlechtern müssen, wenn der Staat dermaßen viel Geld für Asyl-​Zuwanderung und Versuche der Integration ausgebe. Viel dramatischer sei jedoch, wie schnell die Mehrheitsverhältnisse kippen könnten. Während er in Deutschland schafft sich ab noch annahm, dies könne frühestens Ende des 21. Jahrhunderts geschehen, haben die Ereignisse dieses Jahres und das, was in den nächsten noch droht, zu einer rapiden Beschleunigung des Bevölkerungsaustauschs geführt. Im Klartext heißt dies also, daß bereits unsere Kinder in die Minderheit geraten werden, wenn sich nicht schnell etwas ändert.

Patzelt ergänzte, Solidarität setze eine Unterscheidung zwischen einem „Wir“ und den „Anderen“ voraus. Dies ergebe sich aus den grundlegenden Erkenntnissen der Soziobiologie. Die Anderen müßten dabei keine Feinde sein, aber sie sind eben nicht „wir“. Wer diese Grenze aufhebe, zerstöre nun jede Solidarität. Aus dem Publikum kam die Frage, ob dies nicht langfristig zum „Bürgerkrieg“ führen könne. Sarrazin antwortete, noch sei es zu früh, darüber zu spekulieren, aber ausschließen könne er ein solches Szenario nicht.

Dieser Beitrag erschien auch auf Ein​wan​derungskri​tik​.de!

mercredi, 02 décembre 2015

Presseschau - Dezember 2015

presse2686a.jpg

Presseschau

Dezember 2015

mardi, 01 décembre 2015

In Memoriam Heinz Dieter Hansen

Deelneming2.jpg

In Memoriam

Heinz Dieter Hansen

Nous venons d'apprendre la disparition de notre ami très cher Heinz Dieter Hansen de Hambourg, animateur de la "Deutsch-Europäische Studiengesellschaft" et fondateur de la série de brochures Junges Forum.

Un hommage mérité lui sera rendu!

17:47 Publié dans Hommages | Lien permanent | Commentaires (0) | Tags : heinz dieter hansen, allemagne, hommage, disparition | |  del.icio.us | | Digg! Digg |  Facebook

vendredi, 27 novembre 2015

ISIS Terrorismus: Political satire by Max Uthoff and Claus von Wagner

Die Anstalt: ISIS terrorism documentary doku 2015 terrorist

English subtitles ENG SUB

Political satire by Max Uthoff and Claus von Wagner

Topic: ISIS and terrorism in general and how it all began - An entertaining summary with real facts.
Chronological topics for reserach:
Mohammad Mosaddegh
1953 Iranian coup d'état
Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi
1979 Iranian Revolution
Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini
Saddam Hussain
1979 Soviet war in Afghanistan
Osama Bin Laden
1990 Invasion of Kuwait
Nayirah (testimony)
Nayirah al-sabah
Hill & Knowlton
Citizens for a Free Kuwait
1990 Holy Ground: Mecca and Medina
Al-Qaeda
Osama bin Laden
2013 IS – Islamic State
ISIS - Islamic State of Iraq and Syria
ISIL - Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant

00:08 Publié dans Le coin de Diogène | Lien permanent | Commentaires (0) | Tags : satire, allemagne | |  del.icio.us | | Digg! Digg |  Facebook

mardi, 17 novembre 2015

Willkommenskultur für Terroristen

Refugees-welcome.jpg

Willkommenskultur für Terroristen

von Gereon Breuer

Ex: http://www.blauenarzisse.de

Terroristen wie die Attentäter von Paris sind in Europa willkommen. Denn auch sie haben ein Recht auf Asyl – mit allen Folgen.

Wachsamkeit ist der Preis der Freiheit – die Anschläge von Paris vom vergangenen Freitag haben gezeigt, dass Frankreich dieses Diktum sträflich vernachlässigt hat. 129 Menschen könnten noch am Leben sein, wenn nicht willkommensbesoffene Politiker die Terroristen, die sie bestialisch niedermetzelten, ausdrücklich eingeladen hätten. Zudem waren sie nicht in der Lage, sich zu wehren, weil das Führen von Waffen in der Grande Nation nur einer kleinen „Elite“ vorbehalten ist.

Besonders perfide ist, dass die Terroristen von Paris wie jeder andere syrische Bürgerkriegsflüchtling, wie jeder Flüchtling überhaupt, ein Recht auf Asyl haben. Auch sie sind Gegner des syrischen Präsidenten Baschar al-​Assad und können sich als Verfolgte seines Regimes ausweisen. Dieses Dilemma haben die Attentate in Paris mit Blut in die veröffentlichte Meinung geschrieben. Die bemüht sich indes nach Kräften so zu tun, als würde nur noch ein Mehr an Willkommenskultur ein Mehr an Sicherheit bieten. Das heißt im Klartext: Nur wenn wir noch ausdrücklicher Terroristen nach Europa einladen, werden wir sicher vor ihnen sein.

Sicherheit statt Willkommenskultur

Leider oder, je nach Sichtweise, Gott sei Dank, ist aber das Gegenteil richtig. Sicherheit lässt sich niemals absolut erreichen, wenn gleichzeitig ein Mindestmaß an Freiheit gewährleistet werden soll. Syrien ist hier ein gutes Beispiel. Vor dem Ausbruch der kriegerischen Auseinandersetzungen zwischen Assad auf der einen und seinen Gegnern auf der anderen Seite, war Syrien eines der sichersten Länder des Nahen Ostens. Ein starker Geheimdienst sorgte dafür, dass sich jeder sicher fühlen konnte, der sich nicht gegen das Regime stellte. Die Überwachung war quasi total und wer morgens seine Brieftasche auf einem zentralen Platz in Damaskus ablegte, der konnte sie ganz sicher dort abends wieder abholen.

Zu groß war die Befürchtung potentieller Diebe, die Brieftasche könnte einem Geheimdienstangehörigen gehören, als dass es jemand gewagt hätte, sie anzurühren. Aus Sicht vieler syrischer Bürger war und ist dieser starke Geheimdienst mit erheblichen Einschränkungen ihrer persönlichen Freiheit verbunden. Für einen Staat wie Deutschland oder Frankreich ist ein mit Syrien vergleichbarer Sicherheitsapparat kaum erstrebenswert. Das bedeutet aber nicht, die eigene Sicherheit aufgeben zu müssen, weil sie mit dem Maß an Freiheit, das die Willkommenskultur einfordert, nicht vereinbar ist.

Willkommenskultur erleichtert Terrorismus

Tatsächlich ist der Anschlag in Paris kein Wunder. Niemand sollte deshalb geschockt sein. In den so genannten „Sicherheitskreisen“, den Innen– und Verteidigungsministerien vieler europäischer Länder, wurde ein solches Szenario schon seit längerem befürchtet und entsprechend in Lageübungen durchgespielt. Die französischen Sicherheitskräfte waren sehr gut auf eine Lage vorbereitet, wie sie am Freitag vergangener Woche zur blutigen Realität wurde. Es stellt sich die Frage, warum sie dennoch nicht in der Lage waren, die terroristischen Anschläge zu verhindern.

Ein Teil der Antwort hat mit der „Willkommenskultur“ zu tun. Mohammedanische Terroristen sind einfach zu identifizieren, wenn sie eine Minderheit bilden. Unter einer Mehrheit von weißen Franzosen fallen ein paar dunkelhäutige, Arabisch sprechende Mohammedaner deutlich mehr auf, als in einer aus willkommensideologischen Gründen durchmischten Gesellschaft. Je mehr „Flüchtlinge“ sich aus Syrien aber in einem europäischen Land befinden, umso größer wird der Rückzugsraum für mohammedanische Terroristen aus diesen Ländern. Und nicht nur das: Weil die Sicherheitsbehörden mit der Kontrolle und Steuerung der asyl– und wohlstandssuchenden Massen überfordert sind, werden sie nachlässig. Unter tausend Syrern fällt es eben viel schwerer, einen mutmaßlichen Terroristen zu identifizieren.

Terrorismus mit Wehrhaftigkeit bekämpfen

Aus den Anschlägen von Paris nun die Konsequenz zu ziehen, die Willkommenskultur noch heftiger zu predigen, ist in etwa so, als würde man einen mutmaßlichen Kinderschänder in einen Kindergarten einladen. Zwar ist nicht jeder syrische Flüchtling ein Terrorist, sondern die Mehrheit von ihnen sehnt sich wohl vor allem nach dem Steuergeld der Deutschen. Aber dennoch verbergen sich unter den Flüchtlingsmassen jene terroristischen Schläfer, denen es nicht um Wohlstand geht, sondern um den direkten Weg zu Allah.

Sie werden sich bestimmt nicht von ihren Terrorakten abbringen lassen, nur weil westliche Politiker wie Hollande oder Merkel sie jetzt umso entschiedener willkommen heißen. Lediglich eine handfeste Sicherheitspolitik ist in der Lage, die Wehrhaftigkeit gegenüber mohammedanischen Attentätern aufrecht zu erhalten. Der wesentliche Bestandteil einer solchen handfesten Sicherheitspolitik ist der Grenzschutz. Grenzen, die wie aktuell so gut wie nicht bewacht werden, sind nämlich keine. Das bedeutet nicht nur, dass illegale Grenzübertritte zur Not mit der Waffe abgewehrt werden, sondern auch eine größtmögliche Schärfe bei der Einreisekontrolle von Menschen mit potentiell terroristischem Hintergrund.

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Wehrhaftigkeit als wichtigste Lektion aus 11. September

Nach den Anschlägen vom 11. September 2001 in New York und Washington wurden die USA dafür belächelt, dass sie ihre Einreisekontrollen in einem Maße verschärften, das jeden Einreisenden potentiell zu einem Terroristen macht. Fakt ist aber, dass diese Verschärfung der Wehrhaftigkeit der US-​amerikanischen Nation äußerst dienlich war. Seit dem 11. September 2001 gab es in den USA keinen mohammedanischen Terroranschlag mehr. Die Anschläge vom vergangenen Freitag in Paris waren aber bereits die zweite Äußerung mohammedanischer Gewalt in Frankreich in diesem Jahr – in einem Ausmaß, das bislang nur aus mohammedanischen Entwicklungsländern bekannt war.

Offenbar hat die französische Regierung aus dem Attentat auf die Redaktion der Satire-​Zeitschrift Charlie Hebdo zu Beginn des Jahres keine oder die falschen Konsequenzen gezogen. Hätte sie nach der Ermordung von Stéphande Charbonnier und seinen Mitarbeitern durch mohammedanische Terroristen die Wehrhaftigkeit Frankreichs gestärkt, 129 Menschen könnten noch am Leben sein. Weil es aktuell leider nicht so aussieht, als würde die französische Regierung das neuerliche Attentat zu Anlass nehmen, die Sicherheitsmaßnahmen und den Grenzschutz zu verstärken, dürfte es nicht auszuschließen sein, dass weitere mohammedanische Attentate folgen.

Europaweite Kooperation der Sicherheitsbehörden

Das gilt leider auch für Deutschland. Wenn die deutschen Sicherheitsbehörden nicht in der Lage sind, aus den Fehlern ihrer französischen Kollegen zu lernen, dann dürfte es nur noch eine Frage der Zeit sein, bis auch Berlin, Köln oder München von einem mohammedanischen Terrorakt heimgesucht werden. Dabei wird es nicht ausreichend sein, einfach nur die Stellungen des IS in Syrien und im Irak stärker zu bombardieren. Die Terroristen Allahs sind äußerst mobil und verfolgen eine Strategie größtmöglicher Flexibilität. Welche fatalen Folgen das haben kann, wenn man darauf nicht richtig vorbereitet ist, zeigten ebenfalls die Anschläge von Paris. Die französischen Behörden waren zwar laut Informationen aus Sicherheitskreisen darüber informiert, dass sich ein Terroranschlag ereignen würde. Sie verorteten dessen Ziel jedoch im Ausland.

Aus diesem Grund wurde der Schutz der französischen Auslandsvertretungen vor allem in der arabischen Welt massiv verstärkt. Der Schlüssel zur wirksamen Bekämpfung des mohammedanischen Terrorismus in Europa liegt deshalb vor allem in einer Kooperation der Sicherheitsbehörden. In diesem Bereich müssen die Dienste in Frankreich oder auch in Großbritannien noch einiges dazu lernen. Sie sind aktuell eher stark in der Zurückhaltung von Informationen. Hier sind die Dienste in Deutschland deutlich besser aufgestellt. Das könnte sich als großes Plus für die Sicherheit Deutschlands erweisen.

lundi, 16 novembre 2015

Allemagne et Turquie: deux dangers pour l’Europe

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Allemagne et Turquie: deux dangers pour l’Europe

par Guillaume Faye

Ex: http://www.gfaye.com

Avec la ”crise des migrants et réfugiés”, qui ne fait que commencer et qui est une invasion migratoire d’une ampleur inouïe dont plusieurs nations européennes peuvent ne jamais se relever, deux pays constituent, par leur politique, des dangers pour les peuples européens : l’Allemagne d’Angela Merkel et la Turquie de R.T. Erdogan. L’Allemagne parce qu’elle favorise l’invasion par la pompe aspirante, la Turquie parce qu’elle la provoque par la pompe propulsive.

Pauvre Allemagne schizophrène…

Il y a quelque chose de suicidaire dans l’ ”âme allemande”, qui est la part d’ombre du génie allemand. Une propension à l’absolu, à l’exaltation extrémiste : du bellicisme et du racisme fous des IIe et IIIe Reich à l’immigrationisme forcené du gouvernement actuel de Berlin, on remarque une même psychologie autodestructrice. Par l’ancien militarisme expansionniste comme par l’humanitarisme inconditionnel, la mentalité politique allemande (est-ce l’héritage du romantisme allemand ?) semble brouillée avec la raison et adepte de l’ubris, y compris dans sa version masochiste.

Première puissance économique de l’UE, l’Allemagne d’Angela Merkel exerce de fait une domination douce sur l’ensemble de l’Europe, sans avoir besoin de force militaire. La nullité du président français Hollande (elle le roule dans la farine en permanence) est une chance pour elle. Le contrepoids ne peut pas venir des Britanniques, qui se désintéressent de l’Europe continentale. Le souvenir affreux des réfugiés allemands de la Seconde guerre mondiale a peut-être joué un rôle. Politicienne et tacticienne, Angela Merkel ne possède aucune conscience nationale allemande ni européenne. Cette femme n’est pas respectable parce que la duplicité est sa règle. Elle est franche comme un âne qui recule.

Devant l’énorme flux des ”réfugiés”, elle assure que l’Allemagne peut en accueillir 800.000, provoquant ainsi un catastrophique appel d’air. La chancelière s’est précipitée à Ankara (est allée à Canossa) pour supplier le gouvernement turc d’essayer de stopper un peu les flux de ”réfugiés” et d’ouvrir des camps d’hébergement sur son territoire. Cerise sur le gâteau : elle a proposé de l’argent aux Turcs, sans demander leur avis aux autres pays européens, ce qui prouve que le gouvernement allemand fait peu de cas de l’avis de ses partenaires. 

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Et c’est là où le président Erdogan, avec son sans-gêne et son cynisme habituel a proposé son marché de dupes. Sans même faire la moindre promesse à Mme Merkel (qu’il méprise comme une faible femelle en bon musulman machiste), il a exigé en contrepartie qu’on reprenne immédiatement les négociations d’adhésion de la Turquie à l’UE. et qu’on supprime tout visa pour l’entrée des ressortissants turcs dans l’Union. Mme Merkel a aussitôt cédé. François d’Orcival commente : «  on échangerait donc 2 millions de réfugiés contre 79 millions de Turcs ! Là, on tombe sur la tête ». (Valeurs actuelles, 22–28/10/2015). Et Ivan Rioufol remarque  dans Le Figaro qu’on « essaie d’éteindre un incendie avec de l’essence ». M. Erdogan ne souhaite nullement éteindre l’incendie, mais le propager.

Recep Tayyip Erdogan est un ennemi majeur

Qui est M. Erdogan et que cherche-t-il ? D’abord Premier ministre puis maintenant président de la Turquie, il représente l’AKP, le parti ”islamique modéré”. En réalité, c’est un faux nez islamiste et les Européens sont tombés dans le piège. Et la stratégie menée est d’une redoutable habileté, machiavélienne. M. Erdogan est un fanatique islamiste dissimulé qui se rêve comme un néo-sultan ottoman conquérant. Sa haine de l’Europe est ancrée dans son idéologie. Son objectif, son programme, peuvent ainsi se résumer:

1) Éradiquer les Kurdes.

2) Réislamiser la Turquie (les ” Turcs noirs” anatoliens contre les ”Turcs blancs” laïcs).

3) Établir en Turquie une dictature sultanique présidentielle à son profit. 3) Conquérir l’Europe (reprise de la conquête ottomane) par le biais de l’immigration musulmane et par l’entrée de la Turquie dans l’UE.

Renforcé par sa victoire aux dernières élections, le néo-sultan Erdogan, qui instaure peu à peu un régime islamo-totalitaire soft, aide en sourdine Dae’ch et toutes les milices islamistes. Il veut en prendre le contrôle. Son but est de faire entrer en Europe des millions de ”réfugiés” musulmans pour saper l’identité de cette dernière, l’investir de l’intérieur. Erdogan veut rétablir, sous une autre forme, l’Empire Ottoman version 2.0 : c’est-à-dire prendre la tête de l’islam radical pour dominer l’Afrique du Nord et l’Europe. Il entend annihiler l’héritage de Mustapha Kemal Ataturk qui voulait désislamiser et européaniser la Turquie. Pour l’instant son entreprise progresse selon ses plans.

R. T. Erdogan est un chef d’État fort perspicace, avec une vision stratégique à long terme. C’est un véritable homme d’État, bien supérieur aux dirigeants européens, actuels comme Mme Merkel ou M. Hollande, qui ne sont que des politiciens. Le seul qui puisse se comparer à Erdogan est Wladimir Poutine. C’est la raison pour laquelle Erdogan est un véritable ennemi et Poutine un véritable ami.   

La Turquie abrite 2 millions de réfugiés venus de Syrie et d’Irak. Erdogan demande 7 milliards d’euros d’aide. Autrement, il menace de lâcher ces ”réfugiés”, à 95% musulmans, sur l’Europe, qui s’ajouteront aux autres. Avec une agressive impudence (pourquoi se gêner ?) Erdogan mène un double jeu avec l’OTAN, dont la Turquie est membre. Le gouvernement américain laisse faire : Washington joue la carte de l’affaiblissement de l’Europe par l’immigration et l’islamisation, ce qui ne déplaît pas à Obama, calculateur roué et islamo–compatible.

Débordée et impuissante, l’Europe se tourne vers la Turquie pour réguler et freiner les flux de réfugiés. À Bruxelles, Erdogan a réitéré devant la Commission son chantage, ce piège qu’il nous tend : il promet d’endiguer le flux des migrants (il ne tiendra évidemment pas parole) en échange d’une reprise des négociations d’adhésion, une libre circulation des Turcs dans l’espace Schengen et un accroissement des aides financières. Le culot paye face aux faibles.    

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Agent de l’invasion musulmane de l’Europe, Erdogan possède deux forces et deux faiblesses : il est d’abord fort de la mollesse pathologique de l’UE mais aussi –il faut le reconnaître – de l’exploitation qu’il fait de sa relative réussite socio-économique. Son premier handicap est son comportement de satrape autoritariste, pas exempt de corruption et de folie des grandeurs ; le second est qu’Erdogan, par sa politique islamiste risque de faire éclater la société turque et prend un énorme risque.

Leçons à en tirer

La Turquie est en proie à une tension croissante : la laïcité et les valeurs européennes affrontent l’obscurantisme islamique en pleine croissance, à quoi s’ajoute la révolte kurde, qui prend doucement des allures sanglantes de guerre civile. La Turquie est un pays ethniquement double, ambivalent, ce qui ne simplifie pas les choses. Angela Merkel est considérée par Erdogan comme une idiote utile. En bon islamiste, il méprise les femmes politiques, ainsi qu’ un pays dirigé par une ”maman”. Pas très viril. Et il méprise aussi une Union européenne sans colonne vertébrale, un énorme mollusque.

D’autre part, n’oublions la très trouble alliance historique germano-turque, contre les puissances occidentales et la Russie au cours des deux dernières guerres mondiales – surtout la Première. La présence massive d’immigrés turcs en Allemagne doit être prise en compte, qui s’accompagne d’une certaine soumission du gouvernement allemand : Erdogan, avec son impudence habituelle (provocation calculée) avait accusé les Allemands d’une sorte de ”racisme” en voulant assimiler et germaniser les immigrés turcs ! Les Turcs possèderaient une sorte de droit à conquérir l’Allemagne, tout en se prétendant des victimes. C’est un classique.

Il faut noter aussi, ce qui est cohérent, la brouille de la Turquie d’Erdogan avec Israël, jadis pays allié et aujourd’hui ennemi. Le néo-sultan, qui veut mobiliser le monde musulman dans son projet de renaissance ottomane, doit logiquement désigner Israël comme puissance hostile. Encore un problème de plus pour les dirigeants allemands, échaudés par toute forme d’antisémitisme et qui se sont toujours montrés pro-israéliens… Nous nageons dans un océan de contradictions où le comique rejoint le tragique.

En déclin démographique dramatique, l’Allemagne – enfin, son oligarchie – essaie d’attirer de la main d’œuvre à tout prix. Politique à courte vue, contrairement à ce que pratique le Japon. D’autre part, culpabilisés par le souvenir cauchemardesque du IIIe Reich, les dirigeants allemands veulent se donner une image de petits saints : ouverture, accueil, charité, solidarité. D’un extrême à l’autre.

Autant il est complètement stupide et injuste de critiquer l’Allemagne pour sa réussite et son hégémonie économiques – c’est de la jalousie, le pire des sentiments, et c’est aussi fuir nos propres responsabilités – autant il est pertinent d’affirmer que la politique étrangère allemande a toujours, depuis 1870, été catastrophique pour l’Europe. La naïveté pacifiste et laxiste de la politique allemande actuelle contraste avec le bellicisme de l’Allemagne de jadis. Les deux attitudes sont aussi dommageables pour le reste de l’Europe.

Quant à la France, la seule qui pourrait faire contrepoids à l’Allemagne, elle n’a plus de politique étrangère ; on ne peut même pas dire que la France soit à la remorque des USA ; elle est comme une caravane sans tracteur. Depuis le début de la présidence Hollande, la politique étrangère française est indéterminée, erratique, illisible, tant vis-à-vis du Moyen-Orient que de la Russie. Marine Le Pen a traité, au Parlement européen, M. Hollande de vice-chancelier de Mme Merkel –les deux étant présents, ce qui fut un grand moment. Mais cette saillie est en dessous de la vérité : M. Hollande n’est ni le vice–chancelier de Mme Merkel, ni le président de la République française. Il est toujours le Premier secrétaire du Parti socialiste, installé gratuitement et par erreur à l’Hôtel Élysée cinq étoiles et qui entend y rester cinq ans de plus. Nous sommes embarqués sur un bateau ivre.

dimanche, 15 novembre 2015

Flagless Germany

By

Ex: http://www.lewrockwell.com

October 3rd was the Anniversary of the Reunification of Germany. Having arrived in Leipzig just days earlier, I decided to take a long walk with my friend Olliver Wichmann. Though we covered nearly 20 miles that day, we saw no national flag on display, only an East German one in Grünau, a neighborhood of huge, Communist-eraapartment blocks.

“This is remarkable, Olliver. In the US, you can’t walk a mile on any day without seeing flags.”

“Generally, the only Germans who display flags are far-right ones. During big soccer matches involving the national team, it’s also OK to display flags.”

Nationalism has become a dirty word for many Germans. Along the Karl-Heine-Kanal, I spotted a sticker that said in English, “FIGHT NATIONALISM AND NAZIS,” then beneath that, “BY ALL MEANS NECESSARY.”

The huge influx of Middle Eastern and North African refugees has triggered a backlash among German nationalists, however. Each Monday, there is a large rally in Dresden and Leipzig. The lead marchers in Leipzig carry a banner that proclaims:

“FOR HOMELAND, PEACE AND GERMAN CORE CULTURE.

AGAINST RELIGIOUS FANATICISM.

AGAINST ISLAMIFICATION AND MULTICULTURALISM.”

These flag waving folks, LEGIDA, have also declared that they are neither left nor right, and certainly not Neo-Nazis. At each Leipzig rally, they are met by an equally large contingent of counter demonstrators who whistle, shout, shake tambourines or bang on drums to drown out their opponents’ speeches. Hundreds of cops are on the streets to keep the two camps apart.

Twenty-five years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, Germany is in danger of being split in two by this refugee crisis. At the University of Leipzig, there’s, “ONLY A COSMOPOLILTAN LEIPZIG IS A BEAUTIFUL LEIPZIG. NO TO LEGIDA,” and at Moritzbastei, a downtown arts center, there’s a banner, “FOR TOLERANCE, OPEN-MINDEDNESS, GOOD MUSIC & AGAINST RACISM.” By St. Peter Church, I saw a sticker, “Better Living—No Nazis!” and another in English, “HATE NAZIS.” In contemporary Germany, to oppose refugees or immigrants is to risk being called a Neo-Nazi.

What you have, then, is a battle between those who seek to defend a national culture based on at least a shared heritage and language, if not ethnicity, and those who subscribe to a more universalist concept. To these multiculturalists, a nation is just a collection of whoever happen to be in it, no matter their differences in core beliefs, since we’re just one big human family, after all, and all resultant frictions are more than compensated for by the varied benefits.

It’s notable that this argument is taking place almost exclusively in the West, in countries that are still mostly white and nominally Christian. Of course, Germany, France, Holland, Belgium, Spain, Portugal, Italy, England and the United States were also Colonialists that used Christianity as a pretext to conquer the world. Even as they slaughtered or enslaved, they saved, and a spin on that narrative is still extant today. As led by the US, the West is still meddling all over, thus generating the millions of refugees now swarming into Europe.

As is, Leipzig is a very cosmopolitan city that’s filled with international eateries. Within two blocks of my apartment, there are Thai, Indian and Turkish restaurants, plus a Doner Kebab stand that’s run by a friendly but mirthless Palestinian who came here from Jordan 20 years ago. There’s a Thai non-erotic massage parlor and a small Vietnamese-owned grocery. Another Vietnamese business, Mr. Quan’s Bar and Restaurant, has gone under. To round out the eating options, there’s a Subway, a German bakery and World of Pizza, a German chain.

WOP, as it is known, is basically a purveyor of American fast food. Besides pizzas, they sell spare ribs, buffalo wings, chicken nuggets, burgers and fries, and their pizzas have names like Montana, Philadelphia, Hawaii, California, Georgia, Kansas, Texas, Western and Spring Rod [?]. There is an Italiano, but no Napoli, interestingly enough. There is one called Zingaro, however, the Italian word for “Gypsy.” English is all over WOP’s menu.

At a strip mall in Grünau, I counted a Croatian, a Turkish and a Vietnameserestaurant. As Olliver and I sat eating outside the Turkish joint, we could see Russians, Turks and Arabs walk by along the wide, tree lined promenade.

“See those three little girls?” Olliver pointed out. “The one on the left is German, the one in the middle, on the bike, is Arabic, and the one on the right is Russian. They don’t see any difference. They don’t care.”

After a Muslim couple passed, Olliver observed, “They’re Turks.”

“How can you tell?”

“By her conservative dress. The typical uniform of a godfearing Turkish wife is a headscarf with an overcoat down to the knuckles, even on summer days in the nineties. Many of the Turks came here from the more backward parts of Turkey, like Anatolia. The Syrians and Iraqis, on the other hand, are more Westernized. They don’t dress that much differently than Germans.”

“And they just got here!”

Olliver is an autodidactic encyclopedia. Of working class background, he’s underemployed, like many people in this region. Abstaining from both meat and alcohol, Olliver is going bald, has a five o’clock shadow, takes photos during endless walks, plays chess against himself in his mind and composes electronic music whenever he starts to hear things. In his youth, Olliver gravitated towards Sartre, then freebased Joyce, Dostoyevsky, Camus, Strindberg, Hemingway, Marquez and Kafka. “In hindsight, I don’t quite like his convoluted style.” Among contemporary political commentators, Olliver pays attention to Noam Chomsky, Andre Vltchek, Michael Parenti, Bill Mitchell, Michael Hudson, John Pilger, Andrew Korybko, Pepe Escobar, Paul Craig Roberts and The Saker. He hates political correctness. Although Olliver’s English is deft and fluent, he becomes exasperated and even apologizes whenever a word or phrase doesn’t come to his mind immediately. Born in Hamburg, Olliver has been in Leipzig for more than 15 years.

Moving with the help of a walker, a German pensioner asked if he could share our table. He had a large bottle of Ur-Krostitzer, the cheap yet excellent local beer. Among the pleasures of being in Germany is the freedom to drink alcohol in just about any setting, a public garden, outside an eatery, strolling down the street or relaxing in a square. Germans don’t have the American hang-up with getting buzzed within sight of kids and other immature beings. The legal drinking age here is 16.

Prodded by us, the affable and serene old man revealed that he had worked for 47 years as a locomotive mechanic. A widower, he lives alone and has one daughter. Born in Leipzig, he lived through the Communist years without problems by not paying any attention to politics. He just put his head down and worked.

Leipzig’s Nicholas Church was where weekly demonstrations in 1989 eroded the Communist government’s legitimacy and helped to tear down the Berlin Wall. LEGIDA and PEDIGA (in Dresden) see themselves as a part of this tradition of peaceful protests. Scuffles have broken out between them and counter-demonstrators, however, with each blaming the other for the violence.

Americans can learn from the persistence of German protests, for they don’t just march for an hour once or twice a decade, give each other high fives then drive home in their SUVs to watch sports on TV. Contemporary German protests are also allowed a stage and microphones, so there’s no need to relay each sentence quite robotically, creepily and time consumingly as happened during our Occupy Wall Street demonstrations.

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Germans, on the other hand, don’t need to be encouraged to follow our example in anything, for they already ape America aplenty. Olliver, “We are not just an occupied nation physically, but mentally. People know about the 40,000 American soldiers here, but who’s talking about the occupation of the German mind?”

At the Cineplex in Grünau, we saw five movies advertised, Straight Out of Compton, Ladies First, Er ist wieder da, Fack yu Göhte 2 and Maze Runner, so three out of five are American, with the two German films featuring Germany mocking itself. There is a war between those who aim to restore German swagger and those who mock such an effort. An anti-Neo-Nazis group calls itself, in English, No Tears for Krauts.

Fack yu Göhte is a moronic or post-literate, millennial spelling of Fuck you Goethe, and on its billboard, there is also the misspelling of “klassenfahrt,” class trip, as “klassnfart.” Get it? Fart! The image is of a Rambo parody, with the muscular man holding a cross bow made from a slide ruler. Instead of going to Vietnam to rescue POW, the cast is romping to Thailand to fack each other.

Based on a best selling novel by Timur Vermes, Er is wieder da [He’s back] has Hitlerwaking up in 2011 Berlin. The ensuing confusion results in a series of comic scenes, with Hitler reduced to a harmless buffoon. To promote the film, Hitler lookalikes were placed on the streets of German cities. Whatever the professed intentions of the writer or director, the popularity of this Hitler resurrection belies a nostalgia for a more muscular and assertive Germany, I think. Though the Führer is mocked, his face is huge on the screen, and Adolf is presented as human and even likeable, not a caricature of evil. At another movie theater, I saw an Er is weider da poster with a plastic rose stem, almost tribute like, next to it.

Joining in the merriment, PEGIDA leader Lutz Bachmann snapped a photo of himself as Hitler and posted it on FaceBook in late 2014. The resultant furor has forced him out of PEGIDA, but more gravely, Bachmann is being prosecuted for calling asylum seekers Viehzeug, Gelumpe and Dreckspack [cattle, garbage and filthy rabble]. Bachmann may be jailed for up to five years. Free speech in Germany is limited, and one must not, above all, publicly criticize Israel or Jews, or raise questions about the Holocaust. France has the same prohibitions.

As for the American films, Olliver told me that German distributors used to translate their titles, but now leave them as is, so folks here must decipher, for example, “Straight Outta Compton” themselves. In my early 20’s, I thought of my goofy self as au courant for knowing N.W.A. and Ice-T, etc., but now Niggers With Attitude has become part of the universal education. Before settling in to your mesmerization, you can even buy a Coors, I kid you not, from the “American-Diner-Stil” concession stand.

American culture shows up everywhere here. English is routinely inserted into advertisements and many stores have English names only. On each police vehicle, there’s “VERDÄCHTIG GUTE JOBS” [“SUSPICIOUSLY GOOD JOBS”]. In tourist infested Markplatz, I saw a big band playing Jazz standards. Swinging along rather ploddingly, all songs were belted out in English. Not too far away, there was a middle-aged German dressed like a country music singer, though in a straw cowboy hat. Twanging or growling in English, he channeled Glenn Campbell, Bruce Springsteen or Bob Dylan, sometimes all within the same song. Well, at least he sounded like an American.

Strolling by, a teenaged girl chirped “hello baby” into her cell phone. Olliver, “It’s how they talk now. It’s cool to insert English words into a conversation. They would say something like, ‘Alles easy. Ich bin voll happy. Das ist nice. See you!’” Years ago in Iceland, I heard a woman complain that English syntax was creeping into Icelandic conversations. English was rearranging their minds’ furniture, in short. The internet has accelerated this linguistic hegemony. Hör auf bitching! Alles groovy!

Downtown, there are bars with names like Texas, Big Easy and Papa Hemingway. One night in Staubsauger [Vacuum Cleaner] Bar on trendy Karl-Liebknecht-Straße, I caught the young bartender reading Mumia Abu-Jamal’s We Want Freedom: Ein Leben in der Black Panther Party. Franziska studied media in college. I also chanced upon a Mumia sticker along the Karl-Heine-Kanal. He’s bigger here than in his native Philly, apparently. Mumia was also made an honorary citizen of Paris in 2001.

Liebknecht, by the way, was a founder of the German Communist Party. After Reunification, most of the street names in Leipzig were left alone. It is curious that Kathe Kollwitz, a very minor artist, is given a busy thoroughfare, while Max Beckmann, among the greatest painters of the 20th century and a Leipzig native to boot, is relegated to a short, serpentining lane. Like other European countries, at least Germany does name its streets after painters, writers and musicians, even foreign ones. When you name a street after a cultural figure, you also educate the people, but in the States, we waste too many street names on trees, stones, animals or real estate promotional monikers.

On October 5th, I tried to observe a LEGIDA rally. Following a handful of Polish house painters walking home, I managed to pass through two police barricades, but still couldn’t get close enough to see anything but the cops. Seeing me photographing, a group of giant men in black uniform approached my sorry ass. Maybe they were not Polizisten but the German basketball Mannschaft. I did as Dirk Nowitzki commanded and deleted his and his buddies’ likeness from my camera.

With so many streets blocked and cops everywhere, Monday in Leipzig these days means slower or practically no business for many stores in the vicinity. As tension ratchets up, who knows if we will see street battles? America’s accelerating collapse ensures that there will be more US-instigated wars, which will send even more refugees into Germany to exacerbate the already rancorous division within its society.

In small, depressed Saxony towns like Riesa, Trebsen and Bautzen, the National Democratic Party of Germany has made serious inroad. Its main slogan, “THE BOAT IS FULL—STOP THE ASYLUM SEEKER FLOOD.” An extremely xenophobic area is also known a National befreite Zone [National Liberated Zone]. Since such a realm is not marked by fixed boundaries but by the mindset of its people, you won’t know if you have strayed into one until you’re suddenly greeted, say, by a highly unpleasant welcome.

There are those who say that these nativists, xenophobes and Neo-Nazis altogether are such a tiny minority, they’re more noise than substance. A Leipziger in his 30’s assessed, “I’d say 90 to 95% of the people here have no problems with immigrants. We need them since they will contribute to our economy. Many of them are highly educated. The LEGIDA and PEGIDA rallies are getting smaller and smaller, and they’re not all local people. Many of these far right fanatics travel around to attend these rallies. Outsiders may think these rallies are a big deal, but they’re really not. We’re doing fine.”

Sharply disagreeing with the above, a friend emailed me from Frankfurt, “Tensions are rising in Germany—while hundreds of thousands flee to us, Germans are beginning to understand that it will cause massive problems in the future […]

Germany still is a rich country—but that doesn’t mean, that all Germans are rich.

On the contrary, the number of poor Germans has been rising for the last 20 years—and the number of homeless people has doubled in the last five years (still only 400,000—but way too high in my view).

Now the little German worker with his shitty job or the poor pensioner, who can buy less and less with his money each year, because pensions are frozen and prices are rising, is seeing these thousands and thousands of mostly young men coming in—and they see them getting health care for free, having doctors treat them for free, that they all have these trendy smartphones, that they do not need to buy a ticket for the bus or the train, because they are refugees, while HE, the German, has to pay some extra money for the doctor and has to pay for the bus etc.

It is mostly well meant, what German officials and actors and ordinary people do, to help the refugees—but since nothing is done in the same way for German homeless people and since some Germans have to leave their apartments for refugees (there were some cases where people in social housing had to leave, because the landlord or the government wanted to put in refugees—in Munich, where my brother lives, they wanted to use a facility for coma patients, but backed off when the parents of these patients complained)—in short, it is a social disaster rising.

WD1.jpg

There are no jobs for these people. Most of them are not qualified for the labor market here. There are no houses for them. In fact, the German housing market for people with little money is down—so the poor will compete with the refugees.

At the moment most of them are in former military areas or even tents. When winter comes, the mood will get worse on both sides.

[…]

At the moment, anyone saying something against the refugees is considered to be either a bad man or even a Nazi—and because of this, a critical view is seldom expressed in the media.

And this also contributes to the anger of many people, because in their view, the refugees keep coming, THEY have to pay for it (rising taxes will come—

it is only a matter of time)—and so it is the perfect storm, which is brewing here.

Unfortunately most Germans are so ill-informed about politics etc. that they will not get the bigger picture—that it is a great chess game we are in—and we are an expendable pawn.

Germany has done its part in US plans—now (meaning the next years) the chaos shall rise so that we will accept anything and everything our masters present to us as a solution, when the real riots come.

Martial law? Yes please! No civil rights anymore? Please!

Alright—we will protect you. Just give us all your money and your freedom—There! Have it! Please protect us!

It’s kinda odd to watch that, Linh—I just hope, that my parents will peacefully pass away, before the real chaos starts.

We shall see.”

So it’s not alles easy, baby. A long, bitter winter is swooping down. I’ve said all along that the only way to solve the refugee problem is to stop bombing one country after another, so to save its own Arsch, Europe must say fick dich to Uncle Sam and regain its autonomy. If you help America bomb, you’ll also reap the chaos that comes with it. Let’s close with Rammstein, a Neue Deutsch Härte band named after the US Airforce base in Germany where most of the drone strikes worldwide are coordinated. Deutschland, you have blood on your hands again, but it’s not from your own choosing. Sense!

“We’re all living in America,

America ist wunderbar.

We’re all living in America,

Amerika, Amerika.

We’re all living in America,

Coca-Cola, Wonderbra,

We’re all living in America,

Amerika, Amerika.

This is not a love song,

this is not a love song.

I don’t sing my mother tongue,

No, this is not a love song.

We’re all living in America,

Amerika ist wunderbar.

We’re all living in America,

Amerika, Amerika.

We’re all living in America,

Coca-Cola, sometimes WAR,

We’re all living in America,

Amerika, Amerika.”

jeudi, 12 novembre 2015

Ludwig Klages and the Biocentric View of Life

Ludwig Klages and the Biocentric View of Life

Joakim Andersen

Ex: http://www.righton.net

Klages2.jpgKlages puts Life in the centre, but he also identifies an anti-Life force that gradually infiltrated the world and took it over.

Ludwig Klages (1872–1956) was one of the most interesting thinkers of the twentieth century. He was also one of the most complex. Klages was a philosopher, a psychologist, and a leading graphologist. Together with Alfred Schuler and Karl Wolfskehl, he formed the ‘Cosmic Circle’ in Munich. The Circle consisted of the milieu around the poet Stefan George, but it did not fully adhere to George’s patriarchal worldview.

Klages was a productive and original thinker. Among other things, he was the father of the term ‘id’ which was later to be picked up by Sigmund Freud. Klages also coined the term logocentrist, which today is a term used in certain types of feminist theories. He gave his psychological school the name characterology, and wrote several classics on graphology.

Klages was a man of paradox. In his writings he was an anti-Semite, yet he spent several years editing the works of his Jewish-Hungarian colleague, the natural philosopher Melchior Palagyi, after he had passed away. Klages was not very popular in the Third Reich, but neither did he renounce his theories about Judaism even after the Second World War, either. Recently, Jürgen Habermas stated that there is much of value in Klages, given that he was such an original and interesting thinker. But his unique perspective is now largely forgotten. It is therefore of great value that Arktos Media has published two books consisting of excerpts from his writings, translated by Joseph D Pryce (Pryce has also written a valuable introduction to both collections). This present review focuses on the first of them, The Biocentric Worldview.

The Biocentric Worldview

‘Wild boar, ibex, fox, pine marten, weasel, duck and otter — all animals with which the legends dear to our memory are intimately intertwined — are shrinking in numbers, where, that is, they have not already become extinct…’
— Klages, 1913

What I appreciate the most in Klages’ thought is his so-called biocentric worldview. Klages claims that the distinction between ‘idealism’ and ‘materialism’ is rather irrelevant. In its place he describes a deeper, less well-known historical conflict. Klages puts Life in the centre, but he also identifies an anti-Life force that gradually infiltrated the world and took it over. Klages uses the German terms Seele and Geist, usually translated as Spirit and Mind. There is an intimate connection between Life and Spirit, but Mind is connected to abstractions, like ‘sin’, ‘will to power’, and similar concepts. Klages illuminates the difference:

‘Just as the philosopher of spirit considers everything that denies spirit to be a “sin”, the philosopher of life regards that which denies life to be an offense… no one speaks of a sin against a tree, but men have certainly spoken in the past — and even today many still speak — of an offense against a tree.’

Among these expressions of anti-Life he mentions moralism, Judaism, and Christianity, as well as capitalism and militarism. Nietzsche’s ‘will to power’ also risks becoming a part of the anti-Life forces and an unhealthy obsession. Klages develops a useful deep ecological perspective, related to and complementing Naess, Abbey, and Linkola. He also describes how ‘progress’ has hurt the world. In the essay ‘Man and Earth’, Klages describes how animals and plants became extinct, but also how folk cultures and authentic human emotions are pushed aside. Klages was an anti-colonialist, and discusses how both species of animals and human cultures are extinguished. In their place everything, is homogenised, and the vampire that is Geist spreads over the world. Thus Klages connects the threat against biological diversity with the threat against cultural.

‘Modern man´s conscious striving for power far surpasses that of any previous epoch… in the service of human needs, the ever-increasing mechanization has brought about the desecration of the natural world.’
— Klages

These essays are also interesting from the perspective of the history and philosophy of science. Klages analyses both psychoanalysis and Socrates, among many other things. He criticises concepts like ‘progress’ and utopianism as being hostile to Life. His perspective places primary value on Spirit and Life, and on the non-conscious and the qualitative. One does well to compare Klages with Guénon’s The Reign of Quantity and the Signs of the Times, along with Heidegger and Alexander Jacob’s De Naturae Natura.

klagesSX336_BO1,204,203,200_.jpgKlages and Romanticism

‘Man should look upon the harvested fruits of the unconscious as an unexpected windfall bestowed by Heaven above.’
— Goethe

Among Klages’ own sources we find Nietzsche and the pre-Socratic philosophers. We also find the German Romantics and Goethe. Among the Romantics, Klages focuses on the now largely forgotten Carl Gustav Carus. He demonstrates that German Romanticism has permanent value.

In one’s own life, Klages is of value in showing that too much Geist leads to a worse and less authentic life. When the process has gone too far, one loses the ability to perceive the beauty of a forest, and instead only sees it as something merely quantifiable: as a bunch of timber. Likewise, the Romantics and Klages are also of use in politics. They show that the tendency towards hyper-politicisation and ideological thinking are among the enemies of Life. Family, nature, emotions, beauty, folk culture — they are all threatened by too much Geist. When Karlheinz Weissmann identifies the living as the leitmotiv of conservatism, or when Heinrich von Leo described his mission as protecting the ‘God-given, real life, in its development following its inner forces’, they are clearly related to Klages. Conservatism, defined as taking care of the living, not only animals and plants but also such ‘organisms’ as cultures, can also be biocentric.

When it comes to the philosophy of science, Carus, Goethe, and Klages are also of great use, given their focus on the whole rather than on the parts of things, on the sub- or non-conscious, and on reality and life above the prevailing focus on the mechanical and quantifiable. Klages quotes Carus:

‘…the key to an understanding of conscious thought resides in the realm of the unconscious.’

The Biocentric Worldview is thus of great value due to its deep ecological qualities as well as Klages’ original conception of history. Klages’ description of the rise and vampire-like spread of Geist has much in common with Nietzsche’s description of how ressentiment and slave morality takes over the world. (However, some aspects of Nietzsche are also dangerously close to the vampire.)

Klages is not a determinist. He does not rule out that Spirit and Life may be defended against Mind. He also reminds us that the goal of a Spirit-oriented science is to understand, rather than to reduce and manipulate. His role models are thus heroes, poets, and gods. The anthology is highly recommended.

Recommended products:

The Biocentric Worldview

Price: $21.00

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Cosmogonic Reflections: Selected Aphorisms from Ludwig Klages

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About The Author

Joakim Andersen is regarded as 'the grand old man' of the Swedish New Right, and was one of the founders of the famous Scandinavian think-tank Motpol. His ideological background is Marxist, but he has since moved on to what he regards as more interesting sources of inspiration such as Julius Evola, Alain de Benoist, and Georges Dumézil. His writing focuses primarily on issues pertaining to intellectual history.

mercredi, 11 novembre 2015

Helmut Schmidt : un très grand Allemand nous quitte

Helmut_Schmidt-Der_Deutsche_Kanzler__MG_2981xxx.jpg

Helmut Schmidt : un très grand Allemand nous quitte

Pascal Décaillet
Journaliste et entrepreneur indépendant
Ex: http://www.lesobservateurs.ch

Sur le vif - 10.11.15 - 16.37h

HS7460z.jpgHambourg, 25 mars 1999 : à quelques heures du début des bombardements de l’OTAN sur la Serbie, l’ancien chancelier Helmut Schmidt (1974-1982), cinquième de la République fédérale à porter ce titre, 80 ans, nous reçoit, mon confrère Pierre-André Stauffer de l’Hebdo, et moi, dans son bureau, au sommet de la tour de « Die Zeit », dont il est l’éditeur. Vue sur le port. Sa ville natale, splendide. Hanséatique. L’une de mes villes allemandes préférées.

Pendant 90 minutes, au milieu d’une incroyable tabagie, alternant les Menthol et les prises de tabac à sniffer (une vielle habitude d’adolescent marin, ici à Hambourg, nous dit-il), cet homme d’exception, successeur de Willy Brandt (dont il a été le ministre) à la Chancellerie, prédécesseur de Kohl, n’ayant rien à envier à ce dernier, nous promène, avec son allemand qui sent la mer du Nord, dans le prodigieux dédale de l’Histoire de son pays au vingtième siècle, celle qu’évoque Günter Grass dans son livre « Mein Jahrhundert ». Mais Grass est peintre, l’un des plus grands, Schmidt est acteur. Ce siècle allemand, il a contribué à le faire.

L’homme qui vient de nous quitter, à presque 97 ans, était né à Hambourg le 23 décembre 1918, un mois et douze jours après l’Armistice, un mois et quatorze jours, surtout, après le début de la Révolution allemande, celle du 9 novembre, celle dont parle Döblin dans son roman « November 1918 ». Il grandit dans la ville hanséatique, fait toute la Seconde Guerre mondiale comme officier de DCA, est décoré de la Croix de Fer, prisonnier des Britanniques en 1945, s’inscrit au SPD (le parti social-démocrate) en 1946, entame une prodigieuse carrière politique, d’abord dans le Land de Hambourg, puis au niveau fédéral (Défense, Finances), avant les huit années de pouvoir suprême.

Helmut Schmidt était un Européen convaincu. Mais pas une Europe du cœur, comme son successeur le Rhénan Helmut Kohl. Non, juste une Europe de la raison, avait-il tenu à nous préciser en ce jour de mars 1999, pour que le continent atteigne une dimension critique suffisante pour affronter les grands blocs. On connaît son amitié légendaire avec Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, ils furent, au même titre que de Gaulle-Adenauer et Kohl-Mitterrand, l’un des grands couples de la construction européenne. En 2001, je les avais revus, MM Schmidt et Giscard, à la Fondation Jean-Monnet de Lausanne, j’avais pu mesurer la proximité qui les liait.

HSdL._SX296_BO1,204,203,200_.jpgCe que les gens, aujourd’hui, connaissent peu en Suisse romande, c’est l’immensité de l’intelligence politique de l’homme qui nous quitte aujourd’hui. Dans la droite ligne de Bismarck, il construit le destin allemand sur le long terme, sans états d’âme, jouant des alliances pour le seul intérêt supérieur de la nation qui lui est confiée. Simplement, ses années de Chancellerie, 1974-1982, sont celles où l’Allemagne, redevenue géant économique, n’a pas encore droit à occuper la même taille en politique. Avec les vainqueurs occidentaux de la Seconde Guerre mondiale, Américains principalement, Schmidt, parfait anglophone, s’entend à merveille. Mais il serait faux de ne voir là qu’une obédience atlantiste : l’homme, patiemment, guette l’heure de son pays. Ce sera son successeur, le Rhénan Helmut Kohl, qui l’entendra sonner, le 9 novembre 1989. Et son prédécesseur, l’immense Willy Brandt, qui aura ce jour-là le mot juste : « Jetzt kann zusammenwachsen, was zusammengehört ».

Je ne puis en dire beaucoup plus pour l’heure, mon émission spéciale sur la grève de la fonction publique genevoise m’attend. Mais je tenais, à chaud, à rendre un premier hommage à cet homme tellement allemand, avec sa discipline de fer, son incroyable liberté de parole (il en a usé jusqu’au bout), sa culture historique, sa virtuosité de piano (il avait hésité à en faire son métier). Helmut Schmidt, comme Willy Brandt, est un chancelier profondément allemand. Je crois que Kohl, et même Adenauer, sont des chanceliers européens, au sens le plus noble de ce mot. Mais Schmidt était, dans toutes les fibres, un chancelier allemand. Connaissant à fond l’Histoire de son pays, en tout cas depuis Frédéric II, son équation (comme Willy Brandt) avec la question de l’Est, son intégration provisoire au système atlantique, sa nécessité d’un dialogue constant avec la France. Pour le reste, un esprit totalement libre, un provocateur. L’un des très grands Allemands du vingtième siècle, oui, lui qui naît en pleine Révolution allemande, et qui meurt au moment où Mme Merkel ne sait pas comment se sortir, mise sous pression par le Ministre-Président de Bavière, de la question des réfugiés.

Le Grand Refuge, Schmidt l’avait connu, à l’âge de 27 ans : alors que, officier de la Wehrmacht, il tombait aux mains des Britanniques, au moins 12 millions d’Allemands des pays de l’Est, fuyant l’Armée Rouge, déboulaient dans une « mère patrie » en ruines. A partir de là, il a fallu reconstruire. Nous perdons aujourd’hui un incomparable constructeur.

Pascal Décaillet

mardi, 10 novembre 2015

Zum Tode Helmut Schmidts

HS317772_303,00.jpg

“Ohne Kenntnis der Geschichte bleibt die Gegenwart unbegreifbar”

Zum Tode Helmut Schmidts

Ex: http://www.zuerst.de

Hamburg. Im Alter von 96 Jahren ist Altkanzler Helmut Schmidt am heutigen Dienstag verstorben. Er prägte die Politik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland über Jahrzehnte hinweg und galt noch im hohen Alter als streitbarer Diskutant, dem die Wahrheitsliebe und klare Worte stets wichtiger waren, als sich dem politischen “Mainstream” unterzuordnen.

Der 1918 in Hamburg geborene Schmidt wollte eigentlich Architekt und Städteplaner werden, doch nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg, in dem er als Oberleutnant der Wehrmacht bis zu seiner Gefangennahme im April 1945 diente, ließ er sein gestalterisches Talent in die Politik einfließen. Angetreten, um Politik als aktives Steuern und Lenken zu betreiben, fiel sein Tatendurst in der Aufbauphase der unmittelbaren Nachkriegszeit auf fruchtbaren Boden. Der SPD-Politiker erlebte seinen ersten kommunal- und landespolitischen Höhepunkt, als er sich in seiner Funktion als Hamburger Innensenator als Mann der Tat bewies: während der Flutkatastrophe im Februar 1962 zögerte er keinen Moment, die Bundeswehr zum Einsatz zu beordern; freilich ohne rechtliche Grundlage. Der anpackende Charakter sollte sein Markenzeichen bleiben.

Auch als Bundeskanzler mußte der Hanseat in Ausnahmesituationen kühlen Kopf bewahren. Als fünfzehn Jahre später arabische Links-Terroristen die Lufthansa-Maschine “Landshut” entführen, befiehlt Schmidt für den 18. Oktober 1977 die Befreiung der 86 Geiseln: die Bundesgrenzschutz-Sondereinheit “GSG 9″ stürmt die Maschine auf dem somalischen Flughafen Mogadischu – die “Operation Feuerzauber” glückt. Helmut Schmidts Ruf als “Krisenkanzler” war begründet.

In der Hochphase des Kalten Krieges war es der SPD-Kanzler Schmidt, der gegen die Parteilinke, die aufkommende Friedensbewegung und den linksextremen Terror eine Linie des realpolitisch Machbaren durchsetzen mußte. Mit dem NATO-Doppelbeschluß, der aus seiner Sicht die Sowjetunion zur Abrüstung ihrer Mittelstreckenraketen zwingen sollte, gelang Schmidt zwar die Durchsetzung seiner Position. Doch mittelfristig war dies der Anfang vom parteipolitischen Ende seiner Kanzlerschaft. Als ihm am 1. Oktober 1982 der Bundestag in einem Mißtrauensvotum das Vertrauen entzog, war dies ein harter Schlag.

Doch Schmidt widmete sich fortan publizistischen Projekten, insbesondere als “Zeit”-Herausgeber sollten es europa- und weltwirtschaftspolitische Themen sein, die in den kommenden 30 Jahren zum Steckenpferd des diplomierten Volkswirts wurden. In den letzten Jahren seines erfüllten Lebens fand der Hamburger Ehrenbürger aber auch zunehmend kritische Worte zur bundesdeutschen Einwanderungs- und Ausländerpolitik. “Wir müssen eine weitere Zuwanderung aus fremden Kulturen unterbinden”, so eine viel zitierte Äußerung des Altkanzlers, der die multikulturelle Gesellschaft als “eine Illusion von Intellektuellen” angriff. Für diese und andere nonkonforme Verlautbarungen stand Schmidt immer wieder im Kreuzfeuer der Kritik – ohne, daß es ihn je angeficht hätte.

Ob als Verteidigungs-, Wirtschafts- oder Finanzminister, ob als Innensenator oder Bundeskanzler, ob als Zeitungsherausgeber oder Kolumnist: Schmidt polarisierte zeitlebens und gehörte zu den wenigen Ausnahmeerscheinungen der bundesrepublikanischen Politik. Sein Ausspruch, “Ohne Kenntnis der Geschichte bleibt die Gegenwart unbegreifbar”, war Leitbild seines Schaffens. Ein Credo, das der heutigen Staatsführung ferner nicht sein könnte. (sp)

 

dimanche, 08 novembre 2015

Jünger-Haus Wilflingen

révolution conservatrice,ernst jünger,wilflingen,allemagne,littérature,lettres,lettres allemandes,littérature allemande

JÜNGER-Haus Wilflingen

Gedenkstätte für Ernst und Friedrich Georg Jünger

 

„Der Besucher taucht ein in die einzigartige
Atmosphäre des Hauses, in dem Ernst Jünger
nahezu ein halbes Jahrhundert lebte und arbeitete.“

Monika Miller-Vollmer, ehemalige Kustodin Jünger-Haus

 

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révolution conservatrice,ernst jünger,wilflingen,allemagne,littérature,lettres,lettres allemandes,littérature allemande

révolution conservatrice,ernst jünger,wilflingen,allemagne,littérature,lettres,lettres allemandes,littérature allemande

Oswald Spengler and the Soul of Russia

domes-crosses-2-web.jpg

Oswald Spengler and the Soul of Russia

By Kerry Bolton
Ex: http://katehon.com

It would be easy to regard Oswald Spengler, author of the epochal Decline of The West in the aftermath of World War I, as a Russophobe.

In so doing the role of Russia in the unfolding of history from this era onward could be easily dismissed, opposed or ridiculed by proponents of Spengler, while in Russia his insights into culture-morphology would be understandably unwelcome as being from an Slavophobic German nationalist. However, while Spengler, like many others of the time in the aftermath of the Bolshevik Revolution, regarded – partially - Russia as the Asianised leader of a ‘coloured revolution’ against the white world, he also considered other possibilities. This paper examines Spengler’s views on Russia as a distinct culture that had not yet fulfilled her destiny, while Western civilisation is about to take a final bow on the world historical stage. His views on Russia as an outsider are considered in relation to the depiction of the Russian soul by seminal Russians such as Gogol.

Russia’s ‘Soul’

Spengler regarded Russians as formed by the vastness of the land-plain, as innately antagonistic to the Machine, as rooted in the soil, irrepressibly peasant, religious, and ‘primitive’. Without a wider understanding of Spengler’s philosophy it appears that he was – like Hitler – a Slavophobe. However, when Spengler wrote of these Russian characteristics he was referencing the Russians as a still youthful people in contrats to the senile West. Hence the ‘primitive’ Russian is not synonymous with ‘primitivity’ as popularly understood at that time in regard to ‘primitive’ tribal peoples. Nor was it to be confounded with the Hitlerite perception of the ‘primitive Slav’ incapable of building his own State.

To Spengler, the ‘primitive peasant’ is the well-spring from which a race draws its healthiest elements during its epochs of cultural vigour.

Agriculture is the foundation of a High Culture, enabling stable communities to diversify labour into specialisation from which Civilisation proceeds.

However, according to Spengler, each people has its own soul, a German conception derived from the German Idealism of Herder, Fichte et al. A High culture reflects that soul, whether in its mathematics, music, architecture; both in the arts and the physical sciences. The Russian soul is not the same as the Western Faustian, as Spengler called it, the ‘ Magian’ of the Arabian civilisation, or the Classical of the Hellenes and Romans. The Western Culture that was imposed on Russia by Peter the Great, what Spengler called Petrinism, is a veneer.

The basis of the Russian soul is not infinite space – as in the West’s Faustian (Spengler, 1971, I, 183) imperative, but is ‘the plain without limit’ (Spengler, 1971, I, 201). The Russian soul expresses its own type of infinity, albeit not that of the Western which becomes even enslaved by its own technics at the end of its life-cycle. (Spengler, 1971, II, 502). (Although it could be argued that Sovietism enslaved man to machine, a Spenglerian would cite this as an example of Petrinism). However, Civilisations cannot do anything but follow their life’s course, and one cannot see Spengler’s descriptions as moral judgements but as observations. The finale for Western Civilisation according to Spengler cannot be to create further great forms of art and music, which belong to the youthful or ‘ spring’ epoch of a civilisation, but to dominate the world under a technocratic-military dispensation, before declining into oblivion that all prior world civilisations. It is after this Western decline that Spengler alluded to the next word civilisation being that of Russia. At that stage Spengler could only hint at the possibilities.

Hence, according to Spengler, Russian Orthodox architecture does not represent the infinity towards space that is symbolised by the Western high culture’s Gothic Cathedral spire, nor the enclosed space of the Mosque of the Magian Culture, (Spengler, 1971, I, 183-216) but the impression of sitting upon a horizon. Spengler considered that this Russian architecture is ‘not yet a style, only the promise of a style that will awaken when the real Russian religion awakens’ (Spengler, 1971, I, p. 201. Spengler was writing of the Russian culture as an outsider, and by his own reckoning must have realised the limitations of that. It is therefore useful to compare his thoughts on Russia with those of Russians of note.

Nikolai Berdyaev in The Russian Idea affirms what Spengler describes:

There is that in the Russian soul which corresponds to the immensity, the vagueness, the infinitude of the Russian land, spiritual geography corresponds with physical. In the Russian soul there is a sort of immensity, a vagueness, a predilection for the infinite, such as is suggested by the great plain of Russia. (Berdyaev, 1).

‘Prussian Socialism’, ‘Russian Socialism’


Of the Russian soul, the ego/vanity of the Western culture-man is missing; the persona seeks impersonal growth in service, ‘in the brother-world of the plain’. Orthodox Christianity condemns the ‘I’ as ‘sin’ (Spengler, 1971, I, 309). Spengler wrote of ‘Prussian Socialism’, based on the Prussian ethos of duty to the state, as the foundation of a new Western ethos under the return to Faith and Authority during the final epoch of Western civilisation. He contrasted this with the ‘socialism’ of Karl Marx, which he regarded as a product of English economics, (Spengler, 1919) as distinct from the German economics of Friedrich List for example, described as the ‘ national system of political economy’, where nation is the raison d’etre of the economy and not class or individual.

The Russian concept of ‘we’ rather than ‘I’, and of impersonal service to the expanse of one’s land implies another form socialism. It is perhaps in this sense that Stalinism proceeded along lines different and often antithetical to the Bolshevism envisaged by Trotsky et al. (Trotsky, 1936), and established an enduring legacy on Russia.

A recent comment by an American visitor to Russia, Barbara J. Brothers, as part of a scientific delegation, states something akin to Spengler’s observation:

The Russians have a sense of connectedness to themselves and to other human beings that is just not a part of American reality. It isn’t that competitiveness does not exist; it is just that there always seems to be more consideration and respect for others in any given situation.

Of the Russian concept of property and of capitalism, Berdyaev wrote:

The social theme occupied a predominant place in Russian nineteenth century thought. It might even be said that Russian thought in that century was to a remarkable extent coloured by socialistic ideas. If the word socialism is not taken in its doctrinaire sense, one might say that socialism is deeply rooted in the Russian nature. There is already an expression of this truth in the fact that the Russian people did not recognize the Roman conception of property. It has been said of Muscovite Russia that it was innocent of the sin of ownership in land, the one and only landed proprietor being the Tsar: there was no freedom, but there was a greater sense of what was right. This is of interest in the light that it throws upon the rise of communism. The Slavophils also repudiated the Western bourgeois interpretation of private property equally with the socialists of a revolutionary way of thinking. Almost all of them thought that the Russian people was called upon to give actual effect to social troth and righteousness and to the brotherhood of man. One and all they hoped that Russia would escape the wrongness and evil of capitalism, that it would be able to pass over to a better social order while avoiding the capitalist stage of economic development. And they all considered the backwardness of Russia as conferring upon her a great advantage. It was the wisdom of the Russians to be socialists during the period of serfdom and autocracy. Of all peoples in the world the Russians have the community spirit; in the highest degree the Russian way of life and Russian manners, are of that kind. Russian hospitality is an indication of this sense of community. (Berdyaev, 97-98).

Here again, we see with Berdyaev, as with Spengler, that there is a ‘Russian Socialism’ based on what Spengler referred to as the Russian ‘we’ in contrast to the Late Western ‘I’, and of the sense of brotherhood dramatised by Gogol in Taras Bulba, shaped not by factories and money-thinking, but by the kinship that arises from a people formed from the vastness of the plains, and forged through the adversity of centuries of Muslim and Mongol invasions.

The Russian Soul - Русская душа

The connections between family, nation, birth, unity and motherland are reflected in the Russian language.

род [rod]: family, kind, sort, genus
родина [ródina]: homeland, motherland
родители [rodíteli]: parents
родить [rodít']: to give birth
роднить [rodnít']: to unite, bring together
родовой [rodovói]: ancestral, tribal
родство [rodstvó]: kinship

Russian National Literature starting from the 1840s began to consciously express the Russian soul. Firstly Nikolai Vasilievich Gogol’s Taras Bulba, which along with the poetry of Pushkin, founded a Russian literary tradition; that is to say, truly Russian, and distinct from the previous literature based on German, French and English. John Cournos states of this in his introduction to Taras Bulba:

The spoken word, born of the people, gave soul and wing to literature; only by coming to earth, the native earth, was it enabled to soar. Coming up from Little Russia, the Ukraine, with Cossack blood in his veins, Gogol injected his own healthy virus into an effete body, blew his own virile spirit, the spirit of his race, into its nostrils, and gave the Russian novel its direction to this very day.

Taras Bulba is a tale on the formation of the Cossack folk. In this folk-formation the outer enemy plays a crucial role. The Russian has been formed largely as the result of battling over centuries with Tartars, Muslims and Mongols. Cournos writes of the Gogol myths in reference to the shaping of the Russian character through adversity and landscape:

This same Prince Guedimin freed Kieff from the Tatar yoke. This city had been laid waste by the golden hordes of Ghengis Khan and hidden for a very long time from the Slavonic chronicler as behind an impenetrable curtain. A shrewd man, Guedimin appointed a Slavonic prince to rule over the city and permitted the inhabitants to practise their own faith, Greek Christianity. Prior to the Mongol invasion, which brought conflagration and ruin, and subjected Russia to a two-century bondage, cutting her off from Europe, a state of chaos existed and the separate tribes fought with one another constantly and for the most petty reasons. Mutual depredations were possible owing to the absence of mountain ranges; there were no natural barriers against sudden attack. The openness of the steppe made the people war-like. But this very openness made it possible later for Guedimin’s pagan hosts, fresh from the fir forests of what is now White Russia, to make a clean sweep of the whole country between Lithuania and Poland, and thus give the scattered princedoms a much-needed cohesion. In this way Ukrainia was formed. (Cournos, ‘Introduction’, ibid).

Their society and nationality were defined by religiosity, as was the West’s by Gothic Christianity during its ‘Spring’ epoch. The newcomer to a Setch or permanent village was greeted by the Chief as a Christian and as a warrior: ‘Welcome! Do you believe in Christ?’ —‘I do’, replied the new-comer. ‘And do you believe in the Holy Trinity?’— ‘I do’.—‘And do you go to church?’—‘I do.’ ‘Now cross yourself’. (Gogol, III).

Gogol depicts the scorn in which trade is held, and when commerce has entered among Russians, rather than being confined to non-Russians associated with trade, it is regarded as a symptom of decadence:

I know that baseness has now made its way into our land. Men care only to have their ricks of grain and hay, and their droves of horses, and that their mead may be safe in their cellars; they adopt, the devil only knows what Mussulman customs. They speak scornfully with their tongues. They care not to speak their real thoughts with their own countrymen. They sell their own things to their own comrades, like soulless creatures in the market-place. The favour of a foreign king, and not even a king, but the poor favour of a Polish magnate, who beats them on the mouth with his yellow shoe, is dearer to them than all brotherhood. But the very meanest of these vile men, whoever he may be, given over though he be to vileness and slavishness, even he, brothers, has some grains of Russian feeling; and they will assert themselves some day. And then the wretched man will beat his breast with his hands; and will tear his hair, cursing his vile life loudly, and ready to expiate his disgraceful deeds with torture. Let them know what brotherhood means on Russian soil! (Spengler, 1971, II, 113).

Here we might see a Russian socialism that is, so far form being the dialectical materialism offered by Marx, the mystic we-feeling forged by the vastness of the plains and the imperative for brotherhood above economics, imposed by that landscape. Russia’s feeling of world-mission has its own form of messianism whether expressed through Christian Orthodoxy or the non-Marxian form of ‘world revolution’ under Stalin, or both in combination, as suggested by the later rapport between Stalinism and the Church from 1943 with the creation of the Council for Russian Orthodox Church Affairs (Chumachenko, 2002). In both senses, and even in the embryonic forms taking place under Putin, Russia is conscious of a world-mission, expressed today as Russia’s role in forging a multipolar world, with Russia as being pivotal in resisting unipolarism.
 

Sergijev-Posad-Zagorsk.jpg


Commerce is the concern of foreigners, and the intrusions bring with them the corruption of the Russian soul and culture in general: in speech, social interaction, servility, undermining Russian ‘brotherhood’, the Russian ‘we’ feeling that Spengler described. (Spengler 1971, I, 309). However, Gogol also states that this materialistic decay will eventually be purged even from the soul of the most craven Russian.

And all the Setch prayed in one church, and were willing to defend it to their last drop of blood, although they would not hearken to aught about fasting or abstinence. Jews, Armenians, and Tatars, inspired by strong avarice, took the liberty of living and trading in the suburbs; for the Zaporozhtzi never cared for bargaining, and paid whatever money their hand chanced to grasp in their pocket. Moreover, the lot of these gain-loving traders was pitiable in the extreme. They resembled people settled at the foot of Vesuvius; for when the Zaporozhtzi lacked money, these bold adventurers broke down their booths and took everything gratis. (Gogol, III).

The description of these people shows that they would not stoop to haggling; they decided what a merchant should receive. Money-talk is repugnant to them.

The Cossack brotherhood is portrayed by Gogol as the formative process in the building up of the Russian people. This process is, significantly, not one of biology but of spirit, even transcending the family bond. Spengler treated the matter of race as that of soul rather than of zoology. (Spengler, 1971, II, 113-155). To Spengler landscape was crucial in determining what becomes ‘race’, and the duration of families grouped in a particular landscape – including nomads who have a defined range of wandering – form ‘a character of duration’, which was Spengler’s definition of ‘race’. (Spengler, Vol. II, 113). Gogol describes this ‘ race’ forming process among the Russians. So far from being an aggressive race nationalism it is an expanding mystic brotherhood under God:

The father loves his children, the mother loves her children, the children love their father and mother; but this is not like that, brothers. The wild beast also loves its young. But a man can be related only by similarity of mind and not of blood. There have been brotherhoods in other lands, but never any such brotherhoods as on our Russian soil. It has happened to many of you to be in foreign lands. … No, brothers, to love as the Russian soul loves, is to love not with the mind or anything else, but with all that God has given, all that is within you. Ah! (Golgol, IX).

The Russian soul is born in suffering. The Russian accepts the fate of life in service to God and to his Motherland. Russia and Faith are inseparable. When the elderly warrior Bovdug is mortally struck by a Turkish bullet his final words are exhortations on the nobility of suffering, after which his spirit soars to join his ancestors:

‘I sorrow not to part from the world. God grant every man such an end! May the Russian land be forever glorious!’ And Bovdug’s spirit flew above, to tell the old men who had gone on long before that men still knew how to fight on Russian soil, and better still, that they knew how to die for it and the holy faith. (Gogol, IX).

The depth and duration of this cult of the martyrs attached to Holy Mother Russia was revived under Stalin during the Great Patriotic War. This is today as vigorous as ever, as indicated by the celebration of Victory Day on 7 May 2015, and the absence of Western representatives indicating the diverging course Russia is again taking from the West.

The mystique of death and suffering for the Motherland is described in the death of Tarus Bulba when he is captured and executed, his final words being ones of resurrection:

‘Wait, the time will come when ye shall learn what the orthodox Russian faith is! Already the people scent it far and near. A czar shall arise from Russian soil, and there shall not be a power in the world which shall not submit to him!’ But fire had already risen from the fagots; it lapped his feet, and the flame spread to the tree.... But can any fire, flames, or power be found on earth which are capable of overpowering Russian strength? (Gogol, XII).

The characteristics of the Russian soul that run through Tarus Bulba are those of faith, fate, struggle, suffering, strength, brotherhood and resurrection. Tarus Bulba established the Russian national literature that articulated the Russian soul.

Pseudomorphosis

A significant element of Spengler’s culture morphology is ‘Historic Pseudomorphosis’. Spengler drew an analogy from geology, when crystals of a mineral are embedded in a rock-stratum: where ‘clefts and cracks occur, water filters in, and the crystals are gradually washed out so that in due course only their hollow mould remains’. (Spengler, II, 89).

Then comes volcanic outbursts which explode the mountain; molten masses pour in, stiffen and crystallize out in their turn. But these are not free to do so in their own special forms. They must fill out the spaces that they find available. Thus there arise distorted forms, crystals whose inner structure contradicts their external shape, stones of one kind presenting the appearance of stones of another kind. The mineralogists call this phenomenon Pseudomorphosis. (Ibid.).

Spengler explained:

By the term ‘historical pseudomorphosis’ I propose to designate those cases in which an older alien Culture lies so massively over the land that a young Culture, born in this land, cannot get its breath and fails not only to achieve pure and specific expression-forms, but even to develop its own fully self-consciousness. All that wells up from the depths of the young soul is cast in the old moulds, young feelings stiffen in senile works, and instead of rearing itself up in its own creative power, it can only hate the distant power with a hate that grows to be monstrous. (Ibid.).

Russia is the example of ‘Historic Pseudomorphosis’ given by Spengler as being ‘presented to our eyes to-day’. A dichotomy has existed for centuries, starting with Peter the Great, of attempts to impose a Western veneer over Russia. This is called Petrinism. The resistance of those attempts is what Spengler called ‘Old Russia’. Spengler, 1971, II, 192). Spengler described this dichotomy:

…This Muscovite period of the great Boyar families and Patriarchs, in which a constant element is the resistance of an Old Russia party to the friends of Western Culture, is followed, from the founding of Petersburg in 1703, by the pseudomorphosis which forced the primitive Russian soul into an alien mould, first of full Baroque, then of the Enlightenment, and then of the nineteenth century. (Ibid., II, p. 192).

Spengler’s view is again in accord with what is spoken of Russia by Russians. Nikolai Berdyaev wrote in terms similar to Spengler’s:

The inconsistency and complexity of the Russian soul may be due to the fact that in Russia two streams of world history East and West jostle and influence one another. The Russian people is not purely European and it is not purely Asiatic. Russia is a complete section of the world a colossal East-West. It unites two worlds, and within the Russian soul two principles are always engaged in strife - the Eastern and the Western. (Berdyaev, 1).

With the orientation of Russian policy towards the West, ‘Old Russia’ was ‘forced into a false and artificial history’. (Spengler, II, 193). Spengler wrote that Russia had become dominated by Western culture from its ‘Late’ epoch:

Late-period arts and sciences, enlightenment, social ethics, the materialism of world-cities, were introduced, although in this pre-cultural time religion was the only language in which man understood himself and the world. In the townless land with its primitive peasantry, cities of alien type fixed themselves like ulcers – false, unnatural, unconvincing. ‘Petersburg’, says Dostoyevski, ‘it is the most abstract and artificial city in the world’.
After this everything that arose around it was felt by the true Russdom as lies and poison. A truly apocalyptic hatred was directed on Europe, and ‘Europe’ was all that was not Russia… ‘The first condition of emancipation for the Russian soul’, wrote Aksakov [1] in 1863 to Dostoyevski, ‘is that it should hate Petersburg with all this might and all its soul’. Moscow is holy, Petersburg Satanic. A widespread popular legend presents Peter the Great as Antichrist.
(Spengler, 1971, II, 193).


Berdyaev also discusses the introduction of Enlightenment doctrines from France into Russia:

The Western culture of Russia in the eighteenth century was a superficial aristocratic borrowing and imitation. Independent thought had not yet awakened. At first it was French influences which prevailed among us and a superficial philosophy of enlightenment was assimilated. The Russian aristocrats of the eighteenth century absorbed Western culture in the form of a miserable rehash of Voltaire.
(Berdyaev, 16).


domes-ancient-russian-church-11780967.jpgThe hatred of the ‘West’ and of ‘Europe’ is the hatred for a Civilisation that had already reached an advanced state of decay into materialism and sought to impose its primacy by cultural subversion rather than by combat, with its City-based and money-based outlook, ‘poisoning the unborn culture in the womb of the land’. (Spengler, 1971, II, 194). Russia was still a land where there were no bourgeoisie and no true class system but only lord and peasant, a view confirmed by Berdyaev, writing:

The various lines of social demarcation did not exist in Russia; there were no pronounced classes. Russia was never an aristocratic country in the Western sense, and equally there was no bourgeoisie. (Berdyaev, 1).

The cities that emerged threw up an intelligentsia, copying the intelligentsia of Late Westerndom, ‘bent on discovering problems and conflicts, and below, an uprooted peasantry, with all the metaphysical gloom, anxiety, and misery of their own Dostoyevski, perpetually homesick for the open land and bitterly hating the stony grey world into which the Antichrist had tempted them. Moscow had no proper soul’. (Spengler, 1971, II, 194).

The spirit of the upper classes was Western, and the lower had brought in with them the soul of the countryside. Between the two worlds there was no reciprocal comprehension, no communication, no charity. To understand the two spokesmen and victims of the pseudomorphosis, it is enough that Dostoyevski is the peasant, and Tolstoi the man of Western society. The one could never in his soul get away from the land; the other, in spite of his desperate efforts, could never get near it. (Ibid.).

Berdyaev likewise states of the Petrinism of the upper class:

Peter secularized the Russian Tsardoni and brought it into touch with Western absolutism of the more enlightened kind. The Tsardom of Moscow had not given actual effect to the messianic idea of Moscow as the Third Rome, but the efforts of Peter created a gulf between a police absolutism and the sacred Tsardom. A breach took place between the upper governing classes of Russian society and the masses of the people among whom the old religious beliefs and hopes were still preserved. The Western influences which led on to the remarkable Russian culture of the nineteenth century found no welcome among the bulk of the people. The power of the nobility increased and it became entirely alien from the people. The very manner of life of the landowning nobility was a thing incomprehensible to the people. It was precisely in the Petrine epoch during the reign of Katherine II that the Russian people finally fell under the sway of the system of serfdom. The whole Petrine period of Russian history was a struggle between East and West within the Russian soul. (Berdyaev, 15).

Russian Messianism

Berdyaev states that while Petrinism introduced an epoch of cultural dynamism, it also placed a heavy burden upon Russia, and a disunity of spirit. (Ibid.). However, Russia has her own religious sense of Mission, which is as universal as the Vatican’s. Spengler quotes Dostoyevski as writing in 1878: ‘all men must become Russian, first and foremost Russian. If general humanity is the Russian ideal, then everyone must first of all become a Russian’. (Spengler, 1963, 63n). The Russian Messianic idea found a forceful expression in Dostoyevski’s The Possessed, where, in a conversation with Stavrogin, Shatov states:

Reduce God to the attribute of nationality?...On the contrary, I elevate the nation to God...The people is the body of God. Every nation is a nation only so long as it has its own particular God, excluding all other gods on earth without any possible reconciliation, so long as it believes that by its own God it will conquer and drive all other gods off the face of the earth. At least that’s what all great nations have believed since the beginning of time, all those remarkable in any way, those standing in the vanguard of humanity...The Jews lived solely in expectation of the true God, and they left this true God to the world...A nation which loses faith is no longer a nation. But there is only one truth; consequently, only one nation can posses the true God...The sole ‘God bearing’ nation is the Russian nation... (Dostoevsky, 1992, Part II: I: 7, 265-266).

Spengler saw Russia as outside of Europe, and even as ‘Asian’. He even saw a Western rebirth vis-à-vis opposition to Russia, which he regarded as leading the ‘coloured world’ against the white, under the mantle of Bolshevism. Yet there were also other destinies that Spengler saw over the horizon, which had been predicted by Dostoyevski.

Once Russia had overthrown its alien intrusions, it could look with another perspective upon the world, and reconsider Europe not with hatred and vengeance but in kinship. Spengler wrote that while Tolstoi, the Petrinist, whose doctrine was the precursor of Bolshevism, was ‘the former Russia’, Dostoyevski was ‘the coming Russia’. Dostoyevski as the representative of the ‘coming Russia’ ‘does not know’ the hatred of Russia for the West. Dostoyevski and the old Russia are transcendent. ‘His passionate power of living is comprehensive enough to embrace all things Western as well’. Spengler quotes Dostoyevski: ‘I have two fatherlands, Russia and Europe’. Dostoyevski as the harbinger of a Russian high culture ‘has passed beyond both Petrinism and revolution, and from his future he looks back over them as from afar. His soul is apocalyptic, yearning, desperate, but of this future he is certain’. [65] (Spengler, 1971, II, 194). Spengler cites Dostoyevski’s The Brothers Karamazov, where Ivan Karamazov (Dostoyevski, 1880, 34: II: V: 3) says to his mother:

I want to travel in Europe… I know well enough that I shall be going only to a churchyard, but I know too that that churchyard is dear, very dear to me. Beloved dead lie buried there, every stone over them tell of a life so ardently lived, so passionately a belief in its own achievements, its own truth, its own battle, its own knowledge, that I know – even now I know – I shall fall down and kiss these stones and weep over them’. (Spengler, 1971, II, 195).

To the ‘Slavophil’, of which Dostoyevski was one, Europe is precious. The Slavophil appreciates the richness of European high culture while realising that Europe is in a state of decay. Berdyaev discussed what he regarded as an inconsistency in Dostoyevski and the Slavophils towards Europe, yet one that is comprehensible when we consider Spengler’s crucial differentiation between Culture and Civilisation:

Dostoyevsky calls himself a Slavophil. He thought, as did also a large number of thinkers on the theme of Russia and Europe, that he knew decay was setting in, but that a great past exists in her, and that she has made contributions of great value to the history of mankind. (Berdyaev, 70).

It is notable that while this differentiation between Kultur and Zivilisation is ascribed to a particularly German philosophical tradition, Berdyaev comments that it was present among the Russians ‘long before Spengler’, although deriving from German sources:

It is to be noted that long before Spengler, the Russians drew the distinction between ‘culture’ and ‘civilization’, that they attacked ‘civilization’ even when they remained supporters of ‘culture’. This distinction in actual fact, although expressed in a different phraseology, was to be found among the Slavophils. (Ibid.).

Tolstoi, who sought to overcome the problems of Civilisation by a ‘return-to-Nature’ in the manner of the Western Enlightenment philosopher J J Rousseau, on the other hand, is the product of the Late West, ‘enlightened and socially minded’, and sees only a problem, ‘whereas Dostoyevski ‘does not even know what a problem is’. (Spengler, 1971, II, 195). Spengler states that the problematic nature of life is a question that arises in Late Civilisations, and is a symptom of an epoch where life itself has become questionable. It is a symptom of the Late West transplanted as a weed onto the soil of Russia, represented by Tolstoi who, stands midway between Peter and Bolshevism, and neither he nor they managed to get within sight of Russian earth…. Their kind of opposition is not apocalyptic but intellectual. Tolstoi’s hatred of property is an economist’s, his hatred of society a social reformer’s, his hatred of the State a political theorist’s. Hence his immense effect upon the West – he belongs, in one respect as in another, to the band of Marx, Ibsen, and Zola. (Ibid.).

Dostoyevski, on the contrary, was indifferent to the Late West, looking beyond the physical, beyond questions of social reform and economics, and to the metaphysical: ‘Dostoyevski, like every primitive Russian, is fundamentally unaware’ of the physical world and ‘lives in a second, metaphysical world beyond’. The living reality is a religious one, which Spengler compares most closely with ‘primitive Christianity’. Dostoyevski is a ‘saint’, Tolstoi, ‘only a revolutionary’, the representative of Petrinism, as the forerunner of Bolshevism, ‘the last dishonouring of the metaphysical by the social’, and a new form of pseudomorphosis. The Bolshevists and other such revolutionaries were ‘the lowest stratum of … Petrine society’. (Ibid., II, 196). Imbued with ideas from the Late West, the Marxists sought to replace one Petrine ruling class with another. Neither represented the soul of Russia. Spengler states: ‘The real Russian is the disciple of Dostoyevski, even though he might not have read Dostoyevski, or anyone else, nay, perhaps because he cannot read, he is himself Dostoyevski in substance’. The intelligentsia hates, the peasant does not. (Ibid.). He would eventually overthrow Bolshevism and any other form of Petrinism. Here we see Spengler unequivocally stating that the post-Western civilisation will be Russian.

For what this townless people yearns for is its own life-form, its own religion, its own history. Tolstoi’s Christianity was a misunderstanding. He spoke of Christ and he meant Marx. But to Dostoyevski’s Christianity, the next thousand years will belong. (Ibid.).

To the true Russia, as Dostoyevski stated it, ‘not a single nation has ever been founded on principles of science or reason’. Dostoyevski continues, with the character Shatov explaining:

[N]ot a single nation has ever been founded on principles of science or reason. There has never been an example of it, except for a brief moment, through folly. Socialism is from its very nature bound to be atheism, seeing that it has from the very first proclaimed that it is an atheistic organisation of society, and that it intends to establish itself exclusively on the elements of science and reason. Science and reason have, from the beginning of time, played a secondary and subordinate part in the life of nations; so it will be till the end of time. Nations are built up and moved by another force which sways and dominates them, the origin of which is unknown and inexplicable: that force is the force of an insatiable desire to go on to the end, though at the same time it denies that end. It is the force of the persistent assertion of one's own existence, and a denial of death. It’s the spirit of life, as the Scriptures call it, ‘the river of living water’, the drying up of which is threatened in the Apocalypse. It’s the æsthetic principle, as the philosophers call it, the ethical principle with which they identify it, ‘the seeking for God’, as I call it more simply. The object of every national movement, in every people and at every period of its existence is only the seeking for its god, who must be its own god, and the faith in Him as the only true one. God is the synthetic personality of the whole people, taken from its beginning to its end. It has never happened that all, or even many, peoples have had one common god, but each has always had its own. It’s a sign of the decay of nations when they begin to have gods in common. When gods begin to be common to several nations the gods are dying and the faith in them, together with the nations themselves. The stronger a people the more individual their God. There never has been a nation without a religion, that is, without an idea of good and evil. Every people has its own conception of good and evil, and its own good and evil. When the same conceptions of good and evil become prevalent in several nations, then these nations are dying, and then the very distinction between good and evil is beginning to disappear. Reason has never had the power to define good and evil, or even to distinguish between good and evil, even approximately; on the contrary, it has always mixed them up in a disgraceful and pitiful way; science has even given the solution by the fist. This is particularly characteristic of the half-truths of science, the most terrible scourge of humanity, unknown till this century, and worse than plague, famine, or war. (Dostoyevski, 1872, II: I: VII).

Here we have the expression of the Russian soul, its repudiation of Petrinism, and in a manner similar to Spengler’s, the identification of faith, not darwinian zoology or economics, as the premise of culture-nation-race-formation, and the primacy of rationalistic doctrines as a symptom of decay.

‘Conflict Between Money & Blood’

Spengler states that at the Late – ‘Winter’ - epoch of a Civilisation where money-thinking dominates, a point is reached where there is a reaction: a ‘Second Religiousness’ which returns a decaying Civilisation to its spiritual foundations. There proceeds a revolt against oligarchy and a return to authority, or what Spengler called ‘Cæsarism’, and from there the fulfilment of a destiny before being eclipsed by a new high culture.

The Second Religiousness is the necessary counterpart of Cæsarism, which is the final political constitution of a Late Civilisation… In both phenomena the creative young strength of the Early Culture is lacking. But both have their greatness nevertheless. That of the Second Religiousness consists of a deep piety that fills the waking-consciousness… (Spengler, 1971, II, 310).

Spengler states that the ‘profoundly mystical inner life feels “thinking in money” as a sin’. The money-thinking imposed on Russia as Communism was ‘Western’ insofar as Marxism reflects the economic thinking of Western civilisation in its Late epoch, (Ibid., II, 402):

[A]n upper, alien and civilised world intruded from the West (the Bolshevism of the first years, totally Western and un-Russian, is the lees of this importation), and a townless barter-life that goes on deep below, uncalculating and exchanging only for immediate needs. We have to think of the catchwords of the surface as a voice, in which the Russian, simple and busied wholly with his soul bears resignedly the will of God. Marxism amongst Russians is based on an inward misunderstanding. They bore with the higher economic life of Petrinism, but they neither created it nor recognised it. The Russian does not fight Capital, but he does not comprehend it. Anyone who understands Dostoyevski will sense in these people a young humanity for which as yet no money exists, but only goods in relation to a life whose centre of gravity does not lie on the economical side. (Ibid., II, 495n)

dome.jpgSpengler states above that the Russians do not ‘fight’ capital. (Ibid., 495). Yet their young soul brings them into conflict with money, as both oligarchy from inside and plutocracy from outside contend with the Russian soul for supremacy. It was something observed by both Gogol and Dostoyevski. The anti-capitalism and ‘world revolution’ of Stalinism took on features that were drawn more from Russian messianism than from Marxism, reflected in the struggle between Trotsky and Stalin. The revival of the Czarist and Orthodox icons, martyrs and heroes and of Russian folk-culture in conjunction with a campaign against ‘ rootless cosmopolitanism’, reflected the emergence of primal Russian soul amidst Petrine Marxism. (Brandenberger, 2002). Today the conflict between two world-views can be seen in the conflicts between Putin and certain ‘oligarchs’ and the uneasiness Putin causes among the West.

The conflict that arises is metaphysical, but oligarchy and plutocracy can only understand the physical. Hence, ‘money-getting by means of money is an impiety, and (from the viewpoint of the coming Russian religion) a sin’. (Ibid.). ‘Money-getting by means of money’ manifests in speculation and usury. It is the basis upon which the economics of the Late West is founded, and from which it is now tottering. That this was not the case in the Gothic era of the West’s ‘high culture’ is indicated by the Church’s strident condemnation of usury as ‘ sin’.

Spengler predicted that in answer to the money-ethos a ‘third kind of Christianity’, based on the ‘John Gospel’, would arise, ‘looking towards Jerusalem with premonitions of coming crusades’. (Ibid.). The Russian also eschews the machine, to which Faustian man is enslaved, and if today he adopts Western technics, he does so ‘with fear and hatred of wheels, cables, and rails’, and will ‘blot the whole thing from his memory and his environment, and create about himself a wholly new world, in which nothing of this Devil’s technique is left’. (Ibid., II, 504).

Has time proved Spengler wrong in his observation that the Russian soul is repelled by the materialism, rationalism, technics and scientism of the Late West, given that the USSR went full throttle to industrialise? Spengler also said that Russia would adapt Western technics for her own use, as a weapon. Anecdotally, in our time, Barbara Brothers, a psycho-therapist, while part of a scientific delegation to Russia in 1993, observed that even among Russian scientists the focus is on the metaphysical:

The Russians seem not to make the divorce between ‘hard’ science and heart and soul that we do in the United States. Elena is probably a classic example. In her position as a part of the Academy of National Economy, a division of the Academy of Science, she works in facts and statistics all day long; when you ask her how (how in the world!) she thinks they will make it, she gives you a metaphysical answer. The scientist part of her gave a presentation that showed us how it was absolutely impossible for the economy to begin to work. Yet, she says, ‘I am not pessimistic’.

Again, Spengler’s observations of the Russian soul are confirmed by this anecdote: the true Russian – even the scientist and mathematician - does not comprehend everything as a ‘problem’ in the Late Western sense. His decisions are not made by Western rationalism, but by metaphysics and instinct. It is an interesting aside to recall that under the USSR, supposedly predicated on dialectical materialism, the metaphysical and the psychic were subjects of serious investigation to an extent that would be scoffed at by Western scientists.
(Kernbach, 2013).


By the time Spengler had published The Hour of Decision in 1934 he was stating that Russia had overthrown Petrinism and the trappings of the late West, and while he called the new orientation of Russia ‘Asian’, he said that it was ‘a new Idea, and an idea with a future too’. (Spengler, 1963, 60). To clarify, Russia looks towards the ‘East’, but while the Westerner assumes that ‘Asia’ and East are synonymous with Mongol, the etymology of the word ‘Asia’ comes from Greek Aσία, ca. 440 BC, referring to all regions east of Greece. (Ibid., 61). As an ethnic, historical, cultural or religious designation it means as little as as the World War I propaganda reference to Germans as ‘Huns’. During his time Spengler saw in Russia that,

Race, language, popular customs, religion, in their present form… all or any of them can and will be fundamentally transformed. What we see today then is simply the new kind of life which a vast land has conceived and will presently bring forth. It is not definable in words, nor is its bearer aware of it. Those who attempt to define, establish, lay down a program, are confusing life with a phrase, as does the ruling Bolshevism, which is not sufficiently conscious of its own West-European, Rationalistic and cosmopolitan origin. (Ibid.).

Of Russia in 1934 Spengler already saw that ‘of genuine Marxism there is very little except in names and programs’. He doubted that the Communist programme is ‘really still taken seriously’. He saw the possibility of the vestiges of Petrine Bolshevism being overthrown, to be replaced by a ‘nationalistic’ Eastern type which would reach ‘gigantic proportions unchecked’. (Spengler, 1963, 63).Spengler also referred to Russia as the country ‘least troubled by Bolshevism’, (Ibid.,182) and the ‘Marxian face [was] only worn for the benefit of the outside world’. (Ibid., 212). A decade after Spengler’s death the direction of Russia under Stalin had pursued clearer definitions, and Petrine Bolshevism had been transformed in the way Spengler foresaw. (Brandenberger, 2002).

Conclusion

As in Spengler’s time, and centuries before, there continues to exist two tendencies in Russia : the Old Russian and the Petrine. Neither one nor the other spirit is presently dominant, although under Putin Old Russia struggles for resurgence. Spengler in a published lecture to the Rheinish-Westphalian Business Convention in 1922 referred to the ‘ancient, instinctive, unclear, unconscious, and subliminal drive that is present in every Russian, no matter how thoroughly westernised his conscious life may be – a mystical yearning for the South, for Constantinople and Jerusalem, a genuine crusading spirit similar to the spirit our Gothic forebears had in their blood but which we can hardly appreciated today’. (Spengler, 1922).

Bolshevism destroyed one form of Petrinism with another form, clearing the way ‘for a new culture that will some day arise between “Europe” and East Asia. It is more a beginning than an end’. The peasantry ‘will some day become conscious of its own will, which points in a wholly different direction’. ‘The peasantry is the true Russian people of the future. It will not allow itself to be perverted or suffocated’. (Ibid.).

The ‘Great Patriotic War’ gave Stalin the opportunity to return Russia to its roots. Russia’s Orthodox foundations were returned on the basis of a myth, an archetypically Russian mysticism. The myth goes that in 1941:

The Virgin appeared to Metropolitan Ilya of the Antiochian Church, who prayed wholeheartedly for Russia. She instructed him to tell the Russians that they should carry the Kazan Icon in a religious procession around the besieged city of Leningrad (St Petersburg). Then, the Virgin said, they should serve a molieben [2] before the icon in Moscow. The Virgin said that the icon should stay with the Russian troops in Stalingrad, and later move with them to the Russian border. Leningrad didn’t surrender. Miraculously, Moscow was also saved. During the Battle of Stalingrad, the icon was with the Russian army on the right bank of the Volga, and the Nazi troops couldn’t cross the river. The Battle of Stalingrad began with a molieben before the Kazan Icon. Only when it was finished, did the troops receive the order to attack. The Kazan Icon was at the most important sectors of the front, and in the places where the troops were preparing for an offensive. It was like in the old times, when in response to earnest prayers, the Virgin instilled fear in enemies and drove them away. Even atheists told stories of the Virgin’s help to the Russian troops. During the assault on Königsberg in 1945, the Soviet troops were in a critical situation. Suddenly, the soldiers saw their commander arrive with priests and an icon. Many made jokes, ‘Just wait, that’ll help us!’ The commander silenced the jokers. He ordered everybody to line up and to take off their caps. When the priests finished the molieben, they moved to the frontline carrying the icon. The amazed soldiers watched them going straight forward, under intense Nazi fire. Suddenly, the Nazis stopped shooting. Then, the Russian troops received orders to attack on the ground and from the sea. Nazis died in the thousands. Nazi prisoners told the Russians that they saw the Virgin in the sky before the Russians began to attack, the whole of the Nazi army saw Her, and their weapons wouldn’t fire. (Voices from Russia).

The message to Metropolitan Ilya from The Theotokos [3] for Russia was that:

‘The cathedrals, monasteries, theological seminaries and academies have to be opened in the whole country. The priests have to be sent back from the front and released from incarceration. They must begin serving again…. When the war will be over, Metropolitan Elijah has to come to Russia and witness how she was saved’. The metropolitan contacted both Russian church representatives and Soviet government officials. Stalin then promised to do everything God indicated. (Russia before the Second Coming).

During ‘The Great Patriotic War’ 20,000 churches were opened. In 1942 the Soviet Government allowed Easter celebrations. On 4 September 1943 Stalin invited the hierarchs of the Russian Orthodox Church to the Kremlin to discuss the need for reviving religious life in the USSR and the prompt election of a Patriarch.

This is the type of Myth that is nation-forming. It exists as a constant possibility within Russia. Spengler stated in his lecture to the German businessmen in 1922 that,

There can be no doubt: a new Russian people is in the process of becoming. Shaken and threatened to the very soul by a frightful destiny, forced to an inner distance, it will in time become firm and come to bloom. It is passionately religious in a way that we Western Europeans have not been, indeed could not have been, for centuries. As soon as this religious drive is directed towards a goal, it possesses an immense expansive potential. Unlike us, such a people does not count the victims who die for an idea, for it is a young, vigorous, and fertile people. (Spengler, 1922).

The arch-Conservative anti-Marxist, Spengler, in keeping with the German tradition of realpolitik, considered the possibility of a Russo-German alliance in his 1922 speech, the Treaty of Rapallo being a reflection of that tradition. ‘A new type of leader’ would be awakened in adversity, to ‘new crusades and legendary conquests’. The rest of the world, filled with religious yearning but falling on infertile ground, is ‘torn and tired enough to allow it suddenly to take on a new character under the proper circumstances’. Spengler suggested that ‘perhaps Bolshevism itself will change in this way under new leaders’. ‘But the silent, deeper Russia,’ would turn its attention towards the Near and East Asia, as a people of ‘great inland expanses’. (Ibid.). Berdyaev, discussing the Slavophil outlook, wrote:

Russian reflections upon the subject of the philosophy of history led to the consciousness that the path of Russia was a special one. Russia is the great East-West; it is a whole immense world and in its people vast powers are confined. The Russian people are a people of the future; they will decide questions which the West has not yet the strength to decide, which it does not even pose in their full depth. (Berdyaev, 70).

There are no certainties. While Spengler postulated the organic cycles of a High Culture going through the life-phases of birth, youthful vigour, maturity, old age and death, it should be kept in mind that a life-cycle can be disrupted, aborted, murdered or struck by disease, at any time, and end without fulfilling itself. Each has its analogy in politics, and there are plenty of Russophobes eager to stunt Russia’s destiny with political, economic and cultural contagion. The Soviet bloc fell through inner and outer contagion.

What Spengler foresaw for the possibilities of Russia, yet to fulfil its historic mission, messianic and of world-scope, might now be unfolding if Russia eschews pressures from within and without. The invigoration of Orthodoxy is part of this process, as is the leadership style of Putin, as distinct from a Yeltsin for example. Whatever Russia is called outwardly, whether, monarchical, Bolshevik or democratic, there is an inner – eternal – Russia that endures and awaits its time on the world historical stage. We see it now with the re-emergence of Eurasianism, for example; not of the ‘East’ nor the ‘West’, but of Russia.

Notes

1. Ivan Sergyeyevich Aksakov (1823-1886) a Pan-Slavic leader, established the ‘Slavophil’ group at Moscow to restore Russia to its pre-Petrine culture.
2. Orthodox service for the sick.
3. Mary.

References

Berdyaev, Nikolai. The Russian Idea, MacMillan Co., New York, 1948
Brandenberger, D. National Bolshevism: Stalinist culture and the Formation of Modern Russian National Identity 1931-1956. Harvard University Press, Massachusetts, 2002.
Brothers, Barbara J. Psychiatry Today, 1 January 1993, http://www.psychologytoday.com/articles/199301/russia-soul
Chumachenko, T.A. Church and State in Soviet Russia, M. E. Sharpe Inc., New York, 2002.
Cournos, H. ‘Introduction’, N V Gogol, Taras Bulba & Other Tales, 1842, http://www.gutenberg.org/files/1197/1197-h/1197-h.htm
Dostoevsky, Fyodor. The Brothers Karamazov, 1880
Dostoevsky, Fyodor. The Possessed, Oxford University Press, 1992.
Kernback, S. ‘Unconventional research in USSR and Russia: short overview, 2013, http://arxiv.org/pdf/1312.1148.pdf
Russia before the Second Coming, Svyato-Troitskaya Sergiyeva Lavra Monastery, p. 239; Archbishop Alypy, ‘My thoughts about the Declaration of 1927’, 2 February 2005, http://www.stjamesok.org/ArbpAlypyBIO.htm
Spengler, Oswald. Prussian and Socialism, 1919.
Spengler, Oswald ‘The Two Faces of Russia and Germany’s Eastern Problems’, Politische Schriften, Munich, 14 February, 1922.
Spengler, Oswald. The Hour of Decision, Alfred A Knopf, New York, 1963.
Spengler, Oswald. The Decline of The West, George Allen & Unwin, London, 1971.
Trotsky, Leon. The Revolution Betrayed: what is the Soviet Union and where is it going?, 1936.
Voices from Russia, 15 January 2008, http://02varvara.wordpress.com/2008/01/15/the-wonderworking-icon-of-kazan-of-the-most-holy-mother-of-god/

samedi, 07 novembre 2015

Jornadas de Actualidad de Carl Schmitt a 30 años de su muerte

CarlSchmitt-620x330.jpg

Jornadas de Actualidad de Carl Schmitt a 30 años de su muerte

Jornadas

Actualidad de Carl Schmitt a 30 años de su muerte.

18, 19 y 20 de noviembre de 2015, Santiago del Estero 1029, CABA.

Facultad de Ciencias Sociales, UBA.

Para consultar el programa, hacé click aquí: 

Jornadas Carl Schmitt – Programa

jeudi, 05 novembre 2015

Presseschau November 2015

lundi, 02 novembre 2015

Le président du Bundestag se rebiffe contre le traité transatlantique

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Le président du Bundestag se rebiffe contre le traité transatlantique

Norbert Lammert menace de dire NON au traité et fait les gros titres de toute la presse outre-Rhin.

Ex: http://www.bvoltaire.fr

Lorsque nous n’entendons plus parler du traité transatlantique en France (TAFTA), sauf par la présidente du FN et par Jean-Luc Mélenchon, pas très relayés par les médias, il faut bien le dire, en Allemagne, il en va tout autrement. C’est la nouvelle du jour ! Le président du Bundestag, Norbert Lammert, menace de dire NON au traité et fait les gros titres de toute la presse outre-Rhin. Tout cela parce qu’une délégation de parlementaires allemands avait récemment exigé, à l’ambassade américaine de Berlin, de consulter les documents des négociations. Ce qui leur a été refusé ! Pour le lecteur français, je souligne que Norbert Lammert est le numéro deux de l’État allemand.

Depuis plus de deux ans, l’Union européenne et les États-Unis d’Amérique négocient presque en catimini le nouveau traité transatlantique. La Commission européenne met à disposition beaucoup de documents, mais les détails sont réservés uniquement à quelques privilégiés. Norbert Lammert, le président du Bundestag, a désormais soumis sa décision à plus de transparence dans les négociations. « Il est hors de question que le Bundestag ratifie un contrat commercial entre l’Union européenne et les États-Unis, pour lequel il n’aura pu accompagner ou influencer les options », a déclaré le politicien CDU. Lammert serait tombé d’accord avec Juncker pour que les documents de négociation, en particulier leurs résultats, soient soumis à tous les États membres, à leurs gouvernements, mais aussi à leurs Parlements. « Et je serai intransigeant », a lancé le président du Bundestag. La France semble absente de ces revendications justifiées. Avec le ministre des Finances, Sigmar Gabriel (SPD), Norbert Lammert estime que l’actuel accès limité, au sein des ambassades américaines, est indiscutable, aussi bien au gouvernement qu’au Parlement.

Les négociations sur le traité transatlantique ont commencé en juillet 2013. Cette création d’une zone de libre-échange doit servir au développement économique entre les deux côtés de l’Atlantique, qui verrait l’abolition des douanes et autres obstacles au commerce. Des esprits critiques craignent néanmoins une érosion des droits sociaux, environnementaux, des consommateurs et, par-delà, un affaiblissement des institutions démocratiques. 250.000 personnes avaient manifesté à Berlin le 10 octobre dernier contre ce traité controversé.

Dernièrement, c’est la chancelière Angela Merkel qui avait promu le traité auprès du syndicat IG Metall. Notons que, sur cette question, comme sur celle de l’immigration massive, Merkel est en total décalage avec son peuple qui vient de se réveiller devant la folie migratoire de leur dirigeante. Elle semble de plus en plus isolée, qui menace aujourd’hui de faire capoter l’union entre la CDU et la CSU.

vendredi, 30 octobre 2015

Diplomaţia lui Stalin

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Diplomaţia lui Stalin

Istoria secolului nostru este învăţată din punctul de vedere american. La fel este şi în cazul celui de-al doilea Război Mondial, al Războiului Rece şi al Războiului din Golf. În optica americană, secolul XXI este “secolul american”, în care trebuie să se instaleze şi să se menţină o ordine mondială conform cu interesele americane, secol care este simultan “sfârşitul istoriei”, sfârşitul aventurii umane, sinteza definitivă a dialecticii istoriei. Francis Fukuyama, chiar înainte de războiul din Golf, afirma că odată cu căderea Cortinei de Fier şi sfârşitul “hegelianismului de stânga” pe care îl reprezenta URSS-ul, un singur model, cel al liberalismului american, va subzista secole de-a rândul. Cu condiţia ca niciun competitor să nu se zărească la orizont. De unde misiunea americană era aceea de a reacţiona rapid, mobilizând maximum de mijloace, contra oricărei veleităţi de a construi o ordine politică alternativă.

Cu câţiva ani înainte de Fukuyama, un autor germano-american, Theodore H. von Laue, pretindea că singura revoluţie veritabilă în lume şi în istorie era aceea a occidentalizării şi că toate revoluţiile politice non-occidentaliste, toate regimurile bazate pe alte principii decât cele în vogă în America, erau relicve ale trecutului, pe care numai nişte reacţionari perverşi le puteau adula, reacţionari pe care puterea americană, economică şi militară, urma să le măture rapid pentru a face loc unui hiper-liberalism de factură anglo-saxonă, debarasat de orice concurenţă.

Dacă hitlerismul este în mod general considerat ca o forţă reacţionară perversă faţă de care America a contribuit la eliminarea din Europa, se ştiu mai puţin motivele care l-au împins pe Truman şi pe protagoniştii atlantişti ai Războiului Rece să lupte contra stalinismului şi să facă din el un căpcăun ideologic, considerat explicit de către von Laue drept „reacţionar” în ciuda etichetei sale proprii de „progresist”. Această ambiguitate faţă de Stalin se explică prin alianţa americano-sovietică în timpul celui de-al Doilea Război mondial, când Stalin era supranumit în mod prietenos “Uncle Joe”. Cu toate acestea, de câţiva ani, numeroşi istorici revăd în mod inteligent poncifele pe care patruzeci şi cinci de ani de atlantism furibund le-au vehiculat în mass-media şi în cărţile noastre de istorie. Germanul Dirk Bavendamm a demonstrat în două lucrări meticuloase şi precise care au fost responsabilităţile lui Roosevelt în declanşarea conflictelor americano-japonez şi americano-german şi de asemenea care era duplicitatea preşedintelui american faţă de aliaţii săi ruşi. Valentin Falin, fostul ambasador al URSS-ului la Bonn, a publicat în Germania o lucrare de amintiri istorice şi de reflecţii istoriografice, în care acest briliant diplomat rus afirmă că Războiul Rece a început imediat după debarcarea anglo-americană din iunie 1944 pe plajele din Normandia: desfăşurându-şi armada lor navală şi aeriană, puterile occidentale duceau deja un război mai ales contra Uniunii Sovietice şi nu contra Germaniei muribunde.

O lectură atentă a mai multor lucrări recente consacrate multiplelor aspecte ale rezistenţei germane contra regimului hitlerist ne obligă să renunţăm definitiv la interpretarea istoriei celui de-al Doilea Război mondial şi a alianţei anglo-americano-sovietice după modelul convenţional. Ostilitatea faţă de Stalin după 1945 provine mai ales din faptul că Stalin înţelegea să practice o diplomaţie generală bazată pe relaţiile bilaterale între naţiuni, fără ca acestea să fie supervizate de o instanţă universală cum ar fi ONU. Apoi, după ce şi-a dat seama că cele două puteri anglo-saxone deciseseră singure la Casablanca să facă războiul excesiv cu Reich-ul, să declanşeze războiul total şi să ceară capitularea fără condiţii a Germaniei naţional-socialiste, Stalin s-a simţit exclus de aliaţii săi. Furios, el şi-a concentrat mânia în această frază bine ticluită, în aparenţă anodină, dar foarte semnificativă: „Hitlerii vin şi se duc, poporul şi statul german rămân”. Stalin nu considera naţional-socialismul hitlerist ca pe răul absolut sau chiar ca pe o esenţă netrecătoare, ci ca pe un accident al istoriei, o vicisitudine potrivnică Rusiei eterne, pe care armatele sovietice urmau pur şi simplu să caute s-o elimine. Dar, în logica diplomatică tradiţională, care îi aparţinea lui Stalin, în ciuda ideologiei mesianice marxiste, naţiunile nu pier: nu trebuie prin urmare să ceri o capitulare necondiţionată şi trebuie mereu să laşi poarta deschisă unor negocieri. În plin război, alianţele se pot schimba cu totul, aşa cum o arată clar istoria europeană. Stalin se mulţumeşte să ceară deschiderea unui al doilea front pentru a uşura misiunea armatelor sovietice şi a diminua pierderile de vieţi omeneşti în rândul ruşilor, dar acest front nu vine decât foarte târziu, ceea ce-i permite lui Valentin Falin să explice această întârziere ca pe primul act al Războiului Rece între puterile maritime anglo-saxone şi puterea continentală sovietică.

Această reticenţă a lui Stalin se explică şi prin contextul care a precedat imediat epilogul lungii bătălii de la Stalingrad şi debarcarea anglo-saxonă în Normandia. Când armatele lui Hitler şi ale aliaţilor săi slovaci, finlandezi, români şi unguri au intrat în URSS în 22 iunie 1941, sovieticii, oficial, au estimat că clauzele Pactului Molotov/Ribbentrop au fost trădate şi, în toamna lui 1942, după gigantica ofensivă victorioasă a armatelor germane în direcţia Caucazului, Moscova a fost constrânsă să sondeze adversarul său în vederea unei eventuale păci separate: Stalin dorea să se revină la termenii Pactului şi conta pe ajutorul japonezilor pentru a reconstitui, în masa continentală eurasiatică, acel „car cu patru cai” pe care i-l propusese Ribbentrop în septembrie 1940 (sau „Pactul Cvadripartit” între Reich, Italia, URSS şi Japonia). Stalin dorea o pace nulă: Wehrmacht-ul să se retragă dincolo de frontiera fixată de comun acord în 1939 şi URSS-ul să-şi panseze rănile. Mai mulţi agenţi au participat la aceste negocieri, ce au rămas în general secrete. Printre ei, Peter Kleist, ataşat în acelaşi timp de Cabinetul lui Ribbentrop şi de „Biroul Rosenberg”. Kleist, naţionalist german de tradiţie rusofilă în amintirea prieteniei dintre Prusia şi Ţari, va negocia la Stockholm, unde jocul diplomatic va fi strâns şi complex. În capitala suedeză, ruşii sunt deschişi la toate sugestiile; printre ei, ambasadoarea Kollontaï şi diplomatul Semionov. Kleist acţionează în numele Cabinetului Ribbentrop şi al Abwehr-ului lui Canaris (şi nu al „Biroului Rosenberg” care avea în vedere o balcanizare a URSS-ului şi crearea unui puternic stat ucrainean pentru a contrabalansa „Moscovia”). Al doilea protagonist al părţii germane a fost Edgar Klaus, un evreu din Riga care făcea legătura între sovietici şi Abwehr (el nu avea relaţii directe cu instanţele propriu-zis naţional socialiste).

În acest joc mai mult sau mai puţin triangular, sovieticii doreau revenirea la status-quo-ul de dinainte de 1939. Hitler a refuzat toate sugestiile lui Kleist şi a crezut că poate câştiga definitiv bătălia prin cucerirea Stalingradului, cheie a fluviului Volga, a Caucazului şi a Caspicii. Kleist, care ştia că o încetare a ostilităţilor cu Rusia ar fi permis Germaniei să rămână dominantă în Europa şi să-şi îndrepte toate forţele contra britanicilor şi americanilor, trece atunci de partea elementelor active ale rezistenţei anti-hitleriene, chiar dacă este personal dator instanţelor naţional-socialiste! Kleist îi contactează deci pe Adam von Trott zu Solz şi pe fostul ambasador al Reich-ului la Moscova, von der Schulenburg. El nu se adresează comuniştilor şi estimează, fără îndoială odată cu Canaris, că negocierile cu Stalin vor permite realizarea Europei lui Coudenhove-Kalergi (fără Anglia şi fără Rusia), pe care o visau de asemenea şi catolicii. Dar sovieticii nu se adresează nici ei aliaţilor lor teoretici şi privilegiaţi, comuniştii germani: ei pariază pe vechea gardă aristocratică, unde exista încă amintirea alianţei prusacilor şi ruşilor contra lui Napoleon, ca şi cea a neutralităţii tacite a germanilor în timpul Războiului Crimeii. Cum Hitler refuză orice negociere, Stalin, rezistenţa aristocratică, Abwehr-ul şi chiar o parte a gărzii sale pretoriene, SS-ul, decid că el trebuie să dispară. Aici trebuie văzută originea complotului care va duce la atentatul din 20 iulie 1944.

Dar după iarna lui 42-43, sovieticii au revenit la Stalingrad şi au distrus vârful de lance al Wehrmacht-ului, armata a şasea, care încercuia metropola de pe Volga. Partida germană a sovieticilor va fi atunci constituită de „Comitetul Germania Liberă”, cu mareşalul von Paulus şi cu ofiţeri ca von Seydlitz-Kurzbach, toţi prizonieri de război. Stalin nu avea în continuare încredere în comuniştii germani, din rândul cărora a eliminat ideologii nerealişti şi revoluţionarii maximalişti troţkişti, care au ignorat mereu deliberat, din orbire ideologică, noţiunea de „patrie” şi continuităţile istorice multiseculare; finalmente, dictatorul georgian nu l-a păstrat în rezervă, ca bun la toate, decât pe Pieck, un militant care nu şi-a pus niciodată prea multe întrebări. Pieck va face carieră în viitoarea RDG. Stalin nu visa nici un regim comunist pentru Germania post-hitleriană: el dorea o „ordine democratică forte”, cu o putere executivă mai marcată decât sub Republica de la Weimar. Această dorinţă politică a lui Stalin corespunde perfect alegerii sale iniţiale: pariul pe elitele militare, diplomatice şi politice conservatoare, provenind în majoritate din aristocraţie şi din Obrigkeitsstaat-ul[1] prusac. Democraţia germană, care trebuia să vină după Hitler, în opinia lui Stalin, urma să fie de ideologie conservatoare, cu o fluiditate democratică controlată, canalizată şi încadrată de un sistem de educaţie politică strictă.

Britanicii şi americanii au fost surprinşi: ei crezuseră că „Unchiul Joe” va înghiţi fără probleme politica lor maximalistă, ruptă total de uzanţele democratice în vigoare în Europa. Dar Stalin, ca şi Papa şi Bell, episcopul de Chichester, se opuneau principiului revoluţionar al predării necondiţionate pe care Churchill şi Roosevelt au vrut s-o impună Reich-ului (care va rămâne, cum gândea Stalin, în calitate de principiu politic în ciuda prezenţei efemere a unui Hitler). Dacă Roosevelt, făcând apel la dictatura mediatică pe care o controla bine în Statele Unite, a reuşit să-şi reducă adversarii la tăcere, indiferent de ideologie, Churchill a avut mai mari dificultăţi în Anglia. Principalul său adversar era acest Bell, episcop de Chichester. Pentru acesta din urmă, nu se punea problema de a reduce Germania la neant, căci Germania era patria lui Luther şi a protestantismului. Filosofiei predării necondiţionate a lui Churchill, Bell îi opunea noţiunea unei solidarităţi protestante şi-i punea în gardă pe omologii săi olandezi, danezi, norvegieni şi suedezi, ca şi pe interlocutorii săi din rezistenţa germană (Bonhoeffer, Schönfeld, von Moltke), pentru a face faţă belicismului exagerat al lui Churchill, care se exprima prin bombardarea masivă a obiectivelor civile, chiar şi în oraşe mici fără infrastructură industrială importantă. Pentru Bell, viitorul Germaniei nu era nici nazismul nici comunismul, ci o „ordine liberală şi democratică”. Această soluţie, preconizată de episcopul de Chichester, nu era evident acceptabilă de către naţionalismul german tradiţional: ea constituia o întoarcere subtilă la Kleinstaaterei, la mozaicul de state, principate şi ducate, pe care viziunile lui List, Wagner etc. şi pumnul lui Bismarck le şterseseră din centrul continentului nostru. „Ordinea democratică forte” sugerată de Stalin era mai acceptabilă pentru naţionaliştii germani, al căror obiectiv a fost mereu crearea unor instituţii şi a unei paidei puternice pentru a proteja poporul german, substanţa etnică germană, de propriile sale slăbiciuni politice, de lipsa simţului său de decizie, de particularismul său atavic şi de durerile sale morale incapacitante. Astăzi, evident, mulţi observatori naţionalişti constată că federalismul constituţiei din 1949 se înscrie poate destul de bine în tradiţia juridică constituţională germană, dar forma pe care a luat-o, în cursul istoriei RFG-ului, îi relevă natura sa de „concesie”. O concesie a puterilor anglo-saxone…

 

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În faţa adversarilor capitulării necondiţionate din sânul coaliţiei antihitleriste, rezistenţa germană a rămas în ambiguitate: Beck şi von Hassel sunt pro-occidentali şi vor să urmeze cruciada anti-bolşevică, dar într-un sens creştin; Goerdeler şi von der Schulenburg sunt în favoarea unei păci separate cu Stalin. Claus von Stauffenberg, autorul atentatului din 20 iulie 1944 contra lui Hitler, provenea din cercurile poetico-ezoterice din München, unde poetul Stefan George juca un rol preponderent. Stauffenberg este un idealist, un „cavaler al Germaniei secrete”: el refuză să dialogheze cu „Comitetul Germania Liberă” al lui von Paulus şi von Seydlitz-Kurzbach: „nu putem avea încredere în proclamaţiile făcute din spatele sârmei ghimpate”.

Adepţii unei păci separate cu Stalin, adversari ai deschiderii unui front spre Est, au fost imediat atenţi la propunerile de pace sovietice emise de agenţii la post în Stockholm. Partizanii unei „partide nule” la Est sunt ideologic „anti-occidentali”, aparţinând cercurilor conservatoare rusofile (cum ar fi Juni-Klub sau acei Jungkonservativen din siajul lui Moeller van den Bruck), ligilor naţional-revoluţionare derivate din Wandervogel sau „naţionalismului soldăţesc”. Speranţa lor era de a vedea Wehrmacht-ul retrăgându-se în ordine din teritoriile cucerite în URSS şi de a se replia dincolo de linia de demarcaţie din octombrie 1939 în Polonia. În acest sens interpretează exegeţii contemporani ai operei lui Ernst Jünger faimosul său text de război intitulat „Note caucaziene”. Ernst Jünger percepe aici dificultăţile de a stabiliza un front în imensele stepe de dincolo de Don, unde gigantismul teritoriului interzice o reţea militară ermetică ca într-un peisaj central-european sau de tip picard-champenoise, muncit şi răsmuncit de generaţii şi generaţii de mici ţărani încăpăţânaţi care au ţesut teritoriul cu îngrădituri, proprietăţi, garduri şi construcţii de o rară densitate, permiţând armatelor să se prindă de teren, să se disimuleze sau să întindă ambuscade. Este foarte probabil ca Jünger să fi pledat pentru retragerea  Wehrmacht-ului, sperând, în logica naţional-revoluţionară, care îi era proprie în anii 20 sau 30, şi unde rusofilia politico-diplomatică era foarte prezentă, ca forţele ruseşti şi germane, reconciliate, să interzică pentru totdeauna accesul în „Fortăreaţa Europa”, chiar în „Fortăreaţa Eurasia” puterilor talasocratice, care practică sistematic ceea ce Haushofer numea „politica anacondei”, pentru a sufoca orice veleitate de independenţă pe marginile litorale ale „Marelui Continent” (Europa, India, ţările arabe etc.).

Ernst Jünger redactează notele sale caucaziene în momentul în care Stalingradul cade şi armata a şasea este înecată în sânge, oroare şi zăpadă. Dar în ciuda victoriei de la Stalingrad, care le permite sovieticilor să bareze calea spre Caucaz şi Marea Caspică germanilor şi să impiedice orice manevră în amontele fluviului, Stalin urmează mai departe negocierile sale sperând în continuare să joace o „partidă nulă”. Sovieticii nu pun un termen demersurilor lor decât după întrevederile de la Teheran (28 noimebrie – 1 decembrie 1943). În acel moment, Jünger pare a se fi retras din rezistenţă. În celebrul său interviu din Spiegel din 1982, imediat după ce primise premiul Goethe la Frankfurt, el declara: „Atentatele întăresc regimurile pe care vor să le dărâme, mai ales dacă sunt ratate”. Jünger, fără îndoială ca şi Rommel, refuza logica atentatului. Ceea ce nu a fost cazul cu Claus von Stauffenberg. Deciziile luate de către aliaţii occidentali şi de către sovietici la Teheran au făcut imposibilă revenirea la punctul de pornire, adică la linia de demarcaţie din octombrie 1939 în Polonia. Sovieticii şi anglo-saxonii s-au pus de acord să „transporte dulapul polonez” spre Vest prin cedarea unei zone de ocupaţie permanentă în Silezia şi în Pomerania. În atari condiţii, naţionaliştii germani nu mai puteau negocia iar Stalin era din oficiu prins în logica maximalistă a lui Roosevelt, în vreme ce la început o refuzase. Poporul rus urma să plătească foarte scump această schimbare de politică, favorabilă americanilor.

După 1945, constatând că logica Războiului Rece vizează încercuirea şi izolarea Uniunii Sovietice pentru a o împiedica să ajungă la mările calde, Stalin a reiterat oferta sa Germaniei epuizate şi divizate: unificarea şi neutralitatea, adică libertatea de a-şi alege regimul politic după placul său, mai ales o „ordine democratică forte”. Acesta va fi obiectul „notelor lui Stalin” din 1952. Decesul prematur al Vojd-ului sovietic în 1953 nu a mai permis URSS-ului să continue să joace această carte germană. Hruşciov a denunţat stalinismul, a apăsat pe logica blocurilor pe care Stalin o refuzase şi nu a revenit la antiamericanism decât în momentul afacerii Berlinului (1961) şi a crizei din Cuba (1962). Nu se va mai vorbi despre „notele lui Stalin” decât înainte de perestroika, în timpul manifestaţiilor pacifiste din 1980-1983, când mai multe voci germane au reclamat afirmarea unei neutralităţi în afara oricărei logici de tip bloc. Unii emisari ai lui Gorbaciov vor mai vorbi despre acele note şi după 1985, mai ales germanistul Viatcheslav Dachitchev, care a luat cuvântul peste tot în Germania, chiar şi în câteva cercuri ultra-naţionaliste.

În lumina acestei noi istorii a rezistenţei germane şi a belicismului american, putem să înţelegem într-un mod diferit stalinismul şi anti-stalinismul. Acesta din urmă, de exemplu, serveşte la răspândirea unei mitologii politice false şi artificiale, al cărei obiectiv ultim este să respingă orice formă de concert internaţional bazat pe relaţiile bilaterale, să impună o logică a blocurilor sau o logică mondialistă prin intermediul acestui instrument rooseveltian care este ONU (Coreea, Congo, Irak: mereu fără Rusia!), să stigmatizeze din start orice raport bilateral între o putere medie europeană şi Rusia sovietică (Germania în 1952 şi Franţa lui De Gaulle după evenimentele din Algeria). Antistalinismul este o variantă a discursului mondialist. Diplomaţia stalinistă era, în felul ei şi într-un context foarte particular, păstrătoare a tradiţiilor diplomatice europene.

Bibliografie:

– Dirk BAVENDAMM, Roosevelts Weg zum Krieg. Amerikanische Politik 1914-1939, Herbig, München, 1983.

– Dirk BAVENDAMM, Roosevelts Krieg 1937-45 und das Rätsel von Pearl Harbour, Herbig, München, 1993.

– Valentin FALIN, Zweite Front. Die Interessenkonflikte in der Anti-Hitler-Koalition, Droemer-Knaur, München, 1995.

– Francis FUKUYAMA, La fin de l’histoire et le dernier homme, Flammarion, 1992.

– Klemens von KLEMPERER, German Resistance Against Hitler. The Search for Allies Abroad. 1938-1945,  Oxford University Press/Clarendon Press, 1992-94.

– Theodore H. von LAUE, The World Revolution of Westernization. The Twentieth Century in Global Perspective,  Oxford University Press, 1987.

– Jürgen SCHMÄDEKE/Peter STEINBACH (Hrsg.), Der Widerstand gegen den National-Sozialismus. Die deutsche Gesellschaft und der Widerstand gegen Hitler,  Piper (SP n°1923), München, 1994.

Traducere: Vladimir Muscalu

Sursa: http://robertsteuckers.blogspot.ro/2011/12/normal-0-21-false-false-false_29.html

[1] Statul autoritar (n. tr.)

mardi, 27 octobre 2015

Arqueólogos alemanes encuentran el campamento de Varus en Germania

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Arqueólogos alemanes encuentran el campamento de Varus en Germania


Ex: http://www.abc.es
 
Los arqueólogos de la Universidad de Osnabrück que están realizando las excavaciones
 

Si los alemanes beben cerveza en lugar de vino, aliñan con mantequilla y no con aceite de oliva, o siguen hablando una lengua endiabladamente hostil a los herederos del latín es porque nunca fueron romanizados. Y se lo deben a Arminio, un líder germano que contuvo a las legiones e impidió la creación de una provincia romana en la margen derecha del Rin. La gesta de Arminio, sin embargo, se ha mantenido a lo largo de los siglos en la niebla del mito nacional germánico, puesto que el único testimonio arqueológico de su victoria era una piedra funeraria con el nombre del centurión Marcus Caelius y una inscripción que documenta que murió en la Batalla de Varus. Ahora, el reciente hallazgo arqueológico de un campamento romano en Baja Sajonia arroja una primera luz científica sobre la leyenda y ayuda a redibujar el mapa de la historia romana de Alemania.

Se trata de un campamento romano de tiempos de Cristo en lo que hoy es Wilkenburg, al sur de Hannover, en el que según los primeros indicios llegaron a concentrarse al menos durante unos cuantos días unos 20.000 soldados romanos fuertemente armados, lo que equivale a tres legiones y a una décima parte del total de las tropas del imperio. Es el primero de su tipo hallado en el norte de Alemania y concretamente estuvo ocupado, según las primeras mediciones, entre el año 12 a.C. y el 9 d.C.. Desde él parten además, en varias direcciones, rutas de 20 kilómetros en las que se encuentran otros pequeños campamentos auxiliares. Junto a restos de sandalias romanas, pinzas y fíbulas, en total vario cientos de objetos y restos, han sido halladas monedas de la época del emperador Augusto. Hay denarios romanos acuñados en Lyon y otras monedas de origen celta. Su pormenorizado estudio aportará precisión al descubrimiento, mientras el trabajo de campo ha cumplido ya sus primeros objetivos.

Fueron unas imágenes aéreas lo que llamó la atención de los arqueólogos estatales del Land de Baja Sajonia y comenzaron las excavaciones en un área de 500 por 600 metros. Harald Nagel, afanado en el repaso con detectores de metales de unas 30 hectáreas de terreno, se muestra prudente en su valoración del hallazgo. «Los estudios de las monedas están todavía en su fase preliminar y es pronto para sacar conclusiones», dice, pero reconoce que «el yacimiento demuestra que Hannover y sus alrededores fueron un punt de importancia histórica y estratégica muy superior a lo que se estimaba hasta ahora».

Al igual que las legiones de Varus, los trabajos arqueológicos han de vérselas con constantes y copiosas lluvias que convierten las trincheras de excavación en auténticos barrizales cada dos por tres. «Tácito ya describió sobre la batalla de Varus que llovían perros y gatos», recuerda el arqueólogo Hening Hassmann, que destaca el cruce de rutas norte-sur y este-oeste que fue elegido para instalar a las tropas romanas.

En efecto, en 1515, el humanista Ullrich von Hutten descubrió en el primer libro de los Anales de Tácito una referencia a «Arminius», de quien el historiador romano decía que había infligido una derrota a Roma cuando el imperio estaba en todo su esplendor. Tácito calificaba a Arminius como el verdadero liberador de Germania. Ullrich von Hutten tomó las lacónicas apreciaciones de Tácito sobre Arminius y publicó en 1529 un diálogo póstumo titulado «Arminius», que cultivaron los los protestantes para subrayar la independencia no ya ante la Roma imperial sino ante la iglesia romana.

Hay consenso entre los historiadores sobre que Arminio, un germano que había formado parte del ejército romano y en quien Varus confiaba, formó una alianza entre varias tribus bárbaras y le tendió una trampa a Varus para hacerse con el control de la región. Las legiones romanas sucumbieron a una emboscada que terminó en carnicería. El actual hallazgo, por su importancia y dimensiones, apunta por ahora solamente a dos posibles lecturas: o bien el mismo Tiberio subió más al norte de lo que se había pensado hasta ahora, o fue Varus el que llegó hasta Hannover para allí morir y poner fin a la expansión romana en Germania.

dimanche, 25 octobre 2015

The Cost Germany Is Paying For Washington’s Wars

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The Cost Germany Is Paying For Washington’s Wars

I am unable to vett the accuracy of this report from a German hospital beyond the fact that this report was given over Czech TV. It coud be true or it could be anti-Muslim propaganda or some combination of the two.

Nevertheless, it is true in the sense that the sudden appearance of one million pennyless refugees in a European country, which are not of the vast size of the US and Canada, is destabilizing in many ways.

One can commiserate with the Germans and the refugees, but the Germans brought it on themselves. They permitted the Merkel government, which serves Washington and not Germany, to legitimize Washington’s illegal wars that brought Germany the refugees. The same is happening all over Europe and in the UK, where the British also sat on their butts and permitted Blair and Cameron to serve Washington instead of them.

Who is to say that the Europeans and British do not deserve the consequences of their own complicity in Washington’s gratuitous and illegal wars? Nothing more needs to be said.

The local German Press are not allowed to report on what is happening inside German Hospitals

The below letter is from a retired physician who had returned to work at a Munich area hospital where they needed an anaesthesiologist. She e-mailed the following letter to her friend in Prague. The letter has been read out on Czech TV but in Germany the issues mentioned in the letter are not being reported on by the German Press because they have been told to not write anything negative about the migrants. Merkel’s government fears that the German population will react badly to the truth, so like bad governments throughout history the truth is being suppressed. Despite this German’s are protesting in record numbers as they can see the negative effects of record migration in their own towns and cities but you will only find articles and photos describing the protests on New Media. Even international media seem to be going along with the Blackout on bad news about migrants in Germany.

“Yesterday, at the hospital we had a meeting about how the situation here and at the other Munich hospitals is unsustainable. Clinics cannot handle emergencies, so they are starting to send everything to the hospitals.

Many Muslims are refusing treatment by female staff and, we, women, are refusing to go among those animals, especially from Africa. Relations between the staff and migrants are going from bad to worse. Since last weekend, migrants going to the hospitals must be accompanied by police with K-9 units.

Many [Muslim] migrants have AIDS, syphilis, open TB and many exotic diseases that we, in Europe, do not know how to treat them. If they receive a prescription in the pharmacy, they learn they have to pay cash. This leads to unbelievable outbursts, especially when it is about drugs for the children. They abandon the children with pharmacy staff with the words: “So, cure them here yourselves!” So the police are not just guarding the clinics and hospitals, but also large pharmacies.

Truly we said openly: Where are all those who had welcomed in front of TV cameras, with signs at train stations?! Yes, for now, the border has been closed, but a million of them are already here and we will definitely not be able to get rid of them.

Until now, the number of unemployed in Germany was 2.2 million. Now it will be at least 3.5 million. Most of these people are completely unemployable. A bare minimum of them have any education. What is more, their women usually do not work at all. I estimate that one in ten is pregnant. Hundreds of thousands of them have brought along infants and little kids under six, many emaciated and neglected. If this continues and German re-opens its borders, I’m going home to the Czech Republic. Nobody can keep me here in this situation, not even double the salary than at home. I went to Germany, not to Africa or the Middle East.

Even the professor who heads our department told us how sad it makes him to see the cleaning woman, who for 800 Euros cleans every day for years, and then meets young men in the hallways who just wait with their hand outstretched, want everything for free, and when they don’t get it they throw a fit.

I really don’t need this! But I’m afraid that if I return, that at some point it will be the same in the Czech Republic. If the Germans, with their nature cannot handle this, there in Czechia it would be total chaos. Nobody who has not come in contact with them has no idea what kind of animals they are, especially the ones from Africa, and how Muslims act superior to our staff, regarding their religious accommodation.

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For now, the local hospital staff has not come down with the diseases they brought here, but, with so many hundreds of patients every day – this is just a question of time.

In a hospital near the Rhine, migrants attacked the staff with knives after they had handed over an 8-month-old on the brink of death, which they had dragged across half of Europe for three months. The child died in two days, despite having received top care at one of the best pediatric clinics in Germany. The physician had to undergo surgery and two nurses are laid up in the ICU. Nobody has been punished.

The local press is forbidden to write about it, so we know about it through email. What would have happened to a German if he had stabbed a doctor and nurses with a knife? Or if he had flung his own syphilis-infected urine into a nurse’s face and so threatened her with infection? At a minimum he’d go straight to jail and later to court. With these people – so far, nothing has happened.

And so I ask, where are all those greeters and receivers from the train stations? Sitting pretty at home, enjoying their non-profits and looking forward to more trains and their next batch of cash from acting like greeters at the stations. If it were up to me I would round up all these greeters and bring them here first to our hospital’s emergency ward, as attendants. Then, into one building with the migrants so they can look after them there themselves, without armed police, without police dogs who today are in every hospital here in Bavaria, and without medical help.

samedi, 24 octobre 2015

Germany Against Itself

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Germany Against Itself

By

Ex: http://www.lewrockwell.com

Though American dissidents are often branded as “anti-American,” many if not most see themselves as opposed only to their government, not their nation or people. At the Occupy camps, for example, the American flag flew freely.

In Germany, however, the dissident crowd are often not just against the state, but their country and, perhaps only subconsciously, even their heritage. Many openly advocate for the dissolution of Germany. Even if this is only youthful, nihilistic posturing, it’s pervasiveness is telling.

In Leipzig, I’ve encountered this sticker several times, “NO NATION / FIGHT LAW & ORDER / NO BORDER.” All over town, there are versions of the same message, “NO ♥ FOR DEUTSCHLAND / REFUGEES WELCOME” on a bed sheet banner, “MOVE AGAINST STATE AND CAPITAL. NO PEACE WITH GERMANY!” “Germany, you lousy Piece of Shit!” “NO MAN IS ILLEGAL / RIGHT OF RESIDENCE / ANYWHERE.” Taken to its natural conclusion, a billion Chinese can move into Germany tomorrow if they so choose.

Holding a bicycle over his head, a man is ready bring it down on his already bloody victim, lying on the ground. The caption to this lovely sticker? In English, “GOOD NIGHT WHITE PRIDE.”

More astonishingly, there’s this in five-foot tall letters on an otherwise handsome building, “I ♥ VOLKSTOD!! FIGHT THE POLICE.” “Volk” is both nation and people, for no matter how borders are shifted, the nation survives through its people. Even without a homeland, Palestinians can still count themselves as a nation, for example, as long their collective identity remains. Granted, the above death wish for nation and people, I spotted in Connewitz, Leipzig’s hotbed for young radicals, or at least those who dig piercings, tattoos, dreadlocks and graffiti. Similar expressions of self-hatred are by no mean unusual in contemporary Germany, however.

Perhaps heeding the call for a more colorful Germany [bunte Deutschland], Connewitz’s malcontents have thoroughly marred their own neighborhood with messy spray paint, and even gorgeous, brand new buildings are not spared. These neo-punks are no Jean Michel Basquiat’s, that’s for sure, not that I prefer SAMO on walls instead of canvas. Just about every other part of town is also defaced, if not to the same degree.

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Punitively flattened at the end of World War II and shamed for 70 years now, many Germans seem to welcome their ongoing erasure as an unending atonement. Japan doesn’t subject itself to such self-flagellation or, for that matter, Russia, whose Red Army committed widespread atrocities on subjugated peoples. In Dresden, I saw a sticker that showed a red flag over the razed city, with this caption, “8 May 1945 / DAY OF LIBERATION / OUR THANKS GO TO ALL THE ALLIED ORGANIZATIONS, PARTISANS AND RESISTANCE FIGHTERS.” Germany had to have Nazism bombed or raped out of them, according to this thinking, so vielen dank to those who chopped her in half and deformed her until this day.

From across the Elbe, Dresden’s famous skyline seems unchanged, but close-up, you can see that most of the stones of its landmark buildings are clearly new. The damaged lesser edifices were never restored. Many are replaced by ugly, Communist-era structures. Now, it’s claimed that only 25,000 civilians were annihilated when Dresden was flattened by American and British bombers, but many people, not just Germans, think the death count must be many times higher. Still lovely, Dresden was once painted by Canaletto.

In the popular mind, Nazism is seen in a vacuum. It’s as if there was no Treaty of Versailles that bankrupted and ultimately starved Germany. It’s as if your average German is, at best, a latent Nazi whose sinister tendencies will flare up if not constantly kept in check. As is, the word “Nazi” itself is ubiquitous in Germany but, ironically, it’s bandied about most liberally by those on the left, for you can hardly walk a few blocks without encountering stickers or flyers denouncing Nazis.

In 1990, a huge Berlin march against nationalism and racism featured on its leading banner a line from Paul Celan, “Der Tod ist ein Meister aus Deutschland.” Death is a master from Germany. Nationalism is conflated with death, and that’s why all guilt-racked Germans must fight against it, but the absence of nationalism is also death. It is the drawn-out death of Germany.

A 2014 Gallup poll asked citizens of 65 countries, “Would you be willing to fight for your country?” Nations with the highest percentage saying yes were Morocco (94%), Fiji (94%), Pakistan (89%), Vietnam (89%) and Bangladesh (86%). Forty-four percent of Americans declared yes. Japan (11%) came in dead last, and Germany (18%) is third from the bottom. The two countries with the fiercest martial spirit from the last century have been pacified, and perhaps wussified, and that’s why one hears of young Japanese men who spend all day, literally, in their childhood room playing video games and looking at porn, and grown men who have cute, wide-eyed little dolls as girlfriends. Some go to brothels only to get it on with sex dolls. Obviously, men who fear real flesh and blood can’t be soldiers.

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Yes, many Germans will cheer their unwillingness to fight as welcomed proof that Nazism has been mostly purged out of them. Germany is still a purveyor of mass death, however, through its promiscuous arms sales to Israel and, more recently, Saudi Arabia and Qatar. Along with the USA, those are the countries behind the continuing butchery in Syria.

Wandering around Leipzig and Dresden, I see plenty of slogans denouncing Fascism, Nazism, sexism, antisemitism, and homophobia, but no mention of Germany’s complicity in the Syrian War. The incessant discussion in the German media about the refugee crisis also sidesteps this gross, bloody stain on the country’s conscience. Fighting its master’s war, Germany lost 54 soldiers in Afghanistan, but with its passive allegiance to Washington’s scheme against Russia and Syria, Germany is running the risk of losing so much more, perhaps even itself.

In the past week alone, we have Berlin deciding to house 3,000 refugees in Langenlohnsheim, a village of 4,000. Neither its mayor nor citizens were consulted. At a town hall meeting in Lohfelden, official Walter Lübcke told citizens that if they didn’t like the huge influx of refugees into their district, they should just leave. “Who is against the values here can always leave the country. That is the right of every good German.” This country of 80.62 million people will accept 1.5 million refugees this year, and this was decided on without any input from its citizens. Next year, who knows how many millions will be welcomed by NSA-bugged Merkel. What’s in her closet, I wonder? To protect her own career, Merkel must obey her master.

As long as you have war, you will have refugees, and since it doesn’t look like the USA, with Germany and others in tow, is about to cease causing mass chaos and carnage, this refugee crisis is just beginning. When ordinary Germans dare to challenge Berlin’s diktats, however, they risk being branded as Nazis, Rechtsextreme, braune Esoteriker, Altnazis, Pack, Dunkeldeutschland, Faschisten, Neonazis, or Neofaschisten, etc.

Just as with Germany’s self-destructive fealty to the US and Israel, there is no frank discussion here about its refugee policies. Those with questions or grievances, then, are forced to become increasingly strident as they scream from the fringe. Brushed aside and demonized, they might just become the hysterical berserkers they’re already caricatured as. Should xenophobic outbursts explode down the line, they can be traced back to this initial suppression of dialogue.

Since nationalism has become a dirty word among the German left and middle, only anti-immigration groups such as PEGIDA, LEGIDA, and KAGIDA can evoke this most basic of concepts without apologies. At an August 31st rally in Leipzig, LEGIDA invited a black African to address the crowd. Son of a Cameroonian diplomat, Ferdinand was born in Germany, and he has studied here.

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Speaking without notes, Ferdinand finished with, “In Germany one has to talk about resurrection, because the German people aren’t asleep—the German people are dead. And when you are dead, you need a ghost, some power to reanimate the corpse or resurrect it […] We want a particular force, and this force, which will cause the people to resurrect, is patriotism.

“Without patriotism you cannot accomplish anything. However, with patriotism you can develop talents [and] this hero inside of each and every one of us can be activated. With patriotism, you can move mountains. With patriotism you can move, shake lakes—because I’m a patriot. This is a matter from the heart; it has nothing to do with your head. One has to be a patriot. You Fascists, you have to be patriots. You have to love your country. That’s my message today. Thank you.”

I suspect that most contemporary Germans would dismiss Ferdinand as a raving, rightwing simpleton. Nationalism, though, is judged by Elias Canetti as a primal force that gives meaning and purpose not just to each community, each nation, but to each individual, “We can take it for granted that no member of a nation ever sees himself as alone. As soon as he is named, or names himself, something more comprehensive moves into his consciousness, a larger unit to which he feels himself to be related.”

Since no two peoples see themselves as identical, there is no universal concept of nationalism, but a “crowd symbol” that galvanizes each nation. In times of war, this self-definition becomes akin to a religion.

Regarding the Germans, Elias Canetti observes, “The crowd symbol of the Germans was the army. But the army was more than just the army; it was the marching forest. In no other modern country has the forest-feeling remained as alive as it has in Germany. The parallel rigidity of the upright trees and their density and number fill the heart of the German with a deep and mysterious delight. To this day he loves to go deep into the forest where his forefathers lived; he feels at one with the trees.

“Their orderly separation and the stress on the vertical distinguish this forest from the tropical kind where creepers grow in all directions. In tropical forests the eye loses itself in the foreground; there is a chaotic and unarticulated mass of growth, full of colour and life, which effectively precludes any sensation of order, or even of repetition. The forests of the temperate zone, on the other hand, have a conspicuous rhythm. The eye moves along lines of clearly visible trees into a uniform distance. Each individual tree is always taller than a man and goes on growing until it becomes a giant. Its steadfastness has much in common with the same virtue in a warrior. In a single tree the bark resembles a coat of mail; in a whole forest, where there are many trees of the same kind growing together, it suggests rather the uniforms of an army. For the German, without his being clearly aware of it, army and forest transfused each other in every possible way. What to others might seem the army’s dreariness and barrenness kept for the German the life and glow of the forest. He was never afraid in it; he felt protected, one amongst many others. He took the rigidity and straightness of trees for his own law.

DDD2.jpg“The boy who escaped into the forest from the confinement of home, thinking to be alone there and able to dream, actually anticipated his entry into the army. In the forest he found the others waiting for him, true, faithful, and upright as he himself wanted to be; each like every other, for each grows straight, and yet quite different in height and strength. The effect of this early forest romanticism on the German must never be underrated. He absorbed it from countless poems and songs and the forest which appears in these is often called ‘German.’

“The Englishman likes to imagine himself at sea, the German in a forest. It is impossible to express the difference of their national feeling more concisely.” [from Crowds and Power, as translated by Carol Stewart]

In 2015, this marching forest has been atomized into so many hand-wringing shrubs or graffiti-spraying haters of homeland. The tall, straight trees, though, are still extant, and their order, strength, and steadfastness can still serve as a guide to this hijacked nation.

Just steps from my apartment, there’s Friedenspark, Peace Park, and sure enough, you can march straight for half a mile between two rows of sheltering trees. Though only a mid-sized city park, it feels like a forest. Blocking out much sunlight, the arched foliage overhead shrouds strollers in a solemn, nave-like ambience. At the far end, there’s a magnificent church that commemorates the 22,000 Russians who died during the three-day Battle of Leipzig in 1813. Losing 54,000 men altogether, the alliance of Germans, Russians, and Poles defeated Napoleon’s invading army.

When I showed a young Leipziger the poll about fighting for one’s country, he pointed out that it’s the former colonies that are most willing to defend themselves. “But isn’t Germany also colonized?” I should have said. When will she regain her autonomy and sanity?

vendredi, 23 octobre 2015

HUGO FISCHER: EL MAESTRO OCULTO DE ERNST JÜNGER

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HUGO FISCHER: EL MAESTRO OCULTO DE ERNST JÜNGER

EL MAGISTER NIGROMONTANUS
 
Manuel Fernández Espinosa

Ex: http://movimientoraigambre.blogspot.com

hugofischer.jpgCuando estos días prepárabamos el excursus a la "Elucidación de la tradición", dedicado en dos entregas (I parte y II parte) a considerar la noción de "tradición" en Ernst Jünger, nos asaltó un tema que hace tiempo acariciábamos la idea de tratar: el de la figura de uno de los maestros que más influencia ejerció sobre el pensamiento de Ernst Jünger y que, en la bibliografía española sobre Jünger, apenas ha sido tratado. Me refiero a Ernst Hugo Fischer.
 
Jünger se refiere a él con profusión, pero de una forma dispersa. En los diarios alude a él casi siempre bajo el pseudónimo de "Magister", aunque también lo cita por su nombre de pila y apellidos. En las novelas "Sobre los acantilados de mármol" y "Heliópolis" se refiere a él con el sobrenombre de "Nigromontanus", en "Visita a Godenholm" germaniza Jünger el "Nigromontanus" pudiéndosele identificar con el personaje de "Schwarzenberg" (Montenegro, que diríamos en castellano). Hay en torno a Hugo Fischer un halo de misterio que el mismo Jünger contribuye a crear y planea en toda la obra jüngeriana en la figura del maestro (aunque no todos los personajes puedan identificarse con éste de carne y hueso) que inicia en los secretos de una sabiduría capaz de superar el nihilismo.
 
Ernst Hugo Fischer nació en Halle an der Saale el 17 de octubre de 1897. La Primera Guerra Mundial lo dejó mutilado y, licenciado por invalidez, se emplea a partir del 1918 al estudio concienzudo y multidisciplinar en la Universidad de Leipzig, donde años más tarde lo conocería Jünger. Los intereses "científicos" de Fischer son múltiples: estudia Historia, Filosofía, Sociología, Psicología y se convierte en un reputado orientalista, doctorándose el año 1921 con la tesis titulada "Das Prinzip der bei Gegensätzlichkeit Jakob Böhme" (El principio de la oposición en Jakob Böhme). Resulta curioso que Ernst Jünger que era unos años mayor que Fischer (Jünger nació en 1895 y Fischer en 1897) le llame hasta el final de sus días "Maestro", pero tendríamos que tener en cuenta que Jünger llegó a la Universidad cuando Fischer le llevaba en ella unos años de ventaja. Cuando Jünger llegó a Leipzig, Fischer era ya uno de los polígrafos más importantes de Europa, pero eso sí: siempre en la sombra, con una discreción que raya el secreto, estudiando y viajando sin cesar y ejerciendo su magisterio a la manera de un maestro oculto de esos que nos hablan las tradiciones orientales como el taoísmo.
 
En 1921 viajó a India, en 1923 estuvo en España. Desde 1925 a 1938 ejerció la docencia en la Facultad de Filosofía de la Universidad de Leipzig, asociándosele con Arnold Gehlen. Su nacionalismo alemán fue una constante en él, militando en los círculos nacional-revolucionarios, trabando relación incluso con el nacional-bolchevique Ernst Niekisch, amigo de Jünger. Emigró de Alemania en 1938,  pues los nazis lo encontraron sospechoso por sus análisis filosóficos del marxismo, expresados en "Karl Marx und sein Verhältnis zum Staat" (Karl Marx y su informe al Estado) y "Lenin: el Maquiavelo del Este", por lo que terminó estableciéndose en Noruega, donde fue Director del Instituto de Investigación de la Sociología y la Enseñanza en Oslo. Más tarde se trasladó a Inglaterra. Siguió viajando a la India, incluso fue profesor en la Universidad de Benarés y regresó a Alemania en 1956, ocupando la cátedra de Filosofía de la Civilización en la Universidad de Múnich. Siguió estudiando, escribiendo y publicando, aunque sin éxitos rotundos que pusieran su figura filosófica en primera línea mundial. Su último libro lo dio a la estampa en 1971, bajo el título "Vernunft und Zivilisation" (Razón y Civilización) Falleció el 11 de mayo de 1975 en Ohlstadt (Baviera).
 
Su pensamiento fue evolucionando, pero siempre se mantuvo hipercrítico contra la modernidad y anticapitalista, siendo uno de los cerebros de la Revolución Conservadora alemana y tanteando todas las formas posibles de combatir lo que consideraba el mal absoluto: la modernidad y el capitalismo, para establecer un orden de nuevo cuño. Uno de los que más ha contribuido a darlo a conocer fue, como dijimos arriba, Ernst Jünger. Más que un exhaustivo seguimiento y localización de las abundantes citas que Jünger dedicó a Fischer a lo largo de toda su obra, merece la pena destacar el marcado carácter metafísico (podríamos decir que hasta místico) que imprimió a la visión del mundo jüngeriana. En "Heliópolis" el protagonista revela que una de las enseñanzas que recibió de su maestro "Nigromontano" era "que la naturaleza interior del hombre debe hacerse visible en su superficie como la flor que nace del germen". La idea se repite al final de la novela: "Creemos que su intención [la de Nigromontano/Fischer] es saturar la superficie con profundidad, de modo que las cosas sean al mismo tiempo simbólicas y reales".
 
En "Sobre los acantilados de mármol" se habla de un misterioso artilugio que Nigromontanus había dado a los hermanos que protagonizan la novela: "Para consolarnos, sin embargo, poseíamos el espejo de Nigromontanus, cuya contemplación (...) siempre nos serenaba". Dicho espejo tenía las supuestas propiedades de "concentrar los rayos solares sobre un punto en el que inmediatamente se producía un gran fuego. Las cosas que, tocadas por aquel ardor, se incendiaban, entraban en la eternidad de una manera que, según Nigromontanus, no podía comparse ni a la más fina destilación. Nigromontanus había aprendido aquel arte en los conventos del lejano Oriente, donde los tesoros de los difuntos son destruidos por las llamas, a fin de que puedan entrar en la eternidad en compañía de éstos".

Habida cuenta de que "Sobre los acantilados de mármol" es una novela que bien mereciera calificarse como "realismo mágico", sin regatearle su condición de "distopía", haríamos bien en pensar que más que un artefacto, el "espejo de Nigromontanus" sería algo así como una posible técnica de meditación inspirada en los saberes ocultos del extremo oriente (me pregunto, no sin advertir que me aventuro a equivocarme: ¿sería un mandala?.) A tenor de ello merece la pena recordar las enigmáticas palabras que Jünger escribe en "El corazón aventurero. Figuras y caprichos": "Entre los arcanos que me reveló Nigromontanus figura la certeza de que entre nosotros hay una tropa selecta que desde hace mucho tiempo se ha retirado de las bibliotecas y del polvo de las arenas, para consagrarse a su trabajo en el más recóndito cenobio y en el más oscuro Tíbet. Él hablaba de hombres sentados solitariamente en estancias nocturnas, imperturbables como rocas, en cuyas cavidades centellea la corriente que afuera hacer girar toda rueda de molino y que mantiene en movimiento el ejército de las máquinas; pero la energía de estos hombres permanece extraña a todo fin y se recoge en sus corazones, que, como matriz caliente y vibrante de toda fuerza y poder, se sustrae para siempre a cualquier luz externa".
 
Como quiera que sea la relación entre Ernst Jünger y este filósofo desconocido fue muy estrecha, incluso Jünger alude a viajes que hicieron juntos, pasando por el Golfo de Vizcaya en el barco "Iris" por ejemplo. Sabemos, por los diarios de Jünger, que todavía en 1968 el filósofo Fischer visitaba Mallorca, pero nos gustaría saber los lugares que recorrió en su viaje a España en 1923 o en otras de sus visitas. Estamos convencidos de que en Hugo Fischer, ese desconocido para la filosofía y la cultura española, estamos ante un maestro oculto cuya labor científica no ha sido todavía, por las razones que sean, lo suficientemente divulgada.
 
BIBLIOGRAFÍA:
 
Jünger, Ernst, "Visita a Godenholm".
Jünger, Ernst, "Heliópolis".
Jünger, Ernst, Diarios: Radiaciones I y II, Pasados los Setenta I, II, III, IV, V.
Jünger, Ernst, "Sobre los acantilados de mármol".
Jünger, Ernst, "El corazón aventurero".
 
Enlaces de interés:
 
Gajek, Bernhard, "Magister-Nigromontan-Schwarzenberg: Ernst Jünger und Hugo Fischer". Revue de littérature comparée. 1997