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dimanche, 11 novembre 2012

Pitirim Sorokin


Pitirim Sorokin

by Morris Berman

Ex: http://morrisberman.blogspot.be/


“Eat bread and salt and speak the truth.” —old Russian proverb
I suddenly remembered, the other day, that it had been ages since I dipped into the work of Pitirim Sorokin, the Russian sociologist who immigrated to the United States and founded the Department of Sociology at Harvard, where he taught for nearly thirty years. His four-volume Social and Cultural Dynamics was written over 1937-41, and rereading it at this late date, one has to marvel at the prescience of the man. Much of what he predicted regarding the cycles of civilization is coming true in our time.
Sorokin distinguished between what he called Ideational cultures and Sensate cultures. The former, he wrote, are spiritual in nature, focusing on the inner life of human beings. The latter, on the other hand—of which the West for the last five hundred years is a classic example—are preoccupied with the material modification of the external world by means of science and technology, and are the opposite of the Ideational ones.  The Sensate culture of the last five centuries, he claimed, is now in crisis; in its dying phase.
(Sorokin also posited the existence of an intermediary-type culture between the Sensate and the Ideational, which he called Idealistic, and which is a compromise between faith and pure empiricism. What we find here is a harmonious synthesis among reason, faith, and the senses as sources of knowing. Sad to say, the West has seen only two such periods in its long history, ones that might well be termed golden ages: Greece in the fifth and fourth centuries B.C., and Europe during A.D. 1200-1350.  Knowledge was not narrowed to one vista, he said, nor reduced to one source. Think Aeschylus, Thomas Aquinas.)
So Sorokin believed that present-day Sensate/scientific culture was in a state of fatigue; that it had run its course. When you have the excessive domination of a single system, he wrote, eventually it begins to exhibit signs of self-destruction.  The pendulum starts to swing in the other direction because each type of culture contains only part of the truth, and is thus an untruth.  But this partial truth is mistaken for the whole truth, and becomes the basis for culture and social life—which is the untruth of the situation. The false part of the culture tends to grow, and eventually, the whole thing goes out of kilter. In other words, the untruth evokes a strong reaction, creating a dynamic of change and disintegration. (Cf. Hegel, or even Aristotle: any reality contains its own negation within itself, producing its antithesis over time.) Cultures dominated by one-sided mentalities, said Sorokin, fall victim to their own narrow-mindedness.  He goes on:
“The great crisis of Sensate culture is here in all its stark reality. Before our very eyes this culture is committing suicide. If it does not die in our lifetime, it can hardly recover from the exhaustion of its creative forces and from the wounds of self-destruction. Half-alive and half-dead, it may linger in its agony for decades; but its spring and summer are definitely over….I hear distinctly the requiem that the symphony of history is playing in its memory.”
Sorokin’s predictions for this end-game scenario (remember, he’s writing this nearly seventy-five years ago) were as follows:
1. The boundary between true and false, and beautiful and ugly, will erode.  Conscience will disappear in favor of special interest groups. Force and fraud will become the norm; might will become right, and brutality rampant. It will be a bellum omnium contra omnes, and the family will disintegrate as well. “The home will become a mere overnight parking place.”
2. Sensate values “will be progressively destructive rather than constructive, representing in their totality a museum of sociocultural pathology….The Sensate mentality will increasingly interpret man and all values ‘physicochemically,’ ‘biologically,’ ‘reflexologically,’ ‘endocrinologically,’ ‘behavioristically,’ ‘economically’…[etc.].”
3. Real creativity will die out. Instead, we shall get a multitude of mediocre pseudo-thinkers and vulgar groups and organizations. Our belief systems will turn into a strange chaotic stew of science, philosophy, and magical beliefs.  “Quantitative colossalism will substitute for qualitative refinement.” What is biggest will be regarded as best. Instead of classics, we shall have best-sellers. Instead of genius, technique. Instead of real thought, Information. Instead of inner value, glittering externality.  Instead of sages, smart alecs. The great cultural values of the past will be degraded; “Michelangelos and Rembrandts will be decorating soap and razor blades, washing machines and whiskey bottles.”
4. Freedom will become a myth. “Inalienable rights will be alienated; Declarations of Rights either abolished or used only as beautiful screens for an unadulterated coercion. Governments will become more and more hoary, fraudulent, and tyrannical, giving bombs instead of bread; death instead of freedom; violence instead of law.” Security will fade; the population will become weary and scared.  “Suicide, mental disease, and crime will grow.”
5. The dies irae of transition will not be fun to live through, but the only way out of this mess, he wrote, is precisely through it. Under the conditions outlined above, the “population will not be able to help opening its eyes [this will be a very delayed phase in the U.S., I’m guessing] to the hollowness of the declining Sensate culture…. As a result, it will increasingly forsake it and shift its allegiance to either Ideational or Idealistic values.” Finally, we shall see the release of new creative forces, which “will usher in a culture and a noble society built not upon the withered Sensate root but upon a healthier and more vigorous root of integralistic principle.” In other words, we can expect “the emergence and slow growth of the first components of a new sociocultural order.”
Hey, one can only hope.

samedi, 10 novembre 2012




por Cristina Martinez 

Teniendo en cuenta la proliferación de guías de lenguaje no sexista, no queda más remedio que realizar la siguiente reflexión:

Quienes defienden el uso inclusivo del lenguaje arguyen que el género masculino es excluyente. Sin embargo, si analizamos esta afirmación detenidamente, podremos comprobar que, como tantas otras emitidas sin conocimiento suficiente, es falsa.

En la oración los niños pequeños son preciosos, se incluye tanto a las mujeres como a los varones; en cambio, la frase las niñas pequeñas son preciosas sólo puede referirse a mujeres y, por tanto, quedan excluidos los varones. Con este sencillo ejemplo, queda demostrado que el masculino es el género inclusivo y el femenino, el exclusivo. De ahí que en gramática se hable de género marcado (femenino) y género no marcado o genérico (masculino).

Dado que en español, como en otras muchas lenguas románicas, el género no marcado representa la concordancia por defecto, si, a fin de evitar la supuesta discriminación sexista implícita en el lenguaje, según esas guías, recurrimos al desdoblamiento pueden ocurrir dos cosas: o bien, pondremos en peligro la concordancia; o bien, caeremos en imposibles circunloquios que atentan contra el principio de economía lingüística.

Veamos un ejemplo. En la oración los humanos son mamíferos, que hace referencia tanto a mujeres como a hombres, si para evitar la discriminación obedecemos los principios no sexistas que tratan de imponer y recurrimos al desdoblamiento, el resultado, respetando la concordancia, debería ser el siguiente: las humanas y los humanos son mamíferas y mamíferos. Es obvio que, esta solución es impracticable, especialmente a nivel oral, además de caer en irrelevantes repeticiones que cansan al lector o al oyente.

Si se opta por concordar únicamente los artículos definidos, se cae en una incorrección gramatical, dado que en castellano los elementos átonos (los artículos) no pueden ir coordinados. Por tanto, una solución como la que sigue, tan recurrente en los medios de comunicación, es agramatical: las y los humanos son mamíferos.

Otra de las soluciones a la que se ha recurrido es el uso de símbolos, ilegibles en el lenguaje escrito e invisibles en el oral, tales como paréntesis, arrobas, etc.

Al no haber una norma sobre el asunto, no parece ni útil, ni justificado, ni mucho menos necesario recurrir a este tipo de desdoblamientos. Es necesario un criterio unificado que homogeneice los usos lingüísticos y eso, precisamente, es lo que trata de hacer la Real Academia, tan criticada a raíz del artículo de Ignacio Bosque sobre este asunto que, paradójicamente, ha recibido el apoyo de la gran mayoría de los lingüistas.

Es tal la estulticia lingüística de los que se han aventurado a escribir esas guías que confunden género con sexo deliberadamente, porque desconocen que con el género, en español, ocurre algo parecido que con el plural y el singular. Este es el genérico y engloba a aquel. Por tanto, no se excluye al resto de madres cuando se afirma, por ejemplo: Una madre nunca abandona a su hijo.

Si los abanderados del lenguaje no sexista fueran coherentes y siguieran sus propios criterios a pies juntillas, caerían en continuas aberraciones porque cualquier afirmación podría resultarles excluyente. Así, por ejemplo, una afirmación como alimente a su hijo con leche materna puede resultar discriminatoria tanto con las niñas como con el resto de bebés del mundo. Siendo consecuentes con las normas (que, curiosamente, no existen) del lenguaje no sexista, deberíamos optar por: *padres y madres alimenten a todos sus hijas e hijos con leche materna y paterna. Huelga el comentario.

El desdoblamiento sólo está justificado cuando exista ambigüedad que no pueda resolverse mediante elementos extralingüísticos o contextuales. Será totalmente aceptable, en este caso, por ejemplo: Tengo hermanos y hermanas, si el interlocutor desconoce que son varones y hembras; o en este otro: los alumnos, varones y hembras, usarán el mismo uniforme, para aclarar que tanto unos como otras vestirán igual. Excepto en estos pocos casos, el desdoblamiento resulta innecesario e injustificado.

Se ha dicho hasta la saciedad que la lengua no entiende de sexos y, por tanto, es el hablante el que discrimina. Esta es una problemática que debería tratarse desde el punto de vista social, no lingüístico, y proponer soluciones  que sean aplicables en la realidad y no falacias que lo único que proporcionan son discusiones fútiles y gastos inútiles del dinero público. Poco podemos hacer, en cuanto a lengua se refiere, si la idea de igualdad entre hombres y mujeres no es una realidad en el imaginario social. Forzar al uso de un lenguaje artificial, en vez de concienciar activamente sobre el asunto, es un disparate que no sólo atenta contra la libertad de los hablantes sino que, además, contraviene las normas gramaticales y sintácticas del español

Cuando el cambio de mentalidad respecto a este asunto se produzca, de una manera real, en la sociedad; cuando se extienda y se consolide la igualdad de sexos, se trasladará de forma natural a la lengua, sin necesidad de forzar el sistema. La realidad hay que cambiarla de raíz y no limitarse a barnizar las palabras que la reflejan, intentando sugestionar a los hablantes para crearles una suerte de sentimiento de culpa por provocar con sus palabras la discriminación femenina. Esto no es otra cosa que un burdo ejercicio de manipulación de la conciencia y un intento evidente de crear una Neolengua que refleje una realidad que no existe.

Las palabras tienen significado pero no ideología. Yo, personalmente, no voy a eludir de toda responsabilidad al hablante porque, si existe machismo en el lenguaje, es la intención del que lo usa la que lo contiene.

Las palabras talismán

APUNTES SOBRE “INGSOC”: Las palabras talismán,

por Cristina Martinez

¡Oh, pueblo lacónico y de una penetración singular! Una sola palabra te significa admiración, enojo, rabia, celos, engaño, placer, novedad, venganza, etc.. (Mariano J. de Larra)

ingsoc-big-brother-political-slogans-poster.jpgParafraseando a Unamuno, el que pretende vencer sin convencer en democracia tiene que usar estrategias que sean tan eficaces como sutiles. Por un lado, porque, en candidaturas de cuatro años, prima la urgencia de manipular el pensamiento colectivo de una manera rápida y, por otro, porque de lo que se trata es de que el pueblo no se percate de que está siendo manejado. Uno de los medios más efectivos para llevar a cabo esta empresa es la manipulación del lenguaje.

El lenguaje es la forma de comunicación más directa entre votantes y políticos, de ahí que sea un arma poderosísima para llegar a la conciencia de las gentes. Los gobernantes lo usan con dos fines muy claros: 1. someter al pueblo dolosamente y 2. hacerle creer que decide en libertad. Para ello, el tirano pone en práctica su astucia recurriendo a los denominados términos talismán, es decir, palabras que a lo largo de la historia se han cargado de un prestigio que nadie pone en duda.

Es el caso de la palabra libertad. Si ponemos atención, nos percataremos de la recurrencia del término en diversos ámbitos: discursos políticos, anuncios de televisión, proclamas reivindicativas, eslóganes, etc…   El poder de los términos talismán radica en que dotan a las palabras vecinas del mismo prestigio que ellos tienen, por contagio positivo, y, al mismo tiempo, desprestigian a las que se les oponen, por contagio negativo. Así, las palabras censura, dominio, orden, norma, deber, etc… están connotadas negativamente, mientras que las palabras cambio, progreso, democracia, autonomía, derecho, etc… estarían connotadas positivamente. Semánticamente, ni las del primer grupo son antónimos ni las del segundo son sinónimos de la palabra en cuestión, pero esto poco importa porque a los oídos de la masa unas se oponen y las otras se acoplan por adherencia.

De este modo, el manipulador sabe que cuando usa una palabra talismán, el poder de discernimiento del oyente queda anulado, o por mejor decir, obnubilado por la eficacia evocadora del término talismán. Así, ante un tema de importancia capital como puede ser el aborto, cierta ministra optó por recurrir a un vago argumento, reforzándolo con una palabra talismán, para defender una ley a la que un amplio sector de la población se oponía por motivos tanto éticos como morales: “la ley pretende dar cobertura al derecho de la mujer a decidir en libertad lo que quiere hacer con su cuerpo”. En rigor, no hizo un razonamiento convincente, pero puso en juego el esquema libertad-imposición, anulando así la capacidad crítica de los oyentes, que por no parecer contrarios al cambio y, por tanto, al progreso, otro de los términos talismán, aceptaron pasivamente el argumento.

Este tipo de esquemas dilemáticos: libertad-censura, democracia-tiranía, cambio-inmovilismo, progreso-regresión, etc… son uno de los métodos más usados por los demagogos, porque reducen la capacidad de discernimiento del hablante poco preparado intelectualmente y le obligan a elegir el término connotado positivamente de un modo automático. Así, para rebatir los argumentos que sean contrarios a su ideología o tendencia política recurren a estos términos talismán y provocan diálogos tan abstractos como este:

- Sr. Presidente ¿cómo es que usted cambia tanto de opinión?

- Disculpe pero soy progresista (término positivo, habitualmente seguido de una pausa locutiva),  y el progreso, en ocasiones, implica cambios imprescindibles.

Un demagogo nunca matiza los conceptos, como hemos podido observar, sino que los usa en función del efecto que quiere conseguir, evitando dar explicaciones precisas que pongan en peligro su imagen y su credibilidad.  Porque si se dan argumentos, es más probable que el interlocutor los pueda rebatir; pero si se habla de una manera vaga y se nubla la capacidad de raciocinio con palabras prestigiosas (como le ocurrió a la periodista ante la palabra progreso), se gana la batalla dialéctica por deslumbramiento del contrincante.

Cuando los políticos hablan de que la libertad es un derecho inalienable en democracia, no se refieren a una libertad creativa, con la que uno decide según su propio criterio ideológico y en consonancia a unos valores individuales, sino a lo que ellos quieren que entendamos por libertad. En democracia, se garantizan una serie de libertades para que la masa se relaje pensando que goza de un estado de bienestar nunca antes logrado; pero la realidad es que la voluntad colectiva es manejada a través de los medios de comunicación, la prensa y la casta política de un modo feroz y la masa acaba dejándose llevar por lo socialmente aceptado o por lo políticamente correcto sin oponer resistencia crítica.

La asociación de esos términos talismán a ciertas imágenes estereotipadas que nos presentan en anuncios publicitarios, nos ha llevado a creer que la libertad es el viento alborotando la melena de un tío que conduce una gran moto por interminables carreteras a ritmo de rock  americano: “Born to be wild”, “born to be free”; o un metrosexual de aspecto aniñado, con un torso perfecto, que camina con chulería bajo la lluvia: “break the rules”, “be free”. Sólo hace falta adquirir el producto que quieren vender para ser libre y socialmente admirado

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vendredi, 09 novembre 2012

Elementos n°34 y n°35


Enlace Revista electrónica

Enlace Revista documento pdf


La pregunta sobre la Técnica en los revolucionario-conservadores, 
por Sebastian J. Lorenz
Mesianismo tecnológico Ilusiones y desencanto,
por Horacio Cagni
El hombre entre el nihilismo de la técnica y la responsabilidad ético-política,
por Franco Volpi
La Edad de la Técnica: reflexiones sobre Heidegger, Jünger y Schmitt,
por José Luis Villacañas Berlanga
Heidegger y el problema de la técnica,
por Felipe Boburg
Ortega y Gasset, meditador de la técnica,
por José María Atencia Páez
Jünger: Antropología de la Técnica
por Patricia Bernal Maz
Técnica y Naturaleza humana según Arnold Gehlen, 
por Amán Rosales Rodríguez
Enlace Revista Electrónica

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El origen histórico del problema técnico,
por Eduardo Arroyo
Tecnología, Utopía y Cultura,                                  
por Germán Doig Klinge
La Técnica como lugar hermeneutico privilegiado: Ortega y Heidegger,
 por Antonio López Peláez
Nihilismo y técnica, 
por José Luis Molinuevo
¿Ecología o Tecnocracia? El conservadurismo en la modernidad,  
por Michael Grossheim
Por una ontología de la técnica. Dominio de la naturaleza y naturaleza del dominio en Julius Evola,  
por Giovanni Monastra
Heidegger y la Técnica,  
por Eugenio Gil
El hombre y la técnica, de Spengler, 
por Carlos E. Luján Andrade
La Perfección de la Técnica: Friedrich-Georg Jünger,  
por Robert Steuckers
Carl Schmitt: Topología de la Técnica, 
por Enrique Ocaña
Arnold Gehlen: la condición del hombre en la era de la Técnica, 
por José Javier Esparza
La técnica, devoradora de hombres, 
por Ernst Niekisch

Nicolás Gómez Dávila: Aphorisms and the Modern World

Nicolás Gómez Dávila

Aphorisms and the Modern World

Nicolás Gómez Dávila
 "I distrust every idea that doesn't seem obsolete and grotesque to my contemporaries."

The reactionary does not extol what the next dawn must bring, nor is he terrified by the last shadows of the night. His dwelling rises up in that luminous space where the essential accosts him with its immortal presence. The reactionary escapes the slavery of history because he pursues in the human wilderness the trace of divine footsteps. Man and his deeds are, for the reactionary, a servile and mortal flesh that breathes gusts from beyond the mountains. To be reactionary is to champion causes that do not turn up on the notice board of history, causes where losing does not matter. To be reactionary is to know that we only discover what we think we invent; it is to admit that our imagination does not create, but only lays bares smooth bodies. To be reactionary is not to espouse settled cases, nor to plead for determined conclusions, but rather to submit our will to the necessity that does not constrain, to surrender our freedom to the exigency that does not compel; it is to find sleeping certainties that guide us to the edge of ancient pools. The reactionary is not a nostalgic dreamer of a cancelled past, but rather a hunter of sacred shades upon the eternal hills.

The Authentic Reactionary, Nicolás Gómez Dávila


Nicolás Gómez Dávila (don Colacho) was born 18 May 1913 in Cajicá, Colombia, into an affluent family. He was a prolific writer and important political thinker who is considered to be one of the most intransigent political theoreticians of the twentieth century. It was not until a few years prior to his death in 1994 that his writing began to gain popularity due the translation of some works into German. At the tender age of six his family relocated to Europe, where they resided for the next seventeen years. During his time in Europe, Gómez Dávila contracted a persistent illness which confined him to his bed for long periods, and as a result of this he had to be educated by private tutors with whom he studied Latin, Greek and developed a fondness for classical literature.

When Gómez Dávila turned twenty-three he moved back to Colombia, residing in Bogotá, where he met and married Emilia Nieto Ramos. Here, with his wife and children Gómez Dávila is reported to have led a life of leisure. Assisting his father briefly in the management of a carpet factory, he spent little time in the office, instead preferring to spend his time at the Jockey Club, where he played polo until incurring an injury (Gómez Dávila was thrown from his horse whilst trying to light a cigar.) Following this, he spent more time reading literature. By the end of his life, he had accumulated a library of approximately 30,000 books, many of which were in foreign languages. In addition to the French, English, Latin and Greek he learnt during childhood, Gómez Dávila could also read German, Italian, Portuguese, and was even reportedly learning Danish prior to his death in order to be able to read Søren Kierkegaard in the original language.

Gómez Dávila was also an eminent figure in Colombian society. He assisted Mario Laserna Pinzón found the University of the Andes in 1948 and his advice was often sought by politicians. In 1958 he declined the offer of a position as an adviser to President Alberto Llera after the downfall of the military government in Colombia, and in 1974 he turned down the chance to become the Colombian ambassador at the Court of St. James. Gómez Dávila had resolved early on during his work as a writer that an involvement in politics would be detrimental to his literary career and thus had decided to politely abstain from all political involvement, despite these tempting and prestigious offers.

During his lifetime, Gómez Dávila was a modest man and made few attempts to make his writings widely known. His first two publications were available only to his family and friends in private editions. Only by way of German (and later Italian as well as French and Polish) translations beginning in the late eighties did Gómez Dávila's ideas begin to disperse. Initially his works were more popular in Germany than in Colombia, and a number of prominent German authors such as Ernst Jünger (who in an unpublished letter defined Gómez Dávila's writing as: "A mine for lovers of conservatism"), Martin Mosebach, and Botho Strauß expressed their admiration for Gómez Dávila’s works. His most translated and final work, El Reaccionario Auténtico (The Authentic Reactionary) was published after his death in the Revista de la Universidad de Antioquia.

Gómez Dávila has many unique features that occur within his works, but perhaps the most famous literary feature he is famed for is the aphorism, which remains prominent throughout his writing. Not only is the aphorism used as an aesthetic tool, it is also a purposely deployed technique selected by Gómez Dávila as his method of choice, which he referred to as escolios (or glosses). This technique was used extensively in the five volumes of Escolios a un texto implícito (1977; 1986; 1992).

By definition, an aphorism is an original thought, spoken or written in a concise and memorable form; the term aphorism literally means a distinction or definition, coming from the Greek ἀφορισμός (aphorismós). In traditional literature, the aphorism is used as a mnemonic technique to relate wisdom and is found in works such as the Sutra literature of India, The Golden Verses of Pythagoras, Hesiod's Works and Days, the Delphic Maxims, and Epictetus' Handbook. In more recent times, the aphorism has been used heavily by philosophers such as Nietzsche and Cioran, both of whom share a number of ideas and perspectives with Gómez Dávila. Nietzsche himself used aphorisms heavily and even went so far as to describe why aphorisms are used – naturally in the form of an aphorism itself – “He who writes in blood and aphorisms does not want to be read, he wants to be learned by heart.” In regards to Gómez Dávila this is certainly the case, for he himself stated that aphorisms are like seeds containing the promise of “infinite consequences.” Thus, with a short but highly memorable sentence, an idea is planted in the mind of the reader, an idea that hopefully sprouts action, and with it consequences. Similarly in Notas, he stated that the only two “tolerable” ways to write were a long, leisurely style, and a short, elliptical style - since he did not think himself capable of the long, leisurely style, he opted for aphorisms. As indicated above however, Gómez Dávila’s use of the aphorism is not merely a stylistic reference; these short but effective phrases are part of his ‘reactionary’ tactic, which he hurls like bombs into readers minds – where they either detonate or take root, sprouting into the ‘consequences’ their author hoped for. In his own words, he describes his use of aphorisms:

[to] write the second way is to grab the item in its most abstract form, when he is born, or when he dies leaving a pure schema. The idea here is a cross burning, a light bulb. Endless consequences of it will come, not yet but [a] germ, and promise themselves enclosed. Whoever writes well but not touching the surface of the idea, [there] a diamond lasts. The ideas and plays extend the air space. Their relationships are secret, [their] roots hidden. The thought that unites and leads is not revealed in their work, but their fruits [are] unleashed on archipelagos that crop alone in an unknown sea.1

According to Gómez Dávila, in the modern era the reactionary cannot hope to formulate arguments that will convince his opponent, because he does not share any assumptions with his opponent. Moreover, even if the reactionary could argue from certain shared assumptions, modern man’s dogmatism prevents him from listening to different opinions and ideas. Faced with this situation, the reactionary should instead write aphorisms to illicit a response rather than engaging in direct debate. Gómez Dávila compares his aphorisms to shots fired by a guerrilla from behind a thicket on any idea that dares advance along the road. Thus, the reactionary will not convince his opponent, but he may convert him.2 Furthermore, the aphorisms themselves are not written in isolation – when placed together in their context they are equally as informative as any normally composed text could hope to be.

Another function that Gómez Dávila’s aphorisms served was, as their Spanish title (Escolios a un Texto Implícito) suggests, as notes on books he had read. The Spanish word escolio comes from the Greek σχόλιον (scholion). This word is used to describe the annotations made by ancient and medieval scribes and students in the margins of their texts. Many of these aphorisms may therefore be allusions to other works. They constitute the briefest of summaries of books he read and conclusions he had drawn from these works or judgments on these texts.3

Gómez Dávila was a truly devout Christian, and his strand of religious thought is deeply entwined with his ideas on politics, democracy and society as a whole. This is a central concept in understanding Gómez Dávila’s work. However, not all of his thoughts resonated with other religious thinkers of his era, for he realised that his contemporaries were incapable of revitalising either Christianity or Catholicism and thus were not able to ensure the survival of the church in the modern era. Not only did this aggravate some of his fellow Catholics, they also were wary of Gómez Dávila due to his appreciation of authors such as such as Nietzsche and Heidegger, who are not usually regarded as being affable to Christianity.

In regards to the way religion is combined with his political thought, Gómez Dávila, interprets democracy as “less a political fact than a metaphysical perversion” and is a harsh critic of ideology. He defines democracy as “an anthropotheist religion,” which he believes is a methodology that seeks to elevate the common man to a plane above God – which he believes to be a dangerous and unprecedented level of religious anthropocentricism. Though this may sound odd at first, Gómez Dávila is by no means the only author who has claimed that democracy incorporates a religious element into it, and even some contemporary political scientists have asserted that democracy functions as a political religion. Gómez Dávila interpreted the vital sign of democracy being a political religion as the modern state’s hostility to traditional religions, which he believed was because a true religious authority was capable of challenging a government – thus the power of religion has to be curbed in order for the government to have full, unmediated control of the people – and as a consequence of this a democracy had to replace religion by adopting ‘quasi-religious’ elements. It is this light, that contrary to public opinion, Gómez Dávila does not see democracy as a promise of liberation; on the contrary to him democracy represents a loss of freedom. Since democracy has achieved hegemony, spiritual and cultural matters have become secondary to politics, and today when a citizen is branded as a ‘heretic’ is not because of his rejection of a religion, but because they dare to question the controlling political regime. In this regard, Gómez Dávila questions democracy, but he should be regarded as a critic and not an opponent, for as mentioned earlier Gómez Dávila had no interest in a political agenda. To Gómez Dávila, democracy was a political religion that encouraged the exaltation of the cult of individualism to a dangerous status, which set an individual on an undeserved plateau above God and eroded genuine metaphysical belief but replaced it with nothing substantial. However he was not a blind devotee or fundamentalist either, for Gómez Dávila was also a powerful critic of the Church as well as democracy.


Another feature at play within Gómez Dávila’s writing is that he believes equality to be a social construct of modernity – whilst equality levels the playing field for some individuals, for others it hobbles them. Effectively, it creates a mythical average citizen who does not in actuality exist, raising one individual to an elevated position and demoting another. Rather than recognising individual qualities and merits, it removes all hierarchies – not only the negative hierarchies, but also the positive ones. All variation is lost and replaced by the ‘myth of the average’ – and if Gómez Dávila’s interpretation of democracy as a political religion is correct, it then denounces religion and evaluates the mythical ‘average citizen’ to a theoretical level of freedom wherein the ‘average citizen’ is a substitute for the very pinnacle of the religious hierarchy – God. Thus, Gómez Dávila criticises democracy because it seeks to replace the sacred with the average and mundane man. And because democracy replaces religion, it is for this reason that criticism of democracy is the taboo of the West, and the modern equivalent to heresy. Thus, the modern ideologies such as liberalism, democracy, and socialism, were the main targets of Gómez Dávila's criticism, because the world influenced by these ideologies appeared to him decadent and corrupt.

In order to critique ideas, Gómez Dávila created the figure of the ‘reactionary’ as his unmistakable literary mask which he developed into a distinctive type of thinking about the modern world as such. This is explained in The Authentic Reactionary, which refers to one of his most well-known works, El reaccionario auténtico, originally published in Revista Universidad de Antioquia 240 (April-June 1995), 16–19. By adopting this label, Gómez Dávila is defining himself as one who sits in opposition. This is not simply a matter of placing Gómez Dávila into a neat political pigeonhole for clearly defined and organised policies – because he turned down prestigious political positions, and certainly didn’t intend to advocate any political platforms in his literary work. The reactionary is for him not at all a political activist who wants to restore old conditions, but rather a “passenger who suffers a shipwreck with dignity”; the reactionary is “that fool, who possesses the vanity to judge history, and the immorality to come to terms with it.”4 He did not mean to identify himself exclusively with a narrow political position. In several aphorisms, he acknowledged that there is no possibility of reversing the course of history. Rather, the reactionary’s task is to be the guardian of heritages, even the heritage of revolutionaries. This certainly does not mean that Gómez Dávila made his peace with democracy; all it means is that he also did not allow himself to be deluded by promises of the restoration of the old order.5 As we see below;

The existence of the authentic reactionary is usually a scandal to the progressive. His presence causes a vague discomfort. In the face of the reactionary attitude the progressive experiences a slight scorn, accompanied by surprise and restlessness. In order to soothe his apprehensions, the progressive is in the habit of interpreting this unseasonable and shocking attitude as a guise for self-interest or as a symptom of stupidity; but only the journalist, the politician, and the fool are not secretly flustered before the tenacity with which the loftiest intelligences of the West, for the past one hundred fifty years, amass objections against the modern world.6

In this regard Gómez Dávila does not seek to eliminate the concept we know of as ‘modernity’, which he sees as an impossible task. Instead he provides a criticism of modernity, disputing that is natural and that it leads to a false conception of progress. The illusionary doctrine of progress, to Gómez Dávila’s way of thinking is a myth which has been deployed to help enslave workers to capitalism and industrial society, by effectively manipulating the population to believe that they helping to make the world a better place, when effectively the real event that is taking place is that they only serving to make capitalism and consumerism more efficient. The illusion of progress acts as a placebo effect to make the citizens feel better about themselves in a world where god and religion has long since perished, replaced by blind faith in the power of the state. “In order to heal the patient, which it wounded in the 19th century, industrial society had to numb his mind [to pain] in the 20th century.”7

By defending cultural and spiritual heritage, however, Gómez Dávila is not advocating a return to the past – rather be is strategically deploying this as a method to cut ties with the present and create a different future, for in his own words: "To innovate without breaking a tradition we must free ourselves from our immediate predecessors linking us to our remote predecessors".8 Gómez Dávila believes that "The modern world resulted from the confluence of three independent causal series: population growth, democratic propaganda, [and] the industrial revolution" (Successive Scholia, 161). This in turn led to further developments and propaganda which effectively restructured traditional belief and "replaced the myth of a bygone golden age of a future with the plastic age" (Scholia II, 88) leading us to a world where consumerism eventually will replace both religion and politics - "The Gospels and the Communist Manifesto pale, the future is in the hands of Coca-Cola and pornography" (Successive Scholia, 181).

Therefore Gómez Dávila’s stance, dispersed through an assortment of brief aphorisms, becomes much more perceptible to the casual reader in light of The Authentic Reactionary, which for English readers (who as yet are not able to read all of his writing in translation) becomes a pivotal key in understanding Gómez Dávila’s work. The reactionary does not act in isolation from history and modernity, rather he seeks to challenge what he perceives as a false doctrine of progress and looks back in retrospect not to recreate the ancient past, but rather to generate ideas which link modernity to tradition, in order to create real progress by offering an alternative to the current regime of mass consumerism, capitalism and other destructive political ideologies. It is incorrect to locate Gómez Dávila in any existing political paradigm, because there is simply nothing which matches his core ideas…and as such he is correctly identified as what he labelled himself – a ‘reactionary’. His reactionary stance comes close to touching on the topics at the core of writers such as Guénon and Evola, but in regard to linking spiritual and cultural decline to political origins, he actually goes further beyond their ideas to suggest that as an inevitable side product of consumerism, destroying belief in a higher power or God would benefit capitalism and help corporations control the people by encouraging self-indulgent attitudes. Thus politics replaces spirituality, and the citizen replaces god with disguised worship of the state, who in turn rewards them with consumerism. The authentic reactionary is someone who is aware of problems like this in society and provides an intellectual critique of the system whilst remaining aloof from it:

History for the reactionary is a tatter, torn from man’s freedom, fluttering in the breath of destiny. The reactionary cannot be silent because his liberty is not merely a sanctuary where man escapes from deadening routine and takes refuge in order to be his own master. In the free act the reactionary does not just take possession of his essence. Liberty is not an abstract possibility of choosing among known goods, but rather the concrete condition in which we are granted the possession of new goods. Freedom is not a momentary judgment between conflicting instincts, but rather the summit from which man contemplates the ascent of new stars among the luminous dust of the starry sky. Liberty places man among prohibitions that are not physical and imperatives that are not vital. The free moment dispels the unreal brightness of the day, in order that the motionless universe that slides its fleeting lights over the shuddering of our flesh might rise up on the horizon of the soul.9

The soul of Nicolás Gómez Dávila, the authentic reactionary, departed from his flesh in his beloved library on the eve of his 81st birthday, on May 17, 1994. Though achieving fame in Colombia, where his works are well read today, Gómez Dávila remains largely unread in the Occident. Whilst his writing achieved some popularity in Germany, much of it remains untranslated for English readers, which prevents his writing from reaching a wider audience. Hopefully a new generation of authors will appear to pick up the challenge of translating Gómez Dávila’s writing and help him achieve the recognition he deserves as a thinker and philosopher.

Main Works

Escolios a Un Texto Implicito: Obra Completa. Nicolas Gomez Davila, Franco Volpi.

July 2006.Villegas Editores.

Notas I, Mexico 1954 (new edition Bogotá 2003).

Textos I, Bogotá 1959 (new edition Bogotá 2002).

Sucesivos escolios a un texto implícito, Santafé de Bogotá 1992 (new edition Barcelona 2002).

Escolios a un texto implícito. Selección, Bogotá 2001.

El reaccionario auténtico, in Revista de la Universidad de Antioquia, Nr. 240 (April–June 1995), p. 16-19.

De iure, in Revista del Colegio Mayor de Nuestra Senora del Rosario 81. Jg., Nr. 542 (April–June 1988), p. 67-85.

Nuevos escolios a un texto implícito, 2 volumes, Bogotá 1986.

Escolios a un texto implícito, 2 volumes, Bogotá 1977.



1 Volpi, F., An Angel Captive in Time

2  Why aphorisms?

3   Why aphorisms?

4    The Last Reactionary

5 What is a reactionary?

6 Gómez Dávila, N.,The Authentic Reactionary

7 Ibid.

8 Duke, O. T., Nicolás Gómez Dávila: Passion of Anachronism, in Cultural and Bibliographical Bulletin . Issue 40. Volume XXXII, 1997

9 Gómez Dávila, N.,The Authentic Reactionary

Gwendolyn Taunton

Gwendolyn Taunton

Gwendolyn Taunton was the recipient of the Ashton Wylie Award for Literary Excellence in 2009 for her work with Primordial Traditions. Her most recent work is Mimir - Journal of North European Traditions.

Warum überhaupt José Ortega y Gasset?

ortega.jpgDr. Ernst-Georg RENDA:

Eine aktuelle und kritische Frage zur Jahrtausendwende: Warum überhaupt Philosophie?

Eine unumgehbare Frage der Philosophie Europas: Warum überhaupt José Ortega y Gasset?

Ex: http://staff.uni-mainz.de/  

Die eindrucksvolle und überzeugende Antwort in der Zeit:

Ortega y Gassets Lebensphilosophie ist deshalb so aktuell,

  • weil eine moderne, utilitaristisch-hedonistisch geprägte europäische Informationsgesellschaft eine Orientierung sucht. Je weiter sich die Schere der Handlungstendenzen zwischen dem Sein und dem Sollen öffnet, desto attraktiver wird eine Philosophie der Moral und der Lebensvitalität, die jenseits der normativen Kraft des Faktischen den Gewissensentscheid des Individuums anmahnt.
  • weil die naturalen Egoismen in uns mit dem archaischen Jagdschema im kulturellen Handlungsschema fortbestehen. Sie beeinflussen unsere Denkschemata und Emotionen, unsere Wünsche und Strebungen. Damit wecken sie im modernen Menschen das unwiderstehliche Bedürfnis nach Selbstaufklärung, nach Selbstdeutung und Selbstauslegung. Weil der Mensch notwendig den Sinn seiner Existenz im Ausgang des ihm natürlich Vorgegebenen mit dem ihm im Ziel Aufgegebenen zu einer Vollendungsgestalt verbinden muß, die in der wahren Humanität, in der sittlichen Persönlichkeit liegt, ist er gezwungen, die Modi eines gelungenen Lebens zu begreifen. José Ortega y Gassets kulturanthropologischer Beitrag in "Meditationen über die Jagd" eröffnet auch dem hypermodernen Menschen ein Selbstverständnis als Jäger, für den die Jagd nur ausnahmsweise zugleich Wildtierjagd bedeutet.
  • weil das spezifisch Menschliche im Sinne der Plessnerschen Anthropologie in der Natur-Kultur-Verschränkung liegt, und wir unter der Voraussetzung aufgeklärten Denkens das Grundproblem menschlicher Existenz in der Frage erblicken: Was ist der Mensch? Worin besteht die Natur des Menschen? Liegt Sinn und Möglichkeit von Kultur in der Natur seiner Natur und wie ist das zu denken?

José Ortega y Gasset hat in seinem kulturanthropologischen Beitrag zur Jagd, den er bereits 1942 in Portugal verfaßte, eine stukturanalytische Erklärung des Menschen gefunden, die unsere weltweit operierenden High-Tech-Jägerhorden am Modell des Wildtierjägers in ihrer Intentionalität besser verständlich machen. Er hat gezeigt, daß die kognitiven und emotionalen Bedingungsstrukturen, die als Jagdschema a priori das Verhalten, näherhin die Intentionalität des frühen Menschen teleologisch beeinflußten, mit der Evolution des Neocortex des Urjägers zu Denkstrukturen wurden, ohne Freiheit und Selbstbestimmung zu "bedrohen" oder in Frage zu stellen. Wer überhaupt begreift, daß und wie dank des mit phänomenologischer Methode analytisch erfahrenen Erkenntnisfortschritts durch José Ortega y Gasset das vitalkategoriale Jagdschema das Denkschema des modernen Menschen handlungsintentional beeinflußt und uns so (methodisch) zum Jäger auf mannigfachen Lebensfeldern werden läßt, der versteht auch, daß aus dem urzeitlichen Wildtierprädator der moderne Ressourcenprädator geworden ist, der im Prozeß der Fortpflanzung, Selbstregulierung und Transformation in derselben Gefühlswelt lebt wie der pleistozäne Jäger.

In der Dialektik von Geist und Natur liegt die Grundspannung, die der Mensch zwischen Jagd und Vernunft gewärtig wird. Die Struktur der Jagd, die aufgrund des Jagdschemas a priori im animalischen Bereich Verhalten determiniert, hat vor allem im Übergang zur neolithischen Revolution bis heute methodisch weiterhin das Handlungsschema beeinflußt ohne die Freiheit und Selbstbestimmung in Frage zu stellen. Unsere Sprache erweist sich als unbeirrbarer Aufweis der Kontinuität des Jagdschemas als Denkschema auf fast allen Lebensgebieten. Homo Venator ist im Spiegel seiner Vernunft Ausdruck des spezifisch Menschlichen. Die Jagd bedeutet im Sinne der anerkannten Anthropologie von Helmuth Plessner eine Vitalkategorie, ein natürliches Phänomen, das in und mit dem modernen Wildjäger als die menschliche Strukturtypik der Natur-Kultur-Verschränkung zum Aufschein gelangt. Der spanische Philosoph José Ortega y Gasset gilt als der bisher einzige große Denker, der den Zusammenhang zwischen Jagd als einem natürlichen (Vitalkategorie) und kulturell angeeigneten Phänomen (z. B. das Waidwerk) im Ausgang der Denkansätze von Platon, Blaise Pascal und Nikolaus von Kues erkannt und systematisch in seinem Beitrag "Meditationen über die Jagd" unter Anwendung der phänomenologischen Methode als Erkenntnisweg analysiert hat. Sein erkenntnistheoretischer Fortschritt liegt in der kulturphilosophischen Grundannahme, daß das Erbeuten und Töten von Wildtieren in Form der Jagd im Falle des modernen Menschen ein kulturell bedingtes Handlungsschema bildet, das im Fortschreiten aus natürlichen Phänomenen im Unterschied zu anderen Formen des Tötens von Tieren sich nur angemessen begreifen läßt, wenn man es als dieses kulturelle Phänomen in den Blick nimmt. Denn in der intentional herbeigeführten, auf das Töten von Tieren als Selbstzweck intendierten Erfüllung, mit der die Realisierung des naturalen Jagdtriebes verbunden ist, erfährt sich der jagende Mensch zugleich in Einheit und Differenz zu der ihn umgebenden Natur, deren Zwecke er jagend auch verfolgt. Im Spiegel seiner Vernunft akzeptiert er demütig sein animalisches Sein und dessen Grenzen. Zugleich weiß er sich in seiner freien und gezielten Unterwerfung unter die Zwecke der Natur, die Struktur der Jagd, über dieses Animalische hinaus. Hier, an der Grenze zwischen Tier- und Menschsein tätig, erfährt er sich selbst und das Gelingen eben dieser spezifisch menschlichen Struktur der Natur-Kultur-Verschränkung als ein höchstmögliches Maß an Glück. Es ist ein der Natur jedes Menschen inhärentes Bedürfnis, sich zum Streben nach Glück berufen zu fühlen. Die Wildtierjagd unter Leitung und Lenkung durch Vernunft, näherhin jene Tätigkeit, die im Verständnis des traditionellen Waidwerks liegt, erweist sich damit nicht als Atavismus, sondern als ökosystemgerechte Jagd, die die naturalen Kriterien und Determinanten der Urjagd aufgreift. Der Mensch bewahrt so die Reziprozität zwischen Jagendem und Gejagtem durch Beschränkung seiner Mittel, durch die Selbstintervention seiner Vernunft, indem er den natürlichen Spielraum bewahrt, der im Aufeinandertreffen der Instinktsysteme bei der Jagd zwischen Jagenden und Beutearten von Natur aus gegeben ist. Auf diese Weise ist die aus dem Verständnis von Waidwerk betriebene Jagd in Wahrnehmung des Wildtieres als Mitgeschöpf eine in sich orientierende moralische Größe unter dem Leitgedanken der Ökosystemgerechtigkeit.

Welcher Umstand macht für unsere Zeit, die sich auch als eine Zeit der ökologischen Revolution betrachtet, den spanischen Philosophen so außerordentlich attraktiv?

Als einer der ersten großen Denker dieses Jahrhundets hat José Ortega y Gasset den Horizont für einen praktisch geübten Tierschutz eröffnet. Im Sprachgebrauch der modernen Soziologie hat er uns vermittelt, daß die Bedingung der Möglichkeit der Erfahrung einer wechselseitigen Mensch-Tier-Beziehung nicht unterschiedlichen Bezugsebenen angehört: Wechselseitig sind Tier und Mensch zur "Kommunikation" und "Interaktion" fähig.

  • José Ortega y Gasset hat mit einer wissenschaftlichen Erkenntnistheorie unter Verwendung der phänomenologischen Methode gezeigt, daß die Existenz der Prädatoren- bzw. Beutetierarten interdependent aufeinander verwiesen ist. Mit anderen Worten: Die Existenz des Beutetieres bedingt die Existenzweise des Jägers (seine Verhaltensdisposition) und umgekehrt. Der Jäger ist das naturnotwendige Pendant für jede Beutetierspezies. Ein Verzicht auf Bejagung bereitet Beutetierpopulationen kein Paradies, sondern beschneidet ihr evolutiv natürlich vorgegebenes Lebensprogramm, das sie in ihrem Lebensraum zu verwirklichen streben. Wildtiersein ohne Jäger bedeutet soviel wie Menschsein ohne Kultur.
  • José Ortega y Gasset hat in einer kulturanthropologischen Analytik, die durch Plessners Anthropologie ("Die Stufen des Organischen und der Mensch") fundiert ist, nachgewiesen, daß die Wildtierjagd des modernen Jägers, näherhin die kulturell angeeignete Jagd nicht erfolgt, um zu töten, obwohl sie das Töten des Tieres intendiert, sondern sich aus einer genuin spezifisch menschlichen Grundausstattung heraus erklärt, auf die sich jeder Mensch anspruchsbegründend gegenüber seiner Gesellschaft regelmäßig beruft.
  • José Ortega y Gasset hat unseren Blick auf ein Moralverständnis gelenkt, das von den menschlichen Vitalinteressen ausgeht und als Bezugsebene das Leben wählt. Im Sinne einer Güterabwägung und Präferenzordnung wird die zoologische Hierarchie als Modell einer sittlichen Werterangordnung an der Natur orientiert, deren Teil die Natur des Menschen ist, denn: Das Denken ist ein Ereignis innerhalb der Natur! Die natürliche Ordnung ist trotzdem nicht Kopievorlage für humane Moralordnung; letztere aber darf die Erstere nicht verletzen. Daraus leitet Ortega sein Postulat, einen moralphilosophischen Leit- und Grundsatz ab: "Die Sorge um das, was sein soll, ist nur dann anerkennenswert, wenn sie die Achtung vor dem, was ist, ausgeschöpft hat."

Lassen wir einige "Schlaglichter" des Denkens von José Ortega y Gasset auf uns einwirken, um mit ihnen, mit einigen partiellen Sichtweisen der Grundlagen unserer Existenz zu den Horizonten seiner Verstehensphilosophie Zugang zu finden. Problematisiert ist das Jahrtausende alte Phänomen, das jene kaum gelöste Frage berührt, weshalb der Mensch auf die immer gleichen Fragen, denen er mit seinem Dasein in der Welt begegnet, zu sehr unterschiedlichen Antworten findet, die dem idealtypischen Vorstellen einer Gleichheit aller Menschen grundlegend widersprechen. Es genügt deshalb nicht, Wissenschaft in Beschränkung auf Natur als Gegenstand der (positiven) Wissenschaften zu begreifen, sondern eine überzeugende Antwort auf die Frage zu finden: Was ist der Mensch? Eine Antwort hierauf aber vermag nur die Philosophie zu leisten, weil die Grundspannung in der modernen Informationsgesellschaft nicht allein in der Dialektik von Materie und Geist liegt, sondern in der Vermittlung von Natur und Kultur. Sie besitzt eine prozeßhafte Tendenz, ihre Sphäre im Durchlauf des vitalen Spannungsfeldes selbstregulativ zu transformieren und zu übersteigen. Das Ziel ist nicht das Leben, sondern es liegt jenseits des Lebens als ein Etwas, an das ich mein Leben setze. "Der Mensch ist ein Tätigkeitspotential", und seine Bezugsebene liegt vor allem nach dem Verständnis von José Ortega y Gasset in der Vitalsphäre innerhalb der wir Menschen unser Lebensprogramm aus einer Berufung zum Glücklichsein zu verwirklichen bestrebt sind.

Das Vorgegebene und das Aufgegebene

Dem Menschen ist als Sinnenwesen im Ausdruck eines Tätigkeitspotentials sein Lebensprogramm vorgegeben. Dieses Programm auf ein Ziel hin zu verwirklichen ist uns aufgegeben: "Werde, der du bist!" Das Aufgegebene ist jene Zielgestalt in unserem Leben, zu der wir eine Berufung verspüren. Eine Berufung fühlen wir in erster Linie in unserem Glücksstreben: "... denn in den glückhaften Beschäftigungen verrät sich die Berufung des Menschen." José Ortega y Gasset nennt die Jagd als eine Beschäftigungsweise, zu der Menschen aller Zeiten die am meisten glückbringende Berufung empfanden. Gemeint ist jene Jagdform, die wir über die animalische Jagdform hinaus als die kulturell geprägte Jagd zwischen Leidenschaft und Vernunft, also unter einem ethischen Postulat betreiben: "Die Berufung ..., das heißt das, was wir wirklich zu tun haben, ist nicht in unser Belieben gestellt. Sie wird uns unweigerlich aufgegeben. Daher hat alles menschliche Leben seine Aufgabe." Dabei ist Freiheit versus Determinismus ein zentraler Begriff. Freiheit und Selbstbestimmung sind die Eckpfeiler, die tragenden Säulen des im Ziel uns Aufgegebenen. Dorthin streben wir nicht in der Weise eines selbständigen Seins (im Gegensatz zu Thomas), sondern als Subjekte des Erlebens, als ein Ich, das mit seinem vitalen Programm unabänderlich identisch ist. Das Sein und die Natur des Menschen werden homolog verstanden. Der ethische Schattenriß des Menschen Wir erfassen die Persönlichkeit eines Menschen im individuellen Antlitz, im Hindurchscheinen des Wesenstypischen durch ein Gesicht, das verhüllt indem es enthüllt. Das Entbergen des Verborgenen des individuellen Charakters bringt auch jene individuelle Zielgestalt zum Aufschein, die uns eine Vollendungsgestalt des Menschen andeutet. Sie zeigt uns, was er wirklich ist, an dem, was er seiner Anlage nach sein könnte: "Ich sehe jeden Menschen, der mir begegnet, gleichsam von seinem idealen Schattenriß umgeben; er verdeutlicht, was sein individueller Charakter im Falle der Vollkommenheit wäre." Der Mensch ist das mit seinem vitalen Programm jederzeit identische Ich. Er gestaltet sein "inneres Schicksal" im Streben nach Glück, und Glück bedeutet Vollkommenheit, näherhin, Glück bedeutet die Humanität, die sittliche Persönlichkeit in Goethes Sinne (sc. Westöstlicher Diwan). Dies besagt, daß wir vollendetes Glück dann erfahren, wenn das entworfene Leben mit dem gelungenen Leben übereinstimmt, wenn sich Lebenswirklichkeit mit der Idee vom Menschen ideal zu verbinden vermag. Demgemäß liegt der Sinn menschlichen Lebens darin, die Sinnaktualität des vital Vorgegebenen aus der Sinnidealität des Aufgegebenen, nämlich als den Inhalt des gelungenen Lebens zu begreifen.

 Der Imperativ der Vitalität

Es ist ein moralisches Gebot, die vitale Gesundheit zu sichern, um diese als die Voraussetzung "für geistige und moralische Gesundheit zu erhalten". Beides steht deshalb unter dem Imperativ der Vitalität. Grundlage des Humanum sind sensu José Ortega y Gasset biologische Werte, die er einteilt in "vital gut" und "vital schlecht". Diese Einteilung hat Bedingungscharakter für moralische Werte: "Tritt die Ethik auf, wird es am Platz sein zu erörtern, ob das moralisch Gute und das moralisch Schlechte mit jenen anderen vitalen Werten übereinstimmen oder nicht." Nur auf diese Weise ist eine höhere Moral konstitutiv, die gelebtes Leben als erlebte Transzendenz des Lebens zu erfassen vermag: "Leben heißt, auf ein Ziel abgeschnellt sein; es ist etwas, woran ich mein Leben setze, und ist deshalb außerhalb, jenseits des Lebens."

Der Tod steht im Sinnkreis der Vitalität

Das Festkleben am Leben mit dem Ziel, nur ja eines natürlichen Todes zu sterben erweist sich als eine der menschlichen Natur inadäquate Empfindung, eine animalische Form des Lebensvollzugs, die "eine würdige Moral" nicht zuläßt: "Eine höhere Moral müßte dem Menschen zeigen, daß er sein Leben besitzt, um es sinnvoll in Gefahr zu bringen", urteilt José Ortega y Gasset.

Was ist der Mensch?

Interessiert Sie eine Antwort auf die Frage, worin die Grundspannung von Geist und Natur, zwischen Jägernatur und Vernunftnatur, zwischen dem Menschen als Sinnenwesen und seiner Personalität liegt? Wußten Sie schon, daß Jagdgegner, jene im Zeichen des Tierschutzes kämpferisch auftretenden Naturschützer, die den modernen Wildjäger an den Pranger stellen, selbst auf beispielhafte Weise dem Jagdschema als Jäger in aggressiver Absicht folgen, ohne es zu ahnen? Reizt Sie das Wissen über Ursprung und Ziel unserer humanen Existenz? Haben Sie sich schon einmal danach gefragt, weshalb das ehemals verhaltenskonstitutive Jagdschema des pleistozänen Jägers, also das vitalkategoriale Jagdschema, heute das Handlungsschema des modernen Homo sapiens der Informationsgesellschaft gestaltend prägt, indem es unsere Aktivitätsmethoden beeinflußt? Wissen sie, weshalb die Wildtierjagd des kulturellen Jägers unserer Zeit Modellfall für die hypermodernen Netzwerksysteme bildet, mit denen unser Gehirn auf allen Lebensfeldern Jagd nach Ressourcen, High-Tech-Jagd betreibt? Für den Freundeskreis José Ortega y Gasset, dem angesehene Persönlichkeiten, Universitätsprofessoren, Manager aus Wirtschaft, Wissenschaft und Medien, Natur- und Geisteswissenschaftler ebenso wie Vertreter verschiedener bürgerlicher Berufe angehören, unterrichte ich Sie gerne mit weiteren Informationen. Fordern Sie einfach unsere Broschüre an; sie wird Ihnen kostenlos zugeleitet.

Ihr Dr. Ernst-Georg Renda

Postanschrift: Am Damsberg 12
                      D-55130 Mainz

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jeudi, 08 novembre 2012

Miglio e le sue Lezioni di Scienze Politiche


Miglio e le sue Lezioni di Scienze Politiche

Una riflessione sull’attualità della storia delle idee e delle prassi politiche illustrata dallo scomparso costituzionalista italiano

Teodoro Klitsche de la Grange

Ex: http://rinascita.eu/  

In due volumi – Storia delle dottrine politiche e Scienza della politica - sono raccolte le “Lezioni di politica” di Gianfranco Miglio. Il primo volume su la Storia delle dottrine Politiche, mentre il secondo tratta la Scienza della politica e sono stati curati rispettivamente da Davide Bianchi e da Alessandro Vitale. La ricostruzione delle lezioni, fatte prevalentemente su registrazioni (e non su appunti degli allievi) ha evitato il consueto problema della fedeltà degli appunti al pensiero dello studioso.
Nella presentazione al primo volume Lorenzo Ornaghi e Pierangelo Schiera esordiscono scrivendo che “Si sta verificando, da qualche tempo, un fatto abbastanza raro nel panorama italiano degli studi sulla politica: la ristampa di scritti di Gianfranco Miglio risalenti ormai a più di cinquant’anni fa. Se questa è la misura della classicità, allora si deve cominciare a pensare che egli sia diventato un Classico”; ed è proprio l’impressione confermata dalla lettura di questi volumi: Miglio è un classico. E lo è non solo per il suo richiamarsi al pensiero (o ai pensatori) politici “classici” (da Tucidide a Machiavelli, da Hobbes agli elitisti, da Burke a Schmitt), ma perché, con le sue opere, vi aggiunge altro. Sull’approccio metodologico Daniele Bianchi nell’introduzione al primo volume scrive “Miglio aveva in uggia (come poche altre cose) la politologia empirica di marca anglosassone, per cui la sua Scienza della politica – a cui alla fine approdò – aveva contorni specifici, decisamente minoritari nella comunità scientifica italiana. Non essendo rivolta a misurare dati quantitativi, la sua era una Scienza della politica “concettuale” dei comportamenti umani nelle cose politiche. In altre parole, compito del politologo era per lui quello di dissodare il territorio sterminato e informe della storia, per portare alla luce le “costanti” nelle azioni degli uomini (p. 21). In effetti anche nella “Presentazione” alle Categorie del politico, scritta da Miglio si ritrova questa considerazione, nel commento che lo studioso lariano fa all’analogo ironico giudizio espresso da Schmitt nella “Premessa” a detto volume. E’ inutile dire che il pensiero di Miglio, pur non essendo “quantitativista” era tuttavia rigorosamente realista.
A tale proposito è interessante quanto Miglio sostiene nella “Lezione introduttiva” sul nesso che lega fatti e idee nella storia della politica “Il nesso che lega idee e fatti, ideologie e istituzioni è molto stretto: sarebbe infatti impossibile ricostruire una storia delle istituzioni senza fare riferimento alle ideologie che la sorreggono. In altre parole le ideologie non sono altro che la “bandiera” delle classi politiche, vessillo che permea di sé le istituzioni quando le classi stesse giungono al potere. Di norma, infatti il succedersi delle classi politiche reca con se anche l’avvento di nuove istituzioni, o la trasformazione delle precedenti, processi in cui le ideologie giocano un ruolo decisivo” (pp. 29-30).
L’altro rapporto su cui Miglio ritorna spesso, in ambedue i volumi (soprattutto nel secondo) è quello tra idee e istituzioni (e tra politica e diritto, in parte coincidente).
Scrive lo studioso lariano: “Ogni apparato ideologico è correlato a un sistema istituzionale, risulta perciò impossibile studiare delle istituzioni prescindendo completamente dalle ideologie che le hanno prodotte… Con le discipline giuridiche la politica intrattiene gli stessi rapporti che vi sono con le istituzioni, dato che il diritto è una sequela di procedure convenute; non è anzi eccessivo affermare che sarebbe impossibile pensare il diritto come qualcosa di autonomo, al di fuori della politica e delle istituzioni a cui attende. In altri termini, il diritto non è altro che un’ideologia tradotta in sistema, per cui ogni istituto è, più o meno direttamente, ascrivibile a una dottrina politica (o più di una)”.
Nell’introduzione al secondo volume il curatore Alessandro Vitale sottolinea che l’errore più grave nel leggere le lezioni “sarebbe però quello di considerarle espressione di semplice o addirittura eccessiva ‘eccentricità’. Questa visione facile e distorta impedirebbe, infatti, di cogliere la coerente e irriducibile ‘classicità’ del percorso di Miglio nello studio della politica. Quella che appare come originalità individuale, magari eccentrica e certamente isolata, è in realtà la coerente prosecuzione di un lungo percorso di riflessione sulla dimensione del ‘politico’ e sulle sue ‘regolarità’, passato attraverso il filtro di numerose discipline e la lezione dei più grandi teorici di tutti i tempi… nonché attraverso l’opera dei maggiori political scientists, che da un metodo prescientifico (dalle origini dei Mosca, Pareto, Michels) sono passati a quello rigoroso dei Weber e degli Schmitt”. Così l’inclusione della parte iniziale (i primi tre capitoli), anche se in taluni tratti si possa ritenerla un po’ ridondante “rimane tuttavia significativa, in quanto rispecchia la sua insofferenza per una cultura, come quella italiana, a lungo rimasta retorica, idealistica e poco empirica. Egli, in particolare, mal sopportava la crescente perdita di rigore e l’irrazionalismo tipico di epistemologie relativiste, che hanno sempre ritenuto equivalenti e intercambiabili tutte le opinioni configgenti nello studio della politica”.
I due volumi sono così densi di giudizi e considerazioni originali che considerarli tutti farebbe di questa recensione un piccolo trattato. Perciò ci limitiamo a due tra i più significativi e ricorrenti (anche in altre opere di Miglio).
La prima è la funzione – carattere principale che lo studioso lariano considera (compito) della scienza politica, cioè la scoperta e analisi delle “regolarità”, “costanti”, “invarianti” (termine quest’ultimo che si può trarre da altri campi e da altri studiosi) della politica.
Come scrive Miglio “Il processo conoscitivo è un processo sempre volto alla ricerca di regolarità. Non c’è conoscenza se non di fenomeni ripetibili. Soltanto con il confronto è possibile entrare nel reale, che di per sé rimane neutro, non risponde, non ha significato: attribuiamo semplicemente significati al mondo reale, distinguendo”, di fronte a un fenomeno che appare nuovo, “all’analisi accurata si rivelerà come qualcosa che era già conosciuta e che si è presentata soltanto in una combinazione differente”. Ci sono regolarità che hanno, almeno nella nostra cognizione ed esperienza, carattere universale; onde è facile prevedere che, in una situazione futura, continueranno a ripresentarsi, anche al di là delle intenzioni e aspirazioni degli attori del processo storico.
Ad esempio il marxismo; questo negava, nello stadio finale (da raggiungere) della società senza classi, due delle regolarità della politica (nel caso anche “presupposti del politico” di Julien Freund): ossia quella della classe politica (in altra prospettiva del comando/obbedienza), cioè dello Stato (l’ente politico) come apparato di governo di pochi su molti; e quella dell’amico-nemico, perché la società senza classi sarebbe stata pacifica, essendone la struttura economica “irenogenetica”. Abbiamo visto com’è andata: la società senza classi non s’è mai vista, neanche all’orizzonte, perché non si poteva realizzare (era contraria alle due “regolarità”); il socialismo reale si è fermato alla (fase della) dittatura del proletariato perché questo non negava (anzi potenziava) le regolarità suddette, essendo una dittatura (di un partito rivoluzionario, cioè di pochi) finalizzata alla guerra contro il nemico (di classe).
Miglio tiene ben presente l’epistemologia di Popper “Lo scienziato ha a che fare con previsioni probabilistiche. Ciò che assumiamo come certezza ha soltanto un elevato grado di probabilità e in un senso tutto operativo, perché adoperiamo come leggi certe, come ipotesi di regolarità certe, quelle che non sono ancora state falsificate. Quanto più a lungo una proposizione di questo tipo resiste alla falsificazione, tanto più possiamo fondarci su di essa: ma questa è sempre e soltanto altamente probabile”. Le regolarità - non falsificate, ma falsificabili – costituiscono poi la base della prevedibilità delle attività politiche.
L’altro è il rapporto tra politica e diritto.
Per Miglio lo Stato moderno è essenzialmente (e prevalentemente) un prodotto del diritto come contratto – scambio; e tutto il diritto è procedura. Il diritto pubblico ha qualcosa di “equivoco”. Adoperando il concetto d’istituzione “arriviamo a una conclusione solo apparentemente paradossale: quello che chiamiamo «Stato (moderno)», essendo un complesso di procedure convenute, di ordinamenti giuridici, non è politica. Si capisce allora perché lo Stato e la politica tendono ad andare per la loro strada”.
Per cui occorre districare “l’intreccio tra politica e diritto e distinguere fra quello che nello Stato è ormai diventato soltanto diritto (e quindi solo “contratto-scambio”) da ciò che invece perennemente sfugge a questa istituzionalizzazione, ossia la politica, generata e legata a un rapporto che non è di “contratto”, che non produce diritto, come quello relativo all’obbligazione politica”; l’analisi del problema delle istituzioni “ci ha condotto non solo a chiarire un problema tecnico molto rilevante, ma anche ad avere ennesima conferma della validità dell’ipotesi dalla quale abbiamo preso le mosse, che distingue radicalmente l’obbligazione politica dall’obbligazione-contratto”.
Il dualismo di Miglio è diverso e radicale: dove c’è obbligazione politica non c’è contratto-scambio: la commistione di queste negli ordinamenti (concreti) non può confondere le differenze. Si può concordare su questo (cioè sulla distinzione dei concetti) con Miglio, ma comunque la commistione c’è.
Tale posizione è così in contrasto con quanto scritto (anche) dai teorici dell’istituzionalismo giuridico (e non solo da loro), d’altra parte apprezzati da Miglio, come Maurice Hauriou e Santi Romano.
Posizione tradizionale nella dottrina giuridica, atteso che risale alla distinzione di Ulpiano “Publicum ius est quod ad statum rei Romanae spectat, privatum quod ad singulorum utilitatem”, D I, De Iustitia et jure, I. Il fundamentum distinctionis più rilevante tra diritto pubblico e diritto privato è condensato da Jellinek – e ripetuto prima e dopo di lui da altri (tanti), che il diritto privato regola i rapporti di coordinazione tra individui, quello pubblico di subordinazione. Nel pensiero di Hauriou la distinzione tra “diritto disciplinare” e “diritto comune” richiama da vicino la distinzione di Max Weber tra ordinamento amministrativo e ordinamento regolativo. Ma quello che è più importante è che, in concreto, il diritto pubblico esiste perché esistono dei rapporti che, anche se fondati sull’obbligo politico (il rapporto comando/obbedienza) costituiscono situazioni giuridiche nei rapporti tra poteri pubblici e tra questi e i cittadini dove è tutto un pullulare di diritti, obblighi, potestà, interessi legittimi interdipendenti. Anche se (molti) di quei rapporti intercorrono tra soggetti non in situazione di parità (ad esempio interessi legittimi/potestà) ciò non toglie che non siano giuridici e che non vi sia (quasi sempre) un giudice per dirimere le liti e statuire su tali diritti.
Rimane quindi una differenza profonda tra diritto pubblico e privato, conseguenza dei principi del Rechtstaat che, necessariamente, impongono una “giuridificazione” o “giustizializzazione” anche se non totale, al potere politico, (uno Stato dove non c’è qualcosa di assoluto – scriveva de Bonald – non s’è mai visto) e in particolare al rapporto di comando-obbedienza.
Nel complesso i due volumi, anche grazie alla chiarezza espositiva dello studioso lariano, costituiscono una lettura agevole e stimolante. E soprattutto portano una ventata di aria fresca in discipline spesso aggravate da un buonismo precettivo (i famosi “paternostri”) e anche da una certa ripetitività conformista. E queste, da sole, sono ragioni più che valide per leggerli e studiarli.
Gianfranco Miglio
Lezioni di politica - (Volume primo Storia delle dottrine politiche) - (Volume secondo Scienza della politica), Bologna 2011, Ed. Il Mulino, pp. 346 € 27,00 (I° Volume); pp. 512 € 33,00 (II° Volume).


samedi, 03 novembre 2012

L'article intitulé “Oswald Spengler”, dans Stur, 1937

L'article intitulé "Oswald Spengler" dans Stur, 1937

Il y a aujourd’hui plus d’un an, mourait à Munich l’un des hommes qui ont le plus fait, dans la crise profonde de la défaite allemande, pour maintenir intact le moral du pays et rendre possible un redressement : celui que nous voyons se développer sous nos yeux. Cet homme est en outre un cerveau de premier ordre, un de ces savants gigantesques, — comme il en apparaît quelques-uns au cours de l’histoire de l’Europe, depuis Roger Bacon jus­qu’à Vinci, Descartes, Newton… — sorte de Titan spiri­tuel, sur les découvertes duquel repose, avouée ou non, presque toute l’orientation de la pensée contemporaine.

Ce philosophe — puisque les travaux historiques d’Oswald SPENGLER sont en quelque sorte « enveloppés » dans une philosophie — a été cependant assez peu remar­qué en France, dans la période qui a suivi immédiatement la dernière guerre . En Allemagne, son Déclin de l’Occident (Untergang des Abendlandes) a connu un succès sans précédent pour un ouvrage aussi sévère, puisqu’il dépasse aujourd’hui le 15e mille — succès d’actualité, mais également succès de profondeur. Le livre venait « à son heure », au moment où la défaite semblait contredire les aspirations de la grande majorité des Alle­mands et les livrer au désespoir ; il leur démontrait, par l’alliance d’une immense érudition et d’une pensée rigou­reuse, l’inanité de la philosophie du progrès généralement admise et les voies qu’ils devaient adopter désormais, s’ils voulaient se relever. Aujourd’hui, les idées de Spengler ont disparu au second plan, dépassées qu’elles sont par la poussée plus apparente des sentiments de race, des mystiques de l’ordre, voire même de la pure apologie de la force. Elles n’en subsistent pas moins dans le domaine intellectuel — face à l’expansion véritablement angoissante du raisonnement matérialiste dans la masse des peuples blancs — comme l’expression profonde et authentique de tous les jeunes mouvements révolutionnaires, de ceux qui ne veulent pas subir la « mécanisation » envahissante, et qui ne la subiront pas.

Il serait temps qu’en Bretagne, cet ensemble de décou­vertes de l’ordre psychologique soit pris à sa juste valeur, que l’âme celtique soit mise désormais, et maintenue irré­médiablement, en face d’un système qui lui est si intime­ment apparenté, et qui, convenablement appliqué, peut faire jaillir son renouveau.
Oswald Spengler est né en 1880, dans la petite ville de Blankenburg-en-Harz. De confession luthérienne, comme un grand nombre de ces compatriotes, il fit des études littéraires et scientifiques très complètes aux grandes Uni­versités de Halle, Munich, Berlin, et il fut reçu docteur en philosophie en 1904 avec une thèse sur l’ancien penseur grec Héraclite d’Ephèse.

Il nous raconte lui-même, dans l’Introduction de son grand ouvrage (parag. XVI), comment il fut amené dans les années qui précèdent la guerre de 1914, à concevoir toute l’étendue de son système de l’histoire :

Les approches d’un grand conflit européen ne lui ont pas échappé, cette marche fatale des événements l’inquiète : « …En 1911, étudiant certains événements politiques du « temps présent, et les conséquences qu’on en pouvait « tirer pour l’avenir, je m’étais proposé de rassembler « quelques éléments tirés d’un horizon plus large. » En historien, il tente de comprendre sans parti-pris, de s’expliquer les tendances actuelles à l’aide de son expé­rience des faits anciens : « …Au cours de ce travail, d’abord restreint, la conviction s’était faite en moi que, pour comprendre réellement notre époque, il fallait une documentation beaucoup plus vaste… Je vis clairement qu’un problème politique ne pouvait pas se comprendre par la politique même et que des éléments essentiels, qui y jouent un rôle très profond, ne se manifestent souvent d’une manière concrète que dans le domaine de l’art, souvent même uniquement dans la forme des idées… Ainsi, le thème primitif prit des proportions considérables. »

L’histoire de l’Europe lui apparaît dès lors sous un jour tout nouveau : « …Je compris qu’un fragment d’histoire ne pouvait être réellement éclairci avant que le mystère de l’histoire universelle en général ne fût lui-même tiré au clair…; Je vis le présent (la guerre mondiale imminente) sous un jour tout différent. Ce n’était plus une figure exceptionnelle, qui n’a lieu qu’une fois…, mais le type d’un tournant de l’histoire qui avait depuis des siècles sa place prédéterminée. »

Un système s’est fait en son esprit, qui ne lui laisse plus de doutes sur la marche générale de l’histoire — et point seulement celle de notre civilisation européenne : « …Plus de doute… : l’identité d’abord bizarre, puis évidente, entre la perspective de la peinture à l’huile, l’imprimerie, le système de crédit, les armes à feu, la musique contrepointique et, d’autre part, la statue nue, la polis, la monnaie grecque d’argent, en tant qu’expressions diverses d’un seul et même principe psychique. » Chaque civilisation suit un cours qui lui est propre, avec une rigueur entière et véritablement impressionnante.

Du même coup, il a saisi le sens profond de l’inquiétude de l’homme moderne et il en ressent comme une assurance, délivré qu’il est de ses manifestations multiples et con­tradictoires : « …Une foule de questions et de réponses très passionnées, paraissant aujourd’hui dans des milliers de livres et de brochures, mais éparpillées, isolées, ne dépassant pas l’horizon d’une spécialité, et qui par conséquent enthousiasment, oppressent, embrouillent, mais sans libérer, marquent cette grande crise… Citons la décadence de l’art, le doute croissant sur la valeur de la science ; les problèmes ardus nés de la victoire de la ville mondiale sur la campagne : dénatalité, exode rural, rang social du prolétariat en fluctuation ; la crise du matérialisme, du socialisme, du parlementarisme, l’attitude de l’individu envers l’Etat ; le problème de la propriété et celui du mariage, qui en dépend ; …Chacun y avait deviné quelque chose, personne n’a prouvé, de son point de vue étroit, la solution unique générale qui planait dans l’air depuis Nietzsche… »

« …La solution se présenta nettement à mes yeux, en traits gigantesques, avec une entière nécessité intérieure, reposant sur un principe unique qui restait à trouver, qui m’avait hanté et passionné depuis ma jeunesse et qui m’affligeait parce que j’en sentais l’existence sans pouvoir l’embrasser. C’est ainsi que naquit, d’une occasion quelque peu fortuite, ce livre… Le thème restreint est donc une analyse du déclin de la culture européenne d’Occident, répandue aujourd’hui sur toute la surface du globe. »

Tout l’essentiel de la théorie spenglérienne de l’histoire est exposé en trois tableaux synoptiques, au début du premier tome de son « Déclin de l’Occident »  : On y suit une comparaison systématique du développement, sur 1000 années environ, des deux civilisations gréco-romain (Antiquité) et européenne (Occident), du triple point de vue de la pensée abstraite, de l’art et des formes du gouvernement. Il en ressort la notion de l’âge des civilisations : une phase de jeunesse, notre Gothique (Moyen Age), à laquelle succède la maturité, notre Baroque (Epoque Moderne), puis la vieillesse au milieu de laquelle nous vivons (Epoque Contemporaine). C’est la même succession des formes doriennes, puis ioniennes, puis « romaines » dans le monde méditerranéen depuis les temps homériques jusqu’à l’avènement d’Auguste ? Des parallèles avec ce que nous savons des philosophie hindoues, de l’art égyp­tien ou des révolutions de l’ancienne Chine confirment cette impression du « cyclisme » de l’histoire humaine.

Le corps même de l’ouvrage n’est qu’une longue et savante justification de ce qui vient d’être avancé : justification métaphysique, en un premier tome, de divers pro­blèmes logiques soulevés par un pareil système; en parti­culier celui de la continuité de la notion de Nombre à travers les diverses civilisations ; d’autre part, la définition de l’idée historique du Destin face à la Causalité scienti­fique… Un second tome renferme la justification érudite de plusieurs des assertions historiques du système : en particulier, l’existence d’une civilisation « arabe » durant le premier millénaire de notre Ere qui est en effet l’époque de floraison des grandes religions universelles de souche « sémitique » (christianisme, manichéisme, islam, judaïs­me talmudique) . Spengler ne distingue pas moins de huit grandes civilisations qui se sont succédées en divers points du globe jusqu’à nos jours: civilisations égyptienne, mésopotamienne, chinoise, hindoue, gréco-romaine, orien­tale-arabe, mexicaine et occidentale-européenne, celle que nous vivons encore. Il tend à réserver le nom de «culture» à la période première de ces civilisations, pleine encore de sève et d’invention, pour laisser plus spécialement le nom de « civilisation » a leur phase de dissolution, quand disparait, dans l’impuissance, tout ce que des ancêtres vigoureux ont créé.

Il ne convient pas de surestimer l’originalité du sys­tème : pareil sentiment du cycle, de la fatalité, se retrouve à travers toute la spéculation germanique voire même européenne, depuis la foi calviniste en la Prédestination jusqu’au moyen nietzschéen du « retour éternel ». Et l’ancienne littérature des Celtes d’Irlande n’est-elle pas l’ex­pression la plus absolue de ce sens du destin, héroïquement accepté ? C’est Spengler lui-même qui nous avertit de ce qu’il doit à Nietzsche dont il a seulement, dit-il, « changé les échappées en aperçus ». De façon plus générale, cette pensée d’historien se rattache à tout le mouvement de spé­culation sur le temps, sur la durée, aux diverses « philosophies de la vie » fort en honneur depuis le début du siècle et dont H. Bergson serait en France le plus illustre repré­sentant («L’Evolution créatrice»). W. Dilthey, en Alle­magne, s’était engagé dans des voies similaires dès 1883, par sa curieuse «Introduction aux sciences morales». Nombreux ont été les historiens, les ethnologues allemands qui, dans le même temps, se sont efforcés de rechercher les lois de l’histoire universelle d’accord avec les résul­tats les plus poussés des sciences d’érudition : notons le grand explorateur africain Léo Frobenius, auteur d’un ou­vrage fort remarqué . A Spengler était réservé, semble-t-il, de les trouver et de les exprimer, pour la première fois, avec une netteté irréfutable .

Là, réside la nouveauté absolue de l’œuvre, comme sa valeur immense dans le domaine de la pensée non moins que de la pratique. Avant lui bien des penseurs, depuis Montesquieu, Herder… jusqu’à Hegel et Auguste Comte plus près de nous, s’étaient bien hasardés à esquisser une « philosophie de l’histoire », très littéraire encore. Karl Marx s’était approché le plus près d’une rigueur scienti­fique, dans son « Capital », lorsqu’il avait bâti toute une interprétation de l’histoire moderne sur la loi du « maté­rialisme historique ». Hegel, il y a un siècle aujourd’hui, avait, d’autre part, parfaitement défini en logique les con­ditions et les limites de toute interprétation de l’Histoire. De là au système d’idées absolument clos et, de plus, par­faitement concret, tangible, expérimentable, que forme l’in­tuition spenglérienne, il y a un monde ! C’est une forme nouvelle de pensée, un instrument nouveau que Spengler met entre les mains des peuples blancs, une exploration dans le domaine du temps : non pas une quelconque magie, il s’agit de possibilités psychologiques nouvelles que dé­gage aussitôt en nous la conscience de la fin pressante de la civilisation que nous subissons, en particulier celle d’en­visager de sang-froid les rapports des diverses nations et races de la planète… la possession de l’histoire entière est mise au service de notre avenir. Il ne faut voir là rien d’autre que la réplique, à trois siècles de distance, à l’ex­ploration tentée dans les espaces sidéraux par les premiers astronomes munis d’instruments à longue portée. « Une découverte copernicienne sur le terrain de l’Histoire», a-t-on pu dire (voir le § VI de l’Introduction). Spengler doit ce sens aigu de la relativité des événements à l’intérêt qu’il porte aux civilisations exotiques, non classiques, si souvent négligées par les historiens. Pour lui, une création en vaut une autre : l’architecture de l’ancienne Egypte n’est pas inférieure à notre calcul infinitésimal, la vieille morale de Confucius pas moins positive que toute la so­phistique rationnelle des socratiques,… il ne craint pas de mettre en parallèle pour leur rôle moral le bouddhisme primitif, le stoïcisme antique, et notre socialisme contem­porain ! Le coup d’oeil est devenu sans parti-pris, mais combien plus pénétrant !

Ce n’est pas aujourd’hui encore que sera saisie dans son ampleur la répercussion révolutionnaire de pareilles nou­veautés dans le monde des idées, ou — pour parler mé­taphysique — la possibilité d’ériger désormais en un sys­tème viable le monde intuitif des poètes, « l’univers-histoire », en face de « l’univers-nature », du règne de la science, si exclusivement tyrannique encore à l’heure ac­tuelle (l’opposition est esquissée au chapitre 2 du tome I) ! Mais, au simple contact de ces doctrines, des sentiments confus se réveillent en nous, un monde mystique tend à reparaître, qui dut exister dans la foi du moyen-âge et que l’éducation classique de la Renaissance avait peu à peu enfoui. Car enfin, est-ce bien le livre qui a bouleversé le monde d’après-guerre ? ou n’est-il pas seulement le pre­mier éclat, la première et insolite traduction littéraire de cette résurrection de l’âme du Nord, qui tend à se faire jour avec la violence d’un élément ?

Le tome I du «Déclin de l’Occident» parut en 1918 et Spengler en dédiait alors la préface aux armées allemandes, espérant que le livre ne serait pas « tout à fait indigne des sacrifices militaires… » Après l’écroulement, parmi « la misère et le dégoût de ce temps », l’édition de l’ouvrage tout entier (1922) apparut d’abord comme un instrument de combat…

STUR n° 11 Octobre 1937

Short URL: http://breizatao.com/?p=7917


jeudi, 01 novembre 2012

Citaat v. Hendrik Marsman


“Individualisme? Goed. Maar: dat werd niet met ‘80 geboren, dat werd in de Renaissance geboren. En zoolang u en ik en de heele wereld met ons over het cultuurprobleem spreken, bestaat de cultuur niet; en al is in velen de wil geboren naar een gemeenschap, maar de Gemeenschap, zij is er niet. En willens of onwillens is alle werk, nà de Moederkerkelijke cultuur der Middeleeuwen, individualistisch: heidensch of protestant. Zoolang de herleving van het Katholicisme, die wij nu beleven, niet zich cultureel (d.i. geestelijk en maatschappelijk) verwerkelijkt tot een katholieke samenleving, zoolang blijft de Katholieke kunst, malgré soi (min of meer) individualistisch. Pas als de naam verdwijnt, het teeken van het individu, zullen de gemeenschappelijk-voelenden, de Nameloozen, de nieuwe Kathedralen mogen bouwen.”

— Hendrik Marsman
(Bron: dbnl.org)

dimanche, 28 octobre 2012



Méridien Zéro a reçu Eric Werner politologue et essayiste suisse pour évoquer avec lui ses analyses critiques de la société libérale contemporaine.

A la barre Jean-Louis Roumégace et le sieur Wilsdorf.

Lord Tesla à la technique

avant guerre civile, après démocratie, eric werner, politologue, décadence, polémologie

Pour écouter: http://www.meridien-zero.com/archive/2012/10/05/emission-n-113-meridien-zero-rencontre-eric-werner.html

00:05 Publié dans Philosophie | Lien permanent | Commentaires (0) | Tags : eric werner, philosophie | |  del.icio.us | | Digg! Digg |  Facebook

samedi, 27 octobre 2012

Différence sexuée et orientation sexuelle : ne pas tout confondre


Différence sexuée et orientation sexuelle : ne pas tout confondre

par Pierre LE VIGAN

La protestation de députés U.M.P. vis-à-vis de la nouvelle rédaction des manuels de Première en Sciences de la vie et de la terre (S.V.T.) amène, à nouveau, à s’interroger sur une polémique où la stupidité n’est pas d’un seul côté.

L’émission « Répliques » de France Culture, du 8 octobre 2011, a encore abordé ce débat sous le titre « Théorie du genre, différence des sexes ».

De quoi s’agit-il ? Les manuels de Première en S.V.T. indiquent « si l’identité sexuelle et les rôles sexuels et ses stéréotypes dans la société appartiennent à la sphère publique, l’orientation sexuelle appartient à la sphère privée ». Paradoxe : affirmer dans un manuel public que « l’orientation sexuelle appartient à la sphère privée » est quelque peu contradictoire. Mais l’essentiel est ailleurs. L’identité sexuée c’est pour l’immense majorité d’entre nous le genre sexuel, masculin ou féminin, qui nous est assigné par la nature, ou si on préfère, le hasard ou encore le destin. L’ambiguïté anatomique est ici très rare et donc l’identité sexuée est pour l’immense majorité un non-problème. Elle est évidente. À côté de cela, on parle parfois d’une identité sexuelle, qui serait plus ouverte. Si on veut dire par là que, dans la psychologie de chacun, cœxistent des éléments féminins et des éléments masculins, c’est exact. Mais la notion d’identité sexuelle tend plutôt à introduire de la confusion. Ce qu’il faut mettre en rapport avec l’identité sexuée, c’est bien plutôt la notion d’orientation sexuelle. Or celle-ci est effectivement ouverte, un homme peut aimer les hommes, en tout cas les préférer. Idem pour une femme qui peut préférer ses semblables au sexe opposé. Ce que nous apprend la sociologie la plus élémentaire, c’est tout de même que cette orientation ne concerne rarement plus de 10 % d’une population. Elle est marginale comme celle des collectionneurs de timbres ou des passionnés d’histoire napoléonienne, ce qui bien entendu ne dit rien de sa valeur ou de non-valeur.

Soyons clair : l’idée de discriminer les homosexuels est antipathique, l’idée de les recenser aussi – ce qui paradoxalement invalide l’idée défendue par certains homosexuels d’imposer le « outing », déclaration comme quoi on est ou on a été à l’occasion praticien de l’homosexualité. Pour ma part,  je trouve souhaitable d’éduquer au rejet de l’homophobie, c’est-à-dire à combattre l’idée que les homosexuels seraient moins respectables (ou moins courageux, ou moins franc, moins loyaux, etc.) que d’autres. Cela fait partie des multiples aspects de la morale civique, et d’ailleurs de l’intelligence la plus élémentaire. L’important est de ne pas tout confondre. Or une tendance actuelle tend à dire que les orientations sexuelles ne sont que le fruit d’un conditionnement culturel et qu’il faut combattre celui-ci. Dans cette perspective, c’est toute la littérature enfantine, ou une bonne partie de la littérature tout court qui font partie de ce conditionnement. On voit l’absurdité. L’histoire de l’homme comme créateur d’œuvres littéraires et artistiques est condamnée. Or l’histoire de l’homme n’est pas autre chose que l’expression de ce qui lui est propre anthropologiquement. Le genre, c’est-à-dire être homme ou femme fait partie de l’identité sexuée et un homosexuel homme reste du point de vue de la sexuation pleinement un homme, sauf cas très rares des transsexuels. L’orientation sexuelle est bien autre chose que l’identité sexuée c’est-à-dire le genre, masculin ou féminin, elle relève bien souvent d’une histoire personnelle que la société – et, pour le coup, nous serons d’accord avec le manuel de première, – n’a pas à connaître; c’est une affaire privée. Voir dans le genre, comme le font les gender studies (« études de genre ») bénéficiant avec une folie inconscience d’une chaire à Sciences Po une pure histoire de rapports de force, et en clair de domination des schémas masculins, c’est un contresens total. C’est surtout du constructivisme anthropologique dans la filiation directe du communisme le plus stalinien. Que l’identité sexuée ait à voir non seulement avec l’anatomie mais avec les sédimentations culturelles, c’est une évidence et cela prouve une fois de plus que la nature de l’homme, c’est aussi d’avoir une culture : l’homme est un animal naturel et culturel. Mais que les sédimentations culturelles soient l’origine – et une origine soi-disant « artificielle » – des identités sexuées est absurde.

Freud faisait l’éloge des « belles différences ». L’écrivain Michel Schneider s’attache aussi à la valeur symbolique et structurante pour l’homme de ces « belles différences ». Que la pratique homosexuelle, prédominante ou occasionnelle, s’inscrive dans une différence à l’intérieur de ces « belles différences », c’est une chose. Que ces orientations et ces pratiques puissent aboutir à nier les identités sexuées elles-mêmes ce n’est pas sérieusement défendable.

Pierre Le Vigan

Article printed from Europe Maxima: http://www.europemaxima.com

URL to article: http://www.europemaxima.com/?p=2251

mardi, 23 octobre 2012

Ce dimanche Méridien Zéro reçoit Thibault Isabel

Méridien Zéro a reçu Thibault Isabel, philosophe, pour évoquer avec lui ses travaux et réflexions sur les maux humains qui traversent les sociétés occidentales.

philosophie, thibault isabel, décadence, perte,




Pour écouter:



20:43 Publié dans Philosophie | Lien permanent | Commentaires (0) | Tags : radio, radio libre, philosophie, thibaut isabel | |  del.icio.us | | Digg! Digg |  Facebook

lundi, 22 octobre 2012

The Loss of Reality

The Loss of Reality

The Ideological Caste and its Tyranny

Ma-Perte-de-Poids-Mythes-Nutritionnels.jpgThere is a distinction between natural and artificial societies. Natural societies grow organically within a group of people with a shared ancestry. This is why patriotism is natural – it grows from emotional relationships and does not need a theory or ideological underpinning. There is more to human nature than reason and the act of bonding with your people and territory is a process of feeling, instinct, intuition and other human qualities.

I live in England so I will use England as my exemplar. England has been a nation since the time of Alfred the Great, and it is an emotional, organic growth, not an intellectual agreement. Intellectual nationalism came from the Enlightenment and, like other forms of thinking derived from the Enlightenment, is theory to be applied to men and women, that is, forced on people. It is a mistake for The New Right to adopt rationalist theorising in imitation of Marxist thinkers.

Education in the liberal era emphasised ideas, with people thinking that we are in a battle of ideas, as if ideas rule the world. In actual fact the world at a Global and local level is run by rich power groups. Power groups are changing our towns and cities into something different and separating us from our culture and history. These are being made un-British. Local councillors stand for election and promise benefits to the local community. If elected they act as agents for corporations and finance. The new buildings in London are financed by money from other countries and built and designed by global corporations using imported labour while our people remain unemployed.

We are educated to be unrealistic and naïve. We are encouraged not to judge others, but the way to live safely is to assess human nature and make judgements on the suitability of others as friends or people we do business with. We are told it is prejudice to decide who to associate with, but making such decisions is essential human wisdom. To neglect this is to open oneself up to being harmed or taken advantage of.

Running a family is a practical activity, as is running a nation. The use of concrete nouns instead of abstract ones would effect how people think and would return them to reality. The abstract way of thinking was brought in by the French Revolution and has led people out of the world of reality into the realm of fantasy, because the words they think in have no substance. This is why immigrants, for instance, are thought to be the same as us, but if you believe they share the same basic human nature with us, then immigration is alarming because they are taking over our territory as earlier invasions have done.

It is their human nature to do so, as it was ours when we were in their countries. The mode of entry is not the point. The point is that, once in a country, human nature decrees that a people start claiming territory and that includes women. The widespread raping of young White girls some as young as eleven and twelve (and some Indian and Black) by the rival Muslim community is for them the taking of the spoils of war. The police and social services have been covering these child-rapes for years. They can not face the fact that their imported pets are not bringing us benefits and enriching our culture.

The use of concrete nouns instead of abstract ones would have an immense effect on how people think – it would bring them back to reality. The French Revolution and its abstract way of thinking have led people from reality into fantasy, because the words they think in have no substance.

When a world view becomes dominant it marginalises the opposing view, and that is what has happened to traditional or national conservatism. Another complication is that new Liberalism is different from Classical Liberalism. Liberalism was replaced by Cultural Marxism in the late 1960s.  They kept the name but changed the content so that there were two Liberalisms – Classical and New. New Liberals changed the nature of the ideology into what we now see as Identity Politics and Political Correctness. For example, individual rights became group rights, and that worked against us, as we are "oppressors" and the immigrants are "victims."

The Progressive way of thinking that stems from the Enlightenment marginalizes traditional systems in favour of a way of thinking that disdains the past and looks forward to a future perfection. Progressives think that we are ineluctably destined for the brotherhood of man – an obvious Utopia! This is no more than an irrational superstition, and any examination of the world around them would show that the opposite is happening. They think human nature is malleable and can be re-fashioned to fit into their ideology and future utopia.

A formal ideology is written down like a "How to" book, which tells people how to think and behave. Ideology grew out of the Enlightenment as a secular replacement for religion with a programme of correct thinking and behaving, and with intolerance for deviation. The rulers changed from an aristocratic class, based on blood and land, to a secular elite defined by their ability to think and say the right things – in other words an "Ideological Caste."

Ideological thinking starts with first principles and requires underpinnings to support or justify beliefs. Conservatism by contrast is a view of the world that grows out of our emotional bonds with our families and expands outwards through neighbourhood and community to the nation. It emanates out to Europe and the Anglosphere, though weaker. For example, we feel for the South African Boers in these days of their genocide. It is stronger at home, and a parent who wishes other children to do better than their own is perverse.

The Ideological uses of language

The elites try to change people's thinking by changing the vocabulary: the British government guidelines to the media suggest certain words about non-white crime be replaced. The words to be suppressed included immigrant, illegal immigrant, illegal asylum seeker, bogus asylum seeker, non-white, non-Christian, mixed race, half-caste, mulatto. There is the substitution of euphemistic terms for those that reflect reality, as in the official designation of Anti-Islamic activity for Muslim terrorists.

The use of Political Correctness is a way of training people to think of, and to perceive, reality in the official way. If you think differently you are a "hater," a "racist."

Ideological change of the meaning of words passes for common usage as people innocently adopt them: bigot and tolerance are prominent examples. Bigot means one who refuses to listen to the opinions of others but is misused as a connotative word that only applies to "right-wingers." A classic example of this Doublespeak was during the 2010 general election campaign when Gordon Brown described a woman who asked him about imported labour as a bigot; but he was the one being bigoted because he refused to listen to her opinions! Tolerance meant to tolerate an action or to put up with something one did not like, but is now misused to make indigenous British people passive and accept being replaced by immigrants.

We need a concrete, definite vocabulary, not vague linguistic terms like person and humanity, but terms like Englishman or Englishwoman, Welshman or Welshwoman, Scotsman or Scotswoman or Irishman or Irishwoman, boy and girl; land rather than country. They are more specific and convey a solid idea of substance; they get away from the woolly vocabulary that is a cause of our collective loss of touch with reality. This would clarify what we are referring to and make our common intercourse more realistic.

The great Welsh national anthem Land of My Fathers is a pertinent example as it makes a clear statement of debt to ancestors and suggests the piety necessary to honour what the ancestors have left us, and our obligation to hand it on to our descendants. This is embodied in the Fifth Commandment to honour thy mother and father; unless they are very cruel parents, of course.

On abstractions, the counter-revolutionary Josef de Maistre stated:  

"there is no such thing as Man in the world. In my lifetime I have seen Frenchmen, Italians, Russians, etc... I declare that I have never in my life met him; if he exists, he is unknown to me." 


A television programme Gypsy Wars contrasted a local woman with tinkers who had invaded her land, and effectively reversed the roles. The intellectual and media elites think our traditional view of the world is pathological and try to correct it for us. No young Gypsy men were shown, because they would be aggressive, and the programme makers did not want to show them as a threat; village life was not shown because that is appealing and viewers would sympathise with the woman; the woman was selected because she is not typical of rural people but was a bit eccentric and could be set up as the aggressor even though she was in fact the victim. This role-reversal was undertaken to mould the public's views and change attitudes. This was an example of how television re-structures thought in accordance with the establishment’s Progressive ideology. 

In August 2011, police closed the largest gypsy camp in Britain at Dale Farm and the biased television news reports once again left gypsy men out of their news reports. 

For years vacancies in television were only advertised in the Bourgeois-Socialist Guardian newspaper to help filter out applicants with the wrong attitudes. 

We are derided as prejudiced if we protest against the elites having us dispossessed, which is used to mean ignorant and narrow-minded, but prejudice is in fact traditional wisdom passed down by our ancestors, and is knowledge which is much broader-based than the narrow solipsism of the contemporary era. It saves us learning the hard way, and we would have been spared this dispossession if natural prejudices had been followed after the last war. 

The great Conservative satirist Michael Wharton would have recommended Prejudometers

We are being dehumanised and made a non-people. We must abandon this inculcated niceness, this apologetic approach and assert ourselves. We need to give our people a sense of their collective worth for the common good, and succeeding generations need to be built up to inherit the responsibility for our life and culture. The media are occupying them with trivialities like what to wear, how to get your hair done and where to have a tat! It is done to get their money, and is morally evil, as they are being debauched by temptations and distractions. 

Government from Brussels, economic control by global corporations, and Afro-Asian colonization is part of the progressives’ new dream for an ideal future, but in practice it disinherits our children of community and association with their own kind, which we are duty bound to preserve for them. 

Throughout history wars have been fought for territory, and by allowing newcomers to stake claims, our emasculated 'elite' are encouraging them to fight for yet more. Our rulers are handing our ancestral homeland to invaders and protecting their welfare over and above that of their own people. 

MPs also want children taught how to have relationships and make "informed decisions" about when to have sex. Propagandising homosexuality is another threat to our demographics.

A world view to unite us 

How do we counter the dominant ideology? The way to develop a new world view is to gather examples from the world around us, of what is really happening as a result of, say, immigration, collate it and form our version of reality. The first thing is to understand human nature and what people are capable of doing to one another. We also need to consider what gives life meaning, and this leads to the idea that nationalism is about our nation and a nation means a group of racially linked people with whom we belong by emotional attachments. I openly admit to being a racialist because I believe in racial differences between people, but do not hate other peoples and do not accept the Marxist pejorative term "racist." 

Power groups are changing our towns and cities into something different and separating us from our culture and history. We must not endlessly rehearse what has come to pass but what we are going to do. How will people cope in the social disorder the elites are plunging us into.

 We have a responsibility for our kin and a duty to them. We have a duty to pass on what we have inherited to our children, as they, in turn, will have a duty to their children. We owe a debt to our ancestors who bequeathed to us our nation and culture and we must honour that. 

The elites promote a version of progress and see the past as obsolete. But the present grows from the past as the future grows from the present, which is why we have to get things right now, in the beginning of our revival. 

The attitude of those who control public life is to transfer power away from their own people and disinherit their descendants for the benefit of rival communities. We are morally obliged to put our people first, as we do with our families, even when foreigners are more in need of help. Supporting outsiders against our own people is morally wrong. 

We have natural bonds with our families, a responsibility for them and a duty to them as we have a duty to pass on what we have inherited to our children, as they, in turn, will have a duty to their children. This extends to our fellow nationals who share the same ancestral descent. We owe a debt to our ancestors who bequeathed to us our nation and culture, and we must honour that. 

A people need the numinous things in life – religion, art, culture, a wholesome countryside. The numinous is a feeling of, and a need for, the sacred, the holy, and the transcendent; not just the material and the hedonistic. 

Simple people say, "So what? It doesn’t matter if different people take over!" This shows a failure to understand human nature. They think it will be painless, like handing the baton on in a relay race, but examples from history like the Norman Conquest, show the oppression the conquered have to endure; other countries like South Africa and Zimbabwe show what will befall our children if the evil elites are not countered. 

The ideology of multi-racialism was a righteous reaction to the opening of the camps and the watchword was, "It must never happen again." This has come full circle and now the Jews are being persecuted in France, Sweden and elsewhere by imported Muslims. Everyone must have seen Muslims brandishing placards that read: "God Bless Hitler" and chanting "Jews to the gas!"  They must know that The Protocols of the Learned Elders of Zion is on sale in Muslim shops all over not only England but Europe. I have written elsewhere and repeat it here: if David Cameron and Ed Milliband and the other fantasists succeed in getting Turkey into the EU the number of Muslims will be so large that the EU forces will not be able to protect European Jews from, I dare say it, possible extermination. This has been imported by the elites who are not facing the reality of what they are doing. 

Unlike the rational ideologies that have been manifold since the Enlightenment, our views derive from an emotional and instinctive relationship with our people and our territory. It is more profound than rationalising an ideology to be learnt from a book because it grows from natural, human instinct and emotion. 

To give favourable treatment to aliens over our own people is morally wrong. A nation’s manners, morals, religions, political institutions, and social structures, are inherited from its ancestors and our loyalties begin with affection within families and this emanates outward to neighbourhood and nation. We belong to our kin, above strangers. 

Look at data from the Office of National Statistics (which doesn't take into account the births to mothers born here), then look at your children and ask yourselves: "Am I betraying my children? Where will they live and work?"

Recommended Reading

A conservative classic: The Quest for Community by Robert A.Nisbit 

For the New Left's takeover of Liberalism: The Politics of the Forked Tongue by Aidan Rankin 

For Ideology: Suicide of the West by James Burnham.

For the conservative interpretation of history: Anything by Keith Feiling

In Defence of the Natural Society by David Hamilton


mercredi, 10 octobre 2012

A Concepção Sagrada dos Espaços

A Concepção Sagrada dos Espaços

por Orazio M. Gnerre

Ex: http://legio-victrix.blogspot.be/ 

Texto da palestra de Orazio Gnerre, do Instituto Millenium, no IIIº Encontro Nacional Evoliano em João Pessoa.

Boa noite à todos,

Com a permissão do público e do professor Dugin, começarei.

Nós definimos o tema que escolhemos para a nossa discussão, "a concepção do espaço sagrado." Como você bem sabe, a escola de pensamento do tradicionalismo integrante baseia-se sobre um determinado assunto: os conceitos polares opostos subjacentes à abordagem dialética da realidade humana são dois simetricamente opostos - Tradição e Modernidade. Por Tradição compreendemos de modo geral a abordagem do "sagrado" ao real, uma leitura simbólica da mesma que, trabalhando com o que Carl Schmitt chamou de "catolicismo romano e forma política" princípio da representação, consideraremos o plano como um reflexo do mundo imanente transcendente, como expresso sistematicamente pela filosofia platônica. É um erro, porém definir o conservadorismo como um ramo da filosofia derivada do idealismo platônico porque, em sua visão ortodoxa, é considerada a ciência que estuda a manifestação do Uno pré-existente imanente - uma revelação eterna - e as estradas a fim de acessar sua experiência direta. A abordagem tradicional também pode ser definida cosmologicamente. A modernidade é a ruptura drástica com a concepção de existência simbólica e espiritual: a chave para o que não é mais cosmológico, como é na concepção tradicional, e sim mecânico. Se o pensamento tradicional é generalizante, representante, universalizante e essencialmente metafísico, o pensamento moderno, como seu oposto radical, manifesta-se como fragmentado, mecanicista e potencialmente niilista. Digo "basicamente" niilista porque, no desenrolar do fenômeno moderno, não esgota as possibilidades (ou pelo menos, não tivemos a oportunidade de conhecer este evento), mas aprofunda-se, expandindo sua influência e aumentando o grau de entropia que contém, provando ser o tempo da grande confusão prevista por René Guénon. Mais do que um sociólogo, incluindo Jedlowsky, advertiu-nos o fato de que a suposta pós-modernidade não é outra coisa senão o fenômeno moderno que é o apenas aparentemente negar a si mesmo, ele se quebra e se expande, criando uma nuvem de "modernidade diversas", e, aparentemente contrário ao contrário, de fato, todos os participantes do mesmo projeto e relativista perspectivista que, em aparente oposição ao primeiro evento universalista e racionalista da modernidade, na verdade, partes da natureza e cartesiana subjetivista. O professor Dugin, em seu discurso na conferência internacional de Moscou "Contra o mundo pós-moderno", tem bem definida a pós-modernidade como a queda da modernidade, então a expansão, a hipertrofia do princípio da quantidade que caracteriza a própria modernidade. Também o professor Dugin tem repetidamente salientou a necessidade de uma restauração da categoria filosófica do objetivismo, em oposição à natureza subjetivista da modernidade: na verdade ele não é o único que viu no universalismo marxista e no objetivismo (assim como na derrubada da manifestação idealista tripartite do Espírito) a continuação de categorias clássicas e tradicionais de pensamento. Cito neste caso o filósofo italiano Costanzo Preve que, em conjunto com Domenico Losurdo, representam a aresta de corte efectivo da Europa neomarxista. 


Se, como já dissemos, Tradição e Modernidade se opõem totalmente (e não dialeticamente), aqui é que ambos se projetam de cada fenômeno, porque, na verdade, são duas chaves reais para a leitura totalizante. É evidente, portanto, que deve haver um "sagrado" (tradicional e religioso) e "profano" (moderno e niilista), mesmo com o conceito de espaço, a importância de lugares, a interpretação providencial de áreas geográficas. O principal trabalho a que deve ser feita referência quando se trata desta diferença de abordagem é "O sagrado e o profano", texto esclarecedor do historiador romeno de religiões, famoso por ser ligado ao movimento da Legião do Miguel Arcanjo, professor, então, University, em Chicago, Mircea Eliade. Em seu texto explicativo, ele salienta as diferenças irreprimíveis que existem entre um homem religioso e secular, entre um homem e um homem da tradição da modernidade, na consideração do tempo, da vida, e lugares. Especialmente este último tema é que nos interessa em particular.



Eliade parte de um pressuposto geral, que é a base da consideração do fator espaço do homem religioso, o homem da Tradição: o mundo não é real. Neste sentido, a única coisa que o homem tradicional via como real, no entanto, era o Sagrado. A objetividade hegemônica do sagrado era aquele pelo qual o homem pudesse fazer o mundo real. O homem tradicional foi o vencedor real do mundo, o verdadeiro governante dos elementos (como ele era, interiorizados no pentagrama, que milênios mais tarde tornou-se o símbolo do Império Soviético sacral), como o filho dos deuses. O antropocentrismo tradicional, longe de ser semelhante ao do Iluminismo, ao contrário do último reconheceu a primazia do sagrado, como a única verdade incontestável. Como para os seres humanos, também criados devem ser realizados, "tornar-se o que você é", afirmando que o neoplatônico Santo Agostinho chamou "o poder" - estar no poder. E ele foi o homem, na verdade, o "Subcreator" (nas palavras de John Ronald Reuel Tolkien) que consagrou lugares, fez-se sagrado, tornando o domínio do Ser brilhante, e participando da criação de Deus também na concepção agostiniana, na verdade, a única coisa que se possa imaginar está sendo a adesão (que é a revelação do Santo), onde o mal é profundo como forte é a sua separação. Mesmo hoje, arar a terra perpetuamente consagrada ao Divino de nossos pais, cujos espíritos, anjos e santos padroeiros intercedem porque não afundam no abismo da não-existência. A perene conquista do Mundo do homem tradicional, então passou através da socialização do próprio mundo. O desenvolvimento desta verdade metafísica foi implementada após a revelação de Cristo, no ideal de evangelização ou Jihad. Útil a este respeito é lembrar que, para o homem tradicional, sendo o mundo espiritual mais importante e mais "real" do que o material, a primeira batalha era travada arduamente para conquistar a nível interno, uma luta até a morte pelo assassinato de seu Ego: esse foi o simbolismo de que também tratava o Barão Julius Evola, a que esta reunião é dedicada, a Grande Guerra Santa (para São Bernardo de Claraval, um dos grandes mestres do monasticismo ocidental, que são inspirados pelos cistercienses e trapistas) ou o Grande Jihad (o profeta Maomé). A corrida espacial foi qualitativamente inferior à horizontal para vertical, a conquista de seu microcosmo, a sua transferência sobre o domínio de si mesmo do indivíduo: a sacralização de si mesmo. Como o Buda disse: ". Entre aquele que vence na batalha mil vezes mil inimigos, e apenas aquele que vence a si mesmo, este é o melhor dos vencedores de cada batalha" . Qualitativamente inferior, mas não menos importante, a conquista horizontal, que Eliade identifica com o landname da tradição germânica, foi o processo pelo qual o homem subtraíu lugares no domínio da água, sem forma, do escuro, para render-se ao domínio da forma, da terra, e da luz. Igualmente Eliade considerava que estes dois princípios arquetípicos existem não apenas no plano horizontal, mas também sobre o eixo vertical. O nível horizontal é expresso pelo conceito axis mundi, o eixo do mundo, o centro radical da realidade. É importante que o eixo do mundo é único para si mesmo, ou localizado em um lugar (poderia realmente existir ...) que pode ser verdadeiramente chamado de centro de todo o mundo. No Mundo da Tradição tudo é relativo e tudo é absoluto, porque é o completo domínio do símbolo. É no templo que o homem tradicional no centro de seu mundo, que é o templo axis mundi. Não poderia ser de outra forma, para todos aqueles que vivem na orientação ao Sagrado: O templo é o seu ponto de referência, como um lugar de encontro entre a terra e os céus. Mas o templo, sendo o eixo do mundo, não só tem o valor de Scala Coeli, a Escada aos Céus: ele também ligou o homem à polaridade oposta, o mundo do informe, as águas primordiais. Esta é a ambivalência simbólica entre os pináculos das igrejas e suas criptas. O templo é de forma que, ao mesmo tempo, permite que você suba ao céu e retenha a água. É uma função mística e exorcista.

É interessante ver que todos estes arquétipos tradicionais nós podemos encontrar também em um pensador substancialmente “laico”, embora pessoalmente muito religioso. Falamos do já mencionado católico alemão Carl Schmitt, uma das mentes mais agudas do século passado, a quem o estudo do direito e mesmo da geopolítica devem muito. Ele abordou o problema espacial/territorial em duas obras suas, que lembramos serem “O Nomos da Terra” e “Terra e Mar”, este último escrito na forma de conto. Ele identificava duas fases da história da Civilização, que chamava respectivamente terrestre e marítima, e que nós podemos associar facilmente ao Mundo da Tradição e o da Modernidade. Segundo Schmitt estas duas concepções não estão ligadas somente a limites históricos, mas também a vínculos territoriais. Este é o motivo pelo qual a concepção terrestre está estritamente ligada ao bloco continental europeu e asiático, enquanto a marítima remete à Grande Ilha, a anglosfera que define o bloco anglo-americano. A primeira concepção, a terrestre, é ligada substancialmente aos princípios tradicionais do Sagrado (que em sentido político, se transpõem na comunidade orgânica, na hierarquia, na legitimidade, e no domínio da Forma e da Política), a segunda ao invés prova ser a manifestação do profano (nas suas expressões sociais de individualismo, igualitarismo, no domínio do informe e na ausência da norma). É aqui que se demonstra claramente o quanto a contraposição da Terra consagrada e da Água está presente também no pensamento de Schmitt. Não é casual que a manifestação da modernidade ocorra gradualmente, por meio da descoberta progressiva do novo mundo. Este é um argumento que tem sido aprofundado, partindo da geografia sagrada, pelo professor Dugin, e disso falaremos mais tarde. A Norma se demonstra em Schmitt com a legítima apropriação do território por parte de uma comunidade humana, que acaba sendo precisamente a consagração da mesma: é aqui que retorna o conceito já citado de landname. O landname é válido, porém somente na estabilidade: é a estabilidade que garante a legitimidade da norma (pelo mesmo motivo pelo qual o não se ater ao ordenamento jurídico pré-existente durante uma revolução política não é considerado ilegítimo). É assim que o landname só possui sentido na perspectiva terrestre. Um dos personagens pelos quaiso pensador alemão foi mais influenciados foi o nobre espanhol Donoso Cortés, herdeiro do que foi o último baluarte contra o avanço do poder marítimo anglo-saxão, a Santa Espanha Católica. Cortés, diplomata europeu de imenso calibre, homem político sem igual e agudo pensador, conhecia bem a realidade das revoluções igualitárias de 1848 e os ambientes da Restauração, considerando que entreteve também uma correspondência com o chanceler Metternich. Nele, feroz opositor da deriva anárquica europeia, Schmitt vê o defensor por excelência da Norma, da Lei. Como Schmitt, também Cortés também estava a procura daqueles que poderiam deter o avanço do anticristo, o processo de decadência total, o kat-echon, um papel que na tradição russa é preenchido pelo Imperador, e ele o identificou (com ou sem razão) em Napoleão III. O próprio Cortés define a Inglaterra como “a Grande Meretriz” (ou seja, Babilônia), que, como é sabido, na simbologia apocalíptica indica a mãe do Anticristo. Schmitt destaca várias vezes, em “Terra e Mar”, a natureza genealógica que liga o Império Britânico aos Estados Unidos da América. A conexão resulta então muito simples, em pleno acordo com todos os movimentos de resistência à Nova Ordem Mundial, que veem nos EUA “o Grande Satã”. Na Itália há dois livros dedicados ao ensinamento antimundialista que se pode tirar do Barão Evola, um de Carlo Terracciano, conhecido e amigo do Professor Dugin, e o outro de Pietro Carini. A lição de Cortés, entre outras coisas, está ligada profundamente à obra majestosa do primeiro opositor da Revolução Francesa (etapa central do processo subversivo na Europa), Joseph de Maistre, embaixador da Savóia junto ao czar. Ele e seu irmão Xavier se comprometeram firmemente ao lado da Rússia na luta contra o jacobinismo, um no sentido político, o outro no sentido militar.



Na abordagem sacra ao estudo dos espaços, não é possível deixar de recordar o papel desempenhado pelo presente professor Aleksandr Dugin, uma importante mente de nosso século, que abarca da geopolítica à filosofia, da sociologia à metafísica. Ele, como bem explica em muitos dos seus textos, está profundamente empenhado em difundir através de suas obras o elo estreito e direto que existe entre a geopolítica e a geografia sagrada, partindo especialmente das teorias do geopolítico alemão Karl Haushofer, que, sob a guarda do alpinista e estrategista britânico Mackinder, teorizava a integração política e militar do bloco continental europeu e asiático (que ele chamou de Heartland – Coração da Terra), contra a integração igual e oposta da World-Island (a Ilha-Mundo anglo-americana). Não definindo com o termo guenoniano de “ciência sagrada” a geopolítica, o professor Dugin a enquadra no âmbito daquelas pseudo-ciências que, por não terem sido completamente racionalizadas, e preservando ainda um alto nível de generalizações, manteve vivos, ainda que inconscientemente, aqueles arquétipos tradicionais dos quais estamos tratando. Em seu texto “Da Geografia Sagrada à Geopolítica”, cujas teses confluíram sucessivamente no “Paradigma do Fim”, o professor indaga antes de tudo o significado simbólico dos pontos cardeais na contraposição geopolítica “leste-oeste” e sociológica “norte-sul”. Leste e Oeste, na dialética geopolítica do mundo bipolar, constituía claramente o binômio da contraposição mundial da guerra Fria, bem como dois modelos diferentes de abordagem da vida. Se de um lado o Leste representava a “geométrica ordem prussiana” socialista, o Oeste simbolizava ao contrário o modelo hedonista do capitalismo desenfreado. Com a queda da contraposição dos blocos, e a transição pouco estável ao mundo unipolar, essa diferença não tem sido aplacada, de fato, ela foi radicalizada. Se bem que aparentemente também o Leste do mundo tem sido influenciado pelos dogmas modernos do progresso e do crescimento econômico exponencial, não podemos deixar de notar como nele estão ressurgindo (acima de tudo graças à parcial independência geopolítica de que pode desfrutar) os modelos culturais fundamentais para uma restauração integral. A oposição Leste-Oeste, no pensamento duginiano, se revela como a manifestação da contraposição do Oriente e do Ocidente metafísicos, ou melhor, simbólicos: a eterna ambivalência do apolíneo nascer do Sol e de sua descida nas Águas ocidentais. Os termos do desafio entre os dois pólos se tornam a Ascensão e a Queda, o Nascimento e a Morte, Criação e Dissolução. Em vários textos o professor se ocupou também do significado simbólico do centro geográfico que animam este desafio titânico dos continentes. Em dois de seus trabalhos, publicados na Itália no volume “Continente Rússia”, editado em 1991, ele diz limpidamente como, em uma perspectiva sacral e simbólica, a Sibéria – centro do Continente – coincide em realidade com a Hiperbórea, e a América do Norte se corresponde ao invés com a mitológica Ilha dos Mortos, a “terra verde”, da mitologia egípcia, a segunda Atlântida, o local das práticas obscenas de cultos orgiásticos. A segunda contraposição polar se identifica ao invés com Norte e Sul que, em uma concepção profana de sublevação, representam a parte rica e a pobre do globo, Primeiro e Terceiro Mundo. Nós todos conhecemos o simbolismo que na vasta literatura tradicional permeia os Pólos, especialmente o Norte. O Norte, ponto superior do Eixo do Mundo, nada mais é que o ápice solar. O Norte representa a superabundância de riqueza espiritual, o estágio último da Ascese. O Sul (de um ponto de vista simbólico e não meramente geográfico representa o contrário. A mentalidade profana, que em tudo opera a derrubada satânica dos significados, imanentizando esta contraposição em um sentido puramente geográfico, a preencheu com o significado de riqueza e pobreza materiais. Na concepção tradicional o nórdico é aquele que retorna ao gelo, aquele que perde o elemento passional e egoístico “demasiado humano” e que transcende a dimensão humana pela heroica. Já o racismo branco anglo-saxão ou pan-germanista, levado ao ápice político pelo Império Britânico em sua escana colonial global, e pelo hitlerismo ideológico ao nível europeu, demonstrava os elementos fundamentais dessa inversão demoníaca, ainda que preservando, no segundo caso, alguns elementos simbólicos da Tradição. O próprio Barão Evola escreveu muito sobre a necessidade de formar e criar uma raça do espírito, uma elite de aristocratas do espírito. O neopaganismo hitlerista, ao qual o orientalista, historiador das religiões e ex-tenente da SS italiana Pio Filippani Ronconi deu a alcunha de “contra-iniciático”, transpôs tudo a um plano biológico, invertendo o problema.


Em nossa opinião, também a cessão do Alasca polar por parte da Rússia aos Estados Unidos, no século XIX, representa um passo em direção à queda do Oriente do Norte espiritual. Não se há de duvidar do fato de que, se o Alasca tivesse permanecido nas mãos do Império Russo, o movimento bolchevique, fortificado no Gelo Eterno, teria empurrados suas hordas aos próprios portões da Pátria do Capitalismo. A sorte histórica seguramente teria sido diversa. No entanto, “os caminhos do Senhor são infinitos”, e Ele opera de maneiras misteriosas.

A ideologia eurasiática revivida pelo professor Dugin, e adaptada ao contexto pós-soviético, representa um destes modelos culturais alternativos, radicalmente verdadeiros, com os quais combater arduamente a Decadência iminente, para ataca-la em seu coração, nas suas contradições mais profundas, e superá-la gloriosamente. Não há dúvida de que as ações do antimoderno atingirão o seu objetivo porque, como dito pelo Para Urbano II durante o Concílio de Clermont: “Deus vult!” – Deus o quer. A Eurásia-Rússia, perfeito centro do Continente, da Heartland, representa hoje um farol de esperança para o Oriente e para o Sul do Mundo, para os europeus orgulhosos de suas próprias tradições e não alinhados ao unipolarismo estadounidense, não só geopolítico, mas também cultural, e para todos os Povos livres que sofreram o martírio por parte dos emissários da Decadência. Penso, neste momento, no heroico povo sírio, uma cidadela de Luz, onde os filhos de Deus xiitas, católicos e ortodoxos estão lutando tenazmente contra as hordas inimigas. A Eurásia, núcleo de reconciliação dos polos, porta do templo de Jano, que se abre para gerar a Unidade do real, se mostra como o Eixo do Mundo global, o templo geográfico, o ponto de partida para o landname total, a sacralização completa do Mundo, a Era do Espírito de Joaquim de Fiore, o Reino do Ar de Carl Schmitt, a terceira concepção espacial.


Tradução por Raphael Machado e Álvaro Hauschild

Compassion n’est pas raison


Compassion n’est pas raison

par Pierre LE VIGAN

La compassion se porte bien. Mais qu’est-ce que la compassion ? C’est un ressenti. C’est un partage de sentiments voire une communion. C’est un « éprouvé avec », plus encore que le « souffrir avec » qu’indique l’étymologie. C’est quelque chose comme la sympathie dans la Théorie des sentiments moraux (1759) d’Adam Smith, qui fonde selon lui notre conduite morale.  La compassion est un thème de société depuis qu’elle est devenue un affect obligatoire, à l’opposé du « soyez dur » de Zarathoustra. Myriam Revault d’Allonnes souligne le « déferlement compassionnel auquel notre société est aujourd’hui en proie ». Pourquoi notre société est-elle si compassionnelle ? Ce n’est pas un hasard. C’est même un symptôme.

Une compassion qui s’étend à tout et à tous

La compassion vaut identification. En ce sens, elle est le produit d’une vision égalitaire des hommes. Dans les sociétés aristocratiques, la compassion n‘a de sens que pour ceux de sa caste et à l’intérieur de celle-ci. À l’inverse, dans les sociétés démocratiques le premier venu (ou le dernier venu si on se réfère aux flux migratoires) devient le semblable de tout le monde. Tocqueville, dans La démocratie en Amérique (1835), remarque que nos sociétés, qu’il qualifie de démocratiques, au sens où elles sont caractérisées par un égalitarisme de principe et non de situation sociale, sont unifiées autour d’un affect commun : la compassion. Il remarque que notre sensibilité se porte sur plus d’objets que ce n’était le cas pour nos pères (c’est-à-dire pour les hommes des sociétés aristocratiques). C’est que notre compassion s’étend désormais à tous les hommes, et non plus seulement à ceux de notre rang. La compassion s’est élargie.

La notion de compassion comme affect commun trouve son origine chez Rousseau même s’il emploie essentiellement les termes de pitié et de commisération. La pitié est pour l’auteur des Confessions le socle de la reconnaissance du semblable. La compassion / pitié est la conséquence de la reconnaissance de la subjectivité humaine. Elle repose tout autant sur l’amour des autres que sur l’amour de soi. La philia, l’amitié est fondée dans la philautia, l’amour de soi, ce qu’Aristote appelait l’« égoïsme vertueux ». S’aimer soi même est la condition pour aimer les autres selon Rousseau. La compassion appartient ainsi à ce que Rousseau croit être la nature de l’homme. La compassion serait même une vertu naturelle voire la mère de toutes les vertus. C’est la naissance d’une conception « moderne » des liens entre les hommes.

La compassion universelle s’accompagne de l’essor de la grande muflerie moderne

Nous vivons toujours sur cette conception comme quoi la compassion, dont la déclinaison forte est la pitié, est le mode moderne, et donc normal dans nos sociétés, du partage du sensible, de ce que l’on sent et ressent.

Cette conception pose plusieurs questions. Tout d’abord, l’extension du champ de la compassion lui fait perdre en intensité. Si on est sensible à tous les malheurs du monde on n’est pas sensible à l’un plus qu’à l’autre. La compassion universelle est par ailleurs inévitablement abstraite. Elle devient sans visage. Ou bien les visages ne sont que ceux des écrans de télévision. Force est aussi de constater que l’extension de la compassion va avec un déclin de la politesse de proximité ou encore de la civilité. De ce qu’Orwell appelait la décence ordinaire. C’est ainsi que se répand en même temps qu’une compassion universelle abstraite et obligatoire une « panbéotie » ou grande muflerie concrète, celle dont parlait Charles Péguy. Ce n’est pas le moindre paradoxe. « Le progrès de la compassion va de pair avec la régression de la civilité », note Alain Finkielkraut. Un risque qu’avait mesuré Rousseau qui écrivait : « Défiez vous de ces cosmopolitiques qui vont chercher loin dans leurs livres des devoirs qu’ils dédaignent de remplir autour d’eux (Émile ou l’éducation, 1762) ».

Compassion, tyrannie de la transparence et dictature de l’urgence

La compassion rencontre d’autres apories. Elle amène à voir les similitudes plus que les différences. A voir ce qui ressemble plus que ce qui distingue. La compassion minore ainsi les distinctions. Elle implique que nous sommes tous égaux au sens où nous serions tous semblables. Elle participe ainsi à la grande érosion moderne des diversités. La compassion implique en outre que ses objets se prêtent au jeu c’est-à-dire acceptent de se montrer en leur malheur. La compassion va avec l’exigence ou même la tyrannie de la transparence, comme nombre d’affaires judiciaires contemporaines en témoignent. La compassion va ainsi avec un effacement de la pudeur et encore de la honte. La compassion suppose en partie de sortir du registre de l’honneur et de la honte pour entrer dans celui de l’exposition voire de l’exhibition, ce qu’avait bien vu Nietzsche.

L’impatience de la pitié

En outre, la compassion, par exemple dans le cas des drames humanitaires,  tels les guerres et les famines, amène à une dictature de l’urgence. Il faut « réagir tout de suite », ne pas « tergiverser ». C’est l’impatience de la pitié. Au risque de faire n’importe quoi, voire plus de mal que de bien. Au risque d’attiser par exemple une guerre tribale, comme en Libye, au lieu de favoriser des négociations.

Il y a un extrémisme de la compassion. Il peut être terroriste. Il peut y avoir une fureur de la pitié, qui amène à déchaîner la haine contre de présumés coupables. « Les malheureux » disait Robespierre à propos du peuple souffrant. On peut penser de même qu’Hitler avait une grande compassion pour la situation difficile du peuple allemand après sa défaite de 1918. Compassion qui peut se retourner en fureur contre les prétendus responsables des malheurs du peuple.

Le problème qui se pose à nous maintenant est toutefois autre que celui des révolutionnaires de droite ou de gauche. La compassion est devenue universelle comme nous l’avons vu. Tient-elle lieu alors de politique ? Doit-on s’en satisfaire ? Pour Rousseau la compassion suppose de ne pas se prendre pour celui qui souffre. La pitié n’est pas pour Rousseau un sentiment fusionnel, elle suppose la distance de la réflexion. Il ne s’agit pas de s’identifier à l’autre mais de comprendre au contraire la différence de l’autre. Rousseau écrit : « La pitié est douce, parce qu’en se mettant à la place de celui qui souffre, on sent pourtant le plaisir de ne pas souffrir comme lui (Émile) ». La compassion ne peut donc être directement politique. Elle ne peut l’être qu’à travers des médiations. Celles-ci sont de plusieurs ordres. Il s’agit bien sûr de comprendre. Sortant de la compassion immédiate, il s’agit d’analyser ce qui se passe et pourquoi. Un exemple ? Il y a une famine en Somalie. Pourquoi le pays a-t-il éclaté en trois régions ? Le Somaliland, le Puntland, et la région de Mogadiscio ? Pourquoi la situation au Somaliland est-elle beaucoup moins dramatique ? Que faire et comment ? A-t-on une simple stratégie de communication ou une stratégie politique à long terme ?

Il s’agit aussi de savoir si toutes les compassions doivent être mises sur le même plan. Ou si « les nôtres » – et selon quel critère les juge-t-on ainsi – doivent passer avant « les autres ». Non en fonction d’une valeur plus grande « en soi » mais au nom du simple principe – par définition relatif – de la primauté de la proximité.  C’était peu ou prou la vision d’Aristote. Il parlait de « sphères d’appartenances » plus ou moins rapprochées et expliquait que la compassion commence au-delà des gens très proches de nous (car ce qui les atteindrait nous ferait peur et mal et ne provoquerait pas une simple compassion) mais ne va pas jusqu’aux gens très éloignés (pour qui prédominerait l’indifférence). La compassion est pour Aristote un « entre deux », c’est une marge.

La compassion universelle a un lien avec le politique. Elle est fondée sur l’abstraction d’un lien entre supposés semblables. Mais le lien politique est à la fois abstrait et situé. S’il va par définition au-delà du charnel (qui n’est pas politique), il n’est pas non plus universel. Il s’inscrit dans un cadre national, ou impérial, mais non pas universalisable. C’est pourquoi l’abstraction du lien compassionnel ne peut être une politique. Rousseau dit que la pitié doit conduire à la justice. Mais celle-ci ne résulte pas d’un simple ressenti. Bien entendu, celui-ci y participe. La richesse insolente de certains provoque l’indignation quand d’autres meurent de faim. Et il y a une dimension politique dans cette indignation. Mais le ressenti ne fonde jamais une justice et chacun sait au demeurant que vouloir appauvrir les riches n’a généralement pas suffi à faire mieux vivre les pauvres. La pitié non plus que la compassion ne fonde une politique et même la justice, si elle est nécessaire, n’y suffit pas. « Il y a des affects politiques fondamentaux comme la colère, comme l’indignation qui sont comme un substrat, un préalable à l’action », écrit Merleau-Ponty dans la préface de Signes. Nous sommes bien d’accord. Mais un levier, mais l’indignation-levier ne suffit pas, il faut à la politique un projet, une analyse des rapports de force, une vision, et sans doute même une poétique. La compassion dispense de la raison, et conforte les stratégies des grandes puissances et les pouvoirs de l’oligarchie.

Le principal danger qui menace de transformer la compassion universalisée en nuisance est la réduction de l’autre au même. Paul Audi note : « La pire violence que l’on puisse faire à l’autre, c’est de ne pas altériser le semblable. […] Tant que l’on altérise pas le semblable, on est dans une logique d’appropriation de la réalité de l’autre, ce qui est la pire violence que l’on puisse lui faire ». Voir l’autre comme le même, c’est décidément le mal contemporain qui, de la colonisation hier à l’immigration aujourd’hui constitue la menace principale contre l’identité des peuples.

Pierre Le Vigan

• Myriam Revault d’Allonnes, L’Homme compassionnel, Le Seuil, 2008, 103 p., 10 €.

• Paul Audi, L’empire de la compassion, Encre marine, 2011, 152 p., 19 €.

Article printed from Europe Maxima: http://www.europemaxima.com

URL to article: http://www.europemaxima.com/?p=2191


dimanche, 07 octobre 2012

La fiducia riparte da noi


Claudio RISE:

La fiducia riparte da noi

Claudio Risé, da “Il Mattino di Napoli” del lunedì, 1 ottobre 2012, www.ilmattino.it

La patologia più diffusa oggi? La sfiducia. E non è solo il frutto degli ultimi scandali, o della crisi. E’ qualcosa di sotterraneo, che si sta sviluppando lentamente, da anni, non solo in Italia. Sfiducia verso le autorità, lo Stato, i superiori. Ma anche verso i genitori, i figli. E, soprattutto, se stessi.

La corruzione è legata, nel profondo, anche a questo. Facciamo molta fatica a pensarci onesti. Sarà ben difficile diventarlo finché vediamo in questo modo noi stessi e gli altri.

Questa sfiducia porta con sé il pessimismo: se non mi fido di nessuno, la vita diventa più difficile. Ed alimenta la paura, lo stato emotivo in cui crescono ansia, e instabilità.

All’origine di siffatto scenario, che rende difficile superare le crisi e risanare persone e nazioni c’è un sentimento preciso: la sfiducia.

Sul perché sia diffuso oggi, le versioni sono molteplici. Una buona parte della psicoanalisi, soprattutto dagli anni 30 del Novecento in poi, ha messo sotto osservazione il rapporto del bimbo con la madre, dato che lì si sviluppa la fiducia (o sfiducia) verso gli altri, e il mondo. I cambiamenti nella famiglia, l’aspirazione femminile al lavoro, il trasferimento dalle campagne alle città, e molto altro, avrebbero reso meno accoglienti e più insicure le madri, e istillato questa fondamentale sfiducia nei figli.
Molti sogni di caduta, anche ripetuti da grandi, sarebbero legati alla fantasia (spesso riconosciuta da madri e padri) di lasciar cadere il figlioletto che hanno in braccio, inconsciamente percepita dai figli come pericolo.

Naturalmente, ciò non basta a spiegare la crescita della sfiducia, e delle diverse paure che questo non fidarsi alimenta.

Anche il crescente moltiplicarsi di contratti, di obblighi e diritti giuridicamente tutelati verso gli altri, paradossalmente aumenta l’insicurezza e la sfiducia. I genitori adempiranno gli standard correnti, illustrati dai media, o devo farli “richiamare” ai loro doveri da assistenti sociali, psicologi, magistrati, giornalisti?

Queste nuove possibilità, che sono in effetti anche protezioni, rendono però fragile fin dall’infanzia un rapporto di fiducia di cui lo sviluppo della personalità ha d’altra parte assoluta necessità.
Lo stesso accade per le innumerevoli altre tutele: sindacali, sanitarie, professionali, amministrative, affettive.

L’altro sarà davvero “in ordine”? O ci saranno in giro batteri, irregolarità, secondi fini?
Queste domande ci spingono ad uno stato psicologico molto vicino al disturbo paranoico, che nelle società di massa diventa sospetto generalizzato e infezione psichica collettiva. Tanto più pericolosa quanto più queste società apparentemente permissive e tolleranti non sviluppano nei propri membri senso critico e autocensure, ma autorizzano a trasferire sugli altri timori e inadeguatezze che percepiamo presenti già in noi stessi.

La mancanza di fiducia si rivela così essere la buccia di banana su cui sta pericolosamente scivolando la nostra società ex opulenta (come racconta tra gli altri la filosofa Michela Marzano che ha dedicato al tema il suo ultimo saggio: Avere fiducia).

Inutile, anzi controproducente, si rivela l’icona pubblicitaria della “trasparenza”. L’uomo, in quanto dotato di spessore e contenuti, non può essere trasparente. Deve, anzi, imparare a riconoscerli e difenderli dalle invasioni massmediatiche. Quando poi necessario ed utile a sé e agli altri, deve però impegnarsi nel cambiamento, senza aspettare di esservi richiamato dall’Autorità. Potrà così sviluppare una più tranquilla fiducia in se stesso. Base indispensabile per aver fiducia negli altri.

vendredi, 05 octobre 2012




EMISSION n°113 :


Ce dimanche, Méridien Zéro reçoit Eric Werner politologue et essayiste Suisse pour évoquer avec lui ses analyse critique de la société libérale contemporaine.

A la barre Jean-Louis Roumégace et le sieur Wilsdorf. Lord Tesla à la technique


Rendez vous ce dimanche à 23 h sur :
Signalons ici la dernière action du MAS à faire circuler à tous vos contacts sans modération

Nous serons présents à la Table Ronde de Terre et Peuple ce dimanche à Rungis également

Avec Méridien Zéro, tous à l’abordage et pas de quartier !
Faites vous les relais de la voie dissidente, rebelle, autonome, sociale, nationale et radicale en diffusant ce message à vos proches.
Encore merci à nos généreux donateurs.

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09:32 Publié dans Entretiens, Philosophie | Lien permanent | Commentaires (0) | Tags : eric werner, entretien, philosophie | |  del.icio.us | | Digg! Digg |  Facebook

samedi, 29 septembre 2012




Enlace Revista electrónica

Enlace Revista formato pdf


Louis Dumont: estructuralismo, jerarquía e individualismo, 
por Robert Parkin

La influencia de Louis Dumont: Evolución teórica de Alain de Benoist,
por Diego L. Sanromán

Gloria o maldición del individualismo moderno según Louis Dumont, 
por Verena Stolcke

La historia entre antropólogos: Dumont y Salhins, por Gladis Lizama Silva

Las formas del holismo: Mauss y Dumont,
por Ángel Díaz de Rada

La racionalidad de la cultura occidental: Weber y Dumont, 
por Aparecido Francisco dos Reis

Individualismo y modernidad, 
por Julio Mejía Navarrete

Los errores y confusiones de Louis Dumont. A propósito de “la autonomía” o "emancipación” de la Economía, 
por Francisco Vergara

Individuo y sociedad: un estudio sobre la perspectiva jerárquica de Louis Dumont,
por Clara Virginia de Queiroz Pinheiro

Individualismo y colectividad a partir del concepto tiempo,
por Patricia Safa

El Homo Hierarchicus de Louis Dumont,
por Carmen Arias Abellán

La ideología del sistema de castas en Louis Dumont,
por Ishita Banerjee
À quoi bon aller en Inde?, 
por Rogelio Rubio

mercredi, 26 septembre 2012



La realidad es, más lo que puede ser y meditación y filosofía occidental


The Sexual Aesthetics and Metaphysics of Julius Evola



Keith Preston:

Beyond Prudery and Perversion: The Sexual Aesthetics and Metaphysics of Julius Evola

Of course, the ongoing institutionalization of the values of the sexual revolution is not without its fierce critics. Predictably, the most strident criticism of sexual liberalism originates from the clerical and political representatives of the institutions of organized Christianity and from concerned Christian laypeople. Public battles over sexual issues are depicted in the establishment media as conflicts between progressive-minded, intelligent and educated liberals versus ignorant, bigoted, sex-phobic reactionaries. Dissident conservative media outlets portray conflicts of this type as pitting hedonistic, amoral sexual libertines against beleaguered upholders of the values of faith, family, and chastity. Yet this “culture war” between liberal libertines and Christian puritans is not what should be the greatest concern of those holding a radical traditionalist or conservative revolutionary outlook.

Sexuality and the Pagan Heritage of Western Civilization

The European New Right has emerged as the most intellectually progressive and sophisticated contemporary manifestation of the values of the conservative revolution. Likewise, the overlapping schools of thought associated with the ENR have offered the most penetrating and comprehensive critique of the domination of contemporary cultural and political life by the values of liberalism and the consequences of this for Western civilization. The ENR departs sharply from conventional “conservative” criticisms of liberalism of the kind that stem from Christian piety. Unlike the Christian conservatives, the European New Right does not hesitate to embrace the primordial pagan heritage of the Indo-European ancestors of Western peoples. The history of the West is much older than the fifteen hundred year reign of the Christian church that characterized Western civilization from the late Roman era to the early modern period. This history includes foremost of all the classical Greco-Roman civilization of antiquity and its legacy of classical pagan scholarship and cultural life. Recognition of this legacy includes a willingness to recognize and explore classical pagan attitudes towards sexuality. As Mark Wegierski has written:

The ENR’s “paganism” entails a naturalism towards mores and sexuality. Unlike still traditionalists, ENR members have a relatively liberated attitude towards sexuality…ENR members have no desire to impose what they consider the patently unnatural moralism of Judeo-Christianity on sexual relations. However, while relatively more tolerant in principle, they still value strong family life, fecundity, and marriage or relations within one’s own ethnic group. (Their objection to intraethnic liaisons would be that the mixture of ethnic groups diminishes a sense of identity. In a world where every marriage was mixed, cultural identity would disappear). They also criticize Anglo-American moralism and its apparent hypocrisy: ” . . . In this, they are closer to a worldly Europe than to a puritanical America obsessed with violence. According to the ENR: “Our ancestral Indo-European culture . . . seems to have enjoyed a healthy natural attitude to processes and parts of the body concerned with the bringing forth of new life, the celebration of pair-bonding love, and the perpetuation of the race.”

In its desire to create a balanced psychology of sexual relations, the ENR seeks to overcome the liabilities of conventional conservative thought: the perception of conservatives as joyless prudes, and the seemingly ridiculous psychology implied in conventional Christianity. It seeks to address “flesh-and-blood men and women,” not saints. Since some of the Left’s greatest gains in the last few decades have been made as a result of their championing sexual freedom and liberation, the ENR seeks to offer its own counter-ethic of sexual joy. The hope is presumably to nourish persons of the type who can, in Nietzsche’s phrase, “make love alter reading Hegel.” This is also related to the desire for the reconciliation of the intellectual and warrior in one person: the reconciliation of vita contemplative and vita activa.1

It is therefore the task of contemporary proponents of the values of conservative revolution to create a body of sexual ethics that offers a genuine third position beyond that of mindless liberal hedonism or the equally mindless sex-phobia of the Christian puritans. In working to cultivate such an alternative sexual ethos, the thought of Julius Evola regarding sexuality will be quite informative.

The Evolan Worldview

Julius Evola published his Eros and the Mysteries of Love: The Metaphysics of Sex in 1958.2This work contains a comprehensive discussion of Evola’s views of sexuality and the role of sexuality in his wider philosophical outlook. In the book, Evola provides a much greater overview of his own philosophy of sex, a philosophy which he had only alluded to in prior works such as The Yoga of Power (1949)3 and, of course, his magnum opus Revolt Against the Modern World (1934)4. Evola’s view of sexuality was very much in keeping with his wider view of history and civilization. Evola’s philosophy, which he termed merely as “Tradition,” was essentially a religion of Evola’s own making. Evola’s Tradition was a syncretic amalgam of various occult and metaphysical influences derived from ancient myths and esoteric writings. Foremost among these were the collection of myths found in various Greek and Hindu traditions having to do with a view of human civilization and culture as manifestation of a process of decline from a primordial “Golden Age.”

It is interesting to note that Evola rejected modern views of evolutionary biology such as Darwinian natural selection. Indeed, his views on the origins of mankind overlapped with those of Vedic creationists within the Hindu tradition. This particular reflection of the Vedic tradition postulates the concept of “devolution” which, at the risk of oversimplification, might be characterized as a spiritualistic inversion of modern notions of evolution. Mankind is regarded as having devolved into its present physical form from primordial spiritual beings, a view that is still maintained by some Hindu creationists in the contemporary world.5 Comparable beliefs were widespread in ancient mythology. Hindu tradition postulates four “yugas” with each successive yuga marking a period of degeneration from the era of the previous yuga. The last of these, the so-called “Kali Yuga,” represents an Age of Darkness that Evola appropriated as a metaphor for the modern world. This element of Hindu tradition parallels the mythical Golden Age of the Greeks, where the goddess of justice, Astraea, the daughter of Zeus and Themis, lived among mankind in an idyllic era of human virtue. The similarities of these myths to the legend of the Garden of Eden in the Abrahamic traditions where human beings lived in paradise prior the Fall are also obvious enough.

It would be easy enough for the twenty-first century mind to dismiss Evola’s thought in this regard as a mere pretentious appeal to irrationality, mysticism, superstition or obscurantism. Yet to do so would be to ignore the way in which Evola’s worldview represents a near-perfect spiritual metaphor for the essence of the thought of the man who was arguably the most radical and far-sighted thinker of modernity: Friedrich Nietzsche. Indeed, it is not implausible to interpret Evola’s work as an effort to place the Nietzschean worldview within a wider cultural-historical and metaphysical framework that seeks to provide a kind of reconciliation with the essential features of the world’s great religious traditions which have their roots in the early beginnings of human consciousness. Nietzsche, himself a radical materialist, likewise regarded the history of Western civilization as involving a process of degeneration from the high point of the pre-Socratic era. Both Nietzsche and Evola regarded modernity as the lowest yet achieved form of degenerative decadence with regards to expressions of human culture and civilization. The Nietzschean hope for the emergence of anubermenschen that has overcome the crisis of nihilism inspired by modern civilization and the Evolan hope for a revival of primordial Tradition as an antidote to the perceived darkness of the current age each represent quite similar impulses within human thought.

The Metaphysics of Sex

a30655.jpgIn keeping with his contemptuous view of modernity, Evola regarded modern sexual mores and forms of expression as degenerate. Just as Evola rejected modern evolutionary biology, so did he also oppose twentieth century approaches to the understanding of sexuality of the kind found in such fields as sociobiology, psychology, and the newly emergent discipline of sexology. Interestingly, Evola did not view the reproductive instinct in mankind to be the principal force driving sexuality and he criticized these academic disciplines for their efforts to interpret sexuality in terms of reproductive drives, regarding these efforts as a reflection of the materialistic reductionism which he so bitterly opposed. Evola’s use of the term “metaphysics” with regards to sexuality represents in part his efforts to differentiate what he considered to be the “first principles” of human sexuality from the merely biological instinct for the reproduction of the species, which he regarded as being among the basest and least meaningful aspects of sex. It is also interesting to note at this point that Evola himself never married or had children of his own. Nor is it known to what degree his own paralysis generated by injuries sustained during World War Two as a result of a 1945 Soviet bombing raid on Vienna affected his own reproductive capabilities or his views of sexuality.

Perhaps the most significant aspect of Evola’s analysis of sex is his rejection of not only the reproductive instinct but also of love as the most profound dimension of sexuality. Evola’s thought on this matter is sharp departure from the dominant forces in traditional Western thought with regards to sexual ethics. Plato postulated a kind of love that transcends the sexual and rises above it, thereby remaining non-sexual in nature. The Christian tradition subjects the sexual impulse and act to a form of sacralization by which the process of creating life becomes a manifestation of the divine order. Hence, the traditional Christian taboos against non-procreative sexual acts. Modern humanism of a secular-liberal nature elevates romantic love to the highest form of sexual expression. Hence, the otherwise inexplicable phenomena of the modern liberal embrace of non-procreative, non-marital or even homosexual forms of sexual expression, while maintaining something of a taboo against forms of non-romantic sexual expression such as prostitution or forms of sexuality and sexual expression regarded as incompatible with the egalitarian ethos of liberalism, such as polygamy or “sexist” pornography.

Evola’s own thought regarding sexuality diverges sharply from that of the Platonic ideal, the Christians, and the moderns alike. For Evola, sexuality has as its first purpose the achievement of unity in two distinctive ways. The first of these is the unity of the male and female dichotomy that defines the sexual division of the human species. Drawing once again on primordial traditions, Evola turns to the classical Greek myth of Hermaphroditus, the son of Hermes and Aphrodite who was believed to be a manifestation of both genders and who was depicted in the art of antiquity as having a male penis with female breasts in the same manner as the modern “she-male.” The writings of Ovid depict Hermaphroditus as a beautiful young boy who was seduced by the nymph Salmacis and subsequently transformed into a male/female hybrid as a result of the union. The depiction of this story in the work of Theophrastus indicates that Hermaphroditus symbolized the marital union of a man and woman.

The concept of unity figures prominently in the Evolan view of sexuality on another level. Just as the sexual act is an attempt at reunification of the male and female division of the species, so is sexuality also an attempt to reunite the physical element of the human being with the spiritual. Again, Evola departs from the Platonic, Christian, and modern views of sexuality. The classical and the modern overemphasize such characteristics as romantic love or aesthetic beauty in Evola’s view, while the Christian sacralization of sexuality relegates the physical aspect to the level of the profane. However, Evola does not reject the notion of a profane dimension to sexuality. Instead, Evola distinguishes the profane from the transcendent. Profane expressions of sexuality are those of a non-transcendent nature. These can include both the hedonic pursuit of sexual pleasure as an end unto itself, but it also includes sexual acts with romantic love as their end.

Indeed, Evola’s analysis of sexuality would be shockingly offensive to the sensibilities of traditionalists within the Abrahamic cults and those of modern liberal humanists alike. Evola is as forthright as any of the modern left-wing sexologists of his mid-twentieth century era (for instance, Alfred Kinseyor Wilhelm Reich7) in the frankness of his discussion of the many dimensions of human sexuality, including sexual conduct of the most fringe nature. Some on the contemporary “far Right” of nationalist politics have attempted to portray Evola’s view of homosexuality as the equivalent of that of a conventional Christian “homophobe.” Yet a full viewing of Evola’s writing on the homosexual questions does not lend itself to such an interpretation. The following passage fromThe Metaphysics of Sex is instructive on this issue:

In natural homosexuality or in the predisposition to it, the most straightforward explanation is provided by what we said earlier about the differing levels of sexual development and about the fact that the process of sexual development in its physical and, even more so, in its psychic aspects can be incomplete. In that way, the original bisexual nature is surpassed to a lesser extent than in a “normal” human being, the characteristics of one sex not being predominant over those of the other sex to the same extent. Next we must deal with what M. Hirschfeld called the “intermediate sexual forms”. In cases of this kind (for instance, when a person who is nominally a man is only 60 percent male) it is impossible that the erotic attraction based on the polarity of the sexes in heterosexuality – which is much stronger the more the man is male and the woman is female – can also be born between individuals who, according to the birth registry and as regards only the so-called primary sexual characteristics, belong to the same sex, because in actual fact they are “intermediate forms”. In the case of pederasts, Ulrich said rightly that it is possible to find “the soul of a woman born in the body of a man”.

But it is necessary to take into account the possibility of constitutional mutations, a possibility that has been given little consideration by sexologists; that is, we must also bear in mind cases of regression. It may be that the governing power on which the sexual nature of a given individual depends (a nature that is truly male or truly female) may grow weak through neutralization, atrophy, or reduction of the latent state of the characteristics of the other sex, and this may lead to the activation and emergence of these recessive characteristics. And here the surroundings and the general atmosphere of society can play a not unimportant part. In a civilization where equality is the standard, where differences are not linked, where promiscuity is a favor, where the ancient idea of “being true to oneself” means nothing anymore – in such a splintered and materialistic society, it is clear that this phenomenon of regression and homosexuality should be particularly welcome, and therefore it is in no way a surprise to see the alarming increase in homosexuality and the “third sex” in the latest “democratic” period, or an increase in sex changes to an extent unparalleled in other eras.8


In his recognition of the possibility of “the soul of a woman born in the body of man” or “intermediate” sexual forms, Evola’s language and analysis somewhat resembles the contemporary cultural Left’s fascination with the “transgendered” or the “intersexed.” Where Evola’s thought is to be most sharply differentiated from that of modern leftists is not on the matter of sex-phobia, but on the question of sexual egalitarianism. Unlike the Christian puritans who regard deviants from the heterosexual, procreative sexual paradigm as criminals against the natural order, Evola apparently understood the existence of such “sexual identities” as a naturally occurring phenomenon. Unlike modern liberals, Evola opposed the elevation of such sexual identities or practices to the level of equivalence with “normal” procreative and kinship related forms of sexual expression and relationship. On the contemporary question of same-sex marriage, for example, Evolan thought recognizes that the purpose of marriage is not individual gratification, but the construction of an institution for the reproduction of the species and the proliferation and rearing of offspring. An implication of Evola’s thought on these questions for conservative revolutionaries in the twenty-first century is that the populations conventionally labeled as sexual deviants by societies where the Abrahamic cults shape the wider cultural paradigm need not be shunned, despised, feared, or subject to persecution. Homosexuals, for instance, have clearly made important contributions to Western civilization. However, the liberal project of elevating either romantic love or hedonic gratification as the highest end of sexuality, and of equalizing “normal” and “deviant” forms of sexual expression, must likewise be rejected if relationships between family, tribe, community, and nation are to be understood as the essence of civilization.

The nature of Evola’s opposition to modern pornography and the relationship of this opposition to his wider thought regarding sexuality is perhaps the most instructive with regards to the differentiation to be made between Evola’s outlook and that of Christian moralists. Evola’s opposition to pornography was not its explicit nature or its deviation from procreative, marital expressions of sexuality as the idealized norm. Indeed, Evola highly regarded sexual practices of a ritualized nature, including orgiastic religious rites of the kind found in certain forms of paganism, to be among the most idyllic forms of sexual expression of the highest, spiritualized variety. Christian puritans of the present era might well find Evola’s views on these matters to be even more appalling than those of ordinary contemporary liberals. Evola also considered ritualistic or ascetic celibacy to be such an idyllic form. The basis of Evola’s objection to pornography was its baseness, it commercial nature, and its hedonic ends, all of which Evola regarding as diminishing its erotic nature to the lowest possible level. Evola would no doubt regard the commercialized hyper-sexuality that dominates the mass media and popular culture of the Western world of the twenty-first century as a symptom rather than as a cause of the decadence of modernity.

Originally published in Thoughts & Perspectives: Evola, a compilation of essays on Julius Evola, published by ARKTOS.


Wegierski, Mark. The New Right in Europe. TelosWinter93/Spring94, Issue 98-99.

2 Evola, Julius. Eros and the Mysteries of Love: The Metaphysics of Sex. English translation. New York: Inner Traditions, 1983. Originally published in Italy by Edizioni Meditterranee, 1969.

Evola, Julius. The Yoga of Power: Tantra, Shakti, and the Secret Way. English translation by Guido Stucci. New York: Inner Traditions, 1992. Originally published in 1949.

4 Evola, Julius. Revolt Against the Modern World: Politics, Religion, and Social Order in the Kali Yuga. English translation by Guido Stucco. New York: Inner Traditions, 1995. From the 1969 edition. Originally published in Milan by Hoepli in 1934.

5 Cremo, Michael A. Human Devolution: A Vedic Alternative to Darwin’s Theory. Torchlight Publishing, 2003.

6 Pomeroy, Wardell. Dr. Kinsey and the Institute for Sex Research. New York: Harper & Row, 1972.

7 Sharaf, Myron. Fury on Earth: A Biography of Wilhelm Reich. Da Capo Press, 1994.

Evola, Eros and the Mysteries of Love: The Metaphysics of Sex, pp. 62-63.


Cremo, Michael A. Human Devolution: A Vedic Alternative to Darwin’s Theory. Torchlight Publishing, 2003.

Evola, Julius. Eros and the Mysteries of Love: The Metaphysics of Sex. English translation. New York: Inner Traditions, 1983. Originally published in Italy by Edizioni Meditterranee, 1969.

Evola, Julius. Revolt Against the Modern World: Politics, Religion, and Social Order in the Kali Yuga. English translation by Guido Stucco. New York: Inner Traditions, 1995. From the 1969 edition. Originally published in Milan by Hoepli in 1934.

Evola, Julius. The Yoga of Power: Tantra, Shakti, and the Secret Way. English translation by Guido Stucci. New York: Inner Traditions, 1992. Originally published in 1949.

Pomeroy, Wardell. Dr. Kinsey and the Institute for Sex Research. New York: Harper & Row, 1972.

Sharaf, Myron. Fury on Earth: A Biography of Wilhelm Reich. Da Capo Press, 1994.

Wegierski, Mark. The New Right in Europe. TelosWinter93/Spring94, Issue 98-99.

lundi, 24 septembre 2012

Mercury Rising: The Life and Writings of Julius Evola


Mercury Rising: The Life and Writings of Julius Evola


by Gwendolyn Toynton

Ex: http://openrevolt.info/

If the industrious man, through taking action,

Does not succeed, he should not be blamed for that –

He still perceives the truth.

The Sauptikaparvan of the Mahābhārata (2,16)


If we could select a single aspect by which to define Julius Evola, it would have been his desire to transcend the ordinary and the world of the profane. It was characterized by a thirst for the Absolute, which the Germans call mehr als leben – “more than living”. This idea of transcending worldly existence colours not only his ideas and philosophy, it is also evident throughout his life which reads like a litany of successes. During the earlier years Evola excelled at whatever he chose to apply himself to: his talents were evident in the field of literature, for which he would be best remembered, and also in the arts and occult circles.


Born in Rome on the 19th of May in 1898, Giulio Cesare Andrea Evola was the son of an aristocratic Sicilian family, and like many children born in Sicily, he had received a stringent Catholic upbringing. As he recalled in his intellectual autobiography, Il cammino del cinabro [1963, 1972, The Cinnabar’s Journey], his favourite pastimes consisted of painting, one of his natural talents, and of visiting the library as often as he could in order to read works by Oscar Wilde, Friedrich Nietzsche, and Otto Weininger.[1] During his youth he also studied engineering, receiving excellent grades but chose to discontinue his studies prior to the completion of his doctorate, because he “did not wish to be bourgeois, like his fellow students.” At the age of nineteen Evola joined the army and participated in World War I as a mountain artillery officer. This experience would serve as an inspiration for his use of mountains as metaphors for solitude and ascension above the chthonic forces of the earth. Evola was also a friend of Mircea Eliade, who kept in correspondence with Evola from 1927 until his death. He was also an associate of the Tibetologist Giuseppe Tucci and the Tantric scholar Sir John Woodroofe (Arthur Avalon).

During his younger years Evola was briefly involved in art circles, and despite this being only a short lived affair, it was also a time that brought him great rewards. Though he would later denounce Dada as a decadent form of art it was within the field of modern art that Evola first made his name, taking a particular interest in Marinetti and Futurism. His oil painting, Inner Landscape, 10:30 a.m., is hanging today on a wall of the National Gallery of Modern Art in Rome.[2] He also composed Arte Astratta (Abstract Art) but later, after experiencing a personal crisis, turned to the study of Nietzsche, from which sprang his Teoria dell, individuo assoluto (Theory of the Absolute Individual) in 1925. By 1921 Evola had abandoned the pursuit of art as the means to place his unique mark on the world. The revolutionary attitudes of Marinetti, the Futurist movement and the so-called avant-garde which had once fascinated him, no longer appeared worthwhile to Evola with their juvenile emphasis on shocking the bourgeoisie. Likewise, despite being a talented poet, Evola (much like another of his inspirations – Arthur Rimbaud) abandoned poetry at the age of twenty four. Evola did not write another poem nor paint another picture for over forty years. Thus, being no longer enamored of the arts, Evola chose instead to pursue another field entirely that he would one day award him even greater acclaim.

To this day, the magical workings of the Ur Group and its successor Krur remain as some the most sophisticated techniques for the practice of esoteric knowledge laid down in the modern Western era. Based on a variety of primary sources, ranging from Hermetic texts to advanced Yogic techniques, Evola occupied a prominent role in both of these groups. He wrote a number of articles for Ur and edited many of the others. These articles were collected in the book Introduction to Magic: Rituals and Practical Techniques for the Magus, which alongside Evola’s articles, are included the works of Arturo Reghini, Giulio Parese, Ercole Quadrelli and Gustave Meyrink. The original title of this work in Italian, Introduzione alla Magia quale scienza dell’lo, literally translates as Introduction to Magic as a Science of the “I”.[3] In this sense, the ‘I’ is best interpreted as the ego, or the manipulation of the will – an idea which is also the found in the work of that other famous magician, Aleister Crowley and his notion of Thelema. The original format of Ur was as a monthly publication, of which the first issue was printed in January 1927.[4]

Contributors to this publication included Count Giovanni di Caesaro, a Steinerian, Emilio Servadio, a distinguished psychoanalyst, and Guido de Giorgio, a well-known adherent of Rudolph Steiner and an author of works on the Hermetic tradition. It was during this period, that he was introduced to Arturo Reghini, whose ideas would leave a lasting impression on Evola. Arturo Reghini (1878-1946), was interested in speculative Masonry and the anthroposophy of Rudolf Steiner, introduced Evola to Guénon’s writings and invited him to join the Ur group. Ur and its successor, Krur, gathered together a number of people interested in Guénon’s exposition of the Hermetic tradition and in Vedanta, Taoism, Buddhism, Tantra, and magic.

Arturo Reghini was to be a major influence on Evola, and himself was a representative of the so-called Italian School (Scuola Italica), a secret order which claimed to have survived the downfall of the Roman Empire, to have re-emerged with Emperor Frederic II, and to have inspired the Florentine poets of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, up to Petrarch. Like Evola, Reghini had also written articles, one of which was entitled Pagan Imperialism. This appeared in Salamandra in 1914, and in it Reghini summed up his anti-Catholic program for a return to a glorious pagan past. This piece had a profound impact on Evola, and it served as the inspiration for his similarly titled Imperialismo pagano. Imperialismo pagano, chronicling the negative effects of Christianity on the world, appeared in 1928. In the context of this work, Evola is the advocate of an anti-Roman Catholic pagan imperialism. According to Evola, Christianity had destroyed the imperial universality of the Roman Empire by insisting on the separation of the secular and the spiritual. It is from this separation that arose the inherent decadence and inward decay of the modern era. Out of Christianity’s implacable opposition to the healthy paganism of the Mediterranean world arose the secularism, democracy, materialism, scientism, socialism, and the “subtle Bolshevism” that heralded the final age of the current cosmic cycle: the age of “obscurity” the Kali-Yuga.[5] Imperialismo pagano was to be later revised in a German edition as Heidnischer Imperialismus. The changes that occurred in the text of Evola’s Imperialismo pagano in its translation as Heidnischer Imperialismus five years later were not entirely inconsequential. Although the fundamental concepts that comprised the substance of Evola’s thought remained similar, a number of critical elements were altered that would transform a central point in Evola’s thinking. The “Mediterranean tradition” of the earlier text is consistently replaced with the “Nordic-solar tradition” in this translation.[6] In 1930 Evola founded his own periodical, La Torre (The Tower). La Torre, the heir to Krur, differed from the two earlier publications Ur and Krur in the following way, as was announced in an editorial insert:

Our Activity in 1930 – To the Readers: “Krur is transforming. Having fulfilled the tasks relative to the technical mastery of esotericism we proposed for ourselves three years ago, we have accepted the invitation to transfer our action to a vaster, more visible, more immediate field: the very plane of Western ‘culture’ and the problems that, in this moment of crisis, afflict both individual and mass consciousness [..] for all these reasons Krur will be changed to the title La Torre [The Tower], ‘a work of diverse expressions and one Tradition.’”[7]

La Torre was attacked by official fascist bodies such as L’Impero and Anti-Europa, and publication of La Torre ceased after only ten issues. Evola also contributed an article entitled Fascism as Will to Imperium and Christianity to the review Critica Fascista, edited by Evola’s old friend Giuseppi Bottai. Here again he launches vociferous opposition to Christianity and attests to its negative effects, evident in the rise of a pious, hypocritical, and greedy middle class lacking in all superior solar virtues that Evola attributed to ancient Rome. The article did not pass unnoticed and was vigorously attacked in many Italian periodicals. It was also the subject of a long article in the prestigious Revue Internationale des Sociétés Secrètes (Partie Occultiste) for April 1928, under the title “Un Sataniste Italien: Jules Evola.”


Coupled with notoriety of Evola’s La Torre, was also another, more bizarre incident involving the Ur Groups reputation, and their attempts to form a “magical chain”. Although these attempts to exert supernatural influence on others were soon abandoned, a rumour quickly developed that the group had wished to kill Mussolini by these means. Evola describes this event in his autobiography Il Cammino del Cinabro.


Someone reported this argument [that the death of a head of state might be brought about by magic] and some yarn about our already dissolved “chain of Ur” may also have been added, all of which led the Duce to think that there was a plot to use magic against him. But when he heard the true facts of the matter, Mussolini ceased all action against us. In reality Mussolini was very open to suggestion and also somewhat superstitious (the reaction of a mentality fundamentally incapable of true spirituality). For example, he had a genuine fear of fortune-tellers and any mention of them was forbidden in his presence.


It was also during this period that Evola also discovered something which was to become a profound influence on many his ideas: the lost science of Hermeticism. Though he undoubtedly came into contact with this branch of mysticism through Reghini and fellow members of Ur, it seems that Evola’s extraordinary knowledge of Hermeticism actually arose from another source. Jacopo da Coreglia writes that it was a priest, Father Francesco Olivia, who had made the most far-reaching progress in Hermetic science and sensing a prodigious student –granted Evola access to documents that were usually strictly reserved for adepts of the narrow circle. These were concerned primarily with the teachings of the Fraternity of Myriam (Fratellanza Terapeutica Magica di Myriam), founded by Doctor Giuliano Kremmerz, pseudonym of Ciro Formisano, 1861-1930). Evola mentions in The Hermetic Tradition that the Myriam’s “Pamphlet D” laid the groundwork for his understanding of the four elements.[8] Evola’s knowledge of Hermeticism and the alchemical arts was not limited to Western sources either, for he also knew an Indian alchemist by the name of C.S. Narayana Swami Aiyar of Chingleput[9].  During this era of history, Indian alchemy was almost completely unknown to the Western world, and it is only in modern times that it has been studied in relation to the occidental texts.

In 1926 Evola published an article in Ultra (the newspaper of the Theosophical Lodge in Rome) on the cult of Mithras in which he placed major emphasis on the similarities of these mysteries with Hermeticism.[10] During this period he also wrote saggi sull’idealismo magico [1925; Essays on Magic Idealism], and L’individuo ed il divenire del mondo [1926; The Individual and the Becoming of the World], this article was to be followed by the publication of his treatise on alchemy, La Tradizione ermetica (The Hermetic Tradition). Such was the scope and depth of this work that Karl Jung even quoted Evola to support his own contention that “the alchemical opus deals in the main not just with chemical experiments as such, but also with something resembling psychic processes expressed in pseudo-chemical language.”[11] Unfortunately, the support expressed by Jung was not mutual, for Evola did not accept Jung’s hypothesis that alchemy was merely a psychic process.

Taking issue with René Guénon’s (1886-1951) view that spiritual authority ranks higher than royal power, Evola wrote L’uomo come potenza [Man as power]; in the third revised edition (1949), the title was changed to Lo yoga della potenza [The yoga of power].[12]This was Evola’s treatise of Hindu Tantra, for which he consulted primary sources on Kaula Tantra, which at the time were largely unknown in the Western world. Decio Calvari, president of the Italian Independent Theosophical League, introduced Evola to the study of Tantrism.[13]Evola was also granted access to authentic Tantric texts directly from the Kaula school of Tantrism via his association with Sir John Woodroofe, who was not only a respected scholar, but was also a Tantric practitioner himself, under the famous pseudonym of Arthur Avalon. A substantial proportion of The Yoga of Power is derived from Sir John Woodroofe’s personal notes on Kaula Tantrism. Even today Woodroofe is regarded as a leading pioneer in the early research of Tantrism.

Evola’s opinion that the royal or Ksatriya path in Tantrism outranks that of the Brahmanic or priestly path, is readily supported by the Tantric texts themselves, in which the Vira or active mode of practice is exalted above that of the priestly mode in Kaula Tantrism. In this regard, the heroic or solar path of Tantrism represented to Evola, a system based not on theory, but on practice – an active path appropriate to be taught in the degenerate epoch of the Hindu Kali Yuga or Dark Age, in which purely intellectual or contemplative paths to divinity have suffered a great decrease in their effectiveness.

In the words of Evola himself:

“During the last years of the 1930s I devoted myself to working on two of my most important books on Eastern wisdom: I completely revised L’uomo come potenza [Man As Power], which was given a new title, Lo yoga della potenza [The Yoga of Power], and wrote a systematic work concerning primitive Buddhism entitled La dottrina del risveglio [The Doctrine of Awakening].”[14]

Evola’s work on the early history of Buddhism was published in 1943. The central theme of this work is not the common view of Buddhism, as a path of spiritual renunciation –instead it focuses on the Buddha’s role as a Ksatriya ascetic, for it was to this caste that he belonged, as is found in early Buddhist records.

The historical Siddharta was a prince of the Śakya, a kṣatriya (belonging to the warrior caste), an “ascetic fighter” who opened a path by himself with his own strength. Thus Evola emphasizes the “aristocratic” character of primitive Buddhism, which he defines as having the “presence in it of a virile and warrior strength (the lion’s roar is a designation of Buddha’s proclamation) that is applied to a nonmaterial and atemporal plane…since it transcends such a plane, leaving it behind.”[15]

The book considered by many to be Evola’s masterpiece, Revolt Against the Modern World was published in 1934, and was influenced by Oswald Spengler’s Decline of the West (1918) and René Guénon’s The Crisis of the Modern World (1927), both of which had been previously translated into Italian by Evola. Spengler’s contribution in this regard was the plurality of civilizations, which then fell into patterns of birth, growth and decline. This was combined with Guénon’s ideas on the “Dark Age” or Hindu Kali Yuga, which similarly portrays a bleak image of civilizations in decline. The work also draws upon the writings of Bachofen in regards to the construction of a mythological grounding for the history of civilizations. The original version of Julius Evola’s The Mystery of the Grail formed an appendix to the first edition of Rivolta contra il mondo moderno, and as such is closely related to this work.[16] Three years later he reworked that appendix into the present book, which first appeared as part of a series of  religious and esoteric studies published by the renowned Laterza Publishers in Italy, whose list included works by Sigmund Freud, Richard Wilhelm, and C. G. Jung, among others. In this book Evola writes three main premises concerning the Grail myths: That the Grail is not a Christian Mystery, but a Hyperborean one, that it is a mystery tradition, and that it deals with a restoration of sacred regality. Evola describes his work on the Grail in the epilogue to the first edition (1937).

To live and understand the symbol of the Grail in its purity would mean today the awakening of powers that could supply a transcendental point of reference for it, an awakening that could show itself tomorrow, after a great crisis, in the form of an “epoch that goes beyond nations.” It would also mean the release of the so-called world revolution from the false myths that poison it and that make possible its subjugation through dark, collectivistic, and irrational powers. In addition, it would mean understanding the way to a true unity that would be genuinely capable of going beyond not only the materialistic – we could say Luciferian and Titanic – forms of power and control but also the lunar forms of the remnants of religious humility and the current neospiritualistic dissipation.[17]

Another of Evola’s books, Eros and the Mysteries of Love, could almost be seen as a continuation of his experimentation with Tantrism. Indeed, the book does not deal with the erotic principle in the normal of sense of the word, but rather approaches the topic as a highly conceptualized interplay of polarities, adopted from the Traditional use of erotic elements in eastern and western mysticism and philosophy. Thus what is described here is the path to sacred sexuality, and the use of the erotic principle to transcend the normal limitations of consciousness. Evola describes his book in the following passage.

But in this study, metaphysics will also have a second meaning, one that is not unrelated to the world’s origin since “metaphysics” literally means the science of that which goes beyond the physical. In our research, this “beyond the physical” will not cover abstract concepts or philosophical ideas, but rather that which may evolve from an experience that is not merely physical, but transpsychological and transphysiological. We shall achieve this through the doctrine of the manifold states of being and through an anthropology that is not restricted to the simple soul-body dichotomy, but is aware of “subtle” and even transcendental modalities of human consciousness. Although foreign to contemporary thought, knowledge of this kind formed an integral part of ancient learning and of the traditions of varied peoples.[18]

Another of Evola’s major works is Meditations Among the Peaks, wherein mountaineering is equated to ascension. This idea is found frequently in a number of Traditions, where mountains are often revered as an intermediary between the forces of heaven and earth. Evola was an accomplished mountaineer and completed some difficult climbs such as the north wall of the Eastern Lyskam in 1927. He also requested in his will that after his death the urn containing his ashes be deposited in a glacial crevasse on Mount Rosa.

Evola’s main political work was Men Among the Ruins. This was to be the ninth of Evola’s books to published in English. Written at the same time as Men Among the Ruins, Evola composed Ride the Tiger which is complementary to this work, even though it was not published until 1961.These books belong together and cannot really be judged seperately. Men among the Ruins shows the universal standpoint of ideal politics; Riding the Tiger deals with the practical “existential” perspective for the individual who wants to preserve his “hegomonikon” or inner sovereignty.[19]  Ride the Tiger is essentially a philosophical set of guidelines entwining various strands of his earlier thought into a single work. Underlying the more obvious sources which Evola cites within the text, such as Nietzsche, Sartre and Heidegger, there are also connections with Hindu thoughts on the collapse of civilization and the Kali Yuga. In many ways, this work is the culmination of Evola’s thought on the role of Tradition in the Age of Darkness – that the Traditional approach advocated in the East is to harness the power of the Kali Yuga, by ‘Riding the Tiger’ – which is also a popular Tantric saying. To this extent, it is not an approach of withdrawal from the modern world which Evola advocates, but instead achieving a mastery of the forces of darkness and materialism inherent in the Kali Yuga. Similarly, his attitude to politics alters here from that expressed in Men Among the Ruins, calling instead for a type of individual that is apoliteia.

[..] this type can only feel disinterested and detached from everything that is “politics” today. His principle will become apoliteia, as it was called in ancient times. [..] Apoliteia is the distance unassailable by this society and its “values”; it does not accept being bound by anything spiritual or moral[20]

In addition to the Evola’s main corpus of texts mentioned previously, he also published numerous other works such as The Way of the Samurai, The Path of Enlightenment According to the Mithraic Mysteries, Il Cammino del Cinabro, Taoism: The Magic, The Mysticism and The Bow and the Club. He also translated Oswald Spengler’s Decline of the West, as well as the principle works of Bachofen, Guénon, Weininger and Gabriel Marcel.

In 1945 Evola was hit by a stray bomb and paralyzed from the waist downwards. He died on June 11, 1974 in Rome. He had asked to be led from his desk to the window from which one could see the Janiculum (the holy hill sacred to Janus, the two-faced god who gazes into this and the other world), to die in an upright position. After his death the body was cremated and his ashes were scattered in a glacier atop Mount Rosa, in accordance with his wishes.

[1] Julius Evola, The Yoga of Power: Tantra, Shakti, and the Secret Way, (Vermont: Inner Traditions, 1992) ix

[2]Ibid., x

[3] Julius Evola, Introduction to Magic: Rituals and Practical Techniques for the Magus, (Vermont: Inner Traditions, 2001) ix.

[4] Ibid., xvii

[5] A. James Gregor, Mussolini’s Intellectuals (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2005), 198

[6]Ibid., 201

[7]Julius Evola, Introduction to Magic: Rituals and Practical Techniques for the Magus, xxi

[8] Julius Evola, The Hermetic Tradition: Symbols & Teachings of the Royal Art,  (Vermont: Inner Traditions, 1992) ix

[9] Ibid., ix

[10] Ibid., viii

[11]Julius Evola, The Yoga of Power: Tantra, Shakti, and the Secret Way, xii

[12] Ibid., xiv

[13] Ibid., xiii

[14] Julius Evola, The Doctrine of Awakening: The Attainment of Self-Mastery According to the Earliest Buddhist Texts, (Vermont: Inner Traditions, 1996) xi

[15] Ibid., xv

[16] Julius Evola, The Mystery of the Grail: Initiation and Magic in the Quest for the Spirit, (Vermont: Inner Traditions, 1997)  vii

[17] Ibid., ix

[18] Julius Evola, Eros and the Mysteries of Love: The Metaphysics of Sex, (Vermont: Inner Traditions, 1991), 2

[19]  Julius Evola, Men Among the Ruins: Post-War Reflections of a Radical Traditionalist, (Vermont: Inner Traditions, 2003) 89

[20] Julius Evola, Ride the Tiger: A Survival Manual for the Aristocrats of the Soul , (Vermont: Inner Traditions, 2003)174-175

Gwendolyn can be contacted at Primordial Traditions.  Please show support!

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jeudi, 20 septembre 2012

Unthinking Liberalism: A. Dugin’s The Fourth Political Theory

Unthinking Liberalism:
Alexander Dugin’s The Fourth Political Theory


Ex: http://www.counter-currents.com/

Alexander Dugin
The Fourth Political Theory, London: Arktos, 2012

Arktos recently published what we can only hope will be the first of many more English translations of Alexander Dugin’s work. Head of the sociology department in Moscow State University, and a leading Eurasianist with ties to the Russian military, this man is, today, influencing official Kremlin policy.

The Fourth Political Theory is a thoroughly refreshing monograph, combining clarity of analysis, philosophical rigor, and intellectual creativity. It is Dugin’s attempt to sort through the confusion of modern political theory and establish the foundations for a political philosophy that will decisively challenge the dominant liberal paradigm. It is not, however, a new complete political theory, but rather the beginning of a project. The name is provisional, the theory under construction. Dugin sees this not as the work of one man, but, because difficult, a collective heroic effort.

The book first sets out the historical topology of modern political theories. In Dugin’s account, liberalism, the oldest and most stable ideology, was in modernity the first political theory. Marxism, a critique of liberalism via capitalism, was the second. Fascism/National Socialism, a critique of both liberalism and Marxism, was the third. Dugin says that Fascism/National Socialism was defeated by Marxism (1945), that Marxism was defeated by liberalism (1989), leaving liberalism triumphant and therefore free to expand around the globe.

According to Dugin, the triumph of liberalism has been so definitive, in fact, that in the West it has ceased to be political, or ideological, and become a taken-for-granted practice. Westerners think in liberal terms by default, assuming that no sane, rational, educated person could think differently, accusing dissenters of being ideological, without realizing that their own assumptions have ideological origins.

The definitive triumph of liberalism has also meant that it is now so fully identified with modernity that it is difficult to separate the two, whereas control of modernity was once contested by political theory number one against political theories two and three. The advent of postmodernity, however, has marked the complete exhaustion of liberalism. It has nothing new to say, so it is reduced endlessly to recycle and reiterate itself.

Looking to identify what may be useful to salvage, Dugin proceeds to break down each of the three ideologies into its component parts. In the process of doing so, he detoxifies the two discredited critiques of liberalism, which is necessary to be able to cannibalize them. His analysis of liberalism follows Alain de Benoist. Because it is crucial, I will avail myself of de Benoist’s insights and infuse some of my own in Dugin’s explication of liberalism.

Dugin says that liberalism’s historical subject is the individual. The idea behind liberalism was to “liberate” the individual from everything that was external to him (faith, tradition, authority). Out of this springs the rest: when you get rid of the transcendent, you end up with a world that is entirely rational and material. Happiness then becomes a question of material increase. This leads to productivism and economism, which, when the individual is paramount, demands capitalism. When you get rid of the transcendent, you also eliminate hierarchy: all men become equal. If all men are equal, then what applies to one must apply to all, which means universalism. Similarly, if all men are equal, then all deserve an equal slice of the pie, so full democracy, with universal suffrage, becomes the ideal form of government. Liberalism has since developed flavors, and the idea of liberation acquires two competing meanings: “freedom from,” which in America is embodied by libertarians and the Tea Party; and “freedom to,” embodied by Democrats.

Marxism’s historical subject is class. Marxism is concerned chiefly with critiquing the inequities arising from capitalism. Otherwise, it shares with liberalism an ethos of liberation, a materialist worldview, and an egalitarian morality.

Fascism’s historical subject is the state, and National Socialism’s race. Both critique Marxism’s and liberalism’s materialist worldview and egalitarian morality. Hence, the simultaneous application of hierarchy and socialism.

With all the parts laid out on the table, Dugin then selects what he finds useful and discards the rest. Unsurprisingly, Dugin finds nothing useful in liberalism. The idea is to unthink it, after all.

Spread out across several chapters, Dugin provides a typology of the different factions in the modern political landscape—e.g., fundamental conservatism (traditionalism), Left-wing conservatism (Strasserism, National Bolshevism, Niekisch), conservative revolution (Spengler, Jünger, Schmitt, Niekisch), New Left, National Communism, etc. It is essential that readers understand these so that they may easily recognize them, because doing so will clarify much and help them avoid the errors arising from opaque, confused, contradictory, or misleading labels.

Liberal conservatism is a key category in this typology. It may sound contradictory on the surface, because in colloquial discourse mainstream politics is about the opposition of liberals vs. conservatives. Yet, and as I have repeatedly stated, when one examines their fundamentals, so-called “conservatives” (a misleading label), even palaeoconservatives (another misleading label), are all ideologically liberals, only they wish to conserve liberalism, or go a little slower, or take a few steps back. Hence, the alternative designation for this type: “status-quo conservative.”

Another key category is National Communism. This is, according to Dugin, a unique phenomenon, and enjoys a healthy life in Latin America, suggesting it will be around for some time to come. Evo Morales and Hugo Chavez are contemporary practitioners of National Communism.

Setting out the suggested foundations of a fourth political ideology takes up the rest of Dugin’s book. Besides elements salvaged from earlier critiques of liberalism, Dugin also looks at the debris that in the philosophical contest for modernity was left in the periphery. These are the ideas for which none of the ideologies of modernity have had any use. For Dugin this is essential to an outsider, counter-propositional political theory. He does not state this in as many words, but it should be obvious that if we are to unthink liberalism, then liberalism should find its nemesis unthinkable.

But the process of construction begins, of course, with ontology. Dugin refers to Heidegger’s Dasein. Working from this concept he would like the fourth political theory to conceptualize the world as a pluriverse, with different peoples who have different moralities and even different conceptions of time. In other words, in the fourth political theory the idea of a universal history would be absurd, because time is conceived differently in different cultures—nothing is ahistorical or universal; everything is bound and specific. This would imply a morality of difference, something I have proposed as counter-propositional to the liberal morality of equality. In the last consequence, for Dugin there needs to be also a peculiar ontology of the future. The parts of The Fourth Political Theory dealing with these topics are the most challenging, requiring some grounding in philosophy, but, unsurprisingly, they are also where the pioneering work is being done.

Also pioneering, and presumably more difficult still, is Dugin’s call to “attack the individual.” By this he means, obviously, destabilizing the taken-for-granted construct that comprises the minimum social unit in liberalism—the discrete social atom that acts on the basis of rational self-interest, a construct that should be distinguished from “a man” or “a woman” or “a human.” Dugin makes some suggestions, but these seem nebulous and not very persuasive at this stage. Also, this seems quite a logical necessity within the framework of this project, but Dugin’s seeds will find barren soil in the West, where the individual is almost sacrosanct and where individualism results from what is possibly an evolved bias in Northern European societies, where this trait may have been more adaptive than elsewhere. A cataclysmic event may be required to open up the way for a redefinition of what it is to be a person. Evidently the idea is that the fourth political theory conceptualizes a man not as an “individual” but as something else, presumably as part of a collectivity. This is probably a very Russian way of looking at things.

The foregoing may all seem highly abstract, and I suspect practically minded readers will not take to it. It is hard to see how the abstract theorizing will satisfy the pragmatic Anglo-Saxon, who is suspicious of philosophy generally. (Jonathan Bowden was an oddity in this regard.) Yet there are real-world implications to the theory, and in Dugin’s work the geopolitical dimension must never be kept out of sight.

For Dugin, triumphant liberalism is embodied by Americanism; the United States, through its origins as an Enlightenment project, and through its superpower status in the twentieth and twenty-first century, is the global driver of liberal practice. As such, with the defeat of Marxism, it has created, and sought to perpetuate, a unipolar world defined by American, or Atlanticist, liberal hegemony. Russia has a long anti-Western, anti-liberal tradition, and for Dugin this planetary liberal hegemony is the enemy. Dugin would like the world to be multipolar, with Atlanticism counterbalanced by Eurasianism, and maybe other “isms.” In geopolitics, the need for a fourth political theory arises from a need to keep liberalism permanently challenged, confined to its native hemisphere, and, in a word, out of Russia.

While this dimension exists, and while there may be a certain anti-Americanism in Dugin’s work, Americans should not dismiss this book out of hand, because it is not anti-America. As Michael O’Meara has pointed out in relation to Yockey’s anti-Americanism, Americanism and America, or Americans, are different things and stand often in opposition. Engaging with this kind of oppositional thinking is, then, necessary for Americans. And the reason is this: liberalism served America well for two hundred years, but ideologies have a life-cycle like everything else, and liberalism has by now become hypertrophic and hypertelic; it is, in other words, killing America and, in particular, the European-descended presence in America.

If European-descended Americans are to save themselves, and to continue having a presence in the North American continent, rather than being subsumed by liberal egalitarianism and the consequent economic bankruptcy, Hispanization, and Africanization, the American identity, so tied up with liberalism because of the philosophical bases of its founding documents, would need to be re-imagined. Though admittedly difficult, the modern American identity must be understood as one that is possible out of many. Sources for a re-imagined identity may be found in the archaic substratum permeating the parts of American heritage that preceded systematic liberalism (the early colonial period) as well as in the parts that were, at least for a time, beyond it (the frontier and the Wild West). In other words, the most mystical and also the least “civilized” parts of American history. Yet even this may be problematic, since they were products of late “Faustian” civilization. A descent into barbarism may be in the cards. Only time will tell.

For Westerners in general, Dugin’s project may well prove too radical, even at this late stage in the game—contemplating it would seem first to necessitate a decisive rupture. Unless/until that happens, conservative prescriptions calling for a return to a previous state of affairs (in the West), or a closer reading of the founding documents (in America), will remain a feature of Western dissidence. In other words, even the dissidents will remain conservative restorationists of the classical ideas of the center, or the ideas that led to the center. Truly revolutionary thinking—the re-imagining and reinvention of ourselves—will, however, ultimately come from the periphery rather than the center.


Article printed from Counter-Currents Publishing: http://www.counter-currents.com

URL to article: http://www.counter-currents.com/2012/09/unthinking-liberalism/

Derechos humanos como disvalor



Derechos humanos como disvalor


Alberto Buela (*)


Como hace muchos años que venimos escribiendo sobre el tema de los derechos humanos y lo hemos encarado desde distintos ángulos: a) derechos humanos de primera, segunda y tercera generación, b) derechos humanos e ideología, c) derechos humanos o derechos de los pueblos, d) derechos humanos: crisis o decadencia.

En esta ocasión vamos a meditar sobre los derechos humanos como un disvalor o, si se quiere para que sea más comprensible, como una falsa preferencia.


Es sabido que la Declaración Universal de los Derechos Humanos proclamada por las  Naciones Unidas a finales de 1948, afirma en su artículo 3 que: Todo individuo tiene derecho a la vida, a la libertad y a la seguridad de su persona.

Con lo cual los legisladores correctamente nos vinieron a decir que los derechos humanos proclamados alcanzan al hombre en tanto que individuo, esto es, formando parte de un género y una especie: animal rationale o zoon lógon éjon, como gustaban decir griegos y romanos.

Pero, al mismo tiempo, nos dicen que estos derechos son inherentes al hombre como persona, esto es, en tanto ser único, singular e irrepetible. Y acá está implícita toda la concepción cristiana del hombre.[1]

Si bien, este magistral artículo 3, merecedor de una exégesis abundantísima, se apoya, tiene su basamento en una concepción sesgada o parcial del hombre: como sujeto de derechos. Y es acá donde comenzamos a barruntar lo que queremos decir.

El hombre durante toda la antigüedad clásica: greco, romano, cristiana nunca fue pensado como sujeto de derechos, y no porque no existieran dichos derechos, sino porque la justicia desde Platón para acá fue pensada como: dar a cada uno lo que corresponde. Con lo cual el derecho está concebido desde el que está “obligado” a cumplirlo y no desde los “acreedores” del derecho. Es por ello que la justicia fue concebida como una restitutio, como lo debido al otro.

Esto es de crucial importancia, pues sino se lo entiende acabadamente, no puede comprenderse la Revolución Copernicana, que produjeron los legisladores onunianos en 1948.

Al ser lo justo, dar a cada uno aquello que le corresponde y no el obtenerlo para uno, la obligación de realizarlo es del deudor. Y ello está determinado por el realismo filosófico, jurídico, político y teológico de la mencionada antigüedad clásica. Así el peso de realización de lo justo recae sobre aquel que puede y debe realizarlo, el acreedor de derechos solo puede demandarlo.

Al respecto relata Platón cómo respondió Sócrates cuando le proponen fugarse de la cárcel al ser condenado a muerte: Nunca es bueno y noble cometer injusticia (Critón, 49ª5) En cualquier caso es malo y vergonzoso cometer injusticia (Critón, 49b6). Nunca es correcto retribuir una injusticia por una injusticia padecida, ni mal por mal (Critón 49 d7), pues es peor hacer una injusticia que padecerla.

Así, Sócrates no ignora que tiene “derecho humano a conservar su vida”, pero prima en él, el “derecho humano de los atenienses”, de los otros. Pues si se fuga realiza un acto de injusticia, peor aún que la recibida.


Hoy la teoría de los derechos humanos invirtió la ecuación y así viene a sostener la primacía del acreedor de derechos por sobre la obligación de ser justos.


Viene entonces la pregunta fundamental: ¿A qué debe el hombre otorgar primacía en el ámbito del obrar: a ser justo o a ser acreedor de derechos?


Sin lugar a dudas todo hombre de bien intenta ser justo en su obrar, sin por ello renunciar a sus derechos pero, si el acto justo implica posponer algún derecho, es seguro que el justo lo pospone.

Ello nos está indicando la primacía y la preferencia axiológica de lo justo sobre el derecho.

Si invertimos esta relación los derechos humanos terminan siendo concebidos como un disvalor.

De modo tal que, obviamente, no estamos en contra del rescate que los derechos humanos han realizado en cantidad de campos y dominios. Estamos en contra que la vida del hombre se piense limitada y girando exclusivamente sobre los derechos humanos.

Y así como el bien tiene una primacía ontológica sobre el deber porque el hombre no es bueno cuando realiza actos buenos, sino que el hombre realiza actos buenos cuando es bueno. Analógicamente, lo justo=ius la tiene sobre el derecho y la lex.




(*) buela.alberto@gmail.com  arkegueta, aprendiz constante





[1]Es cierto que se han producido éticas ateístas de la persona (Nicolai Hartmann) pero eso no dejó de ser un mero ejercicio filosófico que no jode a nadie.


































lundi, 17 septembre 2012

Los artistas como intelectuales


Los artistas como intelectuales


Alberto Buela (*)


En una sociedad como la nuestra, de consumo, opulenta para pocos, cuyo dios es el mercado, la imagen reemplazó al concepto. Es que se dejo de leer para mirar, aun cuando rara vez se ve.


Y así los artistas, actores, cantantes, locutores y conductores televisión han reemplazado a los intelectuales.


Este reemplazo viene de otro más profundo; cuando los intelectuales, sobre todo a partir de la Revolución Francesa, vinieron a remplazar a los filósofos. Es cierto que siguió habiendo filósofos, pero el tono general de estos últimos dos siglos marca su desaparición pública.

El progresismo, esa enfermedad infantil de la socialdemocracia, se caracteriza por asumir la vanguardia como método y no como lucha, como sucedía con el viejo socialismo. Aún existe en Barcelona el viejo diario La Vanguardia.


La vanguardia como método quiere decir que para el progresista hay que estar, contra viento y marea, siempre en la cresta de la ola. Siempre adelante, en la vanguardia de las ideas, las modas, los usos, las costumbres y las actitudes.


El hombre progresista se sitúa siempre en el éxtasis temporal del futuro, ni el presente, ni mucho menos el pasado tiene para él significación alguna, y si la tuviera siempre está en función del futuro. No le interesa el ethos de la Nación histórica, incluso va contra este carácter histórico-cultural. Y esto es así, porque el progresista es su propio proyecto. Él se instala siempre en el futuro pues ha adoptado, repetimos, la vanguardia como método. Nadie ni nada puede haber delante de él, de lo contrario dejaría de ser progresista. Así se explica que el progresista no se pueda dar un proyecto de país ni de nación porque éste se ubicaría delante de él, lo cual implica y le crea una contradicción.


Y así como nadie puede dar lo que no tiene, el progresista no puede darse ni darnos un proyecto político porque él mismo es su proyecto político.


El hombre progre, al ser aquél que dice sí a toda novedad que se le propone encuentra en los artistas sus intelectuales. Hoy que en nuestra sociedad de consumo donde las imágenes han reemplazado a los conceptos nos encontramos con que los artistas son, en definitiva, los que plasman en imágenes los ideas. Y la formación del progresista consiste en eso, en una sucesión de imágenes truncas de la realidad. El homo festivus, figura emblemática del progresismo, del que hablan pensadores como Muray o Agulló, encuentra en el artista a su ideólogo.


El artista lo libera del esfuerzo, tanto de leer (hábito que se pierde irremisiblemente), como del mundo concreto. El progresista no quiere saber sino solo estar enterado. Tiene avidez de novedades. Y el mundo es “su mundo” y vive en la campana de cristal de los viejos almacenes de barrio que protegían a los dulces y los fiambres donde las moscas (el pueblo y sus problemas) no podían entrar.


Los progresistas porteños viven en Puerto Madero, no en Parque Patricios.

La táctica de los gobiernos progresistas es transformar al pueblo en “la gente”, esto es, en público consumidor, con lo cual el pueblo deja de ser el agente político principal de toda comunidad, para cederle ese protagonismo a los mass media, como ideólogos de las masas y a los artistas, como ideólogos de sus propias élites.


Este es un mecanismo que funciona a dos niveles: a) en los medios masivos de comunicación cientos periodistas y locutores, esos analfabetos culturales locuaces, según acertada expresión de Paul  Feyerabend (1924-1994) nos dicen qué debemos hacer y cómo debemos pensar. Son los mensajeros del “uno anónimo” de Heidegger que a través del dictador “se”, se dice, se piensa, se obra, se viste, se come, nos sume en la existencia impropia. b) a través de los artistas como traductores de conceptos a imágenes en los teatros y en los cines y para un público más restringido y con mayor poder adquisitivo: para los satisfechos del sistema.


 Esto es: los progres


El artista cumple con su función ideológica dentro del progresismo porque canta los infinitos temas de la reivindicación: el matrimonio gay, el aborto, la eutanasia, la adopción de niños por los homosexuales, el consumo de marihuana y coca, la lucha contra el imperialismo, la defensa del indigenismo, de los inmigrantes, de la reducción de las penas a los delincuentes, un guiño a la marginalidad y un largo etcétera. Pero nunca le canta a la inseguridad en las calles, la prostitución, la venta de niños, el turismo pedófilo, la falta de empleo, el creciente asesinato y robo de las personas, el juego por dinero, de eso no se habla como la película de Mastroiani. En definitiva, no ve los padecimientos de la sociedad sino sus goces.  


El artista como actor reclama para sí la transgresión pero ejecuta todas aquellas obras de teatro en donde se representa lo políticamente correcto. Y en este sentido, como dice Vittorio Messori, en primer lugar está el denigrar a la Iglesia, al orden social, a las virtudes burguesas de la moderación, la modestia, el ahorro, la limpieza, la fidelidad, la diligencia, la sensatez, haciéndose la apología de sus contrarios.


No hay actor o locutor que no se rasgue las vestiduras hablando de las víctimas judías del Holocausto, aunque nadie representa a las cristianas ni a las gitanas. Estas no tienen voz, como no la tienen las del genocidio armenio ni hoy las de Darfour en Sudán.


Así, si representan a Heidegger lo hacen como un nazi y si a Stalin como un maestro en humanidad. Al Papa siempre como un verdugo y a las monjas como pervertidas, pero a los prestamistas como necesitados y a los proxenetas liberadores.  Ya no más representaciones del Mercader de Venecia, ni de la Bolsa de Martel. El director que osa tocar a Wagner queda excomulgado por la policía del pensamiento y sino ¡qué le pregunten a Baremboin?


En el orden local si representan al Martín Fierro quitan la payada y duelo con el Moreno. Si al general Belgrano, lo presentan como doctor. A Perón como un burgués y a Evita como una revolucionaria. Pero claro, la figura emblemática de todo artista es el Che Guevara.


Toda la hermenéutica teatral está penetrada por el psicoanálisis teñido por la lógica hebrea de Freud y sus cientos de discípulos. Lógica que se resuelve en el rescate del “otro” pero para transformarlo en “lo mismo”, porque en el corazón de esta lógica “el otro”, como Jehová para Abraham, es vivido como amenaza y por eso en el supuesto rescate lo tengo que transformar en “lo mismo”.


Es que el artista está educado en la diferencia, lo vemos en su estrafalaria vestimenta y conducta. Él se piensa y se ve diferente pero su producto termina siendo un elemento más para la cohesión homgeneizadora de todas las diferencias y alteridades. Es un agente más de la globalización cultural.


El pluralismo predicado y representado termina en la apología del totalitarismo dulce de las socialdemocracias que reducen nuestra identidad a la de todos por igual.


Finalmente, el mecanismo político que está en la base de esta disolución del otro, como lo distinto, lo diferente, es el consenso. En él, funciona el simulacro del “como sí” kantiano. Así, le presto el oído al otro pero no lo escucho. Se produce una demorada negación del otro, porque, en definitiva, busco salvar las diferencias reduciéndolo a “lo mismo”.


Esta es la razón última por la cual nosotros venimos proponiendo desde hace años la teoría del disenso, que nace de la aceptación real y efectiva del principio de la diferencia, y tiene la exigencia de poder vivir en esa diferencia. Y este es el motivo por el cual se necesita hacer metapolítica: disciplina que encierra la exigencia de identificar en el área de la política mundial, regional o nacional, la diversidad ideológica tratando de convertir dicha diversidad en un concepto de comprensión política, según la sabia opinión del politólogo Giacomo Marramao.


El disenso debería ser el primer paso para hacer política pública genuina y la metapolítica el contenido filosófico y axiológico del agente político.    






vendredi, 14 septembre 2012

La bohème au XIXe siècle: épate-bourgeois, faux révolutionnaires et précurseurs des bobos

Pierre Le Vigan

La bohème au XIXe siècle: épate-bourgeois, faux révolutionnaires et précurseurs des bobos

boheme.jpgLes bobos. Ils sont moins une classe sociale qu’un sociostyle. On en parle depuis 30 ans. Claire Bretecher les a dessinés. Mais à quoi fait-on référence ? A la bohème du XIXe siècle et à toute une histoire. Une histoire qui ne concerne pas seulement le passé mais aussi notre présent : comment la notion de vie de bohème a joué un rôle important dans la dissolution progressive des valeurs traditionnelles.

A l’origine, le terme bohémien désigne des Tsiganes partis de l’Inde et stabilisés notamment en Bohême. Le bohémien est ainsi un voyageur tel que l’on en retrouvera beaucoup dans le pays basque. C’est Gédéon Tallemant des Réaux (1619-1692) qui introduit un sens nouveau à la notion de gens de la bohème.  Auteur d’Historiettes, portraits d’écrivains publiés d’abord clandestinement, c’est en 1659 qu’il parle de la bohème comme d’un mode de vie. Le bohème est une sorte de dandy vivant de rien et riant de tout, à la lisière des milieux artistes et en marge des corps sociaux traditionnels. La bohème relève de ce que Saint Simon (1760-1825), le petit-cousin du mémorialiste, appelle le premier une « avant-garde », au sens non pas militaire mais artistique et littéraire. « C’est nous, artistes, qui vous servirons d’avant-garde : la puissance des arts est en effet la plus immédiate et la plus rapide. Nous avons des armes de toute espèce : quand nous voulons répandre des idées neuves parmi les hommes, nous les inscrivons sur le marbre ou sur la toile… Quelle plus belle destinée pour les arts, que d’exercer sur la société une puissance positive, un véritable sacerdoce et de s’élancer en avant de toutes les facultés intellectuelles, à l’époque de leur plus grand développement ! » On voit quelle importance possède pour la bohème la fascination de la table rase et des idées « neuves ».

C’est à partir de la première moitié du XIXe siècle que la figure de celui qui mène « la vie de bohème » prend un sens courant. En 1840, Balzac commence à publier Un prince de la bohème. « Ce mot de bohème vous dit tout. La Bohème n'a rien et vit de tout ce qu'elle a. L'espérance est sa religion, la foi en soi-même est son code, la charité passe pour être son budget. Tous ces jeunes gens sont plus grands que leur malheur, au-dessous de la fortune mais au-dessus du destin. » L’homme de la bohème veut faire du passé table rase, il est un enfant de 1789, mais va au-delà et là est l’important. Il oppose le « génial » à l’académique, le surgissement au travail, l’individu au peuple, la dépense à l’économie. Il ne se reconnait aucune obligation de fidélité à ce qui nous a précédé. Pour lui comme pour Rabaut Saint Etienne (1743-1793), « notre histoire n’est pas notre code ».  L’homme de la bohème doute même que nous ayons besoin d’un code, sauf un code implicite : rien n’est tabou, l’ancien ne vaut rien. On verra plus tard que c’est le meilleur code possible du point du vue du capitalisme.

La bohème du milieu du XIXe siècle se retrouve au Petit Cénacle, le Cénacle étant à la fois un groupe d’amis de Victor Hugo et de Charles Nodier (1780-1844). En 1852, Gérard de Nerval publie La Bohème galante dans la revue bimensuelle L’Artiste. Au programme : jeunisme, et aristocratique plébéen.  « On vit un jour Gérard de Nerval trainant un homard dans la rue. A quoi il répondit : ‘’En quoi un homard est-il plus ridicule qu’un chien, qu’un chat, qu’une gazelle, qu’un lion ou toute autre bête dont on se fait suivre ? J’ai le goût des homards, qui sont tranquilles, sérieux, savent les secrets de la mer, n’aboient pas…’’ » Réponse paradoxale et au sens propre insensée bien caractéristique de l’esprit bohème. Théophile Gautier, Pétrus Borel (1809-1859) illustrent aussi ce monde de la bohème. Tristan Tzara écrira : « La Lycanthropie (l’esprit du loup-garou) de Pétrus Borel n'est pas une attitude d'esthète, elle a des racines profondes dans le comportement social du poète [...] qui prend conscience de son infériorité dans le rang social et de sa supériorité dans l'ordre moral. » L’esprit bohème s’apparente ici au dandysme que Baudelaire voyait comme « le dernier éclat d'héroïsme dans les décadences »[i].

Le livre-clé de cette époque est celui d’Henri Murger (né Heinrich Mürger),  Scènes de la vie de bohème (1845-48). Ce feuilleton donnera naissance à un opéra de Puccini.  Henri Murger écrit que la bohème « est l’état de ces jeunes gens qui n’ont d’autre fortune, au soleil de leur vingt ans, que le courage, qui est la vertu des jeunes, et l’espérance, qui est le million des pauvres…  C’est le stage de la vie artistique, c’est la préface de l’académie, de l’Hôtel-Dieu ou de la morgue. Nous ajouterons que la bohème n’existe et n’est possible qu’à Paris. » Lorédan Larchey écrit en 1865 : « La bohème se compose de jeunes gens, tous âgés de plus de vingt ans, mais qui n’en ont pas trente, tous hommes de génie en leur genre, peu connus encore, mais qui se feront connaître, et qui seront alors des gens fort distingués… Tous les genres de capacité, d’esprit, y sont représentés… Ce mot de bohème vous dit tout. La bohème n’a rien et vit de ce qu’elle a. »  C’est « une société composée de toutes les sociétés, bizarre, monstrueux assemblage de talent et de bêtise, d’ivresse et de poésie, d’avenir et de néant, et qu’on nomme la bohème. » écrit Henri Maret (Le Tour du monde parisien, 1862).  « C’est un vice de nature qui fait le bohème. Il naît de la paresse et de la vanité combinées. Tant qu’il y aura des paresseux et des vaniteux. il y aura des bohèmes. » (Gabriel Guillemot, Le Bohême, 1868 in Lucien Rigaud, Dictionnaire d’argot moderne, 1888).

Travestissement, extravagance, goût de choquer « le bourgeois » caractérisent la bohème. Le poète Jean Richepin (1849-1926) s’attirera ce jugement sévère de Léon Bloy : « En réalité, vous vous foutez de tout, excepté de deux choses : jouir le plus possible et faire du bruit dans le monde. Vous êtes naturellement un cabotin, comme d'autres sont naturellement des magnanimes et des héros. Vous avez ça dans le sang. Votre rôle est d'épater le bourgeois. L'applaudissement, l'ignoble claque du public imbécile, voilà le pain quotidien qu'il faut à votre âme fière. » (Lettre à Paul Richepin, 1877). C’est ce qu’on a pu appeler le romantisme frénétique[ii] , celui d’une France romantique qui succède et s’oppose à la France antique et classique de Napoléon. C’est un « mélange intime du comique et du tragique, [...] des éclats de rire alternés ou combinés, ce que Flaubert en somme appellera plus tard le “grotesque triste” » écrit Jean Bruneau, grand spécialiste de Flaubert.

Les gens de l’avant-garde bohème s’appellent les Bousingots, les Gueux, les Impassibles, les Vilains-Bonhommes, les Hirsutes fondés par Léo Trézenik (1883), les Jmenfoutistes (de là vient l’expression contemporaine si usuelle), les Zutistes (on dirait maintenant Les Enfoirés ?), Les Incohérents, les Fumistes (un groupe fondé par Emile Goudeau [iii] et Eugène Bataille dit Arthur Sapeck, le nom faisant référence aux fumeurs d’opium mais aussi aux adeptes des fumisteries comme goût de tout faire paraître dérisoire).

Aux Hirsutes succèdent les Hydropathes, avec le poète Emile Goudeau (abusant du jeu de mot good eau). « …marche encore et toujours ! marche ! si, d’aventure, Tu touchais ton but de la main, Laissant derrière toi l’oasis et la source, Vers un autre horizon tu reprendrais ta course ; Tu dois mourir sur un chemin. » (Emile Goudeau). Lyrisme et enfantillages se mêlent à la naissance du groupe des Hydropathes : « On pleura de tendresse, on exultait de joie ; on alla casser deux ou trois pianos, dans les brasseries ».

Dans les 20 dernières années du XIXe siècle les Incohérents fondés par Jules Lévy marquent une nouvelle étape de la bohème[iv], avec dans le domaine de la peinture les peintures monochromes (Combat de nègres dans une cave, pendant la nuit, Récolte de la tomate par des cardinaux apoplectiques au bord de la mer Rouge, Stupeur de jeunes recrues de la Marine en apercevant pour la première fois la Méditerranée…). Le critique d’art Félix Fénéon disait d’eux qu’ils représentaient  « ... tout ce que les calembours les plus audacieux et les méthodes d’exécution les plus imprévues peuvent faire enfanter d’œuvres follement hybrides à la peinture et à la sculpture ahuries ... » (La Libre Revue, 1er novembre 1883).

Le Manifeste des Incohérents (in Le Courrier français, 12 mars 1884) explique que le mariage ou les rhumatismes amènent à l’exclusion du groupe. « L’Incohérent est jeune, il lui faut en effet la souplesse des membres et de l’esprit pour se livrer à des perpétuelles dislocations physiques et morales (…). L’Incohérent n’a conséquemment ni rhumatisme ni migraines, il est nerveux et robuste. Il appartient à tous les métiers qui se rapprochent de l’art : un typographe peut être Incohérent, un zingueur jamais. L’Incohérent est donc peintre ou libraire, poète ou bureaucrate ou sculpteur, mais ce qui le distingue, c’est que, dès qu’il se livre à son incohérence, il préfère passer pour ce qu’il n’est pas : le libraire devient ténor, le peintre écrit des vers, l’architecte discute de libre-échange, le tout avec exubérance. (…) L’Incohérent prend sa retraite en se mariant ou en attrapant un rhumatisme… » Un point peu souligné est la duplicité du bohème incohérent : il assume une façade sociale et donne le change :  «  A travers Paris, l’incohérent marche comme tout le monde, il salue ses supérieurs, et serre la main de ses égaux ; mais si, par hasard, il rencontre quelque part un co-incohérent, il se désarticule soudainement, se désagrège : son front, son nez, ses yeux et sa bouche forment des grimaces cabalistiques, ses bras se contournent drôlement et ses jambes s’agitent, suivant une cadence extravagante. Cela ne dure qu’une ou deux secondes. Mais ce sont les signes maçonniques auxquels se reconnaissent les F*** en incohérence. »

La bohème va au-delà d’un esprit potache fut-il régressif. Elle s’alimente de la haine des aieux. Diego Malevue c’est-à-dire Emile Goudeau écrit : « Une chose bizarre à coup sûr, c’est qu’il soit nécessaire de s’intituler moderne et de rompre sans fin ni trêve des lances contre les anciens. » Il est dit à propos des gérontes : « Qu’ils ne nous poussent point au parricide, qu’ils nous laissent la part de soleil, et ne nous enterrent plus sous leur gérontocratie, ou sinon, furieux, nous pourrions lever la main contre nos pères. » Il poursuivait : « De la place s’il vous plait Messieurs. Et pour finir : un seul mot. Il est moderne, il est d’hier : on appelle le gâteux un sous-lui. Nous prions les sous-eux de faire prendre mesure au fossoyeur. » La bohème révolutionnaire du XIXe et ses prolongements au XXe – dont le surréalisme - s’inscrit dans ce moment de l’individualisme révolutionnaire. Tout en étant dans la lignée de la Révolution de 1789 cet individualisme est en même temps profondément en phase avec le mouvement du capitalisme et d’une société de plus en plus marchande et consumériste. « Luc Ferry note justement que « les bohèmes, malgré leur opposition apparente aux bourgeois, malgré aussi, en retour, la haine ou le mépris dont ces derniers vont pendant longtemps les gratifier, n’ont été pour l’essentiel que le bras armé de l’épanouissement du capitalisme mondialisé, l’instrument de la réalisation parfaite de ce qu’on appellera finalement la société de consommation » [v]. Il  écrit encore : « Il fallait que les valeurs et les autorités traditionnelles fussent déconstruites par des jeunes gens plutôt ‘’de gauche’’, en tout cas révolutionnaires, pour que le capitalisme puisse nous faire entrer dans l’ère de l’hyperconsommation sans laquelle son propre épanouissement eut été tout simplement impossible. (…) Pour le dire autrement, rien ne freine autant la consommation que le fait de posséder des valeurs solides et bien ancrées, c’est-à-dire des valeurs traditionnelles. »  De ce fait, c’est désormais la bourgeoisie, n’ayant plus besoin de poissons-pilotes, ou encore d’éclaireurs d’avant-garde pseudo-dissidents, qui est à la pointe de l’avant-garde et du culte du nouveau pour le nouveau, de l’innovation pour l’innovation, de la désacralisation de toutes les valeurs. Luc Ferry remarque que « le bourgeois, chef d’entreprise ou banquier, devient lui aussi une espèce de révolutionnaire. Il abjure désormais ses troupes de ne pas s’embourgeoiser, de ne pas s’encrouter ni s’endormir sur leurs lauriers. Innovez, innovez et innovez encore leur demande-t-il en permanence. Comme Duchamp,  il lui faut sans cesse produire du nouveau,  rompre avec le passé. De là sa fascination pour l’art contemporain, dont il comprend enfin combien il lui montrait le chemin, combien il était,  au sens propre, l’avant-garde du monde moderne. Nul hasard si c’est Pompidou, le président le plus bourgeois de toute l’histoire de la république,  qui ouvre les portes du Louvre à ce vieux stalinien de Picasso et Jacques Chirac, lui aussi pourtant  fort peu bohème,  celles de l’Ircam à Pierre Boulez. En quoi  les bourgeois furent les benêts de l’histoire : comme le disait encore Marx de manière prophétique,  ils ont fait l’histoire, mais sans savoir l’histoire qu’ils faisaient,  tandis que  bohèmes et soixante-huitards en furent les cocus.  Reconvertis dans la pub, le cinéma ou la  presse, ces derniers peuplent aujourd’hui les réunions du Medef. Bohèmes et bourgeois ont ainsi célébré leurs noces et leur petit dernier, le ‘’bobo’’,  n’est que le fruit de leur union enfin consommée au sein de la logique désormais sacrée pour les uns comme pour les autres,  dans l’art comme dans l’entreprise,  de l’innovation pour l’innovation,  de la rupture permanente avec la tradition.  Sans cette lecture de l’histoire morale et culturelle de l’Europe, il est, je crois, à peu près impossible de comprendre le siècle. [vi] » Les bohèmes annonçaient ainsi ce que Luc Boltanski et Eve Chiapello appelleront le nouvel esprit du capitalisme [vii] postfordiste et « ludique ». Les bohèmes du XIXe siècle annonçaient les bobos d’aujourd’hui. Ils étaient en phase avec l’éthos économique et culturel de la bourgeoisie, seulement, ils étaient en avance, d’où des déconvenues.  Mais ils ouvraient le chemin de l’extension du domaine du capitalisme à l’ensemble de la vie humaine devenue parodique. Ils ouvraient la voie à la destruction de toutes les valeurs, à leur réduction à de simples signes. C’est pourquoi la critique de la bohème d’hier rejoint la critique du rôle actuel des libéraux-« libertaires » dans l’individualisme croissant et dans la néophilie (l’idée que le nouveau est toujours mieux que l’existant [viii]), avec comme conséquence le renforcement de l’emprise productiviste et capitaliste sur les hommes et sur les peuples. Un beau résultat pour de pseudo-dissidents.  

[i] Daniel Salvatore Schiffer, Le dandysme, dernier éclat d'héroïsme, PUF, 2010.

[ii]  Cf. La France frénétique de 1830,  Choix de textes de Jean-Luc Steinmetz, Phebus, 1978. Cf. aussi Anthony Glinoer, La littérature frénétique, PUF, 2009.

[iii] Emile Goudeau, Dix ans de bohème, 1888 et Champ Vallon, 2000.

[iv] Catherine Charpin, Les arts incohérents 1882-1893, Syros, 1990.

[v] Luc Ferry, La révolution de l’amour. Pour une spiritualité laïque, Plon, 2010, et J’ai lu, 2011, ouvrage intéressant même si on n’adhère pas à la thèse de l’auteur d’un second humanisme postrépublicain.

[vi]www.lucferry.fr, 25 décembre 2011.

[vii] Le nouvel esprit du capitalisme, Gallimard, 1999.

[viii] Une idée que critique longuement Jean-Claude Michéa in Le complexe d’Orphée, Climats-Flammarion, 2011.

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