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vendredi, 12 août 2011

Carl Schmitt's Decisionism

Carl Schmitt's Decisionism

Paul Hirst

Ex: http://freespeechproject.com/


politik.gifSince 1945 Western nations have witnessed a dramatic reduction in the variety of positions in political theory and jurisprudence. Political argument has been virtually reduced to contests within liberal-democratic theory. Even radicals now take representative democracy as their unquestioned point of departure. There are, of course, some benefits following from this restriction of political debate. Fascist, Nazi and Stalinist political ideologies are now beyond the pale. But the hegemony of liberal-democratic political agreement tends to obscure the fact that we are thinking in terms which were already obsolete at the end of the nineteenth century.

Nazism and Stalinism frightened Western politicians into a strict adherence to liberal democracy. Political discussion remains excessively rigid, even though the liberal-democratic view of politics is grossly at odds with our political condition. Conservative theorists like Hayek try to re-create idealized political conditions of the mid nineteenth century. In so doing, they lend themselves to some of the most unsavoury interests of the late twentieth century - those determined to exploit the present undemocratic political condition. Social-democratic theorists also avoid the central question of how to ensure public accountability of big government. Many radicals see liberal democracy as a means to reform, rather than as what needs to be reformed. They attempt to extend governmental action, without devising new means of controlling governmental agencies. New Right thinkers have reinforced the situation by pitting classical liberalism against democracy, individual rights against an interventionist state. There are no challenges to representative democracy, only attempts to restrict its functions. The democratic state continues to be seen as a sovereign public power able to assure public peace.

The terms of debate have not always been so restricted. In the first three decades of this century, liberal-democratic theory and the notion of popular sovereignty through representative government were widely challenged by many groups. Much of this challenge, of course, was demagogic rhetoric presented on behalf of absurd doctrines of social reorganization. The anti-liberal criticism of Sorel, Maurras or Mussolini may be occassionally intriguing, but their alternatives are poisonous and fortunately, no longer have a place in contemporary political discussion. The same can be said of much of the ultra-leftist and communist political theory of this period.

Other arguments are dismissed only at a cost. The one I will consider here - Carl Schmitt's 'decisionism' - challenges the liberal-democratic theory of sovereignty in a way that throws considerable light on contemporary political conditions. His political theory before the Nazi seizure of power shared some assumptions with fascist political doctrine and he did attempt to become the 'crown jurist' of the new Nazi state. Nevertheless, Schmitt's work asks hard questions and points to aspects of political life too uncomfortable to ignore. Because his thinking about concrete political situations is not governed by any dogmatic political alternative, it exhibits a peculiar objectivity.

Schmitt's situational judgement stems from his view of politics or, more correctly, from his view of the political as 'friend-enemy' relations, which explains how he could change suddenly from contempt for Hitler to endorsing Nazism. If it is nihilistic to lack substantial ethical standards beyond politics, then Schmitt is a nihilist. In this, however, he is in the company of many modern political thinkers. What led him to collaborate with the Nazis from March 1933 to December 1936 was not, however, ethical nihilism, but above all concern with order. Along with many German conservatives, Schmitt saw the choice as either Hitler or chaos. As it turned out, he saved his life but lost his reputation. He lived in disrepute in the later years of the Third Reich, and died in ignominy in the Federal Republic. But political thought should not be evaluated on the basis of the authors' personal political judgements. Thus the value of Schmitt's work is not diminished by the choices he made.

Schmitt's main targets are the liberal-constitutional theory of the state and the parliamentarist conception of politics. In the former, the state is subordinated to law; it becomes the executor of purposes determined by a representative legislative assembly. In the latter, politics is dominated by 'discussion,' by the free deliberation of representatives in the assembly. Schmitt considers nineteenth-century liberal democracy anti-political and rendered impotent by a rule-bound legalism, a rationalistic concept of political debate, and the desire that individual citizens enjoy a legally guaranteed 'private' sphere protected from the state. The political is none of these things. Its essence is struggle.

In The Concept of the Political Schmitt argues that the differentia specifica of the political, which separates it from other spheres of life, such as religion or economics, is friend-enemy relations. The political comes into being when groups are placed in a relation of emnity, where each comes to perceive the other as an irreconcilable adversary to be fought and, if possible, defeated. Such relations exhibit an existential logic which overrides the motives which may have brought groups to this point. Each group now faces an opponent, and must take account of that fact: 'Every religious, moral, economic, ethical, or other antithesis transforms itself into a political one if it is sufficiently strong to group human beings effectively according to friends and enemy.' The political consists not in war or armed conflict as such, but precisely in the relation of emnity: not competition but confrontation. It is bound by no law: it is prior to no law.

For Schmitt: 'The concept of the state presupposes the concept of the political.' States arise as a means of continuing, organizing and channeling political struggle. It is political struggle which gives rise to political order. Any entity involved in friend-enemy relations is by definition political, whatever its origin or the origin of the differences leading to emnity: 'A religious community which wages wars against members of others religious communities or engages in other wars is already more than a religious community; it is a political entity.' The political condition arises from the struggle of groups; internal order is imposed to pursue external conflict. To view the state as the settled and orderly administration of a territory, concerned with the organization of its affairs according to law, is to see only the stabilized results of conflict. It is also to ignore the fact that the state stands in a relation of emnity to other states, that it holds its territory by means of armed force and that, on this basis of a monopoly of force, it can make claims to be the lawful government of that territory. The peaceful, legalistic, liberal bourgeoisie is sitting on a volcano and ignoring the fact. Their world depends on a relative stabilization of conflict within the state, and on the state's ability to keep at bay other potentially hostile states.

For Hobbes, the political state arises from a contract to submit to a sovereign who will put an end to the war of all against all which must otherwise prevail in a state of nature - an exchange of obediance for protection. Schmitt starts where Hobbes leaves off - with the natural condition between organized and competing groups or states. No amount of discussion, compromise or exhortation can settle issues between enemies. There can be no genuine agreement, because in the end there is nothing to agree about. Dominated as it is by the friend-enemy alternative, the political requires not discussion but decision. No amount of reflection can change an issue which is so existentially primitive that it precludes it. Speeches and motions in assemblies should not be contraposed to blood and iron but with the moral force of the decision, because vacillating parliamentarians can also cause considerable bloodshed.

In Schmitt's view, parliamentarism and liberalism existed in a particular historical epoch between the 'absolute' state of the seventeenth century and the 'total state' of the twentieth century. Parliamentary discussion and a liberal 'private sphere' presupposed the depoliticization of a large area of social, economic and cultural life. The state provided a legally codified order within which social customs, economic competition, religious beliefs, and so on, could be pursued without becoming 'political.' 'Politics' as such ceases to be exclusively the atter of the state when 'state and society penetrate each other.' The modern 'total state' breaks down the depoliticization on which such a narrow view of politics could rest:


Heretofore ostensibly neutral domains - religion, culture, education, the economy - then cease to be neutral. . . Against such neutralizations and depoliticizations of important domains appears the total state, which potentially embraces every domain. This results in the identity of the state and society. In such a state. . . everything is at least potentially political, and in referring to the state it is no longer possible to assert for it a specifically political characteristic.


Democracy and liberalism are fundamentally antagonistic. Democracy does away with the depoliticizations characteristic of rule by a narrow bourgeois stratum insulated from popular demands. Mass politics means a broadening of the agenda to include the affairs of all society - everything is potentially political. Mass politics also threatens existing forms of legal order. The politicization of all domains increases pressure on the state by multiplying the competing interests demanding action; at the same time, the function of the liberal legal framework - the regulating of the 'private sphere' - become inadequate. Once all social affairs become political, the existing constitutional framework threatens the social order: politics becomes a contest of organized parties seeking to prevail rather than to acheive reconciliation. The result is a state bound by law to allow every party an 'equal chance' for power: a weak state threatened with dissolution.

Schmitt may be an authoritarian conservative. But his diagnosis of the defects of parliamentarism and liberalism is an objective analysis rather than a mere restatement of value preferences. His concept of 'sovereignty' is challenging because it forces us to think very carefully about the conjuring trick which is 'law.' Liberalism tries to make the state subject to law. Laws are lawful if properly enacted according to set procedures; hence the 'rule of law.' In much liberal-democratic constitutional doctrine the legislature is held to be 'sovereign': it derives its law-making power from the will of the people expressed through their 'representatives.' Liberalism relies on a constituting political moment in order that the 'sovereignty' implied in democratic legislatures be unable to modify at will not only specific laws but also law-making processes. It is therefore threatened by a condition of politics which converts the 'rule of law' into a merely formal doctrine. If this 'rule of law' is simply the people's will expressed through their representatives, then it has no determinate content and the state is no longer substantially bound by law in its actions.

Classical liberalism implies a highly conservative version of the rule of law and a sovereignty limited by a constitutive political act beyond the reach of normal politics. Democracy threatens the parliamentary-constitutional regime with a boundless sovereign power claimed in the name of the 'people.' This reveals that all legal orders have an 'outside'; they rest on a political condition which is prior to and not bound by the law. A constitution can survive only if the constituting political act is upheld by some political power. The 'people' exist only in the claims of that tiny minority (their 'representatives') which functions as a 'majority' in the legislative assembly. 'Sovereignty' is thus not a matter of formal constitutional doctrine or essentially hypocritical references to the 'people'; it is a matter of determining which particular agency has the capacity - outside of law - to impose an order which, because it is political, can become legal.

Schmitt's analysis cuts through three hundred years of political theory and public law doctrine to define sovereignty in a way that renders irrelevant the endless debates about principles of political organization or the formal constitutional powers of different bodies.


From a practical or theoretical perspective, it really does not matter whether an abstract scheme advanced to define sovereignty (namely, that sovereignty is the highest power, not a derived power) is acceptable. About an abstract concept there will be no argument. . . What is argued about is the concrete application, and that means who decides in a situation of conflict what constitutes the public interest or interest of the state, public safety and order, le salut public, and so on. The exception, which is not codified in the existing legal order, can at best be characterized as a case of extreme peril, a danger to the existence of the state, or the like, but it cannot be circumscribed factually and made to conform to a preformed law.


Brutally put: ' Sovereign is he who decides on the exception.' The sovereign is a definite agency capable of making a decision, not a legitimating category (the 'people') or a purely formal definition (plentitude of power, etc.). Sovereignty is outside the law, since the actions of the sovereign in the state of exception cannot be bound by laws since laws presuppose a normal situation. To claim that this is anti-legal is to ignore the fact that all laws have an outside, that they exist because of a substantiated claim on the part of some agency to be the dominant source of binding rules within a territory. The sovereign determines the possibility of the 'rule of law' by deciding on the exception: 'For a legal order to make sense, a normal situation must exist, and he is sovereign who definitely decides whether this normal situation actually exists.'

Schmitt's concept of the exception is neither nihilistic nor anarchistic, it is concerned with the preservation of the state and the defence of legitimately constituted government and the stable institutions of society. He argues that ' the exception is different from anarchy and chaos.' It is an attempt to restore order in a political sense. While the state of exception can know no norms, the actions of the sovereign within the state must be governed by what is prudent to restore order. Barbaric excess and pure arbitrary power are not Schmitt's objecty. power is limited by a prudent concern for the social order; in the exception, 'order in the juristic sense still prevails, even if it is not of the ordinary kind.' Schmitt may be a relativist with regard to ultimate values in politics. But he is certainly a conservative concerned with defending a political framework in which the 'concrete orders' of society can be preserved, which distinguishes his thinking from both fascism and Nazism in their subordination of all social institutions to such idealized entities as the Leader and the People. For Schmitt, the exception is never the rule, as it is with fascism and Nazism. If he persists in demonstrating how law depends on politics, the norm on the exception, stability on struggle, he points up the contrary illusions of fascism and Nazism. In fact, Schmitt's work can be used as a critique of both. The ruthless logic in his analsysis of the political, the nature of soveriegnty, and the exception demonstrates the irrationality of fascism and Nazism. The exception cannot be made the rule in the 'total state' without reducing society to such a disorder through the political actions of the mass party that the very survival of the state is threatened. The Nazi state sought war as the highest goal in politics, but conducted its affairs in such a chaotic way that its war-making capacity was undermined and its war aims became fatally overextended. Schmitt's friend-enemy thesis is concerned with avoiding the danger that the logic of the political will reach its conclusion in unlimited war.

Schmitt modernizes the absolutist doctrines of Bodin and Hobbes. His jurisprudence restores - in the exception rather than the norm - the sovereign as uncommanded commander. For Hobbes, lawas are orders given by those with authority - authoritas non veritas facit legem. Confronted with complex systems of procedural limitation in public law and with the formalization of law into a system, laws become far more complex than orders. Modern legal positivism could point to a normal liberal-parliamentary legal order which did and still does appear to contradict Hobbes. Even in the somewhat modernized form of John Austin, the Hobbesian view of sovereignty is rejected on all sides. Schmitt shared neither the simplistic view of Hobbes that this implies, nor the indifference of modern legal positivism to the political foundation of law. He founded his jurisprudence neither on the normal workings of the legal order nor on the formal niceties of constitutional doctrine, but on a condition quite alien to them. 'Normalcy' rests not on legal or constitutional conditions but on a certain balance of political forces, a certain capacity of the state to impose order by force should the need arise. This is especially true of liberal-parliamentary regimes, whose public law requires stablization of political conflicts and considerable police and war powers even to begin to have the slightest chance of functioning at all. Law cannot itself form a completely rational and lawful system; the analysis of the state must make reference to those agencies which have the capacity to decide on the state of exception and not merely a formal plentitude of power.

In Political Theology Schmitt claims that the concepts of the modern theory of the state are secularized theological concepts. This is obvious in the case of the concept of sovereignty, wherein the omnipotent lawgiver is a mundane version of an all-powerful God. He argues that liberalism and parliamentarism correspond to deist views of God's action through constant and general natural laws. His own view is a form of fundamentalism in which the exception plays the same role in relation to the state as the miracles of Jesus do in confirming the Gospel. The exception reveals the legally unlimited capacity of whoever is sovereign within the state. In conventional, liberal-democratic doctrine the people are sovereign; their will is expressed through representatives. Schmitt argues that modern democracy is a form of populism in that the people are mobilized by propaganda and organized interests. Such a democracy bases legitimacy on the people's will. Thus parliament exists on the sufferance of political parties, propaganda agencies and organized interest which compete for popular 'consent.' When parliamentary forms and the rule of 'law' become inadequate to the political situation, they will be dispensed with in the name of the people: 'No other constitutional institution can withstand the sole criterion of the people's will, however it is expressed.'

Schmitt thus accepts the logic of Weber's view of plebiscitarian democracy and the rise of bureaucratic mass parties, which utterly destroy the old parliamentary notables. He uses the nineteenth-century conservatives Juan Donoso Cortes to set the essential dilemma in Political Theology: either a boundless democracy of plebiscitarian populism which will carry us wherever it will (i.e. to Marxist or fascist domination) or a dictatorship. Schmitt advocates a very specific form of dictatorship in a state of exception - a "commissarial' dictatorship, which acts to restore social stability, to preserve the concrete orders of society and restore the constitution. The dictator has a constitutional office. He acts in the name of the constitution, but takes such measures as are necessary to preserve order. these measures are not bound by law; they are extralegal.

Schmitt's doctrine thus involves a paradox. For all its stress on friend-enemy relations, on decisive political action, its core, its aim, is the maintenance of stability and order. It is founded on a political non-law, but not in the interest of lawlessness. Schmitt insists that the constitution must be capable of meeting the challenge of the exception, and of allowing those measures necessary to preserve order. He is anti-liberal because he claims that liberalism cannot cope with the reality of the political; it can only insist on a legal formalism which is useless in the exceptional case. He argues that only those parties which are bound to uphold the constitution should be allowed an 'equal chance' to struggle for power. Parties which threaten the existing order and use constitutional means to challenge the constitution should be subject to rigorous control.

Schmitt's relentless attack on 'discussion' makes most democrats and radicals extremely hostile to his views. He is a determined critic of the Enlightenment. Habermas's 'ideal speech situation', in which we communicate without distortion to discover a common 'emancipatory interest', would appear to Schmitt as a trivial philosophical restatement of Guizot's view that in representative government, ' through discussion the powers-that-be are obliged to seek truth in common." Schmitt is probably right. Enemies have nothing to discuss and we can never attain a situation in which the friend-enemy distinction is abolished. Liberalism does tend to ignore the exception and the more resolute forms of political struggle.

jeudi, 11 août 2011

Keith Preston: Understanding Carl Schmitt


Keith Preston: Understanding Carl Schmitt

dimanche, 07 août 2011

Sommerakademie zur Konservativen Revolution



Sommerakademie zur Konservativen Revolution


Cf: http://www.sezession.de/

Seit dem verheerenden Attentat in Norwegen haben bestimmte Kausalketten wieder Konjunktur. Beispielsweise wenn Volker Weiß bei Spiegelonline irgendein Zitat Oswald Spenglers für die Tat verantwortlich macht. Treffen will Weiß damit die ganze sogenannnte Konservative Revolution und möglichst auch jede Art von Demokratiekritik, die nicht von links kommt.

Carl Schmitt nannte solche Konstrukte „irreale Bedingungssätze“: Wenn Oswald Spengler nicht gelebt hätte, wäre Breivik nicht zum Mörder geworden. So einfach (in doppelter Hinsicht) kann Geistesgeschichte sein. Wir wollen Weiß auf seinen simplen Pfaden nicht folgen, sondern uns grundsätzlich mit dem Phänomen „Konservative Revolution“ auseinandersetzen, das immer wieder in einen Ruf gerät, der in einem so merkwürdigen Widerspruch zu seiner tatsächlichen Wirkungslosigkeit steht.

Die 12.Sommerakademie des IfS wird sich daher vom 16. bis 18. September 2011 dem Thema „Konservative Revolution“ widmen. Dabei geht es nicht um das Herunterbeten der fünf Mohlerschen Hauptgruppen, sondern um die gegenwärtig gültigen Gedanken dieser Geistesrichtung. Daher wird es nach einer ausführlichen Einleitung durch Karlheinz Weißmann u.a. um folgende Themen gehen: den Zusammenhang von Politik und Lebensreform, den Gedanken einer schöpferischen Restauration, um Heideggers konservative Revolution der Philosophie, um das Verhältnis von Deutschtum und Christentum…

Wie immer: 40 Teilnehmerplätze, sieben Vorträge, Film, Diskussionen, Sport: Wenn Sie 35 Jahre oder jünger sind, können und sollten Sie teilnehmen! Die 11. Winterakademie wird nicht in Schnellroda stattfinden, sondern in der Region zwischen Hannover und Kassel! Der Ausweichort ist gut mit der Bahn erreichbar. Genaue Informationen gibt es nach der Anmeldung. Die Hörerbeiträge sind nicht hoch, wer Geld verdient, bezahlt für zwei Übernachtungen, Vollpension und alle Vorträge 80,00 €, alle anderen bezahlen 35,00 €. Und: Keiner sollte wegen finanzieller Engpässe fernbleiben. Rufen Sie uns an, falls es knapp wird!

Tagungsfolge und Antwortbogen.


mardi, 02 août 2011

Arnolt Bronnen: Entre o Communismo e o Nacional-Socialismo

Arnolt Bronnen: Entre o Comunismo e o Nacional-Socialismo

por Werner Olles
Ex: http://legio-victrix.blogspot.com/
Arnolt Bronnen nasceu em 19 de agosto de 1895 em Viena. Desde muito jovem decidiu mudar seu nome verdadeiro (Arnold Bronner) pelo que anos mais tarde conhecerá a celebridade no mundo das letras. Esta tendência a maquiar a realidade acompanhar-lhe-á ao longo de sua existência. Assim é como converteu-se de judeu vienense em ário-germânico; de cidadão alemão em cidadão austríaco, para voltar à cidadania alemã; de comunista a nacional-revolucionário, mais tarde nacional-socialista, para regressar anos mais tarde ao comunismo.
Após a Grande Guerra, na qual participou como Kaiserjäger (Caçador Imperial) no front do Tirol, onde foi ferido gravemente no pescoço, iniciou sua carreira literária em 1922 com a publicação de uma obra teatral entitulada Vatermord (Parricida), que havia começado a escrever sendo prisioneiro dos italianos. Naquela época Bronnen pertencia a um grupo de dramaturgos, escritores e atores vanguardistas comprometidos com o expressionismo e vinculados a Bertold Brecht, com quem mantinha estreitos laços de amizade. Brecht havia encarregado-se da montagem de dita obra porém, desgraçadamente, abandonou esta iniciativa depois de haver escrito inclusive os arranjos para a encenação.
Após sua estréia em Frankfurt, representou-se em Berlim pela primeira vez em 14 de maio de 1922, a cargo da companhia "Deutscher Theater", convertendo-se em um autêntico escândalo. Sua segunda obra, Anarchie in Sillian (Anarquia em Sillian), levou à maioria dos críticos a considerar que o dramaturgo do futuro não era Brecht, senão Bronnen.
Em 1924 estreou-se sua obra Katalaunische Schlacht (A batalha dos Campos Catalaúnicos) no Grande Teatro de Frankfurt. Um ano mais tarde, Bronnen escreveu Die Rheinischen Rebellen (Os rebeldes renanos), obra que suscitou profundas polêmicas entre a crítica: o autor, conhecido até esse momento com um simpatizante das correntes marxistas, havia passado ao campo do nacionalismo. Bronnen, porém, todavia não havia dado esse passo.
Mais tarde escreveu Ostpolzug (Campanha ao Polo Leste), drama no qual explorava a personalidade de Alexandre o Grande. Em 1925 estreou Exzesse (Excesso) obra com a qual, uma vez mais, provocou um grande alvoroço como consequência de suas cenas e diálogos eróticos Um ano mais tarde estreou Reparationen (Reparações), obra dedicada à resistência nacional contra a ocupação francesa da Renânia e contra o pagamento de reparações de guerra.
Do marxismo ao nacionalismo-revolucionário
Em 1929, Bronnen publicou um romance sobra a Alta Silésia entitulado O.S., onde recria a luta dos Freikorps contra os insurgentes polacos antes de iniciar-se a Primeira Guerra Mundial e do significativo e sangrento assalto dos voluntários alemães contra Annaberg. Tucholsky repreende-o por ter feito um "biscate insensato" e de propagar "mentiras próprias de fascistas de salão". Pelo contrário, Joseph Goebbels, escreveu: "O.S. de Bronnen é o livro que todos gostaríamos de ter escrito." Ernst Jünger considerou este romance como "um primeiro sinal, que indica que nos ambientes de Bronnen, cabe a responsabilidade". Em Der Tag e no Münchener Neueste Nachrichten podia ler-se: "É algo mais que um romance, é uma profissão de fé política de altos voos", enquanto que Alfred Rosenberg, no Völkischer Beobachter chama a atenção sobre Bronnen, porém isso sim, sem deixar de considerá-lo um "bon vivant" e um autor "perigoso".
Politicamente, Bronnen já havia convertido-se em um nacional-revolucionário, próximo ao grupo de intelectuais que expressavam-se em revistas como Die Standarte, Deutsches Volkstum, Arminius, Deutsche Front, Das Dritte Reich, Gewissen, Die Kommanden, Nationalsozialistische Briefe, Der Vormarsch, Der Wehrwolf e Widerstand, as quais pertenciam os irmãos Ernst e Friedrich-Georg Jünger, Friedrich Hielscher, Franz Schauwecker, Ernst von Salomon, Herbert Blank, Otto Strasser, Ernst Niekisch e A.Paul Weber. Como antigo intelectual da esquerda marxista, partidário de uma sorte de socialismo popular e combativo, Bronnen sentiu-se atraído por tais círculos.
No plano profissional, Bronnen começou sua carreira na UFA e na Reichsrundfunkgesellschaft (Sociedade Radiofônica do Reich), ao tempo que rompe os laços que ainda o uniam com os extremistas de esquerda. Após um congresso sob o título "Literatura e Rádio", produz-se uma azeda polêmica com seus colegas, os escritores Alfred Döblin, Walter von Molo, Börries von Münchhausen, Alfons Paquet, Ludwig Fulda, Herbert Euleberg e Arnold Zweig, na medida em que ele era partidário de pôr a rádio "a serviço do povo", "não estava ali para servir aos literatos, senão ao povo", e, em qualquer caso, não devia converter-se em "uma instituição beneficente para escritores aposentados". Para Bronnen, o escritor é tão somente "o instrumento da expressão das idéias da nação".
Em janeiro de 1930 organiza um debate que, com os anos, converter-se-á em emblemático frente aos microfones da Radio Berlim, com Kurt Hiller, dirigende do Grupo de Pacifistas Revolucionários, e Franz Schauwecker, conhecido escritor nacional-revolucionário. Bronnen escreve uma biografia de Von Rossbach, chefe dos Freikorps, e pouco depois, conhece Goebbels, com cuja personalidade fica fascinado. Bronnen converte-se desta maneira no provocador número um da Alemanha. Quando Thomas Mann sustenta em um ato público que a burguesia alemã defende, lado a lado com os social-democratas, as instituições da República de Weimar, Bronnen abandona a sala flanqueado por vinte SA pedindo a dissolução da reunião. Por ocasião da estréia do filme Nada de novo no front, baseada no romance do mesmo nome de Erich Maria Remarque, Bronnen, com sua mulher Olga, uma amiga de Goebbels - que dar-lhe-á uma filha em 1938, Bárbara, que, anos mais tarde, como seu pai, converter-se-á em escritora - e vários camaradas, provocarão um grande alvoroço soltando ratos brancos na sala. Goebbels conhecia a ascendência judia de Bronnen, razão pela qual o responsável da propaganda nazi dar-lhe-á seu apoio diante das denúncias de alguns colegaso que desprezavam-no e de não poucos artigos publicados na imprensa.
A partir da tomada de poder pelos nacional-socialistas em 1933, Bronnen conheceu algumas dificuldades como consequência de sua origem racial. Em um princípio, disse ser filho natural, depois fez-se um estudo antropométrico do crânio para provar seu caráter "ariano". Não participava das idéias de resistência antinazi de alguns de seus antigos amigos nacional-revolucionários e nacional-bolcheviques. Antes de 1933, por exemplo, Bronnen havia protegido Ernst Niekisch contra as injúrias lançadas por Goebbels, porém quando os nazis subiram ao poder Bronnen cuidou-se muito de dar a conhecer sua posição contra o anti-hitlerismo de Niekisch.
Stalingrad: a estrela de Bronnen apaga-se
Bronnen teve muito poder através daso ndas da Radio Berlim. Depurou os profissionais de esquerda, liberais e judeus. Escreveu um romance sobre o ambiente radiofônico, Der Kampf in Äther (Combate pelas ondas), que Alfred Rosenberg chegou inclusive a censurar, por entender que criticava subliminalmente a política cultural nacional-socialista. Meses mais tarde, Bronnen converter-se-á em um pioneiro da televisão, à cabeça de uma pequena equipe que filma os Jogos Olímpicos de Berlim de 1936.
A estrela de Bronnen, não obstante, começa a apagar-se após a tragédia de Stalingrad. Alfred Rosenberg, inimigo das vanguardas nas artes e na literatura, a quem nunca havia gostado o dandy Bronnen e a quem, definitivamente, considerava um produto da boêmia literária, começa a maquinar. Em uma conversação entre Hitler e aquele, Rosenberg ataca aos literatos "bolcheviques culturais" entocados na retaguarda, enquanto que os jovens soldados alemães regavam com seu sangue o front russo ou congelavam no inverno das estepes. Rosenberg cita dois nomes: Erich Kästner e Arnolt Bronnen. Depois de um processo de intenções e da proibição de toda atividade literária, Bronnen é expulso da Câmara de Escritores do Reich. Quando Bronnen pede explicações por esta sanção, é-lhe respondido que é como consequência de suas antigas atividades e "escandalosas" atividades vanguardistas. Meses mais tarde, por conta de escutas por parte da Gestapo, Bronnen é inclusive detido, como anos mais tarde explicará em sua autobiografia.
Em 1944 Bronnen saiu da Alemanha e instalou-se em Goisern im Salzkammergut, onde reúne-se com um grupo da resistência antinazi, não sem antes vestir o uniforme da Wehrmacht, chegando à Áustra em 8 de maio de 1945. Até 1959, trabalhou como jornalista do diário Neue Zeit de Linz.
Na República Democrática Alemã
A princípios da década de 50 Bronnen traslada-se a Berlim Oriental. Afilia-se ao SED social-comunista e escreve sua autobiografia em 1954, Arnolt Bronnen gibt zu Protokoll, que embelezará a seu gosto. Mais tarde aparecem Deutschland Kein Wintermärchen (Alemanha, não és um pequeno conto de inverno), em 1956, e Tage mit Bert Brecht (Dias junto a Bert Brecht), em 1959. Em 1957, reeditou um de seus velhos livros, o romance Film und Leben der Barbara La Marr (Filme e vida de Bárbara La Marr). A imprensa da República Democrática ataca-o duramente acusando-o de "antissemitismo e pornografia". Fala-se inclusive de "atitude fundamentalmente anti-humana de sua consciência", faz-se alusão a "seus vícios desagradáveis de juventude", de seu "estilo amaneirado", e suas "posturas cínicas e insolentes" nos "baixos estádios da pirâmide literária da época". A nova edição de dito romance foi proibida, o que supôs o imprevisto final da carreira como dramaturgo de Bronnen. Brecht interveio apelando à bondade intrínseca de Bronnen e em memória de sua velha amizade. Brecht oferece a Bronnen a possibilidade de converter-se em crítico teatral, o que permite ao inconformista visceral escapar do muro de silêncio que a exclusão definitiva do mundo cultural representa. Bronnen, não obstante, já não poderá jogar papel político nenhum na República Democrática comunista.
Em 12 de outubro de 1959, Bronnen morreu à idade de 64 anos em Berlim. Durante toda sua vida foi um personagem controvertido: de dramaturgo esquerdista a romancista nacional-revolucionário e nacional-socialista. Arnolt Bronnen encarnou essa mistura de inconformismo, oportunismo e dandismo. Jamais foi um renegado, senão um eterno convertido, responsabilidade, sem dúvida alguma, de sua vocação e seu secreto talento.

mercredi, 27 juillet 2011

Oswald Spengler ed il senso metapolitico del declino occidentale

 Oswald Spengler ed il senso metapolitico del declino occidentale

Luca Valentini

Ex: http://www.centrostudilaruna.it/

La crisi morale, oltre che economica e finanziaria, che attualmente attanaglia l’Italia, le farsesche vicende dell’attuale cricca di potere al governo, spesso conducono anche i più acuti osservatori a smarrire quella visione d’insieme e di lontani orizzonti che dovrebbe sempre caratterizzare una visione del mondo e della vita autenticamente tradizionale, cioè fondata e determinata su principi dall’Alto.

E’ importante tale precisazione, perché, al di là delle giuste analisi sociologico-politiche, delle doverose battaglie per il benessere del Popolo Italiano, mai si dovrebbe dimenticare che l’ampiezza della crisi va ben oltre il nostro Paese e che le radici sono ben più profonde di ciò che ai nostri occhi si manifesta, essendo il piano finanziario solamente una risultante di un processo degenerativo, che interessa, nelle sue profondità abissali, i caratteri più interni dell’intera civilizzazione occidentale, nel suo spirito, nella sua moderna involuzione, nelle imboscate e nei tradimenti che essa ha subito.

Riferirsi a Oswald Spengler ed a ciò che ha espresso nelle sue opere, particolarmente nel Il Tramonto dell’Occidente, come noi faremo sinteticamente in questo articolo, ha proprio la determinata volontà di mettere in risalto codesto piano d’osservazione, un orizzonte che va ben oltre la semplice narrazione storicistica o i lineari ed apparentemente confusi e contradditori accadimenti del quotidiano, ma che vuole riaprire una riflessione, un ragionamento all’interno della nostra comunità sull’essenzialità di un approfondimento metapolitico che è e deve essere un approfondimento sulla nostra civiltà, sulla decadenza secolare che la caratterizza, nel rapporto della Tradizione Europea – che dal nostro punto di vista è essenzialmente Tradizione elleno-romano-germanica – con la sfera del Sacro, con l’esplicitazione nell’istituzione statuale, fino alle più ramificate e secondarie sezioni dello sviluppo produttivo e sociale: “Le civiltà sono degli organismi. La storia mondiale è la loro biografia complessiva” (da Il Tramonto dell’Occidente).

Un’analisi che valorizzi e ridesti il senso nascosto, occulto, quella terza dimensione della storia che molti smarriscono, insieme con quei punti di riferimento che unici possono stabilire un preciso quanto indispensabile percorso di autoriconoscimento identitario per la nostra comunità, per chi ricerca nell’impegno politico e culturale l’Uomo Nuovo e Differenziato dalla modernità, dalla pandemia inarrestabile che conduce oramai da diversi secoli l’intero Occidente – e con esso tutto il resto del mondo – verso un baratro di cui non si riescono a vedere vie d’uscita o possibilità di risalita. Per riferirci direttamente a Oswald Spengler, si rammenti come affermasse esserci un ciclo vitale per ogni singola civiltà, quasi fosse la stessa un vero e proprio ente animico, con una precisa contezza di se stesso. In riferimento all’Occidente sarebbe esistita prima la civiltà greco-romana, sorta grazie alle migrazioni indoeuropee in Grecia e nella penisola italica, che lo stesso ha definito “apollinea”, seguita da una civiltà germanica o detta “faustiana”. Entrambe queste Kultur hanno in sé un simbolo esprimente il proprio spirito vitale: Apollo, divinità della forma e della misura, dell’equilibrio interno, spirituale ed estetico; Faust, il personaggio creato da Goethe, come aspirazione perpetua che tenta di colmare lo iato tra l’esistenza parziale e limitata dell’Uomo e le altezze metafisiche della Divinità Trascendente. L’odierna società, pertanto, è il prodotto dell’esaurimento di tale forza originaria, di tale spirito ancestrale, lo spegnimento progressivo di ogni slancio oltre l’umano, di ogni classica forma interna: “Ognuna ha la sua fanciullezza, la sua gioventù, la sua età virile e la sua senilità (da Il Tramonto dell’Occidente)”.

A tal punto, partendo proprio da questa presa di coscienza, che dovrà risultare quanto più profonda e lucidamente attiva, si può accennare a ciò può e deve essere il senso di una militanza, di un impegno politico-culturale. Nella fase finale di questo ciclo, in questa umanità parodistica, l’unica via da percorrere è quella che conduce alla fedeltà nel proprio essere, alla costruzione di una comunità di uomini e di donne, conscia delle proprie radici e fiera della propria diversità dal resto del mondo. La lotta interna per la nascita di uomo che tragga da sé la legge da osservare, che sia impassibile ed inattaccabile di fronte alla marea che tutto corrompe, un uomo che con il suo essere sia esempio e trasmissione di Tradizione, questa la via d’onore che i nostri cuori hanno il diritto di percorrere. Il nostro ed unico scopo è quello, pertanto, anche grazie a questo giornale, di mettere a disposizione di quanti possano e vogliano le nostre umili  conoscenze di studio e di ricerca tradizionali, per “fare ciò che deve essere fatto”, come Evola ci ricorda, e per rimanere fedeli all’Idea, che può essere valorosamente servita solo se da Spengler si assume la consapevolezza del mondo in cui siamo stati destinati a vivere:…civiltà crepuscolare che è – scrive su La Vita italiana Evola riferendosi agli scritti di Spengler – una civiltà delle masse, civiltà antiqualitativa, inorganica, urbanistica, livellatrice, intimamente anarchica, demagogica, antitradizionale”.

* * *

Pubblicato sul periodico d’informazione politica Il Megafono, anno 2011.

samedi, 23 juillet 2011

Carl Schmitt: Total Enemy, Total State & Total War

Total Enemy, Total State, & Total War


Ex: http://www.counter-currents.com/

 Translated by Simona Draghici

Editor’s Note:

The following translation from Carl Schmitt appears online for the first time in commemoration of Schmitt’s birth on July 11, 1888. The translation originally appeared in Carl Schmitt, Four Essays, 1931–1938, ed. and trans. Simona Draghici (Washington, D.C.: Plutarch Press, 1999).


cs.jpgIn a certain sense, there have been total wars at all times; a theory of the total war, however, presumably dates only from the time of Clausewitz who would talk of “abstract” and “absolute” wars.”[1] Later on, under the impact of the experiences of the last Great War, the formula of total war has acquired a specific meaning and a particular effectiveness. Since 1920, it has become the prevailing catchword. It was first brought out in sharp relief in the French literature, in book titles like La guerre totale. Afterwards, between 1926 and 1928, it found its way into the language of the proceedings of the disarmament committee at Geneva. In concepts such as “war potential” (potentiel de guerre), “moral disarmament” (désarmement moral) and “total disarmament” (désarmement total). The fascist doctrine of the “total state” came to it by way of the state; the association yielded the conceptual pair: total state, total war. In Germany, the publication of the Concept of the Political has since 1927 expanded the pair of totalities to a set of three: total enemy, total war, total state. Ernst Jünger’s book of 1930 Total Mobilization made the formula part of the general consciousness. Nonetheless, it was only Ludendorff’s 1936 booklet entitled Der Totale Krieg (The Total War) that lent it an irresistible force and caused its dissemination beyond all bounds.

The formula is omnipresent; it forces into view a truth whose horrors the general consciousness would rather shun. Such formulas, however, are always in danger of becoming widespread nationally and internationally and of being degraded to summary slogans, to mere gramophone records of the publicity mill. Hence some clarifications may be appropriate.

(a) A war may be total in the sense of summoning up one’s strength to the limit, and of the commitment of everything to the last reserves.[2] It may also be called total in the sense of the unsparing use of war means of annihilation. When the well-known English author J. F. C. Fuller writes in a recent article, entitled “The First of the League Wars, Its Lessons and Omens,” that the Italian campaign in Abyssinia was a modern total war, he only refers to the use of efficacious weapons (airplanes and gas), whereas looked at from another vantage point, Abyssinia in fact was not capable of waging a modern total war nor did Italy use its reserves to the limit, reach the highest intensity, and lead to an oil blockade or to the closing of the Suez Canal, because of the pressure exerted through the sanctions imposed by the League of Nations.

(b) A war may be total either on both sides or on one side only. It may also be deliberately limited, rationed and measured out, because of the geographical situation, the war technique in use, and also the predominant political principles of both sides. The typical 18th-century war, the so-called “cabinet war,” was essentially and deliberately a partial war. It rested on the clear segregation of the soldiers participating in the war from the non-participant inhabitants and non-combatants. Nevertheless, the Seven Years War of Frederick the Great was relatively total, on Prussia’s side, when compared with the other powers’ mobilization of forces. A situation, typical of Germany, showed itself readily in that case: the adversity of geographical conditions and the foreign coalitions compelled a German state to mobilize its forces to a higher degree than its more affluent and fortunate bigger neighbors.[3]

(c) The character of the war may change during the belligerent showdown. The will to fight may grow limp or it may intensify, as it happened in the 1914–1918 world war, when the war trend on the German side towards the mobilization of all the economic and industrial reserves soon forced the English side to introduce general conscription.

(d) Finally, some other methods of confrontation and trial of strength, which are not total, always develop within the totality of war. Thus for a time, everyone seeks to avoid a total war which naturally carries a total risk. In this way, after the world war, there were the so-called military reprisals (the 1923 Corfu Conflict, Japan-China in 1932), followed by the attempts at non-military, economic sanctions, according to Article 16 of the Covenant of the League of Nations (against Italy, autumn 1935), and finally, certain methods of power testing on foreign soil (Spain 1936–1937) emerged in a way that could be correctly interpreted only in close connection with the total character of modern warfare. They are intermediate and transitional forms between open war and true peace; they derive their meaning from the fact that total war looms large in the background as a possibility, and an understandable caution recommends itself in the delineation of the conflictual spaces. Likewise, it is only from this point of view that they can be grasped by the science of international law.


The core of the matter lies in warfare. From the nature of the total war one may grasp the character and the whole aspect of state totality; from the special character of the decisive weapons one may deduce the peculiar character and aspect of the totality of war. But it is the total enemy that gives the total war its meaning.[4]

The different services and types of warfare, land warfare, sea warfare, air warfare, they each experience the totality of war in a particular way. A corresponding world of notions and ideas piles on each of these types of warfare. The traditional notions of “levée en masse” (levy), “nation armée” (nation in arms), and “Volk in Waffen” (the people in arms) belong to land warfare.[5] Out of these notions emerged the continental doctrine of total war, essentially as a doctrine of land warfare, and that thanks mainly to Clausewitz. Sea warfare, on the other hand, has its own strategic and tactical methods and criteria; moreover, until recently, it has been first and foremost a war against the opponent’s trade and economy, whence a war against non-combatants, an economic war, which by its laws of blockade, contraband, and prizes, drew neutral trade into the hostilities, as well. Air warfare has not so far built up a similar fully-fledged and independent system of its own. There is no doctrine of air warfare yet that would correspond to the world of notions and concepts accumulated with regard to land and sea warfare. Nonetheless, as a consequence of air warfare, the overall configuration sways in the main towards a three-dimensional total war.

The “if” of a total war is beyond any doubt today. The “how” may vary. The totality is perceptible from opposite vantage points. Hence the standard type of guide and leader in a total war is necessarily different. It would be too simple an equation to accept that the soldier will step into the centre of this totality as the prevailing type in a total war to the same extent as in other kinds of wars previously.[6] If, as it has been said, total mobilization abolishes the separation of the soldier from the civilian, it may very well happen that the soldier changes into a civilian as the civilian changes into a soldier, or both may change into something new, a third alternative. In reality, it all depends on the general character of the war. A real war of religion turns the soldiers into the tools of priests or preachers. A total war that is waged on behalf of the economy becomes the tool of economic power groups. There are other forms in which the soldier himself is the typical model and the ascending expression of the character of the people. Geographical conditions, racial and social peculiarities of all kinds, are factors that determine the type of warfare waged by great nations. Even today it is unlikely that a nation could engage in all the three kinds of warfare to a degree equal to the three-dimensional total war. It is probable that the centre of gravity in the deployment of forces will always rest with one or the other of the three kinds of warfare and the doctrine of total war will draw on it.[7]

Until now the history of the European peoples has been dominated by the contrast of the English sea warfare with the Continental land warfare. It is not a matter of “traders and heroes” or that sort of thing, but rather the recognition that any of the various kinds of warfare may become total, and out of its own characteristics generate a special world of notions and ideals as its own doctrine and also relevant to international and constitutional law, particularly in the assessment of the soldier’s worth and of his position in the general body of the people. It would be a mistake to regard the English sea warfare of the last three centuries in the light of the total land warfare of Clausewitz’s theory, essentially as mere trade and economic but not total warfare, and to misinterpret it as unconnected with and markedly different from totality. It is the English sea warfare that generated the kernel of a total world view.[8]

The English sea warfare is total in its capacity for total enmity. It knows how to mobilize religious, ideological, spiritual, and moral forces as only few of the great wars in world history have done. The English sea warfare against Spain was a world-wide combat of the Germanic and Romance peoples, between Protestantism and Catholicism, Calvinism and Jesuitism, and there are few instances of such outbursts of enmity as intense and final as Cromwell’s against the Spaniards. The English war against Napoleon likewise changed from a sea war into a “crusade.” In the war against Germany between 1914 and 1918, the world-wide English propaganda knew how to whip up enormous moral and spiritual energies in the name of civilization and humanity, of democracy and freedom, against the Prussian-German “militarism.” The English mind had also proved its ability to interpret the industrial-technical upsurge of the 19th century in the terms of the English worldview. Herbert Spencer drew an extremely effective picture of history that was disseminated all over the world, in countless works of popularization, the propagandistic force of which proved its worth in the 1914–1918 World War. It was the philosophy of mankind’s progress, presented as an evolution from feudalism to trade and industry, from the political to the economic, from soldiers to industrialists, from war to peace. It portrayed the soldier essentially as Prussian-German, eo ipso “feudal reactionary,” a “medieval” figure standing in the way of progress and peace. Moreover, out of its specificity, the English sea warfare evolved a full, self-contained system of international law. It asserted itself and its own concepts held on their own against the corresponding concepts of Continental international law throughout the 19th century. There is an Anglo-Saxon concept of enemy, which in essence rejects the differentiation between combatants and non-combatants, and an Anglo-Saxon conception of war that incorporates the so-called economic war. In short, the fundamental concepts and norms of this English international law are total as such and certainly indicative of an ideology in itself total.

Finally, the English constitutional regulations turned the subordination of the soldiers to the civilians into an ideological principle and imposed it upon the Continent during the liberal 19th century. By those standards, civilization lies in the rule of the bourgeois, civilian ideal which is essentially unsoldierly. Accordingly, the constitution is always but a civil-bourgeois system in which, as Clemenceau put it, the soldier’s only raison d’être is to defend the civilian bourgeois society, while basically he is subject to civilian command. The Prussian soldier state carried on a century-long political struggle on the home front against this bourgeois constitutional ideal. It succumbed to it in the Autumn of 1918. The history of Prussian Germany’s home politics from 1848 to 1918 was a ceaseless conflict between the army and parliament, an uninterrupted battle which the government had to fight with the parliament over the structure of the army, and the army budget necessary to make ready for an unavoidable war, that were determined not by the necessities of foreign policy but rather by compromises regarding internal policy. The dictate of Versailles, which stipulated the army’s organization and its equipment to the smallest detail, in an agreement of foreign policy, was preceded by half a century of periodical agreements of internal policy between the Prussian-German soldier state and its internal policy opponents, in which all the details of the organization and the equipment of the army had been decided by the internal policy. The conflict between bourgeois society and the Prussian soldier state led to an unnatural isolation of the War Office from the power of command and to many other separations, consistently rooted in the opposition between a bourgeois constitutional ideal imported from England either directly or through France and Belgium, on the one hand, and the older constitutional ideal of the German soldiery, on the other.[9]

Today Germany has surmounted that division and achieved a close integration of its soldier force.[10] Indeed, attempts will not fail to be made to describe it as militarism, in the manner of earlier propaganda methods, and to hold Germany guilty of the advent of total war. Such questions of guilt too belong to the totality of the ideological wrangles. Le combat spirituel est aussi brutal que la bataille d’hommes (spiritual combat is as brutal as the battles of men). Nonetheless, before nations stagger into a total war once more, one must raise the question whether a total enmity truly exists among the European nations nowadays. War and enmity belong to the history of nations. But the worst misfortune only occurs wherever the enmity is generated by the war itself, as in the 1914–1918 war, and not as it would be right and sensible, namely that an older, unswayed enmity, true and total to the Day of Judgment, should led to a total war.

Translator’s Notes

Originally published in Völkerbund und Völkerrecht, vol. 4, 1937, this essay was reproduced in Posirionen und Begriffe im Kampf mit Weimar-Gent-Versailles, 1929–1939, (Hamburg, 1940), pp. 235–239.

1. General Carl von Clausewitz (1780–1831) is best known for his book Vom Kriege, never finished and published posthumously, which incidentally has been translated into English under the title On War. There are numerous versions available in print.

2. Carl Schmitt’s own political principles of “will” and “energy,” components of his qualitative concept of total state, derive from this characteristic feature of “total war”: collective determination to assume a cause considered worthwhile and unreserved commitment to its fulfillment. As a generalized rallying around and enthusiasm for a cause and a particular course of action, it is a frequent phenomenon of social psychology, yet its usually ephemeral character makes it unfit as a durable basis of any social structure. I remember the enthusiasm with which in 1982, to a man, the Argentines, for instance, rallied to the idea of going to war to free the Maldives and hurried to put it into practice, and the accompanying hatred which grew against the British. The enthusiasm cooled off quickly, but not the hatred, which lingered on. To perpetuate the enthusiasm, a plethora of other factors have to be brought in, of which, in the case of Germany at the beginning of the ’thirties, Carl Schmitt actually had not a clue.

3. The “lesson” is in keeping with the Hitlerite Frederician cult and legitimating tradition and does not claim to be historically accurate. Although a digression that seems out of place, it has a certain significance for the time it was made. In the autumn of 1936, Hitler circulated a memorandum revealing his expansionist intentions. Then in 1937, the organization of the nation to serve those intentions began, a process which coincided with the rise of the SS state. In November of the same year the German media were ordered to keep silent about the preparations for a “total war.” Bearing all that in mind, Schmitt’s short digression reads more as a warning of danger than a point of military strategy.

4 . What is interesting here is his insistence on the existential essence of the phenomenon, which is consonant with his earlier definition of the political and at the same time renders the distinction between the professional soldier and the civilian meaningless. Moreover, total enmity with its implicit elimination of the adversary excludes any prospect of a peace treaty, as the war is to go on until one of the belligerents is annihilated.

5. Das Volk in Waffen (The Nation in Arms) happens to be the title of a work on total war by Colmar von der Goltz (1843–1916), published in 1883, and which is an important stepping stone in the reflection on modern warfare that led to Ludendorff’s book.

6. At the beginning of February 1938, Adolf Hitler became commander in chief of the German armed forces, appointing General Keitel his assistant at the head of the High Command of the Armed Forces, as the War Ministry was dissolved.

7. Eventually only the Soviet Union came closest to Carl Schmitt’s expectations, while the United States waged a fully-fledged three-dimensional war, dictated by its geographical position and sustained by its vast economic and technical resources most of which remained outside the battle zone.

8. For a broader treatment of the subject-matter see Carl Schmitt’s Land und Meer, which as Land and Sea is available in an English translation (Washington, D.C.: Plutarch Press, 1997).

9. The conflict between the civil society and the military in Germany was the subject-matter of a longer essay by Carl Schmitt, published in Hamburg in 1934 under the title Staatsgefüge und Zusammenbruch des Zweites Reiches. Der Sieg des Burgers über den Soldaten (The State Structure and the Collapse of the Second Reich. The Burghers’ Victory Over the Soldiers).


10. Röhm, the ideological soldier, had been eliminated in 1934, at the same time as the political soldiers, the Generals von Schleicher and von Bredow. Furthermore, as already mentioned in note 6 above, the War Ministry ceased to exist at the beginning of 1938, while the Commander in Chief, Field Marshal Werner von Blomberg was removed from his post for having compromised himself by marrying a “lady with a past,” and his prospective successor, General von Fritsch was forced to resign on a trumped-up Charge of homosexuality. At the same time, sixteen other generals were retired and forty-four were transferred. Göring who had been very active in carrying out this “integration” got for it only the title of field marshal, as Hitler kept for himself the supreme military command.


Article printed from Counter-Currents Publishing: http://www.counter-currents.com

URL to article: http://www.counter-currents.com/2011/07/total-enemy-total-state-and-total-war/

vendredi, 15 juillet 2011

Herman Wirth en de Indo-Europese voorgeschiedenis

Herman Wirth en de Indo-Europese voorgeschiedenis

door Marc. EEMANS

Ex: http://marceemans.wordpress.com/

herman-wirth.jpgToen het Derde Rijk ineengestort was hebben heel wat gezellen van het eerste uur gepoogd zich – met min of meer sukses – als slachtoffers van het nationaal-socialisme voor te doen. Anderzijds had de regelrechte nazi-jacht die de overwinnaars ontketenden tot gevolg dat een aantal persoonlijkheden die tot de konservatieve revolutie behoorden en vanaf het begin duidelijk afstand hadden genomen van Hitler, toch werden verdacht, vervolgd en soms zelfs gedood.

Dat was onder meer het geval met de jurist Carl Schmitt, de schrijvers Ernst en Georg Jünger en Ernst von Salomon, de wijsgeren Martin Heidegger en Hermann von Keyserling, Rudolf von Sebottendorf, een der meest eminente leden der Thule-Gesellschaft, of nog de geleerden Friedrich Hielscher en Herman Wirth.


Ernst Jünger bracht de oorlog door te Parijs, als Duits officier. Hij had kennis van het tegen Hitler gerichte komplot van 20 juli 1944, maar was een van de weinige, zoniet de enige samenzweerder die werd gespaard. Hoe Heidegger vervolgd werd door de fanatici van het regime hebben wij hier reeds beschreven (zie: Martin Heidegger en de traditie van het Westers denken, in TK&S afl. 12, november 1980, pag. 150/11-20). Met opmerkelijke waardigheid en een stoïcisme dat dat der Oudheid evenaart, verdroeg hij zowel deze vervolging als, na 1945, die door linksen van allerlei pluimage.

Men kent Ernst von Salomons boek Der Fragebogen (1951), waarin hij de soms lachwekkende, maar altijd hatelijke aard van de “denazifikatie-riten” aanklaagt. In feite trad von Salomon nooit tot het nationaal-socialisme toe, dat hij – net als o.m. Julius Evola – zijn demagogische en plebeïsche aard verweet. Zijn vriend uit de dagen van de Brigade Ehrhardt, Hartmut Plaas, werd in 1944 omgebracht in het KZ Ravensbrück.

Datzelfde misprijzen vinden we bij Hermann von Keyserling, stichter van de School der Wijsheid, die echter toch, na de anarchie van de Weimar-republiek, de opkomst van het nationaal-socialisme begroette als een zegen voor Duitsland, maar zich dan weer plots uit alle politieke aktiviteit terugtrekt.

Rudolf von Sebottendorf kreeg last met de nazi-autoriteiten na de publikatie van zijn boek Bevor Hitler kam: het werd meteen verboden en bijna alle beschikbare eksemplaren vernietigd. Maar ook na 1945 blééf het door de Geallieerden verboden, zodat dit boek, dat voor de genesis van het nationaal-socialisme van kapitaal belang is, omzeggens onvindbaar werd, vermits het nooit heruitgegeven of vertaald werd. (1) De schrijver zelf verliet Duitsland en verdronk in 1945 in de Bosporus, in geheimzinnige omstandigheden.

Een geheimzinnig personage is ook Friedrich Hielscher. Men kent zijn naam doorgaans nog enkel omdat hij Wolfram Sievers, sekretaris-generaal van het wetenschappelijk instituut Ahnenerbe bijstond, toen die op 2 juni 1948 als “oorlogsmisdadiger” in Landsberg werd opgehangen. Hielscher zélf werd door de denazificeerders niet verontrust. Men beweerde dat hij lid zou zijn geweest van de Thule-Gesellschaft, maar in de ledenlijst van dit genootschap (opgesteld door Rudolf von Sebottendorf en door René Alleau gepubliceerd in zijn Hitler et les sociétés secrètes, Grasset, Parijs, 1969) vinden we zijn naam niet terug.

Ernst Jünger, die hem goed moet hebben gekend, noteert in zijn Parijs’ dagboek op 14 oktober 1943 “Hielscher bevestigde het vermoeden – dat ik al lang koesterde – dat hij een Kerk zou gesticht hebben. De dogmatiek is hij al voorbij en in de liturgie is hij ver gevorderd. Hij heeft mij een reeks gezangen getoond en een cyclus feesten, het heidens jaar, die een ganse ordening godheden, kleuren, dieren, spijzen, edelstenen, planten … omvat.” De konfrontatie Hielscher-Sievers, tijdens diens laatste ogenblikken, lijkt de thesis “Hielscher, kerkstichter” te bevestigen, als men tenminste geloof mag hechten aan hen die Wolfram Sievers’ martelgang beschreven. Jean-Claude Frère schrijft in zijn boek Nazisme et sociétés secrètes (Grasset, Parijs, 1974): “Toen Sievers zijn vonnis vernam, vroeg hij in zijn laatste ogenblikken te worden bijgestaan door Hielscher. Dit werd hem toegestaan; en toen kon men, aan de voet van de galg, het verbazend, krankzinnig schouwspel beleven van twee mannen die een onbekende ritus voltrokken, onbegrijpelijke formules spraken, en alle aanwezigen – tot de beul toe – zenuwachtig maakten. Tenslotte drukte Hielscher Sievers tegen zich aan, de veroordeelde trad achteruit, boog voor zijn meester en leverde zich dan, onbewogen, aan de beul over.”

In het spoor van de studie der geschiedenis van onze voorouders zullen we straks Herman Wirth ontmoeten, maar blijven we nog even bij Friedrich Hielscher stilstaan. Hij werd geboren in 1902, studeerde rechten en bewoog zich in de jaren twintig in zgn. nationaalrevolutionaire kringen, op een behoorlijke afstand van het nationaal-socialisme. Hij schreef diverse boeken, waaronder Das Reich (1931) en raakte bevriend met Sievers, die hem het werk leerde kennen van Herman Wirth, wiens leerlingen ze beide werden. Hun wegen liepen echter weldra sterk uiteen: terwijl Sievers het nationaal-socialisme vervoegde ging Hielscher in de oppositie. Das Reich werd verboden en hij kreeg bij herhaling last met de nazi-autoriteiten. Hij werd de ‘ideoloog’ van een verzetsgroep die men best als Widerstandsgruppe Hielscher kan aanduiden. Toch bleef hij met Sievers bevriend, werkte aan de rand van het Ahnenerbe met hem mee en zou hem zelfs in zijn verzetsaktiviteiten hebben betrokken – wat hij tevergeefs, om Sievers van de strop te redden, voor het Nürnbergtribunaal trachtte te bewijzen.

Carl Schmitt werd er door zijn tegenstanders van beticht te hebben meegewerkt aan het opstellen van wetten, ten tijde van het Derde Rijk: ongetwijfeld deed hij dat ook. Vanaf 1935 werd hij echter de schietschijf van een aantal aan het nazi-regime onderworpen juristen en een aanval tegen hem in het officiële SS-blad Das schwarze Korps bracht hem ertoe zich volledig terug te trekken uit het openbare leven. Na 1945 hield een geallieerde onderzoekskommissie zich met hem bezig, klasseerde de aantijgingen “zonder gevolg” en rehabiliteerde hem.

Alvorens we nu de idee en het werk van de protohistoricus Herman Wirth behandelen, schetsen we eerst zijn levensloop. Herman Wirth Roeper Bosch, Nederlander, werd in 1885 te Utrecht geboren, als zoon van een turnleraar. Hij studeerde Germaanse filologie, volkskunde, geschiedenis en muziekwetenschap aan de universiteiten van Utrecht, Leipzig en Bazel. In 1910 doktoreert hij op de thesis De ondergang van het Nederlandse Volkslied, die een jaar later in Den Haag als boek verscheen. In 1909 was hij al tot lektor benoemd aan de universiteit van Berlijn, voor het vakgebied Nederlandse filologie.

Hij meldt zich in 1914 als oorlogsvrijwilliger in het Pruissische leger en wordt kort daarop verbindingsofficier te Brussel. Hij onderhield de kontakten met de groep Jong Vlaanderen, die de motor was van het aktivisme, en nam ook aktief deel aan de proklamatie van de Raad van Vlaanderen in 1917 en de kortstondige Vlaamse zelfstandigheid , die in 1918 met de nederlaag van het Duitse keizerrijk ter ziele ging (2). Intussen was hij, in 1916, aan de Berlijnse universiteit tot professor benoemd.

ln 1920 probeerde Wirth in Nederland onder de benaming Dietse Trekvogels een jeugdbeweging van de grond te krijgen, naar het model van de Wandervogel in Duitsland en de Blauwvoeterie in Vlaanderen. In 1923 vestigt hij zich dan in Marburg an der Lahn, als zelfstandig ethnograaf en begint met zijn diepgaand onderzoek naar de Europese pre historie. In 1925 werd hij lid van de  N.S.D.A.P., maar in juli 1926 stapt hij er weer uit. In 1928 laat hij bij Diederichs in Jena zijn bekend werk Der Aufgang der Menschheit verschijnen. In die periode behoorden Friedrich Hielscher en Wolfram Sievers tot zijn trouwste leerlingen. Net ais Wirth zelf werkten ze, op diverse vlakken, aan Ahnenerbe mee, ook al was alleen Sievers een partijman. Wirth was trouwens een van de oprichters van Ahnenerbe en moet er één der invloedrijke leden van zijn geweest, vermits hem meteen de sektie Studie van voorhistorisch schrift en symbolen werd toevertrouwd. In 1935 en 1936 was hij vele maanden op studiereis in Skandinavië. In 1938 brak hij met Ahnenerbe, wei onder de dubbele druk van de vakhistorici, die hem voor een dilettant hielden, en van de nazi•ideologen die hem hoogst kwalijk namen dat hij niet ophield te proklameren dat elke Führerkultus historisch gezien een vervalverschijnsel is…

De eerste bekende anti-Wirth brochure was van de hand van Prof. Dr. Paul Hambruch en droeg de alleszins niet dubbelzinnige titel: Die Irrtumer und Phantasien des Prof. Dr. Herman Wirth/Marburg, Verfasser von “Der Aufgang der Menschheit” und “Was heisst deutsch”. Dit denunciërende geschrift werd dan nog uitgerekend door het Deutscher Polizeiverlag uitgegeven (Lübeck, 1931). De latere Berlijnse n.s.-rektor Alfred Baeumler, bekend o.m. om zijn even perfide als doldrieste aanvallen tegen Heidegger, volgde weldra met het boekje Was bedeutet Herman Wirth für die Wissenschaft? (1932).

ln datzelfde jaar volgde van de geoloog Prof. Dr. Fritz Wiegers Herman Wirth und die deutsche Wissenschaft, waarin Wirth openlijk van dilettantisme werd aangeklaagd: “De geschriften van deze ethnoloog vormen slechts een weefsel van valse besluiten, van onbewezen beweringen en van ontkenningen van wetenschappelijke evidenties” … En verder: “De ‘ontdekkingen’ van Wirth zijn niets meer dan de fantazieën van een door de religieuze gedachte geobsedeerde geest”. In 1934 verscheen dan van Rudolf Glaser een brochure die Herman Wirth kategorisch verwierp, ditmaal niet in naam van de wetenschap, maar in naam van het nationaal-socialisme: Wer ist Herman Wirth? Volkstümliche Aufsatze über die Forschungen Herman Wirth’s von Rudolf Glaser. In de bibliografie vindt men al 62 pro- en contra-Wirth geschriften.

Natuurlijk verschenen er ook artikels en werken die van sympathie en belangstelling getuigden, maar de (tegen)partij had een veel grotere invloed, vooral toen Prof. Dr. Wiegers het argument hanteerde dat Wirth nog in 1932 relaties onderhield met de vrijmetselarij en Bolko Freiherr von Richthofen, de voorzitter van de Beroepsvereniging der Duitse Prehistorici, de aandacht trok op Wirth’s vriendschappelijke betrekkingen met bepaalde Joden… In een brief aan Prof. Hans F.K. Günther schreef Richthofen dat hij “niet begreep waarom men Wirth zou moeten ontzien omwille van taktische en humanitaire redenen” en op 16 januari 1934 liet hij aan Ministerialrat Sunkel weten: “Herr Wirth weiss genau, dass ihm führend besonders kiimpferische Nationalsozialisten gegenüberstehen. Mit Heil Hitler und deutschem Gruss, Ihr ergebenster gez. B. Frhr. v. Richthofen”.

Ook voor de grote kampagne tegen zijn ideeën en zijn persoon moet Herman Wirth binnen Ahnenerbe wel aanstoot gegeven hebben, door zijn onderzoekingen naar een oerkultuur en een oerreligie, die op een heel andere man-vrouw-relatie steunde, als hoogste godheid een “Almoeder” zou gekend hebben en eerder “demokratisch” van inslag was, in de zin van de latere IJslandse demokratie dan.

Wirth verdedigde de stelling dat de overheersend mannelijke trekken in de late kultuur, met hun overwaardering van het militaire leiderschap, typische dekadentieverschijnselen waren uit een periode van kulturele laagkonjunktuur zoals de tijd van de grote volksverhuizingen en de Vikingerperiode. De pogingen van het nationaal-socialisme om precies met deze periodes terug aan te knopen waren hem dan ook een politieke gruwel én kulturele nonsens.

In zijn studie Die Frage der Frauenberge – eine europäische Gegenwartsfrage (1972) komt Herman Wirth nog eens terug op zijn oude thesis: “De Vrouwenberg bij Cappel, nabij Marburg, is een van de meer dan honderd vrouwenbergen, maagden-, jonkvrouwen- enz. – bergen, -burgen, -stenen van het Duitse taalgebied en volksgebied. Wat hun ontstaan en hun bloeitijd betreft behoren deze Vrouwenbergen tot een bepaalde grote periode van het Avondland, gaande van de periode der grote stenen graven en de rotstekeningen in de Jongsteentijd tot bij het begin van de Volksverhuizingen. Over de geschiedenis en de betekenis van deze “Vrouwenbergen” is niets bekend. Dat er niets over geweten is, dat men niet eens geprobeerd heeft op het vraagstuk van de “Vrouwenbergen” enige vat te krijgen, heeft een tweeledige reden. De eerste reden is van psychologische aard: in een nog altijd mannelijk-ideologisch gericht wetenschapssysteem kan het probleem van een blijkbaar verheven plaats van de vrouw op religieus, kultureel en sociaal vlak geen geschiedkundige betekenis en belangrijkheid worden toegekend. En de tweede reden was dat de “Vrouwenbergen” tot de zgn. voorgeschiedenis behoren, d.w.z. dat er over dit onderwerp geen historische bronnen, geen schriftelijke overlevering (inskripties, berichten) bestaat. Dat er daarover toch een schriftelijke overlevering bestond en bestaat, niet in letterschrift maar in symboolschrift, daarvan hadden en hebben de totnogtoe bevoegde wetenschappen tot op de dag van vandaag geen idee: de prehistorici niet, maar evenmin de volkskundigen, de germanisten, de godsdiensthistorici, de mythologen enz.”

oera_linda.jpgZijn vriend Dr. Joachim Weitzäcker schrijft: “Na Herman Wirth’s “verwijdering” uit Ahnenerbe, dat hij gesticht had (3), verloor hij in 1938 zijn leerstoel aan de Berlijnse universiteit, omwille van zijn op gewetensbezwaren gegrondveste oppositie en zijn eis tot vrij onderzoek. Hij moest terug naar Marburg en kreeg verbod om nog onderricht te geven, te publiceren en in het openbaar te spreken. Tenslotte leverde de wet van het stilzwijgen zijn naam aan de vergetelheid over…”

Maar Wirth was niét helemaal vergeten: in 1945 namen de Amerikanen zijn bibliotheek en zijn omvangrijke dokumentatie in beslag; hij bleef aan dezelfde verbodsbepalingen onderworpen als tijdens de laatste zeven jaren van het Hitlerregime.

Zonder dokumentatie en bijna zonder bestaansmiddelen, herbegon hij, bijgestaan door zijn echtgenote Margarete Schmitt, en enkele vrienden, met bewonderswaardige moed aan zijn levenswerk. In 1960 verscheen in Wenen Um den Ursinn des Menschseins. Hij stichtte de Europaische Sammlung für religionsgeschichte en, in 1979 begon hij – 94 jaar jong! – in de ruïnes van een oud slot te Lichtenberg nabij Kusel, met de installatie van een museum en van archieven, die al zijn geschriften en zijn verzamelingen zou herbergen.

De allerlaatste jaren, haast volledig verlamd, werkte hij onverdroten verder, geholpen door enkele trouwe vrienden, en in leven gehouden met wat schaarse subsidies. Begin van dit jaar is hij er overleden.

Laat ons nu (noodgedwongen oppervlakkig) onderzoeken, wat Herman Wirth’s werk betekent. In zijn paleo-epigrafische opzoekingen, die de historische rekonstruktie van een oerreligie beogen, waagt Wirth zich in feite erg ver in de voorhistorie. In zijn opvatting zouden de Indo-europeërs slechts de vertegenwoordigers zijn van een erg late, hoogstens protohistorische periode.

Inderdaad, al wat de voorstanders van de “primordiale traditie”, waarvan René Guénon en Julius Evola de meest eminente vertegenwoordigers zijn, als positief d.i. kontroleerbaar kunnen bevestigen, gaat niet verder achteruit dan de eerste geschriften, waarmede volgens hen in feite de geschiedenis begint. Al de rest is slechts gissing, die op – weliswaar konvergerende – tradities steunt … doch het blijven tradities, om niet het woord ‘legenden’ te gebruiken. De meeste van Wirth’s werken moeten ook tot deze konjekturale wetenschap gerekend worden, en al zijn opsommingen van tekens en symbolen, waarvan hij de uitleg geeft, steunen (althans volgens zijn criticus Fritz Wiegers) slechts op vaak vernunftige interpretaties, die niet of moeilijk kontroleerbaar zijn. Dat er naast het “letterschrift” ook een koherent “symboolschrift” bestaat, word t intussen minder betwist dan ten tijde van Wirth’s eerste werken: het probleem ligt op het vlak van de duiding.

Vermelden we terloops dat de klassieke prehistorici wantrouwig staan tegenover elke subjektieve interpretatie. Ze doen opgravingen, ontdekken fossielen of voorwerpen van aile aard, klasseren ze en situeren ze meestal naar gelang de vindplaats. Uit hun ontdekkingen kunnen we afleiden, dat in deze of gene periode de Homo sapiens die of deze stap zette in de langzame opgang der mensheid naar wat we prozaisch “beschaving” noemen. Zo spreekt men over lager-, midden-, en lioger-paleoliticum, mesoliticum, neoliticum, bronstijdperk en ijzertijdperk, mét hun onderverdelingen, die ais “beschavingen” bestempeld worden, en waarvan de recentste die van Hallstatt en die van La Tène zijn. Om die periodes te dateren gebruikt men heden de radio-carbonmethode. Intussen ontdekken de prehistorici aanwijzingen omtrent de religie, de technologie, de begrafenisriten, zonder de eerste kunstuitingen te vergeten.

Onder de resten van een tamelijk geëvolueerde beschaving vermelden we de rotstekeningen van Altamira en Lascaux, die volgens de klassieke prehistorici uit het laag-neoliticum stammen (zowat tussen 35.000 en 10.000 v.o.j.). Vermits ze in een geografische ruimte liggen die zich ver van Noord-Europa bevindt, konden ze noch Wirth, noch de geleerden van Ahnenerbe interesseren, vervuld ais ze waren van die Indo-europese beschaving, waarvan de oudste sporen niet vroeger te situeren zijn dan in het 5de of 4de milennium vóór onze tijdrekening. Eerder zou men van het 3de of zelfs het 2de milennium moeten spreken, wat onze Europese primordiale traditie wei érg dicht bij ons legt. Werkt een kenner van de Indo-europese traditie ais Georges Dumézil trouwens niet bij voorkeur op geschreven bronnen? En nu weten we, dat het schrift van tamelijk recente datum is.

De klassieke prehistorici struikelen nog over raadsels, zoals die van de megalithen. Ze stellen hun bestaan vast, wagen een interpretatie, maar trekken geen besluiten: dat laten ze liever over aan geleerden als Wirth, die ze voor het overige wantrouwen. En wat raadsels ais Atlantis of het verloren kontinent Mu betreft, verkiezen ze er niet aan te raken en laten gissingen omtrent die vraagstukken over aan mensen die ze ais specialisten van “science-fiction” beschouwen.

Wij moeten toegeven dat de klassieke prehistorici al wat wij onze “primordiale Traditie” noemen, ignoreren; het vertrekpunt van deze benaming en van de vraagstukken die er verband mee houden, vindt men in een werk van de Duitse taalkundige Franz Bopp Vergleichende Grammatik des Sanskrit, Zend, Griechischen, Lateinischen, Lithauischen, Gotischen und Deutschen, dat uit de jaren 1833-52 stamt. Het vraagstuk van de Indo-europeërs breidde zich vlug uit van de taalkunde naar het probleem van het woongebied der volkeren die Indo-europese talen spraken en schreven, zonder dat de geleerden het eens konden worden over het vertrekpunt en de datering van deze verspreiding. Het zou interessant zijn dit probleem te bestuderen: men zou dan vaststellen dat op dit vlak de grootste verwarring heerst. Wat zeker is: overal waar de Indo-europeërs zich vestigden, overvleugelden ze de bevolking die al in dat gebied woonde, en onderwierpen ze hen (de Dravida’s in Indië b.v.).

Overal, zowel in Europa ais in Azië, vormden ze de twee overheersende kasten, die de geestelijken en die der strijders of ridders.

Om naar Herman Wirth te rug te keren, stellen we vast dat hij, al zat hij dan min of meer in de lijn van Bachofen, de theoreticus van het matriarchaat, toch niet afkerig was van de Odinistische mythologie, die hij uit de graffiti op de rotswanden van Noord-Europa meende te mogen afleiden en die hij poogde in te voegen in zijn konstrukties omtrent een matriarchale godsdienst. Ook de runen horen daar ergens bij, zodat men in zijn theorieën een soort mythisch-godsdienstig synkretisme mag zien, waarvan het “Mutter Erde”-begrip het sluitstuk is. Het is onbetwistbaar (de klassieke prehistorie bévestigt het ons) dat er in het Atlantisch Europa van het derde millenium een “megalitische” godsdienst bestond, met aanbidden van een vruchtbaarheidsgodin, die tegelijk de begrafenis-riten voorzat. Maar even zeker is dat er sinds het neoliticum (wellicht zelfs sinds het paleolitieum) een verering van de vrouwelijke godheid bestond: dit wordt bevestigd door talrijke beelden, als de “Venus” van Savignano (Italië), Gargarino (USSR) en Willendorff (Oostenrijk); of door de vrouwenkoppen van Dolmi Vestaniee (Tsjeehoslovakije) en Brassempuy (Frankrijk), wat ons zéker tot zowat 30.000 jaren vóór onze tijdrekening terugvoert.

Wirth’s onderzoeken waren vooral op Noord-Europa gericht, zoals zijn reizen uit 1935-36 aantonen. Wij moeten er, om met de klassieke prehistorici te spreken, uit besluiten dat zijn onderzoek vooral het zogenaamd mesoliticum betrof, dat aanvangt rond 10.000 v66r onze jaartelling en zich uitstrekt over het neoliticum en de twee metaaltijdperken, tot de eerste eeuwen van onze jaartelling, voor de kerstening van Noord-Europa.

Volgens de primordiale Traditie moet er echter, vóór die tijd, een ander, veel zachter klimaat geheerst hebben, toen Groenland en Spitzbergen groene en vruchtbare gebieden waren , (de naam Groenland wijst er op!). Hoe dit tijdperk situeren ? Laat ons het antwoord afwachten van de geologen, de prehistorici of de historici van de primordiale Traditie. Immers, in welke periode van het Pleistoceen de groene velden van het aloude Ultima Thule situeren ? Wie weet gaat het om een vrij recente periode, uit het zesde tot derde milennium vóór onze jaartelling, en die men in de geologie de Atlantische periode noemt. Toen was het legendarische Mu-gebied allang, rond 12.500 of 12.000 jaar voor onze jaartelling, in de golven verdwenen (4). Waarschijnlijk verdween, tijdens dezelfde natuurramp, Atlantis, dat andere hypothetische land .

Wat er ook van zij, doorheen heel zijn lange loopbaan heeft Wirth niet opgehouden, zijn studies over Europa’s voorgeschiedenis voort te zetten, daarbij vooral de aandacht vestigend op de paleo-epigrafie.

In zijn speurtocht naar al wat de voorhistorische Moeder Aarde-kultus kan bevestigen, heeft hij het onmetelijk belang onderstreept van de pre-Indo-europese beschaving voor het kultureelleven én de religie in Europa. Het magisch-religieuze leven in die periode hield hem voortdurend bezig, en hij bewees dat vóór de stroom Indogermaanse veroveraars, die over heel de antieke wereld van de Atlantische oceaan tot het Nabije- en Verre-Oosten neerstortte, er hier reeds mensen leefden die zich even zeer als de nieuwkomers om geestelijke zaken bekommerden.

Mogelijk zijn Wirth’s werken getekend door een zeker dilettantisme, maar loopt niet iedereen die zich in de kronkelingen van ons oudste verleden waagt, dit risiko ? Hoeveel bewonderaars van dat geheimzinnig verleden goochelen niet met min of meer fantaisistische gevolgtrekkingen en benaderingen, zich tegelijk als “gezaghebbend” voordoend ? Zij weten, wat u, de lezer, niet weet; zij zijn ingewijd en u bent het niet. Zij halen hun ‘wetenschap’, rechtstreeks of onrechtstreeks, bij een of ndere Tibetaanse monnik, of bij een of andere, min of meer geheimzinnige Goeroe, die de sleutel tot een eeuwenoud mysterie bezit…

Laat ons maar toegeven: hoeveel pretentieuze domheden vinden we niet onder de dekmantel van wat onze vrienden van de Traditie, de ‘Primordiale Traditie’ noemen ? René Guénon en Julius Evola hebben zich veel moeite getroost, de kwakzalvers van de – zogezegd – traditionele wetenschappen te ontmaskeren. Desondanks lopen ze nog rond en staan ze voortdurend klaar, u om het even welke valse ‘revelatie’ of welk produkt van hun op hol geslagen verbeelding ook aan te smeren …

Moeten we Herman Wirth bij de kwakzalvers van de Traditie onderbrengen ? Wij zijn overtuigd van niet, maar wél dienen we met omzichtigheid de resultaten van zijn onderzoekingen te beschouwen.

Zo heeft hij zich vér in de zogenaamde Ura Linda-kroniek gewaagd. Is ze een vervalsing, een louter literaire fantasie in de aard van de “Ossian-liederen” ? Is het een laattijdige kompilatie van een mondelinge traditie, ais de “Kalewala” ? De vraag blijft gesteld.

Vergeten we anderzijds ni et dat hij zolang hij persona grata was bij Ahnenerbe, ais groot geleerde op het vlak van de prehistorie werd beschouwd; en dat hij na zijn ongenade, zelfs het recht verbeurde les te geven en in het openbaar te spreken.

Jean Beelen schreef: “De onmetelijke verdienste van Prof. Wirth ligt erin, de oerperiode van het geschrift en de symboliek te hebben dóórgelicht en te hebben bewezen dat de mensen uit die tijd een kosmisch aanvoelen hadden dat aan de basis lag van een volkse godsdienst”. Dat is al héél wat en zo moeten we wei rekening houd en met al wat hij deed, en al wat hij schreef, zelfs al blijven we vrij te redetwisten over zijn – onbetwistbaar belangrijke – aanbreng inzake de voorgeschiedenis van de Westerse wereld.


(Vert. Roeland Raes)
(1) Het boek van Sebottendorf is niet te verwarren met dat van Dietrich Bronder dat eveneens de titel “Bevor Hitler kam” draagt (Hans Pfeiffer-Verlag, Hannover, 1964). Het essay van R.H. Phelps “Before Hitler came”. Thule Society and German Order” (in het Journal of Modern History, 1963) is géén vertaling maar een zelfstandige studie.
(2) Over Herman Wirth en het aktivisme, over Herman Wirth en het Vlaams-nationalisme, is het laatste woord nog niet gezegd. Willemsen en Elias vermelden hem even in de rand. Heel wat meer gegevens vindt men in een studie van Dr. Lammert Buning over Wirth, verschenen in Wetenschappelijke Tijdingen, 3/74.
(3) In feite medegesticht, samen met Hermann Reischle, Heinrich Himmler, Adolf Babel, Georg Ebrecht, Erwin Metzner en Richard Hintmann.
(4) Zie James Churchward: “Mu, le continent perdu.”

mardi, 12 juillet 2011

Robert Steuckers sur "Méridien Zéro" - Paris 16juin 2011

Robert Steuckers sur "Méridien Zéro"

Paris, 12 juin 2011

Interview with "New Antaios"


tradition, traditionalisme, Croatie, entretiens, révolution conservatrice,

Interview with "New Antaios"


Who are you? What’s the main purpose of your “New-Antaios” project? And why do you refer to the mythological figure of Antaios? Is it a revival of Jünger’s and Eliade’s Antaios or an English counterpart of the former Antaios journal of the Belgian novelist Christopher Gérard?

I was born in Agram (a German name for the city of Zagreb) in Croatia just over 42 years ago. I have lived in Zagreb during the times while my country was occupied by Yugoslav communist regime led by dictator Josip Broz Tito. There I have studied Political Sciences at the University of Zagreb and later on Philosophy and Psychology at Hrvatski Studiji, University of Zagreb. I have studied as well at Universities in Scandinavia, United Kingdom and Germany. I am coming from a family which is of an ethnic German heritage.

tradition, traditionalisme, Croatie, entretiens, révolution conservatrice, Antaios is uniting Earth and Sea, soil and water without whom both there is no life. Antaios father was Poseidon, the God of Sea and mother Gaia of the Earth. Antaios or Antaeus in Greek means as well ‘’against’’ so in this way ‘’The New Antaios’’ is in cultural and philosophical terms set to make an intellectual bulwark against that what is destroying Our European culture, tradition, heritage, folklore and with that ultimately our roots.

Journal ‘’The New Antaios’’ is the continuation of the original ‘’Antaios’’ Journal of Mircea Eliade and Ernst Jünger so we can say it is a revival albeit the Journal will/is as well reflecting on all that is happening in these postmodern times. Hence Journal represents what I call ‘’Postmodern European thought’’ and as such serves primarily as an outlet for the postmodern philosophers and thinkers.

I do respect and highly admire Christopher Gerard and his work on Antaios in years from years 1992 to 2001. Like Gerard I dislike New Age teachings and don’t have any interest in TraditionalistSchool.  The New Antaios is made of four sections which are making the whole Journal. First part is ‘’Plethon’’ the name I gave after the Byzantine Hellenistic philosopher George Gemistos Plethon and articles in that section are related to Hellenism, Heathenism in a scholarly way. Contributions will be made as well by certain authors from Asatru background. Heathenism and Heithni comes from the Old Norse word heiðni which was used to describe the pre-Christian spiritual beliefs and practices of the Northern European peoples. The word Heithinn (or Heathen) comes from the Old Norse word heiðinn, an adjective to describe the ideals of Heithni (ex. Heithinn ethics - those ethics which conform to Heithni), or as a noun to describe those who live by the ethic and world-view of Heithni (ex. He is Heithinn, those people are Heithnir [plural]). Heiðni also means 'high, pure, clear' in Icelandic language. Word also describes person who is a dweller in place in the nature. Postmodern Heathens are those people who are reviving and revitalizing the tradition through serious study, research and dedication combined with the worship of the Gods and Goddesses or just simply in a way of their thinking without the ritual worship part. Personally I am keen of combining the two in a proper and balanced way. Second section is ‘’Aesthetic Vedanta’’ named after the book by Swami Bhaktivedanta Tripurari Maharaja, Western teacher of ancient tradition of Gaudiya Vaishnavism. Aesthetic Vedanta section deals with Hindutva, Hinduism,Vaishnavism and Gaudiya Vaishnavism exclusively. Third section is ‘’Suncovrat’’ a Croatian archaic word for the Solstice and deals with pre-Christian cultures which existed prior to Christianization of what makes nowadays Republic of Croatia. Fourth section is the main section of the Antaios Journal.

I would further like to point out that Christopher Gerard has no input whatsoever and isn’t in any way associated or affiliated with this new Journal. That is why the journal has prefix ‘’The New’’ to clearly mark difference with previous two journals. As far as I know Gerard’s Journal ceased to exist just on the turn of the century hence prefix ‘’The New’’ is completely appropriate here. While it will preserve and retain the original idea and concept with due respect to previous editors and directors of the Journal, it will be updated with short blog style texts, proper academic articles and essays which reflect on and take a critical eye of current state of affairs in different areas of  philosophy, politics, culture, art, tradition, science and these postmodern times .

What was the maturation process of your worldview? Has it to do with Croatian politics or not?

 I would say that I have spiritual and political Weltanschauung complementing each other. I was brought up in a family whose background is Christian albeit my late grandfather and my late father were both reading authors like Nietzsche and Jünger and considere themselves to be Pagans. I was brought up on stories from ancient Greece and Old Norse and Germanic tales whom my friends in school didn’t even hear about. My own father was a Heathen. He wrote small and up until now unpublished treatise on what he calls ‘’Raan’’. In this book Raan is knowledge of the Gods and Goddesses who once in previous Yugas did visit our planet. In this work he is influenced by Nietzsche’s and Heidegger’s philosophy.

After spending years at the University in Croatia studying Political sciences in Zagreb I went to become a monk in Gaudiya Vaishnava tradition. The reason for that was again in the Family. During the mid to late 80es my family got interested in Gaudiya Vaishnavism so I started reading and studying different books of Vedic knowledge like Upanishads, Puranas and Bhagavad Gita. I have discovered in mid 90es about Traditionalist School, Rene Guenon and Julius Evola. In years to come I have been reading and studying about diverse cultures, traditions of Europe and parallel with that I got initiated in the Traditional Gaudiya Vaishnavism while travelling to one of my spiritual pilgrimages to India.

Hence as a result, my own spiritual belief system would be Traditional Gaudiya Vaishnavism, while I permanently study and read about Indo-European beliefs of our ancestors, Ostrogothic pre-Christian beliefs, Old Norse, Hellenic and Germanic pre-Christian belief systems and Mithraism. Vedic knowledge in my opinion is very important key to unlock many secrets of the European tradition itself. In line with that I very much admire Hindutva writers such as Sita Ram Goel and Ram Swarup, Indian historian Bal Gangadhar Tilak , contemporary scholar from Belgium Dr. Koenraad Elst as well as Alain Danielou who are all big influence. Next influence would be primarily my own teacher Sri Ananta das Babaji Maharaja by whom I was directly initiated in Parivar or Traditional line which goes back many centuries ago, then authors such as: Sri Kunjabihari das Babaji Maharaja (who is the direct teacher of my own teacher Ananta das Babaji Maharaja), Kundali das, Binode Bihari das Babaji and Sripad Bhaktivedanta Tripurari Swami Maharaja whose certain books and teachings are in my opinion the Gaudiya Vaishnava answer to Traditionalist school. There should be veneration of our ancestors together with the firm belief in divine origins of Our Ancestral lines, veneration of Nature and veneration of the Gods and Goddesses which are part of our European Identity. Perhaps it would be the best to quote here another great influence of mine, Dominique Venner: ''To live according to tradition is to conform to the ideal that incarnates, to cultivate excellence according to its standard, to rediscover its roots, to transmit its heritage, to be in solidarity with the people who uphold it. ''

Croatian politics were influential to my worldview and perhaps it would be better to give a bit of background explanation from the not so well known Croatian history. Certain people would like such knowledge to remain hidden as such. In my opinion Croatian people have a unique position in Europe. There are people who label Croatia Western Balkans which is a complete nonsense. According to what I was reading from diverse sources Croats aren’t only just Slavs and are mixture of Slavenized Germanic tribes, Celtic tribes, Illyrians, ancient Romans, ancient Greeks and Indo-Persians. Over the span of more than half a century Croat academics and researchers who were proclaiming such theories were executed or ‘’disappeared’’. Persecutions started in times of the monarchist Yugoslavia up to late 80es of 20th century in the communist regime. Names like Haraqwati and Haraxvati which paleographic expert Dr. Kalyanaraman has found were names of the tribes, etnonymes which clearly show how early we can find about Croatian origins. Places where such names were found were part of Bharata Varsha or what is today India. Archaeologists have found along names emblems and coats of arms which look very much similar to Croatian coat of arms with the twenty - five field "chessboard". In a similar way the remnants and artefacts were also found when those tribes have moved from what is today India to Persia and those names can be found in 6th century before Christ in places like Bagistan and Persepolis and also with ancient peoples like Hurrwuhé. Ancestors of today’s Croats were worshippers of Saraswati Goddess of Vedic India (Goddess of learning, arts and music) and from her name comes originally name Hrvati. Croats are therefore known as Hrvati, Haravaitii, Arachosians or Sarasvatians, descendants of the ancient inhabitants of the Harauti province & the Haravaiti or the Sarasvati River. The recent hravati /hrvati [sic] hence comes from haraxvaiti and earlier spelt as haraquati (arachotos, arachosia, araxes). Sarasvati is the river and Arachosia being the region." Their mention is as well on the legendary inscriptions of Darius the Great. Early Croatian pre-Christian religion was derived from primordial Persian Sun-worship. Even the Croatian word for tie is kravat(a) which is again another connecting word.

Furthermore, the name of the Croatian capital, Zagreb, is related to the Zagros mountain range of Iran. The Dinara mountains in Dalmatia may be connected to Mount Dinar (Dene) of Iran. When the tribes came to what is nowadays Croatia they have mingled with the numerous local Slavic (or Slavenized Germanic tribes) tribes and adopted the Slavic language from them. Meanwhile after the collapse of the Hunnic Empire Croats organized the local Slavs into a state and gave them their national name. Before the invasion of the Avars ca. 560 the White or Western Croats created along with the Antes a great state extending north of the Carpathians from the upper Elbe to the upper Dniester. (35: Niederle, 263-266; Dvornik, The Slavs, 277-297) R. Heinzel is of the opinion that the Carpathians of the old Germanic Hervarsaga took their name from the Croats who called them the Harvate mountains i.e. Croatian mountains. (36: Heinzel, 499; Dvornik, op. cit., 284, sq.)" (Mandic 1970, Ch.1)

There are similarities in folklore as well. "There are old Croatian customs and national poems that have been cited as evidencing lingering traces of the fire and sun worship of the Persians. Fire, the essence of human origin, the sun, and the great boiling cauldron around which the warriors spring in the age old kolo or circle dance, all these are ingredients in the national lore of the Croatian nation. The Croat vilas or fairy witches resemble the peris of Iranian mythology. Then there is the legendary Sviatozov, the personification of strength, a being almost too huge for the earth to bear. He is strongly reminiscent of the "elephant-bodied" Rustum of Persian legend." (Guldescu 1964, pt.1.II) "It should be noted that only the thesis of the Iranian origin of the Croats can explain the name "Horvath", the title of a Croat dignitary Banus, the names "White" and "Red Croatian", and the Bogumile phenomenon (like Cathars in Occitania). According to this theory, the Croats were a branch of the Caucasian Iranians, who lived somewhere in the western Caucasus during the era of the Roman Emperors. The Caucasian Anten were another branch of this group." (Dobrovich 1963)

Research shows clearly everything what I have written and quoted above to be the truth although some oppose that theory as they want to preserve artificial Panslavism , idea of  Yugosphere ( the idea for the 3rd  united Yugoslavia without Slovenia and with Albania) under the guise of ‘’Western Balkans’’. In Croatian language there is an excellent word I really like: ‘’Samosvojnost’’. Samosvojnost means Identity in Croatian language. In my opinion Croatian identity should and must be preserved only through the independent republic of Croatia or as it is now. Hence Croatia does not need any new unions. Friendship yes, but union definitely not.

Serbia on the other hand would like to establish themselves as a regional leader. They play with naive Croatian government and Croatian president Josipović while behind their back they lobby in EU to make what was once war in ex-Yugoslavia look as a ‘’civil war’’ and accuse Croatia who were defending themselves . They do have some allies and friends in Europe who would like to see them as the leaders in the region. Those allies on the other hand actually don’t consider Serbia as a friend but as a tool for their own means and nothing else. It is a travesty of justice to see Croatian generals such as Gotovina and Markač to be sitting in Hague so just that Croatia can get a green light for EU so that bureaurocrats in EU they can say that ‘’all sides’’ were equally responsible. I would like to ask the question then. What about the people and country of Croatia which was invaded, whose homes are burned and destroyed? According to that ‘’theory’’ Croatians should not have been defending themselves as they were supposed just to sit and wait to be erased from the face of this planet. 

Croatia has been suffering since demise of Austria-Hungary. It wasn’t good for Croatians either to be in any previous unions but union with Serbs has proven to be so far the worst one. Union with Austria-Hungary was far from perfect but at least we were in a monarchy which had culture and tradition. Croatian people don’t need anything anymore other than their own independence and peace with the neighbouring nations.

tradition, traditionalisme, Croatie, entretiens, révolution conservatrice, How the time is passing by I am less and less interested in Croatian politics. As a result I won’t be writing in Croatian language anymore since there is no purpose for it. I will rather use and invest my energy, effort and time for something I think will yield certain results than to write constantly for something what will anyway reach just a handful of people or just completely wither away. I have learned that from an example of the members of the ‘’Croatian Historical Revolution’’. Over the years I have read articles by leading Croatian intellectuals and scholars such as Dr. Tomislav Sunić then Dr. Jure Georges Vujić, prof. Amir Riđanović, prof. Petar Bujas (all members of Croatian group similar to G.R.E.C.E. – Arhelinea – www.arhelinea.com ) Dr. Zoran Kravar, then Croat republican conservatives such as: Tomislav Jonjić, Mario Marcos Ostojić, Hrvoje Hitrec, Croatian scientists such as : Dr. Vitomir Belaj, prof. Tomo Vinšćak, Dr. Radoslav Katičić, and prof. Mario Kopić and Dr. Hrvoje Lorković (of whom we can’t hear these days what is a real tragedy since Dr. Lorković is one of Croatian important intellectuals). Croatians should be happy to have such giants of free thinking yet many in Croatia don’t even know about some of them. That is for me completely bizarre. If one is carefully reading articles and books by above mentioned intellectuals and scholars one can only see that many of them are actually disillusioned with the current state of Croatia altogether. That is evident even from their articles. Hence as a result of that Zoran Kravar is not interested in any kind of politics neither he wants to be or get involved (yet he is one of authorities on Ernst Jünger in Croatia) same is with prof. Tomo Vinšćak as well, while others like Mario Kopić and Dr. Tom Sunić are publishing their new books outside of Croatia because there is hardly any interest in their ideas in Croatia. It seems that Dr. Jure Georges Vujić will publish his new books as well outside of Croatia. That is unavoidable since Croatians are lethargic in finding new solutions in political dialogue or any kind of new political ideas. They would rather stick to something what is completely falling apart while thinking that ‘’it would get better’’. I have a best friend in Croatia whose political ideas are in minority and while he wants betterment in any spheres of Croatian life (including politics and his fight against corruption) he doesn’t have as much support as he actually would and should get. It is the apathy and lethargy which are deeply rooted in certain parts of Croatian nation (thankfully not all of it) with its roots in the fear of change and political and historical lower self-esteem (which is really uncalled for, since Croats have such rich history, tradition and culture of whom they should be absolutely proud of) . The question they often ask themselves is: ‘’ What would happen if things change? ‘’ and because of constantly repeating that question they are indeed unable to make any significant change. I believe firmly that in the forthcoming parliamentary elections Croats will elect again some party or coalition of parties which will not bring nothing new to already stagnating Croatian political scene. In the right as well as left and centre there is nobody who could potentially have a quality for the deep changes Croatia needs desperately. In the right side of spectrum and as well on centre and left one can just see political opportunists in Croatia who long for their seat in parliament (called Sabor in Croatia) or certain position. That is their goal before anything else I am afraid, of course my humble bow to those politicians who aren’t like that and are in significant, significant minority.

My own political interests nowadays evolve around Eurocontinentalism and European Identitarian Communitarianism. Even though I do speak Croatian language I consider myself first and foremost an ethnic German with Prussian mentality, after that I am an European.

Eurocontinentalism in this case represents strong continental Europe which stands between USA and Great Britain on one and Russia on the other side. The question of Europe here is not just a matter a blood; it is spiritual, historical and cultural phenomenon.
This further quote actually explains some of my thinking on the matter: ‘’Implicit in this view is the assumption that the body is inseparable from the spirit animating it, that biological difference, as a distinct vitality, is another form of spiritual difference, and that the significance of such differences (given that man is a spiritual being, not merely an animal) is best seen in terms of culture and history rather than nineteenth-century biological science. American "white racialists" with their materialist-technical conceptions of race actually diminish the significance of the Racial Question by reducing it to a simple matter of genes, biology, equations....’’ ( Mladikov – The Phora Forum)

Dominique Venner is in my opinion the greatest influence for the Eurocontinentalism and my own political Weltanschauung with his writings, articles and books. In Croatia some of his books are available as well.

His thoughts describe the best what I think further:

‘’ The idea that is made of love is no more frivolous than the tragic sense of history that characterizes the European spirit. It defines the civilization, its immanent spirit, and each person’s sense of life, in the same way the idea shapes one’s work. Is the sole point of work to make money, as they believe across the Atlantic, or, besides ensuring a just return, is it to realize oneself in a job well done, even in such apparently trivial things as keeping one’s house. This idea urged our ancestors to create beauty in their most humble and most lofty efforts. To be conscious of the idea is to give a metaphysical sense to “memory.”

To cultivate our “memory,” to transmit it in a living way to our children, to contemplate the ordeals that history has imposed on us–this is requisite to any renaissance. Faced with the unprecedented challenges that the catastrophes of the twentieth century have imposed on us and the terrible demoralization it has fostered, we will discover in the reconquest of our racial “memory” the way to respond to these challenges, which were unknown to our ancestors, who lived in a stable, strong, well-defended world.

The consciousness of belonging to Europe, of Europeanness, is far older than the modern concept of Europe. It is apparent under the successive names of Hellenism, Celticness, Romanism, the Frankish Empire, or Christianity. Seen as an immemorial tradition, Europe is the product of a multi-millennial community of culture deriving its distinctness and unity from its constitutive peoples and a spiritual heritage whose supreme expression is the Homeric poems. ‘’

To read further perhaps I would recommend this article (and as well all other articles by Dominique Venner) : http://www.counter-currents.com/2010/06/europe-and-europeanness/#more-881

What were your main sources of inspiration?

I have mentioned some of them above. I would say that Ernst Jünger, Dominique Venner and Nicolás Gómez Dávila are the most significant and important influence for me personally simply because they complement each other perfectly and in my own opinion they represent the true European Tradition which Ram Swarup, Sita Ram Goel, Alain Danielou and Koenraad Elst represent in Hindu Tradition. Apart from them other authors, thinkers and philosophers I would say first of all I feel especially close regarding ideas and Weltanschauung are : Croatian thinkers and members of the ‘’Croatian Historical Revolution’’, Classical philosophers such as : Emperor Julian the Apostate, Porphyry, Celsus, Platonis Sallustius, Libanius, Julius Firmicus Maternus, Iamblichus, Gemistus Pletho(n) and other such philosophers, Erik von von Kuehnelt - Leddihn, Croatian philosopher prof. Mario Kopić, prof. Robert Steuckers, certain ideas of Alain de Benoist, certain ideas of Dr. Guillaume Faye, Dr. Georges Dumezil, Dr. Jan Assmann, Mircea Eliade, Emile Cioran, Alain Danielou, German greatest living poet Rolf Schilling,  Oswald Spengler, Carl Schmitt, German Romanticism period authors and artists, Felix Dahn, Antoine Saint du Exupery, certain ideas of Julius Evola, Norwegian composer Geirr Tveitt, composers Arvo Part and Johannes Brahms, Felix Mendelssohn, Sibelius, Ralph Vaughan Williams, postmodern musical projects such as Triarii, Arditi, In Slaughter Natives and new project Winglord, artists such as Ludwig Fahrenkrog, Karl Wilhelm Diefenbach, Fidus, Caspar David Friedrich, Hermann Hendrich, Franz von Stuck, Carl Larsson, John Atkinson Grimshaw, Jean Béraud and others.

Who are the main Croatian thinkers according to you and that are completely ignored in the rest of the world? How could we discover them?

Main and most influential Croatian thinkers were:  Dr. Milan von Šufflay, Dr. Ivo Pilar, Dr. Vinko Krišković, Dr. Filip Lukas, Dr. Julije (Julius) von Makanec, Dr. Stjepan Buć and authors involved with journal ‘’Spremnost’’ : prof. Tias Mortigjija, Dr. Milivoj Magdić, Dr. Ante Ciliga & Dr. Vilko Rieger (Dr. George W. Cesarich) . Influential are also early works of prof. Ivan Oršanić, Dr. Ivo Korsky, then author Ivan Softa (Croatian Knut Hamsun), national poet Jerko Skračić and a few others. It is very hard for somebody in Europe to discover them as their works were burned, destroyed and left to be forgotten by Yugoslavian and Serbian communist regime. Back in 1970es of 20th century for just reading the works of these authors, philosophers and thinkers one could get a lengthy prison term and that would be of course if you did find their books somewhere. I am collecting their works wherever I can find them and that is in most cases extremely hard and on top of that some of their books command very high prices. Situation is not like with authors of Conservative Revolution whose works remain saved and translated to many languages now. Most of the above mentioned people were brutally murdered by either Serbian Monarchist regime who ruled the first Yugoslavia or by communist regime who ruled Yugoslavia and occupied Croatia after the year 1945.

At this point in time there is no translated literature in any of other languages except the book ‘’Southslav question’’ written by Dr. Ivo Pilar (under pseudonym Dr. Leon v. Südland) which was printed at the beginning of the 20th century in Vienna originally in German language. Book was never reprinted again either in German or English (or any other foreign language) and was translated in Croatian language and has since been in print only twice. Copies of both editions are virtually impossible to find. Books of other authors are not being reprinted at all. I really don’t know if that is because of the economic crisis in Croatia since many members of Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) turned out to be crooks and thieves who were stealing money from their own country and country’s resources. It has been going on like that for a long time and no government (even the coalition of liberals and social democrats which lasted for 4 years)  didn’t make situation any better or because there is no interest in those books and those authors at all. It is partially because of many Croatians were killed and murdered from 1944 to early 1950es by communist regime (and in years after that up to 1990 just prior to war in Croatia) and because of the mentality which became a norm since 1918, after Croats lost the war as part of Austria-Hungary. Dr. Ivo Pilar did warn Croatians about those kinds of problems especially in two of his books. One of those books was above mentioned ‘’Southslav question’’.

I am afraid that the only way to discover them will be through book I am currently writing and subsequently I will translate some of the most important works by Šufflay, Pilar, Lukas, Krišković, Makanec, Mortigjija and Magdić. I will start with works of Dr. Ivo Pilar and Dr. Milivoj Magdić whose works I am collecting at the present time. I am putting together Dr. Milivoj Magdić’s and dr. Ivo Pilar’s articles and smaller important works and will include one very informative article about Milivoj Magdić’s life done by one Croatian historian. Dr. Pilar’s book ‘’Southslav question’’ will be most likely the first one to surface followed by Dr. Magdić’s collected works. It is very interesting to mention that Dr. Ivo Pilar and Dr. Milivoj Magdić had both the biggest private libraries in the city of Zagreb and most likely in Croatia at that time. I have heard that currently Alain de Benoist has one of the biggest private libraries.

So we can talk about a genuine Croatian “Conservative Revolution”?

Croatian Historical Revolution was a German Conservative Revolution’s and France’s Ordre Nouveau’s counterpart. It strikes me how there wasn’t anybody in Croatia trying to compare German Conservative Revolution with all these authors we have had. My guess is that certain levels of academia in Croatia have some sort of inferiority complex and lower self-esteem. Except post modern Croatian intellectuals and academics I have mentioned above (and most in this group were living, studying and teaching for some time outside of Croatia) other Croatian intellectuals constantly behave in a way which has ruined indescribably reputation of Croatia. Members of Croatian Historical revolution were totally opposite. Partially that is because they grew up in Austria- Hungary and partially because up until year 1918 influence of Balkan ‘’culture’’ wasn’t predominant in Croatia and our gene pool wasn’t almost destroyed as it is the case today (holocaust of Croats and ethnic Germans from years 1944 -1950es). Most of the people who today want any kind of communism to be back in Croatia are leftovers of previous regime and they are not even Croats by their genes or in spirit.

Members of CHR (Croatian Historical Revolution) have had experience with different ideologies and transformations as the ones in Germany. They rallied for the Croatia as an integral part of Europe and how some of them called it at the time ‘’Bieli Zapad’’ (White West). Like authors in German counterpart they have produced diverse works such as philosophical treatises, political journalism, manifestoes which have outlined their ideas for the transformation of Croatia and role of Croatia in Central Europe and Europe altogether. They were strongly opposing liberalism and even liberal democracy and they have rejected despiritualization and commercial culture. They advocated new conservative thought which was inspired by Croatian national patriotism. I find their ideal very much connected with ideals of German Conservative Revolution members and nowadays with prof. Dominique Venner.

How could we connect Croatian authors with their other European counterparts? Who are the Croatian authors that should be read together, beyond every language barrier?

My opinion is that all the works of the above mentioned members of the Croatian Historical revolution are very much worth exploring, studying and reading. They all do come highly recommended albeit due to totalitarian and primitive backwards communist regime headed by Josip Broz Tito and his blind followers lots of original writings are lost , destroyed or are very rare to that extent that only Croatian National Library may have only one copy or original of each of the original works of the members of the Croatian Historical Revolution. None of those works were translated in any languages (as I have mentioned above) except Dr. Pilar’s ‘’Southslav question’’ which was originally written in German and then translated to Croatian. Dr. Ivo Pilar was speaking and writing as Dr. Milan v. Šufflay and many other members of CHR, in several languages. In those times after the I WW it was quite normal for people of Croatia to speak German as a second and in many cases as their mother language together with Croatian language. Hopefully in time through my own ‘’ Hyperborea Press’’ which is the part of Somnium Media all the main works of the members of the Croatian Historical Revolution will surface and be translated in English language. As always one has to be realistic, as with any of such efforts good will isn’t enough, I will have to invest money and time into this project in a balanced manner.

Do you see original viewpoints or bias by these Croatian authors that you cannot find back in the works of their other European counterparts?

 I know that I risk now sounding a bit vague but most of their viewpoints are similar or identical with their German and French counterparts, although one of their main focal points or focus was naturally fight against the repressive Serbian monarchist regime and its imperialistic hegemony. I have written recently some articles about this topic. I believe that I will answer much broader to this question in my book about Croatian Historical Revolution.

What are your projects for the near future?

The New Antaios Journal’s further development is my priority and alongside with TNAJ there is ‘’Eurocontinentalism Journal’’ and my own ‘’Somnium Media’’ website which offers music, merchandise and books which are serving as an alternative to world of mass consumerism we live in. Great help in that effort is my dear friend mr. Zvonimir Tosic who is an editor in chief and managing webmaster of The New Antaios Journal and Somnium websites. The New Antaios and Eurocontinentalism Journal will both have some interesting interviews and articles in months to come. Somnium Media imprint ‘’Hyperborea Press’’ will publish most significant works of members of the Croatian Historical revolution and hopefully some works by Nicolas Gomez Davila.

Further related to ‘’Hyperborea Press’’ I have plans for the three books and three translations. First one is above already mentioned book about Croatian Historical Revolution and its members and it will be an overview of the significance of Croatian Historical Revolution and works of its members and authors not only for Croatia but for Europe and European thought as well. Another book is ‘’ Gaudiya Vaishnavism - The Living and Timeless Tradition ‘’ which will explain how important Traditional Gaudiya Vaishnavism is (a belief in Hinduism) not only for Hinduism but for the resurgence of Indo – European thought in general. I know that Dr. Alexander Jacob has written extensively on the topic of resurgence of Indo-European thought but his emphasis is not like in authors such as Georges Dumezil , Jan de Vries, or Ram Swarup, Sita Ram Goel and Alain Danielou in Hinduism or ancestral pre-christian beliefs. Rather he uses as an example for restoration of Indo –European thought resurgence of European Medieval Christian noble spirit of ‘’archaic and brave’’ and Prussian noble spirit. In my own opinion the best starting point for such study would be a Saxon epic ‘’Heliand’’.

Traditional Gaudiya Vaishnava thought in this book will serve as an alternative for the Traditionalist thought which was espoused by Guenon, Schuon and other Traditionalists. Third book deals with Croatian pre-Christian and pre-Slavic legends and it delves in times of the heroic Croatian past. I have contacted one still living Croatian author who gave me information on stories and its characters which obviously have roots in pre-Christian and pre-Slavic times of Croatia. It is quite a work and a huge challenge to reconstruct those tales and to find out and connect certain characters. Some shortened versions of those stories I will be presenting at certain Storytelling Fairs in Ireland during the summer. Three translations will be my most likely first translation work on the new book by Dr. Jure Georges Vujic (which will be his first book in English language) followed by translations of two books of the members of the Croatian Historical Revolution, Dr. Ivo Pilar’s ‘’Southslav question’’ and Dr. Milivoj Magdić’s best and collected works complete with my own explanations and commentaries. I will also continue writing for Brett Stevens's Journal on line www.amerika.org which is with Europa Synergon one of the most interesting journals to be found on line.

Thank you very much Robert for the opportunity you gave me with this interview and as well thank you for your influence on my own thought which is indispensable and very important. I would also like to thank to anybody who has read this interview and found it interesting or just thought provoking.


(interview taken by Robert Steuckers, late spring 2011).

vendredi, 03 juin 2011

Urkultur 15: Moeller van den Bruck, conservadurismo revolucionario


Ex: http://urkultur-imperium-europa.blogspot.com/ 




Enlace con issuu.com


Arthur Moeller van den Bruck y la Nouvelle Droite
Sebastian J. Lorenz

Moeller van den Bruck: un rebelde conservador
Luca Leonello Rimbotti

Moeller van den Bruck: ¿un “precursor póstumo”?
Denis Goedel

Moeller y Dostoievski
Robert Steuckers

Moeller y la Kulturpessimismus de Weimar
Ferran Gallego

Moeller y los Jungkonservativen
Erik Norling

Moeller y Spengler
Ernesto Milá

Moeller y la Konservative Revolution
Keith Bullivant

Moeller van den Bruck
Alain de Benoist

mardi, 31 mai 2011


Ex: http://rezistant.blogspot.com/
Die Wertlehre feiert in der Erörterung der Frage des gerechten Krieges ihre eigentlichen Triumphe. Das liegt in der Natur der Sache. Jede Rücksicht auf den Gegner entfällt, ja sie wird zum Unwert, wenn der Kampf gegen diesen Gegner ein Kampf für die höchsten Werte ist. Der Unwert hat kein Recht gegenüber dem Wert, und für die Durchsetzung des höchsten Wertes ist kein Preis zu hoch. Hier gibt es dann infolgedessen nur noch Vernichter und Vernichtete. Alle Kategorien des klassischen Kriegsrechts des Jus Publicum Europaeum - gerechter Feind, gerechter Kriegsgrund, Verhältnismässigkeit der Mittel und das geordnete Vorgehen, der debitus modus - fallen dieser Wertlosigkeit hoffnungslos zum Opfer. Der Drang zur Wertdurchsetzung wird hier ein Zwang zum unmittelbaren Wertvollzug.

Carl Schmitt, Die Tyrannei der Werte, 1960.

samedi, 28 mai 2011

Gottfried Benn

Gottfried Benn in Interview (1956)

Gottfried Benn liest aus "Kunst und Drittes Reich"


mercredi, 25 mai 2011

Ortega y Gasset: un européiste critique de la révolte des masses et de la désertion des élites


Ortega y Gasset : un européiste critique de la révolte des masses et de la désertion des élites

par Arnaud IMATZ

Ex: http://www.polemia.com/

« “Avant moi le néant, après moi le déluge” semble être devenu la devise préférée d’une nouvelle classe dirigeante dont le style de vie est marqué par le rejet des valeurs communautaires, le mépris des traditions populaires, la fascination pour le marché, la tyrannie de la mode, le nomadisme, l'insatisfaction assouvie dans la consommation de la marchandise, l'obsession de l'apparence physique, le culte du spectacle, du succès et de la renommée. Ortega disait que la désertion des minorités n'est que l'envers de la révolte des masses. »
Polémia livre à ses lecteurs une belle analyse critique d’Arnaud Imatz consacrée à Ortega y Gasset et à la « Révolte des masses ». Nos lecteurs trouveront ci dessous la critique de l’œuvre maitresse d’Ortega y Gasset et en PDF (voir en fin d’article) l’intégralité de l’article d’Arnaud Imatz.

La révolte des masses : une vision aristocratique de la société

Dans La rebelión de las masas Ortega soutient que la société, organisation hiérarchique normale et spontanée de la vie humaine, est fondée sur l'inégalité psycho-vitale des membres qui la composent. La société est toujours aristocratique parce que l'aristocratie n'est pas un État ou une classe mais un principe spirituel, indestructible par nature, qui agit dans le monde sous différente forme. « Une société sans aristocratie, sans minorité éminente, n'est pas une société ». L'homme exemplaire n'est pas un homme né avec des privilèges et des droits refusés aux autres, c'est simplement l'homme capable d'une plus grande vision et d'un plus grand effort que le reste du genre humain. C'est celui qui rejette les croyances et usages insatisfaisants, qui se rebelle pour construire et non pas pour détruire.

Avec une pléiade d'auteurs traditionalistes, nationalistes, conservateurs-révolutionnaires, anarcho-syndicalistes, libéraux et socialistes élitistes, Ortega partage une même confiance en la vertu des minorité « éclairées », « éminentes » ou « sélectives ». « Contrairement à ce que l'on croit habituellement, écrit-il, c'est l'être d'élite et non la masse qui vit "essentiellement" dans la servitude. Sa vie lui paraît sans but s'il ne la consacre au service de quelques obligations supérieures. Aussi la nécessité de servir ne lui apparaît-elle pas comme une oppression, mais au contraire, lorsque cette nécessité lui fait défaut, il se sent inquiet et invente de nouvelles règles plus difficiles, plus exigeantes qui l'oppriment ». La liberté c’est au fond la possibilité de choisir ses chaînes.

Pour Ortega, le nivellement par le bas à partir de l'élimination des meilleurs n'a rien à voir avec la démocratie. Il ne reflète au contraire que hargne et ressentiment. L'idée que l´égalité politique doit s'accompagner d'égalité dans tout le reste de la vie sociale est erronée et dangereuse. Une société vraiment démocratique doit tenir compte des différences individuelles pour ne pas sombrer dans le règne de la vulgarité et de la médiocrité.

L’homme masse

Selon Ortega, l'Europe traverse la plus grave crise que les nations, les peuples et les cultures puissent pâtir: la révolte des masses. L'homme-masse est un type d'homme qui apparait dans toutes les classes d'une société. Il représente à la fois le triomphe et l'échec de l'ethos bourgeois. C'est l'individu qui refuse toute forme de supériorité et se sent le droit inné d'exiger toutes sortes de commodités ou d'avantages de la part d'un monde auquel il n'estime ne rien devoir. Il ne se croit pas meilleur que les autres, mais il nie que les autres soient meilleurs que lui. C'est l'« homme moyen », qui « n'a que des appétits », « ne se suppose que des droits » et « ne se croit pas d'obligations ». C'est « l'homme sans la noblesse qui oblige ». C'est l'homme en qui « manque tout simplement la morale, laquelle est toujours, par essence, un sentiment de soumission à quelque chose, la conscience de servir et d'avoir des obligations ». A l'opposé de l'homme masse, Ortega affirme que l'homme noble ou exemplaire vit au service d'un idéal. Il est celui qui exige d'abord tout de lui même. « L'homme d'élite, dit-il, n'est pas le prétentieux qui se croit supérieur aux autres, mais bien celui qui est plus exigeant pour lui que pour les autres, même lorsqu'il ne parvient pas à réaliser en lui ses aspirations supérieures ».

Indiscipline des masses, démission des élites

Venons en enfin à son diagnostic de la crise historique que l'altération de la hiérarchie des valeurs et le désordre de la structure sociale manifestent. La raison en est double: d'une part, l'indiscipline des masses, d'autre part, la démission des élites. C'est parce que les minorités échouent dans leurs tâches d'orientation, d'éducation, de découverte et de direction que les masses se rebellent ou refusent toute responsabilité historique. Tôt ou tard l’aristocratie engendre une philosophie de l'égalité et la philosophie de l'égalité conduit au règne de nouveaux seigneurs.

Publié au début des années trente du siècle passé, La révolte des masses contient une étonnante et « prophétique » défense de l’Europe unie, communauté de destin dans laquelle les diverses nations peuvent fusionner sans perdre leurs traditions et leurs cultures. Ortega voit dans l’union de l’Europe la seule possibilité d’éviter la décadence, car le vieux continent a perdu son hégémonie historique au bénéfice des États-Unis et de l’URSS. Homogénéité et diversité sont, selon lui, les deux faces de la société européenne. L’Europe est à l’évidence une société plurielle, elle est une pluralité de peuples et de nations, non pas du fait d’inévitables flux migratoires, comme on le dit aujourd’hui, mais en raison de racines historico-culturelles. Pour Ortega, les racines européennes sont avant tout gréco-latines, chrétiennes et germaniques.

De la révolte des masses à la révolte des élites

Plus de soixante ans après la première publication de La révolte des masses, l'historien et politologue américain Christopher Lasch a complété et renouvelé la thèse d'Ortega y Gasset. Dans un ouvrage fondamental, The Revolt of the Elites and the Betrayal of Democracy (La révolte des élites et la trahison de la démocratie) (1994), Lasch a montré que les attitudes mentales de l'homme masse sont désormais plus caractéristiques des classes supérieures que des classes moyennes et basses.(*) « Avant moi le néant, après moi le déluge » semble être devenu la devise préférée d’une nouvelle classe dirigeante dont le style de vie est marqué par le rejet des valeurs communautaires, le mépris des traditions populaires, la fascination pour le marché, la tyrannie de la mode, le nomadisme, l'insatisfaction assouvie dans la consommation de la marchandise, l'obsession de l'apparence physique, le culte du spectacle, du succès et de la renommée. Ortega disait que la désertion des minorités n'est que l'envers de la révolte des masses.

Arnaud Imatz

(*) Le livre de Christopher Lasch a été traduit et publié en France en 1996 (voir : La révolte des élites et la trahison de la démocratie, Avant-propos de Jean-Claude Michéa, Castelnau-le-Lez, Climats, 1996).

Voir le texte intégral de l’analyse d’Arnaud Imatz :

Ortega y Gasset : un européiste critique de la révolte des masses et de la désertion des élites, en PDF en cliquant ici.

samedi, 21 mai 2011

Evola e il mondo di lingua tedesca

Evola e il mondo di lingua tedesca

Alberto Lombardo

Ex: http://www.centrostudilaruna.it/

evola_envers_cong.pngLa Germania e in genere il mondo di cultura tedesca ebbero per Evola un’importanza centrale. Sin da giovanissimo questi apprese il tedesco per avvicinarsi alle opere della filosofia idealistica; la sua dottrina filosofica deve molto all’idealismo, ma ancor più a Nietzsche, Weininger e Spengler. Nel 1933 compì il suo primo viaggio in Austria ; per tutti gli Anni ’30 e ’40 continuò a tenersi aggiornato leggendo saggî scientifici in lingua tedesca sui diversi argomenti dei quali si occupava: dalla romanità antica (Altheim) alla preistoria (Wirth, Günther), dall’alchimia (Böhme) alle razze (Clauß, ancora Günther), dalla teoria politica (Spann, Heinrich) all’economia (Sombart) e via dicendo. In generale, considerando gli apparati di note, i riferimenti culturali e in un bilancio che tenga conto di tutti gli apporti non mi sembra affatto di esagerare sostenendo che il peso degli studi pubblicati in tedesco sia nell’opera complessiva di Evola almeno pari a quello di quelli italiani.

Tutto questo è già assai indicativo dell’influenza della cultura tedesca sull’opera di Evola. Vanno aggiunti però altri dati: richiamando qui quanto accennato in sede biografica nel capitolo primo, ricordo i lunghi soggiorni di Evola in Austria e Germania, le numerose conferenze ivi tenute, i rapporti con esponenti della tradizione aristocratica e conservatrice mitteleuropea e della Konservative Revolution etc . Inoltre nei paesi di lingua tedesca Evola godette, almeno sino alla fine della seconda guerra mondiale, di una notorietà diversa da quella che ebbe in Italia, poiché vi fu accolto quasi come l’esponente di una particolare corrente di pensiero italiana, e ciò sin dal 1933, anno della pubblicazione di Heidnischer Imperialismus . Questo il giudizio in merito di Adriano Romualdi: «L’azione di Evola in Germania non fu politica, anche se contribuì a dissipare molti equivoci e a preparare un’intesa tra Fascismo e Nazionalsocialismo. Essa investì il significato di quelle tradizioni cui in Italia e in Germania si richiamavano i regimi, il simbolo romano e il mito nordico, il significato di classicismo e romanticismo, o di contrapposizioni artificiose, come quella tra romanità e germanesimo» .

Dal 1934 Evola tiene conferenze in Germania: in un’università di Berlino, al secondo nordisches Thing a Brema, e all’Herrenklub di Heinrich von Gleichen, rappresentante dell’aristocrazia tedesca (era barone) col quale stabilì una «cordiale e feconda amicizia» . Così Evola ricordò nel 1970 quest’importante esperienza: «ogni settimana si invitava una personalità tedesca o internazionale in quel circolo di Junkers. Devo dire peraltro che, se ci fossimo aspettati di vedere dei giganti biondi con gli occhi azzurri la delusione sarebbe stata grande, poiché per la maggior parte erano piccoli e panciuti. Dopo la cena e il rituale dei toasts, l’invitato doveva tenere una conferenza. Mentre questi signori fumavano il loro sigaro e sorseggiavano il loro bicchiere di birra, io parlavo. Fu allora che Himmler sentì parlare di me» .
È effettivamente assai verosimile che l’attenzione da parte degli ambienti ufficiali per Evola sia nata in seguito alle prime conferenze in Germania. I suoi rapporti col nazionalsocialismo furono di collaborazione esterna, e specialmente con diversi settori delle SS tra cui l’Ahnenerbe ; Evola espresse nei confronti dell’“ordine” guidato da Himmler parole assai positive , anche nel dopoguerra , che da una parte gli valsero i prevedibili (e fors’anche scontati) strali dei suoi detrattori, dall’altra determinarono una rilettura – in seno alla storiografia e allo stesso “sentimento del mondo” della Destra Radicale del dopoguerra – del nazionalsocialismo come di un movimento popolare guidato da un’élite ascetico-guerriera . Dagli ormai numerosi dati d’archivio pubblicati, risulta un quadro di Evola tenuto in considerazione ma sempre osservato con cura dagli ambienti ufficiali tedeschi .

Dopo il conflitto mondiale la notorietà di Evola nei paesi di lingua tedesca andò scemando; la sua immobilità fisica pare che gli impedì, tra l’altro, ulteriori viaggi all’estero. Solo negli ultimi decenni Evola è stato fatto oggetto di una sorta di riscoperta, per merito soprattutto di Hans Thomas Hansen, che ne ha tradotto (e ritradotto) la buona parte delle opere, con il consenso dello stesso Evola quando questi era ancora in vita, e che viene giustamente considerato uno dei massimi conoscitori del pensiero e della vita di Evola. Oltre alla rivista da questi fondata e animata, «Gnostika» (che come suggerisce il titolo ha interessi prevalentemente esoterici), negli ultimissimi anni stanno nascendo diverse attività che si ispirano in vario modo all’opera di Evola, tra le quali meritano una menzione le riviste tedesche «Elemente» e «Renovatio Imperii» e soprattutto l’austriaca «Kshatriya», diretta da Martin Schwarz (autore della più ampia bibliografia evoliana sino a oggi stilata ), di più marcata impronta “evoliana ortodossa”. A margine di ciò, si stanno iniziando a tenere convegni sul pensatore e a tradurre sue ulteriori opere. Inoltre il centenario della nascita di Evola, nel 1998, è stato occasione per varie testate tedesche per ricordarlo con ampi articoli, tra cui quelli apparsi sulla storica «Nation & Europa» (che esce ormai da mezzo secolo, e cui nei primi Anni ’50 lo stesso Evola collaborò), «Criticn» e la prestigiosa «Zeitschrift für Ganzheitforschung», altra rivista cui Evola collaborò (nei primi Anni ’60) e che fu fondata e lungamente diretta da Walter Heinrich (sino alla morte di questi, avvenuta nel 1984), che era in grande amicizia con Evola. Come curiosità, segnaliamo che per l’occasione numerosi complessi e gruppi musicali tedeschi e austriaci hanno dedicato nel centenario allo scrittore tradizionalista un disco, intitolato Cavalcare la tigre.

* * *

Sebbene alcuni elementi politici della storia d’Italia e di quella tedesca appaiano affini, (il processo di unificazione nazionale avvenuto nella seconda metà dell’Ottocento, la comune partecipazione alla Triplice Alleanza, l’Asse Roma-Berlino), Evola individua nella “tradizione germanica” dei tratti che differenziano nettamente – in senso positivo – i paesi di lingua tedesca dall’Italia. Così anzitutto «può dirsi che in Germania il nazionalismo democratico di massa di tipo moderno non fece che una fuggevole apparizione. […]. Il nazionalismo in tal senso, con un fondo democratico, non andò oltre il fugace fenomeno del parlamento di Francoforte del 1848, in connessione con i moti rivoluzionari che in quel periodo imperversavano in tutta l’Europa (è significativo che il re di Prussia Federico Guglielmo IV rifiutò l’offerta, fattagli da quel parlamento, di mettersi a capo di tutta la Germania perché accettandola egli avrebbe anche accettato il principio democratico – il potere conferito da una rappresentanza popolare – rinunciando al suo diritto legittimistico, sia pure ristretto alla sola Prussia). E Bismarck, creando il secondo Reich, non gli diede affatto una base “nazionale”, vedendo nella corrispondente ideologia il principio di pericolosi disordini anche dell’ordine europeo, mentre i conservatori della Kreuzzeitung accusarono nel nazionalismo un fenomeno “naturalistico” e regressivo, estraneo ad una più alta tradizione e concezione dello Stato» . Estranei a questa forma “naturalistica” di nazionalismo, i paesi di lingua tedesca cullarono un diverso spirito, quello del Volk, che animò lo spirito pangermanico. La corrente völkish, che un notevole peso ebbe anche nella genesi del nazionalsocialismo, affondava le sue radici nei Discorsi alla nazione tedesca di Fichte, in Arndt, Jahn e Lange e soprattutto nel Deutschbund e nella deutsche Bewegung . In questa diversità di retroterra si ha la prima divaricazione tra Italia e Germania.

Ma le differenze di ambiente sono assai più nette. Nel suo saggio sul Terzo Reich, delineando le correnti culturali complesse e spesso irriducibili che cooperarono nella sua genesi, Evola scrive: «Dopo la prima guerra mondiale in Germania la situazione era sensibilmente diversa da quella dell’Italia. […] Mussolini dovette creare quasi dal nulla, nel senso che nel punto di combattere la sovversione rossa e di rimettere in piedi lo Stato non poteva rifarsi ad una tradizione nel senso più alto del termine. Tutto sommato, ad essere minacciato era solo il prolungamento dell’Italietta democratica ottocentesca, con un retaggio risorgimentale risentente delle ideologie della Rivoluzione Francese, con una monarchia che regnava ma non governava e senza salde articolazioni sociali. In Germania le cose stavano altrimenti. Anche dopo il crollo militare e la rivoluzione del 1918 e malgrado il marasma sociale sussistevano resti aventi radici profonde in quel mondo gerarchico, talvolta ancora feudale, incentrato nei valori dello Stato e della sua autorità, facenti parte della precedente tradizione, in particolare del prussianesimo. […]. In effetti, nell’Europa centrale le idee della Rivoluzione Francese non presero mai tanto piede quanto nei restanti paesi europei» .

evola_julius_-_meditations_on_the_peaks.jpgIn un’occasione Evola cita la teoria giuridica di Carl Schmitt dell’international law . Il filosofo della politica tedesco aveva espresso l’idea della caduta del diritto internazionale europeo consuetudinario avvenuta, all’incirca, dopo il 1890, e la conseguente affermazione di un diritto internazionale più o meno ufficializzato. «Noi però qui non siamo interamente del parere dello Schmitt», scrive Evola, spiegando che «di contro all’opinione di molti, nei riguardi dell’azione svolta da Bismarck, sia all’interno della Germania che in Europa, non tutte le cose sono “in ordine”. […]. Più che Bismarck, a noi sembra che, se mai, Metternich sia stato l’ultimo “Europeo”, vale a dire l’ultimo uomo politico che seppe sentire la necessità di una solidarietà delle nazioni europee non astratta, o dettata solo da ragioni di politica “realistica” e da interessi materiali, ma rifacentesi anche a delle idee e alla volontà di mantenere il migliore retaggio tradizionale dell’Europa» . Contrariamente a quanto sostenuto da Baillet , Evola fu dunque piuttosto critico nei confronti di Bismarck, che non ebbe, secondo la visione tradizionale evoliana, il coraggio di opporsi in modo sistematico e rigoroso al mondo moderno e della sovversione (nella sua forma economico-capitalistica), ma dovette in alcuni casi venire a patti con esso.

La stessa Germania federiciana e poi guglielmina, seppur conservante le strutture e l’ordine di uno stato tradizionale, nel quale la stessa burocrazia e l’apparato statale apparivano quasi come corpi di un ordine, conteneva i germi della dissoluzione, dovuti alle idee illuministe che avevano iniziato a filtrare – in modo più larvato che altrove – presso le varie corti. Se il giudizio evoliano nei confronti del codice federiciano conservante l’ordinamento diviso negli Stände è positivo, ciò è poiché, per l’epoca in cui sorse, quel codice conservava meglio d’ogni altro le strutture feudali e gerarchiche precedenti. Esse, tramite la tradizione prussiana, affondavano nell’Ordine dei cavalieri teutonici e nella loro riconquista delle terre baltiche: un ordine ascetico-cavalleresco formato da una disciplina e da una severa organizzazione gerarchica. Così, sin da giovanissimo Evola intuì l’assurdità della “guerra civile europea” che, come ufficiale, egli andava a combattere sulla frontiera carsica: l’Italia si schierava cioè contro ciò che restava della migliore tradizione europea. «Nel 1914 gli Imperi Centrali rappresentavano ancora un resto dell’Europa feudale e aristocratica nel mondo occidentale, malgrado innegabili aspetti di egemonismo militaristico ed alcune alleanze sospette col capitalismo presenti soprattutto nella Germania guglielmina. La coalizione contro di essi fu dichiaratamente una coalizione del Terzo Stato contro le forze residue del Secondo Stato […]. Come in poche altre della storia, la guerra del 1914-1918 presenta tutti i tratti di un conflitto non fra Stati e nazioni, ma fra le ideologie di diverse caste. Di essa, i risultati diretti e voluti furono la distruzione della Germania monarchica e dell’Austria cattolica, quelli indiretti il crollo dell’impero degli Czar, la rivoluzione comunista e la creazione, in Europa, di una situazione politico-sociale talmente caotica e contraddittoria, da contenere tutte le premesse per una nuova conflagrazione. E questa fu la seconda guerra mondiale» .

Come accennato, anche nei confronti della tradizione dell’Austria Evola espresse un giudizio marcatamente positivo. La stessa linea dinastica degli Asburgo ebbe un ruolo di rilievo in questa valutazione (Evola si era espresso in termini molto positivi nei confronti di Massimiliano I) ; nel periodo in cui visse a Vienna Evola respirò ciò che restava dell’atmosfera antica dell’Austria felix, e venne in contatto con quella temperie culturale e spirituale e soprattutto con uomini in cui, per usare le parole di Ernst Jünger, «la catastrofe aveva certo lasciato le sue ombre […], ma si era limitata a distruggerne la serenità innata senza distruggerla. A tratti scorgevamo […] una patina di quella sofferenza che potremmo definire austriaca e che è comune a tanti vecchi sudditi dell’ultima vera monarchia. Con essa venne distrutta una forma del piacere di vivere che negli altri paesi europei già da generazioni era diventata inimmaginabile, e le tracce di questa distruzione si avvertono ancora nei singoli individui. […]. Da noi nel Reich, se si prescinde dal generale esaurimento delle forze, si incominciava a notare tutt’al più la disparità degli strati sociali; qui invece si erano aperte, come voragini, le differenze tra le varie etnie» . In questo humus storico degli anni compresi tra le due guerre, in cui ancora forti erano i legami sentimentali ed etici di molti con la precedente tradizione imperiale – la monarchia asburgica d’Austria aveva almeno formalmente conservato, sino al Congresso di Vienna, la titolarità del Sacro Romano Impero – Evola ebbe anche modo di percepire direttamente l’attaccamento diffuso a livello popolare alla monarchia , e lo spiegò in questi termini: «Senza riesumare forme anacronistiche, invece di una propaganda che “umanizzi” il sovrano per accattivare la massa, quasi sulla stessa linea della propaganda elettorale presidenziale americana, si dovrebbe vedere fino a che punto possano avere un’azione profonda i tratti di una figura caratterizzata da una certa innata superiorità e dignità, in un quadro adeguato. Una specie di ascesi e di liturgia della potenza qui potrebbero avere una loro parte. Proprio questi tratti, mentre rafforzeranno il prestigio di chi incarna un simbolo, dovrebbero poter esercitare sull’uomo non volgare una forza d’attrazione, perfino un orgoglio nel suddito. Del resto, anche in tempi abbastanza recenti si è avuto l’esempio dell’imperatore Francesco Giuseppe che, pur frapponendo fra sé e i sudditi l’antico severo cerimoniale, pur non imitando per nulla i re “democratici” dei piccoli Stati nordici, godette di una particolare, non volgare popolarità» . In questo stesso senso nel 1935, scrivendo a proposito della possibilità di una restaurazione regale in Austria, Evola riferisce ciò che gli esponenti del pensiero conservatore e monarchico in quel paese sostenevano: «La premessa, intanto, è quella a cui ogni mente non ingombra di pregiudizî può anche aderire, cioè che il regime monarchico, in generale, è quello che più può garantire un ordine, un equilibrio e una pacificazione interna, senza dover ricorrere al rimedio estremo della dittatura e dello Stato centralizzato, sempreché nei singoli sussista la sensibilità spirituale richiesta da ogni lealismo. Questa condizione, secondo dette personalità, sarebbe presente nella gran parte della popolazione austriaca, se non altro, per la forza di una tradizione e di uno stile di vita pluricentenario» .

Il problema dell’Anschluss, dell’annessione dell’Austria alla Germania naizonalsocialista, fu negli anni che lo precedettero al centro di un ampio dibattito internazionale. Giuristi e politici lo affrontarono da diversi punti di vista; Evola non fu in concordanza di vedute, su questo tema, con l’amico Othmar Spann, che, scriveva Evola, per la coraggiosa coerenza delle sue idee non era ben visto né in Austria né in Germania. Scrivendo sul sociologo viennese, Evola affermava: «gli Austriaci non perdonano le sue simpatie per la Germania, mentre i Tedeschi non gli perdonano le critiche da lui mosse al materialismo razzista» . Ampliando alla scuola organicistica viennese e al mondo culturale austriaco il suo sguardo, Evola ne esponeva in questi termini le vedute: «Non ci si può rassegnare a far scendere una nazione, che ha la tradizione che l’Austria ha avuto, al livello di un piccolo Stato balcanico. Qui non si fa quistione della mera autonomia politica, si fa essenzialmente quistione di cultura e di tradizione. Storicamente, la civiltà austriaca è indisgiungibile da quella germanica. Non è possibile che oggi l’Austria a tale riguardo si emancipi e cominci a far da sé. Proprio perché essa è stata menomata, ridotta ad un’ombra di quel che essa fu precedentemente, le si impone di connettersi nel modo più stretto alla Germania, appoggiarsi ad essa, trarre da essa gli elementi che possono garantire l’integrità della sua eredità tedesca». Proseguiva Evola sostenendo che dal lato positivo l’Austria avrebbe avuto molto a sua volta da trasmettere alla Germania sotto il profilo della tradizione culturale. Ma di là dal piano squisitamente intellettuale, «Nel dominio delle tradizioni politiche l’antitesi è ancor più visibile. Vi sarebbe infatti da chiedere a questi intellettuali germanofili che cosa essi pensino quando parlano di tradizione austro-tedesca. La tradizione austriaca era una tradizione imperiale. Erede del Sacro Romano Impero, il Reich austriaco, formalmente almeno, non poteva dirsi tedesco. Di diritto, era supernazionale, e di fatto esso sovrastava un gruppo di popoli assai diversi come razza, costumi e tradizioni, gruppo nel quale l’elemento tedesco non figurava che come parte. Nemmeno giova dire che purtuttavia la direzione dell’impero austriaco era intonata in senso tedesco e faceva capo ad una dinastia tedesca. Dal punto di vista dei principî ciò conta così poco quanto il fatto che i rappresentanti del principio supernazionale della Chiesa Romana siano stati in larga misura italiani. Se si deve parlare di tradizione austriaca», concludeva Evola, «è ad una tradizione imperiale che bisogna riferirsi. Ora, che cosa può avere a che fare una tale tradizione con la Germania, se Germania oggi vuol dire nazionalsocialismo?» . Francesco Germinario ha scritto a tale proposito che per Evola «un’Austria legata alle radici cattoliche, e in cui, soprattutto, rimaneva ancora vivo il ricordo degli Asburgo, era molto più vicina ai valori della Tradizione rispetto a una Germania travolta dalla nuova ondata di modernizzazione promossa dal nazismo» .

Si esprimevano in questi termini già nel 1935 le posizioni critiche di Evola nei confronti del nazismo, di cui il filosofo tradizionalista accusava gli eccessi populistici, sociali e di sinistra. Il tono in questo caso è particolarmente critico perché il raffronto è con l’Austria, nella quale Evola vedeva appunto l’erede spirituale della più alta tradizione europea. D’altronde, si tratta di una linea interpretativa e storiografica apprezzabile, e che Evola mantenne anche nel dopoguerra, tendendo a separare i diversi elementi e le varie correnti che operarono nel nazionalsocialismo per giudicarli separatamente . Concludeva dunque la sua lettura politica della situazione internazionale affermando: «Se non ci si vuole rassegnare alla perdita dell’antica tradizione supernazionale centro-europea, l’Austria più che verso la Germania dovrebbe volgere i suoi sguardi verso gli Stati successori, nel senso di vedere fino a che punto è possibile ricostruire una comune coscienza centro-europea come base non solo della soluzione di importantissimi problemi economici e commerciali ma eventualmente […] anche della formulazione di un nuovo principio politico unitario di tipo tradizionale» .

Nei confronti della seconda guerra mondiale, il cui esito indubbiamente Evola vedeva come l’ultima fase del crollo epocale della civiltà europea, lo scrittore tradizionalista denunciava le colpe morali delle potenze occidentali: «a Himmler si deve un tentativo di salvataggio in extremis (considerato da Hitler come un tradimento). Pel tramite del Conte Bernadotte egli tramise una proposta di pace separata agli Alleati occidentali per poter continuare la guerra soltanto contro l’Unione Sovietica e il comunismo. Si sa che tale proposta, la quale, se accettata, forse avrebbe potuto assicurare all’Europa un diverso destino, evitando la successiva “guerra fredda” e la comunisticizzazione dell’Europa di là dalla “cortina di ferro”, fu nettamente respinta in base ad un cieco radicalismo ideologico, come era stata respinta, per un non diverso radicalismo, l’offerta di pace fatta da Hitler di sua iniziativa all’Inghilterra in termini ragionevoli in un famoso discorso dell’estate del 1940 quando i Tedeschi erano la parte vincente» .

Anche dopo la seconda guerra mondiale Evola mantenne un occhio di riguardo nei confronti dei paesi di lingua tedesca. La sua visione fu di ammirazione nei confronti della nuova resurrezione economica operata dai Tedeschi dopo la distruzione del secondo dopoguerra («questa nazione ha saputo completamente rialzarsi di là da distruzioni senza nome. Perfino in regime di occupazione essa ha sopravvanzato le stesse nazioni vincitrici sul piano industriale ed economico riprendendo il suo posto di grande potenza produttrice») , e per il coraggio col quale la Repubblica federale aveva bandito il pericolo comunista dalla sua politica («I Tedeschi fanno sempre le cose con coerenza. Così anche nel giuoco di osservanza democratica. Essi hanno messo su una democrazia-modello come un sistema “neutro” – diremmo quasi amministrativo, più che politico – equilibrato ed energico a un tempo. A differenza dell’Italia, la Germania proprio dal punto di vista di una democrazia coerente ha messo al bando il comunismo. La Corte Costituzionale tedesca ha statuito ciò che corrisponde all’evidenza stessa delle cose, ossia che un partito che, come quello comunista, segue le regole democratiche soltanto in funzione puramente tattica e di copertura, per scopo finale dichiarato avendo invece la soppressione di ogni contrastante corrente politica e la dittatura assoluta del proletariato, non può essere tollerato da uno Stato democratico che non voglia scavare la fossa a sé stesso») . Ma, ciò nonostante, la guerra aveva ormai prodotto un vacuum, un vuoto spirituale non più colmato: «Di contro a tutto ciò, stupisce, nella Repubblica Federale, la mancanza di qualsiasi idea, di qualsiasi “mito”, di qualsiasi superiore visione del mondo, di qualsiasi continuità con la precedente Germania» . Anche nel campo della cultura, Evola ravvisa un generale franamento, una sorta di generale “venire meno” alle posizioni coraggiose e d’avanguardia tenute dall’intellettualità tedesca negli anni – ad avviso di Evola, assai floridi e proficui sotto il profilo culturale – del Reich nazionalsocialista. Nel suo giudizio negativo Evola prende come esempio di questo crollo Gottfried Benn ed Ernst Jünger (cadendo con ciò in errori di veduta piuttosto grossolani ).


* * *


Da Vie della Tradizione 125 (2002), pp. 37-50.
Il presente articolo è stato ripubblicato privo delle note a pié pagina.

samedi, 14 mai 2011

Othmar Spann / Jungkonservativ




pdf der Druckfassung aus Sezession 41 / April 2011


Sebastian Maaß: Dritter Weg und wahrer Staat. Othmar Spann – Ideengeber der Konservativen Revolution
(= Kieler Ideengeschichtliche Studien, Bd. 3)
,  Kiel: Regin-Verlag 2010. 174 S., 18.95 €  (hier bestellen).


spann01.jpgDie »Kieler Ideengeschichtlichen Studien« gewinnen mit
Band III an Konturen.


Den vorausgehenden Monographien über Edgar Julius Jung und Arthur Moeller van den Bruck steuert Sebastian Maaß mit der Studie zu Othmar Spann ein weiteres Puzzleteil in der Darstellung der »profiliertesten Vertreter der jungkonservativen Richtung der Konservativen Revolution« bei.


Als Fraktion mit gemäßigten Strukturelementen nahm der Jungkonservatismus eine Mittelstellung zwischen Völkischen und Nationalrevolutionären ein und konnte sowohl in der Weimarer Republik (Regierung von Papens) als auch der Ersten Republik Österreichs (Heimwehrbewegung) in die realpolitischen Auseinandersetzungen der Zeit eingreifen. Die Kontextualisierung in die ideengeschichtliche Umwelt der KR unternimmt Maaß einerseits über das Aufzeigen dezidiert jungkonservativer Positionen (ständestaatliche Konzeption, mittelalterliche Reichsidee, christliche Bezugspunkte, ganzheitlicher Ansatz) in Abgrenzung zu anderen Gruppierungen der KR, andererseits mittels Bezugnahme auf die charakteristischen Analogien (Mythos der »Ewigen Wiederkehr«, Antiliberalismus und -marxismus) von Jungkonservatismus und restlichen konservativ-revolutionären Strömungen. Dem Vorwort des Spann-Kenners Hanns Pichler, der die von Maaß vorgenommene Fokussierung auf Gesellschafts- und Staatslehre Spanns als klugen Ansatz für eine einführende Darstellung bezeichnet und gerade den in dessen frühen Schriften ausgebreiteten »ganzheitlichen« gesellschaftswissenschaftlichen Ansatz als erkenntnisleitend für diesen Rahmen betrachtet, folgt ein biographischer Überblick. Anschließend widmet sich Maaß den Spann-Schülern Jakob Baxa und Walter Heinrich, die maßgeblichen Anteil an der akademischen Verbreitung der universalistischen Lehre Spanns besaßen, Heinrich versuchte darüber hinaus die ganzheitliche Lehre Spanns in reale Politik (Heimwehrbewegung in Österreich; Kameradschaftsbund für volks- und sozialpolitische Bildung im Sudetenland; Institut für Ständewesen in Düsseldorf) umzusetzen.


spann02.jpgAnschließend behandelt Maaß »Philosophie und Religion als Grundlagen der Ganzheitslehre«, um über die Darlegung der »Kategorienlehre« und der politischen Publizistik (Der wahre Staat; Vom Wesen des Volkstums) den Aufbau des Spannschen »organischen« Staatswesens zu rekonstruieren. Indem der Verfasser das Wirken des Wiener Kreises um Spann sowohl in Österreich als auch dem deutschsprachigen Kulturraum analysiert, wird die meta- und realpolitische Bedeutung dieses Dritten Weges deutlich, der mit seiner machtpolitischen Ausprägung in Österreich um 1930 eine ernsthafte historische Alternative zu den »dritten Wegen« des Nationalsozialismus und des Faschismus darstellte. Das im Untertitel verwandte Konstrukt »Ideengeber der Konservativen Revolution« stellt – aufgrund der überschaubaren Rezeption von Spanns Universalismus in der Weimarer Republik – einen einzelnen Kritikpunkt an dieser soliden Monographie dar.










Sebastian Maaß M. A. (geb. 1981) studierte Politik, Geschichte und Erziehungswissenschaft an den Universitäten Konstanz und Tübingen, Studienschwerpunkte waren Neuere Ideen- und Philosophiegeschichte sowie Altertumswissenschaften, umfassende Forschungstätigkeit insbesondere zum Themenkomplex der Konservativen Revolution (KR). Maaß' Studie über Leben und Werk von Edgar Julius Jungist einer zentralen und wirkmächtigen Gestalt der KR gewidmet und erscheint nun als Monographie in der akademischen Reihe „Kieler ideengeschichtliche Studien“






Spengler - Zu seinem 75. Todestag

Spengler – Zu seinem 75. Todestag

Karlheinz Weissmann

Ex: http://www.sezession.de/

Gestern fand am Grab Oswald Spenglers auf dem Münchener Nordfriedhof ein Gedenken zu dessen 75. Todestag statt. Die Einladung war durch das Institut für Staatspolitik (IfS) ergangen, das auch einen Kranz niederlegen ließ.

In der Ansprache am Grab hieß es:

Wir gedenken heute eines Mannes, den man noch in der jüngeren Vergangenheit selbstverständlich zu den großen Deutschen rechnete. Damit ist es heute vorbei. Der Name Spenglers sagt nur noch wenigen etwas. Zu denen rechnen wir uns, die wir heute hier zusammen gekommen sind.

Der 75. Todestag Oswald Spenglers ist für uns Anlaß, an einen Mann zu erinnern, der zu den bedeutenden Geschichtsdenkern des 20. Jahrhunderts gehört. Dabei ist die Rede vom `Propheten des Untergangs´ eine unzulässige Verkürzung, vorschnelle Ableitung aus dem Titel seines Hauptwerks Der Untergang des Abendlandes. Es wäre aber ein Irrtum, in Spengler den Verkünder der Schicksalsergebenheit zu sehen. Er forderte das amor fati, die Liebe zum Schicksal. Vor allem aber und zuerst war er ein unbestechlicher Beobachter und Analytiker, der weder vor dem großen Entwurf und der Gesamtschau, noch vor den notwendigen Schlußfolgerungen zurückscheute, – auch wenn die das Ende der eigenen, der abendländischen Kultur bedeuteten.

Spengler hat zu sehen gelehrt, daß auch die Kultur, wie jedes Lebewesen, den Gesetzen von Werden und Vergehen, Geburt, Wachstum und Tod unterliegt. Er war darin nicht der erste. Aber kein anderer hat wie er, trotz der bitteren Einsicht, gefordert, die Resignation zu meiden, tapfer auszuharren und den Posten nicht zu räumen.

Der Name Spenglers steht für Wirklichkeitssinn. Das allein könnte schon genügen. Wir gedenken seiner als eines Großen unseres Volkes.

Im Anschluß an das Gedenken fand noch eine Zusammenkunft statt, in deren Rahmen mehrere kurze Vorträge zu Leben, Werk und Bedeutung Spenglers gehalten wurden.

S6003247 480x360 Spengler   Zu seinem 75. Todestag

Article printed from Sezession im Netz: http://www.sezession.de

URL to article: http://www.sezession.de/24726/spengler-zu-seinem-75-todestag.html

vendredi, 13 mai 2011

Gerd-Klaus Kaltenbrunner is overleden

Gerd Klaus Kaltenbrunner is overleden
Ex: Deltanieuwsbrief nr. 47 - Mei 2011

Gerd Klaus Kaltenbrunner“Conservatisme is een ‘elitaire’, men kan ook zeggen ‘esoterische’ aangelegenheid (…).  Het misverstand als zou de conservatief een theorielozen, een onfilosofische, ja, zelfs antifilosofische pragmaticus zijn, lijkt onuitroeibaar. Ik heb nochtans met veel kracht en overtuiging aangetoond dat het een misverstand is, toen ik het over die domeinen had, die man als ‘conservatieve mystiek’ zou kunnen omschrijven (…). Een zekere zin voor de onoplosbare complexiteit van de werkelijkheid, de erkenning van het feit dat men over het leven slechts brokstukgewijs rationeel kunnen spreken, de aandacht voor de tegenstelling, voor het tragische en voor het gedeeltelijk demonische dat door de geschiedenis waart, een constitutionele scepsis tegenover de ‘grote oplossingen’”. Woorden van Gerd Klaus Kaltenbrunner, een grote Oostenrijkse mijnheer, die bij menig jonge Europeaan de grondvesten van een degelijke conservatieve ideeënwereld heeft gelegd.

Kaltenbrunner werd in 1939 in Wenen geboren, maar na zijn studies in de Rechten in 1962 trok hij naar Duitsland en werkte er bij uitgeverijen als lektor. In 1972 publiceerde hij een verzamelwerk Rekonstruktion des Konservatismus, en ontwierp hiermee, enkele jaren na 1968, de basis voor een conservatieve tegenactie. Hij ging in het werk uit van de idee dat het conservatisme eerst de hegemonie op het geestelijke vlak moet veroveren, vooraleer politieke consequenties te trekken.

Gerd Klaus Kaltenbrunner wou niet zomaar ‘conserveren’: hij was er veeleer op uit het ‘moderne’ conservatieve denken mee gestalte te geven – met daarin natuurlijk dat wat eeuwig een Europese waarde had. De door hem opgezette en gepubliceerde Herderbücherei Initiative  - een reeks die liep van 1974 tot 1988 – bracht op een hoog niveau conservatieve auteurs, wetenschappers, onderzoekers en andere bijeen, die rond bepaalde thema’s (soms) baanbrekende bijdragen brachten.  Interessante titels waren (en zijn): Die Zukunft der Vergangenheid (1975), Plädoyer für die Vernunft: Signale einer Tendenzwende (1974).  Gerd Klaus Kaltenbrunner legde ook een bijzondere ijver aan de dag om de bronnen voor het conservatieve denken open en toegankelijk te houden. Hij publiceerde een driedelig werk Europa. Seine geistigen Quellen in Porträts aus zwei Jahrtausenden (1981-1985). Ook het werk Vom Geist Europas heeft niets van zijn waarde verloren en verdient het zeker op opnieuw gelezen te worden.

Hierna werd het stil rond Kaltenbrunner. Hij trok zich – na de ontgoocheling over het uitblijven van een échte conservatieve wende – terug als een lekenmonnik in Kandern, afgesneden van alle moderne communicatiemiddelen. Hij trok ook voorgoed een streep onder het metapolitieke werk. Nochtans loont het de moeite, zeker in deze tijden van ideeënarmoede ter linker en rechter zijde de moeite om de stijl en de onderwerpen die Gerd Klaus Kaltenbrunner nauw aan het hart lagen, te bestuderen.  Met TeKoS hebben wij in elk geval niet op het overlijden van deze bescheiden, overtuigdconservatieve intellectueel gewacht om bijdragen van hem te publiceren. In ons nummer 127 brachten wij een vertaling van Elite. Erziehung für den Ernstfall, in het Nederlands: Zonder Elite gaat het niet. Wij groeten u met bijzondere veel respect, meester Kaltenbrunner!

(Peter Logghe)

dimanche, 08 mai 2011

Ernst Moritz Arndt, jacobin romantique

Ernest Moritz Arndt, jacobin romantique


par Guy CLAES


ernst_10.jpgErnst Moritz Arndt est la figure essen­tielle du nationalisme romantique allemand. « Je suis né dans le petit peuple proche de la glèbe », écrivait-il en 1819. À son propos, l'éminent historien Diwald (Cf. Vouloir n°8) disait : « Au contraire de presque tous les autres romantiques, le romantique Arndt est issu de ce terreau populaire, de cette glèbe que les ruraux travaillent ; il s'est hissé à l'esprit du romantisme et n'a pas suivi la voie inverse comme les Schlegel, Tieck, Novalis qui sont, eux, partis de l'intellect et de l'esprit pour découvrir les merveilles de la forêt et la joie des fêtes de la moisson ». Arndt est effecti­vement né d'une famille de paysans poméra­niens de l'Ile de Rügen, en 1769, la même année que Napoléon.


Aucun de ses ancêtres n'était libre. Son père fut affranchi par son seigneur puis devint inspecteur de ses terres et, enfin, métayer. Son père acquiert suffisamment de moyens pour lui payer un précepteur et l'envoyer au gymnasium de Stralsund. Après avoir quitté cet établissement sur un coup de tête et par dégoût pour l'étroitesse d'esprit petite-bourgeoise rencontrée chez ses condisciples, il étudie la théologie aux universités de Greifswald et d'Iéna. Après cette pose studieuse, il reprend sa vie errante, traverse et visite toute l'Europe, poussé par une soif de connaître la diversité des peuples et des mœurs. Cette vie vagabonde lui donne conscience de son identité d'Alle­mand et le récit de ses expériences vécues sera codifié dans son Geist der Zeit (= L'es­prit du temps) dont l'impact, dans la société, fut finalement plus important que le Discours à la Nation Allemande du philosophe Fichte. Dans cet ouvrage fait de plusieurs volumes, sans prétention philosophique, il y a "flammes et enthou­siasme".


Sa prise de conscience identitaire l'oblige à choisir son camp : il sera pour la Prusse de Gneisenau et de Clausewitz et Napoléon sera l'ennemi, le "Satan à la tête de ses troupes de bandits". Il sera l'ennemi mais aussi le modèle à suivre : il faudra faire de l'Allemagne une nation aussi solide que la France, et lui donner une constitution moderne calquée sur les acquis positifs de la Révolu­tion française, acquis revus et corrigés par le Baron von Stein. Arndt sera un "jacobin allemand", un "jacobin romanti­que", les deux termes n'étant pas antinomi­ques dans le contexte de son époque et de sa patrie.


En 1818, Arndt, le paysan voyageur, devient professeur d'histoire à Bonn. Son esprit farouchement contestataire lui cause ennui sur ennui. Accusé de "démagogie", il est emprisonné, chassé de sa chaire, relâché sans explications, jamais jugé. À partir de 1822, il ne cessera d'écrire, notamment sur le problème de l'indépendance belge (nous y revien­drons). En 1848, il siège à l'Assemblée Nationale de Francfort pour en être chassé en mai 1849. En 1860, il meurt âgé de 90 ans et un mois.


Ces 90 années d'une vie dûment remplie et mise entièrement au service de la cause de son peuple, ont permis à Arndt d'élaborer, avec un vocabulaire clair et limpide que les Français croient rare en Allemagne, la théorie du "jacobinisme romantique". L'anthologie que nous offre la Faksimile-Verlag nous permet de saisir les piliers de cette vision (c'est à coup sûr davantage une vision qu'une théorie sèche et ardue) et de comprendre les racines du nationalisme populaire, non seulement allemand mais propre à tous les pays continentaux de langue germani­que. Le Mouvement Flamand en a été fortement influencé et, dans l'élaboration de son corpus culturel, a tenu compte des écrits enthousiastes d'Arndt à propos de nos provinces, écrits qui ont précédé ceux de Hoffmann von Fallersleben (ajoutons ici qu'Arndt distinguait Wallons, Flamands et Luxembourgeois par la langue mais englobait les trois ethnies dans la sphère des mœurs sociales germani­ques).


Né sujet du roi de Suède, Arndt a voulu favoriser l'union des Allemands au sein d'un même État. Son modèle initial fut le modèle suédois. Les Suédois consti­tuaient, disait-il, un vrai peuple ("ein echtes Volk"), conscient, depuis Gustav Adolf, de la valeur des vertus politiques et de la nécessité de protéger le peuple par une structure étatique solide. L'antholo­gie de la Faksimile-Verlag nous dévoile le système d’Arndt : les rouages de sa conception du "Volk", les lois vitales du peuple, le peuple et l'État dans la perspective d'un double combat contre la réaction féodale et le révolutionna­risme de 1789 et les projets pour la consti­tution d'un État "völkisch".


L'idée de "Volk" repose sur trois batte­ries de définitions : empiriques, métaphy­siques et politiques. Sur le plan empiri­que, tout observateur décèlera l'existen­ce tangible et concrète de spécificités ethno-culturelles, de folklores immémo­riaux, de réseaux de liens communautai­res, d'us et de coutumes ancestrales. Sur le plan métaphysique, le "Volk" est le réceptacle d'une unicité idéelle, d'une religiosité particulière que rien ni personne ne saurait rendre interchangeable. Sur le plan politique, le "Volk" est une volon­té. La volonté de demeurer dans l'histoi­re est une force redoutable : les Anglais et les Suédois ont tenu tête ou se sont imposés à des voisins plus puissants quanti­tativement parce qu'ils avaient une con­science très nette de leur identité et refusaient de se laisser guider par l'arbi­traire de leurs gouvernants. Les peuples libres (et Arndt regrette ici que le peuple allemand n'en fasse pas partie) ont une claire conscience de leur honneur (Ehre) et de leur honte (Schande).


Arndt distingue la notion de "Volk" de celles de "Menge" (= masse, foule) et "Pöbel" (= populace). "Menge" est la masse "neutre", sans opinions clairement définies ; elle est cette "majorité silencieu­se" que tous réclament comme clientèle. Le "Pöbel" est l'ensemble des éléments déracinés, incapables de discipliner leurs comportements parce que dépouillés de toute norme ancestrale, de toute pesan­teur stabilisatrice. La Révolution françai­se, par son individualisme (manifeste notamment dans les lois qu'elle édicte contre les corporations et contre le droit de coalition), a hissé au pouvoir le "Pöbel" qui a mené la "Menge" dans l'aventure révolutionnaire et napoléonienne. Le "Pöbel" s'est imposé en "maître", en despote sur une "Menge" d'esclaves. La collusion des "despotes" et des "esclaves" ne donne pas un "Volk". Pour que "Volk" il y ait, il faut une circulation des élites, une égalité des chances et une adhésion spontanée et non contrainte à un même ensemble de valeurs et à une même vision de l'histoire.


Pour Arndt, le peuple est un tout organi­que d'où jaillit une Urkraft (force originelle) qu'il convient de reconnaître, de canaliser et de faire fructifier. Sans ce travail d'attention constant, le "Volk" dégénère, subit l'aliénation (qui deviendra concept-clef du socialisme), sort de l'histoi­re. Arndt, poète, compare le "Volk" à un volcan, à un Vésuve que les despotes veulent maintenir éteint. Les éruptions sont pourtant inévitables.


Pour accéder à l'idée d'État, le peuple doit mener une double lutte contre la "réaction" et la "révolution". Cette lutte doit d'abord se concentrer contre la concep­tion mécaniste de l'État, issue à la fois de l'absolutisme et de la Révolution fran­çaise. L'enthousiasme créatif part d'un enracinement, d'une terre (Heidegger nous systématisera cette vision) où vit encore une dimension historique et non des belles et vibrantes rhétoriques abstrai­tes que les premières heures de la Révolu­tion française avaient connues et diffusées par la presse à travers l'Europe. Arndt, dès les séminaires de Stralsund, ressent un malaise inexplicable à l'écoute des discours parisiens contre l'absolutisme et la monarchie. Son "bon sens" paysan perçoit et dénonce la mascarade lexicale des clubs jacobins. Ce sentiment confus d'antipathie, Arndt le retrouvera lors d'une conversation en Haute-Italie en 1799 avec un officier républicain français qui s'enivrait de trop belles paroles à propos de la liberté (au nom de laquelle, expliquait-il, on venait de fusiller deux députés plus ou moins responsables de l'assassinat d'un tribun). Ces paroles sonnaient faux dans l'oreille d'Arndt et la légèreté avec laquelle beaucoup d'adeptes de la terreur envisageaient fusillades et "guillotinades" l'effrayait. La "force tranquille" de l'organicité se passait de tels débordements.


L'idée d'État née lors de la Révolution de 1789 est inorganique. Elle est "con­structiviste" et néglige l'évolution lente qui a germé dans les inconscients collec­tifs. Malgré ce jugement sévère, partagé par Burke, par certains contre-révolu­tionnaires français ou par les romanti­ques traditionalistes (dits parfois réaction­naires) allemands, Arndt reconnaît les aspects, les éléments positifs de la Révolution. Les Allemands doivent beau­coup à cette Révolution : elle a permis leur prise de conscience nationale. Elle a accéléré le processus de décomposition amorcé déjà sous l'Ancien Régime. Elle nous a appris que les peuples ne commet­taient, ni en intention ni en pratique, de crime contre les rois en voulant être gouvernés par des lois qu'ils connaissent et reconnaissent, qui sont le fruit d'une sagesse trempée dans l'expérience des générations antérieures. Il a manqué à la France révolutionnaire cette sagesse organique et le torrent révolutionnai­re a débouché sur la Terreur puis sur un nouvel absolutisme ; ce qui fermait la boucle et ne résolvait rien. Les Princes allemands ont trahi leur peuple en se comportant comme des "grands mogols" ou des "khans tatars". C'est à cela que mène l'irrespect des liens organiques et de la faculté d'écouter qu'ils impli­quent.


Arndt critique le droit romain, destruc­teur du droit coutumier (il préfigure ici von Savigny) et voit dans une paysan­nerie sainement politisée, le fondement de l'État völkisch (cette idée, Spengler, Spann et bien d'autres la reprendront à leur compte). Enfin, il nous expose les raisons pour lesquelles il ne croit pas en une Pan-Europe qui se ferait au-­delà, par-delà les peuples. Cette Europe ne serait qu'une panacée insipide dépour­vue de cette organicité stabilisante que cherchent, au fond, tous les peuples depuis l'effondrement de l'Ancien Régime. Cette anthologie est une lecture impérative pour tous ceux qui veulent comprendre l'Allemagne du XIXème siècle, la genèse des socialismes et les idéaux des acteurs du 1848 allemand.




Ernst Moritz ARNDT, Deutsche Volks­werdung : Arndts politisches Vermächtnis an die Gegenwart, Bremen, Faksimile­ Verlag (Adresse : Postfach 10 14 20, D­2800 Bremen 1, RFA), 160 pages avec un portrait d'Arndt et une courte biogra­phie, DM 15.

mercredi, 04 mai 2011

Armin Mohler / Eine politische Biographie

Armin Mohler. Eine politische Biographie


Ex: http://www.sezession.de/


mohlereinband 121x200 Armin Mohler. Eine politische BiographieHeute wäre Armin Mohler 91 Jahre alt geworden. Ich konnte ihn Mitte der neunziger Jahre noch kennenlernen und habe meinen Verlag nicht zuletzt gegründet, weil Ellen Kositza, Karlheinz Weißmann und ich im Jahre 2000 Mohler zum 80. eine Festschrift überreichen wollten. Es wird keinem Antaios-Leser unbemerkt geblieben sein, daß das Erbe Mohlers und sein besonderer Ton in Schnellroda auffindbar und virulent gehalten werden.

Nun hat Karlheinz Weißmann jahrelange Arbeiten in Form gebracht und legt Armin Mohler. Eine politische Biographie vor (hier subskribieren!). Weißmann ist der beste Kenner des Werks und der Denkweise Mohlers, hat auch Teile von dessen Nachlaß übernehmen können und in vielen persönlichen Gesprächen Details erfahren und Zusammenhänge notiert, die nirgends schriftlich niedergelegt sind.

Weißmanns Arbeit ist eine politische Biographie, weil Mohler ein politisch denkender, strategisch und taktisch im Sinne einer modernen deutschen Rechten agierender Kopf war. Man liest von der Nähe zur Macht (im Umfeld Josef Strauß‘), erfährt, was in den sechziger und siebziger Jahren an Debatten noch alles möglich war und verneigt sich vor der Prinzipientreue Mohlers, der Respekt nie mit Undeutlichkeit oder einer Schleimspur verwechselte.

Dies zeigt sich deutlich in den Großkapiteln über Mohlers Zeit als Sekretär von Ernst Jünger und über die Kontakte mit Carl Schmitt: In keinem Fall war er so etwas wie Goethes Eckermann (am Kaffeetisch sitzend und glühend vor Glück die Gespräche notierend), sondern ein Gesprächs- und Briefpartner auf Augenhöhe, der sich ja zuletzt nicht scheute, Jüngers Frühwerk gegen den Autor öffentlich zu verteidigen (was zum Bruch mit Jünger führte).

Dies alles breitet Weißmann in seiner Biographie aus, und natürlich auch all die anderen, für uns bis heute so wichtgen Aspekte: Mohler rettete das Erbe der Konservativen Revolution, sezierte die Mechanismen der Vergangenheitsbewältigung, verfaßte elektrisierende Essays – wir pflegen sein Erbe zurecht, und zurecht sind viele, die sich – dem Zeitgeist folgend – über ihn erhoben und über ihn urteilten heute so richtig und ganz und gar vergessen …

+ Weißmanns Mohler-Biographie kann man hier für 19 € subskribieren (bis zum 30. April). Später kostet sie 22 €, erscheinen wird sie Mitte, Ende Mai.
+ Von der dreibändigen Mohler-Ausgabe, die wir 2001 und 2002 aufgelegt haben, sind Reste der Bände 1 und 2 noch erhältlich. Wir bieten sie günstig im Doppelpack für 24 € an (in Einzelbänden: 44 €). Bestellen Sie hier.
+ Mohlers Essay Gegen die Liberalen (mit einem Nachwort von Martin Lichtmesz) wird derzeit in 2. Auflage gedruckt. Informationen und eine Bestellmöglichkeit gibts hier.

mardi, 03 mai 2011

G.-K. Kaltenbrunner ist verstorben

Gerd-Klaus Kaltenbrunner ist verstorben

Götz Kubitschek

Ex: http://www.sezession.de/


kaltenbrunner-99x150.jpgGestern ist – wie ich eben erfahren habe – Gerd-Klaus Kaltenbrunner verstorben. Daß ich zuletzt einen seiner Essays in der reihe kaplaken nachdrucken konnte, ist nur eine Marginalie im Leben dieses für eine gewisse Zeitspanne wichtigsten Publizisten der deutschen Nachkriegsrechten.

Ich hatte zu Kaltenbrunners 70. Geburtstag vor zwei Jahren einen Beitrag veröffentlicht (Sezession 28/ Februar 2009). Online ist er hier zu finden.

Und im Oktoberheft 2010 der Sezession (Nr. 38) hatten wir in einer Personenreihe unter dem Titel „Konservative Intelligenz“ selbstverständlich auch einen Eintrag zu Kaltenbrunner veröffentlicht. Im Gedenken an ihn veröffentlichen wir diese Vita hier noch einmal:

Gerd-Klaus Kaltenbrunner wurde 1939 in Wien geboren, übersiedelte nach einem Studium der Rechtswissenschaft 1962 nach Deutschland und arbeitete zunächst für verschiedene Verlage als Lektor. Noch in dieser Eigenschaft gab er den Sammelband Rekonstruktion des Konservatismus (1972) heraus und konnte damit wenige Jahre nach ’68 die Grundlagen für einen möglichen politischen Gegenentwurf liefern. Kaltenbrunner ging dabei von der Einsicht aus, daß der Konservatismus zunächst die Hegemonie im Geistigen erlangen müsse, bevor politische Konsequenzen durchsetzbar seien. Im Hintergrund stand seine Überzeugung, daß die »ökonomischen Verhältnisse« nur den Rahmen für die entscheidenden Ereignisse abgeben: Ideen und Utopien siegen demnach einfach dadurch, »daß sich genügend ›Verrückte‹ finden, die bereit sind, dafür zu kämpfen und sich, wenn’s sein muß, auch töten zu lassen«. Kaltenbrunner sah seine Aufgabe im Bewahren der Tradition des Konservatismus sowie im gegenwartsbezogenen Weiterdenken. Die von ihm initiierte und herausgegebene Taschenbuchreihe Herderbücherei Initiative (1974–1988) diente diesem Ziel. Auf hohem Niveau wurden aktuelle Fragen von verschiedenen Autoren auf dem Hintergrund der konservativen Tradition bearbeitet.

032693_1-234x300.jpgKaltenbrunners Einleitungen wurden dabei lagerübergreifend als scharfsinnig und bedenkenswert gelobt. Die schönen, oft mehrdeutigen Titel der einzelnen Bände prägten sich ein: Die Zukunft der Vergangenheit (1975), Tragik der Abtrünnigen (1980), Unser Epigonen-Schicksal (1980). Bereits der erste Titel Plädoyer für die Vernunft: Signale einer Tendenzwende (1974) wurde als »Tendenzwende« zu einem Schlagwort unter Konservativen und Rechten. Parallel zu den aktuellen Analysen kümmerte sich Kaltenbrunner weiterhin um die Quellen des Konservatismus. Sein dreibändiges Werk Europa. Seine geistigen Quellen in Portraits aus zwei Jahrtausenden (1981–1985) und die Fortsetzung Vom Geist Europas (1987–1992) sind hier zu nennen. Mit dem Begriff Konservatismus war auch Kaltenbrunner nicht glücklich: Mit der Weltbewahrung allein wäre es nicht getan und geborene Konservative gebe es im Zeitalter des Fortschritts nicht mehr. Kaltenbrunner bemühte sich deshalb um eine konservative Theorie. Nach dem 75. Band wurde die Initiative-Reihe eingestellt. Kaltenbrunner beschäftigt sich seither mit Biographien zur Geschichte des frühen Christentums. Seine letzten Veröffentlichungen tragen esoterischen Charakter: Johannes ist sein Name (1993) Dionysius vom Areopag (1996). Kaltenbrunner lebt zurückgezogen im Schwarzwald und publiziert nicht mehr.

dimanche, 17 avril 2011

Thomas Mann: Betrachtungen eines Unpolitischen - über die Wiedersprüche der demokratischen Gesinnungsethik


Thomas Mann: Betrachtungen eines Unpolitischen - Über die Wiedersprüche der demokratischen Gesinnungsethik

Geschrieben von: Prof. Dr. Paul Gottfried (Gastautor)

Ex: http://www.blauenarzisse.de/   


Thomas_Mann_1937.jpgEine Vielfalt von bunten, einander verwandten Themen bilden Die Betrachtungen eines Unpolitischen, die Thomas Mann zwischen 1915 und 1918 zusammentrug und vor Kriegsende herausbrachte. Der Erstteil des Werkes erwähnt, dass der Schriftsteller ein schon angesetztes „Künstlerwerk“ beiseite schob, nämlich den Zauberberg, um sich einem zeitdringlicheren Auftrag zuzuwenden. Eine Kontinuität erschliesst sich zwischen den letzten Szenen des Romans, als Hans Castorp sich kriegsmäßig gekleidet auf dem Schlachtfeld herumtummelt, und dem tragenden Thema der Betrachtungen, die eine Verteidigung des Deutschtums in einem folgenschweren Krieg darbieten.

Als Universitätsstudent wurde mir eingehämmert, dass beides dieselbe antidemokratische Streitlust bloßlegt, die den Krieg angestossen hatte. Obendrein ist ein gradliniger Verbindungsgang vermeintlich aufzuspüren, der von Manns Empfehlung des „deutschen Sonderwegs“ in den Betrachtungen bis auf die Nazi-Gewaltherrschaft hinüberleitet. Das wurde in den relativ beschaulichen und unparteiischen USA im Jahre 1963 gelehrt. Man kann sich vorstellen, wie dröhnend dieselbe Mahnung im heutigen antifaschistischen Deutschland ertönen muss.

Der deutsche Sonderweg gegen die jakobinisch-westliche Versuchung

Dazu gehören ein paar abgrenzende Bemerkungen. Wie andere Ehrenverteidiger auf beiden Seiten versuchte Mann im Verlauf der Kriegsaktion seine Heimat vor der Propaganda ihrer Opponenten zu bewahren. Da die auf der anderen Seite ausgerichteten Polemiker wie Lord Bryce und Henri Bergson, sich als Verfechter der westlichen Demokratie mit glänzendem Erfolg ausgegeben hatten, entschied sich Mann dafür, Widerstand zu leisten und Deutschland als eine konservative, volksgemeinschaftliche Kultur vorzustellen. Im Gegensatz zu ihren Widersachern kämpften die Deutschen und ihre Verbündeten nicht für eine zivilisatorische Sendung sondern gegen die Auslöschung ihrer Lebensweise und die Verdrängung „des deutschen Wesens“ durch ein eindringende Fremdlehre, sei es das Jakobinertum oder ein getarntes Römertum im revolutionären Gewand.

Vorrangig ist die deutsche Kriegssache als ein defensiver Einsatz auszulegen, auch wenn die Deutschen gezwungen wurden, gegen die Alliierten den ersten Schlag zu richten. Auf der internationalen Ebene war es schwer, einen anderen Kurs einzuschlagen. Schon vor den Ansätzen seines Kunstwerks scharten sich Manns verhasste „Zivilisationsliteraten“ in neutralen Ländern zusammen, den anderen voran, die spanischen Literaten, José Ortega y Gasset und Azorin, um für die „liberalen Streitmächte“ die Werbetrommel zu schlagen.

250px-thomas_mann_betrachtungen_eines_unpolitischen_1918.jpgWar das deutsche Kaiserreich fortschrittlich?

Wenngleich Hermann Cohen in seiner Kampfschrift Deutschtum und Judentum (1917) die Deutschen als Vehikel einer fortschrittlichen Weltzivilization schilderte, muss zugegeben werden, dass die Alliierten die Fortschrittsargumentation wirksamer für sich vereinnahmt hatten. Zum Ausgleich dieses propagandistischen Vorsprungs wäre den deutschen Eliten geboten gewesen, eine aufklärungsfreundlichere Miene vorzuzeigen. Bestimmt vermochten die Deutschen und Österreicher ihre modernisierenden und freiheitlichen Errungenschaften hervorzuheben. Es hätte gelohnt, diesen Vorzug auszuspielen, um den Deutschfeindlichen einen Strich durch die Rechnung zu machen. Mann und seine Mitkämpfer gerieten somit auf den Holzweg, als sie zum Glauben gelangten, dass die deutsche Rolle als Kulturhüter auf Entfernung von mehr als dreißig Meilen von Deutschland Anklang finden würde. Die Auseinandersetzung der Deutung von „Kultur“ und „Zivilisation“ fochten sie so in kultureller Abgeschlossenheit aus.

Auch bemerkbar sind Manns vielmalige Hinweise in den ersten sechzig Seiten auf Scheinpazifisten und auf die verachteten Kosmopoliten, die Deutschlands Geisteskräfte schwächen. Anvisiert ist vor allem Manns Bruder Heinrich, mit dem er damals zerstritten war. Anfang der Kriegsereignisse erklärte sich der linksgesinnte Heinrich für neutral, und wie der französische Romanautor Romain Rolland setzte er sich für eine Einstellung der Kriegshandlung von der Schweiz aus ein. Thomas Mann befand den „widersetzlichen“ Bruder als Fürsprecher für die Alliierten (nicht ganz grundlos). Die geringschätzenden Verweise sind nicht leicht zu kontextualisieren, ohne auf den biographischen Hintergrund Bezug zu nehmen.

Thomas Mann mit seinen Betrachtungen auf dem Holzweg: Er selbst schuf damit etwas Fremdartiges

Eine durchdringende Zwiespältigkeit zeigt auch der Text, die ebensostark auf die Befindlichkeit des Autors zurückverweist. Es bleibt im Schwanken, dass sein „Künstlerwerk“ dem deutschen Gemeinnutz dienen könnte. Mann grübelt vor sich hin, ob seine Wortkunst nicht eine unterwühlende Gabe darstellt, da sie kein wahrhaftiges Erzeugnis des „deutschen Geistes“ hergibt. Im Unterschied zu der deutschen Veranlagung zum Dichtwerk und zu musikalischen Leistungen befasst er sich mit einer „undeutschen“ Kunstform, der Schriftstellerei und erst recht mit französisch anmutenden Novellen und Romanen. Obwohl Mann deswegen nicht Abbitte tut, erscheint es (ihm vielleicht selbst zu jener Zeit), dass, was er schafft, fremdartig aussieht.

Als „Eideshelfer“, um seine patriotische Sache besser zu begründen, griff er zum Russen und Slavophil Dostojewski, der die Festigkeit und Rechtschaffenheit des deutschen Wesens pries. Angesichts dieser Hinweise wird es schwer, den Eindruck zu verfehlen, dass Mann den russischen Schriftsteller trotz seiner angegebenen Vorbehalte den Deutschen gegenüber zutiefst bewundert. Zu dem Dreigestirn von Nietzsche, Schopenhauer und Wagner, deren schöpferischer Ertrag Mann mitgeprägt hat und die er auch als Zeugen zur deutschen Größe zuzieht, kehrt er Dostojewski zum selben Zweck hervor.

Versteckte Slavo- und Frankophilie: Mann zwischen Faszination und Erschrecken über das Fremde

Es fällt ebenso in den Sinn, dass Mann von der französischen Schriftstellerei und besonders von Gustave Flaubert begeistert war. Den allerzwingendesten Beweis ergibt der lange Passus im Zauberberg, in welchem Mann die Zärtlichkeiten des Hans Castorp seiner Geliebten gegenüber en français zum Ausdruck bringt. Mann machte daraus keinen Hehl, dass er den französischen Autoren bis zum Gebrauch ihrer eigenartigen französischen Ausdrucksform Ehre zollte. Hinzu kommt, dass der Gro?teil der Betrachtungen das deutschpatriotische Leitmotiv nebensächlich berühren. Sie behandeln wahlweise das europäische Literatentum oder Manns’ Eigenschriften.

Die aufsehenerregendsten Seiten sind die ungefähr ersten dreißig, in denen Mann aus allen Rohren feuernd das Deutschtum gegen die Westernisierung hochhält. Der Verfasser hält sich für „unpolitisch“, indem er die Politisierung mit dem Aufmarsch des Kosmopolitanismus gleichsetzt. Im Gegensatz zu seinen deutschfeindlichen Gegnern verrät er keineswegs einen unweigerlich „politisierten Geist“. Er beschützt sein Vaterland nicht lediglich als Mittel, um eine demokratische „Weltbekehrung“ zu vervollständigen, sondern weil sie von außen bedroht ist.

Der Pazifismus der gesinnungsethischen Literaten

Zeitrelevanter ist die von Mann getroffene Unterscheidung von „Gesinnungsmilitarismus“ und „Zweckmilitarismus“. In Abgrenzung zu dem preußischen Dienstadel mit ihrer miltärstolzen Gesittung schlagen die bewaffneten Advokaten der Zivilisationsdemokratie empört auf ihre ideologischen Gegner los. Sie stürmen mit einfallenden Armeen nicht bloß, um den Feind zurückzustoßen, sondern gegen das Böse eine Weltmission durchzuführen: „Wir beobachten da eine Art von Irrationalismus, der in Wahrheit ein vergeistigter Rationalismus ist und darin besteht, dass man den Krieg für ein Gottesgericht erklärt.“ Die Zivilisationsliteraten, die für diese bevorzugte Kriegsart eintreten, sind keineswegs gegen das Vergießen des Blutes: Diese „Menschenliebe ist nicht blutscheu; so gut wie das literarische Wort gehört die Guillotine zu ihren Werkzeugen.“

Ebensowenig sind die erklärten Pazifisten in Deutschland grundsätzlich gegen die Gewalt: „Sein Verhältnis zu diesem Krieg schwankt zwischen humanitärem Abscheu und größter Bewunderung für die soldatischen Leistungen der Feinde.“ Umso kriegslustiger ist der Scheinpazifist, der der mit Deutschland im Widerstreit stehenden Seite beitrat. „Er ist entzückt von den Leistungen der Zivilisationsmächte, er bewundert ihr Kriegsgerät, ihre Stahlplatten, Betongräbern, Fliegerpfeile, Erkrasit- und Stickgasbomben, ohne sich zu fragen,wie sich das alles mit Edelschwäche verträgt, und während er dieselben Dinge auf der deutschen Seite ekelerregend findet. Eine französische Kanone scheint ihm verehrungswürdig, eine deutsche verbrecherisch, abstoßend und idiotisch.“ Wie die Entente-Minister und -Journalisten fühlt sich der antideutsche Gemütsdemokrat nicht bemüßigt zu fragen, warum die andere Seite „gerüstet, glänzend gerüstet“ sei, wenn er uns vormachen will, dass es nur die Deutschen sind, die mit ihrer soldatischen Überlieferung über Heerscharen und Kriegsmittel verfügen.

Der Krieg für die gute Sache, der auch heute noch geführt wird

Mann ging mit den Fahnenträgern des demokratischen Internationalismus ins Gericht, ehe die amerikanische Regierung das „Junkertum“ zu bekriegen anfing. Mann rückte das Scheinwerferlicht auf das Jakobinertum und die Freimauererei, denen der französischen Feind und seine ausländischen Schwärmer verschrieben seien. In seiner Schilderung weist er jedoch über das Nahziel hinaus und trifft die heutzutage allgegenwärtige menschenrechtliche Ideologie. Beim Kriegsausbruch musste es einem Unbefangenen dämmern, dass beide Seiten ihr Scherflein beitrugen, um die Lawine loszutreten. Jedoch deutete Mann auf ein Novum hin, als er eine Art Militarismus umschrieb, der mit traditonsverbundenen Gesellschaften nichts zu tun hat. Vielmehr haftet diese Haltung spätmodernen, ausgesprochen demokratischen Ländern an, die der ganzen Welt ihre menschenfreudige Gesinnung zurschaustellen wollen.

Im Vergleich mit den alten Monarchien steht das Neumodell im Aufwind. Von den geschlagenen Mittelmächten sich abhebend, gaben sich die siegreichen Demokraten als Humanisten aus, die im Zeichen einer weltweiten Friedensmission gekämpft haben. Aus ihrem Schlag stammen die Wilsonianer und noch zeitgeistiger die Neokonservativen, die militärische Einsätze verkünden, um wesensfremde Gesellschaften zu „vermenschlichen“. Mann erhob die Fragen, warum die Humanisten der Friedsamkeit wohlgerüstet auftreten und warum der vermutlich allerletzte Kampf für die demokratische Ruhe zu immer verbisseneren Kriegsaktionen hinüberführt. Und natürlich werden die Literaten aufgebracht, wenn versucht wird, die Stellung der Antidemokraten klarzukriegen. Man wittert bei solchen Klarmachungen den Hauch einer schandhaften Aufrechnung. Die wehrhaften Demokraten gereuen sich keineswegs, dass ein Bombenkrieg im Zweiten Weltkrieg gegen Zivilisten geführt wurde. Blutige Ungeheurlichkeiten sind hinzunehmen, wenn eine demokratische Weltverwandlung den Kämpfern vorschwebt. Thomas Mann traf in seinen (später von ihm bedauerten und zurückgezogenen) Betrachtungen den Nagel auf den Kopf, als er die harte Anwendung von Zwangsmitteln kurz- und mittelfristig als die zweckmilitäristischen Kosten darstellt, die eine friedlich-demokratische Weltordnung zustande bringen sollten.

mardi, 05 avril 2011

Carl Schmitt, the Inquisition, and Totalitarianism

Carl Schmitt, the Inquisition, and Totalitarianism


Ex: http://www.esoteric.msu.edu/

The work of Carl Schmitt, on its face, presents us with enigmas; it is esoteric, arcane, words that recur both in scholarship about Schmitt and in his own writings.  Jan-Wenner Müller observes that Schmitt “employed what has been called a kind of philosophical ‘double talk,’ shifting the meaning of concepts central to his theory and scattering allusions and false leads throughout his work.”[1]  And Müller goes on to remark about Heinrich Meier’s work on Schmitt that ultimately Meier too “lapsed into the kind of double talk, allusiveness, and high-minded esoteric tone so typical of Strauss and, to a lesser extent, Schmitt.”[2]  Indeed, Schmitt himself writes, in The Leviathan in the State Theory of Thomas Hobbes that “like all great thinkers of his times, Hobbes had a taste for esoteric cover-ups.  He said about himself that now and then he made ‘overtures,’ but that he revealed his thoughts only in part and that he acted as people do who open a window only for a moment and closely it quickly for fear of a storm.”[3]  This passage could certainly be applied to Schmitt himself, whose work both makes direct reference to Western esoteric traditions, and itself has esoteric dimensions.  These esoteric allusions and dimensions of Schmitt’s thought are, in fact, vitally important to understanding his work, but the question remains: what place do they have in it?




Carl Schmitt and Early Modern Western Esotericism

   Much has been made of the exoteric-esoteric distinction in the thought of Leo Strauss.  Some authors suggested that a Straussian esotericism guided the neonconservative cabal within the Bush II administration, after all a secretive group that disdained public opinion and that was convinced of its own invincible rectitude even in the face of facts.[4] It is true that Strauss himself distinguished between an esoteric and an exoteric political philosophy.   In perhaps his most open statement, Strauss writes, coyly, of how “Farabi’s Plato eventually replaces the philosopher-king who rules openly in the virtuous city, by the secret kingship of the philosopher who, being a ‘perfect man,’ precisely because he is an ‘investigator,’ lives privately as a member of an imperfect society which he tries to humanize within the limits of the possible.”[5]  Strauss’s “secret kingship of the philosopher” is, by its nature, esoteric; as in Schmitt’s, there is in Strauss’s work a sense of the implicit superiority of the esoteric political philosopher.

    But in fact those who are searching for esotericism have much more to find in the work of Schmitt, not least because Schmitt’s references to classical Western esotericism are quite explicit.  Schmitt refers directly to Kabbalism and to Rosicrucianism, to Freemasonry, and, most importantly for our purposes, to Gnosticism.  It is quite important, if one is to better understand Schmitt, to investigate the meanings of these explicitly esoteric references in his work.  While there are allusions to such classical Western esoteric currents as Jewish Kabbalah, Rosicrucianism, and Freemasonry scattered throughout Schmitt’s writings, those references are concentrated in Schmitt’s 1938 The Leviathan in the State Theory of Thomas Hobbes.  There are a number of reasons why Western esoteric currents should form a locus in this particular work, among them the fact that many of these traditions (notably, Rosicrucianism, Freemasonry, and Christian theosophy) emerged precisely in the early modern period of Hobbes himself and so correctly, as Schmitt recognized, represent historical context as well as contribute to Schmitt’s larger argument.

   But what is Schmitt’s larger argument regarding these esoteric currents?  There is little to indicate, at first glance, that Schmitt is derogating these esoteric currents—even the references to the Kabbalistic interpretation of leviathan, which come on the wake of Schmitt’s notorious 1936 conference on Judaism and jurisprudence, are not immediately recognizable as anti-semitic.  Schmitt’s own overview of his argument is instructive.  He summarizes the first chapter as covering the “Christian-theological and Jewish-cabbalistic interpretations” of the symbol of leviathan, and “the possibilities of a restoration of the symbol by Hobbes.”[6]  A restoration indicates a prior fall: this is our first clue.  Schmitt’s treatise on Hobbesian state theory is also an occasion for Schmitt’s diagnosis of modernity as socio-political decline, and in this decline, (in Schmitt’s view), esoteric currents played a part.  Hence he references the seminal twentieth-century French esoterist René Guénon’s La Crise du monde moderne (1927), and specifically Guénon’s observation that the collapse of medieval civilization into early modernity by the seventeenth century could not have happened without hidden forces operating in the background.[7]

   Both Schmitt and Guénon came from a Catholic background and perspective—and Guénon’s broader thesis was that the advent of early modernity represented one stage in a much larger tableau of decline in which modernity (representing the kali yuga or final age) would conclude in the appearance of the Antichrist and the end of the world.  In this Guénonian tableau of decline, the emergence of individualistic Protestantism represented an important step downward from the earlier corporate unity of Catholicism, and a similar perspective inheres in Schmitt’s work, no doubt why he alludes to Guénon in the first place.  Hence, in the important Chapter V of Leviathan, Schmitt refers to the “separation of inner from outer and public from private” that emerged during the early modern period, and in particular to “secret societies and secret orders, Rosicrucians, freemasons, illuminates, mystics and pietists, all kinds of sectarians, the many ‘silent ones in the land,’ and above all, the restless spirit of the Jew who knew how to exploit the situation best until the relation of public and private, deportment and disposition was turned upside down.”[8]

   At this point, we can see Schmitt’s perspective is implicitly critical of the subjectification and inward or contemplative turn characteristic of those who travel “the secret road” “that leads inward.”  He opposes the split between private spiritual life and public life, which Schmitt associates with Judaism as well as with Protestantism and the profusion of esoteric groups during this period—and by implication, affirms a unified, corporate inner and outer life that is characteristic of Catholicism.  Schmitt remarks that “as differently constituted as were the Masonic lodges, conventicles, synagogues, and literary circles, as far as their political attitudes were concerned, they all displayed by the eighteenth century their enmity toward the leviathan elevated to a symbol of state.”[9]  He sees Protestantism and the variety of esoteric groups or currents during the early modern period as symptomatic—like Guénon, he sees the emergence of modernity as a narrative of cultural disintegration. 

   Like Hobbes himself, Schmitt is pessimistic about the human condition.  Still, in Schmitt’s view, Hobbes was not proposing that human beings flee from the state of nature into a monstrous state leviathan, but rather was arguing for total state power only insofar as it guaranteed protection and security.  Hence, Schmitt writes, one’s obedience to the state is payment for protection, and when protection ceases, so too does the obligation to obey.[10]  The leviathan serves to diagnose the artificial, gigantic mechanism of the modern state, and to symbolize that state as an intermediate stage that can restrain or postpone the larger decline that modernity represents.  In Leviathan, Schmitt isn’t extolling the leviathan state or totalism, but rather coyly stops short—even though it is clear that he seeks a political alternative to the split between inner and outer life represented by the inward turn of esoteric groups and individuals, and by the subjectification represented by Romanticism during the early modern period. Schmitt belongs to the world of jurisprudence, to the realm of weighing and deciding, and one can see this in his treatment of esoteric groups, in which he acknowledges their differences—but he clearly has ‘placed’ them in his larger narrative as indicative of the fragmentation represented by modernity.

   It becomes clearer, then, how Schmitt could have seen in National Socialism a secular alternative to modernity.  Fascism represented for him, at least potentially, the re-unification of inner and outer life, a kind of modern re-unification of the mythic and spiritual with the outer public life.  It at first seemed to conform to the Hobbesian notion that in exchange for obedience, one receives protection from the state; it represented a new form of corporatism as an alternative to the socio-political disintegration represented by parliamentary democracy in the Weimar era; and it even offered an apparent unity of esoteric and exoteric through its use of symbolism and mythology in the service of the state.  But to the extent that he allied with the Nazis, Schmitt was consciously siding with the Inquisitors, and with totalistic state power.  In retrospect and by comparison, perhaps the “secret road” inward as represented by eighteenth-century esotericism was not quite so bad as all that.  Yet to understand more completely Schmitt in relation to the esoteric, we must turn to a subject he treats somewhat more explicitly: Gnosticism.

 Carl Schmitt and Gnosticism

   Schmitt writes that oppositions between friend and enemy are “of a spiritual sort, as is all man’s existence.”[11]  In Politische Theologie II, he writes that Tertullian is the prototype of the theological possibilities of specific judicial thinking, and refers to him as the “jurist Tertullian.”[12]  Heinrich Meier discusses Schmitt’s indebtedness to Tertullian and in fact remarks that “Tertullian’s guiding principle We are obliged to something not because it is good but because God commands it accompanies Schmitt through all the turns and vicissitudes of his long life.”[13]  What is it about Tertullian that Schmitt found so fascinating that he returned to his work again and again?  Divine authority as presented by Tertullian divides men: obedience to divine authority divides the orthodox from the heretics, the “friends of God” from the “enemies of God,” and the political theologian from the secular philosopher.  Here we are reminded of perhaps Tertullian’s most famous outcry: “What then does Athens have to do with Jerusalem?  What does the Academy have to do with the Church?  What do the heretics have to do with Christians?”[14]  Tertullian was, of course, a fierce enemy of Gnosticism, and his works, especially De praescriptione haereticorum, belong to the genre of heresiophobic literature. 

   Now with Tertullian’s antignosticism in mind, we should turn to the afterword of Schmitt’s Politische Theologie II, in which “gnostische Dualismus” figures prominently.  There, Schmitt remarks that Gnostic dualism places a God of Love, strange to this world, in opposition to the lord and creator of this evil world, the two conflicting in a kind of “cold war.”[15]  This he compares to the Latin motto noted by Goethe in Dichtung und Wahrheit, “nemo contra deum nisi deus ipse”—only a god can oppose a god.[16]  With these references, Schmitt is alluding to the Gnostic dualism attributed to the Gnostic Marcion, who reputedly posited two Gods, one a true hidden God, the other an ignorant creator God. 

  What is important here, for our purposes, is the underlying theme of heresy and orthodoxy.  As is well-known, for Schmitt, especially from Der Begriff des Politischen onward, the political world is defined in terms of the well-known Schmittean distinction between friend and foe.  But not so often remarked is that this friend-foe distinction can be traced directly back to the anti-heresiology of Tertullian.  Tertullian devoted a considerable number of pages to the refutation of Marcion in five books, and in particular attacked what he perceived as Marcionitic docetism.  In “Against the Valentinians,” Tertullian attacked “certain heretics who denied the reality of Christ’s flesh,” first among these heretics being, again, Marcion.[17]  For Tertullian, historicity is paramount: the docetic view that Christ did not come in the flesh but belongs to another world—this is unbearable to him.  Tertullian devotes hundreds of pages to detailing and attacking the works of those he designates heretical, and (perhaps ironically, given Tertullian’s venomous diatribes) compares them to scorpions full of venom.

   So virulent is Tertullian in his hatred of those he perceives as heretics that he goes so far as to imagine that “There will need to be carried on in heaven persecution [of Christians] even, which is the occasion of confession or denial.”[18]  Here we begin to see the dynamic that impels Tertullian’s hatred of those he designates as heretical.  On the one hand, Tertullian belongs in the context of Roman persecution of Christians as a whole—but on the other hand, he in turn carries on an intellectual persecution of heretics whom he sees as scorpions, that is, as vermin.[19]  Thus we see Tertullian’s perception of himself as defender of the historicist orthodox, the strength of whose identity comes on the one hand, from affirmation of faith in the historical Christ against the Romans, on the other hand, from rejection of the Gnostics who seek to transcend history and who affirm, for example, a docetic Christ.  Tertullian’s very identity exists by definition through negation—he requires the persecution of “heretics.”  Tertullian is the veritable incarnation of a friend/enemy dynamic, and he exists and defines himself entirely through such a dynamic.  We can even go further, and suggest that the background of persecution by the Romans in turn inevitably impels the persecuted historicist Christians to themselves become persecutors of those whom they deem heretics—a dynamic that continues throughout the subsequent history of Christianity (from the medieval condemnation of Eckhart right through the various forms of early modern and modern anti-mysticism within Protestant and Catholic Christianity alike).[20]  Tertullian, for all his fulminations against what he imagines as Gnostic dualism, is in fact himself the ultimate dualist [or duelist].  He cannot exist without historical enemies, without persecutors and without those whom he can persecute in his turn.

   Thus we begin to see the reasons for Schmitt’s endorsement of Tertullian as the paradigmatic jurist theologian and political theologian.  For Tertullian, Christ’s historicity is paramount—exactly as is the case with Schmitt himself.  In Nomos of the Earth, Schmitt proposes the historical importance within Christianity of the concept of the katechon, or “restrainer” that makes possible Christian empires whose center was Rome, and that “meant the historical power to restrain the appearance of the Antichrist and the end of the present eon.”[21] The concept of the katechon is derived from an obscure Pauline verse: II Thessalonians 2.6-7, “And you know what is restraining him now so that he may be revealed in his time.  For the mystery of lawlessness is already at work; only he who now restrains it will do so until he is out of the way.”  This passage is in the larger context of a Pauline warning against the “activity of Satan” among those who are “sent” a “strong delusion” by God himself [!] “so that all may be condemned who did not believe the truth (II.2.11).”  The katechon represents, for Schmitt, an “historical concept” of “potent historical power” that preserves the “tremendous historical monolith” of a Christian empire because it “holds back” nothing less than the eschatological end of history.[22] The Pauline context in Thessalonians can be read to support institutional Christianity as a prosecutorial power. In any case, the katechon makes intellectually possible (in Schmitt’s view) the emergence of the Christian empire oriented toward Rome and itself now a juridical, prosecutorial or persecutorial imperial power within history. 

   Now I am not arguing that Schmitt’s work—and in particular his emphasis on the role of antagonism and hostility as defining politics, nor his emphasis on historicity—derives only from Tertullian.  Rather, I hold that Schmitt refers to Tertullian because he finds in him a kindred spirit, and what is more, that there really is a continuity between Schmitt’s thought and the anti-heretical writings of Tertullian.  Both figures require enemies.  Schmitt goes so far as to write, in The Concept of the Political, that without the friend-enemy distinction “political life would vanish altogether.”[23]  And in the afterword to Political Theology II, Schmitt—in the very passages in which he refers to Gnosticism and in particular to dualism—ridicules modern “detheologization” [Die Enttheologisierung] and “depoliticization” [Die Entpolitisierung] characteristic of a liberal modernity based upon production, consumption, and technology.  What Schmitt despises about depoliticizing or detheologizing is the elimination of conflict and the loss thereby of the agonistic dimension of life without which, just as Tertullian wrote, the juridical trial  and judging of humanity cannot take place.  Tertullian so insists upon the primacy of persecution/prosecution that he projects it even into heaven itself.  Schmitt restrains himself to the worldly stage, but he too insists upon conflict as the basis of the political and of history; and both are at heart dualists.

   Why, after all, was Schmitt so insistent upon what he called “political theology”?  In the very term, there is a uneasy conjunction of the worldly sphere of politics with what usually would be construed as the otherworldly sphere of theology.  But Tertullian represents the forced convergence of these two spheres—in some central respects, Tertullian symbolizes the point at which Christianity shifted from the persecuted by Rome to the persecutor from Rome, the shift from Christ’s saying that His Kingdom is not of this world, to the assertion of Christendom as a political-theological entity and of the possibility of Christian empire—that is, of the compression together and perhaps even the merger of politics and theology.  This forced convergence of politics and theology could not take place without the absolute insistence upon an historical Christ and on the paramount importance of the horizontal, that is, of history itself (as opposed to and indeed, founded on the explicit rejection of the transcendence of history or of the vertical dimensions represented by gnosis).

   The work of Schmitt belongs to the horizontal realm of dualistic antagonism that requires the antinomies of friends and enemies and perpetual combat.  Schmitt is a political and later geopolitical theorist whose political theology represents, not an opening into the transcendence of antagonism, but rather an insistence upon antagonism and combat as the foundation of politics that reflects Tertullian’s emphasis on antagonism toward heretics as the foundation of theology.  When Schmitt writes, in The Concept of the Political, that “a theologian ceases to be a theologian when he . . . no longer distinguishes between the chosen and the nonchosen,” we begin to see how deeply engrained is his fundamental dualism.[24]  This dualism is bound up with Schmitt’s insistence upon “the fundamental theological dogma of the evilness of the world and man” and his adamant rejection of those who deny original sin, i.e., “numerous sects, heretics, romantics, and anarchists.”[25]  Thus “the high points of politics are simultaneously the moments in which the enemy is, in concrete clarity, recognized as the enemy.”[26]  The enemy, here, just as in Tertullian’s work, is those deemed to be heretical.

   Here we should recognize a certain irony.  Tertullian, we will recall, railed against the Gnostics because they supposedly were dualists and because some of them reputedly held that humanity was deluded and that the world was evil.[27]  Yet much of mainstream Christianity, like Tertullian himself, itself came to espouse a fierce dualism and an insistence on the evil nature of humanity and of the world.  Even when it is clear, as in the case of Valentinus, that his thought includes the transcendence of dualism, Tertullian cannot bring himself to recognize this transcendence because his mind works on the level of the juridical only—he is compelled to attack; indeed, his entire worldview is constructed around those whom he rejects, ridicules, refuses to recognize as in any way legitimate—around those whom he sees as his enemies.  And this fierce dualism, this need for that which is construed as heretical, as the enemy, is exactly what Schmitt’s work also reflects. 

   As perhaps Tertullian once did, Schmitt too came up against the command of Christ to “love your enemies” (Matt. 5.44; Luke 6.27).  His interpretation of it is befitting a wily attorney—he takes it only on a personal level.  “No mention is made of the political enemy,” Schmitt writes.  “Never in the thousand-year struggle between Christians and Moslems did it occur to a Christian to surrender rather than to defend Europe,” he continues, and the commandment of Christ in his view “certainly does not mean that one should love and support the enemies of one’s own people.”[28]  Thus, Christ can be interpreted as accepting political antagonism and even war—while forgiving one’s personal enemies along the way.  Schmitt conveniently overlooks the fact that nowhere in the New Testament can Christ be construed as endorsing, say, political war against Rome—His Kingdom is not of this world.  Is it really so easy to dismiss the power of the injunction to love one’s enemies?

   There is more.  For Schmitt’s distinction between the personal and the political here makes possible what his concept of the katechon also does: Christian empire.  Here we see the exact point at which the Christian message can be seen to shift from the world-transmuting one of forgiving one’s enemies to the worldly one that leads inexorably toward the very imperial authority and power against which Christ himself stood as an alternative exemplar.  “My Kingdom is not of this world,” Christ said.  But somehow a shift took place, and suddenly Christ was being made to say that his kingdom is of this world, that rather than forgiving one’s enemies, one should implacably war against them.  Thus we have the emergence of Christian empire.  But the collapse of feudalism and of the medieval polis, and the emergence of modernity ultimately meant the de-politicization of the world—the absence of enemies, of heretics, of those against whom others can define themselves—none other than the cultural vacuum represented by technological-consumerist modern society.



   And so we again reach the argument that I began to suggest in “Voegelin’s Antignosticism and the Origins of Totalitarianism,” but from a very different angle.  There, I argued that rather than attempting (like Voegelin and his acolytes) to blame the victims—the Gnostics and ‘heretics’—for the advent of modernity and for totalitarianism, it might be more reasonable to take a closer look at the phenomenon of the Inquisition and of historicist Christianity (particularly millennialist Christianity) for the origins of modern secular chiliasm.  After all, it wasn’t the heretics or the Gnostics who burned people at the stake, or created institutional torture chambers, or who slaughtered the Albigensians.  Rather, it was the institutional church that did this. Our analysis of Schmitt’s work has brought us, unexpectedly, back to the same general terrain.

   It is worth remarking, however unpleasant it might be to admit it, that as Mao or Pol Pot did when their policies meant the deaths of millions, so too the Church itself did when it burned at the stake the great mystic Marguerite Porete, or the brilliant author Giordano Bruno and many others for heresy—all of these institutional murderers believed at least in part that they killed people for their own good, or at least, for the better good, and in order to realize some better state upon earth in the near future.  How is it that the medieval Church was so unwilling to allow the Albigensians their freedom and their own traditions?  Why was it so impossible to regard them as Christian brethren and not as enemies to be slaughtered?  By slaughtering those deemed heretics, one hastens the historical millennium of Christ’s kingdom upon earth, or so the logic goes.  Secular chiliasm in the technological modern world like that analyzed by Pellicani is only a more extensive and brutal form of the same phenomenon, whose origins are to be found in historicist Christianity, not among those victims of it that were deemed heretical.[29]

   Schmitt’s work belongs to the juridical tradition of Tertullian and he inherits Tertullian’s need for enemies, for heretics by which one can define oneself.  Thus it was not too difficult for Schmitt to organize the 1936 conference to weigh the “problem” of “the Jews”—he was predisposed toward the division of “us” and “them” by the triumphant Western historicist Christian tradition that peremptorily and with the persistence of two thousand years, rejected “heretics” who espoused gnosis and, all too frequently, rejected even the possibility of transcending dualism.  Indeed, Schmitt’s work allows us to see more clearly the historical current that was operative in National Socialism as well as in Mussolini’s Fascist party—and that brought Schmitt to open his 1936 conference remarks with the words of Hitler: “In that I defend myself against the Jews, I struggle to do the work of the Lord.”[30]  The murder of heretics has a theological origin; the murder of secular opponents has a political origin—but often the two are not so far apart, and so one could even speak of political theology in which to be the enemy is to be de facto heretical. 

   Thus, after the “Night of the Long Knives” and after Goebbels and Himmler carried out the murder of various dissidents, Schmitt published an article defending the right of the Third Reich and its leader to administer peremptory justice—and, in an interview published in the party newspaper Der Angriff,  defending none other than the Inquisition as a model of jurisprudence.[31]  Schmitt argued there that when Pope Innocent III created the juridical basis for the Inquisition, the Church inaugurated perhaps the “most humane institution conceivable” because it required a confession.  Of course, he goes on, the subsequent advent of confessions extracted by torture was unfortunate, but in terms of legal history, he thought the Inquisition a fine model of humane justice.  He managed to overlook the fact that the “crimes,” both in the case of the Inquisition and in the case of National Socialism in mid-1930s Germany, were primarily “crimes” of dissidence.

   Here we begin to consider the larger question of ideocracy as characteristic of modernity.  Ideocracy has nothing to do with Gnosticism or gnosis—but it might well have something to do with those who require enemies in order to define themselves, and with those who are willing to torture and slaughter in the name of some forthcoming imagined religious or secular millennium.  It is rigid ideocracy we see at work in the unreadable pronouncements of Communist China defending their occupation of Tibet and the insanity of the Cultural Revolution; it is rigid ideocracy at work in the pronouncements of Stalinist Russia, behind which millions upon millions lie dead.  Secular millennialism requires a rigid historicism—faith in history is necessary, a belief that one can remake this world and human society into a new historical model, even if the price is murder and torture.  Schmitt was a subtle thinker and very learned, no question of that.  His work offers us insights into the nature of modernity, into geopolitics, and into politics as combat.  But his work also, unexpectedly, throws light on the intellectual origins of modern ideocracies in early and medieval historicist, anti-heresiological Christianity.


[1] See Jan-Werner Müller, A Dangerous Mind: Carl Schmitt in Post-War European Thought, (New Haven: Yale UP, 2003), p. 7

[2] Ibid., p. 205

[3] See Carl Schmitt, G. Schwab, trs.,  The Leviathan in the State Theory of Thomas Hobbes, (Westport: Greenwood, 1996), p. 26.

[4] See Hugh Urban, “Religion and Secrecy in the Bush Administration: The Gentleman, the Prince, and the Simulacrum,” in Esoterica VII(2005): 1-38.

[5] See Leo Strauss, Persecution and the Art of Writing, (Chicago: U. of Chicago P., 1952), p. 17; Leo Strauss, “Farabi’s Plato,” Louis Ginzberg Jubilee Volume, New York: American Academy for Jewish Research, 1945), pp. 357-393, p. 384.

[6] Schmitt, Leviathan, op. cit., p. 3.

[7] Ibid., p. 29.

[8] Ibid., p. 60.

[9] Ibid., p. 62.

[10] Ibid., pp. 96-97.

[11] See Heinrich Meier, Carl Schmitt and Leo Strauss: The Hidden Dialogue, (Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1995), p. 59, citing The Concept of the Political  (1933 ed.) III.9.

[12] See Schmitt, Politische Theologie II, (Berlin: Duncker und Humblot, 1970), p. 103, to wit: “Für eine Besinnung auf die theologischen Möglichkeiten spezifisch justischen Denkens ist Tertullian der Prototyp.”

[13] Heinrich Meier, The Lesson of Carl Schmitt, (Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1998), p. 92.

[14] See Meier, op. cit., p. 94, citing Tertullian, De praescriptione haereticorum, VII. 9-13: “Quid ergo Athenis et Hierosolymis?  Quid academiae et ecclesiae?  Quid haereticis et Christianis?”

[15] Schmitt, PTII, op. cit., p. 120: “Der gnostische Dualismus setzt einen Gott der Liebe, einen welt-fremden Gott, als den Erlöser-Gott gegen den gerechten Gott, den Herrn und Schöpfer dieser bösen Welt. . . [einer Art gefährlichen Kalten Krieges]”.

[16] Ibid., p. 122. 

[17] See A. Roberts and J. Donaldson, eds., Ante-Nicene Fathers, (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1989), III.521.

[18] Ibid., III. 643.

[19] See Tertullian’s treatise “Scorpiace,” op. cit., III.633-648.

[20] Here we might remark that Western forms of Christianity are strikingly different in this respect from those in the Eastern Church, where mysticism remained (however uneasily at times) incorporated into orthodoxy itself and not imagined as inherently inimical to orthodoxy.

[21] See Carl Schmitt, The Nomos of the Earth in the International Law of the Jus Publicum Europaeum, G.L. Ulmen, trs., (New York: Telos, 2003), pp. 59-60.

[22] Ibid., p. 60.

[23] Carl Schmitt, G. Schwab, trs., The Concept of the Political, (New Brunswick: Rutgers, 1976), p. 51.

[24] Ibid., p. 64.

[25] Ibid., p. 65.

[26] Ibid., p. 67.

[27] I write “supposedly” dualist and “reputedly” held the world to be evil because these accusations, repeated by Tertullian and several other ante-Nicene Fathers, are hardly borne out as characteristics of all the works we see in the Nag Hammadi library, the collection of actual Gnostic writings discovered in 1945. 

[28] Ibid., p. 29.

[29] See Luciano Pellicani, Revolutionary Apocalypse: Ideological Roots of Terrorism, (Westport: Praeger, 2003), pp. xi. I wholeheartedly agree with Pellicani’s basic thesis that “The expansion on a planetary scale of a new form of chiliasm that substituted transcendence with absolute immanence and paradise with a classless and stateless society is the most extraordinary and shattering historical-cultural phenomenon of the secular age.” But this “new form of chiliasm” has nothing whatever to do with Gnosticism as an actual historical phenomenon.  One cannot find a single instance in late antiquity among the Gnostics themselves for such a phenomenon—but if one were to refer instead to “the destructive calling of modern pseudo­-gnostic revolution” that seeks to “purify the existing through a policy of mass terror and annihilation,” Pellicani’s thesis would no longer be quite as subject to the criticism of an anachronistic misuse of terms.  Later in the book, Pellicani discusses the cases of the Pol Pot regime and of Communist China—both of which illustrate his larger thesis well.  But neither of these have anything whatever to do with the phenomenon of Gnosticism in any historically meaningful sense. Even Voegelin himself expressed doubts about attempting to apply “Gnosticism” to the case of Communist Russia—let alone to Cambodia!  Such cases could be construed to illustrate a uniquely modern pseudo-gnosticism—though one could with more accuracy dispense entirely with the dubious references to “Gnosticism” and simply refer to secular millennialism.

[30] See Carl Schmitt, “Das Judentum in der deutschen Rechtswissenschaft,” in “Die deutsche Rechtswissenschaft im Kampf gegen den jüdischen Geist,” in Deutsche Juristen-Zeitung, 41(15 Oct. 1936)20:1193-1199, cited in Gopal  Balakrishnan, The Enemy: An Intellectual Portrait of Carl Schmitt, (London: Verso, 2000), p. 206.

[31] See “Können wir uns vor Justizirrtum schützen?” Der Angriff, 1 Sept. 1936, cited in Andreas Koenen, Der Fall Carl Schmitt, (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche, 1995), p. 703; see also Balakrishnan, op. cit., pp. 202-203.

lundi, 21 mars 2011

Hans-Joachim Schoeps und die Restauration der Monarchie: Über die Unterschätzung des liberal-demokratischen Nihilismus


Hans-Joachim Schoeps und die Restauration der Monarchie: Über die Unterschätzung des liberal-demokratischen Nihilismus

Geschrieben von: Prof. Dr. Paul Gottfried (Gastautor)   


Ex: http://www.blauenarzisse.de/


Hans-Joachim SchoepsEinem Monarchisten jüdischen Glaubens, Hans-Joachim Schoeps (1909-1980), fühle ich mich schon längst schicksalsgemeinschaftlich zugetan. Als seine preußischen Vorfahren, der Hohenzollern-Hausmacht huldigend, im Ersten Weltkrieg zu Felde zogen, meldete sich zeitgleich mein öesterreichisch-jüdischer Onkel zum Kriegsdienst. Auch als Greis mit steigender Hinfälligkeit schlug sich Schoeps gegen Deutschhasser jeder Couleur und vor allem gegen die Verächter des preußischen Erbguts. Außerdem trat er mutig der Beschimpfung entgegen, dass er gegen die von den Alliierten installierte Demokratie als „jüdischer Nazi“ antrat.

Während der Lektüre von Frank-Lothar Krolls Monographie über Schoeps’ Leben und Wirken, Hans-Joachim Schoeps und Preußen (2010), wurde ich angespitzt, über bestimmte Anklagen gegen den philosophierenden Historiker nachzudenken. Das Grübeln wurde durch eine Unterhaltung mit meinem Sohn veranlasst, nachdem er Schoeps’ Preußen. Geschichte eines Staates (1965) mit Gewinn las. Es fiel meinem Sohn auf, wie unerwartet ausgereift und unbefangen die darin befindlichen Geschichtsurteile sind. Schoeps scheint keineswegs von dem letzten Kaiser geblendet zu sein und er befindet etwa die deutsche Vereinigung unter Bismarck als einen Fehltritt, der der Entgrenzung der schon geregelten internationalen Beziehungen in Mitteleuropa Tür und Tor öffnete.

Falsche Fährte: Schoeps sieht das Aufgehen Preußens im Deutschen Kaiserreich kritisch

Des weiteren bekrittelte er die „Verausgabung“ der aufgespeicherten preußischen Kraftquellen, die das Zustandebringen des Deutschen Reiches ermöglichte. Besser wäre es für die jenseits der Elbe gesiedelten Deutschen ausgefallen, wenn Preußen nie in Deutschland aufgegangen wäre. Schoeps beruft sich auf die Vorfechter einer älteren, gutsherrlichen und christlich gebundenen, deutschen Tradition, die in Preußen auf dem Lande Wurzeln schlugen und in dieser Biosphäre langjährig gediehen ist. Diesem „anderen Preußen“ widmete er 1951 ein Werk, worin er hervorragende „konservative Gestalten“ im Zeitalter Friedrich Wilhelm IV. herausstellt und als Vorbilder der politischen Ehre hochhält. In dieselbe Kerbe schlägt er in seinen eingehenden Schilderungen von Ernst und Ludwig von Gerlach, die altkonservativen Gegner, die sich mit Bismarck zerstritten haben. Diese von Schoeps verehrten Ritterfiguren lehnten das Vereinigungsringen der Kleindeutschen und des Eisernen Kanzlers glattwegs ab. Wenn man einen Deutschnationalisten in Schoeps Preußengeschichte sucht, dann sitzt man also bestimmt auf dem falschen Dämpfer.

Trotzdem haftet ihm dauernd die Belastung an, dass nach Hitlers Machtantritt er und seine Mitkämpfer in dem rechtsgestellten deutschjüdischen Verein Vortrupp. Gefolgschaft Deutscher Juden für das hinaufziehende Dritte Reich eintraten. Wie der Chemnitzer Historiker Kroll stichhaltig beweist, gibt es gar keine Begründung für diese breitgetretene Schimpferei. Außer einer allgemeinen Versicherung seitens des Vereins, dass ihre Mitglieder dem deutschen Vaterland festgebunden blieben, erschliesst sich in seinem Bekenntnis zum Deutschtum kein Grund, warum damit zugleich Hitlers Machtstellung bejubelt worden wäre.

Positionen intellektueller Juden im Schicksalsjahr 1933

Etliche deutsche Zionisten, allen voran Joachim Prinz, der in die USA auswanderte, haben die Nazis eingangs schwärmend begrüsst. Diese jüdischnationalen Gegner der Assimilierung erhofften sich, dass ihre Stammesgenossen durch die Nazis in dem Maß ausgegrenzt worden wären, dass sie samt und sonders nach Palästina aufbrechen würden. Nach seiner Emigration firmierte Prinz als dezidiert „antifaschistisch“ und in den 1960ern wurde er dann zu einem Linksaktivisten, der gegen die bis dahin gewohnte Betensverrichtungen in den Staatsschulen mit besonderem Nachdruck opponierte.

Es gibt auch einen Briefwechsel zwischen Schoeps und dem schon ausgezogenen deutschen Zionisten, Gershom Scholem, worin Scholem Schoeps vorwirft, den Deutschjuden Sand in die Augen gestreut zu haben. Wenn er seinen Mitjuden behilflich sein wollte, dann würde er, so Scholem, Himmel und Erde in Bewegung setzen, um das jüdische Volk von Deutschland zu entfernen. Es ist beachtenswert, dass Scholem mehr als zwanzig Jahre als überzeugter Zionist agiert hat, bevor er die in Frage stehende Ansicht vorbrachte. Im Ersten Weltkrieg stellte er sich gegen die deutsche Seite, um die kaisertreuen Eltern zu bestürzen und um seine bewusste Distanz von seinem nichtjüdischen Geburtsort zu bekunden.

Innere Emigration deutschnationaler Juden bis zu dem Punkt, an dem das Exil unumgänglich wurde.

Es bleibt offen, ob Schoeps weniger tiefblickend war als sein Gesprächspartner. Schoeps hielt unbeirrt an seinem Vaterlandssinn fest. Das führte dazu, dass er Deutschland in den 1930ern durchstreifte und andere Juden aufrief, weiter auf ihrem Posten auszuharren, bis die brausende Krise verfliegt. Rückblickend war das unklug, aber verständlich dass Schoeps bis auf seine eigene Flucht am Heiligabend 1938 nach Schweden die Hoffnung hegte, dass die Nazis gestürzt werden könnten.

Dass er die Sachlage falsch einschätzte, war schade, ist aber bestimmt nicht mit Nazi-Mitwisserschaft gleichzusetzen. Es ist unberechtigt, seinen zionistischen Gegnern zuviel Einsicht beizumessen. Scholems betonierte antideutsche Stellung entstieg einer früheren Zeitepoche. Diese Haltung verdichtete sich bei ihm lange vor der katastrophalen Gegebenheit, die sein Antideutschtum zu rechtfertigen schien. Man würde dem antideutschen Scholem zuviel zumuten, wenn man glaubt, dieser habe schon 1913 den gesamten Verlauf der Zeitgeschichte von dem Kaiserreich bis zur Nazi-Gewaltherrschaft erspürt.

Versuche konservativer Restauration nach 1945

Eine für mich weniger verständliche Seite von Schoeps’ Tätigkeit ist seine langjährige Bestrebung, die Hohenzollernmonarchie nach 1945 wiederherzustellen. Kroll belegt, dass Schoeps nach seiner Heimkehr stets auf eine monarchistische Restauration hingearbeitet hat. Zum Thronprätendenten Louis Ferdinand von Hohenzollern (1907-1994) knüpfte er eine innige Beziehung. Er verschrieb sich parallel dazu der Aufgabe der Neugestaltung eines preußischen Landesgebiets. Sein Zorn war groß darüber, dass die Alliierten Nazismus im preußischen Militärgeist beheimateten. Aufgrund dieses Mißgriffs gingen die Siegermächte daran, Preußen als geläufigen Begriff und als Verwaltungsgebiet abzuschaffen, um es endlich aus dem Sinn der Deutschen zu schlagen.

Für Schoeps bilden Preußen und Monarchie ein einheitliches Gespann. Sein ausgeprägt preußisches Bewußtsein und die Wiedereindeutschung des dazugehörigen Ortsbezuges gingen mit einer monarchistischen Staatsform Hand in Hand. Beides zielte auf eine moralische Wiederbewaffnung der deutschen Nation ab, die nur zu erlangen war im Zusammenhang mit einer erneuten traditionsgebundenen Gruppenidentität. Schoeps beweifelte, dass die „liberaldemokratische“ Staatsform mit ihrer Betonung auf Erwerbstätigkeit und Konsumismus die erwünschte „Umkehr“ bewirken könnte. Nur die Wiederaufwertung einer preußischen Dienstethik mit einem „mehr an Autorität“ von einer altkonservativen Ausprägung, so Schoeps in einem „nicht gehaltenen Vortrag in eigener Sache“ vom Februar 1968, würde es den Deutschen erlauben, ein neues Selbstbewußtsein und eine Kollektividentität erreichen zu können. Die Frage steht noch offen, warum die angestrebte Restauration in den so gelagerten Umständen die gewollte Wirkung haben müsste. Auf Schoeps entfällt die Beweislast zu zeigen, dass die Rückkehr zu einer monarchistischen Staatsform das Genesungsverfahren in seiner zergeschlagenen Heimat beschleunigt hätte.

Die moralische Wiederbewaffnung der deutschen Nation und letztlich gescheiterte Konzepte dazu

Was er eigentlich verlangte, ist eine Galionsfigurmonarchie von einer Art, die schon in den Benelux-Ländern und in Großbritannien zu finden war. Eine solche Restauration strebte er an, als er in seiner Konservativen Erneuerung. Ideen zur deutschen Politik (1958) ausführte: Die monarchistische Staatsform sei Alternative zu einer nivellierenden Mittelstandsgesellschaft sowie Korrektiv zur „antiautoritären Vermassung und Entpersönlichung des öffentlichen Lebens“. Mit Respekt zu melden, deutet Schoeps auf keinen Heiligen Gral sondern auf die Ausdehnung auf die Deutschen von einer schon in Westeuropa befindlichen „figure head monarchy“.

In westlichen Ländern erzeugt dieser Bezug auf die Tradition allerdings kein Gegenmittel gegen die Auflockerung durch den liberaldemokratischen Nihilismus. Es wäre einfältig zu glauben, dass Schweden und England, um nur zwei treffende Beispiele anzuführen, den schädlichen Folgen der Spätmoderne entfliehen könnten, indem sie eine monarchistische Galionsfigur beibehalten. Sie eilen gleichfalls der Vermassung und Entpersönlichung, die Schoeps beängstigten, mit Vollgeschwindigkeit entgegen. In dieser Frage zeigt sich Schoeps als „politischer Romantiker“ schlechthin.

Das traurige Ende seiner wissenschaftlichen Karriere

Tieftraurig klang Schoeps’ professorale Laufbahn aus, als Ende 1967 der Sozialistische Deutsche Studentenbund (SDS) ihn in Erlangen aus seinen Seminaren mit Drohmitteln heraustrieb. Schoeps wurde von der Philosophischen Fakultät im Stich gelassen. Bis zu seinem Lebensende hat er mit Fakultätssitzungen keinen weiteren Kontakt gehabt und trotz seines internationalen Rufes als Sachverständiger über die urchristliche Kirche und deren Beziehung zu der alteren jüdischen Kulturwelt hat Schoeps nie wieder in einem akademischen Zusammenhang sein Fachwissen vermittelt.

Sein Gegengift gegen die massendemokratische Zerrüttung hätte keineswegs gereicht, das bangmachende Übel zu mildern – geschweige denn zu unterbinden. Die Wiederherstellung der spanischen Monarchie nach Francos Tod erreichte es nicht, Spanien auf einer mäßigen Kursrichtung zu halten. Das Land schwenkte danach ausufernd nach links in kulturellen sowie wirtschaftlichen Angelegenheiten. Warum hätte es anders in Deutschland ablaufen sollen, auch wenn es dem wackeren Schoeps gelungen wäre, sich programmatisch durchzusetzen?

00:50 Publié dans Histoire, Judaica, Révolution conservatrice | Lien permanent | Commentaires (0) | Tags : allemagne, | |  del.icio.us | | Digg! Digg |  Facebook

vendredi, 11 mars 2011

Il soldato di Jünger è l'uomo-massa in rivolta contro la massificazione, cioè contro se stesso

Il soldato di Jünger è l’uomo-massa in rivolta contro la massificazione, cioè contro se stesso

di Francesco Lamendola

Fonte: Arianna Editrice [scheda fonte]

È altamente significativo il fatto che un evento epocale e lacerante come la prima guerra mondiale abbia trovato, nell’ambito della letteratura, solo pochi scrittori capaci di penetrare l’essenza di ciò che essa aveva in se stessa di nuovo, di tragicamente nuovo, rispetto a tutte le guerre precedenti: vale a dire la massificazione e l’industrializzazione del massacro.
Fra i non molti che se ne resero conto, spicca il nome di Ernst Jünger, uno dei maggiori nella pleiade della cosiddetta “rivoluzione conservatrice” fiorita nei primi decenni del Novecento, che ha rappresentato tale carattere di novità in alcuni libri divenuti giustamente famosi, da «In Stahlgewittern», del 1920 («Nelle tempeste d’acciaio», Parma, Guanda, 1995), a  «Der Kampf als inneres», del 1922 (La lotta come esperienza interiore»); da «Sturm», del 1923 («Il tenente Sturm», Parma, Guanda, 2000), a «Das Waldchen 125», del 1925 («Boschetto 125. Una cronaca delle battaglie in trincea nel 1918», Parma, Guanda, 1999).
Da questi romanzi e saggi emerge con lucidità e prepotenza una nuova figura antropologica, quella del “soldato”, peraltro con caratteristiche radicalmente diverse da quelle “classiche”: più un pirata e un avventuriero, che un disciplinato esecutore di ordini superiori; più un anarca che un borghese, anzi, decisamente un anti-borghese, forgiato dal ferro e dal fuoco e darwinianamente sopravvissuto alle “tempeste d’acciaio” proprio per accendere la fiaccola della rivoluzione nella stagnante società del cosiddetto ordine costituito.
Jünger delinea questa nuova figura con l’entusiasmo e con la compartecipazione di chi ne ha fatto l‘esperienza diretta (fu ufficiale di complemento nelle trincee a partire dal 1915, dopo essersi arruolato romanticamente nella Legione Straniera francese) e, al tempo stesso, con il tono profetico che lo contraddistinguerà, poco dopo - negli anni del primo dopoguerra - quando sposterà le sue simpatie su di una nuova figura antropologica, quella dell’”operaio”; per poi approdare, definitivamente, a quella del “ribelle”, di colui che “passa al bosco” e rifiuta radicalmente le tranquille certezze del mondo borghese, per “vivere pericolosamente” in una sorta di guerra privata contro ogni tentativo di ingabbiarlo, di ammaestrarlo, di ammansirlo e, in ultima analisi, di manipolarlo.
Nemmeno Jünger, però, riesce a sottrarsi alle premesse irrazionalistiche, vitalistiche, confusamente nietzschiane, che fanno velo alla rigorosa imparzialità della sua analisi e finisce per caricare la figura del “soldato” di valenze romantiche, nel senso più ampio del termine, che poco o niente hanno a che fare con la realtà storica della prima guerra mondiale; e, soprattutto, per cercare una scorciatoia ideologica che gli consenta di sottrarre quella figura, a lui così cara, al destino della massificazione e della nullificazione della sua volontà individuale, per restituirle - ma, ahimé, solo in maniera astratta e velleitaria - quella capacità decisionale che contrassegna, per definizione, qualsiasi “eroe” letterario: categoria - quest’ultima - alla quale anche il “soldato” appartiene.
In altre parole, Jünger tenta di delineare la figura di un combattente che, slanciandosi contro le linee nemiche per “sfondarle” o “penetrarle” (psicanalisti freudiani, sbizzarritevi!), con una sorta di furore eroico che è anche, al tempo stesso, decisamente erotico, si fa protagonista di un vero e proprio surrogato dell’atto sessuale.
Sarebbe troppo semplice insistere sul velleitarismo, nonché sulla natura eminentemente letteraria, nel senso di “straniante”, di un simile atteggiamento, che, come nel caso dei Futuristi, celebra la “bellezza” della lotta per se stessa e finisce per cadere in un eccesso di estetismo, vagamente spruzzato di superomismo e, naturalmente, del più crudo darwinismo.
Più interessante, invece, della chiave di lettura psicologica e più fruttuosa come ipotesi di lavoro, ci sembra essere quella specificamente ideologica: non potendo sottrarsi ad una spietata quanto cieca gerarchia,  che lo afferra e lo scaraventa in un sanguinoso, delirante bagno di anonimità, il “soldato” jüngheriano si prende la sua rivincita individualistica, facendo proprio quel modello gerarchico e quella impersonalità tecnologica, ma vivendoli, con orgoglio, dall’interno, illudendosi così di mutare i termini della propria condizione di totale impotenza decisionale e di radicale e assoluta sottomissione ad un tale apparato anonimo e distruttivo.
Eric J. Leed, nel suo pregevole studio «Terra di nessuno. Esperienza bellica e identità personale nella prima guerra mondiale» (titolo originale: «No Man’s Land. Combat and Identity in World War I», Cambridge University Press, 1979; traduzione italiana di Rinaldo Falcioni, Bologna, Il Mulino, 1985, 2004 pp. 200-212 passim), ha colto nel segno, a nostro avviso, allorché ha evidenziato il carattere illusorio e, al tempo stesso, auto-consolatorio, della identificazione jüngheriana fra il “soldato” e la guerra:

«Man mano che gli uomini esperivano la guerra come estraniazione dal proprio “agire”, come perdita di controllo, come svilimento delle loro potenzialità, la loro autonomia smarrita e le loro energie represse furono investite in un’astrazione: “la Guerra”, il meccanismo autonomo di macello. Ma alcuni combattenti, e in prima file Ernst Jünger, non poterono rassegnarsi allo statuto di individui qualsiasi, sofferenti passivi dello strapotere del materiale. Essi tentarono dunque di recuperare la loro potenza perduta tramite un’identificazione proprio con quel meccanismo autonomo della “Guerra” che tiranneggiava le “masse”. Nel caso di Jünger» l’identificazione personale con la tecnologia autonoma divenne fonte di potere e autorità personali; tramite questa identificazione egli fu in grado di acquisire lo statuto di esecutore di un potere sovrapersonale, un potere che concedeva a coloro che si identificavano in esso una rinnovata, anche se “amorale”, capacità d’azione. È in quest’ottica che bisogna leggere l’affermazione di Jünger secondo cui la prima guerra mondiale produsse una nuova “Gestalt”, un “uomo tecnologico” che era tanto “duro”, “insensibile”, e “imperturbabile” quanto la stessa macchina da guerra.
In base a queste identificazioni la guerra in generale, e in particolare l’immagine della guerra come realtà industriale, “tecnologica”, acquista sovente un profondo significato soggettivo. Nei libri di guerra di Jünger è evidente che la “macchina” assomma tutte le altre caratteristiche della figura d’”autorità” in grado d’impartire sofferenze e punizioni, rimanendo ad esse impermeabile – la figura del padre, lo stato, la divinità. La posizione politica post-bellica di Jünger, il suo “conservatorismo radicale”, trae le mosse da un’esperienza di guerra in cui egli apprese, una volta di più, che l’individuo non acquisisce la sua capacità di azione e la sua autonomia tramite la ribellione contro quelle figure, bensì tramite l’identificazione con esse. […]
Per Jünger la guerra fu un’esperienza che liberò i figli della borghesia dalle loro origini sociali, rivoltandoli contro i loro genitori borghesi. […]
Al pari di tutti gli altri, Jünger esperì la guerra autentica come umiliazione, come tremenda rassegnazione; il nemico era scomparso dietro una maschera macchinica che impediva ogni confronto od osservazione. I successivi anni di guerra avrebbero solo intensificato le contraddizioni implicite in questa esperienza iniziale: la guerra non era la prova delle capacità e delle volontà individuali, bensì la soppressione di ogni valore connesso all’individuo. […]
Qui l’offensiva è l’atto che risolve tutte le inibizioni: essa permette a coloro che marciscono nelle trincee e nelle buche di granata di comportarsi finalmente come pirati e tagliaborse svincolati da ogni morale o coscienza.  L’immagine di violenza sistematica nei confronti di un paese pingue e pacifico in compagnia di altri “armati di tutto punto” è necessariamente legata allo strapotere inibitore del fuoco d’artiglieria, al sistema di trincea, alle condizioni di immobilismo della guerra: sono proprio queste realtà, queste condizioni che creano le condizioni immaginarie dello straripamento di una feroce soldatesca in territori vergini. […]
Nei primi lavori di Jünger si può chiaramente cogliere - nell’idea dell’assalto di tipo militare e sociale - la sovrapposizione fra mondo sociale e mondo militare. È evidente che l’esperienza di guerra non è, almeno non a livello mentale, un’esperienza discreta, creatrice di nuove strategie psichiche; piuttosto, con i materiali dell’esperienza di guerra, Jünger semplifica e intensifica un tipo di conflitto  psichico prettamente tradizionale. Da un lato stanno tutte le realtà restrittive e inibitorie - la tecnologia, la borghesia, la figura del padre - che servono a proteggere e a difendere un territorio amico e pacifico; dall’altro stanno le creazioni della realtà e della fantasia - il pirata predone, le truppe d’assalto, gli assassini segreti della coscienza borghese, giovani che erano a un tempo “costretti a sacrificare se stessi” e armati “dei massimi strumenti di potenza”. […]
In tutti questi frangenti, il personaggio del soldato è contrassegnato da un’elevata tensione ormai abituale: in termini patologici, questo carattere è basato su di una stasi, un equilibrio teso, che fomenta in continuazione fantasie di scarica, di liberazione. Qualora si voglia ricostruire il percorso che nell’opera di Jünger lega l’esperienza di guerra ad un’ideologia del tutto ambivalente, che combina totalitarismo e rivoluzione, si deve partire dalla situazione di fatto esistente della guerra di trincea. Proprio da questa situazione in cui le scariche pulsionali e la mobilità dei singoli combattenti erano inibite dalla tecnologia, risultò una mostruosa stasi fisica; ma nel particolare caso di Jünger, questa stasi assunse il carattere di una fissazione sulla tecnologia, approdando quest’ultima allo statuto di genitrice di una generazione intera.»

Se, dunque, la guerra moderna rappresenta l’estremo punto d’arrivo, da un lato, della industrializzazione, della gerarchizzazione e dell’anonimato dei modelli sociali e, dall’altro, della loro mistificazione ideologica (perché solo così si potrebbe ottenere il consenso nei confronti di una macchina di distruzione di tale apocalittico orrore), Jünger ha visto giusto nell’individuarne i legami di contiguità, logica e produttiva, con i meccanismi economici, sociali e politici che caratterizzano la modernità in quanto tale, anche in tempo di “pace”: che altro non è se non la tregua in attesa del riaccendersi d’un conflitto permanente.
Lo provano, fra l’altro, le evidenti analogie, riscontrate già nelle retrovie dei campi di battaglia, fra le nevrosi caratteristiche della società in tempo di pace e quelle che insorgevano nei soldati alle prese con l’esperienza diretta della guerra: nevrosi da gas, nevrosi da trincea, nevrosi da bombardamento e via di seguito.
Perfino la loro ripartizione per classi sociali riproduceva fedelmente la “distribuzione” del disagio mentale in tempo di pace: gli attacchi di ansia generalizzata, infatti, erano più diffusi tra gli ufficiali, provenienti dalle classi superiori; mentre le nevrosi “specifiche”, ad esempio quelle da gas (dopo che ebbe inizio la guerra chimica con l’attacco tedesco ad Ypres, in Belgio, nel 1915, mediante un aggressivo chimico passato alla storia, appunto, con il nome di “iprite”) erano più diffuse fra i soldati di truppa, provenienti dal proletariato.
Non aveva visto giusto, invece, Jünger - a nostro avviso - allorché confondeva lo slancio aggressivo del “soldato” con una forma di affermazione dell’individuo, addirittura dell’individuo eccezionale (al punto da teorizzare che la tattica della cosiddetta “difesa elastica”, adottata dallo Stato Maggiore dell’esercito per limitare il numero delle perdite e per facilitare l’azione manovrata di contrattacco sui fianchi, era contraria allo spirito del soldato, secondo lui naturalmente offensivo), perché non sapeva o non voleva riconoscere il carattere coercitivo della macchina militare da cui il singolo soldato totalmente dipendeva, ridotto in condizioni d’irrimediabile eteronomia.
Perciò la rivolta del “soldato” contro la massificazione era, in fondo, l’inconscia rivolta dell’uomo massificato contro se stesso: contro quella proiezione illusoria di se stesso che vestiva l’uniforme di un altro colore ed era perciò identificata con il “nemico”.
Non seppe o non volle vedere che il soldato, in una guerra moderna, cioè totale, è null’altro che un ingranaggio, anonimo e perciò sostituibile a volontà, della macchina-esercito; così come non saprà o non vorrà vedere che l’operaio, nella società moderna, altro non è che un ingranaggio, altrettanto anonimo e intercambiabile, della macchina-industria.
Molto più lucido e molto più coerente con le sue premesse individualistiche, conservatrici e tuttavia, o proprio per questo, irriducibilmente antiborghesi, è stato, secondo noi, l’ultimo Jünger, quello del Waldgänger, ossia dell’anarca che “passa al bosco” (una rivisitazione, in fondo, del “masnadiere” di schilleriana memoria) e riesce così, pur dovendo vivere nell’era dei Titani, a difendere almeno l’essenziale della propria individualità, del proprio spirito critico, della propria volontà di non sottomettersi ad un sistema omologante, che tutto abbraccia e che tutto livella con l’inesorabile efficienza produttiva della Tecnica.

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mercredi, 02 mars 2011

Reflections on Carl Schmitt's "The Concept of the Political"

Reflections on Carl Schmitt’s The Concept of the Political

Greg Johnson

Ex: http://www.counter-currents.com/

“Why can’t we all get along?”–Rodney King

carl_schmitt-20300.jpgCarl Schmitt’s short book The Concept of the Political (1932) is one of the most important works of 20th century political philosophy.

The aim of The Concept of the Political is the defense of politics from utopian aspirations to abolish politics. Anti-political utopianism includes all forms of liberalism as well as international socialism, global capitalism, anarchism, and pacifism: in short, all social philosophies that aim at a universal order in which conflict is abolished.

In ordinary speech, of course, liberalism, international socialism, etc. are political movements, not anti-political ones. So it is clear that Schmitt is using “political” in a particular way. For Schmitt, the political is founded on the distinction between friend and enemy. Utopianism is anti-political insofar as it attempts to abolish that distinction, to root out all enmity and conflict in the world.

Schmitt’s defense of the political is not a defense of enmity and conflict as good things. Schmitt fully recognizes their destructiveness and the necessity of managing and mitigating them. But Schmitt believes that enmity is best controlled by adopting a realistic understanding of its nature. So Schmitt does not defend conflict, but realism about conflict. Indeed, Schmitt believes that the best way to contain conflict is first to abandon all unrealistic notions that one can do away with it entirely.

Furthermore, Schmitt believes that utopian attempts to completely abolish conflict actually increase its scope and intensity. There is no war more universal in scope and fanatical in prosecution than wars to end all war and establish perpetual peace.

Us and Them

What does the distinction between friend and enemy mean?

First, for Schmitt, the distinction between friend and enemy is collective. He is talking about “us versus them” not “one individual versus another.”

Schmitt introduces the Latin distinction between hostis (a collective or public enemy, the root of “hostile”) and inimicus (an individual and private adversary, the root of “inimical”). The political is founded on the distinction between friend (those on one’s side) and hostis (those on the other side). Private adversaries are not public enemies.

Second, the distinction between friend and enemy is polemical. The friend/enemy distinction is always connected with the abiding potential for violence. One does not need to actually fight one’s enemy, but the potential must always be there. The sole purpose of politics is not group conflict; the sole content of politics is not group conflict; but the abiding possibility of group conflict is what creates the political dimension of human social existence.

Third, the distinction between friend and enemy is existentially serious. Violent conflict is more serious than other forms of conflict, because when things get violent people die.

Fourth, the distinction between friend and enemy is not reducible to any other distinction. For instance, it is not reducible to the distinction between good and evil. The “good guys” are just as much enemies to the “bad guys” as the “bad guys” are enemies to the “good guys.” Enmity is relative, but morality—we hope—is not.

Fifth, although the friend/enemy distinction is not reducible to other distinctions and differences—religious, economic, philosophical, etc.—all differences can become political if they generate the friend/enemy opposition.

In sum, the ultimate root of the political is the capacity of human groups to take their differences so seriously that they will kill or die for them.

It is important to note that Schmitt’s concept of the political does not apply to ordinary domestic politics. The rivalries of politicians and parties, provided they stay within legal parameters, do not constitute enmity in Schmitt’s sense. Schmitt’s notion of politics applies primarily to foreign relations — the relations between sovereign states and peoples — rather than domestic relations within a society. The only time when domestic relations become political in Schmitt’s sense is during a revolution or a civil war.




If the political arises from the abiding possibility of collective life or death conflict, the political rules over all other areas of social life because of its existential seriousness, the fact that it has recourse to the ultimate sanction.

For Schmitt, political sovereignty is the power to determine the enemy and declare war. The sovereign is the person who makes that decision.

If a sovereign declares an enemy, and individuals or groups within his society reject that declaration, the society is in a state of undeclared civil war or revolution. To refuse the sovereign’s choice of enemy is one step away from the sovereign act of choosing one’s own enemies. Thus Schmitt’s analysis supports the saying that, “War is when the government tells you who the bad guy is. Revolution is when you decide that for yourself.”


Philosophical Parallels

The root of the political as Schmitt understands it is what Plato and Aristotle call “thumos,” the middle part of the soul that is neither theoretical reason nor physical desire, but is rather the capacity for passionate attachment. Thumos is the root of the political because it is the source of attachments to (a) groups, and politics is collective, and (b) life-transcending and life-negating values, i.e., things that are worth killing and dying for, like the defense of personal or collective honor, one’s culture or way of life, religious and philosophical convictions, etc. Such values make possible mortal conflict between groups.

The abolition of the political, therefore, requires the abolition of the human capacity for passionate, existentially serious, life and death attachments. The apolitical man is, therefore, the apathetic man, the man who lacks commitment and intensity. He is what Nietzsche called “the last man,” the man for whom there is nothing higher than himself, nothing that might require that he risk the continuation of his physical existence. The apolitical utopia is a spiritual “boneless chicken ranch” of doped up, dumbed down, self-absorbed producer-consumers.

Schmitt’s notion of the political is consistent with Hegel’s notion of history. For Hegel, history is a record of individual and collective struggles to the death over images or interpretations of who we are. These interpretations consist of the whole realm of culture: worldviews and the ways of life that are their concrete manifestations.

There are, of course, many interpretations of who we are. But there is only one truth, and according to Hegel the truth is that man is free. Just as philosophical dialectic works through a plurality of conflicting viewpoints to get to the one truth, so the dialectic of history is a war of conflicting worldviews and ways of life that will come to an end when the correct worldview and way of life are established. The concept of human freedom must become concretely realized in a way of life that recognizes freedom. Then history as Hegel understands it—and politics as Schmitt understands it—will come to an end.

Hegel’s notion of the ideal post-historical state is pretty much everything a 20th (or 21st) century fascist could desire. But later interpreters of Hegel like Alexandre Kojève and his follower Francis Fukuyama, interpret the end of history as a “universal homogeneous state” that sounds a lot like the globalist utopianism that Schmitt wished to combat.

Why the Political Cannot be Abolished

If the political is rooted in human nature, then it cannot be abolished. Even if the entire planet could be turned into a boneless chicken ranch, all it would take is two serious men to start politics—and history—all over again.

But the utopians will never even get that far. Politics cannot be abolished by universal declarations of peace, love, and tolerance, for such attempts to transcend politics actually just reinstitute it on another plane. After all, utopian peace- and love-mongers have enemies too, namely “haters” like us.

Thus the abolition of politics is really only the abolition of honesty about politics. But dishonesty is the least of the utopians’ vices. For in the name of peace and love, they persecute us with a fanaticism and wanton destructiveness that make good, old-fashioned war seem wholesome by comparison.

Two peoples occupying adjacent valleys might, for strategic reasons, covet the high ground between them. This may lead to conflict. But such conflicts have finite, definable aims. Thus they tend to be limited in scope and duration. And since it is a mere conflict of interest—in which both sides, really, are right—rather than a moral or religious crusade between good and evil, light and darkness, ultimately both sides can strike a deal with each other to cease hostilities.

But when war is wedded to a universalist utopianism—global communism or democracy, the end of “terror” or, more risibly, “evil”—it becomes universal in scope and endless in duration. It is universal, because it proposes to represent all of humanity. It is endless, of course, because it is a war with human nature itself.

Furthermore, when war is declared in the name of “humanity,” its prosecution becomes maximally inhuman, since anything is fair against the enemies of humanity, who deserve nothing short of unconditional surrender or annihilation, since one cannot strike a bargain with evil incarnate. The road to Dresden, Hiroshima, and Nagasaki was paved with love: universalistic, utopian, humanistic, liberal love.



Liberalism seeks to reduce the friend/enemy distinction to differences of opinion or economic interests. The liberal utopia is one in which all disputes can be resolved bloodlessly by reasoning or bargaining. But the opposition between liberalism and anti-liberalism cannot be resolved by liberal means. It is perforce political. Liberal anti-politics cannot triumph, therefore, without the political elimination of anti-liberalism.

The abolition of the political requires the abolition of all differences, so there is nothing to fight over, or the abolition of all seriousness, so that differences make no difference. The abolition of difference is accomplished by violence and cultural assimilation. The abolition of seriousness is accomplished by the promotion of spiritual apathy through consumerism and indoctrination in relativism, individualism, tolerance, and diversity worship—the multicult.

Violence, of course, is generally associated with frankly totalitarian forms of anti-political utopianism like Communism, but the Second World War shows that liberal universalists are as capable of violence as Communists, they are just less capable of honesty.

Liberalism, however, generally prefers to kill us softly. The old-fashioned version of liberalism prefers the soft dissolution of differences through cultural assimilation, but that preference was reversed when an unassimilable minority rose to power in the United States, at which time multiculturalism and diversity became the watchwords, and the potential conflicts between different groups were to be managed through spiritual corruption. Today’s liberals make a fetish of the preservation of pluralism and diversity, as long as none of it is taken seriously.


Multicultural utopianism is doomed, because multiculturalism is very successful at increasing diversity, but, in the long run, it cannot manage the conflicts that come with it.

The drug of consumerism cannot be relied upon because economic crises cannot be eliminated. Furthermore, there are absolute ecological limits to the globalization of consumerism.

As for the drugs of relativism, individualism, tolerance, and the multi-cult: only whites are susceptible to their effects, and since these ideas systematically disadvantage whites in ethnic competition, ultimately those whites who accept them will be destroyed (which is the point, really) and those whites who survive will reject them. Then whites will start taking our own side, ethnic competition will get political, and, one way or another, racially and ethnically homogeneous states will emerge.

Lessons for White Nationalists

To become a White Nationalist is to choose one’s friends and one’s enemies for oneself. To choose new friends means to choose a new nation. Our nation is our race. Our enemies are the enemies of our race, of whatever race they may be. By choosing our friends and enemies for ourselves, White Nationalists have constituted ourselves as a sovereign people—a sovereign people that does not have a sovereign homeland, yet—and rejected the sovereignty of those who rule us. This puts us in an implicitly revolutionary position vis-à-vis all existing regimes.

The conservatives among us do not see it yet. They still wish to cling to America’s corpse and suckle from her poisoned tit. But the enemy understands us better than some of us understand ourselves. We may not wish to choose an enemy, but sometimes the enemy chooses us. Thus “mainstreamers” will be denied entry and forced to choose either to abandon White Nationalism or to explicitly embrace its revolutionary destiny.

It may be too late for mainstream politics, but it is still too early for White Nationalist politics. We simply do not have the power to win a political struggle. We lack manpower, money, and leadership. But the present system, like all things old and dissolute, will pass. And our community, like all things young and healthy, will grow in size and strength. Thus today our task is metapolitical: to raise consciousness and cultivate the community from which our kingdom—or republic—will come.

When that day comes, Carl Schmitt will be numbered among our spiritual Founding Fathers.