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jeudi, 15 septembre 2011

Colloque de "Terre & Peuple"

mercredi, 14 septembre 2011

Dominique Venner: Le passé vichyste de Mitterrand

Dominique Venner:

Le passé vichyste de Mitterrand

R. Steuckers: "Vitalist Thinking is incorrect"


Interview with Robert Steuckers

“Vitalist Thinking is incorrect”

by Jürgen Hatzenbichler

joie.jpgThis year is the thirtieth anniversary of the 1968 revolution. What value does the “New Left” have for a rightist discourse today?

Steuckers: First, it has to be said that although the “New Left” demonstrated, rioted and mobilised the factories in Paris in May 1968, one million counter-demonstrators were also on the streets, there to put an end to the events. Furthermore, the “right” won in May; de Gaulle returned in June. One must keep in mind that the so-called “anti-authority movement” could only start the occupation of the institutions in 1988, after the assumption of power by Mitterand. Although between 1968 and 1981 the “New Left” carried a lot of weight in France, the “liberal-conservative Right” remained in power and was able to develop its “Weltanschauung”. One should also know, in order to understand ’68, that de Gaulle had changed his programme completely after the War in Algeria: he was anti-imperialist and anti-American, he visited Russia in 1965 and left NATO. In a speech in Cambodia, he depicted France as the leading anti-imperialist Power and as a partner for countries that were neither “americanist” nor communist. He also developed contacts with South America, which lead to the French aviation industry being able to drive out the Americans there. In Quebec in 1967, he exclaimed “free Quebec”, which was a direct provocation for the Americans, who didn’t tolerate it. Thus the May of ’68 was partly brought about by the American secret service, so that France would refrain from its anti-imperialist function.

In the German-speaking world 1968 is subsequently linked to “political correctness”. What impact did the revolution have in the francophone world?

Steuckers: Moralism appeared more strongly in Germany and with the German Left than in France. In France there are two concepts. There is May ’68: the student movement as a revolutionary movement. But there is also the “thought of ‘68”, la pensée ’68. When one speaks of it, one means a way of thinking like Foucault, Derrida, Deleuze and Guattari among others, who were especially inspired by Nietzsche. Nowadays “political correctness” criticises these philosophers because they think “lebensphilosophisch”, because they are “vitalists”.

This method of “deconstruction” criticises the modern age above all…

Steuckers: …yes, against the “Enlightenment”. Here I would like to highlight an “accent” of Michel Foucault. Foucault is of course regarded as a leftist philosopher, but at the start of his career, which he began with an article that appeared in 1961, he developed a thesis, which stated that the enlightenment was not at all the emancipation of humanity, but instead the beginning of omnipotent observation and punishment. When this article appeared, Foucault was branded a reactionary by certain guardians of virtue. It’s well known that Foucault was a homosexual… He said: “I must commit myself to the outsiders, I must play for the left, otherwise my career is lost.” Nevertheless, his thesis is valid: the enlightenment means observation and punishment. He further criticised the enlightenment as the “ground” for the French Jacobin state. For Foucault, enlightenment society embodies a new panoptical prison, in the middle of which stands a tower, from which all prisoners can be observed. The model of the enlightenment also embodies a “transparent” society without mystery, without a private sphere or personal feelings. Political correctness has seen that these thoughts are extremely dangerous for enlightenment states/ regimes. Foucault is branded a vitalist.

Which ideas of the “New Left” are still relevant?

Steuckers: I’ll have to answer this question in a roundabout way: what does the current “New Left” want? Does the “New Left” want to disseminate the ideas of Foucault, be against societies that want total surveillance and punishment? I can’t answer for the left. But what I do see is that the “New Left” never thinks nowadays, but merely wants to push through political correctness.

The left-right schema is now called into question by some rightists. Is the abolition of these opposites relevant?

Steuckers: I think that for several decades the right has repeated the same obloquies too often. Though I see that today in Germany certain philosophical currents are reading Foucault together with Carl Schmitt and Max Weber. This is very important; it is the kernel of a new conservative revolution, because it is anti-enlightenment. Though I don’t reject the entire enlightenment myself; not the enlightenment King of Prussia, Friedrich II for example. Nor do I reject everything from Voltaire – who was an enlightenment philosopher and gave an excellent definition of identity when he said: “There is no identity without memory.” I don’t reject everything, but I gladly reject political correctness, which claims to be heir to the enlightenment, but sold us a corrupt enlightenment. It has to be said, anti-enlightenment ideas are available on both the right and left. On the other hand, a certain “right”, above all the techno-conservative powers, no longer poses the question of values. These conservatives want an enlightenment profile like the politically correct left.

Can one say that in such a society, which sees everything in terms of economics and consumption, the intellectuals of the left and right are the last defenders of meaning and value?

Steuckers: The American debate answered this very well, when the philosopher John Rawls posed the question of justice. If the enlightenment ends in consumerism, neither community nor justice is possible. There are seemingly conservative and progressive values and here a debate over the deciding questions of tomorrow is possible, but the organised groups of “political correctness” will do everything to prevent it.

Where on the right do you see the possible divisions between a value conservative attitude and a reactionary position?

Steuckers: Nowadays a “value conservative” attitude cannot remain structurally conservative. This attitude defends the values that hold a community together. If structural conservatives, meaning economic liberals, absolutely avoid posing the question of values, then the dissolution of communities is pushed forward. Then we have the danger that states, and even an eventual global community, become totally ungovernable.

What value does the “Nouvelle Droite” have in today’s intellectual discourse?

Steuckers: Nowadays it no longer has a solitary position. It should back the American communitarians more and lead the debate against globalisation and for identity-building values. Outside of Europe and America: to observe those non-western civilizations, like China and the Asiatic states, which have twice rejected the enlightenment ideology of “human rights”; first in Bangkok then in Vienna. These societies have set out to ensure that “human rights” are adapted to their own civilizations, because, as the Chinese have said, humans are never merely individuals but are always imbedded within a society and culture.

lundi, 12 septembre 2011

Jonathan Bowden: Marxism and The Frankfurt School

Jonathan Bowden: Marxism and The Frankfurt School

Racial War & the Implosion of the System



Racial War & the Implosion of the System

by Pierre Vial

Translated by Greg Johnson

Ex: http://www.counter-currents.com/

Burning buildings, stores and shopping malls robbed and vandalized, streets strewn with debris, blackened carcasses of buses, cars, police vehicles . . . These images of London, Birmingham, Bristol, and Liverpool have been beamed around the world on television. They evoked what Labour deputy Diane Abbott called “a war zone” (a theater, said Le Monde on August 10th, of “urban guerrilla warfare”).

The French media immediately wanted to set the tone for interpreting these events: it is the fault of social tensions due to cuts in public funds for the most vulnerable; it is the fault of unemployment and thus idleness; and it is the fault, of course, of the British police force (“the blunders of the police force” according to the conservative daily Daily Mail, just as false as the French newspapers). All is explained . . . and the hooded rioters are “youths” with restless hearts. Well-organized, all the same (one is thus far from the spontaneous and superficial reactions of hooligans), with a communications system well-enough developed to sustain the assault waves for several successive days.

But what about the government? Prime Minister Cameron, the Minister of the Interior, the Minister for Finance, the mayor of London were all . . . on vacation (Cameron in Italy). The rioters were definitely ill-bred to choose such a moment. They could have awaited their return.

It is undeniable that the social climate deteriorated by unfettered liberalism has caused much discontent. But that was merely grafted on a will to racial confrontation. The death of a West-Indian delinquent during a police operation against the West-Indian gangs was the pretext of the outbreak of the riots. The first nucleus of revolt was the district of Tottenham, euphemistically described as “multiethnic,” the majority of its population being of West-Indian origin. The rioters wished to show—and they succeeded—that they could rule the streets in defiance of white power and order. Even Le Monde, in spite of its ideological presuppositions, recognized in passing (August 9th) that it was “about the most serious racial confrontation in the United Kingdom since the Oldham disorders of 2001” and that there was thus indeed a “race riot.”

The shine has come off multiculturalism, which has long been presented as the British answer to racial tensions, and which Cameron recently admitted is a failure (as did Angela Merkel of Germany). It was based on the irenic conviction that various racial communities could cohabit harmoniously in the same territory. This illusion is due to the ideological presuppositions that one finds on the right as well as on the left among intellectuals who simply deny the burden of reality. Realities so disturbing to their mental comfort that they must be stubbornly denied. Until the day they catch up with you . . .

This day has come for many Britons. As Libération (August 16th) notes, they are following the advice being reproduced on large placards posted by the police or painted on the plywood covering broken shop windows: it is necessary to locate and denounce the “rats in hoods” (in England as in France the immigrant delinquents like to hide their faces). In particular, self-defense militias are setting themselves up to ensure order and safety in the threatened districts. To mitigate the inefficiency of a police force paralyzed by politically correct taboos (as admitted by a bobby quoted in Le Monde on August 12th: “The order was to intervene with caution to avoid the charges of brutality, of racism.”)

The present System, sapped by its internal contradictions, is in the process of imploding. Racial warfare is now bubbling beneath the surface in many European countries. Now is the time to denounce without respite the devastations of liberal capitalism and to preach a realistic, that is to say, a racialist, conception of a society in order to free the minds and will to resistance and reconquest or our European brothers.

Source: http://tpprovence.wordpress.com/ [2]


Article printed from Counter-Currents Publishing: http://www.counter-currents.com

URL to article: http://www.counter-currents.com/2011/08/racial-war-and-the-implosion-of-the-system/

Racial War & the Implosion of the System

By Pierre Vial

Translated by Greg Johnson

Ex: http://www.counter-currents.com/

Burning buildings, stores and shopping malls robbed and vandalized, streets strewn with debris, blackened carcasses of buses, cars, police vehicles . . . These images of London, Birmingham, Bristol, and Liverpool have been beamed around the world on television. They evoked what Labour deputy Diane Abbott called “a war zone” (a theater, said Le Monde on August 10th, of “urban guerrilla warfare”).

The French media immediately wanted to set the tone for interpreting these events: it is the fault of social tensions due to cuts in public funds for the most vulnerable; it is the fault of unemployment and thus idleness; and it is the fault, of course, of the British police force (“the blunders of the police force” according to the conservative daily Daily Mail, just as false as the French newspapers). All is explained . . . and the hooded rioters are “youths” with restless hearts. Well-organized, all the same (one is thus far from the spontaneous and superficial reactions of hooligans), with a communications system well-enough developed to sustain the assault waves for several successive days.

But what about the government? Prime Minister Cameron, the Minister of the Interior, the Minister for Finance, the mayor of London were all . . . on vacation (Cameron in Italy). The rioters were definitely ill-bred to choose such a moment. They could have awaited their return.

It is undeniable that the social climate deteriorated by unfettered liberalism has caused much discontent. But that was merely grafted on a will to racial confrontation. The death of a West-Indian delinquent during a police operation against the West-Indian gangs was the pretext of the outbreak of the riots. The first nucleus of revolt was the district of Tottenham, euphemistically described as “multiethnic,” the majority of its population being of West-Indian origin. The rioters wished to show—and they succeeded—that they could rule the streets in defiance of white power and order. Even Le Monde, in spite of its ideological presuppositions, recognized in passing (August 9th) that it was “about the most serious racial confrontation in the United Kingdom since the Oldham disorders of 2001” and that there was thus indeed a “race riot.”

The shine has come off multiculturalism, which has long been presented as the British answer to racial tensions, and which Cameron recently admitted is a failure (as did Angela Merkel of Germany). It was based on the irenic conviction that various racial communities could cohabit harmoniously in the same territory. This illusion is due to the ideological presuppositions that one finds on the right as well as on the left among intellectuals who simply deny the burden of reality. Realities so disturbing to their mental comfort that they must be stubbornly denied. Until the day they catch up with you . . .

This day has come for many Britons. As Libération (August 16th) notes, they are following the advice being reproduced on large placards posted by the police or painted on the plywood covering broken shop windows: it is necessary to locate and denounce the “rats in hoods” (in England as in France the immigrant delinquents like to hide their faces). In particular, self-defense militias are setting themselves up to ensure order and safety in the threatened districts. To mitigate the inefficiency of a police force paralyzed by politically correct taboos (as admitted by a bobby quoted in Le Monde on August 12th: “The order was to intervene with caution to avoid the charges of brutality, of racism.”)

The present System, sapped by its internal contradictions, is in the process of imploding. Racial warfare is now bubbling beneath the surface in many European countries. Now is the time to denounce without respite the devastations of liberal capitalism and to preach a realistic, that is to say, a racialist, conception of a society in order to free the minds and will to resistance and reconquest or our European brothers.

Source: http://tpprovence.wordpress.com/ [2]


Article printed from Counter-Currents Publishing: http://www.counter-currents.com

URL to article: http://www.counter-currents.com/2011/08/racial-war-and-the-implosion-of-the-system/

dimanche, 11 septembre 2011

Terre & Peuple n°48: les patries charnelles



Terre & Peuple n°48: les patries charnelles
Le numéro 48 du TP-Mag est centré sur le thème des patries charnelles.
Dans l’éditorial, Pierre Vial souligne en quoi l’Affaire DSK révèle la pourriture de nos ‘élites’ : la connivence et la solidarité immédiate (avant que les faits ne soient connus) et inconditionnelle de la politique et de la presse avec la super-classe née de la mondialisation.
Bernard Lugan épingle dans Science et Avenir (n°772) un article d’Yves Coppens qui démontre le bien fondé de l’hypothèse régionaliste : ni les Européens, ni les Asiatiques ne descendent de l’homme moderne africain. D’autre part, pour Marcel Otte, qui enseigne la préhistoire à l’université de Liège, « qu’on le veuille ou non, l’homme de Néandertal est notre proche parent ».
Emmanuel Ratier déshabille Le Grand Siècle, section française de la super-classe mondialisée : « Si un missile tombait sur l’Automobile Club de France, le pouvoir serait décapité », car les six cents privilégiés qui représentent sa quintessence s’y réunissent chaque quatrième mercredi du mois.
Edouard Rix retrace l’arbre généalogique de l’individualisme moderne, à partir de la thèse d’Henry Sumner Maine (1822-1888). Celui-ci discerne à l’origine deux grands principes d’organisation politique : la parenté de sang puis la communauté de territoire. Tout commence avec le pouvoir du patriarche et, au lieu de se disperser à sa mort, les familles s’agrègent autour de la vertébrale lignagère. Maine note que l’état de nature n’est pas une notion historique, pas plus que le contrat social de Rousseau. Pour les sociétés modernes, la cellule de base n’est plus la famille, mais l’individu, la communauté organique évoluant vers une société mécanique et rationalisée. Max Weber (1864-1920) avait déjà développé ce thème dans ‘L’éthique protestante et l’esprit du capitalisme’. Dans son ‘Essai sur l’individualisme’ (1983), l’anthropologue Louis Dumont (1911-1998) oppose les structures traditionnelles ‘holistes’ aux sociétés individualistes : alors que dans les sociétés traditionnelles chacun contribue à l’ordre global de l’Homme collectif, la société moderne n’est plus qu’un moyen pour l’individu, lequel devient une fin en soi. Platon et Aristote voyaient en l’homme un être social, les hellénistiques poseront comme idéal le sage détaché du social. Le christianisme, avec l’égalitarisme, l’universalisme et la dévaluation du monde, va dresser l’individu seul face à Dieu. Toutefois, après une opposition au monde de la part du christianisme primitif, l’Eglise triomphante du paganisme subordonne et même gouverne le monde, avant de replacer bientôt l’individu moderne dans le monde. Avec la Réforme, l’étape suivante sera bientôt la laïcisation des valeurs chrétiennes d’individualisme, égalitarisme et universalisme. Pour Louis Dumont, l’émancipation économique de la bourgeoisie libérale est un nouveau progrès de l’individualisme, Dieu servant de garantie à la moralité des affaires. Mais le rationalisme fait bientôt perdre de son influence à la religion, laquelle est remplacée par la recherche hédoniste du bonheur individuel qui devient le but essentiel de l’existence humaine (voir la Déclaration d’Indépendance américaine). Dans la postmodernité et l’hypermodernité, l’individualisme vire à l’indifférence à autrui, au narcissisme forcené et au cocooning.
Pierre Vial ouvre le dossier des ’Patries charnelles’, en rappelant que, dans l’esprit de Saint-Loup, père de la formule, mais aussi dans celui d’autres réveilleurs de peuples enracinés comme Jean Giono et Jean Mabire, elles s’incarnent dans l’union d’un sol et d’un sang. Ce que réclament bonnement les syndicalistes qui veulent ‘vivre et travailler au pays’.
Guillaume Guégan traite de la Bretagne contrariée. Contrariété majeure : sa séparation d’avec la grande Bretagne, alors que la Manche est un lien plus qu’un obstacle. César situe la source du druidisme dans l’île bretonne, d’où provient la migration. La seconde migration sera celle des moines et des abbés, victorieux des princes, première trahison des clercs qui fonderont la Bretagne des saints. La prolifération des saints va de pair avec celle des Pardons, circum-ambulations qui d’avantage qu’à Dieu s’adressent au petit saint de la paroisse. Les Normands, chassés par Alain Barbe Torte (937), vont faire place à cinq siècles d’indépendance à laquelle mettront un terme la défaite de Saint-Aubin-du-Cormier (1488) et les mariages de la Duchesse Anne avec Charles VIII et Louis XII et de sa fille Claude avec François 1er. Les siècles ensuite sont scandés par les trahisons (aux actes d’union) et par les fidélités (héroïques dont celle de Pontcalleck, décapité en 1720), consacrant l’opposition fondamentale entre deux conceptions du pouvoir. Cette opposition se concrétisera dans la chouannerie, qui n’était pas royaliste, mais libertaire : le dernier chouan, Isidore Le Devehat, est arrêté en 1842 et condamné sous la monarchie! S’expliquerait ainsi le scandale du Camp de Conlie, où on laissera pourrir sans soins durant l’hiver 1971 (et sans armes) une armée de 60.00 volontaires ‘chouans’ levée contre les Prussiens ! Le XIXe siècle n’en a pas moins été celui de la celtomanie, marqué notamment par le Barzaz Breiz, recueil de chants collectés en Basse-Bretagne par Villemarqué. Et par un réveil littéraire et politique, notamment le Parti National Breton, radicalisé finalement dans le clandestin Gwen-ha-Du, qui fera exploser, en 1932, le monument de l’union à la France. Après 1944, la Bretagne courbe l’échine sous l’épuration communiste, mais en 1966 De Gaulle autorise quand même l’enregistrement des prénoms bretons. Toutefois, le mouvement n’existe presque plus, sinon au niveau des ‘élites entrepreneuriales’, et le vent tarde à présent à se lever sur la Bretagne.
Pierre Vial brûle un cierge à la Provence de Giono et sa communauté du Contadour, à laquelle il enseignait la religion des vraies richesses sur la montagne de Lure ‘libre et neuve qui vient à peine d’émerger du déluge’.
Edouard Rix évoque la redécouverte du Lubéron que vient de vivre la bannière de Provence. Double pèlerinage, à Albert Camus qui avait acquis une maison à Lourmarin et y repose, et aux martyrs vaudois. Fidèles d’un mouvement religieux fondé par le Lyonnais Valdès qui leur prêchait la pauvreté, ils ont été persécutés comme hérétiques. Réfugiés dans de hautes vallées alpines, ils y ont proliféré et une colonie a émigré en 1470 à Lourmarin, où elle a prospéré dans vingt-quatre villages, assainissant les marais du sud du Lubéron. Le 18 avril 1545, une ‘croisade’ a exterminé trois mille Vaudois et en a expédié six cents aux galères.
Jean Mabire a été pieusement pillé d’une perle précieuse : son hymne à l’Auvergne immortelle, celle du romancier Henri Pourrat (1887-1959), qui vit, écrit et meurt à Ambert, dans le Puy-de-Dôme. Pour Mait’Jean, Pourrat est, bien plus qu’un écrivain régionaliste, un ‘écrivain tellurique’, qui produit une littérature du sang et du sol, inspirée par les vertus de l’enracinement, à la fois païenne et chrétienne, plus artisanale qu’intellectuelle.
Evoquant l’Alsacien Jean-Jacques Mourreau, Pierre Vial promène le faisceau de son projecteur depuis la cathédrale de Strabourg, édifice solaire avec sa grande rosace flamboyante érigé sur l’emplacement d’un temple à Hercule et qui illustre bien le génie européen, jusqu’à la source sacrée du Mont-Sainte-Odile, fille du Soleil et porteuse de lumière guérisseuse des aveugles, en passant par le Mur Païen, construction cyclopéenne, qualifié tel par le Pape Léon IX et qui a fait l’objet de fouilles importante de 1942 à 1944.
Llorenç P.A. traite de la pédagogie identitaire par l’immersion linguistique. L’action révolutionnaire de pérennisation des lignées doit se concrétiser dans la musique, le chant, la cuisine, la danse traditionnelle et, bien entendu, l’école ethniquement enracinée. Il fait l’inventaire des expérience basques, occitanes, bretonnes, corses, catalanes d’écoles enracinées et souligne l’indispensable partenariat des parents. Il plaide pour l’école bilingue et l’immersion linguistique, les anciens prenant en charge les nouveaux élèves. Catalan, il s’étend sur son terroir, la Catalogne (Gothalonia ou land des Goths), où la Generalitat a été rétablie en 1977 et la langue normalisée en 1983.
Johan relate le pèlerinage accompli au mois de mai dernier par une douzaine d’amis au cœur de la Bourgogne sur les tombes des Vincenot, à la Pourrie près de Commarin. Cela faisait suite à une randonnée à travers la vallée de l’Ouche, sur les traces des héros des Etoiles de Compostelle.
Alain Cagnat est allé évaluer sur pièces le bilan de la Tunisie libérée de son dictateur (sous lequel, malgré une corruption généralisée, il faisait quand même bon vivre). Le résultat est désastreux : la corruption est toujours là, mais les touristes ont disparu. Par contre, les réfugiés affluent, libyens, mais également tchadiens, soudanais, nigériens, somaliens, maliens, éthiopiens, victimes du nouvel esclavagisme.
Le même Alain Cagnat réalise ensuite un panorama étourdissant et presque complet du monde musulman, depuis le Maroc à l’ouest jusqu’au Pakistan, en passant par l’Algérie, la Tunisie, la Libye, l’Egypte, le Liban, la Jordanie, la Syrie, Israël, l’Arabie saoudite, les EAU, le sultanat d’Oman, le Koweit, le Qatar, Bahrein, le Yémen, la Turquie, l’Irak, l’Iran et l’Afghanistan. Une encyclopédie !
Jean Haudry, qui a pris part à la 27e université annuelle du Club de l’Horloge sur le thème ‘La France en faillite’, en souligne, avec l’importance, la qualité des communications présentées par Didier Maupas, Jean-Yves Le Gallou, François-Georges Dreyfus, Bertrand Lemennicier, Henry de Lesquen, Laurent Artur du Plessis, Jean-Jacques Rosa et Yvan Blot. Pierre Millan, qui en a réalisé à titre de conclusion la synthèse, suggère ‘pour remettre l’Etat au service de la Nation’ une série de mesures, notamment le referendum d’initiative populaire et la sortie de l’euro et de l’Union européenne. Pour Jean Haudry, cette rupture est un préalable indispensable, puisque l’UE s’oppose à toute mesure d’intérêt national et même d’ordre public. Il approuve le referendum, qui vient encore de faire ses preuves en Suisse. Mais il objecte que serait inopérante la réinsertion proposée du FN dans la droite, témoin l’engagement de cette dernière à l’égard du B’nai Brith, engagement qu’elle tient depuis 25 ans avec une rigueur significative à la différence de ses traditionnelles inconstances.

"Le choc de l'histoire" de Dominique Venner

« Le choc de l'histoire » de Dominique Venner : un livre lumineux

Ex: http://www.polemia.com/


Après Histoire et tradition des Européens, 30.000 ans d'identité et Le siècle de 1914, Utopie, guerres et révolutions en Europe au XXe siècle, Dominique Venner publie un nouveau livre majeur : Le choc de l’histoire : religion, mémoire, identité. « Français d’Europe, Européen de langue française d’ascendance celtique et germanique », Dominique Venner y fait preuve « d’optimisme historique ». Aujourd’hui en « dormition », les nations de civilisation européenne se réveilleront. Fruit d’une profonde méditation en forme de testament intellectuel, Le choc de l’histoire est un livre lumineux que Jean-Yves Le Gallou présente ici aux lecteurs de Polémia.

1- L’Europe en dormition

A la suite de la catastrophe européenne des deux grandes guerres, l’Europe est entrée en dormition en 1945. Elle recule sur tous les plans. Elle est soumise à la puissance américaine. Elle est culpabilisée sous les prétextes de la « Shoah », de la colonisation et de l’esclavage. « Le monde blanc est en recul général ». Les nations européennes se sont vues imposées « la domination sans partage de puissances et d’idéologies étrangères, dont la pseudo-Union européenne est le produit. » Sous couvert de libéralisme le pouvoir est aux mains « d’oligarchies prédatrices associées aux médias ». De plus – et à la différence de l’Inde, du Japon ou de la Chine - « l’Europe n’a pas de religion identitaire ». Car pour l’auteur, si le christianisme porte une part de l’héritage européen, il est universel : et l’universalisme qui fut un atout de l’Europe au temps de sa puissance se retourne contre elle au moment où notre continent subit une immigration de masse.

2- Le cycle historique commencé en 1914 touche à son terme

Comment dans ces conditions être optimiste ? D’abord parce que le cycle historique commencé en 1914 arrive à son terme. En 1917, sur les ruines de l’ordre ancien aristocratique, quatre idéologies sont nées et ont prospéré : le fascisme, le national-socialisme, le communisme et le mondialisme anglo-saxon. Le fascisme et le national socialisme ont disparu en 1945. Le communisme en 1989. Dans Le siècle de 1914 paru en 2006, Dominique Venner prédisait la chute du mondialisme anglo-saxon. Les crises financières à répétition et le désastre budgétaire américain ont confirmé depuis ce point de vue. On peut d’ailleurs se demander si Dominique Venner n’a pas eu tort de dater de 1989 (la chute du communisme) la fin du XXe siècle ; la date à retenir ne serait-ce pas plutôt 2007, le début de la fin de l’empire américain ?

3- La chute de l’Amérique va libérer les nations européennes

Quoiqu’il en soit, la chute de la domination américaine va libérer les nations européennes. Elle va affaiblir leurs oligarchies dominantes (économiques, médiatiques, politiques, culturelles) qui ne sont que le reflet des intérêts de Wall street, du Pentagone et de leurs alliés. Comme les dépêches de Wikileaks le révèlent, elle va permettre de s’affranchir d’un modèle économique technomorphe et marchand, trop réducteur pour être conforme à la mentalité européenne.

4- Face à l’immigration de masse, un réveil civilisationnel

Face à l’immigration de masse les réactions se font aussi jour : « des signes de réveil populaires apparaissent dans toute l’Europe occidentale montrant que les Européens commencent à retrouver une conscience de soi ». La vitalité des partis populistes, partout en Europe, en témoigne. Mais au-delà de cette analyse politique, Dominique Venner souligne à juste titre que l’opposition entre l’Europe et les masses musulmanes présentes sur son sol se cristallise sur le statut et l’image de la femme : pour une raison majeure, ce sont deux civilisations, deux représentations du monde qui s’affrontent. Or « Les grandes civilisations ne sont pas des régions sur une planète, ce sont des planètes différentes » (René Marchand, cité par l’auteur). La réaction à l’immigration ne relève pas d’une vulgaire xénophobie mais d’un réveil civilisationnel.

5 -  La mémoire identitaire : Homère et les humanités

Cet exemple aide à percevoir le rôle de la mémoire identitaire. La mémoire identitaire qui vient du fond des âges. Dominique Venner donne ici une très belle définition de la tradition. Ce n’est pas la nostalgie, « c’est tout le contraire, ce n’est pas le passé, c’est même ce qui ne passe pas. Elle nous vient du plus loin mais elle est toujours actuelle. Elle est notre boussole intérieure, l’étalon des normes qui nous conviennent et qui ont survécu à tout ce qui a été fait pour nous changer » (…) « L’histoire européenne des comportements pourrait être décrite comme le cours d’une rivière souterraine invisible et pourtant réelle. La rivière souterraine de la tradition ». Et Dominique Venner de revenir sur un de ses sujets de préoccupation : « l’Europe n’a pas de religion identitaire » [puisque le christianisme est universel] mais elle possède une « riche mémoire identitaire ». Pour Dominique Venner la cité grecque et Homère en sont le cœur : Homère qui « nous a légués nos principes de vie : la nature comme socle, l’excellence comme but, la beauté comme horizon ». Sans doute certains pourront-ils être tentés d’élargir ce point de vue à ce que furent les humanités classiques, modèle de l’honnête homme européen de 1500 à 1960.

6 - Revisiter l’héritage : monde prométhéen, monde apollinien

Dominique Venner ne nie pas la part de responsabilité de l’Occident dans la domination arrogante du machinisme, de la technique, du commerce ; dans le triomphe de ce que Heidegger appelle le « Gestell », la raison utilitaire. Ce qu’un autre philosophe de l’histoire Spengler appelait la part prométhéenne, la part faustienne de la civilisation européenne. Dominique Venner appelle lui à réhabiliter la part apollinienne de la civilisation européenne qui est caractérisée par l'ordre, la mesure, la maîtrise de soi. Il est aussi permis de penser à Orphée à qui précisément Apollon donna des dons de communion avec la nature. Communion avec la nature que l’auteur évoque en se définissant ainsi : « Je suis du pays de l’arbre et de la Forêt, du chêne et des sangliers, de la vigne et des toits pentus, des chansons de geste et des contes de fée, du solstice d’hiver et de la Saint Jean d’été ».

7- Le cœur rebelle et la bataille des mots

Loin de ces perspectives bucoliques, Dominique Venner n’oublie pas ses engagements de jeunesse dans le combat français sur l’Algérie ; engagement qui lui coûta dix-huit mois de prison en échange… d’une formation historique vécue. Cela vaut au lecteur de beaux passages sur Le cœur rebelle, titre d’un ouvrage paru en 1994. Car le cœur doit être « aventureux » pour se libérer du conformisme du politiquement correct et de la persuasion clandestine de la pub : « Le cœur aventureux se reconnaît à ce qu’il tire son plaisir de ce qui pour les autres serait un enfer ». Comment ne pas penser à la diabolisation et à son parfum capiteux. Autre définition, celle qu’on trouve dans Le Hussard sur le toit de Giono ; « Sois toujours très imprudent, mon petit, c’est la seule façon d’avoir un peu de plaisir à vivre dans notre époque de manufacture. » Dominique Venner souligne ici l’importance du courage moral (très différent du courage physique comme le comportement des militaires en est souvent l’illustration). Un courage moral qui doit être utilisé pour « se libérer de la peur ou de la fascination des mots ». Car le retour sur le devant de l’histoire des nations européennes passe aussi par la bataille du vocabulaire.

8- Le réveil européen : l’inattendu qui vient

Il n’y a pas de nécessité ni de déterminisme historiques. Les uchronies auraient pu survenir. L’effet papillon existe aussi en histoire. Celle-ci est le domaine de « l’inattendu ».Telle est la conviction de Dominique Venner : « Le monde est entré dans une nouvelle histoire où l’imprévu historique retrouve ses droits. Ce qui bouge ne peut-être que favorable à un réveil européen par ébranlement de la puissance suzeraine que sont les Etats-Unis. (…) « Je crois aux qualités spécifiques des Européens qui sont provisoirement en dimension. Je crois à leur individualité agissante, à leur inventivité et au réveil de leur énergie. Le réveil viendra. Quand ? Je l’ignore. Mais de ce réveil je ne doute pas. » N’oublions pas que « les réveils historiques sont toujours très lents, mais une fois commencés, on ne les arrête plus ».

9 - Le sang et l’esprit

Et en attendant que faut-il faire ? Transmette ! Transmette la vie, transmettre la culture. Génétique et mémétique. Le sang et l’esprit. L’avenir appartient à ceux qui ont la mémoire la plus longue !

Jean-Yves Le Gallou

Dominique Venner, (entretien avec Pauline Lecomte) Le choc de l’histoire : Religion, mémoire, identité, Editions Via Romana, sortie 10 septembre 2011, 185 pages.

jeudi, 08 septembre 2011

Le Yogi et le commissaire

Ex : http://zentropa.splinder.com/post/25473109/le-yogi-et-le-commissaire

Le yogi et le commissaire

yogi.jpgFutur auteur de Le zéro et l’infini, Arthur Koestler avait joué un rôle important dans la guerre d’Espagne comme agent du Komintern. Par ses écrits, il avait donné le ton d’une propagande antifranquiste qui a perduré. Plus tard, ses déceptions firent de lui un critique acéré du stalinisme. À l’été 1942, il publia un texte qui marquait sa rupture : Le yogi et le commissaire. Deux théories, écrivait-il, prétendent libérer le monde des maux qui l’accablent. La première, celle du commissaire (communiste) prône la transformation par l’extérieur. Elle professe que tous les maux de l’humanité, y compris la constipation, peuvent et doivent être guéris par la révolution, c’est-à-dire par la réorganisation du système de production. À l’opposé, la théorie du yogi pense qu’il n’y a de salut qu’intérieur et que seul l’effort spirituel de l’individu, les yeux sur les étoiles, peut sauver le monde. Mais l’histoire, concluait Koestler, avait consacré la faillite des deux théories. La première avait débouché sur les pires massacres de masse et la seconde conduisait à tout supporter passivement. C’était assez bien vu et totalement désespérant.

C’était bien vu à une réserve près. Pourquoi fallait-il donc « sauver » le monde ? Et le sauver de quoi au juste ? La réponse était dans la vieille idée de la Chute et dans celle, plus récente, du Progrès. L’une et l’autre impliquaient l’idée de salvation. Si les théories opposées du yogi et du commissaire avaient fait tant d’adeptes au XXe siècle en Occident, c’est qu’on avait pris l’habitude depuis longtemps de penser la vie en termes de rédemption ou d’émancipation.

Il n’en avait pas toujours été ainsi. La Grèce antique, par exemple, avait une approche toute différente, assez voisine de celle du Japon traditionnel. Nulle intention de changer le monde, mais la volonté de construire et de conduire sa vie en visant l’excellence. C’était une forme de spiritualité vécue dans l’immanence, mais on ne le savait pas. Elle avait sa source dans l’œuvre d’Homère que Platon appelait « l’éducateur de la Grèce ». Homère avait exprimé un idéal éthique, celui du kalos kagathos, l’homme beau et noble. Idéal aristocratique qui devint celui de tous les Grecs à l’époque classique. Seulement, cet idéal n’a jamais été regardé comme une spiritualité. Au contraire, les philosophes l’ont souvent dénigré en laissant entendre que seules leurs spéculations conduisaient à la sagesse.

En dépit de tout, pourtant, cet idéal n’a pas cessé d’irriguer une part essentielle du comportement européen le plus noble, mais jamais de façon explicite. Lacune due notamment à un parfait contresens sur l’idée de spiritualité.

Il faut comprendre que la spiritualité ne se confond pas avec les mystiques du vide. Elle est indépendante du surnaturel. Elle est ce qui élève au-dessus de la matérialité brute et de l’utilitaire, donnant un sens supérieur à ce qu’elle touche. Les pulsions sexuelles appartiennent à la matérialité, tandis que l’amour est spiritualité. Le travail, au-delà du désir légitime de rémunération, s’il a le gain pour seule finalité, patauge dans le matérialisme, alors que, vécu comme accomplissement, il relève de la spiritualité. Autrement dit, ce qui importe n’est pas ce que l’on fait, mais comment on le fait. Viser l’excellence de façon gratuite, pour la beauté qu’elle apporte et qu’elle fonde, est la forme européenne de la spiritualité, qu’il s’agisse de l’embellissement de la demeure par la maîtresse de maison, de l’abnégation du soldat ou du dressage équestre.

Ces réflexions peuvent sembler futiles face aux grands enjeux historiques de notre temps. En réalité, la spiritualité et son contraire commandent largement ces derniers. À la différence des animaux, les hommes ne sont pas programmés par l’instinct. Leur comportement dépend de leurs représentations morales, religieuses ou idéologiques, donc spirituelles.

Faute d’avoir été formulée, reconnue et revendiquée, l’authentique spiritualité européenne est ignorée. Et plus on avance dans l’ère de la technique triomphante, plus elle est masquée par un matérialisme étouffant. D’où l’attrait illusoire pour les spiritualités orientales, le « yogi » comme disait Koestler. Pour renaître, ce n’est pourtant ni sur les bord du Gange ni au Tibet que les Européens se laveront des souillures de l’époque, mais à leurs propres sources.

► Dominique Venner.


dimanche, 04 septembre 2011

Entretien avec Dominique Venner

Entretien avec Dominique Venner

jeudi, 01 septembre 2011

Boreas Rising

amazone 01.jpg

Boreas Rising:
White Nationalism & the Geopolitics of the Paris-Berlin-Moscow Axis, Part 1

By Michael O'MEARA

Ex: http://www.counter-currents.com/ 

 “History is again on the move.”
—Arnold Toynbee

For a half-century, we nationalists stood with the “West” in its struggle against the Asiatic Marxism of the Soviet bloc. There was little problem then distinguishing between our friends and our foes, for all evil was situated in the collectivist East and all virtue in the liberal West.

Today, things are much less clear. Not only has the Second American War on Iraq revealed a profound geopolitical divide within the West, the social-political order associated with it now subverts our patrimony in ways no apparatchik ever imagined. Indeed, it seems hardly exaggerated to claim that Western elites (those who Samuel Huntington calls the “dead souls”)[1] have come to pose the single greatest threat to our people’s existence.

For some, this threat was discovered only after 1989. Yet as early as the late forties, a handful of white nationalists, mainly in Europe, but with the American Francis Parker Yockey at their head, realized that Washington’s postwar order, not the Soviet Union, represented the greater danger to the white biosphere.[2] Over the years, particularly since the fall of Communism, this realization has spread, so that a large part of Europe’s nationalist vanguard no longer supports the West, only Europe, and considers the West’s leader its chief enemy.[3]

For these nationalists, the United States is a kind of anti-Europe, hostile not only to its motherland, but to its own white population. The Managerial Revolution of the thirties, Jewish influence in the media and the academy, the rise of the national security state and the military-industrial complex have all had a hand in fostering this anti-Europeanism, but for our transatlantic cousins its roots reach back to the start of our national epic. America’s Calvinist settlers, they point out, saw themselves as latter-day Israelites, who fled Egypt (Europe) for the Promised Land. Their shining city on the hill, founded on Old Testament, not Old World, antecedents, was to serve as a beacon to the rest of humanity. America began—and thus became itself—by casting off its European heritage. The result was a belief that America was a virtuous land, dedicated to liberty and equality, while Europe was mired in vice, corruption, and tyranny. Then, in the eighteenth century, this anti-Europeanism took political form, as the generation of 1776 fashioned a new state based on Lockean/Enlightenment principles, which were grafted onto the earlier Calvinist ones. As these liberal modernist principles came to fruition in the twentieth century, once the Christian, Classical vestiges of the country’s “Anglo-Protestant core” were shed, they helped legitimate the missionary cosmopolitanism of its corporate, one-world elites, and, worse, those extracultural, anti-organic, and hedonistic influences hostile to the European soul of the country’s white population.[4]

This European nationalist view of our origins ought to trouble white nationalists committed to a preserving America’s European character, for, however slanted, it contains a not insignificant kernel of truth. My intent here is not to revisit this interpretation of our history, but to look at a development that puts it in a different racial perspective. So as not to wander too far afield, let me simply posit (rather than prove) that the de-Europeanizing forces assailing America’s white population are only superficially rooted in the Puritan heritage. The Low Church fanatics who abandoned their English motherland and inclined America to a biblical enterprise, despite their intent, could not escape their racial nature, which influenced virtually every facet of early American life. Indeed, the paradox of America is that it began not simply as a rejection but also as a projection of Europe. Thus, beyond their ambivalent relationship to Europe, Americans (until relatively recently) never had any doubt that their race and High Culture were European. As such, they showed all the defining characteristics of the white race, taming the North American continent with little more than rifles slung across their backs, and doing so in the European spirit of self-help, self-reliance, and fearlessness. As Francis Parker Yockey writes: “America belongs spiritually, and will always belong to the [European] civilization of which it is a colonial transplantation, and no part of the true America belongs to the primitivity of the barbarians and fellaheen outside of this civilization.”[5]

As long, then, as Americans were of Anglo-Celtic (or European) stock, with racially conscious standards, their Calvinist or liberal ideology remained of secondary importance. Our present malaise, I would argue, stems less from these ideological influences (however retarding) than from a more recent development—the Second World War—whose world-transforming effects were responsible for distorting and inverting our already tenuous relationship to Europe. For once our motherland was conquered and occupied (what the apologists of the present regime ironically refer to as its “liberation”) and once the new postwar system of transnational capital was put in place, a New Class of powers with a vested interest in de-Europeanizing America’s white population was allowed to assume command of American life. The result is the present multiracial system, whose inversion of the natural order negates the primacy of our origins and promises our extinction as a race and a culture. The only possibility of escaping its annihilating fate would seem, then, to be another revolutionary transformation of the world order—one that would throw the existing order into crisis and pose an alternative model of white existence. The “Paris-Berlin-Moscow Axis” formed during the recent Iraq war, I believe, holds out such a possibility.

Genesis of an Axis

As part of its Mobiles Géopolitique series, the Franco-Swiss publisher L’Age d’Homme announced in April 2002 the release of Paris-Berlin-Moscou: La voie de l’indépendance et de la paix (Paris-Berlin-Moscow: The Way of Peace and Independence). Authored by Henri de Grossouvre, the youngest son of a prominent Socialist party politician, and prefaced by General Pierre Marie Gallois, France’s premier geostrategic thinker, Paris-Berlin-Moscou argued that Europe would never regain its sovereignty unless it threw off American suzerainty and did so in alliance with Russia.

In recommending a strategic alliance between France, Germany, and Russia for the sake of a Eurasian federation stretching from the Atlantic to the Pacific, Grossouvre’s thesis seemed entirely utopian. For although the prospect of such an alliance had long animated the imagination of revolutionary nationalists, it seemed more fantasy than possibility, even when proposed by a well-connected and reputable member of the governing elites. Fantasy, however, rather unexpectedly took hold of the international arena. Within months of the book’s publication, its thesis assumed a life of its own, as the new Likudized administration in Washington started beating the drums for another war on Iraq.

The axis and the war it sought to avoid will be looked at in the following sections. Here, a few words on Grossouvre’s book are in order, for, besides being one of those novel cases where life seemed to imitate art, it stirred the European public, was extensively reviewed, led to the organization of several international conferences attended by diplomats, military leaders, and parliamentarians, and culminated in a website with over two thousand pages of documentation.[6] Its effect on the European—especially on the anti-liberal—spirit has been profound. If the axis it proposes is stabilized as an enduring feature of the international order (and much favors that), a realignment as significant as 1945 could follow.

Paris-Berlin-Moscou begins by acknowledging the common values linking America and Europe, the so-called Atlantic community, as well as the US role in guaranteeing European security during the Cold War. On both these counts, the author’s establishment ties are evident, for no anti-liberal views the Atlantic relationship in quite such uncritical terms. Nevertheless, in arguing that these two factors no longer justify Europe’s dependence on the United States, he breaks with the prevailing system (or at least what was the prevailing system) of strategic thought.

In Grossouvre’s view, Europe’s geopolitical relationship to the United States was fundamentally altered between 1989 and 1991, when Eastern Europe threw off its Soviet yoke, Germany reunified, and Russia called off the Communist experiment begun in 1917. Then, as Europe’s strategic dependence on the US came to an end, so too did its heteronomy.[7] Moreover, it is only a matter of time, Grossouvre predicts, before Russia recovers, China develops, and US power is again challenged. In the meantime, US efforts to perpetuate its supremacy, defend its neo-liberal system of global market relations, and stifle potential threats to its dominance are transforming it into a force of international instability. But even if this were not the case, Grossouvre contends that Europeans would still need to separate themselves from America’s New World Order (NWO), for their independence as a people is neither a luxury nor a vanity, but requisite to their survival.[8] For as Carl Schmitt contends, it is only in politically asserting itself that a people truly exists—conscious of its place in history, oriented to the future, and secure in its identity.[9]

Europe’s ascent—and here Grossouvre most distinguishes himself from the reigning consensus—will owe little to the European Union (EU). Although its GNP is now approaching that of the US; its share of world imports and exports is larger; its manufacturing capacity and productivity are greater; its population is larger, more skilled, and better educated; its currency, the euro, sounder; and its indebtedness qualitatively lower, the EU does not serve Europe in any civilizational sense.[10] Its huge unwieldy bureaucracy serves only Mammon, which means it lacks a meaningful political identity and hence the means to play an international role commensurate with its immense economic power. It indeed caricatures the “European idea,” representing a technocratic economism without roots and without memory, focused on market exchanges and financial orthodoxies that are closer in spirit to America’s neo-liberal model than to anything native to Europe’s own tradition. (As one French rightist argues, “Every time the technocrats in Brussels speak, they profane the idea of Europe.”)[11] The EU’s growth has, in fact, gone hand in hand with the weakening of its various member states—and the corresponding failure to replace them with a continental or federal alternative.[12] Given its current enlargement to twenty-five members, political unity has become an even more remote prospect, particularly in that many of the new East European members lack any sense of the European idea.

A strong centralized state, however, is key to Europe’s future. Since the Second World War, power is necessarily continental: Only a Großraum (large space), a geopolitically unified realm animated by a “distinct political idea,” has a role to play in today’s world.[13] Yet even with the dissolution of the East-West bloc, a continental state is not likely to emerge from the EU’s expanding market system. If earlier state-building is any guide (think of Garibaldi’s Italy, Kara-George’s Serbia, Pearse’s Ireland, or Washington’s America), political unification requires a vision, a mobilizing project, emanating from a history of blood and struggle. As Jean Thiriart writes: “One does not create a nation with speeches, pious talk, and banquets. One creates a nation with rifles, martyrs, jointly lived dangers.”[14] For Grossouvre, this mobilizing vision is De Gaulle’s Grande Europe: a political-civilizational Großraum pivoted on a Franco-German confederation (encompassing Charlemagne’s Francs de l’Ouest et Francs de l’Est), allied with Russia, and forged in opposition to the modern Carthage.

The three great continental peoples, he believes, constitute the potential “core” around which a politically federated Europe will coalesce. Like De Gaulle, who refused to accept his country’s defeat in 1940 and who fought all the rest of his life against the conquerors of 1945, Grossouvre views the entwined cultures of the French, Germans, and Russians as fundamentally different from les Anglo-Saxons (the English and the Americans), whose thalassocratic, Low Church, and market-based order favors a rootless, economic definition of national life. Accordingly, for most of her history, with the tragic exception of the 1870–1940 period, France’s great enemy was “perfidious Albion,” not Germany.[15] Then, after 1945, this larger historical relationship was resumed, as numerous cooperative ventures succeeded in blunting nationalist antagonisms—to the point that war between them is now inconceivable.[16] Finally, in 1963, when De Gaulle and Konrad Adenauer signed the Treaty of Elysée, their reconciliation was formalized on the basis of an institutionalized system of social, economic, and political collaborations. Their supranational commitment to Europe has since had a powerful synergetic effect, influencing virtually every significant measure undertaken in the name of continental unity. The complementary nature of these closely related peoples has, in fact, triumphed over the political disunity that came with the Treaty of Verdun (843).[17] While a confederation between France and Germany is probably still on the distant horizon, the history of the last 60 years suggests that their national projects are converging.[18] Until then, they are likely to continue to speak with a single voice, for France and Germany are more than two states among the EU’s twenty-five. In addition to being the crucible of European civilization, their combined populations (142 million), their economic power (41 per cent of the EU), and, above all, their capacity to transcend national interests make them special—the nucleus, the motor, the vanguard of a potentially united Europe. Whatever political organization the EU eventually achieves will undoubtedly be one of their doing.

A somewhat different convergence is also under way in the East. The fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and Germany’s ensuing reunification shifted Europe’s center of gravity eastward. The EU’s enlargement to Eastern Europe this year moved it even farther in this direction. The consolidation of Europe’s eastward expansion hinges, though, on Russia, whose white, Christian people, as the historian Dieter Groh argues, represents one of the great primeval stirrings of the European conscience.[19] (It was the Roman Catholic Church, in its schism with Orthodox Christianity in 1054, not Russia’s history, culture, or racial disposition that kept it from being recognized as a European nation.) France has ancient ties with Russia and today shares many of the same geopolitical interests. But it is Germany that is now most involved in Russian life. She is Russia’s chief trading partner, her banks are the chief source of Russian investment capital, and her 1800 implanted entrepreneurs the leading edge of Russian economic development.[20] Thanks to these ties, along with bimonthly meetings between Russia’s Vladimir Putin and Germany’s Gerhard Schröder, Russia is presently engaged in numerous joint ventures with the EU. Together, they have put seven communications satellites into orbit, developed a global positioning system (Galileo) to rival the American one (GPS), signed numerous agreements in the field of aerospace research, given one another consultative voice in the other’s military operations, upgraded and expanded the roads, canals, and railways linking them, brokered a series of deals related to gas and energy, and established an elaborate system of cultural exchanges. Visa-free travel between Russia and the EU is expected by 2007. And though Russia is too big to be integrated into the EU, she is nevertheless developing relations with it that portend ones of even greater strategic significance.

Russia also sees its future in Europe. Since the collapse of Communism and the imposition of what critical observers characterize as a “Second Treaty of Versailles,” it has been on life-support.[21] The economy is in shambles, the state discredited, society afflicted with various pathologies, and its former empire shattered. The appointment of Vladimir Putin in 1999 and his subsequent election as president in 2000 and again in 2004 represent a potential turnaround (even if he is not the ideal person to lead Russia). Full recovery is probably still far off, but it has begun and Europe—its capital, markets, and expertise—is necessary to it. Putin also believes Europe’s growing estrangement from America’s unilateral model of hegemony will eventually lead it into a collective security pact with Russia.[22] Having distanced himself from the pro-American regime of the corrupt Yeltsin, whose liberal market policies were an excuse to plunder the accumulated wealth of the Russian people, and having had his various efforts at rapprochement rebuffed by the Bush administration (which continues to encroach on Russia’s historical spheres of interest), this Deutsche im Kreml now looks to exploit his German connections to gain a wedge in European affairs.[23]

His Eurocentric policies are already assuming strategic form, for Russia’s vast oil reserves have the potential of satisfying all of Europe’s energy needs. (As russophobes say, Russia will build her hegemony in Europe with pipelines.) To consolidate these emerging East-West exchanges, Russia has recently received a €400 million grant to modernize its institutional, legal, and administration apparatus to accord with the EU’s. At the same time, tariffs on Russian imports have been slashed (50 percent of Russian exports now go to the EU) and the EU is sponsoring Russia’s admission to the World Trade Organization. Putin’s arrest of the oligarch Mikhail Khodorkovsky, one of the principal proponents of US-style “casino capitalism,” and the seizure of his massive Yukos oil concern, the resignation of the last Yeltsin holdovers, especially Alexander Voloshin; and an ongoing series of internal reforms, however incomplete, represent further steps toward a restoration of Russian state power.[24] Finally, Russia possesses the military capacity, even in its debilitated state, to guarantee Europe’s security, for in a period when America’s “new liberal imperialism” runs roughshod over European concerns, threatening endless conflicts detrimental to their interests, Russia suddenly becomes a credible defense alternative.[25]

Grossouvre concludes that an axis based on France’s political leadership, Germany’s world class economy, and Russia’s military might represent the potential nucleus of a future Eurasian state. Five distinct advantages, he argues, would follow from such a rapprochement: It would guarantee Europe’s independence from America, correct certain imbalances in the globalization process, enhance the EU’s security, solve its energy needs, and complement the different qualities of its allied members. If such an axis draws the chief continental powers into a more enduring alliance, it will inevitably reshape the international order, making the white men of the North—the Boreans—the single most formidable force in the world.[26] It should come as no surprise, then, that Grossouvre’s most strident critics are to be found in those former left-wing Jewish ranks (as represented by Bernard-Henri Lévy, André Gluckmann, Alain Finkielkraut, etc.), who, like our home-grown neocons, champion the raceless, deculturated policies of Washington’s New World Order.


1. Samuel P. Huntington, Who Are We? The Challenge to America’s National Identity (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2004), pp. 264ff.

2. Francis Parker Yockey, The Enemy of Europe (Reedy, W.V,: Liberty Bell Publications, 1981). In this same period, a related argument can be found in the works of Maurice Bardèche, Julius Evola, Otto Strasser, and, later, Jean Thiriart.

3. For example: Claudio Finzi, “‘Europe’ et ‘Occident’: Deux concepts antagonistes,” Vouloir (May 1994); Guillaume Faye, Le système à tuer les peuples (Paris: Copernic, 1981).

4. For example, Robert de Herte (Alain de Benoist) et Hans-Jürgen Nigra (Giorgio Locchi), “Il était une fois l’Amérique,” Nouvelle Ecole 27–28 (Fall 1975); Robert Steuckers, “La menace culturelle américaine” (January 16, 1990), http://foster.20megsfree.com [2]; Reinhard Oberlercher, “Wesen und Verfall Amerikas” (n.d.), http://www.deutsches-kolleg.org [3]

5. Francis Parker Yockey, “The Destiny of America” (1955), http://www.counter-currents.com/2011/06/the-destiny-of-america/ [4]

7. Emmanuel Todd, Après l’empire: Essai sur la décomposition du système américain (Paris: Gallimard, 2002); Charles A. Kupchan, The End of the American Era: U.S. Foreign Policy and the Geopolitics of the 21st Century (New York: Knopf, 2002).

8 Henri de Grossouvre, Paris-Berlin-Moscou: La voie de l’indépendence et de la paix (Lausanne: L’Age d’Homme, 2002), p. 47.

9 Carl Schmitt, The Concept of the Political, tr. by G. Schwab (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996), p. 53.

10 Robert Went, “Globalization: Can Europe Make a Difference?,” EAEPE 2003 conference paper, http://eaepe.infomics.nl/papers/Went.pdf [6]

11. Louis Vinteuil, “Discours sur l’Europe” (July 20, 2004), http://www.voxnr.com

12. Pierre-Marie Gallois, Le consentement fatal: L’Europe face aux Etats-Unis (Paris: Seuil, 2001).

13. In 1943, at the height of the Second World War, Pierre Drieu La Rochelle wrote: “The national era has come to an end and an age of [continental] empires is dawning.” See Révolution Nationale: Articles 1943–44 (Paris: L’Homme Libre, 2004), p. 7. Theoretically, the notion of a European Großraum was worked out in Carl Schmitt, Der Nomos der Erde im Völkerrecht des Jus Publicum Europaeum (Cologne: Greven Verlag, 1950); its most impressive programmatic formulation is Jean Thiriart, Un empire de 400 millions d’hommes: L’Europe (Brussels, 1964).

14. Jean Thiriart, For the European Nation-State (Paraparaumu, NZ: Renaissance Press Pamphlet,  n.d.).

15. Pauline Schnapper, La Grande Bretagne et l’Europe: Le grand malentendu (Paris: Eds. Presses de Sciences Po, 2000); Christian Schubert, Grossbritannien: Insel zwischen den Welten (Munich: Olzog, 2004).

16. Brigitte Sauzay, “L’Allemagne et la France: Quel avenir pour la coopération?” (n.d.), http://geogate.geographie.uni-marburg.de [7]

17. This treaty divided Charlemagne’s empire, separating the Germanic tribes of the West from those of the East. In one respect, the fratricidal history of nineteenth and twentieth century nationalism was a history of this separation.

18. Blanine Milcent, “La ‘Françallemagne’ attendra,” L’Express, December 11, 2003.

19. Dieter Groh, Russland und das Selbstverständis Europas (Neuwied: Luchterhand Verlag, 1961). Also see Georges Nivat, Russie-Europe: La fin du schisme (Lausanne: L’Age d’Homme, 1993); Andreas-Renatus Hartmann, “Die neue Nachbarschaftspolitik der Europäischen Union” (April 16, 2004), http://www.boschlektoren.de [8]

20. Klaus Thörner, “Das deutsche Spiel mit Russland” (February 2003), http://www.diploweb.com

21. Nikolai von Kreitor, “Russia and the New World Order” (1996). Published years before the Iraq war, Kreitor’s article is perhaps the single most important analysis to have been made of the international situation leading up to the war. My views here are much indebted to it.

22. Wladimir Putin, “Russland glaubt an die große Zukunft der Partnerschaft mit Deutschland,” Die Zeit (April 10, 2002).

23. Alexander Rahr, “Ist Putin der ‘Deutsche’ im Kreml?” (September 2002), http://www.weltpolitik.com [9]

24. Jacques Sapir, “Russia, Yukos, and the Elections” (February 2004), worldoil.com ; “Poutine restaure l’Etat: Un entretien avec Jacques Sapir,” Politis 774 (November 6, 2002); Wolfgang Strauss, “Putin oder Chodorkowski: 14. März, eine Niederlage Amerikas” (March 29, 2004), http://staatsbriefe.de [10]

25. One sign of this capacity is the fact that in 2003, Russia became the world’s number one arms exporter. See P. Schleiter, “Defense, securité, relations internationales” (April 25, 2004), http://www.polemia.com [11]; also Yevgeny Bendersky, “Keep a Watchful Eye on Russia’s Military Technology” (July 21, 2004), http://www.pinr.com [12]

26. The notion of a possible northern imperium of white men is taken from Guillaume Faye, Le coup d’Etat mondial: Essai sur le Nouvel Impérialisme Américain (Paris: L’Æncre, 2004), pp. 183ff. On the myth of the Boreans (or Hyperboreans), see Jean Mabire, Thulé: Le soleil retrouvé des hyperboréens (Lyon: Irminsul, n.d.).

Boreas Rising:
White Nationalism & the Geopolitics of the Paris-Berlin-Moscow Axis, Part 2

A Defensive Alignment

The Paris-Berlin-Moscow axis arose in reaction to the Second American War on Iraq. It needs thus to be understood in the context of that war, which the Bush administration treated as the second phase of its war on terror, the first being the invasion of Afghanistan and the assault on the Taliban regime harboring bin Laden’s al-Qa’ida (both of which, incidentally, were, via the CIA and Pakistan’s ISI, made in the USA).[1] However much it resembled the Anglo-Afghan and Russo-Afghan wars of the nineteenth century, the American assault on Afghanistan did not provoke the kind of opposition that Iraq would, for there was still enormous sympathy for the US after “9/11.” “Victory,” moreover, came quickly, as it had for all former conquerors. The Taliban were chased from Kabul and the warring tribes associated with the US-supported Northern Alliance, which did most of the fighting on the ground, soon gained control of the countryside. While Afghanistan has since reverted to a pre-state form of regional, tribal rule (ideal for narco-terrorists) and most al-Qa’ida fighters succeeded in dispersing, the Bush administration was nevertheless able to broadcast publicly satisfying TV images of swift, forceful action.[2]

Buoyed up by the nearly effortless rout of the medieval Taliban, Bush adopted the policies recommended by his neoconservative advisers,[3] whose neo-Jacobin assertion of American power not only has nothing to do with fighting Islamic terrorism, but cloaks a Judeo-liberal vision of global domination which threatens to turn the entire Middle East into something akin to Israel’s occupation of the West Bank. Key to their vision is Iraq, whose threat to Israel has been repackaged by such Jewish propaganda mills as the Project for the New American Century as a threat to US security. Besides promoting a peculiar blend of liberal statist and Zionist strategic concerns that represents a turn (not a break) in US foreign policy, the Krauthammers, Wolfowitzes, and other sickly neocon types advising the administration seek to “Sharonize” Washington’s strategic culture. To this end, military force is designated the option of choice, and a moralistic Manichaeanism which pits the US and Israel against the world’s alleged evils is used to legitimate the most dishonorable policies.[4] As the former wastrel of the Bush dynasty signed on to this Likud-inspired agenda, he began making a case for extending his antiterror crusade to Mesopotamia. Iraq’s “Hitler-like tyrant,” he claimed, had links with al-Qa’ida and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) capable of reaching the United States.

While America’s TV-besotted masses had little difficulty swallowing his unsubstantiated argument, the rest of the world balked.[5] At this point in early 2002, the two shores of the Atlantic began pulling apart. German chancellor Gerhard Schröder was the first major European figure to oppose Bush’s war plans. He was soon joined by French president Jacques Chirac. In July 2002 they issued a joint declaration formally rejecting the US proposal, stating that the UN’s embargo and its inspectors were doing their job and that the proposed attack would only distract from the “real war on terror.” By September, Russia (whose economic situation required the good graces of Washington) hinted that it too would veto a UN resolution sanctioning war. Then, on February 10, 2003, Putin joined Chirac and Schröder in issuing a declaration condemning what one senior US intelligence officer later called “an avaricious, premeditated, unprovoked war against a foe who posed no immediate threat.”[6]

The Paris-Berlin-Moscow axis thus originated as a temporary coalition organized around a single point of agreement. Convinced that Bush had failed to make his case for war, the French, Germans, and Russians thought the evidence for al-Qa’ida links and WMD was unconvincing (we know now, by the government’s own admissions, that it was a tissue of lies, distortions, and manipulations).[7] Their coalition was nevertheless more than a response to a momentary disturbance in the world system. As one high-level Russian analyst characterized it, the coalition was a “rebellion against a unilateral America unwilling to accommodate European interests.”[8] As such, it announced a possible geopolitical power shift from the Atlantic to Eurasia.

Globalism at Gunpoint

Since the Cold War’s end, international relations have undergone changes as fundamental as those following the world-historical realignment of 1945.[9] The neoconservatives influencing Bush, in their preemptive crusade for what is tendentiously labeled “global democracy,” have been anxious to take advantage of these “shifting tectonic plates in international politics . . . before they harden again.”[10] As Robert Kagan and William Kristol, two of the chief neocon publicists, argue: There is a danger today that an unassertive US will lose control of the world order it created in 1945. Beginning with the fall of the Soviet Union, when the field was cleared of possible rivals, they believe the US should have consolidated its “benevolent hegemony,” turning the unipolar moment into the unipolar era. Instead, George I and Clinton allegedly failed to exploit the moment, further ensnaring the US in multilateral relations that compromised its power and interests.[11]

Against this trend, the Bush administration has carried out what some characterize as a “revolution in foreign policy.” Without abandoning Washington’s objective of developing a global market system based on American-style liberal-democratic principles, it now employs hegemonist methods, codified in the new Bush Doctrine, that change the way the US asserts its power abroad.[12] In this vein, the administration dismisses international laws and institutions, as it asseverates America’s unilateral right to alter the world system however it wishes, including attacking and overthrowing states deemed a threat to its security. Traditional strategies of deterrence and containment have consequently been supplanted by a proactive policy of prevention and preemption, just as ad hoc coalitions are given precedence over established alliances and collective security arrangements, regime change over negotiations with “failed” states, and ideological goals over previous notions of the national interest.[13]

The entire tenor of American power has thus altered, but against those who claim Bush has abandoned the core assumptions of the liberal internationalist tradition, the conservative Andrew J. Bacevich points out that his foreign policy innovations are largely methodological in character. For the past half century, no matter which party occupied the White House, US policy has pursued a single overarching goal: “global openness”—as in Hay’s “Open Door” imperialism—which promotes the movement of goods, peoples, and fashions into and out of world markets for the sake of US capitalist concerns.[14] Moreover, in assuming responsibility for this integrated international trading system—this “empire”—the US wins the right not only “to sell Big Macs and Disney products round the world,” but to govern the system itself.

While Bacevich’s argument is an excellent foil to those seeking to portray Bush as a revolutionary—somehow different from the Democrats who have manipulated the United States into most of the 20th century wars and played a leading role in semantically transforming “democracy” and “human rights” into the totalitarian double-speak of the NWO—Bacevich nevertheless ignores the different ways in which the two parties implement their liberal internationalist principles. Republicans, especially since Reagan, are inclined to see the growth of US national power as the precondition for sustaining their imperial system, while Democrats look to the universalization and institutionalization of their liberal principles. This disposes Republicans to a unipolar model of liberal internationalism based on military supremacy, unlike Democrats, who favor a world-government model emphasizing the economic facets of globalization and the need for international regulation. (Lately, though, the Democratic world-government types, if such influential liberal internationalists as those associated with Richard Haas of the Council on Foreign Relations and Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the Brookings Institution are any guide, seem increasingly disposed to the unipolar model; John Kerry’s neocon cloning of Bush’s foreign policy also suggests a shift toward the Republican vision.) But whether pursued by Republicans or Democrats, this liberal internationalist agenda, with its emphasis on the antitraditional and anti-Aryan forces of free trade, free markets, and open societies, has been a bane to white people everywhere—for it wars against “the fundamental value of blood and race as creators of true civilization.”[15]

In pressing into areas which were off-limits during the Cold War, Washington’s imperial market system has become increasingly aggressive. Under Clinton, the Weinberger/Powell Doctrine of avoiding military engagements unless absolutely necessary was discarded, as the “unipolar moment” ushered in by the Soviet collapse was treated as a blank check for “intervening practically wherever and whenever it chose.” In this spirit, Clinton’s Secretary of State contemplated invading Iraq and disparaged the principle of national sovereignty. Her distinction between war and the use of military force has since reoriented US policy, as military interventions overseas cease being labeled wars and become armed forms of “humanitarianism.”[16] Finally, the Clinton Doctrine of Enlargement, in championing the worldwide spread of US-style democracy and free markets (that is, the globalist assault on national identity and national institutions), privileged unilateralism (rechristened “assertive multilateralism”) over containment and disarmament.[17]

Although he avoided Bush’s swaggering brand of leadership, Clinton was only slightly less coercive in promoting the totalitarian ideology of openness.[18] It is hardly irrelevant that Iraq was bombed nearly every day of his administration, that Bosnia was turned into a US military protectorate, and that unilateral military action, in one of the great “war crimes” of the 20th century, was taken against Serbia. Though smaller in scale than Operation Iraqi Freedom, the terrorist air assault on this proud little country (whose historical role was the defense of the white borderlands) aimed at “spreading democracy” for the sake of openness. Symptomatic of the “openness” Washington favors, the Albanian Liberation Front (UCK), an Islamic, drug-smuggling, terrorist mafia with links to al-Qa’ida, was armed and trained by Clinton’s government and a quarter million Christian Serbs, whose nationalist aspirations represented an affront to the New World Order, were ethnically cleansed from Kosovo.[19] These interventions by the Clintonistas also played a leading role in destabilizing the international state system, giving rise to new stateless groups whose megaterrorism is historically unprecedented. The horror of 9/11 and the unfathomable massacre of Russian children at Beslan, not to mention numerous lesser affronts to our humanity, have roots in Clinton’s Yugoslavian intervention. Bush has simply accelerated this process, which is nourishing new, more nihilistic forms of terrorism.[20]

Although he came into office complaining of Clinton’s immodest foreign policy, Bush II has actually gone further, introducing methods which removed the existing restraints on Washington’s use of military force and whatever reservation it might have in violating national sovereignty.[21] Like Clinton, he is a man beholden to alien and dishonorable interests, and inspired by a juvenile notion of power. His “faith-based foreign policy,” like the alley-cat policies of his predecessor, privileges the liberalization of global trade relations, imposes the cosmopolitan imperatives of his corporate supporters on virtually every issue pertinent to the nation’s biocultural welfare, rejects the American tradition of “isolationism,” and runs roughshod over whoever resists an order hostile to ethnocultural particularisms (unless they take innocuous folkloric forms). He might differ with Clinton in favoring a missile defense system, a different approach to China, and a Likudnik rather than a Laborite Zionism, but he is no less committed to a global system of market democracies “open to trade and investment, and policed by the United States.” As one Marxist puts it: “Playboy Clinton, Cowboy Bush, same policy.”[22] With his “Judeo-Protestant” rhetoric of American exceptionalism and his willingness to remove the velvet glove from America’s mailed fist, Bush’s “jackbooted Wilsonianism” differs from that of his predecessor mainly in linking economic globalization to “military modernization.”

As the neoconservatives Thomas Barnett and Henry Gaffney argue, the Bush Doctrine ought to be viewed as a necessary complement to the globalizing process. They claim that before 9/11 globalization (which much of the world identifies with Americanization) was mainly economic, thought best left to business. The collapse of the Twin Towers has since (allegedly) triggered a more serious reflection on America’s role as globalism’s “system administrator.” In their view, bin Laden’s al-Qa’ida, Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, and all the “rogue states”—Bush’s “axis of evil”—act as “dangerous disconnects” from a world based on interdependence and a single framework of economic governance. (Although they refrain from taking their argument to its logical conclusion, globalization here is inadvertently revealed as the harbinger of global terror.)[23] Faced with these threats to its one-world system, the market not only needs to be policed, the US has a responsibility to maintain its harmonious functioning. Bush’s unilateralist use of force, in applying military power whenever violent “disconnects” interrupt the international flow of labor, raw materials, and energy, Barnett and Gaffney argue, aims at ensuring the security and operability of the globalizing process.[24] But what they do not mention is that once economic globalization is joined with “military globalization,” the globalizing process is not so much ensured as altered, becoming less a neutral extension of economic trends (not that it ever was simply that) and more a classic expression of imperial power. In Iraq, for instance, the American army had no sooner occupied Baghdad than its neoconservative viceroy, Paul Bremer, began to dismantle the Iraqi state, privatize the economy, open the borders to unrestricted imports (unless they came from France or Germany), and, within two weeks of his arrival, had declared that Iraq was “now open for business.”[25]

September 11, then, did not change the long-range goal of US foreign policy (global openness), only the way in which it was pursued. The restraints on military force, already compromised under Clinton, were formally thrown off and a proactive doctrine of preemption superseded the more reactive methods of containment and disarmament. At the same time, Clinton’s human rights rhetoric and “humanitarian” militarism were jettisoned for the bellicose language of “strategic vital interests” and “imperial responsibilities.” It would be misleading, however, to think the transatlantic rift was due solely to Bush’s militaristic assertion of US global interests. Long before 9/11, real policy differences had begun to emerge: over trade; agriculture; armament exports; relations with Cuba, Iran, and Korea; the Palestinian-Israeli conflict; the Echelon economic espionage system monitoring European faxes, e-mails, and phone calls; the Kyoto Protocol; globalization; the abrogation of the ABM treaty; the euro and the dollar, etc. All these differences, in one way or another, reflected Europe’s unwillingness to remain a pawn on Washington’s global chessboard.[26] In the year leading up to Iraq, as Europe sought to check Bush’s unilateralist moves, the transatlantic relationship went into crisis, forcing France and Germany to assert their autonomy sooner than they might otherwise have intended.[27]



1. Alexandre del Valle, Islamisme et Etats-Unis: Une alliance contre l’Europe (Laussanne: L’Age d’Homme, 1999).

2. Justin Raimondo, “Afghanistan: The Forgotten War” (June 21, 2004), http://antiwar.com; Elaine Sciolino, “NATO Chief Offers Bleak Analysis,” New York Times, July 3, 2004.

3. Louis R. Browning, “Bioculture: A New Perspective for the Evolution of Western Populations,” The Occidental Quarterly 4(1) (Spring 2004).

4. There is still no satisfactory treatment of neocon foreign policy. One of the better recent ones, although highly flawed, especially in ignoring its Jewish roots, is Stefan Halper and Jonathan Clarke, America Alone: Neo-Conservativism and the Global Order (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004). On neoconservatism’s racial basis, see Kevin MacDonald, “Understanding Jewish Influence III: Neoconservatism As a Jewish Movement,” The Occidental Quarterly 4(2) (Summer 2004). The previous, and in many ways, still existing strategic basis of U.S. policy is perhaps best represented by Zbigniew Brzezinski, The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives (New York: Basic Books, 1997). On the larger historical contours of U.S. foreign policy, see Walter A. McDougall, Promised Land, Crusader State: The American Encounter with the World since 1776 (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1997).

5. John Le Carré, “The United States Has Gone Completely Mad,” London Times, January 15, 2003. With some irony, one Russian general, Leonid Ivashov, characterized the U.S. media coverage of the war debate (and not simply that of Fox News) as something one might expect in a “police state.” See Johannes Voswinkel, “Schmallippig im Kreml,” Die Zeit (15/2003). For one of the more interesting critiques of the controlled media’s role in mobilizing the population behind Bush’s crusade, see David Miller, “Caught in the Matrix” (April 26, 2004), http://www.scoop.co.nz [2]

6. The anonymous author of Imperial Hubris (2004), quoted in Julian Borgen, “Bush Told He Is Playing into Bin Laden’s Hands,” The Guardian, June 19, 2004.

7. Andrew Buncombe, “Carter Savages Bush and Blair,” The Independent, March 27, 2004; David Corn, The Lies of George W. Bush (New York: Three Rivers Press, 2004); F.-B. Huyghe, “Pour en finir avec les ADM” (February 2004), http://vigirak.com [3]; the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, “WMD in Iraq” (January 2004), http://www.ceip.org [4]

8. Viatcheslav Dachitchev, “La Turkie doit-elle faire partie de l’Europe?” (July 8, 2004), http://www.voxnr.com [5]

9. Gabriel Kolko, “The U.S. Must Be Contained: The Coming Elections and the Future of American Global Power” (March 12, 2004), http://www.counterpunch.org [6]; Robert L. Hutchins, “The World after Iraq” (April 8, 2003), http://www.cia.gov

10. Norm Dixon, “What’s behind War on Terrorism? (September 2002), www.globalresearch.ca [7]

11. Robert Kagan and William Kristol, “The Present Danger,” The National Interest 59 (Spring 2000).

12. The Bush Doctrine was elaborated in three key documents, which can be accessed at http://www.whitehouse.gov [8].  They are: “Presidential Speech of 17 September 2001,” “President Bush Delivers Graduation Speech at West Point” (June 1, 2002), “The National Security Strategy of the United States of America” (September 2002).

13. François Géré, “La nouvelle stratégie des Etats-Unis” (May 2002), http://www.diploweb.com [9]; Ivo H. Daalder and John M. Lindsay, America Unbound: The Bush Revolution in Foreign Policy (Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 2003), p. 13; Chalmers Johnson, “Sorrows of Empire” (November 2003), http://www.fpif.org [10]

14. Andrew J. Bacevich, American Empire: The Realities and Consequences of U.S. Diplomacy (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2002).

15. Julius Evola, Three Aspects of the Jewish Problem (N.P.: Thomkins & Cariou, 2003), p. 36.

16. Thomas W. Lippman, Madeleine Albright and the New American Diplomacy (Boulder: Westview Press, 2004). In his treatment of the subject, James Mann suggests (correctly, in my view) that the move to military assertiveness begins, haphazardly, with George I. See Rise of the Vulcans: The History of Bush’s War Cabinet (New York: Viking, 2004), pp. 179–97.

17. Phillipe Grasset, “Finalement, Clinton sera-t-il réélu?” (June 25, 2004), http://www.dedefensa.org [11]

18. Nikolai von Kreitor, “American Political Theology” (n.d.), http://foster.20megsfree.com [12]; Mann, Rise of the Vulcans, pp. 214–15.

19. Michael A. Weinstein, “Containment or Concessions: The Eclipse of Regime Change” (June 28, 2004), http://www.yellowtimes.org [13]; Hunt Tooley, “The Bipartisan War Machine” (September 17, 2003), http://www.mises.org [14]; Pierre M. Gallois, La sang du pêtrole: Bosnie (Lausanne: L’Age d’Homme, 1996).

20. Brendan O’Neill, “Beslan: The Real International Connection” (8 September 2004), http://www.spiked-online.com [15]; David Halberstam, War in a Time of Peace: Bush, Clinton and the Generals (New York: Scribner, 2001).

21. Bacevich, American Empire, p. 199; Daalder and Lindsay, America Unbound, pp. 36–40.

22. Samir Amin, “Le contrôle militaire de la planète” (February 17, 2003), http://www.alternatives.ca [16]

23. “Globalization inevitably generates global terror. For if the U.S. claims the entire planet as its sphere of vital interests, then all the territory of the U.S. becomes a possible sphere of vital interests for global terrorists.” See Alexander Dugin, “Premiers signes de l’apocalypse” (October 18, 2004), http://www.voxnr.com [17]

24. Thomas Barnett and Henry Gaffney, “Operation Iraqi Freedom Could Be the First Step toward a Larger Goal: True Globalization,” Military Officer 1(5) (May 2003); also Thomas Barnett, The Pentagon’s New Map: War and Peace in the 21st Century (New York: Putnam, 2004). Cf. Alain Joxe, “Les enjeux stratégiques globaux après la guerre d’Iraq” (May 27, 2003), http:www.ehess.fr [17]

25. Naomi Klein, “Baghdad Year Zero: Pillaging Iraq in Pursuit of a Neocon Utopia,” Harper’s Bazaar (September 2004).

26. Charles A. Kupchan, “The End of the West,” The Atlantic Monthly (November 2002).

27. Europe’s growing alienation from the U.S. is thus not just about the latter’s unilateralist bullying. In addition to the above cited issues, it also touches on the drug-running, mafia, terrorist, and espionage networks that the U.S. operates in Europe. For example, see Rémi Kaufer, L’arme de la désinformation: Les multinationales américains en guerre contre l’Europe (Paris: Grasset, 1999); Xavier Rauffer, Le grand réveil des mafias (Paris: Lattés, 2003); Karl Richter, Tödliche Bedrohung USA: Waffen und Szenarien der globalen Herrschaft (Tübingen: Hohenrain Verlag, 2004); Alexander del Valle, Guerres contre l’Europe (Paris: Syrtes, 2001); Robert Steuckers, “Espionage par satellites, guerre cognitive, manipulation par les mafias” (November 2003), http://www.centrostudaruna.it; Thierry Meyssen, “Propagande états-unien” (January 2, 2003), http://www.reseauvoltaire.net [18]

Boreas Rising:
White Nationalism & the Geopolitics of the Paris-Berlin-Moscow Axis, Part 3

A Promising Rapprochement

In the last instance, the US-European rift of 2002–2003 followed from the Cold War’s end, which destroyed the rationale for the transatlantic alliance and hence the restraints on European autonomy. For without the Red Army on the Elbe, Europe was no longer obliged to take orders from the West Wing. Because NATO has outlived its usefulness and Bush’s unipolar security system made no accommodation to Europe’s post-Cold War status, the more self-confident Europeans have begun to distance themselves from Washington.

However headline-capturing, their modest assertion of autonomy has nevertheless been carried out in ways that are thoroughly inadequate to Europe’s independence, based as they are on principles of jurisprudence and ethics, rather than on more consequential forms of power. In Robert Kagan’s now famous characterization, Europeans are from Venus and Americans from Mars, with the former acting as if the world were governed by abstract Kantian principles, ignorant of or unwilling to acknowledge the violent Hobbesian reality which Americans, especially after 9/11, have been forced to confront.[1] In other words, Europeans look to negotiations, diplomacy, and international law to resolve international disputes, while Americans emphasize the importance of military force. These differing “perspectives and psychologies of power,” the anti-white Kagan suggests, explain something of what divides the two shores of the Atlantic.[2] But perhaps more debilitating than Europe’s “Kantianism” (which will not last) is the fact that its increasingly autonomous foreign policy is less an expression of its political identity (although it is that) than a symptom of its liberal evasion of what such an identity ought to entail.

In France, for instance, which is the sole continental country to have defended the European idea in the last half century, as well as maintained a nuclear arsenal and professional army worthy of a “power,” opposition to US unilateralism has been framed largely in liberal internationalist terms that draw attention away from the state’s failed domestic policies. Since De Gaulle’s death, France has been in decline. The population is aging, millions of inassimilable Muslim immigrants are colonizing its lands, and virtually all the major institutions are in need of reform. Having eyes only for the “poor immigrant,” the metastasizing state bureaucracy imposes unrealistic social laws that hamper production and serve as a force for national decline. At the same time, the historical sources of nationalism have been dissolved, the native French dispirited by the institutionalization of multiculturalism, and the country’s extraordinary military and diplomatic apparatus, the necessary basis of both French and European power, if not neglected, then underfunded.[3] The hoopla that comes with France’s resistance to Bush simply focuses attention away from these failures and toward geopolitical developments that are potentially key to Europe’s future, but whose import is limited by the state’s misconceived domestic policies. As Julius Evola puts it: “The measure of freedom is power.”[4] And because Europeans are now uncomfortable with the exercise of power, their freedom is necessarily limited.

It is worth recalling that Jacques Chirac was responsible for the totalitarian mobilization against the presidential candidacy of the nationalist Jean Marie Le Pen in 2002.[5] Like much of the European governing class, he is a product of the same plutocratic system that subordinates national interests to international finance, indifferent to everything associated with his people’s blood and soil.[6] Such a system, as our own experiences reveal, is incapable of producing anything other than mediocrities. In this spirit, Chirac’s opposition to Washington’s unipolar order orients to a multipolar model based on liberal market principles hostile to Europe’s unique bioculture. As Guillaume Faye points out, Chirac’s opposition to the Iraq war was motivated less by his Gaullist nationalism (which he routinely betrays) than by his pacifist and Third World politics.[7] With the 2007 presidential elections in view, his foreign policy seems, in fact, aimed at the new Muslim electorate, which thrives on his anti-American, Third World, and multilateralist posturing.[8]

Faye also claims that American power is ultimately a reflex of Europe’s refusal of power.[9] Like many commentators, he stresses that US power in this period is greatly exaggerated and goes unchecked mainly for want of challengers. Revealingly, Chirac has, for all his opposition to Bush, done little to rearm Europe and what he does do he does for the worst of reasons, neglecting Grande Europe in the name of a legalistic idealism that contradicts the biocultural foundations of European life. Rather than fixating on the illegalities and incivilities of American unilateralism (which has proven to be a paper tiger in Iraq), he and other establishment leaders would make a greater contribution to Europe’s destiny if they devoted more attention to its military, restored the basis of its national identity, and addressed the real dangers coming from the South. Worse, they wholeheartedly subscribe to the American model of ethnopluralism, communitarianism, and multiculturalism. Just as US leaders think nothing of sending troops halfway around the world to fight a war whose immediate beneficiary is Israel, ignoring the more serious security threat posed by the Third World’s incessant assaults on the country’s southern border, European elites (and the demonstrators massed behind them) trumpet their solidarity with the Islamic Middle East, whose immigrants are presently rending the fabric of European life. There are good reasons for opposing Bush’s war, but the liberal ones motivating Chirac cannot but come back to haunt the continent.

Germany’s relationship with the US is significantly different than France’s, but no less infused with noxious anti-identitarian influences. Germany was virtually remade by the Americans after 1945 and throughout the Cold War remained subservient to them. Yet Germany is slowly beginning to throw off her tutelage. Schröder nevertheless adheres to values and policies that qualify as examples of Kagan’s Kantianism (i.e., pure liberalism). More than Chirac, he upholds Washington’s earlier liberal internationalism, criticizing Bush for violating its principles.[10] (As one journalist for the Süddeutsche Zeitung writes: “We [Germans] owe a great debt to the US for contributing to our transformation into truly democratic citizens after World War II. . . . They [Americans] must forgive us if we have difficulty letting go some of the lessons we have learned.”)[11] It was thus his pacifism—his Social Democratic opposition to power per se—rather than any geopolitical ambition for a powerful Europe that seems to have prompted his opposition to the Iraq war.[12] And in this, alas, he resembles much of the German population, which prefers bourgeois comforts to those virtues that made earlier generations great. Finally, Schröder, like Chirac, supports Turkey’s admission to the EU and panders to the new “German Turk” electorate. He might therefore have been the first German chancellor since Hitler to frontally oppose Washington, but he has no intention of letting the old anti-liberal dream of white renaissance out of the bag.[13]

Despite the mediocre stature of these politicians, which makes them ill-suited to the great tasks at hand, I would argue that the “force of things”—the realities of power and the dictates of survival—is greater than those charged with carrying them out.[14] This seems especially evident in Europe’s rapprochement with Russia. For as France and Germany become increasingly alienated from the US, they lean eastward—even though French and German elites have much more in common with their American than their Russian counterparts.[15]

A rapprochement between the three great European peoples promises great things. As Karl Haushofer once said: “The day when Germans, Frenchmen, and Russians unite will be the last day of Anglo-Saxon [i.e., liberal] hegemony.”[16] Bush—and this is why his administration seems destined to achieve world-historical significance—has brought about what a century of US geostrategists have sought to prevent. Conversely, it is hardly coincidental that even at the Cold War’s height, a wing of the French military looked to Russia as a possible ally. In 1955, the prominent geostrategist, Admiral Raoul Castex, published an article titled “Moscou, rempart de l’Occident?” (Moscow, rampart of the West?), in which he wondered if Russia might not one day become “the vanguard of the white world’s defense.”[17] Today, in a period when Grande Europe—from Dublin to Vladivostok—is at peace, white nationalists in Europe and America again pose Castex’s question and again affirm the possibility that Russia has a leading role to play in the white race’s defense. Indeed, the question now possesses a qualitatively greater weight than it did a half century ago, before the Third World hordes, abetted by the West’s liberal elites, began their colonization of our lands. Russia, moreover, is not just the last white nation on earth, but the only one to have shown the slightest interest in defending its ethnoracial identity. (Our russophobic nationalists might be reminded that the former Soviet Union was the sole white power to define nationality racially.) Its heritage of nationalism, socialism, and anti-liberalism also lends it something of that “Prussian socialism” which Spengler and Yockey saw as the one viable antidote to Western liberalism.[18] In courting Russian support in their conflict with the US, French and German elites might think Putin will be converted to their misconceived Kantianism, but in the great racial-civilizational battles that lie ahead, it is far more likely that Russia’s ethnonationalism will prevail.[19]

America’s Future

Since the rise to world power of the United States, white America has been in decline. For most of the twentieth century, but especially since the end of the Second World War, the country’s overlords have taken one step after another to de-Europeanize its white population. To this end, white culture and identity have been socially re-engineered. White communities, schools, and businesses have been forced to integrate with races previously considered inferior and inimical. And, for the last 40 years, whites have been expected to replace themselves with Third World immigrants. As the biocultural identity of white Americans gives way to a universal, transnational, and global one (the ideological analogue of the New World Order), they are further alienated from who they are.[20] Against this de-Europeanization and the postnational, multiracial regime succeeding it, the small, isolated pockets of white resistance confront a seemingly impossible task—similar to the one King Canute faced when he tried to hold back the ocean tide. Because of this, I would argue that only a catastrophe will save white America. Only a catastrophic collapse of the political, institutional, and cultural systems associated with imperial America—call it the managerial state, liberal democracy, corporate capitalism, the NWO, or whatever label you prefer—holds out any possibility that a small, racially conscious vanguard of white Americans will succeed in defending their people’s existence.[21] With the Iraq war, Bush—”this Buster Keaton of the apocalypse”—has opened a Pandora’s box of catastrophes. He, in fact, has done more to discredit, weaken, and vilify the existing systems of liberal subversion than any previous president, inadvertently creating conditions that should give white Americans another chance to regain control of their destiny. In this spirit, his administration acts as “a lightning rod for catastrophes.”  As one foreign observer notes: “The paradox of the present situation is that the worse the crisis becomes, the more Washington reinforces the position that evokes so much resistance.”[22] Indeed, his “war on terror creates more monsters than its destroys.”[23] Lacking the cognitive and normative tools to deal with a complex area like the Mideast, the president ends up managing the Iraqi occupation “by the seat of his pants.”[24] And as he does, the real dangers threatening the country are totally ignored: the dangers posed by the mestizo and Asiatic colonization of our lands, the growth of US Muslim communities, the denationalization of the economy and the looming fiscal crisis of the state, the Zionist domination of the political and information systems, the replacement of truth with propaganda and disinformation, the deculturation and miscegenation of our people, and the unrelenting assault on everything associated with the “freedoms” he allegedly defends in Mesopotamia. Instead of inaugurating a new era of unchallenged American power and enhancing national security, Bush seems set on preparing their demise.[25] Since the murderous terror of 9/11, his administration has shattered the myth of American military omnipotence, tarnished the country’s moral authority, alienated its allies, squandered its once formidable diplomatic powers, created the basis of an anti-US realignment, and undermined America’s image not only as a force for democracy and order, but as a secure economic haven. This latter tendency is now causing overseas investors to think twice about sending their capital to the US, which, combined with the ballooning expenses of the Iraq war, is hastening the dollar’s decline and the country’s economic deterioration. But more than undermining American power and prestige, the Bush administration has discredited the liberal civilizational model associated with the United States, provoking, in the process, a worldwide revulsion against the “American way of life.”[26]

The simple-minded, dishonorable, and raceless character of Bush’s government—riddled with Israeli spies and unsavory influence peddlers and premised on the belief that truth is irrelevant to its political calculus—seems to epitomize nothing so much as the debilitated state of our governing classes and their inability to serve as a nation-bearing stratum. That for the first time in American history Europe is not the focus of US strategic thinking, but rather Israel, should say it all.[27] It would be misleading, though, to think the failures at the highest level of state are simply the result of an unusually incompetent administration or its alien controllers. For even the “opposition” party produces candidates who are but variants of the reigning mediocrity.[28] This suggests that the system itself is bankrupt. Not coincidentally, the telltale signs of blockage, symptomatic of regimes heading toward the abyss (or “staying the course,” as George II says), appear now with increased frequency. The great bard of our decline, H. Millard, likens America to a runaway train. “The Israel firsters, neurotics, low IQ PTA types, political opportunists, easily susceptible dupes, genocidal blenders, party loyalists, war profiteers, and opportunists of various stripes” who are at the controls either have no idea of what they are doing or an unwillingness to profess it publicly.[29]

Contrary to the pipedreams of both our conservatives and liberals, there will be no going back.[30] Like the Soviet Union in the 1980s, the US has become bogged down in a protracted war at the very moment its economy is in steep decline. The slash-and-burn policies Bush has introduced will also be extremely difficult to retract, no matter who captures the White House in 2008. But even if there were a desire to retract them, the means are lacking. For example, in 1956, when Dwight Eisenhower warned France and England not to retake the Suez Canal, after Egypt nationalized it, he was able to threaten the stability of their national currencies. Today, the dollar is itself threatened.[31] For all the fabled shock and awe of US power in this period, the country is qualitatively weaker than it was a generation ago, when it was able to rein in the largest European empires. This erosion of its economic, diplomatic, moral, and even military power, combined with the near universal opposition to its increasingly unilateral and militaristic foreign policy, cannot but provoke a geopolitical realignment. The prospect of the Iraq war spreading to Iran and elsewhere will simply compound these destabilizing forces.[32] Increased conflict abroad, growing dissent at home, and deep division within the government itself are also likely to foster decisional paralysis, further exacerbating the crisis.

But however this crisis plays out, America and Europe seem set on a collision course.[33] Already wary of Washington, France and Germany (along with Spain, Belgium, and Italy, once Berlusconi goes) will eventually have no choice but to reposition themselves in opposition to it, for their strategic imperatives are increasingly at odds. This is certain to trigger new conflicts and new alignments, compelling Europeans to reaffirm their sovereignty—and their distinct strategic identity. As they do, their cooperation is bound to deepen and their nationalist consciousness to grow. At the same time, certain mentalities will be forced to change and certain taboos to fall, including the postmodern ones that leave Europe powerless. The collapse of the Cold War alliance system also throws open the strategic-political parameters of the international arena. The future, as a consequence, now holds out several possible alternatives. The Paris-Berlin-Moscow axis may still lack credibility, but this is probably less important than the effect it has had—and will continue to have—on the European spirit. It thus promises a possible renewal. The big question is whether or not Europeans have the will and acumen to realize it.

Fundamental to virtually all schools of geopolitical thought is the notion that the augmentation of power in one part of the world inevitably comes at the expense of another part. If the Paris-Berlin-Moscow axis continues to affect the continent and shift power out of the Atlanticist camp, this cannot but destabilize the United States, for without its omnipotent dollar and its domination of global markets, it will no longer be able to consume more than it produces, to live on credit, to afford the social-welfare measures that buy off the Africans and tame the Mexicans, to sustain the social-engineering schemes discriminating against the talents and energies of its white majority, to afford the police, the drugs, the TVs, and the computer toys that narcotize its cretinized masses. The institutionalization of such an axis is also likely to dislodge America’s dominant place in the world system, setting off economic disruptions that will make it impossible for whites to live in the old way, to lose themselves in vacuous material comforts, to accept the lies that fly in the face of reality. Once this point is reached, European-Americans will be forced to act like people elsewhere who are suddenly thrown into a do-or-die situation.[34]

Like the “American Century” Henry Luce announced in 1941, the “New American Century” of Washington’s current generation of schemers and chiselers promises an even greater holocaust of our people. The future they envisage might indeed be called the New Anti-White Century. For like the order issuing from their Second World War, the one planned for the period following Iraq will not serve white America, only the alien, plutocratic, and cosmopolitan interests aligned in the current Washington-London-Tel Aviv axis.

No one should be surprised, then, that when the inevitable collapse comes, white America’s front fighters will not mourn the eclipse of the so-called American Century, for they are nationalists not in the nineteenth century sense. They do not fight for the petty-statism of the so-called “nation-state”—which is now made up of peoples from many different nations. The American, German, and French states—none of these entities any longer represent the descendants of those who founded them. As Sam Francis puts it, “the state has become the enemy of the nation.”[35] And as a thousand years of European history demonstrate, whenever the state and the nation come into conflict, the latter inevitably proves the stronger. I think it is no exaggeration to claim that only on the ruins of the existing political order will white America be reborn—and reborn not as another constitutional “nation-state” which elevates abstract rights above biocultural imperatives, but as a northern imperium of white peoples who, as Bismarck exhorted, “think with their blood.”

Those who would dismiss the Paris-Berlin-Moscow axis as a temporary happenstance, a product of convenience, inflated with purely speculative significance, should be reminded that the 21st century will decide if white people have a future or not. From this perspective, collapse and realignment are necessities—and necessities have a way of engendering the imagination appropriate to them. For when the world’s population reaches ten billion, when China, India, and all Asia challenge the white man’s dominance, when the colored multitudes crossing our borders are magnified by ten or a hundred, when oil is depleted and raw materials are used up, when all the forests have been cut down and all the cultivable lands claimed, and—hopefully—when the Paris-Berlin-Moscow axis has established an alternative realm of white existence, the ensuing chaos cannot but sunder whatever misbegotten allegiance white Americans have had to the present system. Then, in alliance with their kinsmen in Europe and Russia, they—if they are to survive as a people—will have no choice but to accept that they are made not in the multihued images of a deracinated humanity, but in that of the luminous Boreans, whose destiny opposes the darkening forces of Bush’s America.

Let us prepare for the coming collapse.


1. Robert Kagan, Of Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order (New York: Knopf, 2003), p. 3. Actually, the unreferenced metaphor originates with Denis MacShane, “Europe and America Need Each Other More Than Ever,” http://www.post-gazette.com [2]

2. Kagan, Of Paradise and Power, p. 28.

3. Guillaume Faye, La colonisation de l’Europe: Discours vrai sur l’immigration et l’Islam (Paris: L’Æncre, 2000); Nicolas Baverez, La France qui tombe (Paris: Perrin, 2004).

4. Julius Evola, Imperialismo pagano: Il fascismo dinanzi al pericolo euro-cristiano (Padua: Ar, 1996), p. 45.

5. Yves Daoudal, Le tour infernal: 21 avril–5 mai (Paris: Godefroy de Bouillon, 2003).

6. Yves-Marie Laulan, Jacques Chirac et le déclin français 1974–2002 (Paris: François-Xavier de Guilbert, 2001); Emmanuel Ratier, Le vrai visage de Jacques Chirac (Paris: Facta, 1995).

7. Faye, Le coup d’Etat mondial, p. 113.

8. Omer Taspinar, “Europe’s Muslim Streets,” Foreign Policy (MarchApril 2003).

9. As Schröder says: “Es gibt nicht zu viel Amerika, es gibt zu wenig Europa.” See “Die Krise, die Europa eint: Ein Gespräch mit Gerhard Schröder,” Die Zeit (14/2003). Cf. Philippe Grasset, “Le dilemme stratégique des U.S.A: Sa faiblesse militaire” (June 15, 2004), http://www.dedefensa.org

10. Günter Maschke, “Vereinigte Staaten sind die Macht der Unordnung,” Deutsche Stimme (June 2003).

11. Quoted in Richard Lambert, “Misunderstanding Each Other,” Foreign Affairs (March–April 2003).

12. Alexander Rar, “Europa ist Zerspaltet” (December 15, 2003), http://evrazia.org [3]

13. Edouard Husson, “Crise allemande, crise européenne?” (March 2003), http://www.diploweb.com [4]

14. As Joseph de Maistre said of the revolutionaries of 1789: “Ce ne sont point les hommes qui mènent la révolution, c’est la révolution qui emploie les hommes.” See Considérations sur la France (Lyon: Vitte, 1924), p. 7.

15. Maja Heidenreich, “Europa und Russland: Eine rückblickende und analysierende Darstellung” (n.d.), http://www.boschlektoren.de/ [5]

16. Quoted in Sacha Papovic, “De la dialectique géopolitique” (August 2003), http://www.voxnr.com.

17. Cited in “Russie-France-Allemagne” ( n.d.), http://www.paris-berlin-moscou.org [6]

18. Oswald Spengler, Preussentum und Sozialismus (Munich: Beck, 1919); K. R. Bolton, ed., Varange: The Life and Thoughts of Francis Parker Yockey (Paraparaumu, NZ: Renaissance Press, 1998), pp. 36–38. Also N. N. Alexeiev, “Raisons spirituelles de la civilisation eurasiste” (1998), http://www.voxnr.com [7]

19. W. Joseph Stoupe, “The Inevitability of a Eurasian Alliance” (August 17, 2004), http://atimes.com [8]

20. James Kurth, “The War and the West,” Orbis (Spring 2002).

21. Guillaume Faye, Avant-Guerre: Chronique d’un cataclysme annoncé (Paris: L’Æncre, 2002).

22. Philippe Grasset, “Comment Rumsfeld devient le garante de l’aventure irakienne” (May 11, 2004), http://www.dedefense.org [9]

23. François-Bernard Huyghe, Quatrième guerre mondiale: Faire mourir et faire croire (Paris: Rocher, 2004), p. 9.

24. D. Priest and T. E. Ricks, “Growing Pessimism on Iraq: Doubts Increase within U.S. Security Agencies,” The Washington Post, September 29, 2004.

25. Philippe Grasset, “La destruction méthodique de la puissance américaine” (September 27, 2004), http://www.dedefensa.org [10]; Guatam Adhikari, “The End of the Unipolar Myth,” International Herald Tribune, September 27, 2004.

26. Philippe Grasset, “Comment l’américainisme est en train d’apparaître pour ce qu’il est: un problème de civilisation” (September 1, 2004), http://www.dedefensa.org [10]

27. Brent Scowcroft, George I’s national security adviser, has publicly criticized George II for being “inordinately influenced by Israel’s Prime Minister Ariel Sharon. ‘Sharon just has him wrapped around his little finger’, Scowcroft said. ‘I think the president is mesmerized.’“ See “Key GOP Figure Raps Bush on Mideast,” San Francisco Chronicle, October 17, 2004.

28. Ehsan Ahari, “How Bush, Kerry Are One and the Same” (September 2, 2004), http://www.latimes.com [11]

29. H. Millard, “Ridin’ the Runaway Train Named America” (2004), http://www.newnation.org [12]

30. Françoise Vergniolle de Chantal, “Les débats américains sur la relations transatlantiques” (2004), http://robert-schuman.org [13]

31. Ian Williams, “Deterring the Empire” (May 13, 2003), http://www.alternet.org [14]

32. David Wood, “U.S. to Sell Precision-Guided Bombs to Israel” (September 23, 2004), http://www.newhousesnews.com [15]

33. Ian Black, “The Transatlantic Drift,” The Guardian, September 20, 2004; Philippe Grasset, “L’UE: Une stratégie de rupture avec l’Amérique” (September 20, 2004), http://www.dedefensa.org [10]

34. Faye, Avant-Guerre.

35. Sam Francis, “When the State Is the Enemy of the Nation” (July 19, 2004), http://www.vdare.com [16] This is not to say that the state is inherently the enemy of the nation—only that this is the case with the existing liberal state. On the difference between statism and nationalism, see Walker Connor, Ethnonationalism: The Quest for Understanding (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994).

Article printed from Counter-Currents Publishing: http://www.counter-currents.com

mercredi, 31 août 2011

Guerre raciale et implosion du système

Guerre raciale et implosion du système

Pierre Vial

Ex: http://tpprovence.wordpress.com/

Immeubles incendiés, magasins et centres commerciaux dévalisés et vandalisés, rues jonchées de débris, de carcasses noircies de bus, de voitures, de véhicules de police… Ces images de Londres, de Birmingham, de Bristol, de Liverpool ont fait, en boucle, le tour du monde par télévisions interposées. Elles évoquaient bien ce que la députée travailliste Diane Abbott a appelé « une zone de guerre » (théâtre, reconnaît Le Monde du 10 août, d’une « guérilla urbaine »).

Les media français ont tout de suite voulu donner le ton pour interpréter ces événements : c’est la faute de tensions sociales dues à la réduction des financements publics en faveur des plus démunis, c’est la faute du chômage et donc du désoeuvrement… et c’est la faute, bien sûr, de la police britannique (« les gaffes de la police » a titré le quotidien conservateur Daily Mail, tout aussi faux cul que les journaux français). Tout s’explique… et les casseurs cagoulés sont des « jeunes » ayant du vague à l’âme. Bien organisés, tout de même (on est donc loin de la réaction spontanée, épidermique, de hooligans), avec un système de liaison bien au point pour relancer les vagues d’assaut pendant plusieurs jours.

Mais que faisait le gouvernement ? Le premier ministre Cameron, le ministre de l’intérieur, le ministre des finances, le maire de Londres étaient…en vacances (Cameron en Italie). Les casseurs sont décidément bien mal élevés de choisir un moment pareil. Ils auraient pu attendre la rentrée.

Il est incontestable que le climat social détérioré par un libéralisme débridé a de quoi susciter bien des rancoeurs.  Mais celles-ci sont venues se greffer sur une volonté d’affrontement racial. La mort d’un délinquant antillais au cours d’une opération montée par  la police contre les gangs antillais a été le prétexte du déchaînement des émeutes. Le premier foyer d’insurrection a été le quartier de Tottenham, qualifié gentiment de « multiethnique » et dont la majorité de la population est d’origine antillaise. Celle-ci a voulu montrer – et elle a réussi – qu’elle pouvait se rendre maîtresse de la rue, en défiant un pouvoir et un ordre blancs. Même Le Monde, malgré ses a priori idéologiques, a reconnu au passage (9 août) qu’il s’agissait « du plus sérieux affrontement racial au Royaume-Uni depuis les troubles d’Oldham en 2001 » et qu’il y avait donc bel et bien « émeute raciale ».

Ce qui fait voler en éclat ce multiculturalisme, présenté pendant longtemps comme le modèle britannique de réponse aux tensions raciales et dont Cameron reconnaissait récemment (tout comme Angela Merckel pour l’Allemagne) qu’il était un échec. Il était basé sur la conviction irénique que des communautés raciales diverses pouvaient cohabiter harmonieusement sur un même territoire. Illusion due à des présupposés idéologiques qu’on retrouve tant à droite qu’à gauche chez des intellectuels qui refusent tout simplement le poids des réalités. Des réalités trop dérangeantes pour leur confort mental et qu’il faut donc nier obstinément. Jusqu’au jour où elles vous rattrapent…

Ce jour est arrivé pour beaucoup de Britanniques. Comme le reconnaît Libération (16 août) ils suivent les conseils figurant sur de grandes affiches placardées par la police ou les inscriptions peintes sur les panneaux de contreplaqué remplaçant les vitrines brisées des commerces : il faut repérer et dénoncer « les rats à capuche » (en Angleterre comme en France les délinquants immigrés aiment pouvoir se dissimuler le visage pour éviter d’être identifiés).  Surtout, des milices d’autodéfense se sont mises en place pour assurer ordre et sécurité dans les quartiers menacés. Pour pallier l’inefficacité d’une police paralysée par les tabous du politiquement correct (aveu d’un bobby publié par Le Monde du 12 août : « L’ordre était d’intervenir avec circonspection pour éviter les accusations de brutalité, de racisme »).

Le Système en place, miné par ses contradictions internes, est en train d’imploser, la guerre raciale montrant qu’elle est désormais sous-jacente dans nombre de pays européens. C’est donc bien en dénonçant sans répit les ravages du capitalisme libéral et en prêchant une conception réaliste, c’est à dire racialiste, de la société que nous pourrons contribuer à la libération mentale et à la volonté de résistance et de reconquête de  nos frères européens.

Pierre Vial

Armin Mohler, l'homme qui nous désignait l'ennemi!


Thorsten HINZ:

Armin Mohler, l’homme qui nous désignait l’ennemi


Le Dr. Karlheinz Weissmann vient de sortir de presse une biographie d’Armin Mohler, publiciste de la droite allemande et historien de la “révolution conservatrice”


Armin Mohler ne fut jamais l’homme des demies-teintes!


Qui donc Armin Mohler détestait-il? Les libéraux et les tièdes, les petits jardiniers amateurs qui gratouillent le bois mort qui encombre l’humus, c’est-à-dire les nouilles de droite, inoffensives parce que dépouvues de pertinence! Il détestait aussi tous ceux qui s’agrippaient aux concepts et aux tabous que définissait leur propre ennemi. Il considérait que les libéraux étaient bien plus subtils et plus dangereux que les communistes: pour reprendre un bon mot de son ami Robert Hepp: ils nous vantaient l’existence de cent portes de verre qu’ils nous définissaient comme l’Accès, le seul Accès, à la liberté, tout en taisant soigneusement le fait que 99 de ces portes demeuraient toujours fermées. La victoire totale des libéraux a hissé l’hypocrisie en principe ubiquitaire. Les gens sont désormais jugés selon les déclarations de principe qu’ils énoncent sans nécessairement y croire et non pas sur leurs actes et sur les idées qu’ils sont prêts à défendre.


Mohler était était un type “agonal”, un gars qui aimait la lutte: sa bouille carrée de Bâlois l’attestait. Avec la subtilité d’un pluvier qui capte les moindres variations du climat, Mohler repérait les courants souterrains de la politique et de la société. C’était un homme de forte sensibilité mais certainement pas un sentimental. Mohler pensait et écrivait clair quand il abordait la politique: ses mots étaient durs, tranchants, de véritables armes. Il était déjà un “conservateur moderne” ou un “néo-droitiste” avant que la notion n’apparaisse dans les médiats. En 1995, il s’était défini comme un “fasciste au sens où l’entendait José Antonio Primo de Rivera”. Mohler se référait ainsi —mais peu nombreux étaient ceux qui le savaient— au jeune fondateur de la Phalange espagnole, un homme intelligent et cultivé, assassiné par les gauches ibériques et récupéré ensuite par Franco.


Il manquait donc une biographie de ce doyen du conservatisme allemand d’après guerre, mort en 2003. Karlheinz Weissmann était l’homme appelé à combler cette lacune: il connait la personnalité de Mohler et son oeuvre; il est celui qui a actualisé l’ouvrage de référence de Mohler sur la révolution conservatrice.


Pour Mohler seuls comptaient le concret et le réel


La sensibilité toute particulière d’Armin Mohler s’est déployée dans le décor de la ville-frontière suisse de Bâle. Mohler en était natif. Il y avait vu le jour en 1920. En 1938, la lecture d’un livre le marque à jamais: c’est celui de Christoph Steding, “Das Reich und die Krankheit der europäischen Kultur” (“Le Reich et la pathologie de la culture européenne”). Pour Steding, l’Allemagne, jusqu’en 1933, avait couru le risque de subir une “neutralisation politique et spirituelle”, c’est-à-dire une “helvétisation de la pensée allemande”, ce qui aurait conduit à la perte de la souveraineté intérieure et extérieure; l’Allemagne aurait dérogé pour adopter le statut d’un “intermédiaire éclectique”. Les peuples qui tombent dans une telle déchéance sont “privés de destin” et tendent à ne plus produire que des “pharisiens nés”. On voit tout de suite que Steding était intellectuellement proche de Carl Schmitt. Quant à ce dernier, il a pris la peine de recenser personnellement le livre, publié à titre posthume, de cet auteur mort prématurément. Dans ce livre apparaissent certains des traits de pensée qui animeront Mohler, le caractériseront, tout au long de son existence.


L’Allemagne est devenue pour le jeune Mohler “la grande tentation”, tant et si bien qu’il franchit illégalement le frontière suisse en février 1942 “pour aider les Allemands à gagner la guerre”. Cet intermède allemand ne durera toutefois qu’une petite année. Mohler passa quelques mois à Berlin, avec le statut d’étudiant, et s’y occupa des auteurs de la “révolution conservatrice”, à propos desquels il rédigera sa célèbre thèse de doctorat, sous la houlette de Karl Jaspers. Mohler était un rebelle qui s’insurgeait contre la croyance au progrès et à la raison, une croyance qui estime que le monde doit à terme être tout compénétré de raison et que les éléments, qui constituent ce monde, peuvent être combinés les uns aux autres ou isolés les uns des autres à loisir, selon une logique purement arbitraire. Contre cette croyance et cette vision, Mohler voulait opposer les forces élémentaires de l’art et de la culture, de la nationalité et de l’histoire. Ce contre-mouvement, disait-il, et cela le distinguait des tenants de la “vieille droite”, ne visait pas la restauration d’un monde ancré dans le 19ème siècle, mais tenait expressément compte des nouvelles réalités.


Dans un chapitre, intitulé “Du nominalisme”, le Dr. Karlheinz Weissmann explicite les tentatives de Mohler, qui ne furent pas toujours probantes, de systématiser ses idées et ses vues. Il est clair que Mohler rejette toute forme d’universalisme car tout universalisme déduit le particulier d’un ordre spirituel sous-jacent et identitque pour tous, et noie les réalités dans une “mer morte d’abstractions”. Pour le nominaliste Mohler, les concepts avancés par les universalismes ne sont que des dénominations abstraites et arbitraires, inventées a poteriori, et qui n’ont pour effets que de répandre la confusion. Pour Mohler, seuls le concret et le particulier avaient de l’importance, soit le “réel”, qu’il cherchait à saisir par le biais d’images fortes, puissantes et organiques. Par conséquent, ses sympathies personnelles n’étaient pas déterminées par les idées politiques dont se réclamaient ses interlocuteurs mais tenaient d’abord compte de la valeur de l’esprit et du caractère qu’il percevait chez l’autre.


En 1950, Mohler devint le secrétaire d’Ernst Jünger. Ce ne fut pas une époque dépourvue de conflits. Après l’intermède de ce secrétariat, vinrent les années françaises de notre théoricien: il devint en effet le correspondant à Paris du “Tat” suisse et de l’hebdomadaire allemand “Die Zeit”. A partir de 1961, il fut le secrétaire, puis le directeur, de la “Fondation Siemens”. Dans le cadre de cette éminente fonction, il a essayé de contrer la dérive gauchisante de la République fédérale, en organisant des colloques de très haut niveau et en éditant des livres ou des publications remarquables. Parmi les nombreux livres que nous a laissés Mohler, “Nasenring” (= “L’anneau nasal”) est certainement le plus célèbre: il constitue une attaque en règle, qui vise à fustiger l’attitude que les Allemands ont prise vis-à-vis de leur propre histoire (la fameuse “Vergangenheitsbewältigung”). En 1969, Mohler écrivait dans l’hebdomadaire suisse “Weltwoche”: “Le ‘Républiquefédéralien’ est tout occupé, à la meilleure manière des méthodes ‘do-it-yourself’, à se faire la guerre à lui-même. Il n’y a pas que lui: tout le monde occidental semble avoir honte de descendre d’hommes de bonne trempe; tout un chacun voudrait devenir un névrosé car seul cet état, désormais, est considéré comme ‘humain’”.


En France, Mohler était un adepte critique de Charles de Gaulle. Il estimait que l’Europe des patries, proposée par le Général, aurait été capable de faire du Vieux Continent une “Troisième Force” entre les Etats-Unis et l’Union Soviétique. Dans les années 60, certaines ouvertures semblaient possibles pour Mohler: peut-être pourrait-il gagner en influence politique via le Président de la CSU bavaroise, Franz-Josef Strauss? Il entra à son service comme “nègre”. Ce fut un échec: Strauss, systématiquement, modifiait les ébauches de discours que Mohler avait truffées de références gaulliennes et les traduisait en un langage “atlantiste”. De la part de Strauss, était-ce de la faiblesse ou était-ce le regard sans illusions du pragmatique qui ne jure que par le “réalisable”? Quoi qu’il en soit, on perçoit ici l’un des conflits fondamentaux qui ont divisé les conservateurs après la guerre: la plupart des hommes de droite se contentaient d’une République fédérale sous protectorat américain (sans s’apercevoir qu’à long terme, ils provoquaient leur propre disparition), tandis que Mohler voulait une Allemagne européenne et libre.


Le conflit entre européistes et atlantistes provoqua également l’échec de la revue “Die Republik”, que l’éditeur Axel Springer voulait publier pour en faire le forum des hommes de droite hors partis et autres ancrages politiciens: Mohler décrit très bien cette péripétie dans “Nasenring”.


Il semble donc bien que ce soit sa qualité de Suisse qui l’ait sauvé de cette terrible affliction que constitue la perte d’imagination chez la plupart des conservateurs allemands de l’après-guerre. Par ailleurs, le camp de la droite établie a fini par le houspiller dans l’isolement. Caspar von Schrenck-Notzing lui a certes ouvert les colonnes de “Criticon”, qui furent pour lui une bonne tribune, mais les autres éditeurs de revues lui claquèrent successivement la porte au nez; malgré son titre de doctorat, il n’a pas davantage pu mener une carrière universitaire. La réunification n’a pas changé grand chose à sa situation: les avantages pour lui furent superficiels et éphémères.


La cadre historique, dans lequel nous nous débattions du temps de Mohler, et dans lequel s’est déployée sa carrière étonnante, freinée uniquement par des forces extérieures, aurait pu gagner quelques contours tranchés et précis. On peut discerner aujourd’hui la grandeur de Mohler. On devrait aussi pouvoir mesurer la tragédie qu’il a incarnée. Weissmann constate qu’il existait encore jusqu’au milieu des années 80 une certaine marge de manoeuvre pour la droite intellectuelle en Allemagne mais que cet espace potentiel s’est rétréci parce que la gauche n’a jamais accepté le dialogue ou n’a jamais rien voulu apprendre du réel. Le lecteur se demande alors spontanément: pourquoi la gauche aurait-elle donc dialogué puisque le rapport de force objectif était en sa faveur?


Weissmann a donc résussi un tour de force: il a écrit une véritable “biographie politique” d’Armin Mohler. Son livre deviendra un classique.


Thorsten HINZ.

(article paru dans “Junge Freiheit”, Berlin, n°31/32-2011; http://www.jugefreiheit.de/ ).

lundi, 29 août 2011

Quel "nationalisme" pour les années 90 et le XXIème siècle?

Quel «nationalisme» pour les


années 90 et le XXIème siècle ?


par Robert STEUCKERS




Dans nos régions, nous avons coutume d'opposer deux formes de nationalisme, le nationalisme de culture (ou nationalisme populaire : volksnationalisme) et le nationalisme d'État (staatsnationalisme). Le nationalisme culturel/populaire tient compte essentiellement de l'ethnicité, en tant que matrice historique de valeurs précises qui ne sont pas transposables dans un autre humus. Le nationalisme d'État met l'ethnicité ou les ethnicités d'un territoire au service d'une machine administrative, bureaucratique ou militaire. Pour cette idéologie, l'ethnicité n'est pas perçue comme une matrice de valeurs mais comme une sorte de carburant que l'on brûlera pour faire avancer la machine. L'État, dans la perspective du staatsnationalisme, n'est pas une instance qui dynamise les forces émanant de la Volkheit mais un moloch qui les consomme et les détruit.

Les nationalismes culturels/populaires partent d'une vision plurielle de l'histoire, du monde et de la politique. Chaque peuple émet des valeurs qui correspondent aux défis que lui lance l'espace sur lequel il vit. Dans les zones intermédiaires, des peuples en contact avec deux grandes aires culturelles combinent les valeurs des uns et des autres en des synthèses tantôt harmonieuses tantôt malheureuses. Les nationalismes d'État arasent généralement les valeurs produites localement, réduisant la diversité du territoire à une logique unique, autoritaire et stérile.


Valoriser l'histoire, relativiser les institutions


Par tradition historique, noua sommes, depuis l'émergence des nationalismes vers l'époque de la révolution française, du côté des nationalismes culturels contre les nationalismes d'État. Mais au-delà des étiquettes désignant les diverses formes de nationalisme, noua adhérons, plus fondamentalement, à des systèmes de valeurs qui privilégient la diversité plutôt qu'à des systèmes d'action qui tentent de la réduire à des modèles simples, homogénéisés et, de ce fait même, stérilisés. Toute approche plurielle des facteurs historiques et politiques implique une relativisation des institutions établies ; celles-ci ne sont pas d'emblée jugées éternelles et indépassables. Elles sont perçues comme exerçant une fonction précise et doivent disparaître dès que cette fonction n'a plus d'utilité. Les approches homogénéisantes imposent un cadre institutionnel que l'on veut intangible. La vitalité populaire, par définition plurielle dans ses manifestations, déborde tôt ou tard ce cadre rigide. Deux scénarios sont alors possibles : a) les mercenaires au service du cadre répriment la vitalité populaire par violence ou b) le peuple met à bas les institutions devenues obsolètes et chasse ou exile les tenants têtus du vieil ordre.

Qu'en est-il de cette opposition entre pluralité et homogénéisation à la veille du XXIème siècle ? Il me semble inopportun de continuer à répéter tel quel les mots d'ordre et les slogans nés lors de l'opposition, au début du XIXème siècle, entre «nationalismes de culture» (Verlooy, Jahn, Arndt, Conscience, Hoffmann von Fallersleben) et «nationalismes d'État» (jacobinisme, bonapartisme). Pour continuer à exprimer notre opposition de principe aux stratégies d'homogénéisation, qui ont été celles du jacobinisme et du bonapartisme, noua devons choisir, aujourd'hui, un vocabulaire moderne, dérivé des sciences récentes (biocybernétique, informatique, physique etc.). En effet, les «nationalismes d'État» ont pour caractéristique d'avoir été forgés sur le modèle des sciences physiques mécanicistes du XVIIIème siècle. Les «nationalismes culturels», eux, ont voulu suggérer un modèle d'organisation politique calqué sur les principes des sciences biologiques émergentes (J.W. Ritter, Carus, Oken, etc.). Malgré les progrès énormes de ces sciences de la vie dans le monde de tous les jours, certains États (Belgique, France, Italie, URSS, Yougoslavie, «démocraties socialistes», Algérie, etc.) fonctionnent toujours selon des critères mécanicistes et demeurent innervés par des valeurs mécanicistes homogénéisantes.


Les leçons d’Alvin Toffler


Le nationalisme, ou tout autre idéologie, qui voudrait mettre un terme à cette anomalie, devra nécessairement être de nature offensive, porté par la volonté de briser définitivement les pouvoirs anciens. Il ne doit pas vouloir les consolider ni remettre en selle des modèles passés de nationalisme statolâtrique. La lecture du dernier livre d'un écrivain américain célèbre, Alvin Toffler, nous apparaît utile pour comprendre les enjeux des décennies à venir, décennies où les mouvements (nationalistes ou non) hostiles aux établissements devront percer sur la scène politique. Entendons-nous bien, ces mouvements, dans la mesure où ils sont hostiles aux formes figées héritées de l'ère mécaniciste/révolutionnaire, sont authentiquement «démocratiques» et «populistes» ; nous savons depuis les thèses de Roberto Michels que le socialisme a basculé dans l'oligarchisation de ses cadres. Nous savons aussi que ce processus d'oligarchisation a affecté le pilier démocrate-chrétien, désormais connecté à la mafia en Italie et partout éloigné du terreau populaire. Si bien que les élus socialistes ou démocrates-chrétiens eux-mêmes se rendent compte que les décisions sont prises, dans leurs partis, en coulisse et non plus dans les assemblées générales (les tripotages de Martens au sein de son propre parti en sont une belle illustration).

Ce phénomène d'oligarchisation, de gigantisme et de pyramidalisation suscite l'apparition de structures pachydermiques et monolithiques, incapables de capter les flux d'informations nouvelles qui émanent de la réalité quotidienne, de la Volkheit en tant que fait de vie. Je crois, avec Alvin Toffler, que ce hiatus prend des proportions de plus en plus grandes depuis le milieu des années 80 : c'est le cas chez nous, où le CVP s'effrite parce qu'il ne répond plus aux besoins des citoyens actifs et innovateurs ; c'est le cas en France, où les partis dits de la «bande des quatre» s'avèrent incapables de résoudre les problèmes réels auxquels la population est confrontée. Toffler nous parle de la nécessité de provoquer un «transfert des pouvoirs». Ceux-ci, à l'instar de ce qui s'est effectivement produit dans les firmes gigantesques d'Outre-Atlantique, devront passer, «des monolithes aux mosaïques». Les entreprises géantes ont constaté que les stratégies de concentration aboutissaient à l'impasse ; il a fallu inverser la vapeur et se décomposer en un grand nombre de petites unités à comptabilité autonome, opérationnellement déconcentrées. Autonomie qui les conduira inévitablement à prendre un envol propre, adapté aux circonstances dans lesquelles elles évoluent réellement. Les mondes politiques, surtout ceux qui participent de la logique homogénéisante jacobine, restent en deçà de cette évolution inéluctable : en d'autres termes, ils sont dépassés et contournés par les énergies qui se déploient au départ des diverses Volkheiten concrètes. Phénomène observable en Italie du Nord, où les régions ont pris l'initiative de dépasser le monolithe étatique romain, et ont créé des réseaux alpin et adriatique de relations interrégionales qui se passent fort bien des immixtions de l'État central. La Vénétie peut régler avec la Slovénie ou la Croatie des problèmes relatifs à la région adriatique et, demain, régler, sans passer par Rome, des problèmes alpins avec la Bavière, le Tyrol autrichien, la Lombardie ou le canton des Grisons. Ces régions se dégagent dès lors de la logique monolithique stato-nationale pour adopter une logique en mosaïque (pour reprendre le vocabulaire de Toffler), outrepassant, par suite, les niveaux hiérarchiques établis qui bloquent, freinent et ralentissent les flux de communications. Niveaux hiérarchiques qui deviennent ipso facto redondants. Par rapport aux monolithes, les mosaïques de Toffler sont toujours provisoires, réorientables tous azimuts et hyper-flexibles.


La «Troisième Vague»


Caractère provisoire, réorientabilité et hyper-flexibilité sont des nécessités postulées par les révolutions technologiques de ces vingt dernières années. L'ordinateur et le fax abolissent bon nombre de distances et autonomisent d'importantes quantités de travailleurs du secteur tertiaire. Or les structures politiques restent en deçà de cette évolution, donc en discordance avec la société. Toffler parle d'une «Troisième Vague» post-moderne qui s'oppose à la fois au traditionalisme des mouvements conservateurs (parfois religieux) et au modernisme homogénéisant. Aujourd'hui, tout nationalisme ou tout autre mouvement visant l'innovation doit être le porte-voix de cette «Troisième Vague» qui réclame une révision totale des institutions politiques établies. Basée sur un savoir à facettes multiples et non plus sur l'argent ou la tradition, la «Troisième Vague» peut trouver à s'alimenter au nationalisme de culture, dans le sens où ce type-là de nationalisme découle d'une logique plurielle, d'une logique qui accepte la pluralité. Les nationalismes d'État, constructeurs de molochs monolithiques, sont résolument, dans l'optique de Toffler, des figures de la «Seconde Vague», de l'«Âge usinier», ère qui a fonctionné par monologique concentrante ; preuve : devant les crises actuelles (écologie, enseignement, organisation du secteur de santé, transports en commun, urbanisme, etc.), produites par des étranglements, des goulots, dus au gigantisme et à l'éléphantiasis des structures datant de l'«âge usinier», les hommes politiques, qui ne sont plus au diapason, réagissent au coup par coup, c'est-à-dire exactement selon les critères de leur monologique homogénéisante, incapable de tenir compte d'un trop grand nombre de paramètres. Les structures mises en place par les nationalismes d'État sont lourdes et inefficaces (songeons à la RTT ou la poste), alors que les structures en mosaïques, créées par les firmes qui se sont déconcentrées ou par les régions nord-italiennes dans la nouvelle synergie adriatique/alpine, sont légères et performantes. Tout nationalisme ou autre mouvement innovateur doit donc savoir s'adresser, dès aujourd’hui, à ceux qui veulent déconcentrer, accélérer les communications et contourner les monolithes désormais inutiles et inefficaces.


Les «lents» et les «rapides»


Toffler nous parle du clivage le plus important actuellement : celui qui distingue les «lents» des «rapides». L'avenir proche appartient évidemment à ceux qui sont rapides, ceux qui peuvent prendre des décisions vite et bien, qui peuvent livrer des marchandises dans les délais les plus brefs. Les pays du Tiers-Monde appartiennent évidemment à la catégorie des «lents». Mais bon nombre de structures su sein même de nos sociétés «industrielles avancées» y appartiennent également. Prenons quelques exemples : l'entêtement de plusieurs strates de l'establishment belge à vouloir commercer avec le Zaïre, pays hyper-lent parce qu'hyper-corrompu (tel maître, tel valet, serait-on tenté de dire...) relève de la pure aberration, d'autant plus qu'il n'y a guère de profits à en tirer ou, uniquement, si le contribuable finance partiellement les transactions ou les «aides annexes». Quand Geene a voulu infléchir vers l'Indonésie, pays plus rapide (dont la balancé commerciale est positive !), les flux d'aides belges au tiers-monde, on a hurlé au flamingantisme, sous prétexte que l'Insulinde avait été colonie néerlandaise. Pour toute perspective nationaliste, les investissements doivent, comme le souligne aussi Toffler, opérer un retour au pays ou, au moins, se relocaliser en Europe. Deuxième exemple : certains rapports de la Commission des Communautés européennes signalent l'effroyable lenteur des télécommunications en Belgique (poste, RTT, chemin de fer, transports en commun urbains, etc.) et concluent que Bruxelles n'est pas la ville adéquate pour devenir la capitale de l'Europe de 1992, en dépit de tout ce que Martens, les banques de l'établissement, la Cour, etc. ont mis en œuvre pour en faire accepter le principe. Hélas pour ces «lents», il y a de fortes chances pour que Bonn ou Strasbourg emportent le morceau !


Partitocratie et apartheid


Des démonstrations qui précédent, il est facile de déduire quelques mots d'ordre pour l'action des mouvements innovateurs :

- lutte contre toutes les formes d'oligarchisation issues de la partitocratie ; ces oligarchisations ou pilarisations (verzuiling) sont des stratégies de monolithisation et d'exclusion de tous ceux qui n'adhérent pas à la philosophie de l'un ou l'autre pilier (zuil). Sachons rappeler à Paula d'Hondt que ce ne sont pas tant les immigrés qui sont des exclus dans notre société, qui seraient victimes d'un «apartheid», mais qu'une quantité impressionnante de fils et de filles de notre peuple ont été ou sont «exclus» ou «mal intégrés» à cause des vices de fonctionnement de la machine étatique belge. Ne pas pouvoir être fonctionnaire si l'on n'est pas membre d'un parti, ou devoir sauter plus d'obstacles pour le devenir, n'est-ce pas de l'«apartheid» ? Conclusion : lutter contre l'apartheid de fait qu'est la pilarisation et rapatrier progressivement les immigrés, après les avoir formés à exercer une fonction utile à leur peuple et pour éviter précisément qu'ils soient, à la longue, victimes d'un réel apartheid, n'est-ce pas plus logique et plus humain que ce qui est pratiqué actuellement à grands renforts de propagande ?

- abattre vite toutes les structures qui ne correspondent plus au niveau actuel des technologies ; un nationalisme de culture, parce qu'il parie sur les énergies inépuisables du peuple, n'est forcément pas passéiste.

- s'inscrire, notamment avec la Lombardie et la Catalogne, dans les stratégies interrégionales en mosaïques ; tout en sachant que l'obstacle demeure la France, dont le conseil constitutionnel vient de décider que le peuple corse n'existait pas ! Ne dialoguer en France qu'avec les régionalistes et renforcer par tous les moyens possibles le dégagement des régions de la tutelle parisienne. Solidarité grande-néerlandaise avec la région Nord-Pas-de-Calais et grande-germanique avec l'Alsace. Pour la Wallonie, si d'aventure elle se dégage de la tutelle socialiste et maçonnique (pro-jacobine), solidarité prioritaire avec les cantons romans de la région Nord-Pas-de-Calais et avec la Lorraine, en tant que régions originairement impériales et romanes à la fois (la Wallonie traditionnelle, fidèle à sa vocation impériale, a un devoir de solidarité avec les régions romanes de l'ancien Reich, la Reichsromanentum, victime des génocides perpétrés par Louis XIV en Lorraine et en Franche-Comté, où 50% de la population a été purement et simplement massacrée ; les énergies de la Wallonie post-socialiste devront se porter le long d'un axe Namur/Arlon/Metz/Nancy/Genève). Appui inconditionnel aux régionalismes corse, breton, occitan et basque, si possible de concert avec les Irlandais, les Catalans, les Lombards et les Piémontais. Forcer les Länder allemands à plus d'audace dans les stratégies de ce type.

- diplomatie orientée vers les «rapides». Ne plus perdre son temps avec le Zaïre ou d'autres États corrompus et inefficaces. Les relations avec ce pays ne sont entretenues que pour défendre des intérêts dépassés, que l'on camoufle souvent derrière un moralisme inepte.

- combattre toutes les lenteurs intérieures, même si nous ne souhaitons pas que Bruxelles devienne la capitale de l'Europe. Si les institutions européennes déménagent ailleurs, les projets de Martens s'effondreront et son régime autoritaire, appuyé notamment sur la Cour et non sanctionné par la base de son propre parti, capotera. L'effondrement du CVP, comme son tassement annoncé, permettra l'envol d'un néo-nationalisme futuriste, tablant sur la longue mémoire et sur la vitesse. Car l'une n'exclut pas l'autre. Un peuple qui garde sa mémoire intacte, sait que l'histoire suit des méandres souvent imprévus et sait aussi quelles réponses ses ancêtres ont apportées aux défis insoupçonnés de l'heure. La mémoire garantit toujours une réponse modulée et rapide aux défis qui se présentent. L'ordinateur n'est-il pas précisément un instrument performant parce qu'il est doté d'une mémoire ? Donc, le nationalisme culturel/populaire, plurilogique, est un bon logiciel. Gardons-le et sachons l'améliorer.



Source : Alvin Toffler, Les Nouveaux Pouvoirs : Savoir, richesse et


violence à la veille du XXlème siècle, Fayard, 1991, 658 p., 149 FF.


Ce texte de R. Steuckers a d'abord été publié en langue néerlandaise dans la revue «RevoIte» (été 1991). Il entrait dans le cadre d'un débat sur le nationalisme en Flandre.

lundi, 22 août 2011

Life After the Collapse

Life After the Collapse

How whites will emerge from the rubble.

Guillaume Faye, Archeofuturism, Arktos Media, 2010, 249 pp., $22.95,
available from arktos.com, soft cover, (originally written in 1998)

Ex: http://www.amren.com/

Guillaume Faye is one of the most brilliant and provocative writers to emerge from the French New Right. He has written a great deal in his long and varied career, but Archeofuturism is his best-known and probably most important book. Written in 1998, only now has it been translated into English, thanks to the Arktos Media publishing group, which has made a number of New Right classics available to English-speakers.

Archeofuturism, by Guillaume Faye

Archeofuturism is hard to place on an American political spectrum. It is openly race-realist — “The ethnic question today is taboo, and hence crucial” — but has a revolutionary fervor that we associate with the left. Dr. Faye is passionately attached to the people and culture of Europe but wants completely to overthrow the current civilization. “The only strategy is all-out war,” he writes. “Compromise must be abolished.”

Archeofuturism is Dr. Faye’s blueprint for the future age that will succeed the cataclysms we are foolishly bringing upon ourselves. Much of it is fanciful, but Dr. Faye’s guesses about the future are never dull, and are based in a far more realistic understanding of history and human nature than the babblings of conventional “futurologists.”

The importance of race

Dr. Faye takes it for granted that race is real. “I insist on the importance of biological kinship to define peoples, and particularly the family of European peoples,” he writes. “The inherited characteristics of a people shape its culture and outlook.” This is why he so opposes “the current demographic colonization of Europe by Afro-Asiatic peoples, which is prudishly called ‘immigration’.” He asserts that Third-Worlders have none of the notions of brotherhood or “multi-culturalism” that hypnotize whites; they come with the intent to dominate. “One land, one people: this is what human nature requires,” he writes, noting that only whites pretend otherwise.

For Dr. Faye, the notion of the West is disappearing, eventually to be replaced by a northern coalition of whites facing waves of invasion: “The twenty-first century will witness global ethnic warfare and the legions of immigrants in Europe will serve as the ‘fifth column’ of an aggressive South.” He points out that all non-whites think in terms of race, “unlike Parisian intellectuals,” and that our rulers are digging their own graves just as surely as they are digging ours: “We shall be submerged by more vital, more youthful and less well-meaning peoples with the complicity of a delinquent bourgeoisie that — whatever it may do — will itself be swept away by the tide it has so heedlessly caused.”

Dr. Faye has nothing but contempt for the present era. The central dogma of the age is egalitarianism, he writes, and it survives only because of a blind faith in miracles. The dogma’s failures are evident everywhere; just as individuals vary enormously in their talents and abilities, so do the races and nations. Forcible equality is tyranny.

Dr. Faye is passionately attached to the people and culture of Europe but wants completely to overthrow the current civilization.

Dr. Faye also denounces what he calls “pathological altruism,” or the perpetual propping up of failed people and failed societies. Our rulers ignore the dysgenic effects of welfare and — even worse — tax their own people to feed Third-Worlders who long to dispossess the North. “Pathological altruism” is partly explained by what Dr. Faye calls “pathological individualism.” Because our rulers think only about the individual — and not about nation or race — they promote dysgenic policies at home and raise armies of overseas enemies who will march against their own children.

“Pathological individualism” is also behind such modern distractions as homosexual marriage. The government should not recognize unions that are by definition barren and have no role in perpetuating society. As Napoleon explained, concubines take no notice of the law and the law takes no notice of them. Dr. Faye thinks homosexuality should likewise be a private matter, of no interest to the pubic or the state.

Gay Times magazine

Homosexual marriage, however, is typical of the interests of Western governments because our rulers are incapable of grasping the questions that really matter. In Dr. Faye’s view, Western democracy is so cut off from reality, so amputated that he calls it “democtomy.” Only “pseudo dissent” is permitted, and Europeans prefer to ban political parties that actually challenge orthodoxy. In France, for example, the authorities call Jean-Marie Le Pen’s National Front “intolerant” because they want to ban it.

Dr. Faye argues that one of the goals of modern society is “to abolish thought in favor of spectacle” by promoting such things as professional sports. He can think of nothing more idiotic than paying money to watch people play games, and believes it is perverse to build up passionate attachments to outcomes that haven’t the slightest meaning or importance. Tennis champions or soccer players are nothing but performers, and their position in society should be no different from that of circus acrobats. Video games likewise clog the brain and prevent thought, which pleases our rulers because thought is dangerous. Dr. Faye also decries the disintegration of the family, the decline of education, and the replacement of culture with audio-visual pap.

Only radical, revolutionary acts, writes Dr. Faye, can destroy modernity. Unfortunately, Europeans are so domesticated they will never abolish egalitarianism and build a vigorous, self-conscious Europe. Instead, their infantilized world will be pulled down around them by “convergent catastrophes” that Dr. Faye predicted (writing in 1998) would strike between the years 2010 and 2020.

Disaster upon disaster

Among these, of course, are colonization by the South, which will lead to the collapse of multi-racial societies (which only whites have encouraged to take root in their midst). As Christianity continues to disintegrate in the face of Islam, Europe will face the prospect of “imperial theocratic totalitarianism.” At the same time, the West will be saddled with millions of old people with only a few young workers — or hostile Third-World immigrants — to support them.

The South is creating disasters of its own as non-whites try to mimic whites. Any Third-World attempt at democracy, for example, “leads to tragic consequences because of intellectual incompatibilities when it is forcefully imposed upon the cultures of the South.” Africans, for example, have lost their traditional societies and are incapable of replacing them with anything that is not squalid and cruel.

illegal immigrants in France
Illegal immigrants in France.

Dr. Faye laughs at anyone who thinks science will save us. He predicts plagues of drug-resistant diseases and, most catastrophically, exhaustion of the planet. The earth will run out of energy, he writes, adding that the notion that people would constantly get richer was a delusional spasm that lasted only 100 years. Dr. Faye roundly dismisses the fantasy of 7 billion people, all living like 20th-century Americans.

Cascading catastrophes will mean financial panic, global recession, plummeting world GNP, race war, and mass die offs. Europeans who survive will live by different principles: the principles of archeofuturism. Dr. Faye believes that what emerges from the rubble is the society Europeans would build deliberately if they were sane, but it will instead be forced on them by catastrophes of their own making. He hopes his book will guide the thinking of those who survive to lay the foundations.

Archaic, not conservative


After the crash, “most of humanity would revert to a pre-technological subsistence economy based on agriculture and the crafts.” An overexploited earth will permit no higher level of material existence. How will society be ordered? Dr. Faye rejects “conservatism,” or nostalgia for an older order: “We should avoid being backward-looking, concerned with restoration and reaction, for it is the last few centuries that have spawned the pox that is now devouring us.” Instead, he predicts the emergence of “archaic” values, that is to say, “answers that stretch back into the mists of time.”

People will live in hierarchical, inegalitarian communities that bind members to a common destiny. Atomized individualism will be impossible because there will be no government handouts, and people will depend on each other for survival. There will be distinct castes, in which the warrior caste will have great prestige. Duties will come before rights, infractions will be severely punished, sex roles will be clearly defined, and marriages will be unions of entire families rather than contracts between individuals. Dr. Faye conceives governance as something like that of the Germanic tribes, or Athens of the fourth century BC.

Unlike today’s system, which falsely promises that anyone can be “a scientist or a prince” — and which only causes envy and resentment — hierarchy will be ingrained but accepted. Free of “individualistic hubris,” even the humble will take pride in their limited contribution.

Dr. Faye insists that these societies will not be inferior to our own; just different. Dr. Faye imagines mystic initiations, rites of passage, and fervent forms of religion in what he calls “the new Middle Ages.” He sees most people as poorer but much more attached to their communities, and happier than people of today.

Not all people will live this way, however. Advanced technology will not have completely disappeared. A small elite will enjoy its benefits, and will live in material abundance. Just what the relations between the elite and the masses will be, Dr. Faye does not make clear, but he seems to think the elite will run things kindly through an aristocracy that renews itself through talent rather than heredity. The masses, in turn, will be satisfied with their lot, barely conscious of the gilded lives led by their betters.

The elites will, in fact, live in a world of “hyperscience” — the futurism of archeofuturism — unfettered by today’s “pseudo-ethical obstacles.” Nuclear power will proliferate, and Dr. Faye believes genetic science will unleash dramatic eugenic breakthroughs. He even imagines useful crossbreeds between humans and animals, and cloned organ banks. None of this will be available to the unscientific masses, so the gaps between the two worlds will grow ever larger.

A new world order

Guillaume Faye
Dr. Faye speaking at the 2006 American

Dr. Faye’s prescriptions for Europe are part of his post-catastrophe scenario, but could conceivably come about without a world-wide crash. He predicts the establishment of Eurosiberia or the United States of Europe, which would be home to the “folk whose natural and historical territory — whose fortress, I would say — extends from Brest to the Bering Strait.” He believes that in the face of Islam and Third-World immigration, whites are uniting within their common homeland and around their common culture, just as the Greeks did when the Persians invaded. He does not expect Eurosiberia to be entirely exclusive, however: “We can accommodate guests, but not invaders.”

Like many thinkers on the European right, Dr. Faye thinks the nation state is finished. Europeans will have deeper attachments to regions, which will have great autonomy in matters of culture, education, and language. In the meantime, he urges support for the European Union. Dr. Faye recognizes that this is a risky strategy, given the stifling, aggressively egalitarian nature of EU institutions. He nevertheless thinks they will become the framework of his beloved Eurosiberia when the collapse shatters egalitarianism and the belief in miracles on which it depends.

Eurosiberia will be just one of perhaps four or five autarkic blocs that Dr. Faye predicts will emerge. All will be racially more or less homogeneous, with the possible exception of the North American Union. Dr. Faye seems to believe that if anyone can make a success of multi-racialism, it is the Americans, but he is not sanguine about that either. The blocs — all with a large pre-technological populations and small elites — will not have much contact with each other, and there will certainly be no foreign aid.

Always entertaining

Clearly, Dr. Faye does not hesitate to make bold predictions, and his speculations are always entertaining. Whether anything he predicts will actually happen is anyone’s guess, but he is unquestionably right about two things: the central role race will play and the impotence of today’s Western ideologies. Whether one accepts his conception of archaism or not, there is no doubt that Islam and the Third World have the spirit of conquest and absolutism that once characterized Christianity and the West. Muslims are famously willing to die for their faith, and non-whites are famously ready to riot for whatever they want. Whites are famously willing to make endless concessions in the name of “human rights” to people who have nothing but contempt for anyone else’s “human rights.” As the game is played today, it is an abysmally unequal contest.


Let us hope it will not take “convergent catastrophes” to jolt whites out of their suicidal softness, but if it does, let the catastrophes come soon. The longer that day is put off, the larger the Third-World “fifth column” will grow, and the more desperate will be the struggle for European survival. AR

Articles de R. Steuckers sur "centrostudilaruna.it"

Articles de Robert Steuckers sur http://www.centrostudilaruna.it/

vendredi, 19 août 2011

The New Jewish Question of Guillaume Faye

The New Jewish Question of Guillaume Faye

By Michael O'MEARA

Ex: http://www.counter-currents.com/

Guillaume Faye
La nouvelle question juive  
Chevaigné: Editions du Lore, 2007

“I don’t know whether God loves or hates the English; I only know that they must be driven out of France.”— Saint Joan

In his critique of this controversial book, the Swiss “revisionist” scholar Jürgen Graf, now exiled in Russia, writes that Guillaume Faye has permanently discredited himself “in racial nationalist and nationalist circles worthy of the name.”[1] The reason: His “dishonest” and defamatory attack on those who challenge the Holocaust story and on those who uphold the traditional “Judeophobic” orientation of the nationalist right.

“The New Jewish Question” (henceforth NJQ) may indeed mark the end of Faye’s career as a leading identitarian and nationalist ideologue among certain segments of the racially conscious community—though by no means all of it, maybe not even the majority of it. For the sharp differences pitting the Holocaust-debunking exile against the militant anti-Islamic Frenchman reflect differences that divide nationalists throughout Europe, as long-standing historical-theoretical identities closely associated with the anti-liberal wing of the nationalist right clash with the electoral imperatives of national-populist parties endeavoring to stem the pro-immigrant policies of their respective states.[2] The white man’s future may well hinge on how these differences are resolved.

The Argument

Faye’s anti-revisionism is part of a larger argument related to what he claims is the changing Jewish relationship to white society.

Central to this change is the Third World colonization of the European heartland—and all the world-destroying effects that have followed in its wake.

Since the late 1990s, as the colonizers became bolder and more assertive, attacks on French Jews (in the form of vandalized synagogues, school violence, murders, etc.) have steadily risen. The Mainstream Media routinely denounce the “radical right,” but these attacks are largely the work of Muslim immigrants. Still of “low intensity,” Faye claims they are symptomatic of a new, more virulent anti-Semitism, which mixes anti-Zionist politics with the Koran’s traditional ethnocidal aversion to the Jews, threatening in this way to move Europe ever closer to Eurabia.

In appraising this new phenomenon, Faye, who has long been persecuted by Jewish advocacy groups for his nationalism, professes to be neither pro- nor anti-Jewish. His single avowed concern as a writer and activist is the survival of Europe. In his treatment of the NJQ, he thus fully acknowledges that the Jews are not “white” (i.e., not of Aryan or European Christian descent) and that their relationship to European society has often been negatively affected by their “schizophrenic” attitude toward Europeans (or what Kevin MacDonald more forthrightly calls their ethnocentric “double standard”).[3] He also acknowledges that the Jewish Question was once “pivotal to the issue of European, especially French, identity, for, historically, the Jews were seen as the métèque [i.e., the ‘wog,’ the ‘wop,’ the offensive foreigner] who threatened the corruption of the nation’s blood and morals” (p. 23).

Given the present Third-World inundation, the Jews, he argues, can no longer seriously be taken as either an alien menace or a métèque, especially considering that more and more of them are allegedly beginning to doubt the wisdom of open borders. Not a few nationalists and identitarians have consequently abandoned their traditional anti-Semitism. The Vlaams Belang, Europe’s most successful nationalist formation, has, for example, formed a tacit alliance with the Jewish community of Flanders in order to stem the nation’s Islamization; he also cites the Jews’ role in Jared Taylor’s American Renaissance and could have mentioned Griffin’s BNP, Fini’s National Alliance, Kjaersgaard’s Danish People’s Party, and many others.

Anti-Jewish sentiment nevertheless persists on the nationalist right, in Faye’s view distorting its movement and distracting it from its principal tasks.

He also claims that nationalist and far right anti-Semites have, in face of the invasion, altered their view somewhat, seeing Jews less as an immediate physical threat than a pernicious influence—as Zionism and elite social engineering—responsible for policies, immigration preeminently, that threaten white survival. Contemporary anti-Jewish ideology, as a result, now rests on three general tenets: That (1) the Jews dominate the world through the cultural and financial powers they wield; that (2) they are the principal force promoting white decadence; and that (3) they immunize themselves to criticism through their manipulation of the Holocaust Story. Much of the NJQ seeks to refute these tenets, revealing not just their alleged political inappropriateness to the nationalist cause, but their role in occultating the challenges facing it. More specifically, the NJQ seeks to sever all association with historic anti-Semitism, the Third Reich, and everything else that might alienate whites from joining nationalists in repelling the Muslim advance. In the name of political realism, then, Faye makes a case for abandoning principles and positions that Graf, among others, considers essential to the nationalist project.


The poorly researched and poorly argued case Faye makes in support of his argument, especially regarding the third tenet, is amply demonstrated in Graf’s review and need not be rehashed here. Two larger and equally serious questions raised by Faye do, however, deserve revisiting: Namely (1) are the Jews, traditional purveyors of anti-ethnic and anti-racial principles, the cause of the white man’s present decline, and (2) are the Jews, as the most powerful group in society, the principal enemy in the battle for white survival?

In respect to the first question, Faye says that though white or European decadence may have been promoted by certain Jewish intellectuals, its real origins lie in the inner recesses of the European soul—specifically in the secular and religious distillations of Christianity. Jews, in other words, have only exacerbated tendencies already indigenous to white life.

The French Catholic Church, he points out, dwarfs French Jewish efforts in promoting not just open borders, race mixing, and pro-immigrant policies, but cosmopolitanism, universalism, and a self-denying love of the Other.

Faye’s argument here is certainly correct in claiming that the ultimate responsibility for our race replacement lies with ourselves and that Christianity, along with its various secular offshoots (egalitarianism, individualism, universalism, etc.), has had a terrible effect on white identity, helping foster processes destructive of both the race’s organic and cultural substratum.

The problem with this aspect of his argument is that Catholicism, like other forms of Christianity, is a temporal institution subject to history. And as a historical subject, it has been different things in different periods. Thus it was that Bishop Turpin in La Chanson de Roland confronted the “Saracens” as a “Christian” warrior bearing the arms of the Frankish hero cult, while antebellum Episcopalians defended the legitimacy of negro slavery with chapter and verse. Even if the argument is only that the deep structure of Christian belief harbors an anti-white or anti-ethnic impetus, it still doesn’t explain why for centuries it served an opposite purpose. Finally, and most importantly, it was the secularization of Christian belief, associated with modernization, that provoked (or, at least, marked the beginning of) the “crisis of Western man” and the subsequent assault on the unique worth of his specific being—and not Christianity itself.[4]

In a similar way, this historical factor also affects the anti-Semitic argument. When Jew-hatred shed its religious forms in the latter part of the nineteenth century, becoming an “anti-Semitism” (implying a critique of Jewish behavior) instead of an anti-Judaism (implying a critique of Jewish religion), it did not explain why the Jews’ anti-gentile disposition (which, after all, had been around since the Hellenistic Age) was suddenly becoming hegemonic. Many of the great anti-Semites (e.g., Proudhon, Dühring, Drumont, Sombart, etc.) consequently directed their critique not just against the Jews but against those white elites who collaborated with them and especially against the emerging social-economic order which fostered such collaboration and made Jewish subversion possible. (Hence also the prominence of anti-Semites in nineteenth- and twentieth-century anti-modernist movements). The point here is that this people “that shall dwell alone” may have evolved a psychology destructively opposed to white society—a psychology, given its biological foundation, that transcends historical contingencies—but in itself this doesn’t explain why in one period Jews were fleeing pogroms and in another managing the White House.

Faye is much more convincing when he emphasizes those larger processes that turned Europeans against themselves, noting that the history leading to the white man’s present self-destruction—the history whose distant origins reside in the Renaissance, the Reformation, and the French Revolution and whose most imposing forms were philosophically expressed in the Enlightenment, politically in liberalism, and economically in capitalism—was part of a long, complex chain of causes and effects that cannot seriously be attributed to a Jewish conspiracy. Egalitarianism, human rights, materialism, individualism, and the categorical imperative, moreover, may all have been promoted by Jewish intellectuals at the white man’s expense, but to think that they are not preeminently products of European culture is possible only through an ignorance of that heritage. The sources of what Faye calls the present decay lie, as a consequence, as much in ourselves as elsewhere.[5] Since Jews, then, are only the occasional instrument of this historical subversion, they are no worse than the multitude of whites who also serve the subversive forces. To blame them for the predicament we’re in is not only false, Faye insists, but dishonorable.

There is a truth in this, just as vulgar or obsessive anti-Semitism which attributes all the white man’s woes to the “highly-ethnocentric, Christian-hating” Jews is something of a bugaboo, justifying its critics’ contempt. But there is nevertheless sound reason for seeing the forces assaulting white life and culture as Judaic in spirit—in the sense that they either stem directly from the Jews’ innate hostility to white existence, reflect the white man’s embrace of Jewish behavioral norms, represent what it means to be “modern” in Yuri Slezkine’s use of the term and “postmodern” in the current multicultural sense, or constitute part of the Jews’ historic campaign against Europe’s traditions, aristocracies, symbols, and transcendent values.[6] Relatedly it is hardly coincidental that for millennia European peoples designated the esprit juif—the spirit of “rule breakers, border crossers, and go-betweens”—as not just alien to their own, but destructive to their unique “synthesis of spirituality and virility.” (The more extreme forms of this designation went so far as to link Jews with “those cosmic forces which are destructive and evil and inimical to human life.”) This still doesn’t make the Jews the chief source of white decadence, and Faye is certainly correct in emphasizing that Europeans have never needed them to engage in ethnomasochist behavior—for the entire course of modern, especially twentieth-century, history has been cause enough. But it does suggest that white and Jewish spirits are fundamentally opposed and that the hegemony of the latter cannot but have a distorting effect on white being. Indeed, it is the white man’s alienation from his spirit that causes him, as Heidegger says, to “fall out of being” and thus into decay, decline, and decadence.[7]

Revealingly, Faye ignores the fact that anti-Semitism appears in virtually every period of European history. He understands the Jewish Question only as a facet of nineteenth- and early twentieth-century developments and does so without actually examining the nature of our increasingly Hebraicized world. Moreover, it is only the Jews’ “schizophrenia,” the divided loyalties they harbor toward Europe, that he sees as arousing European hostility and provoking gentile opposition. Though acknowledging the often negative offshoots of this “schizophrenia,” he also claims it is nowhere near as threatening as the menace posed by Islam and that it is frequently mitigated by the Jews’ identification with “Western Civilization.” Faye thus joins those nationalists who seek “freedom from history” in order to pursue anti-immigrant politics without being associated with the demobilizing tags of anti-Semitism, Nazism, and extremism, dismissing, in effect, the contention that it is the anathematization of these earlier expressions of European being that empowers and legitimatizes the system’s anti-European policies.

It would be historically unserious, I believe, to dispute Faye’s claim that the Jews are not wholly responsible for the white man’s decline. But at the same time it is quite another thing to then claim, as Faye does, that the Jewish Question is today passé and of no political interest to the struggle for white survival. There’s a difference he ignores between discarding the baggage of past failures and avoiding the challenges the past poses for the present. A case in point is the Holocaust Story, whose misrepresentation, as Graf, among many others, points out, is used to defame Europe’s greatest people, the Germans, demonizing not only their history and ethnos, but that of all Europeans. A European or white nationalist movement to stave off the race’s destruction by accepting this defamation and demonization, along with the lies, propaganda, and repression accompanying them, might arguably enhance its electoral prospects, but the proponents of such a system-accommodating movement never seem to concern themselves with the kind of “nationalism” it would represent or the sort of goals it could possibly achieve—or if it would actually be able to address the real sources of European decay. Following Heidegger, I would go further and argue that Europe and the “West” will never be reborn without the spiritual rebirth of the Germans and that this is impossible as long as they are forced to cower in the shadow of the Holocaust Story.

The Enemy

Of even greater concern for Faye is his belief that nationalists and identitarians fixated on the Jewish Question ignore the real enemy: The non-white, Muslim-led hordes encamped on Europe’s southern border who threaten to replace the indigenous European population.

Confronted with six million non-whites inside France and the millions to arrive in the near future, Faye argues that 600,000 French Jews (the largest Jewish community in Europe) are hardly an enemy. He even argues that the power and influence of France’s Jewish minority, virtually omnipotent in anti-Semitic eyes, are waning. Unlike the nineteenth and first half of the twentieth century, Jews no longer dominate the nation’s financial heights, having been supplanted by the holders of Anglo-American pension funds, Arab petro-dollars, and the new East Asian economies; he also stresses that none of the world’s top fifty banks are Jewish owned. Likewise, in French education, the judiciary, the unions, and the civil service, Jewish power is marginal and in French politics, ideas, and media, while still prominent, is hardly dominant. Possessing powers incommensurate with their demographic weight, these powers are not, then, what they once were. Future trends (world opinion’s increasingly negative image of Israel, European Islamization, and the rise of the East Asian powers and a non-Eurocentric world order, etc.), Faye insists, will exacerbate this tendency. At the same time, Jews are allegedly becoming less and less supportive of mass Third World immigration.[8] In a period when Europe is under assault by Islam, revisionism and other anti-Jewish engagements, he argues, are “a typical example of a phony problem, a strategy of avoidance, of taking shelter in the past” (p. 171).[9] Anti-Semitism, in a word, has become “an ideological relic of a dead past,” irrelevant to the great challenge posed by the rising tide of color.

I imagine TOQ readers will find this a strange argument, given that Jewish power in the United States has never been greater or more destructive and that even France, the one European country not completely subject to American hegemony, has recently been captured by “semi-neocons.”[10] How, then, can Faye, given his history and publishing record, make such a claim?  One obvious reason, touched on above, is that anti-Jewish politics have the effect of politically marginalizing nationalists and that for them to break out of their ghetto they need to conform to the system’s underlying principles or else risk continued irrelevance. His argument (which is not entirely wrong) nevertheless rests on the assumption that the European situation is roughly analogous to the American one. Jewish power in Europe, however, has never been as great as its American counterpart and has a different nature, for it is a product of the American-centric system introduced in 1945—a system, I would argue, whose deracinating, globalizing, and totalizing economic and technological tendencies are preeminently Jewish, though it takes an ostensibly American form (Graf describes it as “a Frankenstein monster with a non-Jewish body and a Jewish head”).[11]

Given the power of this system’s centripetal forces and the degree to which the old European order was destroyed during the Second World War (and thus the degree to which it is no longer possible to speak of Europe as an autonomous actor), Faye in my view underestimates the external (American) sources of Jewish influence. For this system—which today subjects the entire planet to its “democratic” terrorism—is geared to the transnational imperatives of U.S. planners, which has the effect of subordinating Europe to its inherently Judeo-American logic. When Faye points out that France’s pro-immigration policies were mainly the work of gentiles and that countries like Sweden, Ireland, and Spain, with negligible or non-existent Jewish communities, have enacted similar ethnocidal policies, he is quite right to argue that Jewish involvement, if any, was peripheral. Nevertheless, the anti-European system prompting the implementation of these policies—the system which transferred sovereignty from the nation-state to the New World’s global economic order—is very much Jewish in depriving whites of everything that might prevent their submersion in its great coffee-colored market.[12] In effect, Europe’s philosemitic policies are facets of the “invisible empire” to which its comprador elites are irreparably tied, and this empire (with its liberal-capitalist impetus and often Jewish leadership) is inherently disposed to destroying the white man’s “racial and blood values.” Faye, in fact, has himself in numerous previous works emphasized the degree to which the United States has lobbied, if not compelled, Europeans to promote multiculturalism, mass Third World immigration, and Muslim Turkey’s admission to the EU.[13]

All this is mentioned by way of getting to Faye’s most important question: Who is the enemy?

From the Schmittian perspective of twentieth-century nationalism, the designation of the enemy is at the heart of every grande politique. “The enemy,” Carl Schmitt writes, “exists only when . . . one fighting collectivity of people confronts a similar collectivity.”[14] Historically, the enemy was a rival state that threatened one’s survival. But the political—which poses man’s highest existential tasks—is invoked whenever friend and enemy polarities come into play, as one adversary “intends to negate his opponent’s way of life.”[15] That the question of race replacement touches on the continued existence of the white biosphere makes racial politics “political” in the highest sense.

Even though “some” Jews continue to employ their double standard, Faye believes they are not the life and death threat that the non-white invaders pose. And though their open border advocacy and their pathologization of white identity have helped foster conditions facilitating the replacement of the indigenous white population, Faye questions if this makes the Jews a greater threat than the Third World interlopers—who are presently ethnically cleansing neighborhoods, disrupting traditional ways of life, and de-Europeanizing Europe. Worse, an obsession with Jews has caused not a few nationalists to ally with their enemy—the Muslims, who are qualitatively more anti-white and supremacist than the Jews. (The latest, most disastrous example of this was the 2007 presidential campaign of Le Pen’s National Front.) He claims, moreover, that the Jews (specifically their intellectuals) are not solely responsible for opening the gates to the “barbarians,” that they have in fact been joined by other, often more consequential, white culprits, and that to waste energy focused on their gate-opening activities is to neglect the real danger lurking in the suburbs and on the border. If nationalists are to mount an effective resistance to the anti-European forces, it is imperative, Faye insists, that they jettison their anti-Semitism and wage their struggle within the system’s philosemitic terms.

There is both a political and a theoretical issue at stake here. In our postmodern age, when the jus publicum Europaeum has given way to globalism’s anti-European order, nationalists confront a situation where they are obliged to fight a multi-front, asymmetrical war: Against an external enemy, the non-white hordes replacing Europeans, and against an internal enemy, those liberal elites, Jewish and otherwise, who promote and make possible this replacement. Faye and the reformists focus on the external enemy, his critics, like Graf, on the internal enemy. And, as in every multi-front war, the question inevitably arises: Who is the principal enemy, the gate keepers or the gate crashers?

For Faye, it’s the non-white immigrants, and every distraction from this realization is a step closer to the European’s impending Islamization. For Graf, it is the system responsible for the Third World invasion. “Effective struggle against immigration within the current framework,” he writes, “is totally impossible. In order to stop the invasion the system has to be overthrown either by a popular insurrection or a coup d’état.” This is a revolutionary answer that strikes at the root of the problem.[16] Of course, such an anti-institutional answer is one that neither Faye nor the conservative majority in nationalist ranks is presently willing to entertain—if for no other reason than it slights the visible enemy in our midst and complicates white efforts to reform existing policies.

How one sees the system, then, affects how one defines the principal enemy. And how one sees the Jews in relation to the system decides if this makes them the principal enemy or not. To the degree, therefore, that the esprit juif is the system’s spirit and favors specifically Jewish interests at the expense of white ones, the Jews are the real danger. But—and this is the qualification that muddies the waters—to the degree that it is the system itself, independent of the Jews, that is responsible for our predicament and thus the degree to which the Jews are only one of its instruments, then they are just facets of a larger, more complex web of subversion—which makes them an adversary to be sure, and one with a very distinct visage, but not, in themselves, the principal enemy.[17]

There is, admittedly, nothing neat and tidy in this, yet it is characteristic of late twentieth-century struggle that nationalists, compelled to fight both foreign invaders and their own collaborating ruling class, face nearly insurmountable challenges under the worst possible conditions.[18] The totalizing character of such struggle, with its universalization of enmity and its confusion of opponents, again owes a great deal to the breakdown of the Eurocentric system of nation-states after 1945, for this breakdown, in addition to threatening the existence of white people and denying a future to their children, completely undermined the traditional European “bracketing” of war—to such an extent that it now increasingly pits the state against the nation, conflates the forces of civil war, revolution, and national liberation, and entails a struggle that is as much about class as it is about race.[19] This makes it very difficult to designate the principal enemy. Relatedly, it raises a question of the highest political order, which Faye neglects entirely: For instead of exonerating the Jews, whose collaboration with the system is either necessary or sufficient to its purpose, and instead of abandoning our European past, which offers numerous historical examples of successfully waged anti-system struggles, Faye might have asked if anything meaningful can possibly be accomplished within a system which he himself once described as “the destroyer of nations” (le tueur des peuples).


[1] Jürgen Graf, “The New Jewish Question, or The End of Guillaume Faye,” http://www.adelaideinstitute.org/LEGAL2006/Faye.htm [2]; my quotations come from the French original, “La nouvelle question juive ou la fin de Guillaume Faye,” http://www.juergen-graf.sled.name/articles/graf-la-fin-de-guillaume-faye.html [3]. Cf. “Dr. Robert Faurisson on Guillaume Faye,” http://www.thecivicplatform.com/2007/ 11/23/dr-robert-faurisson-on-guillaume-faye-2/ [4]; Michael O’Meara, “Guillaume Faye and the Jews [5].”

[2] For disclosure’s sake, I should mention the divided loyalties affecting my review of this work. Revisionism, especially as disseminated by Mark Weber’s IHR, played a major role in shaping my work as a professionally trained historian and as a racial nationalist; relatedly, revisionist ideas led to the termination of my short-lived academic career. My identification with Graf is thus both personal and intellectual. At the same time, I helped introduce English-speaking nationalists to Faye’s ideas, which I continue to think are an invaluable contribution to the coming European Revolution.

[3] Kevin MacDonald, The Culture of Critique (Bloomington, Ind.: 1stBooks, 2002).

[4] This is not an apology, but a simple historical observation—one, moreover, made with the knowledge that most non-Orthodox distillations of Christianity are today objectively anti-white and that, at the same time, any credible nationalist movement in America cannot be anti-Christian.

[5] In probing the sources of European decay, our greatest thinkers are closer to Faye than to the anti-Semitic vulgate: Think of Nietzsche’s theory of nihilism, Weber’s Iron Cage, Heidegger’s evasion of being, Spengler’s organic cycles, or Evola’s loss of Tradition—all of which emphasize the self-destructive tendencies inherent in European culture. Kevin MacDonald’s own work, in considering the role that individualism, weak ethnocentrism, and moral universalism have played in making whites vulnerable to Jewish subversion, also acknowledges the effects of these European sources (though he tends to emphasize the primacy of the Jewish ones).

[6] When Slezkine argues (further substantiating MacDonald’s argument in The Culture of Critique) that the “Modern Age is the Jewish Age,” he affirms, in effect, the essentially Judaic character of the existing system. Yuri Slezkine, The Jewish Century (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004). Julius Evola, whom I consider the most profound anti-Jewish critic of the twentieth century, actually ended up abandoning his anti-Semitism after 1945 because he thought it “absurd” to continue posing the Jewish Question when the “negative behavior attributed to Jews had become that of the majority of Aryans.” Julius Evola, Il Camminino del Cinabro (Milan: Scheiwiller, 1972). See also Michael O’Meara, “Evola’s Anti-Semitism [6].”

[7] Martin Heidegger, Introduction to Metaphysics, trans. by G. Fried and R. Polt (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000).

[8] As evident in the immigration policies of Nicolas Sarkozy, French Jews are becoming less supportive of the present Afro-Arab immigration, which is the principal source of the growing anti-Semitism. But this does not mean, as Faye assumes, that they are beginning to oppose Third World immigration tout court. Rather, Sarkozy’s “select immigration” is increasingly oriented to East Asians, who are both less of a welfare charge and indifferent to Judaism. See Michael O’Meara, “Racial Nationalism and the French Presidential Election of 2007,” http://www.vanguardnewsnetwork.com/?p=1703 [7].

[9] This argument bears comparison to the argument he makes against European anti-Americanism. See Guillaume Faye, Le coup d’Etat mondial: Essai sur le Nouvel Impérialisme Américain (Paris: L’Æncre, 2004); Michael O’Meara, “Europe’s Enemy: Islam or America? [8]

[10] “Semi” because Sarko l’Américain has on several occasions threatened (and threatens still) to mutate into Sarko l’Européen—given that the geopolitical imperatives of France’s leadership of Europe overrides the pro-Americanism of his neocon ideology. See “Candide postmoderne, avec Ray-Bans, jeans et ‘esprit apocalyptique’” (1-11-08), http://www.dedefensa.org/article.php?art_id=4819 [9].

[11] The history of this system has yet to be written. It was anticipated as early as 1950 in Carl Schmitt, The Nomos of the Earth, tr. by G. L. Ulmen (New York: Telos Press, 2006). Its origins have been examined in Jean-Gilles Malliarakis, Yalta et la naissance des blocs (Paris: Eds. du Trident, 1982, 1995). One of its better recent theoretical conceptualizations is Alexandre Zinoview, La grande rupture: Sociologie d’un monde bouleversé (Lausanne: Eds. L’Age d’Homme, 1999). Faye himself attempted to grasp the system’s nature in one of his more important early works, Le Système à tuer les peuples (Paris: Ed. Copernic, 1981).

[12] Julius Evola, Three Aspects of the Jewish Problem (NP: Thompkins & Cariou, 2003).

[13] “What we call Americanism is nothing else . . . than the Jewish spirit distilled.” Werner Sombart, The Jews and Modern Capitalism, trans. by M. Epstein (New Brunswick: Transaction Books, 1982). Writing at the end of the twentieth century, Kevin MacDonald makes a similar contention in The Culture of Critique. The difference is that Sombart believed the liberal-capitalist core of American civilization was inherently Judaic, while MacDonald contends that it was imposed.

[14] Carl Schmitt, The Concept of the Political, trans. by G. Schwab (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996).

[15] Schmitt, Concept of the Political.

[16] Cf. Michael O’Meara, “The Defeat of the Jewnited States as Imagined by H. A. Covington,” http://www.vanguardnewsnetwork.com/?p=1936; and “Through the Barrel of a Gun or Not at All,” http://www.vanguardnewsnetwork.com/?p=2236.

[17] For decades now, the Jewish spirit has obviously influenced the “hostile elite” managing America’s world system, but whether this elite is Jewish in essence is something that anti-Jewish critics have yet to prove.

[18] Think of France in the early Sixties, when General Salan’s Organisation Armée Secrète had to fight a non-white enemy in Algiers and a French enemy in Paris; or the situation today in Iraq, as Sunni insurgents simultaneously battle Shi’ites, the puppet government in Baghdad, and the foreign army of occupation.

[19] Carl Schmitt, “Theory of the Partisan,” Telos no. 127 (Spring 2004).

Article printed from Counter-Currents Publishing: http://www.counter-currents.com

URL to article: http://www.counter-currents.com/2011/08/the-new-jewish-question-of-guillaume-faye/

Guillaume Faye and the Jews

Guillaume Faye & the Jews

By Michael O'Meara 

Ex: http://www.counter-currents.com/

Faye.jpgFew postwar thinkers in my view have played a greater role in ideologically resisting the forces assaulting Europe’s incomparable bioculture than Guillaume Faye. This was publicly evident at the international conference on “The White World’s Future” held in Moscow in June 2006, which he helped organize. It’s even more evident in the six books he’s written in the last seven years and in the innumerable articles, interviews, and conferences in which he’s alerted Europeans to the great challenges threatening their survival.

In this spirit he has developed an “archeofuturist” philosophy that takes its inspiration from the most primordial and Faustian urgings of our people’s spirit; he has incessantly warned of the threat posed by the Third World, specially Islamic, invasion of the former white homelands; he has promoted European collaboration with Russia and made the case for a white imperium stretching from Dublin to Vladivoskov; he privileges biopolitics over cultural or party politics; he’s developed a theory of the interregnum that explains why the existing system of subversion will soon collapse; and he’s successfully promoted anti-liberal ideas and values in a language and style that transcends the often ghettoized discourse of our movement. But despite his incomparable contribution to the forces of white resistance, he has always remained suspiciously silent on certain key issues, particularly regarding the Jews, the so-called Holocaust, and the interwar heritage of revolutionary nationalism — even though he is routinely referred to in the MSM as a fascist, a racist, and a negationist. On those few occasions he has spoken of Israel or the Jews, it has been to say that their cause is not ours and that we need to focus on the dangers bearing down on us. To this degree, his silence was tolerable. Recently, however, he’s broken this silence and taken a stance likely to alienate many of his supporters.

The occasion was an interview granted to the Zionist France-Echos — now posted at subversive.com. When asked in the interview about anti-Semitism in the “identitarian” movement he leads, Faye responded in explicitly philosemitic terms:

Anti-Judaism (a term preferable to anti-Semitism) has melted away like snow in the sun. There are, of course, pockets of resistance . . . . But this tendency is more and more isolated . . . because of the massive problem posed by Islamizaton and Third World immigration. In these circumstance, anti-Judaism has been forgotten, for the Jew no longer appears as a menace. In the milieux I frequent, I never read or hear of anti Jewish invectives. . . . [A]nti-Judaism is a political position that is obsolete, unhelpful, out of date, even when camouflaged as anti-Zionism. This is no longer the era of the Dreyfus Affair. Anti-Jews, moreover, are caught in an inescapable contradiction: they despise Jews, but claim they dominate the world, as if they were a superior race. This makes anti-Judaism a form of political schizophrenia, a sort of inverted philosemitism, an expression of resentment. One can’t, after all, detest what one aspires to . . . . My position is that of Nietzsche: To run down the Jews serves no purpose, it’s politically stupid and unproductive.

Besides ignoring the fact that Jewish influence has never been more dominant and more destructive of white existence, three questions are raised in this quote:

(1) Is it that the problems posed by immigration and Islam have trivialized those once associated with the Jews?

(2) Or is it that Islam and immigration reveal that the Jews are not (and never were) a problem, that the anti-Judaism of the Dreyfus era, like other historical expressions of anti-Judaism, was simply a product of a culture whose traditionalism or resentment “stupidly” demonized the Jew as the Other?

(3) Or is it that one can’t have two enemies at the same time, that the threat posed by Islamic immigration is greater than whatever threat the Jews might pose, making it strategically necessary to focus on the principal enemy and to relegate the other to a lesser degree of significance?

Faye tends to conflate these questions, leaving unsaid what needs to be said explicitly. He assumes, moreover, that the Islamic or Third World threat (both in the form of the present invasion and internationally) is somehow unrelated to the Jews. He acknowledges, of course, that certain Jews have been instrumental in promoting multiracialism and immigration. But the supposition here is that this is just a tendency on the part of certain Jews and that to think otherwise is to commit the error of seeing them in the way that “old-fashioned” anti-Semites once did. At first glance, his argument seems to be that of Jared Taylor and American Renaissance, being a tactical decision to take the path of least resistance (which many of us don’t support but nevertheless can live with). Faye, though, goes beyond Taylor, making claims about the Jews that will inevitably compromise our movement.

The anti-Islamism and philosemitism that Faye here combines reflect a deep ideological divide in French nationalist ranks. This divide is symptomatic of a larger schism that is rarely discussed by white nationalists, but has had worldwide ramification for our movement. Since 1945, when the anti-white forces of triumphant American liberalism and Russian Communism, in alliance with Zionism, achieved world hegemony, the hounded and tattered ranks of the nationalist right, in Europe and America, split into a number of divergent, if not contradictory tendencies. With the advent of the Cold War and the formation of the Israeli state, these tendencies tended to polarize around two camps. One tendency, including certain ex-Nazis, allied with postwar anti-Communism, viewing the Russian threat as the greater danger to Western Civilization. Given Israel’s strategic place in the Cold War alignment, these anti-Communists treated organized Zionism as an ally and downplayed the “anti-Semitism” that had traditionally been part of their anti-liberal nationalism. This tendency was opposed by another, which also included former Nazis, but it saw Russian Communism in terms of Stalin’s alleged anti-Semitism and nationalism. This led it to assume an anti-American, anti-Zionist, and pro-Third World position.

The legacy of this polarization continues to affect white nationalist ranks, even though elements of it have been jumbled and rearranged in recent years. As ideal types, however, neither tendency is completely supportable nor insupportable. White nationalism, I suspect, will succeed as a movement only in synthesizing the positive, pro-white elements in each tendency. For a long time, I thought Faye represented this synthesis, for he was both pro-Russian without being hysterically anti-American, anti-Third World without supporting the globalist super-structure dominating the “West.” More impressive still, his orientation was to a revolutionary, racially conscious, and archeofuturist concept of the European race that refused any accommodation to the existing regime.

Recently, however, his anti-Islamism seems to have morphed into a Zionism that cannot but trouble our movement. In the France-Echos interview he says in reference to his nationalist critics that it is nonsensical to call him a Zionist since he is not a Jew. But in the same breath he adds:

How could I be anti-Zionist . . . . Unlike Islamism, Communism, Leftism, human rights, and masochistic, post-conciliar Christianity, Zionism neither opposes nor restrains in any significant way the ideals I defend, that is, the preservation of [Europe's biocultural] identity. How would the disappearance of Israel serve my cause? For a European identitarian to think that the Hebrew state is an enemy is geopolitically stupid.

He goes on to argue that those who are viscerally anti-American and anti-Zionist are implicitly pro-Islam, pro-Arab, and immigrationist, allies in effect of the Left’s Third-Worldism. Pointing to Alain de Benoist’s GRECE, Christian Bouchet’s revolutionary nationalist movement, and those “Traditionalist” European converts to Islam, all of whom are fascinated by Iran’s new leadership and by Hezbollah, he claims, with some justice, that these anti-Zionists are in the process of abandoning their commitment to Europe.

Faye’s contention that Islam (the civilization) is a mortal threat to Europe is solidly grounded. While one might appreciate Amadinehjad’s critique of Zionist propaganda, especially as it takes the form of the Holocaust, or Nasrallah’s humbling of the IDF, to go from there to supporting Iran’s Islamic Republic or Islamic insurgents in general (think of the Paris Ramadan riots of November 2005) is, for white nationalists, a betrayal of another sort. Faye here acts as an important bulwark against those in our ranks who would leave it to others to fight our battles — others, if history is any guide, who won’t
hesitate to subjugate us once the opportunity arises.

Where Faye crosses the line in my view is in arguing that Jews ought to be considered part of European civilization, that the defense and reinforcement of the Israeli state is a vital imperative for Europe, and that Israel is the vanguard in the struggle against “our common enemy.” The collapse of Israel, he claims, would “open the door to the total conquest of Europe.” He concludes by declaring that he is no Judeophile. “I consider the Jews allies, as part of European civilization, with a very particular and original status as a people apart.” He rejects anti-Judaism “not because it is immoral, but because it is unuseful, divisive, infantile, politically inconsistent, out dated.” For ostensively strategic reasons, then, he rejects anti-Judaism.

It is not my intention here to critique Faye’s new-found Zionism (which I find insupportable) — that would require a format different from this report. It is also not my intention to put his other ideas in doubt, for I continue to believe that he has made an incomparable intellectual contribution to the cause of white resistance. I do, however, question how Faye can consider a non-European people like the Jews to be part of our biocivilization; how he can ignore the destructive role they have played in European and especially American history; how he can dismiss their role in fostering the anti-white forces of multiculturalism, globalism, and the existing regime; and how he can think that Israel is not a geopolitical liability to Europe and Russia?

Finally, I can’t help but recall an earlier occasion when Faye argued that our survival as a people depends on “ourselves alone” — and not on appeals to those whose interests are inevitably served at our expense.

From VNN, July 31, 2006

Article printed from Counter-Currents Publishing: http://www.counter-currents.com

URL to article: http://www.counter-currents.com/2011/08/guillaume-faye-the-jews/

Articles de Jean Mabire sur "centrostudilaruna"

Articles de Jean Mabire

sur http://www.centrostudilaruna.it/

Jean MabireJean Mabire (Paris 8 février 1927 - Saint-Malo 29 mars 2006), était un écrivain, journaliste et critique littéraire français, engagé des milieux régionalistes normands et de la Nouvelle droite. Il est l'auteur de nombreux livres consacrés à l'histoire, notamment à la Seconde Guerre mondiale.

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mardi, 16 août 2011

Hoe ontstaan revoluties?

Hoe ontstaan revoluties?


Ex: Nieuwsbrief Deltastichting - Nr. 50 - Augustus 2011

Hoe revoluties ontstaan, is een vraag die men zich al heel lang stelt. De actualiteit van de zogenaamde Arabische Lente in 2011 heeft ondertussen geleerd dat er geen antwoorden bestaan, die het fenomeen op zich volledig verklaren. Maar het Franse tijdschrift, La Nouvelle Revue d’Histoire, fraai uitgegevendoor Dominique Venner en één van de beste van zijn soort, heeft het nodig gevonden om hieraan een dossier te wijden. Een dossier dat net op tijd komt, want net rond deze periode werd ook het hoofdwerk van José Ortega y Gasset , La Rebelion De Las Masas (vertaal in het Nederlands als De Opstand der Horden, verschenen bij Nijgh & Van Ditmar met ISBN-nummer 9789023655671) opnieuw in het Frans uitgegeven.
Auteur Jean Michel Baldassari vraagt zich af op welke manier men het belang van een boek kan afmeten en geeft hierop als antwoord: “Als men het boek lang na de publicatie nog kan herlezen, zonder de indruk te hebben dat men verraden werd of bij de neus genomen”.  De Opstand der Horden, dat in 1929 in Spanje werd gepubliceerd, voldoet volkomen aan deze stelregel en – wat meer is – geeft daarenboven eeninteressante inkijk in het wezen en het ontstaan van revoluties. Een boek dat velen irriteert, want hetgaat helemaal in tegen de lineaire conceptie van de geschiedenis, die de vooruitgang van de mensheid afmeet aan de doorbraak van de democratie.

Voor deze Spaanse filosoof is democratie geen doel op zichzelf, maar slechts een middel van emancipatie, dat de beschaving ter beschikking stelt van het individu, zodat hij uit zijn apathie kanbreken. Europa kende op dat moment een beschaving waarbij de macht en de leiding van de maatschappij werd uitgeoefend door aldan niet verlichte minderheden. Maar tussen 1800 en 1914 groeide debevolking in Europa van 180 naar 460 miljoen mensen. Daarmee deed demassa haar intrede in het publieke leven. Samen hiermee ontwikkelde het De opstand der hordenonderwijs zichenorm en zorgden democratische rechten ervoor dat een ongekende situatie ontstond. Voor de eerste keer in de geschiedenis “oefenden individuen, die onverschillig stonden tegenover verleden en toekomst, die geen bijzondere ambitie of passie hadden, het recht uit om het lot van de wereld in een bepaalde richting te sturen” (Jean Michel Baldassari, pag. 35).

Beschouwde Ortega y Gasset de democratie dan niet als een vooruitgang? Natuurlijk wel, al waarschuwde hij er wel voor dat deze vooruitgang zich evengoed tegen zichzelf kon keren en in eennieuw barbarendom kon omslaan als de elites, anders gezegd diegenen die de zware verantwoordelijkheid op zich wilden nemen om de maatschappij te leiden, zich volledig zouden laten leiden door de blinde eisen van diegenen die hij met “massa’s” omschreef.

José Ortega y Gasset zal vooral de geschiedenis ingaan als de scherpe analyticus van het verschijnsel ‘massamens’.  Dit fenomeen is eigenlijk een agglomeraat van individuen zonder welomschreven groep of bijzonder talent, maar die zich soeverein opstellen, omdat men hen heeft laten geloven dat zij dat zijn.  “Want de gemiddelde mens heeft geleerd dat alle mensen wettelijk gezien gelijk zijn”, aldus de filosoof.  Verwaand in die mate dat hij elk hiërarchie als een agressie tegen zichzelf aanvoelt. Onverschillig tegenover de mogelijke plichten, kent hij maar al te goed zijn rechten.
Onvermijdelijk komen dan die andere groten in beeld: Alexis de Toqueville en Hannah Arendt. Want naar het voorbeeld van de Toqueville, die ongerust was over de gevolgen van de democratie, en ORTEGA Y GASSETHannah Arendt, die in haar De oorsprong van het totalitarisme het spiritueel ontworteld individu beschrijft datzeer gevoelig is voor collectivistische avonturen, zo vreest ook Ortega y Gasset de irrationele kracht van massa. Hij stond dus eerder afkerig van het Italië van Mussolini, maar was bovenal een anticommunist.
Was hij een reactionair? Helemaal niet, hij observeerde gewoon wat hij zag. Maarin tegenstelling tot Oswald Spengler die de fatale ondergang van het Westen voorspelde, dacht de Spanjaard niet dat Europa ‘gedoemd’ was tot een onomkeerbare decadentie. De Europese naties, aldus Ortega y Gasset, bevonden zich natuurlijk wel in een neerwaartse spiraal, maar als ze zich maar verenigden in iets nieuw, kon er zeker een nieuwe wereldmacht groeien. Was hij het eens met liberale denkers in die tijd om te stellen dat geschiedenis niet op voorhand geschreven was en dat mensen hun eigen lot perfect in eigen handen konden nemen, dan was hij in zoverre niet meer akkoord met diezelfde liberalen en stelde zich dus eerder als een conservatief op, dat hij als voorwaarde hieraan verbond dat vrijheid betekende dat diegenen die geroepen waren om te “leiden”, dit dan ook moesten kunnen zonder aan allerlei zware democratische regels te zijn gebonden.

José Ortega y Gasset stond positief tegenover een humanistische en tezelfdertijd elitaire beschaving, maar zou heel weinig voeling hebben gehad met “wat de beschaving vandaag heeft voortgebracht, een libertaire maatschappij, puur op consumptie gericht”.
Enkele historici belichtten verder in dit nummer 55 de Franse revolutie van 1789, de val van de burgerkoning Louis-Philippe, het belang van het jaar 1848 voor de opstanden over gans Europa, en de revolutie van 1917 in Rusland. Tenslotte belicht Dominique Venner in een bijdrage “Wanneer de revolutie een religie wordt” de gelijkenissen tussen de twee totalitaire ideologieën van de 20ste eeuw, het fascisme en het communisme. In deze beide collectivistische stromingen merkt de auteur – terecht naar mijn inschatting – een honger naar nieuwe religiositeit, en gaat hij op zoek wat er van het geloof van de fiere zeloten is overgebleven.

Een nummerén een tijdschrift dat we alleen maar kunnen aanbevelen:

La Nouvelle Revue d’Histoire.
Avenue des Ternes, 88
F-75017 Paris (Frankrijk)

(Peter Logghe)

Tomislav Sunic on the European New Right

Tomislav Sunic on the European New Right

lundi, 15 août 2011

Europe's Enemy: Islam or America?

Europe’s Enemy: Islam or America?
Guillaume Faye’s Le coup d’Etat mondial

Michael O'MEARA

Ex: http://www.counter-currents.com/

Guillaume Faye
Le coup d’Etat mondial:
Essai sur le Nouvel Impérialisme Américain
(Global Coup d’Etat: An Essay on the New American Imperialism)
Paris: L’Æncre, 2004

 Fas est ab hoste doceri. (It is permitted to learn from the enemy.) — Ovid

This past spring, for the sixth time in six years, Guillaume Faye has published a book that redefines the political contours of European nationalism (“nationalism” here referring not to the defense of the nineteenth-century “nation-state,” but of Magna Europa). Like each of his previous works, Coup d’Etat mondial speaks to the exigencies of the moment, as well as to the perennial concerns of the European ethnos. In this spirit, it offers a scathing critique of the “new American imperialism” and the European anti-Americanism opposing it, while simultaneously contributing to a larger nationalist debate over Europe’s destiny. Framed in terms of Carl Schmitt’s Freund/Feind designation, this debate revolves around the question: Who is Europe’s enemy? For Schmitt, this question is tantamount to asking who threatens Europe’s state system and, by implication, who threatens its unique bioculture.

During the Cold War, the more advanced nationalists rejected the conventional view that Soviet Communism was the principal enemy and instead designated the United States. This is evident in the works of Francis Parker Yockey, Jean Thiriart, Adriano Romualdi, Otto Strasser, Alain de Benoist, and in the politics of the sole European statesman to have defended Europe’s independence in the postwar period: Charles de Gaulle.

It was not, however, America’s occupation of postwar Europe that alone aligned these nationalists against the U.S.—though this was perhaps cause enough. Rather, it was the liberal democratic basis of America’s postwar order, whose deculturating materialism was seen as corrupting the biocultural foundations of European life. The Soviets’ brutal occupation of Eastern Europe may therefore have broken the bodies of those opposing them, but America, for nationalists, threatened their souls.

Today, this anti-American opposition persists, but has come to signify something quite different. What has changed, and this starts to be evident in the late 1980s and even more so in the ’90s, is Third World immigration, which puts the American threat in an entirely altered perspective. In nationalist ranks, Faye stands out as the principal proponent of the view that Islam and its nonwhite immigrants now constitute Europe’s enemy and that America, though still an adversary, has become a less threatening menace.

For Faye, the New American Imperialism (NAI) associated with the Bush administration supplants the earlier, more implicit imperialism of the Cold War era. This imperialism, though, is not specifically Bush’s creation, for it arose in the Cold War’s wake and took form in subsequent aggressions on Somalia, Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and now Iraq.

The older imperialism had a Wilsonian facade, legitimated with moral pronouncements and a naive, but occasionally sincere, effort to regulate the world according to its liberal principles. By contrast, the NAI rejects this “softer” (and actually more effective) variant of American power for a policy that aggressively asserts U.S. military might irrespective of “world opinion.” It ceases thus to pursue its interests through international organizations embodying its liberal world view and instead embraces a militaristic unilateralism that defies international convention in the name of America’s “vital interests.”

Against the arguments of its apologists, Faye claims the NAI is not the hard-headed, morally clear assertion of American power that they make it out to be, but rather a puerile, utopian, and unrealistic one based on the notion that tout est permis!— anything goes. The United States may be the world’s dominant power, but it lacks what Aristotle and the conservative tradition of statecraft understood as the enduring basis of power: prudence. For in confusing dominance with omnipotence, the NAI’s neoconservative executors, like all who draw the wages of hubris, inadvertently earn themselves—and America—the likelihood of a tragic fall.

In this vein, U.S. vital interests (what the present administration defines in Zionist, militarist, and globalist terms) are treated as the sole permissible basis of national sovereignty. A state—”rogue” or otherwise—that exercises its autonomy, fabricates weapons of mass destruction (i.e., weapons capable of ensuring its sovereignty), or resists Washington’s dictates is deemed an enemy and risks reprisal. Implicit in this redefinition of America’s world role is the assumption that the United States is the world’s gendarme, its lone sovereign power, obliged to uphold a law which is synonymous with its own strategic interests.

Moreover, the NAI’s assumption that the United States has the capacity to dominate the planet is, if nothing else, simpleminded. Its proponents might think they are breaking with the legalistic or Kantian postulates of liberal internationalism by pursuing hegemonist objectives with military methods (which, in itself, would be unobjectionable), but this readiness to substitute raw power for other forms of power (that is, for power exercised in the “thieves’ den” of the United Nations or through international regulatory agencies the United States created after 1945) is informed by the Judeo-Protestant illusion that America does God’s work in the world. This cannot but disconnect them from all they seek to dominate, for in applying their illusory principles to an intractable reality, they cannot but lurch from disaster to disaster.

The NAI’s peculiar mix of political Machiavellianism and millennial Calvinism has been especially prominent in Iraq, the conquest of which was to be a cakewalk. Not only did Bush and his advisers have no idea of what they were getting into, they completely misread the capacities of American power. If the U.S. Air Force possesses unparalleled firepower, the modern American soldier cannot fight on the ground. With half its army occupying a country with no military capacity and its helicopter gunships, Bradley Fighting Vehicles, and body-armored ground troops arrayed against lightly-armed and untrained insurgents, it is stretched to the breaking-point.

Despite its imperialist ambitions, America is not Rome. Faye argues that it is more like a house of cards—an ephemeral economic-political enterprise—lacking those ethnic, religious, and cultural traits that go into making a great people and a great power.

As any white Californian will attest, there is, in fact, no longer anything particularly American about America, only people like the turbaned Sikh who drives the local cab, the Mexican illegal who mows our neighbors’ lawn, the Indian programmer who replaces his higher-paid white counterpart, the Chinese grocer who sells us beer and cigarettes late at night, the African who empties the bedpans in our nursing homes, the Africans of American birth who run our cities and public agencies, and the white zombies insulated in distant, manicured suburbs, where the voices of children are rarely heard. For Faye, this disparate hodgepodge is not a nation in any historical sense, only an artificial social system, whose members, as Lewis Lapham has written, are “united by little else except the possession of a credit card and password to the internet.” Why, it seems almost unnecessary to ask, would an American Gurkha risk his life for such an entity?

The military technology of Imperial America undoubtedly lacks an equal, but its centrality to U.S. power, Faye claims, testifies to nothing so much as the enfeebled cognitive abilities of its elites, who think their computerized gadgetry is a substitute for those primordial human qualities that go into making a people or a nation—qualities such as those that steeled not just Rome’s republican legions, but the Celtic-Saxon ranks of the Confederacy, the gunmen of the IRA, the indomitable battalions of the Wehrmacht, and the Red Army of the Great Patriotic War. In the absence of these qualities forged by blood and history, the NAI’s space-age military (whose recruiters now slip beneath the border to find the “volunteers” for its imperial missions) is a paper tiger, no match for a nation in arms—not even a pathetic, misbegotten nation like Iraq.

The hubris-ridden neoconservatives leading America into this costly adventure from which it is unlikely to recover did so without the slightest consideration of the toll it would take on the country’s already stressed and overtaxed institutions. Fighting for objectives that are everywhere challenged and with troops that are not only afraid to die, but have no idea of what they are dying for, the only thing they have actually accomplished is what they set out to combat: For they have inflamed the Middle East, enhanced Islam’s prestige, augmented bin Laden’s ranks, accelerated the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and turned the whole world against them.

Finally, Faye depicts the NAI as America’s last bloom. Both domestically and internationally, the signs of American decline, he observes, are more and more evident. For all that once distinguished America is now tarnished. Its melting pot no longer assimilates, its mixed-race population is inextricably Balkanized, its state is increasingly maniacal in its anti-white, anti-family, anti-community policies, and its market, the one remaining basis of social integration, is in serious difficulty, burdened by massive trade imbalances, unable to generate industrial jobs, hampered by astronomical debts and deficits, and increasingly dependent on the rest of the world. Even the country’s fabled democracy has ceased to work, with elections decided by the courts, fraudulent polling practices, and a pervasive system of spin and simulacrum. The virtuality of the political process seems, actually, to reflect nothing so much as the increasingly illusory authority of its reigning elites, whose oligarchic disposition and incompetent management necessitates a system of smoke and mirrors.

Internationally, America faces a no less bleak situation. Faye points out that the almighty dollar, for sixty years the world’s reserve currency, is now threatened by the euro (which means the country will soon no longer be able to live on credit); the European Union and Asia’s rising economic colossus are undermining its primacy in world markets; it faces the wrath of a billion Muslims worldwide and does nothing to stem the Muslim immigration to the United States; its occupation of Iraq is causing it to hemorrhage monetarily, morally, and militarily; and, not least, its image and integrity have been so damaged that raw power alone sustains its fragile hegemony.

Unlike the implicit imperialism of the Cold War era, the NAI is openly anti-European. In this vein, it opposes the continent’s political unification; treats its allies, even its British poodle, with contempt; practices a divide and conquer tactic which pits the so-called New Europe against the Old; and pursues a strategic orientation aimed at containing Europe and keeping it dependent on the U.S. security system.

In parallel with this anti-Europeanism, there has developed in Europe what Faye calls an “obsessional and hysterical anti-Americanism” (OHAA). He sees this development as so destructive of Europe’s self-interest that he factitiously suggests that it is probably subsidized by the CIA. For this anti-Americanism bears little relation to earlier forms of French anti-Americanism, which sought to defend France’s High Culture from the subversions of America’s culture industry. Nor are its right-wing proponents firmly in the pale of the “new revolutionary nationalism,” which designates liberalism’s cosmopolitan plutocracy as the chief enemy and resists its denationalization of capital, population, and territory. Instead, this OHAA not only does nothing to advance the European project, its fixation on the NAI inadvertently contributes to the Islamization and Third Worldization of the continent, hastening, in effect, its demise as a civilizational entity.

Touching the government and numerous nationalist tendencies, in addition to the perennially anti-identitarian Left, this OHAA is informed by a simpleminded Manichaeanism, which assumes that America’s enemy (Islam) is Europe’s friend. By this logic, America is depicted as a source of evil and Islam as a possible savior. In effect, these anti-Americans adopt not just Islam’s Manichaean world view, but that of the Judeo-Protestants who make up Bush’s political base. For like the neoconservative publicists and propagandists advising the administration and like the mullahs shepherding their submissive, but fanatical flocks, they too paint the world in black and white terms, the axis of good versus the axis of evil, with the enemy (America or Islam) seen as the source of all evil and our side (America or Islam) as the seat of all virtue.

And just as the liberal/neocon image of America is Hebraic, not Greco-European, these European anti-Americans carry in their demonstrations the flags of Iraq, Palestine, Algeria, and Morocco, shout Allah Akbar, and affirm their solidarity with Islam—all without the slightest affirmation of their own people and culture. This simple-minded Manichaeanism influences not only left-wing immigrationists bent on subverting Europe’s bioculture, but French New Rightists around Alain de Benoist, revolutionary nationalists around Christian Bouchet, traditionalists around the Austrian Martin Schwartz and the Italian Claudio Mutti, and various Eurasianists, as well as many lesser known tendencies. Worse, the politicians catering to this anti-Americanism oppose the NAI less for the sake of Europe’s autonomy than for that of its large Muslim minority. They thus refuse to be an American protectorate, but at the same time display the greatest indifference to the fact that they are rapidly becoming an Islamic-Arabic colony: Eurabia.

The economic and cultural war the United States wages on Europe, Faye stresses, ought to warrant the firmest of European ripostes, but to feel the slightest solidarity with Islam, even when “unjustly” attacked, is simply masochistic—for, if the last 1400 years is any guide, it seeks nothing so much as to conquer and destroy Europe. American plutocratic liberalism may be responsible for fostering transnational labor markets that import millions of Third World immigrants into the white Lebensraum, but if the latter are ignored for the sake of resisting the former, the end result may soon be that there will no Europeans left to defend. (Medically, this would be equivalent to fighting typhoid by ignoring the infectious bacillus assaulting the sufferer and instead concentrating exclusively on eliminating the contaminated food and water that transmit it —in which case the disease would be eradicated, but the patient not live to appreciate it).

The OHAA’s simpleminded politics, Faye argues, ends up not just misconceiving Europe’s enemy, but sanctioning its colonization, including the colonization of its mind. Like the “poor African” who is routinely portrayed as the victim of white colonialism, this sort of anti-Americanism makes the European the victim of U.S. imperialism. As we know from experiences on our side of the Atlantic, such a mentality takes responsibility for nothing and attributes everything it finds objectionable to the white man, in this case the American.

More pathetically still, in designating the United States as an irreconcilable enemy and Islam as a friend, these anti-Americans inadvertently dance to Washington’s own tune. Based on his La colonisation de l’Europe: Discours vrai sur l’immigration et l’Islam (2000) and in reference to Alexander del Valle’s Islamisme et Etats-Unis: Une alliance contre l’Europe (1999), Faye contends that since the early 1980s U.S. policy has aggressively promoted Europe’s Third Worldization—through its ideology of human rights, multiculturalism, and multiracialism, through its unrelenting effort to force the European Union to admit Turkey, but above all through its intervention on behalf of Islam in the Yugoslavian civil war. In all these ways fostering social, religious, cultural, and ethnic divisions that neutralize Europe’s potential threat to its own hegemony, it seeks to subvert European unity.

Looking to the Arab world to counter U.S. imperialism can only lead to national suicide. Those who advocate Europe’s alliance with the Third World are thus for Faye not simply naive, but neurotic. America may be a competitor, an adversary, a culturally distorting force, it may even be the principal international force for liberal cosmopolitanism, but in relation to the ethnocidal threat posed by Islam it is almost entirely innocuous. Europeans can always recover from the deculturation that comes from American domination, but not from the destruction of their genetic heritage, which Islam promises. Faye suggests that this anti-American neurosis, like the classic textbook pathology, designates America as its enemy for fear of acknowledging the danger looming under its very nose. As such, the anti-American Islamophiles refuse to see what’s happening in Europe, whose soft, dispirited white population is increasingly cowed by Islam’s conquering life-force. For however much American policy assaults Europe, it does not constitute the life-and-death danger which the invading Islamic colonizers do. To think otherwise is possible only by ignoring the primacy of race and culture. Instead, then, of pursuing chimerical relations with people whose underlying motive is the destruction of Europe as we know it, it would be wiser, Faye claims, for Europeans to view what’s happening in Iraq as the Chinese and Indians do: with cynical detachment and an eye to their own self-interest.

The greatest danger to Europe, and this idea is the axis around which Faye’s argument revolves, comes from the Islamic lands to the “South,” whose nonwhite immigrants are presently colonizing the continent, assuming control of its biosphere, and altering the foundations of European life. For European nationalists and governments to treat America, with its shallow, provisional power, as the enemy and Islam, with its nonwhite multitudes pressing on Europe’s borders, as its friend is the height of folly.

Not coincidentally, such an anti-Americanism is first cousin to the anti-white sensibility one finds in American liberal and neoconservative ranks. For just as those who try to convince us that America is a “creed,” not a white nation, these anti-Americans allying with Islam to fight the ricains betray their patrie—treating it as an abstraction and not a people. If Americans would be better off using their troops to defend their porous border instead of playing cowboy in Mesopotamia, as we white nationalists believe, Europeans loyal to their heritage would do better, Faye advises, to resist rather than to make common cause with those who are presently invading their lands.

To Faye, there can never be a total rupture between Europe and white America, given the blood bonds linking them. They might pursue divergent interests, over which dispute is inevitable, but the racial and cultural differences separating Europe from the Islamic world are insurmountable. In this spirit, he predicts that “the great clashes of the 21st century will not pit the United States against the rest of the world, but rather the Whitemen of the North against all the other racial-civilizational blocs.”

The culturally noxious effects of the liberal-democratic order of money imposed on Europe after 1945 caused European nationalists to define themselves in opposition not just to American-style liberalism, but to America as a nation. For those nationalists who continue to uphold this line, Third World immigration (which they do not favor) is viewed as an offshoot of a techno-economic system that dismisses biocultural qualities for the quantifying ones of the liberal market.

Only in fighting this system, and its chief sponsor, the United States, will Europe, they believe, be able to defend its heritage and its destiny. The Third World immigrants experiencing the deracination that comes with transnational labor markets cannot, then, be Europe’s enemy, for they too are its victim. Besides, their traditionalist, premodern culture makes them prospective allies in what is seen as a common struggle against America’s “cultureless civilization.”

But even in granting that there is a certain logic—even a certain justice—to this position, it rests upon two false premises, which Guillaume Faye has been almost alone in Europe in polemicizing: 1) that culture trumps race and 2) that race is unrelated, if not irrelevant, to culture.

His Coup d’Etat mondial offers, then, a powerful antidote to this false and potentially fatal reasoning. It demystifies the new American imperialism, revealing its tenuous character. It exposes the self-destructive character of an opposition refusing to recognize Europe’s real enemy. And, most important, in designating this enemy—the nonwhite colonizers who hope to turn Europe into a dar-al-Islam—it designates what is the single, most unavoidable, and absolutely necessary duty of white people everywhere: the defense of their homelands.

Source: TOQ, vol. 5, no. 3 (Summer 2005)

Article printed from Counter-Currents Publishing: http://www.counter-currents.com

URL to article: http://www.counter-currents.com/2011/08/europes-enemy-islam-or-americaguillaume-fayes-le-coup-detat-mondial/

dimanche, 14 août 2011

Can History Adress the Problems of the Future?

pikemen reenactors.jpg

Can History Address the Problems of the Future?

Dominique VENNER

Ex: http://www.counter-currents.com./

Translated by Greg Johnson

Men have always felt the need to peer into the future. The Greeks asked the Pythia of Delphi. The obscurity of the oracle’s pronouncements lent them to multiple interpretations. Bowing to custom, Alexander consulted her before undertaking the conquest of Asia. As she was slow to return to her tripod, the impatient Macedonian dragged her there by force. She exclaimed: “One cannot resist you . . .” Having heard these words, Alexander let her go, saying: “This prediction is enough for me.” He was a sage.

Every age has its prophets, soothsayers, haruspices, astrologers, palmists, futurologists, and other charlatans. Today we use computers. Then, they used mediums. Catherine de Medici consulted Nostradamus. Cromwell listened to William Lily. Stalin questioned Wolf Messing. Hitler questioned Eric Hanussen. Briand and Poincaré shared the talents of Mrs. Fraya . . . The destiny of an individual, however, is one thing; the destiny of a civilization is another.

Preceded by the optimism inherited from the Enlightenment, the 20th century began with promises of a glowing future, in the certitude that science and knowledge led to progress and wisdom. were progress factors and of wisdom.  Man would truly become, “Master and possessor of nature” and acquire self-mastery too. After the victory over things, peace and harmony between the men would establish themselves.

 [2]The pitiless 20th century shattered these illusions. Nobody, or almost nobody, had foreseen the catastrophic consequences of the murder in Sarajevo in the Summer of 1914. All the belligerents expected a short, fresh, happy war. It was interminable, terrible, and deadly as never before. It was the unforeseen gift of industrial progress and mass democracy to mankind—two new factors that had transformed the very nature of war. Beginning as a traditional conflict between States, it finished as an ideological crusade, dragging down the old European order, incarnated by the three great empires of the Center and the East. And the butchery of Europe and the conditions imposed on the vanquished after 1919 carried the germ of another more catastrophic war.

At the dawn of a new century and a new millennium, the illusions of progress have been partly dissipated, so much so that one hears about “fatal progress” or “economic horror.” Marxism and its certitudes foundered in the collapse of the system to which it had given birth. The optimism of yore often yields to a kind of overpowering pessimism, nourished by anxiety over a future we have every reason to fear. One turns to History to ask for answers.

But the interpretation of History escapes neither fashion nor reigning ideas. Thus one always needs strength of mind and character to free oneself from the weight of one’s own time. With a little drive, any curious, free, and cultivated spirit can grasp the unforeseeable character of History, which the last hundred years of facts make unavoidably clear, and see through the deterministic theories resulting from the Hegelian vision.

On January 22nd, 1917, a Lenin who was almost unknown and permanently exiled, spoke before a circle of socialist students: “We old men,” he said of himself, “will perhaps never see the decisive battles of the Revolution . . .” Seven weeks later, Tsarism was overthrown, and Lenin and the Bolsheviks had nothing to do with it. The “decisive battles” in which he no longer believed were commencing, to the misfortune of Russia and the whole world. I know few anecdotes so revealing of the difficulty of historical forecasts. This one is in a class by itself.

 [3]During the academic year 1975–1976, Raymond Aron, one of the most perspicacious minds of our time, gave a course at the Collège de France on “The Decline of the West,” which was already a whole curriculum. Here is his conclusion: “the decline of the United States of 1945 to 1975 rose from irresistible forces.” Let us note the word “irresistible.” In his Memories, published the year of his death, in 1983, Aron returned to this reflection and amplified it: “What I have observed since 1975 was the threat of disintegration of the American imperial zone . . .” To those who live under the shadow of the American world imperium, this analysis makes one question the author’s lucidity. And yet, he never doubted himself. Our astonishment is due to the fact that History galloped on unbeknownst to us, showing us a world today that is very different from what it was twenty years earlier, which nobody had foreseen.

By no means do I suggest ignoring the threats looming on our horizon: devouring globalization, demographic explosions, massive immigration, the pollution of nature, genetic engineering, etc. During an age of anxiety, it is healthy to repel happy illusions; it is salubrious to practice the virtues of active pessimism, those of Thucydides or Machiavelli. But it is just as necessary to reject the kind of pessimism that turns into fatalism.

The first error regarding future threats would be to regard them as inescapable. History is not the domain of fate but of the unforeseen. A second error would be to imagine the future as a prolongation of the present.  If anything is certain, it is that the future will be different from how one imagines it today. A third error would be to lose hope in intelligence, imagination, will, and finally ourselves.

Source: Le Figaro, January 19th, 2000

Online: http://euro-synergies.hautetfort.com/archive/2011/08/02/l-histoire-repond-elle-aux-problemes-de-l-avenir.html [4]

Article printed from Counter-Currents Publishing: http://www.counter-currents.com

URL to article: http://www.counter-currents.com/2011/08/can-history-address-the-problems-of-the-future/

lundi, 08 août 2011

L'histoire répond-elle aux problèmes de l'avenir?

L’Histoire répond-elle aux problèmes de l’avenir ?

Ex: http://scorpionwind.hautetfort.com/

Par Dominique Venner (historien)

Toujours les hommes ont éprouvé le besoin de scruter l‘avenir. Les Grecs interrogeaient la pythie de Delphes. Elle savait rendre des oracles dont l’obscurité se prêtait à de multiples interprétations. Se pliant à l’usage, Alexandre vint la consulter avant d’entreprendre la conquête de l’Asie. Comme elle tardait à rejoindre son trépied, l’impatient Macédonien l’y traîna de force. Elle s‘exclama : « On ne peut te résister…» Ayant entendu ces mots, Alexandre la laissa choir, disant : « Cette prédiction me suffit. » C’était un sage.

Chaque époque eut ses prophètes, devins, haruspices, astrologues, chiromanciens, futurologues et autres charlatans. Autrefois, on faisait tourner des tables, aujourd’hui les ordinateurs. Catherine de Médicis s’en rapportait à Nostradamus. Cromwell écoutait William Lily. Staline interrogeait Wolf Messing. Hitler questionnait Eric Hanussen. Briand et Poincaré se partageaient les talents de Mme Fraya… Une chose cependant, est le destin individuel, une autre celui des civilisations.

Précédé par l’optimisme hérité des Lumières, le XXème siècle s‘était ouvert sur les promesses d’un avenir radieux, dans la certitude que la science et le savoir étaient des facteurs de progrès et de sagesse. L’homme devenu vraiment «maître et possesseur de la nature», allait acquérir la maîtrise de lui-même. Après la victoire sur les choses, la paix et l’entente entre les hommes s’établiraient d’elles-mêmes.

L’impitoyable XXème siècle a démenti ces illusions. Personne ou presque n’avait vu venir la catastrophe sortie du meurtre de Sarajevo à l’été 1914. Chez tous les belligérants, on croyait à une guerre courte, fraîche et joyeuse. Elle fut interminable, épouvantable et meurtrière comme jamais. C’était le cadeau imprévu fait aux hommes par le progrès industriel et la démocratie de masse, deux facteurs nouveaux qui avait transformé la nature même de la guerre. Commencée comme un conflit classique entre les Etats, elle finit en croisade idéologique, entraînant la destruction de l’ancien ordre européen, incarné par les trois grands empires du Centre et de l’Est. On sait que le charcutage de l’Europe et les conditions imposées aux vaincus après 1919 portaient le germe d’une autre guerre plus catastrophique encore.

A l’aube d’un nouveau siècle et d’un nouveau millénaire, les illusions du progrès se sont en partie dissipées, au point que l’on entend parler de «progrès meurtrier» ou «d’horreur économique». Le marxisme et ce qu’il charriait de certitudes se sont effrondés dans la débâcle du système qu’il avait enfanté. L’optimisme d’hier cède souvent devant une sorte de pessimisme accablé, nourri par l’inquiétude d’un avenir à biens des égards angoissant. On se tourne vers l’Histoire pour lui demander des réponses.

Mais l’interprétation de l’Histoire n’échappe ni aux modes ni aux idées dominantes. Un effort de l’intelligence et du caractère est donc toujours requis pour s’affranchir des pesanteurs de son époque. Avec un peu d’entraînement, tout esprit curieux, libre et cultivé peut y parvenir. A ne prendre que les cent dernières années les faits ne manquent pas, qui soulignent par exemple le caractère imprévisible de l’Histoire, n’en déplaisent aux théories déterministes issues de la vision hégélienne.

Le 22 janvier 1917, un Lénine quasi inconnu et toujours exilé, prit la parole devant le cercle des étudiants socialistes : « Nous, les vieux, dit-il en parlant de lui, nous ne verrons peut-être jamais les batailles décisives de la Révolution… » Sept semaines plus tard, le tsarisme était renversé sans que Lénine et les bolchéviks n’y fussent pour rien. Les « batailles décisives » aux quelles il ne croyait plus allaient commencer, pour le malheur de la Russie et du monde entier. Je connais peu d’anecdotes aussi révélatrices de la difficulté des prévisions historiques. Mais il en est d’autres dans un registre différent.

Durant l’année universitaire 1975-1976, Raymond Aron, l’un des esprits les plus perspicaces de sont temps, donna un cours au Collège de France sur « La Décadence de l’Occident », ce qui était déjà tout un programme. Voici sa conclusion : « l’abaissement des Etats-Unis de 1945 à 1975 découlait de forces irrésistibles ». Retenons « irrésistibles ». Dans ses Mémoires, publiées l’année de sa mort, en 1983, Aron revenait sur cette réflexion en l’amplifiant : « Ce que j’observais dès 1975, c’était la menace de désagrégation de la zone impériale américaine…» A nous qui vivons sous l’ombre portée de l’imperium mondial américain, cette analyse ferait douter de la lucidité de l’auteur. Et pourtant, celle-ci n’a jamais été mise en doute. Notre étonnement vient du fait que l’Histoire a galopé à notre insu, nous montrant aujourd’hui un monde très différent de ce qu’il était vingt ans plus tôt, ce que personne n’avait prévu.

Je ne suggère nullement d’ignorer les menaces inscrites à notre horizon : mondialisation dévorante, gonflement démographique, immigrations massives, pollution de la nature, manipulations génétiques, etc. Dans une période inquiétante il est sain de repousser les illusion béates, il est salubre de pratiquer les vertus du pessimisme actif, celui de Thucydide ou de Machiavel. Mais il est tout aussi nécessaire de rejeter la forme de pessimisme qui pousse au fatalisme. Devant les menaces du futur, une première erreur serait de les considérer comme inéluctables. L’Histoire n’est pas le domaine de la fatalité mais celui de l’imprévu. Une deuxième erreur serait d’imaginer l’avenir en prolongement du présent. S’il est une certitude, c’est que l’avenir sera différent de ce qu’on l’imagine aujourd’hui. Une troisième erreur serait de désespérer de l’intelligence, de l’imagination, de la volonté, et finalement de nous-mêmes.

source : Le Figaro du 19 janvier 2000


dimanche, 17 juillet 2011

J. P. Arteault / F. Sainz: les racines anglo-saxonnes du mondialisme

J. P. Arteault / F. Sainz: Les racines anglo-saxonnes du mondialisme




mardi, 07 juin 2011

Tekos nr. 142/2011


Tekos nr. 142/2011



In memoriam dr. Carel Boshoff
door Peter Van Windekens

Eugene Terre’blanche en de Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging (deel 4)
door Peter Van Windekens

In het derde en vorige gedeelte van deze artikelenreeks over Eugene Terre’blanche en de AWB kwamen de plannen van de beweging aan bod om het unitaire Zuid-Afrika om te vormen tot een “Boer Volkstaat”, gebaseerd op het principe van de gewezen Boerenrepublieken. De Engelstaligen dienden zich in de toekomstige staat volledig aan te passen aan het Afrikanerdom, de joden zouden er nooit dezelfde rechten als in Israël kunnen genieten. De meeste aandacht in dit derde gedeelte ging echter uit naar de ‘belevenissen’ van Eugene Terre’blanche en de Engelstalige journaliste Jani Allan. Hetgeen de reputatie van de ‘leier’ niet ten goede kwam en wat voor onvrede en zelfs voor dissidentie binnen de AWB zorgde. Terre’blanche trachtte zich daarom te rehabiliteren via de partijpolitiek (waarop hij nochtans steeds had neergekeken), maar hij kon geen plaats op de kieslijsten bemachtigen. Door de verkiezingsoverwinning van de Nasionale Partij in september 1989 werd de apartheidspolitiek voor een eerste keer aan het wankelen gebracht. De NP had zich immers voorgenomen drastische veranderingen door te voeren. De AWB was het (uiteraard) hiermee niet eens…

Bij de opening van het nieuwe AWB hoofdkwartier te Ventersdorp op 10 oktober 1989 nodigde Eugene Terre’blanche Staatspresident de Klerk uit tot een gesprek. Deze laatste had naar eigen zeggen reeds alle betrokken partijen – uitgezonderd de AWB en de hele rechtsradicale zijde – rond zich verzameld om (met hem) te discussiëren over de toekomst van Zuid-Afrika. De Klerk aanvaardde de uitnodiging en derhalve vond op 9 november 1989 een ontmoeting plaats. Terre’blanche kwam echter niet in zijn eentje. In zijn gezelschap vertoefden ook nog: Ernst van der Westhuizen, leider van de AWB in Pretoria (hij zou later plaatsvervangend leider van de AWB worden), Piet Cloete, voorman van de Transvaalse separatisten, Theunis “Rooi Rus” Swanepoel (1927-1998), een berucht politieman met als standplaats de zogeheten ‘zwarte woonwijk’ Soweto (afkorting voor South Western Townships) buiten Johannesburg, alsook Robert van Tonder en Piet Rudolph voor de BSP (deze organisatie telde nochtans niet meer dan 200 ‘leden’, dixit Jan Groenewald in een interview). De president was op zijn beurt vergezeld door Gerrit Viljoen (1926-2009), minister voor Constitutionele Ontwikkeling en Planning. De aanwezigen boorden zowat alle mogelijke thema’s aan. Maar de “plat de résistance” van de bijeenkomst vormde uiteraard de eis van de AWB om de oude Boerenrepublieken weer in ere te herstellen en dit territorium af te scheiden van de rest van Zuid-Afrika. De Klerk wees de eis met beslistheid van de hand, waarop Eugene Terre’blanche repliceerde dat de oude republieken wettelijk gezien de eigendom van “het volk” waren. Men kon bijgevolg moeilijk van de Boeren verwachten dat zij zomaar hun recht zouden opgeven om zichzelf en hun eigen grondgebied te besturen .....

Zijn meisjes en jongens gelijk?
door Dr. med. Rudolf Kemmerich

Turkije: het neo-ottomanisme.
Francis Van den Eynde

Het blinde geloof van een aantal Europeanen dat Bush, omdat hij ‘rechts’ gecatalogeerd werd, een politiek voerde die ook de belangen van ons oude continent op het oog had, wordt slechts geëvenaard door de naïeve overtuiging van weldenkend links Europa dat Obama een totaal ander beleid dan zijn voorganger wil tot stand brengen omdat hij zwart is en voor een ‘progressist’ doorgaat. Dat zij beiden slechts om Amerika bekommerd waren en zijn, is nochtans voldoende opvallend. Dit geldt o.m. voor wat de Amerikaanse houding t.o.v. de relaties tussen Turkije en Europa betreft. Meer dan eens werd door de Democraat Obama, net zoals door de Republikein Bush, met heel veel verve gepleit voor de aansluiting van Turkije bij de EU. Dit zou immers voor Amerika zeer goed uitkomen en dit om verschillende redenen:

-Turkije te vriend houden betekent eerst en vooral voor de VS dat ze een aanspreekpunt behouden in de islamitische wereld waarvan op zijn minst kan gezegd worden dat die hen meestal niet zeer gunstig gezind is en dat is altijd meegenomen.

-Turkije kan ook een sterke bondgenoot zijn aan de zuidgrens van Rusland: een groot en machtig land dat wel eens opnieuw de wereldhegemonie van de VS in het gedrang zou kunnen brengen. Wie bovendien olie en/of gas uit Centraal-Azië naar het westen wil krijgen zonder door dat niet helemaal betrouwbare Rusland te moeten, heeft trouwens buiten het Turkse alternatief weinig keuze.

-Turkije is een behoorlijk stabiel land in het voor het overige toch zeer woelige Midden-Oosten. Iets wat voor de VS, maar nog meer voor Israël, de bondgenoot waar ze zo veel voor over hebben, best van pas kan komen.

-Eenmaal Turkije, een land dat geografisch noch cultureel bij Europa hoort, de EU vervoegd zal hebben, zal bovendien niemand zich nog kunnen verzetten tegen de aansluiting van Israël vermits dat land weliswaar ook buiten Europa ligt, maar tenminste nog als westers kan worden beschouwd. Vanzelfsprekend is dit conform de Amerikaanse wensen. Israël krijgt er een stevige Europese veiligheidswaarborg bij en Washington loopt niet langer rond met het odium dat het de enige grootmacht is, die onvoorwaardelijk de toch zeer omstreden politiek van Israël steunt. Een schandvlek is minder pijnlijk als ook iemand anders er mee rond loopt.

Geen wonder dus dat Obama ook op dit vlak de lijn Bush trouw blijft volgen en met alle mogelijke middelen Turkije in de EU probeert binnen te loodsen. Ondermeer door de Britten, die steeds het Amerikaanse paard van Troje in de Europese constructie geweest zijn, te vragen de Fransen en de Duitsers die op dat vlak nog steeds dwars liggen, van de gegrondheid van de Turkse toetredingsaanvraag te overtuigen. Amerika heeft hier immers alle belang bij. De vraag is echter of dit voor Europa eveneens het geval is ......

Humboldt als crisismanager
door Heino Bosselmann

Vlaams Belang: nood aan ideologische herbronning
door Jan Sergooris

Sinds de laatste verkiezingsuitslag gaat het met het VB van slecht naar erger. De partij komt in de media alleen nog aan bod met uitvoerige berichtgeving over persoonlijke conflicten en ruzies tussen haar sterkhouders. Voor het eerst in de 30-jarige geschiedenis van de partij ontstaan er serieuze barsten in de samenhorigheid. Electoraal succes kent vele vaders, de nederlaag is een eenzame wees. Het jarenlang gevoerde cordon tegen de partij dat finaal tot politieke machteloosheid heeft geleid en de opkomst van enkele politieke nieuwkomers (LDD, N-VA) die haar rechtse en Vlaamsgezinde monopolie hebben doorbroken, leidden tot een uittocht van tienduizenden kiezers.

Sinds haar oprichting in 1978 heeft het VB de ideologische verdienste gehad om, naast haar Vlaams-nationaal programma dat haar ware ontstaansreden vormde (cfr het Egmontpact), ook enkele maatschappelijke problemen op de politieke agenda te hebben geplaatst, die tot dan genegeerd werden door de traditionele politiek en de journalistiek. Ze vertolkte daardoor de rol van seismograaf van maatschappelijk ongenoegen. De problematiek aangaande “migranten” en “veiligheid” werden op geen tijd de “core business” van de partij en hebben haar geen windeieren gelegd! Sinds 1987 heeft het VB geoogst wat de traditionele partijen decennia lang gezaaid hebben nl. de negatie van problemen die reëel voelbaar waren voor de gewone man in de straat. Doordat de partij vanaf 1987 verkiezingsoverwinning na verkiezingsoverwinning aan elkaar reeg, ontbrak elke stimulans om zich ideologisch te herbronnen, laat staan een koerswijziging te overwegen. Maar wat haar sterkte was in het verleden wordt vandaag haar grote zwakte ......

De groene hoek
door Guy De Maertelaere

Schrijvers en Lezers
door P.L, P.V.W. & P.J.V.

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