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mercredi, 29 mai 2013

Venner: symbolish, männlich, frei und hart

Venner: symbolish, männlich, frei und hart

von Götz Kubitschek

Ex: http://www.sezession.de/

domv.jpgIndem der 79jährige Historiker Dominique Venner sich am 21. Mai in der Kathedrale Notre Dame zu Paris erschoß, reagierte er radikal auf den Weg ins Verderben, den sein Vaterland und Europa seit Jahrzehnten beschreiten. Er reagierte dabei nicht so, wie es uns das liberale System und die offene Gesellschaft nahelegen: ertragend, selbstkritisch, ausweichend, akzeptierend, weich, anknüpfungsbereit.

Venners Reaktion war überlegt [3], symbolisch, männlich, frei und hart. Sie war schockierend für all jene, die das Leben quantitativ und nicht qualitativ, individualistisch und nicht eingebettet, hedonistisch und nicht in erster Linie als Dienst auffassen. Was Venner am Altar der Kathedrale tat, begreift man entweder sofort oder gar nicht: Es umgibt sein Leben und seine Argumentation mit der Aura radikaler Unabhängigkeit und jäher Fremdheit, und alle Versuche, seine Tat zu instrumentalisieren, sind peinlich und müssen scheitern, auch jene von unserer Seite. Man muß schweigen können beim Blick auf etwas, das so weit entfernt von dem ist, was wir uns vorgenommen und was wir Tag für Tag zu tun haben.

Suicide in the Cathedral: The Death of Dominique Venner


Suicide in the Cathedral:
The Death of Dominique Venner

By Greg Johnson

Ex: http://www.counter-currents.com/

Dominique Venner is too big for me to judge. Thus I am not going to criticize or second-guess his decision to end his life with a bullet at the altar of the Cathedral of Notre Dame on May 21, 2013.

But I have no qualms about judging the reactions of smaller men to his suicide.

1. Venner’s Suicide was not a Protest Against Gay Marriage

Venner made it clear in his final blog post [2] that he believed that the gay marriage protests were merely a distraction. Venner was opposed to gay marriage, but without passion and without “homophobia [3].” He was, however, intrigued by the massive protests, as well as France’s pervasive cynicism [4] about the political establishment, phenomena that he judged to have revolutionary potential [5]. But he believed that this potential was being wasted on the issue of gay marriage when a much greater threat to France was looming unopposed: the replacement of the French people with non-white immigrants organized under the banner of Islam. Venner made it clear that his suicide was not a protest against gay marriage but an attempt to awaken people to the danger of demographic displacement.

The gay marriage statute, after all, is only a law. Laws can be changed. And this particular law clearly will be abolished, along with the rest of liberalism, when Sharia law is imposed by France’s rising Muslim majority. Sharia law, of course, is not forever either. But Sharia law will be imposed only by the demographic swamping of the French, which will lead to their genetic and cultural obliteration. And extinction is forever.

Of course the mainstream media wish to keep our people unaware of this very danger. So naturally they are reporting that Venner killed himself simply to protest gay marriage. Venner has even been described as a traditionalist Catholic, although a traditionalist Catholic would not commit suicide at all, much less at the altar of Notre Dame. Beyond that, Venner makes it clear in his final writings that he was an atheist and a cultural pagan.

But when people on the Right, who should be both sympathetic to Venner and skeptical of the press, repeat these false claims at face value, what is their excuse?

2. “One more bullet that will not be fired at the enemy.”

Many of Venner’s Right-wing critics fault him for killing himself rather than one of our enemies. But Venner was right, for two reasons. First, as I have argued elsewhere [6], revolutionary violence today is premature and thus pointless. Second, if Venner had killed another individual, the primary focus would be on the victim, and Venner himself would simply be dismissed as another crazed, embittered Right-wing loser. By killing himself, he knew that he would still be vilified and mocked. But he also knew that it would be far more likely that at least some people would actually take his ideas seriously. Very few people have convictions they will die for, thus some people will want to learn what those convictions were.

3. Venner’s Career as Activist and Intellectual

Some of Venner’s Right-wing critics reproach him for killing himself, as opposed to engaging in political or metapolitical activism. But from 1956 to 1971, Dominique Venner was very much a political and metapolitical activist.

According to Wikipedia [7] – which all of Venner’s critics could have read before attacking him in online forums — after serving in the Algerian War, Venner was demobilized in 1956 and joined the Jeune Nation [8] (Young Nation) movement, which later folded into the Organisation de l’Armée Secrète [9] (OAS, Secret Army Organization). On November 7, 1956, Venner took part in the ransacking of the office of the French Communist Party as a protest against the Soviet repression of the Hungarian Revolution. Venner then helped found a short-lived Parti Nationaliste (Nationalist Party).

Venner strongly opposed the French decolonization of Algeria. Thus he took part in General Chassin’s pro-colonist Mouvement populaire du 13-mai [10] (Popular Movement of May 13). Venner was also a member of the OAS, which used bombings and assassinations to try to halt the betrayal of European colonists in Algeria. Members of the OAS took part in the attempted military coup of April 1961 and tried to assassinate Charles De Gaulle in August of 1962. Because of his OAS membership, Venner was jailed for 18 months and was released in 1962.

After prison, Venner became increasingly involved in metapolitics: writing essays and books; founding intellectual organizations, journals, and publishing houses; networking with other Right-wing intellectuals, and the like. In the autumn of 1962, Venner wrote For a Positive Critique [11] (online at Counter-Currents), a manifesto analyzing the failure of the coup and outlining a new, somewhat “Leninist” model for a revolutionary, militant Right wing.

In January of 1963, Venner and Alain de Benoist created a movement and magazine called Europe-Action. Venner then founded the publisher Éditions Saint-Just, which was associated with Europe-Action. Venner was also an early member of the flagship organization of the French New Right, Alain de Benoist’s Groupement de recherche et d’études pour la civilisation européenne (GRECE) (Research and Study Group for European Civilization) from its beginning until the 1970s. With Thierry Maulnier, Venner founded the Institut d’études occidentales (IEO) (Institute of Western Studies), and its journal, Cité-Liberté (City-Liberty), founded in 1970.

In 1971, the IEO was dissolved and Venner withdrew from political entanglements to focus entirely on his career as a historian, a metapolitical activity in itself. He wrote and edited some 50 books, edited two journals, authored countless essays, gave many print and broadcast interviews, and mentored and promoted numerous writers.

In short, at the age of 78, Dominique Venner had done more for our people as a writer or political activist than practically anyone else. Thus it is absurd, if not obscene, to claim that “he could have done more” and that his suicide was somehow a dereliction of duty.

4. The Rationale for a Revolutionary Suicide

Venner decided, evidently after long deliberation, that there was one more thing he could do for his people, i.e., that a spectacular public suicide would (a) raise public awareness of the danger of white race replacement, and (b) encourage people who are already aware of the danger to do more to stop it.

And maybe, just maybe, Venner thought, his death would be enough to make a difference.

Because as a historian, Venner knew that individual actions can and do change history. But as a historian, he also knew that such actions and their consequences are contingent and thus unpredictable [12]. Thus, in the end, it was a gamble. But it was his own life that he was gambling with, and I, for one, do not feel it is my right to second-guess him.

I should note, however, that the first of Venner’s predictions has already been proven right. His death has won enormous publicity for our cause. That can be verified by anyone with a simple web search. But I have additional evidence: because Counter-Currents/North American New Right is the primary source of English translations of Venner’s essays, our traffic increased dramatically due to his death. Indeed, on Tuesday the 21st and Wednesday the 22nd we had the highest traffic in our history so far.

As for Venner’s second prediction: whether he is proved right or wrong is in your hands, dear reader. No, Venner did not wish to inspire the rest of us to take our lives, which would be absurd. But he did want to inspire us to take courage in moving our flag forward. All of us know of some constructive steps toward saving our race, constructive steps that we could take if only we were not afraid. But if Dominique Venner conquered the fear of death to serve our people, then surely you can conquer the lesser fears that are holding you back. Our duty is to make sure that his sacrifice was not in vain.


Article printed from Counter-Currents Publishing: http://www.counter-currents.com

URL to article: http://www.counter-currents.com/2013/05/suicide-in-the-cathedralthe-death-of-dominique-venner/

URLs in this post:

[1] Image: http://www.counter-currents.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/VennerNotreDame.jpg

[2] final blog post: http://www.counter-currents.com/2013/05/the-may-26-protests-and-heidegger/

[3] without passion and without “homophobia: http://www.counter-currents.com/2012/12/are-marriage-and-children-consumer-goods/

[4] pervasive cynicism: http://www.counter-currents.com/2013/04/theyre-all-rotten/

[5] revolutionary potential: http://www.counter-currents.com/2013/04/how-are-revolutions-born/

[6] argued elsewhere: http://www.counter-currents.com/2013/05/on-violence-2/

[7] Wikipedia: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dominique_Venner

[8] Jeune Nation: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jeune_Nation

[9] Organisation de l’Armée Secrète: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Organisation_de_l%27arm%C3%A9e_secr%C3%A8te

[10] Mouvement populaire du 13-mai: https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mouvement_populaire_du_13-Mai

[11] For a Positive Critique: http://www.counter-currents.com/tag/for-a-positive-critique/

[12] unpredictable: http://www.counter-currents.com/2011/11/the-unforeseen-the-chinese-and-the-favorable-moment/

L'occidentalisme contre l'Europe



L'occidentalisme contre l'Europe

Ex: http://www.europe-identite.com/

Tomislav Sunic

Conférence prononcée  à Lyon le 25 mai 2013  („GUD-Europe Identité“)

Le terme « occidentalisme » n’existe qu’en langue française et il a une signification bien particulière. Souvent les mots « Occident » et « occidentalisme » reçoivent leurs sens particulier en fonction de son utilisateur et de son état des lieux. Le terme « occidentalisme » ne s’utilise  guère en langue allemande ou en langue anglaise. Même le vocable français « Occident » possédant  une signification largement géographique est traduit en allemand comme « l’Ouest », à savoir « der  Westen. Il en va de même pour l’anglais où le terme français « Occident » est traduit en anglais par « the West », le sujet auquel on a consacré  pas mal de livres et de traductions. À ce propos, Patrick Buchanan, ancien conseiller de Ronald Reagan et écrivain conservateur ẚ gros tirage a publié y il a une dizaine d’années le bestseller « Death of the West » (La Mort de l’Occident) où il se lamente sur le sort de l’Ouest envahi par des millions d’immigrés non chrétiens. Dans sa prose, l’Amérique et l’Europe sont mises dans le même sac.

Or nous savons fort bien que l’Amérique et l’Europe ne sont pas synonymes – ni par leur notion des grands espaces, ni par leurs volontés hégémoniques – quoique ces deux continents soient pour l’heure toujours peuplés d’une majorité d’Européens de souche. Fort souvent dans notre histoire récente, ces deux grands espaces, malgré leurs populations quasi identiques, se sont livré des guerres atroces.

Dans les langues slaves, le substantif « Occident » et  l’adjectif  « occidental » n’existent pas non plus. À la place « d’Occident », les Croates, les Tchèques ou les Russes utilisent le substantif « zapad » qui signifie « l’Ouest ».

Le substantif français « occidentalisme », indique une notion de processus, une motion, à savoir une idéologie, et non l’idée d’une entité stable dans le temps et dans l’espace comme c’est le cas avec le substantif « Occident ».  Je vous rappelle que le titre français du livre d’Oswald Spengler, Der Untergang des Abandlandes, ou en français  Le déclin de l’Occident, ne reflète pas exactement le sens du titre allemand. Le mot allemand « der Untergang » signifie, en effet, la fin des fins, une sorte de débâcle finale, et il est plus fort que le terme français «déclin » qui sous-entend une gradation, donc une « déclinaison du mal », et qui laisse envisager pourtant une possibilité de demi-tour, une fin qu’on peut renverser au dernier moment. Tel n’est pas le cas en allemand où le substantif « Untergang » porte un signifié final à sens unique, irréversible et tragique. La même chose vaut pour le substantif allemand « das  Abendland », qui traduit en français, signifie « le pays du soleil couchant » et qui porte en langue allemande une signification largement métaphysique.  

Je dois vous rappeler ces nuances lexicales afin que nous puissions bien conceptualiser notre sujet, en l’occurrence l’occidentalisme. Il faut être bien conscient que les termes, « L’Occident «  et « l’Ouest », dans les différentes langues européennes, portent souvent des significations différentes lesquelles engendrent souvent des malentendus.

Nul doute que les termes « Occident » et « occidentalisme » ont subi un glissement sémantique. Au cours de ces quarante ans, ils ont pris en français une connotation associée au mondialisme, à l’américanisme vulgaire, au libéralisme sauvage et au « monothéisme du marché », très bien décrit par Roger Garaudy.  On est loin des années soixante et soixante-dix, quand le journal  Défense de l’Occident  sortait en France contenant des plumes  bien connues dans nos milieux. La même chose vaut pour le mouvement politico–culturel français « Occident » qui portait dans les années soixante une certaine promesse tant pour les nationalistes français que pour toute la jeunesse nationaliste européenne.

Or les deux termes – « Occident » et « occidentalisme » – qui sont aujourd’hui fustigés par les cercles identitaires et nationalistes français sont toujours objet d’éloges chez les identitaires et les nationalistes est-européens qui souffrent d’un complexe d’infériorité quant à leur nouvelle identité postcommuniste et européenne. En Pologne, en Hongrie ou en Croatie par exemple, se dire de « l’Ouest » est souvent une manière de mettre en lumière sa grande culture ou bien de se targuer de son style d’homme du monde.

Je vous rappelle qu’à l’époque communiste, les Européens de l’Est se sentaient non seulement vexés par les brimades et les oukases communistes, mais également par leur statut d’Européens de deuxième classe lorsque les Occidentaux, à savoir les Francophones  et les Anglais utilisaient le terme « l’Est » pour désigner leur coin d’Europe, à savoir l'Europe de l'Est c’est-à-dire, « Eastern Europe ». D’ailleurs, en français, on utilise parallèlement l’adjectif  « orientale » –  à savoir « l’Europe orientale » – pour désigner l’Europe de l’Est, un adjectif dont l’homonymie rend les Européens de l'Est franchement furieux.  L’adjectif « oriental »  rappelle aux Européens de l’Est l’Orient,  la Turquie, l’Arabie, l’islam, des notions avec lesquelles ils ne veulent absolument pas être rangés. Même les Européens de l’Est  qui maîtrisent parfaitement la langue française et connaissent la culture française préfèrent,  faute de mieux, que les Francophones, au lieu d’« Europe orientale »,  désignent leur coin d’Europe, comme « l’Europe de l’Est ».

Balkanisation et Globalisation

L’histoire des mots et les glissements sémantiques ne s’arrêtent pas là. Tous les Européens de l’Est, qu’ils soient de gauche ou de droite, les globalistes ou les anti-globalistes, et même la classe politique au pouvoir en Europe de l’Est aiment bien se désigner comme membres de la « Mitteleuropa » et non comme citoyens de l’Europe de l’Est. Le terme allemand  Mitteleuropa veut dire « l’Europe du centre », terme qui  renvoie aux beaux temps nostalgiques de l’Empire habsbourgeois, au biedermeier, à la douceur de vie assurée autrefois par la Maison d’Autriche et à laquelle les Slovaques, les Polonais, les Croates, les Hongrois, et mêmes les Roumains et les Ukrainiens appartenaient il n’y pas si longtemps.           

La notion d’appartenance à l’Europe, surtout dans ce coin de l’Est européen  s’aggrave davantage par les vocables utilisés par mégarde. Ainsi le terme «   Balkans » et  l’adjectif « balkanique », utilisés dans un sens neutre en France pour désigner l’Europe du sud-est,  ont une connotation injurieuse dans la culture croate même si cette désignation ne véhicule aucune signification péjorative. La perception que les Croates se font d’eux-mêmes va souvent à l’encontre de celle qui provient de l’Autre, à savoir de leurs voisins serbes ou bosniaques.  Aux yeux des Croates, les termes «  Balkans » et « balkanisation » signifient non seulement une dislocation géopolitique de l’Europe ; le vocable « Balkans », qui peut porter un signifiant tout à fait neutre en français ou en anglais, et qui est souvent utilisé dans des études géopolitiques, provoque souvent chez les nationalistes et identitaires croates des sentiments associés au comportement barbare, des complexes d’infériorité politique, et l’image de dégénérescence raciale de leur identité blanche. De plus le terme « balkanique » en croate induit souvent un sentiment négatif où se mélangent et se confondent diverses identités raciales et culturelles venues de l’Asie et non de l’Europe. On entend souvent les Croates de n’importe quel bord, se lancer mutuellement pour leurs prétendu mauvais comportement, la boutade : « Ah t’es un vrai Balkanique !».  Ce qui veut dire, dans le langage populaire croate, avoir un comportement non civilisé,  ou être un « plouc » tout simplement.  En Serbie, ce n’est pas le cas, l’identité serbe étant bien réelle et bien ancrée dans le temps et dans l’espace des Balkans et ne portant aucune signification péjorative.

Les Allemands, qui connaissent le mieux la psychologie des peuples de l’Europe centrale et des Balkans, sont très au courant de ces identités conflictuelles chez les peuples de l’Europe de l’Est et des Balkans. D’ailleurs, le terme « der Balkanezer » possède une signification fortement injurieuse dans le lexique allemand.

Quelle Europe ? 

Passons à l'Europe. A la fameuse Union européenne, bien sûr. Alors, qu’est que cela veut dire être un bon Européen aujourd’hui ? Soyons honnêtes. Compte tenu de l’afflux massif d’immigrés  non-européens, surtout du Moyen Orient, tous les Européens – que ce soient les Français de souche, ou les Anglais de souche et les « souchiens » de toute l’Europe,  sont en train de devenir de bons « balkanesques Balkaniques. » En effet, qu’est-ce que cela veut dire aujourd’hui, être Allemand, Français, ou bien Américain, vu le fait que plus de 10 à 15 pour cent d’Allemands et de Français et plus de 30 pour cent des citoyens américains sont d’origine non–européenne, donc non-blanche ? En passant par Marseille on a l’impression de visiter la ville algérienne ; l’aéroport de Francfort ressemble à celui de Hongkong. Les alentours de Neukölln à Berlin charrient les parfums de la casbah libanaise. La glèbe, le terroir, la terre et le sang, si chères à  Maurice Barrès, si chers à nous tous, qu’est-ce que cela veut dire aujourd’hui ? Strictement rien. 

On a beau prendre maintenant les allogènes comme coupables. Force est de constater que ce sont nous, les Européens, qui sommes les premiers responsables de l’occidentalisation et donc de la perte de notre identité. Ce faisant on a beau vilipender la prétendue inculture des Américains, au moins ils ne sont pas tiraillés par le petit tribalisme intra-européen. Les Américains de souche européenne peuvent demain, à la rigueur, devenir le fer de lance de la renaissance d’une nouvelle identité euro-blanche. Force et de constater que les sentiments d’identité raciale chez les nationalistes blancs américains sont plus forts que chez les nationalistes européens. 

Or en Europe de demain, dans le meilleur des mondes européens, même sans aucun allogène, il est douteux que le climat sera d’emblée propice à des grandes embrassades fraternelles entre les Irlandais et les Anglais, entre les Basques et les Castillans, entre les Serbes et les Croates, entre les Corses et les Français.  Soyons francs. Toute l’histoire de l’Europe, toute l’histoire des Européens, au cours de ces deux millénaires s’est soldée par des guerres fratricides interminables. Cela vaut toujours pour L’Europe orientale, à savoir « l’Europe de l’Est, » qui continue toujours d’être en proie à la haine interethnique. Le dernier conflit en date fut la guerre récente entre deux peuples similaires, les Serbes et les Croates. Qui peut nous garantir le contraire demain, même si l’afflux des Asiatiques et les Africains devait prendre subitement fin ?

Se dire « être  un bon Européen » aujourd’hui, ne veut rien dire. Se proclamer un « bon Occidental » non plus. Etre enraciné dans son terroir dans un monde globaliste n’a strictement aucun sens aujourd’hui, vu que nos quartiers sont peuplés d’allogènes qui avec nous sont soumis à la même culture marchande. Il y a au moins quelque chose de paradoxal avec l’arrivée des non-Européens : les interminables guerres et les disputes entre les grands discours  des nationalistes européens, entre les Polonais et les Allemands, entre les Serbes et les  Croates, entre les Irlandais et les Anglais – semblent devenus dérisoires.  L’afflux constant de non-Européens dans nos contrées européennes fait de la désignation  « L’Europe européenne » une  absurdité lexicale.

Ce qu’il nous reste à nous tous à faire c’est le devoir de nous définir tout d’abord comme héritiers de la mémoire européenne, même si nous vivons hors d’Europe, même en Australie, au Chili, ou en Amérique et même sur une autre planète.  Force est de constater que nous tous « les bons Européens » au sens nietzschéen,  nous pouvons changer notre religion, nos habitudes, nos opinions politiques, notre terroir, notre nationalité, voir même nos passeports, mais nous ne pouvons jamais échapper à notre hérédité européenne.

Non les allogènes, mais les capitalistes, les banksters,  les « antifas » et  les architectes des meilleurs des mondes, sont désormais nos principaux ennemis. Pour leur résister, il nous incombe de ressusciter notre conscience raciale et notre héritage culturel. Tous les deux vont de pair. La réalité de notre race et culture blanche ne peut pas être niée. Nous tous, nous pouvons tout changer et même aller sur une autre planète.  Mais notre hérédité, à savoir notre fond génétique, on ne peut  jamais changer.

La race, comme Julius Evola ou Ludwig Clauss nous l’enseignent, n’est pas seulement la donnée biologique – notre race est aussi notre responsabilité spirituelle qui seule peut assurer notre survie européenne.

Tomislav Sunic ( www.tomsunic.com)est écrivain et membre du Conseil d’Administration de American Freedom Party. http://a3p.me/leadership


mardi, 28 mai 2013

Dominique Venner, la lueur sacrée de l’arme


Dominique Venner, la lueur sacrée de l’arme

par Claude BOURRINET

Le mardi, Dominique Venner s’est tiré une balle dans la bouche, peu après 16 heures, dans le chœur de Notre-Dame de Paris, ce haut monument de la grandeur française, de sa spiritualité, de son génie, après avoir glissé un message sur l’autel. On a retrouvé sur lui six enveloppes cachetées adressées à ses proches. La presse, rapidement, a identifié le « désespéré » comme étant un « essayiste et ancien membre de l’O.A.S., proche de la mouvance des anti-mariage gay ». Fiche signalétique un peu courte. Dominique Venner était, par ses ouvrages historiques, la Nouvelle Revue d’Histoire, qu’il animait, ses interventions, sa personne, son personnage, une figure importante de la constellation nationale, un phare pour certains, un témoin capital pour tous.

Sa mort volontaire le transfigure. Par-là, il accomplit le temps, sa durée d’homme, celle d’une période qui semble clore la deuxième partie du XXe siècle, tout ce dont on est comptable devant l’éternité. Son geste, dont l’ostentatoire théâtralité s’inscrit dans une Antiquité pérenne, le fait cousiner avec des monstres héroïques comme Hannibal, Caton d’Utique, Sénèque, Mishima, Drieu, Montherlant, au-delà de la prose mondaine, pour le faire pénétrer dans la poésie sacrée de la longue mémoire. Il s’est réalisé, il s’est parfait, il est devenu ce en quoi l’éternité l’a fait advenir par sa volonté propre.
« Reviens en toi-même et regarde : si tu ne vois pas encore la beauté en toi, fais comme le sculpteur d’une statue… Comme lui, enlève le superflu, redresse ce qui est oblique, nettoie ce qui est sombre …, et ne cesse pas de sculpter ta propre statue…
Es-tu tout entier une lumière véritable, non pas une lumière de dimension ou de forme mesurables …, mais une lumière absolument sans mesure, parce qu’elle est supérieure à toute mesure et à toute quantité ? Te vois-tu dans cet état ? Tu es alors devenu une vision; aie confiance en toi; même en restant ici, tu as monté; et tu n’as pas plus besoin de guide; fixe ton regard et vois. » (Plotin, Ennéades, I, VI)
Les derniers hommes, les lilliputiens, ont donné, en réaction, la mesure de leur petitesse morale. Frigide Barjot, jument efflanquée mangeant au râtelier le plus opulent, habituée des noces parisiennes gaies et raisonnablement camées, a parlé d’un « monsieur dérangé qui mélangeait tout, […] qui n’allait pas bien, qui était dans une idéologie mortifère ». Le député U.M.P. Guillaume Peltier [N.D.L.R. d’Europe Maxima : Guillaume Peltier n’est pas fort heureusement parlementaire, mais vice-président de ce parti…], a déclaré : « C’est un drame humain » mais « c’est du grand n’importe quoi ! ».
D’aucun ont ressorti de leurs tiroirs freudiens l’inévitable haine de soi. On se tuerait parce qu’on ne s’aime pas. Toutefois, chez les païens (dont je suis), on ne quête pas des raisons de vivre (ou de mourir), dans l’affect, mais dans le sacré, c’est-à-dire le Beau supra-humain. Venner était au service de forces qui transcendent l’ego. C’est impensable qu’il ait abordé le problème sous l’angle de l’amour ou de la détestation de soi. Ridicule. De la psychologie pour magazine féminin.
Dans le dernier texte paru sur son blogue, après avoir encore une fois condamné la « loi infâme du mariage pour tous », il offrait, à mi-mot, l’une des raisons de son acte, en avançant que nous entrions dans une époque où, pour « secouer les consciences anesthésiées, les paroles doivent être authentifiées par des actes ».
S’est-il perçu comme le Mohamed Bouazizi de l’identité française ? Peut-être. Sans doute. Venner fut soldat. À ce titre, toute action doit porter son efficace. Un soldat n’aime pas le gaspillage. Surtout des vies humaines. L’avenir nous dira si la résistance à la fatalité n’est pas un vain mot.
Il est aussi nécessaire de faire la part du désespoir. Non qu’il faille l’interpréter de façon petite bourgeoise, empreinte de ce narcissisme pathologique qui dissout maintenant les personnalités. Notre désespoir n’est pas lâche. Il est celui d’êtres qui aiment, et qui aiment peut-être trop. Nous plaçons haut la France, et c’est pourquoi nous sommes désespérés. Mais c’est un désespoir viril.
Dominique Venner fait penser à ces consuls qui se dévouaient, qui allaient se faire tuer dans les rangs des ennemis, pour les emporter avec soi dans les enfers.
Il sera donc nécessaire, en bons légionnaires, de le venger, d’une façon ou d’une autre. Il est mort au combat, en service commandé, et c’est lui-même, en samouraï, qui s’est ordonné cette tâche. Puisque ainsi le veut notre temps, auquel manquent les chefs. Il faut le venger. En se bagarrant, en nous aimant, nous, les patriotes, au lieu de nous foutre des bâtons dans les pattes, en haïssant nos vrais ennemis, en ne se laissant pas abattre, en ayant du courage, en réfléchissant, en retrouvant l’amour de la France.
Qui n’a pas pensé à se faire sauter face à l’immonde ruine de notre pays ? Qui ne souffre pas de l’abjection présente n’a ni coeur, ni âme. Ce qui nous laisse en vie, c’est la rage. Le combat, seul, soutient l’esprit, et le peu de goût pour vivre. Vivre pour nos enfants et notre patrie, pour qu’ils existent encore dans l’honneur et la grandeur !
La patrie est en danger, comme jamais elle ne l’a été. C’est le message de Dominique Venner. Sa mort est une Révolte face au désastre que connaît notre patrie, qui est en voie de disparaître de la pire des façons, dans le grotesque, le ridicule, le déshonneur et l’abjection marchande.
« Je crois nécessaire de me sacrifier pour rompre la léthargie qui nous accable », clame-t-il dans l’un de ses testaments. « Sacrifice », devant un autel chrétien, lui qui fit porter au christianisme la lourde responsabilité de la décadence européenne. Toute l’ambiguïté du geste sacrificiel est là, à la frontière conflictuelle entre Jérusalem et Athènes. Paradoxe vain, en vérité, car tout païen sait que le christianisme historique a modelé l’Europe avec le matériau antique, et que le paganisme a toujours rayonné sur la tunique du Christ. Mot pourtant chargé de sens. Le sacrifice relie avec le monde des dieux, et les appelle. Un Dieu viendra, dit Heidegger. Encore faut-il que les hommes crient leur besoin des dieux, du sens. Venner, l’avant-garde ? Cela lui ressemblerait.
Mais pas un martyr. Il ne faut pas faire de Venner un martyr (je donne mon sang, donc j’ai raison – version chrétienne – Je donne mon sang, donc j’ai des couilles – version fasciste). Il nous appelle à nous-mêmes, son geste assumé, libre, exige des hommes libres.
À quoi servirait de nous battre, d’affronter la servilité d’une société d’universel esclavage, si nous ne cherchions la liberté ? « Franc » signifie libre. Ceux qui ont fait Sparte et Rome ont, par le courage citoyen, craché à la mort et à la lâcheté la virilité de l’homme libre. Et ce n’est pas déconsidérer un homme, l’insulter, que de prendre au mot ce pour quoi il a donné sa vie, le désir, la nécessité d’être soi.
Non que j’aie quelque ambition d’être l’égal de Dominique Venner. Mais que faire d’autre, pour mériter l’honneur de le suivre, que de dire franchement, loyalement ce que l’on pense, ne pas le cacher comme un valet, le déployer à la lumière du soleil, hardiment, contre, peut-être, l’incompréhension de ceux qui confondent la soumission à un dogme, et l’adhésion rationnelle à une thèse ?
Voici donc : je prends des distances par rapport à son « dernier message » écrit. Je ne dis pas que l’islam est un problème à éluder. Je dis que le combat est un tout, le combat contre le capitalisme postmoderne, dont l’islamisme est une déclinaison. Je dis que le Français, tel qu’il est, tel que je le vois, américanisé, corrompu, oublieux de la gloire nationale, est un danger pire que l’islam. On ne peut pas se battre quand on a pour soldats des pourceaux. Il faut se redresser soi-même. Le combat est une éthique avant d’être une croisade. La première croisade, c’est d’abord de se défaire des poisons inoculés par le colonialisme yankee.
Le peuple français n’a pas attendu les immigrés pour connaître la « substitution ». On dirait qu’un peuple français en a remplacé un autre. Je suis en face d’une autre race, presque d’une autre espèce. Moi qui ai connu la France des années Soixante, je constate qu’elle a bel et bien disparu. Ne reste qu’un magma qui s’agite, ou un cadavre qui file dans le courant, et ne semble seulement « vivre » que quand des sollicitations commerciales lui triturent les chairs pourries.
C’est une raison suffisante pour quitter cette scène de boulevard.
Dominique Venner, à mon sens, a été trop aveuglé par sa haine d’ancien de l’Algérie française. Son ouvrage sur de Gaulle est pétri de malentendus, d’incompréhensions, et d’erreurs évidentes. Je ne le place pas pour autant, il va de soi – mais il est bon de le rappeler – au même niveau qu’une Christine Tasin ou que fdesouche, qui, par la culture, l’intelligence et la qualité d’être, ne lui arrivent pas à la cheville.
Mais qu’importe, pour l’heure ! À chaque jour suffit sa peine, et demain, il sera temps de polémiquer.
Dominique Venner nous a parlé. il faut lui être fidèle. Luttons ! Plus de pitié, surtout pour soi-même. De la rage, de la fureur, du courage !

Claude Bourrinet
• D’abord mis en ligne sur Vox N.-R., le 22 mai 2013.



Article printed from Europe Maxima: http://www.europemaxima.com


URL to article: http://www.europemaxima.com/?p=3186


Dominique Venner ou la fondation de l’avenir

Dominique Venner ou la fondation de l’avenir


DominiqueVennersss.jpgLe 21 septembre 1972, jour de l’équinoxe d’automne, se suicidait Henry de Montherlant. C’est au lendemain de la Pentecôte chrétienne qui marque la montée du Christ au Ciel, un mardi – jour de Mars – et au mois de la Vierge Marie – mai -, que Dominique Venner s’est donné la mort dans « un lieu hautement symbolique, la cathédrale Notre Dame de Paris que je respecte et admire », précise-t-il dans son testament politique.

À 78 ans, Dominique Venner a librement choisi de se retirer définitivement de ce monde dont il voyait poindre l’avènement du nihilisme triomphant. Il est mort comme il a toujours vécu : en homme  debout qui ne plia jamais face à l’adversité. Toute sa vie, il a montré, il a été l’exemple même de la virilité, et pratiqué cette virtu chère à Machiavel et aux vieux Romains. La verticalité faisait sens en lui et a ordonné son existence jusqu’à la fin.

Le jeune parachutiste volontaire qui traquait le fellagha dans le djebel, l’expert renommé des armes, l’activiste pro-Algérie française qui rêvait de renverser par l’opération « Gerfaut » la Ve République naissante, le militant politique qui sut renouer et réinscrire la tradition française dans la continuité européenne, le chasseur réputé dont le patronyme se rapproche si symboliquement de la vénerie, l’écrivain et l’historien à la riche bibliographie, le fondateur et responsable d’Enquête sur l’Histoire, puis de La Nouvelle Revue d’Histoire, l’homme privé, père et grand-père heureux, représentent diverses facettes qui, loin de se contredire, expriment en réalité une cohérence intérieure d’une rare intensité.

En observateur attentif de la longue durée des peuples, Dominique Venner s’inquiétait des signes chaque jour plus visibles de la langueur mortifère de ses compatriotes autochtones. Ce guetteur de l’imprévu historique désirait les voir se réveiller le moment venu. C’est dans cette perspective salvatrice qu’il commit en pleine lucidité un acte ultime.

Par cette action sacrificielle, il a voulu secouer la psyché des Européens, car toute guerre est d’abord psychologique, culturelle, idéologique. Il savait que ce serait le don de soi absolu, l’affranchissement total des siens, de leur amour et de leur amitié, et l’acceptation sereine que son sang vienne, tel un nouveau Saint Chrême, oindre une mémoire collective pas encore amnésique.

« Dans toute guerre, des hommes sont volontaires pour des missions sacrifiées, note-t-il dans Le cœur rebelle (p. 85) ». Cette décision héroïque, Dominique Venner l’a nourrie, méditée, réfléchie patiemment. Dans son billet du 23 avril 2013, « Salut à toi, rebelle Chevalier ! », interrogeant, après Jean Cau, la superbe gravure d’Albrecht Dürer Le Chevalier, la Mort et le Diable, il conclut que « l’image du stoïque chevalier m’a souvent accompagné dans mes révoltes. Il est vrai que je suis un cœur rebelle et que je n’ai pas cessé de m’insurger contre la laideur envahissante, contre la bassesse promue en vertu et contre les mensonges élevés au rang de vérités. Je n’ai pas cessé de m’insurger contre ceux qui, sous nos yeux, ont voulu la mort de l’Europe, notre civilisation millénaire, sans laquelle je ne serais rien ». Il comprend que, au-delà de l’adoption du mariage contre-nature, s’opère un changement d’essence civilisationnelle contre lequel seule peut contrecarrer une ardente et ferme résolution.

S’il a commis le geste irréparable devant l’autel de Notre Dame de Paris, lui le païen qui ne se sentait aucune affinité avec le monothéisme, c’est peut-être parce qu’il a saisi l’urgence du Katékhon, cette figure eschatologique qui retient l’Antéchrist afin de maintenir l’ordre normal du cosmos.

« Alors que tant d’hommes se font les esclaves de leur vie, mon geste incarne une éthique de la volonté. » Il ajoute dans son ultime billet, « La manif du 26 mai et Heidegger », mis en ligne sur son blogue ce mardi 21 mai dans la matinée qu’« il faudra certainement des gestes nouveaux, spectaculaires et symboliques pour ébranler les somnolences, secouer les consciences anesthésiées et réveiller la mémoire de nos origines. Nous entrons dans un temps où les paroles doivent être authentifiées par des actes ». Il y souligne en outre qu’on trouvera « dans mes écrits récents la préfiguration et les explications de mon geste ».

Dominique Venner n’était pas un désespéré. Il en était même aux antipodes. Déjà, dans Le cœur rebelle, il insistait, lui l’admirateur de Maurice Pinguet, auteur de La mort volontaire au Japon, sur la haute figure du samouraï et de sa dernière métamorphose historique, le kamikaze, le combattant d’assaut qui, au nom de ses principes, se dépasse une dernière fois. « Mourir en soldat, avec la loi pour soi, exige moins d’imagination et d’audace morale que de mourir en rebelle solitaire, dans une opération suicide, sans autre justification intime que l’orgueilleuse certitude qu’on est le seul à pouvoir accomplir ce qui doit être fait (Le cœur rebelle, p. 85) ». Dans des circonstances qu’il a estimées propices, il a proclamé qu’« il faudrait nous souvenir aussi, comme l’a génialement formulé Heidegger (Être et Temps) que l’essence de l’homme est dans son existence et non dans un “ autre monde ”. C’est ici et maintenant que se joue notre destin jusqu’à la dernière seconde. Et cette seconde ultime a autant d’importance que le reste d’une vie. C’est pourquoi il faut être soi-même jusqu’au dernier instant. C’est en décidant soi-même, en voulant vraiment son destin que l’on est vainqueur du néant. Et il n’y a pas d’échappatoire à cette exigence puisque nous n’avons que cette vie dans laquelle il nous appartient d’être entièrement nous-mêmes ou de n’être rien ». « Je me sens le devoir d’agir tant que j’en ai encore la force. Je crois nécessaire de me sacrifier pour rompre la léthargie qui nous accable », répond-il par avance à tous ses détracteurs.

« On ne meurt pas chacun pour soi, mais les uns pour les autres, ou même les uns à la place des autres (p. 57) » rappelle Georges Bernanos dans Le Dialogues des Carmélites. L’altruisme héroïque, combattant et radical défendu par Dominique Venner se concrétise par un acte décisif qui transcende toute une œuvre d’écriture et de réflexions pour rejoindre les antiques préceptes des vieux Romains, en particulier ceux du stoïcien Sénèque pour qui « bien mourir, c’est échapper au danger de mal vivre ». Or, ce mal vivre, par-delà la simple condition personnelle, affecte toute la société française et européenne. Arrive le temps que, « le discours dominant ne pouvant sortir de ses ambiguïtés toxiques, il appartient aux Européens d’en tirer les conséquences. À défaut de posséder une religion identitaire à laquelle nous amarrer, nous avons en partage depuis Homère une mémoire propre, dépôt de toutes les valeurs sur lesquelles refonder notre future renaissance en rupture avec la métaphysique de l’illimité, source néfaste de toutes les dérives modernes ». Dans ce contexte mortel pour l’esprit et pour les âmes, « apprendre aux gens à bien mourir est la grande affaire du stoïcisme, écrit Gabriel Matzneff (« La mort volontaire chez les Romains » dans Le Défi, p. 147) ».

Gabriel Matzneff distingue par ailleurs qu’« il y a ceux qui se tuent au nom d’une certaine idée qu’ils se font de la morale privée et publique, au nom d’une certaine idée qu’ils se font de l’homme : ils quittent un monde où les valeurs à quoi ils sont attachés n’ont plus cours et où partout triomphent celles qu’ils méprisent (pp. 164 – 165) ». Dominique Venner appartient à ces derniers. Il récuse en effet avec vigueur l’antagonisme artificiel et fallacieux entre le postmodernisme sociétal hyper-individualiste et le holisme conquérant de communautés allogènes, parfois musulmanes, sur notre continent. Il s’élève contre cette submersion migratoire qui bouleverse la physionomie européenne habituelle. « Alors que je défends l’identité de tous les peuples chez eux, je m’insurge contre le crime visant au remplacement de nos populations. »

En mettant fin à ses jours, Dominique Venner témoigne qu’une troisième voie autochtone identitaire française et européenne est la seule apte à préserver nos traditions plurimillénaires. Non, ce n’est pas en entérinant l’institution de l’homosexualité, de la famille monoparentale et de l’avortement de masse qu’on fera reculer l’islam et l’immigration extra-européenne. Et ce n’est pas en acceptant l’implantation de minorités étrangères aux mœurs exotiques qu’on rétablira les principes traditionnels de l’Être européen. C’est en les affrontant simultanément que les Européens ne sombreront pas dans le néant de l’histoire. Mais il faudra beaucoup de force morale pour mener de front ce double combat.

Dominique Venner n’a pas manqué de force morale. En allant, une arme à la main, jusqu’au chœur d’un espace consacré, depuis longtemps profané par des masses de touristes, il a resacralisé le lieu. Avait-il en ses derniers instants le souvenir du seppuku du Japonais Yukio Mishima en novembre 1970, et des immolations anti-communistes du Tchèque Jan Palach en janvier 1969 et du militant solidariste français Alain Escoffier en février 1977 ? Plus que marquer l’opinion, Dominique Venner qui savait que toute fondation pérenne exige un sacrifice préalable a surtout semé par sa disparition assumée les germes d’un renouveau continental et poser les assises d’un nouveau cycle boréen au XXIe siècle.

Georges Feltin-Tracol

Article printed from Europe Maxima: http://www.europemaxima.com

URL to article: http://www.europemaxima.com/?p=3190

samedi, 25 mai 2013

Afscheidsbrief van Dominique Venner

Afscheidsbrief van Dominique Venner
Vertaling door Francis Van den Eynde
Waarom ik voor een vrijwillige dood heb gekozen?
Ik ben gezond van lichaam en geest en meer dan tevreden met de liefde waarmee mijn vrouw en mijn kinderen mij omringen.

Ik hou van het leven en verwacht niets meer daarna tenzij dat mijn ras moge blijven bestaan en dat mijn geest zou overleven.

Geconfronteerd met de grote gevaren die vandaag de dag mijn Frans en mijn Europees vaderland bedreigen, beschouw ik het, nu de avond van dat leven is aangevangen, als mijn plicht tot actie over te gaan, zolang ik daar de kracht toe heb.

Ik denk dat het nodig is dat ik mij opoffer om de slaperigheid die ons overrompelt, te doorbreken.
Wat mij van leven overblijft, wil ik dus wegschenken  als een vorm van protest maar ook ten bate van de heropbouw van onze beschaving.

Ik heb een bijzonder symbolische plek gekozen om dit te doen, de Notre Dame kathedraal van Parijs waar ik eerbied en bewondering voor koester. Ze werd door onze voorouders met het genie dat hun eigen was, opgericht op een eiland dat al eerder werd gebruikt voor een cultus die naar onze oudste wortels verwijst.

Daar waar zoveel mensen aan hun eigen leven verslaafd zijn, wil ik met dit gebaar getuigenis afleggen  ten gunste van de ethiek van de wilskracht.
Mijn zelfgekozen dood is bedoeld om slapende gewetens wakker te maken.
Ik kom op tegen fatalisme.

Ik kom op tegen de vergiftiging van onze zielen en tegen de invasie van persoonlijke verlangens die onze identiteitsverankering zwaar aantasten en zich onder meer vergrijpen aan het gezin, dat nochtans de intieme onderbouw vormt van onze duizendjarige beschaving.

Ik verdedig de identiteit van alle volkeren op hun eigen grondgebied en kom dus in opstand tegen de misdaad die de vervanging van onze bevolking op het oog heeft.

Vermits de heersende ideologieën hun toxische ambiguïteit niet kwijt geraken, moeten wij Europeanen hieruit de nodige consequenties trekken.

We moeten beseffen dat wij, bij gebrek aan een eigen identiteitsreligie die ons houvast zou kunnen zijn, al sinds Homeros beschikken over een gemeenschappelijk geheugen als bergplaats voor alle waarden waarop wij onze toekomstige renaissance zullen heropbouwen, bevrijd van de metafysica van het grenzeloze, die de nefaste oorzaak van al de moderne afwijkingen is.

Ik vraag bij voorbaat vergiffenis aan al wie mijn dood pijn zal doen. Eerst en vooral aan mijn vrouw, aan mijn kinderen, kleinkinderen, en ook aan mijn vrienden en getrouwen.
Ik ben er echter van overtuigd dat, wanneer de schok van de pijn zal beginnen wegdeemsteren, zij de betekenis van het door mij gestelde gebaar zullen begrijpen en dat hun lijden dan stilaan in trots zal worden omgezet.
Ik wens dat ze met elkaar overleggen om te blijven voortbestaan.           
Ze zullen in wat ik recent heb geschreven de prefiguratie en de verklaring van mijn daad terugvinden.
Voor bijkomende informatie kan steeds beroep worden gedaan op mijn uitgever Pierre-Guillame de Roux die niet op de hoogte was maar mij al zeer lang kent.

Dominique Venner 
16 april 1935 - 21 mei 2013

jeudi, 23 mai 2013

Dominique Venner : la force de l’effet produit

 Dominique Venner : la force de l’effet produit

Ex: http://www.polemia.com/

La mort de Dominique Venner, ce 21 mai, donne déjà lieu à de nombreux hommages mérités. Compagnons d’armes ou de plume, ses vieux camarades servent sa mémoire, racontent sa geste et témoignent de l’homme qu’il fut.

Parce que la différence d’âge a fait de nous des camarades de ses enfants plus que de lui-même, nous pensons que le meilleur hommage à lui rendre est de saluer le choix, rayonnant d’intelligence et de puissance, de son sacrifice.

Dominique Venner croyait à l’Histoire. Il savait que celle-ci se forge autour de longues et patientes évolutions, mais plus souvent encore par l’irruption de l’imprévu, de l’inattendu, de l’événement qui embrase tout, précipite les choses – au sens chimique – pour assurer le basculement d’un monde ancien vers un nouvel ordre à bâtir.

La seconde passion de Dominique Venner, c’était la patiente recherche du meilleur effet produit. Sans illusion sur la dureté des temps, il a, toute sa vie durant, après avoir connu l’ivresse des combats, militaires puis militants, cherché à peser et être utile au meilleur endroit, au meilleur moment, avec les meilleures armes politiques, intellectuelles, esthétiques ou morales.

Le choix de sa mort est, à ce titre, troublant de pertinence. Elle lui ressemble totalement.

Il a choisi un acte pur, romain, sans peur ni faiblesse. Quelles que soient les analyses médiatiques qui seront faites, la nudité et la pureté de son acte ne pourront être salis et, dans notre inconscient engourdi de Vieux Européens, cette mort volontaire nous saisit plus fortement que nous le pensons nous-mêmes. Elle nous rappelle le sens du tragique, à tous ces moments de l’histoire où nos ancêtres ont eu leur propre vie entre leurs mains, bien loin des douceurs émollientes de notre époque d’enfants gâtés.

Il a choisi un lieu d’une puissance évocatrice exceptionnelle. Un lieu symbolique de la Chrétienté, si fortement malmenée depuis longtemps et pourtant si puissamment réveillée, ces derniers temps, par le sursaut de ces centaines de milliers de manifestants qui, partout en France, défendent une certaine conception de la civilisation européenne et chrétienne sans être nécessairement de fervents catholiques. Un lieu laïc aussi, car Notre-Dame est la cathédrale de Paris, capitale de la France, ce qui permet à tous de s’y identifier, quelles que soient leurs options intellectuelles, philosophiques, morales ou religieuses.

Il a choisi un moment opportun. Celui où, dans le sillage des grands cortèges de la Manif pour Tous, de jeunes générations s’éveillent au combat militant et à la défense de leurs valeurs, face au silence des immobiles, au mépris des médias ou aux mensonges de l’Etat. Dominique Venner a vu, lui, que ces jeunes sont un levain, un ferment, l’avant-garde d’une nouvelle génération de Français et d’Européens qui, inconsciemment ou non, tardivement peut-être, ont décidé de ne pas abdiquer le droit de vivre leurs vies d’hommes dans la fidélité à leur identité. Lui, l’observateur des joutes politiques trop souvent stériles, a compris que ces jeunes gens ont besoin de repères, d’illustrations, de symboles. De quelque chose qui parle à leur Etre.

Il a, enfin, choisi l’humilité. Sa renommée et la force de sa plume auraient pu lui faire préférer l’écriture d’un nouveau bréviaire pour jeunes militants, ou d’un livre définitif sur sa vision de l’histoire et de notre devenir. Il a choisi de ne donner qu’un seul signe, qu’un seul exemple. En rappelant que toute cause ne vaut que si le sacrifice ultime fait partie des options, que toute cause n’est véritablement sacrée que si elle engage sa vie même, il a offert aujourd’hui la sienne pour que vivent, demain, dans la fierté retrouvée, de nouvelles générations d’Européens.

En ce sens, nous qui n’avons pas partagé avec Dominique Venner les passions de sa jeunesse, nous qui n’avons pas, pour nous réchauffer de son absence, les souvenirs des combats du passé, nous voulons dire combien nous nous inclinons devant la lumineuse intelligence de sa dernière action, sans doute la plus politique de ses vingt dernières années.

Nous n’avons pas de peine. Nous sommes frappés par la lucidité de son choix et le courage de son acte. Ce qu’il nous reste, c’est la joie de l’avoir suffisamment connu pour comprendre la puissance de cet acte et apprécier la force de l’effet produit. Il nous faudra désormais rester fidèles et être à la hauteur.

 Philippe Christèle et Grégoire Gambier

© Polemia

mercredi, 22 mai 2013

La mort d’un samouraï d’Occident

 La mort d’un samouraï d’Occident


Ex: http://cerclenonconforme.hautetfort.com/

Quel geste ! Quelle grandeur ! Faisant suite à la stupéfaction et à une grande tristesse, c’est immédiatement ce à quoi nous avons pensé lorsque nous avons appris, en ce 21 mai 2013, l’annonce du suicide de Dominique Venner.

Le geste en lui-même est très parlant et répond à une certaine logique pour qui connait un minimum les écrits de celui qui était véritablement, pour nous au Cercle Non Conforme, un de nos maîtres à penser. Dominique Venner s’est donné la mort dans un lieu hautement symbolique de l’histoire de France et du génie européen : la cathédrale gothique de Notre-Dame de Paris. Grand connaisseur des armes à feu, c’est avec l’une d’entre elles qu’il s’est tiré une balle dans la bouche…

Dominique Venner a suivi en cela ses idées. Il était un grand Européen, conscient et affecté de la décadence actuelle de son continent. Pour lui, ce terrible déclin n’était pas inéluctable, l’Europe étant « en dormition »… Cette « dormition » se révélant au fil du temps peut être plus profonde qu’on ne le pensait, l’ « historien contemplatif » qu’il était s’est certainement résolu à passer à l’acte. Pourquoi ? Car ce suicide n’est pas l’œuvre d’un "dérangé" ou d'un "désespéré" comme le pense certains, il est un acte de protestation héroïque contre le monde moderne, contre cette Europe actuelle dégénérée et coupée de ses racines, négation totale de ce qu’elle est réellement. C’est un acte, pour nous Français, que nous devons considérer de la même manière que les Japonais considèrent le suicide de Mishima. C’est une mort digne, désintéressée, grandiose quelque part, romaine en un mot. Dominique Venner rejoint ici Lucrèce, Caton le Jeune et Publius Spendius mais aussi tant d’autres grands personnages de notre histoire dont le suicide fut une protestation contre le délitement de leur époque : pensons en premier lieu à Drieu la Rochelle.

Il l’écrivait lui-même dans sa dernière lettre : « Je me sens le devoir d’agir tant que j’en ai encore la force. Je crois nécessaire de me sacrifier pour rompre la léthargie qui nous accable. Je choisis un lieu hautement symbolique, que je respecte et j’admire. Mon geste incarne une éthique de la volonté. Je me donne la mort pour réveiller les consciences assoupies. Alors que je défends l’identité de tous les peuples chez eux, je m’insurge contre le crime visant au remplacement de nos populations. »

Nous l’avons dit, Dominique Venner était (et restera) pour nous une source d’inspiration infinie, tant de par ses réflexions historico-culturelles que par sa vision du militantisme politique. Lui qui avait abandonné celui-ci pour voguer vers d’autres cieux depuis des décennies, il a mis fin à sa vie par l’acte militant par excellent : le sacrifice. Le côté tragique de son choix ne fait qu’en renforcer la portée et la fierté qui brûle en nous d’avoir comme guide un tel homme.

Le Cercle Non Conforme

Note du C.N.C.: Toute reproduction éventuelle de ce contenu doit mentionner la source.

Déclaration de Dominique Venner

Les raisons d’une mort volontaire

Je suis sain de corps et d’esprit, et suis comblé d’amour par ma femme et mes enfants. J’aime la vie et n’attend rien au-delà, sinon la perpétuation de ma race et de mon esprit. Pourtant, au soir de cette vie, devant des périls immenses pour ma patrie française et européenne, je me sens le devoir d’agir tant que j’en ai encore la force. Je crois nécessaire de me sacrifier pour rompre la léthargie qui nous accable. J’offre ce qui me reste de vie dans une intention de protestation et de fondation. Je choisis un lieu hautement symbolique, la cathédrale Notre Dame de Paris que je respecte et admire, elle qui fut édifiée par le génie de mes aïeux sur des lieux de cultes plus anciens, rappelant nos origines immémoriales.

Alors que tant d’hommes se font les esclaves de leur vie, mon geste incarne une éthique de la volonté. Je me donne la mort afin de réveiller les consciences assoupies. Je m’insurge contre la fatalité. Je m’insurge contre les poisons de l’âme et contre les désirs individuels envahissants qui détruisent nos ancrages identitaires et notamment la famille, socle intime de notre civilisation multimillénaire. Alors que je défends l’identité de tous les peuples chez eux, je m’insurge aussi contre le crime visant au remplacement de nos populations.

Le discours dominant ne pouvant sortir de ses ambiguïtés toxiques, il appartient aux Européens d’en tirer les conséquences. À défaut de posséder une religion identitaire à laquelle nous amarrer, nous avons en partage depuis Homère une mémoire propre, dépôt de toutes les valeurs sur lesquelles refonder notre future renaissance en rupture avec la métaphysique de l’illimité, source néfaste de toutes les dérives modernes.

Je demande pardon par avance à tous ceux que ma mort fera souffrir, et d’abord à ma femme, à mes enfants et petits-enfants, ainsi qu’à mes amis et fidèles. Mais, une fois estompé le choc de la douleur, je ne doute pas que les uns et les autres comprendront le sens de mon geste et transcenderont leur peine en fierté. Je souhaite que ceux-là se concertent pour durer. Ils trouveront dans mes écrits récents la préfiguration et l’explication de mon geste.



As Razões para uma Morte Voluntária

As Razões para uma Morte Voluntária

por Dominique Venner


Nota do blog: No dia de hoje, 21 de maio de 2013, o historiador dissidente Dominique Venner deu fim a sua vida com um tiro na boca no altar da Catedral de Notre Dame. Seu gesto heroico e corajoso foi um último grito de desafio contra a pós-modernidade, cujos tentáculos se estendem por toda a Europa e cujo domínio se torna mais total a cada dia. 
Ao camarada Venner nossas saudações.
Eu estou sadio em mente e corpo, e estou repleto de amor por minha esposa e filhos. Eu amo a vida e não espero nada além, senão a perpetuação de minha raça e minha mente. Porém, no entardecer de minha vida, me deparando com imensos perigos para minha pátria francesa e europeia, eu sinto o dever de agir enquanto eu ainda tenho forças. Eu creio ser necessário me sacrificar para romper a letargia que nos empesteia. Eu entrego o que resta de vida em mim de modo a protestar e fundar. Eu escolho um local altamente simbólico, a Catedral de Notre Dame de Paris, que eu respeito e admiro: ela foi construída pelo gênio de meus ancestrais no local de cultos ainda mais antigos, reclamando nossas origens imemoriais.
Enquanto muitos homens são escravos de suas vidas, meu gesto corporifica uma ética de vontade. Eu me entrego à morte para despertar consciências adormecidas. Eu me rebelo contra o destino. Eu protesto contra venenos da alma e os desejos de indivíduos invasivos de destruir as âncoras de nossa identidade, incluindo a família, a base íntima de nossa civilização multimilenar. Enquanto eu defendo a identidade de todos os povos em seus lares, eu também me rebelo contra o crime da substituição de nosso povo.

O discurso dominante não pode deixar para trás suas ambiguidades tóxicas, e os europeus devem lidar com as consequências. Carecendo de uma religião identitária para nos ancorar, nós partilhamos de uma memória comum que volta até Homero, um repositório de todos os valores nos quais nosso futuro renascimento será fundado uma vez que rompamos com a metafísica do ilimitado, a fonte dolorosa de todos os excessos modernos.


Eu peço desculpas antecipadamente a qualquer um que venha a sofrer com a minha morte, primeiramente e mais importantemente a minha mulher, meus filhos, e meus netos, bem como a meus amigos e seguidores. Mas uma vez que a dor e o choque se dissipem, eu não duvido que eles compreenderão o significado de meu gesto e transcenderão seu pesar com orgulho. Eu espero que eles resistam juntos. Eles encontrarão em meus escritos recentes intimações e explicações de minhas ações.

lundi, 20 mai 2013

The Enlightenment from a New Right Perspective


The Enlightenment from a New Right Perspective


By Domitius Corbulo

Ex: http://www.counter-currents.com/

“When Kant philosophizes, say on ethical ideas, he maintains the validity of his theses for men of all times and places. He does not say this in so many words, for, for himself and his readers, it is something that goes without saying. In his aesthetics he formulates the principles, not of Phidias’s art, of Rembrandt’s art, but of Art generally. But what he poses as necessary forms of thought are in reality only necessary forms of Western thought.” — Oswald Spengler 

“Humanity exists in its greatest perfection in the white race.” — Immanuel Kant

Every one either praises or blames the Enlightenment for the enshrinement of equality and cosmopolitanism as the moral pillars of our times. This is wrong. Enlightenment thinkers were racists who believe that only white Europeans could be fully rational, good citizens, and true cosmopolitans.

Leftists have brought attention to some racist beliefs among Enlightenment thinkers, but they have not successfully shown that racism was an integral part of Enlightenment philosophy, and their intention has been to denigrate the Enlightenment for representing the parochial values of European males. I argue here that they were the first to introduce a scientific conception of human nature structured by racial classifications. This conception culminated in Immanuel Kant’s anthropological justification of the superior/inferior classification of “races of men” and his “critical” argument that only European peoples were capable of becoming rational and free legislators of their own actions. The Enlightenment is a celebration of white reason and morality; therefore, it belongs to the New Right.

In an essay [2] in the New York Times (February 10, 2013), Justin Smith, another leftist with a grand title, Professeur des Universités, Département d’Histoire et Philosophie des Sciences, Université Paris Diderot – Paris VII, contrasted the intellectual “legacy” of Anton Wilhelm Amo, a West African student and former slave who defended a philosophy dissertation at the University of Halle in Saxony in 1734, with the “fundamentally racist” legacy of Enlightenment thinkers. Smith observed that a dedicatory letter was attached to Amo’s dissertation from the rector of the University of Wittenberg, Johannes Kraus, praising the “natural genius” of Africa and its “inestimable contribution to the knowledge of human affairs.” Smith juxtaposed Kraus’s broad-mindedness to the prevailing Enlightenment view “lazily echoed by Hume, Kant, and so many contemporaries” according to which Africans were naturally inferior to whites and beyond the pale of modernity.

Smith questioned “the supposedly universal aspiration to liberty, equality and fraternity” of Enlightenment thought. These values were “only ever conceived” for a European people deemed to be superior and therefore more equal than non-whites. He cited Hume: “I am apt to suspect the Negroes, and in general all other species of men to be naturally inferior to the whites.” He also cited Kant’s dismissal of a report of something intelligent that had once been uttered by an African: “this fellow was quite black from head to toe, a clear proof that what he said was stupid.” Smith asserted that it was counter-Enlightenment thinkers, such as Johann Herder, who would formulate anti-racist views in favor of human diversity. In the rest of his essay, Smith pondered why Westerners today “have chosen to stick with categories inherited from the century of the so-called Enlightenment” even though “since the mid-20th century no mainstream scientist has considered race a biologically significant category; no scientist believes any longer that ‘negroid,’ ‘caucasoid,’ and so on represent real natural kinds.” We should stop using labels that merely capture “something as trivial as skin color” and instead appreciate the legacy of Amo as much as that of any other European in a colorblind manner.

Smith’s article, which brought some 370 comments, a number from Steve Sailer, was challenged a few days later by Kenan Malik, ardent defender of the Enlightenment, in his blog Pandaemonium [3]. Malik’s argument that Enlightenment thinkers “were largely hostile to the idea of racial categorization” represents the general consensus on this question. Malik is an Indian-born English citizen, regular broadcaster at BBC, and noted writer for The GuardianFinancial TimesThe Independent, Sunday Times, New StatesmanProspectTLSThe Times Higher Education Supplement, and other venues. Once a Marxist, Malik is today a firm defender of the “universalist ideas of the Enlightenment,” freedom of speech, secularism, and scientific rationalism. He is best known for his strong opposition to multiculturalism.

Yet this staunch opponent of multiculturalism is a stauncher advocate of open door policies on immigration [4]. In one of his TV documentaries, tellingly titled Let ‘Em All In (2005), he demanded that Britain’s borders be opened to the world without restrictions. In response to a report published during the post-Olympic euphoria in Britain, “The Melting Pot Generation: How Britain became more relaxed about race [5],” he wrote: “news that those of mixed ethnicity are among the fastest-growing groups in the population is clearly to be welcomed [6].” He added that much work remains to be done “to change social perceptions of race.”

This work includes fighting against any immigration objection even from someone like David Goodhart, director of the left think tank Demos, whose just released book, The British Dream [7], modestly made the observation that immigration is eroding traditional identities and creating an England “increasingly full of mysterious and unfamiliar worlds.” In his review (The Independent [8], April 19, 2013) Malik insisted that not enough was being done to wear down the traditional identities of everyone including the native British. The solution is more immigration coupled with acculturation to the universal values of the Enlightenment. “I am hostile to multiculturalism not because I worry about immigration but because I welcome it.” The citizens of Britain must be asked to give up their ethnic and cultural individuality and make themselves into universal beings with rights equal to every newcomer.

It is essential, then, for Malik to disassociate the Enlightenment with any racist undertones. This may not seem difficult since the Enlightenment has consistently come to be seen — by all political ideologies from Left to Right — as the source of freedom, equality, and rationality against the “unreasonable and unnatural” prejudices of particular cultural groups. Malik acknowledges that in recent years some (he mentions George Mosse, Emmanuel Chuckwude Eze, and David Theo Goldberg) have blamed Enlightenment thinkers for articulating the modern idea of race and projecting a view of Europe as both culturally and racially superior. By and large, however, Malik manages (superficially speaking) to win the day arguing that the racist statements one encounters in some Enlightenment thinkers were marginally related to their overall philosophies.

A number of thinkers within the mainstream of the Enlightenment . . . dabbled with ideas of innate differences between human groups . . . Yet, with one or two exceptions, they did so only diffidently or in passing.

The botanist Carolus Linnaeus exhibited the cultural prejudices of his time when he described Europeans as “serious, very smart, inventive” and Africans as “impassive, lazy, ruled by caprice.” But let’s us not forget, Malik reasons, that Linnaeus’ Systema Naturae “is one of the landmarks of scientific thought,” the first “distinctly modern” classification of plants and animals, and of humans in rational and empirical terms as part of the natural order. The implication is that Linnaeus could not have offered a scientific classification of nature while seriously believing in racial differences. Science and race are incompatible.

Soon the more progressive ideas of Johann Blumenbach came; he complained about the prejudices of Linnaeus’ categories and called for a more objective differentiation between human groups based on skull shape and size. It is true that out of Blumenbach’s five-fold taxonomy (Caucasians, Mongolians, Ethiopians, Americans and Malays) the categories of race later emerged. But Malik insists that “it was in the 19th, not 18th, century that a racial view of the world took hold in Europe.”

Malik mentions Jonathan Israel’s argument that there were two Enlightenments, a mainstream one coming from Kant, Locke, Voltaire and Hume, and a radical one coming from “lesser known figures such as d’Holbach, Diderot, Condorcet and Spinoza.” This latter group pushed the ideas of reason, universality, and democracy “to their logical conclusion,” nurturing a radical egalitarianism extending across class, gender, and race. But, in a rather confusing way and possibly because he could not find any discussions of race in the radical group to back up his argument, Malik relies on the mainstream group. He cites David Hume: “It is universally acknowledged that there is a great uniformity among the acts of men, in all nations and ages, and that human nature remains the same in its principles and operations.” And George-Louis Buffon, the French naturalist: “Every circumstance concurs in proving that mankind is not composed of species essentially different from each other.” While Enlightenment thinkers asked why there was so much cultural variety across the globe, Malik explains, “the answer was rarely that human groups were racially distinct . . . environmental differences and accidents of history had shaped societies in different ways.” Remedying these differences and contingencies was what the Enlightenment was about; as Diderot wrote, “everywhere a people should be educated, free, and virtuous.”

Malik’s essay is pedestrian, somewhat disorganized, but in tune with the established literature, and therefore seen by the public as a compilation of truisms against marginal complaints about racism in the Enlightenment. Almost all the books on the Enlightenment have either ignored this issue or addressed it as a peripheral theme. The emphasis has been, rather, on the Enlightenment’s promotion of universal values for the peoples of the world. Let me offer some examples. Leonard Krieger’s King and Philosopher, 1689–1789 (1970) highlights the way the Enlightenment produced “works in which the universal principles of reason were invoked to order vast reaches of the human experience,” Rousseau’s “anthropological history of the human species,” Hume’s “quest for uniform principles of human nature,” “the various tendencies of the philosophes’ thinking — skepticism, rationalism, humanism, and materialism” (152-207). Peter Gay’s The Enlightenment: An Interpretation (1966) is altogether about how “the men of the Enlightenment united on . . . a program of secularism, humanity, cosmopolitanism, and freedom . . . In 1784, when the Enlightenment had done most of its work, Kant defined it as man’s emergence from his self-imposed tutelage, and offered as its motto: Dare to know” (3). Norman Hampson’s The Enlightenment (1968) spends more time on the proponents of modern classifications of nature, particularly Buffon’s Natural History, but makes no mention of racial classifications or arguments opposing any notion of a common humanity.

kant.jpgRecent books are hardly different. Louis Dupre’s The Enlightenment and the Intellectual Foundations of Modern Culture (2004), traces our current critically progressive attitudes back to the Enlightenment “ideal of human emancipation.” Dupré argues (from a perspective influenced by Jurgen Habermas) that the original project of the Enlightenment is linked to “emancipatory action” today (335). Gertrude Himmelfarb’s The Roads to Modernity: The British, French, and American Enlightenments (2004), offers a neoconservative perspective of the British and the American “Enlightenments” contrasted to the more radical ideas of human perfectibility and the equality of mankind found in the French philosophes. She brings up Jefferson’s hope that in the future whites would “blend together, intermix” and become one people with the Indians (221). She quotes Madison on the “unnatural traffic” of slavery and its possible termination, and also Jefferson’s proposal that the slaves should be freed and sent abroad to colonize other lands as “free and independent people.” She implies that Jefferson thought that sending blacks abroad was the most humane solution given the “deep-rooted prejudices of whites and the memories of blacks of the injuries they had sustained” (224).

Dorinda Outram’s, The Enlightenment (1995) brings up directly the way Enlightenment thinkers responded to their encounters with very different cultures in an age characterized by extraordinary expeditions throughout the globe. She notes there “was no consensus in the Enlightenment on the definition of the races of man,” but, in a rather conjectural manner, maintains that “the idea of a universal human subject . . . could not be reconciled with seeing Negroes as inferior.” Buffon, we are safely informed, “argued that the human race was a unity.” Linnaeus divided humanity into different classificatory groups, but did so as members of the same human race, although he “was unsure whether pigmies qualified for membership of the human race.” Turgot and Condorcet believed that “human beings, by virtue of their common humanity, would all possess reason, and would gradually discard irrational superstitions” (55-8). Outram’s conclusion on this topic is typical: “The Enlightenment was trying to conceive a universal human subject, one possessed of rationality,” accordingly, it cannot be seen as a movement that stood against racial divisions (74). Roy Porter, in his exhaustively documented and opulent narrative, Enlightenment: Britain and the Creation of the Modern World (2000), dedicates less than one page of his 600+ page book to discourses on “racial differentiation.” He mentions Lord Kames as “one of many who wrestled with the evidence of human variety . . . hinting that blacks might be related to orang-utans and similar great apes.” Apart from this quaint passage, there is only this: “debate was heated and unresolved, and there was no single Enlightenment party line” (357).

In my essay, “Enlightenment and Global History [9],” I mentioned a number of other books which view the Enlightenment as a European phenomenon and, for this reason, have been the subject of criticism by current multicultural historians who feel that this movement needs to be seen as global in origins. I defended the Eurocentrism of these books while suggesting that their view of the Enlightenment as an acclamation of universal values (comprehensible and extendable outside the European ethnic homeland) was itself accountable for the idea that its origins must not be restricted to Europe. Multicultural historians have merely carried to their logical conclusion the allegedly universal ideals of the Enlightenment. The standard interpretations of Tzvetan Todorov’s In Defence of the Enlightenment (2009), Stephen Bronner’s Reclaiming the Enlightenment (2004), and Robert Louden’s, The World We Want: How and Why the Ideals of the Enlightenment Still Eludes Us (2007), equally neglect the intense interest Enlightenment thinkers showed in the division of humanity into races. They similarly pretend that, insomuch as these thinkers spoke of “reason,” “humanity,” and “equality,” they were thinking outside or above the European experience and intellectual ancestry.

What about Justin Smith, or, since he has not published in this field, the left liberal authors on this topic? There is not that much; the two best known sources are two anthologies of writings on race, namely, Race and the Enlightenment: A Reader (1997), edited by Emmanuel Chukwudi Eze; and The Idea of Race (2000), edited by Robert Bernasconi and Tommy Lott. Eze’s book gathers into a short book the most provocative writings on race by some Enlightenment thinkers (Hume, Linnaeus, Kant, Buffon, Blumenbach, Jefferson and Cuvier). This anthology, valuable as it is, is intended for effect, to show how offensively racist these thinkers were. Eze does not disprove the commonly accepted idea that Enlightenment thinkers were proponents of a universal ethos (although, as we will see below, Eze does offer elsewhere a rather acute analysis of Kant’s racism). Bernasconi’s The Idea of Race is mostly a collection of nineteenth and 20th century writings, with short excerpts from Francois Bernier, Voltaire, Kant, and Blumenbach. The books that Malik mentions (see above) which connect the Enlightenment to racism are also insufficient: George Mosse’s Toward the Final Solution: A History of European Racism (1985) is just another book about European anti-Semitism, which directs culpability to the Enlightenment for carrying classifications and measurements of racial groups. David Goldberg’s Racist Culture (1993) is a study of the normalization of racialized discourses in the modern West in the 20th century.

There are, as we will see later, other publications which address in varying ways this topic, but, on the whole, the Enlightenment is normally seen as the most critical epoch in “mankind’s march” towards universal brotherhood. The leftist discussion of racist statements relies on the universal principles of the Enlightenment. Its goal is to uncover and challenge any idea among 18th century thinkers standing in the way of a future universal civilization. Leftist critics enjoy “exposing” white European males as racists and thereby re-appropriate the Enlightenment as their own from a cultural Marxist perspective. But what if we were to approach the racism and universalism of the Enlightenment from a New Right perspective that acknowledges straightaway the particular origins of the Enlightenment in a continent founded by Indo-European [10] speakers?

This would involve denying the automatic assumption that the ideas of the philosophes were articulated by mankind and commonly true for every culture. How can the ideas of the Enlightenment be seen as universal, representing the essence of humanity, if they were expressed only by European men? The Enlightenment is a product of Europe alone, and this fact alone contradicts its universality. Enlightenment thinkers are themselves to blame for this dilemma expressing their ideas as if “for men of all times and places.” Johann Gottfried Herder (1744–1803), writing at the same time as Kant, did question the notion of a cosmopolitan world based on generic human values. He saw in the world the greatest possible variety of historical humans in different regions of the earth, in time and space. He formulated arguments against racial rankings not by questioning their scientific merits as much as their reduction of the diversity of humans to one matrix of measurement and judgment. It was illusory to postulate a universal philosophy for humanity in which the national character of peoples would disappear and each human on earth would “love each other and every one . . . being all equally polite, well-mannered and even-tempered . . . all philanthropic citizens of the world.”[1] Contrary to some interpretations, Herder was not rejecting the Enlightenment but subjecting it to critical evaluation from his own cosmopolitan education in the history and customs of the peoples of the earth. “Herder was among the men of the Enlightenment who were critical in their search for self-understanding; in short, he was part of the self-enlightening Enlightenment.”[2] He proposed a different universalism based on the actual variety and unique historical experiences and trajectories of each people (Volk). Every people had their own particular language, religion, songs, gestures, legends and customs. There was no common humanity but a division of peoples into language and ethnic groups. Each people were capable of achieving education and progress in its own way from its own cultural sources.

From this standpoint, the Enlightenment should be seen as an expression of a specific people, Europeans, made up of various nationalities but nevertheless in habitants of a common civilization who were actually conceiving the possibility of becoming good citizens of Europe at large. In the words of Edward Gibbon, Enlightenment philosophers were enlarging their views beyond their respective native countries “to consider Europe as a great republic, whose various inhabitants have attained almost the same level of politeness and cultivation” (in Gay, 13).

Beyond Herder, we also need to acknowledge that the Enlightenment inaugurated the study of race from a rational, empirical, and secular perspective consistent with its own principles. No one has been willing to admit this because this entire debate has been marred by the irrational, anti-Enlightenment dogma that race is a construct and that the postulation of a common humanity amounts to a view of human nature without racial distinctions. Contrary to Roy Porter, there was a party line, or, to be more precise, a consistently racial approach among Enlightenment thinkers. The same philosophes who announced that human nature was uniform everywhere, and united mankind as a subject capable of enlightenment, argued “in text after text . . . in the works of Hume, Diderot, Montesquieu, Kant, and many lesser lights” that men “are not uniform but are divided up into sexes, races, national characters . . . and many other categories” (Garret 2006). But because we have been approaching Enlightenment racism under the tutelage of our current belief that race is “a social myth” and that any division of mankind into races is based on malevolent “presumptions unsupported by available evidence [11],” we have failed to appreciate that this subject was part and parcel of what the philosophes meant by “enlightenment.” Why it is so difficult to accept the possibility that 18th century talk about “human nature” and the “unity of mankind” was less a political program for a universal civilization than a scientific program for the study of man in a way that was systematic in intent and universal in scope? It is quite legitimate, from a scientific point, to treat humans everywhere as uniformly constituted members of the same species while recognizing their racial and cultural variety across the world. Women were considered to be intrinsically different from men at the same time that they were considered to be human.

Not being an expert on the Enlightenment I found recently a book chapter titled “Human Nature” by Aaron Garrett in a two volume work, The Cambridge History of Eighteenth-Century Philosophy [12] (2006). There is a section in this chapter dealing with “race and natural character”; it is short, 20 pages in a 1400 page work, but it is nevertheless well researched with close to 80 footnotes of mostly primary sources. One learns from these few pages that “in text after text” Enlightenment thinkers proposed a hierarchical view of the races. Mind you, Garrett is stereotypically liberal and thus writes of “the 18th century’s dubious contributions to the discussion of race,” startled by “the virulent denigrations of blacks . . . found in the works of Franklin, Raynal, Voltaire, Forster, and many others.” He also playacts the racial ideas of these works as if they were inconsistent with the scientific method, and makes the very unscientific error of assuming that there was an “apparent contradiction” with the Enlightenment’s notion of a hierarchy of races and its “vigorous attacks on the slave trade in the name of humanity.”

Just because most Enlightenment thinkers rejected polygenecism and asserted the fundamental (species) equality of humankind, it does not mean that they could not believe consistently in the hierarchical nature of the human races. There were polygenecists like Charles White who argued that blacks formed a race different from whites, and Voltaire who took some pleasure lampooning the vanity of the unity of mankind. But the prevailing view was that all races were members of the same human species, as all humans were capable of creating fertile offspring. Buffon, Cornelius de Pauw, Linnaeus, Blumenbach, Kant and others endorsed this view, and yet they distinctly ranked whites above other races.

Liberals have deliberately employed this view on the species unity of humanity in order to separate, misleadingly, the Enlightenment from any racial connotations. But Linnaeus did rank the races in their behavioral proclivities; and Buffon did argue that all the races descended from an original pair of whites, and that American Indians and Africans were degraded by their respective environmental habitats. De Pauw did say that Africans had been enfeebled in their intelligence and “disfigured” by their environment. Samuel Soemmering did conclude that blacks were intellectually inferior; Peter Camper and John Hunter did rank races in terms of their facial physiognomy. Blumenbach did emphasize the symmetrical balance of Caucasian skull features as the “most perfect.” Nevertheless, in accordance with the evidence collected at the time, all these scholars asserted the fundamental unity of mankind, monogenism, or the idea that all races have a common origin.

Garrett, seemingly unable to accept his own “in text after text” observation, repeats the standard line that Buffon’s and Blumenbach’s view, for example, on “the unity and structural similarity of races” precluded a racial conception. He generally evades racist phrases and arguments from Enlightenment thinkers, such as this one from Blumenbach: “I have allotted the first place to the Caucasian because this stock displays the most beautiful race of men” (Eze, 1997: 79). He makes no mention or almost ignores a number of other racialists [13]: Locke, Georges Cuvier, Johann Winckelmann, Diderot, Maupertuis, and Montesquieu. In the case of Kant, he says it would be “absurd” to take some “isolated remarks” he made about race as if they stood for his whole work. Kant “distinguish between character, temperament, and race in order to avoid biological determinism” for the sake of the “moral potential of the human race as a whole.”

kant-german-philosopher-from.jpgActually, Kant, the greatest thinker of the Enlightenment, “produced the most profound raciological thought of the 18th century.” These words come from Earl W. Count’s book This is Race, cited by Emmanuel Chukwudi Eze in what is a rather good analysis of Kant’s racism showing that it was not marginal but deeply embedded in his philosophy. Eze’s analysis comes in a chapter, “The Color of Reason: The Idea of ‘Race’ in Kant’s Anthropology [14]” (1997). We learn that Kant elaborated his racial thinking in his Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View [15] (1798); he introduced anthropology as a branch of study to the German universities together with the study of geography, and that through his career Kant offered 72 courses in Anthropology and/or Geography, more than in logic, metaphysics and moral philosophy. Although various scholars have shown interest in Kant’s anthropology, they have neglected its relation to Kant’s “pure philosophy.”

For Kant, anthropology and geography were inseparable; geography was the study of the natural conditions of the earth and of man’s physical attributes and location as part of this earth; whereas anthropology was the study of man’s soul, his psychological and moral character, as exhibited in different places on earth. In his geography Kant addressed racial classifications on the basis of physical traits such as skin color; in his anthropology he studied the internal structures of human psychology and the manner in which these internal attributes conditioned humans as moral and rational beings.

Kant believed that human beings were different from other natural beings in their capacity for consciousness and agency. Humans were naturally capable of experiencing themselves as self-reflecting egos capable of acting morally on the basis of their own self-generated norms (beyond the determinism which conditioned all other beings in the universe). It is part of our internal human nature to think and will as persons with moral agency. This uniquely human attribute is what allows humans to transcend the dictates of nature insofar as they are able to articulate norms as commandments for their own actions freed from unconscious physical contingencies and particular customs. As rational beings, humans are capable of creating a realm of ends, and these ends are a priori principles derived not from the study of geography and anthropology but from the internal structures of the mind, transcendental reason. What Kant means by “critical reason” is the ability of humans through the use of their minds to subject everything (bodily desires, empirical reality, and customs) to the judgments of values generated by the mind, such that the mind (reason) is the author of its own moral actions.

However, it was Kant’s estimation that his geographical and anthropological studies gave his moral philosophy an empirical grounding. This grounding consisted in the acquisition of knowledge about human beings “throughout the world,” to use Kant’s words, “from the point of view of the variety of their natural properties and the differences in that feature of the human which is moral in character.”[3] [16] Kant was the first thinker to sketch out a geographical and psychological (or anthropological) classification of humans. He classified humans naturally and racially into white (European), yellow (Asians), black (Africans) and red (American Indians). He also classified them psychologically and morally in terms of the mores, customs and aesthetic feelings held collectively by each of the races. Non-Europeans held unreflective mores and customs devoid of critical examination “because these people,” in the words of Eze, “lack the capacity for development of ‘character,’ and they lack character presumably because they lack adequate self-consciousness and rational will.” Within Kant’s psychological classification, non-Europeans “appear to be incapable of moral maturity because they lack ‘talent,’ which is a ‘gift’ of nature.” Eze quotes Kant: “the difference in natural gifts between various nations cannot be completely explained by means of causal [external, physical, climatic] causes but rather must lie in the [moral] nature of man.” The differences among races are permanent and transcend environmental factors. “The race of the American cannot be educated. It has no motivating force; for it lacks affect and passion . . . They hardly speak, do not caress each other, care about nothing and are lazy.” “The race of the Negroes . . .  is completely the opposite of the Americans; they are full of affect and passion, very lively, talkative and vain. They can be educated but only as servants . . . ” The Hindus “have a strong degree of passivity and all look like philosophers. They thus can be educated to the highest degree but only in the arts and not in the sciences. They can never arise to the level of abstract concepts . . . The Hindus always stay the way they are, they can never advance, although they began their education much earlier.”

Eze then explains that for Kant only “white” Europeans are educable and capable of progress in the arts and sciences. They are the “ideal model of universal humanity.” In other words, only the European exhibits the distinctly human capacity to behave as a rational creature in terms of “what he himself is willing to make himself” through his own ends. He is the only moral character consciously free to choose his own ends over and above the determinism of external nature and of unreflectively held customs. Eze, a Nigerian born academic, obviously criticizes Kant’s racism, citing and analyzing additional passages, including ones in which Kant states that non-Europeans lack “true” aesthetic feelings. He claims that Kant transcendentally hypostasized his concept of race simply on the basis of his belief that skin color by itself stands for the presence or absence of the natural ‘gift’ of talent and moral ‘character’. He says that Kant’s sources of information on non-European customs were travel books and stories he heard in Konigsberg, which was a bustling international seaport. Yet, this does not mean that he was simply “recycling ethnic stereotypes and prejudices.” Kant was, in Eze’s estimation, seriously proposing an anthropological and a geographical knowledge of the world as the empirical presupposition of his critical philosophy.

With the publication of this paper (and others in recent times) it has become ever harder to designate Kant’s thinking on race as marginal. Thomas Hill and Bernard Boxill dedicated a chapter, “Kant and Race [17],” to Eze’s paper in which they not only accepted that Kant expressed racist beliefs, but also that Eze was successful “in showing that Kant saw his racial theory as a serious philosophical project.” But Hill and Boxill counter that Kant’s philosophy should not be seen to be inherently “infected with racism . . . provided it is suitably supplemented with realistic awareness of the facts about racism and purged from association with certain false empirical beliefs.” These two liberals, however, think they have no obligation to provide their readers with one single fact proving that the races are equal. They don’t even mention a source in their favor such as Stephen J. Gould [18]. They take it as a given that no one has seriously challenged the liberal view of race but indeed assume that such a challenge would be racist ipso facto and therefore empirically unacceptable. They then excuse Kant on grounds that the evidence available in his time supported his claims; but that it would be racist today to make his claims for one would be “culpable” of neglecting the evidence that now disproves racial classifications. What evidence [19]?

They then argue that “racist attitudes are incompatible with Kant’s basic principle of respect for humanity in each person,” and in this vein refer to Kant’s denunciation, in his words, of the “wars, famine, insurrection, treachery and the whole litany of evils” which afflicted the peoples of the world who experience the “great injustice of the European powers in their conquests.” But why do liberals always assume that claims about racial differences constitute a call for the conquest and enslavement of non-whites? They forget the 100 million killed in Russia and China, or, conversely, the fact that most Enlightenment racists were opponents of the slave trade. The bottom logic of the Hill-Boxill counterargument is that Kant’s critical philosophy was/is intrinsically incompatible with any racial hierarchies which violate the principles of human freedom and dignity, even if his racism was deeply embedded in his philosophy. But it is not; and may well be the other way around; Kant’s belief in human perfectibility, the complete development of moral agency and rational freedom, may be seen as intrinsically in favor of a hierarchical way of thinking in terms of which race is the standard bearer of the ideal of a free and rational humanity.

It is quite revealing that an expert like Garrett, and the standard interpreters of the Enlightenment generally, including your highness Doctor Habermas, would ignore Kant’s anthropology. A recent essay by Stuart Elden, “Reassessing Kant’s geography [20]” (2009), examines the state of this debate, noting that Kant’s geography and anthropology are still glaringly neglected in most newer works on Kant. One reason for this, Elden believes, “is that philosophers have, by and large, not known what to make of the works.” I would specify that they don’t know what to make of Kant’s racism in light of the widely accepted view that he was a liberal progenitor of human equality and cosmopolitanism. Even Elden does not know what to make of this racism, though he brings attention to some recent efforts to incorporate fully Kant’s anthropology/geography into his overall philosophy, works by Robert Louden, Kant’s Impure Ethics (2000); John Zammito, Kant, Herder, and the Birth of Anthropology (2002), and Holly Wilson, Kant’s Pragmatic Anthropology (2006). Elden pairs off these standard (pro-Enlightenment, pro-Kant) works against the writings of leftist critics who have shown less misgivings designating Kant a racist. All of these works (leftists as well) are tainted by their unenlightened acceptance of human equality and universalism. They cannot come to terms with a Kant who proposed a critical philosophy only for the European race.

There is no space here for details; some of the main points these authors make are: Kant’s anthropology and geography lectures were part of Kant’s critical philosophy, “devoted to trying to enlighten his students more about the people and world around them in order that they might live (pragmatically as well as morally) better lives” (Louden, p. 65). The aim of these lectures, says Wilson, on the cultures and geography of the world was “to civilize young students to become ‘citizens of the world’” (p. 8). Kant was a humane teacher who cared for his students and expected them to become cognizant of the world and in this way acquire prudence and wisdom. “Kant explicitly argues that the anthropology is a type of cosmopolitan philosophy,” writes Wilson, intended to educate students to develop their rational powers so they could think for themselves and thus be free to actualize their full human potentiality (5, 115). This sounds very pleasant yet based on the infantile notion that knowledge of the world and cosmopolitanism, wisdom and prudence, are incompatible with a racial understanding. To the contrary, if Kant’s racial observations were consistent with the available evidence at the time, and if masses of new evidence have accumulated since validating his views, then a critical and worldly philosophy would require us to show understanding towards Kant’s racism, which does not mean one has to accept the subjective impressionistic descriptions Kant uses. Hiding from students the research of Philippe Rushton, Richard Lynn, Charles Murray, Arthur Jensen, among others, would negate their ability to become free enlightened thinkers.

Elden brings the writings of Bernasconi and David Harvey, agreeing with them that Kant played “a crucial role in establishing the term ‘race’ as the currency within which discussions of human variety would be conducted in the 19th century.” He agrees too that Kant’s racism is “deeply problematic” to his cosmopolitanism, and that earlier responses by Kantians to swept aside his racism as “irrelevant” or “not to be taken seriously” are inadequate. Elden thinks however that scholars like Louden and Wilson have risen to the leftist challenge. But what we get from Louden is the same supposition that Kant’s philosophy can be made to meet the requirements of humanitarianism and egalitarianism simply by discarding the racist components. This constitutes a confounding of the actual Enlightenment (and the authentic Kant) with our current cultural Marxist wish to create a progressive global civilization. Louden even makes the rather doleful argument that Kant’s monogenetic view of the races, the idea that all humans originated from a common ancestor, “help us reach our collective destiny.” Kant’s monogenetic view is not an adequate way to show that he believed in a common humanity. The monogenetic view is not only consistent with the eventual differentiation of this common species into unequal races due to migration to different environments, but it is also the case that Kant specifically rejected Buffon’s claim that racial differences could be reversed with the eventual adaptation of “inferior” races to climates and environments that would induce “superior” traits; Kant insisted that the differences among races were fixed and irreversible regardless of future adaptations to different environmental settings. Louden’s additional defense of Kant by noting that he believed that all members of the human species can cultivate, civilize, and moralize themselves does not invalidate Kant’s view that whites are the model of a universal humanity.

So many otherwise intelligent scholars have willfully misled themselves into believing that Enlightenment thinkers were promoters of egalitarianism and a race-less cosmopolitan public sphere. We do live in a time of major deceptions at the highest levels of Western intellectual culture. We are continually reminded that the central idea in Kant’s conception of enlightenment is that of “submitting all claims to authority to the free examination of reason.”[4] [21] Yet the very ideals of the Enlightenment have been misused to preclude anyone from examining freely and rationally the question of race differences even to the point that admirers of the Enlightenment have been engaged in a ubiquitous campaign to hide, twist beyond clarity, and confound what Enlightenment thinkers themselves said about such differences. White nationalists should no longer accept the standard interpretation of the Enlightenment. They should embrace the Enlightenment and Kant as their own.


[1] Gurutz Jáuregui Bereciartu, Decline of the Nation State (1986), p. 26.

[2] Hans Adler and Ernest Menze, Eds. “Introduction,” in On World History, Johan Gottfried Herder: An Anthology (1997): p. 5

[3] These words are cited in Stuart Elden’s “Reassessing Kant’s geography,” Journal of Historical Geography (2009), a paper I discuss later.

[4] Perpetual Peace. Essays on Kant’s Cosmopolitan Ideal, eds. Johan Bohman and Mathias Lutz Bachman. The MIT Press, 1997.



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URL to article: http://www.counter-currents.com/2013/05/the-enlightenment-from-a-new-right-perspective/


URLs in this post:

[1] Image: http://www.counter-currents.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/09/Kant_Portrait.jpeg

[2] essay: http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/02/10/why-has-race-survived/

[3] Pandaemonium: http://kenanmalik.wordpress.com/2013/02/13/on-the-enlightenments-race-problem/

[4] open door policies on immigration: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kenan_Malik

[5] The Melting Pot Generation: How Britain became more relaxed about race: http://www.britishfuture.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/12/The-melting-pot-generation.pdf

[6] welcomed: http://www.britishfuture.org/blog/mixed-britain-will-the-census-results-change-the-way-we-think-and-talk-about-race/

[7] The British Dream: http://www.amazon.co.uk/gp/product/1843548054/ref=as_li_qf_sp_asin_il_tl?ie=UTF8&camp=1634&creative=6738&creativeASIN=1843548054&linkCode=as2&tag=kenanmalikcom-21

[8] The Independent: http://www.independent.co.uk/arts-entertainment/books/reviews/the-british-dream-by-david-goodhart-8578883.html

[9] Enlightenment and Global History: http://www.counter-currents.com/2013/04/enlightenment-and-global-history/

[10] Indo-European: http://www.theoccidentalobserver.net/2012/12/where-is-the-historical-west-part-1-of-5/

[11] presumptions unsupported by available evidence: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Scientific_racism

[12] The Cambridge History of Eighteenth-Century Philosophy: http://www.amazon.com/Cambridge-History-Eighteenth-Century-Philosophy-Haakonssen/dp/0521418542

[13] other racialists: http://www.quodlibet.net/articles/foutz-racism.shtml

[14] The Color of Reason: The Idea of ‘Race’ in Kant’s Anthropology: http://books.google.ca/books?id=moH_07971gwC&pg=PA200&lpg=PA200&dq=%E2%80%9CThe+Color+of+Reason:+The+Idea+of+%E2%80%98Race%E2%80%99+in+Kant%E2%80%99s+Anthropology%E2%80%9D&source=bl&ots=Q9-oKv3Wks&sig=QDcpHumNboU6TrfmWYfZCdjPyss&hl=en&sa=X&ei=rHSOUbebCNWz4AP87YCwDA&sqi=2&ved=0CDEQ6AEwAQ#v=onepage&q=%E2%80%9CThe%20Color%20of%20Reason%3A%20The%20Idea%20of%20%E2%80%98Race%E2%80%99%20in%20Kant%E2%80%99s%20Anthropology%E2%80%9D&f=false

[15] Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View: http://books.google.ca/books/about/Kant_Anthropology_from_a_Pragmatic_Point.html?id=MuS6WI_7xeYC&redir_esc=y

[16] [3]: http://www.counter-currents.comfile:///C:/Users/Owner/AppData/Local/Microsoft/Windows/Temporary%20Internet%20Files/Content.IE5/F9Q4VNXE/The%20Enlightenment%20from%20a%20New%20Right%20Perspective%20(1).rtf#_ftn3

[17] Kant and Race: http://www.faculty.umb.edu/lawrence_blum/courses/465_11/readings/Race_and_Racism.pdf

[18] Stephen J. Gould: http://menghusblog.wordpress.com/2012/05/08/stephen-jay-gould-myth-and-fraud/

[19] What evidence: http://www.jehsmith.com/philosophy/2008/09/phil-498629-rac.html

[20] Reassessing Kant’s geography: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0305748808000613

[21] [4]: http://www.counter-currents.comfile:///C:/Users/Owner/AppData/Local/Microsoft/Windows/Temporary%20Internet%20Files/Content.IE5/F9Q4VNXE/The%20Enlightenment%20from%20a%20New%20Right%20Perspective%20(1).rtf#_ftn4


vendredi, 17 mai 2013

Robert E. Howard & the Heroic



Robert E. Howard & the Heroic

By Jonathan Bowden

Ex: http://www.counter-currents.com/

Editor’s Note:

The following text is a transcript by John Morgan of a lecture by Jonathan Bowden, “Robert Erwin Howard: Pulpster Extraordinaire,” given at the 26th New Right meeting in London on Saturday, April 17, 2010. The audio is available on YouTube [2].

Unfortunately, significant portions of the audio were cut off at the beginning of the second and third segments on YouTube. For the purposes of publishing this essay in the Pulp Fascism [3] collection, I also removed some 2,300 words of digressive material. If anyone has access to a complete copy of the lecture, please contact me. Also, if you have any corrections or if you can gloss the passages marked as unintelligible, please contact me at editor@counter-currents.com [4] or simply post them as comments below. If and when a complete transcript can be assembled, we will publish it here as well. 

I’ll be talking about Robert Ervin Howard. A while back, I had a talk about H. P. Lovecraft, Aryan mystic, and he was one of a triumvirate of writers who wrote for a fantasy magazine called Weird Tales, a pulp magazine; they were incredibly cheaply produced magazines in the 1930s, with quite good art, graphic sort of art, printed on cheap bulk newsprint paper which was very acidic and fell apart very quickly. And yet three writers, Clark Ashton Smith, Robert Ervin Howard, and Howard Phillips Lovecraft have survived and been inducted into literature. I saw in my local library that Penguin Classics, or Modern Classics, the ones with the grey covers, now include Robert Erwin Howard’s Heroes in the Wind, from Kull to Conan: The Best of Robert E. Howard as a book. Penguin Classics, you see? So it begins as a pulp, and a hundred years later it’s redesignated as literature.

Howard is a very interesting figure. He only lived 30 years. He was born in 1906 and shot himself with a revolver in the head in his car, outside his home, when he was 30 years of age. We’ll get on to that afterwards. He wrote 160 stories, and the interesting thing about these stories is that they are pre-civilized in their settings, they’re barbaric, they’re ultra-masculine stories, and they deal with many themes which have been so disprivileged from much of mainstream liberal humanist culture that they no longer exist.

Howard had a range of heroes and wrote in most popular genres. He wrote to make money, but he began as a poet, and a poetic and sort of Saturnalian disposition influenced his work and his friendship, by correspondence, with Lovecraft, and to a lesser extent, Clark Ashton Smith, throughout his life. He was of Irish descent, and he was born in a town which became a boom town in the oil booms of the early 20th century in Texas. For those of you who don’t know, Texas is enormous. England fits into Texas twelve times, and Britain, eight times. He was born in Peaster, Texas, and spent some of his early life in a town called Brownwood, a quintessentially small-town American, which is the experience of most white Americans through the settlement of Western civilization in North America. The state capital, of course, is Austin, and you have the big cities like Houston, Dallas, and Galveston.

Now, Howard hated the oil booms, and what happened. When the oil boom happened to Cross Plains, a town of about 1,200 with a mayor and so on, morphed into a large, sprawling, lawless place of about 10,000. An enormous number of prospectors and drillers and criminals and people seeking easy money, all heavily armed of course, came in to Cross Plains. The town burst out beyond its limits in all directions. Oil was discovered everywhere. Fortunes were made, and fortunes were lost.

At the time he was born, lynchings were still in vogue right across the South and the ex-Confederate states. Everyone displayed and carried weapons openly. Sometimes the Rangers, as they were called, a man alone in the sun with a rifle, was basically all you had of semi-ordered civilization. People don’t realize how, if you like, wild and open certain parts of the United States were, certainly until the 1860s, 1870s.

The psychological experience of an intuitive and sympathetic and radically imaginative young man like Howard invests the tall Texan story, and stories of prospectors and ranchers and drillers in the oil industry, and Texas Rangers and Marshals and so on, with an added piquancy. His family supported the Confederacy in a previous generation, and he was mildly descended from certain Confederate commanders.

His attitude towards life is expressed in the stories, which is why they survived. The stories are like lucid dreams. You walk straight into them, and the action begins. Most of them were dreams, and in a way, most critics believe Howard’s an oral creator. He’s in the oral, folklorist, and narrative-oriented tradition. He’s a storyteller par excellence. It’s said he wrote at night, and he used to chant the stories to himself, which of course is a very old Northern European and Nordic tradition. It’s the idea of the skald. It’s the idea that things are illuminated to you, and you speak because you hear the voice.

He had a series of masculine heroes beginning with certain Celtic and Pictish/Scotch-Irish heroes such as Bran Mak Morn and so on; Conan, the hero that he’s most associated with, whose name, of course, is abstracted from Sir Arthur Conan Doyle’s middle name. Howard would take from all sorts of roots, many of which related to heroic, Celtic, Indo-European elements which he imagined to exist in his own past.

robEHow.jpgHe was very influenced by G. K. Chesterton’s dictum at the beginning of the 20th century that myth is the commingling of emotional reality with what is understood to be fact. If you mix together eras and peoples, but you keep the emotional truth of the substance of what we perceive their lives to have been, then you can influence the present and the future. It’s noumenal truth, as Aristotle said 2,000 years ago, the idea that certain things are artistically and emotionally true irrespective of what you think about them factually.

His most famous series of stories, the Conan stories that he wrote pretty much towards the end of his life, were based upon a false yet true/factual world history, the so-called Hyborian Age that he created for himself. Maps of the Hyborian Age have been produced, and they are based upon a realistic sociology, ethnography, geological history, and a coherent view of economics. The country of Aquilonia that Conan ends up conquering at the end of the mythos is partly Britain. The Picts are partly the Scots, of course, covered in woad, barbaric, kept out by a wall, that sort of thing.

War is the dynamic of all of Howard’s fiction, and his attitude towards life was conflict-oriented. His stories are described as ultra-masculine and non-feminist stories. Unkind critics say that they’re Barbara Cartland for men, where all women are beautiful, all men are heroic, where magic works instead of science, and where force decides all social problems, and there is a degree to which the genre which he has founded, called sword and sorcery—of which one supposes J. R. R. Tolkien, an Oxford professor, is the senior representative in the 20th century—is an example of the literary and the heroic in contemporary letters. It’s interesting to notice that the early great texts of the Western civilization, Homer, Beowulf, are deeply heroic, and yet over time, the heroic imprimatur within our language and within our sensibility dips.

It’s said that boys aren’t interested in reading at school, and that 80 to 90% of those who do English literature courses in further educational colleges and universities, the tertiary sector, are women. It’s said that men don’t disprivilege literature, and it’s also said in the West that boys get bullied if they’re regarded, as Howard was when he was younger, as sissies because they read too much, and this sort of thing.

I think one of the problems is that literature that appeals to men is often not the concern of the people who run these sorts of educational establishments. If the sort of people that influenced Howard, people like Noyes, people like Robert W. Service, people like Byron, people like Kipling, people like the heroic imperialist literature of William Henley, who was the basis for Long John Silver in Treasure Island, and was a close friend of Robert Louis Stevenson, a man who could go from bonhomie to murderous rage with a click of your fingers, as Silver does in Treasure Island, of course, because he moves from extreme malevolence to a sort of Cockney paternalism in the same breath. Now, if this literature was normative much further down the social and the educational scale, one would imagine that boys and youngish men would be much more interested in literature as a whole.

Howard essentially sold stories from about the age of 20, certainly 19. He started writing when he was 9, and the interesting thing about him is that his stories are not really derivative. There are connections to enormous writers that were prominent at the time, principally Jack London, but Howard emerged fully-formed and had his own voice from the very beginning.

London’s a very interesting figure, because London’s often been associated, truthfully and yet forcefully, with the extreme Left. Trotsky, of course, wrote an introduction to his famous dystopia of American life called The Iron Heel, and yet London, as George Orwell intimated in one of his essays, was proto-fascistic, and was in many ways a Left nationalist, or even a National Bolshevik, or somebody who would be now described as a Third Positionist. London’s positions were those of socialism from the outside, but also a form of socialism, with and without quotation marks, that was Right-wing rather than Left-wing, and was both national and racial. The interesting thing about London’s discourse is the radicalism of the racialism. [. . .]

We had at the last meeting, or the meeting before last, a speaker from Croatia called Tomislav Sunić who wrote a book which I edited a long time ago, actually, called Homo Americanus: Child of the Postmodern Age. Among the very important points about that book is his recognition, as a European ex-Catholic in his case, of the Protestant fundamentalist nature of the United States. I think this is a crucial point to understand the United States. The influence of contemporary Jewry in the United States is due to the fact that it’s a Protestant fundamentalist country and many, many Americans really believe in their deep and even subconscious mind that the viewpoint that they are a self-chosen elect to rule by right, by divine imprecation, is so deep in their consciousness, the idea as Pentecostalists sing, that “we are Zion,” goes so far down that the difference between their identity and their group specificity and their militant patriotism and that of a small country in the Middle East, and people who didn’t begin to emigrate en masse into the United States until the latter stages of the 19th century, and only really began to have major socioeconomic impact, particularly culturally, in the first quarter to a third of the 20th century makes these things, to my mind, easier to understand.

Now, Protestant fundamentalism doesn’t seem to have scratched Howard very much, and yet one of his heroes is a Puritan called Solomon Kane, and Solomon Kane, who comes between Bran Mak Morn, Kull, and Conan, is in some ways his first major hero. Solomon Kane is very, very interesting because he’s one of these Protestant extremists of the 1620s—well, they’re set before—but that’s when the movement comes to power in the Cromwellian Interregnum in England, and yet stretches way back into the previous century, and yet in a strange way he’s an outsider, even in that movement.

Kane dresses all in black with a little white sort of a bib round his neck. He’s extraordinarily heavily armed, as most of the Puritans were, had a sword on either side, had pistols in the belts, had a knife in the boot, because you were fighting for the Lord, you see! “I am the flail of the Lord.” They had these endless quotes, largely from the Old Testament, but to a degree from elements of the New, which they would roll out on occasions when they had to justify what they were about to do, and that their instincts wanted to do, in a way that nothing could restrain them.

There’s a famous moment in Northern Ireland, when James Callaghan was Northern Irish Secretary under Wilson in the late 1960s, slightly sympathetic to Social Democratic, Catholic nationalism in Northern Ireland, as part of the local movement was then, but in a very moderate way, and then said in a concerned and perplexed way to the Reverend Ian Paisley, who softened a bit as he’s got older, and in turn wanted to be Prime Minister of Northern Ireland before he died, he said to Paisley that, “But we’re all the children of God, Reverend,” and Paisley said, “No! Nooooo!” He said, “We are the children of wrath!

And that is the attitude of those Puritan extremists, loyal to the Old Testament in many ways. Men of a sort of always implacable fury, and elements of their dictatorship, under Cromwell of course, were increasingly maniacal. The banning of Shakespeare, our greatest writer. When an English national revolutionary movement bans the country’s greatest-ever writer, you do begin to think there’s something slightly wrong, don’t you, no? Similarly, the flogging of actors under the New Model Army in Newcastle for performing Shakespeare, these were the latter stages, these were the Buddhas of Bamiyan moments, weren’t they really, of these English revolutionaries of the 1640s, or what was really going on.

Now, the sort of Puritanism that Howard puts into this character is different, because Howard’s character, Solomon Kane’s a loner, a man who always fights for his own cause, but when he hears those almost voluptuous pagan stirrings in the background, it’s always Christianized, and it’s always put in a Protestant context.

Cromwell once had a phrase: “I disembowel you for Christ’s love.” And that’s what he said in the Putney Debates. When the parliamentary side won the Civil War, the whole New Model Army, which of course was a revolutionary army of that time—no brothels, no drinking; in the Royal army, you went to the back, and there was endless entertainment at the back of the battlefront. With the Puritan armies, there was none of that. You went to the back, and there was no drinking, and there was a chap ranting at you about whether you’d sinned that day.

It was less fun, but at the same time, when they raised their pikes together, not in a higgledy-piggledy way, or one bloke at the back didn’t want to, but they raised them together, as one unit. They would all chant, “God is our strength.” Cromwell understood as Shaw said early in the 20th century that a man who has a concept of reality that is metaphysically objectivist, a man who believes in something as absolute truth is worth fifty men. And that’s the type of revolutionary ideology that these people then had.

But at the Putney Debates, there was a debate about how the country should go, and Ireton and the other supreme commanders were there. Under Cromwell they committed regicide of course, they killed the King, so the future of the country was theirs. There was another tendency known as the Levellers, who in some ways of course were retrospectively the first socialists, so-called because they wanted to level down distinctions. There was an even more radical movement called the Diggers that came along later. But Cromwell told Ireton, “Either we hang them or they will hang us.” And that’s the Levellers. And at the end of the Putney Debates, the army moves aside, the Cromwellian regime has been established, and the Levellers are hanging on the trees. So Cromwell had got his way.

The importance of Protestantism to the United States, in a complicated way, is the reason why there has never been an extreme Right-wing movement of any great success in the United States, except in a localized way like the Klan to deal with particular circumstances at a particular time. America, you could imagine, is ripe for such a movement, as Australia always has been, and yet there has not been one, not really. Not a national movement. There were figures in the 1930s: there was the Silver Shirt movement; there were Father Coughlin’s radio broadcasts, which had all sorts of interesting ramifications in American life, as Catholic priest giving the radical Right to essentially a Protestant nation, which of course set up a cultural tension and contradiction in and of itself.

There are also interesting liberal counterparts to this. Most people remember Orson Welles’ treatment of H. G. Wells’ The War of the Worlds, when the Martians invade New York, and then he admitted it was a fiction retrospectively, and tens of thousands of ninnies leave New York because they think the Martians are landing. “Gee, they’re up the road!” And they get the pickup truck, and they go. And then they broadcast later that it was all a stunt and it was an artistic show, and people shouldn’t take it literally.

Welles deliberately did that to discredit Coughlin. He said afterwards, “We did it because too many people believed everything that fascist priest was telling them on the radio, so we proved them, don’t believe what you hear that comes out of the radio.” And that’s a purely sort of aesthetic response to the impact that sort of thing had.

robEHow2.jpgYet still movements lie there, Aryan Nations, National Alliance, these sorts of movements, very small, very isolated, geographically and in other ways. National Alliance was quite interesting because it morphed from Youth for George Wallace. That’s how it started, and then it took various transformatory steps until it emerged as a very hard-line group under the late Dr. William Pierce at a later date.

And this culture of extreme Protestantism—which contained elements which are to the Right of almost anything you’ve ever seen, mentally, psychologically, conceptually—seems partly, because, of its extreme individualism, to be incapable of generating radical Right mass movements. Most Americans still adopt a deliberately materialist, liberal humanist and individualist way of looking at life. They divide into two basic political parties that have switched over during the course of the last two centuries. Don’t forget in the 19th century the Republican Party was the party of the nominal Left, and the Democrats were red. The Democrats were conservatives who supported states’ rights—not the right to secede, but certainly the right to own slaves. The party led by a man who’s proud to have ex-slaves in his own family, the present President, would have actually, in a strange sort of way, not been able to join the Democrat Party in the 19th century, and yet the switch around, that you can vote in each other’s primaries, and that “Isn’t everyone a Democrat? Isn’t everyone a Republican?,” hence the meaninglessness of the names, adds to this sort of feeling that you get in the contemporary United States that all that matters is money and social success. America’s very important, because America, of course, dominates this country now culturally and geopolitically. We can’t almost do anything without them, and all the wars that we’re now dragged into are due to American hegemony.

But the repudiation of parts of American power should never blind ourselves to the cultural excellence of what many white Americans have achieved, both for their group and individually. If you actually look at all the radical Right literature, the alternative side of an isolationist and American nationalist posture, there is some great work there by people like William Gayley Simpson, who wrote an enormous book of over a thousand pages called Which Way Western Man? Again, without going on a tangent too much, he’s a very interesting man because he’s an ex-Trappist monk. He began as a liberal and an aching humanist whose heart bled for the Third World and who had all the correct sort of UN-specific attitudes, and gradually he changed step by step by step, and he ended up, if not a member then a fellow traveler, of the National Alliance. That is quite a change. That is quite a leap. But it is also true that tens and tens of thousands of educated Western people who are liberal-minded now will have to change their views, will have to begin to change their mindset in this and the coming generation if Western civilization is virtually not to slide off the cliff. [. . .]

Now, to return to Howard, Howard’s writing, by the end of his sort of period, and don’t forget that he was sort of mature at 22 and dead at 30, he produced 160 stories, 15, 16 volumes basically, and other fragments. There was an unfinished fantasy novel called Almuric, the early Celtic stories, Bran Mak Morn and the others morphed into Solomon Kane. There were associated Westerns and humorous stories. There were some detective stories, but he never particularly liked that genre, although his attitude towards life was hard-boiled. There were also some Crusader stories as well, and some slightly mythological stories about a sort of white man in the East called Gordon, presumably named after the Gordon of Khartoum, but actually an American, and these were the old Borak stories set in Afghanistan, where he goes native and fights along sort of inter-tribal and group-based and clan lines in that context.

Howard’s attitude toward politics is quite complicated and not entirely logical, and primarily emotional. He supported the New Deal because he believed the American economy had collapsed and something needed to be done. He argued strongly with H. P. Lovecraft, he was more of a “reactionary” in these respects, a classical liberal, didn’t like the Roosevelt and the people around him, didn’t like intervention in the market in that sort of Protestant, American way. He felt that you fail commercially, you suffer punishment, because God has chosen that punishment for you. Destiny involves sacrifice.

The irony is that the banks have been saved in the United States by Bush, costing trillions of dollars, but the metaphysic which founded the country would have allowed all of those banks to fail, all of those banks to fail and all those bankers to hang themselves and throw themselves off buildings. That happened in 1929, and then you rebuild quickly, because the pure, American, sort of Randian view is that capitalism is an insatiable animal and vortex of energy, and if people go to pot, if people lose everything they have, if as a trader, an insurance agent I vaguely knew years ago at Lloyd’s, lost all his money in the Names scandal, and goes there on a Sunday and unlocks the door and goes down to the toilets and sits there and drinks Domestos and kills himself and is found by the cleaners, Africans probably, on Monday morning, and his senior partner in Lloyd’s said, “Well, that’s capitalism for you.” And that’s it! What goes up goes down! This was the view that founded the United States

And yet the irony is, why have these Western politicians intervened, why have they saved these structures: few collateral damage moments, Lehman Brothers; they’ve charged Goldman Sachs with fraud. Well, that’s a bit late, isn’t it, really? And yet why have they intervened? They’ve intervened because of the voting danger. The fact that there are radical parties on the fringe of all Western societies, everyone knows who they are, that people could vote for in a major moment of fiscal/physical/moral/emotional distress, and the whole Western clerisy that’s bought into the contemporary liberal package knows that. Many of these parties are actually quite moderate in relation to the traditions they come out of, but they terrify the present establishment that often sees the more populist ones as just the start of something worse that’s coming behind, see?

And there’s also a certain guilt there as well, because these people are well aware of what’s happened to Western societies because they’ve been running them for 70 years. This idea it’s all an accident, “I didn’t really mean it,” and the turning of Western societies into a sort of version of Brasília, en masse with a tiny, little elite at the top that’s creaming most of the goodies off for themselves.

I’m not an egalitarian in any sense, but it’s interesting to note that this country’s slightly more unequal now than it was in 1910 in terms of 90% of all equity and all capital and all wealth is owned by the top 10%, and the top 2% of that 10%, and yet the society has changed out of all recognition, 1910 to 2010. Most Western people born in the first [unintelligible] part of the 20th century would not believe the transformation of the West just in a lifetime, basically, after they died. And it occurred because of the extraordinary wars, largely amongst ourselves, that we fought in the 20th century that also gave outsider ideologies like Communism their chance to vulture-like pick over the defeat and the carrion corpses of what was left.

The heroic attitude towards man and society that Howard’s work depicts exists virtually nowhere except as play and pleasure in computer games for boys and adolescents, in comic books and so on. The areas of life where that sort of ethos remains, the armed forces, the army, navy, and air force of most contemporary Western societies, particularly their specialist or elite forces, in Britain the Special Air service, the naval equivalent the Special Boat Service, and all of those novels, these Andy McNab sort of novels about the heroic and this sort of thing, which are lapped up by a largely male audience, largely male audience. Other than that, there is not really the imprimatur of the heroic in Western life, the extraordinary demilitarization of Western life, hardly ever see a policeman, hardly ever see soldiers. When do you ever see British forces? And that’s because they’re always outside the country as globalist mercenaries fighting American and Zionist wars all over the world. They’re never seen here, and many of their commanders don’t want them here, either, because they regard parts of British life as so irretrievably decadent that they actually want to keep their troops away from much of what’s happened in relation to the society. There are towns in Berkshire where a lot of the military stay, like Arborfield and these sorts of towns, where it’s quite clear there’s a sort of military zone and there’s a civilian zone. You all know what British towns are like on Friday, Saturday night: no police; they’re all in their vans; they’re all in the station; they’re at home; they’re filling in forms. They wear yellow bibs when they’re out, but when you want one, you can never see them, can you?

And a lot of our older people are, let’s face it, frightened to go into town and city centers on Thursday, Friday, Saturday, certainly after 6. And why is this happening? It’s partly happening because the concept that Howard’s fiction deals with, masculinity, has been completely disprivileged, completely demonized and rerouted in contemporary liberal life. Hostility to masculinity, certainly as defined, say, before 1950 is very considerable, and it’s had a very corrosive effect ideologically, aesthetically. Men can have their own pleasures in various zones, which are sort of sneered at and disprivileged, but the centrality of the heroic as a myth for life has largely gone.

The way to explicate something like Howard, as I did with Lovecraft before, is to maybe to concentrate on one of their stories. With H. P. Lovecraft I chose “The Dunwich Horror,” and with Howard I would choose “Rogues in the House,” which was published in Weird Tales in the early ’30s. One fantasy critic has called it the greatest fantasy story of the 20th century, but that’s just one individual’s opinion. It’s relatively early in the Conan series.

Conan is a northern barbarian, and because everything’s fused together in Howard, he’s got slightly Nordic, Germanic, and slightly Celtic traits. He’s an outsider, but he has a clean code of masculine barbarism. Civilization is always seen as slightly weak-kneed and sybaritic to Howard. And yet at the same time, barbarism has its own inner order.

Now, there are counter-factual and countercultural elements there that will be used by social anthropologists in a totally different context, like Lévi-Strauss and others, in the middle of the 20th century, but Howard means it in a different way.

There’s a Left-wing streak to Howard, as there was to London, a siding with the outsider, with those ruined by capitalism, by tramps. London’s book about the East End is one of the most extraordinary books about mass poverty before George Orwell’s Down and Out in Paris and London and “How the Poor Die,” were quite extraordinary works. A poor little hospital in Paris before any sort of socialized medicine, where those who were in the bottom 10%, their corpses were just thrown on the ground! And they died in agony, and they kick you away and put another one on top. This is how the poor die! And Orwell said to this chap in this hospital, “But look at the state they’re in!” And he said, “Well, they gave up slavery. Here’s another batch.” This was the attitude then. This is why things like the labor movement, even in the United States in an attenuated way, were created, to correct that imbalance as it’s seen from the bottom.

The far Right, of course, always wanted not the class war of the contemporary Left, but to socialize mass life in a way that preserved the traditions of the civilization of which we’re a part, that brought on what was excellent about the past and yet realized that the 50% of people who own no capital, the 50% of people who are largely excluded from all center-Right parties’ definition of patriotism, are part of the country, are part of the nation, fight the country’s wars for the most part when they’re asked to do so, and therefore have to be within the remit of social consideration in relation to education, health, and other matters.

My explanation for Howard’s support of the New Deal and that type of politics largely is along those sorts of lines. It’s the sort of apolitical chap who likes country and western in a Midwestern state and supports socialized medicine up to a point, as long as it’s not too costly, doesn’t like Obama, and supports our troops, you see. But it’s in a sort of apolitical zone which has got no real knowledge above that. Some of the instincts are right, but the ideological formulation in which that takes place is likely wrong, because even these wars—do you think Iraq was fought for ordinary white Americans? Do you think Afghanistan has anything to do with ordinary families living in Nebraska or Nevada or Kansas? None of these wars have anything to do with them at all. Even the Black Muslims have worked out that white gentiles largely are second-class citizens now in the society that they created. But that’s another story, and I’d just like to concentrate on Howard.

This particular story concerns Conan from the outside, Conan as perceived by an aristocrat and fop called Murilo. Howard’s a little bit of a Nordicist. He thinks southern Europeans are a bit foppish in comparison to northern Europeans. There’s a streak of this, and some of the society is seen to be Italy, Corinth, Zamora, but they’re not. But they seem to be Italy.

Well, there’s this Italian city-state that’s run by a corrupt priest called Nabonidus, who’s known as the Red Priest. These myths are set, these stories, mythologically encoded, are set before the beginning of recorded history and after the sinking of Atlantis, possibly a fantasy itself. So he sets them far back enough that he can do whatever he wants with them, but at the same time he can import a large amount of retrospective historical insight.

The interesting thing is the Machiavellianism of the politics of these stories. All of these societies are run extremely ruthlessly and are run completely for the power interests of the people in charge. The nationalities don’t really matter, but they are, if the gloves are off, as marauding and vengeful as their own leaders who they represent at a lower level. Truly Howard believes, with the Roman dictator Sulla, that when the weapons are out, the laws fall silent.

Now, Murilo is a courtier, a relatively corrupt courtier, in this city-state, and Nabonidus comes to him one day at a royal council meeting and gives him a small casket that contains a severed ear. And this is a warning, as it would be if a Renaissance prince in post-Medieval Italy, gave it to a rival, and it’s, “Clear off. Get out of the city-state as quickly as possible. I’m giving you one day.” And Murilo wonders what he’s going to do. He can flee, but he’s not a coward, why should he leave his own city? And in any case he’s got lots of rackets on the go, you know, so he wants an out, and he thinks, “I need to assassinate Nabonidus,” who runs the drunken King as a sort of priest/philosopher-king/leader of a native death cult within the city like a puppet master controls his dog.

So he needs a vassal, and he finds it in the prisons of the city where a young, heathen, northern barbarian has been captured and lays there in chains after various escapades and thefts, and this is a young man of 19 called Conan, who’s twice the size of a normal man. All Howard’s heroes are physically enormous, and all incredibly violent, although they all have an honor code of their own which is interesting, particularly towards the end of the story, what you might call an innate code of masculine morality and honor which is part and parcel of natural law.

The Social Darwinian view that was spread throughout mass culture, particularly these types of fictions in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, is not entirely true as all prisons and all armies testify, there’s a code of honor and morality even in very extreme male behavior. Rapists are always amongst the most disprivileged in any prison. Men who attack and feed on women, for example, in very all-male and male-concentric cultural spaces are always disprivileged, always disliked, and that’s because of innate feelings about how, in a very traditionalist way, what we call partly a sexist way now, men should treat women, and these things pre-date all modern ideas and are partly innate, and in some ways, because Howard is such an instinctualist, he brings these sorts of forces to the fore.

Now, Nabonidus wants Murilo to leave the city. Murilo hires Conan to murder Nabonidus. Nabonidus is [unintelligible]. Conan is in his cell sucking some beef off a bone, and besides, Nabonidus is an upper-class priest—so why not murder him for money, he’s an adventurer?—so he decides to go with Murilo on this plot. As always with Howard, a synopsis never does justice to the sort of the lucid dreaming of the story itself. Howard always said that he was there and that Conan was next to him like an old soldier dictating his stories, some of which will be tall stories as well.

Now, Murilo then hears that Conan has been captured because the guard that he bribed to get him out of the prison has been arrested on another offense. Conan’s actually escaped in another way and joins Murilo later. Murilo, desperate, a Borgia without any sort of a family fortune decides to murder Nabonidus himself, so he creeps up to his fortified estate, which is on the edge of town, described in this Gothic way—it’s dark, it’s sepulchral, it’s moonlit, there’s an enormous dog that roams the grounds.

Remember Conan Doyle’s stories? There’s always this enormous mastiff that the villain has that roams the grounds to bring people down, but Watson shoots on Holmes’ behalf usually at the end. In The Hound of the Baskervilles, which is extraordinarily amusing because the hound is covered with phosphorous to make it glow in the dark when it races after some poor chap who’s looking back, terrified, on a sort of West Country moor, and yet phosphorous is so poisonous that, the dog licks itself all the time, one lick and its dead. But these stories are metaphorical. They’re extreme exercises in the imagination. They’re not concerned with these pettifogging details of which critics make too much.

Now, Murilo creeps into the garden and, horror of horrors, what does he find? He finds the dead body of the dog, and it looks as though it’s been savagely mauled in a way by something he doesn’t understand, by some weird thing or ape or monster. He then proceeds into the house and finds much of it wrecked. Nabonidus is nowhere to be seen, and one of his servants, Joka, has been murdered.

Suddenly he gets into the inner chamber of Nabonidus’ villa, which is modeled on a Renaissance palace essentially, and he sees the Red Priest, so named because he wears this red cowl, sitting on a throne, made of alabaster, and everything’s heavy and ornamental, a bit like those Cecil B. DeMille films from the ’30s, everything extraordinarily overdone and luxuriant. And he creeps up to Nabonidus to stab him, and the figure turns, and it’s a were-thing, or a monster, something of the imagination. It’s not human at all, simian rather than human. And Murilo faints, and then the story closes.

This story’s in three acts. Traditionally, like a lot of Western drama, like Dante’s Inferno, Purgatory, Paradise, you’ve got this three-pronged triadic element, the thesis, the antitheses, the synthesis at the end. So that’s the first part.

The second part is Murilo awakens in dungeons or interconnected corridors underneath Nabonidus’ house, manse, mansion. He crawls along a corridor and somebody hisses, and it’s Conan. He’s come into the house to murder Nabonidus because Murilo’s going to pay him, and because he’s a member of a cult that he dislikes and so on. Murilo scents his hair, like the young aristocrats of his era, and Conan’s senses are so acute that he detects that with his nostrils, and that’s the reason he doesn’t attack him in the darkness.

They both decide to, they swear loyalty to each other—don’t forget this is an oral culture where bonds and legal sanctions are expressed orally. Howard despised the element of modern life where people say anything they want just to get their own way at any particular time. In pre-modern, say Nordic societies, the oath or something which is given verbally with strength is as binding as any legal document ever could be, even more so.

Conan and Murilo proceed looking for Nabonidus. They come out into the body of the house, which as I said resembles just sort of Renaissance, Florentine palace, and they see Nabonidus stripped, semi-naked and wounded, in a neighboring corridor, and they wonder what has replaced him up inside the house.

And what has happened, as he in a dazed way explains once he returns to full consciousness, is that his servant, who’s this ape that he’s taken from one of the outlying countries in Howard’s imaginary kingdoms, has supplanted him as the master in the house. Howard, to a moderate degree, believed in science, believed in evolution, it was very much almost  a cult then, as was eugenics, and Thak as he’s called, this ape-man who wears the red because he’s supplanted the human he wanted to supplant, has thrown his master, Nabonidus, into the pit and has seized control of the house. Thak sits, waiting for them to come out of the pit because there’s a bell underneath there in the pits that they’ve crossed, a trap basically, and he knows humans are down there, and he’s waiting for them.

Nationalists emerge. There’s an interesting political element here, because Nabonidus is a very corrupt ruler and has the King in his thrall, so nationalists of the city-state—you could be a nationalist and of a city-state because it was the unit of civilization essentially, and a country would be city-states federated together. Attempts to assassinate Nabonidus in a way that Murilo wanted to, Thak deals with them. The story fast-forwards in a very filmic way, because Howard is a visualizer. The male brain is visual and always thinks in images. And these sorts of stories are extraordinarily cinematographical in their nature and their forward, pumping lucidity.

Thak senses that they’ve come up from under the ground, and there are interesting pseudo-scientific elements. The Red Priest, Nabonidus is a scientist and a mage and a magician combined. It’s Religion and the Decline of Magic in some ways if you view it academically. He has this construction of mirrors whereby from one room you can reflect light through tubes that contain small mirrors, and it ends up being able to look into another room, so you can actually look round corners, and they can see Thak, and he can see them.

Because he needs to dispose of the bodies of the nationalists who’ve come into the house, Thak disappears for a time, and Conan and the others seize their chance, and they go up. Nabonidus becomes terrified when all the doors are locked and he can’t find the weapons they need to fight against his servant who’s turned against him.

In the end, Conan has to face off against Thak in this quite extraordinarily violent scene. Howard was one of the most brilliant writers of physical force and conflict between men in the 20th century. There’s little doubt about that. It’s so immediate you’re almost there and it is essentially visual. Conan and Thak have this clash-of-the-gods-type of titanic duel with each other, much like a scene from Homer basically, Hector before the walls of Troy. Thak is done down in the end, and Conan, half-dead, is saluted by Murilo.

Nabonidus then tries to betray both of them, and Conan does for him, really, with a stool. He whips up a stool and throws it into his head, and he falls, and all Conan can say is, “His blood is red, not black,” because in the slums of the city they said the Red Priest’s blood was black because his heart was black, and Conan’s a barbarian and a literalist, you see. “His blood isn’t black.”

There’s an interesting moment when Conan is helped by Murilo because he’s so hurt and wounded in the fight with Thak, and he pushes Murilo aside and says, “A man walks alone. When you can’t stand up it’s time to perish.” That’s not an attitude you heard from the Blair government too often, is it? These are pre-modern attitudes, you see. As somebody on Radio 4 would say now, “But that’s a dangerously exclusionist notion. What about the ill, what about the weak?” And of course in that type of barbaric morality, the strong look after the weak, but only in an assent of being and natural law which is codified on the basis of the morality of strength. That’s what those sorts of civilizations thought and felt.

And the other interesting thing is that he looks down on Thak, this sort of beast, sort of man that he’s killed, and he says, “I didn’t kill a beast tonight, but a man! And my women will sing of him.” And there’s two cultural views of these sorts of things. One is to regard them as remarkable pieces of creative imagination. There is other is to sort of laugh and sneer at them, and think that they represent old-fashioned values that we’ve thankfully gotten rid of, or moved away from.

The stories, with the exception of the Kane stories, are all pre-Christian in the most radical of terms, and yet pre-liberal and liberal secular, which of course in the modern West is what’s replaced Christianity. I would say that contemporary Catholicism is rather like the Protestantism of yesteryear, and Protestantism has become liberalism, and liberalism has morphed, strangely, without the Protestantism that gave it a moral compass, into a form of cultural Marxism, and that’s what we have now.

And yet Howard’s stories are very, very interesting and very dynamic and very much appeal to an imaginative element in certainly a lot of men. The belief in self-definition, the belief in the heroic as a model for life, the belief in strength but with an honor code that saves it from wanton exercise in strength without purpose, and the beliefs that one is part of even a tribe or a community.

In the stories, Conan’s a Cimmerian. He’s from a northern group. He’s always introduced, he’s only got one name, he’s so primal, he doesn’t have any other names. Conan. Like Heathcliff in Wuthering Heights, he only had one name. Heathcliff, he doesn’t need any other names. He’s just a force, you see? A force of the female imagination, which is what he is. And in a strange way, the way in which he’s described in that novel by Emily Brontë is very similar to the way Conan’s described, but Conan’s a bit more beefed out, a bit more muscular.

Many films have been made, many TV series have been made, there’s a Conan industry in the 20th century. What Howard would have thought of all that no one knows. He’s there, possibly on a slightly lower tier, but with Tarzan and Doctor Who and James Bond and these other iconic sort of mass popular fantasy figures. Yet in all of them, certainly in this sort of material, there’s a truth to experience, there’s a vividness, there’s a cinematographical and representational reality, and there’s a concern with courage, masculinity, and the heroic which is lacking from most areas of society, and there’s also an honor code, a primitive morality if you like, which goes with it and gives it efficacy and purpose.

The other thing which he differentiates in this type of literature is respect for the enemy. When Terre’Blanche was murdered, I noticed liberals on the BBC giggling and sort of laughing and thinking it was all a jolly joke. These are people who are against the death penalty and believe that murder’s a terrible infraction against human rights, jurisprudence, and all the rest of it. But the sort of cultural space that this work comes out of respects the enemy. Kills the enemy, respects the enemy, which of course is a soldier’s emotion. Many who’ve fought in wars don’t disrespect the enemy. They know what they’re like. British soldiers who’ve fought in the Falklands, American soldiers who’ve fought against Islamist militants, and even some of the militants themselves when they’ve fought against Western warriors, understand the code of the soldier and the code of the warrior on the other side. But many of these men are spiritually, fundamentally similar men in a way, born in other groups.

Men will always fight with each other, and they’re biologically prone to do so. How, in an era of mass weapons of destructive warfare, some existing and others not, that is to be worked through. It is a part of the destiny of the relationship between groups and states. But the hard-wiring that makes men competitive and egotistical and conflict-oriented is ineradicable and irreducible, and modern liberal societies which are based upon the idea of inclusionist love without thought of conflict are sentimental to the point that they will fall apart, bedeviled by their endless contradictions.

And I personally think that if you inculcate yourself, with a bit of irony and estrangement, from some of the elements of the culture of the heroic that certainly subsisted as mainstream cultural fare in our society before 1950, you have a different attitude towards what spews out of the telly every evening, and you have a different attitude towards the sort of culture that you’re living in, and you have a different attitude towards great figures in your own group and even in others, and you have a different attitude towards yourself and the future.

I give you Robert Ervin Howard, 1906 to 1936, a man who walked alone but spoke for an element, not just of America, but what it is to be white, male, Western, and free.

Thank you very much.


Article printed from Counter-Currents Publishing: http://www.counter-currents.com

URL to article: http://www.counter-currents.com/2013/05/robert-e-howard-and-the-heroic/

URLs in this post:

[1] Image: http://www.counter-currents.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/RobertEHoward2.jpg

[2] YouTube: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1ucBGENZjnM

[3] Pulp Fascism: http://www.counter-currents.com/2013/04/forthcoming-from-counter-currents-pulp-fascism/

[4] editor@counter-currents.com: mailto:editor@counter-currents.com

mercredi, 15 mai 2013

Lyon: Conférence de Tomislav Sunic


Lyon, 25 mai: Conférence de Tomislav Sunic

mardi, 07 mai 2013

Machiavelli & the Conservative Revolution


Machiavelli & the Conservative Revolution

By Dominique Venner

Ex: http://www.counter-currents.com/

Translated by Greg Johnson

Borne along by the French Spring, the Conservative Revolution is in fashion. One of its most brilliant theorists deserves to be remembered, even if his name has long been maligned. Indeed it is scarcely flattering to be described as “Machiavellesque” if not “Machiavellian.” It can be seen as an aspersion of cynicism and deceit. 

And yet what led Niccolò Machiavelli to write the most famous and the most outrageous of his works, The Prince, was love and concern for his fatherland, Italy. It was published in 1513, exactly 500 years ago, just like Albrecht Dürer’s “The Knight, Death, and the Devil [2].” A fertile time! In the early years of the 16th century, Machiavelli was nevertheless the only one to worry about Italy, the “geographical entity,” as Metternich later said. Then, one cared about Naples, Genoa, Rome, Florence, Milan, and Venice, but nobody cared about Italy. This had to wait a good three centuries. This proves that we should never despair. The prophets always preach in the wilderness before their dreams reach the unpredictable waiting crowds. We and some others believe in a Europe that exists only in our creative memory.

Born in Florence in 1469, died in 1527, Niccolò Machiavelli was a high official and diplomat. His missions introduced him to the grand politics of his time. What he learned, and what he suffered for his patriotism, prompted him to reflect on the art of conducting public affairs. Life had enrolled him in the school of great upheavals. He was 23 years old when Lorenzo the Magnificent died in 1492. The same year, the ambitious and voluptuous Alexander VI Borgia became Pope. He swiftly made one of his sons, Cesare (at that time, the popes cared little for chastity), a very young cardinal and then the Duke of Valentinois thanks to the king of France. This Cesare, gripped by a terrible ambition, cared nothing about means. Despite his failures, his ardor fascinated Machiavelli.

But I anticipate. In 1494 came a huge event that would change Italy for a long time. Charles VIII, the ambitious young king of France, made ​​his famous “descent,” i.e., an attempt at conquest that upset the balance of the peninsula. After being well-received in Florence, Rome, and Naples, Charles VIII then met with resistance and was forced to retreat, leaving a terrible chaos. It was not finished. His cousin and successor, Charles XII, came back in 1500, this time for longer, until Francis I became king. Meanwhile, Florence was plunged into civil war, and Italy was devastated by condottieri greedy for loot.

Appalled, Machiavelli observed the damage. He was indignant at the impotence of the Italians. From his reflections arose The Prince in 1513, the famous political treatise written thanks to its author’s disgrace. The argument, with a compelling logic, seeks to convert the reader. The method is historical. It is based on the confrontation between the past and the present. Machiavelli stated his belief that men and things do not change. This is why the Florentine councilor continues to speak to us Europeans.

Following the Ancients–his models–he believes Fortune (chance), represented by a woman balancing on an unstable wheel, rules half of human actions. But she leaves, he says, the other half ruled by the virtues (qualities of manly boldness and energy). Machiavelli calls for men of action and teaches them how to govern well. Symbolized by the lion, force is the primary means to conquer or maintain a state. But one must also have the cunning of the fox. In reality, one must be both lion and fox. “We must be a fox to avoid traps and a lion to frighten wolves” (The Prince, ch. 18). Hence his praise, devoid of any moral prejudice, of Alexander VI Borgia, who “never did anything, and never thought of doing anything, other than deceiving people and always found a way to do so” (The Prince, ch. 18). However, it is in the son of this curious pope, Cesare Borgia, that Machiavelli saw the incarnation of the Prince according to his wishes, able “to win by force or fraud” (The Prince. ch. 7).

Placed on the Index by the Church, accused of impiety and atheism, Machiavelli actually had a complex attitude vis-à-vis religion. Certainly not devout, he nevertheless went along with its practices but without abdicating he critical freedom. In his Discourses on the First Ten Books of Titus Livy, drawing lessons from ancient history, he questioned which religion best suits the health of the state: “Our religion has placed the highest good in humility and contempt for human affairs. The other [Roman religion] placed it in the greatness of soul, bodily strength, and all other things that make men strong. If our religion requires that we have strength, it is only to be more capable of suffering heavy things. This way of life seems to have weakened the world, making it easy prey for evil men” (Discourses, Book II, ch. 2). Machiavelli does not risk religious reflection, but only a political reflection on religion, concluding: “I prefer my fatherland to my soul.”

Source: http://www.dominiquevenner.fr/2013/04/machiavel-et-la-revolution-conservatrice/ [3]

Article printed from Counter-Currents Publishing: http://www.counter-currents.com

URL to article: http://www.counter-currents.com/2013/05/machiavelli-and-the-conservative-revolution/

URLs in this post:

[1] Image: http://www.counter-currents.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/machiavellistatue.jpg

[2] The Knight, Death, and the Devil: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Knight,_Death_and_the_Devil

[3] http://www.dominiquevenner.fr/2013/04/machiavel-et-la-revolution-conservatrice/: http://www.dominiquevenner.fr/2013/04/machiavel-et-la-revolution-conservatrice/

dimanche, 28 avril 2013

1979: l'émission de Bernard Pivot qui a lancé la "nouvelle droite"

1979: l'émission de Bernard Pivot qui a lancé la "nouvelle droite"

jeudi, 25 avril 2013

La radicalité contre la dictature des minorités !...

La radicalité contre la dictature des minorités !...


Nous reproduisons ci-dessous un point de vue de Jean-Yves Le Gallou, cueilli sur Polémia et consacré au mouvement populaire et à sa nécessaire radicalisation s'il veut pouvoir ébranler les minorités qui nous gouvernent...

Jean-Yves Le Gallou dirige la fondation Polémia et a récemment publié aux éditions Via Romana un essai percutant intitulé La tyrannie médiatique.


La radicalité contre la dictature des minorités

Chaud, chaud, chaud ! Le printemps sera chaud. Car les majorités se révoltent contre la dictature des minorités.

Minorités sexuelles

Il y a, selon l’INSEE, 100.000 couples homosexuels en France, soit 0,3% de la population ; et 10.000 enfants – 0,003% de la population – vivent au domicile de ces couples homosexuels. Une minorité de ces minorités réclame qu’on change des règles multimillénaires pour les adapter à leur situation individuelle ou à leurs caprices. Il est normal que cela suscite une forte exaspération des majorités ! En vérité les homosexuels devraient être reconnaissants aux familles traditionnelles qui défilent contre la dénaturation du mariage : ce sont leurs enfants qui paieront leurs retraites…

Minorités associatives subventionnées 

Les associations LGBT, minorité agissante de la minorité revendicative des minorités sexuelles, veulent régenter le débat public. Au nom de la lutte contre une prétendue « homophobie », il s’agit d’interdire toute prise de position jugée politiquement incorrecte ; en fait, d’empêcher toute critique du mariage homosexualiste à l’image de ce qu’ont réussi les associations « antiracistes » censurant tout débat sur l’immigration. Le tout avec l’argent des contribuables. C’est insupportable au pays de Voltaire.

Minorités ethniques et religieuses

Elles cherchent à imposer dans l’espace public comme dans l’espace privé leurs exigences vestimentaires et leurs interdits alimentaires : refus du porc, abattage hallal pour tous – ce qui suscite la réaction des amis des bêtes et de la France profonde. C’est à Guéret, dans la Creuse, qu’on se mobilise contre la construction d’un abattoir hallal voulu au nom de médiocres intérêts commerciaux, quoique contraire à la loi européenne, aux traditions françaises et à la sécurité sanitaire.

Minorités financières

Elles imposent des réglementations conformes à leurs intérêts mais non à l’intérêt général. Quand les banques, les grandes entreprises et les hyper-riches échappent à l’impôt (tout en bénéficiant des infrastructures techniques, des services publics et des systèmes de protection sociale des Etats), ce sont les classes moyennes qui payent. Ces classes moyennes sont doublement victimes : des excès de l’Etat-providence qu’ils payent mais aussi de la finance-providence qui échappe à l’impôt.

Minorités médiatiques

Moins de 50.000 journalistes, qui informent de moins en moins et qui conditionnent de plus en plus ; qui ne cherchent pas à distinguer l’exact de l’inexact, ni le vrai du faux, mais qui prétendent dire où est le « bien », où le « mal », en louant les « gentils » et en dénonçant les « méchants ». Avec un grand sens de l’à-propos, les personnes manifestant le 28 mars devant France Télévision, protégée par les forces de l’ordre, criaient : « CRS, retourne-toi, la racaille est derrière toi ! » Sans commentaire.

Minorités parlementaires

Moins de 1.000 personnes prétendent avoir le monopole de la fabrication de la loi sans tenir compte du peuple. C’est, certes, la logique de la démocratie représentative mais celle-ci est, hélas, de moins en moins représentative :

-En raison des lois et du calendrier électoral, une partie importante de l’opinion n’est pas représentée ; et les socialistes qui ont, à eux seuls, la majorité de l’Assemblée nationale n’ont recueilli que 16% des électeurs inscrits, lors du premier tour des élections législatives de juin 2012. Un peu court comme majorité pour transformer un homme en femme !

-Le Sénat a voté le projet de loi Taubira à la sauvette. Une loi dont la garde des Sceaux a dit qu’elle portait un « changement de civilisation » mais dont, faute de scrutin public, on ne sait pas individuellement qui l’a votée et qui l’a refusée. Un formidable déni de démocratie voulu par tous les groupes politiques de la majorité comme de l’opposition. Une belle manœuvre qui permet de faire adopter la loi, qui autorise les sénateurs à se faire passer pour « progressistes » auprès des médias parisiens tout en leur permettant individuellement de dire à leurs électeurs d’outre-mer ou des campagnes françaises qu’ils n’ont pas approuvé le « mariage gay ». Belle manœuvre, vraiment, mais qui indigne à juste titre les adversaires de la loi Taubira et tous les démocrates sincères.

-Plus généralement, les hommes politiques les plus en vue représentent de moins en moins leurs électeurs car ce sont des médiagogues, des hommes et des femmes qui cherchent à plaire aux médias plus qu’au peuple, à coups de surenchère politiquement correcte. Telle est la principale cause du discrédit de la démocratie représentative.

Or toutes ces minorités se tiennent et se soutiennent. C’est contre elles que la révolte gronde. Moins d’un an après l’élection de François Hollande la probabilité d’une crise politique majeure est devant nous : la dissolution de l’Assemblée nationale ou la démission du président de la République ne changeraient pas grand-chose. Ce qu’il faut c’est rendre la parole au peuple. Par le référendum d’initiative populaire national et local. A partir de la demande de 500.000 électeurs au plan national et ce sans censure prétendument constitutionnelle. A partir de 7,5% des électeurs au niveau local, sous la seule réserve qu’il s’agisse d’une délibération locale. Bien sûr, ceci devrait s’accompagner d’un rétablissement de la liberté d’expression, de l’arrêt des subventions aux grands lobbys politiquement corrects et du retour au pluralisme des médias.

Le printemps français doit trouver un débouché politique autour de thèmes forts : référendum et démocratie directe ; liberté d’expression et pluralisme des médias ; dénonciation de la dictature des minorités et respect de la majorité populaire. Quant aux manifestants ils ne doivent pas avoir peur de la radicalité car seule la radicalité s’attaque aux racines du mal et propose un ressourcement créateur.

 Jean-Yves Le Gallou (Polémia, 14 avril 2013)

mardi, 23 avril 2013

How are Revolutions Born?


How are Revolutions Born?

By Dominique Venner 

Ex: http://www.counter-currents.com/

Translated by Greg Johnson

The birth of revolutions is a fascinating, quite relevant, and little-known topic. It was studied by the sociologist Jules Monnerot (1908–1995) after the French events of May 1968 in his book Sociologie de la Révolution [Sociology of Revolution] (Paris: Fayard, 1969). A valuable work for which the author has forged a series of concepts applicable to all situations.

As a sociological study and not one in the history of ideas, Monnerot uses one term, “revolution”—without, of course, ignoring all that separates and opposes the various revolutions of the 20th century:  Bolshevism, Italian Fascism, German National Socialism, the French revolutions of 1944 or 1968. Indeed, he applies the same sociological analysis to these mass phenomena while making a clear distinction between conservative revolutions and deconstructive revolutions.

To begin, Monnerot defines some concepts applicable to any revolution. Firstly, the “historical situation“: it is one we’ll never see twice. This is true for 1789, 1917, 1922, 1933, or 1968. Another complementary notion: the “situation of distress.” It is characterized by uncontrolled disturbances. The social structure is defeated: the elements are no longer in place.

When a society is stable, we can distinguish normal (“homogeneous“) and marginal (“heterogeneous“) social elements. Marginal elements are marginal because they are maintained by the pressure of “homogeneous” elements. When a critical threshold of upheaval is reached, the homogeneous part begins to dissociate. Chaos then becomes contagious.

An interesting observation that applies to conservative revolutions: “the homogeneous, even in dissociation, remains homogeneous.” When the upheaval is radical, “the very foundation of society mounts a demand for power.” Fascism, in 1922 or 1933, for example, was a response to this demand in a highly developed society (industry, science, culture). In such a society, when order collapsed, the conservative elements (homogeneous) become temporarily revolutionary in their desire for order and demanded power.

How do we arrive at a “revolutionary situation“? Monnerot’s synthetic response: deficiency at the top. A regime crisis is characterized by a “plurality of conflicts.” Any exception to the authority of those in power, and disorder becomes endemic. The society “boils over.”

This effervescence is not revolution. It is a phase, a time, with a beginning and an end (a cooling down) when the medium “is no longer combustible.” When the excitement dies down, the same people are not in command (Robespierre was replaced by Napoleon, Trotsky by Stalin, Mussolini by Balbo).

The revolutionary and turbulent condition involves the “masses.” These are momentary coagulations, troops of revolution. To lead the masses, to give them a nervous system, the Jacobins and Lenin (much more efficiently) developed the instrument of the party.

What Leninists called “the radicalization of the masses” is a tendency to politicize those hitherto conformist and little inclined to be passionate about the public good (those who above all ask the state to do the job of the state). When it enters a phase of turmoil, “society is traversed in all directions intense emotional reactions, like iron filings in a magnetic current.”

Situations of distress bring to the fore violent elites: the “subversive heterogenes,” the irregular and marginal that the customary barriers cannot stop. They give the movement the force to break through.

In a revolutionary situation, the painful lack and need of power can force social elements that aspire to order down the road to revolution. “A time comes when the Arditi or young Baltic lancers,[1] previously regarded as reprobates, appear more reassuring than worrisome to the most homogeneous part of the population. They seem to embody, through misfortune, the values ​​of courage, bravery, and character without which there is no great country. . . . Even those who are not supporters think they should be allowed to try.” This is a good summary of exceptional historical situations. But, as Monnerot specified, the “historical situation” is that which never arises twice.

In the France of 2013, we are entering a “historical situation”? Not yet, surely. But there are signs that it may head toward such an unforeseen situation. Will it be all that it promises? It is too early to say. But nothing is impossible.

Source: http://www.dominiquevenner.fr/2013/04/comment-naissent-les-revolution/ [2]

Translator’s Note

1. The Arditi were the Italian shock troops of the First World War, many of whom became Fascist Blackshirts. Baltic lancers probably refer to the German Freikorps veterans who played a similar role in the National Socialist movement. I wish to thank Robert Steuckers for clarifying the latter point. If Monnerot is alluding to a specific individual, please email me at: editor@counter-currents.com.


Article printed from Counter-Currents Publishing: http://www.counter-currents.com

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[1] Image: http://www.counter-currents.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/franceprotest.jpg

[2] http://www.dominiquevenner.fr/2013/04/comment-naissent-les-revolution/: http://www.dominiquevenner.fr/2013/04/comment-naissent-les-revolution/

vendredi, 19 avril 2013

Comment naissent les révolutions?


Dominique VENNER:

Comment naissent les révolutions?

C’est un sujet passionnant, très actuel et mal connu que la naissance des révolutions. Il avait été étudié par le sociologue Jules Monnerot (1908-1995) après les événements français de Mai 68 dans son livre Sociologie de la Révolution (Fayard, 1969). Travail précieux pour lequel son auteur a forgé une série de concepts applicables à toutes les situations.

S’agissant d’une étude sociologique et non d’une histoire des idées, Monnerot use d’une seule appellation, sans ignorer bien entendu tout ce qui sépare et oppose les différentes révolutions du XXe siècle, bolchevisme, fascisme italien, national-socialisme allemand, révolution de 1944, ou celle de 1968. Il estime en effet que ces phénomènes de foule relèvent de la même analyse sociologique, tout en faisant une nette différence entre révolutions de type conservatrice et révolutions déconstructrices.

Mais d’abord, Monnerot définit quelques concepts applicables à toute révolution. En premier lieu la « situation historique ». Elle est celle que l’on ne reverra jamais deux fois. C’est vrai pour 1789, 1917, 1922, 1933 ou 1968. Autre notion complémentaire : la « situation de détresse ». Elle se caractérise par des troubles non maîtrisés. La structure sociale se défait : les éléments ne sont plus à leur place.

Quand une société est stable, on y distingue des éléments sociaux normaux (« homogènes ») et des marginaux (« hétérogènes »). Les éléments marginaux sont en marge parce qu’ils y sont maintenus par la pression des éléments « homogènes ». Lorsqu’un seuil critique de bouleversement est atteint, la partie homogène commence à se dissocier. On observe alors comme une contagion de chaos.

Remarque intéressante qui s’applique aux révolutions conservatrices : « l’homogène, même en voie de dissociation, reste l’homogène ». Quand le bouleversement est radical, « du fond même de la société monte une demande de pouvoir ». Le fascisme, en 1922 ou 1933, fut par exemple une réponse à cette demande dans une société ayant un haut développement (industrie, sciences, culture). Dans une telle société, quand l’ordre s’est effondré, les éléments conservateurs (homogènes) deviennent provisoirement révolutionnaires par aspiration à l’ordre et demande de pouvoir.

Comment aboutit-on à une « situation révolutionnaire » ? Réponse synthétique de Monnerot : par carence au sommet. Une crise de régime se caractérise par une « pluralité des conflits ». Tout échappe à l’autorité du pouvoir en place, le désordre devient endémique. La société entre en « effervescence ».

L’effervescence n’est pas la révolution. Elle en est une phase, un moment, avec un début et une fin (un refroidissement) quand le milieu « n’est plus combustible ». Quand l’effervescence retombe, ce ne sont plus les mêmes qui sont aux commandes (Robespierre a été remplacé par Napoléon, Trotski par Staline, Balbo par Mussolini).

Situation révolutionnaire et effervescence font intervenir les « masses ». Ce sont des coagulations momentanées, les troupes des révolutions. Pour diriger les masses, leur donner un système nerveux, les jacobins, puis Lénine (en beaucoup plus efficace) ont conçu l’instrument du parti.

Ce que les léninistes appelaient « la radicalisation des masses », est une tendance à la politisation de catégories jusque-là conformistes et peu enclines à se passionner pour la chose publique (elles demandent surtout à l’État de faire son métier d’État). On entre alors dans une phase d’effervescence, « la société est parcourue en tous sens de réactions affectives intenses, comme les grains de limaille de fer par un courant magnétique ».

Les situations de détresse font apparaître sur le devant de la scène des élites violentes : les « hétérogènes subversifs », des irréguliers et marginaux que les barrières habituelles n’arrêtent pas. Ils contribuent à donner au mouvement sa force de rupture.

Dans une situation révolutionnaire, la carence et le besoin douloureux du pouvoir, peuvent jeter sur la voie de la révolution des éléments sociaux qui n’aspirent qu’à l’ordre. « Une heure vient où les Arditi, les jeunes lansquenets du Baltikum, les réprouvés qui le sont de moins en moins, n’apparaissent plus inquiétants, mais rassurants à la partie la plus homogène de la population. Ils semblent incarner à travers le malheur les valeurs de courage, de bravoure  et de caractère sans quoi il n’est pas de grand pays… Même ceux qui ne sont pas leurs partisans pensent qu’il faut laisser faire l’expérience. » C’est un bon résumé des situations historiques d’exception. Mais, comme le précise Monnerot, la « situation historique » est celle que l’on ne revoit jamais deux fois.

Dans la France de 2013, sommes-nous entrés dans une « situation historique » ? Pas encore, bien entendu. Mais des signes attestent que l’on peut se diriger vers une telle situation imprévue. Ira-t-elle jusqu’au bout de ses promesses ? Il est trop tôt pour se prononcer. Mais rien n’est impossible.

Dominique Venner

jeudi, 18 avril 2013

“They’re All Rotten!”


“They’re All Rotten!”

By Dominique Venner

Translated by Greg Johnson

Ex: http://www.counter-currents.com/

This exclamation is probably a bit simplistic, but it sums up the feeling of revulsion spreading today throughout the fair country of France. When taxes were being raised to benefit various electoral constituencies, explosive revelations about the corruption of the minister in charge forced back the increase. This lovely scandal added to the rising anger of a large segment of the public against a clear intent to destroy them, as evidenced by mass immigration policy or the legalization of gay marriage.

Corruption and embezzlement by people in power, the politicians or officials of a bloated administration, is nothing new. Whole libraries have been devoted to the scandals of the successive republics. However, the Fifth Republic has broken all records since it was founded by General de Gaulle, a man of integrity who loved to be surrounded by rogues. It is not just that the temptations became more numerous, fueled by new financial powers granted to elected officials and huge windfalls to administrations, unions, and associations for this or that. No, there was something else.

The reasons for public corruption are manifold. Some are historical. I happen to remember that in the purge trials in the High Court, after 1945, against the ministers of the French State, otherwise known as the Vichy regime, it was impossible to identify a single case of enrichment through fraud or corruption, despite the strenuous efforts of investigators.[1] The men who held power then were certainly criticized in many ways, but, in general, they were imbued with a sense of almost military duty to their country trapped in a situation of extreme distress. No doubt they also knew they were being watched by the large surveillance corps established by the State. The idea of ​​duty then evaporated in many of their successors, who without doubt profited from the real or supposed dangers they faced during the war years.

But, since I wish to invoke the mindset, i.e. the “representations” that we all know exist and determine our behavior, we must surely dig deeper.

Europe since earliest antiquity has always been ruled by the idea that each individual is inseparable from his community, clan, tribe, people, city, empire, to which he is linked by a bond more sacred than life itself. This unquestioned belief, of which the Iliad offers the oldest and most poetic expression, took various forms. Think of the worship of ancestors for whom the city owed its existence, or the loyalty to the prince who was its visible expression.

The first threat was introduced by the individualism of early Christianity. The idea of ​​a personal god emancipated men from the hitherto unquestioned authority of ethnic gods of the city. Yet the Church itself reimposed the idea that the individual will could not order things as it pleased.

Yet the seed of a spiritual revolution had been sown. It reappeared unexpectedly in the religious individualism of the Reformation. In the following century, the rationalist idea of absolute individualism was developed forcefully by Descartes (“I think, therefore, I am”). The philosopher also made central the biblical idea of ​​man as the master and possessor of nature. No doubt, in Cartesian thought, man was subject to the laws of God, but God set a very bad example. Unlike the ancient gods, He was not dependent on a natural order anterior and superior to him. He was the single all-powerful and arbitrary creator of all things, of life and nature itself, according to His sole discretion. If this God was a creator free of all limits, then why not man, who is made his image, as well?

Set in motion by the scientific revolution of the 17th and 18th centuries, this idea has no known limits. In it lies what we call “modernity.” This idea assumes that man is his own creator and he can recreate the world as he pleases. There is no other principle than the will and pleasure of each individual. Consequently, the legitimacy of a society no longer depends on its compliance with the eternal laws of the ethnos. It depends only on the momentary consent of individual wills. In other words, society is legitimate only as a contract resulting from a free agreement between parties who are pursuing their own advantage.[2]

If self-interest is the sole basis of the social compact, there is nothing to prevent us from satisfying our interests and appetites, including by filling our pockets if the opportunity is offered by our position. All the more so, given that market society, through advertising, tells us that we are obligated to enjoy ourselves, indeed, that we exist only to enjoy ourselves.

Still, despite this individualistic and materialistic logic, we have long maintained communal ties of birth and fatherland and all the obligations these imply. These ties have been progressively destroyed across Europe in the decades following World War II, while the triumphant consumer society arrived from the United States. Like other European countries, France has gradually ceased to be a nation (based on nationality, common birth) to become an aggregate of individuals united by their pleasures or the ideas they have of their interests. The former obligation to “serve” has been replaced by the general temptation to “serve oneself.” This is the logical consequence of the principle that founds society solely on human rights, thus on each individual’s interests.

And now, before our eyes, this repulsive logic faces a revolt from the depths. We are witnessing the unexpected awakening of all those who, through atavistic reflexes, feel deep down that unquestionable ancestry is what make a clan, a people, or a nation.


1. See my Histoire de la Collaboration [History of the Collaboration] (Paris: Pygmalion, 2002).

2. Rousseau understood that this was the fault of the social contract. He sought to remedy it by justifying the use of force to compel the reluctant to submit to a problematic “general will.”

Source: http://www.dominiquevenner.fr/2013/04/tous-pourris/ [2]

Article printed from Counter-Currents Publishing: http://www.counter-currents.com

URL to article: http://www.counter-currents.com/2013/04/theyre-all-rotten/

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Systemverbesserung oder Systemüberwindung?

Ob schwarz oder rot, Politiker seien immer das gleiche Gesindel, soll Thomas Bernhard gemeint haben. Dieser Meinung scheinen sich, und zwar nicht allein auf die beiden Erwähnten bezogen, immer mehr aufgeklärte Bürger angeschlossen zu haben.                

Fest steht, den traditionellen Parteien steht das Wasser unterschiedlich bis zum Hals, und ob sie auf ihrer bisherigen Erfolgswelle weiter schwimmen können, wird schon der nächste Herbst zeigen, darf aber stark bezweifelt werden.

Die Gunst der Stunde nützen daher immer mehr Initiativen und Neugründungen, über deren Chancen zumindest in zwei Fällen, dem des Team Stronach in Österreich und dem der Alternative für Deutschland, (ADL) sich schon Zuverlässigeres über deren Chancen sagen ließe. Interessanterweise läßt sich bei beiden Neugründungen neben Demokratiefreundlichkeit und rechtsstaatlicher Reformbereitschaft eine nicht unwesentliche ökonomielastige Orientierung und Motivation erkennen.

Wie weit nun diese beiden und andere Mitbewerber auch wieder nur Partikularinteressen vertreten, könnte sich noch in aller Klarheit zeigen. Aber unabhängig davon ist natürlich jede Neubelebung des politischen Lagers zu begrüßen. Die traditionellen Parteien haben ausgedient, sind ermattet und orientierungslos. Schlimmer noch: sie sind in ihrem weltanschaulichen Kern derart geschwächt, so daß ihnen der Antriebsstoff im Inneren abhanden gekommen ist.

Nun scheint es aber so zu sein, daß der eine oder andere Neo-Parteiführer alles andere als ein erfahrenre politischer Kämpe ist, schon gar nicht ein solcher, der gesamtgesellschaftliche Anstöße im Sinne einer  neuen weltanschaulichen Richtung vorgeben möchte oder könnte.

Wie gesagt, scheint es so. Dazu wäre außerdem, wie zuletzt zwei Beispiele in Österreich gezeigt haben, eine höhere  Kunst der Integrationsleistung erforderlich., was Geld oder Großsprech allein auf Dauer gewiß nicht schaffen können.

Ob es außerdem, wie in einem Fall, genügt, zur Balance und Bündelung einige selbstverständliche moralische oder sonstige Werte als strategischen Punkt voranzustellen? Daß es zwei oder drei entscheidenden Botschaften bedarf, um eine Partei nach vorne zu bringen, ist schon klar. Sind diese aber stark genug um bruchsichere parteiinterne Integration und anhaltende Bindungen zu schaffen? Und wenn, mit welchem gesamtgesellschaftlichem Ziel?

Die Zielfrage des politischen Einsatzes hat jedenfalls mehr zu sein als den EURO in Frage zu stellen oder abzulehnen, hat sogar mehr zu sein als dem Nationalstaat wieder mehr Kompetenzen zu verschaffen. Beides ist wichtig, sogar sehr wichtig, es könnte sich aber an einem entscheidenden Punkt als nicht genügend genug erweisen, dem der Systemfrage. Diese in inhaltlicher wie auch organisatorischer Hinsicht.

Das ist nämlich des Pudels Kern: Wenn, wie Frank Stronach meint, und ich denke bei der ADL wird es ähnlich sein, es nur darum geht „zu einer Systemverbesserung beizutragen“, dann wird eben am Ende gerade jenes System effizienter gemacht und am Leben erhalten, daß uns als Volk und Gesellschaft an den Rand des Abgrundes geführt hat. Also gewissermaßen nicht Systemüberwindung, sondern Systemrettung als Ziel?

Wer aber in der Sackgasse steckt, dem nützt eine Kurskorrektur nicht, er muß umkehren. Er muß die Ursachen einer ganz allgemeinen Fehlentwicklung aufspüren und beseitigen versuchen, die Probleme an der Wurzel anpacken und dazu natürlich  in größeren Zusammenhängen und Zeiträumen denken können.                                         

Spektakuläre Einzelmaßnahmen und spezielle politische Dienstleistungen im Interesse der Verursacher der Krise, die ja in Wirklichkeit total ist,  hielt ich für wenig sinnvoll und noch weniger wünschenswert.

Am Ende des Tages harrt die eine Frage einer Beantwortung: Welches Österreich? Welches Deutschland? Schlaraffenland für Spekulanten, Abzocker, Kriminelle und Scheinasylanten? Spielwiese der Globalisierer? Multikulti-Paradies nach Geschmack rot-grüner oder liberaler Weltverbesserer? Oder souveräner Nationalstaat als Wahrer und Garant kultureller wie nationaler Identität, von am Gemeinwohl orientierter ökosozialer Volkswirtschaft, nicht zuletzt von Rede- und Meinungsfreiheit?                                                                                                                              

Ein solcher, freier und unabhängiger Staat, der bereit ist, in der Besinnung auf die Wurzeln und geschichtlichen Grundlagen der eigenen wie auch der anderen nationalen Kulturen Europas alle geistigen und menschlichen Kräfte für eine wahre europäische Gemeinschaft in einem revolutionärem Ruck  zu mobilisieren, ist gefragt. Von den Neuen auch erwünscht?  Wer den schaffen will, der sollte es laut und deutlich sagen.  Der Glaubwürdigkeit wegen.

lundi, 15 avril 2013

Tous pourris!


Tous pourris!

par Dominique Venner

Ex: http://zentropaville.tumblr.com/

L’exclamation est un peu facile sans doute, mais elle résume le sentiment d’écœurement nauséeux qui se répand ces temps-ci dans le beau pays de France. Tandis que s’alourdissaient les impôts en faveur de diverses clientèles électorales, explosaient les révélations sur la corruption du ministre chargé de faire rentrer de force ces impôts. Ce joli scandale s’ajoutait à la colère montante d’une large fraction de l’opinion devant une évidente volonté de détruire, dont témoignent la politique d’immigration massive ou le projet de mariage gay.

La corruption et les malversations des gens de pouvoir, politiciens ou agents d’une administration pléthorique, n’est pas une nouveauté. Des bibliothèques entières ont été consacrées aux « affaires » des républiques successives, la Vème ayant cependant battu tous les records depuis sa fondation par le général de Gaulle, un homme intègre qui aimait s’entourer de coquins. Ce n’est pas seulement que les tentations étaient devenues plus nombreuses, alimentées par de nouveaux pouvoirs financiers accordés aux élus et par l’énorme pactole des administrations, syndicats et associations d’aide à ceci ou à cela. Non, il y avait autre chose.

Les raisons de la corruption publique sont multiples. Certaines sont historiques. Il m’est arrivé de rappeler que, lors des procès d’épuration en Haute Cour, après 1945, à l’encontre des ministres de l’État français, autrement appelé régime de Vichy, il fut impossible de relever un seul cas d’enrichissement frauduleux ou de corruption, en dépit des efforts d’enquêteurs acharnés (1). Les hommes qui ont alors exercé le pouvoir  étaient certainement critiquables à de multiples égards, mais, dans l’ensemble, ils étaient imprégnés par une idée presque militaire du devoir à l’égard de leur pays prisonnier d’une situation d’extrême détresse. Sans doute savaient-ils aussi qu’ils étaient surveillés par les grands corps de l’État restés en place. L’idée du devoir s’est ensuite évaporée chez beaucoup de leurs successeurs qui entendaient sans doute rentabiliser les périls réels ou supposés des années de guerre.

Mais, puisque je viens d’invoquer les mentalités, autrement dit les “représentations” que chacun se fait de l’existence et qui conditionnent la façon de se comporter, il faut certainement creuser plus loin encore.

En Europe, depuis l’Antiquité la plus ancienne, avait toujours dominé l’idée que chaque individu était inséparable de sa communauté, clan, tribu, peuple, cité, empire, à laquelle il était lié par un lien plus sacré que la vie elle-même. Cette conscience indiscutée, dont l’Iliade offre la plus ancienne et poétique expression, prenait des formes diverses. On songe au culte des ancêtres à qui la cité devait son existence, ou encore à la loyauté pour le prince qui en était l’expression visible. Une première menace fut introduite par l’individualisme du christianisme primitif. L’idée d’un dieu personnel permettait de s’émanciper de l’autorité jusque-là indiscutée des dieux ethniques de la cité. Pourtant, imposée par l’Église, la conviction se reconstitua qu’aucune volonté particulière ne pouvait ordonner les choses à son gré.

Pourtant le germe d’une révolution spirituelle avait été semé. Il réapparut de façon imprévue avec l’individualisme religieux de la Réforme. Au siècle suivant, se développa l’idée rationaliste d’un individualisme absolu développée avec force par Descartes (« je pense donc je suis »). Le philosophe faisait sienne également l’ancienne idée biblique de l’homme possesseur et maître de la nature. Sans doute, dans la pensée cartésienne, l’homme était-il soumis aux lois de Dieu, mais ce dernier avait donné un fort mauvais exemple. Contrairement aux dieux antiques, il n’était dépendant d’aucun ordre naturel antérieur et supérieur à lui. Il était l’unique créateur tout puissant et arbitraire de toute chose, de la vie et de la nature elle-même, selon son seul vouloir. Si ce Dieu avait été le créateur affranchi de toute limite, pourquoi les hommes, à son image, ne le seraient-ils pas à leur tour ?

Mise en mouvement par la révolution scientifique des XVIIe et XVIIIe siècle, cette idée n’a plus connu de bornes. C’est en elle que réside ce que nous appelons la « modernité ». Cette idée postule que les hommes sont les auteurs d’eux-mêmes et qu’ils peuvent recommencer le monde à leur gré. Il n’y a d’autre principe que la volonté et le bon plaisir de chaque individu. Par voie de conséquence, la légitimité d’une société n’est pas dépendante de sa conformité avec les lois éternelles de l’ethnos. Elle ne dépend que du consentement momentané des volontés individuelles. Autrement dit, n’est légitime qu’une société contractuelle, résultant d’un libre accord entre des parties qui y trouvent chacune leur avantage (2).

Si l’intérêt personnel est le seul fondement du pacte social, on ne voit pas ce qui interdirait à chacun d’en profiter au mieux de ses intérêts et de ses appétits, donc de se remplir les poches si l’occasion lui est offerte par sa position. Cela d’autant plus que le discours de la société marchande, par le truchement de la publicité, fait à chacun l’obligation de jouir, plus exactement de n’exister que pour jouir.

Longtemps, en dépit de cette logique individualiste et matérialiste, le lien communautaire de la naissance et de la patrie s’était maintenu, avec toutes les obligations qui en découlent. Ce lien a été progressivement détruit un peu partout en Europe dans les décennies qui ont suivi la Seconde Guerre mondiale, alors que triomphait la société de consommation venue des États-Unis. À l’instar des autres pays d’Europe, la France a donc cessé peu à peu d’être une nation (fondée sur la natio, la naissance commune) pour devenir un agrégat d’individus rassemblés par leur bon plaisir ou l’idée qu’ils se font de leur intérêt. L’ancienne obligation de « servir » a donc été remplacée par la tentation générale de « se servir ». Telle est la conséquence logique du principe qui fonde la société sur les seuls droits de l’homme, donc sur l’intérêt de chacun.

Et voilà que, sous nos yeux, cette répugnante logique se heurte à une révolte qui vient des profondeurs. Nous assistons à l’éveil inattendu de tous ceux qui, par réflexe atavique, sentent au fond d’eux-mêmes que l’appartenance ancestrale indiscutée est ce qui fonde un clan, un peuple ou une nation.

Dominique Venner


  1. J’ai rappelé le fait, références à l’appui, dans mon Histoire de la Collaboration (Pygmalion, 2002).
  2. Rousseau avait compris que telle était la faille du contrat social. Il prétendit y remédier en justifiant l’usage de la force pour contraindre les récalcitrants à se soumettre à une problématique « volonté générale »

dimanche, 14 avril 2013

L'enracinement, une arme contre la mondialisation

L'enracinement, une arme contre la mondialisation

00:05 Publié dans Nouvelle Droite | Lien permanent | Commentaires (0) | Tags : enracinement, mondialisation, nouvelle droite | |  del.icio.us | | Digg! Digg |  Facebook

samedi, 13 avril 2013

Convergence of Catastrophes by Guillaume Faye

Politics Book Review:

Convergence of Catastrophes by Guillaume Faye,

by Jared Taylor

vendredi, 12 avril 2013

Méridien Zéro - Un homme, un destin : Jean Mabire

Méridien Zéro:

Un homme, un destin :

Jean Mabire

Hegelian Reflections on Body Piercing & Tattoos


A Little Death:
Hegelian Reflections on Body Piercing & Tattoos

By Greg Johnson

Ex: http://www.counter-currents.com/

It is safe to say that urban youth culture in the contemporary West is pretty much saturated with hedonism. Yet in the midst of all this hedoism, tattooing and body piercing are huge industries, and they hurt.

It is, moreover, shared pain, broadcast to and imposed upon all who see it. It is natural for human beings to feel sympathy for people in pain, or who show visible signs of having suffered pain. Perhaps this is a sign of morbid oversensitivity, but I believe I am not the only person who feels sympathy pains when I see tattoos and piercings, especially extensive ones. Sometimes I actually shudder and look away. Furthermore, am I the only one who finds tattoos and piercings extreme sexual turn-offs?

Sexual sadism and mascochism fit into a larger hedonistic context, since the are merely intensifications or exaggerations of features of normal hetrosexual relations. But what is the place of the non-sexual masochism of body piercing and tattooing in a larger hedonistic society?

This question first occured to me when I saw Quentin Tarantino’s Pulp Fiction, in which Jody, the wife of the drug dealer Lance, launches into a discourse about piercing. Jody, it is safe to say, is about as complete a hedonist as has ever existed. Yet Jody has had her body pierced sixteen times, including her left nipple, her clitoris, and her tongue. And in each instance, she used a needle rather than a relatively quick and painless piercing gun. As she says, “That gun goes against the whole idea behind piercing.”

Well then, I had to ask, “What is the whole idea behind piercing?” Yes, piercing is fashionable. Yes, it is involved with sexual fetishism. (But fetishism is not mere desire either.) Yes, it is now big business. But the phenomenon cannot merely be reduced to hedonistic self-indulgence. It is irreversible. And it hurts. And apparently, if it doesn’t hurt, that contradicts the “whole idea.”

For Hegel, history begins when a distinctly human form of self-consciousness emerges. Prehistoric man is merely a clever animal who is ruled by his desires, by the pursuit of pleasure and the avoidance of pain, including the desire for self-preservation. When we enjoy creature comforts, however, we are aware of ourselves as mere creatures.

But human beings are more than clever animals. Slumbering within prehistoric man is a need for self-consciousness. To see our bodies, we need a mirror. To see our self also requires an appropriate “mirror.” For Hegel, the first mirror is the consciousness of others. We see ourselves as we are seen by others. When the reactions of others coincide with our sense of self, we feel pride. When we are treated in ways that contradict our sense of self, we feel anger. Sometimes this anger leads to conflict, and sometimes this conflict threatens our very lives.

For Hegel, the duel to the death for honor reveals the existence of two different and conflicting parts of the soul: desire, including the desire for self-preservation, and honor, which is willing to risk death to find satisfaction. For Hegel, the man who is willing to risk death to preserve his honor is a natural master. The man who is willing to suffer dishonor to preserve his life is a natural slave. For the master, honor rules over desire. For the slave, desire rules over honor. Hegel sees the struggle to the death over honor as the beginning of history, history being understood as a process by which human beings come to self-understanding.

Of course not every road to self-understanding involves an encounter with death. But the primary means by which we understand ourselves is participation in a culture, and civilized life entails countless repressions of our physical desires, countless little pains and little deaths.

According to Hegel, if history is a process of self-discovery, then history can end when we learn the truth about ourselves and live accordingly. And the truth is that all men are free. Hegel’s follower Francis Fukuyama became famous for arguing that the fall of communism and the globalization of liberal democracy was the end of history. But he also followed Alexandre Kojève, Hegel’s greatest 20th-century interpreter, who argued that the end of history would not bring a society of universal freedom, but a society of universal slavery: slavery in the spiritual sense of the rule of desire over honor. And that is a perfect description of modern, hedonistic, bourgeois society.

But there is more to the soul than desire. Thus man cannot be fully satisfied by mere hedonism. The restless drive for self-consciousness that gave rise to history in the first place will stir again. In a world of casual and meaningless self-indulgence, piercing and its first cousin tattooing are thus deeply significant; they are tests; they are limit experiences; they are encounters with something—something in ourselves and in the world—that transcends the economy of desire. To “mortify” the flesh literally means to kill it. Each little hole is a little death, which derives its meaning from a big death, a whole death, death itself. Thus one can see the contemporary craze with body modification as the re-enactment of the primal humanizing encounter with death within the context of a decadent and dehumanizing society. History is beginning again.

Article printed from Counter-Currents Publishing: http://www.counter-currents.com

URL to article: http://www.counter-currents.com/2013/03/a-little-death-hegelian-reflections-on-body-piercing-and-tattoos/

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jeudi, 11 avril 2013

Conférence de Guillaume Faye en Allemagne en 2006

Conférence de Guillaume Faye

en Allemagne en 2006

00:05 Publié dans Nouvelle Droite | Lien permanent | Commentaires (0) | Tags : guillauem faye, nouvelle droite | |  del.icio.us | | Digg! Digg |  Facebook