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mercredi, 04 septembre 2013

Au royaume de Kipling

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Au royaume de Kipling

Par

Mickaël Fonton

 

 

Ex: http://www.valeursactuelles.com

 

1894. Publiée cette année-là, la Légion perdue évoque dans un même mouvement la frontière afghane, le souvenir d'une colonie britannique massacrée en se retirant de Kaboul et la récolte des Cipayes. L'écrivain reporter conserve de l'afghanistan l'image d'un pays fascinant et redouté. 

Kipling nous avait prévenus : cette guerre ne pas être gagnée! De même que l’échec – re - latif – de l’invasion soviétique des années 1980, les difficultés rencontrées par les Britanniques en Afghanistan un siècle plus tôt servent de caution historique à ceux qui, aujourd’hui, jugent perdu d’avance le conflit mené par la coalition occidentale contre les talibans. Il est in contestable que Kipling a connu l’Afghanistan de la fin du XIXe siècle, expérience qui a influencé et nourri son oeuvre littéraire ; il est tout aussi vrai de dire que celle-ci n’a constitué qu’un épisode parmi d’autres d’une vie passée à parcourir de long en large l’Empire britannique, de l’Inde au Canada en passant par l’Afrique australe et l’Australie. Une biographie fouillée de Charles Zorgbibe, déjà auteur de travaux sur Herzl, Mirabeau ou Metternich, permet de mieux cerner le regard que l’auteur du Livre de la jungle portait sur le “pays rebelle”.

jung.jpgJoseph Rudyard Kipling est né le 30 décembre 1865, à Bombay, où ses parents sont arrivés huit mois plus tôt. Enfant, Kipling parle l’hindoustani aussi bien que l’anglais et, s’échappant du bungalow familial en compagnie de sa nounou (ayah), il découvre les foules indiennes aux turbans multicolores, les illusionnistes montreurs de serpents, les sons et les odeurs du bazar de Borah.

Toute sa vie Kipling gardera la trace de cette dualité de culture, ce « scandale intime » qu’on retrouvera aussi chez un autre écrivain, français cette fois, Albert Camus. À 6 ans, il est envoyé en Angleterre pour y suivre sa scolarité. Si ses premières années en famille d’accueil à Southsea sont douloureuses (il parlera plus tard de la « maison de la désolation »), ses années de collège à Westward Ho ! constituèrent en revanche une époque plus heureuse, à laquelle l’écrivain devra une part certaine de ses ressources littéraires – notamment l’humour et une imagination débridée.

Au sortir du collège, la vie de Kipling prend un tournant décisif : grâce aux relations de son père et du principal de Westward Ho !, il est engagé par la Civil and Military Gazette, le grand quotidien de Lahore, où il arrive le 18 décembre 1882, à l’âge de 17 ans. Après deux années d’apprentissage de son métier, durant lesquelles il découvre le microcosme de la société angloindienne, le jeune Kipling accompagne le nouveau vice-roi des Indes, lord Dufferin, sur la frontière afghane. Quarante ans plus tôt, à l’hiver 1842, seize mille soldats britanniques ont été massacrés dans la retraite de Kaboul et, si les Anglais ont pu ensuite y acheter un semblant de paix, la situation devait à nouveau se détériorer. À Rawalpindi, tout près de la frontière afghane, Kipling observe, prend des notes, recueille les confidences d’un proche d’Abdur Rahman, l’émir de Kaboul, alors en visite officielle. Il s’agit, pour lui, non seulement d’exercer son métier de journaliste mais aussi et surtout de nourrir des réflexions personnelles qu’il exprimera plus tard dans ses nouvelles. En particulier dans l’Homélie de l’émir, dont Charles Zorgbibe dit qu’elle constitue un « portrait extraordinairement percutant de l’émir et de son royaume ».

On y lit notamment que, pour Kipling, les Afghans constituent tout simplement « la race la plus turbulente qui existe ici-bas » ; il les voit comme des guerriers indépendants, éternels insoumis, rétifs à toute autorité interne ou étrangère. «Pour l’Afghan, écrit-il, ni la vie, ni la propriété, ni la loi, ni la royauté ne sont sacrées lorsque ses appétits le poussent à la révolte. L’instinct l’érige en voleur, l’hérédité et l’éducation le transforment en meurtrier, les trois réunis le rendent bestialement immoral. Il a, certes, une certaine conception de l’honneur, tortueuse et très personnelle, et son caractère est passionnant à observer. »

Ces réflexions – dont on comprend qu’elles aient pu contribuer à forger le mythe d’un Kipling “raciste” – traduisent chez le journaliste de 20 ans une vision qui porte davantage sur les hommes qui font un pays que sur des considérations militaires. D’ailleurs, si, à l’occasion de son séjour à Simla, la résidence d’été du vice-roi, Kipling est longuement interrogé par le général Roberts, commandant en chef des armées, c’est parce que celui-ci souhaite recueillir des impressions de journaliste sur l’état d’esprit des officiers ou le moral des troupes. Immergé dans le milieu militaire, Kipling met à profit son « extraordinaire faculté d’assimilation des moeurs et de la couleur locales » selon l’avis de son rédacteur en chef Kay Robinson ; il double son activité journalistique d’une production littéraire qui lui offre d’être plus offensif, plus critique, d’adopter un regard plus perçant sur le monde qui l’entoure. Sa nouvelle réputation de journaliste et le succès croissant de ses nouvelles (notamment les Simples Contes des collines) le conduisent bientôt à quitter Lahore pour Allahabad et la rédaction du Pioneer, puis à rejoindre l’Angleterre via la Chine, le Japon et les États-Unis. Il rencontre Mark Twain, Henry James ou Jerome K. Jerome, l’auteur de Trois hommes dans un bateau, avec qui il partage le goût d’un humour très britannique. Tout ce qu’il voit constitue pour lui une matière à écrire, qu’il s’agisse d’articles ou de nouvelles.

Il n’en demeure pas moins attaché à l’Inde, qui continue d’occuper son imaginaire ou nourrir ses réflexions politiques. Naturellement prisonnier d’une vision très “anglo-indienne”, il accueille avec beaucoup de scepticisme la naissance du Parti du Congrès et estime que, « sans les Britanniques, l’Inde s’effondrerait dans le chaos ». En Afghanistan, un accord entre les Afghans et les Anglais a donné naissance en 1893 à la ligne Mortimer-Durand (actuelle frontière avec le Pakistan, dans les monts Sulayman, au coeur du pays pachtoun). S’il ne s’exprime pas directement sur la politique menée par les Anglais, Kipling va donner à voir ses sentiments à travers plusieurs nouvelles aux genres très différents.

La Légion perdue, publiée en 1894, évoque dans un même mouvement la frontière afghane, le souvenir de la colonne massacrée lors de la retraite de Kaboul, plaie toujours à vif dans l’imaginaire britannique, et la révolte des Cipayes, qui secoua l’Inde huit ans avant la naissance de Kipling. Il brouille ici les cartes de la loyauté et de la rébellion entre les Britanniques, les Hindoustanis et les Afghans, dans le cadre d’une expédition visant à capturer « l’éternel trublion, le dissident islamique immuablement dressé contre la présence étrangère, le mollah Gulla Kutta ».

Dans Chéri des dames, publié un an plus tôt, une nouvelle sur le thème de l’amour fou, le régiment du héros rentre décimé d’une campagne en Afghanistan, preuve que, pour Kipling, comme pour ses lecteurs, la région conserve une résonance tragique.

Entre Lahore et la contrée mystérieuse au nord…

L’Afghanistan servait déjà de décor à la nouvelle l’Homme qui voulut être roi – publiée en décembre 1888, c’est-à- dire toujours dans la période indienne de Kipling. « Deux aventuriers ont conçu le projet fou de se tailler un royaume en Asie centrale, au-delà de la passe de Khyber – au “Kafiristan”, habité par des tribus aryennes. » Sensibles à l’équilibre géo stratégique de la région, ils sont en effet « soucieux d’établir un “glacis” sur la frontière nord de l’Inde, qui s’appuierait sur des populations plus assimilables que les tribus afghanes ». Où l’on voit qu’au-delà de la trame romanesque (doublée ici d’une ré - flexion sur la franc-maçonnerie), l’Afghanistan apparaît déjà aux yeux de Kipling, qui y a passé deux mois, comme une terre indomptable.

Kim.jpgEnfin il y a Kim, cette grande fresque publiée en 1901, roman picaresque, envoûtant, colonialiste et généreux, « l’oeuvre de la vie de Kipling ». Bien que le personnage principal en soit l’Inde, une Inde totale, éternelle, l’Inde de la grande route de liaison, l’un des personnages principaux est afghan. Celui-ci, Mahbub Ali, est marchand de chevaux ; il passe sa vie sur les pistes, entre Lahore et « la contrée mystérieuse au-delà des passes du Nord ». Agent des Britanniques, il surveille depuis Peshawar les principautés des montagnes. Selon Zorgbibe, Mahbub Ali incarne aux yeux de Kipling « à la fois l’Afghanistan hostile, incontrôlable et redouté, et l’espoir d’une alliance avec une fraction des Afghans » – ce qui est probablement le lien le plus pertinent qui puisse être établi avec les enjeux du conflit actuel.

Si Kipling n’est pas l’inventeur de la notion de “Grand Jeu” – cet affrontement entre les empires russe et britannique sur le terrain afghan –, il l’a rendu populaire par l’intermédiaire de ses nombreux récits. On peut y voir la raison pour laquelle l’écrivain est invoqué encore aujourd’hui quand il est question de l’Afghanistan, alors que l’importance réelle de ce pays fut, dans la vie de Kipling, inférieure à celle de l’Inde, de l’Empire britannique dans son ensemble, des États-Unis, de l’Angleterre, voire même de l’Afrique au trale, où Kipling joua un rôle important à l’époque de la guerre des Boers.

Car Rudyard Kipling ne saurait être réduit à ses récits les plus fameux, Kim, le Livre de la jungle ou son poème If («ce texte au souffle de forge volontariste »), encore moins à ses caricatures : écrivain colonialiste, héraut de la « plus-Grande Bretagne », voix officielle de l’Empire britannique.

Ce fut un homme à la pensée nuancée et complexe, célèbre à 20 ans, Prix No bel de littérature, qui influença aussi bien Baden-Powell que George Orwell, ami de Théodore Roosevelt ou de Clemenceau. Un Anglais amoureux de la France. Un homme qui perdit une fille en bas âge puis un fils à la guerre. Un écrivain convaincu que les écoles devaient « forger des hommes afin de créer et de conserver des empires », mais persuadé en même temps que « le fardeau de l’homme blanc » est finalement trop lourd à porter. Un homme d’action enfin, devenu mystique, partagé entre saint Paul et Kismet, le petit dieu malin de la mythologie indienne. 

Mickael Fonton

Kipling, de Charles Zorgbibe, Editions de Fallois, 490 pages, 24€

dimanche, 25 août 2013

Inde : économie et société

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Gilbert ETIENNE:

Inde : économie et société

Ex: http://aucoeurdunationalisme.blogspot.com

Gilbert Etienne est Professeur honoraire d’économie du développement à l’IHEID Genève. Auteur de nombreux livres sur l’Afghanistan, l’Asie du Sud, la Chine et de diverses publications sur l’Afrique subsaharienne, ex. Repenser le Développement, Messages d’Asie (Afghanistan, Pakistan, Inde, Chine), Paris, A. Colin, 2009

L’année financière (avril de l’année « n » à mars de l’année« n+1 ») 2010-2011 s’est terminée en beauté : le PIB indien a crû de 8,6 %, après un creux suscité par la crise mondiale. Le commerce extérieur se porte bien, les firmes indiennes investissent de plus en plus à l’étranger et la société de consommation s’affirme. Les « Grands » de la planète se succèdent à New Delhi : les présidents Obama et Sarkozy, les premiers ministres David Cameron et Wen Jiabo. Que l’Inde soit bel et bien un pays émergent est évident, mais Amartya Sen et d’autres Indiens rappellent que subsistent de larges pans d’extrême pauvreté dans le pays. L’agriculture, qui occupe encore environ 50 % de la population active, progresse trop faiblement. Les infrastructures (transports, électricité) sont encore très défaillantes, suscitant de lourds surcoûts pour l’économie. Depuis l’automne 2010, plusieurs scandales de corruption ont ébranlé le gouvernement central, créant un climat de suspicion et le ralentissement des prises de décision.

L’économie indienne a le vent en poupe

INTRODUITES à partir de 1980, les réformes se sont très largement amplifiées en 1991 en Inde, grâce à Manmohan Singh, alors Ministre des Finances. Le PIB a enregistré des progressions annuelles de 5 % puis 7 %, voire 8 à 9 %, contre une hausse annuelle moyenne de 3,5 % entre 1950 et 1980. Ouverture, libéralisation, allégements de la bureaucratie, dévaluation de la roupie ont créé un mouvement irréversible. Les gouvernements opposés au Parti du Congrès, qui lui succèderont au pouvoir de 1996 à 2004, ont globalement suivi la même voie. Avec les élections de 2004, le parti du Congrès a repris le pouvoir, mais à la tête d’une coalition disparate de plusieurs partis, ce qui a freiné la poursuite des réformes. Manmohan Singh, devenu Premier ministre, a de nouveau gagné les élections de 2009, mais il doit toujours gouverner avec une coalition de partis alliés.

De nombreux succès sont apparus sur les dernières décennies : modernisation des usines existantes grâce à de nouveaux équipements, floraison de nouvelles entreprises, en particulier dans les technologies de l’information où l’on trouve autant de PME que de sociétés qui démarrent avec quelques milliers de dollars et deviennent des multinationales. Plusieurs unités du secteur public, entre autres SAIL, gros groupe sidérurgique, et BHEL (équipements électriques) se modernisent et s’agrandissent. Le secteur automobile accueille de nombreuses firmes étrangères en joint ventures. Les ventes de voitures explosent, suivant celles de scooters et de motocyclettes, avec pour corollaire un accroissement des embouteillages. Dans l’électroménager, la production, qui s’est affermie entre 1980 et 1991, poursuit sur sa lancée. L’industrie pharmaceutique enregistre des succès en Inde et à l’étranger. Le tourisme médical apparaît, avec d’excellents médecins opérant dans des hôpitaux très bien équipés. Modernisation et innovations débordent des métropoles vers les villes de province.

La construction urbaine bat son plein, après des décennies au cours desquelles le taux de construction de nouveaux immeubles était l’un des plus bas du monde (moins de la moitié de celui de la Thaïlande, trois fois moins qu’en Chine). Dans les districts avancés de Révolution verte (Cf. Infra), apparaissent les premières voitures privées après les motos. La cuisine au gaz remplace la bouse de vache séchée et les femmes font moudre le blé dans un moulin local, au lieu de passer des heures à moudre le grain dans la meule de pierre. Les taux d’épargne et d’investissement indiens se situent désormais autour de 35 % du PIB, contre 22 % pour le premier en 1991.


Les produits indiens deviennent plus compétitifs sur le marché mondial. La catégorie engineering (machines, acier) représente jusqu’à 22 % des exportations, dont 70 % sont assurées par des produits manufacturés. Les produits agricoles totalisent 8,5 % des exportations, les minerais 4,3 %, les produits pétroliers 17,3 % (une partie du pétrole brut importé est raffiné puis exporté). Au sein des importations, le pétrole vient en tête avec 33 %, en forte hausse car la production indienne stagne depuis 2000 autour de 33 millions de tonnes. Viennent ensuite les biens d’équipement, qui représentent 15 % des importations. Fidèle à ses traditions, l’Inde continue à importer de l’or, tandis que de grosses quantités de diamants sont également importées, taillées sur place et exportées. Légumineuses et huiles comestibles représentent 3,7 % des importations.


Les exportations de services sont stimulées par les technologies de l’information et les activités des firmes indiennes pour les entreprises étrangères. Avec les assurances et les transports, les exportations totales de services sont passées de 16 milliards de dollars en 2000/2001 à 96 milliards aujourd’hui, tandis que les importations passaient sur la même période de 15 à 60 milliards. Le commerce extérieur, qui représentait 15 % du PIB en 1990, atteint 35 % vingt ans plus tard. Les principaux pays clients de l’Inde sont l’Asie, avec 57 milliards de dollars, le Moyen-Orient (40 milliards), l’Union européenne (36 %), les États-Unis (19 %). Les exportations indiennes se sont élevées à 179 milliards de dollars sur l’année fiscale 2009/2010. Du côté des importations, le Moyen-Orient est le principal partenaire de l’Inde, avec 81 milliards de dollars (pétrole). Viennent ensuite l’Union européenne (38 milliards), les États- Unis (19 milliards) et l’Asie (90 milliards). Les importations totales s’élèvent ainsi à 288 milliards de dollars. À noter la faiblesse des échanges francoindiens : la France réalise 4 milliards de dollars d’importations et 4 milliards de dollars d’exportations avec l’Inde. À l’inverse, le commerce extérieur de l’Inde se caractérise par un accroissement des exportations chinoises vers l’Inde (31 milliards de dollars) ainsi que par une progression des échanges de l’Inde avec l’Afrique (dont des importations de pétrole) et avec l’Amérique latine.


Très limités dans les années 1970, les investissements privés étrangers (FDI) atteignent 281 milliards de dollars cumulés de 1980 à 2010. Un net ralentissement est apparu en 2010. Est-il simplement conjoncturel ou lié au climat politique actuel (Cf. Infra). Les investissements de portefeuille ont, quant à eux, chuté sous l’effet de la crise financière en 2008 et 2009, avant de remonter à 35 milliards de dollars en 2010-2011. En sens inverse, les entreprises publiques ou privées indiennes investissent à l’étranger, dans l’industrie et les services dans les pays occidentaux, dans les matières premières - notamment le pétrole - en Afrique. De 2000 à 2010, ces investissements ont atteint 133 milliards de dollars.


La société de consommation s’affirme


Comme la Chine, l’Inde subit les ombres de notre révolution industrielle avec toutes sortes d’abus, corruption, coulage, etc. et, dans le même temps, découvre les prémisses de la société de consommation que nous avons connue en Europe occidentale dans les Trente Glorieuses de l’après 1945 (J. Fourastié).


Il existe néanmoins des différences sensibles. Notre niveau de vie en 1945-1950 était très supérieur à celui de l’Inde aujourd’hui. La croissance démographique, même tombée à + 1,5 % l’an, dépasse de loin notre baby boom. Par ailleurs, le taux de croissance économique de l’Inde aujourd’hui est très supérieur au nôtre à l’époque. Mais il faut noter un manque croissant de cadres supérieurs et d’ouvriers qualifiés dans tous les domaines : aux côtés des Instituts de technologie de haut niveau, les universités n’assurent, dans l’ensemble, qu’un enseignement médiocre, ce qui oblige nombre d’entreprises à organiser leurs propres formations de jeunes cadres.


Le développement de la société de consommation se traduit par une amélioration de l’alimentation de la population (lait, fruits, légumes, éventuellement poulet, etc.), ainsi que par des modifications de l’habillement (accroissement du port de jeans pour les garçons et les filles) et une hausse des dépenses en cosmétiques des femmes. Les familles constituant les classes moyennes ou supérieures avec des revenus annuels de 7 000 à 37 000 dollars par an représenteraient environ 13 % de la population totale, soit 160 millions d’âmes. On ne saurait oublier les loisirs : 100 millions de touristes indiens visitent leur propre pays chaque année, sans parler de ceux, nombreux, qui vont à l’étranger. Les repas au restaurant deviennent également à la mode, tout comme la lune de miel pour les jeunes mariés…


27 à 30 % des Indiens ont beau connaître encore l’extrême pauvreté, les aspirations des classes montantes vont constituer un puissant moteur de croissance pour l’Inde pendant encore des décennies, jusqu’à ce que de plus larges couches de la population en profitent.


Le monde rural a besoin de plus d’attention


Le monde rural conserve un très grand rôle dans l’économie indienne, puisqu’il représente encore 69 % de la population totale. L’agriculture emploie environ 50 % du total des actifs et assure 14-15 % du PIB. Des progrès considérables ont été atteints depuis l’indépendance : routes en dur, électricité, croissance agricole d’abord lente, avant que ne soit mise en place la Révolution verte (RV) en 1965.


Le processus de la RV était basé sur des variétés de céréales qui réagissent beaucoup mieux à l’engrais chimique que les semences traditionnelles. Mais qui dit doses relativement élevées d’engrais chimiques dit une exigence en eau plus importante, voire en système d’irrigation. C’est dire que les vastes régions de l’Inde péninsulaire, aux pluies incertaines et aux faibles capacités d’irrigation, se trouvaient - et demeurent encore - en dehors de la Révolution verte. En revanche, dans les plaines irriguées, nombre de paysans, souvent illettrés, ont doublé leurs rendements de blé ou de riz décortiqué en une année pour atteindre 2t/ha dans un premier temps et 3 à 4 t/ha aujourd’hui. En quelques années, l’Inde a ainsi fortement réduit son déficit en céréales, tout en appliquant une politique de stockage d’une partie du grain par l’État en prévision des mauvaises moussons ainsi que pour une distribution de grains à prix modérés.


Autour de 1980, les efforts dans l’agriculture, l’électricité, les routes se sont relâchés, avec une baisse des investissements publics et des dépenses d’entretien. Si l’on observe une plus grande diversité de la production agricole (élevage et lait, fruits et légumes), stimulée par la hausse des revenus, force est de constater que la croissance agricole baisse : la recherche manque de fonds ; les services agricoles sont en plein déclin ; le manque d’électricité affecte les vastes régions dont l’irrigation dépend de puits à pompes électriques ; les canaux d’irrigation sont mal entretenus, tout comme les nouvelles routes ; quant aux investissements dans de nouvelles infrastructures, ils sont très insuffisants.


Au total, les districts concernés par la Révolution verte s’essoufflent et les rendements plafonnent. Qui plus est, les pertes après les récoltes atteignent 30 % pour les fruits et les légumes : lenteur des transports, manque de chambres froides, emballages défectueux, parasites sont autant de nuisances qui plombent la production. Il est non moins urgent de stimuler en particulier les plaines du bas Gange, d’Assam et d’Orissa, encore très peu irriguées malgré un énorme potentiel. Peu développées sous les Britanniques, elles n’ont enregistré que de faibles progressions de leur production depuis 1947, ce qui se traduit par une pauvreté qui reste très aigüe… De gros efforts s’imposent aussi dans les vastes zones de cultures pluviales.


Les infrastructures sont toujours à la peine


Les infrastructures ont joué un rôle décisif de 1950 à 1980, en ville comme à la campagne, pour le développement de l’Inde. Depuis lors, elles sont devenues des freins à la croissance : les plans quinquennaux 1992-2007 n’ont atteint que la moitié de leurs objectifs pour l’électricité ; le plan actuel (2007-2012) ne tient pas non plus l’horaire. Le manque d’investissements et de dépenses pour l’entretien des centrales et des réseaux de transmission et de distribution perdure. Viennent ensuite les vols de courant. Le manque d’électricité aux heures de pointe est passé de 7,5 % en 2001/2002 à 11 % à l’été 2010. Les coupures de courant de plusieurs heures par jour sont fréquentes dans les villes ; elles sont encore plus longues dans les campagnes. 40 à 45 % du courant seraient ainsi perdus sur l’ensemble du territoire. À Bangalore, grand centre du High Tech, les pertes dues au manque d’électricité représentent 12 à 15 % de la production des entreprises informatiques. Des chantiers de grandes centrales ont été ouverts mais les constructions annoncent de nouveaux retards.


Ces défauts sont aussi provoqués par un manque de coordination entre services concernés, des livraisons d’équipement défaillantes, un manque de cadres. Dans ces conditions, les riches installent un petit générateur chez eux, les entreprises en acquièrent de plus gros ou créent parfois leur propre centrale, ce qui grève leurs coûts. La question des matières premières devient délicate : manque de pétrole, de gaz, de charbon pour les centrales électriques et pour d’autres usines. De gros gisements de gaz ont heureusement été découverts au large des deltas de la Godavari et de la Krishna (sud-est de l’Inde) et l’on vient de découvrir des dépôts d’uranium en Andhra qui pourraient être les plus riches du monde : ils sont estimés à 44 000 tonnes.


Autre talon d’Achille de l’Inde, les transports avec, ici aussi, un manque d’investissements et de dépenses d’entretien patents : routes encombrées, souvent étroites, multiplicité des contrôles routiers, au point que les camions ne dépassent guère 25 km/h de moyenne. Le bilan des chemins de fer n’est guère plus brillant, les trains de marchandises roulant eux aussi à 25 km/h. Transports et logistique représentent 20 % des coûts finaux de production en Inde, contre 4 à 5 % en Europe. Les ports sont également sous pression et les coûts d’exportation par container sont de 1 053 dollars, contre 456 à Singapour. Ces insuffisances dans les transports correspondraient à près de 1 % du PIB par an, soit 14 milliards de dollars.


Enfin, mentionnons l’eau dans les villes, dont la fourniture est souvent interrompue et dont seuls 13 à 18 % des eaux usées sont traités. Du point de vue environnemental, les fonds consacrés à la lutte contre la pollution des eaux et de l’air, à l’érosion des sols ou encore aux risques liés au changement climatique sont très insuffisants. Les dommages annuels se situeraient entre 3,5 et 7 % du PIB.


Gouvernance et malaises déstabilisent la vie politique


Une avalanche de scandales se sont succédés depuis l’automne 2010 : pots de vin considérables et détournements touchent le gouvernement et l’administration, des hommes d’affaires, des militaires, etc. La société civile ainsi que de grands industriels donnent de la voix ; les media se déchainent ; même des religieux font la grève de la faim… Il n’est néanmoins pas certain que le coulage et la corruption aient beaucoup augmenté. Lorsqu’il était au pouvoir, en 2001, le Premier ministre Vajpayee du BJP, opposé au Congrès, parlait d’un véritable « cancer ».


La répression des abus a été faible jusqu’à maintenant. Un ministre du gouvernement central est sous les verrous, un autre a été mis à pied, ce qui ne calme pas les critiques, malgré l’intégrité du Premier ministre Manmohan Singh. Un climat de malaise s’est étendu sur New Delhi ; la Chambre du Peuple est secouée de désordres ce qui conduit à de fréquentes suspensions de séance…, le tout étant aggravé par une inflation à 9 % et un ralentissement de la croissance économique depuis le printemps 2011 : + 7,7 % (avril-juin). Les inégalités se creusent. De vastes régions rurales très pauvres, les bidonvilles, une mortalité infantile encore élevée suscitent de légitimes inquiétudes pour l’avenir du pays.


Les inégalités sont également marquées entre les États. Plusieurs d’entre eux, dont l’imposant Uttar Pradesh, sont mal gérés et se développent mal. Au Gujrat, la croissance prend, à l’inverse, des allures à la chinoise. Le Bihar est sorti d’une longue période de pourrissement grâce au gouvernement de Nitish Kumar, depuis les élections de 2005 et 2010. Le Tamil Nadu, malgré beaucoup de corruption, attire toujours plus les grandes firmes de l’automobile. La région de Gurgaon près de Delhi est en plein boom. Le gouvernement central peine plus que jamais à réduire les dépenses et les subventions, à imposer de nouvelles réformes sous le poids des affaires et des dissensions au sein de la coalition. Il faut aussi compter avec le poids de Sonia Gandhi, présidente du parti du Congrès. Depuis 2007, par exemple, est en discussion au Parlement le nouveau Land Acquisition Act pour remplacer celui de 1894 ! Entre temps, conflits, retards se succèdent pour créer des usines, exploiter de nouvelles mines de fer, de bauxite, de manganèse dans l’angle nord-est de la péninsule. Les gouvernements des États concernés perdent des rentrées de fonds, les habitants locaux peuvent être malmenés dans leur opposition, les investisseurs indiens comme Tata ou les firmes étrangères comme POSCO (Corée du Sud) perdent de l’argent alors qu’ils sont prêts à créer de nouvelles aciéries. Une vingtaine de milliards de dollars sont ainsi en attente d’investissement.


En conclusion, malgré le ralentissement actuel, l’économie indienne conserve de solides atouts et presque personne ne conteste le système démocratique du pays en dépit de sérieuses failles. Il serait néanmoins urgent, pour que l’Inde puisse poursuivre son développement, de sortir de la crise de gouvernance qui lèse aujourd’hui l’économie et de réduire l’inflation. Rahul Gandhi, fils de Sonia Gandhi, Présidente du parti du Congrès, actuellement aux États-Unis (pour des soins, semble-t-il), va-t-il quitter ses fonctions au sein du parti pour succéder à Manmohan Singh ? Et si oui, réussira t-il à sortir son pays de la difficile phase d’aujourd’hui ?

Gilbert Etienne (Diploweb)

dimanche, 11 août 2013

Quelques notes sur le Pakistan

 

politique internationale,actualité,géopolitique,pakistan,inde,moyen orient,asie,affaires asiatiques

Robert Steuckers:

Quelques notes sur le Pakistan

Notes complémentaires à une conférence tenue à la tribune de l’ASIN (“Association pour une Suisse Indépendante et Neutre”), le 31 octobre 2012, à Genève, et à la tribune du “Cercle non-conforme”, le 14 novembre 2012, à Lille.

Les Etats-Unis ont donné au Pakistan, depuis les années 50, deux missions qui, au fil du temps, se sont avérées contradictoires: d’une part, demeurer un allié des Etats-Unis dans la politique d’endiguement de l’URSS et de la Chine (du moins jusqu’en 1972) et, d’autre part, soutenir les Talibans, soi-disant ennemis de l’Occident et des Etats-Unis, à partir de 1978-79, au moment où l’Iran tombe aux mains de Khomeiny et des pasadarans et où l’Afghanistan opte, après le départ de Zaher Shah, pour une politique pro-soviétique, que les puissances anglo-saxonnes ne peuvent tolérer en vertu de théories géopolitiques traduites sans faille dans la réalité politique mondiale depuis leur émergence dans l’oeuvre du stratégiste Homer Lea, rédigée dans la première décennie du 20ème siècle.

La politique pakistanaise a dès lors été fluctuante, fluctuations dont il faut retenir la chronologie pour ne pas se laisser duper par les médias dominants qui déploient leurs stratégies en pariant sur l’amnésie des peuples et des élites, mêmes académiques:

 

1.     Le Pakistan d’Ali Bhutto penchait quelque peu vers le non alignement, raison pour laquelle cet homme politique a été éliminé et pendu pour être remplacé par le Général Zia ul-Hak; Ali Bhutto avait aussi le désavantage, dans une république islamique comme le Pakistan, structurée par le mouvement sunnite “déobandi”, fondé en 1867, sous la domination britannique, d’avoir été chiite et partisan de la laïcité; il s’opposait au mouvement Jamaat-e-Islami fondé par le théologien Mawdoudi en 1941, très critique à l’égard du fondateur de la future république Islamique du Pakistan, Mohammed Ali Jinnah, trop “laïque” à ses yeux, trop inspiré par des modèles européens, dont l’Italie mussolinienne;

 

2.     Zia ul-Hak suit les ordres des Etats-Unis et s’aligne sur la géopolitique préconisée par Zbigniew Brzezinski: il coopère avec les Mudjahiddins puis les Talibans en leur prêtant l’appui des services secrets pakistanais, l’ISI; le raisonnement de Zia ul-Hak n’est pas seulement pro-occidental; il ne s’inscrit pas entièrement, du point de vue national pakistanais, dans le cadre de la coopération américano-pakistanaise, en vigueur depuis les années 50: pour ce militaire arrivé au pouvoir par un coup de force, Islamabad doit se doter d’une “profondeur stratégique”, en coopérant avec les Talibans d’ethnie pachtoune, pour faire face à l’ennemi héréditaire indien, doté de l’arme nucléaire. Cette coopération armée/talibans vise à terme à unir stratégiquement les territoires afghan et pakistanais, avec l’appui stratégique des Etats-Unis et la manne financière islamique-saoudienne (versée essentiellement aux “medressahs” déobandies, chargées par le mouvement “déobandi” de ré-islamiser les masses dans l’ancien Raj indien sous domination britannique; depuis l’indépendance et depuis l’entrée des troupes de Brejenev à Kaboul en 1979, il forme des combattants de la foi, actifs au Cachemire et, très probablement, en Afghanistan). Le raisonnement de Zia ul-Hak est historique: c’est au départ du territoire afghan que les armées musulmanes ont lancé leurs offensives en direction du bassin du Gange et se sont rendues maîtresses du sous-continent indien jusqu’à l’arrivée des Britanniques au 18ème siècle; le fondateur de la République islamique du Pakistan, Mohamed Ali Jinnah rêvait d’ailleurs de reconstituer l’ancien Empire moghol; de ce fait, les intérêts musulmans traditionnels et les intérêts américains coïncidaient; pour les Pakistanais, il fallait reconstituer le glacis offensif de l’islam sunnite d’antan et menacer ainsi l’Inde, leur ennemi n°1, en disposant des mêmes atouts territoriaux (la “profondeur stratégique”) que leurs ancêtres spirituels depuis le 10ème siècle; pour les Etats-Unis, il fallait une base opératoire en marge de l’Afghanistan en voie de soviétisation, quelle qu’elle soit, pour contrôler à terme l’Afghanistan et menacer indirectement l’Inde, alliée de l’URSS puis de la Russie, et encercler l’Iran chiite, le coincer entre un bloc sunnite-wahhabite saoudien et un bloc afghano-pakistanais, également sunnite; d’autres menaces, par terrorisme interposé, étaient articulées par les services pakistanais contre l’Inde, notamment par le soutien apporté aux mouvements islamistes “Lashkar-e-Taiba” (“Armée des Purs”) ou “Jaish-e-Mohammad” (“Armée du Prophète”), actifs dans toute l’Inde mais surtout au Cachemire-et-Jammu, province himalayenne disputée entre les deux pays depuis la partition de 1947; après le 11 septembre 2001, la stratégie d’appui aux talibans n’est plus poursuivie par les Etats-Unis, qui demandent donc aux services pakistanais de cesser tout appui aux fondamentalistes afghans, ce qui ruine d’office la volonté pakistanaise de faire d’un Afghanistan fondamentaliste l’hinterland géostratégique nécessaire face à la masse territoriale indienne et ce qui disloque simultanément le dispositif pakistanais de guerre indirecte (contre l’Inde) par mouvements islamo-terroristes interposés;

 

3.     Zia ul-Hak mort, le pouvoir revient, par le biais d’élections, à la fille de sa victime, Ali Bhutto, Benazir Bhutto, présidente du “Mouvement pour la restauration de la démocratie”; en dépit de sa réputation de chiite modérée et moderniste et de son démocratisme hostile aux militaires putschistes, Benazir Bhutto ne change pas fondamentalement la politique engagée par Zia ul-Hak: elle découple l’ISI de l’état-major, le rendant plus indépendant encore, et appuie les opérations militaires des talibans en Afghanistan, visant à chasser un gouvernement trop favorable aux Russes, même après l’effondrement définitif de l’URSS;

 

4.     Musharaf —successeur de Zia ul-Hak après la mort de ce dernier en 1988 dans un accident (?) d’avion et de Mian Nawaz Sharif, renversé par un nouveau coup d’Etat en 1999— s’est retrouvé, passez-moi l’expression, le “cul entre deux chaises”, dès que la politique américaine est devenue ambigüe à l’égard des talibans, leurs anciens alliés, puis franchement hostile après le 11 septembre 2011; Musharaf devait lutter contre ses propres services, contre un ISI découplé de l’état-major général des armées par Benazir Bhutto et, par conséquent, devenu beaucoup plus “opaque”, contre les talibans (héritiers directs des Mudjahiddins anti-soviétiques) et contre le parti MMA fondamentaliste, très puissant au parlement, au nom d’une alliance américaine ancienne qui, à un certain moment, avait parié sur l’islamo-terrorisme pour chasser les Soviétiques ou les gouvernements afghans pro-soviétiques ou pro-russes, avant de se retourner contre leur propre golem; de plus, Musharaf, arrivé au pouvoir suite à un coup d’Etat, devait donner des gages à ses “alliés” américains, et promouvoir un semblant de démocratie, système qui était refusé par de larges strates de l’opinion publique, sous la forte influence des fondamentalistes, soucieux de rétablir une “sharia” pure et dure, foncièrement hostile aux idées occidentales; par ailleurs, les forces démocratiques luttaient, elles aussi, contre un pouvoir mis en place par les militaires au nom de la clause de “nécessité”; Musharaf devait constamment prouver aux Américains que le “pouvoir fort” des militaires était le seul rempart possible contre les fondamentalistes, alliés aux talibans et hostiles à toute alliance occidentale; son successeur Asif Ali Zardari a hérité de cette situation difficile, où les groupes armés fondamentalistes et la puissante caste militaire du pays n’aiment pas la “transition démocratique” imposée par Washington; Zardari souhaite aussi une “paix en Afghanistan” qui aille dans le sens des intérêts pakistanais et non indiens;

 

5.     Ralph Peters, colonel de l’armée des Etats-Unis, face à ce Pakistan fragilisé, brandit indirectement une menace, qui s’adresse aussi à l’Arabie Saoudite, à l’Iran et à la Turquie: celui de réduire leurs territoires nationaux respectifs en pariant sur les séditions et les particularismes religieux et ethniques. Si le Pakistan ne joue pas le jeu que Washington lui impose, en dépit des contradictions que ce jeu implique, les Etats-Unis feront miroiter l’émergence d’un Patchounistan indépendant regroupant les régions afghanes et pakistanaises où vivent les tribus pachtounes et l’émergence d’un Beloutchistan, également indépendant et regorgeant de matières premières importantes, qui regrouperait les territoires iraniens et pakistanais où vit le peuple beloutche (5 à 10% seulement de la population pakistanaise).

Ralph Peters: faire chanter le Pakistan

Le soutien potentiel de Washington et des autres Etats occidentaux à d’éventuels indépendantistes pachtounes ou beloutches, que fait entrevoir le Colonel Peters en commentant sa cartographie prospective du Proche- et du Moyen-Orient, sert à faire chanter le Pakistan et à l’obliger à réduire les activités trop “talibanistes” et anti-occidentales des éléments pachtouns dans les provinces frontalières bordant l’Afghanistan, ruinant du même coup toute la stratégie de soutien à des mouvements islamo-terroristes, d’abord entraînés pour combattre les Indiens au Cachemire ou pour déstabiliser l’Inde de l’intérieur. Les talibans pachtouns/afghans tout comme les islamistes en lutte contre l’Inde forment un tout, contrôlé en dernière instance par l’ISI, un tout pourvu de nombreuses passerelles: le Pakistan ne peut trancher dans le vif de cet ensemble sans se défaire de l’arme indirecte qu’il s’est forgée au fil des décennies pour lutter contre son voisin indien, notamment en manipulant le “Hizb ul-Mujahidin” et le “Jaish-e-Muhammad” au Cachemire. Participer à la “guerre contre la terreur”, voulue par les deux présidents néo-conservateurs, le père et le fils Bush, équivaut, pour le Pakistan à se faire la guerre à lui-même, à démanteler son système offensif de défense, dont certains éléments forts se révoltent, notamment en créant le TTP (“Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan” ou “Mouvement des Talibans du Pakistan”), dont le porte-paroles Eshanullah Ehsan déclare que, désormais, “Zardari et l’armée sont nos premières cibles” et que “l’Amérique viendra en second”.

Réduire le Pakistan à une bande territoriale sans profondeur stratégique?

Quant aux tentatives de rapprochement entre l’Inde et les Etats-Unis, elles fragilisent le Pakistan, soucieux de sa profondeur stratégique, qu’il perdrait automatiquement, et de manière particulièrement dangereuse, si un Patchounistan et un Beloutchistan indépendants s’inscrivaient sur la carte politique du monde, comme y ont récemment été inscrits de nouveaux Etats sécessionistes, comme le Kosovo ou le Sud-Soudan, avec l’appui de Washington. On commence à entrevoir pourquoi l’indépendance du Kosovo et celle du Sud-Soudan servent surtout à créer des précédents à répéter, le cas échéant, dans des zones de turbulences encore plus chaudes... Un Pakistan privé de ses provinces pachtounes et beloutches et réduit au Punjab et au Sindh ne serait d’ailleurs plus qu’une bande territoriale étroite et surpeuplée, s’étirant du Sud (Karachi) au Nord (Islamabad et Rawalpindi), cette fois sans aucune “profondeur stratégique”, à la merci de son ennemi héréditaire indien. Islamabad veut intervenir dans le processus de paix en Afghanistan, de manière à y faire valoir ses intérêts stratégiques, quitte à absorber tacitement, et sur le long terme, les régions pachtounes et beloutches de l’Afghanistan, de façon à former un Etat “quadri-ethnique” des Pachtouns, Beloutches, Punjabis et Sindhis: en effet, les relations cordiales entre le nouveau pouvoir afghan, mis en place par les Américains dès octobre 2011, et l’Inde inquiètent fortement Islamabad, angoissé à l’idée d’un encerclement potentiel aux conséquences désastreuses. L’Afghanistan n’a jamais reconnu le tracé de la “ligne Durand”, séparant l’Afghanistan du Pakistan depuis 1893, à l’époque de la plus grande gloire de l’Inde britannique. Cette non reconnaissance de la frontière actuelle permet d’inciter toutes les formes d’irrédentisme pachtoun. Pour y faire face, le Pakistan opte pour une alliance inter-pachtoun (mieux vaut prévenir que guérir...), regroupant les Pachtouns du Pakistan et d’Afghanistan, soustraits à toute influence indienne et dont l’armée serait encadrée par des officiers pakistanais.

Le Pakistan quitte-t-il l’orbite occidentale?

Face à la menace de “balkanisation” théorisée par Peters, le Pakistan ne reste toutefois pas inactif, comme le resterait un pays européen complètement émasculé: il a demandé le statut d’observateur dans le “groupe de Shanghaï”; il a renforcé ses liens anciens avec la Chine, noués lors de leur inimitié commune contre l’Inde dans la zone himalayenne et renforcés dès la signature des accords sino-américains forgés par Kissinger au début des années 70; le Pakistan tente d’entretenir de nouveaux rapports bilatéraux avec la Russie depuis juin 2009, qui auraient pour corollaire que le Pakistan abandonnerait à terme son inféodation à la géopolitique américaine héritée de la Guerre Froide et oublierait les effets négatifs du soutien soviétique puis russe à l’Inde. Lavrov est partisan d’un changement dans ce sens, souhaite de bons rapports russo-pakistanais mais sans rien lâcher de l’amitié russo-indienne. L’objectif russe est clair sur ce chapitre: il faut consolider le “Groupe de Shanghaï” et l’alliance informelle des “BRICS”. Derrière cette politique se profile un objectif évident et pacifiant: plus de conflits sur la masse continentale eurasienne! Les conseiles russes ont permis un rapprochement très timide avec le voisin indien (que n’admettent évidemment pas les extrémistes du TTP, susceptibles de s’y opposer par la manière forte).

Enfin, en dépit de la vieille hostilité entre Chiites et Sunnites, qui faisait du Pakistan un ennemi de l’Iran depuis la chute du Shah, Islamabad renforce ses liens avec Téhéran, ce qui inquiète non seulement les Américains mais aussi et surtout les Saoudiens: le tandem américano-saoudien parie sur le gazoduc “TAPI” (Turkménistan, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Inde), qui évite les territoires iranien et russe, alors que les accords irano-pakistanais visent à finaliser le gazoduc “IPI” (Iran, Pakistan, Inde), passant par le territoire des ethnies beloutches, projet qui pourrait aussi, à plus long terme, atténuer l’inimitié entre lslamabad et New Delhi, comme l’avait d’ailleurs voulu le Shah d’Iran dès la fin des années 60.

La nouvelle Realpolitik indienne et le conflit sous-jacent avec la Chine

La nouvelle Realpolitik indienne ne peut plus être considérée comme un avatar lointain du non-alignement théorisé jadis par Nehru. En dépit du rapprochement sino-indien par le truchement du “groupe de Shanghaï”, l’ennemi principal de l’Inde est aujourd’hui la Chine: ce clivage est d’ailleurs celui qui fragilise le plus l’ensemble BRICS, outre les problèmes que connait le Brésil depuis quelques mois. Face à l’ennemi héréditaire pakistanais, l’Inde peut désormais compter sur une certaine mansuétude américaine, qu’il convient toutefois de relativiser car cette “mansuétude”, toute de façade, ne sert qu’à faire chanter Islamabad ou à irriter les Chinois; lors de la visite d’Obama à New Delhi en novembre 2010, le Président américain a dicté indirectement ses conditions, en un langage faussement feutré qui relève plutôt, comme d’habitude, de l’injonction pure et simple: l’Inde doit s’engager davantage dans la propagation universelle des “droits de l’homme” (version américaine/occidentale), revenir à une forme plus idéologique du non-alignement émancipateur du tandem Gandhi/Nehru, à une sorte de tiers-mondisme revu et corrigé qui pourrait aider les Etats-Unis à damer le pion des Européens et des Chinois en Afrique subsaharienne, par exemple. Si l’Inde ne participe pas à la diplomatie subversive, dite des “droits de l’homme”, elle ne pourra pas compter sur l’appui des Etats-Unis pour faire partie du Conseil de Sécurité de l’ONU, position à laquelle elle aspire. Mais l’Inde prend surtout ombrage des relations sino-pakistanaises, se souvient de la guerre (perdue) de 1962 contre la Chine maoïste, prend au sérieux les menaces chinoises sur l’ancien Assam britannique (Arunachal Pradesh), aujourd’hui divisé en plusieurs entités administratives indiennes, soupçonne le Pakistan de favoriser l’immigration de musulmans du Bengla Desh dans le Bodoland, une entité subétatique et administrative de l’Union indienne, située dans le “Nord-Est assamite” et peuplée d’une ethnie tibéto-birmane de deux millions d’âmes, animiste, hindouisée voire christianisée et très hostile aux immigrés musulmans, accusés de faire le jeu des Pakistanais, surtout quand un tiers de la population de l’ancien Assam est désormais musulman. L’ethnie bodo craint la submersion dans une future majorité bengladaise.

L’affaire du gaz birman

Les Etats-Unis reprochent à l’Inde, quand elle articule sa double stratégie de contrer et le Pakistan et la Chine, de chercher l’alliance des Chiites iraniens et des militaires birmans, hostiles, bien entendu, à toute ingérence américaine sur le pourtour de l’Océan Indien. Quand l’Inde avait écouté les Américains et s’était éloignée de la Birmanie voisine au nom de l’idéologie occidentale des droits de l’homme, la Chine avait avancé ses pions en direction de l’Océan Indien et de la sphère d’influence indienne et avait tiré grand profit de l’isolement diplomatique imposé aux Birmans. Pire: l’affaire birmane a porté un coup dur à l’approvisionnement énergétique de l’Inde. Outre l’utilisation prévue du gazoduc IPI, saboté par tous les moyens par les Etats-Unis, contre les intérêts des trois pays concernés, l’Inde prévoyait l’acheminement de gaz birman pour ses industries en plein développement: le boycott de la Birmanie/Myanmar couplé au sabotage perpétré par le Bengla Desh, qui exige des droits de passage exorbitants, et aux troubles incessants qui secouent l’Assam (Arunachal Pradesh), a fait que les Chinois ont raflé le marché du gaz birman, désormais acheminé vers le Yunnan chinois. De plus, la Chine déploie son “collier de perles”, soit une chaîne d’installations portuaires et navales dans l’Océan Indien, du Détroit d’Ormuz au Sri Lanka et du Bengla Desh au détroit de Malaka, avec au moins quatre stations en territoire birman. L’Inde, lésée par ces avancées chinoise dans son environnement géographique immédiat, veut dorénavant défendre ses intérêts nationaux, ses intérêts vitaux et ne plus les sacrifier à des chimères idéologiques et irréalistes occidentales. Outre sa nouvelle politique positive à l’égard de la Birmanie, elle spécule sur les ressentiments anti-chinois au Vietnam ou au Japon, pratiquant dès lors une Realpolitik qui ne coïncide ni avec les intérêts américains ni avec la volonté russe d’annuler tous les conflits sur la masse continentale eurasiatique.

Trois axiomes géopolitiques à déduire des événements

Trois axiomes géopolitiques doivent être déduits de cette analyse brève de la situation fragilisée et paradoxale du Pakistan:

1)     Pas de conflits inutiles sur la masse eurasienne;

2)     Aucun soutien aux politiques américaines et saoudiennes visant à envenimer de tels conflits sur ce même vaste territoire;

3)     Liberté totale des peuples dans l’organisation de l’acheminement des hydrocarbures et d’autres matières premières, sans ingérence de puissances extérieures à leur espace (Carl Schmitt, Karl Haushofer).

 

Robert STEUCKERS.

(Rédigé à Fessevillers, Genève, Nerniers, Villeneuve-d’Asq et Forest/Flotzenberg, d’octobre 2012 à août 2013).

Bibliographie sommaire:

-          Mariam ABOU ZAHAB, “Pakistan”, in L’état du monde – 2002, La Découverte, Paris, 2001.

-          Frédéric BOBIN, “Le Pakistan veut avoir son mot à dire sur la paix afghane”, in Le Monde Hors série - Bilan géostratégique, édition 2013.

-          Gérard CHALIAND, Atlas du Nouvel Ordre Mondial, Robert Laffont, Paris, 2003.

-          Eric DENECE & Frédérique POULOT, Dico-Atlas des conflits et des menaces – Guerres, terrorisme, crime, oppression, Belin, Paris, 2010.

-          Guy SPITAELS, La triple insurrection islamique, Luc Pire/Fayard, Bruxelles/Paris, 2005.

-          Praveen SWAMI, “Le djihad au pays de Gandhi”, in Courrier international Hors-série, L’atlas du Terrorisme – Géographies, religions, politique, esthétiques, mars-avril-mai 2008.

-          Jean-Christophe VICTOR, Le dessous des cartes – Itinéraires géopolitiques, Arte Editions/Tallandier, 2012.

Articles anonymes:

-          “Afghanistan: quel avenir après 2014?”, in Diplomatie – Les Grands dossiers, n°13, février-mars 2013.

-          “Pakistan: entre le marteau et l’enclume”, in Diplomatie – Les Grands dossiers, n°13, février-mars 2013.

mardi, 25 juin 2013

Выпуск XIX. Индия

Выпуск XIX. Индия

 

 

Раджа Мохан
Новая внешняя политика Индии
 
Леонид Савин
Идеология и стратегия
 
Шаши Тхарур
Глобальный индиец
 
Родни В. Джоунс
Тема войны и мира
в индийской стратегической культуре
 
Смрути С. Паттанаик
Индия и Пакистан: на пути к мирному процессу 
 
Фрэнсис Корнигэй
Индия, Южная Африка
и уравнение IBSA-BRICS 2013
 
Табасум Фирдоус
Инициативы Индии в Центральной и Южной Азии:
проблемы и перспективы
 
Мохаммад Самир Хуссейн
Проблемы безопасности в Центральной Азии
и роль Индии
 
Адит Чарли
Ответ Индии на арабскую весну
 
Харш Пант, Джулия Супер
Балансирующие конкуренты:
Индия между Ираном и США
 
Герард О’Туатайл
Геополитические условия постмодерна:
государства, государственное управление и безопасность 
в новом тысячелетии
 
Николай Малишевский
Политическая картография
 
Рецензии
Сведения об авторах

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dimanche, 05 mai 2013

Semitic Monotheism

lap860-03173888w.jpg

S. Gurumurthy:

 

S. Gurumurthy argues that the monotheistic Semitic religions of what he calls "the West" brought intolerance to India. Traditionally, Gurumurthy argues, Indian culture was characterized by a liberal pluralism stemming from the polytheism of Hindu beliefs.

 

In the history of human civilization there have been two distinct ways of life -- the eastern and the Semitic. If we look at the history of India and of its people on the one hand and at the history of Semitic societies on the other, we find a glaring difference. In India the society and individual form the center of gravity, the fulcrum around which the polity revolves, and the state is merely a residuary concept. On the other hand, in the Semitic tradition the state wields all the power and forms the soul and the backbone of the polity. In India, temporal power was located in the lowest units of society, which developed into a highly decentralized social network. This was the very reverse of the centralized power structures that evolved in the Semitic tradition of the West. We had decentralizing institutions, of castes, of localities, of sects belonging to different faiths; of groups of people gathering around a particular deity or around a particular individual. Society was a collection of multitudes of self-contained social molecules, spontaneously linked together by socio spiritual thoughts, symbols, centers of pilgrimage, and sages. In the West the most important, and often the only, link between different institutions of the society was the state.

 

THE RESIDUAL STATE

 

Of course, the state also existed in India in the past, but only as a residual institution. It had a very limited role to perform. Even the origin of the state is said to be in the perceived necessity of an institution to perform the residual supervisory functions that became necessary because a small number of people could not harmonize with the rest in the self- regulating, self-operating and self powered functioning of the society. The state was to look after the spill-over functions that escaped the self-regulating mechanisms of the society. The Mahabharata, in the Santiparva, defines the functions of the state precisely thus. The state was to ensure that the one who strays away from public ethics does not tread on others. There was perhaps no necessity for the state at one point in our social history. The evolution of society to a point where certain individuals came to be at cross purposes with the society because of the erosion of dharmic, or ethical values, introduced the need for a limited arbiter to deal with "outlaws" who would not agree to be bound by dharma. That task was entrusted to the state. This appears to be the origin of the state here. So the society or the group, at whatever level it functioned, was the dominant reality and the state was a residual authority. The society had an identity distinct from the state. Social relations as well as religious and cultural bonds transcended the bounds of the state.

 

DHARMA VS. SOCIAL CONTRACT

 

People in the Semitic society, on the other hand, seem to have burdened themselves with the state the moment they graduated from tribalism and nomadic life to a settled existence. Thus the Semitic society never knew how to live by self-regulation. People never knew how to exist together unless their lives were ordered through the coercive institution of the state. The concept of self-regulation, the concept of dharma, the personal and public norms of action and thought that we have inherited from time immemorial, did not have any chance to evolve. Instead what evolved, for example in the Christian West, was the "social contract" theory of the state. And this became the basis of the nation state that dominated during the era of Western hegemony. But even before that, a mighty state, a nation-less state, had already evolved in the West. It was a state that cut across all nations, all societies, all ethnicities, all faiths, all races. This was the kind of state developed by the Romans. The statecraft of the Romans purveyed power and power alone. Later, after the collapse of the nationless state, tribal nationalism began to be assertive. This nation state, whose power was legitimated according to socio-religious criteria, became the model for the Semitic society. Far from being an arbiter, the state became the initiator, the fulcrum of the society.

 

STATELY RELIGION

 

Western society thus became largely a state construct. Even geography and history began to follow state power. In the scheme of things, the king symbolized total power, the army became crucial to the polity, and the police indispensable. The throne of the king became more important than the Church, and his word more important than the Bible, forcing even the Church to acquire stately attributes and begin competing with the state. That is why the first Church was founded in Rome. Because of the social recognition of state power and the importance that it had acquired, religion had to go to the seat of the state. That is how Rome, and not Bethlehem, became the center of Christian thought. The Church developed as a state-like institution, as an alternative and a competing institution. The Church began to mimic the state, and the Archbishop competed with the King. And finally religion itself became a competitor of the state. Naturally there were conflicts between these two powerful institutions -- between the state and the Church, and between the King and the Archbishop. Both owed allegiance to the same faith, the same book, the same prophet -- and yet they could not agree on who should wield ultimate power. They fought in order to decide who amongst them would be the legitimate representative of the faith. And, in their ^ght, both invoked the same God. The result was a society that was at war with itself; a society in which the stately religion was at war with the religious state. The result also was centralism and exclusivism, not only in thought, but also in the institutional arrangements. Out of such war within itself -- including between Christianity and Islam -- Semitic society evolved its centralist and exclusivist institutions that are now peddled as the panacea for the ills of all societies. As the monotheistic civilization rapidly evolved a theocratic state, it ruled out all plurality in thought. There could not be any doubt, there could not be a second thought competing with the one approved and patronized by the state, and there could not even be a second institution representing the same faith. The possibility of different religions or different attitudes to life evolving in the same society was made minimal. No one could disagree with the established doctrine without inviting terrible retribution. Whenever any semblance of plurality surfaced anywhere, it was subjected to immediate annihilation. The entire social, political and religious power of the Semitic society gravitated toward and became slowly and finally manifest in the unitary state. Thus single-dimensional universality, far more than plurality, is the key feature of Western society. The West, in fact, spawned a power-oriented, power-driven, and power-inspired civilization which sought and enforced thoughts, books, and institutions.

 

GUARDIAN SAGES

 

This unity of the Semitic state and the Semitic society proved to be its strength as a conquering power. But this was also its weakness. The moment the state became weak or collapsed anywhere, the society there also followed the fate of the state. In India, society was supported by institutions other than the state. Not just one, but hundreds and even thousands of institutions flourished within the polity and none of them had or needed to use any coercive power. Indian civilization -- culture, arts, music, and the collective life of the people guardianship of the people and of the public mind was not entrusted to the state. In fact, it was the sages, and not the state, who were seen as the guardians of the public mind. When offending forces, whether Sakas or Huns or any others, came from abroad, this society -- which was not organized as a powerful state and was without a powerful army or arms and ammunition of a kind that could meet such vast brute forces coming from outside -- found its institutions of state severely damaged. But that did not lead to the collapse of the society. The society not only survived when the institutions of the state collapsed, but in the course of time it also assimilated the alien groups and digested them into inseparable parts of the social stream. Later invaders into India were not mere gangs of armed tribes, but highly motivated theocratic war-mongers. The Indian states, which were mere residues of the Indian society, caved in before them too. But the society survived even these crusaders. In contrast, the state-oriented and state-initiated civilizations, societies and cultures of the West invariably were annihilated with the collapse of the state. Whether the Romans, the Greeks or the Christians, or the later followers of Islam, or the modern Marxists -- none of them could survive as a viable civilization once the state they had constructed collapsed. When a Semitic king won and wiped out another, it was not just another state that was wiped out, but all social bearings and moorings of the society -- all its literature, art, music, culture and language. Everything relating to the society was extinguished. In the West of today, there are no remnants of what would have been the products of Western civilization 1500 years ago. The Semitic virtue rejected all new and fresh thought. Consequently, any fresh thought could prevail only by annihilating its predecessor. At one time only one thought could hold sway. There was no scope for a second.

 

EASTERN PLURALISM

 

In the East, more specifically in India, there prevailed a society and a social mind which thrived and happily grew within a multiplicity of thoughts. "Ano bhadrah kratavo yantu visatah" ("let noble thoughts come in from all directions of the universe") went the Rigvedic invocation. We, therefore, welcomed all, whether it was the Parsis who came fleeing from the slaughter of Islamic theocratic marauders and received protection here for their race and their religion, or the Jews who were slaughtered and maimed everywhere else in the world. They all found a secure refuge here along with their culture, civilization, religion and the book. Even the Shia Muslims, fearing annihilation by their coreligionists, sought shelter in Gujarat and constituted the first influx of Muslims into India. Refugee people, refugee religions, refugee cultures and civilizations came here, took root and established a workable, amicable relationship with their neighborhood. They did not -- even now they do not -- find this society alien or foreign. They could grow as constituent parts of an assimilative society and under an umbrella of thought that appreciated their different ways. When first Christianity, and later Islam, came to India as purely religious concerns, they too found the same assimilative openness. The early Christians and Muslims arriving on the west coast of India did not find anything hostile in the social atmosphere here. They found a welcoming and receptive atmosphere in which the Hindus happily offered them temple lands for building a church or a mosque. (Even today in the localities of Tamilnadu temple lands are offered for construction of mosques). It was only the later theocratic incursions by the Mughals and the British that introduced theological and cultural maladjustments, creating conflict between the assimilative and inclusive native ways of the East and the exclusive and annihilative instincts of Islam and even Christianity. Until this occurred, the native society assimilated the new thoughts and fresh inputs, and had no difficulty in keeping intact its social harmony within the plurality of thoughts and faiths. This openness to foreign thoughts, faiths and people did not happen because of legislation, or a secular constitution or the teachings of secular leaders and parties. We did not display this openness because of any civilizing inspiration and wisdom which we happened to have received from the West. Yet, we are somehow made to believe, and we do, that we have become a somewhat civilized people and have come to learn to live together in harmony with others only through the civilization, the language, the statecraft and the societal influence of the West! It is a myth that has become an inseparable component of the intellectual baggage that most of us carry.

 

SURVIVING THE SEMITIC ONSLAUGHT

 

Religious fanaticism, invaded us and extinguished our states and institutions, our society could still survive and preserve its multidimensional life largely intact. Our survival has been accompanied, however, with an extraordinary sense of guilt. In our own eyes, we remain a society yet to be fully civilized. This is because, as the state in India quickly became an instrument in the hands of the invaders and colonizers, we were saddled not just with an unresponsive state, but a state hostile to the nation itself. A state-less society in India would have fared better. Such a paradox has existed nowhere else in the history of the world. When we look at the history of any other country, we find that whenever an overpowering alien state came into being, it wiped out everything that it saw as a native thought or institution. And if the natives insisted on holding on to their thought and institutions, then they were wiped out. But the Indian society survived under an alien and hostile state for hundreds of years, albeit at the price of having today lost almost all initiative and self confidence as a civilization.

 

GIVE ME YOUR PERSECUTED

 

How did the assimilative Hindu cultural convictions fare in practice, not just in theory and in the archives? This is probably best seen by comparing the Iranians of today with the Parsis of India. A few thousand of them who came here and who now number 200,000 have lived in a congenial atmosphere. They have not been subjected to any hostility to convert, or to give up their cultural or even racial distinction. They have had every chance, as much as the natives had, to prosper and evolve. And they did. They have lived and prospered here for 1500 years, more or less the same way as they would have lived and prospered in their own lands, had those lands not been ravaged by Islam. Compare an average Parsi with an average Iranian. Does the Persian society today display any native attributes of the kind that the Parsis, living in the Indian society, have managed to preserve? One can ^nd no trace of those original native attributes in the Iranian society today. That is because not only the native institutions, native faiths and native literature, but also the native mind and all vestiges of native originality were wiped out by Islam. That society was converted and made into a uniform outfit in form, shape and mental condition. On that condition alone would Islam accept it. What Islam did to the natives in Egypt, Afghanistan and Persia, or what Christianity did to the Red Indians in America, or what Christianity and Islam did to each other in Europe, or the Catholics did to Protestants, or the Sunnis did to Shias and the Kurds and the Ahmedias, or what the Shias did to the Bahais, was identical. In every case the annihilation of the other was attempted -- annihilation of other thoughts, other thinkers and other followers. The essential thrust of the Semitic civilizational effort, including the latest effort of Marxist monotheism, has been to enforce uniformity, and failing that, to annihilate. How can the West claim that it taught us how to lead a pluralistic life? If you look at history, you find that they were the ones who could not, and never did, tolerate any kind of plurality, either in the religious or the secular domain. If it has dawned upon them today that they have to live with plurality, it must be because of the violence they have had to commit against themselves and each other. The mass slaughter which the Western society has been subjected to by the adherents of different religious thoughts and by different tyrants is unimaginable, and perhaps they are now sick of this slaughter and violence. But the view we get, and are asked to subscribe to, is that the "civilized" West was a peaceful society, and that we brutes down here never knew how to live at peace with ourselves and our neighbors until liberated by the literate. What a paradox!

 

TEMPORAL POWER

 

The foundation of the Semitic system is laid on temporal power. For acceptance and survival in this system even religion had to marry and stick to temporal authority at the cost of losing its spiritual moorings. It was with this power -- first the state power, which still later was converted into technological power -- that the Christian West was able to establish its dominance. This brute dominance was clothed in the garb of modernity and presented as the civilization of the world. The aggressively organized Western society, through its powerful arm of the state, was able to overcome and subordinate the expressions of the self- governing decentralized society of the East that did not care to have the protection of a centralized state. Our society, unorganized in the physical sense, although it was much more organized in a civilizational sense, had a more evolved mind. But it did not have the muscle; it did not have the fire power. Perhaps because of the Buddhist influence, our society acquired disproportionately high Brahmatejas, Brahminical piety and authority, which eroded the Kshatravirya, the temporal war-making power. So it caved in and ceded temporal authority to the more powerful state and the statecraft that came from outside. The society that caves in is, in terms of the current global rules, a defeated society. This society cannot produce or generate the kind of self-confidence which is required in the modern world.

 

DYNAMIC CHRISTIANS, STAGNANT MUSLIMS

 

The nation-state was so powerful, that other countries, like India, could not stand against it. And when the nation-state concept was powered by religious exclusivism it had no equal. When religion acquired the state, the church itself was the first victim of that acquisition. Christianity suffered from the Christian state. It had to struggle not only against Islamic states and Islamic society, but also against itself. As a consequence, it underwent a process of moderation. First, it experienced dissent, then renaissance through arts, music and culture. Thus Christianity was able to overcome the effect of theocratic statecraft by slowly evolving as a society not entirely identified with the state. First the state began to dominate over the Church on the principle of separation between the religious and temporal authorities. The result was the evolution of the secular state. Thus the King wrested the secular power from the Archbishop. Then through democratic movements following the French Revolution, the people wrested power from the King. Later commerce invaded public life as the prime thrust of the Christian West. The theocratic state abdicated in favor of a secular state, the secular state gave way to democracy and later democracy gave way to commerce. Then power shifted from commerce to technology. And now in the Christian West, the state and the society are largely powered by commerce and technology. The Christian West today is even prepared to give up the concept of the nation-state to promote commerce fueled by technological advance. Look at the consolidation that is taking place between Mexico, Canada and the United States of America around trade, and the kind of pyramidal politico economic consolidation that is taking place in Western Europe. All this is oriented towards only one thing West.

 

ISLAM REMAINED UNCHANGED

 

While the Christian West has evolved dynamically over the past few centuries, the story of Islam is one of 1500 years of unmitigated stagnation. There has never been a successful attempt from within Islam to start the flow, so to speak. Anyone who attempted to start even a variant of the mainstream flow -- anyone who merely attempted to reinterpret the same book and the same prophet -- was disposed of with such severity that it set an example and a warning to anyone who would dare to cross the line. Some, who merely said that it was not necessary for the Islamic Kingdom to be ruled by the Prophet's own descendants were wiped out. Some others said that the Prophet himself may come again -- not that somebody else might come, but the Prophet himself may be reborn. They were also wiped out. The Sunnis, the Shias, the Ahmedias, the Bahais -- all of whom trusted the same prophet, revered the same book and were loyal to the same revelation -- were all physically and spiritually maimed. From the earliest times, Islam has proved itself incapable of producing an internal evolution; internally legitimized change has not been possible since all change is instantly regarded as an act of apostasy. Every change was -- and is -- put down with bloodshed. In contrast, the Hindu ethos changed continuously. Though, it was always change with continuity: from ritualistic life, to agnostic Buddhism, to the Ahimsa of Mahavira, to the intellect of Sankara, to the devotion of Ramanuja, and finally to the modern movements of social reform. In India, all these changes have occurred without the shedding of a single drop of blood. Islam, on the other hand retains its changelessness, despite the spilling of so much blood all around. It is the changelessness of Islam -- its equal revulsion towards dissent within and towards non-Islamic thoughts without -- that has made it a problem for the whole world.

 

ISLAM IN INDIA

 

The encounter between the inclusive and assimilative heritage of India and exclusive Islam, which had nothing but theological dislike for the native faiths, was a tussle between two unequals. On the one side there was the inclusive, universal and spiritually powerful -- but temporally unorganized - native Hindu thought. And on the other side there was the temporally organized and powerful -- but spiritually exclusive and isolated -- Islam. Islam subordinated, for some time and in some areas, the Hindu temporal power, but it could not erode Hindu spiritual power. If anything, the Hindu spiritual power incubated the offending faith and delivered a milder form of Islam -- Sufism. However, the physical encounter was one of the bloodiest in human history. We survived this test by fire and sword. But the battle left behind an unassimilated Islamic society within India. The problem has existed since then, to this day.

 

ISLAM, INDIA AND THE CHRISTIAN WEST

 

The Hindu renaissance in India is the Indian contribution to an evolving global attitude that calls for a review of the conservative and extremist Islamic attitudes towards non-Islamic faiths and societies. The whole world is now concerned with the prospect of extremist Islam becoming a problem by sanctifying religious terrorism. So long as the red flag was flying atop the Kremlin, the Christian West tried to project communism as the greatest enemy of world peace. It originally promoted Islam and Islamic fundamentalism against the fanaticism of communism. The West knew it could match communism in the market-place, in technology, in commerce, and even in war, but it had no means of combating communism on the emotive plane. So they structured a green Islamic belt -- from Tunisia to Indonesia -- to serve as a bulwark against Marxist thought. But that has changed now. When communism collapsed, extremist Islam with its terrorist tendencies instantly emerged in the mind of the Christian West as the major threat to the world.

 

HINDUS SURVIVED MUSLIM INVASION

 

We must realize that we have a problem on hand in India, the problem of a stagnant and conservative Islamic society. The secular leaders and parties tell us that the problem on our hands is not Islamic fundamentalism, but the Hindutva ideology. This view is good only for gathering votes. The fact is that we have a fundamentalist Muslim problem, and our problem cannot be divorced from the international Islamic politics and the world's reaction to it. To understand the problem and to undertake the task of solving it successfully, we must know the nature of Hindu society and its encounter with Islam in India. As a nation, we are heckled by the secularist historians and commentators: "You are caste-oriented, you are a country with 900 languages, and most of them with no script," they say. "You can't even communicate in one language, you don't have a common religious book which all may follow. You are not a nation at all. In contrast, look at the unity of Islam and its brotherhood." But the apparently unorganized and diverse Hindu society is perhaps the only society in the world that faced, and then survived, the Islamic theocratic invasion. We, the Hindu nation, have survived because of the very differences that seem to divide us. It is in some ways a mind- boggling phenomenon: For 500 to 600 years we survived the invasion of Islam as no other society did. The whole of Arabia, which had a very evolved civilization, was run over in a matter of just 20 years. Persia collapsed within 50 years. Buddhist Afghans put up a brave resistance for 300 years but, in the end, they also collapsed. In all of these countries today there remains nothing pre- Islamic worth the name save for some broken down architectural monuments from their pre-Islamic past. How did our society survive the Islamic onslaught? We have survived not only physically, but intellectually too. We have preserved our culture. The kind of music that was heard 1500 years ago is heard even today. Much of the literature too remains available along with the original phonetic intonations. So the Indian society continued to function under a hostile occupation even without a protective state. Or rather, we survived because our soul did not reside in an organized state, but in an organized national consciousness, in shared feelings of what constitutes human life in this universe that happens to be such a wonderfully varied manifestation of the divine, of Brahman.

 

HINDUTVA AS INDIA'S ANCHOR

 

The assimilative Hindu cultural and civilizational ethos is the only basis for any durable personal and social interaction between the Muslims and the rest of our countrymen. This societal assimilative realization is the basis for Indian nationalism, and only an inclusive Hindutva can assimilate an exclusive Islam by making the Muslims conscious of their Hindu ancestry and heritage. A national effort is called for to break Islamic exclusivism and enshrine the assimilative Hindutva. This alone constitutes true nationalism and true national integration. This is the only way to protect the plurality of thoughts and institutions in this country. To the extent secularism advances Islamic isolation and exclusivism, it damages Hindu inclusiveness and its assimilative qualities. And in this sense secularism as practiced until now conflicts with Indin nationalism. Inclusive and assimilative Hindutva is the socio-cultural nationalism of India. So long as our national leaders ignore this eternal truth, national integration will keep eluding us.

 

Center for Policy Studies, Madras.
1993.

samedi, 13 avril 2013

De vedische zieners

De vedische zieners

Koenraad Elst

Ex: http://www.alfredvierling.com/

Aardrijkskundige en geschiedkundige situering

radha-10.jpgDe vedische hymnen werden volgens de vedische overlevering zelf hoofdzakelijk gecomponeerd in de schoot van de Paurava-stam, de stam van Puru, één van de vijf zonen van Yayāti, een prins van de Maandynastie uit Prayāg (later bekend als Allāhābād) en veroveraar van het bovenstroomgebied van de Sarasvatī in het noordwesten van India. Deze was via een gemeenschappelijke voorvader, Manu Vaivasvata die de zondvloed overleefde, verwant met de Zonnedynastie uit Ayodhyā, waartoe Rāma (en later ondermeer ook de Boeddha) behoorde. Eén van de eerste Paurava-koningen heette Bharata. Het is naar hem dat India zichzelf nog steeds Bhāratavarsa of kortweg Bhārat noemt.

In de Veda’s worden alle Paurava’s, vriend of vijand, Ārya genoemd, “volksgenoot”, dezelfde betekenis die dit woord heeft in het Iraans en het Anatolisch. Omgekeerd wordt geen enkele niet-Paurava, of hij nu vriend of vijand was, zo genoemd. Naarmate de vedische traditie normatief en nagebootst werd, ging Ārya “vedisch, beschaafd” betekenen.

De absolute chronologie van de Veda’s is een heikele kwestie. De meeste handboeken geven de data uit de theorie van westerse oriëntalisten weer, namelijk ruwweg 1500 tot 1000 v.Chr. De inheemse chronologie, ondersteund door enkele sterrenkundige gegevens in de vedische literatuur zelf, situeert de oudste teksten in het 4de millennium v.Chr., met jongere teksten tot in het 2de millennium, met als één van de jongste de Jyotisa-Vedānga, die zichzelf via sterrenkundige gegevens expliciet rond 1350 (of 1800) v.Chr. dateert.

Een open vraag is die naar het verband tussen de vedische literatuur en de archeologische vondsten in steden als Harappa en Kalibangan, samen de grootste beschaving van het 3de millennium v.Chr. Enerzijds een enorme literatuur zonder materiële resten, anderzijds een massa archeologische resten zonder enige literatuur (zgn. David Frawley’s paradox): het suggereert dat we met twee helften van één beschaving te maken hebben. Maar zolang de flarden teksten op Harappa-zegels niet ontcijferd zijn, blijft het mogelijk dat zij een taal weergeven die niets met het vedische Sanskrit te maken heeft. Het onderzoek gaat verder.

Nadien verspreidde de vedische samenleving naar het oosten en zuiden. Dit was deels genoodzaakt door een opdroging van de noordwestelijke zone, deels omdat vorsten daar zich het prestige van de vedische beschaving wilden eigen maken.

De Mahābhārata-oorlog markeert het einde van de vedische periode. De vader of grootvader van de meeste protagonisten, Krsna Dvaipayana alias Vyāsa, was de eindredacteur die volgens de hindoe-overlevering de vedische collecties hun definitieve vorm gaf. We zien van dan af een verschuiving van de vedische god Indra naar de vergoddelijkte historische figuur Krsna Vāsudeva, een prins die als wagenmenner aan de veldslag deelneemt. Volgens westerse geleerden vond die oorlog (als hij al historisch is) plaats rond 900 v.Chr., volgens de hindoetraditie en de meeste hindoes in of rond 3139 v.Chr. Zelf sluit ik mij aan bij de minderheidsopinie die voor zowat de 15de eeuw v.Chr. kiest, precies de tijd van de zo centrale oorlogvoering met strijdwagens (zie gelijktijdig de Egyptisch-Hittitische oorlog of in de 13de eeuw de oorlog om Troje), niet betuigd vóór 2200 v.Chr. Het epos vermeldt ook dat de volle maan nabij de ster Regulus (Magha) nà de winterevening plaatsvond, wat pas na 2300 v.Chr. kon.

Vier hymnencollecties en aanhangsels

Drie vedische samhitā’s (collecties): Rk/“hymne”-, Sāma/“melodie”-, Yajuh/“offerspreuk”-Veda-Samhitā, vormen het Veda-drievoud. Zij bestaan uit hymnen aan de goden, gecomponeerd door mensen. Merk de tegenstelling met de Tien Geboden of de Koran, die geacht worden door God aan de mensen gericht te worden. Moderne hindoes zien de Veda’s als apauruseya, “onpersoonlijk”, en interpreteren dit als “geopenbaard”, precies zoals de Koran of de Tien Geboden; maar de vedische hymnen zelf pleiten daartegen, want zij worden door de mens aan een godheid gericht.

Deze hymnen bevatten enkele kosmologische bespiegelingen en terloops ook een aantal geschied- en aardrijkskundige gegevens. De invloedrijke hervormingsbeweging Ārya Samāj duidde deze concrete gegevens, bv. plaats- en persoonsnamen, als symbolen voor bewustzijnstoestanden, maar daar kan je niets mee aanvangen. De Sāma-Veda-Samhitā herneemt een deel van de Rg-vedische hymnen, maar dan in gezongen vorm. De jongere Yajur-Veda-Samhitā is vooral begaan met het offerritueel, wat de duiding van de twee oudere Veda’s beïnvloed heeft. Sommige hymnen worden in rituelen gebruikt, andere niet.

Pas later is hier de Atharva/“offerpriester”-Veda-Samhitā aan toegevoegd. Hij heeft minder prestige, mogelijk wegens de behandeling van toverij, inbegrepen bezweringen met genezende kracht; of wegens de Perzische invloed daarin. Figuren, producten of ideeën uit het noordwesten (het huidige Pakistan) werden altijd een beetje miszien.

De Rg-Veda-Samhitā omvat 1028 hymnen (sūkta, < su-vakta, “goed gezegd), meestal gesteld in de vorm van een aanroeping van een met name genoemde godheid door de in een aparte index (anukramanī) met name genoemde componist of rsi, “ziener”. Zij zijn uiteraard in versvorm (mantra) met vast metrum, waarbij bepaalde lettergrepen op hogere of lagere toon gereciteerd worden, dit mede als geheugensteun. Zij zijn gegroepeerd in tien boeken (mandala’s), waarvan de volgorde uit het oorspronkelijk aantal hymnen voortkomt, wat echter deels gemaskeerd werd doordat er tijdens het redactieproces nog hymnen bijgekomen zijn. De historische volgorde is, spijts overlappingen, 6-3-7-2-4-5, dan 1 en 8, dan 9 en dan 10. Boeken 2-7 heten de “familieboeken” omdat zij telkens door één familie zieners opgesteld zijn. Boek 8 was de oorspronkelijke afsluiter, en was net als het inleidend boek 1 ook een verzamelwerk uit verschillende families.

Boek 9 is toegevoegd aan een bestaand geheel, nl. de eerste acht boeken. Het bestaat uit hymnen van rsi’s (“zieners”) uit alle vedische families, gericht aan de Soma (“sap”, “geperst”), het aftreksel van een psychotropische plant. Jawel, de zieners waren nog geen saaie geleerden maar eerder trippende dichters. Dit geeft voedsel aan de theorie van Mircea Eliade dat yoga voortkwam uit het sjamanisme: de Veda’s bevatten nog sjamanistische elementen zoals geestreizen met behulp van geestesverruimende planten. Boek 10 kwam nog later, het is duidelijk jonger in taal.

Bijkomende literatuur

Bij elk van de collecties horen een aantal bijkomende geschriften, deels in vers maar grotendeels in proza, te groeperen in drie opeenvolgende categorieën: Brāhmana’s/“priesterboeken”, Āranyaka’s/“woudboeken”, en Upanisad-en/“zitten aan de voet van (de meester)”, vandaar “vertrouwelijk onderricht, geheimleer”. In de eerste categorie ligt de klemtoon op de praktische instructies voor het ritueel, al komen er ook wijsgerige passages in voor. In de tweede categorie verschuift de klemtoon naar de symbolische interpretatie van het ritueel, dat in de derde categorie grotendeels uit het zicht verdwijnt en plaats maakt voor diepzinnige wijsbegeerte.

Volgens de 19de-eeuwse wijsgeer Arthur Schopenhauer zijn de Oepanisjaden het hoogste wat de menselijke geest ooit heeft voortgebracht; in ieder geval bevatten ze een geestelijke revolutie, namelijk de verschuiving van karmakānda, rituele godsdienstoefeningen, naar jñānakānda, bewustzijnscultuur. Het brandpunt van de belangstelling is niet langer de godenwereld, maar het Zelf (ātman).

Van materiëlere aard zijn de zes hulpwetenschappen/Vedānga’s van de vedische traditie: Vyākarana, “spraakkunst”; Śiksā, “eufonie, uitspraakleer”: Candas, “metrum, versbouw”; Nirukta, “etymologie”; Jyotisa, “sterrenkunde”; en Kalpa, “gelijkenis, procedure, ritueel”. Deze laatste categorie van eerder technische teksten met alle mogelijke details over alle mogelijke private en openbare rituelen bevat interessante aanzetten tot exacte wetenschap, bv. sterrenkundige kennis om te bepalen wanneer rituelen moeten plaatsvinden, of meetkundige kennis (inbegrepen de oudste formulering van de stelling van Pythagoras) in de voorschriften voor de bouw van een vedisch altaar.

Daarnaast zijn er de wereldse “ondergeschikte wetenschappen” of Upaveda’s zoals Dhanur-Veda, “krijgskunde”; Artha-Śāstra, “kennis van het wereldse succes”, staatkunde en economie; Gāndharva-Veda, “musicologie”; en tenslotte Āyur-Veda, “kennis van de levensspanne”, gezondheidskunde alias geneeskunde. Men rangschikt de Āyur-Veda bij de aanhangselen van de Atharva-Veda omdat deze laatste ook bezweringen inzake ziekte en gezondheid bevat. De studie van de oudste geneeskundige teksten maakt echter zonneklaar dat zij op kruidenkundige praktijk en empirische waarneming van ziektebeelden gebaseerd zijn, en alleen om redenen van schriftuurlijk prestige aan de Atharva-Veda gekoppeld worden.

agni_01.gifTenslotte zijn uit al deze intellectuele bedrijvigheid nog de volgende vier disciplines voortgekomen: Mīmānsā, “duiding, exegese”; Nyāya, “oordeel, logica”; Purāna, “oudheid, geschiedenis”, weliswaar overlopend in mythologie; en Dharma-Śāstra, “ethiek”, maatschappelijke plichtenleer, sociologie. De eerste twee zijn het begin van de “zes standpunten” of wijsgerige scholen, met als overige vier Sānkhya, “opsomming”, elementenleer, dualistische kosmologie; Vaiśesika, “onderscheiding van bijzonderheden”, pluralistische kosmologie; Yoga, “beheersing”, leer van de controle over het gedachtenleven; en Uttara-Mīmānsā, “latere duiding” alias Vedānta, “het sluitstuk van de Veda”, d.w.z. de monistische uitwerking van de oepanisjadische leer van het Zelf.

Purāna wordt de titel van 18 geschiedkundig-mythologische compendia met alle mogelijke verhalen over zowel godheden en vergoddelijkte mensen als over historische koningen, huwelijken en veldslagen. Sommige verhalen gebruiken de vedische zieners als hoofdfiguur; soms zijn zij volledig onhistorisch en later bedacht; maar soms bewaren zij zeer oude kennis. De schier onmogelijke kunst bestaat erin, het kaf van het koren te scheiden. Qua thematiek gaat deze literatuur in de middeleeuwen over in de Tantra’s, “systemen”, “handboeken”. De Dharma-Śāstra’s, tenslotte, zijn de teksten over de onderscheiden plichten van de leden van de samenleving naargelang geslacht, levensfase en kaste. Zij zijn deels normatief maar deels ook gewoon beschrijvend, en vertonen dan ook een inhoudelijke evolutie in functie van veranderende maatschappelijke zeden.

De epische literatuur noemt men Itihāsa, uit iti-ha-āsa, “zo inderdaad was het”, te vergelijken met het “er was eens” in onze sprookjes. In het moderne Hindi is dit de normale term voor “geschiedenis”. Inhoudelijk loopt zij over in de Purāna-literatuur, maar als Itihāsa beduidt men specifiek de twee grote epen, de Rāmāyana en de Mahābhārata. Dit zijn verhalencycli met een vagelijk historisch kernverhaal, nadien rijkelijk bijgekleurd, en daarin verweven tal van subplots en gastverhalen, vaak van nog oudere oorsprong. Bovendien is er voortdurend aan bijgeschreven tot de eindredactie, die pas in de laatste eeuwen vóór Christus plaatsvond. Beide epen hebben een opvoedende bedoeling, een soort mega-zedenles over het sleutelbegrip dharma, min of meer “plichtenleer”, “integratie in de wereldorde”.

De Bhagavad-Gītā, “lied des Heren”, vormt een kerndeel van de Mahābhārata. Het vat de vedische en andere filosofieën samen maar introduceert een nieuw en later sterk dominant element, nl. bhakti, “devotie”, bv. tot de vergoddelijke Krsna. Voor een juist begrip van het levende hindoeïsme is kennis van de epen belangrijker dan kennis van de Veda’s, waaraan men wel lippendienst betuigt maar die slechts bij specialisten bekend zijn.

De belangrijkste zieners

Eigen Indiase etymologie leidt rsi, “ziener”, af uit de stam rs, “gaan, bewegen, reiken (naar de hogere wereld door kennis)”. Het woord zou echter verwant kunnen zijn met Iers arsan, “oude, wijze”; of met Germaans razen, “in extase zijn” (Manfred Mayrhofer). Het zou ook kunnen komen van een Indo-Europese stam h3er-s-, “rijzen, uitsteken”, in de zin van “uitstekend zijn” (Julius Pokorny). Men hoort ook vaak Monier Monier-Williams’ 19de-eeuwse suggestie dat het om een verbastering gaat van *drsi, wat heel letterlijk “ziener” betekent. Hoe dat ook zij, hier volgen de bekendste vedische zieners.

Bharadvāja was de hoofdauteur van het oudste, 6de boek, en een tijdgenoot van koning Bharata. Traditioneel wordt hem grote geleerdheid en meditatiekracht toegeschreven. Hij was een zoon van Brhaspati, kleinzoon van Angiras, samen het drievoud/Traya genoemd, en een voorouder van Drona. Zijn hermitage (āśrama) bij Prayāg bestaat nog steeds. Zijn grootvader Angiras was ook co-auteur met Atharva van de Atharva-Veda.

Viśvāmitra is de hoofdauteur van meeste van boek 3, inbegrepen de Gāyatrī mantra. Verhaald wordt in de Rāmāyana, hoofdstuk Bālakanda, dat hij de achterkleinzoon van koning Kuśa (niet te verwarren mat Rāma’s zoon Kuśa) was en daarom Kauśika genoemd werd. In de Mahābhārata, hoofdstuk Ādiparva, wordt verhaald hoe hij betrekkingen had met de nimf Menakā, gezonden door Indra om zijn ascese te testen, waaruit Śakuntalā voortkwam, die hij niet erkende; hij vervloekte zijn minnares omdat ze zijn ascese gebroken had. Het Puranisch verhaal situeert deze asceseoefeningen in het kader van zijn rivaliteit met de ziener Vasistha om de gunst van koning Sudās, Hij wilde Vasistha’s koe Nandinī, gift van Indra en dochter van diens koe Kāmadhenu. Na vernedering door Vasistha zag hij de macht van ascese, beoefende ze en gaf er zijn koninkrijk voor op. Hij werd een Brahmarsi (een ziener die Brahma kent; een priester) en kreeg de naam Viśvāmitra.

Vasistha, hoofdauteur van het 7de boek, waaronder de Mrtyuñjaya mantra. Speelde een rol in Sudās’ zege in de Slag van de Tien Koningen. Hij en koning Bhava zijn de enige mensen aan wie een hymne uit de Veda’s gewijd is. Hij had een gurukula (“leermeesterfamilie”, verblijfsschool) aan de Beas-rivier met zijn vrouw Arundhatī. Hun namen worden nu nog gebruikt voor de sterren Mizar en Alcor in de Grote Beer. De leermeester van Rāma, hofpriester van diens vader, heette ook Vasistha. Hoewel Rāma in de vedische tijd gesitueerd wordt (Krsna op het einde ervan), hoeft het niet om dezelfde persoon te gaan; het was een talrijke familie. Ze was herkenbaar, want zieners van die familie droegen hun haarknoetje rechts.

Grtsamada was de auteur van 36 van de 43 hymnes uit Mandala 2 (daarnaast zijn hymne 27-29 door zijn zoon Kurma gecomponeerd, en 4-7 door Somahuti), behoort tot de familie Angiras, bekend van het zesde boek, maar werd door de wil van Indra overgedragen aan de familie Bhrgu.

Vāmadeva, is de belangrijkste auteur van boek 4. Later werd hij vereenzelvigd met één van de vijf aspecten van para-Śiva, namelijk het dichterlijke, vredige, gracieuze. Links (Vāma) is noord als je de opgaande zon begroet, vandaar beduidt hij het noordelijke aspect.

Atri, auteur van sommige hymnen het 5de boek, werd later beschouwd als vader van ondermeer Dattātreya en, warempel (met overbrugging van enkele eeuwen) Patañjali. De Rāmāyana verhaalt dat Rāma hem bezocht in het woud tijdens zijn ballingschap (evenals de āśrama’s van Agastya en Gautama). Hij werd eeuwen later nog eens opgetrommeld om Drona tijdens de Mahābhārata-veldslag te kalmeren.

Kanva, Kaksīvān, Gotama en Parāśara zijn bekende zieners uit boek 1, evenals Agastya en Dīrghatamas. Laatstgenoemde was de hofpriester van koning Bharata, auteur van hymne 140-164, met 164 als één van de rijkste en bekendste hymnen. We vinden er voor het eerst de sterrenkundige hemelindeling in 360; het yogische inzicht dat dadendrang en waarneming twee complementaire bezigheden zijn, hier verbeeld door twee vogels waarvan de ene vruchten eet en de andere slechts toekijkt; en “de lettergreep”, wat kennelijk op aum/om duidt.

Agastya was gehuwd met Lopāmudrā, die hem in een duo-hymne smeekt om geslachtsverkeer en nageslacht. Hij bracht de vedische rituelen naar het Vindhyā-gebergte in het zuiden; de zuidelijke ster Canopus is naar hem genoemd.

Kaśyapa is de naam van een ziener, maar ook van de vader der goden (Āditya’s), die hij verwekte bij zijn hoofdvrouw Aditī. Hij was de stichter van het naar hem genoemde Kaśmīr, dat hij drooglegde.

Bhrgu wordt geassocieerd met het vuuroffer, centrum van de vedische bedrijvigheid. Zijn naam is verwant met Brigit, aan wie in Ierland een vuurtempel gewijd was, met de Griekse vuurpriesters of phleguai, en kennelijk ook met de landsnaam Phrygia. Hij was de vader van de ziener Śukra. Het astrologisch handboek Bhrgu Samhitā wordt aan hem toegeschreven. Het betreft de nu gebruikelijke hellenistische horoscopie, met de bekende Dierenriem van twaalf tekens.

Jamadagni was een afstammeling van Bhrgu, met vrouw Renukā vader van Jāmadagni ofte Paraśurāma. Dit is kennelijk een Puranische verhaspeling van Parśurāma, “de Perzische Rāma”, want hij was net als zijn voorvader Bhrgu van Iraanse afkomst.

De “zeven rsi’s”

De zeven sterren van de Grote Beer worden in India de Sapta-rsi, “zeven zieners”, genoemd. Eerste versie: Grtsamada, Vāmadeva, Atri, Angiras, Vasistha, Viśvāmitra, Bharadvāja, Kanva.

Tweede versie in de Śatapatha Brāhmana: Jamadagni, Bharadvāja, Vasistha, Viśvāmitra, Kaśyapa, Atri, Gautama (= Uddālaka Āruni), later uitgebreid met Pracetas/Daksa, Bhrgu, Nārada, samen de tien “heren der schepselen”.

Derde versie, specifiek betrekking hebbend op het vroegere eerste Manu-tijdperk, vinden we in de Mahābhārata: Marici, Pulaha, Pulastya (vader van Agastya, langs andere zoon grootvader van Rāma’s tegenstander Rāvana), Vasistha, Atri, Angiras, Kratu.

Niet in de Veda’s

Wat er niét in de Rg-Veda staat, hoewel tegenwoordig toch “vedisch” genoemd:

· Wedergeboorte en de bijbehorende werking-op-afstand/karma (wel karma als “ritueel”), beide verschijnen samen in de Chândogya Upanisad.

· Asceten: zwerfmonniken worden slechts vermeld (“naakt en modderig”) als een bestaande beweging, maar waar de zieners zelf duidelijk niet toe behoorden.

· Verlichting/bevrijding. Pas in de Upanisaden duikt de bevrijding (mukti) uit de onwetendheid (avidyâ) op als streefdoel. De wereld als tranendal en de nood om dááruit te ontsnappen daagt voorzichtig aan de horizon in de Sânkhya-wijsbegeerte, waarvan de we eerste sporen ook in de Upanisaden aantreffen, maar komt pas echt in het centrum met het boeddhisme. De vedische hymnen daarentegen zijn levenslustig. Het doel van rituelen en zelfs van zelfkastijding is werelds geluk in allerlei vormen.

· Ideaal van geweldloosheid, vegetarisme, onschendbaarheid van de koe.

· Goddelijke openbaring. Anders dan beweerd profetische teksten (Tien Geboden, Qur’ān) geven de vedische hymnen volstrekt niet voor, van goddelijke oorsprong te zijn. Zij worden door mensen, de zieners die met naam bekend zijn, vaak zelfs met stamboom en levensschets, tot één of meerdere van de (“33”) goden gericht. Zij zijn mensenwerk.

· Tempels en beeldenverering: onbekend in de Veda’s en in de Harappa-steden. Duiken pas op na Alexander o.i.v. de Grieken (die ze zelf aan het Midden-Oosten ontleend hadden). Idem voor de zoeterigheid en extreme onderdanigheid typisch voor het middeleeuwse en moderne Bhakti (devotie) tegenover goden en goeroes.

· Astrologie, d.i. sterrenwichelarij. Wel sterrenkunde, bv. berekening van verhouding maanmaand/zonnejaar. Een aanhangsel bij Atharva-Veda bevat embryonale astrologie, echter grondig verschillend van de Babylonisch-Hellenistische die nu “vedisch” heet. De echte vedische astrologie betrof geen persoonlijke horoscopie, wel het bepalen van gunstige tijdstippen voor rituelen (nu nog voor bruiloften) met een Dierenriem van 27 of 28 “maanhuizen”.

· Kundalinī en de cakra’s: verschijnen pas in middeleeuwse teksten.

· Hatha-yoga-āsana’s. Pas uit de late middeleeuwen. Tot dan alleen “aangename doch stevige zithouding” als lichamelijke grondslag voor meditatie, reeds afgebeeld op Harappa-zegels. Wel vanaf het begin eenvoudige Prānāyāma.

Wel kiemen daarvan:

· Monisme: “Hij die in de zon leeft, hem ben ik” (so’ham); het Brahman is in de mens.

· Polymorf theïsme: “De wijzen noemen het Ene Ware met vele namen.”

· Kosmisch corporatisme: heelal en samenleving vergeleken met menselijk lichaam met organische samenhang tussen alle leden. Bandhu, overeenkomst/resonantie tussen verschillende bestaansdomeinen (Zo boven, zo beneden).

· Onthechting: “Twee vogels, de ene eet vruchten en de andere kijkt slechts toe.”

· Agnosticisme, skepsis: de geheimen van de schepping, “misschien kent ook Hij ze niet.”

· Meditatie, of althans verstilling om voor hymnische inspiratie open te staan.

dimanche, 07 avril 2013

Banco de Desarrollo de los BRICS

Los países emergentes de BRICS, Brasil, Rusia, India, China y Sudáfrica acuerdan establecer un banco de desarrollo que entre otros objetivos tendrá la tarea de contrarrestar al Banco Mundial y el Fondo Monetario internacional. Los BRICS trabajan también en el establecimiento de un fondo de reservas de divisas de contingencia por un valor inicial de 100 mil millones de dólares.

Establecer el banco de desarrollo

El pacto fue alcanzado durante la quinta conferencia que reunió a los presidentes de los países miembros del grupo económico emergente en Durban, Sudáfrica. El banco de desarrollo acordado por BRICS tiene como objetivo “movilizar recursos”, fomentar la construcción de infraestructuras y el “desarrollo sostenible” en países emergentes y en vías de desarrollo.

Esta iniciativa se enfrenta a la oposición de algunas potencias hegemónicas como Estados Unidos y Reino Unido, de ahí que estos dos mediante el FMI y el Banco Mundial promovían sus planes contra los países en vía de desarrollo y les dependía a ellos mismos, por lo que es bien claro que la iniciativa de BRICS para establecer este banco y ayudar a los países en vía de desarrollo conllevará enormes obstáculos por parte de Occidente.

Retos para FMI y Banco Mundial

Tal como sabemos los BRICS representan el 43% de la población mundial, ocupan un lugar destacado dentro de la economía global ya que disponen de enormes riquezas naturales, el mayor mercado del mundo, una base industrial sólida y recursos humanos cualificados, acaparando casi el 30 % del Producto Interno Bruto global.

Teniendo en cuenta estas destacadas cifras, se nota claramente la influencia que puede tener este bloqueo a nivel mundial y en las regiones, donde se ubican estos países. Razón por la cual, el banco de desarrollo de los BRICS puede sustituir fácilmente el FMI y Banco Mundial liderados por Estados Unidos y Reino Unido, algo que no le conviene para nada al sistema hegemónico ya que no puede impulsar, más, sus planes de saqueo a los países en vía de desarrollo.

Criticas al FMI y Banco Mundial

Cuando el Fondo Monetario Internacional como idea fue planteado el 22 de julio de 1944 durante una convención de la ONU en Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, Estados Unidos y comenzó a funcionar en 1945, sus estatutos declaran como principales objetivos la promoción de políticas cambiarias sostenibles a nivel internacional, facilitar el comercio internacional y reducir la pobreza. No obstante lo que se consiguió fue lo contrario, ya que ni este fondo monetario ni el Banco Mundial funcionan de manera independiente.

De ahí que EEUU es el principal proveedor del fondo de esta entidad internacional y los expertos de este país desempeñan un rol importante en manejar las políticas de este organismo internacional, se nota que el FMI se ha convertido en una herramienta en manos de la Casa Blanca.

Históricamente, el director gerente del FMI siempre ha sido europeo y el presidente del Banco Mundial siempre ha sido estadounidense. Los consejeros ejecutivos, quienes conforman el director gerente, los eligen los ministros de finanzas de los países que representan. El primer Subdirector Gerente del FMI, el segundo al mando, tradicionalmente ha sido un estadounidense, algo que pone de relieve la influencia de EEUU y Reino Unido en estos dos organismos.

Se argumenta que las recetas del FMI bajo la influencia de EEUU, provocaron una desaceleración de la industrialización, o desindustrialización en la mayoría de los casos. Las recesiones en varios países latinoamericanos a fines de los años noventa y crisis financieras como la de Argentina a finales de 2001.

Considerando los defectos mencionados del FMI y Banco Mundial, se puede concluir que el banco de desarrollo de los BRICS es un golpe duro a EEUU y Reino Unido e impedir sus políticas colonialistas en los países en vía de desarrollo.

V cumbre de los BRICS dio otro golpe a EEUU

Al margen de la cumbre de los BRICS en Durban se adoptó otra medida que perjudica aún más a EEUU, es decir, la eliminación de la divisa dólar de los intercambios comerciales entre dos gigantes polos de la economía mundial, Brasil y China a fin de asegurar sus intercambios de las fluctuaciones de la moneda estadounidense.

El canje de divisas ‘antidólar’, con un valor de 30 mil millones de dólares anuales y formulado para un periodo de tres años, fue firmado por representantes de ambos países. Además, el ministro brasileño de Finanzas, Guido Mantega, anunció que ofrecerá un acuerdo similar a presidentes de los otros Estados miembros del organismo que representan cuatro de los cinco continentes del mundo.

Al adoptar esta medida, el grupo BRICS se acerca a convertirse en un sólido bloque político, económico y militar a nivel mundial, rivalizando, así, con los intereses del país norteamericano.

Si bien los BRICS con la gran población y la inmensa cantidad de PIB que posee puede promover sus planes y desmantelar los del capitalismo estadounidense y británico, debe esperar los obstáculos de estos países en su camino.
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Fuente: HispanTV

mercredi, 03 avril 2013

V. S. NAIPAUL, DE L’AUTRE COTE DES TENEBRES

       

VS_Naipaul_1368593c.jpg

V. S. NAIPAUL, DE L’AUTRE COTE DES TENEBRES

par Frédéric Schramm

Ex: http://livr-arbitres.com/

A propos du prix Nobel 2001 de Littérature, écartons d’emblée la question de l’éventuel opportunisme politique dont auraient pu faire preuve certains juges séduits par la position radicale du lauréat sur la question islamique[1]. Le lauréat échappe à toute comparaison simpliste avec un écrivain tel que Salman Rushdie, qu’il avoue d’ailleurs n’avoir jamais lu.

Qu’elle soit niée ou revendiquée, une loi récurrente s’impose à tout ce qui a attrait au domaine de la création à l’échelle humaine. Elle inverse le postulat d’une prétendue raison pure détachée du monde comme la feuille morte se détache de l’arbre : « Je pense ce que je suis » présuppose l’œuvre créée en général et l’œuvre littéraire en particulier. Celle-là n’est jamais que le témoignage d’une réalité existentielle inexpugnable et l’univers littéraire de Vidiadhar Surajprasad Naipaul, exact reflet de son parcours identitaire et de l’enseignement sur le monde qu’il en a retiré, s’inscrit dans cette perspective.

Originaire des îles caraïbes de Trinité et Tobago, Naipaul est issu de la troisième génération d’Indiens[2] exilés dans cette possession britannique. Ecrivain anglophone, il devient en 1989, comme il l’avoue lui-même, citoyen des Lettres anglaises plutôt que véritable citoyen britannique, peuple auquel il reste définitivement étranger autant par la culture que par le sentiment d’appartenance nationale : un Britannique de papier, en somme mais dans le sens le plus noble du terme. Dès lors la comparaison revendiquée avec le Polonais Jozef Conrad Korzeniowski s’impose à bien des égards. La colonisation vécue par ceux qui la subissent ou « Marlow de l’autre côté du miroir » : ainsi pourrait se résumer la contribution de Naipaul. Mais loin des revendications geignardes et manichéennes, l’écrivain jette un regard sans complaisance sur les peuples colonisés en même temps qu’il poursuit la réflexion sur l’idée de la sauvagerie et des ténèbres entamée par Joseph Conrad[3].

Conscient d’appartenir à un peuple doué d’une forte identité, Naipaul oppose la solidarité communautaire[4] à l’individualisme occidental même s’il reste lucide face à de sa propre acculturation, ses ancêtres issus des hautes castes ayant perdu le véritable sens mystique de leurs rituels hindous. Fondamentalement opposé au mimétisme de classe de la part des plus éduqués parmi le peuple colonisé, qui se contentent de singer les classes supérieures colonisatrices, il annonce le leurre des sociétés démocratiques américaines, agglomérat de races à prétention égalitaire, la réalité des faits obligeant l’une de ces races à prendre le dessus. Et sans s’embarrasser de sous-entendus, il annonce clairement dans son roman Guérilleros[5]. qu’il ne peut pas s’agir des Afroaméricains, leurs tentatives aboutissant au même chaos que dans les états africains calqués sur des normes occidentales contredites par les réalités tribales et morales africaines, thème du roman A la courbe du fleuve5.

Profitant de ses voyages en Asie, il poursuit ses réflexions sur la nature des civilisations, leurs normes et l’effacement de leurs valeurs par les exemples hindous dans L’Inde brisée5 et L’illusion des ténèbres5 et islamique dans Parmi les croyants5 et Crépuscule sur L’Islam5 En Inde, il constate la contradiction profonde entre l’immuabilité du regard hindou sur le monde et le modernisme de l’Inde du parti du Congrès. Son jugement de l’Islam est beaucoup plus sévère puisqu’il dénonce son  intransigeance, son refus de la conscience individuelle, son caractère intrinsèquement fanatique et sa société acculturante par l’obligation de se soumettre à une oumma, communauté religieuse inexistante dans la réalité des faits mais idéalisée[6].



[1] Les prix Nobel restent à l’image du pays qui les décernent : neutres mais intéressés pour les prix littéraires et scientifiques suédois, ignoble pour l’improbable prix Nobel de la Paix, décerné par la Norvège, membre de l’OTAN délivrant ces dernières années leur rançon à des individus ou des organisations favorisant les intérêts bellicistes ou financiers de l’organisation criminelle et terroriste.

[2] Présente dans les quatre coins de l’Empire britannique, cette communauté atypique présente le double désavantage d’avoir été victime de la sanglante colonisation anglo-saxonne tout en l’ayant renforcée par sa participation à la repopulation des terres conquises.

[3] Notons qu’à cette fin, il utilise le même procédé de l’opposition entre le village et la brousse, les mêmes métaphores animales pour l’inanimé et l’humain.

[4] Affirmant pour l’occasion l’opposition entre les notions de Peuples ou Nations et celles de Patrie ou Etat.

[5] Editions 10/18

[6] Rappelons la tentative de coup d’état islamique perpétrée à Trinité, le 27 juillet 1990 par le Jamaat Al-Muslimeen de Yasin Abou Bakr (plusieurs dizaines de morts).

samedi, 30 mars 2013

Poutine veut un BRICS stratégique, vite…

brics195082191.jpg

Poutine veut un BRICS stratégique, vite…

Ex: http://www.dedefensa.org/

Le président russe Poutine annonce qu’il proposera à la prochaine réunion du BRICS, les 26-27 mars à Durban, en Afrique du Sud, une extension décisive du rôle de ce regroupement jusqu’ici essentiellement économique de cinq puissances de ce qu’on a coutume de nommer un peu vite “le monde émergent”. Poutine prend garde d’identifier le BRICS comme “un élément-clef du monde multipolaire émergent”, ce qui a une toute autre signification, quasiment opposée, à l’expression “monde émergent”. L’expression “monde émergent”, avec sa connotation dégradante ou implicitement méprisante rappelant l’expression “Tiers-Monde”, implique évidemment le suprématisme anglo-saxon étendu au bloc BAO, conduisant à considérer le modèle BAO comme la Lumière du monde en tous points mais essentiellement économique et moral pour satisfaire les convictions de la modernité, le “monde émergent” évoluant avec comme destin fatal de s’intégrer au bloc BAO. Poutine voit le BRICS comme un élément d’une alternative à la structure du monde actuel régentée par le bloc BAO, alternative fondée sur la multipolarité contre l’unipolarité arrogante, ex-USA et désormais bloc BAO. (Selon notre rangement, nous qualifierions les puissances du BRICS, effectivement selon une vision multipolaire, comme déterminant un “monde se constituant aux marges du Système”, disons “un pied dedans, un pied dehors”, ou encore “dans le Système d’une certaine façon, avec un œil critique et éventuellement réformiste sur le Système d’une autre façon”.)

Cette annonce est faite dans une interview de Poutine à l’agence ITAR-TASS, avec le texte retranscrit le 22 mars 2013 sur le site de la présidence. En préliminaire, Poutine rappelle ce qu’est le BRICS, et surtout les principes sur lesquels est fondée ce regroupement. On retrouve l’accent sur le respect de la légalité internationale et sur le principe de la souveraineté… «BRICS is a key element of the emerging multipolar world. The Group of Five has repeatedly affirmed its commitment to the fundamental principles of the international law and contributed to strengthening the United Nations central role. Our countries do not accept power politics or violation of other countries' sovereignty. We share approaches to the pressing international issues, including the Syrian crisis, the situation around Iran, and Middle East settlement.»

Puis une des questions porte sur le rôle géopolitique du BRICS : «Does it go beyond the purely economic agenda and should the BRICS countries accept greater responsibility for geopolitical processes? What is their policy with regard to the rest of the world, including its major actors such as the United States, the European Union, Japan… What future do you see for this association in this regard?» On trouve dans la réponse de Poutine la présentation et l’explicitation de son initiative.

«At the same time, we invite our partners to gradually transform BRICS from a dialogue forum that coordinates approaches to a limited number of issues into a full-scale strategic cooperation mechanism that will allow us to look for solutions to key issues of global politics together.

»The BRICS countries traditionally voice similar approaches to the settlement of all international conflicts through political and diplomatic means. For the Durban summit, we are working on a joint declaration setting forth our fundamental approaches to pressing international issues, i.e. crisis in Syria, Afghanistan, Iran and the Middle East.

»We do not view BRICS as a geopolitical competitor to western countries or their organisations — on the contrary, we are open to discussion with any country or organisation that is willing to do so within the framework of the common multipolar world order.»

Notre ami M K Bhadrakumar a repris instantanément la nouvelle sur son blog (Indian PunchLine), le 22 mars 2013. Manifestement, il juge extrêmement importante la proposition russe. Par ailleurs, selon son scepticisme habituel pour la direction indienne qu’il tient en piètre estime, il se demande quelle va être l’attitude de l’Inde… M K Bhadrakumar note que Poutine envisage cette transformation du BRICS comme graduelle et étendue sur un laps de temps.

«What stands out is the stunning suggestion Putin has made to reorient the BRICS. He said, “we invite our partners [Brazil, India, China and South Africa] to gradually transform BRICS from a dialogue forum that coordinates approaches to a limited number of issues into a full-scale strategic cooperation mechanism that will allow us to look for solutions to key issues of global politics together.” [Emphasis added.] Putin acknowledges that such a profound transformation will take time. Aside across-the-board harmonization of foreign policies amongst the BRICS members, a fundamental reorientation of the foreign-policy doctrines may also be required.

»How India responds to the grand idea remains to be seen. To be sure, a ‘leap of faith’ is required. India has been comfortable with the fact that the leitmotif of BRICS is economics. Putin’s proposal would fundamentally readjust the BRICS’ orientation…»

… Justement, nous différons quelque peu de M K Bhadrakumar sur l’appréciation du tempo que Poutine voudrait voir suivre pour la transformation du BRICS. Il nous semble que sa proposition, loin de n’être que théorique et laissée au temps pour mûrir, est d’ores et déjà basée sur des propositions spécifiques de prises de position sur des problèmes précis («…a joint declaration setting forth our fundamental approaches to pressing international issues, i.e. crisis in Syria, Afghanistan, Iran and the Middle East»). Cela peut aussi bien signifier que la Russie aimerait voir, dès le sommet de Durban, le BRICS prendre position sur les problèmes spécifiques identifiés, – on verra cela d’une façon concrète la semaine prochaine. Cette perspective signifierait que les Russes voudraient au contraire aller très vite. La position de l’Inde paraîtrait sans aucun doute parmi les plus incertaines vis-à-vis d’un tel projet, quoique les Indiens, comme l’avait signalé M K Bhadrakumar lui-même, ont été les premiers à prendre l’initiative de réunir les conseillers de sécurité nationale des pays du groupe (voir le 7 janvier 2013), ce qui va évidemment dans le sens prôné par Poutine.

Quoi qu’il en soit et si l’on s’en tient à une appréciation objective, il serait évidemment logique de penser que les Russes veulent aller vite, parce que la situation générale des relations internationales et des crises continue à se détériorer à une très grande vitesse et demande la mise en place de forces, soit pour contenir cette descente dans le désordre, soit pour équilibrer les autres forces (le bloc BAO, principalement) qui alimentent ce désordre. Il paraît également très probable que les Russes ont le soutien de la Chine pour ce projet. (Le président chinois commençait sa visite à Moscou le jour où cette interview de Poutine était diffusée, ce qui ne peut être tenue pour une coïncidence, et au contraire doit être apprécié comme un signe puissant dans le sens d'une communauté de vues Russie-Chine.) D’une façon générale, on pourrait apprécier que la proposition russe vient à son heure, qu’il existe autour du BRICS une urgence d’évolution et d’intervention, selon laquelle un tel rassemblement peut difficilement restreindre sa propre dynamique au seul champ économique ; c’est notamment, voire essentiellement par le champ économique que le Système active son travail de déstructuration et de dissolution, et par conséquent des acteurs de cette importance, regroupés autour du champ économique dans la situation pressante qu’on connaît, ne peuvent pas ne pas considérer tous les effets engendrés par ce domaine.

Le projet russe n’a rien à voir, à notre sens, avec la constitution d’un pôle de puissance pouvant éventuellement concurrencer d’autres pôles de puissance (le bloc BAO, évidemment), – comme le dit justement Poutine et, selon notre approche, en exprimant sa véritable pensée. Le BRICS, s’il était réformé dans le sens voulu par Poutine, ne constituerait pas une partie prenante dans la situation actuelle, mais bel et bien une tentative de stabilisation de la dite situation. De ce point de vue, les Russes cherchent des partenaires capables de les épauler, ou au moins de les soutenir, dans cette même entreprise de “tentative de stabilisation”, comme ils font en Syrie, et leur initiative vers le BRICS est une démarche naturelle.

Continuant à considérer objectivement la situation, le BRICS n’apparaît en aucun cas assez puissant et assez organisé pour bouleverser complètement la situation générale. Il est vrai qu’il n’a pas affaire seulement à d’autres groupes dont la plupart sont déstabilisateurs, mais, au-dessus, à une tendance générale de déstructuration-dissolution qui dépasse évidemment les capacités humaines d’organisation ou de désorganisation. Le BRICS transformé-selon-Poutine, serait une saine et juste réaction face à cette tendance, mais absolument insuffisante pour espérer la stopper de quelque façon que ce soit. Par contre, et sans que ce soit justement le but conscient et élaboré de Poutine, cette évolution du BRICS apparaîtrait au bloc BAO comme un défi, ou bien une pression nouvelle et menaçante, – même faussement apprécié mais peu importe, le bloc BAO vit dans ses narrative, – et l’effet général serait d’accentuer le trouble et l’inquiétude au sein de ce même bloc, c’est-à-dire d’y attiser un désordre dont les effets seraient bienvenus, au moins pour la raison évidente que le bloc BAO est le principal relais des forces de désordre qu’on a identifiées.

Aucune force politique n’est aujourd’hui capable de stabiliser la situation générale du monde et, encore moins, d’en restructurer les composants pour transformer cette restructuration temporaire en une structure nouvelle et solide. La marche du désordre dépend de forces hors du contrôle humain et disposent donc d’une complète immunité sur l’essentiel du mouvement. Le véritable apport d’un BRICS renforcé serait, justement, de renforcer les puissances qui le composent et de les conduire à rassembler leurs forces ; et, ce faisant, d’accentuer la pression sur le bloc BAO qui est le principal vecteur de désordre, donc d’accélérer les pressions qui l’affectent du point de vue de sa situation intérieure. L’effet net d’une telle évolution serait alors d’accroître le désordre interne, et donc le processus de déstructuration-dissolution des forces du bloc BAO. Objectivement, il s’agirait d’une accélération supplémentaire du désordre en cours, – mais, bien entendu, d’une accélération vertueuse puisque le désordre se développerait dans un champ éminemment défavorable au bloc BAO, et influant directement sur la cohésion et la solidité interne des membres de ce bloc.

lundi, 25 mars 2013

Giu le mani dai nostri soldati!

dimanche, 24 février 2013

ON THE EURASIAN ROOTS OF INDIAN SPIRITUAL TRADITIONS

 

ON THE EURASIAN ROOTS OF INDIAN SPIRITUAL TRADITIONS

Kashmir Shaivism and Slavic-Russian Mysticism

Acharya Peter Wilberg

Ex: http://granews.info/

1.       Historical Introduction and Background

This essay will seek to show that here is no more profound and powerful counterpart and complement to Indian wisdom traditions than Slavic-Russian Mysticism and its relation to Nordic-Arctic climate and culture. There is now both archaeological and linguistic evidence to show that  the Vedas and Upanishads and Tantras (including those of Kashmir Shaivism) all had their roots in a highly advanced pre- or proto Indo-European and Arctic civilisation covering the entire area known as Eurasia and with centres not only in the Indus Valley but in many other ancient civilisations such as Sumeria and also Russia and the Arctic.  This pre-historic or ‘primordial’  civilization was founded by ruler priests and teachers from other planets and/or planes of consciousness called ‘Urs’ in the Nordic-Arctic region (‘Ur’ being cognate with the German prefix ‘Ur-’ which means ‘primordial’ – and recalling also both  the Urals in Russia and the name of the Sumerian city called Ur, Uru or Urim. 

According to Levashov (The Untold History of Russia)

“Urs became tutors and guides to the rest of the people. They protected an initially rather small number of settlements of ‘ordinary’ people both from wild nature and ‘biped predators’. Urs trained people and helped them to master primary technologies, and gave them the knowledge necessary for them at that moment as well as knowledge that would be called for only in millennia.

Urs taught them and gave them into the charge of a special caste of keepers – volkhvs[1], who in due time were to convey conserved knowledge, having carried them through millennia and preserved as much of it as possible.

For this purpose those keepers-volkhvs received two runic alphabets, each of them was used by volkhvs of different levels of initiation. Those alphabets were da’Aryan and h’Aryan letters[2].

The memory of Urs, the teachers, has remained in language, for example, in the word ‘cult-ur-e’, which means a system of moral and spiritual concepts, which were transferred by Urs to their wards, the Ruses.

The two-caste system of the ancient Slavs reverberated in the names given them by their neighbours. For instance, the majority of Asian neighbours called an inhabitant of the Slavoniс-Aryan Empire as ‘ur-rus’, uniting the self-names of these two castes in a single word. Even now many Asian neighbours call Russians in the old fashioned manner, as ‘Urruses’.

There was a time when the names of the Slavonic tribes were formed by the addition of prefixes to the root ‘rus’, reflecting distinctive features of these tribes of Ruses, for example, Et-rus-can, P-rus-sian. The prefix ‘et’ before the self-name of Ruses means ‘elucidated Ruses’ – the carriers of highcult-ur-e. The proof of their existence has been found in the north of Italy in the form of inscriptions on stones and works of art. The name ‘Prussian’ meant ‘Ruses of Perun’[3], their other self-name was Venedas[4] (bellicose tribes of western Slavs), was kept in the self-name of the territory where they lived up to the 19th-20th centuries even after the German (gothic) tribes seized this land in 9th-10th  centuries A.D. The gothic tribes destroyed the majority of Prussian-Slavs, assimilated the rest amidst them and borrowed their name. After that one of the German tribes that lived on this territory began to call themselves ‘Prussians’; in the 19th century they played a key role in the merger of German tribes into a united state.

During the thousands of years of history of the Slavs, who initially had a united culture and language, the formation of self-names of the different Slavonic tribes was influenced by different factors. In the Urs’ time all Slavonic tribes have the second name ‘Ur-rus’. After the Urs’ disappearance their functions had to be distributed between their wards, Ruses.

This led to the formation of several castes: a caste of Volkhvs, carriers of knowledge and traditions; a caste of professional warriors, defenders from external enemies; a caste of handicraftsmen, grain-growers and cattlemen. At the top of all castes was a patrimonial aristocracy.

After the Urs’ disappearance, Ruses added to the common tribal name (Rus) one or another prefix reflecting their basic type of activity (Et-rus-can, P-rus-sian).”

The ancient pre- or proto-Aryan civilisation that Levashov describes, with a caste system clearly similar to that of Vedic civilisation, was essentially a Eurasian civilisation with multiple centres, not only in the Indian sub-continent, but also in Sumeria (whose language was neither Indo-European nor Semitic), Babylon and Assyria, the Egyptian Middle Kingdom, Minoan Crete, Troy and Mycenae – and as recent  discoveries show it also had centres in Russia and the Arctic. Evidence for this was found in 1987, when archaeological discoveries were uneathed in the Southern Urals (the so-calledARKAIM site) of an earlier ‘Arctic’ civilisation. This was referred to by Herodotus, Hesiod, Homer and Pindra as Hyperborea (‘beyond the North Wind’ or Boreas) and by Virgil as Thule. It corresponds also to Asgard – the land of the Norse gods or Aesir, one of the nine worlds unified by the world tree called Yggdrasill  and described in the Nordic Eddas as the abode of the  god Odin and his wife Frigg and the site of his fortress – Valhalla. What has since come to be known as the Slavic Vedasshare a similar script to Sanskrit, similar scriptures to the Vedas, and similar sagas to the Eddas – describing a migration south from the Arctic as climatic conditions changed from temperate to glacial.  The singular of aesir is ás related  to the  Sanskrit word asura – referring to the ‘anti-gods’ opposed to but inseparable from their half-brothers, the celestial sura – known in Sanskrit as devasor ‘shining ones’ (from the root *diw meaning “to shine”).

What united all the centres of this proto-Indo-European or Eurasian civilisation was both the ‘pillar’ connecting Sky (ARKA) and Earth (IM)  - also one important meaning of the Shivalingam – and theswastika/svastika symbol  found in so many ancient cultures. This is now understood not as a solar or sun symbol alone but as representing a spiralling or spinning galaxy. In this context it is interesting to note that the Slavic svastika symbol, called kolovrat means ‘spinning wheel’ – just as the Sanskrit chakra also means a ‘wheel’ which turns or spins.   

Neither svastika nor kolovrat essentially symbolise the sun however. For ancient Eurasian religious cultures worshipped the pole star rather than the sun – that star, close to the constellation of the bear (URSA) which lights up the darkness of the night sky and points us North i.e.  towards the planet Nibiru from which the Sumerian ruler-priests were thought to have come, toward the pole star – and toward the giant ‘black hole’ or ‘black sun’ at the very centre of our galaxy around which both the earth and the entire solar system turns or ‘spins’.  All the different geographical centres of the Eurasian civilisation however were seeded and guided long ago in the past by the advanced knowledge of their extra-terrestrial ruler priests or Urs. Conversely however, the rebirth in Russia of a future Eurasian culture and civilisation - one that will replace the currently dominant global capitalist culture of the U.S.A. - was anticipated by the German theosophist Rudolf Steiner. One of the chief current advocates of spiritual-political Eurasianism in Russia is Aleksandr Dugin – erstwhile organiser of the now-banned National Bolshevik Party and National Bolshevik Front in Russia, and founder of the Eurasia Party – now called Eurasia Movement and now leader of the International Eurasian Movement. 

“In principle, Eurasia and our space, the heartland Russia, remain the staging area of a new anti-bourgeois, anti-American revolution …The new Eurasian empire will be constructed on the fundamental principle of the common enemy: the rejection of Atlanticism, strategic control of the USA, and the refusal to allow liberal values to dominate us. This common civilizational impulse will be the basis of a political and strategic union.” Dugin —The Basics of Geopolitics (1997)  
 

2. The Metaphysics of Light and Darkness

As early as 1903, Lokamanya Bâl Gangâdhar Tilak (then proprietor of the Kesari and the Mahrattanewspapers, author of the Orion or Researches into the Antiquity of the Vedas) wrote a book presenting evidence of clear reference to an ‘Arctic Homeland’ in the Sanskrit Vedas and Zoroastrian Avestas.  This in turn formed the basis of a work by J.G. Bennett (metaphysical interpreter of the ‘4th Way’ spiritual movement of Gurdjieff and Ouspensky) entitled ‘The Hyperborean Origin of Indo-European Culture’.  A key argument that Tilak offers are numerous temporal indications in the Vedas of a ‘year’ in which, as is the case above the Arctic circle, the sun rises only once – making it the equivalent of a ‘day’. Nordic-Arctic countries in general are influenced culturally and psychologically by long periods of sunless winter darkness, interspersed with only brief summers in which the sun shines through the night.

This brings us to the central metaphysical theme of this essay – namely that there is no more profound and powerful counterpart  and complement  to both the Vedas, Upanishads  and Kashmir Shaivism itself than Slavic-Russian Mysticism and its relation to Nordic-Arctic climate and culture.

For whereas Kashmir Shaivism places special emphasis on the ‘light’ of awareness, Russian mysticism and even the Russian Orthodox Church has always emphasised the ‘darkness’, ‘dark light’ or ‘luminous darkness’, as expressed in the blackness of the night sky and long winters, rather than the blue sky of summer. Inward depth and darkness of soul go together, just as outward expansiveness of soul goes together with light.

“The divine darkness is not the kind of blackness we experience stumbling into an underground room with no lights. This darkness is a positive reality that helps us to discover God, and hence is called “luminous.” Although it sounds like a contradiction in terms, a luminous darkness is one filled with God’s presence, and by faith, the soul can begin to perceive God in darkness. In fact, the closer that God comes to the soul, the more intense the darkness becomes; it is then that all other things of this world are cleared away. The soul looks up to the Lord and never ceases to desire him.”

St. Gregory of Nyssa

If, as in Kashmir Shaivism, we understand God (Shiva) as ultimately identical with awareness as such or ‘pure awareness’ – and awareness as the ultimate sole reality (what I call The Awareness Principle) then we must also recognise that awareness itself is first and foremost an awareness of the ‘dark’ realm of ‘non-being’ constituted by infinite potentials of awareness – infinite potential consciousnesses or ‘beings’.  It is the very awareness of these potentials that ultimate leads to their actualisation and birth – like the birth of stars in the darkness of the cosmos.

Similarly, The Awareness Principle understands the key Kashmiri Shaivist term Spanda as a primordial tension (German ‘Spannung’) that literally spans the dark realm of potentiality (symbolised by the blackness of Ma Kali) and the light of awareness by which alone all things actual – including the sun and stars – become visible.  Spanda can be compared to a stretched string or ‘monochord’ strung between the twin poles of dark potentiality and illuminated actuality. The chord not only has a fundamental tone – the OM sound or Omkara, but also countless harmonics – each a unique tonal quality or ‘colouration’ of awareness. The Awareness Principle also recognises the universe as amultiverse – a multitude of parallel space-time universes all of which open up like bubbles of space and light within the darkness of a wholly non-extensional ‘space’ of potentiality. For just as light and ordinary ‘extensional space’ are inseparable, so also are ‘intensional’ space and darkness. Within any space-time universe light is what rays out from a centre towards a cosmic circumference, like light raying out from stars in the night sky. Darkness or ‘dark light’ on the other hand, is ‘light’ raying in from that cosmic circumference we behold as the blackness of the night sky itself and its ‘luminous darkness’ – illuminated at all times by the pole star.

According to the colour theory of both Goethe and Steiner, redness is light beheld through darkness. Blueness, on the other hand is darkness behold through light. Hence the two colour poles of the spectrum of darkness and light are red and blue. As the blue-throated one, Shiva has come to be associated with blue.  Yet as we know, one of the principal Vedic gods associated with Shiva isRudra – which is cognate with words such as ruddy or reddish. Similarly the syllable ‘rus’ in Russia is a proto-Slavic word for both bear and ‘reddish-haired’, cognate with ursus or ursa – the constellation of the Bear whose name combines the words ‘ur’ and ‘rus’.  Furthermore, the Slavic ‘s’  in ‘rus’ corresponds to the ‘d’ in the name Rudra itself, which also means ‘to howl’ – like a bear or wolf. Indeed, the Sanskrit ‘Shiva’ may itself be a loan word from the Tamil-Dravidian civa – meaning ‘red’ or ‘angry’. Blue and red have become of course powerful colour symbols in politics. Communists or those on the political left are ‘reds’. Conservatives or those on the political right on the other hand, are signified by the colour blue. Interestingly, since the collapse of the Soviet Union the flag of the Russian Federation is no longer purely red but red, white (the colour of the anti-Bolshevik ‘White Russians’) and… blue.  But let us return to Levashov:

“At the end of the 20th century, people got access to the Slavoniс-Aryan Vedas, which contained a lot of very interesting information that was vainly ignored by modern science. These unique manuscripts translated into modern Russian reveal that last glacial age was a consequence of the war between the Great Russenia and Antlania[5] (Atlantis). This war happened more than 13,000 years ago. Then people moved large distances of planetary scale by means of Vaitmans  [Sanskrit Vimanas]. So, those mysterious rhombic platforms on the three-dimensional map of Western Siberia are nothing else but landing grounds for Vaitmars. The last Vaitmars [travelers in the Vaitmans] left our planet Midgard-Earth about 3500 years ago when the Night of Svarog[6] began.

There is another interesting document – the Book of Veles. The last records in it were made by volkvs of Novgorod at the end of the 10th century. This book covers more than 20,000 years of Slavic history.

To learn something useful is always welcome, but did it happen like this in reality? Let us remember, that in the middle of the 11th century (according to the Christian calendar) a daughter of Jaroslav Mudry, princess Anna became the French queen. Arriving from the «wild» Kievan Rus, the princess did not consider that arrival as entering into civilized Europe but considered Paris a big village. This has documentary acknowledgement in the form of her letters.  She brought with her to the remotest depth of the provinces, which France was then, a part of the library, some books from which returned to Russia only in the 19th century and were found in the library of Mr. Sulakadzaev. It was he who made the first translation into modern Russian of the Book of Veles, which was composed of wooden plates with runic letters on them. After Sulakadzaev’s death his widow sold the greater part of his library to the Romanovs, and after that nobody heard anything about these books. The most interesting fact is that after the appearance of these copies, all originals without exception have disappeared – they either were burned down in bonfires of the inquisition, having been declared as heretical books, or were lost in ‘accidental’ fires and epidemics ‘affecting’ all ancient libraries.The libraries of Alexandria, Athens, and Tzargrad (Constantinopol), along with the Etruscan library in Rome, were burned down almost simultaneously. The libraries of Yaroslav I the Wise (978-1054) and Ivan IV the Terrible (1530-1584) disappeared without a trace. All originals were burned or disappeared, while the copies made from them so «opportunely» have been kept and cherished. Old books were destroyed; new ones were written. They were adjusted so that in new ‘history’ there was no any mention about the Slavonic-Aryan Empire. The period of history before the 10th century in Europe was declared as dark, barbarous centuries, which were illuminated by the light of education brought with the culture of the Sacred Roman Empire.”

Note firstly that the 10th century marked both the apotheosis and the beginning of the decline of Kashmir Shaivism. Note also that the very term ‘dark ages’ places a negative connotation on darkness. Then again, the Bible itself  (Genesis 1) admits that ‘darkness was over the surface of the deep’ even before God said ‘Let there be light’ and supposedly created heaven and earth.  Still today, however, inner knowing or gnosis is associated almost exclusively with ‘illumination’ or ‘en-lightenment’. This is paradoxical given that modern scientific and atheistic ‘rationalism’ had its source origin in the European ‘Age of Enlightenment’.  Yet the modern scientific mode of ‘rationality’ it gave rise to however, is now confronted with an ‘occult’ mystery that threatens to undermine its entire theoretical framework – the mystery of what physicists and cosmologists term ‘dark matter’ and ‘dark energy’ – whose nature is completely unknown but which is nevertheless acknowledged to make up 90% of the mass and two thirds of the ‘mass-energy’ of the universe. Levashov:

“…the last record in the Book of Veles and christening of Kievan Rus falls on the same time – the end of the 10th century according to contemporary chronology … What are these Days and Nights of Svarog? These words are mentioned in the Slavonic-Aryan Vedas quite often. It is time to understand what these concepts mean. There are several types of star accumulations in our Universe, such as spiral and spherical galaxies, star nebulas, etc. Our Sun is located in one of four sleeves of our spiral galaxy, in the «backyards» of this sleeve. Every spiral galaxy rotates around its nucleus while traveling on the star roads of our Universe. Seven primary matters form our Universe. The so-called, physically solid matter, which everybody is used to see as galaxies, nebulas, stars, planets, etc., appeared as a result of the merging of these primary matters in the areas of space, where necessary terms for this merging were observed. As proved by ‘scientists’,’physically’ solid matter makes only 10% of the whole matter of the Universe, and the rest (90%) is so-called ‘dark matter’. However, they do not specify what this “dark matter,” which can not be registered by any known modern scientific tool, is; we will forgive them this ‘insignificant misunderstanding’ and will move on to business.”

The galactic ‘nucleus’ that Levashov refers to is recognised to be a huge ‘black hole’ – itself a portal linking our universe to other universes in the ‘honeycomb’ plurality of multiple universes or ‘multiverse’. The types of ‘primary matter’ that Levashov refers to are what is now ‘scientifically’ termed ‘dark matter’. He refers also to the ‘psi-generators’ used in early civilisations, and those which he himself employs as medium of both healing and natural growth and regeneration. These he sees as “made of dark matter” and therefore essentially neither detectable by or requiring any technical or physical instrumentation, except as outward symbols for the subjective manipulation of the dark matter in its different forms.

The Awareness Principle understand the forms of ‘dark matter’ that Levashov refers to as specific potentialities and qualities of awareness - and their dark power or ‘energy’ as the capacity or power (Shakti) for the actualisation of these potentials – itself released by interaction with the invisible lightof awareness (Paramashiva). On the physical plane, this interaction plays itself out as an interaction between solar and earthly magnetism – what we call ‘magnetism’  being itself a bipolar spatial flow pattern of the all-pervasive ‘aether’ of pure awareness known in Sanskrit as Akash.

In modern translations the tantric term Shakti is almost invariably translated as ‘energy’. A closer translation would be ‘power’ or ‘power of action’ (Shak). Indeed this translation of Shakti accords with the root meaning of the term ‘energy’ itself – not as some ‘thing in itself’ but as pure action – the actualisation of those powers or potentialities of action latent in space itself as the ‘aether’ of pure awareness. What I call ‘The Awareness Principle’ is the metaphysical understanding that awareness is ultimate reality – that ultimately ‘awareness is everything’ and ‘everything is awareness’. The Awareness Principle stands in direct contrast to ‘The Energy Principle’ shared by modern science and ‘New Age’ pseudo-science alike – namely the principle that ‘energy is everything’ and ‘everything is energy’. As a ‘Theory Of Everything’ (TOE) ‘The Energy Principle’ is a highly questionable one, resting as it does on an unquestioned notion of energy as some ‘thing in itself’, a notion that is at the same time a distortion of its root meaning as that ‘formative action’ (energein) through which all forms are actualised in awareness. Pure awareness then, like the seeming emptiness of space itself, is no mere formless void but a plenum of formative potentials.  ‘Energy’ in the root sense is the actualisation of these potentials – the emergence of form from the apparent formlessness of space.

The Sanskrit term akash is translated both as ‘space’ and ‘aether’, sometimes spelled ‘ether’. It is understood in Indian thought as pervaded by countless basic units or “animations of consciousness” (Seth) which constitute the very ‘air’ or ‘breath’ of awareness called Prana – and the quintessence of air as such. The Sanskrit term prana is etymologically cognate with the Latin-derived terms ‘spirit’ and ‘spiral’ (from spirare – ‘to breathe’). It is also cognate with the root meanings of the Greek words for ‘spirit’ and ‘soul’ – pneuma (meaning air or wind) and ‘psyche’ (‘vital breath’). To be ‘spiritual’ in the root sense of this word therefore, is to be capable, quite literally, of a wholly different type of re-spiration or breathing – a type of whole body ‘transpiration’ of the clear, luminous expansiveness of the space around us – not through our lungs alone but through every pore of our felt body surface. It is the long-lost experience of breathing the clear, luminous ‘air’ or ‘aether’ of awareness itself that lies concealed behind both the otherwise wholly vague Western notion of ‘spirit’, as well as different classical and modern-scientific notions of a cosmic ‘aether’. Its secret is that invisible breath or ‘air’ of awareness (Prana) that pervades the entirety of space (Akash), both the space around us and the space which pervades and makes up by far the largest proportion of each and every atom of ‘matter’. This space vibrates with spanda – the fundamental tensing spanning the realm of the potential and the actual, together with the vibration of the actual within the potential and of the potential within the actual. Spanda is also what resounds with the inner sound ‘OM’. Hence also the association in Indian thought of the Akash with the element of sound or vibration. The double meaning of the Sanskrit Akash as both ‘space’ and ‘aether’ goes together with the Greek meaning of the word aether itself – as that ‘upper’, less gaseous, purer and thus morespacious air of the sort we breathe at Himalayan mountain summits – or in Nothern polar regions such as the Arctic.  For aether was the ‘higher air’ breathed by the gods themselves in their uppermost abode – whether we call this Olympus, Hyperborea, Thule or Asgard.

Dark Forces?

“I’m not the Devil. I’m much, much older. I watched the beginning and I will see the end. I am the dark behind all the stars. I am the dark inside you all.”

…from the screenplay of the film ‘Event Horizon’

The Greek word Khaos refers to a gaping dark void or chasm. It is cognate with Sanskrit Kha andAkash – referring to space itself, understood as the womb of all things – including the gods. In contrast, the Sanskrit kala means ‘time’ As such it is connected with the name of the great black Indian mother goddess Kali (kal – black / kala – time). Metaphysically, she can be understood as both, the ultimate temporal circumference or ‘event horizon’ of this spatial womb (kala – time) and as an ultimate ‘black hole’ or ‘singularity’ at its heart. Put in other terms, the realm of pure potentiality symbolised by Kali is a realm of unbounded inwardness – an inwardness that cannot be perceived by looking out from some localised centre of consciousness in space, but only by looking inwards from an infinite periphery, circumference or ‘horizon’ of awareness.

If the actual physical universe is a realm of spatial and material extensionality, then the primordial realm of potentiality is a non-extensional realm – a realm of pure intensionality. As such, it is made up not of extensional material bodies in space-time but of pure intensities of awareness in an unbounded ‘time-space’. The massive density of intensities that constitute this realm of unbounded inwardness – deified as Kali – find manifestation only through gravitational densities of matter so great, that they have collapsed themselves into ‘black holes’ with a so-called ‘singularity’ at their core. In physical-scientific terms, a black hole is ‘black’ because at its ‘event horizon’ the gravitational pull of the ‘singularity’ is so great as to bend space itself around itself – allowing no light-information to escape  – only sound in the form of a fundamental tone (the primordial sound of silence known as the Omkara or ‘OM’ sound).

From a metaphysical perspective however, the apparent outer surface of every visible body in space is also an event horizon. For like the visible outer surface of the human body, every ‘physical’ body conceals an unbounded and invisible psychical interiority along with invisible psychical ‘events’. These can never be perceived from without, no matter to what degree the physical interiority of the body is opened up and physiologically examined. For, what we perceive as fleshly bodies, cells and organs too are but outer surface appearances or ‘event horizons’ concealing an invisible psychicalinteriority and invisible psychical events.

When the crew on board the fictional movie spaceship  called ‘Event Horizon’ start ‘hallucinating’ terrifying images of bodies invisible to others (and later perceive each other’s bodies in horrific form) is this because they have entered ‘hell’ in the Christian sense or because, under the influence of the ship’s black hole, they have also unconsciously penetrated the event horizon of their own and each other’s bodies – perceiving events and images within their otherwise invisible psychical interiority in outward bodily form? The root meaning of ‘hallucinate’ is ‘to wander’. The crew’s ‘hallucinations’ are an expression of their wandering into and within the realm of ultimate inwardness associated with the primordial “agony” of creation as described in ‘The SETH Material’ by Jane Roberts – in which what Seth calls ‘All That Is’ (in essence the ultimate and universal awareness) sought a way to release all the potential consciousnesses embraced but still contained in His nebulous, dreamlike awareness into that state of autonomous actuality or being into which they “clamoured to be released”.   

In reality then, every outwardly perceived body is an Event Horizon. And at the core of all material bodies is a ‘black hole’ or “Singularity of Awareness”. This singularity at the core of all material bodies is both a central point (Sanskrit Bindu) and a central tone linking that unit of extensional matter to all other bodies through that dark, intensional realm of unbounded inwardness and inexhaustible potentiality that “flows through and forms all matter”.

This flow is that of the higher air or aether of awareness itself in its twin but inseparable aspects of light and darkness. Darkness is the in-flow of an invisible and wholly translucent ‘light’ of awareness from the cosmic circumference towards a centre just as light is the outward radiance of that invisible light of awareness from a centre. If we learn to sense the entirety of ‘empty’ cosmic space above and surrounding the entire surface of our heads and upper bodies, we can come to to experience ourselves breathing in its innate aetheric vitality of that invisible light and feel its countless centres – each of which have the character of miniature, light-emitting ‘white holes’ – revitalising the inner spaces within every atom, cell and molecule of our body.

If, on the other hand, we sense our lower bodies and let awareness flow inwards from our abdominal surface towards the singularity of awareness at its centre – or a few inches below and behind our navel – we will experience that inner space of our abdomen or hara (Japanese) as filled with inner darkness or blackness. Each out-breath can then be experienced as both an inward and downward flow of a ‘dark light’ of awareness – one that not only rays inwards from the abdomen or toward itshara centre or tanden but also flows downwards from our lower body and abdominal centre to yet lower centres. This dark inward and downward flow of awareness ultimately reaches and roots down below the very ground beneath our feet and  towards the fiery core of the earth itself. Here we contact the ‘dark force’ known in occult literature as Vril or Kundalini – the fire of awareness that then rises from that molten and fiery core – whose spinning is known to be responsible for the earth’s magnetic field.

The felt surface of our bodies then, both unites and distinguishes two spaces or fields of awareness – one extending outward and upward to a heavenly cosmic circumference, the other downward and inward towards a bodily and earthly centre or ‘singularity’ of awareness. The relationship between these two different flows of awareness is essentially a relation between the invisible space or light of awareness in its dual character – as both light and darkness. It also finds expression as the relation between polar or axial magnetism on the one hand and ‘spherical’ magnetism or ‘magnetospheres’ on the other. Thus, like the earth itself, the body has both axial magnetic poles (North and South)  and a ‘magnetosphere’ – the outer surface or ‘event horizon’ surrounding the black hole at its gravitational centre and the fiery core into which it can lead – demonised as the ‘underworld’ or ‘hell’ in both religious mythology and science fiction. The word ‘hell’ however derives from the German Halle (hall) and the verb hallen – to echo or resound, as the  Omkara does from within the event horizon of a black hole.  Polar axial and vertical dimensions of light and darkness, space and gravity, electricity and magnetism are all expressions of axial and vertical flows of awareness – corresponding to the Shivalingam and the vertical axis of kundalini within our body of awareness.  On the other hand, spherical dimensions of light and darkness, space and gravity, electricity and magnetism – all express spherical boundaries, spaces and centres of awareness.

Beyond space, time and ‘space-time’

Time too has a spatial dimension – including a spherical one and not just a linear one. Like a sphere, time (Seth) has an outside and an inside. Behind and beyond ‘space’ ‘time’ and ‘space-time’ as physicists conceive it is a “spacious present” (Seth).  This is ‘space-time’ understood and experienced as a spherical time-space of awareness embracing and yet ‘outside’ all ‘space-time’ universes and embracing also all actual and potential pasts and futures – both of the cosmos and of human civilisation. The interweaving of the actual and potential in the realm of dreams and mythical possibilities – like the interweaving of dreams and mythologies that opens up new possibilities for humankind – are themselves nothing mythical but the ‘dreamtime’ and very loom or tantra of time-space. It finds expression today in the mythological history, credible actuality and futural possibility of the civilisation called ‘Eurasia’ – with both its multiple geographical centres and its single axial pole – pointing to the pole star and to the ‘black hole’ at the centre of our spinning galaxy or kolovrat.

Dream-Land

By a route obscure and lonely,
Haunted by ill angels only,
Where an Eidolon, named Night,
On a black throne reigns upright,
I have reached these lands but newly
From an ultimate dim Thule –
From a wild weird clime, that lieth, sublime,

Out of Space – out of Time.

Edgar Allen Poe 1844

3. Personal Postscript

I might not have come to write this piece were it not for the fact that, lying down on my mother’s sofa one afternoon in the late seventies or early eighties – and despite being wholly ignorant of what was then the still-undiscovered ARKAIM site -  I entered a hypnagogic state in which I experienced the strong but invisible presence of Rudolf and Marie Steiner beside me. Accompanying this, I had a most vivid and lucid dream of an isolated citadel of the future – from within which I found myself peering out at a vast steppe land, one which I knew from the Steiners to be somewhere in Russia – and the centre of a future civilization.

Links:

ARKAIM – ancient Russian city

Michael Kosok  The Singularity of Awareness

Peter Wilberg  THE AWARENESS PRINCIPLE

Peter Wilberg TANTRA REBORN – ON THE SENSUALITY AND SEXUALITY OF THE SOUL BODY

P.Wilberg  EVENT HORIZON – TERROR, TANTRA AND THE ULTIMATE METAPHYSICS OF AWARENESS

J. G. Bennett – THE HYPERBOREAN ORIGIN OF THE INDO-EUROPEAN CULTURE

Lokamanya Bâl Gangâdhar Tilak – THE ARCTIC HOME IN THE VEDAS

Levashov – THE UNTOLD HISTORY OF RUSSIA

INTERNATIONAL EURASIAN MOVEMENT

THE NATIONAL PEOPLES PARTY U.K.

INTERVIEW WITH ALEKSANDR DUGIN SaveFrom.net

EVENT HORIZON – the film

THE BOOK OF VELES


[1]A Volkhv is a cleric, the Supreme priest, and a keeper of ancient sacred texts.

[2] Da’Aryan and h’Aryan characters (letters) are two of four kinds of writing of the Great Race: da’Aryan Trags, h’Aryan Runes, Sviatorussians Images (bukvitca, runica, cherty and rezy) and Russenian Molvitca.

[3] Perun was the god-patron of all soldiers, the defender of the land and the clan of SviatoRuses (Russians, Byelorussians, Asts, Lits, Lats,  Latgalls, Zemgalls, Polans, Serbs, etc.)

[4] Venedas were inhabitants of the Great Venea where Clans and tribes of Venedas migrated. It corresponds to the territory of modern Western Europe.

[5] Antlania was an island in the Atlantic Ocean where Slavonic clan of Ants was lodged. Then their land began to be called as Ant-lan, i. e., the Land of Ants. Ancient Greeks named it Atlantis and its inhabitants – atlantes (modern Ukrainians; U-krai-ne means in Russian outskirts («krai») of the Land of Holy Race).

[6] The Night of Svarog, according to Slavonic tradition, is the name of a dark difficult time when our solar system passes through spaces of the Dark Worlds; or Kali-Uga in Aryan or Indian tradition.

samedi, 12 janvier 2013

Islam In India

Islam In India: William Dalrymple’s jihad negationism

Dr. Elst defends Naipaul's views

Koenraad Elst

Ex: http://www.alfredvierling.com/

Koenraad-elst

Taj Mahal


In several articles and speeches since at least 2004 (“Trapped in the ruins” in The Guardian, 20 March 2004), and especially in the commotion provoked by Girish Karnad’s speech in Mumbai (autumn 2012), William Dalrymple has condemned Nobel prize winner V.S. Naipaul for writing that the Vijayanagar empire was a Hindu bastion besieged by Muslim states. The famous writer has taken the ruins of vast Vijayanagar as illustration of how Hinduism is a “wounded civilization”, viz. wounded by Islam. Dalrymple’s counter-arguments against this conflictual view of Indian history consist in bits of Islamic influence in the Vijayanagar kings’ court life, such as Hindu courtiers wearing Muslim dress, Hindu armies adopting techniques borrowed from the Muslims, styles of palace architecture and the Persian nomenclature of political functions; and conversely, elements of Hinduism in Muslims courts and households, e.g. the Muslim festival of Muharram looking like the Kumbha Mela of the Hindus.
V.S. NaipaulSecularism and Vijayanagar

As is all too common in Nehruvian-secularist discourse, Dalrymple’s analysis of the role of Islam in India stands out by its superficiality. Whenever a Hindu temple or a Muslim festival is found to employ personnel belonging to the opposite religion, secular journalists go gaga and report on this victory of syncretism over religious orthodoxy. Secular historians including Dalrymple do likewise about religious cross-pollination in the past.

It is true that Hindus are eager to integrate foreign elements from their surroundings, from Hellenistic astrology (now mis-termed “Vedic astrology”) in the past to the English language and American consumerism today. So Hindu courts adopted styles and terminology from their Muslim counterparts. They even enlisted Muslim mercenaries in their armies, so “secular” were they. We could say that Hindus are multicultural at heart, or open-minded. But that quality didn’t get rewarded, except with a betrayal by their Muslim regiments during the battle of Talikota (1565): they defected to the enemy, in which they recognized fellow-Muslims. When the chips were down, Hindu open-mindedness and syncretism were powerless against their heartfelt belief in Islamic solidarity. In September 2012, Dalrymple went to Hyderabad to praise the city and its erstwhile Muslim dynasty as a centre of Hindu-Muslim syncretism; but fact is that after Partition, the ruler of Hyderabad opted for Pakistan, against multicultural India. When the chips are down, secular superficiality is no match for hard-headed orthodoxy.

William DalrympleMuslims too sometimes adopted Hindu elements. However, it would be unhistorical to assume a symmetry with what the Hindus did. Hindus really adopted foreign elements, but most Muslims largely just retained Hindu elements which had always been part of their culture and which lingered on after conversion. Thus, the Pakistanis held it against the Bengalis in their artificial Muslim state (1947-71) that their language was very Sanskritic, not using the Arabic script, and that their womenfolk “still” wore saris and no veils. The Bengali Muslims did this not because they had “adopted” elements from Hinduism, but because they had retained many elements from the Hindu culture of their forefathers. “Pakistan” means the “land of the pure”, i.e. those who have overcome the taints of Paganism, the very syncretism which Dalrymple celebrates. Maybe it is in the fitness of things that a historian should sing paeans to this religious syncretism for, as far as Islam is concerned, it is a thing of the past.

A second difference between Hindus and Muslims practicing syncretism is that in the case of Muslims, this practice was in spite of their religion, due to a hasty (and therefore incomplete) conversion under duress and a lack of sufficient policing by proper Islamic authorities. If, as claimed by Dalrymple, a Sultan of Bijapur venerated both goddess Saraswati and prophet Mohammed, it only proves that he hadn’t interiorized Mohammed’s strictures against idolatry yet. In more recent times, though, this condition has largely been remedied. Secular journalists now have to search hard for cases of Muslims caught doing Hindu things, for such Muslims become rare. Modern methods of education and social control have wiped out most traces of Hinduism. Thus, since their independence, the Bengali Muslims have made great strides in de-hinduizing themselves, as by widely adopting proper Islamic dress codes. The Tabligh (“propaganda”) movement as well as informal efforts by clerics everywhere have gone a long way to “islamize the Muslims”, i.e. to destroy all remnants of Hinduism still lingering among them.
Hindu iconoclasm?

Another unhistorical item in the secular view of Islam in India is the total absence of an Islamic prehistory outside India. Yet, all Muslims know about this history to some extent and base their laws and actions upon it. In particular, they know about Mohammed’s career in Arabia and seek to replicate it, from wearing “the beard of the Prophet” to emulating his campaigns against Paganism.

Dalrymple, like all Nehruvians, makes much of the work of the American Marxist historian Richard Eaton. This man is famous for saying that the Muslims have indeed destroyed many Hindu temples (thousands, according to his very incomplete list, though grouped as the oft-quoted “eighty”), but that they based themselves for this conduct on Hindu precedent. Indeed, he has found a handful of cases of Hindu conquerors “looting” temples belonging to the defeated kings, typically abducting the main idol to install it in their own capital. This implies a very superficial equating between stealing an idol (but leaving the worship of the god concerned intact, and even continuing it in another temple) and destroying temples as a way of humiliating and ultimately destroying their religion itself. But we already said that secularists are superficial. However, he forgets to tell his readers that he has found no case at all of a Muslim temple-destroyer citing these alleged Hindu precedents. If they try to justify their conduct, it is by citing Mohammed’s Arab precedents. The most famous case is the Kaaba in Mecca, where the Prophet and his nephew Ali destroyed 360 idols with their own hands. What the Muslims did to Vijayanagar was only an imitation of what the Prophet had done so many times in Arabia, only on a much larger scale.

From historians like Eaton and Dalrymple, we expect a more international view of history than what they offer in their account of Islamic destructions in India. They try to confine their explanations to one country, whereas Islam is globalist par excellence. By contrast, Naipaul does reckon with international cultural processes, in particular the impact of Islam among the converted peoples, not only in South but also in West and Southeast Asia. He observes that they have been estranged from themselves, alienated from their roots, and therefore suffering from a neurosis.

So, Naipaul is right and Dalrymple wrong in their respective assessments of the role of Islam in India. Yet, in one respect, Naipaul is indeed mistaken. In his books Among the Believers and Beyond Belief, he analyses the impact of Islam among the non-Arab converts, but assumes that for Arabs, Islam is more natural. True, the Arabs did not have to adopt a foreign language for religious purposes, they did not have to sacrifice their own national traditions in name-giving; but otherwise they too had to adopt a religion that wasn’t theirs. The Arabs were Pagans who worshipped many gods and tolerated many religions (Jews, Zoroastrians, various Christian Churches) in their midst. Mohammed made it his life’s work to destroy their multicultural society and replace it with a homogeneous Islamic one. Not exactly the syncretism which Dalrymple waxes so eloquent about.
Colonial “Orientalism”?

Did Muslims “contribute” to Indian culture, as Dalrymple claims? Here too, we should distinguish between what Islam enjoins and what people who happen to be Muslims do. Thus, he says that Muslims contributed to Indian music. I am quite illiterate on art history, but I’ll take his word for it. However, if they did, they did it is spite of Islam, and not because of it. Mohammed closed his ears not to hear the music, and orthodox rulers like Aurangzeb and Ayatollah Khomeini issued measures against it. Likewise, the Moghul school of painting shows that human beings are inexorably fond of visual art, but does not disprove that Islam frowns on it.

Also, while some tourists fall for the Taj Mahal, which Naipaul so dislikes, the Indo-Saracenic architecture extant does not nullify the destruction of many more beautiful buildings which could have attracted far more tourists. In what sense is it a “contribution” anyway? Rather than filling a void, it is at best a replacement of existing Hindu architecture with new Muslim architecture. Similarly, if no Muslim music (or rather, music by Muslims) had entered India, then native Hindu music would have flourished more, and who is Dalrymple to say that Hindu music is inferior?

Another discursive strategy of the secularists, applied here by Dalrymple, is to blame the colonial view of history. Naipaul is said to be inspired by colonial Orientalists and to merely repeat their findings. This plays on the strong anti-Westernism among Indians. But it is factually incorrect: Naipaul cites earlier sources (e.g. Dalrymple omits Ibn Battuta, the Moroccan traveler who only described witnessed Sultanate cruelty to the Hindus with his own eyes) as well as the findings of contemporaneous archaeologists. Moreover, even the colonial historians only repeat what older native sources tell them. The destruction of Vijayanagar is a historical fact and an event that took place with no colonizers around. Unless you mean the Muslim rulers.
Negationism

In the West, we are familiar with the phenomenon of Holocaust negationism. While most people firmly disbelieve the negationists, some will at least appreciate their character: they are making a lot of financial, social and professional sacrifices for their beliefs. The ostracism they suffer is fierce. Even those who are skeptical of their position agree that negationists at least have the courage of their conviction.

In India, and increasingly also in the West and in international institutions, we are faced with a similar phenomenon, viz. Jihad negationism. This is the denial of aggression and atrocities motivated by Islam. Among the differences, we note those in social position of the deniers and those in the contents of the denial. Jihad deniers are not marginals who have sacrificed a career to their convictions, on the contrary; they serve their careers greatly by uttering the politically palatable “truth”. In India, any zero can become a celebrity overnight by publishing a condemnation of the “communalists” and taking a stand for Jihad denial and history distortion. The universities are full of them, while people who stand by genuine history are kept out. Like Jawaharlal Nehru, most of these negationists hold forth on the higher humbug (as historian Paul Johnson observed) and declare themselves “secular”.

Whereas the Holocaust lasted only four years and took place in war circumstances and largely in secret (historians are still troubled over the absence of an order by Adolf Hitler for the Holocaust, a fact which gives a handle to the deniers), Jihad started during the life of Mohammed and continues till today, entirely openly, proudly testified by the perpetrators themselves. From the biography and the biographical collections of the Prophet (Sira, Ahadith) through medieval chronicles and travel diaries down to the farewell letters or videos left by hundreds of suicide terrorists today, there are literally thousands of sources by Muslims attesting that Islam made them do it. But whereas I take Muslims seriously and believe them at their word when they explain their motivation, some people overrule this manifold testimony and decide that the Muslims concerned meant something else.

The most favoured explanation is that British colonialism and now American imperialism inflicted poverty on them and this made them do it, though they clothed it in Islamic discourse. You see, the billionaire Osama bin Laden, whose family has a long-standing friendship with the Bush family, was so poor that he saw no option but to hijack some airplanes and fly them into the World Trade Center. What else was he to do? And Mohammed, way back in the 7th century, already the ruler of Medina and much of the Arabian peninsula, just had to have his critics murdered or, as soon as he could afford it, formally executed. He had to take hostages and permit his men to rape them; nay, he just had to force the Jewish woman Rayhana into concubinage after murdering her relatives. If you don’t like what he did, blame Britain and America. Their colonialism and imperialism made him do it! Under the colonial dispensation which didn’t exist yet, the Muslim troops who were paid by the Vijayanagar emperor had no other option but to betray their employer and side with his opponents who, just by coincidence, happened to be Muslim as well. And if you don’t believe this, the secularists will come up with another story.
Conclusion

India is experiencing a regime of history denial. In this sense, the West is more and more becoming like India. There are some old professors of Islam or religion (and I know a few) who hold the historical view, viz. that Mohammed (if he existed at all) was mentally afflicted, that Islam consists of a manifold folie à deux (“madness with two”, where a wife supports and increasingly shares her husband’s self-delusion), and that it always was a political religion which spread by destroying other religions. But among the younger professors, it is hard to find any who are so forthright. There is a demand for reassurance about Islam, and universities only recruit personnel who provide that. Indeed, many teach false history in good faith, thinking that untruth about the past in this case is defensible because it fosters better interreligious relations in the present. Some even believe their own stories, just like the layman who is meant to lap them up. Such is also my impression of William Dalrymple.

– Koenraad Elst, 30 December 2012

00:05 Publié dans Actualité, Islam | Lien permanent | Commentaires (0) | Tags : inde, islam, islamisme, koenraad elst, naipaul, dalrymple, djihad | |  del.icio.us | | Digg! Digg |  Facebook

vendredi, 23 novembre 2012

Inner Revolutions and Kindred Souls

 

Inner Revolutions and Kindred Souls:
A Review of Indo-Europe Rising and Atoms of Kshatriyas

by Gwendolyn Taunton

Ex: http://shunyarevolution.wordpress.com/

“Of all that is written, I love only what a person hath written with his blood. Write with blood, and thou wilt find that blood is spirit.” — Nietzsche

Azsacra Zarathustra’s work always makes for an interesting read, and his latest books (Indo-Europe Rising and Atoms of Kshatriyas are no exception. Since these books are related in terms of content, I will review them both together in this article). In these texts Azsacra Zarathustra continues to expand on the themes developed in earlier works and a number of concepts presented in these titles are covered extensively and explained in earlier books. As such, I would to stress here that Zarathustra’s work can be intellectually challenging for beginners and people whom are not well versed in traditional metaphysics and philosophy. Therefore it is essential for readers to familiarise themselves with his earlier works in order to understand his writing in the full context. Azasacra Zarathustra: Creator of ShunyaRevoution and Absolute Revolutionis recommended as an introductory text for those who are unfamiliar with the concepts introduced by Zarathustra. For those who are already loyal readers, no such introduction is required and they will thoroughly enjoy immersing themselves in the pages of his latest writing.That being said, like Nietzsche whom I quoted above, I have no time for the idle readers — and it is the readers who appreciate different ideas and perspectives who will experience the greatest rewards from Zarathustra’s books. Here, at last we see some new ideas emerging in Traditionalism — rather than reciting Traditionalists, Zarathustra develops of some of their ideas — and challenges them when need be. In this regard, Zarathustra’s latest book Indo-Europe Uprising is unapologetically addressed to the Hindu and European Traditions (which are linked by linguistic and religious heritage).

It is from this perspective that they need to be understood — the revolution and uprising of which he writes is one rooted in tradition and spirituality, and is not politically motivated. It is a revolution that is rooted deep in the roots of the psyche of India and Europe, and like all good books it speaks not to the head but direct to the heart and to the blood. The Absolute Revolution is an interior one, not an exterior revolution — thus like Krishna’s instructions to Arjuna, it is a spiritual process. This instruction to the Ksatriya is echoed in Zarathustra’s works, who like Evola adopts the perspective that the Ksatriya caste has its own set of spiritual teachings which differs from that of the religious code of the Brahmins. This is readily supported by the Upanisads, to which Ksatriya authorship is attributed, and even to the Buddha who was born into the Ksatriya caste. It is to those people who identify with the Ksatriya role (for caste is not determined by birth in his works, but by temperament and natural inclination) that Zarathustra addresses his works and expounds the theory of the Shunya Revolution; an interior and psychological process weaving together thoughts from Hinduism, Buddhism and Nietzsche — all of which Zarathustra does not merely cite, but actively develops upon, adding new teachings to the old ones to develop a new level.

What is of special interest in Zarathustra’s latest book, is that it offers a new model of Tradition which places emphasis on the ties between Europe and India, in contrast to the older Traditionalist model which favours the Abrahamic Traditions of Christianity and Islam. In terms of the history of religion, this perspective is academically correct as Vedic India and the old gods of Europe come from the same religious family, the Indo-European genus of religion. Christianity, Islam (and also Judaism) originate instead from Abraham, and form a triad which scholars refer to as the Abrahamic Tradition. The remaining Traditions fall under the rubric of Taoic, Dharmic (Hindu), Pagan (European) and Shamanic. Recent developments in the studies of religion such as the reconstruction of the Proto Indo European language and consequential dialect shifts suggest that the Dharmic Traditions and the Pagan Traditions stem from a common heritage in the pre-Vedic era, thus indicating that they are in fact related, and therefore the association of India with Europe is a genuine one which is easily backed up by historical facts.  The bond between the Hindu Tradition and the European Tradition is therefore a natural one which is rooted deep in the past where it has existed since the dawn of history. The Indo-Europe Uprising of which Zarathustra writes is one which unites both Hinduism and the indigenous spiritual traditions of Europe at the core of this ancestry, and therefore it is a  shared kinship between two cultures. This is the new element of Traditionalism which speaks to the Hindu and Pagan audiences, who have previously been under represented in Traditionalism and have previously occupied only a secondary role to that of the Abrahamic Traditions. Also of interest here is that Zarathustra correctly identifies Tibet as having a religious connection with Hinduism and it is included as part of the theory — thus forming a religious triad of its own as part of the Indo-European Tradition: Hinduism, the European Traditions, and Buddhism.

Into this vision of a shared ancestral past is woven an intricate dialogue of Ksatriya mysticism, the metaphysical state of emptiness and the detachment from the karma-phalam advocated by Krishna. These Hindu and Buddhism thoughts are then coupled with the ideas of Europe’s greatest thinker and philosopher, Freidrich Nietzsche to create a perspective which is not only unique and original, but also profoundly Indo-European in this combination. Much of Nietzsche’s thought expresses an admiration for the Vedic past, and he too advocated the warrior temperament above that of the priest, for he saw it as a more vital mode of life and being, rather than the mode of renunciation which represents a withdrawal from life rather than engaging and conflicting with it head on. It is obvious that Zarathustra is highly influenced by Nietzsche, but he does not merely cite Nietzsche’s works — rather he develops on them by adding layers of mysticism and spiritual development drawn from the esoteric doctrines of India and Tibet, to develop a new teaching for those who identify themselves as Kstariya, in order to fight the great internal war and overcome the flawed human nature which separates them from the numinous essence of the divine which is the great spiritual uprising and the esoteric doctrine of the Absolute Revolution and the forms the Atoms of Ksatriyas.

Gwendolyn Taunton was the recipient of the Ashton Wylie Award for Literary Excellence in 2009 for her work with Primordial Traditions and is a well-known author on Hinduism and Heathen/Pagan Traditions:  Her most recent work is ‘Mimir — Journal of North European Traditions’:

http://numenbooks.com.au/books/spirituality_books/mimir_-_journal_of_north_european_traditions.aspx

mercredi, 17 octobre 2012

The Life of Ananda K. Coomaraswamy

The Life of Ananda K. Coomaraswamy

Rama P. Coomaraswamy (His Son)

lundi, 08 octobre 2012

Reeks lezingen door dr. Koenraad Elst, oriëntalist

"De Lezing"

Reeks lezingen door dr. Koenraad Elst, oriëntalist

 

 

Dr. Koenraad Elst, oriëntalist, geeft een reeks van drie lezingen over thema's die niet alleen hem maar ook u meer dan gewoon (kunnen) interesseren: Islam, boeddhisme en Ghandi.

 

Dr. Koenraad Elst schreef fel besproken boeken en zeer veel artikels over de drie onderwerpen in voornamelijk het Nederlands en het Engels. Hem aan het woord horen is leerrijk en verhelderend. Hem lezen is dat minstens evenveel.

 

Na de lezingen biedt dr. Elst zijn boeken aan en signeert.

 Er is kans tot vragen en nabespreking.

 

Voor zeer redelijke prijzen is het mogelijk drank te bekomen.

 

De eerste lezing is op dinsdag 9 oktober, 20 uur.

 

De tweede lezing is op dinsdag 13 november, 20 uur.

 

De derde lezing is op dinsdag 11 december, 20 uur.

 

Prijs: GRATIS (met dank aan het nieuwe adres).

Drank aan betaalbare prijzen.

Opgelet: aantal plaatsen beperkt tot 25 !

Inschrijven :

http://www.facebook.com/events/469606533069702/

of via

koenraad.elst@telenet.be

of via

guntercauwenberghs@gmail.com

tel 0484 08 45 85

Plaats : Torrestraat 76, Dendermonde.

 Belangrijke mededeling :

 Dit is GEEN organisatie van Euro-Rus.

De lezingen worden georganiseerd door derden. Zij maken enkel gebruik van de aangeboden faciliteiten.

samedi, 22 septembre 2012

Revolutionary Sikh: The Last Words of Udham Singh

Revolutionary Sikh: The Last Words of Udham Singh

Who Was Udham Singh?

164841.jpgUdham Singh, a revolutionary nationalist, was born Sher Singh on 26 December 1899, at Sunam, in the then princely state of Patiala. His father, Tahal Singh, was at that time working as a watchman on a railway crossing in the neighbouring village of Upall. Sher Singh lost his parents before he was seven years and was admitted along with his brother Mukta Singh to the Central Khalsa Orphanage at Amritsar on 24 October 1907. As both brothers were administered the Sikh initiatory rites at the Orphanage, they received new names, Sher Singh becoming Udham Singh and Mukta Singh Sadhu Singh. In 1917, Udham Singh’s brother also died, leaving him alone in the world.

Udham Singh left the Orphanage after passing the matriculation examination in 1918. He was present in the Jallianvala Bag on the fateful Baisakhi day, 13 April 1919, when a peaceful assembly of people was fired upon by General Reginald Edward Harry Dyer, killing over one thousand people. The event which Udham Singh used to recall with anger and sorrow, turned him to the path of revolution. Soon after, he left India and went to the United States of America. He felt thrilled to learn about the militant activities of the Babar Akalis in the early 1920′s, and returned home. He had secretly brought with him some revolvers and was arrested by the police in Amritsar, and sentenced to four years imprisonment under the Arms Act. On release in 1931, he returned to his native Sunam, but harassed by the local police, he once again returned to Amritsar and opened a shop as a signboard painter, assuming the name of Ram Muhammad Singh Azad. This name, which he was to use later in England, was adopted to emphasize the unity of all the religious communities in India in their struggle for political freedom.

Udham Singh was deeply influenced by the activities of Bhagat Singh and his revolutionary group. In 1935, when he was on a visit to Kashmlr, he was found carrying Bhagat Singh’s portrait. He invariably referred to him as his guru. He loved to sing political songs, and was very fond of Ram Prasad Bismal, who was the leading poet of the revolutionaries. After staying for some months in Kashmlr, Udham Singh left India. He wandered about the continent for some time, and reached England by the mid-thirties. He was on the lookout for an opportunity to avenge the Jalliavala Bagh tragedy. The long-waited moment at last came on 13 March 1940. On that day, at 4.30 p.m. in the Caxton Hall, London, where a meeting of the East India Association was being held in conjunction with the Royal Central Asian Society, Udham Singh fired five to six shots from his pistol at Sir Michael O’Dwyer, who was governor of the Punjab when the Amritsar massacre had taken place. O’Dwyer was hit twice and fell to the ground dead and Lord Zetland, the Secretary of State for India, who was presiding over the meeting was injured. Udham Singh was overpowered with a smoking revolver. He in fact made no attempt to escape and continued saying that he had done his duty by his country.

On 1 April 1940, Udham Singh was formally charged with the murder of Sir Michael O’Dwyer. On 4 June 1940, he was committed to trial, at the Central Criminal Court, Old Bailey, before Justice Atkinson, who sentenced him to death. An appeal was filed on his behalf which was dismissed on 15 July 1940. On 31 July 1940, Udham Singh was hanged in Pentonville Prison in London.

Udham Singh was essentially a man of action and save his statement before the judge at his trial, there was no writing from his pen available to historians. Recently, letters written by him to Shiv Singh Jauhal during his days in prison after the shooting of Sir Michael O’Dwyer have been discovered and published. These letters show him as a man of great courage, with a sense of humor. He called himself a guest of His Majesty King George, and he looked upon death as a bride he was going to wed. By remaining cheerful to the last and going joyfully to the gallows, he followed the example of Bhagat Singh who had been his beau ideal. During the trial, Udham Singh had made a request that his ashes be sent back to his country, but this was not allowed. In 1975, however, the Government of India, at the instance of the Punjab Government, finally succeeded in bringing his ashes home. Lakhs of people gathered on the occasion to pay homage to his memory.

The Last Words of Udham Singh

On the 31st July, 1940, Udham Singh was hanged at Pentonville jail, London. On the 4th of June in the same year he had been arraigned before Mr. Justice Atkinson at the Central Criminal Court, the Old Bailey. Udham Singh was charged with the murder of Sir Michael O’Dwyer, the former Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab who had approved of the action of Brigadier-General R.E.H. Dyer at Jallianwala Bagh, Amritsar on April 13, 1919, which had resulted in the massacre of hundreds of men, women and children and left over 1,000 wounded during the course of a peaceful political meeting. The assassination of O’Dwyer took place at the Caxton Hall, Westminster. The trial of Udham Singh lasted for two days, he was found guilty and was given the death sentence. On the 15th July, 1940, the Court of Criminal Appeal heard and dismissed the appeal of Udham Singh against the death sentence.

Prior to passing the sentence Mr. Justice Atkinson asked Udham Singh whether he had anything to say. Replying in the affirmative he began to read from prepared notes. The judge repeatedly interrupted Udham Singh and ordered the press not to report the statement. Both in Britain and India the government made strenuous efforts to ensure that the minimum publicity was given to the trial. Reuters were approached for this purpose.

The father of Udham Singh, Tehl Singh, was born into a poor peasant family and worked as a Railway Gate Keeper at the railway level crossing at Village Uppali. Udham Singh was born on 28th December, 1899 at Sanam, Sangrur District, Punjab. After the death of his father Udham Singh was brought up in a Sikh orphanage in Amritsar. The massacre at Jallianwala Bagh in 1919 was deeply engraved in the mind of the future martyr. At the age of 16 years Udham Singh defied the curfew and was wounded in the course of retrieving the body of the husband of one Rattan Devi in the aftermath of the slaughter. Subsequently Udham Singh travelled abroad in Africa, the United States and Europe. Over the years he met Lala Lajpat Rai, Kishen Singh and Bhagat Singh, whom he considered his guru and ‘his best friend’. In 1927 Udham Singh was arrested in Amritsar under the Arms Act. The impact of the Russian revolution on him is indicated by the fact that amongst the revolutionary tracts found by the raiding party was Rusi Ghaddar Gian Samachar. After serving his sentence and visiting his home town, Udham Singh resumed, his travels abroad. If it was the Jallianwala Bagh massacre which provided the turning point of his life which led him to avenge the dead, it was Bhagat Singh who provided him with the inspiration to pursue the path of revolutionary struggle.

Echoes of Kartar Singh Sarabha and Bhagat Singh may be found in the words of Udham Singh in the wake of the assassination of O’Dwyer.

‘I don’t care, I don’t mind dying. What Is the use of waiting till you get old? This Is no good. You want to die when you are young. That is good, that Is what I am doing’.

After a pause he added:

‘I am dying for my country’.

In a statement given on March 13th, 1940 be said:

‘I just shot to make protest. I have seen people starving In India under British Imperialism. I done it, the pistol went off three or four times. I am not sorry for protesting. It was my duty to do so. Put some more. Just for the sake of my country to protest. I do not mind my sentence. Ten, twenty, or fifty years or to be hanged. I done my duty.’

In a letter from Brixton Prison of 30th March, 1940, Udham Singh refers to Bhagat Singh in the following terms:

‘I never afraid of dying so soon I will be getting married with execution. I am not sorry as I am a soldier of my country it is since 10 years when my friend has left me behind and I am sure after my death I will see him as he is waiting for me it was 23rd and I hope they will hang me on the same date as he was.’

The British courts were able to silence for long the last words of Udham Singh. At last the speech has been released from the British Public Records Office.

Shorthand notes of the Statement made by Udham Singh after the Judge had asked him if he had anything to say as to why sentence should not be passed upon him according to Law.

Facing the Judge, he exclaimed, ‘I say down with British Imperialism. You say India do not have peace. We have only slavery. Generations of so called civilization has brought for us everything filthy and degenerating known to the human race. All you have to do is read your own history. If you have any human decency about you, you should die with shame. The brutality and bloodthirsty way in which the so called intellectuals who call themselves rulers of civilization in the world are of bastard blood…’

MR. JUSTICE ATKINSON: I am not going to listen to a political speech. If you have anything relevant to say about this case say it.

UDHAM SINGH: I have to say this. I wanted to protest.

The accused brandished the sheaf of papers from which he had been reading.

THE JUDGE: Is it in English?

UDHAM SINGH: You can understand what I am reading now.

THE JUDGE: I will understand much more if you give it to me to read.

UDHAM SINGH: I want the jury, I want the whole lot to hear it.

Mr. G.B. McClure (Prosecuting) reminded the Judge that under Section 6 of the Emergency Powers Act he could direct that Udham Singh’s speech be not reported or that it could be heard in camera.

THE JUDGE (to the accused): You may take it that nothing will be published of what you say. You must speak to the point. Now go on.

UDHAM SINGH: I am protesting. This is what I mean. I am quite innocent about that address. The jury were misled about that address. I am going to read this now.

THE JUDGE: Well, go on.

While the accused was perusing the papers, the Judge reminded him ‘You are only to say why sentence should not be passed according to law.’

UDHAM SINGH (shouting): ‘I do not care about sentence of death. It means nothing at all. I do not care about dying or anything. I do not worry about it at all. I am dying for a purpose.’ Thumping the rail of the dock, he exclaimed, ‘We are suffering from the British Empire.’ Udham Singh continued more quietly. ‘I am not afraid to die. I am proud to die, to have to free my native land and I hope that when I am gone, I hope that in my place will come thousands of my countrymen to drive you dirty dogs out; to free my country.’

‘I am standing before an English jury. I am in an English court. You people go to India and when you come back you are given a prize and put in the House of Commons. We come to England and we are sentenced to death.’

‘I never meant anything; but I will take it. I do not care anything about it, but when you dirty dogs come to India there comes a time when you will be cleaned out of India. All your British Imperialism will be smashed.’

‘Machine guns on the streets of India mow down thousands of poor women and children wherever your so-called flag of democracy and Christianity flies.’

‘Your conduct, your conduct – I am talking about the British government. I have nothing against the English people at all. I have more English friends living in England than I have in India. I have great sympathy with the workers of England. I am against the Imperialist Government.’

‘You people are suffering – workers. Everyone are suffering through these dirty dogs; these mad beasts. India is only slavery. Killing, mutilating and destroying – British Imperialism. People do not read about it in the papers. We know what is going on in India.’

MR. JUSTICE ATKINSON: I am not going to hear any more.

UDHAM SINGH: You do not want to listen to any more because you are tired of my speech, eh? I have a lot to say yet.

THE JUDGE: I am not going to hear any more of that statement.

UDHAM SINGH: You ask me what I have to say. I am saying it. Because you people are dirty. You do not want to hear from us what you are doing in India.

Thrusting his glasses back into his pocket, Udham Singh exclaimed three words in Hindustani and then shouted, Down with British Imperialism! Down with British dirty dogs!’

As he turned to leave the dock, the accused spat across the solicitor’s table.

After Singh had left the dock, the Judge turned to the Press and said:

‘I give a direction to the Press not to report any of the statement made by the accused in the dock. You understand, members of the press?’

00:05 Publié dans Histoire | Lien permanent | Commentaires (0) | Tags : udham singh, inde, histoire | |  del.icio.us | | Digg! Digg |  Facebook

vendredi, 21 septembre 2012

Problématique et prospective géopolitiques de la question pakistanaise

 

6.jpg

Andrea Jacopo SALA:

Problématique et prospective géopolitiques de la question pakistanaise

 

Ce sont les événements qui ont immédiatement suivi la fin de la seconde guerre mondiale qui constituent le point de départ à analyser pour comprendre les tensions qui ont affecté la zone la plus méridionale du continent asiatique. La fin des empires coloniaux et la volonté d’émancipation des nations émergentes ont entraîné un partage nouveau des territoires, tenant compte des réalités culturelles qui, auparavant, avaient cohabité sous une hégémonie étrangère unique, britannique en l’occurrence. On ne peut nullement se référer au découpage arbitraire que les puissances dominantes et coloniales ont imposé car elles sont une des causes premières des tensions qui ont ensanglanté ces pays, lesquels, aujourd’hui encore, présentent des cicatrices difficilement guérissables. Ces cicatrices, béantes, sont autant de bonnes opportunités pour tous ceux qui veulent s’immiscer dans les querelles intérieures et dans les contentieux diplomatiques qui affectent ces pays du Sud et du Sud-est de l’Asie, comme si les castes dirigeantes de l’Occident avaient la nostalgie du statut colonial d’antan, que ces jeunes nations ont rejeté; ces castes préfèrent encore et toujours contrôler ces pays indirectement, au bénéfice de leurs prorpes intérêts, plutôt que de prendre acte, sereinement, des maturations et des changements qui se sont effectués au fil du temps.

 

Il faut donc esquisser un bref panorama historique des événements les plus marquants qui ont accompagné la désagrégation de l’ancien “Raj” britannique, ainsi que de leurs conséquences directes, puis il faut passer au tamis toutes les problématiques liées au terrorisme, car ce terrorisme est un des moyens les plus utilisés pour intervenir dans et contre les choix politiques posés par les anciennes colonies britanniques, aussi pour s’immiscer dans les potentialités émergentes germant dans ces pays mêmes et pour freiner ou ralentir les nouvelles perspectives géopolitiques qui se révèlent réalisables depuis quelques temps.

 

Après le “Raj” britannique

 

Le “Raj” britannique des Indes (au pluriel!), on le sait, a été subdivisé en deux pays, le Pakistan et l’Inde, en 1947. C’était l’aboutissement de cette longue lutte indienne pour l’indépendance qui s’était radicalisée dans les années 20 et 30 du 20ième siècle, lutte dont les vicissitudes sont bien connues du public occidental grâce à la fascination qu’avait exercée sur bien des esprits la forte personnalité politique et spirituelle que fut Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi. Parallèlement au Parti du Congrès National Indien (PCNI), dont le “Mahatma” (Gandhi) était le membre le plus influent, existait aussi le Parti de la Ligue Musulmane (PLM), dirigé par Mohammed Ali Jinnah, tout aussi âpre dans sa lutte contre le colonialisme britannique. Dans une première phase de la lutte pour l’indépendance indienne, le PLM était allié au PCNI puisqu’ils avaient des objectifs communs. Mais, dès que les Britanniques promirent de résoudre la question indienne en renonçant à toutes prérogatives coloniales dans la région, les rapports entre le leader musulman et Gandhi se sont détériorés: tandis que le “Mahatma”, inspiré par les thèses théosophiques, rêvait d’une seule et unique nation indienne où coexisteraient pacifiquement plusieurs religions, Mohammed Ali Jinnah revendiquait l’instauration d’un Etat exclusivement islamique. La résolution du problème fut confiée à Lord Mountbatten qui a accepté la requête des Musulmans et a, par voie de conséquence, partagé le territoire du “Raj” britannique entre les dominions du Pakistan et de l’Inde.

 

Le plan Mountbatten contenait toutefois beaucoup d’approximations et de concessions arbitraires (et parfois inutiles), si bien qu’on ne pouvait guère le faire appliquer tout en voulant maintenir la paix: la zone d’influence du Pakistan était divisée fort maladroitement en un Pakistan occidental et un Pakistan oriental, séparé l’un de l’autre par un immense territoire sous juridiction indienne; de nombreux territoires, comme le Cachemire, n’avaient été attribués officiellement à aucun des deux nouveaux Etats souverains; malgré la volonté affichée d’attribuer aux uns et aux autres des territoires sur base de critères religieux et culturels, la partition laissait des zones à majorité hindoue au Pakistan et des zones à majorité musulmane au nouveau “dominion” de l’Inde.

 

 

pakistan_groupes_ethniques.jpg

 

 

A cette situation délicate s’ajoutaient les prétentions chinoises sur quelques territoires de l’ancien “Raj” britannique. Le tout a enflammé la région pendant la seconde partie du 20ème siècle, aux dépens des populations. Pas moins de quatre guerres ont sévi et, suite à l’une d’elles, la zone baptisée par Lord Mountbatten “Pakistan oriental” est devenue indépendante, avec l’aide des Indiens, pour devenir l’actuel Bengladesh; la région du Cachemire a été divisée selon les lignes des fronts où s’étaient successivement affrontés Pakistanais, Indiens et Chinois. Il ne faut pas oublier non plus les nombreuses migrations qui ont suivi la partition, où les Hindous quittaient en masse les territoires sous juridiction pakistanaise-musulmane et où les Musulmans quittaient les zone attribuées à la nouvelle Inde indépendante, majoritairement hindoue. Ces transferts de population ont eu des effets fortement déstabilisants pour les équilibres internes des deux nouveaux Etats. Entretemps, alors que l’Inde optait pour la voie de la modernisation sous l’impulsion du gouvernement de Nehru, le Pakistan fut secoué par une série de coups d’Etat militaires, renversant à intervalles réguliers les régimes démocratiques.

 

Terrorisme et guerre au terrorisme

 

Après avoir déployé une politique fièrement hostile aux Etats-Unis sous la houlette de Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, qui a ouvert le Pakistan aux technologies nucléaires, le pays tombe ensuite sous une nouvelle dictature militaire, dirigée par le Général Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq et fortement inspirée par le fondamentalisme musulman. La période de la dictature de Zia-ul-Haq fut celle d’une collaboration étroite avec les bandes anti-soviétiques actives dans le conflit afghan; ensuite, l’amitié entre Zia-ul-Haq et le chef d’une faction insurrectionnelle afghane, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar —appuyée par un financement d’au moins 600 millions de dollars en provenance des circuits de la CIA et transitant par le Pakistan— favorisait un soutien direct à la puissante guérilla intégriste qui luttait contre les Soviétiques (1).

 

L’existence même d’Al-Qaeda est issue de ce contexte conflictuel entre, d’une part, le gouvernement légal afghan, soutenu par l’Union Soviétique, et, d’autre part, l’insurrection des “moudjahiddins”. D’après l’ancien ministre britannique des affaires étrangères, Robert Cook, Al-Qaeda serait la traduction en arabe de “data-base”. Et ce même Cook affirmait dans un entretien accordé à “The Guardian”: “Pour autant que je le sache, Al-Qaeda était, à l’origine, le nom d’une ‘data-base’ (base de données) du gouvernement américain, contenant les noms des milliers de moudjahiddins enrôlés par la CIA pour combattre les Soviétiques en Afghanistan” (2). Ce que confirme par ailleurs Saad al-Fagih, chef du “Movement for Islamic Reform” en Arabie Saoudite: Ben Laden s’est bel et bien engagé, au départ, pour s’opposer à la présence soviétique en Afghanistan (3). Si cet appui initial des Américains à de telles organisations (qui seraient ensuite partiellement passées dans les rangs du terrorisme anti-occidental) explique les raisons stratégiques qui ont forcé les Etats-Unis à se rapprocher des organisations fondamentalistes islamiques, celles-ci, dès qu’elles ne fournissent plus aucun avantage stratégique et ne servent plus les intérêts géopolitiques immédiats de Washington, deviennent automatiquement “ennemies” et sont donc combattues en tant que telles.

 

Dans cette logique, on peut s’expliquer la ruine actuelle du Pakistan, sombrant dans le chaos sous le regard des Américains. Après la chute du régime de Zia-ul-Haq et pendant toute la durée du régime de Pervez Mucharraf, le gouvernement du Pakistan a été continuellement accusé de soutenir les talibans (4), surtout depuis l’opération, parachevée avec succès, visant l’arrestation du troisième personnage dans la hiérarchie d’Al-Qaeda, Khalid Shaykh Muhammad. Dans un tel contexte (et un tel imbroglio!), le ministre indien des affaires étrangères n’a pas hésité à déclarer “que le Pakistan a échoué dans ses projets d’éradiquer le terrorisme qui puise ses racines sur son prorpe territoire”: c’était immédiatmeent après les attentats de Mumbai (Bombay) (5). Ce bref rapprochement entre l’Inde et les Etats-Unis, prévisible et dirigé contre le Pakistan, ne devrait pourtant pas mener à une éventuelle intervention occidentale dans la zone du Cachemire, vu que tous les Etats impliqués dans cette zone se sont toujours montrés très rétifs à des interventions extérieures, même si de telles interventions pouvaient faire pencher la balance dans le sens de leurs propres intérêts géopolitiques. Il me paraît inutile, ici, d’évoquer la prétendue exécution du terroriste Osama Ben Laden, justement sur le territoire du Pakistan lui-même.

 

Mais pourquoi les relations américano-pakistanaises se sont-elles détériorées à ce point, et de manière assez inattendue?

 

Le tracé des gazoducs

 

La Pakistan est devenu membre observateur de l’OCS (Organisation de Coopération de Shanghai) en 2005, ce qui constitue déjà un motif d’inquiétude pour les pays inféodés à l’OTAN. Cependant, ce qui constitue probablement la cause principale de la mobilisation des énergies et des médias pour discréditer la République Islamique du Pakistan est la proposition des Iraniens, séduisante pour les Pakistanais, de construire un gazoduc qui reliera les deux pays et dont Islamabad a prévu la parachèvement pour 2014. Le projet initial aurait dû également impliquer l’Inde, dans la mesure où un terminal du gazoduc y aurait abouti, mais les pressions américaines ont empêché l’adhésion de l’Inde au projet suggéré par l’Iran.

 

 

gazoduc_iran_pakistan_inde_01.jpg

 

 

Le projet déplait à l’évidence aux Etats-Unis non seulement parce qu’il renforce les relations entre deux pays islamiques mais aussi et surtout parce que le nouveau choix du Pakistan est diamètralement contraire aux plans prévus pour un autre gazoduc, le gazoduc dit “TAPI”, qui devrait partir du Turkménistan et passer par l’Afghanistan et le Pakistan pour aboutir en Inde, tout en étant étroitement contrôlé par des investisseurs américains.

 

Dans ce jeu, la région du Beloutchistan joue un rôle de premier plan, région habitée majoritairement par une ethnie très apparentée aux Pachtouns. Les Pachtouns sont un peuple originaire de régions aujourd’hui afghanes et se sont rendus tristement célèbres pour leurs violences et pour leurs velléités indépendantistes (tant en Iran qu’au Pakistan), sans oublier leurs trafics d’opium et d’héroïne qui posent quantité de problèmes au gouvernement pakistanais.

 

Les jeux stratégiques demeurent toutefois peu clairs et peu définis jusqu’à présent, si bien qu’il me paraît difficile de se prononcer d’une manière définitive sur les problèmes de la région. Le Pakistan reçoit encore et toujours un soutien financier de la part des Etats-Unis, en provenance directe du Pentagone; officiellement, cet argent sert à lutter contre le terrorisme mais, forcément, on peut très bien imaginer qu’il s’agit surtout de convaincre Islamabad de refuser l’offre iranienne.

 

Andrea Jacopo SALA,

Article paru sur le site italien http://www.eurasia-rivista.org/ en date du 6 août 2012.

 

Notes:

 

(1)   http://it.wikipedia.org/ Entrée sur Gulbuddin Hekmatyar.

(2)   http://www.guardian.co.uk/ , 8 juillet 2005

(3)   http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/binladen/interviews/al-fagih.html/

(4)   http://www.asiantribune.com/index.php?q=node/3231/

(5)   http://www.repubblica.it/2008/11/sezioni/esteri/india-attentato-3/dimissioni-capo-provincia/dimissioni-capo-provincia.html/

 

vendredi, 14 septembre 2012

Genetic Evidence on the Origins of Indian Caste Populations

Genetic Evidence on the Origins of Indian Caste Populations

 

This 2001 study found that the genetic affinity of Indians to Europeans is proportionate to caste rank, the upper castes being most similar to Europeans whereas lower castes are more like Asians. The researchers believe that the Indo-European speakers entered India from the Northwest, mixing with or displacing proto-Dravidian speakers, and may have established a caste system with themselves primarily in higher castes.
 
Foto: de Bollywood-actrice Aishwarya Rai (bron: www.voxtropolis.com)

vendredi, 20 avril 2012

Agni V placera l'Inde au même rang que les USA et la Russie

Agni-V-nuclear-capable-missile.jpg

L'Inde veut entrer dans la cour des grands, aux côtés des USA et de la Russie, avec l'Agni V (missile balistique intercontinental) dont l'essai sera réalisé demain mercredi.

Agni V placera l'Inde au même rang que les USA et la Russie
    
Ex: http://mbm.hautetfort.com/

Les préparatifs du lancement du nouveau missile balistique intercontinental indien Agni V depuis le polygone de l'île de Wheeler dans le golfe de Bengale sont presque achevés. Son essai est prévu pour le mercredi 18 avril.


Les militaires indiens ont déclaré qu'en cas de succès, l'Inde se placera au même rang que les Etats-Unis, la Russie et la Chine qui disposent déjà de tels missiles.


Agniv pèse 50 t, sa longueur est de 17,5 m et son diamètre est de 2 m. La portée maximale est de 5 000 kms. Le missile peut porter une ogive d'un poids total d'une tonne.

lundi, 19 mars 2012

L'Inde menacée de sanctions pour le refus de réduire les achats de pétrole à l'Iran

L'arrogance des Etats-Unis met à l'index l'Inde pour ses achats pétroliers à l'Iran. Ils envisagent des sanctions contre l'Inde à partir de l'été. Il serait temps qu'une politique commune de rétorsion économique se prenne au BRICS contre les USA.

L'Inde menacée de sanctions pour le refus de réduire les achats de pétrole à l'Iran

  Ex: http://mbm.hautetfort.com/

Photo: EPA
 
     
Les États-Unis pourraient imposer des sanctions contre l'Inde, si elle ne restreint pas les importations du pétrole iranien, rapporte Bloomberg.

La loi, qui est entrée en vigueur aux États-Unis, pénalise tout pays pour le règlement du pétrole iranien par le biais de la Banque centrale d'Iran, si ce pays ne réduit pas significativement le volume des achats de pétrole à Téhéran dans la première moitié de cette année. Et si l'Inde ne le fait pas, le président des États-Unis sera obligé d'introduire des sanctions contre ce pays à partir du 28 juin, a indiqué l'agence en citant des responsables américains.

L'Inde achète à l'Iran, en moyenne 328.000 barils de pétrole par jour. Le pays est le troisième plus grand importateur de pétrole iranien, après la Chine et le Japon.

samedi, 10 mars 2012

Notes sur le BRICS, l’OCS et Poutine

L'Occident avait rêvé détruire la Russie par déstabilisation intérieure. Le résultat des élections, ayant tournure de plébiscite pour Poutine, a eu la conséquence inverse. Loin d'être isolé, Poutine devient le Commandeur de la fronde anti-Occident.

Notes sur le BRICS, l’OCS et Poutine

Ex: http://mbm.hautetfort.com/

La nébuleuse de crise du Moyen-Orient (Syrie, Iran, notamment) bouleverse toutes les données générales des relations internationales et, en tant que ce que nous avons désigné comme archétype de la “crise haute”, ne cesse d’effectuer une poussée vers un élargissement constant. Nous abordons d’abord le problème de l’Inde au travers d’un plus vaste ensemble, qui est le fameux BRICS (rassemblement informel du Brésil, de la Chine, de la Russie, de l’Inde et de l’Afrique du Sud), – dont un sommet est justement prévu les 28 et 29 mars à Delhi. Puis nous élargissons notre propos à l'OCS (Organisation de Coopération de Shanghai), avec la proximité entre la Chine et la Russie... Tout cela doit être vu à la lumière de l’élection de Poutine, qui constitue un évènement nouveau et important.

C’est l’excellent commentateur, l’ancien diplomate indien M K Bhadrakumar, sur son blog baptisé Indian Punchline, qui lance l’idée d’une offensive du BRICS qui pourrait s’élaborer à cette occasion.

La colère de M K Bhadrakumar

Mais voyons la chronologie… D’abord, M K Bhadrakumar avait exprimé, le 2 mars 2012, une saine et juste colère à l’encontre de son pays, qu’il accusait de céder, pris de panique, aux pressions US dans divers domaines. Deux choses avaient fait bouillir M K Bhadrakumar, d’habitude attentif à conserver un ton diplomatiquement contenu… Deux dépositions au Congrès US, celui de Clinton et celui de l’amiral Robert Willard, commandant en chef US pour la zone Pacifique.

«What stunned me is that in the same breath Clinton also commended the Manmohan Singh government for “making steps that are heading in the right direction.” Clinton told the US Congressmen not to take seriously the public utterances of Indian officials regarding friendly relations with Iran or Delhi’s grit to keep up the oil imports from Tehran. She revealed, in essence, that Uncle Sam did some tough talking and Manmohan Singh government panicked.

»Clinton’s statement means only this: Manmohan Singh government has taken ordinary Indians — you and me — for a ride by secretly complying with the US sanctions against Iran while professing publicly that India will only heed the UN sanctions. I have no reason to doubt Clinton, because the US Administration takes the Congressional hearings bloody seriously.

»Therefore, equally, I am inclined to believe the latest revelation by the Pentagon about the government’s security policies. The Pentagon has revealed that the US Special Forces are stationed on Indian soil with regard to improving India’s “counter-terrorism capabilities and in particular on the maritime domain” and assisting India’s security agencies in terms of “internal counter-terror and counter-insurgency challenges.” Again, the statement was made during a US Congressional hearing and there is no reason to doubt its veracity. A Congress-led government on Raisina Hill accepted US military personnel’s presence on Indian soil to safeguard the country’s security!»

L’Inde sermonne la Ligue Arabe

Deux jours plus tard, le 4 mars 2012, le même M K Bhadrakumar exprimait, selon un sentiment tout à fait inverse, toute sa satisfaction devant la prise de position de l’Inde lors d’un entretien du ministre des affaires étrangères indien avec le président de la Ligue Arabe. Les deux interlocuteurs discutèrent longuement du sujet de la Syrie et conclurent qu’ils se trouvaient devant une divergence majeure. La position de la Ligue Arabe, qui est celle imposée par l’Arabie et les Emirats du Golfe, est connue ; celle de l’Inde est, au contraire, du refus de toute ingérence, et de laisser les affaires syriennes aux seuls Syriens.

TheHindu.com expliquait, le 4 mars 2012 : «India and the Arab League on Saturday held extensive discussions on Syria, but have been unable to chart out a common route that would end the crisis in the strife-torn nation. After a lengthy dialogue between visiting External Affairs Minister S.M. Krishna and Arab League head, Nabil ElAraby, the two sides failed to find convergence on one core issue — the fate of Syrian President Bashar Al Assad.

»The Arab League, citing the Syrian Constitution itself as the basis, says it has called upon Mr. Assad to step down and hand over power to his Vice President and a national unity government. In contrast, India's view is non-prescriptive: It is up to the Syrians themselves to internally decide how they need to resolve their crisis. Foreign intervention of any kind was both unhelpful and unnecessary.»

Les incertitudes assurées d’Hillary

Cette nouvelle sur la position indienne vis-à-vis de la Syrie, c’est-à-dire vis-à-vis de la position du bloc BAO, est confirmée par ailleurs par les nouvelles venues régulièrement des relations entre l’Inde et l’Iran. (Il s’agit pour nous de la même “crise haute”, qui évolue autour, pour ou contre, de la politique du bloc BAO, c’est-à-dire la “politique-Système de l’idéologie et de l’instinct”.)

Il s’agit, par exemple, du développement des relations commerciales entre l’Inde et l’Iran, qui implique évidemment une prise de position contraire aux pressions du bloc BAO. (Voir le 6 mars 2012, sur PressTV.com : «Tehran Chamber of Commerce, Industries and Mines will host the Indian delegation, comprising 70 businessmen and exporters from the South Asian country. The businessmen, headed by Joint Secretary of India’s Ministry of Commerce and Industry Arvind Mehta, are due to meet with their Iranian counterparts on Saturday March 10, 2012. Discussing trade opportunities in various fields including oil, gas, chemicals, minerals, electronics, agriculture, sugar production, textile machinery, tire-making, car-manufacturing and medicine will be on the agenda of the meeting. India seeks to upgrade its trade balance with Iran that is currently tilted in Tehran's favor.»)

Cet exemple est donné comme tel, simplement comme un pas de plus dans un enchaînement d’accords commerciaux entre l’Inde et l’Iran qui prend son rythme structurel. Cela se place évidemment en complète contradiction avec le contenu de la déclaration d’Hillary Clinton au Congrès…

Hillary ment-elle au Congrès ? Sans doute pas. Elle ne fait qu’émettre les avis impératifs de ses services après sa rencontre avec la direction indienne. L’interprétation est qu’elle-même a émis des conseils et des vœux appuyés qui, dans son esprit, étaient des ordres (à cette direction indienne). Les dirigeants indiens n’ont pas dit non car ils ne se distinguent pas par un courage exceptionnel, mais répondirent vaguement. Cela fut pris pour un engagement ferme d’“obéir aux ordres”, et ainsi régurgité au Congrès sous une forme de bouillie bureaucratique satisfaite d’elle-même. (De même, Washington et Hillary vécurent-ils en général, et peut-être continuent à vivre, avec la certitude d’avoir permis aux Indiens enthousiastes d’acheter le JSF, jusqu'à faire de l'Inde un client assuré et soumis.)

Des troupes US en Inde

L’affaire des “troupes US” stationnée en Inde, que soulève également M K Bhadrakumar, est encore plus révélatrice de la difficulté d’apprécier précisément la réalité de la situation et de la nécessité de se garder de l’extraordinaire montage virtualiste accentué d’un aussi peu ordinaire imbroglio bureaucratique que constitue, constamment et irrésistiblement, sans même la conscience de ceux qui effectuent le montage, la “politique” étrangère et de sécurité nationale des USA (du bloc BAO)… La déposition au Congrès de l’amiral Willard à laquelle M K Bhadrakumar fait allusion a aussitôt été contredite par plusieurs sources : l’ambassade US en Inde, les ministères indiens de la défense et des affaires étrangères.

Antiwar.com exprimait brièvement l’affaire et ses contradictions, le 2 mars 2012 : US Pacific Command head Admiral Robert Willard announced today that US special forces have been deployed to India, along with Nepal, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Maldives, as an effort to fight the Lashkar-e Taiba (LeT), a militant faction mostly active in Kashmir.

»Though Willard was very clear about there being teams deployed to India, the US Embassy and the Indian Defense Ministry later denied the claims, saying that there are no US troops of any type inside India. The revelation is already causing political waves in India, with the opposition Communist Party demanding to know why parliament wasn’t consulted. The External Affairs Ministry’s statement that the US never sought nor had India approved any deployment seems difficult to believe.»

Qui croire ? Malgré le scepticisme de Antiwar.com, nous répondrons : tout le monde… L’explication la plus évidente est que ce déploiement est d’abord une manœuvre conjointe, incluant 200 soldats US sous le commandement d’un colonel, et qui n’avait pas été signalée aux autorités civiles des deux pays (département d’État aux USA, les deux ministères indien) dans son détail. C’est une habitude propre au Pentagone, entraînant aisément des “partenaires” étrangers dans la même discrétion, de mener des opérations, surtout d’entraînement, sans en dévoiler les caractéristiques auprès des pouvoirs ou ministères civils concernés.

Le résultat est douteux et se constate dans le désordre le plus complet. Après tout, la présence de militaires US, plus innocente sur l’instant qu’elle n’y paraît, a soulevé des remous sérieux en Inde, et compromis si on en avait l’idée toute perspective d’installation structurelle de militaires US en Inde. Au contraire, elle pousse un peu plus l’Inde hésitante à s’engager plutôt sur une voie plutôt “anti-BAO”, ne serait-ce que pour ne pas se trouver captive d’un entraînement servile et captif, pro-BAO.

De l’Inde au Brésil

L’ensemble de constats et de nouvelles permet de cerner une image de l’Inde dans ces diverses composants de la crise centrale (crise haute) qui est à la fois incertaine et orientée de facto vers un engagement de moins en moins sympathique aux vœux des USA et du bloc BAO qui suit. (On a déjà vu d’autres signes de cette évolution de l’Inde, notamment par rapport à l’Iran.) Cette tendance générale affecte également le Brésil, puissance émergente au statut assez semblable à celui de l’Inde, notamment par le biais du groupe BRICS.

• On peut noter l’intervention sévère pour les pratiques américanistes-occidentalistes, le 2 mars 2012 (PressTV.com), de la présidente Dilma Rousseff, au cours d’un séminaire au Brésil… «Instead of using fiscal policies to invest in their own economies in order to avert the crisis, the rich nations have spilled USD 4.7 trillion in the world to make problems worse, thus putting emerging markets in jeopardy” […] Brazilian President Dilma Rousseff has slammed the rich countries fiscal policies, accusing them of unleashing a ‘monetary tsunami’ that is cannibalizing the emerging economies.»

• On peut noter également l’intervention du ministre des affaires étrangères Antonio Patriota auprès du secrétaire général de l’ONU (NewsBeaconIreland.com, le 3 mars 2012) : «Last week, Brazil’s Foreign Affairs Minister, Antonio Patriota, reminded Ban Ki-moon regarding his role as UN Secretary General. It referred to the issue of criminal actions in derogation of international law. “One sometimes hears the expression, ‘all options are on the table.’ But some actions are contrary to international law” Patriota told UN Secretar General Ban Ki-moon.»

BRICS à Delhi, avec Annan ?

On conclut de tout cela que des membres en général moins engagés dans l’affrontement avec le bloc BAO sont conduits à prendre des positions qui se radicalisent par la seule force de la dynamique en cours. Il n’en faut pas plus, dans tous les cas pour l’Inde qui est son pays, pour lire, le 4 mars 2012, du même M K Bhadrakumar, une plaidoirie pour un BRICS beaucoup plus engagé dans le sens qu’on devine… Justement, l’occasion ne ferait-elle pas le larron ? En d’autres termes, pourquoi le BRICS, qui se réunit à Delhi, les 28-29 mars, sous présidence indienne, n’inviterait-il pas, à propos de la Syrie, Kofi Annan, dont M K Bhadrakumar, qui connaît la qualité de l’homme et sa carrière intelligente pour freiner les folies américaniste, sait parfaitement qu’il saura défendre une position conforme aux intérêts et à la dynamique du BRICS ?

«In sum, a BRICS voice needs to raised and India is going to chair the forum through the coming one-year period. India is too big a country to take a limited, opportunistic perspective of the situation as a mere new game on the West Asian chessboard. It is a fallacy to imagine that being ‘non-aligned’ via-a-vis West Asian situation means simply not taking sides between Saudi Arabia and Iran.

»Being ‘non-aligned’ actually means to be able to occupy the heights from where it becomes possible for India introduce into the West Asian situation the impetus toward creating an authentic Arab narrative that is free of manipulation by Nicolas Sarkozy or David Cameron. That is what Nehru would have done.

»Alas, South Block didn’t consider it necessary to issue even a one-line statement commending the arrival of Kofi Annan on the scene. Annan is a great friend of India. We respect him profoundly as a man of peace. We trust his integrity and his wisdom. We rely on his vast experience in conflict management. Why don’t we invite Annan to New Delhi to meet the BRICS leaders as they gather for the annual summit on March 28-29? The BRICS, after all, stands for the primacy of the United Nations in resolving international disputes and regional conflicts.

»South Block needs to think big — real big. Don’t let this period be written off as a chronicle of wasted time, of small men grappling with a big world.»

…En attendant l’OCS

Du groupe BRICS à l’OCS (Organisation de Coopération de Shanghai), il n’y a qu’un pas. Nous passons de Delhi à Pékin, les deux vieux ennemis qui sont bien obligés par les obligations du caractère eschatologique de la “crise haute” de se regrouper dans des ensemble à dimensions mondiales, – celles du groupe émergent, BRICS-OCS.

Un texte de China Daily, ce 6 mars 2012, détaille d’une façon générale les ambitions de la Chine pour le sommet de l’OCS, le 15 juin dans la capitale chinoise. Le texte s’articule notamment sur la mention de l’important évènement qu’est l’élection de Poutine à la présidence de la Russie, dimanche dernier. Il importe d’observer un rapport de complémentarité, sinon d’auto accélération, dans la convergence affichée des deux évènements : cette proximité symbolique dans un texte chinois indique sans aucun doute ce que les Chinois attendent à la fois de l’élection de Vladimir Poutine et du sommet de l’OCS.

«Following incumbent Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin's victory in the country's presidential election on Sunday, Chinese President Hu Jintao has sent a congratulatory message to Putin, Foreign Ministry spokesman Liu Weimin said Monday. […]

»“We are confident that with the joint efforts of the two countries, the China-Russia comprehensive strategic partnership of coordination will achieve even greater results,” the foreign minister said.

»China will play host to this year's summit of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), which marked its 10th anniversary of establishment in 2011. One of the main agendas of this year's summit, Yang said, is to plan the practical cooperation of the SCO, particularly the establishment of institutional safeguards for the financing of multilateral cooperation.

»The summit will also discuss regional and international situations, with a focus on improving SCO measures in coping with situations that pose a threat to regional peace, stability and security, Yang said. Founded on June 15, 2001, the SCO groups China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. Observer countries include Mongolia, Pakistan, Iran and India while Belarus and Sri Lanka are dialogue partners.»

Dynamique de formation d’un “bloc anti-BAO”

Ainsi une diagonale est-elle tracée, de l’Inde au Brésil et au BRICS, à l’élection de Poutine, aux relations sino-russe, et au sommet de l’OCS. Cette diagonale encore tourmentée et manquant de solidité, est néanmoins l’indication la plus ferme et la plus évidente de la formation en cours d’un “bloc anti-BAO”, à organiser en fonction de toutes les tensions et crises en développement. La surprise incontestable de cette opportunité, c’est le rôle soudain qu’y tient la Russie, non en tant que telle, mais bien à la lumière de l’élection de Poutine.

…Car cette élection, en trois jours, grâce à l’activisme absolument forcené et affolant du bloc BAO pour la discréditer, et aboutissant à un fiasco de ce point de vue, a enfanté l’effet exactement inverse ; alors qu’elle n’était au départ qu’une formalité assez banale et avec effectivement un certain volume d’apprêt et de mise en scène qui en amoindrissait l’effet, l’élection de Poutine brusquement dramatisée par le bloc BAO, et d’une dramatisation aboutissant à un fiasco du point de vue du bloc, s’impose en sens inverse, comme un triomphe de Poutine et de sa conception de la Russie. C’est ce que nous interprétions (le 6 mars 2012) comme une légitimation de Poutine dans une position de dirigeant nécessairement ambitieux et affirmé de la Russie dans un rôle global renouvelé, réaffirmé... «D’une certaine façon extrêmement paradoxale et en agissant par simple effet de réaction antagoniste, l’évènement a accentué la légitimité de Poutine, et la légitimité de la nouvelle politique qu’il sera conduit à appliquer.»

Légitimation d’un rôle extérieur de Poutine

La mise en cause d’un caractère obsessionnel par le bloc BAO de cette élection et des fraudes qui l’auraient marquée, concernant la démocratie, le fonctionnement de l’élection, etc., constitue indirectement un témoignage puissant sur les angoisses propres des dirigeants politiques dépendant du Système, et concernant leur propre légitimité ; en quelque sorte, leur illégitimité tentant de se projeter sur l’élection de Poutine pour les exonérer de leur propre handicap s’étant heurtée au succès de l’élection, a légitimé paradoxalement et par effet inverse Poutine, et accentué leur propre illégitimité. Là-dessus, passant nécessairement d’un plan intérieur au plan extérieur parce que les évènements y pressent, cette paradoxale légitimation de Poutine se projette sur son rôle extérieur.

En effet, c’est ce rôle extérieur que nous considérons, hors des éventuels problèmes intérieurs russes qui obsèdent le système de la communication du bloc BAO. L’élection propulse Poutine, de cette façon symbolique qui est au moins aussi importante que le domaine politique, comme meneur naturel d’un regroupement anti-BAO, qui passe évidemment par l’alliance chinoise dans le cadre de l’OCS, puis par l’extension vers les grands pays du BRICS, c’est-à-dire l’Inde, le Brésil et l’Afrique du Sud.

Champ de bataille en formation subreptice

Au contraire de l’organisation structurelle du bloc BAO, qui passe nécessairement par les postures de servilité imposée par le Système, le rôle de Poutine devrait être effectivement celui d’un meneur coordinateur, éventuellement d’un inspirateur, valant essentiellement par l’exemple de l’entraînement bien plus que par une autorité qui n'est pas dans les habitudes de ces regroupements. C’est pour cette raison que l’organisation de cette sorte de “bloc anti-BAO” doit se faire plutôt subrepticement, par des dynamiques naturelles dont on a vu l’exemple plus haut pour l’Inde et pour le Brésil, cela largement favorisé par les extraordinaires maladresses, les contretemps systématiques des actions et des réactions du bloc BAO. Ainsi devrait-on voir surgir ce rassemblement sans avertissement, plutôt de façon impromptue et inattendue, à la suite de mouvements souterrains qui se seraient déroulés sans signes annonciateurs.

Cela devrait réserver des surprises, à mesure que la crise haute s’étend et se développe. D’autre part, il s’agit du signe de la confirmation que nous nous trouvons en présence de forces puissantes et autonomes, celles qui animent la dynamique de la crise haute, qui agissent par pressions indirectes et contribuent à rendre extrêmement difficiles des actions de retardement, de freinage ou de blocage. Le champ de la bataille et les acteurs qui s’y trouveront se mettent en place d’eux-mêmes, sans que nous ne voyons rien venir.

De foyer d’incendie en foyer d’incendie

On observera combien la stratégie générale de ces grands mouvements métahistoriques qui organisent la bataille générale passe avec régularité d’un “front à l’autre”, rendant encore plus difficile de bloquer ou de contrôler leur action. Ainsi depuis un an et demi sommes-nous passés du “front du printemps arabe“ au “front intérieur” des USA (Occupy, prémisses de la campagne présidentielle), au “front européen” parallèlement, à nouveau au front “extérieur” issu du “printemps arabe” (Syrie, Iran), qui pourrait s’étendre désormais à un front “anti-BAO” après avoir concerné le front intérieur russe, et ainsi de suite.

A chaque fois, un foyer de désordre nouveau (contre le Système) s’allume et continue ensuite à brûler, sans pouvoir être éteint ni même vraiment réduit. C’est bien d’une stratégie globale antiSystème qu’il s’agit. Inutile de chercher à identifier les auteurs-comploteurs. Ils sont hors de notre portée.

mercredi, 29 février 2012

Les ONG américaines se mêlent des projets nucléaires indiens

Il était temps que le premier ministre indien dénonce publiquement, et dans un média US de surcroît, la déstabilisation américaine en Inde. Ils finiront par pousser l'Inde à intégrer l'OCS comme avec l'Ukraine à intégrer l'Union eurasienne.

Les ONG américaines se mêlent des projets nucléaires indiens

 

 

© Collage: «Voix de la Russie»
 
     
Les organisations non-gouvernementales américaines sont derrière les mouvements de protestation contre le projet de la centrale nucléaire de Kudankulam, qui est actuellement en construction dans le sud de l'Inde avec l'aide de la Russie, a déclaré le premier ministre Manmohan Singh dans une interview accordée au magazine américain Science.
«Les ONG, dont la plupart se base aux Etats-Unis, ne voient aucune nécessité pour notre pays d’accroître la production de l’électricité», a déclaré Manmohan Singh. A cause des protestations, que nous estimons comme initiées par des ONG étrangères, le premier bloc de la centrale de Kudankulam, dont la construction est terminée, ne pourra pas être lancé dans les délais prévus. Une date ultérieure a été également fixée pour le lancement du second bloc de la centrale, actuellement en construction. Quant à la construction du troisième et quatrième bloc de la deuxième série, la signature des contrats pour l’élaboration de ces projets a également été reportée à plus tard. A l’origine, ces contrats devaient être signés lors de la visite du premier ministre indien en Russie en décembre de l’année dernière. Le développement du secteur de l’énergie nucléaire en Inde se retrouve ainsi bloqué, ce qui porte préjudice à l’économie du pays.

«Manmohan Singh a déclaré dans une interview au magazine américain ce dont toute la presse indienne parlait depuis longtemps», explique le célèbre journaliste indien Vinay Shukla. Par exemple, le journal Times of India a rapporté que les organisations chrétiennes occidentales ont transféré à l'Inde 630 millions de roupies pour le financement de la campagne de protestation contre le développement de l'énergie nucléaire pacifique dans le pays. Par conséquent, la déclaration du premier ministre indien est vue très positivement. Les gens disent que le chef du gouvernement a enfin appelé les choses par leur nom, en exprimant fermement ce qu'il devait dire depuis très longtemps. En Occident, il y a effectivement certains cercles, en particulier en Scandinavie, qui ne veulent pas le développement économique de l'Inde, ayant à cet effet leurs propres projets».

En Inde, on se souvient bien que ces organisations, financées par les pays occidentaux, étaient à l’origine des protestations de masse contre la construction des usines de sidérurgie, des entreprises d'ingénierie, et des raffineries de pétrole. Dans l’interview au magazine Science, le premier ministre de l'Inde a également accusé les ONG étrangères de s'opposer au développement des biotechnologies de pointe dans le pays. «Les biotechnologies ont un potentiel énorme», explique-t-il. «Et nous avons besoin d’utiliser ces biotechnologies pour accroître la production alimentaire en Inde», a déclaré Manmohan Singh.

En ce qui concerne l'énergie nucléaire, les Etats-Unis ont signé au début de 2006 avec l'Inde un accord de coopération, en s'engageant à construire dans le pays des centrales nucléaires et fournir les technologies et l'équipement nécessaire à leur fonctionnement. Toutefois, jusqu'à présent, le travail en vertu de cet accord n'a toujours pas commencé. Mais l'activité des ONG basées aux Etats-Unis visant à entraver la coopération de l’Inde avec les autres pays dans le domaine de l'énergie nucléaire pacifique s’est intensifiée. Une tentative visant à perturber le lancement de la centrale nucléaire de Kudankulam, construite avec l'aide des technologies russes – ce n'est pas seulement une attaque contre un projet spécifique. Il s'agit d'une tentative de remettre en question l'ensemble du programme de la coopération russo-indienne dans la construction des centrales nucléaires, alors que la Russie et l’Inde comptent construire ensemble dans les années à venir en tout 16 blocs pour les centrales nucléaire indiennes.

mercredi, 23 novembre 2011

Iran/Inde: coopération dans les secteurs hydrique et alimentaire

 

water.jpg

Federico DAL CORTIVO:

 Iran/Inde: coopération dans les secteurs hydrique et alimentaire

L’eau est un bien précieux et, dans un futur proche, elle pourra constituer un “casus belli” quand il s’agira, une fois de plus, d’exporter la “démocratie” dans l’une ou l’autre région du monde

VBK-BANSAL_307869f.jpg

Le ministre indien des ressources hydriques, Pawan Kumar Bansal (photo), s’est rendu récemment à Téhéran pour y représenter l’Inde au XXIème Congrès sur la sécurité alimentaire et hydrique: ce sont là des sujets du plus haut intérêt pour ces deux grands pays de la masse continentale eurasienne. Bansal a surtout mis l’accent sur “l’importance de détenir une sécurité alimentaire sur la scène mondiale actuelle”, ce qui a pour corollaire la disponibilité en eau pour la population et les cultures; l’eau, véritable or bleu, est essentielle pour toute autosuffisance en ces secteurs d’activité humaine.

Le ministre indien, après avoir souligné les affinités qui existent entre l’Inde et l’Iran, a également rappelé qu’il manquait une stratégie commune en ce domaine hydrique/alimentaire. “L’Inde investit beaucoup en ce moment dans le secteur hydrique, avec sa population de plus de 1,7 milliard d’habitants; les recherches pour trouver de nouvelles sources d’eau s’effectuent de concert avec la construction d’implantations spécifiques, destinées à la distribution et l’épuration”. Bansal a ensuite ajouté: “Le gouvernement de la Nouvelle Delhi carresse le projet d’augmenter de 20% l’efficacité des systèmes d’irrigation en l’espace de cinq années, projet qui va de paire avec un renforcement des capacités technologiques de la productivité agricole”. “Toutes les activités concernant l’eau et son utilisation”, a poursuivi le ministre indien, “devront être abordées avec l’implication totale et complète de la population et des diverses entités collectives locales, de manière à responsabiliser également les utilisateurs quant à l’usage correct de cette précieuse ressource”.

L’eau représente de fait un bien de plus en plus important sur le plan stratégique, au vu de ce qui se passe dans le monde actuel où la consommation par tête d’habitant a doublé depuis le début du 20ème siècle, avec un maximum de quelque 1700 m3 par habitant aux Etats-Unis.

Dans le monde, il y a environ 1400 millions de km3 d’eau, dont 96% se trouvent dans les océans; seule une petite partie est constituée d’eau douce, dont 1,74% est immobilisée dans les glaces et 1,7% dans les nappes phréatiques souterraines; par conséquent, moins d’1% de l’eau douce se trouve dans les fleuves et les lacs de surface. En 2000, l’ONU avait fixé huit objectifs de développement mondial; parmi ceux-ci, il y avait la volonté de réduire, dans la mesure du possible, la part de la population mondiale sans accès à l’eau potable.

Derrière ces aspects purement humains de l’utilisation de l’or bleu, il y a les intérêts de ceux qui veulent contrôler cette richesse et s’en accaparer comme c’est déjà le cas pour le pétrole.

Carlos Pareyra Mele, analyste argentin et expert ès géopolitique de l’Amérique latine, soutient la thèse que depuis le milieu des années 80 du 20ème siècle, l’eau est devenue un objectif considéré comme stratégique par les gouvernements américains qui la camouflent généralement derrière un discours sur la “biodiversité”. En 2004, toujours selon cet expert argentin, le journal “The Guardian” a rendu public un rapport secret d’un conseiller du Pentagone, A. Marshall, dans lequel ce dernier avertissait les autorités américaines que, vu le réchauffement climatique, l’eau deviendra bien vite une matière première précieuse, dont il faudra nécessairement s’assurer le contrôle, du moins de ses sources les plus importantes.

puissance-l-eau-300426.jpg

Or c’est justement le continent sud-américain qui recèle les plus grands bassins d’eau douce du monde, avec 25% du total de la planète entière. Cette masse hydrique pourrait fort bien attirer l’attention de la superpuissance américaine qui chercherait alors à contrôler, pour son compte propre, cette énorme masse d’eau douce disponible, soit par le biais de ses seules multinationales soit en organisant la déstabilisation politique des Etats latino-américains. Ce qui ne serait pas nouveau même si aujourd’hui de telles manigances semblent moins probables qu’aux temps jadis. L’Amérique du Sud cherche depuis deux bonnes décennies à sortir le plus rapidement possible de son statut d’“arrière-cours” des Etats-Unis; ceux-ci s’étaient substitués à l’Angleterre et avaient pillé à grande échelle les immenses richesses naturelles de ce continent. Cependant, les Sud-Américains ne doivent pas baisser la garde, comme d’ailleurs personne sur cette planète ne doit la baisser, parce que ce qui est en jeu, ce sont les matières premières et les richesses naturelles. Soyons-en sûrs, elles attireront l’attention de Washington et de ses alliés. Face à leurs manoeuvres, il s’agira de ne pas être désarmé.

Federico DAL CORTIVO.

(article paru dans “Rinascita”, Rome, 28 octobre 2011 – http://rinascita.eu ).

 

dimanche, 20 novembre 2011

India's only communalist A short biography of Sita Ram Goel

India's only communalist
A short biography of Sita Ram Goel

Ex; http://koenraadelst.voiceofdharma.com/

Koenraad Elst

1. Is there a communalist in the hall ?

A lot of people in India and abroad talk about communalism, often in grave tones, describing it as a threat to secularism, to regional and world peace. But can anyone show us a communalist? If we look more closely into the case of any so-called communalist, we find that he turns out to be something else.

sitaramgoel.jpgCould Syed Shahabuddin be a communalist? After all, he played a key role in the three main "Muslim communalist" issues of recent years: the Babri Masjid campaign, the Shah Bano case and the Salman Rushdie affair (it is he who got The Satanic Verses banned in September 1988). Surely, he must be India's communalist par excellence? Wrong: if you read any page of any issue of Shahabuddin's monthly Muslim India, you will find that he brandishes the notion of "secularism" as the alpha and omega of his politics, and that he directs all his attacks against Hindu "communalism". The same propensity is evident in the whole Muslim "communalist" press, e.g. the Jamaat-i Islami weekly Radiance. Moreover, on Muslim India's editorial board, you find articulate secularists like Inder Kumar Gujral, Khushwant Singh and the late P.N. Haksar.

For the same reason, any attempt to label the All-India Muslim League as communalist would be wrong. True, it is the continuation of the party which achieved the Partition of India along communal lines. Yet, emphatically secularist parties like the Congress Party and the Communist Party of India (Marxist) have never hesitated to include the Muslim League in coalitions governing the state of Kerala. No true communalist would get such a chance.

On the Hindu side then, at least the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS, "National Volunteer Corps") could qualify as "communalist"? Certainly, it is called just that by all its numerous enemies. But then, when you look through any issue of its weekly Organiser, you will find it brandishing the notion of "positive" or "genuine secularism", and denouncing "pseudo-secularism", i.e. minority communalism. Moreover, in order to prove its non-communal character, it even calls itself and its affiliated organizations (trade-union, student organization, political party etc.) "National" or "Indian" rather than "Hindu". The allied political party, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP, "Indian People's Party"), shows off the large number of Muslims among its cadres to prove how secular and non-communal it is. Even the Shiv Sena shows off its token Muslims. No, for full-blooded communalists, we have to look elsewhere.

There is only one man in India whom I have ever known to say: "I am a (Hindu) communalist." To an extent, this is in jest, as a rhetorical device to avoid the tangle in which RSS people always get trapped: being called "communalist!" and then spending the rest of your time trying to prove to your hecklers what a good secularist you are. But to an extent, it is because he accepts at least one definition of "communalism" as applying to himself, esp. to his view of India's history since the 7th century. Many historians try to prove their "secularism" by minimizing religious adherence as a factor of conflict in Indian history, and explaining so-called religious conflicts as merely a camouflage for socio-economic conflicts. By contrast, the historian under consideration accepts, and claims to have thoroughly documented, the allegedly "communalist" view that the major developments in medieval and modern Indian history can only be understood as resulting from an intrinsic hostility between religions.

Unlike the Hindutva politicians, he does not seek the cover of "genuine secularism". While accepting the notion that Hindu India has always been "secular" in the adapted Indian sense of "religiously pluralistic", he does not care for slogans like the Vishva Hindu Parishad's advertisement "Hindu India, secular India". After all, in Nehruvian India the term "secular" has by now acquired a specific meaning far removed from the original European usage, and even from the above-mentioned Indian adaptation. If Voltaire, the secularist par excellence, were to live in India today and repeat his attacks on the Church, echoing the Hindutva activists in denouncing the Churches' grip on public life in christianized pockets like Mizoram and Nagaland, he would most certainly be denounced as "anti-minority" and hence "anti-secular".

In India, the term has shed its anti-Christian bias and acquired an anti-Hindu bias instead, a phenomenon described by the author under consideration as an example of the current "perversion of India's political parlance". Therefore, he attacks the whole Nehruvian notion of "secularism" head-on, e.g. in the self-explanatory title of his Hindi booklet Saikyularizm: râshtradroha kâ dûsra nâm ("Secularism: the Alternative Name for Treason"). The name of India's only self-avowed communalist is Sita Ram Goel.

2. Sita Ram Goel as an anti-Communist

Sita Ram Goel was born in 1921 in a poor family (though belonging to the merchant Agrawal caste) in Haryana. As a schoolboy, he got acquainted with the traditional Vaishnavism practised by his family, with the Mahabharata and the lore of the Bhakti saints (esp. Garibdas), and with the major trends in contemporary Hinduism, esp. the Arya Samaj and Gandhism. He took an M.A. in History in Delhi University, winning prizes and scholarships along the way. In his school and early university days he was a Gandhian activist, helping a Harijan Ashram in his village and organizing a study circle in Delhi.

8185990239.jpgIn the 1930s and 40s, the Gandhians themselves came in the shadow of the new ideological vogue: socialism. When they started drifting to the Left and adopting socialist rhetoric, S.R. Goel decided to opt for the original rather than the imitation. In 1941 he accepted Marxism as his framework for political analysis. At first, he did not join the Communist Party of India, and had differences with it over such issues as the creation of the religion-based state of Pakistan, which was actively supported by the CPI but could hardly earn the enthusiasm of a progressive and atheist intellectual. He and his wife and first son narrowly escaped with their lives in the Great Calcutta Killing of 16 August 1946, organized by the Muslim League to give more force to the Pakistan demand.

In 1948, just when he had made up his mind to formally join the Communist Party of India, in fact on the very day when he had an appointment at the party office in Calcutta to be registered as a candidate-member, the Government of West Bengal banned the CPI because of its hand in an ongoing armed rebellion. A few months later, Ram Swarup came to stay with him in Calcutta and converted him as well as his employer, Hari Prasad Lohia, out of Communism. Goel's career as a combative and prolific writer on controversial matters of historical fact can only be understood in conjunction with Ram Swarup's sparser, more reflective writings on fundamental doctrinal issues.

Much later, in a speech before the Yogakshema society, Calcutta 1983, he explained his relation with Ram Swarup as follows: "In fact, it would have been in the fitness of things if the speaker today had been Ram Swarup, because whatever I have written and whatever I have to say today really comes from him. He gives me the seed-ideas which sprout into my articles (...) He gives me the framework of my thought. Only the language is mine. The language also would have been much better if it was his own. My language becomes sharp at times; it annoys people. He has a way of saying things in a firm but polite manner, which discipline I have never been able to acquire." (The Emerging National Vision, p.1.)

S.R. Goel's first important publications were written as part of the work of the Society for the Defence of Freedom in Asia:

·        World Conquest in Instalments (1952);

·        The China Debate: Whom Shall We Believe? (1953);

·        Mind Murder in Mao-land (1953);

·        China is Red with Peasants' Blood (1953);

·        Red Brother or Yellow Slave? (1953);

·        Communist Party of China: a Study in Treason (1953);

·        Conquest of China by Mao Tse-tung (1954);

·        Netaji and the CPI (1955);

·        CPI Conspire for Civil War (1955).

Goel also published the book Blowing up India: Reminiscences of a Comintern Agent by Philip Spratt (1955), who, as an English Comintern agent, had founded the Communist Party of India in 1926. After spending some time in prison as a convict in the Meerut Conspiracy case (1929), Spratt had come under the influence of Mahatma Gandhi, and ended as one of the best-informed critics of Communism.

Then, and all through his career as a polemical writer, the most remarkable feature of Sita Ram Goel's position in the Indian intellectual arena was that nobody even tried to give a serious rebuttal to his theses: the only counter-strategy has always been, and still is, "strangling by silence", simply refusing to ever mention his name, publications and arguments.

An aspect of history yet to be studied is how such anti-Communist movements in the Third World were not at all helped (in fact, often opposed) by Western interest groups whose understanding of Communist ideology and strategy was just too superficial. Most US representatives starkly ignored the SDFA's work, and preferred to enjoy the company of more prestigious (implying: fashionably anti-anti-Communist) opinion makers. Goel himself noted in 1961 about his Western anti-Communist contacts like Freda Utley, Suzanne Labin and Raymond Aron, who were routinely dismissed as bores, querulants or CIA agents: Communism was "opposed only by individuals and groups who have done so mostly at the cost of their reputation (...) A history of these heroes and their endless endeavour has still to be written." (Genesis and Growth of Nehruism, p.212)

3. Sita Ram Goel and the RSS

gagon.jpgIn the 1950s, Goel was not active on the "communal" battlefield: not Islam or Christianity but Communism was his priority target. Yet, under Ram Swarup's influence, his struggle against communism became increasingly rooted in Hindu spirituality, the way Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn's anti-Communism became rooted in Orthodox Christianity. He also co-operated with (but was never a member of) the Bharatiya Jana Sangh, and he occasionally contributed articles on Communism to the RSS weekly Organiser. In 1957 he contested the Lok Sabha election for the Khajuraho constituency as an independent candidate on a BJS ticket, but lost. He was one of the thirty independents fielded as candidates by Minoo Masani in preparation of the creation of his own (secular, rightist-liberal) Swatantra Party.

In that period, apart from the said topical books in English, Goel wrote and published 18 titles in Hindi: 8 titles of fiction and 1 of poetry written by himself; 3 compilations from the Mahabharata and the Tripitaka; and Hindi translations of these 6 books, mostly of obvious ideological relevance:

·        The God that Failed, a testimony on Communism by Arthur Koestler, André Gide and other prominent ex-Communists;

·        Ram Swarup's Communism and Peasantry;

·        Viktor Kravchenko's I Chose Freedom, another testimony by an ex-Communist;

·        George Orwell's Nineteen Eighty-Four.

·        Satyakam Sokratez ("Truth-lover Socrates"), the three Dialogues of Plato centred round Socrates' last days (Apology, Crito and Phaedo);

·        Shaktiputra Shivaji, a history of the 17th-century Hindu freedom fighter, originally The Great Rebel by Denis Kincaid.

There is an RSS aspect to this publishing activity. RSS secretary-general Eknath Ranade had asked Goel to educate RSS workers about literature, and to produce some literature in Hindi to this end. The understanding was that the RSS would propagate this literature and organize discussions about it. Once Goel had set up a small publishing outfit and published a few books, he had another meeting with Ranade, who gave him an unpleasant surprise: "Was the RSS created to sell your books?" Fortunately for Goel, his friend Guru Datt Vaidya and son Yogendra Datt included Goel's books in the fund of their own publishing-house, Bharati Sahitya Sadan. This is Goel's own version, and Ranade is not there to defend himself; but Goel's long experience in dealing with the RSS leadership translates into a long list of anecdotes of RSS petty-mindedness, unreliability and lack of proper manners in dealing with fellow-men.

In May 1957, Goel moved to Delhi and got a job with a state-affiliated company, the Indian Cooperative Union, for which he did research and prospection concerning cottage industries. The company also loaned him for a while to the leading Gandhian activist Jayaprakash Narayan, who shared Goel's anti-Communism at least at the superficial level (what used to be called "anti-Stalinism": rejecting the means but not the ends of Communism).

During the Chinese invasion in 1962, some government officials including P.N. Haksar, Nurul Hasan and the later Prime Minister I.K. Gujral, demanded Goel's arrest. But at the same time, the Home Ministry invited him to take a leadership role in the plans for a guerrilla war against the then widely-expected Chinese occupation of eastern India. He made his co-operation conditional on Nehru's abdication as Prime Minister, and nothing ever came of it.

In 1963, Goel had a book published under his own name which he had published in 1961-62 as a series in Organiser under the pen name Ekaki ("solitary"): a critique of Nehru's consistent pro-Communist policies, titled In Defence of Comrade Krishna Menon. An update of this book was published in 1993: Genesis and Growth of Nehruism. The serial in Organiser had been discontinued after 16 installments because Eknath Ranade and A.B. Vajpayee feared that if any harm came to Nehru, the RSS would be accused of having "created the climate", as in the Gandhi murder case.

In it, Goel questioned the current fashion of attributing India's Communist-leaning foreign policy to Defence Minister Krishna Menon, and demonstrated that Nehru himself had been a consistent Communist sympathizer ever since his visit to the Soviet Union in 1927. Nehru had stuck to his Communist sympathies even when the Communists insulted him as Prime Minister with their unbridled scatologism. Nehru was too British and too middle-class to opt for a fully authoritarian socialism, but like many European Leftists he supported just such regimes when it came to foreign policy. Thus, Nehru's absolute refusal to support the Tibetans even at the diplomatic level when they were overrun by the Chinese army ("a Far-Eastern Munich", according to Minoo Masani: Against the Tide, Vikas Publ., Delhi 1981, p.45.), cannot just be attributed to circumstances or the influence of his collaborators: his hand-over of Tibet to Communist China was quite consistent with his own political convictions.

While refuting the common explanation that the pro-Communist bias in Nehru's foreign policy was merely the handiwork of Minister Krishna Menon, Goel also drew attention to the harmfulness of this policy to India's national interests. This critique of Nehru's pro-China policies was eloquently vindicated by the Chinese invasion in October 1962, but it cost Goel his job. He withdrew from the political debate, went into business himself and set up Impex India, a company of book import and export with a modest publishing capacity.

In 1964, RSS general secretary Eknath Ranade invited Goel to lead the prospective Vishva Hindu Parishad, which was founded later that year, but Goel set as his condition that he would be free to speak his own mind rather than act as a mouthpiece of the RSS leadership; the RSS could not accept this, and the matter ended there. Goel's only subsequent involvement in politics was in 1973 when he was asked by the BJS leadership to mediate with the dissenting party leader Balraj Madhok in a last attempt at conciliation (which failed); and when he worked as a member of the think-tank of the Janata alliance before it defeated Indira's Emergency regime in the 1977 elections. As a commercial publisher, he did not seek out the typical "communal" topics, but nonetheless kept an eye on Hindu interests. That is why he published books like Dharampal's The Beautiful Tree (on indigenous education as admiring British surveyors found it in the 19th century, before it was destroyed and replaced with the British or missionary system), Ram Swarup's apology of polytheism The Word as Revelation (1980), K.R. Malkani's The RSS Story (1980) and K.D. Sethna's Karpasa in Prehistoric India (1981; on the chronology of Vedic civilization, implying decisive objections against the Aryan Invasion Theory).

4. Sita Ram Goel as a Hindu Revivalist

hsus.jpgIn 1981 Sita Ram Goel retired from his business, which he handed over to his son and nephew. He started the non-profit publishing house Voice of India with donations from sympathetic businessmen, and accepted Organiser editor K.R. Malkani's offer to contribute some articles again, articles which were later collected into the first Voice of India booklets.

Goel's declared aim is to defend Hinduism by placing before the public correct information about the situation of Hindu culture and society, and about the nature, motives and strategies of its enemies. For, as the title of his book Hindu Society under Siege indicates, Goel claims that Hindu society has been suffering a sustained attack from Islam since the 7th century, from Christianity since the 15th century, this century also from Marxism, and all three have carved out a place for themselves in Indian society from which they besiege Hinduism. The avowed objective of each of these three world-conquering movements, with their massive resources, is diagnosed as the replacement of Hinduism by their own ideology, or in effect: the destruction of Hinduism.

Apart from numerous articles, letters, contributions to other books (e.g. Devendra Swarup, ed.: Politics of Conversion, DRI, Delhi 1986) and translations (e.g. the Hindi version of Taslima Nasrin's Bengali book Lajja, published in instalments in Panchjanya, summer 1994), Goel has contributed the following books to the inter-religious debate:

·        Hindu Society under Siege (1981, revised 1992);

·        Story of Islamic Imperialism in India (1982);

·        How I Became a Hindu (1982, enlarged 1993);

·        Defence of Hindu Society (1983, revised 1987);

·        The Emerging National Vision (1983);

·        History of Heroic Hindu Resistance to Early Muslim Invaders (1984);

·        Perversion of India's Political Parlance (1984);

·        Saikyularizm, Râshtradroha kâ Dûsrâ Nâm (Hindi: "Secularism, another name for treason", 1985);

·        Papacy, Its Doctrine and History (1986);

·        Preface to The Calcutta Quran Petition by Chandmal Chopra (a collection of texts alleging a causal connection between communal violence and the contents of the Quran; 1986, enlarged 1987 and again 1999);

·        Muslim Separatism, Causes and Consequences (1987);

·        Foreword to Catholic Ashrams, Adapting and Adopting Hindu Dharma (a collection of polemical writings on Christian inculturation; 1988, enlarged 1994 with new subtitle: Sannyasins or Swindlers?);

·        History of Hindu-Christian Encounters (1989, enlarged 1996);

·        Hindu Temples, What Happened to Them (1990 vol.1; 1991 vol.2, enlarged 1993);

·        Genesis and Growth of Nehruism (1993);

·        Jesus Christ: An Artifice for Agrression (1994);

·        Time for Stock-Taking (1997), a collection of articles critical of the RSS and BJP;

·        Preface to the reprint of Mathilda Joslyn Gage: Woman, Church and State (1997, ca. 1880), an early feminist critique of Christianity;

·        Preface to Vindicated by Time: The Niyogi Committee Report (1998), a reprint of the official report on the missionaries' methods of subversion and conversion (1955).         

Goel's writings are practically boycotted in the media, both by reviewers and by journalists and scholars collecting background information on the communal problem. Though most Hindutva stalwarts have some Voice of India publications on their not-so-full bookshelves, the RSS Parivar refuses to offer its organizational omnipresence as a channel of publicity and distribution. Since most India-watchers have been brought up on the belief that Hindu activism can be identified with the RSS Parivar, they are bound to label Sita Ram Goel (the day they condescend to mentioning him at all, that is) as "an RSS man". It may, therefore, surprise them that the established Hindu organizations have so far shown little interest in his work.

It is not that they would spurn his services: in its Ayodhya campaign, the Vishva Hindu Parishad has routinely referred to a "list of 3000 temples converted into or replaced by mosques", meaning the list of nearly 2000 such cases in Goel, ed.: Hindu Temples, vol.1. Goel also published the VHP argumentation in the government-sponsored scholars' debate of 1990-91 (titled History vs. Casuistry), and he straightened and corrected the BJP's clumsily drafted White Paper on Ayodhya. But organizationally, the Parivar is not using its networks to spread Ram Swarup's and Sita Ram Goel's books and ideas. Twice (1962 and 1982) the RSS intervened with the editor of Organiser to have ongoing serials of articles (on Nehru c.q. on Islam) by Goel halted; the second time, the editor himself, the long-serving arch-moderate K.R. Malkani, was sacked along with Goel. And ideologically, it has always turned a deaf ear to their analysis of the problems facing Hindu society.

Most Hindu leaders expressly refuse to search Islamic doctrine for a reason for the observed fact of Muslim hostility. RSS leader Guru Golwalkar once said: "Islam is a great religion. Mohammed was a great prophet. But the Muslims are big fools." (Delhi ca. 1958) This is not logical, for the one thing that unites the (otherwise diverse) community of Muslims, is their common belief in Mohammed and the Quran: if any wrong is attributed to "the Muslims" as such, it must be situated in their common belief system. Therefore, Goel's position is just the opposite: not the Muslims are the problem, but Islam and Mohammed.

In the Ayodhya dispute, time and again the BJP leaders have appealed to the Muslims to relinquish all claims to the supposed birthplace of the Hindu god Rama, arguing that destroying temples is against the tenets of Islam, and that the Quran prohibits the use of a mosque built on disputed land. In fact, whatever Islam decrees against building mosques on disputed property, can only concern disputes within the Muslim community (or its temporary allies under a treaty). Goel has demonstrated in detail that it is perfectly in conformity with Islamic law, and established as legitimate by the Prophet through his own example, to destroy Pagan establishments and replace them with (or turn them into) mosques. For an excellent example, the Kaaba itself was turned into a mosque by Mohammed when he smashed the 360 Pagan idols that used to be worshipped in it.

Therefore, S.R. Goel is rather critical of the Ayodhya movement. In the foreword to Hindu Temples, vol.2, he writes: "The movement for the restoration of Hindu temples has got bogged down around the Rama Janmabhoomi at Ayodhya. The more important question, viz. why Hindu temples met the fate they did at the hands of Islamic invaders, has not been even whispered. Hindu leaders have endorsed the Muslim propagandists in proclaiming that Islam does not permit the construction of mosques at sites occupied earlier by other people's places of worship (...) The Islam of which Hindu leaders are talking exists neither in the Quran nor in the Sunnah of the Prophet. It is hoped that this volume will help in clearing the confusion. No movement which shuns or shies away from truth is likely to succeed. Strategies based on self-deception stand defeated at the very start."

Goel's alternative to the RSS variety of "Muslim appeasement" is to wage an ideological struggle against Islam and Christianity, on the lines of the rational criticism and secularist politics which have pushed back Christian self-righteousness in Europe. The Muslim community, of course, is not to be a scapegoat (as it is for those who refuse to criticize Islam and end up attacking Muslims instead), but has to be seen in the proper historical perspective: as a part of Hindu society estranged from its ancestral culture by Islamic indoctrination over generations. Their hearts and minds have to be won back by an effort of consciousness-raising, which includes education about the aims, methods and historical record of religions.

5. Conclusion

One of the grossest misconceptions about the Hindu movement, is that it is a creation of political parties like the BJP and the Shiv Sena. In reality, there is a substratum of Hindu activist tendencies in many corners of Hindu society, often in unorganized form and almost invariably lacking in intellectual articulation. To this widespread Hindu unrest about the uncertain future of Hindu culture, Voice of India provides an intellectual focus.

The importance of Ram Swarup's and Sita Ram Goel's work can hardly be over-estimated. I for one have no doubt that future textbooks on comparative religion as well as those on Indian political and intellectual history will devote crucial chapters to their analysis. They are the first to give a first-hand "Pagan" reply to the versions of history and "comparative religion" imposed by the monotheist world-conquerors, both at the level of historical fact and of fundamental doctrine, both in terms of the specific Hindu experience and of a more generalized theory of religion free from prophetic-monotheistic bias.

Their long-term intellectual importance is that they have contributed immensely to breaking the spell of all kinds of Christian, Muslim and Marxist prejudices and misrepresentations of Hinduism and the Hindu Revivalist movement.

vendredi, 14 octobre 2011

The genesis of India according to Bernard Sergent

 

The Genesis of India Acording to Bernard Sergent

A review

Dr. Koenraad ELST

Ex: http://koenraadelst.bharatvani.org/reviews/sergent.html/

1. A remarkable book

The debate concerning the theory of an Aryan invasion in India has taken off at last. In spite of the mutual deafness of the pro- and anti-invasionist schools, the increasing awareness of a challenge has led prominent scholars groomed in the invasionist view to collect, for the first time in their careers, actual arguments in favour of the Aryan Invasion Theory. As yet this is never in the form of a pointwise rebuttal of an existing anti-invasionist argumentation, a head-on approach so far exclusively adopted by one or two non-invasionists.

Nonetheless, some recent contributions to the archaeological and physical-anthropological aspects of the controversy pose a fresh challenge to the (by now often over-confident) noninvasionist school.

An extremely important new synthesis of various types of data is provided by Dr. Bernard Sergent in his book Genèse de l'Inde (Genesis of India), as yet only available in French (Payot, Paris 1997). The book comes as a sequel to his equally important book Les Indo-Européens (Payot 1995). Sergent is a Ph.D. in Archaeology with additional degrees in Physical Anthropology and in History, a researcher at the French National Centre for Scientific Research, and chairman of the French Society for Mythology.

One of Sergent's objectives is to counter the rising tide of skepticism against the AIT with archaeological and other proof. In particular, he proposes a precise identification of a particular Harappan-age but non-Harappan culture with the Indo-Aryans poised to invade India: the Bactrian Bronze Age culture of ca. 2500-2000 BC. At the same time, he is quite scornful of AIT critics and neglects to take their arguments apart, which means that he effectively leaves them standing. He dismisses the non-invasion theory in one sentence plus footnote as simply unbelievable and as the effect of nationalistic blindness for the shattering evidence provided by linguistics (Genèse de l'Inde, p.370 and p.477 n.485).

Nonetheless, it is important to note that, unlike Indian Marxists, he does not show any contempt for Hinduism or for the idea of India. Most people who analyze Indian culture into different contributions by peoples with divergent origins do so with the implicit or explicit message that "there is no such thing as Indian or Hindu culture, there is only a composite of divergent cultures, each of which should break free and destroy the dominant Brahminical system which propagates the false notion of a single all-Indian culture". Sergent, by contrast, admits that the ethnically different contributions have merged into an admirable synthesis, e.g.: "One of the paradoxes of India is its astonishing linguistic diversity compared with its cultural unity." (p.9) Rather than denying the idea of India, he strongly sympathizes with it: though a construct of history, India is a cultural reality.

2. Evidence provided by physical anthropology

Bernard Sergent treads sensitive ground in discussing the evidence furnished by physical anthropology. Though not identifying language with race, he maintains that in many cases, a certain correlation between language and genes may nonetheless be discernible, as explained earlier by Luigi Cavalli-Sforza and other leading population geneticists. The underlying logic is simple: people who speak a common language do so by living together as a community, and as such, they will also intermarry and pass on their genes along with their language and culture to their children. Yet, to say that there was an original Proto-Indo-European (PIE) community whose language got diversified into the existing IE languages, and whose "heirs" we IE-speakers are, is already enough to attract suspicions of Nazi fantasies, even in the case of so authoritative and objective a scholar as Bernard Sergent.

Indeed, oblique aspersions have been cast on Sergent by Jean-Paul Demoule ("Les Indo-Européens, un mythe sur mesure", La Recherche, April 1998, p.41), who uses the familiar and simple technique of juxtaposition, i.c. with the term "mother race", used off-hand by Emmanuel Leroy-Ladurie in a review of Sergent's book Les Indo-Européens. Demoule's explicit thesis is that "not one scientific fact allows support for the hypothesis of an original [PIE-speaking] people". In fact, there are no known languages which are not spoken by a living community or a "people", either in the past (e.g. Latin) or in the present. Plain common sense requires that the PIE dialects were also spoken by some such "people". If postmodernists like Demoule want to deny to the hypothetical PIE language the necessary hypothesis that it was used by a community of speakers, it is up to them to provide an alternative hypothesis plus the "scientific facts" supporting it.

A related political inhibition obstructing the progress of research in IE studies is the post1945 mistrust of migratory models as explanations of the spread of technologies, cultures or indeed languages. Sergent goes against the dominant tendency by insisting that the IE language family has spread by means of migrations (p.153-156, criticizing non-migrationist hypotheses by Jean-François Jarrige and Jim Shaffer). Prior to the telegraph and the modern electronic media, a language could indeed only be spread by being physically taken from one place to the next. In the case of India, while we need not concede Sergent's specific assumption of an Aryan immigration, it is obvious that migrations have been a key factor in the present distribution of languages. One scholar who still agrees with Dr. Sergent's commonsense position is Dr. Robert Zydenbos ("An obscurantist argument", Indian Express, 12-12-1993): "And it should be clear that languages do not migrate by themselves: people migrate, and bring languages with them."

As Sergent points out, the historical period in India has witnessed well-recorded invasions by the Greeks, Huns, Scythians, Kushanas, Arabs, Turks, Afghans and Europeans.

So, there is no need to be shy about surmising the existence and the linguistic impact of migrations, including violent ones, in the proto-historical period. It so happens that migrations may leave traces in the physical-anthropological "record" of a population, thus adding modern genetics to the sciences which can be employed in reconstructing ancient history.

Sergent claims that the oldest Homo Sapiens Sapiens racial type of India, now largely submerged by interbreeding with immigrant Dravidian, Austro-Asiatic and IE populations, is the one preserved in the Vedda and Rodiya tribes of Sri Lanka. While the purely black skin is associated (by Sergent) with the population which "brought" the Dravidian languages, the Veddoid traits are found to an extent among tribal populations in south India and as far north as the Bhils and the Gonds. Perhaps Nahali is the last remnant of the lost language of this ancient layer of the Indian population, for all the said tribes including the Veddas now speak the languages of their non-tribal neighbours. (p.38)

Sergent questions the neat division of the South-Asian population into "Mediterranean", "Melano-Indian" (black-skinned, associated with the Dravidian languages) and "Veddoid" or "Australoid", introduced by British colonial anthropologists: "the Vedda, the Melano-Indians and the Indus people and the actual inhabitants of the northern half of India, which classical anthropology used to class as Mediterraneans, all belong to one same human 'current' of which they manifest the successive 'waves'. Everything indicates, physical traits as well as geographical distribution, that the Vedda have arrived first, followed by the Melano-Indians, and then the Indus people." (p.43) Note that he does not mention "Aryans" as a distinct type separate from and arriving after the "Indus people". Indeed, he joins the list of anthropologists who acknowledge the absence of a genetic discontinuity at the end of the Harappan age marking the Aryan invasion.

Sergent rejects the classical view that populations having traits halfway between the typical Veddoid and Mediterranean traits must be considered "mixed". Instead, rather than assuming discrete racial types subsequently subject to miscegenation, he posits a racial continuum, corresponding with the continuum of migrations from northeastern Africa via West Asia to South Asia. The Dravidian-speakers largely coincide with a racial type called "Melano-Indian", which is very dark-skinned but in all other respects similar not to the Melano-Africans but to the Mediterranean variety of the white race, e.g. wavy hair, a near-vertical forehead, a thinner nose. Sergent thinks they arrived in Mehrgarh well before the beginning of the Neolithic, in ca. 8,000 BC, and that they were subsequently replaced or absorbed by the real Harappans, who belonged to the "Indo-Afghan" type. (p.50)

At this point, it is customary to point to the Dravidian Brahui speakers of Baluchistan (living in the vicinity of Mehrgarh) as a remnant of the Dravidian Harappans. However, Sergent proposes that the Brahui speakers, far from being a native remnant of a pre-Harappan population of Baluchistan, only immigrated into Baluchistan from inner India in the early Muslim period. Given that Baluchi, a West-Iranian language, only established itself in Baluchistan in the 13th century ("for 2000 years, India has been retreating before Iran", p.29; indeed, both Baluchistan, including the Brahminical place of pilgrimage Hinglaj, and the Northwest Frontier Province, homeland of Panini, were partly Indo-Aryan-speaking before Baluchi and Pashtu moved in), and that the only Indo-Iranian loans in Brahui are from Baluchi and not from Pehlevi or Sindhi, Sergent deduces that Brahui was imported into its present habitat only that late. (p.130) We'll have to leave that as just a proposal for now: a Central-Indian Dravidian population migrated to Baluchistan in perhaps the 14th century.

The Harappan civilization "prolongs the ancient Neolithic of Baluchistan [viz. Mehrgarh], whose physical type is West-Asian, notably the type called (because of its contemporary location) Indo-Afghan". (p.50) This suggests that the "Indo-Afghan" type was located elsewhere before the beginning of the Neolithic in Mehrgarh, viz. in West Asia. If so, this means that the last great wave of immigrants (as opposed to smaller waves like the Scythian or the Turco-Afghan or the English which did not deeply alter the average genetic type of the Indian population) took place thousands of years before the supposed Aryan invasion. And the latter, bringing Aryans of the Indo-Afghan type into an India already populated with Harappans of the Indo-Afghan type, happens to be untraceable in the physical-anthropo-logical data.

No new blood type or skull type or skin colour marks the period when the Aryans are supposed to have invaded India. So, one potentially decisive proof of the Aryan invasion is conspicuously missing. Indeed, the physical-anthropological record is now confidently used by opponents of the AIT as proof of the continuity between the Harappan and the post-Harappan societies in northwestern India.

3. The archaeological evidence

3.1. Tracing the Aryan migrants

Though the question of Aryan origins was much disputed in the 19th century, the Aryan invasion theory has been so solidly dominant in the 20th century that attempts to prove it have been extremely rare in recent decades (why prove the obvious?), until the debate flared up again in India after 1990. In his attempt to prove the Aryan invasion, Bernard Sergent uses the archaeological record, which, paradoxically, is invoked with equal confidence by the noninvasionist school (e.g. B.B. Lal: New Light on the Indus Civilization, Aryan Books, Delhi 1997).

The crux of the matter is: can archaeologists trace a population migrating through Central Asia and settling down in India? There seems to be new hope to pin down this elusive band of migrants: "Today, thanks to the extremely rich findings in Central Asia in the past twenty years, the discovery of the 'pre-Indian Indians' has become possible." (p.33) Sergent has tried to identify a crucial stage in this itinerary: the 3rd-millennium Bactrian culture as the base from which the Indo-Aryans invaded India.

Bactria, the basin of the Amu Darya or Oxus river, now northern Afghanistan plus southeastern Uzbekistan, is historically the heartland of Iranian culture. In an Indian Urheimat scenario, the Iranians left India before the heyday of the Harappan cities. The next waystation, where they developed their own distinct culture, was Bactria, where Zarathushtra lived (in the city of Balkh). In that framework, it is entirely logical that a separate culture has been discovered in Bactria and dated to the late 3rd millennium BC. However, Bernard Sergent identifies this Bronze Age culture of Bactria, "one of the most briliant civilizations of Asia" (p.157), as that of the Indo-Aryans poised to invade India.

Though not figuring much in the development of his own theory, evidence for similarities in material culture between Harappa and Bactria is acknowledged by Bernard Sergent, e.g. ceramics resembling those found in Chanhu-Daro. This Harappan influence on the Bactrian culture proper is distinct from the existence of six fully Harappan colonies in Afghanistan, most importantly Shortugai in Bactria, "a settlement completely Harappan in character on a tributary of the Amu Darya (...) on the foot of the ore-rich Badakshan range (...) with lapis lazuli, gold, silver, copper and lead ores. Not one of the standard characteristics of the Harappan cultural complex is missing from it." (Maurizio Tosi: "De Indusbeschaving voorbij de grenzen van het Indisch subcontinent", in UNESCO exhibition book Oude Culturen in Pakistan, Koninklijke Musea voor Kunst en Geschiedenis, Brussels 1989, p.133)

Logically, the close coexistence of Harappan colonies and Bactrian settlements was a conduit for mutual influence but also a source of friction and conflict. Indian-Iranian conflict has been a constant from the Bronze Age (replacement of Harappan with Bactrian culture in Shortugai ca. 1800 BC, Genèse de l'Inde, p.180) through Pehlevi, Shaka and Afghan invasions in India until Nadir Shah's sack of Delhi in the 18th century. Any Bactrian-Harappan antagonism would fit this pattern of hostility between Indo-Aryans and Iranians. Sergent's first job is to disprove the Iranian and prove the Indo-Aryan character of the Bactrian culture; the second is to show a Bactrian immigration in late- or post-Harappan India and a subsequent overwhelming Bactrian cultural impact on Indian society.

Sergent cites Akhmadali A. Askarov's conclusion that the Harappan-Bactrian similarities are due to "influence of northwestern India on Bactria by means of a migration of Indus people to Central Asia after the end of their civilization". (p.224, with reference to A.A. Askarov: "Traditions et innovations dans la culture du nord de la Bactriane à l'âge du bronze",Colloque Archéologie, CNRS, Paris 1985, p.119-124) The acknowledgment of a Harappa-to-Bactria movement is well taken, but this poses a chronological problem, for the Bactrian culture was not subsequent to but contemporaneous with Harappan culture. Sergent solves the problem by pointing out that Askarov and other Soviet scholars who first dug up the sites in Margiana (eastern Turkmenistan) and Bactria, used an obsolete form of C-14 Carbon dating, and that newer methods have pushed the chronology of these sites back by centuries, making Bactrian culture contemporaneous with Harappa. (p.160)

For Sergent, this chronological correction is essential: if the Bactrian culture was that of the Indo-Aryans who brought down the Indus civilization, it is necessary that they lived there before the end of the latter. But this synchronism is equally compatible with a dim pre-Harappan kinship between the Bactrian and Harappan cultures, which were different yet partly similar, a similarity which Askarov and Sergent attribute to Harappa-to-Bactria influence (which must inevitably have existed), but which may also owe something to a common origin.

Sergent then mentions a number of similarities in material culture between the Bactrian culture and some cultures in Central Asia and in Iran proper, e.g. ceramics like those of Namazga-V (southern Turkmenistan). Some of these were loans from Elam which were being transmitted from one Iranian (in his reconstruction, Indo-Iranian) settlement to the next, e.g. the so-called "Luristan bronzes", Luristan being a Southwest-Iranian region where Elamite culture was located. Some were loans from the "neighbouring and older" (p.158) culture of Margiana: does this not indicate an east-to-west gradient for the Indo-Iranians?

Well, one effect of Sergent's chronological correction is that what seem to be influences from elsewhere on Bactrian culture, may have to be reversed: "From that point onwards, the direction of exchanges and influences gets partly reversed: a number of similarities can just as well be explained by an influence of Bactria on another region as one of another on Bactria." (p.160) Note that this fits the Iranian east-to-west expansion implicit in the Avestic data and in the first chapter of the Zoroastrian Vendidad, which puts Afghanistan in the centre of the Iranian world, with the Caspian region hardly on the horizon yet. So, even for the relation between the Bactrian culture and its neighbours, the proper northwest-to-southeast direction required by the AIT has not been demonstrated, let alone a movement all the way from the northern Caspian region to India. And if there was transmission from other cultures to Bactria (as of course there was), this does not prove that the Bactrians were colonists originating in these other cultures; they may simply have practised commerce. Conversely, if they were colonists from elsewhere, they may have been colonists originating in pre-Harappan India.

At any rate, all the sites related in material culture to the prototypical Bactrian settlement of Dashli are in present-day Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Afghanistan or Iran proper, without exception regions which were Iranian at the time they made their appearance in written history, mostly in the last millennium BC. While migrations are obviously possible, this Iranian bias says something about the burden of proof. It is entirely reasonable to accept as a starting hypothesis that the Dashli settlement, like its sister settlements, was Iranian. Those who insist it was something else, should accept the burden of proving that Dashli was Indo-Aryan, that migrations took place in which the Indo-Aryans there made way for Iranians.

3.3. Bactria vs. Harappa

A new insight based on archaeology and detrimental to the stereotypical Harap-pan/Aryan opposition, is that the Harappans were not matriarchal pacifists after all, that they did have weapons and fortifications, "just like" the Aryans (see e.g. Shereen Ratnagar: Enquiries into the Political Organization of Harappan Society, Ravish Publ., Pune 1991; note that Prof. Ratnagar is a virulent critic of all Indocentric revisions of the Aryan question, as in her article "Revisionist at work: a chauvinistic inversion of the Aryan invasion theory", Frontline, 9-2-1996, an attack on Prof. N.S. Rajaram). Yet, Sergent insists that the old picture still holds good: relatively unarmed mercantile Harappans versus heavily armed Aryans preparing their invasion in Bactria. The Bactrian settlements abound in metal weaponry, and this does present a contrast with the relative paucity of weapons in Harappa. The latter was a well-ordered mercantile society, Bactria a frontier society.

This contrast actually reminds us of a contrast between Iranian and Indian in the historical period. In pre-Alexandrine Iranian royal inscriptions, we come across truly shameless expressions of pride in bloody victories, even defiantly detailing the cruel treatment meted out to the defeated kings. By contrast, in Ashoka's inscriptions, we find apologies for the bloody Kalinga war and a call for establishing peace and order. Far from being a purely Buddhist reaction against prevalent Hindu martial customs, Ashoka's relative pacifism presents a personal variation within a broader and more ancient tradition of Ahimsa, nonviolence, best expressed in some sections of the Mahabharata. Though this epic (and most explicitly its section known as the Bhagavad Gita) rejects the extremist non-violence propagated by Mahatma Gandhi and also by the wavering Arjuna before the decisive battle, Krishna's exhortation to fight comes only after every peaceful means of appeasing or reconciling the enemy has been tried, whence the Hindu dictum Ahimsa paramo dharma, "non-violence is the highest religious duty".

True, the Vedas seem to be inspired by the same martial spirit of the Iranian inscriptions, but in the Indocentric chronology, they predate the high tide of Harappan civilization, belonging to a pre-Harappan period of conquest, viz. the conquest of the northwest by the Yamuna/Saraswati-based Puru tribe. Their westward conquest was connected with a larger westward movement which included the Iranian conquest of Central Asia (later continued into the Caspian area and West Asia). By way of hypothesis, I propose that Ahimsa was a largely post-Vedic development, and that the Iranians (who had a taste of it through Zarathushtra's strictures against animal sacrifice and the like) missed its more radical phase, sticking instead to the more uncivilized glorification of victory by means of force. This would concur with the finding of a more military orientation of Bactrian culture as compared with the post-Vedic Harappan culture.

3.4. The Bactrian tripura

In the principal Bactrian site of Dashli, a circular building with three concentric walls has been found. The building was divided into a number of rooms and inside, three fireplaces on platforms were discovered along with the charred remains of sacrificed animals. In this building, its Soviet excavator Viktor Sarianidi recognized an Iranian temple, but Sergent explains why he disagrees with him. (p.161) He argues that the Vedic Aryans were as much fire-worshippers as the Iranians, and that they sacrificed animals just like the early Iranians did (prior to the establishment of Zarathushtra's reforms, and even later, cfr. the bull sacrifice in the Roman-age Mithras cult), so that the excavated fire altars could be either Indo-Aryan or Iranian.

Of course, India and Iran have a large common heritage, and many religious practices, mythical motifs and other cultural items in both were the same or closely similar. But that truism will not do to satisfy Sergent's purpose, which is to show that the Bactrian culture was not generally Indo-Iranian, and definitely not Iranian, but specifically Indo-Aryan. There is nothing decisively un-Iranian about the Dashli fire altars, and I think Sarianidi's identification of Dashli as Iranian remains undisproven.

In fact, there may well be something un-Indic and specifically Iranian about it. First of all, roundness in buildings is highly unusual in Hindu culture, which has a strong preference for square plans (even vertically, as in windows, where rectangular shapes are preferred over arches), in evidence already in the Harappan cities. Moreover, Sergent notes the similarity with a fire temple found in Togolok, Margiana. The Togolok fire altar has gained fame by yielding traces of a plant used in the Soma (Iranian: Haoma) sacrifice: laboratory analysis in Moscow showed this to be Ephedra, a stimulant still used in ephedrine and derivative products.

Asko Parpola has tried to identify the Togolok temple as Indo-Iranian and possibly proto-Vedic, citing the Soma sacrifice there as evidence: the Rg-Vedic people reproached their Dasa (Iranian) enemies for not performing rituals including the Soma ritual, so Parpola ("The coming of the Aryans to Iran and India and the cultural and ethnic identity of the Dasas", in Studia Orientalia, vol.64, Helsinki 1988, p.195-265) identifies the former with the "Haumavarga Shakas" or Soma-using Scythians mentioned in Zoroastrian texts. However, every testimony we have of the Scythians, including the Haumavarga ones in whose sites traces of the Soma ceremony have been found, is as an Iranian-speaking people. It is possible that the sedentary Iranians included all nomads in their term Shaka, even the hypothetical Vedic-Aryan nomads on their way to India, but it is not more than just possible. The use of Soma was a bone of contention within Mazdeism, with Zarathushtra apparently opposing it against its adepts who were equally Iranian. There is nothing against characterizing the Togolok fire temple as Iranian.

And even if Thomas Burrow ("The Proto-Indoaryans", Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society, 1973, cited with approval by Sergent: Genèse de l'Inde, p.232) were right with his thesis that the Mazdean religion originated in a sustained reaction against the Indo-Aryans present in Bactria and throughout the Iranian speech area, making the non-Zoroastrian faction in Greater Iran an Indo-Aryan foreign resident group, it remains to be proven that these dissident Indo-Aryans made way for Zoroastrian hegemony in Iran by moving out, and more specifically by moving to India, somewhat like Moses taking the Israelites out of Egypt. There is neither scriptural nor archaeological evidence for such a scenario: the normal course of events would be assimilation by the dominant group, and the only emigration from Iranian territory (if it had already been iranianized) by Indo-Aryans that we know of, is the movement of the Mitannic Indo-Aryans from the southern Caspian area into Mesopotamia and even as far as Palestine.

In the Dashli building, Asko Parpola recognized a tripura such as have been described in the Vedic literature as the strongholds with three circular concentric walls of the Dasas or Asuras (Asura/Ahura worshippers), whom Parpola himself has identified elsewhere as Iranians ("The coming of the Aryans", Studia Orientalia, vol.64, p.212-215, with reference to Shatapatha Brahmana 6:3:3:24-25; and: "The problem of the Aryans and the Soma", in G. Erdosy ed.: The Indo-Aryans of Ancient South Asia, p.368 ff.). So, chances are once more that the Soma-holding fire-altars, like the tripura structures around them, in both Togolok and Dashli, were Iranian. Parpola (in Erdosy, ibid.) makes this conclusion even more compelling when he informs us that a similar building in Kutlug-Tepe "demonstrates that the tradition of building forts with three concentric walls survived in Bactria until Achaemenid times" -- when the region was undoubtedly Iranian.

Moreover, Parpola points out details in the Vedic descriptions of the tripura-holding Dasas and Asuras which neatly fit the Bactrian culture: the Rg-Veda "places the Dasa strongholds (..) in the mountainous area", which is what Afghanistan looks like to people from the Ganga-Saraswati-Indus plains; it speaks of "a hundred forts" of the Dasa, while the Vedic Aryans themselves "are never said to have anything but fire or rivers as their 'forts'. The later Vedic texts confirm this by stating that when the Asuras and Devas were fighting, the Asuras always won in the beginning, because they alone had forts. (...) The Rg-Vedic Aryans described their enemy as rich and powerful, defending their cattle, gold and wonderful treasures with sharp weapons, horses and chariots. This description fits the Bactria-Margiana Archaeological Complex in Bactria, with its finely decorated golden cups, weapons with ornamental animal figurines including the horse, and trumpets indicative of chariot warfare." (in Erdosy, ibid.)

This may pose a chronological problem to those who consider the Rg-Veda as pre-Bronze Age, or perhaps not, e.g. Parpola notes that the term tripura was "unknown to the Rg-Veda" and only appears later, "in the Brahmana texts" (in Erdosy, p.369) which noninvasionists date to the high Harappan period, contemporaneous with the Bactrian Bronze Age culture. At any rate, it affirms in so many words that the Bactrian Bronze Age culture was Dasa or Asura, terms which Parpola ("The coming of the Aryans", Studia Orientalia, vol.64, p.224) had identified with "the carriers of the Bronze Age culture of Greater Iran". It also constitutes a challenge to those who make India the Urheimat of IE or at least of Indo-Iranian: if the presumed tripuras are a distinctly Dasa/Iranian element, identified as such in Vedic literature, and if the Vedic Aryans fought the Dasas in India, as the Rg-Vedic data indicate, should we not be able to find some tripuras in India too? Or did the Iranians only develop them after leaving India but while still waging occasional wars on the Indian border?

3.5. Were the Bactrians Indo-Aryans?

Other artefacts in Dashli have the same Iranian/Indo-Aryan ambiguity with a preference for the Iranian alternative. A vase in Dashli shows a scene with men wearing a kind of shirt leaving one shoulder uncovered. In this, Sergent recognizes the upanayana ceremony, in which a youngster is invested with the sacred shirt or thread. (p.163) But this is both a Vedic and a Zoroastrian ritual, with the latter resembling the depicted scene more closely: in India, only a thread is given, but among Zoroastrians, it is an actual shirt.

Some vases display horned snakes or dragons carrying one or more suns inside of them: according to Sergent, this refers to an Indo-Iranian dragon myth, attested in slightly greater detail in the Rg-Veda than in the Avesta (but what else would you expect, with Vedic literature being much larger, older and better preserved than the Avestan corpus?), about Indra liberating the sun by slaying the dragon Vrtra, or in the Avesta, Keresaspa killing the snake Azhi Srvara, "the horned one". (p.163-164, ref. to Rg-Veda 1:51:4, 1:54:6) The sources which drew his attention to this picture, both Soviet and French (Russian articles from the 1970s by Viktor Sarianidi and by I.S. Masimof, and Marie-Hélène Pottier: Matériel Funéraire de la Bactriane Méridionale à l'Age du Bronze, Paris 1984, p.82 ff.), are agreed that it is specifically Iranian, and we have no reason to disbelieve them. What Sergent adds is only that, like with the fire cult, it could just as well be Indo-Aryan; but that does not amount to proof of its Indo-Aryan rather than Iranian identity.

Several depictions (statuettes, seals) of a fertility goddess associated with watery themes have been found. Sergent points out that they are unrelated to Mesopotamian mythology but closely related to the "Indo-Iranian" goddess known in India as Saraswati, in Iran as Anahita. Which shall it be in this particular case, Iranian or Indian, Avestan or Vedic? Sergent himself adds that the closest written description corresponding to the visual iconography in question is found in Yasht 5 of the Avesta. (p.163)

Of course we must remain open to new interpretations and new findings. In this field, confident assertions can be overruled the same day by new discoveries. But if Sergent himself, all while advocating an Indo-Aryan interpretation of the known Bactrian findings, is giving us so many hints that their identity is uncertain at best, and otherwise more likely Iranian than Indo-Aryan, we have reason to believe in the Iranian identification established by other researchers. On the strength of the data he offers, the safest bet is that the Bactrian Bronze Age culture was the centre of Iranian culture.

This happens to agree with the evidence of Zoroastrian scripture, which has dialectal features pointing to the northeast of the historical Iranian linguistic space, meaning Bactria, and which specifically locates Zarathushtra in Bahlika/Balkh, a town in northern Afghanistan. It tallies with the list of regions in the opening chapter of the Vendidad, corresponding to Bactria, Sogdia, Pamir, Margiana, southern Afghanistan and northwestern India (Hapta Hendu, the Vedic Sapta Sindhavah), which happens to put Balkh near the geographical centre. Iran proper was iranianized only well after Zarathushtra's preaching. As Sergent notes, in ca. 1900 BC, the Namazga culture in Turkmenistan changes considerably taking in the influence of the then fast-expanding Bactria-Margiana culture (p.179): I read that as the Iranian expansion from their historical heartland westward into the south-Caspian area. From there, but again only after a few more centuries, they were to colonize Kurdistan/Media and Fars/Persia, where their kingdoms were to flourish into far-flung empires in the 1st millennium BC.

It is only logical that the dominant religious tradition in a civilization is the one developed in its demographic and cultural metropolis: the Veda in the Saraswati basin, the Avesta in the Oxus basin, i.e. Bactria. That Bactria did have the status of a metropolis is suggested by Sergent's own description of its Bronze Age culture as "one of the most brilliant in Asia". Though provincial compared with Harappa, it was a worthy metropolis to the somewhat less polished Iranian civilization.

3.6. Clarions of the Aryan invaders

Another distinctively Aryan innovation attested in Dashli was the trumpet: "Bactria has yielded a number of trumpets; some others had been found earlier in Tepe Hissar and Astrabad (northeastern Iran); Roman Ghirshman proposed to connect these instruments with the use of the horse, with the Iranian cavalry manoeuvring to the sound of the clarion. (...) In ancient India, the trumpet is not mentioned in the written sources". (p.162) Would it not be logical if the same type of cavalry manoeuvres had yielded the Aryans both Iran and India? In that case, we should have encountered some references to clarions in the Vedas. But no, as per Sergent's own reading, the Rg-Veda, supposedly the record of Aryan settlement in India, knows nothing of trumpets; though post-Harappan depictions of riders with trumpets are known.

All this falls into place if we follow the chronology given by K.D. Sethna and other Indian dissidents: the Rg-Veda was not younger but older than the Bronze Age and the heyday of Harappa. So, the trumpet was invented in the intervening period, say 2,500 BC, and then used in the subsequent Iranian conquest of Bactria, Margiana and Iran.

The comparatively recent migration into Iran of the Iranians, who supposedly covered the short distance from the Volga mouth to Iran in the 3rd or 2nd millennium BC (losing the wayward Indo-Aryans along the way), has not been mapped archaeologically, in contrast with the successive Kurgan expansion waves into Europe. Jean Haudry reports optimistically: "Since the late 3rd millennium BC, an undecorated black pottery appears in Tepe Hissar (Turkmenistan), together with violin-shaped female idols and esp. with bronze weapons, the horse and the war chariots, and -- a detail of which R. Ghirshman has demonstrated the importance -- the clarion, indispensible instrument for collective chariot maneuvers. We can follow them from a distance on their way to the south." (J. Haudry: Les Indo-Européens, p.118, with reference to R. Ghirshman: L'Iran et les Migrations des Indo-Aryans et des Iraniens, 1977) But this is not necessarily the entry of "the" Iranians into Iran, and if it is, it need not have the Kurgan area as its starting-point.

In the account of Roman Ghirshman and Jean Haudry, the proto-Iranians with their clarions travelled "to the south". Rather than Indo-Iranians on their way from South Russia to Iran and partly to India, these may just as well be the Iranians on their way from Bactria (and ultimately from India), via the Aral Lake area, to Iran and Mesopotamia. Indeed, viewed from Iran, entrants from Russia and from India would arrive through the same route, viz. from the Aral Lake southward. A look at the map suffices to show this: rather than go in a straight line across the mountains, substantial groups of migrants would follow the far more hospitable route through the fertile Oxus valley to the Aral Lake area, and then proceed south from there.

Even in Bernard Sergent's erudite book, I have not found any data which compel us to accept that a particular culture can be identified with the very first Indo-Iranian wave of migrants; Central Asia was criss-crossed for millennia by variegated Iranian-speaking tribes. Nonetheless, Haudry's clarion-wielders of "the late 3rd millennium BC" and Sergent's occupiers of Namazga "in ca. 1900 BC" may of course be the first Iranian intruders into Turkmenistan and Persia, but that would serve the Indocentric theory even better, for Sergent's data show that these intruders came from Bactria, not from Russia.

3.7. Bactrian invasion in India

Thus far, the archaeological argument advanced by some scholars in favour of an Aryan invasion into India has not been very convincing. Consider e.g. this circular reasoning by Prof. Romila Thapar ("The Perennial Aryans", Seminar, December 1992): "In Haryana and the western Ganga plain, there was an earlier Ochre Colour Pottery going back to about 1500 BC or some elements of the Chalcolithic cultures using Black-and-Red Ware. Later in about 800 BC there evolved the Painted Grey Ware culture. The geographical focus of this culture seems to be the Doab, although the pottery is widely distributed across northern Rajasthan, Panjab, Haryana and western U.P. None of these post-Harappan cultures, identifiable by their pottery, are found beyond the Indus. Yet this would be expected if 'the Aryans' were a people indigenous to India with some diffusion to Iran, and if the attempt was to find archaeological correlates for the affinities between Old Indo-Aryan and Old Avestan."

Firstly, if no common pottery type is found in Iran and India in 1500-800 BC, and if this counts as proof that no migration from India to Iran took place, then it also proves that no migration from Iran to India took place. In particular, the PGW, long identified with the Indo-Aryans, cannot be traced to Central Asia; if it belonged to Aryans, then not to Aryan invaders. So, if substantiated, Prof. Thapar's statement is actually an argument against an Aryan invasion in ca. 1500 BC. Secondly, if the absence of migration in either direction in the period from 1500 BC onwards is really proven, this evidence remains compatible with an Indo-European emigration from India in another time bracket, say between 6000 and 2000 BC.

In spite of the impression created in popular literature, archaeology has by no means demonstrated that there was an Aryan immigration into India. Even the new levels in accuracy do not affect the following status quaestionis of the Aryan Invasion theory: "The question of Indo-European migrations into the subcontinent of India can, at best, be described as enigmatic." (David G. Zanotti: "Another Aspect of the Indo-European Question", Journal of Indo-European Studies, 1975/3, p.260) Thus, among those who assume the Aryan Invasion, there is no consensus on when it took place, and some AIT archaeologists alter the chronology so much that the theory comes to mean the opposite of what it is usually believed to mean, viz. an affirmation of Aryan dominance in Harappa rather than an Aryan destruction of Harappa: "[This] episode of elite dominance which brought the Indo-Aryan branch of the Indo-European family to India (...) may have been as early as the floruit of the Indus civilization (...)" (C. Renfrew: "Before Babel", Cambridge Archaeological Journal, 1, p.14)

Enter Bernard Sergent. He builds on a corpus of findings (some of them already used by Asko Parpola) pertaining to the apparent entry of elements from the Bactrian Bronze Age culture into late- and post-Harappan northwestern India. He also offers a theory of how these Bactrians may have caused the downfall of the Harappan civilization, parallel with the contemporaneous crisis in civilizations in Central and West Asia.

Civilization and urbanization are closely related to commerce, exchange, colonization of mining areas, and other socio-economic processes which presuppose communications and transport. When communication and transport cease, we see cultures suffer decline, e.g. the Tasmanian aboriginals, living in splendid isolation for thousands of years, had lost many of the skills which mankind had developed in the Stone Age, including the art of making fire. One of the reasons why the Eurasian continent won out against Africa and the Americas in the march of progress, was the fairly easy and well-developed contact routes between the different civilizations of Europe, Egypt, Mesopotamia, India and China. So, one can force decline on a culture by cutting off its trade routes, a tactic routinely used for short periods (hence only with limited long-term effect) in wartime, but which seems to have troubled the ancient civilizations in ca. 2000 BC with devastating effect for several centuries. It was in reaction to this destabilization of international trade links that the civilizational centres started building empires by the mid-2nd millennium, e.g. the Kassite empire in Mesopotamia where there had only been city-states (Ur, Uruk, Isin, Larsa, etc.) prior to the great crisis.

Or so Sergent says. Dismissing the thesis of a climatological crisis (though such a crisis would by itself already trigger an economic crisis even in the areas not directly affected climatologically), he argues that only an economic crisis can explain the simultaneous decline of cities in widely different locations, some near rivers and some on hills, some in densely populated agglomerations and some overlooking thinly populated steppes or mountain areas, some in hot and some in colder areas. The ones to blame are -- who else? -- the Aryans. They, and "specifically Indo-Aryans" (p.198-99), played a role in the Hurrian and Kassite invasions disrupting Mesopotamia (while the IE or non-IE identity of the Guti and Lullubi invaders remains unknown, though attempts are made to link the Guti with the Tocharians); and from Bactria, they by themselves disrupted the economy of the Indus-Saraswati civilization.

They didn't physically destroy the Harappan cities, as Mortimer Wheeler and others of his generation thought: "No trace of destruction has been observed in these cities." (p.201) But by creating insecurity for the travelling traders, they bled and suffocated the economy which made city life possible, and thus forced the Harappans to abandon their cities and return to a pre-urban lifestyle. The declining and fragmented Harappan country and society then fell an easy prey to the Indo-Aryan invaders from Bactria.

This scenario has been attested in writing in the case of Mesopotamia. Sergent quotes other experts to the effect that "from ca. 2230 BC, (...) the Guti had cut off the roads, ruined the countryside, set the cities on fire" (p.199, quoting Paul Garelli: Le Proche-Orient Asiatique, PUF, Paris 1969, p.89-93), that the Assyrian trade system was disrupted by the Mitannic people, etc. But is there similar evidence for the Indus-Saraswati civilization?

Sergent cites findings that in the final stage of Mohenjo Daro, we see the large mansions of the rich subdivided into small apartments for the poor, the water supply system neglected, the roads and houses no longer following the plan. (p.200) This certainly marks a decline, the rich losing their power and the powerful losing their control and resources. Same story in Harappa, Chanhu Daro, Kalibangan, Lothal: a great loss of quality in architecture and organization in the last phase. Moreover, all traces of long-distance trade disappear (just as in Mesopotamia, all signs of commerce with "Meluhha"/Sindh disappear by 2000 BC), and trade is the basis of city life. So, "these cities didn't need to be destroyed: they had lost their reason for existing, and were vacated". (p.201) But that doesn't bring any Indo-Aryan invasion into the picture. Indeed, it is perfectly compatible with a hypothesis of Iranian Bactrians disrupting a Harappan economy manned by Indo-Aryans.

3.8. Aryan invader settlements in India

To Bernard Sergent, the "strategic" key to the Aryan invasion puzzle has been provided by the discovery, by a French team in 1968, of the post-Harappan town of Pirak, near the Bolan pass and near Mehrgarh in Baluchistan. Pirak was a new settlement dating back only to the 18th century BC. Culturally it was closely related to the societies to its north and west, especially Bactria. Sergent sums up a long list of precise material items which Pirak had in common with those non-Indian regions. (p.219 ff.) So, this was a settlement of foreign newcomers bringing some foreign culture with them.

Sergent will certainly convince many readers by asserting that in Pirak, "the horse makes its appearance in India, both through bones and in figurines", and this "connotes without any possible doubt the arrival in India of the first Indo-European-speaking populations". (p.221) That depends entirely on how much we make of the limited but real evidence of horses in the Harappan civilization. Note moreover that while the horse was important to the Indo-Aryans, the Bactrian two-humped camel was not; but in Pirak, both camel and horse are conspicuous, both in skeletal remains and in depictions.

If the Bactrian culture and those to its west were Iranian-speaking, which is likely, then Pirak is simply an Iranian settlement in an Indian border region, a southward extension of the Bactrian culture. Indo-Iranian borders have been fluctuating for millennia, while different groups of Iranians down to Nadir Shah have again and again tried to invade India, so the Iranian intrusion in Pirak (which may have ended up assimilated into its Indo-Aryan environment) need not be the momentous historical breakthrough which it is to Sergent. It would only be that if it can be shown that the Pirak innovations are repeated in many North-Indian sites in the subsequent centuries, where we know that the dominant culture was Indo-Aryan.

A related culture is the Cemetery H culture on the outskirts of Harappa itself. Sergent offers a detail which is distinctly non-Vedic and Mazdean (Zoroastrian): "The dead, represented by unconnected skulls and bones, were placed, after exposure, in big jars". (p.224; emphasis added) Exposure to birds and insects is still the first stage in the Zoroastrian disposal of the dead. Sergent also reports that the influence of the native Harappan civilization is much greater here than in Pirak. So, as the Iranian invaders moved deeper inland, across the Indus, they soon lost their distinctiveness. Considering that Afghan dynasties have ruled parts of India as far east as Bengal, using Persian and building in a West-Asian style, this post-Harappan Iranian intrusion as far as the Indus riverside is not that impressive.

Indeed, from the Indus eastwards, we lose track of this Bactrian invasion. Sergent himself admits as much: "For the sequel, archaeology offers little help. The diggings in India for the 2nd millennium BC reveal a large number of regional cultures, generally rather poor, and to decree what within them represents the Indo-Aryan or the indigenous contribution would be arbitrary. If Pirak (...) represents the start of Indian culture, there is in the present state of Indian archaeology no 'post-Pirak' except at Pirak itself, which lasted till the 7th century BC: the site remained, along with a few very nearby ones, isolated." (p.246-247) So, the Bactrian invaders who arrived through the Bolan pass and established themselves in and around the border town of Pirak, never crossed the Indus, and never made their mark on India the way the Indo-Aryans did.

This confirms the statement by the American archaeologist Jim Shaffer that "no material culture is found to move from west to east across the Indus" (personal communication, 1996), or more academically, that the demographic eastward shift of the Harappan population during the decline of their cities, i.e. an intra-Indian movement from Indus and Saraswati to Ganga, "is the only archaeologically documented west-to-east movement of human populations in South Asia before the first half of the first millennium BC", while the archaeological record shows "no significant discontinuities" for the period when the Aryan invasion should have made its mark. (Jim Shaffer and Diane Lichtenstein: "The concepts of 'cultural tradition' and 'palaeoethnicity' in South-Asian archaeology", in G. Erdosy, ed.: The Indo-Aryans of Ancient South Asia, p.139-140)

The Pirak people were not the Vedic Aryans conquering India. The Aryan invasion of India has somehow gone missing from the archaeological record, and this is admitted by Sergent himself in the very section containing his decisive piece of evidence for the Aryan Invasion Theory.

3.9. Scriptural evidence

To fortify his reconstruction of the Aryan invasion, Bernard Sergent repeats some well-known scriptural references. Indian authors are right in pointing out that this is systematically the weakest part in AIT argumentations, as the knowledge of Vedic literature among Western scholars is either too limited or too distorted by AIT presuppositions. Sergent's arguments at this point repeat well-known claims about the contents of the Vedas. Thus, the Rg-Veda was written by foreigners because it doesn't know the tiger nor rice nor "the domesticated elephant which existed in the Harappan Indus culture". (p.241)

As for the tiger, it is often said that India was divided in a lion zone in the west and a tiger zone in the rest. This image persists in the symbolism of the civil war in Sri Lanka: the Sinhalese, originating in Gujarat (where lions exist even today), have the lion as their symbol, while the separatists among the Tamils, originating in southeastern India, call themselves the Tigers. However, to judge from the Harappan seal imagery, tigers did originally exist in the Saraswati and Indus basins as well, overlapping with the lion zone. As Sir Monier Monier-Williams (Sanskrit-English Dictionary, p.1036, entry vyâghra) notes, in the Atharva-Veda, "vyâghra/tiger is often mentioned together with the lion". It is simply impossible that the Rg-Vedic seers, even if they were unfamiliar with the Ganga basin (quod non), had never heard of tigers.

As for the domesticated elephant, if it was known in Harappa, does anyone seriously suggest that it was not known in the same area in subsequent centuries by the Vedic Aryans?

While regression in knowledge and technology does sometimes happen, there is no reason whatsoever why people who could domesticate elephants would have lost this useful skill, which is not dependent on foreign trade or urbanization, when the Harappan cities declined. Isn't the mention of how "the people deck him like a docile king of elephants" (Rg-Veda 9:57:3, thus translated by Ralph Griffith: Hymns of the Rg-Veda, p.488) a reference to the Hindu custom of taking adorned domesticated elephants in pageants?

Rice, according to Sergent himself, made its appearance in the Indus basin in the late Harappan period, and was known to the Bactrian invaders in Pirak. (p.230) He identifies those Bactrian invaders as the Vedic Aryans, so why haven't they mentioned rice in their Rg-Veda? One simple answer would be that the Rg-Veda is pre-Harappan, composed at a time when rice was not yet cultivated in northwestern India. This chronological correction solves a lot of similar arguments from silence. Thus, there was cotton in Harappa and after, but no cotton in the Rg-Veda. Bronze swords were used aplenty in the Bactrian culture and in Pirak, but are not mentioned in the Rg-Veda; a short knife can be made from soft metals like gold or copper, but a sword requires advanced bronze or iron metallurgy. (Ralph Griffith uses "sword" twice in his translation The Hymns of the Rg-Veda, p.25, verse 1:37:2, and p.544, verse 10:20:6, both already in the younger part of the Rg-Veda, but in the index on p.702 he corrects himself, specifying that "knife" or "dagger" would be more appropriate.) Likewise, the core stories of the Ramayana and Mahabharata, the ones most likely to stay close to the original versions even in their material details (unlike the many sideshows woven into these epics, often narrating much more recent events), feature only primitive pre-Bronze Age weapons: Rama's bow and arrow, Hanuman's club.

Camels were part of the Bactrian culture and its Pirak offshoot, but are not mentioned in the Rg-Veda except for its rather late 8th book, which mentions Bactrian fauna, possibly in the period when the early Harappans were setting up mining colonies like Shortugai. It all falls into place when the Rg-Veda is considered as pre-Harappan. Incidentally, the late appearance of Afghan fauna in the Rg-Veda contradicts an Afghanistan-to-India itinerary, and argues in favour of an India-to-Afghanistan movement during the Rg-Vedic period.

For a very different type of scriptural evidence, Sergent sees a synchronism between the archaeologically attested settlement of Pirak and the beginning of the Puranic chronology, which in his view goes back to the 17th century BC, in "remarkable coincidence" with the florescence of Pirak. (p.223) Reference is in fact to Kalhana's Rajatarangini, which starts a dynastic lists of kings of Kashmir in 1882, i.e. the early 19th century BC. But if Kalhana can be a valid reference, what about Kalhana's dating the Mahabharata war to the 25th century BC? If Puranic history is any criterion, Sergent should realize that its lists of Aryan kings for other parts of India than Kashmir go way beyond 2,000 BC.

Another classic scriptural reference concerns everything relating to the enemies of the Vedic Aryans, such as the "aboriginal" Dasas. Very aptly, Sergent identifies the Dasas and the Panis as Iranian, and the Pakthas (one of the tribes confronting the Vedic king Sudas in the Battle of the Ten Kings) as the Iranian Pathans. (p.241-244) He specifically rejects the common belief that the Dasas were black-skinned, in spite of their occasional description as "black-covered" or "from a black womb", pointing out that even the fair-haired and white-skinned Vikings were called the "black foreigners" by the Irish, with "black" purely used as a metaphor for "evil". (This is even the case in some African languages, for there is no relation between colour symbolism and skin colour: white is the sacred colour to dark-skinned Indian tribals, while black is auspicious to the whitish Japanese, who consider white as the colour of mourning, just as Sanskritic Hindus do.)

Yet, Sergent doesn't identify the said Iranian tribes with the Bronze Age Bactrians, arguing that in Alexander's time, Greek authors locate the Parnoi and Dahai just south of the Aral Lake. But that was almost two thousand years after the heyday of the Bactrian Bronze Age culture and arguably even longer after the Rg-Veda. The only mystery is that these ethnonyms managed to survive that long, not that during those long centuries, they could migrate a few hundred miles to the northwest -- centuries during which we know for fact that the Iranians expanded westward from their Bactrian heartland across rivers and mountains to settle as far west as Mesopotamia.

Moreover, the Vedas locate the confrontations in the prolonged hostility between IndoAryans and Iranians not on the Saraswati (which could in theory be identified as the homonymous Harahvaiti/Helmand in Afghanistan) (p.242), but on the riverside of the Parush-ni/Ravi and other Panjab rivers, unambiguously in India. This is only logical if the Vedic Aryans were based in the Saraswati basin and their Iranian enemies were based in an area to their west near the Khyber pass: they confronted halfway in Panjab. So not only did these Iranian tribes (Dahai, Parnoi) move from Bactria to the Aral Lake area in 2000-300 BC, but they had started moving northwestward centuries earlier, in the Rg-Vedic period, in Panjab.

With every invasionist attempting to strengthen his case by appealing to the testimony of Hindu scripture, the collective failure becomes more glaring.

3.10. Comparison with archaeological reconstruction in Europe

The westward expansion of the Kurgan culture has been mapped with some degree of accuracy: "If an archaeologist is set the problem of examining the archaeological record for a cultural horizon that is both suitably early and of reasonable uniformity to postulate as the common prehistoric ancestor of the later Celtic, Germanic, Baltic, Slavic, and possibly some of the Indo-European languages of Italy, then the history of research indicates that the candidate will normally be the Corded Ware culture. At about 3200-2300 BC this Corded Ware horizon is sufficiently early to predate the emergence of any of the specific proto-languages. In addition, it is universally accepted as the common component if not the very basis of the later Bronze Age cultures that are specifically identified with the different proto-languages. Furthermore, its geographical distribution from Holland and Switzerland on the west across northern and central Europe to the upper Volga and middle Dniepr encompasses all those areas which [have been] assigned as the 'homelands' of these European proto-languages."

(J.P. Mallory: In Search of the Indo-Europeans, Hudson & Hudson, London 1989, p.108)

This is a very important insight for understanding the large common (partly pre-IE substratal) element in the European IE languages, distinguishing them collectively from Anatolian, Tocharian and Indo-Iranian: "The study of the lexicon of the Northern European languages, especially Germanic and Baltic, reveals that a large number of terms relevant to the ecology of the habitat of the early populations of the area and to their socio-economic activities have no plausible Indo-European etymology. (...) it is possible to ascribe to the pre-Indo-European substrate in the Baltic area a number of names of plants, animals, objects and activities characteristic of the Neolithic cultures." (Edgar C. Polomé: "The Indo-Europeanization of Northern Europe: the Linguistic Evidence", Journal of Indo-European Studies, fall 1990, p.331-337) Many of these terms also extend to Celtic, Slavic and sometimes Italic and Greek.

Examples include the words barley, Russian bor ("millet"), Latin far ("spelt"); Irish tuath, Gothic thiuda, "people", whence the ethnic names Dutch/Deutsch; German wahr, Latin verus, Old Irish fir, "true"; Latin granum, Dutch koren, English grain and corn; Lithuanian puodas, Germanic fata, whence Dutch vat, "vessel"; Dutch delven, "dig", Old Prussian (Baltic) dalptan, "piercing-tool"; Old Irish land, Old Prussian lindan, Germanic land; Latin alnus (<alisnos), Dutch els, Lithuanian elksnis, "alder", also related to Greek aliza, "white poplar"; Dutch smaak, "taste", Gothic smakka, "fig, tasty fruit", Lithuanian smaguricu, "sweet, treat"; from an ancient form *londhwos, Dutch lenden, Latin lumbus, "waist". Likewise, the Germanic words fish, apple, oak, beech, whale, goat, elm, (n)adder have counterparts in other European languages, e.g. Latin piscis, Old Irish aball, Greek aig-ilops or krat-aigos (possibly related to Berber iksir, Basque eskur, as suggested by Xavier Delamarre: Le Vocabulaire Indo-Européen, Maisonneuve, Paris 1984, p.167), Latin fagus, squalus, haedus, ulmus, natrix; but they have no attested counterparts in the Asian IE languages. Archaeology and linguistics reinforce each other in indicating the existence of a second centre of IE dispersal in the heart of Europe, the Corded Ware culture of ca. 3000 BC, whence most European branches of IE parted for their historical habitats.

Even earlier demographic and cultural movements have been mapped with promising accuracy. The sudden apparition of full-fledged Neolithic culture in the Low Countries in about 5,100 BC can clearly be traced to a gradual expansion of the agricultural civilization through Hungary (5700) and southern Germany (5350 BC), from the Balkans and ultimately from Anatolia. (Pierre Bonenfant & Paul-Louis van Berg: "De eerste bewoners van het toekomstige 'België': een etnische overrompeling", in Anne Morelli ed.: Geschiedenis van het eigen volk, Kritak, Leuven 1993, p.28) It is this gradual spread of agriculture and its concomitant changes in life-style (houses, tools, ceramics, domesticated animals) which the leading archaeologist Colin Renfrew has rashly identified as the indo-europeanization of Europe, but which Marija Gimbutas and many others would consider as the spread of the pre-IE "Old European" culture.

It remains possible that in some outlying regions, the early Indo-Europeans arrived on the scene in time to capture this movement of expanding agriculture, but it did not originate with them, because Anatolia and the Balkans were demonstrably not the IE Urheimat. On the contrary, in the northeastern Mediterranean, the presence of pre-IE elements in the historically attested IE cultures and languages (Greek, Hittite) is very strong, indicating that the Indo-Europeans had to subdue a numerous and self-confident, culturally advanced population. It is this Old European people, known through towns like Catal Hüyük and Vinca, which gradually spread to the northwest and civilized most of Europe before its indo-europeanization.

So, that's archaeology in action. After the wave of agriculture spreading to the farthest corners from the southeast in the 7th-4th millennium BC (linguistically unidentified), the wave of the horse-riding late-Kurganites has been identified as bringing the IE languages. There is as yet no parallel map of a Kurgan-to-India migration. Thus, the material relation between the Andronovo culture in Kazakhstan (often considered as the Indo-Iranians freshly emigrated from the Kurgan area) and the Bactria-Margiana culture (presumed to be the Indo-Aryans and the Iranians on their way to India and Iran) has been established only vaguely, certainly not well enough to claim that the latter was an offshoot of the former (which would support the AIT). As we saw, even tracing a migration from Bactria across the Indus has not succeeded so far.

But then, neither has a reverse migration been mapped archaeologically. If the Bactrian Bronze Age culture was Iranian and the Iranians had earlier been defeated in India, where is the archaeological trail of the Iranians from India to Bactria? And earlier, where is the evidence of Proto-Indo-Europeans on their way from India to the Kurgan area? Those who consider India as the Urheimat of IE should suspend their current triumphalism and take up the challenge.

3.11. Indo-Aryans in West Asia

Another challenge to the Indocentric school has been thrown by Bernard Sergent without his realizing it. On p.206 ff., he adds some new data about the large IE and specifically Indo-Aryan presence in West Asia: Indo-Aryan names are quite common in Syria and Palestine in the 15th-13th century BC, e.g. the Palestian town of Sichem was ruled by one Birishena, i.e. Vira-sena, "the one who has an army of heroes", and Qiltu near Jerusalem was ruled by one Suar-data, i.e. "gift of Heaven"; to Sergent, this also proves that the Indo-Aryans maintained a separate existence after and outside the Mitannic kingdom until at least the 13th century BC.

A fairly serious problem for the non-invasionists in this regard concerns the term Asura: in the Rg-Veda a word for "god" (cfr. Germanic Ase, Aesir), in later Vedic literature a word for "demon", obviously parallel and causally related with the Iranian preference for Asura/Ahura as against the demonized Deva/Daeva, the remaining Hindu term for "god". On p.211 and p.280, Sergent makes the very popular mistake of seeing "the Asuras" as a separate class of gods next to "the Devas". In fact, the distinction and opposition between them is a late-Vedic development connected with the Irano-Indian (or Mazdeic-Vedic) conflict. In the Rg-Veda, Deva and Asura are not two tribes of gods; they are as synonymous as "God" and "Lord" are in Christian parlance.

That state of affairs seems to persist in the Indo-Aryan diaspora in West Asia of the 2nd millennium BC, i.e. long after the completion of the Rg-Veda in the non-invasionist chronology.

Sergent has found quite a few personal names with Asura in West Asia, e.g. the Mitannic general Kart-ashura, the name Biry-ashura attested in Nuzi and Ugarit, in Nuzi also the names Kalm-ashura and Sim-ashura, the Cilician king Shun-ashura, while in Alalakh (Syria), two people were called Ashura and Ashur-atti. (p.210) He explicitly deduces a synchronism between early Vedic and Mitannic-Kassite, which tallies splendidly with the AIT chronology. But in that case, the problem which I am drawing attention to, disappears: of course the West-Asian Indo-Aryans practised a form of the Vedic religion consistent with the early Vedic data, because theirs was the early Vedic age. And that is why Sergent doesn't see the problem which arises when the wild non-invasionist chronology is accepted: if two millennia have passed between the Rg-Vedic seers and the said testimony of an Indo-Aryan presence in West Asia, how is it possible that these West-Asian Indo-Aryans have missed the late-Vedic developments which turned the revered Asuras into demons?

At present, this problem for the non-invasionists can only be solved at the level of hypothesis. It is perfectly possible, even if not yet attested archaeologically or literarily, that along with the Iranians, a purely Indo-Aryan-speaking group emigrated from India in the Rg-Vedic period to seek its fortune in the Far West. Perhaps it is from them that Uralic speakers borrowed the term Asura, "lord", along with Sapta, "seven, week", Sasar, "sister", and a few other Indo-Aryan words. Some of these Indo-Aryans, organized as bands of warrior, engineered the conquests of their Mitannic and Kassite host populations. Considering that Vedic names are still given to Hindu children today, thousands of years after Vedic Sanskrit went out of daily use, and often in communities which speak a non-Indo-Aryan language, it is conceivable that the Indo-Aryans in West Asia managed to preserve their Vedic tradition from the time of their emigration from India during the Vedic age until the mid-2nd millennium BC. And if so, they had to preserve it in the form it had at the time of their emigration, i.c. complete with the veneration for Asura, the Lord.

A related problem concerns the Kassites, who were also Indo-Aryan to a extent. Non-in-vasionists have made much of the presence of Sanskrit names in the Kassite dynasty in Babylon. However, we have information from Semitic Mesopotamians about the Kassite language, and it was not Indo-Aryan. A number of known Kassite words are apparently unrelated to any known language, e.g. mashu, "god"; yanzi, "king"; saribu, "foot". They also seem to have a formation of the plural unknown in IE, viz. with an infix, e.g. sirpi, sirpami, "brown one(s)", or minzir, minzamur, "dotted one(s)". (Wilfred van Soldt: "Het Kassitisch", Phoenix, Leiden 1998, p.90-93) Assuming that the language described as "Kassite" and located by the Babylonian sources in the hills east of Mesopotamia was indeed the language of the Kassite dynasty (for language names sometimes change referent), does this not refute the Indian connection of the Kassites?

No: this state of affairs suggests a third scenario, viz. that a non-IE population in Iran used Sanskrit names referring to Vedic gods. This would be the same situation as in the Dravidian provinces: a non-IE-speaking population maintains its own language but adopts Sanskritic lore and nomenclature. It would mean that Vedic culture had spread as much to the west as we know it has spread to the east and south, and that a part of western Iran (well before its iranianization) was as much part of Greater India as Kerala or Bali became in later centuries.

4. Linguistic arguments

4.1. East-Asian influences

Bernard Sergent traces practically all Indian language families to foreign origins. He confirms the East-Asian origins of both the Tibeto-Burmese languages (Lepcha, Naga, Mizo etc.) and the Austro-Asiatic languages (Santal, Munda, Khasi etc.). Though many tribals in central and southern India are the biological progeny of India's oldest human inhabitants, their adopted languages are all of foreign origin. To Sergent, this is true of not only Austro-Asiatic and Indo-Aryan, but also of Dravidian.

The Himalayan branch of the Sino-Tibetan language family, distinct from Tibetan, already has a very long but inconspicuous presence in northern India. Originating in China, this group of now very small languages once embraced parts of the northern plains. Of greater historical importance is the Austro-Asiatic family, which Sergent describes as once the predominant one in a continuous area from central India to Vietnam, but now reduced to a series of pockets in between the riverine population centres dominated by the immigrant Thai and Tibeto-Burmese languages (originating in China) and in India by the Indo-Aryan languages.

Sergent is merely following in others' footsteps when he assumes that mayura, "peacock", gaja, "elephant", karpasa, "cotton", and other Sanskrit fauna or flora terms are loans from Austro-Asiatic. (p.370) In most such cases, the only ground for this assumption is that similar-sounding words exist in the Munda languages of Chotanagpur, languages which have not been committed to writing before the 19th century. Chances are that in the intervening millennia, when these words were attested in Sanskrit but not necessarily in Munda, they were borrowed from Indo-Aryan ino Munda, or from an extinct language into both. At any rate, the hypothesis of an Austro-Asiatic origin should only be accepted in case the term is also attested in non-Indian branches such as Khmer.

The alleged loans only start appearing in the 10th and youngest book of the Rg-Veda and really break through in the Brahmanas. Sergent follows the classical interpretation, viz. that this shows how the Vedic Aryans gradually moved east, encountering the Austro-Asiatic speakers in the Ganga basin. While I am not convinced of the existence of more than a few Munda terms in Sanskrit (more in the adjoining Indo-Aryans Prakrits: Hindi, Bengali, Oriya), I would agree that there are other Munda influences, notably in mythology, as we shall discuss separately. Non-invasionists will have to account for this Munda contribution.

Here too, I suggest that chronology is all-important. It is quite possible that Munda had not arrived in India at the time of the Rg-Veda. When the Harappans migrated eastward (as demographically expansive populations do), or when the post-Harappans fled eastward from the disaster area which the Indus-Saraswati basin had become, the Munda-speaking people they encountered in eastern Uttar Pradesh and Bihar may have been recent immigrants from the agricultural civilization of what is now Thailand and southwestern China. All the same, it remains possible that for local flora and fauna, the Indo-Aryans did adopt some Munda terminology.

Broadly, the Austro-Asiatic expansion can be compared with the gradual spread of the Old European Neolithic from Anatolia and the Balkans to the far corners of Europe, and with the spread of India's Northwestern Neolithic to the rest of the subcontinent. In that case, the Munda-speaking farmers in the eastern Ganga basin must have assimilated into the Indo-Aryan population, with only the peripheral populations in the hills retaining their imported languages. This Munda contribution is by no means incompatible with a native status of IE.

4.2. Is Dravidian native to India?

In one of his most innovative chapters, Sergent reviews all the evidence of Dravido-African and Dravido-Uralic kinship. In African languages spoken in the entire Sahel belt, from Sudan to Senegal, numerous semantic and grammatical elements are found which also exist in Dravidian. The similarity with the Uralic languages (Finnish, Hungarian, Samoyedic) is equally pronounced. Sergent offers the hypothesis that at the dawn of the Neolithic Revolution, some 10,000 years ago, the Dravidians left the Sudan, one band splitting off in Iran to head north to the Urals, the others entering India and moving south.

Within this scenario of a Dravidian immigration, it is tempting to speculate that upon entering India, the Dravidians first of all founded the Indus civilization. Surprisingly, Sergent rejects this otherwise popular hypothesis, on the impeccably rational ground that there is no evidence for it. Thus, except in coastal Sindh and Gujarat, geographical terms in the Indus-Saraswati area are never of Dravidian origin. There is also no continuity in material culture between Harappan culture and the oldest known Dravidian settlements.

True to scholarly norms, Sergent pleads for a provisional acceptance of our ignorance about the identity of the Harappans. However, as a concession to impatient readers who insist on having some theory at least, he gives one or two very slender indications that the Burushos (who preserve their Burushaski language till today in Hunza, Pak-Occupied Kashmir) may have played a role in it. (p.138) However, he finds no Burushaski lexical influence on Indo-Aryan except possibly the word sinda, "river", connected in one direction or the other with Sanskrit Sindhu, "river, Indus", not otherwise attested in IE. (Remark that the Iranian name Hindu for "Indus", hence also for "India", indicates that the Iranians have lived near the Indus. If they had not, then Sindhu would have been a foreign term which they would have left intact, just as they kept the Elamite city name Susa intact rather than evolving it to Huha or something like that; but because Sindhu was part of their own vocabulary, it followed the evolution of Iranian phonetics to become Hindu.)

Sergent is also skeptical of David MacAlpin's thesis of an "Elamo-Dravidian" language family: what isoglosses there are between Elamite and Dravidian can be explained sufficiently through contact rather than common origin.

Like many others, Sergent suggests that the early Dravidians can be equated with the "southern Neolithic" of 2500-1600 BC. Their round huts with wooden framework are the direct precursors of contemporary rural Dravidian housing. Two types of Hindu vessel have been discovered in southern Neolithic sites, including a beaked copper recipient still used in Vedic fire ceremonies. (p.48, with reference to Bridget and Raymond Allchin and to Dharma Pal Agrawal) Though the prehistory of the southern Neolithic is difficult to trace, it can be stated with confidence that the best candidate is the Northwestern Neolithic, which started in Mehrgarh in the 8th millennium BC. It is, by contrast, very unlikely that it originated as an outpost of the Southeast-Asian Neolithic, which expanded into India at a rather late date, bringing the Austro-Asiatic languages. According to Sergent, a link with the mature Harappan civilization is equally unlikely: neither in material culture nor in physical type is such a link indicated by the evidence. The Dravidians were certainly already in the Deccan when the mature Harappan civilization started. Sergent suggests that the Dravidians formed a pre-Harappan population in Sindh and Gujarat, and that they were overwhelmed and assimilated, not by the invading Aryans, but by the mature-Harappan population. (p.52)

The picture which emerges is that of a multi-lingual Indus-Saraswati civilization with Dravidian as the minor partner (possibly preserved or at least leaving its mark in the southern metropolis of Mohenjo Daro) who ended up getting assimilated by the major partner, a non-Dravidian population whom we may venture to identify as Indo-Iranian and ultimately Indo-Aryan.

4.3. Afro-Dravidian kinship

One of the most remarkable findings related in some detail by Bernard Sergent, on the basis of three independent studies (by Lilias Homburger, by Tidiane Ndiaye, and by U.P. Upadhyaya and Mrs. S.P. Upadhyaya) reaching similar conclusions, is the multifarious kinship of the Dravidian language family with African languages of the Sahel belt, from Somalia to Senegal (Peul, Wolof, Mandé, Dyola). As Sergent notes, all Melano-African languages have been credibly argued to be related, with the exception of the Khoi-San and Korama languages of southern Africa and the Afro-Asiatic family of northern Africa; so the kinship of Dravidian would be with that entire Melano-African superfamily, though it would be more conspicuous with some of its members.

Thus, between Dravidian and Bantu, we find the same verbal endings for the infinitive, the subjunctive, the perfect, the active participle or nomen agentis, related postpositions or nominal case endings, and many others. In over-all structure, Dravidian and the Melano-African languages (as distinct from North-African and Khoi-San languages) form a pair when compared with other language families: "The tendency to agglutination, the absence of grammatical gender, the absence of internal vowel change, the use of pre- or postpositions instead of flection are some of the main traits which set the Negro-African and Dravidian languages jointly apart from the Indo-European and Hamito-Semitic groups." (p.55) Here I would say that this doesn't prove much: the first trait is shared with some more, and the other ones are shared with most language families on earth; it is IE and Semito-Hamitic which stand out jointly by not having these traits.

That Hamito-Semitic (Afro-Asiatic) and IE stand jointly apart and may have a common origin in Mesopotamia, has been argued by B. Sergent himself (Les Indo-Européens, p.431-434). Critics such as the reviewer in Antaios 10, Brussels 1996, have suggested that with this position, he is playing a political game. This much is true, that by design or by accident, Sergent is pulling the leg of far-rightist adepts of IE studies who consider the reduction of IE to sisterhood with Semitic as sacrilege. All the same, his position is quite sound linguistically.

But between Melano-African and Dravidian, there are more specific similarities: "A simple system of five basic vowels with an opposition short/long, vocalic harmony, absence of consonant clusters in initial position, abundance of geminated consonants, distinction between inclusive and exclusive pronoun in the first person plural, absence of the comparative degree in adjectives, absence of adjectives and adverbs acting as distinct morphological categories, alternation of consonants or augmentation of nouns noted among the nouns of different classes, distinction between accomplished and unaccomplished action in the verbal paradigms as opposed to the distinction of time-specific tenses, separate sets of paradigms for the affirmative and negative forms of verbs, the use of reduplicated forms for the emphatic mode, etc." (Genèse de l'Inde, p.55)

Sergent himself adds more isoglosses: "Preference for open syllables (i.e. those ending in vowels), the rejection of clusters of non-identical consonants, the generally initial position of the word accent in Dravidian and in the languages of Senegal". (p.56) The similarity in the demonstrative affixes is among the most striking: proximity is indicated by [i], initial in Dravidian but terminal in Wolof; distance by [a], intermediate distance by [u].

Knowing little of Dravidian and nothing at all of African languages, I don't feel qualified to discuss this evidence. However, I do note that we have several separate studies by unrelated researchers, using different samples of languages in their observations, and that each of them lists large numbers of similarities, not just in vocabulary, but also in linguistic structure, even in its most intimate features. Thus, "the preposed demonstratives of Dravidian allow us to comprehend the genesis of the nominal classes, the fundamental trait of the Negro-African languages". (p.53)

To quite an extent, this evidence suggests that Dravidian and some of the African languages (the case has been made in most detail for the Senegalo-Guinean languages such as Wolof) have a common origin. At the distance involved, it is unlikely that the isoglosses noted are the effects of borrowing. Either way, Proto-Dravidian must have been geographically close to the ancestor-language of the Negro-African languages. Did it come from Africa, as Sergent concludes? Should we think of a lost Saharan culture which disappeared before the conquests of the desert? Note that earlier outspoken fans of Dravidian culture (e.g. Father H. Heras: Studies in Proto-Indo-Meditarranean Culture, 1953, and Alain Daniélou: Histoire de l'Inde, 1983) didn't mind describing the Dravidians as immigrants: unlike the Aryans, they were bringers rather than destroyers of civilization, but they were immigrants nonetheless. Or should we follow Tamil chauvinists in assuming that the Dravidians came from Tamil Nadu and the now-submerged lands to its south, and took their language and civilization to Africa?

4.4. Additional indications for Afro-Dravidian

Bernard Sergent argues against the Indian origin of Dravidian. One element to consider is that the members of the Dravidian family have not diverged very much from one another. The relative closeness of its members suggests that they started growing apart only fairly recently: a thousand years for Tamil and Malayalam (well-attested), perhaps three thousand for the divergence of North- from South-Dravidian. This would indicate that Dravidian was still a single language covering a small area in the early Harappan period, after having entered the country from the West.

That the "genealogical tree" of the Dravidian family seems to have its trunk in the coastal West of India, i.e. to the northwest of the main Dravidian area, has long been recognized by scholars of Dravidian. A map showing this "tree" is given in G. John Samuel, ed.: Encyclopedia of Tamil Literature, Institute of Asian Studies, Madras 1990, p.45, with reference to Kamil Zvelebil, who locates the Proto-Dravidians in Iran as late as 3500 BC. It also fits in with the old Brahminical nomenclature, which includes Gujarat and Maharashtra in the Pancha-Dravida, the "five Dravida areas of Brahminical settlement" (as contrasted with Pancha-Gauda, the five North-Indian ones). The northwestern coast was the first part of India to be dravidianized, the wellspring of Dravidian migration to the south, but also an area were Dravidian was gradually displaced by Indo-Aryan though not without influencing it.

Another indication for the Dravidian presence in Gujarat is the attestation in Gujarati Jain texts of inter-cousin marriage, typically South-Indian and quite non-Indo-European. (p.51) The IE norm was very strict in prohibiting even distant forms of incest, a norm adopted by both Hinduism and Christianity. Linguists had already pointed out, and Sergent confirms, that Dravidian has left its mark on the Sindhi, Gujarati and Marathi languages (as with the distinction between inclusive and exclusive first person plural) and toponymy. So, it is fairly well-established that Dravidian culture had a presence in Gujarat while spreading to South India.

It is possible that Gujarat was a waystation in a longer Dravidian migration from further west. Whether the itinerary of Dravidian can ultimately be traced to Sudan or thereabouts, remains to be confirmed, but Sergent already has some interesting data to offer in support. Africans and Dravidians had common types of round hut, common music instruments, common forms of snake worship and tree worship. A South-Indian board game pallankuli closely resembles the African game mancalal; varieties of the game are attested in Pharaonic Egypt and in a pre-Christian monastery in Sri Lanka. (p.59)

A point which I do not find entirely convincing is the distinction, based on Mircea Eliade's research, between two types of Shamanism, one best known from Siberia and in evidence among all people originating in North and East Asia including the Native Americans and the Indian Munda-speaking tribes, another best known from Africa but also attested among some South-Indian tribes. (p.62) This is a distinction between Shamanism properly speaking, in which the Shaman makes spirit journeys, despatches one of his multiple souls to the spirit world to help the soul of a sick person, etc.; and the religion of ghost-possession, in which the sorcerer allows the ghost to take him over but at the same time makes him obey. The latter is perhaps best known to outsiders through the Afro-Caribbean Voodoo religion, but is also in evidence among South-Indian tribals such as the Saora and the Pramalai Kallar.

If anthropologists have observed these two distinct types, I will not disbelieve them. It does not follow that there must be a link between Africa and South India: Sergent himself notes that the same religion of ghost-possession is attested among the Australian aboriginals, who may be related with the Veddoid substratum in India's population. (p.62) On the other hand, this theme of ghost-possession is but one of Sergent's numerous linguistic and anthropological data which all point in the same direction of Afro-Dravidian kinship.

4.5. Uralic-Dravidian kinship

If Dravidian migrated from Africa to India through the Middle East, it could have left traces in Egypt and countries under Egyptian influence as well, explaining the data which led earlier researchers to the thesis of a Dravidian "Indo-Mediterranean" culture, most influentially Father H. Heras: Studies in Proto-Indo-Mediterranean Culture, 1953. Sergent links Indian forms of phallus worship with Sahel-African, Ethiopian, Egyptian and Mediterranean varieties of the same. The Egyptian uraeus ("cobra"), the snake symbol on the pharaonic regalia, has been linked in detail with Dravidian forms of snake worship, including the priest's possession by the snake's spirit. Dravidian cremation rituals for dead snakes recall the ceremonial burial of snakes in parts of Africa. Others have added the similarity between the Dravidian nâga-kal (Tamil: "snake-stone", a rectangular stone featuring two snakes facing one another, their bodies intertwined) and the intertwined snakes in the caduceus, the Greek symbol of science and medicine.

It has consequently been suggested that some Dravidian words may also have penetrated into the European languages. Thus, Dravidian kal, "stone", resembles Latin calculus, "pebble", and Dravidian malai, "mountain", resembles an Albanian and Rumanian word mal, "rock, rocky riverside". (Sorin Paliga: "Proto-Indo-European, Pre-Indo-European, Old European", Journal of Indo-European Studies, fall 1989, p.309-334) But this hypothesis is a long shot and we need not pursue it here.

Far more substantial is the Dravidian impact on another language family far removed from the present Dravidian speech area, viz. Uralic. The influence pertains to a very sizable vocabulary, including core terms for hand, fire, house (Finnish kota, Tamil kudi), talk, cold, bathe, die, water, pure, see, knock, be mistaken, exit, fear, bright, behind, turn, sick, dirty, ant, strong, little, seed, cut, wait, fish (Hungarian men, Tamil min) tongue, laugh, moist, break, chest, tree; some pronouns, several numerals and dozens of terms for body parts. (p.66-67) But it goes deeper than that. Thus, both language families exclude voiced and aspirated consonants and all consonant clusters at the beginning of words. They have in common several suffixes, expressions and the phonological principle of vocalic harmony.

As the Dravidian influence, like that of IE, is more pronounced in the Finno-Ugric than in the Samoyedic branch, we may surmise that the contact took place after the separation of the Samoyedic branch. But the main question here is how Dravidian could have influenced Uralic given their actual distance. Sergent suggests that a lost branch of Dravidians on the way from Africa strayed into Central Asia and got assimilated but not without influencing their adopted language.

On the other hand, he rejects the theory that Dravidian forms one family along with Uralic, Turkic, Mongolian and Tunguz. The latter three are often grouped as "Altaic", a partly genetic and partly areal group which may also include Korean and Japanese, and all the said languages including Japanese have at one time or another been claimed as relatives of Dravidian, with which they do present some isoglosses. However, the isoglosses are fragmentary and mostly different ones for every language group concerned. Moreover, some Dravidian influences are also discernible in Tocharian, or Arshi-Kuchi (Tocharian A c.q. Tocharian B) as Sergent appropriately calls it, which is obviously a matter of influence through contact. So Sergent concludes that this is a matter of areal influence rather than genetic kinship: Dravidian was a foreign language entering Central Asia at some point in time to briefly exert an influence on the local languages before disappearing. (p.71-76) This goes against a fairly popular theory locating Dravidian origins in Central Asia whence a Dravidian immigration preceded the Aryans one.

I am not sure this will convince everyone: if Dravidian is not genetically linked with all the said language groups, it might still be so with one of them, viz. Uralic, at least on the strength of the data Sergent offers. Tamil chauvinists may well be tempted to complete the picture by claiming that before the Indo-Europeans from India colonized Central Asia and Europe, it was the turn of the Dravidians to colonize Central Asia and, after mixing genetically and linguistically with the natives, to develop the Uralic languages. At a time when subtropical Neolithic cultures had a tremendous technological and demographical edge over the hunter-gatherers in the inhospitable northern countries, it would not even be so far-fetched to imagine that a small wayward group of Dravidians could enter the vast expanse of Central Asia and completely change the linguistic landscape there.

At any rate, Sergent's observations represent a clean break with earlier theories which had the Dravidians originate in the Uralic speech area and preceding the Indo-Aryans in an invasion of India from Central Asia.

4.5. Geographical distribution of IE languages

Since Bernard Sergent doesn't take the Indocentric case for IE seriously, he doesn't bring out all the linguistic data which to him support the Kurgan scenario. One classical argument from linguistics is nonetheless developed at some length: "In Europe one finds the most numerous and geographically most concentrated IE language groups. Such a situation is not unique, and invariably denotes the direction of history: the Indo-Iranian languages represent a branch extended to the east and south, starting from Europe and not the other way around. It is obviously not the IE languages of Europe which have come from India". (p.29-30)

This early in his book (p.30 of 584 pp.), he is already so sure that "obviously" the central question of the Urheimat has been decided to the disadvantage of India. That is a great pity, for it is the reason why he has not applied himself to really developing the argument against the Indian Urheimat. If anyone is capable of proving the AIT, it must be Sergent. Yet, because he assumes no proof is necessary, he gives the question much less attention than

e.g. the much less contentious (though more original) question of the geographical origins ofDravidian.

To be sure, the pattern of language distribution invoked by Sergent as "not unique", is indeed well-attested, e.g. in sub-Saharan West Africa, there are about 15 language families, while in the much larger region of sub-equatorial Africa, a very large majority of the people speaks languages belonging to only one family, Bantu. Though it is only a branch of a subfamily of the Niger-Kordofanian language family, Bantu easily outnumbers all the other branches of this family combined: "Africanists conclude that Bantu originated in a small area, on the border between Nigeria and Cameroon." (p.30)

But in fact, India is in this respect more akin to West Africa, and Europe more to subequatorial Africa. India has more language families: Nahali, Andamanese, Burushaski, Dravidian, Austro-Asiatic (Munda and Mon-Khmer), Sino-Tibetan (Himalayan, Tibetic and Burmese) and IE (Iranian, Kafir, Dardic, Indo-Aryan, and possibly proto-Bangani). Europe is almost entirely IE-speaking, with Basque serving as the European counterpart to the Khoi-San languages in subequatorial Africa, a left-over of the original linguistic landscape largely replaced with the conquering newcomer, IE c.q. Bantu; and Uralic (Finnish, Estonian, Hungarian) a fellow if perhaps slightly later intruder in the European landscape, vaguely comparable to the intrusion of an Austronesian language in a part (viz. Madagascar) of southern Africa.

Therefore, I reject the argument from the geographical distribution. If the spread of the IE languages to Europe was often a matter of assimilating divergent native populations, this process promoted the speedy diverging of the IE dialects into distinct language groups. Though this is not a conclusive argument against the possibility of IE settlement in Indian being younger than in Europe, it at least terminates the impression that there was a compelling case in favour of that possibility. So, even under Bernard Sergent's hands, the fabled "linguistic evidence" has failed to decide the IE Urheimat question once and for all.

5. The evidence from comparative religion

5.1. Aryan contributions to indigenous culture

Unlike most invasionists, who minimize the IE contribution by seeing "pre-Aryan" origins behind every (post-Harappan) Hindu cultural item, Sergent admits the IE origin of numerous elements of Hinduism usually classified as remnants of earlier populations. This is one of the most elaborate and original sections in his book.

In invasionist sources, and more so in politicized writings against the "Aryan invader religion" Hinduism, it is claimed that the two most popular gods, Vishnu and Shiva, are (the former partly, the latter wholly) sanskritized pre-Aryan indigenous gods. Sergent argues that they are in fact neat counterparts of IE gods attested in distant parts of the IE language domain, Vishnu corresponding to the Germanic god Vidar, Shiva to the Greek and Thracian and Phrygian god Dionysos and to an extent also to the Celtic god Dagda. (p.310, p.402) He notices the puzzling fact that the classical Shiva is unattested in the Vedas (though Shiva's persona includes some elements from Indra, Rudra and Agni who are not counterparts of Dionysos); so he suggests that the Shiva tradition, definitely part of the common IE heritage, was passed on through a Vratya or non-Vedic Indo-Aryan circle. (p.323-324) This is an important acknowledgment of the fact that the Vedic tradition is only one tradition in the Indo-Aryan religious landscape, a key element in Shrikant Talageri's reconstruction of ancient Indian history (The Aryan Invasion Theory, a Reappraisal, Ch.14): just as Sanskrit is not the mother of all Indo-Aryan languages (rather an aunt), the Vedas are not the wellspring of the whole of Hindu tradition.

Sergent goes into great detail in showing how the IE trifunctionality model does apply throughout the Vedic and Puranic worldview, in fact far more splendidly than in any other IE culture. (p.252-278) Thus, the first function is juridical-religious and corresponds with sattva, the transparent and truthful quality in the Hindu triguna or three-qualities model; the second function is martial-political and corresponds with rajas, the passionate and energetic quality; the third function is production and consumption, corresponding with tamas, the quality of materiality and ignorance. This threesome also corresponds with the trivarga ("three categories") model, where dharma or religious duty is sattvik, artha or striving for worldly success is rajasik, kama or sensuous enjoyment is tamasik, though there is a fourth (nirguna, "quality-less") dimension, viz. moksha, liberation. Likewise for the three states of consciousness: dreaming, waking, sleeping, surpassed by "fourth state", turiya, the yogic state. This scheme can then be applied to the Hindu pantheon, e.g. Brahma the creator is rajasik, Vishnu the maintainer is sattvik, Shiva the dissolver is tamasik; or the white mountain goddess Parvati is sattvik, the tiger goddess Durga rajasik, the black devouring goddess Kali tamasik.

Many more IE elements in Hinduism could be cited to the same effect, such as the numerous correspondences in epic motifs between Hindu and European sagas, which Sergent discusses at length. But the interesting ones for our purpose are those which already existed in the Harappan civilization.

5.2. The linga

Dr. Sergent goes quite far in indo-europeanizing the alleged aboriginal contribution to Hinduism. He even asserts that "the linga (or Shiva's phallus) cult is of IE origin". (p.139) An important detail is that Aryan linga worshippers venerated the linga by itself, not in the linga-yoni combination common in Hindu shrines, for "the yoni cult is without IE parallel". (p.139) Sergent makes a distinction between the sculpted stone phallus and the unsculpted variety. The first type is attested in the Harappan area and period, as well as in Africa and the Mediterranean, while the second type is common in historical and contemporary Hinduism. However, on linga worship in the Harappan cities, we find conflicting presentations of the facts, with Sergent assuming that the same Mediterranean-type phallus worship flourished, while no less a scholar than Asko Parpola claims the exact opposite. Parpola (Deciphering the Indus Script, p.221) contrasts the "earliest historical (1st-2nd century BC) lingas", which are "realistic", with the "abstract form of the Harappan conical stones". If Parpola is right, the Harappan linga cult was more akin to the classical Hindu form than to Mediterranean phallus worship. However, the crucial point of comparison in this case is not Harappa but the Indian tribals.

Votaries of the Indo-Mediterranean school claim that the cult of phallus-shaped stones is unknown among the indigenous (though in many cases historically dravidianized) tribal populations of India, implying that the Dravidian immigrants brought it from abroad, first to the Indus Valley, next to the whole of India. The same claim, that the untainted tribals are unattracted to the urban Hindu depravity of phallus-worship, has often been made by Christian missionaries as an argument in support of their doctrine that "tribals are not Hindus". But is this true?

First of all, many Indian tribals do practise linga worship. Pupul Jayakar (The Earth Mother, Penguin 1989/1980, p.30) situates both Shiva and the linga within the culture of a number of tribes, e.g. the Gonds: "There are, in the archaic Gond legend of Lingo Pen, intimations of an age when Mahadeva or Shiva, the wild and wondrous god of the autochthons, had no human form but was a rounded stone, a lingam, washed by the waters of the river Narmada. Even to this day there are areas of the Narmada river basin where every stone in the waters is said to be a Shiva lingam: '(...) What was Mahadev doing? He was swimming like a rolling stone, he had no hands, no feet. He remained like the trunk (of a tree).' [Then, Bhagwan makes him come out of the water and grants him a human shape.]" Till today, Shiva or a corresponding tribal god is often venerated in the shape of such natural-born, unsculpted, longish but otherwise shapeless stones.

At the same time, female yoni symbols are common enough among Indian tribals, esp. inverted triangles, the origin of the Hindu plural-triangle symbols called yantra, venerated in such seats of orthodoxy as the Shankaracharya Math in Kanchipuram, where celibacy is the rule and thoughts of fertility unwelcome. In a palaeolithic site in the Siddhi district of Madhya Pradesh (10th or 9th millennium BC), a Mother Goddess shrine has been found containing well-known Hindu symbols: squares, circles, swastikas and most of all, triangles. (Pupul Jayakar: The Earth Mother, p.20-22) A participant in an excavation in Bastar (Jan Van Alphen, of the Etnografisch Museum, Antwerp) told me of how a painted triangular stone was dug up, and the guide, a Gond tribal, at once started doing puja before this ancient idol. Such is the continuity of indigenous Indian religion across eleven thousand years.

However, these two-dimensional triangles constitute a different symbolism from the three-dimensional ring-shaped or oval-shaped sculpted yoni symbols used in the linga-yoni combination. Sergent sees these sculpted yoni symbols as part of the Dravidian tradition with African links, while the triangles, like the unsculpted linga stones, might be older in India than even the Dravidian invasion as imagined by Sergent.

Quite separate from these abstract triangles and unsculpted stones, explicit sexual imagery is also common among the "untainted" tribals: "When the Bhils, primitive people of western India, paint their sacred pithoras, they include in an obscure corner a copulating man and woman. When asked to explain, they say, 'without this, where would the world be?'" (Pupul Jayakar: The Earth Mother, p.36) When they want to express the fertility process, they do so quite explicitly, and they don't have to make do with a shapeless stone. Conversely, when they do choose to use a shapeless stone, it must be for a different purpose. Therefore, it is logical that the tribal linga cannot be equated with the sexually explicit sculptures of the ancient Mediterranean cultures.

Like the tribals, Vedic Hindus worship unsculpted lingas without explicit sexual connotation. Most Hindus will reject the Western interpretation of their idol as a phallic symbol, and the quoted details of tribal linga worship tend to prove their point, as would the abstract uses of the term linga ("sign", "proof", one of the terms in a syllogism, and symbol of the nirguna/undefined primeval reality; for a serious discussion of the profound meanings of linga worship, see Swami Karpatri & Alain Daniélou: Le mystère du culte du linga, Ed. du Relié, Robion 1993). The pebbles picked up from the Narmada river are hardly phallus-shaped, in contrast to the phallic pillars in the Mediterranean.

When Hindus object to the purely sexual reading of their symbols by Western authors, the latter, irritated with the "refusal of prudish Indian hypocrites to face facts", retort that "after all, anyone can see that this is explicit sexual imagery". Or for a more academic variation: "The Brahmans succeeded in concealing the alcoholic and sexual-orgiastic character of the adoration of the phallus (lingam or linga) and transformed it into a pure ritualistic temple cult", according to Max Weber: The Religion of India, Munshiram Manoharlal, Delhi 1992 (ca. 1910), p.298.

Clearly, both conflicting interpretations have their validity, and linga worship in India is probably a syncretic phenomenon. If "phallus worship" was scorned in the Rg Veda (in the much-discussed verses where the enemies are abused as shishna-devâh, "those who have the phallus for god", Rg-Veda 7:21:5 and 10:99:3.), we do not perforce have to deny, as most anti-AIT authors do, that this concerned non-Aryan people who worshipped phallic stones. There were non-Aryans in many parts of India, though these phallus worshippers may equally have been Indo-Aryan-speaking cultists. We have at any rate a testimony for an ancient religious dispute. A clue has perhaps been given in Sergent's information that the lone linga ("objects which are interpreted as phalli", p.139; emphasis added) has been found in the northern half of the Indus-Saraswati civilization, the yoni-linga couple with ring-shaped yoni stones in its arguably Dravidian south.

Anyway, the point for now is that the alleged tribal and Vedic Aryan forms of linga worship are very similar. If this linga worship was IE, as Sergent claims, and if it is an age-old Indian tribal tradition at the same time, may I suggest that the Indo-Europeans discovered or developed it in India itself? Could this be an instance of what should at present be the Holy Grail of non-invasionist researchers, viz. a case of decided continuity between native tribal and IE cultures, distinguishing both together from imported cultures such as that of the Dravidians?

5.3. Harappan and Vedic fire cult

Most invasionist accounts of Hindu history acknowledge that classical Hinduism has included elements from the "Indus civilization". Thus, the unique water-supply system in the Indus-Saraswati system and the public baths so visibly similar to the bathing kunds still existing in numerous Indian cities have been interpreted as early witnesses to the Hindu "obsession" with purity. Though open to correction on details, this approach is not controversial. However, it runs into difficulties when items are discovered which are not typical for the Indian IE-speaking culture alone, but for the whole or larger parts of the IE-speaking family of cultures: how could these have been present in Harappa when the IE contribution was only brought in during or after Harappa's downfall by the Aryan invaders?

The bathing culture which the Harappans shared with the later Hindus is often cited as a pre-IE remnant which crept into Hinduism. However, this is also attested (with local differences, of course) among such IE tribes as the Romans and the Germanic people, and may therefore be part of the common IE heritage. Of course, a general concern about cleanliness is not a very specific and compelling type of evidence. More decisive would be a case like the famous Harappan seal depicting the so-called Pashupati (Shiva as Lord of Beasts), long considered proof that the Shiva cult is indigenous and non-Aryan. It is found to have a neat counterpart, to the detail, in the horned god Cernunnos surrounded by animals (largely similar ones and in the same order as on the Pashupati seal) on the Celtic Gundestrup cauldron made in central Europe sometime in the last centuries BC. So, this Harappan motif may well be part of the common IE heritage.

For another very general trait, the absence of distinct temple buildings in the Harappan cities constitutes a defect in the AIT postulate of a Vedic-Harappan cultural opposition. The fact that no temples are attested is a common trait of Harappa, of some ancient IE cultures (Vedic, Celtic, Germanic), and of that other acclaimed centre of Aryanism, the South Russian Kurgan culture, where "no real sanctuaries have ever been found; they probably had open sanctuaries" (M. Gimbutas: "Proto-Indo-European Culture: The Kurgan Culture during the Fifth, Fourth and Third Millennia BC", in George Cardona et al., eds.: Indo-European and Indo-Europeans, p.191). It contrasts with Mesopotamian and Egyptian cultures and with the bhakti cult in later Hinduism, which venerates the deity as if it were a human person and consequently gives the deity a house to live in: a temple. Harappans, Vedic Aryans, many ancient IE-speaking Europeans and contemporary Indian tribals have this in common: they worship without temple buildings.

For a more specific example: fire plays a central role in most historically attested IE religions, most emphatically in the Indo-Iranian branches. A fire-cult was present in the Indus-Saraswati civilization, and it resembled the practices of the Vedic people. The presence of Vedic fire-altars in several Harappan cities (Lothal, Kalibangan, Rakhigarhi) has been noticed by a number of authors, but is somehow always explained away or ignored. Parpola ("The coming of the Aryans to Iran and India and the cultural and ethnic identity of the Dasas", Studia Orientalia, Helsinki 1988, p.238) admits as "quite plausible" the suggestion (made to him by Raymond and Bridget Allchin) that they form an Indo-Aryan element within Harappan civilization, but he explains them as imported by "carriers of the Bronze Age culture of Greater Iran, who had become quickly absorbed into the Indus Civilization, culturally and linguistically".

Likewise, Sergent admits that "the Indian Vedic fire altar seemed to have borrowed its construction principles from the Indus civilization", all while "the very idea of the fire cult was Indo-Iranian". (p.161) This falls neatly into place if we equate proto-Harappan with Indo-Iranian: the idea of a fire cult was taken along by the emigrating Iranians, while the Indo-Aryans stayed on in the Indus-Saraswati region to develop their altars' distinct Indian style of construction.

At any rate, how deeply had these Aryan fire-worshippers not penetrated the Harappan civilization, that they had installed their altars in patrician mansions of three of the largest Harappan cities, all three moreover very far from the northwestern border? If they were imported from outside, it rather seems they came from the east, which would bring us back to Shrikant Talageri's thesis that IE originated in the Ganga basin and entered the Harappan area from there. Leaving aside this question of ultimate origins, the very fact of the Vedic fire-altars in the Indus-Saraswati culture is a serious problem for the AIT.

5.4. More on Harappan vs. Vedic

The stellar cult is common to the Harappan and Vedic religions. This is explained by Asko Parpola as the effect of borrowing: the barbarian invaders adopting the religion of the empire they just conquered, somewhat like the Heathen Germanic tribes did when they conquered the Christian Roman empire. In fact, the whole of Vedic and core-Puranic literature has been explained as essentially translations of non-Aryan Harappan traditions.

A similar explanation is given for the "soma filter", often depicted on Harappan seals, and of which an ivory specimen has been discovered by J.M. Kenoyer's team. Iravathan Mahadevan (interviewed by Omar Khan, Chennai, 17-1-1998, on http://www.harappa.com/script/mahadevantext.html) proposes that "the mysterious cult object that you find before the unicorn on the unicorn seals is a filter. (...) Since we know that the unicorn seals were the most popular ones, and every unicorn has this cult object before it, whatever it represents must be part of the central religious ritual of the Harappan religion. We know of one religion whose central religious cult [object] was a filter, that is the soma [cult] of the Indo-Aryans." If this is not an argument for the identity of Vedic and Harappan, I don't know what is. Yet, Mahadevan dismisses this conclusion citing the well-known argument that the Vedas know of no cities while Harappa had no horses, so "the only other possibility is that a soma-like cult (...) must have existed in Harappa and that it was taken over by the Indo-Iranians and incoming Indo-Aryans." This is a case of multilying entities without necessity.

Speaking of the unicorn: Prof. R.S. Sharma ("The Indus and the Saraswati", interview published on http://www2.cybercities.com/a/akhbar/godown/history/RSSIndus.htm) defends the AIT pointing out that the unicorn/ekashrnga is popular on Indus seals and in late- or post-Vedic literature but is not mentioned at all in the Rg-Veda. Within the AIT, this would be an anomaly: first the Harappans had unicorn symbolism, then the Vedic-Aryan invaders didn't have it, and finally the later Aryans again had it. The implied and slightly contrived explanation is that native unicorn symbolism went underground after the Aryan invasion, but reasserted itself later. But this pro-AIT argument is circular in the sense that it is dependent on the AIT-based chronology, viz. of the Rg-Veda as post-Harappan. Its force is dissolved (along with the anomaly) if the possibility is considered that the Rg-Veda was pre-Harappan, with the Unicorn an early Harappan innovation attested in both the the archaeological and the late-Vedic literary record.

Asko Parpola (in G. Erdosy: The Indo-Aryans of Ancient South Asia, p.370) has developed the theory that there is at least one clearly identifiable Hindu deity whose trail of importation from abroad we can follow. In the Bactrian Bronze Age culture, deemed Indo-Iranian if not specifically Indo-Aryan, ample testimony is available of the cult of a lion goddess, known in Hinduism as Durga, "the fortress", and who is "worshipped in eastern India as Tripura, a name which connects her with the strongholds of the Dasas". Politicized Indian invasionists usually claim goddess worship as a redeeming native, non-Aryan, "matriarchal" and "humanist" contribution to the "patriarchal" and "oppressive" Hindu religion, but now it turns out to have been brought along by the Bactrian invaders: how one invasionist can upset another invasionist's applecart.

However, Parpola himself reports elsewhere ("The coming of the Aryans to Iran and India and the cultural and ethnic identity of the Dasas", Studia Orientalia, Helsinki 1988, p.238) that the same lion or tiger goddess was worshipped in the Indus-Saraswati civilization as well.

Discussing "carriers of the Bronze Age culture of Greater Iran" as having been "quickly absorbed into the Indus civilization", he finds support in "the famous Kalibangan seal showing a Durga-like goddess of war, who is associated with the tiger". For now we retain Parpola's confirmation of a common religious motif in a Harappan city and an Aryan culture (on top of the indications mentioned above of a soma cult in both the Harappan cities and the Bactria-Margiana Bronze Age culture); but whether this shows an early Bactrian penetration of India as far as the Saraswati riverside remains to be seen. The hypothesis that both Harappa and Bactria were Aryan, is less contorted.

Just like those few colleagues who have paid attention to the elements of continuity between Harappa and Aryan India, Sergent fails to discuss the most plausible conclusion that could be drawn from all this material: that Harappan and post-Harappan or Aryan are phases of a single civilization.

5.5. The impact of East-Asian mythology

Indo-European mythology, or some of its branches, has certain motifs and stories in common with mythologies of non-IE cultures. Some of these are a common heritage dating back to long before a separate IE linguistic and cultural identity existed.

Conversely, some myths can be shown to have been transmitted in a fairly recent time,

e.g. the Excalibur myth known to most readers through the King Arthur saga has an exactparallel in a North-Iranian myth, with the sword being drawn from the stone (a poetic reference to the mystery of metallurgy, transforming shapeless ore into metal implements), making its bearer invincible, and finally getting thrown into a lake. This is not because of a common IE heritage of the Celtic and Iranian communities, but because in the 2nd century AD, Sarmatian mercenaries in the Roman army were garrisoned in Britain and, well, told their story. (Shan

M.M. Winn: Heaven, Heroes and Happiness. The Indo-European Roots of Western Ideology, p.34-35) Through Mongolia and Korea, elements of this myth have even reached Japan when the supremacy of the sword was established there. So, myths are not necessarily witnesses from the night of time; their invention and transmission can sometimes be dated.

In the case of the transmission of East-Asian myths into Hindu tradition, by medium of the Munda-speaking culture of the eastern Ganga basin, the apparent date might pose a problem. Some contributions are fairly late: "The puja, that extremely common and important practice of covering the gods' idols with flowers and perfumes, is rather late in India, and succeeds wholly different practices: could that also be an East-Asian substratum?" (p.483, n.639, with reference to Louis de la Vallée Poussin: "Totémisme et végétalisme", 1929, who emphasizes the similarity with devotional practices among the Kol tribe and among the Semang, a tribe in Malaysia. The more usual explanation is that puja came from the Dravidian south.) On the other hand, Sergent mentions several apparently East-Asian contributions to Vedic and Puranic lore which point to the ultimate beginning of those traditions themselves.

The name of Ikshvaku, founder of the Solar Dynasty of Ayodhya, whom the Puranic genealogies place several dozen generations before the Rg-Vedic seers, literally means "bitter gourd". Likewise, Sumati, wife of the early Ayodhya king Sagara, is said to produce offspring with the aid of a bitter gourd. Sergent attributes this to the Southeast-Asian mythic motif of the birth of humanity from a bitter gourd: "The Austro-Asiatic myth has visibly been transposed in the legends of Sumati and Ikshvaku". (p.386)

The birth of Vyasa's mother Satyavati from a fish equally refers to a Southeast-Asian myth, unknown in the IE world. The Brahmanas have a story of Brahma or Prajapati, the Creator, taking the form of a boar and diving to the bottom of the ocean to extract the earth and bring it to the surface (p.372, citing Taittiriya Brahmana 7:1:5:1-2 and Shatapatha Brahmana 14:1:2:11). This myth of the "cosmogonic plunge" is widespread in Siberia, among the native Americans, and among some Southeast-Asian peoples, but is foreign to the IE mythologies and to the Vedic Samhitas. The same is true of another innovative mythic motif appearing in the Brahmanas: Brahmanda, the cosmic egg which, when broken, releases all creatures.

Sergent explains that the Rg-Veda could not yet know these myths, just as it had not yet adopted items of Munda vocabulary, because its horizon was still confined to the northwest (note that Ikshvaku is first mentioned in the youngest part of the Rg-Veda: 10:60:4). But once the Vedic Aryans settled in the Ganga basin, they started assimilating the mythic lore of the Munda people, also immigrants, but who had settled there earlier. So, this seems to confirm the classic picture of the Aryans moving through North India from east to west.

However, even the non-invasionist school accepts that the Vedic tradition spread eastwards during and after the Harappan period, just as it spread to South India in subsequent centuries; but it maintains that the Ganga down to Kashi or so, already had an Indo-Aryan (but non-Vedic) population. This population was obviously exposed to influences from its eastern neighbours, immigrants from Southeast Asia. And their non-Vedic, partly borrowed traditions were incorporated in later Vedic and especially in Puranic literature. By contrast, the IE-speaking people living to the west of the Vedic Puru tribe, those who migrated to the west and formed the other branches of IE, were not exposed to this Austro-Asiatic lore, which is why their mythologies have not adopted elements from Southeast-Asian myths, just as their languages have not borrowed from Munda (or if they have, those words or those mythic motifs would be pan-IE and consequently not recognizable as borrowed).

If Ikshvaku, one of flood survivor Manu Vaivasvata's immediate successors, was indeed a historical figure, and if his name really refers to an Austro-Asiatic myth, then that would prove either that Manu and his crew had come from the southeast (but then why hasn't the bitter gourd myth become a pan-IE myth?), or that the Mundas were already in the Ganga basin at the beginning of IE history as narrated in the Puranic genealogies (6776 BC?). In that case, shouldn't non-invasionists be able to find more points of contact between IE and Munda, linguistically too?

A parallel argument could be made from the commonly assumed etymology of Ganga, a name already appearing in the oldest part of the Rg-Veda (6:45:31), viz. as an Austro-Asiatic loan cognate to Chinese kiang/jiang, "river". This would mean that the Munda presence in the (western!) Ganga basin well precedes the beginning of the Vedic period, and that they were either the first or the dominant group, so that they could impose their nomenclature. However, Zhang Hongming: "Chinese etyma for river", Journal of Chinese Linguistics, January 1998, p.1-43, has refuted the derivation of Chinese kiang from Austro-Asiatic, arguing among other things that the reconstructed Austro-Asiatic form is *krong, still preserved in the Mon-Khmer languages. This makes the Munda origin of Ganga less likely. A third language family may be involved, or an obscure IE etymon. How about kinship with Middle Dutch konk-el, "twist, turn, whirlpool"? Or simply a Vedic reduplication, nasalized for onomatopoeic effect, of the root ga-, "go", meaning "the fast-flowing"?

How exactly should we imagine the beginning of IE history in India, in what cultural and linguistic environment? For example, one could imagine that the Aryans overran the Indus basin, then Afghanistan and beyond, because they had been pushed to the west by invading Mundas from the east. If the idea of the fierce Aryans being put to flight by the fun-loving Mundas seems strange, remember that the invasion of the Roman Empire by the fierce Germanic tribes was partly caused by their being pushed westward by the Slavs. For another question: does this evidence of Munda contributions support the mainstream indological position that the entire Puranic history of the Vedic and pre-Vedic age in Ayodhya, Kashi or Prayag is but "reverse euhemerism", i.e. the transformation of myth into fabulated history, so that Ikshvaku and his clan never existed except as projections by aryanized Mundas of their gourd-god onto the ancestry of their conquerors? This is worth a discussion in its own right.

For now, I propose a hypothesis which takes care of all the data: there was a period of neighbourly coexistence of Indo-Aryans and Mundas in the Ganga basin, with a very limited exchange of cultural items (mythic motifs, vocabulary), which suddenly increased when the

Indo-Aryans started incorporating parts of the Munda territory and assimilating its inhabitants. This does not exclude that the Mundas entered India in the late-Vedic period; after all, even a pre-Munda population of the lower Ganga basin may have known some Southeast-Asian myths. But the main point is that North India was big enough to contain both Indoa-Aryans and Mundas, and that a Munda presence does not imply an Aryan invasion from outside India.

5.6. Some caveats to comparatists

Mythology is a large subject, and numerous myths are not well-known even to aficionados of the subject. This way, it sometimes happens that a Hindu myth gets classified as non-IE because it is not reported in any other IE mythology, only to show up in some far corner of the IE world upon closer scrutiny. Sergent provides one example.

Everyone knows the Hindu myth of the "churning of the ocean" with which the gods and demons jointly produce the amrta, the immortality drink. Sergent assures us that this myth "has no parallel in the IE world" (p.116), that it "is ignored by Vedic India and the IE world outside India" (p.378-379) but present in Mongolian mythology and in the Kojiki, a kind of Japanese Purana. Yet, he also informs us of a lesser-known Germanic myth in which the god Aegir churns the ocean to make the beer of the gods. (p.378-79, with reference to Georges Dumézil: Le Problème des Centaures, Paris 1929, p.51-60) But that one finding, even if it is in only one (but certainly distant) corner of the IE world, completely nullifies the earlier statement that the myth "has no parallel in the IE world". It is in fact possible that the Mongolian version (which is closer to the Germanic one, with a single deity doing the churning) and the Japanese version have been adapted from an IE original, just like the Excalibur myth.

Secondly, eastern contributions to Hindu tradition are not exclusively from the Mundas. The Rajasuya ceremony described in the Shatapatha Brahmana has an exact counterpart, not in Rome or Greece, nor in Chotanagpur or Japan, but in Fiji. The latter coronation ceremony has been analyzed into 19 distinct elements, and practically all of them are found in the Rajasuya. (p.381, with reference to Shatapatha Brahmana 5:3-5, and Arthur M. Hocart: Kingship, OUP 1927, p.76-83) This island culture is part of the vast expanse of the Austronesian language family. And indeed, a number of scholars have pointed out remarkable lexical similarities between IE and Austronesian. Unlike in the case of the Mundas, contacts of the Indo-Europeans with the Austronesians are hard to locate even in theory, unless we assume that the Austronesians at one time had a presence in India.

Finally, if a myth or religious custom is attested in India but not in the other IE cultures, this need not mean that the Indians have borrowed it from "pre-Aryan natives" or so. It can also mean that the other Indo-Europeans have lost what was originally a pan-IE heirloom. All of them have started by going through the same bottleneck, passing through Afghanistan, immediately plunging themselves into a very different climate from India's permanent summer, so that they had to adopt a very different lifestyle. And as they moved on, the difference only got bigger. Of practically all IE myths attested in some IE cultures, we know that they have been lost in other (generally in most) IE cultures; it is statistically to be expected that some myths have survived only in the Hindu tradition. And because of the full survival of Pagan religion in India plus the long centuries of literacy, it is in fact to be expected that a much higher percentage than the statistical average has only survived in India. So, probably, some myths attested only in Hinduism are purely IE, and if they are also attested in a non-IE neighbouring culture, the possibility remains that the latter has borrowed it from the Indo-Europeans rather than the reverse.

5.7. Harappa, teacher of China?

Quite separate from the importation of Southeast-Asian myths through the Austro-Asiatic population of the Ganga basin, Sergent also notes similarities between Harappan and Chinese civilizations unrelated to Munda lore. An important myth is that of the cosmogonic tortoise, the Chinese symbol of the universe; also the vehicle of Varuna, god of world order, and the form which, in the Shatapatha Brahmana, Prajapati takes to create the world. A tortoise-shaped construction forms part of the Yajur-Vedic fire altar, and the tortoise has also been depicted in a giant sculpture found in Harappa, indicating a similar myth. (p.116, with reference to John Marshall: Mohenjo Daro and the Indus civilization, London 1931) The tortoise as a cosmogonic symbol may well be one such mythic motif which is purely IE yet not attested in the non-Indian branches of IE. There is no indication for a foreign origin, and the tortoise's association with the Yamuna river (like the crocodile with the Ganga, the swan with the Saraswati) adds to its indigenous Northwest-Indian character.

Sergent also mentions the common origin of the Chinese and Hindu systems of 27 lunar mansions (Xiu, Nakshatra), which we have already considered. He admits that it could only have originated in an advanced culture, and that this was not Mesopotamia. He also notes that the Nakshatra system starts with the Pleiades/Krttika, which occupied the vernal equinox position in the centuries around 2,400 BC, exactly during the florescence of the Indus cities. This date, approximately, has been accepted by Jean Filliozat: "Notes d'astronomie ancienne de l'Iran et de l'Inde", Journal Asiatique 250, 1962, p.325-350; Albert Pike: "Lectures on the Arya", Kentucky 1873; and A.L. Basham: The Wonder That Was India, London 1954, according to Bernard Sergent: Genèse de l'Inde, p.422, n.65. We'll stick to this date for the present discussion, but not without mentioning that Asko Parpola (Decipherment of the Indus Script, p.206, p.263-265) himself gives reasons for thinking that Aldebaran had been the starting-point earlier, which would push back the birthdate of the Nakshatra system to ca. 3054 BC, the time of the pre-Harappan Kot Diji culture.

So, Harappa is the best bet as originator of this system, which spread to China and later also to West Asia. Sergent wonders aloud whether the similarities should be attributed to Harappa being "the teacher of China, whose civilization's beginning is contemporaneous". (p.380)

He informs us that the Nakshatra division of the heavens is unknown in other IE cultures, and in this case I would not speculate that they had known it but lost it along the way: rather, the system was invented after they had left India. This simple fact that there already was IE history before the genesis of the Nakshatra system also explains another fact he mentions: "The Rg-Veda doesn't allude to it, except in its 10th mandala, the youngest one occording to most indologists." (p.118) And even the youngest book only mentions "constellations" (RV 10:85:2), a concept known to all cultures, without specifying them as lunar mansions. At any rate, it is only at the end of (if not completely after) the Rg-Vedic period, well after the European branches of IE had left India, that the Nakshatra system was devised. This indicates once more that the Rg-Veda was pre-Harappan.

This chronology is confirmed by another fact related by Sergent: "Another aspect of the continuity between Indus and historical India is marked in the personal names: the oldest in Vedic India are in perfect conformity with Indo-European customs and highlight mostly the attributes with which an individial (or his family) adorns himself. In a later period astral names appear in India, which is foreign to the customs observed elsewhere among the Indo-Europeans". (p.121) Exactly: the Rg-Vedic people lived before the heyday of astronomy in Harappa and before the starry sky acquired a central place in the late-Vedic "and" in the Harappan religion.

5.7. The Harappan contribution

Sergent has identified the Oriental origin of so many Hindu myths, and the Dravidian (ultimately even African) origin of so many Hindu customs, including even the purity concept underlying post-Vedic caste relations: "As the same importance of purity is found in other societies, e.g. Semitic societies including even Islam and sub-Saharan Africa, it is not impossible that we have here another substratum: that of the ex-Dravidians of North India [Sindh-Gujarat], for instance?" (p.483, n.639) Yet, he has said relatively little about specifically Harappan contributions, eventhough these should logically have made a much larger impact. After all, the Harappans were more numerous, more advanced and more literate than the Mundas, and it is in their territory that the invading Aryans settled before scouting around in the then peripheral and relatively backward Munda-speaking region.

To be sure, Sergent devotes a chapter to the Harappan heritage in Hindu civilization. Thus, the weights and measures found in Lothal are the same ones which Kautilya has defined in his Arthashastra. (p.113) Personally, I would add that apart from being an important fact in itself, this continuity may also be symptomatic for a profounder continuity pertaining to fundamental cultural traits. Thus, the same search for standardization visible in the decimal measurements and in the orderly geometrical lay-out of the Harappan cities is evident in the rigorous structure of the Vedic hymns; in the attempt in the later Vedic literature to categorize all types of phenomena in neat little systems (from verbal conjugation classes listed by the grammarians through the Manu Smrti's artificial genealogy of the occupational castes in society to the Kama Sutra's varieties of sexual intercourse); and in the laborious ritual and architectonic details laid down in Brahminical texts for the proper construction of Vedic altars.

Sergent correctly notes that statuettes of mother goddesses have been found in large numbers in the Harappan cities, that mother goddesses are equally common in popular Hinduism, and that these are very uncommon in the historic IE religions. He also adds that in Europe, mother goddesses originated in the neolithic Old European culture, and remained popular all through the IE Pagan period to be picked up for christianization as Our Lady, suggesting a parallel: in India like in Europe, the popular pre-IE mother goddess survived and even asserted itself against the male-dominated IE official religion.

But clearly, IE religion was not hostile to the goddess cult: when the Church sought to win over the devout by accepting their goddess worship in a christianized form, most of Europe had been IE-speaking for several thousand years. All memory of a pre-IE period had vanished, yet these Celts and Romans and Germans venerated goddesses. In their mythologies, goddesses played only a supporting act, but this is the same situation as in Puranic Hinduism, in which goddess worship is widespread eventhough most myths have the male gods in the starring roles. It is like in real life: men need to dramatize their importance with all kinds of heroism, women simply are important without making such fuss over it. The Virgin Mary is by far the most popular Catholic saint, still present on every rural street corner around my village, much more popular than Jesus and His Father, yet the parts about her in the New Testament and the stories confabulated about her are very few. Therefore, our view of IE religion may be distorted by the fact that we rely on textual sources and myths, which belong to the public and official part of the religion; while by contrast, of Harappan religion we only have cult objects, showing us religion as it was lived by the people.

Sergent mentions the association of gods with animals as their respective "vehicle" (vahana: Vishnu's eagle, Shiva's bull, Saraswati's swan etc.) as an element of Hinduism which is commonly attributed to the pre-Aryan Harappans. But he minimizes this contribution, pointing out that such associated animals are common throughout the IE pantheon, e.g. Athena with her owl, Wodan with his raven, Jupiter who can appear as an eagle, Poseidon as a horse, Demeter as a cow. (p.115) In one case, the correspondence is even more exact: like Hindu goddess Saranyu (mother of the Ashwins), Celtic goddess Epona is imagined as either mare or rider.

Several more astronomy-based amendments to IE customs are mentioned as effects of Harappan influence, e.g. the fixation of the goddess festival (which existed in other parts of the IE world as well -- see that the Indo-Europeans had goddess cults of their own?) at the autumnal equinox. Very significant is the "stellar vestment": the shirt worn by the famous Harappan "priest-king" shows little three-petaled designs (also in evidence on other Harappan depictions), which Sergent, following Parpola, interprets as depictions of stars, exactly like in the scriptural description of the tarpya coat which the king must wear at some point in the Rajasuya ceremony. (p.121, with reference to Asko Parpola: Deciphering the Indus Script, p.201-218) In post-Harappan centuries, Mesopotamian kings are known to have worn such stellar vestments, and the China court ritual was likewise full of celestial symbolism.

What we see happening in the Harappan period is that a particular IE culture transforms itself under the impact of the florescence of what I would call a first scientific revolution; there is no indication of a foreign impact. Sergent has the facts under his own eyes without realizing their significance: "Shiva, Varuna, Yama, Durga-Parvati, we already said it, are deities of IE origin, the rituals concerning fire, soma and the person of the king are equally of IE if not Indo-Iranian origin. But it is now obvious that the Indo-Aryans, upon arriving in India, have amply harvested the Harappan heritage and included its ritual customs (construction of hearth-altars, rites inside buildings, use of the stellar vestment, ritual baths, fixation of feasts on the stellar equinoxes...) in their own religion." (p.124) Well, building facilities had been vastly improved, astronomical knowledge had been developed, so these innovations are not a matter of syncretism, merely of material and intellectual progress.

What more continuity was there? Apart from numerous material items, we note Harappan depictions of men wearing a tuft of hair on their backheads like Brahmins do, and of women wearing anklets. Some pictures suggest the notion of the "third eye". Most importantly, the Harappan people have remained in place: "the Italian anthropologist has emphasized not only that the skulls of Mohenjo Daro resemble those of today's Sindh and those of Harappa resemble those of today's Panjab, but even that the individual variability is identical today to what it was four thousand years ago." (p.128, quoting Mario Cappieri: "Ist die Indus-Kultur und ihre Bevölkerung wirklich verschwunden?", Anthropos 60:22, 1965, p.22)

Though Sergent considers it exaggerated to say that "the Indus civilization is still alive today", I would comment that it is not very exaggerated. (p.128; the quoted phrase, which Sergent dismisses in footnote 146, p.425, as "a Hindu nationalist myth", is from Dharma Pal Agrawal: L'Archéologie de l'Inde, CNRS, Paris 1986, p.2) But the point for now is that we really have seen very little evidence of the incorporation in Vedic tradition of elements which are foreign to it and which are traceable to the Harappan civilization. Compared with the limited but very definite list of items borrowed by Hindu tradition from cultures of East-Asian origin, the harvest in the case of the Harappan contribution is of a different type, larger but murkier. In spite of the ample archaeological material (quite in contrast with the zero objects identified as Vedic-age Austro-Asiatic), we don't get to see a sequence of "now it's in Harappa, and now it enters Vedic tradition". We don't get to see that clear contrast between Harappan and Vedic which most scholars have taken for granted. What we see is on the one hand plenty of elements which are simply in common between the Vedic and Harappan cultures, and on the other certain late-Vedic innovations which match the Harappan data and which constitute a departure from the common IE heritage: they are perfectly explainable through internal developments, particularly in proto-scientific knowledge and material control of the environment.

6. Conclusion

Bernard Sergent has written a book of incomparable erudition to narrate the genesis of the "composite culture" of Hinduism from what to him are the separate sources of Harappan, Dravidian, Indo-European and Austro-Asiatic elements. As part of this effort, he has tried to pinpoint the arrival of the Indo-Aryans in India, and this attempt has become the heroic failure of his book. Even in his two fields of expertise, he has not succeeded in finding decisive evidence for the Aryan invasion: in archaeology, he has not shown where a Bactrian or otherwise foreign culture crossed the Indus into India (indeed, the one entry he identifies as the Indo-Aryan invasion doesn't get farther than Pirak in Baluchistan); and in physical anthropology, he has not been able to identify an immigration wave coinciding with the supposed aryanization of northwestern India.

In comparative religion and mythology, he has thrown a few interesting challenges to non-invasionists, giving them some homework to do in fact-finding as well as in interpreting the data. But here too, he has not presented any insurmountable difficulties for a noninvasionist reading of the Harappan and Vedic information. On the contrary, many bits of information which he has either discovered or synthesized from secondary sources actually add substance to the emerging outlines of a non-invasionist version of ancient Indian and Indo-European history. For once the trite reviewer's phrase fully applies: one need not agree with Sergent's position, but his work is highly thought-provoking and bound to stimulate further research.

This is a shorter version of a chapter of Koenraad Elst's new book: Update on the Aryan Invasion Debate, Aditya Prakashan, Delhi.

 

 

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