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vendredi, 02 mars 2012

Donoso, precursor de la época del pavor

Donoso, precursor de la época del pavor

 

Entre restauración y cesarismo: la antiutopía de Donoso Cortés

Por Rafael Campos García-Calderón
Filósofo de la Universidad Nacional Mayor de San Marcos

Ex: http://geviert.wordpress.com/

Cuando en Interpretación europea de Donoso Cortés, Carl Schmitt nos describe el pensamiento del político y diplomático español como un pensamiento de carácter “europeo”, nos muestra algo inédito dentro del llamado “pensamiento reaccionario”.
La Revolución de 1848 fue el anuncio de una nueva era en la historia de Europa. La civilización burguesa europea sustentada en el liberalismo fue puesta a prueba. Una nueva filosofía política suspendió, por un momento, la hegemonía cultural burguesa: socialismo, comunismo, anarquismo, nihilismo y ateísmo aparecieron como una amenaza en el horizonte. Frente a este peligro, la Contrarrevolución europea, uno de cuyos baluartes será Napoleón III, asumió el costo de enfrentar estos acontecimientos. Con su acción, trastocó el orden liberal burgués creando un nuevo fenómeno: el Cesarismo. Así, el Estado recuperó, bajo una nueva forma, su status político y se alió con un conjunto de fuerzas sociales no incluidas, hasta ese momento, en el orden democrático liberal.

Uno de los partidarios de esta Contrarrevolución fue Donoso Cortés. A diferencia de Joseph de Maistre, Donoso no creía en la restauración de la Monarquía. Para él, los reyes habían perdido su lugar en la historia política de Europa. En su lugar solo quedaba la “dictadura del sable”, la nueva forma de ejercicio de la soberanía política. Donoso había percibido que los acontecimientos del 48 no respondían simplemente a una crisis del sistema liberal burgués. En realidad, había visto en ellos uno de los síntomas de un proceso anunciado ya por algunos teóricos. Sin embargo, frente a estos científicos, la visión de Donoso destacaba por su radicalismo espiritual. Para él, no se trataba simplemente de un combate político o cultural, sino de una guerra religiosa contra un enemigo mortal: la pseudoreligión del hombre expresada en el socialismo y sus diferentes formas. En este sentido, superaba la coyuntura política de Napoleón III y preparaba, con su visión, el escenario de una antiutopía.
Por esta razón, Donoso no debería ser considerado un pensador reaccionario, sino más bien el precursor de una nueva época: la época del pavor (δεινόσ). En ella, el hombre, con tal de desplegar su genio organizado, aprovecharía ventajosamente cualquier situación ignorando las diferencias entre el bien y el mal. Es esta consideración espiritual de la cultura europea la que condenó al pensamiento de Donoso al silencio. Superada la revolución, los historiadores burgueses ocultaron los acontecimientos y restauraron su fe en los ideales ilustrados. Sin embargo, los acontecimientos del 48 quedaron sin una interpretación satisfactoria.

 

Setenta años después la amenaza reapareció en el horizonte. La Revolución Bolchevique dirigida por Lenin desarrollaba el programa que Marx había esbozado, a partir de los acontecimientos del 48, en el Manifiesto Comunista. A diferencia de los historiadores burgueses, los comunistas habían podido leer en estos acontecimientos la inexorabilidad de un proceso que sus rivales pretendían ignorar: el triunfo de la civilización proletaria. Existía, para ellos, una continuidad histórica entre ambas revoluciones y, por tanto, según ellos, un nuevo poder se apropiaría indefectiblemente de los destinos de Europa. Este poder tendría como objetivo primordial el desarrollo de las fuerzas productivas capitalistas para alcanzar el socialismo, fase preparatoria del comunismo o sociedad sin clases.
Sin embargo, esta interpretación no era la única posible. A despecho del olvido de los pensadores liberales, hubo un conjunto de filósofos e historiadores que atendieron a los eventos de aquel momento y a su continuidad en el tiempo. Uno de ellos fue, sin duda, el mismo Donoso Cortés, cuyo diagnóstico de la situación histórica ha permitido esbozar una “interpretación europea” de su pensamiento. Según esta expresión, el alcance de la interpretación comunista estaría fuera de los límites de Europa, pues en lugar de dar cuenta del destino histórico del Viejo Continente, habría esbozado el futuro de un espacio muy diferente: la Rusia de los zares.

La profecía comunista habría proyectado sobre una crisis histórica concreta su propio plan histórico ideal. Sin duda, el lugar de realización de esta idea no podía ser Europa, pues la condición sine qua non para su concretización era la implementación generalizada de la tecnología en la vida social y la centralización de la administración política. A pesar de la interpretación comunista, la cultura europea era todo menos un cuerpo homogéneo capaz de someterse sin más al aplanamiento homogenizante de la tecnología y la burocracia. Para ello, era preciso un espacio político carente de conciencia histórica, es decir, un Estado carente de vínculos orgánicos con su Sociedad. La Rusia zarista, sometida incontables veces al azote tártaro-mongol y a la política del exterminio, era el candidato oportuno para esta nueva utopía.
Para Carl Schmitt, era posible reconstruir esta interpretación europeísta de los acontecimientos del 48 a partir de la obra de Donoso Cortés y de otros pensadores contemporáneos que, sin embargo, no tuvieron con él mayor contacto. Esta perspectiva estaba constituida por tres elementos: un pronóstico histórico, un diagnóstico cultural y un paralelismo histórico con el pasado. Según el pronóstico histórico de esta interpretación, estos eventos habrían marcado el inicio del descenso de la civilización europea frente a la hegemonía de dos nuevas potencias: Rusia y EE.UU. Es a partir de la derrota de Napoleón I frente a Rusia en 1814 que esta nueva realidad se apodera de la historia: las potencias europeas han dejado de ser el centro de la Historia Universal.

El primer hito en la historia de esta interpretación lo constituye, según Schmitt, Tocqueville (1835), quien pronosticó el despliegue de la democratización y centralización administrativa a gran escala por parte de Rusia y EE.UU. Además de ello, Tocqueville hizo un diagnóstico cultural de Occidente. Para él, la revolución de 1789 abría las puertas al proceso de centralización política que se realizaría inexorablemente en manos de cualquier partido o ideología política. En este sentido, la actividad política en general estaba irremediablemente destinada a servir al propósito centralista administrativo: la civilización se dirigía a la masificación.
Paralelamente, Donoso Cortés (1850) había percibido que la política exterior de Europa había decrecido en relación a la de EE.UU., Rusia e Inglaterra. Esta señal le indicaba la misma conclusión a la que Tocqueville había llegado con su pronóstico. En cuanto al diagnóstico, Donoso arribaba a otra conclusión, cercana más bien a la que algunos historiadores y sociólogos alemanes habían efectuado. Según esta, las modernas invenciones tecnológicas puestas al servicio de la administración pública anunciaban la futura mecanización de la sociedad y la destrucción de los órganos intermedios de poder. En efecto, Jakob Burckhardt, Friedrich List, Max Weber y Oswald Spengler, entre otros, diagnosticaron la creciente mecanización e industrialización de la civilización como el camino hacia una sociedad perfectamente organizada dirigida por una burocracia que tiene en sus manos la explotación económica. A los ojos de esta “interpretación europea”, la nueva era no traía consigo el paraíso sino la esclavitud a la técnica.
Un tercer elemento de esta interpretación consistía en la comparación o paralelismo histórico que a partir de 1848 los historiadores, comunistas o “europeístas”, habían efectuado respecto de la situación histórica de Europa. Este paralelismo consistía en la comparación con la época de las guerras civiles en Roma, época en la que el Cesarismo se implantó y en la que el Cristianismo florecía hasta imponerse al Imperio. Esta comparación traía consigo la idea del final de la Antigüedad que, en clave decimonónica, debía leerse como el final del Cristianismo.

Spengler, en la Decadencia de Occidente, había tratado de vincular entre sí diversos paralelismos históricos. Entre ellos, el más importante constituía la batalla de Accio, considerado el comienzo de nuestra era cristiana. Saint-Simon, en El Nuevo Cristianismo, estableció una relación entre nuestra época actual y la de los orígenes del Cristianismo. Para él, el Cristianismo habría terminado y su sustituto, un nuevo poder espiritual, habría llegado a reemplazarlo: el Socialismo, el nuevo cristianismo.
La posición de Donoso frente al paralelismo histórico era muy diferente. En clara oposición a ambas interpretaciones del mismo fenómeno, consideraba que el Cesarismo y el inicio del Cristianismo como paralelismo histórico a los eventos de 1848 eran evidentes, aunque insuficientes para explicar la circunstancia histórica del momento. En efecto, a diferencia de todos los otros pensadores, juzgaba demasiado optimista el pronóstico, pues por ninguna parte veía a aquellos “pueblos jóvenes”, símbolo de la regeneración espiritual occidental, que hubiesen correspondido a los germanos de la época de las invasiones a Roma. En el siglo XIX, esos “pueblos jóvenes” ya estaban corrompidos por el veneno de la civilización occidental desde el momento en que son un resultado de esta. Por ello, para él, el paralelismo histórico entre nuestra época y la era del cristianismo primitivo o del cesarismo no podía asemejarse a la visión que los socialistas tenían del mismo.

En realidad, la falta de este tercer elemento regenerador hacía del paralelismo histórico la antesala a una catástrofe. En lugar de un elemento regenerador, una seudorreligión ‒el socialismo ateo‒ ocupaba su lugar. Se trataba del culto a la Humanidad absoluta, culto que, paradójicamente, conducía, según él, al terror inhumano. Desde su punto de vista y a la luz de los acontecimientos del 48, una religión del Hombre solo podía conducir al terror y la destrucción, pues el Hombre no tolera a los demás hombres que no se someten a él. Para Donoso, esta Utopía era el resultado de un espejismo producido por la asociación entre el progreso de la técnica y la aspiración a la perfección moral de la Humanidad. Así, la idea ilustrada de progreso dejó de ser un esquema abstracto y se transformó en un programa materialmente realizable a partir de la técnica.
La visión que Donoso tenía de los acontecimientos del 48 y del paralelismo histórico tan celebrado se asemejaba, según Schmitt, a la experiencia interior a la que Soren Kierkegaard había accedido por aquellos años. En efecto, Kierkegaard había percibido la amenaza de un clima de horrores a partir de la lasitud espiritual que las iglesias de su tiempo padecían. Una vez más, la era de las masas había llegado. En este sentido, la visión de Donoso no era otra cosa que la objetivación histórica de esta realidad espiritual. A diferencia de las utopías idealistas y materialistas que sus enemigos liberales y socialistas trataban de imponer a la historia desde esferas extrañas a ella, Donoso consideraba el acontecimiento histórico concreto y a partir de él interpretaba los signos sorprendentes de una teleología simbólica.
Desde este punto de vista, el Hombre no podía ser la encarnación de la paz, como querían los demagogos de su época, sino del terror y la destrucción. Según Schmitt, Donoso vaticinó el advenimiento de aquello que Nietzsche expresó en su concepto de Superhombre: la legitimación histórica del poder y la violencia sobre los infrahombres.

jeudi, 01 mars 2012

Why Conservatives Always Lose

Why Conservatives Always Lose

By Alex Kurtagic

In our modern Western societies, liberals do all the laughing, and conservatives do all the crying. Liberals may find this an extraordinary assertion, given that over the past century their preferred political parties have spent more time out of power than their conservative rivals, and, indeed, no radical Left party has ever held a parliamentary or congressional majority. Yet, this view is only possible if one regards a Labour or a Democratic party as ‘the Left’, and a Conservative or a Republican party as ‘the Right’—that is, if one considers politics to be limited to liberal politics, and regards the negation of liberalism as a negation of politics. The reality is that in modern Western societies, both ‘the Left’ and ‘the Right’ consist of liberals, only they come in two flavours: radical and less radical. And whether one is called liberal or conservative is simply a matter of degree, not of having a fundamentally different worldview. The result has been that the dominant political outlook in the West has drifted ever ‘Leftwards’. It has been only the speed of the drift that has changed from time to time.

This is not to deny the existence of conservatism. Conservatism is real. This is to say that conservatism, even in its most extreme forms, operates against, and is inevitably dragged along by, this Leftward-drifting background. And this is crucial if we are to have a true understanding of modern conservatism and why conservatives are always losing, even when electoral victories create the illusion that conservatives are frequently winning.

It would be wrong, however, to attribute the endless defeat of conservatism entirely to the Leftward drift of the modern political cosmos. That would an abrogation of conservatives’ responsibility for their own defeats. Conservatives are responsible for their own defeats. The causes stem less from liberalism’s dominance, than from the very premise of conservatism. Triumphant liberalism is made possible by conservatism, while triumphant conservatism leads eventually to liberalism. Anyone dreaming of ‘taking back his country’ by supporting the conservative movement, and baffled by its inability to stop the march of liberalism, has yet to understand the nature of his cause. The brutal truth: he is wasting his time.

Defeating liberalism requires acceptance of two fundamental statements.

  • Traditionalism is not conservatism.
  • Liberal defeat implies conservative defeat.

Much of our ongoing conversation about the future of Western society has focused on the deconstruction of liberalism. Not much of it has focused on a deconstruction of conservatism. Most deconstructions of conservatism have come from the Left, and, as we will see, there is good reason for this. It is time conservatism be deconstructed from outside the Left (and therefore also the Right). I say ‘also’ because neither conservatism nor traditionalism I class as ‘the Right’. Neither do I accept that ‘Right wing’ is the opposite of ‘Left wing’; ‘the Right’ is predicated on ‘the Left’, and is therefore not independent of ‘the Left’. Consequently, any use of the terms ‘Left’ and ‘Right’ coming from this camp is and has always been expedient; I expect such terms to disappear from current usage once the political paradigm has fundamentally changed.

Below I describe eight salient traits that define conservatism, explain the long-term pattern of conservative defeats, and show how liberalism and conservatism are complementary and mutually reinforcing partners, rather than contrasting enemies.

Anatomy of Conservatism

Fear

Proponents of the radical Left like to describe the politics of the Right as ‘the politics of fear’. Leftist propaganda may be full of invidious characterisations, false dichotomies, and outright lies, but this is one observation that, when applied to conservatism, is entirely correct. The reason conservatives conserve and are suspicious of youth and innovation is that they fear change. Conservatives prefer order, fixity, stability, and predictable outcomes. One of their favourite refrains is ‘if it ain’t broke, don’t fix it’. There is some wisdom in that, and there are, indeed, advantages to this view, since it requires less effort, permits forward planning, and reduces the likelihood of stressful situations. Once a successful business or living formula is found, one can settle quite comfortably into a reassuring routine in a slow world of certainties, which at best allows for gradual and tightly controlled evolution. Change ends the routine, breaks the formula, disrupts plans, and lead to stressful situations that demand effort and speed, cause stress and uncertainty, and may have unpredictable outcomes. Conserving is therefore an avoidance strategy by risk-averse individuals who do not enjoy the challenge of thinking creatively and adapting to new situations. For conservatives change is an evil to be feared.

No answers

We can deduce then that the reason conservatives fear change is that they are not very creative. Creativity, after all, involves breaking the mould, startling associations, unpredictability. Conservatives are disturbed by change because they generally know not how to respond. This is the primary reason why, when change does occur, as it inevitably does, their response tends to be slow and to focus on managing symptoms rather than addressing causes. This is also the primary reason why they either plan well ahead against every imaginable contingency or remain in a state of denial until faced with immediate unavoidable danger. Conservatives are first motivated by fear and then paralysed by it.

Defensive

Unfortunately for conservatives, the world is ever changing, the universe runs in cycles, and anything alive is always subject to unpredictable changes in state. Because they generally have no answers, this puts conservatives always on the defensive. The only time conservatives take aggressive action is when planning against possible disruptions to their placid life. They are the last to show initiative in anything else because being a pioneer is risky, fraught with stress and uncertainties. Thus, conservatism is always a resistance movement, a movement permanently on the back foot, fighting a tide that keeps on coming. The conservatives’ main preoccupation is holding on to their positions, and ensuring that, when retreat becomes inevitable, their new position is as close as possible to their old one. Once settled into a new position, any lull in the tide becomes an opportunity to recover the previous position. However, because lulls do not last long enough and recovering lost positions is difficult, the recovery is at best partial, never wholly successful. Conservatives are consequently always seen as failures and sell-outs, since eventually they are always forced to compromise.

Necrophiles

Their lack of creativity leads conservatives to look for answers in the past. This goes beyond learning the lessons from history. Averse to risk, they mistrust novelty, which makes their present merely a continuation of the past. In this they contrast against both liberals and traditionalists: for the former the present is a delay of the future, for the latter it is a moment between what was and will be. At the same time, conservatives resemble the liberals, and contrast against traditionalists more than they think. One reason is that they confuse tradition with conservation, overlooking that tradition involves cyclical renewal rather than museological restoration. Museological restoration is what conservatives are about. Their domain is the domain of the dead, embalmed or kept alive artificially with systems of life support. Another reason is that both liberals and conservatives are obsessed with the past: because they love it much, conservatives complain that things of the past are dying out; because they hate it much, liberals complain that things of the past are not dying out soon enough! One is necrophile, the other a murderer. Both are about death. In contrast, traditionalism is about life, for life is a cycle of birth, growth, maturity, death, and renewal.

Boring

Fear, resistance to change, lack of creativity, and an infatuation with dead things makes conservatives boring. Dead things can be interesting, of course, and in our modern throwaway society, dead things can have the appeal of the exotic, particularly since they belong to a time when the emphasis was on quality rather than quantity. Quality, understood both as high quality and possessing qualities, is linked to rarity or uniqueness, excitement or surprise, and, therefore, creativity or unpredictability. Conservatives, however, conserve because they long for a world of certainties—slow, secure, comfortable, and with predictable outcomes. Granted: such an existence can be pleasant given optimal conditions, and it may indeed be recommended in a variety of situations, but it is not exciting. Excitement involves precisely the conditions and altered states that conservatives fear and seek to avoid. It thus becomes difficult to get excited about anything conservative.

Old

There are good reasons why conservatism is associated with old age. As a person grows old he loses his taste for excitement; his constitution is less robust, he has less energy, he has fewer reserves, he has rigidified in mind and body, and he is less capable of the rapid, flexible responses demanded by intense situations and sudden shocks. It makes sense for a person to become more conservative as he grows old, but this is hardly a process relished by anyone. Once old enough to be taken seriously, the desire is always to remain young and delay the signs of old age. Expressing boredom by saying that something ‘got old’ implies a periodic need for change. Conservatives oppose change, so they get old very fast.

Irrelevant

Preoccupation with the past, resistance to change, and mistrust of novelty eventually makes conservatives irrelevant. This is particularly the case in a world predicated on the desirability of progress and constant innovation. Conservatives end up becoming political antiquarians, rather than effective powerbrokers: they operate not as leaders of men, but as curators in a museum.

Losers

Sooner of later, through their refusal to adapt until they become irrelevant, conservatives are constantly left behind, waving a fist at the world with angry incomprehension. Because eventually survival necessitates periodic surrenders and regroupings at positions further to the Left, conservatives come to be seen as spineless, as people always in retreat, as, in short, losers. The effective function of a conservative in present-day society is to organise surrender, to ensure retreats are orderly, to keep up vain hopes or a restoration, so that there is never risk of a revolutionary uprising.

Liberalism’s Best Ally

With the above in mind, it is hard not to see conservatism as liberalism’s own controlled opposition: it may not be that way, but the effect is certainly the same. Conservatism provides periodic respite after a bout of liberalism, allowing citizens to adapt and grow accustomed to its effects before the next wave of liberalisation. Worse still, conservative causes, because they eventually always become irrelevant, provide a rationale for liberalism, supplying proof for the Left of why it is and should remain the only game in town. Liberals love conservatives.

Conservatism and Tradition

Conservatism does not have to be liberalism’s best ally: conservatism can be the best ally of any anti-establishment movement, since it always comes to represent the boring alternative. Conservatives defend the familiar, but familiarity breeds contempt, so over time people lose respect for what is and grow willing to experience some turbulence—results may be unpredictable and may indeed turn out to be negative, but at least the turbulence makes people feel alive, like there is something they can be actively involved in. In the age of liberalism, conservatism is fundamentally liberal: it does not defend tradition, since liberalism has caused it to be forgotten for the most part, but an earlier version of liberalism. In an age of tradition, conservatism could well be the best ally of a rival tradition, since conservatism always stagnates what is, thus increasing receptivity over time to any kind of change. Thus conservatism sets the conditions for destructive forms of change.

By contrast, tradition is evolution, and so long as it avoids the trap of conservatism (stagnation), those within the tradition remain engaged with it. This is not to say that traditions are immune from self-destructive events and should never be abandoned: hypertely, maladaption, or pathological evolution, for example, can destroy a tradition from within. However, that is outside our scope here.

Confusion of Tradition and Conservation

In the age of liberalism, because it has forgotten tradition, tradition is confused with conservation. Thus some conservatives describe themselves as traditionalists, even though they are just archaic liberals. Some self-described traditionalists may erroneously adopt conservative traits, perhaps out of a confused desire to reject liberalism’s notions of progress. Tradition and conservation are distinct and separate processes. Liberalism may contain its own traditions. Liberalism may also become conservative in its rejection of tradition. Likewise for conservatism, except that it rejects liberalism and does so only ostensibly, not in practice.

End of Liberalism

Ending liberalism requires an end to conservatism. We should never call ourselves conservatives. The distinction between tradition and conservation must always be made, for transcending the present ‘Left’-‘Right’ paradigm of modern democratic politics in the West demands a great sorting of what is traditional from what is conservative, so that the former can be rediscovered, and the latter discarded as part of the liberal apparatus.

In doing so we must be alert to the trap of reaction. Reactionaries are defined by their enemies, and thus become trapped in their enemies’ constructions, false dichotomies, and unspoken assumptions. Rather than rejection, the key word is transcendence. The end of liberalism is achieved through its transcendence, its relegation into irrelevance.

Given the confusion of our times, it must be stressed that tradition is not about returning to an imagined past, or about reviving a practice that was forgotten so that it may be continued exactly as it was when it was abandoned. There may have been a valid reason for abandoning a particular practice, and the institution of a new practice may have been required in order for the tradition successfully to continue. A tradition, once rediscovered, must be carried forward. Continuation is not endless replication.

After Liberalism

The measure of our success in this enterprise will be seen in the language.

We know liberalism has been successful because many of us ended up defining ourselves as a negation of everything that defined liberalism. Many of the words used to describe our political positions are prefixed with ‘anti-‘. This represented an adoption by ‘anti-liberals’ of negative identities manufactured by liberals for purposes of affirming themselves in ways that suited their convenience and flattered their vanity.

Ending liberalism implies, therefore, the development of a terminology that transcends liberalism’s constructions. Only when they begin describing themselves as a negation of what we are will we know we have been successful, for their lack of an affirmative, positive vocabulary will be indicative that their identity has been fully deconstructed and is then socially, morally, and philosophically beyond the pale.

Developing such a vocabulary, however, is a function of our determining once again who we are and what we are about. Without a metaphysics to define the tradition and drive it forward, any attempt at a cultural revolution will fail. A people need a metaphysics if they are to tell their story. If the story of who we are and where we are going cannot be told for lack of a defining metaphysic, any attempt at a cultural revolution will need to rely on former stories, will therefore lapse into conservatism, and thus into tedium and irrelevance.

After Conservatism

One cannot be for Western culture if one is not for the things that define Western culture. A metaphysics, and therefore ‘our story’, is defined through art. Art, in the broadest possible sense, gives expression to values, ideals, and sentiments that a people share and feel in the core of their beings, but which often cannot be articulated in words. Therefore, the battle for Western identity is waged at this level, not in the political field, even if identity is a political matter. Similarly, any attempt to use art for political purposes fails, because politics, being merely the art of the possible, is defined by culture, not the other way around.

In the search for ‘our story’, we must not confuse art with craft. Craftmanship may be defined by tradition, and a tradition may find expression in crafts, making them ‘traditional’, but the two are not synonymous. Similarly, craftsmanship may improve art, but craft is not art anymore than art is craft. Art explores and defines. Craft reproduces and perpetuates. Thus, art is to tradition what craft is to conservatism. This is why contemporary art, being an extreme expression of liberal ideals, is without craftsmanship, and why art with craftsmanship is considered conservative, illustration, or ‘outsider’.

Those concerned with the continuity of the West often treat reading strictly non-fiction and classics as proof of their seriousness and dedication, but ironically it will be when they start reading fiction and making new fiction that they will be at their most serious and dedicated. If tradition implies continuity and not simple replication, then it also implies ongoing creation and not simple preservation.

After Tradition

No tradition has eternal life. Ours will some day end. Liberalism sees its fulfilment as the end of history, but that is their cosmology, not ours. Therefore, liberalism does not—and should never—indicate to us that we have reached the end of the line. The degeneration of the West is tied to the degeneration of liberalism. The West will be renewed when the liberals come crashing down. They will be reduced to an obsolete and irrelevant subculture living off memories and preoccupied with conserving whatever they have left. Once regenerated, the West will continue until its tradition self-destructs or is replaced by another. Whatever tradition replaces ours may be autochthonous, but it could well be the tradition of another race. If that proves so, that will be the end of our race. Thus, so long as our race remains vibrant, able to give birth to new metaphysics when old ones die, we may live on, and be masters of our destiny.

mercredi, 29 février 2012

Debunking Another Lie: Lawrence H. Keeley’s War Before Civilization: The Myth of the Peaceful Savage

Debunking Another Lie:
Lawrence H. Keeley’s War Before Civilization: The Myth of the Peaceful Savage

Ex: http://www.counter-currents.com/

Lawrence H. Keeley’s War Before Civilization: The Myth of the Peaceful Savage (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996)

This slender volume published by Oxford University Press is an invaluable contribution to the historical and anthropological literature. Author Lawrence H. Keeley [3], a professor of anthropology at the University of Illinois at Chicago, is an archaeologist specializing in the prehistory of northwestern Europe.

According to Keeley, the thoughts of English philosopher Thomas Hobbes and French philosopher Jean-Jacques Rousseau embody two competing paradigms of peace, violence, and civilization.

Hobbes believed the inertial “natural” state of humanity to be war, not peace. In Keeley’s rendering Hobbes was nevertheless a universalistic egalitarian who did not think human beings were “innately cruel or violent or biologically driven to dominate others”—a faith Keeley shares.

But the dominant ideological-academic paradigm of today is Rousseau’s, which denies “civilization its humanity while proclaiming the divinity of the primitive.” (p. 6)

The most interesting and surprising observation Keeley makes about these two men is this one: “Unlike Hobbes, Rousseau seemed genuinely interested in whether his contentions were confirmed in the observations of real ‘savages’ then being encountered by European explorers. His disciples accompanied French explorations and brought back mixed reports.”

But Rousseau and his followers “were too thoroughly convinced that the natural state of human society was a peaceful combination of free love and primitive communism to see [the] violent first encounters as anything but rare aberrations.” (p. 7)

“Prejudices” and “blinders,” Keeley says, prevent professional anthropologists and archaeologists from acknowledging “unambiguous physical evidence” of primitive violence. Successive waves of “existentialism, structuralism, structural Marxism, poststructuralism, and postmodernism” in the humanities and social sciences “have left American universities a ‘burned-over district.’” (pp. 221–22, n. 1)

Keeley demonstrates conclusively that prevailing dogmas about primitive life—the myth of the peaceful savage corrupted by white civilization—is contrary to fact.

Keeley marshals three kinds of evidence to make his case: prehistoric findings by archaeologists, 20th century ethnographic surveys by cultural anthropologists who lived among still-extant primitive peoples, and historical accounts of early contact between whites and nonwhites.

“A Scarcity of Peace”

“Given the neo-Rousseauian tenor of the present day, it comes as a shock to discover that the proportion of war casualties in primitive societies almost always exceeds that suffered by even the most bellicose of war-torn modern states.” (p. 88)

Professor Keeley debunks two primary myths in particular: the romantic, Left-wing, anti-Western, Rousseauian-Fennimore Cooper (he mentions the latter author by name) primitive idyll, as well as a WWII-era academic perception that nonwhite tribesmen waged a stylized, less horrible, special kind of primitive warfare that differed radically from “real” or “true” war conducted by modern, civilized states. By comparison, primitive warfare was seen as unprofessional, undisciplined, unspecialized, ineffective, unserious, and relatively harmless.

But, Keeley asserts, genuinely peaceful societies have been extremely rare: 90–95% of known societies have engaged in warfare on a routine basis.

One fascinating chapter in history I had not been aware of involved the stark contrast between the violent Spanish and US frontier engagement of Amerindians in Mexico and America versus a far more intelligent, peaceful, and just handling of essentially the same situation in Canada. (pp. 152–57)

In North America, Indian tribes on both sides of the 49th parallel were frequently the same. Likewise, Euro-Canadians and Euro-Americans were essentially the same racially and ethnically.

In Mexico and the US there was frequent bitter warfare. But in Canada subjugation, pacification, and segregation on reservations was accomplished peacefully. Keeley’s explanation of how this occurred is extremely interesting. Essentially, it was a function of different central government and law enforcement policies.

Another opinion of Keeley’s is that the Inuit may have committed genocide against the Greenland Vikings: “The unequivocal traditions of the Inuit, not recorded until 1850, claim that their ancestors administered the coup de grâce to the fading Norse colonies in the course of mutual raids and massacres.” (p. 77) There is archaeological evidence to support the tradition.

The author analyzes the cross-cultural history of warfare from every conceivable angle: its prevalence and importance, frequency, degree of mobilization, tactics, weapons, fortifications, battles, raids, ambushes, massacres, primitive versus civilized warfare, prisoners, captives, war deaths, wounds, mutilation, trophy-taking (of body parts), cannibalism, looting and destruction, territorial acquisition, motives and causes of warfare, population density and pressure, trading, raiding, frontiers, attitudes toward war and peace, and the maintenance of peace.

Cannibalism

His discussion of cannibalism (pp. 103–106) illustrates his approach to these various subjects.

Anthropologists distinguish three kinds of cannibalism.

Ritual cannibalism, the most frequent type, involved consumption of a portion of a corpse for magical purposes—brain, heart, liver, bits of flesh, or ashes from various body parts mixed with a beverage. Such cannibalism was very widely distributed, though not the norm in prestate warfare.

Culinary or gastronomic cannibalism consisted of eating human meat as food. Starvation cannibalism occurred under famine conditions.

Academic disputes arise particularly over culinary cannibalism. “Neo-Rousseauians” deny that it ever existed anywhere, except under conditions of extreme starvation. While not true, “Certainly, it appears that many of the societies accused of culinary cannibalism either were being slandered by their enemies or, at most, practiced ritual cannibalism.” Alleged cases of culinary cannibalism often turn out to be exaggerations of ritual cannibalism or misinterpretations of customs having nothing to do with cannibalism, such as preserving skulls as war trophies.

Nevertheless, culinary cannibalism has occurred.

Ethnographic evidence concerning the Polynesians of the Marquesas Islands derived from native self-reports initially categorized them as ritual cannibals. However, wholesale consumption of human flesh leaves distinct forensic archaeological evidence in the form of human bones treated like the bones of meat animals.

Subsequent archaeological evidence from the Marquesas revealed, contrary to ethnographic accounts, that the scale of culinary cannibalism was large, and increased as the population expanded and other sources of meat disappeared.

Additional evidence for culinary cannibalism has been found among tribes and chiefdoms in southern Central America and northeastern South America. Many tribes “reputedly consumed large numbers of their dead foes and captives. Notwithstanding some kind of magical or religious justification, several of these groups seemed to have positively relished human flesh.”

People in Oceania, sections of the Congo, and Amerindian tribes in the American Southwest also ate human victims. Cannibalism occurred as well in Early Neolithic (3000–4000 BC) southern France and portions of Bronze Age and Early Iron Age Europe.

The Aztecs are a special case. Keeley does not accept the contention of Marxist Jewish anthropologist Marvin Harris that the Aztec empire was the only “[culinary] cannibal state.” (Aztec society is considered a state or civilization rather than a tribe.)

“There can be little doubt,” Keeley writes, “that the Aztecs annually sacrificed large numbers of war captives in their great temples and that parts of these victims’ bodies [ritual cannibalism] were eaten. There were even recipes for human stews.” Archaeological excavation “has uncovered ample evidence of human sacrifice but none yet of cannibalism.” He leaves open the possibility that future excavations might turn up evidence of culinary cannibalism.

Keeley concludes, “It is clear that the consumption of enemies’ corpses has occurred in the warfare of several tribes and chiefdoms. Victorious states may have ruthlessly exploited the vanquished, but, with the exception of the Aztecs, they have never actually consumed them.”

Discussion of cannibalism covers only four pages in Keeley’s book, and I have omitted most of the details, supporting evidence, and citations.

Scaling the Data

Keeley presents the data he has gathered and tabulated proportionally, measuring deaths and other figures against the size of the societies in question. It is this approach that suddenly places primitive and modern warfare on a proper analytical footing.

The author has constructed several graphs, typically with percentage figures along one axis and type of society along the other: prehistoric, primitive, civilized, tribal, ancient, modern, hunter-gatherer, horticulturalist, pastoralist, and state entities.

Graphs show percent of male populations mobilized, percent killed and wounded in specific battles, annual war deaths as percentage of mean population, percent of deaths from warfare by society, and percent of territorial change per generation.

An appendix consisting of seventeen supplementary tables tabulating statistical data used in the text is included at the end of the book. The tables were constructed from a wide array of academic studies, many of which were cross-cultural in nature.

Because the proportional approach is central to Keeley’s method, it is worth quoting his argument at length:

Some readers may be unconvinced by percentage comparisons between populations of hundreds or thousands of people and populations of millions or tens of millions—that is, they are more impressed by absolute numbers than ratios. However, consistent with such views, such skeptical readers must also disdain any calculations of death rates per patient or passenger-mile and therefore always choose to undergo critical surgery at small, rural, Third World clinics and fly on small airlines. At such medical facilities and on such airlines, the total number of passenger or patient deaths are always far fewer than those occurring on major airlines or at large university and urban hospitals. These innumerate readers should also prefer residence on one of the United States’s small Indian reservations to life in any of its metropolitan areas since the annual absolute number of deaths from homicide, drug abuse, alcoholism, cancer, heart disease, and automobile accidents will always be far fewer on the reservations than in major cities and their suburbs. (p. 214 n. 21)

Not Perfect

Keeley deserves enormous credit for debunking an asinine anti-white narrative (which his book very effectively does), but he is not perfect.

Keeley harbors the academic’s simplistic, black-and-white detestation of Germany, saying that by his “conservative calculation,” excluding deaths from disease and starvation, “the annual homicide rate of Nazi Germany (1933 to 1945)” qualifies it as “the most homicidal society ever recorded.” (p. 206, n. 11)

Nowhere is the deadliness of Communism discussed. The USSR is mentioned only in connection with its casualties in WWII: “In modern history, Nazi Germany is unique in both the scale and the indiscriminateness of its homicides.” (p. 214, n. 28)

Keeley even writes, “The human-hide lampshades produced at Nazi death camps are perhaps the modern era’s preeminent symbol of evil.” (p. 102)

He does not define his nonstandard use of “homicide,” but it obviously includes alleged camp deaths and probably some or all enemy military deaths as well. Nevertheless, Germany (or Europe, when figures are inclusive) is at the bottom, not the top, of his tabulated statistical rankings, which invariably show primitive warfare to have been far more lethal and violent, proportionally speaking, than modern conflicts.

In WWII, the Allies “delivered the world from evil” through the use of “total war.” Keeley approvingly quotes British historian H. P. Willmott’s belief that 57 million dead is “a small price to pay for ridding the world of depraved wickedness.” (p. 222, n. 2) (Academics, like politicians and bureaucrats, are casual about the loss of human life as long as the killing serves their ideological predilections.)

Keeley is a garden-variety egalitarian: “all members of our species have within rather narrow limits of variation the same basic physiology, psychology, and intellect.” Variations in temperament or intellect “have no value in explaining social or cultural differences between groups.” People of every racial background win Nobel Prizes. “The many and profound differences in technology, behavior, political organization, and values” among the peoples of the Earth are explained solely by “nongenetic” “material and social factors.” “This attitude reflects not just the antiracist tenor of the twentieth century, but also the accumulated facts and especially the experiences of ethnographers.” (p. 180)

The allusion to “accumulated facts” as proving human sameness is significant because, unlike most academics, Keeley places a high premium on facts and evidence—it was, after all, hard archaeological and anthropological data that compelled him to abandon his faith that civilization is inherently evil.

Clearly, breaking free of one overarching societal myth does not of necessity open a man to new ideas, or produce general skepticism or caution. Keeley does not ask himself, “If this was wrong, what other widely-held beliefs might also be constructed upon sand?” Instead, he simply reaches a dead end and switches his impressive critical faculties off.

This is not to say that the author beats the reader over the head with his misguided beliefs—he doesn’t. They play little role in the overall discussion. Nevertheless, they constitute his guiding principles.

Furthermore, Keeley does not draw sensible conclusions from his empirical findings, leading him to deduce some rather appalling “lessons” from his survey.

Though rejecting the myth of the pacified past out of hand, and with it the unequivocal conclusion “that the only answer to the ‘mighty scourge of war’ is a return to tribal conditions and the destruction of [Western] civilization,” he remains committed to the “practical prospect for universal peace.” (p. 179)

Peace will be achieved in familiar Left-wing fashion by creating

the largest social, economic, and political units possible, ideally one encompassing the whole world, rather than allowing those we do have to fragment into mutually hostile ethnic or tribal enclaves. The degree of mutual interdependence created by modern transportation and communications long ago rendered the concepts of national and ethnic self-sufficiency and self-determination absurd and dangerous delusions. (p. 181)

World peace will be achieved without resort to “totalitarian tyranny, disastrous economic policies, or state imposition of cultural or religious uniformity”—or, for that matter, massive warfare and permanent, institutionalized violence and injustice. (p. 181)

So the man who challenged stereotypes through laborious theoretical and empirical work didn’t learn as much from his intellectual breakthrough as one might have expected.

Fortunately, Keeley generally keeps these cherished if erroneous beliefs to himself and permits his considerable accumulation of the evidence do most of the talking. The author adheres to facts rather than dogma at least within his specialty—no small feat for an academic.

I highly recommend this book. It is full of useful information and insights. At only 245 pages it is quite short—183 pages of text plus an appendix, bibliography, footnotes, and index. The rudimentary 4-page index could have been usefully expanded.

White nationalists and patriotic military personnel alike—active duty, academic, retired, conservative, libertarian, or pro-white—can learn a great deal from this overview. A cursory check of the Internet provides no indication that the book is being consistently used as a standard text in military curricula.

Professor Keeley has done a great service by writing War Before Civilization.

 


Article printed from Counter-Currents Publishing: http://www.counter-currents.com

URL to article: http://www.counter-currents.com/2012/02/debunking-another-lie/

mardi, 28 février 2012

An essay on Ernst Jünger's concept of the sovereign individual

EUROPEAN SYNERGIES – SYNERGIES EUROPEENNES – MARS/MARCH 2004

WARRIOR, WALDGAENGER, ANARCH
An essay on Ernst Jünger's concept of the sovereign individual

[TAKEN FROM : http://scot.altermedia.info/ ]

tumblr_liurg6UdCg1qzdxojo1_400.jpgErnst Jünger says in his acceptance speech for the prestigious Goethe prize in 1982, "I've had the experience that one meets the best comrades in no-man's-land. I've always been pleased with my troops (Mannschaft) in war and my readership in peace. A hand that holds a weapon with honor, holds a pen with honor. It is stronger than any atom bomb, or any rotary press." With these words Jünger bestows an honour on us, his readership. He equates us with his comrades-in-arms in times of peace, but is it a wonder after all? If you are a reader of Ernst Jünger, you must be in either one of two camps, those who consider his opus with genuine admiration or the detractors, those sceptics, "whose contribution does not equal to one blade of grass, one mosquito wing".

Ernst Jünger was both literally and metaphorically a warrior of the 20th Century. Not only did he survive two world wars but also the ideologies of the 20s and 30s. He would cross swords with the bourgeoisie, and later after the war with the Frankfurter School of philosophy and Gruppe 47 proponents. But all of his achievements both on the battlefield of war and on paper serve as a guide to our being in the world, above all his achievements are not only personal, they are also a contribution to us his readership.

Jünger's first book, The Storm of Steel gives us an insight to his character and his future development as an author and individual. It is here that the seeds are sown, that great men of any war are not soldiers; they are warriors, they fight to test themselves and above all to uphold the truth, whatever the reality of that may be. They do not fight for ideologies, but instead they are initiated in earth, blood and fire. By his own admission Jünger was never a good soldier. He admitted to being useless in basic training and the field drills. In his own words: "I had hoped to go from there (the battle field) without being praised. From the beginning, I've always had particular allergy to honors. That this happens to be the case, I probably owe to field marshal Von Hindenberg, who said to me in his sonorous voice: 'Don't you know that this is not good that the king of Prussia has awarded his highest order to such a young man. Nothing much came of my comrades, who received the Pour le Merit in 1864, 1866, and 1870.' He was right. In two world wars, I was only able to achieve Captain. And could be happy that it didn't cost me my head as it did Rommel and other brothers in my order."

Jünger made up for this seeming lack through his bravery and concern for his comrades in no-man's-land. He was one of the few who survived the trenches. He went through the baptism of fire and iron to be wounded 14 times (not an insignificant number). "Exactly at the times when the force of things threatened to hammer the soul soft, men were found who unawares danced it away as over nothingness." Jünger reflects introducing to us the knowledge that the human soul is indeed stronger than the material world, a point not lost on his readers.

He attributes his survival, not to any skill of his own, but rather to the higher power of fate, a portent of his later writings. Jünger leads us through this most nihilistic of wars, with the cool eye of the observer. In its midst the only meaning he can find is a personal one, one of the initiation of life and death. All of those men who survived the horrors of this mass-suicide found one of two things, either the inward strength to master the madness of the material war or insanity. Jünger found out who he was by the end of the war and would carry on this inward strength to the end of his life, not only benefiting himself but his readers too.

Never being concerned about the shells that went off around him, would equally help him in the ideological years after the war. After Versailles Jünger responded to the selling out of Germany by embarking on a war of words with the bourgeois Weimar Republic supporters. Jünger contributed to any cause, be it right or left on the political spectrum, that wanted the best for Germany. These were Jünger's nationalistic years.

The fires of Jünger's youth were not completely spent on the battlefield. Attacking all those people he envisioned as selling out Germany brought him into the centre of many radical parties that longed to have him as spokesman. The Nazis courted him, as did the Communists. He wrote for the various propaganda organs of the right and left. He was even invited to a place on Nazi electoral list, which he luckily declined, a near miss. Later Jünger will stand accused of writing a thinly veiled critique of the Nazi tyrannies in On the Marble Cliffs. The Volkische Beobachter stated that Ernst Jünger..."begibt sich in der Nähe eines Kopfschüsses." Which loosely translated means that he is coming very close to a bullet in the head, one of the methods used by the Nazis for political executions, another brush with death.

Jünger himself says that he had finished with the Nazis after Krystal Nacht, the Nazis' attack on the Jewish businesses of Germany. It didn't take this erudite observer much to recognise that both Hitler and the Nazis were proletarian scum and that nothing higher could ever come from them. On one occasion Jünger was asked what he thought of Hitler, he replied, "Er war nur ein kleiner Mann". (He was just a little man.)

But with the war over that was not the end of his troubles, now he had to deal with the Allies, who believed him to be a contributing ideologue to the Nazi war machine. Jünger refused to undergo the denazifaction program of the Allies and as a result was hung with the prohibition to publish for some years, from 1945 to 1949 to be precise. Now the attacks would come from the liberal left at the head of which was the Frankfurter School. Still Jünger took it all in his stride and would gain in stature in the post war Germany, until the chancellor of Germany, Helmut Kohl and the prime minister of France, Francois Mitterand would visit him in his Wilflingen home. Recognised as a man of letters, his death at 102 was mourned by all.

But what was Jünger's contribution? How are we, his readership, to profit from his experience? We might profit in many ways as the scope of Jünger's opus is vast, covering such diverse topics as botany and etymology or "War as an inner experience" and modern nihilism, but to me the triumvirate of the Krieger (warrior), Anarch, and the Waldgaenger are his legacy and we, his readership, are his inheritors.

Paul Noack in his biography of Jünger's life sums up for us the nature of Jünger's contribution with these words. Jünger believed "…that every failure only comes from ourselves, and therefore can also be overcome in ourselves. That is the way that he (Jünger) wanted to show: he guides Over the Line through the Wall of Time into a future of a different sort."

And it is Jünger's opus that gives us the means to bridge the modern nihilism of this age through the figures of the Krieger, Anarch and Waldgaenger. I have spoken of the significance of Jünger's life from the perspective of a warrior and its potential differences with the soldier as well as its indications for us. Now we must turn to the Anarch and the Waldgaenger, which are both an extension of each other and the warrior.

Let us state unequivocally that the Anarch is not an anarchist, or to use Jünger's own definition, "The Anarch is to the anarchist, what the monarch is to the monarchist..." So it follows that sovereignty is the meaning sought here. The Anarch is sovereign like the monarch. And from this conviction of sovereignty, he does not need to rely on others. But what is the frame in which this becomes necessary or even desirable? In our modern times this approach to politics is desirable, even lifesaving. Again it must be said that Jünger's own character typifies this sort of behaviour in the face of the tyranny of modern political nihilism. The Anarch is capable of survival because he can outwardly assume any form, be it a clerk behind a counter or a soldier in the military, while inwardly he remains free, able to think and observe. He, in his inward migration, does not nihilistically implode into himself, but remains aware of the circumstances around himself but not affected by them. It is not his goal to be dialectically resistant to the tyranny, rather he is observant as if following the Confucian code: "Attacking false systems merely harms you." Aware of the inherent falseness of any sort of tyranny, he does not need to jeopardise his life or that of others by attacking something that itself will come to an end. Rather he becomes a preserver of knowledge, a philosopher, poet and historian. He waits, studies, and preserves until a time when he can contribute. Otherwise it is his duty to pass on what he knows, preserving it for a time when his inheritors can put it to use.

Jünger himself in one description of the Anarch says: "...His inner strength is far greater. In fact, the Anarch's state is the state that each man carries within himself. He embodies the viewpoint of Stirner,...that is the Anarch is unique. Stirner said, "Nothing gets the best of me." The Anarch is really the natural man. He is corrected only by the resistance he comes up against when he wishes to extend his will further than is permitted by the prevailing circumstances. In his ambition to realise himself, he inevitably encounters certain limits; but if they did not exist his expansion would be indefinite..."

"The Anarch can don any disguise. He remains wherever he feels comfortable; but once a place no longer suits him he moves on. He can, for instance, work tranquilly behind a counter or in an office. But upon leaving it at night, he plays an entirely different roll. Convinced of his own inner independence, he can even show a certain benevolence to the powers that be. He's like Stirner, he's a man who, if necessary, can join a group, form a bond with something concrete; but seldom with ideas. The Anarchist is an idealist; but the Anarch, on the contrary, is a pragmatist. He sees what can serve him - him and the common good; but he is closed to ideological excesses. It is in this sense that I define the Anarch's position as a completely natural attitude. First of all, there is a man, and then comes his environment. That is the position I favor at the moment."

Jünger took this position in World War II and before, during the tyranny of the Nazi regime. He became invisible despite his writings in the Wehrmacht. This also enabled him to have contact with the resistance within Paris and the German General Staff itself. His writing entitled The Peace, (Der Friede) was a plan for post-war Europe, although contrary to every Nazi policy, it found a great reception among the Staff, even if fate would never allow it to be played out.

The Anarch gives us the means to observe and understand the materialist age we find ourselves in, without jeopardising our own sovereignty. Because the Anarch is the natural form of man, by Jünger's own definition, we should not be mistaken that we are talking about the individualist or individualism as it has become known today. Individualism itself is an extension of the rampant nihilism of our age and therefore an illness to be overcome. The individual is a private being closed in his own world. The individualist even rejects the naturalness of a social milieu free of the exploitation of the modern servile state. If we are talking of the Anarch as a natural man then we must also mean a man who is social in his form. The sovereign individual is always capable of joining together with others of his kind. It means to be an individual only in the truth with which one faces oneself, otherwise it has nothing to due with individualism. Still this Anarch may not find many people who understand him or what it means to be natural. If this figure is a threat to the status quo, he is an Anarch, if not we must suspect the individual.

By extension the Waldgaenger is the Anarch who has had to retreat into the wilderness because he has been exposed as the Anarch, the free sovereign man and is in danger of being killed. So he must range the forest, or the city for that matter, but it requires a style of resistance to the forces of tyranny. He will have to take up the fight and this is the indication that the Anarch again is not an individual in Jünger's meaning, because although the Waldgaenger can and might have to fight alone, it is futile to do it without support, one cannot live the Hollywood film of the lone hero. This is simply a psychological indoctrination for the masses enforcing the nihilistic idea of the individual and must therefore be recognised for what it is, a baseless myth.

The retreat into the forest comes today under certain conditions which Jünger describes for us, "The Waldgang (retreat into the forest) followed upon proscription. Through it man asserted his will to survive by virtue of his own strength. That was held to be honorable, and it is still today in spite of all indications to the contrary. Waldgängers (Rangers in the forest) are all those, isolated by all great upheavals, and are confronted with ultimate annihilation."

"Since this could be the fate of many, indeed, of all, another defining characteristic must be added: The Waldgaenger (the Ranger) is determined to offer resistance. He is willing to enter into a struggle that appears hopeless. Hence he is distinguished by an immediate relationship to freedom which expresses itself in the fact that he is prepared to oppose the automatism and reject its ethical conclusion of fatalism. If we look at him in this fashion we shall understand the roll which the Waldgang plays not only in our thoughts but also in the realities of our age. Everyone today is subject to coercion and the attempts to banish it are bold experiments upon which depends a destiny far greater than the fate of those who dare to undertake them."

Here we have it in its essence, we see its nature as broad capable of taking many forms, but all to the same end, the preservation of the dignity and freedom of man in its original and most natural form. This is beyond the polemics of modern philosophy and politics. It is the removal of the coercion that has become characteristic of the modern mega-state and its master the banking titan.

Jünger: "The Waldgang is not to be understood as a form of Anarchism directed against world technology (technik), although this is a temptation, particularly for those who strive to regain a myth. Undoubtedly, mythology will appear again. It is always present and arises in a propitious hour like a treasure coming to the surface, but man does not return to the realm of myth, he re-encounters it when the age is out of joint and in the magic circle of extreme danger..."

The Waldgang is the stuff of myth, but not created by the likes of us. Myth has its root in the disclosure of the divine and it is only the natural man, a man who is beyond the concepts of liberty, fraternity and equality that might achieve this. Where the modern concepts of the Enlightenment prevail, so prevails the tyranny of the state. Here the Anarch becomes potent in his reflection even dangerous, he has recognised the tyranny and if he is exposed he must choose the method of retreat into the forest or pay the price.

In our age we cannot underestimate the heritage that Jünger has left us. All around us we see the levelling effects of technology. It becomes more and more difficult to be free in the golden cage of the world state. Who are the men and women that are still sovereign in this age? It is certainly becoming more difficult to find real ‘Anarchs’ devoted to learning and freedom, but they are there; some of them are the readership that Jünger honours so greatly and others are unaware of Jünger, but possess a natural inclination to his thoughts.

These ideas have never been popular, even with some of his loyal readers. Jünger himself had burnt himself on the hot iron of modern democracy. Naturally those who believe in the saying of Winston Churchill, "Democracy is the worst form of government, but the best we've got," will certainly disagree with Jünger's political analysis, but the further we go down this strange path called the modern world, the more we must realise how much Jünger's political analysis rings true. Modern Democracy is a sham, covering up the all too real and undemocratic exploitation of people, wealth, and resources, siphoning it off into the hands of the few, in the name of the many. We have entered the age of the Anarch and who knows what will come next?

ABDALBARR BRAUN - 7 March 2002

 

Link to this text : http://scot.altermedia.info/index.php?p=446&more=1&c=1

vendredi, 24 février 2012

Du retrait

philosophie,réflexions personnelles,claude bourrinet

Du retrait

par Claude BOURRINET

 

Dans le film d’Akira Kurosawa, Kagemusha. L’ombre du guerrier, une fameuse scène de bataille illustre la stratégie inspirée par le défunt seigneur Shingen Takeda, qui fait du clan une « montagne » inamovible et invincible. Cette doctrine, apparemment dictée uniquement par des impératifs stratégiques, est reconduite par son sosie, voleur et vagabond, usurpateur de sa fonction seigneuriale, dont nul, sinon quelques vassaux, ne connaît l’identité. Mais, démasqué, le « kagemusha » est obligé d’abandonner le pouvoir au fougueux fils du chef charismatique, le téméraire Katsuyori Takeda. Si bien que la charge de cavalerie et d’infanterie menée à la bataille de Nagashino, face au feu des mousquets livrés par les Occidentaux, est réduite à néant. La mort et la destruction ont suivi la vaine agitation et la présomption.

 

L’œuvre d’Akira Kurosawa est d’une profondeur rarement égalée. Ses films sont une méditation imprégnée d’esprit zen. L’amertume liée à l’exercice dérisoire du pouvoir et du jeu mortel des apparences souille toute aspiration à la pureté ou à la paix, sinon même à la force véritable. C’est le cas par exemple dans cette adaptation emblématique de Macbeth qu’est Le Château de l’araignée, véritable chef d’œuvre irrigué par l’esthétique du théâtre .

 

L’analogie avec l’histoire millénaire de notre civilisation occidentale n’est pas fortuite. Jadis, la lutte entre le Sacerdoce et l’Empire, entre le pouvoir spirituel de l’Église, tentée par la théocratie, et celui, terrestre, du Saint-Empire romain germanique, a ouvert la voie à la révolte du kshatriya, du guerrier, et, finalement, a permis aux États modernes d’asseoir une domination dégagée des contraintes de la Tradition, entraînant une dérive dont nous sommes les acteurs. Le déséquilibre entre la force armée et l’inspiration spirituelle a mené à un déchirement entre les deux tensions structurantes de la société, entre deux dynamismes qui, sous l’angle de la Tradition, se doivent d’être unis pour empêcher le monde de sombrer dans le déclin, dans l’âge de fer. En effet, l’axe central, l’essieu qui meut la roue, le «  moteur immobile », source de légitimation et d’énergie, noue un lien harmonieux entre l’impératif contemplatif,  la méditation, et l’éthique de l’engagement, le devoir chevaleresque de dépassement et de sacrifice. Le regard tourné vers l’ailleurs transcendantal, vers le monde divin, vers l’Un, « informe » (donne forme et sens) à l’immanente pluralité du monde humain. Son absence serait l’éclatement de monades erratiques. La rupture entre les deux puissance souveraines, dont l’une, par sa proximité avec les forces démoniaques et telluriques de la nature se devait d’être soumise à l’autre, supérieure par sa capacité à donner une signification au déploiement de l’action, a éloigné la société, progressivement, de toute validité, de tout bien-fondé, jusqu’à ce que la guerre elle-même, mobilisation extrême au service du massacre et de la destruction totales, fût  l’expression du nihilisme et de la volonté intégrale de puissance.

 

Dès lors que la pente est prise, il est presque impossible de remonter vers l’amont. L’action détient une supériorité par rapport à l’esprit de méditation, une séduction capable de toucher vigoureusement la nature humaine, qui est fascinée par le bruit, la fureur et les modifications spectaculaires du monde, et prodigue en dépenses d’énergie et de sang. C’est là le côté sombre de la condition guerrière, mais, notre époque, si avancée dans la voie plébéienne, met en sus l’obligation de résultat, l’impérieuse nécessité de voir bouger les choses. Aussi l’avenir semble-t-il le produit de la technique. La médiatisation prométhéenne entre l’homme et la nature s’est autonomisée, et le monde, création de l’artifex, redevable des lois de la métis, de la ruse et de l’astuce, du savoir-faire et du calcul, est devenu une seconde nature, un milieu où le jeu se conjugue au caprice, le désir de possession à celui de destruction. Si bien que l’homme, ce sorcier, éprouve l’hybris enivrante d’être un dieu pour lui-même.

 

Notre âge, de façon ironique, a vu dans le même temps une survalorisation du geste et sa perte de substance. Les combats d’ombres et leur spectacularisation rendent  la politique aussi impuissante qu’un coup d’épée dans l’eau.


Claude Bourrinet

 

 


 

Article printed from Europe Maxima: http://www.europemaxima.com

 

URL to article: http://www.europemaxima.com/?p=2326

lundi, 13 février 2012

Leo Strauss—Immigration Enthusiast?

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Leo Strauss—Immigration Enthusiast?

For many, Leo Strauss is a man of mystery. Was he, as Myles Burnyeat of Cambridge University suggested many years ago in The New York Review of Books, a “sphinx without a secret”, not a genuine philosopher but rather a proponent of “ruthless anti-idealism” who provided intellectual backing for an aggressive American foreign policy?

Kevin MacDonald takes a different view, holding that “Strauss crafted his vision of an aristocratic elite manipulating the masses as a Jewish survival strategy.”(MacDonald, Cultural Insurrections, Occidental Press 2007, p.163).

In his illuminating book Leo Strauss and the Conservative Movement in America: A Critical Appraisal, the distinguished intellectual historian Paul Gottfried rejects what these approaches have in common: their picture of Strauss as an enemy of liberal democracy. Though Strauss earned the respect of the rightwing legal theorist Carl Schmitt, he was by no means, Gottfried maintains, a man of the Right. To the contrary, and despite some ambiguous remarks made early in his career, he remained throughout his long sojourn in America a convinced liberal democrat.

Gottfried traces the misapprehension to Strauss’s popular lectures in 1949 for the Walgreen Foundation, published in 1953 as Natural Right and History. Strauss appeared to many as the vindicator of natural law against the relativism and nihilism that threatened to weaken America in its Cold War against communism. Gottfried writes:

“A one-time teacher of mine, Anton Hermann Chroust...used to joke about Strauss’s visit to South Bend: ‘The natural law Catholics came out in force, and as soon as St. Leo started talking, they were like Moses receiving the Law.’”

Gottfried calls attention to the role of Willmoore Kendall of National Review in propagating the myth of Strauss as a high-powered philosopher of conservatism. Kendall, himself an eminent conservative political theorist, was a hero-worshipper, and Eric Voegelin vied with Strauss as the object of his intellectual star-gazing.

But despite the adulation of Kendall and other conservatives, Gottfried notes that Strauss was in politics an “FDR-Truman Democrat---that is, someone who found even the uncertain Republican Dwight Eisenhower to be a bit far to the right for his taste.” Strauss abhorred Joe McCarthy and feared a rightwing populist outbreak.

Still, whatever his personal political opinions, does not Strauss remain useful as a defender of classical philosophy against modern-day relativists and other enemies of the Right?

Gottfried does not think so. Though he recognizes Strauss’s remarkable linguistic and scholarly abilities, he argues that Strauss was in not in fact an advocate of either ancient philosophy or natural law.

Despite Strauss’ close and careful study of Plato and Aristotle and his ostensible praise for the ancient polis, he did not derive from the classical sources doctrines designed to correct the unwisdom of the modern world. Strauss found in Plato, for example, not the doctrine of eternal forms that most scholars discern in his work but rather a search for truth that eventuates in no fixed conclusions: “Unfortunately, Strauss and his disciples never show that what Plato seems to accept is not what he in fact believes.”

Some of Strauss’s followers go further: Mary Nichols gives Aristotle “a recognizably progressive gloss.” Aristotle’s support for slavery, she thinks, is not what it seems. Modern democrats can embrace Aristotle without worry.

But what of natural law? Here too Gottfried maintains that Strauss’s conservative defenders have misunderstood the Master. Strauss, contrary to his Catholic friends, opposed Thomist natural law:

“Advances in the natural sciences had shaken the cosmology that was attached to an earlier understanding of man’s relation to the universe, ands so there was no plausible way—or so one might read into Strauss without too much reaching—of returning to medieval metaphysical notions.”

If Strauss thought that Thomist natural law rested on outdated views, he can hardly be taken as its advocate.

Cannot those who would see in Strauss a conservative at least take solace in one point? Did he not offer sharp attacks on relativism and historicism?

Indeed he did, says Gottfried, but precisely in his attack on historicism he distanced himself from the Right.

 

In contrast with the Left, which stress principles supposedly true regardless of time, place, or manner, the Right has exalted race, nation, and community. The immigration controversy, key to readers of VDARE.com, illustrates this division of opinion. Leftists scorn the attachment of a people to its national territory, defending instead an alleged right of everyone to live where he wishes, regardless of historical circumstance. Those on the Right reject such nonsense, emphasizing, with Taine, la race, le milieu, le moment.

But in this dispute between universal and particular, Strauss took the side of the Left. He had little use for Edmund Burke and the German Romantic conservatives of the nineteenth century. We must, Strauss argued, guard ourselves against the “waves of modernity” that followed the American Revolution. In Gottfried’s summary:

“These waves were due to the value-relativist British counterrevolutionary Edmund Burke and to various nineteenth-century German romantic worshippers of History, some of whom are mistaken for ‘conservatives’.”

Gottfried must confront an objection to his interpretation of Strauss. If in fact Strauss cloaked his liberal democratic beliefs in rhetoric redolent of the ancients, would not conservatives have eventually discovered the ruse and abandoned him?

Kendall and his fellow Catholic conservatives have long since departed the scene. There are today a few Catholics, like Daniel Mahoney and Pierre Manent, influenced by Strauss, but they are not Straussians of the strict observance. Why would the conservatives of today embrace a false friend?

Gottfried has an ingenious response to this problem. The neoconservatives, he says, exercise immense influence over the American Right because of their control of so many foundations, journals and newspapers. They are in fact pseudo-conservatives, who, just like Strauss, preach liberal democracy disguised as the wisdom of the ancients and the American Founders. It is in their interest to elevate Strauss as a conservative sage, and they have achieved great success in doing so.

The neoconservatives in particular appeal to Strauss to support one of their key doctrines: a foreign policy for America based on the spread of “democracy” worldwide. Gottfried writes:

“Straussians contributed to the process by which the conservative movement came to redefine itself during the Cold War as the defender of ‘democratic values’. . .a bellicose missionary  spirit is very much in evidence, but it is doubtful that one could link it to anything identifiably right-wing. “

 Gottfried calls attention to another theme that neoconservatives draw from Strauss: the alleged dangers that stem from German nationalism and German philosophy. In one revealing comment, Strauss wrote: “All profound German longings… all those longings for the origins or, negatively expressed, all German dissatisfaction with modernity pointed   toward a third Reich, for Germany was to be the core even  of Nietzsche’s Europe ruling the planet.”

Gottfried finds “a major concern among Strauss’s students, namely that the specifically German path toward a viciously anti-Semitic form of fascism must never again be taken in Germany or anywhere else.” (p.58)

Gottfried argues strongly that Strauss does not belong on the Right. But he must confront yet another objection. If Strauss was not a conservative but rather a liberal democrat, why do so many of his critics take him to be a rightwing elitist, if not an outright fascist?

Here once again Gottfried blames the neoconservatives and their concerted influence. He bring to the fore Shadia Drury, who views Strauss as an immensely learned scholar but dangerous anti-democrat, and other leftist critics like her. He writes:

“Such critics have reinforced the image that the Straussians have cultivated for themselves, as patriotic Americans with vast humanistic learning.  And the Straussians have returned the favor by showering attention on their preferred critics.”

In doing so, the Straussians ignore, because they cannot answer, the most cogent criticisms of their Master: those that stem from the genuine Right. As Gottfried puts it:

“Significantly, Spinoza expert Brayton Polka, American religious historian Barry Allen Shain, and linguistic philosopher David Gordon have all devoted many pages of criticism to the defects of the Straussian interpretive grid, without eliciting appropriate responses. Basic to these criticisms is the contention that the Straussians misinterpret the historical past either by ignoring it or by refusing to notice the religious aspects of what they style ‘modernity’”

Gottfried has omitted one of the most penetrating of Strauss’s assailants—himself. In a brilliant passage, he challenges Strauss’s key claim that political philosophy is the most fundamental branch of philosophy:

“It seems that Strauss is providing a somewhat personal view of ‘philosophy.’ He does not deem as more than incidental to his inquiry those metaphysical aspects of classical philosophy that mattered to Plato and Aristotle; nor does Strauss attach to his ‘political philosophy’ the epistemic assumptions that mark Plato’s discussion of the Good, the Just, and the Prudent.”

Leo Strauss and the Conservative Movement in America: A Critical Appraisal is far and away the best critical examination of Strauss we have. It is no diatribe: Gottfried is fully appreciative of Strauss’s merits as a scholar and thinker. But he makes unmistakably clear, however, that Strauss was not a man of the Right. 

 

John Venn (Email him) says he is “a student of the passing scene”

jeudi, 09 février 2012

Ernst Jünger @ http://www.centrostudilaruna.it/

Ernst Jünger @ http://www.centrostudilaruna.it/

Sezione multilingue dedicata a Ernst Jünger (29.III.1895-17.II.1998), alla sua opera e al suo pensiero.

 

Luca Leonello Rimbotti, La resurrezione europea
Alfredo Cattabiani, Le forbici dell’Anarca
Julius Evola, The Gordian Knot
Stefano Di Ludovico, Jünger, il tempo e gli orologi
Ernst Jünger, On danger
Gianfranco de Turris, Evola e Jünger
Ernst Jünger, La Tradición
Alberto Lombardo, Ancora Ernst Jünger
Alfredo Cattabiani, L’Anarca fra i Titani

mercredi, 08 février 2012

The communitarian critique of liberalism left and right

The communitarian critique of liberalism left and right

by Graham Lister

Ex: http://majorityrights.com/

For the philosophical communitarian, the Sartrean cogito, spontaneously reinventing itself ex nihilo, permanently free to choose and revise its definition of the good, is a fiction that pervades all modern liberalism. From Hobbes, Locke and Kant, through to Mill and Rawls, the rootless, solitary and “unencumbered self”, as Michael Sandel describes it, prior to and independent of its ends and rationally deliberating on the value of its voluntary attachments, is adopted as the starting point of social analysis.

This conception of the subject, it is argued, precludes from the start the possibility of genuinely communal forms of association, of “constitutive” communities “bound by moral ties antecedent to choice”. This is why communitarians stress the cultural constitution of the subject, the way the individual forms his or her identity, sense of self, and intuitive system of values by inheriting and passing on an unchosen legacy of collective orientations, shared meanings and standards, networks of kinship and pre-contractual forms of solidarity which are a prerequisite for, rather than the outcome of, the subject’s capacity for moral commitment.

Rising discontinuity is accompanied by the diversity of visible cultures and lifestyles. This is promoted by the density of urban populations, high social mobility and change, unprecedented choice for the individual consumer - albeit at the potential cost of a rapid decline in the overall diversity of our natural stocks - and the impact of transport and communications technology, especially on the tourist industry. Exposure to different forms of life, particularly those that are too exclusive or stylized to permit participatory understanding by outsiders, inevitably creates a sense of cultural relativism. Where ethnic, class, national and religious traditions do intermingle and combine, discrete cultural narratives are severed or reinvented, and hybrid cultural forms emerge which lack historical precedent, thus weakening the constitutive bonds between generations.

There is also the well-documented impact of the mass media, another factor which has served to heighten many of the trends already noted. The entertainment media have encouraged the privatization of society and the decline of face-to-face interaction through which communal narratives are reaffirmed and passed on. The proliferation of sophisticated images has blurred the boundaries between the real and the imaginary and saturated social life with ubiquitous representations of novelty and difference, representations which typically incorporate easily identifiable elements of ordinary life and recycle them in impossibly exotic, erotic, and alluringly faultless images. Moral and cultural relativism reflects the success with which the media has, by providing simulated substitutes for human interaction, made us wide-eyed strangers to those lives and cultures whose basic elements - from the mundane aspects of work and play, to the feelings and puzzles which human existence gives rise to - we all share in common.

At the same time, our insatiable appetite for remote and alien experience has attenuated our capacity to recover something of the child’s original wonder at the everyday world, to yield to a curiosity for the most familiar aspects of our surroundings, to find joy in the simple passage of the seasons, to marvel at the growth of children, to renew our affections and attachments without the aid of imported novelty and change.

Today’s “imaginative hedonism”, this limitless and self-gratifying appetite for rootless novelty and conquest which seems so hostile to our need to re-establish an ethic of self-limitation, is not a “postmodern” phenomenon, as is largely assumed, but is better described as a characteristic of “hyper-modernity”, in which society has failed to steer the emancipatory dynamic of modernity towards a political end. Daniel Bell saw it as a radical extension of the trends in modernist culture itself, reinforced by the hedonistic compensatory mechanisms of organized capitalism. Christopher Lasch believed its origins lie in our failure to achieve psychological individuation, a process demanding that we repudiate our memories of pre-natal bliss and find connections with a world that is independent of our wishes yet responsive to our needs. Robert Bellah and his colleagues identified the clear emergence of this “expressive individualism” in nineteenth-century America, contrasting it with a scientific culture of utilitarian calculation to which it was both a reaction and a complement. And with greater precision, Colin Campbell has located the religious source of the consumerist outlook in the Pietist strand of the same Protestant ethic that helped generate the entrepreneurial spirit of capitalism.

For the philosophical communitarians, then, it is the cultural and historical heritage of individuals, their identities as “bearers of a tradition”, which provides the moral particularity essential for an authentic life. In MacIntyre’s account, it is the roles and attachments of one’s family, one’s profession, one’s city or nation, which incur “a variety of debts, inheritances, rightful expectations and obligations” that “constitute the given of my life, my moral starting point”.

This theme is taken up by Sandel, who rejects what he refers to as liberalism’s depiction of a “deontological” self whose identity is never tied to its aims or attachments. He writes:

“We cannot regard ourselves as independent in this way without great cost to those loyalties and convictions whose moral force consists partly in the fact that living by them is inseparable from understanding ourselves as the particular persons we are.

... Allegiances such as these … go beyond the obligations I voluntarily incur and the ‘natural duties’ I owe to human beings as such. They allow that to some I owe more than justice requires or even permits, not by reason of agreements I have made but instead in virtue of those more or less enduring attachments and commitments which taken together partly define the person I am”.

A person without such constitutive attachments, Sandel continues, would be lacking in moral character and depth:

“For to have character is to know that I move in a history I neither summon nor command, which carries consequences none the less for my choices and conduct. It draws me closer to some and more distant from others; it makes some aims more appropriate, others less so”.

The “deontological self” which is the starting point to liberal contract theory is, by contrast, a self so bereft of character that it is incapable of self-knowledge, and therefore self-direction. Being “unencumbered” by its conception of the good, having no attributes and aims other than those it has voluntarily chosen, its enquiry into its own motives and ends “can only be an exercise in arbitrariness”. Sandel’s belief that “some relative fixity of character appears essential to prevent the lapse into arbitrariness which the deontological self is unable to avoid”, is shared by MacIntyre, who sees the work of Sartre as the epitome of this liberal individualism. Should we follow MacIntyre and dispense with Sartre’s existentialism for depicting “a self that can have no history”, that is “entirely distinct from any particular social role which it may happen to assume”, and that creates a human life “composed of discrete actions which lead nowhere, which have no order”?

Comments, thoughts, reactions?

Ex: http://majorityrights.com/

dimanche, 05 février 2012

Rex Fairburn

Rex Fairburn

By Kerry Bolton

Ex: http://www.counter-currents.com/

Editor’s Note:

A. R. D. Fairburn was born on February 2, 1904. Fairburn was a poet, painter, critic, essayist, and advocate of Social Credit, New Zealand Nationalism, and organic farming. In commemoration,we are publishing the following expanded version of Kerry Bolton’s essay on Fairburn. To read Fairburn’s magnificent poem “Dominion,” click here [2].

A. R. D. “Rex” Fairburn, 1904–1957, is not usually identified with the “Right.” As a central figure in the development of a New Zealand national literature, much of the contemporary self-appointed literary establishment would no doubt wish to identify Fairburn with Marxism or liberalism, as were other leading literary friends of Fairburn’s such as the Communist R. A. K. Mason.

However, the primary influences on Fairburn were distinctly non-Left, and include D. H. Lawrence, Nietzsche, Oswald Spengler, and of course Social Credit’s Major C. H. Douglas.

While Fairburn described himself at times as an “anarchist,”[1] it was of a most unorthodox type, being neither Left-wing nor Libertarian. For Fairburn outspokenly rejected all the baggage dear to the Left, including feminism and internationalism. His “anarchism” was the type of individualism of the Right that called for a return to decentralized communities comprised of self-reliant craftsmen and farmers. His creed was distinctly nationalistic and based on the spiritual and the biological components of history and culture, both concepts being antithetical to any form of Leftism.

We feel more than justified then in identifying Fairburn as an “Artist of the Right.”

Rejection of Rationalism

Fairburn was born in modest though middle class circumstances. He was proud of being a fourth generation New Zealander related to the missionary Colenso.

Although critical of the Church hierarchy and briefly involved with the Rationalist Association, Fairburn was for most of his life a spiritual person, believing that the individual becomes most profoundly who he is by striving towards God. He believed in a basic Christian ethic minus any moralism. Fairburn soon realized that rationalism by itself answers nothing and that it rejects the dream world that is the source of creativity. He was in agreement here with other poets of the Right such as Yeats, and often stated throughout his life his rejection of materialism.

While he concurred with his friend Geoffrey Potocki de Montalk, who called poets a “spiritual aristocracy,” Fairburn at first thought socialism was the answer to “free artists of economic, worldly shackles,” and even made sporadic favorable references to Communism.[2] However, in particular he looked to the non-doctrinaire socialism not of a political theorist but of another artistic luminary, Oscar Wilde, whose essay on the subject[3] he enthusiastically recommended to Potocki, Wilde advocating the elimination of the “burden” of private property to free the creative spirit from economic drudgery.[4]

Potocki would have no belief in socialism of any type other than “national socialism,” and Fairburn would find the answer to the economic question he was looking for in Social Credit. Nonetheless, the early socialist interests were part of Fairburn’s quest for a more humane system.

Fairburn throughout his life rejected any form of “materialism” and rationalism, and it seems likely that in his youth he had not realized that these are the predicates of communism and most forms of socialism, having rather a romantic ideal of “socialism” and even of “communism.” The counting-house mentality came to be seen by Fairburn as intrinsic to rationalism and it repelled his sense of the spiritual.

This,
having rejected Jonah and Genesis,
contrived to erect
a towering edifice of belief
on the assumption that God
is an abridgement of the calculus
and lived happily
ever after.
What is adequate suffices.[5]

England

Potocki had left New Zealand in disgust at the cultural climate and persuaded Fairburn to join him in London, since New Zealand prevented them from doing what they were born for, “to make and to mould a New Zealand civilization,” as Potocki stated it.

Fairburn arrived in London in 1930. Like Potocki, he was not impressed with bohemian society and the Bloomsbury intellectuals who were riddled with homosexuality, for which both Potocki and Fairburn had an abiding dislike.[6] He was reading and identifying with Roy Campbell’s biting satire and ridicule of Bloomsbury,[7] and there was much of the “wild colonial boy” in both personalities.

However, away from the bohemianism, intellectualism, and pretentiousness of the city, Fairburn came to appreciate the ancestral attachment with England that was still relevant to New Zealanders through a continuing, persistent “earth-memory.”[8]

In London he felt the decay and decadence of the city. Like Knut Hamsun and Henry Williamson, Fairburn conceived of a future “tilling the soil.” He now stated: “I’m going to be a peasant, if necessary, to keep in touch with life,” and he and his future wife lived for a year at a thatch-roofed cottage in Wiltshire.

Regarding a land and culture in metaphysical terms gave Fairburn a deeper spirituality than he could find in modern religion, while early eschewing rationalism and godlessness, and the land became fundamental to his world-view. His reading of Spengler would have made him acutely aware of the land and the farmer/peasant as the foundations of a healthy culture, and of the symptoms of cultural decay and of the predominance of money-values in the “Winter” cycle of a civilization, when the land becomes denuded of people, debt-ridden, with foreclosures and urban drift.

The barn is bare of hoof and horn,
the yard is empty of its herds;
the thatch is grey with age and torn,
and spattered with the dung of birds.

The well is full of newts, the chain
long broken, and the spindle cracked,
and deep in nettles stands the wain
three-wheeled, with rotten hay half-stacked.

Where are the farmer and his bride
who came from their honeymoon in spring
filled full with gaudy hope and pride,
and made the farm a good paying thing? . . .[9]

Social Credit

In 1931 Fairburn was introduced to A. R. Orage,[10] who had published New Zealander Katherine Mansfield, and who was editing the New English Weekly which was bringing forth a new generation of talents to English literature, including Ezra Pound and T. S. Eliot. Orage was a “guild socialist,” advocating a return to the medieval guilds which had upheld craftsmanship and represented interests according to one’s calling rather than one’s political party. Orage met C. H. Douglas in 1918 and had himself become a seminal influence on Social Credit. Orage probably introduced Fairburn to Douglas around 1931.[11]

Fairburn  had read Spengler’s Decline of the West at least as early as 1930. He saw that New Zealand as a cultural outpost of Europe was just as much subject to Spengler’s cyclical laws of decline as the Occident.[12] It would have been with the fatalist eyes of a Spenglerian that Fairburn observed London and bohemian society and recognized in them the symptoms of decadence of which Spengler wrote, retreating to rural England where cultural health could still be found.

However, Fairburn felt that the vitality of individuals could be the answer to a reinvigorated culture, and break the cycle of decay, rather than the rise of  a Caesar that Spengler stated was a kind of “last hurrah” of a Civilization before its eclipse,[13] despite Fairburn’s earlier belief that Social Credit could only be “ushered in by a dictatorship.”[14] This anti-statist, individualist belief reflects two major influences on Fairburn, that of Nietzsche and of D. H. Lawrence,[15] who espoused “heroic vitalism” as the basis of history.[16]

Spengler however, also had much to say on the role of money and plutocracy in the final or “Winter” epoch of a civilization, and of the last cultural resurgence that saw the overthrow of money by “blood,” or what we might call the instinctual.[17] It is not too speculative to believe that Fairburn saw “Social Credit” as the practical means by which the money-power could be overthrown through economic reform rather than through an authoritarian “Caesar” figure. Fairburn returned to a Spenglerian theme in 1932 when writing to his communist friend, the poet R. A. K. Mason: “A civilization founded on Materialism can’t last any time historically speaking of course. But it may be necessary to go through the logical end of our present trend of development before we can return to the right way of life.”[18]

While Fairburn agreed with Marx that capitalism causes dehumanization, he rejected the Marxist interpretation of history as based on class war and economics. Materialistic interpretations of history were at odds with Fairburn’s belief that it is the Infinite that touches man. Art is a manifestation of the eternal, of pre-existing forms. It is therefore the calling of the artist to see what is always here and bring it forth.[19]

Fairburn met the Soviet press attaché in England but concluded that the USSR had turned to the 19th century Western ideal of the machine. He did not want a Marxist industrial substitute for the capitalist one. Hence Fairburn’s answer amidst a decaying civilization was the vital individual: not the alienated “individual” thrown up by capitalism, but the individual as part of the family and the soil, possessing an organic rootedness above the artificiality of both Marxism and capitalism. Culture was part of this sense of identity as a manifestation of the spiritual.[20]

Not surprisingly, Fairburn was increasingly distanced from his communist friends. He was repelled by communist art based on the masses and on the fetish for science, which he called “false.” He writes: “Communism kills the Self—cuts out religion and art, that is today. But religion and art ARE the only realities.”[21]

Fairburn also repudiated a universal ideal, for man lived in the particular. New Zealand had to discover its own identity rather than copying foreign ideas. Another communist friend, the photographer Clifton Firth, wrote that the “New Zealand penis was yet to be erect.” To this Fairburn replied: “True, but as a born New Zealander, why don’t you try to hoist it up, instead of tossing off Russia? Why steal Slav gods? Why not get some mud out of a creek and make your own?”[22]

The artist and poet William Blake appealed to Fairburn’s spiritual, anti-materialist sentiments, as a means of bringing English culture out of decadence, Blake being for Fairburn “the rock on which English culture will be built in the future, when Christianity dies of an inward rot,”[23] Blake’s metaphysic holding forth against the tide of industrialization and materialism.[24] Fairburn also saw in D. H. Lawrence “a better rallying point than Lenin.”[25] He was similarly impressed with Yeats.[26] In 1931 he wrote to Guy Mountain that “Lawrence is the big man of the century as far as we are concerned.” To Clifton Firth he wrote of a lineage of prophets against the materialist age: William Blake, Nietzsche, and Lawrence.[27]

To Mason, he wrote: “our real life is PURELY spiritual. Man is not a machine.[28]

While social reform was required, it was the inner being that resisted the onrush of materialism, and Blake “was a great old boy” for what he had offered to those who fought against the material: “Social reform by all means: but the structures of the imagination are the only ones which, fortified by the spirit, can resist all the assaults of a kaleidoscopic world of matter.”[29]

In 1932 Fairburn wrote an article for the New English Weekly attacking materialism. He feared that the prosperity that would be generated by Social Credit monetary reform would cause rampant materialism devoid of a spiritual basis. He saw the aim of monetary reform as being not simply one of increasing the amount of material possessions, but as a means of achieving a higher level of culture.

Fairburn wished for a post-industrial, craft and agricultural society. The policy of Social Credit would achieve greater production and increase leisure hours. This would create the climate in which culture could flourish. Because culture requires sufficient leisure time beyond the daily economic grind, not simply for more production and consumption, as the declining cultural level of our own day shows, despite the increasing quantity of consumer goods available. It was the problem that Fairburn had seen admirably but impractically addressed by Oscar Wilde, but the practical solution of which could now be sought in Social Credit, which moreover did not aim to abolish private property but to ensure its wider distribution as a means of freedom rather than servitude.

In June 1932  Fairburn wrote to Mason that if the Labour Party rejected Social Credit economics,[30] he would on returning to New Zealand start his own movement:

 If I were in NZ I should try to induce Holland[31] and the Labour Party to adopt the Social Credit scheme. Then, if they turned it down, I should start a racket among the young men off my own bat. A Nationalist, anti-Communist movement, with strong curbs on the rich; anti-big-business: with the ultimate object of cutting NZ away from the Empire and making her self-supporting. That party will come in England hence, later in NZ. I should try and anticipate it a little, and prepare the ground. Objects: to cut out international trade as far as possible (hence, cut out war); to get out of the clutches of the League of Nations; to assert NZ’s Nationalism, and make her as far as possible a conscious and self-contained nation on her own account. I should try, for the time being, to give the thing a strong military flavor. No pacifism, “idealism,” passive resistance, or other such useless sentimentalities. Then, when the time came, a Fascist coup might be possible.

But Social Credit and Nationalism would be the main planks and the basis of the whole movement. Very reactionary, you will say. But I am quite realistic now about these things. No League of Nations, Brotherhood of Man stuff. “Man is neither a beast nor an angel”: but try to make him into an angel, and you will turn him into a beast, idealism is done with—over—passé—gone phut.

Behind the labels, of course, all this would be a cunning attempt to get what we are actually all after: decent living conditions, minimum of economic tyranny, goods for all, and the least possible risk of war. Our Masters, the Bankers, would find it harder to oppose such a movement than to oppose communism. And it would be more likely to obtain support.[32]

Murray in commenting on this stated of Social Credit that it drew from both the Left and the Right, T. S. Eliot and Ezra Pound being Social Credit adherents from the Right, while New Zealand author Robin Hyde, a Leftist, also embraced Social Credit. As for Fairburn, Murray describes him as “probably one of the most notable campaigners for Douglas’s ideas in New Zealand [who had] flirted with at least the theories of fascism early in the decade.”[33]

On his return to New Zealand Fairburn, instead of launching his own movement, wholeheartedly campaigned for Social Credit, mainly through his position as assistant secretary of the Auckland Farmers’ Union, which had a social credit policy, and as editor of its paper Farming First, a post he held until being drafted into the army in 1943. As Trussell says of New Zealand during the early 1930s, “Everywhere now Douglas Credit was in its heyday,” and in 1932 the Social Credit association was formed, followed that year by the adoption of Social Credit policy by the Auckland Farmers’ Union. “Rex Quickly slipped into the routine of a campaigner,” speaking at Social Credit meetings, and engaging in public debates.[34]

As Trussell accurately observes, although the Social Credit association did not field candidates,[35] the victorious Labour Party incorporated some of Social Credit’s “more useful concepts.”[36]

National Culture, Organic Society

Around the closing years of the war, Fairburn began to paint in earnest and made some money as a fabric designer, necessitated by the need to provide for a wife and four children.

He spurned abstract art, and particularly Picasso, as falsifying life. Abstraction, like rationalism, was a form of intellectualism that took life apart. Fairburn believed in the total individual. In art this meant synthesis, building up images, not breaking them down: “If art does anything it synthesizes, not analyses, or it is dead art. Creative imagination is the thing, all faculties of man working together towards a synthesis of personal experience resulting in fresh creation.”[37]

While Fairburn believed in innovation in the arts and had earlier adhered to the Vorticist movement founded in England by Ezra Pound, Wyndham Lewis, et al., he also believed that art should maintain its traditional foundations, which was a feature of Vorticism: its classicism was quite unique among the new forms of art arising at the time Art is a product of an organic community, not simply the egotistical product of the artist.

Fairburn, however, saw many artists as not only separate from the community but also as destructive, calling Picasso for instance, “a bearer of still-born children,” and referred to the “falseness of abstract art” and its “nihilism.”[38] By way of example, Fairburn pointed to the contemporary French and Italian artists, writing of the “French Exhibition” that few of those who either scoff or praise see the art for what it is: “the great monument to industrialist and materialist civilisation.”

It is the finest expression of that civilisation that has emerged yet. But as I happen not to be a materialist, I can’t accept any of the modern French painters as of any permanent importance. I’m all for Turner and the English landscape school, and for the Dutch. The Italians and the French can go and stuff themselves for all I care![39]

Fourteen years later Fairburn elaborated in a  radio talk:

Art is not the private property of artists. It belongs to the living tradition of society as a whole. And it can’t exist without its public. Conversely, I think it can be said that no society can live for long in a state of civilization without a fairly widespread appreciation of the arts, that is to say, without well-organized aesthetic sensibility.[40]

Hence there was a reciprocal interaction between the artist and the public. Both possessed a shared sense of values and origins, in former times, whether peasant or noble, in comparison to the formlessness of the present day cosmopolitanism. “The artist has brought contempt upon himself by letting himself be used for ends that he knows to be destructive. By doing so he has brought art and his own type close to extinction.”[41]

“Form” in art, geometrically, is fundamental. It is the primary responsibility of art schools to teach “traditional techniques” then allow those who have genuine talent to flow from there.[42]

Fairburn lectured in art history at the Elam School, Auckland University, the most influential of New Zealand’s art schools which produced Colin McCahon et al. McCahon, New Zealand’s most esteemed artist whose splatters fetch millions on the market and whose influence upon new generations of artists endures, was vehemently opposed by Fairburn, who considered his works devoid of form, “contrived,” and “pretentious humbug, masquerading as homespun simplicity.” “In design, in colour, in quality of line, in every normal attribute of good painting, they are completely lacking.”[43]

He also considered modern music sensationalist, without content, form, or order, reflecting the chaos of the current cycle of Western civilization.[44]

Fairburn, in accordance with his nationalism, advocated a New Zealand national culture arising from the New Zealand landscape. He believed that one’s connection with one’s place of birth is of a permanent quality, not just a question of which place in the world one find’s most pleasant as a place to live.

Conversely to this rootedness of Being, Fairburn had early come to regard Jews as a rootless people who consequently serve as agents for the disruption of traditional society,[45] juxtaposing old England with that of the new in his 1932 poem “Landscape with Figures,” where:

In mortgaged precincts epicene Sir Giles,
cold remnant of a fiery race, consorts
with pale fox-hunting Jews with glossy smiles,
and plays at Walton Heath, and drives a sports[46]

Writing to Mason in June 1932, Fairburn had stated that the criterion of “fortune-hunting” in choosing where one lives cannot satisfy “anybody who is un-Semitic like myself.”[47]  Fairburn explained to Mason that the art which is manufactured for the market by those who have no attachment to any specific place, is Jewish in nature:

The Jews are a non-territorial race, so their genius is turned to dust and ashes. Their works of art have no integrity—have had none since they left Palestine. Compare Mendelsohn and Humbert Wolfe with the Old Testament writers. When I came to England, I acted the Jew. I have no roots in this soil. In the end every man goes back where he belongs, if he is honest. . . . Men are not free. They are bound to fate by certain things, and lose their souls in escaping—if it is a permanent escape. . . . Cosmopolitanism—Semitism—are false, have no bottom to them. Internationalism is their child—and an abortion.[48]

Fairburn condemned the notion that a culture can be chosen and attached to “like a leech” without regard to one’s origins. He further identifies the impact of Jewish influence on Western culture: a contrived art that does not arise spontaneously from the unconscious mind of the artist in touch with his origins.

 Jewish standards have infected most Western art. It is possible to look on even the “self-conscious art” of Poe, Baudelaire, Mallarmé, Pater—Coleridge even—as being “Jewish” in the sense I am meaning. The orgasm is self-induced, rather than spontaneous. It has no inevitability. The effect is calculated. The ratio between the individual artist and his readers is nicely worked out prior to creation. It does not arise as an inevitable result of the artist’s mental processes. William Blake, who was not Jewish, had perfect faith in his own intuitions—so his work could not fail to have universal truth—to have integrity. But the truth was not calculated . . . [49]

This cosmopolitan influence expressed an “international” or “world standard” for the arts which debased culture. He wrote: “Is poetry shortly to be graded like export mutton?”[50]

The “racket of modern art” was related to economic motives:

. . . the infection of the market place . . .  the sooty hand of commerce. The “modern art racket” has the aim of “rapid turnover, a rate of change that induces a sort of vertigo, and the exploitation of novelty as a fetish—the encouragement of the exotic and the unusual.

Fairburn’s biographer Denys Trussell comments: “Rex feared that internationalism in cultural matters would reduce all depiction of human experience to a characterless gruel, relating to no real time or place because it attempted to relate to all times and places.[51] In contrast, great art arises from the traditional masculine values of a culture: “honor, chivalry, and disinterested justice.”

Writing to the NZ Listener, Fairburn decried the development of a “one world” cosmopolitan state, which would also mean a standardized world culture that would be reduced to an international commodity:

The aspiration towards “one world” may have something to be said for it in a political sense (even here, with massive qualifications), but in the wider field of human affairs it is likely to prove ruinous. In every country today we see either a drive (as in Russia and the USA) or a drift (as in the British Commonwealth) towards the establishment of mass culture, and the imposition of herd standards. This applies not only in industry, but also in the literature and the arts generally. In the ant-hill community towards which we are moving, art and literature will be sponsored by the State, and produced by a highly specialized race of neuters. We have already gone some distance along this road. Literature tends more and more to be regarded as an internationally standardized commodity, like soap or benzine—something that has no particular social or geographical context. In the fully established international suburbia of the future it will be delivered by the grocer—or, more splendidly, be handled by a world-wide chain store Literary Trust . . . [52]

The situation today has proved Fairburn correct, with the transnational corporations defining culture in terms of international marketing, breaking down national cultures in favor of a global consumer standard. This mass global consumer culture is most readily definable with the term “American.”[53]

Fairburn opposed State patronage of the arts, however, believing that this cut the artist off from the cycle of life, of family and work, making art contrived and forced instead. He also opposed the prostitution of the nation and culture to tourism, more than ever the great economic panacea for New Zealand,along with world trade. In a letter to the NZ Herald he laments the manner by which the Minister of Tourism wished to promote Maori culture as a tourist sales pitch to foreigners:

May I suggest that there is no surer way in the long run to destroy Maori culture than to take the more colorful aspects of it and turn them into a “tourist attraction.” If the elements of Maori culture are genuine and have any place outside of a museum, they will be kept alive by the Maori people themselves for their own cultural (not commercial) needs. The use of Maori songs and dances to tickle the pockets of passing strangers, and the encouragement of this sort of cheapjackery by the pakeha are degrading to both races. . . . And the official encouragement of Maori songs, dances, and crafts as side-shows to amuse tourists is both vulgar and harmful. [54]

This situation has since become endemic in New Zealand, but where once in Fairburn’s time there was the spectacle of the plastic Maori tiki made in Japan and sold in tourism shops, Maori culture has now been imposed as the “New Zealand culture” per se, as a selling point not just for tourism, but for world trade. Conversely, opening New Zealand up to the word economically has a concomitant opening up to cosmopolitanism, which usually means what is defined as “American,” and the younger generations of Maori, uprooted from the rural life of Fairburn’s time, have succumbed to alien pseudo-culture as conveyed by Hollywood and MTV. It is part of the “one world,” “internationalized commodity standard” Fairburn saw unfolding.

In discussing the question as to whether there is any such thing as “standard English” Fairburn nonetheless alluded to his opposition to cultural standardization, including that between those of the same nationality, in favor of “personalism” and “regionalism,” distinguished from “individualism,” which in our own time we have seen in the form of a pervasive selfishness raised up as social, political and economic doctrines. Fairburn wrote:

There is, first of all, the question whether it is a desirable thing for all English-speaking people to conform to a common standard in their style of speech. My own instinct leads me to resist standardisation of human behaviour in all possible contexts. I believe in ‘personalism’ (which is not quite the same thing as individualism), in regionalism, and in organic growth rather than mechanical order. With Kipling, I ‘thank God for the diversity of His creatures’.[55]

A “mechanical order” pushing cultural standardization across the world is the present phase of capitalism, now called “globalization,” of which Fairburn was warning immediately after World War II.

The Dominion of Usury

In 1935 Fairburn completed Dominion, his epic poem about New Zealand.[56] Much of it is an attack upon greed and usury, and is reminiscent of Ezra Pound’s Canto XLV: “With Usura.”[57]

The assumption to Government of the Labour Party gave Fairburn  little cause for optimism. Trussell writes that Fairburn’s view was that the Labour Government might introduce “a new dimension in social welfare, but apart from that he felt it to be conformist.”[58]

Dominion begins by  identifying the usurer as the lord of all:

The house or the governors, guarded by eunuchs,
and over the arch of the gate
these words enraged:
He who impugns the usurers Imperils
the State.[59]

Those who serve the governors are picked from the enslaved, well paid for their services to “keep the records of decay” with “cold hands . . . computing our ruin on scented cuffs.” For the rest of the people there is the “treadmill . . . of the grindstone god, and people look in desperation to the “shadow of a red mass” of communism”’[60] Like Pound in “With Usura,[61] Fairburn saw the parasitic factor of usury as the corruptor of creativity and work, where labor becomes a necessary burden rather than a craft with a wider social function than that of profit.

For the enslaved, the treadmill;
the office and adoration
of the grindstone god;
the apotheosis of the means,
the defiling of the end;
the debasement of the host
of the living; the celebration
of the black mass that casts
the shadow of a red mass.[62]

And . . .

In this air the idea dies;
or spreads like plague; emotion runs
undamned, its limits vague,
its flush disastrous as the rolling floods,
the swollen river’s rush; or dries
to a thin trickle, lies
in flat pools where swarms of flies
clouding the stagnant brim
breed from thick water, clustered slime.[63]

The unemployed and those on relief work, as Fairburn had been when he returned to New Zealand, were “witnesses to the constriction of life” which was necessary to maintain the financial system. Nor did the countryside escape the ravages of the system. The farms are “mortgaged in bitterness . . .” to the banks. “A load of debt for the foetus” dramatizes how the debt system of usury compounds generation after generation, with each being placed further into serfdom to the banks, while the banker is lauded as an upstanding businessman, the new aristocrat of the age of decline that Spengler states emerges in the “Winter” cycle of Civilization.  The city is:

a paper city built on the rock of debt,
held fast against all winds by the paperweight of debt.
The living saddled with debt.
A load of debt for the foetus . . .
And all over the hand of the usurer,
Bland angel of darkness,
Mild and triumphant and much looked up to.[64]

Colonization had bought here the ills of the Mother Country, and debt underscored the lot:

They divided the land,
Some for their need,
And some for sinless, customary greed
. . .

Fairburn’s answer is a return to the land.

Fair earth, we have broken our idols:
and after the days of fire we shall come to you for the stones of a new temple.[65]

The destruction of the usurers’ economic system would result in the creation of a new order: the land freed of debt would yield the foundation for “a new temple” other than that of the usurer. Fairburn’s belief in the soil as a key ingredient to cultural renewal and freedom brought him also to the cause of farmers, then allied to Social Credit.

Organic Farming

In 1940 Fairburn extended his advocacy to include organic farming, and he became editor of Compost, the magazine of the New Zealand Humic Compost Club. He considered that the abuse of the land led to the destruction of civilization. The type of civilization that arises depends on its type of farming, he said. Food remains the basis of civilization, but industrial farming is spiritually barren.

The type of community Fairburn sought is based on farming, not industry that gives rise to fractured, contending economic classes. Industry reduces life to a matter of economics.

In a lecture to the Auckland Fabian Society in 1944 Fairburn stated:

It is natural for men to be in close contact with the earth; and it is natural for them to satisfy their creative instincts by using their hands and brains. Husbandry, “the mother of all crafts,” satisfies these two needs, and for that reason should be the basic activity in our social life—the one that gives color and character to all the rest.[66]

In the same lecture he spells out his ideal society:

The decentralization of the towns, the establishment of rural communities with a balanced economic life, the co-operative organization of marketing, of transport and of necessary drudgery, the controlled use of manufacturing processes . . .

In 1946 Fairburn elaborated again on his ideal of decentralization, regarding the corporation as soulless and the State as the biggest of corporations:

The best status for men is that of independence. The small farmer, the small tradesman, the individual craftsman working on his own—these have been the mainstay of every stable civilization in history. The tendency for large numbers of men to forsake, or to have taken from them, their independent status, and to become hangers-on of the state, has invariably been the prelude to decay.[67]

“The broad aspect of soil politics engaged Rex’s imagination: the consciousness that the fate of civilization and the shape of its culture depended ultimately on its style of farming,” writes Trussell.

He hankered after a community that was itself “organic” rather than broken into a meaningless series of economic functions, and as far as he could see, the community that was founded on industrialized farming was spiritually barren even though, in the sort term, it could produce huge surpluses of food.[68]

The influence of Spengler obviously remained, as did William Blake, and the aim was clearly to return through agriculture and the defeat of “Money” via Social Credit, to the “Spring” epoch of Western Civilization; an era prior to industrialization, the “City” as a Spenglerian metaphor for intellectualism and its ruler, Money, and all the other symptoms of decay analyzed by Spengler.

However utopian, Fairburn’s vision was still vaguely possible in the New Zealand of his day. Today, the vision is inconceivable considering not only the rate of debt at every level of society, but due to a steady elimination of the independent farmer in favor of the corporation. If Fairburn were alive today he might well return to his original belief that such a revitalized society could only be implemented after a period of crisis and via a dictatorship, as he had written in The New English Weekly in regard to Social Credit.

New Barbarism—America and the USSR

Fairburn feared that the victors of World War II, America and the USSR, would usher in a new age of barbarism. In 1946 he wrote in an unpublished article to the NZ Herald:

The next decade or two we shall see American economic power and American commercial culture extended over the whole of the non-Russian world. The earth will then be nicely partitioned between two barbarisms. . . . In my more gloomy moments I find it hard to form an opinion as to which is the greater enemy to Western civilization—Russian materialism, the open enemy, or American materialism with its more insidious influence. The trouble is that we are bound to stick by America when it comes to the point, however we may dislike certain aspects of American life. For somewhere under that Mae West exterior there is a heart that is sound and a conscience that is capable of accepting guilt.[69]

Experience has shown that Fairburn’s “more gloomy moments” were the most realistic, for America triumphed and stands as the ultimate barbarian threatening to engulf all cultures with its materialism, hedonism, and commercialism. The Russian military threat was largely bogus, a convenient way of herding sundry nations into the American orbit. The USSR is no more, while Imperium Americana stands supreme throughout the world, from the great cities to the dirt road towns of the Third World, where all are being remolded into the universal citizen in the manner of American tastes, habits, speech, fashions, and even humor.

Fairburn’s attitude towards “Victory in Europe” seems to have been less than enthusiastic, seeing post-war Europe as a destitute, ruined, famished heap, yet one that might arise from the ashes in the spirit of Charlemagne and Jeanne d’Arc.

. . . Ten flattened centuries are heaped with rubble,
ten thousand vultures wheel above the plain;
honour is lost and hope is like a bubble;
life is defeated, thought itself is pain.

But the bones of Charlemagne will rise and dance,
and the spark unquenched will kindle into flame.
And the voices heard by the small maid of France
will speak yet again, and give this void a Name. [70]

Biological Imperatives

Fairburn regarded feminism as another product of cultural regression. In The Woman Problem[71] he calls feminism an “insidious hysterical protest” contrary to biological and social imperatives. He saw the biological urge for children as central to women.

Fairburn also considered biological factors to be more important than the sociological and economic, therefore putting him well outside the orbit of any Left-wing doctrine, which reduces history and culture into a complex of economic motives.

Our public policies are for the most part anti-biological. Social security legislation concerns itself with the care of the aged long before it looks to the health and vitality of young mothers and their children. We spend vast sums of money on hospitals and little or nothing on gymnasia. We discourage our children from marrying at the right age, when desire is urgent, and the pelvic structure of the female has not begun to ossify; we applaud them when they spend the first ten years of their adult lives establishing a profitable cosmetic business or a legal practice devoted to the defense of safe breakers. The feminists must feel a sense of elation when they see an attractive young woman clinging to some pitiful job or other, and drifting toward spinsterhood, an emotion that would no doubt be shared by the geo-political experts of Asia, if they were on the spot.[72]

Indeed, what has feminism shown itself to be, despite its pretensions as being “progressive,” other than a means of fully integrating women into the market and into production, while abortion rates soar?

It is interesting also that Fairburn makes a passing reference to the burgeoning population of Asia in comparison to New Zealand, in relation to geopolitics, the implication being that he foresaw a danger of New Zealand succumbing to Asia, which in the past few decades has indeed been the case, and which proceeds with rapidity.

Fairburn saw Marxism, feminism, and Freudianism as denying the “organic nature” of man. Urbanization means the continuing devitalization of the male physically and ethically as he is pushed further into the demands of industrial and economic life. The “masculine will” requires reassertion in association with the decentralization of the cities and, “the forming of a closer link with agriculture and the more stable life of the countryside.”

The influence of Spengler’s philosophy can be seen in Fairburn’s criticism of urbanization as leading to the disintegration of culture: “Whether this will anticipate and prevent or follow in desperation upon the breakdown of Western society is a matter that is yet to be decided.”

Fairburn, with others, especially the poets, such as Dennis Glover, Mason, Curnow, and Potocki, represented the great blossoming of an embryonic New Zealand culture that was starting to come into its own from out of the cultural hegemony of British colonialism. It was the type of nation-forming process that was being forcefully advocated by Fairburn’s contemporary “across the ditch” in Australia, Percy Stephensen.

World War II cut short what Fairburn and others had hoped to achieve; the creation of a nativist New Zealand culture. Maori culture became, as Fairburn wrote, a tourist curiosity, and the arts became as subject to international “market forces” as any commodity. Fairburn exposed, like none other of the New Zealand cultural milieu from out of that Golden Age, the forces that were bending and shaping the arts, and his polemics were a reflection of what he saw as his calling to help create a “New Zealand civilization.”

Fairburn died of cancer in 1957. He continues to be recognized as a founder of a New Zealand national literature; albeit one that in this writer’s opinion was an abortive process that waits fallow for refertilization.

Notes

[1] Fairburn to R. A. K. Mason, December 28, 1931, cited by Denys Trussell, Fairburn (Auckland: Auckland University Press, 1984), p. 116.

[2] Fairburn to Geoffrey Potocki de Montalk, August 6, 1926, in Lauris Edmond, ed., The Letters of A. R. D. Fairburn (Auckland: Oxford Univesrity Press, 1981), p. 6.

[3] Oscar Wilde, Soul of Man Under Socialism, 1891. http://wilde.thefreelibrary.com/Soul-of-Man-under-Socialism

[4] Trussell, p. 49.

[5] Fairburn, “The Rationalist,” Collected Poems (Christchurch: Pegasus, 1966), p. 95.

[6] Trussell, p. 91. Throughout his life Fairburn maintained that homosexuality was not merely a personal preference, but an actual subversion, and referred to a “Green International,” an informal conspiracy of homosexuals who were distorting the arts to their own temperament. He came to regard the “dominance” of “pansies” in the arts as largely responsible for “the decadence of contemporary English and American writing.” Fairburn to Eric McCormick, ca. 1951 or 1952 (Trussell, Fairburn, p. 249).

[7] Trussell, pp. 105–106.

[8] Fairburn, “A New Zealander at Home. Our Two Countries,” Star, August 3, 1931, magazine section, p. 1 (Trussell, p. 91).

[9] Fairburn, “Deserted Farmyard,” Collected Poems, p. 89.

[10] Trussell, p. 109.

[11] Trussell, p. 114.

[12] Trussell, pp. 109–110.

[13] Oswald Spengler, The Decline of the West, 2 vols. (London: Allen and Unwin, 1971), Vol. II, p. 506.

[14] Fairburn, New English Weekly, July 14, 1932, p. 314.

[15] Trussell, p. 113.

[16] Eric Bentley, The Cult of the Superman (London: Robert Hale, 1947).

[17] Spengler, The Decline of The West, Vol. II, pp. 506–507.

[18] Fairburn to Mason, January 29, 1932 (Trussell, p. 116).

[19] Fairburn to Guy Mountain, July 23, 1930 (Trussell, p. 112).

[20] Trussell, p. 111.

[21] Fairburn to Clifton Firth, December 23, 1931 (The Letters of A. R. D. Fairburn, p. 60).

[22] Fairburn to Clifton Firth (The Letters of A. R. D. Fairburn, p. 60).

[23] Fairburn to Clifton Firth (The Letters of A. R. D. Fairburn, p. 60).

[24] Trussell, p. 113.

[25] Trussell, p. 113.

[26] Trussell, p. 114.

[27] Stuart Murray, Never a Soul at Home: New Zealand Literary Nationalism in the 1930’s (Wellington: Victoria University Press, 1998), p. 117.

[28] Fairburn to Mason, December 28, 1931 (Trussell, p. 116).

[29] Fairburn to Mason, August 1931 (Murray, Never a Soul at Home, p. 120).

[30] The Labour Party, mainly through the persistence of the popular John A, Lee, a one-armed ex-serviceman, was campaigning for election on a platform of nationalizing the Reserve Bank and issuing “state credit.” Although this was not the same as Douglas’ Social Credit, the Douglas tour of New Zealand had provided an influential impetus for financial reform. Again at Lee’s insistence, the Labour Government did issue 1% state credit to finance the iconic sate housing project, which reduced unemployment by 75%, but the Government was too hide-bound by orthodox finance, and Lee split from Labour amidst much bitterness. See: Erik Olssen, John A. Lee (Dunedin: Otago University Press, 1977). Also: Cedric Firth, State Housing in New Zealand (Wellington: Ministry of Works, 1949) “Reserve Bank Credit,” p. 7.

[31] Harry Holland, Labour Party leader.

[32] Fairburn to Mason, June 16, 1932 (The Letters of A. R. D. Fairburn, p.  77).

[33] Stuart Murray, Never a Soul at Home, pp. 36–37.

[34] Trussell, pp. 132–33.

[35] Orthodox “Douglas Social Crediters” do not believe in party politics, and it was therefore a contentious move when the majority of Social Crediters gradually moved into becoming a full fledged political party, now known as the “Democrats for Social Credit,” a very dim shadow of what Social Credit was in Fairburn’s time.

[36] Trussell, p. 135.

[37] Fairburn to R. A. K. Mason, December 22, 1931 (The Letters of A. R. D. Fairburn, p. 58).

[38] Fairburn to Firth, December 23, 1931 (The Letters of A. R. D. Fairburn, p. 61).

[39] Fairburn to Guy Mountain, February 4, 1932 (The Letters of A. R. D. Fairburn, p. 65).

[40] Fairburn, “The Arts are Acquired Tastes,” radio talk; New Zealand Listener, July 5, 1946, pp. 21–22.

[41] Fairburn, “Notes in the Margin,” Action, New Zealand, 1947.

[42] Fairburn, “The Auckland School of Art,” Art in New Zealand, December-January 1944–1945, pp. 21–22.

[43] Fairburn, “Art in Canterbury,” Landfall, March 1948, pp. 49–50.

[44] Fairburn, “Art in Canterbury,” Landfall, pp. 49–50.

[45] Stalin came to similar conclusions from another direction, launching a campaign in 1949 against “rootless cosmopolitanism” in Soviet culture.

[46] Fairburn, “Landscape of Figures (Memories of England, 1930),” Collected Poems (Christchurch: Pegasus Press, 1966), p. 88.

[47] Fairburn to R. A. K. Mason, June 24, 1932 (The Letters of A. R. D. Fairburn,  p. 80).

[48] Fairburn to R. A. K. Mason, June 24, 1932 (The Letters of A. R. D. Fairburn, p. 80).

[49] Fairburn to R. A. K. Mason, June 24, 1932 (The Letters of A. R. D. Fairburn, pp. 80–81).

[50] Fairburn to New Zealand Listener, September 11, 1953 (Trussell, p. 263).

[51] Trussell, p. 263.

[52] Fairburn to the Editor, New Zealand Listener, June 18, 1955 (The Letters of A. R. D. Fairburn, p. 228).

[53] See for example: G Pascal Zachary, The Global Me (New South Wales: Allen and Unwin, 2000). Zachary, a senior business correspondent, celebrates the way by which globalization is making interchangeable cogs of humanity, not bound to place or culture, to enable a more efficient utilization of talent under capitalism. The world situation seems to be precisely what Fairburn feared would develop several decades previously.

[54] Fairburn to the New Zealand Herald, February 4, 1955 (The Letters of A. R. D. Fairburn, pp. 225–26).

[55] Fairburn, The Woman Problem and Other Prose (Auckland: Blackwood and Janet Paul, 1967), “Spoken English,” p. 93.

[56] Fairburn, “Dominion,” http://www.nzepc.auckland.ac.nz/authors/fairburn/dominionfull.asp

[57] Ezra Pound, “Canto XLV, With Usura,”Ezra Pound Selected Poems 1908–1959 (London: Faber and Faber, 1975), pp. 147–48.

[58] Trussell, p. 176.

[59] Fairburn, Dominion, “Utopia”, I.

[60] Fairburn, Dominion, “Utopia”, I.

[61]

With usura, sin against nature,

is thy bread ever more of stale rags . . .

with no mountain of wheat, no strong flour . . .

WITH USURA

Wool, comes not to the market

Sheep bringeth no grain with usura . . .

And stoppeth the spinner’s cunning . . .

 

[62] Fairburn, Dominion, “Utopia,” I.

[63] Fairburn, Dominion, “Utopia,” IV.

[64] Fairburn, Dominion, “Utopia,” IX.

[65] Fairburn, Dominion, “Elements,” IV.

[66] Fairburn, “The Land of Our Life,” unpublished essay, p. 5 (Trussell, p. 199).

[67] Fairburn, “A Nation of Officials,” in The Woman Problem and other Prose, p. 47.

[68] Trussell, pp. 198–99.

[69] Fairburn to NZ Herald, August 28, 1946. Trussell, p. 198.

[70] Fairburn, “Europe 1945,” Collected Poems, p. 97.

[71] Fairburn, The Woman Problem and other Prose.

[72] Fairburn, “The Woman Problem,” in The Woman Problem and other Prose.


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URL to article: http://www.counter-currents.com/2012/02/rex-fairburn-2/

vendredi, 03 février 2012

Carl Schmitt y el Federalismo

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Carl Schmitt y el Federalismo

Por Luís María Bandieri*

Ex: http://www.disenso.org/

Cuando se trata de abordar la relación que el título de este trabajo propone,  entre nuestro autor y el concepto jurídico-político de federación, aparece de inmediato una dificultad. El federalismo resulta un tema episódico en su obra -un índice temático de la opera omnia schmittiana registraría escasas entradas del término. Más aún, puede sospecharse que se trata, antes que de una presencia restringida y a contraluz, de una ausencia a designio.  Entonces, además de reseñar lo que dice sobre el federalismo, cabría preguntarse, también, el por qué de lo que calla. Schmitt es un autor tan vasto y profundo que, como todos los de su categoría, habla también por sus silencios, dejando una suerte de "escritura invisible" que el investigador no puede desdeñar.

El lector de Schmitt advierte, ante todo, que cuando nuestro autor se refiere al Estado, a la "unidad política" por excelencia, no suele detallar las modalidades de su organización interna y, especialmente, de cómo se articula hacia adentro, funcional o territorialmente, el poder. Autodefinido como último representante del jus publicum europaeum, Schmitt destaca en el Estado su capacidad de lograr la paz interior, sin preguntarse demasiado por cuáles mecanismos se alcanza. Las preguntas iniciales, pues,  podrían ser: formuladas así: ¿cabe el federalismo dentro de la estatalidad clásica, propia de aquel jus publicum y tan cara a Schmitt? ¿Nuestro autor concibió otras formas políticas trascendentes a aquella estatalidad clásica? Si ese ir más allá se dio ¿hubo lugar para el federalismo?

En principio, aunque luego se verá que esta caracterización resulta insuficiente, cuando nos referimos al federalismo, según surge de la literatura jurídica corriente en nuestro país, nos  referimos a una forma particular de articulación territorial del poder. El control de un territorio por el aparato de poder del Estado.

El control de un territorio por parte del Estado puede realizarse fundamentalmente de dos maneras:

  • conun modelo de articulación territorial del poder en que las partesnacen y dependen del todo -el centro-, que posee el monopolio delcontrol.

  • conun modelo de articulación territorial del poder donde el todo -elcentro- nace y depende de las partes, entre las cuales y el centrose reparten dicho control.

El primero es un modelo unitario o centralista. El segundo es el modelo federal o más exactamente “federativo”. La Argentina, por ejempo, es un Estado federativo compuesto por estados provinciales federados. La confederación resulta un procedimiento de articulación territorial del poder donde un cierto número de Estados acepta delegar ciertas competencias a un organismo común supraestatal. Basten, por ahora, estas nociones rudimentales.

Schmitt se forma en un medio jurídico-político donde las ideas de lo federal y confederal   están vivas y presentes. Después de todo, aquéllas toman entidad en la Lotaringia y el Sacro Imperio Romano Germánico, donde se desarrollan aldeas, ciudades y comunas, cada una de ellas con objetivos y alcances propios, sin perjuicio de estar relacionadas con los conjuntos más amplios del reino o el imperio, originándose así la idea de la unidad como una "concordia armoniosa", presente en el pensamiento medieval[1]. Cuando Napoleón derriba al antiguo imperio alemán, comprende que los múltiples principados alemanes no pueden sobrevivir aislados y, para organizar la Mitteleuropa, crea, bajo su protectorado, la Confederación del Rhin (1806-1813), excluída Prusia.. A la caída de Napoleón, se establece la Confederación Germánica (1815-1866), integrada por treinta y ocho  estados soberanos donde se cuentan un Imperio (Austria) y cinco reinos (Prusia, Baviera, Wurtemberg, Sajonia y Hannover). El II Reich alemán se organiza en 1871 como un Estado federal, formado por veinticinco estados federados bajo hegemonía prusiana. El Consejo federal, o Bundesrat, estaba presidido por el rey de Prusia, que llevaba el título de emperador de Alemania y designaba al canciller del Reich. La República de Weimar de 1919, es federal, parlamentaria y democrática, si bien los Länder retenían facultades limitadas. En fin, sean cuales fueren las limitaciones y problemas que manifestaron estas confederaciones y federaciones, lo cierto es que un jurista, en la Alemania de principios del siglo XX, no podía evitar la reflexión inmediata sobre el federalismo[2].

En la vasta obra schmittiana, sólo hay dos textos donde se desarrolla su pensamiento sobre el federalismo. El primero es la "Teoría  de la Constitución", Verfassungslehre, publicada en 1928. La otra, aparecida en 1931, aunque reúne estudios publicados ya en 1929, es "El Guardián de la Constitución", Der Hütter der Verfassung.  Reseñemos lo que ambas dicen sobre nuestro tema.

El primero, "Teoría de la Constitución", es la única obra de Schmitt concebida y desarrollada mediante el formato del tratado jurídico convencional y clásico. Podría pensarse en un desafío de nuestro jurista renano a sus colegas más reconocidos de la época: escribo en igual molde que ustedes, diciendo todo lo contrario de lo que inveteradamente repiten ustedes. Schmitt, que fue, al fin de cuentas, más jurista -más Kronjurist- de la república de Weimar que del Tercer Reich, donde terminó como un outsider, construye esta obra como una empresa de demolición del Estado de derecho, esto es, del tipo de Estado que la constitución weimariana pretendía más adecuadamente reflejar. Ella, sin embargo, lo convierte, paradójicamente, en uno de los mejores y más agudos expositores de los aspectos del  Rechtstaat  en general más descuidados por los análisis habituales[3].

Hasta ese momento, y salvo la opinión de Max von Seydel, sobre la que se apoya nuestro autor, la teoría dominante contraponía la confederación de Estados -Staatenbund- (al modo de la Confederación de 1815) al Estado federal -Bundstaat- (como el II Reich de 1871). Para Schmitt, en cambio, no existen diferencias entre ambas formas.

Para él, "federación [en el sentido amplio y abarcativo señalado] es una unión permanente, basada en libre conveniencia y al servicio del fin común de la autoconservación de todos los miembros, mediante la cual se cambia el total status político de cada uno de los miembros en atención al fin común"[4]. La federación da lugar a un nuevo status jurídico-político de cada miembro. El pacto federal es un pacto interestatal de status con vocación de permanencia (toda federación es concertada para la "eternidad", esto es, para la eternidad relativa de toda forma política, mortal por definición).

Toda federación, según nuestro autor, reposa sobre tres antinomias o contradicciones:

  1. Derechode autoconservación vs. renuncia al ius belli.

  1. Derechode autodeterminación vs. Intervenciones.

  1. Existenciasimultánea, por un lado. de la federación común y, por otro, de los estados miembros.La esencia de la federación reside, pues, en un dualismo de laexistencia política. Tal coexistencia de una unidad políticageneral y de unidades políticas particulares da lugar a unequilibrio difícil.   Se presenta, ante todo,  elproblema de la soberanía: ¿serán soberanos los estados federadosy no la federación? ¿o  la federación  es la únicasoberana y los estados federados carecen de tal atributo?. Se tratade soberanía, es decir, de una decisión (soberano es el que decidesobre el estado de excepción; en este caso, el que decide sobre su propia existencia política o, invirtiendo la fórmula, acerca deque un extraño no decida sobre  su propia existenciapolítica). Si la decisión  es deferida a un tribunaljudicial, éste se tornaría inmediatamente soberano, en otraspalabras, poder político existencial. La respuesta, según nuestroautor, tampoco puede consistir (según la teoría corriente en sutiempo, y vigente entre nuestros constitucionalistas) en ladistinción entre confederación y federación: en la confederación los estados federados son soberanos y en el Estado federal  lasoberanía reside en la federación misma. Ya hemos visto su rechazode  esa distinción, que no tiene en cuenta -afirma - cómosurge una decisión soberana en caso de un conflicto en que esté enjuego la propia existencia de la forma política en cuestión. Enpuridad, dice Schmitt,  conforme aquel criterio  dominanteresulta que la confederación se disuelve siempre en caso deconflicto, y que la federación se resuelve siempre, cuando mediaconflicto, en un Estado unitario. Schmitt, citándolo a través delos escritos de Max von Seydel, se refiere a las doctrinas de JohnCalhoun, que sirvieran a la argumentación  de los confederadossudistas[5].Calhoun no  admitía que, al sancionarse en Norteamérica laconstitución federativa de 1787, los estados federados hubiesenrenunciado a  sus derechos soberanos, los State Rights,anteriores a la federación y en principio ilimitados, salvo lascompetencias  que expresamente se delegaron en la constitución.Calhoun, como Seydel hará suyo, sostiene que una suma decompetencias delegadas no transmite soberanía  al delegado, niimplica renuncia a ella por parte del delegante. Los estadosfederados conservaban, pues, un derechoa la anulación delas leyes y actos federales y, cuando estuviese comprometida suseguridad y existencia, un derechoa la secesión (loque condujo a la guerra civil de 1861-65). Derrotada esa posiciónen  el campo de batalla (a partir de allí anulación ysecesión equivalen a rebelión y sobre las cuestiones entre estadosfederados decide en último término la Corte Suprema) no queda,según Schmitt, refutado por ello el argumento calhouniano. Lo queocurre es que la Constitución como tal ha cambiado su carácter yla federación ha cesado: subsiste tan sólo una autonomíaadministrativa y legislativa de los estados federados; en otraspalabras, una seudofederación.

A continuación, nuestro autor se plantea cómo se diluyen las antinomias que afectan a la federación. La federación supone homogeneidad de todos sus miembros. Para Montesquieu, esta homogeneidad significaba que los federados fueran estados republicanos, es decir, que tuviesen homogeneidad de  organización política. La homogeneidad podría ser, también, de nacionalidad, de religión, de civilización etc. Schmitt parece privilegiar la homogenidad nacional de la población, esto es, para él, la homogeneidad de origen.

Así, la primera antinomia (derecho a la autodefensa y renuncia al ius belli) se diluye porque la homogenidad con los otros federados excluye la la hostilidad entre ellos.

La segunda antinomia (autonomía e intervención) se disuelve porque la voluntaCarl Schmitt y el Federalismo - SILACPOd de autodeterminación se plantea frente a una ingerencia extraña, pero no  resulta extraña la de la propia federación.

La tercera antinomia (dualismo existencial entre federación soberana y estados miembros soberanos) se disuelve porque la homogeneidad excluye el conflicto existencial decisivo. Como las cuestiones de la existencia política pueden presentarse en campos diversos, se da así la posibilidad de que la decisión de una clase de cuestiones tales como, por ejemplo, de la política exterior, competa a la federación y que, por el contrario, la decisión de otras, por ejemplo, mantenimiento de la seguridad y el orden público dentro de un estado federado, quede reservada al propio estado miembro. No se trata de una división de la soberanía, porque en caso de una decisión que afecte a la existencia política como tal, la tomará por entero sea la federación, sea el estado miembro[6]. Donde hay homogeneidad, el caso de conflicto decisivo entre la federación y los estados miembros debe quedar excluída. De otro modo, el pacto federal se convierte en un "seudonegocio jurídico nulo y equívoco"[7].

El traductor español de la obra, Francisco Ayala, apunta en el prólogo, respecto de esta conclusión: "se las ingenia de manera a asegurar que tanto las federaciones como los estados miembros aparezcan al mismo tiempo como unitarios y soberanos". Pero Schmitt, en verdad, está señalando como propio de toda organización federativa la tensión conflictual entre federación y federados, que puede llegar al pico de la situación excepcional y resolverse por decisión soberana de la primera o de los segundos. Las antinomias que están en la base de esa tensión conflictual pueden diluirse, para Schmitt, mientras la homogeneidad que ha llevado al foedus o pacto originario, en cuya virtud ha cambiado el status de los federados, se mantenga. En el momento  en que alguno de los federados sienta su propia existencia amenazada porque aquella homogeneidad se ha roto o no es reconocido como integrándola, entonces, o el foedus se revelará como pacto de origen de un Estado, en el fino fondo, "uno e indivisible", o será quebrado por ejercicio de los derechos de anulación y secesión. En otras palabras, en el primer caso, ante  la situación excepcional, la federación ejerce la soberanía irrenunciable y deviene, en los hechos, un Estado centralizado y, en el segundo, el acto soberano proviene del estado federado, que rompe la federación.  La Ausnahmezustand, la situación o estado de excepción, en ese caso, y cualquiera sea quien protagonice la decisión (federación o estado federado), da lugar al acto soberano y consecuente re-creación de un nuevo orden jurídico[8]. De todos modos, las circunstancias bien apuntadas por Schmitt no significarían una debilidad especial de la federación con respecto a otras formas de articulación territorial del poder. Basta observar el Estado unitario descentralizado italiano o español ("Estado de regiones" o "Estado de las autonomías"), o el caso del Reino Unido de la Gran Bretaña, para advertir la misma tensión existencial entre Estado central y comunidad particular que nuestro autor apunta como meollo antinómico y foco conflictivo de la federación, con situaciones extremas y excepcionales cual el Ulster o el País Vasco. Hasta en Francia, república "una e indivisble" por antonomasia, apunta, sobre otros, el caso inmanejable de Córcega. A tal punto que Raymond Barre, ex primer ministro francés, medio en broma medio en serio, proponía devolvérsela a Génova.

Volvamos a nuestro autor. Nos ha presentado las dificultades mayúsculas y tensiones conflictivas que, a su juicio, aparecen allí donde una federación exista.  Luego aparenta disolverlas acudiendo al recurso de la homogeneidad, especialmente la homogeneidad de origen, la homogeneidad nacional de un pueblo. Pero a continuación, nos plantea una nueva dificultad, en la que aquella homogenidad amenaza destruir la federación. Se trata de una antinomia sobreviniente, que enfrenta a democracia y federalismo.

A mayor democracia, menor esfera propia de los Estados federados. Democracia y federación descansan, ambas, en el supuesto de la homogeneidad. El pensamiento de Schmitt, como se sabe, apunta en este aspecto a separar la noción de democracia de la noción de Estado liberal-burgués. Democracia, para Schmitt, es una forma política que corresponde al principio de identidad entre gobernantes y gobernados, de los que mandan y de los que obedecen, dominadores y dominados, esto es, identidad del pueblo y de la unidad política. Ello por la sustancial igualdad que es su   fundamento y que supone, parejamente, una básica homogeneidad, en el pueblo. Por ello, en el desarrollo de la democracia dentro de una federación, la unidad nacional   homogénea del pueblo transpasará las fronteras políticas de los Estados federados y tenderá a suprimir el equilibrio de la coexistencia de federación y estados federados políticamente independientes, a favor de una unidad común.

Ello conduce a un "Estado federal sin fundamentos federales"[9], como los EE.UU. o la República de Weimar, según nuestro autor. En ellos, la constitución toma elementos de una anterior organzación federal y expresa la decisión de conservarlos, pero el concepto democrático de poder constituyente de todo el pueblo, a juicio de Schmitt, suprime el concepto de federación. Se organiza un complejo sistema de distinción de poderes y descentralización, pero falta el fundamento federativo: hay una unidad política (la unidad política de un pueblo en un Estado) y no una pluralidad de unidades políticas, que es lo que supone la federación propiamente dicha. No existe, apunta Schmitt, un pueblo bávaro, prusiano, hamburgués en la constitución de Weimar: sólo existe el pueblo alemán. Sin embargo, la contradicción entre democracia y federación, donde la consecuencia de la primera, el poder constituyente del pueblo uno y único, socava los fundamentos de la segunda, no parece haber afectado a Suiza, por ejemplo. Una respuesta más afinada nos la dará Schmitt en la segunda obra donde se encuentran referencias al federalismo: Der Hüter der Verfassung.

En ella, sostiene que el presidente es el custodio de la constitución, como poder neutro y super partes. No podría serlo un tribunal judicial o corte constitucional porque, en ese caso, se le trasladaría la decisión soberana, convirtiéndose la Corte Suprema o el Consejo Constitucional en soberanos "legisladores negativos" (la expresión es de Kelsen). Detalla los peligros concretos que acechan a la defensa de la constitución que asigna al presidente del Reich. Por un lado, la existencia de partidos dotados de Weltanschauungen   o cosmovisiones totales y encontradas (el nacionalsocialismo y el comunismo), es decir, partidos totalitarios. Cada uno de ellos trata de arrebatarle al Estado su prerrogativa propiamente política, esto es, trazar la línea divisoria entre el amigo y el enemigo. Al lado de estos partidos totalitarios, se manifiestan coaliciones parlamentarias lábiles, que acentúan tendencias pluralistas, es decir, para nuestro autos, fragmentantes de la unidad política. También contribuye a desarticular el Estado weimariano, prosigue nuestro autos, el "policratismo" de los diversos sectores de la economía pública (correo, ferrocarriles, Reichbank, etc.) que se mueven cada uno independientemente del otro y hasta chocando entre sí. Por otra parte, al haberse dado la república de Weimar una organización al mismo tiempo parlamentaria y federal, continúa nuestro autor, resurge la antinomia ya señalada en Verfassungslehre entre federalismo y democracia. Schmitt no oculta que la organización federativa   de la república de Weimar le parece desestabilizante para el Estado, y la función presidencial de guardián de la constitución. Este peligro se acentúa cuando federalismo y pluralismo político se refuerzan mutuamente, consiguiéndose, dice nuestro jurista, "un doble quebrantamiento del hermetismo y de la solidez de la unidad estatal"    En un   Estado al mismo tiempo federal y parlamentario el federalismo, según nuestro autor, puede justificarse sólo de dos maneras:

  1. Comorecurso de auténtica descentralización territorial, contra lospoderes pluralistas y policráticos enquistados en el gobierno y enla actividad económica.

  2. Como"antídoto contra los métodos peculiares del pluralismo de lospartidos" [10].Esta última es una observación de gran actualidad: la realidad deun sistema de articulación territorial del poder reside en elsistema de partidos. Con partidos nacionales de direccióncentralizada, como en el caso de nuestro país, y más aún con sistemas electorales donde tales partidos monopolizan larepresentación y la manejan a través de listas cerradas,reduciéndose así, poco a poco, la democracia a un ejercicioautorreferencial de lo que se ha llamado el englobante "partidode los políticos", la variedad de las comunidades federadas sediluye en cacicazgos locales dentro de los bloques partidarios. Otra consecuencia es la aparición defensiva de partidosparticularistas, como se ve en España, Italia, Escocia, etc., comoreacción simétrica a lo anterior. Por lo tanto, y esto explica lainaplicabilidad, en principio, de la reflexión schmittiana enVerfassungslehre al caso suizo, la antinomia más virulenta se daríaentre federación y democracia monopolizada por partidos nacionalesy centralizados.

Muchos conocedores de Schmitt sostienen que, si bien advirtió la declinación del Estado-nación como forma política, jamás pudo superar   el horizonte teórico estatalista. José Caamaño Martínez afirma, por ejemplo, ante la dúplice soberanía que otorga nuestro autor a la federación y a los miembros federados: "esta teoría   de la federación nos muestra claramente que la forma histórica del Estado nacional unitario sigue siendo un dogma del pensamiento de Schmitt"[11].

"No deja lugar -dice Francisco por su parte Ayala- a un tipo de organización de la convivencia política distinto del Estado nacional [centralizado]"[12].

Gary Ulmen, por su lado, resume así la cuestión: Schmitt consideraba sustancialmente al federalismo como una fase del pasaje entre el mundo plural y parcializado de los Estados Naciones y el mundo contemporáneo, que tiende a la unidad homogeneizante. Schmitt plantea en el federalismo algunas antinomias fundamentales: partiendo del presupuesto que una federación es un contrato de status entre unidades más o menos iguales, que adhieren a la federación con finalidad de mutua protección, gestión e integración,   conlleva una permanente tensión entre la autonomía de las unidades federadas y la intervención federal. Con el tiempo, la mayor fuerza de la federación respecto de las unidades federadas producirá una creciente centralización, mientras que la heterogeneidad de las diversas unidades (ej. los EE.UU) choca con el principio democrático del pueblo soberano, que trasciende las diferencias entre los Estados miembros y tiende a una única homogeneidad. En ese punto la contradicción se manifiesta insoluble: sin homogeneidad la federación democrática no puede funcionar, pero si la homogeneidad se logra, las diferencias resultan superadas y, de hecho, se realiza un Estado unitario. Un proceso, pues, de gradual reductio ad unum [13].

En Schmitt hay una permanente tensión entre la nostalgia del jus publicum europaeum, derecho público interestatal,   y su percepción de la declinación de la forma estatal. Es muy claro respecto a esto último cuando prologa la reedición de "El Concepto de lo Político":

"Hasta los últimos años la parte europea de la Humanidad vivió una época cuyas nociones jurídicas eran acuñadas desde el punto de vista estatal. Se supuso al Estado modelo de la unidad política. La época del estatismo está terminando ahora. No vale la pena discutirlo. Con ello se termina toda la infraestructura de construcciones relacionadas con el Estado, que una ciencia europeo-céntrica del derecho internacional y del derecho político había erigido en cuatrocientos años de trabajo espiritual. Se destrona al Estado como modelo de la unidad política, al Estado como portador del monopolio de la decisión política. Se destrona a esta obra maestra de la concepción europea y del racionalismo occidental. Pero se mantienen sus nociones e incluso se mantienen como ideas clásicas, aunque hoy día la palabra clásico suena casi siempre equívoca y ambivalente, por no decir irónica"[14].    Se advierte, junto a la claridad de la toma de posición, el tono elegíaco respecto de la época que se cierra y   un   pronóstico ominoso respecto de la que se abre. Hay una cierta renuencia a pensar más allá de la forma estatal. Nuestro autor es claro, preciso y de seguimiento ineludible en cuanto a la pars destruens respecto de lo que asoma tras la retirada de la estatalidad y el jus publicum europaeum, donde aquélla se expresaba. Recoge la frase de Proudhon, "quien dice Humanidad quiere engañar" y alerta sobre la intensificación de la enemistad hacia posiciones absolutas que encubre el interventismo humanitarista.   Pero, a la vez, desde la pars construens, no alcanza a concebir una pluralidad superadora de la estatalidad moderna, un orden jurídico postestatal, tanto hacia adentro del Estado y la articulación terriotorial del poder, como hacia fuera de los Estados, que suceda sin traicionar en lo esencial y valioso aquel jus publicum moribundo. Para Schmitt, la unidad política estatal fue el unum necessarium; ahora, marchamos hacia una unidad política de alcance planetario, que no podría cumplir con lo que el Estado consiguió ad intra: la paz interior, la deposición de la enemistad intestina; en otras palabras, se perdería, a escala global, el vivere civile, la dimensión civilizatoria de la política. Pero a Schmitt no le interesó jamás cómo se articulaba hacia adentro, funcional y territorialmente, aquella paz interior. Lo seduce la unitas, pero no lo atrae   la universitas donde se articulan diversidades y diferencias. Así, deja a un lado la corriente de pensamiento medieval, con culminación en Dante, luego reaparecida con Altusio, que resulta basilar para la noción federativa. Los jurisconsultos del medioevo hablaban de una bóveda de universitates locales ordenadas desde el domus, el vicus, la civitas, la provincia, el regnum, el imperium. Es probable que nuestro autor viese en esta corriente una manifestación del romanticismo político que solía fulminar. Así, por ejemplo, en las fórmulas de Adam Müller acerca de una   concepción "orgánica" y estamental del Estado como una comunidad superior de comunidades, transmitidas por la obra de Gierke y recogidas por un contemporáneo de Schmitt, Othmar Spann. Schmitt polemizó en varias   ocasiones   con las teorías organicistas que asimilaban el Estado a las otras comunidades, tanto las menos como las más amplias, afectando así la summa potestas del soberano[15]. En "El Concepto de lo Político" (1927) hace referencia expresa a Gierke, cuya teología política, según nuestro autor, en la búsqueda de una unidad última, de un "cosmos' y de un "sistema" resulta "superstición y reminiscencia de la escolástica medieval"[16].   En "El Leviatán en la Teoría del Estado de Tomás Hobbes" (1938) señala que los mecanismos estamentales, generadores de un derecho de resistencia, conducen a la guerra civil, cuando la misión del Estado es ponerle un cierre definitivo[17]. Pero su ataque se concentró, especialmente, sobre las concepciones pluralistas de Harold Laski y G.D.H. Cole, que, entre 1914 y 1925, habían propiciado, desde posiciones cercanas al socialismo inglés y los fabianos, la descentralización y repartición del poder estatal. Aunque las notas polémico de Schmitt son de 1927[18], cuando Laski ya había abandonado el pluralismo o policratismo, le servían a nuestro autor para reafirmar su pensamiento nuclear de rechazo de toda forma de contestación o recorte de la superioridad ad intra del Estado.

Nuestro autor, como se sabe, desde los años 40 comienza a hablar de los imperios y de los grandes espacios, los Grosseraume, como las formas políticas surgentes tras la estatalidad. El mundo quedaría parcelado en una pluralidad de grandes espacios, pero como pluralidad de unidades estancas. Habría, en otras palabras, un nuevo jus publicum con menos protagonistas que el antiguo: "un equilibrio de varios grandes espacios que creen entre sí un nuevo derecho de gentes en un nuevo nivel y con dimensiones nuevas, pero, a la vez, dotado de ciertas analogías con el derecho de gentes europeo de los siglos dieciocho y diecinueve, que también se basaba en un equilibrio.de potencias, gracias al cual se conservaba su estructura"[19]. Nada nos dice de cómo se organizarían ad intra los grandes espacios: súlo sabemos que deberían mantener alguna homogeneidad interna y que algún Estado ejercería en ellos un papel hegemónico (el ejemplo es el papel de los EE.UU respecto al resto de América, luego de que la doctrina Monroe estableciera límites y exclusiones configuradoras de este gran espacio).

Los Grosseraume se plantean como alternativa al gran peligro, a la remoción del katéjon (es decir, lo que retiene, ataja   u obstaculiza, concepto recurrente en la teología política final de nuestro autor). El katéjon actúa en toda época y es, por lo tanto, variable con el decurso de aquéllas. El katéjon asienta o mantiene el Nomos epocal y desaparece con él[20]. Se lo menciona en Pablo de Tarso (II epístola a los tesalonienses, 2, 6/7), que lo considera el obstáculo o retardo, qui tenet nunc,   el que retiene   ahora la manifestación del Anticristo.   El Anticristo de Schmitt es la soberanía global, el mundo uno y uniforme correspondiente al pensamiento técnico-industrial. El sistema de Estados nacionales en pugna controlada, construcción de la racionalidad europea, edificadores al mismo tiempo, cada uno, de su propia paz interior, he allí el verdadero katéjon para Schmitt. Ninguna virtualidad le ve en ese sentido a la provisoria federación, contrato temporario de status, fuente de desestabilizaciones, que prefiere mostrar a contraluz o no mostrar, como dijimos al principio de este trabajo. Aunque, a pesar de su desconfianza hacia las formas federativas, dejó sobre ellas notables observaciones jurídico-políticas, como hemos visto. Quizás, alguien ha señalado, se consideraba el mismo Schmitt como el katéjon intelectual al  diseño maligno de la soberanía global desde la unidad política del mundo. De todos modos, advierte que un Nomos de la tierra desaparece y no ha apuntado el otro todavía. No alcanza a divisar si es posible un nuevo Nomos pluralístico donde la conflictualidad se canalice y yugule, sin proclamar su desaparición, como sueña la soberanía global mientras desarrolla sin pausa sus operaciones de policía humanitaria.

Schmitt advertía una sustancial oposición entre estatalidad y federalismo. Por eso decía que el Estado federal, seudonegocio jurídico nulo y equívoco se resuelve, como el federalismo hamiltoniano, en la forma de Estado unitario más o menos matizado. Hoy reaparece el federalismo de raíz lotaringio germánica, cuyo teórico más reciente fuera Proudhon, como visión comprensiva del mundo y de la sociedad, no como simple forma de Estado (su fórmula   podría ser, en lugar de   e pluribus, unum, del federalismo norteamericano, la de   ex uno, plures[21]). El katéjon schmittiano está removido. Una soberanía global es posible. Hasta hace poco, se pensaba que esa soberanía residía impersonal y ubicuamente en los mecanismos,   soportes y programas autosuficientes de las redes tecnológicas, de comunicación, informáticas y financieras que rodean el planeta[22]. Al no haber un Leviatán visible, se lo suponía muerto o dormido. Después del 11 de septiembre de 2001, Leviatán debe manifestarse otra vez, ahora para asegurar el globo ante la amenaza del terrorismo global y "privatizado".    En esa bufera o borrasca dantesca nos toca movernos, y las reflexiones schmittianas permiten allí algunos vislumbres. Decía Hölderlin que en el peligro crece también lo que salva. Y nuestro autor agregaba que, al borde del abismo, en la situación excepcional, "la mente se abre al arcano".

* Doctor en Ciencias Jurídicas, Universidad Católica Argentina.

NOTAS

[1]) Ver Otto von Gierke, "Teorías Políticas de la Edad Media",con introducción de F.W. Maitland, traducciónindirecta del ingléspor Julio Irazusta, Editorial Huemul, Bs. As., 1963, p. 108/109.

[2] )Tras la Segunda Guerra Mundial, la República Federal Alemana seconfiguró en 1949, como su nombre lo indica, bajo un sistemafederativo. La República Democrática Alemana, en cambio, como"Estado socialista de la nación alemana", se configuróbajo un sistema unitario. Anteriormente, bajo el III Reich, la Leyde Plenos Poderes del 24 de marzo de 1933, que en los hechos derogóla Constitución de Weimar, otorgó la potestad legislativa laGobierno del Reich, es decir, al Fuehrer., que designaba algobernador (Gauleiter) en cada uno de los distritos. La organizacióndel Reich fue asimilándose (Gleichschaltung) a la organizacióncentralizada y uniforme del Partido Nacional Socialista ObreroAlemán. Alemania, hoy, es un Estado federal.

[3] )Ver Carl Schmitt, "La Defensa de la Constitución", trad.de Manuel Sénchez Sarto, prólogo de Pedro de Vega, ed. Tecnos,Madrid, 1998, 2ª. Edición, p. 12

[4] )Carl Schmitt, "Teoría de la Constitución", traducción ypresentación de Francisco Aala, epílogo de Manuel García-Pelayo,Alianza editorial, Madrid, 1982, p. 348.

[5] )Schmitt solía adherir a la causa de los vencidos: victrix causadiis placuit, sed victa Catoni,la causa de los vencedores place alos dioses, pero la de los vencidos a Catón..y a Schmitt.

[6] )Contra James Madison en "El Federalista", XXXIX, XLIV yXLV: se propone una soberanía distributiva, donde los estadosfederados retienen una porción no delegada, un residuo inviolable,y la federación ejerce sólo la delegada. Ello es posible porque elpueblo, organizado en ciudadanía, no en masa, manifiesta suvoluntad soberana parcialmente en varias represdentaciones: comoindividuo, como miembro del estado federado, como miembro de lafederación. Ver Hamilton, Madison y Jay, "El Federalista",prólogo y traducción de Gustavo R. Velasco, FCE, Mexico,6ª.reimpresión, 1998. Para Schmitt, este deslinde, esta especie definium regundorum entre federación y estados miembros de la mismasoberanía, no resulta concebible. En la situación excepcional,quien decida, federación o estado miembro, resulta plenamentesoberano.

[7] )Op. cit. n. iv, p. 359

[8] )Sobre las dificultades de traducción de Ausnahmezustand como"estado" o "situación" excepcional puede versela nota del traductor, Jean-Louis Schlegel en "ThéologiePolitique, 1922,1969", Gallimard, 1988, p. 15. Para otrosdesarrollos sobre el concepto de soberano en Schmitt me remito a miprólogo a "Teología Política", Ed. Struhart y Cía.,2ª. Ed., Bs. As. 1998.

[9] )Op. cit nota iv, p. 369.

[10] )Op. cit. n. iii, p. 161.

[11] )José Caamaño Martínez: "El Pensamiento Juídico-Político deCarl Schmitt", prólogo de Luis Legaz y Lacambra, Ed. Porto yCía, Santiago de Compostela, 1950, p. 159.

[12] )Op. cit. n iv, p. 17

[13] )  Gary L. Ulmen en Paul Piccone y otros, "La RivoluzioneFederalista", Settimo Sigillo, Roma, 1995.

[14] )Carl Schmitt, "La Noción de lo Político", en Revista deEstudios Políticos, Instituto de Estudios Políticos, nº 132, Madrid, noviembre-diciembre 1963, p.6

[15] )Una de ellas fue en una conferencia de 1930 en honor de Hugo Preuss,discípulo de Gierke. Ver George Schwab, "Carl Schmitt, lasfida dell'eccezione", introducción de FrancoFerrarotti, traducción de Nicola Porto, Laterza, Bari, 1986, p.92

[16] )Carl Schmitt, "El Concepto de lo Político", trad. deFrancisco Javier Conde, en "Estudios Políticos", Doncel,Madrid, 1975, p. 118.

[17] ) Carl Schmitt, "El Leviatán en la Teoría del Estado de TomásHobbes", traducción de Francisco Javier Conde, Ediciones Haz,Madrid,1941 p. 72/73.

[18] )Op. cit. nota anteror, loc. cit. Un eco de este ataque al pluralismo"extremista" del "judío Laski" aparece en "ElConcepto de Imperio en el Derecho Internacional" (1940), trad.de Francisco Javier Conde, Revista de Estudios Políticos, Madrid,1941, p. 97.

[19] )Carl Schmitt, "La Unidad del Mundo", Ateneo, Madrid, 1951,p.24

[20] )Carl Schmitt, "El Nomos de la Tierra en el Derecho de Gentesdel jus publicum europaeum", trad. Dora Schilling Thon,Estudios Internacionales, Madrid, 1979, p. 37 y sgs.

[21] )Me remito a mi trabajo "El Federalismo Argentino en elNovecientos o de cémo perdimos el siglo", IV Congreso Nacionalde Ciencia Política, UCA -SAAP, Buenos Aires, RA, noviembre 17 al20 de 1999,.

[22] )Ver Bandieri, Luis María, "¿Soberanía Global vs. SoberaníaNacional? (Hacia una Micropolítica Federativa)" Ponencia en laPrimeras Jornadas nacionales de derecho Natural, San Luis, RA, 14 al16 de junio de 2001, RA

Le malaise est vraiment dans l’homme

Le malaise est vraiment dans l’homme

par Georges FELTIN-TRACOL

On connaissait Pierre Le Vigan philosophe, urbaniste et penseur préoccupé par les questions sociales et écologiques. On le découvre aujourd’hui fin analyste de l’âme humaine. Se plaçant dans le sillage de La crise est dans l’homme, le premier ouvrage de Thierry Maulnier (1932), Le malaise est dans l’homme est un essai passionnant d’exploration des différentes psychopathologies et souffrances psychiques de l’homme moderne. Il considère que « la souffrance psychique est au carrefour du psychique et du social (p. 19) ». De là son intérêt pour ce sujet pointu.

Il examine en une vingtaine de chapitres la dépression, l’ennui, la mélancolie, la paranoïa, les « états-limites », le bovarysme – cette illusion d’être autre -, les phobies, le dandysme, etc. En historien, en philosophe et presque même en « praticien » averti, Pierre Le Vigan définit, scrute, observe les manifestations de ces troubles ou de ces surmenages. Par exemple, « l’actuelle dépression est une maladie de la responsabilité (p. 46) ». On peut regretter qu’il n’exploite pas assez la polysémie du mot qui a aussi des significations topographique et météorologique éclairantes si l’on croit à l’importance symbolique de la métaphore…

Sur la paranoïa, il remarque que c’« est une maladie très moderne. Elle n’est en effet guère pensable sans l’individualisme et la croyance en un “ moi ” autonome et donc susceptible de “ corruption ” par l’Autre, par l’Extérieur (pp. 92 – 93) ». Concernant les addictions ou « dépendances », il souligne fort justement que « c’est se passer du désir (p. 138) » au profit d’une satisfaction immédiate et éphémère. Il s’agit d’« une emprise irrésistible [qui] s’instaure (p. 139) ».

Pierre Le Vigan soumet aussi le concept d’identité à ses interrogations. Pour lui, « l’identité n’est pas l’authenticité. Celle-ci est le mythe d’une non-dualité, d’une spontanéité totale, de relations humaines qui n’obéiraient pas à des codes, à une éducation (paideia), et qui n’auraient pas d’histoire (p. 174) ». La construction de soi se révèle désormais plus ardue pendant que « s’accroît le nihilisme “ mou ” qu’est la fatigue de vivre et d’engager des choses (p. 186) ». Éreintées par un quotidien matériel trépidant, les âmes sont en déshérence. Pour cacher ce naufrage psychique, « la société valorise la repentance plutôt que l’orgueil, fut-il mal placé (p. 187) ». Dans le même temps, « l’hyper-émotivité contemporaine et l’hypersensibilité nourrissent le narcissisme qui demande lui-même en retour des réassurances hyperprotectrices (cellules de soutien psychologique, etc.) (p. 187) ».

La dévastation est si considérable – car elle s’amplifie de l’omnipotence des médias et de leurs écrans tyranniques – que la fin des souffrances psychiques paraît encore bien lointaine. Est-il possible de s’en sortir ? Pour Le Vigan, « les seules réponses de long terme ne peuvent être que le renforcement du lien social, du “ tenir-ensemble ” la société. Le mythe de la mondialisation heureuse ne fera pas longtemps illusion, c’est l’invention et l’appropriation de nouvelles pratiques sociales, solidaires, c’est le tissage de nouveaux liens qui est nécessaire. La modernité hypercapitaliste avance sur la base du couple société de masse – repli individualiste, la massification jouant le rôle du répulsif entraînant toujours plus d’individualisme et de privatisation de l’individu (habitat des plus riches en résidences sécurisées, déplacements en voiture, isolement dans sa bulle musicale avec les diffuseurs individuels de musique numérique, etc.). Il faut rechercher des contre-courants à cette privatisation des existences. Il faut réapprendre le sens de la vie, le sens de la ville, et aussi le temps et son bon usage, qui peut être la lenteur (pp. 22 – 23) ». Alors la psyché humaine retrouvera peut-être une certaine quiétude à rebours du délire actuel hyper-moderne.

Georges Feltin-Tracol

• Pierre Le Vigan, Le malaise est dans l’homme. Psychopathologie et souffrances psychiques de l’homme moderne, préface de Thibault Isabel, Avatar Éditions, coll. « Polémiques », 2011, 195 p., 22 €.


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mercredi, 01 février 2012

Recuperare l’unità della coscienza contro la deriva del soggettivismo e delle “scienze umane"

cartesian_theatre.jpg

Recuperare l’unità della coscienza contro la deriva del soggettivismo e delle “scienze umane"

di Francesco Lamendola

Fonte: Arianna Editrice [scheda fonte]

Tante altre notizie su www.ariannaeditrice.it

La coscienza dell’uomo moderno si trova presa in trappola tra due forze apparentemente opposte: da un lato quella del soggettivismo, dell’individualismo e del nominalismo, che nega la possibilità di conoscere alcunché, e dunque - a maggior ragione - la coscienza, se non come semplice nome; e quella delle sedicenti “scienze umane”, e specialmente dello strutturalismo, le quali, in nome di una visione oggettivistica dei fatti interiori, ridotti a semplici prodotti di norme e divieti imposti dall’esterno, vorrebbe azzerare la coscienza individuale in quanto tale e farne un semplice prodotto di risulta.

Diciamo che si tratta di “forze” perché, penetrando nella cultura del cittadino medio e venendo continuamente enfatizzate dalla grande maggioranza degli intellettuali, specialmente filosofi e psicologi, esse sono entrate a far parte del nostro modo di pensare e di sentire e non si delineano più semplicemente come l’orizzonte culturale entro il quale pensiamo, agiamo e viviamo, ma come parte del nostro immaginario e del nostro stesso sentire, cioè come parte del nostro essere.

Presa in una simile tenaglia, la coscienza dell’uomo moderno si è notevolmente modificata rispetto a quella dell’uomo pre-moderno; e, se la prima di queste due forze ha avuto l’effetto di relativizzare al massimo i suoi legami con il mondo, la seconda ha prodotto quello di opprimerla sotto il peso di un destino ineluttabile, o all’opposto (ma sono le due facce di una stessa medaglia) di consegnarla, per reazione, al più disordinato relativismo e al più egoistico indifferentismo.

Il soggettivismo moderno incomincia con Kant e si afferma con l’idealismo di Fichte ed Hegel: inizia con la negazione della cosa in sé e della metafisica e culmina con la delirante dottrina secondo cui non è la realtà a creare il pensiero, ma il pensiero a creare la realtà. A partire da quel momento, la strada era aperta per ogni fumisteria solipsistica: le cose non sono quelle che sono perché possiedono una propria natura, ma perché attraverso di esse si manifesta l’Idea: Idea che, a dispetto della lettera maiuscola, non è affatto un dato metafisico, ma una sorta di manifestazione superomistica (ante-litteram) del pensiero medesimo.

E così via di questo passo: deducendo, l’una dall’altra, tutta una serie di conseguenze sempre più improbabili, l’idealismo se ne va dritto per la sua strada, costruendo un castello di affermazioni gratuite, che si arrampicano l’una sopra l’altra, per niente preoccupato che il primo soffio di vento possa far crollare un edificio così pericolosamente sbilanciato e del tutto privo di solide fondamenta.

Le scienze umane - le quali, già nella definizione, tradiscono la matrice positivista -, da parte loro, hanno largamente avvalorato l’idea che il comportamento dell’uomo non sia che il frutto di un condizionamento da parte della società o che sia il risultato di istinti sui quali egli ha uno scarso controllo, oppure l’una e l’altra cosa insieme: in ogni caso, quel che emerge è una realtà umana impoverita, compressa, alienata da se stessa, condannata o ad un conformismo avvilente o ad una rivolta velleitaria, in nome di una autenticità che, di fatto, non è mai esistita.

Nessuna meraviglia che, in una simile prospettiva, l’io dell’uomo moderno appaia frammentato, disgregato, dissolto: che cosa resta dell’uomo, una volta che gli siano state strappate via le varie maschere, se non il nulla?

E che cosa può giustificare da parte sua, una determinata scelta etica, se in nessun caso il soggetto sceglie liberamente, ma agisce sempre sotto la duplice, inesorabile tirannia delle istituzioni sociali e dei propri stessi, inconfessabili istinti?

Ci sembra meritevole di riflessione quanto scrive a questo proposito Giannino Piana nell’articolo «La coscienza nell’attuale contesto culturale» (in: «Credere», Edizioni Messaggero, Padova, n. 128, vol. 2 del 2002, pp. 7-10):

 

«La cultura moderna è contrassegnata, fin dall’inizio e in tutte le sue fasi, dalla riduzione del soggetto a individuo, alla mancanza di una visione “personalista” del soggetto, la sola in gradi di fare immediatamente spazio (interpretandola non come dato accidentale ma come fattore costitutivo) alla dimensione della relazione e sociale. Vi è chi - non a torto - tende a far risalire tale riduzione all’influsso del Nominalismo, cioè alla negazione che esso fa dell’esistenza di ogni dato oggettivo (a causa della impossibilità di pervenire all’elaborazione di concetti che abbiano una consistenza reale, che non siano meri nomi o semplici “flatus vocis”), perciò a una lettura radicalmente “singolare” della realtà e alla riconduzione dell’ordine esistente a una realtà onnipotente, cin significative ricadute tanto su piano etico che politico.

La definitiva soppressione del concetto di “natura” (e conseguentemente di diritto naturale”) coincide con la nascita del “diritto soggettivo” come unico referente della vita sociale:l’antropologia individualista non consente di fondare la società a partire dal’essenza del soggetto, ma ne impone l’accettazione unicamente come condizione per lo sviluppo delle istanze individuali; la mediazione dei diritti soggettivi, cioè la imitazione della loro area di estensione diviene pertanto la via che rende possibile a tutti l’accesso a una loro (sia pire parziale) fruizione. La visione pessimistica dell’uomo propria della Riforma accentua tale tendenza, identificando il diritto soggettivo con il luogo di concentrazione degli istinti individuali e dei desideri egocentrici. Le teorie contrattualiste - a partire da Hobbes - fanno proprio questo assunto, impegnandosi, mediante il “patto sociale”, nella costruzione di un ordine, che consenta il superamento del “bellum omnium contra omnes”, che renda in altri termini possibile l’articolarsi di una forma di convivenza ordinata e pacifica

Il presupposto individualistico trova poi ulteriore conferma (e grande consolidamento) con l’avvento dell’industrializzazione e con l‘affermarsi del sistema capitalista. L’egoismo intellettuale sembra costituire la molla da cui l’attività economica prende avvio, e la stessa scienza economica, che si sviluppa in tale contesto fa dei princìpi della proprietà privata e della massimizzazione della produttività e del profitto le leggi “naturali” che devono governare la vita economica. L’interesse generale non rientra direttamente negli obiettivi dell’economia, ma viene piuttosto concepito o come l’esito automatico del ibero mercato si pensi al teorema della “mano invisibile” che ridistribuisce quanto viene prodotto (A. Smith) - o con una variabile con cui fare i conti per ragioni puramente economiche, considerando cioè i riflessi negativi prodotti dall’eccesso di sperequazione in termini di disagio e di conflittualità sociale.

Questo insieme di fattori si riflette in una lettura radicalmente soggettivistica della coscienza: : essa, lungi dall’essere vista come fonte originaria di una identità - quella del soggetto - che prende senso e si costruisce in un tessuto di relazioni, risulta espressione di una individualità chiusa e autosufficiente; la necessità di fare i conti con istanze derivanti dalla presenza  dell’altro (e degli altri) ha infatti carattere  del tutto esteriore ed è motivata da ragioni meramente utilitariste. La coscienza non è soltanto l’ultimo criterio della verità, è il criterio unico (ed esclusivo) del suo esercizio. L’affermazione “decido secondo coscienza” rispecchia questa convinzione: il riferimento a un ordine oggettivo è ritenuto superfluo (e persino deviante), l’agire ha nell’individuo la sua sorgente e si esaurisce in esso; tutto il resto è legato esclusivamente a ragioni di convenzione sociale, ragioni che non intaccano  la soggettività delle scelte.

Questa spinta soggettivista si scontra peraltro - sta qui ilo carattere paradossale della situazione attuale - con l’opposta tendenza alla radicale oggettivazione della coscienza, provocata soprattutto dall’interpretazione (o dalle interpretazioni) che di essa ci forniscono le scienze umane. La psicologia, quella del profondo in particolare, pone l’accento sull’importanza che riveste il processo di formazione della personalità : la coscienza morale altro non è che l’introiezione del super-io sociale, l’assimilazione cioè di comandi e di divieti, che non hanno origine nell’interiorità del soggetto, ma sono il prodotto del condizionamento esercitato dal mondo esterno di cui il soggetto si appropria in nome del “principio di realtà”. A loro volta, le scienze sociali e culturali – basti qui ricordare l’antropologia d’ispirazione funzionalista - sottolineano la pesantezza degli influssi esercitati dalle strutture e dalle istituzioni della vita associata e, più in generale, dal costume dominante, cioè dagli stili di vita e dai modelli di comportamento, sulla condotta dei singoli; mentre gli stessi sviluppi elle scienze biologiche - si pensi alla fisiologia dei vari apparati e allo studio delle interazioni che tra essi si istituiscono - svelano la dipendenza dell’agire dell’uomo da dinamismi istintuali che producono forme di reazione immediata, difficilmente controllabili a livello razionale. La coscienza risulta così essere più il riflesso dell’insieme delle pressioni esercitate da un insieme di fattori - endogeni o esogeni - guidati, in ogni caso, da logiche deterministiche che una realtà dotata di consistenza originaria e autonoma, da cui prende forma il giudizio e la decisione morale. È come dire - ed è questa la posizione più radiale (e tuttavia, in tale ottica, coerente) espressa dallo strutturalismo - - che essa si riduce a eventi del tutto sovrastrutturale, a epifenomeno, la cui genesi e i cui caratteri distintivi vanno ricercati altrove; nel’influenza di un complesso intreccio di elementi, il peso di ciascuno dei quali è inoltre difficilmente valutabile. Al di là della convergenza attorno a questa visione, che svuota la coscienza della sua identità soggettiva, e pertanto la reifica, diverse sono le modalità descrittive che si danno di essa a seconda che si privilegi l’una o l’latra tecnica di approccio;  la tendenza elle scienze umane, guidate nella ricerca e nella elaborazione dei dati da inevitabili precomprensioni metascientifiche, è infatti quella di trasformarsi in ideologie totalizzanti, dando vita a un “conflitto delle interpretazioni” che ha come sbocco  la riduzione della coscienza alla realtà dell’inconscio op al riflesso condizionato dei modelli sociali  e culturali egemoni.

L’oggettivazione della coscienza comporta per ciò stesso la negazione della moralità: sottraendo all’uomo  quel principio interiore che dà senso autenticamente  umano all’agire e riducendolo alla risultante di condizionamenti indotti dalla pressione di fattori diversi (e in ogni caso decisivi), si perviene allo svuotamento  totale della soggettività umana, perciò all’ammissione dell’impossibilità  di attribuire contenuto etico alle scelte…»

 

Giannino Piana, dunque, dopo aver fatto una analisi a nostro avviso largamente condivisibile della situazione attuale, considera tuttavia “paradossale” la confluenza di soggettivismo e scienze umane  nell’espropriazione del senso di unità e di interiorità della coscienza che caratterizza la cultura moderna.

Ma è proprio vero che si tratta di un dato paradossale, ossia di un dato che scaturisce in maniera imprevista dall’azione reciproca delle forze in gioco? Vediamo.

Il nominalismo, che parte dalla negazione di una realtà conoscibile in se stessa, si sposa, come egli ben mette in evidenza, con l’utilitarismo sul piano etico  e con il liberalismo sul piano politico-sociale. Ora, tanto l’utilitarismo quanto il liberalismo sono ideologie dell’egoismo individuale: per esse l’individuo è tutto, la società non è altro che lo sfondo in cui egli si muove e che deve assicurargli il massimo della sicurezza e del soddisfacimento dei suoi “diritti”.

In particolare, il liberalismo è parente stretto di una ideologia politica che, a torto, si considera come radicalmente antitetica ad esso, l’anarchismo: in realtà, esse hanno in comune l’interesse esclusivo per i diritti del singolo, la diffidenza verso l’altro, il fatto di ritenere lo Stato come un male inevitabile, ma da ridurre al minimo (liberalismo) o da eliminare del tutto (anarchismo). Adam Smith e Max Stirner sono molto più simili di quanto non si creda e hanno più cose in comune di quante ve ne siano a dividerli.

Entrambe le ideologie negano un’etica che si basi sulla relazionalità dei soggetti e che rappresenti l’autentico compimento della coscienza individuale, ciò che fa dell’uomo una “persona” e non un atomo isolato o, come voleva Leibniz (ma anche Freud), una monade senza porte e senza finestre; ed entrambe tentano poi, goffamente, di reintrodurre in qualche modo, dalla finestra, ciò che avevano cacciato dalla porta: il liberalismo, tirando in ballo la stravagante teoria per cui il massimo dell’egoismo individuale produrrebbe anche, chissà come, il massimo del bene comune; l’anarchismo, sposandosi - ma solo a parole - con il suo esatto contrario, il comunismo, e dando vita al comunismo anarchico di Kropotkin e Malatesta.

In ogni caso, il nominalismo porta al soggettivismo e quest’ultimo porta all’accentuazione ipertrofica delle ragioni dell’ego, nello stesso tempo in cui tende a svalutare la presenza dell’altro o, addirittura, a vederla come un impedimento e un ostacolo: c’è un filo rosso che lega, con assoluta coerenza, l’affermazione di Freud, secondo cui il comandamento di amare il prossimo come se stessi è assurdo, perché irrealizzabile, e quella di Sartre, che vede negli altri la manifestazione del nostro particolare inferno.

Le scienze umane, poi, per il modo stesso in cui sono sorte e si sono affermate e per il contesto culturale che le ha prodotte, dominato dall’ideologia del Positivismo, hanno esasperato la componente esterna nella formazione della coscienza, fino a suggerire che, senza tale azione proveniente dalla società, gli uomini sarebbero più o meno privi di una coscienza originaria e, con essa, di un senso profondo ed autentico del bene e del male, riducendoli a oggetti passivi ed inermi davanti a delle forze molto più grandi di loro.

Preso fra un inconscio oscuro e minaccioso, che lo domina con i suoi impulsi tanto più potenti, quanto più ci si sforza di reprimerli, ed una pressione sociale continua, sistematica, soffocante, l’uomo finisce per ridursi alla condizione di un grottesco burattino, agitato da ogni vento e sbattuto di qua e di là, senza una volontà propria, senza una capacità di distinguere, e tanto meno di scegliere, fra il bene e il male: per cui egli agisce come capita, «non si sa come» (parafrasando Pirandello), in maniera bizzarra, capricciosa, imprevedibile.

Ed è logico che così avvenga: se la coscienza non esiste come dato originario, o se essa è per noi inattingibile, e - dunque - si riduce a una mera ipotesi indimostrabile, allora non bisogna aspettarsi alcuna coerenza, alcuna progettualità, alcuna logica nelle azioni umane: esse avvengono a capriccio, incomprensibilmente, sul filo dell’istinto o della nevrosi cui il conflitto permanente e insolubile tra Es e Super-Io ci tiene costantemente impegnati e lacerati.

Oppure si prenda il caso delle terapie psicologiche moderne (per distinguerle da quelle che sono sempre esistite, sia presso i popoli tribali, ad esempio con i riti d’iniziazione, sia presso il mondo classico, ad esempio con la catarsi provocata nel pubblico dalla tragedia greca): come è possibile che possano essere realmente d’aiuto all’uomo, se esse partono dall’assunto pregiudiziale che non vi sia alcuna anima da guarire, alcuna coscienza da ricostituire, ma soltanto delle funzioni psichiche da ripristinare, in base ad una valutazione arbitraria ed egoistica di ciò che è utile, e non di ciò che è vero, buono e giusto?

Ebbene, non ci sembra che la convergenza di soggettivismo e oggettivazione esasperata si possa definire un fatto paradossale, perché in essa vi è una logica piuttosto chiara e lineare: se il nominalismo sostiene che non possiamo conoscere nulla di reale e il suo naturale erede, il soggettivismo, afferma che dobbiamo agire in base al nostro interesse e non in base alla scelta tra il bene e il male, allora il soggettivismo estremo viene a completarsi naturalmente nelle dottrine dell’oggettivazione, secondo le quali possiamo misurare i fattori che agiscono su di noi, sia dall’interno che dall’esterno, ma non rispondere ad essi con una decisione della coscienza, poiché quest’ultima non è che una vuota parola che diamo, sostanzializzandola, alla rete di influssi che operano su noi sia dall’esterno, sia dall’interno.

Il punto estremo del nominalismo, la filosofia del linguaggio che riduce le cose a frasi logicamente consequenziali, si tocca con il punto estremo dell’oggettivismo, ossia quello strutturalismo che fa sparire il soggetto come sorgente di coscienza e volontà e lo riduce a passiva appendice di forze molto più grandi, che agiscono su di lui a senso unico.

Che sia andata smarrita l’unità della coscienza è un male, perché, con buona pace di certo agnosticismo e di certo relativismo etico, tale smarrimento ha accentuato il senso di solitudine, di impotenza e di frustrazione dell’uomo moderno e ha trasformato la sua vita sociale in un deserto popolato di incubi, di nemici da abbattere o di schiavi da sottomettere.

Quando capiremo che la rifondazione della coscienza, il recupero della sua unità e della sua originaria autonomia, sono i compiti più urgenti che ci dobbiamo dare per il prossimo futuro?

Quando capiremo che ogni altra preoccupazione, che ogni altra indagine, al confronto, sono qualcosa di simile alle dispute sul sesso degli angeli, mentre Costantinopoli stava per cadere?

00:05 Publié dans Philosophie | Lien permanent | Commentaires (0) | Tags : philosophie, individualisme, solipsisme | |  del.icio.us | | Digg! Digg |  Facebook

mardi, 31 janvier 2012

La visione del mondo atomista e oggettivista getta l’uomo moderno in una disperata solitudine

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La visione del mondo atomista e oggettivista getta l’uomo moderno in una disperata solitudine

di Francesco Lamendola

Fonte: Arianna Editrice [scheda fonte]

Tante altre notizie su www.ariannaeditrice.it

L’uomo moderno è in preda a una crisi di valori senza precedenti; e, a monte di essa, di una crisi di senso complessiva, che investe ogni singolo aspetto della sua esistenza e lo rende perplesso, confuso, incapace di discriminare e di decidere, vittima di una sconfortante sensazione della vanità e dell’inutilità di qualsiasi cosa, di qualunque eventuale scelta.

Tale situazione è dovuta all’azione concomitante di due forze apparentemente diverse e perfino opposte, ma in realtà originatesi dalla stessa temperie culturale e spirituale: il meccanicismo scientifico, sviluppatosi dalla Rivoluzione scientifica del XVII secolo in poi, che tende ad imporre una visione atomistica della realtà e, quindi, anche dell’uomo; e l’oggettivismo, anch’esso di matrice scientifica, secondo il quale l’uomo, o meglio lo scienziato, può e deve porsi in maniera distaccata davanti al mondo, osservarlo, misurarlo, catalogarlo.

L’atomismo fa sì che gli esseri umani tendano a sentirsi  isolati e separati gli uni dagli altri e, quindi, terribilmente soli e incapaci di comunicare, sia sul piano del pensiero, sia su quello delle emozioni e dei sentimenti; l’oggettivismo tende a recidere il legame necessario fra essi e il mondo, a proiettarli in una dimensione diversa da quella degli altri enti e della natura tutta, in una atmosfera rarefatta e artificiale, ove smarriscono il senso dell’unità con il tutto.

Entrambe queste forze provocano, o accentuano, il senso di estraneità, di alienazione, di disperata solitudine dell’uomo: egli non si ritiene più capace né di gettare dei ponti verso i suoi simili, né di sentirsi parte di una unità organica; e l’effetto di questi due orientamenti è, da un lato, l’accentuarsi della durezza dei rapporti umani, dall’altro l’abuso nei confronti della natura, senza che all’uomo appaiano chiare le terribili conseguenze, anche per lui stesso, di un tale abuso.

Partiamo dal primo aspetto. Le cosiddette scienze umane sono state le prime a teorizzare, sul modello delle scienze naturali, il grossolano meccanicismo di derivazione illuminista e positivista: l’anima è stata ridotta alla psiche e la vita spirituale degli esseri umani è stata ridotta all’insieme delle loro manifestazioni mentali: nessun mistero, nessun senso di riverenza per la dimensione interiore dell’uomo; tutto è spiegabile ed, eventualmente, curabile, partendo da una analisi rigorosa delle quantità in gioco (anche se poi, specialmente nella psicanalisi, questa pretesa “scienza” non esita a ricorrere a dei metodi che ricordano, in tutto e per tutto, un basso cerimoniale di magia nera).

Ma una volta negato il mistero della condizione umana, il suo insopprimibile bisogno di trascendenza, attestato dalla originarietà e dalla universalità del fatto religioso; una volta negata la vita dell’anima, anzi, la stessa esistenza di quest’ultima; una volta ridotto l’essere umano alle sue componenti chimiche, neurologiche, comportamentali, un po’ come nello schema del cane di Pavlov, che cosa ci resta fra le mani, se non un manichino svuotato della sua reale sostanza umana, della sua specifica dimensione ontologica?

Anche nel secondo aspetto si nota l’influsso devastante di una concezione scientista e neopositivista: se, infatti, l’uomo è un osservatore distaccato della realtà (e si noti che le ultime acquisizioni della fisica subatomica, come il principio di indeterminazione di Heisenberg, negano recisamente un tale modello scientifico: ma i divulgatori dello scientismo a un tanto il chilo non lo sanno, e continuano a diffondere i più vieti luoghi comuni del positivismo), allora viene a  cadere la cosa più importante di cui lo scienziato dovrebbe essere dotato: la compassione.

Così come, ne «Il Saggiatore», Galilei descrive la vivisezione di una cicala senza tradire il benché minimo rammarico, la benché minima pietà verso la bestiola sacrificata in nome della ricerca scientifica, allo stesso modo il moderno psicologo e il moderno psichiatra si guardano bene dal provare la minima empatia per l’essere umano sofferente che si è rivolta a loro per ricevere aiuto: si limitano a formulare la loro diagnosi, a somministrare farmaci, a prospettare percorsi terapeutici in nome di un sapere che essi credono asettico e imparziale, mentre è, nove volte su dieci, la prona sottomissione ad una nuova fede religiosa, anzi ad una nuova setta, che non prevede la possibilità di sbagliare e che, cosa più grave ancora, non ha nulla da dire all’uomo quanto al bene ed al male, ma solo quanto alle tecniche di adattamento e di sopravvivenza in un mondo assurdo, allucinato, dominato da forze incomprensibili.

Ma il mondo è davvero così assurdo e allucinato, così incomprensibile, come afferma questa pretesa scienza moderna, oppure è essa che lo vede così e che formula le sue leggi e i suoi princìpi a partire da una percezione del reale che nasce dalla sua incapacità di porsi in maniera armoniosa, costruttiva e fiduciosa nei confronti del mondo?

Siamo sicuri che i vari Newton e i vari Freud non abbiano descritto il mondo a partire dai loro pregiudizi, dalle loro ossessioni, dal loro disperato pessimismo, e che la loro scienza altro non sia che il delirio di una intelligenza arida, fredda, disumana, incapace di cogliere la bellezza e del tutto priva di compassione per la sofferenza altrui?

Così Danah Zohar e Ian Marshall in «La coscienza intelligente» (titolo originale: «SQ, Spiritual Intelligence. The Ultimate Intelligence», 2000; traduzione italiana di Valeria Galassi, Sperling & Kupfer, Milano, 2001, pp. 27-30):

«In Occidente, la cultura tradizionale e tutti i significati e i valori da essa preservati cominciarono a disgregarsi in seguito alla rivoluzione scientifica del diciassettesimo secolo e alla relativa ascesa dell’individualismo e del razionalismo. Il pensiero di Isaac Newton e di suoi colleghi diede impulso non solo alla tecnologia, che poi portò alla Rivoluzione Industriale, ma anche a una più profonda erosione delle convinzioni religiose e della visione filosofica che avevano fino ad allora caratterizzato la società. La nuova tecnologia apportò molti vantaggi ma spinse anche le popolazioni ad abbandonare le campagne per le città, smembrò comunità e famiglie, soppiantò tradizioni e artigianato e rese quasi impossibile una vita basata su usi e costumi. I valori sociali vennero sradicati dalla terra in cui si erano formati, così come la rivoluzione che ne seguì sradicò l’animo umano.

I princìpi fondamentali della filosofia newtoniana possono essere riassunti con le parole “atomismo”, “determinismo” e “oggettività”. Pur apparendo astratti e remoti, i concetti insiti in questi termini hanno toccato fino in fondo il nostro essere.

L’atomismo è l’idea che il mondo consista, in ultima analisi, di frammenti: particelle isolate nello spazio e nel tempo. Gli atomi sono compatti, impenetrabili: non potendo entrare l’uno nell’altro, interagiscono mediante azione e reazione. Si urtano o si evitano. John Locke, fondatore nel diciottesimo secolo della democrazia liberale, usò gli atomi come modelli per gli individui, considerandoli le unità di base della società. La società come un tutto unico, affermava, era un’illusione:; i diritti e le esigenze degli individui erano la priorità. L’atomismo è altresì il fondamento della visione psicologica adottata da Sigmund Freud, nella sua “Teoria delle relazioni fra gli oggetti”.

Secondo questa teoria, ciascuno di noi è isolato all’interno degli impenetrabili confini dell’ego. Voi siete un oggetto per me e io sono un oggetto per voi. Non potremo mai conoscerci a vicenda in nessun modo fondamentale. L’amore e l’intimità sono impossibili. “Il comandamento di amare il prossimo come se stessi”, disse Freud, “è il più impossibile che sia mai stato scritto”. L’intero mondo dei valori, egli riteneva, era una mera proiezione del Super Io e consisteva nelle aspettative di genitori e società. Simili valori sovraccaricavano l’Io di un impossibile fardello e lo rendevano malato, o “nevrotico”, come diceva Freud. Un uomo veramente moderno, secondo lui si sarebbe liberato da aspettative tanto irragionevoli e avrebbe seguito principi del tipo: ognuno badi a se stesso, la sopravvivenza del più forte, e via dicendo.

Il determinismo newtoniano insegnava che il mondo fisico era governato da leggi ferree: le tre leggi del movimento e della gravità. Tutto, nel mondo fisico, è prevedibile e quindi in ultima analisi controllabile. A uguali condizioni seguirà sempre B. Non possono esserci sorprese. Freud inserì anche il determinismo nella sua “psicologia scientifica”, affermando che L’Io indifeso è manovrato dal basso dagli impulsi delle oscure forze dell’istinto e dell’aggressività situate nell’Es, mentre dall’alto riceve le pressioni delle impossibili aspettative del Super Io. I nostri comportamenti, nel corso di tutta la vita, sono totalmente determinati da queste forze in conflitto e dall’esperienza vissuta nei primi cinque ani di vita. Siamo vittime delle nostre esperienze,  come miserabili comparse di un copione scritto da altri. La sociologia e il moderno sistema giuridico hanno rafforzato questa sensazione.

Benché la maggior parte della popolazione sappia ben poco del determinismo newtoniano, dell’Es e del Super Io di Freud, l’idea che siamo vittime isolate e passive di forze più grandi di noi, che sia impossibile cambiare la nostra vita, figuriamoci poi il mondo, è endemica. Siamo preoccupati, ma non sappiamo come assumerci le responsabilità. Un ragazzo di circa vent’anni mi ha detto: “Mi sentivo confuso di fronte a questo mondo frammentario, e siccome ero incapace di ricavarne un senso o di farci qualcosa, sono scivolato nell’apatia e nella depressione”.

L’oggettività newtoniana, o “oggettivismo”, come io preferisco chiamarlo, ha rafforzato questo senso di isolamento e di impotenza. Nel fondare il suo nuovo metodo scientifico, Newton tracciò una profonda spaccatura tra l’osservatore(lo scienziato) e ciò che egli osserva. Il mondo è diviso tra soggetti e oggetti: il soggetto è “qui dentro”, il mondo ”là fuori”. Lo scienziato newtoniano è un osservatore distaccato che guarda semplicemente il mondo, lo soppesa, lo misura e  conduce esperimenti su di esso. Quello che fa è manipolare e controllare la natura.

L’uomo medio moderno vede se stesso semplicemente nel mondo, non come pare del mondo. In questo contesto “il mondo” include gli altri, comprese le eventuali persone intime, nonché le istituzioni, la società, gli oggetti, la natura e l’ambiente. La spaccatura di Newton tra osservatore/osservato ci ha lasciato la sensazione di essere semplicemente qui per vedercela meglio che possiamo. Anche in questo caso non sappiamo assumerci le responsabilità e abbiamo solo una vaga idea di chi o di che cosa potremmo essere responsabili. Non c’è senso di appartenenza verso i nostri rapporti, né sappiamo come riappropriarci della nostra possibile efficienza.

Infine, il cosmo ritratto dalla scienza newtoniana è freddo, morto e meccanico. Non c’è posto, nella fisica di Newton, per la mente o la coscienza, né per nessun aspetto della lotta umana. Paradossalmente le scienze biologiche e sociali sviluppatesi nel diciannovesimo secolo si sono molto ispirate a questo schema, inserendo gli esseri umani, mente e corpo, nello stesso paradigma meccanico. Siamo macchine mentali o macchine genetiche, il corpo è una collezione di parti, il comportamento è condizionato o prevedibile l’anima un’illusione del linguaggio religioso arcaico il pensiero una mera attività delle cellule cerebrali. Come è possibile trovare il significato dell’esperienza umana in un quadro del genere?»

 

Il soggettivismo estremo, che nasce dallo scetticismo e conduce al senso di isolamento, e l’oggettivismo estremo, che nasce da una ipervalutazione della scienza meccanicista, materialista e riduzionista, che conduce al senso di impotenza e di sconforto, sono, dunque, manifestazioni di una stessa incapacità di porsi in maniera serena, accogliente, armoniosa, davanti alla bellezza del mondo; sono il portato di una maniera arrogante, utilitarista e aggressiva di rapportarsi con gli altri enti, e, in ultima analisi, anche di rapportarsi con se stessi.

Lungi dal poter guidare il cammino dell’uomo moderno, la cultura ereditata dalla visione del mondo atomista e oggettivista è il frutto di una distorsione, di uno squilibrio, di una vera e propria malattia dell’anima: malattia che colora a fosche tinte le lenti con le quali guardiamo il mondo, senza renderci conto che quelle fosche tinte non appartengono alla realtà.

I ciechi non possono condurre altri ciechi, senza che tutti cadano, prima o poi, nel fossato; solo dei vedenti possono condurre i ciechi: ma, perché ciò avvenga, bisogna che i ciechi riconoscano di non essere in grado di vedere e bisogna che si affidino alla guida di coloro che vedono, posto che ve ne siano e posto che siano disposti a sobbarcarsi un tale onere. E coloro che vedono, son divenuti tali perché sanno vedere il Tutto e non solo le singole parti: la loro coscienza, infatti, si è risvegliata…

samedi, 28 janvier 2012

Armin Mohler: discípulo de Sorel e teórico da vida concreta

Armin Mohler: discípulo de Sorel e teórico da vida concreta

amb715fd1078.jpgO “mito”, como a “representação de uma batalha”, surge espontaneamente e exerce um efeito mobilizador sobre as massas, incute-lhes uma “fé” e torna-as capazes de actos heróicos, funda uma nova ética: essas são as pedras angulares do pensamento de Georges Sorel (1847-1922). Este teórico político, pelos seus artigos e pelos seus livros, publicados antes da primeira guerra mundial, exerceu uma influência perturbante tanto sobre os socialistas como sobre os nacionalistas.

Contudo, o seu interesse pelo mito e a sua fé numa moral ascética foram sempre – e continuam a sê-lo apesar do tempo que passa – um embaraço para a esquerda, da qual ele se declarava. Podemos ainda observar esta reticência nas obras publicadas sobre Sorel no fim dos anos 60. Enquanto algumas correntes da nova esquerda assumiram expressamente Sorel e consideravam que a sua apologia da acção directa e as suas concepções anarquizantes, que reclamavam o surgimento de pequenas comunidades de “produtores livres”, eram antecipações das suas próprias visões, a maioria dos grupos de esquerda não via em Sorel mais que um louco que se afirmava influenciado por Marx inconscientemente e que trazia à esquerda, no seu conjunto, mais dissabores que vantagens. Jean-Paul Sartre contava-se assim, evidentemente, entre os adversários de Sorel, trazendo-lhes a caução da sua notoriedade e dando, ipso facto, peso aos seus argumentos.

Quando Armin Mohler, inteiramente fora dos debates que agitavam as esquerdas, afirmou o seu grande interesse pela obra de Sorel, não foi porque via nele o “profeta dos bombistas” (Ernst Wilhelm Eschmann) nem porque acreditava, como Sorel esperara no contexto da sua época, que o proletariado detivesse uma força de regeneração, nem porque estimava que esta visão messiânica do proletariado tivesse ainda qualquer função. Para Mohler, Sorel era um exemplo sobre o qual meditar na luta contra os efeitos e os vectores da decadência. Mohler queria utilizar o “pessimismo potente” de Sorel contra um “pessimismo debilitante” disseminado nas fileiras da burguesia.

Rapidamente Mohler criticou a “concepção idílica do conservantismo”. Ao reler Sorel percebeu que é perfeitamente absurdo querer tudo “conservar” quando as situações mudaram por todo o lado. A direita intelectual não deve contentar-se em pregar simplesmente o bom-senso contra os excessos de uma certa esquerda, nem em pregar a luz aos partidários da ideologia das Luzes; não, ela deve mostrar-se capaz de forjar a sua própria ideologia, de compreender os processos de decadência que se desenvolvem no seu seio e de se desembaraçar deles, antes de abrir verdadeiramente a via a uma tradução concreta das suas posições.

Uma aversão comum aos excessos da ética da convicção

Quando Mohler esboça o seu primeiro retrato de Sorel, nas colunas da revista Criticón, em 1973, escreve sem ambiguidades que os conservadores alemães deveriam tomar esse francês fora do comum como modelo para organizar a resistência contra a “desorganização pelo idealismo”. Mohler partilhava a aversão de Sorel contra os excessos da ética da convicção. Vimo-la exercer a sua devastação na França de 1890 a 1910, com o triunfo dos dreyfusards e a incompreensão dos Radicais pelos verdadeiros fundamentos da Cidade e do Bem Comum, vimo-la também no final dos anos 60 na República Federal, depois da grande febre “emancipadora”, combinada com a vontade de jogar abaixo todo o continuum histórico, criminalizando sistematicamente o passado alemão, tudo taras que tocaram igualmente o “centro” do tabuleiro político.

Para além destas necessidades do momento, Mohler tinha outras razões, mais essenciais, para redescobrir Sorel. O anti-liberalismo e o decisionismo de Sorel haviam impressionado Mohler, mais ainda do que a ausência de clareza que recriminamos no pensamento soreliano. Mohler pensava, ao contrário, que esta ausência de clareza era o reflexo exacto das próprias coisas, reflexo que nunca é conseguido quando usamos uma linguagem demasiado descritiva e demasiado analítica. Sobretudo “quando se trata de entender elementos ou acontecimentos muito divergentes uns dos outros ou de captar correntes contrárias, subterrâneas e depositárias”. Sorel formulou pela primeira vez uma ideia que muito dificilmente se deixa conceptualizar: as pulsões do homem, sobretudo as mais nobres, dificilmente se explicam, porque as soluções conceptuais, todas feitas e todas apropriadas, que propomos geralmente, falham na sua aplicação, os modelos explicativos do mundo, que têm a pretensão de ser absolutamente completos, não impulsionam os homens em frente mas, pelo contrário, têm um efeito paralisante.

Ernst Jünger, discípulo alemão de Georges Sorel

Mohler sentiu-se igualmente atraído pelo estilo do pensamento de Sorel devido à potencialidade associativa das suas explicações. Também estava convencido que este estilo era inseparável da “coisa” mencionada. Tentou definir este pensamento soreliano com mais precisão com a ajuda de conceitos como “construção orgânica” ou “realismo heróico”. Estes dois novos conceitos revelam a influência de Ernst Jünger, que Mohler conta entre os discípulos alemães de Sorel. Em Sorel, Mohler reencontra o que havia anteriormente descoberto no Jünger dos manifestos nacionalistas e da primeira versão do Coração Aventureiro (1929): a determinação em superar as perdas sofridas e, ao mesmo tempo, a ousar qualquer coisa de novo, a confiar na força da decisão criadora e da vontade de dar forma ao informal, contrariamente às utopias das esquerdas. Num tal estado de espírito, apesar do entusiasmo transbordante dos actores, estes permanecem conscientes das condições espacio-temporais concretas e opõem ao informal aquilo que a sua criatividade formou.

O “afecto nominalista”

O que actuava em filigrana, tanto em Sorel como em Jünger, Mohler denominou “afecto nominalista”, isto é, a hostilidade a todas as “generalidades”, a todo esse universalismo bacoco que quer sempre ser recompensado pelas suas boas intenções, a hostilidade a todas as retóricas enfáticas e burlescas que nada têm a ver com a realidade concreta. É portanto o “afecto nominalista” que despertou o interesse de Mohler por Sorel. Mohler não mais parou de se interessar pelas teorias e ideias de Sorel.

Em 1975 Mohler faz aparecer uma pequena obra sucinta, considerada como uma “bio-bibliografia” de Sorel, mas contendo também um curto ensaio sobre o teórico socialista francês. Mohler utilizou a edição de um fino volume numa colecção privada da Fundação Siemens, consagrado a Sorel e devida à pluma de Julien Freund, para fazer aparecer essas trinta páginas (imprimidas de maneira tão cerrada que são difíceis de ler!) apresentando pela primeira vez ao público alemão uma lista quase completa dos escritos de Sorel e da literatura secundária que lhe é consagrada. A esta lista juntava-se um esboço da sua vida e do seu pensamento.

Nesse texto, Mohler quis em primeiro lugar apresentar uma sinopse das fases sucessivas da evolução intelectual e política de Sorel, para poder destacar bem a posição ideológica diversificada deste autor. Esse texto havia sido concebido originalmente para uma monografia de Sorel, onde Mohler poria em ordem a enorme documentação que havia reunido e trabalhado. Infelizmente nunca a pôde terminar. Finalmente, Mohler decidiu formalizar o resultado das suas investigações num trabalho bastante completo que apareceu em três partes nas colunas da Criticón em 1997. Os resultados da análise mohleriana podem resumir-se em 5 pontos:

Uma nova cultura que não é nem de direita nem de esquerda

1. Quando falamos de Sorel como um dos pais fundadores da Revolução Conservadora reconhecemos o seu papel de primeiro plano na génese deste movimento intelectual que, como indica claramente o seu nome, não é “nem de direita nem de esquerda” mas tenta forjar uma “nova cultura” que tomará o lugar das ideologias usadas e estragadas do século XIX. Pelas suas origens este movimento revolucionário-conservador é essencialmente intelectual: não pode ser compreendido como simples rejeição do liberalismo e da ideologia das Luzes.

2. Em princípio, consideramos que os fascismos românicos ou o nacional-socialismo alemão tentaram realizar este conceito, mas estas ideologias são heresias que se esquecem de levar em consideração um dos aspectos mais fundamentais da Revolução Conservadora: a desconfiança em relação às ideias que evocam a bondade natural do homem ou crêem na “viabilidade” do mundo. Esta desconfiança da RC é uma herança proveniente do velho fundo da direita clássica.

3. A função de Sorel era em primeiro lugar uma função catalítica, mas no seu pensamento encontramos tudo o que foi trabalhado posteriormente nas distintas famílias da Revolução Conservadora: o desprezo pela “pequena ciência” e a extrema valorização das pulsões irracionais do homem, o cepticismo em relação a todas as abstracções e o entusiasmo pelo concreto, a consciência de que não existe nada de idílico, o gosto pela decisão, a concepção de que a vida tranquila nada vale e a necessidade de “monumentalidade”.

Não há “sentido” que exista por si mesmo.

4. Nesta mesma ordem de ideias encontramos também esta convicção de que a existência é desprovida de sentido (sinnlos), ou melhor: a convicção de que é impossível reconhecer com certeza o sentido da existência. Desta convicção deriva a ideia de que nunca fazemos mais que “encontrar” o sentido da existência forjando-o gradualmente nós próprios, sob a pressão das circunstâncias e dos acasos da vida ou da História, e que não o “descobrimos” como se ele sempre tivesse estado ali, escondido por detrás do ecrã dos fenómenos ou epifenómenos. Depois, o sentido não existe por si mesmo porque só algumas raras e fortes personalidades são capazes de o fundar, e somente em raras épocas de transição da História. O “mito”, esse, constitui sempre o núcleo central de uma cultura e compenetra-a inteiramente.

5. Tudo depende, por fim, da concepção que Sorel faz da decadência – e todas as correntes da direita, por diferentes que sejam umas das outras, têm disso unanimemente consciência – concepção que difere dos modelos habituais; nele é a ideia de entropia ou a do tempo cíclico, a doutrina clássica da sucessão constitucional ou a afirmação do declínio orgânico de toda a cultura. Em «Les Illusions du progrès» Sorel afirma: “É charlatanice ou ingenuidade falar de um determinismo histórico”. A decadência equivale sempre à perda da estruturação interior, ao abandono de toda a vontade de regeneração. Sem qualquer dúvida, a apresentação de Sorel que nos deu Mohler foi tornada mais mordaz pelo seu espírito crítico.

Uma teoria da vida concreta imediata

Contudo, algumas partes do pensamento soreliano nunca interessaram Mohler. Nomeadamente as lacunas do pensamento soreliano, todavia patentes, sobretudo quando se tratou de definir os processos que deveriam ter animado a nova sociedade proletária trazida pelo “mito”. Mohler absteve-se igualmente de investigar a ambiguidade de bom número de conceitos utilizados por Sorel. Mas Mohler descobriu em Sorel ideias que o haviam preocupado a ele também: não se pode, pois, negar o paralelo entre os dois autores. As afinidades intelectuais existem entre os dois homens, porque Mohler como Sorel, buscaram uma “teoria da vida concreta imediata” (recuperando as palavras de Carl Schmitt).

Karlheinz Weissmann

traduzido por Rodrigo Nunes

causanacional.net

vendredi, 27 janvier 2012

¿Qué es una Guerra Escatológica?

¿Qué es una Guerra Escatológica?

Por Sergio Prince Cruzat

Ex: http://geviert.wordpress.com/

 

I.  Introducción

En este trabajo intento dilucidar el significado de la expresión ‘guerra escatológica’ acuñado por  J. Derrida (1930 – 2004).  La EXPLICACIÓN de la guerra escatológica, no se encuentra en las taxonomías tradicionales de la guerra. Se trata de una problematización propia del filósofo argelino pero que nunca desarrolló. Por lo demás los conceptos mismos de guerra y escatología nunca fueron objeto, por parte de Derrida, de una indagación sistemática. El análisis que yo propongo no es definitivo; constituye un conjunto de conjeturas más que una tesis. Se trata de la descripción de tres escatologías cuyos enunciados son importantes para el estudio de las relaciones internacionales. Lo que presento a la consideración del lector no es otra cosa que un modo de problematización del estudio de la guerra en el siglo XXI.

Cuando se estudia el significado del concepto ‘guerra’, encontramos numerosas taxonomías que remiten a expresiones tales como, guerra convencional, asimétrica, de cuarta generación y, últimamente, guerra irrestricta [1]. No aparece hasta ahora definición alguna de ‘guerra escatológica’. Esto se debe, en gran medida, a que la expresión fue acuñada en un ámbito aparentemente ajeno a los estudios políticos y estratégicos. Esta aparece en un escrito del filósofo posestructuralista francés Jaques Derrida (1930 – 2004). Éste se  titula De espectros de Marx. El estado de la deuda, el trabajo del duelo y la nueva internacional. Data de 1993. En el capítulo II titulado Conjurar el marxismo, se refiere a la  guerra entre escatologías, la guerra por la “apropiación simbólica de Jerusalén”, la verdadera guerra mundial, que demuestra que la promesa neo – evangélica de Fukuyama (1992) no se ha cumplido y sigue siendo sólo eso: una promesa. Fukuyama afirmaba que la caída del comunismo y el triunfo de las democracias liberales marcaban el comienzo de la etapa final en la que no había más lugar para largas batallas ideológicas. En este sentido, la historia habría terminado. El “Fin de la historia”, afirmó Fukuyama, significaría el fin de las guerras y de las revoluciones sangrientas, los hombres podrían satisfacer sus necesidades a través de la actividad económica sin tener que arriesgar sus vidas en ese tipo de batallas. Según Derrida (1992) este evangelio desempeña un papel que excede la trasnominación como cliché retórico e indica la mayor concentración sintomática o metonímica de lo que es irreductible en la coyuntura mundial que tenía [y aún tiene hoy] lugar en Medio Oriente. Allí se movilizan tres escatologías mesiánicas distintas, allí todas las fuerzas del mundo, todo el “orden mundial” participa en la guerra sin cuartel que mantienen, directa o indirectamente las tres religiones del Libro:

[…] la mayor concentración sintomática o metonímica de lo que permanece irreductible en la coyuntura mundial […] tiene su lugar, su imagen o la imagen de su lugar, en Oriente Medio: tres escatologías mesiánicas distintas movilizan allí todas las fuerzas del mundo y todo el “orden mundial” en la guerra sin cuartel que mantienen, directa o indirectamente; movilizan [...]

¿A qué se refiere Derrida cuando habla de la mayor concentración sintomática o metonímica de lo que irreductible en la coyuntura mundial? Veamos. Sintomático es lo que constituye un síntoma de algo y, síntoma, es un indicio que revela un trastorno funcional. Por otra  parte, la  metonimia[2] es un tropo que alude al sentido translaticio. Ambos términos hablan sobre algo haciendo referencia a un otro que se relaciona con el algo de algún modo. Síntoma y metonimia son un hablar, un decir indirecto sobre algo que no es lo hablado o lo dicho. Ambos términos nos indican la existencia de algo velado, inefable que es al mismo tiempo irreductible. En el Corán las metonimias, las metáforas no son un mero recurso retórico, sino que ponen de manifiesto, develan la semejanza entre lo oculto y lo visible. En el libro sagrado del Islam hay una palabra que indica esta conexión, tawhîd. Esta palabra denota la conexión interior entre el mundo espiritual y el material, se refiere a la conciencia de que todo está relacionado, nos recuerda que el mundo no es un conjunto de cosas, sino un conjunto de signos que denotan a otra cosa que no son sí mismo. Una montaña es una palabra, un río es otra, un paisaje es una frase. Todo dice, todo es lenguaje y permanece conectado. Ahora bien, para Derrida lo irreductible es la crisis que afecta una sociedad como resultado de la convergencia de un conjunto relevante de eventos tales como los equilibrios presupuestarios, los imperativos técnicos, económicos, científicos y militares, que están inefablemente vinculados al mundo espiritual. A mayor imposición de estos imperativos materiales  mayor es la irreductibilidad espiritual de una crisis (Derrida, 1991)[3]. Entonces, podemos entender la mayor concentración de metonimia como la mayor cantidad de argumentos espirituales indirectos que demuestran que la Historia se resiste a su fin. Estos argumentos espirituales y materiales se manifiestan con una claridad meridiana en los conflictos, en la crisis permanente que vive el Medio Oriente

Al refutar la tesis de Fukuyama, Derrida abrió,  un nuevo campo de estudio y la posibilidad de una nueva reflexión sobre los conflictos, la guerra y el terrorismo. Todo sintetizado en los acontecimientos del Medio Oriente, en esta guerra sin cuartel que mantienen, directa o indirectamente las religiones del Libro. Estas enfrentan el mundo globalizado en una lucha intestina que tiene rasgos de una guerra civil. Economía y política  de árabes, judíos y cristianos se enfrentan en una lucha sin cuartel que impide la paz prometida por la democracia liberal y el libre mercado que predicó el politólogo de origen nipón.

II.  Los mitemas de las escatologías

Revisemos la estructura o los mitemas[4] de las tres escatologías. Estas comparten la creencia  en una Edad de Oro, en una Teleología de la Historia, en un Demiurgo o un sujeto de la historia y en una sociedad futura: una Jerusalén reconstruida que vendrá al mundo para premiar a los justos.

En la guerra escatológica se enfrentan estructuras fundadas en la creencia de una verdad única, lo que imposibilita un dialogo racional. Cualquier toma y dacca se da entre elementos superficiales. Existe una suerte de dificultad ontológica que impide solucionar el conflicto o acabar con la guerra. El conflicto entre escatologías permite un acuerdo cosmético sólo sobre un tema: los orígenes de la humanidad. Las escatologías comparten lo que llamaré la estructura hesíodica del mito sobre el origen de la humanidad. Comparten la idea de una Edad de Oro que podemos rastrear hasta el poema Trabajos y Días, en donde el poeta relata el mito de las edades:

al principio, los Inmortales, en tiempos de Cronos, crearon una dorada estirpe de hombres mortales, quienes vivían en paz y armonía con los dioses, disfrutando de los deleites de una vida fácil, abundante en riquezas y comodidades, hasta que la vida se les acababa en sueños, sin sufrimiento. Luego, crearon una estirpe de inmortales de plata, de menor inteligencia y belleza. Los niños se criaban bajo la protección de su madre y, ya adultos, vivían poco tiempo lleno de sufrimiento debido a su falta de sabiduría, extremada violencia y falta de respeto por los dioses. Después de que muriera esta estirpe, Zeus creó una tercera, de bronce, interesada solo en la guerra, por lo que la edad de oro es la edad originaria, primigenia, en la cual se vive la unidad original (Hesíodo, [VIII a. C.] 2007).

En lo referente a  la teleología de la historia, su sentido, su finalidad no hay acuerdo posible a pesar de los esfuerzos del ecumenismo. Para las tres religiones del libro este es un tema fundamental ya que expresa el propósito de éstas y  explica la acción presente en pos de aquel futuro lejano. Los especialistas han  distinguido varias formas de teleología, en especial tendientes a diferenciar lo que se entiende por  “finalidad” en las ciencias naturales con lo que se entiende por “finalidad” o propósito en la filosofía y las humanidades en donde se utilizan las nociones de “tendencia, “aspiración”, “intencionalidad” y “propósito para explicar el significado del telos. El fin o el propósito de las religiones del libro es hacer que la fe en la escatología desempeñe un papel efectivo, práctico, reformando la vida humana, preparándola para el gran final.

Sobre este último punto, se presentan las diferencias que impiden el acuerdo de la paz  y que convocan a la guerra para imponer la recta ratio. Los judíos esperan el mesías, los cristianos esperan que el mesías vuelva a gobernar y los islamitas esperan el paraíso en el cual serán premiados con todos los placeres sensuales que les han sido privados en la vida en este mundo. Ni un cristiano ni un judío esperan el paraíso de Alá. Ni un buen islamita espera algo así como la venida del Mesías de origen humano o el Reino de Cristo al final de los tiempos. Así, parece lícito tratar de convertir a los otros a “verdad”. De allí que el otro pase de enimicus a hostis por no aceptar la verdad.

Tener que decidir quién es el sujeto de la historia, el Demiurgo, divide a  las escatologías. Esta decisión implica decidir quién transforma la realidad y mueve la Historia: ¿Yavé? ¿Cristo? ¿Alá? Los atributos de Dios son muy similares en las distintas escatologías, sin embargo, las especulaciones teológicas provocan un abismo insalvable entre ellos. El atributo que da rango de soberano a quienes gobiernan desde el “cielo a sus súbditos, hace imposible la decisión racional. Yavé, Melej haMelajim[5] (rey de reyes de Israel), Alá al-Maalik (el soberano)[6] y Cristo Rey, disputan la soberanía sobre el cuerpo y el espíritu de los seres  humanos.

Aquí surgen preguntas tal como: ¿Qué rey gobierna la historia? o ¿Qué rey gobernará al final de los siglos? En el Medio Oriente combaten los soldados de Dios, los soldados de  Yavé, Jesucristo y Alá. Luchan por establecer un reino, reino de paz, de justicia, de amor pero epistemológicamente excluyente y ontológicamente  intolerante. Por la fuerza de las armas Dios busca imponerse al igual que en las Cruzadas, en las Guerras de religión de Francia, en el Ulster, en los Balcanes, en el Líbano, y en las hostilidades que aún enfrentan a palestinos e israelíes.

En esta lucha del Oriente Próximo se juega el rostro, el carácter que tendrá el Fin de los Tiempos. Por esta razón Derrida pudo afirmar que la tesis del Fin de la Historia de Fukuyama (1992) estaba errada. Es obvio que entonces existían y aún existen fuerzas que luchan, que combaten, que guerrean con la finalidad de imponer su escatología. Una guerra escatológica, una guerra por el Fin de los Tiempos, no se entrega a las reglas del Arte de la Guerra propuestas por  Suntzu, Maquiavelo o Clausewitz. La guerra entre escatologías va más allá de toda regla, de todo límite, de todo concepto tradicional de “soldado” “arma”, y campo de batalla. Por ejemplo, la nueva conceptualización de arma en la guerra entre escatologías considera todos los medios que trascienden el ámbito militar, pero que aún pueden ser utilizados en operaciones de combate. Todo lo que puede beneficiar a la humanidad también puede hacerle daño (Faundes, 2010). Esto quiere decir que no hay nada en el mundo de hoy que no puede convertirse en un arma, y esto requiere pensar que se puede abrir el dominio del reino de armas de un solo golpe: un accidente en un solo mercado de valores, una invasión de virus o el rumor de una o escándalo que dé lugar a una fluctuación en los tipos de cambio del país enemigo o que exponga a los líderes enemigos en Internet, todos pueden ser incluidos en las filas de la nueva concepción de armas (Liang y Xiangsui. (1999:25)[7]

Faundes (2010) también nos dice que observando en detalle el fenómeno guerra, tal como lo describen los coroneles China Liang y Xiangsui (1999)[8], es posible entender que la sutileza es una nueva herramienta que se puede explotar, por medio de ataques imperceptibles que afecten el funcionamiento regular de un país, por ejemplo alterando la calidad del agua, atentando contra los productos de exportación, interviniendo el mercado financiero local, azuzando movimientos en contra del poder político (sindicales y étnicos, por ejemplo), efectuando ataques informáticos, etc. Con todo, una Estado puede estar en medio de una guerra escatológica sin siquiera saberlo, peor aún, desconociendo al adversario. Veamos un ejemplo. El 13 de septiembre de 2010 minuto digital.com[9] informó:

“que tal y como informa España y Libertad en su web, la última ofensiva mediática yihadista data del pasado miércoles: los radicales llaman al “boicot” y a “combatir” a España tras conocer que en Águilas se reabrió una discoteca de nombre La Meca. Los yihadistas, incluso, amenazan con una «gran guerra entre España y el pueblo del Islam”.

A pesar de la violencia del discurso yihadista, no todos los españoles saben que están en medio de un combate escatológico, como el que vivieron hace siglos. La guerra con el Islam no terminó con la conquista de Granada en 1492 y desde entonces las armas se han sofisticado hasta llegar a ser armas de la cotidianeidad. Liang y Xiangsui precisan:

“Lo que debe quedar claro es que el nuevo concepto de armas está en el proceso de creación de nuevas armas que están estrechamente relacionadas con la vida de la gente común”. Con el advenimiento de este nuevo concepto de las armas la guerra escatológica se elevará a un nivel insospechado por la gente común y los militares: “Creemos que algunas personas despertarán por la mañana para descubrir con sorpresa que algunos objetos amables y cotidianos han comenzado a tener características ofensivas y letales (Liang y Xiangsui, 1999:26).[10]

III. Los mitemas del soldado

El soldado que combate al alero de una escatología tiene clara la distinción entre el bien y el mal. Nada más necesario. Esta claridad que no existe entre los filósofos contemporáneos permite al soldado saber que su causa es justa en tanto él es servidor del bien. Esta licenciado y protegido por la bondad que encarna la patria, la patria celestial y / o llamada por Dios a ser el eje de la Historia Universal. Las distinciones entre Bien y Mal suelen coincidir con la distinción amigo enemigo y, siguiendo a Schmitt, puedo afirmar que enemigo, es para el soldado de la escatología, aquel el conjunto de hombres y mujeres  que de acuerdo con una posibilidad real se le opone combativamente. [11] Existe un enorme parecido entre el amigo y el enemigo schmittiano que también se observa entre el amigo enemigo escatológico; son una esencia que los hace existencialmente distintos en un sentido particularmente intensivo que hemos mencionado supra: ‘¿Qué Dios es el motor de la Historia?’ Responder a esta pregunta es lo que lleva, quizás, al punto más extremo de su relación ¿Existe alguien, fuera de ellos, que pueda intervenir en la decisión del conflicto? Schmitt responde a esta cuestión diciendo que sólo es posible intervenir en la medida en que se toma partido por uno o por otro, cuando el tercero se convierte en amigo o enemigo. No hay mediación posible, no hay neutralidad posible en el enfrentamiento entre diferentes telos. El conflicto sólo puede ser resuelto por los implicados, pues sólo a ellos les corresponde decidir si permiten su domesticación o viceversa como una forma de proteger su forma esencial de vida. Las opciones escatológicas se definen entre las escatologías, al combatiente sólo puede triunfar o morir. O vivir con honor o morir con gloria[12], es un emblema que indica la realidad del soldado que combate por el Fin de la Historia. El honor se da al vivir en la bondad, en la verdad, el haber alcanzado el telos, el fin. La gloria, la muerte gloriosa es como la que esperan los soldados del Islam, en una muerte Ad maiorem Dei gloriam.

Disciplina. El soldado de infantería, que llevaba una kipá, sacó una tarjeta colorida del bolsillo de su campera. En el exterior estaba impreso el “Shema” (que significa “Oye, Israel”), que es el credo judío. Y rodeado de coloridas ilustraciones de lugares judíos de todo Israel, se encontraba en la parte interior de la tarjeta una “oración para el combate”:

“¡Señor de los ejércitos, que tienes tu trono por encima de los ángeles! Tú nos has ordenado en tu Torá y nos has dicho: ‘Oye, Israel, vosotros os juntáis hoy en batalla contra vuestros enemigos; no desmaye vuestro corazón, no temáis, no os azoréis, ni tampoco os desalentéis delante de ellos; porque Jehová vuestro Dios va con vosotros, para pelear por vosotros contra vuestros enemigos, para salvaros’ (Dt. 20:3-4). … Puedas Tú ahora estar con los soldados del ejército israelí, con los mensajeros de Tu pueblo que hoy van a la batalla contra sus enemigos. Danos fuerza y valor. Protégenos y pelea Tú nuestra batalla. Fortalécenos, protégenos y guárdanos. Ayúdanos y sálvanos por amor a Tu bondad”[13].

 

 

Bibliografía sugerida

Cohn, Norman.(1995). El Cosmos, el caos y el mundo venidero.  Barcelona: Crítica – Grijalbo Mondadori.

Faundes, C. (2010). Desde la guerra total a la guerra irrestricta. La deconstrucción de un concepto. Tesis para optar al grado de Magíster en Seguridad y Defensa, mención Política de Defensa, Santiago de Chile: Academia Nacional de Estudios Políticos y Estratégicos.

Qiao Liang  y  Wang Xiangsui (1999). Unrestricted Warfare, Beijing: PLA Literature and Arts Publishing House. Disponible en formato pdf en www.c4i.org/unrestricted.pdf.  Visitado 12 septiembre 2010

Orozco, José Luis. (2001). De teólogos, pragmáticos y geopolíticos. Aproximación al globalismo norteamericano. Barcelona: Gedisa-UNAM

Schmitt, Carl. (1999), El concepto de lo político, Alianza Editorial, Madrid..

 

[1]    La guerra irrestricta (超限战, literalmente “guerra allende los límites”) es una guerra combinada que trasciende los límites de las dimensiones y métodos en las dos principales áreas de asuntos militares y no-militares, se deben incluir todas las dimensiones que ejercen influencia sobre la seguridad nacional. Para que una guerra sea irrestricta lo suficiente es que se persiga un objetivo político por medio del ejercicio de la violencia en un sentido amplio, es decir, traspasando el dominio de lo militar para combinar de manera irrestricta elementos de las distintas dimensiones de la seguridad, sobrepasando sus fronteras, por medio de combinaciones en lo supra-nacional, supra-dominio, supra-medios y supra-niveles; todo con el objeto de controlar al adversario. En Latinoamérica, la guerra irrestricta ha sido estudiada por Faundes (2010).

[2] La metonimia (griego: μετ-ονομαζειν met-onomazein [metonomadz͡ein], «nombrar allende’, es decir, ‘dar o poner un nuevo nombre» ), o transnominación, es un fenómeno de cambio semántico por el cual se designa una cosa o idea con el nombre de otra, sirviéndose de alguna relación semántica existente entre ambas. Son casos frecuentes las relaciones semánticas del tipo causa-efecto, de sucesión o de tiempo o de todo-parte.

[3]  Derrida, J. (1991). El derecho a la filosofía desde el punto de vista cosmopolítico. Edición On line disponible en http://www.jacquesderrida.com.ar/textos/derecho_filosofia.htm#_edn2 [Consultado el 1 de agosto de 2010]

[4]  Levi-Strauss, C. (1955). El estudio estructural del mito en Journal of American Folklore, nº 68 p. 428-555. En el estudio de la mitología, un mitema es una porción irreducible de un mito, un elemento constante (a diferencia de un meme cultural) que siempre aparece intercambiado y reensamblado con otros mitemas relacionados de diversas formas, o unido en relaciones más complicadas, como una molécula en un compuesto. Por ejemplo, los mitos de Adonis y Osiris comparten varios elementos, lo que lleva a algunos investigadores a concluir que comparten una misma fuente.

[5] También se le nombra como Elohim, plural de Dios que se usa repetidamente con verbos singulares, y con adjetivos y pronombres en singular, de la que una de sus hipótesis de origen indicaría que podría ser un plural mayestático que significa ‘Dios por sobre todos los dioses’ o ‘Dios de todo’ o podría ser simplemente un plural de majestad para indicar la alta dignidad de la persona divina.

[6] Al-Asmā’ al-Husnà (الأسماء الحسنى), en árabe, “los nombres más hermosos”, también llamados los noventa y nueve nombres de Dios o noventa y nueve nombres de Alá, son las formas de referirse a dios en el Islam.  En su mayor parte son epítetos que hacen referencia a atributos divinos.

[7]  Liang y Xiangsui. 1999:25. Citado en Faundes (2010)

[8] Quiao Liang  and Wang Xiangsui (1999). Unrestricted Warfare, Beijing: PLA Literature and Arts Publishing House

[9]  http://tinyurl.com/365lqgs

[10]  Liang y Xiangsui, 1999:26. Citado en Faundes (2010)

[11] Schmitt, Carl. (1999), El concepto de lo político, Alianza Editorial, Madrid.

[12] Esta postura de Schmitt cambia un poco cuando estudia la neutralidad

[13] Escrito encontrado en la libreta de combate del Sargento Mario Antonio Cisnero. Caído en combate en la Gesta de Malvinas en 1982. http://tinyurl.com/297fwsc

jeudi, 26 janvier 2012

Geopolítica Posmoderna

Geopolítica Posmoderna

Por Sergio Prince Cruzat

Ex: http://geviert.wordpress.com

La geopolítica crítica es posmoderna, por lo tanto, compleja. Hoy, el conocimiento se constituye a partir de los discursos que circulan dando cuenta de nuestras prácticas sociales. Nuestras prácticas están dominadas por tecnologías sofisticadas y, en general, recientes. En cambio, nuestros discursos sociales y políticos son herencias de prácticas cuestionadas. El choque entre las nuevas tecnologías y los léxicos heredados han producido una fragmentación en los procesos de constitución de nuestro conocimiento sobre el espacio y el territorio. Aunque el discurso de la globalización y las propuestas de una geopolítica crítica nos quieran presentar un modelo holístico del mundo, aún somos sujetos fragmentados o multifrénicos. La integración es un proyecto así como la Ilustración fue el proyecto de la Modernidad. En la presente reflexión, pretendo señalar una perspectiva de la conformación actual de nuestro saber y cómo esto afecta los conceptos de territorialidad que sustentan el conocimiento de la geopolítica.

I. Introducción. Modernidad y posmodernidad

 Para explicar esta distinción, seguiremos de cerca a Herrera (1996). El autor nos explica que existe consenso entre los especialistas en que la modernidadse puede entender como sinónimo de Ilustración. Pero ¿qué es la Ilustración? Podemos distinguir entre la Ilustración en el sentido que le da el historiador, es decir, la sensibilidad cultural propia del siglo XVIII, resultado de un proceso que comienza en la Alta Edad Media y, por otra parte, la Ilustración en el sentido que le da el filósofo, es decir, como un esfuerzo reflexivo para explicitar y fundamentar filosóficamente esta sensibilidad cultural, obra llevada a cabo, principalmente, en Alemania por Kant y Hegel.

Kant (1784) en su escrito “¿Qué es la Ilustración?” define Ilustración como “la salida del hombre de su autoculpable minoría de edad” hacia una mayoría de edad gracias a la cual busca determinar su existencia y su acción a partir exclusivamente de la razón. Esta definición implica, entre otras cosas, que para el hombre ilustrado la existencia no es un destino regido por Dios o por la naturaleza.

La Ilustración es un aspiración, una vocación, un fin que debe y puede ser determinada y conquistada autónomamente por el mismo hombre. Es la expresión del fenómeno de la secularización. El hombre ilustrado es alguien que ha abandonado la idea judeo-cristiana de la “religación”. Del mismo modo, kant sostiene que la autoridad y la tradición que hasta la Edad Media fundamentaban el saber sobre el ser y quehacer del hombre, deben ceder el paso a la razón. Es la razón quien debe decirnos cómo se debe definir el ser y el quehacer del hombre: “Atrévete a pensar por ti mismo” fue el lema de la Ilustración.

Herrera (1996) afirma que, a partir de la definición dada, kant explicitará, en sus dos críticas, que la misión del hombre sobre la tierra no es asegurar la salvación de su alma y contemplar la naturaleza para cantar la grandeza de su Creador. En kant (2005 [1781]), desde el punto de vista teórico, es la de dominar y transformar la naturaleza mediante la ciencia y la tecnología para que responda a la dignidad de la persona humana. Se trata de la humanización de la naturaleza.

De acuerdo con el mismo kant (2002 [1788]), esta misión, desde el punto de vista ético, es la de instaurar un reino de libertad, de justicia, de igualdad, de tolerancia, de “paz perpetua”, de reconocimiento de la dignidad de la persona, de respeto de los derechos humanos, de democracia política. En otras palabras, el problema es cómo el hombre podría humanizarse a sí mismo.

Hegel (2002 [1807]) trató de superar a  kant haciendo de la subjetividad trascendental de éste, que le parecía demasiado abstracta, pura y, por lo mismo, vacía, una subjetividad concreta: el espíritu subjetivo absoluto, un universal concreto o, mejor, una totalidad concreta que se expresa en la ciencia, la moral, el arte y en las objetivaciones de la sociedad. Por otra parte, creyó encontrar un principio de inteligibilidad de las diferentes etapas históricas con todas sus contradicciones y fragmentaciones: la esencia de la racionalidad histórica está en la negatividad.

En contra de la razón kantiana que despreciaba la pasión, Hegel proclama que es a través de sus intereses como los hombres hacen la historia, constituyéndose así en “los medios y los instrumentos de algo más elevado, más vasto, que ignoran y realizan inconscientemente”: el espíritu absoluto. La existencia temporal encierra en sí misma la destrucción, la infelicidad, la desgracia. Pero sólo así sirve a lo eterno, sólo así el espíritu absoluto se puede objetivar. A partir de aquí, Hegel realiza la reconciliación de lo finito y lo infinito, de la razón y la sinrazón, de la esclavitud y la libertad. La filosofía, “autoconciencia de cada época”, conlleva la amarga experiencia de la negatividad: el extrañamiento y la alienación. De esta manera, la razón todo lo puede justificar, inclusive los millares de vidas “sacrificadas en el altar de la historia”. Sin ellas, el Absoluto, el fin y el sentido de la historia no se pueden realizar (Herrera, 1996).

El proyecto emancipatorio proclamado por la modernidad ha fracasado. Los hechos están ahí: negación de la dignidad de la persona y de sus derechos, intolerancia, desigualdad, violencia, regímenes políticos represivos, destrucción de la naturaleza, dominio de la técnica sobre el hombre, ente otros grandes temas de la distopía moderna. Muchos autores utilizan una palabra para designar el paso de la modernidad a la posmodernidad: Auschwitz, palabra que designa todos los campos de exterminio construidos por los nazis a partir de la teoría sobre la raza que se consideraba científica y, por consiguiente, fundamentada en la modernidad.

Pensemos en las guerras mundiales, en la bomba atómica, en la destrucción de la capa de ozono, entre otros problemas. Esto nos hace sospechar que la utopía de que la razón con su poder absoluto garantizaba el triunfo de la civilización sobre la barbarie tan sólo fue un simple sueño (Herrera,1996).El término posmodernidad expresa la desazón, el malestar, el desengaño que el hombre actual experimenta frente a las promesas falaces de la modernidad.

Digámoslo en palabras de Lyotard:  “Ya hemos pagado suficientemente la nostalgia del todo y de lo uno, de la reconciliación del concepto y de lo sensible, de la experiencia transparente y comunicable. Bajo la demanda general de relajamiento y apaciguamiento, nos proponemos mascullar el deseo de recomenzar el terror, cumplir la fantasía de apresar la realidad. La respuesta es: guerra al todo, demos testimonio de lo impresentable, activemos los diferendos, salvemos el honor del hombre”  (Lyotard, 1979).22

Ante el fracaso de la modernidad, no son pocos los que asumen una actitud nihilista e irracionalista que nos invita a aceptar como válido cualquier punto de vista y, lo que es peor, a renunciar a todo futuro: vivamos el presente hasta donde nos sea posible, que ya veremos qué pasará mañana. Inclusive, no son pocos los que viven esta autoalienación, esta autodestrucción, como la posibilidad de un goce estético de primer orden. No son pocos los que viven la posmodernidad como el imperio de la arbitrariedad. Para estos, el lema de la posmodernidad sería el “todo vale”, de Heller (1991: 21).

El término posmodernidad expresa, igualmente, la reflexión filosófica queen los últimos años han adelantado autores como Lyotard, Foucault, Derridà, Habermas y Vattimo para comprender, explicitar, validar o invalidar esta sensibilidad cultural del hombre del siglo XX y para descubrir la falla y, por ende, la responsabilidad de la modernidad. Desde este punto de vista, la posmodernidad constituye una crítica a la racionalidad moderna en todos los autores, sin excepción, ya sea que esta crítica culmine con su condenación a muerte, como es el caso de Vattimo, o a reconocer sus errores, pero al mismo tiempo sus virtudes, como en Habermas, que se ha esforzado en redefinir los ideales de la modernidad en función de una nueva realidad social donde reine no la arbitrariedad sino la tolerancia, el antidogmatismo, el reconocimiento de la particularidad y singularidad de los individuos y de las pequeñas comunidades, el respeto por la pluralidad de formas de vida, de manifestaciones culturales, de juegos del lenguaje.

II. La geopolítica crítica como geopolítica de la Posmodernidad

Esta confianza en la razón que promueve el pensamiento Ilustrado es el marco intelectual en el que se desarrolla la geopolítica clásica, aquella fundada por kjellen. Este autor desarrolló, hacia 1916, la idea de “el Estado como organismo viviente” (Der Staat als Lebensform), donde el término geopolítica fue utilizado por primera vez. Su uso se da dentro de la concepción organicista propia del nazismo germano y que también comparten otros modos de pensamiento totalitario (Toal 1996). El organicismo geopolítico es una muestra de Darwinismo social que promueve la “lucha por sobrevivir”. Esta la gana el más fuerte, lo que se objetiva en el mundo –utilizando la terminología hegeliana– en el derecho a poseer la tierra, el territorio. Los espacios vitales en donde se configura la vida. Este organicismo también se aprecia en el pensamiento estratégico del geógrafo alemán F. Ratzel (1891, 1897). Según éste, los Estados tienen muchas de las características de los organismos vivientes. También introdujo la idea de que un Estado tenía que crecer, extender o morirse dentro de “fronteras vivientes”, por ello, tales fronteras son dinámicas y sujetas al cambio.

La racionalidad organicista y los fundamentos filosóficos que la sustentaban sufren un golpe demoledor al enfrentarse al pensamiento crítico y a la racionalidad popperiana que abren las puertas a la posmodernidad y que, entre otras ideas, se caracteriza por la pérdida de fe en la razón y la ciencia, la pérdida de fe en el poder público y una búsqueda de lo inmediato. Los individuos sólo quieren vivir el presente; futuro y pasado pierden importancia. En este ámbito, surge, en la década del noventa, la geopolítica crítica como un movimiento académico radical y que, en oposición a la geopolítica “clásica”, define la geopolítica como un sistema complejo de discursos, representaciones y prácticas, más que como una ciencia coherente, neutral y objetiva. La geopolítica crítica ve la geopolítica como un constructo tripartito que incluye la geopolítica popular, formal y práctica. La versión académica de la geopolítica crítica se ocupa de modo preferente de problemas relacionados con la práctica discursiva de la geopolítica y la historia de la geopolítica.

La geopolítica crítica se ocupa de la operación, interacción y respuesta a los discursos geopolíticos. Esta orientación del posestructuralismo sostiene que las realidades del espacio político global no se revelan simplemente a observadores separados, omniscientes. Los conocimientos geopolíticos se consideran como parciales, cualidades emergentes, situaciones subjetivas particulares. En este contexto, las prácticas geopolíticas resultan de complejas constelaciones de ideas y discursos que compiten y se modifican unos a otros. Por lo tanto, la práctica geopolítica no es derechamente “correcta” o “natural”. Por el contrario, puesto que se considera el conocimiento geopolítico como parcial, situado y corporalizado, los Estados-Nación no son la única unidad “legítima” del análisis geopolítico en la geopolítica crítica.

Por lo tanto, la geopolítica crítica nos ofrece dos miradas distintas pero relacionadas. En primer lugar, busca “abrir” la geopolítica como disciplina y concepto. Hace esto, en parte, considerando los aspectos populares y formales de la geopolítica junto a la geopolítica práctica. Además, se enfoca en las relaciones de poder y su dinámica. En segundo lugar, la geopolítica crítica se ocupa de los temas geopolíticos “tradicionales”, siempre dentro del paradigma democrático, considerando la desterritorialización del conocimiento, utilizando las bases epistemológicas y metodológicas de los estudios interdisciplinarios de la estructura del espacio, considerando la cultura como un fenómeno y un proceso clave y promoviendo el interés medioambiental y el discurso crítico del colonialismo y la globalización.

 III. Conocimiento y territorialidad posmoderna

Quisiera presentar aquí las ideas de Lavandero y Malpartida (2003). Siguiendo a Piaget, los autores afirman que la territorialidad es, en tanto cognición, la cognición efectiva del mundo. La idea de representación es constitutivamente objetual, especialmente, por la idea de trascendencia en el conocer. Así, uno de sus pilares fundamentales es formular la constancia del objeto, la cual resulta ser uno de los elementos cognitivos adquiridos en la niñez y modulados culturalmente (Piaget, 1954). Esta idea de Piaget recogida por los autores nos permite interpretar lo que, desde el punto de vista psicológico, es la relación mapa-territorio, que constituye una de las bases epistemológicas y cognitivas del discurso geopolítico.

Veamos, si siguiéramos la lógica de la Ilustración, buscaríamos una relación objetiva entre mapa-territorio lo que, en otros términos, quiere decir que el mapa es una representación “verdadera” del territorio, por lo que un observador puede llegar a la comprensión efectiva del objeto por medio del estudio cartográfico. Por el contrario, desde la visión piagetiana, nos vemos obligados a establecer la distinción mapa-territorio, ya que la comprensión efectiva del objeto territorio sólo es posible en un proceso de conocimiento trascendente que se configura desde la niñez y que nos facilita la interpretación territorial por la experiencia efectiva de nuestros entornos, lo que nos permite tener configuraciones de significado a partir de nuestra actividad como observadores. Esto nos indica que el mapa no es capaz de capturar la subjetividad cognitiva del observador territorial. En otros términos, el mapa sólo es capaz de generar una representación simbólica del mismo modo que el lenguaje formal puede llegar a ser una representación del lenguaje natural. La cognición efectiva y afectiva del territorio no es posible por medio de la cartografía. Así, Lavandero & Malpartida (2003) han llegado a definir la territorialidad como “un proceso de equivalencia efectiva en el intercambio de mapas o paisajes (configuraciones de significado) a partir de la actividad generada en la actividad de los observadores en los entornos en comunicación”. Asimismo, podemos afirmar que la efectividad cognitiva del territorio emerge en el dominio de lo afectivo. Esta dimensión cognitiva se incorpora al discurso geopolítico crítico cuando se formula la posibilidad de una geopolítica cultural que se ocupa de la territorialidad del lenguaje en la cual no existen límites sino fronteras difusas en permanente cambio e imposibles de captar en la estática de una cartografía invariante.

La nueva geopolítica inserta en su paradigma democrático pone especial atención en el intercambio de cogniciones efectivas dentro del proceso de comunicación que se da entre los observadores. Dicho de otro modo, la efectividad de la cognición territorial es la efectividad de la cultura entendida como un conjunto de configuraciones que pautan el agenciamiento y pertenencia de un observador y su entorno. No existe posibilidad de intercambio territorial cartográfico, ya que la dimensión de lo humano agencia significado a territorialidades virtuales del mismo modo que agencia la territorialidad del espacio geográfico. Esto obliga a la geopolítica crítica a incorporar la noción de paisaje, ausente en la geopolítica organicista de corte clásico. El paisaje ha sido definido por Lavandero & Malpartida como “la aplicación cultural de intercambio sobre configuraciones dentro del proceso de comunicación entre observadores”.

Cuando Ó Tuathail (1996) o Wallerstein (2007) se refieren al aspecto cultural de la geopolítica crítica, declaran de modo implícito la necesidad de construir una cartografía efectiva de los afectos territoriales de los observadores ya que, siguiendo la lógica de la cognición de un territorio, la cultura no es otra cosa que “el conjunto de configuraciones conservativas que pautan agenciamiento y pertenencia para un observador – entorno o un conjunto de ellos dentro de una red de comunicación” (Lavandero & Malpartida, 2003:63).Nos queda por aclarar el concepto de entorno, entendido como “configuraciones relacionales de territorialidad únicas y permanentes para un sistema”. (Lavandero & Malpartida, 2003:63). Las configuraciones relacionales se dan en el lenguaje y permiten la construcción de sentido territorial, es decir, los espacios geográficos se presentan ante nosotros como espacios afectivos en los cuales desarrollamos nuestra vida y construimos nuestro conocimiento del mundo. Los entornos virtuales son de tanta importancia para la geopolítica crítica como los entornos físicos. Lo virtual del entorno en el cual se desarrolla gran parte de nuestra actividad cognitiva se ve destacado por una tendencia filotecnológica que ha otorgado al ciberespacio un valor instrumental y ético impensable dentro de la racionalidad ilustrada moderna. Ni la razón kantiana ni el absoluto hegeliano pueden llegar a representar la complejidad de la configuración afectiva de la virtualidad. La cartografía de los entornos virtuales es de gran importancia a la hora de formular una geopolítica humanista y que haga suyo el principio de desterritorialización.

También debemos destacar que en el pensamiento relacional complejo que sustituye la racionalidad moderna, el concepto de comunicación es fundamental. Así, podemos decir que la territorialidad se puede entender como un acto comunicativo, ya que es en el intercambio de información entre observadores donde surgen las distinciones que configuran la territorialidad subjetiva de ambos. En tanto busquemos un acto de comunicación objetivo, corremos el riesgo de negar la comunicación, ya que si la objetividad se entiende como “lo verdadero”, el intercambio efectivo de los afectos territoriales es absolutamente imposible, ya que al menos en una de las partes existirá la imposibilidad de decodificar la llamada experiencia objetiva de la cognición efectiva del otro. Es así que la comunicación es, para Lavandero & Malpartida (2003:63), “toda actividad que organice el intercambio de configuraciones (formas de la extracción de diferencias) que conserven la relación organismo-entorno. De esta manera, comunicación es una condición de la unidad viva que organiza la relacionalidad y sus formas, las cuales denominamos lenguaje”.

Si continuamos el análisis relacional sustituyendo la lógica bivalente de la racionalidad cartesiana por una lógica compleja que recoge las paradojas, entonces debemos afirmar que la geopolítica crítica en su intento de establecer la relación hombre territorio debe enfrentar la paradoja de la invarianza-cambio. Para explicar esto, recurriremos a una formalización libre desarrollada por Lavandero & Malpartida (2003) que nos permite revisar en forma breve el contenido de esta paradoja. La paradoja de la inavariaza-cambio se da cuando se afirma que el sistema es lo mismo siendo distinto. Ahora bien, desde la relación Observador-Entorno, se da cuando se dice que: “Sea un observador X que configura un conjunto de distinciones y dentro de un contexto de significado particular y que lo organiza como abstracción para un determinado instante tj”. Entonces;

 (Ci (tj)) Obsx ———————– (Ci (tj))

Sea a la vez un observador y que genera para ese mismo contexto y momento tj una configuración f

(Cf (tj)) Obsy ———————– (Cf (tj))

Entonces, Def. Paisaje de la configuración (Mxy): Toda aplicación P que, actuando sobre las configuraciones particulares (Ci (tj)) y ( Cf (tj)), sirva como forma de intercambio dentro de la comunicación entre ambos observadores, así:

P (Ci (tj)) obsx ———– Mx

P (Cf (tj)) obsy ———– My

Sea (Mx ↔ My) → (el observador X & el observador Y generan & comparten territorialidad). Esta territorialidad se computa a partir de las relaciones de equivalencias en los mapas Mx  My. Estas equivalencias se producen en al menos dos ámbitos:

(1)  (Mx, My ↔ (P(Ci, f))

El primer ámbito se manifiesta cuando la forma de generar las configuraciones es similar. Estas configuraciones son invariantes en el tiempo signándoseles un nombre que las hace distintas. El segundo ámbito se manifiesta cuando la otra computación de equivalencias es para tj lo que implica

(2) i[(Mx, My)  (T(Ci, f))]

Finalmente, si  [(Mx, My) ↔T (Ci, f)  (Mx, My↔P(Ci, f))] se dan en el proceso de intercambio, los mapas Mx  My generarían territorialidad o cognición efectiva, lo cual es sólo experienciable en el dominio de los afectos (Lavandero & Malpartida, 2003).

Conclusión

¿Adónde nos lleva el camino que va desde la racionalidad moderna a la complejidad posmoderna? A una geopolítica crítica, posmoderna, a la cual prefiero llamar geopolítica de la complejidad. De la formalización propuesta por Lavandero y Malpartida, se puede concluir que los invariantes y sus cambios son parte de nuestra dinámica relacional como observadores, entonces, no existe posibilidad de formalizar procesos relacionales del observador, ya que el proceso y el resultado son constitutivos de esta relacionalidad, clausurada por la cultura y por su biología del conocer, por lo tanto, son siempre únicos y particulares (Lavandero & Malpartida, 2003). El mapa no es el territorio, y el nombre no es la cosa nombrada. Este principio, hecho célebre por Alfred  korzybski y Gregory Bateson, hace referencia a distintos niveles de nuestros procesos cognitivos y, por las características de su contenido, nos ayudará a clarificar lo que debe ser una geopolítica que asuma los retos del pensamiento complejo. En primer lugar, nos trae a la vista el hecho de que cuando pensamos en territorios o en cartografía de territorios, no tenemos territorios en nuestra mente-cerebro. Aún mejor, la afirmación del fundador de la teoría de la semántica general nos dice que en todo pensamiento o percepción o comunicación de una percepción hay trasformación, codificación. Poner un nombre, nos dice Bateson, es siempre clasificar; trazar un mapa es, en esencia, lo mismo que poner un nombre.

Por otra parte, los desafíos de una cartografía política compleja nos obligana aceptar que no existe la experiencia objetiva. Toda experiencia es subjetiva y toda geopolítica es, en último término, la interpretación subjetiva del territorio conocido efectivamente y configurado en los afectos. El desafío de cualquier nueva geopolítica es permitir y construir la libertad de los ciudadanos-observadores del paisaje democrático.

BIBLIOGRAFÍA

BATESON, G. (1982). Espíritu y naturaleza. Buenos Aires: Amorrortu.

HEGEL (2002[1807]). Fenomenología del espíritu. México:FCE.

HELLER, A. (1991). La controversia posmoderna, Barcelona.

HERRERA, D. (1996). Posmodernidad, ¿ruptura con la modernidad? Revista de Filosofía de México, Nº 82. México.

KANT, I. (1992 [1784]). ¿Qué es la Ilustración? Madrid: Alianza.

kANT (2005 [1781]). Crítica de la razón pura. Madrid: Taurus.28 Revista Política y Estrategia N˚ 108 – 2007academia nacional de Estudios Políticos y Estratégicos

kANT (2002[1788]). Crítica de la razón práctica. Barcelona: Alianza.

kORZYBSkI, A. (1950).  Manhood of Humanity. Fort Worth, Texas: Institute of General Semantics.

kORZYBSkI, A. (1994). Science and Sanity: An Introduction to Non-Aristotelian Systems and General Semantics. Fort Worth, Texas: Institute of GeneralSemantics.

LAVANDERO, L. & Malpartida, A. (2003). La organización de las unidades cultura-naturaleza. Santiago: Corporación Síntesis.

LYOTARD, F. (1979). La condición posmoderna: Informe sobre el saber. Madrid: Cátedra.

Ó TUATHAIL, G. (1996), Critical Geopolitics: The Politics of Writing Global Space. London: Routledge.

PIAGET, J. (1954). La formación del símbolo en el niño. México: FCE.

RATZEL, F. ([1921]. 1891). Anthropogeographie. Stuttgart: J. Hegelhorns Nachf.

RATZEL, F. (1987 [1897]).  La géographie politique: les concepts fondamentaux. Paris: Fayard.

WALLERSTEIN, I. (2007). Geopolítica y geocultura: ensayos sobre el moderno sistema mundial. Barcelona: kairos.

mardi, 24 janvier 2012

L'insolence des anarchistes de droite

L'insolence des anarchistes de droite
 
ADG

Article de Dominique Venner dans Le Spectacle du Monde de décembre 2011

Ex: http://www.dominiquevenner.fr/

Les anarchistes de droite me semblent la contribution française la plus authentique et la plus talentueuse à une certaine rébellion insolente de l’esprit européen face à la « modernité », autrement dit l’hypocrisie bourgeoise de gauche et de droite. Leur saint patron pourrait être Barbey d’Aurévilly (Les Diaboliques), à moins que ce ne soit Molière (Tartuffe). Caractéristique dominante : en politique, ils n’appartiennent jamais à la droite modérée et honnissent les politiciens défenseurs du portefeuille et de la morale. C’est pourquoi l’on rencontre dans leur cohorte indocile des écrivains que l’on pourrait dire de gauche, comme Marcel Aymé, ou qu’il serait impossible d’étiqueter, comme Jean Anouilh. Ils ont en commun un talent railleur et un goût du panache dont témoignent Antoine Blondin (Monsieur Jadis), Roger Nimier (Le Hussard bleu), Jean Dutourd (Les Taxis de la Marne) ou Jean Cau (Croquis de mémoire). A la façon de Georges Bernanos, ils se sont souvent querellés avec leurs maîtres à penser. On les retrouve encore, hautins, farceurs et féroces, derrière la caméra de Georges Lautner (Les Tontons flingueurs ou Le Professionnel), avec les dialogues de Michel Audiard, qui est à lui seul un archétype.

Deux parmi ces anarchistes de la plume ont dominé en leur temps le roman noir. Sous un régime d’épais conformisme, ils firent de leurs romans sombres ou rigolards les ultimes refuges de la liberté de penser. Ces deux-là ont été dans les années 1980 les pères du nouveau polar français. On les a dit enfants de Mai 68. L’un par la main gauche, l’autre par la  main droite. Passant au crible le monde hautement immoral dans lequel il leur fallait vivre, ils ont tiré à vue sur les pantins et parfois même sur leur copains.

À quelques années de distances, tous les deux sont nés un 19 décembre. L’un s’appelait Jean-Patrick Manchette. Il avait commencé comme traducteur de polars américains. Pour l’état civil, l’autre était Alain Fournier, un nom un peu difficile à porter quand on veut faire carrière en littérature. Il choisit donc un pseudonyme qui avait le mérite de la nouveauté : ADG. Ces initiales ne voulaient strictement rien dire, mais elles étaient faciles à mémoriser.

En 1971, sans se connaître, Manchette et son cadet ADG ont publié leur premier roman dans la Série Noire. Ce fut comme une petite révolution. D’emblée, ils venaient de donner un terrible coup de vieux à tout un pan du polar à la française. Fini les truands corses et les durs de Pigalle. Fini le code de l’honneur à la Gabin. Avec eux, le roman noir se projetait dans les tortueux méandres de la nouvelle République. L’un traitait son affaire sur le mode ténébreux, et l’autre dans un registre ironique. Impossible après eux d’écrire comme avant. On dit qu’ils avaient pris des leçons chez Chandler ou Hammett. Mais ils n’avaient surtout pas oublié de lire Céline, Michel Audiard et peut-être aussi Paul Morand. Ecriture sèche, efficace comme une rafale bien expédiée. Plus riche en trouvailles et en calembours chez ADG, plus aride chez Manchette.

Né en 1942, mort en 1996, Jean-Patrick Manchette publia en 1971 L’affaire N’Gustro directement inspirée de l’affaire Ben Barka (opposant marocain enlevé et liquidé en 1965 avec la complicité active du pouvoir et des basses polices). Sa connaissance des milieux gauchistes de sa folle jeunesse accoucha d’un tableau véridique et impitoyable. Féministes freudiennes et nymphos, intellos débiles et militants paumés. Une galerie complète des laissés pour compte de Mai 68, auxquels Manchette ajoutait quelques portraits hilarants de révolutionnaires tropicaux. Le personnage le moins antipathique était le tueur, ancien de l’OAS, qui se foutait complètement des fantasmes de ses complices occasionnels. C’était un cynique plutôt fréquentable, mais il n’était pas de taille face aux grands requins qui tiraient les ficelles. Il fut donc dévoré.

Ce premier roman, comme tous ceux qu’écrivit Manchette, était d’un pessimisme intégral. Il y démontait la mécanique du monde réel. Derrière le décor, régnaient les trois divinités de l’époque : le fric, le sexe et le pouvoir.

Au fil de ses propres polars, ADG montra qu’il était lui aussi un auteur au parfum, appréciant les allusions historiques musclées. Tour cela dans un style bien identifiable, charpenté de calembours, écrivant « ouisquie » comme Jacques Perret, l’auteur inoubliable et provisoirement oublié de Bande à part.

Si l’on ne devait lire d’ADG qu’un seul roman, ce serait Pour venger Pépère (Gallimard), un petit chef d’œuvre. Sous une forme ramassée, la palette adégienne y est la plus gouailleuse. Perfection en tout, scénario rond comme un œuf, ironie décapante, brin de poésie légère, irrespect pour les « valeurs » avariées d’une époque corrompue.

L’histoire est celle d’une magnifique vengeance qui a pour cadre la Touraine, patrie de l’auteur. On y voit Maître Pascal Delcroix, jeune avocat costaud et désargenté, se lancer dans une petite guerre téméraire contre les puissants barons de la politique locale. Hormis sa belle inconscience, il a pour soutien un copain nommé « Machin », journaliste droitier d’origine russe, passablement porté sur la bouteille, et « droit comme un tirebouchon ». On s’initie au passage à la dégustation de quelques crus de Touraine, le petit blanc clair et odorant de Montlouis, ou le Turquant coulant comme velours.

Point de départ, l’assassinat fortuit du grand-père de l’avocat. Un grand-père comme on voudrait tous en avoir, ouvrier retraité et communiste à la mode de 1870, aimant le son du clairon et plus encore la pêche au gardon. Fier et pas dégonflé avec çà, ce qui lui vaut d’être tué par des malfrats dûment protégés. A partir de là on entre dans le vif du sujet, c’est à dire dans le ventre puant d’un système faisandé, face nocturne d’un pays jadis noble et galant, dont une certaine Sophie, blonde et gracieuse jeunes fille, semble comme le dernier jardin ensoleillé. Rien de lugubre pourtant, contrairement aux romans de Manchettes. Au contraire, grâce à une insolence joyeuse et un mépris libérateur.

Au lendemain de sa mort (1er novembre 2004), ADG fit un retour inattendu avec J’ai déjà donné, roman salué par toute la critique. Héritier de quelques siècles de gouaille gauloise, insolente et frondeuse, ADG avait planté entre-temps dans la panse d’une république peu recommandable les banderilles les plus jubilatoires de l’anarchisme de droite.

Notes

Alain Fournier, dit ADG (1947-2004), un pseudonyme choisi à partir des initiales de son tout premier nom de plume, Alain Dreux-Gallou. Une oeuvre jubilatoire plein d ‘irrespect contre les “valeurs” avariées d’une époque corrompue.

dimanche, 22 janvier 2012

L'histoire serait-elle impartiale ?...

L'histoire serait-elle impartiale ?...

Nous reproduisons ci-dessous l'éditorial de Dominique Venner publié dans le dernier numéro de la Nouvelle Revue d'Histoire (n°58, janvier - février 2012) au manichéisme qui sévit actuellement dans la lecture de l'histoire.

 

L'histoire serait-elle impartiale ?

200_Venner.jpgPour tous ceux qui avaient des raisons de combattre la Collaboration, celle-ci fut détestable.  Et de fait, ses aspects haïssables n’ont pas manqué. Pourtant, du côté français, mais aussi du côté allemand, des hommes d’honneur et de foi se sont engagés dans cette voie qu’ils croyaient juste et que l’histoire a condamné. Le plus souvent, ils ont payé leurs illusions au prix fort. Non seulement ils y ont fréquemment perdu la vie, leur liberté et leur existence sociale, mais plus encore la possibilité de faire valoir leurs raisons. Morts ou survivants, il leur fallait endurer une réprobation générale à l’égard d’un engagement réputé ignoble et devenu incompréhensible, L’interprétation imposée par la victoire de leurs adversaires triomphants était à la fois totale et totalitaire (1). En d’autres termes, l’histoire écrite par les vainqueurs impose un manichéisme absolu entre eux-mêmes qui sont associés au Bien, et les vaincus, devenus incarnation du Mal à tout jamais.

Il en est toujours ainsi après une guerre de religions. Et la Seconde Guerre mondiale fut une guerre de religions. Les vaincus perdirent d’un seul coup la possibilité d’être compris. Ce qui les avait justifiés quand ils portaient encore les armes, soudain s’est évanoui, remplacé par le verdict sans appel d’un procès jugé d’avance, où les inquisiteurs triomphants jouissaient du pouvoir de les transformer en d’indicibles criminels pour l’éternité ou presque. Oui, je dis bien l’éternité !

L’empereur Julien, qui pourtant ne fit jamais couler le sang pour la cause qu’il croyait juste, se voit aujourd’hui encore qualifié d’Apostat par la mémoire collective imposée par ses adversaires victorieux. Rien ne sert d’expliquer que cet attribut est aussi calomnieux que scandaleux. Calomnieux, puisque jamais Julien n’adopta la nouvelle religion étrangère contre laquelle il éleva la protestation de sa fidélité. Il ne fut donc pas « apostat », mais fidèle. Si l’on réfléchit un instant, l’attribut dont on continue de l’affubler est également scandaleux. Dans notre monde européen, libre en principe de tout interdit religieux, l’apostasie est en effet une sentence criminelle d’un autre âge, impliquant une condamnation pour l’éternité. En dépit du temps écoulé et des travaux de réhabilitation des historiens, elle a cependant persisté (2).

9782857047841FS.gifPar ce détour, je ne me suis pas éloigné de ma réflexion initiale. L’exemple de l’opprobre attachée au nom de l’empereur Julien, disparu depuis plus de quinze siècles, attire l’attention sur l’écriture de l’histoire après un conflit ayant mobilisé les passions à l’extrême et dont les vainqueurs ont l’exclusivité de la parole publique. Ce que j’ai dit de l’empereur Julien pourrait l’être aussi, bien que de façon plus limitée, pour le grand personnage que fut le Connétable de Bourbon, à tout jamais qualifié de « traître » par une mémoire française qui se confond avec celle de l’État. En son temps, la révolte du Connétable contre François Ier et sa mère qui l’avaient grugé, fut comprise par les contemporains. Le droit féodal et le principe de l’engagement réciproque la justifiaient. Rien de cela ne fut plus admis quand s’imposa plus tard l’idée nouvelle de la nation et de la « trahison » postérieure à 1792 ou 1870.

Nous voici revenus au jugement manichéen que l’histoire inflige aux acteurs des années de l’Occupation. Par deux autres exemples, j’ai montré ce qu’il y a d’incertain dans le jugement historique. Autrement dit, quand un vaincu, devant les fusils qui vont le tuer, s’écrie : « L’Histoire jugera ! », il se remonte le moral au prix d’une chimère. L’histoire n’est jamais un tribunal impartial. Elle est toujours écrite par les vainqueurs. Il arrive cependant qu’une défaite ultérieure des anciens vainqueurs, une défaite « historique », c’est-à-dire sans appel, accorde une revanche inattendue aux vaincus. Il en a été ainsi en Russie pour les Blancs, réhabilité par l’effondrement absolu du système qu’avaient édifié les Rouges après 1917.

Dominique Venner (La Nouvelle Revue d'Histoire n°, janvier-février 2012)

Notes

1. Totalitaire : qui s’impose à tous et en toute chose, pénétrant la vie privée au même titre que le vie publique.

2. Grand historien récemment disparu, Lucien Jerphagnon, chrétien lui-même, s’indignait de l’éternisation de la condamnation posthume portée contre le jeune empereur auquel il consacra une captivante et riche biographie, Julien, dit l’Apostat (Tallandier, 2008).

Dominique VENNER: Is de geschiedenis werkelijk onpartijdig… ?

Dominique VENNER:

Is de geschiedenis werkelijk onpartijdig… ?

Hieronder vindt u het editoriaal van Dominique Venner in het laatste nummer van La Nouvelle Revue d'Histoire (nr. 58, januari - februari 2012) over het manicheïsme dat tegenwoordig heerst in de manier waarop men de geschiedenis uitlegt.

Landsknechte.jpgVoor hen die goede redenen hadden om de collaboratie te bevechten, was deze verwerpelijk. Het heeft de collaboratie inderdaad niet aan verfoeibare aspecten ontbroken. Niettemin hebben zich zowel aan Franse als aan Duitse zijde mensen in eer en geweten ingezet voor deze weg, waarvan zij dachten dat hij de juiste was, en die achteraf door de geschiedenis werd veroordeeld. Heel vaak hebben ze hun illusies cash betaald. Niet enkel hebben ze er vaak het leven bij gelaten, of hun vrijheid en hun sociaal bestaan verloren, maar meer nog bleven ze verstoken van de mogelijkheid om hun beweegredenen te duiden. Zowel de overledenen als de overlevenden werden blootgesteld aan de algemene veroordeling van een engagement dat als weerzinwekkend werd afgeschilderd en dat onbegrijpelijk was geworden. De interpretatie die door de overwinning van hun zegevierende tegenstanders werd opgelegd was tegelijkertijd totaal en totalitair (1). Met andere woorden, de geschiedenis, die door de overwinnaars wordt geschreven, legt een absoluut manicheïsme op tussen deze laatsten enerzijds, die geassocieerd worden met het Goede, en de overwonnenen anderzijds, die tot in de eeuwigheid het Kwade belichamen.

Zo gaat het altijd na een godsdienstoorlog. En de Tweede Wereldoorlog was wel degelijk een godsdienstoorlog. De overwonnenen verloren in één klap de mogelijkheid om begrepen te worden. Wat hen rechtvaardigde toen ze nog wapens droegen, verdween in één klap en werd vervangen door een verdict van een proces zonder beroepsmogelijkheid, waarvan de uitkomst op voorhand vaststond, met triomferende inquisiteurs die genoten van de macht die hen in staat stelde hun tegenstanders voor de eeuwigheid – of zo goed als - te veranderen in uitgespuwde criminelen. Ja, ik zeg wel degelijk “voor de eeuwigheid”!

Keizer Julianus, die nochtans nooit bloed liet vloeien voor een zaak die hij als de juiste aanzag, wordt vandaag nog steeds uitgemaakt voor “afvallige” door het collectieve geheugen dat werd opgelegd door zijn zegevierende tegenstanders. Uitleggen dat dit predikaat even lasterlijk als schandalig is, heeft weinig zin. Lasterlijk, omdat Julianus zich nooit bekeerde tot de vreemde nieuwe religie waartegen hij uit trouw protesteerde. Hij was dus niet “afvallig”, maar trouw. Wanneer men wat verder nadenkt, beseft men dat de bijnaam waarmee men hem bedenkt ook schandalig is. In onze Europese wereld, die in principe vrij is van religieuze verboden, is afvalligheid een crimineel vergrijp dat dateert uit een ander tijdperk en eeuwige verdoemenis met zich meebrengt. Ondanks het vervliegen van de tijd en de rehabilitatie door historici blijft deze desondanks aan hem kleven (2).

Ik ben langs deze omweg niet afgeweken van mijn initiële bedenking. Het voorbeeld van de schandvlek die kleeft aan keizer Julianus, die meer dan vijftien eeuwen geleden gestorven is, vestigt de aandacht op de geschiedschrijving na een conflict dat de emoties tot in het extreme heeft beroerd en waarvan de overwinnaars over de exclusiviteit van het publieke woord beschikken. Wat ik geschreven heb over keizer Julianus geldt evenzeer, zij het in beperktere mate, voor de Konstabel van Bourbon, die voor altijd het stigma van « verrader » kreeg opgekleefd door een Frans geheugen dat zichzelf verwart met het geheugen van de staat. Indertijd kon de opstand van de Konstabel tegen Frans I en diens moeder, die hem geruïneerd hadden, op begrip rekenen bij zijn tijdgenoten. Het feodale recht en het principe van de wederzijdse verbintenis rechtvaardigden deze opstand. Dit verdween toen later de nieuwe idee van de natie en van het “verraad” na 1792 of 1870 ingang vond.

Laat ons nu terugkeren naar het manicheïstische oordeel dat de geschiedenis velt over de actoren van de collaboratiejaren. Met twee voorbeelden heb ik de onzekerheden in het historische oordeel aangetoond. Een overwonnene maakt zich dus illusies, wanneer hij voor het vuurpeloton uitroept dat de geschiedenis wel zal oordelen. De geschiedenis is nooit een onpartijdige rechtbank. Zij wordt altijd geschreven door de overwinnaars. Het gebeurt evenwel dat een latere nederlaag van de vroegere overwinnaars, een « historische » nederlaag, namelijk ééntje zonder mogelijkheid om ze ongedaan te maken, uiteindelijk toch nog onvoorzien gelijk geeft aan de vroegere overwonnenen. Zo is het bijvoorbeeld in Rusland gelopen met de Witten, die door de volledige ineenstorting van het systeem dat door de Roden na 1917 was opgebouwd, werden gerehabiliteerd.

Dominique Venner (La Nouvelle Revue d'Histoire nr. 58, januari - februari 2012)

Voetnoten :

1. Totalitair: wat zich aan alles en iedereen opdringt, en zowel het openbare als het privé-leven binnendringt.

2. De grote, onlangs overleden historicus Lucien Jerphagnon, die zelf christen is, was verontwaardigd over de vereeuwiging van de postume veroordeling van de jonge keizer, aan wie hij een boeiende en rijke biografie heeft gewijd: Julien, dit l’Apostat (Tallandier, 2008).

samedi, 21 janvier 2012

De Theologie van de Politieke Correctheid

De Theologie van de Politieke Correctheid

 

Ex: http://vrijenationalisten.blogspot.com/
“Religie is de opium van het volk” is wellicht een van de meest herhaalde en verkeerd begrepen uitspraken van Karl Marx. In de correcte context zien we een erkenning van de noodzaak voor mensen om zich tot religie te keren om hun ziel te verlichten en om een comfort te creëren waar deze niet gevonden kan worden. Het is de manier waarop mensen orde vinden in een chaotische wereld. Het is een cocon tegen het nihilistische universum en een geloof in een buitenmenselijk bewustzijn. Het is een geloofssysteem dat mensen hun sterkste emotionele vermogens gebruiken en als zodanig het meest effectieve middel is om mensen te binden aan diegenen die dit zullen exploiteren voor hun eigen doelen en macht. 
“Religie is het zelfbewustzijn en zelfvertrouwen van de mens die nog niet is doordrongen van zichzelf of zichzelf alweer heeft verloren. Maar de mens is geen abstract wezen dat buiten deze wereld staat. De mens vormt de wereld van de mens – Staat en samenleving. Deze Staat en samenleving produceren religie, dat een omgekeerd bewustzijn van de wereld is, omdat zij een omgekeerde wereld zijn. Religie is de algemene theorie van deze wereld, haar encyclopedische compendium, haar logica in een populaire vorm, haar enthousiasme, haar morele sanctie en haar universele basis van consolidatie en rechtvaardiging. Het is de fantastische realisatie van de menselijke essentie omdat de menselijke essentie nog geen echte realiteit heeft verworven. Een strijd tegen religie is om die reden dan ook een strijd tegen een wereld wiens spirituele aroma religie is. Religieus lijden is, op hetzelfde moment, de expressie van echt lijden en een protest tegen echt lijden. Religie is de zucht van het onderdrukte wezen, het hart van een harteloze wereld, en de ziel van zielloze condities. Het is de opium van het volk. De afschaffing van religie als het illusoire geluk van het volk is de eis voor hun echte geluk. Om hen op te roepen om hun illusies op te geven is om hen op te roepen een conditie op te geven die illusies nodig heeft. “ Karl Marx
In het begin van de eenentwintigste eeuw kunnen we in de Westerse wereld terug kijken en de afname zien van de theocratische controle binnen Westerse samenlevingen. Samenlevingen welke langzaam en pijnlijk, en niet zonder martelaars, de opgelegde lasten van religieuze geloofsystemen van zich af hebben weten te werpen. De Westerse wereld heeft besloten om op eigen benen te gaan staan en de grote leegte en betekenisloosheid van het bestaan te confronteren zoals het is, en niet zoals we willen dat het is.
Echter met de afname van de macht van de kerk, hoeven we niet noodzakelijk het einde van religie te zien. Nieuwe religies verschijnen om de leegte op te vullen. New-Age religies, verschillende samenzwerende cults en sekten, Oosterse religies en mysticisme en wellicht de meest prominente van allemaal de Politieke Correctheid. Politieke Correctheid is een moreel systeem dat wordt gebruikt om vorm te geven aan taal, gedachten, beleid en sociale standaarden ter ondersteuning van de Links Liberale idealen. Politieke Correctheid is niet ontstaan als resultaat van wetenschappelijke studie noch is het gebaseerd op een hypothetisch feit dat is aangetoond, het is eerder een systeem dat is geformuleerd om in een bepaalde politieke behoefte te voorzien. Het is een systeem van geloof, gebaseerd op een geloof.
Op veel gebieden zijn er duidelijke parallellen tussen Politieke Correctheid en religie. Het gedraagt zich in veel gevallen net als religie, het vervult dezelfde behoeften als religie. We kunnen gerust stellen dat Politieke Correctheid een religie is. Het is een moderne, gedecentraliseerde kerk. Het is de religie waarbij iedereen een priester of dominee kan worden en daarom macht over mensen kan uitoefenen. Het is de denkwijze waarvan men kan eisen dat mensen het accepteren zonder bewijs te zien. Het is de moderne ideologie die mensen niet enkel van de religie kan verbannen, maar die mensen uit de samenleving kan verbannen omdat ze niet dezelfde ongefundeerde aannames maken.
Om een moraal systeem te adopteren dat Politieke Correctheid voorschrijft is het maken van morele besluiten gebaseerd op geloof in plaats van feiten. Het is de acceptatie van de moraliteit van de “Hoge Priesters” van de Politieke Correctheid zonder vragen en zonder kritiek. Politieke Correctheid heeft haar eigen doctrine, haar eigen hoge priesters, haar eigen zonden, inquisitie en ketters. Het is op geloof gebaseerd omdat het werkt op onderliggende aannames die worden gemaakt zonder enig bewijs dat die aannames ondersteund. Het definieert welke idealen progressief zijn en welke regressief zijn en neemt het gewoon voor waarheid aan, steunend op de aanhangers die geloven dat het zo is. Het is gewoon een nieuwe poging om orde te vinden waar deze niet bestaat en een veilige cocon te creëren waarin de mensheid een vaststaand lot heeft, waar de natuur meegaand en respectvol is in plaats van onverschillig. Politieke Correctheid beschrijft, net zoals vele andere religies, een wereldbeeld waar de universiteit, het leven op aarde en de mensheid wordt aangepast om op de  “wishful thinking” tegemoet te komen. Het geeft de impressie dat de mensheid in een staat van harmonie en vrede zou leven als men enkel de Politiek Correcte doctrines zou volgen.
De Oorspronkelijke Zonde
Genesis begint met Adam en Eva, de twee creaties van God in de tuin van Eden. De slang overtuigde Adam en Eva om het fruit te eten van de boom van de kennis van goed en kwaad. De slang deed dit met weinig moeite en volgens de geschriften moest de mens het paradijs verlaten vanwege ongehoorzaamheid aan God.
“Door één mens is de zonde in de wereld gekomen en door de zonde de dood, en zo is de dood voor ieder mens gekomen, want ieder mens heeft gezondigd.  Er was al zonde in de wereld voordat de wet er was; alleen, zonder wet wordt er van de zonde geen rekening bijgehouden. Toch heerste de dood in de tijd van Adam tot Mozes over alle mensen, ook al begingen ze met hun zonden niet dezelfde overtreding als Adam. Nu is Adam de voorafbeelding van hem die komen zou.” - Romeinen 5: 12-19 

De zonde die door Adam was begaan veroordeelde toekomstige generaties voor de eeuwigheid, ondanks hun gedrag, ondanks iedere moeite die zij doen om niet te zondigen, tot de dood. Er zijn geen manieren om de ketting te breken en de vlek van de erfzonde te doen verdwijnen. De schuld is automatisch en wordt geërfd bij de verwekking, bijna alsof er genen zijn voor de oorspronkelijke zonde. Mensen zijn gedoemd om naar de Hel te gaan en enkel bepaalde acties kunnen hen redden van deze vurige ondergang. Het is niet genoeg om zonder zonden te blijven, het is niet genoeg om eerlijk, liefhebbend en genereus te zijn, het is niet genoeg om een gouden hart te hebben. Enkel wat de religieuze doctrine voorschrijft kan verlossing bieden.
Dit is een zeer krachtig concept. Ten eerste creëert het wijdverspreide propageren en indoctrineren van deze religieuze doctrine dat er massa’s aan mensen zijn die dit lot willen ontlopen. Ten tweede kan jij en enkel jij de uitweg bieden.
Een persoon kan niet ontsnappen van deze situatie omdat deze bevlekt is sinds de geboorte. Zij hebben geen enkele keus hierbij en hebben geen middelen om de oorspronkelijke zonde tegen te gaan. Dit is het morele equivalent van het creëren van eeuwige dienaren die een morele schuld erven vanaf de geboorte. Een schuld van oneindige kwantiteit die nooit afbetaald kan worden. De Kerk fungeert als een bemiddelaar tussen de schuldenaar en de schuldeiser en heeft dus een positie van macht. Hoewel de Christelijke doctrine van de “Oorspronkelijke Zonde” refereert naar de mens die tegen God zondigt en niet tegen andere mensen, hebben velen de taak op zich genomen om te handelen als schuldeisers voor God. De morele schuld die men vanaf de geboorte heeft zorgt ervoor dat individuen slaven worden van een ander die dit geloofssysteem weet te benutten voor eigen doeleinden.
Het voordeel van het verspreiden van zo’n geloof is duidelijk. Financiële schulden kunnen afbetaald worden waardoor de schuldenaar wordt verlost van de schuldeiser wanneer de schuld is afgelost. Hun nazaten zijn eveneens verlost van deze schuld omdat deze niet langer bestaat. De “Oorspronkelijke Zonde” biedt niet een dergelijke uitweg, de termen van aflossing zijn permanent en zullen door iedere generatie worden geërfd. Generatie na generatie gelooft dat zij zijn geboren met deze zonde. De Theocratie kan vervolgens claimen dat zij de enige middelen voor verlossing bieden. De vraag of het moreel is om iemand “zonde” te laten erven kan niet gesteld worden omdat dit ketterij zou zijn.              
Blanke schuld
De term “Oorspronkelijke Zonde” refereert aan de allereerste transgressie van mensen tegen de wil van God. De kracht van dit concept ligt in haar eeuwigdurende karakter. De “Oorspronkelijke Zonde” is een smet in de bloedlijn. Het hoeft niet noodzakelijk te bestaan om macht over mensen te hebben. Het feit dat iemand gelooft in een smet van zonde bij zijn voorouders is al voldoende.  

Blanke schuld is simpelweg de schuld die Westerlingen van Europese afkomst voelen vanwege de slechte behandeling van andere etnische groepen door blanken. Mensen voelen deze schuld vrijwillig, omdat zij leren over vroegere gebeurtenissen waarvan zij geloven dat deze onjuist waren en waarbij ze een gevoel van compassie en empathie hebben voor de slachtoffers. Of mensen krijgen blanke schuld opgelegd doordat ze geïndoctrineerd worden om te accepteren dat blanken andere etnische groepen en minderheden zouden hebben onderdrukt.
De relatie tussen “blanke schuld” en Politieke Correctheid zijn opvallend gelijk aan de relatie tussen “Oorspronkelijke Zonde” en de oude Theocratieën. Politieke Correctheid heeft dit geëxploiteerd voor vergelijkbare misdadige doeleinden. Het promoot dit idee als een middel om meer eeuwigdurende dienaars te creëren. Blanke mensen die “de schuld” van hun voorouder erven zijn gewillig om herstel betalingen te doen aan diegenen die “kwaad” gedaan zijn, de Politiek Correcte “Priesters” zijn hierbij de schuldeisers. De schuld wordt afbetaald met onderdanigheid en het adopteren van het moraal dat het Liberalisme van ons vraagt.    
Voor een ideologie die het idee aanhangt dat mensen moeten worden behandeld volgens hun individuele daden en karakter is “blanke schuld” een duidelijke uitzondering op deze regel, dit geeft de Politieke Correctheid veel macht. Zoals bij de “Oorspronkelijke Zonde” waar men niet kan kiezen om geboren te worden als een mens zonder zonde, ken men eveneens niet kiezen om als bepaalde etniciteit geboren te worden. Ondanks dat zij zelf geen zonde begaan hebben, worden ze eeuwige dienaars van de Politieke Correctheid. Men moet eerst de morele positie accepteren of men verantwoordelijk kan worden gehouden voor de misstanden begaan door je voorouders. Deze vraag stellen staat, net als bij de “Oorspronkelijke Zonde”, gelijk aan ketterij. Politieke Correctheid richt zich niet op een individuele compassie tegen minderheden, maar eist dat het individu de Politieke Correctheid volgt en de Politiek Correcte doctrine blind en volledig volgt. De Politiek Correcte theocratie, de intellectuelen, politici en andere zelfbenoemde leiders die deze religie van rechtvaardigheid, tolerantie en harmonie bepleiten eisen allereerst onderdanigheid aan hun eigen doctrine en hun bevelen.       
Mensen die zich verzetten tegen de oproep om zich schuldig te voelen en zich te onderwerpen aan de wil van Liberalisme en Linkse Politieke Correctheid richten zich op de aard van de zogenaamde misdaden. Veel tijd wordt gestoken om de ernst van de historische gebeurtenissen te verminderen of het te rechtvaardigen. Sommigen stellen zelfs dat andere etniciteiten beter af waren na de blanke kolonisatie. Anderen proberen om historische gebeurtenissen te weerleggen. Deze pogingen zijn niks meer dan pogingen om de “Oorspronkelijke Zonde” van “Blanke Schuld” te vernietigen door de zonde zelf aan te vechten. De zogenaamde “zondes” waar enkel en alleen Blanke volkeren schuldig aan zouden zijn, zijn in realiteit door de gehele geschiedenis en door de gehele wereld door allerhande rassen en etniciteiten begaan. Men kan discussiëren over het feit dat bepaalde gebeurtenissen fout of niet fout waren, maar dat is niet van belang. Zulke wreedheden zijn eerder een eigenschap van de mensheid als geheel dan van een bepaalde groep, maar ook dit punt is irrelevant. 
Wat veel mensen zich niet realiseren is dat het niet om de (universeel gepleegde) misdaden en wreedheden gaat, maar dat het erom gaat of het moreel is om te suggereren dat iemand die zich nooit daaraan schuldig heeft gemaakt de schuld ervan moet dragen. Wat de tegenstanders van Politieke Correctheid niet begrijpen is dat we niet te maken hebben met een moreel systeem dat objectief is afgeleid van bewijs en historische precedenten, maar dat we te maken hebben met een moreel systeem dat zich baseert op geloof. Men moet zonder reden accepteren dat men schuldig kan zijn aan de “misdaad van vorige generaties”.
Er is geen enkele basis om erfgenamen schuldig te maken voor de misdaden van hun voorouders. De argumenten over deze misdaden, wat er gebeurt is, wie er benadeeld is, en met welke kwantiteit is volkomen irrelevant. Het gaat erom of het moreel acceptabel is om te suggereren dat mensen zich schuldig moeten voelen omdat ze Westers of Blank zijn. Accepteren dat mensen vanwege hun etniciteit niet erfelijke en niet doorgeefbare aspecten van eerdere generaties zich schuldig moeten voelen is racistisch op zichzelf. De oproep voor Westerlingen om zich te onderwerpen aan bepaalde ideologieën vanwege “schuld” of morele schuldaflossing is een oproep voor blinde onderwerping. Het geeft bepaalde mensen macht door andere mensen te bedwelmen. Politieke Correctheid is een religie die eist dat mensen vanwege de identiteit die zij geërfd hebben hun eigen identiteit vernietigen.   
De manier om te breken met deze ketenen is simpelweg door te erkennen wat de Politiek Correcte klucht echt is; een klucht. Het creëren van “morele schuld” door immoreel mensen te laten geloven dat ze een bepaalde schuld delen. Het is al eerder uitgeprobeerd en succesvol gebleken, echter omdat er geen God figuur is wordt het niet erkend als de verraderlijke religie die ontworpen is om enkele de macht te geven over velen.  

G James

Karl A. Wittfogel: oosterse samenlevingen, hydraulische samenlevingen en oosters despotisme

Karl A. Wittfogel: oosterse samenlevingen, hydraulische samenlevingen en oosters despotisme

 

Tussenkomst van Robert Steuckers op de 8ste Zomeruniversiteit van "SYNERGIES EUROPÉENNES", Gropello de Gavirate, zomer 2000

 

Waarom dienen we ons vandaag de dag nog onledig te houden met de biografie, het werk en de werkingscontext van Karl August Wittfogel?

Drie belangrijke redenen hebben ons ertoe gebracht om op deze 8ste zomeruniversiteit van "Synergies Européennes" het onderwerp Karl August Wittfogel aan te snijden. Het doel van deze zomeruniversiteit is om, net zoals de voorgaande edities, allerlei vergeten of zelden geraadpleegde auteurs binnen de culturele niche waarin wij werkzaam zijn opnieuw in de belangstelling te plaatsen. 

Ten eerste, omdat Wittfogel een groot Duits-Amerikaans socioloog was, aan wie we belangrijke concepten, zoals de “oosterse samenleving”,de “hydraulische samenleving” en het “oosters despotisme” te danken hebben. 

De tweede reden ligt vervat in het dubbele culturele milieu dat hem heeft voortgebracht: aan de ene kant de Wandervogel-beweging, aan de andere kant de ontluikende Duitse communistische beweging, de USPD, en later de KPD, om dan in dit marxistisch milieu te eindigen bij de beroemde “Anti-imperialistische Liga”, die fungeerde als overgangsveld tussen partijcommunisten en de nationaal-revolutionaire beweging, verenigd in hun revolte tegen het westen. 

De derde reden, tenslotte, is van theoretische en filosofische aard. Wittfogel is iemand die Marx op een originele en vruchtbare manier aanvult, zoals we nog zullen zien. Wittfogel verduidelijkt een aantal bronnen die van belang zijn voor het denken van Marx en die tevens de vitale bronnen van ons eigen politieke traject vormen:
- het culturele relativisme van Herder,
- het denken van Montesquieu, dat geworteld is in de tijd ,de ruimte, het klimaat en de etniciteit,
- de geografie van Carl Ritter, de vader van de moderne cartografie (cf. Robert Steuckers, "Carl Ritter", in: Encyclopédie des Oeuvres philosophiques, PUF, 1992; en "Aux sources de la géopolitique allemande: la vision de Carl Ritter", in: Vouloir, n°9-nieuwe serie, 1997).


Wittfogel voegt aan dit drievoudig corpus een rationalistische noot toe, die eigen is aan de Franse Verlichtingsfilosofen, meer bepaald door geregeld het materialisme van d'Holbach en d'Helvétius aan te halen. Wittfogels eerste doelstelling ligt in het benadrukken van de historiciteit van de fenomenen, teneinde hen uit de vergeetput van de verstarde corpora te halen, die altijd een symptoom van mentale blokkering zijn en de reden vormen voor politieke inertie, die uiteindelijk tot de ondergang leidt.

In die zin beschouwt Wittfogel het marxisme en zijn filosofische, politieke en revolutionaire optie als een instrument dat kan bijdragen tot de “ontgrendeling” van fenomenen, door hen uit té verstarde en té nauwe conceptuele corsetten te bevrijden, die hen van de tijd vervreemden. Het dringt blijkbaar niet door tot Wittfogel dat het marxisme zelf verstrikt is geraakt in dogma’s, meer bepaald vanaf de opname van de sociaal-democratie in het Duitse politieke leven vóór 1914. De jonge Wittfogel heeft, in tegenstelling tot de nationaal-revolutionaire discipelen van Sorel (ook deze in Duitsland), de les van de dissidente socialistische theoreticus Roberto Michels niet onthouden, die de transformatie van de SPD naar een gesloten politieke oligarchie hekelde. Michels hakte vol ironie in op wat hij noemde de Verbonzung, de Verkalkung en de Verbürgerlichung van het socialisme, zelfs vóór het uitbreken van de Eerste Wereldoorlog (deze Duitse polemische termen betekenen: “bonzificering”, zijnde de voortschrijdende overheersing door de “bonzen”, aderverkalking en verburgerlijking).   

Een reële interesse voor de geopolitiek 

Wittfogel rehabiliteert volledig de rol van de geografie in het politieke denken. Zijn voornaamste inspiratiebron in dezen is Montesquieu, die zich gebogen heeft over het belang van het klimaat. Wittfogel haalt tevens de aarde aan, die de sokkel voor een precieze landbouwproductie vormt, en die verschilt naargelang de plaats en de bevolking die erop leeft. Wittfogel ontwijkt evenmin de etnische of zelfs raciale factoren, en citeert in het bijzonder Hippolyte Taine (men is zich sinds de werken van Zeev Sternhell bewust van de belangrijke rol die Taine gespeeld heeft in de groei en de consolidering van de Franse “revolutionare rechterzijde”). Wittfogel interesseert zich vanaf dan voor de geopolitiek van zijn tijd: hij citeert beurtelings Richthofen, Kjellén, Ratzel, Haushofer, en, om wat tegengewicht te bieden aan die ruimtedenkers die men veeleer in het “conservatief-revolutionaire” kamp kan plaatsen, haalt hij vaak de Amerikaanse Ellen Semple en de Engelsman J. F. Horrabin aan, die beide tot het socialistische kamp behoren. Horrabin ziet zichzelf als leerling van de anarchistische Franse geograaf Elisée Reclus, net zoals een andere hedendaagse vernieuwer van het geopolitieke denken, Yves Lacoste, die zijn eigen inzichten haalt bij de levendige geografie van Reclus. 

Ziehier nu de “wetenschappelijke” redenen die ons moeten aanzetten tot het herlezen van de werken van Wittfogel. Maar los van deze “wetenschappelijke” redenen, zijn er ook redenen van zeer actuele aard om de werken van deze oude Wanderogel die daarna overgelopen is naar het Duitse communisme uit de kast te halen.

Beheersing van het water en “hydraulische samenlevingen"

Zijn denken met betrekking tot de “hydraulische samenlevingen” herinnert ons op zeer realistische wijze aan het feit dat elk politiek handelen begint bij de beheersing van het water: verwerven van drinkbaar water, irrigatie die regelmatige landbouw mogelijk maakt die onttrokken wordt aan de grillen van de natuur, gebruik van waterwegen die het transport van grote hoeveelheden goederen mogelijk maken. De beheersing van het water is eigen aan alle georganiseerde samenlevingen, al zijn ze nog zo bescheiden. Ze impliceert evenwel een groepsdiscipline, die bij momenten dwingend is, en die men volgens de jonge Wittfogel kan vereenzelvigen met een autoritair politiek bestel.

Het ontstaan van staten en rijken, zoals China (Wittfogel toont zich vooral een groot sinoloog), Egypte of Mesopotamië, bewijst de pertinentie van Wittfogels stellingen. Maar hij speelt niet enkel de historicus van voorbije grote hydraulische mogendheden, hij durft ook te vergelijken en zijn theorie toe te passen op het heden. Zo trekt hij parallellen tussen de grote rijken van de Oudheid en de twee grote mogendheden van zijn tijd, de Sovjetunie en de Verenigde Staten. Vanaf de machtsovername van Stalin begint de Sovjetunie met grote “hydraulische” werken: het graven van kanalen, verbindingen tussen de grote rivieren (bijvoorbeeld tussen de Don en de Volga), stuwdammen, irrigatiewerken, enzovoort. Dankzij deze werken kon de Sovjetunie opklimmen tot de status van supermogendheid en kan het huidige Rusland, spijts de afschuwelijke terugval waarin het zich vandaag “dankzij” het in de praktijk brengen van de stellingen van Bzrezinski bevindt, deze meerwaarde heractiveren. Het stalinisme werkte disciplinerend, dwingend of autoritair: het is, volgens Burnham, de Russische of Sovjetversie van het “tijdperk der directeurs”, eigen aan de jaren onmiddellijk na de Eerste Wereldoorlog, zowel in de Sovjetunie als in andere Europese en Amerikaanse landen. 

Tussen 1920 en 1940 kenden de Verenigde Staten ook een belangrijke fase van hydraulische ontwikkelingen, meer bepaald de grote werken ter beheersing van de loop van de Mississipi. Deze fase impliceert dan ook het tijdelijk bevriezen van de gangbare praktijken van het klassieke politieke liberalisme. De republikeinse oppositie spreekt vanaf dat moment van het “cesarisme” van Roosevelt, de Amerikaanse versie van het “tijdperk der directeurs”.

Het tijdperk der directeurs

Ondanks de Italiaanse (fascistische) en Duitse (nationaalsocialistische) versie van het “tijdperk der directeurs” bleek een hydraulische harmonisering van het continent onmogelijk. Het nationaalsocialistische Duitsland tracht evenwel de richtlijnen uit het in 1752 geschreven “Politieke Testament” van Frederik II van Pruisen door te voeren. Pruisen bereikte economische coherentie door de Elbe, de Spree en de Oder door middel van kanalen te verbinden, en daardoor zowel aan de Noordzee (Hamburg) als aan de Baltische Zee (Stettin) over een haven te beschikken. Men diende nog werk te maken van een verbinding tussen de Elbe en de Weser en tussen de Weser en de Rijn. Als Duitse variant van het “tijdperk der directeurs” realiseert het nationaalsocialistische Duitsland, volgens Burnham, deze werken, meer bepaald dankzij de inzet van de mankracht die door de “verplichte arbeidsdienst” (Reichsarbeitsdienst) wordt aangeleverd. De verbinding tussen Rotterdam of Antwerpen (via het in 1928 in dienst genomen Albertkanaal) en Berlijn en vervolgens Frankfurt/Oder wordt perfect voorstelbaar, hoewel ze op dat ogenblik onvoldoende afgewerkt is. Ondanks de nederlaag van het Derde Rijk zouden de werken na de oorlog tot een goed einde gebracht worden door de Nederlandse, Belgische en West-Duitse overheden, met die beperking dat het IJzeren Gordijn deze watersynergie ter hoogte van de grens op de Elbe blokkeert, en nog eens hetzelfde doet op de Donau-ader in het zuiden, tussen Oostenrijk en Hongarije. De Duitse hereniging van oktober 1990 herstelt vervolgens de communicatie en maakt zelfs een projectie richting Weichsel mogelijk, en schenkt op die manier een indirect Atlantisch venster aan Polen, zonder het anders noodzakelijke omvaren van de Deense archipel. 

Het harmoniseringsproject van rivieren en kanalen heeft een heel lange voorgeschiedenis in Europa; Karel de Grote had reeds het plan opgevat om de Main met de Donau te verbinden. Frederik II van Pruisen constateerde in de 18de eeuw dat de rivieren van de Noord-Duitse vlakte parallel verlopen. En dat bijgevolg de communicatielijnen een zuid-noordas volgen, grosso modo van de Alpen naar de Noordzee of de Baltische Zee. Maar ook dat de oost-westverbindingen minder ontwikkeld waren, waardoor het Germaanse geografische geheel tot politieke versplintering veroordeeld werd, aangezien dit natuurgegeven steeds een centrifugale logica met zich meebracht. Frederik II schrijft in zijn hierboven aangehaald Politiek Testament dat de oplossing voor dit probleem bestaat uit het graven van kanalen die de rivieren met elkaar verbinden, en dit volgens een oost-westas. Daardoor zou het Pruisische (Noord-Duitse) grondgebied een coherentie te beurt vallen, waarvan het door de natuur verstoken blijft. De grote architect van dit project zou Friedrich List worden, een econoom uit de 19de eeuw. Deze zou later zijn visie exporteren: naar de Verenigde Staten waar hij verschillende kanaalprojecten uitwerkt, naar Frankrijk en België, waar hij tijdens een privé-audiëntie aan Leopold I suggereert om het Centrumkanaal (tussen de Samber-Maas en de Hene-Schelde) te graven, een grootschalige waterweg tussen Antwerpen en Luik te graven (dit wordt het latere Albertkanaal, dat pas in 1928 wordt opgeleverd), de verbinding tussen Brussel en Antwerpen uit te diepen en het kanaal Brussel-Charleroi te openen. Zonder dergelijke werken zou België niet langer dan twee decennia overleefd hebben. Het land leed namelijk op kleine schaal aan het hetzelfde gebrek als de Noord-Duitse vlakte, die op dat ogenblik door Pruisen bestuurd werd. De parallelle configuratie van haar rivierstelsel legt nolens volens een centrifugale logica op. 

Vandaag realiseert Duitsland onder het toeziend oog van Kanselier Kohl vlak na zijn hereniging het duizend jaar oude project van Karel de Grote: de verbinding tussen Main en Donau, waardoor een waterweg geopend wordt die vertrekt van de Noordzee en eindigt in de Zwarte Zee en vandaar verder loopt naar de olierijke Kaukasus. Ik heb de problematiek van de verbinding tussen Main en Donau reeds uitvoerig genoeg behandeld, om er hier verder op in te gaan.

Hydraulische politiek en riviergebonden lotsbestemming van de naties

Vanuit Pruisen zou geen enkele Duitse éénmaking mogelijk zijn geweest zonder het graven van kanalen en zonder een “hydraulische” politiek. Net zo min is vandaag de dag een Europese vorm van imperialiteit mogelijk zonder “hydraulische” politiek, gericht op de loop van de Rijn, de Main en de Donau. Deze politiek dient vanzelfsprekend ondersteund te worden door andere grote werken of communicatieprojecten (satellieten, snelle hovercrafts, hogesnelheidstreinen, enzovoort). 

Begin jaren ’30 beschreven de Duitse geopolitici Hennig en Körholz de riviergebonden lotsbestemming van de grote Europese naties. Er bestonden volgens hen twee gelukkige lotsbestemmingen, die van Frankrijk en Rusland, wier waterbekkens een centripentale (en dus geen centrifugale) logica met zich meebrengen. En er was één ongelukkige lotsbestemming, die van Duitsland, wier politieke éénmaking vertraagd werd door een andere configuratie van zijn stroombekkens, met parallelle stromen en rivieren, die de valleien van elkaar isoleerden en bijgevolg culturele en commerciële contacten in telkens verschillende richtingen genereerden (cf.: R. Hennig & L. Körholz, "Fluvialité et destin des Etats", in: Vouloir nr. 9, 1997). 

Tweede hoofdreden om terug te komen op Wittfogel door eens te meer in termen van hydraulische politiek of “hydropolitiek” te redeneren: het schaarser wordende drinkbaar water overal ter wereld. Deze toenemende schaarste leidt tot steeds heviger wordende conflicten. Turkije houdt zodoende, door het optrekken van stuwdammen in het oostelijke Taurusgebergte het water van de Tigris en de Eufraat tegen, ten koste van de lager gelegen regio’s, zijnde Syrië en Mesopotamië (Irak). Het ontzegde water verzwakt beide Arabische landen en onderwerpt hen aan de wil van Turkije. Een deel van dit water wordt doorverkocht aan Israël, dat aan chronische waterschaarste lijdt die zelfs zijn voortbestaan op lange termijn hypothekeert, aangezien de joodse immigranten volgens een westers patroon van groot waterverbruik leven, terwijl de veel zuiniger verbruikende Arabisch-Palestijnse massa’s hun waterreserves aanzienlijk zien wegslinken, wat dan weer hun verwarring en woede versterkt. Dit leidt op zich dan weer tot confrontaties. Dit spel om water in een uiterst explosieve regio als het Midden-Oosten genereert uiteraard op termijn nieuwe oorlogen.

Water in Tibet, Brazilië en Congo

De verbetenheid waarmee de Chinezen vasthouden aan Tibet kan verklaard worden door de aanwezigheid in dit gebied, het “Tibetaans Plateau”, van de bronnen van de belangrijkste Chinese en Indochinese stromen, die resulteren uit het smelten van de sneeuw van de Himalaya, zoals de Gele Rivier, de Jangtsekiang, de Salween, de Mekong en de Tsangpo. De bronnen van de twee belangrijkste Indische stromen, de Indus en de Ganges, bevinden zich eveneens in het Himalayamassief. Voor de uit de beheersing van de rivieren ontstane hydromacht China is de beheersing van het grondgebied met daarop de bronnen van levensbelang. Daarvan is de Tibetaanse cultuur, wier originaliteit essentieel is, uiteraard het slachtoffer.

De geschiedenis van Zuid-Amerika wordt volledig bepaald door de wil van Brazilië om het gehele Amazonegebied te controleren. Bij zijn stichting stond deze staat lijnrecht tegenover zijn buren in een conflict over de beheersing van de volledige loop van de Plata.

Congo is potentieel een hydromacht. De Congostroom kent een zodanig debiet dat hij voor de gehele mensheid een waardevolle reserve vormt waar men in de toekomst spaarzaam mee om zal moeten gaan.

Wittfogel: Wandervogel, communisme, Frankfurter Schule 

Laat ons terugkeren naar Wittfogel. Wie was hij? Hij werd in Lüneburg geboren in een familie van protestantse onderwijzers met een uitgesproken zin voor cultuur en met een ware voorliefde voor boeken. Op jonge leeftijd begint Wittfogel een groot aantal instructieve boeken te verslinden. Karl August Wittfogel is tijdens zijn puberteit een gecultiveerde en rebelse ziel, die revolteert tegen het verstikkende conformisme van zijn tijd (hetgeen in het bijzonder door de socioloog Simmel, die we besproken hebben op de Zomeruniversiteit van 1998, aan de kaak werd gesteld). Zijn culturele background en zijn revolte zorgen ervoor dat hij contact zoekt met de Wandervogel, de jeugdbeweging die in 1896 in de buurt van Berlijn werd opgericht onder invloed van Karl Fischer. Hij zou in 1914 weliswaar niet meestappen in de patriotische bevlogenheid van zijn makkers. Hij zou geen dienst nemen bij de stoottroepen, zoals de eenheden die zich in de pan lieten hakken bij Langemark in West-Vlaanderen. Wittfogel evolueert daarna in pacifistische richting en naar een links sociaal en politiek engagement. In 1915 schrijft hij zich in aan de universiteit en volgt er colleges geografie, sociologie, filosofie en sinologie. Van 1916 tot 1918 sluit hij zich aan bij het politieke marxisme, zonder evenwel toe te treden tot de sociaal-democratische SPD, die hij té gematigd en té compromisbereid ten opzichte van de macht vindt, maar wel tot de USPD van Rosa Luxemburg en later tot de KPD. Hij interesseert zich voor het agitatiewerk van Karl Radek, de agent van Lenin en van de Komintern in Duitsland. Dit contact zou hem brengen tot de beroemde “Anti-imperialistische Liga”, die een alliantie tussen China, de Sovjetunie, Duitsland, de gekoloniseerde en revolterende volkeren, waaronder India, en bepaalde revolutionaire krachten in het westen voorstond. Deze Liga wist ook enkele figuren aan te trekken die door Armin Mohler bij de “conservatieve revolutie” werden gerekend, zoals Niekisch en Jünger. Wittfogel volgt tevens de werken van de Frankfurter Schule, en dit vanaf haar oprichting in 1924 (Institut für Sozialforschung). Wanneer de NSDAP in 1933 aan de macht komt, emigreert hij naar de Verenigde Staten.

Hoe heeft het denken van Wittfogel zich binnen deze dubbele, universitaire en politieke, context kunnen uitkristalliseren en vormen? Zijn denken berust voornamelijk op een nauwgezette lectuur van Karl Marx en van Max Weber, bij wie Wittfogel een tegenstelling tussen het westen en het oosten ontdekt. Het model bij uitstek van het Westen is “Manchester-Engeland”. Het oosterse paradigmatische ontwikkelingsmodel is het Chinese model. Als sinoloog verdiept Wittfogel de marxistische en weberiaanse stellingen over de “Aziatische productiewijze”. Hij leidt daaruit af dat China (maar ook het oude Egypte en Mesopotamië) “despotisch” (om efficiënt opgewassen te zijn tegen de wetmatigheden van de natuur) en “hydraulisch” zijn. Dit Aziatisch model vormt volgens hem een niet-burgerlijk “tegenmodel”. Wittfogel, die in zekere zin een “maoïst” avant-la-lettre was, neemt zich voor om de Europeanen het oosterse en niet-burgerlijke China te leren kennen.

Hydraulische samenlevingen = totalitaire samenlevingen? 

Later zal deze fascinatie voor China omslaan in kritiek. Wittfogel is antistalinist en bijgevolg wordt Stalin gezien als een Aziatisch despoot. Maar hij schrijft tenslotte weinig over de onder Stalin uitgevoerde grote hydraulische werken in Siberië en Centraal-Azië. In 1938 publiceert hij in de VS het werk The Theory of Oriental Society, waarin hij de hydraulische samenleving ontegensprekelijk gelijkstelt met despotisme en totalitarisme. Een jaar later, nadat Hitler en Stalin het Duits-Sovjetrussisch pact ondertekend hebben, verdiept deze gelijkstelling zich in zijn denken. In deze ietwat propagandistische stelling liggen Wittfogels antihitleristische en antistalinistische gevoelens vervat. Hetzelfde werk verschijnt opnieuw in gepolijste vorm in 1957, ditmaal onder de titel Oriental Despotism: A Comparative Study of Total Power. Hitler en Stalin zijn inmiddels van het wereldtoneel verdwenen, de Koreaanse Oorlog ligt achter de rug, McCarthy slaat niet langer wild om zich heen in de VS en de koude oorlog verloopt niet meer zo gespannen als voorheen. Na 1945 vervoegt Wittfogel de rangen van het Amerikaanse anticommunisme, en noemt Stalin een agent van de “Aziatische restauratie”, terwijl hij de Verenigde Staten voorstelt als een hydraulische samenleving die niet despotisch is. In die zin vormen zij een te volgen model voor de wereld.

Hoe komt het dat een vroegere student van de Duitse linkerzijde zo geëvolueerd is? Hoe is hij tot zo’n in se tegenstrijdig standpunt gekomen? Hij werd hoogstwaarschijnlijk opgevist door bepaalde geheime diensten die nogal wat vroegere militanten van de Duitse linkerzijde rekruteerden, gezien het feit dat deze vertrouwd waren met de Komintern, de communistische structuren en de Sovjetmethoden in de Aziatische landen.  

Vanaf 1953 wordt Wittfogel in de Verenigde Staten dé autoriteit op het vlak van de beheersing van de grote rivieren. Hij wordt professor aan de Columbia University en vanaf 1966 doceert hij Chinese geschiedenis in Washington. Zijn werk omvat interessante wetenschappelijke, maar tevens apolitieke ontwikkelingen.

Een theorie van de beschavingen

Wittfogel presenteert doorheen zijn werk een theorie van de beschavingen, van het ontstaan van de beschavingen. Voor hem, net zoals eerder bij Hobbes, is het de angst die de politicus, de staat, het “commonwealth”, de roep om gezag (dat de wetten maakt - auctoritas non veritas facit legem) aanvuurt. Maar deze angst vloeit niet voort uit de vrees voor een invasie van buitenaf, zoals bij Hobbes, die prematuur geboren, omdat zijn moeder vreesde voor de ontscheping van de Spaanse troepen van de Grote Armada. De angst die de mens motiveert en die hem aanzet tot het opbouwen van stevige en duurzame politieke structuren is de panische angst voor overstromingen en droogte, overstromingen die de oogst overspoelen en droogte die leidt tot hongersnood. Deze angst haalt de mens uit zijn lethargie en dwingt hem tot samenwerking met zijn tot een andere clan behorende medemens en dwingt hem tot gehoorzaamheid jegens diegenen die technisch in staat zijn om de rivieren te beheersen, het water te kanaliseren (voor irrigatie of transport) en te irrigeren. De angst voor de grillen van het water doet de figuur van de “Grote Weldoener” aanvaarden. Het oude China, een hydraulische beschaving, eikt de term "Shiu li", die zoveel als “beheersing der wateren” betekent. De beschavingsdiscipline wordt uit deze angst geboren. Aan het ontstaan van grote staten of rijken ligt zo goed als altijd een hydraulische reden ten grondslag. De Chinese wijzen uit de Oudheid waren van mening dat, indien het water niet volgens een regelmatig en voorspelbaar ritme vloeit, men afglijdt in de chaos, gaande tot de burgeroorlog.

De staatsmacht vervult de rol van stuwdam.

In filosofisch en anthropologisch opzicht toont Wittfogel zich een leerling van Montesquieu en van Carl Ritter (cf. supra). Hij analyseert de interactie tussen mens en natuur en vice versa. De studie van deze interactie ligt aan de basis van het ware intellectuele, politieke en historische materialisme zoals Marx het persoonlijk had opgevat, in tegenstelling tot nogal wat van zijn discipelen. De geopolitiek is een discipline die zich meze interactie bezig houdt. Waarschijnlijk is dit de reden waarom Wittfogel deze discipline heeft aangesneden in het kader van de Frankfurter Schule. Kan men hier gewagen van een erfenis van zijn plattelandsafkomst, zijn rurale wortels, was het onder invloed van de Wandervogel en van het discours van Ludwig Klages, wiens naar aanleiding van de zomerzonnewende van 1913 op de Hoher Meißner voorgedragen rede de ware grondsteen van de moderne ecologie vormt? Een diepgaandere analyse van Wittfogels verleden zal ons ooit de nodige antwoorden bieden. In 1928 vindt deze materialistische en marxistische interesse voor de geopolitiek haar weerslag in het werk Geopolitik, geographischer Materialismus und Marxismus.

Het voorbeeld van de Pueblo-, Zuni- en Hopi-indianen

Wittfogel stelt dus een fundamentele anthropologische kwestie voorop. De beheersing van het water ligt aan de basis van de staat. Maar hoe ontstaat deze irrigatie als basis van de staten, de rijken en de beschavingszones? Het eerste stadium is dat van de vijver waar de huisdieren drinken. De clan die deze vijver gebruikt moet de randen ervan bewaken en het ecosysteem beheren. Uiteindelijk moet men grachten graven om de plantages te irrigeren. In de Verenigde Staten voert Wittfogel onderzoek naar de Pueblo-, Zuni- en Hopi-indianen, waaruit duidelijk blijkt dat de Volkswerdung [letterlijk: het “volk-worden"] van deze Amerindiaanse etnische groepen vertrekt vanuit de beheersing van het water op hun grondgebied. Deze studies tonen duidelijk aan dat losse clans er op een bepaald ogenblik in hun geschiedenis in slagen om op hun schaal de waterlopen en het stilstaande water, de bronnen en de freatische vlakken te beheersen, evenwel zonder de eigen dimensie te verliezen. 

In het bekken van de Rio Grande del Norte gaan clans zich verenigen om stammen te vormen die vervolgens samen volkeren worden. Deze “wording” gaat altijd gepaard met een verdedigingssysteem dat steeds verder wordt uitgewerkt, en gericht is tegen hen die de irrigatie-orde willen omgooien, de bevoorradingslijnen willen afsnijden of er onterecht gebruik van willen maken.

Irrigatiewerken en corvee 

China kende volgens Wittfogel bij het begin van zijn geschiedenis een gelijkaardige evolutie als deze die etnologen bij de Amerindianen van het bekken van de Rio Grande del Norte hebben vastgesteld. Helemaal in het begin was China een los mozaïek van stammen, dorpen en autonome clans (China valt bij momenten terug in dit stadium, zoals tijdens de heerschappij van allerlei provinciale of lokale krijgsheren, de warlords). De éénmaking van deze Chinese micro-entiteiten wordt voltrokken onder het toezicht van een technische elite die de grote rivieren gaat beheren. Zowel voor de eerdere libertaire Wittfogel, als voor de latere anticommunistische Wittfogel heeft de voortschrijdende machtsovername door deze elite negatieve kanten, aangezien zij de gedwongen mobilisering van alle beschikbare armkracht voor de grote werken van hydraulische aard met zich meebrengt. In deze massaconcentratie veroorzaakt de promiscuïteit van de gerekruteerde arbeiders epidemieën, zoals de aanwezigheid van een wormsoort die tot 90% van de Chinese bevolking aantast. Wittfogel haalt zijn negatief oordeel over de mobilisering van werkkracht bij Julien Barois, een Frans socioloog uit de 19de eeuw en specialist in de geschiedenis van de corvee.  

Voor de Wittfogel van de jaren ‘20 en ‘30, die het communisme omarmt, heeft deze mobilisering positieve aspecten, aangezien zij de ontwikkeling van de wetenschappen bevordert: de astronomie, de wiskunde, de architectuur, de geografie (Yves Lacoste haalt dit aan in zijn werken over de eerste cartografen van de keizerlijke Chinese legers). Wittfogel bestudeert eveneens de mythologische aspecten van de beheersing van het water: Osiris en Hapi in Egypte, de Nijlgoden, Ninurta in Mesopotamië en de vergoddelijking van de Ganges in India. In Europa is water in overvloed aanwezig en zijn de rivieren kalmer dan in China, vandaar de minder despotische vormen van politiek hydraulisme. De optimale democratie schiet steeds daar wortel, waar water vrij en overvloedig beschikbaar is, zoals, bijvoorbeeld, in Zwitserland. 

De Chinese beschaving, een beschaving van grote werken

Laat ons even terugkeren naar de corvee (en naar de stellingen van Julien Barois, die door Wittfogel verder ontwikkeld werden). De corvee wordt eerst opgelegd voor irrigatiewerken, vervolgens voor stuwdammen, dan voor wegen, vestingbouw (de Chinese Muur), en tenslotte voor prestigewerken (piramiden en zigurats). China laat zodoende zijn eerste kanalen graven vanaf 581 voor Christus. Het ontstaan en het behoud van de antieke Chinese beschaving vloeit dus voort uit de beheersing van de Gele Rivier (Huang Ho) of veeleer uit de strijd tegen zijn wrede grillen. Deze rivier heeft miljoenen mensen het leven gekost en de recente overstromingen in China zijn slechts een volgende episode in zijn verschrikkelijke geschiedenis van groei en verval.  

De studies van Wittfogel met betrekking tot de Chinese beschaving, een beschaving van grote werken die in een eerste fase hydraulisch van aard waren, heeft hem ertoe gebracht om de volgende vraag te stellen: is China intrinsiek despotisch of niet? Wittfogels antwoord is dubbel, hoewel de communistische Wittfogel van de jaren ’20 (die het totalitarisme niet bekritiseert) de neiging heeft om deze vraag negatief te beantwoorden, terwijl de antitotalitaire, antinazistische en anticommunistische Wittfogel eerder positief zou antwoorden en dit “hydraulische” China zou beschouwen als matrix voor latere politieke dwangsystemen. Volgens hem schommelt China evenwel tussen confucianisme en taoïsme. Het confucianisme impliceert een strenge discipline, terwijl het taoïsme (met de Tao Te King van Lao Tse), de machthebbers aanraadt om “zoals het water” te zijn, soepel en vleierig. Conclusie van Wittfogel: door de aanwezigheid van het taoïsme is China uiteindelijk minder centralistisch, lees: minder despotisch, dan Egypte of de staatkundige entiteiten van Mesopotamië. 

De werken van de "Tennessee Valley Authority"

In de jaren ’30, toen de militante vereenvoudigingen hoogtij vierden, had men zonder veel moeite een propagandistische dichotomie kunnen creëren op basis van de werken van Wittfogel, door de gelijkschakeling tussen hydraulische samenlevingen en totalitaire samenlevingen te poneren; in tegenstelling tot niet-hydraulische samenlevingen, die dan per definitie zouden worden beschouwd als zijnde democratisch en liberaal. Wittfogel moest vaststellen dat, kort na zijn aankomst in de Verenigde Staten, zijn bestemming als balling, in dat land een groot hydraulisch project in de steigers stond, en dit onder leiding van de "Tennessee Valley Authority". De Verenigde Staten, nochtans de vaandeldragers van het democratische ideaal in zijn liberale versie, waren ook een hydraulische mogendheid. Tot dan waren de Verenigde Staten een onvolledige mogendheid geweest. Ze werden “bi-oceanisch” (met een venster op de Atlantische Oceaan en ééntje op de Stille Oceaan) tegen het midden van de 19de eeuw. De transcontinentale treinverbinding had een gigantisch fortuin gekost en slechts een bescheiden resultaat opgeleverd. Vóór de Eerste Wereldorlog staken de Verenigde Staten diep in de schulden en alles wees op hun onvermijdelijke neergang. Na 1918 werden de Europese staten, in het bijzonder Frankrijk en Groot-Brittannië, schatplichtig aan hen.

Maar een betere organisatie van het Amerikaanse grondgebied drong zich op: daarom diende het Mississipibekken aangepast te worden. Een groot deel van de tijdens de Eerste Wereldoorlog gemaakte winst werd aangewend voor het hydraulische project van de "Tennessee Valley Authority".  

De jaren tussen 1920 en 1940 waren voor de Verenigde Staten twee decennia van grote aanpassingswerken, tijdens dewelke de principes van het zuivere liberalisme toch wel enigszins met voeten getreden werden. Burnham spreekt in dit verband van het “tijdperk der directeurs”, toen het decisionisme van de beslissers het haalde op de parlementaire discussies van het tijdperk van het klassieke liberalisme, zowel in Europa, met het fascisme en het nationaalsocialisme, als in de Sovjetunie, met de stalinistische planeconomie, alsook in de Verenigde Staten. Lawrence Dennis pleit op dat moment voor een continentaal, panamerikaans isolationisme met als doel de rigoureuze organisatie van het continent volgens een autoritaire logica. Maar Dennis is, in tegenstelling tot Roosevelt, voorstander van continentale autarkie zonder oorlog, zonder interventie buiten de Amerikaanse ruimte. De liberale oppositie tegen Roosevelt spreekt van het “cesarisme van Roosevelt”, dat slechts gedeeltelijk slaagt in zijn opzet om het grondgebied te herorganiseren, omdat de klassieke liberale traditie op de rem gaat staan, terwijl deze remmechanismen in West-Europa en in de Sovjetunie uit de weg waren geruimd, wat dan weer de weg vrijmaakte voor een despotisme dat in staat was om de technische en industriële moderniteit snel op te leggen en daardoor aan schaalvergroting te doen. Aangezien de Amerikaanse liberale instellingen sterker zijn en bijgevolg een absoluut despotisme à la Stalin of een dictatuur à la Hitler onmogelijk maken, dient Roosevelt bijgevolg een “conjunctuurinjectie” in te roepen om de nodige fondsen te kunnen verzamelen en zo dit geheel aan macroprojecten af te ronden. Wat dan weer de reden vormt voor zijn vroege voorbereiding van de oorlogen tegen Duitsland en Japan. De interne doelstelling van deze dubbele externe oorlog was dus de financiering van de definitieve irrigatie van de Mid West en het Westen.

De Noord-Amerikaanse irrigatieprojecten maken van de Verenigde Staten de graanschuur van de wereld

De Amerikaanse democratie is volgens de oppositie tegen Roosevelt een verbloemde democratie die het Congres en het Hooggerechtshof in de pas doet lopen en de populistische oppositie een halt toeroept. Met Roosevelt komt de megamachine aan de macht, het raakveld tussen de macht en de grote industriële trusts, die aan de kaak gesteld worden door Lewis Mumford en later, in Europa, door de ecologist en Oost-Duitse dissident Rudolf Bahro.  

Maar deze inbreuken op de traditionele liberale praktijk van de Amerikaanse democratie hebben de politiek in staat gesteld grote werken uit te voeren, die de Verenigde Staten nodig hadden om hun nationale machtsbasis te consolideren, wat an sich een noodzakelijke voorwaarde was voor hun mondialistische (zo genoemd ten tijde van Roosevelt) of globalistische (in het huidige taalgebruik) politiek. De Amerikaanse irrigatieprojecten, voornamelijk dan in het bekken van de Mississippi, en de bouw van stuwdammen in het Westen hebben de VS in staat gesteld om de graanschuur van de mensheid te worden en zodoende hun dominantie in Europa, de voormalige Sovjetunie (en dus het huidige Rusland) en het steeds opnieuw door hongersnoden geplaagde Afrika te betonneren.

Ik herinner vaak aan de woorden van Eagleburger: "Food is the best weapon in our arsenal" ("Voeding is het sterkste wapen van ons arsenaal"). Alle Europees-Amerikaanse conflicten inzake landbouwpolitiek zijn terug te voeren op de Amerikaanse wil om kost wat kost hun leiderschap in dit domein te behouden en zoveel mogelijk de Europese autonomie op voedselvlak te beperken. De soja-oorlog, ongetwijfeld ook de gekkekoeiencrisis, de pastastrijd, het opleggen van normen, de poging om Europa met massa’s immigranten te overspoelen die zijn reserves opeten, enzovoort, zijn slechts een aantal aspecten van de Europees-Amerikaanse oorlog die begonnen werd onder Roosevelt, die culmineerde in de Tweede Wereldoorlog en verre van gestreden is! 

Door hun feilloos aanvoelen van de macht die een goede beheersing van de waterwegen hen biedt trachten de Verenigde Staten – door Carl Schmitt de “vertragers van de geschiedenis” genoemd – de beheersing van de waterwegen door anderen af te remmen, een halt toe te roepen of te saboteren. We waren getuige van het manipuleren van ecologistische en “souverainistische” milieus in Frankrijk, van sociaal-democratische en neogaullistische signatuur, teneinde de verbinding tussen de bekkens van de Rijn, de Rhône en de Donau af te remmen. Vervolgens waren we getuige, onmachtig en vermoeid door het mediatieke discours dat slechts een kopij van CNN, lees: van het Pentagon en de Amerikaanse inlichtingendiensten, is, van het bombardement van de Donaubruggen in Belgrado en Novi Sad, en dit onder het voorwendsel van een strafactie tegen een zekere Milosevic.

Degenen die Jupiter in het verderf wil storten, ontneemt hij eerst hun zinnen.
 

Robert STEUCKERS, Vorst, juli 2000.  

Bibliografie:

 

  1. Gary L. ULMEN, The Science of Society. Toward an Understanding of the Life and Work of Karl August Wittfogel, Mouton Publishers, The Hague/Paris/New York, 1978. 
  2. Karl A. WITTFOGEL, Oriental Despotism. A Comparative Study of Total Power, Vintage Books/Random House, New York, 1981 (herdruk van de eerste uitgave van 1957).
  3. Donald WORSTER, "Water, Aridity and the Growth of the American West", introduction to Rivers of Empire: Water, Aridity and the Growth of the American West, Oxford University Press, Oxford/New York, 1985 (pp. 19-61). Deze fundamentele, helder en didactisch geschreven tekst kan op internet geraadpleegd worden: http://www.cudenver.edu/stc-link/weblink/water/materials/...

 

 

jeudi, 19 janvier 2012

Bonapartism - Machiavellianism - Elitism

Bonapartism - Machiavellianism - Elitism

di Troy Southgate

Ex: http://www.juliusevola.it/

niccolo-machiavelli-0708-lg-75217122.jpgBonapartism is a rather unusual term and one which Evola borrows from R. Michels, author of the 1915 work Political Parties: A Sociological Study of the Oligarchical Tendencies of Modern Democracy. Michels demonstrates how representative democracy and "government of the people" leads to the control of the State by a self-interested minority. This view is echoed by J. Burnham in The Machiavellians, who explains that the so-called "will of the people" is eventually superseded by the domination of a bureaucratic clique. Thus Bonapartism begins with a popular demand for more freedom and equality and ends in the totalitarian "dictatorship of the proletariat." Evola likens this process to a people who have catastrophically "led and disciplined themselves." After the decline of its aristocratic nobility, ancient Greece witnessed the same systematically repressive phenomenon. Power simply became detached from a higher, spiritual authority, leading to fear and brutality. Evola then turns to Otto Weininger, who once "described the figure of the great politician as one who is a despot and at the same time a worshipper of the people, or simultaneously a pimp and a whore." Indeed, by seeking to appeal to the masses the modern leader easily commands their respect and adulation. Not in the way that traditional societies gave their loyalty to the organic State, however, because instead of engendering a healthy diversity between the various levels (not classes) of society Bonapartism forces the politician to become a "man of the people." Therefore he is perceived as a common man, rather than as someone exceptionally transcendent and symbolic. This, Weininger called "mutual prostitution." Authority is perfectly useless unless it is attached to a central idea which runs throughout the social fabric and acts as a point of reference. This affects the individual because one "is restricted not so much in this or that exterior freedom (which is, after all, of little consequence) but rather in the inner freedom - the ability to free himself from his lowest instincts." Bonapartism - which Evola interprets here as a political, rather than militaristic, term - is equated with dictatorship because this is the logical result of its democratic ethos. It completely erodes the traditional values of human existence, refusing to "distinguish clearly between the symbol, the function, and the principle, on the one hand, and man as an individual, on the other." Instead, it rejects "that a man be valued and recognised in terms of the idea and principle he upholds" and simply views man in terms of "his action upon the irrational forms of the masses." Similarly, Evola points out the errors which began with Social-Darwinism and consequently found expression in Nietzsche’s concept of the Superman (Ubermensch): "most people, even when they admit the notion of aristocracy in principle, ultimately settle for a very limited view of it: they admire an individual for being exceptional and brilliant, instead of for being one in whom a tradition and a special 'spiritual race' shine forth, or instead of whose greatness is due not to his human virtues, but rather to the principle, the idea, and a certain regal impersonality that he embodies."

Machiavellianism - despite its frequent portrayal as an aristocratic notion - is also a highly individualist philosophy. Indeed, although the concept of The Prince rejects democracy and the masses, it makes the fatal mistake of encouraging power and authority to reside in the hands of man. In other words, man is himself the be all and end all of Machiavellian doctrine. Such men are not connected to a chain of Tradition, they are merely interested in deploying their political capabilities to advance their own interests. His very position is maintained by lies, deceit and manipulation, becoming a rampant political monster to which everything must be methodically subjected. This is clearly very different to the way in which traditional aristocracies functioned and indicates that Machiavellianism is a consequence of the general decline. True elitism, argues Evola, degenerates in four stages: "in the first stage the elite has a purely spiritual character, embodying what may be generally called ‘divine right’. This elite expresses an ideal of immaterial virility. In the second stage, the elite has the character of warrior nobility; at the third stage we find the advent of oligarchies of a plutocratic and capitalistic nature, such as they arise in democracies; the fourth and last elite is that of the collectivist and revolutionary leaders of the Fourth Estate."

Troy Southgate examines late Italian philosopher Julius Evola’s Men Among the Ruins: Post-War Reflections of a Radical Traditionalist. This is chapter 5 ( n.d.r. )

THORSTEIN VEBLEN, WERNER SOMBART AND THE PERIODIZATION OF HISTORY

THORSTEIN VEBLEN, WERNER SOMBART AND THE PERIODIZATION OF HISTORY

Ex: http://library.by/portalus/modules/economics/

 
 
 

Источник: Journal of Economic Issues, Jun91, Vol. 25 Issue 2, p421, 8p
Loader, Colin & Waddoups, Jeffrey

THORSTEIN VEBLEN, WERNER SOMBART AND THE PERIODIZATION OF HISTORY

It is often alleged that the German historical school and the American institutional school possess a number of doctrinal and theoretical similarities.[1] Since ideas of figures within each of these schools are not homogeneous, a comparison in a short piece such as this is best focused on specific individuals. We have chosen to compare the work of a pioneer in institutional economics. Thorstein Veblen (1857-1929), with one of the second generation of the historical school, Werner Sombart (1863-1941).[2] As the dates indicate, the two were contemporaries, having published their first major works within a year of each other.[3] We will show that the two men move from similar premises in markedly different directions.


Both men offered critiques of the capitalist present supported by a schema of historical development, which posited a past golden age in pre-industrial Europe. Crucial to both critiques was an attempt to place modern capitalism in a larger historical context. This meant placing the periodization of the historical process into a series of epochs[4]--a nonmaterial (spiritual/instinctual) realm that became actualized through institutional structures. The way back to the golden age, however, would be traversed along two very different paths--for Veblen, it would mean a reiteration of his commitment to egalitarianism, for Sombart, a movement toward fascism.


Spirit and Instinct


Sombart wrote that economic epochs could be delineated by discernible types of character consisting of two elements, a spirit and a set of material forms. The spirit, defined as "the sum total of the purposes, motives, and principles which determine man's behaviour in economic life"[5] was more important than material forms, for its defined the era. Spirit, however, was not all-powerful; in order to form life in its image, certain conditions had to be present. Economic institutions, technology, material conditions, certain types of subjects and their wills all were necessary conditions for the "actualization" of spirit. There was some confusion in Sombart's writings regarding causal priority of spirit and material forces. Sometimes he wrote of spirit[6] creating material forms; at other times of material forms actualizing spirit; sometimes the spirit seemed to precede the new economic institutions; at other times it seemed to follow. However, it is clear that the economic system, or epoch, was defined by its spirit.


Veblen also wrote of "spirit," but he defined it as "[t]he complement of instinctive dispositions."[7] The peaceful instincts mentioned were the instinct of workmanship, the parental bent, the instinct of idle curiosity, while the predatory instincts were divided up into their sporting and pecuniary components. Veblen also stated that "all instinctive action is intelligent and teleological,"[8] indicating an affinity of his configuration of instincts with Sombart's spirit as a set of dominant "purposes, motives and principles" that gave meaning to his definition of historical epochs. Veblen's use of the concept, "spirit," was less central to his analysis than was the case for Sombart. The central element was, rather, the cumulatively changing institutional structure.


The spiritual/instinctual elements appeared in different ratios in the various epochs and racial groups in the two men's systems. For Sombart the whole (spirit) was more important, while the component (instinct) was more important for Veblen. An additional difference is that, for Veblen, the wholes were largely historical, while the components were immutable. For Sombart, on the other hand, both the wholes and the components (constituent elements) were historical (although not always coterminous).
Both men denied that epochs were homegeneous, although both believed an epoch could be dominated by a certain spirit/instinct. Sombart wrote that when a spirit was clearly dominant, one could speak o a "pure" or "high" period. In addition to these pure epochs there were "mixed" epochs, which were periods of transition between high epochs. These were termed either "early" or "late" depending on whether the perspective was past- or future-oriented. Thus the period from the Renaissance to the end of the eighteenth century was defined as early capitalism." While Veblen did not use the adjectives "early" and "late," he believed that periods such as the handicraft era (which chronologically approximated Sombart's early capitalist period) combined instincts that were dominant in earlier or later periods.[10]


Veblen's instincts and Sombart's spiritual elements also show remarkable structural similarities. Of the instincts postulated by Veblen, three are especially relevant to a comparison with Sombart's "spirit": the parental bent, the instinct of workmanship, and the predatory instincts. The parental bent was an instinct that went beyond having and nurturing children; it was essentially a communal instinct, which placed the common good above all else, and which disapproved of "wasteful and useless living." The instinct of workmanship promoted the desire to do a task thoroughly and well, producing a pride in the quality of work done. Veblen believed it was primarily responsible for the technical progress of humankind.[11] The parental bent and an uncontaminated instinct of workmanship were seen as positive forces (which furthered the generic ends of life) in contrast to the predatory instinct, which represented aggression--the will to compete, to subordinate, to conquer. In its sporting form, the predatory instinct gave rise especially to military activities and in its pecuniary form, to business competition and the desire to accumulate wealth and power.[12]


For Sombart, there were two primary spirits: precapitalist, dominated by the idea of sustenance, and the capitalist, which contained the principles of both accumulation (the profit motive) and rational calculation. The idea of sustenance and its extension, the principle of meeting needs, were both concerned with consumption; in the former, consumption to survive, in the latter, consumption to meet needs appropriate to one's status. In its primitive form, the idea of sustenance had the same concern for communal survival as Veblen's parental bent. The discrepancy in status characterizing more complex forms of economic organization resulted from the emergence of a military, land-owning elite, whose outlook was not unlike that defined by Veblen's predatory instinct. Within the precapitalist spirit, this aggressive orientation was subordinate to the idea of sustenance, as was craft ethic that was very to Veblen's instinct of workmanship. An important difference was that, unlike the latter, Sombart's craft ethic was oriented towards stasis, and therefore hindered rather than promoted the development of technology.[13]


Sombart's capitalist was embodied by the entrepreneur (Unternehmer), whose adventurous activities often in pursuit of wealth contradicted the stasis inherent in the idea of sustenance. The drive for accumulation embodied in sombart's entrepreneur was similar to Veblen's predatory instinct.[14] The principle of rational calculation also embodied in sombart's entrepreneur--with its objectification of the subjective elements of the work process, its instrumentality, its reduction of quality to calculable quantification in the form of money-- had no direct equivalent in Veblen's set of instincts. For Veblen, these characteristics were just a part of a contaminated manifestation of the instinct of workmanship in a capitalist institutional structure.


Economic Epochs


Using spirit and instinct as central concepts in their periodization of economic history, Sombart and veblen each delineated a set of economic stages, which cannot be directly to one another. Veblen's stages were more anthropological and less historically defined, applying to humankind's entire tenure on earth. (One and possibly two of his stages were prehistorical.) Sombart's stages were strictly historical, beginning with the European Middle Ages. (He did not address at any length the situations of prehistoric and ancient peoples.) Despite this difference, it will be argued that the two sets demonstrate important structural similarities. The configuration of spiritual/instinctual elements in the different stages, however, were weighted in such a way as to make the two men's systems incompatible.
Veblen's first three economic stages occupied the sane structural, but not chronological, positions as Sombart's first two stages and their subdivision. Veblen's first stage was "primitive savagery," characterized by stasis, communal ownership, and the parental bent. It was an economically inefficient and technologically stagnant period due to an anthropomorphic, rather than scientific, view of view of nature,[15]


This stage demonstrated qualities similar to an element of Sombart's first stage, precapitalist Europe. That element, the village community, was dominated by the idea of sustenance whose similarity to the parental bent has already been noted. In addition, the characteristics of stasis, communal ownership, a nonscientific view of nature ("empirical" and "traditional") and a lack of technological advancement were also present.[16]


Veblen's second stage, barbarism, saw the beginning of predatory culture. Here society was dominated by exploitative and warlike institutions, such as those the feudal nobility in Europe. Economic surplus, resulting from technological improvement, became the target of aggressive barbarian communities as they raided one another. Surplus also stratified communities internally by providing the means for "invidious distinction" based on command over the economic surplus.[17] A second element of Sombart's precapitalist stage, the seigniorial economy, was akin to barbarism and was also identified with the feudal nobility of Europe. This stage was also characterized by an economic surplus controlled by the lord, and an aggressive, military spirit.[18]


The third stage of Veblen, the handicraft era, witnessed the emergence of a more pervasive and less contaminated form of the instinct of workmanship, although predatory instincts of barbarism had not disappeared. This stage was characterized by the individual craftsman, who embodied all elements of the production process. He as the owner of his shop and tools and at the same time provided the labor power necessary to carry out production. The individual craftsman demonstrated a pride in his workmanship, which he saw as statement of his own work. He was willing to make the necessary technological adjustment to modify work as conditions demanded. Technological innovation, however to lead the era's demise, for as markets widened, fueled by the development of transportation and communication technologies a division of labor between pecuniary and productive pursuits arose. This development resulted in the individual placing his own interests over those of the community and the reemergence of pecuniary/ predatory instinct dominance and a contamination of the instinct of workmanship. This domination would reach its fullest development in the fourth stage of the "machine era."[19]


Sombart portrayed the handicraft element of the precapitalist epoch in terms very similar to Veblen's. He also emphasized that the handicraft system was more "natural," more communal, and conductive to the creative elements of the individual's personality. A major difference, as noted above, was that Sombart believed that the handicraft system inclined to a stasis found in the village economy, whereas, Veblen saw the predatory instinct retarding the development of technological efficiency and scientific insight, Sombart saw it promoting those factors. This can be seen in his assertion that the rise of cities stemmed not from the productive forces that Veblen identified with the instinct of workmanship, but from consumption demands of the predatory class. The latter were the "city founders;" the craftsmen and traders were simply the "city fillers" who serviced the formers' needs.[20]


Like Veblen, Sombart wrote that the impetus for the development of capitalism came from the adventurous, enterprising, predatory element of the earlier period. Entrepreneur were risk takers, those who sought to accumulate wealth and power by challenging the status quo. They range from conquerors to economic speculators. Accordingly, Sombart noted the association of trade with piracy in the early capitalist period. He presented this group as if they were the heirs of the feudal nobility with its "heroic" convictions.[21]


In other capitalists, the bourgeois spirit predominated, implying a lack of "heroism." Instead, they possessed the organizational ability to rationally plan steps toward a goal, thriftiness, an insistence on the profitable expenditure of time and the ability to calculate, to reduce things to quantities. Rather than forcing people to do their bidding, they convinced strangers to enter into contracts with them and to buy their products. This group emerged not from the nobility but from the handicraft system.[22]
While the early capitalist contained both the adventurous and calculating elements, the entrepreneurial spirit was the stronger. The bourgeois spirit was partially held in check by the traditional convictions and form of the guilds. As capitalism developed during its early period, the bourgeois spirit became stronger, so that by the epoch of high capitalism it had come to dominated the entrepreneurial spirit.[23]


Veblen's machine age and Sombart's high capitalist epoch began in the last half of the eighteenth century. Both saw these stages as characterized by artificial (as opposed to natural), impersonal relationships in which large-scale productive process reduced all qualitative standards to the simple quantitative standard of increased output for more money.


Veblen believed that the machine age brought standardization and mechanistic discipline, especially to the working class. The impersonal working of the system, the attention to cause and effect, resulted in loss of the personal qualities of work. The rationalities of a reified world were oblivious to more conventional standards of morality, truth, and beauty. While the presence of the machine was ubiquitous, the business classes maintained their pecuniary outlook. The standardized regimentation of the working classes and the pecuniary instincts of the businessman were complementary in the machine age.[24]


Sombart wrote that the high capitalist period, like the high precapitalist period, was static, but its stasis was enforced through science, self-interest and flexibility rather than through the rigid traditions of the community. It is important to note the decline of the entrepreneurial spirit in high capitalism. The reified mechanism demonstrated non of the dynamic adventurism that characterized the emergence of capitalism. Thus, while Veblen's machine age was characterized by the dominance of the predatory instinct over all others, Sombart saw the decline of its analogous spiritual element in high capitalism.[25]


Conclusion


Like Veblen, sombart distinguished two aspects of modern capitalism that were traced to the mobility and the artisanry respectively. Sombart also connected the predatory aspect of the nobility with consumption, especially luxury consumption. Unlike Veblen, however, he viewed the nobility positively, rather than simply as parasites. They were the real creators of capitalism through their will to power and wealth. They were the heroes. While Sombart, like Veblen, extolled the virtues of the producing artisan, he saw them giving way to the negative aspect of the modern capitalist system. Thus, the very element Veblen condemned as predatory and parasitic in machine age capitalism was held out by Sombart as the only hope for the future.


As a remedy for the ills of modern capitalism, Veblen looked to the instinct as they were expressed in a past golden age while Sombart became interested in a new breed of heroes--the socialist warriors. In revising Socialism and the Social Movement in 1919, he added a chapter describing Russian Bolshevism as a fighting movement that was preventing socialism from being coopted by capitalism and restoring its heroic spirit. When Bolshevism failed him, him the extreme nationalism that he displayed in Traders and Heroes moved him into the cap of the new "heroism," that of National Socialism.[26]
Veblen's evolutionary perspective and his cultural lag theory stressed the likelihood of atavistic continuities and left him uncertain of the future because blind drift was as likely an outcome as any. In his last years, while Sombart took refuge in Nazi apologetics, Veblen, though adhering to egalitarian ideas and an open society, became increasing pessimistic regarding the possibilities of throwing off the yoke of the vested interests.[27]


Notes


[1.] For example, cf. Lev E. Dobriansky, Veblenism: A New Critique (Washington, D. C.: Public Affairs Press, (1975), pp. 171-73; David Reisman, Thorstein Veblen: A Critical Interpretation (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1960) pp. 155-56; Joseph Dorfman, Thorstein Veblen and His America (New York: Augustus M. Kelley, 1966) pp. 147, 156, 212-13, 323.
[2.] For Sombart's place in the German Historical School, see Dieter Lindenlaub, Richtungkampfe im Verein fur Soziapolitik (Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner, 1967) pp. 314-37; Arthur Mitzman, Sociology and Estrangement (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1973, 135-264; Joseph Schumpeter, History of Economic Analysis (New York: Oxford University Press. 1954) pp. 815-18.
[3.] Cf. Veblen, Essays, Reviews and Reports, ed. Joseph Dorfman (clifton, N.J.: August M. Kelley. 1973) pp. 463-65, 498-506, 529-32; sombart, Luxury and Capitalism, trans, W.R. Dittmar (An Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1967), p. 61. In a note to Wesley Mitchell, Sombart wrote that Mitchell and Veblen were exceptions to the rule of America economists who wander along completely antiquated paths. Mitchell Papers, Butler Library, Columbia University, New York. Also cf. Arthur K. Davis, Thorstein Veblen's Social Theory (New York: Arno Press, 1980), pp. 417-32; Carle c. Zimmerman, Consumption and Standards of Living, (New York: Van Nostrand, 1936), pp. 498-520.
[4.] Leo Rogin, "Werner Sombart and the Natural Science Method," Journal of Political Economy, 41 (1933): 224; Sombart, Der moderne Kapitalismus second edition (Munich and Leipzig: Duncker und Humblot, 1928) vol. I, p. xx.
[5.] Sombart, "Economic Theory and Economic History," The Economic History Review 2 (1929): 14.
[6.] Sombart, Moderne Kapitalismus, vol. I pp. 13-14, vol. II, p. 3; Sombart, Die deutsche Volkwirtschaft im neuzehnten Jahrhundert, 8th ed. (Darmstadt: Wissenchaftliche Buchgemeinschaft, 1954) p. 44.
[7.] Veblen, The Instinct of Workmanship and the State of the Industrial Arts (new York: Augustus M. Kelley, 1964), p. 15.
[8.] Ibid., p. 32.
[9.] Sombart, Modern Kapitalismus, vol. I p. 26, pp. 3-5.
[10.] Sombart, Instinct, pp. 231-98.
[11.] Ibid., pp. 27,35.
[12.] Veblen, The Theory of the Leisure Class, (New York: New American Library, 1912) pp. 165-76.
[13.] Sombart, Moderne Kapitalismus, vol. I, pp. 14, 31-34; Sombart, The Quintessence of Capitalism, trans. and ed. M. Epstein (New York: Howard Fertig, 1967) pp. 13-21.
[14.] Sombart, Quintessence, pp. 51-55.
[15.] Veblen, Instinct, p. 74.
[16.] Sombart, Moderne Kapitalismus, vol. I, 36-37.
[17.] Veblen, Instinct, p. 32.
[18.] Sombart, Moderne Kapitalismus, vol. I p. 66.
[19.] Veblen, Instinct, pp. 344-45.
[20.] Sombart, Moderne Kapitalismus, vol. I pp. 131, 159, 190-97, 737.
[21.] Ibid., vol. II pp. 23-28; Quintessence, pp. 51-53.
[22.] Sombart, Moderne Kapitalismus, vol. II, pp. 31-34; Quintessence pp. 53-55.
[23.] Sombart, Quintessence pp. 172-180.
[24.] Veblen, The Theory of Business Enterprise (new York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1904) chapts. 2,4.
[25.] Sombart, Quintessence pp. 344-46, 358.
[26.] Sombart, Sozialismus und soziale Bewegung, 7th edition (Jena: Gustav Fisher, 1919) 190-91; Sombart, Handler und Helden (Munich: Duncker und Humblot. 1915).
[27.] Cf Veblen Absentee Ownership (New York: B. W. Huebsch, 1923) pp. 398-445 © Library.by

vendredi, 13 janvier 2012

Slavoj Zizek: De nar die de koning de waarheid zegt

Slavoj Zizek: De nar die de koning de waarheid zegt. Gesprek met de Sloveense filosoof en volksmenner

Ex: http://solidarisme.be

Van een verwaaide extremist die niet kan zwijgen over Hegel, Marx en Lacan is de Sloveense filosoof Slavoj Zizek uitgegroeid tot het boegbeeld van ieder die jong is en iets anders wil. De Occupiers dragen hem op handen, maar of hij blij is met al die eer, is een andere vraag.

MARNIX VERPLANCKE

slavojzizek.jpg'Toen ik in Wall Street het parkje naderde waar de Occupy-activisten zich verschanst hebben, kreeg ik dezelfde indruk als overal elders: hoe dichter je komt, hoe groter de teleurstelling wordt. Laten we eerlijk zijn, die mensen weten niet wat ze willen. Ze zouden een voorbeeld moeten nemen aan die Poolse overlevende van Auschwitz die ieder jaar naar het kamp trok en daar gewoon stond, in een stil protest. Maar nee, ze willen de wereld iets meedelen en dat is alleen maar bullshit zoals: 'Het geld moet de mensen dienen.' Daar zou zelfs Hitler het mee eens zijn geweest, want als het geld de mensen niet dient, dient het de Joodse bankiers. Ik hou anders wel van de term Occupy. Normaal verwijst die naar de machthebbers, die buitenlandse gebieden bezetten of kolonies stichten. Hier wordt dat omgedraaid. Dat is leuk, maar Occupy heeft geen programma en dat zal de dood zijn van die beweging."

De Sloveense filosoof Slavoj Zizek staat erom bekend zijn mening niet onder stoelen of banken te steken en daarbij steevast tegen de haren van zijn geestesverwanten in te strijken. Hij is de communist die in de jaren tachtig door het Joegoslavische communistische regime een beroepsverbod van vijf jaar opgelegd kreeg, de psychoanalyticus die met zijn constante geëmmer over Hegel en vooral Marx zijn collega's de gordijnen in jaagt en de volksmenner die op Wall Street een stel jongeren steunt en aanmoedigt en hen daarna lelijk te kakken zet. En misschien wel terecht, want wie op YouTube de beelden ziet van een orerende Zizek wiens woorden zin voor zin door de Occupiers nagescandeerd worden, kan bijna niet anders dan denken aan die scène uit Life of Brian waarin Brian zijn ongewenste volgelingen probeert weg te sturen met de boodschap dat ze voor zichzelf moeten denken en zij dit gewoon gedachteloos herhalen.

Beweren dat Zizek de John Cleese van de hedendaagse filosofie is, gaat misschien wat ver, maar grappig is hij ongetwijfeld. Hij is de nar die al schertsend de koning de waarheid zegt en zich zo verzekert van een miljoenenpubliek. Vorige week kreeg hij er een paar duizend van bij elkaar in de Brusselse Bozar, waar hij een lezing gaf over ons Europese erfgoed en het gesprek dat we nadien hadden kwam automatisch uit bij het lot van dit oude Avondland. "Wanneer je een Chinees alle kwaad van de wereld toewenst, zeg je: 'Dat je in interessante tijden moge leven.' Wel, vandaag leven we in interessante tijden. We kunnen kritiek hebben op wat er in West- Europa na de Tweede Wereldoorlog is verwezenlijkt, maar je moet de duivel uiteindelijk ook geven wat hem toekomt. Was er ooit een moment in de geschiedenis van de mensheid waarop zo veel mensen een vrij, welgesteld en veilig leven konden leiden? Het verontrustende is echter dat dit op zijn einde loopt. Neem nu het antifascistische pact dat de Europese democratische partijen vanzelfsprekend vonden, dat komt vandaag op de helling te staan. Je had vroeger ook extreemrechtse partijen, maar daar praatte je niet mee. In Oostenrijk en Nederland geldt die regel opeens niet meer en sluiten ze overeenkomsten met extreem rechts. En onze kijk op de geschiedenis wordt er ook door aangetast. Hitler is nog steeds des duivels, maar de vroege Franco of Mussolini, ho maar! Het enige wat zij deden was zich terecht verzetten tegen het communisme. Wij staan dus op het punt iets heel belangrijks overboord te gooien. En hier ga ik akkoord met Peter Sloterdijk wanneer hij zegt dat je een onderscheid moet maken tussen de sociaaldemocratie en sociaaldemocratische partijen. Na de oorlog werd de sociaaldemocratie iets vanzelfsprekends, ook voor christendemocratische en liberale partijen. Het deed er niet toe wie er aan de macht was, de sociaaldemocratie werd niet ter discussie gesteld. Ik vrees dat dit voorgoed voorbij is."

Is dit geen wereldwijd fenomeen? Uit de VS komt er ook al geen goed nieuws.

"Hoe raar het ook moge klinken, de meest linkse president die ze daar ooit hadden, was Richard Nixon. Na hem zijn onderwijs, cultuur, ziekenzorg en andere sociale programma's er alleen maar op achteruit gegaan. Zoals we in Griekenland en Italië op dit moment al kunnen zien, en misschien ook wel in Nederland, wacht Europa een pact tussen technocraten en antimigrantenrechts.

Weet je wat Lacan zei over jaloerse mannen? Dat hun jaloezie pathologisch is, ook al bedriegt hun vrouw hen aan alle kanten. Wat van belang is, is niet of de man gelijk heeft, maar waarom hij zo pathologisch gefixeerd is op dat overspel. Hetzelfde zie je vandaag met de angst voor moslims. Zelfs al zijn er inderdaad moslims die terroristische aanslagen voorbereiden, dat is het probleem niet. Dat ligt in de onmogelijkheid voor extreem rechts om een Europa op te bouwen dat zijn identiteit niet ophangt aan de oppositie tegen de islam. Vandaar mijn oproep om deze politiek van de angst achter ons te laten. Angst is vandaag de grote politieke hefboom geworden, ook voor links trouwens, die mensen bang maakt voor hervormingen. Niemand gelooft blijkbaar nog in een positieve visie op wat de toekomst zou kunnen zijn. Ik vind dat jammer."

Is dat geen teken dat onze beschaving in een crisis verkeert?

"Het enige wat politici vandaag beloven, is dat de boel zal blijven draaien. De fundamentele crisis van vandaag is dus niet economisch of politiek, maar wel spiritueel, en ik ben er mij van bewust dat dit een rare uitspraak is uit de mond van een marxist. Niet dat ik me tot het katholicisme heb bekeerd en de paus gelijk geef wanneer hij zegt dat we met een morele crisis te maken hebben geleid door hebzuchtige bankiers. Dat is gewoon dom, want wat zou een bankier anders moeten zijn dan hebzuchtig, dat is toch zijn job? Het probleem ligt bij ons systeem dat steunt op dit type bankiers. De paus bezondigt zich hier aan protofascistisch denken: het probleem ligt niet bij het systeem, maar bij die vuige bankiers, en als het een beetje meezit zijn het ook nog eens Joodse bankiers. Kijk naar de VS, waar alle schuld op de schouders van Bernie Madoff werd geschoven. Daar hebben we een corrupte Jood! Maar over de ondergang van Lehman Brothers werd gezwegen, terwijl Madoff in vergelijking maar een schooljongetje was. We moeten dus niet zitten zaniken dat het kapitalisme egoïstisch is, maar juist nog veel egoïstischer zijn. We moeten aan onszelf denken en aan onze toekomst."

De openlijke speculatie met voedsel lijkt wel het lelijkste gezicht van het kapitalisme.

"Zelfs Bill Clinton sprak zich uit tegen het economische neokolonialisme van vandaag, waarbij de vruchtbare gronden in ontwikkelingslanden verpacht worden aan firma's uit het Westen die er landbouwproducten verbouwen louter voor de export. Pas op, ik zeg niet dat we terug moeten naar een oubollige socialistische landbouwpolitiek. Dat was de grootste ramp die het socialisme ooit veroorzaakte. Zuidwestelijk Rusland en Oekraïne bezaten de vruchtbaarste landbouwgrond van heel de wereld. Oekraïne zou op zijn eentje heel Europa kunnen voeden. En toch diende de Sovjet-Unie vanaf de jaren zestig constant voedsel in te voeren. Daar moeten we dus zeker niet naar terug."

En wat met het argument dat het allemaal de schuld is van China, het land dat oneerlijk concurreert door de waarde van zijn munt kunstmatig laag te houden?

"De crisis van 2008 veroorzaakte in China op slag en stoot 13.000.000 werklozen, maar een paar maanden later waren die alweer aan de slag. Het autoritaire regime kon de banken verplichten geld te lenen met het doel de binnenlandse vraag aan te wakkeren en weg was de crisis. Voor mij is dit de donkere boodschap van de crisis: dat de democratie het op zo'n moment moet afleggen tegen om het even welk autoritair regime. We dachten altijd dat het kapitalisme enkel kon floreren onder een democratisch regime, maar dat is vandaag niet meer zo. De dictaturen fietsen ons lachend voorbij. Kijk naar het boegbeeld van de politiek autoritaire maar economisch ultraliberale praktijk, Singapore. In 2009, toen de crisis het zwaarst toesloeg, tekende dat land een economische groei van 15 procent op, een record. Ik vind dat verontrustend."

Is Chinese democratie denkbaar?

"China heeft geen nood aan meer politieke partijen, maar wel aan een vrije samenleving, met ecologische drukkingsgroepen en onafhankelijke vakbonden. In het China van vandaag kun je gerust de vloer aanvegen met Marx. Niemand geeft nog om die ouwe troep. Maar wanneer je een staking probeert op te zetten, ben je - poef - zo maar opeens verdwenen. Iedere samenleving heeft zijn heilig boek en in China is dat De geschiedenis van de Communistische Partij. In de laatste editie bleek een bepaalde paragraaf opeens weg. Het gekke is dat die paragraaf heel lovend was voor de Partij. Hij ging over de jaren dertig, net voor de Japanse invasie, toen de streek rond Shanghai een economische boom beleefde en de Communistische Partij arbeiders verenigde in vakbonden. Stel dat dit mensen op ideeën brengt, dacht men wellicht, en dus ging die paragraaf eruit. Kijk, ik ben geen catastrofist die het einde van de wereld verkondigt. Ik doe niet meer dan de crisis serieus nemen en beweren dat het tijd wordt om na te denken over een alternatief voor het kapitalisme."

En wat is dat alternatief?

"Zeker niet het oude communisme, want dat is zo dood als een pier, en de sociaaldemocratische welvaartsstaat wellicht ook. In de twintigste eeuw wisten we wat we moesten doen, maar we wisten niet hoe. Vandaag zitten we met het tegenovergestelde probleem: we zien dat we iets moeten doen, maar we weten niet wat. Iemand vroeg me ooit waarom ik alleen kritiek heb en geen oplossingen aandraag. 'Waarom gun je ons geen blik op het licht aan het einde van de tunnel?', vroeg hij. Dus gaf ik hem het perfecte Oost-Europese antwoord: 'Dat doe ik liever niet aangezien het licht aan het einde van de tunnel afkomstig is van een andere trein die aan topsnelheid op ons afkomt.' Ik vind al die oplossingen zo goedkoop dramatisch: je beschrijft een probleem en op het einde bied je de oplossing. Zo makkelijk is het, maar wat als er geen hoop is? Volgens mij is de eerste stap naar een oplossing het besef dat er geen makkelijke hoop is. In dit leven kun je alleen maar pessimistisch zijn, vind ik. Dat is de enige manier om nog af en toe ook gelukkig te zijn, want optimisten worden constant teleurgesteld".

Maar toch blijft u streven naar een nieuw soort communisme?

"Waarom doe je dat Slavoj, vragen mijn vrienden, want je weet toch dat iedereen bij het horen van de term communisme meteen aan de stalinistische goelag denkt? Precies, antwoord ik dan, ik gebruik communisme omdat alle andere termen bezwaard geraakt zijn. Neem socialisme, iedereen is tegenwoordig toch socialist? Zelfs Hitler was er een. Socialisme staat immers voor een soort gemeenschappelijke solidariteit, waardoor het niet meer is dan gegeneraliseerd kapitalisme. Wie heeft in Amerika in 2008 de banken gered? Inderdaad, links, want rechts wou ze failliet laten gaan. Zonder socialisme hadden we vandaag misschien zelfs geen kapitalisme meer. Voor mij is communisme eerder de naam van een probleem, niet van de oplossing. Met het nieuwe communisme bedoel ik een manier om zinvol om te springen met al onze gemeenschappelijke goederen."

Bron: De Morgen, 7 december 2011, pp. 33-35

00:07 Publié dans Philosophie | Lien permanent | Commentaires (0) | Tags : slovénie, slavoj zizek, philosophie | |  del.icio.us | | Digg! Digg |  Facebook

dimanche, 08 janvier 2012

The Oppression of “Human Rights”

The Oppression of “Human Rights”

By Keith Preston

ex: http://www.alternativeright.com/

“Whoever invokes humanity wants to cheat.”

Pierre Joseph Proudhon

In his important work Beyond Human Rights: Defending Freedoms (Arktos, 2011), Alain De Benoist aptly summarizes the first article of faith of the present day secular theocracy which reigns in the Western world:

One proof of this is its dogmatic character; it cannot be debated. That is why it seems today as unsuitable, as blasphemous, as scandalous to criticize the ideology of human rights as it was earlier to doubt the existence of God. Like every religion, the discussion of human rights seeks to pass off its dogmas as so absolute that one could not discuss them without being extremely, stupid, dishonest, or wicked…(O)ne implicitly places their opponents beyond the pale of humanity, since one cannot fight someone who speaks in the name of humanity while remaining human oneself.

 

While reading the above passage, I was instantly reminded of a particularly venal leftist critic who once amusingly described me as “flunking out of the human race” for, among other things, promoting the work of Benoist. The zealous religiosity which the apostles of human rights attach to their cause is particularly ironic given the nebulous and imprecise nature of their cherished dogma. As Thomas Szasz has observed:

Never before in our history have political and popular discourse been so full of rights-talk, as they are today. People appeal to disability rights, civil rights, gay rights, reproduction rights (abortion), the right to choose (also abortion), the right to health care, the right to reject treatment…and so forth, each a rhetorical device to justify one or another social policy and it enforcement by means of the coercive apparatus of the state.

 

Indeed, contemporary “rights-talk” often resembles the scene in one of the Star Trek films where Captain Kirk and his cohorts are engaged in negotiations of some sort with the Klingons and the Chekhov character raises the issue of the Klingons’ lack of regard for “democracy and human rights.” A Klingon responds by denouncing the term “human rights” as “racist” (presumably because Klingons are excluded from the human rights pantheon).

Benoist traces the development of modern “human rights” ideology and explores how the concept of “rights” has changed throughout history. In the classical world, “rights” were conceived of as being relative to an individual’s relationship to a particular community. Someone possessed “rights” because they were a citizen of a specific political entity or some other institutional context. The notion of abstract “rights” in a quasi-metaphysical sense was non-existent. Benoist considers the ideology of human rights to be an outgrowth of Christian universalism. Christianity introduced the concept of an individual soul that is eternal, transcendent, and independent of one’s specific social identity. Out of the Christian notion of the transcendent soul emerged the Enlightenment doctrine of “natural rights.” These rights are assumed to be universal and immutable.

Yet the very concept of “rights” as conceived of in this manner has itself undergone a number of profound metamorphosis. In its early phase, rights doctrine recognized only the Lockean negative liberties of “life, liberty, and property” and so forth. With the advent of ideologies like socialism or progressive liberalism the rights doctrine began to include what are now called “positive” rights. FDR’s famous “four freedoms” are an illustration of the foundations of this perspective. With the racial and cultural revolutions of the postwar era, rights doctrine took on a whole new meaning with “rights” now including exemption from discrimination on the basis of ethnicity, gender, sexual orientation, disability and an increasingly long list of other things. This certainly would have come as a shock to the great apostle of “natural rights,” Thomas Jefferson, who, as the Left never ceases to remind us, was a white male slaveholder who thought homosexuals should be castrated.

The definition of “human rights” continues to become increasingly murky over time. Benoist provides an apt illustration of the escalating imprecision of the rights doctrine by citing this quote from Pierre Manent:

To respect the dignity of another human being is no longer to respect the respect which he conserves in himself for the moral law; it is today, more and more, to respect the choice that he has made, whatever this choice may be, in the realization of his rights.

 

Benoist describes the predictable outcome of the rights doctrine that is now observable in contemporary politics:

The present tendency…consists in converting all sorts of demands, desires, or interests into ‘rights.’ Individuals, in the extreme case, would have the ‘right’ to see no matter what demand satisfied, for the sole reason that they can formulate them. Today, to claim rights is only a way of seeking to maximize one’s interests.

Particularly disastrous has been the fusion of the rights doctrine with mass democracy and the parallel growth exhibited by these two. Hans Hermann Hoppe has observed that a mass democracy comprised of an infinite number of interest groups making infinite rights claims is simply a form of low-intensity civil war. Likewise, Welf Herfurth has demonstrated how the very meaning of “democracy” has changed over time whereby earlier definitions of this concept, even in their modern liberal variations, have been abandoned and “democracy” has simply become a pseudonym for the limitless right to personal hedonism.

A paradoxical effect of the infinite expansion of the rights doctrine has been the simultaneously infinite growth of the state. Fustel de Coulandges described the political order of pre-modern Europe:

At the top of the hierarchy, the king was surrounded by his great vassals. Each of these vassals was himself surrounded by his own feudatories and he could not pronounce the least judgment without them…The king could neither make a new law, nor modify the existing laws, nor raise a new tax without the consent of the country…If one looks at the institutions of this regime from close quarters, and if one observes their meaning and significance, one will see they were all directed against despotism. However great the diversity that seems to reign in this regime, there is, however, one thing that unites them: this thing is obsession with absolute power. I do not think any regime better succeeded in rendering arbitrary rule impossible.

 

Benoist contrasts this with subsequent political developments in European civilization:

The end of the feudal regime marked the beginning of the disintegration of this system under the influence of Roman authoritarianism and the deadly blows of the centralized state. Little by little, hereditary royalty implemented a juridicial-administrative centralization at the expense of intermediary bodies and regional assemblies. While the communal revolution sanctioned the power of the nascent bourgeoisie, the regional parliaments ceased to be equal assemblies and became meetings of royal officers. Having become absolute, the monarchy supported itself upon the bourgeoisie to liquidate the resistances of the nobility.

 

Indeed, it could be argued that a similar process is presently transpiring whereby the New Class (or what Sam Francis called the “knowledge class” or what Scott Locklin regards as simply a new upper middle class) is aligning itself with the central government for the purpose of destroying the traditional WASP elite and marginalizing the traditional working to middle classes just as the nascent bourgeoisie of earlier times aligned itself with absolute monarchies against the nobility.

The growth of the rights doctrine has of course brought with it the explosive growth of rights-enforcement agencies and bureaucrats as any small business owner or self-employed person who has dealt with Occupational Health and Safety Administration would agree. Likewise, the autonomy of regions, localities, and the private sector has been nearly entirely eradicated in the name of creating rights for an ever expanding army of grievance groups and their advocates. Benoist discusses how the rights doctrine has also resulted in the phenomenal growth of the legal system. Today, there is virtually no aspect of life that is considered to be beyond the reach of state regulation or prohibition. Says Pierre Manent:

In the future, if one depends principally upon human rights to render justice, the ‘manner of judging’ will be irreparable. Arbitrariness, that is to say precisely what our regimes wanted to defend themselves against in instituting the authority of constitutionality, will then go on increasing, and will paradoxically become the work of judges. Now, a power which discovers that it can act arbitrarily will not delay in using and abusing this latitude. It tends towards despotism.

Far more dreadful than the use of “rights” as a pretext for enlarging civil bureaucracies and creeping statism in domestic and legal matters has been the application of the “human rights” ideology to international relations. Benoist points out the irony of how the military imperialism that the decolonialization movements were ostensibly supposed to end has been revived under the guise of “humanitarian intervention.” The doctrine of “humanitarian intervention” not only contravenes the international law established by the Peace of Westphalia but as well the Charter of the United Nations: “It suggests that every state, whatever it be, can intervene at will in the internal affairs of another state, whatever it be, under the pretext of preventing ‘attacks on human rights.’” The effect of this doctrine is the simple sanctioning of aggressive war without end.

Plato’s observation that a democratic regime on its deathbed is most typically characterized by a combination of individual licentiousness and creeping political tyranny would seem to be apt assessment of our present condition. As one Facebook commentator recently suggested:

Barbarism. Take a picture, we need to get it down for future civilizations. They need to know how the dialectic works: the negation of parental and local authority does NOT lead to freedom, or does so only briefly. That negation is in turn negated by a soft totalitarianism, now becoming harder and more crystallized in order to fill the vacuum of authority. If we record it for them, when some future Neo-Enlightenment philosopher promises liberty and equality circa 2800CE, he can be properly dressed down before he does any damage.

 

Hear, hear!