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vendredi, 31 janvier 2014

Turkey and Iran: The Ties That Bind

Turkey and Iran: The Ties That Bind
Turkey and Iran

As Turkey works for harmonization with Iran and Russia, an internal struggle has developed between the PM and the Gulenists that may threaten the process. If the leadership of the AKP is to be believed, it’s part of a foreign conspiracy to remove them.

Regarding the conflict in Syria, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s AKP (Justice and Development Party) government in Ankara might be on the opposite side of the fence from both Tehran and Moscow, but the depth of Turkish ties with Iran and Russia go beyond this.

Turkey is not only tied to both Iran and Russia through geography and centuries of common history, it also shares the bonds of mutual trade, culture, linguistics, and ethnic composition. Although Turkish policies and political relations with Iran and Russia are subject to fluctuation, the many links tying Turkish society to both cannot be undone, including the economic reality of their ties.

Tehran and Moscow are two of Turkey’s most important trading partners and sources of energy. Aside from Germany, in terms of Turkish exports and imports, the combined volume of Turkish trade with both Iran and Russia outflanks, by way of comparison, any bilateral trade relations Ankara has with other countries.

Realizing the importance of Turkish economic ties to Iran, it is important to note that the unilateral US and European Union sanctions set up against Iran have hurt the Turkish economy. The Turks need Iranian energy in the form of natural gas and oil. When the US government asked Ankara to cut back on Iranian energy imports, it basically expected the Turkish government to knowingly handicap the Turkish economy in order to serve Washington’s agenda.

Even under the US-led sanctions regime directed against Iran as a form of economic manipulation and warfare, Turkish businesses and the AKP government have tried their best to maintain their economic and energy ties with Iran. This has been done both openly and covertly. Turkey has even acted as a covert channel for Iran to evade the US and EU sanctions.

Among other things, the corruption scandal involving the head of the state-owned Halk Bankasi (People’s Bank), or Halkbank for short, that emerged on December 17, 2013, is a reflection of the continuation of business and trade between Turkey and Iran. Sales from Iran were silently facilitated by the Turkish bank through the purchasing of gold that was given to Tehran as payment, instead of a currency, after Tehran was blocked from using the SWIFT international money-transfer system in March 2012. Halkbank maintains that the transactions were legal and that no rules prevented trading precious metals with Iran until July 2013 and that it ceased doing so on June 10, 2013.

An internal power struggle has emerged in Turkey. The Halkbank scandal is really a sub-plot and symptom of this. Not only do the recent graft probes reflect widespread government corruption in Turkey, but it puts the spotlight on an inner tussle within the AKP and, more broadly, within the Turkish elite managing the affairs of the Republic of Turkey.

Neo-Ottomanism: Winter in Turkish foreign politics

Since 2011, the economic damage on Turkey caused by the sanctions regime against Iran has been aggravated through an aggregate of Turkish miscalculations and domestic incidents. In large part, these miscalculations are the result of the metamorphosis of Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu’s business-friendly ‘zero problems’ foreign policy into the much more aggressive ‘neo-Ottoman’ foreign policy.

Senior Turkish politicians believed that the so-called Arab Spring would elevate Ankara as an indisputable regional powerhouse from the borders of Morocco to Iraq. These Turkish views were also encouraged by the US and from inside the EU, with the promotion of the so-called ‘Turkish model’ for the Arabs, which buoyed the AKP government to diverge from its ‘zero problems’ policy in pursuit of neo-Ottoman dreams of unchallenged Turkish economic and political supremacy in the Arab World.

Through its neo-Ottoman enterprise, Ankara walked away from the Ankara-Damascus-Tehran axis that appeared to be forming and all the advances it had made with Libya, Syria, Iraq and Lebanon. A winter of sorts had arrived for Ankara in the field of foreign affairs. Turkish relations eventually soured, with almost all the countries on its borders and a chilling of relations began to emerge with Tehran and the Kremlin.

Neo-Ottoman foreign policy was initiated through the Turkish government’s support for the NATO war and regime change operations in Tripoli that ultimately disrupted Turkish trade with the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya. Although the Turkish government pretended it was against the war, Ankara did not veto any of NATO’s war plans at the North Atlantic Council in Brussels. Instead Turkey supported the NATO-imposed no-fly zone, actively took part in the naval embargo around the Libyan coast, manned the airport in Benghazi as the NATO provisional authority there, and facilitated the Libyan anti-government forces in multiple ways.

As a result of the Turkish government’s own actions, the intensity of Turkish business ties and trade with Libya has not recovered since the NATO war in 2011 due to the damage and instability inflected on the Libyan economy.

Gulf of Izmir, formerly known as the Gulf of Smyrna, on the Aegean Sea in the Turkish city of Izmir (AFP Photo)
 
Gulf of Izmir, formerly known as the Gulf of Smyrna, on the Aegean Sea in the Turkish city of Izmir (AFP Photo)

The events in Libya were followed by the eventual suspension of Turkish trade with Syria, another important Turkish trading partner. The discontinuation of legal trade with Syria resulted as a consequence of Erdogan’s reckless support for regime change in Damascus.

All the while, Turkey’s relations with Iraq, another major Turkish trading partner, were degenerating due to the arrogance and hubris of Erdogan and the AKP. Ankara believed that Iranian influence in the Levant and Mesopotamia would be replaced with Turkish influence and kept pushing for its affiliates to supplant the governments in Damascus and Baghdad.

Even when the AKP government saw that a formidable Eurasian alliance formed by Russia, Iran and China would not let Damascus collapse to the anti-government insurgency supported by Turkey and its NATO and GCC allies, Erdogan opted to stay the course against Damascus instead of trying to reverse Ankara’s disastrous Syria policy.

Aside from the economic damage the AKP was inflicting on Turkey, the instability that Ankara was helping support in Syria through the training, arming, and financing of insurgents in Syria began to have political and security consequences on Turkish soil too.

As the Turkish economy began to hurt, domestic political tensions began to build, the disparity caused by the AKP’s neoliberal economic policies began to hurt more, and the AKP began to act more authoritarian so as to protect its authority.

To an extent, the Gezi Park protests that spread from Istanbul across Turkey in 2013 are a reflection of the ignition of these domestic tensions.

This article was originally published by Russia Today on January 20, 2014.


A worker walks past the pumping station on the border between Iran and Turkey (Reuters)

A worker walks past the pumping station on the border between Iran and Turkey (Reuters)

 

 

Articles by: Mahdi Darius Nazemroaya

About the author:

An award-winning author and geopolitical analyst, Mahdi Darius Nazemroaya is the author of The Globalization of NATO (Clarity Press) and a forthcoming book The War on Libya and the Re-Colonization of Africa. He has also contributed to several other books ranging from cultural critique to international relations. He is a Sociologist and Research Associate at the Centre for Research on Globalization (CRG), a contributor at the Strategic Culture Foundation (SCF), Moscow, and a member of the Scientific Committee of Geopolitica, Italy.

 

Related content:

 

samedi, 18 janvier 2014

Erdogan in Trouble but Gulen and CIA Intrigues need containing

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Turkey in crisis: Erdogan in Trouble but Gulen and CIA Intrigues need containing 

Nuray Lydia Oglu and Lee Jay Walker 

Ex: http://www.moderntokyotimes.com - Modern Tokyo Times

The grand ambitions of Recep Tayyip Erdogan are unraveling in many directions because the Prime Minister of Turkey is suffering from many internal convulsions which are rocking this nation.  Several years ago it appeared that Erdogan could continue to abuse many excesses based on the strength of the Justice and Development Party (AKP). Therefore, Erdogan’s Islamist dream and “Ottoman mirror” had a powerful swagger, whereby he perceived himself to be the “new father of Turkey” providing nationals followed his conservative and Islamist agenda. Yet now, the AKP is starting to look fragile and increasingly authoritarian under Erdogan.

In saying this, it is clear that Fethullah Gulen is no savior because just like Erdogan he also wants to pull the strings. Equally important, both individuals share the Islamist dream of crushing progressive forces in Turkey. Indeed, in the past Erdogan and Gulen were playing the same tune.

Regionally, the grand designs of Erdogan have literally bitten the dust because of the meddling of Turkey. After all, only Erdogan could disillusion Egypt, Iraq, Iran, Israel, Syria, and other nations. Also, with Erdogan being determined to overthrow the government of Syria, then not only did he turn a blind eye towards international jihadists and covert operatives; but, more alarmingly, he avidly tolerates and encourages brutal sectarian and terrorist forces against secular Syria. Therefore, the image of Turkey is suffering greatly throughout the entire region because Erdogan can’t stop meddling and upsetting regional nations.

Re-focusing on the current scandal in Turkey then clearly the Erdogan boat is rocking. Baha Gungor, Deutsche Welle, says: “Erdogan has made the same mistakes as many autocrats before him. He has come to see himself as infallible, tolerating criticism of his policies less and less. Journalists, intellectuals and politicians who see things differently have been locked up. Large swaths of the army’s former leadership were handed harsh jail sentences for allegedly planning a coup.”

Indeed, it is clear that 2013 witnessed many shortcomings for the leader of Turkey because Erdogan kept on piling on more judgments of errors. This was clearly apparent during the Taksim Square crisis because Erdogan issued harsh statements about the demonstrators. Also, excessive force against demonstrators and his unapologetic stance meant that Turkey was becoming even more divided.

Serious allegations by the end of 2013 related to money laundering, the smuggling of gold, major bribes – and other areas related to corruption – equated to a huge downturn in the domestic fortunes of Erdogan. Not only this, the ramifications for the economy is now being felt. This is clearly apparent because now the Turkish lira is fairing miserably with the US dollar and the Euro.

Yet the current internal struggle of Islamist powerbrokers between Erdogan and Gulen is alarming. After all, under the Obama administration in America it is clear that a pro-Muslim Brotherhood agenda existed whereby Egypt was going to be the grand experiment. Luckily, the masses in Egypt rose up against the Muslim Brotherhood putsch for usurping state institutions in order to turn the clock back. However, the dream is still alive and kicking and not surprisingly Gulen is based in America just like the leading Islamist in Tunisia resided in the United Kingdom prior to returning. Therefore, the erratic behaviour of Erdogan must have set off some alarm bells in Washington and it would appear that Gulen is now being readied for the next stage in the unraveling of secularism in Turkey.

It must be remembered, that Afghanistan and Iraq had secular governments prior to America and the United Kingdom meddling into their respective internal affairs. Indeed, America also welcomed Sharia law in Sudan in the early 1980s despite the outcome of this policy being detrimental for Animists and Christians in Sudan. Likewise, Sharia law and the jihadist threat followed on the coattails of America, France, the United Kingdom and several Gulf powers in Libya. In other words, a natural reality is emerging whereby Western powers are siding with the Islamist agenda. This can also be witnessed in Syria whereby the usual players in the Gulf and West are siding with sectarian and terrorist forces. The knock on effect is also the crushing of Christianity in Syria just like what happened in Iraq and Kosovo. Similarly, Coptic Christians were expendable in Egypt because of the intrigues of Washington and London. However, just like the crisis in Iraq it is clear that Saudi Arabia doesn’t want the Muslim Brotherhood too close to home just like this nation didn’t welcome the loss of Sunni power in Iraq.

Family Security Matters says: Osman Nori, the retired head of Turkish intelligence, recently alleged that the Gulen movement has served as a front for US intelligence by sheltering 130 CIA agents in its schools throughout Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan.”

“This claim collaborates the testimony of Sybil Edmonds, a former FBI translator and celebrated whistleblower. Ms. Edmonds says that Gulen and his movement began to receive vast sums of money from the CIA in the wake of the collapse of the Soviet Union, when US officials realized that they could not obtain control of the massive energy resources of the newly created Russian republics because of a deep-seated suspicion of American motives.”

“The CIA, Ms. Edmonds maintains, came to view Turkey as a perfect “proxy” for US interests since it was a NATO ally that shared the same language, culture, and religion as the other Central Asian countries. But centralized control of these republics, she points out, could only be actualized by the creation of the Pan-Turkish nationalism and religion, envisioned by Gulen and his followers. And so, according to Ms. Edmonds, the CIA became Gulen’s partner in the creation of the New Islamic World Order. The money for the pasha’s schools and settlements, she says, came not from congressionally-approved funding but rather from covert CIA operations, including narcotics trafficking, nuclear black market, weapons smuggling, and terrorist activities.”

In other words, if Turkey is left to the geopolitical whims of America and the United Kingdom alongside the Islamist dreams of Gulen, then Turkey will lose its secular and modernist approach. Of course, the same applies to the initial gambit of America, the United Kingdom and Gulen utilizing Erdogan – and other Islamists in Turkey, prior to the ongoing internal struggle between Erdogan and Gulen – after the applecart began to lose balance. Therefore, is essential that secular forces wake-up in Turkey and the same applies to all independent forces, which don’t rely on Western and Islamist intrigues.

Erdogan is undermining secularism in Turkey therefore his authoritarian nature is worrying vast numbers of Turkish citizens. Yet, the intrigues of Gulen aren’t the answer and the same applies to CIA shadows and the usual role of the United Kingdom. The Russian Federation must also focus on events in Turkey because Chechen Islamists and others in the Caucasus have been given havens by Turkey and the same applies to Georgia. Likewise, the Erdogan government is undermining secular Syria by supporting sectarian and terrorist forces against the people of this nation.

Turkey like Egypt is facing an internal clash of civilization and currently the intrigues of America and the United Kingdom are favoring the Islamist agenda. Ironically, in Turkey the power play between Erdogan and Gulen is between two individuals who share much in common. It is hoped that both negative forces will devour each other in order for secular and other political forces in Turkey to return the nation back to its modernization path. Therefore, political parties who oppose Erdogan should not rush into the arms of “the Gulen shadow.”

http://www.familysecuritymatters.org/publications/detail/more-dangerous-than-bin-laden-protestors-to-descend-on-gulens-mountain-fortress-in-pennsylvania#ixzz2qRaPXtVm  Family Security Matters

http://www.dw.de/opinion-erdogan-is-on-course-to-self-destruct/a-17327807 Deutsche Welle

leejay@moderntokyotimes.com

http://moderntokyotimes.com

mercredi, 15 janvier 2014

Politics behind Turkey graft probe

ErdoganGulen.jpg

Politics behind Turkey graft probe
By Omer Aslan

Ex: http://www.atimes.com

Speaking Freely is an Asia Times Online feature that allows guest writers to have their say. Please click here if you are interested in contributing.

[As Asia Times Online was going to press, Turkey's ruling party ordered purges of police chiefs and moved to tighten control of the judiciary, as a top official said there's no chance of a truce in the struggle with prosecutors leading a corruption probe, Bloomberg reported.

The government will keep firing those leading the investigation and then seek to prosecute them for attempting a coup, Osman Can, a member of the central committee of Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan's Justice and Development Party, or Ak Party, said in a January 6 interview in Istanbul.


The government has reassigned prosecutors leading the investigations and dismissed almost 2,000 police officers since news of the 15-month secret investigations broke on December 17, Bloomberg cited Hurriyet newspaper as reporting.]

Six months after the Gezi Parki protests in Istanbul, Turkey is going through tumultuous times once again. To those observing Turkey from outside, it may seem a non-stable and highly polarized country. If lack of understanding on fine details of democracy and abuse of loopholes that exist in a democratic system is part of the answer for such turbulence and unpredictability, I argue that the main reason is the vibrancy of Turkish politics. That is to say, politics is alive in Turkey; social groups have causes to mobilize around for.

There are alternative visions of Turkish society represented by different groups as well as political parties. The dominant discourse around "old Turkey versus new Turkey" is a testimony to this feature of Turkish politics.

For this reason, it may be particularly hard to grasp Turkish politics from North America and Europe where "in the era of neoliberalism, the ruling elite has hollowed out democracy and ensured that whoever you vote for you get the same." The absence of alternative visions of American or European societies runs as "stability".

These reasons behind passionate political activity in Turkey are in fact interrelated. Groups that have different visions of Turkish society and public interest sometimes exploit the loopholes in the system either deliberately or because of a failure to grasp democracy fully. The most recent political battle between the Gulen movement and the Justice and Development Party (AKP), close allies for the past decade, exemplifies this well.

The Gulen movement
What exactly is the Gulen movement? Are they an international civil society group involved in education activities and promoting global peace and interfaith dialogue? Amid this heated controversy, members of the movement argued that they are a civil society organization. They point out that "democracy allows civil society groups to pursue their interests through democratic means. Besides, theory and practice of civil society also allow such groups to use all means of communication and interaction including media outlets for [the] public interest." Is this what the Gulen movement really does?

We may take our clues from the criticisms against the Israeli Lobby in the United States to make sense of what the Gulen movement does and why it is criticized in Turkey nowadays. The concerns John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt, the authors of the Israel Lobby and US Foreign Policy, raised with the Israeli lobby was that it shaped American policy towards the Middle East in such a way that US policy served Israeli, not American, interests. The political clout that the lobby has had over primarily the US Congress forced US administrations to appoint pro-Israeli figures to critical positions, block anything in the United Nations that may be against Israel, and continue to support Israel in diverse ways that in the end ensured automatic American support for Israel.

The Gulen movement seeks to be Turkey's Israel Lobby. It would like Turkey's domestic and foreign policies to serve the movement's narrow interests. The movement has been so enmeshed in the international arena for the past decade that it now has its own interests independent of Turkey or the Muslim ummah, or community.

Some pillars of the movement's policies are maintaining good relations with Israel, avoiding any serious fall-out with the United States, where the movement's founder, Muhammed Fethullah Gulen, has resided since 1999 anyway, and never opting for an aggressive response when it comes to any type of assault on Muslims.

For example, it was for this reason that the movement and the AK Party were at loggerheads after the 2010 Mavi Marmara incident, when Israeli commandos boarded the vessel as it tried to breach Israel's blockade of Gaza. Gulen's followers were angry with the government because the break-up in ties between Turkey and Israel that followed gave the Gulen movement a headache in its dealings in the United States.

The recent political battle between the Gulen movement and the AKP is therefore more about "political deviance" of the government than the government's decision to close prep schools, a significant number of which are owned by the movement, or financial corruption charges against some prominent members inside the AKP.

For Gulen, the AKP government has lately been too critical of the West, too supportive of popular revolts in Egypt and Syria, and continues its economic dealings with Iran. In a relatively recent interview with the Atlantic, Gulen said that he did not think Turkey is having good diplomatic relations in the region and that it protects its reputation based on love, respect, and good will and collaborate around mutually agreeable goals.

A columnist at Zaman newspaper, Huseyin Gulerce, expressed the real reason behind the split: "It was the Mavi Marmara crisis that created the first cracks ... Mr Gulen's attitude was very clear, as he always suggested that Turkey should not be adventurous in its foreign policy and stay oriented to the West, and that it should resolve its foreign policy issues through dialogue."

In domestic policy too, the Gulen movement wants the government not to violate certain parameters. They do not want the government to take the PKK - the Kurdistan Workers' Party - as its negotiating partner even to resolve the Kurdish issue.

With a different vision of Turkish society and what Turkey should do in domestic arena and international politics, the Gulen movement exploited the legal cover provided by the system to start political operations on the government.

"The rule of law" and separation of three branches of government are indivisible parts of a democratic system. Prosecutors in Turkey are given an almost untouchable status so that they may prosecute without fear any holder of political power. However, while these rights and privileges are given to prosecutors, the law gives them certain responsibilities and puts certain limits on them. It is assumed and expected that prosecutors will not abuse their power and act as a supporting cast in political operations conducted on the executive branch.

However, the judiciary is treated as if they only need to be independent in Turkey; the fact that they also are expected to remain impartial is forgotten. Betraying these expectations, prosecutors suspected of links to the Gulen movement started the recent corruption probe in Turkey. The fact that three independent probes are combined for no understandable reason and that the suspects, including well-known figures, have been taken into custody to create noise and then released one by one led to the suspicion that the probes were politically motivated.

The content of the ongoing graft probe was somehow leaked to opposition newspapers, mainly to the Gulenist media outlets in Turkey.

Besides, the subjects of the probes somehow came to be published in Today's Zaman, a Gulenist mouthpiece, some days before the operation started. Some columnists at Today's Zaman later put great effort in relating the AKP to both Al-Qaeda and Iran (at the same time!) on social media.

Here is the dilemma in a democracy: how can a democratic government protect itself when unaccountable prosecutors conduct politically motivated operations to bring down a government and to arrest the prime minister under the legal cover of principles of rule of law and independent judiciary? Can a government subject to a politically motivated judiciary operating under the cover of independence and unaccountability save itself by remaining within the remit of law?

Anything but an NGO
Any civil society organization may criticize any government for its foreign and domestic policies on various scores. Civil society organizations, nevertheless, do not raise their own agents and penetrate state organs (the police, judiciary and so forth) through them so that, regardless of the identity of the government, they will set the parameters or red lines within which government policies will have to remain.

Here we have another fine line; any public employee has the constitutional right to belong to any sect/voluntary association as long as they do not confuse their duties to the state and their membership in such an association outside their job. This means that even when a public employee thinks his sect/tariqah may benefit from the classified information he has access to, he cannot leak any documents to his "brothers".

Nor may he legally eliminate his colleagues in his department or bureau so that he may replace them with his "brothers" to control the institution. There are credible doubts as to whether Gulenists respect such distinctions.

What is more, civil society organizations are transparent entities; they are accountable; those outside such organizations more or less know who belongs and who does not. They also declare their sources of income and the amount of money that they collect.

The Gulen movement does neither; no one knows the amount of money they control, the number of private schools, prep schools, other charities, print and visual media outlets, and number of members they have. Nobody exactly knows the hierarchy within the movement, or even whether there is one, and the chain of authority in it.

In that respect, the Gulen movement is the exact opposite of a civil society organization. It is rather a ghostly presence; everyone knows it exists, you feel its influence, people talk about it, certain figures are known to have ties to it, but you do not really see the whole or can put your finger on it.

But why is this movement so different from others? After all, the tradition of tariqahs in Turkey and other Muslim countries is centuries old. Yet, the Gulen movement differs from the rest as a messianic organization. They believe that "the destiny gave them a mission".

In practice, this means that they are the God's chosen flock, and have a particular program and method on Earth that they think will make only them reach their desired end. Those who stand in their way, who oppose the sacred program/roadmap, are shirkers, and thus deserve to be crushed.

In their mind, the AKP government that defends ousted Egyptian president Mohamed Morsi at the expense of antagonizing the junta administration in Egypt, or that protects Palestinians at the cost of eliciting Israeli fury, acts shortsightedly. Yet, the movement makes long-term projections; even if they may consciously refuse to speak against cruelties done to their fellow Muslims today, they are so sure that the movement will be so powerful in the year, say, 2150 that they will be able to appoint a governor to, say, Yakutia Republic in today's Russia.

They will not act or speak against the massacred members of the Ikhwan, or Muslim Brotherhood, because the Ikhwan chose the method of defiance and opposed the junta administration instead of reconciling with it and searching for ways of dialogue.

Such a messianic zeal combined with the idea of sacred chosen-ness justifies any means and acting against anyone as long as the means serve the ultimate purpose of Earthly glory promised to this movement. It is such heterodoxy that separates the Gulen movement from the corpus of tariqahs in and outside Turkey.

Political suicide
The Gulen movement has been interested and involved in politics for a long time. However, they did not out come out in the open until recently. It appears that open political engagement in front of cameras and the public eye proved to be tough for the movement. It is therefore no surprise that Gulen's explosive curses, perceived by the wider public as against the AKP government, in a video recently released by the movement backfired.

The public outrage ran so high that perhaps for the first time since 2002 Gulen had to immediately release another video to retract and reframe what he said. The video went viral and became subject of pranks.

The recent row also widened the distance between the Gulen movement and the rest of the tariqahs in Turkey. Other tariqahs threw their open support behind the government after the battle broke out. To make things worse for the Gulen movement, the rest of the Nurcu (or Nursu)? community, with which the Gulen movement is related, took a stance against them as well.

A cursory skim of discussions on social media demonstrates the widening rift within the Nurcus now, so much so that many Nurcu groups including Said Nursi's students accuse Gulen betraying the true, non-political ideals of Bediuzzaman Said Nursi.

Perhaps the most important outcome of the recent controversy will be that Gulen movement was stripped of its immunity from criticism. The conservatives and Islamists have now joined the Kemalists, leftists, liberals, nationalists of all hues who had already been criticizing Gulen and doubting his real intentions for a long time.

Today therefore the Gulen movement is on the table and Turkey's conservatives, Islamists of all stripes sit around the table discussing what it is that they have on the table, what is its nature, why it wants to conquer the state, which actors it cooperates with outside Turkey, how consistent Gulen's words are and how Islamic what he preaches, his methods and goals are.

Moreover, Turkey's dominant conservative public may not buy the support that the CHP - or Republican People's Party - in any case a strange bedfellow for the movement, is giving the Gulen movement.

Such an odd alliance between the CHP and the Gulen movement may be deceptive for two reasons. First, the movement will find it very hard to convince its grassroots to vote for the Kemalist CHP, which for decades had been for them the chief evil. Secondly, since all political actors will know the role of the movement in case the AKP government falls, no political party will ever trust the Gulen movement from now on.

It is unlikely that any government will forget for a moment what Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan says so often these days: "The parallel state". For all these reasons, the question that begs an answer is not, as some assume, whether the Gulen movement or the AKP will win this war; the question is, why has such a powerful movement as Gulen's attempted something that is akin to political suicide?

And unfortunately also just that for the concept of civil society in this part of the world; in our region, either states control civil society organizations for exerting social control or those who claim to be civil society organizations, such as the Gulen movement, try to capture the state.

Speaking Freely is an Asia Times Online feature that allows guest writers to have their say. Please click here if you are interested in contributing. Articles submitted for this section allow our readers to express their opinions and do not necessarily meet the same editorial standards of Asia Times Online's regular contributors.

Omer Aslan is a PhD candidate in political science at Bilkent University, Ankara, Turkey, and may be contacted at aslano@bilkent.edu.tr.

(Copyright 2014 Omer Aslan)

mardi, 31 décembre 2013

Turkey Caught Up in a Storm

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Mikhail AGHAJANYAN
Ex: http://www.strategic-culture.org

Turkey Caught Up in a Storm

A corruption scandal has broken out in Turkey. At the epicenter of the scandal is the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP). Over 50 people have been detained on suspicion of exceeding official authority, taking bribes, and merging authority and business (according to various data, between 52 and 84 people). The greatest resonance in the Turkish media was caused by the arrests of the sons of cabinet members. The hidden political motives for the revelations of corruption in the ranks of the ruling party are intriguing as well...

The scandal poses the greatest threat to Turkish Prime Minister Recep Erdogan, the leader of the AKP. He has always taken the position of an uncompromising fighter against corruption within the government system and outside of it, and now he himself has been affected by the corruption investigations. 

Commentators have proposed various explanations for the surfacing of a topic which compromises Erdogan and his party. They name a flare-up in the relations between two old friends (or rather, former friends) as the most likely detonator for the scandal. This refers to Erdogan and Fetullah Gulen, a Muslim cleric and founder of the Hizmet movement. The latter now lives in the American state of Pennsylvania, from which he continues to rule his «mini-empire», which includes media outlets and educational institutions (1), and influence social and political processes in Turkey. 

At the dawn of Erdogan's political career, as he was just starting to ascend the Olympus of power, there was complete harmony between him and Gulen. Gulen is an advocate of the systematic Islamicization of Turkey. His theological views combined with the ambitions of a political leader appealed to Erdogan. Gulen supported Erdogan in all the previous national elections. The flare-up in relations, Turkish commentators note, became noticeable in the first few months of 2012, when Erdogan and Gulen disagreed over several issues at once. The most sensitive among these for the «Gulenites» was the government's intention to close private schools. Approximately a quarter of such educational institutions in Turkey are closely tied with the Hizmet movement (they are often called «Gulen schools»). By autumn 2013 things had come to the point of direct confrontation. The Erdogan government moved from words to actions; several schools were forced to close their doors. This was a direct challenge to Erdogan's former ally. In response, the «Pennsylvania exile» brought all his influence to bear. Warnings to those in power appeared on the pages of Zaman, one of the most-read newspapers in Turkey, which is under Gulen's control. 

There are plenty of Gulen supporters in the ruling party, the corridors of power, and especially in the judicial and law enforcement systems of Turkey. If one is to believe Turkish journalists, it was pro-Gulen public prosecutors who initiated the corruption investigation. After Erdogan came to power in 2003, he promoted an entire cohort of personnel to responsible posts, including in the law enforcement system.  For all these years Erdogan's appointees have given no cause to doubt their loyalty to him. However, the flare-up between the prime minister and the influential Islamic authority figure has shown that the vector of loyalty can change.

At the same time, the agitation in the system of power built by Erdogan cannot be explained only by the conflict between Erdogan and Gulen. On the lower levels of the AKP there are growing sentiments in favor of a generational change in party leaders. In addition, some party members support the nomination of Abdullah Gul, the current president of Turkey, for another presidential term next year. The coming elections are to be held by direct voting for the first time (previously the president of Turkey was elected by the parliament). This part of the political elite sees Gul as a more level-headed statesman than the impulsive Erdogan, whose emotional disposition has recently led to several incidents in Turkey's relations with foreign partners.

The nascent opposition to Erdogan and his circle has become especially difficult to restrain since summer 2013, when a wave of protests swept across the largest Turkish cities. The trigger was the clearing of Istanbul's Gezi Park and the building of a new shopping center on its territory. The authorities were able to localize the protests and prevent them from expanding beyond large cities. However, the demonstrations had deeper causes than environmental protection. Amid the complete removal of the Turkish army from positions of power and a series of prosecutions against senior generals, forces for which Erdogan's name was associated with total control over the media, a simulation of democratic reforms, and most importantly, the creeping Islamicization of Turkey, the aims and implementation of which has caused sharp disagreement even in the ranks of the ruling AKP, have become more active. 

The army returned to its barracks, and civilian activists took to the streets; fertile ground appeared for all the conflicts in society and the government to come to the surface. Up until then Gulen and his followers had been opposing Erdogan tacitly; the corruption scandal essentially was the first real manifestation of this group's capabilities. They sent Erdogan the signal that if he wants a «smear war», he'll get it. But first, let him think about what he will bring to the new elections next year (municipal and presidential). This is the somewhat simplified, but enlightening leitmotif of the current conflict between the prime minister and the preacher. The opinion of Turkish analyst Murat Yetkin is also worthy of attention: Gulen's supporters in the AKP are irritated by Erdogan's claims to ideological monopoly in the party and sole authority in the country.  

Erdogan reacted to the attacks on him and his team in his typical harsh style. The wave of arrests initiated by pro-Gulen public prosecutors was followed by a counter-wave of indictments. Now the public prosecutors and policemen themselves have fallen afoul of Turkish justice. Five Istanbul police officials were relieved of their duties a day after their subordinates made arrests on suspicion of corruption. Something similar could be observed in the «challenge-response» actions of Erdogan and his cabinet at the very beginning of the demonstrations in defense of Gezi Park in Istanbul. First Erdogan brought down the full force of Istanbul's police on the demonstrators, but then moved away from repressions. He started to hold a dialog with the protestors, albeit only in the intervals between firing water cannons at them and attacking them with tear gas. Something tells me that this time, too, after the energy of the conflict has dropped off, the various groups in power will start to resolve the conflicts through negotiation. Essentially, Erdogan has no other option, considering the upcoming elections; escalation of the conflict is not in his interests. 

Much will become clearer closer to the elections for the head of Turkey's largest city in March 2014. The country's main financial streams are concentrated in Istanbul, and over 18% of Turkey's 75 million people live there. Along with other metropolises of Western Turkey, the city has become a hotbed for protest sentiments with an anti-Erdogan tone. Victory in the Istanbul elections would serve as a stimulus for the current prime minister and his team to strengthen their power in the country. And then Gulen and his mudslinging will move to the ranks of less dangerous opponents to the impulsive yet charismatic Erdogan. 

(1) According to Turkish sources, Gulen's «mini-empire» includes 18 places of worship, 89 specialized religious schools, 207 trading companies, 373 teacher's colleges and around 500 dormitories in Turkey. Outside of Turkey there are 6 religious universities, 236 high schools, 2 elementary schools, 2 Turkish language study centers, 6 university preparation courses and 21 dormitories operating under the auspices of Gulen and his movement. They also publish 14 journals and broadcast on 2 national radio stations and the satellite television channel Samanyolu TV.




Republishing is welcomed with reference to Strategic Culture Foundation on-line journal www.strategic-culture.org.

dimanche, 29 décembre 2013

Turquie: un triste spectacle

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Turquie: un triste spectacle

Ex: http://www.europesolidaire.eu

par Jean-Paul BAQUIAST

Vue de l'extérieur et malgré les efforts d'explication de la presse européenne, la Turquie paraît s'enfoncer dans une crise incompréhensible. Depuis quelques jours maintenant, les déclarations abruptes du Premier ministre Recep Tayyip Erdogan se succèdent, accusant des manipulations politiques destinées à déstabiliser son gouvernement, dit islamo-conservateur, et son parti l'AKP.

Dans le même temps, la justice et la police mènent depuis le 17 décembre une vaste opération dite anti-corruption. Cinquante et une personnes étaient toujours en garde à vue, mercredi soir, soupçonnées de malversations, de fraudes et de blanchiment d'argent. Parmi les placés en garde à vue figurent le maire (AKP) du quartier central de Fatih à Istanbul, les fils de trois ministres parmi les plus proches du chef du gouvernement, le cousin d'un responsable du bureau national de l'AKP, des bureaucrates de premier plan mais aussi des hommes d'affaires liés au secteur de la construction et de la promotion immobilière.. .

La justice enquête en particulier sur l'Administration de développement de l'habitat collectif (TOKI), qui a réalisé au cours de la dernière décennie des bénéfices considérables en revendant à des promoteurs immobiliers amis du pouvoir des terrains publics, tout en réalisant ses propres projets de logements collectifs. Cette entreprise parapublique est au cœur de la politique de transformation urbaine initiée par Erdogan à Istanbul et tant décriée au printemps au moment des manifestations de la place Taksim. Ceux-ci protestaient notamment contre la destruction envisagée par le pouvoir du parc de la place Taksim, le seul ou presque espace vert demeurant dans la capitale.

L'opposition menée par le CHP (Parti républicain du peuple), exige la démission du gouvernement et la création par l'Assemblée nationale d'une commission d'enquête. Mais la justice et l'opposition peuvent-elle se présenter comme neutres dans cette offensive de vertu? Malheureusement non. Il apparaît de plus en plus qu'elles sont instrumentalisées par une secte ou confrérie très puissante qui, un peu comme les frères musulmans dans d'autres Etats islamiques, a pris en mains une partie de la police, de la justice et des cercles économiques.

Bien qu'elle s'en défende, la confrérie, née dans les années 1970 autour des prêches de l'imam turc Fethullah Gülen, issue du courant Nourdjou et inspirées par les idées du penseur Said Nursi, prospère depuis vingt ans dans les coulisses du pouvoir politique. L'Etat turc, quelle que soit la couleur du parti majoritaire, a utilisé, dès le début des années 1990, les réseaux de ces "missionnaires de la turcité", actifs dans les pays d'Asie centrale nouvellement indépendants.

Une véritable guerre

Or longtemps alliés, la secte et l'AKP s'opposent aujourd'hui dans une véritable guerre. Les partisans du premier ministre Erdogan affrontent désormais ceux de Fethullah Gülen, exilé depuis 1999 aux Etats-Unis à la suite d'enquêtes menées à l'époque par les militaires alors très présents au gouvernement avant d'en être chassés par Recep Tayyip Erdogan. L'instruction contre l'entourage de ce dernier est conduite par le procureur Zekriya Öz, proche des gülénistes, et qui avait dirigé l'enquête dans l'affaire Ergenekon, un réseau militaro-nationaliste démantelé après 2008.

Pourquoi les deux pouvoirs, précédemment alliés, non seulement contre les militaires mais contre l'opposition réputée démocratique, sont-ils entrés en guerre? Les raisons n'en sont guère glorieuses. La secte reproche désormais au gouvernement la fermeture des dershane – un réseau de cours privés de soutien scolaire dans lesquels elle a massivement investi. Plus généralement, l'enjeu est la conquête du patronat, notamment de province. Depuis 2004, la forte croissance turque a largement profité aux petits patrons qui forment le tissu du mouvement religieux et financent ses écoles dans le monde entier. Depuis 2005, les gülénistes ont formé leur propre patronat : la confédération des entrepreneurs turcs (Tüskon). Elle compte 30 000 membres, dont 30 des 200 plus grandes entreprises du pays, et les réseaux commerciaux de ses hommes d'affaires sont incontournables.

Mais pourquoi l'AKP a-t-elle décidé d'affronter la secte en organisant la fermeture de ses écoles privées? D'une part pour prendre de l'influence dans les esprits des très nombreux milieux sociaux fréquentant ces écoles, et d'autre part pour récupérer une partie des revenus en découlant.

Tout ceci ressemble fort à une guerre entre mafias. L'actuel visage de la Turquie la rend plus mal fondée que jamais à poursuivre une entrée dans l'Union européenne, quels que soient les soutiens qu'elle avait reçus pour cela de l'Amérique. Certes les intérêts de beaucoup d'entreprises européennes sont très liés aux intérêts turcs dont nous venons de voir la complexité. Mais les Européens doivent cependant sauver les apparences. Ajoutons que les louvoiements de la diplomatie turque dans le conflit syrien augmentent encore les méfiances qu'elle inspire.

La conclusion de ces péripéties pourrait être, non une montée sérieuse de l'opposition libérale toujours faible et divisée, mais un certain retour en grâce des militaires. Ils ont été chassés du pouvoir par Erdogan, à la suite d'accusations apparaissant aujourd'hui injustes. En fait, dans la tradition du kémalisme, ils incarnaient un gouvernement se voulant aussi laïc et intègre que souhaitent l'être beaucoup d'Etats européens. Dans une certaine mesure, ils ressemblaient aux militaires égyptiens revenus récemment au pouvoir à la suite du « coup d'état » du général Abd el Sissi.

N'idéalisons pas ici les militaires turques ou ce qu'il en reste, mais bornons nous à retenir, en attendant la suite des évènements, que Recep Tayyip Erdogan et l'AKP ne donnent pas une image très attrayante de la politique islam-conservatrice modérée qu'ils prétendaient incarner. La place de la Turquie en Europe est moins souhaitable que jamais.
 
20/12/2013

jeudi, 12 décembre 2013

Ukraine, Turkey and America’s Selective Human Rights Rhetoric

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Ukraine, Turkey and America’s Selective Human Rights Rhetoric

Chad NAGLE

Ex: http://www.strategic-culture.org

 

The US government was quick to condemn its Ukrainian counterpart for the brutality of police in Kiev against pro-European Union demonstrators after the Ukrainian government’s suspension of negotiations on closer association with the EU. According to the website of the US Embassy in Ukraine, Washington «condemns the violence against protesters on Independence Square», and «urge(s) the government of Ukraine to respect the rights of civil society and the principles of freedom of speech and freedom of assembly… « The «spirit of the principles embodied by the OSCE» is cited as the basis for the statement.

Flash back to May and June in Turkey, which, like Ukraine, is also a member of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). Over a period of several weeks, police cracked down on crowds of demonstrators many times the size of those in Kiev, using truncheons, water cannon and tear gas, injuring hundreds and ultimately killing half a dozen. A small group of environmentalists had staged a sit-in in central Istanbul to protest the uprooting of trees and the planned paving of a park to build another shopping mall. Social media and blogs took the lead in capturing Turkish police brutality sparked by defenseless tree-huggers, because almost no international news outlets covered the upheaval in any depth for the better part of a week. When international media did start covering the Turkish disturbances properly, Western governments were largely silent. The White House and State Department never criticized the Turkish government for heavy-handedness. The only sharply worded criticism came from non-governmental entities like the Council of Europe, a human rights body.

The current regime in Turkey has arrested and imprisoned hundreds of suspected opponents: journalists, lawyers and military officers. Many are held without charge, qualifying them as political prisoners. Ukraine has one high-profile political prisoner, former Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko, jailed under vague «abuse of power» charges but undeniably involved in high-level corruption dating back to the 1990s, when the patronage of then-Prime Minister Pavlo Lazarenko (now in prison in California) allowed her to corner the domestic natural gas market. Tymoshenko is certainly a political rival of President Viktor Yanukovych, and yet Western governments and the international human rights community have singled out Tymoshenko’s detention as evidence of «selective justice» in Ukraine. No such demonization of Erdogan’s Turkey has occurred, despite mass arrests and jailing of suspected conspirators.

This is interesting in part because the two countries’ domestic politics parallel each other in many ways. Both countries «straddle» east and west, with markedly different populations characterizing extreme eastern and western regions. The opponents of the current authorities in both states are largely «urban liberals», who see themselves confronting an «eastern mentality» and provincial social forces. In Ukraine, Yanukovych and his Party of the Regions come from the Russian-speaking east and southeast, and many in Kiev and the Ukrainian-speaking west of the country despise them for not viewing Russia and its president as enemies. In Turkey, urban, secular Turks perceive Prime Minster Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s Justice and Development Party (AKP) government as bigoted and male chauvinist, and fear that the AKP seeks to impose traditional Islamic morality on all of Turkish society.

human-rights-smart-power.jpgBut for all this, Ukraine comes in for harsh criticism; Turkey does not. This may be because Turkey’s government employs powerful lobbyists like Patton Boggs to enforce its interests on Capitol Hill., and US investment in Turkey – including the US military presence – is substantial. Whenever a Congressional resolution on recognizing the Armenian Genocide comes up for a vote, a few intimidating phone calls to the White House and members of the House and Senate quickly and quietly sink it, leaving America quivering on one side of the historical debate, while Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Russia and a host of other major powers appear unafraid to take an official stand.

Meanwhile, Ukraine languishes across the Black Sea, its naïve government coming away disappointed and empty-handed from talks with more «civilized» EU leaders, and its opposition crying that the government has «stolen» the people’s «European dream». But Yanukovich and the other Ukrainian leaders must have thought their country of 45 million – with a territory the size of France and the most fertile soil in Europe – was worth more than Brussels’ paltry offer. No doubt it was. It’s just that the EU, beset by huge problems of unemployment, recession and social malaise, can’t possibly afford to pay for Ukraine’s overhaul and integration into the economic bloc right now. So Ukraine is naturally turning back to Russia, a vast country representing the historical and present-day lifeblood of its economy, for better trade benefits and debt relief.

That it has taken the Ukrainians years of negotiations and ultimate humiliation to reach this decision probably has much to do with the global economic downturn of the last five years. The vocal negative reaction of the US and EU is almost certainly attributable to geopolitical perceptions still rooted in the outdated mentality of the Cold War. But one thing should be certain: in the wake of the Turkish upheaval of 2013, Washington’s indignation over police brutality – such as what has occurred over the last few days in Kiev – is hollow and phony. It is truly selective, and has nothing to do with human rights…

Chad Nagle lives in Washington, DC. He has lived and worked in Ukraine and Turkey as a human rights monitor, lawyer and teacher.

samedi, 30 novembre 2013

El sueño de Turquía de islamizar la basílica de Hagia Sophia

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El sueño de Turquía de islamizar la basílica de Hagia Sophia

Ex: http://europauniversal.blogspot.com.es


El viceprimer ministro Bulent Arinc, quiere convertir la famosa basílica-museo en una mezquita.


El viceprimer ministro turco aprovechó la apertura de un museo en el histórico distrito de Sultanahmet, para expresar su deseo de ver la basílica de Hagia Sophia, que está justo al lado, convertido en un lugar de culto musulmán. "La mezquita de Santa Sofía, Bulent Arinc espera ver, sonriendo" según informes de prensa. La declaración se produjo en un contexto de tensión en el que el Partido de la Justicia y el Desarrollo en el poder (AKP) se encarga de islamizar la sociedad y el espacio público turco multiplicando las reformas en favor de una determinada concepción de la religión.


Para apoyar su argumento, el número dos del gobierno criticó el estado actual del edificio religioso, convertido en museo por un decreto de 1934. Según él, "un lugar de culto no puede ser utilizado para cualquier función que no sea la inicial." Y para su gran satisfacción, es a causa de este precepto que dos iglesias-museos también llamada Santa Sofía, una en Trabzon, a orillas del Mar Negro y la otra en Iznik en los países occidentales se registraron como mezquitas en los últimos meses.


La atracción turística emblemática de Estambul, Santa Sofía es una joya arquitectónica con su enorme cúpula de diez metros de diámetro y mosaicos cubiertos con hojas de oro. Construido en el siglo VI por el emperador Justiniano I, el edificio, que fue la sede del patriarca ortodoxo de Constantinopla fue saqueada durante la cuarta cruzada y más tarde transformada en mezquita durante la toma de la ciudad por los otomanos en 1453.


Las solicitudes de conversión de Hagia Sophia en una mezquita se multiplican.


Su conversión en mezquita es una vieja reivindicación de la extrema derecha e islamistas turcos. El año pasado en octubre, el día de la fiesta del sacrificio, un centenar de miembros del Partido de la gran unidad (BBP), los islamo-nacionalista, oraron delante del muso-basílica. ero en los últimos meses, las demandas están aumentando. Una petición de particulares reclaman una transformación que está siendo bien estudiada por un comité parlamentario desde febrero. La edición de agosto de Skylife, la revista de la compañía aérea Turkish Airlines, cuyo accionista mayoritario es el estado turco, dedicaba su portada a "La mezquita de los sultanes". Sin hacer referencia al origen cristiano de "este legado otomano en gran parte", el expediente pone en duda la legalidad de la situación del museo. ¿Mezquita Santa Sofía?. ¿Como suena el nombre en sus oídos?, pretende examinar el columnista Nurak Bekdil en el Hürriyet Daily News. ¿Qué significaría la sinagoga al-Aqsa o la iglesia en Sultanahmet para los musulmanes?. Derrota y la injusticia, ¿no es así? Eso sería lo correcto".


Las declaraciones de Bülent Arinc sobre el futuro de la iglesia de Santa Sofía se realizaron pocos días después de su oposición a un proyecto del primer ministro. A principios de noviembre, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, se había quejado de los dormitorios mixtos para los estudiantes  ya que algunos "estilos de vida" no son "legítimos". Las redadas policiales se hicieron en pisos compartidos habían seguido a los edificios de las principales ciudades de Turquía. Esta postura moral, fue vista como una violación de la privacidad por una gran parte de la población,siendo también criticada por el vice primer ministro. Pero el estado de Santa Sofía se agrega a una lista, que sigue creciendo en los últimos meses, con medidas a favor de una presencia más visible del Islam o con las restricciones de venta de alcohol y la introducción de cursos adicionales en la religión sunita en el plan escolar. 


Le Figaro

lundi, 25 novembre 2013

Syria, Egypt Reveal Erdogan’s Hidden “Neo-Ottoman Agenda”

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Syria, Egypt Reveal Erdogan’s Hidden “Neo-Ottoman Agenda”

 
Global Research, November 20, 2013

The eruption of the Syrian conflict early in 2011 heralded the demise of Turkey ’s officially pronounced strategy of “Zero Problems with Neighbors,” but more importantly, it revealed a “hidden agenda” in Turkish foreign policy under the government of Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan.

What Sreeram Chaulia, the Dean of the Jindal School of International Affairs in India ’s Sonipat, described as a “creeping hidden agenda” (http://rt.com on Sept. 15, 2013) is covered up ideologically as “Islamist.”

But in a more in-depth insight it is unfolding as neo-Ottomanism that is pragmatically using “Islamization,” both of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk’s legacy internally and Turkey ’s foreign policy regionally, as a tool to revive the Ottoman Empire that once was.

Invoking his country’s former imperial grandeur, Foreign Minister Ahmet Davotoglu had written: “As in the sixteenth century … we will once again make the Balkans, the Caucasus, and the Middle East, together with Turkey , the center of world politics in the future. That is the goal of Turkish foreign policy and we will achieve it.” (Emphasis added)

Quoted by Hillel Fradkin and Lewis Libby, writing in last March/April edition of www.worldaffairsjournal.org, the goal of Erdogan’s AKP ruling party for 2023, as proclaimed by its recent Fourth General Congress, is: “A great nation, a great power.” Erdogan urged the youth of Turkey to look not only to 2023, but to 2071 as well when Turkey “will reach the level of our Ottoman and Seljuk ancestors by the year 2071” as he said in December last year.

“2071 will mark one thousand years since the Battle of Manzikert,” when the Seljuk Turks defeated the Byzantine Empire and heralded the advent of the Ottoman one, according to Fradkin and Libby.

Some six months ago, Davotoglu felt so confident and optimistic to assess that “it was now finally possible to revise the order imposed” by the British – French Sykes-Picot Agreement of 1916 to divide the Arab legacy of the Ottoman Empire between them.

Davotoglu knows very well that Pan-Arabs have been ever since struggling unsuccessfully so far to unite as a nation and discard the legacy of the Sykes-Picot Agreement, but not to recur to the Ottoman status quo ante, but he knows as well that Islamist political movements like the Muslim Brotherhood International (MBI) and the Hizb ut-Tahrir al-Islami (Islamic Party of Liberation) were originally founded in Egypt and Palestine respectively in response to the collapse of the Ottoman Islamic caliphate.

However, Erdogan’s Islamist credentials cannot be excluded as simply a sham; his background, his practices in office since 2002 as well as his regional policies since the eruption of the Syrian conflict less than three years ago all reveal that he does believe in his version of Islam per se as the right tool to pursue his Ottoman not so-“hidden agenda.”

Erdogan obviously is seeking to recruit Muslims as merely “soldiers” who will fight not for Islam per se, but for his neo-Ottomanism ambitions. Early enough in December 1997, he was given a 10-month prison sentence for voicing a poem that read: “The mosques are our barracks, the domes our helmets, the minarets our bayonets and the faithful our soldiers;” the poem was considered a violation of Kemalism by the secular judiciary.

Deceiving ‘Window of Opportunity ’

However, Erdogan’s Machiavellianism finds no contradiction between his Islamist outreach and his promotion of the “Turkish model,” which sells what is termed as the “moderate” Sunni Islam within the context of Ataturk’s secular and liberal state as both an alternative to the conservative tribal-religious states in the Arabian Peninsula and to the sectarian rival of the conservative Shiite theocracy in Iran.

He perceived in the latest US withdrawal of focus from the Middle East towards the Pacific Ocean a resulting regional power vacuum providing him with an historic window of opportunity to fill the perceived vacuum.

“Weakening of Europe and the US’ waning influence in the Middle East” were seen by the leadership of Erdogan’s ruling party “as a new chance to establish Turkey as an influential player in the region,” Günter Seufert wrote in the German Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP) on last October 14.

The US and Israel , in earnest to recruit Turkey against Iran , nurtured Erdogan’s illusion of regional leadership. He deluded himself with the unrealistic belief that Turkey could stand up to and sidestep the rising stars of the emerging Russian international polar, the emerging Iranian regional polar and the traditional regional players of Egypt and Saudi Arabia , let alone Iraq and Syria should they survive their current internal strife.

For sure, his allies in the Muslim Brotherhood International (MBI) and his thinly veiled Machiavellian logistical support of al-Qaeda – linked terrorist organizations are not and will not be a counter balance.

He first focused his Arab outreach on promoting the “Turkish model,” especially during the early months of the so-called “Arab Spring,” as the example he hoped will be followed by the revolting masses, which would have positioned him in the place of the regional mentor and leader.

But while the eruption of the Syrian conflict compelled him to reveal his Islamist “hidden agenda” and his alliance with the MBI, the removal of MBI last July from power in Egypt with all its geopolitical weight, supported by the other regional Arab heavy weight of Saudi Arabia, took him off guard and dispelled his ambitions for regional leadership, but more importantly revealed more his neo-Ottoman “hidden agenda” and pushed him to drop all the secular and liberal pretensions of his “Turkish model” rhetoric.

‘Arab Idol’ No More 

Erdogan and his foreign policy engineer Davotoglu tried as well to exploit the Arab and Muslim adoption of the Palestine Question as the central item on their foreign policy agendas.

Since Erdogan’s encounter with the Israeli President Shimon Peres at the Economic Summit in Davos in January 2009, the Israeli attack on the Turkish humanitarian aid boat to Gaza, Mavi Marmara, the next year and Turkey’s courting of the Islamic Resistance Movement “Hamas,” the de facto rulers of the Israeli besieged Palestinian Gaza Strip, at the same time Gaza was targeted by the Israeli Operation Cast Lead in 2008-2009 then targeted again in the Israeli Operation Pillar of Defense in 2012, Turkey’s premier became the Arab idol who was invited to attend Arab Leage summit and ministerial meetings.

However, in interviews with ResearchTurkey, CNN Turk and other media outlets, Abdullatif Sener, a founder of Erdogan’s AKP party who served as deputy prime minister and minister of finance in successive AKP governments for about seven years before he broke out with Erdogan in 2008, highlighted Erdogan’s Machiavellianism and questioned the sincerity and credibility of his Islamic, Palestinian and Arab public posturing.

“Erdogan acts without considering religion even at some basic issues but he hands down sharp religious messages … I consider the AK Party not as an Islamic party but as a party which collect votes by using Islamic discourses,” Sener said, adding that, “the role in Middle East was assigned to him” and “the strongest logistic support” to Islamists who have “been carrying out terrorist activities” in Syria “is provided by Turkey” of Erdogan.

In an interview with CNN Turk, Sener dropped a bombshell when he pointed out that the AKP’s spat with Israel was “controlled.” During the diplomatic boycott of Israel many tenders were granted to Israeli companies and Turkey has agreed to grant partner status to Israel in NATO: “If the concern of the AKP is to confront Israel then why do they serve to the benefit of Israel ?” In another interview he said that the NATO radar systems installed in Malatya are there to protect Israel against Iran .

Sener argued that the biggest winner of the collapse of the Syrian government of President Bashar al-Assad would be Israel because it will weaken Lebanon ’s Hizbullah and Iran , yet Erdogan’s Turkey is the most ardent supporter of a regime change in Syria , he said.

Erdogan’s Syrian policy was the death knell to his strategy of “Zero Problems with Neighbors;” the bloody terrorist swamp of the Syrian conflict has drowned it in its quicksand.

Liz Sly’s story in the Washington Post on this November 17 highlighted how his Syrian policies “have gone awry” and counterproductive by “putting al-Qaeda on NATO’s (Turkish) borders for the first time.”

With his MBI alliance, he alienated Egypt , Saudi Arabia and the UAE, in addition to the other Arab heavy weights of Syria , Iraq and Algeria and was left with “zero friends” in the region.

According to Günter Seufert, Turkey ’s overall foreign policy, not only with regards to Syria , “has hit the brick wall” because the leadership of Erdogan’s ruling party “has viewed global political shifts through an ideologically (i.e. Islamist) tinted lens.”

Backpedaling too late

Now it seems Erdogan’s “ Turkey is already carefully backpedaling” on its foreign policy,” said Seufert. It “wants to reconnect” with Iran and “ Washington ’s request to end support for radical groups in Syria did not fall on deaf Turkish ears.”

“Reconnecting” with Iran and its Iraqi ruling sectarian brethren will alienate further the Saudis who could not tolerate similar reconnection by their historical and strategic US ally and who were already furious over Erdogan’s alliance with the Qatari financed and US sponsored Muslim Brotherhood and did not hesitate to publicly risk a rift with their US ally over the removal of the MBI from power in Egypt five months ago.

Within this context came Davotoglu’s recent visit to Baghdad , which “highlighted the need for great cooperation between Turkey and Iraq against the Sunni-Shiite conflict,” according to www.turkishweekly.net on this November 13. Moreover, he “personally” wanted “to spend the month of Muharram every year in (the Iraqi Shiite holy places of) Karbala and Najaf with our (Shiite) brothers there.”

Within the same “backpedaling” context came Erdogan’s playing the host last week to the president of the Iraqi Kurdistan Regional Government, Massoud Barzani, not in Ankara , but in Diyarbakir , which Turkish Kurds cherish as their capital in the same way Iraqi Kurds cherish Kirkuk .

However, on the same day of Barzani’s visit Erdogan ruled out the possibility of granting Turkish Kurds their universal right of self-determination when he announced “Islamic brotherhood” as the solution for the Kurdish ethnic conflict in Turkey , while his deputy, Bulent Arinc, announced that “a general amnesty” for Kurdish detainees “is not on today’s agenda.” Three days earlier, on this November 15, Turkish President Abdullah Gul said, “Turkey cannot permit (the) fait accompli” of declaring a Kurdish provisional self-rule along its southern borders in Syria which his prime minister’s counterproductive policies created together with an al-Qaeda-dominated northeastern strip of Syrian land.

Erdogan’s neo-Ottomanism charged by his Islamist sectarian ideology as a tool has backfired to alienate both Sunni and Shiite regional environment, the Syrian, Iraqi, Egyptian, Emirati, Saudi and Lebanese Arabs, Kurds, Armenians, Israelis and Iranians as well as Turkish and regional liberals and secularists. His foreign policy is in shambles with a heavy economic price as shown by the recent 13.2% devaluation of the Turkish lira against the US dollar.

“Backpedaling” might be too late to get Erdogan and his party through the upcoming local elections next March and the presidential elections which will follow in August next year.

Nicola Nasser is a veteran Arab journalist based in Birzeit, West Bank of the Israeli-occupied Palestinian territories. nassernicola@ymail.com

mercredi, 20 novembre 2013

Le « mur de la honte » et la défaite turque en Syrie….

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Le « mur de la honte » et la défaite turque en Syrie….

Global Research

La Turquie, à l’heure présente, édifie un « mur de la honte » sur sa frontière sud pour empêcher que ne débordent sur son propre sol les affrontements faisant rage en territoire syrien entre Kurdes et djihadistes internationalistes en lutte contre les forces régulières de Damas. Une construction donnant lieu à des émeutes de la part des communautés kurdes qui vont se trouver séparées de part et d’autre de la barrière. Colère faisant suite à celle des turcs alévis qui se sont soulevés dans les zones où affluent les réfugiés syriens, rebelles à l’autorité du régime baasiste de Damas… C’était à l’heure où les révoltes du Printemps arabes semblaient ouvrir la voie à l’instauration au sud de la Méditerranée d’une chaine de gouvernements islamistes tous issus de la matrice des Frères musulman. Une perspective qui encouragea la Turquie dans des ambitions néo-ottomanes soutenues par une réussite économique exemplaire. Las, le pouvoir alaouite ne s’est pas effondré, la guerre est devenue sans issue. L’Amérique s’est alors résignée à renoncer, pour l’heure, à toute intervention directe alors qu’elle engageait des négociations quasi bilatérales avec l’Iran, allié stratégique de la Syrie. Un fait totalement inédit au bout de trois décennies de déni. Mais à présent l’économie turque pâtit durement de l’effort de guerre et du fléchissement de sa croissance – 5% en 20113 soit une perte de quatre points en deux ans et demi de guerre – tout comme elle souffre de l’afflux des réfugiés sur son territoire national. Aujourd’hui contestations et émeutes se multiplient. Dernièrement, après les manifestations massive du mois de juin à Istanbul, l’agitation a gagné dans la capitale Ankara, fragilisant un pouvoir islamiste pourtant réputé modéré mais qui peu à peu se démasque en limitant les libertés publiques ou en répudiant la laïcité héritée du kémalisme et en imposant par la loi des normes chariatiques. Malgré son dynamisme économique, la Turquie tend à redevenir « l’homme malade de l’Europe »… Une Europe qui, comme par miracle, vient de reprendre avec Ankara des négociations d’adhésion laissées au point mort depuis plusieurs années. Peut-être une façon de dédommager Ankara de la peine prise à tenter de renverser Assad, une compensation pour les débours liés à la guerre et pour les bénéfices perdus en renonçant à voir s’installer à Damas un gouvernement sunnite islamiste modéré, clone de celui d’Ankara.

Si le président Français, moins habile à l’esquive que les gens de Washington, s’est ridiculisé dans l’affaire syrienne – mais aux yeux de qui ? – la Turquie y a, elle, laissé des plumes… Si Tarik Ramadan, petit fils du fondateur des Frères musulmans dont la chaire d’islamologie à d’Oxford est financée par Doha, pouvait écrire en septembre 2011 que « la visite du Premier Ministre Erdogan Afrique du Nord avait été un immense succès populaire »… « Car depuis trois ans celui-ci est devenu plus populaire et plus respecté pour plusieurs raisons : il a été élu et réélu, et tous, même ses opposants ont reconnu sa compétence et l’efficacité de son gouvernement. La Turquie s’améliore de l’intérieur comme à l’extérieur : moins de corruption, une meilleure gestion, moins de conflit… » [tariqramadan.com20spt11]. Un jugement très laudateur vite cependant démenti par les faits. Si en effet la Turquie a été putativement « du bon côté de l’Histoire » au début des Printemps arabes, il lui a fallu rapidement déchanter son économie ayant subi un sévère coup d’arrêt avec une guerre qui a sonné le glas de ses exportations vers le voisin syrien, et avec la multiplication de camps de réfugiés fort mal tolérés par des populations locales dont certaines s’y sont montrées hostiles.

En 2010, les exportations turques vers la Syrie s’élevaient à 1 845 milliards de dollars. À la fin de l’année 2011 elles étaient descendues à 1 611 milliards… sur un volume total, il est vrai, de 137 mds de $. Mais c’est sans compter les 800 000 Syriens qui – en dépit de la rude dictature assadienne ! – se rendaient chaque année en Turquie pour y faire du tourisme… De plus « depuis que la Syrie est à feu et à sang, les entreprises turques ne peuvent plus y faire transiter leurs marchandises à destination des pays du Golfe et du Machrek” [ceri/fr25oct12]. Alors quoiqu’en disent les experts, même si les échanges avec Damas ne représentaient qu’une une part mineure des échanges commerciaux turcs, les incidences de la guerre sont multiples et toutes ne sont pas encore visibles. En 2012 un net ralentissement de l’économie a commencé à se fait sentir et tend à s’accentuer avec la prolongation de la guerre : la Turquie cumulerait ainsi des pertes économiques se montant à quelque cinq milliards de $ depuis l’éviction en Égypte des Frères musulmans en juillet dernier [Irib2spt13] !

Au chapitre des réfugiés “leur nombre dépasserait les 600.000 personnes, dont plus de 400.000 vivant hors des camps d’accueil installés le long de la frontière” [lesechos.fr21oct13]. Vingt et un camps abritent environ 200.000 réfugiés, or « la Turquie entendant conserver sa politique de « porte ouverte » pour les civils fuyant la guerre en Syrie malgré des fermetures temporaires de la frontière en raison de violences localisées”. À ce sujet le Premier ministre Erdogan avait indiqué en août que son pays avait déjà consacré près de deux milliards de dollars pour abriter les réfugiés [Ibidem]. Un afflux incontrôlable qui a donné lieu en 2012 à de dures émeutes de la part des populations locales… Sur les centaines de milliers de syriens arrivés en Turquie depuis le printemps 2011, seulement deux cent mille – avons-nous dit – on trouvé refuge dans des camps, des dizaines de milliers d’autres s’étant dispersés au milieu des populations urbaines où leur présence est une cause permanente de troubles, principalement ment dans la province de Hatay-Alexandrette, Sandjak arraché à la Syrie en 1938, et dans laquelle cohabitaient jusqu’à présent Alaouites turcisés, Turcs et Kurdes sunnites, Chrétiens et Alévis… “des heurts entre communautés et des manifestations anti-Erdoğan ont déjà eu lieu à Antioche” [lesechos.f16spt13].

Et parce que la Turquie et la Syrie partagent 900 kilomètres de frontières communes le long desquels se déroulent d’intenses combats – particulièrement dans la province d’Idlib où des affrontements opposent tribus kurdes et arabes aux mercenaires du Front al-Nosra – Ankara a décidé de construire un mur de sécurité… en principe pour interdire les entrées clandestines et la contrebande, en réalité pour empêcher les combats opposant Kurdes et insurgés salafistes de s’étendre en territoire turc [Reuters7oct13]. Barrière pour l’heure de quelques kilomètres mais aussitôt qualifiée de « Mur de la honte » par référence au mur de séparation érigé par les autorités israéliennes pour isoler des terres palestiniennes pourtant placées sous le statut de zone d’occupation.

Le gouvernement de l’AKP plombe désormais la Turquie

De ce seul point de vue, il faut insister sur l’épuisement du crédit moral dont bénéficiait jusqu’en 2011 un pouvoir qui, croyant l’heure d’un triomphe islamiste arrivée, s’est fort maladroitement démasqué. Un pouvoir qui s’est montré tel qu’il est, à savoir une démo-théocratie tatillonne et tracassière s’ingérant dans la vie quotidienne d’un peuple dont les pratiques religieuses sont loin d’être homogènes à l’image de la diversité ethnique de la nation turque. Pensons aux dix à vingt pour cent d’Alévis composant la Turquie actuelle, de six à dix millions ! Ces « Têtes rouges » [Qizilbash], turkmènes ou kurdes, insoumises depuis des siècles aux normes d’un sunnisme rarement tolérant voire parfois éradicateur, ne tolérerons pas le durcissement islamiste en cours, le dépérissement de la laïcité qui garantissait peu ou prou leurs libertés religieuses, le retour du foulard, la confessionnalisation des institutions et celle de la vie quotidienne…

Dans le même ordre d’idée, en réponse aux mesures restrictives prises par le gouvernement Erdogan – renforcement de dispositions légales inspirées de la charia, la loi islamique – les étudiants manifestaient hier encore violemment à Ankara faisant écho aux grandes mobilisations de juin, en particulier à Istambul, lesquelles avaient eu des motivations similaires sinon identiques. C’est dire que le gouvernement turc, présenté lors de son élection comme “islamique modéré”, évolue dans le même sens que celui, éphémère des Frères musulmans égyptiens – ou tunisiens – que leur idéologie islamiste ont conduit rapidement à compromettre leurs chances, puis les conduire vers la sortie.

Ainsi donc des choix sociaux, idéologiques et géopolitiques profondément erronés combinés à une inféodation atlantiste sans mesure ni discernement, ont conduit la Turquie prospère a connaître à la fois un affaiblissement économique durable, une notable déstabilisation intérieure, la montée d’une large contestation que la reprise des négociations d’adhésion à l’Union européenne – encalminée ces dernières années avant l’ouverture le 5 novembre du chapitre 22 « Politique régionale et coordination des instruments structurels » – ne sauvera peut-être pas d’un fiasco économique et sociétale qui commence à se profiler à moyen terme. De nombreux facteurs sont réunis qui autorisent en effet un certain pessimisme quant à l’avenir d’un pays qui ne devra peut-être son salut qu’à une entrée tardive dans une Europe en crise mais empressée d’associer à ses propres impuissances les frontières de guerre de la Turquie, sa vocation à l’islamisme rampant et son écrasant poids démographiques. C’est bien entendu faire fi de l’histoire du siècle passée et des leçons qui eussent dû en être tiré depuis la dernière confrontation avec les ambitions turques, lesquelles se sont encore bellement manifestées en juillet et août 1974 et les quelques milliers de morts et de disparus de l’Opération Attila [Cf. note5].

Léon Camus

mardi, 05 novembre 2013

La Turquie déjà en Europe grâce au Kosovo

La Turquie déjà en Europe grâce au Kosovo
 
Erdogan jette le masque

Jean Bonnevey
Ex: http://metamag.fr
1372453379-people-in-kosovo-protest-in-favor-of-turkish-pm-erdogan_2203285.jpgLes turcs ne se sentent certes pas européens mais ils sont en Europe physiquement déjà et de plus en plus. L’Europe s’est laissée entraîner par les Usa et l’Otan dans une guerre stupide contre la Serbie, contre le dictateur Milosevic pour les gentils kosovars.

C’était objectivement faire le jeu des musulmans contre les chrétiens dans une région d’affrontement historique entre la civilisation helléno- judéo-chrétienne et la civilisation arabo musulmane. Le perdre de vue était totalement stupide. La reconquête de la quasi-totalité des Balkans sur les turcs qui ont achevé contre l’empire romain d’orient ce que les arabes avaient commencé, est comparable à la reconquista espagnole.
 
Le Kosovo, patrie d’origine des Serbes, devenu un état musulman kosovar, c’est une chose terrible et parlante au niveau du poids de la démographie et des migrations de remplacement. La revendication de cette terre, au nom d’un passé commun, par la Turquie est plus terrifiante encore et rappellera, à certains démocrates sourcilleux, des thèses de l’époque la plus sombre de notre histoire.

En visite officielle au Kosovo à l’occasion de l’inauguration de l’aéroport de Pristina, le Premier ministre turc Recep Tayyip Erdogan a lâché une petite bombe en déclarant : « la Turquie, c’est le Kosovo, et le Kosovo, c’est la Turquie ». Le chef du gouvernement turc a déclaré que les citoyens du Kosovo et de Turquie faisaient toujours partie d’un même pays. « Chers frères et amis, nous partageons la même histoire culturelle et la même civilisation. N’oubliez pas que la Turquie, c’est le Kosovo et que le Kosovo, c’est la Turquie. Nous sommes à ce point proches que l’auteur de l’hymne turque, Mehmet Akif Ersoj, est originaire du Kosovo, de la ville d’Ipek-Peć-Peja », s’est exclamé Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. 

 
Hashim Thaçi, le Premier ministre du Kosovo, a remercié son homologue turc de la qualité de la coopération entre les deux pays et a rappelé que la Turquie était le premier pays à avoir reconnu l’indépendance du Kosovo. Le Premier ministre albanais, Edi Rama a, quant à lui, déclaré que les citoyens du Kosovo et de la Turquie, Albanais et Turques, étaient des peuples frères, qui devaient travailler ensemble à construire un avenir meilleur. Banques, autoroutes, aéroport de Pristina : la Turquie est le premier investisseur étranger au Kosovo. Cette présence économique massive alimente toutes les théories du complot. Le Kosovo serait-il, comme certains le prétendent, le « point d’ancrage » dans les Balkans d’une Turquie, qui aurait retrouvé ses ambitions impériales ?

Du côté de Belgrade, les propos de Recep Tayyip Erdoğan ont provoqué de très vives réactions. « Je considère ces déclarations scandaleuses  et j’attends des excuses rapides de la Turquie et de son Premier ministre. Ce comportement est inacceptable et incompatible avec de bonnes relations diplomatiques », a déclaré jeudi 24 octobre le vice-Premier ministre Aleksandar Vučić, avant d’ajouter que la Turquie savait très bien que le Kosovo n’était plus turc « depuis les Guerres balkaniques ».

Ce que semble oublier ce premier ministre très pro-occidental, c’est que les guerres balkaniques ont repris, menées par l’occident contre la Serbie et apparemment au profit de l’ottoman. Détruire la grande Serbie pour instaurera au cœur de l’Europe une nouvelle grande Turquie, ça c’est bien joué !

lundi, 28 octobre 2013

Revolten in der islamischen Welt – Türkei, Syrien und Ägypten – Endstation arabischer Frühling?

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Revolten in der islamischen Welt – Türkei, Syrien und Ägypten – Endstation arabischer Frühling?

Ex: http://www.andreas-moelzer.at

Gut drei Jahre nach Beginn der Welle von Protesten, Aufständen und Revolutionen gegen die autoritär herrschenden Regimes etlicher Staaten im Nahen Osten und Nordafrika ist Ernüchterung eingekehrt. Die erwartete Demokratie und den erträumten Wohlstand hat der „Arabische Frühling“ keinem Land gebracht. Ganz im Gegenteil: Die islamische Welt scheint sich schwer zu tun mit der Demokratisierung, daran können auch Abermillionen an Subventionen aus dem Westen nichts ändern. Und auch die sogenannte „islamisch geprägte Demokratie“ des Musterknaben Türkei hat jüngst gezeigt, wie weit man tatsächlich vom westlichen Demokratieverständnis entfernt ist.

Der Preis der Arabellion – Teures Öl

Aus Angst vor politischen Umstürzen halten die Regierungen ölreicher Länder ihre Bevölkerung mit Vergünstigungen bei Laune, dafür verzichten die Bürger auf ihr Recht auf politische Partizipation. Die dafür anfallenden erhöhten Ausgaben belasten die Budgets der Ölförderländer. Und das wiederum treibt den Ölpreis in die Höhe. Ebenso wie die finanziellen Unterstützungen der Ölstaaten für die syrischen Rebellen und das ägyptische Militär finanziert werden müssen. Auch die Syrien-Krise und die Spannungen im Sudan wirken sich negativ auf die Ölversorgung aus. Ein Präventivkrieg Israels und der USA gegen den Iran (um die Anlagen des iranischen Atomprogramms zu zerstören) würde den Ölpreis gar in lichte Höhen katapultieren.

Türkische Schein-Demokratie

Gewiss, verglichen mit den Diktaturen und Mullah-Regimes anderer Länder mag das Land am Bosporus mit seiner islamisch geprägten Demokratie tatsächlich ein Fortschritt sein. Allerdings hat Premier Erdogan jüngst sein wahres Gesicht derart gezeigt, sodass selbst die größten EUphoriker in Brüssel nicht länger schönreden können, dass Ankara sich kaum in Richtung Europäische Union bewegt und es hinsichtlich der Grund- und Menschenrechte, die laut den Kopenhagener Kriterien Grundvoraussetzung für einen EU-Beitritt sind, große Mankos gibt.

Schon der Prozess gegen die angeblichen „Ergenekon-Verschwörer“ mit einer ganzen Reihe von Missachtungen rechtsstaatlicher Prinzipien hat gezeigt, wie ernst es Erdogan mit der Demokratie wirklich ist. Ergenekon wurde als Freibrief missbraucht, gegen all jene vorzugehen, die sich der Ideologie der Regierung widersetzten. Nach wie vor ist die Türkei hinsichtlich Meinungs- und Pressefreiheit eher mit einem Dritte-Welt-Staat als mit einem europäischen Land zu vergleichen. Seit dem dritten Wahlsieg der AKP vor zwei Jahren braucht Erdogan die Medien nicht länger mit einer Klageflut einzudecken. Aus Angst, keine staatlichen Inseratenaufträge mehr zu erhalten, oder wirtschaftlich ruiniert zu werden, wagt keiner mehr auch nur die leiseste Regierungskritik. Als die Mehrheit der türkischen Presse die Proteste um den Istanbuler Gezi-Park im Mai einfach ignorierte und die Behörden brutal gegen die Demonstranten vorgingen, da konnte selbst Brüssel nicht länger so tun, als wäre alles eitle Wonne. Auch der Friedensprozess, den Ankara und die kurdische PKK gerade erst im Frühjahr vereinbarten, scheint gescheitert. Bestenfalls gibt es Alibi-Zugeständnisse an die Kurden. Und anders als die Bürokraten im fernen Brüssel, welche Reformen auf dem Papier oft für bare Münze nehmen, ließen sich die Kurden nicht mit leeren Worten abspeisen. Die Christen werden weiter diskriminiert, der Armenier-Genozid wird geleugnet, das Zypernproblem ist völlig ungelöst, und natürlich ist die Türkei auch ein Frontstaat zu Syrien, was für Europa auch ungeahnte Probleme brächte, wenn sie Mitglied wäre.

Die Lira-Flaute

Mit seinem Vorgehen gegenüber den Demonstranten hat Erdogan viel an internationalem Vertrauen verspielt. Dabei ist die Türkei auf den kontinuierlichen Kapitalstrom aus dem Ausland angewiesen. Hinzu kommt, dass die Lira seit langem unter enormen Abwertungsdruck steht. Außerdem ist das Land stark von Energieimporten abhängig, was angesichts steigender Erdölpreise zusätzlich auf die Lira drückt.

Nachdem die Kombination aus kränkelnder Währung und tiefen Zinsen keine neuen Investoren lockt und in den letzten Jahren notwendige Reformen verabsäumt wurden, wird es wohl auch mit der Türkei wirtschaftlich bergab gehen. Gerade dem (durch EU-Vorbeitritts-hilfen mitfinanzierten) steigenden Wohlstand hat Erdogan indes seinen Aufstieg zu verdanken. Und wie wird er dann erst mit den zu erwartenden sozialen Unruhen und Protesten umgehen?

Unregierbares Ägypten

Nach dem Militärputsch gegen Mursi, der zwar auf demokratischen Wege zum Präsidenten gewählt wurde, indes undemokratisch regierte und es verabsäumte, sich um die strukturellen Probleme zu kümmern, war das Land in zwei unversöhnliche Lager gespaltet. Die USA waren mehr um die Entwicklung des ägyptischen Militärs besorgt, das sie seit Jahren großzügig unterstützten, und multilaterale Kreditgeber verlangten Finanzreformen, während die Unterstützung der ohnedies bereits angeschlagenen Wirtschaft in den Hintergrund geriet. Die politischen und wirtschaftlichen Probleme des Landes schaukeln sich seitdem gegenseitig hoch. Damit mutierte Ägypten zu einem weitgehend unregierbaren Land, das nach wie vor auf großzügige Spenden aus dem Ausland angewiesen ist. Jener Demokratisierungsprozess, der einst als Vorbild für andere arabische Länder galt, liegt nun also in Scherben.

Ratloser Westen

Der demokratisch gewählte Muslim-Präsident Mursi in Haft während der Ex-Diktator entlassen wurde – das gilt als symbolisches Ende der Demokratie-bestrebungen Ägyptens. Unterdessen werden die Muslimbrüder immer mehr niedergeschlagen und in die Illegalität getrieben. Damit wiederum steigt die Gefahr der Radikalisierung.

Als Reaktion auf die anhaltende Gewalt in Ägypten hat die EU ihre Waffenlieferungen ausgesetzt. Drohungen, den Geldhahn zuzusperren, verpuffen erfolglos. Denn die Muslimbrüderschaft, die mit Mursi vorübergehend an der Macht war, wird seitens der arabischen Monarchen als Bedrohung für den eigenen Herrschaftsanspruch angesehen. Solange jedoch das ägyptische Militär von den arabischen Ölstaaten finanziert wird, bleibt der Westen ohnmächtig.

Blutiger Bürgerkrieg in Syrien

Als er im Vorjahr eine „rote Linie“ definierte – dem Einsatz von Chemiewaffen – ließ US-Präsident Obama in dem seit mehr als zwei Jahren tobenden syrischen Bürgerkrieg nur eine Option für einen Militäreinsatz offen. Da es indes in Syrien nichts zu gewinnen gibt und sich das Chaos im Falle einer Intervention nur vergrößern (schlimmstenfalls sogar die ganze Region destabilisieren) könnte, wurde weltweit nach Auswegen gesucht, um dem mit dem Giftgas-Angriff (bei dem es noch dazu jede Menge Ungereimtheiten gibt) unter Zugzwang stehenden Obama eine Möglichkeit zu bieten, sich aus dieser Sackgasse wieder heraus zu manövrieren. Schließlich hat niemand Interesse dran, dass der Westen auch Kämpfern al-Quaida-naher Gruppen, die ja im syrischen Bürgerkrieg eine große Rolle spielen, quasi Feuerschutz gibt.

Christenverfolgung

Christen sind nachweislich die weltweit am meisten verfolgte Gruppe. Immer mehr werden Christen zur Zielscheibe der Rebellen in Syrien. Oft werden sie entführt - mit hohen Lösegeldforderungen. Wie Ägypten und Libyen zeigen, steht auf Sicht in Syrien keine Demokratie im westlichen Sinne zu erwarten. Die EU darf sich jedenfalls nicht in den Syrien-Konflikt hineinziehen lassen und muss eine Strategie für ein Post-Assad-Syrien mit Schwerpunkt auf eine Verbesserung der Lage der Christen entwickeln.

Ist Demokratie in arabischen Ländern möglich?

All diese Beispiele führen deutlich vor Augen: Weder Millionen-Subventionen noch der sogenannte Annäherungsprozess an die EU bringen zwangsläufig mehr Demokratie in ein Land. Das sind Werte, für die die Bürger selbst kämpfen müssen, demokratische Prinzipien müssen von einer Gesellschaft getragen werden, die sich für die Einhaltung dieser Spielregeln auch einsetzt. Und Demokratie sowie Verbesserungen der Lebensbedingungen brauchen Zeit. Die Geduld dafür haben aber die wütenden Menschen in den arabischen Staaten nicht. Manche Experten sind der Ansicht, dass die Trennung von Staat und Religion, wie sie sich in Europa mühsam entwickelte, das Fundament ist, auf dem eine Demokratie erst gebaut werden kann. Und genau gegen diese Trennung in der Türkei, den sogenannten Laizismus, ist Erdogan unter dem Vorwand der Demokratisierung und des EU-Beitrittes vorgegangen, indem er das Militär, traditioneller Hüter der türkischen Laizität, unter zustimmenden Jubel der Brüsseler Granden aus den Machtpositionen hievte. Die Türkei betreibt durch ihre Regierung eine Politik der Islamisierung im Inneren und nach außen hin eine neo-osmanische Machtpolitik. Wir müssen uns also klar sein, dass diese Beitrittsverhandlungen im Grunde ein Hohn sind, der schnellstmöglich abzubrechen ist. Wir müssen uns klar sein, dass die Türkei natürlich ein wichtiger Partner für die EU ist, aber sicher kein europäisches Land. Sie wird es auch nicht werden.

mardi, 22 octobre 2013

Erdogan y el TSK

Ex: http://www.elespiadigital.com

Por Germán Gorraiz Lopez

Erdogan proseguiría con su estrategia de implementar el Estado Erdoganista, (socavando los pilares del Estado Secular que en 1923 implantó el Padre de la Turquía Moderna, Mustafa Kemal)  y que se plasmarían en pinceladas como la implantación de la enseñanza del Corán en la escuela Primaria, restricciones a la libertad de expresión en forma de encarcelación de periodistas opositores, la polémica restricción de venta de alcohol y el anunciado despliegue de la policía en los campus y residencias universitarias que podría desencadenar un nuevo Mayo del 68. Recordar que Kemal creía que “el secularismo y la europeización de Turquía eran los medios más aptos para transformar su país en una nación industrial moderna”, pero el kemalismo dejó como herencia una crisis de identidad en la sociedad turca, europeizada pero no integrada en las instituciones europeas y musulmana pero extraña al mundo islámico.

Erdogan y Egipto

El primer ministro turco, Recep Tayip Erdogan, ha acusado al Gobierno en funciones de Egipto de terrorismo de Estado y ha comparado al jefe del Ejército, Abdel Fatá al Sisi, con el presidente sirio, Bashar al Assad. Igualmente, acusó a los medios de comunicación occidentales que transmitieron en directo  las protestas violentas de las calles de Estambul, “como BBC y CNN” de “no mirar ni escuchar lo que ocurre en Egipto”, según  el diario ‘Hurriyet’.

El propio Erdogan ha reiterado que Turquía no reconoce al Gobierno interino egipcio y que sigue considerando al depuesto y encarcelado mandatario, Mohamed Morsi, como único presidente legal del país árabe, con lo que la tensión entre ambos Gobiernos ha ido “in crescendo” y tras el baño de sangre producido por la represión del ejército egipcio, ambos países habrían llamado a consultas a sus respectivos embajadores y Egipto habría cancelado las maniobras militares marítimas conjuntas que tenía previsto realizar con Turquía el próximo mes de octubre , debido “ a la injerencia flagrante de Ankara en los asuntos egipcios”, por lo que Erdogan se  habría granjeado la enemistad de EEUU.

Pulso Erdogan-TSK

El Ejército turco (TSK) desempeña un importante papel político en la sombra,  puesto que se consideran los guardianes de la naturaleza secular y unitaria de la República  siguiendo los postulados kemalistas y los partidos políticos juzgados como anti-seculares o separatistas por el Poder Judicial Turco (a instancias del estamento militar), pueden ser declarados ilegales.Ya en vísperas de la elección de Abdullah Gül como Presidente de Turquía ( agosto del 2007), las Fuerzas Armadas  afirmaron que “intervendrán decisivamente en la defensa del laicismo ante los esfuerzos de determinados círculos de socavar los valores fundamentales de la república  que han aumentado claramente en tiempos recientes”, advertencia próxima a la retórica del Golpe Militar de 1.980 y que podría extrapolarse a la situación política actual.

En los últimos años , Erdogan ha asestado varios golpes a la cúpula militar turca, del que sería paradigma la decisión de Erdogan de relegar de su cargo a tres oficiales de alto rango acusados de formar parte de la trama “Ergenekon”, una agrupación ultra-nacionalista compuesta por militares y activistas de marcado carácter laicista, pero también por segmentos de la esfera política, mediática, intelectual y educativa del país y cuyo supuesto cometido habría sido deponer al actual ejecutivo islamista de Erdogan y el pulso Erdogan-TSK habría llegado a su paroxismo con las sentencias condenatorias del caso Erdegon, destacando la dureza de las penas impuestas a 250 de los implicados, 12 de los cuales habrían sido condenados a cadena perpetua.

¿Hacia el golpe de mano?

El mandato de Erdogan como primer ministro finiquita en el 2015 sin posibilidad de reelección,por lo que es previsible que abandone el puesto de Primer Ministro para competir por la presidencia en las elecciones presidenciales de septiembre.

Dicho cargo sería meramente simbólico pero podría asumir poderes ejecutivos si prospera la reforma constitucional que el propio Erdogan propone con el objetivo inequívoco de implantar la nueva República Islámica de Turquía en el horizonte del 2016, con lo que Turquía se convertiría en un régimen indefinido en el que la lealtad a los intereses occidentales en Oriente Próximo estaría en entredicho.

Ante esta situación, tras conocerse las condenas del mediático affaire Ergenekon, (de las que sería paradigma el general retirado Ilker Basbug, antiguo Jefe de Estado Mayor del TSK, condenado a cadena perpetua y su frase premonitoria “La Nación tendrá la última palabra”) y sin el paraguas protector de la UE (al posponer “sine die” la incorporación de Turquía miembro de pleno de derecho de la UE), no sería descartable que el ejército turco (TSK) protagonice un nuevo golpe “virtual” o “posmoderno” que acabaría con el mandato del Primer Ministro Erdogan, (rememorando el ‘golpe blando’ de 1997, cuando los generales kemalistas arrebataron el poder al Gobierno del presidente Necmettin Erbakanpor, quien lideraba una coalición islamista).

Dicho golpe contaría con las bendiciones de Washington al haber dejado Erdogan de ser un peón útil para la estrategia geopolítica de EEUU en Oriente Próximo y significaría el ocaso de la primavera árabe del arco mediterráneo y la posterior inmersión en el llamado otoño árabe, fruto de la nueva estrategia de EEUU para la zona tras el evidente fracaso para sus intereses del experimento de exportación del otrora régimen islamista moderado y pro-occidental de Erdogan a todos los países que componen el tablero gigante del mundo árabe-mediterráneo.

La nueva estrategia de EEUU consistirá en la implementación de “golpes virtuales o postmodernos“ en los países de la zona con el objetivo inequívoco de sustituir a los regímenes islamistas surgidos de las urnas por regímenes militares presidencialistas en el marco del nuevo escenario geopolítico mundial surgido tras el retorno al endemismo recurrente de la Guerra Fría entre EEUU y Rusia, quedando Siria y Marruecos como portaaviones continentales de Rusia y EEUU respectivamente.

* Analista

jeudi, 19 septembre 2013

L’Alevismo Turco

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L’Alevismo Turco

Ex: http://www.statopotenza.eu

L’Alevismo nella odierna Turchia è un elemento religioso molto interessante che si è sviluppato nei secoli, attualmente vivono in Turchia più di 10 milioni di Aleviti che non sono da confondere con gli Alawiti che vivono in Siria e Libano, discendono entrambi però da gruppi sciiti che vedremo nello specifico, nel  mondo islamico la divisione  tra sunniti e sciiti,  risale agli avvenimenti seguiti alla morte del profeta Muhammad (pace su di lui), la questione della successione, di chi prenderà il suo posto, la lotta per il Califfato. Per i sunniti il successore doveva essere Abu Baker, per gli sciiti invece Ali (sas) marito di Fatima (sas) la figlia di Muhammad (pace su di lui), è destinato a prendere il posto del Profeta. Tra gli sciiti, come tra i sunniti, ci sono poi correnti diverse. Gli Aleviti non rientrano in nessuna di queste correnti.


L’Alevismo è una setta unica  si pensa che le tribù turche e iraniche e azere del nord dell’Iran e dell’Anatolia Orientale furono convertite allo Sciismo durante l’Ikhanato Mongolo che dominava la Persia e l’Iraq all’epoca e parte dell’Anatolia. Il poeta Yunus Emre e il santo Hajji Bektash furono i primi santi di quel periodo e più tardi vennero associati con l’Alevismo. Gli Aleviti emersero in questo contesto come un ordine sufi militante con base ad Ardabil nell’odierno Iraq, il cui leader Shah Ismail riuscì a conquistare la Persia e dare vita alla dinastia Safavide. Ora nell’ambito dell’Islam sciita duodecimano, dal momento che gli Aleviti accettano si  il credo sciita riguardo Ali (as) e i dodici Imam (as), ci sono dei distinguo, alcuni Aleviti non vogliono essere descritti come Sciiti ortodossi, a causa di grosse differenze nella filosofia, abitudini e rituali rispetto alle forme prevalenti dello Sciismo dell’Iraq e del moderno Iran nonostante questo, l’Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini (r.a.) nel 1970 ha dichiarato gli Aleviti parte della linea tradizionale sciita.


Gli  Aleviti credono e professano i dodici imam come discendenti del Profeta, Imam che torneranno un giorno a portare pace e giustizia nel mondo, elementi che avvicinano gli Aleviti agli Sciiti. Nella teologia e nella pratica ci sono però molte differenze e vedremo quali, per esempio la ritualità Alevita non prevede le cinque preghiere quotidiane, non c’è il mese del digiuno (il Ramadan) e neppure il pellegrinaggio alla Mecca. La credenza nella uguaglianza tra uomini e donne che condividono lo stesso spazio nella preghiera, l’esistenza di un semah, cioè un rituale sufi che consiste in una danza esoterica e gnostica detta “dei pianeti” l’uso della musica, l’uso degli alcolici nelle cerimonie, sono tutti elementi che mostrano quanto gli Aleviti siano lontani dalla Tradizione Sciita. Nelle cerimonie Alevite si parla molto dei fatti di Karbala nell’odierno Iraq, città dove nel 680 d.C. l’esercito Omayyade di Yazid l’usurpatore assassinò Hussein nipote di Muhammad (pace su di lui). Il ruolo della sofferenza, del martirio sono importanti così come nella tradizione sciita. L’ingiustizia patita a Karbala da Ali nel corso della lotta per la successione, l’avvelenamento di suo figlio Hasan (as) e l’uccisione del fratello Hussein (as) sono elementi importanti tra gli Aleviti ma anche qui ci sono differenze rilevanti soprattutto per quanto riguarda il dolore e la sua manifestazione. La questione del lutto e del Martirio  tra gli sciiti è molto importante, durante il periodo del Muharram e di Ashura cioè le cerimonie di lutto che si celebrano in questo mese ,  si possono  vedere queste differenze. Ferirsi, tagliarsi, colpirsi con delle catene, anche se si tratta di tradizioni che stanno perdendo la loro forza e per inciso in Iran sono vietate ma il folklore popolare a volte si manifesta in questi atti  sono elementi caratteristici del mondo sciita.


Tra gli Aleviti queste tradizioni sono completamente assenti. Il ricordo dei fatti di Karbala avviene durante le cerimonie chiamate “Cem” dentro le Cemevi che sono case assemblative  in luogo delle moschee che non esistono nell’Alevismo, attraverso orazioni funebri, con una modalità poetica ed artistica queste cerimonie vengono celebrate senza le tradizionali letture coraniche o formule di richiesta a Dio, questa è una differenza importante. Un’altra differenza è che nella cerimonia del Cem il momento in cui si ricorda l’ascensione di Muhammad  (pace su di lui) al fianco d Allah (SwT)  e chiamato “miraclama”,  in questa fase assistiamo anche alla divinizzazione della figura di Ali, questa una differenza fondamentale e importante rispetto a gran parte del mondo Sciita. Una nota a parte merita la confraternita “Sciita” dei Bektashi ancora oggi presente nei Balcani, Albania, Grecia e Turchia. I Bektashi sono una confraternita e quindi chiunque può diventare Bektashi, certo, ma l’Alevismo è qualcosa che passa attraverso di essa, il padre e la madre, i bektashi eleggono i loro “dede” cioè i loro maestri , i loro leader spirituali mentre per gli Aleviti il dede è una carica che si trasmette tra le generazioni, da padre in figlio. La confraternita dei bektashi è stata considerata il braccio spirituale dei giannizzeri, il corpo militare d’élite dello stato ottomano. Con le riforme del Sultano Mahmut II, la modernizzazione ottomana ha soppresso i giannizzeri ed allo stesso tempo la confraternita poiché visti come sciiti e quindi sospettati di cospirazione con l’Impero Persiano Safavide sciita, in epoca ottomana ogni professione, gruppo o corporazione, aveva legami privilegiati con una confraternita religiosa, molto fiorenti in Turchia e tra le migliori come quella dei Mevlevi di Rumi o i Jerrahi-Halveti. I giannizzeri erano legati ai Bektashi i quali erano spesso legati agli Aleviti , il  problema è guardare l’Impero Ottomano come uno stato nazionale moderno e in questa prospettiva vedere le relazioni tra confraternite e il centro come unidimensionali. Molti intellettuali Aleviti vedevano  di cattivo occhio una relazione tra i Bektashi ed il potere ottomano.


Nel mondo Turco c’erano diversi rapporti di forza e i Bektashi possono aver avuto una relazione privilegiata con i giannizzeri, del resto molti esponenti di spicco dei giannizzeri erano Bektashi e gli stessi erano cristiani convertiti all’Islam, perché era  particolare il  carattere dei giannizzeri formati da bambini cristiani, reclutati secondo il sistema della devsirme, ovvero  venivano rapiti dalle famiglie di origine e poi spesso affidati a famiglie Alevite-bektashi poiché gli Aleviti non facevano discriminazioni rispetto ai loro figli naturali, quindi le famiglie Alevite rappresentavano un ambiente ideale per crescere i futuri soldati. La religione nel mondo ottomano non aveva però un carattere così conservatore come vorrebbero gli islamisti odierni, difatti il Salafismo è una ideologia moderna come lo sono i Fratelli Musulmani nati negli anni 20′ del ’900, i Sunniti non avevano una posizione così predominante e il potere ottomano intrecciava relazioni coi differenti gruppi religiosi in modo pragmatico, strumentale a seconda delle circostanze, si può dire che almeno fino al XVI secolo nell’Islam sia impossibile parlare di una ortodossia consolidata. Quindi possiamo dire che in questo contesto non è possibile parlare neanche di eterodossia.


Dopo il XVI  secolo si può parlare tuttavia  di una ortodossia Sunnita Hanafita cioè una delle 4 scuole teologiche che preferisce l’intelletto e la moderazione , ora bisogna vedere se possibile parlare di ortodossia nella Turchia contemporanea che oggi è un paese laico ma probabilmente esiste ancora una ortodossia ufficiosa di origine sufi , come lo sono Gul o Erdogan per esempio di  scuola Naqsbanhdi .Il carattere “moderato” turco non sempre è stato manifestato dagli stessi…anzi per esempio  nel 1993 , il 2 luglio precisamente ci fu il triste massacro di Sivas dove morirono degli Aleviti per mano dei Sunniti , quel giorno cantanti, scrittori e filosofi Aleviti si riunirono per celebrare la festa di Pir Sultan Abdal, una loro  importante figura storico culturale nell’ambito musicale Alevita , la festa venne  celebrata nell’hotel Madimak e poco dopo una folla di 20.000 sunniti si riuni’ e circondò l’edificio, dandolo alle fiamme, bersagliandolo con pietre mentre intonavano slogan anti-Alevismo e pro-Sharia. Il massacro durò diverse ore durante nei quali ne i pompieri, la polizia e la gendarmeria fecero nulla  per fermare il massacro, alcuni filmati mostreranno come le richieste d’aiuto furono respinte, alla fine della strage si conteranno 33 morti, tutti Aleviti., nel 1997 la polizia arrestò 31 presunti responsabili e li condanno a morte, ma poi la pena di morte venne  trasformato in carcere a vita. Altro episodio nel 1995 dove questa volta ci  fu  una sparatoria da un’auto nel quartiere Gazi di Istanbul che causò la morte di alcuni Aleviti. Durante le  manifestazioni di protesta, la polizia aprì più volte il fuoco contro i dimostranti che abbatterono altri 15 Aleviti.


Oggi gli Aleviti politicamente sono contrapposti al fondamentalismo Sunnita e al Salafismo con le sue ramificazioni, assicurando  la continuazione del secolarismo turco Kemalista. sono i principali alleati delle forze secolari e alla sinistra, cercano anche l’alleanza dei Sunniti moderati contro gli estremisti. Richiedono che lo stato riconosca l’Alevismo come una comunità ufficiale islamica, con gli stessi diritti del, ma diversa dal, Sunnismo interessante è il pensiero Alevita secondo cui tutti gli sviluppi negativi dell’Islam sono visti come un fallimento della società e delle caratteristiche Arabe. Il Sunnismo, secondo gli Aleviti, non è vero Islam, ma un’aberrazione il cui stretto legalismo si oppone al pensiero libero e indipendente ed è visto come reazionario, bigotto, fanatico e antidemocratico. Gli Aleviti credono che il nazionalismo Sunnita sia intollerante, dominatore e settario credono fermamente che il Sunnismo sia una propria peculiarità araba e fallimentare come i loro popoli e strutture governative e l’Alevismo sia la vera Tradizione Religiosa Turca e Anatolica.

Mustafà

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mercredi, 18 septembre 2013

Il Processo Ergenekon: Un’analisi giuridica e politica in ordine cronologico

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Il Processo Ergenekon: Un’analisi giuridica e politica in ordine cronologico

Aytekin Kaan Kurtul

Ex: http://www.statopotenza.eu

Il 5 agosto ha avuto luogo l’ultima udienza del processo Ergenekon che si trattava della “formazione di un’organizzazione terrorista” che “ha tentato ad organizzare un colpo di stato contro il Governo attuale (Erdoğan)”. L’inchiesta era stata iniziata nel 2007, con la “scoperta” delle armi “segrete” e dei “diari del golpe” dalla polizia, i quali erano stati “forniti” nel dipartimento della polizia secondo i video fatti da parte della polizia (gia’ qui si capisce come si e’ svolto il processo) .


Dopo il consolidamento del potere della “nuova oligarchia islamica” (ovvero dopo le elezioni generali e l’elezione presidenziale del 2007, con le quali il partito di Erdoğan ha praticamente “nominato” il Presidente)  il processo e’ stato portato davanti alla Corte dove sono state scritte le accuse. I soggetti in questione venivano accusati di far parte di un’organizzazione terrorista, chiamata Ergenekon, che mirava ad organizzare un colpe di stato contro il Governo Erdoğan. Anche se le accuse venivano considerate dentro il quadro di un tentato colpo di stato, i primi ad essere arrestati erano civili. Il piu’ noto di questi, Ergun Poyraz, era un ricercatore e uno scrittore indipendente che aveva scritto libri sulle relazioni “intime” tra le sette mafiose in Turchia (come la setta Gülen) , “gli stati religiosi” (il Vaticano e l’Israele) e i capitalisti finanziari d’Occidente. Il libro che veniva considerato come “una prova di delitto” s’intitolava “Erdoğan e Gül: I Figli d’Israele“, tanto per mostrare la liberta’ di espressione in Turchia.


Un altro personaggio noto tra i primi ad essere arrestati era l’imprenditore Kuddusi Okkır. Egli era il fondatore di un’impresa di informatica che cercava di sviluppare tecnologie nazionali per non dipendere totalmente dal rete statiunitense. Okkır e’ stato arrestato il 20 giugno 2007 ed e’ morto in carcere (presumabilmente a causa della tortura) prima della prima udienza del processo Ergenekon, nella data del 6 giugno 2008. Il 22 gennaio 2008, e’ stata iniziata la seconda onda di arresti. Questa volta i bersagli erano prevalentemente militari, con alcune eccezioni. Due di queste erano l’avvocato Kemal Kerinçsiz e la portavoce della Chiesa Ortodossa Turca, Sevgi Erenerol. Kemal Kerinçsiz era noto per aver impugnato scrittori liberali come Orhan Pamuk per “aver incitato odio razziale, aver insultato la nazione turca e aver incitato una guerra contro i confinanti della Repubblica” (artt. 301, 304 del Codice Penale). Sevgi Erenerol, invece, era una sacerdotessa cristiana e una scrittrice nota per le sue idee patriottiche.


Il 21 marzo 2008 era la data dell’inizio della onda piu’ grande. Personaggi noti dell’opposizione legale in Turchia come il Presidente del Partito dei Lavoratori (noto per essere uno dei primi due partiti comunisti a difendere il socialismo eurasiatista), il Dottor Doğu Perinçek; il giornalista socialista noto per essere torturato durante il regime della giunta del ’71, İlhan Selçuk; il Vice Presidente del Partito dei Lavoratori, Ferit İlsever; il Vice Presidente del Partito dei Lavoratori, Nusret Senem; il fondatore della Fondazione del Pensiero Kemalista, Şener Eruygur; l’ex generale e personaggio kemalista Hurşit Tolon; giornalista socialdemocratico e deputato del Partito Repubblicano del Popolo, Mustafa Balbay; il tenente noto per aver provato ad arrestare i soldati statiunitensi ad İncirlik, Hasan Atilla Uğur e l’accademico Erol Mütercimler sono stati detenuti dalla polizia e la maggior parte e’ stata arrestata.
L’1 luglio 2008 ha testimoniato l’espansione dell’onda precedente ed e’ stato arrestato il Presidente Fondatore dell’Unione Giovanile di Turchia (l’Unione della Gioventu’ di Turchia), Adnan Türkkan. L’Unione Giovanile di Turchia (l’Unione della Gioventu’ di Turchia) e’ stata definita come “l’ala giovanile dell’organizzazione terrorista Ergenekon” dalla stampa liberale (conosciuta come “la stampa dei pinguini” dopo la Sollevazione di Giugno), anche se non era definita cosi neanche nelle accuse. L’arresto e’ stato seguito da repressioni nelle universita’ e tanti studenti hanno dovuto lottare per praticare il loro diritto allo studio.

La prima udienza e lo “schema” dell’organizzazione


La prima udienza ha avuto luogo nel comune di Silivri nella provincia di İstanbul (il quale e’ abbastanza lontano dal centro) il 20 ottobre 2008 ed e’ stato dichiarato lo “schema” dell’organizzazione. Secondo lo “schema”, non c’era una gerarchia o qualsiasi struttura organizzativa – c’era solo un “gruppo” di leader composto prevalentemente da militari. Tra questi leader, c’erano due personaggi noti: il Generale Martire Eşref Bitlis e l’ex generale Hurşit Tolon.


Il Generale Martire Eşref Bitlis era stato assassinato misteriosamente il 17 febbraio 1993. Egli era noto per aver promosso il dialogo con i contadini curdi per risolvere la questione curda. Il 7 febbraio 1993, il Generale Bitlis aveva dichiarato che “gli aerei statunitensi che partono da İncirlik portano armi e forniture ai terroristi del PKK nell’Iraq settentrionale e gli israeliani gli offrono informazioni vitali riguardo le nostre posizioni nella regione“. Era stato assassinato 10 giorni dopo.


L’ex generale Hurşit Tolon, invece, era uno dei primi militari a dichiarare il fatto che “far parte della NATO e’ una minaccia per l’esistenza della Repubblica“. Egli aveva promosso un’alleanza con “l’altro polo che sta crescendo, cioe’ quello guidato oggi dalla Cina, dalla Russia, dall’India e dall’Iran. In questo quadro l’Iran e’ il nostro alleato naturale per il fatto che abbiamo legami sociali e nemici in comune – a prescindere dalle nostre differenze ideologiche“.


Gli avvocati dei prigionieri hanno obiettato l’intero processo citando la mancanza delle prove concrete, l’illegalita’ dell’invasione della sfera privata durante l’inchiesta e il fatto che il Generale Bitlis era gia’ morto nel 1993 e quindi non era fisicamente capace di fare un colpo di stato nel 2008. Le loro obiezioni non sono state prese in considerazione.

L’aggiunta dell’attacco al Consiglio di Stato e il salafita Osman Yıldırım


Il 3 agosto 2009, il caso che riguarda l’attacco al Consiglio di Stato perpetuato da un salafita che si chiama Osman Yıldırım e’ stato aggiunto al caso Ergenekon, rendendo la cosidetta “organizzazione terrorista” in questione “un’organizzazione terrorista attiva”. Osman Yıldırım era stato condannato precedentemente per “aver commesso matricidio” e “aver venduto la propria nipote” (artt. 81, 227 del Codice Penale). Nelle prime udienze nel processo riguardo all’attaco al Consiglio di Stato, egli aveva affermato che mirava a “distruggere il regime laico infedele e costruire il Sacro Califfato. Io sono un cittadino dello Stato Islamico dell’Asia Minore  e un nemico del bastardo europeo che ha fondato il regime“, riferendosi al fondatore della Repubblica, il comandante antimperialista Mustafa Kemal Atatürk che era nato a Salonica. Per di piu’ ha ammesso che egli aveva perpetuato l’attacco. Nonostante il fatto che egli ha commesso i crimini “mirando a distruggere l’ordine repubblicano e l’unione nazionale” ed “essersi opposto all’ordine costituzionale” (artt. 302, 309 del Codice Penale), e’ stato rilasciato dopo l’ultima udienza (per aver collaborato con la corte) mentre decine di giornalisti, accademici e politici e anche l’ex Comandante in Capo delle Forze Armate Turche con il quale lo stesso Governo Erdoğan aveva collaborato sono stati simbolicamente condannati all’ergastolo.

La durata della reclusione e le sentenze della Corte Costituzionale e della CEDU


La maggior parte dei prigionieri e’ stata in carcere per piu’ di cinque anni senza una sentenza definitiva, una situazione che era stata legittimizzata con l’ultima riforma del Codice di Procedura Penale che aveva prolungato la durata massima di reclusione a 10 anni. La riforma, comunque, e’ stata dichiarata incostituzionale da parte della Corte Costituzionale con la sentenza 07/2013 pubblicata il 2 agosto 2013 sulla Gazzetta Ufficiale. Secondo la Corte, siccome la norma presente e’ stata annullata, dovrebbe essere applicata la norma precedente che aveva fissato la durata massima a 5 anni.


La sentenza e’ stata emessa parzialmente in conformita’ con le ultime sentenze della CEDU riguardo alla massima durata di reclusione. La CEDU, infatti, nella sentenza Vaccaro v. la Repubblica Italiana, aveva deciso che sei anni di reclusione era inaccettabile in un caso piu’ “leggero” rispetto al processo Ergenekon. Nonostante le sentenze della CEDU (le cui massime dovrebbero essere applicate nelle corte nazionali siccome la Turchia e’ una firmataria della Convenzione) e l’ultima sentenza della Corte Costituzionale della Repubblica di Turchia, la corte penale ha deciso di non rilasciare i prigionieri mentre uno che doveva essere condannato all’ergastolo secondo il Codice Penale vigente e’ stato rilasciato.

Una sintesi


Come avete visto, il processo Ergenekon e’ stato un processo illegale, incostituzionale e disumano sia nel senso giuridico che nel senso morale. L’Associazione degli Avvocati ha dichiarato che essa non riconosce le sentenze e giornalisti comunisti come Jürgen Elsasser e partiti comunisti come il Partito Comunista della Federazione Russa hanno espresso solidarieta’ ai prigioneri politici in Turchia. Gli antimperialisti nel mondo hanno visto che personaggi come l’ex Comandante in Capo delle Forze Armate Turche sono stati arrestati “simbolicamente”, ovvero per rendere piu’ “credibile” il processo che era totalmente politico e mirava a reprimere l’opposizione legale in Turchia. E ultimamente il Primo Ministro Erdoğan ha affermato che “non riconoscere le sentenze Ergenekon e’ un delitto“. Le sue parole contraddicono le norme del Codice Penale ma se esse valgono piu’ del diritto nazionale e della Costituzione, possiamo parlare di uno stato di diritto?
Scusate la mia liberta’ di espressione.

Le sentenze


Adnan Türkkan, membro fondatore dell’Unione Giovanile di Turchia (l’Unione della Gioventu’ di Turchia): 10 anni e 6 mesi in carcere
Tunç Akkoç, membro fondatore dell’Unione Giovanile di Turchia (l’Unione della Gioventu’ di Turchia), membro del Comitato Centrale del Partito dei Lavoratori: 11 anni in carcere
Doğu Perinçek, Presidente del Partito dei Lavoratori: Ergastolo + 117 anni in carcere
Ferit İlsever, Vice Presidente del Partito dei Lavoratori: 15 anni in carcere
Nusret Senem, Vice Presidente del Partito dei Lavoratori: 20 anni, 3 mesi in carcere
Mehmet Bedri Gültekin, Vice Presidente del Partito dei Lavoratori: 10 anni, 6 mesi in carcere
Zafer Şen, membro del Comitato Centrale del Partito dei Lavoratori: 8 anni, 9 mesi in carcere
Erkan Önsel, membro del Comitato Centrale del Partito dei Lavoratori: 9 anni in carcere
Mustafa Balbay, Deputato del Partito Repubblicano del Popolo: 34 anni e 8 mesi in carcere
Tuncay Özkan, giornalista socialdemocratico: Ergastolo aggravato
Yalçın Küçük, accademico marxista: Ergastolo aggravato
İlker Başbuğ, Ex Comandante in Capo delle Forze Armate Turche: Due ergastoli aggravati seguenti + 4 anni, 2 mesi in carcere
Hikmet Çiçek, giornalista comunista: 21 anni in carcere
Sevgi Erenerol, Portavoce della Chiesa Ortodossa Turca: Ergastolo
Şener Eruygur, Fondatore della Fondazione del Pensiero Kemalista: Ergastolo
Tenente Hasan Atilla Uğur: 29 anni, 3 mesi in carcere
Dursun Çiçek, ammiraglio: Ergastolo aggravato
Mustafa Özbek, Presidente del Sindacato Türk-Metal: Ergastolo
Deniz Yıldırım, ex direttore editoriale del quotidiano comunista Aydınlık: 16 anni, 10 mesi in carcere
Hurşit Tolon, ex generale: Ergastolo aggravato
Kemal Kerinçsiz, avvocato: Ergastolo aggravato
Emcet Olcaytu, avvocato: 13 anni, 2 mesi in carcere
Adnan Akfırat, giornalista: 19 anni in carcere
Ünal İnanç, giornalista: 19 anni in carcere
Ergün Poyraz, scrittore: 29 anni, 4 mesi in carcere
Vedat Yenerer, giornalista: 7 anni, 6 mesi in carcere
Kemal Alemdaroğlu, accademico: 15 anni, 8 mesi in carcere
Mehmet Perinçek, accademico, figlio di Doğu Perinçek: 6 anni e 3 mesi in carcere
Ferit Bernay, accademico: 10 anni in carcere
Mustafa Yurtkuran, accademico: 10 anni in carcere
Aydın Gergin, membro del Partito dei Lavoratori: 8 anni in carcere
Tenente Fikri Karadağ: Ergastolo aggravato
İsmail Hakkı Pekin, ex generale: 7 anni, 6 mesi in carcere
Özlem Konur Usta, editore del quotidiano comunista Aydınlık: 6 anni, 3 mesi in carcere
Mehmet Bozkurt, editore del quotidiano comunista Aydınlık: 9 anni, 3 mesi in carcere
Turan Özlü, fondatore del canale televisivo Ulusal: 9 anni in carcere
Sinan Aygün, Deputato del Partito Repubblicano del Popolo: 13 anni, 6 mesi in carcere
Tenente Fuat Selvi: Ergastolo
Fatih Hilmioğlu, accademico: 23 anni in carcere
Serdar Öztürk, veterano di guerra: 25 anni, 6 mesi di carcere
Mahir Çayan Güngör, corrispondente del canale televisivo Ulusal: 6 anni, 3 mesi in carcere
Kemal Yavuz, ex generale: 7 anni, 6 mesi in carcere

mardi, 17 septembre 2013

Turkey’s Islamists and the military

turkish_military.jpg

Turkey’s Islamists and the military

Youri Kirillov
Ex: http://journal-neo.org

A trial of a group of the former military has started in Turkey. They are accused of the overthrow, in the course of the bloodless coup in 1997, of the Islamist government led by Prime Minister N. Erbakan’s Refah Partisi (Welfare Party). Later, it was banned by the country’s Constitutional Court for the activities of the “anti-secular nature”.

The Justice and Development Party (JDP) – the Islamist party which has been ruling the country since 2002 – originated from Refah Partisi. One of its founders – present Prime Minister Erdoğan – received the relay baton from the hands of his teacher Erbakan.

The trial process, which reminds us of who governs politics in Turkey today, continues the sequence of trials of the military. They include the Ergenekon case, which took place only a month ago, a conspiracy against the government, the imprisonment verdicts issued earlier to more than 300 military for preparing terrorist acts aimed at destabilisation.

In fact, this is the echo of the confrontation between the Islamists and the Turkish army, which, for a long time, considered itself to be the successor of Kemal Ataturk – the founder of secular Turkey.

Although the current process is Turkey’s internal matter, its regional subtext should not be disregarded in the context of the ongoing turbulent Arab Spring near Turkey.

After the Islamists’ success (which was unexpected for many) at the elections in Egypt and Tunisia, as well as the deepening of the crisis in Syria, prospects have emerged for these forces to strengthen their positions at the centre of power, in place of the former elites. A number of Arab political forces, especially the Muslim Brotherhood and similar groups, have focused their attention on the development experience according to the Turkish model. These trends, obviously, appealed to the JDP’s leadership and increasingly inspired them for political involvement, and not only that, in the internal affairs of the countries undergoing the “Arab awakening”.They have revived the long-cherished dreams of Ankara’s Islamist elite to obtain the status of the leader or “big brother” in the Arab-Muslim region.

However, as the subsequent events of the Spring have shown, the leadership of the Islamist parties in Egypt and Tunisia turned out to be incapable to put an end to the post-revolutionary turmoil. Their rule just exacerbated the existing problems in all aspects, and in the field of security in particular.

In Syria, the anti-government opposition was joined, under the mask of the revolution, by the most militant elements of the international terrorist forces.

As a result of the perturbations and the overall imbalance of the situation in the region, the system of economic relations established by Turkey with a number of Arab countries during the rule of the authoritarian leaders, has been shaken. Ankara suffered damage economically and financially due to the internal war and overthrow of Gaddafi in Libya, which used to be one of the strongholds of Turkey’s entrepreneurship in the Arab world. There were about 30,000 Turks here engaged in the implementation of projects worth $15 billion dollars.

The Ankara–Syria relations – once friendly and mutually beneficial for both countries – now have been knocked out. Bilateral trade was growing rapidly, the visa regime was removed, but Ankara’s withdrawal from this trajectory in 2011 shook the cooperation structure like an earthquake.

In addition to the expenses for the support of rebels, the Turkish authorities had to provide shelter to more than 400,000 Syrian refugees. The presence of so many people is fraught with the destabilisation of normal life in the region, which leads to dissatisfaction among the local population.

Experts are warning that the rebellion in Syria fomented with Turkey’s help can have a boomerang-like effect on Turkey itself, and the Syrian religious war will spill into Turkey.

Turkey’s regional geopolitical ambitions were challenged by the overthrow of President Mohamed Morsi in Egypt as the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood had been considered by Ankara as one of the most important partners.

Ankara’s relations with Egypt began to show signs of strain after Turkey’s leadership condemned the rise of the military in Egypt and the overthrow of Morsi. Cairo responded with an official protest to the interference in its internal affairs.

A very subdued reaction to the coup in Egypt from the West (especially from Turkey’s close ally – the US), the support for the Egyptian military on the part of Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf monarchies increased Erdoğan’s concerns about the military, interprets Atilla Yesilada, political analyst at Global Source Partners, Istanbul.

There is no denying that Turkey has outpaced the Arab world in terms of the level of the secularisation of society. Today, when in a number of the Spring countries there is a growing divide in society and an increasing confrontation between the Islamists, who came to power on the protest wave, and the liberal pro-secular forces, logically Ankara should side with the latter.

However, in reality, its authorities, following their narrow party interests, are playing into the hands of those forces in the Arab countries which, by striking the Islamist chords, are pulling their countries back.

Yuri Kirillov, an expert on the Middle East and North Africa, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook”.

dimanche, 01 septembre 2013

The Social “Big Bang” of the 21st Century Turkey: from Atlantic to Eurasia

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The Social “Big Bang” of the 21st Century Turkey: from Atlantic to Eurasia

Ex: http://www.geopolitica.ru
 

There are two important aspects of the nation-wide uprising in Turkey centered at the Taksim Square in İstanbul that deserve emphasis. First and foremost, it is an unprecetented social “big bang” of the 21st century Turkey. Secondly, the extreme hostility of the stance of the Erdoğan regime against this protest movement is equally unseen.  

The Taksim Square represents the uprising of the Turkish Nation against the Erdoğan Administration, who arrogantly attempted to trample on the Turkish Nation and the values of the Atatürk Republic. The main symbol that unites millions of people who have been filling the squares all over Turkey for about three weeks now and facing police violence everywhere is the Turkish flag. The nation-wide common slogan  these masses are chanting everywhere is “Tayyip resign! Government resign! Dictator resign!”. If this movement is to be connected to something in the past, its roots clearly lie in the Kemalist Revolution.

                                                               How it began?

            Protests were started by a small group of activists as a reaction to the demolition of the Gezi Park in Taksim, to rebuild the “historic” Taksim Military Barracks, which was also planned to house a shopping mall. The construction company had started to demolish the wall of Gezi Park and cut down the trees, when the protestors stood up to prevent any further demolition. Then the police intervened with tear gas. More people joined the activists to start a sit-in act and a night watch in the Gezi Park. The police attacked once more and more violently with tear gas and water cannons to drive the protestors out of the Park. The outcome of this sequence of  “more protestors-more police violence” was that the resistance grew very quickly and spread over the whole country covering millions of people in hundreds of protest rallies. All the demonstrations were met with police violence, tear gas, water cannons, plastic bullets. The target of the demonstrators went far beyond stopping the project of the government concerning the Gezi Park. They started to unanimously demand the resignation of Erdogan and the government. By now, there are four people killed, thousands injured, including many who are heavily injured by tear gas shells and plastic bullets.

            Before analyzing the background and reasons that led to the mobilization of masses to such an unseen extent, it might be telling to shortly look into the reasons of  Erdoğan's insistence on the project concerning the Gezi Park. This project is two-legged. One leg is concerned with the history of the Military Barracks that are to be rebuilt. After the 1908 Revolution led to the establishment of the Constitutional Monarchy in the Ottoman State, a reactionary rising was staged on the 31st of March in 1909 in Istanbul demanding to go back to an absolutist regime based on religious principles again. The rising was started in the Taksim Barracks, which was then turned into the  headquarters of this reactionary rebellion. The rising was suppressed by the Movement Army which came from Thessaloniki to İstanbul and whose staff officer was Mustafa Kemal (Atatürk).  It is thus only natural that those who desparately wish to take the revenge of the Kemalist Revolution today insist on rebuilding these Barracks as a symbol of their own stance.

            The second leg of the project is that the rebuilt Barracks are planned to house a shopping mall. I think it will be no exaggeration to regard “shopping malls” as symbols of a lifestyle imposed by the global capitalist system to the entire world. Thus the project itself is nothing but a synthesis of Ottomanism and global capitalism, reflecting the current alliance between the imperialistic system and the medieval forces in Turkey.

                                        The background of the Taksim Resistance     

            If the question is whether the social outburst in Turkey triggered by the resistance against Erdoğan's Gezi Park project was something expected or not, the answer is both yes and no. The first thing to be noted in that regard is that, for the last decade, the political and social tensions in Turkey have been growing since Erdoğan came into power, along with this process being especially accelerated within the last few years. Prior to the Taksim Resistance, the potential energy accumulated within the society had already started to turn into kinetic energy in the form of big mass demonstrations within the last one year.  Large numbers of demonstrators became familiar with tear gas, water cannons and police violence during these struggles. It was this militant rise of the people's movement, which paved the way to the current resistance. That is what underlies the answer “yes”. Due to the stochastic nature of social phenomena, however, it usually is not possible to precisely forecast the time, place and scale of social outbursts, as was also the case with the Taksim Resistance. 

            The bans and limitations introduced by the Erdoğan government last year concerning the celebration of national holidays was met with  big anger among the citizens. The Youth Union of Turkey (Türkiye Gençlik Birliği) made a call for a demonstration in İstanbul on May 19, 2012, in which more than 200 thousand citizens took part. The 19th of May is the date when Mustafa Kemal landed in Samsun in 1919 to start the National Liberation Movement and is celebrated as a national holiday dedicated to the youth in Turkey. 19 May 2012 witnessed the first big mass demonstration in Turkey in the aftermath of the Republic Meetings in 2007, which had been held in Ankara, İstanbul, İzmir and several other cities with the participation of millions of citizens. On 29 October 2012 - the Anniversary of the Foundation of the Turkish Republic – hundreds of thousands of people gathered in Ulus (Ankara) in front of the First Turkish Grand National Assembly Building under the leadership of Workers' Party (Turkey) (İşçi Partisi – Türkiye) and the Youth Union of Turkey. The police tried to prevent the gathering by attacking the crowd with tear gas and water cannons and by setting up barricades between groups that were coming to the square from different directions. Neither the police raids nor the barricades could prevent the people from gathering at the Ulus Square, from where they marched several kilometers to reach Atatürk's Mausoleum. 19 May 2012 acted as the sparkler, and 29 October 2012 was the turning point in the rising wave of the people's movement in Turkey.

            Hatay is one of the Southern provinces of Turkey bordering with Syria, where several “refugee camps” are located. As most of these are acting as “mercenary camps” from where terror is being “exported” to Syria under the patronage of the Erdoğan administration, several big mass demonstrations were held in Hatay starting as of September 2012, demanding the shutdown of these terror camps and calling for solidarity and friendship with the Syrian people. It seems also worthwhile to emphasize that these demands united people of different ethnic origins and religious beliefs in Hatay and neigboring provinces along the border with Syria.

            The trials of the so-called Ergenekon Case are being held in a prison compound near Silivri. The very fact that Silivri is a town about 100 km distant from İstanbul , while the natural location of the court in charge of this case is in Beşiktaş – a central district of İstanbul –, may give everyone some idea about how “open” these trials are to the public. The summary accusation is that the suspects of this trial (including leaders of political parties, former rectors and several academicians, journalists, retired generals and officers) have formed a secret organization called Ergenekon to overthrow the government, although many of them got to know each other well only in prison. Dr. Doğu Perinçek who is still the chairman of Workers' Party (Turkey) is among the suspects and has now been under arrest for more than five years. The common feature that unites almost all the suspects is that they are all patriotic figures who have struggled against the US plans concerning Turkey and the Middle East and have defended the Kemalist Revolution. The “Ergenekon Case” itself is a US plot implemented by the Erdogan Administration not only against the suspects, but against Turkey as a whole. Thus, it comprises along with other similar “cases” one of the most important sources of political and social tension underlying the current social outburst. There have been two big mass demonstrations (along with several other smaller ones) in Silivri in front of the court within the last year, one on December 13, 2012, and the other on April 8, 2013, both including about 100 000 participants, who had to face barricades, tear gas and water cannons. The citizens, however, insisted on staying in front of the court until the trial was over, thereby also defending the principle of the “openness of the trials to the public”.

            These are just some chosen incidences to exemplify the background of the current nation-wide resistance. It should thus be no wonder any more to anyone who sees this picture how come these young people of all ages, these women and men of Turkey have been struggling day and night all over the country for so long.

            Having gone through the source of human energy of the Taksim uprising, let us turn to the architecture of the political and social tensions in Turkey and the factors behind them. This is quite important as the people's movement in Turkey will continue to rise in waves with outcomes that will not stay confined only to Turkey itself, but will have an impact upon the entire region.

                        Erdoğan's foreign policy is tightly bound to the US and NATO

            It might be best to start with the foreign policy that the Erdoğan Administration has been following since it came into power in 2002 with a focus on the Syrian issue.

            Tayyip Erdoğan – the Prime Minister of Turkey- is known to have himself publicly declared more than 30 times that he is acting as one of the Co-Chairs of the Great Middle East Project of the USA. Abdullah Gül – the President of Turkey- is known to have admitted himself that he signed a secret “two-page, nine-item” agreement with Colin Powell in 2003, when he was the Foreign Minister of Turkey. Ahmet Davutoğlu – the present Foreign Minister of Turkey – is known to have written a book entitled “Strategic Depth” whose main message can be summarized as “Align your policies with those of big powers, if you wish to become a regional leader.” This provides a clear picture of the framework that has been shaping the foreign policy of the Erdoğan Administration.

            Erdoğan is known to be the world champion of hostility against Bashar Assad in Syria. He is   supporting the so-called “Syrian Free Army” and other terror groups against Esad logistically by all means, which include the provision of safe bases behind the front to these mercenaries in Turkey under the guise of “refugee camps”. As a consequence of this policy, the control of Turkish security forces on the border with Syria was practically lifted so that the mercenaries could cross the border freely in either direction. The displeasure aroused thereby among the inhabitants in cities and towns near the border was made visible by mass demonstrations in Hatay and other places as mentioned above.

            The terror that was exported to Syria under the patronage of the Erdoğan regime struck back Turkey itself violently. On 11 February 2013, a car bomb exploded at Cilvegözü Bordergate killing 13 people including both Syrians and Turks. The second and more tragic incidence of terror took place on 11 May 2013 in Reyhanlı, a town in Turkey very near to Cilvegözü Bordergate, when two car bombs exploded in the town center killing more than 50 people and injuring hundreds of them. Erdoğan could go to Reyhanlı only one week after the  incidence and made a speech to a crowd supposedly collected together from other regions  because he was afraid of the fury of the people from Reyhanlı. These two tragic events only added to the great fury of the Turkish people who demand peace with the neighbor and peace at neighbor's home.

            The Taksim Resistance in Turkey and the opposition of the Turkish people to Erdoğan's hostile stance against Syria combined with the inevitable tightening of the control on the Syrian border by Turkish security forces after the Reyhanlı bombs seem to have recently contributed to the Syrian Administarion headed by Beshar Esad in combatting terror at home.

            The relationship between Obama's and Erdoğan's stances concerning the Syrian issue might look puzzling at first glance, as Erdoğan seems to be the one who is ready to do everything to overthrow Esad, while Obama looks as if he were dragging his feet in this regard. It is, however, doubtless that the patent of Erdoğan's policy concerning Syria belongs to the US. Initially, he was driven against Beshar Esad by the US in an unbridled way in expectation of an easy and quick victory. When this plan failed, however, Erdoğan found himself in the midst of a mined ground, while Obama still could use the relative maneuvre space he had secured for himself by having let someone else jump to the mined ground on his behalf. It should be noted here that the “good times” between Erdoğan and Assad, the climax of which was reached by holding joint government meetings very shortly before Erdoğan's sharp turn from “extreme friendship” to “extreme hostility”, were not a product of Turkey either.

            After Obama came into office in the US, Davutoğlu became the Foreign Minister in Turkey.

In the first term (2002-2007) of AKP (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi - Justice and Development Party), “membership to the European Union” had been the major keyword of Turkish foreign policy.  The rationale behind this policy, whose patent again belongs to the US, was to keep Turkey bound to the door of the EU in order to prevent it from seeking other alternatives and forming closer ties with Eurasia. In AKP's second term (2007-2011), however, the keyword “EU” entirely disappeared from the scene, and Davutoğlu replaced it first by “zero-problem-with-the neighbors” and then by “New Ottomanism”.

            In order to understand the rationale behind this change, let us remember the main components of the Obama doctrine, which can be summarized as (i) making more effective use of diplomatic, political and cultural channels, (ii) letting the “allies” share the burden by getting them do some of the jobs on behalf of the US rather than the US itself directly, and (iii) shifting the center of weight from regular warfare to special warfare in reshaping the world. It is the implementation of the second and third items that we presently witness in Syria.

            As for the first item, the USA was lacking direct diplomatic, political and cultural channels with the Islamic World whose effective use would help the creation of political and social footholds 

that would internalize the US plans and thus be useful in implementing them. So, the need was for a country which owned such channels and was ready to use them on behalf of the US. This country was not only to look socially and culturally Islamic, but also should introduce a reinterpretation of Islam that would get rid of all obstacles in Islam to integration with the global capitalistic market. Finally, for such a country to be influential in the Islamic World, it should not act like a proxy of the US. All this is actually nothing but what is meant by “Moderate Islam”, represented by the AKP Administration in Turkey.

            Davutoğlu's formula of “zero-problem-with-the neighbors” as well as Erdoğan's “one-minute-show” in Davos against Israel followed by his stance in the Mavi Marmara Incidence are to be evaluated within this framework. The “golden times” with Syria were not an indication of a shift of axis of the Erdoğan Administration from the West to the East, but were part of a scenario aiming at softening and weakening Syria from inside. But the difficulty that USA and the West have been facing in producing an effective opposition to Bashar Assad in the Syrian issue now nclearly shows that the task of creating an effective political and social foothold on behalf of the US was not succeeded.

            The firm resistance of Syria under Esad's leadership against the dirty war initiated by the US using the Erdoğan Administration as an instrument gained the sound support of a “Eurasian hinterland”. Assad's resistance, the international support it gained and the strong opposition of the Turkish people to Erdoğan's stance concerning Syria left Erdoğan in a cumbersome position. When the inability of the US and the West due to the big difficulties they are going through because of the global economic crisis was added to that, the claim to regional leadership or equivalently “New Ottomanism” collapsed before it even started. We can hardly deny the importance of the role this collapse played in the rise of the people's movement in Turkey and thus in the Taksim Uprising. Conversely, the strength of the nation's opposition now renders Erdoğan more inable than ever concerning Syria as well as in other major issues.

      The Second Israel = “Free Kurdistan” is an invariant of the Great Middle East Project

            One of the invariants of the US policy concerning the Middle East is to turn Northern Iraq into a permanent base of its own, or equivalently into a second Israel. This target can be reached by founding a “Free Kurdistan”. The territory of the Kurdistan Regional Government is by itself not adequate for the sustainability of such a state. Sustainability requires expansion of the territory to the North into Turkey and an opening to the Mediterranean via a “Kurdish Corridor” in Northern Syria. A possible expansion to the East into Iran is also desirable. The competence and accumulation needed for founding and running such a state is owned by the PKK. This collection of statements depicts the framework within which the USA considers the “Kurdish factor” in the Middle East.

            Turkey is now going through a so-called “peace process” with the PKK, the roadmap of which has been drawn by the US. The US authorities had been advocating for quite some time that the PKK should be taken as a negotiation partner by the Turkish Government. To cope with circumstances under which the acceptance of the PKK as a formal negotiation partner would be politically untenable for a government, the advice was that the parliamentary deputies of the BDP (Barış ve Demokrasi Partisi – Peace and Democracy Party) serve as interlocutor in negotiations. The Erdoğan Administration has followed this advice to such an extent that the current position of Öcalan and the PKK is factually far beyond that of a negotiation partner. A description that would fit the present situation best is to refer to them as “coalition partners” of the Erdoğan Administration. The process was carried out under the pretense that this was the only feasible way of liquidating the PKK. The consequence was, however, the legitimization of the PKK, rendering this separatist force stronger than ever.

            “Peace at home” is naturally the common demand of all Turkish citizens irrespective of their ethnic origins. As now the continuation of “cease fire” is made dependent upon the well-treatment of the PKK so that it continues to comply with cease fire, the social engineering behind the “peace process” is the utilization of this common demand of the people for peace by blackmailing them with the PKK terror. The success of this blackmail naturally requires a strong PKK, rather than one that has entered a liquidation process.

            The next stop of the roadmap is the change of the Constitution accordingly, the essence of which can be summarized as to remove the “Turkish Nation” along with all values of the Atatürk Republic from the Constitution. The estimation that has been rendered vacuous by the uprising of the nation was that the same blackmailing by the PKK would be useful in making these changes acceptable  to the nation and carrying it to the brink of fragmentation.

            Having noted that a “Free Kurdistan” lies at the core of the Great Middle East Project and the PKK is indispensable for the US in that regard, it would be an illusion to even think that the USA would allow the Erdoğan Administration to liquidate the PKK. The US plan is, in fact, to let the PKK and the Turkish Army to fight together in Syria and Iraq against the territorial integrities of these two countries when the time ripens for that

                        Turkey is drowning in the Atlantic System: Back to the route of the Kemalist Revolution in Eurasia

            The conquest of the state apparatus by the counter-revolutionary forces was mainly completed in 2007, when Abdullah Gül became the President. It was then that they started the operation against the members of the Turkish Army and the leaders of the patriotic forces in Turkey, who had been opposing Turkey getting turned into an instrument of the USA, under the guise of legal cases as Ergenekon, Balyoz and several others. In the meantime, they also were able to tighten their control on the judiciary. The next item on their agenda was to start the liquidation of the Kemalist Revolution from within the social life.

            The Kemalist Revolution had replaced “religion” by “nation” as the source of power. What naturally accompanied that process was the substitution of “reason and science” for “dogma”. In an attempt tor reverse this process, the AKP Administration is now trying to replace “nation” by “religion” again and substitute “dogma” for “reason and science”. This revival of the medieval approach is in compliance with the attempt of the imperialistic system to dissolve the national states of the Oppressed and Developing World.

            The reversal attempted by the Erdoğan Regime, however, required  on its part to intervene more and more not only into social life, but also into individual lives. It is precisely this increasing intervention what is now especially being met with fury by broad masses. Thus, it is no wonder that the youth and women formed the overwhelming majority in the Taksim Uprising so far.

            There is another very important process going on in Turkey, in parallel with the rise of the people's movement, one of whose main slogans is “we will win by uniting”. Namely, it is the construction of a united national front with the Workers' Party (Turkey) in its center, with the aim of carrying a national government to power. To indicate how successful this movement is proceeding, it might suffice to quote Erdoğan who said about a month ago that “the Chair of Workers' Party (Dr. Doğu Perinçek) is giving direction from prison to CHP (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi - Republican People's Party) with his left finger and to MHP (Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi – Nationalist Movement Party) with his right finger”.

            The summary conclusion that from now on everyone has to take into account is that the rising movement of the nation has invalidated all equations concerning Turkey that do not contain the nation itself as the biggest source of power.

            Everything said in this article points at the fact that Turkey is drowning in the Atlantic System. The unique framework that will allow Turkey to live and develop embracing all its people as equal citizens irrespective of their etnic origins or religious beliefs is the Atatürk Republic. The only geography in which Turkey can set itself back to the route of the Kemalist Revolution and complete it in order to go beyond is nothing but Eurasia.

Published in Journal of Eurasian Affairs No.1, Vol. 1, 2013

mardi, 27 août 2013

Claudio MUTTI: Il lupo grigio al bivio

turquie-europe_402.jpg

Claudio MUTTI:

IL LUPO GRIGIO AL BIVIO

Ex: http://www.eurasia-rivista.org

La Turchia è Europa

La regione chiamata con termine greco-bizantino Anatolia (“terra di levante”) nell’antichità fu considerata parte integrante dell’Europa: Erodoto1 fissa infatti il confine orientale dell’Europa sul fiume Fasi, nei pressi degli odierni porti georgiani di Poti e Batumi. Nel Medioevo Dante colloca “lo stremo d’Europa”2 vicino ai monti dell’Asia Minore, dai quali, dopo la distruzione di Troia, l’Aquila imperiale spiccò il volo verso l’Italia. Per la geografia moderna, la penisola anatolica è la propaggine più occidentale dell’Asia; tuttavia alcuni geografi la considerano più che altro la quarta penisola del Mediterraneo, data la sua posizione analoga a quella delle penisole iberica, italiana e greca.

Sotto il profilo etnico, il popolo turco stanziato nella penisola anatolica costituisce il risultato di una sintesi che ha coinvolto popoli di diversa origine. Fin dall’antichità, l’Anatolia è stata abitata da popolazioni di lingua indoeuropea: Ittiti, Frigi, Lidi, Lici, Panfili, Armeni, Celti ecc. Con l’arrivo dei Turchi Selgiuchidi e poi dei Turchi Ottomani, ebbe luogo una fusione dell’elemento autoctono con quello turanico, sicché oggi si ha in Turchia “un tipo medio, che va considerato più di fattezze europee che asiatiche”3. In altre parole, i Turchi dell’Anatolia “sono in maggioranza europidi purissimi, passati nel tempo all’uso di una lingua turca a opera dei loro conquistatori centro-asiatici”4.

La lingua ufficiale della Turchia, il turco ottomano (osmanli), come tutte le lingue turco-tatare appartiene al gruppo altaico. Si tratta perciò di una lingua non indoeuropea, così come non sono indoeuropee altre lingue parlate da secoli in Europa: le lingue turco-tatare della Russia, le lingue caucasiche, il basco, le lingue ugrofinniche (ungherese, finlandese, estone, careliano, lappone, mordvino, ceremisso, sirieno, votiaco ecc.).

La religione professata dalla quasi totalità del popolo turco è l’Islam, presente in Europa fin dall’VIII secolo d.C. La Turchia è musulmana così come lo sono state la Spagna, la Francia meridionale e la Sicilia; come lo sono alcune regioni della Russia, del Caucaso e dei Balcani; come lo è oggi una parte della popolazione dell’Europa, dove il numero complessivo dei musulmani supera ormai i dieci milioni di anime.

La dinastia che resse l’Impero ottomano fino alla sua caduta fu in sostanza una dinastia europea, nella quale il tasso di sangue turco diminuiva ad ogni generazione, poiché la validé (la madre del Sultano) era o greca, o slava o circassa o anche italiana. In un certo senso, si potrebbe dunque dire che i Sultani ottomani erano “più europei” che non i re ungheresi della dinastia di Arpád, turanici per parte di padre e di madre. Quanto alla classe dirigente ottomana, furono innumerevoli i visir, i funzionari politici e gli ufficiali dell’esercito appartenenti ai popoli balcanici. Gli stessi giannizzeri, l’élite militare dell’Impero, non erano d’origine turca.

Il pontefice Pio II, nella lettera da lui inviata nel 1469 a Mehmed il Conquistatore, riconobbe il Sultano come “imperatore dei Greci” de facto, in quanto successore dei basileis di Bisanzio e degli imperatori di Roma: “Fuerunt Itali rerum domini, nunc Turchorum inchoatur imperium”. Papa Enea Silvio Piccolomini proponeva quindi al Conquistatore di trasformare la situazione de facto in stato de jure, facendosi nominare da lui “imperatore dei Greci e dell’Oriente” mediante… “un pochino d’acqua (aquae pauxillum)”. Ma, mentre un altro principe “pagano”, il magiaro Vajk, si era fatto battezzare col nome di Stefano e aveva ricevuto da Papa Silvestro II la corona regale, Mehmed invece rimase Mehmed e trasmise ai suoi successori quell’autorità imperiale che, toccatagli per effetto dell’ordalia del maggio1453, era stata ben presto riconosciuta dall’Europa in maniera esplicita e ufficiale. Secondo la Repubblica di Venezia, infatti, Mehmed II era imperatore di Costantinopoli, cosicché gli spettavano di diritto tutti i territori dell’impero bizantino, comprese le vecchie colonie greche della Puglia (Brindisi, Taranto e Otranto). Per quanto riguarda Firenze, Lorenzo il Magnifico fece coniare una medaglia sulla quale, accanto all’immagine del Conquistatore, si poteva leggere: “Mahumet, Asie ac Trapesunzis Magneque Gretie Imperat(or)”; dove per Magna Gretia si doveva intendere Bisanzio col suo vasto retroterra europeo. Altre due medaglie, che parlavano anch’esse un linguaggio inequivocabile circa il carattere rivestito dall’imperium ottomano, furono fatte coniare nel 1481 da Ferrante d’Aragona; le iscrizioni qualificavano Mehmed II come “Asie et Gretie imperator” e “Bizantii imperator”.

“Fatto come i Romani per reggere i popoli, secondo l’affermazione dell’antico poeta, [il Turco] ha governato vecchi popoli civili nel rispetto delle loro tradizioni e delle loro ambizioni millenarie”5. Così l’Impero ottomano, subentrando all’Impero Romano d’Oriente, fu “l’ultima ipostasi di Roma (…) la Roma musulmana dei Turchi”6, ovvero “un Impero romano turco-musulmano”7. La Turchia ottomana fu perciò una potenza europea, come venne d’altronde ufficialmente riconosciuto dagli stessi rappresentanti degli Stati europei nel congresso di Parigi del 1856, quando la Turchia era diventata “il grande malato d’Europa”.

Un secolo e mezzo più tardi lo Stato turco non è più il grande malato d’Europa, ma, al contrario, gode di uno stato di salute migliore di quello di molti Paesi europei. Tuttavia, pur essendo candidata dal 1999 all’ingresso nell’Unione Europea, la Turchia viene tenuta in quarantena a tempo indeterminato. La sua adesione all’Unione, fissata per il 2015, è tutt’altro che scontata.

La Turchia è Asia

Il primo insediamento di un popolo turco sul territorio anatolico ebbe luogo in seguito alla battaglia di Melashgert, avvenuta il 26 agosto 1071, nella quale le truppe comandate da Romano Diogene furono sbaragliate dai guerrieri selgiuchidi di Alp Arslan. Con questi primi invasori turchi erano arrivati in Anatolia anche i Turchi ottomani, ai quali fu inizialmente assegnata una marca di confine fra i territori selgiuchidi della Frigia e della Galazia e la provincia di Bitinia, ancora sotto controllo bizantino; l’indebolimento della potenza selgiuchide favorì la nascita dell’impero ottomano.

politique internationale, géopolitique, turquie, proche-orient, asie mineure, eurasie, eurasisme, claudio mutti,

Ma già prima che Selgiuchidi e Ottomani giungessero in Anatolia, tra i secoli VI e IX diversi gruppi turchi si erano stanziati in Europa. I Cazari avevano fondato un impero che dalle rive nordoccidentali del Caspio si estendeva fino alla Crimea; i Bulgari avevano costituito due distinti khanati, nei bacini della Volga e del Danubio; gli Avari erano dilagati fino ad occidente del Tibisco; i Peceneghi avevano occupato le foci del Danubio; i Qipciaq e i Cumani si erano stabiliti a nord e a nordest del Mar Nero. Prima ancora, nel IV secolo, nei territori dell’Impero romano erano apparsi gli Unni, che sotto la guida di Attila (m. 453) sarebbero poi assurti a grande potenza creando un impero; essi erano i probabili discendenti di quegli Hsiung-nu che per qualche secolo avevano minacciato l’Impero cinese.

Selgiuchidi e Ottomani, antenati dei Turchi d’Anatolia e degli Azeri, costituiscono una delle tre parti in cui si divise, tra i secoli X e XII, la massa di tribù turche nota come gruppo oguzo. La seconda, costituita inizialmente da Uzi e Peceneghi, è rappresentata oggi dai Gagauzi (sparsi tra Ucraina, Repubblica di Moldavia, Romania e Bulgaria) nonché da varie comunità turche dei Balcani. La terza parte del gruppo oguzo è quella che, rimasta rimasta nei pressi dell’Aral, diede origine al popolo dei Turkmeni.

Premesso che  i vari sistemi di classificazione delle lingue e dei dialetti turchi proposti dai turcologi “sono tutti necessariamente artificiosi nel tentativo di raggruppare concrezioni linguistiche di età differente”8, è comunque possibile collocare il gruppo oguzo nel ramo occidentale della famiglia turca, al quale appartengono anche i gruppi bulgaro, kipciak e karluk.

Il gruppo bulgaro, che nell’Alto Medioevo comprendeva la lingua parlata dai Bulgari della Volga e della Kama, nonché la lingua cazara, è rappresentato attualmente dal ciuvascio, parlato sui territori di tre repubbliche autonome della Federazione Russa.

Il gruppo kipciak viene ripartito in tre sottogruppi, al primo dei quali appartenne la lingua di quei Cumani che, apparsi nell’Est europeo nel sec. XI, in parte si stanziarono in territorio ungherese; le lingue vive di questo sottogruppo sono parlate da circa cinque milioni di anime tra Lituania, Ucraina, Caucaso, Kirghizistan e Uzbekistan. Il secondo sottogruppo è costituito da Tatari e Baskiri. Fra le tre lingue del terzo sottogruppo, la più importante è quella kazaka, lingua ufficiale del Kazakhstan.

Il gruppo karluk comprende, oltre ad alcune lingue antiche e letterarie, due lingue parlate in vari territori dell’Asia centrale: l’usbeco (ufficiale in Uzbekistan) e l’uiguro moderno (ufficiale nella Regione Autonoma dello Hsinkiang).

Per quanto riguarda il ramo orientale della famiglia turca, esso comprende il gruppo uiguro-oguzo e quello kirghiso-kipciak. Nel primo gruppo rientrano, assieme ad altri idiomi, il tuvino, parlato nell’omonima repubblica della Federazione Russa, e lo jacuto, che corrisponde alle zone più settentrionali ed orientali dell’area turcofona (Repubblica Jacuta e isola di Sachalin). Nel secondo gruppo, la lingua più diffusa è il chirghiso, che è parlata in Kirghizistan, Tagikistan, Uzbekistan, Hsinkiang, Afghanistan e Pakistan.

Fatta eccezione per la lingua parlata anticamente dai Bulgari, per lo jacuto e per il ciuvascio, le lingue turche antiche e moderne non differiscono molto tra loro, sicché risulta evidente il rapporto di affinità linguistica che lega i Turchi dell’Anatolia agli altri popoli turchi che vivono nel continente eurasiatico.

Prospettive eurasiatiche

Non è facile stabilire dove gli antenati della grande famiglia turca abbiano avuto la loro primitiva dimora, dalla quale ondate successive di orde nomadi partirono per invadere i territori della Cina, dell’India, della Persia e dell’Europa. Secondo le ipotesi formulate dagli studiosi, la sede originaria dei Turchi dovrebbe coincidere con la zona dei monti Altai o con la regione compresa tra gli Altai, gli Urali e l’Ural, mentre altri ritengono che essa si sarebbe trovata a nord della Cina, nell’odierna Jacuzia; altri ancora indicano la vasta area che va dal deserto del Gobi fino al corso della Volga.

L’identificazione dell’Urheimat turco con la regione designata dal termine persiano Turan, a nord dell’Iran, costituisce il mito d’origine del movimento politico-culturale noto come panturanismo, che preconizza l’unità dei popoli turchi. Della tesi panturanista, nata nel quarto decennio del XX secolo in ambiente tataro, si appropriò Ármin Vámbéry9, il quale la propose alla Gran Bretagna come uno strumento ideologico da utilizzare nel “Grande Gioco”: una grande entità politica compresa tra i Monti Altai e il Bosforo avrebbe potuto sbarrare per sempre la strada all’espansione russa verso la Persia e i Dardanelli. Ben diverso fu il significato che l’ideale panturanico assunse nei primi anni del Novecento, quando fu la Germania guglielmina, alleata della Turchia, a sostenere il panturanismo e il panislamismo nel quadro geostrategico di un asse Berlino-Vienna-Istanbul-Bagdad che metteva a rischio l’egemonia coloniale britannica.

Anche Samuel Huntington ha preso in seria considerazione l’eventualità che, ponendosi “a capo di una comunità di nazioni turche”10, la Turchia “si ridefinisca come paese leader del mondo islamico”11 e persegua “sempre più intensamente i propri interessi particolari nei Balcani, nel mondo arabo e in Asia centrale”12. Il teorico dello “scontro delle civiltà” ha riassunto nei termini seguenti le iniziative intraprese da Ankara in direzione turanica subito dopo il crollo dell’URSS: “Il presidente Özal e altri leader turchi cominciarono a vagheggiare la creazione di una comunità di popoli turchi e dedicarono grandi sforzi per sviluppare legami con i ‘turchi esterni’ dell’ex impero ‘dall’Adriatico ai confini con la Cina’. Particolare attenzione venne prestata all’Azerbaigian e alle quattro repubbliche centroasiatiche di lingua turca: Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Kazakistan e Kirghizistan. Nel 1991 e 1992 la Turchia avviò un’ampia gamma di iniziative volte a rinsaldare i legami e ad accrescere la propria influenza in queste nuove repubbliche: prestiti a lungo termine e a interesse agevolato (…) assistenza umanitaria (…) televisione via satellite (…) reti telefoniche, servizi aerei, migliaia di borse di studio e corsi di formazione in Turchia per banchieri, imprenditori, diplomatici e ufficiali centroasiatici e azeri. Furono inviati insegnanti di lingua turca e sono nate circa duemila imprese miste. La comunanza culturale ha certamente aiutato i rapporti economici”13.

Nell’elaborazione geopolitica di Ahmet Davutoğlu14, consigliere diplomatico di Erdoğan diventato ministro degli Esteri nel 2009, la comunità dei popoli turchi occupa un posto fondamentale: “L’impero delle steppe, l’Orda d’Oro, dal Mar d’Aral all’Anatolia è un punto fermo del suo pensiero. La Turchia ha ogni interesse a rivivificare questa vocazione continentale e ad avvicinarsi al gruppo di Shanghai sotto la bacchetta della Cina e della Russia”15. La lentezza con cui procedono i negoziati per l’adesione all’Unione Europea è stata determinante per spingere Ankara nella direzione teorizzata da Ahmet Davutoğlu, il quale ha firmato nell’aprile 2013 un protocollo d’intesa che fa della Turchia un “membro dialogante” dell’Organizzazione per la Cooperazione di Shanghai. “Ora, con questa scelta, – ha dichiarato Dmitrij Mezencev, segretario generale dell’Organizzazione – la Turchia afferma che il nostro destino è il medesimo dei Paesi dell’Organizzazione per la Cooperazione di Shanghai”. E Davutoğlu: “La Turchia farà parte di una famiglia composta di paesi che hanno vissuto insieme non per secoli, ma per millenni”.

politique internationale, géopolitique, turquie, proche-orient, asie mineure, eurasie, eurasisme, claudio mutti,

La decisione turca di aggregarsi all’Organizzazione di Shanghai, nucleo di un potenziale blocco di alleanza eurasiatica, potrebbe essere gravida di importanti sviluppi. Infatti la politica di avvicinamento a Mosca, Pechino e Teheran, se coerentemente perseguita, si rivelerebbe incompatibile con un “neoottomanismo” che malamente nasconde un ruolo subimperialista, funzionale agl’interessi egemonici statunitensi. Non solo, ma prima o poi la Turchia potrebbe porre seriamente in discussione il proprio inserimento nell’Alleanza Atlantica e rescindere i vincoli col regime sionista, qualora intendesse credibilmente proporsi come punto di riferimento per i Paesi musulmani del Mediterraneo e del Vicino Oriente. E non è nemmeno da escludere che uno scenario di tal genere possa indurre l’Europa stessa ad un’assunzione di responsabilità, incoraggiandola a riannodare quell’alleanza con la Turchia che la Germania e l’Austria-Ungheria avevano stabilita all’inizio del secolo scorso…

Börteçine,il lupo grigio che guidò i Turchi verso l’Anatolia, oggi si trova ad un bivio. Non si tratta di scegliere tra l’Europa e l’Asia, ma tra l’Occidente e l’Eurasia.

Claudio Mutti, direttore di “Eurasia”.

1. Erodoto, IV, 45.

2. Dante, Par. VI, 5.

3. R. Biasutti, Le razze e i popoli della terra, Utet, Torino 1967, vol. II, p. 526.

4. S. Salvi, La mezzaluna con la stella rossa, Marietti, Genova 1993, p. 60.

5. R. Grousset, L’empire des steppes, Payot, Paris 1939, p. 28.

6. N. Iorga, cit. in I. Buga, Calea Regelui, Bucarest 1998, p. 138.

7. A. Toynbee, A Study of History, London – New York – Toronto 1948, vol. XII, p. 158).

8. A. Bombaci, La letteratura turca, Sansoni-Accademia, Firenze-Milano 1969, p. 17.

9. Ármin Vámbéry (pseud. di Hermann Bamberger) nacque il 19 marzo 1832 da una famiglia ebraica che si era stabilita a Szentgyörgy, nei pressi dell’attuale Bratislava. Dopo avere studiato il turco, nel 1857 andò a Istanbul, dove rimase fino al 1861. Partito per l’Asia centrale, si spacciò per derviscio ed arrivò a Khiva, Bukhara e Samarcanda. Rientrato a Pest, si recò successivamente a Londra, dove, per i servigi resi alla Gran Bretagna, fu nominato membro onorario della Royal Geographical Society e ricevuto dalla corte reale inglese. Nel 2005 gli Archivi nazionali di Kiev hanno rivelato che Vámbéry lavorò per il British Foreign Office come agente e spia nel “grande gioco” in Asia centrale. Nel 1900-1901 si adoprò per procurare a Theodor Herzl un’udienza presso il Sultano Abdülhamid II. Morì il 15 settembre 1913.

10. S. P. Huntington, Lo scontro delle civiltà e il nuovo ordine mondiale, Garzanti, Milano 2001, p. 211.

11. S. P. Huntington, op. cit., p. 234.

12. S. P. Huntington, op. cit., ibidem.

13. S. P. Huntington, op. cit., p. 210.

14. A. Davutoglu, Strategik derinlik [Profondità strategica], Kure yayinlari, Istanbul 2008.

15. T. Josseran, La nouvelle puissance turque. L’adieu à Mustapha Kemal, Ellipses, Paris 2010, pp. 42-43.

samedi, 24 août 2013

Il lupo grigio al bivio

Il lupo grigio al bivio

 Il lupo grigio al bivio

SOMMARIO

Editoriale 

C. Mutti, Il lupo grigio al bivio

Geofilosofia

Aristotele, Popolazione e territorio della polis ideale

Dossario – Il lupo grigio al bivio

Aldo Braccio, La Repubblica turca a dieci anni dal centenario

Tancrède Josseran, È duro essere turchi

Davide Ragnolini, Il pensiero geopolitico del Giano turco

Mahdi Darius Nazemroaya, Neoottomanismo e teoria del sistema mondiale

Francesca Manenti, Turchia e Stati Uniti: evoluzione di un’alleanza

Alessandro Lattanzio, Le Forze Armate turche

Federico Donelli, La strategia energetica turca guarda verso il Kurdistan

Giuseppe Cappelluti, La Turchia e il Kazakhstan

Augusto Sinagra, La Repubblica Turca di Cipro del Nord

Lorenzo Salimbeni, Il grande malato

Emanuela Locci Atatürk, e la massoneria

Continenti

Carlo Fanti, Air Sea Battle

Ye Feng, L’esercito cinese: una forza di pace

Andrea Fais, Il ruolo della Bielorussia nel mondo multipolare

Giacomo Gabellini, L’offensiva di Tel Aviv

Documenti

La “Rivoluzione Democratica Nazionale” del Partito dei Lavoratori di Turchia

Jean Thiriart, Criminale nocività del piccolo nazionalismo: Sud Tirolo e Cipro

Interviste

La Turchia vista da Budapest. Intervista a Gábor Vona

Intervista all’ambasciatore tedesco in Italia

Recensioni

Nilüfer Göle, L’Islam e l’Europa. Interpenetrazioni (C. Mutti)

Carlo Frappi, Azerbaigian. Crocevia del Caucaso (C. Mutti)

Giovanni Bensi, Le religioni dell’Azerbaigian (C. Mutti)

Gamal Abd el-Nasser, La filosofia della rivoluzione (D. Ragnolini)

Imam ‘Alî ibn Abî Tâlib, Lettera a Mâlik al-Ashtar. Il governo dal punto di vista islamico (E. Galoppini)

Marco Di Branco, Storie arabe di Greci e di Romani. La Grecia e Roma nella storiografia arabo-islamica medievale (C. Mutti)

Fabio Vender, Kant, Schmitt e la guerra preventiva (D. Ragnolini)

  Ecco di seguito l’elenco degli articoli presenti in questo numero, con un breve riassunto per ciascuno di essi.

Turquie: coup dur contre l’armée

ergenekon_010_2008_oct_20.jpg

Bernhard TOMASCHITZ:

Turquie: coup dur contre l’armée

Le procès du réseau Ergenekon en Turquie sert à renforcer le processus de ré-islamisation voulu par Erdogan et à éviter un scénario à l’égyptienne

Au bout de cinq années, enfin, le procès contre la très hypothétique “société secrète” Ergenekon vient de prendre fin en Turquie. Plusieurs verdicts de culpabilité ont été prononcés. Le Tribunal de Silivri, près d’Istanbul, n’a acquitté que 21 prévenus sur les 275 accusés: tous les autres ont écopé de nombreuses années de prison, certains ont reçu la perpétuité. Parmi eux, beaucoup de militaires, dont l’ancien chef de l’état-major, Ilker Basbug. On reproche aux condamnés d’avoir fomenté un putsch: parmi eux, il n’y a pas que des militaires, il y a aussi des hommes de science, des hommes politiques et des journalistes.

Des militaires et quelques civils auraient amorcé un complot en 2003, sous le nom de code “Marteau préventif”. Selon les plans prévus, les comploteurs auraient voulu faire sauter une grande mosquée un vendredi, jour de prière, et provoquer le voisin grec de façon à ce qu’un appareil turc aurait été abattu. Les conséquences de ces deux actions auraient été telles, prévoyait le plan, qu’une agitation générale aurait secoué le pays, si bien que l’armée aurait pu, en toute bonne conscience, intervenir et se poser en “force salvatrice du pays”.

Mais, en fait, on ne sait pas très bien si la société secrète Ergenekon, baptisée du nom du foyer territorial initial des peuples turcs en Asie centrale, existe vraiment... Le procès est dès lors contestable, lui aussi, et le tribunal d’appel d’Ankara statuera une dernière fois sur les jugements prononcés. Bon nombre d’observateurs critiquent les preuves avancées et les contradictions flagrantes énoncées au cours de la procédure. On reproche surtout au premier ministre islamiste Recep Tayyip Erdogan de manipuler la procédure pour en finir avec ses vieux ennemis politiques. “Cette procédure n’a d’autres motivations que politiques”, a déclaré l’un des accusés, Mustafa Balbay, dans la salle du tribunal. Quant au député de l’opposition Umut Oran, il a déclaré: “C’est un procès mis en scène par Erdogan, c’est là son théâtre”. Pour l’organisation “Reporters sans frontières”, ce procès a démontré une fois de plus qu’une réforme générale de la justice est indispensable en Turquie.

Quoi qu’il en soit, il est certain qu’Erdogan, par ce procès, vient de porter un coup très dur à son principal adversaire politique, l’armée, qui se veut la gardienne de l’héritage laïque kémaliste. Débarrassé de l’armée, Erdogan peut poursuivre sa politique de ré-islamisation de la Turquie. C’est dans cette optique que l’on peut interpréter les procédures lancées contre de prétendus “ennemis de l’islam” ou de “blasphémateurs”. Le procureur d’Istanbul exige ainsi des peines avec sursis de neuf à dix-huit mois de prison pour les animateurs d’une plateforme populaire sur internet et pour 39 utilisateurs connus de ce portail parce que ces accusés auraient proféré des propos blasphématoires outrepassant les limites accordées à la liberté d’expression.

Outre le but de ré-islamiser la société turque, les jugements portées contre les soi-disant activistes de la société secrète Ergenekon ont encore un autre objectif: Erdogan veut éviter à tout prix un “scénario à l’égyptienne” où, vu les protestations incessantes —depuis la fin mai 2013 les manifestations anti-gouvernementales ne cessent plus—, l’armée pourrait prendre le prétexte d’intervenir pour démettre les élus du peuple de leurs fonctions. Erdogan a sévèremement critiqué le coup des militaires égyptiens et déploré le renversement du Président Mohammed Mursi, un Frère Musulman. Lorsque le ministre américain des affaires étrangères John Kerry a commenté brièvement l’élimination de Mursi en ces termes: “finalement, ce putsch a restauré la démocratie”, la réponse turque ne s’est pas fait attendre: le vice-premier ministre turc Bekir Bozdag a répondu sur Twitter: “L’armée a-t-elle un jour aussi rétabli la démocratie dans les Etats de l’UE ou aux Etats-Unis? Les coups d’Etat n’apportent pas la démocratie: ils ruinent et détruisent la voie vers la démocratie. Comme en Egypte”.

Il y a toutefois de bonnes raisons de penser que les Etats-Unis pourraient tenter de semer le désordre en Turquie; en effet, les relations entre Ankara, d’une part, et Washington et Tel Aviv, d’autre part, se sont considérablement détériorées depuis quelques années. L’une des raisons majeures de cette détérioration vient d’un concept mis en oeuvre par le ministre turc des affaires étrangères Ahmet Davutoglu, celui de la “profondeur stratégique” nécessaire à la Turquie. Ce concept structure désormais la ligne de conduite de la diplomatie turque. Pour pouvoir devenir une puissance régionale, dont l’aire d’influence correspondrait à celle de l’ancien Empire ottoman, la Turquie doit entretenir de bonnes et étroites relations avec tous les acteurs importants de la région. Parmi ces acteurs, il y a évidemment des Etats que Washington considère comme des “Etats-voyous” qu’il faut ramener à la raison en provoquant en leur sein des changements de régime. Ankara ne se soucie guère des classifications américaines.

Des cercles et caucus importants aux Etats-Unis ont pris position. Ainsi, Freedom House, organisation propagandiste américaine, reproche au gouvernement d’Erdogan de commettre de graves entorses aux principes des droits de l’homme. Le but de ces reproches n’est évidemment pas de promouvoir véritablement les droits de l’homme et du citoyen en Turquie; le but réel est de ramener au plus vite cet Etat-clef d’Asie Mineure, qui est un “pays de transit”, dans le giron de l’américanosphère. Dans une publication de “Freedom House”, on peut lire ce passage dépourvu de toute ambigüité: “En tant que pays stratégiquement très important, la Turquie doit impérativement se démocratiser et viser une intégration plus étroite encore à l’Europe; ce serait non seulement important pour le pays lui-même mais aussi pour l’ensemble de ses voisins voire au-delà”.

Tout en critiquant la politique étrangère du Président Obama qu’ils jugent trop molle, les cercles néo-conservateurs sont encore plus explicites. Michael Rubin, animateur de la boîte-à-penser “American Enterprise Institute”, écrivait en mai sur “la rupture prochaine dans les relations américano-turques” et dressait l’inventaire des péchés commis par Erdogan: “Au cours de cette dernière décennie, les conflits potentiels entre Washington et Ankara ne se sont pas apaisés (...) Jadis, la Turquie, les Etats-Unis et Israël coopéraient très étroitement; aujourd’hui, la rupture entre Ankara et Jérusalem constitue un souci permanent pour les Etats-Unis (...) Tandis que les affaires étrangères américaines soutiennent les autorités autonomes palestiniennes, la Turquie favorise, elle, le Hamas”.

En fin d’article, Rubin nous livre sa conclusion: “La Turquie constitue de plus en plus un obstacle à l’unité de vues au sein de l’OTAN: dans l’avenir, elle constituera une question ouverte dans l’alliance”. Enfin, tout nouveau président américain sera amené “à prendre des décisions graves à propos de la Turquie”.

Bernhard TOMASCHITZ.

(article paru dans “zur Zeit”, Vienne, n°33-34/2013; http://www.zurzeit.at ).

jeudi, 04 juillet 2013

Hoog lid Erdogans AKP dreigt Berlijn met 3,5 miljoen Turken in Duitsland

Hoog lid Erdogans AKP dreigt Berlijn met 3,5 miljoen Turken in Duitsland

Radicalisering Turken in Europa door islamistische Gulenbeweging - Erdogan moedigt gebruik van vlag Ottomaans Rijk aan


Erdogan moedigt het gebruik van de Ottomaanse vlag inmiddels openlijk aan.

Onopgemerkt -of opnieuw bewust genegeerd- door de Westerse media is een uiterst veelzeggend dreigement dat Melih Gökcek, de burgemeester van de Turkse hoofdstad Ankara en een vooraanstaand lid van premier Erdogans AK Partij, deze week aan het adres van de Duitse regering Merkel heeft gedaan vanwege de kritiek die Berlijn had op het keiharde neerslaan van de massademonstraties in Turkije. 'Duitsland zou voorzichtig moeten zijn. In Duitsland leven 3,5 miljoen Turken.' In april 2012 schreven we al dat de regering in Ankara van plan was om de in Europa woonachtige Turken te mobiliseren, om zo de belangen van Turkije en de islam te 'verdedigen'. Hiervoor werd in 2010 zelfs een speciaal ministerie opgericht.

Westerse 'inmenging'

De flamboyante burgemeester Gökcek was woedend om wat hij de 'Westerse inmenging' bij de massale demonstraties tegen de regering Erdogan noemde. Hij beschuldigde een BBC-journalist ervan een geheim 'agent' te zijn die tot acties tegen de regering zou hebben opgeroepen, en op Twitter voerde hij een ware veldslag tegen CNN. Tevens kondigde hij op TV aan een campagne tegen Duitsland op te zullen starten. Als voorbeeld van de 'inmenging' noemde hij de Duitse pianist Davides Martello, die op het Taksimplein in Istanbul een paar deuntjes had gespeeld 'om de bevolking op te hitsen'.

'Vijandige buitenlandse machten'

De regering Erdogan geeft inmiddels 'vijandige machten' in het buitenland de schuld van de demonstraties, die nog altijd doorgaan. Een paar weken geleden wees Erdogan al 'bankiers' in het buitenland als de plannenmakers achter de schermen aan. (3) Gökcek eist inmiddels een verbod op de seculiere oppositiepartij CHP, die volgens hem de aanstichter van de protesten is. Ook wil de AKP de regels voor Twitter verscherpen, om daarmee de negatieve berichtgeving over de regering in te dammen.

De Turkse kritiek op de regering Merkel had ook te maken met de aanvankelijke blokkade die Duitsland opwierp tegen een nieuwe onderhandelingsronde over de toetreding van Turkije tot de Europese Unie. Nadat hier alsnog overeenstemming over werd bereikt matigde de regering Erdogan zijn toon. Minister van Economie Zafer Caglayan zei dat het antwoord op Merkels voorlopige afwijzing van de Turkse toetreding 'hoffelijk' moest blijven.

Getuigen van dodelijk politiegeweld opgepakt

Tegelijkertijd komen er steeds meer berichten uit Turkije over toenemende intimidatie en geweld door de veiligheidstroepen. Zo zei de advocaat van de familie van de door politieagenten doodgeschoten demonstrant Ethem Sarsülük dat de politie twee getuigen van de dodelijke schietpartij heeft gearresteerd. Het lijkt er sterk op dat de regering demonstranten en getuigen wil bang maken. De agent die Sarsülük doodschoot werd daarentegen weer op vrije voeten gesteld.  (1)

Afgelopen avond en nacht kwam het in het zuidoosten van Turkije tot nieuwe ongeregeldheden. Bij een militaire politiepost in Lice/Diyarbakir werd vrijdag een 18 jarige demonstrant doodgeschoten. Volgens de BDP partij heeft de militaire politie gericht met scherp geschoten, waardoor in Istanbul opnieuw honderden mensen de straat opgingen om tegen het regeringsgeweld te protesteren. (2)

Speciaal ministerie om Turken in buitenland te mobiliseren

De waarschuwing van burgemeester Gökcek zal in Europa waarschijnlijk lacherig worden weggewuifd, maar kan maar beter heel serieus worden genomen. In 2010 richtte de regering Erdogan het ministerie voor Turken in het Buitenland op, dat speciaal is bedoeld om de in het buitenland woonachtige Turken, met name in Europa, te mobiliseren om samen een vuist te maken en de belangen van Turkije en de islam te 'verdedigen'.

Aan de buitenkant klinkt dat wellicht nog niet zo dreigend, ware het niet dat er in 2010 een speciale geheime bijeenkomst met 1500 in het buitenland woonachtige Turkse politici en zakenmensen werd georganiseerd om dit omvangrijke project op poten te zetten. Ook werden er vorig jaar twee grote conferenties georganiseerd om een strategie op te stellen hoe de invloed van de in Europa woonachtige Turken kan worden vergroot.

Islamistische Gulenbeweging bestuurt AK Partij

Bovendien is de Turkse vicepremier en theoloog Bekir Bozdag, die aan het hoofd van het bewuste ministerie staat, een aanhanger van de beruchte extremistische islamistische Gulenbeweging, die openlijk pleit voor het met leugens en misleiding ondermijnen van de Westerse samenleving en daarbij uiteindelijk geweld en terreur niet schuwt. De vrees bestaat dan ook dat Bozdag het omvangrijke internationale netwerk van de Gulenbeweging de ruggengraat van zijn 'mobilisatie'plannen heeft gemaakt, waardoor de in Europa wonende grote Turkse gemeenschap sterk zal radicaliseren.

In Turkije worden critici van de Gulenbeweging inmiddels als 'terreurverdachten' vastgezet. De oprichter van de beweging, Fethullah Gulen -door sommigen beschouwd als de gevaarlijkste islamist ter wereld-, vluchtte in 1998 naar de VS omdat de toenmalige seculiere Turkse regering hem wilde arresteren vanwege zijn plannen om van Turkije een radicaal islamistische staat te maken. Vanuit Amerika controleert Gulen de heersende islamitische AKP partij van premier Tayyip Erdogan, die net als president Abdullah Gul een heimelijke discipel van Gulen is.

Erdogan moedigt Ottomaanse vlag aan

Gezamenlijk streven de AKP- en Gulenleden naar de wederoprichting van het Turks-Ottomaanse Rijk. 'Wij zullen weer heersen van Sarajevo tot Damascus,' voorspelde de Turkse minister van Buitenlandse Zaken Davutoglu eerder dit jaar aan zijn Amerikaanse collega John Kerry. Veelzeggend is dat Erdogan zijn aanhangers inmiddels aanmoedigt om de vlag van het Ottomaanse Rijk te gebruiken (4). In zijn toespraak vorige week in Erzurum, de grootste stad van Oost Turkije, zei hij:

'Hang de Turkse vlaggen aan uw huizen op... Maar liever nog zou ik willen dat u daarnaast aan uw balkon de Ottomaanse vlag ophangt, die drie halve manen heeft. Dat zullen we verwelkomen, want we zijn trots op de Ottomaanse vlag (4).' Historisch gezien is deze vlag het symbool van het islamistische theocratische systeem waar het Ottomaanse Rijk op gebaseerd was, wat anno 2013 door Erdogan en de AKP opnieuw wordt nagestreefd.

'We hebben genoeg van deze arrogante premier'

Een Turkse zakenman: 'We hebben genoeg van deze premier, zijn dagelijkse uitbranders, zijn bemoeienis met hoeveel kinderen we zouden moeten krijgen (drie per gezin), zijn verbod op zoenen in het openbaar, zijn verbanning van alcohol tussen 10 uur 's avonds en 6 uur 's ochtends (behalve in toeristengebieden) en zijn derde brug over de Bosporus (die wordt genoemd naar Sultan Selim de Meedogenloze, die in de 16e eeuw Egypte annexeerde en van de Ottomanen het machtigste islamitische rijk maakte)... Erdogans stijl is zo onvriendelijk en arrogant geweest, dat de mensen nu zeggen dat het genoeg is geweest en de straat op gaan.' (5)

Xander

(1) Tagesspiegel
(2) Deutsche Wirtschafts Nachrichten
(3) Ynet News
(4) Hurriyet (via Walid Shoebat)
(5) Huffington Post

Zie ook o.a.:

10-06: Erdogans megamoskee in VS wordt Ottomaanse 'ambassade'
05-06: Gatestone Instituut: VS helpt herstel Turks-Ottomaans Rijk
23-03: Turkse minister BuZa: Wij zullen weer heersen van Sarajevo tot Damascus
21-03: Jordaanse koning waarschuwt het Westen voor Turkse premier Erdogan
12-03: Duitse geheime dienst: Turkije werkt al jaren aan kernwapens
01-03: Turkse premier Erdogan: Israël en kritiek op islam zijn misdaden tegen mensheid
02-02: Turkse minister BuZa roept Syrië op Israël aan te vallen

2012:
04-07: Turkse rechter: ' ... Erdogan en president Gül jagen het Ottomaanse Rijk na'
18-06: Turkije wil terugkeer machtigste en gevaarlijkste islamist ter wereld
18-04: Turkse regering gaat miljoenen Turken in Europa mobiliseren (/ Turkse vicepremier gaat extreem islamistische Gülen beweging inzetten)

2011:
12-07: Turkije wil leger verdubbelen naar 1 miljoen man (/ Erdogan impliceert nieuw Ottomaans Rijk inclusief Sarajevo en Jeruzalem)
09-06: Turkse opperrechter: Erdogan is tiran en wil sultan van het Midden Oosten worden

2010:
09-12: WikiLeaks (8): Turkije wil Europa islamiseren via lidmaatschap EU (/ 'Wraak op Europa vanwege nederlaag bij Wenen')
08-04: Gevaarlijkste islamist ter wereld is een Turk en leeft veilig in Amerika

jeudi, 27 juin 2013

Énigme turque et ours russe

bosphore-peinture-L-4uNxJe.png

Énigme turque et ours russe

Ex: http:://www.dedefensa.org/

Le site DEBKAFiles annonce que la Turquie a décidé de fermer ses frontières aux rebelles syriens, et plus précisément au passage d’armes US et otaniennes vers la Syrie. On connaît DEBKAFiles, dont les informations sont diffusées à partir de milieux proches des services de sécurité israéliens et sont nécessairement de véracité variable. Pourtant, il est un domaine où DEBKAFiles s’est montré ces derniers temps particulièrement attentif, qui est celui du comportement de la Russie, et du poids grandissant de la Russie sur la crise syrienne et tout ce qui va autour. Il semble d’ailleurs que cette orientation corresponde à une attention grandissante d’Israël vis-à-vis de la Russie, considérant ce pays désormais comme un acteur majeur de la région avec lequel il faudrait éventuellement envisager (dans le chef d’Israël) certains arrangements, à mesure que les USA sont moins actifs et dominateurs qu’auparavant et le sont de moins en moins. Par conséquent, les nouvelles que donne DEBKAFiles concernant la Russie sont particulièrement soignées et, souvent, reflètent certaines vérités de la situation. Or, la nouvelle rapportée ici concernant la Turquie est directement liée à la Russie, et à la crainte d’Erdogan concernant les réactions de la Russie si la Turquie continue à aider les rebelles syriens. Tout cela correspondrait assez justement au rôle grandissant de la Russie.

Le texte dont nous faisons ci-dessous des citations est donc de DEBKAFiles, du 22 juin 2013.

«The US decision to upgrade Syrian rebel weaponry has run into a major setback: DEBKAfile reveals that Turkish Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan phoned President Barack Obama in Berlin Wednesday, June 19, to report his sudden decision to shut down the Turkish corridor for the transfer of US and NATO arms to the Syrian rebels. [...]

»Erdogan’s decision will leave the Syrian rebels fighting in Aleppo virtually high and dry. The fall of Qusayr cut off their supplies of arms from Lebanon. Deliveries through Jordan reach only as far as southern Syria and are almost impossible to move to the north where the rebels and the Hizballah-backed Syrian army are locked in a decisive battle for Aleppo.

»The Turkish prime minister told Obama he is afraid of Russian retribution if he continues to let US and NATO weapons through to the Syrian rebels. Since the G8 Summit in Northern Ireland last week, Moscow has issued almost daily condemnations of the West for arming “terrorists.”

»Rebel spokesmen in Aleppo claimed Friday that they now had weapons which they believe “will change the course of the battle on the ground.” DEBKAfile’s military sources are strongly skeptical of their ability – even after the new deliveries — to stand up to the onslaught on their positions in the embattled town by the combined strength of the Syrian army, Hizballah troops and armed Iraqi Shiites. The prevailing intelligence assessment is that they will be crushed in Aleppo as they were in Al Qusayr. That battle was lost after 16 days of ferocious combat; Aleppo is expected to fall after 40-60 days of great bloodshed.

»The arms the rebels received from US, NATO and European sources were purchased on international markets – not only because they were relatively cheap but because they were mostly of Russian manufacture. The rebels are thus equipped with Russian weapons for fighting the Russian arms used by the Syria army. This made Moscow angrier than ever.»

Par ailleurs, le même DEBKAFiles annonce des renforts importants venant de Russie pour la Syrie, notamment un contingent de 600 “marines” russes, soldats d’infanterie de marine ou/et forces spéciales (Spetnatz). Ce déploiement est présenté comme une mesure consécutive au sommet du G-8, et à ce qui est présenté par DEBKAFiles comme “un échec” (le sommet) et l’occasion pour les Russes de se forger une conviction concernant les livraisons d’armes du bloc BAO vers les rebelles, non seulement projetées mais d’ores et déjà en cours. Ce point est évidemment à mettre en corrélation avec la nouvelle que le même DFEBKAFiles annonce ci-dessus concernant la décision turque de fermer sa frontière aux rebelles syriens. L’argument de la protection des 20.000 citoyens russes en Syrie est largement présenté comme impératif dans la décision russe d’envoyer ces forces en Syrie, avec l’annonce supplémentaire que des forces aériennes russes seraient déployées en Syrie si une no-fly zone était établie par le bloc BAO. (DEBKAFiles, le 21 juin 2013 .)

«Just one day after the G8 Summit ended in the failure of Western leaders to overcome Russian resistance to a resolution mandating President Bashar Assad’s ouster, Moscow announced Wednesday June 19, the dispatch to Syria of two warships carrying 600 Russian marines. They were coming, said the official statement, “to protect the Russian citizens there.” Russian Deputy Air Force Commander Maj.-Gen. Gradusov added that an air force umbrella would be provided the Russian expeditionary force if needed.

»DEBKAfile's military sources report that the pretext offered by Moscow for sending the force thinly disguised Russian President Vladimir Putin’s intent to flex Russian military muscle in response to the delivery of Western heavy arms to Syrian rebels – which DEBKAfile first revealed Tuesday, June 18.»

Si elle est confirmée, la nouvelle donnée par DEBKAFiles concernant la Turquie est évidemment du plus grand intérêt. Si l’on s’en tient aux seules circonstances décrites et toujours en leur accordant le crédit de la véracité, on dirait, en un terme hérité du temps de la Guerre froide, qu’une telle circonstance se nommerait “finlandisation”, en plus appliquée à un membre de l’OTAN dans le cas turc (ce que n’était pas la Finlande dans les années de Guerre froide). Il s’agit de la paralysie, ou plus simplement de l’absence volontaire d’actes de politique extérieure, et encore plus d’actes militaires contraires aux intérêts de l’URSS, qui caractérisait la politique générale de la Finlande en échange de l’indépendance que respectait cette même URSS.

Dans tous les cas, – véracité ou pas de la nouvelle, – il ne fait aucun doute qu’en cas d’aggravation de la tension en Syrie, avec renforcement russe direct, pour une raison ou l’autre, la Turquie sera soumise de facto à de très fortes pressions russes dans le sens qu’on devine. Cela conduirait effectivement à une situation tout à fait inédite, dans la mesure extrêmement importante pour ce cas où la Turquie est membre de l’OTAN. On rapprochera ce cas d’une autre occurrence évoquée le 4 juin 2013 (Russia Today) par Medvedev, lors de questions qui lui étaient adressées par des journalistes, durant le Euro-Atlantic Forum, en Ukraine, et qui concernent plutôt le flanc Nord des rapports Russie-OTAN. Les réponses de Medvedev sur l’attitude de la Russie concernant de nouveaux membres de l’OTAN pourraient être extrapolées pour d’actuels membres de l’OTAN, notamment la Pologne, particulièrement concernée puisqu’elle déploie des missiles antimissiles US contre lesquels sont déployés des SS-26 Iskander russes dans l’enclave de Kaliningrad. Là aussi, la démarche russe telle qu’elle se dessine, également contre des membres de l’OTAN (la Pologne pouvant bien être la Turquie du Nord à cet égard), prend de plus en plus l’aspect d’une riposte offensive aux pressions exercées contre la Russie depuis vingt ans par l’OTAN, les USA et les divers États-clients (anciens d'Europe de l'Est complètement “rachetés” par les réseaux et l'argent US) et autres ONG téléguidés par les USA (type “révolutions de couleur“ et “agression douce“).

«When a reporter asked Dmitry Medvedev how the balance of forces in Europe will change if Sweden and Finland decide to enter NATO, the Russian Prime Minister answered that his country would have to react to such developments. “This is their own business; they are making decisions in accordance with the national sovereignty doctrine. But we have to consider the fact that for us the NATO bloc is not simply some estranged organisation, but a structure with military potential,” the head of the Russian government said adding that under certain unfavorable scenarios this potential could be used against Russia. “All new members of the North Atlantic alliance that appear in proximity of our state eventually do change the parity of the military force. And we have to react to this,” the top official noted.»

D’autre part, et considérant d’un autre point de vue la nouvelle initiale concernant la Turquie, on admettra qu’un (nouveau) changement d’orientation sinon d’“alliance” de facto de la part d’Erdogan, prenant ses distances du bloc BAO pour s’extraire du guêpier syrien et se replacer dans un axe Moscou-Ankara-Téhéran, pourrait être de bonne politique intérieure pour lui. Cela permettrait de remobiliser puissamment les forces qui l’ont soutenu fermement jusqu’à ce qu’elles perdent un peu de leur allant avec sa politique syrienne anti-Assad, détestée par de nombreux milieux turcs, y compris dans son propre parti, y compris chez les contestataires qui occupent actuellement les rues. Il s’agirait, comme nous l’avons envisagé, d’une voie vers une “relégitimisation” d’Erdogan (voir le 10 juin 2013), qui pourrait contribuer notablement à réduire les dimensions et le dynamisme de la contestation publique.

mercredi, 26 juin 2013

Disturbances Continue, Schism in Society Intensifies

turkey-police-main.jpg

Disturbances Continue, Schism in Society Intensifies

Dmitriy SEDOV

 

Ex: http://www.strategic-culture.org/

The events on Istanbul's Taksim Square are presented in the world media as the consequences of an «ecologically incorrect» decision by the government to clear a landscaped area in a park located on the square. This is far from the truth and raises questions about the real interests of the West in the spreading conflict.

In fact, the landscaped area plays but a minor role in the civil clash. This is really about Recep Erdoğan's intention to demolish the Mustafa Kemal Atatürk Cultural Center, which is located there, and also to remove the monument to the founder of the secular Turkish Republic. In place of the Cultural Center Erdoğan has decided to build a mosque, even though there is already a mosque on the square, Taksim Mescid Camii.

It is this intention which has united the secular part of society in protesting against the prime minister. A wide variety of community groups, including those which were previously irreconcilable, have united in opposition to Erdoğan's policy of actively destroying Atatürk's political legacy.

Of course, the consistent Islamization of the country over the past 10 years was causing an undercurrent of discontent among many societal forces before this. The potential for protest was gradually building.

So when society learned of Erdoğan's attempt to demolish the Atatürk Center, a symbol of the secular order, there was an explosion.

The cult of the Republic's founder is unshakable among the Turkish people. There are few political figures in the world who enjoy such unconditional respect as that which surrounds the figure of the founder of the modern Turkish state.

Only a politician who imagines himself to be Atatürk's equal could publicly encroach on his authority.

It seems that Recep Erdoğan imagines himself to be some kind of «Anti-Atatürk». He is planning a historical accomplishment on the same scale, but the other way around; he wants to turn Turkey from a modern secular state to an Islamist regime.

To this end it is necessary to remove symbols connected with Mustafa Atatürk, and that is why Erdoğan is so stubbornly and ferociously holding on to the idea of demolishing the center and the monument. For him it will be an ideological victory at a crucial moment in history. But the protesters also see the fight for the monument as a fight for the path Turkey will take.

Erdoğan has already done a lot to eradicate Atatürk's legacy.

At one time, Mustafa Kemal, with the support of the army, purged Turkey of any attributes of a «Muslim state» and turned the core of the former feudal Ottoman Empire into a Europeanized secular country. According to Atatürk's precepts, the army was the buttress of the secular authorities and their protector against Islamization.

Erdoğan has devoted all 10 years of his administration to depriving the army of its cementing role in society, replacing the officer corps with imams. In recent years there has been a growing «epidemic» of dismissals, criminal cases and scandals in connection with Turkish officers and generals, who have been accused of attempting coups d’état, corruption and much more.

Erdoğan himself has been speaking of the «inevitable Islamization» of the country since 2007. He has also been supporting Islamists abroad, especially in neighboring countries. Chechen, Ingush and Dagestani rebels to this day often receive supplies from Ankara. In the Chechen Wars there were «Turkish amirs» («amir bilal»). Among the rebels liquidated by federal forces there were as many Turks as there were Saudis.

In his own country Erdoğan has been conducting a policy of neo-Ottomanism, which is a mixture of national socialism and Sunnism.

Erdoğan has achieved recognition both among the lower social classes of Turkey and in Europe. Among European countries, the most active supporters of Turkey's current policy are Spain and Germany, the latter of which has very close ties with Turkey. Overall, Erdoğan is a favorite of the European socialists who are in power. To them he is the personification of their idealistic notion of «rational Islam».

Erdoğan began storming Kemalism on the crest of his influence within the country and abroad. Turkey was developing economically at an enviable rate and was strengthening its positions in the region. The war in Syria was a long-awaited chance for Erdoğan to show himself even more boldly. The irony of the situation is that he heatedly accused al-Asad of «undemocratic» methods of dealing with the opposition.

Now the mass dispersals and arrests of demonstrators in Turkish cities are showing what a «true democrat» he is himself.

The coverage of the events in Turkey in the Western media is worth examining separately. It is difficult to shake the feeling that these media have no interest in the truth about what is happening. They do not know how to present information on Erdoğan's Islamist «irresistible force» meeting the «immovable object» of the Kemalist opposition.

It doesn't fit in with the concept of the civilized Islamization which was supposed to make Recep Erdoğan the authorized representative of Western interests in the region. A month ago Europe was providing all possible support to Turkish Islamization, and the Western media were acting accordingly. And suddenly an openly anti-Islamist movement, behind which stand the army and broad social strata (and possibly some groups of the Turkish elite) has appeared in the country.

Nationwide solidarity, declaration of will through peaceful means and consolidation via Facebook and Twitter are taking place according to all the canons of neoliberalism. But it's directed against the interests of the West. A «color revolution in reverse» is in the making, and the results for the European capitals could be unpredictable. After all, forces which advocate a foreign policy governed by the precepts of the «Father of the Turks» could end up in power; such precepts include «No problems with neighbors,» which first and foremost means Syria. This would be a big surprise for NATO strategists.

For that reason many things are being kept quiet in the Western media, and the few stories that appear try very hard to pass over the anti-Islamist rhetoric of the protesters, but they are not very successful at it. Not a word is mentioned about Atatürk.

In the meantime, the conflict is spreading.

On Sunday 300,000 supporters of Recep Erdoğan, organized by the government, came out on the streets. It was meant to be a demonstration of the forces which support the prime minister. And such forces undoubtedly exist. However, in order to turn the situation around with their help, Erdoğan must de facto be equal in authority to Atatürk. But it seems that he has overestimated himself, because in response the protesters came out again and are fighting with the police. The prime minister summoned 1,000 special forces agents to Istanbul, and rather unexpectedly the powerful Turkish labor unions, which are threatened with extinction if Islamic norms are introduced, joined the conflict.

Reuters reports that one of Turkey's largest labor unions, the «Confederation of Unions of State Employees» (KESK), called for the organization of a general strike on Monday, June 17. The leadership of another Turkish labor union, the «Confederation of Revolutionary Labor Unions» (DISK), held an emergency meeting at which it decided to join this action.

Observers are following sentiments in the army attentively. Something unexpected could take place here as well.

It seems that the price Recep Erdoğan will have to pay for his attempt to banish Kemal Atatürk from Turkish history is becoming higher and higher. Soon rapidly developing events will show whether or not he will be able to pay it…

mardi, 25 juin 2013

Turkey doomed to collapse?

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Turkey doomed to collapse?

Araik STEPANYAN

Ex: http://english.pravda.ru/

Is this a chain reaction or mass epidemic? Either way, the fact remains - the political upheavals in the Muslim world that began in Tunisia swept across North Africa and Syria, and now a wave of instability has reached Turkey. A member of the Presidium of the Academy of Geopolitical Issues Araik Stepanyan analyzed this complex, ambiguous situation in the country.

"We will identify the external and internal factors that have caused, for the lack of a better word, social unrest in Turkey.

Internal factors have deep roots. The main reason is the collapse of the Ottoman Empire after the First World War and the Turkish Republic established by the "father of the Turks" Kemal Ataturk. He decided to raise the status of the ethnic Turks that was low in the Ottoman Empire, turning them into an overriding ethnic group and create a political nation - the Turks.

In 1926, a law was passed stating that all residents of Turkey were ethnic Turks, and different names - the Kurds, Armenians, Laz, Circassian, and so on - were insulting to the Turkish national identity and must not be used. Everybody was recorded as Turks. And, although many years have passed, the first problem in Turkey is a problem of national identity.

There is a huge mass of people, more than half of today's Turkish population, who do not consider themselves Turks. They see themselves as citizens of Turkey, but ethnically they do not identify themselves with the Turks, and do not want to. But because they live in the country where they have to be Turks to have a chance for a career, they are considered Turks. In 2000-2002, Western funds conducted a secret survey of the Turkish population and obtained evidence that only 37 percent of all Turkey residents saw themselves as ethnic Turks. The national issue has aggravated, and rallies and slogans are convincing evidence. 

The second internal factor that undermines today's Turkey is a debate about the type of the government - secular or theocratic. The elite of modern Turkey have serious disagreements about this. The heirs of the Ottoman Empire believe that the highest level of prosperity in Turkey was in the days of the Ottoman Empire, where all citizens were equal, except for Christians, and ethnicity was not emphasized. That means, people were Osman regardless of the ethnicity - the Turks, Circassian, or Kurds. 

The secular government afraid of Islamic influence is holding to the legacy of Kemal Ataturk. This is the army general staff who until recently served as the guarantor of the Constitution by the secular power. But Erdogan came to power and abolished that item of the Constitution. Incidentally, this is a revolutionary step, and can be compared with the constitution of the Soviet Union whose sixth article stated that the Communist Party was the governing body of the Soviet state. Once it was removed, the state has collapsed. Eliminating his "sixth paragraph," Erdogan dealt a crushing blow to the General Staff and the army. Naturally, the army is very unhappy and wants to overthrow Erdogan, although it is not directly involved in the rallies.

Third internal factor is the Kurdish issue. The Kurds are seeking autonomy in Eastern Anatolia (the largest region of Turkey), their number is approximately 20 million. Despite the talks started by Erdogan (negotiations with Barzani, president of the Kurdish autonomy in northern Iraq, and Ocalan, the PKK leader) armed clashes between Kurdish rebels and the official Turkish army continue, with daily casualties on both sides. Thus, this is the third most important factor.

The fourth factor is the Armenian issue. Armenians living in the south-eastern and eastern Anatolia, the original Armenian territories of Western Armenia, have, so to speak, their hidden aspirations. They are hidden because they have bitter experience of being eliminated and thrown out. The Turkish elite, the intelligentsia, too, in turn, realizes that it is impossible not to recognize the Armenian Genocide. About three thousand Turkish intellectuals on Turkish websites apologized to the Armenians for the Genocide and eviction. Then there was football diplomacy with signing the agreement on opening the border between Turkey and Armenia. The Armenians are now fighting with diplomatic methods.  

Turkish demographic policy denies all other nationalities. Turkey strongly advocates that 82 percent of the population is Turks. But for obvious reasons this is not the case. There is a vast array of Greek Muslims who do not even speak the Turkish language and as many Bulgarian Muslims.

There are Armenians who speak Kurdish, Armenians who speak Turkish and Armenians who speak the Armenian dialect. But the state considers them all Turks. This is not the case, but a reason to oppose the government in one form or another.

The fifth factor is internal - it's Alawites, a religious movement with millions of people who adhere to the same religious beliefs as Bashar al-Assad, the Syrian Alawi. When I see banners proclaiming "Erdogan, you are a thief!" I understand that these are Alawites. In the course of combat activities in Syria, Aleppo in particular, gunmen took out everything - from machines to museum exhibits, and exported them to Turkey, with the connivance of the authorities, and sold or appropriated them.

But Gezi Park or Taksim Square where rallies are held now is a special topic that overlaps, incidentally, with the Armenian issue.

First, in 1500 sultan Suleiman presented this territory to his Armenian assistant who uncovered a conspiracy. In 1560, an Armenian cemetery was laid there. The cemetery existed until late 19th century and was eliminated after a well-known cholera epidemic, but the ownership was left to the Armenian community. After the genocide in 1915, when the Armenians were expelled, the owner clearly changed. Barracks were built there, then a park. When the authorities planned to build a shopping center, the community exploded. All ethnic minorities, anti-globalization activists, gays, lesbians, football fans, the "green" joined against the destruction of the park. Clearly, everyone had different views and goals, but the only reason was rejection of the current government that none of these social groups liked. Yes, individually they are in the minority, but this is the case where the sum of minorities produces the majority, incidentally, in contrast to Russia.

There is also an external factor. The U.S. lost interest in Turkey after the collapse of the Soviet Union. The Turks tried to start building a new Turkic empire, the so-called Great Turan based on pan-Turkism, but the Turkic-speaking states, newly formed in the Soviet Union, gave the initiative a cold shoulder despite the extent of the economic expansion of Turkey in these regions is impressive.

The U.S. does not really support these imperial ideas. Especially when Turkey did not provide its territory for ground operations during the recent war in Iraq, did not let the American ships into the Black Sea during the Russian-Georgian conflict in 2008, incidentally, rightly so, in accordance with the international status of the Black Sea and the Bosporus and the Dardanelles.

The White House is beginning to move away from its ally. Moreover, according to the plan of a military expert Ralph Peters of the National Military Academy of the United States, in accordance with the concept of the Greater Middle East, Turkey is disintegrated. A large Kurdistan is created, and Mount Ararat goes to Armenia. Most important task, of course, is to take control of the Bosporus and the Dardanelles, close access for Russia to the Mediterranean Sea, and so on. The U.S. has a clear plan and is implementing it. The European Union, of course, agrees with this plan.

America will not save Erdogan despite the fact that he supported the Muslim extremists against Assad. Only Assad is winning, and Turkey has lost its authority with the nearby neighbors. It is likely to face open hostility, because no one has forgotten the Ottoman Empire or the imperial motives of the Turkish foreign policy. Turkish leaders have painted themselves into a geopolitical trap. There are still chances of getting out of it, but, judging by Erdogan's recent statements, they are becoming slimmer every day.

All of these factors combined lead Turkey to a collapse. It will not happen overnight, but the trend is moving in this direction. All mass movements just show the causes, both external and internal. Therefore, even if the military who wants to overthrow Erdogan comes to power, and the constitution and the role of the General Staff is restored, it will be impossible to stop the process of globalization and crush the rebellion of ethnic groups.

Araik Stepanyan

Pravda.Ru

Read the original in Russian

 

Дмитрий Судаков

lundi, 24 juin 2013

Turquie: détricoter le kémalisme

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“M.”/” ’t Pallieterke”:

Turquie: détricoter le kémalisme

Le mécontentement qui agite la Turquie à l’heure actuelle a des racines profondes mais fort hétérogènes. Un large éventail de motivations anime les contestataires mais l’Occident ne braque les projecteurs de ses médias que sur la relation difficile qui a toujours existé entre l’Etat et la religion dans la République turque. On peut le comprendre. Les émeutes nocturnes ne sont que le sommet de l’iceberg: voilà ce qui importe de constater. Le pays connait depuis des années des glissements considérables. Ils ont toujours été minimisés ou ignorés.

Si le Proche et le Moyen Orient nous ont appris quelque chose au cours des dernières années écoulées, c’est bien que le terme “révolution” doit être pris, désormais, avec des pincettes. On ne peut plus l’utiliser à tort et à travers. Le syndrôme “Vivaldi”, qui consiste à placarder le rythme des saisons sur la vie politique des peuples arabo-musulmans, est, lui aussi, une aberration qu’il faudra bien vite jeter à la poubelle de l’histoire. Donc, disons-le une fois pour toutes, il n’est pas question d’évoquer ici un “printemps turc” tout comme il n’y a plus lieu de répéter à satiété la formule “printemps arabe”. La Turquie, d’abord, est un pays bien différent de l’Egypte ou de la Tunisie d’il y a deux ans. Le premier ministre turc Erdogan, dans certains cas, agit de manière aussi tyrannique que le faisaient Mubarak en Egypte ou Ben Ali en Tunisie mais, force est aussi de constater, qu’il a gagné les élections trois fois de suite. Les adversaires de son régime font face à un gouvernement bien ancré, qui a engrangé quelques beaux succès économiques. Ce n’est là qu’un premier aspect de la situation actuelle de la Turquie qui nous intéresse ici.

Dans les médias en général, on a tendance à utiliser des anecdotes hautes en couleurs pour simplifier les choses qui, en réalité, ne sont pas simples du tout. Exemple: quelques habitants d’un quartier d’Ankara sortent le soir de chez eux en frappant des couvercles de casseroles avec des cuillers en scandant des slogans pro-kémalistes comme “Nous sommes les soldats de Mustafa Kemal”, vociférés par des jeunes gens qui passent à toute vitesse en voiture. Quand les médias extrapolent et mettent ce type d’incident en exergue, cela devient la narration médiatique d’une “résistance séculière contre la ré-islamisation” envisagée par Erdogan. On a commis la même erreur en Egypte. Quelques manifestants sur la Place Tahir militaient effectivement pour une démocratisation du pays mais, en bout de course, la plupart des manifestants qui se sont joints à eux avaient de toutes autres idées derrière la tête, tout en voulant, eux aussi, chasser Moubarak du pouvoir. Sur la Place Taksim, c’est le même topo. L’Occident évoque certes un ressentiment chez les forces séculières et laïques mais, simultanément, tente de relativiser ce mécontentement . A tort, nous semble-t-il, car il y a vraiment, en Turquie, aujourd’hui, un ressentiement kémaliste.

Tansu Çiller

C’est un fait incoutournable: au cours de ces dernières années, le gouvernement AKP a provoqué des transformations profondes au sein de la tradition séculière du pays. Ainsi, de manière systématique, le gouvernement verse plus de fonds aux écoles religieuses au détriment des établissements d’enseignement qui entendent promouvoir un regard séculier sur la société. Pour des raisons financières, les écoles se transforment, par la force des choses, en institutions religieuses. Rien qu’à Istanbul, 98 écoles primaires ont déjà franchi le pas. Conséquence logique de cette politique de subsides: suivre les cours dans une école séculière devient plus cher et n’est plus accessible qu’aux seules classes aisées. Les familles normales sont obligées désormais de faire suivre un itinéraire religieux à leurs enfants.

Le climat est bien différent aujourd’hui qu’hier, disent tous ceux qui sont à même de comparer. Apparemment, il faut du culot et du courage désormais pour manger en public pendant la période du Ramadan. Il y a deux ans, deux amoureux se sont embrassés dans le bus (public!): une émeute a failli se déclencher... La colère du chauffeur (“Mon bus n’est pas un bordel!”) a été suivie d’une action de protestation en faveur des deux tourtereaux, suivie d’une deuxième action de protestation, religieuse celle-là, et hostile, comme il se doit, à ces deux “dangereux pervers”. Au cours des années écoulées, la violence à l’endroit des femmes aurait augmenté de 1400%. Mais lorsqu’on a appris qu’un homme de 78 ans avait des relations sexuelles avec une jeune fille de 14 ans, aucun acteur en vue de la sphère religieuse n’a émis de protestation. Ensuite, que faut-il penser d’un premier ministre qui appelle les femmes à rester chez elles et à faire beaucoup d’enfants? Rappelons qu’Erdogan est l’homme politique qui a un jour déclaré que la démocratie, c’était un autobus: “Dès qu’on arrive à destination, on en sort!”. Dans son cas, et vu les incidents de ces dernières semaines, cette réflexion est exacte. Récemment, une loi réglementant de manière drastique la vente d’alcool a suscité du mécontentement. Elle a été concoctée par les députés de l’AKP, soi-disant pour éviter les abus, alors que la Turquie est le pays de l’OCDE qui présente la consommation d’alcool la plus basse... Ce ne sont là que quelques exemples dans une longue série. Tout cela se déroule, rappellons-le aussi, dans un pays qui, il y a vingt ans seulement, avait une femme pour premier ministre: Tansu Çiller, ancienne étudiante de Yale.

Les forces armées

L’absence de toute influence religieuse sur la vie socio-économique est un trait caractéristique de tout Etat séculier. En Turquie, aujourd’hui, il faut bien constater que de nombreuses initiatives gouvernementales visent à ruiner le caractère séculier de l’Etat. Le changement de donne s’observe surtout au sein des forces armées et est sans doute l’indice le plus patent de ce glissement. On a certes appris que des soldats ont distribué des masques à gaz aux manifestants hostiles à Erdogan et ont évacué les blessés vers des hôpitaux militaires. Mais, mis à part de tels cas, on s’est également aperçu que l’emprise religieuse est désormais plus forte dans l’armée, certainement dans le corps des sous-officiers. N’oublions pas qu’un général turc sur dix est actuellement en prison, pour participation présumée à la préparation d’un quelconque coup d’Etat. Dans le passé, on disait que la Turquie était un simple decorum d’Etat autour d’une armée, noyau réel de la République. Cette armée était la gardienne de la tradition séculière voulue jadis par Atatürk. Aujourd’hui, cette armée est soumise à deux pressions: sa composition est plus marquée par la religion et par ailleurs elle perd tout soutien politique. Les pouvoirs politiques réduisent les moyens mis à disposition de l’armée. Plusieurs analystes constatent en effet que le nombre d’accident d’avions militaires, ces derniers temps, sont l’effet de ces restrictions.

La République turque, née en 1923, a été un laboratoire fort intéressant. Dans quelle mesure les principes de démocratie et de sécularisme étaient-ils compatibles dans une société musulmane? Bien sûr, un certain équilibre a été atteint, pendant un assez long moment de l’histoire de la Turquie kémaliste, mais, aujourd’hui, force est de constater que ces équilibres n’existent quasi plus. Personne n’ose augurer ce que deviendra la Turquie le jour du centième anniversaire de la République. Ah oui... n’oublions pas que la Turquie, par dessus le marché, est candidate à l’adhésion pleine et entière à l’UE...

“M.” / “ ’t Pallieterke”, Anvers, 19 juin 2013.

mercredi, 12 juin 2013

Mai 68 en Turquie

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Mai 68 en Turquie :
Réelle malvie et nostalgie d’empire

«L’érudition n’est pas la science, de même que les matériaux ne sont pas l’édifice.»

 Proverbe turc

Des émeutes de plus en plus incontrôlables eurent lieu ces derniers jours en Turquie. Mis en cause un projet d’urbanisation et aussi la dureté de la répression par la police. La résistance face aux projets de construction dans le parc Gezi, dans le quartier Taksim à Istanbul, s’est transformée, ce week-end, en une remise en cause globale de la politique du gouvernement turc, et la révolte s’est propagée dans toute la Turquie.

Les médias occidentaux pensaient et pensent  que le dernier «domino» allait tomber. Ils ont présenté cette colère comme celle d’une Turquie ultralaïque qui en a marre de l’AKP et tout est fait pour forcer l’analogie avec les places Tahrir et partant avec les tyrans arabes. Pas un mot d’une analogie avec mai 1968 en Europe au sortir des trente glorieuses bâties sur la sueur des émigrés. Quand Daniel Cohn-Bendit et ses camarades avaient mis à mal le gouvernement de De Gaulle ce n’était pas pour du pain comme la plupart des révoltes dans les pays arabes, mais c’était pour secouer un ordre ancien en interdisant d’interdire…

Les journalistes voulaient ainsi, montrer que ce mouvement «spontané» touchait toutes les couches de la société, toutes sensibilités, jeunes ou vieux, mais en filigrane on sent l’attaque contre l’Islam, avec les allusions à l’alcool à la laïcité, au mode de vie à l’européenne Florilèges de quelques impressions le plus souvent sollicitées par les journalistes occidentaux qui avaient un cap: «Il y avait longtemps que le ´´peuple´´ n’avait pas réagi, malgré les restrictions sur l’alcool, l’annulation de certaines fêtes nationales par le gouvernement, l’impossibilité d’organiser le 1er-Mai… » (1)

 « A croire que tous les esprits s’étaient accordés: dans les rues d’Ankara, jeunes actifs, étudiants, pères et mères de famille, issus des classes moyenne et populaire marchaient ensemble pour soutenir Istanbul sans mauvaises intentions. A la base de toutes les manifestations qui se sont multipliées en Turquie pendant trois jours, il y a une colère irrésistible qui s’est développée pendant le gouvernement de l’AKP (le Parti pour la justice et le développement d’Erdogan). Les citoyens turcs sont confrontés à une attitude et une politique de renoncement par le gouvernement de plusieurs valeurs morales importantes pour les Turcs. Tout d’abord, des attitudes hostiles contre Atatürk et ses valeurs, comme la République, les fêtes nationales, la laïcité. (…) Les hommes dans ces manifestations ont essayé de souligner que nous n’avons pas seulement des valeurs religieuses, mais aussi celles nationales, sociologiques et plus profondément des valeurs réelles. Nous ne voulons pas une Istanbul qui devient un bazar de bâtiments et de shopping centers’. Nous ne voulons pas vivre dans une ville où les arbres sont coupés au nom d’une régularisation de l’environnement sans prendre l’avis des Stambouliotes.»(1)

Il y a cependant d’autres causes objectives. Il est vrai que l’on ne peut pas vivre uniquement pour survivre. Il est nécessaire que les corps exultent et toutes les conditions sont réunies pour que la mayonnaise prenne :

«Cette révolte peut être résumée par deux réalités: la jeunesse étudiante, se réclamant de Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, est dans la rue pour dénoncer la pratique trop longue du pouvoir de l’AKP. Mais il y a aussi la réalité alévie, niée par les médias: cette minorité religieuse en Turquie dénonce la politique fondée sur le sunnisme de M.Erdogan, qui se traduit par sa politique contre Bachar Al- Assad et le nom choisi au futur pont à Istanbul: Selim Ier ou Yavuz Sultan Selim, le sultan génocidaire des Alévis… La population veut simplement que le gouvernement respecte leur mode de vie, sans les insulter ni tenter d’islamiser la société. Beaucoup parlent de ´´démocratie à reculons´´, car les droits et les libertés sont de plus en plus limités. Depuis onze ans, nous sommes chaque jour un peu plus pris en étau par Erdogan, qui est le seul acteur dans toutes les lois et les sanctions grâce à son fort pouvoir au Parlement. (…) il insulte Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, notre grand héros et fondateur de la Turquie moderne et laïque, et ses sympathisants. (…) Nous sommes des socialistes, des républicains, des communistes, des libéralistes, des démocrates, des anarchistes. Nous sommes musulmans, athées, chrétiens, juifs. Nous sommes des gens qui nettoient les rues le lendemain de ´´la guerre´´.» (1)

Parti du parc Gezi à Istanbul, le mouvement de contestation en Turquie a surpris, autant par sa soudaineté que par son ampleur et son expansion à plus de quarante villes de province. ´´A Istanbul, comme à Ankara ou Izmir, cela était attendu depuis des mois. Les journaux étaient inondés de signaux alarmants à destination du pouvoir indiquant que les choses ne pouvaient continuer comme cela en matière de contrôle du corps et de l’espace public´´, analyse Hamit Bozarslan, historien à l’Ehess. (…)Parmi ces manifestants, nombreux sont sans affiliation politique mais ont une sensibilité de gauche libérale, écologiste, défendent les droits de l’homme, ´´Ces contre-pouvoirs se sont émoussés ces dernières années´´, indique Jean Marcou »

    « « La dérive autoritaire est très claire depuis 2008-2009. Il y a un culte de puissance. Individuel: Recip Tayyep Erdogan est devenu très puissant et dans son amour-propre, il n’arrive pas à comprendre pourquoi il est défié. National: de la Turquie qui se projette comme une superpuissance mondiale. Du parti: l’AKP est un super-parti avec 50% d’opinions favorables après onze ans au pouvoir. ´´On n’est pas dans un processus de soulèvement, de printemps turc’ comme on a pu le lire ici et là, car le pouvoir est politiquement et électoralement légitime´´, indique Jean Marcou. La société turque est devenue extrêmement conservatrice au cours des vingt dernières années. ´´Elle a été marquée, comme dans le reste du Moyen-Orient, par une crise identitaire violente allant dans le sens d’un conservatisme social face aux transformations socio-économiques considérables. Ce qui explique l’hégémonie de l’AKP´´, explique Hamit Bozarslan» (2).

Pour rappel, samedi 1er juin, tard dans l’après-midi, les forces de police se sont retirées de la place. Les bars de la rue de Pera sont envahis de jeunes gens exprimant leur frustration à grand renfort de bière. Les gens se pressent autour de moi pour me parler, l’air frondeur et déterminé. Ils demandent le départ du gouvernement d’Erdogan et sont résolus à rester sur la place Taksim tant qu’il le faudra. ´´Tous les Turcs ne sont pas pareils, me disent-ils. Il y a des Turcs, des Kurdes, des alévis et d’autres minorités, les gays, les hétéros et tout ça. Nous voulons que tout le monde soit respecté et accepté.» (3)

Pourquoi les manifestations contre un projet d’urbanisme à Istanbul se sont-elles transformées en protestations contre le pouvoir du Premier ministre? Parce que celui-ci s’est isolé dans un refus des critiques et semble avoir choisi la fuite en avant, estime un éditorialiste. Erdogan, qui s’est enfermé dans une tour d’ivoire où aucune critique ne peut plus l’atteindre, ne veut pas voir que les projets qu’il a décidés et qu’il estime utiles à la collectivité suscitent en réalité de sérieuses objections dans de nombreuses franges de la société. Il ne veut pas non plus entendre que cette société n’accepte plus que tous les mécanismes de décision ne se trouvent plus que dans les mains d’un seul homme. (…) Il n’a pas compris que ménager la minorité, même s’il dispose d’une majorité confortable, n’est pas le signe d’un manque de puissance mais bien une preuve de vertu, et que le pouvoir faire montre de souplesse quand il le faut n’est pas un signe de faiblesse mais bien d’une grande intelligence politique.

Par ailleurs à l’international après avoir, littéralement, contribué  à la « fitna » ( le chaos)  dans le Monde arabe, Erdogan se permet de par une ivresse du pouvoir, de donner des leçons çà et là dans le Monde arabe, Erdogan subit lui-même la colère de son peuple. « Erdogan commence à subir l’effet retour de sa politique d’ultralibéralisme défavorable aux pauvres et d’ingérence coûteuse dans les affaires syriennes. Le peuple turc ne veut pas de la politique d’Erdogan qui a coupé ses contacts commerciaux via la Syrie. Il veut la paix, le bon voisinage. Toutes les tendances ont des griefs: les laïcs, les Kurdes, les Alévites, les Arabes, les communistes en ont assez, mais aussi les partis islamistes d’opposition en ont assez de l’alliance entre la Turquie à l’Otan et à Israël. Tout cela sous couvert hypocrite d’islam ». (4).

La réalité du « modèle turc »

Pourtant, Erdogan c’est 52% des voix et 70% d’opinions favorables en Turquie, c’est l’homme qui a sorti le pays du tiers-monde et son gouvernement est considéré comme le plus populaire depuis l’avènement de la Turquie. Il y a une réalité: cet ancien empire est en train de revenir sur le devant de la scène. La Turquie de par son histoire, sa profondeur stratégique, son poids démographique, près de 80 millions, est en train de s’affirmer comme un pays émergent qui a toute sa place dans le Bric’s. Pour rappel, la Turquie d’Atatürk avait octroyé le vote aux femmes dès les années 30 bien avant la plupart des pays européens

«Contrairement à l’Union européenne, en plein marasme économique et politique, écrit José Ignacio Torreblanca, c’est un pays sûr de lui et en plein essor économique qui se rend aux urnes le 12 juin. Une puissance émergente érigée en modèle par les démocraties moyen-orientales naissantes et que l’UE n’a pas su garder dans son giron. Cela faisait des années qu’on se demandait si la Turquie était européenne ou asiatique, si elle était tournée vers l’Occident ou vers l’Orient, et on a enfin trouvé la réponse. En fait, la question était mal posée. La Turquie ne va ni vers l’est ni vers l’ouest, elle va vers le haut. En seulement une décennie, la Turquie a vu son PIB multiplié par quatre, passant de 200 à 800 milliards de dollars (550 milliards d’euros); elle a triplé son revenu par habitant, qui est passé de 3000 à 10.000 dollars; elle a réduit sa dette publique de 75% à 40% du PIB et ramené sa prime de risque très en dessous du niveau de la plupart des pays du sud de l’Europe. Entre-temps, l’Union européenne stagne, et beaucoup se demandent si elle n’a pas cessé de progresser, si son avenir n’est pas marqué par le déclin, si les Européens ne sont pas résignés à un recul de leur niveau de vie.(5)

« Poursuivant son plaidoyer, sur le feuilleton de l’adhésion à l’Europe depuis 1959, Ignacio Terreblanca écrit: «Alors même que l’Europe débattait sur l’adhésion de la Turquie, s’offrant le luxe de négliger ce pays, voire de le mépriser ouvertement, les Turcs ont battu en brèche tous les stéréotypes et ont volé de succès en succès. (…) Cette Turquie pauvre et analphabète qu’on nous a si souvent dépeinte, qu’on disait peuplée de paysans anatoliens ignorants, avides de prendre d’assaut la forteresse du bien-être européen, appartient au passé. Dans les rues de Rabat, de Tunis ou du Caire, l’Europe a cessé d’être le modèle à suivre au profit de la Turquie, un pays qui démontre qu’il peut être à la fois musulman, démocratique et prospère, et même avoir une politique extérieure indépendante, non soumise aux diktats de l’Occident. Apparue dans un espace méditerranéen sous le joug de dictatures serviles, la Turquie [du Premier ministre] Recep Tayyip Erdogan laisse présager un avenir où de nombreux régimes indépendants et fiers n’hésiteront plus à montrer du doigt l’Europe quand elle appliquera deux poids, deux mesures face à Israël, à l’ouverture des marchés, aux droits de l’homme, à la prolifération nucléaire ou à l’immigration».(5)

Il est vrai que nous sommes toujours à la promesse d’adhésion en 1999, les négociations durent depuis huit ans et des pays autrefois communistes sont maintenant adoubés, même la partie cypriote grecque fait partie de l’Union. Juste retour des choses, cette partie envie l’autre partie cypriote turque et il n’est pas sûr que les Turcs veulent bien encore d’une adhésion, à moins que cela l’Europe du déclin en fasse la demande.

L’ivresse du pouvoir et la nostalgie de l’empire perdu

Cependant tout n’est pas rose ; Au fil du temps Erdogan, devient de plus en plus mégalomane. Hassan Cemal ancien journaliste licencié nous parle de la folie des grandeurs et de la dérive progressive d’Erdogan lui qui a connu la torture. : « Erdogan, lui aussi, a connu la prison, et il y a même été torturé. (…)Dans le cadre du processus d’adhésion à l’Union européenne (UE), il a réalisé des avancées indéniables sur le plan du droit et de la démocratie. Il a ainsi mis un terme à la tutelle que l’armée exerçait sur la société et a fait en sorte que l’autorité militaire dépende désormais de l’autorité civile élue, c’est-à-dire du gouvernement, ce qui était juste. Sauf qu’il s’est ensuite substitué aux militaires qui freinaient le processus démocratique et s’est mis à son tour, considérant qu’il incarnait désormais l’Etat, à bloquer cette évolution démocratique.  Il est ainsi devenu avec le temps l’unique source du pouvoir, à tel point qu’il s’est mis à penser que “l’Etat, c’était lui”. Tout en recourant de plus en plus souvent à la force, il a, peut-être sans s’en rendre compte, été pris par une sorte d’ivresse du pouvoir. Une sorte d’orgueil d’enfant gâté qui ne veut plus lâcher le pouvoir, qui sait tout et qui ne tolère plus aucune critique » (6)

On l’aura compris l’ivresse du pouvoir la nostalgie d’empire a fait que progressivement il en soit amené à vouloir tout contrôler  et particulièrement le quatrième pouvoir des médias qui en vinrent à être tétanisés au point que la couverture de la révolte soit minimisée voire ignorée .Hassen Cema poursuit : «  (…) Il s’est aussi permis de réunir à Ankara les patrons de médias et des rédacteurs en chef pour leur expliquer quelles étaient les lignes rouges à ne pas franchir. C’est encore lui qui a le dernier mot lorsqu’il s’agit de savoir comment les journaux et les chaînes de télévision doivent être répartis entre ces différents patrons. Il décide alors à qui on va ôter un quotidien ou une chaîne et à qui on va les réattribuer. L’ombre d’Erdogan sur les médias s’est fait sentir dans la façon dont ont été couverts les événements du parc Gezi. Nous avons ainsi pu mesurer l’état pitoyable des médias dont la couverture de cette mobilisation a été scandaleuse.  (…) Le nombre de journalistes et d’éditorialistes qui ont perdu leur job à la suite des manœuvres en coulisse n’a cessé d’augmenter. (6)

Enfin parlant des disparités ethniques le journaliste pointe du doigt le peu d’effort d’Erdogan pour régler les problème  des minorités : « La sensibilité des alévis [chiites hétérodoxes anatoliens, minoritaires] pour lesquels aucune solution n’a été apportée durant les mandats d’Erdogan n’a absolument pas été prise en compte lors du choix du nom du troisième pont sur le Bosphore [Yavuz sultan Selim, c'est-à-dire Selim Ier, sultan ottoman connu pour avoir combattu violemment les chiites ; ce pont a été inauguré en présence d'Erdogan le 29 mai].  (…) Souhaitons que les personnes de bonne volonté qui sont dans son entourage puissent freiner ce penchant autoritaire et le ramener à la raison ».(6)

Erdogan à Alger malgré le chaos place Taksim

Laissant une situation de chaos, sûr de lui, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, se permet de s’absenter quatre jours de Turquie pour un périple en brochette au Maghreb. Il  est arrivé à Alger pour une visite d’une journée dans le cadre d’une tournée maghrébine qui l’a conduit, au Maroc et en Tunisie. A la tête d’une importante délégation comprenant plus de 200 acteurs et chefs d’entreprise.

Pour rappel, écrit Said Rabia décrivant l’ingérence turque dans le printemps arabe: «Aux côtés du Qatar, la Turquie a joué un rôle important dans la chute des régimes dictatoriaux. Dans le cas de la Libye, elle y a participé pleinement. Les Turcs voyaient d’un si bon oeil l’arrivée au pouvoir, au Maghreb et ailleurs dans le Monde arabe, des Frères musulmans prêts à ouvrir les portes aux frères de l’AKP plus qu’à n’importe quel autre. (..) En Algérie, la mayonnaise de l’AKP, bien qu’elle ait ses adeptes, n’a pas pris. C’est donc dans un contexte politique totalement différent de celui d’il y a deux ans que Recep Tayyip Erdogan arrive dans les pays du Maghreb. En Algérie, les Turcs sont depuis longtemps dans le secteur du bâtiment et viennent de mettre le paquet dans le textile avec plusieurs usines. Plus de 200 entreprises turques prendront part, aujourd’hui à Alger, à un forum pour explorer les opportunités de partenariat avec leurs homologues algériennes.» (6)

Le Premier ministre a prononcé, à cette occasion, un discours devant les élus de la nation. Au plan économique, cette visite permettra aux deux responsables de l’exécutif, de passer en revue l’ensemble des volets de la coopération bilatérale, notamment dans d’autres secteurs comme l’énergie, les transports, le commerce, la pêche, l’industrie, la construction des infrastructures économiques et sociales. Le Premier ministre turc, Recep Tayyib Erdogan, a émis mardi à Alger le voeu de supprimer les visas d’entrée entre l’Algérie et la Turquie. ´´Nous avons supprimé les visas d’entrée avec 70 pays, alors pourquoi pas avec l’Algérie´´, a-t-il indiqué La suppression des visas d’entrée entre l’Algérie et la Turquie va encourager les échanges entre les deux pays, notamment dans le domaine touristique.

On peut regretter cependant que l’aspect culture et archives historiques soit absent de ce deal. Les relations de plus de trois siècles ne peuvent et ne doivent pas se résumer à un dialogue de marchands C’est peut être là aussi, l’un des signes de mépris dans lequel  le « sultan » Erdogan croit pouvoir tenir les anciennes régences.

Aux dernières nouvelles, et malgré les excuses la tension ne faiblit pas. La porte-parole de la haute-commissaire des Nations unies aux droits de l’homme, Navy Pillay, a demandé à la Turquie de mener une enquête ´´rapide, complète, indépendante et impartiale´´ sur ´´les policiers qui auraient violé la loi et les normes internationales des droits de l’homme´´.

Nul doute cependant le croyons-nous -du fait des institutions légitimes-  que la Turquie surmontera cette crise, mais rien ne sera comme avant. L’autoritarisme  d’Erdogan isolé dans Tour d’ivoire plus craint que respecté , devrait laisser la place au dialogue et pourquoi pas à l’alternance après  dix ans de pouvoir sans partage. Le XXIe siècle est celui de la liberté et non celui de la contrainte . Il est vrai que  Les Turcs ne meurent pas de faim. Le chômage n’est pas structurel comme en Europe, mais il est important que toutes les sensibilités se sentent en sécurité, libres de réfléchir et de vivre en harmonie avec un libre arbitre qui respecte les autres sensibilités.

L’agitation des médias occidentaux n’est pas neutre en filigrane, il est demandé aux Turcs de jeter par-dessus bord des siècles d’équilibres sociologiques et d’espérance religieuse pour aller à l’aventure de  l’anomie , celle de la théorie du genre qui dit-on est l’asymptote vers laquelle il faut tendre.  Erdogan n’a pas compris,  le croyons nous, que s’il veut faire aimer l’Islam ce n’est pas par la contrainte –Pas de contrainte en religion lit on dans le Coran-  c’est l’adhésion de chacun qui pourra alors aboutir à une  vision  apaisée d’un Islam en phase avec le monde et qui demeure un repère moral  en ces temps où il devient évident qu’il de plus en plus difficile  interdit d’interdire ..

Professeur Chems Eddine Chitour

Ecole Polytechnique enp-edu.dz

1. http://www.lemonde.fr/europe/article/2013/06/03/on-se-sent-chaque-jour-un-peu-plus-pris-en-etau-par-erdogan_3422878_3214.html

2. http://www.lemonde.fr/europe/article/2013/06/04/en-turquie-le-ras-le-bol-face-a-la-marche-triomphante-de-l-akp_3423050_3214.html

3. Ariana Ferentinou Hürriyet Gouvernement démission!´´ scande la foule à Istanbul
Daily News 3 juin 2013

4. http://www.courrierinternational.com/chronique/2013/06/03/erdogan-assiege-dans-sa-tour-d-ivoire

5. José Ignacio Torreblanca http://www.presseurop.eu/fr/content/article/705901-ni-l-est-ni-l-ouest-mais-vers-le-haut

6. Hasan Cemal | 6 juin 2013 T 24 repris danshttp://www.courrierinternational.com/article/2013/06/06/comment-erdogan-est-devenu-autocrate?page=all

7.Said Rabia: Quand les affaires font oublier la politique El Watan 4 06 2013