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vendredi, 02 septembre 2022

Quelques réflexions sur Gorbačëv et la fin de l'URSS

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Quelques réflexions sur Gorbačëv et la fin de l'URSS

par Gennaro Scala 

Source: Gennaro Scala & https://www.ariannaeditrice.it/articoli/qualche-riflessione-su-gorba-ev-e-la-fine-dell-urss

L'effondrement de l'Union soviétique a été entièrement dû à l'idiotie de Gorbačëv, tel qu'il semble être compris à partir des "célébrations" de certains à l'annonce de sa mort. Cela dénote la régression infantile, qui comporte aussi une barbarie considérable, dans laquelle sont tombés ceux qui prétendent se référer à Marx, connu, entre autres, pour avoir promu l'analyse structurelle. Il faut se demander comment une seule personne a pu faire échouer tout un système qui, jusqu'à quelques années auparavant, rivalisait pour l'hégémonie avec les États-Unis, et il faut se demander comment quelqu'un comme Gorbačëv est arrivé à la tête de l'Union soviétique.

Quelles ont été les causes de l'effondrement de l'Union soviétique est une question trop complexe pour être traitée de manière adéquate dans un message sur FB, j'en ai traité indirectement dans mon livre "Pour un nouveau socialisme". Je voudrais ici soulever une question : le mondialisme. Marx voulait donner au communisme une perspective mondialiste. Extrait d'un article important, très négligé par les "marxologues", son dernier article publié dans le Rheinische Zeitung dans les derniers jours de 1848, avant son exil en Angleterre, où il désigne l'Angleterre elle-même comme le principal ennemi de la révolution, mais déclare en même temps qu'étant donné sa puissance mondiale, seul un mouvement de portée mondiale pourrait la vaincre. C'est grâce à cette approche mondialiste que le communisme soviétique a pu être un défi mondial à l'hégémonie mondiale des États-Unis qui a succédé à celle de l'Angleterre (pour plus de détails, voir mon livre précité).

Dans le défi mondial lancé à l'hégémonie américaine, l'Union soviétique a perdu pour plusieurs raisons. Tout d'abord, bien qu'étant un mondialisme, le soviétisme n'était pas un véritable impérialisme, c'est-à-dire avec les connotations économiques du terme, capable de drainer des pays subordonnés vers le centre des ressources à utiliser dans la compétition avec les Etats-Unis.

Pour des raisons inhérentes aux conditions exceptionnelles dans lesquelles l'État soviétique est né, et pour les immenses défis auxquels il a été confronté à sa naissance et plus tard avec l'attaque nazie, il n'a jamais surmonté la centralisation du pouvoir étatique, de sorte qu'une formation étatique stable n'a jamais été atteinte, l'État soviétique étant toujours géré selon les critères de l'État d'exception. Cela était également dû à l'absence d'une théorie efficace de l'État au sein du marxisme. Domenico Losurdo a mis l'accent sur ces deux questions.

Le défi avec les États-Unis n'était pas le défi entre deux systèmes de vie différents. Que le travailleur soit employé par une entreprise privée ou qu'il soit employé par l'État, nous avons la même aliénation de ses conditions de vie, alors que le communisme de Marx aspirait à la libération du travailleur qui consistait à pouvoir contrôler ces conditions de vie, qui passent avant tout par le travail. Sous le prétexte qu'il s'agissait d'un pays socialiste en Union soviétique, même les syndicats ont été interdits (alors que Lénine avait déclaré que les syndicats devaient subsister afin de "défendre les travailleurs contre leur propre État"). 

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Par conséquent, certaines nations européennes avec une forte présence syndicale étaient plus socialistes. Pour ces raisons, les Soviétiques ont souffert de l'hégémonie du "consumérisme" occidental. Sauf que si un ingénieur occidental pouvait acheter une Mercedes, la plus haute aspiration d'un ingénieur soviétique pouvait être la Trabant. Certains philosophes tels que Lukács et son élève Agnes Heller (photo) ont écrit qu'au lieu de rivaliser sur la consommation, le système aurait dû offrir la possibilité d'une "vie raisonnable", comme une extension de la "bonne vie" aristotélicienne au monde actuel (un thème qui reste très pertinent aujourd'hui), mais cela aurait signifié permettre une participation politique que le système soviétique ne pouvait pas permettre. En Union soviétique, une classe moyenne s'est formée, nécessaire dans la sphère de la production, le complexe militaire, l'éducation, la bureaucratie d'État, etc., mais elle était comprimée dans la consommation et le mode de vie, ce qui fit qu'elle s'est finalement tournée vers le mode de vie occidental. C'était la base de Gorbačëv dans le parti communiste qui a fini par liquider l'État. C'est la thèse de Costanzo Preve.

La première fissure majeure dans le mondialisme soviétique s'est produite avec la Chine, qui a rejeté la doctrine Brejnev d'intervention dans les pays socialistes qui ne suivaient pas les directives soviétiques, ce qui a conduit à une quasi guerre à la frontière avec la Russie en 1969. Cette rupture a ensuite conduit à la normalisation des relations entre la Chine et les États-Unis avec la visite de Nixon en 1972, qui a jeté les bases de la collaboration économique et de l'exportation de capitaux. Les États-Unis pensaient subjuguer la Chine, mais étant donné le contrôle conservé par l'État chinois sur l'économie, cela n'a conduit qu'à l'industrialisation ultime de la Chine. D'une certaine manière, le gorbatchevisme était interne au communisme, mais il n'en a retenu que le "bon" côté universaliste, la paix entre les peuples, la coexistence, etc., mais a oublié la question de l'impérialisme, croyant aux fausses promesses occidentales de détente et de collaboration.

Les États-Unis en ont profité pour démolir le système d'alliance soviétique, visant en fin de compte la démolition de la Russie elle-même. La guerre actuelle en Ukraine est elle-même le résultat de cette politique américaine.

La naissance du monde multipolaire s'est d'abord présentée comme un mondialisme alternatif. Mais un tel mondialisme était voué à la défaite, tout comme le mondialisme libéral, car il contredisait la dynamique fondamentale de notre monde. Probablement qu'avec une classe politique moins désorientée et avec moins d'illusions que celle de Gorbatchev, cette transition nécessaire aurait été moins traumatisante pour la Russie.

Cette déclinaison mondialiste particulière du socialisme qu'était le communisme appartient désormais définitivement au passé. S'il doit y avoir un socialisme de l'avenir, ce sera un socialisme qui saura se penser dans le monde multipolaire de demain.

 

samedi, 27 août 2022

L'impact des conséquences géopolitiques de l'effondrement de l'URSS sur l'image de l'islam traditionnel dans le paysage médiatique russe

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L'impact des conséquences géopolitiques de l'effondrement de l'URSS sur l'image de l'islam traditionnel dans le paysage médiatique russe

Rustam Nugumanov

Source: https://www.geopolitika.ru/article/vliyanie-geopoliticheskih-posledstviy-raspada-sssr-na-obraz-tradicionnogo-islama-v

Le développement des technologies de l'information et des communications a créé des conditions particulières pour l'impact de l'information sur la conscience de masse, ce qui a sans aucun doute influencé la formation de la conscience religieuse des musulmans russes. L'espace médiatique, avec ses attributs d'accès universel à l'information de n'importe où dans le monde et la possibilité d'exprimer librement son opinion sur n'importe quelle question, y compris religieuse, a imposé ses propres exigences spécifiques aux clercs musulmans et aux spécialistes de l'Islam en termes d'argumentation adéquate de sujets donnés et de promotion des idées et valeurs islamiques traditionnelles. Malgré les efforts continus pour faire revivre la bonne tradition, l'image de l'islam traditionnel a été influencée par des cadres contenant des représentations biaisées de l'islam, avec une tendance caractéristique à la destruction. Pour continuer à œuvrer de manière productive à la préservation de la véritable pureté des valeurs traditionnelles de l'Islam dans la nouvelle réalité, il faut tenir compte des conséquences géopolitiques de l'effondrement de l'URSS.

Depuis le jour de la propagation de l'islam, les musulmans ont mené leurs activités éducatives en se basant strictement sur des principes qui garantissent que les concepts intégrés dans les sermons reflètent exactement les significations transmises aux associés par le Messager de Dieu Mohammed (que la paix soit avec lui) lui-même. Conscients de la grande responsabilité qui leur incombe à l'égard des générations futures, les musulmans ont veillé méticuleusement et soigneusement à la pureté des significations transmises, ce qui les a sans doute encouragés à déployer des efforts titanesques pour relever les défis de chaque époque successive. Grâce à ce travail minutieux, les savants musulmans ont développé toute une série de sciences, qui comprenaient, entre autres, non seulement les questions de croyance (aqeedah) et de jurisprudence (fiqh), mais aussi une méthodologie spéciale pour déterminer la fiabilité des jugements transmis remontant au Prophète Muhammad (la paix soit avec lui), qui a pris forme plus tard dans la science de l'hadithologie. C'est par cette transmission rigoureuse et cette assimilation sérieuse des valeurs sociales et culturelles de génération en génération que les significations de l'orthodoxie qui caractérisent l'Islam traditionnel ont survécu jusqu'à ce jour dans leur essence inchangée.

Dans tout le monde islamique, la plupart des spécialistes de l'islam sont unanimes pour dire que l'islam traditionnel (Ahlu Sunna wal Jama'a) (1) reconnaît un islam dans laquelle le fondement de la croyance (usul ad-din) remonte aux penseurs théologiens musulmans al-Ashari (2) et al-Matrudī (3), et la pratique religieuse et juridique repose sur les quatre madhhabs (4) (Hanafi'i (5), Shafi'i (6), Maliki (7) et Hanbali (8)).

Les Fondements de l'orthodoxie sont les résultats compilés des disputes polémiques des adeptes du Dieu unique avec les adeptes de différentes religions, mouvements hérétiques, écoles de philosophie, etc., qui ont eu lieu pendant la vie du Prophète (PBUH) et sont devenues par la suite une partie intégrante de la vie culturelle des centres scientifiques de la civilisation musulmane. Ces compilations, qui exposent et étayent les principales idées dogmatiques, les normes et règles juridiques, rituelles et éthiques de la conception traditionaliste de la foi, deviennent un élément obligatoire du système éducatif de pratiquement toutes les institutions éducatives musulmanes (madrasahs).

Malgré l'énorme quantité de littérature dans le domaine des croyances religieuses, la présentation la plus populaire et la plus répandue de la doctrine de la foi islamique parmi les musulmans est la dénommée Akida al-Tahawiyya, œuvre d'un contemporain des imams al-Ashari et al-Matroudi, un juriste et érudit égyptien, l'imam Abu Jaafar Ahmad ibn Muhammad al-Azdi (9), connu sous le nom d'imam al-Tahawi. Étant un résumé concis de la doctrine islamique et composé de 105 dictons, l'Akida at-Tahawiyya a incité de nombreux érudits islamiques à écrire des commentaires détaillés sur ce credo universellement accepté par les musulmans.

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En Russie, notamment dans la région de Volga-Ourals, malgré la présence du credo Tahawi, la version Nasafi était la plus connue et la plus populaire. "Akida an-Nasafi", écrit par l'Imam Abu-Hafs an-Nasafi (10), est un résumé de la doctrine de l'Imam al-Matrudi et de ses disciples, et a atteint la célébrité, selon les chercheurs turcs, grâce à l'interprétation de l'Imam at-Taftazani (11) dans son livre "Sharh al-aka'id". La popularité du commentaire d'at-Taftazani montre qu'il a été publié une quinzaine de fois à Kazan, et le théologien tatar Shihab-ad-din al-Marjani y a écrit son commentaire détaillé sous le titre "al-Hikma al-baliga al-janiyya fi sharkh al-akaid al-khanafiyya" (12), qui a été publié à Kazan en 1888.

Pendant la période soviétique, malgré la domination de l'idéologie athée, la transmission de l'héritage musulman s'est poursuivie, mais dans un cadre très étroit et sous le strict contrôle de l'État, au sein de la madrasa "Mir-Arab" de Boukhara et de l'Institut islamique de Tachkent. La qualité de l'enseignement dans ces institutions spirituelles soviétiques est démontrée par les nombreux diplômés de ces institutions, qui occupent aujourd'hui des postes à responsabilité dans de nombreuses structures religieuses de l'ancienne Union soviétique.

Après l'effondrement du système soviétique, les enseignements traditionnels de l'Islam ont pu regagner leurs positions perdues et être ravivés sous une forme fraîche et moderne, enrichie par les réalisations des sciences séculaires. Cependant, la pénétration incontrôlée de diverses organisations et mouvements islamiques étrangers et internationaux sur le territoire de l'ex-Union soviétique, dont la controverse idéologique et politique interne n'est pas la moindre, a non seulement créé des obstacles au retour de la bonne tradition, mais a également révélé les graves défis auxquels est confronté l'Islam traditionnel. Les musulmans de l'ex-URSS ont été confrontés à une nouvelle réalité dans laquelle le travail de retour aux valeurs traditionnelles exigeait de prendre en compte les conséquences géopolitiques de l'effondrement de l'URSS.

Les conséquences géopolitiques de l'effondrement de l'URSS ont été caractérisées par le démantèlement du système communiste et la proclamation du modèle de société occidental-libéral comme universel pour tous les peuples du monde, suivis par l'intégration et l'unification de tous les aspects de la société sous la domination directe des États-Unis et de leurs alliés.

Les États-Unis ont profité de l'absence d'obstacles juridico-internationaux pour arranger le monde selon leurs propres normes. Ils se sont empressés de reconstruire les frontières de l'Europe de l'Est, du Moyen-Orient et de l'Afrique du Nord, en créant de nouveaux États indépendants, des autonomies non reconnues, dont la direction est sous le contrôle total de Washington. La guerre en Yougoslavie, en Irak, en Afghanistan, en Syrie, en Libye, au Yémen ne sont qu'une liste mondialement connue de points chauds qui ont pris des centaines de milliers de vies innocentes et laissé des millions de réfugiés. En outre, poursuivant une politique d'endiguement contre la Russie, l'Occident collectif, dirigé par les États-Unis, met en scène une série de révolutions de couleur dans les pays post-soviétiques. Le Kirghizistan, la Géorgie, l'Arménie, l'Ukraine et la Moldavie deviennent les principaux théâtres de la confrontation géopolitique entre l'Occident et la Russie.

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En raison de la politique irresponsable et criminelle des États-Unis, de nombreux peuples musulmans sont devenus les otages des intrigues politiques des élites pro-occidentales, qui ont divisé l'Oumma musulmane, commune dans sa foi, en plusieurs camps politiquement hostiles. En outre, divers acteurs non étatiques extrémistes et terroristes sont devenus plus actifs en raison des tensions croissantes au Moyen-Orient. Les activités criminelles de divers mouvements djihadistes, dont Al-Qaïda (13) et ISIS (14), ont créé de nouveaux obstacles à la perception adéquate du bon héritage de l'islam traditionnel, accompagnés d'une haine pure et simple des autres musulmans et d'une islamophobie rampante.

Dans le contexte du facteur géopolitique, la renaissance des valeurs de l'Islam traditionnel est confrontée à plusieurs défis sérieux. D'une part, la proclamation de l'universalité du modèle de société occidental-libéral et les processus de mondialisation qui y sont liés ont posé des exigences intransigeantes quant à l'adaptation des valeurs islamiques séculaires aux modèles de la culture occidentale, ce qui se manifeste davantage dans les activités dites réformistes des activistes orientés vers l'Occident. D'autre part, il existe un soutien constant et tout à fait délibéré à tous les mouvements et organisations pseudo-islamiques radicaux, extrémistes et terroristes possibles pour discréditer les adeptes de l'Islam traditionnel et diaboliser l'Islam dans son ensemble, accompagné d'une promotion constante de l'islamophobie.

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Une sorte de dichotomie est en train de se créer, où l'effet destructeur de deux directions apparemment sans rapport vise à freiner les aspirations positives des représentants de l'islam traditionnel. La popularisation par les "réformateurs" d'idées telles que la "libéralisation de l'Islam", la "suprématie de l'individualisme sur la famille élargie", l'"égalité des sexes", le "rejet des traditions des écoles religieuses et juridiques", la "pertinence de la vie présente par rapport à la vie future" se fait sur fond de slogans radicaux et extrémistes des mouvements pseudo-islamiques sur le renforcement des normes religieuses, le rejet de toutes les formes de vie séculière et de traditions populaires, ainsi que le maintien d'un état de guerre constant (jihad) contre les "infidèles".

Tout cela crée une instabilité socio-économique et politique persistante, désorganisant la société et rendant impossible la planification de toute tâche positive et constructive pour l'avenir.

Pour contrer les menaces et les défis posés par le facteur géopolitique, il est nécessaire d'établir les fondements théoriques et méthodologiques de l'Islam traditionnel comme base scientifique pour la formation de contenu dans l'espace médiatique. En conséquence, toutes les images médiatiques tendancieuses existantes de l'Islam seront confrontées et ajustées selon la méthodologie scientifique de l'Islam traditionnel. Dans ce cas, l'image de l'Islam traditionnel sera adéquate et non déformée dans l'espace médiatique, ce qui assurera la souveraineté spirituelle et des bases saines pour le développement ultérieur de l'Islam dans l'intérêt non seulement des citoyens russes mais aussi de l'humanité entière.

Notes:

1. traduit de la langue arabe, il signifie "les gens de la Sunnah et de l'harmonie communautaire".

2. Le plus éminent penseur musulman, théologien, et fondateur de l'une des écoles kalama, qui porte son nom, les Asharites.

3. Abu Mansur Muhammad ibn Muhammad ibn Mahmud al-Maturidi as-Samarqandi (870, Maturid, près de Samarqand - 944, Samarqand), penseur islamique, fondateur et éponyme d'une école de kalam, le maturid.

4. "École théologique et juridique".

5. Les enseignements de l'école religieuse sunnite de l'islam sont liés à la doctrine de la charia.

6. Le madhhab Shafi'i est l'une des écoles de droit de l'islam sunnite, fondée par Muhammad ibn Idrees ash-Shafi'i. Ce mazhab a été formé sous la forte influence des mazhabs Hanafi et Maliki et a adopté leurs caractéristiques.

7. Le madhab Maliki est un madhab sunnite dont le fondateur est considéré comme étant Malik ibn Anas.

8. Le madhab hanbali (les adeptes du madhab sont appelés Hanbali) est l'une des quatre écoles de droit canoniques (madhabs) de l'islam orthodoxe sunnite ; son fondateur et éponyme est Ahmad ibn Hanbal, l'un des plus célèbres experts en hadiths.

9. Abu Ja'far Ahmad ibn Muhammad al-Tahawi (843/853, Taha-935, Égypte) est un célèbre érudit musulman sunnite, l'une des autorités du madhab Hanafi.

10. Najmuddin Abu Hafs 'Umar ibn Muhammad al-Nasafi (1067, Nasaf-1142, Samarqand) - Théologien islamique, juriste du mazkhab Hanafi, spécialiste du hadith, interprète du Coran.

11. Sadd al-Din Masud ibn Umar at-Taftazani (1322, Taftazan, Khorasan, - 1390, Samarqand) - le philosophe arabo-musulman, le représentant exceptionnel du Kalam tardif. Ses ouvrages sur la logique, la jurisprudence, la poétique, la grammaire, les mathématiques, la rhétorique et l'exégèse coranique étaient populaires comme guides d'étude.

12. "La sagesse mature dans l'explication des dogmes d'al-Nasafi".

13. Interdit sur le territoire de la Fédération de Russie.

14. Interdit sur le territoire de la Fédération de Russie.

 

vendredi, 15 avril 2022

Le traité de Rapallo de 1922

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Il est possible de faire autrement

Le traité de Rapallo de 1922 montre que l'Allemagne et la Russie peuvent pleinement coopérer - ce qui ne plaisait déjà pas aux puissances occidentales à l'époque.

par Hermann Ploppa

Source: https://www.rubikon.news/artikel/es-geht-auch-anders-3

La confrontation entre l'Occident dit des "valeurs" et la Russie ne cesse de s'intensifier. Bien avant que l'armée russe n'envahisse l'Ukraine en violation du droit international, le ton s'était déjà durci à l'égard de la Russie. Tout au long de l'histoire, la propagande antirusse a donné l'impression que les relations entre l'Allemagne et la Russie avaient toujours été hostiles. Cet oubli de l'histoire est politiquement voulu. Nous sommes tous plus ou moins conscients du terrible conflit armé de la Seconde Guerre mondiale. Elle a été suivie par la guerre froide, au cours de laquelle l'Allemagne de l'Ouest et l'Allemagne de l'Est se sont affrontées en tant qu'États de la ligne de front. Ce n'est qu'avec la politique de détente du chancelier Willy Brandt que d'autres sons de cloche se sont faits entendre. Une partie de notre mémoire collective veut que les relations avec notre voisin de l'Est aient toujours été extrêmement délicates. Mais c'est totalement faux.

La plupart du temps, les relations germano-russes ont été marquées par une étroite coopération et des échanges mutuels. Même à l'époque de la guerre froide, il y a eu des phases d'initiation d'une coopération étroite. Des rapprochements ont eu lieu entre le chancelier allemand de l'époque, Ludwig Erhard, et le chef d'État soviétique, Nikita Khrouchtchev. Le chancelier Helmut Kohl et Mikhaïl Gorbatchev ont également commencé à coopérer plus étroitement. Dans les deux cas, la perte soudaine du pouvoir des hommes forts de l'Est a conduit à la fin de l'Entente.

Une relation de confiance étroite s'est également développée entre le chancelier Gerhard Schröder et Vladimir Poutine. Le président français s'est également joint temporairement à ce groupe d'hommes. A Londres et à Washington, ces coopérations ont été regardées avec scepticisme. On y murmurait souvent que le dangereux "esprit de Rapallo" planait à nouveau sur l'Europe.

Le principe de la nation la plus favorisée

Il y a exactement 100 ans, le dimanche de Pâques 16 avril 1922, le traité portant le nom de la station balnéaire italienne était signé à Rapallo, près de Gênes, entre le Reich allemand et la République socialiste fédérative soviétique de Russie. Dans ce traité, les deux États s'assuraient le traitement de la nation la plus favorisée. En d'autres termes, ils ont commencé à entretenir des relations économiques normales, comme c'était le cas depuis longtemps entre tous les autres pays. Les deux pays renoncèrent aux demandes de réparations réciproques. En d'autres termes, ils renoncèrent aux indemnisations pour les dommages de guerre subis.

L'Allemagne a également renoncé à réclamer les biens allemands expropriés par les bolcheviques en Union soviétique. L'Allemagne a livré des installations industrielles à la Russie. En échange, la Russie fournissait à l'Allemagne le pétrole tant convoité. L'Allemagne a alors ouvert 2.000 stations-service qui servaient de l'essence en provenance d'Azerbaïdjan de la société de distribution soviétique Azneft.

Ce fut un pas en avant décisif pour l'économie allemande, qui souffrait encore largement du boycott de la communauté internationale. Une situation gagnant-gagnant absolue s'est également présentée dans le secteur militaire. En effet, le traité de Versailles interdisait à l'Allemagne d'avoir sa propre armée de l'air et ses propres unités de chars.

Les usines Junkers construisaient désormais leurs avions de guerre dans la banlieue de Moscou, à Fili. Les avions Junkers ont ensuite été testés à Lipetsk. Toute une génération de pilotes de chasse allemands a été formée ici. Les Allemands et les Russes ont également partagé des unités de gaz toxiques à Tonka. Alors que les soldats de la Reichswehr en Allemagne s'amusaient avec des chars factices sous les yeux des Alliés, des ingénieurs et des mécaniciens allemands construisaient de vrais chars en Union soviétique et les testaient à Kazan.

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L'architecte de Rapallo

Le traité de Rapallo est essentiellement l'œuvre du diplomate Adolf Georg Otto von Maltzan (photo), qui, par commodité, se faisait simplement appeler "Ago" (1). Ago von Maltzan avait déjà fait carrière à l'époque de l'Empire et, en tant que chef de la section Russie au ministère des Affaires étrangères, il travaillait depuis la fin de la guerre à un traité de coopération germano-russe. Lors de la conférence financière et économique de Gênes en avril 1922, il est apparu que la Grande-Bretagne et la France travaillaient également sur un traité économique avec l'Union soviétique.

Après avoir tenté d'imposer un changement de régime par une intervention militaire sanglante dans une Union soviétique encore fragile, puis avoir échoué lamentablement dans cette tentative, ces pays acceptaient désormais les bolcheviks comme nouveau "facteur d'ordre" dans la région et essayaient d'en tirer le meilleur parti.

Dans le même temps, les Soviétiques ont fait savoir au gouvernement allemand, par des canaux discrets, qu'ils pouvaient envisager un accord de coopération similaire à celui conclu avec les puissances occidentales, mais également avec l'Allemagne. La délégation allemande s'est alors mise en branle. C'était le 15 avril 1922 et il fallait être vigilant pour le lendemain afin de conclure un accord avec les Soviétiques avant la délégation américano-britannico-française. L'histoire a retenu ce que l'on a appelé la "conférence des pyjamas".

Pendant la nuit, Ago von Maltzan a rédigé le projet de traité et a tiré les membres de la délégation allemande de leur lit. En pyjama, les délégués se sont assis sur le bord de leur lit et ont travaillé ensemble sur le traité, paragraphe par paragraphe. Le ministre des Affaires étrangères responsable, Walther Rathenau, avait encore du mal. Il était plutôt sceptique quant à l'ensemble du projet. Mais finalement, Rathenau a accepté et le projet de traité a été adopté.

Le lendemain, les délégations allemande et soviétique se sont rencontrées, deux heures avant l'heure prévue pour la conclusion du traité, qui était celle fixée par les Alliés occidentaux. Du côté allemand, nous voyons en bonne place : le chancelier Joseph Wirth, le ministre des Affaires étrangères Walther Rathenau, le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires étrangères Ago von Maltzan et leur entourage.

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Du côté soviétique : Leonid Borissovitch Krassine, commissaire du peuple au commerce extérieur ; Georgi Vassiliévitch Tchitcherinr (photo), commissaire du peuple aux affaires étrangères, et comme conseiller Adolf Abramovitch Joffe, ambassadeur soviétique en Allemagne. La signature du contrat s'est déroulée dans une atmosphère très cordiale. Deux heures plus tard, la délégation des Alliés occidentaux est arrivée. Leur colère fut sans limite lorsqu'ils apprirent qu'on leur avait coupé les vivres au dernier moment.

Retour sur la scène internationale

Du point de vue allemand, le traité de Rapallo était la dernière chance d'échapper aux effets d'étranglement du traité de Versailles. En effet, le traité de Versailles n'a pas seulement dépossédé massivement les citoyens allemands et leur État mais les a plongés dans une servitude pour dettes totalement contre-productive, ce que l'économiste John Maynard Keynes, et non des moindres, a vivement condamné dans son livre très remarqué (2). L'Allemagne dans son ensemble a été chargée de la responsabilité exclusive du déclenchement de la guerre et mise au ban de la société par un isolement diplomatique.

L'État soviétique russe a également été mis au ban pour son opposition à l'ordre économique capitaliste et pour l'expropriation d'actifs étrangers. Il était donc logique que les stratèges des deux États parias réfléchissent intensément à une coopération germano-russe.

Les deux parties ont agi avec un pragmatisme absolu. La droite politique allemande voyait dans la coopération avec les bolcheviks une réelle opportunité de faire un retour en force de l'Allemagne en dehors des règles fixées par le régime de Versailles. Les partisans d'une union de l'Allemagne avec les puissances occidentales se trouvaient plutôt chez les libéraux et les sociaux-démocrates, tandis que les communistes votaient naturellement pour les Soviétiques.

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Malgré cela, la conclusion du traité de Rapallo le 16 avril 1922 entre l'Allemagne et la République socialiste fédérative soviétique de Russie fit l'effet d'une bombe sur la scène diplomatique internationale. La colère des Français et des Britanniques était immense. Car en fait, ils voulaient eux-mêmes conclure des traités avec les Soviétiques, qui s'étaient imposés comme "facteur d'ordre" sur le territoire de l'ancien empire tsariste. Les énormes ressources naturelles de l'empire géant font que toutes les réserves à l'égard de l'ennemi de classe communiste semblaient surmontables.

Or, le ministre allemand des Affaires étrangères Walther Rathenau et son secrétaire d'État Ago von Maltzan avaient signé le traité avec leur homologue soviétique Georgi Tchitcherine le dimanche de Pâques 1922, peu de temps avant que les Français et les Anglais ne signent un tel traité.

La méfiance des puissances occidentales

Le traité de Rapallo a été majoritairement bien accueilli en Allemagne. Les entrepreneurs allemands, en particulier, poussèrent Rathenau à le signer, car les marchés de l'Ouest leur étaient en grande partie fermés. De plus, on pensait qu'en annonçant la nouvelle politique économique, Lénine ferait un retour en arrière énergique vers l'économie de marché libérale - ce qui ne se réalisera pas sous cette forme, comme on le sait aujourd'hui. Un seul homme politique s'est élevé contre le traité de Rapallo : un certain Adolf Hitler, originaire de Bavière.

Le cas que le géopoliticien anglais Halford Mackinder a décrit dans une conférence donnée à Londres en 1904 comme le pire des cas pour les Anglais s'était donc produit : une puissance de dimension continentale, enclavée, s'était à nouveau alliée à une puissance côtière.

Les Allemands avaient rompu leur isolement et, par leur trahison, jugée sacrilège du point de vue anglais, laissaient entendre qu'ils étaient en mesure de construire dans l'espace eurasien un éventuel contre-pouvoir à l'ordre occidental.

En effet, peu après la fin de la guerre, des cercles influents de l'armée et de l'économie avaient déjà réfléchi à haute voix à un partenariat avec les Soviétiques.

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Walther Rathenau (photo), qui avait hérité du groupe électrique AEG de son père, et le président de son conseil d'administration, Felix Deutsch, entre autres, avaient publié un mémorandum le 17 février 1920. Dans ce document, il est fait référence à l'excédent de main-d'œuvre qualifiée en Allemagne, qui pourrait être parfaitement combiné avec un excédent de matières premières en Russie. Ce sont les "fruits qui mûriront dans un avenir pas très lointain, et non les avantages immédiatement tangibles, qui sont les plus importants si l'on veut juger de l'intérêt allemand à s'associer à la Russie soviétique" (3).

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Et le général-colonel Hans von Seeckt (ci-dessus), qui venait d'être promu chef de la direction de l'armée de terre de la Reichswehr en 1920, ne laissait aucun doute sur sa vision des choses dans deux mémoires publiés la même année :

"Ce n'est qu'en se rattachant fermement à la Grande Russie que l'Allemagne a la perspective de retrouver sa position de puissance mondiale... L'Angleterre et la France craignent la fusion des deux puissances terrestres et cherchent à l'empêcher par tous les moyens - c'est donc vers elle que nous devons tendre de toutes nos forces" (4).

Plus loin dans le second document : "Et si l'Allemagne se range du côté de la Russie, elle est elle-même invincible, car les autres puissances devront alors toujours tenir compte de l'Allemagne, car elles ne peuvent pas laisser la Russie sans surveillance" (5).

L'assassinat de Rathenau et ses conséquences

Mais Rathenau n'a plus eu la chance de pouvoir contribuer à l'évolution future. Tout comme Olof Palme, il refusait la protection rapprochée. Ainsi, le 24 juin 1922, deux mois à peine après avoir signé le traité de Rapallo, il fut abattu par deux tueurs à gages dans sa décapotable ouverte, alors qu'il se rendait à son travail au ministère des Affaires étrangères.

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L'indignation en Allemagne face à ce lâche assassinat a été gigantesque. Des centaines de milliers de personnes ont suivi son cercueil lors d'une impressionnante manifestation en faveur de la démocratie. Des émeutes de type guerre civile s'ensuivirent. Les assassins de Rathenau appartenaient à l'organisation Consul, également appelée  "Reichswehr noire". Il s'agissait d'une scission de la Brigade Erhardt, à laquelle appartenaient des sections importantes de la Division de fer, elle-même issue des Baltikum (mercenaires allemands) ...

La coopération germano-russe n'a jamais atteint la dimension envisagée par Rathenau et Seeckt. Néanmoins, l'armée de l'air et l'armée blindée allemandes ont continué à être développées en Union soviétique - jusqu'à ce que les nazis mettent fin à cette coopération d'un trait de plume en 1933.

Aujourd'hui, le traité de Rapallo du 16 avril 1922 est largement occulté de la mémoire collective. Il ne correspond tout simplement pas à l'agenda transatlantique.

Sources et notes :

(1) Niels Joeres : Der Architekt von Rapallo - Der deutsche Diplomat Ago von Maltzan im Kaiserreich und in der frühen Weimarer Republik. Heidelberg 2005.
(2) John Maynard Keynes : The Economic Consequences of the Peace. Londres 1919.
(3) Cité par Horst Günther Linke : Deutsch-sowjetische Beziehungen bis Rapallo. Cologne 1972. page 94.
(4) Ibid., page 153.
(5) Ibid., page 156.

Pour cet article, des passages du livre Der Griff nach Eurasien - Die Hintergründe des ewigen Krieges gegen Russland de Hermann Ploppa, Marburg 2019, ont été intégrés.

Livres de Hermann Ploppa:

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Commandes : https://www.amazon.fr/Die-Macher-hinter-Kulissen-transatl...

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Commandes : https://www.bookdepository.com/Ploppa-H-Griff-nach-Eurasi...

samedi, 12 mars 2022

Opération militaire en Ukraine : Analyse géopolitique

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Opération militaire en Ukraine : Analyse géopolitique

En toute exclusivité: la perspective russe selon Alexandre Douguine

Alexandre Douguine

Source: https://katehon.com/en/article/military-operation-ukraine-geopolitical-analysis?fbclid=IwAR3Y3lIY5eabLUPz3tvclSDLIcGNl6PFCv0d4vj71c0Avnjof-Ojj7AzSBM


La question ukrainienne à l'origine de la géopolitique

La place de l'Ukraine dans la confrontation géopolitique entre la Terre et la Mer a déjà fait l'objet de nombreux écrits et de descriptions détaillées. Il est d'ailleurs symbolique que le fondateur de la géopolitique, Halford J. Mackinder, ait été le haut commissaire de l'Entente pour l'Ukraine pendant la guerre civile en Russie. Et à cette époque-là, dans le gouvernement blanc de Wrangel, le fondateur de l'eurasisme, le géographe Piotr Savitsky, qui fut le premier, dans le journalisme de langue russe, à mentionner lui-même le terme "géopolitique" et à exposer les points principaux de cette méthodologie, travaillait comme assistant du ministre des Affaires étrangères Peter Struve.

La géopolitique : la guerre continuelle entre la terre et la mer

Mackinder a formulé la théorie de la grande guerre des continents, l'opposition entre la civilisation de la Mer (l'Occident en général, l'Empire britannique plus spécifiquement) et la civilisation de la Terre (Heartland, Russie-Eurasie) quelques années plus tôt, en 1904, dans son célèbre ouvrage The Geographic Pivot of History.  Terre (Rome, Sparte) et Mer (Carthage, Athènes) représentent deux civilisations antagonistes, opposées en tout - traditionalisme et modernité, spiritualité et matérialisme, esprit militaire et esprit commercial. Le conflit qui les oppose est une constante de l'histoire du monde.

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L'Eurasie, théâtre d'affrontements géopolitiques

Au cours des derniers siècles, lorsque le Grand Jeu, la confrontation entre les empires britannique et russe, battait son plein, la grande guerre continentale s'inscrivait dans l'espace de l'Eurasie. Dans cet espace, le "Heartland", c'était la Russie. Et la "civilisation de la mer" était portée par l'Angleterre. L'Angleterre tentait d'enserrer l'Eurasie de l'extérieur, depuis les océans. La Russie se défendait de l'intérieur, en essayant de briser le blocus.

La principale bande territoriale où se multipliaient les tensions se nommait alors, dans le langage spécial de la géopolitique mackindérienne, le Rimland, la "zone côtière". Elle s'étendait de l'Europe occidentale à l'Asie du Sud-Est, comprenait l'Inde et la Chine, en passant par le Moyen-Orient et l'Asie centrale.

L'objectif de la Mer était de subjuguer le Rimland. L'objectif de la Terre était de briser cette influence et de déserrer l'anneau de l'anaconda thalassocratique qu'il fallait rétrécir. C'est la raison de l'avancée de la Russie en Asie centrale et en Extrême-Orient.

D'où la formule principale de la géopolitique: "Qui contrôle l'Europe de l'Est contrôle le Heartland. Qui contrôle le Heartland, contrôle le monde". Telle est la théorie.

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Le démembrement de la Grande Russie

De par sa position de Haut Commissaire de l'Entente, Mackinder tenta de mettre la théorie en pratique. La guerre civile russe a donné à la civilisation de la mer une nouvelle chance de repousser les frontières du Rimland vers l'est, aux dépens des territoires qui quittaient alors la sphère de la puissance russe - la Finlande, la Pologne et, surtout, l'Ukraine.

Mackinder (comme Savitsky) avait compris que la victoire des bolcheviks conduirait inévitablement à une confrontation avec l'Occident et à une tentative de recréer l'Empire russe sous une nouvelle forme (et c'est exactement ce qui s'est passé). Et face à cette perspective, Mackinder a exigé que le gouvernement britannique soit plus actif dans l'aide aux Blancs [1], il a tenté de convaincre les dirigeants anglais de la nécessité de soutenir l'indépendance de l'Ukraine. Il a également élaboré un plan visant à séparer de la Russie la grande région du Caucase méridional, la Biélorussie, l'Asie centrale, ainsi que la Sibérie orientale et même un certain nombre de territoires du sud de la Russie. Plus tard, en 1991, l'effondrement de l'URSS permet, dans une large mesure, de réactiver le plan de Mackinder.

L'Ukraine et le cordon sanitaire

L'Ukraine jouait un rôle majeur dans le plan géopolitique de Mackinder. Ce territoire, avec la Pologne et les pays d'Europe de l'Est, faisait partie du "cordon sanitaire", une zone stratégique qui devait être sous le contrôle direct de l'Angleterre et de la France (les alliés de l'Entente à l'époque) et empêcher tout rapprochement entre la Russie et l'Allemagne. Retenue par un "cordon sanitaire", la Russie-Eurasie ne pouvait pas devenir un Empire à part entière. Sans l'Ukraine, la Russie n'est pas un Empire. Et de plus, l'Ukraine, rendue hostile à la Russie et placée sous le contrôle direct des Anglo-Saxons, couperait la Russie de l'Europe continentale, où l'Allemagne, à son tour, était un Heartland, mais pas un Heartland mondial (comme la Russie), mais local, européen. Le conflit de l'Angleterre avec l'Allemagne (aussi avec l'Autriche) était une constante de la géopolitique européenne.

En conséquence, le projet d'une Ukraine indépendante était initialement dirigé contre la Russie et était supervisé par les Anglo-Saxons.

Les bolcheviks créent et démantèlent simultanément l'Ukraine

Nous savons que pendant la guerre civile, les Blancs ont adhéré à une politique de restauration d'un Empire uni et indivisible. En même temps, ils dépendaient du soutien de l'Entente, qui leur imposait certaines conditions. Quoi qu'il en soit, le gouvernement britannique, n'étant pas d'accord avec Mackinder sur la nécessité d'un soutien fort aux Blancs en échange de leur accord à la sécession de l'Ukraine, les Blancs ont perdu la guerre. Dans cette configuration, le sujet a donc été écarté de l'ordre du jour.

Les bolcheviks, quant à eux, ont d'abord soutenu l'Ukraine et encouragé activement les cercles nationalistes en pensant qu'ils s'étaient orientés contre le "tsarisme", mais ils ont ensuite opté pour une politique centraliste, voyant que l'Ukraine n'allait pas accepter le pouvoir bolchevique sans se plaindre et cherchait à céder aux Anglo-Saxons (ce qui signifiait alors le "capitalisme mondial"). Par conséquent, comme Mackinder l'avait prévu, Lénine a commencé la saisie directe de l'Ukraine, qui n'avait pas eu, dans son passé, une histoire d'État indépendant et était une proie relativement facile pour les Rouges. Les Rouges n'ont pas réussi à conquérir la Pologne par le même stratagème. Mais le territoire de la Biélorussie, qui était revendiqué par la Pologne de Piłsudski, est resté aux mains des Rouges.

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Ensuite, déjà sous l'autorité des bolcheviks en 1922, Lénine a donné à la République socialiste soviétique d'Ukraine les vastes territoires qui avaient toujours fait partie de l'Empire russe - Slobozhanshchina, Donbass, Novorossiya, ainsi que de vastes zones au nord (oblast de Tchernigov) et à l'ouest (Petite Russie proprement dite). La Galicie est restée sous la tutelle de la Pologne, la Bucovine faisait partie de la Roumanie. La Crimée appartenait à la RSFSR.

Mais cet arrangement territorial de l'Ukraine n'impliquait pas véritablement la création d'un État. Le pouvoir bolchevique s'étendait à tous les territoires de l'URSS et, dans l'esprit de l'idéologie internationaliste, il ne pouvait être question d'un statut d'État pour les différentes républiques. Il s'agissait presque d'une division purement administrative dans le cadre d'un pouvoir solidement unifié. C'est exactement ce que Mackinder avait craint.

Les bolcheviks ont à la fois créé l'Ukraine et l'ont abolie (en tant qu'État indépendant).

L'Ukraine dans l'URSS après la Grande Guerre patriotique

La Galicie, la Volhynie et la Bukovine ont été annexées à l'Ukraine juste avant la Grande Guerre patriotique et la Transcarpathie - juste après la guerre. Mais à ce moment-là, la Russie-Eurasie sous la forme de l'URSS s'est déplacée de manière significative vers l'ouest, déplaçant la frontière du pays au détriment du Rimland, et établissant son contrôle sur l'Europe de l'Est, qui était toute entière sous le pouvoir de Moscou. L'URSS a ainsi réduit à néant et totalement aboli le "cordon sanitaire" de Mackinder et de Lord Curzon, s'installant directement en Europe continentale et s'emparant, en fait, des territoires de l'ancienne Prusse/Brandebourg (RDA).

Dans une telle position - profondément à l'arrière de ce rimland européen de l'Eurasie et donc dans le Heartland eurasien - l'Ukraine a existé jusqu'en 1991. Dans le même temps, pour des raisons de convenance purement administrative dans les limites d'un État absolument unitaire, Khrouchtchev a transféré en 1954 la Crimée à Kiev. Du point de vue géopolitique, cependant, cela ne signifiait rien, car toutes les frontières entre les sujets de l'URSS, les républiques fédératives, étaient conditionnelles et ne signifiaient rien du tout dans la pratique.

L'atlantisme et le monde bipolaire

Pendant la guerre froide, l'Occident est revenu à sa pratique particulière de la géopolitique. C'est ainsi qu'en 1949, suivant les modèles mise au point par Mackinder, l'OTAN (l'Organisation du Traité de l'Atlantique Nord) a été créée. Le terme "Atlantique" ayant été introduit dans le sigle de l'organisation militaire, le vocable "atlantisme" devient synonyme de "civilisation de la mer", de thalassocratie, dans le sens exact où Mackinder l'entendait. L'"atlantisme", c'est l'Occident et ses alliés, le monde capitaliste avec un noyau dur anglo-saxon, dont le centre, au XXe siècle, s'est progressivement déplacé de Londres à Washington, de l'Angleterre aux États-Unis.

La carte dessinée par Mackinder correspondait parfaitement à l'équilibre des forces dans la guerre froide, et les deux camps - le communiste et le capitaliste - étaient strictement alignés sur les critères attribués à la Terre et à la Mer. Le bloc de l'Est était la Terre, avec l'URSS en son centre, le Heartland. Le bloc occidental était la Mer, centrée sur l'Atlantique (les Anglo-Saxons), mais comprenait les colonies stratégiques d'après-guerre des États-Unis - les pays d'Europe, le Japon et d'autres États du tiers-monde qui proclamaient leur allégeance au capitalisme. Ils étaient disposés en ordre dispersé en Asie, en Afrique et en Amérique latine, qui constituaient la carte géopolitique de la confrontation mondiale. Terre et Mer s'affrontaient rarement directement (comme lors de la crise des missiles de Cuba), et agissaient généralement par le biais de leurs mandataires, les régimes pro-soviétiques ou pro-américains. Et si la Terre était directement impliquée dans un conflit - comme en Tchécoslovaquie, en Afghanistan, etc., alors la Mer s'y opposait par le biais de mandataires, de "proxies", de groupes et de mouvements antisoviétiques sans intervenir directement. Et quand la Mer intervenait ouvertement - comme en Corée et au Vietnam -  la Terre aidait indirectement, avec des conseillers, la diplomatie, l'économie, etc.

Le problème du Rimland

Pendant la guerre froide, le problème du Rimland est redevenu extrêmement pertinent. Ainsi, le géopolitologue américain Nicholas Spykman, révisant les théories de Mackinder, arrive à la conclusion que c'est le Rimland qui est la principale zone de confrontation. Il formule la loi de la géopolitique comme suit : "Celui qui contrôle le Rimland contrôle le monde". Mais il ne s'agit pas d'une nouvelle géopolitique, mais d'une réinterprétation - mineure - du poids des zones principales dans la théorie de Mackinder. D'autant plus que Mackinder lui-même a commencé par énoncer une théorie sur "l'Europe de l'Est", c'est-à-dire sur ce qui deviendra le "cordon sanitaire", et que celui-ci appartient au Rimland.

Quoi qu'il en soit, la guerre froide, d'un point de vue géopolitique, était une bataille pour le Rimland. Moscou a tenté d'étendre son influence - par le biais de partis et de mouvements de gauche - en Europe, au Moyen-Orient, en Asie, en Afrique et en Amérique latine. À une certaine époque, la Chine maoïste faisait également partie d'un camp socialiste unique, c'est-à-dire du Heartland eurasien.

L'attaque de l'Atlantisme

Lorsque l'URSS a commencé à s'affaiblir, les géopoliticiens atlantistes (Z. Brzezinski, R. Gilpin, etc.) ont commencé à penser et à agir de manière plus avant-gardiste. Outre le modèle bipolaire et le déplacement partiel de l'équilibre à la périphérie du monde et le long des contours de l'Eurasie, ils ont commencé à élaborer des concepts plus audacieux, évoquant un monde unipolaire. Ainsi, les idées de Mackinder ont retrouvé leur fraîcheur et leur pertinence. Pour obtenir la victoire décisive et finale de la civilisation de la mer, il fallait briser le bloc de Varsovie, puis de préférence l'URSS, et enfin ce qu'il en restait. En d'autres termes, faire progresser de manière significative le Rimland dans les profondeurs de la terre, en le bridant et en bloquant l'accès aux "mers chaudes", vers lesquelles la Russie tentait constamment de se porter.

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L'un des géopoliticiens atlantistes les plus constants était Zbigniew Brzezinski. À l'époque bipolaire, il soutenait farouchement les forces antisoviétiques en Afghanistan, jusqu'à et y compris Al-Qaïda. Au début des années 80, Brzezinski et Kissinger se sont efforcés de rompre définitivement les derniers liens que la Chine entretenait encore avec l'URSS, en cherchant à l'inclure dans l'économie mondiale et à l'intégrer progressivement dans la civilisation de la mer.

Lorsque les processus destructeurs de l'URSS ont commencé à agir, les atlantistes ont augmenté la pression sur l'Europe de l'Est, provoquant, fomentant et soutenant par tous les moyens possibles des sentiments artificiellement antisoviétiques/russophobes. D'un point de vue géopolitique, le soviétique et le russe coïncidaient à l'époque.

Avec Gorbatchev, l'effondrement rapide du camp socialiste a commencé. La Terre reculait, la Mer avançait. Nous ne devons donc pas être surpris que l'expansion de l'OTAN vers l'Est ait commencé et se soit parachevé. Cette expansion était à l'origine inscrite dans la théorie géopolitique de l'atlantisme. On ne pouvait rien attendre d'autre de la politique atlantiste.

La création de l'anti-Russie

Lorsque l'on a assisté à l'effondrement de l'URSS, les projets de Mackinder visant à démembrer la Russie-Eurasie, redevenaient toujours plus pertinents. Les frontières conditionnelles des républiques au sein d'un État unitaire, entièrement et étroitement contrôlé par le parti communiste, se sont soudainement transformées en frontières d'États-nations souverains. Tous les États post-soviétiques ont été créés selon les moules atlantistes. Ces entités n'ont d'autre sens que d'être anti-russes. L'une de ces "Anti-Russie" était la Fédération de Russie elle-même. Mais parce que la Fédération de Russie occupait le territoire du Heartland, même si elle s'est considérablement réduite, elle représente toujours la Terre ennemie aux yeux des géopoliticiens atlantistes, c'est-à-dire de l'ennemi thalassocratique. Et pour achever l'ennemi, il a fallu pousser l'OTAN plus loin vers l'Eurasie, et aussi tenter de démembrer la Russie elle-même (la première campagne de Tchétchénie, la vague des séparatismes internes à la Fédération de Russie, etc.)

La Russie ne pourra jamais se relancer sans l'Ukraine.

Tous ces processus, Brzezinski les a compris et a contribué à les mettre en pratique (comme Mackinder l'avait fait auparavant). Dans son célèbre livre Le grand échiquier, Brzezinski parle ouvertement de la nécessité de démembrer davantage la Russie, de renforcer le "cordon sanitaire", etc. Plus important encore, Brzezinski comprend le rôle de l'Ukraine dans cette question. Brzezinski dit à son propos que la chose la plus importante est :

    - d'arracher irrévocablement l'Ukraine, alors hésitante, à la Russie,
    - d'en faire un avant-poste de l'Atlantisme et
    - d'imposer à son peuple le nationalisme russophobe comme idéologie principale.

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Sans l'Ukraine, la Russie ne sera jamais en mesure de devenir une puissance souveraine à part entière, un Empire, un pôle indépendant du monde multipolaire. Ainsi, le sort de l'unipolarité et du globalisme (pour Brzezinski, c'est presque la même chose), dépend de la capacité de l'Occident à mettre en œuvre la séparation de l'Ukraine d'avec la Fédération de Russie. Après tout, si la Russie et l'Ukraine s'unissent - d'une manière ou d'une autre, l'unipolarité s'effondrera et la carte géopolitique changera à nouveau de manière irréversible.

La bataille pour l'Ukraine et contre la Russie est une constante historique dans la stratégie géopolitique de l'Occident. Cela explique tout, de la déclaration d'indépendance à la révolution orange Iouchtchenko-Timochenko, en passant par le Maïdan et huit années de préparation intensifiée par Kiev, sous la houlette des instructeurs atlantistes, aux opérations militaires visant à s'emparer du Donbass et de la Crimée.

La naissance de la géopolitique en Russie : L'Eurasie comme sujet

Depuis le début des années 1990 en Russie, juste au moment de l'effondrement de l'URSS et de l'arrivée au pouvoir des agents atlantistes (l'ancien ministre des Affaires étrangères Andrey Kozyrev a directement admis qu'il était un atlantiste), contrairement à l'attitude politique et idéologique de base envers le libéralisme et l'occidentalisme, la Russie - principalement dans les cercles militaires (en particulier, à l'Académie d'état-major militaire) - a commencé à développer sa propre école géopolitique. Elle était basée sur l'eurasisme, car ce sont les premiers Eurasiens russes qui, dans les années 1920, ont décrit la carte géopolitique de la confrontation entre la Russie et l'Occident, en dehors de l'idéologie communiste (les Eurasiens étaient des Blancs). Leurs idées sont les plus adaptées à la situation actuelle, face à l'offensive de l'OTAN à l'Est et aux propres politiques incompréhensibles (par endroits perfides) de Moscou. Les militaires ne pouvaient pas prendre pour amis ceux dont ils enregistraient toutes les heures les intentions et les actions agressives contre la Russie. Mais le gouvernement libéral est resté sourd à la géopolitique. Néanmoins, l'école géopolitique ne pouvait être détruite. Tout le monde était occupé par les processus fascinants de la corruption totale.

La géopolitique expliquait parfaitement ce qui se passait en Europe de l'Est et dans l'espace post-soviétique dans les années 1990 (l'écrasement par la mer de la terre, l'expansion des "cordons sanitaires" et du territoire du Rimland), mais cette compréhension restait à l'intérieur des cercles militaires, qui n'appréciaient guère la politique officielle, mais qui n'avaient à l'époque aucun poids ni aucune influence politique. Les atlantistes, en revanche, ont méthodiquement poursuivi leur cause, nourrissant et renforçant l'anti-Russie, à la fois à l'extérieur et, en partie, au sein même de la Fédération de Russie.

Poutine change le vecteur géopolitique

Tout a changé lorsque Poutine est arrivé au pouvoir. Il a commencé par restaurer la souveraineté de la Russie, à se débarrasser des agents atlantistes qui étaient à la tête du pays, à concentrer et à développer son potentiel militaire, et à renforcer l'unité de la Russie. La deuxième campagne de Tchétchénie, l'introduction des districts fédéraux et les changements dans la législation ont renforcé l'intégrité territoriale et la verticalité du pouvoir. Poutine a progressivement commencé à s'opposer de plus en plus à l'Occident et à mener une politique d'intégration eurasienne dans l'espace post-soviétique. En bref, Poutine a rendu à la Russie le statut de sujet de la géopolitique, et a anénati son état de déréliction, qui faisait d'elle un objet de la géopolitique globale, atlantiste. Il a rejoint de manière consciente et responsable la grande guerre continentale au nom de la Terre.

Cela n'a pas échappé à l'Occident et a entraîné une pression accrue sur les pays post-soviétiques pour qu'ils adoptent une position de plus en plus anti-russe, pour qu'ils s'intègrent plus rapidement aux structures occidentales. Cela a touché tous les pays post-soviétiques, mais surtout l'Ukraine. Il dépendait de l'Ukraine de déterminer si la Russie serait capable ou non de restaurer pleinement sa souveraineté géopolitique. Selon les lois de la géopolitique, sans l'Ukraine, la Russie n'est pas un Empire, pas un pôle, pas une civilisation, mais avec l'Ukraine, elle est un Empire, un pôle et une civilisation. Et cette formule peut être lue depuis deux positions - celle des yeux de la Mer et celle des yeux de la Terre. De toute évidence, Poutine l'a lue avec les yeux de la Terre, car il était et reste le dirigeant du Heartland, conscient et puissant.

Le nationalisme ukrainien comme outil géopolitique de l'Atlantisme

Dans le même temps, l'initiateur des cataclysmes en Ukraine était l'Occident atlantiste. Même les politiques neutres, modérément pro-occidentales - multi-vectorielles - de Kuchma ou de Yanukovich ne convenaient pas aux atlantistes. Ceux-ci ont fait pression sur Kiev pour que l'Ukraine se transforme le plus rapidement possible en une anti-Russie agressive et radicale, attaquante. Dans cette logique, Kiev devait attaquer. 

Cela explique la Révolution orange, le Maïdan et les raisons de l'opération militaire russe actuelle.

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L'Occident se battait pour l'Ukraine. Il faut tenir compte du fait que l'Ukraine n'a pas du tout d'histoire en tant qu'Etat inscrit dans la durée, et que les territoires dans lesquels elle se trouve sont historiquement accidentels et sont le résultat de la créativité administrative des bolcheviks. Lorsque Poutine a justifié l'opération militaire en Ukraine en disant que "Lénine a créé l'Ukraine", il avait parfaitement raison. Cependant, Lénine n'a pas créé l'Ukraine en tant que telle, mais une des zones de contrôle bolchevique parmi d'autres. La nationalité, selon la théorie bolchevique, devait être complètement dépassée dans une société internationale socialiste. Lénine a créé l'Ukraine et l'a en fait immédiatement abolie.

Par conséquent, après 1991, il y avait sur le territoire de l'Ukraine des peuples et des territoires ayant chacun une histoire, une identité, une langue et une culture complètement différentes. La moitié d'entre eux n'étaient pas du tout différents des Russes. La seconde moitié était constituée d'Ukrainiens plus ou moins russifiés. Et seule une écrasante minorité professait une idéologie nationaliste autoproclamée. Mais seule cette minorité était capable, selon les géopoliticiens occidentaux, de transformer les Ukrainiens en une "nation" et ce, à un rythme accéléré. Il s'agissait d'un projet géopolitique atlantiste. Dans d'autres pays, l'Occident a soigneusement éradiqué le nationalisme, surtout dans ses formes radicales. En Ukraine, cependant, l'Occident a agi exactement à l'inverse, soutenant activement toutes les formes de nationalisme jusqu'aux plus extrêmes. Selon les stratèges atlantistes, c'était le seul moyen d'accélérer la formation d'une construction artificielle, rigidement russophobe, un simulacre virtuel de nation. C'est pourquoi la sphère de l'information était si importante, car elle inculquait de manière obsessionnelle aux Ukrainiens une haine infondée des Russes et de tout ce qui unissait nos peuples. Toutes les inepties étaient utilisées, jusqu'à "l'ancienne civilisation des anciens Ukrainiens", ce qui n'aurait provoqué qu'une totale perplexité en Occident. Cependant, toute l'opération était supervisée par les services secrets atlantistes, et c'est pourquoi l'Occident a créé une image artificielle de l'Ukraine comme une jeune démocratie ouvertement vulnérable, souffrant de la menace russe. En fait, un état d'esprit nazi s'est affirmé de manière obsessionnelle dans la société, inextricablement lié à l'atlantisme et même au mondialisme libéral (peu importe combien ces systèmes se contredisent, car le mondialisme nie l'État, et le libéralisme toute identité collective, et surtout l'identité nationale).

L'affrontement final

Le virage russophobe prononcé de Kiev et de l'ensemble de la société ukrainienne est le résultat des événements de Maidan de 2013-2014, qui ont culminé avec l'expulsion et la fuite du président Ianoukovitch. Ianoukovitch n'était ni un politicien pro-russe ni un eurasiste. C'était plutôt un pragmatique à courte vue, mais même cela, du point de vue de l'Occident, était tout aussi inacceptable. L'Occident voulait "tout et pas tout". En regardant la Russie de Poutine se renforcer et en tenant compte des événements de 2008 en Géorgie, où l'Occident a également opposé Saakashvili à la Russie, mais où le résultat n'était clairement pas en faveur de la civilisation de la Mer, les Atlantistes ont décidé d'agir par les méthodes les plus radicales.

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L'actuel président américain Joe Biden, alors vice-président, et d'autres membres de son équipe, comme Victoria Nuland, etc., ont participé très activement au renversement de Ianoukovitch et à la préparation du Maïdan. L'objectif était le même que celui de Mackinder et Brzezinski : arracher enfin l'Ukraine à la Russie et préparer le terrain pour un conflit violent entre Kiev et Moscou.

Poutine a répondu en ramenant la Crimée dans le giron russe et en soutenant le Donbass, mais cela n'a pas résolu le problème sur le plan géopolitique. Poutine a déjoué le plan visant à accélérer l'adhésion de l'Ukraine à l'OTAN, notamment celui qui visait à expulser la marine russe de Sébastopol, il a ensuite empêché les génocides en Crimée et dans le Donbass, mais l'ampleur de l'Ukraine était trop importante pour qu'il puisse poursuivre son offensive eurasienne en 2014 et mener la défense du monde russe à sa conclusion logique. À ce moment-là, la Terre a cessé de réagir. Le processus des accords de Minsk avait commencé, mais d'un point de vue géopolitique, il était évident qu'aucune solution pacifique ne pourrait être trouvée et qu'une confrontation directe se produirait inévitablement tôt ou tard. En outre, les services de renseignement russes ont reçu des informations selon lesquelles la partie ukrainienne ne faisait que profiter de ce report pour préparer une opération militaire dans le Donbass, puis en Crimée.

Les forces nationalistes qui avaient remporté le coup d'État de 2014 à Kiev haïssaient encore plus la Russie, déployaient une propagande massive pour laver le cerveau de la population, lançaient une opération punitive brutale contre les habitants du Donbass, victimes d'un génocide systématique, et préparaient une attaque contre le Donbass et la Crimée d'ici le printemps 2022. Dans le même temps, Kiev, en collaboration avec l'Occident, élaborait des plans pour construire ses propres armes nucléaires. En outre, il y avait des laboratoires biologiques dispersés dans toute l'Ukraine, engagés dans des expériences illégales pour produire des armes biologiques.

Tout cela faisait partie d'une même géostratégie atlantiste.

[1] L'armée blanche (également connue sous le nom de Gardes blancs ou simplement Blancs) était des forces militaires qui ont combattu le régime bolchevique pendant la guerre civile russe.

mercredi, 06 octobre 2021

Aérocratie

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Pavel Toulaev

Aérocratie

L'aérocratie est un terme qui exprime l'une des formes les plus importantes de domination du monde, la domination de l'air.

Au sens strict, le mot "air" désigne l'air qui nous entoure, l'air que nous respirons. Dans un sens plus large, l'air est l'ensemble de l'atmosphère, l'environnement gazeux autour de la terre, et l'espace proche. Il y a ensuite le concept alchimique de l'air, l'un des quatre éléments cosmogoniques (avec l'eau, le feu et la terre). Lui est associée la sphère de l'esprit, qui plane au-dessus de la matière dense et forme le Ciel chrétien.

Pour la Russie, l'air, dans tous ses sens, est un domaine d'une importance capitale. Le cosmos russe, dans sa spécificité, s'adresse dans une plus large mesure au ciel qu'à la terre. Invisible en termes d'espace, et en même temps fermé, autosuffisant, il est plus "aérien" que matériel. Les célèbres paroles de Jean de Cronstadt (photo) selon lesquelles la Sainte Russie a des frontières avec Dieu ont un fondement profond.

jdc.jpgLes particularités du destin historique et de la géographie de la Russie, qui se reflètent naturellement dans les frontières de l'URSS, ont déterminé les grandes lignes de l'Idée russe. Étant multidimensionnelle et supranationale, elle comprend comme éléments essentiels l'idéalisme, la sobornost, l'impérialisme, le colonialisme, le volontarisme, le cosmisme. Tous ces éléments sont reliés à l'élément "air", au ciel, et ont un vecteur divin ou surhumain. Sur le plan religieux, ils indiquent la voie de la perfection intérieure, tandis que sur le plan technique, ils indiquent la sphère de l'expansion extérieure.

Au cours de la première décennie du vingtième siècle, le rêve séculaire des humains de conquérir le ciel a commencé à se réaliser. Les avions ont été fabriqués en production industrielle. Une révolution dans les transports et les communications a commencé. Si, au cours de la Première Guerre mondiale, les avions n'ont eu que des fonctions auxiliaires et que la charge principale du transport était assurée par les transports maritimes et terrestres, l'issue de chaque opération militaire majeure au cours de la Seconde Guerre mondiale dépendait dans une large mesure de la participation de l'aviation. L'URSS, principal vainqueur d'Hitler, avait terminé la guerre avec une puissante flotte aérienne, principale artère de transport du commonwealth socialiste, tandis que son allié temporaire, les États-Unis, avait créé une structure coloniale moderne basée sur l'aviation. 

Un nouveau cycle de rivalité entre les superpuissances s'est développé face aux changements dans l'infrastructure du monde. S'appuyant sur une marine traditionnellement puissante, les pays anglophones, menés par les États-Unis, ont créé un système mondial de "thalassocratie" (pouvoir par la mer) avec l'aide de l'aviation. Ils ont entouré les pays terrestres du Pacte de Varsovie d'un réseau de bases militaires et les ont enfermés dans le continent. Le blocus géopolitique a été complété par le rideau de fer dans le domaine de l'information, plaçant effectivement les Russes en dehors des frontières de la "civilisation occidentale".

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L'URSS et ses nouveaux alliés, principalement à l'Est, n'avaient pas la capacité technique de répondre symétriquement à l'Ouest. L'inévitable solution asymétrique à la division des sphères d'influence a été la course à l'aérospatiale. Le contrôle de la mer, de l'océan mondial et de sa civilisation, ne pouvait être exercé que depuis l'espace. Cette vérité alphabétique de la stratégie militaire, qui découle naturellement de la logique même du développement du monde, a contribué à ce que les projets fantastiques de Tsiolkovsky de coloniser l'Univers commencent à prendre des traits de plus en plus réalistes. 

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La concurrence pour la domination de l'espace a inévitablement entraîné une rivalité dans le domaine de la haute technologie. Deux systèmes de normes, indépendants l'un de l'autre, ont vu le jour. Chaque découverte scientifique et technologique a fini par graviter vers le système soviétique ou américain. La course technologique, qui s'est transformée en une guerre des civilisations, la "guerre froide", a été perdue par l'URSS. Elle a été perdue pour des raisons idéologiques, et non technologiques. 

Aujourd'hui, l'Occident, qui triomphe sur ses lauriers, nous propose, au lieu du désarmement idéologique, un désarmement militaro-technique. Cette politique est menée sous le couvert de la lutte pour la paix et un environnement propre à travers des projets dits communs, des sociétés mixtes et des programmes internationaux. Cette coopération, pour ne pas dire plus, ne reflète pas toujours les intérêts russes. Les sponsors étrangers nous accordent des prêts temporaires et en échange, ils reçoivent des informations stratégiquement importantes. 

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L'histoire de la lutte pour la station orbitale Mir et le projet Alpha en est un exemple typique. Ayant reçu un montant relativement faible pour la modernisation de l'industrie aéronautique, la partie russe a en fait volontairement remis l'initiative stratégique entre les mains des États-Unis et de ses partenaires de l'OTAN. Si la station Mir était un symbole de l'ère soviétique dans l'histoire de l'aérocratie, Alpha est en train de devenir un symbole de la domination américaine dans l'espace.

Il est également important de comprendre que l'aérocratie moderne est étroitement liée à la médiocratie - le pouvoir dans le domaine de l'information. Toutes les formes de communication les plus récentes, où la haute technologie a été introduite (télévision, radio, ordinateur, téléphone), sont réalisées à travers "l'air" ou "l'espace". 

Dans les nouvelles conditions, la lutte pour le ciel acquiert d'autres caractéristiques. Cependant, les anciens problèmes - spirituels, économiques, de colonisation - ne sont pas abolis, mais seulement élevés à un nouveau niveau. La question de savoir à qui appartiendra le "ciel" réside finalement dans la solution du problème de la domination elle-même. 

Faisons donc tout ce qui est en notre pouvoir pour que la jeune génération du peuple russe remporte une victoire décisive dans la bataille pour les sphères d'influence stratégiques et que, lors d'un défilé festif, elle répète fièrement les paroles de ses grands-pères : "Hourra ! Le ciel est à nous ! L'espace est à nous !".

14:27 Publié dans Définitions | Lien permanent | Commentaires (0) | Tags : définition, aérocratie, urss, russie, air, éléments | |  del.icio.us | | Digg! Digg |  Facebook

lundi, 17 août 2020

Zinoviev et le grand avènement de la démocratie totalitaire

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Zinoviev et le grand avènement de la démocratie totalitaire

par Nicolas Bonnal

Alexandre Zinoviev devint un dissident de la société mondiale après avoir été un dissident soviétique. A l’époque il y avait des dissidents, maintenant, comme dit Paul Virilio, il n’y a plus que des dissuadés.

En 1998 le maître répond à une interview et explique que tout allait bien à l’ouest quand nous étions sous la menace soviétique (le capital avait peur) :

« Pendant la guerre froide, la démocratie était une arme dirigée contre le communisme, mais elle avait l’avantage d’exister. On voit d’ailleurs aujourd’hui que l’époque de la guerre froide a été un point culminant de l’histoire de l’Occident. Un bien être sans pareil, un extraordinaire progrès social, d’énormes découverts scientifiques et techniques, tout y était!»

La fin du communisme fut le crépuscule de nos droits sociaux et politiques (fin de l’Histoire !) :

« Mais la fin du communisme a aussi marqué la fin de la démocratie, notre époque aujourd’hui n’est pas que post communiste, elle est aussi post démocratique. Nous assistons aujourd’hui à l’instauration du totalitarisme démocratique, ou si vous préférez à l’instauration de la démocratie totalitaire. »

30046266853.jpgZinoviev décrit très bien le redoutable mondialisme qui naît du défunt et redouté communisme :

« Aujourd’hui nous vivons dans un monde dominé par une idéologie unique, un fait unique, par un parti unique mondialiste. La constitution de ce dernier a commencé à  l’époque de la guerre froide, quand des structures transnationales se sont mises en œuvre sous les formes les plus diverses : médias, sociétés bancaires, sociétés commerciales…Malgré leurs différents secteurs d’activités, ces forces étaient unies par leur nature supranationale. Avec la chute du communisme, elles se sont retrouvées aux commandes du monde. »

Cette démarche est suicidaire, qui va à terme, avec la crise du Covid, nous priver de nos libertés, de nos économies et aussi (pourquoi pas ?) de nos vies :

 « Les pays occidentaux sont donc dominateurs, mais aussi dominés car perdent progressivement leur souveraineté au profit de ce que j’appelle la «supra société». Elle est constituée d’entreprises commerciales et non commerciales dont la zone d’influence dépasse les nations. Les pays occidentaux sont soumis comme les autres au contrôle de ces structures non nationales… Or la souveraineté des nations est elle aussi une part considérable et constituante du pluralisme, donc de la démocratie, à l’échelle de la planète. »

Zinoviev comprend l’horreur européenne :

« L’intégration Européenne qui se déroule sous nos yeux, provoque elle la disparition du pluralisme au sein de ce conglomérat, au profit d’un pouvoir supranational. »

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Il comprend que nous ne connaîtrons plus de démocratie politique ou économique comme à l’époque de la guerre froide :

« Les pays occidentaux ont connu une vraie démocratie à l’époque de la guerre froide. Les partis politiques avaient de vraies divergences idéologiques et des programmes politiques différents. Les organes de presse avaient des différences marquées, eux aussi. Tout cela influençait la vie des gens, contribuait à leur bien-être. C’est bien fini.

Parce le capitalisme démocratique et prospère, celui des lois sociales et des garanties d’emploi devait beaucoup à l’épouvantail communiste. L’attaque massive contre les droits sociaux à l’ouest a commencé avec la chute du communisme à l’ouest. »

les-hauteurs-beantes-141693-264-432.jpgA la fin des années 90  les socialistes sont de pures canailles (voyez aussi les excellents pamphlets de Guy Hocquenghem et de mon éditeur Thierry Pfister qui datent des années 80) :

« Aujourd’hui les socialistes au pouvoir dans la plupart des pays d’Europe mènent une politique de démantèlement social qui détruit tout ce qu’il y avait de plus socialiste justement dans les pays capitalistes. Il n’existe plus en occident de force politique capable de défendre les humbles. L’existence des partis politiques est purement formelle. Leurs différences s’estompent chaque jour d’avantage. »

C’est le totalitarisme financier jadis expliqué par Paddy Chayefsky dans Network (1976) :

« La démocratie tend aussi à disparaître de l’organisation sociale occidentale.

Cette super structure non démocratique donne des ordres, sanctionne, bombarde, affame. Même Clinton s’y conforme. Le totalitarisme financier a soumis les pouvoirs politiques. Le totalitarisme financier est froid. Il ne connaît ni la pitié, ni les sentiments. Les dictatures politiques sont pitoyables en comparaison de ce totalitarisme-là. Une certaine résistance était possible au sein des dictatures les plus dures, aucune révolte n’est possible contre une banque. »

L’andouille qui interroge Zinoviev l’accuse déjà de Théo rire du complot quand Zinoviev ne pratique que la théorie de la constatation. Zinoviev rappelle que nous sommes très abrutis :

« Nous sommes dans une époque post idéologique mais en réalité la supra idéologie du monde occidental diffusée au cours des 20 dernières années est bien plus forte que l’idéologie communiste ou nationale-socialiste. Le citoyen occidental est bien plus abruti que ne l’était le soviétique moyen par la propagande communiste. Dans le domaine idéologique, l’idée importe moins que les mécanismes de sa diffusion. Or la puissance de diffusion des médias occidentaux est énorme. (…) Il suffit que la décision soit prise de stigmatiser un Karadzic ou un Milosevic et ça y est, une machine de propagande planétaire se met en branle. Et alors qu’il faudrait juger les dirigeants occidentaux pour viol de toutes les règles de droit existants… La majorité des citoyens occidentaux sont persuadés que la guerre contre la Serbie était juste. »

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Puis Zinoviev fait une remarque intéressante sur un sujet que j’avais évoqué dans la presse russe (pravda.ru) :

« L’Occident se méfiait moins de la puissance militaire soviétique que de son potentiel intellectuel, artistique, sportif. Parce qu’il dénotait une extraordinaire vitalité. Or c’est la première chose à détruire chez son ennemi. Et c’est ce qui a été fait. La science Russe dépend aujourd’hui des financements Américains. Et est dans un état pitoyable, car ses derniers n’ont aucun intérêt à faire travailler leurs concurrents. Ils préfèrent faire travailler les avants Russes aux Etats-Unis. Le cinéma soviétique a lui aussi été détruit et remplacé par le cinéma Américain. »

Le destin de l’Amérique est d’abrutir et de « fabriquer de la merde » comme me disait un jour le grand et courageux cinéaste Richard Brooks :

51TneYRmBmL._AC_UL600_SR414,600_.jpg« En littérature, c’est la même chose. La domination mondiale s’exprime, avant tout, par le diktat intellectuel ou culturel si vous préférez. Voilà pourquoi les Américains s’acharnent depuis des décennies à faire baisser le niveau culturel et intellectuel du monde : ils veulent baisser au leur pour pouvoir exercer ce diktat. »

J’ai évoqué ces réalités dans mes textes sur la culture comme arme de destruction massive. Regardez ce qu’ils ont fait de l’Inde ou de l’Asie… Tous abonnés à Marvel comics ! Même Scorsese ou Ridley Scott s’en sont plaint…

Tout cela est irrésistible car c’est malheureusement un vieux processus. C’est l’uniformisation entamée depuis la Renaissance. Ici Zinoviev rejoint Spengler et René Guénon :

« Le processus d’uniformisation du monde ne peut être arrêté dans l’avenir prévisible. Car le totalitarisme démocratique est la dernière phase de l’évolution de la société occidentale. Evolution commencée à la Renaissance. »

Sources :

Extrait du livre d’Alexandre Zinoviev: «La grande rupture» Disponible à l’age d’homme. L’entretien à été réalisé par Victor Loupan à Munich en juin 1999 quelques jours avant le retour définitif de Zinoviev en Russie.

https://alexandrelatsa.ru/2008/01/la-grande-rupture-analy...

https://www.pravdareport.com/opinion/122042-western_cultu...

https://strategika.fr/2020/08/07/la-culture-moderne-comme...

https://www.amazon.fr/CULTURE-COMME-ARME-DESTRUCTION-MASS...

 

 

 

dimanche, 09 août 2020

The Prison Plays of Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn

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The Prison Plays of Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn

Ex: http://www.counter-currents.com

Known mostly as a novelist, memoirist, and historian, Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn had actually completed four plays before his first novel, One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich, was published in 1962. He composed his first two, Victory Celebrations and Prisoners, while a zek in the Soviet Gulag system in 1952. These Solzhenitsyn composed in verse and memorized before burning since prisoners were forbidden to own even scraps of paper. His third play, the title of which is most commonly translated into English as The Love-Girl and the Innocent, he composed outside of the gulag in 1954 while recovering from cancer. In writing Love-Girl, he rejoiced in his ability to actually type and hide his manuscript, rather than keep it all bottled up in his head. [1] [1] Solzhenitsyn composed his final play, Candle in the Wind, in 1960 in an earnest attempt to become a Soviet playwright. Where his earlier plays exposed the evil and corruption of the gulag system — and beyond that, impugned the Soviet Union for its unworkable Marxist-Leninist ideology, disastrous collectivization policies, totalitarian government, and ubiquitous cult of personality in Stalinism — Candle in the Wind avoided politics altogether. It takes place in an unspecified international setting and focuses on the dangerous effects of untrammeled technological progress on the human soul. Of all his plays, Candle in the Wind has the least relevance to the political Right. It also cannot be classified as a prison play, despite how its main character had recently been released from prison.

It would be fair to describe Solzhenitsyn’s first two prison plays as “apprentice works,” in the words of his biographer Michael Scammell. [2] [2] And this is not just in comparison to Solzhenitsyn’s most famous and successful volumes such as One Day and the sprawling Gulag Archipelago. Victory Celebrations and Prisoners do come across as uneven and amateurish. Excessive dialogue makes the reading tedious at times. Solzhenitsyn always had the historian’s impulse to explain and the prophet’s impulse to warn, and seemed to doggedly follow both impulses while writing these plays. As a result, purely narrative elements such as plot and character tend to suffer. Further, many of the themes appearing in his prison plays resurface in more complete form in both One Day and Gulag as well as in his other early novels Cancer Ward and In the First Circle.

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Regardless, it is in his three prison plays where Solzhenitsyn’s conservative, Christian, ethnonationalist, and anti-Leftist outlook appears as firm as it does in his later works. It’s as if the man never changed, other than spending the last forty-eight years of his life not writing plays. Even if he had stopped writing altogether by 1960, his prison plays still would have had value to the Right for their keen perception of human nature under the most trying circumstances as well as for their conveyance of the cruelties and absurdities brought about by an oppressive communist ideology that is wholly at odds with human nature. That Solzhenitsyn had produced works that were much greater than these three plays later in his career is no reason for any student of the Right to exclude them from study.

Victory Celebrations

Burdened with a loose plot, excessive dialogue, and an awkwardly large cast of characters, Victory Celebrations (also called Feast of the Conquerors) takes place during the last days of World War II in which a Soviet artillery battalion prepares a lavish victory banquet in the Prussian mansion they had just captured. The play switches back and forth from the minor characters opining their various frustrations with the Soviet regime to what could be a political — potentially deadly — love triangle. This relationship is the heart of the play and produces its only real suspense, brief and poignant as it is.

Galina, a Russian girl living in Vienna, had traveled to Prussia to be with her fiancé who is fighting with the doomed Russian Liberation Army (a force of disgruntled Red Army POWs and anti-Soviet, pro-White Russian émigrés whom had been conscripted by the Germans). Before the story begins, however, she is captured by the battalion and convinces them that she had been a prisoner of the Germans working as a slave girl. Believing her, they invite her to take part in the upcoming celebration.

Counter-intelligence officer Gridnev, however, sees through her and suspects that she is a spy. Any Russian person who has had exposure to the enemy must be held suspect, and Gridnev quickly threatens her with imprisonment if she does not confess all. But Galina is also beautiful, and Gridnev soon finds himself falling in love (or lust) with her. This causes him to append a promise to his threats — if she sleeps with him, he’ll protect her.

While agonizing over this dilemma, Galina meets Captain Nerzhin, a childhood friend of hers. To him, she tells the truth. Nerzhin, being an honest and honorable soldier, empathizes and sees the justice in her position. How could not when Galina delivers a speech such as this?

The U.S.S.R.! It’s impenetrable forest! A forest. It has no laws. All it has is power — power to arrest and torture, with or without laws. Denunciations, spies, filling in of forms, banquets and prizewinners, Magnitogorsk and birch-bark shoes. A land of miracles! A land of worn-out, frightened, bedraggled people, while all those leaders on their rostrums. . . each one’s a hog. The foreign tourists who see nothing but well organized collective farms, Potyemkin style. The school-children who denounce their parents, like that boy Morozov. Behind black leather doors there are traps rather than rooms. Along the rivers Vychegda and Kama there are camps five times the size of France. Wherever you look you see epaulettes with that poisonous blue strip; you see widows, whose husbands are still alive. . .

Now Nerzhin faces a dilemma of his own: shepherding this woman to her fiancé just as Soviet forces are about to crush the Russian Liberation Army will not only be physically dangerous but will make himself vulnerable to a charge of treason. Can he trust anyone in his battalion? Yes, his fellows may see through the corruption and hypocrisy of the Soviet authorities or find fault with Marxism. For example, one tells the harrowing story of how a series of unjust NKVD arrests nearly wiped out an entire town. Another relays the humorous story of how, as an art student, his instructors imagined they saw a swastika in his painting. Despite this, these men wish to survive in the current system, as absurd as it is. They just don’t want to think about it, and thus choose to bow to evil.

Major Vanin says it best:

Thinking is the last thing you want to do. There is authority. There are orders. No one grows fat from thinking. You’ll get your fingers burnt from thinking. The less you know, the better you sleep. When ordered to turn that steering wheel, you turn it.

But with Galina, there is clearly so much more. During her dialogue with Nerzhin, she keeps distinguishing “us” from “them,” and soon a leitmotiv evolves involving loyalty. Galina expresses loyalty to the Russian people and never doubts herself. Nerzhin professes loyalty to the Russian nation — or, at the very least, its military. Meanwhile, Gridnev expresses loyalty to the current Russian government and its inhuman machinations as laid down by the genocidal Stalin. Of course, Gridnev never strays far from his own selfish designs.

Contemporary Soviet audiences, likely still bruising from the Second World War, would most likely have reacted negatively to the Galina character simply for her traitorous support of the RLA. Nevertheless, later audiences, even Russian ones, carry less baggage and will likely see her as the most sympathetic character in the play. At one point, she rejects the terms “Comrade” and “Citizen” and avers that the more traditional courtesy titles of “Sir” and “Madam” are more civilized. She had studied music in Vienna and remains in thrall of great Germanic classical composers such as Mozart and Haydn despite her love of Russia. Clearly, she represents the world that preceded the Soviets. She is the only tragic character in the story, since she symbolizes Solzhenitsyn’s own ethnonationalism, but only under a cloud of death or unspeakable oppression. She’s also the only character moved enough by romantic love to put herself at great risk — even if all it will amount to is her dying by her lover’s side in a hail of artillery fire.

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Solzhenitsyn could express his sympathy for this heartbreaking character (and presage the stirring ending of his story Matryona’s House) no better than in the admiring words of Nerzhin:

“I’ve no fears for the fate of Russia while there are women like you.”

Prisoners

Originally titled Decembrists Without December, Prisoners suffers to a greater extent than Victory Celebrations from a thin, meandering plot, a bloated dramatis personae, and excessive dialogue. It lacks even the scraps of narrative formalism found in the earlier play, and instead resembles the dialogues of Plato for of its reliance upon dialectic. The events take place in a gulag wherein the mostly-male cast discuss the absurdities of Soviet oppression, argue the merits and demerits of communism, and endure ludicrous interrogations from counter-intelligence officers. Most of the characters were based on people Solzhenitsyn himself knew. Further, several of the characters appear in later, more famous works, such as Vorotyntsev (The Red Wheel), Rubin (In the First Circle), and Pavel Gai (The Love-Girl and the Innocent).

While much weaker than Victory Celebrations in terms of plot, character, and resolution, Prisoners far surpasses it in astute political commentary as well as in philosophical and historical discourse. In its many debates, Solzhenitsyn does not always demonize the representatives of the Soviet system and sometimes puts wise, thoughtful, or otherwise honest words in their mouths. This leads to some fascinating reading (as opposed to what would seem like tedious chatting onstage). On the whole, however, Prisoners devastates the Soviet Union in a way that would have invited much more than mere censure in that repressive regime. Solzhenitsyn had to keep the play close to his chest for many years, and revealed its existence only after his exile in the West during the 1970s. Had the KGB ever acquired the play, it is likely there would not have been an exile for Solzhenitsyn at all.

Due to the narrative’s unmoored rambling, examples of Solzhenitsyn’s incisive observations can appear with little context and in list form. The relevance to the broader struggle of the Right in all cases should become clear.

We clutch at life with convulsive intensity — that’s how we get caught. We want to go on living at any, any price. We accept all the degrading conditions, and this way we save — not ourselves — we save the persecutor. But he who doesn’t value his life is unconquerable, untouchable. There are such people! And if you become one of them, then it’s not you but your persecutor who’ll tremble!

Far too many on the Right today meekly accept the degrading, second-class citizenship imposed upon us by the racial egalitarian Left. If more of us could value our lives a little less and the Truth a little more, perhaps this unnatural state of affairs could be overturned.

Here, now, we’re all traitors to our country. Cut down the raspberries — mow down the blackcurrants. But that’s not what I got arrested for. I got arrested for infringing on the regulations. I issued extra bread to the collective farm women. Without it, they would have died before the spring. I wasn’t doing it for my own good — I had enough food at home.

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Aside from revealing the murderous lack of concern that the Soviet authorities had for their own people, this passage reveals how the Left does not merely value some lives over others but becomes by policy quite hostile to those lives it values least. In today’s struggles, whites in the West who act in their racial interests are meeting with increasing hostility from our Leftist elites, while these same elites actively encourage non-whites to act in their racial interests.

Of course, Solzhenitsyn’s proud ethnonationalism (as expressed by his angst-filled love for Russia) shines through the text as well.

They are ringing the bell. They are ringing for Vespers. . . O Russia, can this ever come back again? Will you ever be yourself? I have lived on your soil for twenty-six years, I spoke Russian, listened to Russian, but never knew what you were, my country! . . .

In some cases, the dialogue becomes downright witty. Take, for example, the absurd interrogation scene between intelligence officer Mymra and Sergeant Klimov, who had been captured in battle by the Germans:

Mymra: Prisoner Klimov. You are here to answer questions, not to ask them. You could be locked up in a cell for refusing to answer questions. Personally, we are ready to die for our leader. Question three: what was your aim when you gave yourself up? Why didn’t you shoot yourself?

Klimov: I was waiting to see if the Divisional Commander would shoot himself first. However, he managed to escape to Moscow by ‘plane out of the encirclement and then got promoted.

Mymra (writing down): Answer. I gave myself up, my aim being to betray my socialist country. . .

Klimov: We-ell, well. You can put it like that…

The Rubin character in Prisoners is no different than his namesake in In the First Circle — a friendly, erudite apologist for communism, and clearly Jewish. Just as in the novel, Prisoner’s Rubin insists that he’d been incarcerated by mistake and that, regardless of his personal circumstances, he remains a true believer in the Soviet system. At one point, in the middle of the play, he is beset upon by his angry co-inmates who challenge him to defend Soviet atrocities such as blockading Ukraine and starving millions into submission. Rubin explains that the great socialist revolutions and slave rebellions of the past had failed because they showed too much leniency towards their former oppressors. They doubted the justice of their cause. He then praises the Soviet Revolution as the product of “unconquerable” science and laments that it has had only twenty-five years to produce results.

. . . you unhappy, miserable little people, whose petty lives have been squeezed by the Revolution, all you can do is distort its very essence, you slander its grand, bright march forward, you pour slops over the purple vestments of humanity’s highest dreams!

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Rubin fixates upon the same wide, historical vista that all Leftists do when they wish to explain away failure or atrocity. Conservative debunking of this arrogant folly is as old as Edmund Burke. In Solzhenitsyn’s case, however, he depicts it with almost cringe-worthy realism when he humanizes Rubin as a reasonable and enthusiastic, if misguided, adherent of the Left. We actually grow to like Rubin, especially at the end of the play when he leads a choir of zeks in song as Vorotyntsev contemplates his fate with the others.

The most memorable scene in Prisoners occurs towards the end when Vorotyntsev debates a dying counter-intelligence officer named Rublyov. In this debate we have perhaps Solzhenitsyn’s most eloquent affirmation of the Right as a way of life, and not just as a reaction to the totalitarian Left. Vorotyntsev claims to have fought in five wars on the side of Monarchy or Reaction — all of which were ultimately lost: the Russian-Japanese War, World War I, the Russian Civil War, the Spanish Civil War, World War II (on the side of the Russian Liberation Army). When Rublyov taunts him for this colossal losing streak, Vorotyntsev speaks of “some divine and limitless plan for Russia which unfolds itself slowly while our lives are so brief” and then responds that he never wavered in his fight against the Left because he felt the truth was always on his side. All that Rublyov ever had on his side was ideology. He explains:

You persecuted our monarchy, and look at the filth you established instead. You promised paradise on earth, and gave us Counter-Intelligence. What is especially cheering is that the more your ideas degenerate, the more obviously all your ideology collapses, the more hysterically you cling to it.

When Rublyov accuses the Right of having its own executioners, Vorotyntsev responds, “not the same quantity. Not the same quality,” and proceeds to compare the twenty thousand political prisoners of the Tsar to the twenty million political prisoners of the Soviets.

The horror is that you grieve over the fate of a few hundred Party dogmatists, but you care nothing about twelve million hapless peasants, ruined and exiled in the Tundra. The flower, the spirit of an annihilated nation do not exude curses on your conscience.

In this, Vorotyntsev makes the crucial point of the Right’s moral superiority to the Left. Note his similarity to Rubin in positing a plan as broad as history. For Rubin, however, it is Man’s plan, an atheist’s plan. It is hubris in action, a contrivance of pride. For Vorotyntsev, on the other hand, it is God’s plan — not something he can begin to understand. All he can do is to live according to Truth as he sees it and according to his nature as a human being.

It’s hard to find a more stark distinction between Left and Right than this.

The Love-Girl and the Innocent

Of Solzhenitsyn’s prison plays, The Love-Girl and the Innocent works best. This perhaps explains why it has been staged most often and continues to be put on today. Notably, the BBC produced a television adaptation of Love-Girl in 1973. Love-Girl resembles most closely what most people expect when they read or see a play: Four acts; a beginning, middle, and end; three-dimensional, evolving characters; and a plot filled with conflict, action, and suspense. We could quibble with some of Solzhenitsyn’s authorial choices, such as making the lead character Nerzhin too passive towards the end, employing too many characters (again), or his general lack of focus regarding some of the plot. Nevertheless, that Solzhenitsyn manages to pursue many of the profound themes from Victory Celebrations and Prisoners to their poignant conclusions in Love-Girl as well as explore new ones that would reach their apotheosis in later works such as Gulag Archipelago makes Love-Girl and the Innocent, in this reviewer’s opinion, the first of Solzhenitsyn’s great narrative works.

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As in Victory Celebrations, we have a potentially deadly love triangle — but one that achieves greater meaning since the audience can now experience the love and all its wide-ranging consequences. In Victory Celebrations, the story takes place during a lull in the action, with all the real action having already happened or will happen in the near future. The battalion had just captured a mansion and plans to advance on the RLA’s position the next day. By the play’s end, Galina’s fate swings between Gridnev’s protection and Nerzhin’s. Will she become Gridnev’s mistress? Will she be shot or be incarcerated in a gulag? Will Nerzhin take her to her fiancé before the Soviet forces attack? Will she even survive? Note also how this love triangle is not entirely real since Nerzhin, despite his demonstrable affection for Galina, can only serve as a stand-in for her fiancé.

In Love-Girl, all the appropriate action happens on stage and in the here and now. There are no stand-ins. It takes place in a gulag in 1945 where the love is real, agonizing, and immediate. It is also multifaceted, since there are technically two love triangles occurring simultaneously. The “love-girl” of the title is a beautiful and compassionate female inmate named Lyuba, while the “innocent” is Rodion Nemov, an officer recently taken in from the front who is committed to behaving as honorably as possible while in the gulag. The third point in the triangle is Timofey Mereshchun, the prison’s fat, repulsive doctor who promises Lyuba privileges and protection in return for sex. He also has the power to send her off to camps in much harsher climates where her chances of survival would become drastically reduced.

The other love triangle involves another beautiful female inmate named Granya. She is a former Red Army sniper incarcerated not for political reasons, like many of the others, but because she murdered her husband while on furlough after finding him in flagrante delicto with another woman. It’s as if Solzhenitsyn could not decide which woman he was in love with more while writing the play. The men vying for Granya’s affections are an honest and feisty bricklaying foreman named Pavel Gai (first seen in Prisoners) and the corrupt and cruel camp commandant Boris Khomich.

Aside from Solzhenitsyn’s now-familiar themes of ethnonationalism, ethno-loyalty, exposing Soviet atrocities, and impugning communist ideology, Love-Girl also introduces the theme of honor vs. corruption. When the play begins, Nemov is responsible for increasing efficiency in prison work. And he does a fine job, noting how the camp authorities could increase productivity by easing up on the harsh exploitation of the prisoners and cutting much of the self-serving and politically-appointed administrative personnel. He quickly runs afoul of the shady and perfidious ruling class of the camp, however, when he demands that the bookkeeper Solomon turn over a recent shipment of boots to the workers rather than divvy them up among his cronies.

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Solomon, along with Mereshchun and Khomich, take their revenge soon after when they manipulate the drunken and irresponsible camp commandant Ovchukhov into transferring Nemov to general work duties while replacing him with the depraved Khomich. In the battle between honor and corruption, honor never has a chance. And, as if to infuriate the audience even further, Solzhenitsyn reveals how Khomich has a few ideas for the commandant, all of which involve increasing the corruption in the camp and turning the screws harder on the prisoners. These ideas include:

  • Issuing the minimum bread guarantee after 101 percent work fulfillment, instead of 100 percent.
  • Forcing the workers to over-fulfill their work requirements to have an extra bowl of porridge.
  • Not allowing prisoners to receive parcels from the post office unless they have fulfilled 120 percent of their work norms.
  • Not allowing men and women to meet unless they have fulfilled 150 percent of their work norms.
  • Building a grand house for Commandant Ovchukhov in time for the anniversary of the October Revolution.

Khomich puts it succinctly and smugly: “They’ll realize: either work like an ox or drop dead.”

The Love-Girl and the Innocent is also notable because of how Solzhenitsyn employs its Jewish characters. Prisoners’ Rubin certainly defends the Soviet orthodoxy and the atrocities it entailed. But at least he’s honest, thoughtful, and friendly about it — which certainly counterbalances some of the audience’s negative feelings for him. Love-Girl’s Jews, however, are not only ugly, corrupt, and cruel, they’re stereotypical as well.

Scammell, in summarizing Jewish-Soviet émigré Mark Perakh’s analysis [3] [5] of Solzhenitsyn’s supposed anti-Semitism, writes:

It was in certain of Solzhenitsyn’s other works, however, the Perhakh found the most to criticize, notably in Solzhenitsyn’s early play The Tenderfoot and the Tart. [4] [6] Again, the three Jews in the play — Arnold Gurvich, Boris Khomich, and the bookkeeper named Solomon — were all representatives of evil, but this time grossly and disgustingly so, and Solomon was the very incarnation of the greedy, crafty, influential “court Jew,” manipulating the “simple” Russian camp commandant and oozing guile and corruption. As it happened, Solomon was modeled on the real-life prototype of Isaak Bershader, [5] [7] whom Solzhenitsyn had met at Kaluga Gate and later described at length in volume 3 of The Gulag Archipelago. . . [6] [8]

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Solzhenitsyn’s habit during his early period was to include characters based on people he personally knew. In this reviewer’s opinion, he often did so to the detriment of the work itself. Why include such a bewildering array of characters in his already wordy volumes when he could have condensed them into fewer characters for more pithy and forceful results? In some cases, Solzhenitsyn didn’t even bother to change his characters’ names: for example, the fervent Christian Evgeny Divnich (Prisoners) and the Belgian theater director Camille Gontoir (Love-Girl).

Thus, when Solzhenitsyn portrays gulag Jews doing evil things in recognizably Jewish ways, it’s probably because he was being true to what he witnessed in the gulag. It was not Solzhenitsyn’s style to invent a Shylock or Fagin out of thin air just to annoy Jewish people, just as he did not employ anti-Russian stereotypes for the sake of stereotyping. He portrays the Russian thieves in Love-Girl as particularly vile. And the simple-minded, corrupt, and drunken commandant Ovchukhov is no better. There should be no doubt that prisoner Solzhenitsyn had known and dealt with the flesh-and-blood prototypes of many of the characters appearing in his plays.

Regardless, that Solzhenitsyn refused to self-censor his negative Jewish characters while also refusing to include positive ones for the sake of political correctness should tell us something about the ethnocentric line he drew between Russians and Jews. He did not consider Jews as Russians, and he did not care if certain Jews got upset over this. If being labeled an anti-Semite by some is the price to pay for his honesty, his rejection of civic nationalism, and his profound love for his nation and his people, then so be it. [7] [9]

There is quite a bit in The Love-Girl and the Innocent that will resonate with the Right. It was probably unintended by Solzhenitsyn that such a meta-analysis of the Jewish Question would do so as well.

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Notes

[1] [12] Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, The Oak and the Calf. New York: Harper & Row, 1975, p. 4.

[2] [13] Michael Scammell, Solzhenitsyn: A Biography. New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 1984, p. 330.

[3] [14] Scammell writes of Perakh’s analysis (page 960):

Perakh’s article, a kind of summa of those that had gone before, had appeared in Russian in the émigré magazine Vrennia i My (Time and We) in February 1976 before being published in English in Midstream.

[4] [15] The Love-Girl and the Innocent appears under several titles in English. These include The Tenderfoot and the Tart (as preferred by Scammell), The Greenhorn and the Camp-Whore, and The Paragon and the Paramour. Scammell (on page 217) has this to say about it:

The question of what to call this play in English is problematical. Solzhenitsyn’s Russian title Olen’ I shalashovka is based on camp slang. Olen’ (literally “deer”) means a camp novice, and shalashovka (derived from shalash, meaning a rough hunter’s cabin or bivouac) means a woman prisoner who agrees to sleep with a trusty or with trusties in exchange for food and privileges—not quite a whore, more a tart or tramp. The published English title The Love-Girl and the Innocent seems to me to catch none of this raciness.

[5] [16] I believe that both Scammell and Solzhenitsyn biographer D.M. Thomas overlooked something regarding Solzhenitsyn’s basing of Solomon on Bershader in Love-Girl. It seems to me that Solzhenitsyn based both the bookkeeper Solomon and the doctor Mereshchun on Bershader. The connection with Solomon is based on their shared profession (bookkeeping) and the fact that they were both corrupt, cunning, manipulative trusties in the gulag. But Solomon only appears in two scenes in Love-Girl and has nothing to do with any of the female inmates (Thomas falsely claims that Solomon was “adept at corrupting women prisoners”). The episode with Bershader in The Gulag Archipelago depicts him laying siege to and ultimately corrupting a beautiful and virtuous Russian woman prisoner, which Solomon does not do. Bershader is also described by Solzhenitsyn as “a fat, dirty old stock clerk” who is “nauseating in appearance.” Solzhenitsyn first describes Solomon, on the other hand, as carrying himself “with great dignity” and looking “sharp by camp standards.” Later, he describes Solomon as “very neatly dressed.”

On the other hand, Mereshchun is described as a “fat, thick-set fellow,” which is more in keeping with Bershader’s appearance. Further, Mereshchun enthusiastically corrupts the female inmates. In fact, in his first line of dialogue, he announces: “I cannot sleep without a woman.” After being reminded that he had kicked his last woman out of bed, he responds, “I’d had enough of her, the shit bag.” Clearly, Mereshchun is as revolting as Bershader. He also engages in the same exploitive behavior with women. Could Mereshchun also have been based on Bershader?

In a curious moment in Love-Girl, Solzhenitsyn describes how Mereshchun immediately strikes up a friendship with Khomich the moment he meets him. It was as if they recognized and understood each other without the need of a formal introduction. Could it be that in Solzhenitsyn’s mind they were both Jewish? It’s hard to say. Mereshchun is an odd name, but it could be a Russianized Jewish one, and in the Soviet Union during that time, doctors were disproportionately Jewish. On the other hand, few Russian Jews would be named Timofey. Perhaps Solzhenitsyn meant for this character to have enigmatic origins.

M. Thomas, Alexander Solzhenitsyn: A Century in his Life. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1998, p. 492.

[6] [17] Scammell, pp. 960-961.

[7] [18] Thomas (page 490) conveys an astonishingly hysterical example of gentile-bashing from Jewish writer Lev Navrozov who really did not like Solzhenitsyn:

An émigré from 1972, Navrozov denounced Solzhenitsyn’s “xenophobic trash.” He is “a Soviet small-town provincial who doesn’t know any language except his semiliterate Russian and fantasizes in his xenophobic insulation”; August 1914 was as intellectually shabby as The Protocols of the Elders of Zion — but that turn-of-the-century forgery, purporting to show that the Jews were plotting world domination, was actually “superior” in its language to the Solzhenitsyn. . . . His style shows a “comical ineptness”; Navrozov writes that when Ivan Denisovich appeared, he thought its author might develop into a minor novelist, but Khrushchev’s use of him to strike the Stalinists, and his subsequent persecution, made him strut like a bearded Tolstoy, so “this semiliterate provincial, who has finally found his vocation — anti-Semitic hackwork — has been sensationalized into an intellectual colossus. . .

 

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jeudi, 11 juin 2020

Comment des «samouraïs russes» se sont battus pour le Japon lors de la Seconde Guerre mondiale

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Comment des «samouraïs russes» se sont battus pour le Japon lors de la Seconde Guerre mondiale

Les Russes sont peut-être les seuls Européens à s'être portés volontaires afin de se battre pour la création de la sphère de coprospérité de la Grande Asie orientale, sous l'égide du Japon. Mais ils avaient aussi leurs propres objectifs.

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La victoire des bolcheviks lors de la guerre civile russe a contraint des centaines de milliers de Russes à quitter le pays. Avec leurs enfants, ils ne cessaient d'espérer qu'ils pourraient un jour rentrer chez eux et renverser ce pouvoir soviétique qu'ils détestaient tant.

Mais si de nombreux émigrants russes en Europe ont parié sur Hitler pour leur lutte contre l'URSS, ceux qui se sont installés en Extrême-Orient ont choisi de s'allier à l'Empire du Japon.

Alliés

À partir des années 20, les Japonais ont tissé des liens avec les Russes blancs s'étant installés dans le Nord-Est de la Chine, dans la région de Mandchourie. Lorsque l'armée japonaise du Guandong a occupé la région en 1931, une grande partie de la population l'a donc soutenue dans sa lutte contre les troupes chinoises.

histoire,urss,russie,russes blancs,japon,mandchourie,seconde guerre mondiale,deuxième guerre mondiale,asie,affaires asiatiques

histoire,urss,russie,russes blancs,japon,mandchourie,seconde guerre mondiale,deuxième guerre mondiale,asie,affaires asiatiques

Soldats de l'armée blanche en Chine.

L'État fantoche de Mandchoukouo a été proclamé sur les territoires de Mandchourie et de Mongolie intérieure et Puyi, dernier empereur de Chine, a été placé à sa tête. Cependant, le réel pouvoir était entre les mains des conseillers japonais et du commandement de l'armée du Guandong.

Les Japonais et les Russes se sont alors unis sur la base de leur rejet commun du communisme. Ils avaient besoin les uns des autres dans la guerre de « libération » contre l'Union soviétique qui s'annonçait.

>>> Rouges vs. blancs: le jour où les ennemis jurés sont devenus alliés

Les « samouraïs russes »

Comme le proclamait l'idéologie officielle du Mandchoukouo, les Russes étaient l'un des cinq peuples « indigènes » du pays, et avaient les mêmes droits que les Japonais, Chinois, Mongols et Coréens qui y vivaient.

Démontrant leur attitude bienveillante envers les Russes blancs émigrés, les Japonais les ont activement impliqués dans leur bureau de renseignement en Mandchourie, l'Agence Spéciale de Harbin. Comme l'a noté Michitarō Komatsubara, son dirigeant : « Ils sont prêts à n'importe quel sacrifice matériel, et acceptent avec joie toute entreprise dangereuse pouvant mener à la destruction du communisme ».

En outre, des détachements militaires russes ont été créés pour protéger les principales infrastructures de transport contre les attaques des Honghuzi, des bandits locaux. Plus tard, ces détachements seront impliqués dans des opérations contre les partisans chinois et coréens.

Les « samouraïs russes », comme le général Genzo Yanagita appelait les Russes blancs qui collaboraient avec les Japonais, ont reçu une formation à la fois militaire et idéologique.Généralement, ils étaient indifférents, voire favorables, à l'idée de construire la Grande Asie orientale sous l'égide du Japon, mais leur projet d'annexer toutes les terres russes jusqu'en Oural les irritait grandement, ce qu'ils devaient soigneusement cacher.

« Nous avons filtré tout ce que les orateurs nous disaient, et nous ne gardions pas en tête tout ce qui avait un esprit trop nippon qui ne correspondait pas à notre esprit russe »,a témoigné l’un des cadets, un certain Goloubenko.

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histoire,urss,russie,russes blancs,japon,mandchourie,seconde guerre mondiale,deuxième guerre mondiale,asie,affaires asiatiques

Le détachement Asano

Le plus important des détachements militaires russes créés par les Japonais était le détachement Asano, nommé en l'honneur de son commandant, le major Asano Makoto. Selon les époques, il comptait entre 400 et 3 500 soldats.

>>> Harbin, étonnante ville chinoise construite par les Russes et refuge des tsaristes

Fondé le jour de l'anniversaire de l'empereur Hirohito, le 29 avril 1938, le détachement comprenait des unités d'infanterie, de cavalerie et d'artillerie. Basés à Mandchoukouo, les soldats du détachement Asano étaient toutefois entièrement supervisés par l'armée japonaise.

Les soldats de cette unité secrète se préparaient à mener des opérations de sabotage et de surveillance sur les terres de l'Extrême-Orient soviétique lors de la guerre à venir contre l'URSS. Les soldats d'Asano devaient en effet prendre ou détruire les ponts et nœuds de communication importants, s'infiltrer dans les camps d'unités soviétiques et y empoisonner la nourriture et les sources d'eau.

L'Empire du Japon a par deux fois pu se confronter au potentiel militaire de l'Armée rouge : d'abord en 1938, lors de la bataille du lac Khassan, puis en 1939 lors de la bataille de Khalkhin Gol. Les soldats d'Asano ont été envoyés dans les zones de combats, où ils s'occupaient principalement des interrogatoires des prisonniers de guerre.

On peut trouver des informations sur des heurts militaires entre les soldats du détachement et leurs adversaires. Ainsi, lors de la bataille de Khalkhin Gol, un détachement de cavalerie de la République populaire mongole a rencontré les cavaliers du détachement Asano, mais les soldats mongols les ont d'abord pris pour les leurs ; cette erreur leur a presque à tous coûté la vie.

>>> Portraits de descendants d’émigrés blancs en France

Un nouveau rôle

Fin 1941, les dirigeants japonais ont abandonné l'idée d'une « guerre éclair » contre l'URSS, connue sous le nom de « plan Kantokuen ». En 1943, il devenait clair que les incursions japonaises en Extrême-Orient soviétique n’auraient lieu sous aucune forme.

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Les Japonais ont par conséquent procédé à la réforme des unités russes. Les soldats russes sont passés de leur détachement spécial dédié à la surveillance et au sabotage, à l'armée générale. Ainsi, le détachement Asano, qui avait perdu son statut de détachement secret, est devenu subordonné au 162e régiment des fusiliers des forces armées de Mandchoukouo.

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Drapeau de l'empereur du Mandchoukouo.

Cependant, les soldats russes étaient encore très appréciés à Tokyo. En mai 1944, Takahito de Mikasa, frère cadet de l'empereur Hirohito, est venu sur les lieux où se trouvaient les soldats d'Asano. Il a prononcé un discours, dans lequel il souhaitait renforcer l'esprit et la formation militaire des peuples japonais et russe.

L’effondrement

La lutte difficile et héroïque de l'Union soviétique contre l'Allemagne nazie a provoqué la croissance rapide des sentiments patriotiques et antijaponais au sein des populations russes de Mandchourie. De nombreux officiers ont alors commencé à coopérer avec les services de renseignements soviétiques. Il s'est d'ailleurs avéré que l'un des dirigeants du détachement Asano, Gourgen Nagolian, était en fait un agent du NKVD.

>>> Comment le dernier empereur chinois est tombé entre les mains de l'Armée rouge

Quand l'Armée rouge a envahi la Mandchourie, le 9 août 1945, les détachements de soldats russes ont réagi différemment : une petite partie d'entre eux a résisté, mais est rapidement tombée avec les troupes de Mandchoukouo. Le major soviétique Piotr Melnikov se souvenait que les soldats du côté japonais criaient souvent en russe pour perturber les soldats soviétiques, afin qu'ils ne puissent pas distinguer leurs ennemis de leurs alliés.

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Arrivée des troupes soviétiques en Mandchourie.

La majorité des Russes a choisi de changer de camp. Ils ont arrêté leurs commandants nippons, organisé des détachements de partisans pour combattre les Japonais, et pris le contrôle de villages pour les livrer aux troupes soviétiques qui arrivaient. Il est même arrivé que les relations entre les soldats de l'Armée rouge et les Russes blancs émigrés soient amicales, et ces derniers étaient autorisés à assurer la garde de certains sites.

Mais cela a pris fin lorsque les officiers de l'organisation de contre-espionnage de l'Armée rouge SMERCH sont arrivés à la suite des soldats. Moscou disposait en Mandchourie d'un vaste réseau de renseignement et était bien au courant des activités des Russes blancs émigrés lors des années précédentes. Ces derniers ont été massivement déportés en URSS, où les figures les plus importantes ont été exécutées, pendant que les autres ont écopé de jusqu'à 15 ans de détention dans les camps.

Dans cet autre article, découvrez le mystérieux peuple des Aïnous, à cheval entre Japon et Russie.

Dans le cadre d'une utilisation des contenus de Russia Beyond, la mention des sources est obligatoire.

mercredi, 06 mai 2020

Le Tannou-Touva : un Etat pastoral inféodé à Moscou

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Erich Körner-Lakatos :

Le Tannou-Touva : un Etat pastoral inféodé à Moscou

Situé au Nord-Ouest de la Mongolie, la République populaire du Tannou-Touva a existé de 1921 à 1944

Celui qui, de nos jours, se souvient encore de la république pastorale du Tannou-Touva au Nord-Ouest de la Mongolie, peut être considéré comme un as imbattable en histoire contemporaine. Cette république a disparu en 1944, âgée d’à peine vingt-trois ans. Elle n’est un objet de recherches que pour une poignée d’historiens spécialisés, tout comme les républiques boers de Zoutpansberg et de Goshen en Afrique du Sud ou encore l’Etat libre d’Acre, proclamé peu avant 1900 par des pionniers de la culture du caoutchouc dans ce triangle territorial situé entre le Brésil, la Bolivie et le Pérou.

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Le Tannou-Touva avait une superficie deux fois supérieure à celle de l’Autriche actuelle, avec 170.500 km2. C’était une immense vallée fermée. Sa partie orientale était impropre aux cultures et servait de zone de pâturages. La partie septentrionale, elle, était riche de forêts et de lacs. C’est la raison pour laquelle les Chinois appellent les habitants de ce pays les « our yan khai » (Uriankhai), soit « le peuple qui habite les forêts ». Il convient de signaler encore une particularité du pays : aucune région du monde ne se trouve plus éloignée de la mer que ne l’était le Tannu-Tuwa.

En 1921, 65.000 âmes vivaient dans le pays, dont 12.000 agriculteurs et négociants russes. Les autochtones se donnent le nom de « Touvains ». Leur ethnogénèse est largement méconnue de nos jours encore. La plupart des ethnologues pensent qu’ils sont le produit d’un mélange de tribus turques et de groupes ethniques mongols et sibériens, même si certains traits du visage, chez une minorité d’entre eux, rappellent ceux des Finno-Ougriens. Sur le plan religieux, ils adhèrent au lamaïsme, soit à la forme tibétaine du bouddhisme.

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Malgré son éloignement de tout, la région a vu arriver et partir bien des conquérants étrangers. En 1207, Gengis-Khan conquiert la région mais, par la suite, les Mongols perdent rapidement tout intérêt pour la région peuplée de pasteurs nomades. A partir de 1757, le Tannou-Touva fait formellement partie de la Chine et paie tribut à son empereur. L’impôt annuel est constitué de peaux rares que l’on envoie à Pékin. Sur le plan administratif, les Touvains relèvent d’une province chinoise appelée le Tannou-Uriankhai et attribuée à la Mongolie extérieure, elle-même soumise à la tutelle chinoise depuis 1697.

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Au 19ème siècle arrivent des négociants chinois qui troquent les bois des cerfs de type maral, considérés comme la base d’un aphrodisiaque, contre du thé vert, du tabac et des tissus. En même temps arrivent de l’Ouest des colons russes. Après 1880, les populations autochtones connaissent un éveil politique, ce qui crée des tensions puis suscite des révoltes contre la tutelle chinoise et contre les incursions des négociants russes.

Le 12 février 1912, la monarchie est renversée définitivement en Chine. Pour le Tannou-Touva, c’est là un motif pour faire sécession car ses habitants ne se sentent liés à la Chine que par le rapport féodal avec l’empereur mandchou. Trois jours après l’abolition de la monarchie, la République de l’Uriankhai est proclamée. En octobre 1913 arrive à Saint-Pétersbourg une pétition rédigée en langue mongole demandant au Tsar de bien vouloir placer le pays sous la protection russe. Six mois plus tard, c’est chose faite.

Le 16 juin 1918, des notables touvains et russes proclament la fin du protectorat et annoncent l’indépendance du pays. Mais c’est un vœu pieux car, en novembre 1918, des unités russes blanches sous le commandement de l’Amiral Koltchak occupent le pays. Dans le Sud s’installent des troupes mongoles et au Sud-Est, pendant un certain temps, ce sont des unités chinoises qui occupent les terres touvaines. En juillet 1919 arrive l’Armée Rouge.

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Le 14 août 1921, la République populaire du Tannou-Touva est proclamée. L’organe suprême de cette république populaire est le « Grand Khoural », une sorte d’assemblée du peuple, où chaque délégué représente cinquante yourtes. Le terme « Khoural » dérive du mongol et signifie, à l’origine, un conseiller de Gengis-Khan. Le Parlement proprement dit est le « Petit Khoural » qui élit le gouvernement. Le premier Premier ministre fut Dondouk Kuular reste prudemment à Moscou, à 4688 km du Tannou-Touva, à cause de la ferme opposition des moines lamaïstes. Cette prudence ne lui a pas servi à grand-chose car Staline donna l’ordre de l’arrêter en janvier 1929. Trois ans plus tard, Kuular est fusillé.

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Son successeur Salchak Toka, lui, reste bien droit dans la ligne et cherche à sédentariser les pasteurs nomades. Beaucoup de ceux-ci fuient alors vers les forêts. La répression exercée par le Parti populaire révolutionnaire des Touvains frappe ensuite les moines : en 1929, il y avait plus de vingt monastères dans le pays. Deux ans plus tard, il n’en restait que deux.

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Sur le modèle des purges moscovites, Toka, devenu président du parti, organise à son tour une féroce répression : en 1938, il met en scène un procès-spectacle dans la capitale Küsül et fait fusiller plusieurs de ses rivaux politiques sous prétexte qu’ils étaient des espions japonais.

A partir de 1940, le pays est dirigé par la première femme présidente du monde, Khertek Ankhima-Toka, dans la vie privée épouse du chef du parti. Mais les jours de la petite république pastorale sont comptés : Staline projette son annexion car on y aurait découvert des gisements d’uranium.

Le 17 août 1944 le « Petit Khoural » vote à l’unanimité son annexion à l’Union Soviétique, ce que Moscou accepte officiellement deux mois plus tard. Le 11 octobre 1944 s’achève définitivement la brève histoire de la République du Tannou-Touva.

Erich Körner-Lakatos.

(article paru dans « zur Zeit », Vienne, n°12/13-2020).

Les dernières années

A partir de 1940, le Tannou-Touva a donc pour présidente Khertel Ankhimaa-Toka, première femme au monde à accéder à un tel statut. Dans la vie privée, elle est l’épouse du Chef du Parti Populaire Révolutionnaire. Cette dame a pris des positions géopolitiques courageuses. Trois jours après le déclenchement de l’Opération Barbarossa, elle déclare la guerre à l’Allemagne, acte qui, à Berlin, dans les locaux de la Wilhelmstrasse, cause une certaine perplexité. Même les plus chevronnés des fonctionnaires du ministère allemand des affaires étrangères ont du mal à situer sur la carte cet étrange sujet du droit international. Le Tannou-Touva est dès lors le tout premier Etat à s’être proclamé allié de l’Union Soviétique.

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Pendant la seconde guerre mondiale, le Tannou-Touva aligne dans l’Armée Rouge un régiment d’infanterie et une unité de cavalerie. En tout, 1600 hommes. Ils participèrent à la guerre bien qu’une grande partie des Touvains aient fui la conscription. L’armée touvaine est surtout constituée de colons russes et d’immigrés chinois ou mongols. Le Tannou-Touva offre ensuite à l’Union Soviétique 60.000 chevaux de trait pour tirer les charrettes « panje », typique des pays de la steppe. Un certain nombre de Touvains participent à un entraînement de conducteurs de chars, qui seront envoyés au front.

On ne sait pas exactement où ces alliés touvains de Staline ont été engagés. L’un de ces combattants a toutefois été proclamé « héros de l’Union Soviétique ». Quelque 90 officiers et soldats ont obtenu la médaille du mérite touvain pour bravoure au feu.

E.K.L.

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dimanche, 22 décembre 2019

RIP: Vladimir Bukovsky, the Defiant

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RIP: Vladimir Bukovsky, the Defiant

Ex: https://www.americanthinker.com
 

One of the first things famous Soviet dissident Vladimir Bukovsky (1942–2019) told me about himself was that his roots were Polish.  After the crushing of the Kościuszko Insurrection of 1794, his ancestor, Pan Bukowski, was taken prisoner by the Muscovites and shipped off to Siberia.  This was a harsh introduction to Russian living for the family.  Vladimir would continue into the footsteps of his forefathers.

Vladimir was born in the matrix of the Soviet Union, but as a teenager, he self-liberated.  At 14, he heard about communist leader Nikita Khrushchev's secret speech blaming Stalin for slaughtering millions.  Soon after, he rooted for the Hungarian freedom fighters in 1956.  He started asking questions.  He challenged the system.  Upon his first arrest in 1959, the youngster refused to become a snitch for the Soviet secret police.  And the KGB judged him, partly with rigid annoyance and partly with grudging admiration, unfit for recruitment.

In 1963, Vladimir was arrested, tried, and sentenced to two years for anti-Soviet agitation.  They locked him up in a psychiatric ward (psikhushka), where he was "diagnosed" with "symptomless schizophrenia."  According to Soviet "science," anyone opposing communism had to be a schizophrenic, even when he did not display any symptoms.  He was medicated forcibly.  Bukovsky told me that the trick was to learn how to regurgitate the psychotropic drugs so the hospital wardens and nurses would not notice.

After getting out in 1965, the intrepid dissident plunged right back into anti-communist activities.  He co-organized a demonstration and a petition drive in solidarity with other Soviet dissidents.  For this he was rearrested and thrown back into the red looney bin.  Now things turned tougher.  The KGB wanted to turn their prisoner into a vegetable.  Forcible administration of drugs and their doses increased.  Luckily, the regurgitation trick continued to serve the dissident.  Vladimir endured half a year of this but was unexpectedly released after half a year in mid-1966.  

Six months later, Bukovsky joined a demonstration in defense of other nonviolent protesters who were on trial or under lock and key, only to be seized himself and tried for violating a ban on public protest.  In his defense, he invoked Soviet law, which Soviet judges and secret policemen were apparently violating.  Because Vladimir refused to express remorse for demonstrating, he was sent to the Gulag — a penal colony with a forced labor regime in Bor in the Voronezh region.  His sentence was three years.  He got out in 1970.

Drawing on his experiences in the Gulag and, in particular, in psychiatric wards, the dissident began compiling a record of the Soviet abuse of psychiatry.  To add insult to injury, he discovered that some of the communist psychiatrists who worked hand in glove with the KGB were treated cordially in the West and even invited to scholarly conferences at some of the leading institutions.  The work of the medical monsters who facilitated the torture of political prisoners was treated seriously by some in the West.  Bukovsky resolved to expose it.  He managed to get his report smuggled out to the West.

Consequently, a veritable storm broke out among French, British, and other psychiatrists, some of whom demanded transparency from their Soviet colleagues and believed the dissident accounts of abuse.  For this Vladimir found himself under pre-trial detention in isolation and almost a year later received a sentence of 12 years for "slandering Soviet science."  While serving his sentence, he secretly co-authored a manual on how to beat the Soviet system of interrogation to avoid being accused of insanity.  The manual eventually found its way to the West, where it was widely disseminated.

Bukovsky became a cause célèbre.  The KGB was livid.  In 1976, at the height of détente, the Kremlin decided to further burnish its "liberal" credentials.  Thus, Moscow agreed to swap the perky freedom-fighter for the head of the communist party of Chile, Luis Corvalán, who was incarcerated following a successful military coup to thwart a red revolution in that country.  Compliments of General Augusto Pinochet, Vladimir was thrown out of the USSR and landed in the West.

He settled in England, where he successfully pursued a degree in biology at Cambridge University, where he settled permanently.  Further, he trained as a neuropsychologist and continued his career as a writer and a human rights campaigner.  He published prodigiously.  Vladimir exposed communist crimes globally as well as Western naïveté regarding the Soviet Union.  He joined numerous initiatives championing freedom.  Among others, Bukovsky animated the American Foundation for Resistance International, which aspired to coordinate all anti-communist activities by the captive people in all countries afflicted by Marxism-Leninism.  At the height of Gorbymania in the West, Vladimir and his associates dared to question the sincerity of secretary general of the Communist Party of the USSR Mikhail Gorbachev.  They pointed out quite correctly that the Soviet leader wanted to save communism, not to destroy it.

In 1992, at the invitation of Russia's president, Boris Yeltsin, Bukovsky returned to Moscow.  The Kremlin solicited his assistance in putting together evidence for the public trial of the Communist Party for its crimes.  Yeltsin eventually scrapped the idea, but not before Bukovsky was able to copy over a million pages of secret documents from Stalin's archives.  While Vladimir scanned away right in front of their noses, the KGB guardians of the documentary treasure trove had no idea what either a scanner or a laptop was, so, while watching him curiously, they never interrupted him.  Later, to his own great surprise, the former dissident was permitted to fly out of Moscow undisturbed with his computer full of archival goodies.

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In 1995, Bukovsky's magnum opus, Judgment in Moscow, emerged from this research trip.  Published in several languages, sadly, it had to wait nearly 25 years for an English translation and publication.  Because we failed to smash communism after it tripped, he warned us about the resurgence of post-communism and its threat of metastasizing in the West in the form of political correctness and socialist étatism.  Vladimir further cautioned everyone about the European integration and its totalitarian potential.  He was always full of unorthodox ideas.  Arguably the most shocking to us was his opinion about the Muscovite state and its successors.  Bukovsky told Dr. Sommer explicitly: "It is not my fault that I was born in the Soviet Union.  Why should I harbor any sentiment to that entity?  And Russia was a logical way to the USSR, even if many fabulous people lived there. ... Therefore, as long as Russia does not fall apart into several entities, it will remain dangerous.  A divided Russia is in the interest of the world, just as a united central Europe is in the interest of the world. ... This is not a question of nationalism and resentment, but of physics and balance.  Big and demoralized Russia will always harm her smaller neighbors.  Only its dividing and balancing can eliminate the danger, although not completely because Russia is a universe of slavery."

At the end, Vladimir had the last laugh: he was buried a hundred yards away from the grave of Karl Marx at Highgate Cemetery in London.  Non-conformist, defiant, and free, Vladimir Bukovsky, RIP.

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vendredi, 23 mars 2018

Entretiens avec Cheyenne-Marie Carron, Marc Laudelout & Martine Gay

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Perles de Culture n°159 :

Entretiens avec Cheyenne-Marie Carron, Marc Laudelout & Martine Gay

 

Plusieurs entretiens comme nulle part ailleurs pour ce numéro de Perles de Culture animé par Anne Brassié.
 
Et tout d’abord avec la réalisatrice Cheyenne-Marie Carron qui vient évoquer son nouveau film « Jeunesse aux coeurs ardents » . Le portrait d’une jeunesse en quête d’idéal, violente et stimulante.
 
Autres entretiens : avec Marc Laudelout le président fondateur du Bulletin des amis de Céline, l’écrivain le plus diffamé de France et de Navarre et avec l’aviatrice Martine Gay . Cette dernière nous offre des portraits d’aviatrices soviétiques pendant la seconde guerre mondiale. Des portraits qui ridiculisent durablement nos féministes contemporaines.
 
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mardi, 28 mars 2017

"Nous", le roman qui a inspiré Huxley, Orwell et Terry Gilliam

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"Nous", le roman qui a inspiré Huxley, Orwell et Terry Gilliam

 
Par 
Ex: http://www.lepoint.fr 
 
Son nom ne vous dit sans doute rien, mais Evgueni Zamiatine a écrit en 1920 un ouvrage d'anticipation (réédité aujourd'hui) sidérant d'acuité

Tout le monde (ou presque) a oublié son nom. L'écrivain russe Evgueni Ivanovitch Zamiatine est pourtant un auteur majeur. Né le 1er février 1884 à Lebedian, une petite ville à 300 kilomètres au sud de Moscou, d'un père pope orthodoxe et d'une mère musicienne, cet architecte naval n'a que peu publié. Son œuvre compte moins d'une vingtaine de romans, recueils de nouvelles et pièces de théâtre. Si le nom de Zamiatine est passé à la postérité, c'est comme scénariste de Jean Renoir. Il a, de fait, signé l'adaptation des Bas-Fonds de Maxime Gorki, un an avant de mourir à Paris, à l'âge de 53 ans, le 10 mars 1937.

Son roman le plus remarquable, écrit en 1920, est aujourd'hui republié aux éditions Actes Sud dans une nouvelle traduction d'Hélène Henry. Et il faut absolument le lire ! Son titre, « Nous » (« Мы » en russe), résume son propos. Il consiste à décrire froidement le monde dans lequel « nous » nous apprêtons à vivre. Un univers futuriste, à l'époque où Zamiatine écrit son roman, mais qui ressemble aujourd'hui à une allégorie de notre époque.

Qu'on en juge… Nous sommes au XXVIe siècle et la Terre sort de deux cents ans de guerre où se sont affrontés deux mondes : celui de la campagne et celui de la ville. Le héros, D-503 (les hommes ont perdu depuis longtemps leur identité au profit d'un matricule), est ingénieur. Il travaille sur le chantier de construction d'un vaisseau spatial surnommé l'Intégral. Cet engin est destiné à entrer en contact avec des civilisations extraterrestres dans le but de coloniser leurs planètes et de les convertir au « bonheur » terrestre. Mais il fait aussi figure de bateau de sauvetage pour l'humanité tant notre monde ressemble à un enfer.

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Journal intime

Régie par un « État unitaire » despotique qui ne tolère chez ses sujets aucun secret, la plus grande partie du globe est recouverte par une immense cité, composée de grandes tours de verre transparent où tout un chacun vit au vu et au su de tout le monde. (Snowden, es-tu là ?). Les seuls moments d'intimité tolérés consistent en ces brefs instants où les habitants ont pour mission de procréer afin d'assurer la perpétuation de l'espèce humaine. Et encore… pour être autorisé à tirer le rideau, encore faut-il avoir obtenu un sésame : en l'espèce un ticket rose, parcimonieusement distribué aux sujets les plus obéissants. La rencontre de D-503 avec une jolie femme, I-330, va bouleverser son existence en lui faisant découvrir qu'une autre vie est possible où il est loisible d'avoir des secrets. Et, encore mieux, de jouir de liberté, même si cela rime avec imprévisibilité et précarité.

I-330, « résistante » au système (elle boit, fume et fait l'amour à qui lui plaît), parviendra-t-elle à le faire s'évader de cet État totalitaire pour rejoindre la dernière parcelle de nature qui se dissimule derrière un grand mur vert ? Les deux amoureux échapperont-ils à la sinistre police du « Bienfaiteur », comme s'est autoproclamé le tyran qui règne sur l'État ? Composé comme un journal intime, découpé en quarante chapitres, où D-503 expose tour à tour son quotidien, ses fantasmes et ses états d'âme, Nous gardera jusqu'au bout les réponses à ces questions.

Algorithmes

On l'aura compris : ce roman est une dystopie, comme on nomme les contre-utopies cauchemardesques en science-fiction. On ne s'étonnera pas qu'Aldous Huxley ait puisé dans l'univers dysfonctionnel de Zamiatine l'inspiration du Meilleur des mondes, tout comme George Orwell celle de 1984. Ce roman a également beaucoup influencé Kurt Vonnegut pour son Pianiste déchaîné et Terry Gilliam : plusieurs scènes de Brazil semblent tout droit tirées de ce livre. Interdit de publication par Moscou qui y voyait, à juste titre, une dénonciation du régime bolchevique, Nous, paru initialement en 1924 en Grande-Bretagne où Zamiatine avait vécu quelques mois sur le chantier de construction de navires-brise-glace (dont l'Intégral semble la transposition SF), avait été traduit en français en 1929 sous le titre de Nous autres (Gallimard). Il n'est sorti en URSS qu'en 1988.

Critique acerbe de la société pré-stalinienne, cet ouvrage ne saurait cependant être réduit à son anticommunisme, car, même s'il était un adversaire de Trotski, Zamiatine n'en avait pas moins été un compagnon de route des révolutionnaires léninistes. S'il résonne encore aujourd'hui, c'est surtout parce que ce roman singulier décrit une modernité broyant les individus sous le poids de la technologie et de la science. À commencer par ces algorithmes prédictifs, censés apporter le bonheur aux hommes en gommant toutes les aspérités que nous appelons le hasard. Cela ne vous rappelle rien ?

Nous , d'Evgueni Zamiatine, traduction d'Hélène Henry, éditions Actes Sud, 240 pages, 21 €

Extrait :
 
« Je ne fais ici que recopier – mot pour mot – ce que publie aujourd'hui le Journal officiel : Dans cent vingt jours, la construction de l'Intégrale sera achevée. Proche est l'heure historique où la première Intégrale s'élèvera dans l'espace universel. Il y a mille ans, vos héroïques ancêtres ont soumis le monde entier au pouvoir de l'État Unitaire. Vous avez devant vous un exploit encore plus glorieux : la résolution de l'équation infinie de l'Univers grâce à l'Intégrale, cette machine électrique de verre qui souffle le feu. Vous êtes destinés à soumettre au joug bienfaisant de la raison des êtres inconnus qui habitent d'autres planètes et sont peut-être encore en état de liberté primitive. S'ils refusent de comprendre que nous leur apportons un bonheur mathématiquement exact, notre devoir sera de les obliger à être heureux. Mais avant de recourir aux armes, nous essayons la parole. »

dimanche, 18 septembre 2016

Finnlands »Sonderkrieg« im Weltkrieg

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Finnlands »Sonderkrieg« im Weltkrieg

Vor 75 Jahren versuchten die Skandinavier, im Schatten der Deutschen die Ergebnisse des Winterkrieges zu revidieren

Wolf Oschlies
Ex: http://www.preussische-allgemeine.de
 

Drei Tage, nachdem der deutsche Angriff auf die Sowjetunion begonnen hatte, erklärte Finnland der UdSSR den Krieg. Das Ziel war die Rückgewinnung der im Winterkrieg von 1939/40 verlorenen Gebiete. Obwohl Finnland mit Deutschland ein gemeinsamer Feind verband, verzichtete es auf ein offizielles Bündnis mit dem  Reich und versuchte vielmehr, einen „Sonderkrieg“ zu führen mit der Hoffnung auf einen „Sonderfrieden“.

Gemäß dem deutsch-sowjetischen Nichtangriffsabkommen vom 23. August 1939 gehörte Finnland zur sowjetischen Interessensphäre. Drei Monate später überfiel Josef Stalin mit 800000 Soldaten Finnland ohne formelle Kriegserklärung und unter Bruch des Nichtangriffspakts von 1932, weswegen die Sowjetunion Ende 1939 als „Aggressor“ vom Völkerbund geächtet wurde. Ihre Rote Armee war an Soldaten dreifach, an Waffen zehnfach überlegen, erlitt aber enorme Verluste: 150000 Gefallene und 325000 Verwundete gegenüber 21000 beziehungsweise 44000 bei Finnland. Nur 30 Panzer besaßen die Finnen, vernichteten aber knapp 2000 sowjetische, vorwiegend mit 550000 todbringenden Brandflaschen, die sie in boshafter Anspielung auf Stalins Regierungschef und Außenminister „Molotovin cocktail“ nannten: Molotowcocktail.

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Vor allem dieser „Cocktail“ befähigte die Finnen zu 105 Tagen heroischem Widerstand, wogegen die Sowjets am 12. März 1940 nur einen glanzlosen „Frieden“ erreichten. Finnland büßte zwölf Prozent seines Territoriums ein.


Die Möglichkeit, die Ergebnisse des sowjetischen Überfalls zu revidieren, schien der deutsche Angriff auf die Sowjetunion zu bieten. Diesem Versuch einer militärischen Grenzrevision gaben die Finnen die Bezeichnung „Fortsetzungskrieg“.


Trotz des gemeinsamen Kriegsgegners versuchte Finnland, in den Augen der Westalliierten, auf Distanz zu Deutschland zu bleiben. Das Land schloss kein offizielles Bündnis mit dem Deutschen Reich. Auch behandelte es seine rund 2000 Juden, Nachfahren sogenannter Kantonisten, russischer Soldaten, die sich nach Dienstende in Finnland niedergelassen hatten, beispielhaft. Im Sommer 1942 war SS-Führer Heinrich Himmler in Finnland, um die Auslieferung von Juden zu fordern. Diese Forderung wies Finnlands Ministerpräsident Jukka Rangell zurück: „Finnlands Juden sind Staatsbürger wie alle anderen. In Finnland gibt es keine Judenfrage.“ Das bestätigte Leutnant Max Jakobson, nach dem Krieg Vizeaußenminister und UN-Vertreter Finnlands: „In der jüdischen Gemeinde Finnlands wurde kein offizieller Beschluss zur Kriegsbeteiligung gefasst. Die Juden reagierten auf die Ereignisse exakt so wie die Finnen.“ Alle seien Patrioten gewesen, schrieb der Historiker Seppo Hentilä: „Vielleicht dachten die Sowjets, die Finnen würden sie mit Blumen begrüßen. Der gemeinsame Hass schweißte die Finnen zusammen.“ Deren Erfahrungen mit Sowjets hätten sie, so Juho Paasikivi, 1940/41 Finnlands Botschafter in Moskau und ab 1946 dessen Staatspräsident, gelehrt, dass das Sowjetsystem „tausend Mal schlimmer“ als Adolf Hitlers Regime gewesen sei.


Bis Ende September hatten die Finnen fast alle 1940 verlorenen Gebiete zurückerobert, wozu der US-Außenminister Cordell Hull Finnland augenblicklich gratulierte. Hingegen argwöhnte England hier eine Tarnung deutscher Angriffspläne auf nordrussische Häfen und Verkehrslinien und erklärte Finnland am 5. Dezember den Krieg. Kurz darauf riet Premier Winston Churchill vertraulich dem finnischen Oberbefehlshaber Gustaf Mannerheim, aus dem Krieg mit den Deutschen auszuscheren. Das hätte Finnland gern getan, aber nicht unter Preisgabe rückeroberter Gebiete, was man noch im Sommer 1943 als „politischen Selbstmord“ ansah. Die Deutschen behielten, ungeachtet herber Rückschläge in der „Schlacht um Moskau“, die Initiative an der Ostfront. Wozu sie fähig waren, sah man am benachbarten Norwegen, das seit April 1940 deutsches Besatzungsgebiet war. Finnland nahm an der Blockade Leningrads teil. Sich selber sah man gut gerüstet, hatte Ende Sommer 1941 etwa 650000 Soldaten aufgestellt, knapp 18 Prozent der 3,7 Millionen Einwohner, ein Rekord in der internationalen Kriegsgeschichte. Darunter litten allerdings Wirtschaft und Beschäftigung, sodass bereits ab Herbst 1941 Soldaten demobilisiert wurden. 1943 hatte Finnland nur noch 320000.

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Das Land glaubte sich, so Ende 1941 sein Militärattaché in Wa­shington, mit seinem „Sonderkrieg“ auf gutem Wege zu einem „Sonderfrieden“. Mannerheim hatte Hitler die Niederlage prophezeit, als dieser im Juni 1942 zu seinem 75. Geburtstag angereist war. Ein offizielles deutsches Bündnisabkommen wurde zu­rück­gewiesen, worauf Deutschland seine Hilfslieferungen stoppte. Ein US-Angebot, bei der Kriegsbeendigung zu helfen, wurde allerdings ebenso am 20. März 1943 als „verfrüht“ abgelehnt. Man glaubte, warten zu können. Die Lage an der Front hatte sich stabilisiert, 1942/43 gab es kaum Kampfhandlungen. Erst im Sommer 1944 griff die Rote Armee in Karelien wieder an, im August übergab der zum Staatspräsident gewählte Mannerheim über die Sowjetbotschaft in Stockholm ein Friedensangebot ab. Schäbiger Bittsteller war man nicht, hatte vielmehr der Roten Armee in der Schlacht von Tali-Ihantala (25. Juni bis 9. Juli 1944) die schwerste Niederlage des Fortsetzungskriegs zugefügt, rund 18000 Rotarmisten waren gefallen, 300 Panzer und 280 Flugzeuge abgeschossen.


Die sowjetischen Bedingungen für die Feuereinstellung waren mit dem Vereinigten Königreich und den Vereinigten Staaten abgestimmt: sofortiger Bruch mit Deutschland, Rückzug der deutschen Truppen bis zum 15. September. Am 4. September stellten die Finnen die Kampfhandlungen ein, die Sowjets erst am Tag danach wegen „bürokratischer Hemmnisse“. Am 19. September signierten in Moskau Finnland, die Sowjetunion und Großbritannien ein Waffenstillstandsabkommen, das für Sowjet-Usancen relativ milde ausfiel: Rückgabe der im Fortsetzungskrieg zurückgewonnenen Ge­biete, Abtretung weiterer Gebiete, ungehinderter Transit der Roten Armee durch Finnland, 300 Millionen US-Dollar Reparationen. Schwierigkeiten ergaben sich beim Rückzug der 200000 Deutschen, wofür die vorgesehene Zeit nicht ausreichte. Um den Sowjets keinen Vorwand zu liefern, den Waffenstillstand nicht einzuhalten, starteten die Finnen ihren „Lapplandkrieg“ gegen Deutsche, der sich dann noch bis Ende April 1945 hinzog.


Der endgültige Friedensvertrag Finnlands mit den „Alliierten und Assoziierten Mächten“ wurde am 10. Februar 1947 in Paris unterzeichnet. Offenkundig waren die Sowjets unzufrieden, nutzten den 1948 geschlossenen Vertrag über Freundschaft, Zusammenarbeit und gegenseitigen Beistand zu einer Knebelung des Landes, für die 1966 der Politologe Richard Löwenthal den Begriff „Finnlandisierung“ prägte.

Wolf Oschlies

dimanche, 29 mai 2016

La tyrannie mondialiste et le totalitarisme démocratique

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La tyrannie mondialiste et le totalitarisme démocratique

Conversation avec Alexandre Zinoviev philosophe, logicien,
sociologue,
et écrivain dissident soviétique.

Entretien réalisé par Victor Loupan à Munich, en juin 1999,
quelques jours avant le retour définitif d’Alexandre Zinoviev en Russie ; extrait de « La grande rupture », aux éditions l’Âge d’Homme.

Ex: http://www.actionroyaliste.fr

Victor Loupan : Avec quels sentiments rentrez-vous après un exil aussi long ?

Alexandre Zinoviev : Avec celui d’avoir quitté une puissance respectée, forte, crainte même, et de retrouver un pays vaincu, en ruines. Contrairement à d’autres, je n’aurais jamais quitté l’URSS, si on m’avait laissé le choix. L’émigration a été une vraie punition pour moi.

V. L. : On vous a pourtant reçu à bras ouverts !

A. Z. : C’est vrai. Mais malgré l’accueil triomphal et le succès mondial de mes livres, je me suis toujours senti étranger ici.

zinoli2221069363.JPGV. L. : Depuis la chute du communisme, c’est le système occidental qui est devenu votre principal objet d’étude et de critique. Pourquoi ?

A. Z. : Parce que ce que j’avais dit est arrivé : la chute du communisme s’est transformée en chute de la Russie. La Russie et le communisme étaient devenus une seule et même chose.

V. L. : La lutte contre le communisme aurait donc masqué une volonté d’élimination de la Russie ?

A. Z. : Absolument. La catastrophe russe a été voulue et programmée ici, en Occident. Je le dis, car j’ai été, à une certaine époque, un initié. J’ai lu des documents, participé à des études qui, sous prétexte de combattre une idéologie, préparaient la mort de la Russie. Et cela m’est devenu insupportable au point où je ne peux plus vivre dans le camp de ceux qui détruisent mon pays et mon peuple. L’Occident n’est pas une chose étrangère pour moi, mais c’est une puissance ennemie.

V. L. : Seriez-vous devenu un patriote ?

A. Z. : Le patriotisme, ce n’est pas mon problème. J’ai reçu une éducation internationaliste et je lui reste fidèle. Je ne peux d’ailleurs pas dire si j’aime ou non la Russie et les Russes. Mais j’appartiens à ce peuple et à ce pays. J’en fais partie. Les malheurs actuels de mon peuple sont tels, que je ne peux continuer à les contempler de loin. La brutalité de la mondialisation met en évidence des choses inacceptables.

V. L. : Les dissidents soviétiques parlaient pourtant comme si leur patrie était la démocratie et leur peuple les droits de l’homme. Maintenant que cette manière de voir est dominante en Occident, vous semblez la combattre. N’est-ce pas contradictoire ?

A. Z. : Pendant la guerre froide, la démocratie était une arme dirigée contre le totalitarisme communiste, mais elle avait l’avantage d’exister. On voit d’ailleurs aujourd’hui que l’époque de la guerre froide a été un point culminant de l’histoire de l’Occident. Un bien être sans pareil, de vraies libertés, un extraordinaire progrès social, d’énormes découvertes scientifiques et techniques, tout y était ! Mais, l’Occident se modifiait aussi presqu’imperceptiblement. L’intégration timide des pays développés, commencée alors, constituait en fait les prémices de la mondialisation de l’économie et de la globalisation du pouvoir auxquels nous assistons aujourd’hui. Une intégration peut être généreuse et positive si elle répond, par exemple, au désir légitime des nations-soeurs de s’unir. Mais celle-ci a, dès le départ, été pensée en termes de structures verticales, dominées par un pouvoir supranational. Sans le succès de la contre-révolution russe, il n’aurait pu se lancer dans la mondialisation.

V. L. : Le rôle de Gorbatchev n’a donc pas été positif ?

A. Z. : Je ne pense pas en ces termes-là. Contrairement à l’idée communément admise, le communisme soviétique ne s’est pas effondré pour des raisons internes. Sa chute est la plus grande victoire de l’histoire de l’Occident ! Victoire colossale qui, je le répète, permet l’instauration d’un pouvoir planétaire. Mais la fin du communisme a aussi marqué la fin de la démocratie. Notre époque n’est pas que post-communiste, elle est aussi post-démocratique. Nous assistons aujourd’hui à l’instauration du totalitarisme démocratique ou, si vous préférez, de la démocratie totalitaire.

zinolié.jpgV. L. : N’est-ce pas un peu absurde ?

A. Z. : Pas du tout. La démocratie sous-entend le pluralisme. Et le pluralisme suppose l’opposition d’au moins deux forces plus ou moins égale ; forces qui se combattent et s’influencent en même temps. Il y avait, à l’époque de la guerre froide, une démocratie mondiale, un pluralisme global au sein duquel coexistaient le système capitaliste, le système communiste et même une structure plus vague mais néanmoins vivante, les non-alignés. Le totalitarisme soviétique était sensible aux critiques venant de l’Occident. L’Occident subissait lui aussi l’influence de l’URSS, par l’intermédiaire notamment de ses propres partis communistes. Aujourd’hui, nous vivons dans un monde dominé par une force unique, par une idéologie unique, par un parti unique mondialiste. La constitution de ce dernier a débuté, elle aussi, à l’époque de la guerre froide, quand des superstructures transnationales ont progressivement commencé à se constituer sous les formes les plus diverses : sociétés commerciales, bancaires, politiques, médiatiques. Malgré leurs différents secteurs d’activités, ces forces étaient unies par leur nature supranationale. Avec la chute du communisme, elles se sont retrouvées aux commandes du monde. Les pays occidentaux sont donc dominateurs, mais aussi dominés, puisqu’ils perdent progressivement leur souveraineté au profit de ce que j’appelle la « suprasociété ». Suprasociété planétaire, constituée d’entreprises commerciales et d’organismes non-commerciaux, dont les zones d’influence dépassent les nations. Les pays occidentaux sont soumis, comme les autres, au contrôle de ces structures supranationales. Or, la souveraineté des nations était, elle aussi, une partie constituante du pluralisme et donc de la démocratie, à l’échelle de la planète. Le pouvoir dominant actuel écrase les états souverains. L’intégration de l’Europe qui se déroule sous nos yeux, provoque elle aussi la disparition du pluralisme au sein de ce nouveau conglomérat, au profit d’un pouvoir supranational.

V. L. : Mais ne pensez-vous pas que la France ou l’Allemagne continuent à être des pays démocratiques ?

A. Z. : Les pays occidentaux ont connu une vraie démocratie à l’époque de la guerre froide. Les partis politiques avaient de vraies divergences idéologiques et des programmes politiques différents. Les organes de presse avaient des différences marquées, eux aussi. Tout cela influençait la vie des gens, contribuait à leur bien-être. C’est bien fini. Parce que le capitalisme démocratique et prospère, celui des lois sociales et des garanties d’emploi devait beaucoup à l’épouvantail communiste. L’attaque massive contre les droits sociaux à l’Ouest a commencé avec la chute du communisme à l’Est. Aujourd’hui, les socialistes au pouvoir dans la plupart des pays d’Europe, mènent une politique de démantèlement social qui détruit tout ce qu’il y avait de socialiste justement dans les pays capitalistes. Il n’existe plus, en Occident, de force politique capable de défendre les humbles. L’existence des partis politiques est purement formelle. Leurs différences s’estompent chaque jour davantage. La guerre des Balkans était tout sauf démocratique. Elle a pourtant été menée par des socialistes, historiquement opposés à ce genre d’aventures. Les écologistes, eux aussi au pouvoir dans plusieurs pays, ont applaudi au désastre écologique provoqué par les bombardements de l’OTAN. Ils ont même osé affirmer que les bombes à uranium appauvri n’étaient pas dangereuses alors que les soldats qui les chargent portent des combinaisons spéciales. La démocratie tend donc aussi à disparaître de l’organisation sociale occidentale. Le totalitarisme financier a soumis les pouvoirs politiques. Le totalitarisme financier est froid. Il ne connaît ni la pitié ni les sentiments. Les dictatures politiques sont pitoyables en comparaison avec la dictature financière. Une certaine résistance était possible au sein des dictatures les plus dures. Aucune révolte n’est possible contre la banque.

V. L. : Et la révolution ?

A. Z. : Le totalitarisme démocratique et la dictature financière excluent la révolution sociale.

V. L. : Pourquoi ?

A. Z. : Parce qu’ils combinent la brutalité militaire toute puissante et l’étranglement financier planétaire. Toutes les révolutions ont bénéficié de soutien venu de l’étranger. C’est désormais impossible, par absence de pays souverains. De plus, la classe ouvrière a été remplacée au bas de l’échelle sociale, par la classe des chômeurs. Or que veulent les chômeurs ? Un emploi. Ils sont donc, contrairement à la classe ouvrière du passé, dans une situation de faiblesse.

V. L. : Les systèmes totalitaires avaient tous une idéologie. Quelle est celle de cette nouvelle société que vous appelez post-démocratique ?

A. Z. : Les théoriciens et les politiciens occidentaux les plus influents considèrent que nous sommes entrés dans une époque post-idéologique. Parce qu’ils sous-entendent par « idéologie » le communisme, le fascisme, le nazisme, etc. En réalité, l’idéologie, la supraidéologie du monde occidental, développée au cours des cinquante dernières années, est bien plus forte que le communisme ou le national-socialisme. Le citoyen occidental en est bien plus abruti que ne l’était le soviétique moyen par la propagande communiste. Dans le domaine idéologique, l’idée importe moins que les mécanismes de sa diffusion. Or la puissance des médias occidentaux est, par exemple, incomparablement plus grande que celle, énorme pourtant, du Vatican au sommet de son pouvoir. Et ce n’est pas tout : le cinéma, la littérature, la philosophie, tous les moyens d’influence et de diffusion de la culture au sens large vont dans le même sens. A la moindre impulsion, ceux qui travaillent dans ces domaines réagissent avec un unanimisme qui laisse penser à des ordres venant d’une source de pouvoir unique. Il suffit que la décision de stigmatiser un Karadzic, un Milosevic ou un autre soit prise pour qu’une machine de propagande planétaire se mette en branle contre ces gens, sans grande importance. Et alors qu’il faudrait juger les politiciens et les généraux de l’OTAN parce qu’ils ont enfreint toutes les lois existantes, l’écrasante majorité des citoyens occidentaux est persuadée que la guerre contre la Serbie était juste et bonne. L’idéologie occidentale combine et fait converger les idées en fonction des besoins. L’une d’entre elles est que les valeurs et le mode de vie occidentaux sont supérieurs à d’autres. Alors que pour la plupart des peuples de la planète ces valeurs sont mortelles. Essayez donc de convaincre les Américains que la Russie en meurt. Vous n’y arriverez jamais. Ils continueront à affirmer que les valeurs occidentales sont universelles, appliquant ainsi l’un des principes fondamentaux du dogmatisme idéologique. Les théoriciens, les médias et les politiciens occidentaux sont absolument persuadés de la supériorité de leur système. C’est cela qui leur permet de l’imposer au monde avec bonne conscience. L’homme occidental, porteur de ces valeurs supérieures est donc un nouveau surhomme. Le terme est tabou, mais cela revient au même. Tout cela mériterait d’être étudié scientifiquement. Mais la recherche scientifique dans certains domaines sociologiques et historiques est devenue difficile. Un scientifique qui voudrait se pencher sur les mécanismes du totalitarisme démocratique aurait à faire face aux plus grandes difficultés. On en ferait d’ailleurs un paria. Par contre, ceux dont le travail sert l’idéologie dominante, croulent sous les dotations et les éditeurs comme les médias se les disputent. Je l’ai observé en tant que chercheur et professeur des universités.

V. L. : Mais cette « supraidéologie » ne propage-t-elle pas aussi la tolérance et le respect ?

A. Z. : Quand vous écoutez les élites occidentales, tout est pur, généreux, respectueux de la personne humaine. Ce faisant, elles appliquent une règle classique de la propagande : masquer la réalité par le discours. Car il suffit d’allumer la télévision, d’aller au cinéma, d’ouvrir les livres à succès, d’écouter la musique la plus diffusée, pour se rendre compte que ce qui est propagé en réalité c’est le culte du sexe, de la violence et de l’argent. Le discours noble et généreux est donc destiné à masquer ces trois piliers – il y en a d’autres – de la démocratie totalitaire.

V. L. : Mais que faites-vous des droits de l’homme ? Ne sont-ils pas respectés en Occident bien plus qu’ailleurs ?

A. Z. : L’idée des droits de l’homme est désormais soumise elle aussi à une pression croissante. L’idée, purement idéologique, selon laquelle ils seraient innés et inaltérables ne résisterait même pas à un début d’examen rigoureux. Je suis prêt à soumettre l’idéologie occidentale à l’analyse scientifique, exactement comme je l’ai fait pour le communisme. Ce sera peut-être un peu long pour un entretien.

zinoli3.jpgV. L. : N’a-t-elle pas une idée maîtresse ?

A. Z. : C’est le mondialisme, la globalisation. Autrement dit : la domination mondiale. Et comme cette idée est assez antipathique, on la masque sous le discours plus vague et généreux d’unification planétaire, de transformation du monde en un tout intégré. C’est le vieux masque idéologique soviétique ; celui de l’amitié entre les peuples, « amitié » destinée à couvrir l’expansionnisme. En réalité, l’Occident procède actuellement à un changement de structure à l’échelle planétaire. D’un côté, la société occidentale domine le monde de la tête et des épaules et de l’autre, elle s’organise elle-même verticalement, avec le pouvoir supranational au sommet de la pyramide.

V. L. : Un gouvernement mondial ?

A. Z. : Si vous voulez.

V. L. : Croire cela n’est-ce-pas être un peu victime du fantasme du complot ?

A. Z. : Quel complot ? Il n’y a aucun complot. Le gouvernement mondial est dirigé par les gouverneurs des structures supranationales commerciales, financières et politiques connues de tous. Selon mes calculs, une cinquantaine de millions de personnes fait déjà partie de cette suprasociété qui dirige le monde. Les États-Unis en sont la métropole. Les pays d’Europe occidentale et certains anciens « dragons » asiatiques, la base. Les autres sont dominés suivant une dure gradation économico-financière. Ça, c’est la réalité. La propagande, elle, prétend qu’un gouvernement mondial contrôlé par un parlement mondial serait souhaitable, car le monde est une vaste fraternité. Ce ne sont là que des balivernes destinées aux populations.

V. L. : Le Parlement européen aussi ?

A. Z. : Non, car le Parlement européen existe. Mais il serait naïf de croire que l’union de l’Europe s’est faite parce que les gouvernements des pays concernés l’ont décidé gentiment. L’Union européenne est un instrument de destruction des souverainetés nationales. Elle fait partie des projets élaborés par les organismes supranationaux.

V. L. : La Communauté européenne a changé de nom après la destruction de l’Union soviétique. Elle s’est appelée Union européenne, comme pour la remplacer. Après tout, il y avait d’autres noms possibles. Aussi, ses dirigeants s’appellent-ils « commissaires », comme les Bolcheviks. Ils sont à la tête d’une « Commission », comme les Bolcheviks. Le dernier président a été « élu » tout en étant candidat unique.

A. Z. : Il ne faut pas oublier que des lois régissent l’organisation sociale. Organiser un million d’hommes c’est une chose, dix millions c’en est une autre, cent millions, c’est bien plus compliqué encore. Organiser cinq cent millions est une tâche immense. Il faut créer de nouveaux organismes de direction, former des gens qui vont les administrer, les faire fonctionner. C’est indispensable. Or l’Union soviétique est, en effet, un exemple classique de conglomérat multinational coiffé d’une structure dirigeante supranationale. L’Union européenne veut faire mieux que l’Union soviétique ! C’est légitime. J’ai déjà été frappé, il y a vingt ans, de voir à quel point les soi-disant tares du système soviétique étaient amplifiées en Occident.

V. L. : Par exemple ?

A. Z. : La planification ! L’économie occidentale est infiniment plus planifiée que ne l’a jamais été l’économie soviétique. La bureaucratie ! En Union Soviétique 10 % à 12 % de la population active travaillaient dans la direction et l’administration du pays. Aux États Unis, ils sont entre 16 % et 20 %. C’est pourtant l’URSS qui était critiquée pour son économie planifiée et la lourdeur de son appareil bureaucratique ! Le Comité central du PCUS employait deux mille personnes. L’ensemble de l’appareil du Parti communiste soviétique était constitué de 150000 salariés. Vous trouverez aujourd’hui même, en Occident, des dizaines voire des centaines d’entreprises bancaires et industrielles qui emploient un nombre bien plus élevé de gens. L’appareil bureaucratique du Parti communiste soviétique était pitoyable en comparaison avec ceux des grandes multinationales. L’URSS était en réalité un pays sous-administré. Les fonctionnaires de l’administration auraient dû être deux à trois fois plus nombreux. L’Union européenne le sait, et en tient compte. L’intégration est impossible sans la création d’un très important appareil administratif.

V. L. : Ce que vous dites est contraire aux idées libérales, affichées par les dirigeants européens. Pensez-vous que leur libéralisme est de façade ?

A. Z. : L’administration a tendance à croître énormément. Cette croissance est dangereuse, pour elle-même. Elle le sait. Comme tout organisme, elle trouve ses propres antidotes pour continuer à prospérer. L’initiative privée en est un. La morale publique et privée, un autre. Ce faisant, le pouvoir lutte en quelque sorte contre ses tendances à l’auto-déstabilisation. Il a donc inventé le libéralisme pour contrebalancer ses propres lourdeurs. Et le libéralisme a joué, en effet, un rôle historique considérable. Mais il serait absurde d’être libéral aujourd’hui. La société libérale n’existe plus. Sa doctrine est totalement dépassée à une époque de concentrations capitalistiques sans pareil dans l’histoire. Les mouvements d’énormes masses financières ne tiennent compte ni des intérêts des États ni de ceux des peuples, peuples composés d’individus. Le libéralisme sous-entend l’initiative personnelle et le risque financier personnel. Or, rien ne se fait aujourd’hui sans l’argent des banques. Ces banques, de moins en moins nombreuses d’ailleurs, mènent une politique dictatoriale, dirigiste par nature. Les propriétaires sont à leur merci, puisque tout est soumis au crédit et donc au contrôle des puissances financières. L’importance des individus, fondement du libéralisme, se réduit de jour en jour. Peu importe aujourd’hui qui dirige telle ou telle entreprise ; ou tel ou tel pays d’ailleurs. Bush ou Clinton, Kohl ou Schröder, Chirac ou Jospin, quelle importance ? Ils mènent et mèneront la même politique.

V. L. : Les totalitarismes du XXe siècle ont été extrêmement violents. On ne peut dire la même chose de la démocratie occidentale.

A. Z. : Ce ne sont pas les méthodes, ce sont les résultats qui importent. Un exemple ? L’URSS a perdu vingt million d’hommes et subi des destructions considérables, en combattant l’Allemagne nazie. Pendant la guerre froide, guerre sans bombes ni canons pourtant, ses pertes, sur tous les plans, ont été bien plus considérables ! La durée de vie des Russes a chuté de dix ans dans les dix dernières années. La mortalité dépasse la natalité de manière catastrophique. Deux millions d’enfants ne dorment pas à la maison. Cinq millions d’enfants en âge d’étudier ne vont pas à l’école. Il y a douze millions de drogués recensés. L’alcoolisme s’est généralisé. 70 % des jeunes ne sont pas aptes au service militaire à cause de leur état physique. Ce sont là des conséquences directes de la défaite dans la guerre froide, défaite suivie par l’occidentalisation. Si cela continue, la population du pays descendra rapidement de cent-cinquante à cent, puis à cinquante millions d’habitants. Le totalitarisme démocratique surpassera tous ceux qui l’ont précédé.

V. L. : En violence ?

A. Z. : La drogue, la malnutrition, le sida sont plus efficaces que la violence guerrière. Quoique, après la guerre froide dont la force de destruction a été colossale, l’Occident vient d’inventer la « guerre pacifique ». L’Irak et la Yougoslavie sont deux exemples de réponse disproportionnée et de punition collective, que l’appareil de propagande se charge d’habiller en « juste cause » ou en « guerre humanitaire ». L’exercice de la violence par les victimes contre elles-mêmes est une autre technique prisée. La contre-révolution russe de 1985 en est un exemple. Mais en faisant la guerre à la Yougoslavie, les pays d’Europe occidentale l’ont faite aussi à eux-mêmes.

V. L. : Selon vous, la guerre contre la Serbie était aussi une guerre contre l’Europe ?

A. Z. : Absolument. Il existe, au sein de l’Europe, des forces capables de lui imposer d’agir contre elle-même. La Serbie a été choisie, parce qu’elle résistait au rouleau compresseur mondialiste. La Russie pourrait être la prochaine sur la liste. Avant la Chine.

zinoli4.jpgV. L. : Malgré son arsenal nucléaire ?

A. Z. : L’arsenal nucléaire russe est énorme mais dépassé. De plus, les Russes sont moralement prêts à être conquis. A l’instar de leurs aïeux qui se rendaient par millions dans l’espoir de vivre mieux sous Hitler que sous Staline, ils souhaitent même cette conquête, dans le même espoir fou de vivre mieux. C’est une victoire idéologique de l’Occident. Seul un lavage de cerveau peut obliger quelqu’un à voir comme positive la violence faite à soi-même. Le développement des mass-media permet des manipulations auxquelles ni Hitler ni Staline ne pouvaient rêver. Si demain, pour des raisons « X », le pouvoir supranational décidait que, tout compte fait, les Albanais posent plus de problèmes que les Serbes, la machine de propagande changerait immédiatement de direction, avec la même bonne conscience. Et les populations suivraient, car elles sont désormais habituées à suivre. Je le répète : on peut tout justifier idéologiquement. L’idéologie des droits de l’homme ne fait pas exception. Partant de là, je pense que le XXIe siècle dépassera en horreur tout ce que l’humanité a connu jusqu’ici. Songez seulement au futur combat contre le communisme chinois. Pour vaincre un pays aussi peuplé, ce n’est ni dix ni vingt mais peut-être cinq cent millions d’individus qu’il faudra éliminer. Avec le développement que connaît actuellement la machine de propagande ce chiffre est tout à fait atteignable. Au nom de la liberté et des droits de l’homme, évidemment. A moins qu’une nouvelle cause, non moins noble, sorte de quelque institution spécialisée en relations publiques.

V. L. : Ne pensez-vous pas que les hommes et les femmes peuvent avoir des opinions, voter, sanctionner par le vote ?

A. Z. : D’abord les gens votent déjà peu et voteront de moins en moins. Quant à l’opinion publique occidentale, elle est désormais conditionnée par les médias. Il n’y a qu’à voir le oui massif à la guerre du Kosovo. Songez donc à la guerre d’Espagne ! Les volontaires arrivaient du monde entier pour combattre dans un camp comme dans l’autre. Souvenez-vous de la guerre du Vietnam. Les gens sont désormais si conditionnés qu’ils ne réagissent plus que dans le sens voulu par l’appareil de propagande.

V. L. : L’URSS et la Yougoslavie étaient les pays les plus multiethniques du monde et pourtant ils ont été détruits. Voyez-vous un lien entre la destruction des pays multiethniques d’un côté et la propagande de la multiethnicité de l’autre ?

A. Z. : Le totalitarisme soviétique avait créé une vraie société multinationale et multiethnique. Ce sont les démocraties occidentales qui ont fait des efforts de propagande surhumains, à l’époque de la guerre froide, pour réveiller les nationalismes. Parce qu’elles voyaient dans l’éclatement de l’URSS le meilleur moyen de la détruire. Le même mécanisme a fonctionné en Yougoslavie. L’Allemagne a toujours voulu la mort de la Yougoslavie. Unie, elle aurait été plus difficile à vaincre. Le système occidental consiste à diviser pour mieux imposer sa loi à toutes les parties à la fois, et s’ériger en juge suprême. Il n’y a pas de raison pour qu’il ne soit pas appliqué à la Chine. Elle pourrait être divisée, en dizaines d’États.

V. L. : La Chine et l’Inde ont protesté de concert contre les bombardements de la Yougoslavie. Pourraient-elles éventuellement constituer un pôle de résistance ? Deux milliards d’individus, ce n’est pas rien !

A. Z. : La puissance militaire et les capacités techniques de l’Occident sont sans commune mesure avec les moyens de ces deux pays.

V. L. : Parce que les performances du matériel de guerre américain en Yougoslavie vous ont impressionné ?

A. Z. : Ce n’est pas le problème. Si la décision avait été prise, la Serbie aurait cessé d’exister en quelques heures. Les dirigeants du Nouvel ordre mondial ont apparemment choisi la stratégie de la violence permanente. Les conflits locaux vont se succéder pour être arrêtés par la machine de « guerre pacifique » que nous venons de voir à l’oeuvre. Cela peut, en effet, être une technique de management planétaire. L’Occident contrôle la majeure partie des ressources naturelles mondiales. Ses ressources intellectuelles sont des millions de fois supérieures à celles du reste de la planète. C’est cette écrasante supériorité qui détermine sa domination technique, artistique, médiatique, informatique, scientifique dont découlent toutes les autres formes de domination. Tout serait simple s’il suffisait de conquérir le monde. Mais il faut encore le diriger. C’est cette question fondamentale que les Américains essaient maintenant de résoudre. C’est cela qui rend « incompréhensibles » certaines actions de la « communauté internationale ». Pourquoi Saddam est-il toujours là ? Pourquoi Karadzic n’est-il toujours pas arrêté ? Voyez-vous, à l’époque du Christ, nous étions peut-être cent millions sur l’ensemble du globe. Aujourd’hui, le Nigeria compte presqu’autant d’habitants ! Le milliard d’Occidentaux et assimilés va diriger le reste du monde. Mais ce milliard devra être dirigé à son tour. Il faudra probablement deux cent millions de personnes pour diriger le monde occidental. Il faut les sélectionner, les former. Voilà pourquoi la Chine est condamnée à l’échec dans sa lutte contre l’hégémonie occidentale. Ce pays sous-administré n’a ni les capacités économiques ni les ressources intellectuelles pour mettre en place un appareil de direction efficace, composé de quelque trois cent millions d’individus. Seul l’Occident est capable de résoudre les problèmes de management à l’échelle de la planète. Cela se met déjà en place. Les centaines de milliers d’Occidentaux se trouvant dans les anciens pays communistes, en Russie par exemple, occupent dans leur écrasante majorité des postes de direction. La démocratie totalitaire sera aussi une démocratie coloniale.

V. L. : Pour Marx, la colonisation était civilisatrice. Pourquoi ne le serait-elle pas à nouveau ?

A. Z. : Pourquoi pas, en effet ? Mais pas pour tout le monde. Quel est l’apport des Indiens d’Amérique à la civilisation ? Il est presque nul, car ils ont été exterminés, écrasés. Voyez maintenant l’apport des Russes ! L’Occident se méfiait d’ailleurs moins de la puissance militaire soviétique que de son potentiel intellectuel, artistique, sportif. Parce qu’il dénotait une extraordinaire vitalité. Or c’est la première chose à détruire chez un ennemi. Et c’est ce qui a été fait. La science russe dépend aujourd’hui des financements américains. Et elle est dans un état pitoyable, car ces derniers n’ont aucun intérêt à financer des concurrents. Ils préfèrent faire travailler les savants russes aux USA. Le cinéma soviétique a été lui aussi détruit et remplacé par le cinéma américain. En littérature, c’est la même chose. La domination mondiale s’exprime, avant tout, par le diktat intellectuel ou culturel si vous préférez. Voilà pourquoi les Américains s’acharnent, depuis des décennies, à baisser le niveau culturel et intellectuel du monde : ils veulent le ramener au leur pour pouvoir exercer ce diktat.

zinovievxxx.jpgV. L. : Mais cette domination, ne serait-elle pas, après tout, un bien pour l’humanité ?

A. Z. : Ceux qui vivront dans dix générations pourront effectivement dire que les choses se sont faites pour le bien de l’humanité, autrement dit pour leur bien à eux. Mais qu’en est-il du Russe ou du Français qui vit aujourd’hui ? Peut-il se réjouir s’il sait que l’avenir de son peuple pourrait être celui des Indiens d’Amérique ? Le terme d’Humanité est une abstraction. Dans la vie réelle il y a des Russes, des Français, des Serbes, etc. Or si les choses continuent comme elles sont parties, les peuples qui ont fait notre civilisation, je pense avant tout aux peuples latins, vont progressivement disparaître. L’Europe occidentale est submergée par une marée d’étrangers. Nous n’en avons pas encore parlé, mais ce n’est ni le fruit du hasard, ni celui de mouvements prétendument incontrôlables. Le but est de créer en Europe une situation semblable à celle des États-Unis. Savoir que l’humanité va être heureuse, mais sans Français, ne devrait pas tellement réjouir les Français actuels. Après tout, laisser sur terre un nombre limité de gens qui vivraient comme au Paradis, pourrait être un projet rationnel. Ceux-là penseraient d’ailleurs sûrement que leur bonheur est l’aboutissement de la marche de l’histoire. Non, il n’est de vie que celle que nous et les nôtres vivons aujourd’hui.

V. L. : Le système soviétique était inefficace. Les sociétés totalitaires sont-elles toutes condamnées à l’inefficacité ?

A. Z. : Qu’est-ce que l’efficacité ? Aux États-Unis, les sommes dépensées pour maigrir dépassent le budget de la Russie. Et pourtant le nombre des gros augmente. Il y a des dizaines d’exemples de cet ordre.

V. L. : Peut-on dire que l’Occident vit actuellement une radicalisation qui porte les germes de sa propre destruction ?

A. Z. : Le nazisme a été détruit dans une guerre totale. Le système soviétique était jeune et vigoureux. Il aurait continué à vivre s’il n’avait pas été combattu de l’extérieur. Les systèmes sociaux ne s’autodétruisent pas. Seule une force extérieure peut anéantir un système social. Comme seul un obstacle peut empêcher une boule de rouler. Je pourrais le démontrer comme on démontre un théorème. Actuellement, nous sommes dominés par un pays disposant d’une supériorité économique et militaire écrasante. Le Nouvel ordre mondial se veut unipolaire. Si le gouvernement supranational y parvenait, n’ayant aucun ennemi extérieur, ce système social unique pourrait exister jusqu’à la fin des temps. Un homme seul peut être détruit par ses propres maladies. Mais un groupe, même restreint, aura déjà tendance à se survivre par la reproduction. Imaginez un système social composé de milliards d’individus ! Ses possibilités de repérer et d’arrêter les phénomènes autodestructeurs seront infinies. Le processus d’uniformisation du monde ne peut être arrêté dans l’avenir prévisible. Car le totalitarisme démocratique est la dernière phase de l’évolution de la société occidentale, évolution commencée à la Renaissance.

vendredi, 20 novembre 2015

Antifascistas en el Gulag

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Antifascistas en el Gulag

por Joaquín Albaicín

Ex: http://culturatransversal.wordpress.com

¿Qué hacía Rafael Pelayo de Hungría, comunista español y partisano soviético en las estepas, fugándose de la Unión Soviética con un sargento de la División Azul, camuflados ambos entre los contingentes de ex combatientes alemanes repatriados tras lago cautiverio en Rusia? Pues… ¿qué iba a hacer? Sencillamente, poner pies en polvorosa como fuera tras arrojar a la letrina el lastre que siempre supone eso de tener una ideología.

Y es que uno de los muchos saldos en números rojos dejados en 1939 por la derrota de la República fue el de los exiliados, y no sólo porque el papel moneda emitido por Madrid hubiera perdido todo valor. Para los fugitivos, claro, no era lo mismo haber logrado hallar acomodo –por precario que fuera- en México o París que en la URSS. Persuadidos por sus líderes de que el paraíso de los obreros era su lugar en la vida, muchos comunistas ibéricos recalaron allí, donde desde hacía tiempo les esperaban, aparte de unos tres mil “niños de la guerra”, bastantes pilotos en su día desplazados hasta tan remotos parajes para recibir cursos de vuelo, así como marinos a cuyos barcos sorprendió el final de la contienda atracados en puertos rusos.

Lógicamente, en cuanto se coscaron del cenizo que recubría toda la pesadilla leninista y constataron que allí se vivía en la miseria y a golpe de látigo, tanto los comunistas como quienes no lo eran iniciaron denodados trámites –supuestamente existentes- para ser autorizados a abandonar el país y trasladarse bien a España, bien a otras naciones donde podrían reunirse con sus familiares. La dirección del PC español fue el mayor obstáculo con que se toparon. En primer lugar, que los antifascistas huyeran de las condiciones de vida vigentes en la URSS no constituía una propaganda deseable. En segundo, era de temer que contaran cómo de verdad transcurrían allí las cosas. Finalmente, aquello constituiría un imperdonable desaire a Dolores Ibárruri, en torno a la cual los dirigentes comunistas españoles estaban edificando un culto a la personalidad calcado del promovido por el PCUS en torno a Stalin: si éste era el severo Padrecito de Todos los Soviéticos, ella –La Pasionaria– era la amantísima Madre de Todos los Obreros Españoles.

La política adoptada por el PCE de la época se centró, pues, en la ejecución de purgas internas paralelas a las regularmente aplicadas en sus filas por el PCUS, así que la Madrecita puso enseguida manos a la obra a un equipo de leales con la misión de investigar y denunciar ante las autoridades soviéticas las conspiraciones fascistas en que andaban envueltos todos aquellos traidores que abominaban de la sopa de remolacha soviética.

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La primera medida fue suave: invitar, a todos los aspirantes a marcharse, a firmar un documento declarando lo felices que vivían en la URSS y solicitando que Moscú no prestara oídos a futuras peticiones que, para sacarlos de allí, pudieran formular sus familias o cualquier organización o gobierno. Como sólo lo rubricaron dos, los republicanos españoles empezaron muy pronto a conocer el Gulag, donde –bromas del Destino- coincidirían con los cautivos de la División Azul. Son los líos en que se mete la gente, o en los que la vida enreda a los habitantes del Valle de Lágrimas. Quién iba a decir a un buen señor nacido en un pueblo de Toledo y anarquista, comunista, socialista o, simplemente, republicano de toda la vida, que iba un buen día a verse cargando vagonetas de pedruscos en un campo de concentración del Círculo Polar Ártico, rezando codo con codo con un falangista por que Dios diese salud y larga vida a Franco, porque él era su única esperanza de salir algún día del agujero.

Irónicamente, así ocurrió. Fue el Estado franquista quien, tras varios años y muchas negociaciones, y previo indulto de aquellos que tuvieran en España causas pendientes o condenas firmes por su actuación durante la guerra civil, sacó del infierno a los supervivientes de aquel dislate (con el consiguiente y, no en vano, merecido provecho político ante la comunidad internacional). La historia de esos esfuerzos y de los –casi baldíos- del fantasmal Gobierno de la República en el Exilio, la cuenta con todos los detalles la profesora rumana Luiza Iordache, Doctora en Ciencias Políticas y docente en la UAB, en su voluminoso y amenísimo estudio En el Gulag. Españoles republicanos en los campos de concentración de Stalin (RBA).

Aparte de tratarse de una investigación muy rigurosa, valdría la pena leerlo aunque sólo fuera por conocer la historia del “niño de la guerra” Pedro Cepeda y el curtido aviador comunista José Antonio Tuñón, que –con la ayuda de diplomáticos argentinos, en cuya embajada moscovita trabajaban como intérpretes- trataron de huir de la URSS ocultos en dos baúles. O la de su cómplice Julián Fuster, verdadero personaje de novela: cirujano en el Ejército Rojo, siete años en el Gulag a las espaldas y médico también tras su liberación en la Cuba revolucionaria, de donde hubo de marcharse por advertir de que se caminaba hacia el modelo soviético, fue uno de los tripulantes del último avión de la OMS que abandonó el Congo al estallar la guerra de Katanga antes de recalar, esta vez definitivamente, en España.

Agitada fue también la de Francisco Ramos, seis meses torturado en la Lubyanka, con quien Solzhenytsin coincidió en los campos y que, irónicamente, como los demás antifascistas españoles “residentes” en el Edén socialista, sólo podía hacer llegar noticias suyas a sus familiares a través de los soldados nazis puestos en libertad y reenviados a Alemania. Retornado a España en 1957, Ramos fue elegido como diputado del PSC-PSOE por Barcelona en 1977 y 1982. No sé qué sentiría al ver sentados con él en el hemiciclo a, por lo menos, dos o tres de las personas responsables en su momento de su envío, por “fascista”, a un campo de concentración de los Urales. Regresó dos veces a la URSS acompañando en viajes oficiales a Felipe González. “Me alegré de ser tratado como una persona en el país donde, cuando me refugié en él, fui tratado como un perro”, escribió.

En fin, que basta con echar de cuando en cuando un somero vistazo a un libro de historia para constatar que, de lo que cuente cualquier político de cualquier lugar o época, lo más juicioso es no creer de la misa ni la media. Y es que la realidad suele, sí, superar a la ficción, pero, por desgracia… casi siempre por abajo.

Foto: José Luis Chaín

vendredi, 30 octobre 2015

Diplomaţia lui Stalin

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Diplomaţia lui Stalin

Istoria secolului nostru este învăţată din punctul de vedere american. La fel este şi în cazul celui de-al doilea Război Mondial, al Războiului Rece şi al Războiului din Golf. În optica americană, secolul XXI este “secolul american”, în care trebuie să se instaleze şi să se menţină o ordine mondială conform cu interesele americane, secol care este simultan “sfârşitul istoriei”, sfârşitul aventurii umane, sinteza definitivă a dialecticii istoriei. Francis Fukuyama, chiar înainte de războiul din Golf, afirma că odată cu căderea Cortinei de Fier şi sfârşitul “hegelianismului de stânga” pe care îl reprezenta URSS-ul, un singur model, cel al liberalismului american, va subzista secole de-a rândul. Cu condiţia ca niciun competitor să nu se zărească la orizont. De unde misiunea americană era aceea de a reacţiona rapid, mobilizând maximum de mijloace, contra oricărei veleităţi de a construi o ordine politică alternativă.

Cu câţiva ani înainte de Fukuyama, un autor germano-american, Theodore H. von Laue, pretindea că singura revoluţie veritabilă în lume şi în istorie era aceea a occidentalizării şi că toate revoluţiile politice non-occidentaliste, toate regimurile bazate pe alte principii decât cele în vogă în America, erau relicve ale trecutului, pe care numai nişte reacţionari perverşi le puteau adula, reacţionari pe care puterea americană, economică şi militară, urma să le măture rapid pentru a face loc unui hiper-liberalism de factură anglo-saxonă, debarasat de orice concurenţă.

Dacă hitlerismul este în mod general considerat ca o forţă reacţionară perversă faţă de care America a contribuit la eliminarea din Europa, se ştiu mai puţin motivele care l-au împins pe Truman şi pe protagoniştii atlantişti ai Războiului Rece să lupte contra stalinismului şi să facă din el un căpcăun ideologic, considerat explicit de către von Laue drept „reacţionar” în ciuda etichetei sale proprii de „progresist”. Această ambiguitate faţă de Stalin se explică prin alianţa americano-sovietică în timpul celui de-al Doilea Război mondial, când Stalin era supranumit în mod prietenos “Uncle Joe”. Cu toate acestea, de câţiva ani, numeroşi istorici revăd în mod inteligent poncifele pe care patruzeci şi cinci de ani de atlantism furibund le-au vehiculat în mass-media şi în cărţile noastre de istorie. Germanul Dirk Bavendamm a demonstrat în două lucrări meticuloase şi precise care au fost responsabilităţile lui Roosevelt în declanşarea conflictelor americano-japonez şi americano-german şi de asemenea care era duplicitatea preşedintelui american faţă de aliaţii săi ruşi. Valentin Falin, fostul ambasador al URSS-ului la Bonn, a publicat în Germania o lucrare de amintiri istorice şi de reflecţii istoriografice, în care acest briliant diplomat rus afirmă că Războiul Rece a început imediat după debarcarea anglo-americană din iunie 1944 pe plajele din Normandia: desfăşurându-şi armada lor navală şi aeriană, puterile occidentale duceau deja un război mai ales contra Uniunii Sovietice şi nu contra Germaniei muribunde.

O lectură atentă a mai multor lucrări recente consacrate multiplelor aspecte ale rezistenţei germane contra regimului hitlerist ne obligă să renunţăm definitiv la interpretarea istoriei celui de-al Doilea Război mondial şi a alianţei anglo-americano-sovietice după modelul convenţional. Ostilitatea faţă de Stalin după 1945 provine mai ales din faptul că Stalin înţelegea să practice o diplomaţie generală bazată pe relaţiile bilaterale între naţiuni, fără ca acestea să fie supervizate de o instanţă universală cum ar fi ONU. Apoi, după ce şi-a dat seama că cele două puteri anglo-saxone deciseseră singure la Casablanca să facă războiul excesiv cu Reich-ul, să declanşeze războiul total şi să ceară capitularea fără condiţii a Germaniei naţional-socialiste, Stalin s-a simţit exclus de aliaţii săi. Furios, el şi-a concentrat mânia în această frază bine ticluită, în aparenţă anodină, dar foarte semnificativă: „Hitlerii vin şi se duc, poporul şi statul german rămân”. Stalin nu considera naţional-socialismul hitlerist ca pe răul absolut sau chiar ca pe o esenţă netrecătoare, ci ca pe un accident al istoriei, o vicisitudine potrivnică Rusiei eterne, pe care armatele sovietice urmau pur şi simplu să caute s-o elimine. Dar, în logica diplomatică tradiţională, care îi aparţinea lui Stalin, în ciuda ideologiei mesianice marxiste, naţiunile nu pier: nu trebuie prin urmare să ceri o capitulare necondiţionată şi trebuie mereu să laşi poarta deschisă unor negocieri. În plin război, alianţele se pot schimba cu totul, aşa cum o arată clar istoria europeană. Stalin se mulţumeşte să ceară deschiderea unui al doilea front pentru a uşura misiunea armatelor sovietice şi a diminua pierderile de vieţi omeneşti în rândul ruşilor, dar acest front nu vine decât foarte târziu, ceea ce-i permite lui Valentin Falin să explice această întârziere ca pe primul act al Războiului Rece între puterile maritime anglo-saxone şi puterea continentală sovietică.

Această reticenţă a lui Stalin se explică şi prin contextul care a precedat imediat epilogul lungii bătălii de la Stalingrad şi debarcarea anglo-saxonă în Normandia. Când armatele lui Hitler şi ale aliaţilor săi slovaci, finlandezi, români şi unguri au intrat în URSS în 22 iunie 1941, sovieticii, oficial, au estimat că clauzele Pactului Molotov/Ribbentrop au fost trădate şi, în toamna lui 1942, după gigantica ofensivă victorioasă a armatelor germane în direcţia Caucazului, Moscova a fost constrânsă să sondeze adversarul său în vederea unei eventuale păci separate: Stalin dorea să se revină la termenii Pactului şi conta pe ajutorul japonezilor pentru a reconstitui, în masa continentală eurasiatică, acel „car cu patru cai” pe care i-l propusese Ribbentrop în septembrie 1940 (sau „Pactul Cvadripartit” între Reich, Italia, URSS şi Japonia). Stalin dorea o pace nulă: Wehrmacht-ul să se retragă dincolo de frontiera fixată de comun acord în 1939 şi URSS-ul să-şi panseze rănile. Mai mulţi agenţi au participat la aceste negocieri, ce au rămas în general secrete. Printre ei, Peter Kleist, ataşat în acelaşi timp de Cabinetul lui Ribbentrop şi de „Biroul Rosenberg”. Kleist, naţionalist german de tradiţie rusofilă în amintirea prieteniei dintre Prusia şi Ţari, va negocia la Stockholm, unde jocul diplomatic va fi strâns şi complex. În capitala suedeză, ruşii sunt deschişi la toate sugestiile; printre ei, ambasadoarea Kollontaï şi diplomatul Semionov. Kleist acţionează în numele Cabinetului Ribbentrop şi al Abwehr-ului lui Canaris (şi nu al „Biroului Rosenberg” care avea în vedere o balcanizare a URSS-ului şi crearea unui puternic stat ucrainean pentru a contrabalansa „Moscovia”). Al doilea protagonist al părţii germane a fost Edgar Klaus, un evreu din Riga care făcea legătura între sovietici şi Abwehr (el nu avea relaţii directe cu instanţele propriu-zis naţional socialiste).

În acest joc mai mult sau mai puţin triangular, sovieticii doreau revenirea la status-quo-ul de dinainte de 1939. Hitler a refuzat toate sugestiile lui Kleist şi a crezut că poate câştiga definitiv bătălia prin cucerirea Stalingradului, cheie a fluviului Volga, a Caucazului şi a Caspicii. Kleist, care ştia că o încetare a ostilităţilor cu Rusia ar fi permis Germaniei să rămână dominantă în Europa şi să-şi îndrepte toate forţele contra britanicilor şi americanilor, trece atunci de partea elementelor active ale rezistenţei anti-hitleriene, chiar dacă este personal dator instanţelor naţional-socialiste! Kleist îi contactează deci pe Adam von Trott zu Solz şi pe fostul ambasador al Reich-ului la Moscova, von der Schulenburg. El nu se adresează comuniştilor şi estimează, fără îndoială odată cu Canaris, că negocierile cu Stalin vor permite realizarea Europei lui Coudenhove-Kalergi (fără Anglia şi fără Rusia), pe care o visau de asemenea şi catolicii. Dar sovieticii nu se adresează nici ei aliaţilor lor teoretici şi privilegiaţi, comuniştii germani: ei pariază pe vechea gardă aristocratică, unde exista încă amintirea alianţei prusacilor şi ruşilor contra lui Napoleon, ca şi cea a neutralităţii tacite a germanilor în timpul Războiului Crimeii. Cum Hitler refuză orice negociere, Stalin, rezistenţa aristocratică, Abwehr-ul şi chiar o parte a gărzii sale pretoriene, SS-ul, decid că el trebuie să dispară. Aici trebuie văzută originea complotului care va duce la atentatul din 20 iulie 1944.

Dar după iarna lui 42-43, sovieticii au revenit la Stalingrad şi au distrus vârful de lance al Wehrmacht-ului, armata a şasea, care încercuia metropola de pe Volga. Partida germană a sovieticilor va fi atunci constituită de „Comitetul Germania Liberă”, cu mareşalul von Paulus şi cu ofiţeri ca von Seydlitz-Kurzbach, toţi prizonieri de război. Stalin nu avea în continuare încredere în comuniştii germani, din rândul cărora a eliminat ideologii nerealişti şi revoluţionarii maximalişti troţkişti, care au ignorat mereu deliberat, din orbire ideologică, noţiunea de „patrie” şi continuităţile istorice multiseculare; finalmente, dictatorul georgian nu l-a păstrat în rezervă, ca bun la toate, decât pe Pieck, un militant care nu şi-a pus niciodată prea multe întrebări. Pieck va face carieră în viitoarea RDG. Stalin nu visa nici un regim comunist pentru Germania post-hitleriană: el dorea o „ordine democratică forte”, cu o putere executivă mai marcată decât sub Republica de la Weimar. Această dorinţă politică a lui Stalin corespunde perfect alegerii sale iniţiale: pariul pe elitele militare, diplomatice şi politice conservatoare, provenind în majoritate din aristocraţie şi din Obrigkeitsstaat-ul[1] prusac. Democraţia germană, care trebuia să vină după Hitler, în opinia lui Stalin, urma să fie de ideologie conservatoare, cu o fluiditate democratică controlată, canalizată şi încadrată de un sistem de educaţie politică strictă.

Britanicii şi americanii au fost surprinşi: ei crezuseră că „Unchiul Joe” va înghiţi fără probleme politica lor maximalistă, ruptă total de uzanţele democratice în vigoare în Europa. Dar Stalin, ca şi Papa şi Bell, episcopul de Chichester, se opuneau principiului revoluţionar al predării necondiţionate pe care Churchill şi Roosevelt au vrut s-o impună Reich-ului (care va rămâne, cum gândea Stalin, în calitate de principiu politic în ciuda prezenţei efemere a unui Hitler). Dacă Roosevelt, făcând apel la dictatura mediatică pe care o controla bine în Statele Unite, a reuşit să-şi reducă adversarii la tăcere, indiferent de ideologie, Churchill a avut mai mari dificultăţi în Anglia. Principalul său adversar era acest Bell, episcop de Chichester. Pentru acesta din urmă, nu se punea problema de a reduce Germania la neant, căci Germania era patria lui Luther şi a protestantismului. Filosofiei predării necondiţionate a lui Churchill, Bell îi opunea noţiunea unei solidarităţi protestante şi-i punea în gardă pe omologii săi olandezi, danezi, norvegieni şi suedezi, ca şi pe interlocutorii săi din rezistenţa germană (Bonhoeffer, Schönfeld, von Moltke), pentru a face faţă belicismului exagerat al lui Churchill, care se exprima prin bombardarea masivă a obiectivelor civile, chiar şi în oraşe mici fără infrastructură industrială importantă. Pentru Bell, viitorul Germaniei nu era nici nazismul nici comunismul, ci o „ordine liberală şi democratică”. Această soluţie, preconizată de episcopul de Chichester, nu era evident acceptabilă de către naţionalismul german tradiţional: ea constituia o întoarcere subtilă la Kleinstaaterei, la mozaicul de state, principate şi ducate, pe care viziunile lui List, Wagner etc. şi pumnul lui Bismarck le şterseseră din centrul continentului nostru. „Ordinea democratică forte” sugerată de Stalin era mai acceptabilă pentru naţionaliştii germani, al căror obiectiv a fost mereu crearea unor instituţii şi a unei paidei puternice pentru a proteja poporul german, substanţa etnică germană, de propriile sale slăbiciuni politice, de lipsa simţului său de decizie, de particularismul său atavic şi de durerile sale morale incapacitante. Astăzi, evident, mulţi observatori naţionalişti constată că federalismul constituţiei din 1949 se înscrie poate destul de bine în tradiţia juridică constituţională germană, dar forma pe care a luat-o, în cursul istoriei RFG-ului, îi relevă natura sa de „concesie”. O concesie a puterilor anglo-saxone…

 

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În faţa adversarilor capitulării necondiţionate din sânul coaliţiei antihitleriste, rezistenţa germană a rămas în ambiguitate: Beck şi von Hassel sunt pro-occidentali şi vor să urmeze cruciada anti-bolşevică, dar într-un sens creştin; Goerdeler şi von der Schulenburg sunt în favoarea unei păci separate cu Stalin. Claus von Stauffenberg, autorul atentatului din 20 iulie 1944 contra lui Hitler, provenea din cercurile poetico-ezoterice din München, unde poetul Stefan George juca un rol preponderent. Stauffenberg este un idealist, un „cavaler al Germaniei secrete”: el refuză să dialogheze cu „Comitetul Germania Liberă” al lui von Paulus şi von Seydlitz-Kurzbach: „nu putem avea încredere în proclamaţiile făcute din spatele sârmei ghimpate”.

Adepţii unei păci separate cu Stalin, adversari ai deschiderii unui front spre Est, au fost imediat atenţi la propunerile de pace sovietice emise de agenţii la post în Stockholm. Partizanii unei „partide nule” la Est sunt ideologic „anti-occidentali”, aparţinând cercurilor conservatoare rusofile (cum ar fi Juni-Klub sau acei Jungkonservativen din siajul lui Moeller van den Bruck), ligilor naţional-revoluţionare derivate din Wandervogel sau „naţionalismului soldăţesc”. Speranţa lor era de a vedea Wehrmacht-ul retrăgându-se în ordine din teritoriile cucerite în URSS şi de a se replia dincolo de linia de demarcaţie din octombrie 1939 în Polonia. În acest sens interpretează exegeţii contemporani ai operei lui Ernst Jünger faimosul său text de război intitulat „Note caucaziene”. Ernst Jünger percepe aici dificultăţile de a stabiliza un front în imensele stepe de dincolo de Don, unde gigantismul teritoriului interzice o reţea militară ermetică ca într-un peisaj central-european sau de tip picard-champenoise, muncit şi răsmuncit de generaţii şi generaţii de mici ţărani încăpăţânaţi care au ţesut teritoriul cu îngrădituri, proprietăţi, garduri şi construcţii de o rară densitate, permiţând armatelor să se prindă de teren, să se disimuleze sau să întindă ambuscade. Este foarte probabil ca Jünger să fi pledat pentru retragerea  Wehrmacht-ului, sperând, în logica naţional-revoluţionară, care îi era proprie în anii 20 sau 30, şi unde rusofilia politico-diplomatică era foarte prezentă, ca forţele ruseşti şi germane, reconciliate, să interzică pentru totdeauna accesul în „Fortăreaţa Europa”, chiar în „Fortăreaţa Eurasia” puterilor talasocratice, care practică sistematic ceea ce Haushofer numea „politica anacondei”, pentru a sufoca orice veleitate de independenţă pe marginile litorale ale „Marelui Continent” (Europa, India, ţările arabe etc.).

Ernst Jünger redactează notele sale caucaziene în momentul în care Stalingradul cade şi armata a şasea este înecată în sânge, oroare şi zăpadă. Dar în ciuda victoriei de la Stalingrad, care le permite sovieticilor să bareze calea spre Caucaz şi Marea Caspică germanilor şi să impiedice orice manevră în amontele fluviului, Stalin urmează mai departe negocierile sale sperând în continuare să joace o „partidă nulă”. Sovieticii nu pun un termen demersurilor lor decât după întrevederile de la Teheran (28 noimebrie – 1 decembrie 1943). În acel moment, Jünger pare a se fi retras din rezistenţă. În celebrul său interviu din Spiegel din 1982, imediat după ce primise premiul Goethe la Frankfurt, el declara: „Atentatele întăresc regimurile pe care vor să le dărâme, mai ales dacă sunt ratate”. Jünger, fără îndoială ca şi Rommel, refuza logica atentatului. Ceea ce nu a fost cazul cu Claus von Stauffenberg. Deciziile luate de către aliaţii occidentali şi de către sovietici la Teheran au făcut imposibilă revenirea la punctul de pornire, adică la linia de demarcaţie din octombrie 1939 în Polonia. Sovieticii şi anglo-saxonii s-au pus de acord să „transporte dulapul polonez” spre Vest prin cedarea unei zone de ocupaţie permanentă în Silezia şi în Pomerania. În atari condiţii, naţionaliştii germani nu mai puteau negocia iar Stalin era din oficiu prins în logica maximalistă a lui Roosevelt, în vreme ce la început o refuzase. Poporul rus urma să plătească foarte scump această schimbare de politică, favorabilă americanilor.

După 1945, constatând că logica Războiului Rece vizează încercuirea şi izolarea Uniunii Sovietice pentru a o împiedica să ajungă la mările calde, Stalin a reiterat oferta sa Germaniei epuizate şi divizate: unificarea şi neutralitatea, adică libertatea de a-şi alege regimul politic după placul său, mai ales o „ordine democratică forte”. Acesta va fi obiectul „notelor lui Stalin” din 1952. Decesul prematur al Vojd-ului sovietic în 1953 nu a mai permis URSS-ului să continue să joace această carte germană. Hruşciov a denunţat stalinismul, a apăsat pe logica blocurilor pe care Stalin o refuzase şi nu a revenit la antiamericanism decât în momentul afacerii Berlinului (1961) şi a crizei din Cuba (1962). Nu se va mai vorbi despre „notele lui Stalin” decât înainte de perestroika, în timpul manifestaţiilor pacifiste din 1980-1983, când mai multe voci germane au reclamat afirmarea unei neutralităţi în afara oricărei logici de tip bloc. Unii emisari ai lui Gorbaciov vor mai vorbi despre acele note şi după 1985, mai ales germanistul Viatcheslav Dachitchev, care a luat cuvântul peste tot în Germania, chiar şi în câteva cercuri ultra-naţionaliste.

În lumina acestei noi istorii a rezistenţei germane şi a belicismului american, putem să înţelegem într-un mod diferit stalinismul şi anti-stalinismul. Acesta din urmă, de exemplu, serveşte la răspândirea unei mitologii politice false şi artificiale, al cărei obiectiv ultim este să respingă orice formă de concert internaţional bazat pe relaţiile bilaterale, să impună o logică a blocurilor sau o logică mondialistă prin intermediul acestui instrument rooseveltian care este ONU (Coreea, Congo, Irak: mereu fără Rusia!), să stigmatizeze din start orice raport bilateral între o putere medie europeană şi Rusia sovietică (Germania în 1952 şi Franţa lui De Gaulle după evenimentele din Algeria). Antistalinismul este o variantă a discursului mondialist. Diplomaţia stalinistă era, în felul ei şi într-un context foarte particular, păstrătoare a tradiţiilor diplomatice europene.

Bibliografie:

– Dirk BAVENDAMM, Roosevelts Weg zum Krieg. Amerikanische Politik 1914-1939, Herbig, München, 1983.

– Dirk BAVENDAMM, Roosevelts Krieg 1937-45 und das Rätsel von Pearl Harbour, Herbig, München, 1993.

– Valentin FALIN, Zweite Front. Die Interessenkonflikte in der Anti-Hitler-Koalition, Droemer-Knaur, München, 1995.

– Francis FUKUYAMA, La fin de l’histoire et le dernier homme, Flammarion, 1992.

– Klemens von KLEMPERER, German Resistance Against Hitler. The Search for Allies Abroad. 1938-1945,  Oxford University Press/Clarendon Press, 1992-94.

– Theodore H. von LAUE, The World Revolution of Westernization. The Twentieth Century in Global Perspective,  Oxford University Press, 1987.

– Jürgen SCHMÄDEKE/Peter STEINBACH (Hrsg.), Der Widerstand gegen den National-Sozialismus. Die deutsche Gesellschaft und der Widerstand gegen Hitler,  Piper (SP n°1923), München, 1994.

Traducere: Vladimir Muscalu

Sursa: http://robertsteuckers.blogspot.ro/2011/12/normal-0-21-false-false-false_29.html

[1] Statul autoritar (n. tr.)

dimanche, 14 juin 2015

American Capital's Love Affair with Soviet Communism

sovus.jpg

Our Kind of Enemy

 

American Capital's Love Affair with Soviet Communism

Ex: http://us2.campaign-archive2.com

Soviet Communism has not been fashionable in elite media and academic circles since 1992. Stalinists are now more often depicted as “conservatives” than leftists, and Communism is seen as a symptom of “nationalism.” A BBC documentary on North Korea declared that country to be a “fascist dictatorship,” on the “right of the political spectrum.” Apparently, if we are to condemn something in the modern world, it must be right-wing.

From a historical perspective, Communism was never really viewed as the enemy by American policymakers. Nationalism was. It has been difficult to discern this, since the true nature and motivations of U.S. policy-making have been shrouded by the myth of the Cold War—the notion that the U.S. and Soviet Union were engaged in an all-or-nothing battle between Freedom and Socialism, with the soul of the world hanging in the balance. In reality, the U.S. and Western Europe invested billions of dollars in the Soviet economy. And at critical times, the USSR was bailed out by cheap grain sales from Archer-Daniels-Midland and other conglomerates.

There was a Cold War of sorts, but it had little to do with “fear of Communism,” which policymakers did not fear nor properly understand. The real antagonism arose when the East sought to create a large, powerful trading bloc outside Western control. Then—and only then—would chatter about “tyranny” and the “Red Menace” be heard. Even in those exceptional times, corporate America continued to invest in “building socialism.”

So it is not entirely surprising to read that President Ford refused to meet with Alexandr Solzhenitsyn, so as not to “prejudice” Brezhnev at a summit held later. Reagan did the same, only meeting with liberal dissidents like Andrei Sakharov. Both Presidents, ostensible “anti-Communists,” were willing to work with Soviets and liberals—but never Russian nationalists.

Sanctions have been put on Putin's Russia that would never have been advocated at the height of the GULAG system. Indeed, the President of Russia has been the target of what scholar Stephen Cohen calls “ongoing, extraordinary, irrational, and nonfactual demonization” from the West. No Soviet dictator was treated so harshly. While Washington was never close to an armed conflict with the Soviet Union, today, a shooting war with Russia is a very real possibility.

The West is deeply indebted, bereft of leadership, and slowly falling into poverty. Yet Washington’s main foreign-policy objectives are to overthrow pro-Russian governments in Uzbekistan, Belarus, Kyrgyzstan, and Armenia. At a low point in American legitimacy, Washington is willing to risk a nuclear war.

In such a context, antiwar protests have been conspicuously absent, mainly because the corporate behemoths that financed them during the Cold War are no longer engaged. There is no peace movement calling for negotiation with Russia, just like there is no peace movement protesting the absurd Afghan war. The U.S. engages in provocative war games in Ukraine and Bulgaria with little domestic protest. This would have been unimaginable during the Cold War. The “no nukes” groups no longer exist, precisely at the time where nuclear war is actually possible.

The U.S. defends the “integrity” of Ukraine today, but demanded her independence during the Soviet era. The U.S. sends agents into Ukraine to overthrow the government, but refused to countenance the idea in 1956 or 1968. The U.S. military is lauded, by Left and Right alike, as heroic, superhuman, and morally spotless. Yet soldiers coming home from Vietnam were attacked physically by protesters at the behest of major media. Apparently, for the official Left, we can peacefully coexist with the USSR; however, nationalist (and non-Communist) Russia is a threat to us all.

To understand this mentality, one must turn to the untold story of the Cold War.

The Greatest Open Secret

On December 17, 2014, the Obama administration rescinded the “trade embargo” on Cuba. Many jumped to the conclusion that Cuba was the last front of Washington’s battle against socialism and Marxism. Nothing can be further from the truth. The West built socialism, not only in the early stages but throughout the Soviet period. (Cuba was exceptional, owing mostly to its geography.)

Bolshevik and early Soviet leaders were open about their desire to bring Russia up to speed with the industrialized West and their willingness to collaborate with European and American firms. In turn, Western capitalists envisioned the Revolution and development of Socialism as an opportunity for Russia to enter the global market. Jacob Schiff—of Kuhn Loeb and Company and the founder of the American Jewish Committee—is probably the most notorious Western capitalist who financed Socialism. According to his grandson, Schiff donated some $20 million to Trotsky to finance world revolution, which would amount to a quarter of a billion in today’s dollars.[1] While Schiff was eager to overthrow regimes (such as Tsarist Russia) that he viewed as threats to the Jewish people worldwide, other American capitalist saw Bolshevik Russia as an investment opportunity.

A key to understanding this relationship between Big Business and Communism is the Congressional Overmann Commission of 1919, a document that is universally ignored by standard texts on the Cold War. The Overmann Commission was called, in large part, to gauge the opinions of American capitalists regarding the USSR. The consensus was that it was quite positive.

One who testified was Roger Simmons, from Hagarstown, Maryland, who was in a Commerce Department Mission in the USSR as Trade Commissioner with the Red State. He was there for 11 months in the transitional period. His entire purpose was to help build the Soviet Union through grants and raw materials from the U.S. He attended a huge business consortium taking place in Grand Rapids, Michigan, where about 800 businessmen were deciding how best to begin investing in the USSR. He spoke of their “misinformed” admiration for the Soviet Union and the potential for profit there. [2]

George A. Simons, the head of the Methodist Mission to Petrograd, noted, “I have a firm conviction that this thing is Yiddish, and one of its bases is in Brooklyn, NY” [3]. (It’s worth noting that Simons said this even though he publicly disavowed anti-Semitism.)

Raymond Robbins, who was part of the Red Cross in Petrograd and elsewhere from 1917-1918, described the work of William Thompson, a wealthy banker negotiating loans for the Soviet government, who used the Petrograd branch of the National City Bank to funnel about 12,000,000 rubles to the revolutionaries (not merely the Bolsheviks), which was, in 1918, about $1 million. Moreover, he was speaking to the Red Cross about coordinating an infrastructure for an entire set of new newspapers supporting the revolutionaries.

What becomes clear in the testimony is that even the most motivated Americans had no idea who was who. There was a sense that there were leftist “revolutionaries,” and that's where the bulk of foreign money went. The Red Cross was granted about $3 million monthly, from both private and state sources in America, to “interpret the revolutionary groups to the army and to peasant villages of how absolutely indispensable to save the revolution to keep the front and defeat the German militarist autocracy.”[4]

This dirty secret of western economics is rarely mentioned, let alone analyzed, by major historians. One of the few is TW Luke writes, who studied Soviet technology.

The Bolsheviks stressed to Soviet workers, managers, and intellectuals the centrality of industry over agriculture in the NEP of 1921. Trotsky notes, 'We [the Soviet Union] are in a process of becoming a part, a very particular part, but nonetheless an integral part of the world market . . . Foreign capital must be mobilized for those sectors of [Soviet] industry that are most backward.' . . . These technological imports were to be limited because the Bolsheviks recognized the dangers of dependencies on the core, especially technological dependence. For example, resolutions of the 14th Party Congress in 1925 stressed the 'whole series of new dangers' in Western trade and advocated domestic technical development to prevent the USSR from becoming, in Parrot's words, 'an appendage of the capitalist world-economy'. Still, as Sutton notes 'the penetration of early Soviet industry was remarkable, Western technical directions, consulting engineers and independent entrepreneurs were common in the Soviet Union.' Even so, throughout the 1920s the Soviet state tightly regulated foreign access to suit its technological needs.[5]

Not only did the U.S. and Western Europe build the USSR, but did so as their own populations were struggling. The West was so involved in the development of the USSR that the 14th Party Congress, mentioned above, was concerned about the loss of Soviet independence.

Luke continues,

The impact of imported technologies differed from industry to industry and from region to region. In the oil industry, for example, they were vital. Petroleum exports in 1926-1927 doubled 1913 exports. Alone, they provided 20 percent of Soviet foreign exchange earnings: 'the importation of foreign oil-field technology and administration, either directly or by concession, was the single factor of consequence in this development (Sutton, 1968:43). While the overall imports of expertise and technology dropped in value from the 1893-1913 levels, the Bolsheviks' bureaucratically planned economy stressed the need for post-1918 imports to be directed toward cost-efficient and economically necessary production to fit the planned industrial program of the regime. [6]

In no other war (“cold” or otherwise) did combatants feverishly invest in building up their opponent.

Had the West not subsidized the USSR, Communism would likely not have survived. Stalin himself admitted that two-thirds of early Soviet industrial products and development were of American origin.[7] Trade and aid to the USSR were constant and often included the most advanced technology available. There were no meaningful sanctions on the USSR throughout most of its history. Hence, the Cuban embargo or the Vietnam War had little to do with Marxism or the USSR. The fact is that the infrastructure of Castro and Ho Chi Minh was largely produced in the US.

The propulsion systems for much of the Soviet Navy and, significantly, at Haiphong Harbor were from American firms. Nixon and Johnson actively went out of their way to stop any move to stifle trade with the USSR, even in the midst of the Vietnam War. The Gorki Truck plant was shipping hundreds of vehicles a month to North Vietnam, with the full blessing of the State Department. It was, of course, a Ford Motors plant, and it was largely staffed by Americans. Henry Ford created the Soviet automotive industry, especially in the development of trucks. His Gorki plant was also making rockets and other military equipment for the USSR, without comment from Washington. Soviet rockets were fired on Ford GAZ-69 chassis.[8]

In 1968, Fiat motors created the world's largest automotive plant in the world at Volgograd. ZIL was created by New Britain Machine Company. In 1972, Nixon personally approved the Kama truck plant deal, the creation of an automotive and trucking plant manufacturing 100,000 vehicles per year, which at the time was more than all U.S. automakers combined. The plant itself came to occupy 36 square miles, every inch created by the U.S.[9]

In Korea, the North Korean Army and China were using trucks made by Ford and tractors by Caterpillar. Soviet fighters were equipped with Rolls Royce engines sent to Stalin by the British automaker. As Anthony Sutton explains, it was the elite, including Maurice Stans, Peter G. Peterson, Peter Flanigan, Averell Harriman, and Robert McNamara, that created the infrastructure for constant and lucrative trade with the “enemy.”[10] The Ural Steel complex that served as the heart of Soviet industrialization was “100% American.” The McKee Corporation built the world's largest steel and iron plant in the world in the USSR:

Organization methods and most of the machinery are either German or American. The steel mill “Morning” near Moscow, is said to be one of the most modern establishments of its kind in the world. Constructed, organized and started by highly paid American specialists, it employs 17,000 workers and produces steel used by motor plants, naval shipyards and arms factories. [11]

The 1932 KHEMZ plant in eastern Ukraine was created by GE, and was 250 percent larger than anything GE had in the U.S.

Anthony Sutton writes:

Major new units built from 1936 to 1940 were again planned and constructed by Western companies. Petroleum-cracking, particularly for aviation gasoline, as well as all the refineries in the Second Baku and elsewhere were built by Universal Oil Products, Badger Corporation, Lummus Company, Petroleum Engineering Corporation, Alco Products, McKee Corporation, and Kellogg Company.[12]

The Federal Reserve Bank of New York sent $1 billion in aid to Trotsky and the Red Army.[13] The First Five year plan had all of its military equipment built by American firms. Sergei Nemetz of Stone and Webber, along with Zara Witkin, supervised most of the military construction for the first two Five-Year Plans, using American capital desperately needed at home. Carp Exports, based in New York City, supplied the Soviet Union with all its high-tech military parts. Electric Boat Company of Groton, Connecticut built the Soviet submarine fleet with express permission of the State Department in 1939. Skoda Armaments of Czechoslovakia was a subsidiary of the Simmons Machine Tool Corporation of Albany, New York. Ball bearings were built in the USSR by Bryant Chucking Grinder Company of Springfield, Vermont.

All told, 90 percent of all Soviet industry was created in the U.S. or Western Europe.

What such a history reveals is that capital does not require markets in order to be profitable. The Western financial elite saw the Soviet system as a perfected version of itself: a totally centralized economy run by experts from one source. Capital looked upon Gosplan—the USSR’s central planning committee—with envy; and it was so similar in its powers to the small group of financial conglomerates that governs the U.S. economy in 2015. The Gosplan board approved investments, set targets, measured economic growth, dictated the amount of money in circulation, manipulated statistics—down to the last detail. This system is little different, institutionally or ideologically, from the American financial elite and the Federal Reserve Board, which organizing the American economy, with remarkable freedom from markets and the influence of politicians.

Once one rejects the formulaic division of the world into “Soviet” and “American” camps, all of 20th-century history appears differently.

One of the most telling quotations is from a Russian-language work, The Political History of the Russian Emigration, written by SA Alexander:

Despite the growing popularity of the right wing in the émigré environment, it is only the leftists that found a response in Western governments. Most significantly, the leftists in exile were feted by the financial and industrial sector interested in trade with the Soviet Union. The “All Emigre Russian Unity” conference was called at the behest of American capital, and the Soviet financial elite were invited. Conferences subsequent to this were called by capital in Cannes, Genoa, The Hague and Lausanne.[14]

Apparently, U.S. capitalists rarely feared Soviet advances.

As an ally of the victorious capitalist core powers, the USSR gained many unexpected technological windfalls in the aftermath of World War II. New technical inputs in weaponry, electronics, nuclear power, aircraft, and chemicals were expropriated from Germany and other Axis powers from 1945 to 1950. Allied Lend-Lease equipment, especially heavy bombers and airplane engines, was also 'reverse engineered' from 1942 to 1953. The USSR dismantled and shipped home 25 percent of the industrial plants in the Western zones of Germany, along with additional industrial equipment constituting 65 percent of all motor vehicle production, 75 percent of all rubber tire capacity, and 40 percent of all paper and cardboard-producing capacity in eastern Germany.[15]

This is extremely significant in that these patents were at least in part financed by American firms. They represent decades of research and millions of dollars in grants. Yet, Stalin brought them home without a peep from the West.

vietnamese-labour-party1.jpg

The Vietnam Era

Between 1965 and 1985, the Soviet Union, Cuba, Vietnam and the rest of the Soviet Bloc was given tremendous boosts by American firms. Alcoa built Soviet aluminum. American Chain and Cable created the machine-tool industry. Ingersoll Rand built much of the heavy-duty transport infrastructure (under Automatic Production Systems, a shell company). Betchell created the construction industry. Boeing was heavily invested in Soviet aviation, while, at the same time, building the bulk of the American Air Force. Dow Chemicals, DuPont, and Dresser industries were competing to see who would build the more advanced Soviet chemical plants. IBM helped create the modern computer industry, while Gulf General Atomic was helping put nuclear missiles together for the USSR.

Much of this was made easier in the 1980s by the U.S.-USSR Trade and Economic Council, a pet project of then-Vice President George H.W. Bush and Commerce Secretary Malcolm Baldrige. Just a partial list of members include Abbott Laboratories, Allen Bradley Gleason Corporation, Allied Analytical Systems, Ingersoll Rand, International Harvester, Kodak, American Express, Archer Daniels Midland, Armco Steel, Monsanto, Cargill, Occidental Petroleum, Caterpillar, Chase Manhattan, Pepsi Co., Chemical Bank, Phibro-Salomon, Coca Cola, Ralston, Continental Grain Seagram, Dow Chemical, and Union Carbide. All members of this Council had substantial investments in the “Soviet enemy” and, through their philanthropic organizations, created the “peace movement.”[16]

In 1985, the San Jose Mercury News reported confirmation from State and Commerce Departments that “[t]he most sensitive, state-of-the-art semiconductor manufacturing equipment went to the Soviet Union after first being shipped to Switzerland.

Creed [spokesman for Commerce] said the material shipped to Cuba, and additional equipment the Cubans were unable to obtain, would have given them the capability to produce semiconductors and integrated circuits. The report stated that such trade was “illegal.”[17]

The State Committee of the Council of Ministers of the USSR sealed a huge deal with Data Control in 1973. While openly denying it in public, Norris and the Department of Commerce squashed all inquiries into the investment and aid project. The Soviets stated that Data Control will “[b]uild a plant for manufacturing mass storage devices based on removable magnetic disk packs with up to 100 million byte capacity per each pack.”

The brunt of the Soviet computer industry was created by American firms. In 1959, the Model-802 system was sold to the USSR from Elliot Automation ltd., an English firm. This was part of General Electric, one of the major offenders in this category. European branches of US firms were selling advanced computer equipment to the USSR at roughly $40 million per year.

During the Vietnam War, giants such as Union Carbide, General Electric, Armco Steel, Bryant Chucking Grinder, and Control Data were just the wealthiest of American capitalists with regular deals in building Soviet industry. This was in 1973, and every bit of it was approved by Johnson and Nixon during the war.

Conclusion

By the 1950s, the Soviets had educated enough of their own in Western methods of production such that they achieved a great deal of independence in most every sector of the economy. Regardless, the USSR was fed on a constant stream of food from American capitalists; American universities praised the USSR as a matter of course (or some form of socialism); and all major capitalists enterprises were invested in the USSR and satellite states. Both before and after Stalin's Great Purges, the U.S. was contributing massively to the Soviet industrialization drive and the creation of its “experimental” economy. When the Cold War got hot, such as during the Vietnam conflict, Washington was never motivated by “anti-Communism” but the fear in the breasts of American business that if China and Russia were to combine forces, the U.S. might become superfluous.


  1. New York Journal—American, February 3, 1949.
  2. Overmann, Congressional Record, 294, 304; all pages come from the Report itself.
  3. Ibid., p. 112.
  4. Ibid., 777.
  5. Luke, TW (1983), “The Proletarian Ethic and Soviet Industrialization,” American Political Science Review 77 (3): 588-601, drawing from Antony Sutton, The Best Enemy Money Can Buy (Montana: Liberty House Press, 1986, Dauphin Publications, 1991),

    http://reformed-theology.org/html/books/best_enemy/index.html.

  6. Ibid., 339-340, also drawing on Sutton.
  7. Chase-Dunn, C, “Socialist States in the Capitalist World Economy,” Social Problems 27(5), 1980: 505-525.
  8. See Sutton, The Best Enemy Money Can Buy.
  9. See Berliner, The Innovation Decision in Soviet Industry (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1976).
  10. All evidence from the State or Commerce Departments has not been declassified. Only through insistent demands have these documents been granted to the public. It is highly likely that the unclassified papers from 70 years ago are largely detailed agreements between American capital and the Soviet Union.
  11. U.S. State Dept. Decimal File, 861.5017, Living Conditions/456, Report No. 665, Helsingfors, April 2, 1932
  12. Sutton, Western Technology and Soviet Economic Development: 1945–1965, Chapter 4 (Stanford, CA: The Hoover Institution, 1973).
  13. Washington Post, Feb. 2, 1918.
  14. S. A. Aleksandrov, Politicheskaia istoriia zarubezhnoi Rossii, http://www.rovs.atropos.spb.ru/index.php?view=publication&mode=text&id=17, translation by the author.
  15. Luke, “The Proletarian Ethic and Soviet Industrialization,” American Political Science Review 77 (3), 1983: 588-601.
  16. Erikson, 1991.
  17. There is no evidence that any law against such a practice existed. Even if it did, it would have made little difference, since the technology would have already been transferred.

mercredi, 12 novembre 2014

The Fall of the Wall Almost Started WWIII

By

Ex: http://www.lewrockwell.com

Twenty-five years ago this week,  the Soviet empire in Eastern Europe was collapsing. The Berlin Wall had been breached. The Communist East German government was literally swept away by the storm tide of history.

It was also the most dangerous moment the world had faced since the 1963 Cuban missile crisis. What would the Soviet leadership do?   Just graciously give way or use its huge Red Army and KGB to crush the uprisings?

Interestingly,  in a raw exposure of shameful historical enmity, Britain’s prime minister Margaret Thatcher and France’s president Francois Mitterand both called Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev to urge him not to allow German reunification. 

The Soviet Union’s reformist leader could have stopped the uprisings in East Germany, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia. The mighty Group of Soviet Forces Germany (GSFG) based in East Germany had 338,000 crack troops in 24 divisions, with 4,200 tanks, 8,000 armored vehicles, 3,800 guns and rocket launchers and 690 combat aircraft.

NATO planners had long believed that GFSG could punch through western defenses on the North German plain and storm Antwerp and Rotterdam by D+8.  Other Soviet corps in Czechoslovakia, Poland and Hungary would strike west.  Switzerland’s defense planners foresaw a massive Soviet thrust through their nation and into the Rhone Valley, outflanking NATO defenses to the north.

General Secretary Gorbachev could have quickly used the iron fist. But true to his humanistic philosophy and his innate decency, the Soviet leader ordered the GFSG to stand down, pack up, and return to the Soviet Union even though there were no barracks or apartments for the returning Soviet legions.

The opening of the East German wall and subsequent fall of its Communist government mixed Karl Marx with Groucho and Harpo Marx. In a comedy of errors, the bumbling East German government became paralyzed as mobs tried to storm the wall and get to West Germany. No high official wanted to give the order to shoot. The gates of the wall were opened by mistake.

In the USSR, resistance among hardline Communists, the military brass and the KGB was intense. Gorbachev would have been unable to sound the retreat without the support of Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze.

He was a remarkable man: the tough former KGB boss of Georgia and Communist Party chief,  Shevardnadze seemed an improbable reformer. But he co-authored the liberating policy of glasnost and perestroika and forced its adoption by the unwilling Soviet hierarchy.

I twice interviewed Shevardnadze in Moscow: he was determined to sweep away the communist system and end the Cold War. We used to call him “Chevvy Eddy.” His quick wit and sardonic humor made him very likeable. I asked him if he might consider becoming president of an independent Georgia – which he later did until overthrown by the US-backed 2003 “rose revolution.”

Soon after the fall of the Berlin Wall, I walked through the just abandoned GFSG headquarters in Wünsdorf, near Berlin. It was a scene of utter desolation: broken windows, phones and plumbing ripped out of the walls, secret files blowing in the wind. The mighty Red Army had gone. As a veteran cold war warrior, I found it incredible that an empire could disappear so quickly. Just a few regiment of Soviet soldiers and tanks, I mused, could have stopped the East German uprising.

 

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In secret, Gorbachev and Shevardnadze agreed to a deal with US President George H.W. Bush and his senior strategy officials:  the Soviet Union would pull out of Eastern Europe and the Baltic. In exchange, the US vowed not to advance NATO into Eastern Europe or anywhere near Russia’s borders.

Equally important, Gorbachev refused to use force to keep the USSR together.

The Soviet leaders believed they had an ironclad deal. They did not.

The next three US administrations – Clinton, Bush II, and Obama – violated the original sphere of influence accord and began advancing US power east towards Russia’s borders. The most recent NATO foray was the overthrow of Ukraine’s pro-Russian government, a ham-handed act that nearly sparked World War III.

For imperial-minded Washington, the temptation to kick Russia while it was down and gobble up its former dominion was irresistible.   Gorbachev was mocked in western power circles – and by many angry Russians – as a foolish idealist: “the Soviet Jimmy Carter.”

Today, 25 years after the fall of the Soviet imperium, US promises have been revoked.  Washington appears determined to undermine the Russian Federation and further dismantle it. Washington sees Russia as a has-been, a minor power unworthy of respect or amity.

The Russians have actually be told to stop complaining because the Gorbachev-Bush deal was not put in writing, only oral. A naïve oversight by the Russians?

From retirement, Gorbachev bitterly watches all he strove for turn to ashes as his countrymen blame him for destroying the Soviet Union. Shevardnadze died in Georgia last July. The Cold Ware is back, to the joy of the triumphant Republicans in Washington.

Soon after the wall fell, I recall writing that unless the western allies and the Soviets came to a firm agreement of spheres of influence and a neutral zone in Middle Europe and the Baltic

that a dangerous series of clashes was inevitable. We are now there.

 

jeudi, 28 août 2014

Estados Unidos encubrió la masacre de Katyn

 

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Estados Unidos encubrió la masacre de Katyn

 

por Carlos de Lorenzo Ramos

Ex: http://culturatransversal.wordpress.com

katyn1.jpgEn la primavera de 1940 la URSS líquidó a 22.000 oficiales polacos. EE.UU conocía estos hechos y los ocultó. Estados Unidos desclasificó el 17 de septiembre unos documentos que corroboran algo ya intuido por los historiadores: El gobierno de Franklin D. Roosevelt sabía que la URSS ejecutó a 22.000 oficiales polacos en Katyn, en la primavera de 1940, y lo ocultó deliberadamente. Estados Unidos tapó el hecho para no incomodar a Stalin, su aliado durante la Segunda Guerra Mundial; y una vez en la Guerra Fría, para no dar explicaciones acerca de su silencio “necesario”. Katyn se convirtió durante décadas en sinónimo de Secreto de Estado. La Casa Blanca solo confirmó la autoría soviética con la asunción de Gorbachov, el dirigente de la URSS, de los hechos, en 1988.

Los documentos se componen de 1.000 páginas, y los expertos destacan su importancia. La evidencia más significativa del conocimiento de la matanza por la administración Roosevelt son los informes de dos prisioneros norteamericanos a los que los nazis trasladaron a la escena del crimen: el capitán Donald B. Stewart y el teniente coronel John H. Van Vliet.

MATANZA DE KATYN CAP STEWART Y TTE COR VAN VLIET

El capitán Donald B. Stewart y el teniente coronel John H. Van Vliet.

Esto ocurrió en mayo de 1943, con el objetivo alemán de usar los testimonios de los prisioneros como propaganda, y crear una cuña entre los rusos y sus aliados occidentales. Lo que vieron los estadounidenses en ese bosque de pinos les dejó sin aliento: encontraron fosas comunes entreabiertas en las que se apretaban miles de cuerpos momificados vestidos con uniformes polacos de buena hechura.

Ni el capitán Stewart ni Van Vliet creyeron a los nazis, a los que odiaban, pues habían experimentado en sus carnes toda la crueldad de ese régimen fanático, y además los soviéticos eran sus aliados. A Stalin todavía se le conocía como el Uncle Joe, el Tío Joe.

Regresaron al campo de internamiento y tras meditar lo que habían visto, se convencieron de las pruebas demoledoras de la autoría soviética: los cuerpos se hallaban en avanzado estado de descomposición y era un área controlada por ellos antes de la invasión alemana de 1941. También tuvieron acceso a cartas y diarios polacos que exhumaron de las tumbas. Ninguna contenía una fecha superior a la primavera de 1940. Además la ropa estaba en considerable buen estado, lo que indicaba que esos hombres no vivieron mucho después de ser apresados.

En realidad, el órgano estalinista responsable de la masacre fue la NKVD, la policía secreta soviética, que liquidó a 22.000 oficiales polacos de disparos a bocajarro en la nuca. El objetivo era borrar de un plumazo a la élite intelectual del país, personas que en su vida civil eran médicos, maestros o abogados. Los rusos veían en ellos a posibles opositores a la ocupación de Polonia Oriental.

Stewart testificó ante el Congreso en 1951, y de Van Vliet se sabe que escribió informes en 1945 (misteriosamente desaparecido) y en 1950. Ambos enviaron mensajes cifrados durante su cautiverio e informaron a la inteligencia militar de la culpabilidad de los comunistas.

En su comparecencia ante la Comisión Maden en 1951, Stewart testificó que “las reivindicaciones alemanas concernientes a Katyn son sustancialmente correctas en la opinión de Van Vliet y en la mía”. A Stewart se le ordenó que nunca más hablara de lo que vio en Katyn.

MATANZA DE KATYN COMISION MADEN

El capitán Donald B. Stewart señala a la Comisión Maden el lugar de las fosas comunes de Katyn.

Es a raíz de la detonación de la bomba atómica por parte de Rusia en 1949 cuando en Estados Unidos suena algo el nombre de Katyn, a pesar de que en Europa ya había caído el Telón de Acero. Es más; Winston Churchill ya había informado a Roosevelt en un detallado informe de las dudas que tenía acerca de “las excusas soviéticas acerca de su responsabilidad en la masacre”. La URSS intentó achacar la matanza de Katyn a los nazis durante los juicios de Nuremberg, pero ante la falta de pruebas la acusación no prosperó.

La valoración que en 1952 efectuó la Comisión Maden, declaró que no cabía duda alguna de la autoría bolchevique y la tildó de “uno de los crímenes internacionales más bárbaros en la historia del mundo”. Recomendó a su vez que el gobierno levantara cargos contra la URSS ante un tribunal internacional. La Casa Blanca mantuvo silencio, y no fue hasta los últimos días de la hegemonía soviética (1988) cuando Gorvachev admitió públicamente la masacre de Katyn, como un paso fundamental a normalizar las relaciones ruso-polacas.

Fuente: Historia Vera

Extraído de: El Espía Digital

vendredi, 18 juillet 2014

A VERY BRIEF HISTORY OF CHINESE RUSSIAN RELATIONS

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A VERY BRIEF HISTORY OF CHINESE RUSSIAN RELATIONS

The response of much western commentary to the Russia China agreements has been scepticism that they can ever burgeon into an outright partnership because of the supposedly long history of mutual suspicion and hostility between the two countries. The Economist for example refers to the two countries as “frenemies”. To see whether these claims are actually justified I thought it might be useful to give a short if rather summary account of the history of the relationship between the two countries.

Official contacts between China and Russia began with border clashes in the 1680s which however were settled in 1689 by the Treaty of Nerchinsk, which delineated what was then the common border. At this time Beijing had no political or diplomatic links with any other European state save the Vatican, which was informally represented in Beijing by the Jesuit mission.

The Treaty of Nerchinsk was the first formal treaty between China and any European power. The Treaty of Nerchinsk was basically a pragmatic border arrangement. It was eventually succeeded by the Treaty of Kyakhta of 1727, negotiated on the initiative of the Kangxi Emperor and of Peter the Great, who launched the expedition that negotiated it shortly before before his death.

The Treaty of Kyakhta provided for a further delineation of the common border. It also authorised a small but thriving border trade. Most importantly, it also allowed for the establishment of what was in effect a Russian diplomatic presence in Beijing in the form of an ecclesiastical settlement there. Russia thereby became only the second European state after the Vatican to achieve a presence in Beijing. It did so moreover more than a century before any of the other European powers. Russia was of course the only European power at this time to share a common border with China (a situation to which it has now reverted since the return to China of Hong Kong). It is also notable that the Treaty of Kyakhta happened on the initiative of Peter the Great. Peter the Great’s decision to launch the expedition that ultimately led to the Treaty of Kyakhta shows that even this supposedly most “westernising” of tsars had to take into account Russia’s reality as a Eurasian state.

For the rest of the Eighteenth Century and the first half of the Nineteenth Century relations between the Russian and Chinese courts remained friendly though hardly close. St. Petersburg was the only European capital during this period to host occasional visits by the Chinese Emperor’s representatives. During the British Macartney mission to Beijing of 1793 the senior Manchu official tasked with negotiating with Macartney had obtained his diplomatic experience in St. Petersburg. As a result of these contacts at the time of the Anglo French expedition to Beijing in 1860 Ignatiev, the Russian diplomat who acted as mediator between the Anglo French expedition and the Chinese court, could call on the services of skilled professional interpreters and was in possession of accurate maps of Beijing whilst the British and the French had access to neither. Russian diplomatic contacts with the court in Beijing during this period do not seem to have been afflicted with the protocol difficulties that so complicated China’s relations with the other European powers and which contributed to the failure of the Macartney mission. This serves as an indicator of the pragmatism with which these contacts were conducted.

This period of distant but generally friendly relations ended with the crisis of 1857 to 1860 when Russia used the Chinese court’s preoccupation with the Taiping rebellion and China’s difficult relations with the western Europeans culminating in the Anglo French expedition of 1860 to secure the annexation of the Amur region. The Chinese continue to see the third Convention of Beijing of 1860 which secured the Amur territory for Russia as an “unequal treaty”. They have however accepted its consequences and formally recognised the border (which was properly speaking part of Manchu rather than Chinese territory). At the time it must have been resented. However it is probably fair to say that Russia would have been seen in China as a marginally less dangerous aggressor during this period than the western powers Britain and France (especially Britain) if only because China’s relations with these two countries were much more important.

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As the Nineteenth Century wore on relations between Russia and China seem to have improved with Russia, undoubtedly for self-interested reasons, playing an important role in the Three Power Intervention that forced Japan to moderate its demands on China following China’s defeat in the Sino Japanese war of 1895. Russian policy of supporting China and the authority of the Chinese court against the Japanese however fell by the wayside when Russia forced the Chinese court in 1897 to grant Russia a lease of the Chinese naval base of Port Arthur. This was much resented in China and damaged Russia’s image there. Russia also became drawn into the suppression of the anti-foreign 1900 Boxer Rising, an event which destabilised the Manchu dynasty and which led to a short lived Russian occupation of Manchuria to suppress the Boxers there. This is not the place to discuss the diplomacy or the reasons for the conflict which followed which is known as the Russo Japanese war of 1904 to 1905. Suffice to say that the ground war was fought entirely on Chinese territory and ended in stalemate (though with the balance starting to shift in favour of the Russians), that I know of no good English account of the war or of the events that preceded it, that the war was precipitated entirely by a straightforward act of Japanese aggression and that the popular view that the war was preceded and/or provoked by Russian economic and political penetration of Korea or plans to annex Manchuria are now known to have no basis in fact.

A radical improvement in Russian Chinese relations took place following the October 1917 revolution caused by the decision of the new Bolshevik government to renounce the extra territorial privileges Russia had obtained in China as a result of the unequal treaties. The USSR became the strongest supporter during this period of Sun Ya-tsen’s Chinese nationalist republican movement and of the Guomindang government in Nanjing that Sun Ya-tsen eventually set up. Sun Ya-tsen for his part was a staunch friend and supporter of the USSR. Though many are aware of the very close relationship between the USSR and China in the 1950s few in my experience know of the equally strong and arguably more genuine friendship between their two governments in the 1920s.

In the two decades that followed the USSR became China’s strongest international supporter in its war against Japanese aggression, a war which has defined modern China and of which the outside world knows lamentably little. During this period the USSR had to balance its support for China’s official Guomindang led government that was supposedly leading the struggle against the Japanese with its support for the Chinese Communist Party (originally the leftwing of the Guomindang movement) with which the Guomindang was often in armed conflict. The USSR also had to balance its support for China with its need to avoid a war in the east with Japan at a time when it was being threatened in the west by Nazi Germany and its allies. The skill with which the government of the USSR performed this difficult feat has gone almost wholly unrecognised.

Following the defeat of Japan in 1945 the USSR’s military support was (as is now known) crucial though obviously not decisive to the Chinese Communist Party’s victory in the civil war against the Guomindang, which led to the establishment in 1949 of the People’s Republic. A decade of extremely close political, military and economic relations followed during which the two countries were formally allies. As is now known this relationship in reality was always strained and eventually broke down in part because of mutual personal antagonism between the countries’ two leaders, Khrushchev and Mao Zedong, but mainly because of Chinese anger at the USSR’s failure to support a war to recover Taiwan and above all because of China’s refusal as the world’s most populous country and oldest civilisation to accept a subordinate position to the USSR in the international Communist movement. The rupture was made formal by Khrushchev’s decision in 1960 to withdraw from China the Soviet advisers and economic assistance that had been sent there. Supporters of sanctions may care to note that on the two occasions Russia has used sanctions (against Yugoslavia in 1948 and against China in 1960) they backfired spectacularly on Russia resulting in consequences for Russia that were entirely bad.

The Sino Soviet rupture of 1960 resulted in a decade and a half of very strained relations. An attempt to restore relations to normal following Khrushchev’s fall in 1964 was wrecked, possibly intentionally, by the Soviet defence minister Marshal Malinovsky who encouraged members of the Chinese leadership to overthrow Mao Zedong through a coup similar to the one that had overthrown Khrushchev. Relations with the USSR during this period also increasingly became hostage to Chinese internal politics with Mao and his supporters during the period of political terror known as the Cultural Revolution routinely accusing their opponents of being Soviet agents. This period of difficult relations eventually culminated in serious border clashes in 1969, an event that panicked the leadership of both countries and which led each of them to explore alignments against each other with the Americans.

This period of very tense relations basically ended in 1976 with the death of Mao Zedong who shortly before his death is supposed to have issued an injunction to the Chinese Communist party instructing it to restore relations with the USSR. Once the post Mao succession disputes were resolved with the victory of Deng Xiaoping a process of outright rapprochement began the start of which was formally signalled in the USSR by Leonid Brezhnev in a speech in Tashkent in 1982 which he made shortly before his death. By 1989 the process of rapprochement was complete allowing Gorbachev to visit Beijing in the spring of that year when however his visit was overshadowed by the Tiananmen disturbances.

Since then there has been a steady strengthening of relations. Gorbachev refused to involve the USSR in the sanctions the western powers imposed on China following the Tiananmen disturbances. Yeltsin, despite the strong pro-western orientation of his government, remained a firm advocate of good relations with China and worked to build on the breakthrough achieved in the 1980s. In 1997 in a speech in Hong Kong Jiang Zemin already spoke of Russia as China’s key strategic ally. In 1998 the two countries acted for the first time openly in concert on the Security Council to oppose the US bombing of Iraq (“Operation Desert Fox”). Subsequently both countries strongly opposed the US led attacks on Yugoslavia in 1999 and on Iraq in 2003.  Since then their cooperation in political, economic and security matters has intensified. Whilst their relations have had their moments of difficulty (eg. over Russian complaints of illicit Chinese copying of weapon systems) and the development of their economic relations has lagged well behind that of their political relations (inevitable given the disastrous state of the Russian economy in the 1990s) it is difficult to see on what basis they can be considered “frenemies”.

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The reality is that Russia and China have for obvious reasons of history, culture and above all geography faced through most of their history in different directions: China towards Asia (where it is the supreme east Asian civilisation) and Russia towards Europe. That should not however disguise the fact that their interaction has been very prolonged (since the 1680s), – longer in fact than that of China with any of the major western powers – and generally peaceful and mostly friendly. Periods of outright hostility have been short lived and rare. Despite sharing the world’s longest border all-out war between the two countries has never happened. On the two occasions (in the 1680s and 1960s) when it briefly appeared that it might, both drew back and eventually sought and achieved a compromise. For China Russia’s presence on its northern border has in fact been an unqualified benefit, stabilising and securing the border from which the greatest threats to China’s independence and security have traditionally come.

Western perceptions of the China Russia relationship are in my opinion far too heavily influenced by the very brief period of the Sino Soviet conflict of the 1960s and 1970s. Across the 300 or so years of the history of their mutual interaction the 15 or so years of this conflict represent very much the anomaly not the rule. Given this conflict’s idiosyncratic origins in ideological and status issues that are (to put it mildly) extremely unlikely to recur again, to treat this conflict as representing the norm in China’s and Russia’s relations with each other seems to me frankly farfetched. The past is never a safe guide to the future. However on the basis of the actual history of their relations, to argue that China’s and Russia’s strategic partnership is bound to fail because of their supposed long history of suspicion and conflict towards each other is to argue from prejudice rather than fact.

vendredi, 21 février 2014

Soviet-Afghan War Lesson

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Soviet-Afghan War Lesson: Political Problems Never Settled by Force

By Sergey Duz
The Voice of Russia

Ex: http://www.lewrockwell.com

25 years ago, the almost 10-year long deployment of the limited contingent of Soviet forces in Afghanistan drew to a close. Experts have since been at variance about the assessment of the Afghan campaign, but they invariably agree that it was the biggest-scale (and actually quite ambiguous, obviously for that reason) foreign policy action throughout the post-war history of the Soviet Union.

The last Soviet soldier left Afghanistan on February 15th 1989 as part of the Soviet 40th Army, which was the backbone of the limited contingent. The Soviet troops withdrew under the command of the 40th Army legendary commander, Lieutenant-General Boris Gromov. He managed to brilliantly carry out the withdrawal, with the US now trying to use his experience to more or less decently pull out of Afghanistan following the more than 20 years of actually useless occupation of that country. This is what an expert with the Centre for Modern Afghan Studies, Nikita Mendkovich, says about it in a comment.

“The Americans will have to rely heavily on intercontinental delivery means, because the troops are being evacuated to another region, to another continent. Back in 1989, it was largely a ground-force operation. The Soviet troops pulled out by land via Central Asia. The basic problem of any operation of this kind is security. Huge masses of troops and a great number of military vehicles are moving along the roads, so they should be guaranteed against likely attacks. To attain the objective, one can either reinforce local garrisons that will remain deployed in Afghanistan after the pull-out of the bulk of the troops and will cover the withdrawal, or reach agreement with the enemy not to attack the leaving troops, because this is not in the enemy’s interests”.

There are both similarities and numerous differences between the Soviet and American campaigns in Afghanistan. The main difference is that the Soviet Union did manage to achieve its goal, whereas with the United States it is no go. The Soviet troops were to render assistance to the Afghan government in settling the home policy situation. Secondly, the Soviet troops were to prevent external aggression. Both objectives were fully attained.

The Soviet political leadership felt that the revolution of April 1978 had no right to lose. Ideological reasoning was reinforced by geopolitical considerations. This predetermined Moscow’s decision to send troops, says editor-in-chief of the National Defence magazine, Igor Korotchenko, and elaborates.

“The Afghan campaign was inevitable if seen from the perspective of defending the Soviet Union’s national interests. It may seem odd, but Afghans are still nostalgic about the times when Soviet troops were deployed in their country. Even former field commanders can’t help but show some sort of liking for the Soviet Union, for the Soviet Army. We were no invaders; we helped build a new Afghanistan. The Soviet troops built tunnels, ensured the operation of water-supply systems, planted trees, built schools and hospitals, and also production facilities. The Soviet troops were indeed performing their international duty, they accomplished quite a feat. When the Soviet troops pulled out, Najibullah had a strong Afghan Army under his command. He remained in control of the situation in Afghanistan for 12 or 18 months. His regime fell when the Soviet Union cut short its material supply for Kabul. The current Afghan regime of Karzai will certainly prove short-lived; it’s no more than a phantom. The US troops will hardly pull out with their heads held high, the way the Soviet soldiers did”.

But then, some people disagree that all Afghans were happy about the Soviet military presence. The Soviet Prime Minister Alexei Kosygin pointed out the danger of the Soviet troops getting drawn into guerrilla warfare. He said in late 1979 that the invasion of Afghanistan “would trigger drastically negative many-sided consequences”. “This would essentially become a conflict not only with imperialist countries, but a conflict with the proper Afghan people. Now, people never forgive things like that”, Kosygin warned, and proved correct. This is what the chairman of the Common Afghan Centre in St. Petersburg, Naim Gol Mohammed, says about it in a comment.

“The people of Afghanistan have their own traditions, mentality and culture. The belligerent Pashtun tribes have never taken orders from anyone. These tribes never take to foreign troops. The locals revolted against the Soviet troops. The Soviet troop withdrawal in 1989 was followed by a period of anarchy. Government agencies were non-operational. The Soviet Union supplied Afghanistan with whatever was required quite well. But once the Soviet troops were out, the supplies were brought to a halt. That was bad. But the Soviet Union made the right decision, for it is impossible to defeat Afghans on their own soil”.

Quite a few experts insist that however tragic or pointless the Soviet military campaign in Afghanistan may seem, it had largely influenced the shaping of the new Russia’s optimal foreign policy. Moscow is perfectly aware today that no use of force can help resolve political problems, that these can only have a negotiated settlement. Moscow is trying to put the idea across to the main geopolitical players today. This is the most important lesson that should be learned from what experience the Soviet Union gained in Afghanistan.

Reprinted from The voice of Russia.

samedi, 23 novembre 2013

Occult Roots of the Russian Revolution

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Occult Roots of the Russian Revolution

Ex: http://www.gnostics.com

Dearest friend, do you not see
All that we perceive –
Only reflects and shadows forth
What our eyes cannot see.
Dearest friend, do you not hear
In the clamour of everyday life –
Only the unstrung echoing fall of
Jubilant harmonies.
– Vladimir Soloviev, 1892

The Great Russian Revolution of 1917, launched by Vladimir Lenin and his Bolshevic party, profoundly influenced the history of the twentieth century. The fall of the Russian Empire and its replacement by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics ushered in а new аgе in world politics. More than this, the Russian Revolution was the triumph of а dynamic revolutionary ideology that directly challenged Western capitalism. But what of the hidden origins of this Revolution? Did secret influences contribute to the victory of Lenin and the Bolshevics?

Innumerable books, not to forget massive scholarly studies, are devoted to examining the Russian Revolution and the rise of Soviet Communism. All this impressive research is almost exclusively devoted to the obvious political, economic and social dimensions, i.e. the surface manifestations of history. However, within or behind this mundane history lies another reality that is more interesting and more important than the everyday analysis offered by mainstream historians and writers.

Establishment historians pay little attention to the remarkable impact occult and Gnostic ideas had on the rise of Bolshevism and the victory of the Russian Revolution.

A number of social and political movements, including Marxism and Lenin’s Bolshevism, have been linked to Gnosticism, which flourished in the early centuries of the Christian era. The political scientists A. Besancon and L. Pellicani argue the intellectual roots of Russian Bolshevism are a structural repetition of the ancient Gnostic paradigm. A distinguishing feature of Gnosticism is an illusive, symbolic interpretation of reality, including history.

For the early Christian Gnostics the Absolute – termed the ‘Unknown Father’– has nothing in common with the wrathful ‘God’ worshipped by theist religion. In fact, for these Gnostics, the ‘God’ of the Old Testament is the adversary of their ‘Unknown Father’, the true God. Our world, including all human institutions, is not the work of the true God, but of a false creator, the Demiurge, who keeps us captive in the world, away from the divine light and truth.

Therefore, in Gnosticism, the world is merely a sort of illusion, a set of allegorical symbols, a reverse image of the real essence of history. Man, who is asleep to his inner potential, must awake and become an active partner of the ‘Unknown Father’ in the transformation of all life. Otherwise he remains a prisoner in what the eminent Russian Gnostic philosopher Vladimir Solviev (1853-1900) aptly described as “a kind of nightmare of sleeping humanity.” A number of Gnostic communities – like nineteenth century communists – held contempt for material goods and lived communally, teaching “the world and its laws, religious, moral and social, are of little relevance to the plan of salvation.”1

Gnostics, Mystic Sects & Radicals

Russian mystical sects played an extremely important part in the Bolshevik revolution, on the side of the Bolsheviks. In spite of their rejection of the state and the church, these sects were deeply nationalistic, since their members were hostile to foreign innovations. They hated the West.
— Mikhail Agursky, The Third Rome

Throughout nineteenth century Europe we find numerous connections between Gnostics, mystics, occultists and radical socialists. They constituted what the historian James Webb calls “a progressive underground” united by a common opposition to the established order of their day. Constantly, Webb writes, “we find socialists and occultists running in harness.”2 Sundry spiritual communities emerged across the United States, with clear Gnostic and occult doctrines, which attempted to follow a pure communistic life style. Victoria Woodhull, the president of the American Association of Spiritualists during the 1870s, was a radical socialist. Woodhull believed that Spiritualism signified not only religious enlightenment, but also a cultural, political and social revolution. She published the first English translation of the Communist Manifesto and tried in vain to persuade Karl Marx that the goals of Spiritualism and Communism were the same.

Dissident Christian mystics, spiritualists, occultists and radical socialists often found themselves together at the forefront of political movements for social justice, worker’s rights, free love and the emancipation of women. Nineteenth century occultists and socialists even used the same language in calling for a new age of universal brotherhood, justice and peace. They all shared a charismatic vision of what the future could be – a radical alternative to the oppressive old political, social, economic and religious power structures. And more often than not they found themselves facing the same common enemy in the unholy alliance of State and Church.

The birth of radical socialist ideas in Russia cannot be easily separated from the spiritual communism practiced by diverse Russian sects. For centuries folk myths nourished a widespread belief in the possibility of an earthly communist paradise united by fraternal love, where justice, truth and equality prevailed. One prominent Russian legend told of the lost land of Belovode (the Kingdom of the White Waters), said to be “across the water” and inhabited by Russian Old Believer mystics. In Belovode, spiritual life reigned supreme, and all went barefoot sharing the fruits of the land and their labour. There were no oppressive rules, crime, and war. Another Russian legend concerned Kitezh, the radiant city beneath the lake. Kitezh will only rise from the waters and appear again when Russia returns to the true Christ and is once more worthy to see it and its priceless treasures. Early in the twentieth century such myths captured the popular imagination and were associated with the hopes of revolution.

In the latter half of the seventeenth century, a schism occurred within the Russian Orthodox Church of a new religious movement called the Old Believers. The result was that many Russian spiritual dissidents took courage from the split to found their own communities, giving vent to Gnostic ideas that had long been simmering underground. The Old Believers, in the face of severe repression, clung tenaciously to their ancient mystic tradition and expressed their separation from the official world of Imperial Orthodox Russia in collective migration to the fringes of the state, mass suicide by fire, rebellion, and a monastic communism.

Gnostic communities, with their communalism and disdain for private property, proliferated throughout Russia in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Known by a variety of names such as Common Hope, United Brotherhood, Love of Brotherhood, Righthanded Brotherhood, White Doves, Believers in Christ, Friends of God, Wanderers, their followers reportedly numbered in the hundreds of thousands. Ruthlessly persecuted by the authorities, they made up a spiritual underground, often hiding themselves from inquisitive eyes. A countrywide revolutionary sectarianism that rejected the state, the church, society, law, and even religious commandments, which they declared were abolished when the Holy Spirit descended to humanity.

The origin of Gnostic ideas in Russia is difficult to trace, but they appear to be an outgrowth of two powerful spiritual impulses in Russian religious history. The first is the Christian esoteric tradition preserved within the monastic communities of the Russian Orthodox Church. A mystical tradition going back by way of Greek Neoplatonism, Origin and Clement of Alexandria to St. John the “beloved disciple”. “Russian Orthodox mystical theology has bent more than a little in the direction of the Gnostic heresy,” notes the historian Maria Carlson.3 The second impulse originated with Essene and Manichean missionaries who reached Russia in the early centuries of the Christian era. An impulse later given new vitality by the Bogomils whose Gnostic teachings had gained a foothold in Russia by the thirteenth century.

By the end of the nineteenth century occult and Gnostic ideas enjoyed wide circulation among all segments of the Russian population. At one point the Russian philosopher Nicholas Berdyaev (1874-1948) welcomed the Gnostics, urging “Gnosticism should be revived and should enter into our life for all time.”4 After the 1917 Revolution, Gnosticism, observed the Russian scholar Mikhail Agursky, “contributed considerably to Soviet culture and even influenced Soviet political life. Its foundations were laid before the revolution…[by] several gnostic trends in nineteenth century Russian culture.”

While Russian Gnostics rejected the world order and strove to live by the apostolic precept to hold “all things in common,”5 they were also profoundly aware of the approaching end of the age. “Russian popular Gnosticism had a very pronounced apocalyptic character,” says Mikhail Agursky. “Russian mystical sectarians lived in anticipation of a catastrophe. The degradation of human life demanded purifying fire from heaven, which would devour the new Sodom and Gomorrah and replace them with the Kingdom of God. Any revolution could easily be identified by such sectarians as this fire, regardless of its external form.”6

Russian Socialism

Bolshevik collectivism had roots in long-standing Russian values of individual self-sacrifice. The suffering, martyrdom, humility, and sacrifice of Christ was deeply embedded in the texture of Russian religious thought and practice, and the lives of Russian saints were a litany of suffering. The Old Believers, heretics in the eyes of the official church for their adherence to their own version of the truth, suffered persecution for centuries at the hands of the government and sought escape in mass immolation, colonization, and, finally, economic mutual aid.
— Robert C. Williams, The Other Bolsheviks

Alexander_Herzen_7.jpgAlexander Herzen (1812-1870), seen by many as the father of Russian socialism, was a friend and admirer of the French revolutionary Proudhon, who viewed himself as a Christian socialist. Proudhon worked intermittently all his adult life on a never completed study of the original teachings of Jesus Christ. Herzen also paid special attention to Russia’s persecuted religious sectarians. He printed a special supplement for the Old Believers, the mystic Christian traditionalists who had been driven out of the Russian Orthodox Church. Nicholas Chernyshevsky, another Russian socialist thinker of the nineteenth century, wrote an article in praise of the “fools for Christ’s sake” and defended members of the spiritual underground.

The Russian radicals of the 1800s, in the words of James H. Billington, looked upon “socialism as an outgrowth of suppressed traditions within heretical Christianity.”7 They saw the genesis of Russian socialism in the spiritual underground of the Gnostics and religious sectarians. One influential network of Russian socialists openly claimed to be rediscovering “the teaching of Christ in its original purity,” which “had as its basic doctrine charity and its aim the realisation of freedom and the destruction of private property.”8

ho.jpgNicholas Chernyshevsky (1828-1889), who spent much of his life in penal servitude, penned the utopian novel What Is To Be Done? as a vision of the future new society and a guidebook for the revolutionaries who would build it. Chernyshevsky wrote:

Then say to all: this is what will come to pass in the future, a radiant and beautiful future. Have love for it, strive toward it, work on behalf of it, bring it ever nearer, bear what you can from it into your present life. The more you can carry from that future into your present life, the more your life will be radiant and good, the richer it will be in happiness and pleasure.

Chernyshevsky’s novel inspired two generations of idealistic young radicals. Among them was Alexandre Ulianov, the beloved elder brother of V.I. Lenin. He was executed in 1887 for his part in the attempted assassination of Tsar Alexander III. Vladimir Lenin told how Chernyshevsky’s What Is To Be Done? “captivated my brother, and captivated me… It transformed me completely.” What impressed the future leader of the Russian Revolution was how Chernyshevsky:

not only demonstrated the necessity for every correctly thinking and really honest man to become a revolutionary, but also showed – even more importantly – what a revolutionary should be like, what his principles should be, how he must achieve his goals, what methods and means he should employ to realise them.9

Nicholas Berdyaev observed that the “Russian revolutionaries who were to be inspired by the ideas of Chernyshevsky present an interesting psychological problem. The best of Russian revolutionaries acquiesced during this earthly life in persecution, want, imprisonment, exile, penal servitude, execution, and they had no hope whatever of another life beyond this. The comparison with Christians of that time is almost disadvantageous to the latter; they highly cherished the blessings of this earthly life and counted upon the blessings of heavenly life.”10

Chernyshevsky, like those who followed him, was passionately committed to the power of reason. His philosophy firmly grounded in the materialist outlook and a sober utilitarianism. But in his life Chernyshevsky was the embodiment of self-abnegation, single-mindedness and asceticism. Like a true saint he asked nothing for himself, but wanted everything for the people as a whole. When the police officers took him into exile in Siberia they said, “Our orders were to bring a criminal and we are bringing a saint. “These two elements, the religious and the secular, the ascetic and the calculating,” writes historian Geoffrey Hosking, “remained in unresolved tension in his personality, but on the level of theory he sought a resolution in the idea of a social revolution to be promoted by the best people on the basis of personal example.”11

Inspired by Chernyshevsky, groups of young radicals emerged committed to the reconstruction of Russia as a federation of village communes and communally run factories. The reading list of one such revolutionary cell is revealing because it included the New Testament and histories of Russian Gnostic communities. The leader of the main radical circle in the Russian capital St. Petersburg spoke of founding “a religion of humanity.” He called his circle “an Order of Knights” and included in its ranks members of a Gnostic “God-manhood sect” which taught that each individual is potentially destined to become a god. It was not uncommon for the revolutionary call “liberty, equality, and fraternity” to be written on crosses, or for Russian revolutionaries to declare their belief in “Christ, St. Paul, and Chernyshevsky.”

The Russian socialists frequently visited religious sectarians and sought their support because of their history of alienation from the tsarist regime. Emil Dillon, an English journalist who had personal contact with several persecuted religious communities, reminds us:

Among the various revolutionary agencies which were at work… the most unpretending, indirect, and effective were certain religious sectarians…. Coercion in religious matters did more to spread political disaffection than the most enterprising revolutionary propagandists. It turned the best spirits of the nation against the tripartite system of God, Tsar, and fatherland, and convinced even average people not only that there was no lifegiving principle in the State, but that no faculty of the individual or the nation had room left for unimpeded growth.12

 V.I. Lenin & The Spiritual Underground

Men who are participating in a great social movement always picture their coming action as a battle in which their cause is certain to triumph. These constructions… I propose to call myths; the syndicalist “general strike” and Marx’s catastrophic revolution are such myths.
— Georges Sorel, 1906

Religious sectarians played a significant part in the formation of Bolshevism, V.I. Lenin’s unique brand of revolutionary Marxism. Indeed, Marxism with its aggressive commitment to atheism and scientific materialism, scorned all religion as “the opium of the people.” Yet this did not prevent some Bolshevic leaders from utilising concepts taken directly from occultism and radical Gnosticism. Nor did the obvious materialist outlook of Communism, as Bolshevism became known, stop Russia’s spiritual underground from giving valuable patronage to Lenin’s revolutionary cause.

One of Vladimir Lenin’s early supporters was the radical Russian journalist V. A. Posse, who edited a Marxist journal Zhizn’ (Life) from Geneva. Zhizn’ aimed to enlist the support of Russia’s burgeoning dissident religious communities in the fight to overthrow the tsarist autocracy. Posse’s publishing enterprise received the backing of V.D. Bonch-Bruevich, a Marxist revolutionary and importantly a specialist on Russian Gnostic sects. Through Bonch-Bruevich’s connections to the spiritual underground of Old Believers and Gnostics, Posse secured important financial help for Zhizn’.

The goal of Zhizn’ was to reach a broad peasant and proletarian audience of readers that would some day constitute a popular front against the hated Russian government. Lenin soon began contributing articles to Zhizn’. To Posse, Lenin appeared like some kind of mystic sectarian, a Gnostic radical, whose asceticism was exceeded only by his self-confidence. Both Bonch-Bruevich and Posse were impressed by Lenin’s zeal to build an effective revolutionary party. Lenin disdained religion and showed little interest in the ‘religious’ orientation of Zhizn’. The Russian Marxist thinker Plekhanov, one of Lenin’s early mentors, openly expressed his hostility to the journal’s ‘religious’ bent. He wrote to Lenin complaining that Zhizn’, “on almost every page talks about Christ and religion. In public I shall call it an organ of Christian socialism.”

The Zhizn’ publishing enterprise came to an end in 1902 and its operations were effectively transferred into Lenin’s hands. This led to the organisation in 1903-1904 of the very first Bolshevic publishing house by Bonch-Bruevich and Lenin. Both men viewed the Russian sectarians as valuable revolutionary allies. As one scholar notes, “Russian religious dissent appealed to Bolshevism even before that movement had acquired a name.”13

5325987-a-stamp-printed-in-the-ussr-show-mikhail-bonch-bruevich-soviet-radio-engineerings-the-founder-of-the.jpgV.D. Bonch-Bruevich (1873-1955) came to revolutionary Marxism under the influence of the Russian novelist Leo Tolstoy’s social teachings. Like Lenin’s wife Krupskaya, he started his revolutionary career distributing Tolstoy’s The Kingdom of God Is within You, a work infused with neo-Gnostic themes. In 1899 Bonch-Bruevich left Russia for Canada to live among the Doukhobors, Russian Gnostic communists whose refusal to pay taxes and serve in the army drove them into exile. Bonch-Bruevich reported on the secret doctrines of the Doukhobors and put in writing their fundamental oral teachings known as the ‘Living Book’. On his return to Europe in 1901 Bonch-Bruevich introduced Lenin to the chief tenets of these Gnostic communists. The Doukhobors, with their radical rejection of the Church and State, with their denial of the uniqueness of the historical Christ, and their neglect of the Bible in favour of their own secret tradition, were of some interest to the founder of Bolshevism.

In 1904 Bonch-Bruevich, with Lenin’s support, began publishing Rassvet (Dawn) in an effort to spread revolutionary Marxism among the religious dissidents. His first editorial attacked all the Russian tsars for their persecution of the Old Believers and sectarians, and stated that the journal’s goal was to report events occurring world wide, “in various corners of our vast motherland, and among the ranks of Sectarians and Schismatics.” Rassvet combined Communist and apocalyptic themes that were both compelling and comprehensible to Russia’s spiritual underground.

By the early years of the twentieth century Russia was in a revolutionary mood. Bonch-Bruevich wrote that this would soon produce a “street battle of the awakened people.” He urged his fellow Communist revolutionaries to use the language of the spiritual underground in persuading the masses that the government was “Satan” and that “all men are brothers” in the eyes of God. He wrote:

If the proletariat-sectarian in his speech requires the word ‘devil’, then identify this old concept of an evil principle with capitalism, and identify the word ‘Christ’, as a concept of eternal good, happiness, and freedom, with socialism.

 Communist God-Builders  & The Occult

If a newcomer to the vast quantity of occult literature begins browsing at random, puzzlement and impatience will soon be his lot; for he will find jumbled together the droppings of all cultures, and occasional fragments of philosophy perhaps profound but almost certainly subversive to right living in the society in which he finds himself. The occult is rejected knowledge: that is, an Underground whose basic unity is that of Opposition to an establishment of Powers That Are.
— James Webb, Occult Underground

A Marxist pamphlet written before 1917 and later reissued by the Soviet government bluntly declared that man is destined to “take possession of the universe and extend his species into distant cosmic regions, taking over the whole solar system. Human beings will be immortal.” Anatoly Lunacharsky, the first Commissar of Enlightenment in the new Soviet state, believed that as religious conviction had been a great force of change in history, Marxists should conceive the struggle to transform nature through labor as their form of devotion, and the spirit of collective humanity as their god.

lunacharski_.jpgA.V. Lunacharsky (1875-1933) and the Russian writer Maxim Gorky (1868-1936), close friends of Vladimir Lenin, were acquainted with a broad spectrum of occult thought, including Rudolf Steiner’s Anthroposophy and Helena Blavatsky’s Theosophy. Both these prominent Bolshevic revolutionaries shared a life-long interest in ancient mystery cults, religious sectarianism, parapsychology and Gnosticism. Maria Carlson maintains that Gorky’s “vision of a New Nature and a New World, subsequently assimilated to its socialist expression as the Radiant Future, is fundamentally Theosophic.”14 Gorky valued the writings of the occultists Emanuel Swedenborg and Paracelsus, as well as those of Fabre d’Olivet and Eduard Schure.

Drawing on the imagery of the ancient solar mysteries, Gorky declared in Children of the Sun, “we people are the children of the sun, the bright source of life; we are born of the sun and will vanquish the murky fear of death.” In his Confession, the “people” have become God, creators of miracles, possessors of true religious consciousness, and immortal. Gorky envisioned a beautiful future of work for the love of work and of man as “master of all things.” Revealing his familiarity with parapsychology and faith healing, Gorky tells how an assembled crowd uses its collective energy to heal a paralysed girl. He was deeply impressed by research into thought transference, often writing of the “miraculous power of thought”, while expressing the hope that one day reason and science would end fear.

The ideas advanced by Lunacharsky and Gorky became known as God building, described by one researcher as a “movement of secular rejuvenation with mystery cult aspects.”15 God building implied that a human collective, through the concentration of released human energy, can perform the same miracles that were assigned to supra-natural beings. God builders regarded early Christianity as an authentic example of collective God building, Christ being nothing other than the focus of collective human energy. “The time will come,” said Gorky, “when all popular will shall once again amalgamate in one point. Then an invincible and miraculous power will emerge, and God will be resurrected.”16 Years before, Fyodor Dostoyevsky had written in The Possessed, “God is the synthetic personality of the whole people.” According to Mikhail Agursky:

For Gorky, God-building was first of all a theurgical action, the creation of the new Nature and the annihilation of the old, and therefore it coincided fully with the Kingdom of the Spirit. He considered God to be a theurgical outcome of a collective work, the outcome of human unity and of the negation of the human ego.17

Before the Russian Revolution, Lunacharsky’s political propaganda relied heavily on words and images ultimately derived from Russian Gnostics and religious sectarians. In one pamphlet he urged readers to refuse to pay taxes or serve in the army, to form local revolutionary committees, to demand ownership of their land, overthrow the autocracy and replace it with a “brotherly society” of socialism. Indeed, there was as much attention given to Christ as to Marx in Lunacharsky’s writings. “Christianity, in all its forms, even the purest and most progressive,” he wrote, “is the ideology of the downtrodden classes, the hopelessly immobile, those who cannot believe in their own powers; Christianity is also a weapon of exploitation.” But Lunacharsky realised there is also an underground spiritual tradition, the arcane language and symbols of which might be used to mobilise the people to carry out the revolution.

Occult elements are obvious in Lunacharsky’s early plays and poems, including a reference to the “astral spirit”, and a familiarity with white magic and demonology. He discussed Gnosticism, the Logos, Pythagoras, and solar cults in his two volume work Religion and Socialism. After the Bolshevic Revolution, Lunacharsky wrote an occult play called Vasilisa the Wise. This was to be followed by a never published “dramatic poem” entitled Mitra the Saviour, a clear reference to the pre-Christian occult deity. Significantly, it is Lunacharsky, along with the scholar of Russian Gnostic sects V.D. Bonch-Bruevich, who is credited with developing the so-called “cult of Lenin” which dominated Soviet life following the Bolshevic leaders’ death in 1924.

 Soviet Power & Spiritual Revolution

A Weltanschauung has conquered a state, and emanating from this state it will slowly shatter the entire world and bring about its collapse. Bolshevism, if unchecked, will change the world as completely as Christianity did. Three hundred years from now it will no longer be said that it is merely a question of organising production in a different way… If this movement continues to develop, Lenin, three hundred years from now, will be regarded not only as one of the revolutionaries of 1917, but as the founder of a new world doctrine, and he will be worshipped as much perhaps as Buddha.
— Adolf Hitler, 193218

In the wake of the total collapse of Imperial Russia and the devastation caused by the First World War, Lenin and the Bolshevics seized power in October 1917. A revolution that would not have been possible without the active support and participation of the Russian spiritual underground. The Bolshevics, in the opinion of one Russian scholar:

most probably would not have been able to take power or to consolidate it if the multimillion masses of Russian sectarians had not taken part in the total destruction brought about by the revolution, which acquired a mystical character for them. To them the state and the church were receptacles of all kinds of evil, and their destruction and debasement were regarded as a mystic duty, exactly as it was with the [medieval Gnostic sects of] Anabaptists, Bogomils, Cathars, and Taborites.19

Ground down by centuries of autocratic tsarist rule as well as the Orthodox Church, its mere appendage, the Russian people came to accept the Communism of Lenin. “Bolshevism is a Russian word,” wrote an anti-Communist Russian in 1919. “But not only a word. Because in that guise, in that form and in those manifestations which have crystallized in Russia… Bolshevism is a uniquely Russian phenomenon, with deep ties to the Russian soul.”20 Even the Nazi propaganda minister Dr. Goebbels, who built his political career fighting Communism, confessed that no tsar had ever understood the Russian people as deeply as Lenin, who gave them what they wanted most – land and freedom.

Lenin wedded the dialectical materialism of Marx to the deep-rooted tradition of Russian socialism permeated as it was by Gnostic, apocalyptic, and messianic elements. In the same manner he reconciled the Marxist commitment to science, atheism and technological progress with the Russian ideas of justice, truth and self-sacrifice for the collective. Similarly the leader of Bolshevism merged the Marxist call for proletarian internationalism and world revolution with the centuries old notion of Russia’s great mission as the harbinger of universal brotherhood. Violently opposed to all religion, atheistic Bolshevism drew much from the spiritual underground, becoming in the words of one of Lenin’s comrades, “the most religious of all religions.”

“Nonetheless we have studied Marxism a bit,” wrote Lenin, “we have studied how and when opposites can and must be combined. The main thing is: in our revolution… we have in practice repeatedly combined opposites.” Several centuries earlier the Muslim Gnostic teacher Jalalladin Rumi pointed out, “It is necessary to note that opposite things work together even though nominally opposed.”

After the 1917 Bolshevic Revolution:

occultism was part of a cluster of ideas that inspired a mystical revolutionism based on the belief that great earthly events such as revolution reflect a realignment of cosmic forces. Revolution, then, had eschatological significance. Its result would be a ‘new heaven and a new earth’ peopled by a new kind of human being and characterized by a new kind of society cemented by love, common ideals, and sacrifice.

The Bolshevic Revolution did not quash interest in the occult. Some pre-revolutionary occult ideas and symbols were transformed along more ‘scientific’ lines. Mingled with compatible concepts, they permeated early Soviet art, literature, thought, and science. Soviet political activists who did not believe in the occult used symbols, themes, and techniques drawn from it for agitation and propaganda. Further transformed, some of them were incorporated in the official culture of Stalin’s time.21

Apocalyptic and mess-ianic themes, popularised for centuries by the Russian spiritual underground, were played out in the Bolshevic Revolution and fueled the drive to build a classless, communist society. The dream of a communist paradise on earth created by human hands, a new world adorned by technological perfection, social justice and brotherhood, was found both in Marx and in the Russian spiritual underground.

Lenin promulgated a law exempting religious sectarians from military service. Writers and poets, drawing inspiration from the Russian religious underground, hailed the Revolution as a messianic, world mystery. One writer compared the Bolshevic Revolution with the origin of Christianity. “Christ was followed,” he exclaimed, “not by professors, nor by virtuous philosophers, nor by shopkeepers. Christ was followed by rascals. And the revolution will also be followed by rascals, apart from those who launched it. And one must not be afraid of this.”

alexander_blok.jpgAlexander Blok (1880-1921) was the most important Russian poet to recognise the Bolshevics. A student of Gnosticism, Blok discerned the inner meaning of the tumultuous political and social events. There was a hidden spiritual content at the core of the external upheavals of the Revolution and the bloody Civil War that followed. Blok clearly expressed this in his famous poem The Twelve, where the invisible Christ leads the revolutionary march.

Another Russian poet and occultist, Andrei Bely, a disciple of Steiner’s Anthroposophical movement, hailed the Revolution as the first stage of a far greater cultural and spiritual revolution to come. For Bely, as for his contemporary Blok, the Bolshevic Revolution was above all a powerful theurgical instrument. Andrei Bely (1880-1934) saw theurgy as a means to change the world actively in collaboration with God. In spite of the turmoil and bloodshed, for these Russian occultists the revolution served as an instrument of the new creation. Bely celebrated the 1917 Revolution in a poem, Christ is Resurrected, in which the Bolshevic take over is compared with the mystery of Crucifixion and Resurrection. Rudolf Steiner understood why the Russians welcomed the October Revolution, but criticised Bolshevism as a dangerous mix of Western abstract thinking and Eastern mysticism.

The Russian spiritual underground spawned several important writers and poets who welcomed the Bolshevic Revolution. Two of the most outstanding were Nikolai Kliuev (1887-1937) and Sergei Esenin (1895-1925). Occult images and Russian messianic themes abound in their poems. Kliuev saw Lenin as the popular leader and embodiment of the Old Belief. In typically Gnostic fashion Esenin disdained the old God of the Church and proclaimed a “new Nazareth”. The young Esenin gave support to the Bolshevic Red Army and even tried to join the Bolshevic party. Tragically, Kliuev felt betrayed by the Revolution, was arrested and died on the way to a labor camp in 1937. Esenin took his own life in 1925 believing dark forces had usurped the Russian Revolution.

By the early 1920s the Bolshevics had consolidated their hold over much of the former Russian Empire. The Communist Party emerged as the monolithic embodiment of the popular will. All occult societies, including the Theosophists and Anthroposophists, were disbanded. Freemasonry was virulently condemned and its lodges closed. In the drive to modernise Russia and build a technologically advanced Soviet Union, occult notions were publicly classed as superstition and openly ridiculed. The new Soviet State, with its Marxist-Leninist ideology, became the sole arbitrator of all thought. Leading occult teachers were forced into exile. Yet many of those associated with the spiritual underground joined the Communist Party and found employment in various Soviet organisations.

The sway of the spiritual underground did not disappear. Arcane truths and primordial urges took on new forms in keeping with the new reality. Esoteric ideas were clothed in the language of a new epoch. One writer explains:

In Stalin’s time, occult themes and techniques detached from their doctrinal base became part of the official culture…. The occult themes of Soviet literature of the 1920s were transformed into the magical or fantastic elements that observers have noted in Socialist Realism. Stalin himself was invested with occult powers.22

The Russian thinker, Isai Lezhnev (1891-1955), insisted on the profoundly religious character of Communism, which was “equal to atheism only in a narrow theological sense.” Emotionally, psychologically, Bolshevism was extremely religious, seeing itself as the only custodian of absolute truth. Lezhnev correctly discerned in Bolshevism the rise of a “new religion” which brought with it a new culture and political order. He embraced Marxism-Leninism and welcomed Stalin as a manifestation of the “popular spirit”.

The Russian Revolution, which gave rise to the super power known as the Soviet Union, cast a gigantic shadow over the twentieth century. Bolshevism, the materialistic worldview developed by Vladimir Lenin, left its mark on all aspects of modern thought. And the roots of Lenin’s Communism and the Soviet Union go deep into the ancient secret tradition of humanity.

Was atheistic Bolshevism, for all its worship of science and materialism, the expression of something supra-natural? Many in the spiritual underground passionately believed so. The Gnostic poet Valery Briusov (1873-1924), who joined the Bolshevic party in 1920, had been involved in magick, occultism and spiritualism prior to the revolution. Briusov stressed that Russia’s destiny was being worked out, not on earth, but by mystic forces for which the 1917 Revolution was part of the occult plot.

Another prominent Russian occultist, the acclaimed artist Nicholas Roerich, acknowledged Lenin and Communism as cosmic phenomenon. In 1926 he wrote:

He [Lenin] incorporated and circumspectly fitted every material into the world order. This opened up for him the path into all parts of the world. And people have formed a legend not only as a record of his deeds but also as a mark of his aspirations…. We have seen for ourselves how the nations have understood the magnetic power of communism. Friends, the worst counsellor is negativity. Behind every negation ignorance is concealed.

The philosopher Nicholas Berdyaev, a former Marxist who came to embrace Christian mysticism, was exiled from the Soviet Union in the 1920s. He had studied occultism and was acquainted with many Russian Gnostic sects. His 1909 book The Philosophy of Freedom is full of Gnostic themes. And like the Gnostics, Berdyaev opposed the institution of the family as yoking men and women to “necessity” and the endless chain of birth and death. Writing from exile, more than twenty-five years after the Revolution, Berdyaev observed:

Russian communism is a distortion of the Russian messianic idea; it proclaims light from the East which is destined to enlighten the bourgeois darkness of the West. There is in communism its own truth and its own falsehood. Its truth is a social truth, a revelation of the possibility of the brotherhood of man and of peoples, the suppression of classes, whereas its falsehood lies in its spiritual foundations which result in a process of dehumanisation, in the denial of the worth of the individual man, in the narrowing of human thought…. Communism is a Russian phenomenon in spite of its Marxist ideology. Communism is the Russian destiny, it is a moment in the inner destiny of the Russian people and it must be lived through by the inward strength of the Russian people. Communism must be surmounted but not destroyed, and into the highest stage which will come after communism there must enter the truth of communism also but freed from its element of falsehood. The Russian Revolution awakened and unfettered the enormous powers of the Russian people. In this lies its principle meaning.23

 

The Hammer and Sickle: Occult Symbols?

Throughout the twentieth century the hammer and sickle were universally recognised as symbols of communism and the Soviet Union. For millions of people the hammer and sickle symbolised a new political and economic order offering progress, justice and liberty. While countless others looked on the same hammer and sickle as ominous emblems of oppression, hatred and tyranny.

Occultists and students of ancient wisdom saw something more. Behind the outward appearance of these communist emblems, which officially represented the emancipation of labor, there was an element unknown to the masses.

Russian occultists saw the Bolshevics as unconsciously working for the cosmic mission of Russia and interpreted the Soviet hammer and sickle as hidden symbols of the blacksmith’s art, hinting at future transmutation and transformation. Both metallurgy and alchemy (regarded as an occult science) sort to destroy impure elements with fire and thereby release a refined product, whether forged metal (the smith) or spiritual gold (the alchemist). Fire is associated with transfiguration, regeneration, and purification, while iron is associated with Mars (the god of war) and the astral world.

To the occultist, the communist hammer and sickle symbolised conflict and transmutation. The forging – in the fires of struggle – of base elements into a purer, higher form. The atheistic Bolshevic, like the occultist, proclaimed that ordinary man must be transformed into new man, free of the bonds of selfish desires and of the oppressive past, in order to freely build the new civilisation of the future.


Footnotes:

1. Benjamin Walker, Gnosticism Its History & Influence

2. James Webb, Occult Underground

3. Maria Carlson, No Religion Higher Than Truth

4. As quoted in Maria Carlson, No Religion Higher Than Truth

5. Acts 2:44-47

6. Mikhail Agursky, The Third Rome

7. James H. Billington, The Icon and the Axe

8. As quoted in James H. Billington, The Icon and the Axe

9. As quoted in Nina Tumarkin, Lenin Lives: The Lenin Cult in Soviet Russia

10. Nicholas Berdyaev, The Russian Idea

11. Geoffrey Hosking, Russia: People and Empire

12. As quoted in Mikhail Agursky, The Third Rome

13. Robert C. Williams, The Other Bolsheviks

14. Maria Carlson, No Religion Higher Than Truth

15. Richard Noll, The Jung Cult

16. Mikhail Agursky, The Third Rome

17. The Occult in Russian and Soviet Culture, edited by Bernice Glatzer Rosenthal

18. As quoted in Hitler’s Words, edited by Gordon Prange

19. Mikhail Agursky, The Third Rome

20. As quoted in Richard Pipes, Russia Under the Bolshevik Regime 1919-1924

21. The Occult in Russian and Soviet Culture, edited by Bernice Glatzer Rosenthal

22. Ibid

23. Nicholas Berdyaev, The Russian Idea

samedi, 09 novembre 2013

Wall Street & the November 1917 Bolshevik Revolution

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Wall Street & the November 1917 Bolshevik Revolution

By Kerry Bolton 

Ex: http://www.counter-currents.com

My last article [2] documented the funding of the March 1917 Revolution in Russia.[1] The primary financier of the Russian revolutionary movement 1905–1917 was Jacob Schiff, of Kuhn Loeb and Co., New York. In particular Schiff had provided the money for the distribution of revolutionary propaganda among Russians prisoners-of-war in Japan in 1905 by the American journalist George Kennan who, more than any other individual, was responsible for turning American public and official opinion against Czarist Russia. Kennan subsequently related that it was thanks to Schiff that 50,000 Russian soldiers were revolutionized and formed the cadres that laid the basis for the March 1917 Revolution and, we might add–either directly or indirectly–the consequent Bolshevik coup of November. The reaction of bankers from Wall Street and The City towards the overthrow of the Czar was enthusiastic.

This article deals with the funding of the subsequent Bolshevik coup eight months later which, as paradoxical as it might seem to those who know nothing of history other than the orthodox version, was also greeted cordially by banking circles in Wall Street and elsewhere.

Apologists for the bankers and other highly-placed individuals who supported the Bolsheviks from the earliest stages of the communist takeover, either diplomatically or financially, justify the support for this mass application of psychopathology as being motivated by patriotic sentiment, in trying to thwart German influence over the Bolsheviks and to keep Russia in the war against Germany. Because Lenin and his entourage had been able to enter Russia courtesy of the German High Command on the basis that a Bolshevik regime would withdraw Russia from the war, Wall Street capitalists explained that their patronage of the Bolsheviks was motivated by the highest ideals of pro-Allied sentiment. Hence, William Boyce Thompson in particular stated that by funding Bolshevik propaganda for distribution in Germany and Austria this would undermine the war effort of those countries, while his assistance to the Bolsheviks in Russia was designed to swing them in favor of the Allies.

These protestations of patriotic motivations ring hollow. International banking is precisely what it is called–international, or globalist as such forms of capitalism are now called. Not only have these banking forms and other forms of big business had overlapping directorships and investments for generations, but they are often related through intermarriage. While Max Warburg of the Warburg banking house in Germany advised the Kaiser and while the German Government arranged for funding and safe passage of Lenin and his entourage from Switzerland across Germany to Russia;[2] his brother Paul,[3] a partner of Jacob Schiff’s at Wall Street, looked after the family interests in New York. The primary factor that was behind the bankers’ support for the Bolsheviks whether from London,[4] New York, Stockholm,[5] or Berlin, was to open up the underdeveloped resources of Russia to the world market, just as in our own day George Soros, the money speculator, funds the so-called “color revolutions” to bring about “regime change” that facilitates the opening up of resources to global exploitation. Hence there can no longer be any doubt that international capital a plays a major role in fomenting revolutions, because Soros plays the well-known modern-day equivalent of Jacob Schiff.

Recognition of Bolsheviks Pushed by Bankers

This aim of international finance, whether centered in Germany, England or the USA, to open up Russia to capitalist exploitation by supporting the Bolsheviks, was widely commented on at the time by a diversity of well-informed sources, including Allied intelligence agencies, and of particular interest by two very different individuals, Henry Wickham Steed, editor of The London Times, and Samuel Gompers, head of the American Federation of Labor.

On May 1, 1922 The New York Times reported that Gompers, reacting to negotiations at the international economic conference at Genoa, declared that a group of “predatory international financiers” were working for the recognition of the Bolshevik regime for the opening up of resources for exploitation. Despite the rhetoric by New York and London bankers during the war that a Russian revolution would serve the Allied cause, Gompers opined that this was an “Anglo-American-German banking group,” and that they were “international bankers” who did not adhere to any national allegiance. He also noted that prominent Americans who had a history of anti-labor attitudes were advocating recognition of the Bolshevik regime.[6]

What Gompers claimed, was similarly expressed by Henry Wickham Steed of The London Times, based on his observations. In a first-hand account of the Paris Peace Conference of 1919, Steed stated that proceedings were interrupted by the return from Moscow of William C. Bullitt and Lincoln Steffens, “who had been sent to Russia towards the middle of February by Colonel House and Mr. Lansing, for the purpose of studying conditions, political and economic, therein for the benefit of the American Commissioners plenipotentiary to negotiate peace.”[7] Steed also refers to British Prime Minister Lloyd George as being likely to have known of the Mission and its purpose. Steed stated that international finance was behind the move for recognition of the Bolshevik regime and other moves in favor of the Bolsheviks, and specifically identified Jacob Schiff of Kuhn, Loeb & Co., New York, as one of the principal bankers “eager to secure recognition”:

Potent international financial interests were at work in favor of the immediate recognition of the Bolshevists. Those influences had been largely responsible for the Anglo-American proposal in January to call Bolshevist representatives to Paris at the beginning of the Peace Conference—a proposal which had failed after having been transformed into a suggestion for a Conference with the Bolshevists at Prinkipo. . . . The well-known American Jewish banker, Mr. Jacob Schiff, was known to be anxious to secure recognition for the Bolshevists . . .[8]

In return for diplomatic recognition, Tchitcherin, the Bolshevist Commissary for Foreign Affairs, was offering “extensive commercial and economic concessions.”

Wickham Steed with the support of The Times’ proprietor, Lord Northcliffe, exposed the machinations of international finance to obtain the recognition of the Bolshevik regime, which still had a very uncertain future.

Steed related that he was called upon by US President Wilson’s primary adviser, Edward Mandel House, who was concerned at Steed’s exposé of the relationship between Bolshevists and international financers:

That day Colonel House asked me to call upon him. I found him worried both by my criticism of any recognition of the Bolshevists and by the certainty, which he had not previously realized, that if the President were to recognize the Bolshevists in return for commercial concessions his whole “idealism” would be hopelessly compromised as commercialism in disguise. I pointed out to him that not only would Wilson be utterly discredited but that the League of Nations would go by the board, because all the small peoples and many of the big peoples of Europe would be unable to resist the Bolshevism which Wilson would have accredited.[9]

Steed stated to House that it was Jacob Schiff, Warburg and other bankers who were behind the diplomatic moves in favor of the Bolsheviks:

I insisted that, unknown to him, the prime movers were Jacob Schiff, Warburg, and other international financiers, who wished above all to bolster up the Jewish Bolshevists in order to secure a field for German and Jewish exploitation of Russia.[10]

Steed here indicates an uncharacteristic naïveté in thinking that House would not have known of the plans of Schiff, Warburg, et al. House was throughout his career close to these bankers and was involved with them in setting up a war-time think tank called The Inquiry, and following the war the creation of the Council on Foreign Relations, in order to shape an internationalist post-war foreign policy. It was Schiff and Paul Warburg and other Wall Street bankers who called on House in 1913 to get House’s support for the creation of the Federal Reserve Bank.[11]

House in Machiavellian manner asked Steed to compromise; to support humanitarian aid supposedly for the benefit of all Russians. Steed agreed to consider this, but soon after talking with House found out that British Prime Minister Lloyd George and Wilson were to proceed with recognition the following day. Steed therefore wrote the leading article for the Paris Daily Mail of March 28th, exposing the maneuvers and asking how a pro-Bolshevik attitude was consistent with Pres. Wilson’s declared moral principles for the post-war world?

. . . Who are the tempters that would dare whisper into the ears of the Allied and Associated Governments? They are not far removed from the men who preached peace with profitable dishonour to the British people in July, 1914. They are akin to, if not identical with, the men who sent Trotsky and some scores of associate desperadoes to ruin the Russian Revolution as a democratic, anti-German force in the spring of 1917.[12]

Here Steed does not seem to have been aware that some of the same bankers who were supporting the Bolsheviks had also supported the March Revolution.

Charles Crane,[13] who had recently talked with President Wilson, told Steed that Wilson was about to recognize the Bolsheviks, which would result in a negative public opinion in the USA and destroy Wilson’s post-War internationalist aims. Significantly Crane also identified the pro-Bolshevik faction as being that of Big Business, stating to Steed: “Our people at home will certainly not stand for the recognition of the Bolshevists at the bidding of Wall Street.” Steed was again seen by House, who stated that Steed’s article in the Paris Daily Mail, “had got under the President’s hide.” House asked that Steed postpone further exposés in the press, and again raised the prospect of recognition based on humanitarian aid. Lloyd George was also greatly perturbed by Steed’s articles in the Daily Mail and complained that he could not undertake a “sensible” policy towards the Bolsheviks while the press had an anti-Bolshevik attitude.[14]

Thompson and the American Red Cross Mission

As mentioned, House attempted to persuade Steed on the idea of relations with Bolshevik Russia ostensibly for the purpose of humanitarian aid for the Russian people. This had already been undertaken just after the Bolshevik Revolution, when the regime was far from certain, under the guise of the American Red Cross Mission. Col. William Boyce Thompson, a director of the NY Federal Reserve Bank, organized and largely funded the Mission, with other funding coming from International Harvester, which gave $200,000. The so-called Red Cross Mission was largely comprised of business personnel, and was according to Thompson’s assistant, Cornelius Kelleher, “nothing but a mask” for business interests.[15] Of the 24 members, five were doctors and two were medical researchers. The rest were lawyers and businessmen associated with Wall Street. Dr. Billings nominally headed the Mission.[16] Prof. Antony Sutton of the Hoover Institute stated that the Mission provided assistance for revolutionaries:

We know from the files of the U.S. embassy in Petrograd that the U.S. Red Cross gave 4,000 rubles to Prince Lvoff, president of the Council of Ministers, for “relief of revolutionists” and 10,000 rubles in two payments to Kerensky for “relief of political refugees.”[17]

The original intention of the Mission, hastily organized by Thompson in light of revolutionary events, was ‘”nothing less than to shore up the Provisional regime,” according to the historian William Harlane Hale, formerly of the United States Foreign Service.[18] The support for the social revolutionaries indicates that the same bankers who backed the Kerensky regime and the March Revolution also supported the Bolsheviks, and it seems reasonable to opine that these financiers considered Kerensky a mere prelude for the Bolshevik coup, as the following indicates.

Thompson set himself up in royal manner in Petrograd reporting directly to Pres. Wilson and bypassing US Ambassador Francis. Thompson provided funds from his own money, first to the Social Revolutionaries, to whom he gave one million rubles,[19] and shortly after $1,000,000 to the Bolsheviks to spread their propaganda to Germany and Austria.[20] Thompson met Thomas Lamont of J. P. Morgan Co. in London to persuade the British War Cabinet to drop its anti-Bolshevik policy. On his return to the USA Thompson undertook a tour advocating US recognition of the Bolsheviks.[21] Thompson’s deputy Raymond Robbins had been pressing for recognition of the Bolsheviks, and Thompson agreed that the Kerensky regime was doomed and consequently “sped to Washington to try and swing the Administration onto a new policy track,” meeting resistance from Wilson, who was being pressure by Ambassador Francis.[22]

The “Bolshevik of Wall Street”

Such was Thompson’s enthusiasm for Bolshevism that he was nicknamed “the Bolshevik of Wall Street” by his fellow plutocrats. Thompson gave a lengthy interview with The New York Times just after his four month tour with the American Red Cross Mission, lauding the Bolsheviks and assuring the American public that the Bolsheviks were not about to make a separate peace with Germany.[23] The article is an interesting indication of how Wall Street viewed their supposedly “deadly enemies,” the Bolsheviks, at a time when their position was very precarious. Thompson stated that while the “reactionaries,” if they assumed power, might seek peace with Germany, the Bolsheviki would not. “His opinion is that Russia needs America, that America must stand by Russia,” stated the Times. Thompson is quoted: “The Bolsheviki peace aims are the same as those of the Untied States.” Thompson alluded to Wilson’s speech to the United States Congress on Russia as “a wonderful meeting of the situation,” but that the American public “know very little about the Bolsheviki.” The Times stated:

Colonel Thompson is a banker and a capitalist, and he has large manufacturing interests. He is not a sentimentalist nor a “radical.” But he has come back from his official visit to Russia in absolute sympathy with the Russian democracy as represented by the Bolsheviki at present.

Hence at this time Thompson was trying to sell the Bolsheviks as “democrats,” implying that they were part of the same movement as the Kerensky regime that they had overthrown. While Thompson did not consider Bolshevism the final form of government, he did see it as the most promising step towards a “representative government” and that it was the “duty” of the USA to “sympathize” with and “aid” Russia “through her days of crisis.” He stated that in reply to surprise at his pro-Bolshevik sentiments he did not mind being called “red” if that meant sympathy for 170,000,000 people “struggling for liberty and fair living.” Thompson also saw that while the Bolsheviki had entered a “truce” with Germany, they were also spreading Bolshevik doctrines among the German people, which Thompson called “their ideals of freedom” and their “propaganda of democracy.” Thompson lauded the Bolshevik Government as being the equivalent to America’s democracy, stating:

The present government in Russia is a government of workingmen. It is a Government by the majority, and, because our Government is a government of the majority, I don’t see how it can fail to support the Government of Russia.

Thompson saw the prospects of the Bolshevik Government being transformed as it incorporated a more Centrist position and included employers. If Bolshevism did not proceed thus, then “God help the world,” warned Thompson. Given that this was a time when Lenin and Trotsky held sway over the regime, subsequently to become the most enthusiastic advocates of opening Russia up to foreign capital (New Economic Policy) prospects seemed good for a joint Capitalist-Bolshevik venture with no indication that an upstart named Stalin would throw a spanner in the works.

The Times article ends: “At home in New York, the Colonel has received the good-natured title of ‘the Bolshevik of Wall Street.’”[24] It was against this background that it can now be understood why labor leader Samuel Gompers denounced Bolshevism as a tool of “predatory international finance,” while arch-capitalist Thompson lauded it as “a government of working men.”

The Council on Foreign Relations Report

The Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) had been established in 1921 by President Wilson’s chief adviser Edward Mandel House out of a previous think tank called The Inquiry, formed in 1917–1918 to advise President Wilson on the Paris Peace Conference of 1919. It was this conference about which Steed had detailed his observations when he stated that there were financial interests trying to secure the recognition of the Bolsheviks.[25]

Peter Grose in his semi-official history of the CFR writes of it as a think tank combining academe and big business that had emerged from The Inquiry group.[26] Therefore the CFR report on Soviet Russia at this early period is instructive as to the relationship that influential sections of the US Establishment wished to pursue in regard to the Bolshevik regime. Grosse writes of this period:

Awkward in the records of The Inquiry had been the absence of a single study or background paper on the subject of Bolshevism. Perhaps this was simply beyond the academic imagination of the times. Not until early 1923 could the Council summon the expertise to mobilize a systematic examination of the Bolshevik regime, finally entrenched after civil war in Russia. The impetus for this first study was Lenin’s New Economic Policy, which appeared to open the struggling Bolshevik economy to foreign investment. Half the Council’s study group were members drawn from firms that had done business in pre-revolutionary Russia, and the discussions about the Soviet future were intense. The concluding report dismissed “hysterical” fears that the revolution would spill outside Russia’s borders into central Europe or, worse, that the heady new revolutionaries would ally with nationalistic Muslims in the Middle East to evict European imperialism. The Bolsheviks were on their way to “sanity and sound business practices,” the Council study group concluded, but the welcome to foreign concessionaires would likely be short-lived. Thus, the Council experts recommended in March 1923 that American businessmen get into Russia while Lenin’s invitation held good, make money on their investments, and then get out as quickly as possible. A few heeded the advice; not for seven decades would a similar opportunity arise.[27]

However, financial interests had already moved into Soviet Russia from the beginning of the Bolshevik regime.

The Vanderlip Concession

H. G. Wells, historian, novelist, and Fabian-socialist, observed first-hand the relationship between Communism and big business when he had visited Bolshevik Russia. Travelling to Russia in 1920 where he interviewed Lenin and other Bolshevik leaders, Wells hoped that the Western Powers and in particular the USA would come to the Soviets’ aid. Wells also met there “Mr. Vanderlip” who was negotiating business contracts with the Soviets. Wells commented of the situation he would like to see developing, and as a self-described “collectivist” made a telling observation on the relationship between Communism and “Big Business”:

The only Power capable of playing this role of eleventh-hour helper to Russia single-handed is the United States of America. That is why I find the adventure of the enterprising and imaginative Mr. Vanderlip very significant. I doubt the conclusiveness of his negotiations; they are probably only the opening phase of a discussion of the Russian problem upon a new basis that may lead it at last to a comprehensive world treatment of this situation. Other Powers than the United States will, in the present phase of world-exhaustion, need to combine before they can be of any effective use to Russia. Big business is by no means antipathetic to Communism. The larger big business grows the more it approximates to Collectivism. It is the upper road of the few instead of the lower road of the masses to Collectivism.[28]

In addressing concerns that were being expressed among Bolshevik Party “activists” at a meeting of the Moscow Organization of the party, Lenin sought to reassure them that the Government was not selling out to foreign capitalism, but that, in view of what Lenin believed to be an inevitable war between the USA and Japan, a US interest in Kamchatka would be favorable to Soviet Russia as a defensive position against Japan. Such strategic considerations on the part of the US, it might be added, were also more relevant to US and other forms of so-called “intervention” during the Russian Civil War between the Red and the White Armies, than any desire to help the Whites overturn the Bolsheviks, let alone restore Czarism. Lenin said of Vanderlip to the Bolshevik cadres:

We must take advantage of the situation that has arisen. That is the whole purpose of the Kamchatka concessions. We have had a visit from Vanderlip, a distant relative of the well-known multimillionaire, if he is to he believed; but since our intelligence service, although splendidly organized, unfortunately does not yet extend to the United States of America, we have not yet established the exact kinship of these Vanderlips. Some even say there is no kinship at all. I do not presume to judge: my knowledge is confined to having read a book by Vanderlip, not the one that was in our country and is said to be such a very important person that he has been received with all the honors by kings and ministers—from which one must infer that his pocket is very well lined indeed. He spoke to them in the way people discuss matters at meetings such as ours, for instance, and told then in the calmest tones how Europe should be restored. If ministers spoke to him with so much respect, it must mean that Vanderlip is in touch with the multimillionaires.[29]

Of the meeting with Vanderlip, Lenin indicated that it was based on a secret diplomacy that was being denied by the US Administration, while Vandrelip returned to the USA, like other capitalists such as Thompson, praising the Bolsheviks. Lenin continued:

. . . I expressed the hope that friendly relations between the two states would be a basis not only for the granting of a concession, but also for the normal development of reciprocal economic assistance. It all went off in that kind of vein. Then telegrams came telling what Vanderlip had said on arriving home from abroad. Vanderlip had compared Lenin with Washington and Lincoln. Vanderlip had asked for my autographed portrait. I had declined, because when you present a portrait you write, “To Comrade So-and-so,” and I could not write, “To Comrade Vanderlip.” Neither was it possible to write: “To the Vanderlip we are signing a concession with” because that concession agreement would be concluded by the Administration when it took office. I did not know what to write. It would have been illogical to give my photograph to an out-and-out imperialist. Yet these were the kind of telegrams that arrived; this affair has clearly played a certain part in imperialist politics. When the news of the Vanderlip concessions came out, Harding—the man who has been elected President, but who will take office only next March—issued an official denial, declaring that he knew nothing about it, had no dealings with the Bolsheviks, and had heard nothing about any concessions. That was during the elections, and, for all we know, to confess, during elections, that you have dealings with the Bolsheviks may cost you votes. That was why he issued an official denial. He had this report sent to all the newspapers that are hostile to the Bolsheviks and are on the pay roll of the imperialist parties . . .[30]

This mysterious Vanderlip was in fact Washington Vanderlip who had, according to Armand Hammer, come to Russia in 1919, although even Hammer does not seem to have known much of the matter.[31] Lenin’s rationalizations in trying to justify concessions to foreign capitalists to the “Moscow activists” in 1920 seem disingenuous and less than forthcoming. Washington Vanderlip was an engineer whose negotiations with Russia drew considerable attention in the USA. The New York Times wrote that Vanderlip, speaking from Russia, denied reports of Lenin’s speech to “Moscow activists” that the concessions would serve Bolshevik geopolitical interests, with Vanderlip declaring that he had established a common frontier between the USA and Russia and that trade relations must be immediately restored.[32] The New York Times reporting in 1922: “The exploration of Kamchatka for oil as soon as trade relations between this country and Russia are established was assured today when the Standard Oil Company of California purchased one-quarter of the stock in the Vanderlip syndicate.” This gave Standard Oil exclusive leases on any syndicate lands on which oil was found. The Vanderlip syndicate comprised sixty-four units. The Standard Oil Company has just purchased sixteen units. However, the Vanderlip concessions could not come into effect until Soviet Russia was recognized by the USA.[33]

The Vanderlip syndicate holds concessions for the exploitation of coal, oil, and timber lands, fisheries, etc., east of the 160th parallel in Kamchatka. The Russian Government granted the syndicate alternate sections of land there and will draw royalties amounting to approximately 5 percent on all products developed and marketed by the syndicate.[34]

It is little wonder then that US capitalists were eager to see the recognition of the Soviet regime.

Bolshevik Bankers

In 1922 Soviet Russia’s first international bank was created, Ruskombank, headed by Olof Aschberg of the Nye Banken, Stockholm, Sweden. The predominant capital represented in the bank was British. The foreign director of Ruskombank was Max May, vice president of the Guaranty Trust Company.[35] Similarly to “the Bolshevik of Wall Street,” William Boyce Thompson, Aschberg was known as the “Bolshevik banker” for his close involvement with banking interests that had channeled funds to the Bolsheviks.

Guaranty Trust Company became intimately involved with Soviet economic transactions. A Scotland Yard Intelligence Report stated as early as 1919 the connection between Guaranty Trust and Ludwig C. A. K. Martens, head of the Soviet Bureau in New York when the bureau was established that year.[36] When representatives of the Lusk Committee investigating Bolshevik activities in the USA raided the Soviet Bureau offices on May 7, 1919, files of communications with almost a thousand firms were found. Basil H. Thompson of Scotland Yard in a special report stated that despite denials, there was evidence in the seized files that the Soviet Bureau was being funded by Guaranty Trust Company.[37] The significance of the Guaranty Trust Company was that it was part of the J. P. Morgan economic empire, which Dr. Sutton shows in his study to have been a major player in economic relations with Soviet Russia from its early days. It was also J. P. Morgan interests that predominated in the formation of a consortium, the American International Corporation (AIC), which was another source eager to secure the recognition of the still embryonic Soviet state. Interests represented in the directorship of the American International Corporation (AIC) included: National City Bank; General Electric; Du Pont; Kuhn, Loeb and Co.; Rockefeller; Federal Reserve Bank of New York; Ingersoll-Rand; Hanover National Bank, etc.[38]

The AIC’s representative in Russia at the time of the revolutionary tumult was its executive secretary William Franklin Sands, who was asked by US Secretary of State Robert Lansing for a report on the situation and what the US response should be. Sands’ attitude toward the Bolsheviks was, like that of Thompson, enthusiastic. Sands wrote a memorandum to Lansing in January 1918, at a time when the Bolshevik hold was still far from sure, that there had already been too much of a delay by the USA in recognizing the Bolshevik regime such as it existed. The USA had to make up for “lost time,” and like Thompson, Sands considered the Bolshevik Revolution to be analogous to the American Revolution.[39] In July 1918 Sands wrote to US Treasury Secretary McAdoo that a commission should be established by private interests with government backing, to provide “economic assistance to Russia.”[40]

Armand Hammer

One of those closely associated with Ludwig Martens and the Soviet Bureau was Dr. Julius Hammer, an emigrant from Russia who was a founder of the Communist Party USA. There is evidence that Julius Hammer was the host to Leon Trotsky when the latter with his family arrived in New York in 1917, and that it was Dr. Hammer’s chauffeured car that provided transport to Natalia and the Trotsky children. The Trotskys were met on disembarkation at the New York dock by Arthur Concors, a director of the Hebrew Sheltering and Immigrant Aid Society, whose advisory board included Jacob Schiff of Kuhn, Loeb and Co.[41] Dr. Hammer was the “primary owner of Allied Drug and Chemical Co.,” and “one of those not so rare creatures, a radical Marxist turned wealthy entrepreneur,” who lived an opulent lifestyle, according to Professor Spence.[42] Another financier linked to Trotsky was his own uncle, banker Abram Zhivotovskii, who was associated with numerous financial interests including those of Olof Aschberg.[43]

The intimate association of the Hammer family with Soviet Russia was to be maintained from start to finish, with an interlude of withdrawal during the Stalinist period. Julius’ son Armand, chairman of Occidental Petroleum Corporation, was the first foreigner to obtain commercial concessions from the Soviet Government. Armand was in Russia in 1921 to arrange for the reintroduction of capitalism according to the new economic course set by Lenin, the New Economic Policy. Lenin stated to Hammer that the economies of Russia and the USA were complementary, and in exchange for the exploitation of Russia’s raw materials he hoped for America’s technology.[44] This was precisely the attitude of significant business interests in the West. Lenin stated to Hammer that it was hoped the New Economic Policy would accelerate the economic process “by a system of industrial and commercial concessions to foreigners. It will give great opportunities to the United States.”[45]

Hammer met Trotsky, who asked him whether “financial circles” in the USA regard Russia as a desirable field of investment? Trotsky continued:

Inasmuch as Russia had its Revolution, capital was really safer there than anywhere else because, “whatever should happen abroad, the Soviet would adhere to any agreements it might make. Suppose one of your Americans invest money in Russia. When the Revolution comes to America, his property will of course be nationalized, but his agreement with us will hold good and he will thus be in a much more favorable position than the rest of his fellow capitalists.[46]

The manner by which Russia fundamentally changed direction, resulting eventually in the Cold War when Stalin refused to continue the wartime alliance for the purposes of establishing a World State via the United Nations Organization, traces its origins back to the divergence of opinion, among many other issues, between Trotsky and Stalin in regard to the role of foreign investment in the Soviet Union.[47] The CFR report had been prescient in warning big business to get into Russia immediately lest the situation changed radically.

Regimented Labor

But for the moment, with Trotsky entrenched as the warlord of Bolshevism, and Lenin favorable towards international capital investment, events in Russia seemed to be promising. A further major factor in the enthusiasm certain capitalist interests had for the Bolsheviks was the regimentation of labor under the so-called “dictatorship of the proletariat.” The workers’ state provided foreign capitalists with a controlled workforce. Trotsky had stated:

The militarization of labor is the indispensable basic method for the organization of our labor forces. . . . Is it true that compulsory labor is always unproductive? . . . This is the most wretched and miserable liberal prejudice: chattel slavery too was productive. . . . Compulsory slave labor was in its time a progressive phenomenon. Labor obligatory for the whole country, compulsory for every worker, is the basis of socialism. . . . Wages must not be viewed from the angle of securing the personal existence of the individual worker [but should] measure the conscientiousness, and efficiency of the work of every laborer.[48]

Hammer related of his experiences in the young Soviet state that although lengthy negotiations had to be undertaken with each of the trades unions involved in an enterprise, “the great power and influence of the trade unions was not without its advantages to the employer of labor in Russia. Once the employer had signed a collective agreement with the union branch there was little risk of strikes or similar trouble.”

Breaches of the codes as negotiated could result in dismissal, with recourse by the sacked worker to a labor court which, in Hammer’s experience, did not generally find in the worker’s favor, which would mean that there would be little chance of the sacked worker getting another job.[49]

However, Trotsky’s insane run in the Soviet Union was short-lived. As for Hammer, despite his greatly expanding and diverse businesses in the Soviet Union, after Stalin assumed power Hammer packed up and left, not returning until Stalin’s demise. Hammer opined decades later:

I never met Stalin—I never had any desire to do so—and I never had any dealings with him. However it was perfectly clear to me in 1930 that Stalin was not a man with whom you could do business. Stalin believed that the state was capable of running everything without the support of foreign concessionaires and private enterprise. That is the main reason I left Moscow. I could see that I would soon be unable to do business there and, since business was my sole reason to be there, my time was up.[50]

Foreign capital did nonetheless continue to do business with the USSR[51] as best as it was able, but the promising start that capitalists saw in the March and November revolutions for a new Russia that would replace the antiquated Czarist system with a modern economy from which they could reap the rewards was, as the 1923 CFR report warned, short-lived. Gorbachev and Yeltsin provided a brief interregnum of hope for foreign capital, to be disappointed again with the rise of Putin and a revival of nationalism and opposition to the oligarchs. The policy of continuing economic relations with the USSR even during the era of the Cold War was promoted as a strategy in the immediate aftermath of World War II when a CFR report by George S Franklin recommended attempting to work with the USSR as much as possible, “unless and until it becomes entirely evident that the U.S.S.R. is not interested in achieving cooperation . . .”

The United States must be powerful not only politically and economically, but also militarily. We cannot afford to dissipate our military strength unless Russia is willing concurrently to decrease hers. On this we lay great emphasis.

We must take every opportunity to work with the Soviets now, when their power is still far inferior to ours, and hope that we can establish our cooperation on a firmer basis for the not so distant future when they will have completed their reconstruction and greatly increased their strength. . . . The policy we advocate is one of firmness coupled with moderation and patience.[52]

Since Putin, the CFR again sees Russia as having taken a “wrong direction.” The current recommendation is for “selective cooperation” rather than “partnership, which is not now feasible.”[53]

The Revolutionary Nature of Capital

Should the fact that international capital viewed the March and even the November Revolutions with optimism be seen as an anomaly of history? Oswald Spengler was one of the first historians to expose the connections between capital and revolution. In The Decline of the West he called socialism “capitalistic” because it does not aim to replace money-based values, “but to possess them.” H. G. Wells, it will be recalled, said something similar. Spengler stated of socialism that it is “nothing but a trusty henchman of Big Capital, which knows perfectly well how to make use of it.” He elaborated in a footnote, seeing the connections going back to antiquity:

Herein lies the secret of why all radical (i.e. poor) parties necessarily become the tools of the money-powers, the Equites, the Bourse. Theoretically their enemy is capital, but practically they attack, not the Bourse, but Tradition on behalf of the Bourse. This is as true today as it was for the Gracchuan age, and in all countries . . .[54]

It was the Equites, the big-money party, which made Tiberius Gracchu’s popular movement possible at all; and as soon as that part of the reforms that was advantageous to themselves had been successfully legalized, they withdrew and the movement collapsed.[55]

From the Gracchuan Age to the Cromwellian and the French Revolutions, to Soros’ “color revolutions” of today, the Russian Revolutions were neither the first nor the last of political upheavals to serve the interests of Money Power in the name of “the people.”

 Notes

[1] K. R. Bolton, “March 1917: Wall Street & the March 1917 Russian Revolution,” Ab Aeterno, No. 2 (March 2010).

[2] Michael Pearson, The Sealed Train: Journey to Revolution: Lenin–1917 (London: Macmillan, 1975).

[3] Paul Warburg, prior to immigrating to the USA, had been decorated by the Kaiser in 1912.

[4] Col. William Wiseman, head of the British Secret Service, was the British equivalent to America’s key presidential adviser, Edward House, with whom he was in constant communication. Wiseman became a partner in Kuhn, Loeb & Co. From London on May 1, 1918 Wiseman cabled House that the Allies should intervene at the invitation of the Bolsheviks and help organize the Bolshevik army then fighting the White Armies in a bloody Civil War at a time when the Bolshevik hold on Russia was doubtful (Edward M. House, ed. Charles Seymour, The Intimate Papers of Col. House [New York: Houghton, Mifflin Co., 1926], Vol. III, p. 421).

[5] Olof Aschberg of the Nye Banken, Stockholm, the so-called “Bolshevik banker” who became head of the first Soviet international bank, Ruskombank, channeled funds to the Bolsheviks. On September 6, 1948 The London Evening Star commented on Aschberg’s visit to Swiss bankers that he had “advanced large sums to Lenin and Trotsky in 1917. At the time of the revolution Mr. Aschberg gave Trotsky money to form and equip the first unit of the Red Army.”

[6] Samuel Gompers, “Soviet Bribe fund Here Says Gompers, Has Proof That Offers Have Been Made, He Declares, Opposing Recognition. Propaganda Drive. Charges Strong Group of Bankers With Readiness to Accept Lenin’s Betrayal of Russia,” The New York Times, May 1, 1922. Online at Times’ archives: http://query.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?res=9E00E3D81739EF3ABC4953DFB3668389639EDE [3]

[7] Henry Wickham Steed, “Through Thirty Years 1892–1922 A personal narrative,” The Peace Conference, The Bullitt Mission, Vol. II.  (New York: Doubleday Page and Co., 1924), p. 301.

[8] Ibid.

[9] Ibid.

[10] Ibid.

[11] Charles Seymour, 165–66. House was assigned by Wilson to draw up the constitution for the League of Nations, and in 1918 formed a think tank at Wilson’s request, called The Inquiry, to advise on post-war policy, which became the Council on Foreign Relations. House was the US chief negotiator at the Peace Conference in Paris, 1919–1920.

[12] Henry Wickham Steed, “Peace with Honor,” Paris Daily Mail, 28 March 1922; quoted in Steed (1924).

[13] Crane was a member of a 1917 Special Diplomatic Mission to Russia, and a member of the American Section of the Paris Peace Conference in 1919.

[14] H. W. Steed, 1924, op. cit.

[15] Antony Sutton, Wall Street and the Bolshevik Revolution (New York: Arlington House Publishers, 1974), p. 71.

[16] Ibid., p. 75.

[17] Ibid., p. 73.

[18] William Harlan Hale, “When the Red Storm Broke,” America and Russia: A Century and a Half of Dramatic Encounters, ed. Oliver Jensen (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1962), p. 150.

[19] Ibid., p.151.

[20] “Gives Bolsheviki a Million,” Washington Post, 2 February 1918, cited by Sutton, ibid., pp. 82–83.

[21] A. Sutton, op.cit., p. 8.

[22] W. Harlan Hale, op.cit., p. 151.

[23] Trotsky while still in the USA had made similar claims. “People War Weary. But Leo Trotsky Says They Do Not Want Separate Peace,” New York Times, March 16, 1917. This was why he became the focus of British intelligence efforts via R. H. Bruce Lockhart, special agent to the British War Cabinet in Russia.

[24] “Bolsheviki Will Not Make Separate Peace: Only Those Who Made Up Privileged Classes Under Czar Would Do So, Says Col. W. B. Thompson, Just Back From Red Cross Mission,” New York Times, January 27, 1918.

[25] Robert S. Rifkind, ‘”The Wasted Mission,” America and Russia, op. cit., p. 180.

[26] Peter Grose, Continuing The Inquiry: The Council on Foreign Relations from 1921 to 1996 (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 2006). The entire book can be read online at: Council on Foreign Relations: http://www.cfr.org/about/history/cfr/index.html [4] (Accessed on February 27, 2010).

[27] Ibid. Chapter: “Basic Assumptions.”

[28] H. G. Wells, Russia in the Shadows, Chapter VII, “The Envoy.” Wells went to Russia in September 1920 at the invitation of Kamenev, of the Russian Trade Delegation in London, one of the leaders of the Bolshevik regime. Russia in the Shadows appeared as a series of articles in The Sunday Express. The whole book can be read online at: gutenberg.net.au/ebooks06/0602371h.html [5]

[29] V. I. Lenin, December 6, 1920, Collected Works, 4th English Edition (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1965), Volume 31, 438–59 http://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1920/dec/06.htm [6] (Accessed on August 4, 2010).

[30] Ibid.

[31] A. Hammer, Witness to History (Reading, England: Hodder and Stoughton, 1988), pp.151-152.

[32] “Vanderlip’s Empire,” The New York Times, December 1, 1920, 14.

[33] “Standard Oil Joins Vanderlip Project,” The New York Times, January 11, 1922, p. 1.

[34] Ibid.

[35] Antony Sutton, Wall Street and the Bolshevik Revolution (New York: Arlington House Publishers, 1974), pp. 62–63.

[36] “Scotland Yard Intelligence Report,” London 1919, US State Dept. Decimal File, 316-22-656, cited by A. Sutton, ibid., p. 113.

[37] Basil H. Thompson, British Home Office Directorate of Intelligence, “Special Report No. 5 (Secret),” Scotland Yard, London, July 14, 1919; cited by Sutton, ibid., p. 115.

[38] A Sutton, op.cit., pp. 130–31.

[39] Sands’ memorandum to Lansing, p. 9; cited by Sutton, ibid., pp. 132, 134.

[40] A. Sutton, ibid., p. 135.

[41] Richard B Spence, “Hidden Agendas: Spies, Lies and Intrigue Surrounding Trotsky’s American Visit, January-April 1917,” Revolutionary Russia, Vol. 21, #1 (2008).

[42] Ibid.

[43] Ibid.

[44]  A. Hammer, Witness to History, op. cit., p. 143.

[45] Ibid.

[46] Ibid., p. 160.

[47] K. R. Bolton, “Origins of the Cold War: How Stalin Foiled a New World Order,” Foreign Policy Journal, May 31, 2010, http://www.foreignpolicyjournal.com/2010/05/31/origins-of-the-cold-war-how-stalin-foild-a-new-world-order/all/1 [7]

[48] Leon Trotsky, Third All-Russian Congress of Trade Unions, April 6th, 1920. http://www.marxists.org/archive/brinton/1970/workers-control/05.htm [8] (Accessed on August 4, 2010).

[49] A. Hammer, op. cit., p. 217.

[50] Ibid., p. 221.

[51] Charles Levinson, Vodka-Cola (West Sussex: Biblias, 1980). Antony Sutton, National Suicide: Military Aid to the Soviet Union (New York: Arlington House, 1973).

[52] Peter Grose, op. it., “The First Transformation,” http://www.cfr.org/about/history/cfr/first_transformation.html [9]

[53] Jack Kemp, et al., Russia’s Wrong Direction: What the United States Can and Should do, Independent Task Force Report, no. 57 (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 2006) xi. The entire publication can be downloaded at: http://www.cfr.org/publication/9997/ [10]

[54] Oswald Spengler, The Decline of The West (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1971), Vol. 2,  p. 464.

[55] Ibid., p. 402.

Source: Ab Aeterno, no. 5, Fall 2010

 


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[1] Image: http://www.counter-currents.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/Lenin-Hammer.jpg

[2] last article: http://www.counter-currents.com/2013/10/wall-street-and-the-march-1917-russian-revolution/

[3] http://query.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?res=9E00E3D81739EF3ABC4953DFB3668389639EDE: http://query.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?res=9E00E3D81739EF3ABC4953DFB3668389639EDE

[4] http://www.cfr.org/about/history/cfr/index.html: http://www.cfr.org/about/history/cfr/index.html

[5] gutenberg.net.au/ebooks06/0602371h.html: http://www.counter-currents.comgutenberg.net.au/ebooks06/0602371h.html

[6] http://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1920/dec/06.htm: http://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1920/dec/06.htm

[7] http://www.foreignpolicyjournal.com/2010/05/31/origins-of-the-cold-war-how-stalin-foild-a-new-world-order/all/1: http://www.foreignpolicyjournal.com/2010/05/31/origins-of-the-cold-war-how-stalin-foild-a-new-world-order/all/1

[8] http://www.marxists.org/archive/brinton/1970/workers-control/05.htm: http://www.marxists.org/archive/brinton/1970/workers-control/05.htm

[9] http://www.cfr.org/about/history/cfr/first_transformation.html: http://www.cfr.org/about/history/cfr/first_transformation.html

[10] http://www.cfr.org/publication/9997/: http://www.cfr.org/publication/9997/

jeudi, 29 août 2013

GERMANIA E RUSSIA NELLA GUERRA FREDDA

ostpol2.jpg

GERMANIA E RUSSIA NELLA GUERRA FREDDA

Marco ZENONI

Ex: http://www.eurasia-rivista.org

L’anteguerra

A riavvicinare Germania e Unione Sovietica, dopo l’allontanamento successivo all’ingresso della Germania nella Società delle Nazioni (SdN), fu soprattutto la questione polacca. Polonia e Germania, quest’ultima mai accontentatasi del riposizionamento geografico voluto a Versailles e – in particolare – della creazione ex tunc della città libera di Danzica, firmarono un patto di non aggressione nel 1934, garantendosi la reciproca neutralità nei 10 anni a venire. La Polonia, naturalmente, era conscia delle mire del terzo Reich e per questo tentò sempre l’avvicinamento a Francia e Inghilterra, in cerca di una strozzatura geopolitica nei confronti dei tedeschi. Peraltro, l’ostilità dei polacchi nei confronti del vicino sovietico, fece sì che nessun accordo militare venisse stretto con i sovietici e che, anzi, la Polonia si allontanasse allo stesso modo sia dal vicino orientale che da quello occidentale, rifiutando una modifica allo status quo e dunque ponendo le basi per l’imminente guerra, che poi diverrà mondiale. Tale posizione, dovuta sì ad alcune particolarità storiche e culturali ma, soprattutto, dall’influenza degli alleati anglosassoni e, in particolare, quella statunitense. Le potenze talassocratiche, infatti, non avevano che da trarre vantaggio da un’eventuale guerra che, chiaramente, non fosse mondiale nelle intenzioni iniziali, ma spingesse le frizioni fino ad uno scontro tra Germania e Unione Sovietica. L’intento primario era infatti quello di spingere le due potenze continentali ad affrontarsi. Per Stalin, tuttavia, questa rimaneva un’ipotesi da scacciare, o quanto meno ritardare il più possibile[1]. Furono queste le condizioni geopolitiche che portarono al patto Molotov-Ribbentrop. Una mutua assicurazione dunque, utile a Stalin per prendere tempo e alla Germania per assicurarsi da eventuali colpi di mano. Tale patto, seppur evidentemente siglato solo in funzione tattica, mise in allarme l’Inghilterra, la quale intervenne, interferendo in entrambi i trattati (polacco-tedesco e tedesco-sovietico), attraverso l’Accordo di reciproco aiuto, siglato con la Polonia – in palese infrazione di quello siglato fra Polonia e Germania, ma anche del Patto Molotov-Ribbentrop. L’intento dell’Inghilterra era quella di costruire una frattura geografica fra le due potenze eurasiatiche, in modo da impedirne l’avvicinamento e in particolar modo di impedire eventuali intese fra i polacchi e il terzo reich. Lo stesso Stalin, difatti, almeno inizialmente, attribuì le colpe della guerra completamente ad Inghilterra e Francia, e non alla Germania[2].


Oltre al noto patto, tuttavia, Germania e Unione Sovietica si legarono anche dal punto di vista commerciale, attraverso un accordo firmato l’11 febbraio 1940. Si arrivò tuttavia alla guerra, una guerra fratricida sulle terre eurasiatiche, che contrappose frontalmente le due potenze continentali. A seguito della guerra, che costò ai sovietici oltre 22 milioni di morti, la frattura fra i due paesi pareva insanabile. L’Armata Rossa marciò fino a Berlino, con spirito vendicativo. I tedeschi venivano visti come un invasore, da schiacciare senza pietà.

Il Dopoguerra

 

ostpolitik.jpgGli animi si placarono,  lasciando spazio al pragmatismo e al calcolo geopolitico. Nel 1945, a Jalta, avvenne la definitiva spartizione della Germania, contrapponendo di fatto da una parte gli alleati (Stati Uniti, Francia e Inghilterra) e dall’altra i sovietici. Il 1948 fu l’anno del piano Marshall, un piano economico presentato come l’inevitabile aiuto dall’oltreoceano per il risanamento delle economie europee, in realtà un mezzo economico indispensabile per il rafforzamento dell’economia statunitense ma, soprattutto, un importante collante per la formazione dell’alleanza occidentale, legata prima economicamente e poi militarmente (e politicamente) attraverso la struttura della NATO.


La divisione della Germania fu ultimata nel 1952, quando la frontiera fu definitivamente chiusa. Da quel momento l’avvicinamento della Germania dell’Ovest al sistema d’alleanze occidentale proseguì spedita. Eppure dei tentativi in funzione di una Germania unita furono mossi. Nel 1952 fu infatti Stalin stesso a proporre l’idea di una Germania unificata, a prezzo però di una sovranità limitata in politica estera: una neutralità imposta e irreversibile. Nei piani di Stalin questo avrebbe permesso la formazione di un cuscino neutrale nel cuore dell’Europa, il che avrebbe per altro sottratto la Germania dalle maglie dell’alleanza atlantica, che ne avrebbe fatto un bastione antisovietico nel cuore dell’Europa, a ridosso dell’oriente, cosa che infatti puntualmente si verificò. Il piano di Stalin fu rigettato, gli alleati occidentali dimostrarono ben presto di avere scarso interesse per una Germania unificata, non al prezzo di una neutralità che avrebbe sottratto un’importante pedina, difensiva, ma all’occorrenza anche offensiva, direttamente puntata ad Oriente, e situata nel cuore dell’Europa continentale. Per la Germania, vittima della frattura insanabile fra Est e Ovest, non poté che profilarsi la sola soluzione della divisione politica e geografica. Due Stati, dunque, per un’unica nazione. Nel 1961 tale divisione fu rimarcata attraverso la costruzione del muro, simbolo della contrapposizione frontale fra i due schieramenti.


Il primo cancelliere della Repubblica Federale Tedesca fu Konrad Adenauer, un fervente anticomunista, che tuttavia fu invitato già nel 1955 a Mosca, a seguito degli accordi di Parigi, che riconoscevano la sovranità della RFT e ufficializzavano il riconoscimento da parte Sovietica della Repubblica Federale. Adenauer fu un grande sostenitore dell’alleanza atlantica e tra gli animatori più vivaci (assieme all’omologo italiano, Alcide de Gasperi) della costituzione della Comunità Europea, tale di nome, ma meramente occidentale di fatto. Nel 1950 era infatti già stata pronunciata la cosiddetta “dichiarazione Schuman”, che prese nome dall’allora ministro degli esteri francese, Robert Schuman, e che proponeva di mettere da parte l’astio che correva fra i due vicini, ponendo le basi per una collaborazione che fosse prima economica, tramite la comune gestione delle risorse del carbone e dell’acciaio, e successivamente anche politica. Furono questi i primi passi che condussero la Germania nell’alleanza occidentale, senza alcun tipo di ripensamenti. Allo stesso Adenauer risale oltretutto la teoria dell’ “Alleinvertretungsanspruch” ovvero al diritto esclusivo della Repubblica Federale Tedesca di parlare a nome dei tedeschi. Per il cancelliere, infatti, la Germania Est altro non era che una zona d’occupazione sovietica e, in quanto tale, non meritava né il riconoscimento, né tanto meno di parlare a nome dei tedeschi. A tale posizione si aggiunse per altro la “dottrina Hallstein”, fatta propria dal cancelliere, la quale prevedeva che ogni apertura di paesi terzi alla Repubblica Democratica Tedesca, il che ne implicava il riconoscimento, era un torto alla Repubblica Federale e come tale non sarebbe stato tollerato. La parola fu mantenuta, tanto che ben presto furono tagliati i rapporti con la Jugoslavia e con Cuba.


L’aggressività occidentale, che non portò alcun risultato né al fine di attenuare gli animi, né a quello dell’unificazione tedesca, maturò in Willy Brandt, il lungimirante cancelliere che succedette ad Adenauer, la convinzione che il muro (metaforico, ma anche fisico) opposto dall’oriente fosse una reazione all’eccessiva aggressività occidentale. Con l’ascesa al cancellierato di Brandt i rapporti tra la Germania Federale e l’Unione Sovietica presero finalmente un’altra piega, giungendo ad una distensione che (escludendo naturalmente la DDR), non si aveva dall’anteguerra. “Il nostro interesse nazionale non ci consente di stare in mezzo fra est e ovest. Il nostro paese ha bisogno della collaborazione con l’occidente e dell’intesa con l’oriente”[3], da queste poche parole, pronunciate da Brandt stesso, si deducono quelli che poi furono i punti cardine dell’Ostpolitik. Non una vera e propria apertura verso l’oriente, ma una distensione, un’intesa al fine di raggiungere, per tappe, alcuni obbiettivi programmatici. Una politica sovranista che potrebbe in qualche modo essere paragonata (e forse ne fu influenzata) a quella gollista. La politica di apertura verso l’oriente, tuttavia, procedette solo dopo aver ribadito il pieno inserimento della repubblica federale all’interno del sistema occidentale, della NATO e della piena amicizia e intesa con la Francia, già consolidata da anni dalla struttura della CECA e, dopo gli accordi di Roma del ’57, dalla Comunità Economica Europea. Per quanto riguarda l’oriente, di fatto, quella che si avanzava era una proposta di dialogo: si chiese all’Unione Sovietica di rinunciare al diritto dell’intervento, in precedenza ribadito dai sovietici, e in cambio si riconosceva lo status quo venutosi a formare dopo la guerra oltre il muro. In particolare il riferimento era alla Polonia, con cui in quegli anni, sempre in linea con la ostpolitik, fu concordato un trattato bilaterale che assicurò l’accettazione da parte tedesca dei confini occidentali della Polonia. Vi fu inoltre, per la prima volta, il riconoscimento dell’esistenza di due Germanie. Il tutto venne siglato con l’accordo germano-sovietico del 1970, firmato a Mosca da Brandt e Kossyghin, indispettendo inevitabilmente gli Stati Uniti, nonostante le rassicurazioni più volte ribadite e dimostrate. Con l’intento della distensione, al fine di costituire un ordine pacifico europeo, si arrivò dunque al congresso di Helsinki (1973-75), un processo diplomatico multilaterale, che portò ad un notevole avvicinamento, al prezzo di alcune pragmatiche rinunce da una parte e dall’altra. Priorità dell’Unione Sovietica era il riconoscimento delle frontiere post-1945, intento degli alleati occidentali era invece indebolire il patto di Varsavia attraverso lo strumento della causa dei “diritti umani”, un punto che la coalizione sovietica aveva sino ad allora visto come un’intollerabile ingerenza[4]. E’ attraverso Mosca (1970) ed Helsinki (1975) che, infine, la repubblica federale tedesca riconobbe la frontiera dell’Oder-Neisse. La RFT per altro rinunciò alla “Alleinvertretung” e, di conseguenza, all’intento politico dell’unione tedesca. Pur rinunciando, almeno nel breve termine, alla riunificazione dello Stato tedesco, Brandt non volle rinunciare all’unificazione della nazione. Per far ciò necessitava del consenso e della collaborazione della repubblica democratica e, dunque, dell’Unione Sovietica. Per questo motivo si potrebbe dire che la ostpolitik fu de facto ed inevitabilmente una “Russlandpolitik”[5]. Condizione posta dall’Unione Sovietica per la collaborazione, e la distensione, fu l’adesione della Germania al trattato di non proliferazione nucleare. Successivamente, la dirigenza sovietica dichiarò, tramite Leonid Brezhnev, la propria approvazione per la nuova politica estera condotta dalla RFT, questo nonostante effettivamente la DDR non venisse riconosciuta (nel 1970 erano 26 gli Stati che la riconoscevano), il che provocò qualche malumore a Berlino Est.


Fino a quel momento la dirigenza sovietica aveva preferito l’immobilismo nei confronti della Germania dell’Ovest, questo permetteva di tenere la Repubblica Federale Tedesca in uno stato di soggezione e d’inferiorità, attraverso una propaganda costante oltrecortina[6], distogliendo anche le attenzioni dai problemi e dalle contraddizioni interne. Tuttavia, alla Ostpolitik tedesca i sovietici fecero allora corrispondere una “Westpolitik”. Il cambiamento di rotta fu spinto dalla necessità che i paesi occidentali riconoscessero lo Status Quo ad oriente, in particolare il riconoscimento della nuova Polonia uscita dalla seconda guerra mondiale e modificata nei suoi confini occidentali. Essendo questi gli anni in cui la Cina andava rompendo con l’URSS, dopo aver elaborato la strumentale categoria di “socialimperialismo”, per avvicinarsi agli Stati Uniti, il riconoscimento delle frontiere occidentali era una pedina fondamentale per placare gli animi su tale fronte, potendosi concentrare con maggior equilibrio nelle questioni orientali. Moralmente inoltre il riconoscimento poteva essere sventolato come una vittoria, essendo state così imposte le conseguenze della guerra allo Stato che si era frontalmente contrapposto a quello sovietico.


Pur essendo il fine dell’Ostpolitik, da parte dei tedesco-occidentali, quello di distendere i due fronti, in modo da riequilibrare anche la situazione tedesca, e quello dei sovietici di indebolire geopoliticamente l’asse antisovietico, consci del peso politico ed economico della Germania (che nel frattempo andava crescendo in maniera sorprendente), Brandt mostrò un certo senso strategico nel suo riavvicinamento all’Unione Sovietica, come dimostrò parlando alla Radio, a Mosca, il 12 agosto del 1970: “La Russia è indissolubilmente legata alla storia europea, non solo come avversario o come pericolo, ma anche come partner, storicamente, politicamente, culturalmente ed economicamente”[7]. Si può dunque dire che dopo la dottrina Adenauer-Hallstein, venne a prevalere la “dottrina Brandt”: promuovere il cambiamento attraverso l’avvicinamento[8]. Bisogna tuttavia aggiungere che nella sua politica fu probabilmente anche condizionato da Günter Guillaume, quello che in breve divenne uno dei suoi uomini più fedeli, secondo alcuni il “braccio destro” , ma che presto si rivelò una spia della Stasi, inviato con non ben precisati compiti da Markus Johannes Wolf , il quale, tuttavia, dichiarò in un’intervista successiva che l’intento non era quello di gettare in disgrazia il cancelliere[9] (quest’ultimo dovette infatti dare le dimissioni, in seguito all’”affare Guillaume”. Una vicenda tutt’oggi poco chiara e su cui poca luce è stata fatta.

Conclusioni

L’ostpolitik fu una politica realista, fu un calcolo pragmatico che prese le mosse dall’accettazione dello status quo, condizione preliminare, conditio sine qua non per distendere i rapporti con l’Est. Questa politica guardava ai vertici, alle dirigenze, indipendentemente dalle possibilità sovversive di determinati movimenti filoccidentali. A testimoniarlo vi è il rifiuto della Repubblica Federale di aderire alle sanzioni mosse dagli Stati Uniti contro la Polonia, per la repressione dei movimenti “rivoluzionari”, i quali godevano in gran parte della simpatia e delle potenze occidentali. Tale fase politica inoltre, come ampiamente previsto dai suoi promotori, permise alla Germania di ritagliarsi un proprio spazio politico, restituendole il peso geopolitico ed economico adeguato, per la preoccupazione e il sospetto degli alleati occidentali.


A conti fatti, pur non ottenendo grandi cambiamenti in ambito geopolitico, l’ostpolitik fu il momento di massima distensione tra la Germania e l’Unione Sovietica, sin dalla rottura in seguito all’Operazione Barbarossa. Un avvicinamento che, seppur apparentemente sotto controllo, mise in allarme alcuni settori, in particolare delle due potenze talassocratiche. D’altronde queste interferirono nei rapporti tedesco-sovietici anche nel primo dopoguerra e nel 1939. A dimostrazione che un’alleanza fra le due potenze continentali, l’unione fra due forze economiche e politiche, non fu e tutt’ora non è ben vista dalle potenze egemoni.

Marco Zenoni è laureando in Relazioni Internazionali all’Università di Perugia


[1] http://www.eurasia-rivista.org/dietro-le-quinte-della-guerra-tra-la-germania-e-la-polonia/1015/ [1]
[2] http://www.eurasia-rivista.org/il-patto-di-non-aggressione-tedesco-sovietico/1645/ [2]
[3] cfr. “Affari esteri”, n. 5 – 1970. P. 130
[4] Cfr. Eurasia, n.2 – 2011
[5] Ibidem
[6] Ibidem.
[7] Cfr. “Affari esteri”, n.8 – 1970. P. 11
[8] Cfr. “Affari Esteri”, n.8 – 1970.
[9] http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/obituaries/1533707/Markus-Wolf.html [3]

samedi, 30 mars 2013

Stalin’s Fight Against International Communism

Stalin’s Fight Against International Communism

By Kerry Bolton stalin-the-enduring-legacy

Ex: http://www.counter-currents.com/

Editor’s Note:

This is the first chapter of Kerry Bolton’s new book Stalin: The Enduring Legacy [2] (London: Black House Publishing, 2012). The chapter is being reprinted as formatted in the book. Counter-Currents will also run a review of the book, which I highly recommend. 

The notion that Stalin ‘fought communism’ at a glance seems bizarre. However, the contention is neither unique nor new. Early last century the seminal German conservative philosopher-historian Oswald Spengler stated that Communism in Russia would metamorphose into something distinctly Russian which would be quite different from the alien Marxist dogma that had been imposed upon it from outside. Spengler saw Russia as both a danger to Western Civilisation as the leader of a ‘coloured world-revolution’, and conversely as a potential ally of a revived Germany against the plutocracies. Spengler stated of Russia’s potential rejection of Marxism as an alien imposition from the decaying West that,

Race, language, popular customs, religion, in their present form… all or any of them can and will be fundamentally transformed. What we see today then is simply the new kind of life which a vast land has conceived and will presently bring forth. It is not definable in words, nor is its bearer aware of it. Those who attempt to define, establish, lay down a program, are confusing life with a phrase, as does the ruling Bolshevism, which is not sufficiently conscious of its own West-European, Rationalistic and cosmopolitan origin.[1]

Even as he wrote, Bolshevism in the USSR was being fundamentally transformed in the ways Spengler foresaw. The ‘rationalistic’ and ‘cosmopolitan’ origins of Bolshevism were soon being openly repudiated, and a new course was defined by Zhdanov and other Soviet eminences.

Contemporary with Spengler in Weimer Germany, there arose among the ‘Right’ the ‘National Bolshevik’ faction one of whose primary demands was that Germany align with the Soviet Union against the Western plutocracies. From the Soviet side, possibilities of an alliance with the ‘Right’ were far from discounted and high level Soviet sources cultivated contacts with the pro-Russian factions of the German Right including the National Bolsheviks.[2]

German-Soviet friendship societies included many conservatives. In Arbeitsgemeinschaft zum Studium der Sowjetrussichen Planwirtschaft (Arplan)[3] Conservative-Revolutionaries and National Bolsheviks comprised a third of the membership. Bund Geistige Berufe (BGB)[4] was founded in 1931 and was of particular interest to Soviet Russia, according to Soviet documents, which aimed ‘to attract into the orbit of our influence a range of highly placed intellectuals of rightist orientation’.[5]

The profound changes caused Konstantin Rodzaevsky, leader of the Russian Fascist Union among the White Russian émigrés at Harbin, to soberly reassess the USSR and in 1945 he wrote to Stalin:

Not all at once, but step by step we came to this conclusion. We decided that: Stalinism is exactly what we mistakenly called ‘Russian Fascism’. It is our Russian Fascism cleansed of extremes, illusions, and errors.[6]

In the aftermath of World War II many German war veterans, despite the devastating conflagration between Germany and the USSR, and the rampage of the Red Army across Germany with Allied contrivance, were vociferous opponents of any German alliance with the USA against the USSR. Major General Otto E Remer and the Socialist Reich Party were in the forefront of advocating a ‘neutralist’ line for Germany during the ‘Cold War’, while one of their political advisers, the American Spenglerian philosopher Francis Parker Yockey, saw Russian occupation as less culturally debilitating than the ‘spiritual syphilis’ of Hollywood and New York, and recommended the collaboration of European rightists and neo-Fascists with the USSR against the USA.[7] Others of the American Right, such as the Yockeyan and Spenglerian influenced newspaper Common Sense, saw the USSR from the time of Stalin as the primary power in confronting Marxism, and they regarded New York as the real ‘capitol’ of Marxism.[8]

What might be regarded by many as an ‘eccentric’ element from the Right were not alone in seeing that the USSR had undergone a revolutionary transformation. Many of the Left regarded Stalin’s Russia as a travesty of Marxism. The most well-known and vehement was of course Leon Trotsky who condemned Stalin for having ‘betrayed the revolution’ and for reversing doctrinaire Marxism. On the other hand, the USA for decades supported Marxists, and especially Trotskyites, in trying to subvert the USSR during the Cold War. The USA, as the columnists at Common Sense continually insisted, was promoting Marxism, while Stalin was fighting it. This dichotomy between Russian National Bolshevism and US sponsored international Marxism was to having lasting consequences for the post-war world up to the present.

Stalin Purges Marxism

The Moscow Trials purging Trotskyites and other veteran Bolsheviks were merely the most obvious manifestations of Stalin’s struggle against alien Marxism. While much has been written condemning the trials as a modern day version of the Salem witch trials, and while the Soviet methods were often less than judicious the basic allegations against the Trotskyites et al were justified. The trials moreover, were open to the public, including western press, diplomats and jurists. There can be no serious doubt that Trotskyites in alliance with other old Bolsheviks such as Zinoviev and Kameneff were complicit in attempting to overthrow the Soviet state under Stalin. That was after all, the raison d’etre of Trotsky et al, and Trotsky’s hubris could not conceal his aims.[9]

The purging of these anti-Stalinist co-conspirators was only a part of the Stalinist fight against the Old Bolsheviks. Stalin’s relations with Lenin had not been cordial, Lenin accusing him of acting like a ‘Great Russian chauvinist’.[10] Indeed, the ‘Great Russians’ were heralded as the well-spring of Stalin’s Russia, and were elevated to master-race like status during and after the ‘Great Patriotic War’ against Germany. Lenin, near death, regarded Stalin’s demeanour as ‘offensive’, and as not showing automatic obedience. Lenin wished for Stalin to be removed as Bolshevik Party General Secretary.[11]

Dissolving the Comintern

The most symbolic acts of Stalin against International Communism were the elimination of the Association of Old Bolsheviks, and the destruction of the Communist International (Comintern). The Comintern, or Third International, was to be the basis of the world revolution, having been founded in 1919 in Moscow with 52 delegates from 25 countries.[12] Zinoviev headed the Comintern’s Executive Committee.[13] He was replaced by Bukharin in 1926.[14] Both Zinonviev and Bukharin were among the many ‘Old Bolsheviks’ eliminated by Stalin.

Stalin regarded the Comintern with animosity. It seemed to function more as an enemy agency than as a tool of Stalin, or at least that is how Stalin perceived the organisation. Robert Service states that Dimitrov, the head of the Comintern at the time of its dissolution, was accustomed to Stalin’s accusations against it. In 1937 Stalin had barked at him that ‘all of you in Comintern are hand in glove with the enemy’.[15] Dimitrov must have wondered how long he had to live.[16]

Instead of the Communist parties serving as agents of the world revolution, in typically Marxist manner, and the purpose for founding the Comintern, the Communist parties outside Russia were expected to be nationally oriented. In 1941 Stalin stated of this:

The International was created in Marx’s time in the expectation of an approaching international revolution. Comintern was created in Lenin’s time at an analogous moment. Today, national tasks emerge for each country as a supreme priority. Do not hold on tight to what was yesterday.[17]

This was a flagrant repudiation of Marxist orthodoxy, and places Stalinism within the context of National Bolshevism.

The German offensive postponed Stalin’s plans for the elimination of the Comintern, and those operatives who had survived the ‘Great Purge’ were ordered to Ufa, South of the Urals. Dimitrov was sent to Kuibyshev on the Volga. After the Battle of Stalingrad, Stalin returned to the issue of the Comintern, and told Dimitrov on 8 May 1943 to wind up the organisation. Dimitrov was transferred to the International Department of the Bolshevik Party Central Committee.[18] Robert Service suggests that this could have allayed fears among the Allies that Stalin would pursue world revolution in the post-war world. However, Stalin’s suspicion of the Comintern and the liquidation of many of its important operatives indicate fundamental belligerence between the two. In place of proletarian international solidarity, Stalin established an All-Slavic Committee[19] to promote Slavic folkish solidarity, although the inclusion of the Magyars[20] was problematic.

Stalin throughout his reign undertook a vigorous elimination of World Communist leaders. Stalin decimated communist refugees from fascism living in the USSR. While only 5 members of the Politburo of the German Communist Party had been killed under Hitler, in the USSR 7 were liquidated, and 41 out of 68 party leaders. The entire Central Committee of the Polish Communist Party in exile were liquidated, and an estimated 5000 party members were killed. The Polish Communist Party was formally dissolved in 1938. 700 Comintern headquarters staff were purged.[21]

Among the foreign Communist luminaries who were liquidated was Bela Kun, whose psychotic Communist regime in Hungary in 1919 lasted 133 days. Kun fled to the Soviet Union where he oversaw the killing of 50,000 soldiers and civilians attached to the White Army under Wrangle, who had surrendered after being promised amnesty. Kun was a member of the Executive Committee of the Comintern. A favourite of Lenin’s, this bloody lunatic served as a Comintern agent in Germany, Austria and Czechoslovakia during the 1920s. In 1938 he was brought before a tribunal and after a brief trial was executed the same day.[22]

Another action of great symbolism was Stalin’s moves against the ‘Old Bolsheviks’, the veterans of the 1917 Revolution. Leon Sedov, Leon Trotsky’s son, in his pamphlet on the Great Purge of the late 1930s, waxed indignant that Stalin ‘coldly orders the shooting of Bolsheviks, former leaders of the Party and the Comintern, and heroes of the Civil War’.[23] ‘The Association of Old Bolsheviks and that of the former political prisoners has been dissolved. They were too strong a reminder of the “cursed” revolutionary past’.[24]

In place of the Comintern the Cominform was established in 1947, for the purpose of instructing Communist parties to campaign against the Marshall Aid programme that was designed to bring war-ravished Europe under US hegemony. ‘European communism was to be redirected’ towards maintaining the gains of the Red Army during World War II. ‘Communist parties in Western Europe could stir up trouble’, against the USA. The Cominform was far removed from being a resurrection of the old Comintern. As to who was invited to the inaugural meeting held at a secluded village in Poland, ‘Stalin… refused a request from Mao Zedong, who obviously thought that the plan was to re-establish the Communist International’. The Spanish and Portuguese parties were not invited, nor were the British, or the Greek Communist Party, which was fighting a civil war against the royalists.[25]

The extent of the ‘fraternity’ between the USSR and the foreign Communists can be gauged from the delegates having not been given prior knowledge of the agenda, and being ‘treated like detainees on arrival’. While Soviet delegates Malenkov and Zhdanov kept in regular communication with Stalin, none of the other delegates were permitted communication with the outside world.[26]

Repudiation of Marxist Doctrine

The implementation of Marxism as a policy upon which to construct a State was of course worthless, and Stalin reversed the doctrinaire Marxism that he had inherited from the Lenin regime. Leon Sedov indignantly stated of this:

In the most diverse areas, the heritage of the October revolution is being liquidated. Revolutionary internationalism gives way to the cult of the fatherland in the strictest sense. And the fatherland means, above all, the authorities. Ranks, decorations and titles have been reintroduced. The officer caste headed by the marshals has been reestablished. The old communist workers are pushed into the background; the working class is divided into different layers; the bureaucracy bases itself on the ‘non-party Bolshevik’, the Stakhanovist, that is, the workers’ aristocracy, on the foreman and, above all, on the specialist and the administrator. The old petit-bourgeois family is being reestablished and idealized in the most middle-class way; despite the general protestations, abortions are prohibited, which, given the difficult material conditions and the primitive state of culture and hygiene, means the enslavement of women, that is, the return to pre-October times. The decree of the October revolution concerning new schools has been annulled. School has been reformed on the model of tsarist Russia: uniforms have been reintroduced for the students, not only to shackle their independence, but also to facilitate their surveillance outside of school. Students are evaluated according to their marks for behaviour, and these favour the docile, servile student, not the lively and independent schoolboy. The fundamental virtue of youth today is the ‘respect for one’s elders’, along with the ‘respect for the uniform’. A whole institute of inspectors has been created to look after the behaviour and morality of the youth.[27]

This is what Leon Sedov, and his father, Leon Trotsky, called the ‘Bonapartist character of Stalinism’.[28] And that is precisely what Stalin represents in history: the Napoleon of the Bolshevik Revolution who reversed the Marxian doctrinal excrescences in a manner analogous to that of Napoleon’s reversal of Jacobin fanaticism after the 1789 French Revolution. Underneath the hypocritical moral outrage about Stalinist ‘repression’, etc.,[29] a number of salient factors emerge regarding Stalin’s repudiation of Marxist-Leninist dogma:

  • The ‘fatherland’ or what was called again especially during World War II, ‘Holy Mother Russia’, replaced international class war and world revolution.
  • Hierarchy in the military and elsewhere was re-established openly rather than under a hypocritical façade of soviet democracy and equality.
  • A new technocratic elite was established, analogous to the principles of German ‘National Bolshevism’.
  • The traditional family, the destruction of which is one of the primary aims of Marxism generally[30] and Trotskyism specifically,[31] was re-established.
  • Abortion, the liberalisation of which was heralded as a great achievement in woman’s emancipation in the early days of Bolshevik Russia, was reversed.
  • A Czarist type discipline was reintroduced to the schools; Leon Sedov condemned this as shackling the free spirit of youth, as if there were any such freedom under the Leninist regime.
  • ‘Respect for elders’ was re-established, again anathema to the Marxists who seek the destruction of family life through the alienation of children from parents.[32]

What the Trotskyites and other Marxists object to was Stalin’s establishment the USSR as a powerful ‘nation-state’, and later as an imperial power, rather than as a citadel for world revolution. However, the Trotskyites, more than any other Marxist faction, allied themselves to American imperialism in their hatred of Stalinist Russia, and served as the most enthusiastic partisans of the Cold War.[33] Sedov continued:

Stalin not only bloodily breaks with Bolshevism, with all its traditions and its past, he is also trying to drag Bolshevism and the October revolution through the mud. And he is doing it in the interests of world and domestic reaction. The corpses of Zinoviev and Kamenev must show to the world bourgeoisie that Stalin has broken with the revolution, and must testify to his loyalty and ability to lead a nation-state. The corpses of the old Bolsheviks must prove to the world bourgeoisie that Stalin has in reality radically changed his politics, that the men who entered history as the leaders of revolutionary Bolshevism, the enemies of the bourgeoisie, – are his enemies also. Trotsky, whose name is inseparably linked with that of Lenin as the leader of the October revolution, Trotsky, the founder and leader of the Red Army; Zinoviev and Kamenev, the closest disciples of Lenin, one, president of the Comintern, the other, Lenin’s deputy and member of the Politburo; Smirnov, one of the oldest Bolsheviks, conqueror of Kolchak—today they are being shot and the bourgeoisie of the world must see in this the symbol of a new period. This is the end of the revolution, says Stalin. The world bourgeoisie can and must reckon with Stalin as a serious ally, as the head of a nation-state…. Stalin has abandoned long ago the course toward world revolution.[34]

As history shows, it was not Stalin to whom the ‘world bourgeoisie’ or more aptly, the world plutocracy, looked on as an ally, but leading Trotskyites whose hatred of Stalin and the USSR made them vociferous advocates of American foreign policy.

Family Life Restored

Leon Trotsky is particularly interesting in regard to what he saw as the ‘revolution betrayed’ in his condemnation of Stalinist policies on ‘youth, family, and culture’. Using the term ‘Thermidor’, taken from the French revolutionary era, in his description of Stalinism vis-à-vis the Bolshevik revolution, Trotsky began his critique on family, generational and gender relations. Chapter 7 of The Revolution Betrayed is worth reading in its entirety as an over-view of how Stalin reversed Marxism-Leninism. Whether that is ‘good’ or ‘bad’ is, of course, left to the subjectivity of the reader.[35]

The primary raison d’etre of Marxism for Trotsky personally seems to have been the destruction of religion and of family (as it was for Marx).[36] Hence, the amount of attention Trotsky gives to lamenting the return to traditional family relations under Stalin:

The revolution made a heroic effort to destroy the so-called ‘family hearth’ – that archaic, stuffy and stagnant institution in which the woman of the toiling classes performs galley labor from childhood to death. The place of the family as a shut-in petty enterprise was to be occupied, according to the plans, by a finished system of social care and accommodation: maternity houses, creches, kindergartens, schools, social dining rooms, social laundries, first-aid stations, hospitals, sanatoria, athletic organizations, moving-picture theaters, etc. The complete absorption of the housekeeping functions of the family by institutions of the socialist society, uniting all generations in solidarity and mutual aid, was to bring to woman, and thereby to the loving couple, a real liberation from the thousand-year-old fetters. Up to now this problem of problems has not been solved. The forty million Soviet families remain in their overwhelming majority nests of medievalism, female slavery and hysteria, daily humiliation of children, feminine and childish superstition. We must permit ourselves no illusions on this account. For that very reason, the consecutive changes in the approach to the problem of the family in the Soviet Union best of all characterize the actual nature of Soviet society and the evolution of its ruling stratum.[37]

Marxism, behind the façade of women’s emancipation, ridicules the traditional female role in the family as ‘galley labour’, but does so for the purpose of delivering women to the ‘galley labour’ of the Marxist state. The Marxist solution is to take the child from the parents and substitute parental authority for the State via childcare. As is apparent today, the Marxist ideal regarding the family and children is the same as that of big capitalism. It is typical of the manner by which Marxism, including Communism, converges with plutocracy, as Spengler pointed out soon after the 1917 Revolution in Russia.[38]

Trotsky states, ‘you cannot “abolish” the family; you have to replace it’. The aim was to replace the family with the state apparatus: ‘During the lean years, the workers wherever possible, and in part their families, ate in the factory and other social dining rooms, and this fact was officially regarded as a transition to a socialist form of life’. Trotsky decries the reversal by Stalin of this subversion of the family hearth: ‘The fact is that from the moment of the abolition of the food-card system in 1935, all the better placed workers began to return to the home dining table’. Women as mothers and wives were retuning to the home rather than being dragooned into factories, Trotsky getting increasingly vehement at these reversals of Marxism:

Back to the family hearth! But home cooking and the home washtub, which are now half shamefacedly celebrated by orators and journalists, mean the return of the workers’ wives to their pots and pans that is, to the old slavery.[39]

The original Bolshevik plan was for a new slavery where all would be bound to the factory floor regardless of gender, a now familiar aim of global capitalism, behind the façade of ‘equality’.  Trotsky lamented that the rural family was even stronger: ‘The rural family, bound up not only with home industry but with agriculture, is infinitely more stable and conservative than that of the town’. There had been major reversals in the collectivisation of the peasant families: they were again obtaining most of their food from private lots rather than collectivised farms, and ‘there can no longer be any talk of social dining rooms’. ‘Thus the midget farms, [were] creating a new basis for the domestic hearthstone…’[40]

The pioneering of abortion rights by the Leninist regime was celebrated as a great achievement of Bolshevism, which was, however, reversed by Stalin with the celebration instead of motherhood. In terms that are today conventional throughout the Western world, Trotsky stated that due to the economic burden of children upon women,

…It is just for this reason that the revolutionary power gave women the right to abortion, which in conditions of want and family distress, whatever may be said upon this subject by the eunuchs and old maids of both sexes, is one of her most important civil, political and cultural rights. However, this right of women too, gloomy enough in itself, is under the existing social inequality being converted into a privilege.[41]

The Old Bolsheviks demanded abortion as a means of ‘emancipating women’ from children and family. One can hardly account for the Bolshevik attitude by an appeal to anyone’s ‘rights’ (sic). The answer to the economic hardship of childbearing was surely to eliminate the causes of the hardship. In fact, this was the aim of the Stalinists, Trotsky citing this in condemnation:

One of the members of the highest Soviet court, Soltz, a specialist on matrimonial questions, bases the forthcoming prohibition of abortion on the fact that in a socialist society where there are no unemployed, etc., etc., a woman has no right to decline ‘the joys of motherhood’.[42]

On June 27 1936 a law was passed prohibiting abortion, which Trotsky called the natural and logical fruit of a ‘Thermidorian reaction’.[43] The redemption of the family and motherhood was damned perhaps more vehemently by Trotsky than any other aspect of Stalinism as a repudiation of the ‘ABCs of Communism’, which he stated includes ‘getting women out of the clutches of the family’.

Everybody and everything is dragged into the new course: lawgiver and litterateur, court and militia, newspaper and schoolroom. When a naive and honest communist youth makes bold to write in his paper: ‘You would do better to occupy yourself with solving the problem how woman can get out of the clutches of the family’, he receives in answer a couple of good smacks and – is silent. The ABCs of Communism are declared a ‘leftist excess’. The stupid and stale prejudices of uncultured philistines are resurrected in the name of a new morale. And what is happening in daily life in all the nooks and corners of this measureless country? The press reflects only in a faint degree the depth of the Thermidorian reaction in the sphere of the family.[44]

A ‘new’ or what we might better call traditional ‘morale’ had returned. Marriage and family were being revived in contrast to the laws of early Bolshevik rule:

The lyric, academical and other ‘friends of the Soviet Union’ have eyes in order to see nothing. The marriage and family laws established by the October revolution, once the object of its legitimate pride, are being made over and mutilated by vast borrowings from the law treasuries of the bourgeois countries. And as though on purpose to stamp treachery with ridicule, the same arguments which were earlier advanced in favor of unconditional freedom of divorce and abortion – ‘the liberation of women’, ‘defense of the rights of personality’, ‘protection of motherhood’ – are repeated now in favor of their limitation and complete prohibition.[45]

Trotsky proudly stated that the Bolsheviks had sought to alienate children from their parents, but under Stalin parents resumed their responsibilities as the guardians of their children’s welfare, rather than the role being allotted to factory crèches. It seems, that in this respect at least, Stalinist Russia was less a Marxian-Bolshevik state than the present day capitalist states which insist that mothers should leave their children to the upbringing of crèches while they are forced to work; and ironically those most vocal in demanding such polices are often regarded as ‘right-wing’.

Trotsky lauded the policy of the early Bolshevik state, to the point where the state withdrew support from parents

While the hope still lived of concentrating the education of the new generations in the hands of the state, the government was not only unconcerned about supporting the authority of the ‘elders’, and, in particular of the mother and father, but on the contrary tried its best to separate the children from the family, in order thus to protect them from the traditions of a stagnant mode of life.[46]

Trotsky portrayed the early Bolshevik experiments as the saving of children from ‘drunken fathers or religious mothers’; ‘a shaking of parental authority to its very foundations’.[47]

Stalinist Russia also reversed the original Bolshevik education policy that had been based on ‘progressive’ American concepts and returned authority to the schools. In speaking of the campaign against decadence in music,[48] Andrei Zhdanov, Stalin’s cultural adviser, recalled the original Bolshevik education policy, and disparaged it as ‘very leftish’:

At one time, you remember, elementary and secondary schools went in for the ‘laboratory brigade’ method and the ‘Dalton plan’,[49] which reduced the role of the teacher in the schools to a minimum and gave each pupil the right to set the theme of classwork at the beginning of each lesson. On arriving in the classroom, the teacher would ask the pupils ‘What shall we study today?’ The pupils would reply: ‘Tell us about the Arctic’, ‘Tell us about the Antarctic’, ‘Tell us about Chapayev’, ‘Tell us about Dneprostroi’. The teacher had to follow the lead of these demands. This was called the ‘laboratory brigade method’, but actually it amounted to turning the organisation of schooling completely topsy-turvy. The pupils became the directing force, and the teacher followed their lead. Once we had ‘loose-leaf textbooks’, and the five point system of marks was abandoned. All these things were novelties, but I ask you, did these novelties stand for progress?

The Party cancelled all these ‘novelties’, as you know. Why? Because these ‘novelties’, in form very ‘leftish’, were in actual fact extremely reactionary and made for the nullification of the school.[50]

One observer visiting the USSR explained:

Theories of education were numerous. Every kind of educational system and experiment was tried—the Dalton Plan, the Project Method, the Brigade Laboratory and the like. Examinations were abolished and then reinstated; though with a vital difference. Examinations in the Soviet Union serve as a test for scholarship, not as a door to educational privilege.[51]

In particular the amorality inherent in Marxism was reversed under Stalinism. Richard Overy sates of this process:

Changing attitudes to behaviour and social environment under Stalin went hand-in-hand with a changing attitude towards the family… Unlike family policy in the 1920s, which assumed the gradual breakdown of the conventional family unit as the state supplied education and social support of the young, and men and women sought more collective modes of daily life, social policy under Stalin reinstated the family as the central social unit, and proper parental care as the model environment for the new Soviet generation. Family policy was driven by two primary motives: to expand the birth rate and to provide a more stable social context in a period of rapid social change. Mothers were respected as heroic socialist models in their own right and motherhood was defined as a socialist duty. In 1944 medals were introduced for women who had answered the call: Motherhood medal, Second Class for five children, First Class for six; medals of Motherhood Glory in three classes for seven, eight or nine offspring, for ten or more, mothers were justly nominated Heroine Mother of the Soviet Union, and an average of 5,000 a year won this highest accolade, and a diploma from the Soviet President himself.[52]

No longer were husband and wife disparaged as the ‘drunken father’ and the ‘religious mother’, from whom the child must be ‘emancipated’ and placed under state jurisdiction, as Trotsky and the other Old Bolshevik reprobates attempted. Professor Overy states, rather, that ‘the ideal family was defined in socialist-realist terms as large, harmonious and hardworking’. ‘Free love and sexual licence’, the moral nihilism encouraged by Bolshevism during its early phase, was being described in Pravda in 1936 as ‘altogether bourgeois’.[53]

In 1934 traditional marriage was reintroduced, and wedding rings, banned since the 1920s, were again produced. The austere and depressing atmosphere of the old Bolshevik marriage ceremony was replaced with more festive and prolonged celebration. Divorce, which the Bolsheviks had made easy, causing thousands of men to leave their families, was discouraged by raising fees. Absentee fathers were obliged to pay half their earnings for the upkeep of their families. Homosexuality, decriminalised in 1922, was recriminalised in 1934. Abortion, legalised in 1920, was outlawed in 1936, with abortionists liable to imprisonment from one to three years, while women seeking termination could be fined up to 300 roubles.[54] The exception was that those with hereditary illnesses could apply for abortion.[55]

Kulturkampf

The antithesis between Marxist orthodoxy and Stalinism is nowhere better seen than in the attitudes towards the family, as related above, and culture.

Andrei Zhdanov, the primary theoretician on culture in Stalinist Russia, was an inveterate opponent of ‘formalism’ and modernism in the arts. ‘Socialist-realism’, as Soviet culture was termed from 1932,[56] was formulated that year by Maxim Gorky, head of the Union of Soviet Writers.[57] It was heroic, folkish and organic. The individual artist was the conveyor of the folk-soul, in contrast to the art of Western decline, dismissively described in the USSR as ‘bourgeoisie formalism’.[58]

The original Bolshevik vision of a mass democratic art, organised as ‘Proletkult’, which recruited thousands of workers to be trained as artists and writers, as one would train workers to operate a factory conveyor built, was replaced by the genius of the individual expressing the soul of the people. While in The West the extreme Left and its wealthy patrons championed various forms of modernism,[59] in the USSR they were marginalized at best, resulting in the suicide for example of the Russian ‘Constructivist’ Mayakovsky. The revitalisation of Russian-Soviet art received its primary impetus in 1946 with the launching of Zhdanovschina.[60]

The classical composers from the Czarist era, such as Tchaikovsky, Glinka sand Borodin, were revived, after being sidelined in the early years of Bolshevism in favour of modernism, as were great non-Russian composers such as Beethoven, Brahms and Schubert.[61] Maxim Gorky continued to be celebrated as ‘the founder of Soviet literature and he continued to visit the USSR, despite his having moved to Fascist Italy. He returned to Russia in 1933.[62] Modernists who had been fêted in the early days of Bolshevism, such as the playwright, Nikolai Erdman, were relegated to irrelevance by the 1930s.[63]

Jazz and the associated types of dancing were condemned as bourgeoisie degeneracy.[64]

Zhdanov’s speech to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolshevik) intended primarily to lay the foundations of Soviet music, represents one of the most cogent recent attempts to define culture. Other than some sparse references to Marx, Lenin and internationalism, the Zhdanov speech should rank alongside T S Eliot’s Notes Towards A Definition of Culture[65] as a seminal conservative statement on culture. The Zhandov speech also helped set the foundation for the campaign against ‘rootless cosmopolitanism’ that was launched several years later. Zhdandov’s premises for a Soviet music were based on the classical and the organic connexion with the folk, striving for excellence, and expressing lofty values, rejecting modernism as detached from folk and tradition.

And, indeed, we are faced with a very acute, although outwardly concealed struggle between two trends in Soviet music. One trend represents the healthy, progressive principle in Soviet music, based upon recognition of the tremendous role of the classical heritage, and, in particular, the traditions of the Russian musical school, on the combination of lofty idea content in music, its truthfulness and realism, with profound, organic ties with the people and their music and songs – all this combined with a high degree of professional mastery. The other trend is that of formalism, which is alien to Soviet art, and is marked by rejection of the classical heritage under the guise of seeming novelty, by rejection of popular music, by rejection of service to the people in preference for catering to the highly individualistic emotions of a small group of select aesthetes.[66]

While some in the Proletkult, founded in 1917 were of Futurist orientation, declaring like the poet Vladimir Kirillov, for example, that ‘In the name of our tomorrow, we will burn Raphael, we will destroy museums, we will trample the flowers of art’, the Proletkult organisation was abolished in 1932,[67] and Soviet culture was re-established on classical foundations. Khdanov was to stress the classical heritage combined with the Russian folk traditions, as the basis for Soviet culture in his address:

Let us examine the question of attitude towards the classical heritage, for instance. Swear as the above-mentioned composers may that they stand with both feet on the soil of the classical heritage, there is nothing to prove that the adherents of the formalistic school are perpetuating and developing the traditions of classical music. Any listener will tell you that the work of the Soviet composers of the formalistic trend is totally unlike classical music. Classical music is characterised by its truthfulness and realism, by the ability to attain to unity of brilliant artistic form with profound content, to combine great mastery with simplicity and comprehensibility. Classical music in general, and Russian classical music in particular, are strangers to formalism and crude naturalism. They are marked by lofty idea content, based upon recognition of the musical art of the peoples as the wellspring of classical music, by profound respect and love for the people, their music and songs.[68]

Zhdanov’s analysis of modernism in music and his definition of classic culture is eminently relevant for the present state of Western cultural degeneracy:

What a step back from the highroad of musical development our formalists make when, undermining the bulwarks of real music, they compose false and ugly music, permeated with idealistic emotions, alien to the wide masses of people, and catering not to the millions of Soviet people, but to the few, to a score or more of chosen ones, to the ‘elite’! How this differs from Glinka, Chaikovsky, Rimsky-Korsakov, Dargomyjsky and Mussorgsky, who regarded the ability to express the spirit and character of the people in their works as the foundation of their artistic growth. Neglect of the demands of the people, their spirit and art means that the formalistic trend in music is definitely anti-popular in character.[69]

Zhdanov addressed a tendency in Russia that has thrived in The West: that of the ever new and the ‘theoretical’ that is supposedly so profound as to be beyond the understanding of all but depraved, pretentious or commodity-driven artistic coteries in claiming that only future generations will widely understand these artistic vanguards. However, Stalinist Russia repudiated the nonsense; and exposed the emperor as having no clothes:

It is simply a terrible thing if the ‘theory’ that ‘we will be understood fifty or a hundred years hence’, that ‘our contemporaries may not understand us, but posterity will’ is current among a certain section of Soviet composers. If this altitude has become habitual, it is a very dangerous habit.[70]

For Zhdanov, and consequently for the USSR, the classics were a folkish manifestation arising from the soul of the Russian people, rather than being dismissed in Marxian manner as merely products of bourgeoisie culture. In fact, as indicated previously, it was modernism that was regarded as a manifestation of ‘bourgeois decadence’. Zhandov castigated the modernists as elitist, aloof, or better said, alienated from the folk. On the other hand the great Russian classicists, despite their class origins, were upheld as paragons of the Russian folk culture:

Remember how the classics felt about the needs of the people. We have begun to forget in what striking language the composers of the Big Five,[71] and the great music critic Stasov, who was affiliated with them, spoke of the popular element in music. We have begun to forget Glinka’s wonderful words about the ties between the people and artists: “Music is created by the people and we artists only arrange it.” We are forgetting that the great master did not stand aloof from any genres if these genres helped to bring music closer to the wide masses of people. You, on the other hand, hold aloof even from such a genre as the opera; you regard the opera as secondary, opposing it to instrumental symphony music, to say nothing of the fact that you look down on song, choral and concert music, considering it a disgrace to stoop to it and satisfy the demands of the people. Yet Mussorgsky adapted the music of the Hopak, while Glinka used the Komarinsky for one of his finest compositions. Evidently, we shall have to admit that the landlord Glinka, the official Serov and the aristocrat Stasov were more democratic than you. This is paradoxical, but it is a fact. Solemn vows that you are all for popular music are not enough. If you are, why do you make so little use of folk melodies in your musical works? Why are the defects, which were criticised long ago by Serov, when he said that ‘learned’, that is, professional, music was developing parallel with and independently of folk music, repeating themselves? Can we really say that our instrumental symphony music is developing in close interaction with folk music – be it song, concert or choral music? No, we cannot say that. On the contrary, a gulf has unquestionably arisen here as the result of the underestimation of folk music by our symphony composers. Let me remind you of how Serov defined his attitude to folk music. I am referring to his article The Music of South Russian Songs in which he said: ‘Folk songs, as musical organisms, are by no means the work of individual musical talents, but the productions of a whole nation; their entire structure distinguishes them from the artificial music written in conscious imitation of previous examples, written as the products of definite schools, science, routine and reflexes. They are flowers that grow naturally in a given locale, that have appeared in the world of themselves and sprung to full beauty without the least thought of authorship or composition, and consequently, with little resemblance to the hothouse products of learned compositional activity’. That is why the naivete of creation, and that (as Gogol aptly expressed it in Dead Souls) lofty wisdom of simplicity which is the main charm and main secret of every artistic work are most strikingly manifest in them.[72]

It is notable that Zhdanov emphasised the basis of culture as an organic flowering from the nation. Of painting Zhandov again attacked the psychotic ‘leftist’ influences:

Or take this example. An Academy of Fine Arts was organised not so long ago. Painting is your sister, one of the muses. At one time, as you know, bourgeois influences were very strong in painting. They cropped up time and again under the most ‘leftist’ flags, giving themselves such tags as futurism, cubism, modernism; ‘stagnant academism’ was ‘overthrown’, and novelty proclaimed. This novelty expressed itself in insane carryings on, as for instance, when a girl was depicted with one head on forty legs, with one eye turned towards us, and the other towards Arzamas. How did all this end? In the complete crash of the ‘new trend’. The Party fully restored the significance of the classical heritage of Repin, Briullov, Vereshchagin, Vasnetsov and Surikov. Did we do right in reinstating the treasures of classical painting, and routing the liquidators of painting?[73]

The extended discussion here on Russian culture under Stalin is due to the importance that the culture-war between the USSR and the USA took, having repercussions that were not only world-wide but lasting.

Notes

[1] Oswald Spengler, The Hour of Decision (New York: Alfred A Knopf, 1963), 61.

[2] K R Bolton, ‘Jünger and National-Bolshevism’ in Jünger: Thoughts & Perspectives Vol. XI (London: Black Front Press, 2012).

[3] Association for the Study of the Planned Economy of Soviet Russia.

[4] League of Professional Intellectuals.

[5] K R Bolton, ‘Jünger and National-Bolshevism’, op. cit.

[6] Cited by John J Stephan, The Russian Fascists (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1978), 338.

[7] K R Bolton, ‘Francis Parker Yockey: Stalin’s Fascist Advocate’, International Journal of Russian Studies, Issue No. 6, 2010, http://www.radtr.net/dergi/sayi6/bolton6.htm [3]

[8] K R Bolton, ‘Cold War Axis: Soviet Anti-Zionism and the American Right’’ see Appendix II below.

[9] See Chapter III: ‘The Moscow Trials in Historical Context’.

[10] R Service, Comrades: Communism: A World History (London: Pan MacMillan, 2008), 97.

[11] Ibid., 98.

[12] Ibid., 107.

[13] Ibid., 109.

[14] Ibid., 116.

[15] G Dimitrov, Dimitrov and Stalin 1934-1943: Letters from the Soviet Archives, 32, cited by R Service, ibid., 220.

[16] R Service, ibid., 220.

[17] G Dimitrov, op. cit., cited by Service, ibid., 221.

[18] R Service, ibid., 222.

[19] Ibid.

[20] Hungarians.

[21] Richard Overy, The Dictators: Hitler’s Germany and Stalin’s Russia (London: Allen Lane, 2004), 201.

[22] L I Shvetsova, et al. (eds.), Rasstrel’nye spiski: Moskva, 1937-1941: … Kniga pamiati zhertv politicheskii repressii. (‘The Execution List: Moscow, 1937-1941: … Book of Remembrances of the victims of Political Repression’), (Moscow: Memorial Society, Zven’ia Publishing House, 2000), 229.

[23] L Sedov, ‘Why did Stalin Need this Trial?’, The Red Book on the Moscow Trials, http://www.marxists.org/history/etol/writers/sedov/works/red/ch01.htm [4]

[24] . Ibid., ‘Domestic Political Reasons’.

[25] R Service, op. cit., 240-241.

[26] Ibid., 242.

[27] Ibid.

[28] Ibid.

[29] Given that when Trotsky was empowered under Lenin he established or condoned the methods of jurisprudence, concentration camps, forced labour, and the ‘Red Terror’, that were later to be placed entirely at the feet of Stalin.

[30] Karl Marx, ‘Proletarians and Communists’, The Communist Manifesto, (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1975), 68.

[31] K R Bolton, ‘The State versus Parental Authority’, Journal of Social, Political & Economic Studies, Vol. 36, No. 2, Summer 2011, 197-217.

[32] K Marx, Communist Manifesto, op. cit.

[33] See Chapter V.

[34] L Sedov, op. cit., ‘Reasons of Foreign Policy’.

[35] L Trotsky, The Revolution Betrayed, Chapter 7, ‘Family, Youth and Culture’, http://www.marxists.org/archive/trotsky/1936/revbet/ch07.htm

[36] K R Bolton, ‘The Psychopathology of the Left’, Ab Aeterno, No. 10, Jan,-March 2012, Academy of Social and Political Research (Athens), Paraparaumu, New Zealand. The discussion on Marx and on Trotsky show their pathological hatred of family.

[37] L Trotsky, The Revolution Betrayed, op. cit., ‘The Thermidor in the Family’.

[38] ‘There is no proletarian, not even a communist, movement that has not operated in the interests of money, in the directions indicated by money, and for the time permitted by money — and that without the idealist amongst its leaders having the slightest suspicion of the fact’. Oswald Spengler, The Decline of The West (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1971),Vol. II, 402.

[39] L Trotsky, op.cit.

[40] Ibid.

[41] Ibid.

[42] Ibid.

[43] Ibid.

[44] Ibid.

[45] Ibid.

[46] Ibid.

[47] Ibid.

[48] See below.

[49] A laudatory article on the ‘Dalton Plan’ states that the Dalton School was founded in New York in 1919 and was one of the most important progressive schools of the time, the Dalton Plan being adopted across the world, including in the USSR. It is described as ‘often chaotic and disorganized, but also intimate, caring, nurturing, and familial’. Interestingly it is described as a synthesis of the theories of John Dewey and Carleton Washburne. ‘Dalton School’, http://education.stateuniversity.com/pages/1902/Dalton-School.html [5]

Dewey along with the Trotsky apologist Sidney Hook (later avid Cold Warrior and winner of the American Medal of Freedom from President Ronald Reagan) organised the campaign to defend Trotsky at the time of the Moscow Purges of the late 1930s. See Chapter II below.

[50] A Zhandov, Speech at the discussion on music to the Central Committee of the Communist Party SU (Bolshevik), February 1948.

[51] Hewlett Johnson, The Socialist Sixth of the World (London: Victor Gollanncz, 1939), Book IV, ‘New Horizons’, http://www.marxists.org/archive/johnson-hewlett/socialistsixth/ch04.htm [6]

[52] R Overy, op. cit., 255-256.

[53] Ibid.

[54] Ibid., 257.

[55] Ibid., p. 258.

[56] Ibid., 352.

[57] Ibid., 353.

[58] Ibid.

[59] K R Bolton, Revolution from Above, op. cit., 134-143.

[60] Overy, op.cit., 361.

[61] Ibid., 366-367.

[62] Ibid., 366.

[63] Ibid., 371.

[64] Ibid., 376.

[65] T S Eliot, Notes Towards the Definition of Culture (London: Faber and Faber, 1967).

[66] Zhdanov, op. cit., 6.

[67] Encyclopaedia of Soviet Writers, http://www.sovlit.net/bios/proletkult.html [7]

[68] Zhdanov, op. cit., 6-7.

[69] Ibid., 7

[70] Ibid.

[71] The Big Five – a group of Russian composers during the 1860’s: Balakirev, Mussorgsky, Borodin, Rimsky-Korsakov, Cui.

[72] Zhdanov, op. cit., 7-8.

[73] Ibid., 12.

 


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