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vendredi, 25 octobre 2013

Eurasian Union: Substance and the Subtext

EurasianUnion_6051.jpg

Eurasian Union: Substance and the Subtext


Ph.D., Professor of the School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, India.
 
Ex: http://www.geopolitica.ru
 

The Eurasian Union has come to the present stage in its evolution within a remarkably compressed time-frame. Although the idea was first mooted by the Kazakh president Nursultan Nazarbaev in 1994, it hibernated for long years.[1] It was only in late 2011 that Vladimir Putin revived the idea; visualised it as one of the major centres of economic power alongside the EU, the US, China and APEC; and initiated the process of its implementation. In November 2011, the presidents of Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus signed an agreement to establish the Eurasian Economic Space (EES) that would graduate towards the Eurasian Union. The EES came into existence on 1 January 2012. The paper proposes to examine the origin of the idea and assess its implementation todate with an analysis of the substance and subtext of the organization.

Eurasian Union: The Origins

On 3 October 2011, Vladimir Putin published a signed article in the daily newspaper Izvestia titled “New Integration Project in Eurasia: Making the Future Today.” Putin was the Russian Prime Minister at that time and set to take over the Russian Presidency. The article can thus be interpreted as the assignment he set for himself in his second tenure. On the ground, the “Treaty on the Creation of a Union State of Russia and Belarus” already existed. The Treaty envisaged a federation between the two countries with a common constitution, flag, national anthem, citizenship, currency, president, parliament and army. On 26 January 2000, the Treaty came into effect after the due ratifications by the Russian Duma and the Belarus Assembly. It provided for political union of the two, creating a single political entity. Whether the Treaty laid down a proto Eurasian Union remains to be seen.

The European Union (EU) announcement in 2008 of its Eastern Partnership Programme (EPP) may also have inspired the Russian drive towards reintegration of the Eurasian space. The EPP was initiated to improve political and economic relations between the EU and six "strategic" post-Soviet states -- Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine -- in the core areas of democracy, the rule of law, human rights, the promotion of a market economy, and sustainable development.[2]  There was much debate over whether to include Belarus, whose authoritarian dictatorship disqualified it. The eventual invitation to Belarus was the concern over an excessive Russian influence in that country.

The US plan to deploy the NATO missile defence system in Poland and Czech Republic was already a source of concern for the Russians. China was emerging as a serious player in the region through its heavy investments in energy and infrastructure. The Russian determination to keep the post-Soviet states away from the US, the EU and China made the Eurasian project a priority in its foreign policy. The Treaty between Russia and Belarus intended to keep the latter into the Russian fold.[3]

 Eurasianism: The Idea

Eurasianism as an idea predates the Soviet Union. The Russian identity has been contested by the Occidentalists, the Slavophils and the Eurasianists. The latter claim Russia as the core of the Eurasian civilization. Today, the former Soviet states accept the Russian centrality but not the core-periphery division bet Russia and the rest.

Within Russia itself, the Eurasianists always considered the Soviet Union to be a Greater Russia. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Eurasian political project is to reunite the Russians from the former Soviet territories and ultimately to establish a Russian state for all the Russians. Aleksander Dugin is an ideologue and activist for neo-Eurasianism in Russia. His political activities are directed at restoring the Soviet space and unification of the Russian-speaking people. The South Ossetian President Eduard Kokoity is a sworn Eurasianist himself and eager to make his country a part of Russia.

Organization and Accomplishments

The Eurasian Economic Commission (EEC), the governing body of the EES is set up in Moscow for the time being. Kazakhstan has already staked its claim to host its permanent headquarters. The formula under which the 350-member body would be filled allots Russians 84 percent of staff, the Kazakhs 10 percent and the Belarusians a mere 6 percent. The formula has been worked out on the basis of the population in the three countries. The expenses towards accommodation and infrastructure would be borne by Russia.

The EEC will be eligible to make decisions with regard to customs policies, as also the issues relating to macroeconomics, regulation of economic competition, energy policy, and financial policy. The Commission will also be involved in government procurement and labour migration control.[4] The right of the EEC to sign contracts on behalf of all of them is contested.

The Supreme Eurasian Union Council will be the apex body of the group. The vice- premiers of the three countries would be leading their countries’ delegations in this body. There are differing opinions on the powers of its apex body.

Eurasian Union is an economic grouping. Its objective is to expand markets and rebuild some of the manufacturing chains destroyed by the collapse of the Soviet Union. The Customs Union of Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus had set the process toward this goal and the Eurasian Union is a continuation of the same process.[5]

The EEC has made some progress, in the meantime. It has simplified the trade rules, eliminated border customs and facilitated free movement of goods, services and capital. It has also encouraged migration of labour among its signatories. The trade among the three is estimated to have gone up by forty percent last year alone. Russia has benefitted from cheaper products and labour force from the rest of the two and several hundred Russian enterprises have re-registered in Kazakhstan to avail cheaper tax rates. Kazakhs and Belarusians have found a large market for their products in Russia.

Major hurdles still remain. A common currency has not been agreed to. The pace of economic integration is yet another point of debate among the three. Belarus would not be comfortable with market integration, which would require economic reforms. Eventually, the economic reforms could lead to political reforms and even changes in political system. Belarus is least prepared for such an eventuality.

Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan         

Within Russia, the Eurasianism still holds an appeal; and not just among the marginal groups. The Eurasian Union is perceived as an expression of Eurasianism that would lead to the state of Russia for all Russians. There are calls to invite countries like Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Finland and even China and Mongolia to join the Eurasian Union. At the leadership level, Putin may also prefer ruling over an expanded space encompassing the entire or most of the former Soviet territory.

The Russian raison d’état for the Eurasian Union cannot be traced to such feelings alone. The missionary zeal to reach out to the neighbours involves subsidizing them. As a general rule, economic integration must necessarily involve mutual benefits for all the parties - even when the benefits are not in equal measure. An economic arrangement does not only eliminate tariffs and other restrictive trade barriers among the signatories, it also formulates and implements tariffs and trade barriers against the non-signatories. Facilitating trade among themselves and restricting trade with the outsiders is the dual track of any economic group. 

As regional integration proceeds in much of the world (not just through the EU but also via NAFTA, ASEAN and Washington’s proposed Trans-Pacific Partnership, among others), the post-Soviet space remains largely on the sidelines. A lack of horizontal trading links and isolation from global markets contribute to the region’s persistent underdevelopment. By reorienting members’ economies to focus on the post-Soviet space, a Eurasian Union would create new barriers between member states and the outside world.[6] Russia is particularly worried about the Chinese forays into its neighbourhood. And the EU Eastern Partnership Programme threatens to encroach into the space that Moscow considers its own sphere of influence.

A second powerful reason for Russia to reach out to its neighbours is that the neighbours are steadily making Russia their home. The influx of migrants from the former Soviet territories has generated a lot of resentment and will soon become a serious political issue. In the circumstances, helping to improve the economic situation beyond the Russian borders and assimilate the new arrivals in a common citizenship is being considered. The then president Dmitry Medvedev explicitly linked the issue of immigrants to the expansion of the state borders. He spoke of the time when the giant state had to comprise different nationalities that created “Soviet People”. "We should not be shy when bringing back the ideas of ethnic unity. Yes, we are all different but we have common values and a desire to live in a single big state," he said.[7]

Russia is not single-mindedly committed to the Eurasian Union. It has initiated and nurtured several other multi-lateral organizations and become a member of scores of others initiated by others. The Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) consisting of Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan[8] is one such. So is the Commonwealth of Independent States comprising most of the post-Soviet countries. It is a member of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization that is clearly a China-led group. The Quadrilateral Forum comprising Russia, Tajikistan, Afghanistan and Pakistan is a Russian project.

It has not shied away from making deals with the EU, either. In 2003, it entered into an agreement with the EU to create four common spaces: 1. of freedom, security and justice; 2. cooperation in the field of external security; 3. economy; and 4. research, education and cultural exchange. Since the formalisation of the Customs Union, Putin has insisted that the EU formalise its relations with the Customs Union before a new basic treaty between the EU and Russia could be formalised. At the EU-Russia Summit in June 2012, he also sought the EU support for the Kazakh and Belarusian bids to join the WTO.[9]

Kazakhstan has formulated and pursued a “multivector” foreign policy since independence. It seeks good relations with its two large neighbours as also with the West. Its operational idiom, therefore, is “diversify, diversify and diversify”.

Its relations with the US are centred on counter-terrorism. In Central Asia, it is now the most favoured US partner in the war on terror. It has welcomed the US-sponsored New Silk Road. The Aktau Sea port is expected to emerge as the capital city on this cross-Caspian Road as the central point for transportation, regional educational cooperation and tourism. The Transportation and Logistics Centre is being developed in the city. Aktau hopes to play a role within the New Silk Road that Samarkand played in the Old Silk Road.[10]

Its relations with Europe are as good. Its bilateral cooperation with the EU dates back to 1999, when it entered into the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement with it. The European Commission has agreed to support its application for membership of the WTO. On 1 January 2010, Kazakhstan became the first post-Soviet state to assume the chairmanship of the 56-member Vienna-based Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. Its trade with the EU accounts for as much as the trade of all the Central Asian countries put together. France has a trade agreement with it that is worth $2 billion under which France would help build a space station and cooperate on nuclear development.

It is its close ties – in fact, too close ties – with China that explains its active membership of the Eurasian Union. China’s presence in the country is pervasive. In 2005, the Asatu-Alashanku oil pipeline between the two countries went into use. The second stage of the same from Kenkyiak to Kumkol is already in works. A gas pipeline is being discussed. In the same year, China bought Petrokazakhstan that was the former Soviet Union’s largest independent oil company. At $4.18 billion, it was the largest foreign purchase ever by a Chinese company. In 2009, it gained a stake in the MangistauMunaiGas, a subsidiary of the KazMunaiGas, which is the Kazakh national upstream and downstream operator representing the interests of the state in the petroleum sector. Even as economic ties get stronger, there could be a point of friction between the two regarding the Uighur-based East Turkestan Islamic Movement in the Xinjiang province of China. There are 180,000 Kazakhs of Uighur descent, which is a source of discomfort to China.

Belarus is a landlocked country and dependent on Russia for import of raw materials and export to the foreign markets. Its dependence on Russia is aggravated by the fact that the US has passed the “Belarus Democracy Act”, which authorizes funding for pro-democracy Belarusian NGOs and prevents loans to the government. The EU has imposed a visa ban on its president Alexander Lukashenko. Even as the Belarus’s dependence on Russia is overwhelming, their bilateral relations have gone through severe frictions. In 2004, there was a gas dispute as Russia stopped the gas supply for six months before a compromise on the price was worked out.

In 2009, the two fought what has come to be called “milk wars”. Moscow banned import of Belarusian dairy products, claiming that they did not meet Russian packaging standards, a non-tariff measure allowed under the common customs code. The disagreement cost Belarus approximately $1 billion. The real problem was that Belarusian farmers were heavily subsidized, meaning that the cost of milk production in Belarus was substantially lower than that in Russia. As a result, Russian dairy producers were on the verge of bankruptcy and looked to their government for support. In response to Russian action, Belarus introduced a ban on the purchase of Russian agricultural machinery, accusing Russia of not providing leasing for Belarusian tractors (a major source of income for Belarus).[11]

Destination Ukraine?

Ukraine is the raison d’être for the entire Eurasian project, according to many. “Once past the verbal hype, it becomes clear that in fact it [Eurasian Union] has nothing to do with Eurasia and has everything to do with a single country, which, incidentally, is situated in Europe of all places: Ukraine,” according to an analyst.[12] Its key task is to draw Kiev into the integration project.

The primary reason for Russian stake in Ukraine is the Ukraine-Russia-Turkmen gas pipeline. Till the break-up of the Soviet Union, it was a domestic grid. Today, the gas trade between Turkmenistan, Russia and Ukraine is not just a commercial proposition, but an illustration of triangular dependencies of the three countries. The key issues in terms of transit are that all Turkmenistan’s gas exports outside Central Asia pass through Russia, which puts the latter in complete control of around three-quarters of Turkmenistan’s exports. Russia’s position vis-à-vis Ukraine is extremely vulnerable in that more than ninety percent of its gas exports to Europe pass through that country.

Thus, Ukraine is the transit point as well as the choke point of the Turkmen and Russian exports. It has also been a leaking point of the deliveries. In early 1990s, there were serious disruptions as Ukraine pilfered the gas for its own domestic use. Since then the gas deliveries have become an important issue in the political and security relationship between Russia and Ukraine, having featured in the package of agreements which have included issues such as the future of the Black Sea Fleet and Ukrainian nuclear weapons. There was a serious stand-off between the two in 2009, when the Russians cut off natural gas supplies to Ukraine over price dispute. A compromise was reached only after Ukraine agreed to pay more for the gas that was, till then, subsidised.[13]

The second most important Russian stake in Ukraine is that Ukraine’s Crimea peninsula hosts a Russian navy base whose lease term was extended for twenty-five years in 2010 by a special agreement between Presidents Dmitry Medvedev and Viktor Yanukovych, despite an unresolved gas dispute. This facility provides Moscow with strategic military capabilities in an area that Russia once considered crucial for the security of its southwestern borders and its geopolitical influence near the “warm seas.”[14] In return for the extension of the lease, Russia agreed to a thirty percent drop in the price of natural gas it sold to Ukraine.

A third reason for Russian interest in Ukraine could be that the latter represents a promising market of 45 million potential consumers, in the context where Russia seeks to diversify its own economy and export destinations.

Russian diplomacy to retain control over Ukraine and the US diplomacy to extend its control over the same have repeatedly to come to a clash. Till recently, Ukraine was pointedly excluded from both the EU and the NATO expansions[15]; as also from the list of possible invitees. Since the “Orange Revolution”, the situation has radically changed. How the energy pipeline politics plays out in the changed circumstances remains to be seen.

For its part, Ukraine has not closed its options between the EU and the Eurasian Union. Its prime minister Mykola Azarov, speaking at a meeting to discuss “Ukraine at the Crossroads: The EU and/or the Eurasian Union: Benefits and Challenges” said, “Ukraine has never contrasted one economic organization with the other and we cannot do that from many points of view. We are in ‘between’ and we must have friends both here and there.”[16]

Conclusions

There is no Eurasian Union todate. And yet, it has been the subject of intense scholarly scrutiny as also of prescriptive analysis. Its future membership, the direction of its evolution and the gamut of its activities must remain speculative in the meanwhile.

In lieu of the final conclusions, some tentative recapitulation of the above is in order. The Russians aim to retain the former Soviet space within their own sphere of influence, seeking to diminish the US, Chinese and the EU presence out of it to the extent possible. The Kazakhs are keeping all their options open: seeking a central role in the US-sponsored war on terror and the New Silk Road, permitting pervasive Chinese presence in their economy, promoting bilateral and institutional ties with the EU, and becoming a member of the Eurasian Union. “Diversify” is the name of the Kazakh game. Belarus is landlocked and dependent on Russia for its trade exports and imports, and the Belarus president is persona non grata in much of the West. Under the circumstances, the Eurasian Union is a solution to much of its problems.

Ukraine has signed a Memorandum of Understanding on trade cooperation with Eurasian Economic Commission. Much will depend on whether and when Ukraine decides to join the Eurasian Union.

Published in Journal of Eurasian Affairs


[1] The Kazakh people like to point out that Kazakhstan’s president Nursultan Nazabaev was the first leader to propose the Eurasian Union in 1994. Chinara Esengul, “Regional Cooperation”, March 27, 2012. http://www.asiapathways-adbi.org/2012/03/does-the-eurasian-union-have-a-future/

[2] Kambiz Behi and Daniel Wagner, “Russia’s Growing Economic Influence in Europe and beyond”,  23 July 2012. 

http://www.huffingtonpost.com/kambiz-behi/russias-growing-economic-influence_b_1696304.html

[3]  On 30 September 2011, Belarus withdrew from the EU initiative citing discrimination and substitution of the founding principles. Three days thereafter, it refuted its decision to withdraw. The EU-Russia competition was obviously at work in quick turnarounds in Belarusian position.

[4] Retrieved from news.mail.ru and kremlin.ru in Russian. Quoted in Wikipedia, “Eurasian Union”.

[5] The Customs Union came into existence on 1 January 2010. Removing the customs barriers among them, the countries took the first step towards economic integration.

[6]Jeffrey Mankoff, “What a Eurasian Union Means for Washington”, National Interest  http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/what-eurasian-union-means-washington-6821

[7] Gleb Bryanski, “Putin, Medvedev Praise Values of the Soviet Union”, Reuters, 17 November 2011,  http://in.reuters.com/article/2011/11/17/idINIndia-60590820111117   

[8] In June 2012, Uzbekistan decided to suspend its membership of the CSTO.

[9] http://www.euractiv.com/europes-east/putin-promotes-eurasian-union-eu-news-513123 “Putin Promotes Eurasian Union at the EU Summit”, 5 June 2012

[11] Behi and Wagner, n. 2

[12] Fyodor Lukyanov, gazeta.ru. 17 September 2012. Quoted in http://www.telegraph.co.uk/sponsored/russianow/opinion/9548428/eurasian-union-explanation.html   

[13] The Ukrainian prime minister at that time, Yulia Tomashenko, has since been sentenced to seven years in prison for abusing the authority and signing the deal.

[14]  Georgiy Voloshin, “Russia’s Eurasian Union: A Bid for Hegemony?”, http://www.geopoliticalmonitor.com/russias-eurasian-union-a-bid-for-hegemony-4730

[15] Putin was reported to have declared at the NATO-Russian Summit in 2008 that if Ukraine were to join the NATO, he would consider annexing the Eastern Ukraine and Crimea in retaliation.

 

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mardi, 22 octobre 2013

Vers un chasseur russo-brésilien?

Su-3511.jpg

Résilience de la NSA ...

Vers un chasseur russo-brésilien?

Ex: http://www.dedefensa.org

Ce qui paraît à la fois logique et inévitable depuis le début des sidérantes aventures de la NSA au Brésil, révélées par Greenwald & Cie, se concrétise. Les premiers jalons sont posés pour une éventuelle coopération entre le Brésil et la Russie pour un avion de combat, disons russo-brésilien, qui pourrait être considéré à partir de l’hypothèse d’un développement du modèle russe de cinquième génération (le Soukhoi T-50, programme russe avec déjà une coopération indienne), ou d’une extrapolation de ce programme. La chose (l’exploration d’une coopération) a été dévoilée après une rencontre entre le ministre russe de la défense et le ministre brésilien de la défense. Le ministre russe a fait une visite fructueuse en Amérique du Sud, continent d’ores et déjà antiaméricaniste où la Russie voudrait renforcer ses ventes stratégiques d’armement. De façon plus concrète pour un autre domaine, la rencontre au Brésil devrait déboucher sur la finalisation, début 2014, d’un contrat entre le Brésil et la Russie pour un ensemble de missiles sol-air pour une valeur annoncée de un $milliard, avec transfert de technologies.

Pour ce qui concerne l’avion de combat, une dépêche AFP du 16 octobre 2013 dit ceci, en y ajoutant un cas hors-domaine où un geste des Russes pourrait faire avancer le dossier : «Brazil said Wednesday it hopes to develop state-of-the-art combat aircraft with Russia, and purchase surface-to-air missile batteries from Moscow. [...] “We are very interested in discussing projects relating to fifth generation (combat) aircraft with new partners,” Defense Minister Celso Amorim told reporters after talks here with his Russian counterpart Sergei Shoigu. “The issue was mentioned as a basis for discussion, but it is for the medium term.” [...]

» [Shoigu] stop in Brazil also coincides with Rousseff pressing for the release of a Brazilian biologist detained in Russia along with 29 other Greenpeace activists after protesting Arctic oil drilling. Ana Paula Maciel was one of 30 activists from 18 countries arrested by Russia in late September and charged with piracy after authorities said they had found “narcotic substances” on the Dutch-flagged Arctic Sunrise, used in their protest.»

La même dépêche mentionne évidemment le contrat actuellement en cours, pour 36 avions de combat pour le Brésil, dits de “quatrième génération”. (Ce concept de “générations” est douteux dans sa signification opérationnelle. Son développement argumentaire constitue plus une manœuvre de relations publiques des USA d’il y a quelques années, pour verrouiller le JSF dans la présentation de son exceptionnalité supposée. L’exceptionnalité du JSF est d’ores et déjà admise, dans le domaine de la catastrophe technologique proche de l’impasse bien entendu, mais le mythe de la “génération” comme facteur rupturiel de progrès survit, de la quatrième des chasseurs actuels à la cinquième des chasseurs nouveaux “du futur”. L’argument de RP s’insère du fait de la catastrophe-JSF dans l’image d’un mythe de plus en plus érodé et de plus en plus contestable, cela dans un contexte de mise en cause générale de la fiabilité fondamentale de l’avancement technologique à ce stade, voire d'une impasse pure et simple du technologisme.)

Le contrat 36 avions/4ème génération a connu bien des vicissitudes. Le Rafale était en 2009 un énorme favori, quasiment choisi selon une cohérence française stratégique prometteuse où même la Russie était incluse (voir le 4 septembre 2009) ; il devint bientôt un favori perdu et sans doute sans plus aucune chance à cause de l’effondrement du sens stratégique indépendant de la France (voir le 24 mai 2011). Le F-18 lui a succédé comme favori, selon la logique habituelle des pressions US sur une nouvelle présidente (Rousseff), soucieuse d’améliorer ses relations avec les USA. Tout cela été pulvérisé par la crise Snowden/NSA, touchant d’abord directement le F-18 (voir le 13 août 2013), puis, d’une façon radicale, les relations du Brésil avec les USA (voir le 25 septembre 2013).

... Ainsi tiendra-t-on les assurances du ministre brésilien de la défense sur la poursuite de ce contrat plutôt comme un vœu pieux de l’establishments militaire brésilien que comme une prévision assurée. D’ailleurs, la partie américaniste, comme indiqué également ci-dessous, ne prend plus de gants pour signifier sa position désespérée.

«Amorim said he hoped the fourth-generation aircraft bidding process would be “finalized soon.” But Boeing's bid to win the contract appears to have been damaged by reports of extensive US spying on Brazil. The allegations, based on documents leaked by fugitive US intelligence analyst Edward Snowden, led President Dilma Rousseff to cancel a state visit to Washington, putting Boeing's bid on hold, Boeing Brazil chief Donna Hrinak said last week. “The postponement of the visit means that any progress about the issue (aircraft contract) was also postponed,” Hrinak, a former US ambassador to Brazil, said during a seminar on the Brazilian economy.»

En effet, la perspective de ce contrat 36 avions de combat/quatrième génération nous paraît extrêmement réduite. Elle est aujourd’hui réduite de facto au seul Gripen si l’on tient compte de l’effondrement successif probable des offres Rafale et F-18. Un tel achat d’un avion suédois tenu par des contraintes US draconiennes interdisant tout transfert de technologies sur près de 50% de l’avion (moteurs et électronique sont US) n’a plus guère de sens politique ni industriel dans le contexte actuel, alors que le Brésil est dans une position socio-économique tendue, avec une agitation de rue qui rend impopulaire toute dépense publique qui n’est pas vitale. Bien entendu, le climat politique général (la Suède est dans le bloc BAO et sous obédience US affirmée) est un facteur très important allant contre ce choix. Bref, c’est tout le marché des 36 avions de combat/quatrième génération, entièrement appuyé sur des offres du bloc BAO alors qu’il était au départ diversifié par la perception d’une stratégie française indépendante, qui est menacé d'effondrement par la politique du bloc BAO.

La démarche russe a ainsi tout son sens et sa logique, et la probabilité est que le contexte politique va pousser au développement de l’examen du projet envisagé, sinon à son accélération, le moyen terme pouvant notablement se raccourcir. Le vrai problème est d’ordre de la politique industrielle. Le programme russe de cinquième génération, le T-50, est largement orienté vers une coopération avec l’Inde, avec les transferts de technologie qui vont avec, et déjà largement avancé. Le Brésil pourrait-il s’y insérer ? Pourrait-on envisager une version spéciale de coopération pour le Brésil, ou une coopération à deux passant à trois ? La politique dit “oui”, d’autant qu’il s’agit de trois pays-BRICS et que la Russie veut donner une dimension stratégique au BRICS. Les domaines industriel et technologique, avec une bureaucratisation touchant parfois à la paralysie (surtout dans le cas de l’Inde) suggèrent bien plus de réserves alors qu’un tel domaine de la coopération à ce niveau nécessite une très grande souplesse. Plus encore, les problèmes fondamentaux de blocage technologique des projets avancés, illustré magnifiquement par le JSF, jettent une ombre universelle sur tous les projets de cet ordre. Quoi qu’il en soit, il reste que la question est non seulement posée mais ouverte.

Elle est aussi ouverte que la question précédente semble se fermer. La question qui concernait la pénétration stratégique du Brésil par un pays occidental au travers du contrat de quatrième génération actuellement en discussion, semble effectivement avoir obtenu une réponse catastrophique. L’orientation politique des pays concernés ayant évolué vers le standard bloc BAO, on a pu mesurer la profondeur de la catastrophe de la politique française avec Sarkozy à partir de 2009/2010, avec Hollande suivant fidèlement ces traces. Il n’y a guère de commentaire à faire devant l’évidence du constat, sinon à observer une fois de plus que l’“intelligence française” est capable d’accoucher en période de basses eaux son double inverti absolument radical, dans le chef de l’aveuglement et de la fermeture de l’esprit. Quant à la partie américaniste, l’aventure en cours de la désintégration de la NSA, avec ses effets collatéraux colossaux dont celui du Brésil est le fleuron, ne fait que confirmer dans le sens du bouquet de la chose la constance d’un aveuglement qui doit tout, lui, à la sottise profonde d’une politique US de brute force malgré les atours du soft power dont elle prétend se parer (voir le 9 octobre 2013).

Cette affaire des chasseurs brésiliens est exemplaire, quatrième et cinquième générations confondues, ou même sixième pour les experts rêveurs qui pensent, les braves gens pleins d’espoir, à la situation d’ici 10-15 ans... Elle est exemplaire de l’effondrement de la politique de la civilisation occidentale prise comme un bloc (bloc BAO), et dans un temps incroyablement court. Elle est exemplaire aussi de l’affirmation diversifiée et très puissante, et aussi rapide, des pays qu’on a peine à qualifier encore d’“émergents”, notamment les BRICS, et la Russie et la Brésil dans ce cas, dans ce cadre spécifique des renversements politiques. Elle est exemplaire enfin, – cela ne peut être dissimulé car c’est finalement le principal, – de la rapide détérioration de tous les attributs de la “contre-civilisation”, que ce soit les conditions stratégiques, le technologisme, les conditions courantes de la “gouvernance”, etc., et cela aux dépens des principaux producteurs de la chose (le bloc BAO) mais aussi des autres (y compris les BRICS), l’ensemble du monde étant simplement confronté à la réalité terrible d’un effondrement civilisationnel sans aucun précédent historique dans son ampleur et sa rapidité.

lundi, 21 octobre 2013

La geopolítica rusa del siglo 21

por Alfredo Jalife-Rahme

Ex: http://paginatransversal.wordpress.com

La Jornada, Bajo la Lupa – Entre los prominentes invitados al seminario internacional del Centro de Estudios de la Transición/Centro de Estudios Geoestratégicos de la UAM-X estuvo Sivkov Konstantin Valentinovich, primer vicepresidente de la Academia de Problemas Geopolíticos y doctor en ciencias militares.

Konstantin es segundo de a bordo de Leonid Ivashov, anterior jefe del departamento de asuntos generales en el Ministerio de Defensa de la URSS. Cobra mayor relieve su postura a raíz del triunfo diplomático de Rusia en Siria (ver Bajo la Lupa, 22/9/13).

Ivashov es muy conocido en los multimedia internacionales y sus puntos de vista suelen ser polémicos (v.gr. el terrorismo internacional no existe: su despliegue beneficia a la oligarquía global) y considera que mientras el imperio de Estados Unidos se encuentra al borde del colapso, corresponde a los BRICS la misión de reconfigurar el mundo (Réseau Voltaire, 15/6/11).

De la ponencia de Konstantin, La geopolítica de la URSS y Rusia, me enfocaré en la parte de Rusia.

A su juicio, la lucha geopolítica global basada en la ideología fue cambiada a la confrontación de civilizaciones: la civilización occidental (euro-estadunidense) confronta las civilizaciones ortodoxa, islámica, confuciana (china). Resalta la similitud con la tesis huntingtoniana del choque de civilizaciones que lleva a la inevitabilidad del conflicto de la civilización occidental con el resto (del planeta).

Identifica cuatro de los más importantes factores al desarrollo de la geopolítica mundial:

1. Formación intensiva de un único sistema mundial de poder dominado por EEUU.

2. Intenso crecimiento poblacional y presión al ecosistema por consumismo occidental.

3. Desequilibrio global industrial y de materias primas: el mayor potencial industrial se concentra en EEUU/Europa/Japón, mientras los recursos de materias primas se concentran en Rusia y en los países del tercer mundo, y

4. El carácter independiente de las trasnacionales como sujeto geopolítico

La activación de los cuatro actores genera una crisis global por la contradicción entre el consumismo y la escasez de materias primas. Define a Rusia como una entidad geopolítica cuya base es Eurasia.

Su inmenso potencial intelectual, su posición del centro euroasiático y su potencial militar significativo pone en duda la durabilidad del modelo unidireccional sin remover (sic) a Rusia como sujeto de la geopolítica” a la que habría que demoler como a su antecesora URSS.

Arguye que la etapa más lúgubre de la historia de Rusia en la década de los 90 del siglo 20 (nota: la era entreguista Yeltsin) encontró a la élite política rusa bajo el control total (¡supersic!) de EEUU.

Ocurre el desmantelamiento científico de Rusia y la privatización de sus joyas geoestratégicas, llegando hasta el asesinato de sus principales científicos, mientras las principales empresas de petróleo/gas e infraestructura de transporte acabaron en manos de compradores (sic) domésticos y trasnacionales.

Así la geopolítica de Rusia operó bajo el control directo de los servicios de espionaje de EEUU: capitulación total. ¡Uf!

Peor aún: el liderazgo ruso fomentó la de-sintegración interna. Pero no contaron con la resistencia oculta de los bajos niveles de la jerarquía y las protestas de la población que hicieron fracasar el esquema desintegrativo que permitió la llegada al poder de Putin, con su equipo proveniente de las fuerzas armadas y los servicios de seguridad, como nuevo estadio de la geopolítica rusa.

Considera que el fracaso de las campañas de Irak y Afganistán, la liberación de Sudamérica de la hegemonía de EEUU, en particular Venezuela, y el fracaso de la operación (¡supersic!) Primavera Árabe, debilitaron la influencia de EEUU en Rusia cuando Occidente exhibió sus pies de barro.

Rusia se libera así de su subordinación a los dictados de EEUU en la esfera de la geopolítica global y comienza un regreso suave a los principios de la geopolítica soviética, pero con diferentes bases conceptuales e ideológicas.

Juzga que los instrumentos más importantes de la influencia geopolítica rusa fueron creados con el único plan de una red de oleo/gasoductos.

A partir de la derrota de EEUU en Irak, Rusia operó un acercamiento con China cuando estableció sus tres proyectos geopolíticos exitosos: el Grupo de Shanghai, los BRICS y la Unión Euroasiática. El Grupo de Shanghai genera el espacio euroasiático de Bielorrusia a China mediante una unión económica.

Los BRICS han cortado en términos económicos el asa Anaconda (nota: del nombre de la ominosa serpiente constrictora más grande del mundo) rompiendo una profunda brecha en el sistema de zonas, la influencia de EEUU que cubre a Rusia.

En una entrevista a Pravda.ru (15/9/11), Konstantin explica el significado del cerco a Rusia por EEUU y su despliegue misilístico en la periferia inmediata rusa, parte del proyecto Anaconda: Rusia es todavía percibida por EEUU como el principal adversario estratégico y su tarea consiste en neutralizar las armas nucleares de Rusia y empujarlo fuera de las principales áreas de los océanos mundiales, aun del mar Negro.

La Unión Euroasiática (Rusia, Bielorrusia y Kazajstán) cubre 85 por ciento del territorio de la ex URSS y es el precursor de mayor integración en el espacio postsoviético.

Rusia se pronuncia por la multipolaridad, en cooperación particular con Europa continental que desea sacudirse la hegemonía de EEUU.

Juzga que los cambios tectónicos en la geopolítica global asociados a la transferencia del centro económico de gravedad a la región Asia/Pacífico, sumado de la crisis financiera occidental, implican la inevitabilidad de una seria reorganización del panorama geopolítico, acoplado con la amenaza de conflictos militares de gran escala (sic).

Aduce que el triunfo presidencial de Putin significó una fuerte derrota para las fuerzas occidentales internas en Rusia, lo cual disminuyó considerablemente su impacto en la geopolítica rusa, ya que el control occidental del país es un factor crítico para la restauración y conservación de la dominación del mundo por Occidente.

Los vectores prioritarios de la geopolítica rusa: 1. Al oeste: desarrollo de relaciones igualitarias con Europa y normalización de relaciones con EEUU, para prevenir el desliz a una nueva guerra fría. 2. Al sur: la zona del Cáucaso, medioriente y noráfrica, donde Rusia aspira a normalizar la situación militar y política y frenar los conflictos militares, sobre todo en Siria (¡supersic!) 3. En Sudamérica (nota: no Norteamérica ni Centroamérica: desarrollo de relaciones económicas), y 4. En Asia: el más importante hoy (¡supersic!) para Rusia donde se compromete a un mayor reforzamiento de buenas relaciones con sus grandes vecinos China e India, Vietnam, las dos (sic) Coreas, y la normalización de relaciones con Japón.

Llama la atención que Konstantin no haya citado la invasión de Georgia a Osetia del Sur y la vigorosa respuesta rusa que, a mi juicio, cambió dramáticamente al mundo (El mundo cambió en el Cáucaso; Bajo la Lupa, 20/8/08).

Ahora al unísono de Rusia, la misma serpiente constrictora Anaconda ha reaparecido en el océano Pacífico, donde tiene en la mira a la apetecible China, muy difícil de digerir.

Fuente: alfredojalife.com

Twitter: @AlfredoJalife

Facebook: AlfredoJalife

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Nr. 319 vom 17.10.2013

Crash-Gefahr in den USA steigt: die Hintergründe

Redaktion

Die Einigung der Politik in den USA auf eine neue Schuldenobergrenze wurde weltweit erleichtert kommentiert. Dieses Theater jedoch ist für objektive Betrachter nicht nachzuvollziehen. Denn das Problem wurde nicht aufgeschoben, sondern sogar noch verschlimmert.

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Geopolitische Kräfteverlagerung: Russland sucht Handel und Investitionen mit China

F. William Engdahl

Während sich die meisten Medien im Westen auf den Fortschritt bei den Gesprächen über die dubiose, von den USA unterstützte Transpazifische Partnerschaft (TPP) zur Liberalisierung des Handels konzentrieren - China ist von den Verhandlungen ausgeschlossen -, zeigt man sich darüber in China nicht allzu betrübt. Denn zurzeit werden Investitionen und Handelsbeziehungen im und zum Nachbarland Russland, dem ehemaligen Gegner im Kalten Krieg, stark ausgeweitet. Die auf den ersten Blick unspektakulären Vereinbarungen deuten auf eine tektonische geopolitische Verschiebung hin, die dem Westen, vor allem den USA, noch zu schaffen machen wird.

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dimanche, 20 octobre 2013

The ceremonial changing of the Guard at the Kremlin, Russia

 

The ceremonial changing of the Guard at the Kremlin, Russia

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Entretien avec Aymeric Chauprade sur la Russie

aymchau.jpg

"Si la Russie court derrière le modèle occidental, elle sera toujours en retard"

Aymeric Chauprade bonjour, pourriez-vous vous présenter aux lecteurs de RIA-Novosti qui ne vous connaîtraient pas?

Je suis géopolitologue. Une formation scientifique d'abord (mathématiques) puis de sciences politiques (docteur) et dix années titulaire de la Chaire de géopolitique de l'Ecole de Guerre à Paris, entre 1999 et 2009. J'ai aussi enseigné la géopolitique et l'histoire des idées politiques en France à la Sorbonne et en Suisse à l'Université de Neuchâtel.

Je suis maintenant également consultant international et très heureux de travailler de plus en plus avec la Russie. Mais je suis également souvent en Amérique Latine et j'ai des réseaux africains développés.

Vous êtes considéré comme l’un des fondateurs de la nouvelle géopolitique française, pluridisciplinaire, attentive à décrire le « continu et le discontinu » dans l’analyse des questions internationales, pourriez vous expliquer aux lecteurs de RIA-Novosti ce qu’il en est exactement?

Je me rattache au courant dit réaliste qui tient compte de la force des facteurs de la géographie physique, identitaire et des ressources, dans l'analyse des relations internationales. Mais pour autant, je ne néglige pas les facteurs idéologiques. Ils viennent en combinaison des facteurs classiques de la géopolitique que j'évoquais à l'instant à savoir les déterminants liés à l'espace, aux hommes dans leur identité culturelle (ethnie, religion...), et à la quête des ressources. J'insiste sur la multicausalité (il n'y a pas de cause unique mais chaque situation est la combinaison unique, un peu comme l'ADN d'une personne, d'une multiplicité de facteurs déterminants) et sur la multidisciplinarité (je refuse l'idée que ma matière, la géopolitique, puisse rendre compte à elle seule de la complexité de l'histoire ; attention au "tout géopolitique", au "tout économique" ou "tout sociologique"). La tentation de tout expliquer par sa discipline, comme le font beaucoup les sociologues aujourd'hui, est une dérive née de l'hyperspécialisation qui nous éloigne de l'époque des savants généralistes, ces savants du XVIe siècle qui étaient à la fois philosophes, mathématiciens et souvent hommes de lettres!

Quant au "continu et au discontinu" c'est ce souci qui me vient de ma première formation scientifique de séparer la dimension continue et même parfois linéaire des phénomènes, de leur dimension discontinue et parfois erratique. Il faut savoir suivre les courbes des facteurs de temps long (la démographie par exemple) mais il faut aussi savoir lire les discontinuités, les sauts, de l'Histoire.

Vous avez le mois dernier été invité au prestigieux Forum Valdaï, cofondé par RIA-Novosti. Pourriez-vous nous faire part de vos impressions sur ce forum?

D'abord j'ai été très honoré de figurer parmi les nouveaux invités du Forum de Valdaï. Ce fut une expérience véritablement passionnante. Les débats sont de qualité, l'organisation rigoureuse. C'est une sorte de Davos russe mais avec une différence notable : il n'y a pas de pensée unique mondialiste unanimement partagée. Des sensibilités différentes sont représentées. Si l'on voulait simplifier d'un côté, les Occidentalistes qui, Russes ou Occidentaux, célèbrent le "modèle démocratique occidental", essentiellement américain et considèrent que celui-ci doit être l'horizon vers lequel doit tendre la société russe, et de l'autre côté, les partisans d'un modèle original russe, dont je fais partie, bien que n'étant pas russe, qui considèrent que la Russie n'est pas seulement une nation, mais une civilisation, dont la profondeur historique est telle qu'elle permet de proposer aux Russes un modèle original. A Valdai, j'ai beaucoup entendu les Occidentalistes se lamenter du fait que la Russie était encore loin des standards occidentaux, à cause d'un prétendu déficit démocratique et d'une forte corruption. Je n'idéalise pas la Russie sous Poutine qui travaille d'arrache-pied au redressement de ce pays depuis 13 ans ; j'en mesure les maux mais je dis simplement que lorsque l'on parle de corruption il faudrait premièrement rappeler que les indicateurs de mesure sont faits pour l'essentiel par les Occidentaux, et les Américains en particulier, ce qui n'est pas une assurance d'objectivité, et deuxièmement s'intéresser non seulement à la corruption de l'Occident lui-même mais à son fort pouvoir corrupteur dans les pays en voie de développement!

Par ailleurs je considère que si la Russie court derrière le modèle occidental, elle sera toujours en retard. Bien au contraire, un pays qui a su pousser si loin la création artistique et scientifique, me paraît plus que capable de proposer un contre-modèle, lequel ne devra pas être fondé sur la toute puissance de l'individualisme, mais au contraire sur l'âme russe, sur la dimension spirituelle de ce pays. Il faut faire attention à une chose : le communisme, comme rouleau compresseur de l'esprit critique et de la dimension spirituelle de l'homme, a été un préparateur redoutable pour le projet de marchandisation de l'homme que propose l'individualisme américain.

Je suis convaincu que le retour à la Sainte Russie, au contraire, peut être un formidable réveil du génie créateur russe, qui seul lui permettra de reconstruire, au-delà des hydrocarbures et d'autres secteurs, une économie performante et innovatrice.

La question de l’identité a été extrêmement discutée et le président russe a utilisé une rhétorique eurasiatique pour parler de l’Etat Civilisation russe, pensez vous comme certains que le réveil russe l’éloigne de l’Occident, et donc de l’Europe, et devrait intensifier son rapprochement avec la Chine?

Si la Russie s'éloigne de l'Occident ce sera de la faute de l'Occident américain. La Russie est en effet diabolisée dans les médias américains dominants et par conséquent dans les médias européens qui s'en inspirent. Cette diabolisation est injuste, c'est de la mauvaise foi qui vise à présenter le redressement russe comme agressif alors que celui-ci cherche à consolider sa souveraineté face à l'impérialisme américain qui fait glisser les frontières de l'OTAN aux frontières de la Russie et de la Chine.

La Russie développe ses relations avec la Chine, dans le cadre notamment du groupe de Shangaï et aussi parce que les Chinois ont compris que les Russes pouvaient être des partenaires solides dans un monde multipolaire. De fait, ces deux puissances partagent la même vision de l'organisation du monde : elles respectent la souveraineté des Etats, refusent l'ingérence chez les autres, veulent l'équilibre des puissances comme garantie de la paix mondiale. Toutes deux s'opposent au projet unipolaire américain qui, il suffit de le constater, a déclenché une succession de guerres depuis l'effondrement soviétique : Irak, Yougoslavie, Afghanistan, Libye, Syrie maintenant... Où avez-vous vu les Russes dans toutes ces guerres?

Je pense que la Russie ne veut pas se contenter d'un partenariat avec la Chine. Certes la Russie est une puissance eurasiatique, mais il suffit de s'intéresser à son histoire, à son patrimoine culturel, pour voir qu'elle est une puissance profondément européenne et qu'elle n'entend pas se couper de l'Europe. Si les Européens se libéraient de leur dépendance à l'égard des Etats-Unis tout pourrait changer et un fort partenariat stratégique pourrait se nouer entre l'Europe et la Russie.

Vous aviez lancé le 13 juin dernier un « Appel de Moscou », quel regard global portez vous sur la Russie d’aujourd’hui?

aymchaup55.jpgD'abord j'essaie de ne pas idéaliser la Russie même si je ne vous cache pas que je me sens extrêmement bien dans ce pays, parce que le matérialisme m'y paraît sans cesse équilibré par une sorte de profondeur d'âme insondable. Je pense que quelque chose est en train de se passer dans la Russie de Poutine et j'espère seulement que le Président Poutine pense à la manière de perpétuer son héritage, car la pire chose qui pourrait arriver ce serait le retour des occidentalistes de l'ère Eltsine, qui prennent la Russie pour un pays du Tiers monde qu'il faudrait mettre aux normes occidentales. L'appel de Moscou que j'ai lancé poursuivait deux buts: d'abord montrer mon soutien au refus russe du programme nihiliste venu d'Occident (mariage homosexuel, théorie du genre, merchandisation du corps), ensuite montrer aux Français qui défendent la famille et les valeurs naturelles que la Russie peut être une alliée précieuse dans ce combat. Je suis très surpris et heureux de constater à quel point mon appel de Moscou lancé à la Douma le 13 juin 2013 a circulé en France dans les milieux catholiques qui se sont mobilisés contre le mariage homosexuel.

Le souverainisme est à vos yeux une notion clef de l’équilibre mondial. Très curieusement ce concept est abandonné en Europe alors qu’en Russie et dans nombre de pays émergents l’affirmation et le maintien de la souveraineté semble au contraire un objectif essentiel. Comment expliquez-vous cette différence d’orientation?

La souveraineté est une évidence pour tous les peuples du monde, et en particulier pour ceux qui ont pris leur indépendance récemment ou qui aspirent à créer un Etat indépendant. Les Européens de l'Ouest, ou plutôt leur fausses élites gouvernantes, sont les seules du monde à avoir abdiqué la souveraineté de leurs peuples. C'est une trahison dont elles devront répondre devant l'Histoire. Des millions de Français ont péri à travers l'Histoire pour défendre la liberté et la souveraineté du peuple français, sous les monarques comme en République. Mon nom est inscrit sur les monuments aux morts français. Si les Français voulaient s'en souvenir, il n'est pas une famille française qui n'ait son nom inscrit sur ces monuments aux morts, de la Première, de la Deuxième ou des guerres de défense de l'Empire français.

Imaginez-vous un Américain ou un Russe abdiquer sa souveraineté? Pour eux le patriotisme est une évidence, qui va d'ailleurs tellement de soi que tout parti affirmant un programme nationaliste en Russie est perçu comme extrémiste parce qu'il n'y a nul besoin là-bas d'affirmer l'évidence. Nos amis russes doivent comprendre en revanche qu'en France ce n'est plus l'évidence et par conséquent qu'il est normal qu'un parti politique qui veut rendre au peuple la souveraineté, mette celle-ci au sommet de son programme!

Aujourd’hui nous assistons à une relative rapide modification des relations internationales, avec le basculement du monde vers l’Asie et la potentielle fin du monde unipolaire. Comment envisagez vous que cette transition puisse se passer?

Ce que je vois c'est que les Etats-Unis refusent de perdre leur premier rang mondial et peuvent créer de grands désordres, peut-être même des guerres de grande ampleur, dans les décennies à venir, et que les Européens, quant à eux, sont dans la gesticulation kantienne, la proclamation de belles leçons de morale qui s'accompagnent d'un déclin en puissance dramatique et donc pathétique.

Au sein de cet basculement, la France semble quant à elle pourtant de plus en plus aligner sa politique étrangère sur les intérêts américains, cela est visible avec la crise en Syrie. Comment l’expliquez-vous?

Je l'explique très simplement. L'oligarchie mondialiste a pris le contrôle des principaux partis de gouvernement français, le PS et l'UMP. La majorité de ses dirigeants ont été initiés dans les grands clubs transatlantiques. Ils ont épousé le programme mondialiste et ne raisonnent plus en patriotes français comme le faisait le général de Gaulle. Lorsque le peuple français l'aura compris, ces fausses élites seront balayés car elles n'ont pour bilan que le déclin en puissance de la France et la perte de sa souveraineté.

Vous avez soutenu Philippe de Villers en 2004, auriez appelé à Voter pour Nicolas Sarkozy en 2007 et vous venez de vous ranger au coté de Marine Le Pen. Souhaitez-vous désormais entamer une carrière politique?

Le mot carrière ne me va guère. Si j'avais choisi de faire une carrière dans le système, alors j'aurais choisi de proclamer autre chose que des vérités qui dérangent. Je n'ai qu'une ambition, pouvoir dire à mes enfants, au seuil de la mort, que j'ai fait ce que je pouvais pour défendre la liberté et la souveraineté du peuple français. J'ai soutenu Philippe de Villiers que je respecte.

Mais je n'ai jamais appelé à voter pour Nicolas Sarkozy, que je vois comme soumis aux intérêts américains. Je ne sais qui a pu dire une chose pareille mais je vous mets au défi de trouver un seul texte de soutien de ma part à Nicolas Sarkozy. C'est d'ailleurs son gouvernement, en la personne de son ministre de la défense Hervé Morin, qui m'a brutalement écarté de l'Ecole de Guerre parce j'étais trop attaché à l'indépendance de la France et que je m'opposait au retour de la France dans les structures intégrées de l'OTAN. Donc de grâce que l'on ne dise jamais que j'ai soutenu ou appelé à voter Sarkozy.

En revanche, oui je soutiens Marine le Pen et il est possible que je joue prochainement un rôle sur la scène politique à ses côtés. Marine a un caractère fort, une carapace héritée des coups que son père a pris pendant tant d'années, et je la sens donc capable de prendre en main avec courage le destin du pays. Le courage plus que l'intelligence est ce qui manque aux pseudo-élites françaises, lesquelles sont conformistes et soumises à l'idéologie mondialiste par confort.

Comment envisageriez vous la relation franco-russe?

Je l'ai dit et je le redis haut et fort. Si le Front national arrive au pouvoir, il rompra avec l'OTAN et proposera une alliance stratégique avec la Russie. Ce sera un tremblement de terre énorme au niveau international et c'est la raison pour laquelle, avant d'arriver en haut des marches, et même avec le soutien du peuple, il nous faudra affronter des forces considérables. Nous y sommes prêts. Et n'oubliez pas que la France est le pays de Jeanne d'Arc. Tout est possible donc, même quand tout semble perdu!

Merci Aymeric Chauprade.

Les lecteurs souhaitant en savoir plus peuvent consulter votre blog ou le site Realpolitik-TV.

L’opinion exprimée dans cet article ne coïncide pas forcément avec la position de la rédaction, l'auteur étant extérieur à RIA Novosti.

Alexandre Latsa est un journaliste français qui vit en Russie et anime le site DISSONANCE, destiné à donner un "autre regard sur la Russie".

vendredi, 18 octobre 2013

La era de la ginecocracia

por Evgueni Golovín*

Ex: http://paginatransversal.wordpress.com

golovin.jpgMuchos libros en nuestro siglo se han escrito sobre la visión del mundo femenina, sobre la psicología femenina y el erotismo femenino. Muy pocos fueron escritos sobre los hombres. Y estos pocos estudios dejan una impresión bastante desoladora. Dos de ellos, escritos por conocidos sociólogos son especialmente sombríos: Paul Duval – “Hombres. El sexo en vías de extinción”, David Riseman – “El mito del hombre en América”. La multitud masculina de rostros variopintos no inspira optimismo. Al contemplar a la multitud masculina uno se entristece: “él”, “ello”, “ellos”… con sus discretos trajes, corbatas mal atadas… sus estereotipados movimientos y gestos están sometidos a la fatal estrategia de la más pulcra pesadilla. Tienen prisa porque “están ocupados”. ¿Ocupados en qué? En conseguir el dinero para sus hembras y los pequeños vampiros que están creciendo.

Son cobardes y por eso les gusta juntarse en manadas. Si prescindimos de las refinadas divagaciones, la cobardía no es más que una tendencia centrípeta, deseo de encontrar un centro seguro y estable. Los hombres tienen miedo de sus propias ideas, de los bandidos, de los jefes, de “la opinión pública”, de las arañas que se chupan el dinero y que lo dan. Pero las mujeres son las que más miedo les dan. “Ella” camina multicolor y bien centrada, su pecho vibra tentadoramente… y los ansiosos ojos siguen sus curvas, y la carne se rebela dolorosamente. Su frialdad – qué desgracia, su compasión erótica – ¡qué felicidad! “Ella” es la materia formada de manera atrayente en este mundo material, en el que vivimos solo una vez, “ella” – es una idea, un ídolo, sus emergentes encantos saltan de los carteles, portadas de revistas y pantallas. “Ella” es un bien concreto. El cuerpo femenino bonito cuesta caro, tal vez más barato que “La maja desnuda” de Goya, pero hay que pagarlo. Una prostituta cobra por horas, la amante o la esposa, naturalmente, piden mucho más. El lema del matrimonio estadounidense es sex for support. Las puertas del paraíso sexual se abren con la llavecita de oro. El cuerpo masculino sin cualificar y sin muscular no vale nada.

La realidad de la civilización burguesa

Aunque nos acusen de cargar las tintas, la situación sigue siendo triste. La igualdad, emancipación, feminismo son los síntomas del creciente dominio femenino, porque la “igualdad de los sexos” no es más que otro fantasma demagógico de turno. El hombre y la mujer debido a la marcada diferencia de su orientación están luchando permanentemente de forma abierta o encubierta, y el carácter del ciclo histórico-social depende del dominio de uno u otro sexo. El hombre por naturaleza es centrípeto, se mueve de izquierda a derecha, hacia adelante, de abajo a arriba. En la mujer es todo al revés. El impulso “puramente masculino” es entregar y apartar, el impulso “puramente femenino” es quitar y conservar. Claro que se trata de impulsos muy esquemáticos, porque cada ser en mayor o menor medida es andrógino, pero está claro que de la ordenación y armonización de estos impulsos depende el bienestar del individuo en particular y de la sociedad en su conjunto, pero semejante armonía es imposible sin la activa irracionalidad del eje del ser, convencimiento intuitivo de la certeza del sistema de valores propios, la instintiva fe en lo acertado del camino propio. De otro modo la energía centrípeta o destrozará al hombre, o le obligará a buscar algún centro y punto de aplicación de sus fuerzas en el mundo exterior. Lo cual lleva a la destrucción de la individualidad y a la total pérdida de control del principio masculino propio. La energía erótica en vez de activar y templar el cuerpo, como ocurre en un organismo normal, comienza a dictar al cuerpo sus propias condiciones vitales.

La androginia del ser está provocada por la presencia femenina en la estructura psicosomática masculina. La “mujer oculta” se manifiesta en el nivel anímico y espiritual como el principio regulador que sujeta o el ideal estrellado del “cielo interior”. El hombre debe mantener la fidelidad hacia esta “bella dama”, la aventura amorosa es la búsqueda de su equivalente terrenal. En el caso contrario estará cometiendo una infidelidad cardinal, existencial.

¿Pero de qué estamos hablando?

Del amor.

La mayoría de los hombres actuales pensarán que se trata de tonterías románticas, que solo valen cuando se habla de los trovadores y caballeros. Oigan, nos dirán, todos nosotros – mujeres y hombres – vivimos en un mundo cruel y tecnificado en condiciones de lucha y competencia. Todos por igual dependemos de estas duras realidades, y en este sentido se puede hablar de la igualdad de los sexos. En cuanto a la dependencia del sexo, sabrá que en todos los tiempos ha habido obsesos y erotómanos. En efecto, las mujeres ahora juegan mucho mayor papel, pero no es suficiente para hablar de no se sabe qué “matriarcado”.

Ciertamente, no se puede hablar del “matriarcado” en la actualidad en el sentido estricto. Según Bachofen, el matriarcado es más bien un concepto jurídico, relacionado con el “derecho de las madres”. Pero perfectamente podemos ocuparnos de la ginecocracia, del dominio de la mujer, debido a la orientación eminentemente femenina de la Historia Moderna. Aquí está la definición de Bachofen:

El ser ginecocrático es el naturalismo ordenado, el predominio de lo material, la supremacía del desarrollo físico”

J.J. Bachofen. Mutterrecht, 1926, p. 118

Nadie podrá negar el éxito de la Época Moderna en este sentido. A lo largo de los últimos dos siglos en la psicología humana se ha producido un cambio fundamental. De entrada a la naturaleza masculina le son antipáticas las categorías existenciales tales como “la propiedad” y el tiempo en el sentido de “duración”. El carácter centrípeto, explosivo del falicismo exige instantes y “segundos” que están fuera de la “duración”, que no se componen en “duración”. El destino ideal del hombre es avanzar hacia adelante, superar la pesadez terrenal, buscar y conquistar nuevos horizontes del ser, despreciando su vida, si por vida se entiende la existencia homogénea, rutinaria, prolongada en el tiempo. Los valores masculinos son el desinterés, la bondad, el honor, la interpretación celestial de la belleza. Desde este punto de vista, “Lord Jim” de Joseph Conrad es casi la última novela europea sobre un “hombre de verdad”. Jim, simple marinero, ofendido en su honor, no lo puede perdonar, ni superar. Por eso el autor le concedió el título, porque el honor es el privilegio y el valor de la nobleza. El justo y el caballero errante son los auténticos hombres.

Podrán replicar: si todos se ponen a hacer de Quijote o a hablar con los pájaros ¿en qué se convertirá la sociedad humana? Es difícil contestar a esta pregunta, pero es fácil observar en qué se convertiría dicha sociedad sin San Francisco y sin Don Quijote. Don Quijote es mucho más necesario para la sociedad que una docena de consorcios automovilísticos.

La civilización burguesa es medio civilización, es un sinsentido. Para crear la civilización hacen falta los esfuerzos conjuntos de los cuatro estamentos.

Decimos: centralización, centrípeto. Sin embargo no es nada fácil definir el concepto “centro”. El centro puede ser estático o errante, manifestado o no, se puede amarlo u odiarlo, se puede saber de él, o sospechar, o presentirlo con la sutilísima y engañosa antena de la intuición. Es posible haber vivido la vida sin tener ni idea acerca del centro de la existencia propia. Se trata del paradójico e inmóvil móvil de Aristóteles. En el centro coinciden las fuerzas centrífugas y las centrípetas. Cuando una de ellas apaga a la otra el sistema o explota o se detiene en una muerte gélida. Es evidente: lo incognoscible del centro garantiza su centralidad, porque el centro percibido y explicado siempre se arriesga a trasladarse hacia la periferia. De ahí la conclusión: el centro permanente no se puede conocer, hay que creer en él. Por eso Dios, honor, bien, belleza son centros permanentes. Es la condición principal de la actividad masculina dirigida, radial.

En los dos primeros estamentos – el sacerdotal y el de la nobleza – la actividad masculina, entendida de esta forma, domina sobre la femenina. Y únicamente con la posición normal, es decir alta, de estos estamentos se crea la civilización, en todo caso la civilización patriarcal. El burgués reconoce los valores ideales nominalmente, pero prefiere las virtudes más prácticas: el honor se sustituye por la honradez, la justicia por la decencia, el valor por el riesgo razonable. En el burgués la energía centrífuga está sometida a la centrípeta, pero el centro no se encuentra dentro de la esfera de su individualidad, el centro hay que afirmarlo en algún lugar del mundo exterior para convertirse en su satélite. La tendencia de “entregar y apartar” en este caso es posible como una maniobra táctica de la tendencia de “quitar, conservar, adquirir, aumentar”.

Después de la revolución burguesa francesa y la fundación de los estados unidos norteamericanos vino el derrumbe definitivo de la civilización patriarcal. La rebelión de La Vendée, seguramente, fue la última llamarada del fuego sagrado. En el siglo XIX el principio masculino se desperdigó por el mundo orientado hacia lo material, haciéndose notar en el dandismo, en las corrientes artísticas, en el pensamiento filosófico independiente, en las aventuras de los exploradores de los países desconocidos. Pero sus representantes, naturalmente, no podían detener el progreso positivista. La sociedad expresaba la admiración por sus libros, cuadros y hazañas, pero los veía con bastante suspicacia. Marx y Freud contribuyeron bastante al triunfo de la ginecocracia materialista. El primero proclamó la tendencia al bienestar económico como la principal fuerza motriz de la historia, mientras que el segundo expresó la duda global acerca de la salud psíquica de aquellas personas, cuyos intereses espirituales no sirven al “bien común”. Los portadores del auténtico principio masculino paulatinamente se convirtieron en los “hombres sobrantes” al estilo de algunos protagonistas de la literatura rusa. “Wozu ein Dichter?” (¿Para qué el poeta?) – preguntaba Hölderlin con ironía todavía a principios del siglo XIX. Ciertamente ¿para qué hacen falta en una sociedad pragmática los soñadores, los inventores de espejismos, de las doctrinas peligrosas y demás maestros de la presencia inquietante? Gotfied Benn reflejó la situación con exactitud en su maravilloso ensayo “Palas Atenea”:

“… representantes de un sexo que se está muriendo, útiles tan solo en su calidad de copartícipes en la apertura de las puertas del nacimiento… Ellos intentan conquistar la autonomía con sus sistemas, sus ilusiones negativas o contradictorias – todos estos lamas, budas, reyes divinos, santos y salvadores, quienes en realidad nunca han salvado a nadie, ni a nada – todos estos hombres trágicos, solitarios, ajenos a lo material, sordos ante la secreta llamada de la madre-tierra, lúgubres caminantes… En los estados de alta organización social, en los estados de duras alas, donde todo acaba en la normalidad con el apareamiento, los odian y toleran tan solo hasta que llegue el momento”.

Los estados de los insectos, sociedades de abejas y termitas están perfectamente organizados para los seres que “solo viven una vez”. La civilización occidental muy exitosamente se dirige hacia semejante orden ideal y en este sentido representa un episodio bastante raro en la historia. Es difícil encontrar en el pasado abarcable una formación humana, afianzada sobre las bases del ateísmo y una construcción estrictamente material del universo. Aquí no importa qué es lo que se coloca exactamente como la piedra angular: el materialismo vulgar o el materialismo dialéctico o los procesos microfísicos paradójicos. Cuando la religión se reduce al moralismo, cuando la alegría del ser se reduce a una decena de primitivos “placeres”, por los que además hay que pagar ni se sabe cuánto, cuando la muerte física aparece como “el final del todo” ¿acaso se puede hablar del impulso irracional y de la sublimación? Por eso en los años veinte Max Scheler ha desarrollado su conocida tesis sobre la “resublimación” como una de las principales tendencias del siglo. Según Scheler la joven generación ya no desea, a la manera de sus padres y abuelos, gastar las fuerzas en las improductivas búsquedas del absoluto: continuas especulaciones intelectuales exigen demasiada energía vital, que es mucho más práctico utilizar para la mejora de las condiciones concretas corporales, financieras y demás. Los hombres actuales ansían la ingenuidad, despreocupación, deporte, desean prolongar la juventud. El famoso filósofo Scheler, al parecer, saludaba semejante tendencia. ¡Si viera en lo que se ha convertido ahora este joven y empeñado en rejuvenecerse rebaño y de paso contemplara en lo que se ha convertido el deporte y otros entretenimientos saludables!

Y además.

¿Acaso la sublimación se reduce a las especulaciones intelectuales? ¿Acaso el impulso hacia adelante y hacia lo alto se reduce a los saltos de longitud y de altitud? La sublimación no se realiza en los minutos del buen estado de humor y no se acaba con la flojera. Tampoco es el éxtasis. Es un trabajo permanente y dinámico del alma para ampliar la percepción y transformar el cuerpo, es el conocimiento del mundo y de los mundos, atormentado aprendizaje del alpinismo celestial. Y además se trata de un proceso natural.

Si un hombre tiene miedo, rehúye o ni siquiera reconoce la llamada de la sublimación, es que, propiamente, no puede llamarse hombre, es decir un ser con un sistema irracional de valores marcadamente pronunciado. Incluso con la barba canosa o los bíceps imponentes seguirá siendo un niño, que depende totalmente de los caprichos de la “gran madre”. Obligando el espíritu a resolver los problemas pragmáticos, agotando el alma con la vanidad y la lascivia, siempre se arrastrará hasta sus rodillas buscando la consolación, los ánimos y el cariño.

Pero la “gran madre” no es en absoluto la amorosa Eva patriarcal, carne de la carne del hombre, es la siniestra creación de la eterna oscuridad, pariente próxima del caos primordial, no creado: bajo el nombre de Afrodita Pandemos envenena la sangre masculina con la pesadilla sexual, con el nombre de Cibeles le amenaza con la castración, la locura y le arrastra al suicidio. Algunos se preguntarán ¿qué relación tiene toda esta mitología con el conocimiento racional y ateísta? La más directa. El ateísmo no es más que una forma de teología negativa, asimilada de manera poco crítica o incluso inconsciente. El ateo cree ingenuamente en el poder total de la razón como instrumento fálico, capaz de penetrar hasta donde se quiera en las profundidades de la “madre-naturaleza”. Sucesivamente admirando la “sorprendente armonía que reina en la naturaleza” e indignándose ante las “fuerzas elementales, ciegas de la naturaleza” es como un niño mimado que quiere recibir de ella todo sin dar nada a cambio. Aunque últimamente, asustado ante las catástrofes ecológicas y la perspectiva de ser trasladado en un futuro próximo a las hospitalarias superficies de otros planetas, apela a la compasión y el humanismo.

Pero el “sol de la razón” no es más que el fuego fatuo del pantano y el instrumento fálico no es más que un juguete en las depredadoras manos de la “gran madre”. No se debe acercar al principio femenino que crea y que también mata con la misma intensidad. “Dama Natura” exige mantener la distancia y la veneración. Lo entendían bien nuestros patriarcales antepasados, teniendo cuidado de no inventar el automóvil, ni la bomba atómica, que ponían en los caminos la imagen del dios Término y escribían en las columnas de Hércules “non plus ultra”.

El espíritu se despierta en el hombre bruscamente y este proceso es duro, – esta es la tesis principal de Erich Neumann, un original seguidor de Jung, en su “Historia de la aparición de la conciencia”. El mundo orientado ginecocráticamente odia estas manifestaciones y procura acabar con ellas utilizando diferentes métodos. Lo que en la época moderna se entiende por “espiritualidad”, destaca por sus características específicamente femeninas: hacen falta memoria, erudición, conocimientos serios, profundos, un estudio pormenorizado del material – en una palabra, todo lo que se puede conseguir en las bibliotecas, archivos, museos, donde, cual si fuera el baúl de la vieja, se guardan todas las bagatelas. Si alguien se rebela contra semejante espiritualidad, siempre podrán acusarlo de ligereza, superficialidad, diletantismo, aventurerismo – características esencialmente masculinas. De aquí los degradantes compromisos y el miedo del individuo ante las leyes ginecocráticas del mundo exterior, que la psicología profunda en general y Erich Neumann en particular denominan el “miedo ante la castración”. “Tendencia a resistir, – escribe Erich Neumann, – el miedo ante la “gran madre”, miedo ante la castración son los primeros síntomas del rumbo centrípeto tomado y de la autoformación”. Y continúa:

La superación del miedo ante la castración es el primer éxito en la superación del dominio de la materia”.

Erich Neumann. Urspruggeschichte des Bewusstseins, Munchen, 1975, p. 83

Ahora, en la era de la ginecocracia, semejante concepción constituye en verdad un acto heroico. Pero el “auténtico hombre” no tiene otro camino. Leamos unas líneas de Gotfried Benn del ya citado ensayo:

De los procesos históricos y materiales sin sentido surge la nueva realidad, creada por la exigencia del paradigma eidético, segunda realidad, elaborada por la acción de la decisión intelectual. No existe el camino de retorno. Rezos a Ishtar, retournons a la grand mere, invocaciones al reino de la madre, entronización de Gretchen sobre Nietzsche – todo es inútil: no volveremos al estado natural”.

¿Es así?

Por un lado: conocimiento dulce, embriagador: sus vibraciones, movimientos gráciles, zonas erógenas… paraíso sexual.

Por el otro:

Atenas, nacida de la sien de Zeus, de ojos azules, resplandeciente armadura, diosa nacida sin madre. Palas – la alegría del combate y la destrucción, cabeza de Medusa en su escudo, sobre su cabeza el lúgubre pájaro nocturno; retrocede un poco y de golpe levanta la gigantesca piedra que servía de linde – contra Marte, quien está del lado de Troya, de Helena… Palas, siempre con su casco, no fecundada, diosa sin hijos, fría y solitaria”.

1 de enero de 1999.

* Evgueni Golovín (1938-2010) fue un genio inclasificable. Situado completamente fuera del mundo actual, cuya legitimidad rechazaba de plano. “Quien camina contra el día no debe temer a la noche” – era su lema vital. Profundo conocedor de alquimia y de tradición hermética europea, también era especialista en los “autores malditos” franceses, románticos y expresionistas alemanes, traductor de libros de escritores europeos cuya obra está catalogada como “de la presencia inquietante”. Su identificación con el mundo pagano griego llegó al punto de que algunos que le conocieron íntimamente llegaron a definirlo como “Divinidad” (para empezar por el principio, Golovín aprendió el griego a los 16 años y comenzó con la lectura de Homero). En los años 60 del siglo pasado se convirtió en la figura más carismática de la llamada “clandestinidad mística moscovita”, conocido como “Almirante” (de la flotilla hermética, formada por los “místicos”). Fue el primero en la URSS en difundir la obra de autores tradicionalistas como Guénon y Évola. Ya en los años 90 y 2000 redactó la revista Splendor Solis, publicó varios libros y una recopilación de sus poemas. Veía con recelo las doctrinas orientales que consideraba poco adecuadas para el hombre europeo. Y, sobre todo, nunca buscó el centro de gravedad del ser en el mundo exterior. En su “navegación” sin fin siempre se mantuvo firmemente anclado a su interiore terra. El encuentro con Evgueni Golovín, en distintas etapas de sus vidas, fue decisivo para la formación de futuras figuras clave en la vida intelectual rusa como Geidar Dzhemal o

Alexandr Duguin

24/08/2012

Fuente: Poistine.com

(Traducido del ruso por Arturo Marián Llanos)

jeudi, 17 octobre 2013

La Russie et l’ONU contre l’OTAN

La Russie et l’ONU contre l’OTAN

La Russie et l’ONU contre l’OTAN

Ex: http://www.realpolitik.tv

Nous avions déjà fait un parallèle entre les faux-massacres attribués aux Serbe en Bosnie et au Kosovo, et les tentatives de montages du même type en Syrie. La manipulation des cadavres des civils, la volonté de faire fi des inspections de l’ONU, le règne absolu de la mauvaise foi et du mensonge, le soutien total au terrorisme, sont bien les marques de la diplomatie américaine.

La question est de savoir désormais si les États-Unis vont intervenir. Le rôle de la France et de l’Angleterre n’étant important que pour donner une légitimité à cette fameuse communauté internationale, incarné en fait par les États-Unis et eux seuls.

Pour continuer notre parallèle avec le Kosovo, il faut prendre en compte plusieurs facteurs.

Premièrement, les opérations au sol au Kosovo ont été un échec. La mafia albanaise, même encadrée par les services secrets occidentaux, s’est faite laminer par les unités serbes. L’OTAN n’a jamais osé venir affronter les Serbes directement, consciente de la faible valeur combattive du soldat américain face à son homologue serbe. De plus dans le cas de la Syrie, les États-Unis n’ont pas 250.000 hommes prêts à envahir le pays comme pour l’Irak.

Deuxièmement, le bombardement par des missiles de type « Tomawak » n’aura pas plus d’effet sur l’armée syrienne que sur l’armée serbe. Rappelons que l’action de « Raytheon » avait été diminuée de moitié après les résultats de la campagne de bombardement sur la Serbie. Du point de vue militaire, ces bombardements n’auront en effet que peu d’efficacité. Les troupes syriennes combattent imbriquées avec les islamistes dans des zones urbanisées. Il restera aux Américains les bombardements pour terroriser les populations civiles, ce qui constitue leur spécialité, mais qui en Serbie a au contraire mobilisé la population contre l’envahisseur. Ils pourront cependant être utilisés pour éviter la débandade des islamistes, en leur faisant croire à une intervention américaine. L’enjeu étant d’arriver à Genève 2 avec quelque chose à négocier.

Troisièmement, les bombardements aériens à haute altitude. Ils n’auront guère plus d’efficacité que les missiles, et comme eux pourraient viser les cibles fixes des infrastructures civiles ou militaires, aéroports, centrales électriques, bâtiments administratifs ou de télévision, etc. En outre la DCA syrienne, même avec des bombardements à haute altitude, risque de faire des dégâts dans une aviation habituée à bombarder impunément les civils comme les militaires.

F117 "furtif" abattu au-dessus de l'ex-Yougoslavie le 27 mars 1999, à l'aide d'un vieux radar des années 70...

F117 “furtif” abattu au-dessus de l’ex-Yougoslavie le 27 mars 1999, grâce un vieux radar des années 70…

Quatrièmement, les bombardements d’appuis au sol. Dans ce cas-là, les pertes seront encore plus grandes, et à moins que l’armée turque envahisse la Syrie, elles seront sans effet réel sur les résultats des combats, à moins de concéder la perte de dizaines d’avions.

Cinquièmement, la suprématie aérienne. C’est un objectif auquel l’OTAN peut prétendre, avec également de nombreuses pertes à la clé, et toujours un faible impact sur les combats au sol. Le fait que le ciel serbe fut américain n’a rien changé sur les combats d’infanterie.

Sixièmement, l’action diplomatique. Ce qui fit basculer la volonté au demeurant très faible de Milošević en 1999, fut le soutien insignifiant de la Russie et pour finir, la pression de Viktor Tchernomyrdine sur le Président serbe. La Russie d’alors avait un Président malade, une oligarchie corrompue et pro-américaine et était ruinée après la crise de 1998. Seule l’action symbolique du Premier Ministre de l’époque, Evguéni Primakov, sauva en partie l’honneur de la Russie. Rappelons tout de même que Milošević obtint satisfaction sur tout ce qu’il demandait déjà à Rambouillet.

Aujourd’hui, la Russie de Vladimir Poutine est tout sauf un pays faible, et ce sont les pays occidentaux, qui sont ruinés et qui ne peuvent plus se permettre d’autres aventures militaires. Les systèmes S-300 sont sans doute déjà en Syrie, même s’ils n’ont pas encore été livrés. Dans ce cas les pertes en chasseurs bombardiers seront importantes. Le dernier sondage montre que seuls 9% de la population américaine est favorable à une intervention. Comment expliquer la mort de pilotes dans un conflit qui, une fois de plus, ne mènera qu’à une impasse ?

Si l’on part du principe, pas toujours évident, que les États-Unis sont un acteur rationnel, l’agitation actuelle ne se justifie une nouvelle fois, uniquement par le fait qu’il faut donner de l’espoir aux djihadistes, pour éviter une débandade complète, et que le conflit syrien s’arrête avant même la réunion de Genève 2. Il est possible que les menaces soient suivies de bombardements, mais leur efficacité restera limitée et risque de provoquer une escalade dans la région où l’Iran n’a pas l’intention d’abandonner son allié. Pour les États-Unis, l’enjeu est de taille, une défaite des islamistes par l’armée syrienne les privera de leur meilleur allié depuis l’Afghanistan, en passant par la Yougoslavie, jusqu’à aujourd’hui. Plus que jamais, la Russie, comme le prévoyait Emmanuel Todd en 2002, est la puissance pacificatrice nécessaire à l’ordre multipolaire, qui quoi que fassent les États-Unis, se met en place peu à peu.

Xavier Moreau

mardi, 15 octobre 2013

L'allemand Siemens investira plus d'un milliard d'euros en Russie

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L'allemand Siemens investira plus d'un milliard d'euros en Russie

Joe Käser
 
Ex: http://fr.ria.ru
TOUAPSE, 11 octobre - RIA Novosti

Le consortium allemand Siemens AG continuera d'investir en Russie en dépassant le montant d'un milliard d'euros prévu pour 2013-2015, a déclaré vendredi à Touapse (littoral russe de la mer Noire) le président de Siemens AG Joe Käser, lors d'une rencontre avec le président russe Vladimir Poutine.

"Il est toujours difficile d'investir le premier milliard, mais cela devient plus facile avec le deuxième (…). Nous continuerons d'investir dans l'industrialisation de la Russie, l'efficacité énergétique de l'industrie russe et les technologies médicales. J'estime que nous pouvons élargir notre partenariat pour le bien des habitants de la Russie et de notre consortium bien sûr", a indiqué M.Käser.

M.Poutine a pour sa part déclaré que le consortium allemand pouvait également coopérer avec les sociétés russes en Allemagne. "Vous avez mentionné le groupe pétrolier Rosneft parmi vos partenaires. Rosneft est déjà actionnaire de quatre entreprises en Allemagne", a rappelé le président russe.

samedi, 12 octobre 2013

Multipolarism as an Open Project

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Multipolarism as an Open Project

 Professor of the Moscow State University, Doctor of political sciences, founder of the contemporary Russian school of Geopolitics, leader of the International Social Movement “Eurasian Movement”, Moscow, Russian Federation.

 

I. Multipolarism and “Land Power”

Geopolitics of the Land in the Global World

In the previous part we discussed the subject of globalism, globalization, and mondialism in a view considered to be generally accepted and “conventional”. Geopolitical analysis of the phenomenon of the subject of globalism, globalization, and mondialism has showed that in the modern globalism we only deal with one of the two geopolitical powers, namely, with a thalassocracy, a “Sea Power” that from now on claims for uniqueness, totality, and normativeness and strives to pretend to be the only possible civilization, sociological and geopolitical condition of the world.

Therewith, the philosophy of globalism is based upon the internal surety with universalism of exactly the Western-European value system thought to be the summary of all the diverse experience of the human cultures on all stages of their history.

And finally, in its roots, globalization has an active ideology (mondialism) and power structures that spread and bring this ideology into use. If taking into account that the latter are the most authoritative intellectual US centers (such as CFR and neoconservatives), structures of the US Supreme Military Command and their analysts (Owens, Sibrowsky, Barnett, Garstka), international oligarchs (such as George Soros), a number of international organizations (The Bilderberg Club, Trilateral Commission, etc.), and innumerous amount of analysts, politicians, journalists, scientists, economists, people of culture and art, and IT sector employees spread all over the world, we can understand the reason why this ideology seems to be something that goes without saying for us. That we sometimes take globalization as an “objective process” is the result of a huge manipulation with public opinion and the fruit of a total information war.

Therefore, the picture of global processes we described is an affirmation of the real state of affairs just in part. In such a description, there is a significant share of a normative and imperative volitional (ideological) wish that everything should be quite so, which means, it is based upon wrenches and, to some extent, striving to represent our wishful thinking as reality.

In this part, we will describe an absolutely different point of view on globalization and globalism that is impossible from inside the “Sea Power”, i.e. out of the environment of the nominal “Global World”. Such a view is not taken into account either in antiglobalism or in alterglobalism because it refuses from the most fundamental philosophical and ideological grounds of Eurocentrism.  Such a view rejects the faith in:

  •  universalism of the Western values, that Western societies, in their history, have passed the only possible way all the other countries are expected to pass;
  • progress as an indisputable forwardness of historical and social development;
  • that it is limitless technical, economical, and material development, which is the answer for the most vital needs of all humankind;
  • that people of all cultures, religions, civilizations, and ethnoses are principally the same as the people of the West and they are governed by the same anthropological motives;
  • absolute superiority of capitalism over other sociopolitical formations;
  • absence of any alternative for market economy;
  • that liberal democracy is the only acceptable form of political organization of the society;
  • individual freedom and individual identity as the superior value of human being;
  • liberalism as a historically inevitable, higher-priority, and optimal ideology.

In other words, we proceed to the position of the “Land Power” and consider the present moment of the world history from the point of view of Geopolitics-2, or the thalassocratic geopolitics as an episode of the “Great Continent War”, not as its conclusion.

Of course, it is difficult to refuse that the present moment of historical development demonstrates a number of unique features that, if desired, can be interpreted as the ultimate victory of the Sea over the Land, Carthage over Rome and Leviathan over Behemoth. Indeed, never in history the “Sea Power” was such a serious success and stretched might and influence of its paradigm in such a scale. Of course, Geopolitics-2 acknowledges this fact and the consequences included. But it clearly realizes that globalization can be also interpreted otherwise, namely, as a series of victories in combats and battles, not as the ultimate win in the war.

Here, a historical analogy suggests itself: when German troops were approaching to Moscow in 1941, one could think that everything was lost and the end of the USSR was foredoomed. The Nazi propaganda commented the course of the war quiet so: the “New Order” is created in the occupied territory, the authorities work, economical and political hierarchy is created, and the social life is organized. But the Soviet people kept on violently resisting – at all the fronts as well as in the rear of the enemy, while systematically moving to their goal and their victory.

Now, there is precisely this moment in the geopolitical stand of the Sea and the Land. Information policy inside the “Sea Power” is built so as no-one has any doubt that globalism is an accomplished fact and the global society has come about in its essential features, that all the obstacles from now on are of a technical character. But from certain conceptual, philosophical, sociological, and geopolitical positions, all of it can be challenged by suggesting an absolutely different vision of the situation. All the point is in interpretation. Historical facts make no sense without interpretation. Likewise in geopolitics: any state of affairs in the field of geopolitics only makes sense in one or another interpretation. Globalism is interpreted today almost exclusively in the Atlantist meaning and, thus, the “sea” sense is put into it. A view from the Land’s position doesn’t change the state of affairs but it does change its sense. And this, in many cases, is of fundamental importance.

Further, we will represent the view on globalization and globalism from the Land’s position – geopolitical, sociological, philosophical, and strategical.

Grounds for Existence of Geopolitics-2 in the Global World

How can we substantiate the very possibility of a view on globalization on the part of the Land, assuming that the structure of the global world, as we have shown, presupposes marginalization and fragmentation of the Land?

There are several grounds for this.

  1. The human spirit (conscience, will, faith) is always capable to formulate its attitude to any ambient phenomenon and even if this phenomenon is presented as invincible, integral, and “objective”, it is possible to take it in a different way – accept or reject, justify or condemn. This is the superior dignity of man and his difference from animal species. And if man rejects and condemns something, he has the right to build strategies to overcome it in any, most difficult and insuperable, situations and conditions. The advance of the global society can be accepted and approved but it can be rejected and condemned as well. In the former case, we float adrift the history, in the latter one – we seek a “fulcrum” to stop this process. History is made by people and the spirit plays the central part here. Hence, there is a theoretical possibility to create a theory radically opposite to the views that are built on the base of the “Sea Power” and accept basic paradigms of the Western view on the things, course of history, and logic of changing sociopolitical structures.
  2. The geopolitical method allows to identify globalization as a subjective process connected with a success of one of the two global powers. Be the Land ever so “marginal and fragmentized», it has serious historical grounds behind itself, traditions, experience, sociological and civilization background. The Land’s geopolitics is not built on a void place; this is a tradition that generalizes some fundamental historical, geographical, and strategical trends. Therefore, even on the theoretical level, estimation of globalization from the position of Geopolitics-2 is absolutely relevant. Just as well as there is the “subject” of globalization in its center (mondialism and its structures), the Land Power can and does have its own subjective embodiment. In spite of a huge scale and massive forms of the historical polemics of civilizations, we, first of all, deal with a stand of minds, ideas, concepts, theories, and only then – with that of material things, devices, technologies, finances, weapons, etc.
  3. The process of desovereignization of national states has not yet become nonreversible, and the elements of the Westphalian system are still being partly preserved. That means that a whole range of national states, by virtue of certain consideration, can still bank on realization of the land strategy, i.e. they can completely or partially reject globalization and the “Sea Power’s” paradigm. China is an example of it; it balances between globalization and its own land identity, strictly observing that the general balance is kept and that only what consolidates China as a sovereign geopolitical formation is borrowed from the global strategies. The same can be also said about the states the US have equaled to the “Axis of Evil” — Iran, Cuba, North Korea, Venezuela, Syria, etc. Of course, the threat of a direct intrusion of US troops hangs over these countries like the sword of Damocles (on the model of Iraq or Afghanistan), and they are continuously subject to more politic network attacks from inside. However, at the moment their sovereignty is preserved what makes them privileged areas for development of the Land Power. It is also possible to refer here a number of hesitant countries, such as India, Turkey and others, which, being significantly involved into the globalization orbit, preserve their original sociological features, getting out of accord with the official precepts of their governing regimes. Such situation is characteristic of many Asian. Latin-American and African societies. 
  4. And, finally, the most general. — The present state of Heartland. The world dominance, as we know, and thus, reality or evanescence of monopolar globalization depends on it. In 1980-90-s, Heartland fundamentally reduced its influence area. Two geopolitical belts – Eastern Europe (whose countries were within the “Socialist Block”, “Warsaw Pact», Comecon, etc.) and the Federative Republics of the USSR consistently withdrew from it. By the mid 1990-s, a bloody testing for a possibility of further breakdown of Russia into “national republics” had started in Chechnya. This fragmentation of Heartland, down to a mosaic of marionette dependent states in place of Russia, had to become the final accord of construction of the global world and the “end of history”, after which it would be much more difficult to speak about the Land and Geopolitics-2. Heartland is of central importance in the possibility of strategical consolidation of all Eurasia and, thus, the “Land Power”. If the processes that took place in Russia in 1990-s had moved in a groove and its disintegration kept on, it would be much more difficult to challenge globalization. But since late 1990-s — early 2000-s, a turning-point has taken place in Russia, disintegration was stopped; moreover, the federal authorities have restored control over the rebellious Chechnya. Then V. Putin implemented a legal reform of the Federation subjects (excision of the article about “sovereignty”, governors’ appointment, etc.) that has consolidated the power vertical all over Russia. The CCI integration processes have started gathering pace. In August 2008, in the course of the five-day conflict of Russia with Georgia, Russia took its direct control over territories beyond the borders of the Russian Federation (Southern Ossetia, Abkhazia), and acknowledged their independence, in spite of a huge support of Georgia on the part of the US and the NATO countries and pressure of the international public opinion. Generally, since early 2000-s Russia as Heartland has ceased the processes of its self-disintegration, has reinforced its energetics, has normalized the issues of energy supply abroad, has refused from the practice of unilateral reduction of armaments, having preserved its nuclear potential. Whereby, influence of the network of geopolitical agents of Atlantism and Mondialism on the political authority and strategical decision making has qualitatively diminished, consolidation of the sovereignty has been understood as the top-priority issue, and integration of Russia into a number of globalist structures menacing its independence has been ceased. In a word, Heartland keeps on remaining the foundation of Eurasia, its “Core” — weakened, suffered very serious losses, but still existing, independent, sovereign, and capable to pursue a policy, if not on a global scale, then on a regional one. In its history, Russia has several times fallen yet lower: the Domain Fragmentation on the turn of the 13th century, The Time of Troubles, and the events of 1917-1918 show us Heartland in a yet more deplorable and weakened condition. But every time, in some period, Russia revived and returned to the orbit of its geopolitical history again. The present state of Russia is difficult to recognize brilliant or even satisfactory from the geopolitical (Eurasian) point of view. Yet in general — Heartland does exist, it is relatively independent, and therefore, we have both a theoretical and practical base to consolidate and bring to life all the pre-conditions for development of a response to the phenomenon of monopolar globalization on the part of the Land.

Such an answer of the Land to the challenge of globalization (as a triumph of the “Sea Power”) is Multipolarism, as a theory, philosophy, strategy, policy, and practice.

Multipolarism as a Project of the World Order from the Land’s Position

Multipolarism represents a summary of Geopolitics-2 in actual conditions of the global process evolution. This is an extraordinarily capacious concept that demands a through consideration.

Multipolarism is a real antithesis for monopolarity in all its aspects: hard (imperialism, neocons, direct US domination), soft (multilateralism) and critical (alterglobalism, postmodernism, and neo-Marxism) ones.

The hard monopolarity version (radical American imperialism) is based upon the idea that the US represents the last citadel of the world order, prosperity, comfort, safety, and development surrounded by a chaos of underdeveloped societies. Multipolarism states the directly opposite: the US is a national state that exists among many others, its values are doubtful (or, at least, relative), its claims are disproportional, its appetites are excessive, methods of conducting its foreign policy are inacceptable, and its technological messianism is disastrous for the culture and ecology of the whole world.  In this regard, the multipolar project is a hard antithesis to the US as an instance that methodically builds a unipolar world, and it is aimed to strongly disallow, break up, and prevent this construction.

The soft monopolarity version does not only act on behalf of the US, but on behalf of “humanity”, exclusively understanding it as the West and the societies that agree with universalism of Western values. Soft monopolarity does not claim to press by force, but persuade, not to compel, but explain profits peoples and countries will obtain from entering into globalization. Here the pole is not a single national state (the US), but Western civilization as a whole, as a quintessence of all the humanity.

Such, as it is sometimes called, “multilateral” monopolarity (multilateralism, multilateralization) is rejected by Multipolarism that considers Western culture and Western values to represent merely one axiological composition among many others, one culture among different other cultures, and cultures and value systems based on some absolutely different principles to have the full right for existence. Consequently, the West in a whole and those sharing its values, have no grounds to insist on universalism of democracy, human rights, market, individualism, individual freedom, secularity, etc. and build a global society on the base of these guidelines.

Against alterglobalism and postmodern antiglobalism, Multipolarism advances a thesis that a capitalist phase of development and construction of worldwide global capitalism is not a necessary phase of society development, that it is despotism and an ambition to dictate different societies some kind of single history scenario. In the meantime, confusion of mankind into the single global proletariat is not a way to a better future, but an incidental and absolutely negative aspect of the global capitalism, which does not open any new prospects and only leads to degradation of cultures, societies, and traditions. If peoples do have a chance to organize effective resistance to the global capitalism, it is only where Socialist ideas are combined with elements of a traditional society (archaic, agricultural, ethnical, etc.), as it was in the history of the USSR, China, North Korea, Vietnam and takes place today in some Latin-American countries (e. g., in Bolivia, Venezuela, Cuba, etc.).

Further, Multipolarism is an absolutely different view on the space of land than bipolarity, a bipolar world.

map1

map2

Multipolarism represents a normative and imperative view on the present situation in the world on the part of the Land and it qualitatively differs from the model predominated in the Yalta World in the period of the “Cold War”.

The Bipolar World was constructed under the ideological principle, where two ideologies – Capitalism and Socialism – acted as poles. Socialism as an ideology did not challenge universalism of the West-European culture and represented a sociocultural and political tradition that threw back to the European Enlightenment. In a certain sense, Capitalism and Socialism competed with each other as two versions of Enlightenment, two versions of progress, two versions of universalism, two versions of the West-European sociopolitical idea.

Socialism and Marxism entered into a resonance with certain parameters of the “Land Power”, and therefore they did not win where Marx had supposed, but where he excluded this possibility – in an agricultural country with the predominant way of life of a traditional society and imperial organization of the political field. Another case of an (independent) victory of Socialism – China – also represented an agricultural, traditional society.

Multipolarism does not oppose monopolarity from the position of a single ideology that could claim for the second pole, but it does from the position of many ideologies, a plenty of cultures, world-views and religions that (each for its own reasons) have nothing in common with the Western liberal capitalism.  In a situation, when the Sea has a unified ideological aspect (however, ever more going to the sphere of subauditions, not explicit declarations), and the Land itself doesn’t, representing itself as several different world-view and civilization ensembles, Multipolarism suggests creating a united front of the Land against the Sea.

Multipolarism is different from both the conservative project of conservation and reinforcement of national states. On the one hand, national states in both colonial and post-colonial period reflect the West-European understanding of a normative political organization (that ignores any religious, social, ethnical, and cultural features of specific societies) in their structures, i.e. the nations themselves are partially products of globalization. And on the other hand, it is only a minor part of the two hundred fifty-six countries officially itemized in the UN list today that are, if necessary, capable to defend their sovereignty by themselves, without entering into a block or alliance with other countries. It means that not each nominal sovereign state can be considered a pole, as the degree of strategical freedom of the vast majority of the countries acknowledged is negligible. Therefore, reinforcement of the Westphalian system that still mechanically exists today is not an issue of Multipolarism.

Being the opposition of monopolarity, Multipolarism does not call to either return to the bipolar world on the base of ideology or to fasten the order of national states, or to merely preserve the status quo. All these strategies will only play in hands of globalization and monopolarity centers, as they have a project, a plan, a goal, and a rational route of movement to future; and all the scenarios enumerated are at best an appeal to a delay of the globalization process, and at worst (restoration of bipolarity on the base of ideology) look like irresponsible fantasy and nostalgia.

Multipolarism is a vector of the Land’s geopolitics directed to the future. It is based upon a sociological paradigm whose consistency is historically proven in the past and which realistically takes into account the state of affairs existing in the modern world and basic trends and force lines of its probable transformations. But Multipolarism is constructed on this basis as a project, as a plan of the world order we yet only expect to create.

2 Multipolarism and its Theoretical Foundation

The absence of the Multipolarism Theory

In spite of the fact that the term “Multipolarism” is quite often used in political and international discussions recently, its meaning is rather diffuse and inconcrete. Different circles and separate analysts and politicians insert their own sense in it. Well-founded researches and solid scientific monographs devoted to Multipolarism can be counted on fingers[1]. Even serious articles on this topic are quite rare[2]. The reason for this is well understood: as the US and Western countries set the parameters of the normative political and ideological discourse in a global scale today, according to these rules, whatever you want can be discussed but the sharpest and most painful questions. Even those considering unipolarity to have been just a “moment[3]” in the 1990-s and a transfer to some new indefinite model to be taking place now are ready to discuss any versions but the “multipolar” one. Thus, for example, the modern head of CFR Richard Haass tells about “Non-Polarity” meaning such stage of globalization where necessity in presence of a rigid center falls off by itself[4]. Such wiles are explained by the fact that one of the aims of globalization is, as we have seen, marginalization of the “Land Power”. And as far as Multipolarism can only be a form of an active strategy of the “Land Power” in the new conditions, any reference to it is not welcome by the West that sets the trend in the structure of political analysis in the general global context. Still less one should expect that conventional ideologies of the West take up development of the Multipolarism Theory.

It would be logical to assume that the Multipolarism Theory will be developed in the countries that explicitly declare orientation upon a multipolar world as the general vector of their foreign policy. The number of such countries includes Russia, China, India, and some others. Besides, the address to Multipolarism can be encountered in texts and documents of some European political actors (e.g., former French minister of Foreign Affairs Hubert Vidrine[5]). But at the moment, we can as well hardly find something more than materials of several symposiums and conferences with rather vague phrases in this field. One has to state that the topic of Multipolarism is not properly conceptualized also in the countries that proclaim it as their strategical goal, not to mention the absence a distinct and integral theory of Multipolarism.

Nevertheless, on the base of the geopolitical method from the position of the “Land Power” and with due account for the analysis of a phenomenon called globalism, it is quite possible to formulate some absolute principles that must underlie the Multipolarism Theory when the matter comes to its more systemized and expanded development.

Multipolarism: Geopolitics and Meta-Ideology

Let’s blueprint some theoretical sources, on whose base a valuable theory of Multipolarism must be built.

It is only geopolitics that can be the base for this theory in the actual conditions. At the moment, no religious, economical, political, social, cultural or economical ideology is capable to pull together the critical mass of the countries and societies that refer to the “Land Power” in a single planetary front necessary to make a serious and effective antithesis to globalism and the unipolar world. This is the specificity of the historical moment (“The Unipolar Moment”[6]): the dominating ideology (the global liberalism/post-liberalism) has no symmetrical opposition on its own level. Hence, it is necessary to directly appeal to geopolitics by taking the principle of the Land, the Land Power, instead of the opposing ideology. It is only possible in the case if the sociological, philosophical, and civilization dimensions of geopolitics are realized to the full extent.

AD4pt-greece.jpgThe “Sea Power” will serve us as a proof for this statement. We have seen that the very matrix of this civilization does not only occur in the Modem Period, but also in thalassocratic empires of the Antiquity (e.g., in Carthage), in the ancient Athens or in the Republic of Venice. And within the Modern World itself atlantism and liberalism do not as well find complete predominance over the other trends at once. And nevertheless, we can trace the conceptual sequence through a series of social formations: the “Sea Power” (as a geopolitical category) moves through history taking various forms till it finds its most complete and absolute aspect in the global world where its internal precepts become predominant in a planetary scale. In other words, ideology of the modern mondialism is only a historical form of a more common geopolitical paradigm. But there is a direct relation between this (probably, most absolute) form and the geopolitical matrix.

There is no such direct symmetry in case of the “Land Power”. The Communism ideology just partly (heroism, collectivism, antiliberalism) resonated with geopolitical percepts of the “ground” society (and this just in the concrete form of the Eurasian USSR and, to a lesser degree, of China), as the other aspects of this ideology (progressism, technology, materialism) fitted badly in the axiological structure of the “Land Power”. And today, even in theory, Communism cannot perform the mobilizing ideological function it used to perform in the 20th century in a planetary scale. From the ideological point of view the Land is really split into fragments and, in the nearest future, we can hardly expect some new ideology capable to symmetrically withstand the liberal globalism to appear. But the very geopolitical principle of the Land does not lose anything in its paradigmatic structure. It is this principle that must be taken as a foundation for construction of the Multipolarism Theory. This theory must address directly to geopolitics, draw principles, ideas, methods and terms out of it. This will allow to otherwise take both the wide range of existing non-globalist and counter-globalist ideologies, religions, cultures, and social trends. It is absolutely unnecessary to shape them to transform into something unified and systematized. They can well remain local or regional but be integrated into a front of common stand against globalization and “Western Civilization’s” domination on the meta-ideological level, on the paradigmatic level of Geopolitics-2 and this moment – plurality of ideologies – is already laid in the very term “Multi-polarism” (not only within the strategical space, but also in the field of the ideological, cultural, religious, social, and economical one).

Multipolarism is nothing but extension of Geopolitics-2 (geopolitics of the Land) into a new environment characterized with the advance of globalism (as atlantism) on a qualitatively new level and in qualitatively new proportions. Multipolarism has no other sense.

Geopolitics of the Land and its general vectors projected upon the modern conditions are the axis of the Multipolarism Theory, on which all the other aspects of this theory are threaded. These aspects constitute philosophical, sociological, axiological, economical, and ethical parts of this theory. But all of them are anyway conjugated with the acknowledged – in an extendedly sociological way – structure of the “Land Power” and with the direct sense of the very concept of “Multipolarism” that refers us to the principles of plurality, diversity, non-universalism, and variety.

3 Multipolarism and Neo-Eurasianism

Neo-Eurasianism as Weltanschauung

Neo-Eurasianism is positioned nearest to the theory of Multipolarism. This concept roots in geopolitics and operates par excellence with the formula of “Russia-Eurasia” (as Heartland) but at the same time develops a wide range of ideological, philosophical, sociological and politological fields, instead of being only limited with geostrategy and application analysis.

What is in the term of “Neo-Eurasianism” can be illustrated with fragments of the Manifesto of the International “Eurasian Movement” “Eurasian Mission»[7]. Its authors point out five levels in Neo-Eurasianism allowing to interpret it in a different way depending on a concrete context.

The first level: Eurasianism is a Weltanschauung.

According to the authors of the Manifesto, the term “Eurasianism” “is applied to a certain Weltanschauung, a certain political philosophy that combines in itself tradition, modernity and even elements of postmodern in an original manner. The philosophy of Eurasianism proceeds from priority of values of the traditional society, acknowledges the imperative of technical and social modernization (but without breaking off cultural roots), and strives to adapt its ideal program to the situation of a post-industrial, information society called “postmodern”.

The formal opposition between tradition and modernity is removed in postmodern. However, postmodernism in the atlantist aspect levels them from the position of indifference and exhaustiveness of contents. The Eurasian postmodern, on the contrary, considers the possibility for an alliance of tradition with modernity to be a creative, optimistic energetic impulse that induces imagination and development.

In the Eurasianism philosophy, the realities superseded by the period of Enlightenment obtain a legitimate place – these are religion, ethnos, empire, cult, legend, etc. In the same time, a technological breakthrough, economical development, social fairness, labour liberation, etc. are taken from the Modern. The oppositions are overcome by merging into a single harmonious and original theory that arouses fresh ideas and new decisions for eternal problems of humankind. (…)

The philosophy of Eurasianism is an open philosophy, it is free from any forms of dogmatism. It can be appended by diversified areas – history, religion, sociological and ethnological discoveries, geopolitics, economics, regional geography, culturology, various types of strategical and politological researches, etc. Moreover, Eurasianism as a philosophy assumes an original development in each concrete cultural and linguistic context: Eurasianism of the Russians will inevitably differ from Eurasianism of the French or Germans, Eurasianism of the Turks from Eurasianism of the Iranians; Eurasianism of the Arabs from Eurasianism of the Chinese, etc. Whereby, the main force lines of this philosophy will, in a whole, be preserved unalterable.(…)

The following items can be called general reference points of the Eurasianism philosophy:

  • differentialism, pluralism of value systems against obligatory domination of a single ideology (in our case and first of all, of the American liberal democracy);
  • traditionalism against destruction of cultures, beliefs and rites of the traditional society;
  • a world-state, continent-state against both bourgeois national states and “the world government”;
  • rights of nations against omnipotence of “the Golden Billion” and neo-colonial hegemony of “the Rich North”;
  • an ethnos as a value and subject of history against depersonalization of nations and their alienation in artificial sociopolitical constructions;
  • social fairness and solidarity of labour people against exploitation, logic of coarse gain, and humiliation of man by man.»[8]

Neo-Eurasianism as a Planetary Trend

On the second level: Neo-Eurasianism is a planetary trend. The authors of the Manifesto explain:

«Eurasianism on the level of a planetary trend is a global, revolutionary, civilization concept that is, by gradually improving, addressed to become a new ideological platform of mutual understanding and cooperation for a vast conglomerate of different forces, states, nations, cultures, and confessions that refuse from the Atlantic globalization.

It is worth carefully reading the statements of the most diverse powers all over the world: politicians, philosophers, and intellectuals and we will make sure that Eurasianists constitute the vast majority. Mentality of many nations, societies, confession, and states is, though they may not suspect about it themselves, Eurasianist.

If thinking about this multitude of different cultures, religions, confessions, and countries discordant with “the end of history” we are imposed by atlantism, our courage will grow up and the seriousness of risks of realization of the American 21st century strategical security concept related with a unipolar world establishment will sharply increase.

Eurasianism is an aggregate of all natural and artificial, objective and subjective obstacles on the way of unipolar globalization, whereby it is elevated from a mere negation to a positive project, a creative alternative. While these obstacles exist discretely and chaotically, the globalists deal with them separately. But it is worth just integrating, pulling them together in a single, consistent Weltanschauung of a planetary character and the chances for victory of Eurasianism all over the world will be very serious.»[9]

Neo-Eurasianism as an Integration Project

On the next level, Neo-Eurasianism is treated as a project of strategical integration of the Eurasian Continent:

“The concept “the Old World” usually defining Europe can be considered much wider. This huge multicivilization space populated with nations, states, cultures, ethnoses and confessions connected between each other historically and spatially by the community of dialectical destiny. The Old World is a product of organic development of human history.

The Old World is usually set against the New World, i.e. the American continent that was discovered by the Europeans and has become a platform for construction of an artificial civilization where the European projects of the Modern, the period of Enlightenment have taken shape. (…)

In the 20th century Europe realized its original essence and had gradually been moving to integration of all the European states into a single Union capable to provide all this space with sovereignty, independence, security, and freedom.

Creation of the European Union was the greatest milestone in the mission of Europe’s return in history. This was the response of “the Old World” to the exorbitant demands of the “New” one. If considering the alliance between the US and Western Europe – with US domination – to be the Atlantist vector of European development, then the integration of European nations themselves with predomination of the continental countries (France-Germany) can be considered Eurasianism in relation to Europe.

It becomes especially illustrative, if taking into account the theories that Europe geopolitically stretches from the Atlantic to the Urals (Ch. de Gaulle) or to Vladivostok. In other words, the interminable spaces of Russia are also valuably included in the field of the Old World subject to integration.

(…) Eurasianism in this context can be defined as a project of strategical, geopolitical, economical integration of the North of the Eurasian Continent realized as the cradle of European history, matrix of nations and cultures closely interlaced between each other.

And since Russia itself (like, by the way, the ancestors of many Europeans as well) is related in a large measure with the Turkish, Mongolian world, with Caucasian nations, through Russia – and in a parallel way through Turkey – does the integrating Europe as the Old World already acquire the Eurasianism dimension to full extent; and in this case, not only in symbolic sense, but also in geographical one. Here Eurasianism can be synonimically identified with Continentalism.[10]»

These three most general definitions of Neo-Eurasianism demonstrate that here we deal with a preparatory basis for construction of the Multipolarism Theory. This is the ground view on the sharpest challenges of modernity and attempt to give an adjust response to them taking into account geopolitical, civilization, sociological, historical and philosophical regularities.


[1]  Murray D.,  Brown D. (eds.) Multipolarity in the 21st Century. A New World Order. Abingdon, UK: Routledge, 2010; Ambrosio Th. Challenging America global Preeminence: Russian Quest for Multipolarity. Chippenheim, Wiltshire: Anthony Rose, 2005; Peral L. (ed.) Global Security in a Multi-polar World. Chaillot

Paper. Paris: European Institute for Security Studies, 2009; Hiro D. After Empire: The Birth of a Multipolar World. Yale: Nation Books , 2009.

[2] Turner Susan. Russia, Chine and the Multipolar World Order: the danger in the undefined// Asian Perspective. 2009. Vol. 33, No. 1. C. 159-184; Higgott Richard Multi-Polarity and Trans-Atlantic Relations: Normative Aspirations and Practical Limits of EU Foreign Policy. – www.garnet-eu.org. 2010. [Electronic resource] URL: http://www.garnet-eu.org/fileadmin/documents/working_papers/7610.pdf (дата обращения 28.08.2010); Katz M. Primakov Redux. Putin’s Pursuit of «Multipolarism» in Asia//Demokratizatsya. 2006. vol.14 № 4. C.144-152.

[3] Krauthammer Ch. The Unipolar Moment// Foreign Affairs. 1990 / 1991 Winter. Vol. 70, No 1. С. 23-33.

[4] Haass R. The Age of Non-polarity: What will follow US Dominance?’//Foreign Affairs.2008. 87 (3). С. 44-56.

[5] Déclaration de M. Hubert Védrine, ministre des affaires étrangères sur la reprise d’une dialogue approfondie entre la France et l’Hinde: les enjeux de la resistance a l’uniformisation culturelle et aux exces du monde unipolaire. New Delhi — 1 lesdiscours.vie-publique.fr. 7.02.2000.  [Electronic resource] URL: http://lesdiscours.vie-publique.fr/pdf/003000733.pdf

[6] Krauthammer Ch. The Unipolar Moment. Op.cit.

[7] Евразийская миссия. Манифест Международного «Евразийского Движения». М.: Международное Евразийское Движение, 2005.

[8] Ibid

[9] Ibid.

[10] Ibid.

This entry was posted in Journal of Eurasian Affairs, vol.1, Num.1, 2013 by eurasianaffairs. Bookmark the permalink.

vendredi, 11 octobre 2013

Too Much Putin?

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Too Much Putin?

By Michael O'Meara 

Ex: http://www.counter-currents.com

US hegemony may be approaching its end. Once the world refuses to acknowledge the imperial authority of its humanitarian missiles, and thus stops paying tribute to its predatory model of the universe (as momentarily occurred in Syria), then American power inevitably starts to decline – and not simply on the world stage, but also domestically, among the empire’s subjects, who in the course of the long descent will be forced to discover new ways to assert themselves.

***

Historically, America’s counter-civilizational system was an offshoot of the Second World War, specifically the US conquest of Europe — which made America, Inc. (Organized Jewry/Wall Street/the military-industrial complex) the key-holder not solely to the New Deal/War Deal’s Washingtonian Leviathan, but to its new world order: an updated successor to Disraeli’s money-making empire, upon which the sun never set.[1]

The prevailing race-mixing, nation-destroying globalization of the last two and a half decades, with its cosmopolitan fixation on money and commerce and its non-stop miscegenating brainwashing, is, as such, preeminently a product of this postwar system that emerged from the destruction of Central Europe and from America’s Jewish/capitalist-inspired extirpation of its European Christian roots.[2]

The fate of white America, it follows, is closely linked to the “order” the United States imposed on the “Free World” after 1945 and on the rest of the world after 1989. This was especially evident in the recent resistance of the American “people” to Obama’s flirtation with World War III – a resistance obviously emboldened by the mounting international resistance to Washington’s imperial arrogance, as it (this resistance) momentarily converged with the worldwide Aurora Movements resisting the scorch-earth campaigns associated with US power.[3]

***

Everyone on our side recognizes the ethnocidal implications of America’s world order, but few, I suspect, understand its civilizational implications as well as Russia’s Vladimir Putin.

On September 19, barely a week after our brush with the Apocalypse, the Russian president delivered an address to the Valdai International Discussion Club (an international forum on Russia’s role in the world), which highlighted the extreme degree to which Putin’s vision of world order differs from that of Obama and the American establishment.[4] Indeed, Putin’s entire line of thought, in its grasp of the fundamental challenges of our age, is unlike anything to be found in the discourse of the Western political classes (though from the misleading reports in the MSM on his Valdai address this would never be known).[5]

Putin, to be sure, is no White Nationalist and thus no proponent of a racially-homogenous ethnostate. This makes him like everyone else. Except Putin is not like everyone else, as we’ll see.

Certain East Europeans, instinctively anti-Russian, like our Cold War “conservatives,” refuse to appreciate Russia’s new international role because of historical grievances related to an earlier legacy of Tsarist or Soviet imperialism (though their grievances, they should know, bare little comparison to those “We Irish” hold against the English ruling class). In any case, such tribal grievances are not our concern, nor should they prevent the recognition that East Europeans and Russians, like Irish and English – and like all the national tribes belonging to that community of destiny distinct to the white man – share a common interest (a life-and-death interest) in being all prospective allies in the war against the globalist forces currently assaulting them in their native lands.

It’s not simply because Russia is anti-American that she is increasingly attractive to the conscious remnants of the European race in North America (though that might be reason enough). Rather it’s that Russia, in defying the globalist forces and reaffirming the primacy of her heritage and identity, stands today for principles that lend international legitimacy – and hence a modicum of power – to patriots everywhere resisting the enemies of their blood.

***

Qualitative differences of world-shaping consequence now clearly separate Russians and Americans on virtually every key issue of our age (more so than during the Cold War) – differences in my view that mark the divide between the forces of white preservation and those of white replacement, and, more generally, between the spirit of European man and the materialist, miscegenating depravity of the US system, which approaches the whole world as if it were a flawed and irredeemable version of itself.

In this sense, the decline of American global power and the rising credibility of Russia’s alternative model can only enhance the power of European Americans, increasing their capacity to remain true to their self-identity. US imperial decline might even eventually give them a chance to take back some of the power that decides who they are.

Putin’s discourse at the Valdai Club addressed issues (to paraphrase) related to the values underpinning Russia’s development, the global processes affecting Russian national identity, the kind of 21st-century world Russians want to see, and what they can contribute to this future.

His responses to these issues were historically momentous in being unlike anything in the West today. Cynics, of course, will dismiss his address as mere PR, though the Russian leader has a documented history of saying what he thinks – and thus ought not be judged like American politicians, who say only what’s on the teleprompter and then simply for the sake of spin and simulacra.

Foremost of Russia’s concerns, as Putin defined it in his address to the club’s plenary session, is “the problem of remaining Russian in a globalizing world hostile to national identity.” “For us (and I am talking about Russians and Russia), questions about who we are and who we want to be are increasingly prominent in our society.” In a word, Putin sees identitarianism as the central concern of Russia’s “state-civilization,” (something quite staggering when you consider that the very term [“identitarianism”] was hardly known outside France when I started translating it a decade ago). Identitarianism in the 21st century may even, as Putin implies, prove to be what nationalism and socialism were to the 20th century: the great alternative to liberal nihilism.

Like Bush, Clinton, or other US flim-flam artists, Obama could conceivably mouth a similar defense of national identity if the occasion demanded it, but never, not in a thousand years, could he share the sentiment motivating it, namely the sense that: “It is impossible to move forward without spiritual, cultural, and national self-determination. Without this we will not be able to withstand internal and external challenges, nor will we succeed in global competitions.”[6]

The operative term here is “spiritual, cultural and national self-determination” – not diversity, universalism, or some putative human right; not even money and missiles – for in Putin’s vision, Russia’s historical national, cultural, and spiritual identities are the alpha and omega of Russian policy. Without these identities and the spirit animating them, Russia would cease to be Russia; she would be nothing – except another clone of America’s supermarket culture. With her identity affirmed, as recent events suggest, Russia again becomes a great power in the world.

The question of self-determination is necessarily central to the anti-identitarianism of our global, boundary-destroying age. According to Putin, Russia’s national identity

is experiencing not only objective pressures stemming from globalisation, but also the consequences of the national catastrophes of the twentieth century, when we experienced the collapse of our state two different times [1917 and 1991]. The result was a devastating blow to our nation’s cultural and spiritual codes; we were faced with the disruption of traditions and the consonance of history, with the demoralisation of society, with a deficit of trust and responsibility. These are the root causes of many pressing problems we face.

Then, following the Soviet collapse of 1991, Putin says:

There was the illusion that a new national ideology, a development ideology [promoted by Wall Street and certain free-market economists with Jewish names], would simply appear by itself. The state, authorities, intellectual and political classes virtually rejected engaging in this work, all the more so since previous, semi-official ideology was hard to swallow. And in fact they were all simply afraid to even broach the subject. In addition, the lack of a national idea stemming from a national identity profited the quasi-colonial element of the elite – those determined to steal and remove capital, and who did not link their future to that of the country, the place where they earned their money.

Putin here has obviously drawn certain traditionalist conclusions from the failings of the former Communist experiment, as well as from capitalism’s present globalizing course.

A new national idea does not simply appear, nor does it develop according to market rules. A spontaneously constructed state and society does not work, and neither does mechanically copying other countries’ experiences. Such primitive borrowing and attempts to civilize Russia from abroad were not accepted by an absolute majority of our people. This is because the desire for independence and sovereignty in spiritual, ideological and foreign policy spheres is an integral part of our national character . . . [It’s an integral part of every true nation.]

The former Communist KGB officer (historical irony of historical ironies) stands here on the stump of that political/cultural resistance born in reaction to the French Revolution and its destruction of historical organisms.

In developing new strategies to preserve Russian identity in a rapidly changing world, Putin similarly rejects the tabula rasa contentions of the reigning liberalism, which holds that you can “flip or even kick the country’s future like a football, plunging into unbridled nihilism, consumerism, criticism of anything and everything . . .” [Like Burke, he in effect condemns the “junto of robbers” seeking to rip the traditional social fabric for the sake of short term profit, as these money-grubbers prepare the very revolution they dred.]

Programmatically, this means:

Russia’s sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity [against which America’s counter-civilizational system relentlessly schemes] are unconditional. These are red lines no one is allowed to cross. For all the differences in our views, debates about identity and about our national future are impossible unless their participants are patriotic.” [That is, only Russians, not Washington or New York, ought to have a say in determining who or what a Russian is.]

Self-criticism is necessary, but without a sense of self-worth, or love for our Fatherland, such criticism becomes humiliating and counterproductive. [These sorts of havoc-wreaking critiques are evident today in every Western land. Without loyalty to a heritage based on blood and spirit, Russians would be cast adrift in a historyless stream, like Americans and Europeans.] We must be proud of our history, and we have things to be proud of. Our entire, uncensored history must be a part of Russian identity. Without recognising this it is impossible to establish mutual trust and allow society to move forward. . .

The challenges to Russia’s identity, he specifies, are

linked to events taking place in the world [especially economic globalization and its accompanying destruction of traditional life]. Here there are both foreign policy and moral aspects. We can see how many of the Euro-Atlantic countries are actually rejecting their roots, including the Christian values that constitute the basis of Western civilisation. They are denying moral principles and all traditional identities: national, cultural, religious, and even sexual. They are implementing policies that equate large families with same-sex partnerships, belief in God with the belief in Satan.

The excesses of political correctness have reached the point where people are seriously talking about registering political parties whose aim is to promote paedophilia. People in many European countries are embarrassed or afraid to talk about their religious affiliations. Holidays are abolished or even called something different; their essence is hidden away, as is their moral foundation. And people [i.e., the Americans and their vassals] are aggressively trying to export this model all over the world. I am convinced that this opens a direct path to degradation and primitivism, resulting in a profound demographic and moral crisis. [Hence, the US-sponsored desecrations of Pussy Riot.]

What else but the loss of the ability to self-reproduce could act as the greatest testimony of the moral crisis facing a human society? Today almost all developed nations [infected with the system’s counter-civilizational ethos] are no longer able to reproduce themselves, even with the help of migration. Without the values embedded in Christianity and other world religions, without the standards of morality that have taken shape over millennia, people will inevitably lose their human dignity. We consider it natural and right to defend these values. One must respect every minority’s right to be different, but the rights of the majority must not be put into question.

Tolerant and pluralist though he is here, Putin nevertheless affirms the primacy of Russia herself. Our politicians get this 100 percent wrong, Putin only 50 percent – which puts him at the head of the class.

At the same time we see attempts to somehow revive a standardized [i.e., Americanized] model of a unipolar world and to blur the institutions of international law and national sovereignty. Such a unipolar, standardised world does not require sovereign states; it requires vassals. In a historical sense this amounts to a rejection of one’s own identity, of the God-given diversity of the world.

Russia agrees with those who believe that key decisions should be worked out on a collective basis, rather than at the discretion of and in the interests of certain countries or groups of countries. Russia believes that international law, not the right of the strong, must apply. And we believe that every country, every nation is not exceptional [as the Americans think they are], but unique, original, and benefits from equal rights, including the right to independently choose their own development path . . .

This is our conceptual outlook, and it follows from our own historical destiny and Russia’s role in global politics. [Instead, then, of succumbing to America’s suburban consumer culture and its larger dictates, Russia seeks to preserve her own identity and independence.]

Our present position has deep historical roots. Russia itself has evolved on the basis of diversity, harmony and balance, and brings such a balance to the international stage.

The grandeur of Putin’s assertion here has to be savored: against the latest marketing or policy scheme the US tries to impose on Russia, he advances his queen, pointing to a thousand years of Russian history, as he disperses America’s corrupting ploys with a dismissive smirk.

Though seeing Russia as a multiethnic/multi-confessional state that has historically recognized the rights of minorities, he insists she must remain Russian:

Russia – as philosopher Konstantin Leontyev vividly put it – has always evolved in ‘blossoming complexity’ as a state-civilisation, reinforced by the Russian people, Russian language, Russian culture, Russian Orthodox Church and the country’s other traditional religions. It is precisely the state-civilisation model that has shaped our state polity….

Thus it is that Russians, among other things, “must restore the role of great Russian culture and literature. . . to serve as the foundation for people’s personal identity, the source of their uniqueness, and their basis for understanding the national idea. . .” Following Yeats, he might have added that the arts dream of “what is to come,” providing Russians new ways of realizing or re-inventing themselves.

I want to stress again that without focusing our efforts on people’s education and health, creating mutual responsibility between the authorities and each individual, and establishing trust within society, we will be losers in the competition of history. Russia’s citizens must feel that they are the responsible owners of their country, region, hometown, property, belongings and their lives. A citizen is someone who is capable of independently managing his or her own affairs . . .

Think of how the “democratic” powers of the Americanosphere now hound and persecute whoever insists on managing his own affairs: e.g., Greece’s Golden Dawn.

The years after 1991 are often referred to as the post-Soviet era. We have lived through and overcome that turbulent, dramatic period. Russia has passed through these trials and tribulations and is returning to herself, to her own history, just as she did at other points in its history. [This forward-looking orientation rooted in a filial loyalty to the Russian past makes Putin something of an archeofuturist.] After consolidating our national identity, strengthening our roots, and remaining open and receptive to the best ideas and practices of the East and the West, we must and will move forward.

***

As an ethnonationalist concerned with the preservation and renaissance of my own people, I hope Russia succeeds not only in defending her national identity (and ideally that of others), but in breaking America’s anti-identitarian grip on Europe, so as to insure the possibility of a future Euro-Russian imperium federating the closely related white, Christian peoples, whose lands stretch from the Atlantic to the Urals.

But even barring this, Russia’s resistance to the ethnocidal forces of the US global system, will continue to play a major role in enabling European Americans trapped in the belly of the beast to better defend their own blood and spirit.

And even if Europeans should persist in their servility and the United States continues to lead its “mother soil and father culture” into the abyss, Russians under Putin will at least retain some chance of remaining themselves – which is something no mainstream American or European politician seeks for his people.

If only for this reason, I think there can never be “too much Putin,” as our Russophobes fear.

Notes

1. Desmond Fennell, Uncertain Dawn: Hiroshima and the Beginning of Post-Western Civilization (Dublin: Sanas, 1996); Julius Evola, “Disraeli the Jew and the Empire of the Shopkeepers” (1940), http://thompkins_cariou.tripod.com/id34.html [2].

2. “Boreas Rising: White Nationalism and the Geopolitics of the Paris-Berlin-Moscow Axis [3]” (2005).

3. “Against the Armies of the Night: The Aurora Movements [4]” (2010).

4. President of Russia, “Address to the Valdai International Discussion Club” September 19, 2013. http://eng.news.kremlin.ru/transcripts/6007/print [5]. (I have made several grammatical and stylistic changes to the translation.)

5. Much of my understanding of this comes from Dedefensa, “Poutine, la Russie et le sens de la crise” (September 23, 2013) at http://www.dedefensa.org/article-poutine_la_russie_et_le_sens_de_la_crise_23_09_2013.html [6].

6. Samuel P. Huntington was the last major representative of the US elite to uphold a view even vaguely affirmative of the nation’s historical culture – and he caught hell for see. Who Are We?: The Challenges to America’s National Identity (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2005).


Article printed from Counter-Currents Publishing: http://www.counter-currents.com

URL to article: http://www.counter-currents.com/2013/10/too-much-putin/

URLs in this post:

[1] Image: http://www.counter-currents.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/putin.jpg

[2] http://thompkins_cariou.tripod.com/id34.html: http://thompkins_cariou.tripod.com/id34.html

[3] Boreas Rising: White Nationalism and the Geopolitics of the Paris-Berlin-Moscow Axis: http://www.counter-currents.com/2011/08/boreas-risingwhite-nationalism-the-geopolitics-of-the-paris-berlin-moscow-axis-part-1/

[4] Against the Armies of the Night: The Aurora Movements: http://www.counter-currents.com/2010/07/against-the-armies-of-the-night/

[5] http://eng.news.kremlin.ru/transcripts/6007/print: http://eng.news.kremlin.ru/transcripts/6007/print

[6] http://www.dedefensa.org/article-poutine_la_russie_et_le_sens_de_la_crise_23_09_2013.html: http://www.dedefensa.org/article-poutine_la_russie_et_le_sens_de_la_crise_23_09_2013.html

Challenges and Opportunities for Russia

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Restructuring the World by Normative Means: Challenges and Opportunities for Russia

 
Ex: http://www.geopolitica.ru

In the light of global crisis lasting for almost five years the traditional advantages of the West in world politics have turned obviously relative. Its military power is ever more costly and ever less effective for imposing stable order in strategically important regions. Its economy is creeping and prospects of its growth are still obscure. And with resurfacing deep societal imbalances Western ideational leadership is also fading away. In many respects the West finds itself excessively dependent upon foreign markets including those of rising powers which strive to retain and expand their political autonomy.

This means that the gap between the West and the Rest cannot be sustained by usual power instruments and in several years it can be narrowed to a dangerous and irreversible extent. Such perspective prompts the United States as well as the European countries to exert urgent efforts in order to prevent imminent assault on Western leadership in the global system.

The strategy to be deployed for this purpose has crystallized in the last two years and consists in promoting major realignments of global and regional powers around the newly consolidated Western community. This strategy has as its main vehicle the normative influence wielded through redefining economic and political rules within and outside that community. And its practical implementation proceeds along two initiatives presented as a centrepiece of Barack Obama second presidency – Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP or ‘Economic NATO’) and Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP).

These projects are intended to form an exclusive circle of countries with close political proximity and high-level normative convergence. Within these frameworks new basic socioeconomic rules could be agreed that would further be extrapolated outwards to the markets of alien regions. Economically this circle would benefit from revitalized capital flows leading to essential reindustrialization of its economies, while normative expansion to third countries, spurred by their aspirations to have an access to the core zone, would enable the renewed West to shape external markets according to the own needs. Rising powers remaining outside the core, first of all China and Russia, would have to adapt to the new rules and make strategic concessions. Thus the centre-periphery structure of world economy and hence of world politics would be secured and Western leadership reasserted.

This strategy of economic and normative consolidation may be quite logical outcome of the tendencies unfolded in recent years where consensus on global rules is hardly attainable, and the economic weight of rising powers makes the increase of their formal representation and political influence in the global institutions inescapable. Perhaps normative impact is actually the only potentially efficient and not so costly leverage at the West’s disposal now. But in political sense it is quite risky and may bring destabilizing outcomes in no less scope than military force. In addition, its implementation is far from unproblematic given the trends dominating the transatlantic relations as well as in US interaction with Asian states over the past years.

Problems with implementation

Despite widely spread idea that crisis may generate radical renovation of domestic and foreign policies, the key global players demonstrate the opposite inclination towards sticking to decades-old reliable methods and ties. In this vein, after several not very convincing attempts at opening to the ‘new horizons’ Washington again returned to traditional alliances and partnerships that underpinned its international posture after the Second World War. Though shattered by centrifugal forces due to inevitable differentiation of interests, these alliances seem more promising in the sense of resource sharing and political solidarity in times when going-it-alone is not a viable option any more. Leaving aside an even more intricate constellation in the Trans-Pacific dimension of US policy let’s focus upon its transatlantic component.

The European states still remain the closest allies for the US since, as Simon Serfaty argues, no other two poles in the world may form a more complete partnership than the US and the EU[1]. But the situation looks not so unequivocal from the vantage point of the EU interests and priorities.

On the one hand, since the beginning of 2000s the EU has persistently aspired to forge a new quality of transatlantic partnership in order to maintain American security engagement in the European continent and retain own position and influence in transatlantic compact. But at the same time, European capitals exhibited little enthusiasm to the prospect of being drawn into American strategy of military interventions outside Europe. Ensuing indifference on the part of Washington generated anxiety over possible ‘transatlantic divorce’. Election of Barack Obama raised far-reaching hopes in this regard and led to amelioration of political atmosphere between the two shores of the Atlantic. But the actual shifts in relationship turned rather ambiguous, and the clear common vision of the future global order as well as of major international issues has not emerged[2], due to reasons not dissimilar to those of George W. Bush era. The kind of conceptual stalemate was aggravated by disagreements over anti-crisis measures and US announced ‘pivot to Asia’ threatening to further reduce American engagement in Europe.

On the other hand, in the post-bipolar era the European Union managed to accumulate important assets which however modest as they may seem provide it with a capability to pursue own strategy in the international scene. In the economic dimension the EU has long turned into US competitor allowing the analyst to speak about ‘transatlantic bipolarity’ in trade matters[3]. It also elaborated a full-fledged normative basis and consistently employs it as a power leverage in interactions with third countries precisely in the way the US envisage for TTIP. At last, in the past decade the EU built up its own web of relationships with neighbouring and remote regions which although not extremely influential lays the ground for its political autonomy, and renouncing it for the sake of supporting US global strategy looks fairly unreasonable.

Certainly, Washington put forward potent arguments behind its ambitious proposal. It portrays it as a last resort means that can avert EU economic stagnation and political downscaling and, in general, keep alive the euro zone and the European integration as a whole. Its appeal may be even greater if combined with substantial political benefits for particular member states, first of all Germany and Great Britain or for communitarian institutions like the European Commission.

But the real implications of this project should be assessed more carefully. The economic benefits of a suggested free trade area for both sides seem disputable and much depending upon its concrete parameters. Even in the best case the foreseen growth rate does not exceed 0,5 % of the EU’s GDP provided the complete opening of markets, which is far from guaranteed.

No more clarity is there in political and institutional side of the matter. Here the main challenge stem from the prospect that streamlined transatlantic integration may really absorb the European project and thus put a brake upon its movement towards a kind of federal model. The recent history already witnessed such a shift when EU-NATO cooperation forestalled essential deepening of European defence integration as was predicted by Hanna Ojanen[4].

An even more significant problem emanates from the process of converging of regulatory rules and eliminating non-tariff barriers. Up to now the EU rejected to make its normative basis subject to negotiations with a third state and it is hard to imagine how it may compromise it this time especially when several major agreements with solid normative components are underway with neighbouring countries.

The matter is complicated by the fact that the conceptual ground for such convergence is also out of sight. it is an open secret that the US and European practices of economic regulation and state-society relations differ to a serious degree. In essence, consolidation inside the supposed core circle may prove no easier to carry out than potentially projecting it outwards after that.

Apparently, all the above mentioned problems may find more or less satisfying solution provided sufficient political will. Initially there was abundant voluntarism on the part of the EU institutions to strike a lucrative trade deal but as far as the issue is discussed by foreign ministries in the course of setting the mandate for negotiations, numerous reservations arise which can postpone reaching agreement within the EU. And the calendar of the project is rather pressing – American side urges to sign the deal in 2015 and the European Commission dared to set the deadline even earlier in 2014 before the elections to the European Parliament. But these terms are hardly realistic.

Another serious nuance must be mentioned in this context. The post-bipolar era unleashed a process of rediscovering mental, societal and cultural divergences between US and the EU. Together with generational shifts in the United States away from Cold War mass affinity with Europe it produces a context where transatlantic proximity is not taken as granted by European and American public. Such considerations stipulate a necessity in blurring distinctions and reinforcing societal solidarity between the two shores of the Atlantic while accentuating the divergences and gaps with non-Western societies. Ostensibly, a recent wave of same-sex marriage campaign is an integral part of such tactics and it actually contributed to further cultural fence-mending with the outer word.

In sum, the key transatlantic question today is whether the US manages to impose China threat on the EU to an extent justifying economic and normative subordination like it managed to impose Soviet threat to subordinate it strategically sixty years ago. But the EU should realize that agreeing to the US proposal amounts to agreeing to the global strategy it promulgates, a strategy where there would be scarcely an autonomous role for the EU.

Global and regional risks

Normative strategies as such – and the EU has amply experienced it elsewhere – are accompanied by a range of problems starting from the problem of indirect political effect due to which normative influence in each concrete case depends on the reaction of the recipients. But the US ‘two-rings’[5] strategy contains even more serious risks for global governance that cannot be voluntarily dispelled.

As many observers pointed out, it threatens to subvert current multilateral order where general political compromise by all stakeholders is the imperative conditions for progress. In the first turn it will challenge global trade and development institutions, notably the WTO. For the EU that has ever been a protagonist of effective multilateralism inscribed even in its security strategy assuming its failure and contributing to it is a rather confusing political step[6]. It has ever constructed its foreign policy identity in terms of ‘the other West’ acting in contrast to US exceptionalism and arrogance to smooth the disproportions of world development. In fact, its ‘normative power Europe’ pretence is founded upon contrasting its international posture with that of US[7].

But the weakening of global institutions is only part of the problem. Their functionality is already fading and the time when their reforming alone could be sufficient for adjusting world power balance is over. But substituting them with bilateral deals is by no means an optimal solution. Preferring bilateral bargaining over multilateral compromise in order to sustain the power asymmetries may engender new round of balancing unchecked by any universal claims. It should be born in mind that asymmetry even on cooperative terms may endure only when recognised and accepted by both sides, otherwise it produces only exacerbation and desire to vindicate own status. In present day multipolar world it is not the case. Artificial fixing of global hierarchy through arbitrary limiting the range of countries participating in elaboration of economic rules will lead to antagonizing rising powers, entrenching polarization of the global system and setting a new overwhelming conflicting structure.

Perhaps for somebody conflicting structure may seem quite pertinent and even attractive owing to its disciplining effects but there are no reasons to deem that in such structure the West will be able to retain its pre-eminence indefinitely. Unilateral escalating tension and rising stakes would create significant pressure for the West itself which not all of its participators would be willing to withhold. Burden sharing has always been a delicate issue for transatlantic community ever containing an essential element of free-riding. Can Washington this time throw behind its design sufficient weight to bind its partners and simultaneously to impose necessary concessions on its rivals? The answer is far from obvious.

Moving global competition into normative realm is hardly a stabilizing development. Norms and values are deeply interlinked with societal worldviews and the rifts they promote elicit highly emotional reactions in the public-at-large. Instead of intended delaying the shaping of already crystallized multipolar landscape, normative differentiation may catalyze its emergence in an explosive balance-of-power mode deprived of meaningful multilateral restraints.

Russia: how to win the game without participating in it

The role of Russia in the US normative strategy is clearly defined as an outsider that at a certain stage will be compelled to accept the Western terms due to economic or strategic reasons. But even if the task of ‘coercion into cooperation’ of Russia is somehow secondary for this policy in comparison to containing China, Russian front nevertheless is important for elaborating and sophisticating the Western normative toolbox. Russia and East European states are primary objects of the EU normative strategy developed under Eastern Partnership programme which is wholly supported by Washington. And recent trends demonstrate a new round of intentional bringing of normative differences to the fore of the US and EU’s Russia policy.

Russia’s response to those trends is two-fold. On the one hand, Moscow adopted the tactics of overt rejecting Western allegations against its normative pitfalls and voices public criticism at the Western values and their practices that sometimes bring about the ever more visible societal distortions and imbalances. On the other hand, Russia embarked on creating an own normative platform within the framework of Customs / Eurasian Union. Such steps are useful though their implementation as for now looks clumsy and hardly improving Russian international and domestic profile.

But the game that is unfolding in world politics does not allow for purely defensive strategies. Normative fence-mending by the West cannot be matched by symmetrical fence-mending by Russia not least because Russian capabilities for that are below the necessary scope. What is more telling, for Russia trying to build own fences means playing the US game and pouring water at the mill of American projects. Russia is gradually getting entangled in normative competition over values, standards and worldviews before producing an alternative she can come up with.

That competition in itself is highly unfavourable for Russia forcing upon it a choice of either norm-contender role that she is yet not apt for, or norm-taker status that she cannot and should not reconcile itself with. Russia needs an own normative strategy which can be projected outwards and its shaping is currently underway but lacks two essential elements that constitute the principal underpinning of Western normative power – firstly, a pretended universal legitimacy of its norms and, secondly, high living standards of its society.

Russia will not gain much from simply criticizing Western norms or creating a set of technical rules relevant for restricted Eurasian space. No more will it benefit from adopting a staunch anti-Western posture. Delimiting mental and cultural distinctions from the West makes sense only with subsequent formulation of an own universal message and worldview upheld with perceptible improvement of socioeconomic situation in own society. Russian potential ability to offer such a message for its direct environment as well as for the world as a whole emerges its key political advantage in comparison to other rising powers. But proceeding from a defensive stance Russia will hardy be able to formulate it. To that end much can be drawn from its XIX century strategy of promoting universal value of Russian culture[8].

Of course, such normative strategy should proceed along adequate political and economic efforts aimed at preventing the disruption of the existing multilateral world order and emphasising the risks of such disruption together with the progress that can be achieved through multilateral consensus-building process. But under present circumstances relevant normative positioning is indispensable for successful pursuing of the likewise policy line.

Published in Journal of Eurasian Affairs


[1] Serfaty S. The West in a World Recast // Survival. – 2012. – Vol. 54, No. 6. – P. 33

[2] Alessandri E. Transatlantic Relations Four Years Later: The Elusive Quest for a Strategic Vision // The International Spectator: Italian Journal of International Affairs. – 2012. – Vol. 47, No. 3. – P. 20-36.

[3] van Oudenaren J. Transatlantic Bipolarity and the End of Multilateralism // Political Science Quarterly. – 2005. – Vol. 120, No. 1. – P. 1-32.

[4] Ojanen H. The EU and NATO: Two Competing Models for a Common Defence Policy // Journal of Common Market Studies. – 2006. – Vol. 44, No 1. – P. 57-76.

[5] Доктрина Обамы. Властелин двух колец / Авторский коллектив: С.М. Рогов, П.А. Шариков, С.Н. Бабич, И.А. Петрова, Н.В. Степанова http://russiancouncil.ru/inner/?id_4=1783#top

[7] Duke, Simon 'Misplaced 'other' and normative pretence in transatlantic relations' // Journal of Transatlantic Studies. – 2010. – Vol. 8, No. 4. – P. 315-336.

[8] Почепцов Г.Г. Cмислові війни в сучасному світі http://osvita.mediasapiens.ua/material/17967

dimanche, 06 octobre 2013

Archetipi della Russia nella lettura di Elémire Zolla

Archetipi della Russia nella lettura di Elémire Zolla

di

Ex: http://www.centrostudilaruna.it

zollaNel suo libro Archetipi (Marsilio, Venezia, 2002), Elémire Zolla descrive i modelli mitici con un linguaggio allusivo, quasi esso stesso simbolico, che lascia spazio all’intuito del lettore e ne sollecita il risveglio.

Il superamento del dualismo io/mondo, il senso dell’Uno-Tutto, i significati archetipici dei numeri, il continuo richiamo alla loro valenza simbolica, la loro percezione emotiva e non freddamente intellettuale, la esplicazione della loro funzione: lo studioso introduce in un mondo antico, a volte addirittura primordiale, eppure straordinariamente presente nel nostro tempo.

“Un archetipo – egli scrive – è ciò che aduna in un insieme una pluralità di oggetti, coordinandoli a certi sentimenti e pensieri. Il contatto con un archetipo non si può esprimere nel linguaggio ordinario, esige esclamativi e idiotismi, comporta una certa eccitazione. Quando una mente feriale sfiori un archetipo, smarrisce il suo instabile equilibrio e cade nella disperazione. Può capitare all’improvviso: scatta l’amore durante una recita galante, scoppia la furia nell’occasione più futile, cala la disperazione quando l’ambizione è soddisfatta, il dovere compiuto, l’affetto di tutti assicurato … Una vita del tutto sensata e disciplinata è un’utopia: crede di poter ignorare gli archetipi. L’uomo ha bisogno di assiomi per la mente e di estasi per la psiche come ha bisogno di cibo per il corpo: estasi e assiomi possono provenire solo dal mondo degli archetipi. Né bastano estasi lievi, brividi modesti: la psiche cerca la pienezza del panico. L’uomo vuole periodicamente smarrirsi nella foresta degli archetipi. Lo fa quando sogna, ma i sogni non bastano. Deve sparire da sveglio, rapìto da un archetipo in pieno giorno” (p.76).

Eppure, è difficile dare una definizione precisa ed esauriente degli archetipi. Essi sono, per Zolla, “energie formanti”, ma li potremmo anche chiamare “miti mobilitanti” che parlano alla psiche dell’uomo, “idee-forza” primordiali che si rivolgono al cuore, alle emozioni, alla sensibilità e che quindi rifuggono da un inquadramento rigido nel pensiero dialettico.

archetipiNel quadro di un intero capitolo dedicato alla “politica archetipale”, ossia alle risonanze degli archetipi nel dominio politico, Zolla illumina anche gli archetipi che si sono manifestati nella storia russa.

“Bisanzio instillò il suo ultimo mito nella Roma teocratica, ma in Russia risorse. Certi circoli ecclesiastici vi coniarono il mito di Mosca come terza e ultima Roma. Ivan III sposò nel 1472 la nipote di Costantino Paleologo. Era come se il destino russo fosse stato suggellato quando, secondo la vecchia cronaca, gli inviati di Vladimir ispezionarono per lui l’Islam, l’Occidente e Bisanzio. Nell’Islam li colpì uno scomposto fervore, nell’Occidente non ravvisarono traccia di gloria, ma la bellezza dei riti bizantini non riuscirono a scordarla.

Ivan IV il terribile assunse il titolo di zar, parola slavonica assonante con Caesar. Nel secolo XVI fu lanciata la leggenda di Augusto che aveva assegnato la Russia a Prus, avo di Rjurik, fondatore della prima dinastia” (p.104).

Vladimir, il duca di Mosca nel X secolo: tanto è antica la vocazione bizantina della Russia. La descrizione di Zolla coincide con quella di Arnold Toynbee, ma aggiunge questa importante leggenda di Augusto che esprime un richiamo ideale diretto alle origini dell’Impero Romano d’Occidente e non solo a Bisanzio; il mito si fa storia e la storia diviene incarnazione di un mito. In questa dimensione mitica possiamo cogliere l’anima russa molto più di quanto non ci dicano le cronache, le successioni dinastiche, gli intrighi diplomatici.

L’analisi di Zolla si differenzia da quella di Toynbee quando evidenzia che il mito incrollabile degli Zar fu la liberazione dell’ortodossia prigioniera dei Turchi, la conquista di Costantinopoli chiave dell’impero ecumenico.

gli-arcani-del-potereNella storia e nella cultura russa, Zolla coglie due miti: quello “costantinianeo”- ossia il mito dell’Imperatore romano-orientale – e quello dell’imperatore-filosofo, di ascendenza ellenica e platonica che ha la sua riemersione nel pensiero, negli scritti e nell’opera di Giorgio Gemisto Pletone, che nel XV secolo pone il seme fecondo della fioritura del neoplatonismo “pagano” prima in Grecia, a Mistrà, poi in Italia, in occasione del suo viaggio nel 1439.  Quando Bisanzio cadde, nel 1453,  per mano dei Turchi, avvenne una divaricazione dei due miti: i neoplatonici greci si trasferirono in Italia, mentre il mito dell’imperatore “costantinianeo” rifiorì in Russia. Eppure, anche il mito dell’imperatore-filosofo trova una sua espressione nella storia russa: Pietro il Grande, nel 1721, abolì il patriarcato ortodosso di Mosca, proclamò la tolleranza religiosa e assunse il titolo latino di Imperator; il mito imperiale-filosofico eclissò, in quel momento, il mito dell’imperatore costantinianeo.

Caterina II, amica dei philosophes e imperatrice-filosofa, si presenta come Minerva o Astrea rediviva e riporta in terra il regno di Saturno come Augusto. Ella educa, però, il nipote da principe bizantino e per porlo sul trono si allea con Giuseppe II, l’imperatore-filosofo dell’Occidente.

I due miti, il costantiniano e il filosofico – scrive Zolla – sedurranno alternativamente gli Zar che si troveranno sempre tutti impediti all’ultimo di raggiungere il Bosforo: Nicola I, Alessandro II, Nicola II” (p.105.)

La soggezione all’archetipo parve interrotta con la rivoluzione bolscevica del 1917 in cui Zolla coglie la manifestazione, su un piano materialistico, dell’archetipo romùleo, ossia l’irruzione di un modello di violenza e di forza distruttrice e creatrice, come Romolo si era affermato fondatore di Roma uccidendo Remo. In realtà, l’interruzione dell’archetipo fu solo una maya, come direbbero gli Indiani.

“Lo stemma bolscevico ripropone gli dèi delle rifondazioni, l’astro rosso di Marte, il martello di Vulcano, la falce di Saturno coi mannelli del suo regno restaurato. Il cranio sfondato di Trotzky conferì allo Stato proletario la compattezza che a Roma era venuta dal cadavere di Remo. Si compirono molte mosse simboliche oscure: la capitale riportata alla terza Roma, la Chiesa ortodossa ricostituita in patriarcato, il Fondatore mummificato come un faraone” (p. 105).

E ancora Zolla ricorda come l’ossessione del Bosforo rimase intatta nei colloqui fra Ribbentropp e Molotov.

filosofia-perenneRiguardo ai simboli arcaici presenti nel bolscevismo, Evola e Guénon avrebbero sicuramente parlato – come del resto fecero – di segni di una contraffazione contro-iniziatica. Gli archetipi di Marte, Vulcano e Saturno agirono nelle forme di una religione rovesciata, il “credo” dell’ateismo.

Il filo rosso della storia russa è, dunque,  il costante richiamo al modello della romanità nella duplice e oscillante versione dell’imperatore costantinianeo e dell’imperatore-filosofo, fra Bisanzio e la Grecia classica, fra l’impero assolutistico di stampo più orientale e il modello romano-occidentale più tollerante e pluralista.

Comunque, pur in questa oscillazione, la Russia scelse consapevolmente di connettersi all’Impero Romano d’Oriente e di raccoglierne l’eredità, pur avendo la possibilità storica di accogliere altri modelli, come quello religioso giudaico scelto dai Kazari nel IX secolo d.C., o quello turco-islamico.

E tale costante è fondamentale per inquadrare la vocazione storica della Russia e la sua anima, nonché le basi della sua comunanza culturale con l’Europa.

samedi, 05 octobre 2013

G. A. Zjuganov: “Il nostro Paese non può esistere senza un’idea nazionale”

G. A. Zjuganov: “Il nostro Paese non può esistere senza un’idea nazionale”

Traduzione di Luca Baldelli

Ex: http://www.statopotenza.eu

Il giorno 20 settembre, anticipando la prossima sessione plenaria della Duma di Stato, G A Zjuganov, Presidente del Comitato centrale del Partito comunista della Federazione russa, nonché capogruppo comunista presso la Duma, ha commentato il discorso tenuto il 19 settembre dal Presidente della Federazione Russa, V. V. Putin, al 10° incontro del Forum Internazionale di dibattito “Valdaj” .

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Gennadij Andreevich Zjuganov
Presidente del Comitato centrale del Partito comunista, capogruppo del Partito comunista nella Duma di Stato della RF.
“Le dichiarazioni che Putin ha reso ieri al Forum “Valdaj”, le ho personalmente attese per 20 anni – ha affermato, condividendole, Gennadij Zjuganov. – Ciò dal momento che, a partire da Gorbaciov, i leaders che si sono avvicendati alla guida del nostro Paese non hanno detto nulla di tutto questo. A mio parere, questo discorso si sarebbe dovuto tenere prima davanti all’Assemblea federale e alla Nazione tutta, non solo davanti al ristretto pubblico dei rappresentanti stranieri. Credo che esso meriti particolare attenzione nel contesto della discussione che si terrà alla Duma” .
“Putin ha dichiarato, per la prima volta, che il nostro Paese non può esistere senza una idea nazionale – ha sottolineato il capo dei comunisti russi. – La Russia non può esistere senza proseguire nel solco delle sue migliori tradizioni, senza un serio dialogo tra le varie forze politiche per la costruzione di programmi e proposte articolati nell’interesse di tutti i cittadini, non solo di singoli gruppi sociali, per non parlare dell’oligarchia”.
G. A. Zjuganov ha inoltre ricordato che ricorre in questi giorni il 20° anniversario dei fatti che coinvolsero il Soviet Supremo della RSFSR (il colpo di mano di Eltsin, ndr), con tanto di attacco militare alla sede istituzionale. “Poche persone per 50 giorni resistettero alla costruzione dell’autocrazia presidenziale. Si è ripetuto e si continua ad affermare da più parti che lo Stato non dovrebbe avere la loro ideologia, la loro cultura, la loro visione dei fatti. Uno Stato senza forma né anima, uno Stato – mostro, ecco quello che da più parti si vuole; uno Stato che ha dato origine alla corruzione selvaggia e al terribile degrado della società che è sotto gli occhi di chiunque voglia vedere” – ha incalzato, con toni indignati, il leader del Partito comunista.
“Oggi si pretende di porre davanti alla storia il compito di inventare un’idea nazionale. A tal proposito, vorrei ricordare a Putin che l’idea nazionale non è né può essere il parto della testa di qualcuno. Eltsin incaricò Burbulis, Shakhraj e altri come loro di plasmare quest’ idea. Le grandi idee, però, quelle in cui le persone credono, sono sempre nate dalle lotte, dal lavoro, dal dolore, dalle vittorie, dalle sconfitte, dalle scoperte geniali” -  ha rimarcato G. A. Zjuganov.
“Abbiamo creato un’idea nazionale in mille anni di storia. L’essenza di quest’idea è rappresentata da uno Stato forte, ad alto contenuto spirituale, dal senso della comunità, della giustizia naturale. Noi – il popolo della Vittoria – siamo stati in grado di sopravvivere, nella nostra storia, grazie ad una serie di trionfi che ci hanno garantito la libertà, il diritto alla terra, la tutela delle nostre credenze e convinzioni” – ha ricordato  il capo comunista russo.
“Abbiamo iniziato con la grande vittoria sul lago Peipus, presso il quale sono stati sconfitti gli stessi Crociati che, in precedenza, avevano saccheggiato Costantinopoli e la Palestina. Abbiamo quindi affermato il diritto di professare la nostra fede e di sviluppare la nostra cultura. Dalla Battaglia di Kulikovo è sorto lo Stato russo; da Poltava è fiorito l’Impero russo. Abbiamo dimostrato di essere in grado di sviluppare i nostri spazi aperti, basandoci sulle nostre proprie forze” – ha continuato Gennadij Zjuganov.
“Sul campo di Borodino, poi, abbiamo dimostrato di poter battere un avversario forte che aveva raccolto sotto le sue insegne “crociati” di tutta Europa.  Le tre grandi battaglie della Grande Guerra Patriottica – Mosca, Stalingrado e Orel/Kursk -  hanno deciso l’esito della lotta contro le forze oscure del fascismo. In quella guerra uscirono vittoriosi l’Armata Rossa e gli ideali della Rivoluzione d’Ottobre. Voglio suggerire a Putin che è bene lavorare tutti insieme, non dimenticare una qualsiasi di queste pagine di storia. Questa è storia vera, altro che i cascami e la poltiglia del liberalismo che, imperanti per anni, hanno imposto al fondo di tutto la russofobia, l’odio verso tutto ciò che era sovietico, nazionale e genuinamente democratico”, – ha detto il leader del Partito comunista.
“Oggi, la politica interna del governo Medvedev non ha nulla a che fare con l’idea dello Stato-Nazione, con gli ideali che ci hanno assicurato la vittoria e il successo. Non ci può essere uno Stato forte quando l’ultimo immobile viene venduto, quando il 90 per cento delle grandi proprietà sono sotto il controllo degli stranieri. Lo Stato dovrebbe dare l’esempio a tutta la società nel far rispettare la legge, in primo luogo ai membri del Governo”- ha detto Gennadij Zjuganov.
“Non possono esistere uno Stato collettivista e un popolo che lo supporta e lo anima, se si dà la stura ad ogni forma di individualismo. Se tutto è predisposto e studiato per non far lavorare le persone, per deprimere le energie vive della società, se si punta tutto sulle lotterie, sui bagordi, sul gioco d’azzardo, sulle carte, come ci si può meravigliare di ciò che accade? – ha affermato G. A. Zjuganov – Inventano un programma su uno dei più importanti canali televisivi, ed ecco quel che avviene: quasi tutti si siedono in poltrona e giocano del denaro. Un Paese in cui si rincorrono ricchezze virtuali è destinato alla sconfitta. Un Paese può conoscere il successo a una sola condizione: la sua gente deve essere in grado di imparare ed inventare, affermando la propria dignità e dormendo così sonni tranquilli. Tutto questo non è contemplato nelle linee guida della nostra politica interna. Nessun Paese può sperare in qualsivoglia successo se la giustizia sociale viene calpestata. Da noi, il 10% più ricco dispone di un reddito 40-50 volte superiore a quello del 10% più povero. Un divario simile non si riscontra nemmeno nei Paesi dell’Africa. In questo senso siamo diventati lo Stato più ingiusto che esiste” – ha detto Gennadij Andreevich.
“Il nostro Paese non può essere certo prospero e solido, dal momento che il Governo di Medvedev è composto da persone che non se ne intendono di industria. Essi distruggono un settore dopo l’altro. Hanno distrutto il settore dei macchinari, quello dell’elettronica, quello della fabbricazione di strumenti di precisione. Hanno condotto alla prostrazione l’agricoltura, con il risultato di 41 milioni di ettari di terra arabile ricoperta da erbacce. Il sistema dell’istruzione, della formazione, dei tirocini è corrotto a livello di ogni scuola e tutte le famiglie ne sono coinvolte. Si è fatto di tutto per provocare l’indebolimento e la distruzione dell’Accademia delle Scienze, senza ascoltare gli scienziati e l’opposizione politica” – ha sottolineato il leader comunista.
“Purtroppo, dobbiamo registrare un divario enorme tra le parole e le azioni dei capi della Nazione. Per l’affermazione di un’idea nazionale proclamata con lo scudo e la bandiera della Federazione russa, si impone la necessità di una politica saggia ed equilibrata. Servono un nuovo corso e una nuova compagine di governo. Valuto pertanto il discorso di Putin come la giustificazione politica e ideologica di un cambiamento tanto necessario che dovrà essere portato avanti nel corso dell’anno, con le dimissioni dell’attuale Governo. Vediamo cosa accadrà . E’ importante che le idee espresse ieri da Putin siano concretamente realizzate nella vita pratica di tutti i giorni. Se così sarà, siamo pronti fin da adesso a fare la nostra parte, appoggiando il nuovo corso” – ha dichiarato, concludendo, G. A. Zjuganov.

vendredi, 04 octobre 2013

Putin saluta il tradizionalismo, nucleo dell’identità nazionale della Russia

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Putin saluta il tradizionalismo, nucleo dell’identità nazionale della Russia

RIA Novosti & http://www.statopotenza.eu

Il presidente russo Vladimir Putin propaganda il tradizionalismo come cuore dell’identità nazionale della Russia, lamentando minacce come la globalizzazione e il multiculturalismo, l’unità per un “mondo unipolare” e l’erosione dei valori cristiani, tra cui un esagerato concentrarsi sui diritti delle minoranze sessuali.


Senza i valori al centro del cristianesimo e delle altre religioni del mondo, senza norme morali plasmate nel corso dei millenni, i popoli perderanno inevitabilmente la loro dignità umana“, ha detto Putin, rivolgendosi a diverse centinaia di funzionari russi e stranieri, studiosi e altre figure pubbliche in una conferenza promossa dal Cremlino nella Russia nordoccidentale. In un discorso e una sessione aperta della durata di oltre tre ore, Putin ha criticato aspramente “i Paesi euro-atlantici“, dove “ogni identità tradizionale,… tra cui l’identità sessuale, viene rifiutata.” “C’è una politica che equipara le famiglie con molti bambini a famiglie dello stesso sesso, la fede in Dio alla fede in Satana“, ha detto durante la 10.ma riunione annuale del cosiddetto Valdai Club, trasmessa in diretta dalla televisione russa e dai siti di informazione. “Il diritto di ogni minoranza alla diversità deve essere rispettata, ma il diritto della maggioranza non deve essere messa in discussione“, ha detto Putin.


Putin si orienta verso una retorica conservatrice da quando è tornato al Cremlino per la terza volta, nel 2012, dopo un periodo di quattro anni come Primo ministro. Ha promosso regolarmente i valori tradizionali nei discorsi pubblici, una mossa che gli analisti politici vedono come tentativo di mobilitare la base elettorale conservatrice di fronte al crescente malcontento pubblico e al rallentamento dell’economia. Molti valori liberali criticati nel suo discorso sono stati associati alla classe media urbana, forza trainante delle grandi proteste anti-Cremlino a Mosca, dopo le controverse elezioni parlamentari alla fine del 2011.

Traduzione di Alessandro Lattanzio

mercredi, 02 octobre 2013

Myth, Utopia, & Pluriversal Realism

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Myth, Utopia, & Pluriversal Realism

By Leonid Savin 

Ex: http://www.counter-currents.com

Georges Sorel divided social and political formations into two types: (1) those which had a myth as the basis for their ideology, and (2) those which appealed to utopian ideas. The first category he attributed to revolutionary socialism, where the true revolutionary myths are not descriptions of phenomena, but the expression of human will. The second category is utopian projects, which he attributed to bourgeois society and capitalism.

In contrast to myth, with its irrational attitudes, utopia is a product of mental labor. According to Sorel, it is the work of theorists who are trying to create a model with which to critique existing society and to measure the good and evil within it. Utopia is a set of imaginary institutions, but also offers plenty of clear analogies to real institutions.

Myths urge us to fight, whereas utopia aims at reform. It is no accident that some utopians after gaining political experience often become adroit statesmen.

Myth cannot be refuted, since it is held in concert as a belief of the community and is thus irreducible. Utopias, however, can be considered and rejected.

As we know, the various forms of socialism, both on the left and right of the political spectrum were actually built on myths, as readily evidenced in their advocate’s works. It is sufficient to recall the Myth of the 20th Century by Alfred Rosenberg, who became an apologist for German National Socialism.

At the opposite end of socialism we also see a mythological basis, although it is analyzed post-facto.  Even while Marx said that the proletariat does not need myths that are destroyed by capitalism, Igor Shafarevich conclusively demonstrated the link of the eschatological expectations of early Christianity and socialism. Liberation Theology in Latin America also confirms the strong presence of myth at work within left socialism of the 21st century.

If we talk in terms of the second and third political theories that have struggled with liberalism, it is pertinent to recall the remark of Friedrich von Hayek, who in his work The Road to Serfdom notes that, “in February 1941, Hitler felt it appropriate to say in a public speech that National Socialism and Marxism are basically the same thing.”

Of course, this does not diminish the importance of modern political myth, and also explains the hatred of it exhibited by the representatives of modern liberalism. Thus, political alternatives—whether the New Right, Indigenism, or Eurasianism—present a new totalitarian threat for neoliberals. Liberals, both classic and neo-, deny us our ideals, because they think they are largely mythological in character and thus cannot be translated into reality.

Now back to utopia. Liberal political economy, as rightly noted by Sorel, is, itself, one of the best examples of utopian thought. All human relationships are reduced to the form of free market exchange. This economic reductionism is presented by liberal utopians as a panacea for conflicts, misunderstandings, and all sorts of distortions that arise in societies.

The doctrine of utopianism emerged from the works of Tommaso Campanella, Francis Bacon, Thomas More, and Jonathan Swift, as well as philosophers-liberals such as the leader of the British radicals Jeremy Bentham. The embodiment of utopia was erected at first on a rigid regulatory policy, which, at the same time included violence as a form of coercion on its citizens. It then switched to colonial expansion, which allowed for the accumulation of capital and the establishment of a single so-called “civilized standard” for other countries. Then liberal utopianism went even farther, becoming, in the words of Bertram Gross, “friendly fascism,” in that it started to institutionalize dominance and hegemony through a regime of international law and regulations. By this time, liberal utopia has itself become a modern myth: technocentric, rational, and totalitarian—emasculating the first utopian idea of ​​a just society and replacing it with materialism and utilitarian law, becoming, in effect, a dystopia.

In the case of both myth-centric societies, and utopias, consistently implemented through experiments with law, economics, philosophy, and politics, there was a major mistake in trying to extend the model globally. Fascism and Marxism fell first historically. However, liberalism has also now been called into question, as presciently noted about 20 years ago by John Lukacs in his work The End of the 20th Century and the End of the Modern Era.

Myth and utopia both drew their strength from the pluriversal world, homogenizing it and destroying its wealth of cultures and worldviews. The pluriversum was the basis on which the superstructure of Utopia was formed. It also where certain modern forces that aimed at implementing violent historical projects drew upon mythological deep mythological layers.

Within pluriversal reality there is space both for myth and utopia, if they are limited to a certain spaces with unique civilizational characteristics and separated from each other by geographical boundaries. Myth can be realized in the form of a theocracy or a futurological empire. Utopia could at the same time strive towards a biopolitical technopolis or a melting pot of the nations, but of course separately from myth-centric orders.

Carl Schmitt suggested the construction and recognition of such self-contained “Big Political Spaces” or Grossraume. The formation of these spaces would require a global program of pluriversalism, appealing to the distinctive myths and cultural foundations of different peoples. But all parties to a pluriversal order must have one thing in common as a prerequisite: the deconstruction of the superstructure of the nascent neoliberal utopia.

 


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vendredi, 27 septembre 2013

L’eredità romano-bizantina della Russia nel pensiero di Arnold Toynbee

L’eredità romano-bizantina della Russia nel pensiero di Arnold Toynbee

Autore:

Ex: http://www.centrostudilaruna.it

toynbeePreambolo

La recentissima iniziativa diplomatica di Vladimir Putin in relazione alla crisi siriana ha riproposto e rilanciato il ruolo internazionale della Russia, dopo un ventennio di declino seguìto allo smembramento ed al collasso dell’Unione Sovietica nel 1991.

In precedenza, con varie scelte di politica interna (l’azione penale contro le Femen, la lotta contro l’oligarchia affaristico-finanziaria, la polemica e l’opposizione al modello occidentale delle adozioni da parte dei gay), Putin si era posto come esponente di un modello alternativo rispetto a quello del “politicamente corretto” di matrice statunitense, differenziandosi anche da altri esponenti della classe dirigente russa che esprimono un atteggiamento più filo-occidentale.

Nella attuale crisi siriana, la Russia esprime ed afferma una visione geopolitica multipolare che si è concretizzata nell’esito del G-20 di S. Pietroburgo, in cui la sua opposizione all’intervento militare USA in Siria ha coagulato intorno a sé i paesi del BRICS (Brasile, India, Cina, Sudafrica, oltre alla Russia stessa). Il presidente russo ha però compreso che non era sufficiente limitarsi a dire no alla guerra nel teatro siriano, ma occorreva mettere in campo un’iniziativa diplomatica che sottraesse ad Obama il pretesto delle armi chimiche per un intervento bellico ammantato da giustificazioni “umanitarie” e legato, in realtà, ad un preciso disegno geopolitico di smembramento e destabilizzazione delle guide politiche “forti” del mondo arabo e dell’area mediorientale in particolare, in moda da garantirsi il controllo delle fonti energetiche (compreso il grande bacino di gas presente nel sottosuolo del Mediterraneo orientale) e consolidare la supremazia militare e politica di Israele.

Questo rilancio del ruolo internazionale della Russia sia rispetto agli USA, sia rispetto al dialogo euro-mediterraneo, unitamente alla riaffermazione di una diversità culturale russa rispetto ad un occidente americanizzato, sollecita una riflessione sulle radici storico-culturali della Russia e sulla possibilità di riscoprire una koiné culturale euro-russa  che investe le origini storiche di questa Nazione e la sua diversità rispetto al modello di un Occidente che graviti sul modello americano.

La diffusione e il rilancio della teoria politica “euroasiatica” (espressa in Italia dalla rivista Eurasia e che vanta illustri precedenti teorici) e la recentissima enucleazione del progetto “Eu-Rus” rendono tale riflessione ancora più attuale e necessaria.

A tale riguardo è molto pertinente considerare un saggio dello storico inglese Arnold Toynbee (Londra 1889-York 1975), dal titolo Civilisation on trial (Oxford, 1948), pubblicato poi in traduzione italiana per le edizioni Bompiani nel 1949 e poi riedito tre volte, fino all’ultima edizione del 2003. Il saggio appare quindi in piena epoca staliniana, quando l’URSS sembrava l’antagonista dell’Occidente nello scenario della “guerra fredda”.

In questo libro – che è un classico della storia comparata e che pur risente fortemente del momento storico in cui viene scritto (il passaggio all’era atomica, la supremazia militare ed economica americana), lo storico inglese si interroga sulle radici remote e sull’ eredità bizantina della Russia, illuminandone una dimensione profonda che, nel contesto storico in cui venne teorizzata, denota la capacità di trascendere le apparenze e identificare le “costanti” della storia.

Toynbee divise la sua attività fra gli incarichi accademici e quelli politico-istituzionali. Fu docente di storia bizantina all’Università di Londra (e questo è un aspetto importante per capire il saggio di cui ci occupiamo) e docente di storia internazionale alla London School of Economics. Egli fece parte di numerose delegazioni inglesi all’estero e fu direttore del Royal Insitute of International Affairs. La sua opera maggiore è A Study of History (Londra-Oxford, 1934-1961) in 12 volumi, ma ricordiamo anche L’eredità di Annibale, pubblicato in Italia da Einaudi,  in cui approfondisce le linee guida della politica estera di Roma antica e le conseguenze devastanti della guerra annibalica; siamo in presenza di uno storico famoso la cui opera spazia da Bisanzio a Roma antica, da Annibale alle civiltà orientali, offrendo al lettore un grande scenario d’insieme. Egli unisce lo studio della storia all’esperienza diplomatica ed alla conoscenza della realtà contemporanea.

L’eredità bizantina della Russia

civilta-al-paragoneIn Civiltà al paragone Toynbee dedica un‘ intero capitolo al tema dell’eredità bizantina della Russia e lo apre con la citazione di una massima di Orazio: “Naturam espellas furca, tamen usque recurret” (“Allontana pure la natura; tuttavia essa ritornerà”).

Quando tentiamo di rinnegare il passato - scrive lo storico inglese -  quest’ultimo ha, come Orazio ben sapeva, un suo modo sornione di tornare fra noi, sottilmente travestito”. Egli non crede quindi alle affermazioni del regime di Stalin secondo cui la Russia avrebbe compiuto un taglio netto col suo passato. In realtà, le radici di un popolo possono manifestarsi in forme nuove, adattate al mutato contesto storico, ma è falso ed illusorio pretendere di cancellare il passato.

Nel decimo secolo d.C. i Russi scelgono deliberatamente – secondo Toynbee – di abbracciare il Cristianesimo ortodosso orientale. Essi avrebbero potuto seguire l’esempio dei loro vicini di sud-est, i Kazars delle steppe – che si convertirono al Giudaismo (v. op.cit., p. 242) – o quello dei Bulgari Bianchi, lungo il Volga, che si convertirono all’Islam nel decimo secolo. Essi preferirono invece accogliere il modello religioso di Bisanzio.

Dopo la presa di Costantinopoli da parte dei Turchi nel 1453 e la scomparsa degli ultimi resti dell’Impero Romano d’Oriente, il principato di Mosca assunse in piena coscienza dai Greci l’eredità di Bisanzio.

Nel 1472 il Gran Duca di Mosca, Ivan III, sposò Zoe Paleològos, nipote dell’ultimo imperatore greco di Costantinopoli, ultimo greco a portare la corona dell’Impero Romano d’Oriente. Tale scelta riveste un senso simbolico ben preciso, indicando l’accoglimento e la riproposizione di un archetipo imperiale, come evidenziato da Elémire Zolla.

Nel 1547, Ivan IV (“il Terribile”) “si incoronò Zar, ovvero – scrive Toynbee – Imperatore Romano d’Oriente. Sebbene il titolo fosse vacante, quel gesto di attribuirselo era audace, considerando che nel passato i principi russi erano stati sudditi ecclesiatici di un Metropolita di Mosca o di Kiev, il quale a sua volta era sottoposto al Patriarca Ecumenico di Costantinopoli, prelato politicamente dipendente dall’Imperatore Greco di Costantinopoli, di cui ora il Granduca Moscovita assumeva titolo, dignità e prerogative”.

il-racconto-dell-uomoNel 1589 fu compiuto l’ultimo e significativo passo, quando il Patriarca ecumenico di Costantinopoli, a quel tempo in stato di sudditanza ai Turchi, fu costretto, durante una sua visita a Mosca, a innalzare il Metropolita di Mosca, già suo subordinato, alla dignità di Patriarca indipendente. Per quanto il patriarcato ecumenico greco abbia mantenuto, nel corso dei secoli fino ad oggi, la posizione di primus inter pares fra i capi delle Chiese ortodosse (le quali, unite nella dottrina e nella liturgia, sono però indipendenti l’una dall’altra come governo), tuttavia la Chiesa ortodossa russa divenne, dal momento del riconoscimento della sua indipendenza, la più importante delle Chiese ortodosse, essendo la più forte come numero di fedeli ed anche perché l’unica a godere dell’appoggio di un forte Stato sovrano.

Tale assunzione dell’eredità bizantina non fu un fatto accidentale né il frutto di forze storiche impersonali; secondo lo storico inglese i Russi sapevano benissimo quale ruolo storico avessero scelto di assumere. La loro linea di “grande politica” fu esposta nel sedicesimo secolo con efficace e sintetica chiarezza dal monaco Teofilo di Pakov al Gran Duca Basilio III di Mosca, che regnò fra il terzo e il quarto Ivan (quindi nella prima metà del ‘500):

La Chiesa dell’antica Roma è caduta a causa della sua eresia; le porte della seconda Roma, Costantinopoli, sono state abbattute dall’ascia dei Turchi infedeli; ma la Chiesa di Mosca, la Chiesa della Nuova Roma, splende più radiosa del sole nell’intero universo… Due Rome sono cadute, ma la Terza è incrollabile; una quarta non vi può essere” .

È significativa questa identificazione esplicita di Mosca con la terza Roma, a indicare l’assunzione, in una nuova forma, dell’ideale romano dell’Imperium, ossia la unificazione di un mosaico di etnie diverse in una entità politica sovranazionale, che è – nella forma storica russa – anche l’autorità da cui dipende  quella religiosa ortodossa, così come in precedenza il Patriarca ecumenico di Costantinopoli dipendeva dall’Imperatore di Bisanzio.

In questo messaggio del monaco Teofilo si coglie, inoltre, un esplicito riferimento allo scisma del 1054 d.C. fra le Chiese ortodosse orientali e quella cattolica di Roma, considerata eretica (Toynbee ricorda, al riguardo, la famosa disputa teologica sul “filioque” nel testo del Credo in latino).

Lo storico inglese si chiede perché crollò la Costantinopoli bizantina e perché invece la Mosca bizantina sopravvisse. Egli reputa di trovare la risposta ad entrambi gli enigmi storici in quella che egli chiama “l’istituzione bizantina dello Stato totalitario”, intendendo per tale lo Stato – Impero che esercita il controllo su ogni aspetto della vita dei sudditi. L’ingerenza dello Stato nella vita della Chiesa e la mancanza di autonomia e di libertà di quest’ultima sarebbero state le cause dell’inaridimento delle capacità creative della civiltà bizantina, soprattutto dopo la restaurazione dell’impero di Bisanzio da parte di Leone il Siriano, due generazioni prima della restaurazione dell’Impero d’Occidente da parte di Carlo Magno (restaurazione che Toynbee, da buon inglese fedele ad un’impostazione di preminenza “talassocratica”, considera come un fortunoso fallimento).

La stessa istituzione dello Stato totalitario sarebbe stata invece all’origine della potenza e della continuità storica della Russia, sia perché ne assicurava l’unità interna, sia anche perché tale unità consentiva alla Russia, unitamente alla sua remota posizione geografica rispetto a Bisanzio, di non essere coinvolta nel disfacimento dell’impero bizantino e di restare l’unico Stato sovrano e forte che professasse il cristianesimo ortodosso orientale.

Tale configurazione politica e religiosa implica però che i Russi, nel corso dei secoli, abbiano riferito a se stessi, secondo lo storico inglese,  quella primogenitura e supremazia culturale che noi occidentali ci attribuiamo quali eredi della civiltà greco-romana e – secondo Toynbee – anche quali eredi di Israele e dell’Antico Testamento (ma qui il tema si fa più complesso e discusso, perché il cristianesimo occidentale si afferma storicamente in quanto si romanizza e diviene cattolicesimo romano che è fenomeno ben diverso dalla corrente cristiana di Pietro e della primitiva comunità cristiana di Gerusalemme).

Pertanto in tutti i momenti storici in cui vi sia un conflitto, una divergenza di vedute fra  l’Occidente e la Russia, per i Russi l’Occidente ha sempre torto e la Russia, quale erede di Bisanzio, ha sempre ragione. Tale antagonismo si manifesta per la prima volta in modo plastico con lo scisma del 1054 fra le Chiese ortodosse orientali e quella di Roma ma è una costante che si sviluppa in tutto il corso della storia russa, seppure con alterne vicende ed oscillazioni, dovute ad una componente filo-occidentale che pur è presente, talvolta, con Pietro il Grande e con la sua edificazione di san Pietroburgo, la più occidentale delle città russe.

Questo Stato totalitario ha avuto due riformulazioni innovative, una appunto con Pietro il Grande e l’altra con Lenin nel 1917. Agli occhi di Toynbee, il comunismo sovietico si configura come una sorta di nuova religione laicizzata e terrestrizzata, di nuova chiesa, ma la Russia nella sua sostanza, resta pur sempre uno Stato-Impero totalitario – nel senso specificato in precedenza -  che raccoglie l’eredità simbolica e politico-religiosa dell’Impero Romano d’Oriente. Ciò equivale a vedere – e in questo il suo sguardo era acuto – il comunismo come una sovrastruttura ideologica, come fenomeno di superficie rispetto alla struttura dell’anima russa, rovesciando così l’impostazione del materialismo storico. In quel momento epocale in cui scrive, Toynbee vede un grande dilemma presentarsi davanti alla Russia: se integrarsi nell’Occidente (che egli vede come sinonimo di una civiltà di impronta anche anglosassone e quindi, implicitamente, nel quadro euro-americano) oppure delineare un suo modello alternativo anti-occidentale. La conclusione dello storico inglese – impressionante per la sua lungimiranza – è che la Russia, come anima, come indole del suo popolo,  sarà sempre la “santa Russia”  e Mosca sarà sempre la “terza Roma”. Tamen usque recurret.

Considerazioni critiche

L’eredità bizantina della Russia è, in ultima analisi l’eredità romana, la visione imperiale come unità sovrannazionale nella diversità, visione geopolitica dei grandi spazi e della grande politica, ivi compresa la proiezione mediterranea, perché un Impero necessita sempre di un suo sbocco sul mare come grande via di comunicazione.

comunita-e-libertaTale retaggio romano (lo Czar ha una sua precisa assonanza fonetica con il Caesar romano, come già notava Elémire Zolla in Archetipi, ove evidenzia anche la componente fortemente germanica della dinastia dei Romanov) è la base, il fondamento della koiné culturale con l’Europa occidentale ed è anche la linea di demarcazione, di profonda distinzione rispetto agli USA.

In altri termini, la Russia è Europa, mentre gli USA risalgono ad un meticciato di impronta culturale protestante e calvinista che è tutta’altra cosa in termini di visione della vita e del mondo, nonché di modello di civiltà.

La teoria del blocco continentale russo-germanico – sostenuta, negli anni ’20 del Novecento dal gruppo degli intellettuali di Amburgo nell’ambito del filone della “rivoluzione conservatrice” – e la visione “euroasiatica” affermata da Karl Haushofer trovano il loro fondamento in questi precedenti storico-culturali, senza la conoscenza dei quali non si comprende la storia contemporanea della Russia, la sua proiezione mediterranea, la sua vocazione ad un ruolo di grande potenza nello scacchiere mondiale.

Sta a noi europei – ed a noi italiani, in particolare, per la specificità della nostra storia e delle nostre origini – ritrovare e diffondere la consapevolezza delle radici comuni euro-russe nella prospettiva auspicabile di un blocco continentale euro-russo che sia un modello distinto e alternativo rispetto a quello “occidentale” di impronta statunitense, sia sul piano politico ma soprattutto su quello “culturale”.

In questa ottica, gioveranno anche altri ulteriori approfondimenti teorico-culturali su temi affini, quali il pensiero di Spengler sull’anima russa, la lettura spengleriana della dicotomia Tolstoj-Dostojevski come simbolo di un’ambivalenza russa, il contributo di Zolla sul rapporto fra la Russia e gli archetipi che essa riprende e sviluppa, l’elaborazione culturale della Konservative Revolution sul rapporto russo-germanico.

Il presente contributo è solo l’inizio di uno studio storico-culturale più ampio.

mardi, 24 septembre 2013

Shanghai Cooperation Organisation warns against US-led war on Syria

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Shanghai Cooperation Organisation warns against US-led war on Syria

By John Chan
Ex: http://www.wsws.org/

The latest summit of the Russian- and Chinese-led Central Asian grouping, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), held in Bishkek, the capital of Kyrgyzstan, on September 13, was dominated by the rising global tensions produced by the US preparations for war against Syria.

Russian President Vladimir Putin insisted that “military interference from outside the country without a UN Security Council sanction is inadmissible.” The summit’s joint declaration opposed “Western intervention in Syria, as well as the loosening of the internal and regional stability in the Middle East.” The SCO called for an international “reconciliation” conference to permit negotiations between the Syrian government and opposition forces.

As he had done at the recent G20 summit in St Petersburg, Chinese President Xi Jinping lined up with Russia against any military assault on Damascus, fearing that it would be a prelude to attack Iran, one of China’s major oil suppliers.

Significantly, Iran’s new President Hassan Rouhani attended the meeting, despite suggestions that his government would mark a shift from former President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and his anti-American rhetoric at previous SCO summits. Rouhani welcomed Russia’s proposal to put Syria’s chemical weapons under international control, claiming that it has “given us hope that we will be able to avoid a new war in the region.”

The SCO explicitly supported Iran’s right to develop its nuclear program. Putin insisted in an address that “Iran, the same as any other state, has the right to peaceful use of atomic energy, including [uranium] enrichment operations.” The SCO declaration warned, without naming the US and its allies, that “the threat of military force and unilateral sanctions against the independent state of [Iran] are unacceptable.” A confrontation against Iran would bring “untold damage” to the region and the world at large.

The SCO statement also criticised Washington’s building of anti-ballistic missile defence systems in Eastern Europe and Asia, aimed at undermining the nuclear strike capacity of China and Russia. “You cannot provide for your own security at the expense of others,” the statement declared.

Despite such critical language, neither Putin nor Xi want to openly confront Washington and its European allies. Prior to the SCO summit, there was speculation that Putin would deliver advanced S-300 surface-to-air missile systems to Iran and build a second nuclear reactor for the country. Russian officials eventually denied the reports.

Russia and China are facing growing pressure from US imperialism, including the threat that it will use its military might to dominate the key energy reserves in the Middle East and Central Asia. The SCO was established in 2001, shortly before the US utilised the “war on terror” to invade Afghanistan. Although the SCO’s official aim is to counter “three evils”—separatism, extremism and terrorism in the region—it is above all a bid to ensure that Eurasia does not fall completely into Washington’s orbit.

Apart from the four former Soviet Central Asian republics—Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan—the group also includes, as observer states, Mongolia, Iran, India, Pakistan and Afghanistan. The “dialogue partners” are Belarus, Sri Lanka and, significantly, Turkey, a NATO member, which was added last year.

However, US influence is clearly being brought to bear on the grouping. Before the summit, there were reports in the Pakistani press that the country could be accepted as a full SCO member. Russia invited new Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif to attend. However, Sharif only sent his national security advisor Sartaj Aziz, and no Pakistan membership was granted.

While the SCO is looking to enhance its role in Pakistan’s neighbour, Afghanistan, after the scheduled withdrawal of NATO forces, Aziz said Pakistan’s policy was “no interference and no favorites.” He insisted that the US-backed regime in Kabul could achieve an “Afghan-led reconciliation” if all countries in the region resisted the temptation to “fill the power vacuum.”

China and Russia are also deeply concerned by the US “pivot to Asia” to militarily threaten China and to lesser extent, Russia’s Far East, by strengthening Washington’s military capacities and alliances with countries such as Japan and South Korea. In June, China and Russia held a major joint naval exercise in the Sea of Japan, and in August, they carried out joint land/air drills in Russia involving tanks, heavy artillery and warplanes.

Facing US threats to its interests in the Middle East and the Asia-Pacific, China is escalating its efforts to acquire energy supplies in Central Asia. For President Xi, the SCO summit was the last stop in a 10-day trip to Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan—where he signed or inaugurated multi-billion-dollar deals for oil and gas projects.

At his first stop, Turkmenistan, Xi inaugurated a gas-processing facility at a massive new field on the border with Afghanistan. Beijing has lent Turkmenistan $US8 billion for the project, which will triple gas supplies to China by the end of this decade. The country is already China’s largest supplier of gas, thanks to a 1,800-kilometer pipeline across Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan to China.

In Kazakhstan, where Xi signed a deal to buy to a minority stake in an offshore oilfield for $5 billion, he called for the development of a new “silk road economic belt.” Trade between China and the five Central Asian republics has increased nearly 100-fold since 1992, and Kazakhstan is now the third largest destination of Chinese overseas investment.

Xi delivered a speech declaring that Beijing would never interfere in the domestic affairs of the Central Asian states, never seek a dominant role in the region and never try to “nurture a sphere of influence.” This message clearly sought to also placate concerns in Russia over China’s growing clout in the former Soviet republics.

During the G20 summit, the China National Petroleum Corporation signed a “basic conditions” agreement with Russia’s Gazprom to prepare a deal, expected to be inked next year, for Gazprom to supply at least 38 billion cubic metres of gas per year to China via a pipeline by 2018.

With so much at stake, Wang Haiyun of Shanghai University declared in the Global Times that “maintaining regime security has become the utmost concern for SCO Central Asian members, including even Russia.” He accused the US and other Western powers of inciting “democratic turmoil” and “colour revolutions” and warned that if any SCO member “became a pro-Western state, it will have an impact on the very existence of the SCO.” If necessary, China had to show “decisiveness and responsibility” to join Russia and other members to contain the turmoil, i.e. to militarily crush any “colour revolution” in the region.

The discussions at the SCO meeting are a clear indication that Russia and China regard the US war plans against Syria and Iran as part of a wider design to undermine their security, underscoring the danger that the reckless US drive to intervene against Syria will provoke a far wider conflagration.

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jeudi, 19 septembre 2013

Une nouvelle Route de la Soie reliera l’Asie à l’Europe

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Une nouvelle Route de la Soie reliera l’Asie à l’Europe

Par Tatiana Golovanova

Ex: http://fortune.fdesouche.com

Les pays regroupés dans l’Organisation de coopération de Shanghai (OCS) pourront rétablir la Voie de la Soie sous forme d’un corridor de transport spécialement aménagé. Comme l’a annoncé vendredi au sommet de l’OCS à Bichkek (Kirghizie) le ministre de la Recherche et des technologies de la Chine Wang Gang, ce projet a trouvé un soutien auprès de tous les pays membres de l’organisation.

Les membres de l’OCS sont prêts à développer les échanges économiques et commerciaux. Durant ces trois mois des spécialistes de Chine, qui a pris l’initiative de faire renaître la Voie de la Soie, ont visité les pays d’Asie Centrale – le Kazakhstan, l’Ouzbékistan et la Turkménie.

La Voie de la Soie rénovée pourra relier la Chine à l’Europe via la Russie et les États d’Asie Centrale

Des ententes ont été conclues au sujet de la réalisation des projets communs pour des dizaines de milliards de dollars. L’aménagement d’un corridor de transport de l’Asie à l’Europe est une étape suivante de l’essor de ces rapports, remarque Sergueï Sanakoïev, secrétaire de la Chambre sino-russe.

« Il s’agit de créer un corridor transnational traversant le territoire du continent eurasiatique. Comme toujours, l’aménagement de tels corridors en plus de rendre possible la circulation des marchandises et des services prévoient aussi la création de grappes d’entreprises industrielles, de nouvelles productions, de technologies de pointe. Cela veut dire que cela ouvre de plus larges possibilités à la coopération dans le cadre de l’OCS lors de la mise en œuvre d’une telle initiative. »

Le projet est censé mettre en place un réseau routier reliant le Pacifique à la mer Baltique, anéantir les barrières commerciales, réduire les délais de livraison des marchandises et augmenter les règlements mutuels en monnaies nationales. L’une des variantes possibles de la future Voie de la Soie est le corridor de transport « Europe –Chine Occidentale ».

Il passera par le Kazakhstan, approchera la frontière de la Russie et se prolongera par Orenbourg et les autoroutes fédérales vers Saint-Pétersbourg et la Golfe de Finlande et la mer Baltique. La longueur de ce parcours pourra atteindre près de 8 500 km. Voici le commentaire d’Alexandre Potavine, analyste de la compagnie « RGS – Gestion des actifs ».
« En regardant la carte du monde et en évaluant les possibilités d’aménager une telle voie, on verra que les marchandises de Chine seront livrées via la Russie, l’Asie Centrale en Europe. Ce projet profite évidemment à la Chine. Il permet de minimiser les frais de transport, étant donnée que la Grande Voie de la Soie est d’environ un tiers est plus court que la voie maritime, contournant l’Asie et la péninsule Arabique. »

Si on réussit de mettre en œuvre cette conception, la Chine réduira les délais de livraison de ses marchandises. Actuellement les frets parviennent à l’Europe par mer au bout de 45 jours, par le Transsibérien – cela prend deux semaines. La nouvelle voie sera la plus courte et ne prendra pas plus de dix jours.

En plus de la Chine le corridor de transport permettra de se développer à d’autres participants. Ils pourront gagner bien sur le transit et la logistique, et vont encore attirer des investissements chinois pour leurs projets de transport, remarque Sergueï Sanakoïev.

La Voix de la Russie

jeudi, 12 septembre 2013

Alexander Dugin on Syria and the New Cold War

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Alexander Dugin on Syria and the New Cold War

Alternative Right

An interview with Alexander Dugin on the Syrian crisis.

 

Prof. Dugin, the world faces right now in Syria the biggest international crisis since the downfall of the Eastern Block in 1989/90. Washington and Moscow find themselves in a proxy-confrontation on the Syrian battleground. Is this a new situation?

Dugin: We have to see the struggle for geopolitical power as the old conflict of land power represented by Russia and sea power represented by the USA and its NATO partners. This is not a new phenomenon; it is the continuation of the old geopolitical and geostrategic struggle. The 1990s was the time of the great defeat of the land power represented by the USSR. Mikhail Gorbachev refused the continuation of this struggle. This was a kind of treason and resignation in front of the unipolar world. But with President Vladimir Putin in the early years of this decade, came a reactivation of the geopolitical identity of Russia as a land power. This was the beginning of a new kind of competition between sea power and land power.

How did this reactivation start?

Dugin: It started with the second Chechen war (1999-2009). Russia by that time was under pressure by Chechen terrorist attacks and the possible separatism of the northern Caucasus. Putin had to realize all the West, including the USA and the European Union, took sides with the Chechen separatists and Islamic terrorists fighting against the Russian army. This is the same plot we witness today in Syria or recently in Libya. The West gave the Chechen guerrillas support, and this was the moment of revelation of the new conflict between land power and sea power. With Putin, land power reaffirmed itself. The second moment of revelation was in August 2008, when the Georgian pro-Western Saakashvili regime attacked Zchinwali in South Ossetia. The war between Russia and Georgia was the second moment of revelation.

Is the Syrian crisis now the third moment of revelation?

Dugin: Exactly. Maybe it is even the final one, because now all is at stake. If Washington doesn´t intervene and instead accepts the position of Russia and China, this would be the end of the USA as a kind of unique superpower. This is the reason why I think Obama will go far in Syria. But if Russia steps aside and accepts the US-American intervention and if Moscow eventually betrays Bashar al-Assad, this would mean immediately a very hard blow to the Russian political identity. This would signify the great defeat of the land power. After this, the attack on Iran would follow and also on northern Caucasus. Among the separatist powers in the northern Caucasus there are many individuals who are supported by the Anglo-American, Israeli and Saudi powers. If Syria falls, they will start immediately the war in Russia, our country. Meaning: Putin cannot step aside; he cannot give up Assad, because this would mean the geopolitical suicide of Russia. Maybe we are right now in the major crisis of modern geopolitical history.

So right now both dominant world powers, USA and Russia, are in a struggle about their future existence…

Dugin: Indeed. At the moment there is no any other possible solution. We cannot find any compromise. In this situation there is no solution which would satisfy both sides. We know this from other conflicts, such as the Armenian-Azeri or the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. It is impossible to find a solution for both sides. We witness the same now in Syria, but on a bigger scale. The war is the only way to make a reality check.

Why?

Dugin: We have to imagine this conflict as a type of card game like Poker. The players have the possibility to hide their capacities, to make all kinds of psychological tricks, but when the war begins all cards are in. We are now witnessing the moment of the end of the card game, before the cards are thrown on the table. This is a very serious moment, because the place as a world power is at stake. If America succeeds, it could grant itself for some time an absolutely dominant position. This will be the continuation of unipolarity and US-American global liberalism. This would be a very important moment because until now the USA hasn´t been able to make its dominance stable, but the moment they win that war, they will. But if the West loses the third battle (the first one was the Chechen war, the second was the Georgian war), this would be the end of the USA and its dominance. So we see: neither USA nor Russia can resign from that situation. It is simply not possible for both not to react.

Why does US-president Barrack Obama hesitate with his aggression against Syria? Why did he appeal the decision to the US-Congress? Why does he ask for permission that he doesn´t need for his attack?

Dugin: We shouldn´t make the mistake and start doing psychological analyses about Obama. The main war is taking place right now behind the scenes. And this war is raging around Vladimir Putin. He is under great pressure from pro-American, pro-Israeli, liberal functionaries around the Russian president. They try to convince him to step aside. The situation in Russia is completely different to the situation in USA. One individual, Vladimir Putin, and the large majority of the Russian population which supports him are on one side, and the people around Putin are the Fifth column of the West. This means that Putin is alone. He has the population with him, but not the political elite. So we have to see the step of the Obama administration asking the Congress as a kind of waiting game. They try to put pressure on Putin. They use all their networks in the Russian political elite to influence Putin´s decision. This is the invisible war which is going on right now.

Is this a new phenomenon?

Dugin: (laughs) Not at all! It is the modern form of the archaic tribes trying to influence the chieftain of the enemy by loud noise, cries and war drums. They beat themselves on the chest to impose fear on the enemy. I think the attempts of the US to influence Putin are a modern form of this psychological warfare before the real battle starts. The US-Administration will try to win this war without the Russian opponent on the field. For this they have to convince Putin to stay out. They have many instruments to do so.

But again: What about the position of Barrack Obama?

Dugin: I think all those personal aspects on the American side are less important than on the Russian side. In Russia one person decides now about war and peace. In the USA Obama is more a type of bureaucratic administrator. Obama is much more predictable. He is not acting on his behalf; he simply follows the middle line of US-American foreign politics. We have to realize that Obama doesn´t decide anything at all. He is merely the figurehead of a political system that makes the really important decisions. The political elite makes the decisions, Obama follows the scenario written for him. To say it clearly, Obama is nothing, Putin is everything.

You said Vladimir Putin has the majority of the Russian population on his side. But now it is peace time. Would they also support him in a war in Syria?

Dugin: This is a very good question. First of all, Putin would lose much of his support if he does not react on a Western intervention in Syria. His position would be weakened by stepping aside. The people who support Putin do this because they want to support a strong leader. If he doesn´t react and steps aside because of the US pressure, it will be considered by the majority of the population as a personal defeat for Putin. So you see it is much more Putin´s war than Obama´s war. But if he intervenes in Syria he will face two problems: Russian society wants to be a strong world power, but it is not ready to pay the expenses. When the extent of these costs becomes clear, this could cause a kind of shock to the population. The second problem is what I mentioned already, that the majority of the political elite are pro-Western. They would immediately oppose the war and start their propaganda by criticizing the decisions of Putin. This could provoke an inner crisis. I think Putin is aware of these two problems.

When you say the Russians might be shocked by the costs of such a war, isn´t there a danger that they might not support Putin because of that?

Dugin: I don´t think so. Our people are very heroic. Let us look back in history. Our people were never ready to enter a war, but if they did, they won that war despite the costs and sacrifices. Look at the Napoleonic wars or World War II. We Russians lost many battles, but eventually won those wars. So we are never prepared, but we always win.

dimanche, 08 septembre 2013

D’UNE EVENTUELLE RIPOSTE RUSSE AU SILENCE DES DEUX PAPES

 

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D’UNE EVENTUELLE RIPOSTE RUSSE AU SILENCE DES DEUX PAPES
 
Par delà des transactions secrètes, quels intérêts pour l'Europe ?


Michel Lhomme
Ex: http://metamag.fr

Un mémorandum "d’action urgente" publié par le bureau du président Poutine aux Forces armées de la Fédération de Russie ordonnerait une "frappe militaire massive" contre l'Arabie saoudite au cas où l'Ouest attaquerait la Syrie . Selon le Kremlin, Poutine serait devenu "furieux" après une réunion début août avec le prince saoudien Bandar ben Sultan, chef des services de renseignement saoudien qui l’aurait averti que si la Russie n'acceptait pas la défaite de la Syrie, l'Arabie saoudite serait acculée à déchaîner les terroristes tchétchènes durant les Jeux Olympiques d'hiver des 7-23 février 2014 à Sotchi, en Russie.
 
Le journal libanais As-Safir a précisé le contexte de cette étonnante menace saoudienne contre la Russie. En fait, le prince Bandar se serait engagé à protéger la base navale russe syrienne (seul débouché méditerranéen pour la marine russe auquel la Russie tient absolument) si le régime Assad était renversé et aurait alors ajouté pour peser un peu plus dans la discussion : "Je peux vous donner une garantie pour protéger les Jeux Olympiques d'hiver prochain car les groupes tchétchènes qui menacent la sécurité des jeux sont contrôlés par nous". Le prince saoudien est même allé plus loin en précisant que les Tchétchènes qui opèreraient en Syrie ne sont qu’un outil de pression temporaire qui pourrait du jour au lendemain sur simple ordre de Riyad être mis à l’arrêt ! "Ces groupes ne doivent pas vous effrayer, aurait déclaré Bandar à Poutine, nous les utilisons dans le cadre du régime syrien mais ils ne joueront aucun rôle dans l'avenir politique de la Syrie.

Le London's Telegraph nous apprend que l'Arabie saoudite a secrètement offert à la Russie, sa participation à un vaste contrat pour contrôler le marché mondial du pétrole et du gaz dans toute la région, mais à l’unique condition que le Kremlin accepte de renverser le régime Assad et donc l’intervention militaire alliée qui se prépare. Quelle a été la réponse de la Russie ? Poutine aurait répondu : "Notre position sur Assad ne changera jamais. Nous pensons que le régime syrien est le meilleur orateur, s'exprimant au nom du peuple syrien, et non pas ceux des mangeurs de foie", faisant ici référence aux séquences de l’été montrant un rebelle djihadiste dévorant le cœur et le foie d'un loyaliste syrien !
 
Il va de soi qu’une riposte russe contre l’Arabie saoudite changerait la donne. Elle clarifierait en tout cas le double jeu américano-saoudien dans la région et mettrait les Etats-Unis au pied du mur de l’instrumentalisation faite depuis des années d’Al Qaïda (« la Base » en arabe). Briser l’Arabie saoudite, déjà actuellement en conflit interne, comme riposte à une attaque syrienne, franchement, très secrètement, on en rêve ! L’Irak  n’a toujours pas retrouvé un équilibre, la Turquie est divisée. Une telle riposte aurait le mérite de clarifier le jeu tordu des Saoud depuis des décennies mais il mettrait aussi très vite face à face Israël et l’Iran. On comprendrait alors que mourir pour Damas n’est qu’un petit préliminaire avant de se retrouver dans quelques années tous à Téhéran ou à devoir assurer la sécurité des boîtes branchées de Tel Aviv ! Poutine mettra-t-il son plan à exécution ? Quels marchandages de gros sous (les avoirs russes sont placés dans des banques américaines) pourraient-ils le faire plier ou sera-t-il après tout, lui l’orthodoxe, le sauveur des Chrétiens d’Orient, le nouveau « roi du monde » ?
 
Il est peut-être temps de clarifier notre position: pourquoi avons-nous toujours été sceptiques et interrogatifs sur le problème syrien ? C’est que contrairement justement à nos dirigeants et à toute la classe politique française, nous parlons en Européens et que pour nous, même si cette identité n’est pas exclusive, loin de là,  notre identité européenne demeure en partie chrétienne. Or, le reniement mercantile des Occidentaux en Orient est d’abord le sacrifice des Chrétiens, des Chrétiens du Liban et de Syrie, des Chrétiens d’Irak, des Chrétiens d’Egypte et de Tunisie. Nous sommes peut-être bénis des Dieux : nous avons deux papes mais pourtant, aucun des deux n’a levé le ton sur la Syrie, aucun des deux papes n’a souligné et posé le sort des Chrétiens de Syrie sur la balance, aucun des deux papes n’a défendu leurs intérêts. François 1er,  si avide de voyages ne devrait-il pas de suite s’envoler vers Damas et se poser là-bas en bouclier humanitaire?

Les Chrétiens de Syrie sont condamnés comme le furent les Chrétiens d’Irak. L’Arabie saoudite, ami des Etats-Unis et de la France s’en réjouit. Il est de bon ton dans les revues chrétiennes et même dans les sermons de justifier l’ingérence alliée au nom de la guerre juste. Pauvre St-Thomas ! C’est cela la moraline, oublier la force du réalisme, ne pas comprendre que comme dans toutes les crises du Moyen-Orient, les Chrétiens seront les boucs émissaires de toutes les rancunes religieuses et ethniques, des cibles faciles, isolées et minoritaires. Déjà, le régime d’Assad ne vient plus à leur aide. Si elle a lieu, l’intervention militaire alliée ne réussira pas à renforcer ou à unifier l’opposition syrienne parce que ce n’est tout simplement pas son but. Son but est de « renverser Assad sans le renverser » c’est-à-dire maintenir en Syrie une sorte de chaos généralisé comme en Irak, en Lybie et dans une moindre mesure au Liban, demain en Egypte. 

Pour les Saoudiens et les Qataris, le prochain gouvernement syrien sera sunnite et les Chrétiens seront immédiatement associés aux « croisés» occidentaux c’est-à-dire aux pires infidèles. Ils ne seront plus alors d’aucune utilité et donc massacrés ou contraints à l’exil forcé comme en Irak. Déjà totalement isolés, les Chrétiens syriens font aujourd’hui face à une rébellion divisée. Au sein de cette rébellion, les Islamistes sont chaque jour plus nombreux. Les Chrétiens ont été depuis le début par une habile propagande saoudienne assimilés au régime, ils sont donc l’une des cibles privilégiées de la rébellion. Largués par les Occidentaux, oubliés par la diplomatie vaticane, les Chrétiens de Syrie n’ont pas su ou n’ont pas pu prendre à temps leur distance avec le régime. Ils disparaîtront.
 
Ainsi, pour le point de vue européen qui devrait principalement nous occuper, une intervention militaire en Syrie ne vaut pas mieux qu’une non-intervention, guerre juste ou pas. Le sort des chrétiens de Syrie est scellé : ils sont condamnés. La France ne les aura pas aidés. Toutes les Eglises de Syrie ont d’ailleurs affirmé leur opposition à l’intervention militaire. Mais il faut aller plus loin et comprendre pourquoi les deux papes ne bougent pas : ils sont kantiens. La bévue des internationalistes et des mondialistes, lecteurs avides du traité de paix kantien, sur l’idée nationale et le concept de nation qu’ils sacrifient pour celui de cosmopolitisme, induit aujourd’hui ces apories d’une mondialisation tiraillée entre des principes républicains auxquels on ne cesse d’objecter le respect des différences communautaires, culturelles ou nationales et l’abandon de ces mêmes principes au nom d’une pseudo-démocratie mondiale et d’une ingérence humanitariste guerrière. Les deux papes sont en fait des papes totalitaires.

samedi, 31 août 2013

50.000 Freiwillige nach Syrien: Ruft Putin zu den Waffen?

50.000 Freiwillige nach Syrien: Ruft Putin zu den Waffen?

Gerhard Wisnewski

 

Nun lassen Sie uns hier mal Klartext reden: In Syrien geht es nicht um Demokratie, Diktatur, Menschenrechte, das Volk und ähnliche Seifenblasen. Es geht auch nicht um Chemiewaffen. Es geht um eine uralte Geschichte, nämlich um Fressen und Gefressenwerden. Es geht um die Machtfrage auf dem Globus. Und wie hier bereits berichtet, kann und darf Russland diesmal nicht nachgeben, oder der gesamte Erdball ist verloren, einschließlich Russland und China selbst.

Mehr:
http://info.kopp-verlag.de/hintergruende/deutschland/gerhard-wisnewski/5-freiwillige-nach-syrien-ruft-putin-zu-den-waffen-.html;jsessionid=550B97075FC62E228E78E9A297981CD6
 
 

00:05 Publié dans Actualité | Lien permanent | Commentaires (0) | Tags : politique internationale, syrie, russie | |  del.icio.us | | Digg! Digg |  Facebook

jeudi, 29 août 2013

GERMANIA E RUSSIA NELLA GUERRA FREDDA

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GERMANIA E RUSSIA NELLA GUERRA FREDDA

Marco ZENONI

Ex: http://www.eurasia-rivista.org

L’anteguerra

A riavvicinare Germania e Unione Sovietica, dopo l’allontanamento successivo all’ingresso della Germania nella Società delle Nazioni (SdN), fu soprattutto la questione polacca. Polonia e Germania, quest’ultima mai accontentatasi del riposizionamento geografico voluto a Versailles e – in particolare – della creazione ex tunc della città libera di Danzica, firmarono un patto di non aggressione nel 1934, garantendosi la reciproca neutralità nei 10 anni a venire. La Polonia, naturalmente, era conscia delle mire del terzo Reich e per questo tentò sempre l’avvicinamento a Francia e Inghilterra, in cerca di una strozzatura geopolitica nei confronti dei tedeschi. Peraltro, l’ostilità dei polacchi nei confronti del vicino sovietico, fece sì che nessun accordo militare venisse stretto con i sovietici e che, anzi, la Polonia si allontanasse allo stesso modo sia dal vicino orientale che da quello occidentale, rifiutando una modifica allo status quo e dunque ponendo le basi per l’imminente guerra, che poi diverrà mondiale. Tale posizione, dovuta sì ad alcune particolarità storiche e culturali ma, soprattutto, dall’influenza degli alleati anglosassoni e, in particolare, quella statunitense. Le potenze talassocratiche, infatti, non avevano che da trarre vantaggio da un’eventuale guerra che, chiaramente, non fosse mondiale nelle intenzioni iniziali, ma spingesse le frizioni fino ad uno scontro tra Germania e Unione Sovietica. L’intento primario era infatti quello di spingere le due potenze continentali ad affrontarsi. Per Stalin, tuttavia, questa rimaneva un’ipotesi da scacciare, o quanto meno ritardare il più possibile[1]. Furono queste le condizioni geopolitiche che portarono al patto Molotov-Ribbentrop. Una mutua assicurazione dunque, utile a Stalin per prendere tempo e alla Germania per assicurarsi da eventuali colpi di mano. Tale patto, seppur evidentemente siglato solo in funzione tattica, mise in allarme l’Inghilterra, la quale intervenne, interferendo in entrambi i trattati (polacco-tedesco e tedesco-sovietico), attraverso l’Accordo di reciproco aiuto, siglato con la Polonia – in palese infrazione di quello siglato fra Polonia e Germania, ma anche del Patto Molotov-Ribbentrop. L’intento dell’Inghilterra era quella di costruire una frattura geografica fra le due potenze eurasiatiche, in modo da impedirne l’avvicinamento e in particolar modo di impedire eventuali intese fra i polacchi e il terzo reich. Lo stesso Stalin, difatti, almeno inizialmente, attribuì le colpe della guerra completamente ad Inghilterra e Francia, e non alla Germania[2].


Oltre al noto patto, tuttavia, Germania e Unione Sovietica si legarono anche dal punto di vista commerciale, attraverso un accordo firmato l’11 febbraio 1940. Si arrivò tuttavia alla guerra, una guerra fratricida sulle terre eurasiatiche, che contrappose frontalmente le due potenze continentali. A seguito della guerra, che costò ai sovietici oltre 22 milioni di morti, la frattura fra i due paesi pareva insanabile. L’Armata Rossa marciò fino a Berlino, con spirito vendicativo. I tedeschi venivano visti come un invasore, da schiacciare senza pietà.

Il Dopoguerra

 

ostpolitik.jpgGli animi si placarono,  lasciando spazio al pragmatismo e al calcolo geopolitico. Nel 1945, a Jalta, avvenne la definitiva spartizione della Germania, contrapponendo di fatto da una parte gli alleati (Stati Uniti, Francia e Inghilterra) e dall’altra i sovietici. Il 1948 fu l’anno del piano Marshall, un piano economico presentato come l’inevitabile aiuto dall’oltreoceano per il risanamento delle economie europee, in realtà un mezzo economico indispensabile per il rafforzamento dell’economia statunitense ma, soprattutto, un importante collante per la formazione dell’alleanza occidentale, legata prima economicamente e poi militarmente (e politicamente) attraverso la struttura della NATO.


La divisione della Germania fu ultimata nel 1952, quando la frontiera fu definitivamente chiusa. Da quel momento l’avvicinamento della Germania dell’Ovest al sistema d’alleanze occidentale proseguì spedita. Eppure dei tentativi in funzione di una Germania unita furono mossi. Nel 1952 fu infatti Stalin stesso a proporre l’idea di una Germania unificata, a prezzo però di una sovranità limitata in politica estera: una neutralità imposta e irreversibile. Nei piani di Stalin questo avrebbe permesso la formazione di un cuscino neutrale nel cuore dell’Europa, il che avrebbe per altro sottratto la Germania dalle maglie dell’alleanza atlantica, che ne avrebbe fatto un bastione antisovietico nel cuore dell’Europa, a ridosso dell’oriente, cosa che infatti puntualmente si verificò. Il piano di Stalin fu rigettato, gli alleati occidentali dimostrarono ben presto di avere scarso interesse per una Germania unificata, non al prezzo di una neutralità che avrebbe sottratto un’importante pedina, difensiva, ma all’occorrenza anche offensiva, direttamente puntata ad Oriente, e situata nel cuore dell’Europa continentale. Per la Germania, vittima della frattura insanabile fra Est e Ovest, non poté che profilarsi la sola soluzione della divisione politica e geografica. Due Stati, dunque, per un’unica nazione. Nel 1961 tale divisione fu rimarcata attraverso la costruzione del muro, simbolo della contrapposizione frontale fra i due schieramenti.


Il primo cancelliere della Repubblica Federale Tedesca fu Konrad Adenauer, un fervente anticomunista, che tuttavia fu invitato già nel 1955 a Mosca, a seguito degli accordi di Parigi, che riconoscevano la sovranità della RFT e ufficializzavano il riconoscimento da parte Sovietica della Repubblica Federale. Adenauer fu un grande sostenitore dell’alleanza atlantica e tra gli animatori più vivaci (assieme all’omologo italiano, Alcide de Gasperi) della costituzione della Comunità Europea, tale di nome, ma meramente occidentale di fatto. Nel 1950 era infatti già stata pronunciata la cosiddetta “dichiarazione Schuman”, che prese nome dall’allora ministro degli esteri francese, Robert Schuman, e che proponeva di mettere da parte l’astio che correva fra i due vicini, ponendo le basi per una collaborazione che fosse prima economica, tramite la comune gestione delle risorse del carbone e dell’acciaio, e successivamente anche politica. Furono questi i primi passi che condussero la Germania nell’alleanza occidentale, senza alcun tipo di ripensamenti. Allo stesso Adenauer risale oltretutto la teoria dell’ “Alleinvertretungsanspruch” ovvero al diritto esclusivo della Repubblica Federale Tedesca di parlare a nome dei tedeschi. Per il cancelliere, infatti, la Germania Est altro non era che una zona d’occupazione sovietica e, in quanto tale, non meritava né il riconoscimento, né tanto meno di parlare a nome dei tedeschi. A tale posizione si aggiunse per altro la “dottrina Hallstein”, fatta propria dal cancelliere, la quale prevedeva che ogni apertura di paesi terzi alla Repubblica Democratica Tedesca, il che ne implicava il riconoscimento, era un torto alla Repubblica Federale e come tale non sarebbe stato tollerato. La parola fu mantenuta, tanto che ben presto furono tagliati i rapporti con la Jugoslavia e con Cuba.


L’aggressività occidentale, che non portò alcun risultato né al fine di attenuare gli animi, né a quello dell’unificazione tedesca, maturò in Willy Brandt, il lungimirante cancelliere che succedette ad Adenauer, la convinzione che il muro (metaforico, ma anche fisico) opposto dall’oriente fosse una reazione all’eccessiva aggressività occidentale. Con l’ascesa al cancellierato di Brandt i rapporti tra la Germania Federale e l’Unione Sovietica presero finalmente un’altra piega, giungendo ad una distensione che (escludendo naturalmente la DDR), non si aveva dall’anteguerra. “Il nostro interesse nazionale non ci consente di stare in mezzo fra est e ovest. Il nostro paese ha bisogno della collaborazione con l’occidente e dell’intesa con l’oriente”[3], da queste poche parole, pronunciate da Brandt stesso, si deducono quelli che poi furono i punti cardine dell’Ostpolitik. Non una vera e propria apertura verso l’oriente, ma una distensione, un’intesa al fine di raggiungere, per tappe, alcuni obbiettivi programmatici. Una politica sovranista che potrebbe in qualche modo essere paragonata (e forse ne fu influenzata) a quella gollista. La politica di apertura verso l’oriente, tuttavia, procedette solo dopo aver ribadito il pieno inserimento della repubblica federale all’interno del sistema occidentale, della NATO e della piena amicizia e intesa con la Francia, già consolidata da anni dalla struttura della CECA e, dopo gli accordi di Roma del ’57, dalla Comunità Economica Europea. Per quanto riguarda l’oriente, di fatto, quella che si avanzava era una proposta di dialogo: si chiese all’Unione Sovietica di rinunciare al diritto dell’intervento, in precedenza ribadito dai sovietici, e in cambio si riconosceva lo status quo venutosi a formare dopo la guerra oltre il muro. In particolare il riferimento era alla Polonia, con cui in quegli anni, sempre in linea con la ostpolitik, fu concordato un trattato bilaterale che assicurò l’accettazione da parte tedesca dei confini occidentali della Polonia. Vi fu inoltre, per la prima volta, il riconoscimento dell’esistenza di due Germanie. Il tutto venne siglato con l’accordo germano-sovietico del 1970, firmato a Mosca da Brandt e Kossyghin, indispettendo inevitabilmente gli Stati Uniti, nonostante le rassicurazioni più volte ribadite e dimostrate. Con l’intento della distensione, al fine di costituire un ordine pacifico europeo, si arrivò dunque al congresso di Helsinki (1973-75), un processo diplomatico multilaterale, che portò ad un notevole avvicinamento, al prezzo di alcune pragmatiche rinunce da una parte e dall’altra. Priorità dell’Unione Sovietica era il riconoscimento delle frontiere post-1945, intento degli alleati occidentali era invece indebolire il patto di Varsavia attraverso lo strumento della causa dei “diritti umani”, un punto che la coalizione sovietica aveva sino ad allora visto come un’intollerabile ingerenza[4]. E’ attraverso Mosca (1970) ed Helsinki (1975) che, infine, la repubblica federale tedesca riconobbe la frontiera dell’Oder-Neisse. La RFT per altro rinunciò alla “Alleinvertretung” e, di conseguenza, all’intento politico dell’unione tedesca. Pur rinunciando, almeno nel breve termine, alla riunificazione dello Stato tedesco, Brandt non volle rinunciare all’unificazione della nazione. Per far ciò necessitava del consenso e della collaborazione della repubblica democratica e, dunque, dell’Unione Sovietica. Per questo motivo si potrebbe dire che la ostpolitik fu de facto ed inevitabilmente una “Russlandpolitik”[5]. Condizione posta dall’Unione Sovietica per la collaborazione, e la distensione, fu l’adesione della Germania al trattato di non proliferazione nucleare. Successivamente, la dirigenza sovietica dichiarò, tramite Leonid Brezhnev, la propria approvazione per la nuova politica estera condotta dalla RFT, questo nonostante effettivamente la DDR non venisse riconosciuta (nel 1970 erano 26 gli Stati che la riconoscevano), il che provocò qualche malumore a Berlino Est.


Fino a quel momento la dirigenza sovietica aveva preferito l’immobilismo nei confronti della Germania dell’Ovest, questo permetteva di tenere la Repubblica Federale Tedesca in uno stato di soggezione e d’inferiorità, attraverso una propaganda costante oltrecortina[6], distogliendo anche le attenzioni dai problemi e dalle contraddizioni interne. Tuttavia, alla Ostpolitik tedesca i sovietici fecero allora corrispondere una “Westpolitik”. Il cambiamento di rotta fu spinto dalla necessità che i paesi occidentali riconoscessero lo Status Quo ad oriente, in particolare il riconoscimento della nuova Polonia uscita dalla seconda guerra mondiale e modificata nei suoi confini occidentali. Essendo questi gli anni in cui la Cina andava rompendo con l’URSS, dopo aver elaborato la strumentale categoria di “socialimperialismo”, per avvicinarsi agli Stati Uniti, il riconoscimento delle frontiere occidentali era una pedina fondamentale per placare gli animi su tale fronte, potendosi concentrare con maggior equilibrio nelle questioni orientali. Moralmente inoltre il riconoscimento poteva essere sventolato come una vittoria, essendo state così imposte le conseguenze della guerra allo Stato che si era frontalmente contrapposto a quello sovietico.


Pur essendo il fine dell’Ostpolitik, da parte dei tedesco-occidentali, quello di distendere i due fronti, in modo da riequilibrare anche la situazione tedesca, e quello dei sovietici di indebolire geopoliticamente l’asse antisovietico, consci del peso politico ed economico della Germania (che nel frattempo andava crescendo in maniera sorprendente), Brandt mostrò un certo senso strategico nel suo riavvicinamento all’Unione Sovietica, come dimostrò parlando alla Radio, a Mosca, il 12 agosto del 1970: “La Russia è indissolubilmente legata alla storia europea, non solo come avversario o come pericolo, ma anche come partner, storicamente, politicamente, culturalmente ed economicamente”[7]. Si può dunque dire che dopo la dottrina Adenauer-Hallstein, venne a prevalere la “dottrina Brandt”: promuovere il cambiamento attraverso l’avvicinamento[8]. Bisogna tuttavia aggiungere che nella sua politica fu probabilmente anche condizionato da Günter Guillaume, quello che in breve divenne uno dei suoi uomini più fedeli, secondo alcuni il “braccio destro” , ma che presto si rivelò una spia della Stasi, inviato con non ben precisati compiti da Markus Johannes Wolf , il quale, tuttavia, dichiarò in un’intervista successiva che l’intento non era quello di gettare in disgrazia il cancelliere[9] (quest’ultimo dovette infatti dare le dimissioni, in seguito all’”affare Guillaume”. Una vicenda tutt’oggi poco chiara e su cui poca luce è stata fatta.

Conclusioni

L’ostpolitik fu una politica realista, fu un calcolo pragmatico che prese le mosse dall’accettazione dello status quo, condizione preliminare, conditio sine qua non per distendere i rapporti con l’Est. Questa politica guardava ai vertici, alle dirigenze, indipendentemente dalle possibilità sovversive di determinati movimenti filoccidentali. A testimoniarlo vi è il rifiuto della Repubblica Federale di aderire alle sanzioni mosse dagli Stati Uniti contro la Polonia, per la repressione dei movimenti “rivoluzionari”, i quali godevano in gran parte della simpatia e delle potenze occidentali. Tale fase politica inoltre, come ampiamente previsto dai suoi promotori, permise alla Germania di ritagliarsi un proprio spazio politico, restituendole il peso geopolitico ed economico adeguato, per la preoccupazione e il sospetto degli alleati occidentali.


A conti fatti, pur non ottenendo grandi cambiamenti in ambito geopolitico, l’ostpolitik fu il momento di massima distensione tra la Germania e l’Unione Sovietica, sin dalla rottura in seguito all’Operazione Barbarossa. Un avvicinamento che, seppur apparentemente sotto controllo, mise in allarme alcuni settori, in particolare delle due potenze talassocratiche. D’altronde queste interferirono nei rapporti tedesco-sovietici anche nel primo dopoguerra e nel 1939. A dimostrazione che un’alleanza fra le due potenze continentali, l’unione fra due forze economiche e politiche, non fu e tutt’ora non è ben vista dalle potenze egemoni.

Marco Zenoni è laureando in Relazioni Internazionali all’Università di Perugia


[1] http://www.eurasia-rivista.org/dietro-le-quinte-della-guerra-tra-la-germania-e-la-polonia/1015/ [1]
[2] http://www.eurasia-rivista.org/il-patto-di-non-aggressione-tedesco-sovietico/1645/ [2]
[3] cfr. “Affari esteri”, n. 5 – 1970. P. 130
[4] Cfr. Eurasia, n.2 – 2011
[5] Ibidem
[6] Ibidem.
[7] Cfr. “Affari esteri”, n.8 – 1970. P. 11
[8] Cfr. “Affari Esteri”, n.8 – 1970.
[9] http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/obituaries/1533707/Markus-Wolf.html [3]

Euramérique, Eurorussie ou Eurasie?

carte-ukraine-bielorussie-moldavie.jpg

Euramérique, Eurorussie ou Eurasie?

Récemment, le site Atlantico a publié un échange de réflexions fort intéressant entre Alexandre Del Valle et Alexandre Melnik sur les perspectives viables pour l’Occident. Les deux Alexandre, qui n’ont de commun que leurs prénoms, prônent deux voies différentes et opposées pour la réaffirmation de l'Occident puissance: l’Alliance continentale Europe-Russie ou l’alliance transatlantique Europe-Amérique.

Cette thématique semble prendre une importance croissante au fur et à mesure que les relations Russie-USA se détériorent, que l’Europe s’enfonce dans la crise et que la Russie regagne stratégiquement des positions, réaffirmant ainsi peu à peu sa position de grande puissance. La même semaine, le site Europe-Israël publiait lui un article intitulé: La morale change de camp, article très élogieux envers Vladimir Poutine et envers la politique russe dans le monde musulman, présentant une Russie devenue la protectrice des minorités, notamment chrétiennes. Le site prenait en exemple les manifestants de la place Tahrir qui dénonçaient l’alliance entre Etats-Unis et Frères musulmans et appelaient la Russie à s’impliquer dans la révolution égyptienne.

L’occident a été historiquement lié à l’Europe, la Méditerranée puis l’Europe du nord et de l’ouest, avant de ne se juxtaposer sur le monde anglo-saxon dès le 17ième siècle via l'empire colonial de l'Angleterre et sa puissance maritime. Ce règne de la rose n’a réellement pris fin qu’après la première guerre mondiale, qui a historiquement marqué la fin des empires européens, y compris l'empire britannique, supplantés par la puissance la plus occidentale et la plus maritime d’Occident: les Etats-Unis d’Amérique.

Ceux-ci achèveront la déseuropéanisation de l’Occident en confirmant leur leadership planétaire en 1991, lors de la mort de l’Union Soviétique. La fin de l’Union Soviétique scellera aussi le destin eurasien de la Russie et donc le déplacement du centre d’attraction du continent vers l’Est et l’Eurasie. La disparition de cet empire permettra donc paradoxalement à l’Europe réelle d’entamer une tentative historique de raccord entre son Ouest et son Est et ainsi de tenter d’affirmer son unité territoriale, continentale et politique. Cela entrainera une rupture sans doute désormais totale et fondamentale entre le monde continental et le monde occidental.

Ce leadership américain qui a été baptisé par le président Bush "le nouvel ordre mondial" s'est développé et affirmé grâce à une formidable domination militaire et économique. Ce dispositif hyperpuissant a mis l'Europe sous contrôle, logiquement étendu sa zone d'influence vers l’Eurasie et l'Asie centrale tout en multipliant les interventions militaires dans le monde musulman. Pourtant, cette domination américaine sera aussi brève, d’un point de vue historique, que ne seront rapides le redressement russe et l’émergence de la Chine, dont on voit mal aujourd’hui ce qui pourrait l’empêcher de devenir la première puissance mondiale dans la décennie qui vient. Si le monde se désoccidentalise rapidement, le centre de gravité des puissances se déplace inexorablement vers l'Asie.

L’Europe de Bruxelles n’a pas transformé l’essai et il est peu probable qu’elle le fasse. L’Union s’est transformée en un "machin" que le Général de Gaulle n’aurait pas pu imaginer même dans ses pires cauchemars: Une entité sans aucune souveraineté politique, comme le souhaitent les donneurs d’ordres de Washington, et gouvernée par une bureaucratie de petits fonctionnaires sans horizons politiques qui espèrent tout en la craignant l’adhésion à l'UE d’une Turquie conquérante et par ailleurs seconde puissance de l’Otan. Pour les plus pessimistes, la crise économique, l’absence de souveraineté, l’échec du modèle multiculturel dans tous les pays d'Europe et l’absence d’élites ne devraient vraisemblablement laisser à Bruxelles que quelques années avant un démembrement volontaire et une sortie de l’histoire par la petite porte. Les nations européennes pourraient-elles y survivre? Sauront-elles le cas échéant renouer avec un nouveau destin continental?

Dans ces conditions, un rapprochement UE-Russie est-il imaginable? La puissance russe n'est pas d'origine maritime, la Russie n’a pas connu la renaissance après le moyen âge, et sa révolution industrielle a été tardive. En outre la démocratie à l’occidentale est encore au banc d'essai en Russie et il semble de plus en plus évident que ce modèle ne soit pas adapté pour gouverner le plus grand territoire de la planète ni de maintenir unis un si grand nombre de peuples si divers. Fait remarquable également, la Russie est le seul empire continental qui ait survécu en maintenant relativement en vie sa sphère d’influence linguistique, culturelle et politique au cœur de l’Eurasie: en Asie centrale et dans le Caucase.

Peut-être à cause de ce parcours historique bien spécifique, la Russie ne fait aujourd’hui encore que peu confiance à un "Ouest" (Zapad en russe désigne l’Occident, ce qui inclut encore aujourd’hui tant l’Amérique que l’Europe de Bruxelles) contre lequel elle a historiquement presque toujours été en guerre ouverte ou larvée. En outre, les modèles de sociétés proposés par l’Occident ne sont pas perçus comme viables ni compatibles avec les souhaits et aspirations de la population russe et encore moins avec le projet global des élites russes pour leur pays. On peut facilement comprendre, au vu des difficultés qu’à connu la Russie pour se redresser et créer un embryon de modèle propre de société (l’État-Civilisation), son souhait de ne pas s’associer ni essayer de s’assimiler à des ensembles politiques et civilisationnels visiblement en crise profonde.

En outre, le basculement lourd et historique du monde vers l’Asie, dans laquelle se trouve 75% du territoire russe ne devrait pas particulièrement inciter Moscou à se tourner à l’Ouest vers la zone euro-atlantique mais plutôt à l’Est, vers la zone Asie-Pacifique pour tenter de profiter du formidable potentiel de la Chine, avec lequel la Russie est d’ailleurs en train de nouer un partenariat historique.

Le 21ème siècle verra-t-il l’émergence d’un tandem gagnant composé des deux ex-géants communistes et de leurs sphères respectives d’influence?

Il semble par conséquent que l’existence d’un Occident-puissance qui, il faut le rappeler reste à ce jour son adversaire stratégique principal, ne soit sans doute pas l’intérêt primordial d’une Russie qui, si elle encore majoritairement slave et chrétienne, n’en reste pas moins aujourd’hui  une puissance eurasiatique et orthodoxe d’abord et européenne ensuite. Le renouveau de la Russie semble du reste à ce jour être inspiré par deux idées ou directions stratégique essentielles, l'une post-byzantine et l'autre postsoviétique (vers l’Eurasie) traduisant sans doute très clairement que la Russie ne se destine pas du tout à devenir un membre du club occidental.

La Russie n'est-elle pas, après tout, l’héritière historique, religieuse et spirituelle de Byzance et donc de l’empire romain d’Orient, et non de l'empire romain d’Occident?

L’opinion exprimée dans cet article ne coïncide pas forcément avec la position de la rédaction, l'auteur étant extérieur à RIA Novosti.

Alexandre Latsa est un journaliste français qui vit en Russie et anime le site DISSONANCE, destiné à donner un "autre regard sur la Russie".

dimanche, 25 août 2013

Una nuova sinergia con la Russia

Eu-Rus. Il protagonismo dei popoli europei e una nuova sinergia con la Russia

Autore:

Ex: http://www.centrostudilaruna.it

Aymeric Chauprade è uno degli autori di geopolitica più importanti della nuova generazione. Animatore della Revue française de géopolitique è anche presidente della Accademia Internazionale di Geopolitica. Chauprade afferma le ragioni del multipolarismo: sostiene che per riequilibrare il sistema di rapporti internazionale sia necessario un nuovo protagonismo dei popoli europei, che solo può avvenire in virtù di una forte intesa con la Russia.

La Russia appunto. La vecchia rappresentazione secondo la quale Mosca esprimeva un potere “asiatico” ed ostile, separato dal nostro vivere occidentale da un limes invalicabile (la cortina di ferro) appare vecchia. Una rappresentazione ossidata e tossica. Archiviata per sempre l’ideologia marxista, la Russia torna ad essere nazione europea, per paesaggio, etnia, lingua, cultura e religione. Ed è naturale che gli spiriti più intuitivi del nostro tempo si prodighino per sostenere la vera, autentica “integrazione” per la quale valga la pena di battersi. L’integrazione tra Est e Ovest dell’Europa; il respiro simultaneo dei “due polmoni dell’Europa”, come li definiva con parola ispirata Giovanni Paolo II.

Il 13 giugno Chauprade ha rivolto un’allocuzione ai deputati della Duma russa. “Signore e signori della Federazione Russa – ha esordito l’autore – è un grande onore essere qui per un patriota francese che come me guarda al popolo russo come a un alleato storico”. Poi Chauprade ha proseguito con affermazioni forti di stampo sovranista: “Il nuovo bipolarismo mette di fronte, in un confronto che si amplificherà, da un lato questo totalitarismo globale, che ha distrutto la famiglia e la nazione, riducendo la persona ad un consumatore schiavo di pulsioni mercantili e sessuali e dall’altro i popoli traditi dalle loro elite, assopiti davanti alla perdita di sovranità e all’immigrazione di massa, ma che di fronte all’attacco contro la famiglia iniziano a risvegliarsi”.

Vladimir_Putin_12015Nel clou dell’intervento l’elogio di Vladimir Putin: “Signore e signori deputati, è con il presidente Putin e tutte le forze vive della Russia, che il vostro paese ha intrapreso una ripresa senza precedenti, militare, geopolitica, economica, energetica e spirituale che ispira ammirazione nei patrioti francesi! I patrioti del mondo intero, gelosi dell’indipendenza dei popoli e delle fondamenta della nostra civiltà, in questo momento hanno gli occhi puntati verso Mosca”.

L’idea che la Russia di Putin rappresenti oggi “il polo” per coloro che si riconoscono nel retaggio e nel futuro della civiltà europea è una impressione condivisa.

Chi scrive, nel suo piccolo, ha concepito l’idea di un progetto denominato Eu-Rus e ne ha cominciato a parlare, alla maniera dei ragazzini … su facebook[1].

La “Eu” di Eu-Rus contiene le stesse lettere della sigla UE (Unione Europea) sia pur in un ordine diverso ed evoca anche la radice greca “eu” che nella lingua di coloro che per primi pensarono l’Eu-r-opa[2] significa bene (come nelle parole composte “eudemonia”, “euritmia”, “euforia”, “eucaristia” e – si spera di no – “eutanasia”).

L’intenzione è quella di realizzare con gli amici che sono interessati un network di intellettuali motivati dall’ideale della integrazione Europa – Russia.

Gli spunti di riflessione e di impegno sono tanti:

1. Affermare l’esigenza di una comunità energetica comune, attraverso la realizzazione dei gasdotti North Stream e South Stream.

2. Battersi affinché in tutto il continente si affermi il programma portato avanti da Putin di socializzazione delle fonti energetiche. Socializzazione versus privatizzazione selvaggia.

3. Auspicare il sorgere di un area di libero scambio comune tra Europa e Russia, di integrazione delle risorse tecnologiche e imprenditoriali. I grandi corridoi orizzontali che in questi anni si stanno costruendo devono essere prolungati fino a Mosca e devono diventare strade a doppia corsia: sulla corsia che va verso Occidente scorrono le risorse energetiche e del sottosuolo, sulla corsia che va verso Oriente scorre il know how che l’Europa Occidentale oggi può mettere a disposizione.

4. Riaffermare i principi della rivoluzione nazional-democratica gaullista: capi di governo eletti direttamente dal popolo, come oggi avviene in Francia e in Russia; con un radicale ridimensionamento di tutti i poteri non-eletti (commissari UE, governi tecnici, ONG …)

5. Rilanciare la politica di coesistenza pacifica con i paesi arabo-islamici secondo la linea perseguita sia pur tra difficoltà e/o incertezza dall’Italia con Mattei, Moro, Craxi, Andreotti.

6. Sviluppare anche l’idea di una graduale integrazione militare delle nazioni europee, una integrazione che coinvolga tutte e due le potenze dotate di arsenale nucleare del continente: la Francia e la Russia.

7. Sostenere un ideale di multipolarismo basato sul principio del Balance of Power per evitare le derive belliciste che inevitabilmente derivano dal predominio mondiale di una “Unica Superpotenza”.

8. Affermare una politica sull’emigrazione corrispondente alle esigenze dei lavoratori e dei disoccupati europei, una politica che non segua gli interessi di coloro che mirano ad abbassare il costo del lavoro con l’immissione continua di nuovi soggetti nel sistema economico, ma che segua le indicazioni del formidabile discorso alla Duma di Vladimir Putin del 4 febbraio 2013.

9. Auspicare l’adozione di una politica per la famiglia corrispondente alle esigenze demografiche dell’Europa.

10. Approfondire il dialogo culturale meditando sulle esperienze spirituali dei grandi pensatori russi: Soloviev, Bulgakov, Dostoevskij, Florensky.

11. Per la stessa ragione contribuire al dialogo ecumenico tra chiesa cattolica romana e chiese ortodosse d’Oriente.

12. Rimeditare in chiave post-moderna il tema della III Roma.

Due sono gli errori da non commettere nello svolgimento di questa impostazione:

1. sviluppare i temi con un taglio “estremista”. La geopolitica autentica confina con la diplomazia e non con l’ideologia. La calma, la moderazione, l’equilibrio sono una sostanza migliore rispetto ai fumi dell’ideologia.

2. sviluppare il progetto con una foga polemica contro altri soggetti internazionali. Qui non si vuole essere anti islamici o antioccidentali o anticinesi. Si vuole semplicemente essere nietzschianamente “buoni europei” e dunque elaborare il tema della fratellanza naturale e storica tra i popoli che sono figli della Grande Madre Europa.

Siamo felici che questo progetto possa partire a bordo della nave pirata di Barbadillo. Ne parleremo nelle prossime settimane con gli amici che condividono, nella piena libertà delle loro equazioni personali, le idee di fondo del progetto.

Note

[1] Vedi la pagina https://www.facebook.com/pages/Eu-Rus/489924397713156

[2] Europa era la splendida fanciulla orientale amata da Zeus (nella radice etimologia, Eu-Op, il riferimento ai grandi occhi splendenti). Il grande dio del cielo per sedurla si trasformò in Toro e condusse la fanciulla dalla sponda orientale a quella occidentale del Mediterraneo, nella terra che avrebbe preso da lei il nome.

Questo articolo è stato tratto, con il gentile consenso dell’Autore, dal sito Barbadillo.