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samedi, 18 octobre 2014

Julius Evola: The World’s Most Right-Wing Thinker


Julius Evola:
The World’s Most Right-Wing Thinker

By Jonathan Bowden 

Editor’s Note:

This text is the transcript by V. S. of Jonathan Bowden’s lecture on Evola delivered to the 27th meeting of the New Right in London on June 5, 2010. As usual, I have deleted a few false starts and introduced punctuation and paragraph breaks for maximum clarity. You can listen to it at YouTube here [2]. Three passages are marked unintelligible. If you can make out the words, please post a comment below or contact me at editor@counter-currents.com [3]. 

This is the 27th meeting of the New Right, and we’ve waited quite a long time to discuss one of the most important thinkers of the radical Right and of a Traditional perspective upon mankind and reality, and that is Baron Julius Evola.

Now, Evola is in some respects to the Right of everybody that we’ve ever considered in nearly any of these talks and not in a sort of unprofound or sententious manner. Julius Evola was somebody who rejected purposefully and metaphysically the modern world. Now, what does that mean? It basically means that at the beginning of the last century, Baron Evola, who is a Sicilian baron, decided that there are about four alternatives in relation to modern life for those of heroic spirit.

One was suicide and to make off with one’s self by opening one’s veins in the warm bath like Sicilian Mafiosi and Italian cardinals and Sicilian brigands and ancient Romans.

Another was to become a Nietzschean, which for many people in tradition is a modern version of some, but by no means all, of their ideas, and it’s a way of riding the tiger of modernity and dealing with that which exists around us now. Later, people like Evola and other perennial Traditionalists as we may well call them became increasingly critical of Nietzsche and regard him as a sort of decadent modern and an active nihilist with a bit of spirit and vigor but doesn’t really have the real position.

I make things quite clear. I would be regarded by most people as a Nietzschean, and philosophically that’s the motivation I’ve always had since my beginning. That’s why parties don’t really mean that much to me, because ideas are eternal and ideas and values come back, but movements and the ways and forms that they take and expressions that they have come and go.

evola.jpgNow, moving from the Nietzschean perspective, which of course relates to the great German thinker at the end of the 19th century and his active and quasi-existential and volitional view of man, is the idea of foundational religiosity or primary religious and spiritual purpose. In high philosophy, there are views which dominate everyone around us and modern media and everyone who goes to a tertiary educational college, such as a university, in the Western world. These are modern ideas, which are materialistic and anti-spiritual and aspiritual and anti-religious or antagonistic to prior religious belief so much so that it’s taken as a given that those are the views that one holds. All of the views that convulsed the Western intelligentsia since the Second European Civil War which ended in 1945, ideas like existentialism and behaviorism and structuralism and so on, are all atheistic and material views. They’ve been discussed in other meetings. As one goes back slightly, one has various currents of opinion such as Marxism and Freudianism and behaviorism beginning in the late 19th century and convulsing much of the 20th century.

But these are views that an advanced Evolian type of perspective rejects. These views are anti-metaphysical and often counter the idea that metaphysics doesn’t exist, that it’s the school returning of the late Medieval period, what was called the Medieval schoolmen. In some of his books, Evola talks about Heidegger, Martin Heidegger, of course, who got in trouble in the 1930s for his alleged academic positioning in relation to the most controversial regime of modernity. Heidegger, in my opinion, and I’ve talked about Heidegger before, was a quasi-essentialist to an essentialist thinker. Evola believes he’s an existentialist, but that’s largely by the by.

These anti-metaphysical views are that which surrounds us. All liberalism, all feminism, all quasi-Marxism, all bourgeois Marxism, all cultural Marxism, the extreme Left moderated a bit into the Center, high capitalist economics and the return of old liberalism against the Keynesianism which was the soft Marxism that replaced it earlier in the 20th century . . . All of these ideas are materialistic and atheistic and aspiritual and anti-metaphysical.

You could argue that the heroic Nietzschean dilemma in relation to what is called modernity is a quasi-metaphysical and metaphysically subjectivist view that there are values outside man and outside history that human beings commune with by virtue of the intensity with which they live their own lives. But there is a question mark over (1) the supernatural and (2) whether there is anything beyond, outside man within which those values could be anchored.

So, the idea of permanence, the idea of a metaphysical realm which most prior civilizations are based on—indeed Evola and the Traditionalists would say all prior civilizations are based on—is questioned by the Nietzschean compact. It is ultimately, maybe, the beginnings of a very Right-wing modern view, but it is a modernist view. Take it or leave it.

The sort of viewpoint that Evola moved towards, and there was a progression in his early life and spiritual career and intellectual and writing career, is what we might call metaphysical objectivism. This is called in present day language foundationalism or fundamentalism in relation to religiosity. Fundamentalism, like the far Right, are the two areas of culture that can’t be assimilated in what exists out there in [unintelligible] Street. They’re the two things that are outside and that’s why they can never entirely be drawn in.

Now, metaphysical objectivism is the absolute belief in the supernatural, the absolute belief in other states of reality, the absolute belief in gods and goddesses, the absolute belief in one supreme power (monotheism as against polytheism, for example), the absolute belief that certain iterizations, certain forms of language and spiritual  culture exist outside man: truth, justice, the meaning of law, purposive or teleological information about how a life should be lived. Most people in Western societies now are so dumbed down and so degraded by almost every aspect of life that nearly any philosophical speculation about life is indeterminate and almost completely meaningless. It’s a channel which they never turn on.


evola copia (1).jpg

Now, the type of metaphysical objectivism that Evola postulates as being an anchor for meaning in modern life can take many different forms. One of the great problems many Right-wing or re-foundational or primal movements or tribal movements or nationalistic movements of whatever character have is if there is a religion somewhere behind it–as there often is for many but not all of the key people involved in such movements and struggles–what form should that be? Everyone knows that culturally, and this is true of a formulation like GRECE or the New Right in France, as soon as you begin to get people of like-mind together they will split on whether they’re atheist or not, secularist or not, but they are also, on a deeper cultural level, split on whether they’re pagan influenced or Christian. Such divisions always bedevil Right-wing cultural and metapolitical groups.

The way that the Evolian Tradition looks at this is to engage in what is called perennialism. This is the inherent intellectual and ideological and theological idea that there are certain key truths in all of the major faiths. All of those faiths that have survived, that are recorded, that have come down to us, even their pale antecedents, even those dissident, deviant and would-be heretical elements of them that have been removed, in all of them can be seen a shard of the perspectival truth that these particular traditions could be said to manifest. Beneath this, of course, is the ethnic and racial idea that people in different groups within mankind as a body perceive reality differently, experience it differently, have different intellectual and linguistic responses to it, and form different cults, different myths, different religions because they are physically constituted in a manner that leads to such differentiation.

This can lead among certain perennialists to a sort of universalism at times, almost a neo-liberalism occasionally, where all cultures are of value, where all are “interesting,” where all are slightly interchangeable. But given that danger, the advantage for a deeply religious mind of the perennial tradition is to avoid the sectarianism and negative Puritanism which is inevitably part and parcel of building up large religious structures.

As always, a thinker like Evola proceeds from the individual and goes to the individual. This can give thinking of this sort a slightly unreal aspect for many people. Where are the masses? Where is the democratic majority? Where is the BBC vote that decides? The truth is Evola is not concerned with the BBC vote. He’s not concerned with the masses. He regards the masses, and the sort of theorists who go along with him regard the masses, as sacks of potatoes to be moved about. His thinking is completely anti-democratic, Machiavellian to a degree, and even manipulative of the masses as long as it’s down within an order of Tradition within which all have a part.

Evola dates the decline of modernity from, in a sense, the end of the Middle Ages and the beginning of the Renaissance. But many thinkers of a similar sort date the slide at other times. Evola’s a Catholic and once asked about his religious particularism he said, “I’m a Catholic pagan,” which is a deeply truthful remark, dialectically. I am not a Christian, but if you look at it from the outside the core or ur part of Christianity is obviously Roman Catholicism, even though I was technically brought up in the Protestant sort of forcing house of Anglicanism. A wet sheet religion if ever there was one. But Anglicanism, of course, is a syncretic religion. It’s a politically created religion. A bit Catholic, a bit Protestant, but not too much, and with a liberal clerisy at the top that’s partly Protestant-oriented within it and exists to manage the thing.

One of the truthful, although this is en passant, asides that can be made about Anglicanism and the reason why it’s been supported even today through state establishmentarianism when virtually no one attends these churches at all except the odd old lady and immigrants from the Third World, is that it’s a way of damming up some of the extremism that does lurk in religion. Religion is a very dangerous formulation as the modern world is beginning to understand.

evola_card10.jpgI remember Robin Cook, who was a minister who opposed the Iraq War and so on and died on a Scottish mountain, all that obsessive walking when one’s thin and redheaded can lead to undue coronaries, but Cook once said, and he’s a son of the manse like most of these Scottish politicians are, in other words, he comes from a Calvinist background to a degree, he said that in his early life he thought with the general Marxist and Freudian conundrum that religion was over. And now towards the end of his life, this is just before he died, he said, “the dark, clammy, icy hand of religiosity,” in all sorts of systems, “is rising again, and secular Leftists like us,” he’s speaking of himself and those who believe in his viewpoint, “are feeling the winds of this force coming from the side and from behind.” It’s a force that they don’t like.

I personally believe, as with Evola, that people are hardwired for faith. Maybe 1 in 10 have no need for it at all. But for most people it’s a requirement. The depth of the belief, the knowledge that goes into the belief, the system they come out of, is slightly incidental. But man needs emotional truths. George Bernard Shaw once said, “The one man with belief is worth 50 men who don’t have any” and it’s quite true that all of the leaders of great movements and those that imposed their will upon [unintelligible] inside and outside of particular countries have considerable and transcendent beliefs, philosophical, quasi-philosophical, religious, semi-religious, philosophical melded into religious and vice versa. Without the belief that there’s something above you and before you and beyond you and behind you that leads to that which is above you, we seem as a species content to slough down into the lowest common denominator, the lowest possible level.

Evola and those who think like him believe that this is the lowest age that mankind has ever experienced, despite its technological abundance, despite its extraordinary array of technological devices that even in an upper pub room in central west London you can see around you. It is also true, and this is one of the complications with these sorts of beliefs, that some of the methodologies that have led to this plasma screen behind me would actually be denied by elements of some of the religiosity that people like him would put forward, but that’s one of the conundrums about epistemology, about what you mean by meaning, which lurks in these types of theories.

The interesting thing about these beliefs is that they are primal. Turn on the television, turn on the radio, the World Cup is just about to begin. Everywhere there is trivia. Everywhere there is celebration of the majority. Everywhere there is celebration of the desire for us all to embrace and become one world, one world together. As someone recently said, “I don’t want to be English. I don’t want to be British. England’s a puddle,” he said. “I want to step out. I want to be a citizen of the world! I don’t want to have a race. I don’t want to have a kind. I don’t want to have a group . . . even a class! I don’t want to come from anywhere. I want to be on this planet! This planet is my home!” Well, my view is that sort of fake universality . . .  Maybe you should get him one of these dinky rockets and fire himself off into some other firmament, because this is the home that we have and know. And the only reason that we can define it as such is by virtue of the diversity of what exists upon it. But the number of people who wish to maintain that level of diversity and the pregnant meanings within it seem to get smaller and smaller with each generation.

The politicians that we have now are managers of a social system. It’s quite clear that we do not have three ruling parties, but one party with three wings, the nature of which are interchangeable in relation to gender, where you come from in the country, class, background, how you were educated, and whether you arrived in the country as a newcomer in the last 40 to 50 years or not.

Now, Evola’s step back from what has made the modern world leads to certain radical conclusions about it which are spiritually and politically aristocratic. Most people are only aware of the Left-Right split as it relates to a pre-immigration, slightly organic society where social class was the basis for political alignment. Bourgeois center Right: conservatism of some sort. Center Left: Labour, social-democratic, trade unionist, and so on. Now we have a racial intermingling which complicates even that division. The distinction between the aristocratic and upper class attitude and the bourgeois attitude, which is as pronounced as any Left-Right split between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie, is that which Evola advocates.

Evola believes, in some respects, in masters and slaves, or certainly serfs. He believes that the merchant and those who deal purely with economics have to be subordinated to politics, to higher politics, to metapolitics, to military struggle. He believes that the warrior and the religious leader and the farmer and the intellectual/scholar/craftsman/artist are uniquely superior to those that make money, and nearly all of Evola’s views are in some way a form of aristocraticism.

If you look at all of the sports that he favors–fencing, mountaineering–they all involve lone individuals who prepare themselves for a task which is usually dangerous and which can usually result–mountaineering for example and his book Meditations on the Peaks–in annihilation, if you go wrong, but creates an extraordinary and ecstatic sense of self-overbecoming if you conquer K2, the Peruvian mountains, the Eiger, Mount Everest and so on. Even in the more populist forms of mountaineering, the sort of beard and upper middle class Chris Bonington cheery mountaineering as you might call it, there is a streak of aristocratic, devil may care and Byronic license. The bourgeois view is, “Why do that!? It’s dangerous. It’s pitiless. You could be hurt and injured! There’s no profit. It serves no higher reason than itself.” For Evola, the reason and the purpose is the reason to do it. It is the stages that you go through and the mental states you get into as you prepare and you execute a task which is dangerous and the same analogy can be extended to martial combat, the same analogy can be extended to sports like ancient wrestling.

Modern wrestling is a circus, of course, where the outcome is largely decided by the middlemen who negotiate the bouts between clowns, who can still damage each other very severely. But ancient wrestling was a bout that ended very quickly and was essentially religious, which is why the area that they wrestled in was purified with salt in most of the major traditions.

Fencing: Take away the protective gloves and gear and you have gladiatorial combat between people who are virtually on the brink of life and death. It’s only one step removed from Olympic fencing. Notice that in the contemporary Olympics, a movement that was founded in modernity on the Grecian ideal, nearly always founded by aristocrats, all of the early victors in shooting and fencing and all these early sports are aristocrats. Of course, the early Olympics have their funny side. Many of the female athletes that won the early Olympics were transsexuals. Of course, medical checks were instituted to prevent hermaphrodites and people of diverse genders and that sort of thing from competing in these competitions. But the individualistic sports in a mass age have been disprivileged and are largely regarded as strange wonderland sports that the masses only flip channels over in relation to the Olympics.

For a man like Evola and for the sensibility which he represents, things like sport are not a diversion. They are targets for initiation in relation to processes of understanding about self, the other, and life that transcend the moment. So, one bout leads to another, leads to another moment of skill. It is as if these moments, which most people always try to avoid rather than engage upon, are in slow motion. The whole point of Evola’s attitude toward these and other matters is to go beyond that which exists in a manner which is upwards and transcendent in its portending direction.

This is a society which always looks downwards. “What will other people think? What will one’s neighbors think? What will people out there think? What will all this BBC audience think? What do the masses, Left, Right, Center, pressing their buttons on panels and consoles think?” The sort of Evolian response is what they think is of no importance and they ought to think what the aristocrats of the world, in accordance with the traditions, which are largely religious, out of which their social order comes, think. You can understand that this is an attitude which is not endeared, this type of thinking, to contemporary pundits and to the world as it now is.

The_Yoga_of_Power_Cover.jpgIt’s also inevitable that when Evola’s books were published they would enter the English-speaking world via the occult, via mysticism, via various types of initiated and individualistic religiosity. The whole point about the Western occult, whether one believes in the literal formulation that these people spout or whether one believes in it metaphorically and quasi-subjectively, is that it’s an individualistic form of religiosity. In simple terms, mass religion involves a small clerisy or priesthood in the old Catholic sense up there and the laity are down there and it’s in Medieval Latin, it’s slightly mysterious, you partly understand it if you’re grammar school educated, otherwise you don’t, it’s mysterious and semi-initiated, but you don’t really know, the mystery is part of the wonder of the thing, you look up at them and they’ve got their backs to you, and they’re looking up further beyond them towards the divine as they perceive it. Now, that’s a traditional form of mass religiosity, if you like.

But the type of religiosity with which he was concerned was individualistic and voltaic. It was essentially the idea that everyone in a small group is a priest. Sometimes there’s a priest and a warrior combined. One of the many scandals that we have in modernity is crimes that are committed by members of various religious groups and organizations. Many Traditionalist minded people believe that the reporting of these crimes in the mass media is deliberately exaggerated in order to demonize any retrospectively traditional elements of a prior and metaphysically conservative type in the society.

But if one looks at it another way–and one of the things about Evola is the creativeness of the aristocratic mind that looks at essentially Centrist and bourgeois problems in a completely different perspective–he would say about those sorts of scandals, which I won’t belabor people with because everyone knows about them, that it’s the absence of the dialectic between the priest, somebody who believes in something, somebody who believes in a philosophy that isn’t just theirs and therefore relates to a society and relates to a continuing generic tradition out of which they come . . . Most contemporary philosophers are “just my view.” “Just my view as a tiny little atom.” Rather than my view as something that’s concentric and links me to something larger and that therefore can be socially efficacious. But from an Evolian perspective, the absence of the warrior or the martial and soldierly traditions and its interconnection with belief and the individual who believes is the reason for decadence or deconstruction or devilment or decay in these religious organizations. In his way of looking at things, there’s a seamlessness between the poet-artist, the warrior, and the religious believer. They are different formulations of the same sort of thing, because they are always looking upwards and, in a way, are deeply individualistic and egotistical but transcend that, because the concentration on one’s self or one’s own thinking, one’s own feeling, one’s own concerns, one’s own attitude towards this mountain, this woman, this fight, this text is conditioned by that which you come out of and move towards.

Evola doesn’t believe in progress nor does the Tradition that he comes out of. They don’t believe in scientific progress. They don’t believe in evolution. But his anti-evolutionism is strange and interesting. It’s got nothing to do with creationism and, if you like, the Evangelical politics of certain parts of what you might call the Puritan American Right, for example. His attitude is a reverse attitude, which in a strange way is an involuntary and inegalitarian way of looking at the same issue. His view is that the apes are descended from us as we go upwards rather than we are descended from them as we leave them in their simian animalism. So, in a way, it’s actually a reformulation of the same idea but looking upwards and always seeing, if you like, the snobbish, the aristocratic, the prevailing, the over-arching view rather than viewing the thing from a mass, generic, and middling perspective which includes people.

Tony Blair says the worst vice anyone can have is to be intolerant. It’s to be exclusive. It’s to exclude people. “The nature of Britishness is inclusion,” when, of course, the nature of any group identity is exclusion, and who is on the boundary and who can be allowed in and the subtleties and grains of difference that exist between one excluded group and another, where one tendency of man ends and another begins. Evola believes, in a very controversial way, that decline is morphic and spiritual combined. In other words, races of man have a spiritual dimension, have a higher emotional dimension, have a psychological dimension, but never forget that Evola is not a Nietzschean. He is not somebody who believes that it’s all at this level. He believes that the gods speak to man directly and indirectly and the civilizations that we come out of are based essentially on religious premises.

Moderns who sneer at these sorts of attitudes, of course, forget that virtually every civilization that mankind has ever had until relatively recently, and in every civilization there are documents and artifacts which are included in the storehouse of the British Museum just over there in central London, was religiously and theologically based. It’s only really in a post-Enlightenment, Scottish Enlightenment, English Enlightenment, French Enlightenment, 18th century plus sort of a way that the secularization of Western Europe rivals the rest of the planet. Further east in Europe, less of it. Further south in Europe, a bit less of it. Religiosity on most of the other continents of the Earth is still a primary force, but Evola would despise the sort of religiosity that prevails there because he would see in it broken down thinking, syncretism, the people who would say he would be in favor of contemporary Saudi Arabia, for example, would probably be sorely disappointed. He would see under the religious police, under the strict observance of this or that rule, American satellite dishes and modern devices and that which is external, in relation to modernity, and which is being internally accepted. So, Evola was always the critic, if you like, and always on the outside.

Now, his career is quite complicated because when he was a very young man he fought in the First World War on the Italian side. They, of course, fought on the “Western” or Allied side in that war as is often forgotten. There are some extraordinary photos of him on the internet in these goggles and these helmets looking like extraordinarily fascistic, and that movement hadn’t even really been created then. He looks like that in a D’Annunzian-type way, stylistically, even before the gesture itself.

Evola, of course, partly disapproved of Fascism and National Socialism even though he became very heavily implicated and/or involved in both of them, because in his view they weren’t Right-wing enough! They weren’t traditional enough. They weren’t organic enough. They weren’t extreme enough. Evola is probably the only thinker in the 20th century whose written a slim volume criticizing National Socialism from the Right not from any point to the Left. He only aligned with these movements because they forced modernity to question itself and because they were anti-democratic and because they were ferocious and desired morally and semi-theologically–because few, including liberal critics, would deny that there was a semi-theological insistence to most of the radical European movements, even of the Left but certainly of the Right, in the first half of the last century. Evola saw in these movements a chance but no more, which is why he flirted with them, why he wrote a fascist magazine in Italy, why he went to colleges run by Himmler’s SS in Germany, why he was disapproved of by them, why he had sympathizers in the Ernst Jünger-like in the party who protected him, why he was allowed to write with a degree of freedom whilst giving a degree of loyalist obeisance to these structures and yet, at the same time, to remain outside them. The question has to be raised whether Evola’s philosophy is consonant with the creation of a society or whether it will become, if you like, a spirited individualism.

Evola was also involved in the beginning of his career in one of the most radical modernist movements of the 20th century: Dadaism in Italy. He produced Dadaist paintings. Now, this, superficially, looks quite extraordinary. But of course there was a strong interconnection between certain early modernisms and fascistic ideologies. The reason that he became involved in Dadaism is quite interesting, and, of all things, there is a talk on YouTube that lasts four-and-a-half minutes in which Evola is an old man explicating why he was involved. He says the reason we got involved in these movements was to attack the bourgeoisie, was to attack the middle class, and was to attack middle class sensibility and sentimentality. The extraordinary radical anti-system nature of many radical Right ideas, which is hidden in more moderate and populist variants, comes out staring at you full in the face in people like Evola. Many fascistic and radical movements of the Right, of course, were peopled by adventurers and outsiders and quasi-artists and demi-criminals and religious mystics and madmen and people who were outside of the grain of mainstream life, particularly people who were socialized by the Great War, which many of them experienced as a revolution.

Wyndham Lewis who was strongly drawn aesthetically to modernism and politically to various forms of fascism and was a personal friend of Sir Oswald Moseley once said that for us, the First War was a revolution, wasn’t a war. We saw killing on a truly industrial scale. We saw the industrialization of slaughter.

One of the interesting ironies of the Evolian, and in some ways Ernst Jünger’s, position about war is that, although thinkers like them are regarded by pacifists and liberal humanists and feminists, as warmongers, there is a distaste for mass war in Jünger and Evola and the others, because it’s the war of the ants, the war of the masses in blood and dung and soil and gore. There is nothing chivalric about a man being torn to pieces by a helicopter gunship when he doesn’t even have a chance to get his Armalite into the air.

Evola would prefer the doctrine of the champion. You know, when two Medieval armies meet, and one enormous, hulking man comes out of one army, in full regalia trained in martial splendor and arts as a previous speaker discussed in relation to the Norse tradition, and another champion emerges and they fight for a limited objective that leaves civilization intact on either side. But the one that is defeated will obviously pay dues to the other.

Now, this shows the extremely Byronic, individualistic, and aristocratic spirit that lurks in Evola’s formulations. The way that his works have come down to us, of course, is the way that he lived his life and the books that he wrote. It’s interesting that the Anglo-Saxon world has received his literature through translations by mystic and occultistic publishers in the United States: about tantra, about Buddhism, about Japanese warrior castes and traditions, about the Holy Grail, about Greco-Roman, High Christian, pagan, and post-pagan Europeanist and other traditions.

Another radicalism about Evola is his total unstuffiness and absence of prudery in dealings with sex. Evola wrote a book called Metaphysics of Sex. He regards sexuality as a primal biological instantiation through which the races of man are renewed and replaced. But at the same time he regarded it as one of the primary human acts of great energy and force that has to be channeled, has to be made use of, has to be transcended in and of itself. You have this odd commitment to tantra, which is a sort of erotic extremism of occultic sex, and a total opposition to pornography. Why? Because the one involves commercialization of sex, the one involves money interrelated with sexuality. From this purely primal perspective, unless a marriage is arranged between dynastic states or groups for particular statal purposes, which is fine, money has almost nothing to do with these areas of life.



The disprivileging of money as the basis of everything and the belief that the society that we have now is the result of the fact that every politician in all of the parties represented in the major assemblies, including radical Right parties essentially of a populist hue actually, believe in Homo economicus. They believe that man is an economic integer and nothing else matters. Immigration? It’s good for the economy, don’t you know? Mass movements of capital around the world at the flick of a button on a screen in exchanges all around the globe, particularly in the Far East now but also ubiquitously? It’s good for the economy! Everything is based upon the freeing of people from prior forms of alleged servitude due to economic enhancement. The sort of doctrines Evola holds are not neo-Medieval, nor are they a desire for a return to the ancient world with certain modern technologies. In some ways, they are a return to the verities that existed before the modern world was created.

One of the most substantial critiques of this type of thinking is the belief that the modern world is inevitable, that all cultures and races will modernize and are doing so at a great rate of knots, that skyscrapers and enormous megalopolic cities are being thrust up in the Andes and the Far East and even client Chinese-built ones will emerge in Africa and elsewhere and that it would be onwards and upwards forever in relation to what we have now. There are grotesque problems with that, of course, because to give every human on this planet irrespective of race, kinship, clime, and culture a middle American lifestyle you will need 3 planets, 8 planets, 10 planets, or you may need them, in order to give them that middle American feeling. The three satellite dishes, the condominium, the three Chelsea tractors outside in the driveway, the multiple channel TV, and so on. To give every African that we will need many, many planets and many, many times the economic wherewithal that we have even at the moment.

The interesting thing about Evola is that many issues that convulse people today–famine in the Third World, war in the Congo, HIV/AIDS–he would say they’re interesting, of course, because they’re things that are going on, and everything has a meaning even beyond itself. But ultimately they’re unimportant. The number of humans on the Earth doesn’t matter to his type of thinking. Pain and suffering do not matter in accordance with his type of thinking. Indeed, he welcomes them as part of the plenitude of life, because life begins in pain and ends in pain and most people live their entire lives in denial of the fact that life is circular as his philosophical tradition believes the world is and meaning is. There is progression around the circle, but there is decline, and decline and death are part of an endless process of will and becoming.

It is essentially and in a very cardinal way a religious view of life, but also a metaphysically pessimistic and conservative view of life in a profound way that the conservatism of contemporary liberal Tories like Cameron would not even begin to understand. To a man like him, theories of Evola’s sort are lunacy, quite literally, the return to the Dark Ages, the return to the Middle Ages, quasi-justifications of slavery, quasi-justifications of the Waffen SS. This is what Cameron or his colleagues on the front bench and his even more liberal colleagues on the same front bench would say about these sorts of ideas.

1907166939.jpgBut the irony is that 300 to 400 years ago, most civilized structures on Earth were based on these ideas. Even the modern ones that replaced them are based upon the contravention of these sorts of ideas, which means that they realized they were real enough to rebel against in the first instance. It’s also true that even in the high point of modernity, post-modernity, hypermodern reality, all the phrases that are used, when a war occurs, when the planes go into the towers in New York, when the helicopter gunships stream over Arabian sands, you suddenly see a slippage in the liberal verities and in the materialism and in some of the ideas which are used to justify these sorts of things. Not much of a slippage, but you suddenly see a slippage, what occultists and mystics call a “rending of the veil,” a ripping of the veil of illusion between life and death.

What is life really about? Is life really about shopping? Is life really about making more and more money? Is life really about bourgeois status when one already has enough to live on? Is life really about eating yourself to death? These are the sorts of things that Evola’s viewpoint pushes before people, which is why the majority will always push it away.

His political texts are essentially Revolt Against the Modern World, Men Among the Ruins, and Ride the Tiger, which explore the nature of a man who is born now when most of the prior traditions of his culture and his civilization have collapsed.  The decivilization of man, the fact that Western cities have turned into Third World zones, the fact that semi-criminality is endemic, the fact that when you go into a street graffiti is there, rap music blares from a passing car, 20%, 40% of the street has no relationship to you aesthetically or ethnically or racially or culturally. Evola would see this as part of the inevitable climate of decline and spiraling downwards towards matter, which is intentional and volitional.

The most controversial area of Evola is when he begins to unpick and reformulate many classic propositionalisms of what might be called the “Old Right” to determine what has occurred and why. Evola is essentially, although he began in a more subjectivist and changeable mood, a deeply religious and aristocratic man. This means there is always a reason. Liberals believe that everything is a confusion and everything is contingent upon itself and everything is an accident waiting to happen. But like Christ in the New Testament, who believes that when two birds fall to the ground the father is aware, Evola believes that there is always a purpose and a reason. Evola believes that civilizations are collapsing in on themselves and tearing themselves apart internally for reasons that are pushed by elites and by forces which are manifest within them that will that desire. The endless atoms and causal moments in the chains may not know of that which is coming, that which is non-volitional, that which is partly pre-programmed. He believes that these tendencies of mass servitude, mass death, mass proletarianization spiritually, mass plebeianism, mass social welfare, mass social democracy are willed, that the destructivity of prior cultural orders is willed and definite, and certain racial groups are used to facilitate that destruction, and that other groups use them in order to achieve it.

He believes in an aristocracy of man, because he believes everything is hierarchical. There was an interesting moment in a by-election in East London or eastern London just recently when the chairman of the party that I used to be in a while ago was asked by a woman of Afro-Caribbean ancestry, “Are we equal with you?” The media’s there, you know. Twenty cameras are upon this individual, and, therefore, given the logic and the paradigm that he is in he said, “Yes.” He would probably want to say, “Yes, but . . . ,” but the media has gone on because it’s got the required answer. Indeed, lots of media investigation now is asking a politician to affirm their correctness before a prior methodological statement, and woe betide any of them if they show the slightest backsliding on any issue about which they should be progressive.

Who can put words in the mouth of somebody who died a while back, but Evola’s answer, the answer of his type of thinking, would be that that woman is unequal in relation to a black writer like Wole Soyinka, who is a Nigerian from the Yoruba tribe and won the Nobel Prize. Is he worthy of winning the Nobel Prize? Was he given the prize in the 1990s because it was fashionable to do? Rabindranath Tagore, the great Indian writer and Brahmin and higher caste type, won it in 1913. Probably wasn’t too much political correctness then, but there was probably a bit even then. The Evolian answer is that she is not equal in relation Soyinka, and Soyinka is not equal in relation to Chaucer or Defoe or Shakespeare or Voltaire or Dante or Tolstoy or Dostoevsky or Wagner, that everything is unequal and that everything is hierarchical and that there is a hierarchy within an individual and between individuals and between groups of individuals, because everything is looking upwards and everything has a different purpose in life.

This means that those who are at the middle and the bottom of an ethnicity, of a social order, of a gender, of a prior historical dispensation should not be lonely, in his way of looking at things, or afraid or rebellious or full of alienation and fear. Because everyone has a role within a hierarchy and people can move to a degree although his viewpoint is essentially aristocratic and not meritocratic. A man like Nietzsche, who Bertrand Russell once condemned as advocating an aristocracy when he was not born in it or anywhere near it, would be accepted, but never completely accepted by an aristocratic caste. Things that are regarded as hopelessly naïve and snobbish now, Evola regards as just due form.

locandina.jpgWhat is the worst thing in the world at the present time according to Sky News? Probably discrimination. Discrimination of one sort or another. Evola would believe that discrimination is the taxonomy of an aristocratic sensibility. One reaches for a piece of cake, one discriminates. One has an arranged marriage with another member of the Sicilian nobility, one discriminates. One reaches for a sword to do down a bounder that one wishes to beat with the flat of the blade, one discriminates between the weapon and the object of the rage, which is itself indifferent because it sees something beyond even itself. These are views, of course, that the majority of people will find cold, chilling, brutal, [unintelligible] beyond their conception. Almost forms of insanity in actual fact in relation to what is today regarded as normal or moral or even human. They are partly inhuman ideas, in some ways, but they are ideas that most aristocracies and most warrior castes have had for most forms of human history.

Evola’s books are now widely available to those who wish to read them. The great conundrum of his work is, does it portend to an asceticism? In other words, if the era of destruction, which is the Kali Yuga on the ideology which he puts forward, which is the Hindu age of destruction where everything is broken and everything is melded together prior to decomposition which will feed a universal rebirth at a future time, because mankind is seasonal in relation to Spengler’s view of the world where his view of history is compared to plants and botany to give it some sort of methodology, some sort of structure.

Don’t forget, these are 19th century and early 20th century ideas. No history don, or hardly any history don, today believes history has a meaning. Carlyle believed that the sort of deistic nature of history impinged upon the decadence of the French royalist elite and it led to the revolution because they didn’t superintend France properly. He sort of believed in his Protestant, thundering way from the pulpit of his study in the mid-19th century that the French Revolution was an outcome that was partly deserved by a failing aristocracy. In other words, history had a meaning.

It had a purpose. Nobody believes history has a meaning or a purpose. Certain anti-fascists would say Stalingrad had a purpose, but they forget that the Red Army shot 16-18,000 of their own men, and the Commissars stood 18 feet behind the lines. They shot an army of their own men in order to win that battle, just as secret police in the Third World cut off the ears and cut out the tongues of any who retreat in battle before they send them back to their villages.

Would Evola approve of that? He would probably say that if it was done individualistically or as a matter of revenge or of rage it’s dependent upon the circumstances, but to do it in a mass-oriented way–mass camps, mass sirens, the totalitarian response particularly of communism, the reduction of everything to the lowest common denominator so all can be free in a sort of pig-like uniformity–he would consider that really to be death and to be fought against.

Evola is extraordinarily controversial because there is an area in his thinking, particularly in relation to the Islamic world, that leads almost to the justification, as certain liberal critics say, of forms of religious terrorism. He never quite advocates that, but it’s quite clear that his loathing of the modern world is so much and his nuanced appreciation of the Islamic concept of Jihad–where you fight within yourself against doubt and fight externally in a quasi-pagan and masculine way against the enemy that is without you–has a resonance that chimes with certain extremist religious people who basically want to blow the modern world up.

So, Evola is, as I say in my title, one of the world’s most Right-wing, certainly most elitist, thinkers. The interesting thing about him is that everything always looks upwards, even his doctrine of race.

You find in many racialistic movements a sort of socialism. That if you are of my ethnicity you are “all right,” as if possession of a certain melanin skin content or absence of same is all that the thing was about. When Norman Tebbit says that the British National Party is old Labour plus allied racialism, there is always a streak of truth to such viewpoints. Evola doesn’t believe in that.

Evola believes that race is spiritual as well as physical. If a man comes to you and says, “Oh, I’m White! You should be looking after me, mate!” he would say what is your intellect, what is your quality, what is your moral sense, what do you know about your civilization, how far are you prepared to fight for it, what pain can you endure, have you had understanding of death in your family and in life, are you a mature and profound human being or are you part of the limitless universality although you were born in a particular group which I respect and come from myself.? That’s the sort of principle that he would have.

Now, that is an attitude of revolutionary snobbery in a way, but it’s snobbery based upon ideas of character. And in the end as we know, politically, character is a fundamentally important thing. And the absence of it, particularly in quasi-authoritarian movements is poisonous because people once in place cannot be removed except by the most radical of means. So, there is a degree to which leadership is all important.

Look at an army. An army is not a gang of thugs. But it can easily become one. An army can easily become a rabble, but armies are controlled by hierarchies of force, the nature of which is partly impalpable. Each squad has a natural leader. Each squad has its non-commissioned officer. Each squad has an officer above them. In real armies, German, British armies of the past, if one officer goes down somebody replaces them from lower down, assumes immediately the responsibility that goes with that role. Even if all the officers are gone and all non-commissioned officers, the natural leader, one of the 5%–most behavioral anthropologists believe that 1 in 20 of all people have leadership critera–can step forward in a moment of crisis and are looked to by the others, because they provide meaning and order and hierarchy in a moment of stress.

Have you ever noticed that when people undergo disaster or when they’re in difficulties they look for help, but they also look for people to lead them out of it? Leaders are never liked, because it’s sort of lonely at the top, but leadership is probably like the desire to believe in something beyond yourself. It’s inborn. And while the principle of leadership remains, where in even democratic societies leaders are required in order to energize the democratic masses . . .

Don’t forget, most of the Caesarisms of modernity are Red forms of Caesarism, forms of extreme authoritarianism and even pitilessness all in the name of the people. All raised in the name of the masses and their glory and their freedom, their liberty and their equality. When Forbes magazine says that the Castro family’s wealth in communist Cuba is $70 million US dollars, when it calls them communist princes . . . Don’t forget, an ordinary man in Cuba could be in prison for owning his own plumbing business. When you realize that these people are princelings of reversal, you sense that some of the hierarchies, although they wear different names and different forms, are occurring in an entropic phase or in a culture of decay do relate to many of Evola’s ideas even in reversal. He would say this is because these ideas are eternal and are perennial and will out in the end.

The traditional political Right-wing criticism of these sorts of ideas is that they are purely philosophical, they relate to individuals and their lives, they tend to Hermeticism and the ascetic view that a learned spiritual man, a man of some substance, can go off and live by himself and the rest can rot down to nothing and who cares. They say that they feed a sort of post-aristocratic misanthropy.

Look at our own aristocracy. They probably lost power in about 1912. They were never shot like in the Soviet Union, they were never beheaded like in revolutionary France of 200 years before. But they have lost everything in a way because their function has been taken from them, hasn’t it? The reason for those schools, the reason they were bred in the first place, the reason for all their privileges and so on has been taken away. The fascination with the Lord Lucan case in the ’70s, the sort of decline of that class. He listens to Hitler’s speeches at Oxford, beats the nanny to death, not even get the right woman in the basement. This sort of thing. Can’t even get that right! Couldn’t even get the crime right! It’s the decline of a class, isn’t it? Going down, and knowing they’ve gone down as well. It’s sort of Oswald Moseley’s son enjoys being dressed up as a woman and spanked and his son has just died of a heroin overdose. And yet Oswald Moseley is in that family chain. You don’t really need to think that there is a sort of efflorescence there. It’s a bit unfair on that family and so on.

But don’t forget, this was a class that was born to pitilessness and rule. This was a class that identified with eagles. That’s why they put them on their shields and on their ties and on their schools. And now look at them.



But, of course, they have in a sense joined the rest, haven’t they? They’ve joined the mass. And what they once were no longer matters. Cameron sums it up in a strange sort of way. Traditionally, since the 1960s, the Tories have always elected pushy middle class people with which the mass of their electoral support can identify.

It was always said Douglas-Home would be the last of the old breed. He was premier when I was born. He would be the last of the old breed that would survive and thrive. When asked about unemployment in 1961, Douglas-Home said, “There’s room for a second gamekeeper on my estate.” And people said he was out of touch. Out of touch! And he was out of touch! Let’s face it. But he thought that was a quite commodious and moral answer, you see.

Cameron is strange because all of the ease–the ease before the camera, the ease before people, no notes, look at me, not a trembling lip–all of that ease is part of the genetics of what he partly comes out of. And yet all of his values are bourgeois. All of his values are middling and mercantile. All of his values are this society’s as it now is.

Would Douglas-Home have joined or even given money to United Against Fascism, who he would have regarded as smelly little people on the margins of society who were a Left-wing rabble who probably needed to be beating the grass somewhere? Or in my regiment. You see what I mean? The idea that he would identify with these people because the real enemy represents the seeds of the aristocracy from which one has fled, that wouldn’t occur to him. He was too much what he was, basically, as a form to really consider these lies and this legerdemain and this flight of fancy.

One comes to the most controversial area of Evola’s entire prognosis, and this is the belief that Jewishness is responsible for decline and that they are a distant and another race that pushes upon things and causes things to fall and be destroyed. These are the views, of course, the belief that there is a morphic element in the nature of the decline, that has made him so untouchable and controversial. The interesting thing is that when he was approached about the Protocols of the Elders of Zion, which is believed by all liberal humanist scholars to be a forgery of the Okhrana secret police based upon an alleged French novel, I think in the 19th century, Evola said, I’m not concerned whether it’s a forgery or not, which is a very interesting response.

Because in Evola’s occultistic and Hermetic view of the world you can indicate something through its reversal, you can indicate something through metaphorization, something can be emotionally true and not completely factually true, a text can be used to exemplify truths deeper than its own surface. This is a religious view of the text, of course, that the text does not end with itself. It’s a Medieval view and is based upon a science of linguistic study called hermeneutics where you would look at every word, you would look at every paragraph, you would look at every piece of syntax to deconstruct for essence rather than deconstruct to find the absence of essence.

In the Western world, if you go to university now and you do any humanities, any arts, any liberal arts, or any social science course you will come across an ideology called deconstruction. Even vaguely, the semi-educated have heard of it. This is a viewpoint that says that any essentialisms (race, class isn’t an essentialism, but it begins to become one in the minds of man, belief in God, gender and so on) lead to the gates of Auschwitz. This is what deconstruction is based on as a theory. Therefore you look at every text, you look at every film, because they’re obsessed with mass culture, you see, looking at what the masses look at and what they’re fed by the capitalist cultural machine. They look at this and say, oh look, dangerous essentialism there. Did you see in that John Wayne film? Did you see the way he spoke to the Red Indian? Sorry, Native American. You see that sort of thing. You look at these things and you break them down and you break them down again and you break down the element of sort of “David Duke” logic that could be said to lie in that particular phrasing and so on.

But the sort of analysis that Evola maintains is what you might call constructionism rather than deconstructionism. And that’s building upon the essences of things and bringing out their discriminatory differences. So, to him the fact that that text may have been put into circulation by the Okhrana, the czarist secret police, as a profound Hermetic, metaphoricization for courses of history which may or may not be occurring, is worthy of study. He again returns to the idea that everything has meaning.

If you want war with the Islamic world, the towers will fall. If you a pacifist and isolationist America to enter the Great War, a particular boat with civilians onboard but weapons underneath, will be torpedoed by the Germans. If you want to get the isolationist boobs of middle America into a global struggle in the early 1940s you allow the prospect of an attack that you know is going to happen to it there and you make sure your aircraft carriers are not there and you blame the middling officers who were there for their incompetence retrospectively because it is the moment to kick start democratic engagement with heroic and Spartan activities.

Who can doubt that there is a streak of the Spartan? When an American Marine goes up a beach on Iwo Jima or when he fights in Fallujah? Some of the modern world has certainly fallen away for that man as he faces oblivion in warriorship against the other, even within the modern. People like Evola and Jünger would realize that. There’s even at times, in the extremity of modern warfare, a return to the individual. What about these American pilots and these other pilots, these Russian pilots, who fly in these planes, and the warrior is part of the plane. You know, they have a computer in their visor and they have all sorts of statistics coming up before them. It’s like a man who is an army fighting on his own, isn’t it? He’s got an amount of force under his wings which is equivalent to an army of centuries ago. So, you have a return to elite individuals trained only for killing and warriorship at the top tier of present Western advanced military metaphysics.

The interesting thing about Evola’s way of thinking is it’s creative. Most Right-wing people are pessimistic introverts who don’t like the world they were born into, but Evola seems to be to me in some ways an extravagant, optimistic aristocrat who always sees, not the best side of everything, but the most heroic side of everything that goes beyond even itself. Even if the Protocols of the Elders of Zion, in accordance with his diction, was a lie and can be proved to be such, the fact that millions were motivated to believe in it, millions to reject its causation, that people fought out the consequences and the consequences of the consequences in relation to even some of those ideas, means that it is of great specificity and import.



Nietzsche has the idea that a man stands on the edge of a pond, and he skims a pebble into the pond, and it skips across the water. You know when you get it skimming right and it goes and it goes and it goes and wave upon wave moves upon the surface, and you can’t predict the formulation of the wave and the current that it leads into. And that History has unknown consequences.

The Maoist general who was asked by an American sympathizer after the Maoist Long March, itself partly mythological, “What’s your view of the French Revolution?” And he memorably replied, “It’s too early to tell.” Because it’s only two 200 years back. That is the sort of perspective that Evola has.

Although there will be crushing defeats, and men of his sort, aristocrats, for whom the modern world has no time, play polo, waste your money, go to brothels, gamble all the time. There’s no role for you. The world is ruled by machines and money and committees and Barack Obama.

You know, American Rightists call Obama “Obamination” instead of abomination. Is he the signification for everything that is declining in America and isn’t all of these middle class tax revolt type movements which are 100% grassroots American really within the allowed channels of opposition? “He’s a socialist!” “It’s all about tax. It’s not about anything else.” “It’s all within the remit of health care budgetary constraints and views on same.” Etc, etc. “What about the deficit?” Aren’t all of these movements and the rage that they contain elements and spectrums of what he would call anti-modernity or semi-anti-modernity within modernity?

None of us know what the future will hold, but it is quite clear that unless people of advanced type in our group believe in some of the traditions that they come out of again, they will disappear. And in Evola’s view they will have deserved to disappear. So, my view is that whatever one’s view, whatever one’s system of faith . . . and don’t forget that in the Greek world you could disbelieve in the gods and think they were metaphors, you could kneel before a statue of them or you could have a philosophical belief in between the two and all were part of the same culture, all were part of the same city-state, and if called upon as a free citizens to defend it, even Socrates would stand in line with his shield and his spear.

All of Evola’s books are now available on the internet. The most controversial passages about morphology and ethnicity are all available on the internet. Read Julius Evola. Read an aristocrat for the past and the future, and look back to the perennial Traditions that are part and parcel of Western civilization and can fuel the imagination and fire even in those who don’t entirely believe in them.

Thank you very much!




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vendredi, 17 octobre 2014

Il filosofo Diego Fusaro: “Sto con Putin perché ho letto Kant”

Il filosofo Diego Fusaro: “Sto con Putin perché ho letto Kant”

A cura di Alfonso Piscitelli
Ex: http://www.barbadillo.it

OLYMPUS DIGITAL CAMERAIl più interessante dei nuovi filosofi italiani legge Marx & Schmitt e appoggia Putin perché riavvicina l’Europa alle radici della sua cultura giuridica e politica.

Diego Fusaro (Torino, 1983) è il più interessante tra i filosofi italiani di giovane generazione. Sua è una rilettura del pensiero di Marx  al di là di ogni vecchia scolastica o tentativo di “rottamazione” (Bentornato Marx! il titolo del suo libro). Tra le sue opere ricordiamo anche “Minima Mercatalia. Filosofia e capitalismo” e il recente “Idealismo e Prassi. Fichte, Marx, Gentile”. Fusaro è stato allievo del grande (e misconosciuto) Costanzo Preve e proprio Preve gli ha trasmesso l’interesse per la Russia.  Costanzo Preve – ci dice Fusaro – scrisse un saggio intitolato “Russia, non deluderci!”.

In che senso?

Preve si aspettava che la Russia potesse opporsi allo strapotere del capitalismo americano e alle sue pulsioni imperialiste, e dunque garantire l’esistenza di un mondo multipolare. Se la Russia non delude in questa sua missione naturale, essa svolge una funzione fondamentale anzitutto per noi Europei.

La Russia di Putin a differenza della vecchia URSS non esprime una radicale alternativa “di sistema” al mondo liberalcapitalista.

Vero, ma dal punto di vista geopolitico la Russia rappresenta pur sempre un freno all’agire di una super-potenza che ormai tende a sconfinare nella pre-potenza. Il mondo post-1989 è esattamente questo, la tendenza americana a dominare il mondo in forma unipolare.

Nel parlare del necessario “multipolarismo” lei fa riferimento a Kant.

Sì, in un mio scritto: Minima Mercatalia. Filosofia e capitalismo. Kant diceva, nel 1795, che per garantire una stabile pace è meglio che vi sia una pluralità di Stati (diremmo noi: meglio più blocchi, anche contrapposti) che una Monarchia Universale. Oggi la “monarchia universale” è quella dello “one way”, del pensiero unico americano che mira ad annullare ogni diritto alla differenza e ogni modo alternativo di abitare il mondo che non sia quello americano.

Oggi la Russia tende a scontrarsi con l’Occidente sul tema dei valori e dei cosiddetti diritti individuali.

Quella dei diritti individuali è una vera e propria ideologia, nel senso deteriore del termine. Tale ideologia afferma i diritti di un individuo astratto, mentre i veri diritti sono quelli dell’individuo all’interno della comunità. Individuo e comunità esistono reciprocamente mediati, non ha senso pensarli astrattamente, come fa l’ideologia dei diritti civili, la quale è poi un alibi per non parlare dei diritti sociali.

Diritti individuali magari bilanciati anche con i doveri, come diceva Mazzini.

Certamente. Mi rifiuto poi di pensare che matrimoni gay, adozioni gay e eutanasia rappresentino i simboli della massima emancipazione possibile. È una presa in giro, anzitutto per i precari e per i disoccupati. I diritti devono essere anzitutto diritti sociali: quelli che garantiscono una sopravvivenza dignitosa dell’individuo all’interno della sua comunità, permettendogli di potersi pienamente esprimere in tutte le sue potenzialità.

Putin si appella a quel diritto naturale che affonda le sue radici nel grande pensiero europeo: lo stoicismo, i padri della chiesa.

In tempi più recenti possiamo ricordare Grozio e Pudendorf come alfieri di questa concezione. Se Mosca oggi ci aiuta a riavvicinarci a questi temi, allora è davvero auspicabile che essa sia forte e ci sia vicina. Infatti, appare evidente come la Russia, anche per via della sua straordinaria cultura, rappresenti una realtà molto più affine allo spirito europeo di quanto non sia l’America, che è invece il regno della tecnica (Heiddeger) e del capitale smisurato (Marx).

E dunque…?

Dunque l’Europa dovrebbe staccarsi dall’America, e dovrebbe schierarsi nel blocco euroasiatico. Impresa utopica… se pensiamo alla presenza delle basi militari USA in Italia, a ben sessant’anni dalla fine dei nazifascismi e a vent’anni dalla fine del comunismo. L’Italia è oggi una colonia statunitense, anche se nessuno lo dice.

In campo economico e sociale sembra che l’“utopia si stia realizzando: flussi di studenti, di merci, di turisti. Interscambio energetico e tecnologico. Anche per questo forse si producono “crisi” … per suscitare un nuovo clima da guerra fredda e impedire la piena integrazione.

Gli Americani devono necessariamente dividere gli Europei per conservare il lorodominio unipolare. Dividere per comandare meglio. Le basi americane che costellano vergognosamente il territorio europeo servono esattamente a mantenere in uno stato di perenne subalternità militare, geopolitica e culturale gli Europei.

C’è anche un ritardo della cultura europea o perlomeno di quella italiana nel capire i cambiamenti epocali in atto.

Dopo il 1989 si è verificata una ondata penosa di riflussi e pentimenti. In questo scenario si inserisce la vicenda tragicomica della sinistra italiana e di quello che, con Preve, chiamo l’orrido serpentone metamorfico PCI-PDS-DS-PD: dal grande Antonio Gramsci a Matteo Renzi. Ormai da venti anni, senza alcun infingimento, la sinistra sta dalla parte del capitalismo, delle grandi banche e dei bombardamenti “umanitari”. Per questo io non sono di sinistra: se la sinistra smette di interessarsi a Marx e Gramsci, occorre smettere di interessarsi alla sinistra.

Se la sinistra ha assunto questa posizione è stato appunto in nome della nuova Ideologia dei Diritti umani

Affermava Carl Schmitt : l’ ideologia diritti umani è utile per creare un fronte unito contro chi viene individuato come “non umano”. Contro un nemico che viene dipinto come un mostro, ogni strumento di annientamento è lecito: si pensi agli strumenti utilizzati contro Saddam Hussein, contro Gheddafi. Si deve sempre inventare un nuovo Hitler in modo da legittimare la nuova Hiroshima: dove c’è il dittatore sanguinario, lì deve esserci il bombardamento etico. È il canovaccio della commedia che, sempre uguale, viene impiegato per dare conto di quanto accade sullo scacchiere geopolitico dopo il 1989: il popolo compattamente unito contro il dittatore sanguinario (nuovo Hitler!), il silenzio colpevole dell’Occidente, i dissidenti “buoni”, cui è riservato il diritto di parola, e, dulcis in fundo, l’intervento armato delle forze occidentali che donano la libertà al popolo e abbattono il dittatore mostrando con orgoglio al mondo intero il suo cadavere (Saddam Hussein nel 2006, Gheddafi nel 2011, ecc.). Farebbero lo stesso contro Putin…

… se Giuseppe Stalin non avesse innalzato attorno alla Russia una palizzata di bombe atomiche.

Esatto, proprio per questo è opportuno che Putin conservi il primato militare come arma di dissuasione: per poter svolgere una civile funzione di freno alla super-potenza americana. Per questo, l’immagine simbolo di questi anni è quella che vede contrapposti Obama che dice: “Yes, we can” e Putin che idealmente gli risponde: “no, you can’t!”. Frenare gli Americani significa frenare la loro convinzione di essere degli eletti, di avere una special mission, che consisterebbe nell’esportare la democrazia, come si esportano merci, a colpi di embarghi o di bombardamenti. Sulla scia di questa convinzione è stata dichiarata una guerra mondiale a tutto il mondo che non si piega ai diktat e la guerra è stata portata di volta in volta in Irak, in Serbia, in Afghanistan, in Libia, attraverso la guerriglia in Siria. Solo la Russia resiste. È questa la “quarta guerra mondiale”. Essa, successiva alla terza (la “Guerra fredda”), è di ordine geopolitico e culturale ed è condotta dalla civiltà del dollaro contro the rest of the world, contro tutti i popoli e le nazioni che non siano disposti a sottomettersi al suo dominio, forma politica della conquista del mondo da parte della forma merce e della logica della reductio ad unum del globalitarismo,

Putin stesso viene definito come una sorta di despota asiatico antidemocratico… anche se le percentuali del consenso di cui gode, espresso in regolari elezioni, sono eclatanti.

Come dice Alain de Benoist, l’ideologia liberale occidentale è una “ideologie du meme”: riconosce e legittima solo ciò che percepisce come uniforme a sé stessa. E in nome di questo unilateralismo si glorificano anche fenomeni ridicoli come quello delle Pussy Riot, come espressioni di “dissidenza” e di “lotta per i diritti”! Il capitale odia tutto ciò che capitale non è, mira ad abbattere ogni limite, in modo da vedere ovunque sempre e solo la stessa cosa, cioè se stesso. Con le parole di Marx, “ogni limite è per il capitale un ostacolo che deve essere superato”.

Come considera la proposta formulata da Vladimir Putin di una “Europa unita da Lisbona a Vladivostok”?

È un concetto interessante. E’ necessario che l’asse dell’Europa si orienti altrove rispetto all’Occidente americanizzato. Ed è necessario immaginare una Europa più ampia dei confini imposti dalla UE: quella UE che rappresenta il trionfo dei principi di capitalismo speculativo di stampo occidentale. La UE è oggi la quintessenza dell’americanismo, del neoliberismo americano e della vergognosa rimozione dei diritti sociali. È, direbbe Gramsci, la “rivoluzione passiva” con cui, dopo il 1989, i dominanti hanno imposto il neoliberismo.

E come si definirebbe Diego Fusaro oggi?

Sono uno allievo indipendente di Hegel e Marx, Gentile e Gramsci, ma mi considero abbastanza isolato nel panorama culturale italiano, perché la sinistra in Italia è passata dalla lotta al capitale alla lotta per il capitale. I suoi nomi di spicco sono Fabio Fazio e la signora Dandini, Zagrebelsky e Rodotà. In questo senso, non ne faccio mistero, mi sento un dissidente e un ribelle, e propongo un pensiero in rivolta contro l’esistente. La sinistra oggi è contro la borghesia ma non contro il capitalismo globale: ma dal 1968 è il capitalismo stesso che lotta contro la borghesia, cioè contro quel mondo di valori (etica, religione, Stato, valori borghesi, ecc.) per loro stessa natura incompatibili con la mercificazione universale capitalistica. Per ciò, lottando contro la borghesia, dal 1968 ad oggi la sinistra lotta per il capitalismo. Io ritengo che si debba invece lottare contro il capitalismo e che sia ancora valido un ideale di emancipazione del genere umano inteso come un soggetto unitario (la razza umana), che esiste solo nella pluralità delle culture e delle lingue, delle tradizioni e dei costumi, ossia in quella pluralità che – diceva il filosofo Herder – è il modo di manifestarsi di Dio nella storia.

All’atto della sua prima elezione Obama veniva accolto – e non solo dalla sinistra – come una sorta di Messia. Vi è chi lo definì come “il Presidente di tutto il mondo libero”.

Quello fu un tipico caso di provincialismo italiano ed europeo: la festa per l’incoronazione dell’Imperatore Buono. Oggi i tempi sono cambiati, c’è piùdisincanto non solo verso Obama, ma anche verso la costruzione verticistica dell’Unione Europea. Mi pare che la Francia si sia rivelata “l’anello debole” della catena eurocratica. O meglio: il punto in cui la catena si può spezzare. Chi è contro il capitale, nel senso di Gramsci e di Marx, non può oggi non essere contro l’imperialismo americano, ma poi anche contro l’Europa dell’euro e della finanza, del precariato e del neoliberismo.


A cura di Alfonso Piscitelli

jeudi, 16 octobre 2014

Julius Evola e la donna crudele


Julius Evola e la donna crudele

Ex: http://romeocastiglione.wordpress.com

Si annida il mistero tra le impalcature dell’imponente opera evoliana Metafisica del sesso. Nei capitoli ammalianti è celato un particolare erotismo evocativo; le tematiche affrontate nel volume brillano di un’immortale e remota luce. L’archetipo femminile è denso di sacralità e spiritualità arcana. La donna è inquadrata in un’ottica tradizionale, ancestrale: è sospesa nella perenne immutabilità ed è legata in modo preponderante alla terra, alla luna, ai ritmi ciclici del mondo. È un libro spiazzante, intrigante, coinvolgente. Le righe si sovrappongono nell’immaginario. Julius Evola esalta l’aspetto segreto della femmina, il lato nero, demoniaco. Secondo l’autore la donna riesce a far coesistere dentro di sé la disposizione alla pietà e quella alla crudeltà. In virtù di ciò egli rielabora alcune convinzioni di Lombroso e Ferreno. Particolarmente pone all’attenzione un prototipo di femmina violenta e spietata; tale modello si esalta nelle rivoluzioni e nei linciaggi. L’autore argomenta le supposizioni e riporta i passaggi più improntati del volume lombrosiano La donna delinquente. Credo che sia di ausilio il lungometraggio Malena: le donne del paese si accaniscono con perfida violenza sulla bellissima protagonista del film. La sfigurano pubblicamente. È un atto di giustizia sommaria. Malena abbatte i tabù. Di conseguenza provoca un’invidia assurda. È l’altra faccia della medaglia; rappresenta l’evasione. E deve essere distrutta.

Le donne crudeli di Tornatore sono simili alla perfida Emma Smael del lungometraggio Johnny Guitar di Nicholas Ray. Come il fuoco Emma Smael avvampa la nuda pelle. Ella sprigiona nell’atmosfera un aroma tragico intriso di dolore; ha un carisma esasperato, uno charme lugubre e impersonale. Porta i segni della rabbia oscura e antisolare. È vestita di nero, non cura il suo corpo. All’apparenza è un essere insignificante e indesiderabile. Ma sotto la scorza alberga un’anima inquieta, crudele, mesta. Luccica di cattiva luce quest’antieroina lunare. Emma fomenta il popolo, aizza le masse. Combatte la crociato contro i diversi, i forestieri, i fuorilegge. È puritana: disprezza le tentazioni dei sensi. Nello stesso tempo desidera ardentemente il bandito Ballerino Kid. Nel suo corpo si affrontano gli istinti contrastanti. Questa donna vorrebbe addirittura uccidere la sua segreta passione per far allontanare i bollenti spiriti. «Desideri Kid, ti vergogni e vorresti vederlo impiccato». Ribecca così Vienna, la nemica acerrima, la rivale assoluta.

Evola tenta di mettere insieme come un puzzle i richiami evocativi. In modo particolare è dedicato alla crudeltà della donna un intero capitolo. Così denocciola una carrellata di aneddoti storici: si sovrappongono le saghe della Tradizione. I persiani intravidero nell’universo femminile una particolare dualità. Fuoco e neve, durezze e dolcezza formano la donna. Ebbene sorge un collegamento tra crudeltà e sessualità: il tipo della baccante e della mènade è un esempio lampante. Nelle pieghe affiora un prototipo femminile afroditico ambiguo. La Dolores di Swinburne, la cosiddetta Nostra signora dello Spasimo è il vessillo del peccato, del piacere, della perdizione, della crudeltà latente. E il filosofo coglie alcune sottili sfumature. Ridisegna l’eroina Mimi della Boheme di Murger in un modo diverso; in sostanza inquadra la ragazza in una dimensione perfino “brutale e selvaggia”.

Ebbene il fascino muliebre è associato alla magia e alla stregoneria. Circe, Calipso e Brunhilde rappresentano l’esasperazione, l’estremizzazione, l’attrazione malefica. Tale tipologia di donna attrae l’uomo come una calamita famelica; la fascinazione è gravida di richiami alla negromanzia, all’occultismo. È la lagnanza della terra, lo spirito del peccato, la rottura. Perfino Ulisse è incantato dalle sirene: ascolta l’eco d’estasi legato a un palo. È una lotta tra il bene e il male. Anche il valoroso Gerardo Satriano nel romanzo L’eredità della priora è sedotto dalle fattucchiere lucane. Smarrisce la concezione del tempo e annulla la sua individualità. Così come perde la cognizione del tempo il giudice salentino protagonista del film Galantuomini di Winspeare. L’uomo prova una strana attrazione nei confronti di una donna legata al mondo della malavita. Per tale ragione perde tutte le certezze e confonde il bene e il male.

La letteratura, la poesia e il cinema hanno esaltato diverse volte le donne crudeli, in altre parole quelle dotate di un fascino antisolare, demoniaco. Per alcune strane similitudini elogio Giulia Venere, la domestica del libro Cristo si è fermato a Eboli di Carlo Levi. Leggo, annoto i passi del racconto. Ed elaboro il pensiero. Penso che sia un accostamento intrigante; tramite poche righe il lettore è catapultato in un anfratto antimoderno. «Giulia era una donna alta e formosa – scrive Levi – doveva aver avuto, nella gioventù una specie di barbara e solenne bellezza. Il viso era ormai rugoso per gli anni e giallo per la malaria, ma restavano i segni dell’antica venusità nella sua struttura severa, come nei muri di un tempio classico, che ha perso i marmi che l’adornavano, ma conserva intatta la forma e le proporzioni. […] Questo viso aveva un fortissimo carattere arcaico, non nel senso del classico greco, né nel romano, ma di una antichità misteriosa e crudele, cresciuta sempre sulla stessa terra senza rapporti e mistioni con gli uomini, ma legata alla zolla e alle eterne divinità animali. Vi si vedevano una fredda sensualità, una oscura ironia, una crudeltà naturale, una protervia impenetrabile e una passività piena di potenza che si legavano in un’espressione insieme severa, intelligente, malvagia». Con molta probabilità anche Levi ha subìto il fascino distruttivo della maga lucana. Emerge un ritratto sensuale, erotico, spietato.

Tale donna è un archetipo, un modello evoliano. Il filosofo della tradizione nella sua Metafisica del sesso rimarca gli oscuri aspetti. E appare con prepotenza la “dimensione fredda” evocata perfino da uno scrittore progressista come Carlo Levi. «È questa la dimensione fredda della donna – scrive Evola – quale incarnazione terrestre della Vergine, di Durgâ e in quanto essere yin. […] Che la donna sia connessa più dell’uomo alla terra, all’elemento cosmico – naturale è cosa dimostrata. […] Ma nell’antichità questa connessione si riferiva piuttosto all’aspetto yin della natura, dal dominio sovrasensibile notturno e inconscio, irrazionale e abissale, delle forze vitali. Di qui, nella donna certe disposizioni veggenti e magiche in senso stretto».

Nella rappresentazione cinematografica del libro Irene Papas veste i panni di Giulia. Avvertiamo nelle pieghe delle scene un velato erotismo colmo di allusioni estatiche. La donna nasconde il suo copro con le vesti. Soltanto i piedi sono scoperti: pertanto codesta forma di pudore primordiale si differenzia da quello delle donne orientali. Le cinesi considerano i piedi l’elemento primitivo da nascondere; le arabe, invece, coprono la bocca. E Giulia cammina scalza fra le macerie derelitte. In uno spezzone lascia intravedere una gamba nuda; la copre subito con un’aria sensuale. Magnetizza così l’uomo. Quest’ultimo è attratto dal gesto insolito della megera, dai movimenti furtivi, dal sensualismo impersonale. Proprio Evola dedica al pudore taluni passaggi coinvolgenti. «Si sa fin troppo bene quanto spesso la donna usa le vesti per produrre un maggior effetto eccitante allusivo alle promesse della sua nudità. Montaigne ebbe a scrivere che ci sono cose che si nascondono per meglio mostrarle».  Giulia Venere si è cristallizzata nelle sembianze di Irene Papas ed è difficile scindere le due figure. Il gesto insolito dell’attrice greca è un frammento penetrante e ipnotico. Con pochissime e calde movenze è riuscita a descrivere i sentieri tracciati nel libro evoliano.

Anarquismo de Derecha

Anarquismo de Derecha

Karlheinz Weißman 

Ex: http://www.counter-currents.com

English version here [2]

Traducido por Francisco Albanese

celine_s.jpgEl concepto de anarquismo derechista parece paradójico, de hecho, oximorónico, partiendo desde la suposición de que todos los puntos de vista políticos “derechistas” incluyen una evaluación particularmente alta del principio de orden… En efecto, el anarquismo de derecha ocurre sólo en circunstancias excepcionales, cuando la hasta ahora velada afinidad entre el anarquismo y el conservadurismo puede hacerse aparente. 

Ernst Jünger ha caracterizado esta peculiar conexión en su libro Der Weltstaat (1960):

Der Anarchist in seiner reinen Form ist derjenige, dessen Erinnerung am weitesten zurückreicht: in vorgeschichtliche, ja vormythische Zeiten, und der glaubt, daß der Mensch damals seine eigentliche Bestimmung erfüllt habe. (…)

In diesem Sinne ist der Anarchist der Urkonservative, der Radikale, der Heil und Unheil der Gesellschaft an der Wurzel sucht.

El anarquista en su forma pura es aquél, cuya memoria se remonta más en el pasado: a lo prehistórico, incluso a lo mítico, y que cree que el hombre cumplió en ese momento con su verdadero propósito. (…)

En este sentido, el anarquista es el ur-conservador, el radical, que busca la salud y la enfermedad de la sociedad en sus raíces.

Jünger más tarde llamó “Anarca” a este tipo de anarquista “conservador” o “prusiano, y refirió su propia “désinvolture” como de acuerdo con la misma: un retraimiento extremo, el cuál se nutre y se arriesga en las situaciones límites, pero sólo permanece en una relación observacional con el mundo, ya que todas la instancias del orden verdadero se disuelven y una “construcción orgánica” no es aún, o no será jamás, posible.

Aunque el mismo Jünger fue influenciado inmediatamente por la lectura de Max Stirner, la afinidad de tales pensamientos complejo con el dandismo es particularmente clara. En el dandy, la cultura de la decadencia a finales del siglo XIX personificada, que por un lado era nihilista y ennuyé, por el otro ofrecía el culto de lo heroico y el  vitalismo como alternativa a los ideales progresistas.

index.jpegEl rechazo de las jerarquías éticas actuales, la preparación para ser “no apto, en el sentido más profundo de la palabra, para vivir” (Flaubert), revelan puntos comunes de referencia del dandy con el anarquismo; su estudiada frialdad emocional, su orgullo y su aprecio por la sastrería fina y los modales, así como la pretensión de constituir “un nuevo tipo de aristocracia” (Charles Baudelaire), representan la proximidad del dandy a la derecha política. A esto se suma la tendencia de los dandies políticamente inclinados a declarar simpatía a la Revolución Conservadora o a sus precursores, como por ejemplo Maurice Barrès en Francia, Gabriele d’Annunzio en Italia, Stefan George o Arthur Möller van den Bruck en Alemania. El autor japonés Yukio Mishima pertenece a los seguidores tardíos de esta tendencia.

Además de esta tradición de anarquismo de derecha, ha existido otra tendencia, más antigua y en gran medida independiente, conectada con circunstancias específicamente francesas. Aquí, al final del siglo XVIII, en las etapas posteriores del ancien régime, se formó un anarchisme de droite, cuyos protagonistas reclamaron para sí una posición “más allá del bien y del mal,” una voluntad de vivir “como a los dioses”, y que no reconocieron valores morales más allá del honor personal y el coraje. La cosmovisión de estos libertinos se hallaba íntimamente unida con un ateísmo agresivo y una filosofía pesimista de la historia. Hombres como Brantôme, Montluc, Béroalde de Verville, y Vauquelin de La Fresnaye sostuvieron al absolutismo para ser una materia prima que lamentablemente se opuso a los principios del antiguo sistema feudal, y que sólo sirvió a deseo de bienestar económico de la gente. Actitudes, que en el siglo XIX volvieron a encontrarse con Arthur de Gobineau y Léon Bloy y también en el siglo XX con Georges Bernanos, Henry de Montherlant y Louis-Ferdinand Céline. Esta posición también apareció en una versión específicamente “tradicionalista” con Julius Evola, cuyo pensamiento giraba en torno al “individuo absoluto”.

En cualquier forma en que el anarquismo de derecha aparezca, siempre es conducido por un sentimiento de decadencia, por el desprecio a la era de las masas y por el conformismo intelectual. La relación con la política no es uniforme; sin embargo, no pocas veces el retraimiento se torna en activismo. Cualquier unidad más allá está ya negada por el individualismo altamente deseado de los anarquistas de derecha. Nota bene, el término es a veces adoptado por hombres –por ejemplo, George Orwell (anarquista Tory) o Philippe Ariès– que no exhiben signos relevantes de una ideología anarquista de derecha; mientras que otros, que exhiben objetivamente estos criterios –por ejemplo, Nicolás Gómez Dávila o Günter Maschke– no hacen uso del concepto.


Gruenter, Rainer. “Formen des Dandysmus: Eine problemgeschichtliche Studie über Ernst Jünger.” Euphorion 46 (1952) 3, pp. 170-201.
Kaltenbrunner, Gerd-Klaus, ed. Antichristliche Konservative: Religionskritik von rechts. Freiburg: Herder, 1982.
Kunnas, Tarmo. “Literatur und Faschismus.” Criticón 3 (1972) 14, pp. 269-74.
Mann, Otto. “Dandysmus als konservative Lebensform.” In Gerd-Klaus Kaltenbrunner, ed., Konservatismus international, Stuttgart, 1973, pp. 156-70.
Mohler, Armin. “Autorenporträt in memoriam: Henry de Montherlant und Lucien Rebatet.”Criticón 3 (1972) 14, pp. 240-42.
Richard, François. L’anarchisme de droite dans la littérature contemporaine. Paris: PUF, 1988.
______. Les anarchistes de droite. Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 1997.
Schwarz, Hans Peter. Der konservative Anarchist: Politik und Zeitkritik Ernst Jüngers. Freiburg im Breisgan, 1962.
Sydow, Eckart von. Die Kultur der Dekadenz. Dresden, 1921.


Article printed from Counter-Currents Publishing: http://www.counter-currents.com

URL to article: http://www.counter-currents.com/2014/10/anarquismo-de-derecha/

URLs in this post:

[1] Image: http://www.counter-currents.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/08/Celine04.jpg

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mardi, 14 octobre 2014

L’uomo come potenza

L’uomo come potenza

Ex: http://romeocastiglione.wordpress.com


Sfoglio con calma le pagine del libro L’uomo come potenza di Julius Evola. Tolgo i petali di una malefica rosa e lascio cadere sul pavimento infiniti aneliti di spasimo. Leggo, rifletto. Dinanzi a me compare una realtà incontaminata: accolgo in silenzio la magia dei Tantra. E soffermo il mio sguardo su un rigo ipnotico. «Evocare una immagine. Fissarvisi, perdersi, per così dire in essa. Bruscamente, sostituirla con un’altra». Chiudo gli occhi e vedo con la mente una ragazza in una stanza. La luce penetra attraverso i buchi delle persiane. È un pomeriggio estivo. Avverto un desiderio di distruzione; l’Inquietudine assale il mio corpo. Così cambio figurazione. Sorge all’improvviso un oceano di ghiaccio. Non si avverte nessun rumore. Il desiderio è atrofizzato. È fuggita la sofferenza.

Resto attonito. Ebbene rileggo il testo altre volte. Sottolineo, scopro. Tra le mani ho un dardo infuocato. E questo idealismo magico è paurosamente meraviglioso: è la vittoria totale dell’individuo. È il superamento dell’idealismo hegeliano. È l’abbraccio mortale del romanticismo tedesco di Novalis e Fichte con il metallico pensiero di Nietzsche. È la negazione della dualità cristiana; conseguenzialmente è il rifiuto del rapporto di dipendenza tra l’Individuo e il Dio trascendente ritenuto fondamentale da Schleiermacher. L’Io è il signore assoluto.

L’uomo come potenza raccoglie nelle pagine l’impetuosa unione della migliore filosofia occidentale con le dottrine orientali. Evola porta all’attenzione del lettore un Oriente remoto e distante dagli stereotipi. Con codesto saggio è stata confutata la distinzione tra i due poli. Non alberga certamente in questo luogo l’Oriente del buddismo arcano e delle primordiali Upanishad. Non occorre fuggire dal mondo; bensì bisogna dominarlo. Proprio per siffatto motivo l’autore ha esaltato il sistema tantrico, in altre parole il sistema orientale con più assonanze con lo spirito del moderno occidente. Nell’età buia, nell’epoca del Kali Yuga non c’è spazio per la conoscenza: soltanto la potenza brutale libera l’individuo.

Quindi è possibile dominare il mondo tramite la potenza liberatrice. L’Io deve diventare un Dio. Propriamente occorre recuperare l’immensa e grandiosa signoria di sé. L’individuo è sovrano ed è una “super monade”. La via dell’azione è salvifica. L’individuo è come un nero cavallo demoniaco libero dai lacci e dalle leggi morali. È il nero cavallo dell’auriga di Platone; è il dionisiaco puledro dalle sembianze tenebrose. È il sole, è la potenza distruttiva. Agire unicamente per l’azione è l’obiettivo. Di conseguenza si oltrepassa la soglia del bene e del male. Non c’è più il bene, non c’è più il male. L’individuo decide ciò che è bene e ciò è male. «Non si tratta cioè – dice Evola – né di violare le leggi, né di conformarvisi, bensì di elevarsi al livello di ciò per cui ogni legge e condizione non ha senso alcuno». Orbene le cupe e ipnotiche parole sembrano vampe immaginifiche. Cerca Dio chi è debole. L’individuo che cerca la libertà diventa Dio.

Proprio con la pratica dei Tantra (precisamente del ҫakti – tantra) l’individuo si libera nel mondo. La potenza divina proietta lungo un avvallamento magico. La naturale realizzazione di sé trova la sua suprema origine nel principio femminile della Shakti. Pertanto lo shaktismo mantiene talune importantissime attinenze con gli antichi culti del mondo mediterraneo pelasgico. Kali è una dea nera e nuda. La sua sagoma sprigiona una mistica sessualità intrisa di disintegrazione; ed è nera anche la Diana d’Efeso. Così come la Madonna Nera del Tindari in Sicilia. Tramite i Tantra è possibile affermare la priorità della potenza sull’esistenza. Al Principio c’è un potere e l’essere è subordinato a esso. Nella scala gerarchica tutti gli esseri vengono dopo e anche Dio viene dopo. Allora la potenza è libera e non è soggetta alle leggi razionali e a quelle morali. In pratica non ha un Dharma, un ordine più su di lei. Con il mondo c’è un rapporto di potenza e la potenza è soltanto la manifestazione. La potenza in azione è la coincidenza del desiderio e della liberazione. Proprio il mondo è il luogo materiale della liberazione. Insomma, bisogna porsi «faccia a faccia con la legge, resisterle e non esserne spezzati ma dominarla e spezzarla; osare di strappar via i veli con la realtà originaria e prudentemente coperta, osare di trascendere la forma per mettersi a contatto con l’atrocità originaria di un mondo in cui bene e male, divino e umano, giusto e ingiusto non hanno alcun senso. […] Ostacoli uno solo: paura. È una lotta terribile. Vi può essere vittoria e vi può essere catastrofe». L’autore individua nei Tantra un titanismo indomito e velato di allusioni nietzschiane. Evola rivendica la possibilità di «poter vivere tragicamente».

Bisogna mantenere la schiena dritta fino al momento di lasciare sé. Per farlo serve la potenza di distrazione, la rinuncia, l’auto crudeltà, la durezza, e la pratica occulta. Per di più bisogna essere coerenti e lineari. Il pentimento è vietato: non esiste alcun rimorso. Una “colpa” voluta non è una reale colpa. È necessario evitare il piacere; in linea di massima la strada maestra è quella della maggior resistenza. Non bisogna giustificare le proprie azioni. Non sussiste la condotta morale: soltanto nel dualismo la morale ha un’importanza. Per il superamento dei paҫa, in altre parole dei legami affettivi è fondamentale mantenere una dura condotta. La pietà, la delusione, il peccato, il disgusto, la famiglia e le convenzioni non hanno alcun valore. È una lotta atroce. Spunta tra i riflessi dell’opera un crepuscolare catastrofismo. Si dipanano le tenebre della perversa realtà. L’Individuo sfida il Dharma, il cosmos. Raccoglie dentro di sé il caos e sprigiona la volontà di potenza. Si arrampica a mani nude sopra una rocciosa parete; il senso di vertigine minaccia la stabilità. Sotto c’è il vuoto. Egli può soltanto andare avanti. Le pietre si sbriciolano intorno a lui. Soltanto in cima c’è la libertà.

In pratica nel volume il tantrismo è spiegato alla stregua di una “scienza positiva”. E l’idealismo magico di Evola è un frullato robusto e ammaliante. Nell’idealismo di Evola, in altre parole nell’idealismo “magico” l’Io si mette in rapporto diretto con le cose. Supera così la conciliazione astratta di spirito e mondo, di soggetto e oggetto figurata da Hegel. Codesto idealismo trae linfa da Novalis: il pensatore romano, in un certo senso, enfatizza ancor di più l’individuo. L’uomo come potenza rientra nel novero delle opere evoliane a carattere filosofico speculativo. L’autore con la successiva Teoria dell’individuo assoluto esaspera ulteriormente la “tragica dimensione dell’esistenza”. Il Superuomo di Nietzsche è oltrepassato sul filo del rasoio. La potentissima “vettura” evoliana percorre una strada stregata. Il singolo sceglie un eccezionalissimo percorso e procede a velocità elevate. Pertanto il poetico “solipsismo” non incute nessun timore. L’individuo assoluto determina ciò che è vero e ciò che è falso. Pare Humpty Dumpty, il personaggio ideato da Lewis Carroll che incontra Alice; Humpty cambia dispoticamente il significato delle parole poiché si sente un padrone. E nell’epoca della dissoluzione, nell’ultima epoca il corpo cerca la sua liberazione. Non è più il tempo della conoscenza. L’ascetismo non alberga fra le righe del libro. Ebbene non subire il fascino distruttivo del volume equivale a non scottarsi i piedi sui carboni ardenti: è impossibile. Di là dai Tantra è possibile scorgere un codice crittografato dal sapore robusto. L’uomo come potenza potrebbe diventare una sorta di nuovo “manuale di sopravvivenza” per gli uomini estranei al proprio tempo. Ma è un manuale algido, rigido, severo. È la vittoria di Dioniso è la consequenziale sconfitta di Apollo; è la vittoria del disordine sull’ordine morale devastatore della potenza dell’individuo. Dopo aver letto L’uomo come potenza il mondo non sarà più lo stesso e i problemi saranno analizzati con distacco. È un libro per pochi eletti. È un libro elegantemente antidemocratico.

E nei nostri giorni esiste l’individuo assoluto. Ad esempio le frange estreme del pianeta ultras corrono lungo una linea invisibile e peccaminosa. Nel cinema ho ritrovato diverse volte tale figura. Il Principe del film Ultrà è un individuo assoluto; così come Jena Plissken di Fuga da New York. È un individuo assoluto Saverio lo skinhead del lungometraggio Teste Rasate. Ebbene anche il generale Kurtz di Apocalypse Now è un individuo assoluto. Chi domina il mondo e chi non riconosce le leggi morali è un Dio. È un Dio chi obbedisce soltanto a sé stesso. Oggi codesti pensieri fanno male. Pesano come frammenti di roccia gravidi di rabbia.

lundi, 13 octobre 2014

Nietzsche 1844-2014


00:05 Publié dans Evénement, Philosophie | Lien permanent | Commentaires (0) | Tags : événement, italie, philosophie, nietzsche | |  del.icio.us | | Digg! Digg |  Facebook



Timotheus Lutz
Ex: http://www.hyperion-journal.net

Relatively recently, certain academics with an interest in those who admit a perennial tradition and expound esoteric doctrines have profiled what they call the ‘traditionalist school’. In their characterization, some individuals have been assimilated wrongly to this category, most notably the famous scholar of ‘comparative religion’, Mircea Eliade. Others, who should be aware of the fundamental differences in outlook between Eliade and modern exponents of traditional metaphysics, have seen him as a sort of sympathetic ‘Trojan horse’ who would subtly alter the course of his field of study in academia, by way of a ‘phenomenological’ view of spirituality in human history, contrasted with the sterile, purely analytical outlook that predominates in the universities.  
Eliade’s encounter with the works of René Guénon and Julius Evola certainly had a significant, or perhaps even a primary influence on his methods of research and ways of interpreting what he called ‘archaic’ systems, but, as he himself stated frankly in his journals, he always kept his distance and was apprehensive about endorsing the views of the latter.
It should be made clear that clarifying Eliade’s position is not necessarily a condemnation, as, obviously, one can accept some ideas of a given thinker without accepting all. However, given the importance and the rarity of the ideas of Guénon and Evola, and the incomprehension of some major ones displayed by Eliade, a firm appraisal is called for, since some are eager to assume an identity of substance in the thought of the former and the latter, where it is really only an appearance.
He states his position most directly in a journal entry on 11 November 1966:
What Guénon and the other ‘hermetists’ say of the tradition should not be understood on the level of historical reality (as they claim). These speculations constitute a universe of systematically articulated meanings: they are to be compared to a great poem or a novel. It is the same with Marxist or Freudian ‘explanations’: they are true if they are considered imaginary universes. The ‘proofs’ are few and uncertain – they correspond to the historical, social, psychological ‘realities’ of a novel or of a poem.
All these global and systematic interpretations, in reality, constitute mythological creations, highly useful for understanding the world; but they are not, as their authors think, ‘scientific explanations’. [1]
The classification of Guénon as a ‘hermetist’ is rather strange since, in his writings, he rarely discussed the hermetic doctrines. Since his main focus was metaphysics (a domain not subject to becoming), it is incorrect to classify him with a title pertaining to cosmological doctrines (which pertain to the domain of becoming). Comparing the formulations of Guénon and those similar in outlook to poems and novels is completely wrong: in poetic creations the subjective is primary, while in Guénon’s writings (as in those of Aristotle, Plotinus or Proclus) a precise objectivity is evident. As far as proofs, in this domain there cannot be empirical demonstration, only support by way of logic and analogy on one end, and identifying principles within oneself on the other. One either understands or does not. That this is a major obstacle for many is apparent. We assume the term ‘scientific explanations’ was not taken from Guénon or another’s writing, but used to imply erroneously that they would describe their interpretations as scientific; this is also an error since none of them would claim their interpretations could be explained scientifically.
We can assume this is Eliade’s basic view, since by 1966 his outlook was more or less fully developed, and since he shows similar opinions later on. This was also an opinion he had long held, as shown in an entry from 1947:
Only after you’ve studied Coomaraswamy’s writings in detail do you discover, suddenly, the poverty, the ‘elementarism’ [rom. primarism], of René Guénon’s œuvre. And the insufferable self-importance with which he hides, so often, his ignorance! [2]
We are not sure what he means here by ‘elementarism’, but perhaps it is Guénon’s focus on principial reality, which is the whole point of his works, contrasted with Ananda Coomaraswamy’s much greater emphasis on factual analysis and use of citations and academic sources. Although Coomaraswamy was indeed a (celebrated) academic, he was in agreement with nearly all of Guénon’s fundamental positions. If this is what Eliade means, it is simply another instance of his incomprehension of the primacy of metaphysics over confirming individual facts. We have found that Coomaraswamy’s writings do not reveal any significant ‘poverty’ in Guénon’s works, but instead complement them nicely.
Incomprehension of some major ideas is also apparent much later. In the early 1980s he writes: ‘Like René Guénon, Evola presumed a ‘primordial tradition’, in the existence of which I could not believe; I was suspicious of its artificial, ahistorical character’ [3]. To modern ears, the term ‘primordial tradition’ is likely to evoke visions of some perfect civilization in the sky, but first and foremost it is to be understood as atemporal (and thus, also, correctly described by Eliade as ahistorical) principles on which all genuinely traditional cultures are based. These principles are superior to, but are as immutable, in a similar manner, as the laws of logic or mathematics. To call them artificial is to demand that they be intelligible only as a particular, empirical example, and so displays, again, his incomprehension.
Worth quoting is his admission of a use for these authors:
I try once again, but I don’t succeed: Yeats’ ‘occultism’, over which so much fuss is made, doesn’t interest me. It’s cheap, ‘literary’, suspect – and, ultimately, uninteresting. Out of all the modern occultist authors whom I have read, only R. Guénon and J. Evola are worthy of being taken into consideration. I’m not discussing here to what extent their assertions are ‘true’. But what they write makes sense. [4]
And another, a response to a student of his interested in occultism: ‘. . . if one is truly attracted to hermetism, he ought to read the ‘authorized’, if not Cardanus, at least Coomaraswamy and René Guénon’ [5]. Clearly he still thought highly of some of their formulations, if only as comprehensible reference points for what is often and wrongly passed off as ‘esotericism’.
The critical attitude appears again in his dismissive appraisal of Evola’s intellectual autobiography. Eliade’s instinct to privilege academic authorities and those who have received wide acceptance is revealed clearly here:


I’m reading the intellectual autobiography of J. Evola, Il Cammino del mercurio [the title written is wrong: it is cinabro (cinnabar), not mercurio –ed.], with much melancholy. The chapter in which he presents and discusses the idealistic ‘university philosophy’, represented by Croce and Gentile: he speaks about his two theoretical volumes in which he supposedly destroyed those ‘professors,’ etc. etc. The naïveté (full of resentment) with which he situates himself in the history of contemporary thought – even though he states repeatedly that his volumes have not been reviewed and have not evoked any response . . .
There must be, indeed, several tons of printed paper in Italy alone on which the philosophy of Croce and Gentile has been discussed. Of what use, then, has Evola’s ‘radical criticism’ and ‘destruction’ been? And abroad, poor J. Evola is viewed as an ultra-fascist. The copy of the English translation of his book on Buddhism in Swift Library is disfigured with polemical annotations (written in indelible lead!): they say (even on the cover) that Evola is a fascist and a ‘racist’, that his theories about ‘Aryans’ were borrowed from A. Rosenberg, etc. I remember the brief, harsh review in Journal asiatique written by J. Filliozat in the same vein: J. E. is a racist, ultra-fascist, etc.
Evola tries to appear indifferent to such criticisms, although he prefers them to the ‘conspiracy of silence’ of which he claims he has suffered all his life. And yet, what a melancholic spectacle to see him talking about what he has done, how he has ‘destroyed’ and ‘surpassed’ everyone, even Nietzsche and Heidegger (whom he claims, moreover, to have anticipated . . .). [6]
Eliade does not admit that the soundness and truth of arguments are more important than how widely read, received and reviewed they are. The quantity of inferior and false ideas that are celebrated in the universities, then and now, is very high. Many are unable to comprehend, nevertheless, how curtly and effectively false ideas, however celebrated they are or however voluminously they are presented, can be dismissed. Of the mass of writings discussing the thought of Croce and Gentile, only Evola’s had looked at these philosophies from the traditional perspective, which is of use, simply, because it is the only one not subject to the movement of opinion and history. Mention of the idiotic slurs applied to him by those who have misunderstood his perspective are not relevant; if one does not take the time to adequately understand a given idea or formulation, his opinion does not matter. It is clear that Eliade is displaying a historicist prejudice; because his writings have been ignored (apparently, at least) and since no admission of the soundness of his criticisms has manifested visibly, the value of the writings in themselves, as formulations to be judged solely by their truth-value, is ignored, and Evola’s observation of this is considered a ‘spectacle’, the judgment of the history of ideas being obviously the decisive factor for Eliade. We might also add, like Eliade did when he compared Coomaraswamy and Guénon vis-à-vis other ‘occultists’ above, that, unlike Heidegger’s and much of Nietzsche’s writing, what Evola writes makes sense.
Despite praise of some aspects of his work, on at least one occasion he engaged in rather irresponsible gossip about Evola. In 1958, in a letter to the poet and former Iron Guard member Vasile Posteucă, regarding a request for information about Evola’s encounter with Corneliu Codreanu, Eliade warned him that Evola was a ‘racist’ and a ‘Nazi’, and liable to generate confusion if used as a source [7]. Never mind that he made it clear that his ‘racism’ was of a type quite different from that of the National Socialists, from whom he explicitly distanced himself ideologically, even during the war, and that several mainstream and semi-mainstream publishers in Europe found his works fit to print! A man of Eliade’s sophistication should have known better than to describe Evola so falsely and simplistically. One would not have thought that, being himself the target of similar slurs by certain elements in academia, he would engage in this kind of rumor-mongering. If the account of the exchange is not a fabrication or an exaggeration, then our opinion of Eliade is lowered considerably.
Evola demonstrated quite well the limits of Eliade’s formulations in a review of the latter’s book on Yoga:
Our fundamental opinion of Eliade’s work on Yoga may be expressed by saying that it is the most complete of all those that have been written on this subject in the domain of the history of religions and of Orientalism. One cannot mention another that for wealth of information, for comparisons, for philological accuracy, for the examination and utilization of all previous contributions, stands on the same level. But when once this has been admitted, some reservations have to be made. In the first place it would seem that the material he handles has often got the better of the writer. I mean to say that in his anxiety to make use of all, really all, that is known on the several varieties of Yoga and on what is directly or indirectly connected therewith, he has neglected the need of discriminating and selecting so as to give importance only to those parts of Yoga that are standard and typical, avoiding the danger that the reader lose track of the essential features by confusing them with the mass of information on secondary matters, variations, and side products. Looking at it from this standpoint, we are even led to wonder whether Eliade’s previous book Yoga, essai sur les origines de la mystique indienne (Paris, 1936), is not in some respects superior to this last one, which is a reconstruction of the former. In the first book the essential points of reference were more clearly outlined, they were less smothered by the mass of information brought together, and the references to less-known forms of Yoga, such as the Tantric and others, were more clearly pointed out [ . . . ]
After this glance at the contents of Eliade’s new book we are tempted to inquire of him a somewhat prejudicial question: to whom is the book addressed? As we have openly declared, it is a fundamental work for specialists in the field not only of Oriental research, but also in that of the history of religions. But in his introduction Eliade states that the book is addressed also to a wider public and he speaks of the importance that a knowledge of a doctrine such as that of Yoga may have for the solution of the existential problems of the modern Westerner, confirmed as that doctrine is by immemorial experience.
Here complications arise. To meet such a purpose it would be necessary to follow a different plan and to treat the matter in a different way. A Westerner who reads Eliade’s book may be able to acquire an idea of Yoga as ‘la science intégrale de l’homme [the integral science of man]’, he may acquire knowledge of a teaching that has faced in practice as well as in theory the problem of ‘deconditioning’ man; he will thus add yet one other panorama to the list of the many modern culture has provided him with. His interest will perhaps be more lively than the ‘neutral’ interest of the specialist; he may flirt with the aspects of a ‘spiritualite virante’. But on the existential plane the situation will be pretty much the same as it was before, even if the information available be deeper, more accurate, better documented. The possibility of exercising a more direct influence could only be looked for from a book addressed to those who have shown an interest in Yoga and similar sciences not because they seek for information but because they are seeking for a path; a book that in this special field would remove the misunderstandings, the popular notions, the deviations, and the delusions spread by a certain kind of literature to which we referred at the beginning of this article; a book displaying the accuracy and knowledge that we find in this work of Eliade, in as far as it is an exposition kept within the limits of the history of religions. Such a book has perhaps still to be written. But even so the essential need would not be met, for it is the unanimous opinion of the true masters of Yoga that the key to their science cannot be handed on by the written word. [8]
It could be said figuratively that if one who comprehends and adopts the traditional perspective can be said to have a view from the peaks that allows the most complete survey, then Eliade could be described as not having completed the ascent, his vision being obscured by clouds above or enamored by objects on the path to the summit. If he could see individual rocks on the path more closely, we must remember that the view from summit is still the most important one.
[1] Eliade, Mircea. No Souvenirs: Journal 1957-1969, p. 291.
[2] Eliade. Jurnal, 26 August 1947, M.E.P., box 15/2 (trans. Mac Linscott Ricketts). *
[3] Eliade. Autobiography, Volume II, p. 152.
[4] Eliade. Jurnal, 5 September 1964, M.E.P., box. 16/6 *
[5] Ibid., 4 March 1969, box 15/4 *
[6] Ibid., 20 December 1964, box. 16/6, pp. 2640-2641 *
[7] Posteucă, Vasile. Jurnal, in: Gabriel Stănescu (ed.), Mircea Eliade în conştiinna contemporanilor săi din exil, Norcross: Criterion, [2001], pp. 272-277 (275 – entry of 28 October 1958). *
[8] Evola, Julius. Yoga, Immortality & Freedom. East and West, vol. 6, no. 3, 1955.

* Quotes and citations from: Bordas, Liviu. The difficult encounter in Rome: Mircea Eliade’s post-war relation with Julius Evola – new letters and data. International Journal on Humanistic Ideology, IV, no. 2, Autumn-Winter 2011, pp. 125-158. Retrieved from: Academia.edu

dimanche, 12 octobre 2014

Il sapere tradizionale di Evola e la scienza ermetica di Hegel


Il sapere tradizionale di Evola e la scienza ermetica di Hegel

Il sapere tradizionale di Evola e la scienza ermetica di Hegel

Giandomenico Casalino

Ex: http://www.ereticamente.net

La comparazione di natura filosofica tra Julius Evola e Giorgio F. G. Hegel, pensatori di natura sapienziale tanto lontani nel tempo e, quindi, apparentemente, così differenti, sia nel lessico da loro adottato che in relazione al contesto storico-culturale in cui hanno vissuto ed operato, impone rigorosamente la ricerca di ciò che realmente abbia significato per gli stessi la Cosa del pensiero, l’oggetto di cui e su cui hanno tematizzato, al di là delle modalità e cioè delle divergenze attraverso le quali, tutto ciò, loro malgrado, si è espresso. Quindi il lavoro deve essere caratterizzato da un approccio di natura ermeneutica, che privilegi non tanto la dimensione filologica quanto quella teoretica che, data la sua natura, abbia l’ambizione di varcare i limiti del tempo e delle stagioni culturali e, per dirla con il Kerenyi, entri in Idea nel cuore del Pensiero, che, nella sua inten­zionalità, li ha guidati nel percorso dello Spirito. Quanto dedotto vuol significare che, come intorno ad Evola il discorso deve superare la “vulgata” del suo preteso “abbandono” della Filosofia, con la co­siddetta “chiusura” del periodo ad essa dedicato e l’ “apertura” nei confronti di ciò che tout court si è definito Tradizione, così per lo Hegel è necessario emendare radicalmente quanto certa critica pigra e conformista ha dedotto sulla sua pretesa modernità e sul concetto di razionale confuso e mistifi­cato con quello cristiano e/o moderno di razionalismo individualistico e quindi astratto. At­tesa la complessa vastità del tema, faremo in modo di esaminare e di indicare sinteticamente alcuni nodi essenziali comuni alla prospettiva sia di Evola che di Hegel, al fine di offrire quelli che, secondo noi, pos­sono essere i percorsi di ricerca e di studio relativi alla quaestio sollevata.


L’autentica “svolta” spirituale esperita da Evola alla fine degli anni venti del Novecento non è con­sistita, a ben riflettere, in un “abbandono” della Fi­losofia e del suo orizzonte di ricerca e di visione, del suo oggetto di amore e dei suoi itinerari aristo­telicamente dovuti, ma bensì in un lasciare al suo destino di impotenza gnoseologica e di inefficacia spirituale la Filosofia moderna o meglio il concetto moderno della stessa (che è poi quello cristiano…). La frase di Lagneau sulla Filosofia considerata una sorta di “…riflessione tesa a riconoscere la sua propria insufficienza e la necessità di un’azione assoluta che conduca al di là della medesima…” (Rev. de Met. et de Mor., Mars 1898, p. 127), posta da Evola come “incipit” ai Saggi sull’idealismo ma­gico (1925), in concreto vuol significare che per realizzare il suo logos, la sua ragione, la Filosofia nel momento attuale, deve superare, andare al di là, effettuare un salto di natura ontologica per collo­carsi nel luogo dello spirito che, e qui sta l’autenticità ermeneutica del percorso evoliano, è il luogo di pertinenza da sempre della Filosofia nel suo unico e autentico significato che è quello premo­derno e cioè greco: percorso spirituale, di natura iniziatica, in un télos che è l’omòiosis theò! Ciò è quanto Evola ha compiuto nella sua azione realiz­zativa e di paidéia dei fondamenti della Scienza dello Spirito, sin dalla costituzione del Gruppo di UR, la cui natura, nel significato di essenza e quindi la sua virtus come finalità, è alquanto simile a ciò che è stata l’Accademia Platonica dagli inizi sino a Proclo: palestra rigorosa del Sapere che è ascesi filosofico-rituale e non cerimoniale, la cui finalità, pertanto, è l’assimilazione al Divino. Tutto ciò cosa ha a che fare con il concetto e la prassi moderni della Filo­sofia? Cosa ha a che fare la vera ricerca del sapere che è essere con, al di là di rare eccezioni, un sedicente “insegnamento” di natura sterilmente nozionistica e stupida­mente specialistica, da “dotti ignoranti”, come si esprime lo stesso Evola, vera caricatura mistificante di quanto l’uomo cerca sin dall’alba del suo spirito? Nulla, desolatamente nulla! Tale concetto moderno e quindi degradato di ciò che Aristotele afferma essere l’atteggiamento più naturale per l’uomo, cosa ha in comune con la definizione espressa dallo Hegel sull’essere la Fi­losofia “… la considerazione esoterica di Dio…”? (Enc. Scienze Fil.) e con il principio di Platone che il filosofo è solo colui il quale vede il Tutto, confermato dallo stesso Hegel quando insegna che “il Vero è l’Intero”?Assolutamente niente, ma le affermazioni hegeliane come quella di Platone hanno tutto in comune invece con quanto Evola enuncia in quella autentica e maestosa professione di fede platonica che è l’inizio di Rivolta contro il mondo moderno, quando edifica tutta la sua opera sul Sapere intorno alle due nature del Mondo, la naturale e la sovrannaturale, come medesime dimensioni e dello Spirito e della Phýsis, tanto che, platonicamente, in Evola la Fisica è Teologia in quanto il Mondo “è pieno di Dei!” E la Teologia in quanto Teosofia, Sapere intorno al Divino, è la stessa Logica che ha per oggetto il Nous come intelletto che è il Dio dormiente nell’uomo e quindi nel cosmo: l’intero Logos evoliano ha per fine, in guisa esclusiva, la rimozione attiva di quel “quindi” in quanto impedimento effettuale all’oscuramento dello Spirito; è, pertanto, opera di realizzazione del Sé, perseguita ed indicata come Via iniziatico-solare, di natura platonico­apollinea e non nientificazione orfico-dionisiaca dell’Io che, avendo la natura spirituale del pathèin e non del  mathéin (Aristotele, Perì philosophias, fr. 15), non è conoscenza dell’autentica essenza dello Spirito in quanto realtà Divina trascendentemente immanente che è come dire la realtà dell’Individuo Assoluto, vera sublimazione dell’Io; “…la filosofia ha lo scopo di riconoscere la verità, di conoscere Dio, poiché Dio è la verità assoluta…”, afferma Hegel nelle Lezioni sulla filosofia della religione; (vol. II).  Allora è d’uopo affermare, senza alcun timore, che sia in Evola che in Hegel, riappare, in piena modernità, il senso e il significato greco della Filosofia, stru­mento per il conseguimento del Risveglio, che è la rinascita, dopo la caduta-oblio, in quanto anàmnesi di ciò che si è e lo si è sempre stati pur  non avendone scienza (ignoranza come avidya), quindi riconquista di un Sa­pere che coincide con l’Essere in senso ontologico. Talché la Filosofia, nel suo vero ed unico significato, che è quello platonico-iniziatico (Lettera VII), nocciolo esoterico della stessa esperienza spirituale dei Misteri (Fedone, 69c-d), è quindi  Scienza Sacra in senso eminente e autentica Tradizione, avente ad “oggetto” solo ed esclusivamente il Divino, che è la Verità in quanto essenza e dell’uomo e del Mondo, come Cosmo; è pertanto Sapere per pochi, è gnosi, è Teosofia, conoscenza del Dio che si rivela, nella completezza del percorso rituale-filosofico, come theopoìesis (deificatio) (Platone, Teeteto, 176 b 1; Repubblica, 613 a b; Timeo, 90 d; Leggi, 716 c s; Plotino, Enneadi, I, 2, 6, 25; Proclo, Elementi di Teologia, 127; 112, 31; Corpus Hermeticum, I, 26; 16, 12), significando ciò il rammemo­rare la consapevolezza quale Sapere, aldilà ed oltre sia il Mito che il Simbolo (livelli di conoscenza sa­pientemente riconosciuti, sia da Evola che da Hegel, inefficaci ai fini della Scienza, in relazione allo stato intellettivo-noetico puro che è l’apolli­neo), che il Dio è “oggetto” da superare, da negare,  andando oltre il dualismo soggetto-oggetto per “osare” essere Lui! Tale identificazione, sia in Hegel che in Evola, è la stessa autoconoscenza del Sé quale Assoluto nella sua natura solare, in totale estraneità, pertanto, ad ogni confusione panteistica e ad ogni vedantino acosmismo spirituale. In tale guisa, pertanto, anche se mediante linguaggi diffe­renti e in contesti storico-culturali lontani, Evola ed Hegel dicono il Medesimo e la Filosofia, quindi, nella loro opera non è più quell’insulsa propaggine della teologia dogmatica (cristiana), né quella serva ti­mida delle cosiddette scienze moderne, cioè della concezione parziale, riduttiva e quindi irreale, in quanto galileiana, della natura, ormai desacraliz­zata e ridotta ad oggetto di calcolo matematico e ciò al di là della autentica rivoluzione epistemologica operata nel XX secolo dalla fisica dei quanti e dalla sua meccanica che, invece, ritornando ad una visione platonica del reale (vedi Heisenberg ed il suo concetto della chòra platonica…) non fa che confermare, tutto sommato, il sapere sia di Evola che di Hegel. La Filosofia torna così ad essere ciò che non può non essere, consistendo, secondo Aristotele, nel Destino che gli Dei hanno affidato all’uomo; non “fede”, non “credenza”, ma Sapere che è esposizione del Mondo in quanto Pensiero puro, sono “le idee di Dio prima della “creazione” del mondo e di ogni oggetto finito” (Hegel); è speculazione (da specu­lum) dove il Pensiero si specchia nel Mondo, in senso oggettivo e vede se stesso come Idea e quindi Unità (Hegel); è la realtà dell’Oro ermetico, che è la Cosa più vicina e nel contempo più lontana (Evola), è la certezza sen­sibile, è il concreto esistente che è da sempre Spirito, solo che non lo sa, (medesimo concetto esprime Plotino in riferimento all’esperienza del “toccare”  il Dio [Enneadi, VI, 9, 7]); l’Oro si trova infatti nella più oscura Tenebra o Feccia (Ermetismo) da cui l’uomo fugge, proprio perché non sa che l’Opera deve iniziare da quello stato come riconquista eroica che corporizza lo Spirito e spiritualizza il corpo, ed è la grande fatica del concetto (Hegel). Tutto ciò Evola lo rende manifesto nella sua opera  La Tradizione ermetica che è la summa circolare del viaggio iniziatico (dal Corpo come impietramento del principio Fuoco allo stesso Corpo però rinato come rosso Cinabro, solfuro di mercurio) simile alla circolarità triadica della Scienza della Logica di Hegel: il Logos qui non è una conoscenza astratta e quindi profana cioè falsa ma, come per gli antichi maestri neoplatonici, è l’apertura dell’occhio dello Spirito sul Mondo come è, e quindi come appare, ciò significando che  essenza ed esistenza sono il Medesimo che è l’Essere, nel “momento”, che non è temporale, ma logico cioè ontologico, in quanto riguarda la natura profonda dell’uomo, in cui lo stesso, acquisito il medesimo livello di essere-conoscenza, è nella capacità di vedere, attesa la natura epoptica della filosofia evoliana. La veneranda Tradizione Platonica, a cui appartengono sia Hegel che Evola, è il filone aureo che da Plotino, Proclo ed Eckhart sino a Nicola da Cusa, Giorgio Gemisto Pletone, Marsilio Ficino, Benedetto Spinoza e Jacob Boehme, non è altro che Introduzione alla Scienza dell’ Io, come spirito Universale, come Atto puro, proprio nel significato dell’autoctisi gentiliana che è poi il causa sui di Spinoza, che, nel Sapere Assoluto, che è filosofico, realizza il Sapere del Dio, dove quel “del” è tanto il Sapere che ha il Dio come “oggetto” che il Sapere che appartiene al Dio stesso.


Il situarsi sia di Evola che di Hegel nella Tradizione Platonica, ci conduce in immediato nella evidenza relativa ad una fondamentale verità presente nel loro orizzonte sapienziale: la polare identità tra Pensiero ed Essere, intesi in senso cosmico e quindi oggettivo e non certo nel significato individuale e soggettivo che è come dire cartesiano e quindi moderno; identità che è da costruire, con fatica eroica, in quanto cammino catartico (Feno­menologia dello Spirito in Hegel; Rivolta contro il mondo moderno in Evola) per la riacquisita co­scienza che è poi Inizio dell’altro percorso, avente il Fine della identificazione plotiniana, che è il mònos pros mònon, come mutamento della propria natura (metànoia), principio noetico ormai desto, non più e non mai “esterno” all’Io ma Sé autentico che è al contempo (e da sempre) il Lògos del mondo (Tradizione Ermetica in Evola; Scienza della Logica in Hegel). Il Sapere (Nous) che coin­cide anzi è l’Essere (Phýsis) è ciò che, in guisa auro­rale, afferma la sapienza indoeuropea, ad iniziare da Parmenide e dai Veda (Atman è Brahman). Il Mi­stero di tale verità è l’Inesprimibile del Pensiero che si riconosce nel Tutto come i Molti che è visto nell’Istante- exàiphnes come Uno (Platone, Parmenide, 156, c) ed è il fondamento della conoscenza comune sia ad Evola che ad Hegel: ad uno stadio di consape­volezza, che è un “momento” (“temporale” ma che non si svolge nel tempo…) della coscienza e quindi un essere della stessa, in senso ontologico, corri­sponde uno stadio o livello di conoscenza-sapere che è il vivere-essere lo stadio o livello equiva­lente e corrispondente nel Mondo; tale processo spirituale in Evola è da situare in guisa manifesta dopo la catarsi dialettica che certamente coincide con la fase del suo pensiero preparatoria della teoresi dell’Idealismo magico che è il salto nella gnosi platonica. La realtà dello spirito che, come qui appare evidente, è circolare, e va dall’io al mondo e dal mondo all’io vuol significare che si conosce ciò che si è e si è ciò che si conosce e, quindi, si conosce ciò che si diviene, equivalendo ciò al ritorno anamnestico verso l’Inizio, dove si è sempre stati, nella natura in cui si è sempre consistiti ma della quale si è presa coscienza, solo dopo aver perfezionato l’Opera filosofica. Evola ed Hegel, nel solco del platonismo, ci inducono pertanto a meditare sulla dimensione dello Spirito, nel “momento” in cui il Pensiero, pensando il suo “passato” (l’Anima, il suo sonno…), si riconosce tale ed il Mondo, gli Dei (l’oggetto) appare quello che è sempre stato, cioè il Pen­sato, la dimensione dell’Anima, il movimento, la Vita, la dialettica (essere-non essere; vita-morte; dolore-gioia…). Evola lo afferma in tutta la sua opera: se si è forma, si vede la forma, che è sempre, ma anche colui che “ora” la vede lo è sempre stato solo che lo aveva dimenticato. Secondo Evola ed Hegel, ovviamente, non è questione di ideologie o di modi di vedere il mondo, cioè di stati soggettivi, poiché di soggettivo, nel senso di personale o individuale-psicologistico, qui non è dato parlare, ma di stati molteplici, differentemente gerarchici, dell’Essere (sia in senso microcosmico che macrocosmico, cioè quello che ignorantemente chiamiamo ancora tanto “soggetto” quanto “oggetto”)!

Hegel, infatti, nella Scienza della Logica, quando parla di meccanicismo, chimismo, organicismo, non sta enunciando determinate visioni del mondo o punti di vista, ma sta dicendo che una natura, in senso ontologico, meccanicistica conosce solo il meccanicismo o meglio il livello o “momento” meccanicistico del mondo e quindi sta trattando filosoficamente degli stati della coscienza, come li­velli del pensiero a cui corrispondono gli stessi stati della natura poiché questa è il medesimo Pensiero uscito da sè (proodòs plotiniana); essi sono pertanto il percorso del Sapere come Idea a cui corrispondono stati equivalenti della natura poiché la Verità cioè il Divino è l’Intero cioè l’Uno (e questo non è lo stesso principio di corrispondenza magica tra uomo e Metalli-Mondo cioè Astro-Nume-Metallo tanto in senso microcosmico quanto macrocosmico che è il fondamento della Tradizione sia nella forma Er­metica che in quella Platonica?). Evola dice il medesimo quando afferma che Inferno e Paradiso, esotericamente, sono stati della coscienza nei quali e attraverso i quali si conoscono le tenebre infernali o le luminosità celesti che sono livelli o dimensioni dell’Essere dello stesso mondo o dimensioni del Tutto, il chiuso Athanòr, che una natura corrispondente andrà a co­noscere o tenebroso come assenza di Luce o luminoso. Pertanto un essere che è, come spiritualità autentica, o il primo o il se­condo, può conoscere solo o uno o l’altro, cre­dendo, nel momento ingenuo (mitico, secondo Evola), intellettivo-astratto (direbbe Hegel), del percorso di conoscenza, che si tratti di un “altro” mondo a sé medesimo opposto e definito dualisticamente non-Io. Gli Dei non esistono a priori per fede… se non si cono­scono e si conoscono solo esperimentando e quindi essendo lo stato corrispondente. Se in Evola tutto ciò è definito identificazione iniziatico-­solare in cui è manifesto che Io sono Te, ricono­scendo pertanto l’irrealtà dello stato religioso-devozionale, in Hegel è il percorso dello Spirito che supera l’oggettivazione del Sé (Dio), come Altro e, con la semplificazione filosofica ed il suo Sapere apicale, è l’Assoluto che conosce se stesso, “accadendo” come evento logico, cioè fuori dal tempo, “dopo” lo stato-essere spirituale rappresentativo che è il religioso-dualistico. È la realizzazione della conoscenza che il soggetto è l’oggetto, il Pensiero come Atto puro cosmico è l’Essere che è il Dio, e si ritorna ad Aristotele, al Pensiero di Pensiero, al Pensiero che pensa Se stesso ed è poi l’Autarca di Evola! In sostanza ed in termini filosofici, cioè concettuali, è il Risveglio buddistico (vedi La dottrina del risveglio) che in Evola è la realizzazione della vera natura  dell’uomo, rendendo manifesta quella occulta o incosciente (Aristotele, Etica nicomachea, 1177b 33) idea di origine platonica (Timeo, 90c) che è l’athanatìzein di Proclo, cioè il rendersi immortali in quanto si assume piena consapevolezza e quindi Sapere di esserlo sempre stati. Corollario di tale Tradizione gnosica è, in Evola, La Scienza dell’Io che si riconosce, quale atto magico di anamnesi, come Idea eterna del Sé: “…Io alla seconda persona, alter ego celeste dell’uomo: è ancora l’uomo ma nello stesso tempo non è più solo l’uomo…” (Henry Corbin) ed è l’affermazione che la conoscenza del Dio è l’autoconoscenza del Dio come Divino nell’uomo e dell’uomo: il Dio si conosce e si vede nell’uomo, come l’uomo, nel doversi conoscere, conosce Se medesimo quale il Divino stesso. È il sapere di natura apollinea, di cui enigmaticamente parla Platone nell’Alcibiade Maggiore (133 c)…!


In riferimento a tale Sapere Pavel Alexandrovic Florenski ne Le radici universali dell’Idealismo rileva la natura primordiale dello stesso e trae la conclusione che il Platonismo è la Conoscenza originaria presente nelle Tradizioni religiose e sapienziali di tutti i popoli del Mondo, cioè a dire, nella sue essenza metafisica, la Tradizione Unica di tutte le Civiltà, nella forma tanto mitico-religiosa nei primordi delle stesse, quanto magica ed unitivo-sapienziale al tramonto del ciclo.

Pertanto il Sapere, la Gnosi, di cui non solo parlano o scrivono sia Evola che Hegel, ma che sono e realizzano come mutamento della natura, essendo lo stesso Sapere, è in virtù di “qualcosa” di arcaico, di ancestrale, di originario, di non classificabile nelle e con le comuni categorie dello Spirito non solo di questo tempo ma di ogni tempo; “qualcosa” che è una realtà vivente, un fuoco che brucia nella continuità della loro vita, nel loro athanòr, come fiamma che consuma tutti i residui, le scorie, le impurità tanto che “magicamente” loro appaiono quello che sono in quanto Essere come identità di essenza ed esistenza; dai contemporanei sono infatti veduti come autentici maghi, nel significato arcaico e quindi vero del termine, chiarito, quasi nello stesso periodo di tempo, sia da Florenski che da Evola in questi termini: natura attiva dello Spirito nei confronti delle Forze e dei Numi cosmici e tanto intensa da apparire quasi naturale, come innata identificazione con gli stessi, mediante riconoscimento anamnestico!

Allora il Sapere tradizionale, che equivale a dire metafisico e che stiamo tentando di delineare per brevi cenni, è di natura magico-sacrale!

E non può essere diversamente, atteso il fatto che Evola non è lo scrittore, lo studioso o l’erudito, figlio di una sclerotica civilizzazione ma è frutto di una Kultur che, proprio nel senso spengleriano, è qualcosa di vivente che emerge maestosa e luminosa, vasta e complessa nella sua cosmica valenza, da tutta la sua opera che è principalmente ed in guisa essenziale, la sua stessa presenza e la sua vita come Simbolo e Mito. Non si può negare la presenza della Luce di questa forza magico-sacrale, quasi sciamanica, in uomini, in Sapienti Solfurei, autentiche trasparenze della doxa omerica, cioè della gloria del Pensiero, inteso in senso Vivente e Divino, in tutti coloro i quali, con linguaggi diversi ed in tempi storico-culturali oltremodo differenti,  hanno osato dire, vivere ed essere Verità, autenticamente rivoluzionarie e destabilizzanti per tutte le Chiese, i Dogmi e le Istituzioni dominanti, quasi come Vie della mano destra di ogni epoca, Verità che hanno sempre incusso paura, tremore e financo terrore nell’uomo, inducendo e provocando mistificazione del loro Dire, calunnie sul loro Fare, negazione del loro Essere e tentativi, peraltro vani, di oscuramento della Verità da loro eroicamente difesa. È la vicenda, non solo di un Evola, criminalizzato e mistificato o di un Hegel, incompreso e pertanto trasferito tout court, nonostante la geniale intuizione di un Feuerbach sull’essere il sapiente Svevo “…il Proclo tedesco…”, nel positivismo e nel laicismo immanentista o nel soggettivismo postcartesiano, ma è la storia umana anche di Eckhart, di Giorgio Gemisto Pletone, di Boehme, di Spinoza, cioè è il destino comune, la risposta, la reazione di chi, in buona sostanza, rifiuta, ne ha paura e non comprende insegnamenti come questi di Plotino: “…Il compito non è essere virtuosi o buoni ma essere Dei!…”; “…Non devo andare io agli Dei ma gli Dei venire a me…!”; che equivalgono a ciò che dice Eckhart nei Sermoni: “…Dio ed io siamo una cosa sola…!”; a quanto afferma Hegel: “…Si crede usualmente che l’Assoluto debba trovarsi molto al di là mentre è invece proprio ciò che è del tutto presente e che, in quanto pensanti, anche senza averne espressamente coscienza, portiamo sempre con noi…!” o a ciò che rivela Boehme nel De Signatura rerum: “…tra la Nascita Eterna, la Redenzione dalla Caduta e la scoperta della Pietra dei Filosofi non c’è alcuna differenza…!”.

Si tratta, quindi, di un Sapere primordiale, è la Tradizione iniziatica regale, è la originaria via indoeuropea agli Dei, nel senso spirituale e realizzativo del Risveglio del Re che dorme nel profondo dell’anima, ed è, innanzitutto ed essenzialmente il Rito filosofico quotidiano e costante onde realizzare il Katèchon che, difendendo il principio superiore della coscienza e quello animico ad esso orientato, costituisca invalicabili barriere nei confronti delle potenze tenebrose provenienti dal basso; al fine di “ricostruire” eroicamente la natura autentica dell’uomo: la libertà dello Spirito, nella divinificazione che è l’Eghemonicòn stoico, di cui parla Evola, la liberazione dell’uomo dalle catene invisibili con cui egli stesso si è reso prigioniero di sé medesimo! Tale Conoscenza suprema che è di una semplicità fanciullesca (gli antichi Ermetisti parlano di “gioco di bambini”) mai come nella fase presente, di palese e drammatica decadenza spirituale da fine di un ciclo di civiltà, come rivela Aristotele (Metafisica, XII, 8,1074a, 38-b 14), è di straordinaria ed inattuale attualità, poiché, essendo la Conoscenza della maturità avanzata di un epoca, proprio come precisa Aristotele nel passo su citato, è l’ultima àncora di salvezza sia per coloro che vogliono percorrere tale unica ed ineludibile Via dello Spirito, per tornare ad essere, come precisa Evola, quanto meno e come base di partenza, uomini, sia per la conservazione e la trasmissione dei Fondamenti della stessa da “tràdere” cioè consegnare a coloro i quali saranno i protagonisti del ciclo successivo: non altro concetto ha, infatti, espresso lo stesso Hegel quando ha definito la filosofia il Sapere del meriggio che nasce quando s’invola la nottola di Minerva!

Ci chiediamo, alla fine di questa nostra riflessione, la ragione per cui la Tradizione magico-arcaica, la Sapienza antica, il Platonismo come eterno Idealismo, il Logos di Evola come quello di tutti i Sapienti che nei secoli e nei millenni hanno rivelato sempre e soltanto la medesima Cosa, avente ad “oggetto” il Pensiero pensante che è già e da sempre Pensiero pensato e cioè il Divino come Mondo che ritorna ciclicamente e liberamente, in quanto sapientemente, in se stesso, appaiono tanto irrimediabilmente inattuali da essere invece così indiscutibilmente attuali; la risposta a tale domanda risiede nella natura protervamente materialista e quindi antiumana di questa epoca in cui dello Spirito nulla si sa e si deve sapere, dell’Anima non se ne deve parlare  più, affidando il suo semantema residuo ed umbratile a forme di stregonerie e ciarlatanerie definitesi, molto appropriatamente, “psicoanalisi” (vedi J. Evola, L’infezione psicanalista, Quaderni della Fondazione Evola, Napoli 2012); il corpo  è ignorato in quanto “pensato” come un assemblaggio di pezzi meccanici da riparare e, nel caso, da sostituire; epoca in cui, infine, ci si è fatti convincere che l’uomo non sia e non debba essere altro che un “tubo digerente” avente solo una finalità: il disciplinato e silenzioso consumo planetario, in quanto “naturalmente”  privo di idee, sentimenti e passioni,  che pericolosamente abbiano o conservino qualcosa che ricordi l’umano; nessun Discorso, religioso o filosofico contemporaneo, che può pur apparire radicale e liberatorio lo può mai essere, in verità e nella dimensione universale, così come lo è manifestamente e dall’eternità la Luce della Tradizione, per la semplice ragione che tutti i “discorsi” che non appartengono alla sua Verità, appartengono alla Modernità, come categoria dello Spirito; e non si può nemmeno tentare di superare l’effetto coniugandolo con la sua causa!

Solo la Scienza dello Spirito, l’atto supremo ineludibile di Rivolta contro il mondo moderno, può aprire gli occhi,  prima dell’anima e poi dello Spirito, dell’uomo della presente età, sì da fargli riacquistare la stazione eretta che, come insegna Platone, gli consente di guardare il Cielo e quindi gli Dei!

Di una sola cosa, comunque, siamo certi e serenamente consapevoli e quindi convinti: il potere unico della Chiesa dogmatica tecno-finanziaria del capitalismo mondialista, apparentemente trionfante al crepuscolo del presente ciclo, ha di fronte, alle spalle ed intorno a sé medesimo, una sola ed invincibile nonché semplice e luminosa Verità, espressa da Julius Evola nei termini seguenti: “…Tutto si potrà fare sull’uomo e nell’uomo ma mai strappare dal fondo del suo animo la presenza del Divino!…”.

Giandomenico Casalino



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The Differentiated Man

The Differentiated Man

Ex: http://aryan-myth-and-metahistory.blogspot.com

10857064-l-39-homme-de-vitruve-sous-les-rayons-x-isole-sur-noir.jpgIn the days when I used to post on white nationalist websites one of the most recurring themes that people would argue about is the declining levels of Aryans vis a vis other races. I argued then as I argue now ratios are not relevant. Lower animals and races of men will breed at a faster rate than higher species or races. Often the reason for this is the higher mortality rate in such species and races. This fact may also be observed amongst the soci-economic classes which are a bastardised and commercialised version of the ancient traditional Aryan caste system (the two are not to be confused or even compared!).  Individuals of lesser education (not merely formal education but general awareness and ability) tend to breed without restraint and with no consideration as to whether they (or the tax payer) can afford such indiscriminate coupling!

Of course I am not here referring to that tiny and select minority of individuals who are spiritually and racially aware who may breed in large numbers with suitable mates for the right reasons. The people I am referring to in the previous paragraph are those who live entirely by instinct and whose days are spent gratifying their every bodily need or desire. Such people are little better than the beasts of the field and I would not expect them to read blogs such as this so forgive me for lecturing to the converted! These belong to von Liebenfels' Affenmenschen (apelings) referred to in his Theozoology. The move from the rural economies of the past to the Industrial Revolution which began in the 18th century in England caused a migration of part of the rural population to the emerging industrial towns and cities to become nothing more than factory wage slaves. The new capitalist bougeoisie needed as many men (and women) as they could find to work in their sweat shops. The same impulse that drove forward the Industrial Revolution was also responsible for the creation of the British Empire which benefitted no one apart from the wealthy (and certainly not the conquered natives!).

The populations of the industrial towns and cities bred like rats but they needed to as the infant mortality rate was extremely high. Their poorly paid labour was needed by the capitalists of the day (nothing much has changed). The problem with having an expanding proletariat is that the individual monetary worth of the worker is reduced proportionately. This is why countries like Britain welcome immigrant labour because their expectations are low and this creates economic competition for British workers. Employers can pick and choose and pay a pittance for a person's toil. For this reason despite the government's protestations they have done abolutely nothing to stem the flow of immigration (legal and otherwise) and indeed the problem has got worse over the last 4 years (if such a thing were possible). Low paid workers and cannon fodder for illegal wars will always be in demand by this corrupt system.

Thus a capitalist economy relies for the production of ever increasing wealth for the 1% on a large mass of labour. Capitalism encourages and fuels population explosions. Babies are born destined to become unimportant cogs in this monstrous and inhuman machine. This and only this is the value of the 'family', much lauded by the government's MPs as women become nothing but battery hens for future workers. Nothing else is of importance. With these thoughts in mind we come to the writings of Julius Evola:

"The differentiated man cannot feel part of a 'society' like the present one, which is formless and has sunk to the level of purely material, economic, 'physical' values, and moreover lives at this level and follows its insane course under the sign of the absurd. Therefore, apoliteia requires the most decided resistance to any social myth. Here it is not just a matter of its extreme, openly collectivist forms, in which the person is not recognised as significant except as a fragment of a class or party or, as in the Marxist-Soviet area, is denied any existence of his own outside the society, so that personal destiny and happiness distinct from those of the collective do not even exist. We must equally reject the more general and bland idea of 'sociability' that today often functions as a slogan even in the so-called free world, after the decline of the ideal of the true state. The differentiated man feels absolutely outside of society, he recognises no moral claim that requires his inclusion in an absurd system; he can understand not only those who are outside, but even those who are against 'society'-meaning against this society." (Ride the Tiger. A Survival Manual for the Aristocrats of the Soul)

jeudi, 09 octobre 2014

Giovanni Gentile, filosofo del combate

lundi, 06 octobre 2014

Engels e Marx omofobi e sessisti

Engels e Marx omofobi e sessisti (e non lo sapevano…)

marx_engelsLa struggente lettera di Lorenzo “Voroshilov”Altobelli, pubblicata su questa testata il 13 agosto 2014 (cfr.  Cronaca di una espulsione annunciata) mi ha fatto fare un piccolo salto indietro nel tempo, quando la sinistra comunista era conformata allo stalinismo e, come in una chiesa, si operava per ghettizzare, processare ed espellere i dissidenti, gli “apostati”, gli “eretici”. Non solo: nell’URSS, dopo l’omicidio di Sergej Kirov, importante dirigente del Partito Comunista a Leningrado, iniziò una vasta operazione di epurazione che con procedimenti giudiziari sommari, colpì anche semplici cittadini, non iscritti al PCUS, considerati ostili al regime e alla linea imperante, imposta attraverso il cosiddetto “centralismo democratico”: dico “cosiddetto” perché nei partiti comunisti in Europa occidentale (il PCI ad esempio), vi era libertà per i membri del partito di discutere e dibattere sulla linea politica e una volta che la decisione del partito era stata presa dal voto della maggioranza, tutti i membri si impegnavano a sostenere in toto quella linea. Quest’ultimo aspetto rappresenta il centralismo, almeno come lo intendeva Lenin.

Invece il nostro caro Lorenzo è stato vittima di una concezione staliniana e – mi si conceda – kafkiana del centralismo, ed espulso dalla federazione giovanile del partito comunista a cui era iscritto. Non faremo il nome, per rispetto nei suoi confronti, del partito a cui era iscritto. Ma il caso è simile: perché nel PCUS stalinista la linea era imposta dal capo, il quale era la fonte unica della Verità Assoluta: chi sgarrava veniva arrestato e obbligato a fare ammenda del crimine ideologico, come essere sionista, trockijsta, socialdemocratico, anarchico, elemento reazionario e piccolo borghese ecc.

Qual è stato il “crimine” ideologico di cui si è macchiato il povero Lorenzo? Ha forse detto che negli Stati Uniti d’America di Obama si sta realizzando, grazie al suo New Deal, il socialismo? Ha elogiato forse la Fondazione Italiani Europei di D’Alema come vera esegesi del socialismo, sostituendo la Repubblica e il Fatto Quotidiano all’ormai defunta Unità (nelle cui feste Togliatti è stato sostituito da De Gasperi)? Ha pubblicato un articolo dove il kibbutz  e l’espropriazione di territorio palestinese sono elogiati come via somma per la sinistra del domani?

Peggio cari miei! Peggio! Gramsci gli ha gettato i Quaderni dal carcere addosso, rinnegandolo! Togliatti si sta rigirando nella tomba per questo “crimine”! Secchia sta oliando il mitra, pronto a risorgere dal sepolcro per giustiziarlo a Dongo! Lorenzo, da marxista, ha semplicemente fatto riflessioni marxiste: ha postato sulla sua bacheca Facebook un video, dove viene mostrato una sorta di corteo del Gay Pride con, nelle prime file, modelli che marciano muovendo «il proprio corpo in un certo modo per fare un certo tipo di passetto», ancheggiando in maniera “provocante” e femminile. [1]

Il commento? L’analisi, marxista fino al midollo spinale – dove non si critica l’omosessualità, ma il piegarsi di certi personaggi alle regole di mercato – è la seguente:


 «I modelli che sfilano su quella passerella sono ormai stati ridotti anche loro alla stessa stregua delle modelle e dei modelli, cioè di uomini e donne eterosessuali, oggetto delle ferree leggi di mercato, della pubblicità e della mercificazione, da parte di un capitalismo che tutto mercifica, che tutto deve trasformare in plus-lavoro e quindi in plus-valore. Ma guardali bene! E riporta alla tua mente le sfilate di vari modelli/e! Il loro è solo in parte un modo naturale di sfilare! In che senso? Il/la modello/a sfila in modo elegante, a volte anche spregiudicato, restando però in certi precisi canoni di grazia ed appunto, come già detto, eleganza. In questo caso invece siamo di fronte ad un modo di camminare forzato, estremamente aggressivo, con ancheggiamenti esageratamente pronunciati e giochi gestuali particolarmente aggressivi, veloci e teatrali, soprattutto nella parte finale del video. Per non parlare dei pantaloni, così attillati, fini e di maglio largo, da offrire completamente il senso di nudità completa delle parti intime maschili, che vengono esposte in modo volgare e pornografico». [2]


Lorenzo – si noti bene – non contestava né l’orientamento sessuale dei modelli né tanto meno il diritto di questi a battersi per ottenere miglioramenti delle loro condizioni di cittadini e di lavoratori ma la riduzione a spettacolo dell’omosessualità, trasformata in una baracconata, così come avviene anche nei Gay Pride, ridotti a carnevalate peraltro del tutto inutili nella capacità di incidere seriamente sui diritti della comunità LGBT.

I soggetti, in sintesi, concedendosi a tale manifestazione, si stavano riducendo a oggetti mercificati. Mancava solo l’etichetta col prezzo appiccicato sulle magliette! Né più, né meno.

Un crimine? Oggi dire a un uomo che egli sta vendendo la sua forza lavoro ad un capitalismo selvaggio che tutto mercifica, lo stesso capitalismo che rende precarie le vite dei giovani (idem per il sottoscritto), che manda in pensione le persone sempre più in la con l’età dopo averle spremute come agrumi, che cancella le più elementari leggi sul mondo del lavoro, non è più sinonimo di marxismo, comunismo, socialismo, ecc. Vuol dire essere fuori moda, out, “vecchi dentro”, matusa, nonni, ecc.

Questo, però, se rivolgo il mio discorso all’eterosessuale maschio che si automercifica. Ma se le stesse critiche vengono rivolte alla femmina o alla comunità LGBT, apriti cielo!

Si è etichettati come reazionari, fascisti, catto-integralisti, talebani, mostri, satanassi con coda, forcone, corna, baffetti e pizzo e voce satanica alla Ignazio La Russa! E il tutto, anche se non  si ha nessun atteggiamente ostile né contro la comunità LGBT – che non è diversa da nessuno! – né contro le donne.

Ma Lorenzo ha avuto l’ardire di attaccare la fonte stessa dell’“omosessualismo”: il femminismo!

E, fulmini & saette! La Gestapo/Stasi del genderismo femminista ha tuonato contro di lui.

Perché se si attacca il femminismo si attacca una “santa istituzione” della sinistra postsessantottina, ed è come – per il buonismo boldrinesco – sparare sulla Croce Rossa, prendendosela con i “più deboli”, coi “poveretti”, cioè le femmine. Ma è veramente così?

Nulla di più falso!

L’ideologia femminista è – se usassimo una terminologia veteromarxiana – un’ideologia borghese. Se utilizzassimo una terminologia moderna la potremmo definire “arma di distrazione di massa”, un mezzo utilizzato dai poteri forti di allora e di oggi (soprattutto tramite le ex studentesse e contestatrici di un tempo che, conseguite lauree e master, siedono nei CdA delle multinazionali a rafforzare la status quo del vigente ordine costituito) per indebolire un movimento operaio in ascesa creando contraddizioni di genere inesistenti.

Insomma, parlando dell’Italia degli anni ’70, per paradosso il femminismo/fricchettonismo fece al movimento operaio molto più male che non l’offensiva padronale o la “strategia della tensione”.

In base al ragionamento neofemminista, la donna appartenente ai ceti “bassi”, grazie a quel clima teso a creare questa nuova forma di razzismo, molto più subdolo dell’etnopluralismo sbandierato dai neofascisti & neodestristi, fra il compagno lavoratore e la “principessina” Grace Kally o la ricca Miss Kennedy, moglie dell’uomo che iniziò il conflitto in Vietnam, col femminismo inizia a sentirsi più in sintonia con queste due: che diamine, Kennedy non tradiva forse la “first lady” con Marilyn Monroe, anch’essa ridotta a donna-oggetto dal fallocentrismo?

Insomma, al bando la lotta di classe! Trionfi la giustizia di genere e l’interclassismo (ideologia “corporativista” per eccellenza, dato che gli interessi di Marisa, casalinga e lavoratrice a tempo pieno con due marmocchi da accudire e un marito che torna a casa la sera stanco e stressato dal lavoro, non collimano affatto con quelli della moglie dell’imprenditore membro dell’Assolombarda/Confindustria: tutt’al più con Luisella, la cameriera dei ricchi di turno, ma li si va oltre la “lotta di genere” e si rientra forzatamente nell’incipit de Il manifesto del partito comunista: «La storia dell’uomo è storia di lotta di classe»).

E tanti saluti a Miss. Boldrini, che si occupa di questi e altri temi “impellenti” ma dimentica di denunciare inghippi d’altro “genere” che riguardano il mondo del lavoro che il suo premier sta affossando col Jobs Act & Co.! L’articolo 18? Ma va! E’ più attuale il sessismo e il femminicidio! E le “morti bianche”? Ma dove!). Il neofemminismo


 «Ha fatto logicamente gli interessi stessi del capitale spaccando il movimento operaio della fine anni degli ’70, tra uomini da una parte, i presunti oppressori, e le donne dall’altra, le presunte vittime. Cosa ci sia di marxista in questa visione del mondo, proprio non riesco a capirlo…»


No Lorenzo, il marxismo è tutt’altra cosa! Qui vengono presi singoli casi incresciosi (perchè la violenza, da parte maschile o femminile è sempre sbagliata) utilizzati dalla stampa di turno per distrarre e parlare d’altro, e non di diritti del lavoratore, tanto per cambiare. Quindi, da maschio, rigirando la frittata lanciata dalle femministe, e denunciando come Lorenzo il carattere interclassista e borghese dell’ideologia “di genere” (che inizia col femminismo e si conclude col cosiddetto “genderismo”, la messa in discussione dei due generi in nome della creazione di un “altro” indistinto. Genitore 1 e 2 non vuol dire nulla, è un attentato ad ogni certezza per manipolare l’immaginario collettivo e il bambino: non è certo così che lo si educa a tollerare le differenze, ma lo si plasma a diventare quel “un altro” indistinto che dovrebbe decidere quello che vuole essere, “un altro” totalmente sradicato e privato di ogni identità), denuncio il carattere “sessista” e “anticostituzionale” di queste ideologie, sentendomi discriminato, umiliato e sessualmente molestato!

Parlare di “femminicidio” significa dimenticare l’uguaglianza giuridica delle persone davanti alla legge, per mettere uno dei due generi sul piedistallo, elevandolo al privilegio: un tempo vi erano la nobiltà e il clero, ora il genere femminile per una società femminilizzata.

Con il “femminicidio” si esce dal solco della formula «La legge è uguale per tutti» creando guarentigie particolari per un genere rispetto all’altro: «C’è un codice per il maschio e un codice separato – e privilegiato – per le donne». L’importante è dire che “TUTTI” i maschi sono portatori sani di un gene distruttivo che è… il loro pene!

Si, avete capito bene! Il tutto, spacciando tale ideologia per marxismo.

Se io, maschio, ammazzo un altro maschio avrò una condanna, ma se uccido una donna la condanna sarà peggiore. Insomma, un tale diceva che «dove c’è uguaglianza c’è ingiustizia»… peccato che il tale sia Werner Sombart, economista corporativista appartenente alla “Rivoluzione conservatrice” e autore di un saggio dichiaratamente reazionario ripubblicato nel 1977 dalle Edizioni di Ar di Franco Freda intitolato “L’ordinamento per ceti” (p. 24), che proponeva una comunità organica, olistica e differenziata al suo interno per ordini e ceti, ognuno dotato di appositi diritti e privilegi.

E’ questa la società a cui auspicano le femministe?

Intendono, superato il dominio dei ceti nobiliari “di sangue” e “di spada” (un dominio senz’altro iniquo), e l’affermazione di quello borghese “di censo”, dove l’uomo conta per quello “che ha” (altrettanto iniquo), instaurare un diritto privilegiato per le donne, un “diritto di genere”?

Insomma, cosa rende le femministe tanto diverse dai nobili e dal clero reazionario contro cui si scagliarono giacobini e sanculotti?

Quelle masse ebbero il coraggio di prendere la Bastiglia e di iniziare una nuovo corso, mentre oggi chiunque, come il nostro Lorenzo “Voroshilov” Altobelli, denuncia una mutazione antropologica all’interno della sinistra, viene denunciato dai suoi stessi “compagni” ormai ottenebrati, come reazionario, come potatore sano di violenza maschilistica, omofobico-fallocentrica!

Insomma, oggi Robespierre verrebbe pestato dalle femministe e il re (dopotutto è maschio e “fascio”) condannato, mentre la “povera” regina Maria Antonietta, vittima dello stesso paternalismo “di genere”, verrebbe salvata, in quanto donna, accomunata a Josephine, povera piccola fiammiferaia parigina. Insomma, dal revisionismo si è passati direttamente al “negazionismo” interclassista… di bassa leva.

Il Sessantotto, movimento che ha avuto i suoi aspetti positivi e negativi, si caratterizzò come un fenomeno generazionale capace di mettere in discussione le evidenti contraddizioni della società borghese, produsse una vera e propria rivolta contro le strutture sociali e culturali di allora e le vecchie consuetudini e convinzioni morali e culturali di tutti, giovani e non.

Quella Contestazione introdusse però un elemento allogeno all’interno della sinistra, una nuova cultura modernista e funzionale all’individualismo capitalistico, con forti presupposti di matrice liberal, cresciuta e sviluppatasi nei campus americani, impregnati di ideologie neoradicali, fra cui il neofemminismo.

Aspetti che colse anche Pier Paolo Pasolini, intellettuale “controcorrente”, ostracizzato dai reazionari di allora perché omosessuale ma anche dai “progressisti” e che stalinisticamente fu espulso dal PCI per il suo orientamento sessuale, proprio perché capace di mettere in discussione una modernizzazione in grado di sradicare le molteplici culture presenti nel nostro paese e creare il nuovo “homo consumans”.

Ebbene, tale cultura liberal, contestata da Pasolini, trattato alla stregua di un “comunista reazionario” (ma oggi elevato a “icona gay”: ve lo immaginereste marciare, tutto impellicciato, truccato, con abiti aderenti e pantaloni in pelle, ad un Gay Pride per il matrimonio gay, lui che arrivò a criticare aborto e divorzio da posizioni antimaterialiste e antiindividualiste?)-, mise in discussione anche Marx, “classista”, troppo “morale”, troppo poco interessato ai diritti individuali, e così “grigio”… troppo poco “arcobaleno”.

La Contestazione, come già detto, introdusse nella sinistra e nella società nuovi imput liberal, fra cui il neofemminismo, che in Europa, per fare breccia in una certa intellighenzia “di sinistra”, formatasi magari negli ambienti comunisti, si tinse di rosso: consiglio a riguardo l’illuminante lettura del testo Le filosofie femministe (Milano, Mondadori, 2002, 251 pp., 10,00 euro), scritto dall’attivista femminista Adriana Cavarero e da Franco Restaino (un “femministo”, mi si conceda il neologismo, cioè un maschio schierato armi e bagagli con la causa femminista e genderista, che quasi si vergogna di essere di sesso maschile), docenti rispettivamente di Filosofia politica all’Università di Verona e di Filosofia teoretica all’Università di Roma Tor Vergata; un testo “fazioso” ma utile a illustrare questo processo che trasforma Marx ed Engels in due “femministi” e “omosessualisti” ante litteram. Nel testo è evidente la filiazione fra le due culture sopra citate e la forzatura con cui i due autori cercano di far indossare il fazzoletto rosso al movimento femminista, un movimento che nel mondo anglosassone è anticomunista e antimarxista e per il quale Marx ed Engels e addirittura Freud, sono giudicati “fallocentrici” e “paternalistici”. Peggio: il cambio di contraddizione, dalla classe al genere, funzionale al liberismo, è palese in molte autrici citate. Il neofemminismo – data la sua funzionalità nel favorire l’ideologia ultraindividualista – inizia a cavalcare l’omosessualità, sostenendo addirittura che l’eterosessualità è un’invenzione del “maschilismo paternalista” per sottomettere la donna, e la “penetrazione” (cioè il normale coito!) è un mezzo per opprimerla. Franco Restaino, commentando autori come D. H. Lawrence, Henry Miller, Norman Mailer e il «noto scrittore omosessuale “lanciato” da Sartre, Jean Genet, nota che i loro scritti si caratterizzano per la denuncia dell’atteggiamento «patriarcale e sessista» dei rapporti uomo/donna o all’interno del rapporto omosessuale (???). Il neofemminismo radicale, quindi, ha come referenti soggetti completamente altri rispetto al marxismo:


 «Non la classe, non la razza, ma il sesso, quindi, sta all’origine della “politica”, cioè dei rapporti di potere e di dominio nella società e fra gli individui. Gli atti sessuali, quindi, sono innanzitutto non atti di piacere o di procreazione ma atti politici, atti nei quali di perpetua la supremazia maschile sulla donna in tutti i momenti della storia e in tutte le forme istituzionali (la principale è quella della eterosessualità) e con tutti i mezzi (dalle “lusinghe” del “mito” della donna alle “minacce” di violenza sessuale)». [3]


Anne Koedt (1941), nel saggio Il mito dell’orgasmo vaginale (1968) va oltre, e contesta sia Marx che Freud e la sua scienza che mette al centro del suo discorso l’arma “inventata” per perpetrare violenza sulla donna: il pene (come se alle donne facesse schifo fare del sesso eterosessuale)! Dalle sue tesi – che da Freud ci conducono direttamente al reparto psichiatrico dell’ex manicomio di Mombello, a Limbiate (Mi), nel settore “camicia di forza” – si arriva a questa conclusione, che sta al marxismo come Adolf Hitler sta all’ARCI. Per l’autrice stabilire che l’orgasmo vaginale è un mito, avrebbe conseguenze per l’uomo (lo destabilizzerebbe), per la donna (la “libererebbe”) e per la società (composta da uomini e donne ormai destabilizzati). Per i primi, li renderà coscienti di essere «sessualmente superflui se la clitoride è sostituita alla vagina come il centro del piacere della donna», mentre la donna – non è una mia invenzione, lo dice la Koedt – potrà affiancare l’eterosessualità, che servirà a mero scopo procreativo per non far estinguere la razza umana, col lesbismo e/o la bisessualità. [4] Anne Koedt scrive che «Lo stabilimento dell’orgasmo clitorideo come fatto minaccerebbe l’istituzione eterosessuale. Esso infatti indicherebbe che il piacere sessuale è ottenibile sia dall’uomo sia da un’altra donna, facendo così dell’eterosessualità non un assoluto ma un opzione». [5] Viva la franchezza! Così, mentre Marx auspica ad una società dove maschi e femmine sono giuridicamente uguali, cittadini/e liberi/e di una comunità dove tutto viene condiviso per il bene comune, dove tutti divengono padroni dei mezzi di produzione e dove nessuno verrebbe mai ghettizzato per il suo orientamento, le “ziette” acide & sessiste alla Boldrini vogliono ridurre il maschio a mero “schiavo/toro da monta” per non far piombare la società – ormai femminilizzata – all’estinzione, mentre la donna, sempre più mascolinizzata e androgina, amministra lo stato e si diverte, divenendo o lesbica o bisessuale o quel che vuole lei. Lei si “libera”, mentre il maschio è sottomesso! Il passo successivo lo si ha nel maggio 1970, quando un sottogruppo del movimento femminista, le femministe lesbiche, fanno irruzione in un teatro in cui si stava rappresentando un testo femminista, occupando il palco. Nascono così le Radicalesbian, le “nonnine” delle Pussy Riot & Femen (le “eroine” stipendiate da Georges Soros), che diffondono un testo intitolato “La donna-identificata donna” che, partendo dalle analisi della Koedt, radicalizza tale messaggio, ci fa arrivare direttamente al “genderismo”, cioè alla relativizzazione delle differenze di genere fra uomo e donna che, guarda caso, parte sempre dalla colpevolizzazione del maschio eterosessuale: «In una società in cui gli uomini non opprimessero le donne e l’espressione sessuale fosse libera di seguire i sentimenti, le categorie di omosessualità e di eterosessualità scomparirebbero». [6] 

La messa in discussione del genere è evidente nel saggio Eterosessualità obbligatoria ed esistenza lesbica (1980), di Adrienne Rich che, con la scusa di difendere il diritti della donna, arriva a sostenere che l’eterosessualità è una forzatura indotta da una società patriarcale, e arriverà a definire le soggettività o identità lesbiche col termine “ambiguo” di “non-donne” e “non-uomini”… insomma, oltre ad una spersonalizzazione assoluta, ecco le origini della messa in discussione del concetto di “mamma” e “papà” che ritroviamo in politiche “genderiste” che hanno creato termini marziani (e non marxiani) tipo “genitore 1” e “genitore 2”, una politica che cerca di corrodere il marxismo, com’è evidente nel saggio del 1974 di Gayle S. Rubin Lo scambio delle donne. Note sulla “economia politica” del sesso, dove Engels è letteralmente preso per la barba e tirato dentro ad un discorso senza capo né coda cercando di forzare il suo famoso saggio scritto del 1884, “L’origine della famiglia, della proprietà e dello Stato”, in chiave lesbo-femminista, mettendo in discussione il concetto di sesso-genere. [7] Insomma, ecco le radici di tutto! Approfondiremo in futuro…

Tornando al “caso Altobelli” – ma gli Altobelli sono tanti nella sinistra radicale italiana, tutti accusati dal politically correct di omofobia e “paternalismo di genere”, processati in quanto maschi dal “neostalinismo femmino-genderista” che non sventola più la bandiera rossa, ma quella arcobaleno, a cui non serve più la gelida durezza dell’acciaio zdanoviano ma usa la femminilizzazione della società che impone nuove mode – notiamo che egli, marxista-leninista doc, oggi non sarebbe il solo ad essere processato dalla neosinistra occidentale. Sì, oggi Altobelli non dovrebbe passare da solo le forche caudine del politicamente corretto e chiedere venia, perdono, cospargendosi il capo di cenere per aver denunciato l’inghippo del genderismo. Al suo fianco vi sarebbero i due padri nobili del socialismo scientifico, due a cui ancora molti si appellano nelle file di Sel e di quella risciacquatura di piatti che è l’odierna sinistra vendola-luxuriana fatta di poeti che inviano i loro amichetti in Russia a denunciare “Il Mostro”, dimenticando che negli States di Obama c’è la pena di morte, differenza etnica, di genere, di ceto, di classe e di tutto, insomma, il darwinismo sociale puro, per dire che “loro” avrebbero detto di “Sì” alla legge Taubira, e anzi, loro avrebbero ufficiato le nozze fra “individuo 1” maschio/femmina e “individuo 2” maschio/femmina, benedicendo senz’altro la loro adozione a distanza e il loro parto eterologo, anch’esso a distanza, magari effettuato con un’indigena (in affitto) del Terzo mondo in nome del cosiddetto progresso.

Di chi sto parlando? Al banco degli imputati, “rei” di omofobia – documentata! – chiamo alla sbarra, ammanettati, il qui presente Karl Marx e l’amico – oh, sono solo amici, niente battute con doppi sensi – Friederich Engels! Cosa?? Sì, avete capito bene!

 Anche Marx ed Engels erano omofobici & sessisti! Dal loro carteggio le prove che inchiodano i filosofi più “odiati” (e citati “ad cavolum”) dalla paladina delle donne… l’amazzone Laura “Wonder Woman” Boldrini

 Marx ed Engels sono per ogni marxista che si rispetti due punti fermi. Nell’iconografia sovietica erano al primo posto, prima addirittura di Lenin, fondatore dello Stato socialista e ideologo del marxismo-leninismo, una variante della dottrina marx-engelsiana. Persino in era stalinista e post-stalinista l’iconografia dell’URSS non variava di una virgola: Stalin era così “umile” da mettersi in fondo alla fila nel pantheon dei padri del socialismo. Primi, però, sono sempre i due tedeschi: Marx ed Engels. Idem per la vecchia socialdemocrazia, che pur contestando a Lenin la sua visione “elitista” e “centralista”, vedeva nei due filosofi i “fari” dell’esegesi di ciò che avveniva nel mondo. Questo è il Novecento. Oggi, però, Marx ed Engels, se qualcuno spulciasse nel carteggio fra i due filosofi, verrebbero severamente espulsi da qualunque partito che anche lontanamente si battesse per la liberazione delle masse. I due filosofi, nelle lettere, si scambiavano salaci battute volgari – Orsù, mica erano radical-chic! Mica indossavano cachemire e andavano a cena con Valeria Marini & Pippo Franco, “sovseggiando” (con erre moscia che fa molto “salotto chic”) champagne & caviale durante la presentazione di un’antologia di poesie scritte da un poeta sconosciuto morto durate un corteo di protesta per difendere i diritti della mosca bianca tze-tze! E non avevano i rasta sulla barba! –, attaccando gli avversari con appellativi che oggi porterebbero Vendola, Ferrero, Diliberto, Ferrando e magari anche lo stalinissimo Rizzo, ad espellere i due dai partiti per “scarsa vigilanza”, “omofobia”, “paternalismo”, “odio di genere” e per non aver appoggiato Vladimir Luxuria.

Paradosso? Giudicate un po’ voi!

Engels, in una lettera inviata all’amico da Manchester il 22 giugno 1869, parlò addirittura dell’esistenza di “lobby gay” (oggi si verrebbe espulsi per direttissima e paragonati ai nazisti runo-muniti di Pravy Sektor che parlano ancora di “complotto ebraico”) scrivendo che

«I pederasti iniziano a contarsi e scoprono di formare una potenza all’interno dello Stato. Mancava solo un’organizzazione, ma secondo questo libro sembra che esista già in segreto. E poiché contano uomini tanto importanti nei vecchi partiti ed anche nei nuovi, da Rösing a Schweitzer, la loro vittoria è inevitabile. D’ora in poi sarà: “Guerre aux cons, paix aux trous de cul”. È solo una fortuna che noi personalmente siamo troppo vecchi per avere timori, se questo partito vincesse, di dover pagare tributo corporale ai vincitori. Ma le giovani generazioni!». [8)

La frase in francese va tradotta con «Guerra alle fi…, pace ai buchi del c…»… ! Il 21 luglio 1868, in una lettera relativa al libro scritto di Carl Boruttau (1837-1873), Gedanken über Gewissens Freiheit (1865), inviato all’amico Engels, in cui si discuteva della libertà sessuale, Marx scriveva: «Chi è questo incalorito Dr. Boruttau, che rivela un organo così sensibile all’amor sessuale?» e l’amico rispondeva (23 luglio 1868) «Del Dr Boruttau dal caloroso membro non so altro se non che “ha commercio” anche con i lassalliani (frazione Schweitzer). La cosa più buffa è il “francese” della sua dedica a un’anima gemella a Mosca». La lettera è il commento a un libro (forse Incubus) che Karl Heinrich Ulrichs, il primo militante omosessuale, aveva inviato a Marx, che l’aveva “girato” a sua volta all’amico Engels. Che ne approfitta per insultare i seguaci di Ferdinand Lassalle, a capo dell’ala nazionalista e corporativista dei socialisti di allora (combattuta da Marx e da Engels), qui insultati come presunti omosessuali. Anche il destinatario moscovita della dedica scritta in cattivo francese è accusato di omosessualità. [9] Il nostro “omofobico/fallocratico” Engels scrive in una lettera inviata a Sorge, dell’11 febbraio 1891, in cui Hasselmann è insultato tranquillamente come Arschficker, cioè “rompiculo”. [10] Proseguiamo. In un’altra lettera del carteggio, oltre a denunciare la “lobby gay”, Engels scrive:

«Incidentalmente, solo in Germania era possibile che un tizio simile apparisse [riferito a Karl Heinrich Ulrichs], trasformasse la sozzura in una teoria e invitasse: “introite” [“entrate”] eccetera. Sfortunatamente non era ancora abbastanza coraggioso da confessare apertamente di esser “lo”, e deve ancora operare coram publico, “dal davanti”, ma non “dal fronte dentro”, come una volta dice per errore. Ma aspetta solo che il nuovo codice penale nord-tedesco riconosca i droits de cul. E sarà tutto diverso. Per le povere persone “del davanti” come noi, con la nostra infantile passione per le donne, le cose si metteranno male». [11]

Ecc. ecc. Insomma, che cattivo ‘sto Engels: si vantava di essere una «persona “del davanti” […], con [una] infantile passione per le donne»… Chissà come verrebbe criminalizzato dall’Asse Vendola-Boldrini-Luxuria, che, con sguardo acido e schifato, gli urlerebbero: «Maschilista! Sessista! Putiniano! Odi le compagne del «Collettivo per l’autocoscienza e la liberazione dal maschio fascista»! Moooostroooo! Gesù – l’ha detto il dott. “teologo” Vip Elton John, “esperto” in materia – sarebbe per le nozze gay e le adozioni “d’altro genere”!»…e via bestemmiando!  

Qui non si vuole attaccare Engels per la sua “omofobia”, dato che era un uomo dell’ ‘800 e quindi tutto va storicizzato. L’omofobia è senz’altro sbagliata e settori consistenti della sinistra – si pensi allo stalinismo – si macchiarono di tale bruttura. [12] Ma volendo ironizzare un po’ – fermo restando che nessuno giudicherebbe mai nessuno per il suo orientamento sessuale – qui vogliamo far riflettere il lettore invitandolo a rileggere gli scritti di Altobelli, perché oggi Lorenzo, per aver criticato il genderismo e non l’omosessualità in quanto tale, è stato espulso dai neostalinisti del politically correct, lo stesso che oggi metterebbe alla gogna il duo Engels-Marx per essere quello che erano, uomini dell’800 o, peggio ancora, che manipola quotidianamente i loro scritti (o che ormai li ha buttati al macero a partire dalla svolta della Bolognina, non per sposare Keynes, ma Obama), trasformandoli in fricchettoni romantici dell’epoca o in liberali illuministi “de sinistra”. Insomma, sono sicuro che i due, se fossero vivi oggi, nel XXI secolo, pur di non dare soddisfazione a tali inquisitori, scapperebbero lontano un miglio, gambe in spalla, dalle sezioni/circoli/club dei partiti cosiddetti “marx-engelsiani” d’oggi o da un qualunque centro sociale o circolo ARCI “de sinistra” presente nel territorio italiano-europeo. I due, il giorno delle elezioni, probabilmente organizzerebbero una bella gita al lago o altro, ma non voterebbero mai Bertinotti, Vendola o Ferrero, l’elogiatore delle “compagne” Pussy Riot! L’odierna sinistra, maestra di anacronismo/revisionismo, travisa il pensiero dei due filosofi, sposandolo con ideologie liberal-individualiste atte a manipolare l’individuo e il suo esser “animale comunitario”. Oggi in sintesi, mi duole ammetterlo, un marxista – pur condannando l’omofobia e ogni violenza/sfruttamento ai danni di donne e uomini, non solo donne – sarebbe distante anni luce dall’odierna sinistra, ormai funzionale al sistema e declassata a stampella dell’odierna eurocrazia liberista.

[3] Franco Restaino, Il pensiero femminista. Una storia possibile, in Adriana Cavarero e Franco Restaino, Le filosofie femministe, Milano, Mondadori, 2002, p. 36.

[4] Ibidem.

[5] Anne Koedt, The Myth of the Vaginal Orgasm, in M. Schneir (a cura di), The Vintage Book of Feminism, Ldon, 1995, pp. 371, 372, cit. in Franco Restaino, Il pensiero femminista. Una storia possibile, in Adriana Cavarero e Franco Restaino, Le filosofie femministe, cit., p. 39.

[6] The Woman – Identified Woman, New York, 1970, in in M. Schneir (a cura di), The Vintage Book of Feminism, London, 1995, p. 163.

[7] Franco Restaino, Il pensiero femminista. Una storia possibile, in Adriana Cavarero e Franco Restaino, Le filosofie femministe, cit., p. 41.

[8] Karl Marx – Friedrich Engels, Opere Complete, vol. 43, Lettere 1868-1870, lett. n. 195, pag.349, Editori Riuniti, Roma, 1975. Johann Baptist von Schweitzer (1833-1875), socialista, fu condannato nel 1862 a due anni di carcere per “proposte omosessuali”. Cfr. Hubert Kennedy, Johann Baptist von Schweitzer: the queer Marx loved to hate, i “Journal of Homosexuality”, a. XXIX, n. 2-3, 1995, pp. 69-96.

[9] Nel testo originale della lettera, in tedesco, c’è un gioco di parole tra schwüle e schwul [finocchio].

[10] Marx-Engels Werke, Band 32, Diet Verlag, Berlin (Pankow) 1965, vol. 38, pp. 30-31, ed. it. Opere, vol. 43, Editori Riuniti, Roma 1972.

[11] Carteggio Marx-Engels, Editori Riuniti, Roma 1972, vol. 5, p. 325.

[12] Fabio Giovannini, Comunisti e diversi. Il Pci e la questione omosessuale, Bari, Dedalo, 1981.

vendredi, 03 octobre 2014

Gog, Papini e il libro nero della modernità


Gog, Papini e il libro nero della modernità

A vent’anni di distanza dal romanzo precedente Gog torna ad essere il protagonista di questo nuovo romanzo di Giovanni Papini intitolato “Il libro nero”.

di Valerio Alberto Menga

Ex: http://www.lintelletualedissidente.it

Gog, peregrino del mondo malato di nervi sparito nel nulla, dopo aver letto in edizione inglese il precedente racconto in cui il suo nome diede il titolo all’opera, fa recapitare un nuovo manoscritto a Papini che, per la seconda volta, decide di pubblicare. Ora, dopo la pubblicazione del precedente libro (“Gog” è del 1931, un anno prima del “Viaggio al termine della notte” di Céline) fa seguito questo romanzo alla quale Papini ha voluto dare il titolo de “Il libro nero. Nuovo diario di Gog” perché, come egli stesso afferma nell’avvertenza introduttiva, “i fogli di questo nuovo diario appartengono quasi tutti a una delle più nere età della storia umana, cioè degli anni dell’ultima guerra e del dopoguerra”.

In questo nuovo diario, oltre a nuovi incontri eccellenti – una sorta di “interviste impossibili” che Papini, attraverso la maschera di Gog, finge di aver fatto ad alcuni degli uomini più influenti della cultura, dell’arte, della scienza e della politica del tempo – con uomini del calibro di Dali, Picasso, Molotov, Hitler, Marconi, Huxley e Paul Valery, vi è anche una carrellata di una serie di (immaginari) manoscritti inediti e autografi, raccolti con zelante mania da Gog, di alcuni grandi della letteratura come Walt Whitman, Cervantes, Victor Hugo, Stendhal, Kafka, Tolstoj, Goethe e William Blake. In questo nuovo diario di Gog, migliore addirittura del primo, l’impressione che si era avuta dell’immaginario protagonista del romanzo che incarna il malato uomo moderno – quasi un demone si era detto in precedenza– muta radicalmente, quasi smentendola, con la lettura di questo nuovo lavoro.

papinigog.jpgPapini ci mostra un Gog sempre più mosso da umana pietà, che addirittura si commuove e si spaventa, mentre l’umanità pare sempre più demoniaca e priva di senno. Se nel primo romanzo Gog pareva schernire l’umanità, ora pare invece averne pena. Sempre schivo, diffidente e riservato, questo magnate giramondo, spettatore attonito delle vicende umane, non prende mai parte a nessuno dei progetti che nuovamente gli vengono proposti dagli uomini che incontra, folli o straordinari che siano. Il massimo che gli riesce di fare è finanziare, o semplicemente dare promessa di tale intento, a qualche inventore o rivoluzionario in cerca di contributi economici per portare a termine il proprio progetto innovativo. Il romanzo si apre, non per niente, con l’incontro con Ernest O. Lawrence, fisico e Premio Nobel per essere stato l’inventore e il perfezionatore del ciclotrone, il primo acceleratore circolare di particelle atomiche. L’era atomica è quella profetizzata da Papini, e la paura di una guerra nucleare il nuovo spettro che si aggira per il mondo. Ma la profezia più grande contenuta nel romanzo è quella che il nostro Gog/Papini riceve da Lin Youtang – il capitolo è infatti intitolato “Visita a Lin Youtang (o del pericolo giallo)”- di cui vale la pena riportare qualche passaggio:

“- Il popolo cinese, mi ha detto, è il popolo più pericoloso che sia al mondo e perciò è destinato a dominare la terra. Per secoli e secoli è rimasto chiuso nei confini dell’immenso impero perché credeva che il resto del pianeta non avesse alcuna importanza. Ma gli Europei e poi i Giapponesi gli hanno aperto gli occhi, gli orecchi e la mente. Hanno voluto stanarci per forza e pagheranno cara la loro cupidigia e la loro curiosità. Da un secolo i cinesi aspettano di vendicarsi e si vendicheranno.” “Il popolo cinese è astuto e paziente…In realtà i cinesi non sono né conservatori né democratici né comunisti. Sono semplicemente cinesi, cioè una specie umana a parte che vuol vivere e sopravvivere, che si moltiplica e deve espandersi per necessità biologica più che per ideologia politica.”“Il popolo cinese è immortale, sempre eguale a se stesso sotto tutte le dominazioni.” “Nessun altro popolo può sperare di sopraffarlo e di respingerlo. È un popolo scaltro e crudele, popolo di mercanti e d’imbroglioni, di briganti e di carnefici, che sa usare ai suoi fini ora l’inganno ora la ferocia. È destinato, perciò, a diventar padrone del mondo perché gli altri popoli sono più ingenui e più buoni di lui. Ci metterà il tempo che sarà necessario ma il futuro gli appartiene.”

Gog verrà ci porta a conoscenza delle conseguenze della Tecnica, del dominio della Macchina sull’Uomo, come avviene nel capitolo intitolato “Il tribunale elettronico” in cui è una macchina e non un giudice in carne e ossa a emettere le (sbrigative) sentenze; o come nel poema “Il Primo e l’Ultimo” che Gog ritrova a firma di Miguel de Unamuno, in cui il primo e l’ultimo uomo della terra (Adamo e W. S. 347926) si confrontano trovandosi in antitesi: Adamo è un uomo in carne ed ossa, pieno di emozioni, di paure e di tabù, mentre W.S. 347926 (questo è il suo nome) è una sorta di cyborg che, guardando in faccia il suo avo pronuncia le seguenti parole: “Tutto ciò che voi andate balbettando è una fila di non sensi, espressi con un gergo selvaggio, sorpassato, incomprensibile e vuoto. Per noi le parole Dio, colpa, redenzione, peccato, bene e male, non hanno più, da secoli e secoli, alcun significato.” Profetico è anche il racconto dal titolo significativo “Il nemico della natura” dove un uomo distrugge tutta la fauna che si trova davanti perché infastidito da essa, dandoci le sue insensate ragioni. Illuminante il capitolo “Ascenzia” dove viene riprodotta la commedia della democrazia; significativo il racconto “Il transvolatore solitario”, un solitario indiano che odia gli uomini e si rifugia nei cieli azzurri dell’Immenso per sfuggire alla loro mediocrità. Il capitolo “Visita a Otorikuma”, che piacerebbe tanto a Massimo Fini, sottolinea invece i paradossi della guerra moderna:

“In atlri tempi e in altre civiltà le azioni sconfitte erano obbligate a cedere territori e a pagare indennità…Ora, invece, i cpai politici e quelli militari dei paesi vinti, vengono ritenuti delinquenti e come tali processati e puniti. È questo un fatto nuovo nella storia moderna”. È da segnalare, infine, il racconto più nostalgico contenuto nel romanzo/diario intitolato “L’imbruttimento dell’Italia”, che piacerebbe tanto a un Vittorio Sgarbi, in cui viene riprodotta l’immagine di un Paese di cui, per dirla con Longanesi, non riconosciamo più né il volto né l’anima. Un romanzo da leggere, indispensabile per comprendere i mali del nostro tempo.

‘Gog’ e le profezie di Giovanni Papini


‘Gog’ e le profezie di Giovanni Papini

Il romanzo, che facilmente si può definire nichilista, se non esistenzialista, rimane di straordinaria attualità per le problematiche esistenziali vissute dall’uomo moderno, ieri come oggi. Per chi abbia apprezzato il “Viaggio al termine della notte” di Céline questa è una lettura consigliata. Diversissimo lo stile asciutto di Papini in confronto a quell’innovazione stilistica dell’autore francese appena citato, ma si percepisce la stessa irrisione nei confronti dell’umanità, delle sue miserie, delle sue fragilità e della sua inconsistenza.

di Valerio Alberto Menga

Ex: http://www.lintelletualedissidente.it

“Satana sarà liberato dal suo carcere e uscirà per sedurre le nazioni, Gog e Magog…”

Apocalisse, XX, 7.

Chi è Gog? Questa è la domanda dalla difficile risposta. Talmente difficile che anche arrivati a fine romanzo ci si ritrova con diversi dubbi sull’identità del personaggio che da il tiolo all’opera in questione. Ma di chi stiamo parlando?

Stiamo parlando di Giovanni Papini, scrittore talentuoso e dimenticato autore di questo vecchio romanzo, ormai fuori catalogo, ma reperibile ovunque su internet tra i buon vecchi libri usati. Fu edito dalla casa editrice Vallecchi che decise di dedicare un’intera collana “opere di Giovanni Papini” all’autore del romanzo in questione.

E chi è Papini? Questa la domanda dalla altrettanto difficile risposta.
Uno scrittore dimenticato, amico e sodale dell’altrettanto talentuoso e dimenticato intellettuale del Novecento italiano Giuseppe Prezzolini: l’anarco-conservatore, allievo di Longanesi e maestro di Montanelli. Insieme, Papini e Prezzolini, fondarono “Lacerba”, il “Leonardo” e la famosa testata “La Voce”, la più grande rivista politico-culturale dalla quale uscì il meglio del fascismo e dell’antifascismo: Benito Mussolini, Benedetto Croce, Curzio Malaparte, Piero Gobetti, Giovanni Amendola…per citarne alcuni.

papini_gog1-200x297.jpgPapini fu giornalista, scrittore, filosofo, poeta, aforista, animatore culturale e agitatore politico, come molti toscani dell’epoca. Fu nazionalista, futurista, filo-fascista, ateo e anticlericale, per poi convertirsi alla religione cattolica. Passò da Nietzsche a Gesù, percorso che si può riassumere nelle rispettive e simboliche opere “Un uomo finito” del 1913 e “Storia di Cristo” del 1921. Ed è forse proprio nella sua riscoperta spirituale, nella sua conversione cattolica, che si può spiegare il suo antisemitismo, probabile percorso nel solco di una certa tradizione cristiana che vede negli ebrei gli assassini di Cristo.

Ma la domanda rimane: chi è Gog?

Gog invece è un personaggio ambiguo, frutto di un miscuglio di razze originarie delle isole Hawaii. Un misantropo ricco sfondato che si annoia della vita e degli uomini e dopo esser stato proprietario e direttore di aziende, aver girato mezzo mondo, ed aver comprato una nazione, tenta di comprendere questi strani esseri chiamati uomini, dal quale pare prender le distanze e porsi al di fuori della stessa umanità – il che fa addirittura dubitare della natura umana del protagonista.

La citazione dall’Apocalisse con cui Papini introduce il personaggio, un essere demoniaco che si beffa dell’Uomo e delle sue miserie, fa addirittura pensare al lettore che esso sia addirittura Satana in persona, in visita sulla Terra come mero turista curioso alla ricerca della natura umana.

Il romanzo è scritto sotto forma di diario, il Diario di Gog appunto, che Papini afferma di aver ricevuto in dono dall’autore prima della sua scomparsa, e che, dopo una difficile opera di ricostruzione cronologica, ha tentato di trascrivere fedelmente. Costruzione cronologica resa difficile dal fatto che Gog nei suoi diari indica il luogo, il giorno e il mese, ma non l’anno in cui ha vissuto le esperienze descritte in quelle pagine. Forse per sottolineare l’attualità delle inquietudini umane che si raccontano nel testo.

Gog, abbreviativo di Gogin, comincia a scoprire l’umanità attraverso la letteratura delle maggiori opere della letteratura mondiale, che riterrà  “Roba assurda, noiosa: talvolta insignificante o nauseabonda”. Tali ai suoi occhi appaiono opere come L’Iliade di Omero, La Divina Commedia di Dante, Il Don Chixote di Cervantes, L’Orlando Furioso di Ariosto, il Gulliver di Swift, Il Faust di Goethe, Madam Bovary di Falubert, Il Vangelo…Insomma tutto lo annoia. Nulla è in grado di soddisfarlo, di eccitarlo, di esaltarlo e di colpirlo. Tutto lo sfiora. Proprio come “l’uomo liquido” della post-modernità.

Allora decide di partire per il Mondo cercando di conoscere uomini eccezionali, alcuni grandi del suo tempo come Lenin, Freud, Henry Ford, Einstein, Gandhi, G.B. Shaw, Edison, Wells; nessuno all’altezza delle sue aspettative. Compra per divertirsi sedicenti maghi, resuscitatori di morti, i più grandi giganti della terra, un boia sadico e nostalgico della buon vecchia tortura, e molto altro ancora… Ma nulla da fare. L’uomo rimane per Gog un miserabile buffone che inganna se stesso e gli altri,  così come l’esistenza stessa appare priva di fine.

Il romanzo, che facilmente si può definire nichilista, se non esistenzialista, rimane di straordinaria attualità per le problematiche esistenziali vissute dall’uomo moderno, ieri come oggi. Per chi abbia apprezzato il “Viaggio al termine della notte” di Céline questa è una lettura consigliata. Diversissimo lo stile asciutto di Papini in confronto a quell’innovazione stilistica dell’autore francese appena citato, ma si percepisce la stessa irrisione nei confronti dell’umanità, delle sue miserie, delle sue fragilità e della sua inconsistenza.

Scorrendo le pagine di “Gog” pare di percepire il Papini nichilista, ancora intriso delle letture di Nietzsche, sicuramente il Papini ossessionato dal “Diavolo” – figura sempre presente nelle opere dell’autore – per poi addirittura riconoscere, arrivati al capitolo finale, il Papini autore della “Storia di Cristo”.

Un libro per tutti e per nessuno.

mercredi, 01 octobre 2014

Egalitarianism and the Elites

Egalitarianism and the Elites

The Review of Austrian Economics Vol. 8, No. 2 (1995): 39-57

The Alleged Self-Evidence of Equality

defend-equality.jpgOne of the great glories of mankind is that, in contrast to other species, each individual is unique, and hence irreplaceable; whatever the similarities and common attributes among men, it is their differences that lead us to honor, or celebrate, or deplore the qualities or actions of any particular person. [1] t is the diversity, the heterogeneity, of human beings that is one of the most striking attributes of mankind.

This fundamental heterogeneity makes all the more curious the pervasive modern ideal of “equality.” For “equality” means “sameness”—two entities are “equal” if and only if they are the same thing. X = y only if they are either identical, or they are two entities that are the same in some attribute. If x, y, and z are “equal in length,” it means that each one of them is identical in length, say 3 feet. People, then, can only be “equal” to the extent that they are identical in some attribute: thus, if Smith, Jones and Robinson are each 5 feet, 11 inches in height, then they are “equal” in height. But except for these special cases, people are heterogeneous, and diverse, that is, they are “unequal.” Diversity, and hence “inequality,” is therefore a fundamental fact of the human race. So how do we account for the almost universal contemporary worship at the shrine of “equality,” so much so that it has virtually blotted out other goals or principles of ethics? And taking the lead in this worship have been philosophers, academics, and other leaders and members of the intellectual elites, followed by the entire troop of opinion-molders in modern society, including pundits, journalists, ministers, public school teachers, counselors, human relations consultants and “therapists.” And yet, it should be almost evidently clear that a drive to pursue “equality” starkly violates the essential nature of mankind, and therefore can only be pursued, let alone attempt to succeed, by the use of extreme coercion.

The current veneration of equality is, indeed, a very recent notion in the history of human thought. Among philosophers or prominent thinkers the idea scarcely existed before the mid-eighteenth century; if mentioned, it was only as the object of horror or ridicule.[2] The profoundly anti-human and violently coercive nature of egalitarianism was made clear in the influential classical myth of Procrustes, who “forced passing travellers to lie down on a bed, and if they were too long for the bed he lopped off those parts of their bodies which protruded, while racking out the legs of the ones who were too short. This was why he was given the name of Procrustes [The Racker].”[3]

One of the rare modern philosophers critical of equality made the point that “we can ask whether one man is as tall as another, or we may, like Procrustes, seek to establish equality among all men in this respect.”[4] But our fundamental answer to the question whether equality exists in the real world must be clearly that it does not, and any quest “to establish equality” can only result in the grotesque consequences of any Procrustean effort. How, then, can we not regard Procrustes’s egalitarian “ideal” as anything but monstrous and unnatural? The next logical question is why Procrustes chooses to pursue such a clearly anti-human goal, and one that can only lead to catastrophic results?

In the context of the Greek myth, Procrustes is simply pursuing a lunatic “aesthetic” goal, presumably following his personal star of every person being precisely equal in height to the length of his bed. And yet, this sort of non-argument, this bland assumption that the ideal of equality needs no justification, is endemic among egalitarians. Thus, the argument of the distinguished Chicago economist Henry C. Simons for a progressive income tax was that he found inequality of income “distinctly evil or unlovely.”[5]  Presumably, Procrustes might have used the same sort of “argument” in behalf of the “unlovely” nature of inequality of height had he bothered to write an essay advocating his particular egalitarian program. Indeed, most writers simply assume that equality is and must be the overriding goal of society, and that it scarcely needs any supporting argument at all, even a flimsy argument from personal esthetics. Robert Nisbet was and is still correct when he wrote, two decades ago, that

It is evident that . . . the idea of equality will be sovereign for the rest of this century in just about all circles concerned with the philosophical bases of public policy. … In the past, unifying ideas tended to be religious in substance. There are certainly signs that    equality is taking on a sacred aspect among many minds today, that it is rapidly acquiring dogmatic status, at least among a great many philosophers and social scientists.[6]

The Oxford sociologist A. H. Halsey, indeed, was “unable to divine any reason other than ‘malevolence’ why anyone should want to stand” in the way of his egalitarian program. Presumably that “malevolence” could only be diabolic.[7]

“Equality” in What?

Let us now examine the egalitarian program more carefully: what, exactly, is supposed to be rendered equal? The older, or “classic,” answer was monetary incomes. Money incomes were supposed to be made equal.

On the surface, this seemed clear-cut, but grave difficulties arose quickly. Thus, should the equal income be per person, or per household? If wives don’t work, should the family income rise proportionately? Should children be forced to work in order to come under the “equal” rubric, and if so at what age? Furthermore, is not wealth as important as annual income? If A and B each earn $50,000 a year, but A possesses accumulated wealth of $1,000,000 and B owns virtually nothing, their equal incomes scarcely reflect an equality of financial position.[8]  But if A is taxed more heavily due to his accumulation, isn’t this an extra penalty on thrift and savings? And how are these problems to be resolved?

But even setting aside the problem of wealth, and focussing on income, can incomes ever really be equalized? Surely, the item to be equalized cannot be simply monetary income. Money is, after all, only a paper ticket, a unit of account, so that the element to be equalized cannot be a mere abstract number but must be the goods and services that can be purchased with that money. The world-egalitarian (and surely the truly committed egalitarian can hardly stop at a national boundary) is concerned to equalize not currency totals but actual purchasing-power. Thus, if A receives an income of 10,000 drachmas a year and B earns 50,000 forints, the equalizer will have to figure out how many forints are actually equivalent to one drachma in purchasing power, before he can wield his equalizing axe correctly. In short, what the economist refers to as “real” and not mere monetary incomes must be equalized for all.

But once the egalitarian agrees to focus on real incomes, he is caught in a thicket of inescapable and insoluble problems. For a large number of goods and services are not homogeneous, and cannot be replicated for all. One of the goods that a Greek may consume with his drachmas is living in, or spending a great deal of time in, the Greek islands. This service (of continuously enjoying the Greek islands) is barred ineluctably to the Hungarian, to the American and to everyone else in the world. In the same way, dining regularly at an outdoor cafe on the Danube is an estimable service denied all the rest of us who do not live in Hungary.


How, then, is real income to be equalized throughout the world? How can the enjoyment of the Greek islands or dining on the Danube be measured, much less gauged by the egalitarian against other services of location? If I am a Nebraskan, and exchange rate manipulations have allegedly equated my income with a Hungarian, how is living in Nebraska to be compared with living in Hungary? The bog gets worse on contemplation. If the egalitarian considers that Danube-enjoyment is somehow superior to enjoying the sights and scenes of Omaha, or a Nebraska farm, on exactly what basis is the egalitarian going to tax the Hungarian and subsidize everyone else? How is he to measure, in monetary terms, the “value of dining on the Danube?” Obviously, the stern rigors of natural law prevent him, much as he would clearly like to do so, from taking the Danube physically and parcelling it out equally to every inhabitant throughout the world. And what of people who prefer the views of and life in a Nebraska farm community to the sins of Budapest? Who, then, is to be taxed and who subsidized and by how much?

Perhaps in desperation, the egalitarian might fall back on the view that everyone’s location reflects his preferences, and that we can therefore simply assume that locations can be neglected in the great egalitarian re-ordering. But while it is true that virtually every spot on the globe is beloved by someone, it is also true that, by and large, some locations are greatly preferred to others. And the location problem occurs within as well as between countries. It is generally acknowledged, both by its residents and by envious outsiders, that the Bay Area of San Francisco is, by climate and topography, far closer to an earthly Paradise than, say West Virginia or Hoboken, New Jersey. Why then don’t these benighted outlanders move to the Bay Area? In the first place, many of them have, but others are barred by the fact of its relatively small size, which (among other, man-made restrictions, such as zoning laws), severely limits migration opportunities. So, in the name of egalitarianism, should we levy a special tax on Bay Area residents and on other designated garden spots, to reduce their psychic income of enjoyment, and then subsidize the rest of us? And how about pouring subsidies into specially designated Dismal Areas, again in the pursuit of equal real incomes? And how is the equalizing government supposed to find out how much people in general, and a fortiori each individual resident, love the Bay Area and how much negative income they suffer from living in, say, West Virginia or Hoboken? Obviously, we can’t ask the various residents how much they love or hate their residential areas, for the residents of every location from San Francisco to Hoboken, would have every incentive to lie—to rush to proclaim to the authorities how much they revile the place where they live.

And location is only one of the most obvious examples of non-homogeneous goods and services which cannot be possibly equalized across the nation or the world.



Moreover, even if wealth and real incomes are both equalized, how are people, their abilities, cultures, and traits, to be equalized? Even if the monetary position of each family is the same, will not children be born into families with very different natures, abilities, and qualities? Isn’t that, to use a notorious egalitarian term, “unfair”? How then can families be made equal, that is, uniform? Doesn’t a child in a cultured and intelligent and wise family enjoy an “unfair” advantage over a child in a broken, moronic, and “dysfunctional” home? The egalitarian must therefore press forward and advocate, as have many communist theorists, the nationalization of all kids from birth, and their rearing in legal and identical state nurseries. But even here the goal of equality and uniformity cannot be achieved. The pesky problem of location will remain, and a state nursery in the Bay Area, even if otherwise identical in every way with one in the wilds of central Pennsylvania, will still enjoy inestimable advantages—or, at the very least, ineradicable differences from the other nurseries. But apart from location, the people—the administrators, nurses, teachers, inside and outside of the various encampments—will all be different, thus giving each child an inescapably different experience, and wrecking the quest for equality for all.

Of course, suitable brainwashing, bureaucratization, and the general robotization and deadening of spirit in the state encampments may help reduce all the teachers and nurses, as well as the children, to a lower and more common denominator, but ineradicable differences and advantages will still remain.

And even if, for the sake of argument, we can assume general equality of income and wealth, other inequalities will not only remain, but, in a world of equal incomes, they will become still more glaring and more important in weighing people. Differences of position, differences of occupation, and inequalities in the job hierarchy and therefore in status and prestige will become even more important, since income and wealth will no longer be a gauge for judging or rating people. Differences in prestige between physicians and carpenters, or between top executives and laborers, will become still more accentuated. Of course, job prestige can be equalized by eliminating hierarchy altogether, abolishing all organizations, corporations, volunteer groups, etc. Everyone will then be equal in rank and decisionmaking power. Differences in prestige could only be eliminated by entering the Marxian heaven and abolishing all specialization and division of labor among occupations, so that everyone would do everything. But in that sort of economy, the human race would die out with remarkable speed.[9]

The New Coercive Elite

When we confront the egalitarian movement, we begin to find the first practical, if not logical, contradiction within the program itself: that its outstanding advocates are not in any sense in the ranks of the poor and oppressed, but are Harvard, Yale, and Oxford professors, as well as other leaders of the privileged social and power elite. What kind of “egalitarianism” is this? If this phenomenon is supposed to embody a massive assumption of liberal guilt, then it is curious that we see very few of this breast-beating elite actually divesting themselves of their worldly goods, prestige, and status, and go live humbly and anonymously among the poor and destitute. Quite the contrary, they seem not to stumble a step on their climb to wealth, fame, and power. Instead, they invariably bask in the congratulations of themselves and their like-minded colleagues of the high-minded morality in which they have all cloaked themselves.

Perhaps the answer to this puzzle lies in our old friend Procrustes. Since no two people are uniform or “equal” in any sense in nature, or in the outcomes of a voluntary society, to bring about and maintain such equality necessarily requires the permanent imposition of a power elite armed with devastating coercive power. For an egalitarian program clearly requires a powerful ruling elite to wield the formidable weapons of coercion and even terror required to operate the Procrustean rack: to try to force everyone into an egalitarian mold. Hence, at least for the ruling elite, there is no “equality” here—only vast inequalities of power, decisionmaking, and undoubtedly, income and wealth as well.

Thus, the English philosopher Antony Flew points out that “the Procrustean ideal has, as it is bound to have, the most powerful attraction for those already playing or hoping in the future to play prominent or rewarding parts in the machinery of enforcement.” Flew notes that this Procrustean ideal is “the uniting and justifying ideology of a rising class of policy advisors and public welfare professionals,” adding significantly that “these are all people both professionally involved in, and owing to their past and future advancement to, the business of enforcing it.”[10]

That the necessary consequence of an egalitarian program is the decidedly inegalitarian creation of a ruthless power elite was recognized and embraced by the English Marxist-Lenist sociologist Frank Parkin. Parkin concluded that “Egalitarianism seems to require a political system in which the state is able to hold in check those social and occupational groups which, by virtue of their skills or education or personal attributes, might otherwise attempt to stake claims to a disproportionate share of society’s rewards. The most effective way of holding such groups in check is by denying the right to organize politically, or, in other ways, to undermine social equality. This presumably is the reasoning underlying the Marxist-Leninist case for a political order based upon the dictatorship of the proletariat.”[11]

But how is it that Parkin and his egalitarian ilk never seem to realize that this explicit assault on “social equality” leads to tremendous inequalities of power, decisionmaking authority, and, inevitably, income and wealth? Indeed, why is this seemingly obvious question never so much as raised among them? Could there be hypocrisy or even deceit at work?

The Iron Law of Oligarchy

One reason that an egalitarian political program must lead to the installation of a new coercive political elite is that hierarchies and inequalities of decisionmaking are inevitable in any human organization that achieves any degree of success in attaining its goals.

Robert Michels first observed this Iron Law of Oligarchy, in seeing the Social Democratic parties of Europe in the late nineteenth century, officially committed to equality and abolition of the division of labor, in practice being run by a small ruling elite. And there is nothing, outside of egalitarian fantasies, wrong with this universal human fact, or law of nature. In any group or organization, there will arise a core leadership of those most able, energetic, and committed to the organization, I know, for example, of a small but increasingly successful volunteer, musical society in New York. Although there is a governing board elected annually by its members, the group has for years been governed by the benevolent but absolute autocratic rule of its president, a lady who is highly intelligent, innovative, and, though employed full-time elsewhere, able and willing to devote an incredible amount of time and energy to this organization. Several years ago some malcontent challenged this rule, but the challenge was easily beaten back, since every rational member knew full well that she was absolutely vital to the success of the organization.

Not only is there nothing wrong with this situation, but blessed be the group where such a person exists and can come to the fore! There is, in fact, everything right about a rise to power, in voluntary or market organizations, of the most able and efficient, of a “natural aristocracy,” in Jeffersonian terms. Democratic voting, at its best when shareholders of a corporation vote the aliquot share of their ownership of a company’s assets, is only secondarily useful as a method of displacing natural aristocrats or “monarchs” gone sour, or, in Aristotelian terms, who have deteriorated from “monarch” to “tyrants.” Democratic voting, therefore, is even at its best scarcely even a primary good, let alone a good-in-itself to be glorified or even deified.

During a period in the mid-1960s, the New Left, before it hived off into Stalinism and bizarre violence, was trying to put into effect a new political theory: participatory democracy. Participatory democracy sounded libertarian, since the idea was that majority rule, even in a private and voluntary organization, is “coercive,” and therefore that all decisions of that organization must be stripped of oligarchic rule. Every member would then participate equally, and furthermore, every member would have to give his or her consent to any decision. In a sense, this Unanimity Rule foreshadowed and paralleled the Unanimity Rule of James Buchanan and of Paretian “welfare economics.”

A friend of mine was teaching about the history of Vietnam at the New Leftist Free University of New York, originally a scholarly organization founded by a young sociologist couple. The Free University set out to govern itself on participatory democratic principles. The governing body, the board of the Free University, therefore consisted of the “staff”—the sociologist couple—plus any students (who paid a modest tuition) or teachers (unpaid) who cared to attend the board’s meetings. All were equal, the founding staff was no more powerful than any teacher or wandering student. All decisions of the school, from courses taught, room assignments, and on down to whether or not the school needed a paint job and what color the paint should be, were decided by the board, never by voting but always by unanimous consent.

Here was a fascinating sociological experiment. Not only, as one might expect, were very few decisions of any sort reached, but the “board meeting” stretched on endlessly, so that the board meeting expanded to become life itself—a kind of Sartrian No Exit situation. When my friend left the perpetual meeting each day at 5:00 pm to go home, he was accused of abandoning the meeting and thereby “betraying the collective” and the school by attempting to live some sort of private life outside the meeting. Perhaps this is what the current leftist political theorists who exalt the “public life” and “civic virtue” have in mind: private lives being forsaken on behalf of the permanent floating “civically virtuous” collective meeting of “the community!”

It should not come as any surprise to reveal that the Free University of New York did not last very long. In point of fact, it quickly deteriorated from a scholarly outfit to the “teaching” of New Left astrology, tarot cards, channeling, eurythmics, and whatnot as the scholars all fled before the mass man, or as a sociological Gresham’s Law came into action. (As for the founding couple, the female wound up in jail for unsuccessfully trying to blow up a bank, while the male, getting increasingly glassy-eyed, in a feat of sociological legerdemain, talked himself into the notion that the only moral occupation for a revolutionary sociologist was that of radio repairman.)

New Left educational theory, during that period, also permeated more orthodox colleges throughout the country. In those days, the doctrine was not so much that teaching had to be “politically correct,” but that the normal teacher-student relation was evil because inherently unequal and hierarchical. Since the teacher is assumed to know more than the student, therefore, the truly egalitarian and “democratic” form of education, the way to put teacher and student on an equal footing, is to scrap course content altogether and to sit around discussing the student’s “feelings.” Not only are all feelings in some sense equal, at least in the sense that one person’s feelings cannot be considered “superior” to others, but those feelings are supposedly the only subjects “relevant” to students. One problem that this doctrine raised, of course, is why the students, or more correctly their long-suffering parents, should pay faculty who are qualified in knowledge of economics, sociology, or whatever but not in psychotherapy, to sit around gabbing about the students’ feelings?

Institutionalizing Envy

As I have elaborated elsewhere, the egalitarian impulse, once granted legitimacy, cannot be appeased. If monetary or real incomes become equalized, or even if decisionmaking power should be equalized, other differences among persons become magnified and irritating to the egalitarian: inequalities in looks, intelligence, and so on.[12]  One intriguing point however: there are some inequalities that never seem to outrage egalitarians, namely income inequalities among those who directly supply consumer services—notably athletes, movie and TV entertainers, artists, novelists, playwrights, and rock musicians. Perhaps this is the reason for the persuasive power of Robert Nozick’s famous “Wilt Chamberlain” example in defense of market-determined incomes. There are two possible explanations: (1) that these consumer values are held by the egalitarians themselves and are therefore considered legitimate, or (2) that, with the exception of athletics, these are fields implicitly recognized as dominated nowadays by forms of entertainment and art that require no real talent. Differences in income, therefore, are equivalent to winning at a lottery, and lottery or sweepstake winners are universally lauded as purely “lucky,” with no envy of superior attributes to be attached to them.[13]

The German sociologist Helmut Schoeck has pointed out that modern egalitarianism is essentially an institutionalization of envy. In contrast to successful or functional societies, where envy is always considered a shameful emotion, egalitarianism sets up a pervasive attitude that the exciting of envy by manifesting some form of superiority is considered the greatest evil. Or, as Schoeck put it, “the highest value is envy-avoidance.”[14]  Indeed, communist anarchists explicitly aim to stamp out private property because they believe that property gives rise to inequality, and therefore to feelings of envy, and hence “causes” crimes of violence against those with more property. But as Schoeck points out, economic egalitarianism would then not be sufficient: and compulsory uniformity of looks, intelligence, etc. would have to follow.[15]

But even if all possible inequalities and difference among individuals could somehow be eradicated, Helmut Schoeck adds, there still would remain an irreducible element: the mere existence of individual privacy. As Schoeck puts it, “if a man really makes use of his right to be alone, the annoyance, envy, and mistrust of his fellow citizens will be aroused. . . . Anyone who cuts himself off, who draws his curtains and spends any length of time outside the range of observation, is always seen as a potential heretic, a snob, a conspirator.”[16] After some amusing comments about suspicion of the “sin of privacy” in American culture, particularly in the widespread open-door policy among academics, Schoeck turns to the Israeli kibbutz and to its widely and overly revered philosopher, Martin Buber. Buber maintained that to constitute a “real community,” the absolutely equal members of the kibbutz must “have mutual access to one another and [be] ready for one another.” As Schoeck interprets Buber: “a community of equals, where no one ought to envy anyone else, is not guaranteed by absence of possessions alone, but requires mutual possession, in purely human terms. … Everyone must always have time for everybody else, and anyone who hoards his time, his leisure hours, and his privacy excludes himself.”[17]

The New Group Egalitarianism

So far we have been describing what may be called “classical,” or the Old, egalitarianism, aimed to make all individuals in some sense equal, generally in income and wealth. But in recent years, we have all been subjected to a burgeoning and accelerating New Egalitarianism, which stresses not that every individual must be made equal, but that the income, prestige, and status of a seemingly endless proliferation of “groups” must be made equal to each other.

At first blush, it might seem that the new group egalitarianism is less extreme or unrealistic than the old individual creed. For if every individual is really totally equal to every other in income, wealth, or status, then it will follow logically that any subset of groups of such individuals will be equal as well. Shifting emphasis from individual to group egalitarianism must therefore imply settling for a less severe degree of equality. But this conclusion misconceives the whole point of egalitarianism, old or new. No egalitarian actually expects ever to be in a state of absolute equality, still less does he begin his analysis with that starting point.

Perhaps we can illuminate the true nature of the egalitarian drive, and the relationship between the Old and the New movements, by focussing not, as is usually done, on their patently absurd and self-contradictory ostensible goals of equality, but on the required means to attain such goals: namely the coming to power of the Procrustean State apparatus, the new coercive elite. Who are the Procrustean elite? That is, which groups are needed to constitute such an elite? By an odd coincidence, the makeup of such groups seems to correspond, almost one-to-one, to those people who have been most enthusiastic about egalitarianism over the years: intellectuals, academics, opinion-molders, journalists, writers, media elites, social workers, bureaucrats, counsellors, psychologists, personnel consultants, and especially for the ever-accelerating new group egalitarianism, a veritable army of “therapists” and sensitivity trainers. Plus, of course, ideologues and researchers to dream up and discover new groups that need egalitarianizing.




If these groups of what might very loosely be called the “intelligentsia” are the driving force of the Old and the New embodiments of egalitarianism, how does this minority hope to convince a majority of the public to turn over an apparatus of despotic power into its hands? In the first place, the intellectuals start with a huge advantage far beyond their relative smallness of number: they are dominant within the “opinion-molding class” that attempts to shape public opinion, and often succeeds in that task. As is always the case, the State rulers need the support of an opinion-molding class to engineer the consent of the public. In the Old Egalitarianism, the would-be rulers sought to bring into their camp, in the first place, the seeming economic beneficiaries of the egalitarian program—the lower-income groups who would be recipients of much of the transfer, or soaking of the wealthy (part of the transfer from the rich, of course, would go into the coffers of the Procrustean elites themselves, the brokers of the egalitarian wealth-transfer). As for the plundered wealthy, they would be induced to support the system by being persuaded that they must expiate their “guilt” at being wealthier than their impoverished fellow-citizens. Infusion of guilt is a classic path of persuading the wealthy victim to surrender his wealth without a struggle.

Any success in the Old Egalitarian program led, of course, to expansion of the number, the wealth, and the power of the new Procrustean elite, resulting in an ever lower income definition of “the wealthy” to be plundered, and an ever higher definition of “the poor” to be subsidized. This process has been all too clearly at work in the United States and in the western world in the twentieth century. From being confined to the highest income brackets, for example, the payers of income tax have descended into the ranks of the far more numerous middle class. At the same time, the “poverty level” to be subsidized and cosseted has marched steadily upward, as the “poverty line” is continually revised upward, and the subsidized escalate from the very poor to the unemployed to the more affluent “working poor.”

From the point of view of the egalitarians, however, the weakness of the Old Egalitarianism is that it has only one category of beneficiary—“the poor,” however defined, and one category of the plundered, “the rich.” (That they themselves are notable beneficiaries is always discreetly left hidden behind the veil of altruism and alleged expertise. For anyone else to bring up to the point would be considered ungentlemanly, or, even worse, to be engaging in the much-derided “conspiracy theory of history.”)[18]

In the light of this analysis, then, let us examine the New Group Egalitarianism. As we all know, the new egalitarians search for “oppressed” groups who are lower in income, status, or prestigious jobs than others, who become the designated “oppressors.” In classic leftism or Marxism, there was only one alleged “oppressed group,” the proletariat. Then the floodgates were opened, and the ranks of the designated oppressed, or “accredited victims,” have proliferated seemingly without end. It began with the oppressed blacks, and then in rapid succession, there were woman, Hispanics, American Indians, immigrants, “the disabled,” the young, the old, the short, the very tall, the fat, the deaf, and so on ad infinitum. The point is that the proliferation is, in fact, endless. Every individual “belongs” to an almost infinite variety of groups or classes. Take, for example, a Mr. John Smith. He may belong to an enormous number of classes: e.g., people named “Smith,” people named “John,” people of height 5 feet 10 inches, people of height under 6 feet, people who live in Battle Creek, Michigan, people who live north of the Mason-Dixon line, people with an income of … etc. And among all these classes, there are an almost infinite number of permutations. It has gotten to the point where the only “theory” of “oppression” needed is if any such group has a lower income or wealth or status than other groups. The below-average group, whatever it is, is then by definition, “discriminated against” and therefore is designated as oppressed. Whereas any group above the average is, by definition, doing the discriminating, and hence a designated oppressor.

Every new discovery of an oppressed group can bring the egalitarian more supporters in his drive to power, and also creates more “oppressors” to be made to feel guilty. All that is needed to find ever-new sources of oppressors and oppressed is data and computers, and, of course, researchers into the phenomena—the researchers themselves constituting happy members of the Procrustean elite class.[19]

The charm of group egalitarianism for the intellectual-technocratic-therapeutic-bureaucratic class, then, is that it provides a nearly endless and accelerating supply of oppressed groups to coalesce around the egalitarians’ political efforts. There are, then, far more potential supporters to rally around the cause than could be found if only “the poor” were being exhorted to seek and promote their “rights.” And as the cause expands, of course, there is a multiplication of jobs and an acceleration of taxpayer funding flowing into the coffers of the Procrustean ruling elite, a not-accidental feature of the egalitarian drive. Joseph Sobran recently wrote that, in the current lexicon, “need” is the desire of people to loot the wealth of others; “greed” is the desire of those others to keep the money they have earned; and “compassion” is the function of those who negotiate the transfer. The ruling elite may be considered the “professional compassionate” class. It is easy, of course, to be conspicuously “compassionate” if others are being forced to pay the cost.

This acceleration of New Egalitarianism leads, relatively quickly, to inherent problems. First, there is what Mises called “the exhaustion of the reserve fund,” that is, the resources available to be plundered and to pay for all this. As a corollary, along with this exhaustion may come the “backlash,” when the genuinely oppressed—the looted, those whom William Graham Sumner once called the Forgotten Man—may get fed up, rise up and throw off the shackles which have bound this Gulliver and induced him to shoulder the expanding parasitic burdens.

The New Egalitarian Elite

We conclude with one of the great paradoxes of our time: that the powerful and generally unchallenged cry for “equality” is driven by the decidedly inegalitarian aim of climbing on its back to increasingly absolute political power, a triumph which will of course make the egalitarians themselves a ruling elite in income and wealth as well as power. Behind the honeyed but patently absurd pleas for equality is a ruthless drive for placing themselves at the top of a new hierarchy of power. The new intellectual and therapeutic elite impose their rule in the name of “equality.” As Antony Flew tellingly puts it: equality “serves as the unifying and justifying ideology of certain social groups . . . the Procrustean ideal has, as it is bound to have, the most powerful attraction for those already playing or hoping in the future to play prominent or rewarding parts for the machinery of its enforcement.”[20]

In a brilliant and mordant critique of the current ascendancy of left-liberal intellectuals, the great economist and sociologist Joseph Schumpeter, writing as early as World War II, pointed out that nineteenth-century free-market “bourgeois” capitalism, in sweeping away aristocratic and feudal political structures, and challenging the “irrational” role of religion and the heroic virtues in behalf of the utilitarianism of the counting-house, foolishly managed to destroy the necessary protections for their own freemarket order. As Schumpeter vividly puts it: “The stock exchange is a poor substitute for the Holy Grail.” Schumpeter continues:

Capitalist rationality does not do away with sub- or super-rational impulses. It merely makes them get out of hand by removing the restraint of sacred or semi-sacred tradition. In a civilization that lacks the means and even the will to guide them, they will revolt…. Just as the call for utilitarian credentials has never been addressed to kings, lords, and popes in a judicial frame of mind that would accept the possibility of a satisfactory answer, so capitalism stands its trial before judges who have the sentence of death in their pockets. They are going to pass it, whatever the defense they may hear; the only success victorious defense can possibly produce is a change in the indictment.

The capitalist process, Schumpeter adds, “tends to wear away protective strata, to break down its own defenses, to disperse the garrisons of its entrenchments.” Moreover,

capitalism creates a critical frame of mind which, after having destroyed the moral authority of so many other institutions, in the end turns against its own; the bourgeois finds to his amazement that the rationalist attitude does not stop at the credentials of kings and popes but goes on to attack private property and the whole scheme of bourgeois values.

As a result, Schumpeter points out, “the bourgeois fortress becomes politically defenseless.” But,

defenseless fortresses invite aggression especially if there is rich booty in them…. No doubt it is possible, for a time, to buy them off. But this resource fails as soon as they discover that they can have all.

Schumpeter notes that his explanation for rising hostility to free market capitalism at a time when it had brought to the world unprecedented freedom and prosperity, is confirmed by the striking fact that,

there was very little hostility [to free-market capitalism] on principle as long as the bourgeois position was safe, although there was then much more reason for it; it [the hostility] spread pari passu with the crumbling of the protective walls.[21]

At the head and the nerve center of the driving force to take advantage of this bourgeois weakness have been the left-liberal intellectuals, a class multiplied vastly in number by the prosperity of capitalism and particularly by continuing and vast government subsidies to public schools, to formal literacy, and to modern communications. These subsidies not only helped create a huge class of intellectuals, but also have provided them—as well as the  state apparatus—for the first time in history with the tools necessary to indoctrinate the mass of the public at large.[22]  Moreover, since the bourgeois free-market order is deeply committed to the rights of private property, and hence to freedom of speech and the press, by the very principles at the heart of their system, they find it impossible to “discipline” the intellectuals, in Schumpeter’s phrase “to bring the intellectuals to heel.” Thus, the intellectuals, nurtured in the bosom of free-market capitalist society, take the earliest opportunity to turn savagely on their benefactors, “to nibble at the foundations of capitalist society,” and finally to organize a drive for power using their virtual monopoly of the opinion-molding process by perverting the original meaning of such words as “freedom,” “rights,” and “equality.”[23]  Perhaps the most hopeful aspect of this process is that, as the late sociologist Christopher Lasch points out in his new work, the values, attitudes, principles and programs of the increasingly arrogant liberal intellectual elite is so out of sync, so much in conflict, with those of the mass of the American public, that a powerful counter-revolutionary backlash is apt to occur, and indeed at this very moment seems in the process of spreading rapidly throughout the country.[24]

In his sparkling essay, “Equality as a Political Weapon,” Samuel Francis gently chides conservative opponents of egalitarianism for expending a large amount of energy in philosophical, historical, and anthropological critiques of the concept and the doctrine of equality. This entire “formal critique,” however rewarding and illuminating, declares Francis, is really wide of the mark:

In a sense, I believe that it has been beating a dead horse—or more strictly, a dead unicorn, a beast that exists only in legend. The flaw, I believe, is that the formal doctrine of equality is itself nonexistent or at least unimportant.[25]

How so? The doctrine of equality is “unimportant,” Francis explains, “because no one, save perhaps Pol Pot or Ben Wattenberg, really believes in it, and no one, least of all those who profess it most loudly, is seriously motivated by it.” Here Francis quotes the great Pareto:

a sentiment of equality … is related to the direct interests of individuals who are bent in escaping certain inequalities not in their favor, and setting up new inequalities that will be in their favor, the latter being their chief concern.[26]

Francis then points out that “the real meaning” of the “doctrine of equality,” as well as its “real power as a social and ideological force,” cannot be countered by merely formal critiques. For:

the real meaning of the doctrine of equality is that it serves as a political weapon, to be unsheathed whenever it is useful for cutting down barriers, human or institutional, to the power of those groups that wear it on their belts.[27]

To mount an effective response to the reigning egalitarianism of our age, therefore, it is necessary but scarcely sufficient to demonstrate the absurdity, the anti-scientific nature, the self-contradictory nature, of the egalitarian doctrine, as well as the disastrous consequences of the egalitarian program. All this is well and good. But it misses the essential nature of, as well as the most effective rebuttal to, the egalitarian program: to expose it as a mask for the drive to power of the now ruling left-liberal intellectual and media elites. Since these elites are also the hitherto unchallenged opinion-molding class in society, their rule cannot be dislodged until the oppressed public, instinctively but inchoately opposed to these elites, are shown the true nature of the increasingly hated forces who are ruling over them. To use the phrases of the New Left of the late 1960s, the ruling elite must be “demystified,” “delegitimated,” and “desanctified.” Nothing can advance their desanctification more than the public realization of the true nature of their egalitarian slogans.


[1] I realize that specialists on bees or ants will point out divisions of labor among various groups of their species, but I remain unconvinced that any individual ant or bee has a “personality” worthy of being honored, mourned, or denounced.

[2] Thus, the great late-eleventh-century Arab al-Ghazali denounced the idea of coerced equality and sternly warned that any sharing of wealth must be voluntary. See S. M. Ghazafar and A. A. Islahi, “The Economic Thought of an Arab Scholastic: Abu Hamid al-Ghazali (1058-1111),” History of Political Economy 22 (Summer 1990): 381-403.

[3] Antony Flew, The Politics of Procrustes: Contradictions of Enforced Equality (Buffalo, N.Y.: Prometheus Books, 1981), frontispiece.

[4] J. R. Lucas, “Against Equality Again,” Philosophy 52 (July 1977): 255.

[5] Henry C. Simons, Personal Income Taxation (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1938), p. 19.

[6] Richard Nisbet, “The Pursuit of Equality,” The Public Interest 35 (1974): 103, cited in Antony Flew, Politics of Procrustes, p. 20.

[7] Cited in ibid., pp. 22, 187.

[8] The progressive income tax, a favorite device of egalitarians to help equalize incomes, neglects the wealth differential. As a result it is scarcely outlandish for multi-millionaires with relatively low annual incomes to support a progressive tax that would cripple rising young, high-income but low wealth, competitors. Cf. Ludwig von Mises, Human Action, 3rd rev. ed. (Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1966), p. 809.

[9] On the Marxian ideal of abolishing the division of labor, see Murray N. Rothbard, Freedom, Inequality, Primitivism, and the Division of Labor (Menlo Park, Calif.: Institute for Humane Studies, 1971), pp. 10-15 (reprinted 1991 by the Ludwig von Mises Institute); and Paul Craig Roberts, Alienation and the Soviet Economy, 2nd ed (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1990).

[10] Flew, Politics of Procrustes, pp. 11-12, 62.

[11] Frank Parkin, Class Inequality and Political Order (London: Paladin, 1972), p. 183; quoted in Flew, Politics of Procrustes, pp. 63-64.

[12] Murray N. Rothbard, Freedom, Inequality, Primitivism, and the Division of Labor, 2nd ed. (1971; Auburn, Ala.: Ludwig von Mises Institute, 1991); and Rothbard, “Egalitarianism as a Revolt Against Nature,” in Egalitarianism as a Revolt Against Nature and Other Essays (Washington, D.C.: Libertarian Review Press, 1974), pp. 1-13.

[13] Helmut Schoeck refers to the “absolute equality of opportunity that prevails in a game of chance which, as all the players know from the start, can be won only by a very few.” Schoeck points out that “the winner of a jackpot is very little envied. This is because of the real equality of opportunity and that absolute fortuitousness of the method of selecting the winner. A wife will not nag her husband for not having bought the right lottery ticket … no one could seriously suffer from an inferiority complex as a result of repeated failure.” Helmut Schoeck, Envy: A Theory of Social Behavior (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1970), p. 240

[14] Ibid., p. 151.

[15] For penetrating examples of this egalitarian dystopia in fiction, see L. P. Hartley, Facial Justice (London: Humish Hamilton, 1960) and Kurt Vonnegut, Jr., “Harrison Bergeron” (1961), in Welcome to the Monkey House (New York: Dell, 1970), pp. 7-13.

[16] Schoeck, Envy, p. 295.

[17] Martin Buber, Paths in Utopia (Boston: Beacon Press, 1958), pp. 144ff; Schoeck, Envy, pp. 298-99.

[18] It seems to me that what is needed to perceive these relationships is no high-flown “theory,” but only a willingness to part the curtains of obfuscation and see what is actually going on, and to acknowledge that the Emperor has no clothes.

[19] On the new group egalitarianism, see Rothbard, Freedom, Inequality, and Primitivism, and the Division of Labor, pp. 8-15.

[20] Flew, Politics of Procrustes, pp. 11-12.

[21] Joseph A. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy (New York: Harper & Bros., 1942), pp. 137, 143-44.

[22] For an illuminating discussion of the use of such subsidies and technology by the political and media elites to manipulate mass support, see Benjamin Ginsberg, The Captive Public: How Mass Opinion Promotes State Power (New York: Basic Books, 1986), pp. 86-98.

[23] Schumpeter, Capitalism, p. 150.

[24] See Christopher Lasch, ‘The Revolt of the Elites,” Harper’s 289 (November 1994): 39-49.

[25] Samuel Francis, “Equality as a Political Weapon,” Essays in Political Economy 10 (July 1991): 2. The essay was originally delivered as a lecture at the Ludwig von Mises Institute’s conference on “Equality and the Free Society” in April 1991. Also published in Beautiful Losers: Essays on the Failure of American Conservatism (Columbia, Mo.: University of Missouri Press, 1993).

[26] Samuel Francis, Beautiful Losers: Essays on the Failure of American Conservatism, pp. 208-9. The Pareto quote comes from Pareto’s The Mind and Society (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1935), vol. 2, pp. 735-36.

[27] Francis, Beautiful Losers, p. 209.


Murray N. Rothbard (1926–1995) was dean of the Austrian School, founder of modern libertarianism, and academic vice president of the Mises Institute. He was also editor – with Lew Rockwell – of The Rothbard-Rockwell Report, and appointed Lew as his literary executor. See his books.

Riprendersi Giovanni Gentile

La tyrannie démocratique ?...

La tyrannie démocratique ?...

par vMichel Onfray

Ex: http://metapoinfos.hautetfort.com

Nous reproduisons ci-dessous une chronique de Michel Onfray datée du mois de septembre 2014 et cueillie sur son site personnel. Une prise de position, parmi d'autres de l'auteur, qui énerve les aboyeurs stipendiés du système...



La tyrannie démocratique

Pour les besoins d’un travail en cours, je reprends mes fiches sur Platon. Relisant mes notes concernant La République, je tombe sur une critique de la démocratie qui me stupéfie par sa vérité.

La démocratie, c’est sa nature, s’avère le régime le plus à même de donner ses chances à l’exercice de la liberté. Mais, anthropologie oblige, la pente naturelle des hommes consiste à vouloir toujours plus de liberté. Chacun veut pouvoir faire ce qu’il veut, quand il veut, comme il veut, sans se soucier d’autrui. L’autorité passe pour une contrainte inadmissible. Elle est vilipendée, détestée, détruite. Si un chef n’est pas assez docile aux revendications de son peuple, il passe pour un tyran, un dictateur, aujourd’hui on dirait : un fasciste, un stalinien…

Platon écrit qu’une cité de ce genre « loue et honore, dans le privé comme en public, les gouvernants qui ont l’air de gouvernés et les gouvernés qui prennent l’air de gouvernants » (562,d). L’actualité lui donne raison : Giscard se faisant photographier torse nu et velu dans une piscine, jouant au football avec une culotte à manches courtes, Sarkozy filmé lui aussi dans ce genre de culotte devenue bouffante pour son format, suant, transpirant, trempé d’humeurs montrées comme les saintes huiles, Hollande se voulant un président normal et photographié en short et polo sur la plage ou arborant un sourire béat sous une pluie battante pour montrer qu’il mouille sous l’averse comme chacun de ses électeurs, nos présidents veulent montrer qu’ils sont comme tout le monde – poilus, sportifs, en sueur, mouillés par la pluie…

De même les exemples de gouvernés qui prennent l’air de gouvernants ne manquent pas : les joueurs de foot décérébrés, les comédiens incultes, les acteurs narcissiques, les vedettes de télévision, les chanteurs de ritournelles à deux neurones ou les stars du rap se comportent dans la vie comme s’ils étaient des princes, des rois, des empereurs à qui tout est dû.

Il en va de même avec le quidam qui se comporte avec ses semblables comme un Roi dans son royaume : malpoli avec son téléphone portable quand il nous inflige ses conversations indigentes, fonçant dans le troupeau pour s’asseoir à la meilleure place en écrasant un ancien ou en piétinant une femme enceinte, passant devant tout le monde dans une file d’attente, se bâfrant d’une poignée de cerises ou d’un abricot pour goûter avant d’acheter… sans acheter, les exemples ne manquent pas.

Le résultat écrit Platon est « que le père s’accoutume à traiter son fils comme son égal et à redouter ses enfants, que le fils s’égale à son père et n’a ni respect ni crainte pour ses parents, parce qu’il veut être libre, que le métèque devient l’égal du citoyen, le citoyen du métèque, et l’étranger pareillement » (562, e-563, a). Parce que le fils ne craint plus le père ni l’élève son maître, c’est le père qui craint son fils et le maître son élève. La peur qui existait de l’inférieur au supérieur ne disparait pas, elle s’inverse : le supérieur se met alors à craindre l’inférieur. Mais la crainte n’a pas disparu. « Ainsi l’excès de liberté doit aboutir à un excès de servitude, et dans l’individu et dans l’Etat » (564,a). La flatterie devient la règle – la démagogie en est la forme contemporaine. Petit à petit, à force de démocratie, le démocrate fait le lit du tyran.

Impressionnant de vérité…

Michel Onfray (Chronique mensuelle de Michel Onfray, septembre 2014)

lundi, 29 septembre 2014

La contracultura como ideología capitalista

La contracultura como ideología capitalista

Sobre La revolución divertida de Ramón González Ferriz


por José Andrés Fernández Leost 

La contracultura es la cultura de los ricos y bien formados. La rebelión es una tradición del sistema capitalista a la que se premia. Estas dos frases, extraídas de su libro, podrían resumir las conclusiones a las que llega Ramón González Ferriz en La revolución divertida, expresión que emplea para referirse a Mayo del 68 y, por extensión, a todas las «revoluciones culturales» que se ha producido desde entonces en Occidente.

La tesis de fondo no es inédita: apela a la capacidad de adaptación del capitalismo democrático ante las transformaciones socio–morales –encauzadas por los medios de comunicación masivos– deslizando de paso una leve crítica a la generación de los años sesenta{1}. El autor no olvida referirse a las «guerras culturales» que desde hace casi medio siglo enmarcan el debate público, sin cuestionar –y esto es clave– las instituciones políticas. En este sentido, subraya la eclosión de un conservadurismo renovado que, al igual que la izquierda libertaria, construye mitos (los dorados y tranquilos cincuenta) para competir en el mercado de las ideas y venderse mejor. A su vez, el libro tiene la virtud de analizar el caso español, cuyas tendencias tras el fin del franquismo no hacen sino replicar las pautas de transgresión sistémica propias de la cultura pop (verdadero marco ideológico del capitalismo), llegando hasta el 15M.

Pero volvamos al principio, esto es, al 68. Fue entonces cuando alcanzaron visibilidad social temas que en gran parte continúan definiendo la agenda político–mediática del presente (feminismo, ecologismo, homosexualidad…). También cuando se rompió el consenso cristiano–socialdemócrata de postguerra, pero solo para generar otro nuevo, en el que convergen la liberación de las costumbres y la economía de mercado. Así, pese a su fracaso político, el 68 triunfó en la calle puesto que, en lugar de una revolución a la antigua usanza –de asalto al poder–, fue un movimiento de ascendencia artística, más pegado a los beatniks y Dylan que a los tratados de Althusser o Adorno. Los «niños de papa tocados por la gracia» que la protagonizaron (de acuerdo con Raymond Aron) constituían la generación mejor tratada de la historia, legatarios de las políticas bienestaristas implantadas por los De Gaulle, Attlee, Roosevelt, etc., en un contexto de boom demográfico. En vez de tumbar al sistema, la revolución divertida tan solo exigió al cabo, en sintonía con la canción de los Beatles, una apertura («interior») de la mente, un ensanche del consumo de experiencias voluptuosas que no hizo sino expandir el capitalismo. Y actualizar su percepción, que pasó de una imagen conformista a otra bohemia, diferente, cool, gradualmente acomodada a la del «genio informático». Entretanto, las reivindicaciones clásicas de la izquierda se fragmentaron al punto de abandonar la lucha de clases y desplazar el núcleo del debate a un terreno de juego estético, identitario. De puro marketing. En consecuencia, la izquierda quedó varada en el callejón sin salida en el que se metió, defendiendo modelos de vida libertarios al tiempo que reclamaba más Estado. Ello no impidió una reacción –asimismo decorativa– de una derecha puritana que, envalentonada por los medios, ha desembocado en el Tea Party. De este modo, mientras el mainstream ha consolidado una hegemonía cultural sincrética, lúdica, tolerante e individualista, se ha abierto un espacio en los márgenes destinado a la retórica radical, intelectualmente confortable y sin mayor repercusión que la que le concede la moda.

La tardía incorporación de España al sistema de democracias representativas apenas retrasó la adhesión de su sociedad al mismo imaginario. Retrotrayéndose al inicio de la transición, el autor subraya la prevalencia que acaparó la Nueva Ola –corriente postpunk antecesora de la Movida madrileña, sin mayores ambiciones políticas– frente a la izquierda ácrata afincada en Barcelona, más «sesuda» (ciertamente, ni la dimensión hedónica que cultivaba esta corriente casaba con el viejo espíritu cenetista –reflejo de una clara ruptura generacional– ni su maximalismo utópico implicaba efectos institucionales). Sea como fuere, el ajuste de los valores postmodernos a las nuevas estructuras de decisión terminó cuajando con la creación del Ministerio de Cultura, el cual –poniendo en ejercicio el concepto de simulacro de Baudrillard– se convirtió en el mayor patrocinador del anti–establishment toda vez que, al amparo del radicalismo estético, la agitación política quedó desactivada. Es lo que algunos etiquetan como «Cultura de la Transición» que en los ochenta encarnaron mejor que nadie los «intelectuales pop»: un conjunto de personajes vinculados a la socialdemocracia procedentes de la esfera universitaria, literaria o periodística (Tierno, Aranguren, Vázquez Montalbán…) a la que se incorporaron figuras del ámbito artístico, siguiendo la estela del resto de Occidente (Bob Marley, Bono, Manu Chao, etc.). Un fenómeno que –también al igual de lo que sucedió fuera de nuestras fronteras– tendrá su contrapunto ideológico, cuando a mediados de los años noventa el partido conservador alcance el poder en España y los intelectuales de derechas, esgrimiendo asimismo un discurso transgresor («políticamente incorrecto») reciban su cuota de apoyo estatal.

Bajo el signo de una conflictividad ideológico–cultural normalizada, en gran parte abolida, el tramo final del libro repasa los últimos ecos del 68 que resuenan en los albores del siglo XXI, al compás de la antiglobalización, la revolución de las nuevas tecnologías y la crisis financiera. La proximidad de estos acontecimientos no ocultan su «lógica divertida», inofensiva en términos políticos y diáfana a poco que se examinen sus características. De hecho, en el caso del movimiento antiglobalización –que alcanzó su mayor cota de popularidad en las manifestaciones de Seattle y Génova de 1999 y 2001– nos encontramos ante un ideario amorfo e inconsistente, rápidamente fagocitado por el capitalismo cultural, vía productos «indies». Pese a su vocación purista por recuperar la esencia mística del 68 –frente a quienes la traicionaron– la multitud de causas que acumulaba (etnicismo, antiliberalismo, animalismo, etc.) acabó por diluir su congruencia. Tanto más por cuanto la única reivindicación de peso, más o menos compartida, solicitaba una mayor presencia estatal, en detrimento del libertarismo genuino. Quizá más coherencia guarden las batallas abiertas por la revolución cibernética, siempre que se acentúe su naturaleza apolítica. Según subraya González Ferriz, la juventud de los líderes y emprendedores del universo digital{2} se plasma en el entorno laboral que han construido: informal, desprofesionalizado y flexible. Ajeno a la agenda política. Y aunque es verdad que internet ha posibilitado la creación de un espacio capaz de impulsar cambios sociales e incluso intensificar los grados de participación (Democracia 2.0), lo cierto es que los fundamentos del régimen representativo permanecen indemnes, escasamente erosionados por la actividad de plataformas «hacktivistas» como Anonymous o WikiLeaks. En cambio, el impacto de internet se ha dejado notar en el circuito de las industrias culturales, cuestionando el alcance de la propiedad intelectual, fracturando los filtros de autoridad y desarbolando el modelo de negocio establecido. Esta brecha ha introducido una cierta mutación ideológica, en el sentido de que los antiguos progresistas se han convertido en los nuevos conservadores, nostálgicos del viejo orden, mientras que muchos partidarios del libre intercambio de contenidos simpatizan con el libertarismo individualista. Con todo, cabe matizar la magnitud de este fenómeno, en tanto no ha alumbrado un sistema alternativo y el rol de las empresas culturales (editoriales, productoras, etc.) sigue vigente.

Por fin, la última estación del trayecto nos lleva a las manifestaciones del 15M español y al movimiento Occupy, en las que confluyen rasgos de la antiglobalización con el empleo eficaz de tácticas digitales, a través de redes como twitter o facebook. Su instantánea instrumentalización mediática amortiguó la carga de su ideario más auténtico, ligado a la corriente «okupa» y al libertarismo de izquierda de los setenta, aunque también colocó en un primer plano de interés sus planteamientos de base (autogestión, asamblearismo…). No obstante, la heterogeneidad de sus integrantes y la fragilidad de sus referentes teóricos (encarnados en el endeble panfleto de Stéphane Hessel) han acabado por desinflar un fenómeno que tampoco estaba exento de contradicciones. Y es que en su trasfondo –debajo del agotamiento provocado por la crisis económica– nos topamos con una nueva quiebra generacional, protagonizada por una juventud que no busca sino vivir en las mismas condiciones de desahogo y estabilidad que sus padres. Estaríamos por tanto ante una suerte de revolución conservadora, presumible nicho de futuros políticos y empresarios de éxito, llamada a perpetuar en una nueva vuelta de tuerca el «entretenimiento–marco» en el que se desenvuelve la dinámica política occidental. El teatro de su mundo. Quizá el desencanto y la desafección social expresada en las encuestas hacia las principales instituciones (dicho de otro modo: la atracción por la anti–política o el populismo) represente su indicio actual más evidente, síntoma de la enfermedad que supone desconocer la reconfiguración de un mundo emergente más complejo, más rico, con más clases medias y, en consecuencia, más sometido a la presión, al riesgo y a la competencia global por los recursos materiales y energéticos. Pero este otro debate carece de diversión.


{1} Dicho razonamiento encuentra soporte en una creciente bibliografía desmitificadora en la que destacan títulos como Rebelarse vende, de Joseph Heath y Andrew Potter (2004) o La conquista de lo cool (1997), donde su autor, Thomas Frank, ubica en las reconversiones de la industria publicitaria de los años cincuenta–sesenta el germen de la contracultura, detonante del consumismo individualista posterior.

{2} Sus máximos exponentes apenas superaban los 30 años en el momento en el que fundaron sus proyectos.

Fuente: El Espía Digital

Jonathan Bowden: Heidegger

Martin Heidegger

By Jonathan Bowden 

Ex: http://www.counter-currents.com

heidegger-crop Editor’s Note:

The following text is a transcript of Jonathan Bowden’s lecture on Martin Heidegger at the 6th New Right Meeting in London on February 18, 2006. You can listen at YouTube here [2]. If you can make out the passage marked unintelligible, please post a comment below. 

In truth, this is not one of Jonathan’s best lectures, but even Heidegger experts would be hard pressed to deliver a good introduction in one hour. It is, in particular, highly misleading to characterize Heidegger as an “essentialist.” But Jonathan means simply the belief that reality that exists “outside” and “before” the existence of the mind. And indeed, Heidegger so strongly believed this that he rejected even Platonic essentialism as implicitly subjectivist, because it posiys that ultimate reality consists of entities that satisfy our quest for certainty, thus conceiving the world based on the needs of the human subject.  

Martin Heidegger: this talk in some respects is incredibly difficult, because I remember when the elitist Jewish academic George Steiner was asked to do the Fontana Modern Masters on Heidegger, it was because a long series of Oxbridge academics couldn’t do it. They basically couldn’t reduce the extraordinary complexity of, in particular this work, Being and Time, to 100 pages. Because Fontana Modern Masters, as you know, is a students’ sort of “cheat” primer, the sort of thing that people look up on the internet now. And to reduce Heidegger to that is slightly ridiculous. But you also have to provide a sort of middling and upper-middling foregrounding for people to come into the theory anyway, otherwise they’ll be at sea.

Now, what people do when they write Times Literary Supplement, never mind Sunday Times, articles about somebody like Heidegger is they basically talk about his politics; they talk about whether or not he had a mistress; they talk about his early Catholicism; they talk about wraparound and biographical matters, because the theory is amongst the most difficult metaphysical theories written in the last century.

Probably Adorno and Sartre on the ultra-Left—both of whom cross over with certain areas that Heidegger was concerned with, Sartre, biographically never mind anything else—and Heidegger are amongst the most complicated theorists that one can ever imagine. So, before we start on this talk we have to look at what’s happened to Western philosophy in the last hundred years.

Now, for those who read their philosophy at tertiary level in our universities—and tertiary education has been so degraded in many respects through egalitarian discourse that it’s almost meaningless, but for those who do—they know that there are two great clusters in Western academic philosophy: so-called Anglo-American philosophy, and so-called, but essentially actual, European and Continental philosophy.

We grow up, whether we like it or not—because even the Tony Blairs of this world are actually subliminally influenced by these ideas—in an empirical, naturalist, factually-oriented, slightly anti-theoretical current which comes from our alleged and soi-disant Enlightenment. And we come out of essentially an anti-theoretical and an anti-metaphysical discourse which is why something as unbelievably outré as this is literally outside of British and Anglo-concentric thinking in all sorts of ways. For a long time it was said that Being and Time would be untranslatable, and it wasn’t translated until ’62. And don’t forget, the book was written in the ’20s. And it’s translated by two academics, so it’s sort of two-for-one, with Blackwells, a sort of generalized Oxbridge publisher.

Now, what is Continental philosophy trying to do, and why does Anglo-American philosophy think it’s meaningless? Because these are questions that can’t be answered and therefore shouldn’t even be asked, in a Bertrand Russell and Wittgensteinian way of looking at things. Basically, Heidegger is trying, through semi-atheistic and allegedly secular discourse, to arrive at certain ultimate spiritual truths grounded in pure philosophy, and in pure thinking about thinking, even thinking about the thinking of thinking. And he is trying to prove certain cardinal things that, in many ways, gifted adolescents ask, but often as they atrophy into adulthood and early maturity they fall away from. Most people ask, “What’s life for?,” “Is there a God?,” “Is there ultimate purpose?,” “What is death about?,” “Will anything happen to me that can be acknowledged as existing before I die that impinges upon this cardinal event?,” “Why are most people completely oblivious to these issues and are terrified and often in a state of mild anxiety if they come up in general discourse?”

Now, Heidegger is trying to reach real conclusions, grounded philosophical conclusions, about these cardinal matters. Because he believed that Western metaphysics—and this is an incredibly arrogant statement really—that Western metaphysics had gone wrong for 2500 years of falsity and inauthenticity in relation to the primal nature of Being, which he believed is even a category within the notion of being which he calls Being-in-being.

Now, what’s “Being”? The “science” of Being in abstract philosophy is called ontology, and all of his work is about ontology. Now, this slogan behind me which Troy has kindly put up is, in part, a conceit because it says, “Martin Heidegger and Death’s Ontology.” Well you can’t really have an ontology of death, but you can have an ontology of life. But his whole point is to place life, as understood as concrete Being and as phenomenon, before death.

Heidegger is essentially a religious thinker, but he wants to route theoretical and theological energies through pure intellectuality. Why so? Because it is a way into intellectual understanding in the 20th century. Most of the cardinal ideas of the 20th century impinge upon him. And he was taught phenomenology at university by Edmund Husserl, to whom Being and Time is dedicated. In the sort of epigraph/frontal page he says, “Dedicated to Edmund Husserl in friendship and admiration. Black Forest 8th of April 1926.”

Now, many people, sort of undergraduates, people who go on Channel 4 documentaries, say that Martin Heidegger is an existentialist. And he influenced enormously that school, but in actual fact he is not an existentialist, hence the endless intellectual complication. He is as far removed as that, whilst being tangential to it, as one can possibly imagine. Now, he is a radical essentialist of the most primary and foundational form.

Most of the contemporary theory that’s influenced Western university professors and other intellectuals in the last 30 years is based on a particular type of existentialism which is designed, in a way, to get rid of this sort of material even before they start thinking. The idea is that existence is all there is, and existence foregrounds essence. There is no prior essence, there are no ontological variants which could be said to be true before us. Essentially, there is—put crudely and in Sun editorial terms if you can even describe Heidegger in such cultural proximities—they’re saying that God is not just dead, but was always dead and was always a mistake and even the admission of his existence or partial existence was based on a question that shouldn’t be asked, because it was epistemologically false even in the asking of it.

Epistemology is the science, or way, of understanding how one should think: thinking about thinking, if you like. Because in this type of thinking, before you have a thought you must, rather like a surgeon, make sure your tools are all right in order to operate. So you have to think about the thinking you’re going to initiate before you even start thinking.

Now, most Left-wing ideas are based upon the idea that we’re a tabula rasa, that we’re a sheet of paper, that you can write upon it as you want and as you will; that we’re the product of economics, or that we’re the product of social forces or interconnections of the two; there might be a bit of biology but it’s so mediated through socio-economic concerns that it’s lost sight of. Certainly, there are no prior truths to us and our existence. Hence Sartre’s famous essay which was designed to bring Leftist students, and a whole generation of them, many of whom are prominent in the media now and so on, in the Western world into a particular type of thinking. He wrote an essay called Existentialism is a Humanism because ultimately, in a sense, it is, although paradoxically there have been plenty of Right-wing existentialists.

They believe that existence precedes essence; essence is just an idea, is a ghost, is a spook in the machine, is that which is prior, is that which all modern theory rejected when the modern world replaced the medieval world. And in some respects, although it’s a very crude analysis, Heidegger is a super-charged modern who was a return of radically medieval ways of looking at the world; at meaning; at purpose; at will; and at existence in existence as clarified essence. So, in a way he is trying—scribbling away at this chalet he had, made of wood in the Black Forest— to confirm the existence of God, basically. That’s what he’s trying to do with this enormous amount of theory.

When post-structuralism, so-called, became the cardinal intellectual discourse of our universities, pretty much in the 1980s/1990s and subsequently, those theories are based upon the idea which radicalizes even the existentialist project of the ’50s and ’60s. And this is that there is no essential foundation to meaning. I remember a Marxist university professor I know quite well—he teaches at some upgraded poly which is now called a university in London—Malcolm Evans, who wrote a book about Shakespeare called Signifying Nothing, which is a quote from Macbeth of course, so there’s a clever interweaving of texts going on here. But he basically believes that essentialism is dangerous. Because of course, although your average Socialist Worker Party activist, and there’s few of them left, would even think in these terms, it is a totally rival and totally discontinuous and totally oppositional way of thinking. They believe, they begin with man in his predicament and the only way to get out of that predicament is to change one’s environment which creates the nature of that predicament.

Heidegger’s view is that everything is prior, everything is prior, and death is before you. And death, in accordance with essentially his religious nature, is what life is about. In other words, life is about preparing yourself for inexistence.

Now, one of the sort of comets that goes across this constellation which could be said to be Heidegger is Jean-Paul Sartre who did his thesis in Germany, partly during the Nazi period. Sartre, this rather sort of short-sighted ugly man, stooping around, running about, didn’t seem to know what was going on in Germany at this period. Indeed, there were circles of the Left in post-war France who held it against Sartre that he actually studied in Germany during this period, influenced by these sorts of ideas.

Now, Sartre takes these ideas in another direction. So, he doesn’t have a prior essence; that there are things like Beauty with a big “B,” Justice with a big “J,” Truth with a big “T,” and so on, that exist prior to man. He believes that everything is unknown prior to specific consciousness. But you authenticate yourself and the possibility of Being by confronting nothingness and filling the emptiness with volition, in his case by choosing to be an extreme Leftist. Life is utterly meaningless. But one chooses a course for one’s life and for one’s discourse.

And this led him to myopic apoliticism and moping around in German libraries in the 1930s through to Maoism, essentially, because he basically ended up in a sort of Maoist sect before he died in the 1970s. Something which, because Pol Pot of all people passed through some of those Parisian Salons in the 1970s, listening to people like Kristeva and these other post-structuralist theorists, has rather doomed Sartre in post-war and after his death terms, because you can’t claim existentialism as a humanism when one of your moral pupils turns out to be Pol Pot! That’s been a bit difficult, you see.

But you have this extraordinary radicalism in the examples of these two men: Sartre ends up with Mao (put crudely), and Heidegger ends up with Hitler. Because both of them, if you like, begin thinking cardinally about the values of our civilization which, when you think about it logically, would lead them to some of the most radical conclusions, socially, politically, and ideologically, which are possible.

Because this type of intellectuality—and I’m going to read certain sections of it because there is a pretension always to talking about people like Heidegger without dealing with what we’ll call the hard core; you’ve actually got to look at the material which is written in a sedentary way but is written, in a sense, in accordance with the notion of intellectual fury. It’s a belief that all of life and all of meaning can be revealed through mental processes, which I don’t believe is true, but it’s a heroic attempt to do this.

And this sort of language is virtually a system of thinking which has more relationship with artistic ways of describing things, actually. Because Heidegger’s theory is something that you have to experience. Here is a man dwelling upon ultimate questions of whether there is an essence in an essence, of what it means to be you, or this table, or anything that phenomenologically exists. Or, are there realms above us or beneath us or around us? And, how can you answer a moral question with an affirmative statement?

Wittgenstein’s point in Tractatus and after is that ultimately you can’t answer a morally affirmative statement because to do so is meaningless outside language, and language is all that exists, and language is given even only a partial meaning through context. There’s a famous and funny story of Wittgenstein where he’s ferociously berating an American visiting professor at Cambridge and he says, “You can’t make affirmative moral statements,” and he’s waving a poker in his face. And the university professor replies, “Here’s an affirmative moral statement: don’t wave pokers in the faces of visiting professors.” And Wittgenstein hurls the poker into the fire and storms out of the room in a rant.

But these attempts, abstract and very radical though they are, always, like Icarus in a sense, go up and then come down again. Because, mark my words, every politician and every pundit, no matter how low-level, no matter how 200 times beneath this sort of discourse they are, is actually replicating ideas that have come from somewhere and are going somewhere. The reason why—you know, you walk around London today—the world is as it is, is ideological in the broadest of senses. Because a man who has any sort of belief becomes the equivalent of 50 men in action. And Heidegger was a man whose action was theory in this purely Germanic way.

I met a German intellectual once and he said, “Ah, you’re an intellectual,” and he sits down and he looks right into your eyes and you begin the theory. This is a totally un-British sort of way of behaving because there’s no concept of irony in a way, but this idea that you achieve truth through almost a violence of intellectuality, which in a way Heidegger evinces.

Now let’s read something from Being and Time. Now, Being and Time is divided into two books, essentially. The first one is “An Explanation of the Question of the Meaning of Being; The Necessity, Structure and Priority of the Question of Being.”This is whether we can even talk about the nature of talking about the book. We have, “The Necessity for Explicitly Restating the Question of Being,” we have “The Formal Structure of the Question of Being,” we have “The Ontological Priority of the Question of Being,” and we have “The Ontical Priority of the Question of Being.” That takes him 32 pages before he’s even started. You’ve got to clear away all the refuse in your garden before you start, basically.

Part One is “The Interpretation of Dasein in Terms of Temporality,” that means the interpretations of Being in terms of time, andThe Explication of Time as the Transcendental Horizon for the Question of Being.” Then there’s another section about “Being-in-the-world in General as the Basic State of Dasein.” Then there’s a section on “The Worldhood of the World,” by which he means, “Is the world as we appear?” Can we prove that you are actually there? Because it’s actually very difficult from first principles to prove common sense: that I’m speaking to you, that I’m not speaking to myself, that it’s a vision, that I’m talking about things that are endlessly solipsistic, in pure mental processes without being empirical, because this type of theory believes that empiricism distorts because you go down to matter, and so you must keep it totally at a theoretical level. It’s actually quite difficult to prove the idea that everything isn’t an idea, and that even addressing you in this way is an idea, and so on.

“Being-in-the-World as Being-within and Bringing-one’s-Self to the ‘They’.” This is the idea that one approaches the possibility of semi-existence in another, theoretically, before one gets there. Then we have “Being-in as Such.” Intellectual Germans love these little “as suches” and so on. “Care as the Being of Dasein,” now this is the self-reflexiveness of the possibility of Being in being. What does he mean by “Being in being”? He really means the presence of God in life. Really, deep down, in my view, he never left the Jesuits who trained him intellectually, and his thesis was on Duns Scotus; the idea that everything is, essentially, foregrounded before one gets there, theoretically.




Here’s the second book, Division two. “Dasein and Temporality; Dasein’s Possibility of Being-a-Whole and Being-Towards-Death,” which is the real point, to place man in full understanding of it before death.

Now, there’s always with this sort of theory, possibly a sort of alienation effect. But the way to look at it is there are few moments of profundity in most individual’s lives, but one of them is that period when one is probably pretty conscious that one is waiting for death. And it’s going to happen to all of us, you and me, and in some ways the way to overcome the sort of innate philistinism that exists about this pure, pure theory is to put yourself in that position. Because Heidegger’s work is a man in early life in full consciousness of radical mental gifts, thinking about what it means to die before you get there, and not responding at the level of emotion. Although I believe personally that all theory is physically based and comes out of the emotions as part of one’s physicality, but let’s not intrude my ideas too much.

Another section is “Dasein’s Attestation of an Authentic Potentiality-for-Being, and Resoluteness.” Another section is “Dasein’s Authentic Potentiality-for-Being-a-Whole, and Temporality as the Ontological Meaning of Care.” Then there’s a section on “Temporality and Everydayness.” By this time we’ve got up to page 421, by the way. Then there’s a section on “Temporality and Historicality,” and then there’s a section on “Temporality and Within-Time-ness as the Source of the Ordinary Conception of Time.” Then there’s some dealings with other theorists who are rather brushed away at the end, Hegel in particular.

The last section of all, which is Section 83, around pages 436–486, is “The existential-temporal analysis of Dasein, and the question of fundamental ontology as to the meaning of Being in general.” This is the moment when he wants to place man before death, self-aware of the nature of authentic existence.

As a critique of all this sort of material Adorno—in some respects his chief ideological nemesis on the other side—wrote a book called The Jargon of Authenticity which is an attack upon this type of thinking. Adorno is one of the key thinkers in what’s called Western Marxism and the Frankfurt School.

Now, here is a section on death, because it’s all essentially about death. “Underlying this biological-ontical exploration of death,” that just means the biological exploration of death, “is a problematic that is ontological.” That concerns the science of Being. “We still have to ask how the ontological essence of death is defined in terms of that of life. In a certain way, this has always been decided already in the ontical investigation of death. Such investigations operate with preliminary conceptions of life and death, which have been more or less clarified.” That’s in the last 290 pages which I’ll forebear from reading out. “These preliminary conceptions need to be sketched out by the ontology of Dasein.” Which is Being in being. “Within the ontology of Dasein, which is superordinate to an ontology of life, the existential analysis of death is, in turn, subordinate to a characterization of Dasein’s basic state. The ending of that which lives we have called ‘perishing.’ Dasein too ‘has’ its death, of the kind appropriate to anything that lives.” Basically he’s asking here, does what traditionalist orders have called the soul survive death? “And it has it, not in ontical isolation, but as codetermined by its primordial kind of Being. In so far as this is the case, Dasein too can end without authentically dying, though on the other hand, qua Dasein, it does not simply perish. We designate this intermediate phenomenon as its ‘demise.’” Then there’s a large footnote which I’ll forebear from going into because it’s printed in point 6, I think. “Let the term ‘dying’ stand for that way of Being in which Dasein is towards its death.” Auxiliary footnote. “Accordingly we must say that Dasein never perishes. Dasein, however, can demise only as long as it is dying.” So, he’s talking about the death of the concept of the soul which is self-aware of the possibility of that moment. “Medical and biological investigation into “demising” can obtain results which may even become significant ontologically if the basic orientation for an existential interpretation of death has been made secure.” Ah ha! “Or must sickness and death in general—even from a medical point of view,” Notice: “medical point of view.” Physical stuff which we keep out of sight. “Be primarily conceived as existential phenomena?”

The first thing that strikes you about this is his attitude towards death. You walk round a death ward in a hospital—you know they’re all about to give out—most people’s response is physical and emotional, the one and the other. He regards that as bourgeois deviation; even as filth. Always keep your theory before you because that’s how you apprise the nature of that which is real as against that which is mere appearance, and that which is governed by dread.

In the 1960s the counter-culture, that had many tendencies which ultimately tended overwhelmingly to the Left regardless of this, had the notion that life was not as it should be or could be. That there needed to be a spiritual dimension to human beings that had been lost sight of given the collapse of the Christian religion. And I take it as unarguable that in our civilization in the last hundred years, in accordance with what it once was, in the West largely, with the odd exception, individual and group, the Christian religion has collapsed. And it’s collapsed amongst the most advanced thinkers of our civilization and racial or ethnic group from early in the 19th century. Or at least they were aware of the possibility of its mass collapse long before it became a sociological phenomenon. This is why this theory, which ultimately has had much more impact in theology than it has in philosophy, has been put in this particular way.

When the Renaissance occurred in our thinking one of the great criticisms of the philosophical schools that preceded it, of which Duns Scotus was an accredited master, was that they were dealing with things that could never be proved at this level of reality, even theoretically. And the slogan that’s used is that they were debating the number of angels that could dance on the head of a pin. And it was all utterly pointless, and we had to get away from all that.

Now, Heidegger wants to go back there, up to a point, but in actual fact he wants to go even further back. He wants to go back to the pre-Socratics, he wants to go back to the Sophists, he wants to go back to the original and primary Greek thinkers that begin the process two-and-a-half thousand years ago, which is why Nietzsche obsessed him. Because, if you like, Nietzsche stands half way between this radical essentialist/quasi-religious thinking, that there is before you nothing but God, and God in all and God for all, and you’re part of Him. Which, if you sacralize this language, begins to make sense of what Being is, what Being-in-being is, what Being-in-being before all being is, and so on. It’s, if you like, a re-rooted theological language use. There’s that position. And prior traditionalists who have Right-wing views largely accord philosophically and psychologically with this area.

Nietzsche, who’s a figure who obsessed Heidegger of course, and who has this enormous theoretical explosion at the end of the 19th century, just preceding the emergence of people like Husserl, Jaspers and Heidegger, in early 20th century Germanic thinking at a high philosophical level. Don’t forget, Anglo-American philosophy almost denies the possibility of metaphysics. Bertrand Russell would say, if he were sat at the back, which is a bit difficult considering he’s been a corpse for about thirty years, “It’s all meaningless. It’s an interesting talk but it’s about things that can’t be proved at any level and is therefore pointless. Because your view is as good as his, as good as so and so’s. The only difference is people can put it better, or worse. But there can be no grounded truth that I can grasp and put social practice and purpose to.”




Now, Nietzsche stands halfway between the Left existentialist view, that there’s nothing prior, that, put very simply, we make it up as we go along.

Baudrillard, a French intellectual, wrote a book in the 1990s saying that the first Gulf war was just a computer game; it didn’t happen. Didn’t happen, it was just a discourse. All those cluster bombs and stealth bombs and so on, it was just a fantasy in a televisual age: one man’s discourse, you see?

In an age of extreme relativism, which is the almost opposite of this absolutist theory, totalitarian theory, which is actually, mentally what it is, we see the division between what exists now and the reasons for some of the very controversial, certainly in the mainstream, political choices that Heidegger made in the middle of his life in Germany in the thirties.

Now, Nietzsche’s position is that there is a prior, there is an essence, but Nietzsche is a partial to semi-absolute existential thinker. Because Nietzsche’s contribution to modernity and to modern intellectual thinking is there may be things which may be prior, but we don’t know what they are, and we have to test them through struggle, through life, through will and purposiveness, and various levels of what he called Will to Power which he believed was the basis of all lived existence.

So, Nietzsche says God is dead partly to say he’s a militant atheist but partly to say that the idea of God in the minds of men has died, which means that theoretically it may not have completely died but is in a point of collapse. Because the point is to test and to rearrange, and you put up a view and I will attack it because life is struggle. And in that struggle comes out the possibility of meaning. Nietzsche would say, “There is a truth but I don’t know it yet.” There is a degree to which ontological circumstances cannot be proved but are not rendered prior meaningless, which is why Nietzsche approaches nihilism, the belief that there is no purpose and no values and no constraints and no morals that aren’t purely human, and that there is nothing outside. Which, of course, makes it very difficult to run any sort of a civilization because there are no lines.

And Nietzsche stands halfway between what you might call this existential Leftist praxis and Heidegger. Nietzsche’s become extremely fashionable on the Left in the last thirty years and there’s lots of post-modernist books by people like Deleuze and Guattari, and these sorts of people, who love the element of Nietzsche that tears down—“I come as a destroyer!”—because in order to create you’ve got to destroy first, you’ve got to level off a bit. There’s ruins around you, so you give them a bit of a push.

All of Nietzsche’s thinking before Zarathustra, when he begins to vouchsafe his own view, if you like, is largely a tearing down: a tearing down of the normative nature of ethics in The Genealogy of Morals; tearing down of the idea of truth itself; an erection of science in works like The Dawn or The Joyful Wisdom/The Gay Science; and then a tearing down of the idea of science; a playing up of certain Darwinian and evolutionary ideas which Nietzsche’s actually quite suspicious of because, he doesn’t think that life and circumstances are linear at all, he believes they’re circular and everything that was comes back again. He thinks that Darwinists are cretinous materialists and shallow optimists. Look at people around you. Are they progressing and moving upwards or are they just dullards led by a few people at the top who manipulate them?

Now, Heidegger made a radical, possibly the most radical, choice philosophically and politically in the century that’s just passed. Admittedly, he was living in Germany at a time when, if the Left-liberal consensus would have it, the most controversial regime in the 20th century came to power. Now, if you were in other races or in other societies you would actually refute that, you’d say that Stalin’s or Lenin’s or Mao’s or various other regimes were more important. You could argue that the most important regime in the 20th century is the American one. But put all that on another table for today.

Heidegger decided in 1933 to join the Nazi Party, to join the National Socialist German Workers Party and gave lectures for a year in his university in full Nazi uniform;[1] and was involved with all of the party Gauleiters and other figures in his area to the shock and horror and consternation of much of the academic elite that he was associated with. And don’t forget that Heidegger did this for purely speculative and theoretical reasons. Heidegger had no concern with doctrines of race, no concerns with doctrines of conspiracy, no concerns with politics at all. Politics was irrelevant in relation to placing man before death, which is what life was about. And what he loved about this movement was that he thought it was a primordial movement that was bringing back, almost in an occultistic way, the partiality towards death, and in some ways it was bringing back the ancient world with modern technology. That’s why he reached out to it.

Now, he regarded democracy, just like middle-brow secular humanism, as a deviation. Because in a sense his nature is so primordially prior and religious that he considers almost all normal life to be irrelevant: family, having a good time, pleasure, pleasure as a principle for life, which in liberal theory is cardinal. The American constitution talks about liberty, talks about property, talks about happiness. Heidegger doesn’t think the purpose of life is happiness; the purpose of life is death and facing ontology. But he doesn’t put it in the vocabulary that you must fall before the one who is on the cross and who bleeds for us because, in a sense, Heidegger just increasingly sees those as forms of metaphysics for metaphysics, stuff that needs to be put out of the way so that one can concentrate on the cardinal things of life, death, spirituality, and the possible existence of God.

“God”, as he told Paul Celan when they met in ’67, “has always been with me.” Celan is interesting of course, a Jewish poet who wrote in German for which he was condemned by his own group and converted to Catholicism because of Heidegger’s influence. And that was not a sectarian influence, because Heidegger was totally uninterested in what sect people were in, and so on. These were all forms that have no importance.

And in some ways there’s a great paradox, because Heidegger’s thinking is so purely, transcendently extreme that he’s one of the few figures where the pagan/Christian split in our civility doesn’t really mean anything to him. This is one of the things that interests me very much about him. With this Right-wing group, for example, a few Christians turned up early, they went, and it’s largely pagan in orientation. In the New Right in Europe, and so on, you have this very great split between the two. Heidegger’s almost totally unconcerned with those things because the forms that people worship Being in being through are incidental to placing man before ontological prerequisites.

His view is that you base life and society upon the profound thinking that will impinge upon a man of full consciousness, not [unintelligible] debilitated, before his moment of death. And that’s why he joined the Nazi Party. That’s why virtually no one could understand why he’d joined it, because he was totally sort of unorthodox in ideological terms because he had very little interest in that.

After a year he realized that: 1. Put crudely, they didn’t understand what he was on about. 2. That he was having to make political decisions in the university, the library, its use and so on that he didn’t agree with. And he fell away. He left the Party then[2] and continued to teach in the university until 1945. In ’45 he was proscribed by the de-nazification tribunals that were set up in the Western Allied zones. Now, he was forbidden from teaching in post-war Germany even though all sorts of people had him as a guest lecturer, so they used to get round it that way. And you have this strange situation where he became a sort of moral and spiritual leper in post-war Germany, and yet he was extremely respected. So Dr. Heidegger, Professor Heidegger, was everywhere. But at the same time he didn’t even have a university post.

And there’s all sorts of interesting things because Husserl taught him, and because Husserl was a Jew he was banned from the university library, but after the war Heidegger was banned from the library. And Jaspers wrote to educational authorities in Germany saying he shouldn’t be given a post. So you have all of this as well.

There was a play a couple of weeks ago on the BBC by John Banville, an Irish writer, about Heidegger that was very interesting. And it’s a dramatization, because all dramatists are interested in dialectic. They’re interested in two minds if it’s a theoretical play of any sort, two minds coming together that disagree, and the tension and the charge and the flow of energy that occurs between those two minds, and whether you can make a narrative out of it that can be listened to from beginning to end. And it’s this talk in his hut in the Black Forest.

Because, very interestingly, there is almost inevitably a monastic element to Heidegger. Heidegger is into the woods in primal inner Germany. To sit there in the middle of this forest and dwell upon death. And write a book of 450 pages of—to certain Anglo-Saxon minds—sheer intellectual torture, virtually, in order to get nearer to the truth that is the truth that is the truth, that will not set you free but release you to die with some dignity. Because that’s the only truth that matters. And there’s a sort of divine element to it in a way because it’s so near to the inexpressible.

Artistically, of course in a blowback sense, it’s had an enormous influence on novelists in Germany like Hermann Broch, who wrote The Death of Virgil, and wrote a book called The Sleepwalkers, and so on. And this extraordinary capacity for intellectual abstraction that many German writers have, that begin with a relatively straightforward narrative and then lurch off into ultimate speculative questions, is very much influenced by this type of theory.

But I don’t think people who are illiberal can understand the shock in liberal intellectual elitist circles of a man like Heidegger joining the Nazi party. It is actually emotionally slightly difficult to describe it. From a sort of BBC view of culture it is the worst thing, and not just the worst thing but beyond the worst, that one could do. This man of supreme intellectual gifts dwelling alone in his Shavian hut in the woods dwelling on the ontology of death in life in death in life in death in life—do you see what I mean?—joins, what they considered to be, a barbarous wrecking crew. And they’re appalled, they’re utterly morally appalled. And since the war people have not really known what to do with Heidegger at all.




And because, in a sense, his theory is an attempt to bring back a different version of the West’s civilization, most people who were on the side politically that he associated with, albeit only for a period, didn’t know how to make use of him either, in a strange sort of way. That’s why he’s this sort of illisible figure. It’s noticeable in Tomislav Sunic’s book on the New Right, for instance, Heidegger in a way can’t be integrated. It’s a sort of cigarette on the paper that burns through to the other side. He really is in a zone on his own.

And what’s he trying to do? He’s trying to see whether human beings can live authentically. There’s a moment in Nietzsche’s letters early on in his theoretical course/development/prognosis after the first text, Birth of Tragedy, when he describes seeing a goatherd killing a goat on a hill—I think it’s in Italy—and it’s what James Joyce would call an epiphany. It’s a moment of total, in his terms, authentication and realization. It’s a poetic moment. It’s what certain natures call a perfect moment. A moment that certain consciousnesses will look at before they die as the one moment that was perfect: the sky, and the goat, and the man, and the soil, and the sun. And, essentially, it’s a religious moment; it’s a sort of cosmotheist moment, in a way.

And Heidegger’s point is to get people to experience such moments, which is why he writes this enormous theory to try and intellectually prepare people for the possibility of having such moments. Which is why, of course, when people try and stimulate themselves to have such moments. They chant; they sing; they starve themselves; they go without; they live ascetically; they do things to alter consciousness. In a sense he just deals with pure consciousness because he doesn’t, almost, relate to the physical level at all.

But it is an attempt to go back to what many Western and Indo-European theorists have believed was cardinal at the beginning of Greek culture. It’s Nietzsche’s view and it’s other people’s view that the Greek tragedians—the great three, Aeschylus, Sophocles and Euripides—that there is a “decadence,” in a sense.

Aeschylus is the most hieratic, the most removed from everyday, the most transcendental, the most ur-ascending.

Sophocles is not a humanist by any means—there’s the matter of the Theban plays, of course—but it’s a step down from that sense of mystery, that sense of sheer awe. We now live in a society without any sense of the sacred at all, as de Benoist has pointed out. It’s virtually void.

And a level down in this trajectory involving the Greek tragic writers is Euripides. He’s hardly writing soap opera, but the gods and the goddesses are seen almost, if not level with human beings, then as superhumans who are just a couple of levels up. But they relate to each other, they fight with each other, they make love to each other, and all this sort of thing, in a way which is recognizably humanesque.

And, in a way, you could metaphoracizse it, because with theory like this that’s all you really can do, certainly in a talk of this nature. Those prior moments when Aeschylus looks at the divine—because don’t forget Western theatre begins with religious ritual and gradually separates itself out—it begins with a monologue, and then Aeschylus has the idea this is going on a bit too long, so we’ll split it and we’ll have a duologue, and the two consciousnesses talk to each other. And in that you have the tension with which you can sustain drama in our culture, in any culture.

Now, in this theatricalization of this meeting in the hut in the woods where he wrote Being and Time and where he wrote other books on Greek tragedy and on Nietzsche, Celan and Heidegger have this talk. And this is Banville dreaming. But this type of theory is actually quite close to forms of artistic creation; forms of higher, non-entertainment based spiritual creation in art forms. And Celan says, “Why did you join the Nazi Party?” And Heidegger replies, “Because they were the one movement of the 20th century that, in my terms, had a tragic view of life. That had a view of life which is actually the motif and the inner essence—Dasein—of the Greek tragedians taken up to date two and a half thousand years later.” And I think that’s essentially a truthful statement.

He gave an interview to the Spiegel magazine after his death, in the sense that it was recorded before his death but could only be published as part of his will and settlement after his demise. I think it was published about three, four weeks after he died. And they ask him, because it was a very adversarial interview while he was alive, post-dated as I say, about why he’d joined, why he did this, why he did that, and so on. And in actual fact there’s lots of evasion and attempts at exculpation and bringing in all the usual things, and even though political correctness wasn’t a buzzword then, he’s in some ways playing games. He’s like a politician on the defensive.

But in actual fact, as often with art in my view, you’ve got to cut to the truth suddenly through all sorts of layers, even if the person never said it, it can actually illuminate because it crystallizes in a form the value of something. And when he says to Celan, with no one there, in this fantasy. Because Celan didn’t go and see him in that hut for nothing, just so he could put his name in Heidegger’s signature book, “I’ve been up to the professor’s lodge.” People at this sort of level don’t do those sorts of things. He wanted to know why, as George Steiner said, one of, if not the most, advanced theoretical minds of the Western civilization in the 20th century adopted this particular course.

And he did it because he believed that you cannot have a society where death has no meaning, because life has no meaning. And you cannot have a society which bases itself upon the absence of the religious urge, however you define that urge and whatever system you use. Because if you do the reverse you will end up with a society which has two values beyond subsistence. And that could be seen in the title of a grubby play produced in London a couple of years ago called Shopping and Fornication. But that is all that life is, if you do not have spiritual levels based upon that.

People will always be completely divided about the forms and the language that they use to talk about cardinal matters. But in a way, in a quite moving way really, Heidegger is attempting to get people to face in early modernity what it means to have a civilization and, not to be human, but to live with profound and real meaning. There’s no doubt that this theoretical postulation and this extreme abstraction is quite alien to certain elements of the Western civilization, certainly our own quadrant of it during the last couple of hundred years. But it is an attempt, not to aestheticize life, but to place life, ultimately, at the service of God, even and most especially for people who either don’t believe in him or can only approach such numinence through endless tiers of theory.

Thank you very much!


[1] Heidegger was not a member of the SA or SS. Therefore, he did not have a “Nazi uniform.”—Ed.

[2] Heidegger resigned from the Rectorate but did not resign from the party. He remained a member until the end in 1945.




Article printed from Counter-Currents Publishing: http://www.counter-currents.com


URL to article: http://www.counter-currents.com/2014/09/martin-heidegger/


URLs in this post:

[1] Image: http://www.counter-currents.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/heidegger-crop.jpg

[2] here: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=R2H2xSluh-o


samedi, 27 septembre 2014

Il "Tramonto" di Spengler. Alba del (neo) pessimismo

spen9256595.jpgL'opera che più di tutte accompagnò la prima guerra mondiale e che dette il nome alla letteratura della crisi che poi ne seguì, in realtà fu scritta prima del conflitto. Era infatti il 1914, giusto cent'anni fa, quando Oswald Spengler concluse Il tramonto dell'Occidente; poi quel titolo divenne l'epigrafe del dopoguerra e il suo compendio, almeno mitteleuropeo. L'opera vide la luce sul finire della prima guerra mondiale e fu un trionfo di vendite e commenti. Uscì in ritardo per via della guerra, e questo permise a Spengler di rielaborare alcune pagine e aggiungere nuovi particolari. Tuttavia era stata scritta e pensata non alla luce della guerra e del suo esito, ma prima, in uno sguardo epocale alle civiltà del passato e del presente. Per l'avvenire Spengler prevedeva lo scontro finale fra la dittatura del denaro e la civiltà del sangue, del lavoro e del socialismo. Alla fine, vaticinava, la spada trionferà sul denaro perché una potenza può essere rovesciata solo da una potenza.

In fondo la profezia fu azzeccata se consideriamo che poi andarono al potere comunismo sovietico, fascismo e nazionalsocialismo. Spengler aveva visto lontano; ma non lontanissimo. La rivolta del sangue contro l'oro, del lavoro contro il capitale, fu infatti spazzata via da guerre, tragedie e fallimenti, almeno in occidente. E dopo il conflitto tra politica ed economia, il denaro restò a dominare incontrastato. Ma dietro il denaro, notava Spengler, è la tecnica che prima serve l'uomo faustiano ma poi lo assoggetta. Il dominio della tecnica, previde Spengler, «detronizzerà pure Dio». A L'Uomo e la tecnica Spengler dedicò un penetrante saggio, parallelo e divergente rispetto all' Operaio di Ernst Jünger che vide la luce poco dopo. Spengler non nascose però una certa ammirazione per il cesarismo tecnico e finanziario e per i suoi militi: ingegneri, inventori, imprenditori. Nessuna lettura cent'anni fa seppe essere così profetica come quella di Spengler. La storia per Spengler è una costellazione di mondi conclusi chiamati civiltà, ciascuna obbedisce al suo sistema di valori, retto da un determinismo ferreo; ma ciascun sistema è poi relativo rispetto agli altri e al tempo; sicché conosce l'alba, l'apice e il tramonto. Una civiltà è assoluta al suo interno, ma non eterna.

Come per i marxisti, anche per Spengler la teoria è al servizio della prassi, il pensiero è al servizio della storia. La comune matrice è nel Faust di Goethe: «In principio fu l'azione». In Marx prende corpo il soggettivismo rivoluzionario nel nome di Prometeo, in Spengler il soggettivismo eroico nel nome della civiltà faustiana. Ma quando la rivolta del sangue contro l'oro prese corpo in Germania col nazionalsocialismo, Spengler prese le distanze da Hitler e dal suo partito: «Volevamo liberarci dei partiti ma è rimasto il peggiore». Il razzismo per lui è «un'ideologia del risentimento verso la superiorità ebraica» e denota «povertà spirituale». Non fece in tempo a vedere cosa sarebbe poi accaduto perché morì nel '36. Anche Hitler non si professava seguace di Spengler e rifiutava l'idea del Tramonto dell'Occidente. Il regime nazista osteggiò il filosofo. Grande accoglienza ebbe invece Spengler nell'Italia fascista, verso cui nutrì un giudizio positivo ed esprimendo anche in dediche ammirazione al suo duce. Mussolini leggeva Spengler, lo recensì, fece tradurre Anni della decisione (che ristampai negli anni Ottanta) e, come notò De Felice, si fece sempre più spengleriano anche in polemica antitedesca. Trovò in Spengler l'elogio dei popoli giovani, dello spirito mediterraneo e della romanità.

Ma gli idealisti italiani, a cominciare da Croce, considerarono Spengler un dilettante. E per i cattolici era un autore intriso di paganesimo e privo di apertura trascendente. Il Dizionario di Filosofia della Treccani liquidò Spengler come pseudofilosofo (l'autore della voce era Felice Battaglia). Lo apprezzò invece Evola che poi tradusse Il tramonto dell'Occidente (De Felice definì curiosamente Evola «mistico spengleriano») e lo ammirarono Giuseppe Rensi e Adriano Tilgher, Lorenzo Giusso e Vittorio Beonio Brocchieri. Nella cultura italiana più recente ha prevalso la lettura di Furio Jesi che ridusse Spengler a un protonazista, un barbaro erudito, ostile alla cultura nel nome della vita; ispiratore del linguaggio radicale delle «idee senza parole».

A prenderlo sul serio fu Theodor Adorno che definì stupefacenti le sue prognosi e lo ritenne un Machiavelli del '900. «Spengler - scrive Adorno che pure altrove lo giudicò uno sprovveduto - appartiene a quei teorici dell'estrema reazione la cui critica al liberalismo in molti punti si è rivelata superiore a quella progressista». All'idea spengleriana di decadenza e destino, Adorno oppose l'idea marxista di utopia rivoluzionaria. Heidegger lo ammirava ma rifiutava il suo storicismo. Thomas Mann restò impressionato dalla potenza del Tramonto, un affresco grandioso che egli definì «un romanzo intellettuale», paragonando Spengler a Schopenhauer.

In effetti Spengler fu un pensatore tragico e al pessimismo dedicò un intenso saggio (che curai insieme ad altri suoi saggi raccolti in Scritti e pensieri, editi da Sugarco). Un pessimismo storico preludio al fatalismo eroico. Spengler era pessimista nell'indole prima che nella teoria. Dietro la sua durezza prussiana e l'elogio dell'acciaio batteva un cuore delicato, incline alle lacrime, di salute cagionevole; era un solitario malinconico come rivela il suo scritto autobiografico A me stesso (Adelphi). Visse in ristrettezze, coi lasciti di un'eredità famigliare che la crisi economica falcidiò. Spengler cercò di tradurre in visione storica il pensiero di Nietzsche e l'arte di Goethe; condusse Zarathustra in battaglia, portando nella storia la Volontà di potenza e l'Eterno Ritorno, il Superuomo e l'Amor fati. Ma restò il profeta della decadenza dell'Occidente (cantò la gloria dei tramonti e l'onore delle sconfitte), più che il veggente precursore della rinascita. Il pessimismo tragico ingoiò il suo banditore. In realtà il pensiero di Spengler fu divorato dalla sua stessa suggestione faustiana.

Il mito di Faust, analogo al mito di Prometeo del giovane Marx, condusse il pensiero spengleriano al naufragio: perché il faustismo alla massima potenza (come il prometeismo scatenato) era la Tecnica unita alla Finanza, e il loro nichilismo compiuto avrebbe spazzato il faustismo epico ed eroico figurato da Spengler, retaggio romantico delle civiltà precedenti. Faust vendette l'anima al diavolo, e il faustismo rubò l'anima a Spengler, lasciandogli in cambio l'aura melanconica del profeta perdente.

(Il Giornale, 11/08/2014)

vendredi, 26 septembre 2014

Norbert Elias. Civilización y Psicogénesis

philosophie,sociologie,norbert elias

Norbert Elias. Civilización y Psicogénesis

por Francisco Díaz de Otazu

Ex: http://www.arbil.org 

El autor presenta un comentario sobre una obra clásica de la sociología. No pretende hacer juicios de valor sobre el autor y el libro estudiado, si no ofrecer un análisis que permitar digerir, para el lector no especializado, parte de una materia relacionada con la vida cotidiana cuya importancia humanísitca no está en sintonía con el interés que ha despertado fuera de medios académicos. Hay otros sociólogos además de Max Weber y Marvin Harris. Y hay temas, como la difusión del tenedor, o los escrúpulos y la vergüenza, que han merecido otras consideraciones que la anécdota gruesa

philosophie,sociologie,norbert eliasNorbert Elias ( 1897, Alemania -1990, Holanda) sociólogo judío-alemán cuyo trabajo se concentró en la relación entre poder, comportamiento, emoción y conocimiento.

Estudió inicialmente Medicina, pero la joven Elias no le satisfacía el concepto de “homo clausus” y el mecanicismo material, interesándole más la ciencia social humana. Más tarde Filosofía y Sociología en Breslau, (su ciudad natal, en la Silesia prusiana, es hoy Wroclaw, por completo polaca), Friburgo y Heidelberg. Allí había un importante círculo de sociología que se ocupó de ordenar y editar en formato de libro los ensayos de Max Weber en torno a su viuda (+1920). Entre sus compañeros y profesores se cuentan: Kart Manhein, Alfred Weber, el hermano de Max, con el que tropezará intelectualmente, Husserl y Jaspers. Será Manhein su mentor preferido.

Su tesis versará sobre la idea del individuo en relación con la sociedad en una dialéctica de acción-estructura. Aislados uno del otro, ambos conceptos no son comprensibles. Se apunta la “figuración/sociología figuracional” y su interés en las relaciones humanas, que marcará toda su obra. Con ocasión de ella se enfrenta a las categorías a priori kantianas, considerando que antes de la experiencia humana, nada existe. 

 Vivió en su propia carne el drama de la Iª Guerra Mundial como soldado voluntario, junto con toda su promoción colegial, y en 1933, ante el nazismo y las limitaciones al trabajo de los intelectuales judíos, emigró a Francia y posteriormente, en 1938, a Gran Bretaña. Su padre muere en circunstancias imprecisas, y en 1941 su madre morirá en el campo de concentración de Auschwitz. A sus padres dedica precisamente el libro central de su obra.

En su exilio con gran precariedad económica fue protegido por círculos de solidaridad judía. En cierta medida se puede ver un tributo en parte de su perfil a cierta facción del pensamiento judío cercano al sionismo clásico (Leo Löwenthal, Gershom Scholem) aunque con matices.

Pasó dos años en París. En general Elias vivió alejado de los medios académicos y sólo desde 1954 será catedrático de Sociología en Leicester, aunque ejerció la docencia en universidades de varios países (Ghana, Holanda, Alemania). Entre sus alumnos se cuenta al sociólogo inglés Anthony Giddens, con consecuencias poco relevantes, mientras que su principal heredero ha sido Eric Dunning. Escribió también obras poéticas y narrativas entre las que se cuenta La balada del Jacob pobre, inspirada en una experiencia real de persecución y desprecio, la suya. De alguna manera, la "deconstrucción" que su pensamiento supone para con las lógicas modernas -naturalizadas socialmente- tiene que ver con la experiencia; al igual que como Hannah Arendt se preguntó por las bases de la humanidad.

Entre 1930 y 1933 trabajó como asistente de Karl Mannheim en Fráncfort del Meno, en el mismo edificio en que trabajaban Adorno y Horkheimer. Debido a lo anterior, existe alguna confusión en relación a la influencia que pudo ejercer la Escuela de Fráncfort en el pensamiento de Elias. Fue un decidido crítico de la sociología tradicional, inclinada a la elaboración de modelos estáticos, como el de Talcott Parsons, y tendencias de grupo.   

Iniciada ya en 1936, en 1939 publicó en alemán, pero en Suiza, tardará mucho en aparecer en inglés, El proceso de civilización –la edición concreta que manejamos es de 1987, naturalmente con modificaciones respecto a la 1ª ed., encabeza la bibliografía ofrecida, y a ella se refieren las citas abreviadas-, sin que llegara ciertamente a la atención del público, en parte por su condición de judío y en parte por su renuncia a formar parte de grupos doctrinarios. En los 70 surge del anonimato (en 1976 se tiraron 100.000 ejemplares en edición de bolsillo de la obra que nos ocupa),  En 1977 Elias recibió el Premio Adorno en Frankfurt. Una tardíamente reconocida voz que debía ser escuchada por las Ciencias Sociales, especialmente por la Historia, hasta ser considerado uno de los sociólogos más importantes del siglo XX, teniendo tiempo de ver reconocida su obra antes de su muerte a los 93 años de edad.

Fue sobresaliente su excepcional interés en comprender por qué los humanos se comportan como lo hacen, lo cual se hace evidente en el conjunto de su obra con títulos como: La sociedad cortesana, La sociedad de los individuos o La soledad de los moribundos; de la cual es pieza maestra El proceso de civilización, en la que realiza un elaborado análisis del “desarrollo histórico a largo plazo” que da lugar a una teoría de la civilización o del desarrollo social. Walter Benjamin, según Juan Carlos Jurado (1) se negó a prologar su obra, al considerar que contradecía la dialéctica marxista. Norbert Elias incide en la imposibilidad de separar el tiempo físico del social y en la compleja evolución del tiempo social que ha llevado hasta a una retícula finísima que parece mera naturaleza.

El concepto de historia de Benjamin incorpora radicalmente la intersubjetividad, pero estaría más cerca de la ortodoxia marxista. Sostiene nuestro autor que “Los modelos teóricos del desarrollo social a largo plazo…Comte, Spencer, Marx, Hobhouse… descansaban sobre hipótesis que venían determinadas fundamentalmente por los ideales políticos de los autores y, en segundo lugar, por la adecuación de los propios modelos a la realidad objetiva. (Elías, 1987; 19)

En la visión de la historia de Elias hay dos procesos de integración nacional interrelacionados: uno de integración territorial, y otro de integración de clases, que lleva a, pero no acaba en, la igualdad ante ley. Pasa por el estadio del absolutismo e implica la “socialización de los monopolios; el de la violencia, la moneda, tributos…que hacen del Estado el soberano indiscutible.

El proceso de la civilización. investigaciones sociogéneticas y psicogenéticas. Particular atención a la psicogénesis.

philosophie,sociologie,norbert eliasEn El proceso de civilización  Elias parte de un problema presente, la orgullosa autoconciencia que tienen los occidentales de ser “civilizados”, para demostrar que las formas de comportamiento sociales y políticas consideradas típicas del hombre “civilizado” occidental no han sido siempre iguales, sino que son fruto de un complejo proceso histórico en el que interactúan factores de diversa índole que dan lugar a transformaciones en las estructuras sociales y políticas (sociogénesis),  y también en la estructura psíquica y del comportamiento de los individuos (psicogénesis), es decir, que a lo largo de muchos siglos se va produciendo una transformación paulatina hasta alcanzar la pauta de nuestro comportamiento actual, lo cual no quiere decir que el proceso civilizador haya culminado. Para Elias no tiene un principio específico y continúa en marcha, ni siquiera lo identifica con la idea de progreso señalando que no hay nada intrínsecamente bueno o malo en la civilización. Por otro lado tampoco lo considera como un proceso rectilíneo sino que más bien implica flujos y reflujos, movimientos hacia atrás y hacia delante, incluso desplazamientos laterales.

Podría ponerse a Elias en relación con Franz Boas y su  particularismo histórico que rechazó el modelo evolucionista de la cultura, que había dominado hasta su aparición. Cada sociedad es una representación colectiva de su pasado histórico único. Boas rechazó el evolucionismo unilineal, la idea de que todas las sociedades siguen el mismo camino y han alcanzado su estadio propio de desarrollo del mismo modo que han podido hacerlo las demás. En su lugar, el particularismo histórico mostró que las diferentes sociedades pueden alcanzar el mismo grado de desarrollo por vías diversas. El acento en las diferencias entre los tres ejemplos de naciones de Elias, relativamente cercanas en cualquier caso, sigue ese camino. La pluralidad cultural de Boas nos parece más cercana que el patrón único de la idea de “cultura” del etnógrafo E. Tylor.

El concepto de civilización se ha usado en el pasado con un sentido semi-metafísico, al que alude en el primer capítulo del libro. En el s. XIX se entendía como un proceso automático que el autor soslayó en la primera edición y del que, como indica en su prólogo, se ocupa a partir de la 2ª ed. 

 El proceso de civilización supone una transformación del comportamiento y de la sensibilidad humanos en una dirección determinada, pero no de una forma consciente o racional, no es el resultado de una planificación que prevea el largo plazo ya que estas capacidades presuponen un largo proceso que se tratará de explicar más adelante, y que entronca con la llamada historia de la cultura  o de las mentalidades, según las historiografías inglesa o francesa respectivamente.

 Elias ha dado forma a la llamada «sociología figuracional». Poco conocida en el campo académico hasta los años 70, cuando fue "redescubierto". Su trabajo de una sociología histórica, puede explicar estructuras sociales complejas sin menoscabo de agencias individuales.

Su obra más conocida es la que centrará el presente trabajo, en su mitad referida a la psicogénesis. (Originalmente, la obra la constituían dos tomos, siendo el otro la sociogénesis). Curiosamente, aunque no lo vemos relevante, el orden del título invierte el del contenido entre ambos conceptos.  Elias hace un análisis de la evolución de las sociedades europeas desde la época medieval y guerrera hasta el proyecto moderno e ilustrado. Reflexiona sobre el carácter de lo público y lo privado, la represión, tabúes y la cultura desde un modelo que trabaja una triada entre Karl Marx, Sigmund Freud y Max Weber. Se divide en dos grandes partes enunciadas en el título, que terminan en una suerte de psicoanálisis del viejo mundo. Muchos de sus trabajos sobre el deseo y la represión, de manera historiográfica, tienen similitudes con el trabajo que posteriormente realizó Michel Foucault.

Los dos primeros capítulos tratan de la cuestión de si es posible corroborar y dar por objetiva la suposición, partiendo de observaciones dispersas, de que hay cambios de larga duración en las estructuras emotivas y de control de los seres humanos que mantienen una única dirección a lo largo de una serie de generaciones. (Elias, 1987: 10). Si este cambio de larga duración de las estructuras de la personalidad se puede relacionar con los estructurales a largo plazo del conjunto de la sociedad en una dirección determinada. (Elias, 1987: 10). El cap. 3º y el Resumen se ocupan de este problema. Una conclusión sería una teoría de la civilización que comprenda un modelo de las relaciones posibles entre el cambio a largo plazo de lo individual y lo social en un grado superior de diferenciación e integración, consolidando los controles estatales. (Elias, 1987: 11)

Siguiendo al profesor Jorge Uría , en la observación de los hechos sociales advertimos modelos, que forman un campo simbólico que los historiadores señalan como patrón de conducta. Los valores constituyen el modo de obrar que la comunidad juzga como idóneo, haciendo lo posible por asemejarse a ellos. Implica adhesión y respeto en las capas más profundas e inconscientes. Son fuente de conductas predeterminadas. Son más eficaces que las sanciones, ya que la coacción necesita de un ejercicio continuo, lo que desgasta a la Autoridad, y que si no se ejerce, desgasta su autoridad. Por el contrario los valores no se desgastan mucho en el caso de no alcanzar su patrón ideal. Naturalmente adoptan una jerarquía.

En el funcionalismo de Parsons se señala la opción que el común de la gente tiene por lo que advierte como positivo entre polos. las sociedades tienden hacia la autorregulación, así como a la interconexión de sus diversos elementos (valores, metas, funciones, etc.). El autor se aleja expresamente de Parsons (Elias, 1987; 14 y ss.), al que se enfrentó duramente cuando el primero era una figura consagrada y el segundo una figura oscura, y al que acusa de reduccionismo conceptual estático, mientras que Elias pone su acento en la categoría de proceso, en perpetuo flujo, sin limitarse a parejas de conceptos. Para Elias no hay existencia separada de individuo y sociedad, sino una imbricación recíproca en línea con Durkheim.

La autosuficiencia de una sociedad está determinada por necesidades básicas, entre las que se incluían la preservación del orden social, el abastecimiento de bienes y servicios, la educación como socialización y la protección de la infancia. Todo ello favorece la integración social, tanto como los símbolos y los elementos movilizadores de lo que Castoriadis llama el imaginario social.

Volviendo a nuestro autor. Para acotar un tiempo de investigación Elias se remonta a la Edad Media en diferentes unidades históricas europeas: Alemania, Inglaterra y Francia principalmente, extendiéndose hasta los comienzos de la Edad Contemporánea. El concepto de civilización deriva de la noción de civilité, al que dedica el cap.2º, que considera deudor de la autoconciencia medieval de la cristiandad, aunque alcanza su significado al rebasar al sociedad caballeresca y la unidad católica (Elias, 1987;99), yque como los de cultivé o politissé trataban de caracterizar la especificidad del comportamiento cortesano del siglo XVI y lo elevado de sus costumbres sociales frente a la conducta de personas más primitivas y sencillas.

philosophie,sociologie,norbert eliasElias demuestra, al margen de si era necesario o una obviedad, que “los hombres de Occidente no se han comportado siempre del modo que hoy acostumbramos a considerar como…propio de hombre “civilizados”. Si uno de nuestros contemporáneos occidentales civilizados regresara…por ejemplo al periodo feudal-medieval, en contraría en él mucho de lo que está acostumbrado a considerar como “incivilizado” en otras sociedades. (Elias, 1987; 47)

 Elias ve también sustanciales diferencias en el proceso de constitución del concepto de civilización así como su función y significado son diferentes para Inglaterra, Francia y Alemania, así para las dos primeras civilización designó en términos genéricos una mejora en el trato y las costumbres; en cambio, en Alemania, por oposición, se concibió como “cultura”, en alusión al hombre cultivado. No nos podemos extender sobre las amplias comparaciones entre las tres naciones a las que dedica el capítulo primero. 

 Norbert Elias realiza su análisis de los cambios graduales que se dan en la conducta, las costumbres y el carácter psicológico de las personas a través de la literatura, los libros de consejos y los manuales de courtoise, donde se manifiesta la diversidad de códigos y reglas para la configuración de las “buenas costumbres”, es decir, el proceso de modelación de los comportamientos hacia costumbres menos rudas en situaciones como la compostura en la mesa, la realización de las necesidades fisiológicas, el modo de sonarse o de escupir, el comportamiento en el dormitorio, las relaciones sociales y en el manejo y represión de la agresividad.

El proceso de la civilización, es en cierto modo una historia de las costumbres que han posibilitado en su progreso la autoconciencia y el hecho sociológico del hombre “civilizado”. La psicogénesis analiza las conductas mundanas particulares. Sin alcanzar nunca un estadio definitivo, identifica cambios en todo aquello que nos avergüenza o enorgullece. No desde la abstracción si no desde una prolija enumeración de ejemplos ricamente documentados de microhistoria, o de lo que Unamuno llamó “intrahistoria”. 

De este modo demuestra que el comportamiento de los hombres medievales podría calificarse de infantil (desde un punto de vista actual) con escasa represión de los instintos y de las necesidades fisiológicas tan naturales para ellos que no veían la necesidad de reprimirlas o hacerlas en soledad. Era una sociedad en la que los sentimientos actuaban de una forma más libre o espontánea e intensa, con oscilaciones muy extremas.

Elias se vale de los manuales de pedagogía, como por ejemplo De civilitate morum puerilum de Erasmo de Rotterdam, o  El Cortesano, de Castiglione, a veces adaptaciones y traducciones de tratados clásicos, como los Disticha Catonis,  para descubrir las contraposiciones entre los “civilizado” e “incivilizado”, lo correcto e incorrecto, y, de modo a veces inferido, lo habitual y lo extraordinario en el momento. Por ejemplo vemos que una princesa bizantina introduce el tenedor en el s. XI con gran escándalo en Venecia, que se irá imponiendo a la mano muy lentamente en siglos siguientes. Nos puede sorprender relativamente la falta de higiene en la alimentación, (compartir la cuchara, beber directamente de la sopera). Como ejemplo de la mentalidad del periodo, puede servir una prescripción de Calviac; «Resulta excesivamente ordinario que el niño ofrezca algo tras haberlo mordido o que no quiera comerlo, si no es a su criado». (Elias, 1987; 137).

Un recurso utilizado por Elias es la llamada sátira grobiana, fórmula mediante la que se recomienda de modo evidente y jocoso lo que es grotesco e indebido.

Recordemos que hablamos en estos tratados siempre de mesas burguesas y nobles, no de medios menesterosos. La sopa, y en general el comer cada uno de su propio plato y cubiertos, se prescribe entre 1640 y 1680, siendo su ejemplo una canción del Marqués de Coulanges. Pero todavía en la Lieja de 1740 se condena sorber la sopa de la escudilla. Hacia 1780 la servilleta es todavía un recurso cortesano. 

 Aunque quizá nos sorprenda menos que la habitual promiscuidad en el lecho, que no tiene necesariamente implicaciones sexuales. En general el pasado fue mucho menos pacato ante el desnudo de lo que pudiera creerse. Esta naturalidad ante el desnudo empieza a desaparecer lentamente en el s.XVI (Elias, 1987; 204), acentuándose hasta el s. XIX. Recordemos que en las bodas se acompañaba hasta la cama a los contrayentes. Y que la consumación matrimonial tenía en algunas monarquías, como Francia, testigos públicos hasta el XVIII.

philosophie,sociologie,norbert eliasErasmo escribe, se supone al menos, en sus Colloquio, a los niños, y no les oculta la prostitución ni las casas donde se ejerce. Se avisa de su peligro pero no se oculta pudorosamente. Sus inquilinas eran un sector marginado, desde luego, pero más aceptado y con un rol social previsto y reconocido en la ciudad medieval de fines de la Edad Media.  Los hijos ilegítimos tenían un reconocimiento en pasados siglos que fueron perdiendo gradualmente (Elias, 1987; 222). Aunque el grado de tolerancia cambie, la visión de al relación extramarital permanece siempre más benevolente para el marido que para la mujer. 

En el s. XVII, reyes y grandes nobles franceses recibían visitas, a las que pretendían honrar con su confianza, mientras defecaban. (No en Elias, si no aportación nuestra, sin mediar desequilibrio mental, ese uso llega a principios del XVIII, en el que el comandante del ejército borbónico, Duque de Vendôme, impartía órdenes de esa guisa). El recibir visitas en la bañera (recordemos el asesinato de Marat), llega de modo general a principios del XIX (Napoleón).

Debemos señalar aquí la influencia de Elias en el historiador francés de la vida cotidiana Roger-Henri Gherrand. Particularmente en su historia de la higiene urbana .

Las costumbres en materia de eructos, ventosidades, escupitajos, estornudos, (el pañuelo aparece en el s. XIII, pero se generaliza, sólo en la sociedad cortesana, con el Rey Sol), fueron en general mucho más espontáneas, al anteponerse el criterio de que la retención amenazaba la salud, antes que el de las formas sociales. Los excesos de perfume en las clases altas podían intentar ocultar la poca frecuencia del lavado.

 En el siglo XVI la clase nobiliaria caballeresca-feudal entra en decadencia mientras se está gestando una nueva clase cortesana-absolutista abriéndose las posibilidades de ascenso social, de modo que los manuales de conducta del momento respondían a las necesidades de una sociedad en transición y en ellos se recogían las formas de comportamiento que la sociedad esperaba de sus miembros anunciando una nueva relación entre los seres humanos que se observan y configuran a sí mismos con una conciencia más clara que en la Edad Media. Según Elias esta situación da lugar a que avance el umbral de la vergüenza y de los escrúpulos, de modo que aumenta la presión externa que unas personas ejercen sobre otras a la vez que crece la presión interna para conseguir el autocontrol o la autocoacción que opera incluso cuando el individuo está en soledad y en consecuencia comienzan las transformaciones en las pautas de comportamiento. 

 A partir de las fuentes mencionadas Elias nos muestra  como una costumbre, aceptada en un tiempo, posteriormente deja de serlo debido a su hipótesis de que los “umbrales de la vergüenza” avanzan gradualmente como parte del proceso civilizador. Puede observarse que muchas conductas eran frecuentes y no causaban vergüenza porque no se consideraban descorteses o simplemente porque no se estaba informado de su nuevo significado reprobatorio: tomar la comida con las manos, limpiarse los dientes con el cuchillo, chuparse los dedos, eructar, desnudarse delante de otros… Es el desplazamiento de los umbrales de vergüenza y de sensibilidad hacia los otros lo que dispara el afán de los reformadores en “prohibirlas”, señalándolas como inapropiadas o inaceptables, es decir, como “incivilizadas”. La posibilidad de inspirar repugnancia precederá al concepto contemporáneo de higiene.

La evolución de la belicosidad y violencia personal también es tratada por Elias. La nobleza se confunde durante siglos con el bandolerismo. La guerra tenía matices alegres y estaba integrada con normalidad en la economía y en la emotividad. Ésta se empieza a canalizar y moderar muy lentamente a partir del s. XV. El patíbulo no tiene nada de desagradable.

En general en el XVI aparece el concepto de “gentilhombre” cuyas exigencias formales y de estilo se anteponen a sus cualidades en la guerra y la caza.

 Es importante (Elias, 1987; 252 y 253) el paso ya citado de courtoisie a civilité en la traducción de Peyrat al libro de buenos modales de Della Casa, en 1562.

El método de Elias estriba básicamente en adjuntar sus observaciones sobre los textos originales previamente aportados.

 Cuando las nuevas formas de comportamiento son imitadas por las clases medias se pierde el carácter de diferenciación con lo cual se impulsa en las clases altas una nueva fase de refinamiento y elaboración de comportamientos para mantener su prestigio diferenciador. Elias lo ejemplifica en el cambio de la nobleza caballeresca (s. XI-XVI) hacia la aristocracia cortesana-absolutista (s. XVII-XVIII) y de ésta al ascenso de la burguesía tras la Revolución Francesa. Son fases del proceso civilizador general en las que estos grupos lideran las transformaciones de las costumbres, destacando el importante papel de la corte, sobre todo la francesa, para la domesticación y pacificación de las costumbres nobiliarias, irradiando su influencia al resto de cortes europeas.

«En principio son las personas situadas más alto en la jerarquía social, las que de una u otra forma, exigen una regulación más exacta de los impulsos, así como la represión de éstos y la continencia en los afectos. Se lo exigen a sus inferiores y, desde luego, a sus iguales sociales. Sólo bastante más tarde, cuando las clases burguesas […] se convirtieron en clase alta, en clase dominante, pasó la familia a ser el centro único o, mejor dicho, el centro primario y dominante de la represión de los impulsos. Únicamente a partir de este momento la dependencia social del niño con respecto a los padres, pasó a convertirse en una fuerza especialmente importante e intensiva de la regulación y la modelación emotivas socialmente necesarias.» (Elias, 1987: 179)

De este modo, según Elias, cada niño recibe de forma intensa el proceso de civilización. La represión de los instintos se la inculcan como una auto-coacción que termina por actuar de forma automática. En consecuencia las “prohibiciones sociales” se convierten cada vez más claramente en parte de uno mismo, en un “súper-yo” o inconsciente estrictamente regulado, produciéndose por tanto la transformación de la condición psíquica del ser humano, aunque no sin conflictos puesto que en el propio individuo se entabla una lucha entre las manifestaciones instintivas (más agradables) y las limitaciones, prohibiciones y sentimientos de vergüenza.

A medida que avanza el proceso civilizador se va diferenciando una esfera íntima o secreta y otra pública, un comportamiento en la intimidad y otro distinto público. Esta división acaba por convertirse en un hábito hasta tal punto dominante que ni siquiera se es consciente de ella.

«… la tensión que supone ese comportamiento “correcto” en el interior de cada cual alcanza tal intensidad que, junto a los autocontroles conscientes que se consolidan en el individuo, aparece también un aparato de autocontrol automático y ciego que, por medio de una barrera de miedos trata de evitar las infracciones del comportamiento socialmente aceptado pero que, precisamente por funcionar de este modo mecánico y ciego, suele provocar infracciones contra la realidad social de modo indirecto. Pero ya sea consciente o inconscientemente, la orientación de esta transformación del comportamiento en el sentido de una regulación cada vez más diferencial del conjunto del aparato psíquico, está determinada por la orientación de la diferenciación social, por la progresiva división de funciones y la ampliación de las cadenas de interdependencia en la que esté imbricado directa o indirectamente todo movimiento, y por tanto toda manifestación del hombre aislado.» (Elias, 1987: 452)

philosophie,sociologie,norbert eliasCadenas de interdependencia; un concepto clave en la obra de Elias. Suponen la dependencia de los individuos entre sí a medida que avanzan una serie de interrelaciones a las que contribuyen entre otras causas el aumento demográfico, el desarrollo urbano, la especialización o división de funciones, el cambio de una economía natural a la monetaria o la centralización de los poderes públicos. Las cadenas de interdependencia se interrelacionan de tal forma que afectan a todos los ámbitos de las manifestaciones humanas, determinando la marcha del proceso histórico, y son el fundamento del proceso civilizador en una dirección determinada.

 Elias acude a la Historia para demostrar que también son motores de este proceso los cambios políticos que se producen entre el final de la Edad Media y el principio de la Contemporánea. Las unidades feudales sufrieron un férreo proceso de luchas de competencia y exclusión que culminó con la absorción de éstas por una sola casa dinástica que se adjudicó la titularidad de un amplio territorio sobre el que ejercía su autoridad (monarquías autoritarias) eliminado la competencia de los nobles atrayéndolos a la corte, convirtiéndose ésta en lugar de control y domesticación de la nobleza lo cual fue un factor decisivo en el proceso de civilización. La nobleza pierde su función guerrera para convertirse en servidora del rey a lo que contribuye la progresiva centralización de los poderes político, militar y fiscal. Esto es lo que Elias llama “mecanismos de monopolio”, aparatos especializados de dominación que caracterizan al Estado Moderno, el autor relaciona por tanto la evolución de estos mecanismos de monopolio, que tienen su máxima manifestación en las monarquías absolutistas, con la génesis del Estado Moderno. La implantación “del monopolio de la violencia” fue decisiva, según Elias, para la consolidación de las transformaciones del comportamiento; las coacciones externas que imponían los entes estatales sobre los individuos estimularon la formación de autocoacciones y controles autónomos interiores que garantizaron la estabilidad del sistema social y político.

«La estabilidad peculiar del aparato de autocoacción psíquica, que aparece como un rasgo decisivo en el hábito de todo individuo “civilizado”, se encuentra en íntima relación con la constitución de institutos de monopolio de la violencia física y con la estabilidad creciente de los órganos sociales centrales. Solamente con la constitución de tales institutos monopólicos estables se crea ese aparato formativo que sirve para inculcar al individuo, desde pequeño, la costumbre permanente de dominarse; sólo gracias a dicho instituto se constituye en el individuo un aparato de autocontrol más estable que, en gran medida, funciona de modo automático»(Elias, 1987: 453-454)

De igual modo la progresiva monopolización de la violencia física y la intensificación de las cadenas de interdependencia impulsan transformaciones de las funciones psíquicas del individuo, esto es, la previsión a largo plazo; la racionalización y psicologización del comportamiento. 

 La transformación de la nobleza caballeresca en cortesana supuso el control de las emociones y de las pasiones espontáneas individuales. Era una sociedad donde la falta de órganos de control externos y la escasez de redes de interdependencia hacían innecesaria la previsión a largo plazo, pero con el progresivo sometimiento a normas y leyes exactas, así como la cada vez mayor dependencia entre los individuos debido al aumento de la división de funciones, se hace necesario reflexionar sobre las consecuencias de las acciones propias y ajenas. Esta transformación se observa  ya claramente en la sociedad cortesana-absolutista donde la lucha por mantener el prestigio, la diferenciación social y conseguir cuotas más altas de poder, tanto con los de su propia clase como con las clases burguesas ascendentes, ya no se realiza a través de las armas sino mediante la imitación, sugerencia, intriga, la previsión y el autocontrol.

«Un hombre que conoce la corte es dueño de sus gestos, de sus ojos y de su expresión; es profundo e impenetrable, disimula sus malas intenciones, sonríe a sus enemigos, reprime su estado de ánimo, oculta sus pasiones, desmiente a su corazón y actúa contra sus sentimientos.» (Elias, 1987: 484)

Todavía serán más profundas y generales las transformaciones en la sociedad burguesa cuando las autocoacciones, factor básico para el proceso civilizador, se convierten definitivamente en un aparato de costumbres que funciona de forma automática y contempla todas las manifestaciones de las relaciones humanas.

Resumen: bosquejo de la teoría de la civilización. Conclusión

En definitiva, con su obra, Elias pretende demostrar que la estructura de las funciones psíquicas y la orientación del comportamiento están íntimamente relacionadas con la estructura de las funciones sociales y con los cambios en la relación entre los seres humanos. Es un proceso que, con variantes, se da en todas las sociedades, no sólo en las occidentales, y aunque no está dirigido racionalmente, ni tampoco es rectilíneo, se observa en él una tendencia a la igualación de las formas de vida, conducta y comportamiento, es decir, a la nivelación de los grandes contrastes. A través de un mecanismo complejo de coacciones y de interdependencias y, sobre todo, a lo largo de mucho tiempo, se va produciendo una transformación progresiva del comportamiento hasta alcanzar nuestra pauta actual, nuestra “civilización”. De la interdependencia entre los seres humanos se deriva un orden que es más fuerte que la voluntad y la razón de los individuos. (Elias,1987; 450). Cuanto Más densa es la red de interdependencia, mayor reprensión social hacia quien se salga del patrón de normalidad en sus emociones y pasiones espontáneas, y mayor ventaja social para quien se conduzca dentro de ese patrón. (Elias,1987; 454).

Cobra mucha importancia la división de funciones y sobre todo el monopolio de la violencia legítima,-que comienza con “el acortesanamiento del los guerreros” (Elias, 1987;472)-  por el estado y sus especialistas. La transformación de las coacciones externas por las autocoacciones es también un carácter de la sociedad occidental contemporánea. Otro sería la reducción de diferencias en las  formas sociales, no tanto en el poder adquisitivo-, en proporción a la generalización del trabajo, de abajo arriba, y del consumo, de arriba abajo. Lo mismo en buena medida entre colonizadores y colonizados.

A la contención de los instintos sigue la psicologización y la racionalización. Los mismo que se ha pasado del guerrero al cortesano, se pasa de niño a adulto. La racionalización tiene paralelismo con la vergüenza, el escrúpulo y el desagrado. Los miedos interiorizados a la pérdida de prestigio y reputación han substituido a los miedos a la miseria, hambre o violencia física inmediatas. La competencia económica a la colisión física.

Sólo cuando se alcance un estadio en el que se superen las tensiones intraestatales e interestatales podremos decir de nosotros mismos que somos civilizados, mientras, la civilización no se ha terminado. Constituye un proceso. (Elias, 1987;532).

Un proceso histórico que tiene orden, lógica, pero no determinismo o  teleología.


Bibliografía del autor:

El proceso de la civilización. Investigaciones sociogenéticas y psicogenéticas, México, FCE, 1987. La sociedad cortesana, México, FCE, 1982.

Sociología fundamental, Barcelona, Gedisa, 1982.

La soledad de los moribundos, México, FCE, 1987.

Humana conditio: consideraciones a la evolución de la humanidad, Barcelona, Península, 2002.

Sobre el tiempo, México, FCE, 1989.

Compromiso y distanciamiento., Barcelona, Península, 2002.

La sociedad de los individuos: ensayos, Barcelona, Península, 1990.

Mozart. Sociología de un genio, Barcelona, Península, 2002.

Teoría del símbolo: un ensayo de antropología cultural, Barcelona, Península, 1994.

Conocimiento y poder, Madrid, Ediciones de la Piqueta, 1994.

Mi trayectoria intelectual, Barcelona, Península, 1995.

La civilización de los padres y otros ensayos, Santa Fe de Bogotá, Norma, 1998.

Los alemanes, México, Instituto Mora, 1999.

Deporte y ocio en el proceso de la civilización, México, FCE, 1992, con DUNNIG, Eric.

Fuentes de red:


Toda la bibliografía del autor:



Bibliografía sobre Norbert Elias en español:

LEYVA, Gustavo, VERA, Héctor y ZABLUDOVSKY,  Gina (coordinadores). Nobert Elias: legado y perspectivas. México, Universidad Iberoamericana, 2002

MORANT, Isabel (2002): Discursos de la vida buena: matrimonio, mujer y sexualidad en la literatura humanista.  Madrid: Cátedra: 290 pp.

ZABLUDOVSKY, Gina. Norbert Elias y los problemas actuales de la sociología. México, FCE, 2007

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Francisco Díaz de Otazu


00:05 Publié dans Philosophie, Sociologie | Lien permanent | Commentaires (0) | Tags : philosophie, sociologie, norbert elias | |  del.icio.us | | Digg! Digg |  Facebook

mercredi, 24 septembre 2014

El hombre normal y el progresismo derrotista


El hombre normal y el progresismo derrotista

Ignacio San Miguel

Ex: http://www.arbil.org

El hombre normal se ve zaherido de forma persistente por mensajes que atacan a su sentido moral, su sentido estético, su sentido de la historia y hasta su sentido común. Así lo han entendido un filósofo como Julián Marías, o un escritor como Juan Manuel de Prada, que han escrito al respecto. Pero comienzan a percibirse algunas fisuras en el poderoso edificio construído por el progresismo derrotista. Fisuras escasas, es cierto, pero que quizás pudiesen agrandarse con una labor consciente de socavamiento.

Es signo de la época -raro e insólito signo- que por mor de la revolución contracultural y contramoral, el hombre corriente y normal se vea agredido mediáticamente, y hasta por su entorno social, con mensajes que hieren sus íntimas convicciones y hasta su sentido común. Y debe ser cuidadoso con la expresión de su pensar, pues si se topa con gente aleccionada por el discurso dominante, gente adocenada y sin juicio crítico, puede ser objeto de repulsa y de una retahila de dicterios.

Hago una distinción entre el hombre normal, instruído o poco instruído, cuyo pensar y sentir se mantienen en un nivel de salud aceptable, y esa otra gente, quizás leída e instruída, pero instruida pésimamente, a la que llamo adocenada y sin juicio propio. Obviamente, me resulta más respetable el hombre ordinario y normal, aún en el caso de que apenas lea los periódicos (y hasta precisamente por ello) que aquel que los lee mucho y asimila dócilmente su discurso.

Las agresiones al hombre normal provienen desde distintos ángulos. Si del campo moral se trata, su sano sentido ético se verá herido por continuas provocaciones. Desde la generalizada (y alentada) promiscuidad sexual de los adolescentes y la amplia acogida legal de la sodomía, con tentativas cada vez más acusadas a legalizar la pederastia, hasta la admisión del aborto con todos los honores y su conversión en una industria floreciente y mortífera.

Si quiere encontrar algún apoyo en el clero ante estas ofensas a su sensibilidad, se llevará una decepción. Ni una carta pastoral, ninguna homilía dominical, destinadas a estos temas básicos. Más fácil es que se produzcan cartas pastorales con fuerte contenido político. Aunque lo más frecuente es que cartas y homilías se refieran al amor y al remedio de las injusticias sociales, materias ambas que no supondrán molestia alguna para sus autores. Porque de lo que se trata es de no provocar a la sociedad, amoldándose camaleónicamente a los "vientos de la Historia".

Encontrará solaz el hombre normal en las artes y las letras siempre y cuando haga caso omiso de casi todo lo producido en los últimos cuarenta años. Es decir, tendrá que trasladarse a una época pasada. En el cine actual no encontrará más que truculencias temáticas y amaneradas exposiciones con abundancia de ruido y estimulaciones al sobresalto y el escalofrío. En literatura, más de lo mismo. Y, campeando victoriosamente en tales producciones, la inevitable pornografía. En el Teatro, por ejemplo, se va imponiendo lo que se llama "sexo explícito", término que ya es de por sí lo suficientemente explícito para que haya que explicarlo. Y, sin llegar a estos extremos, los desnudos en los escenarios son bastante comunes desde hace ya muchos años. Y resulta risible el espectáculo que ofrece el gran número de señoras maduras en las colas de los teatros con la plausible intención de poder ver a uno o varios hombres con las vergüenzas al aire.

El festivismo banal y compulsivo y una pornografía igualmente compulsiva imperan en la televisión. Todo son chirigotas, muecas tontas, chistes soeces y facilones, chabacanería degradadora y desnudos reiterados. El desnudo, sobre todo el del hombre, es el socorrido recurso cuando no existe arte. Hay que ganarse el condumio como sea, y esta es una forma fácil y cómoda que permite mantener el intelecto en reposo.

Se podrá decir que también se programan documentales interesantes en la televisión. Pero hasta estos documentales son presentados siguiendo las reglas inconmovibles del discurso dominante. No hace mucho, pude ver un trozo de uno que trataba de los pueblos aborígenes de América y comprobé el respeto con que mostraba sus costumbres ancestrales y la hostilidad empleada al tratar de la labor de los europeos en aquellas tierras. Capté una frase que se refería a los conquistadores y exploradores expañoles: "...llegaron para incivilizar, es decir, para cristianizar a estos pueblos." Apagué el televisor en seguida, pues el combinado de idiotez y perversidad suele resultar explosivo. Y no me parece adecuado adoptar posturas de burla o ironía. El asunto es grave y por tal hay que tomarlo.

Es grave que el hombre normal se vea zaherido de forma continuada, persistente, por mensajes de este o parecido jaez. Es grave que su sentido moral, su sentido estético, su sentido de la historia y hasta su sentido común se vean burlados, vilipendidados, hostilizados continuamente. Así lo han entendido un filósofo como Julián Marías, o un escritor como Juan Manuel de Prada, que han escrito al respecto. Han sabido captar el estado de ánimo desalentado, desazonado, de este hombre normal al que me refiero. Porque aunque quizás constituya una mayoría, carece de los resortes para conseguir que su pensar y su sentir sean expresados de forma idónea, por lo menos en cuantía y calidad suficientes para notar alguna sensación de comodidad y arropamiento.

Los órganos de expresión están en otras manos. En las de intelectuales de medio pelo al servicio de los grandes poderes. Son personas relacionadas no con el hombre normal sino con el adocenado. Sus mensajes, una y otra vez repetidos, se dirigen al rebajamiento de la dignidad del hombre, es decir, a su derrota. Ellos mismos son derrotistas por vocación, aunque no se consideren así. Pues su deseo de trastocar el orden de valores que mal o bien rigió hasta hace cuatro o cinco décadas, parte del odio a la excelencia que surge cuando el hombre dirige sus acciones al servicio de un ideal superior. Esto último exige un esfuerzo, y el derrotista aborrece el esfuerzo. No creo que sea desacertado decir que la última revolución, la de los años sesenta, fué impulsada en medida importante por el amor a la molicie y la indolencia.

La coartada, la justificación, ha de venir de descubrir infamia en los valores, costumbres y hechos del pasado. Puesto que aquellos valores exigían esfuerzo y superación, el domeñamiento del instinto y la predominancia del espíritu, se ha de rebuscar en la vida privada de los prohombres de aquella época todo lo que pueda suponer alguna mácula o deshonra, al objeto de poder proclamar a los cuatro vientos la hipocresía de aquellas gentes. Pero no queda ahí la cosa. La denuncia de la hipocresía es el primer paso. El segundo, y definitivo, es la condena de los propios valores como represivos, falsos, y puros instrumentos de poder.

La ley del instinto, del capricho, de la satisfacción de todo deseo, va siendo promulgada por estos derrotistas mediáticos, sustituyendo perversamente el antiguo código basado en la ley natural y en el encauzamiento de las pasiones por la razón.
El resultado es una realidad degradada, basada en una libertad falsa e imaginaria, que humilla al hombre normal, pues no sabe cómo defenderse de ella, como no sea abstrayéndose por completo en su privacidad.

Sin embargo, el mundo siempre va evolucionando, y no hay por qué suponer que esta evolución haya de ser necesariamente y siempre a peor, por lo menos en su totalidad. De hecho, comienzan a percibirse algunas fisuras en el poderoso edificio construído por el progresismo derrotista. Fisuras escasas, es cierto, pero que quizás pudiesen agrandarse con una labor consciente de socavamiento. Y es que las conciencias de las gentes, aún las de los hombres adocenados, ofrecen algunos signos de hastío, de hartazgo del discurso único dominante.

Al hombre normal puede servirle de alivio considerar que hay muchos que piensan como él, aunque no se atrevan a manifestarlo. Que el ambiente social y cultural generado por los medios de comunicación es en gran parte imaginario, virtual. Que hay, sí, mucha gente como él, que siente y piensa a la manera tradicional, acorde a la ley natural, y que nunca dejará de haberla, pues esto constituiría una anomalía de imposible consistencia.

Es necesario que evite el contagio y que aprenda a percibir las señales del derrotismo que están omnipresentes en su derredor. En cuanto a las personas, el derrotista no es difícil de identificar. Se caracteriza por un conjunto de opiniones monótonamente expresadas.

Sobre los conflictos políticos dirá que todas las partes deben dialogar y hacer concesiones mutuas (con independencia de que a alguna de ellas le pueda asistir la razón y no deba hacer concesión alguna); que cualquier solución es mejor que derramar una sola gota de sangre humana; que la paz es el máximo bien del ser humano y que lo peor son las posturas rígidas e inmovilistas. Es característica de la izquierda política española, es decir Llamazares y demás.

Sobre acontecimientos históricos, siempre encontrará la manera de enjuiciarlos en detrimento de las posiciones occidentales cristianas: horrores de las Cruzadas, horrores de la Inquisición, horrores de la conquista y civilización de América, horrores de la colonización de África... Con el indefectible resultado de que indios, negros y amarillos son gentes inocentes y con culturas respetables, en contraste con la codicia, rapiña y brutalidad de los europeos cristianos. Consúltese a Manuel Vázquez Montalbán o a Eduardo Haro Tecglen.

En cuestiones morales, encontrará justificaciones para el aborto, presentando al efecto situaciones trágicas y excepcionales de la madre, y se enfurruñará cuando uno le señale la imposibilidad de que los muchos millones de abortos que se cometen en el mundo anualmente se deban a situaciones excepcionales y trágicas. Llegará a decir entonces que es dudoso que el feto sea un ser humano (Javier Sádaba). Respecto de la clonación, encontrará algunos argumentos en su defensa. Será favorable a la manipulación de embriones humanos con fines terapéuticos. Y también defenderá la eutanasia en determinados casos (haciendo caso omiso de que tal práctica ha de extenderse igual que el aborto, y que los "determinados casos" se convierten en realidad en "todos los casos", salvo excepciones para salvar la cara). Es decir, en cuestiones morales el derrotista se manifestará como un discípulo de Javier Sádaba, aún si no lo conoce.

En cuestiones culturales y artísticas, su criterio consistirá en repetir lo que le digan los medios de comunicación, pues carece de juicio propio, siendo como es un hombre derrotado espiritualmente. Es decir, admitirá toda la basura, toda la obscenidad, que le sirvan, siempre que lleve el marchamo de lo moderno, avanzado y rebelde, por muy adocenadas y sin significación auténtica que se hayan vuelto estas expresiones.

En el aspecto social, será un decidido feminista y abominará del "machismo". Encontrará machismo hasta en las conductas más normales. En realidad, cuando un hombre hable de machismo con cierta frecuencia, es muy probable que se trate desgraciadamente de un derrotista. Lo que se confirmará por descontado si mira con displicencia el matrimonio tradicional, ve con afectada simpatía a los homosexuales, y trata de los múltiples divorcios y uniones y desuniones sentimentales (para emplear el término al uso), así como de la promiscuidad sexual de los adolescentes y jóvenes, con la placentera indiferencia del que piensa que la sociedad marcha buenamente por el camino de la modernidad.

En materia religiosa, condenará sin dudar los tiempos preconciliares, será un admirador sin reservas de Juan XXIII, muy crítico con Pio XII por su presunta connivencia con los nazis y con Pablo VI por haber ejercido una labor de freno en la marcha del Concilio Vaticano II, muy favorable a la tesis de que todas las religiones son buenas, entusiasta de un cristianismo pacifista y adogmático que aspira a una difusa fraternidad universal (es decir, el cristianismo que hoy en día predomina profusamente en los mensajes clericales), partidario del matrimonio de los sacerdotes, benevolente con un hipotético sacerdocio femenino, etcétera. En este aspecto religioso el prototipo es Enrique Miret Magdalena.

No todos los derrotistas exhiben con idéntica rotundidad todos y cada uno de los estereotipos mentados, pues nada es perfecto en esta tierra y, por tanto, el derrotista perfecto tampoco existe; aunque bien es cierto que hay bastantes que se acercan mucho a esta inasible perfección. Lo que sí resulta casi seguro es que si alguien muestra alguno de los tics señalados, los demás estarán en situación de salir a relucir, a poco que se tercie, pues todos ellos forman una ristra bien unida por un eje constituído por la debilidad moral.

Al hombre normal le cabe el deber de mantenerse firme en sus convicciones y no dejarse contaminar por estas personas y estos medios de comunicación tan flojos y desmolarizados. Hay que percibir su abyección y debilidad, disimuladas con alborotos de artificiosas rebeldías, inventadas reivindicaciones, mixtificaciones históricas, reformas religiosas a la baja y falsos mensajes de paz y amor.

Como en este mundo tampoco hay nada eterno, también el progresismo derrotista irá desvaneciéndose -comienza ya a cuartearse- y lo apropiado ha de ser procurar, cada cual dentro de sus posibilidades, acelerar este proceso resolutorio.
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Ignacio San Miguel.

00:05 Publié dans Philosophie | Lien permanent | Commentaires (0) | Tags : philosophie | |  del.icio.us | | Digg! Digg |  Facebook

lundi, 22 septembre 2014

The End of American History

The End of American History

By Alexander Jacob

Lecture delivered at the IV Encontro Internacional Evoliano, Sao Paulo, Brazil, September 10, 2014.

francis-fukuyama-end-history.jpgFrancis Fukuyuma, the Japanese-American intellectual spokesman for the Jewish American Neoconservative movement, proclaimed in his 1992 book The End of History and the Last Man that liberal democracy was the final socio-political form since earlier alternatives such as Fascism and Communism had proven to be ideological failures, and liberty and equality had now been established as universal norms. 

Fukuyama’s view of history moving in progressive political phases was of course first popularized in the nineteenth century by German thinkers like Hegel, Marx, and their followers, who sought to discern historiographical patterns in the vagaries of military and economic fortune and to either celebrate or revolt against the current political status of their own nation, in their case Germany.

To be sure, Hegel was somewhat more elevated than Marx in supposing the course of history to be the varying manifestations of a developing Weltgeist, or world-spirit, whereas Marx’s historiography was ruled by mere economic alterations. Nevertheless, the falsehood of even Hegel’s philosophy of history is made clear to anyone who considers the history of the country which is actually promoting liberal democracy now as a universal norm, America.

In America there has been, from its inception as an independent nation, hardly any deviation from liberal democratic goals, and Communism and Fascism have not only been absent there in their European forms but are, if ever they emerge, quickly absorbed into the unchanging liberal democratic framework of the nation. Actually what American society represents is a sort of ahistoric, shadow-communist utopia, where private individuals strive ever more strenuously to possess the means of production and to resist the interference of the state in public affairs. There is little also to distinguish the Communist ideal of equality from the Liberal.

When Fukuyama suggests that we have come to the “end of history,” therefore, what he means is that the world that has undergone genuine historical changes has now been conquered by a country that began and continues as a utopia that is as little capable of historical change as of real progress, that is, progress understood not in the technological but in the traditional sense of the development of the spiritual, intellectual and social attitudes of a people.

The “end of history” is indeed a phenomenon that is peculiar to America as a British colony that has had tenuous connections with the naturally developing history of the Old World. While most countries founded by colonial settlement manage to maintain and develop the culture of their mother nation to a certain extent — as Australia, for example, has done — America began and developed at a time of Protestant and Puritan revolt against the ancient Catholic monarchical traditions of Britain.

It is important therefore to consider the phenomenon of Puritanism which provoked the English Civil War during which America was settled and to notice also the close connection between Christian Puritanism and Judaism. We may recall in this context that the Jews, who had been officially expelled from England in 1290 by Edward I, were allowed by the Puritan dictator Cromwell in the 1650s to return from Holland, where they had been conducting a flourishing financial business, and throughout the Commonwealth the Jews were held in high esteem by the Puritans.

The similarity of the capitalist ethics developed by the Puritans and that of the Jews was noted already in 1911 by the German sociologist Werner Sombart in his work Die Juden und das Wirtschaftsleben. Sombart maintained that the “Protestant” ethic that Max Weber had focused on in his 1905 work, Die protestantische Ethik und der Geist des Kapitalismus, was indeed to be identified specifically as a Puritan one that should be equated to Judaism. For, as Sombart explained, “In both will be found . . . the close relationship between religion and business, the arithmetical conception of sin, and, above all, the rationalization of life.”

With the American Civil War of 1861-65, the last links with monarchical England that had persisted in the pro-English Confederate South were cut by the victory of the Federalist North. Then, in the aftermath of the Civil War, in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, the Christian religious aspect of the original Puritan work-ethic of the Americans was seriously damaged by the large-scale influx of Jews from Central and Eastern Europe who succeeded in modulating the philo-Semitic Puritan character of American capitalism into a fully Jewish one.

As Sombart pointed out, the Jews had indeed been active in American economic life already from the seventeenth century and had gradually come to monopolize many branches of American commerce such as the wheat, tobacco, and cotton trade. But we must note that with the increased immigration of eastern Jews at the end of the nineteenth century and the promotion of Jewish finance capitalism, what remained of the original Puritan work-ethic and concomitant frugality in the American economy was soon dissipated, while the only vestige of the dissident Puritanical religiosity that survived was its stubborn anti-clericalism.

With the replacement of the Puritan veneration of industry by the parasitical reign of finance, the Jewish tendency to economic utopianism which manifested itself in the twentieth century as totalitarian Communism in Russia, Eastern Europe and the Far East was transformed in the new “promised land” of the Jews into the totalitarian liberalism of the “American Dream.” The capitalism promoted by the Jews steadily strengthened the nation’s commitment to individualistic freedom and material aggrandizement rather than to the civilizational aims of the old monarchies and empires. Such a nation could naturally not evolve or even acquire a human history. Instead of producing examples of human greatness it could only boast of a certain number of tycoons and millionaire entertainers, and instead of historical development it could only experience periodic economic booms and recessions.

Fukuyama himself attempts, in his book, to introduce a Nietzschean question into his glorification of liberal democracy by raising the specter of the “last man,” or the average American-like man whose life is materially sated and spiritually meaningless. But with naïve optimism he maintains that such an intolerably vacuous life will certainly be mastered in a liberal democracy by man’s spiritedness, a human characteristic that will inevitably rebel against such a monotonous existence. This spiritedness is the same as what Plato called the middle part of the tripartite soul, between the rational and the animal parts of it. In Fukuyama’s view, in the liberal democratic system, instead of its reappearance in violent strife, as in the case of nationalist or imperialistic states, there will be an absorption of this passionate energy into sports, business and political shows like election campaigns.

Fukuyama’s belief in such social engineering as liberal democracy universally aims at ignores the vast difference between the states of the Old World and the American. Indeed, the Neoconservative enterprise propagated by Fukuyama serves as a timely reminder of the incompatibility of American with genuinely European systems of political thought. The American social values that are being imposed on Europe and the rest of the world through economic and military means are essentially alien ones and are neither likely to take root easily nor endure. For, unlike the American nation, European and other older nations have a historical vitality that cannot be suffocated by American avarice. In order to illustrate this fact I shall survey here the characteristic political traditions of the Indo-Europeans and the contradictory intellectual movements that have distorted these traditions in the course of modern history.

To understand the traditional Indo-European social ethos, I may begin with the paradigmatic Āryan conception of society discernible in ancient India. The famous ‘caste system’ of the Indians is, unlike the modern western ‘class system’, an entirely spiritual one and men are recognized not by their economic status but by their hereditary spiritual capacity. The four Indian social orders are represented symbolically as the head, arms, thighs and feet of the primordial cosmic anthropomorphic form of the divine Soul. This Cosmic Man, or Purusha, was itself formed, first ideally and then manifestly, through the spiritual desire, the Soul, of the godhead, or the One.

The manifestation of the Soul in Indian religious philosophy is said to be due to its three inherent forms of energy, sattva, rajas and tamas, the first  representing pure existence, the second  motion and the third inertia (Brahmānda Purāna I,i,3,12). Since there is an intimate and unavoidable correspondence between the macrocosm and the human microcosm, these three energies appear embodied in differing degrees among humans too, the sattvic element most fully in the brāhmans, the rājasic in the warriors or kshatriyas,  and the tāmasic in the vaisyas and shudras, particularly the latter. This is the original spiritual and psychological basis of all hierarchy. The brāhman owes his preeminent position in society to his superhuman spiritual power. The name “Brahman” of the deity who represents the Intellectual light of the cosmos, itself derives from a word denoting creative power and it is the privilege and duty of the brāhman to represent this creative power while the kshatriyas, or political rulers and warriors, only serve to maintain this creative power both within the land and also in the universe. The brāhman and kshatriya thus constitute the paradigmatic Indo-European polity centered on the dual organs of what in European politics are called Church and State.

If we turn to the Greek philosophers, we find that in Plato and Aristotle the state is again constantly conceived of in terms of the constitution of the universal and individual soul. According to Plato, the soul is “that which moves itself” (Phaedrus 246a) and is naturally prior to body since it “is what governs all the changes and modifications of bodies” (Laws 892a).

Just as in ancient India, the soul, or psyche, in Plato’s Republic, Bk.IV, is divided into three parts, a higher rational or spiritual part (called logistikon) corresponding to the Indian sattva, a middle passionate one (called thymoeides) correspondng to rajas, and a lower sensual part (called epithymetikon) corresponding to tamas. Since society is as organic a phenomenon as the individuals of which it is composed, in a state too the more the rational aspect predominates over the passionate the closer it approximates to the ideal political form. But the discipline of the lower desires by the dictates of reason is to be found only in a few and these are the “best born and the best educated” men (Republic, IV), whereas the untrained and untamed passions are to be found in abundance among children, women and the lower classes, which form the most numerous section of society. The aristocratic “guardians” of Plato’s ideal republic are therefore required to be true philosophers and will not be drawn from the inferior classes.

Aristotle continues Plato’s spiritually oriented political theory in his Ethica Nichomachea, where he declares that the main aim of politics is the attainment of the good of the nation. The higher classes of a nation will comprise the full citizens who will assume the military and administrative, including priestly, offices of the land. The legislators must govern with a clear knowledge of the spiritual constitution of man, that is, the rational and passionate elements that Plato had discerned in the individual soul. And it is the duty of the legislators to ensure the predominance of the higher aspect of the soul over the lower.

Platonic principles reappear in the European Renaissance in the writings of aristocratic thinkers like Francesco Guicciardini and Jean Bodin. According to Guicciardini — who offered a critique of Machiavelli in one of his works, Considerations on the Discourses of Machiavelli – the chief reason of the superiority of a prince and an aristocracy to the people is that they are not subject to pernicious passions, such as, notably, envy. The French Renaissance philosopher, Jean Bodin — who is notable for his championing of monarchical absolutism — also based his defence of the latter on a similar Platonic basis. For genuine monarchy is, according to him, derived from the Divine Law and the monarch is the earthly image of God. Care should be taken that the religious foundation of the state is never brought into doubt and religious leaders must act as censors of the state in order to maintain moral discipline in it.

It is at this juncture in the history of the world that the revolutionary anti-monarchical ideas of the English Civil War, the American Revolution and the French Revolution appear. If we study the American Bill of Rights of 1789 we realise that it was based largely on the English Bill of Rights of 1689 promulgated by the (originally Puritan) English Parliament after the “Glorious” Protestant Revolution of 1688 in order to curb the powers traditionally invested in the formerly Catholic monarchs of England.

One of the most influential English thinkers of the seventeenth century and one generally considered to be the father of liberal democracy, John Locke, was also a Puritan. Locke was a champion of the separation of the Church and State and had a profound influence on the American ‘Founding Fathers’ such as Thomas Jefferson. The American Bill of Rights, based on the British parliamentarian one, is especially notable for its dissociation (in the First Amendment) of the American state from any official religion. What had begun in England as a rejection of Catholicism was thus turned in America into a rejection of all official religion. Combined with this fear of theocracy was the Puritanical devotion to individual freedom and industry which caused the Americans to view citizenship as a status defined primarily by liberty and citizens as economic units of production not unlike those of the later Communist utopia of Marx.

A little later, in the middle of the eighteenth century, Jean-Jacques Rousseau propagated in France the Lockean conception of government as a social “contract” directed  by the “volonté générale” of the people which would reduce the inequalities springing from subservience to the state. However, a robust answer to Rousseau’s doctrine of the “social contract” was offered immediately after the fateful French Revolution by the English political philosopher Edmund Burke in his Reflections on the Revolution in France (1790), where he pointed out that “the state ought not to be considered as nothing better than a partnership agreement in a trade of pepper and coffee, calico or tobacco, or some such low concern . . .”

And since the people cannot be relied upon to follow any “general will” towards the attainment of the good of the nation, Burke proposed a natural aristocracy as the only viable government of a nation. A strong nation is also necessarily a religious one for, as Burke said, all politicians indeed act on behalf of “the one great Master, Author and Founder of society,” namely God.

This vital role of religion in the conduct of states was reiterated in post-revolutionary France too by the French monarchist Count Joseph de Maistre who noted in his “Essai sur les principes generateurs des constitutions politiques et des autres institutions humaines” (1809) that “the duration of empires has always been proportionate to the degree of influence the religious element gained in the political constitution.” Indeed, the truly political laws of a land are synonymous with the religious feelings of the people and the “instant [man] separates himself from God to act alone . . . he does not lose power . . . but his activity is negative and leads only to destruction.” To follow the doctrines of Enlightenment thinkers like Rousseau and Voltaire would thus result in a return to a state of anarchy and degeneracy.

In Germany around the same time philosophers like Kant and Fichte were beginning to point to the crucial significance of the ‘State’ as the means of enforcing an enlightened government. Kant took as his point of departure the excellence of Divine Law in relation to Natural Law, so that Reason, or the Moral Law, was elevated far above the mindless workings of Nature. To establish this rule of the Moral Law on earth, Kant proposed a supremely powerful state that would control all religious and commercial offices in the land.

The leader of the state can never be a democratic representative of the people since democracy inevitably results in a despotism. While Kant favored a monarchical republic, Johann Fichte advocated a Platonic philosopher-statesman who is at once a political and religious leader of his nation. Like a Platonic “guardian,” such a statesman, “in his estimate of mankind looks beyond that which they are in the actual world to that which they are in the Divine Idea . . .” (The Nature of the Scholar, Lecture VIII). The monarch will bear the responsibility of the realization of the inner freedom of the individuals within his nation. It is important to note in this context Fichte’s emphasis that the aim of all society is “ever-increasing ennoblement of the human race, that is, to set it more and more at liberty from the bondage of Nature,” just as the aim of all culture is “to subject Nature . . . to Reason.” In order to counteract the spurious freedom that especially the young hanker after, Fichte insists that a new system of education must be developed which “essentially destroys the freedom of will . . . and produces on the contrary strict necessity in the decisions of the will” (Addresses to the German Nation, Address II).

The state continues to be glorified in the Idealistic philosophy of Hegel, for whom the state, and especially the Prussian state, is the “embodiment of rational freedom realizing and recognizing itself in an objective form” (Lectures on the Philosophy of History). And in the Prussian nationalism of Heinrich von Treitschke, the state is glorified to an extent that it becomes a sort of substitute for God. Treitschke takes care to stress that “the consciousness of national unity is dependent on a common bond of religion, for religious sentiment is one of the fundamental forces of the human character.” (Politics, I) Unfortunately the interference of Jewish elements in German politics had disturbed the traditional spiritual ordering of society by encouraging “the coexistence of several religions within one nationality, involving an irreconcilable and ultimately intolerable difference of outlook upon life.”

Directly opposed to these several statist doctrines of the German Idealists and nationalists is the doctrine of Communism which was propounded in the middle of the nineteenth century by the Jewish political economist Karl Marx. The radical difference between the Marxist view of the world and the Indo-European is already evident in the fact that Marx’s system was based on an atheistic materialism that totally denied the existence of any spiritual reality whatsoever, and all metaphysics in general, in favour of a dialectical socio-economics that attempted to understand the transformations of society according to its changing modes of production. Unlike Hegel who had justified history as the changing manifestations of a quasi-divine world-spirit, Marx wished to ‘create’ history by focusing on what he considered its essential economic activities. As he put it in The German Ideology (Ch.1):

Morality, religion, metaphysics, all the rest of ideology and their corresponding forms of consciousness . . . have no history, no development; but men, developing their material production and their material intercourse, alter, along with their real existence, their thinking and the products of their thinking.

However, the Communist system, for all its apparent evolutionary aspirations, is an anti-scientific, utopian construct aiming at an anti-human classless and stateless society based on the common ownership of the means of production. In this delusional sociological experiment Marx focused especially on class-struggle, or the conflict between capital and labor, as the primary instrument of historical change. By granting economic, social and political equality to all citizens Marx believed that the social awareness and discipline of every individual would naturally be increased. And, while he tolerated a representative parliamentary political system as a transitional stage, his Communist utopia aimed at a final dissolution of the state apparatus (which is what induces hierarchy and inequality) at the most advanced state of Communism, when the people would become fully self-governing.

Marxism is thus the fullest expression of a world-view that is diametrically opposed to the traditional Indo-European ordering of society according to spiritual character which we have observed in ancient India, Greece and the rest of Europe until the advent of philo-Judaic Puritanism in the middle of the seventeenth century. Marxism is naturally also opposed to the state structure that supports the religious and warrior aristocracy that founded, constitute and preserve the nation. It may be noted here that although modern liberal democracies pretend to abhor the Communist ideology, the arrogation of political authority in the West by the legislature and its prime ministerial or presidential leader represents a major step towards the same dissolution of the concepts of state and sovereignty that Communism too strives for.

Marx’s political economic theories were strongly criticized at the turn of the century by many notable German thinkers like Eugen Dühring and Oswald Spengler, but I should like to highlight here one of the most metaphysically structured political philosophical responses to Marxism – namely, the system of the Italian Fascist philosopher, Giovanni Gentile. According to Gentile, the basis of evil, exactly as in Plato and Plotinus, is Matter, or Nature, which is opposed to Spirit and represents as it were, “not merely moral and absolute nullity [but] the impenetrable chaos of brute nature, mechanism, spiritual darkness, falsehood and evil, all the things that man is forever fighting against” (Genesis and Structure of Society).

Gentile points out that the economic life focused on by Marx is marked by a utilitarianism akin to the instinctual life of animals and is a life of slavery to matter, whereas politics should be a means to spiritual freedom. While Marxism aimed at the worst sort of social organization, “the utilitarian, materialistic and hence egoistic conception of life understood as a realm of rights to be vindicated, instead of as an arena of duties to be performed by sacrificing oneself to an ideal,” Gentile’s own ideal of Fascism is based on a metaphysical understanding of society as emerging from a Kantian ideal of a “transcendent society” which is produced by the interaction of the ego and its pure object, the alter ego. It is this conception of a ‘transcendent society’ which makes man a ‘political animal’, as Aristotle had earlier suggested. The gradual self-realization of an individual necessarily entails the enlightenment of his objective counterparts, the other members of society, so that the nation as a whole begins to approach the ideal “transcendent society.”

Indeed, for Gentile, as for Fichte, the proper intellectual activity of the enlightened individual is the comprehension of the whole of mankind or of the Idea of it. And the ‘State’ is the objective embodiment of the personality of the individuals constituting it or the “universal common aspect” of their will. True political liberty is therefore possible only when the individuals that constitute the state become free through the realization of the universal aspect of their personality.

The State in its universal aspect is indeed an image of the Divine Will and the laws of the State must ever be in consonance with the Divine Law. Religion naturally is not an external aid to the will of the state but the constitutive element of it. The prime task of the state is to foster the dual development of individuals and of the society. Gentile’s project of state education is therefore governed by a keen awareness of the essentially moral nature of all education. Those concerned with culture as the self-development of the individuals constituting a state must, he says, be “critical of all knowledge that man does not need for the actual realization of his human nature and for the growth and health of his moral character” (Genesis and Structure of Society). In short, they must be critical of all knowledge that is not genuinely human.

Gentile interestingly also distinguishes between two kinds of treatment of political history. True history is not that which observes the “brute fact” but rather “the inward act of the spirit” always considered from the point of view of the “transcendent state,” the “higher ideal that operates as an end in the actual life of the state” (Ibid.). This transcendent state is indeed the divine model of an earthly state and therefore a constant unchanging norm to which the temporal changes of a state approximate in varying degrees throughout its history.

In this Fascist view of history and of the philosophical significance of the state we finally obtain a corrective to the historiographical errors of Hegelians like Fukuyama who raise the political status quo to an ideal after superficially surveying the external changes of a state as also to the errors of the Marxists who conjure up utopias from these same changes. All of these thinkers ignore the transcendent or divine aspect of statecraft, which, as we have observed in our initial survey of ancient Indian and Greek philosophy, starts with the constitution of the psyche or soul itself and aims, through a sacred kingship or an enlightened autocracy, at the psychological improvement of the individuals that comprise the state. Materialistic societies governed by economically oriented political doctrines, whether Puritan or Marxist, are incapable of any real historical development because the spiritual element of man which alone is capable of movement and development is either poorly understood or wholly dismissed.

Fukuyama’s historiographic thesis is thus merely a description of the abortive state of America itself, which has through its history gradually substituted materialistic and economic principles of statecraft for the spiritual ones that originally governed all European monarchies, including the British. In considering this American problem, we cannot afford to ignore the fateful role that Jewry have played in the history of the West, for the re-entry of the Jews into England during the Puritan revolution is linked, psychologically, to the capitalist career of the new American state just as the Jewish economic utopia of Karl Marx lurks behind the liberal democratic dreams of contemporary Americans. Indeed, all modern political theories that aim at a dissolution of the state or of the leading religious institution of a nation — whether these theories are called Libertarian or Anarchist — must be recognized as derivatives of the defective Jewish economic mentality.

This mentality can, and should, be fully replaced by genuinely Indo-European political doctrines that begin not with contractual promises to the masses of liberty and equality and plenty but rather with the obligations of the leaders of a nation and of the State to actually improve the human psychological condition, or culture, of these masses. Both the State and its leading religious institution — in the case of the West, the Church — must therefore be strengthened in their national role and their alliance must be consolidated. This will naturally entail the exclusion of all anti-statist and anti-clerical elements from national government and education. The philosophical guidelines for the urgently required regeneration of nations are clearly available in the long tradition of European conservative philosophy that I have pointed to and particularly in the most recent example of Gentile. Of course, I am aware that Monarchism, Fascism and the Church are all equally abhorrent to those who today follow Judaized America in its various utopian adventures, but it is well to bear in mind that the price of utopianism is the end of history.

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samedi, 20 septembre 2014

Hoffmann e Jünger: La natura perturbante della tecnologia


Hoffmann e Jünger: La natura perturbante della tecnologia

di Marco Zonetti
Fonte: Arianna Editrice [scheda fonte]  

Leggendo il racconto “L’Uomo della Sabbia” di Ernst Theodor Hoffmann e il breve romanzo distopico “Le api di vetro” di Ernst Jünger, potremmo scoprire che i due autori non condividono soltanto il nome di battesimo e la nazionalità, bensì una peculiare e chiaroveggente diffidenza nei confronti della tecnologia, o perlomeno del suo potere manipolatore e disumanizzante.

Nel racconto di Hoffmann, scritto nel 1815, il giovane Nathanael è ossessionato dalla figura di un uomo misterioso, Coppelius, che fin dall’infanzia egli apparenta iconograficamente all’Uomo della Sabbia (o Mago Sabbiolino), una sorta di uomo nero delle tradizioni popolari che getta la sabbia negli occhi dei bambini, strappandoli e portandoli nel suo rifugio sulla “falce di luna” per darli da mangiare ai suoi “piccolini dai becchi ricurvi”.

Coppelius viene introdotto nel racconto in veste di vecchio avvocato amico del padre di Nathanael, per poi rivelarsi una specie di folle scienziato/alchimista nonché complice di un fabbricante di automi italiano, Lazzaro Spalanzani, che si spaccia per un innocuo professore di Fisica. Nathanael conosce la figlia di quest’ultimo, Olimpia, in realtà un automa costruito da Spalanzani con l’aiuto di Coppelius, e se ne innamora perdutamente finendo in un vortice di follia. Dopo una breve parentesi di serenità, accudito dalle amorevoli cure della fidanzata Clara e dell’amico Lothar, che rappresentano il focolare domestico e gli affetti sinceri non contaminati dall’unheimlich costituito dalle “diavolerie” della tecnica incarnate invece da Coppelius e Spalanzani, Nathanael sembrerà aver ritrovato brevemente la ragione, salvo poi risprofondare nelle antiche ossessioni – ridestate da un cannocchiale fabbricato da Coppelius – che lo condurranno al suicidio.

Lo stesso approccio alla scienza e alla tecnologia viste come “perturbanti” traspare dal breve romanzo di Ernst Jünger, “Le api di vetro” del 1957. Api di vetro, ovvero minuscoli automi intelligenti che popolano i giardini dell’industriale Zapparoni (un altro italiano) ove il protagonista Richard – reduce di guerra e di un mondo semplice fatto di tradizioni d’onore e di valori ormai perduti – è capitato in cerca di un impiego. Nei giardini di Zapparoni, arricchitosi grazie all'ideazione e costruzione di macchine tecnologicamente avanzate che dominano ormai il mondo, Richard osserva la “spaventosa simmetria”, per citare William Blake, delle api di vetro e della loro fisiologia ipertecnologica che, lungi dal migliorare o perfezionare la natura (imperfettibile in sé come fa notare Jünger in molte sue opere, ricordandoci che più la tecnologia progredisce più l’umanità subisce un’involuzione e viceversa), la impoveriscono, devastandola in ultima analisi – i fiori toccati dalle “api di vetro” sono infatti destinati a perire poiché deprivati dell’impollinazione incrociata..

Seppur concepite in due epoche diverse, Olimpia e le api di vetro rappresentano l’elemento perturbante di un mondo ossessionato dalla scienza, e in corsa dissennata verso un futuro ultratecnologico in cui uomini e macchine divengono intercambiabili sempre più a discapito dei primi. In cui la poesia dell’ideale romantico e dell’amore sincero, come quello di Nathanael per Clara, viene guastato dall’ossessione per la fredda e innaturale Olimpia, meccanismo perfetto ma inumano come quello degli “automi di Neuchatel” che devono aver ispirato Hoffmann per la sua protagonista. In cui uomini e animali vengono via via sostituiti distopicamente dalle macchine e dagli automi, e dove la stessa nascita, lo stesso atto d’amore che porta al concepimento dell’essere umano viene sostituito da un alambicco, da una provetta, da una miscela in laboratorio, in una sorta di “catena di montaggio” della riproduzione, di “fordismo” applicato alle nascite come nel “brave new world” di Aldous Huxley, “eccellente mondo nuovo” in cui sia Olimpia sia le api di vetro sarebbero cittadini onorari e abitanti privilegiati.

arman110.jpgAltra peculiare affinità fra le due opere è quella data dalla ricorrenza dell’elemento degli “occhi” e del “vetro”. Nel racconto di Hoffmann, troviamo per esempio il leitmotiv dei cannocchiali (“occhi” fatti di vetro come le api) costruiti dal solito Coppelius nelle vesti dell’italiano Coppola. Cannocchiali che ci riportano immediatamente a Galileo Galilei, sommo esponente dell’ambizione scientifica dell’uomo, ambizione che nel racconto di Hoffmann è tuttavia distorta dagli ambigui scopi di Coppelius, intenzionato a deprivare Nathanael degli occhi, per renderlo un cieco automa come la stessa Olimpia. Paradossalmente, anziché donargli una visione amplificata della realtà rendendolo più “lungimirante”, il cannocchiale che Nathanael acquista da Coppelius lo fa sprofondare in una follia primordiale che non riconosce affetti, amore, amicizia, né tantomeno connotati umani, portandolo infine all’annullamento di sé, ovvero al suicidio.

Come lo stesso Richard protagonista de “Le api di vetro”, Nathanael perde a poco a poco la propria umanità e l’attaccamento alle proprie tradizioni e ai propri valori, travolto dalla tecnologia malvagia di due esseri votati alla creazione di marionette e pagliacci destinati a divertire le folle, fenomeni da baraccone come Olimpia, o come gli automi di Zapparoni finiti a sostituire gli attori in carne e ossa nei film, quali li descrive Jünger nel suo romanzo.

Per tornare al tema degli occhi, il protagonista de “Le api di vetro” capirà a poco a poco che, per l’incarico che intende assumere, occorrono occhi disumanizzati, asettici, (occhi di vetro?) che devono vedere senza guardare, senza discernere, così da passar sopra alle atrocità perpetrate nel giardino (e nella società) degli orrori tecnologici di Zapparoni. Per poter sopravvivere nel mondo ipertecnicizzato e inumano insediatosi grazie alla perdita dei valori e della tradizione, Richard si renderà dunque conto che è necessario lasciarsi cavare metaforicamente gli occhi dall’Uomo della Sabbia rappresentato dall’ambizione e della protervia dell’uomo.

Con le derive della tecnologia, con il sacrificio dell’etica sull’altare della Hýbris, con la corsa dissennata a voler piegare la natura al nostro volere, sembrano quindi preconizzarci Hoffmann e Jünger, l’essere umano diventa simulacro di se stesso, automa (fintamente) perfetto, “ape di vetro” senz’anima, senza cuore, senza sesso. Transgender e ultragender costruito in serie come una marionetta, al punto che – nella nostra realtà più vicina – i genitori risultano tanto spersonalizzati da abdicare perfino al nome di padre e di madre per diventare “genitore 1” e “genitore 2”, espressioni che tanto piacerebbero all’ambiguo Zapparoni – che deve il suo successo al tramonto dell’etica e della tradizione – ma anche all’infido Coppelius, sorta di “tormento del capofamiglia” kafkiano, non meno inquietante del “rocchetto di filo” Odradek, protagonista del celebre racconto dello scrittore praghese. Ma soprattutto al mostruoso Uomo della Sabbia che, dal suo antro nella “falce di Luna”, non potrebbe che compiacersi oltremodo della nostra cieca ambizione, che ci impedisce di vedere la realtà distopica nella quale, superbi e protervi, ci stiamo gettando a capofitto inseguendo le derive della tecnologia e dell’ingegneria genetica.

La Hýbris demiurgica della tecnica rappresentata da Coppelius e Zapparoni, ovvero l’aspirazione a replicare la potenza creatrice divina, racchiude necessariamente l’annullamento di sé e dell’umanità, per questo il Nathanael di Hoffmann non può che suicidarsi e il Richard di Jünger tradire i propri princìpi per assoggettarsi al nuovo status quo e al nuovo regime di spersonalizzazione dell’uomo.

Privi degli occhi dell’etica, dei valori e del sacro rispetto della natura, accecati dalla nostra arroganza, siamo solo bambini sprovveduti destinati a diventare cibo della progenie di occulti “uomini della sabbia” o schiavi di scaltri e spietati “Zapparoni”.

Tante altre notizie su www.ariannaeditrice.it

mercredi, 17 septembre 2014

Pour mieux comprendre la Révolution Conservatrice allemande

Pour mieux comprendre la Révolution Conservatrice allemande


junger-1-198x300.jpgEn dépit de la parution en 1993 chez Pardès de l’ouvrage majeur d’Armin Mohler, La Révolution Conservatrice allemande 1918 – 1932, le public français persiste à méconnaître cet immense ensemble intellectuel qui ne se confine pas aux seules limites temporelles dressées par l’auteur. Conséquence immédiate de la Première Guerre mondiale et de la défaite allemande, cette mouvance complexe d’idées plonge ses racines dans l’avant-guerre, se retrouve sous des formes plus ou moins proches ailleurs dans l’espace germanophone et présente de nombreuses affinités avec le « non-conformisme français des années 30 ».

Dans son étude remarquable, Armin Mohler dresse une typologie pertinente. À côté d’auteurs inclassables tels Oswald Spengler, Thomas Mann, Carl Schmitt, Hans Blüher, les frères Ernst et Friedrich Georg Jünger, il distingue six principales tendances :

— le mouvement Völkisch (ou folciste) qui verse parfois dans le nordicisme et le paganisme,

— le mouvement Bündisch avec des ligues de jeunesse favorables à la nature, aux randonnées et à la vie rurale,

— le très attachant Mouvement paysan de Claus Heim qui souleva le Schleswig-Holstein de novembre 1928 à septembre 1929,

— le mouvement national-révolutionnaire qui célébra le « soldat politique »,

— il s’en dégage rapidement un fort courant national-bolchévik avec la figure exemplaire d’Ernst Niekisch,

— le mouvement jeune-conservateur qui réactive, par-delà le catholicisme, le protestantisme ou l’agnosticisme de ses membres, les idées de Reich, d’État corporatif (Ständestaat) et de fédéralisme concret.

Le riche ouvrage d’Armin Mohler étant épuisé, difficile à dénicher chez les bouquinistes et dans l’attente d’une éventuelle réédition, le lecteur français peut épancher sa soif avec La Révolution Conservatrice allemande, l’ouvrage de Robert Steuckers. Ancien responsable des revues Orientations, Vouloir et Synergies européennes, animateur aujourd’hui de l’excellent site métapolitique Euro-Synergies, Robert Steuckers parle le néerlandais, le français, l’allemand et l’anglais. À la fin des années 1970 et à l’orée des années 1980, il fit découvrir aux  « Nouvelles Droites » francophones des penseurs germaniques méconnus dont Ernst Niekisch. Il faut par conséquent comprendre ce livre dense et riche comme une introduction aux origines de cette galaxie intellectuelle, complémentaire au maître-ouvrage de Mohler.

Vingt-cinq articles constituent ce recueil qui éclaire ainsi de larges pans de la Révolution Conservatrice. Outre des études biographiques autour de Jakob Wilhelm Hauer, d’Arthur Mœller van den Bruck, d’Alfred Schuler, d’Edgar Julius Jung, d’Herman Wirth ou de Christoph Steding, le lecteur trouve aussi des monographies concernant un aspect, politologique ou historique, de cette constellation. Il examine par exemple l’œuvre posthume de Spengler à travers les matrices préhistoriques des civilisations antiques, le mouvement métapolitique viennois d’Engelbert Pernerstorfer, précurseur de la Révolution Conservatrice, ou bien « L’impact de Nietzsche dans les milieux politiques de gauche et de droite ».

De tout cet intense bouillonnement, seuls les thèmes abordés par les auteurs révolutionnaires-conservateurs demeurent actuels. Les « jeunes-conservateurs » développent une « “ troisième voie ” (Dritte Weg) [qui] rejette le libéralisme en tant que réduction des activités politiques à la seule économie et en tant que force généralisant l’abstraction dans la société (en multipliant des facteurs nouveaux et inutiles, dissolvants et rigidifiants, comme les banques, les compagnies d’assurance, la bureaucratie, les artifices soi-disant “ rationnels ”, etc., dénoncés par la sociologie de Georges Simmel) (p. 223) ».

La Révolution Conservatrice couvre tous les champs de la connaissance, y compris la géopolitique. « Dans les normes internationales, imposées depuis Wilson et la S.D.N., Schmitt voit un “ instrumentarium ” mis au point par les juristes américains pour maintenir les puissances européennes et asiatiques dans un état de faiblesse permanent. Pour surmonter cet handicap imposé, l’Europe doit se constituer en un “ Grand Espace ” (Grossraum), en une “ Terre ” organisée autour de deux ou trois “hegemons ” européens ou asiatiques (Allemagne, Russie, Japon) qui s’opposera à la domination des puissances de la “ Mer ” soit les thalassocraties anglo-saxonnes. C’est l’opposition, également évoquée par Spengler et Sombart, entre les paysans (les géomètres romains) et les “ pirates ”. Plus tard, après 1945, Schmitt, devenu effroyablement pessimiste, dira que nous ne pourrons plus être des géomètres romains, vu la défaite de l’Allemagne et, partant, de toute l’Europe en tant que “ grand espace ” unifié autour de l’hegemon germanique. Nous ne pouvons plus faire qu’une chose : écrire le “ logbook ” d’un navire à la dérive sur un monde entièrement “ fluidifié ” par l’hégémonisme de la grande thalassocratie d’Outre-Atlantique (p. 35). »

Robert Steuckers mentionne que la Révolution Conservatrice a été en partie influencée par la riche et éclectique pensée contre-révolutionnaire d’origine française. « Dans le kaléidoscope de la contre-révolution, note-t-il, il y a […] l’organicisme, propre du romantisme post-révolutionnaire, incarné notamment par Madame de Staël, et étudié à fond par le philosophe strasbourgeois Georges Gusdorf. Cet organicisme génère parfois un néo-médiévisme, comme celui chanté par le poète Novalis. Qui dit médiévisme, dit retour du religieux et de l’irrationnel de la foi, force liante, au contraire du “ laïcisme ”, vociféré par le “ révolutionnarisme institutionnalisé ”. Cette revalorisation de l’irrationnel n’est pas nécessairement absolue ou hystérique : cela veut parfois tout simplement dire qu’on ne considère pas le rationalisme comme une panacée capable de résoudre tous les problèmes. Ensuite, le vieux-conservatisme rejette l’idée d’un droit naturel mais non pas celle d’un ordre naturel, dit “ chrétien ” mais qui dérive en fait de l’aristotélisme antique, via l’interprétation médiévale de Thomas d’Aquin. Ce mélange de thomisme, de médiévisme et de romantisme connaîtra un certain succès dans les provinces catholiques d’Allemagne et dans la zone dite “ baroque ” de la Flandre à l’Italie du Nord et à la Croatie (p. 221). » Mais « la Révolution Conservatrice n’est pas seulement une continuation de la Deutsche Ideologie de romantique mémoire ou une réactualisation des prises de positions anti-chrétiennes et hellénisantes de Hegel (années 1790 – 99) ou une extension du prussianisme laïc et militaire, mais a également son volet catholique romain (p. 177) ». Elle présente plus de variétés axiologiques. De là la difficulté de la cerner réellement.

La postérité révolutionnaire-conservatrice catholique prend ensuite une voie originale. « En effet, après 1945, l’Occident, vaste réceptacle territorial océano-centré où est sensé se recomposer l’Ordo romanus pour ces penseurs conservateurs et catholiques, devient l’Euramérique, l’Atlantis : paradoxe difficile à résoudre car comment fusionner les principes du “ terrisme ” (Schmitt) et ceux de la fluidité libérale, hyper-moderne et économiciste de la civilisation “ états-unienne ” ? Pour d’autres, entre l’Orient bolchevisé et post-orthodoxe, et l’Hyper-Occident fluide et ultra-matérialiste, doit s’ériger une puissance “ terriste ”, justement installée sur le territoire matriciel de l’impérialité virgilienne et carolingienne, et cette puissance est l’Europe en gestation. Mais avec l’Allemagne vaincue, empêchée d’exercer ses fonctions impériales post-romaines, une translatio imperii (une translation de l’empire) doit s’opérer au bénéficie de la France de De Gaulle, soit une translatio imperii ad Gallos, thématique en vogue au moment du rapprochement entre De Gaulle et Adenauer et plus pertinente encore au moment où Charles De Gaulle tente, au cours des années 60, de positionner la France “ contre les empires ”, c’est-à-dire contre les “ impérialismes ”, véhicules des fluidités morbides de la modernité anti-politique et antidotes à toute forme d’ancrage stabilisant (p. 181) ». Le gaullisme, agent inattendu de la Révolution Conservatrice ? Dominique de Roux le pressentait avec son essai, L’Écriture de Charles de Gaulle en 1967.

Ainsi le philosophe et poète allemand Rudolf Pannwitz soutient-il l’Imperium Europæum qui « ne pourra pas être un empire monolithique où habiterait l’union monstrueuse du vagabondage de l’argent (héritage anglais) et de la rigidité conceptuelle (héritage prussien). Cet Imperium Europæum sera pluri-perspectiviste : c’est là une voie que Pannwitz sait difficile, mais que l’Europe pourra suivre parce qu’elle est chargée d’histoire, parce qu’elle a accumulé un patrimoine culturel inégalé et incomparable. Cet Imperium Europæum sera écologique car il sera “ le lieu d’accomplissement parfait du culte de la Terre, le champ où s’épanouit le pouvoir créateur de l’Homme et où se totalisent les plus hautes réalisations, dans la mesure et l’équilibre, au service de l’Homme. Cette Europe-là n’est pas essentiellement une puissance temporelle; elle est la “ balance de l’Olympe ” (p. 184) ». On comprend dès lors que « chez Pannwitz, comme chez le Schmitt d’après-guerre, la Terre est substance, gravité, intensité et cristallisation. L’Eau (et la mer) sont mobilités dissolvantes. Continent, dans cette géopolitique substantielle, signifie substance et l’Europe espérée par Pannwitz est la forme politique du culte de la Terre, elles est dépositaire des cultures, issues de la glèbe, comme par définition et par force des choses toute culture est issue d’une glèbe (p. 185) ».

On le voit, cette belle somme de Robert Steuckers ne se réduit pas à une simple histoire des idées politiques. Elle instruit utilement le jeune lecteur avide d’actions politiques. « La politique est un espace de perpétuelles transitions, prévient-il : les vrais hommes politiques sont donc ceux qui parviennent à demeurer eux-mêmes, fidèles à des traditions – à une Leitkultur dirait-on aujourd’hui -, mais sans figer ces traditions, en les maintenant en état de dynamisme constant, bref, répétons-le une fois de plus, l’état de dynamisme d’une anti-modernité moderniste (p. 222). » Une lecture indispensable !

Georges Feltin-Tracol

• Robert Steuckers, La Révolution Conservatrice allemande. Biographies de ses principaux acteurs et textes choisis, Les Éditions du Lore (La Fosse, F – 35 250 Chevaigné), 2014, 347 p., 28 € + 6 € de port.

Pour commander: Editions du Lore

Article printed from Europe Maxima: http://www.europemaxima.com

URL to article: http://www.europemaxima.com/?p=3947

mardi, 16 septembre 2014

Emmanuel Lévinas, assolutizzando l’Altro nega all’Io il diritto di auto-realizzarsi

emmanuel levinas, philosophie,

Emmanuel Lévinas, assolutizzando l’Altro nega all’Io il diritto di auto-realizzarsi

di Francesco Lamendola

Fonte: Arianna editrice

Quando ci si accosta alla filosofia di Emmanuel Lévinas, dopo le gelide acrobazie speculative di Husserl e di Heidegger, che pure furono i suoi maestri, si prova una piacevole sensazione di aria fresca che irrompe nell’aria chiusa e viziata; una sensazione di calore e di vita. Finalmente una filosofia che, sulle orme di Kierkegaard, volta le spalle agli “universali”, alla “totalità”, alle generalizzazioni, e scende sul terreno concreto dell’uomo singolo, che soffre, che pensa, che spera. Finalmente una filosofia che non procede per astrazioni, per ragionamenti così sottili da diventare quasi evanescenti, che non volta le spalle all’uomo in carne e ossa, con la sua domanda di senso, in nome di principi e teorizzazioni “superiori”. E, soprattutto, finalmente una filosofia del “tu”, che esce dal circolo vizioso dell’autoreferenzialità, del soggettivismo, del narcisismo intellettuale ed esistenziale, e che pone al centro di tutto la relazione, l’alterità, la differenza.

Ma poi, quasi subito, ci si accorge che non si è passati da una stanza chiusa in un aperto giardino, ma in un’altra stanza chiusa: più grande, almeno in apparenza, ma pur sempre chiusa: chiusa come la precedente. Ci si accorge che questo “tu”, questo Altro, anche se scritto con la lettera maiuscola, rimane qualcosa di rigido, di compatto, di irriducibile: talmente estraneo che non potrà mai diventare un fratello, tanto meno un amico; talmente altro che non lo si potrà veramente amare, ma solo “rispettare”; che non lo si potrà soccorrere, ma solo “parlargli”; che non lo si potrà stringere, ma solo “riconoscere”. Sarò un Altro misterioso (e questo è condivisibile) e inafferrabile (e anche questo, fino a un certo punto, lo si può accettare), del quale non sappiamo veramente nulla e che ci resta indecifrabile nella sua alterità: un Altro che sorge come limite, non come ponte; come barriera invalicabile, non come tratto d’unione; come affermazione di qualcosa che ci è preclusa, non come rivelazione della nostra stessa umanità.

Non solo. Quest’Altro, che non si può dire, che non si può capire, che non si può pensare, se non accettando incondizionatamente la sua diversità, finisce per imporsi come un tremendo dittatore: nulla è permesso al di fuori della sua relazione, l’Io non esiste che per lui, per farsi piccolo davanti a lui, per accoglierlo escludendosi da se stesso, esiliandosi da se stesso, alienandosi da se stesso. Qualunque realizzazione personale viene bollata come immorale, perché non si rivolge all’Altro; qualunque anelito alla propria realizzazione, diventa qualcosa di intrinsecamente cattivo; qualunque pensiero che non sia rivolto a lui, ma a se stessi, appare sotto la luce odiosa, o quanto meno sospetta, dell’egoismo, dell’indifferenza, della mancanza di amore. L’Altro non è una sollecitazione, un invito, una occasione di apertura: è l’alfa e l’omega di ogni cosa, è l’unico oggetto degno di attenzione: senza di esso non si danno né Io, né Dio.

Ora, può essere che quest’ultima affermazione contenga un nocciolo di verità. Che cosa sarebbe l’Io, che cosa sarebbe Dio, se non vi fosse l’Altro? Ma questa è solo una parte della verità: l’Io esiste comunque, e anche Dio – se esiste - può esistere comunque: l’Io ha un diritto ontologico fondamentale, quello di esistere, e di esistere per se stesso; Dio, poi, non deve chiedere il permesso agli enti per esserci, né per rivelarsi. È vero che solo la sua mediazione rende pienamente fecondo l’incontro fra gli uomini, ma è falso che essi non potrebbero trovarlo se non annullandosi nel “tu”. Dio si rivela nel prossimo, ma questa non è la condizione esclusiva perché si riveli. Egli si rivela anche nel mondo, nelle cose più umili, nelle creature non umane: tutte realtà che, per Lévinas, sono di seconda scelta. Solo l’uomo conta per lui, anzi, solo l’Altro: non bisogna amare l’altro come se stessi, bisogna amare solo l’altro.

Ma è poi vero che lo si può amare, dopo aver detto che non lo si può nemmeno conoscere? Che non si può, che non si deve agire, dunque nemmeno per fargli del bene? Lévinas sostiene che si può solo parlare all’Altro, ma che non conta il significato delle parole, bensì il fatto del linguaggio in se stesso; che nessuna azione, nessun lavoro è buono: buona è solo la contemplazione; che non c’è alcun mistero nelle cose, nelle piante, negli animali, ma solo negli esseri umani; che qualsiasi forma di possesso equivale a una perdita dell’innocenza; che il discorso filosofico deve essere anzitutto apofatico, ossia negativo (ciò ricorda il Montale di «Codesto solo oggi possiamo dirti: ciò che NON siamo, ciò che NON vogliamo»); che l’Io si realizza solo con e per l’Altro; che il linguaggio autentico è solo quello verbale e non quello scritto, quindi che tutta la poesia è intrinsecamente falsa (condanna che ricorda quella di Platone dell’arte in generale); che di Dio non si può dire niente e, dunque, che la teologia è inutile e pericolosa.

Ancora: quando parla dell’Altro, non si capisce mai se Lévinas intenda il mio prossimo o Dio, o magari tutti e due insieme; tranne quando afferma recisamente che l’Altro è la “traccia”, anzi la sola ed unica “traccia”, che può permetterci di giungere a Dio. Strana traccia: perché l’Altro, per Lévinas, è qualcosa di radicalmente diverso, in cui non si ravvisa alcuna somiglianza con l’Io: e come può esservi, allora, abbastanza familiarità in lui, da intravedervi il volto di Dio? Di più: se l’Altro è, per definizione, l’alterità assoluta, come potremmo giungere, non diciamo a conoscerlo, ma anche soltanto a relazionarci in qualsiasi modo con lui? E poi: chi lo dice che l’Io non ha alcun diritto di esistere, di tendere alla propria realizzazione, perché qualunque cosa non sia rivolta all’Altro risulterebbe, per ciò stesso, malvagia e immorale? Questo è puritanesimo alla rovescia: equivale a demonizzare l’Io, ad assolutizzare l’Altro fino a trasformarlo in un feticcio incombente, minaccioso, tirannico. È l’imperativo categorico kantiano elevato all’ennesima potenza; e, come quello, non fondato su alcun ragionamento, su alcuna dimostrazione. È così perché è così, e basta. Tu devi porti solo in relazione all’Altro, non avrai altro Dio all’infuori di lui. E, sulle orme di Cartesio, si svaluta completamente il valore dell’altro, quando si tratta di un “altro” non umano. Solo l’uomo conta, anzi, solo l’altro uomo (e non l’uomo che sono io); tutto il resto è accessorio. Come si vede, un antropocentrismo spinto fino  al fondamentalismo, fino alla negazione iconoclasta di tutto ciò che non è “tu”. Paradosso supremo, un universo concentrazionario di segno opposto all’arroganza dell’Io.

Ci sembrano pertinenti, a questo proposito, le conclusioni che trae Guido Sommavilla nella sua chiara e acuta monografia «Il pensiero non è un labirinto. Dialettica e mistero» (Milano, Jaca Book, 1980, pp. 332-4):


«Quest’errore di logica elementare [aver considerato la parte come nulla del tutto, invece che come qualcosa che riceve significato dall’insieme] è, ripetiamo, alla radice dei vistosi inconvenienti del pensiero di Lévinas Ricordiamone alcuni: 1) una relazione dell’io all’Altro (uomo o Dio) che è, insieme (“secundum idem”), separazione, cioè non relazione semplicemente; 2) una conoscibilità dell’altro (uomo o Dio) che è, insieme, inconoscibilità semplicemente; 3) un essere-per-altri che mi proibisce di fare ad altri del male, ma anche del bene; 4) egoistica, vergognosa, immorale ogni aspirazione dell’io all’autorealizzazione 5) un prossimo a cui si può onestamente soltanto parlare e che non si può onestamente aiutare; 6) immorale o amorale ogni genere di lavoro: anche conoscitivo quando si annette valore ai contenuti; 7) un impossibile, e dunque disumano, “amour pur” che per essere tale deve depurarsi di ogni bisogno; (9una creazione che non è creazione perché non causa niente e una traccia che non è traccia perché non è segno di niente. In tal modo la triplice inscindibile logica dell’identità causalità finalità viene pericolosamente scardinata  tutto a vantaggio della logica hegeliana della non contraddizione  tra le contraddizioni, la sola che potrebbe salvare un senso a più d’una delle proposizioni elencate.

Questa critica non dimentica i grandi meriti del pensiero di Lévinas, anzi mira a meglio garantirli nella loro credibilità. Essi sono per esempio: 1) la difesa della persona umana singolare sacra e inviolabile nella sua trascendenza  su tutti i sistemi e contro tutti i trascendentali delle filosofie moderne, contro tutte le alienazioni del personale al “neutrum”;  2) la rievocazione del mistero di Dio di cui si è riscoperta almeno una traccia  nella dignità della persona dell’Altro; il richiamo alla nobile etica del disinteresse, dell’essere-per-altri, della santità dei rapporti interumani, che è anche (agostinianamente, cioè cristianamente) un vero “vestigium Trinitatis”.

Ma facciamo bene, noi uomini, a ricordarci che siamo relativi in tutto, ANCHE IN QUANTO ALTRI. Anche la nostra alterità è relativa, il che significa che essa è relativamente anche comunione, sia a vicenda tra noi, sia tra noi e Dio. Tra noi e Dio, anzi, l’alterità  (o “assenza” o “a-teismo”) è tale che Dio, proprio perché massimamente assente è anche massimamente presente a noi e in noi, “interior intimo meo”, e lo è soprattutto quando esistiamo per altri ossia siamo eticamente onesti, giusti e buoni. Anche Lévinas parla di una “presenza” dell’Assente nel rapporto con Altri. Altrove egli parla addirittura della “creazione”come di qualcosa “in cui, nello stesso tempo, viene affermata la parentela degli esseri tra loro, ma anche (sic) la loro eterogeneità radicale”.

Ci si domanda come una “eterogeneità radicale” possa coesistere con una “parentela”. E ci si domanda come questa proposizione di Lévinas possa concordare con un’altra sua proposizione in cui si dice che “la creazione lascia alla creatura una traccia di dipendenza, ma di una dipendenza senza simili”. Come si può essere “parenti” se non si è in nessun modo “simili”? è, dobbiamo dire, un altro lapsus che tradisce un’altra volta la forza che la logica elementare e classica esercita anche su chi per principio la rifiuta.  La “parentela” (o analogia) che Lévinas qui ammette tra esseri creati potrebbe suggerire discretamente che non sempre e non necessariamente la “totalità” è così antinomica all’”infinito” ( e alla sua “curvatura” o “alterità”) come vorrebbe la tesi di tutto questo libro [cioè “Totalità e infinito”]. Invece una filosofia dell’alterità o dell’”esteriorità” così ostile all’analogia come questa rischia di separare e di isolare ogni altro essere umano in una autonomia che farebbe di ciascuno di noi relativi un assoluto. Si avrebbe allora un altro idolo distruttivo.

Ma c’è un altro rischio ancora da rilevare, per finire, in questa “filosofia dell’esteriorità” ai limiti di nettezza a cui Lévinas la porta: il rischio di quel materialismo di predominio del “neutrum” che soprattutto si vuole scongiurare. Ossia l’ALTERITÀ di cui si tratta e a cui tanto si tiene rischia di identificarsi, così pura come la si vuole, con quell’ESTERIORITÀ che vige precisamente e unicamente tra i corpi e tra le parti dei corpi  nella loro tridimensionalità e impenetrabilità, tipiche proprietà dell’essere fisico. In una parola la valenza SIMBOLICA del termine “esteriorità”, valenza d’obbligo quando esso è applicato a realtà e a relazioni metafisiche, appare debole, ammesso pure che ci sia, in “Totalità e infinito”.»


La filosofia di Lévinas, si dice, ha operato una rottura con la tradizione ontologica del pensiero occidentale, basato sulla teoria generale dell’essere; ma questo lo aveva già fatto Kierkegaard. La reazione di Lévinas contro Husserl e soprattutto contro Heidegger è una reazione di secondo grado rispetto a quella di Kierkegaard contro Fichte ed Hegel. Di suo, Lévinas ha introdotto l’idea che  l’alterità va rispettata in quanto tale, senza voler operare alcun tentativo per sminuirne la differenza; un “rispetto”, però, che stenta a tradursi in relazione fattiva, in amore operoso, stante la diffidenza radicale, o, per meglio dire, la condanna recisa e inappellabile di Lévinas nei confronti dell’agire e del lavorare. In questo, egli è stato un anti-Calvino deciso e irriducibile; mentre la sua ostilità verso le “opere”, e perfino verso la “parola” (tranne che nel suo significato immediato) ha piuttosto un sapore luterano.

Dalla Torah, dalla cultura biblica e rabbinica, Lévinas deriva l’idea della assoluta inconoscibilità e indicibilità di Dio, anche se poi ci dice che il volto dell’Altro è una traccia che porta verso di lui; da Franz Rosenzweig e dalla sua «Stella della redenzione», deriva una chiara propensione per quello che si potrebbe definire un empirismo assoluto (in funzione antihegeliana e antiparmenidea). Dialoga con i cattolici, fra i quali conta dei buoni amici ed estimatori (specialmente gesuiti: sono gli anni rampanti di Teilhard de Chardin), e conosce il pensiero di Gabriel Marcel; ma non, come pare, quello di Romano Guardini, il massimo filosofo cattolico del XX secolo.

La sua intuizione fondamentale, attorno alla quale ruota tutta la sua filosofia, è che l’Altro è l’Altro: di lui, cioè, non si può dire nulla, assolutamente nulla, perché egli è radicalmente diverso dall’Io. Però, a ben guardare, da una simile radicale alterità riesce difficile capire cosa possa nascere. Tutto ruota intorno all’alterità dell’Altro; ma di essa, proprio perché tale, io non so nulla e non posso dire nulla. Per quale ragione, allora, l’Altro dovrebbe fornire la base di tutta la mia esistenza, di tutto il mio conoscere, di tutto il mio essere uomo? Perché mai questo Sconosciuto totale dovrebbe pretendere di essere, per me, la sola cosa significativa, la sola capace di restituire un senso alla mia vita? Perché, in ultima analisi, in lui dovrei riconoscere un fratello, se, di fatto, egli è per me un perfetto estraneo?

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