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mercredi, 24 avril 2013

Le culte de l’Amérique en Europe

Emrah Kaynak:

Le culte de l’Amérique en Europe

Ex: http://aucoeurdunationalisme.blogspot.com/

 

Le culte de l’Amérique en Europe
Le rapport que l’Europe entretient avec les États-Unis ressemble à s’y méprendre au rapport traditionnel métropole-colonie à ceci près que la colonie d’antan s’est muée en modèle-type universel. Le moindre événement qui a lieu aux États-Unis a une projection hors norme dans le Vieux Continent. Un attentat engendre trois morts outre-Atlantique et aussitôt le plan Vigipirate est renforcé en France ; un cyclone s’apprête à toucher la côte est des Etats-Unis, après avoir dévasté les Caraïbes, et c’est toute l’Europe qui retient son souffle.

La double explosion qui a frappé le marathon de Boston a joui d’une exposition médiatique extraordinaire : éditions spéciales dans les journaux télévisés et dans la presse écrite. Un événement similaire dans un pays périphérique n’aurait très certainement pas joui du même écho. A l’inverse, les États-Unis sont recroquevillés sur leur société et font très peu cas de ce qui se passe au-delà de leurs frontières, hormis lorsque leurs intérêts directs sont en cause.

Ce qui est nommé fâcheusement « mondialisation » n’est en réalité que la propagation virale de la culture consumériste étasunienne et de son corrélat moral dans le reste du monde. Ce qui se déroule aux états-Unis préfigure très souvent ce qui se passera d’ici peu en Europe : combat entre le moderne (néo-libéralisme anglo-américain) contre l’ancien, le dépassé (modèle social européen). Sarkozy, qui faisait du jogging à New-York affublé d’un T-shirt NYPD, incarne à merveille cette dévotion infantile pour l’Oncle Sam. En son temps, il déclarait au Journal Le Monde : « J’aime l’énergie et la fluidité de l’Amérique. Ce sentiment que tout est possible. Cette impression - peut être artificielle - que des sagas sont possibles, qu’on peut partir du bas de l’échelle et monter très haut, ou bien le contraire ». (1)

La sujétion européenne est non seulement politique mais aussi économique et intellectuelle. La politique étrangère européenne est déjà sous tutelle, alors que le marché européen n’est déjà plus qu’un comptoir de marchandises étasuniennes. L’UE est la terre d’accueil la plus importante du monde pour les marchandises, les services et les capitaux en provenance des États-Unis.

L’Angleterre, la France, l’Allemagne qui étaient les incubateurs des courants de pensée avant-gardistes, se contentent de plus en plus de décalquer les concepts et idées marqués du sceau étasunien . Tout ce qui est estampillé États-Unis, par rapport à n’importe lequel de ses équivalents, représente per se une valeur ajoutée. Que ce soit en nouvelles technologies (Apple, Microsoft, Google, Facebook…), en vêtements (Nike), en productions culturelles de masse (cinéma, série TV, musique,…), en boissons et en produits alimentaires (Coca-cola, Mc Donald,…), le Made in USA bénéficie d’une attractivité sans égal (2).

« Le théâtre, les jeux, les farces, les spectacles, les gladiateurs, les bêtes curieuses, les médailles, les tableaux et autres drogues de cette espèce étaient pour les peuples anciens les appâts de la servitude, le prix de leur liberté ravie, les outils de la tyrannie. Ce moyen, cette pratique, ces allèchements étaient ceux qu’employaient les anciens tyrans pour endormir leurs sujets sous leur joug. Ainsi les peuples abrutis, trouvant beaux tout ces passe-temps, amusés d’un vain plaisir qui les éblouissait, s’habituaient à servir aussi niaisement mais plus mal que les enfants n’apprennent à lire avec des images brillantes » avisait déjà Étienne de La Boétie. (3)

Cette acculturation psychologique s’exprime de la manière la plus éclatante par l’anglomanie butée qui sévit autant dans les couches populaires qu’au sein des élites dirigeantes (4). Publicitaires, journalistes, scientifiques, hommes politiques recourent abusivement à l’anglais qui est censé conférer un surcroît de sérieux à leurs propos. L’anglais est en passe de devenir une véritable « supralangue » qui relègue toutes autres langues au rang de dialecte régional. La langue n’est pas simplement un vecteur de communication ; il s’agit en outre d’un objet idéologique qui traduit une certaine « cosmovision » c’est-à-dire une appréhension générale de l’existence.

L’onde du culte de l’Amérique, l’idée que c’est le meilleur pays au monde, s’étend à l’Europe entière et au reste du monde. Après les événements du 11 septembre 2001, l’Europe avait proclamé ses affinités électives avec les États-Unis sous l’aphorisme « nous sommes tous américains ». Cette déclaration de soumission s’est concrétisée et s’est même intensifiée ces dernières années dans les faits et dans les esprits. La conversion à la culture usaméricaine, au néo-libéralisme, à l’esprit du temps, contraint malheureusement les masses à l’aliénation et à l’encerclement de l’imaginaire.

Emrah Kaynak

Notes :

(1) http://www.lemonde.fr/societe/article/2006/09/09/nicolas-sar...

(2) Cette Amérique qu’on aime, Thierry Fiorilli, http://archives.lesoir.be/cette-amerique-qu-8217-on-aime-823....

(3) Etienne de la Boétie, Discours de la servitude volontaire, 1574.

(4) L’anglomanie en Belgique francophone,
http://correspo.ccdmd.qc.ca/Corr16-3/Anglomanie.html.

mardi, 09 avril 2013

Eté 1942, hiver 2010 : un échange

Eté 1942, hiver 2010 : un échange

Par Michael O'Meara

English original here [2]

Ex: http://www.counter-currents.com/

medium_heidegger_index.jpgDurant l’été 1942 – alors que les Allemands étaient au sommet de leur puissance, totalement inconscients de l’approche de la tempête de feu qui allait transformer leur pays natal en enfer – le philosophe Martin Heidegger écrivit (pour un cours prévu à Freiberg) les lignes suivantes, que je prends dans la traduction anglaise connue sous le titre de Hölderlin’s Hymn “The Ister”: [1]

« Le monde anglo-saxon de l’américanisme » – notait Heidegger dans une note à son examen nationaliste/ontologique de son bien-aimé Hölderlin – « a résolu d’anéantir l’Europe, c’est-à-dire la patrie, et cela signifie : [il a résolu d’anéantir] le commencement du monde occidental. »

En anéantissant le commencement (les origines ou la naissance de l’être européen) – et ainsi en anéantissant le peuple dont le sang coulait dans les veines américaines – les Européens du Nouveau Monde, sans le savoir, détruisaient l’essence de leur propre existence – en désavouant leurs origines – en dénigrant la source de leur forme de vie, en se déniant ainsi à eux-mêmes la possibilité d’un avenir.

« Tout ce qui a un commencement est indestructible. »

Les Américains scellaient leur propre destruction en s’attaquant à leur commencement – en tranchant les racines de leur être.

Mais l’Europe – cette synergie unique de sang et d’esprit – ne peut pas être tuée, car son essence, nous dit Heidegger, est le « commencement » – l’originel – le renouvellement – la  perpétuelle refondation et réaffirmation de l’être.

Ainsi, l’Europe resurgit toujours inévitablement – assise sur son taureau, elle resurgit des  eaux, qui la recouvrent lorsqu’elle plonge avec intrépidité dans ce qui est à venir.

Sa dernière position est par conséquent toujours la première – un autre commencement – lorsqu’elle avance vers ses origines – renouvelant l’être non-corrompu de son commencement – lorsqu’elle s’authentifie dans la plénitude d’un avenir qui lui permet de commencer encore et encore.

* * *

L’opposé est vrai aussi.

L’anéantissement de son commencement par l’Amérique lui a révélé son propre manque inhérent de commencement.

Depuis le début, son projet fut de rejeter ses origines européennes – de désavouer l’être qui l’avait faite ce qu’elle était –, quand ses colons évangélistes adoptèrent la métaphore des Deux Mondes, l’Ancien et le Nouveau.

Pour Heidegger, « l’entrée [de l’Amérique] dans cette guerre planétaire n’est pas [son] entrée dans l’histoire ; au contraire, c’est déjà l’ultime acte américain d’a-historicité et d’auto-destruction ».

Pour avoir émergé, conçue de manière immaculée, des jérémiades de sa Mission Puritaine, l’Amérique s’est définie par un rejet de son passé, par un rejet de ses origines, par un rejet de son fondement le plus ontologique – comme si elle regardait vers l’ouest, vers le soleil couchant et la frontière toujours mouvante de son avenir sans racines et fuyant, mythiquement légitimé au nom d’un « Rêve américain » né de l’éthique protestante et de l’esprit du capitalisme.

Les Américains, l’homo oeconomicus rationnel, sans racines et uniforme qui domine aujourd’hui ne s’est jamais soucié de regarder devant lui parce qu’il n’a jamais regardé derrière lui. Passé et futur, racines et branches – tout cela a été déraciné et coupé.

Pas de mémoire, pas de passé, pas de sens.

Au nom du progrès – que Friedrich Engels imaginait comme un « char cruel passant sur des amas de corps brisés » –, l’être américain se dissout dans sa marche désordonnée vers le gouffre béant.

Mais bien que ce soit d’une manière indirecte, c’est à partir de la matrice européenne que les Américains entrèrent dans le monde, et c’est seulement en affirmant l’être européen de leur Patrie et de leur Lignée qu’ils pouvaient s’enraciner dans leur « Nouveau » Monde – sans succomber aux barbares et aux fellahs étrangers à la Mère-Patrie et à la Culture des Ancêtres.

Au lieu de cela, les fondateurs de l’Amérique entreprirent de rejeter leur Mère. Ils la traitèrent d’égyptienne ou de babylonienne, et prirent leur identité d’« élus », de « choisis », de « lumière des nations » chez les nomades de l’Ancien Testament, étrangers aux grandes forêts de nos terres nordiques, envieux de nos femmes aux yeux bleus et aux cheveux clairs, et révulsés par les hautes voûtes de nos cathédrales gothiques.

L’abandon de leur être originel unique fit des Américains les éternels champions de l’amélioration du monde, les champions idéologiques de l’absurdité consumériste, la première grande « nation » du nihilisme.

* * *

Pendant que Heidegger préparait son cours, des dizaines de milliers de chars, de camions et de pièces d’artillerie commençaient à faire mouvement de Detroit à Mourmansk, puis vers le front de l’Est.

Quelque temps plus tard, le feu commença à tomber du haut du ciel – le feu portant la malédiction de Cromwell et les idées de terre brûlée de Sherman –, le feu qui transforma les familles allemandes en cendres, avec leurs belles églises, leurs musées splendides, leurs quartiers ouvriers densément peuplés et d’une propreté éclatante, leurs bibliothèques anciennes et leurs laboratoires de pointe.

La forêt qui a besoin d’un millier d’années pour s’épanouir périt en une seule nuit dans le feu du phosphore.

Il faudrait longtemps – le moment n’est pas encore venu – avant que les Allemands, le Peuple du Milieu, le centre de l’être européen, se relèvent de leurs ruines, aujourd’hui plus spirituelles que matérielles.

* * *

B17G.jpg

Heidegger ne savait pas qu’une tempête apocalyptique était sur le point de détruire son Europe.

Mais suspecta-t-il du moins que le Führer avait fourvoyé l’Allemagne dans une guerre qu’elle ne pouvait pas gagner ? Que non seulement l’Allemagne, mais aussi l’Europe s’opposant aux forces anglo-américaines de Mammon serait détruite ?

* * *

« L’esprit caché du commencement en Occident n’aura même pas un regard de mépris pour cette épreuve d’autodestruction sans commencement, mais attendra que son heure stellaire surgisse de la sérénité et de la tranquillité qui appartiennent au commencement. »

Une Europe réveillée et renaissante promet donc de répudier la trahison de soi accomplie par l’Amérique – l’Amérique, cette stupide idée européenne baignant dans l’hubris des Lumières, et qui devra être oubliée (comme un squelette de famille) quand l’Europe se réaffirmera.

Mais en 1942, Heidegger ne savait pas que des Européens, et même des Allemands, trahiraient bientôt en faveur des Américains, que les Churchill, les Adenauer, les Blum – les lèche-bottes de l’Europe – monteraient au sommet de la pyramide yankee de l’après-guerre, pyramide conçue pour écraser toute idée de nation, de culture et de destin.

C’est la tragédie de l’Europe.

* * *

Dès que l’Europe se réveillera – elle le fera un jour –, elle se réaffirmera et se défendra, ne se laissera plus distraire par le brillant et le clinquant de l’Amérique, ne se laissera plus intimider par ses bombes H et ses missiles guidés, comprenant enfin clairement que toutes ces distractions hollywoodiennes dissimulent un vide immense – ses incessants exercices de consumérisme insensé.

Par conséquent, incapable d’un recommencement, s’étant dénié elle-même un commencement, la mauvaise idée que l’Amérique est devenue se désintégrera probablement, dans les temps de feu et d’acier qui approchent, en parties disparates.

A ce moment, les Américains blancs seront appelés, en tant qu’Européens du Nouveau Monde, à réaffirmer leur « droit » à une patrie en Amérique du Nord – pour qu’ici ils puissent au moins avoir un endroit pour être ce qu’ils sont.

S’ils devaient réussir dans cette entreprise apparemment irréalisable, ils fonderont la nation – ou les nations – américaine(s) pour la première fois non pas comme le simulacre universaliste que les francs-maçons et les déistes concoctèrent en 1776, mais comme la pulsation du sang du destin américain de l’Europe.

« Nous pensons seulement à moitié ce qui est historique dans l’histoire, c’est-à-dire que nous ne le pensons pas du tout, si nous calculons l’histoire et son ampleur en termes de longueur… de ce qui a été, plutôt qu’attendre ce qui vient et ce qui est dans le futur. »

Le commencement, en tant que tel, est « ce qui vient et ce qui est dans le futur », ce qui est l’« historique dans l’histoire », ce qui remonte le plus loin dans le passé et qui surgit loin dans le futur en cours de dévoilement – comme la charge d’infanterie manquée de Pickett à Gettysburg, dont Faulkner nous a dit qu’elle devait être tentée encore et encore, jusqu’à ce qu’elle réussisse.

* * *

« Nous nous trouvons au commencement de la véritable historicité, c’est-à-dire de l’action dans le domaine de l’essentiel, seulement quand nous sommes capables d’attendre ce qui nous est destiné. »

« Ce qui nous est destiné » – cette affirmation de nous-mêmes –, affirme Heidegger, ne viendra que si nous défions la conformité, les conventions, et le conditionnement artificiel pour réaliser l’être européen, dont le destin est le seul à être nôtre.

A ce moment, si nous devions réussir à rester debout, de la manière dont nos ancêtres le firent, nous atteindrons devant nous et au-delà ce qui commence par chaque affirmation futuriste de ce que nous sommes, nous Européens-Américains.

Cette affirmation, cependant, ne sera pas « sans action ni pensée, en laissant les choses venir et passer… [mais] quelque chose qui se tient devant nous, quelque chose se tenant dans ce qui est indestructible (à quoi le voisinage désolé appartient, comme une vallée à une montagne) ».

Car désolation il y aura – dans ce combat attendant notre race – dans cet avenir destiné conservant avec défi une grandeur qui ne rompt pas en pliant dans la tempête, une grandeur certaine de venir avec la fondation d’une nation européenne en Amérique du Nord, une grandeur dont je crains souvent que nous ne l’ayons plus en nous-mêmes et que nous devons donc appeler par les ardents rites guerriers qui étaient jadis dédiés aux anciens dieux célestes aryens, aussi éloignés ou fictionnels qu’ils puissent être devenus.

–Hiver 2010

  Note

1. Martin Heidegger, Hölderlin’s Hymn ‘The Ister’, trans W. McNeill and J. Davis (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1996), p. 54ff.


Article printed from Counter-Currents Publishing: http://www.counter-currents.com

URL to article: http://www.counter-currents.com/2011/12/ete-1942-hiver-2010-un-echange/

URLs in this post:

[1] Image: http://www.counter-currents.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/12/heideggerwoodpath.jpg

[2] here: http://www.counter-currents.com/2011/09/summer-1942-winter-2010-an-exchange/

lundi, 25 mars 2013

L'ENVOL D'UNE PUISSANCE

L'ENVOL D'UNE PUISSANCE

Méridien Zéro a reçu Sylvain Roussillon pour évoquer avec lui l'importance historique de la guerre anglo-américaine de 1812-1814 dans la fondation de la puissance des Etats-Unis.

guerre anglo-américaine, 1814, colonisation, empire anglais

Pour écouter:

http://www.meridien-zero.com/archive/2013/02/16/emission-n-132-l-envol-d-une-puissance.html

samedi, 23 mars 2013

Les anciens Romains connaissaient l’Amérique

Les anciens Romains connaissaient l’Amérique: de nouvelles preuves mises à jour

 

Un examen d’ADN démontre qu’il y avait des semences de tournesol dans les vestiges retrouvés dans l’épave d’un bateau coulé dans le Mer Tyrrhénéenne au II° siècle avant Jésus-Christ. Pourtant on croyait que cette fleur, vénérée par les Incas, avait été importée en Europe par les conquistadores...

 

copertina_romani_II.jpgEn somme, on peut croire désormais que bien avant les Vikings, les Romains fréquentaient le continent américain. De nouveaux indices archéologiques convaincants semblent confirmer désormais que les navires romains entretenaient des relations commerciales avec l’Amérique. Elio Cadelo, vulgarisateur scientifique, l’a annoncé lors d’une conférence tenue en marge d’une conférence de presse à Bologne portant sur la série cinématographique archéologique “Storie del Passato”. Le documentaire “Quand les Romains allaient en Amérique” dévoile des choses surprenantes sur les anciennes routes de navigation.

 

Un indice fort probant nous est fourni par une analyse ADN de résidus d’origine végétale (appartenant à une pharmacie du bord) retrouvés dans les restes d’une épave romaine, récupérés le long de la côte toscane. Le naufrage du navire a dû avoir lieu entre 140 et 120 avant JC quand Rome, après avoir détruit Carthage, était devenue la seule superpuissance de la Méditerranée. Sur ce malheureux bateau devait se trouver un médecin, dont le matériel professionnel a pu être retrouvé quasi intact dans l’épave: il y avait là des fioles, des bendelettes, des outils chirurgicaux et des petites boîtes, encore fermées, qui contenaient des pastilles magnifiquement bien conservées et qui constituent aujourd’hui des éléments très précieux pour connaître la pharmacopée de l’antiquité classique.

 

Les nouvelles analyses des fragments d’ADN provenant des végétaux contenus dans les pastilles “ont confirmé l’utilisation, déjà observée, de plusieurs plantes pharmaceutiques, mais deux d’entre elles ont plongé les archéologues dans la perplexité”, a expliqué Cadelo lors de sa communication de Bologne, organisée par “Ancient World Society”. En effet, “on y trouvait de l’ibiscus, qui ne pouvait provenir que de l’Inde ou de l’Ethiopie, et, surtout, des graines de tournesol”.

 

D’après les connaissances communément admises jusqu’ici, le tournesol n’est arrivé en Europe qu’après la conquête espagnole des Amériques. Le premier à avoir décrit la fleur de tournesol fut le conquistador du Pérou, Francisco Pizzaro, qui racontait aussi que les Incas la vénéraient comme l’image de leur divinité solaire. On sait aussi que cette fleur, de dimensions imposantes et fascinante, était cultivée dans les Amériques depuis le début du premier millénaire avant notre ère. Mais on n’en avait trouvé aucune trace dans le Vieux Monde, avant son introduction par les marchands qui furent les premiers à fréquenter les “terres à peine violées” par les conquistadores ibériques.

 

Une autre curiosité s’ajoute à de nombreuses autres, que nous explique le livre de Cadelo qui dresse l’inventaire des trafics commerciaux antiques, inconnus jusqu’ici. Ainsi, cette surprenante découverte d’un bijou raffiné en verre recouvert de feuilles d’or provenant d’ateliers romains de l’ère impériale que l’on a retrouvé dans une tombe princière japonaise, non loin de Kyoto. Il s’agit d’une pièce de verroterie rehaussée d’or que des marchands marins romains emportaient avec eux pour en faire des objets d’échange. Mais on ne doit pas nécessairement penser que ce furent des marchands romains qui l’apportèrent au Japon; ce bijou a très bien pu être échangé en d’autres lieux avant d’arriver en Extrême-Orient. Par ailleurs, on a retrouvé des monnaies romaines lors de fouilles en Corée et même en Nouvelle Zélande. D’autres preuves de la présence en Amérique de navires phéniciens ou romains avaient été décrites dans la première édition du livre de Cadelo, où, entre autres choses, l’auteur dénonce notre ignorance absolue des connaissances astronomiques de nos ancêtres: par exemple, il y a, dans la “Naturalis Historia” de Pline l’Ancien une page peu lue où le naturaliste antique explique que le mouvement de rotation de la Terre autour de son propre axe peut se démontrer par le lever et le coucher du soleil toutes les vingt-quatre heures (près d’un millénaire et demi avant Copernic...). Et Aristote disait être certain que l’on pouvait atteindre l’Inde en naviguant vers l’Ouest: si Christophe Colomb avait pu monter cette page d’Aristote aux Rois catholiques d’Espagne, il se serait épargné bien du mal à les convaincre de lui confier trois caravelles.

 

(article trouvé sur le site du quotidien italien “Il Giornale”; http://www.ilgiornale.it/ ).

jeudi, 14 mars 2013

Gli antichi Romani conoscevano l'America

Gli antichi Romani conoscevano l'America, arrivano nuove prove

L'esame del Dna dimostra che ci sono anche semi di girasole nelle pastiglie ritrovate nel relitto di una nave affondata nel Tirreno nel II secolo avanti Cristo. Ma il fiore venerato dagli inca non era stato portato in Europa dai Conquistadores?

Ex: http://www.ilgiornale.it/ 

Insomma, molto prima dei vichinghi, i romani frequentarono l'America. Emergono nuovi, convincenti indizi archeologici sulle antiche frequentazioni commerciali delle Americhe da parte di navi romane: li ha illustrati, in una conferenza a margine della rassegna bolognese di cinema archeologico «Storie dal Passato», il divulgatore scientifico Elio Cadelo, con un'ampia anteprima della nuova edizione del suo libro «Quando i Romani andavano in America», ricco di sorprendenti rivelazioni sulle antiche rotte di navigazione.
Un indizio dalla robusta forza probatoria si deve alle nuove analisi del Dna dei farmaci fitoterapici rinvenuti in un relitto romano recuperato alle coste toscane: il naufragio avvenne a causa di una tempesta fra il 140 e il 120 avanti Cristo, quando Roma, distrutta Cartagine, era ormai la sola superpotenza del Mediterraneo. Su quella sfortunata nave viaggiava anche un medico, il cui corredo professionale ci è stato restituito dal relitto: fiale, bende, ferri chirurgici e scatolette che, ancora chiuse, contenevano pastiglie molto ben conservate, preziosissime per la conoscenza della farmacopea nell'antichità classica.


Le nuove analisi dei frammenti di Dna dei vegetali contenuti in quelle pastiglie «hanno confermato l'uso, già noto, di molte piante officinali, tranne due che - ha spiegato Cadelo nella sua relazione alla Rassegna, organizzata da Ancient World Society - hanno destato forte perplessità fra gli studiosi: l'ibisco, che poteva solo provenire da India o Etiopia, e, soprattutto, i semi di girasole».


Ma il girasole, secondo le cognizioni fino a ora accettate, arrivò in Europa solo dopo la conquista spagnola delle Americhe: il primo a descriverlo fu il conquistador del Perù Francisco Pizarro, raccontando che gli Inca lo veneravano come l'immagine della loro divinità solare. Di quel fiore imponente e affascinante, poi, si seppe che era coltivato nelle Americhe fin dall'inizio del primo millennio avanti Cristo. Ma ancora non se n'era trovata alcuna traccia nel Vecchio Mondo, prima della sua introduzione a opera dei mercanti per primi frequentarono le terre appena «violate» dai conquistadores iberici.


È questo un altro tassello che si aggiunge ai moltissimi altri, spiegati nel libro di Cadelo, che documentano traffici commerciali insospettati: come il sorprendente rinvenimento - altra novità - di raffinati gioielli in vetro con foglie d'oro, provenienti da botteghe romane di età imperiale: erano in una tomba principesca giapponese, non lontano da Kyoto. Si tratta di perline che i mercanti navali romani portavano spesso con sé, come oggetto di scambio. Ma non è necessario pensare che fossero proprio romani, i mercanti che le portarono fino in Giappone: quei gioielli potrebbero essere stati scambiati anche su altri approdi, prima di arrivare in Estremo Oriente. Peraltro, monete romane sono state restituite da scavi effettuati anche in Corea e perfino in Nuova Zelanda. Altre prove delle antiche frequentazioni navali americane di Fenici e Romani sono già descritte nella prima edizione del libro di Cadelo, dove - fra l'altro - si sfatano alcune sconcertanti nostre ignoranze sulle cognizioni astronomiche dei nostri antenati: per esempio, c'è una poco frequentata pagina della «Naturalis Historia» di Plinio il Vecchio dove si spiega che il moto di rotazione della Terra attorno al proprio asse è dimostrato dal sorgere e tramontare del Sole ogni 24 ore (un millennio e mezzo prima di Copernico). E Aristotele si diceva certo che fosse possibile raggiungere l'India navigando verso ovest: se Cristoforo Colombo avesse potuto esibire quella pagina aristotelica, si sarebbe risparmiato tanta fatica durata a convincere i regnanti di Spagna a concedergli le tre caravelle.

samedi, 02 mars 2013

Die USA – ein globales Verhängnis

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Die USA – ein globales Verhängnis

 

Das ist einigermaßen einleuchtend. Die Führer der USA  inszenieren seit 1945 Staatsstreiche, organisieren Überfälle und führen versteckt oder offen Angriffskriege, für die sie vor sieben Jahrzehnten vor dem Nürnberger Kriegsverbrecher-Tribunal angeklagt geworden wären. Nicht ganz nebenbei auch noch beschuldigt der  versuchten und tatsächlichen Ermordung von Staatsführern.                                                                         

Zwar geht es der  politischen und ökonomischen US-Elite nicht, wie etwa den Nationalsozialisten, auch um Lebensraum, aber dafür umso mehr um die Sicherung der  ökonomischen Interessen ihres Landes, d. h. ihrer Konzerne, bei gleichzeitiger Ausschaltung von Konkurrenten oder Störenfriede. Auch wenn, in unvermeidbarer Zusammenarbeit mit Israel, dadurch zusehends der Weltfriede gefährdet wird.

Nun ist diese Art von Machtpolitik nichts Neues, auch Satrapen und tributpflichtige Länder hat es immer wieder gegeben. Daß aber die unterworfenen, vor allem europäischen Völker ihrem Los in Ketten freiwillig und scheinbar demokratisch zustimmen, ist schon eher eine Errungenschaft zumindest der  Moderne, die, zugegeben, auch so manchen und so manchem Komfort zu bieten hat. Aber es bewahrheitet sich eben, daß, nach Marie Ebner von Eschenbach, die  glücklichen Sklaven zugleich die erbittertsten Feinde der Freiheit sein können. Nun, ganz so glücklich scheinen sie aber nicht mehr zu sein.

Und auch andere hadern inzwischen mit dem einstigen Vorbild der Coca-Cola-Generation, ja selbst  in Gottes  gelobtem Land der unbeschränkten Möglichkeiten machen sich, zwar noch vereinzelt, Zweifel und Ängste  breit. Erstmals hat die hoch verschuldete Supermacht ein Desaster zu befürchten, nachdem sie, einerseits, in argen ökonomischen und finanziellen Schwierigkeiten steckt und, andererseits, China zur größten Handelsnation aufgestiegen ist. Zudem sitzt Peking auf anwachsenden Gold-  und Rohstoffreserven, während im „goldenen“ Westen laufend die Währungen entwertet, die Sparer und Leistungsträger geplündert und die Autochthonen durch massive Einwanderung um ihre Heimat gebracht werden.

Mittlerweile tobt längst ein Finanzkrieg, der durch eine andernorts eingeleitete Umgehung der Weltleitwährung Dollar weiter angeheizt wird. So breitet sich im innerasiatischen Handel der  Yuan als Abrechnungswährung aus, während die Schwellenländer der sogenannten BRICS-Gruppe, Brasilien, Russland, Indien, China und  Südafrika, angeblich bereits an einer Entwicklungsbank arbeiten, die noch zu einer Konkurrenz für den Internationalen Währungsfonds heranwachsen könnte. Konzerne aus diesen Ländern rücken US-Multis ohnehin schön langsam auf den Pelz.

Die USA treten also in dieser Situation vermehrt die Flucht nach Vorne an und  kontern nach dem Motto „Wer nicht für uns ist, ist gegen uns“ mit aggressiver Außenpolitik. Rohstoffreiche oder  militärisch-strategisch wichtige Staaten, die nicht gewillt sind, das Spiel mitzumachen, versucht man über ferngesteuerte Revolutionen und direkte wie indirekte Interventionen auf Linie zu bringen oder kreist sie ein. Vielleicht demnächst Algerien mit seinen verstaatlichten Energiereserven.                                                         

Dabei ist es für Washington kaum von Bedeutung, ob, nach einer Intervention, der  neue Verbündete dann ein islamistisches Regime wie in Saudi Arabien oder ein „demokratisches“ wie in Jordanien ist.. Oder ob dabei zehntausende über die Klinge springen müssen.

Die Geschichte lehrt aber, daß auf diese Weise der Niedergang eines in vielfacher Hinsicht überforderten und geistig-moralisch absteigenden Imperiums nicht aufgehalten, sondern nur aufgeschoben werden kann. Und sie lehrt auch, daß die ihm bis zuletzt ergebenen Protektorate in vielen Fällen, wie hier schon einmal erwähnt, das gleiche Schicksal ereilen kann.  Mitgefangen, mitgehangen, eben.                                                                                    

Für Staaten wie Deutschland oder Österreich ergäbe sich daraus normalerweise nur eine Konsequenz: Rückführung der im Ausland lagernden Goldreserven, Abnabelung vom Dollar und, auf der Basis einer neuen Wirtschaftsordnung, verstärkte ökonomische und poltische Zusammenarbeit mit aufstrebenden Ländern in Asien, Afrika und Lateinamerika. Vorher müßte aber die EU in die Wüste geschickt werden.

jeudi, 10 janvier 2013

Typologie de la sécession aux USA

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Typologie de la sécession aux USA

Ex: http://www.dedefensa.org/

Ce n’est pas demain la veille, ni même l’avant-veille, que vous trouverez dans la presse-Système et dans ses satellites quelque élaboration que ce soit sur le thème de “la sécession” aux USA. Sans doute le terme est-il en passe de devenir l’équivalent, sinon pire, dans le registre de la diablerie-Système, que des termes tels que “isolationnisme”, “protectionnisme”, “souverainisme”, éventuellement “poutinisme” si cela existe, – sans citer les caves interdites de l’enfer, “racisme”, “fascisme”, “antisémitisme”, etc.

Le regain d’impopularité-Système du “sécessionnisme”, – pour “anoblir” l’idée de la connotation idéologique qui achèvera sa diabolisation, – tient aux pétitions en faveur de la sécession qui ont fleuri aussitôt après la réélection d’Obama. Vu la majesté du medium (la Maison-Blanche) qui enregistra ces actes, et ce qui parut être un certain engouement populaire pour le thème, la susdite presse-Système dut se fendre de quelques articles à ce propos, le plus tard possible certes.

• L’un d’entre eux est l’article paru le 10 décembre 2012, sur BBC.News, de Jon Kelly, qui nous démontre en quelques arguments joliment troussés mais peu sensibles aux réalités courantes que jamais les Américains n’ont été aussi heureux de vivre ensemble (« Unlike almost all of their Western counterparts, however, Americans appear remarkably happy to stay together despite their differences»). D’une façon générale, l’auguste station de radio et de télévision britannique en tient évidemment pour l’explication évidente et orwellienne par excellence : ceux qui font des pétitions pour la sécession n’ont aucun goût pour la sécession, – peut-être dirait-on même qu’ils en sont adversaires ? («Neil Caren, assistant professor of sociology at the University of North Carolina, who has carried out research into the signatories… “My reading would be that even among the people who signed these petitions, probably a majority wouldn't actually want secession,” he says. “It's like saying you'll move to Canada - it's about how you express your dissatisfaction in the immediate aftermath of the election.”»)

• Sur le nombre même de signature, l’article reconnaissait qu’il y en avait eu, pour pouvoir mieux constater que cela faisait fort peu, et si peu jusqu'au ridicule, constituant presque une forme de réaffirmation de l’Union. Kelly écrivait donc, mettant en évidence combien nous, en Europe, sommes bien plus menacés de sécessions diverses et complètement significatives de notre incapacité de seulement espérer figurer à la cheville ouvrière de la vertu américaniste :

«So far Texas, South Carolina, Georgia, Louisiana, Florida, Missouri, Tennessee, North Carolina, Alabama, Oklahoma and Ohio have all attracted more than 25,000 names apiece - entitling them an official response from the administration. In the context of the US population of 312 million, however, the numbers involved are minuscule. Some 700,000 people in total are estimated to have signed so far - around 0.2% of all Americans. Even Texas's 118,000 signatures - the most of any state - represent less than 0.5% of its inhabitants. These tiny figures actually set Americans apart from their counterparts in other major Western countries.»

Cela était écrit le 10 décembre 2012. Nous-mêmes écrivions, vingt-cinq jours plus tôt, le vendredi 16 novembre 2012, et selon des appréciations chiffrées qui semblaient indiquer que, depuis cette date et compte tenu du bilan à-la-Jon-Kelly, les signatures cessèrent brutalement, voire même régressèrent, ainsi que le nombre d’États de l’Union concernés… «Le 15 novembre 2012, le site Washington’s blog publiait une longue analyse du mouvement, donnant surtout des détails chiffrés, des déclarations, des appréciations, etc., ainsi que les détails des diverses pétitions embrassant les cinquante États de l’Union. Russia Today en donnait également une appréciation le même 15 novembre 2012. Au travers de ces diverses sources, on peut apprécier l’ampleur, le rythme du mouvement, son sérieux, etc… A 18H00, mercredi [14 novembre], le cap des 675.000 signatures électroniques pour toutes les pétitions était dépassé (selon Washington.blog). A minuit, ce même mercredi on atteignait 703.326 signatures (selon Russia Today). Alex Jones, de Infowars.Com, affirmait, dans son émission du jeudi soir [15 novembre], que le million de signatures avait été dépassé. (A ce moment, la pétition du Texas atteignait 107.000 signatures.)»

• Essayons d’être sérieux… Le fait est que les sites intéressés par le mouvement (laissons la presse-Système hors de cela, dans son enclos) ont en général le rythme Internet et passent aisément d’un sujet l’autre, d’autant que les sujets nous pressent. (Dès le 14 novembre, l’attaque de Gaza, dite “Pilier Défense”, commençait à enterrer les affaires américanistes dans le swing de l’accélération de l’Histoire, – réélection de BHO, affaire Petraeus, affaire des pétitions…) Ils savaient évidemment que cette affaire de pétitions était une bonne action de communication, mais qu’elle n’irait pas jusqu’à provoquer une sécession. Donc, on était passé à autre chose et l’article de BBC.News vient à son heure, comme un retour de flamme sur une peur rétrospective du Système, sur une affaire d’ores et déjà oubliée et sur laquelle on peut désormais gloser à loisir et fort sarcastiquement, en la qualifiant de “minuscule”… Puis, tout récemment, voilà qu’Infowars.com, l’un des initiateurs des pétitions-sécession, revient sur le sujet, sous les plumes d’Alex Jones et de Joseph Watson. Les deux hommes protestent contre le sort qui serait fait à une pétition lancée par eux-mêmes pour “déporter” Piers Morgan, le Britannique du Daily Mirror passé à CNN et qui, selon Jones-Watson, a attaqué d’une façon inacceptable les droits constitutionnels des citoyens US en demandant une réglementation de fer sur la vente des armes, suite au massacre de Newtown. Mais tout le monde, à Washington où l’on sauve le sort du monde en déplaçant le bord de la “falaise fiscale” de quelques centimètres, rit de cette pétition (voir The Australian du 2 janvier 2013) ; et Jones-Watson ne se font aucun illusion et citent, ce 27 décembre 2012, le précédent des pétitions sur la sécession (manifestement, ils n'ont pas été voir l'évolution du décompte depuis la mi-novembre parce que, de toutes les façons, là n'est pas le problème)…

«Given the fact that the Obama administration has failed to respond to dozens of petitions advocating states secede from the union, it seems almost inevitable that the White House will also ignore the petition to deport Piers Morgan for his rhetorical assault on the constitutional rights of American citizens. […]

»However, a brief investigation into which petitions the Obama administration has actually responded to confirms that the White House merely cherry picks those it wishes to address and completely ignores others, violating its own rules. For example, the petition for Texas to secede from the union reached the threshold to warrant a comment from the administration on November 12 but has still not been addressed 45 days later. Dozens of similar petitions from other states also passed the threshold but have been ignored, despite the total number of signatures for all states equaling well over a million. In contrast, petitions calling on Obama to enact gun control measures in the aftermath of the Sandy Hook massacre, only three of which totaled over 25,000 signatures, were addressed within days.»

• … Et ce dernier point, certes, d’un intérêt certain. Qui peut comparer cette rigolade (Jon Kelly, de BBC.News, s’en marre encore) de la sécession-today à l’immense événement du massacre de Newtown, considéré dans le monde comme un tournant fondamental, disposant d’une couverture médiatique phénoménale et ainsi de suite ? Ainsi est-on en droit d’attendre que les citoyens US, si fortement concernés dans le fait que ce massacre réactualise le problème du contrôle des ventes d’armes à feu aux USA, et dans les deux sens d’ailleurs (pour et contre), le feraient savoir par le canal idéal des pétitions de la Maison-Blanche ; et nous ajouterions que l’on verrait bien alors, à l’importance comptable et quantitative, – qui ont l’air d’être, sans surprise, les références de Jon Kelly, – de cet événement par comparaison avec celui, ridicule, des pétitions-sécession, la différence d’importance des choses. Nous avons donc été voir le 1er janvier 2013 sur le site des pétitions de la Maison-Blanche, la page réservée à la réponse de la Maison-Blanche et aux pétitions concernant cette question du contrôle des ventes d’armes après le drame de Newtown.

On y trouve, du chef de cabinet adjoint du vice-président, une réponse circonstanciée et fort bien balancée (personne n’est vraiment mis en cause, la plupart des possesseurs d’armes à feu étant jugés comme sains d’esprit). La réponse n’est pas datée, par prudence peut-être, mais elle a du être mise en ligne après le 19 décembre puisque cette date avec une intervention du président sont mentionnées ; il y a 33 pétitions sur le sujet des armes à feu (et aussi sur celui du statut des personnes psychologiquement déséquilibrées), et des pétitions dans les deux sens (la plus importante, avec 197.073 signatures reste assez ambigüe, puisqu’elle demande que le Congrès examine la question du contrôle des armes sans indiquer dans quel sens il devrait légiférer, ce qui ressemble plus à une manœuvre qu’à une pétition : «Immediately address the issue of gun control through the introduction of legislation in Congress»). Le total des signatures de ces 33 pétitions est de 554.630, et l'on peut alors comparer avec les résultats obtenus par les pétitions-sécession dans les mêmes conditions de durée… Cela amène à la question de savoir si un tel nombre de personnes intéressées à ce problème (monsieur Kelly, de BBC/News, fera les comptes pour le pourcentage qui sera au moins d’un tiers, et sans doute de beaucoup plus inférieur à celui des pétitions sur sécession), qui fait entrer de toutes les façons le processus dans la rubrique «In the context of the US population of 312 million, however, the numbers involved are minuscule», implique que le problème soulevé à Newtown, dans l’émotion qu’on sait, intéresse encore moins les citoyens US que celui de la sécession.

• Tout cela pour introduire notre “sujet du jour”, tout cela pour avertir qu’il était improbable que la susdite presse-Système nous informe d’une façon normale sur un sondage concernant la “sympathie” ou le “sentiment positif” qu’éprouvent différents groupes sociaux aux USA à l’égard de la sécession. C’est par conséquent sur le blog de Lew Rockwell, le 31 décembre 2012, qu’on trouve relayé un commentaire d’un sécessionniste acharné, Kirkpatrick Sale du Middlebury Institute, ; lequel relaie lui-même un commentaire… Mais nous vous laissons lire la courte dépêche.

« Bill Regnery, a long-time supporter of the secessionist movement, has sent me notice of a nationwide poll on popular support for secession as measured by a poll by the well-respected Public Policy Polling outfit of Raleigh, NC, that Wikipedia has described as “Democratic-leaning and accurate.” The poll, taken among 700 people in late November and issued on December 4, 2012, has a margin of +/- 3.7 points. Here is a report he sent of the “interesting to remarkable” poll results, along with pertinent comments:

»Secession is viewed positively/sympathetically by: • 46% of Hispanics, 14 million, and 31% of whites, 49 million. We need to crank this irredentist sentiment into our calculations. • 50% of conservatives. This is by far the most support from by far the largest group, 41 million, of ideological supporters. By comparison 19% of liberals, 14 million, fall into this category. • 35% of women and only 29% of men. We should discard the notion that women cannot be recruited. • 50% of 18-29 year olds. We need to hunt where the ducks are.

»The lessons are obvious: Let’s go hunting.»

…Il est probable, sinon certain pour Lew Rockwell, que les divers personnages cités ne sont pas convenables. (Rockwell, ami intime de Ron Paul, avait été catalogué comme “raciste” et inspirateur de Paul à cet égard, lors de la polémique sur les newsletters de Ron Paul, à la fin 2011.) Peut-être ne sont-ils pas convenables, mais que dire de monsieur Jon Kelly et des milliers d’autres de son acabit, qui analysent les affaires avec cette espèce d’incroyable attitude postmoderniste et attitude-Système consistant à déployer tant de flagornerie pour plaire à l’idéologie sans laquelle leur intelligence aurait autant de colonne vertébrale qu’un éclair au chocolat («Il a autant de colonne vertébrale qu’un éclair au chocolat» disait le vice-président Teddy Roosevelt du président McKinley dont il jugeait qu’il s’inclinait beaucoup…). Les nombreux Jon Kelly n’ont d’ailleurs pas vu, lors de leurs divers mépris (question de la sécession) et épanchements (question de la tuerie de Newtown), combien ces questions de la sécession et du contrôle des armes sont liées, tant un grand nombre d’Américains considèrent la possession libre des armes comme un droit constitutionnel (2ème amendement) mais aussi, désormais de plus en plus fermement, comme un moyen de défense contre les forces coercitives (Dieu sait s’il n’en manque pas, par les temps qui courent) du gouvernement, ou du Système, dont ce même gouvernement, ou Système, voudrait les priver, – et cela ne fait-il pas une bonne cause de sécession ? (Cette dernière idée rejoignant l’absence de légitimité du gouvernement central, dès l’origine des USA, que nous jugeons être comme une des principales raisons, cachées sinon seulement comprises, du goût des citoyens américains pour les armes.)

Enfin, faisons le travail des divers Kelly qui trouvent ridicule et vraiment shockingly dépassée cette vieille lune d’idée de la sécession. Le sondage que Rockwell porte à notre connaissance, qui vaut bien en valeur, par référence à l’institut qui l’a réalisé, ceux des prestigieux instituts nationaux et internationaux couverts de fric-Système, donne quelques enseignements extrêmement intéressants. Le plus intéressant, évidemment, celui que n’a pas manqué de remarquer implicitement Rockwell si l’on en croit son titre («Viva Secession !»), c’est le sentiment de la communauté hispanique qu’il faut envisager sur l’arrière-plan de l’état d’esprit général dit de “remexicanisation”. Ce sentiment se marie aisément avec (deuxième enseignement intéressant) l’énorme penchant des conservateurs pour le même thème, conservateurs qui sont légions dans le Sud, où l’ont trouve également des légions d’Hispaniques… Imaginez la vulnérabilité des États de la zone dans ce contexte. L’intérêt de la combinaison est que l’on trouve rassemblées deux forces complémentaires, également tournées contre le centre washingtonien pour des raisons différentes et également complémentaires, la tranquille hégémonie hispanique dans les États frontaliers du Mexique et l’agressivité défensive et centrifuge des conservateurs du Sud.

Le troisième enseignement intéressant, c’est la proportion énorme des jeunes qui voient avec “sympathie” l’idée de sécession. Ce sont certainement les mêmes jeunes qui ont applaudi Ron Paul tout au long de sa campagne électorale si étrangement écourtée. Dans ce résultat somme toute étonnant se cache peut-être un hideux secret du Système. On sait que l’évolution du Système dans son mode de surpuissance est tournée vers la déstructuration et la dissolution, ce qui implique déstructuration et dissolution, également, de l’enseignement (public), de l’esprit de l’enseignement, du goût du savoir et des attitudes de respect et d’ordre qui vont avec. En favorisant cette course naturelle du Système, tous les systèmes d’enseignement son atteints, y compris ceux qui diffusent de l’enseignement favorable au Système, et, dans ce cas, au système de l’américanisme. Du point de vue de ce dernier, c’est un énorme échec et un signe de l’effondrement de lui-même que de n’avoir pas su dispenser chez ses propres jeunes gens la même considération sacrée d’un sacrilège insupportable pour les USA dans le chef de la volonté de sécession qui fut la cause de la Guerre de sécession, plutôt dite Civil War dans le langage officiel, pour dissimuler l’outrage. Si cette hypothèse est la bonne c’est alors qu’on pourra considérer avec admiration la capacité d’autodestruction se substituant à la capacité de surpuissance du Système lui-même.

Pour le reste et d’une façon générale, ces diverses considérations nous confortent dans notre idée centrale que l’éclatement, la désintégration, la sécession constituent le risque fondamental, la fragilité considérable des USA, sa vulnérabilité structurelle permanente et aujourd’hui exacerbée, et sans doute le motif de la plus grande panique possible des autorités du Système. Par conséquent, tout ce qui va dans ce sens nous rapproche d’un événement fondamental pour notre crise terminale du Système.

 

samedi, 01 décembre 2012

How the American matrix destroys every culture

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How the American matrix destroys every culture

By Nicolas BONNAL

Ex: http://english.pravda.ru/

 

 

As I already showed in these columns, Alexis de Tocqueville is the best commentator of the modern agenda of alienation, giving aristocratic critics to the American matrix which starts its nuisances at the beginning of the nineteenth century. Tocqueville foresees a bleak American future for Europe and the whole world. His analyses are as implacable as those of Edgar Poe, a violent opponent to the so-called democratic order, as writers like Hawthorne or Melville.

In his famous book about democracy, Tocqueville describes and explains the destruction of the two victim races of these times, the blacks and the Indians. We shall start by the black slaves:

The Negro of the United States has lost all remembrance of his country; the language which his forefathers spoke is never heard around him; he abjured their religion and forgot their customs when he ceased to belong to Africa, without acquiring any claim to European privileges.

The black slave is thus the prototype of the global citizen desired by the magazine the Economist and the New World Order agenda. He has no past, no family, and no nation:

The Negro has no family; woman is merely the temporary companion of his pleasures, and his children are upon equality with himself from the moment of their birth.

Half the babies born in France have no father nowadays! Today's parents are their children's pals! And who knows his babushka in America? Why do you think so many people stroll around in the shopping centres nowadays?

Like the masses of today obsessed by sex, money and fame, driven by pleasures, captivated by the rich and famous storytelling, the American slave adores his masters:

The slave scarcely feels his own calamitous situation... he admires his tyrants more than he hates them, and finds his joy and his pride in the servile imitation of those who oppress him: his understanding is degraded to the level of his soul.

This modern slave or modern man, adds Tocqueville, doesn't love freedom, for independence is often felt by him to be a heavier burden than slavery. He is just manipulated by his desires, fabricated fantasies and material needs. As if he has inspired the Prisoner of McGoohan, Tocqueville writes:

A thousand new desires beset him, and he is destitute of the knowledge and energy necessary to resist them: these are masters whom it is necessary to contend with, and he has learnt only to submit and obey. In short, he sinks to such a depth of wretchedness, that while servitude brutalizes, liberty destroys him.

The destruction of the Indians has different meanings. The Blackman symbolised the weak or the poor, the submitted proletarian, the Indian the feudal lord, the warrior, doomed to disappear during the industrial revolution, like the religious man. Marx made the same analysis in his famous manifesto. This man of elite is such sentenced to disappear by the civilization of money-lenders and businessmen:

When the North American Indians had lost the sentiment of attachment to their country; when their families were dispersed, their traditions obscured, and the chain of their recollections broken; when all their habits were changed, and their wants increased beyond measure, European tyranny rendered them more disorderly and less civilized than they were before.

A simple animal, or a mere sinner, the man is easily mind-programmed by consumption; and the brave and frugal Indians inevitably fell in front of the new needs and strange goods:

The Europeans introduced amongst the savages of North America fire-arms, ardent spirits, and iron.... Having acquired new tastes, without the arts by which they could be gratified, the Indians were obliged to have recourse to the workmanship of the whites; but in return for their productions the savage had nothing to offer except the rich furs which still abounded in his woods.

Tocqueville in every page of this marvellous and unread book sees the perils of the so-called American civilization. One of these perils is of course pollution and... noise. The noise produced by isolated colons could thus exasperate the Indians, hastening a cruel stroke. Let's understand the causes of these reactions:

Thousands of savages, wandering in the forests and destitute of any fixed dwelling, did not disturb the beasts of chase; but as soon as the continuous sounds of European labour are heard in their neighbourhood, they begin to flee away, and retire to the West...

The retirement of the game meant for the Indians discombobulated anguish, exhausting migrations and a progressive starving. The race was thus exterminated passively, the invaders needing no such massacres and slaughters as one could believe. This is the same mean Hitler, this great admirer of Anglo-Saxon America, wanted to use in Russia (I say wanted, for the people there resisted more, and so had to be slaughtered by the colonial conqueror until the defeat of the last).

Last but no least: if we contemplate the disastrous cultural balance of this civilization, couldn't we admit that she is one of the worst ever occurred? Tocqueville admits that the Spaniard conquest of the south continent was horrible; yet the Indians survived, mixed and intertwined with their masters, thus creating the beautiful Hispano-American civilization. You have tens of architectural masterworks and ancient colonial cities in southern America, and how many in the US?

Anyway, and this remark must be underlined at the hour of philanthropic and humanitarian wars anywhere (Palestine, Syria, Libya, Afghanistan... not to mention the past ones), Tocqueville thinks that the American modern way of life (or death) is more destructive than any other. And he had not in mind the McDonald's, the highways, the desperate suburbs, the shopping malls and the amusement parks!

The Spaniards were unable to exterminate the Indian race by those unparalleled atrocities which brand them with indelible shame, nor did they even succeed in wholly depriving it of its rights; but the Americans of the United States have accomplished this twofold purpose with singular felicity; tranquilly, legally, philanthropically, without shedding blood, and without violating a single great principle of morality in the eyes of the world. It is impossible to destroy men with more respect for the laws of humanity.

Tolkien writes somewhere that a monster (he refers to giant spider Ungoliant) finishes up the job devouring his own flesh. This is what happens to American civilization today. Philanthropically, she is destroying herself. But unhappily humanity who has chosen this way of death, in the East like in the South, is doomed too, since the American matrix has overcome any resistance.

Yet childish technology, money obsession, humanitarian wars and amusement parks will take us nowhere. We need to replace the American way to design a new world.

Nicolas Bonnal

jeudi, 29 novembre 2012

La réélection d'Obama

carn rio.jpg

La réélection d'Obama comme symptôme de la «brésilianisation» des Etats-Unis

par le Prof. Gérard DUSSOUY

Ex: http://www.polemia.com/

Comme Samuel Huntington, dans Qui sommes-nous ?, l’avait pressenti, l’immigration a changé la nature des Etats-Unis. Reste à savoir comment les communautés de cette polyarchie ethnique vont parvenir à vivre en société ensemble ? Comment parviendra-t-elle à imposer de nouveaux impôts à ceux qui les payent alors qu’ils ont de moins en moins de choses en commun avec ceux qui en bénéficient ? Pour le professeur Gérard Dussouy les turbulences de la mondialisation atteignent désormais les Etats-Unis.

Dans une étude qui a presque vingt ans, Michaël Lind divisait l’histoire sociale, culturelle et politique des Etats-Unis en trois périodes (Lind, 1995). Aux « deux premières républiques américaines » de l’Anglo-Amérique (1788-1861) et de l’Euro-Amérique (1875-1957) avait succédé, selon lui, une « Fédération de races » de moins en moins cohésive malgré l’existence réaffirmée d’une culture américaine. Née de l’adoption des lois sur les droits civiques (années 1960-1970), puis confortée par l’Affirmative Act (à savoir la politique des quotas qui favorise l’accès des ressortissants des communautés non blanches aux emplois publics et privés, à l’enseignement secondaire et supérieur), cette « troisième république», vient, on peut l’écrire, d’être consacrée par la réélection de Barack Obama. Celle-ci donne raison à Lind, parce qu’elle est symbolique des nouveaux rapports de forces sociodémographiques qui caractérisent une société américaine de plus en plus multiculturelle, par suite d’une immigration intense. Obama a été réélu, même s’il existe d’autres causes inhérentes aux faiblesses du parti républicain et aux aspects rétrogrades de son programme, grâce à l’alliance des minorités, y compris les Blancs les plus nantis qui sont à l’abri de toute catastrophe économique, contre le vieux stock européen.

Maintenant, la question qui se pose est de savoir comment va fonctionner cette polyarchie ethnique (Blancs, Noirs, Latinos, Asiatiques, musulmans, etc.), qui signifie aussi la fin du leadership anglo-saxon, lui qui a évité, dans le passé, la transposition aux Etats-Unis des antagonismes européens et qui leur a imprimé leur style diplomatique.

Les turbulences de la mondialisation sur le sol américain ?

Après avoir voulu formater le monde à son image, en s’ouvrant démesurément à lui pour mieux le conquérir, l’Amérique ne risque-t-elle pas, faute d’y avoir perdu sa culture politique homogène, de subir toutes les turbulences de la mondialisation sur son propre sol ?

La question est d’autant plus d’actualité que le changement politique et culturel s’accompagne, comme le redoutait Lind, d’une « brésilianisation » (*) des Etats-Unis. Il faut entendre par là, outre la fin de la suprématie de la population blanche et la reconnaissance du pluralisme culturel, toute une série de phénomènes qui vont compliquer la résolution des problèmes financiers et sociaux, et qui, à terme, pourraient affaiblir la puissance américaine.

L’immense responsabilité de Bill Clinton

Le premier phénomène est celui d’un retranchement exacerbé des catégories sociales qui ne se limite pas à un séparatisme spatial, mais qui se manifeste par une privatisation systématique des services, ce qui équivaut, pour les plus nombreux, à cause de la faillite de l’Etat fédéral et de nombreuses villes, à la privation de ces derniers. Le premier mandat d’Obama a été ainsi marqué par une régression sociale inconnue aux Etats-Unis depuis les années trente. Il faut dire qu’il n’en est pas le premier responsable. Le mal vient de la mandature de William Clinton qui a commis une double faute. D’une part, il a autorisé l’adhésion de la Chine à l’OMC et a ouvert le marché américain à l’afflux des produits chinois ; il en a résulté un déficit commercial américain abyssal et la désindustrialisation des Etats-Unis. D’autre part, il a fait supprimer la séparation des banques d’affaires et des banques de dépôts, en vigueur depuis 1933. Une telle décision a relancé toutes les activités spéculatives et elle est à l’origine du grand endettement des ménages américains. Sur le moment, et c’était l’effet recherché par Clinton pour se faire réélire, le pouvoir d’achat des Américains s’en est trouvé amélioré : ils pouvaient s’endetter et acheter des produits importés à bas prix. Au final, les Etats-Unis ont connu les deux krachs de 2007 et 2008, et de nombreux quartiers des villes américaines n’ont, aujourd’hui, pas grand chose à envier aux favelas brésiliennes…

Le deuxième phénomène est l’accroissement considérable des inégalités sociales (1% de la population détiendrait 80% des richesses), de la paupérisation (26 millions de personnes au chômage ou sous-employées ; 1 personne sur 8 vit de bons alimentaires), et, toujours en rapport avec les faillites des collectivités locales et l’affaiblissement du pouvoir fédéral (contrairement au discours de la droite extrême), la dégradation accélérée des services publics. Une économiste américaine a dressé un bilan désolant de la situation (Huffington, 2007). Pourquoi et pour qui de nouveaux impôts ?

C’est à la lumière de ce contexte économique et sociétal que le débat sur la réforme fiscale, qui vient de s’ouvrir, prend tout son sens. Certes, à son origine, il y a l’intérêt général de réduire la dette, sous peine de coupes budgétaires automatiques. Mais, sachant que les classes moyennes blanches seraient les principales contributrices aux nouvelles recettes, ce débat sera un test. Il va montrer à quel niveau se situe la solidarité nationale dans une société éclatée comme celle des Etats-Unis. Le pourquoi et le pour qui de nouveaux impôts sont plus difficiles à légitimer quand les liens sociétaux et intergénérationnels se défont, quand, à l’intérieur d’une même population, des groupes humains considèrent qu’ils n’ont plus beaucoup en commun. Si aucun accord n’intervient, la fuite en avant (le relèvement du plafond de la dette) permettra, seule, de retarder les effets de l’anomie sociale…

L’élargissement de la polyarchie ethnique à de nouveaux groupes va se traduire aussi, en parallèle avec l’affaissement du leadership anglo-saxon, par une révision des choix et des préférences, lesquels relèvent souvent de l’affectivité, en matière de politique étrangère. Si le changement ethnoculturel en cours éloigne, sans aucun doute, les Etats-Unis de leurs sources et de leurs affinités européennes, il ne leur procurera pas forcément de nouveaux repères sur l’horizon mondial.

Ceci pourrait avoir l’avantage d’entraîner un désengagement américain du continent européen (en obligeant les Européens à regarder la réalité géopolitique en face et s’assumer au plan stratégique), tant il est devenu clair que pour Obama la relation avec la Chine est devenue primordiale. Néanmoins, il ne faut pas se cacher que les sollicitations intérieures multiples et divergentes rendront moins lisible qu’auparavant l’action extérieure des Etats-Unis.

Gérard Dussouy
Professeur émérite à l’Université de Bordeaux
15/11/2012

(*) Note de la rédaction : à rapprocher de la citation d'Eric Zemmour, à propos de la France, qui, selon le journaliste, encourt le même risque : « C’est la  "brésilianisation" qui nous menace : ségrégation raciale, milliardaires à foison et appauvrissement de la classe moyenne. Misère du monde aux portes des antiques cités. La Défense sera notre Brasilia. Et la Seine-Saint-Denis, nos favelas.»

Bibliographie :

Michaël Lind, The Next American Nation. The New Nationalism and the Fourth American Revolution, New York, The Free Press, 1995.
Arianna Huffington, L’Amérique qui tombe, Paris, Fayard, 2011.

Voir aussi les article Polémia :

« Les théories de la mondialité » de Gérard Dussouy : gagnants et perdants du sans-frontiérisme
Barack Hollande et François Obama : la « post-démocratie » ethnique en marche
Obama : élu des minorités ethniques et de l'oligarchie financière
Paul Gottfried, un auteur incontournable pour comprendre le conservatisme américain
« Les sept plaies de l'Amérique d'Obama » de Jean-Michel Quatrepoint
Obama régularise un million de clandestins
Les Etats-Unis se délabrent

Anatomie de l'effondrement des Etats-Unis
L'identité nationale selon Huntington

Correspondance Polémia – 21/11/2012

samedi, 03 novembre 2012

1421: The Year China Discovered America?

1421: The Year China Discovered America?

Part 1:

Part 2:

vendredi, 02 novembre 2012

Solutreans Are Indigenous Americans

Solutreans Are Indigenous Americans

 

dimanche, 22 avril 2012

Isolement de Barack Obama au Sommet des Amériques

Isolement de Barack Obama au Sommet des Amériques

 

Ex: http://www.europesolidaire.eu/
 
Ce 6e sommet (Summit of the Americas) qui a réuni les Etats-Unis et 30 chefs d'Etat d'Amérique centrale et d'Amérique du Sud à Carthagène en Colombie les 14 et 15 avril, s'est traduit par un véritable isolement de l'Amérique.

 

 

 

Celle-ci est traditionnellement considérée comme dominant son « arrière-cour » des Etats latino-américain, grâce aux opportunités commerciales et aux investissements qu'elle offrait. Or elle s'est vu refuser la signature de l'habituel communiqué final. Le prétexte officiel en a été le refus toujours opposé par Obama à la reconnaissance de Cuba comme membre à part entière.

Mais les observateurs pensent que l'isolement de l'Amérique ainsi manifesté en plein jour tient aussi au développement économique et à l'indépendance politique croissante de la plupart des Etats américains. S'impose aussi sans doute une influence grandissante de la Chine, qui cherche à ce que l' « arrière-cour » américaine devienne aussi la sienne. On a remarqué ainsi les investissements chinois importants dans les Caraïbes, au plus grand déplaisir des Etats-Unis.

Les membres du sommet ont voulu signifier à Obama que le temps de la Guerre Froide était passé et qu'ils avaient définitivement repris leur indépendance. Ils ont cependant loué le président américain de la patience avec laquelle il a écouté les remontrances à son égard, notamment en ce qui concerne la tolérance américaine aux trafics d'armes, de drogues et de prostitution dont les Etats-Unis constituent un des principal débouché.

L'Union européenne n'est pas officiellement invitée à participer à de tels sommets, malgré les liens entretenus par certains Etats européens avec leurs homologues en Amérique Latine. Cependant, le durcissement des relations commerciales entre l'Argentine et l'Espagne, de même qu'entre l'Argentine et le Royaume-Uni à propos des Malouines, a été évoqué off records. L'Europe n'y a pas été présentée sous son meilleur visage. On regrettera en fait que l'Union Européenne ne s'efforce pas d'exercer une action diplomatique suffisante dans de telles instances, au service d'un renforcement des liens avec l'Amérique latine. Elle s'imposerait d'autant plus que recule l'influence américaine.

* Voir Reuters http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/04/17/us-americas-summit-obama-idUSBRE83F0UD20120417


* Le sommet des Amériques (http://www.summit-americas.org/default_en.htm) est une des manifestations de l'OAS, Organization Of American States (http://www.oas.org/en/default.asp )

mercredi, 26 octobre 2011

US-Bundesbeamte versorgten auch unter Bush verdächtige Kriminelle mit Waffen

US-Bundesbeamte versorgten auch unter Bush verdächtige Kriminelle mit Waffen

Paul Joseph Watson

In der Nachrichtensendung Face the Nation des amerikanischen Fernsehsenders CBS räumte die republikanische Kongressabgeordnete Darell Issa, Vorsitzende des Ausschusses für Aufsicht und Regierungsreform, am vergangenen Sonntagnachmittag ein, unter der Regierung Bush habe bereits ein Programm existiert, dass mit der jüngst in die Schlagzeilen geratenen »Operation Fast and Furious« praktisch identisch gewesen sei. Auch damals hatten Bundesbeamte Schusswaffen direkt an verdächtige Kriminelle geliefert.

 

Das Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosivs (ATF) ließ bereits vor Operation Fast and Furious zu, dass Waffen unkontrolliert den Besitzer wechseln.

»Wir wissen, dass unter der Regierung Bush ähnliche Operationen stattfanden, aber sie waren mit Mexiko abgesprochen«, erklärte der Abgeordnete aus Kalifornien. »Sie haben alles versucht, die Waffen die ganze Zeit im Auge zu behalten. Wir sind daher nicht der Ansicht, dass dieses Verfahren, [die Weitergabewege von] Waffen zu verfolgen, grundsätzlich eine schlechte Idee ist.«

Das Programm der Regierung Bush mit Namen Operation Wide Reciever lief in der Zeit zwischen 2006 und Ende 2007 und wurde von Arizona aus koordiniert. Ähnlich wie im Falle der Operation Fast and Furious ließ das ATF (eine amerikanische Bundesbehörde mit polizeilichen Befugnissen, die dem Justizministerium untersteht) zu, dass Schusswaffen in die Hände mutmaßlicher Rauschgifthändler gerieten, ohne dass dies unterbunden wurde.

Mehr: http://info.kopp-verlag.de/hintergruende/geostrategie/paul-joseph-watson/us-bundesbeamte-versorgten-auch-unter-bush-verdaechtige-kriminelle-mit-waffen.html

mardi, 18 octobre 2011

Occupy Wall Street: Die künstliche Opposition der Neuen Weltordnung

Occupy Wall Street: Die künstliche Opposition der Neuen Weltordnung

Oliver Janich

 

»Zwei Dinge sind unendlich, das Universum und die menschliche Dummheit, aber bei dem Universum bin ich mir nicht ganz sicher«. Mein Lieblingszitat von Albert Einstein könnte über vielen Artikel stehen, aber wenn es um die Occupy-Bewegung geht, trifft es den Nagel wirklich auf den Kopf.

 

Eines vorab: Ich meine nicht, dass jeder, der dort mitmacht, ein Idiot ist. Viele haben berechtigte Zweifel am System und wollen einfach etwas tun. Man kann auch nicht von jedem, der auf die Straße geht, verlangen, dass er erstmal unzählige Bücher über das Geldsystem liest. Aber von den Rädelsführern und denen, die sich ins Fernsehen einladen lassen, darf man das schon verlangen.

Es ist immer schwer zu unterscheiden, ob etwas aus böser Absicht oder aus Dummheit geschieht. War Angela Merkel im Mai 2010 bei der ersten Griechenlandhilfe, als das Desaster begann, aus Zufall in Moskau oder hat sie sich die Befehle ihres Führungsoffiziers abgeholt? Stimmen die Abgeordneten der Ausplünderung Deutschlands zu, weil sie irgendjemand in der Hand hat oder sind sie so doof? Wer weiß das schon?

Mehr: http://info.kopp-verlag.de/hintergruende/geostrategie/oliver-janich/occupy-wall-street-die-kuenstliche-opposition-der-neuen-weltordnung.html

mercredi, 05 octobre 2011

U.S. Plan to Invade Brazil

 

U.S. Plan to Invade Brazil

Ex: http://xtremerightcorporate.blogspot.com/

Not many people know how close the United States came to invading, of all places, Brazil during World War II. Most know that Brazil did finally enter the war as one of the Allied nations and the Brazilian expeditionary force saw action in the later phase of the conflict in Italy against the forces of Nazi Germany and the Italian Social Republic. However, how Brazil came to that point is a sordid tale of diplomatic pressure and military threats against the Brazilian dictator President Getulio Vargas. Today, as with so many others, Vargas is labeled by historians as an example of a far-right dictator but actually moved from right to left and back again in terms of his policies. However, he did finally adopt elements of syndicalism and the “New State” idea first enacted in Portugal by their last great leader Prime Minister Antonio Salazar. President Vargas doubtlessly admired some of the principles of the fascist trend that was sweeping Europe but, more than that, he really had no desire to enter World War II and, as far as Brazilian national security went, was more concerned with Argentina than Germany or Italy. Vargas also had to be wary of taking sides since his army tended to favor the fascist powers while his air force and navy tended to favor the Allies.


The Roosevelt administration was very concerned about Brazil, mostly due to the wealth of natural resources available in the country. They claimed, naturally, that they were worried about Axis aggression against Brazil and South America -famously putting out a forged Axis “war plan” that, among other ludicrous lies, called for Axis forces, having conquered Africa, to jump the Atlantic gap over to Brazil. President Vargas, of course, knew that there was no more danger of Germany and Italy invading Brazil than of them invading Mars. However, he knew he had to keep on friendly terms with the United States which was a much more immediate threat and which, through the Monroe Doctrine, had long claimed all of the Americas as their exclusive sphere of influence. Vargas did such a good job at this that the State Department diplomats in Brazil reported to Washington that they really had no idea which side he was really on. FDR had his State Department strongly “suggest” that Vargas request U.S. military support to strengthen his defenses against possible German and Italian aggression.

Naturally, Vargas turned down this suggestion but later did request simply U.S. weapons and war materials, not for fear of Germany or Italy but for the real threat posed by Argentina. However, FDR’s War Department was hesitant to fulfill that request because they feared that FDR would invade Brazil and American forces would then have Brazilian troops using their own weapons against them. Still, despite the diplomatic pressure from FDR, President Vargas refused to let FDR dictate his foreign policy and he still wanted no part in FDR’s aggressive war to save the Soviet Union. Just this hesitation was deemed as being so outrageous by FDR that he had his military staff come up with the “Joint Basic Plan for the Occupation of Northeastern Brazil”. Keep in mind that this was the same President who had criticized Mussolini for invading Ethiopia (after being provoked), who had criticized Hitler for invading Scandinavia (after the British had mined Norwegian waters) and who had criticized the Japanese for occupying Manchuria even though the Republic of China did not even resist the incursion. Now, FDR was coming up with plans for an invasion of neutral Brazil which had no ties with the Axis and posed absolutely no threat to the United States simply because they refused to fall in behind him.


There is absolutely no doubt about this as, in addition to that contingency plan, an actual plan of attack was drawn up with specific military units assigned to the invasion. FDR approved “Operation Rubber Plan” on December 21, 1940 (before the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor and before the U.S. was even at war herself with Germany, Italy and Japan) which called for -without a declaration of war mind you- a naval bombardment of Brazilian coastal facilities to soften up shore defenses for an amphibious attack by the U.S. Marines. This would be followed by a formal invasion by the 1st and 3rd Marine Battalions from the 5th Marine Division, launched from a naval task force including the battleship USS Texas, the aircraft carrier USS Ranger, 12 troop transports and supporting vessels. The 9th Division, US Army, would then relieve the Marines and press forward the invasion to seize key Brazilian ports and airfields for American use. The 45th Army Infantry Division would be held in reserve in case unexpected resistance was met. All of these forces were in training for this operation and put on the alert to be ready to launch the attack within 10 days of President Roosevelt giving the “go” order.


President Vargas found out about this invasion plan in January of 1942 and, of course, had no choice but to immediately break off diplomatic relations with the Axis and he allowed 150 US Marines to occupy certain Brazilian airfields. Still, however, FDR was not satisfied and his plan for the invasion and occupation of Brazil was not officially set aside until May when Vargas signed the Brazilian-American Defense Agreement. Nonetheless, it was clear that Vargas was acting under extreme duress as he delayed as long as possible committing Brazilian forces to combat in a war which had nothing to do with his country at all. Nonetheless, eventually he was forced to declare war on the Axis and Brazilian troops were dispatched to the bitter fighting in northern Italy where they fought with great courage but were badly mauled by the Italian Monterosa Division. This was the victory which allowed Mussolini to return to Milan where the march to power of his Blackshirts had first begun. But, as far as Brazil was concerned, it was President Roosevelt rather than Mussolini who was the real aggressor and the real threat to their independence and national sovereignty.

dimanche, 02 octobre 2011

Il collasso delle colonie norvegesi in Groenlandia

Il collasso delle colonie norvegesi in Groenlandia

Autore:

Ex: http://www.centrostudilaruna.it/

Una pagina di storia particolarmente interessante dal punto di vista dell’equilibrio fra società umane e ambiente naturale è quella relativa alla fallita colonizzazione scandinava della Groenlandia, terminata con l’abbandono dei due insediamenti, occidentale (Vestribyggd) e orientale (Eystribyggd), posti, in realtà, entramibi sulla costa occidentale della grande isola, l’uno più a nord, l’altro più a sud, presso il Capo Farewell. A metà strada fra i due esisteva un terzo insediamento, molto più piccolo, che si può chiamare Insediamento medio.

Le fonti storiche scandinave sono incerte e confuse, per cui la fine di queste tre colonie europee, poste letteralmente all’estremità del mondo allora conosciuto, rimane a tutt’oggi avvolta nel mistero. Non sappiamo se vennero distrutte dagli Eschimesi, chiamati Skraeling dai coloni norreni, o se scomparvero per una serie di cause legate ai mutamenti climatici che, fra il 1200 e il 1600, videro in tutto l’emisfero boreale il ritorno di una ‘piccola età dei ghiacci’, come è stata chiamata da alcuni scienziati. Oltre ad impoverire ulteriormente le già magre risorse ambientali, dalle quali dipendeva la sopravvivenza dei coloni, l’espansione dei ghiacci rese assai più difficili le rotte marittime nei mari settentrionali e fece sì, che a poco a poco, cessarono di partire dalla Norvegia le navi che avrebbero dovuto assicurare i collegamenti con quell’estremo avamposto europeo.

Certo è che, abbandonati a se stessi, i coloni norvegesi scomparvero.

Le testimonianze letterarie dicono che gli abitanti dell’insediamento occidentale finirono per abbandonare la religione cristiana, probabilmente per adottare quella degli Eschimesi, con i quali, evidentemente, dovette esservi una fusione, o, quanto meno, un tentativo di convivenza pacifica, dopo una fase certamente cruenta, in cui i due popoli vennero a contatto per la prima volta. Va ricordato, infatti, che il peggioramento delle condizioni climatiche indusse gli Eschimesi a spingersi verso sud, inseguendo la loro preda preferita, la foca, dalla quale dipendevano totalmente (un po’ come gli Indiani del Nord America dipendevano dal bisonte).

Mappa della Groenlandia del XVII secolo

Mappa della Groenlandia del XVII secolo

Quanto all’insediamento orientale, che sopravvisse più a lungo – anche perché era assai più consistente -, le testimonianze archeologiche indicano che gli ultimi norvegesi vennero seppelliti secondo il rito cristiano, indossando i loro migliori abiti; per cui si sarebbe portati a credere che, in quel caso, non vi fu alcuna assimilazione da parte dell’elemento indigeno; della quale, del resto, non v’è traccia neanche dal punto di vista antropologico fra gli Eschimesi o Inuit attuali. Nulla, infatti, indica che le due stirpi si siano mescolate: nessun carattere fisico degli Scandinavi, per quanto sporadico, è osservabile negli Eschimesi odierni.

Sempre le testimonianze archeologiche attestano che l’insediamento occidentale fu occupato dagli Eschimesi a partire dal 1341, per cui la fine della colonia norvegese dovette precedere di pochissimo tale data. Nell’insediamento medio, la presenza eschimese sostituisce quella scandinava dal 1380 circa; e per quello orientale, ciò dovette avvenire nei primissimi anni del 1500. Ma, ripetiamo, non è dato sapere, allo stato attuale delle nostre conoscenze, se gli Eschimesi occuparono i fiordi già abbandonati dai norvegesi, o già spopolati dalla ‘morte bianca’; oppure se li occuparono con la forza, uccidendo gli abitanti fino all’ultimo uomo e, magari, facendo prigionieri un certo numero di ragazzi e ragazze, come è documentato che accadde in alcuni scontri di minore entità, verificatisi nei decenni che precedettero la fine della colonia occidentale.

Sappiamo soltanto che sono stati identificati i resti di numerose fattorie norrene nonché di alcune chiese, a testimonianza del fatto che, ai loro tempi d’oro (se mai ve ne furono), i colonizzatori avevano spiegato notevoli mezzi per creare condizioni di vita che fossero quanto più simili possibile a quelle che avevano lasciato nella loro lontana madrepatria, in Norvegia – e, in minor misura, in Islanda.

Scrive il saggista e scrittore gallese Gwyn Jones, nel suo importante studio Antichi viaggi di scoperta in Islanda, Groenlandia e America, ripubblicato alcuni anni fa dalla Casa editrice Newton Compton (titolo originale: The Norse Atlantic saga. Being the Norse Voyages of Discovery and Settlement to Iceland, Greenland, America, 1964, Oxford University Press; traduzione italiana Giorgio Romano, Milano, Bompiani Editore, 1966, pp. 82-110):

“La colonia di Groenlandia, che va tenuta distinta dallo stato o nazione di Groenlandia, sopravvisse fino all’inizio del secolo XVI, e il modo in cui avvenne la sua fine ha interessato a lungo gli studiosi. La Colonia di Groenlandia era il più remoto avamposto della civiltà europea e la sua fine – su un lontano lido, in un paese quasi dimenticato, in condizioni climatiche che peggioravano e in circostanze assai tetre – è stata considerata da molti la più impressionante tragedia vissuta da un popolo nordico. Essa rimane uno dei problemi insoluti della storia.

“Vediamo oggi, col senno di poi, come tutto, nella colonizzazione norrena in Groenlandia, fosse giocato al suo limite. I colonizzatori sarebbero potuti sopravvivere soltanto se non fosse intervenuto nessun mutamento in peggio. In Islanda l’Europeo del Medioevo aveva rischiato le sue ultime possibilità per vivere al nord, e aveva potuto osar questo senza rinunziare a un sistema di vita scandinavo. L’Islanda si trova all’estremo limite del mondo abitabile; la Groenlandia oltre quel limite. Papa Alessandro VI scriveva nel 1492: «La Chiesa di Gardar è situata alla fine del mondo» e la strada per raggiungerla era infaustamente nota: per mare non minus tempestosissimum quam longissimum. Era pertanto un prerequisito per i groenlandesi – se volevano dominare il destino – possedere un naviglio loro capace di solcare i mari. Ben presto invece non ebbero non ebbero a disposizione né i capitali né il materiale per costruirlo; dopo essersi sottomessi alla Norvegia fu loro esplicitamente vietato di usare navi proprie: e, da allora in poi, le condizioni per la sopravvivenza non dipesero più dalla loro volontà. I cambiamenti politici ed economici all’estero, senza loro colpa né offesa, potevano ormai distruggerli, e la loro negligenza doveva mostrarsi altrettanto letale di un attacco. Secondariamente il loro numero era pericolosamente esiguo: probabilmente non raggiunsero mai le tremila anime. La popolazione dell’Islanda dell’anno 1100 era pressappoco di 80.000 persone. Il fuoco, i ghiacci, le pestilenze e l’abbandono da parte dei norvegesi ridussero questo numero a 47.000 nel 1800: uno sciupio omicida per una razza molto prolifica. La Groenlandia non possedeva una siffatta riserva di umani sacrifici. In terzo luogo: di tutte le comunità europee essa era la più vulnerabile ai cambiamenti climatici. Per gli altri uomini dell’Europa una serie di inverni freddi e di cattive estati è una seccatura e un fastidio; per i groenlandesi rappresentava il suono di una campana a morte. (…)

“Con tutta probabilità il freddo crescente e la maggior aridità dopo il 1200 contribuirono gli eschimesi a recarsi verso sud. Man mano che il ghiaccio andava estendendosi lungo le coste ovest della Groenlandia, anche le foche si diffusero; a loro volta gli Skraeling seguirono le foche, perché ogni aspetto della loro vita dipendeva da questi animali. Trichechi e balene, caribù e orsi, pernici bianche e piccoli pesci erano tutti bene accolti dagli eschimesi, ma alle foche essi erano legati in modo particolare. I norreni si spingevano a nord, alla ricerca di territori di caccia e di legname trasportato dalle correnti; gli eschimesi scendevano a sud inseguendo le foche: il loro incontro era inevitabile. Non sappiamo quanti di questi incontri abbiano lasciato tracce di sangue sulla neve, poiché tanto per i norreni quanto per gli eschimesi la posta era alta, ed essi dovevano ben saperlo. Il futuro sarebbe stato favorevole a quel popolo che sarebbe riuscito ad adattarsi meglio al mutamento del clima. Gli eschimesi, resi autosufficienti dalle foche, ben impellicciati e protetti contro il freddo, con le loro tende per l’estate, le case per l’inverno e i velocissimi caicchi, erano invero mirabilmente attrezzati. I norreni, legati alle abitudini europee sino alla fine, della colonizzazione, attaccati ai greggi, alle mandrie e ai pascoli che andavano scomparendo, non potevano sopravvivere al loro fimbulvetr, a quel lungo, spietato, terribile inverno, il cui avvicinarsi annunciava la fine del loro mondo. (…)

“L’insediamento occidentale ebbe termine nel 1342. Abbiamo scarse prove di come ciò sia avvenuto, e sono inoltre prove discutibili. Gli Annali del vescovo Gisli Oddsson precisano sotto la data di quell’anno che: «Gli abitanti della Groenlandia, di loro spontanea volontà, abbandonarono la vera fede e la religione cristiana, avendo abbandonato il retto sentiero e le virtù fondamentali, e si unirono coi popoli dell’America (ad Americae populos se converterunt). Alcuni considerano anche che la Groenlandia si trova molto vicina alle regioni occidentali del mondo. E da questo derivò che i cristiani rinunciassero ai loro viaggi in Groenlandia». Per il vescovo i ‘popoli dell’America’ erano quasi certamente gli eschimesi, cioè quegli stessi Skraeling che i groenlandesi avevano incontrato molto tempo prima in Marclandia e in Vinlandia; e la sua asserzione dev’essere interpretata come un’indicazione che già nel 1342 si riteneva che i groenlandesi fossero divenuti indigeni per costume e religione. Fu probabilmente per esaminare il carattere e l’estensione di quest’apostasia che un anno prima, nel 1341, il vescovo Hakon di Bergen aveva inviato il prete Ivar Bardarson in una spedizione divenuta poi famosa. (…)

“Si sparse la voce che i norreni stavano ‘convertendosi’ alla fede egli eschimesi e abbandonavano la religione cristiana; si disse che bisognava fare qualcosa a questo proposito. Ma allorché Ivar Bardarson arrivò in Groenlandia, una di queste due cose doveva essere accaduta: o gli ultimi sopravvissuti dell’insediamento occidentale si erano ritirati verso il sud per cercare scampo, o erano stati vinti e sterminati dagli Skraeling. Comunque, la spedizione di Ivar non servì che a confermare questo fatto: «attualmente gli Skraeling occupano tutta la Colonia occidentale». La cultura tipicamente scandinava scomparve ovunque al di là della latitudine 62° nord. Dopo il 1350 circa l’esistenza di colonie norrene in Groenlandia era limitata a Eystridyggd.

“I documenti storici e archeologici dimostrano che l’insediamento orientale combatté tenacemente per la propria esistenza. Lì viveva gran parte della popolazione norrena, e lì si trovavano anche le terre migliori. Ciononostante la perdita dell’Insediamento occidentale rappresentò per quello orientale un’irreparabile calamità. Da un lato portò alla perdita del Nordseta, il miglior terreno di caccia della Groenlandia, che si trovava più a nord dell’insediamento perduto e, sebbene la richiesta di prodotti del Norseta fosse in declino, ciò costituì una drastica riduzione delle risorse dei coloni. Ma ancora più grave fu la sensazione che un destino analogo minacciasse anche l’insediamento rimasto. Certamente gli eschimesi stavano reagendo duramente alla presenza dei bianchi nel sud; e noi apprendiamo dagli Annali islandesi (Gottskalksannal) che intorno al 1379 «gli Skaraeling attaccarono i groenlandesi, ne uccisero diciotto e rapirono due ragazzi che fecero schiavi». (…)

“Le testimonianze relative alle comunicazioni tra la Groenlandia e il mondo esterno, dopo la metà del secolo XIV, si possono così sintetizzare: nei primi decenni una nave, protetta dal monopolio regale, compì, a intervalli frequenti se non proprio ogni anno, il tragitto Norvegia Groenlandia. Era questo il Groenlands knörr, il Corriere della Groenlandia; ma non sembra che sia stato sostituito dopo che andò perduto nel 1367 o ’69. In seguito le comunicazioni furono scarse. Tutte le prove che possediamo di viaggi in Groenlandia riguardano una strana serie di uomini: Bjorn Einarsson Jorsalafari, detto il Pellegrino di Gerusalemme, fece naufragio in Groenlandia e vi rimase per due anni; un gruppo d’islandesi, smarrita la rotta, vi arrivò nel 1406 e vi rimase quattro anni; una coppia alquanto misteriosa, Pining e Pothorst, fece un viaggio piuttosto chimerico in Groenlandia, e pare anche oltre, nell’oceano occidentale, forse anche fino al Labrador, poco dopo il 1470, aggiungendo così nuove sfumature fantastiche alla cartografia del Rinascimento e qualche luce, ma anche molte ombre, alle vaghe conoscenze che il XVI secolo ebbe del più remoto settentrione. (…)

“Quando e come si sia estinto l’Insediamento orientale non sapremo mai. Con ogni probabilità il fenomeno si verificò subito dopo la fine del 1500. Deve esserci stato un progressivo indebolimento della Colonia. A Herjolfsnes, e ancor più probabilmente a Unartoq, ci sono prove di sepolture collettive che possono far pensare a una morte per epidemia, forse per peste, sebbene non se ne trovi conferma nelle fonti storiche. Come per Vestribyggd, dobbiamo immaginare che la Colonia si sia andata ritirando sotto la pressione eschimese, mentre le famiglie che vivevano ai confini indietreggiavano verso le zone centrali, e alcuni (non necessariamente gli spiriti più deboli) coglievano l’occasione per far ritorno in Islanda o in Norvegia. Altri furono rapiti da violenti predoni europei, tra i quali par che predominassero gli inglesi; ed è logico ritenere che l’isolamento, profondamente sentito, unito alle altre sciagure, abbia alimentato una debolezza fisica e morale che ridusse la volontà di sopravvivenza. Nel complesso la vecchia teoria che la Colonia groenlandese sia andata morendo tra l’indifferenza del resto del mondo rimane sostanzialmente valida. (…)

“Quando nel 1586 l’inglese John Davis riuscì a sfuggire all’atroce desolazione delle coste sud-orientali della Groenlandia e contemplò con sollievo «semplice paesaggio campestre con terra ed erba», all’interno dei fiordi occidentali, non trovò nessuna traccia di bianchi, «né vide alcuna cosa a eccezione di avvoltoi, corvi e piccoli uccelli, come allodole e fanelli». Questi erano i fiordi dell’antico Insediamento occidentale, ma la stessa cosa era di quello orientale. La terra, l’acqua e tutto ciò che esse potevano offrire appartenevano ormai agli esuberanti e tenaci eschimesi. La vicenda norrena in Groenlandia era giunta alla fine”.

La Groenlandia era stata visitata da arditi navigatori vichinghi già al principio del X secolo e colonizzata a partire dal 982 per opera di Erik il Rosso, che la chiamò “Terra Verde” perché tale, in estate, è l’aspetto di alcuni fiordi riparati, ove fioriscono alcuni verdi prati e si concentra buona parte della fauna dell’isola.

Grazie alla presenza di correnti marine calde, era la costa più lontana dall’Europa, ossia quella occidentale, a presentare le condizioni più favorevoli per un insediamento; e fu lì che si concentrarono gli sforzi di quei primi coloni, provenienti tutti dall’Islanda. Il loro numero si stabilizzò intorno alle tremila unità; la loro economia, oltre che su di una limitata attività silvo-pastorale, era basata essenzialmente sul commercio delle pelli di foca e sulle ossa di balena (cfr. Enzo Collotti, La storia della Groenlandia, in Enciclopedia Geografica Il Milione, Novara, De Agostini, 1970, vol. X, p. 135).

Anche il cristianesimo si organizzò presso quelle comunità scandinave, tanto che nel 1126 fu insediato in Groenlandia, per la prima volta, un vescovo norvegese.

Scrive il Collotti (loc. cit.):

“Seppure per breve tempo, i legami con la Norvegia erano destinati a divenire ancora più stretti ed istituzionali, allorché nel 1261 fu riconosciuta sull’isola la sovranità del re di Norvegia. Successivamente, il progressivo allentamento dei rapporti con la penisola scandinava fu conseguenza della creazione di un nuovo equilibrio di forze politiche e di nuove correnti di traffico, che dirottarono il commercio norvegese verso gli interessi dei mercanti tedeschi, che avevano finito con l’assumere di fatto il controllo dei traffici della Norvegia”.

Anche se si tratta di una pagina di storia generalmente poco conosciuta, il collasso della colonizzazione norvegese in Groenlandia offre un esempio, che si potrebbe definire paradigmatico, di come una società umana non possa reggersi indefinitamente in un ambiente in cui essa non è in grado di adattarsi in maniera adeguata.

Non vi sono prove del fatto che i Norvegesi abusarono delle risorse locali offerte dalla magra vegetazione e dalla fauna artica; è certo, invece, che non furono in grado di fronteggiare il peggioramento climatico con gli scarsi mezzi di cui disponevano. Il colpo di grazia venne poi da una serie di circostanze concomitanti: il disinteresse del re di Norvegia, che di fatto li abbandonò al loro destino, dopo averli obbligati a rinunciare, per legge, all’esercizio di una propria marineria; le migrazioni verso sud di gruppi, relativamente numerosi, di Eschimesi, assai meglio adattati alla sopravvivenza in quell’ambiente ostile; alcune probabili pestilenze, testimoniate da un certo numero di sepolture comuni; e, infine, le incursioni di alcuni pirati europei, specialmente inglesi, che rapirono gli abitanti e devastarono le loro fattorie.

Ad ogni modo, la lezione che possiamo trarre da quella lontana vicenda è chiara: un gruppo umano non può mantenersi su un determinato territorio, a meno che sappia integrarsi con l’ambiente, usufruire adeguatamente delle sue risorse, adattarsi ai cambiamenti climatici ed ecologici e introdurre quelle innovazioni, nei suoi metodi di lavoro e nella sua psicologia, che gli consentano di attenuare l’impatto dovuto ai mutamenti stessi.

Il risultato della incapacità dei coloni norvegesi in Groenlandia di adattarsi a condizioni di vita sensibilmente diverse da quelle esistenti in Scandinavia fu la decadenza della loro società, il suo progressivo restringimento, che dovette essere anche morale e spirituale oltre che materiale, e infine la loro scomparsa totale e irreversibile.

Il loro principale errore, se così possiamo chiamarlo, fu, in altre parole, quello di aver cercato di colonizzare la Groenlandia come se fosse stata la Norvegia o magari l’Islanda: non si resero conto che le condizioni del clima e del suolo erano sostanzialmente diverse e che solo sforzandosi di elaborare nuove forme di caccia, di pesca, di architettura e di riscaldamento, avrebbero potuto sopravvivere e, forse, prosperare. Il loro fu un vero e proprio collasso tecnico e morale: ed è impressionante pensare che dei coraggiosi e valentissimi marinai, quali essi erano stati, alla fine, quando ciò sarebbe stato questione di vita o di morte, non seppero mettere in mare neppure una nave per ristabilire il collegamento con l’Europa o, almeno, per evacuare ordinatamente i loro sfortunati insediamenti.

Per trovare un esempio altrettanto drammatico di come la decadenza dell’arte della navigazione possa segnare il destino di una importante società umana, bisogna spostarsi di molte decine di migliaia di chilometri, fino nel cuore dell’Oceano Pacifico meridionale, sull’isola di Pasqua (Rapa-Nui in polinesiano). Gli studi più recenti hanno ormai ampiamente dimostrato che la civiltà che aveva saputo costruire gli sbalorditivi monumenti di pietra, i Moai, che tanto colpirono i primi coloni europei, dopo la scoperta dell’isola da parte di Roggeveen nel 1722, subì un collasso irreversibile a causa del dissennato disboscamento praticato dagli indigeni. L’isola di Pasqua, allorché vi giunsero i colonizzatori polinesiani provenienti da occidente – probabilmente da Tahiti – era ammantata da una straordinaria, lussureggiante foresta primigenia. Ma, nel corso di alcuni secoli, essa venne ridotta a una landa sassosa battuta dai venti, a causa della deforestazione incontrollata, il cui scopo era mettere a coltura nuovi terreni fertili, procurare legname per le imbarcazioni da pesca, per le abitazioni, e per il riscaldamento, nonché la stessa tecnica di trasporto delle statue colossali, dalle pendici del vulcano centrale fino alle coste dell’isola, che richiedeva l’uso dei tronchi degli alberi in funzione di rulli.

Allorché l’ultimo albero venne abbattuto, la pratica della navigazione d’alto mare andò irrimediabilmente perduta e quei fieri navigatori, regrediti a coltivatori sedentari del tutto isolati dal resto del mondo, precipitarono in una serie di guerre intestine che cancellarono perfino il ricordo della passata grandezza.

Al giorno d’oggi, gli uomini fanno totalmente affidamento sui continui progressi della tecnica per imporre un controllo sempre più forte sull’ambiente in cui vivono; sono convinti, infatti, di poter padroneggiare qualsiasi ambiente naturale, tanto è vero che sono allo studio persino dei progetti di colonizzazione spaziale.

Ma, in questo modo, ci sembra che la lezione della fallita colonizzazione norvegese in Groenlandia (e del collasso della civiltà dell’isola di Pasqua, di cui ci occuperemo in un prossimo lavoro), sia andata interamente perduta. Non bisognerebbe puntare, infatti, su una radicale trasformazione dell’ambiente ai fini delle esigenze umane, bensì puntare al raggiungimento dell’equilibrio fra le esigenze della società umana – economiche, culturali e spirituali – e l’ambiente medesimo. In altre parole, l’uomo dovrebbe cercare di vivere in armonia con la natura, e non di imporre ad essa, in tutto e per tutto, le sue necessità, cercando di creare quasi una seconda natura “artificiale”. Procedendo in quest’ultima direzione, infatti, egli crea con le sue stesse mani le premesse per una degenerazione degli equilibri ambientali, che prima o poi gli si ritorcerà contro; senza contare che la tecnologia, quanto più è sofisticata, tanto più è settoriale e non adeguata a fronteggiare situazioni impreviste, quali un rapido cambiamento climatico.

I piccoli Eschimesi, ben coperti nelle loro calde pellicce e ben attrezzati per la caccia alla foca, sia per mare che a terra, sopravvissero all’avvento della ‘piccola età glaciale’, che si abbatté sulla Groenlandia a partire dal XIII secolo; mentre gli alti e forti Norvegesi si estinsero miseramente, senza lasciar di sé alcuna traccia, tranne alcune fattorie in rovina e poche chiese abbandonate, con i loro malinconici cimiteri.

La lezione, ripetiamo, è piuttosto chiara.

Qualora le circostanze climatiche e ambientali dovessero mutare, anche a livello globale, non sarebbe una tecnologia sempre più invasiva a salvarci, ma, al contrario, la capacità di elaborare una tecnologia a misura di ambiente, ossia la capacità di creare condizioni di adattamento eco-compatibili che, rispettando le altre specie viventi animali e vegetali, offrirebbero anche a noi maggiori possibilità di sopravvivenza.

È evidente che, in una simile prospettiva, dovremmo rinunciare alla funesta ideologia dello sviluppo illimitato e al delirio di onnipotenza che le filosofie scientiste hanno veicolato, dal 1600 ad oggi; per ritrovare, invece, le ragioni di una presenza umana sul pianeta Terra che non sia più vista in termini di ‘crescita’ e di sfruttamento indiscriminato delle risorse, ma di armonioso inserimento nell’ambiente naturale.

lundi, 15 août 2011

Europe's Enemy: Islam or America?

Europe’s Enemy: Islam or America?
Guillaume Faye’s Le coup d’Etat mondial

Michael O'MEARA

Ex: http://www.counter-currents.com/

Guillaume Faye
Le coup d’Etat mondial:
Essai sur le Nouvel Impérialisme Américain
(Global Coup d’Etat: An Essay on the New American Imperialism)
Paris: L’Æncre, 2004

 Fas est ab hoste doceri. (It is permitted to learn from the enemy.) — Ovid

This past spring, for the sixth time in six years, Guillaume Faye has published a book that redefines the political contours of European nationalism (“nationalism” here referring not to the defense of the nineteenth-century “nation-state,” but of Magna Europa). Like each of his previous works, Coup d’Etat mondial speaks to the exigencies of the moment, as well as to the perennial concerns of the European ethnos. In this spirit, it offers a scathing critique of the “new American imperialism” and the European anti-Americanism opposing it, while simultaneously contributing to a larger nationalist debate over Europe’s destiny. Framed in terms of Carl Schmitt’s Freund/Feind designation, this debate revolves around the question: Who is Europe’s enemy? For Schmitt, this question is tantamount to asking who threatens Europe’s state system and, by implication, who threatens its unique bioculture.

During the Cold War, the more advanced nationalists rejected the conventional view that Soviet Communism was the principal enemy and instead designated the United States. This is evident in the works of Francis Parker Yockey, Jean Thiriart, Adriano Romualdi, Otto Strasser, Alain de Benoist, and in the politics of the sole European statesman to have defended Europe’s independence in the postwar period: Charles de Gaulle.

It was not, however, America’s occupation of postwar Europe that alone aligned these nationalists against the U.S.—though this was perhaps cause enough. Rather, it was the liberal democratic basis of America’s postwar order, whose deculturating materialism was seen as corrupting the biocultural foundations of European life. The Soviets’ brutal occupation of Eastern Europe may therefore have broken the bodies of those opposing them, but America, for nationalists, threatened their souls.

Today, this anti-American opposition persists, but has come to signify something quite different. What has changed, and this starts to be evident in the late 1980s and even more so in the ’90s, is Third World immigration, which puts the American threat in an entirely altered perspective. In nationalist ranks, Faye stands out as the principal proponent of the view that Islam and its nonwhite immigrants now constitute Europe’s enemy and that America, though still an adversary, has become a less threatening menace.

For Faye, the New American Imperialism (NAI) associated with the Bush administration supplants the earlier, more implicit imperialism of the Cold War era. This imperialism, though, is not specifically Bush’s creation, for it arose in the Cold War’s wake and took form in subsequent aggressions on Somalia, Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and now Iraq.

The older imperialism had a Wilsonian facade, legitimated with moral pronouncements and a naive, but occasionally sincere, effort to regulate the world according to its liberal principles. By contrast, the NAI rejects this “softer” (and actually more effective) variant of American power for a policy that aggressively asserts U.S. military might irrespective of “world opinion.” It ceases thus to pursue its interests through international organizations embodying its liberal world view and instead embraces a militaristic unilateralism that defies international convention in the name of America’s “vital interests.”

Against the arguments of its apologists, Faye claims the NAI is not the hard-headed, morally clear assertion of American power that they make it out to be, but rather a puerile, utopian, and unrealistic one based on the notion that tout est permis!— anything goes. The United States may be the world’s dominant power, but it lacks what Aristotle and the conservative tradition of statecraft understood as the enduring basis of power: prudence. For in confusing dominance with omnipotence, the NAI’s neoconservative executors, like all who draw the wages of hubris, inadvertently earn themselves—and America—the likelihood of a tragic fall.

In this vein, U.S. vital interests (what the present administration defines in Zionist, militarist, and globalist terms) are treated as the sole permissible basis of national sovereignty. A state—”rogue” or otherwise—that exercises its autonomy, fabricates weapons of mass destruction (i.e., weapons capable of ensuring its sovereignty), or resists Washington’s dictates is deemed an enemy and risks reprisal. Implicit in this redefinition of America’s world role is the assumption that the United States is the world’s gendarme, its lone sovereign power, obliged to uphold a law which is synonymous with its own strategic interests.

Moreover, the NAI’s assumption that the United States has the capacity to dominate the planet is, if nothing else, simpleminded. Its proponents might think they are breaking with the legalistic or Kantian postulates of liberal internationalism by pursuing hegemonist objectives with military methods (which, in itself, would be unobjectionable), but this readiness to substitute raw power for other forms of power (that is, for power exercised in the “thieves’ den” of the United Nations or through international regulatory agencies the United States created after 1945) is informed by the Judeo-Protestant illusion that America does God’s work in the world. This cannot but disconnect them from all they seek to dominate, for in applying their illusory principles to an intractable reality, they cannot but lurch from disaster to disaster.

The NAI’s peculiar mix of political Machiavellianism and millennial Calvinism has been especially prominent in Iraq, the conquest of which was to be a cakewalk. Not only did Bush and his advisers have no idea of what they were getting into, they completely misread the capacities of American power. If the U.S. Air Force possesses unparalleled firepower, the modern American soldier cannot fight on the ground. With half its army occupying a country with no military capacity and its helicopter gunships, Bradley Fighting Vehicles, and body-armored ground troops arrayed against lightly-armed and untrained insurgents, it is stretched to the breaking-point.

Despite its imperialist ambitions, America is not Rome. Faye argues that it is more like a house of cards—an ephemeral economic-political enterprise—lacking those ethnic, religious, and cultural traits that go into making a great people and a great power.

As any white Californian will attest, there is, in fact, no longer anything particularly American about America, only people like the turbaned Sikh who drives the local cab, the Mexican illegal who mows our neighbors’ lawn, the Indian programmer who replaces his higher-paid white counterpart, the Chinese grocer who sells us beer and cigarettes late at night, the African who empties the bedpans in our nursing homes, the Africans of American birth who run our cities and public agencies, and the white zombies insulated in distant, manicured suburbs, where the voices of children are rarely heard. For Faye, this disparate hodgepodge is not a nation in any historical sense, only an artificial social system, whose members, as Lewis Lapham has written, are “united by little else except the possession of a credit card and password to the internet.” Why, it seems almost unnecessary to ask, would an American Gurkha risk his life for such an entity?

The military technology of Imperial America undoubtedly lacks an equal, but its centrality to U.S. power, Faye claims, testifies to nothing so much as the enfeebled cognitive abilities of its elites, who think their computerized gadgetry is a substitute for those primordial human qualities that go into making a people or a nation—qualities such as those that steeled not just Rome’s republican legions, but the Celtic-Saxon ranks of the Confederacy, the gunmen of the IRA, the indomitable battalions of the Wehrmacht, and the Red Army of the Great Patriotic War. In the absence of these qualities forged by blood and history, the NAI’s space-age military (whose recruiters now slip beneath the border to find the “volunteers” for its imperial missions) is a paper tiger, no match for a nation in arms—not even a pathetic, misbegotten nation like Iraq.

The hubris-ridden neoconservatives leading America into this costly adventure from which it is unlikely to recover did so without the slightest consideration of the toll it would take on the country’s already stressed and overtaxed institutions. Fighting for objectives that are everywhere challenged and with troops that are not only afraid to die, but have no idea of what they are dying for, the only thing they have actually accomplished is what they set out to combat: For they have inflamed the Middle East, enhanced Islam’s prestige, augmented bin Laden’s ranks, accelerated the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and turned the whole world against them.

Finally, Faye depicts the NAI as America’s last bloom. Both domestically and internationally, the signs of American decline, he observes, are more and more evident. For all that once distinguished America is now tarnished. Its melting pot no longer assimilates, its mixed-race population is inextricably Balkanized, its state is increasingly maniacal in its anti-white, anti-family, anti-community policies, and its market, the one remaining basis of social integration, is in serious difficulty, burdened by massive trade imbalances, unable to generate industrial jobs, hampered by astronomical debts and deficits, and increasingly dependent on the rest of the world. Even the country’s fabled democracy has ceased to work, with elections decided by the courts, fraudulent polling practices, and a pervasive system of spin and simulacrum. The virtuality of the political process seems, actually, to reflect nothing so much as the increasingly illusory authority of its reigning elites, whose oligarchic disposition and incompetent management necessitates a system of smoke and mirrors.

Internationally, America faces a no less bleak situation. Faye points out that the almighty dollar, for sixty years the world’s reserve currency, is now threatened by the euro (which means the country will soon no longer be able to live on credit); the European Union and Asia’s rising economic colossus are undermining its primacy in world markets; it faces the wrath of a billion Muslims worldwide and does nothing to stem the Muslim immigration to the United States; its occupation of Iraq is causing it to hemorrhage monetarily, morally, and militarily; and, not least, its image and integrity have been so damaged that raw power alone sustains its fragile hegemony.

Unlike the implicit imperialism of the Cold War era, the NAI is openly anti-European. In this vein, it opposes the continent’s political unification; treats its allies, even its British poodle, with contempt; practices a divide and conquer tactic which pits the so-called New Europe against the Old; and pursues a strategic orientation aimed at containing Europe and keeping it dependent on the U.S. security system.

In parallel with this anti-Europeanism, there has developed in Europe what Faye calls an “obsessional and hysterical anti-Americanism” (OHAA). He sees this development as so destructive of Europe’s self-interest that he factitiously suggests that it is probably subsidized by the CIA. For this anti-Americanism bears little relation to earlier forms of French anti-Americanism, which sought to defend France’s High Culture from the subversions of America’s culture industry. Nor are its right-wing proponents firmly in the pale of the “new revolutionary nationalism,” which designates liberalism’s cosmopolitan plutocracy as the chief enemy and resists its denationalization of capital, population, and territory. Instead, this OHAA not only does nothing to advance the European project, its fixation on the NAI inadvertently contributes to the Islamization and Third Worldization of the continent, hastening, in effect, its demise as a civilizational entity.

Touching the government and numerous nationalist tendencies, in addition to the perennially anti-identitarian Left, this OHAA is informed by a simpleminded Manichaeanism, which assumes that America’s enemy (Islam) is Europe’s friend. By this logic, America is depicted as a source of evil and Islam as a possible savior. In effect, these anti-Americans adopt not just Islam’s Manichaean world view, but that of the Judeo-Protestants who make up Bush’s political base. For like the neoconservative publicists and propagandists advising the administration and like the mullahs shepherding their submissive, but fanatical flocks, they too paint the world in black and white terms, the axis of good versus the axis of evil, with the enemy (America or Islam) seen as the source of all evil and our side (America or Islam) as the seat of all virtue.

And just as the liberal/neocon image of America is Hebraic, not Greco-European, these European anti-Americans carry in their demonstrations the flags of Iraq, Palestine, Algeria, and Morocco, shout Allah Akbar, and affirm their solidarity with Islam—all without the slightest affirmation of their own people and culture. This simple-minded Manichaeanism influences not only left-wing immigrationists bent on subverting Europe’s bioculture, but French New Rightists around Alain de Benoist, revolutionary nationalists around Christian Bouchet, traditionalists around the Austrian Martin Schwartz and the Italian Claudio Mutti, and various Eurasianists, as well as many lesser known tendencies. Worse, the politicians catering to this anti-Americanism oppose the NAI less for the sake of Europe’s autonomy than for that of its large Muslim minority. They thus refuse to be an American protectorate, but at the same time display the greatest indifference to the fact that they are rapidly becoming an Islamic-Arabic colony: Eurabia.

The economic and cultural war the United States wages on Europe, Faye stresses, ought to warrant the firmest of European ripostes, but to feel the slightest solidarity with Islam, even when “unjustly” attacked, is simply masochistic—for, if the last 1400 years is any guide, it seeks nothing so much as to conquer and destroy Europe. American plutocratic liberalism may be responsible for fostering transnational labor markets that import millions of Third World immigrants into the white Lebensraum, but if the latter are ignored for the sake of resisting the former, the end result may soon be that there will no Europeans left to defend. (Medically, this would be equivalent to fighting typhoid by ignoring the infectious bacillus assaulting the sufferer and instead concentrating exclusively on eliminating the contaminated food and water that transmit it —in which case the disease would be eradicated, but the patient not live to appreciate it).

The OHAA’s simpleminded politics, Faye argues, ends up not just misconceiving Europe’s enemy, but sanctioning its colonization, including the colonization of its mind. Like the “poor African” who is routinely portrayed as the victim of white colonialism, this sort of anti-Americanism makes the European the victim of U.S. imperialism. As we know from experiences on our side of the Atlantic, such a mentality takes responsibility for nothing and attributes everything it finds objectionable to the white man, in this case the American.

More pathetically still, in designating the United States as an irreconcilable enemy and Islam as a friend, these anti-Americans inadvertently dance to Washington’s own tune. Based on his La colonisation de l’Europe: Discours vrai sur l’immigration et l’Islam (2000) and in reference to Alexander del Valle’s Islamisme et Etats-Unis: Une alliance contre l’Europe (1999), Faye contends that since the early 1980s U.S. policy has aggressively promoted Europe’s Third Worldization—through its ideology of human rights, multiculturalism, and multiracialism, through its unrelenting effort to force the European Union to admit Turkey, but above all through its intervention on behalf of Islam in the Yugoslavian civil war. In all these ways fostering social, religious, cultural, and ethnic divisions that neutralize Europe’s potential threat to its own hegemony, it seeks to subvert European unity.

Looking to the Arab world to counter U.S. imperialism can only lead to national suicide. Those who advocate Europe’s alliance with the Third World are thus for Faye not simply naive, but neurotic. America may be a competitor, an adversary, a culturally distorting force, it may even be the principal international force for liberal cosmopolitanism, but in relation to the ethnocidal threat posed by Islam it is almost entirely innocuous. Europeans can always recover from the deculturation that comes from American domination, but not from the destruction of their genetic heritage, which Islam promises. Faye suggests that this anti-American neurosis, like the classic textbook pathology, designates America as its enemy for fear of acknowledging the danger looming under its very nose. As such, the anti-American Islamophiles refuse to see what’s happening in Europe, whose soft, dispirited white population is increasingly cowed by Islam’s conquering life-force. For however much American policy assaults Europe, it does not constitute the life-and-death danger which the invading Islamic colonizers do. To think otherwise is possible only by ignoring the primacy of race and culture. Instead, then, of pursuing chimerical relations with people whose underlying motive is the destruction of Europe as we know it, it would be wiser, Faye claims, for Europeans to view what’s happening in Iraq as the Chinese and Indians do: with cynical detachment and an eye to their own self-interest.

The greatest danger to Europe, and this idea is the axis around which Faye’s argument revolves, comes from the Islamic lands to the “South,” whose nonwhite immigrants are presently colonizing the continent, assuming control of its biosphere, and altering the foundations of European life. For European nationalists and governments to treat America, with its shallow, provisional power, as the enemy and Islam, with its nonwhite multitudes pressing on Europe’s borders, as its friend is the height of folly.

Not coincidentally, such an anti-Americanism is first cousin to the anti-white sensibility one finds in American liberal and neoconservative ranks. For just as those who try to convince us that America is a “creed,” not a white nation, these anti-Americans allying with Islam to fight the ricains betray their patrie—treating it as an abstraction and not a people. If Americans would be better off using their troops to defend their porous border instead of playing cowboy in Mesopotamia, as we white nationalists believe, Europeans loyal to their heritage would do better, Faye advises, to resist rather than to make common cause with those who are presently invading their lands.

To Faye, there can never be a total rupture between Europe and white America, given the blood bonds linking them. They might pursue divergent interests, over which dispute is inevitable, but the racial and cultural differences separating Europe from the Islamic world are insurmountable. In this spirit, he predicts that “the great clashes of the 21st century will not pit the United States against the rest of the world, but rather the Whitemen of the North against all the other racial-civilizational blocs.”

The culturally noxious effects of the liberal-democratic order of money imposed on Europe after 1945 caused European nationalists to define themselves in opposition not just to American-style liberalism, but to America as a nation. For those nationalists who continue to uphold this line, Third World immigration (which they do not favor) is viewed as an offshoot of a techno-economic system that dismisses biocultural qualities for the quantifying ones of the liberal market.

Only in fighting this system, and its chief sponsor, the United States, will Europe, they believe, be able to defend its heritage and its destiny. The Third World immigrants experiencing the deracination that comes with transnational labor markets cannot, then, be Europe’s enemy, for they too are its victim. Besides, their traditionalist, premodern culture makes them prospective allies in what is seen as a common struggle against America’s “cultureless civilization.”

But even in granting that there is a certain logic—even a certain justice—to this position, it rests upon two false premises, which Guillaume Faye has been almost alone in Europe in polemicizing: 1) that culture trumps race and 2) that race is unrelated, if not irrelevant, to culture.

His Coup d’Etat mondial offers, then, a powerful antidote to this false and potentially fatal reasoning. It demystifies the new American imperialism, revealing its tenuous character. It exposes the self-destructive character of an opposition refusing to recognize Europe’s real enemy. And, most important, in designating this enemy—the nonwhite colonizers who hope to turn Europe into a dar-al-Islam—it designates what is the single, most unavoidable, and absolutely necessary duty of white people everywhere: the defense of their homelands.

Source: TOQ, vol. 5, no. 3 (Summer 2005)


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URL to article: http://www.counter-currents.com/2011/08/europes-enemy-islam-or-americaguillaume-fayes-le-coup-detat-mondial/

mardi, 26 juillet 2011

Atlantis & the Death of the American Myth

atlantis.jpg

Atlantis & the Death of the American Myth

John MORGAN

Ex: http://www.counter-currents.com/

On Friday, July 8, 2011, the 135th and last-ever space shuttle mission, carried out by the shuttle Atlantis, is being launched. What many Americans don’t seem to realize yet is that this effectively marks the end of a half-century of America’s adventure into space which began with John F. Kennedy’s call for America to land men on the Moon in his famous 1961 speech.

Since that time NASA carried out the Mercury, Gemini and Apollo programs, the last of which successfully completed 6 astronaut landings on the Moon. This was followed closely by the shuttle program, which began in 1981 and lasted for 30 years. So after this illustrious record, what’s next?

The answer is: nothing. NASA had a Constellation program in development which was intended to replace the shuttle, and which it was hoped would eventually return men to the Moon and perhaps eventually go on to Mars. But last year President Obama declared that the program was hopelessly behind schedule and over-budget, and killed it, over the protests of many of the Apollo astronaut veterans. After all, when you’re engaged in two wars (four these days, counting Libya and Yemen) and trying to create and fund a lot of ambitious social programs while being trillions of dollars in debt, space travel seems a bit extravagant.

This means that from now on, if America ever wants or needs to send astronauts into space, such as to the international space station, it will have to hitch a ride with its former competitors, the Russians. (If there is any greater indicator of declining American power and wealth than that, I don’t know what it is.) And the Russians are still using the same old Soyuz rockets that they’ve been building since the 1960s. It makes you think that maybe the U.S. should have kept around a few of its Saturn V rockets from the Apollo days.

Not that manned American spaceflight is completely dead. After killing the Constellation project, Obama’s people came up with a plan by which NASA may eventually build some sort of capsule that can be attached to existing commercial satellite launchers, rockets that are built and owned by private companies rather than by NASA itself. So the dream of space travel has officially been privatized. How far off can “Planet Starbucks” be, to quote Fight Club?

I can’t get too worked up about the fate of the shuttle itself. Its technology is antiquated by today’s standards. And it was never really inspiring, since all it ever did, and all it was ever capable of doing, was to make short excursions into low-earth orbit and then come home. As an American kid growing up in the 1980s, I remember the shuttle was kind of a bummer after the previous generation had been able to experience the thrill of landing men on the Moon.

But still, the shuttle was cool. It could land like a plane rather than splashing down in the ocean as the old space capsules had done. It could be re-used many times, unlike all previous rockets. And it at least showed that we were doing something in space.

In the ’80s many of us were convinced that the shuttle was just part of a larger plan to bring the world of 2001: A Space Odyssey into reality, with routine flights to the Moon, manned missions to other planets, and Hiltons in orbit, all within our lifetimes.

Looking back after 30 years and 135 missions, it now seems that NASA was just marking time. Atlantis is the end of an era, and an indicator of the dangerous new era that America is entering.

Like any healthy civilization, America, since its birth, has always had a motivating myth to inspire its people, westward expansion being the most prominent one. In the 1960s, when American confidence was flagging in the face of apparently unstoppable Soviet expansionism and the ongoing humiliation of the Vietnam War, the goal of landing a man on the Moon helped to inspire Americans.

Yes, I’m well aware that the Apollo program was not really about the grandeur of space exploration or the desire to go there “in peace for all mankind,” but was just intended to pay the Soviet Union back for Sputnik. And I think most Americans must have known that at the time.

But still, it was exciting, and it was a good reason to do well in school or read a book or care about your country. And as a myth, it continues to be effective — “landing a man on the Moon” has been a rallying cry for defenders of America and Western civilization ever since.

While space travel was inspiring to me as a boy, in my adult years other things inspire me now. A great book or a great piece of music, or a spiritually advanced individual, or someone dedicated wholeheartedly to a good cause, mean a lot more to me these days than do astronauts or space flights.

I’ve also grown quite negative in my view of America’s role in the world, as well as of science’s ability to solve humanity’s genuine problems (and still more about scientism, or science’s elevation to the same status that rightfully belongs to religion). But in spite of all that, if America landed astronauts on the Moon or Mars, I haven’t grown so cold that it wouldn’t warm my heart.

Every great civilization has a motivating myth that gives its citizens a sense of purpose and meaning. And the United States did have that once, even when those myths were occasionally bad ones, such as “making the world safe for democracy.” But what myth can America offer today? The only myths that we have are not those which spark the imagination, one’s enthusiasm and the will, but only those by which America is trying desperately not to lose what it already has, such as the “war on terror,” which is really just a clumsy attempt to reverse America’s declining geopolitical power and grab the last of the cheap oil resources.

I really don’t know what inspires young minds today. At the risk of sounding like a young fogey (I’m only 37), perhaps that’s why the younger generation seem so materialistic and self-centered, since there’s never been much in terms of social idealism to capture their imaginations. What can America offer as something to inspire its young people? National health care? Multiculturalism? Imposing democracy by force of arms upon people who don’t want it? Bringing down the deficit? No wonder the young are more interested in worrying about their careers and their bank accounts.

I think the most frightening aspect of the end of American manned spaceflight has been the apparent lack of public outcry about it. Either people are ignorant of what’s afoot, or they are simply too jaded or worried about more immediate problems to care. Whatever the case may be, the end of the shuttle program marks the end of the last vestiges of the American myth.

I generally tend to shy away from apocalyptic collapse scenarios. Still, it cannot be denied that the United States, while it may continue to coast in some form for decades to come, has already seen its best days. The task now is not to mourn but to construct an alternative which can inspire our people for the age that will come after the American age. And I think we can do better.


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jeudi, 24 février 2011

Klansmen, Irishmen, & Nativists

Klansmen, Irishmen, & Nativists:
The Origins of Racial Nationalism in America

Ex: http://www.counter-currents.com/

The heterogeneity of America’s European population has always posed a challenge to its national identity. Only late in the nineteenth century was this identity extended to European immigrants assimilated in its Anglo-Protestant values and, in the twentieth century, to Catholics, whose Church (the “Whore of Babylon”) had learned to accommodate the Protestant contours of American life (or what John Murray Cuddihy called its “civil religion”). From this ethnogenesis, the original Anglo-Protestant identity of the American people gradually evolved into a more inclusive European Christian identity, though one closely tied to its Anglo-Protestant antecedents.

Based on this heritage, racial nationalists today define America as a European nation and designate its anti-white elites as their principal enemy.

It was, though, but in fits and starts that American whites acquired an ethnonational identity. What’s often referred to as American nationalism—the expansionist slogans of Manifest Destiny, the ideology of Anglo-Saxonism, the gunboat diplomacy of the Progressives (McKinley, T. Roosevelt, Wilson)—was more a chauvinist statism legitimating territorial expansionism and land speculation than an ideological offshoot of the country’s racial-historical life forms. The primordial concerns of the American nation were thus only tangentially represented in these imperialist movements associated with the state’s expansion.

The first genuinely post-revolutionary expression of American ethnonationalism (i.e., “nationalism in its pristine sense”) began, accordingly, with the first wave of mass immigration, in the late 1830s and “the hungry Forties,” as Irish and South German Catholics reached American shores, affronting “Anglo-Americans” with their “otherness.” The “nativists” (native born, White, Protestant Americans) opposing the new immigrants rejected the crime, public drunkenness, pauperism the Irish brought, but above all the Catholicism of both groups, for “the Church of Rome” was an anathema to a liberal nation born of the Reformation and of the struggles against the Catholic empires of Spain and France.

The nativist response was nevertheless a nuanced one recognizing the distinctions that culturally separated Irishmen from Germans. The latter, who began to outnumber the Irish only in the late 1850s, tended to be farmers and artisans. That they settled inland, away from the older coastal settlements, and engaged in respectable occupations also mitigated nativist opposition, though nativists opposed the formation of German-speaking communities, beer-drinking forms of sociability, and the Germans’ political radicalism.

The Germans nevertheless seemed assimilable, which was not the case with the Irish. The first expression of American nativism was thus largely an anti-Irish movement, for the tribal solidarity of this unbourgeois people, their aggressive rejection of Protestant culture, their whiskey drinking and pre-modern behavior, and their anti-liberal sympathy with the slave states (which nativists resented because these states closed off land to white settlement) were an offense to the country’s Anglo-Protestant culture.

This anti-Irish sentiment became especially prominent once the famine ships, with their destitute cargoes, began arriving.

The Irish, though, offended not simply the Yankees’ religious and behavioral standards, their quick exploitation of the political system offended their republican convictions. Though one of the most afflicted of Europe’s nations, Erin’s exiles were also one of the most politically “advanced.” Not only had they a long history of secret societies (such as the Defenders, Whiteboys, Ribbonmen, etc.), which had waged an underground war against English landlords and Orangemen, in the 1820s, Daniel O’Connell’s Catholic Association, “the first mass political party in history,” taught the Irish how to exploit the new electoral forms of liberal parliamentary politics in order to throw off England’s Protestant ascendancy and its genocidal Penal Laws.

In America, the politically savvy Irish (led by their priests, saloon keepers, and eloquent rebels) challenged not just Yankee folkways, but the individualistic tenor of republican governance.

The terrible age of American ethnic politics begins with the Irish.

From the 1830s through to the late 1850s, nativist opposition to Catholic, specifically Irish, immigration took the form of intercommunal strife, the proliferation of anti-immigrant associations, and, then in 1854, the establishment of a national political party—the American Party (known as the “Know-Nothings”)—which, for a time, became a refuge for abolitionist and free-soil opponents of Southern slavery who had broken with the Whig party but not yet affiliated with the newly formed Republican party. (That is, this nativist party was partly the creation of those who now seek our destruction as a people.)

The Know Nothings held that Protestantism was an essential component of American identity; that Catholicism’s “autocratic” Pope and Church hierarchy were incompatible with republican self-rule; that Catholics had acquired undue political advantage; and that a longer, more thorough process of naturalization (Americanization) was necessary for the acquisition of citizenship. More fundamentally, it gave expression to the deep reservation which Anglo-American Protestants had about allowing their country to be overrun by Catholic immigrants.

Like most future manifestations of American racial nationalism (though they lacked a genuinely racial dimension), the Know Nothings were moved by a populist distrust of the state and the established political parties, which were seen as indifferent to the ethnocommunal identity of native whites.

Within but a year of its founding, the American Party succeeded in electing eight state governors, more than a hundred Congressmen, the mayors of Boston, Philadelphia, and Chicago, and thousands of local officials. Its future looked bright.

But the party fell almost as rapidly as it rose, having been swept up and then forced off the political stage by powerful sectional conflicts related to slavery and the preservation of the Union.

Its struggle for an Anglo-Protestant America in the 1850s nevertheless represented the first bloom of American nationalism in its blood-and-soil stage (somewhat earlier than other European nationalisms, which were still at the liberal political stage). As such, it resisted a political system privileging economics over community, opportunity over belief, and a liberal over a biocultural understanding of American life.

Though race was not an issue, religion, culture, and an endogamous sense of community were—issues that are preeminently ethnonationalist. Nativism became, as such, the foundation upon which the future defense of European life in America would be waged—for in however rudimentary and unfocused a way, it defended the American nation as an Anglo-Protestant community of descent, not a political entity based on an abstract ideological or creedal notion of nationality opened to all the world. (We Irish, supreme irony, have, as any roll of white nationalist ranks reveals, become the foremost exponent of this view today.)

The racial component of this biocultural definition of the nation did, though, soon come into its own—in the anti-Chinese movement that dominated California politics in the half century following the Gold Rush (1848).

As European immigrants, native Americans, and the first Chinese made their way to California in this period, so too did racial conflict—though conflict here would not be between natives and immigrants, but between Occidentals and Orientals, White against Yellow.

Standing together against the first Chinese arrivals—and to the swarming millions threatening to follow in their wake—native Americans and Irish Catholics discovered their common racial identity.

Almost from the start, they recognized the joint stake they had in opposing a people which worked at half the white man’s wage, retained their alien clothes, customs, and language, practiced a “heathen” religion, and created distinct, over-crowded, dirty, and often self-contained communities associated with vice and disease.

Comprising more than a fifth of the California labor force in the 1870s, these Chinese newcomers, with their low living standards and servile conditions, were seen as threatening not just the racial definition of the nation, but the American way of life—the prevailing standard for what it meant to be a free white man—and, ultimately, white civilization.

In such a situation, white solidarity was paramount—which meant that, in face of the Yellow Hordes, religious differences dividing Protestant natives and Catholic immigrants in the antebellum period had to be superseded.

Accused of cheapening labor and introducing foreign elements in the East, the Irish were now welcomed into California nativist ranks—as whites facing a common threat—and, accordingly, they came to play a leading role—perhaps the leading role—in spearheading the trade-union, political, and communal opposition to the Chinese.

The extent of white solidarity in the popular classes was such that it spurred numerous official and unofficial measures to restrict Chinese participation in the economy and in other realms of American life.

As early as the 1850s, local and state laws were passed to limit the type of jobs the Chinese could work, the land they could own, and the schools their children could attend, while white, especially Irish, workingmen not infrequently resorted to violence to drive them from certain trades and neighborhoods. In mining, logging, and construction, the Chinese were forced out entirely and in numerous small towns throughout California and the Northwest, Chinese communities were abandoned in face of angry white mobs.

Then, in the late 1870s, in a period of economic crisis, a Workingmen’s Party, led by an Irish demagogue, Denis Kearney, was formed in San Francisco.

Its principal slogan was “The Chinese must go.”

Supported by a mass network of “anti-coolie clubs” and trade unions, the party became the chief vehicle for the cause of Chinese exclusion.

The state organization of the two established national parties, the Democrats and the Republicans, each, for the sake of appeasing the pervasive anti-Chinese sentiment the Workingmen represented, were forced to support its exclusionist policies.

But more than transcending religious and political differences between closely related whites, the Chinese exclusion movement took aim at those large-scale corporate interests (primarily the railroads) responsible for importing Chinese contract labor and using it as leverage against white workers.

In frequent sand-lot demonstrations and in broadsheets, the movement, buttressed by large crowds of male workers, warned the monied men of Judge Lynch, targeting not just alien, but native threats to the nation’s bioculture.

Its slogan—“We want no slaves or aristocrats”—was an “egalitarian” affirmation of the existing racial hierarchy, and of the right of white men to the ownership of the land their people had conquered and created.

The movement’s achievements were momentous. For the first time in modern history, national legislation (to supplant the less effective immigration law of 1790) was passed to prevent non-whites from entering the United States and preventing those already within its borders from setting down roots.

White workers, supported by their trade unions, workingmen associations, and other organized expressions of white power, succeeded in frustrating capitalist and official efforts to change the country’s demographic character. White racial solidarity, at this stage, triumphed over those differences that stemmed from the religious wars of the Reformation.

Racially consciousness, populist, and at times anti-capitalist, the anti-Chinese movement of the 1870s (whose spirit, incidentally, lived on in the national-socialist novels of Jack London) succeeded in preserving the American West as a white Lebens-raum. As I see it (and I see it from both from an Irish and American perspective), it represents the single greatest movement of White America

The third great formative influence affecting the shape of American racial nationalism—though a step back from the anti-Chinese movement—came during the First World War.

The Ku Klux Klan, which had emerged after Appomattox to defend Southern whites from Negro aggression and the Yankee military occupation, was re-organized in 1915 to address certain changes in American life.

Like the European fascist movements of the interwar period, this “Second Klan” constituted a mass populist reaction to the war’s radical cultural/social dislocations.

The war had imbued the central government with unprecedented powers, enabling it to encroach on local communities in ways previously unknown; the recently founded Federal Reserve, in charge of the money supply, and the growing influence of Wall Street and the great corporations assumed an influence in national life that seemed to come at the expense of independent entrepreneurs and “the little men.” At the same time, the war effort assaulted the existing racial, familial, and moral hierarchies.

Blacks in this period acquired a foothold in northern industries and discharged Negro soldiers, “after having seen Paris,” were no longer willing to tolerate their caste status. The year 1919 was accordingly one of unprecedented racial violence, as Negroes challenging the existing system of race relations set off bloody riots in 26 urban centers.

In the same period, the middle-class family came under attack. Suffragettes carried the day with the 19th Amendment, a “new women,” promoted by advertisers and by Hollywood, questioned conventional “gender” relations, divorce rates suddenly shot up, and children were increasingly exposed to anti-traditionalist influences.

Finally, there was the specter of Bolshevism, which appealed to the unassimilated communities of recently arrived Eastern and Southern European immigrants (only 10 percent of the CPUSA membership could speak English by the mid-1920s) and assumed a menacing form in the great industrial conflicts that swept up more than a fifth of the national workforce.

On every front, then, it seemed as if small-town, rural, and middle-class White America was in retreat.

But not before making a last—and, for a generation, successful—stand in its defense, for within a decade of its founding, the Klan had rallied 5 million members to its ranks, penetrating local and national power-structures as few other anti-liberal movements in US history.

Comprised of white, native-born, anti-immigrant, anti-Catholic, and anti-Jewish elements, particularly in the South and the Midwest, this “Second Klan” saw itself as an “army of Protestant Americans.” As such, it sought to defend “pure Americanism, old-time religion, and conventional Protestant morality”—in the process reviving those religious issues that had earlier divided whites along sectarian lines (like in the 1850s), yet at the same time attempting to preserve the hegemony of Anglo-Protestants against the forces seeking to subvert the nation’s historic ethnic core.

To the degree the Klan was more sectarian than racial, favoring the conformist, materialist, and philistine elements in American life, it was a step back from the white consciousness of the anti-Chinese movement. (A similar phenomenon occurred after the Second World War among recently assimilated, often Catholic, immigrants, whose support for Joseph McCarthy was part of a more general effort to demonstrate that the “Americanism” of the “old immigrants,” largely Irish and German, was superior to that of the established but liberal and cosmopolitan Anglo-Protestant elite).

The Klan (like McCarthyism) was nevertheless not entirely the “reactionary” movement that academic historians make of it, for like its European counterpart, it was both traditionalist and populist, favoring measures that were anti-liberal, anti-cosmopolitan, and anti-egalitarian in spirit but by no means regressive.

In this capacity, it forced the government to close the border to immigration, it beat back the black assault on white hegemony, it let the wheeler-dealers in Washington and New York know that their “progressive policies” would not go unchallenged in the Heartland, and it acted as a moral bulwark against the permissive forces of Hollywood and Madison Avenue.

Above all, it upheld a racial standard for American existence.

Only in the late 1920s, after successfully preserving many traditional areas of American life that might otherwise had succumbed to the race-mixing modernism of the postwar “Jazz Age” did the movement finally subside in face of the economic breakdown of the 1930s.

* * *

The history of American racial nationalism, as exemplified by the Second Klan, the Chinese exclusion movement, and the early nativists, is a history whose legacy has, in the last half century, been squandered and suppressed by the elites now controlling American destinies.

Yet this is the legacy that the heirs of European-America today, if they are to survive, need to reclaim.

For this history confirms them in their belief that the popular classes in America have always rejected the creedal definition of the nation; that they refused to allow their society and territory to be overrun by non-whites; and that divisive sectarian issues (between Protestants and Catholics, leftists and rightists, modernists and traditionalists, etc.) served only the interest of their enemies.

Most of all, this heritage of American ethnonationalism calls on whites today, in this era of their dispossession, to defend the racial-cultural-civilizational “nation” to which they once belonged and which, if regained, might again distinguish them from the world’s less favored races.

mercredi, 23 février 2011

What is the American Nation?

What is the American Nation?

Michael O'Meara

Ex: http://www.counter-currents.com/

minuteman%20funky%20clouds.jpgThe following is part of a larger series of articles that was written for an audience of French “revolutionary nationalists” whose image of America is almost categorically negative. Its ostensible aim was to highlight the positive in the heritage we White Nationalists claim. But at a deeper level, it was also an effort to convince myself that America has not been a historical disaster for the white race. The negative interpretation opposed here can be found in the chapter “Anti-Europe” in my New Culture, New Right: Anti-Liberalism in Postmodern Europe.

In the United States, the closest thing to Europe’s “new revolutionary nationalism”—which designates liberalism’s cosmopolitan plutocracy as Europe’s chief enemy, resists the de-Europeanization of its capital, population, and territory, and identifies with a biocultural vision of Magna Europa rather than the 19th-century nation-state—is “White Nationalism.” Though a marginal force on the American political scene (theoretically deficient, fragmented into scores of tiny organizations, and with a greater presence in cyberspace than in the public sphere), it nevertheless wages the same fight as its European counterpart and, on the most decisive issue, race, is considerably more advanced. In this spirit, it takes its stand with the “Old America” that is the counter-part to Bush’s “Old Europe,” it considers its people part of Europe’s biosphere, and opposes not just the present Hebraicized administration in Washington, but the anti-White impetus of “the American century.”

Fundamental to White nationalism is the understanding that, historically, America was not a melting pot, but a settler nation: hence a European transplant. Its original settlers (all of whom were Protestant, but not exclusively Puritan or Calvinist) may have had an ambivalent attitude to the Europe they left behind, but they had no intention of shedding their European being for the sake of mixing with races and cultures unlike their own. Their identity as such was rooted in distinctly European life forms, which were opposed to those of the country’s aboriginals and to its imported Black slaves. Specifically, this identity was an Anglo-Protestant one adapted to the nativist environment of colonial America.

At the time of the revolution, 80 percent of the population was of Anglo-Protestant descent. Of the remaining 20 percent, most were Dutch, German, and Swedish, all of whom were Protestant and easily assimilated into the original core population. Only one percent of its people, mainly of French Canadian and Irish origin, was Catholic. The country’s institutions were accordingly reflective of the values and beliefs of its transplanted Anglo-Protestant settlers, just as the state’s republican ideology and the producerist ideology of its popular classes were in harmony with its specific ethnic disposition.

At the time of revolution, the country’s national identity was still an embryonic one. The loyalties of the revolutionary generation were more to the individual colonies that had become states, such as Virginia and Massachusetts, than to the federal republic established in 1789. But despite the absence of a strong state, informed by tradition and aristocracy, the American polity was not simply the cultureless, economic enterprise that certain Nouvelles Droitistes make it out to be and it was certainly not the “nation of nations,” “the first universal nation,” or “the proposition nation” that our virtualist-minded anti-White elites insist on.

Even in this early period there existed an American national identity, buttressed by several hundred years of history; and by the development of specifically American institutions based on instincts of racial superiority and self-reliance; by conflicts with the British crown, which caused its people to see itself as a transplanted nation of Anglo-Protestant descent (though one imbued with freedoms Englishmen had allegedly lost during the Norman Conquest); but above all by an ethnic or biocultural identity rooted in the North European, specifically British (that is, Celt, Norse, and Saxon) stocks of the country’s settlers.

America, thus, may have lacked Europe’s ancient genealogy, cultural legacy, rooted, territorial sense, and distinct ethnic consciousness, but its people spoke a European language, practiced a European religion, had a history informed by European symbols and themes, represented a fusion of European racial stocks, and felt their North European identity to be the defining part of their individual and collective identity. Until quite recently, as Jared Taylor argues, “America was a self consciously European, majority-white nation.”

Accordingly, the Americanized Englishmen who declared their political independence in the late 18th century did not simultaneously declare their autonomy from Europe’s ethnoracial identity. The liberal ideals of the revolutionary generation, in any case, were soon superseded by a Romantic emphasis on the particularisms and “special inner characteristics” of its people—a Romanticism that betrayed the new republic’s rationalist or Enlightenment premises. To these Indian-fighters, slavers, borderland Celts, and Texas revolutionaries, whose physical proximity to non-Whites had a powerful effect in enhancing their racial identity, it was obvious that the world’s peoples lacked the innate capacity to share in “the free government, power, and prosperity of the United States.”

What Tocqueville called the “Anglo-Americans” had not the slightest intention of extending their liberties to Indians or Negroes, nor even to those White men whose (Catholic) religion and (Irish clannish) temperament seemed to disqualify them for republican government. America’s founding liberal principles were, in fact, little more than the ideological gloss of the country’s Anglo-Protestant life forms.

Despite the Calvinist conceit of believing itself “chosen,” America’s political principles had universal import only in the most vacuous theoretical sense. For example, the Puritan vision of America was less a call to world reform than an affirmation of its uniqueness and superiority. And though the principles of American republicanism have since been re-interpreted to justify the present de-Europeanization, this was neither the intention of the Founders nor that of the country’s settlers, for their republic was preeminently a Herrenvolk democracy — germane not to humanity, but to the “historical humanity” that was White America.

In this vein, the US Constitution, which contemporary liberals have re-interpreted for the sake of their multiracial utopia, defended the institution of slavery and posited that a Black’s worth was only 60 percent of a White. The first Congress (1790) voted that only Whites could be naturalized as citizens. And even after the Civil War, the granting of basic civil rights to former negro slaves, as Sam Francis points out, had “nothing to do with voting, holding political office, sitting on juries, intermarriage, getting a job or being promoted . . . which is what civil rights have come to mean today.”

White immigrants were assimilated into the founding stock only after they (or their children) shed the cultural-linguistic identities that separated them from native Whites. As late as the Kennedy Administration (1960), the nationally conscious Irish, the first immigrant group, were still not fully assimilated. The so-called “melting pot” (a 20th-century concept invented by a cosmopolitan “Englishmen,” Israel Zangwill) was similarly selective, accepting only White immigrants as possible Americans (though it did mistakenly think that Jews from European countries were European).

Moreover, this racially defined identity was the legacy of both the popular classes and the country’s ruling elites. For example, Thomas Jefferson, who in a fit of Enlightenment enthusiasm included the phase “all men are created equal” in the Declaration of Independence, never — not for a moment — thought of extending equal rights to Negroes; Abraham Lincoln, the two faced Whig pioneer of the liberal leviathan, wanted to repatriate Blacks back to Africa; and the great liberal crusader, Woodrow Wilson, was an ardent segregationist who thought his cherished “democracy” inappropriate to all but Whites. Until the postwar period, White Americans of virtually every class and denomination saw themselves not as an amalgam of humanity, but as an American nativist variant of Europe’s white Christian nations. The racial vision of America which White nationalists today defend against the anti-European regimes in Washington, London, and Tel Aviv was actually the prevailing vision for most Americans for most of their history.

The racially selective character of America’s republican, and especially egalitarian, rhetoric, was indisputably evident in the country’s enslavement of Negroes, its extermination and/or ethnic cleansing of the aboriginal population, its territorial expansion at the expense of mestizo Mexico, and its effort to prevent Chinese and Japanese immigration. Its racial identity was so deeply rooted in the emerging national consciousness that it imbued Anglo-Americans with the confidence to assimilate different White ethnicities.

In the latter half of the 19th century, as European immigration and intermarriage demoted the prevalence of the British elements and the reigning spirit of American Anglo-Saxonism diminished the immigrants’ attachment to their past, American identity gradually extended beyond its original Anglo-Protestant core to become a European-American Christian identity. Race as such remained primary, for only on the basis of the immigrants’ racial compatibility with Anglo-Americans were they able to assimilate. The later advent of Black nationalism, as Walker Connor argues, testifies to the fact that American nationalism has always been a White nationalism. By the same token, the state’s new-found multicultural ideology inadvertently acknowledges that the historical forms of American identity are incompatible with non-European races and cultures.

From the time of the revolution until the beginning of the Civil Rights revolution (1956), American nationality was articulated almost exclusively in terms of three mutually reinforcing influences: an Anglo-European racial identity, Protestantism, and republicanism. The latter, it needs stressing, owed less to 18th-century liberalism than to the character of Anglo American society, whose small proprietors and farmers defined themselves in terms of self-sufficiency, relative equality, and self-rule.

Though the corporate capitalism and New Class managerialism today stifling this self-sufficiency grew out of the country’s liberal postulates, this was only one (however consequential) of its manifestations, for Anglo Protestant culture also nurtured a conservative, traditionalist, and authoritarian dimension opposed to much of what presently passes for “Americanism,” (just as the feminist, homophile, and ethnomasochistic beliefs of today’s mainstream Protestant denominations would have shocked earlier generations of Protestants). The Reformation heresies that prompted America’s Low Church settlers to accept the Bible’s inerrancy and uphold a literal interpretation of scripture also compelled them to spurn the behavioral, moral, and social principles of a purely materialist society of individualist gratification. Though this type of Protestantism engendered (or expressed) that “spirit of independence, self-reliance, and freedom” which accompanied the rise of capitalism in Northern European and today encourages the cosmopolitan nihilism of the existing order, at the same time its original impetus rejected an indifferent, massifying capitalism destructive of community and morality. In this spirit, it upheld hierarchy, authority, and tradition, opposed modern feudalism (corporate capitalism) and its verso, mob democracy (Communism), privileged the centrality of family, community, and mutuality, and cultivated behaviors and social structures supportive of a communally responsible rather than an atomized individuality.

In a conscious effort to re-engineer the character of the American people, the ruling Judeo-oligarchy has re-christened the republican component of traditional American identity the “American Creed” and made it the sole legitimate basis of American nationality — as if being an American were merely a matter of subscribing to a certain liberal beliefs. Divested of its racial-cultural grounding, and the political responsibilities it once entailed, the liberal, cosmopolitan, and globalist implications of this so-called creed is now used to legitimate the multiracial pluralism that presently assaults the nation’s European heritage. For at least the last two generations, the country’s elites have waged a merciless war on the ethnonational interests of America’s Whites, who are treated with “mingled scorn and apprehension” for hampering the country’s transformation into an economically efficient Brazil.

But if America for racial nationalists is preeminently a European country, it is — admittedly — “also something less than Europe. As a settler nation, America was founded and remains, to use Georges Dumézil’s term, a country of the “Third Function.” Lacking the warrior and priestly functions of its motherland and centered on the productive/reproductive activities of the lowest order, the American people traditionally immersed themselves in economic and mundane activities devoid of High Cultural possibility.

It would be exaggerated, though, to claim, as certain Europeans have, that this emphasis on economics (with its accompanying values of hard work, self reliance, and technical efficiency) made Americans somehow un-European. A middle-class country of the Third Function, America materialistically thrived in the technoeconomic realm. This may have left its culturally-impoverished society of self-made men something less than Europe — but hardly un-European.

While the country’s economic and materialist passions rendered its people vulnerable to the machinations of plutocrats and monopolists, bankers and corporate barons, and, above all, Jewish peddlers and illusionists, this, alas, has been the fate of White people worldwide. In America’s defense it should be emphasized that until the postwar era, when the state and the dominant institutions fell into the hands of corporate managers, social engineers, and alien interests, its popular history was very much a history of struggle against the great economic powers, as these powers endeavored to subordinate the nation to those systemic imperatives threatening the economic self-sufficiency and biocultural identity of its large middle class.

This is evident in the history of Jacksonian producerism, the nativism of the 1840s and ‘50s, the Confederate insurgency of the 1860s, the struggle against Chinese immigration in California in the 1870s, the populist revolt of Midwestern and Southern farmers in the 1880s and ‘90s, the bitter labor wars of the late 19th and early 20th centuries, the rise of the Second Klan in the 1920s, Father Coughlin’s Social Justice movement in the 1930s, etc.

Though lacking an established church and an aristocracy (the First and Second Functions), even here the European racial spirit influenced the formation of the American nation. The yeoman farmers making up the ranks of the Minute Men who bloodied Britain’s imperial troops at Lexington and Concord, the gentlemen warriors like Nathanael Greene, Anthony Wayne, and George Washington who led the revolutionary armies, the Anglo-Celtic frontiersmen and colonists of the Texas Revolution who triumph over massively larger Mexican forces, the gallant Robert E. Lee and Stonewall Jackson of the Confederacy, even George Patton of World War II fame, all these figures stand in the tradition of European arms and are tributes not just to America, but to the warrior spirit of their ancestral homeland.

Moreover, whatever High Culture Americans have known has been European. Disneyland may be the contemporary emblem of America’s Culture Industry, but its relationship to American life is as contrived as is Hollywood’s. The composers, philosophers, and great artists animating the higher reaches of American life have always been European. The few great men of literary stature they have produced— Edgar Allen Poe, T. S. Eliot, Ezra Pound, Henry James, Jack London, William Faulkner — belong to Europe’s Pantheon and are recognized as such. Only an intellectual sleight of hand can justify the argument that the American people are not an organic (however culturally hybrid) expression of Europe’s life-world.

Perhaps more to the point, the growth of the American republic ought to be seen as one of the great feats of modern history, for, from its origins as a small outpost on the outer edge of Western Civilization, it grew, in a remarkably short period, into a great power. Given the prominence of its Third Function, much of course was lost in this process, for America lacked the depths of its motherland, retained a weak grasp of history and tradition, and never developed a political class capable of sustaining its political ideals. Yet beyond the shallow, often philistine character this cultural paucity imparted to American life, the European settlement of North America represented an unprecedented manifestation of Nietzsche’s will to power — an untamed life force — that had transformed a vast wilderness into a flourishing extension of the European life world.

Against those transatlantic critics whose grand pronouncements are based on their familiarity with Los Angeles or New York (both of which have ceased to be American cities), it needs stressing that no White nationalist fails to honor Europe or to distinguish himself from its heirs. His opposition to the New Class, war-mongering, and Zionist hegemonism of the country’s deracinated elites stems, in fact, from his commitment to Europe’s biocultural heritage. This heritage, as such, informs virtually every significant facet of the country’s racial nationalism.

mardi, 01 février 2011

Il fascismo in America

Il fascismo in America

Autore: Luca Leonello Rimbotti

Ex: http://www.centrostudilaruna.it/

La recente morte dello storico americano John Patrick Diggins ci offre il destro per alcune considerazioni circa l’argomento del suo studio più noto in Italia, L’America, Mussolini e il fascismo, ormai fuori commercio da anni, in quanto pubblicato da Laterza nel lontano 1982, ma originariamente uscito dieci anni prima col titolo Mussolini and Fascism: The View from America, a cura dell’Università di Princeton. Quello di Diggins è un libro famoso, tradotto in molte lingue, ed è stato un po’ l’apripista della scarna bibliografia sui rapporti tra USA e Italia fascista e sull’attività delle organizzazioni del PNF nella repubblica stellata. Ai tempi fecero scandalo, nel provinciale antifascismo nostrano, alcune riflessioni di Diggins sulla generale simpatia mostrata in America per l’avvento al potere di Mussolini, in virtù della sua politica sociale e, soprattutto, in virtù del suo rivoluzionario disegno antropologico di mutare gli Italiani da turba di straccioni emigranti, facili al coltello e al crimine – di cui negli USA si aveva sin dall’Ottocento una sprezzante opinione, venata di non secondarie inflessioni razziste – finalmente in un popolo serio, moderno e disciplinato.

Diggins, che è stato un rinomato studioso dei movimenti politici e in particolare del ruolo degli intellettuali nelle moderne dinamiche della società di massa, ribaltò decennali pregiudizi che in America avevano, sin dai primi flussi migratori, bollato l’Italiano come un delinquente mafioso, e operò di conserva un aggiustamento delle posizioni. Scrisse che «la maggioranza degli Americani approvarono il Fascismo in base alle loro inclinazioni e ai loro bisogni»: ne apprezzarono il lato di movimento di “rinascita nazionale”. E formulò l’originale prospettiva di un Mussolini visto come un “eroe americano”: l’uomo che dal nulla era riuscito a pervenire a un disegno di riedificazione politica che parve esaltante alla mentalità americana, adusa a premiare lo sforzo bagnato dal successo, l’efficientismo e la tenacia dei propositi dell’individuo d’eccezione. Per una volta, era dunque l’Italia che si dimostrava il “Paese delle occasioni”.

Era, questo, ciò che Diggins ha chiamato «il lato oscuro delle valutazioni politiche americane», implicando la storica immaturità ideologica di quel popolo, versato a superficiali simpatie piuttosto che ad approfonditi scandagli di cultura politica. Bisogna pur dire che, come molto spesso accadde all’estero (ma per la verità non solo all’estero), e soprattutto negli anni Venti, l’accoglienza favorevole che venne riservata al Fascismo al suo avvento e per parecchi anni a seguire, si presentò negli Stati Uniti, più che un filo-fascismo, un filo-mussolinismo. Era la figura carismatica dell’uomo d’ordine, del giovane politico decisionista e innovatore, che colpiva gli immaginari anglosassoni, più di quanto non fosse l’ideologia nazionalpopolare che ne animava le scelte, per lo più ignorata nei suoi risvolti, a parte una generica curiosità per il corporativismo. Le simpatie raccolte da Mussolini in quel mondo – pensiamo solo a Churchill o a Franklin Delano Roosevelt – le diremmo per lo più a-fasciste e prive di connotati ideologici, se non per l’aspetto, certo non secondario, del robusto anti-comunismo impersonato dal Duce.

Paradigmatico, in questo senso, è quanto scritto da Diggins, quando riportava autorevoli giudizi di studiosi dell’Università di New York circa un Mussolini visto come «l’uomo della tradizione con il quale Aristotele, San Tommaso o Machiavelli si sarebbero senza imbarazzo trovati a loro agio». Del resto, come giustamente ha ricordato Renzo Santinon in I Fasci italiani all’estero (Settimo Sigillo), il terreno era già stato in precedenza preparato ad esempio da Marinetti, che «seminando il futurismo nel continente americano, aprì negli anni Venti la strada a una lettura avanguardistica ed entusiasmante del fascismo». Poi, a queste iniziali simpatie si aggiunse nel decennio seguente l’importante episodio del grande successo mediatico e d’opinione ottenuto negli USA da Italo Balbo, a seguito delle sue straordinarie imprese aviatorie. L’eccezionale prestigio riservato al trasvolatore fu sancito da un trionfale corteo per le vie di New York, con l’intitolazione di strade e targhe celebrative all’ex-capo squadrista. Tutto questo funzionò certamente da volano per nuovi consensi al Regime fascista, destinati a scemare soltanto a seguito della guerra etiopica (gli Stati Uniti, su sobillazione inglese, parteciparono alle sanzioni anti-italiane votate dalla Società delle Nazioni, di cui pure non facevano parte), volgendosi poi in crescente ostilità solo dopo l’intervento militare del 1940.

Ma, prima, ci fu tutto un lungo intreccio di rapporti tra America e Italia fascista. In cui non mancarono le luci e le ombre. Se la luce era essenzialmente la figura di Mussolini e in specie la sua politica sociale – segnatamente quella relativa alla bonifica delle terre paludose, che riscosse in America larga eco -, le ombre erano date dalla presenza dell’attivismo fascista di base negli Stati Uniti. Qui, spesso, risuonarono antichi pregiudizi anti-italiani duri a morire. Su questo terreno, il fuoriuscitismo antifascista lavorò sporco e a fondo. Sulla scorta di talune predicazioni marcatamente di parte – pensiamo a Salvemini, che a lungo saturò le Università americane con la sua propaganda ideologica basata sul risentimento – si volle ricreare anche su suolo americano la storica diffamazione basata sul binomio Fascismo-violenza. Un’ostinata campagna falsificatoria si ingegnò di sospingere l’opinione pubblica di quel Paese, ingenuamente portata a dare credibilità al bluff (allora come oggi), verso una preconcetta diffidenza nei confronti dei Fasci, sorti a quelle latitutidini sin da 1921. Fu allora facile mischiare le carte e fare del militante fascista italo-americano nulla più che una nuova versione del mafioso o del picchiatore da bassifondi. E questo, nonostante che le cronache dell’epoca riportassero sì di scontri tra Italo-americani fascisti e antifascisti, ma non mancando per altro di precisare che spesso erano proprio i fascisti a rimanere vittime della violenza e dell’odio: nel 1927, per dire, a New York vennero uccisi i fascisti Nicola Amoroso e Michele D’Ambrosoli, oppure, nel 1932, venne assassinato il fascista Salvatore Arena a Staten Island. Non si ha invece notizia di gravi fatti di sangue di parte fascista.

Il fascismo italo-americano era organizzato. E anche bene. Già nel 1925 c’erano novanta Fasci e migliaia di iscritti nelle città americane, riuniti nella Fascist League of North America guidata da Ignazio Thaon di Revel, che per motivi politici cessò di operare nel 1929. Il coordinamento tra i Fasci fu opera di Giuseppe Bastianini, primo segretario dei Fasci Italiani all’Estero e personaggio ingiustamente demonizzato per le sue origini “movimentiste” (era stato Ardito e vicesegretario del PNF a ventiquattro anni), favorevole allo sviluppo dello squadrismo tra gli italofoni d’oltreoceano. Un ambiente in cui si distinse Domenico Trombetta, singolare figura di organizzatore e animatore, esponente del radicalismo fascista newyorchese, direttore del periodico fascista “Il Grido della Stirpe”, assai diffuso tra gli Italiani e attorno al quale si catalizzò l’idea del volontariato di milizia, a difesa dell’italianità tra i milioni di nostri immigrati negli Stati Uniti. Questo ambiente rimase attivo anche quando, negli anni Trenta, Mussolini, per non urtare la sensibilità americana allarmata dalle campagne antifasciste, per gestire l’immagine del Regime preferì puntare sui normali canali diplomatici anziché sull’attivismo di base. Eppure, anche nel nuovo contesto, diciamo così più istituzionale, il Fascismo dimostrò di essere ben vivo tra gli Italo-americani, tanto da esprimere, persino verso la fine del decennio, una militanza a tutto campo – comprese trasmissioni radiofoniche di propaganda da una stazione di Boston –, ben rappresentato dall’American Union of Fascists di Paul Castorina, in rapporti amichevoli con i fascisti inglesi di Oswald Mosley e con la Canadian Union of Fascists, e dal pre-fascista Ordine dei Figli d’Italia in America, la principale associazione comunitaria italo-americana, che proprio nei tardi anni Trenta si identificò strettamente col Regime italiano, condividendone anche i più recenti indirizzi di politica razziale. Messi in sordina i Fasci per motivi di opportunità politica, una fitta rete di associazioni culturali, di attivisti, animatori di eventi comunitari, ma specialmente di giornali e stampa periodica, fece sì che il Fascismo, fino agli anni a ridosso della guerra, fosse di gran lunga la scelta politica che godeva dei maggiori consensi tra gli Italiani residenti negli USA. Un caso tipico fu l’arruolamento di un migliaio di volontari italo-americani nella Legione degli Italiani all’Estero, comandata in Africa Orientale dal Console della Milizia Piero Parini. E nella sola New York, negli anni Trenta, funzionavano non meno di cinquanta circoli fascisti, i cui membri indossavano la camicia nera e divulgavano assiduamente l’Idea.

Talune di queste dinamiche, e soprattutto quella relativa alla polemica tra istituzioni diplomatiche e Fasci politici, sono state rivisitate nel 2000 da Stefano Luconi in La diplomazia parallela. Il regime fascista e la mobilitazione degli Italo-americani (Franco Angeli), che ha segnalato proprio il ruolo centrale della comunità italo-americana filo-fascista come fattore politico di sostegno al governo di Roma, strumento di pressione economica, d’opinione e anche politica nei confronti di Washington. Una realtà che vedeva le ragioni politiche del Fascismo appoggiate non già dalla teppa dei portuali o dei picciotti del sottoproletariato italiano del New England, ma proprio all’opposto dalla vasta quota di Italiani che in America riportarono un solido successo personale, andando a costituire quel segmento sociale nazionalista, politicamente maturo ed etnicamente solidarista, sul quale non a torto Mussolini faceva conto per avere buona stampa negli Stati Uniti.

Per concludere brevemente l’argomento, vogliamo solo dire che, nonostante il seminale studio di Diggins abbia riportato larga fama, insegnando a molti come si fa storiografia senza confonderla con le opinioni personali, ancora oggi ci si imbatte in spiacevoli casi di ottusa faziosità. Chi si desse la pena di dare uno sguardo a quanto scrive ad esempio Matteo Pretelli sul sito “Iperstoria” gestito dal Dipartimento di Storia dell’Università di Verona e dal locale Istituto Storico della Resistenza, sotto il titolo Fascismo, violenza e malavita all’estero. Il caso degli Stati Uniti d’America, potrebbe pensare che Diggins abbia predicato nel deserto. Il solerte accademico italiano – che ci assicurano Lecteur presso l’Università di Melbourne – si danna l’anima per dimostrare i legami tra Fascismo italo-americano e criminalità mafiosa. Nessuno nega che da qualche parte ci sia stato un mascalzone che abusava della camicia nera. Ogni rivoluzione ha avuto la sua feccia, e il Fascismo molto meno di altre. Ma vorremmo segnalare al propagandista in parola che la malavita vera, quella gestita dai grandi criminali mafiosi, dimostrò di non stare dalla parte del Fascismo, bensì da quella dell’antifascismo. Basta sfogliare il libro di Alfio Caruso Arrivano i nostri pubblicato nel 2004 da Longanesi, in cui si dimostra in che misura la lobby di massoni e mafiosi di vertice preparò lo sbarco americano in Sicilia nel 1943. Lì non fu il caso di teppistelli: l’intero apparato della criminalità mafiosa organizzata, estirpata manu militari dal Fascismo nel 1928, si ripresentò compatto in veste di mortale nemico del Fascismo. E fu la volta di Genco Russo, Calogero Vizzini, Lucky Luciano… insomma la “cupola” al completo, ritornata al potere in Sicilia sotto bandiera a stelle e strisce e garantita dal capofila del legame tra mafia e governance americana: quel Charles Poletti che gettò le basi della repubblica italiana “democratica”, antifascista, ma soprattutto mafiosa, che gode ancora oggi ottima salute.

* * *

Tratto da Linea del 6 febbraio 2009.

samedi, 29 janvier 2011

D. H. Lawrence on America

D. H. Lawrence on America

Derek HAWTHORNE

Ex: http://www.counter-currents.com/

LAW1.jpgI have contributed several essays to Counter-Currents dealing with D. H. Lawrence’s critique of modernity. Those essays might lead the reader to believe that Lawrence treats modernity as a universal ideology or worldview that could be found anywhere.

However, in many of his writings Lawrence treats modernity as, in effect, a spiritual disease that specifically afflicts white, northern Europeans. Everything I have said in other essays about the modern overemphasis on the “spiritual sympathetic centres” and how we starve the “lower centres” in favor of the upper, or how love and benevolence are our undoing, Lawrence usually frames in explicitly racial terms. Modernity, in other words, is the condition of white, Northern European peoples, the peoples who initiated modernity in the first place.

In a letter from October 8, 1924, when he was living in New Mexico, Lawrence writes: “I loathe winter. They gas about the Nordic races, over here, but I believe they’re dead, dead, dead. I hate all that comes from the north.” Like Nietzsche, Lawrence does not lament the “death” (or decline) of the Nordic races. He merely observes it. Nor, generally speaking, does he fall into the common error of romanticizing other races. (However, he does on occasion contrast “northern” to “southern” culture, usually to the detriment of the former.)

In Women in Love, Gerald Crich represents the white race in general; his life is an allegory of what Lawrence believes is wrong with the “northern people,” and his death symbolizes what Lawrence regarded as their degeneration. Early in the novel, Gudrun Brangwen reacts to him:

There was something northern about him that magnetised her. In his clear northern flesh and his fair hair was a glisten like sunshine refracted through crystals of ice. And he looked so new, unbroached, pure as an arctic thing. . . . “His totem is the wolf,” she repeated to herself.

Later in the novel, Birkin reflects on Gerald: “He was one of these strange white wonderful demons of the north, fulfilled in the destructive frost mystery. And was he fated to pass away in this knowledge, this one process of frost-knowledge, death by perfect cold?”

Like Gerald’s, the end of the white race shall be an ice death: a death brought about by cold ideals and abstractions; a cutting off from the source, from the life mystery. “The white races, having the Arctic north behind them, the vast abstraction of ice and snow, would fulfill a mystery of ice-destructive knowledge, snow-abstract annihilation.” It is a self-destruction, just as Gerald’s death is self-destruction.

The Great Death Continent

Though the process of snow-abstract annihilation began in Northern Europe, for Lawrence the “epicenter” of the process has shifted to North America. Lawrence’s most dramatic statement of this occurs in one of his last books, The Plumed Serpent, in a passage so important that I shall quote it at length:

Was that the clue to America, she sometimes wondered. Was it the great death-continent, the continent that destroyed again what the other continents had built up? The continent whose spirit of place fought purely to pick the eyes out of the face of God? Was that America? . . .

And did this account for the great drift to the New World, the drift of spent souls passing over to the side of godless democracy, energetic negation? The negation which is the life-breath of materialism.—And would the great negative pull of the Americas at last break the heart of the world? . . .

White men had had a soul, and lost it. The pivot of fire had been quenched in them, and their lives had started to spin in the reversed direction, widdershins [counterclockwise]. That reversed look which is in the eyes of so many white people, the look of nullity, and life wheeling in the reversed direction. Widdershins. . . .

And all the efforts of white men to bring the soul of the dark men of Mexico into final clenched being has resulted in nothing but the collapse of the white men. Against the soft, dark flow of the Indian the white man at last collapses, with his god and his energy he collapses. In attempting to convert the dark man to the white man’s way of life, the white man has fallen helplessly down the hole he wanted to fill up. Seeking to save another man’s soul, the white man lost his own, and collapsed upon himself.

There is much to digest in this passage. Lawrence is suggesting that America (by which he means North America, including Mexico and Canada) acts as a vast engine of negation, wiping away or adulterating all human characteristics and all human distinctions that are “natural,” and doing so in the name of the Ideals of democracy and materialism (i.e., commerce).

Second, Lawrence is suggesting that the soul of the “dark man” is fundamentally different from that of the white man (a point he makes again and again in the Mexican writings) and that the white man’s soul has not been shifted to the “upper centres,” or knocked widdershins and out of touch with the life mystery. Therefore, all the efforts by the white man to “civilize” the dark man are in vain and it is the latter that will in fact win the day, because in some primal sense he is “stronger.” America, in short, is the continent of nihilism; the lead actor in the final drama of white, western civilization, the Ragnarok.

One of Lawrence’s heresies is to believe in essential national and racial characters. Culture, for Lawrence, flows from natural differences between human beings—and this means that humans are not fundamentally malleable and interchangeable; certain cultures simply cannot be fitted to certain people. Nevertheless, Lawrence does not believe in any doctrine of racial superiority. (The references that Lawrence makes from time to time to an “Aryan race” and, more narrowly, to the “Nordic” type may raise eyebrows today, but such terminology was common for the time.)

The Studies in Classical American Literature

Much of Studies in Classical American Literature (1923) is devoted to developing these points. This book—one of Lawrence’s most entertaining—is misleadingly titled for it is really not so much about American literature as it is about America itself. Note that in the quote above from The Plumed Serpent Lawrence refers to America as the continent “whose spirit of place fought purely to pick the eyes out of the face of God.”

The first essay in Studies is entitled “The Spirit of Place,” Lawrence explains this term as follows:

Every continent has its own great spirit of place. Every people is polarized in some particular locality, which is home, the homeland. Different places on the face of the earth have different vital effluence, different vibration, different chemical exhalation, different polarity with different stars; call it what you like. But the spirit of place is a great reality.

America’s spirit of place, Lawrence tell us, is one which draws men who want to “get away” and to be masterless. It is the land of those drawn to a kind of negative freedom: not the freedom actually to be something, but, in essence, the freedom to not have to be anything at all, and especially not to be subject to another’s will. But as Hegel recognized this negative freedom—freedom to say no—does not translate into any positive sort of freedom at all. True freedom, Lawrence states, only comes about through finding something you “positively want to be.” Americans, on the other hand, “have always been shouting about the things they are not. Unless, of course, they are millionaires, made or in the making.”

The spirit of America, for Lawrence, thus begins to resemble very much the spirit of Gudrun Brangwen in Women in Love: negation; a fierce desire really to be nothing at all. This is American “freedom.” America is the land where the white race has gone to die, and to literally kill all its old forms: its traditions, customs, blood-ties, myths and folktales, morality, religion, high culture, even its memory of its past.

America is the land where men have come to free themselves of everything in life that is unchosen, especially when the unchosen is the natural. Again, there is a break from the primal self or true unconscious and a shift to life lived entirely from the Ideal “upper centres.” Lawrence writes, “The American has got to destroy. It is his destiny. It is his destiny to destroy the whole corpus of the white psyche, the white consciousness. And he’s got to do it secretly. As the growing of a dragon-fly inside a chrysalis or cocoon destroys the larva grub, secretly.”

The self-destruction of the white man takes place secretly, marching under the banner of the Ideal. America is the land where all the old forms are destroyed in the name of “Freedom,” “Democracy,” and, above all else, “Progress”:

Destroy! Destroy! Destroy! Hums the under-consciousness [of Americans]. Love and produce! Love and produce! cackles the upper-consciousness. And the world hears only the Love-and-produce cackle. Refuses to hear the hum of destruction underneath. Until such time as it will have to hear.

The cause of Liberty in Europe, Lawrence tells us, was something vital and life-giving. But he detects in American icons like Abraham Lincoln and Woodrow Wilson something strident, cold, and life-killing in their appeals to Democracy. American democracy, Lawrence claims, is at root a kind of “self-murder”; that is, when it is not “murdering somebody else.”

Lawrence’s analyses of American literature basically consist in showing how these American tendencies play themselves out in authors like Franklin, Hawthorne, Poe, Melville, Whitman, and others. Whitman—an author with whom Lawrence had a love-hate relationship—gets by far the roughest treatment:

ONE DIRECTION! toots Walt in the car, whizzing along [in] it. . . .

ONE DIRECTION! whoops America, and sets off also in an automobile.

ALLNESS! shrieks Walt at a cross-road, going whizz over an unwary Red Indian.

ONE IDENTITY! chants democratic En Masse, pelting behind in motor-cars, oblivious of the corpses under the wheels.

law2.jpgIt is Lawrence’s analysis of Melville’s Moby Dick, however, that is perhaps his most incisive. He sees in this simple story an encapsulation of the American spirit, the American thanatos itself. Here is Lawrence summing up his interpretation:

What then is Moby Dick? He is the deepest blood-being of the white race; he is our deepest blood-nature.

And he is hunted, hunted, hunted by the maniacal fanaticism of our white mental consciousness. We want to hunt him down. To subject him to our will. And in this maniacal conscious hunt of ourselves we get dark races and pale to help us, red, yellow, and black, east and west, Quaker and fire-worshipper, we get them all to help us in this ghastly maniacal hunt which is our doom and our suicide.

The last phallic being of the white man. Hunted into the death of the upper consciousness and the ideal will. Our blood-self subjected to our will. Our blood-consciousness sapped by a parasitic mental or ideal consciousness.

When a people loses a sense of blood-relatedness, what basis is there for community? American community is not based on blood ties, shared history, shared religion, or shared culture: it is based on ideology. He who professes the American creed is an American—he who does not is an outcast.

The American creed is based principally on a belief in freedom, equality, and Progress. For Lawrence, the first of these is (in its American form) empty, and the other two are a lie. American equality is a lie because in fact people are not equal, and virtually everyone realizes this in their heart of hearts.

American ethics requires, however, that everyone pay lip service to the idea that no one is, or can be, fundamentally better than anyone else. This is one of the country’s core beliefs. In fact, Lawrence points out that this is so fundamental to being an American that Americans are terrified lest they somehow let on to their fellow countryman that they really don’t believe that everyone is equal, or that all opinions are equally valid and valuable. They are afraid of seeming “judgmental,” and they parrot an absurd relativism in order to be seen by others as “tolerant.” Lawrence writes of America, “I have never been in a country where the individual has such an abject fear of his fellow countrymen. Because, as I say, they are free to lynch the moment he shows he is not one of them.”

Essentially the same point was made by Alexis de Tocqueville. In his Democracy in America, Tocqueville includes a section titled “The Power Exercised by the Majority in America over Thought,” and writes as follows:

I know no country in which, speaking generally, there is less independence of mind and true freedom of discussion than in America. . . . In America the majority has enclosed thought within a formidable fence. A writer is free inside that area, but woe to the man who goes beyond it. . . . Before he goes into print, he believes he has supporters; but he feels that he has them no more once he stands revealed to all, for those who condemn him express their views loudly, while those who think as he does, but without his courage, retreat into silence as if ashamed of having told the truth. . . . Hence the majority lives in a state of perpetual self-adoration; only strangers or experience may be able to bring certain truths to the Americans’ attention. (Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, trans. George Lawrence [New York: Doubleday, 1969], 254–55)

A creedal state such as America is as intolerant as a creedal religion. A Jew who does not believe in the Exodus story does not cease thereby to be a Jew, since being Jewish is an ethnic as well as a religious identification. Similarly, Hinduism (another ethnic religion) tolerates and subsumes a vast number of doctrines and differences of emphasis. (It is even possible, in a certain sense, to be an atheist Hindu.) Christianity and Islam, however, are creedal religions and therefore much less tolerant of doctrinal deviations. One can stop being a Christian or a Muslim—immediately—by believing or not believing certain things.

America early on divided itself into ethnic communities—the English, the Germans, the Irish, etc. A genuine spirit of community existed within these groups, in virtue of their blood ties and shared history, culture, and religion. But gradually these communities mixed and lost their unique identities. The creed of “Americanism” was the only thing that then arose as something that was supposed to bind people together. But since Americanism consists mostly of the recognition of negative liberties, how effective could it be at creating community? The result is that Americans became increasingly alienated from each other.

In his Preface to Edward Dahlberg’s Bottom Dogs (1929) Lawrence speaks of the breakdown in America of “blood-sympathy” and argues that it is responsible for a seldom-discussed facet of the American character, one which Europeans find particularly strange and amusing: the American pre-occupation with hygiene and super-cleanliness:

Once the blood-sympathy breaks . . . human beings become secretly intensely repulsive to one another, physically, and sympathetic only mentally and spiritually. The secret physical repulsion between people is responsible for the perfection of American “plumbing,” American sanitation, and American kitchens, utterly white-enamelled and antiseptic. It is revealed in the awful advertisements such as those about “halitosis,” or bad breath. It is responsible for the American nausea at coughing, spitting, or any of those things. The American townships don’t mind hideous litter of tin cans and broken rubbish. But they go crazy at the sight of human excrement.

With the blood-sympathy broken, Americans seek as much as possible to isolate themselves from their fellow citizens, who they fear and find repulsive. In his essay “Men Must Work and Women as Well,” Lawrence writes presciently of how technology serves to abstract us from human relationships: “The film, the radio, the gramophone were all invented because physical effort and physical contact have become repulsive to us.”

The radio and the gramophone brought individuals and families indoors and isolated them in their individual dwellings. No longer did they sit on their front porches and converse with their neighbors. The rise of the automobile contributed to this as well. Front porches were built for the cleaner, slower paced horse-and-buggy days. Sitting on the front porch was no longer so attractive when it meant being subjected to the noise and exhaust of automobiles whizzing by. Architecture began to reflect this change in the early part of the twentieth century, with designs for new houses sometimes eliminating the front porch altogether, and often with entrances concealed from view.

In the early days of the radio and the gramophone, only some families owned them, and they would often invite the neighbors in to listen to the gramophone or to the radio. This was also the case in the early days of television. But as these technologies became cheaper, just about every family acquired them and instead of facilitating social interaction they came to positively inhibit it. One can see this same phenomenon playing itself out in an even more radical way in the age of personal computers. It is now quite common for many Americans to live almost completely isolated lives, interacting with others via the Internet and carrying on “virtual relationships.”

Progressively, the lives of Americans became denuded of most of the features that have made life worth living throughout human history: community, extended family relations, participation in rituals, customs, traditions, remembrance of the past through shared stories, and the transmission of folk wisdom through myths, fables, and songs. The lives of most Americans became entirely dominated by the concerns of what Hegel called bürgerliche Gesellschaft, or “bourgeois society”: the realm of commerce.

“Getting ahead” becomes the primary concern in life, and all else—all the products of High Culture and most of the simple pleasures of life—become distractions, impracticalities. In his essay “Europe v. America,” Lawrence writes that “the American grips himself, at the very sources of his consciousness, in a grip of care: and then, to so much of the rest of life, is indifferent. Whereas the European hasn’t got so much care in him, so he cares much more for life and living.”

This is the secret to much of the inadequacy that Americans still feel when in Europe or in European company. Partly it is the (usually correct) sense that Europeans are better educated. But it is also the sense that these people have mastered the art of life. Life for most Americans is a problem to be solved, something we will eventually be able to do better than the Old World, thanks to the marriage of commerce and science.

Hence the tendency of Americans to believe anything that is asserted by scientists and medical men, no matter how ridiculous and ill-founded, and to distrust all that comes from tradition and “the past.” As witness the bizarre American reliance on “self-help books” and “how-to” manuals, even on such subjects as making friends or raising children. Americans are aware that these things were done in the past, without manuals, but believe that “experts” can teach us how to do them better than they have ever been done before.

While we wait for science to tell us how to live, life slips by. As Lawrence writes in a letter, “They can’t trust life until they can control it. So much for them—cowards! You can have the Land of the Free, as much as I know of it.”

Perhaps Lawrence’s most eloquent and succinct summation of the difference between the New World and the Old comes is the following line from “Europe v. America”: “The Europeans still have a vague idea that the universe is greater than they are, and isn’t going to change very radically, not for all the telling of all men put together.”

With life narrowed to the concerns of “getting ahead,” and natural human sympathies submerged or obliterated, Americans began to see each other more and more merely as objects: as consumers, or competitors, or employees, or bosses, but seldom as flesh and blood human beings. Thus we find the terrible American record of exploitation of the workers; frauds committed against the consumers, often at the expense of their health or even their lives; the devastation of communities wrought by the dumping of industrial waste; and the dumping of armies of workers in massive “layoffs.”

Heidegger was right: in its disregard for human life, American capitalism reveals itself as metaphysically identical to communism. And like communism, it tramples human life in the name of Progress. In its paper-thin idealism, its inhumanity, its self-destructiveness, and in its uncertainty of exactly what it is or should be, America is Women in Love’s Gerald Crich made real on a vast scale. Or, rather, Gerald Crich—coupled with the nihilism of Gudrun Brangwen—is the spirit of America. (Remember, those two are a couple: they complement one another. See my essay on Women in Love.)

The spirit of America—at once nihilism and “benevolent” idealism—can be seen very clearly in how it has treated other peoples both on its own soil and abroad. Earlier we saw in The Plumed Serpent Lawrence commenting on the white man’s attempt to “civilize” the “dark men.” Why do Americans feel that they must bend others to their way of life? American universalism leads to the belief that inside every foreigner is an American just screaming to get out.

Americans are like fresh converts to a religion, who feel that they have to convert all their friends—subconsciously in order to reassure themselves that they have made a sound choice. Americans have given up so much that was once thought to be essential to life and to community—so they simply must be right; others must find their way the most desirable way. If they do not, then they are ignorant and don’t know what’s good for them; or their governments have prevented them from seeing the truth.

Americans have been converting foreigners into Americans for a long time now, through exporting their consumer culture (irresistibly appealing to the baser elements in all peoples), and through less peaceable means.

On their own soil, white Americans have also tried to convert the “dark man” to Americanism. In his essay “Certain Americans and an Englishman,”  Lawrence speaks of Americans trying to turn the Red Man into a “wage earner.” This can be done, up to a point, but at the price of the Red Man sacrificing his soul. But ultimately Lawrence believes there can be no true harmony between different races, because they are so different, and that the attempts of white men to create “multicultural societies” will end in the destruction of the whites (an outcome he does not particularly lament).

Writing of Hector St. John de Crèvecouer in Studies, Lawrence states that he only wanted to know the Red Man in his head, abstractly because “he must have suspected that the moment he saw as the savages saw, all his fraternity and equality would go up in smoke, and his ideal world of pure sweet goodness along with it.” Later on in Studies, Lawrence writes that “The Red Man and the White Man are not blood-brothers: even when they are most friendly. When they are most friendly, it is as a rule the one betraying his race-spirit to the other.”

Lawrence’s views on America are apocalyptic. He sees no hope for the country, and seems to believe that it will drag the rest of the white world down with it. What, then, are we to make of these extreme views? Much of what Lawrence has to say about the emptiness of American ideals, and the emptiness of American lives, presages arguments that would be made by numerous social critics years later, especially in the 1950s and 1960s. I am thinking of such writers as Erich Fromm, Wilhelm Reich, Christopher Lasch, and Daniel Bell. Much of what he has to say would strike any Leftist as uncontroversial.

But once again Lawrence shows himself to be a kind of political hybrid, for his remarks on race, his opposition to the ideal of equality, and his opposition to multiculturalism seem to put him, by today’s standards, on the extreme right. Of course, contrary to what many Leftists might think, simply to point this out does not serve to refute Lawrence. Nor is it entirely convincing to accuse him of inconsistency: perhaps it is today’s Leftists and Rightists who are confused. And there is some plausibility to this suggestion.

For example, leftists today advocate both multiculturalism and “diversity,” which they tend to equate. But it is hard to see how the latter can be preserved if the former is achieved. In other words, inevitably a multicultural society would lead to the blending of peoples and the blending and watering-down of cultures, thus potentially destroying diversity rather than maintaining it. Lawrence challenges us to critique our own views, and to question their consistency—and their sanity.

There is no easy, ready-to-hand answer to Lawrence’s charges—about America in particular, or modernity in general. They strike at the heart of what is believed by most people in the West today. Whatever else one may say about his views, it is striking how their capacity to shock and to challenge us has only increased over the years.

vendredi, 17 décembre 2010

La disparition des Etats-Unis en tant que superpuissance mondiale

La disparition des Etats-Unis en tant que superpuissance mondiale

Ex: http://www.mecanopolis.org/

Un atterrissage en douceur pour les Etats-Unis d’ici quarante ans ? N’y pensez pas ! La disparition des Etats-Unis en tant que superpuissance mondiale pourrait survenir bien plus vite que ce que l’on imagine. Si Washington rêve de 2040 ou de 2050 comme date de fin pour le « Siècle Américain », une estimation plus réaliste des tendances aux Etats-Unis et dans le monde laisse penser qu’en 2025, exactement dans 15 ans, tout pourrait être pratiquement terminé.

 [1]

Malgré l’aura d’omnipotence que la plupart des empires projètent, un regard sur leur histoire devrait nous rappeler que ce sont des organismes fragiles. L’écologie de leur pouvoir est si délicate que lorsque les choses commencent à aller vraiment mal, les empires se désagrègent généralement à une vitesse incroyable : juste une année pour le Portugal, deux années pour l’Union Soviétique, 8 pour la France, 11 pour les Ottomans, 17 pour la Grande-Bretagne et, selon toute vraisemblance, 22 ans pour les Etats-Unis, à partir de la cruciale année 2003.

Les futurs historiens identifieront probablement l’invasion irréfléchie de l’Irak par l’administration de George W. Bush, cette année-là, comme le commencement de la chute de l’Amérique. Cependant, à la place du bain de sang qui a marqué la fin de tant d’empires du passé, avec des villes qui brûlent et des civils massacrés, cet effondrement impérial du 21ème siècle pourrait survenir de façon relativement discrète, par les circonvolutions invisibles de l’effondrement économique ou de la guerre cybernétique.

Mais n’ayez aucun doute : lorsque la domination mondiale de Washington prendra irrémédiablement fin, il y aura des souvenirs quotidiens douloureux de ce qu’une telle perte de pouvoir signifie pour les Américains de tous les milieux. A l’instar de ce qu’une demi-douzaine de nations européennes ont découvert, le déclin impérial tend à avoir un impact remarquablement démoralisant sur une société, apportant ordinairement des privations économiques pendant au moins une génération. Au fur et à mesure que l’économie se refroidit, la température politique monte, déclenchant souvent de sérieux troubles.

Les données économiques, éducatives et militaires disponibles indiquent, pour ce qui est de la puissance mondiale des Etats-Unis, que les tendances négatives s’accumuleront rapidement d’ici à 2020 et atteindront probablement une masse critique au plus tard en 2030. Le Siècle Américain, proclamé si triomphalement au commencement de la Deuxième Guerre Mondiale, sera réduit à néant et s’éteindra d’ici à 2025, dans sa huitième décennie, et pourrait être relégué définitivement au passé d’ici 2030.

Fait révélateur, en 2008, la Commission Nationale Américaine des Renseignements [US National Intelligence Council] a admis pour la première fois que la puissance globale des Etats-Unis suivait vraiment une trajectoire déclinante. Dans l’un de ses rapports périodiques sur le futur, Global Trends 2025 [Tendances Mondiales 2025], cette commission a cité « le transfert brutal de la richesse mondiale et de la puissance économique, actuellement en cours, de l’Ouest vers l’Est », et « sans précédent dans l’histoire moderne », comme premier facteur du déclin de la « force relative des Etats-Unis – même dans le domaine militaire ». Toutefois, comme beaucoup à Washington, les analystes de cette commission ont anticipé un atterrissage très en douceur et très long de la prééminence mondiale américaine, et ils ont nourri l’espoir que d’une façon ou d’une autre les Etats-Unis « garderaient longtemps une capacité militaire unique… afin de projeter leur puissance militaire sur le monde » pour les décennies à venir.

Pas la moindre chance ! Selon les projections actuelles, les Etats-Unis se retrouveront en deuxième position derrière la Chine (déjà deuxième économie mondiale) en terme de production économique, aux alentours de 2026, et derrière l’Inde d’ici à 2050. De même, l’innovation chinoise suit une trajectoire qui conduira la Chine au leadership mondial en science appliquée et en technologie militaire entre 2020 et 2030, juste au moment où les nombreux scientifiques et ingénieurs brillants de l’Amérique actuelle prendront leur retraite, sans pouvoir être adéquatement remplacés à cause d’une nouvelle génération mal instruite.

D’ici 2020, selon les prévisions actuelles, le Pentagone se lancera dans un va-tout militaire d’un empire mourrant. Il lancera une triple couverture spatiale létale, constituée de robotique avancée et qui représente le dernier meilleur espoir de Washington de maintenir son statut de puissance mondiale, malgré son influence économique déclinante. Toutefois, dès cette année-là, le réseau mondial de satellites de communication de la Chine, soutenu par les super-ordinateurs les plus puissants du monde, sera également entièrement opérationnel, procurant à Pékin une plate-forme indépendante pour la militarisation de l’espace et un puissant système de communication pour ses missiles – ou attaques cybernétiques – dans tous les endroits de la planète.

Enveloppée dans sa prétention démesurée impériale, comme Whitehall ou le Quai d’Orsay avant elle, la Maison Blanche semble toujours imaginer que le déclin américain sera progressif, modéré et partiel. Dans son Adresse à l’Union en janvier dernier, le Président Barack Obama a donné la garantie qu’il « n’accepte pas la deuxième place pour les Etats-Unis d’Amérique ». Quelques jours plus tard, le Vice-président Joseph Biden, a tourné en dérision l’idée même que « nous sommes destinés à réaliser la prophétie de [l’historien Paul] Kennedy, selon laquelle nous serons une grande nation qui aura échoué parce que nous avons perdu le contrôle de notre économie et que nous nous sommes trop agrandis ». De la même manière, Joseph Nye, le gourou néolibéral en politique étrangère, s’exprimant dans le numéro de novembre du journal institutionnel Foreign Affairs, a balayé toute idée d’essor économique et militaire de la Chine, rejetant « les métaphores trompeuses de déclin organique » et niant qu’une détérioration de la puissance globale des Etats-Unis était en cours.

Les Américains ordinaires, voyant leurs emplois se délocaliser à l’étranger, ont une vision plus réaliste que leurs dirigeants qui, eux, sont bien protégés. Un sondage d’opinion d’août 2010 a mis en évidence que 65% des Américains pensaient que leur pays était désormais « en état de déclin ». Déjà, l’Australie et la Turquie, des alliés militaires traditionnels des Etats-Unis, utilisent leurs armes fabriquées en Amérique pour des manœuvres aériennes et navales conjointes avec la Chine. Déjà, les partenaires économiques les plus proches des Etats-Unis s’éloignent de la position de Washington et se tournent vers la devise chinoise, dont les taux sont manipulés. Alors que le président [Obama] revenait d’Asie le mois dernier, un gros titre sinistre du New York Times résumait ainsi le moment fort de son voyage : « Sur La Scène Mondiale, La Vision Economique d’Obama Est Rejetée, La Chine, La Grande-Bretagne Et L’Allemagne Contestent Les USA, Les Pourparlers Commerciaux Avec Séoul Ont Egalement Echoué ».

D’un point de vue historique, la question n’est pas de savoir si les Etats-Unis perdront leur puissance globale incontestée, mais juste à quelle vitesse et avec quelle brutalité se produira leur déclin. A la place des désirs irréalistes de Washington, prenons la propre méthodologie du National Intelligence Council pour décrypter l’avenir, afin de suggérer quatre scénarios réalistes (accompagnés de quatre évaluations associées de leur situation actuelle) sur la manière, que ce soit avec fracas ou dans un murmure, dont la puissance globale des Etats-Unis pourrait toucher à sa fin dans les années 2020. Ces scénarios futuristes comprennent : le déclin économique, le choc pétrolier, la mésaventure militaire et la Troisième Guerre Mondiale. Même si ces scénarios sont loin d’être les seules possibilités en matière de déclin – voire même d’effondrement – américain, ils offrent une fenêtre sur un futur qui arrive au pas de charge.

Le déclin économique

La situation actuelle

Aujourd’hui, trois menaces principales existent vis-à-vis de la position dominante des Etats-Unis dans l’économie mondiale : la perte de l’influence économique grâce à une part du commerce mondial qui se rétrécit, le déclin de l’innovation technologique américaine et la fin du statut privilégié du dollar en tant que devise de réserve mondiale.

Dès 2008, les Etats-Unis sont déjà tombés au troisième rang mondial pour les exportations, avec 11% des exportations mondiales, comparés à 12% pour la Chine et 16% pour l’Union Européenne. Il n’y a aucune raison de croire que cette tendance va s’inverser.

De la même façon, le leadership américain dans l’innovation technologique est sur le déclin. En 2008, les Etats-Unis étaient encore numéro deux derrière le Japon en matière de dépôts de brevets, avec 232.000, mais la Chine se rapprochait très vite avec 195.000 brevets, grâce à une augmentation foudroyante de 400% depuis l’an 2000. Un signe annonciateur d’un déclin supplémentaire : en 2009, les Etats-Unis sont tombés au plus bas, au cours de la décennie précédente, parmi les 40 pays étudiés par la Fondation pour l’Innovation et l’Information Technologique, en termes de « changement » dans la « compétitivité mondiale en matière d’innovation ». Ajoutant du corps à ces statistiques, en octobre dernier, le Ministère de la Défense chinois a dévoilé le super-ordinateur le plus rapide du monde, le Tianhe-1 A, si puissant, selon un expert américain, qu’il « fait voler en éclat les performances de l’actuelle machine n°1 » aux Etats-Unis.

Ajoutez à cette preuve limpide que le système éducatif américain, qui constitue la source des futurs scientifiques et innovateurs, est passé derrière ses concurrents. Après avoir été à la tête du monde pendant des décennies sur la tranche d’âge des 25-34 ans possédant un diplôme universitaire, ce pays a sombré à la douzième place en 2010. Le Forum Economique Mondial, la même année, a classé les Etats-Unis à une médiocre 52ème place sur 139 pays, en ce qui concerne la qualité de ses universités de mathématiques et d’instruction scientifique. Près de la moitié de tous les diplômés en sciences aux Etats-Unis sont désormais des étrangers, dont la plupart rentreront chez eux, et ne resteront pas aux Etats-Unis comme cela se passait autrefois. Autrement dit, d’ici 2025, les Etats-Unis se retrouveront probablement face à une pénurie de scientifiques de talent.

De telles tendances négatives encouragent la critique acerbe croissante sur le rôle du dollar en tant que devise de réserve mondiale. « Les autres pays ne veulent plus adhérer à l’idée que les Etats-Unis savent mieux que les autres en matière de politique économique », a observé Kenneth S. Rogoff, ancien chef économiste au FMI. A la mi-2009, avec les banques centrales qui détenaient un montant astronomique de 4.000 milliards de dollars en bons du trésor américain, le Président russe Dimitri Medvedev a insisté sur le fait qu’il était temps de mettre fin au « système unipolaire artificiellement maintenu » et basé sur « une devise de réserve qui avait été forte dans le passé ».

Simultanément, le gouverneur de la banque centrale chinoise a laissé entendre que l’avenir pourrait reposer sur une devise de réserve mondiale « déconnectée des nations individuelles » (c’est-à-dire, le dollar américain). Prenez tout ceci comme des indications du monde à venir et comme une tentative possible, ainsi que l’a soutenu l’économiste Michael Hudson, « d’accélérer la banqueroute de l’ordre mondial militaro-financier des Etats-Unis ».

Un scénario pour 2020

Après des années de déficits croissants, nourris par des guerres incessantes dans des pays lointains, en 2020, comme l’on s’y attend depuis longtemps, le dollar américain perd finalement son statut spécial de devise de réserve mondiale. Soudain, le coût des importations monte en flèche. Incapable de payer des déficits allant crescendo en vendant des bons du Trésor à présent dévalués, Washington est finalement obligé de réduire considérablement son budget militaire boursouflé. Sous la pression de ses citoyens et de l’étranger, Washington retire les forces américaines de centaines de bases à l’étranger qui se replient sur un périmètre continental. Cependant, il est désormais bien trop tard.

Face à une superpuissance qui s’éteint et qui est incapable de payer ses factures, la Chine, l’Inde, l’Iran, la Russie et d’autres puissances, grandes ou régionales, défient et provoquent la domination des Etats-Unis sur les océans, dans l’espace et le cyberespace. Pendant ce temps, en pleine inflation, avec un chômage qui croit sans cesse et une baisse continue des salaires réels, les divisions intérieures s’étendent en violents clashs et en débats diviseurs, souvent sur des questions remarquablement hors sujet. Surfant sur une vague politique de désillusion et de désespoir, un patriote d’extrême-droite capture la présidence avec une rhétorique assourdissante, exigeant le respect de l’autorité américaine et proférant des menaces de représailles militaires ou économiques. Le monde ne prête quasiment pas attention alors que le Siècle Américain se termine en silence.

Le choc pétrolier

La situation actuelle

Une victime collatérale de la puissance économique déclinante de l’Amérique a été son verrouillage des approvisionnements en pétrole. Accélérant et dépassant l’économie américaine gourmande en pétrole, la Chine est devenue cet été le premier consommateur mondial d’énergie, une position détenue par les Etats-Unis depuis plus d’un siècle. Le spécialiste [américain] de l’énergie Michael Klare a exposé que ce changement signifie que la Chine « donnera le rythme pour façonner notre avenir mondial ».

D’ici 2025, la Russie et l’Iran contrôleront près de la moitié des réserves mondiales de gaz naturel, ce qui leur octroiera potentiellement un énorme effet de levier sur une Europe affamée d’énergie. Ajoutez les réserves pétrolières à ce mélange, ainsi que le National Intelligence Council a prévenu, et dans juste 15 ans, deux pays, la Russie et l’Iran, pourraient « émerger comme les chevilles ouvrières de l’énergie ».

Malgré leur ingéniosité remarquable, les principales puissances pétrolières vident actuellement les grands bassins de réserves pétrolières qui s’avèrent être des extractions faciles et bon marché. La véritable leçon du désastre pétrolier de « Deepwater Horizon » dans le Golfe du Mexique n’était pas les normes de sécurité laxistes de BP, mais le simple fait que tout le monde ne voyait que le « spectacle de la marée noire » : l’un des géants de l’énergie n’avait pas beaucoup d’autre choix que de chercher ce que Klare appelle du « pétrole coriace », à des kilomètres sous la surface de l’océan, pour maintenir la croissance de ses profits.

Aggravant le problème, les Chinois et les Indiens sont soudainement devenus des consommateurs d’énergie beaucoup plus gourmands. Même si les approvisionnements en pétrole devaient rester constants (ce qui ne sera pas le cas), la demande, et donc les coûts, est quasiment assurée de monter – et, qui plus est, brutalement. D’autres pays développés répondent agressivement à cette menace en se plongeant dans des programmes expérimentaux pour développer des sources énergétiques alternatives. Les Etats-Unis ont pris une voie différente, faisant bien trop peu pour développer des sources énergétiques alternatives, tandis qu’au cours des dix dernières années, ils ont doublé leur dépendance sur les importations du pétrole provenant de l’étranger. Entre 1973 et 2007, les importations de pétrole [aux Etats-Unis] sont passées de 36% de toute l’énergie consommée aux Etats-Unis à 66%.

Un scénario pour 2025

Les Etats-Unis sont restés si dépendants du pétrole étranger que quelques événements défavorables sur le marché mondial de l’énergie déclenchent en 2025 un choc pétrolier. En comparaison, le choc pétrolier de 1973 (lorsque les prix ont quadruplé en quelques mois) ressemble à un avatar. En colère face à la valeur du dollar qui s’envole, les ministres du pétrole de l’OPEP, se réunissant en Arabie Saoudite, exigent les futurs paiements énergétiques dans un « panier de devises », constitué de yen, de yuan et d’euro. Cela ne fait qu’augmenter un peu plus le coût des importations pétrolières américaines. En même temps, tandis qu’ils signent une nouvelle série de contrats de livraison à long-terme avec la Chine, les Saoudiens stabilisent leurs propres réserves de devises en passant au yuan. Pendant ce temps, la Chine déverse d’innombrables milliards pour construire un énorme pipeline à travers l’Asie et finance l’exploitation par l’Iran du plus grand champ gazier au monde, à South Pars, dans le Golfe Persique.

Inquiets que l’US Navy pourrait ne plus être en mesure de protéger les bateaux-citernes naviguant depuis le Golfe Persique pour alimenter l’Asie Orientale, une coalition entre Téhéran, Riyad et Abu-Dhabi forme une nouvelle alliance inattendue du Golfe et décrète que la nouvelle flotte chinoise de porte-avions rapides patrouillera dorénavant dans le Golfe Persique, depuis une base dans le Golfe d’Oman. Sous de fortes pressions économiques, Londres accepte d’annuler le bail des Américains sur la base de Diego Garcia, située sur son île de l’Océan Indien, tandis que Canberra, contrainte par les Chinois, informe Washington que sa Septième Flotte n’est plus la bienvenue à Fremantle, son port d’attache, évinçant de fait l’US Navy de l’Océan Indien.

En quelques traits de plume et quelques annonces laconiques, la « Doctrine Carter », selon laquelle la puissance militaire étasunienne devait éternellement protéger le Golfe Persique, est enterrée en 2025. Tous les éléments qui ont assuré pendant longtemps aux Etats-Unis des approvisionnements illimités en pétrole bon marché depuis cette région – logistique, taux de change et puissance navale – se sont évaporés. A ce stade, les Etats-Unis ne peuvent encore couvrir que 12% de leurs besoins énergétiques par leur industrie d’énergie alternative naissante, et ils restent dépendants du pétrole importé pour la moitié de leur consommation d’énergie.

Le choc pétrolier qui s’ensuit frappe le pays comme un ouragan, envoyant les prix vers de nouveaux sommets, rendant les voyages une option incroyablement coûteuse, provoquant la chute-libre des salaires réels (depuis longtemps en déclin) et rendant non-compétitif ce qui reste des exportations américaines. Avec des thermostats qui chutent, le prix des carburants qui bat tous les records et les dollars qui coulent à flot vers l’étranger en échange d’un pétrole coûteux, l’économie américaine est paralysée. Avec des alliances en bout de course qui s’effilochent depuis longtemps et des pressions fiscales croissantes, les forces militaires américaines commencent finalement un retrait graduel de leurs bases à l’étranger.

En quelques années, les Etats-Unis sont fonctionnellement en faillite et le compte à rebours à commencé vers le crépuscule du Siècle Américain.

La mésaventure militaire

La situation actuelle

Contrairement à l’intuition, tandis que leur puissance s’éteint, les empires plongent souvent dans des mésaventures militaires inconsidérées. Ce phénomène, connu des historiens spécialistes des empires sous le nom de « micro-militarisme », semble impliquer des efforts de compensation psychologique pour soulager la douleur de la retraite ou de la défaite en occupant de nouveaux territoires, pourtant de façon brève et catastrophique. Ces opérations, irrationnelles même d’un point de vue impérial, produisent souvent une hémorragie de dépenses ou de défaites humiliantes qui ne font qu’accélérer la perte de puissance.

A travers les âges, les empires assaillis souffrent d’une arrogance qui les conduit à plonger encore plus profond dans les mésaventures militaires, jusqu’à ce que la défaite devienne une débâcle. En 413 av. J.-C., Athènes, affaiblie, envoya 200 vaisseaux se faire massacrer en Sicile. En 1921, l’Espagne impériale mourante envoya 20.000 soldats se faire massacrer par les guérillas berbères au Maroc. En 1956, l’empire britannique déclinant détruisit son prestige en attaquant Suez. Et, en 2001 et en 2003, les Etats-Unis ont occupé l’Afghanistan et envahi l’Irak. Avec la prétention démesurée qui marque les empires au fil des millénaires, Washington a augmenté à 100.000 le nombre de ses soldats en Afghanistan, étendu la guerre au Pakistan et étendu son engagement jusqu’en 2014 et plus, recherchant les désastres, petits et grands, dans ce cimetière nucléarisé des empires, infesté par les guérillas.

Un scénario pour 2014

Le « micro-militarisme » est si irrationnel et imprévisible que les scénarios en apparence fantaisistes sont vite surpassés par les évènements réels. Avec l’armée américaine étirée et clairsemée de la Somalie aux Philippines et les tensions qui montent en Israël, en Iran et en Corée, les combinaisons possibles pour une crise militaire désastreuse sont multiformes.

Nous sommes au milieu de l’été 2014 au sud de l’Afghanistan et une garnison américaine réduite, dans Kandahar assailli, est soudainement et de façon inattendue prise d’assaut par les guérillas Taliban, tandis que les avions américains sont cloués au sol par une tempête de sable aveuglante. De lourdes pertes sont encaissées et, en représailles, un commandant militaire américain embarrassé lâche ses bombardiers B-1 et ses avions de combat F-16 pour démolir tout un quartier de la ville que l’on pense être sous contrôle Taliban, tandis que des hélicoptères de combat AC-130 U « Spooky » ratissent les décombres avec des tirs dévastateurs.

Très vite, les Mollahs prêchent le djihad dans toutes les mosquées de la région, et les unités de l’armée afghane, entraînées depuis longtemps par les forces américaines pour renverser le cours de la guerre, commencent à déserter massivement. Les combattants Talibans lancent alors dans tout le pays une série de frappes remarquablement sophistiquées sur les garnisons américaines, faisant monter en flèche les pertes américaines. Dans des scènes qui rappellent Saigon en 1975, les hélicoptères américains portent secours aux soldats et aux civils américains depuis les toits de Kaboul et de Kandahar.

Pendant ce temps, en colère contre l’impasse interminable qui dure depuis des dizaines d’années à propos de la Palestine, les dirigeants de l’OPEP imposent un nouvel embargo pétrolier contre les Etats-Unis pour protester contre leur soutien à Israël, ainsi que contre le massacre d’un nombre considérable de civils musulmans dans leur guerre en cours dans tout le Grand Moyen-Orient. Avec le prix des carburants qui monte en flèche et ses raffineries qui s’assèchent, Washington prend ses dispositions en envoyant les forces des Opérations Spéciales saisir les ports pétroliers du Golfe Persique. En retour, cela déclenche un emballement des attaques-suicides et le sabotage des pipelines et des puits de pétrole. Tandis que des nuages noirs s’élèvent en tourbillons vers le ciel et que les diplomates se soulèvent à l’ONU pour dénoncer catégoriquement les actions américaines, les commentateurs dans le monde entier remontent dans l’histoire pour appeler cela le « Suez de l’Amérique », une référence éloquente à la débâcle de 1956 qui a marqué la fin de l’Empire Britannique.

La Troisième Guerre Mondiale

La situation actuelle

Au cours de l’été 2010, les tensions militaires entre les Etats-Unis et la Chine ont commencé à croître dans le Pacifique occidental, considéré autrefois comme un « lac » américain. Même un an plus tôt, personne n’aurait prédit un tel développement. De la même manière que Washington a exploité son alliance avec Londres pour s’approprier une grande part de la puissance mondiale de la Grande-Bretagne après la Deuxième Guerre Mondiale, la Chine utilise à présent les profits générés par ses exportations avec les Etats-Unis pour financer ce qui risque probablement de devenir un défi militaire à la domination américaine sur les voies navigables de l’Asie et du Pacifique.

Avec ses ressources croissantes, Pékin revendique un vaste arc maritime, de la Corée à l’Indonésie, dominé pendant longtemps par l’US Navy. En août, après que Washington eut exprimé un « intérêt national » dans la Mer de Chine méridionale et conduit des exercices navals pour renforcer cette revendication, le Global Times, organe officiel de Pékin, a répondu avec colère, en disant : « Le match de lutte entre les Etats-Unis et la Chine sur la question de la Mer de Chine méridionale a fait monter les enchères pour décider quel sera le futur dirigeant de la planète. »

Au milieu des tensions croissantes, le Pentagone a rapporté que Pékin détient à présent « la capacité d’attaquer… les porte-avions [américains] dans l’Océan Pacifique occidental » et de diriger « des forces nucléaires vers l’ensemble… des Etats-Unis continentaux. » En développant « des capacités offensives nucléaires, spatiales et de guerre cybernétique », la Chine semble déterminée à rivaliser pour la domination de ce que le pentagone appelle « le spectre d’information dans toutes les dimensions de l’espace de combat moderne ». Avec le développement en cours de la puissante fusée d’appoint Long March V, de même que le lancement de deux satellites en janvier 2010 et d’un autre en juillet dernier, pour un total de cinq [déjà mis sur orbite], Pékin a lancé le signal que le pays faisait des progrès rapides en direction d’un réseau « indépendant » de 35 satellites pour le positionnement, les communications et les capacités de reconnaissance mondiales, qui verra le jour d’ici 2020.

Pour contrôler la Chine et étendre mondialement sa position militaire, Washington a l’intention de construire un nouveau réseau numérique de robotique aérienne et spatiale, de capacités avancées de guerre cybernétique et de surveillance électronique. Les planificateurs militaires espèrent que ce système enveloppera la Terre dans un quadrillage cybernétique capable de rendre aveugles des armées entières sur le champ de bataille ou d’isoler un simple terroriste dans un champ ou une favela. D’ici 2020, si tout fonctionne selon son plan, le Pentagone lancera un bouclier à trois niveaux de drones spatiaux – pouvant atteindre l’exosphère depuis la stratosphère, armés de missiles agiles, reliés par un système modulaire de satellites élastique et opérant au moyen d’une surveillance totale par télescope.

En avril dernier, le Pentagone est entré dans l’histoire. Il a étendu les opérations de drones à l’exosphère en lançant discrètement la navette spatiale non habitée X-37 B, la plaçant en orbite basse au-dessus de la planète. Le X-37 B est le premier d’une nouvelle génération de véhicules non-habités qui marqueront la militarisation complète de l’espace, créant une arène pour les futures guerres, contrairement à tout ce qui a été fait auparavant.

Un scénario pour 2025

La technologie de la guerre spatiale et cybernétique est tellement nouvelle et non-testée que même les scénarios les plus bizarres pourraient bientôt être dépassés par une réalité encore difficile à concevoir. Toutefois, si nous employons simplement le type de scénarios que l’US Air Force a elle-même utilisés dans son 2009 Future Capabilities Game, nous pouvons obtenir « une meilleure compréhension sur la manière dont l’air, l’espace et le cyberespace coïncident dans l’art de la guerre » ; et, commencez alors à imaginer comment la prochaine guerre mondiale pourrait réellement être livrée !

Il est 23h59 en ce jeudi de Thanksgiving 2025. Tandis que les foules se pressent dans les cyberboutiques et qu’elles martèlent les portails de Best Buy pour des gros discounts sur les derniers appareils électroniques domestiques provenant de Chine, les techniciens de l’US Air Force, au Télescope Spatial de Surveillance de Maui [Hawaï], toussent sur leur café tandis que leurs écrans panoramiques deviennent soudainement noirs. A des milliers de kilomètres, au centre de commandement cybernétique au Texas, les combattants cybernétiques détectent rapidement des codes binaires malicieux qui, bien que lancés de façon anonyme, montrent l’empreinte numérique distincte de l’Armée de Libération Populaire de Chine.

Cette première attaque ouverte n’avait été prévue par personne. Le « programme malicieux » prend le contrôle de la robotique à bord d’un drone américain à propulsion solaire, le « Vulture », alors qu’il vole à 70.000 pieds au-dessus du Détroit de Tsushima, entre la Corée et le Japon. Il tire soudain tous les modules de fusées qui se trouvent en dessous de son envergure gigantesque de 135 mètres, envoyant des douzaines de missiles létaux plonger de façon inoffensive dans la Mer Jaune, désarmant ainsi efficacement cette arme terrible.

Déterminé à répondre coup pour coup, la Maison Blanche autorise une frappe de rétorsion. Confiant que son système de satellites F-6, « fractionné et en vol libre » est impénétrable, les commandants de l’Air Force en Californie transmettent les codes robotiques à la flottille de drones spatiaux X-37 B qui orbitent à 450 kilomètres au-dessus de la Terre, leur ordonnant de lancer leurs missiles « triple terminator » sur les 35 satellites chinois. Aucune réponse. Proche de la panique, l’US Air Force lance son véhicule de croisière hypersonique Falcon dans un arc de 160 kilomètres au-dessus de l’Océan Pacifique et ensuite, juste 20 minutes plus tard, envoie les codes informatiques pour tirer les missiles contre sept satellites chinois en orbite basse. Les codes de lancement sont soudainement inopérants.

Au fur et à mesure que le virus chinois se répand irrésistiblement à travers l’architecture des satellites F-6 et que ces super-ordinateurs américains de deuxième classe ne parviennent pas à cracker le code diablement complexe du programme malicieux, les signaux GPS, cruciaux pour la navigation des navires et des avions américains dans le monde entier, sont compromis. Les flottes de porte-avions commencent à tourner en rond au milieu du Pacifique. Des escadrons d’avions de combat sont cloués au sol. Les drones moissonneurs volent sans but vers l’horizon, se crashant lorsque leur carburant est épuisé. Soudain, les Etats-Unis perdent ce que l’US Air Force a longtemps appelé « le terrain élevé de combat ultime » : l’espace. En quelques heures, la puissance mondiale qui a dominé la planète pendant près d’un siècle a été vaincue dans la Troisième Guerre Mondiale sans causer la moindre victime humaine.

Un nouvel ordre mondial ?

Même si les événements futurs s’avèrent plus ternes que ce que suggèrent ces quatre scénarios, toutes les tendances importantes pointent vers un déclin beaucoup plus saisissant de la puissance américaine d’ici 2025 que tout ce que Washington semble maintenant envisager.

Alors que les alliés [des Etats-Unis] dans le monde entier commencent à réaligner leurs politiques pour rencontrer les puissances asiatiques montantes, le coût de maintien des 800 bases militaires ou plus à l’étranger deviendra tout simplement insoutenable, forçant finalement Washington à se retirer graduellement à contre-cœur. Avec la Chine et les Etats-Unis qui se trouvent dans une course à la militarisation de l’espace et du cyberespace, les tensions entre les deux puissances vont sûrement monter, rendant un conflit militaire d’ici 2025 au moins plausible, voire quasiment garanti.

Pour compliquer un peu plus les choses, les tendances économiques, militaires et technologiques exposées brièvement ci-dessus n’agiront pas de manière clairement isolée. Comme cela s’est produit pour les empires européens après la Deuxième Guerre Mondiale, de telles forces négatives se révèleront sans aucun doute synergiques. Elles se combineront de façon complètement inattendue, créeront des crises pour lesquelles les Américains ne sont absolument pas préparés et menaceront d’envoyer l’économie dans une spirale descendante soudaine, reléguant ce pays dans la misère économique, pendant une génération ou plus.

Tandis que la puissance américaine s’estompe, le passé offre un éventail de possibilités pour un futur ordre mondial. A un bout de ce spectre, la montée d’une nouvelle superpuissance mondiale, même si elle est improbable, ne peut pas être écartée. Toutefois, la Chine et la Russie manifestent toutes deux des cultures autoréférentielles, des écritures abstruses non-romaines, des stratégies de défense régionales et des systèmes légaux sous-développés, leur contestant les instruments clés pour la domination mondiale. Alors, dans ce cas, aucune superpuissance de semble pouvoir succéder aux Etats-Unis.

Dans une version noire contre-utopique de notre futur mondial, il est concevable qu’une coalition d’entreprises transnationales, de forces multilatérales comme l’OTAN et d’une élite financière internationale puisse élaborer un réseau supranational instable qui ne donnerait plus aucun sens à l’idée même d’empires nationaux. Tandis que des entreprises dénationalisées et des élites multinationales dirigeraient de façon usurpée un tel monde depuis des enclaves urbaines sécurisées, les multitudes seraient reléguées dans des terres, rurales ou urbaines, laissées à l’abandon.

Dans Planet of Slums [planète bidonvilles], Mike Davis offre au moins une vision partielle du bas vers le haut d’un tel monde. Son argument est que le milliard de personnes (deux milliards d’ici 2030) déjà entassées dans des bidonvilles fétides de type favelas autour du monde, feront « les villes sauvages et en faillite du Tiers Monde […] l’espace de combat caractéristique du 21ème siècle ». Alors que l’obscurité s’installe sur quelques super-favelas futures, « l’empire peut déployer des technologies orwelliennes de répression », tandis que « les hélicoptères de combats de type hornet chassent des ennemis énigmatiques dans les rues étroites des bas-quartiers… Tous les matins, les bidonvilles répliquent par des attentats-suicides et des explosions éloquentes ».

Au milieu de ce spectre de futurs possibles, un nouvel oligopole pourrait émerger entre 2020 et 2040, avec les puissances montantes chinoise, russe, indienne et brésilienne collaborant avec des puissances en déclin comme la Grande-Bretagne, l’Allemagne, le Japon et les Etats-Unis, en vue d’imposer une domination globale ad hoc, semblable à l’alliance approximative des empires européens qui ont dirigé la moitié de l’humanité aux alentours de 1900.

Une autre possibilité : la montée d’hégémons régionaux dans un retour à quelque chose rappelant le système international en œuvre avant que les empires modernes ne se forment. Dans cet ordre mondial néo-westphalien, avec ses perspectives sans fin de micro-violence et d’exploitation incontrôlée, chaque hégémon dominerait sa région immédiate – le Brésil en Amérique du Sud, Washington en Amérique du Nord, Pretoria en Afrique méridionale, etc. L’espace, le cyberespace et les profondeurs maritimes, retirés du contrôle de l’ancien « gendarme » planétaire, les Etats-Unis, pourraient même devenir des nouvelles parties communes mondiales, contrôlées au moyen d’un Conseil de Sécurité onusien élargi ou d’une autre institution ad hoc.

Tous ces scénarios extrapolent des tendances futuristes existantes, sur la supposition que les Américains, aveuglés par l’arrogance de décennies de puissance sans précédent historique, ne peuvent pas prendre ou ne prendront pas les mesures pour gérer l’érosion incontrôlée de leur position mondiale.

Si le déclin de l’Amérique suit en fait une trajectoire de 22 années entre 2003 et 2025, alors les Américains ont déjà gaspillé la plus grande partie de la première décade de ce déclin avec des guerres qui les ont détournés des problèmes à long-terme et, de la même manière que l’eau est bue rapidement par les sables du désert, des trillions de dollars terriblement nécessaires gaspillés.

S’il reste seulement 15 ans, les risques de les gaspiller tous reste toujours élevé. Le Congrès et le président [des Etats-Unis] sont à présent dans une impasse ; le système américain est submergé par l’argent des grandes entreprises qui bloquent les usines ; et peu de choses laissent penser que toute question d’importance, y compris les guerres américaines, l’Etat national sécuritaire bouffi de l’Amérique, son système éducatif démuni et ses approvisionnements énergétiques archaïques, sera traitée avec assez de sérieux pour assurer la sorte d’atterrissage en douceur qui pourrait maximiser le rôle et la prospérité des Etats-Unis dans un monde en changement.

Les empires d’Europe sont révolus et le pouvoir suprême des Etats-Unis se poursuit. Il semble de plus en plus improbable que les Etats-Unis obtiendront quelque chose qui ressemble de près ou de loin à la réussite de la Grande-Bretagne, pour façonner un ordre mondial réussi qui protège leurs intérêts, préserve leur prospérité et porte la marque de leurs meilleures valeurs.

Alfred W. McCoy

Traduction : Questions Critiques [2]

Alfred W McCoy est professeur d’histoire à l’Université de Wisconsin-Madison. Auteur régulier pour TomDispatch, il préside également le projet “Empires in transition”, un groupe de travail mondial de 140 historiens, provenant d’universités issues de quatre continents.

 

 


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lundi, 01 novembre 2010

To Cleanse America: Some Practical Proposals

To Cleanse America:
Some Practical Proposals

Greg Johnson

Ex: http://www.counter-currents.com/

Author’s Note:

The following short piece from 2002 or 2003 has the same major flaw as “Separatism vs. Supremacism,” namely, it deals with the issue in the abstract. Racial separation is not likely to happen this way. Nonetheless, it has the virtue of broadening the reader’s sense of what is morally and practically possible.

50s.jpgI hear a lot of defeatist talk among White Nationalists. A recurring theme is that there are too many non-whites in America to even consider an all-white nation. The most optimistic solution is to partition the country into ethnically pure nations.

The answer to this kind of talk is simple: If it was not too much trouble for all these people to come here, then it will not be too much trouble for them to go back. If whites could conquer and settle this country once, then we can do it again. The only thing stopping us from doing it again is lack of nerve, not lack of ability. But an awakened white nation could quickly set things right.

Part of the problem may be that people are trying to envision a government program that could remove tens of millions of non-whites. It seems impossible, so they give up in dismay. But as a matter of fact, there have already been such programs. From 1929 to 1939, more than one million Mexicans — more than half of them US citizens — were forced to return to Mexico. In the 1950s, more than one million Mexicans were again repatriated by Operation Wetback. Surely with modern computers and law enforcement techniques, it would be relatively easy to scale such programs up to deal with more than 20 million Mexicans plus other non-whites.

But does one really need a massive government operation to cleanse America? After all, most non-whites did not come here through government programs, but through private initiative. They came because there were economic incentives to come. They will leave when there are economic incentives to leave.

And I am not talking about the use of government money to bribe non-whites to leave. That was the feeble proposal of the British National Party, before they abandoned the idea of repatriation altogether as unfeasible.

We need to make a distinction between government programs, in which the state takes the initiative, and government policies, which allow or encourage private initiative. The economic incentives that lead to non-white immigration work only by the government’s permission. If immigration were banned and the ban rigorously enforced, these incentives would become impotent. By the same token, the government can pass laws creating economic incentives for non-whites to go home.

Of course before we talk of incentives, we need to deal with the hundreds of thousands of non-whites, citizens and aliens, who are already incarcerated at public expense for breaking the law. These people should be immediately deported. Then we should crack down on non-white crime and automatically deport all new offenders. That would rid us of millions in short order.

As for non-whites who are here illegally, but who are not already incarcerated, we should first levy fines of $10,000 per day per alien on any business that employs them and any landlord who rents to them. That should send most of them scurrying for the border. After six months or so, the police can scour out the ones who remain and deport them. After another six months, the government can offer a bounty for those who slipped through the cracks.

As for the ones here legally: They should be immediately stripped of their citizenship and all the benefits that come from it. They should be denied any government or government subsidized benefits, e.g., education, welfare, unemployment insurance, health care. We should allow them to sell their property and take the proceeds with them. But to make a quick departure even more appealing, that option would expire after a year. Those who cannot take a hint would then be deported, with a bounty for those who remain.

Such policies, after a couple of years, would rid us of millions of non-whites. Only diplomats, tourists, and traveling businessmen would remain within our borders. Yes, these would be government policies. But the beauty of them is that they would encourage most non-whites to leave on their own initiative. The government would not have to track down, incarcerate, and deport each one, which would be an enormously expensive burden on the taxpayer and economy.

Instead, the policies I propose would stimulate economic activity, especially in travel and real estate. One appealing result is that home prices would drop, making it easier for white couples to get a start. Another result would be higher wages for white workers.

Only after the non-white population had been significantly reduced would a more active government role be necessary, but by that time the problem would be much more manageable.

“But there would be violence! There would be race war!” the defeatists will bleat. Of course there would be.

I am all for minimizing violence. But let’s be real: There already is violence. There already is race war. There already is ethnic cleansing.

Every time a white is robbed, raped, or murdered by a non-white predator, that is race war. The Cincinnati riots were race war. The Wichita Massacre was race war. “Beat up a White Kid Day” was race war. “Polar Bear Hunting” is race war. When tens of thousands of whites fled American cities and lost tens of millions in property because of desegregation, that was ethnic cleansing.

The race war and the cleansing are already upon us. It is just that we are not fighting back. And if we don’t start fighting back, we are going to be destroyed.

Yes, there would be thousands of white race traitors marching and holding candlelight vigils. That’s why we have rubber bullets and fire hoses. Yes, Blacks and Mexicans would riot and burn down their neighborhoods and Korean convenience stores. But that’s why we have police and the National Guard. In the end, non-white lawlessness would simply allow us to accelerate their expulsion.

Yes, violence would have economic costs, but they would be nothing compared to the costs in crime, chaos, ugliness, and inefficiency of keeping these people here. Yes, there would be white casualties. But the white death toll would be nothing compared to the white death toll that is inevitable if we do nothing: namely, extinction.

lundi, 21 juin 2010

I processi di integrazione nell'America Indiolatina

I processi di integrazione nell’America Indiolatina

di Sergio Barone

Fonte: eurasia [scheda fonte] 
 

I processi di integrazione nell’America Indiolatina

In America Latina dalla fine della Guerra Fredda sono in corso processi di integrazione regionale che vanno nel senso dell’autodeterminazione economica e politica, lontani dall’influenza del modello neoliberale e dal dollaro.

Il Mercosur stesso, che ha le sue fondamenta nella Dichiarazione di Foz Iguazù del 1985  (integrazione tra Brasile e Argentina), ha parzialmente cambiato nel corso del tempo la sua impostazione iniziale, dando maggiore importanza ai temi del lavoro, oltre che del commercio.

Il progetto di integrazione più originale e significativo dal punto di vista geopolitico è l’Alianza Bolivariana para los Pueblos de Nuestra América – Tratado de Comercio de los Pueblos (ALBA-TCP), che si contrappone ai progetti neoliberisti nordamaricani dell’ALCA nell’area, per uno sviluppo ed un’integrazione che parta da principi antagonisti rispetto a quelli liberisti: ovvero sovranità, autodeterminazione, cooperazione, solidarietà.

L’ALBA mostra così di essere, oltre che uno strumento di integrazione fra Paesi della stessa area, un altro modello di società e sviluppo possibile rispetto al capitalismo globalizzato dai cui binari non sembra possibile staccarsi.

MERCOSUR

L’embrione di quello che oggi conosciamo come MERCOSUR (Mercato Comune del Sud) fu il Trattato di Asunción, firmato il 26 luglio 1991 da Argentina, Brasile, Paraguay e Uruguay.

Gli organismi decisionali del Mercosur sono:

Il Consiglio del Mercato Comune, organo supremo (Decisioni);

il Gruppo del Mercato Comune, che si occupa delle questioni socio-lavorative (Risoluzioni);

la Commissione del Commercio del Mercosur (Direttive).

Esiste anche un Parlamento che non ha poteri decisionali, ma emette un parere per ogni direttiva, decisione o risoluzione degli organi decisionali e ha il compito di presentare un documento annuale circa la situazione dei diritti umani nei Paesi membri, oltre ad avere il ruolo di interlocutore privilegiato per ogni organo dell’Organizzazione.

I propositi iniziali del Mercosur erano: raggiungere

la libera circolazione di merci, servizi e fattori produttivi entro i Paesi membri;

l’adozione di una tassa comune con l’esterno  e di una politica commerciale comune;

la coordinazione tra le politiche macroeconomiche degli Stati membri;

l’armonizzazione delle legislazioni interne per avanzare nell’integrazione regionale;

Attualmente il raggiungimento di questi obiettivi soffre le molte eccezioni che ogni Paese applica alla lista di prodotti a cui non vuole applicare l’imposta comune e per questi motivi sono in molti a ritenere il MERCOSUR una unione doganiera incompleta o parziale.

Quello che è da rilevare invece è che, nonostante il Trattato di Asunción non prevedesse nessuno spazio  per i temi del lavoro, fin da subito i sindacati rappresentati nella Coordinadora de Centrales Sindicales del Cono del Sur (CCSCS), assieme ai Ministeri del Lavoro dei vari Paesi hanno spinto per discutere e prendere le adeguate misure a riguardo dell’impatto che l’integrazione avrebbe avuto sulle condizioni socio-lavorative nei Paesi membri.

Così, a un anno dalla nascita del Mercosur, nacque il Sotto Gruppo sulle Questioni socio-lavorative, dipendente dal GMC (Gruppo del Mercato Comune) e organizzato come un vertice tripartito tra sindacati, imprenditori e Ministeri del Lavoro, che ha generato un fruttuoso dialogo interregionale a partire dal quale il Mercato Comune si è dotato di organismi e strumenti per affrontare le tematiche del lavoro.

Nel 1997 si firmò la prima norma di contenuto socio-lavorativo del Mercosur (Acuerdo Multilateral de Seguridad Social del Mercado Común del Sur, ratificato solo dopo anni) e l’anno seguente con la Dichiarazione Sociolavorativa del Mercosur si stabilirono le basi per l’emanazione di risoluzioni di diretta applicazione (senza necessità di ratifica) nei Paesi membri, sempre con lo schema delle riunioni tripartitiche, che riuniscono gli interessi del mondo del lavoro, dell’impresa e i Ministeri del lavoro.

Dopo le associazioni nel Mercosur da parte del Cile e della Bolivia nel 1996, del Perù nel 2004 e di Colombia ed Ecuador nel 2006, si aspetta la ratifica dell’adesione venezuelana da parte del Paraguay.

Il Venezuela firmò gli accordi pre-adesione assieme alla Colombia ed all’Ecuador, ma ancora il Congresso paraguayense non ha dato il suo nullaosta per l’opposizione ideologica al presidente venezuelano Chavez.

Tuttavia le cose si dovrebbero sbloccare presto visto che lo stesso Presidente del Paraguay, Lugo, ha esortato di recente il proprio Congresso affinchè acceleri il processo di ratifica, in quanto l’ingresso venezuelano e’ considerato importante per gli interessi di integrazione di tutti i Paesi della regione.

ALBA

L’ALBA, nata il 14 dicembre 2004 a l’Havana su iniziativa del Presidente venezuelano Hugo Chavez, è oggi composta da otto Paesi (dopo l’espulsione dell’Honduras a seguito del golpe del giugno 2009), Venezuela, Cuba, Ecuador, Bolivia, Nicaragua, Rep.Dominicana, Granada, Antigua e Barbuda.

Se il Mercosur è la gamba economico-commerciale dell’integrazione dell’america indiolatina (non per niente i due Paesi cardine nella sua costruzione furono Brasile e Argentina, storicamente i più floridi della zona), l’ALBA è la sua gamba politica.

L’iniziativa per la nascita di questo nuovo organismo di integrazione regionale è portata avanti principalmente da Cuba e Venezuela e pretende di abbracciare tutte le nazioni che si trovano tra il Rio Bravo e la Patagonia, realizzando così l’ideale panamericano di Bolìvar.

L’obiettivo è quello di superare i nazionalismi egoistici di ogni Paese al fine di integrarsi secondo i principi di solidarietà e cooperazione, in modo da contrastare il modello neoliberale imposto dagli Stati Uniti tramite l’Accordo di Libero Commercio delle Americhe (ALCA).

La massima autorità è il Consiglio dei Presidenti dell’ALBA, allo stesso livello si trova il Consiglio dei Movimenti Sociali, che si propone di rappresentare appunto i movimenti sociali e i popoli dei Paesi membri, ma che è ancora in via di definizione.

Le principali forme di integrazione dell’ALBA sono i Trattati di Commercio dei Popoli, i cosiddetti progetti “Gran Nazionali” e le imprese Gran Nazionali, che si oppongono per struttura e obiettivi alle note imprese Trans-nazionali.

Queste forme di integrazione hanno come caratteristica primaria il rigetto di qualsiasi principio neoliberista, visto solo come uno strumento di colonizzazione del Nord America.

I Trattati di Commercio dei Popoli sono accordi di interscambio di beni e servizi per soddisfare le esigenze delle persone, al di là della logica del mero profitto.

Si sostentano sui principi di solidarietà, reciprocità, trasferimento tecnologico, utilizzo dei vantaggi che offre ogni Paese per il bene collettivo, risparmio di risorse e includono anche facilitazioni creditizie per facilitare i pagamenti.

Essi nascono per opporsi ai Trattati di Libero Commercio proposti dagli Stati Uniti, che portano verso la distruzione delle economie nazionali, incapaci di competere, senza l’adeguata protezione, con il grande capitale privato straniero.

I progetti Gran Nazionali danno concretezza ai principi solidaristici e antiliberisti espressi dall’ALBA, nonchè ai processi economici e sociali dell’integrazione americana.

Tali progetti sono a differenti stati di sviluppo e quelli che fino ad ora hanno avuto più successo sono il progetto della Banca dell’ALBA e quello di Alfabetizzazione e Post-alfabetizzazione (che ha fatto della zona dell’ALBA il primo spazio regionale libero da analfabetismo), ma esistono progetti Gran Nazionali in ogni settore, dalla scienza all’alimentazione, passando per salute e commercio.

Le imprese Gran Nacional nascono sempre da un progetto e possono essere composte dalla collaborazione fra due o più Stati aderenti all’ALBA.

Il concetto che le muove si oppone allo strapotere dei grandi gruppi privati (Corporations Transnazionali) e del mercato, a favore di una partecipazione dello Stato nell’economia affinchè si ottenga una produzione ed un’allocazione di risorse più razionale, che tenga conto innanzitutto dei reali bisogni della popolazione, a spese della logica del profitto, come fine ultimo dell’impresa.

Esistono imprese Gran Nazionali in molti settori: pesca (Transalba), trasporti, agricoltura e telecomunicazioni (Albatel), settore petrolifero (Albanisa, società mista venezuelo-nicaraguense) , costruzione di porti (Puertos de Alba, nata dalla collaborazione tra Cuba e Venezuela).

Il progetto forse più ambizioso dell’ALBA è la creazione di una moneta comune (SUCRE) da usare negli scambi commerciali fra Paesi dell’area  per sostituire il dollaro, che è già in piena fase di realizzazione.

Dapprima si è utilizzato esclusivamente come unità di misura comune (Sistema Unitario de Compensaciòn Regional, SUCRE), mentre il 27 gennaio è entrata in funzione come moneta commerciale a tutti gli effetti e il 4 febbraio vi è stata la prima transazione commerciale in SUCRE, con l’esportazione di diverse tonnellate di riso venezuelano verso Cuba.

Conclusioni

Oggi in America Latina ci sono degli attori che, dopo due secoli di subalternità alla dottrina Monroe, vogliono giocare il proprio ruolo nello scacchiere internazionale e nello scegliere il proprio modello economico.

Vi è una potenza regionale, il Brasile, che proprio di recente ha dimostrato come sia capace di giocare un ruolo indipendente nel mondo delle relazioni internazionali (si veda l’accordo con la Turchia e Iran sul nucleare) e che è la locomotiva economica trainante del Mercosur.

Proprio il Brasile si è espresso a più riprese per l’ingresso del Venezuela nel MERcado COmune del SUR, poichè, anche per le sue risorse energetiche, è un Paese fondamentale per l’integrazione sudamericana e ormai la ratifica da parte del Paraguay dovrebbe avvenire presto.

Il Venezuela è anche il motore dell’ALBA (organizzazione composta oggi da otto Paesi, ma con l’obiettivo di aumentarne il numero), organizzazione di ispirazione socialista e pan-americana che si propone di disegnare un altro modello di società, antagonista al modello neoliberale americano. Difatti la pressione statunitense nella regione è cresciuta parecchio negli ultimi anni, con la costruzione di sette nuove basi militari in Colombia, la riattivazione della IV Flotta (ottobre 2008) destinata a operare nel Sud Atlantico (inattiva da 52 anni) e attraverso il colpo di Stato contro il Presidente dell’Honduras Zelaya, che ha portato il Paese centroamericano fuori dall’organizzazione Bolivariana.

Il successo di queste iniziative di integrazione regionale dipenderà molto dai concreti risultati che si otterranno nel migliorare le condizioni materiali delle popolazioni sudamericane, poichè, specialmente nel caso dell’ALBA, un cambio nelle preferenze politiche da parte dei cittadini potrebbe interrompere o azzoppare tutto il processo, facendo ritornare preponderante l’influenza statunitense nel decidere le politiche economiche nell’area.

Nonostante i Paesi dell’area siano differenti fra loro (come composizione etnica, popolazione, estensione, sviluppo industriale) e dunque abbiano in parte interessi differenti, finora ha prevalso il rispetto per l’autonomia di ogni Paese e la consapevolezza che una maggiore integrazione può portare solo vantaggi ai Paesi dell’area, al di là delle loro priorità specifiche.

* Sergio Barone è dottore in Relazioni Internazionali (Università di Bologna)


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