During the late afternoon of June 11, 1924, in a modest ceremony at Prague’s New Jewish Cemetery, one of the 20th century’s most influential writers was laid to rest. Franz Kafka died of tuberculosis one week earlier, in a sanatorium outside Vienna. He was just shy of his 41st birthday.
In his own lifetime Kafka’s prose bequeathed him no recognition, no fame, no notoriety, and no literary prizes. Which seems odd, considering that, apart from Shakespeare and Goethe, Kafka is one of the most written about wordsmiths in modern European literature.
But in another way, this initial lack of critical praise is hardly surprising. For starters, there wasn’t much finished work to praise in the first place. Kafka hadn’t completed a single novel before his death. The little that had been published by him was largely ignored, and few bothered to read him. With the exception of one dear friend: a fellow Prague Jew, Max Brod.
The two met as teenagers, following a talk Brod gave about Arthur Schopenhauer at a students’ Union Club on Prague’s Ferdinandstrasse. One of their first conversations concerned Nietzsche’s attack on Schopenhauer’s renouncement of the self. Pretty quickly the two curious minds became inseparable, usually meeting twice daily to discuss life, literature, philosophy, and whatever other topics might randomly arise.
Brod’s memoirs spoke about Kafka’s gentle serenity, describing their relationship almost as if they were lovers. He also recalled the mystical experience of both men reading Plato’s Protagoras in Greek, and Flaubert’s Sentimental Education in French, like a collision of souls.
While there is no evidence of any homosexual feeling between Kafka and Brod, their intimate relationship appeared to go beyond typical camaraderie from two straight men of their era.
In their early 20s the pair vacationed together on Lake Garda on the Austrian-Italian border; they paid their respects at Goethe’s house in Weimar; stayed together at the Hotel Belvedere au Lac in Lugano, Switzerland; and even visited brothels together in Prague, Milan, Leipzig, and Paris. Brod, a self-confessed ladies’ man with an insatiable appetite for adventurous sexual conquests, often berated Kafka for not having a similarly urgent drive of eros. “You avoid women and try to live without them,” Brod once told his friend.
Kafka was engaged to two women over his short life: Julie Wohryzek and Felice Bauer. But for a host of complicated reasons he married neither. Kafka reacted to women he became intimate with as he did to almost everything else in his emotional life: with anxiety, dread, concealment, fear, and despair.
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He coped with the failure of his intimate relationships by purposely avoiding face-to-face emotional conflict. Instead, he turned to words: specifically, to the art of letter writing. This happened not just with Kafka’s lovers, but with members of his own immediate family too. Kafka penned “Letter to My Father” in November 1919: a long, emotional epistle in which he accused his father, Hermen, of playing the role of prosecutor in what Kafka called a “terrible trial” pending between both men. Kafka then asked his mother, Julie, to pass the note onto his father. But she prudently sent it back to her son. Along with a whole host of other unfinished manuscripts, it ended up in a drawer in Kafka’s room. Brod ensured it was eventually published—posthumously—in 1952.
Brod’s graveside eulogy to his fellow man of letters and dear friend came straight from the heart. He referred to Kafka as a “prophet in whom the splendor of ‘the Shekhina [divine presence] shone.’” It was a fitting gesture, constructing the saintly prism of reverence that much of Kafka’s work would eventually be viewed through, when a global audience finally came to recognize the magnitude of his literary talents. Brod, after all, would spend the next few decades championing his friend’s genius with relentless determination and resilience.
There were even some suggestions in the immediate years following Kafka’s death that Brod was simply dining out on his friend’s genius and using him for his own career advancement. These accusations came from serious literary critics and huge admirers of Kafka’s work, such as Gershom Scholem and Walter Benjamin. But they appear to be grounded in petty jealousy rather than substantial evidence. Today, readers of Kafka ought to be cautious of such cynicism. Without Brod’s determined efforts, Kafka’s work would have never seen the light of day.
The American historian Anthony Grafton has referred to early-20th century Prague—where Kafka wrote some of his greatest work—as “Europe’s capital of cosmopolitan dreams.” Like Vienna in the same period, it was a vibrant bohemian metropolis where literature, painting, philosophy, and poetry flourished, under the unified German-speaking Habsburg Empire, which collapsed suddenly in 1918. By the age of 25, Brod was at the heart of this diverse cultural community, keeping in regular contact with the great and the good of central Europe’s literati; this included Hermann Hesse, Hugo von Hofmannsthal, Thomas Mann, and Rainer Maria Rilke. In many of these correspondences, Kafka was never far from Brod’s thoughts.
In 1916 Brod even wrote to the Austrian philosopher Martin Buber, explaining how frustrating it was to watch his best friend’s lack of enthusiasm for his own creative process: “If you only knew his substantial, though unfortunately incomplete novels, which he sometimes reads to me at odd hours,” Brod wrote. “What I wouldn’t do to make him more active!”
It wasn’t that Kafka didn’t take his writing seriously. As early as 1913, for example, he wrote in one diary entry that “I am made of literature. I am nothing else and cannot be anything else.”
Conversely, Kafka’s writing resembled something closer to a secular prayer: where he attempted to transcend his tortured, neurotic, and anxious mindset into something resembling universal existential truth—a task the troubled writer never saw as a simple procedure. Reading Kafka’s diary entries gives us a clearer view of what he thought about his own writing.
Take Kafka’s short novella, The Metamorphosis. It describes how a young man, Gregor Samsa, wakes up suddenly one day to discover he has turned into an insect. Becoming a burden on his family, Gregor becomes distressed by his father’s abusive physical actions towards him, and eventually he dies. The whole event brings a great sense of relief to the family, who decide to move to a smaller apartment, which they could not have done if Gregor was still alive.
Kafka described the novella in one diary entry as “imperfect almost to its very marrow.” In another entry, Kafka vented his frustrations about why he believed his own inner mental world could only be lived and not described. “I am constantly trying to communicate something incommunicable,” he wrote. Ironically, it was this unknowable and unnamable force—that Kafka couldn’t quite put a precise label on with language—that became his most valuable asset as a writer.
A number of critics have described Kafka as a prophet, viewing his work through a political and sociological lens in which he foresaw the evil forces of 20th-century totalitarianism. Some have even gone as far to say that he predicted the Holocaust. Reading the final page of The Trial, for example, one becomes eerily spooked by Kafka’s subtle observation that individuals—either in a solitary manner or collectively—can be condemned to death for doing nothing wrong, committing no crime, breaking no moral code.
But a wide array of interpretations on Kafka’s work would come much later. In fact, most of Kafka’s ideas and words nearly vanished with him into an early grave. Thankfully, for the sake of literature, and posterity, the Kafka canon survived. In time, its idiosyncratic signature stamp would become a recognizable adjective: Kafkaesque.
The term would come to represent a whole host of traumas that appeared to have subtly infected Western society—and subsequently the individual Western mind—since the coming of modernity, including existential angst, alienation, paranoia, isolation, insecurity, the labyrinth of state bureaucracy, the corrupt abuse of totalitarian power, and the impenetrable tangle of legal systems. With its unique exactitude and precision, Kafka’s prose describes a milieu where individuals—for reasons unbeknownst to them—feel utterly powerless, confused, trapped, and subsumed into a world they really do not understand. And, perhaps more importantly, they become dehumanized in the process.
As the British literary academic John R. Williams puts it rather aptly in The Essential Kafka, the Czech modernist writer frequently expressed himself through aphorism and parable, in stories that represent “remoteness, hopelessness [and] the impossibility of access to sources of authority or certainty or what in German is termed Ausweglosigkeit—the impossibility of escape or release from a labyrinth of false trails and frustrated hopes.”
Kafka’s work, Williams stresses:
appears to have articulated, and indeed to have prefigured, many of the horrors and terrors of twentieth-century existence, the angst of a post-Nietzschean world in which God is dead, in which there is therefore no ultimate authority, no final arbiter of truth, justice or morality.
The key moment for rescuing Kafka’s manuscripts came in the immediate hours following Kafka’s funeral: when his parents asked Brod back to their home to go through their son’s desk. It was there Brod made a discovery that would drastically transform the fate of modern literature. Looking through Kafka’s drawers, he came across two notes. The first, written in pen, left instructions that everything left behind belonging to Kafka—including notebooks, manuscripts, letters, and sketches—were to be destroyed.
The second, written in pencil, read:
Dear Max,
Here is my last will concerning everything I have written: Of all my writings the only books that can stand are these: “The Judgment,” “The Stoker,” “Metamorphosis,” “Penal Colony,” “Country Doctor,” and the short story “Hunger Artist”…But everything else of mine is extant…all these things without exception are to burned, and I beg you to do this as soon as possible.
-Franz
But why was Kafka so adamant to destroy his own work? Dora Diamant—who was in her mid-20s when she was Kafka’s lover in Berlin during the last year of his life—claimed the writer wanted to burn everything he had written in order to “free his soul from [his] ghosts.”
Brod wasn’t surprised by the note. He had always understood Kafka’s complicated relationship with what he often casually referred to as his “scribbling.” And whenever Kafka did read to him from his manuscripts, it usually involved a great deal of pleading, cajoling, and persuading.
Kafka isn’t the first author in the history of Western literature who requested that their work go up in a ball of flames. The Roman poet Virgil was so frustrated and dissatisfied with The Aeneid that on his deathbed in 19 BC he ordered for the manuscript to be burned. The English poet Philip Larkin also instructed that all his diaries be burned just three days before he died in December 1985, while the Russian writer Vladimir Nabokov similarly left instructions for his rough draft of The Original of Laura to be destroyed.
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With Kafka, though, no narrative ever follows a simple, straightforward pattern. Even his dying wishes contained a multitude of conflicting requests that could be left open to interpretation. Discerning Kafka’s true will was a bit like trying to deconstruct the infinite possibilities contained within the enigmatic codes of a sacred Kabbalistic scroll. Kafka even admitted in one letter to Brod that “concealment has been my life’s vocation.”
In Kafka’s Last Trial, Israeli writer and cultural commentator Benjamin Balint suggests (but also questions) that Kafka’s last instruction to Brod can perhaps be understood as a gesture of a literary artist “whose life was a judgment against itself? As a self-condemnation, with Kafka acting as both judge and the accused?”
The literary biography covers a wide range of topics, including an in-depth analysis of Kafka and Brod’s complex relationship. It also dissects Kafka’s rather indifferent notion towards identity and rootedness which, in turn, leads to a conversation about his Jewishness. All of this is good foundational reading for understanding the book’s central focal point, which involves a complicated legal battle in Israel that has dragged on since the mid-1970s relating to Kafka’s literary estate.
The decades-long trial—no pun intended—centered around one fundamental question: who is the rightful cultural guardian of Kafka’s original manuscripts, since the passing of Max Brod in 1968? Do they belong to Eva Hoffe (the daughter of Brod’s good friend, Esther Hoffe, who was clearly cited as a beneficiary of Brod’s estate in his will), or should Brod’s dedicated commitment to the Zionist project ensure the manuscripts find a home at the National Library of Israel? But then, considering that Kafka wrote, thought, and spoke in German, should they not perhaps find their place in the German Literature Archive in Marbach, Germany?
In August 2016, that question was finally answered by Israel’s Supreme Court: it ruled that Eva Hoffe must hand the entire Max Brod estate—including Kafka’s manuscripts—over to the National Library of Israel, for which she received no compensation in return.
Balint’s impartial and measured style ensures he avoids dogmatic personal judgments or opinions. And when he does lean towards persuasion and argument, he does it with subtlety, meandering and exploring his way through a complicated literary history that spans several decades, countries, and individuals, all of whom are randomly interlinked to Kafka’s original manuscripts.
Balint points out, for instance, the rather odd notion of Germany laying claim to a writer whose family was decimated in the Holocaust, where German was the official administrative language that slaughtered millions of Jews. He also notes that Kafka—who always considered himself the ultimate outsider and a kind of citizen of nowhere—didn’t have much love for finding a place he could call home anywhere, least of all a Jewish state in Palestine.
Interestingly, Balint also reminds us that Israel has never had much love for Kafka either, despite its decades-long legal battle to publicly house his work on display for purposes of cultural appropriation and national prestige. There are no streets named after Kafka in Tel Aviv or Jerusalem, as there are in European cities. And translations of Kafka’s work into Hebrew weren’t exactly met with speedy enthusiasm either.
But this is just one of many of the ironic twists in Balint’s book, which tend to present themselves, ubiquitously, in typical Kafkaesque fashion.
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The most prevalent example of this came in October 2012, Balint notes, when Judge Talia Kopelman Pardo, of the Tel Aviv family district court, reopened a case against Esther Hoffe in an Israeli court case 40 years earlier. The judge took the unusual step of quoting a passage from Kafka’s The Trial: indicating a case where art really does mirror life. Specifically, she quoted a passage from the novel that relates to the timeless nature of files in the legal world, pointing out how “no file is ever lost, and the court never forgets.”
Back in 1915 after Kafka read Brod two draft chapters of what was then his novel in progress, The Trial, Brod documented in his diary that his friend was “the greatest writer of our time.” Published posthumously in 1925, The Trial is Kafka’s masterpiece; it tells the story of Josef K., a 30-year-old bank clerk. The novel’s opening sentence explains how “someone must have been spreading slander about K., for one morning he was arrested, though he had done nothing wrong.” The short passage’s paranoid uncertainty and consistent hints towards some unknown catastrophe exemplifies—with great clarity and precision—a literary style that made Kafka such a unique writer of prose fiction.
In the novel’s final scene, Josef K. becomes aware that his life is culminating towards sudden execution.
At one stage Josef K. is tempted to “seize the knife himself…and plunge it into his own body.” In the end, however, he cannot bring himself to carry out his own execution. Balint claims that, just like Josef K., Kafka lacked the strength to carry out his own last sentence: the destruction of his own writings—both personal (letters and diaries) and literary (unfinished stories). Instead, he left that execution to Brod, a friend who as early as 1921 had told Kafka with frank directness, when he had first mentioned his request to burn all his work, that “I shall not carry out your wishes.”
In an essay published in 1983 on Kafka’s three novels—Amerika, The Trial, and The Castle—the Scottish author, James Kelman, drew particular attention to the ambiguous and mysterious relationship that Josef K.’s arrest in The Trial displays to us about the very nature of “the Law.”
The Law exists, Kelman explains: “But it exists outside of society as K. understands it. He has been ignorant of it. He has been living under a misapprehension.”

Everything relating to this mysterious Law suggests it is under the control of human reason, Kelman, notes. And yet, it is a peculiar form of human reason that seems to be attempting “to translate something that must remain outside human understanding into a form which human beings can understand.”
Kelman’s rather ambiguous conclusions about Kafka’s work seem like an apt note on which to end this discussion. Kafka, after all, is a writer whose work epitomizes the unnerving anxiety and mystery that faces any human being seeking to find meaning in their daily existence, pace modernity. Scientific and industrial advancement may have replaced spiritual authority and absolute truths, and enlightenment may have even replaced theology, but at what cost? In its place—Kafka’s work seems to subtly suggest—is an unexplainable empty vacuum: an infinite black hole of uncertainty, where fear and existential dread collide.
But one’s reaction to such a cold and despairing analysis of the human condition depends, of course, on whether you generally tend to see the glass half full or half empty. As Kelman nicely puts it: “there is nothing in Kafka’s work to suggest any source of power beyond humankind itself, but whether or not this represents grounds for pessimism depends on the individual reader’s own beliefs.”
JP O’Malley is a journalist, writer and cultural critic, who writes for a host of publications around the globe on literature, history, art, politics, and society.




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Tout a été dit sur l’indigeste pavé du tandem Taguieff-Duraffour paru au début de l’année passée ¹. En attendant la version en collection de poche, agrémentée d’une préface sur la réception critique (!), on peut maintenant y revenir avec quelque recul même si d’aucuns penseront qu’on lui accorde trop d’importance.

La phase du « Travailleur » a toutefois été très brève dans la longue vie de Jünger. Mais même après sa sortie sereine et graduelle hors de l’idéologie techniciste , Jünger refuse tout « escapisme romantique » : il rejette l’attitude de Cassandre et veut regarder les phénomènes en face, sereinement. Pour lui, il faut pousser le processus jusqu’au bout afin de provoquer, à terme, un véritablement renversement, sans s’encombrer de barrages ténus, érigés avec des matériaux surannés, faits de bric et de broc. Sa position ne relève aucunement du technicisme naïf et bourgeois de la fin du 19ème siècle : pour lui, l’Etat, la chose politique, le pouvoir sera déterminé par la technique, par la catégorie du « Travail ». Dans cette perspective, la technique n’est pas la source de petites commodités pour agrémenter la vie bourgeoise mais une force titanesque qui démultipliera démesurément le pouvoir politique. L’individu, cher au libéralisme de la Belle Epoque, fera place au « Type », qui renoncera aux limites désuètes de l’idéal bourgeois et se posera comme un simple rouage, sans affects et sans sentimentalités inutiles, de la machine étatique nouvelle, qu’il servira comme le soldat sert sa mitrailleuse, son char, son avion, son sous-marin. Le « Type » ne souffre pas sous la machine, comme l’idéologie anti-techniciste le voudrait, il s’est lié physiquement et psychiquement à son instrument d’acier comme le paysan éternel est lié charnellement et mentalement à sa glèbe. Jünger : « Celui qui vit la technique comme une agression contre sa substance, se place en dehors de la figure du Travailleur ». Parce que le Travailleur, le Type du Travailleur, s’est soumis volontairement à la Machine, il en deviendra le maître parce qu’il s’est plongé dans le flux qu’elle appelle par le fait même de sa présence, de sa puissance et de sa croissance. Le Type s’immerge dans le flux et refuse d’être barrage bloquant, figeant.


J'avais en mémoire le Charles le Téméraire décrit par Marcel Brion en 1977. Gaston Compère me le décrit sous un autre angle. Un angle que je préfère. Écrit à la première personne du singulier, Je soussigné, Charles le Téméraire, duc de Bourgogne est un roman tout comme Moi, Antoine de Tounens, roi de Patagonie de Jean Raspail est un roman Celui de Gaston Compère est aussi différent de la biographie de Marcel Brion, parue sous le titre Charles le Téméraire, que celui de Jean Raspail l’est de celle de Saint-Loup Le roi blanc des Patagons.Avec Mémoires d’Hadrien, Marguerite Yourcenar avait porté le roman biographique à sa perfection ; avec Je soussigné, Charles le Téméraire, duc de Bourgogne, Gaston Compère fait voler en éclats la biographie romanesque. Né en Wallonie en 1929, cet écrivain s’avère visionnaire. Il investit l’âme du Téméraire, qui n’aimait pas son nom et qui eût préféré celui de Charles le Hardi.
Cela suffit peut-être mais je ne peux m’empêcher de citer ici quelques perles qui font à la fois comprendre l’esprit qui anima Charles le Téméraire et l’immense talent de Gaston Compère.

Les personnages de cet essai romanesque (le narrateur travaille sur Opera Palas – belle mise en abyme , le journaliste étatsunien Julius Wood qui fait plus que du journalisme) pratiquent à leur façon l’impersonnalité active. Toutefois, bien que mise en arrière-plan, c’est une œuvre d’art qui focalise l’attention : Le Grand Verre de Marcel Duchamp, aussi connu sous le nom de La Mariée mise à nu par ses célibataires, même. Réalisé entre 1915 et 1923 sur du verre (fils de plomb, feuilles et peinture), cette œuvre inachevée et fêlée présente une riche polysémie propice aux interprétations érotiques, psychanalytiques ou ésotériques. C’est dans ce dernier champ qu’intervient principalement Opera Palas.


« L’Église catholique, qui avait toujours regardé avec réticence la sexualité hors mariage, accueillit avec enthousiasme cette évolution vers le mariage d’amour, plus conforme à ses théories (« Homme et femme Il les créa »), plus propre à constituer un premier pas vers cette civilisation de la paix, de la fidélité et de l’amour qui constituait son but naturel. Le Parti communiste, seule force spirituelle susceptible d’être mise en regard de l’Église catholique pendant ces années, combattait pour des objectifs presque identiques. C’est donc avec une impatience unanime que les jeunes gens des années cinquante attendaient de tomber amoureux, d’autant que la désertification rurale, la disparition concomitante des communautés villageoises permettaient au choix du futur conjoint de s’effectuer dans un rayon presque illimité, en même temps qu’elles lui donnaient une importance extrême (c’est en septembre 1955 que fut lancée à Sarcelles la politique dite des « grands ensembles », traduction visuelle évidente d’une socialité réduite au cadre du noyau familial). C’est donc sans arbitraire que l’on peut caractériser les années cinquante, le début des années soixante comme un véritable âge d’or du sentiment amoureux – dont les chansons de Jean Ferrat, celles de Françoise Hardy dans sa première période peuvent encore aujourd’hui nous restituer l’image. »

Does this sound like it was written by an anti-Semite? Maybe it does to someone as dishonest and as blinkered as Cathy Young. Maybe it does to someone who wishes to enforce a program of mandatory philo-Semitism among the goyim. But to everyone else, it just seems like it was written by the same man who thirty years earlier told Russians they should “err . . . on the side of exaggeration” when it comes to repentance . . . but only if that repentance is mutual.
L’Etat nous détruira (Tocqueville, Nietzsche, etc.). Voici ce qu’il aurait dû être l’Etat :
Et Novalis d’attendre une résurrection de l’Europe :



Guide to Kulchur is unique in both its structure and style. Written in Pound’s folksy demotic English that at times seems more akin to Mark Twain or Joel Chandler Harris, the book is arranged in a series of very short chapters that seem to unfold in a haphazard fashion. The book’s form only becomes manifest the longer one reads, and by the end of the book one is amazed at how Pound has managed to weave seamlessly the many strands of Western and ancient Chinese thought.
Sommaire :
Faszination eines Trugbildes (The Fascination of an Illusion) by Tarmo Kunnas is an unusual book in several respects. It sets out to examine what in the subtitle to the book is described as “the European intellectual and the fascist temptation, 1919-1945.” “Here,” Kunnas explains, “the tragedy of fascism is seen through the opera glasses of the person it has captivated, and my book for its part is intended to complete a picture of the fascist movements.” (p. 9) In his Foreword, Kunnas tells us that his book deals with the relationship of more than seventy European intellectuals from fifteen nations who were “tempted” by fascism.
In his Foreword, Kunnas says his objective is to examine “why fascism in the inter-war years held such attraction for the European intelligentsia and on the people of the time.” In fact, this study does not look at the attraction fascism held for people in general; it focuses exclusively on writers. The organization of the book is unusual. Instead of covering his ground with chapters devoted to specific writers or nations, Kunnas works through chapters which revolve around given themes, and then scrutinizes in each an array of writers in relation to its theme. Here are the titles of a few of the many chapters: “Exactness is not Truth,” “Mistrust of the Good in People,” “Social Darwinism,” “Puritanism,” “The Weakness of Parliamentarianism,” and “Against Faith in Progress.” For each of these, Kunnas provides the reader with an abundance of examples of how, within the perspective of the given theme, many intellectuals inclined towards fascism and a fascist solution, or towards an interpretation of the theme. This unusual approach has the advantage that it shifts focus from a biographical account to a philosophical and theoretical one so that the reader is compelled to think about the matter at hand firstly, and about the writers and thinkers drawn to it secondly; that is to say, he looks at the subject in respect of the theme itself and how fascist thinkers and fascist thought approached and evaluated each given theme. This is an original alternative to the standard presentation in critical assessments of the relation of writers to certain themes, as in potted biographies and the organization of such books into the intellectual, political, and literary career of one writer per chapter.
Kunnas is good at highlighting contradictions and paradoxes which abound in fascist theory. How does an avowed Roman Catholic like Giovanni Papini, for example, reconcile his religious faith with the evident amoralism and ruthlessness of the militaristic foreign policy enacted by the Fascist government which he so ardently supported? By way of answer, according to Kunnas (p. 358), Papini’s early work Il tragico quotidiano (The Daily Tragic) accepts the notion that evil is a necessary part of God’s creation, and that without sin, there could be no poets, artists, or philosophers; indeed, no leaders of a people and no heroes. Vice may be the necessary condition of virtue, and evil may need to exist in order for good to do so likewise. Kunnas does not go far down the thorny and well-trodden theological path of speculation which he opens here. However, he is well aware of this and other conundra and contradictions within fascist thought, including in the writings of those intellectuals who were attracted by fascism, especially the notion that the warring poles of good and evil, war and peace, and pain and pleasure constitute the very fabric of life.


Certains de ses romans sont passés à la postérité. Une chanson de Serge Gainsbourg mentionne L’amour monstre. Louis Pauwels doit aussi sa renommée à deux essais coécrits avec Jacques Bergier, Le matin des magiciens (1960), et sa suite moins connue, L’homme éternel (1970). Le succès du Matin des magiciens lui permit de lancer, dès 1961, la revue Planète versée dans le réalisme fantastique (l’Atlantide, les extra-terrestres dans l’histoire, le Tibet mystérieux, les expériences parapsychologiques, etc.).
Ce zélateur anti-écologiste du progrès technicien s’intéressait à l’Europe. Dans son maître-livre, Le droit de parler (Albin Michel, 1981), le recueil de ses premières chroniques « révolutionnaires – conservatrices » du Figaro Magazine préfacé par Jean-Édern Hallier, il revient régulièrement sur l’avenir de notre continent. « Pour que l’Europe trouve son indépendance et assure sa sécurité, elle n’a pas d’autre voie que la volonté de puissance. Nous devons avoir le dessein de devenir l’une des grandes puissances mondiales, y compris dans le domaine militaire. Nous en avons les moyens. Nous avons le nombre. […] Nous avons à nous affirmer et à nous manifester comme union des nations du vieux monde central, communauté vivante de peuples historiques concrets, forgeant concrètement leur sécurité, conscients de leur originalité, soucieux de leur rayonnement (p. 219). »

Jusqu’à ce jour, tout le monde (Céline lui-même, ses biographes, le monde judiciaire) considérait qu’en 1950 la justice française avait été bonne fille avec l’auteur des Beaux draps. Anne Simonin, directrice de recherche au CNRS, estime, elle, que le jugement fut d’une « sévérité extrême » ¹. Mais il y a mieux : on sait que l’année précédente, en novembre 1949, le commissaire du gouvernement Jean Seltensperger fut dessaisi du dossier, sa hiérarchie estimant son réquisitoire magnanime. Il se concluait, en effet, par le renvoi de Céline devant une Chambre civique (au lieu de la Cour de justice), ce qui eût entraîné une peine sensiblement moins lourde. L’historienne considère qu’il s’agit en réalité d’une « apparente complaisance », le magistrat ayant, au contraire, fait preuve d’une rare duplicité : « Imaginer renvoyer Céline en chambre civique était une façon habile de l’inciter à rentrer en France et à se produire en justice. Une fois Céline devant une chambre civique et condamné à la dégradation nationale, rien n’interdisait au commissaire du gouvernement de considérer que Céline avait aussi commis des actes de nature à nuire à la défense nationale (art. 83-4 du Code pénal). Le mandat d’arrêt, ordonné en 1945, autoriserait alors à renvoyer Céline en prison avant de le déférer en Cour de justice. Et le tour serait joué. » C’est perdre de vue que, dans son réquisitoire, Seltensperger avait requis la mainlevée du mandat d’arrêt. Et c’est surtout ne pas connaître les arcanes de cette histoire judiciaire. Coïncidence : il se trouve que le père (magistrat, lui aussi) d’un de nos célinistes les plus pointus, Éric Mazet, fut le meilleur ami de Jean Seltensperger. Au mitan des années soixante, les confidences que celui-ci fit au jeune Mazet attestent qu’il n’a jamais voulu piéger Céline, bien au contraire. Le réquisitoire modéré qu’il prononça en atteste et ce n’est pas pour rien que le dossier fut confié à un autre magistrat.

Les éditions Allia publient cette semaine un essai de Friedrich-Georg Jünger intitulé La perfection de la technique. Frère d'Ernst Jünger. Auteur de très nombreux ouvrages, Friedrich-Georg Jünger a suivi une trajectoire politique et intellectuelle parallèle à celle de son frère Ernst et a tout au long de sa vie noué un dialogue fécond avec ce dernier. Parmi ses oeuvres ont été traduits en France un texte écrit avec son frère, datant de sa période conservatrice révolutionnaire, 
Mr. Wilson begins his “inquiry into the nature of the sickness of mankind in the twentieth century” at the effective point of the writers who have most influence in the present intellectual world. They are mostly good writers; they are not among the writers catering for those intellectuals who have every qualification except an intellect. They are good, some are very good: but at the end of it all what emerges? One of the best of these writers predicted that at the end of it all comes “the Russian man” described by Mr. Wilson as “a creature of nightmare who is no longer the homo sapiens, but an existentialist monster who rejects all thought”, As Hesse, the prophet of this coming, put it: “he is primeval matter, monstrous soul stuff. He cannot live in this form; he can only pass on”. The words “he can only pass on” seem the essence of the matter; this thinking is a chaos between two orders. At some point, if we are ever to regain sanity, we must regard again the first order before we can hope to win the second. It was a long way from Hellas to “the Russian man”; it may not be so far from the turmoil of these birth pangs to fresh creation. It is indeed well worth taking a look at the intellectual situation; where Europeans were, and where we are.
This union of mind and will, of intellect and emotion in the classic Greek, this essential harmony of man and nature, this at-oneness of the human with the eternal spirit evoke the contrast of the living and the dying when set against the prevailing tendencies of modern literature. For, as Mr. Wilson puts it very acutely: when “misery will never end” is combined with “nothing is worth doing”, “the result is a kind of spiritual syphillis that can hardly stop short of death or insanity”. Yet such writers are not all “pre-occupied with sex, crime and disease”, treating of heroes who live in one room because, apparently, they dare not enter the world outside, and derive their little satisfaction of the universe from looking through a hole in the wall at a woman undressing in the next room. They are not all concerned like Dostoievsky’s “beetle man” with life “under the floor boards” (a study which should put none of us off reading him as far as the philosophy of the Grand Inquisitor and a certain very interesting conversation with the devil in the Brothers Karamazof, which Mr. Wilson rightly places very high in the world’s literature). Many of these writers of pessimism, of destruction and death have a considerable sense of beauty. Hesse’s remarkable Steppenwolf found his “life had become weariness” and he “wandered in a maze of unhappiness that led to the renunciation of nothingness”; but then “for months together my heart stood still between delight and stark sorrow to find how rich was the gallery of my life, and how thronged was the soul of wretched Steppenwolf with high eternal stars and constellations . . . this life of mine was noble. It came of high descent, and turned, not on trifles, but on the stars.” Mr. Wilson well comments that “stripped of its overblown language,” “this experience can be called the ultimately valid core of romanticism — a type of religious affirmation”. And in such writing we can still see a reflection of the romantic movement of the northern gothic world which Goethe strove to unite with the sunlit classic movement in the great synthesis of his Helena. But it ends generally in this literature with a retreat from life, a monastic detachment or suicide rather than advance into such a wider life fulfilment. The essence is that these people feel themselves inadequate to life; they feel even that to live at all is instantly to destroy whatever flickering light of beauty they hold within them. For instance De Lisle Adam’s hero Axel had a lady friend who shot at him “with two pistols at a distance of five yards, but missed him both times.” Yet even after this dramatic and perfect illustration of the modern sex relationship, they could not face life : “we have destroyed in our strange hearts the love of life . . . to live would only be a sacrilege against ourselves . . .” “They drink the goblet of poison together and die in ecstasy.” All of which is a pity for promising people, but, in any case, is preferable to the “beetle man”, “under the floor boards”, wall-peepers, et hoc genus omne, of burrowing fugitives; “Samson you cannot be too quick”, is a natural first reaction to them. Yet Mr. Wilson teaches us well not to laugh too easily, or too lightly to dismiss them; it is a serious matter. This is serious if it is the death of a civilisation; it is still more serious if it is not death but the pangs of a new birth. And, in any case, even the worst of them possess in some way the essential sensitivity which the philistine lacks. So we will not laugh at even the extremes of this system, or rather way of thinking; something may come out of it all, because at least they feel. But Mr. Wilson in turn should not smile too easily at the last “period of intense and healthy optimism that did not mind hard work and pedestrian logic.” He seems to regard the nineteenth century as a “childish world” which presaged “endless changes in human life” so that “man would go forward indefinitely on ‘stepping stones of his dead self’ to higher things.” He thinks that before we “condemn it for short-sightedness”, ” we survivors of two world wars and the atomic bomb” (at this point surely he outdoes the Victorians in easy optimism, for it is far from over yet) “would do well to remember that we are in the position of adults condemning children”. Why? — is optimism necessarily childish and pessimism necessarily adult? Sometimes this paralysed pessimism seems more like the condition of a shell-shocked child. Health can be the state of an adult and disease the condition of a child. Of course, if serious Victorians really believed in “the establishment of Utopia before the end of the century”, they were childish; reformist thinking of that degree is always childish in comparison with organic thinking. But there are explanations of the difference between the nineteenth and the twentieth century attitude, other than this distinction between childhood and manhood. Spengler said somewhere that the nineteenth century stood in relation to the twentieth century as the Athens of Pericles stood in relation to the Rome of Caesar. In his thesis this is not a distinction between youth and age — a young society does not reach senescence in so short a period — but the difference between an epoch which is dedicated to thought and an epoch which has temporarily discarded thought in favour of action, in the almost rhythmic alternation between the two states which his method of history observes. It may be that in this most decisive of all great periods of action the intellectual is really not thinking at all; he is just despairing. When he wakes up from his bad dream he may find a world created by action in which he can live, and can even think. Mr. Wilson will not quarrel with the able summary of his researches printed on the cover of his book : “it is the will that matters.” And he would therefore scarcely dispute the view just expressed; perhaps the paradox of Mr. Wilson in this period is that he is thinking. That thought might lead him through and far beyond the healthy “cowboy rodeo” of the Victorian philosophers in their sweating sunshine, on (not back) to the glittering light and shade of the Hellenic world — das Land der Griechen mit der Seele suchen — and even beyond it to the radiance of the zweite Hellas. Mr. Wilson does not seem yet to be fully seized of Hellenism, and seems still less aware of the more conscious way of European thinking that passes beyond Hellas to a clearer account of world purpose. He has evidently read a good deal of Goethe with whom such modern thinking effectively begins, and he is the first of the new generation to feel that admiration for Shaw which was bound to develop when thought returned. But he does not seem to be aware of any slowly emerging system of European thinking which has journeyed from Heraclitus to Goethe and on to Shaw, Ibsen and other modems, until with the aid of modern science and the new interpretation of history it begins to attain consciousness.
He is acute at one point in observing the contrasts between the life joy of the Greeks and the moments when their art is “full of the consciousness of death and its inevitability”. But he still apparently regards them as “healthy, once born, optimists,” not far removed from the modern bourgeois who also realises that life is precarious. He apparently thinks they did not share with the Outsider the knowledge that an “exceptional sense of life’s precariousness” can be “a hopeful means to increase his toughness”. The Greeks, of course, had not the advantage of reading Mr. Toynbee’s Study of History, which does not appear on a reasonably careful reading to be mentioned in Mr. Wilson’s book.
But Mr. Wilson moves far beyond Sartre in regarding the thinkers of an earlier period; notably Blake. At this point he recovers direction. The reader will find pages 225 to 250 among the most important of this book, but he must read the whole work for himself; this review is a commentary and an addendum, not a précis for the idle, nor a primer for those who find anything serious too difficult. The author advances a long way when he considers Blake’s “skeleton key” to a solution for those who “mistake their own stagnation for the world’s”. Here we reach realisation that the “crises of’living demand the active co-operation of intellect, emotions, body on equal terms”; contact is made here with Goethe’s Ganzheit, although it is not mentioned. “Energy is eternal delight” takes us a long way clear o the damp caverns of neo-existentialism and
No men ever had a deeper sense of the human tragedy than the Greeks; none ever faced it with such brilliant bravery or understood so well not only the art of grasping the fleeting, ecstatic moment, but of turning even despair to the enhancement of beauty. Living was yet great; they understood dennoch preisen; they did not “leave living to their servants”. Mr. Wilson in quoting Aristotle in the same sense as the above lines of Sophocles — “not to be born is the best thing, and death is better than life” — holds that “this view” lies at one extreme of religion, and that “the other extreme is vitalism”. He does not seem at this point fully to understand that the extremes in the Hellenic nature can be not contradictory but complementary, or interacting. The polarity of Greek thought was closely observed and finely interpreted by Nietzsche in diverse ways. But it was left to Goethe to express the more conscious thought beyond polarity in his Faust: the Prologue in Heaven:
May we end with a few questions based on that doctrine of higher forms which has found some expression in this Journal and in previous writings? Is it not now possible to observe with reason and as something approaching a clearly defined whole, what has hitherto only been revealed in fitful glimpses to the visionary? What are the means of observation available to those who are not blessed with the revelation of vision? Are they not the thoughts of great minds which have observed the working of the divine in nature and the researches of modern science which appear largely to confirm them?
At some point the spirit, the soul — call it what you will — is ignited by some spark of the divine and moves without necessity; yet, again it is a matter of common observation that this only occurs in very advanced types. In general it is only the “challenge” of adverse circumstance which evokes the “response” of movement to a higher state. Goethe expressed this thought very clearly in Faust by his concept of evil’s relationship to good; he also indicated the type where the conscious striving of the aspiring spirit replaces the urge of suffering in the final attainment of salvation: wer immer strebend sich bemüht, den können wir erlösen. In the early stages of the great striving all suffering, and later all beauty must be experienced and sensed; but to no moment of ecstasy can man say, verweile doch, du bist so schön until the final passing to an infinity of beauty at present beyond man’s ken. Complacency, at any point, is certainly excluded. So must it be always in a creed which begins effectively with Heraclitus and now pervades modern vitalism. The philosophy of the “ever living fire”, of the ewig werdende could never be associated with complacency. Still less can the more conscious doctrine of higher forms co-exist with the static, or with the illusory perfections of a facile reformism. Man began very small, and has become not so small; he must end very great, or cease to be. That is the essence of the matter. Is it true? This is a question which everyone must answer for himself after studying European literature which stretches from the Greeks to the vital thought of modern times and, also, the world thinking of many different climes and ages which in many ways and at most diverse points is strangely related. He should study, too, either directly or through the agency of those most competent to judge, the evolutionary processes revealed so relatively recently by modern biology and the apparently ever increasing concept of ordered complexity in modern physics. He must then answer two questions: the first is whether it is more likely than not that a purpose exists in life? — the second is whether despite all failures and obscurities the only discernable purpose is a movement from lower to higher forms? If he comes at length to a conclusion which answers both these questions with a considered affirmative, he has reached the point of the great affirmation. The new religious impulse which so many seek is really already here. We need neither prophets nor priests to find it for ourselves, although we are not the enemies but the friends of those who do. For ourselves we can find in the thought of the world the faith and the service of the conscious and sentient man.
Après Guénon se défoule sur la classe moyenne apparue en France à la fin du Moyen Age et si visible déjà au temps de Molière (que ne le lisez-vous en ce sens celui-là !) :
La classe moyenne pense sur tout pareil, et c’est en fonction des médias. Elle a été d’abord terrifiante en Angleterre (lisez Fukuyama) puis en France et dans le monde. Balzac :
Ainsi que le montre très bien le professeur Bales, de l’Université d’Exter, les condisciples formés par les Jésuites de Gand connaissent des hauts et des bas dans l’histoire de leur amitié riche en « interférences », mais aussi en « confrontations ». Après avoir rappelé la formation de bibliothécaire de Le Roy, le poste qu’il occupe ainsi à l’Académie des Beaux-Arts de Bruxelles, son rôle de conseiller artistique dans une galerie de la Porte de Namur et l’apothéose de sa carrière au Musée Wiertz, dont il devient le conservateur, revenons un moment sur son œuvre de conteur pour souligner Joe Trimborn, un recueil de nouvelles datant de cette année 1913 décidément très prolifique.

Lire Bernanos aujourd’hui, c’est donc renouer avec l’idéal de la plus vieille France, celui d’une chrétienté médiévale – peut-être idéalisée – qui, dans toute sa puissance, était restée le marchepied du Royaume des Cieux. Royaume qui ne s’ouvrait qu’à ceux qui n’avaient pas tué en eux l’esprit d’enfance. Une chrétienté virile qui châtiait les usuriers et faisait miséricorde aux putains, qui couvrait la France de monastères, de vignes et de moulins. C’est à cette vieille terre de France que Bernanos songeait lorsqu’il écrivait : « Quand je serai mort, dites au doux royaume de la terre que je l’aimais plus que je n’ai jamais osé le dire ». Et cette terre est la nôtre, alors…