En poursuivant votre navigation sur ce site, vous acceptez l'utilisation de cookies. Ces derniers assurent le bon fonctionnement de nos services. En savoir plus.

mardi, 18 septembre 2012

An interview with Filip Martens

An interview with Filip Martens
GRA : Western media confidently say that the fall of the current Syrian regime is inevitable. In your opinion, how well founded this prediction is, and is there some political power that can bring order to this situation?

F.M.:  In the beginning of the Syrian conflict, there were obviously sincere demonstrations for political reforms. And president al-Assad did listen to them: he started a political proces of reforms, which resulted in a new constitution, parliamentary elections and a new government that is composed of all political tendencies in Syria. Moreover, presidential elections will take place in 2014 and the new Syrian constitution clearly states that the president can remain just two terms.

The terrorists consist of jihadists and by Saudi Arabia and Qatar financed mercenaries from Turkey, Libanon, Jordanië, Libya, Chechnya, Yemen, Afghanistan, … They are supported by Syrian Muslim Brothers and by American, British, French, Turkish and Qatarese Special Forces. In addition, criminal gangs abuse the insecurity to rob and plunder. So once again the Western media play a game of disinformation.

Only since about two months, the Syrian army strikes back hard. And of course with extreme caution in order to spare the civilian population as much as possible. First there was the agreement with the Arab League in which the Syrian goverment promised to withdraw the army from the cities and to respect a truce. The Syrian goverment has kept its word, but the terrorists only abused this truce by immediately infiltrating the cities where the Syrian army withdrew.

Than there was the mediation attempt by the U.N. and the observers. Here happened the same. The Syrian army kept itself as good as possible to the armistice, but again the terrorists only abused the situation to sow terror, to infiltrate and – with help of the West, the Gulf Cooperation Countries (GCC) and Turkey – to spread disinformation and lies. This was followed by the attack in Damascus on 18th July 2012, which killed some senior officials of the Syrian state. And afterwards, there was the withdrawal of the U.N. observers.

After all this and after 18 months of practicing patience, the Syrian army decided to eradicate terrorism. Now the army rules firmly and the terrorists are on the run. Daraa, Homs en Damascus are largely safe. In Aleppo, the terrorists are also driven out and this city will be again under full control of the Syrian authorities very soon. Of course, there are still serious incidents, like bombings and shootings. But this absolutely doesn’t mean that the jihadists and mercenaries still occupy entire neighbourhoods and terrorise the civilians. These acts of violence are the last convulsions of the terrorists. Wherever the terrorists resurface, they are immediately eradicated by the Syrian army, that can rely on the strong support of the people.

Syria has long and porous borders, that make it impossible to practice full control. That is why the terrorists infiltrate the country from the neighbouring countries Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan and Iraq. And that is also why the terror attacks will continue for a long while. The infiltration of jihadists and mercenaries through the borders is a tedious but limited problem. The only thing which they are still capable of are bombings and terrorist acts, but acquiring control over a region or neighbourhood has become impossible. After the victory in Aleppo the army will control entire Syria again.

However, the terrorists have about endless financial and logistical resources from the West, Turkey and a few Arab countries. For instance, the financial resources of Qatar and Saudi Arabia are inexhaustible thanks to the oil dollars. But the question is what purpose these inexhaustible financial resources and foreign support for the terrorists can serve when they absolutely have no sympathy at all from the Syrian people?

Therefore a solution can only come from the Syrians themselves. And in this, the interfaith ‘musalahah’ movement, which was born a few months ago, offers hope. This Arab word means ‘reconciliation’. It was an initiative of Syrian civilians in order to find a solution for the crisis in their country. This means that the musalahah movement arose neither from the Western sponsored ‘opposition’, nor the regime of al-Assad. The origin of the musalahah movement is only the Syrian people. In crucial places, like Homs, already hundreds of young people chose such a conciliatory internal dialogue. The basic vision of this movement is that Syria is one family, where there is no place for violence and sectarianism, where the different religious groups live together in peace. That is the desire of the silent majority of the Syrian people.

Russia, China and Iran can play a positive role in this, because they are the only powers that the Syrian people trust. But I don’t see any alternative for president al-Assad: any other ‘solution’ can only create chaos in Syria.

GRA: How likely is a forceful U.S. intervention in the Syrian conflict and attempt to violently overthrow the regime of Bashar al-Assad (or the U.S. will keep a distance and will not dare to risk)? Under circumstances of such a possibility, what consequences it will bring to America itself?

F.M.:  To understand what is happening in Syria, it is good to consult Zbigniew Brzezinski. His books and articles are directing Washington’s foreign policy. According to Brzezinski the control of Eurasia is crucial to the U.S. to remain the world leader. Eurasia counts 75% of the world population, produces 60% of the world’s wealth and has 75% of the world’s energy resources.

Brzezinski calls the critical zone in Eurasia the ‘New Global Balkans’. This area extends from the Suez Canal to the western borders of China and from Central-Russia to the Indian Ocean. It is this area that the U.S. wants to control. That is why the U.S. invaded Afghanistan and Iraq, as well as the American attempts to destabilize Pakistan (through bombings directed by the CIA and the ‘export’ of the Taliban from Afghanistan to Pakistan’s North West Frontier).

A problem for the U.S. is that since 1979 Iran arose as a non-Western regional power. We must bear in mind that the finger of the alliance between the West and the GCC is pointed at Hezbollah and Iran. And that Syria is the link between Hezbolllah and Iran. The demise of the al-Assad regime in Syria is crucial in order to isolate Iran and also in order to disable Lebanon and eventually also Iran. Without Syria’s support and the supply routes from Iran to Lebanon, Hezbollah will no longer be able to play a dominant role in Lebanon and Iran’s regional influence will greatly decrease. Also will Russia lose an important partner and its only military base in the Mediterranean Sea. And last but not least, after a future collapse of Iran it will be possible to create similar ethnic and religious wars in Russia.

A direct military intervention of the U.S. in Syria would put the entire region in flames, but most important of all is that the U.S. is not capable of doing this. Therefore the preference goes to a kind of ‘intervention light’. This works through subcontracting: local militias, allied armies and private firms. This was tried out successfully for the first time in Libya. The deployment of American troops is limited to Special Forces, because the U.S. is increasingly dependent on its allies.

Russia and China vetoed any kind of militarily aggression against Syria in the U.N. and there is no reason why they would change their mind. And because of this strong Russian and Chinese resistance the U.S. won’t attack Syria without U.N. permission (like in the case of Iraq). The U.S. is now using a persiflage on their ‘weapons of mass destruction’ propaganda, which they used against Iraq, by trying to convince the U.N. with ‘chemical weapons’ propaganda in order to find a reason to attack Syria. But there won’t be an American attack on Syria before the presidential elections in the U.S. (which take place in November).

In my opinion, the American public will not pay attention to a possible invasion of Syria. Why not? It’s just another country attacked by their government.


GRA: How do you assess Russia's position in this issue? Is Russia able to compromise, yielding to the wiles of the West (for example, the proposal of Hillary Clinton to establish demilitarized zone), despite the fact, that Russia has already received a very difficult experience in the situation in Libya?

F.M. : Russia, China, Iran and Hezbollah are a Eurasian resistance block against the Atlantist arrogance. Russia has the potential and the resources to confront this challenge. It has an acute awareness of what is historically going on in the world and a deep consciousness of its own eschatological mission. Therefore Russia can play a central role in this.

It is useless to try to compromise with universalist fanatics. Russia already compromised when it abstained from blocking the Libyan intervention in the U.N. President Medvedev committed a real crime against Libya and helped to initiate the Western supported interventions and color revolutions in the Arab world. The West was behind the Libyan insurgency, that destroyed this rich country and killed tens of thousands of Libyans. Also the murder of Gaddafi was partly Medvedev’s responsibility. Russia has blood on its hands for allowing Libya to be bombed back into prehistoric times. But all the people around Medvedev were liberals. Russia should have defended Libya, because the fall of Libya was a defeat for Russia. A possible fall of Syria will be another defeat. Russia should present itself internationally as the country that votes “Njet!” to war in the U.N.

Fortunately, the mistake committed in Libya has not been repeated in the Syrian conflict. Syria has a much higher strategic value for Russia’s security and stability. With Putin back in power, Russia’s position is much better. He is consistent in his support for president Bashar al-Assad. The explosive situation in Syria is the most important geopolitical threat for Russia at this moment. All the liberals and pro-Atlantist forces are against Putin. Russia needs Putin to make a fist against the West on foreign policy, especially because new destabilization by secessionist movements (supported by Saudi Arabia and the U.S.) arose in the Caucasus.

And the Europeans should realise that the world is broader than only the U.S. and Europe. Syria develops fast its economical relations with other major powers and area’s: Russia, China, India, South America, South Africa, Belarus, etc. Russia (and also China) will be happy to take the place of the Europeans as trade partner. The only ones who suffer the economic sanctions against Syria and have a lot to lose there, are the Europeans themselves. However, they should know better, because a similar dirty game is going on against Iran already for years. European oil companies lost very lucrative contracts in Iran because of silly economic sanctions inspired by the U.S.

GRA: How, in your opinion, will deploy the situation after the overthrow of Bashar Assad? According to the information, disseminated through the media, there are already dozens of catastrophic scenarios.

F.M.: The destabilization of the Mediterranean region and the Near East threatens the Russian naval presence in the Mediterranean and also paves the way for new color revolutions, uprisings and insurgencies in Iran, Central Asia and even Russia. So, the fall of the al-Assad regime and the destruction of Syria would make it easier to destabilize other countries in Eurasia.

In a destabilized Syria, the Muslim Brotherhood can arise as political power. Another possibility is the creation on the Syrian territory of small and weak states, based on sectarian identities, which can easily be manipulated by the West.

Millions of people would suffer from these violent political changes, the further disintegration of the Near East and ethnic and religious wars in Eurasia. The final objective of the alliance between the U.S., Israel, the GCC, Turkey and Western Europe is the destruction of Iran, the downfall of Russia and the containment of China, Pakistan and India.

GRA: One possible scenario is the territorial division of Syria into three parts. Chagry Erhan, Director of the Center of Strategic Research of the European peoples, believes that the Baath regime, that is being removed from power, will try to create a new state on the basis of belonging to a madhhab through Latakia-Tartus, what can lead to a decision of destruction or assimilation of the Sunni population. In addition, such a step (creation of a new state) can undertake also Kurds. And here raises a difficult question - how to prevent the partition of the country? Erhan believes that once the government will intervene in the process by violent means, this will lead to more bloodshed. How likely do you think, this scenario is?

F. M.: A madhhab represents the entire school of thought of a particular mujtahid Imam, together with many first-rank scholars that came after him and checked his evidences and refined his work. The scenario above is about the division of Syria in an Alawite state, a Kurdish state and a Sunni state. It’s an idea that mainly lives in Atlantist circles. But Erhan is totally wrong: in the past two months, the terrorists were almost complety defeated by the Syrian army.

Geopolitically, Syria is situated in a central and crucial region, which is intersected by 2 important fault lines: one religious (Shia vs. Sunni) and two ethnic (Turks vs. Kurds and Turks vs. Alawites). Turkey, the GCC and the jihadists are mainly Sunni. Iran and the Alawites minority are Shia. And after the demise of Saddam Hussein, the Shia also came to power in Iraq, which narrowed the GCC’s sphere of influence. Saudi Arabia and Qatar want to regain this dominant position at all costs by turning Syria into a kind of vassal state in order to tackle Iran.

The Turks will do everything to avoid another Kurdish state – there is already one in Northern Iraq – because they have a large Kurdish minority of their own. And an Alawite state can cooperate with their Alevi brothers in Turkey. Syria already now supports the Kurdish PKK in Turkey, because of the Turkish support for the terrorists in Syria. All this means that also Turkey can become a victim of the balkanization of the Near East in the future.

This balkanization is a necessary condition for Western geopolitics. It is certainly not far-fetched, because it is similar to the Yinon Plan from 1982. This aimed to break the existing states in the Near East and to create mini states, hostile to each other and controlled by the West.  


mercredi, 11 juillet 2012

Fascism, Anti-Fascism, and the Welfare State

Fascism, Anti-Fascism, and the Welfare State

Paul Gottfried

mardi, 10 juillet 2012

Interview with Paul Gottfried

"Attack the System"

Interview with Paul Gottfried

00:18 Publié dans Entretiens | Lien permanent | Commentaires (0) | Tags : droite, gauche, paul gottfried, entretiens, etats-unis | |  del.icio.us | | Digg! Digg |  Facebook

samedi, 07 juillet 2012

Fabrice LUCHINI à propos de Louis-Ferdinand CÉLINE



à propos de Louis-Ferdinand CÉLINE

vendredi, 22 juin 2012

E&R Bretagne rencontre Guillaume Faye

E&R Bretagne rencontre Guillaume Faye

mercredi, 13 juin 2012

Civilization as political concept

Civilization as political concept

Interview with the leader of the International “Eurasian Movement”, a philosopher, and a  professor at Moscow State University Alexander Dugin

Interviewed by the Global Revolutionary Alliance’s own Natella Speranskaja 

Ex: http://www.granews.info/

- The crisis of identity, with which we faced after the Cold War and the collapse of the communist world, is still relevant. What do you think is capable of lifting us out of this crisis  – a religious revival or creation of a new political ideology? Which of the options are you  inclined to yourself?

- After the collapse of communism came the phase of the “unipolar moment” (as Charles Krauthammer called it). In geopolitics, this meant the victory of unilateralism and Atlanticism, and because the pole was left alone, the West has become a global phenomenon. Accordingly,  the ideology of liberalism (or more accurately, neo-liberalism) is firmly in place crushing the two alternative political theories that existed in the twentieth century – communism and fascism . The Global liberal West has now defined culture, economics, information and technology, and politics. The West’s claims to the universalism of it’s values, the values of Western modernity and the Postmodern era, has reached its climax. 

Problems stemming from the West during the “unipolar moment” has led many to say that this “moment” is over, that he could not yet be a “destiny” of humanity.That is, a “unipolar moment” should be interpreted very broadly – not only geopolitical, but also ideologically, economically, axiologically, civilization wide. The crisis of identity, about which you ask, has scrapped all previous identities – civilizational, historical, national, political, ethnic, religious, cultural, in favor of a universal planetary Western-style identity  – with its concept of individualism, secularism, representative democracy, economic and political liberalism, cosmopolitanism and the ideology of human rights.Instead of a hierarchy of identities, which have traditionally played a large role in sets of collective identities, the “unipolar moment” affirmed a flat one-dimensional identity, with the absolutization of the individual singularity.  One individual = one identity, and any forms of the collective identity (for example, individual as the part of the religious community, nation, ethnic group, race, or even sex) underwent dismantling and overthrow. Hence the hatred of globalists for different kind of “majorities” and protection of minorities, up to the individual.

The Uni-polar Democracy of our moment - this is a democracy, which unambiguously protects the minority before the face of the majority and the individual before face of the group.  This is  the crisis of identity for those of non-Western or non-modern (or even not “postmodern”) societies,since this is where customary models are scrapped and liquidated. The postmodern West with  optimism, on the contrary, asserts individualism and hyper-liberalism in its space and zealously  exports it on the planetary scale.

However, it’s not painless, and has caused at all levels it’s own growing rejection.  The problems, which have  appeared in the West in the course of this “uni-polar moment”, forced many to speak, that this “moment’s” conclusion, has not succeeded in becoming “the fate” of humanity.  This, therefore,  was the cost of the  possibility of passage to some other paradigm…

So, we can think about an alternative  to the “unipolar moment” and, therefore, an alternative to liberalism, Americanism, Atlanticism, Western Postmodernism, globalization, individualism, etc. That is, we can, and I think should,  work out plans and strategies for a “post-uni polar world “, at all levels – the ideological and political, the economic, and religious, and the philosophical and geo-political, the cultural and civilizational, and technology, and value.

In fact, this is what I call multi-polarity. As in the case of uni-polarity it is not only about the political and strategic map of the world, but also the paradigmatic philosophical foundations of the future world order.  We can not exactly say that the “uni-polar moment” has finally been completed. No, it is still continuing, but it faces a growing number of problems. We must put an end to it – eradicate it. This is a global revolution, since the existing domination of the West, liberalism and globalism completely controls the  world oligarchy, financial and political elites.

So they just will not simply  give up their positions. We must prepare for a serious and intense battle.   Multi-polarity will be recaptured by the conquered peoples of the world in combat and it will be able to arise only on the smoking ruins of the global West.  While the West is still dictating his will to the rest, to talk about early multipolarity  – you must first destroy the Western domination on the ground.   Crisis – this is much, but far from all.

- If we accept the thesis of the paradigmatic transition from the current unipolar world order model to a new multi-polar model, where the actors are not nation-states, but  entire civilizations, can it be said that this move would entail a radical change in the very human identity?

- Yes, of course. With the end of the unipolar moment, we are entering a whole new world. And it is not simply a reverse or a step back, but it is a step forward to some unprecedented future, however, different from the digital project of “lonely crowds”, which is reserved for  humanity by globalism. Multi-polar identity will be the complex nonlinear collection of different identities – both individual and collective, that is varied for each civilization (or even inside each civilization).

This is something completely new that  will be created.

And the changes will be radical. We can not exclude that, along with known identities, civilizations, and offering of  new ways … It is possible that one of these new identities will become the identity of “Superman” – in the Nietzschean sense or otherwise (for example, traditionalist) …  In the “open society” of globalism the individual is, on the contrary, closedand strictly self-identical.

The multi-polar world’s anthropological map will be, however, extremely open, although the boundaries of civilizations  will be defined clearly. Man will again re-open the measurement of inner freedom – “freedom for”, in spite of the flat and purely external  liberal freedom – “freedom from” (as John Mill), Which is actually,  not freedom, but its simulacrum, imposed for a more efficient operation of the planetary masses by a small group of global oligarchs.

- Alexander Gelevich Dugin, you are the creator of the theory of a multi-polar world, which laid the foundation from which we can begin a new historical stage. Your book“The theory of a multi-polar world” has been and is being translated into other languages. The transition to a new model of world order means a radical change in the foreign policy of nation-states, and in today’s global economy, in fact, you have created all the prerequisites for the emergence of a new diplomatic language. Of course, this is a challenge of the global hegemony of the West. What do you think will be the reaction of your political opponents when they realize the seriousness of the threat posed?

- As always in the vanguard of  philosophical and ideological ideas, we first have the effect of bewilderment, the desire to silence or marginalize them. Then comes the phase of severe criticism and rejection. Then they begin to consider. Then they become commonplace and a truism. So it was with many of my ideas and concepts in the past 30 years. Traditionalism, geopolitics, Sociology of imagination , Ethnosociology, Conservative Revolution , National Bolshevism, Eurasianism, the Fourth Political Theory, National-structuralism, Russian Schmittianism, the concept of the three paradigms, the eschatological gnosis, New Metaphysics and Radical Theory of the Subject , Conspiracy theories, Russian haydeggerianstvo , a post-modern alternative , and so on – perceived first with hostility, then partially assimilated, and finally became part of mainstream discourse in academia and politics of Russia, and in part, and beyond.

Each of these directions has their fate, but the diagram of their mastering is approximately identical. So it will be also with the theory of a multipolar world   It will be hushed up, and then demonized and fiercely criticized, and then they will begin to look at it closely, and then accepted. But for all this it is necessary to pay for it and to defend it in the fight.  Arthur Rimbaud said that “the spiritual battle as fierce and hard, as the battle of armies.” For this we will have to struggle violently and desperately. As for everything else.

- In the “Theory of a multipolar world,” you write that in the dialogue between civilizations the responsibility is born by the elite of civilization. Do I understand correctly, it should be a “trained” elite, that is, the elite, which has a broad knowledge and capabilities, rather than the present “elite”? Tell me, what is the main difference between these elites?

- Civilizational elite – is a new concept. Thus far  it does not exist. It is a combination of two qualities – deep assimilation of the particular civilizational culture (in the philosophical, religious, value levels) and the presence of a high degree “of drive,” persistently pushing people to the heights of power, prestige and influence. Modern liberalism channels passion exclusively in the area of economics and business, creating a preference for a particular social elevator and it is a particular type of personality (which is an American sociologist Yuri Slezkine called “mercurial type”) .

The Mercurial elite of globalism, “aviakochevniki” mondialist nomadism, sung by Jacques Attali, should be overthrown in favor of radically different types of elites. Each civilization can dominate, and other “worlds”, not only thievish, mercurial shopkeepers and  cosmopolitans.  Islamic elite is clearly another – an example of this we see in today’s Iran, where the policy (Mars) and economics (Mercury) are subject to  spiritual authority, of the Ayatollah (Saturn).

But the “world” is only a metaphor. Different civilizations are based on different codes. The main thing is that the elite must be reflected in the codes themselves, whatever they may be. This is the most important condition. The will to power inherent in any elite, shall be interfaced with the will to knowledge, that is intellectualism and activism in such a multipolar elite should be wedded. Technological efficiency and value (often religious) content should be combined in such an elite. Only such an elite will be able to fully and responsibly participate in the dialogue of civilizations, embodying the principles of their traditions and engaging in interaction with other civilizations of the worlds.

- How can you comment on the hypothesis that the return to a bipolar model is still possible?

- I think not, practically or theoretically. In practice, because today there is no country that is comparable to the basic parameters of the U.S. and the West in general. The U.S. broke away from the rest of the world so that no one on its own can compete with them. Theoretically, only the West now has a claim to universality of its values, whereas previously Marxism was regarded as an alternative. After the collapse of the Soviet Union it became clear that universalism is only  liberal, capitalist. To resist Western imperialism there can only be a coalition of large spaces – not the second pole, but immediately multiple poles, each of them with its own strategic infrastructure and with a particular civilizational, cultural and ideological content.

- How real is the sudden transition to a non-polar model? What are the main disadvantages of this model?

- Passage to a non-polar model, about which leaders are increasingly talking of in the Council on Foreign Relations (Richard Haass, George Soros,etc.), means the replacement of the facade of a uni-polar hegemony, the transition from the domination based on military and strategic power of the United States and NATO (hardware ) to dispersed domination of the West as a whole (software). These are two versions – hard-hegemony and soft-hegemony. But in both cases the West, its civilization, its culture, its philosophy, its technologies, its political and economic institutes and procedures come out as the standard universal model.  Over the long term, this will indicate  the transfer of power to a “world government”, which will be dominated by all  the same Western elites, the global oligarchy. It will then  discard it’s  mask and will act directly on behalf of the transnational forces. In some sense non-polarity is worse than uni-polarity, though, it would seem hard to believe.

Non-polarity itself, and even more sharply and rapidly, will not yet begin. For this, the world must go through the turmoil and trials until a desperate humanity itself cried for the world elite with a prayer for salvation. Prior to that, to weaken the power of the United States, world disasters occur, and war. Non-polar world under the control of a world government, consisting of direct representatives of the global oligarchy,  is expected by many religious circles as the coming “of the kingdom of the Antichrist.”

As for the “shortcomings” of such a model, I believe that it is just  “a great parody of” the sacred world empire, which  Rene Guenon warned of in his work The Reign of Quantity and the Signs of the Times. This will be a global simulacrum.  To recognize these “deficiencies” will  not be so easy, otherwise opposition “to the antichrist” would be too simple a matter, and the depth of his temptation would be insignificant.

The true alternative is a multi-polar world, everything else – evil in the truest sense of the word.

- The “counter-hegemony” by Robert Cox, who you mention in your book aims to expose the existing order in international relations and raise the rebellion against it. To do this, Cox called for the creation of counter-hegemonic bloc, which will include political actors who reject the existing hegemony. Have you developed the Fourth Political Theory as a kind of counter-hegemonic doctrine that could unite the rebels against the hegemony of the West?

- I am convinced that the Fourth Political Theory fits into the logic of building counter-hegemony, which Cox spoke of. By the way, also inthe proximity of critical theory in the MO theory, and multi-polar world is a wonderful text by Alexandra Bovdunova ,voiced at the Conference on the Theory of a multipolar world in Moscow, Moscow State University on 25-26 April 2012 .

4PT is not a complete doctrine, this is still the first steps toward the exit from the conceptual impasse in which we find ourselves in the face of liberalism, today rejected by more and more people around the world, in the collapse of the old anti-liberal political theories – Communism and Fascism. In a sense, the need for 4PT – is a sign of the times, and really can not be disputed by anyone. Another matter, what will be 4PT in its final form. The temptation appears to build it as a syncretic combination of elements of previous anti-liberal doctrines and ideologies …

I am convinced that we should go another way. It is necessary to understand the root of the current hegemony. This coincides with the root of modernity as such, and it grows from the roots of modernity in all three pillars of political theories – liberalism, communism and fascism. To manipulate them to find an alternative to modernity and liberalism, respectively, and of the liberal hegemony of the West, is in my view, pointless. We must move beyond modernity in general, beyond the range of its political actors – individual, class, nation, state, etc.

Therefore 4PT as the basis of a counter-hegemonic planetary front should be constructed quite differently. Like the theory of a multipolar world 4PT operates with a new concept – “civilization”, but 4PT puts special emphasis on the existential aspect of it. Hence the most important, the central thesis of 4PT that its subject is the actor -  Dasein. Every civilization, its Dasein, which means that it describes a specific set of existentials. On their basis, should be raised a new political theory  generalized at the following level into a “multipolar federation Of Dasein” as the concrete structure of counter – hegemony. In other words, the very counter-hegemony must be conceived existentially, as a field of war between the inauthentic globalization (global alienation) and the horizon of authentic  peoples and societies in a multipolar world (the possibility of overcoming the alienation  of civilizations).

- When we talk about cognitive uprising, however first of all, our actions should be aimed at the overthrow of the dictatorship of the West?

- The most important step is the beginning of the systematic preparation of a global revolutionary elite-oriented to multi-polarity 4PT. This elite must perform a critical function – to be a link between the local and global. At the local level we are talking about the masses and the clearest exponents of their local culture (religious leaders, philosophers, etc.). Often, these communities do not have a planetary perspective and simply defend their conservative identity before the onset of toxic globalization and Western imperialism.

Raising the masses and the traditionalist-conservatives  to a realized uprising in the context of a complex union of a counter-hegemonistic block is  extremely difficult. Simple conservatives and their supportive mass, for example, of the Islamic or Orthodox persuasion are unlikely to realize the necessity of  alliances with the Hindus or the Chinese. This will be the play  (and they are already actively playing it) of the globalists and their principle of “divide and conquer!” But the revolutionary elite, which is the elite, even within a particular traditionalist elite of society, should take the , heartfelt deep and deliberate feelings of local identity and correlate it within a total horizon of multi-polarity, and  4PT.

Without the formation of such a elite the revolt against the  post-modern world and the overthrow of the dictatorship of the West will not take place. Every time and everywhere   the West has a problem, he will come to the aid of anti-Western forces, which, however, will be motivated by narrow bills to specific civilizational neighbors – most often, just as anti-Western as they are. So it will be and already is the instrumentalization of globalists of various conservative fundamentalist and nationalist movements. Islamic fundamentalists to help the West is one. European nationalists – is another. So a “unipolar moment” extends not only to exist in itself, but also playing the antagonistic forces against him. The overthrow of the dictatorship of the West will become possible only if this strategy  will be sufficient enough to create or make appear a new counter-hegemonic elite. A initiative like Global Revolutionary Alliance – the unique example of really revolutionary and effective opposition to hegemony.

- You have repeatedly said that Eurasianism is a strategic, philosophical, cultural and civilizational choice. Can we hope that the political course chosen by Vladimir Putin (establishment of a Eurasian Union ) Is the first step towards a multipolar model?

- This is a difficult question. By himself, Putin and, especially, his environment, they act  more out of inertia, without calling into question the legitimacy of the existing planetary status quo. Their goal – to win his and Russia’s  rather appropriate place within the existing world order. But that is the problem: a truly acceptable place for Russia is not and can not exist, because the “uni-polar moment”, as well as the globalists stand for the desovereignization of Russia, eliminating it as an independent civilization, and strategic pole.

This self-destruction seems to suit, Dmitry Medvedev and his entourage (INSOR) for he was ready to reboot and go for almost all of it. Putin clearly understands the situation somewhat differently, and his criteria of “acceptability” is also different. He would most of all psychologically  arrange  a priority partnership with the West while maintaining the sovereignty of Russia. But this is  something  unacceptable under any circumstances to the unipolar globalists -  practically or theoretically.

So Putin is torn between multipolarity, where he leads the orientation of  sovereignty and Atlanticism, where he leads the inertia and the tireless work of a huge network of influence that permeates all of the structure of Russian society. Here’s the dilemma. Putin makes moves in both directions – he proclaims multi-polarity, the Eurasian Union, to protect the sovereignty of Russia, even spoke of the peculiarities of Russian civilization, strengthening vertical power, shows respect (if not more) to Orthodoxy, but on the other hand, surrounds himself with pro-American experts (eg, “Valdai Club”), rebuilds, education and culture under the globalistic Western models, has a liberal economic policy and suffers comprador oligarchs, etc.

The field for maneuver Putin is constantly shrinking. The logic of the circumstances pushes him to a more unambiguous choice. Inside the country this uncertainty of course causes growing hostility, and his legitimacy falls.

Outside the country  the West only increases the pressure on Putin to persuade him towards globalism and the recognition of “unilateralism”, specifically – to cede his post to the Westerner Medvedev. So Putin, while continuing to fluctuate between multipolarity and Westernism, loses ground and support here and there.

The new period of his presidency will be very difficult. We will do everything we can to move it to a multipolar world, the Eurasian Union and 4PT. But we are not alone in Russian politics – against us for influence in Putin’s circles we have an army of liberals, agents of Western influence and the staff of the global oligarchy. For us, though, we have the People and the Truth. But behind them – a global oligarchy, money, lies, and, apparently, the father of lies. Nevertheless, vincit omnia veritas. That I have no doubt.

mardi, 12 juin 2012

Multipolarity as challenge

Multipolarity as challenge

Interview with political analyst Alexander Latsa by N.Speranskaya for GRAnews

Ex: http://www.granews.info/

The collapse of the Soviet Union meant the cancellation of the Yalta system of international relations and the triumph of the single hegemony - the United States, and as a consequence, transformations of the bipolar world order to a unipolar model. Nevertheless, some analysts are still talking about a possible return to a bipolar model. How do you feel about this hypothesis? Is there a likelihood of emergence of a power capable of challenging the global hegemony?

The collapse of the Soviet Union has indeed led directly to an American domination of the world affairs. When Bush father proclaimed the new world order in the sands of Iraq, many (in the Western world) even thought that it would be so forever, that the history of ideas had stopped and that the world would from now on forever be under American domination. 

We can see today that those who thought so were wrong, and it only took a decade for History to take back its rights, leading America into wars that will accelerate its decline, while paradoxically, they were supposed to establish its domination. 

During the same decade, Russia was reborn from its ashes and has once again become a strong regional power, a power that has visions of domination of Eurasia, as Vladimir Putin hammered during his first speech as the elected president on May 7, 2012. 

We hear a lot more about the Russia / America confrontation than at the beginning of this century but these countries will probably never be anymore the main key players in the world of tomorrow, unlike America and the USSR in the world of yesterday. 

Logically, China is today targeted by the American strategists as being a main adversary as it is most likely to become the leading world power during this century, on an economical, financial and demographic level - perhaps even a military one. China should therefore become the biggest competitor of an America in decline, and if nothing is done, the world of tomorrow will be punctuated by the China/America opposition.

Zbigniew Brzezinski openly admits that the U.S. is gradually losing its influence. Here it is possible to apply the concept of "imperial overstretch", introduced by renowned historian Paul Kennedy. Perhaps, America has faced that, what was previously experienced by the Soviet Union. How do you assess the current state of the U.S.?

Zbigniew Brzezinski is getting older and is probably aware of his mistakes, realizing that his outlook for the future world (under an American domination) have not fully come true. I say "not fully” because today the world is still dominated by the American hyper-power. The dollar is still the dominant currency in 2012 and America remains the world's largest economy, although the 2008 crisis seems to have been almost fatal to this financial domination. On the military level, its predominance is also over. Iraq and especially Afghanistan have shown the limits of the American military supremacy. Nobody longer sees America as an invulnerable power as it was the case a decade ago. Curiously though, America just like the USSR chose to die and go to prove their vulnerability to the world in the same location:Afghanistan. I would like to add that this “end of Empire” had already been planned by a French sociologist, Emmanuel Todd, in 2002.

The loss of global influence of the U.S. means no more, no less, as the end of the unipolar world. But here the question arises as - to which model will happen the transition in the nearest future? On the one hand, we have all the prerequisites for the emergence of the multipolar world, on the other – we face the risk of encountering non-polarity, which would mean a real chaos.

In fact, no one knows what direct and indirect consequences the collapse of this superpower may have. Neither do we know if the unilateral post-transition will not be chaotic, nor how this potential chaos will occur. One can really wonder who the future major players will be in a "world of post-American domination."
China and India are likely to become (in that order) the two dominant powers in the Southern Eurasia and in the South East Asia. Russia will likely become the dominant power in Northern and Western Eurasia but it will also probably be a new pole of attraction for the European nations, for cultural, political and religious reasons.

I would also add that if neither China nor Russia nor India have and probably should not have, global ambitions, those powers should have strong regional ambitions in their respective zones of influence, that is to say in Eurasia / Central Asia / South East Asia. And yet this area is obviously a key strategic geopolitical area. Russian, Indian, Chinese and American regional interests will therefore probably continue to cross, and accentuate the new great game between these great powers at the heart of Eurasia. Thus it is doubtful that the transition towards a multipolar world (or at least towards a world that will no longer be under American control) happens in a non-chaotic, at least initially.

The project of "counter-hegemony", developed by Cox, aims to expose the existing order in international relations and raise the rebellion against it. For this, Cox calls for the creation of counter-hegemonic bloc, which will include those political actors who reject the existing hegemony. The basis of the unipolar model imposed by the United States, is a liberal ideology. From this we can conclude that the basis of the multipolar model just the same has to be based on some ideology. Which ideology, in your opinion, can take replace the counter-hegemonic one, capable of uniting a number of political actors who do not agree with the hegemony of the West?

The opposition of the communist and liberal ideologies had the advantage of structuring the world. With the victory of the liberal ideology, through the military and political victory of the Western coalition, there was more or less  a sense of global unity  because "the world" thought that victory was final and that the ideology of the winner would be "functional". But three decades later (and this has accelerated since the crisis of 2008) the system now appears to be corrupt, probably unsustainable and not adapted to the world. 

The liberal ideology has accelerated the globalization process, but this globalization has probably contributed indirectly to the destruction of the Western domination and of the related liberal ideology, that had put the economy at the heart of human history, just as Marxism had somehow done it before.

To have a glance at the emerging powers undoubtedly gives clues about the near future. The  new emerging  players of the world (BRICS for example), are a group of emerging powers that despite their important cultural, civilizational, geopolitical and demographic differences, also appear to have a lot of similarities. Their emergence is characterized by a type of development that challenges the recommendations of economic liberalism. These powers are characterized by strong state intervention. The BRICs are also societies in transition from an authoritarian tendency (China, Russia) or conservative societies dominated by a cast system (India, Brazil). Consequently they do not accept Western standards i.e. the rule of law and democracy. Their foreign policies are converging to challenge the status quo of the post-Cold War and the Western domination as it is American-centered. BRICS share a core value: a national sovereignty as a basic structural element  of the international system. Last, the BRICS systems have focused on societal systems based on traditions, identity and religion. All these are probably indications on the possible BRICS ideologies in construction, that will replace the current reigning ideology.

If we project the multipolar model on the economic world map, then we’ll get the coexistence of multiple poles, and at the same time, will create a complete matrix for the emergence of a new economy - outside of Western capitalist discourse. In your opinion, is the concept of “autarky of big spaces”, suggested by List, applicable for this?

I think we should differentiate the end of the unipolar world, and its corollary - the end of the current Western-centered world - from the globalization process, as the latter will continue. The Western world collapses mainly for political, demographic and economic reasons but also for spiritual ones. Its "code" of operation is clearly not functional anymore, nor adapted to today's world. Globalization will be lethal to the system that helped to accentuate it. Besides, the dominant power since the end of World War II (America) does not have the means anymore to promote its system of values and of thoughts, nor to impose its military domination. Therefore, America cannot control the Western world any longer.

That said, even if the Western world disappeared and even if the weakening of America continued during the first half of this century, globalization will spread culturally and demographically. As an example, in 2030, the world will perhaps count 8.5 billion people, and all the younger generation of the entire planet will read and write, which never happened before. There are human upheavals to come that are probably unprecedented. I do not think the anti-Western ideology is a sufficient vector to build a new world. BRICS though probably give a “first and vague” idea of what tomorrow's world could be: a world of civilizational and identity consolidation. Actually, it will be world made of a self-centered and wide open spaces.

Globalization should therefore widen and force "the worlds of tomorrow" to get more in contact the ones with the others, but one can sincerely doubt that this will happen in a friendly way and without tension. All this will probably be happening in a very chaotic way at first, since there will not be one dominant power able to more or less control, structure or master these flows.

Do you agree that now the fate of the world order is solved in Russia, that is, in the Heartland, to contain and weaken of which aims the Planetary U.S. strategy?

I see several interrelated equations together, and they are all related to the Heartland. First the global takeover of America and its globalist device happened via a projection capacity, that is to say, by extension beyond its borders to its military, economic and political devices, through NGOs and the revolutions of colours for example. This extension occurred through a unique  military control of the oceans in History, but also by using the dominated Western Europe as a bridgehead to attack Eurasia. This battle against the USSR for the global control turned  (since the fall of the Soviet Union) in a battle against Russia for the control of Eurasia.

Today the U.S. project is weakened by the financial, social, moral and political situation of the country. The expansion of NATO is jammed: the U.S. strategists surely foresaw Russia as a compliant bridgehead to America and that could attack an awakening China. But the reconstruction of Russia since March 2000 and the development of China hamper those plans. This is the reason why Russia is again the main enemy, as it prevents the American’s interference in what is known as the Heartland. 

Russia is now the key equation to prevent the unilateral world under American domination, to turn into a bilateral America / China world. Paradoxically, Russia will now have to deal with China in a subtle balance of forces, both friendly but firm.

We are now on the verge of paradigmatic transition from the unipolar world order model to the multi-polar one, where the actors are no more nation-states, but entire civilizations. Recently in Russia was published a book "Theory of multipolar world," written by the Doctor of Political and Social Sciences, Professor Alexander Dugin. This book lays the theoretical foundation, basis, from which a new historical stage can start, and describes a number of changes both in the foreign policy of nation-states and in today's global economy, which involve a transition to the multipolar model. Of course, this also means the emergence of a new diplomatic language. Do you believe that multipolarity is the natural state of the world and that transition to the multipolar model is inevitable?

I do not believe in the unipolar world and it seems to me that a multipolar world is best able to preserve the overall balance. But this requires several consistent players, of equivalent size and weight and whose own interests do not intersect. We know very well that this is not the case. The grandees of today and of tomorrow have their own interests in mind. I do not believe in an eternal honeymoon between non-western victorious countries.

In that sense, Russia may be facing a very difficult equation to contain an explosion in Asia: first, China will probably naturally and very quickly have its own sphere of influence felt in the pre-squared Russian Central Asia, and second, a Western coalition is currently installing a military device on the Western Russian side. Therefore, the collapse of the U.S. in my opinion refers directly to the place of Europe and Russia in the world of tomorrow. I put these two blocks together for several reasons. Neither Russia nor Europe can afford to face each other, as they both have strategic and structural weaknesses. Europe is currently an economic giant but a political and spiritual dwarf. On the opposite, Russia is a political and spiritual giant but also relatively an economic dwarf, apart from its raw materials.

The Europe / Russia relationship is one of the key points of the future. The political, economic and military potential of a European-Russian block, from the Atlantic to the Pacific Ocean, could make it become one of the giants of tomorrow's world.Of course it also means that Europe must accept to become part of a Eurasian  block, allied with Russia and all the countries that would choose to ally themselves with Russia too, in the near future. 

I spoke of the need to have players of similar size; As a French of Eurasia - and in order for this Eurasian block to constitute itself, I believe in the creation of a Paris-Berlin-Moscow-Astana axis. This huge Euro-Eurasian pole would be a sovereign power and would be essential to contribute to peace on the continent, and why not, in the world.



dimanche, 03 juin 2012

Intervista a Claudio Mutti


Intervista a Claudio Mutti

La traduzione della tragedia “Ifigenia” di Mircea Eliade è pubblicata dalle Edizioni all’insegna del Veltro

Ultimamente fioccano le “censure di presentazione” di libri ritenuti - per lo più a torto - politicamente o culturalmente scorretti. Tutti lettori sanno qualcosa del recente divieto di presentazione del “Così parlò Zarathustra” edito da Ar. O della richiesta dell’associazione “Gherush” di sospendere l’insegnamento di Dante e della sua “Comoedia” perché... antisemita.

Ma c’è un altro precedente, forse ignoto, che riassumiamo in breve.
Un paio d’anni fa Claudio Mutti - il filologo di Parma tacciato di rossobrunismo e eresia - aveva tradotto e pubblicato in italiano una tragedia di Mircea Eliade, “Ifigenia”, che fu messa in scena un paio di volte in Romania (prima sotto Antonescu e poi sotto Ceausescu).
Alcuni mesi fa un regista teatrale, Gianpiero Borgia, ha letto il libro e gli è piaciuto. Così ha preparato un allestimento dell’Ifigenia di Eliade per il Teatro Festival di Napoli (12 giugno) e per la stagione teatrale del Teatro Stabile di Catania (26 giugno).

Qualche giorno fa, però ha ricevuto un diktat dall’erede dei diritti d’autore di Eliade, tale Sorin Alexandrescu, attivista liberale e fondatore di un Comitato per i diritti umani: la tragedia non deve essere rappresentata nella traduzione di Claudio Mutti, perché ha pubblicato tre saggi storici sul rapporto di Eliade con la Guardia di Ferro di Corneliu Codreanu. Proponiamo ai lettori di “Rinascita” un’intervista al professore fatta da un giovane studioso della lingua romena, che ha appena pubblicato un libro presso Aliberti un libro sul colpo di Stato del dicembre 1989.
Claudio Mutti, antichista, filologo, linguista, poliglotta, traduttore e molto altro: una delle Sue ultime fatiche è stata la traduzione della tragedia Ifigenia di Mircea Eliade, pubblicata dalle Edizioni all’insegna del Veltro. Lei ha così portato alla luce un testo pressoché sconosciuto dello studioso romeno. Quando ha scoperto questo lavoro? Di che cosa tratta?

Mutti: Sono debitore della prima lettura di Ifigenia al mio amico Ion Marii, che alcuni decenni fa mi donò un esemplare dell’ormai irreperibile edizione uscita grazie ai suoi sforzi nel 1951, quando era esule in Argentina. A tale proposito, Mircea Eliade scrisse nel dicembre di quell’anno su un periodico dell’emigrazione romena: “Talvolta arrivano degli operai dall’anima angelica e donano i loro averi affinché si possano stampare i versi e le prose dei nostri sognatori o dei nostri veglianti; è il caso di quell’operaio che sta in Argentina, Ion Marii, il quale ha donato all’editore di Cartea Pribegiei tutto quello che aveva risparmiato in un anno e mezzo di lavoro (Ion Marii, primo membro d’onore della Società degli Scrittori Romeni, quando ritorneremo a casa…)”. Norman Manea invece raccontò su “Les Temps Modernes” che Ifigenia venne pubblicata… dal proprietario “della stampa di destra argentina” (sic)!

Di che cosa si tratta? Ifigenia è una tragedia che riprende il mito trattato da Euripide nell’Ifigenia in Aulide, ma si caratterizza per il risalto attribuito al motivo del sacrificio, motivo di cui Eliade si occupò, in quegli stessi anni, nei Commenti alla leggenda di Mastro Manole. La figlia di Agamennone accetta e sollecita il proprio sacrificio affinché la spedizione contro Troia possa compiersi con successo.
La tesi di Eliade è che Ifigenia, accettando e sollecitando il proprio sacrificio, acquisisce un “corpo di gloria” che consiste nel successo della spedizione bellica; essa vive nell’impresa degli Achei proprio come la moglie di Mastro Manole vive nel corpo di pietra e calce del monastero.
Nel mese di giugno il regista Gianpiero Borgia presenterà la versione italiana di Ifigenia, in prima assoluta per l’Italia, al Teatro Festival di Napoli e al Teatro Greco-Romano di Catania. Abbiamo però notato che il Suo nome non compare più nel cartellone. Si tratta di un “refuso” oppure c’è stato qualche problema “tecnico”?

L’erede di Mircea Eliade, suo nipote Sorin Alexandrescu, ha posto come condizione irrinunciabile per la concessione dei diritti che la rappresentazione dell’opera non si avvalesse della mia traduzione e che questa venisse sostituita dalla traduzione inedita di Horia Corneliu Cicortas. Il motivo di questo aut-aut dell’erede di Eliade è dovuto ad un puro e semplice pregiudizio ideologico. Infatti Sorin Alexandrescu, già fondatore di un comitato per i “diritti umani”, ritiene che oggi, “grazie al trionfo mondiale del liberalismo, noi comprendiamo più facilmente quello che molti intellettuali e cittadini non potevano comprendere allora [cioè nel periodo interbellico], ossia che la società liberale è la società meno imperfetta”. Ora, siccome lo zio non ebbe la possibilità di comprendere quello che invece è stato compreso dal nipote, quest’ultimo si trova in grande imbarazzo allorché il nome di Eliade viene associato alla cultura del tradizionalismo o, peggio ancora, al movimento legionario; perciò si sforza di dissociare Eliade da tutto ciò che è culturalmente e politicamente scorretto. Ai suoi occhi io ho commesso la grave colpa di pubblicare in più lingue alcuni studi che sine ira et studio documentano le liaisons dangereuses di Eliade sia col tradizionalismo (Eliade, Vâlsan, Geticus e gli altri. La fortuna di Guénon tra i Romeni) sia con il legionarismo (Mircea Eliade e la Guardia di Ferro e Le penne dell’Arcangelo). Di qui il diktat di Sorin Alexandrescu al regista italiano.
Leggendo Eliade si ha l’impressione che egli abbia rivelato di se stesso molto di più nei romanzi e, scopriamo oggi, in questa tragedia, che non nei diari e nella sua produzione saggistica. Qual è la Sua impressione a riguardo?

Credo di essere stato il primo, oltre una ventina d’anni fa, ad affermare che “sotto il velame” della narrazione romanzesca Eliade ha celato qualcosa che non poteva o non voleva dire esplicitamente in altra maniera: un qualcosa che aveva a che fare con il “culturalmente e politicamente scorretto” di cui ho detto poc’anzi. La mia convinzione è stata poi confermata da altri studiosi, i quali hanno scrutato le pagine della narrativa eliadiana cercando di mettere in luce quelli che Marcello De Martino definisce come i “non detti” e i “frammenti di un insegnamento sconosciuto”.
In Romania è mai stata rappresentata questa tragedia? Quali riscontri ha avuto?

Eliade si trovava all’estero allorché il 12 febbraio 1941 Ifigenia venne rappresentata per la prima volta al Teatro Comedia di Bucarest (il Teatro Nazionale era in restauro in seguito ad un terremoto). Una ventina di giorni prima, il generale Antonescu aveva espulso i legionari dal governo ed aveva instaurato una dittatura militare; dato il successo riscosso dalla prima dell’opera, la moglie di Eliade temeva che le autorità potessero vietare ulteriori rappresentazioni, perché, come si legge nel Diario di Petru Comarnescu, con la figura di Ifigenia “Eliade vuole ricordare Codreanu”. Col Diario di Comarnescu converge il Diario di Mihail Sebastian, il quale non si era recato alla prima di Ifigenia: “Avrei avuto l’impressione di assistere – annotò il drammaturgo ebreo – ad una seduta di cuib”, ossia ad una riunione legionaria. Dovette trascorrere una trentina d’anni, prima in Romania si potesse leggere di nuovo il testo di Ifigenia o assistere ad una rappresentazione della tragedia. Il testo fu pubblicato su “Manuscriptum”, una rivista culturale edita a Bucarest, nel 1974, nel quadro di un’operazione di “recupero” della produzione eliadiana da parte del regime nazionalcomunista. Negli anni Ottanta, la tragedia di Eliade venne rappresentata due o tre volte.
Qual è la percezione che oggi in Romania si ha dell’adesione di Eliade al Movimento legionario? E in Italia?

Per i Romeni che hanno un’opinione positiva del Movimento legionario, l’adesione di Eliade (così come quella della maggior parte dell’intellettualità romena dell’epoca) è motivo d’orgoglio. Per gli altri, a partire dall’erede dei diritti delle sue opere, è motivo d’imbarazzo. Quanto all’Italia, alcuni hanno demonizzato Eliade come un aguzzino che “consegnava alle SS gli ebrei romeni” (così scrisse testualmente “Repubblica”), mentre altri hanno cercato a lungo di sottacerne l’impegno legionario, poi si sono arrampicati sugli specchi per negarlo o minimizzarlo.

26 Maggio 2012 12:00:00 - http://rinascita.eu/index.php?action=news&id=15103

vendredi, 01 juin 2012

Entretien avec Alexandre Douguine


Entretien avec Alexandre Douguine

Propos  recueillis  par le magazine allemand “Zuerst”

( http://www.zuerst.de )

Q.: Monsieur Douguine, la Russie subit un feu roulant de critiques occidentales, surtout depuis  la  réélection de Vladimir Poutine à la présidence  de la fédération de Russie. Les politiciens etl es médias prétendent que les élections ont été truquées, que Poutine n’est pas un démocrate et qu’il bafoue les “droits de l’Homme”...

AD: Vladimir Poutine, qu’on le veuille ou non, apprtient aux vrais grands sur la scène politique internationale. Pourtant, il faut dire que la  politique qu’il préconise est très spéciale, ce que bon nombre de politiciens et de médiacrates occidentaux ne sont apparemment pas capables de comprendre. D’une part, Poutine est un libéral, un homme politique résolument tourné vers l’Occident; d’autre part, il est un défenseur acharné de laa  souveraineté et de l’indépendance russes. C’est pourquoi il s’oppose de front aux Etats-Unis et à  leurs intérêts géopolitiques. Poutine est donc simultanément libéral-démocrate et souverainiste. Il est ensuite un réaliste politique absolu, une personnalité politique non fantasque. Poutine serait par voie de  conséquence  le partenaire idéal de tout pays occidental qui accorderait à la  souveraineté une valeur identitque et aussi élevée. Mais les pays  d’Occident ont abandonné depuis longtemps les valeurs du réalisme politique...

Q.: Que voulez-vous dire par là?

AD: Voyez-vous, ce que croit l’Occident aujourd’hui, c’est qu’un jour toutes  les démocraties libérales abandonneront leur souveraineté et se fonderont dans une sorte de “super-nation” sous l’hégémonie américaine. Telle est bien l’idée  centrale de la globalisation à l’oeuvre aujourd’hui. Ce projet est irréalisable avec un Vladimir Poutine car il s’y oppose et défend la souveraineté russe. Ensuite, il ne reconnaît pas la  prétention américaine à exercer cette hégémonie en toute exclusivité. C’est là qu’il faut chercher la vraie raison des attaques acharnées que commet l’Occident contre lui et de sa diabolisation. C’est aussi la  raison pour laquelle l’Occident soutient de manière aussi spectaculaire l’opposition russe: il s’agit d’acquérir de l’influence et de consolider l’hégémonie occidentale.

Q.: D’après vous donc, Poutine fait tout ce qu’il faut faire...

AD: Bien sûr que non. Il a commis  des erreurs, notamment lors des dernières élections pour le Parlement. Elles n’ont pas été aussi transparentes qu’elles auraient dû l’être.

Q.: La critique occidentale s’adresse surtout aux élections présidentielles...

AD: Pourtant, lors de ces élections-là, c’était le contraire: elles ont été parfaitement transparentes. La  grande  majorité des électeurs  soutient Poutine, voilà tout, même si l’Occident ne peut ni ne veut le comprendre. L’étranger ne soutient qu’une minorité pro-américaine, ultra-libérale et hostile à toute souveraineté russe, pour qu’elle s’attaque à Poutine. Tel est l’enjeu. Voyez-vous, Poutine peut être bon ou mauvais en politique intérieure, cela n’a pas d’importance pour l’Occident. La mobilisation de ses efforts pour maintenir l’idée de souveraineté  —et pas seulement la souveraineté russe—  et l’existence d’un monde  multipolaire fait qu’il est la cible de toutes les attaques occidentales.

Q.: L’Ukraine aussi subit désormais de lourdes attaques médiatiques en provenance de l’Occident. C’est surtout la détention de Ioulia Timochenko  que critiquent les médias. Est-ce que l’enjeu en Ukraine est le même qu’en Russie?

AD: La situation en Ukraine est complètement différente, même si les critiques occidentales visent également la souveraineté du pays.

Q.: Le président ukrainien Viktor Ianoukovitch est considéré par les agences médiatiques occidentales comme “pro-russe”...

AD: C’est pourtant faux. Ianoukovitch tente de maintenir un équilibre politique entre la  Russie et l’Union Européenne. Bien sûr, il n’estp as aussi pro-occidental que ne l’était Mme Timochenko. Ce qui dérange l’Occident, c’est que Ianoukovitch s’est à nouveau rapproché de la Russie. C’est contraire aux intérêts atlantistes. Ioulia Timochenko est aujourd’hui le symbole de ce que l’on a appelé  la “révolution orange”  —que l’Occident a soutenu matériellement et idéologiquement en Ukraine. C’est pour cette raison  que les forces atlantistes la considèrent comme une héroïne.

Q.: Ce que l’on critique surtout, ce sont les conditions de  détention de Ioulia Timochenko. On dit que ces conditions bafouent lourdement les règles convenues quant aux droits de l’Homme...

AD: L’Occident utilise les droits de l’Homme à tour de bras pour pouvoir exercer influence et chantage sur les gouvernements qui lui déplaisent. Si l’on parle vrai et que l’on dévoile sans détours ses plans hégémoniques et ses véritables intérêts politiques, on obtient moins de succès que si l’on adopte un langage indirect et que l’on évoque sans cesse les droits de l’Homme. Voilà ce qu’il faut toujours avoir en tête.

Q.: Vous venez d’évoquer la “révolution orange” qui a secoué l’Ukraine en 2004. Les protestations et manifestations contre Poutine à Moscou, il y a quelques mois et quelques semaines, ont-elles, elles aussi, été une nouvelle tentative de “révolution colorée”?

AD: Absolument.

Q.: Pourquoi ces manifestations se déroulent-elles  maintnenant et pourquoi cela ne s’est-il pas passé auparavant?

AD: Il me paraît très intéressant d’observer le “timing”. Il y a une explication très simple. Le Président Dmitri Medvedev est considéré en Occident comme une sorte de nouveau Gorbatchev. L’Occident avait espéré que Medvedev aurait introduit des réformes de nature ultra-libérales lors de son éventuel second mandat présidentiel et se serait rapproché des Etats-Unis et de l’UE. Mais quand Medvedev a déclaré qu’il laisserait sa place de président à Poutine et qu’il redeviendrait chef du gouvernement, la “révolution” a aussitôt commencé en Russie.

Q.: Les protestations et manifestations visaient cependant les fraudes supposées dans le scrutin et le manque de transparence lors des présidentielles...

AD: Non, ça, c’est une “dérivation”. Il s’agissait uniquement d’empêcher tout retour de Poutine à la présidence. Une fois de plus, bon nombre d’ONG et de groupes influencés par l’Occident sont entrés  dans la danse. Cela a permis d’accroître l’ampleur des manifestations, d’autant plus que certains déboires el a politique de Poutine ont pu être exploités. La politique de Poutine n’a pas vraiment connu le succès sur le plan social et il restait encore quelques sérieux problèmes de corruption dans son système. C’était concrètement les points faibles de sa politique. Mais répétons-le: la révolte contre Poutine a été et demeure inspirée et soutenue par l’étranger et n’a finalement pas grand chose à voir avec ces faiblesses politique: il s’agissait uniquement de barrer la  route au souverainisme qu’incarne Poutine.

Q.: D’après vous, Medvedev serait pro-occidental...

AD: La politique russe est plus compliquée qu’on ne l’imagine en Occident. Laissez-moi vous donner une explication simple: d’une  part, nous avons le souverainiste et le Realpolitiker Poutine, d’autre part, nous avons les “révolutionnaires (colorés)” et les atlantistes ultra-libéraux soutenus par l’Occident. Medvedev se situe entre les deux. Ensuite, les oligarques comme, par exemple, Boris Abramovitch Beresovski qui vit à Londres, jouent un rôle important aux côtés des révolutionnaires ultra-libéraux.

Q.: A ce propos, on ne fait qu’évoquer la figure de Mikhail Khodorkovski, sans cesse arrêté et emprisonné. Dans les médias occidentaux, il passe pour un martyr du libéralisme et de la démocratie. Comment jugez-vous cela?

AD: Il représente surtout le crime organisé en Russie. Dans un pays occidental, on n’imagine pas qu’un individu comme Khodorkovski ne se retrouverait pas aussi en prison. Il est tout aussi criminel que les autres oligarques qui ont amassé beaucoup d’argent en très peu de temps.

Q.: Et pourquoi les autres ne sont-ils pas en prison?

AD: C’est là que je critiquerai Poutine: les oligarques qui se montrent loyaux à son égard sont en liberté.

Q.: Quelle a été la faute de Khodorkovski?

AD: Khodorkovski n’a fait que soutenir les positions pro-occidentales, notamment quand il a plaidé pour un désarmement de grande envergure de l’armée russe. Il a soutenu les forces libérales et pro-occidentales en Russie. Pour Khodorkovski, le “désarmement” de la  Russie constituait une étape importante dans l’ouverture du pays au libéralisme et à l’occidentalisation. Il fallait troquer l’indépendance et la souveraineté contre un alignement sur les positions atlantistes. Alors qu’il était l’homme le plus riche de Russie, Khodorkovski a annoncé qu’il était en mesure d’acheter non seulement les parlements mais aussi les électeurs. Il est même allé plus  loin: il a fait pression sur Poutine pour faire vendre aux Américains la plus grosse entreprise pétrolière russe, “Ioukos”.

Q.: Khodorkovski était donc opposé à Poutine en bien des domaines?

AD: Effectivement. Khodorkovski a ouvertement déclaré la guerre à Poutine. Et Poutine a réagi, fait traduire l’oligarque en justice, où il a été condamné, non pas pour ses vues politiques mais pour les délits qu’il a commis. Pour l’Occident, Khodorkovski est bien entendu un héros. Parce qu’il s’est opposé à Poutine et parce qu’il voulait faire de la Russie une part du “Gros Occident”. Voilà pourquoi de nombreux gouvernements occidentaux, les agences médiatiques et les ONG prétendent que Khodorkovski est un “prisonnier politique”. C’est absurde et ridicule. Ce qui mérite la critique, en revanche, c’est que dans notre pays un grand nombre d’oligarques sont en liberté alors qu’ils ont commis les mêmes délits que Khodorkovski. Ils sont libres parce qu’ils n’ont pas agi contre Poutine. Voilà la véritable injustice et non pas l’emprisonnement que subit Khodorkovski.

Q.: Peut-on dire que, dans le cas de Khodorkovski, Poutine a, en quelque sorte, usé du “frein de secours”?

AD: Oui, on peut le dire. Avant que Khodorkovski ait eu la possibilité de livrer à l’étranger le contrôle des principales ressources de la Russie, Poutine l’a arrêté.

Q.: Vous  parlez de groupes et d’ONG pro-occidentaux qui soutiennent en Russie les adversaires de Poutine et qui, en Ukraine et aussi en Géorgie, ont soutenu les “révolutions colorées”. Qui se profile derrière ces organisations?

AD: Celui qui joue un rôle fort important dans toute cette agitation est le milliardaire américain Georges Soros qui, par l’intermédiaire de ses fondations, soutient à grande échelle les groupements pro-occidentaux en Russie; A Soros s’ajoutent d’autres fondations américaines comme par exemple “Freedom House” dont les activités sont financées à concurrence de 80% par des fonds provenant du gouvernement américain. “Freedom House” finance par exemple la diffusion de l’ouvrage de Gene Sharp, politologue américain auteur de “The Politics of non violent Action”, auquel se réfèrent directement les “révolutionnaires colorés” d’Ukraine. Beaucoup d’autres groupements et organisations sont partiellement financés par le gouvernement américain ou par des gouvernements européens en Russie ou dans des pays qui firent jadis partie de l’Union Soviétique. Nous avons affaire à un véritable réseau. Toutes les composantes de ce réseau sont unies autour d’un seul objectif: déstabiliser la Russie pour qu’à terme le pays deviennent une composante de la sphère occidentale.

Q.: Est-ce là une nouvelle forme de guerre?

AD: On peut parfaitement le penser. Les révolutions colorées représentent en effet une nouvelle forme des guerre contre les Etats souverains. Les attaques produisent des effets à tous les niveaux de la société. Dans cette nouvelle forme de guerre, on ne se pas pas en alignant et avançant des chars ou de l’artillerie mais en utilisant toutes les ressources des agences de propagande, en actionnant la pompe à finances et en manipulant des réseaux avec lesquels on tente de paralyser les centres de  décision de l’adversaire. Et l’une des armes les plus importantes dans le nouvel arsenal de  cette nouvelle forme de guerre, c’est la notion des “droits de l’Homme”.

Q.: Monsieur Douguine, nous vous remercions de nous avoir accordé cet entretien.

jeudi, 24 mai 2012



Méridien Zéro reçoit ce dimanche Jean-Jacques Langendorf, historien, écrivain et essayiste suisse, spécialiste des problèmes de stratégie et de défense ainsi que Laurent Schang, animateur du blog Le Polémarque pour évoquer avec eux les grands problèmes stratégiques européens.

Jean-Jacques langendorf, Laurent Schang, géopolitique, europe, suisse

Pour écouter:


dimanche, 20 mai 2012

Zuerst Magazin: Interview mit Alexandr Dugin

Zuerst Magazin: Interview mit Alexandr Dugin

ex: http://www.zuerst.de/

Aleksandr-Dughin-Alexandr-Dugin-Badescu-Roncea-ro-Ziaristi-Online-ro.jpgHerr Dugin, Rußland wird seit Monaten mit einem Trommelfeuer westlicher Kritik überzogen – vor allem nach der Wiederwahl Wladimir Putins zum Präsidenten der Russischen Föderation. Politiker und Medien behaupten, die Wahlen seien gefälscht gewesen, Putin sei kein Demokrat und verletze die Menschenrechte…

Dugin: Wladimir Putin gehört wohl zu den wirklichen Größen in der internationalen Politik. Seine Politik ist zudem sehr speziell, das mögen viele Politiker und Journalisten im Westen vielleicht nicht verstehen. Einerseits handelt es sich bei Putin um einen liberalen, durchaus pro-westlichen Politiker, andererseits ist er ein starker Verfechter der russischen Souveränität und Unabhängigkeit. So tritt er gegenüber den USA und ihrer geopolitischen Interessen stark auf. Er ist also gleichzeitig liberal-demokratisch und souveränistisch. Putin ist zudem ein absoluter politischer Realist und kein Phantast. Putin wäre eigentlich der perfekte Partner für jedes westliche Land, welches sich ebenfalls der Souveränität einen so hohen Stellenwert einräumt. Aber der Westen hat längst dem politischen Realismus eine Absage erteilt.

Wie meinen Sie das?

Dugin: Sehen Sie, der Westen glaubt heute doch, daß alle liberalen Demokratien unter Aufgabe ihrer Souveränität zu einer Art Supernation unter US-Führung verschmelzen sollen. Das ist doch die Idee der Globalisierung. Doch das ist mit Wladimir Putin nicht zu machen, er wehrt sich dagegen und verteidigt die russische Souveränität. Zudem erkennt er nicht den Hegemonialanspruch der USA an. Das ist der wahre Grund, weshalb er aus dem Westen so scharf attackiert und dämonisiert wird. Und das ist auch der Grund, weshalb der Westen so massiv die Opposition in Rußland unterstützt – es geht um Einfluß und westliche Hegemonie.

Macht Putin also Ihrer Ansicht nach alles richtig?

Dugin: Natürlich nicht. Fehler wurden beispielsweise bei den vergangenen Parlamentswahlen gemacht. Diese waren nicht so transparent, wie sie hätten sein sollen und müssen.

Die westliche Kritik richtete sich aber vor allem auf die Präsidentenwahlen…

Dugin: Da war ja genau das Gegenteil der Fall: Diese Wahlen waren sehr transparent. Die große Mehrheit der Wähler unterstützt nun einmal Putin, auch wenn es der Westen nicht verstehen kann oder will. Nur eine Minderheit, die pro-amerikanisch, ultra-liberal und anti-souveränistisch eingestellt ist, wurde vom Ausland unterstützt, damit sie Putin angreift. Darum geht es. Sehen Sie, Putin kann in der Innenpolitik gut oder schlecht sein, das spielt für den Westen keine Rolle. Sein Eintreten für die Souveränität – und nicht nur für die von Rußland – sowie für eine multipolare Welt macht ihn zum Angriffsziel des Westens.

Auch die Ukraine ist schweren medialen Angriffen aus dem Westen ausgesetzt. Vor allem die Inhaftierung von Julia Timoschekow wird kritisiert. Geht es dort um die gleichen Dinge wie in Rußland?

Dugin: Die Situation in der Ukraine ist eine völlig andere, obgleich die Kritik aus dem Westen ebenfalls auf die Souveränität des Landes abzielt.

Der ukrainische Präsident Wiktor Janukowytsch gilt in den etablierten westlichen Medien als „pro-russisch“…

Dugin: Das ist aber falsch. Janukowytsch versucht das politische Gleichgewicht zwischen Rußland und der Europäischen Union zu halten. Natürlich ist er nicht so pro-westlich, wie es Timoschenkow war. Aber was den Westen stört, ist daß Janukowytsch sich wieder an Rußland angenähert hat. Das widerspricht den transatlantischen Interessen. Julia Timoschenkow hingegen ist heute ein Symbol für die sogenannte „Orangene Revolution“ – die vom Westen materiell und ideologisch unterstützt wurde - in der Ukraine. Im Westen gilt sie deswegen als Heldin.

Vor allem die Haftbedingungen von Julia Timoschenkow stehen in der Kritik. Es ist die Rede davon, daß diese einen schweren Verstoß gegen die Menschenrechte darstellen…

Dugin: Der Begriff der Menschenrechte wird vom Westen immer wieder gerne dafür genutzt, um auf mißliebige Regierungen Einfluß auszuüben. Spricht man über Hegemonie und Interessen, hat man für seine Politik weniger Unterstützung als wenn man über die Menschenrechte spricht. Das ist der Punkt.

Sie erwähnten die „Orangene Revolution“ in der Ukraine im Jahr 2004. Waren die Proteste und Demonstrationen gegen Putin in Moskau vor einigen Wochen ebenfalls ein Versuch einer solchen „Farbrevolution“?

Dugin: Absolut.

Warum erst jetzt und nicht schon früher?

Dugin: Das Timing ist sehr interessant. Und es gibt dafür eine sehr einfache Erklärung. Präsident Dmitri Medwedew wurde vom Westen als eine Art zweiter Gorbatschow betrachtet. Die Hoffnung des Westens war, daß Medwedew in einer zweiten Amtszeit als Präsident entscheidende ultra-liberale Reformen umsetzen würde und sich der EU und den USA annähern. Als aber Medwedew erklärte, er werde das Präsidentenamt für Putin freimachen und stattdessen wieder Regierungschef werden, war das der Start für die „Revolution“ in Rußland.

Die Proteste und Demonstrationen richteten sich doch angeblich gegen die mutmaßlichen Wahlfälschungen und gegen die fehlende Transparenz bei den Präsidentenwahlen…

Dugin: Nein, das ist Unsinn. Es ging einzig und allein darum, eine Rückkehr Wladimir Putin ins Präsidentenamt zu verhindern. Und wieder mischten dabei viele westlich beeinflußte Gruppen und Nichtregierungsorganisationen mit. Dabei wurde dieser Protest gegen Putin noch ausgeweitet, was durch die Mißerfolge Putins natürlich einfacher wurde. Er war vor allem in sozialen Belangen nicht sehr erfolgreich und es gibt nach wie vor große Probleme mit der Korruption im System Putins. Das sind tatsächliche Schwachpunkte seiner Politik. Aber nochmals: Die Revolte gegen Putin war und ist inspiriert und unterstützt von ausländischen Kräften und hat nichts mit diesen Schwachpunkten zu tun – es geht einzig und allein um Putins souveränistische Ausrichtung, die bekämpft werden soll.

Medwedew gilt als pro-westlich?

Dugin: Die russische Politik ist etwas komplizierter, als man im Westen allgemein annimmt. Lassen Sie es mich so erklären: Wir haben auf der einen Seite den Souveränisten und politischen Realisten Wladimir Putin, auf der anderen Seite sind die ultra-liberalen, vom Westen geförderten „Revolutionäre“ und Transatlantiker. Zwischen diesen beiden Positionen steht Medwedew. Übrigens spielen auch die Oligarchen wie beispielsweise Boris Abramowitsch Beresowski, der in London lebt, auf Seiten der ultra-liberalen Revolutionäre eine wichtige Rolle.

In diesem Zusammenhang wird auch immer wieder der inhaftierte Michail Chodorkowski genannt. In den westlichen Medien gilt er mittlerweile als eine Art liberaler, demokratischer Märtyrer. Wie sehen Sie das?

Dugin: Er steht für das organisierte Verbrechen in Rußland. Es ist kaum vorstellbar, daß ein Mann wie Chodorkowski in einem westlichen Land nicht in Haft säße. Er ist genauso kriminell wie die vielen anderen Oligarchen, die in sehr kurzer Zeit und sehr viel Geld gekommen sind.

Warum sitzen dann die anderen nicht im Gefängnis?

Dugin: Das ist wieder ein Kritikpunkt an Putin: Die Oligarchen, die ihm gegenüber loyal sind, sind auf freiem Fuß.

Was war Chodorkowskis Fehler?

Dugin: Chodorkowski machte sich zunehmend für pro-westliche Positionen stark, sprach sich unter anderem für eine starke Abrüstung der russischen Armee aus. Er unterstützte westlich-liberale Kräfte in Rußland. Für Chodorkowski war eine russische „Entwaffnung“ ein wichtiger Weg, das Land für die westlich-liberale Entwicklung zu öffnen. Unabhängigkeit und Souveränität sollten gegen eine größere Bindung an den Westen eingetauscht werden. Als reichster Mann Rußlands verkündete Chodorkowski sogar, er könne nicht nur Parlamente, sondern auch Wahlergebnisse kaufen. Chodorkowski ging sogar noch weiter: Er erpreßte Putin damit, daß er das größte Erdölunternehmen Rußlands „Jukos“ an die Amerikaner verkaufen würde.

Damit stand Chodorkowski also im Widerspruch zu Putin…

Dugin: Genau das ist der Punkt. Chodorkowski hat Putin quasi öffentlich den Krieg erklärt. Und Putin reagierte und ließ den Oligarchen vor Gericht stellen, wo er natürlich nicht wegen seiner politischen Ansichten, sondern wegen seiner Verbrechen verurteilt wurde. Für den Westen ist Chodorkowski natürlich ein Held. Denn er wollte es mit Putin aufnehmen und Rußland zum Teil des Westens machen. Daher behaupten nun verschiedene westliche Regierungen, Medien und NGOs, Chodorkowski sei ein politischer Häftling. Und genau das ist Unsinn. Kritik verdient aber die Tatsache, daß so viele andere Oligarchen bei uns noch immer frei herumlaufen, obwohl sie die gleichen Verbrechen begangen haben wie Chodorkowski. Diese sind nur deshalb frei, weil sie nicht gegen Putin agieren. Genau das ist die große Ungerechtigkeit und nicht die Haftstrafe Chodorkowskis.

Hat Putin bei Chodorkowskis sozusagen die Notbremse gezogen?

Dugin: Genau so kann man das sagen. Bevor Chodorkowskis die Möglichkeit hatte, die Kontrolle der wichtigsten Ressourcen Rußlands an das Ausland zu vergeben, hat ihn Putin gestoppt.

Sie sprechen von den pro-westlichen Gruppen und NGOs, die in Rußland die Putin-Gegner unterstützen und in der Ukraine, aber auch in Georgien die „bunten Revolutionen“ unterstützt haben. Wer steht hinter diesen Organisationen?

Dugin: Eine wichtige Rolle spielt hierbei der US-Milliardär George Soros, der über seine Stiftungen pro-westliche Gruppen in Rußland massiv unterstützt. Dazu kommen andere US-Stiftungen, wie beispielsweise „Freedom House“, die ihrerseits mit etwa 80 Prozent mit Geldern der US-Regierung finanziert wird. „Freedom House“ sorgt für die Verbreitung der Schrift The Politics of Nonviolent Action des US-Politologen Gene Sharp, auf die sich die Revolutionäre in der Ukraine explizit berufen. Viele andere Gruppen und Organisationen, teilweise direkt von der US-Regierung oder den europäischen Regierungen finanziert, engagieren sich in Rußland und in den Ländern der ehemaligen Sowjetunion. Es gibt es regelrechtes Netzwerk. Sie alle eint ein Ziel: die Destabilisierung Rußlands, damit das Land ein Teil des westlichen Systems wird.

Ist das eine neue Form des Krieges?

Dugin: So kann man das betrachten. Die bunten Revolutionen sind eine neue Form des Krieges gegen souveräne Staaten. Die Angriffe wirken auf allen Ebenen der Gesellschaft. In diesem neuen Krieg kämpft man nicht mit Kanonen, sondern mit Propaganda, Geld und weit verzweigten Netzwerken, mit denen man versucht, die Entscheidungszentren des Gegners lahmzulegen. Eine der wichtigsten Waffen dieses neuen Krieges ist der Begriff der „Menschenrechte“.

Herr Dugin, vielen Dank für das Gespräch.

jeudi, 17 mai 2012

A. Chauprade & D. Venner sur Radio Courtoisie

A. Chauprade & D. Venner sur Radio Courtoisie

par Agent__001

00:12 Publié dans Entretiens | Lien permanent | Commentaires (0) | Tags : entretiens, france, europe, affaires européennes | |  del.icio.us | | Digg! Digg |  Facebook

mercredi, 16 mai 2012

Philippe Conrad présente Géopolitique de la France, par Pascal Gauchon

Philippe Conrad présente

Géopolitique de la France, par Pascal Gauchon

par realpolitiktv

jeudi, 10 mai 2012

The conflict in Syria primarily aims at the weakening of Iran

peter scholl latour.jpg

The conflict in Syria primarily aims at the weakening of Iran

Peter Scholl-Latour in an interview with Deutschlandfunk radio station

Ex: http://www.currentconcerns.ch/

Who supports the insurgents, and with what interests?

It’s not about Syria, and that’s just the complete deception of the public opinion. It’s about Iran. Iran is portrayed as the great devil, as the great demon. Iran is known to be Shiite, has always been a historical enemy of Saudi Arabia and the Wahhabi sect prevailing there, which is one of the most intolerant branches of Islam. It’s about hastily weakening Iran – against whom in fact everything is directed – and above all about stopping Iran from building a continuous land bridge.

This is supposed to start in Iraq, which is predominantly Shiite and where al-Maliki, a Shia Prime Minister is currently governing. It then runs via Syria, ruled by the Alawites, who are said to be close to the Shiites. Either way, the country is not Sunni, but rather secular. Then, the land bridge goes on to the Shiite Hezbollah in Lebanon, which is the strongest force there. What one has not taken note of is the following: Hezbollah has defeated the Israelis in 2006. And to prevent this continuous bridge of Shiism, which is connected with Iran, Syria is now to be smashed.

Mr Scholl-Latour, what developments do you expect, should Assad’s opponents prevail?

[...] If Syria was relying on itself, the insurgency would have ended long ago. But they want to overthrow Syria from outside. What will come next – well, a look at Libya is very revealing. In Libya there is a civil war going on that has broken out with estimated 60,000 to 70,000 deaths. Of which no one is even speaking, nobody speaks of Libya any longer and of the chaos that arose there. And not even of the fact that there are various Islamist groups, e.g. the Senussi sect, and so on, and that the separation of Cyreneika is now imminent. There is a civil war going on. And if today we are talking about 7000 deaths in Syria, reported by the so-called activists, which may be true – we can not judge that. This is terrible enough. But when the civil war breaks out, which is fueled by all sides, namely from Turkey, from the Anbar province in Iraq, from Jordan, from parts of Lebanon and first and foremost from America, you have to say, in that case a civil war will break out with 70 000 deaths.

Source: Original at www.dradio.de on 03/09/2012
The extract was linguistically revised.
(Translation Current Concerns)

mercredi, 09 mai 2012

“Foreign imposed ‘Regime-Change’ violates the UN Charter in letter and spirit”


“Foreign imposed ‘Regime-Change’ violates the UN Charter in letter and spirit”

“Actions outside the Security Council would be illegal interventions and constituted crimes against peace or else aggressive acts, and those who decide on them would have to be brought to justice accordingly”

Interview with Professor Dr phil. et iur. Alfred de Zayas

Ex: http://www.currentconcerns.ch/

thk. Syria was the dominant topic during the first days of the UN Human Rights Council session. Already on the second day of the spring session the Western states urged for a special meeting to deal with the events in Syria. The extremely biased media reports about the situation in Syria were mirrored by the statements of several countries. Similar to their unambiguous position in the Security Council Russia and China took a clear stance inspired by international law, bringing reason to this emotional debate that way. Obviously the West aims for another «Regime-Change» following the Libyan recipe and human rights violations are meant to provide justification for an intervention. In the following interview, US-American international law expert Professor Alfred de Zayas judges the situation in the Near East from the viewpoint of international law and also talks about the war preparations against Iran.

Zeit-Fragen: Some countries especially from the West, keep issuing statements about Syria at the Human Rights Council here in Geneva. As it seems, the West is urging for a mandate to militarily intervene like in Libya. How should we see that from a standpoint of international law?

Professor de Zayas: When we are talking about Syria, we should bear in mind why the United Nations were founded in the first place. We learn from the preamble that the objective of the UN is to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, to protect people from conflicts and to solve conflicts peacefully. The principles and aims are made very clear in the UN Charter. This includes the policy of non-intervention. But what was at stake here was a conversion, a revolution, a corruption of the United Nations. The transformation of an organization of peace, a peace-promoting and peace-keeping organization into an organization engaging in «Regime-Change» this is totally against meaning and spirit of the UN Charter.

The Libya resolution was meant to protect the Libyan civilian population; however it was interpreted in a completely different way. The resolution was abused as a pretext to wage war and to overthrow the government. This is a turning point. The Russians and Chinese drew their consequences from this. If one intends to interfere in a civil war in order to protect the civilian population, this can be debated. But this resolution was abused; therefore China and Russia won’t put up with it any longer.

Is it fair to say that the veto of Russians and Chinese strengthened international law?

Absolutely. There was a real threat here for the principle of non-intervention, the principle of non-violence. To break down. It is also a vote for legal security. If resolutions get abused as in the case of Libya, one has to make it very clear to those responsible for the abuse that it is unacceptable, that it will not happen again. Should they wish to act outside the UN this would constitute a crime. It is a crime as defined by the ICC statute member states according to Article 5 of the International Criminal Court. If it had taken place outside the Security Council, it would immediately have been regarded as a crime and aggressive act, and those who decided upon this would have to be brought to justice accordingly.

In this line of argument any intervention bypassing the UN is definitely a war crime?

The question is, whether NATO would dare to intervene in Syria without resolution of the Security Council the same way as they did in the case of Yugoslavia. Syria is in geographical proximity to Russia and Russia will not put up with that. It is well-known that the Russians will take certain protective measures in such a situation. NATO has to think very carefully how this could escalate. At the time of the NATO intervention in Serbia, Russia was relatively weak. The reemergence of the Russians was still to come. I believe it is a totally different situation today as compared with the year 1999; it is not so easy any more to intervene. The intervention of NATO or rather of the so-called «coalition of the willing» in Iraq in 2003 would prove much more difficult today.

What is the task then of the UN in this situation?

The UN functions as a moderator for dialogue. We have all bodies for a reasonable and peaceful settlement of differences between states, such as the Human Rights Council in Geneva, the Security Council and the General Assembly in the USA. These are all arenas where differences between states may be articulated without engaging in violence. Article II para 4 of the UN charter is a legal proposition; it rules that the use of violence is prohibited, even the threat or aggressive gesture.

At the moment it is not only Syria, where we have an escalation...

If I look at Syria, the situation in Iran worries me even more. Whether Iran aims for the atomic bomb or not, is something we cannot tell any better than the International Atomic Energy Agency. Of course we would like to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons, which is exactly why the Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) was introduced.

What was the objective behind it?

According to Article 6 of the NPT, this is quite explicit: nuclear disarmament. Total disarmament of all nuclear states. That is the USA, France, Britain, Russia and China. Considering that a number of nuclear states who possess nuclear weapons have never signed the Non-proliferation Treaty, namely India, Pakistan and Israel, one should not get hysterical about the possibility of Iran perhaps one day owning nuclear weapons, too. Even if Iran had them, they could never use them. As soon as Iran would use a nuclear bomb, it would face total annihilation. The Iranian government knows that very well. It is the same what we have already known in the 1960s, 70s and 80s, the possible nuclear destruction. The question, whether Iran has an atomic bomb or not, should not drive the world community into hysteria.

There are already thousands of atomic weapons around in the established nuclear states, and those weapons are not getting used. Why should one expect Iran to start a nuclear war? Actually, this would be quite obvious for any reasonable politician and hardly comprehensible.

Is that not further warmongering?

A cool analysis of the situation in Iran is one thing, another one is the agitation against Iran which can be read anywhere in the media today. Taking into account that this kind of war propaganda is actually prohibited by Article 20 of the UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, it is striking to note, that the press in the USA, in Great Britain and partially also in Germany is doing just that – engaging in war propaganda against Iran, using lies, half-information emotionalizations among other things, which cannot really stand up to serious scrutiny. Nevertheless an atmosphere is created in the USA by constantly repeated messages via FOX News and CNN, programming peoples’ minds into thinking that Iran poses the greatest threat to world peace. I think this can easily be pushed aside. It is what we in the USA call a «red herring», a method to fool people.

How could these tensions be solved?

A real disarmament of the region should be the priority. Basically, disarmament of the world would be desirable. Let us begin with the Near East. If we achieved a nuclear disarmament and a conventional one in the Near East, this would be a brave act. Israel would also join in because there is no international law at leisure, there is no sideway which is open to one state, but not for the other.

This would mean to comply with the Non-proliferation Treaty?

This is clearly the disarmament, as stipulated in Article 6 of the Treaty. This means that all states possessing nuclear weapons undertake to disarm. They have not done so far. This violation of the NPT is a much more blatant violation on the side of the nuclear powers than on the side of Iran. According to Article 3 of the treaty, Iran has been given the right to peaceful use of nuclear energy and even the right to international assistance in order to achieve the peaceful use of nuclear power. It is just a matter relating to Article 4, if the IAEA inspections are thorough, or whether the inspections have been undermined. It is a matter of argument, but it has never been a casus belli or a reason to provoke a quarrel or preemptive war. It should also be mentioned that the UN Charter concerning Article 51 is very clear: The right to self-defense exists, but there is no pre-emptive right to do so. I cannot say that Iran poses a potential threat, ergo you may attack Iran. It applies only when a country has been attacked and had no time to address the Security Council in order to get the UN involved directly; only in this case you have the right to immediate counter-measures, i.e. war, until the Security Council has become involved. The very moment, in which the Security Council takes over, defensive measures have to stop. That is, what Article 51 of the UN Charter means. It is not to be understood as a lex specialis that discards or replaces everything else. It represents a very limited possibility under very restricted conditions. If not, it is a crime against peace as defined by the Nuremberg Verdict and as described in Article 5 of the ICC Statute.    •

(Translation: Current Concerns)

mardi, 08 mai 2012

"Vendée, du génocide au mémoricide" : entretien avec Reynald Secher

"Vendée, du génocide au mémoricide" :

entretien avec Reynald Secher

lundi, 07 mai 2012

Ernst Jünger, 102 years in the heart of Europe (English subtitles)

Ernst Jünger, 102 years in the heart of Europe (Swedish comments - German answers of Jünger - English subtitles)

vendredi, 04 mai 2012

Sarkozy ou la diplomatie de l'éléphant / Interview du journaliste Gilles Delafon par Pascal Boniface


Sarkozy ou la diplomatie de l'éléphant

Interview du journaliste Gilles Delafon par Pascal Boniface

Révélatrice des lacunes des différents prétendants ou d'une appréciation insignifiante de son importance, l'action diplomatique est la dernière roue du carrosse dans cette campagne présidentielle. Le paradoxe est d'autant plus surprenant que notre pays est engagé militairement comme jamais sur les théâtres extérieurs (Afghanistan, Libye, Côte d'Ivoire) et de façon  diplomatique mais ostentatoire (n'excluant pas l'action de terrain) dans différentes autres zones chaudes (Liban, Tunisie, Syrie, Iran, Palestine, Mali-Niger). Politique arabe, défense des droits de l'homme, préservation d'intérêts économiques, lutte contre le terrorisme, sauvegarde du fait israélien, suivisme américain sont autant de lièvres qui paraissent poursuivis... 

Mais y a-t-il un plan de chasse et une logique entre les acteurs:  les politiques (Kouchner, Juppé) et les conseillers néo-conservateurs type Levitte , BHL ou Yves Roucaute (ancien dirigeant de l’UNEF et de l’Union des étudiants communistes devenu président du conseil scientifique de l’Institut National des Hautes Etudes de Justice et de Sécurité et conseiller privilégiés de Claude Guéant). Oui, Nicolas Sarkozy. Comment? C'est ce que révèle l'entretien mené, sur le site de l'IRIS, par Pascal Boniface, directeur de l'Institut de relations internationales et stratégiques, avec Gilles Delafon, à l'occasion de la sortie de son ouvrage, "Le règne du mépris" aux éditions du Toucan.
Flavia Labau

Pascal Boniface et Gilles Delafon
"Pascal Boniface: A propos de Nicolas Sarkozy vous évoquez à la fois « sa vision à courte vue des enjeux stratégiques, sa religion du tout médiatique » mais vous reconnaissez son « surprenant sens politique et son volontarisme énergique ». Qu’est-ce qui l’emporte et quelle politique étrangère cela produit ?
Gilles Delafon : Tout le monde le reconnaît, son volontarisme et son énergie ont souvent donné l’impulsion nécessaire à une vraie mobilisation, de l’Union européenne ou de la communauté internationale. Mais cela ne suffit pas à constituer une vraie stratégie diplomatique. Définir une politique, c’est d’abord tracer un objectif à long terme, évaluer les moyens nécessaires pour l’atteindre, tisser des alliances, mesurer les chances de succès et appréhender les différentes conséquences. 
Or là, comme le dit fort justement un diplomate que j’ai interviewé « Nicolas Sarkozy est un homme de réflexes, pas de réflexions ». Cela donne une politique de « coups », montés dans l’instant, à la va vite, sans tenir compte du passé et en se fichant de l’avenir. Cela produit une politique étrangère sans réelle cohérence, dont le but premier est d’agir sur l’émotion de l’électeur pour exister et engranger des gains électoraux. 
Pascal Boniface : Vous parlez d’un « pacte faustien » que Kouchner aurait agréé en acceptant le Quai d’Orsay en 2007.
Gilles Delafon : Dépité par le mépris des socialistes à son égard, Kouchner a cédé son insolente popularité pour les seuls ors et lambris du ministère dont il rêvait. Il savait pertinemment que la politique étrangère de la France serait dirigée depuis l’Elysée, par le secrétaire général Claude Guéant et par le conseiller diplomatique Jean-David Lévitte. Mais son orgueil l’a emporté sur ses préventions. Du coup, du rôle de ministre il n’aura eu que l’illusion. Il a passé son temps à avaler des couleuvres en découvrant des actions qui se faisaient sans lui. Et il a fait payer cash à ses collaborateurs ses humiliations et ses frustrations, avant de sortir par la petite porte.
Pascal Boniface : Selon vous Nicolas Sarkozy a assujetti la politique étrangère aux faits divers pour adopter une « diplomatie de l’émotion ».
Gilles Delafon : Nicolas Sarkozy n’avait aucune vision du monde à son arrivée à l’Elysée, mais une parfaite connaissance de la société qui l’a élu. Tout à son obsession d’agir, il a alors assujetti la politique étrangère aux exigences du fait divers. Le cas de Florence Cassez en est le criant exemple. Il a reçu ses parents une dizaine de fois alors que certains ambassadeurs étrangers n’ont pas eu le loisir d’une simple audience. Les décisions n’étaient plus dictées que par l’émotion et la télévision. C’est ce que j’appelle la « Star’Ac diplomatie », qui voit les intérêts stratégiques du pays sacrifiés sur l’autel d’une compassion sans résultats. La meilleure preuve de l’indigence de cette « diplomatie de l’émotion » c’est qu’il l’a abandonné depuis. 
Pascal Boniface : Peut-on dire qu’on a assisté à une montée en puissance de jeunes diplomates néo-conservateurs au Quai d’Orsay ?
Gilles Delafon : C’est ce qui m’a le plus surpris. En fait, un vrai courant néoconservateur, sensible aux thèses des théoriciens américains, existait déjà au Quai d’Orsay dès le lendemain des attentats du 11 septembre. Mais ces diplomates là s’étaient faits discrets pendant la guerre en Irak, puisque Jacques Chirac président menait alors l’opposition planétaire à ce conflit. L’arrivée d’un Nicolas Sarkozy les a décomplexés. L’ex-ministre de l’Intérieur avait une approche sécuritaire de la diplomatie et son conseiller Claude Guéant pratiquait ce que j’appelle une « diplomatie de flic ». Naturellement, bon nombre de ces diplomates se sont retrouvés à la cellule diplomatique. Paradoxe, il y avait donc des neocon à l’Elysée alors qu’il n’y en avait plus à la Maison Blanche d’Obama." 

vendredi, 27 avril 2012

Panorama Geopolítico: Tensiones y conflictos en un mundo convulsionado.

Panorama Geopolítico: Tensiones y conflictos en un mundo convulsionado.

Ex: http://disenso.org/


En esta ocasión entrevistamos al geopolitólogo argentino Carlos Pereyra Mele. Analista Político y especialista en Geopolítica Suramericana, el Prof. Pereyra Mele ha sido también Coautor del “Diccionario de Seguridad y Geopolítica latinoamericana” y de "Tropas Norteamericanas y la Geografía del saqueo". Su nombre figura ligado a numerosas instituciones y comités científicos tanto americanos como europeos. Desde www.dossiergeopolitico.com sigue el pulso de los acontecimientos con artículos e informaciones de notable relevancia geopolítica. Desde ya agradecemos al Prof. Pereyra Mele su colaboración.


DISENSO: En las últimas semanas se han multiplicado los encuentros y las declaraciones entre los gobiernos de Israel y Estados Unidos en relación al programa nuclear iraní. Si bien es cierto que desde el año 1995 el Estado iraní puso en agenda la necesidad de consolidar la generación de energía nuclear, no fue hasta la victoria de Mahmud Ahmadineyad en el año 2005 que se sucedieron con cierta temeridad y periodicidad las amenazas de guerra por parte de Estados Unidos e Israel además de un buen número de sanciones promovidas por aquellos en el Consejo de Seguridad de las Naciones Unidas. Ante este escenario ¿por qué cree Ud. que un Irán nuclear irrita los ánimos de Estados Unidos, Israel y sus socios, y en qué sentido Irán representa una amenaza para ellos? Por otra parte, ¿Porqué teniendo suficiente poder de fuego, tecnología y recursos financieros se ven impedidos de ejecutar finalmente un ataque militar?

PEREYRA MELE: En el Caso Irán, lo que ocurre es que su poder regional va en aumento. En Occidente es poco conocida la realidad política y económica de esta potencia mediana. ¿Cuál es el rol de Irán que les preocupa? es su influencia en Irak (mayoría chiíta en la zona más rica en petróleo y el Líbano). Geopolíticamente además Irán controla el estrecho de Ormuz por donde pasa el 40% del crudo consumido por el mundo, y también es clave en la región conflictiva con la zona del Cáucaso, ya que allí se encuentran varios países de la ex URSS productores de Petróleo y Gas. Esa triangulación del Golfo Pérsico, Mar Caspio y el Mar Negro representa el 65% de las reservas mundiales.

Ante ello, y luego de observar que la Revolución Islámica de Jomeini no se derrumbó a pesar de la guerra con el Irak de Saddam Hussein, (donde gracias a la asistencia de las potencias occidentales el ex-dictador iraqui pudo atacar con gases venenosos a un Irán que sobrevivió, lección a ser tenida en cuenta para los nuevos agresores) Estados Unidos hace años que planifica atentados contra Irán. En este sentido resulta revelador el reciente informe de “Democracy Now” sobre como se preparan “fedayines” en EE.UU. para hacer asesinatos selectivos de especialistas nucleares iraníes. También se juega a la desestabilización de Irán a través de pseudo-revoluciones que se inician en las redes sociales como Facebook o twitter, pero que el gobierno iraní pudo sofocar.

El permanente discurso mediático occidental de la posibilidad de que Irán acceda a la creación de un dispositivo nuclear con fines bélicos, argumento que es negado hasta el hartazgo por Irán y por los propios organismos de inteligencia de occidente, es parte del discurso para atacar a Irán sostenido por los “halcones” de EE.UU. y de Israel, como también por las monarquías petroleras de la península arábiga para impedir que Irán tome el control geopolítico de la región y desestabilice así a sus corruptos regímenes que cuentan con la alianza estratégica de Londres y Washington.

En cuanto a lo que Ud. bien dice, la superioridad militar y tecnológica de EE.UU., la OTAN e Israel en la zona es formidable y, en principio dejaría el camino libre para la intervención militar, sin embargo la mejor explicación de porque no han atacado aún la expuso el ex jefe del Mossad: “Un ataque a Irán sin explorar todas las opciones disponibles no es la manera correcta de hacer las cosas”. […] “Bombardear a Irán es la cosa mas estúpida que había escuchado”. Ésta es la evaluación del ex jefe del Mossad, Meir Dagan, director de inteligencia de Israel, un equivalente al Jefe de la CIA. Hay que entender lo que dice Dagan en el sentido de que lo primero que se desestabilizaría bajo la hipótesis de guerra es el Golfo Pérsico y las tiránicas y corruptas monarquías petroleras que sostiene USA. Además, como no se contempla la ocupación del territorio iraní, esta nación herida en su orgullo sí buscaría obtener el arma nuclear por ahora no deseada por el régimen, por lo que el supuesto ataque solo serviría para atrasar el desarrollo nuclear pero, al mismo tiempo, Irán buscaría consolidar alianzas más profundas con Rusia y China, y allí Occidente perdería definitivamente el control del Centro de Eurasia, espacio clave para el control del Nuevo Orden Mundial.

DISENSO: El papel de China en la política internacional se ha visto incrementado en el último decenio. Su participación en diversos foros y polos de poder desconciertan a más de un observador. Se suele hacer referencia a China desde diversas focalizaciones tales como: “Chimérica” y BRICs sin olvidar su participación en el Consejo de Seguridad, en la OMC, su papel como garante de la seguridad de Corea del Norte, su reciente encuentro diplomático con Rusia – país con el que comparte la frontera más extensa del mapa y teniendo ambos situaciones demográficas asimétricas - y sus relaciones con Irán, así como su relación comercial y financiera con Estados Unidos y Europa. ¿Puede aventurarse hoy cuál es la posición geopolítica de China? ¿Tiene China en el tablero geopolítico mundial definidos a sus amigos y a sus enemigos o está ganando tiempo mientras desarrolla su propio sistema nacional y estabiliza su frente interno, aún hoy frágil y fragmentado? Finalmente, ¿Qué opinión le merece la intención de Henry Kissinger de crear una “Comunidad del Pacífico”, al mejor estilo OTAN, para involucrar los intereses regionales de China con los de Estados Unidos?

PEREYRA MELE: Lo primero que debemos analizar es la cultura milenaria China que no mide el tiempo en siglos sino en milenios, por lo cual las interpretaciones de los occidentales sobre China están siempre erradas por “fallas” culturales. El rol de potenciación económica dirigista de China y sus grandes logros, mas tarde o mas temprano chocaran con los intereses occidentales. En este sentido hay expertos económicos que especulan que para el 2010 China será la primera economía mundial. Ahora bien, como señalan los estrategas de estadounidenses, China no actuará como una potencia agresora sino que por la necesidad de cubrir sus necesidades básicas de recurso y materias primas chocará con los poderes establecidos que ya hoy están viviendo un período de decadencia. Para su geopolítica lo importante es asegurarse su “Continentalismo”, de allí el “Tratado de Shangai”, que le permitió materializar un bloque que pasó rápidamente de lo económico a lo militar, además de los recientes tratados estratégicos con Rusia, sin perder de vista su presencia en África y América del Sur que, en conjunto, busca impedir el “cerco geopolítico” de la “nueva doctrina militar” que en Enero de 2012 planteó el presidente Barak Obama, con el asesoramiento de Henry Kissinger, con la intención de concentrarse en Asia. Pero reitero, China no es Occidente, donde todo lo mide con la idea de consumo; allí la tríada occidental (EE.UU., U.E. Y Japón) tienen otro talón de Aquiles, pues el despertar del dragón revierte años de humillaciones occidentales y japonesas difíciles de olvidar.

DISENSO: Desde hace más de un año asistimos a una serie de conflictos que los medios han denominado “Primavera árabe”. Si bien por momentos gran parte de los reclamos parecen justos o razonables, no puede dejarse de vislumbrar el aspecto confuso y sospechoso que tiñe el proceso en cuestión al verse a todo tipo de “rebeldes” actuando en diversas formaciones “revolucionarias” en sintonía con los discursos e intereses que a diario salen a difundir el Departamento de Estado de los Estados Unidos, la Troika europea, la ONU, la OTAN y el Consejo de Cooperación para los Estados Árabes del Golfo. En este contexto nos interesa saber qué opina de la denominada primavera árabe así como de los acontecimientos que se están desarrollando en Siria.

PEREYRA MELE: La denominada “Primavera árabe” no es sino una nueva experimentación de manipulación política y social de masas que durante años han estado subyugadas por regímenes políticos dictatoriales cuasi-feudales. Éste modelo de manipulación había funcionado hasta cierto punto “eficazmente” con las denominadas “revoluciones de colores” que se aplicó a las naciones que en su momento formaron parte de la URSS. Con el paso del tiempo podemos concluir que esos movimientos políticos pseudo-revolucionarios manejados por la híperpotencia vencedora de 1991 fue solo la herramienta para imponer en esos pueblos el Nuevo Orden Mundial o, mejor dicho, el Neoliberalismo. El esquema se reitera en el Magreb: a la “sorpresa” de la reacción popular contra el tirano Ali en Túnez le siguió la revuelta de los jóvenes egipcios, todos manipulados por las grandes cadenas mass mediáticas que hoy ya han demostrado ser el brazo más importante de la denominada “Guerra de Baja Intensidad” iniciada por Occidente. Al día de hoy ya se puede ver las consecuencias de esas dos “revoluciones”: los militares siguen en el poder y las represiones a los pueblos que querían el cambio están igual como al principio de las revueltas, pero ahora ya sin cobertura mediática. Otros dos casos distintos de manipulación mediática son el de Libia primero y el Siria por estos días. El primero fue una clara intervención extranjera con mercenarios, entre los que hay que contar a Al Qaeda, como brazo armado islámico de la CIA, y las fuerzas especiales de la OTAN y del CCEAG (Consejo de Cooperación para los Estados Árabes del Golfo), en especial Qatar y Arabia Saudita, que destrozaron al país con mejor nivel de vida de toda África y lo han trasformado en un territorio donde bandas armadas negocian en forma independiente del CNT (Consejo Nacional de Transición) sus “arreglos” económicos con los países de la OTAN. Sintetizando, se siguen cometiendo masacres a diarios pero ahora hay un muro de silencio informático que impide conocer esta situación. Con Siria se ha intentado utilizar el mismo libreto: Pseudos opositores armados en Qatar, Turquía y Jordania que ingresan equipados por la OTAN para cometer crímenes de lesa humanidad contra la población civil, pero en este caso encontraron un ejercito más sólido y no tribal como el Libio pero, fundamentalmente, el Veto de Rusia y China en el Consejo de Seguridad de la ONU que por ahora desespera a los “amigos de la Siria libre” pues no permitieron la invasión militar ni los "quirúrgicos” ataques aéreos de la OTAN que no son otra cosa que sembrar el pánico entre civiles desarmados para abrir el camino a los invasores como pudo comprobarse en el caso Libio. Rusia y China saben que el ataque a Siria es el paso previo al ataque a Irán y que si se impide esta operación el ataque a la nación persa se complica más para Occidente.

DISENSO: Al analizar el desarrollo de los diversos conflictos que planteó la “Primavera árabe” no puede dejarse de atender el hecho de la multiplicación de conflictos que se configuran como guerras asimétricas y cómo fueron contemplados éste tipo de conflictos por la Doctrina Bush, el Patriot Act - extendida por el actual Presidente Obama - así como por el Estado de Israel, en especial desde la Guerra del Líbano. Más allá de justificaciones humanitarias, ¿El actual marco jurídico de las potencias involucradas no está hecho a la medida de los conflictos que vemos desarrollarse?

PEREYRA MELE: Occidente, o sea la Tríada ya comentada, ha establecido como nueva forma de las relaciones internacionales la utilización de la herramienta militar como el non plus ultra de la misma. La diplomacia se subordinó a los poderes militares y éstos a los complejos tecnológico-militares-financieros que son, por ahora, el único sector de la economía de USA y de la OTAN que funciona, pues lo demás huelga hacer comentarios al ver los planes de ajustes en Portugal, España, Italia, Francia o Grecia. El ultimo argumento impuesto es el del supuesto “derecho de proteger” que se arrogan unilateralmente las potencias occidentales, remozando el viejo concepto eurocéntrico de llevar la civilización a los pueblos colonizados. Para ello utilizan el expediente militar como la herramienta de “protección a los pueblos oprimidos”. Por supuesto que ese derecho a “proteger” de la OTAN solo se ejerce contra los países con recursos estratégicos de gran importancia geopolítica para la tríada.

DISENSO: Todos los días los medio de comunicación masiva bombardean con noticias acerca de la “crisis económica” europea. Por momentos parece haber dos interpretaciones de los hechos. Una que se concentra en la crisis fiscal, clamando ajustes para generar “confianza” en los mercados, y otra que acusa a los bancos, a diversas instituciones financieras, a la clase dirigente de ciertos estados europeos y a la “Troika” de llevar a cabo un “golpe de Estado financiero”. Nos interesa conocer su opinión al respecto así como también saber porqué cree Ud. que se ha naturalizado hablar de crisis europea y no más bien de crisis japonesa, habida cuenta del Tsunami que hace un año sufrió la tercera economía del mundo, mucho más relevante para las finanzas y el comercio mundial que la economía griega, española o portuguesa.

PEREYRA MELE: Esto que Ud. afirma es la realidad y demuestra como un sistema mediático hiperconcentrado, manejado por 5 agencias mundiales, administra la información que debemos conocer y, con ello, la manipulación mediática casi total que se lleva a cabo en el llamado Occidente. ¿Porqué no se habla del caso de Islandia, donde la población reaccionó más que con un cacerolazo contra el régimen político-financiero neoliberal, destituyendo a los responsables, impidiéndoles huir del País y sometiéndolos a juicio y, lo más destacable, es que Islandia desconoció los dictados de la Troika (FMI - Banco Central Europeo - Consejo de la Unión Europea-), llegando al día de hoy a una recuperación de los principales indicadores económicos. Es evidente que el accionar de las grandes cadenas informativas fue distinto para los otros países periféricos europeos. En los PIGS (Portugal, Italia, Grecia y España o “cerdos” como prefieren llamarlos peyorativamente los medios anglosajones) se está cambiando la cúpula gubernamental instaurando hombres por medio de “Golpes de Mercados”, disolviendo a los gobiernos elegidos por sus pueblos y sustituyéndolos por empleados del sistema financiero mundial o “tecnócratas”, como se les suele llamar, como lo son Mario Monti (Italia), Lucas Papademos (Grecia) o Mario Draghi (BCE).En todos los casos elegidos sin el voto popular, pero sí con el voto de los bancos y de los organismos financieros internacionales que hoy están aplicando los dictados económicos más ortodoxos para la salvar el sector.

DISENSO: Hace pocas semanas Vladimir Putin ganó con más del 60% las presidenciales en Rusia. Todos los medios de comunicación, así como diversas ONGs financiadas por potencias adversarias al partido Rusia Unida, cerraron filas junto con los partidos opositores – Comunistas y liberales a la cabeza – y las sedes diplomáticas de Estados Unidos, Gran Bretaña y la Unión Europea para desestimar dicha victoria en razón de un supuesto fraude. Es sabido que Putin significó un punto de inflexión en la historia de la Rusia Postsoviética. Hace pocos meses, antes de iniciarse la campaña presidencial y aún cumpliendo el rol de Primer Ministro, Vladimir Putin anunció formalmente su proyecto de conformar una “Unión Euroasiática” que devuelva a Rusia una posición de relevancia en el tablero geopolítico mundial. ¿Qué papel le asigna Ud. a Rusia y a su actual gobierno en los acontecimientos geopolíticos de los próximos años? ¿Tiene viabilidad una Unión Euroasiática?

PEREYRA MELE: Lo que Ud. me plantea acerca del funcionamiento del sistema de desacreditación y confusión sobre las elecciones en Rusia está relacionado con lo que venimos hablando sobre cómo, a través de los medios masivos, hoy en día la clave no es la información veraz sino la manipulación al servicios de los intereses económicos que componen sus paquete accionario, ya que todos los medios son sociedades anónimas y además concentrados (Diarios, Revistas, TV, Cable, telefonía celular e Internet), y donde está en juego el poder de sus empresas, realizan una tarea primero de confusión y luego de manipulación intentando cambiar descaradamente los resultados que no le son afectos a ellos.

Creo que la nueva etapa que inicia la presidencia de Vladimir Putin es la de la consolidación del nuevo rol de potencia, ya no regional, sino global nuevamente. Sus recientes declaraciones de establecer un gigantesco presupuesto militar para poner a Rusia al frente en todas las esferas que tiene que enfrentar demuestra la proyección geopolítica del nuevo rol ruso en Eurasia. También los acuerdo estratégicos con China de transferencia de tecnología aeroespacial y militar van en ese sentido; parafraseando a Henry Kissinger podemos decir: “hacia donde se inclinen China y Rusia en los próximos años se inclinara Asia” y ello determinará un nuevo escenario internacional multipolar con un Nuevo Orden, pero, hay que decirlo, aquí también esta el peligro la paz mundial, pues la trilateral – EE.UU., U.E. y Japón-, seguramente reaccionarán para impedir este Nuevo Orden que representa su declinación después de 500 años de dominio planetario. Por ello el siglo XXI no será pacifico.

DISENSO: Los caminos de la integración regional son tortuosos. Año tras año infinidad de declaraciones, anuncios, reuniones y cumbres, parecen delinear definitivamente la necesaria integración entre los pueblos hermanos, sin embargo faltan los estadistas con el suficiente compromiso para plantear una agenda genuina que termine en hechos y no en palabras. La UNASUR parece ser el camino más idóneo, sin embargo no aparecen con claridad Políticas de Estado que trasciendan gobiernos de turno con proyectos y compromisos políticos de largo aliento. ¿Qué hace falta para concretar la unidad regional? ¿Es productiva la proliferación de diversos foros de integración que operan al mismo tiempo tales como el de la CELAC – Comunidad de Estados Latinoamericanos y Caribeños - ?

PEREYRA MELE: Lo primero que tenemos que comprender es que la actual situación mundial es inédita si la pensamos a 10 años vista. En el 2001 parecía que el poder de superioridad absoluta de EE.UU. era imposible de revertir, que era el “fin de la historia” tal como lo anunciaban sus publicistas. Luego, en apenas 12 años podemos afirmar que esa idea “del siglo americano” que habían planteado los think tanks norteamericanos desde los 80´ y 90´, con el eje puesto en la unípolaridad, es hoy imposible de ser sostenida por sus creadores. En apenas 12 años se pasó a un mundo multipolar donde las potencias emergentes, el BRICS (Brasil, Rusia, India, China y Sudáfrica) rompieron con esa hegemonía y empezaron a establecer la idea de los nuevos bloques continentales, que son la etapas superiores a los estados nación, teniendo a estos como la base del sistema. En ese marco podemos entender lo que pasa hoy en día en Suramérica en particular; una sola vez anteriormente vivimos una situación similar y fue al fin de la II Guerra Mundial cuando América del Sur intentó establecer acuerdos de integración basados en el ABC (Argentina, brasil y Chile) durante los gobiernos de Perón, Vargas e Ibáñez del Campo, impedido por el accionar de Estados Unidos. Hoy la historia nos vuelve a dar otra oportunidad para romper con la “balcanización” que impuso el modelo neocolonial inglés primero, y luego Estados Unidos con su idea de “patio trasero”. El surgimiento de una potencia emergente como Brasil, que hoy es la locomotora económica de la región además de ser la 6° economía mundial, y que desde el Mercosur, con toda las dificultades del caso intenta crear un espacio regional ampliado que se consolida en la UNASUR, permite junto a la aparición de nuevos socios comerciales importantes en la región como lo son China, India y Rusia, el desplazamiento de la relación de dependencia económica y, por lo tanto política, con los EE.UU. Nos lleva a pensar que estamos ante un nuevo periodo de integración real y de potenciación del subcontinente más allá de los mismos dirigentes y de las corrientes ideológicas que tengan los mismos.

Los foros surgen o se anulan según el momento histórico. Estamos en la puerta de una nueva “Cumbre de las Américas”, que seguramente no tendrá la trascendencia que tenía antaño, y la presencia de EE.UU. y sus aliados será cuestionada, situación que parecía imposible hace apenas unos años atrás por mas lenguaje diplomático que se use. Otro Foro que tiende a languidecer es el de las “Cumbres Iberoamericanas”, pues ya no son útiles a la tríada el rol que tenia España y Portugal, que eran el puente de acceso y captura de las empresas públicas privatizadas por el neoliberalismo en Suramérica, al estar éstos países en crisis financieras gravísimas y, por lo tanto, no tienen nada para ofrecer a los países iberoamericanos.

El Foro de la UNASUR en cambio viene desarrollándose positivamente para los intereses regionales, pues ha logrado no poca cosa: evitar la disgregación de Bolivia, con el separatismo camba, y evitó un conflicto entre Ecuador, Colombia y Venezuela, en aquel momento en el cual Colombia bombardeó territorio ecuatoriano en el que se encontraban miembros de las FARC. Por otra parte, se profundiza el sistema de integración vial de toda América del Sur, uniendo regiones antes separadas y permitiendo realizar nuevos pasos bioceánico con los cuales se puede llegar a los mercados de Asia, donde está la nueva economía del mundo. También se está desarrollando un sistema de defensa regional para evitar los conflictos regionales con el “Consejo de Defensa Suramericano”, todo ello sin la injerencia ni la censura de los Estados Unidos. Estamos en un cambio realmente superador, que de consolidarse definitivamente, en especial por el eje Argentina, Brasil como el núcleo duro del mismo, viviremos una nueva historia iberoamericana.

DISENSO: Finalmente, con la intención de cerrar una entrevista de la que estamos muy agradecidos y creemos que servirá de mucho a nuestros lectores, queremos saber su opinión en torno al debate que surgió en las últimas semanas en nuestro país en torno a la cuestión Malvinas. ¿Cuál cree Ud. que es el valor simbólico y estratégico de las Islas para ser objeto de disputa entre el Reino Unido y la Argentina, y cuales deberían ser los argumentos para actualizar el rechazo a un enclave colonial como lo son actualmente las “Falkland Islands” teniendo en cuanta la vocación de ciertos grupos de reconocer a los kelpers como sujetos de derecho y no como colonos de una potencia enemiga?

PEREYRA MELE: El conflicto de las Islas Malvinas ya no es un litigio bilateral entre Argentina y Reino Unido, pues un enclave colonial con base militar de la OTAN pone en riesgo la seguridad del Continente Suramericano al controlar el paso bioceánico entre el Pacifico Sur y el Atlántico Sur y viceversa. Además afecta la proyección hacia la Antártida del nuestro país y de Suramérica en su conjunto. Si a eso le sumamos que el heredero de la corona inglesa, símbolo del Estado anglosajón, esta realizando ejercicios militares en el archipiélago malvinense, es una clara demostración del interés británico en la zona, pues a lo estratégico debemos sumarle la importancia económica (alimentos, minerales, etc.)

Otro tema no menor es que tenemos el diferendo más grande en la actualidad de posesión territorial, pues no solo esta el tema Malvinas sino todos los archipiélagos del Atlántico Sur (Georgias y Sándwich del Sur) más las Orcadas, que por la CONVEMAR (Convención de las Naciones Unidas sobre el Derecho de Mar) tenemos un litigo con Gran Bretaña por mas de 3.000.000 de Km2 de mar (La Pampa sumergida como bien se la denominó). Gran Bretaña unilateralmente separó el tema Malvinas de los otros archipiélagos, pues en Georgias y Sándwich no hay población sino bases militares y científicas de la potencia colonial, y allí el pseudo argumento de la autodeterminación de la población es inexistente, lo cual me lleva a decir algo acerca esto. En primer lugar no existen generaciones de pobladores ingleses que puedan considerarse como originarios, sino sólo como colonos traídos por la corona británica a un territorio usurpado por la fuerza, ya que no se les reconoció como ciudadanos británicos durante 150 años que van desde 1833 a 1983. Recién en ese año se les reconoce la ciudadanía inglesa a algunos habitantes de los llamados Kelpers, que si descontamos las fuerzas militares rotativas y los trabajadores temporarios en las islas, la población reconocida como británica es de 1 a 3 con la que habitan el territorio insular, por lo tanto la preocupación de algunos autollamados intelectuales argentinos por los derechos de esa población es realmente carente de todo sustento lógico. 

00:05 Publié dans Actualité, Entretiens, Géopolitique | Lien permanent | Commentaires (0) | |  del.icio.us | | Digg! Digg |  Facebook

mardi, 24 avril 2012

Robert Steuckers over geopolitieke vraagstukken


Robert Steuckers over geopolitieke vraagstukken

Hier de Nederlandse vertaling door A. Vierling van ‘Robert Steuckers s’explique sur le plan geopolitique’ ook hier op de website gepubliceerd. Bijdrage tijdens ronde Tafel maart 2012

Antwoorden van Robert Steuckers aan de Ronde Tafel, inzake de toekomst van de Europese volken, tijdens het colloquium in het kasteel Coloma, maart 2012.

(vertaling van Frans naar Nederlands door Alfred Vierling)

Vraag: Welke positieve reacties ontwaart U thans onder de Europese volkeren?

RS: Daar merk ik weinig van. Twee ervan ,, weliswaar geopolitiek gezien van weinig waarde, maar wel betekenisvol en mutatis mutandis (indien aangepast aan andere omstandigheden) navolgingswaardig houd ik gedachtig: het volksverzet in IJsland en de volkswoede in Griekenland. Eerst dus die IJslandse reactie, die van een klein eilandvolkje van 350.000 inwoners, dat reeds vanaf het prille begin van zijn geschiedenis een waarachtige democratische vertegenwoordiging heeft bedacht en de eerste hedendaagse en wereldlijke (niet-religieuze) literatuur van ons continent vorm heeft gegeven. In dat landje zijn de verantwoordelijken voor de crisis van 2008, de vuige banksters die zo verwerpelijk hebben zitten speculeren, voor de rechter gesleept, evenals eerste minister Haarde, die hun smerige streken had afgedekt, terwijl in Belgie de Dexia-commissie er maar oppervlakkig overheen fietst en men hier nog niet zo gauw de toch echt wel verdiende opsluiting van Dehaene zal meemaken. In IJsland zitten dus hun walgelijke evenknieën achter slot en grendel of althans voor de rechter. Deze gezonde reactie ging gepaard met de weigering van de IJslanders om de buitenlandse banken, welke hadden meegedaan aan het ruïneren van hun land. Ze hebben een grondwetswijziging doorgevoerd waarblijkens speculeren uitdrukkelijk wordt gestipuleerd als misdrijf en overdracht van soevereiniteit voortaan worden veroordeeld of bijgeval aan een referendum worden onderworpen. De IJslanders hebben blijk gegeven van een politieke wilskracht: ze leverden het bewijs, dat in het Westen, waar de economie op subtieler wijze alles bepaalt, het primaat van de politiek kan terugkeren. Met als resultaat dat IJsland thans weer een in het oog lopende economische opbloei beleeft.

De rest van Europa is in diepe apathie weggezonken.

In Griekenland echter zijn we getuige van nog gewelddadiger rellen dan die die Athene vorig jaar op zijn grondvesten deden schudden. Het volk weigert het dictaat van banken, het IMF en de Eurocratie. Belgische massamedia hebben op straat mensen lukraak ondervraagd, van wie er drie fel lucht gaven aan hun waarschuwing: zo meteen zijn jullie aan de beurt! (hodie mihi, cras tibi). Dat is nog eens een realistische, vooruitziende blik. In feite zijn de slappe, lafhartige en slijmerige politici, die de oplichters en bankiers niet bij dageraad door de politie durven laten oppakken onder het oog van de media om ze zo aan de schandpaal te zetten (name and blame), verantwoordelijk voor de enig mogelijke uitkomst op middellange termijn: de totale teloorgang van de staat en de vergriekenlanding (lees: verpaupering van onze samenleving). Maar ondanks deze woede-uitbarsting in de straten van Athene hebben de Grieken en de Italianen ook trouwens, dus in tegenstelling tot de IJslanders, een regering moeten slikken die wordt gevormd door economen, bankiers en technocraten, die niets gemeen hebben met de bevolking en dus gespeend zijn van enige democratische legitimatie. De dictatuur is dus weer terug op het Europese toneel, niet als massaal toegewuifde macht of als een duveltje voortgekomen uit de stembussen zoals we die nog onlangs op ons continent hebben gezien, maar als een heerschappij zonder toejuichingen, zonder legitimatie door verkiezingsuitslagen, die klaar staat om hele Griekse en Italiaanse gezinnen naar de sodemieter te helpen. Waar zijn toch die anti-autoritaire provo's gebleven en de actievoerders zoals tegen Franco of het Griekse kolonelsregime?

In Frankrijk zijn de belangrijke lessen van het gaullisme uit de jaren '60 vergeten. Geen enkele gezonde reactie kan men van het neoliberale "sarkozisme" verwachten. In Spanje verdient de beweging van verontwaardigde burgers wel sympathie, maar wat levert het op? Jean David vertelt dat Spanje thans 4 miljoen werklozen kent, maar ook een liberale regering die het IMF-beleid uitvoert en onpopulaire maatregelen voorstaat, zoals ook bij ons al in een veel te vroeg stadium mensen als een De Croo (aardje naar zijn vaardje) of een Reynders (hooggeplaatste van BNP in Parijs) namen.

Die Spaanse actiebereidheid van verontwaardigden toont nu juist aan dat elk jeugdprotest voortaan wordt gesmoord in wat de betreurde Phillippe Muray placht te noemen: festivisme (langlevedelollogie). Een demonstratie voor wat echt op het spel staat verwordt tot een Woodstock-happening, waar de bankiers noch hun neoliberale werktuigen van onderste boven liggen. Het gevaar van links komt helemaal niet van zijn tegendraadse natuur en verzet tegen de autoriteiten, maar van zijn neiging de pot te verteren in feestgedruis. Deze alles doordrengende lang-leve-de-lol-levenshouding die op emoties en verlangens bouwt, doodt feitelijk alle politieke reflexen voortkomend uit ernstige, wezenlijke bestaansdreigingen en doodstrijd (Ernst Juenger, Armin Mohler) en uit het zich rekenschap geven van een pessimistische, maar vooruitziende risico-inschatting van het allerergste (Clement Rosset). Voorbeelden te over die het afglijden van de schijnbaar revolutionaire ideeën uit 1968 naar een feestelijke klucht aangeven: de loopbaan van Daniel Cohn-Bendit bewijst het ruimschoots, die nep-revolutionair uit Nanterre 1968, die pseudo-marxistische taal met seksuele obsessies doorspekte en nu een bondgenoot van de neoliberale Thatcher-adept Guy Verhofstadt is als het erom gaat om binnen de muren van het Europarlement elke van het volk uitgaande natuurlijke politieke reflex te verguizen, of als het welk initiatief dan ook betreft door een of andere opportunist (zoals Sarkozy) om de natuurlijke reactie van de bevolking te misbruiken voor welk beleid dan ook om er alleen politiek munt uit te slaan, maar welk beleid, mits echt tenuitvoergelegd, toereikend de belangenbehartiging van de banksters zou ontwapenen.

De Nederlandse politicoloog Luuk van Middelaar maakte gewag van een cultuur onder Franse filosofen van ‘politicide’, het om zeep brengen van het politieke strijdtoneel, dat gepaard ging met de ontwikkeling van een onwrikbare staatsleer, welke de republiek gestaag heeft getracht te doen zegevieren op eigen grondgebied. Of je nu denkt aan Sartre in zijn toespraken gericht aan de demonstranten uit 1968, Michel Foucault of de neo-Nietzscheanen die de vreugdevolle bevrijding eisten van de ‘wensmachines’, de nog eens hernieuwde neo-Kantiaanse post-marxistische moralisten, die niet terug hadden van de door hen plotseling ontdekte gruwelijkheden van de ‘Goelag’ bij hun oude bondgenoten, de ‘Sovjets’ in de jaren 70, dan wel aan de hysterische supermoralisten van de heersende media of de door die laatste massaal aangeprezen ‘meelevende republiek’, de Franse intellectuelen hebben bij voortduring een moordaanslag op de politiek gepleegd, die alleen maar naar een doodlopende weg kon voeren. Een impasse waarin we ons nu bevinden, aldus Luuk van Middelaar in zijn Politicide - De moord op de politiek in de Franse filosofie (van Gennep, Amsterdam 1999).

Dus moeten we een metapolitieke strijd voeren om ons radicaal los te maken uit de moorddadige greep van de ‘lang-leve-de-lol’-mentaliteit en ons te weren tegen de allesvernietigende en uitwissende werking van de apathie, waarin het merendeel van onze medeburgers behaaglijk voortdommelt.

Vraag: Aan welke gevaren zal een weer ‘populistisch’ (in de goede zin des woords) geworden Europa worden blootgesteld?

RS: Om nu een hele lijst gevaren die ons bedreigen op te stellen is onbegonnen werk. Neem nu die speculatie tegen de Euro als symbool van ontbrekende soevereiniteit en politieke machtsvorming binnen de Europese bureaucratie, dan zien we toch dat die vijandige aanvallen allemaal van de andere kant van de Atlantische Oceaan komen, precieser gezegd vanuit de speculatieve sector van de Amerikaanse bankwereld. Ik kan alleen maar concluderen dat die speculatie tegen staten en hun valuta, waar Azië al in 19997 mee te maken kreeg, een betrekkelijk nieuwe wijze van indirecte oorlogvoering is. Saddam Hoessein wilde zijn olie in euro's verhandelen en ook Ahmadinedjad wilde dat gaan doen met Iraanse olie- en gasvoorraden. Maar daar hebben de BRIC-landen (Brazilië, Rusland, India en China) vooralsnog een stokje voor gestoken. De euro betekende dus het grootste gevaar op korte en middellange termijn voor de VS, want die stond op het punt Koning Dollar van de kroon te stoten. Europa, die beschaafde en vreedzame macht (Zaki Laïdi) zou dus zonder blikken of blozen de Koning schaakmat hebben gezet en dus moest erop los geslagen worden, op dat instrument van Europese soevereiniteit en wel in haar zachte mediterrane onderbuik. Die mediterrane landen de PIGS (Portugal, Italië, Griekenland, Spanje) zijn echt wel de kwetsbaarste en gemakkelijk uit hun evenwicht te brengen met als gevolg een mogelijk domino-effect om zodoende tevens de economisch sterkste landen van de oude Duitse mark-zone te verzwakken. {Ja, België wordt bedreigd, Oostenrijk heeft een ‘A’ verloren en Nederland is ongerust in zijn zwak te worden getroffen, want die kennen hun achilleshiel wel}. Duitsland rooit het nog wel gelet op zijn gas-overeenkomsten met Rusland en de markten die het op grote schaal creëert in China. Het blijft ook sterker doordat het beter is verbonden met de BRIC-landen, het mikt heimelijk op het uitspelen van een Euro-Aziatische kaart zonder met veel ophef zijn officiële Atlantische optie te ontkennen. Oud-kanseliers Schmidt en Schroeder hebben zich verheven tot een spilpositie in de garantstellingen die met de energie-as Berlijn-Moskou gepaard gaan, de huidige belichaming van de akkoorden tussen Rathenau en Tsjitsjerin (gesloten in 1922).

Om nog even terug te komen op Griekenland, dat nu aan diggelen ligt, daar hebben ze het dan vaak over de zorgeloosheid van de Griekse politici met hun demagogische beleid waar de welvaartsstaat bijzonder vrijgevig was en weinig toekeek (honderden blinden hadden een rijbewijs) en over het financiële gat geslagen door de organisatie van de Olympische Spelen in 2004, maar men laat merkwaardig genoeg de enorme kosten achterwege die de grote bosbranden die twee jaar lang achter elkaar land en opstal in het hele land teisterden, met zich meebrachten. Het vuur heeft op het land tot in de voorsteden huisgehouden op een ongekende schaal. Zo verging het ook het Rusland van Poetin, weerspannig tegen de dictaten van de ‘nieuwe wereldorde’, dat ook al op zijn grondgebied branden onderging van een in de geschiedenis ongekende omvang.

Zijn die branden wel toe te schrijven aan de grillen van de natuur, of zijn ze een beetje al te snel op het conto van de veronderstelde ‘opwarming van het klimaat’ geschreven? Of hebben we hier te maken met de uitlopers van nog weer eens een andere vorm van ‘indirecte oorlogvoering’? Dat mag je je toch werkelijk afvragen.

Zo wordt er ook gesproken van het project HAARP, van de mogelijkheid kunstmatig seismische en andere rampen uit te lokken. De tsunami heeft wel vorig jaar Japan van zijn atoom-opwekking beroofd, hetgeen op korte termijn leidt tot de gehele ontmanteling van zijn nucleaire sector en te denken valt ook aan de buitengewoon hevige stormen die Frankrijk enige jaren geleden onderging, onmiddellijk na het aldaar gerezen enthousiasme over een mogelijke as Parijs/Berlijn/Moskou. Zijn het allemaal toevalligheden? Dat zijn toch vragen die nauwe bestudering verdienen, zoals de uitgever ‘Kopp-Verlag’ doet.

Het wapen van wilde stakingen is tegen Chirac ingezet in 1995, na zijn kernproeven bij het Mururoa-atol. Sommige Franse vakbonden, geïnfiltreerd door trotskistische of lambertistische elementen (socio-economische tegenhangers van de ‘nieuwe filosofen’ die in de openbare ruimte ageren) worden naar bekend ondersteund door de CIA (of in het verledeb de ex-OSS om de oude communisten te neutraliseren). Frankrijk leeft voortdurend onder het zwaard van Damocles, een volledige lamlegging door bijvoorbeeld vrachtwagenchauffeurs die zijn (toegangs)wegen kunnen afsluiten. Zo heb je niet eens een 'oranje revolutie' nodig in Frankrijk.

Blijft dus nog het werkelijke gevaar van een ‘gekleurde revolutie’ over, naar het voorbeeld van wat gelukt is in Georgië in 2003 en die Saakasjvili aan de macht bracht. Maar men doorziet de truc nu en het werkt dus niet meer zo optimaal, ondanks een zeer goed opgeleide beroepsbevolking die al bij het begin van de Servische beweging OTPOR werd gerekruteerd. Zo wordt korte metten gemaakt met de uitwas van de ‘oranje revolutie’ in de Oekraïne van 2004, namelijk een toenadering van het land tot de Atlantische en eurocratische verdragsorganisaties onder druk van de geopolitieke werkelijkheid. De Oekraïense ruimte wordt bepaald door de grote rivieren (Dnjestr, Dnjepr, Don) en de Zwarte Zee. Het staat ook in verbinding met de Russische laagvlakte in het noorden. De laatste poging van een ‘oranje revolutie’ om Poetin te laten vallen liep uit op een faliekante mislukking: De peilingen wezen op 66% van de voorgenomen stemmen voor de Russische eerste minister. Maar wat nog erger is voor de westerse handlangers: de absolute meerderheid gaat niet naar de beweging van Poetin, maar ook voor een derde naar communisten en nationalisten (Zjoeganov en Zjirinovski) en dus niet naar de voorvechters van een heroriëntering op het westen van Rusland, met zijn oligarchen en verdorven zwakbegaafde politiekelingen.

De ‘Arabische Lentes’ zijn weer een andere manier om de massa’s in beweging te zetten teneinde potentiële markten open te breken, wat de Arabisch-islamitische staten eigenlijk zijn. Traditionele staatkundige verbanden en stamgebonden corrupte structuren hebben slechts in Tunesië en deels in Egypte gefunctioneerd. Maar in Syrië lukt het niet en dus is men bezig Syrië een soort Libanese toekomst te bereiden….

De Europese landen worden tenslotte gerekend tot de landen met de zwakste politieke identiteit. Afgezien van die speculatie tegen de euro. Welk ander instrument heeft men nog op de plank om Europa te doen vermurwen mocht het bij de lurven worden genomen? De Amerikaanse ambassadeur Charles Rivkin praatte zijn mond voorbij door openlijk over het gereedschap te spreken dat zal worden gebruikt om de West-Europese samenlevingen te destabiliseren, mochten die zich te koppig gaan verzetten. Dan werpen we hun het uitschot uit de probleemwijken voor de voeten. Charles Rivkin wijst hier onomwonden op de mogelijkheid de massa-immigratie uit de probleemwijken te mobiliseren om zo een tegenstribbelende regering te laten vallen of uit het zadel te werpen. Sarkozy moet als geen ander weten dat hij aan de macht kwam als gevolg van de rellen in de Franse voorsteden in november 2005. ((AV: In Frankrijk zijn dat de etnische probleemwijken)). Die rellen hebben al gediend om Chirac weg te vagen, de voorstander van de as Parijs/Berlijn/Moskou. Ze kunnen dus ook voor zijn val worden gebruikt zodra hij niet wijselijk in het vaarwater van de Amerikaanse alleenheerschappij blijft varen en het Groot-Brittannië van Cameron als bevoorrechte bondgenoot aanhoudt.

Guillaume Faye heeft al voorspeld, dat Frankrijk niet voor eeuwig met die rellen in de voorstadswijken kan wegkomen, zeker niet als die tegelijkertijd in verschillende agglomeraties uitbreken, dus niet alleen in het beruchte 93ste departement bij Parijs, maar ook in Lyon, Marseille et Rijsel. Zowel de salafistische netwerken als de lambertisten staan klaar om de Amerikaanse troef uit te spelen ten koste van hun gastlanden, voorop Saoedi-Arabië, de geldschieter van de wahabieten uit de salafistische bewegingen, als onvoorwaardelijk bondgenoot van de Verenigde Staten.

Vraag: Wie zijn de vijanden der Europese volken van binnenuit en van buitenaf in het huidige speelveld?

RS: Laten we beginnen met die van buiten, want die vanbinnen zijn slechts hun handlangers. De buitenlandse vijand is de genoemde alleenheerser die ons niet op gelijke voet duldt zoals je logisch doet met al je trouwe bondgenoten, al sinds de Romeinen. Men gooit ons dus steeds terug in de onderwerping door elke keer weer, maar nu met de subtielere middelen eigen aan de indirecte oorlogsvoeringswijzen elke nieuwe economische of politieke opleving van Europa te breken. Die alleenheerser is een zeemacht, die heerst over niemandsland: de oceanen en de ruimte en legt ons daarbij allerlei internationale regels op die van dag tot dag verschillen en altijd te zijnen gunste worden uitgelegd. Ik duid hier met luide toon op de Verenigde Staten zoals beschreven door zo iemand als Carl Schmitt, al is het hier niet de plaats om zijn diepzinnige en rake reflexen in herinnering te brengen omtrent de willekeurige en perfide wijze waarop kneedbare en manke internationale rechtsregels tot stand komen, schatplichtig als ze zijn aan het ‘ Wilsoniaanse denken’ en gericht op het laten oprukken van de pionnen van het Amerikaans imperialisme in de wereld of op het alles wegvagende proces van een soort ebola-virusachtige verwording van diplomatieke zekerheden en tradities tot een vormloze brei, welke door die trouweloze regels wordt uitgebraakt. Toegankelijker zijn de richtlijnen van de Amerikaanse strateeg Nicholas J. Spykman, samengebracht in een vademecum als aanhangsel bij zijn werk uit 1942: America’s Strategy in World Politics.

Voor hem had Europa in zijn tijd nog 10 troeven in handen die het superieur aan Amerika maakte, die ik elders heb opgesomd (Zie 'Theoretisch panorama van de geopolitiek’, in: Orientations, nr. 12, zomer 1990-91). Hij putte inspiratie bij een Duits geo-politicoloog uit de school van Haushofer, een zekere Robert Strauss-Hupe die naar de VS uitweek na de machtsgreep door de nazi's wegens zijn ietwat joodse afkomst. Maar goed, laat ik eens drie van die troeven noemen die volgens deze mensen nodig zijn voor het kaliber van een supermacht zoals nu de VS: een uitmuntend school- en universitair onderwijssysteem, etnische saamhorigheid en een min of meer zichzelf onderhoudende economie (of althans, zoals later de Fransen François Perroux en Andre Grjebine stelden, gericht op de opkomst en de consolidatie van een economisch blok met de VS dat de markten van Azië, Afrika en Latijns-Amerika kan veroveren en op lange termijn zijn posities daar kan bestendigen).

Om nu dit goede onderwijssyteem te slopen was er mei 1968 met zijn stoet aan nieuwe lulkoek-opvoeders en navenante lamawaaien-mentaliteit, gevolgd door een aan ‘rechts’ toegeschreven neoliberaal offensief dat opvoedkunde louter in dienst stelde van gemakkelijk te verwerven louter praktische vaardigheden ten koste van de humaniora, de klassieke menswetenschappen die totaal werden verbrijzeld. Ook hier weer liep het met het 1968 sausje overgoten linkse lang-leve-de-lol hedonisme hand in hand met de op de praktijk gerichte neoliberale doctrine om zo gezamenlijk de verworvenheden van onze beschaving teniet te doen en slechts door hun verbeelde verzet, dat in de media breed werd uitgemeten om de indruk te wekken dat er democratische alternatieven denkbaar zijn, de massa’s aan zich wisten te binden. Om de etnische saamhorigheid te breken heeft men Europa eerst van zijn reservoir aan aanvullende arbeidskrachten, Oost-Europa, afgesneden en voorts de integratie- en assimilatieprocessen gedwarsboomd met hulp van de wahabitisch/salafistische netwerken die aan Saoedi-Arabië ondergeschikt zijn, dat goedkope olie aanbood als Europa zijn grenzen openstelde aan de hele moslim-invasie); daarnaast bereidt men zich voor om met ambassadeur Rivkin te spreken op de ophitsing van de ontwortelde nieuwe bewoners die in probleemwijken met allerlei kleuren en religies door elkaar zijn gehutseld, teneinde het staatsapparaat en de samenleving als geheel buiten functie te stellen door het in gang zetten van etnische burgeroorlogjes in de grote stedelijke gebieden. In Duitsland dreigen Erdogan en Davutoglu ermee ten koste van de Duitse staat de parallelle Turkse gemeenschappen zo’n rol te laten spelen, waarbij je moet bedenken, dat het neoliberalisme uiteindelijk alle ‘economieën-in-de-diaspora’ voortrekt en doet opbloeien, dus ook die Turkse netwerken, die aanvankelijk sterk geënt waren op de heroïnehandel. Tenslotte zal de voortdurende afgedwongen ‘politicide’, vooral in Frankrijk, geen enkel herstel toelaten van het politieke besluitvormingsproces inzake onze existentiële keuzes, in de zin van Julien Freund. Zonder dergelijk herstel riskeren we de totale en definitieve ondergang.

Kijk, we zien duidelijk dat de alleenheerser die onze oplevingen wil afremmen voor het moment alom opportunistisch bondgenoten om zich heen verzamelt, die niet de voornaamste vijand zijn, maar wel straks zijn handlanger. Het verzet in Turkije, dat door de media sterk werd benadrukt na de botsing van Erdogan met zijn Israëlische tegenhanger te Davos en die zaak van Turkse schepen met medicamenten voor de Palestijnen in Gaza, is maar een show om de Arabisch-islamitische volksmassa’s te vermurwen. De Turkse buitenlandse politiek is er nauwelijks door veranderd, ook niet door de neo-ottomaanse toespraak van Davutoglu, die gewag maakte van ‘geen problemen met de buren’ en moslim-solidariteit. Kijk, in Syrië stond al sinds augustus 2011 Turkije pal achter de Amerikaanse alleenheerser: Erdogan, Guel en Davotoglu hebben geprobeerd al-Assad te laten buigen door de ‘moslimbroeders’ in zijn regering toe te laten en op te houden de alawieten, dat zijn aanhangers van een meer sjiitische islam, te bevoorrechten en af te zien van de scheiding kerk en staat, dus af te zien van het beginsel van geen staatsbemoeienis met geloofszaken, zoals door de seculiere ideologie van de Baath-partij altijd is voorgestaan en elke discriminatie tussen soennieten, sjiieten, alawieten en druzen verbiedt, alsmede op te houden met de bevoorrechting van Arabische en Armeense christenen. De Baath-partij was ten aanzien van de religieuze neutraliteit veel soepeler dan het Turkse kemalisme voordat het door Erdogan en zijn AKP van de troon werd geschopt, gelet op de ontstentenis aan institutioneel geweld tegen de bestaande religieuze Syrische volksdelen. Thans komen de wapens voor de opstandelingen in Syrië, de zogenaamde Afghaanse of Libische huursoldaten binnen via Turkije en dan door Irak of Jordanië, die de strijd aangaan met het Syrische leger. Trouwens, je moet bedenken dat de Turkse geopolitiek niet verenigbaar is met een samenhangend Europees geopolitiek beleid. De onderliggende doeleinden van Turkije gaan helemaal niet dezelfde kant op als die van de Europese, mochten die ooit eens samenhangend worden en voor heel Europa gaan gelden: Turkije wil bijvoorbeeld indirect weer voet op de Balkan zetten, terwijl dat eigenlijk voor Europa slechts een springplank moet zijn naar de Levant en de verdere Oost-mediterrane kuststreek en het Suezkanaal. Het huidige Turkse grondgebied is echter al een doorvoerzone voor immigratie uit het Nabije Oosten, het Midden-Oosten en Azië naar Europa, met name om binnen te dringen in het Schengen-gebied. Turkije sluit zijn grenzen niet en laat ondanks enorme subsidies van de Europese Commissie doodleuk honderdduizenden toekomstige illegalen door op weg naar de Europese Unie. De politie en douane van Griekenland zijn dus overbelast. De Griekse financiën zijn door deze Sisyphus-arbeid geheel uit het lood geslagen en dus ook door die bosbranden op enorme grote schaal, en niet zozeer zoals de neoliberale media ons op de mouw spelden door financieel wanbeheer bij de Olympische Spelen van 2004 en door enige duizenden arme Grieken die hun sociale dienst hebben pootje gelicht.

Om dat enorme aanzwellen van economische vluchtelingen te stuiten, die dus niet in verhouding staat tot wat zich in Lampedusa bij Sicilië of Feuerteventura op de Canarische eilanden aandient, geeft de Europese Commissie maar een miezerig klein bedrag vrij om slechts 200 armzalige politie-agenten uit te sturen die dan een grens moeten bewaken die vanaf de Thracische landengten eerst naar de Egeïsche eilanden en Rhodos helemaal doorloopt naar de Dodekanesos (12 eilanden).
Het agentschap Frontex, dat in theorie alle buitengrenzen van het Schengen-gebied moet afsluiten en zo de onevenwichtigheden die een ongebreidelde immigratie met zich meebrengt moet voorkomen, ontvangt in werkelijkheid maar een schijntje aan financiën en blijkt een lege dop te zijn.

Men weet dat al wat die salafisten en wahabieten uitvreten uiteindelijk op afstand wordt aangestuurd door de Amerikaans-Saoedische tandem en zich uitstekend leent om operaties van indirecte oorlogsvoering te plegen, die ook wel ‘low intensity war’ en ‘false flag operations’ heten. Pim Fortuyn werd niet zozeer als ‘ islamofoob’ vermoord als wel omdat hij de Nederlandse deelname aan de operaties in Afghanistan wou stopzetten. ((AV: Zie mijn eigen artikel: Ook wegens zijn wil niet deel te nemen aan het Joint Strike Fighter-project en de afschaffing van het Nederlandse leger behoudens de marine)). Men rekruteert een moordenaar uit de Marokkaanse gemeenschap van Molenbeek om commandant Massoud om te brengen en hem niet de macht te laten grijpen na de val van de Taliban, zoals gepland door het Pentagon. Men stuurt een Jordaanse fundamentalist op weg om de leiding te nemen van het Tsjetsjeense verzet op het traject van een oliepijpleiding die de Russische en Kazakse grondstof zou brengen naar de Zwarte Zee en ga zo maar door. Rusland, de belangrijkste leverancier van brandstoffen aan West-Europa wordt in de Noord-Kaukasus verzwakt door fundamentalistische Tsjetsjenen en Daghestani, maar ook en vooral, zoals ons de Duitse waarnemer Peter Scholl-Latour meldt, door een potentieel wahabitische (en dus indirect Amerikaanse) interventie in zijn twee moslimrepublieken Tatarstan en Basjkirostan. Als die twee republieken door burgeroorlog ten onder gaan of de fundamentalisten aan de macht komen wordt het grondgebied van de Russische Federatie letterlijk in tweeën geknipt ter hoogte van de Oeral, alleen het hoge noorden buiten beschouwing gelaten (dus boven de toendra-grens).
Europa wordt alsdan dus teruggebracht tot wat het was aan het begin van de zestiende eeuw: dus voor het geraas van de troepen van Ivan de Verschrikkelijke en Fjodor I die vanuit de Moskouse regio heel de loop van de Wolga tot en met Astrachan (1556) veroverden. Kazan, de latere hoofdstad van de Tartaren viel in 1552. Peter Scholl-Latour wijst erop, dat de Tartaren zelden warm lopen voor het wahabisme uit Arabië of voor de Egyptische Moslimbroeders van Hanna al-Banna en Sayyid Qutb en een moderne islam voorstaan die met het Europese en Russische modernisme verenigbaar is, men noemt het ‘jadidisme’ of de ‘Tartaarse weg’, waarvan de huidige bedenker Rafael Chakimov is. Die verzette zich tegen de wahabitische eis Arabische zeden en gebruiken uit de 7de en 8ste eeuw over te nemen. Aanhangers van Chakimov hebben thans dan wel nog de meerderheid in Tatarstan, maar ze moesten toch wel optreden tegen de praktijken van de moskee ‘Yoldiz Madrassa’ in de industriestad Naberezjnye Tsjelny, die werd opgehitst door onderwijskrachten uit Saoedi-Arabië. Ze werden verjaagd omdat enige van hun leerlingen zich bij de Tsjetsjeense rebelen hadden aangesloten. De toekomst ligt nog open voor deze oevers van de Karna, zijrivier van de Wolga die ver in het Noorden ontspringt bij de toendras, maar de alleenheerser kan met zijn Arabische bondgenoten er rotzooi gaan trappen en tegen het Tartaarse ‘jadidisme’ ten strijde trekken of er een soort panturkisme nieuwe leven in blazen (zie L’islam de Russie - Conscience communautaire et autonome politique chez les Tartars de la Volga et de l’Oural depuis le XVIIIe siecle, Stephane A. Dudoignon, Daemir Is’haqov en Raefyq Moehaemmaetshin, ed. Maisonneuve & Larose, Paris 1997; Peter Scholl-Latour, Russland im Zangengriff - Putin’s Imperium zwischen NATO, China und Islam, Propylaeen Verlag, Berlin, 2006).

Laten we nog iets zeggen over de vijanden onder ons. Ik zal er drie noemen. Eerst het volkomen parasitaire banksysteem dat een ware plutocratie (een woord dat door Pierre-André Taguieff en Jean-Francois Kahn in Parijs opnieuw wordt gebruikt) in het zadel heeft geholpen en niets en dan ook helemaal niets met democratie heeft te maken. Daar hangen dan systemen als de supermarkten aan die op voedselprijzen speculeren en verantwoordelijk zijn voor de hogere duurte in België dan de in omringende landen, veel noodzakelijke levensmiddelen zijn hier dubbel zo duur als in de Duitse schappen. En ook de de ermee verbonden energiesector, die extreem hoge gas- en electriciteitsprijzen afperst van de consument. De onevenwichtigheden die door de enorme omvang van deze geprivatiseerde of semi-geprivatiseerde para-statelijke structuren worden veroorzaakt moeten weer in het gelid gebracht worden, willen we niet dat de meest intieme bouwstenen van onze maatschappij erdoor worden vergruisd. Ten tweede noem ik de neoliberale ideologie en zijn vertakkingen met vooraan ex-premier Guy Verhofstadt die het ‘ regenboogkabinet’ leidde, een verbond tussen het neoliberalisme en het linkse feestgedruis. Want die ideologie smoort onder het masker van zijn goede bedoelingen elke echt opbouwend verzet. En dan hebben we dus als derde die zeer manipuleerbare diaspora, let wel ze zijn het bij monde van ambassadeur Rivkin en van het tendem Erdogan/Davutoglu.

Doel moet dus zijn de exponentiele ontwikkeling van de parasitaire plutocratie te beteugelen, ze grenzen en controles opleggen en ze onderwerpen aan een rechtvaardige belastingbijdrage, het Romeinse mulcto of multo en tevens moet er gewerkt worden aan een stevige etnische basis zonder telkens weer automatisch te worden bestraft als geldt het een strafbaar feit. Het neoliberalisme en zijn afgeleide denkconstructies zijn een ideologie van ‘politicide’, een moordaanslag op het politiek uiten van een gemeenschap en dus staatsgevaarlijk, ook op Europees niveau. Die etnische uitzaaiingen bij ons, de manipuleerbare diaspora, kunnen als vijfde colonnes gaan dienen, omdat ze vooral onder dreiging van Erdogan/Davutoglu recht kunnen krijgen op hun eigen rechtsstelsels, soevereiniteit in eigen kring. Onze beschaving kan niet gered worden zonder drastische maatregelen.

NVDR: De vertaling blijkt soms iets vrijer dan het origineel, waardoor sommige betekenissen verloren zijn gegaan. Ze is ook door ons nog eens herlezen en bewerkt. Voor het origineel verwijzen we naar: Euro-Synergies.

dimanche, 22 avril 2012

The Multicultural Theocracy: An Interview With Paul Gottfried



The Multicultural Theocracy: An Interview With Paul Gottfried

Myles B. Kantor
Thursday, Dec. 5, 2002

Ex: http://archive.newsmax.com/

Paul Gottfried is Professor of Humanities at Elizabethtown College. An adjunct scholar of the Ludwig von Mises Institute and contributing editor to Humanitas and Chronicles, he is the author of several books including "The Conservative Movement," "Carl Schmitt: Politics and Theory" and "After Liberalism: Mass Democracy in the Managerial State." His new book is "Multiculturalism and the Politics of Guilt: Toward a Secular Theocracy."

You observe, "Nothing could be more misleading than to equate a multicultural society with a multiethnic one." What distinguishes a multicultural society from a multiethnic one?

Multiethnic societies have been recurrent political phenomena and involve the coexistence of more than one ethnos, that is, national community, living in the same jurisdiction. Such an arrangement has usually come about because of conquest or dynastic inheritance and until now has never required a celebration of diversity. Multiethnic societies have almost always been empires because of the way they have been formed and because of their lack of cohesion beyond the fact of what Thomas Hobbes called "acquired sovereignty." Moreover, unlike multicultural regimes, multiethnic ones do not celebrate sexual exotica or the nonrecognition of separate gender identities. Multicultural regimes are inherently subversive of traditional social relations.

You frame the multicultural question as fundamentally governmental in nature: "For all their complaints about 'political correctness,' moderate conservatives...do not devote their primary attention to the government's control of speech and behavior. The battle between supporters and opponents of political correctness is thought to be taking place among warring cultural elites." What is the consequence of viewing multiculturalism as a purely cultural phenomenon?

The fact that neoconservatives – the anti-Communist liberals, once identified with Daniel Patrick Moynihan, Henry "Scoop" Jackson and Hubert Humphrey, who took over the conservative movement with only minor opposition in the 1980s – have been able to treat multiculturalism as an hermetically sealed cultural and academic problem has allowed them to go on glorifying the current American regime as the paradigmatic global democracy. (Read the second edition of my book "The Conservative Movement" for a detailed description of the neoconservative ascendancy and the marginalization of everyone to the right of the Cold War liberals.)

Their other avoidance of the truth in order to spare the government that they want to expand is presenting the state as the hapless victim of bad culture. My own perspective is diametrically opposite. It is trying to understand the role of multiculturalism as a politically enforced ideology. Multiculturalism has the same relation to the present managerial state as the Catholic Church did to medieval European monarchies. It travels in the baggage of the American empire, as was evident during the unprovoked attack on Serbia.

You often refer to "the managerial state," "the administrative state," and "the therapeutic state." What are these phenomena and their relationship to multiculturalism?

State administrations have been around since the High Middle Ages, while the managerial state refers to the social engineering, redistributionist regime that came into existence with mass democracy in the twentieth century. (Mass democracy is a term used to describe a government that rules in the name of the "people" but is highly centralized and operates increasingly without an ethnic-cultural core. It is a bureaucratic empire that distributes political favors and provides a minimal level of physical protection but is no longer capable of or interested in practicing self-government.

In "After Liberalism," which precedes my latest book, an attempt is made to plot the development of modern administrative "democracy" from a more limited and nationally focused state that existed a hundred years ago. What happened is that, contrary to what nineteenth-century critics of democracy believed, universal suffrage and urbanization did not lead to the outbreak of anarchy and violent expropriation. Rather the people voted to hand over power to "public administrators" and more recently in the U.S. judges, who became the agents for practicing democracy on our behalf. Democracy was not equated with meaningful self-rule but with being socialized by administrators, who taught us "equality" and later, pluralism and multiculturalism. )

That mass democratic regime has turned progressively therapeutic, with the advent of the cult of victims and the degeneration of Christianity into a purveyor of the politics of guilt. Question two misses a point: I am not except in a negative sense a libertarian. Through most of its history, the state, in my opinion, has been a positive force, assisting the rise of the bourgeoisie in Western Europe more than hindering that development and providing a uniform system of law protecting persons and property. The good state reached its high point in the nineteenth century but was overtaken by mass democracy and the managerial revolution in the twentieth century.

I am also not an enemy of all forms of democracy and totally approve of the management of my own town by small property-owners who come out of a shared rural culture. Unfortunately the hand of PC is already upon us as the demonic state and federal behemoths (the first is only an agent of the second) invade our civic and family life.

What are some examples of those behemoths invading civic and family life?

Examples of PC enforcement by the state are the use of Title Nine to impose verbal and behavioral conformity on male academics and workers; the various hate speech laws that exist in Canada and Europe and are applied almost exclusively against white Christian European; and the delegitimation of the historical heritage of victimizing groups: e.g., the war against Southern symbols and iconography waged, in among other areas in the US, public education [e.g., dress codes prohibiting attire with a Confederate flag].

The BBC recently had a headline, "Hate crime police raid 150 homes," about an operation in London administered by a "Diversity Directorate." Sweden recently passed a law criminalizing the "disrespecting" of homosexuals.

This attempt to muzzle traditional Christians is perfectly consistent with both the multicultural values of the therapeutic state and the thrust of liberal Christianity. In fact what is happening in England and Sweden is the disciplining by the government of Christians who have not accepted the Protestant deformation. A by now transformed Christianity, which is as grotesque in its own way as Hitler's Nazified Evangelical Church, has allied itself to the state that is suppressing Christians who will not go along with PC indoctrination.

On the matter of Hitler, perhaps the most sensitive instance of the politics of guilt you discuss is contemporary treatment of the Holocaust. You write, "By now all Christians have been generically indicted for the Holocaust, which has been extended to gays and explained in such a way as to minimize the suffering of identifiably Christian victims."

Members of my family were worked to death in Nazi labor camps; some died of typhus soon after being liberated. Needless to say, I am not a Holocaust denier. Indeed I am profoundly offended by the attempts to draw parallels between Nazi Germany and the German Imperial government, on the grounds that the latter was a "defective constitutional regime."

The Nazis were reprehensible not for establishing a second-class constitutional government but for turning Europe into a death camp. What I oppose is not the recognition by the establishment Left that the Nazis killed millions of people but the use of anti-fascism as a tool of control. This instrumentalization has been cynically carried out by political elites, European Commies, and academics throughout the West.

A very useful book on this subject in French by Elisabeth Levy shows how completely the totalitarian Left suppresses opposition in France by identifying all dissenters as Nazis or fascists. Supposedly by making a case against increased Islamicist immigration into France, one incites fascist hate and prepares the way for a second Auschwitz.

Read Peter Novick's "The Holocaust in American Life" for a striking account of the changes in Jewish attitudes about who or what caused the Holocaust. Novick maintains that what has fueled this new animus against "Nazi-bearing" Christianity has nothing to do with scholarly revelations. Rather it has arisen out of Jewish repugnance for Christianity at a time when Christians have certainly not persecuted Jews. To the contrary, Christians are the only possible allies that the Jews can now claim.


You referred earlier to "the Protestant deformation." What is it and its relation to the multicultural theocracy?

In the U.S., what the Presbyterian scholar James Kurth (see my intro chapter) calls the "Protestant deformation" has profoundly influenced the spread of multiculturalism. Although Catholic clergy, as revealed by the Italian study "L'invasione silenziosa" (The Silent Invasion), have expressed many of the same xenophile sentiments, calling for massive Third World immigration to offset Western parochialism and bigotry, in the U.S., Canada and England, Protestants have taken the lead in pushing both multicultural ideology and the politics of guilt.

Kurth tries to explain this by looking at the progressive deterioration of Protestant theology and moral culture since the nineteenth century. At the heart of the problem is the transformation of justified spiritual guilt into social guilt and the Protestant focus on the individual into a rejection of membership in a shared civilization that needs to be preserved.

What are the prospects for containing or rolling back the multicultural theocracy?

A deus ex machina that may come along to prevent the worsening of the situation I describe is the rallying by Western nations to a defense of their societies. This may be happening dramatically in Flanders whose people vote for the anti-immigration and anti-welfare Vlaams Blok. Moreover, in Antwerpen there are now armed camps with, on the one side, the Arab European League and, on the other, Flemish nationalists. While such confrontations are not particularly savory, they may prevent the Islamicists and the European Union PC bureaucracy from moving in more quickly to convulse or denature European society.

Note I do not think these battles will solve long-term problems; unless Western peoples start having families again, the social unit and population base needed for a civilization will be lacking. I do not believe that civilizations are purely or even substantially "propositional" or can be sustained by requiring courses on Martin Luther King and global democracy prepared by Harry Jaffa, Bill Bennett, and Mrs. Cheney.

While societies can assimilate, there are three presuppositions that must obtain: a core population that carries a distinctive culture that it hopes to preserve; a minority that is accepted on the condition that it eagerly embraces that majority culture; and a sufficiently controlled immigration so that assimilation is possible.

Contact Myles Kantor at kantor@FreeEmigration.com


Editor's note:
Now we know: "Why the Left Hates America"

00:10 Publié dans Entretiens | Lien permanent | Commentaires (0) | Tags : multiculturalisme, entretiens, paul gottfried | |  del.icio.us | | Digg! Digg |  Facebook

lundi, 16 avril 2012

The Heritage of Europe's 'Revolutionary Conservative Movement'

The Heritage of Europe's 'Revolutionary Conservative Movement'

A Conversation with Swiss Historian Armin Mohler (1994)

By Ian B. Warren


mohlereinband.jpgFollowing the aftermath of the cataclysmic defeat of Germany and her Axis partners in the Second World War, exhausted Europe came under the hegemony of the victorious Allied powers — above all the United States and Soviet Russia. Understandably, the social-political systems of the vanquished regimes — and especially that of Hitler's Third Reich — were all but completely discredited, even in Germany.

This process also brought the discrediting of the conservative intellectual tradition that, to a certain extent, nourished and gave rise to National Socialism and Hitler's coming to power in 1933. In the intellectual climate that prevailed after 1945, conservative views were largely vilified and suppressed as "reactionary" or "fascist," and efforts to defend or revitalize Europe's venerable intellectual tradition of conservatism came up against formidable resistance.

Those who defied the prevailing "spirit of the times," maintaining that the valid "Right" traditions must be accorded their proper and important place in Europe's intellectual and political life, risked being accused of seeking to "rehabilitate" or "whitewash" Nazism. Germans have been especially easy targets of this charge, which is nearly impossible to disprove.

One of the most prominent writers in German-speaking Europe to attempt this largely thankless task has been Armin Mohler. As German historian Ernst Nolte has observed, this job has fortunately been easier for Mohler because he is a native of a country that remained neutral during the Second World War.

Born in Basel, Switzerland, in 1920, Mohler worked for four years as secretary of the influential German writer Ernst Jünger. He then lived in Paris for eight years, where he reported on developments in France for various German-language papers, including the influential Hamburg weekly Die Zeit.

In his prodigious writings, including a dozen books, Dr. Mohler has spoken to and for millions of Europeans who, in defiance of the prevailing political-intellectual order, have sought to understand, if not appreciate, the intellectual heritage of Europe's venerable "old right."

Mohler's reputation as the "dean" of conservative intellectuals and as a bridge between generations is based in large part on the impact of his detailed historical study, Die Konservative Revolution in Deutschland 1918–1932 ("The Conservative Revolution in Germany, 1918–1932"). Based on his doctoral dissertation at the University of Basel, this influential work was first published in 1950, with revised editions issued in 1972 and 1989.1

In this study, Mohler asserts that the German tradition of the Reich ("realm") in central Europe (Mitteleuropa) incorporates two important but contradictory concepts. One sees Mitteleuropa as a diverse and decentralized community of culturally and politically distinct nations and nationalities. A second, almost mythical view stresses the cultural and spiritual unity of the Reich and Mitteleuropa.

The main current of radical or revolutionary conservative thinking is expressed by such diverse figures as the Russian writer Feodor Dostoyevsky, Italian sociologist Vilfredo Pareto, American poet and social critic Ezra Pound, American sociologist Thorstein Veblen, and English novelist C. K. Chesterton. 2 This intellectual movement began at the close of the 19th century and flourished particularly during the 1920s and 1930s. Sometimes also called the "organic revolution," this movement sought the preservation of the historical legacy and heritage of western and central European culture, while at the same time maintaining the "greatest [cultural and national] variety within the smallest space."3 In Germany, the "Thule Society" played an important role in the 1920s in this European-wide phenomenon as a kind of salon of radical conservative intellectual thought. It stressed the idea of a völkisch (folkish or nationalist) pluralism, underscoring the unique origins and yet common roots of a European culture, setting it apart from other regions and geopolitical groupings around the globe. 4

In Mohler's view, the twelve-year Third Reich (1933–1945) was a temporary deviation from the traditional conservative thinking. At the same time, the conservative revolution was "a treasure trove from which National Socialism [drew] its ideological weapons." 5 Fascism in Italy and National Socialism in Germany were, in Mohler's judgment, examples of the "misapplication" of the key theoretical tenets of revolutionary conservative thought. While some key figures, such as one-time Hitler colleague Otto Strasser, chose to emigrate from Germany after 1933, those who decided to remain, according to Mohler, "hoped to permeate national socialism from within, or transform themselves into a second revolution." 6

Following the publication in 1950 of his work on the conservative revolution in Europe, Mohler explored in his writings such diverse subjects as Charles DeGaulle and the Fifth Republic in France, 7 and the Technocracy movement in the depression-era United States. 8 In 1964 Mohler was appointed Managing Director of the prestigious Carl-Friedrich von Siemens Foundation, a leading scholarly and research support institute in Germany. In 1967 he began a stint of several years teaching political science at the University of Innsbrück in Austria. That same year, Konrad Adenauer honored Mohler for his writing with the first "Adenauer Prize" ever bestowed.

During the 1970s and 1980s, Mohler was a frequent contributor to Criticon, a scholarly German journal whose editor, Caspar von Schrenk-Notzing, has been a close friend of the Swiss scholar and a major promoter of his work. In 1985, Dr. Mohler produced a collection of writings to commemorating the 25th anniversary of the Siemens Foundation. The volume contained contributions from the writings of Oswald Spengler, Carl Schmitt, Konrad Lorenz, Hellmut Diwald, H.J. Eysenck, and Julian Freund.

Mohler is a leading figure in the European "New Right," or "Nouvelle Droite." (For more on this, see Prof. Warren's interview with Alain de Benoist, another major figure in this social-intellectual movement, in The Journal of Historical Review, March–April 1994.)

Year after year, political leaders, educators and much of the mass media take care to remind Germans of their important "collective responsibility" to atone for their "burdensome" past. This seemingly never-ending campaign has become nearly a national obsession — manifest recently in the enormous publicity and soul-searching surrounding the Spielberg film "Schindler's List." In Mohler's view, all this has produced a kind of national neuroses in Germany.

Mohler has written extensively on the particularly German phenomenon known as "mastering the past" or "coming to grips with the past" ("Vergangenheitsbewältigung"). He tackled this highly emotion-laden topic in a book (appropriately entitled Vergangenheitsbewältigung), published in 1968, and later re-issued in a revised edition in 1980. 9 Two years later he turned to the subject of German identity.10

In 1989 Mohler again boldly took on the issue of Germany's difficulty in coming to terms with the legacy of the Third Reich in what is perhaps his most provocative book, Der Nasenring ("The Nose Ring").11 [A review by M. Weber of this work appears in this issue of the Journal.]

With the reunification of Germany in 1989, the collapse of the Soviet empire, the end of the Cold War US-USSR rivalry, and the withdrawal of American and Soviet Russian forces from Europe, has inevitably come an earnest reconsideration of the critical issues of German identity and Germany's the role in Europe. This has also brought a new consideration of precisely how Germans should deal with the troubling legacy of the Third Reich and the Second World War.

Changing social-political realities in Germany, Europe and the world have given new significance to the views developed and nurtured by Dr. Mohler and his circle of like-minded "revolutionary conservatives."


am-KR.jpgThis writer was privileged to spend a day with Armin Mohler and his gracious wife at their home in Munich early in the summer of 1993. After having spoken earlier with historian Ernst Nolte, I was interested to compare his views with those of Mohler. In particular, I was curious to compare how each of these eminent figures in German intellectual life assessed the present and future climate of their nation, and of the continent within which it plays such a critical role.

Although his movement is restricted due to a serious arthritic condition, Dr. Mohler proved to be witty, provocative and fascinating. (In addition to his other talents and interests, he is a very knowledgeable art specialist. His collection of reprints and books of Mexican, US-American and Russian art is one of the largest anywhere.)

During our conversation, Mohler provided both biting and incisive commentary on contemporary political trends in Europe (and particularly Germany), and on American influence. Throughout his remarks, he sprinkled witty, even caustic assessments of the German "political class," of politicians spanning the ideological spectrum, and of the several generational strands forming today's Germany. As he explained to this writer, Dr. Mohler felt free to offer views without any of the "politically correct" apologetics that have hampered most native German colleagues.

Q: What do you see as the state of the conservative political movement in Germany today?

M: Well, first let me explain my own special analysis. I believe there are three possibilities in politics, which I characterize as "mafia," "gulag," and "agon." Each has been a possible or viable political form in twentieth century history. Of course, between the choice of the "gulag" and the "mafia," people will choose the latter because it is more comfortable and less apparently dangerous, or so it seems.

But what of this third option, which is taken from the Greek term "agon" ("competition" or "contest"), and recalls the ancient Hellenic athletic and literary competitions? I believe it is possible to have a society that is free of the politics both of the mafia and of the Left, but bringing this about is quite complicated. It is a pity that today we appear only to have a choice between the mafia and the gulag. Liberalism in the 19th century context was a positive idea with a serious basis of thought. Today, however, liberalism has become just another name for the mafia. I do not believe that political liberalism is able to govern in the modern world. My ideal is most apparent today in the "tiger" states of Asia, such as Malaysia, Singapore, Korea and Taiwan, which have dynamic free market, liberal economies, but without liberal politics.

Q: When you speak of a "third option," are you referring to the anti-capitalist and anti-Communist "third way" or "third position" advocated by some political and intellectual groups in Europe today that reject the establishment elites of both the traditional left and right?

M: No. I do not see any significant movement of that kind. What small steps are being taken in this direction are denounced as "fascist" or in the "fascistic style." The role of the modern mass media has destroyed any possibility of such "third way" politics. This means, unfortunately, that we must exclude the "agon" option. We are left only with the "mafia" or the "gulag" options.

Q: Are you therefore saying that a true conservative revolution is not possible? Is there now in Germany anything that might be called an authentic conservative movement?

M: At first, just after the war, we did have a certain kind of conservatism. Essentially, it had two aims: first, to be the Number One enemy of Communism; and second, it must be allied with America. It also had its origins in two forms of conservatism. One was Burkian [after Edmund Burke], what I have called Gärtner-Konservatismus — "Gardener Conservatism" — that is, merely attending to the cultivation and restoration of society as a gardener would. The other is the "humility conservatism" of the Christian churches. These were the only kinds of conservatism allowed by the Americans. After all, they were the ones who handed out the chocolates, and western Germany wanted that. What the entire population did not want was Communism.

At last this began to change, particularly with the publication in 1969 of Moral und Hypermoral by Arnold Gehlen. 12 This book opened the way to a real Conservatism. Gehlen used the term "conservatism," which I do not like because it implies merely wanting to hold on to something from the past. Most of the time "conservatism" is used to refer to rather trivial and stupid things. In any event, a year after Gehlen's book was published our journal Criticon was started. The first issue was devoted to Gehlen and his ideas.

And then there was the "War Generation." I am not referring here to the "Old Nazis," but rather to a second generation that no longer believed in the early romantic notion of revolutionary National Socialism. By 1942, the "Old Nazis" were effectively all gone. In Berlin, by then, all of the government posts were in the hands of young technocrats: the "second generation" of National Socialists. They were not interested in the stories of the Party's struggle for power, or in the fight against Communism.

And this generation — members of which I met in 1942 in the government ministries in Berlin — were in their 30s. A good example of this type is Helmut Schmidt, who eventually became leader of the Social Democratic party, and then Chancellor. He is very typical of this generation that had conducted the war: in the later war years, they played a major role in the government agencies and in the [National Socialist] party organizations. They were very much a group of "survivors."

Q: So they were the first "new" class?

M: Yes. This first "new class" — most of whom came of age in the 1940s — accepted the ideology of the Western allies because they told themselves, and others: "We lost the war, now at least we must win the peace." I worked for 24 years at the Siemens corporation with people of this type. I tried to encourage them to fight against government regimentation. But they replied, "you can do that, you are Swiss. We, though, have to trust the system, to appreciate the possibilities of life within this economy and society."

They didn't have to develop a liberal or free market economy, of course, because Hitler was intelligent enough not to socialize or nationalize the economy. He had said, "I will socialize the hearts, but not the factory." And the members of this "new generation" felt that there was no time to dwell on being individualist: "We must work. We lost the war, at least we must win this struggle."

They are completely different from their sons and daughters! This next generation, which is now between 40 and 60, you could call them the "unemployed" generation: too young to serve in the army of Hitler and too old to serve in the army of Bonn. Well educated, they sought only to work in a liberal, industrial society, vacationing in Tuscany. They've wanted money for themselves, not accepting any social responsibilities. They wouldn't think of sacrificing their blood in wars decided by Americans or Russians. In their youth they were Maoists, but not seriously so; after all, they want to live comfortably. They didn't want to work hard like the Asians. Disdaining such a goal, they declared, "Our fathers and mothers had to work too much." They wanted an easier life, and they succeeded. The money was there, and the larger political questions were settled for them by the Americans. So these were the "volunteer helpers" — the "Hiwis" or Hilfswilligen — of the Americans.

The young socialists of this generation rejected the idea of national and social responsibility. It regarded the notion that men must work, and that one must help others, as a secondary and not very important idea of old people. These are the sons and the daughters of the people of my generation, too. This is largely a destroyed or wasted generation.

I admire the "war generation" very much because they had a sense of responsibility, and furthermore, they didn't lie. They did not mouth the trivial and hackneyed old political slogans of liberalism; they were too serious to do this. They knew in their hearts that this paradise of the Bundesrepublik [German federal republic] would not be viable.

But now we have a generation in power that is not capable of conducting serious politics. They are not willing to fight, when necessary, for principles. Typically, they think only about having good times in Italy or the Caribbean. As long as the generation between the ages of 40 and 60 remains in power, there will be bad times for Germany.

The generation that is coming into its own now is better because they are the sons and the daughters of the permissive society. They know that money is not everything, that money does not represent real security. And they have ideas. Let me give my description of this generation.

For 20 years people like me were on the sidelines and barely noticed. But for the past six or seven years, the young people have been coming to me! They want to meet and talk with the "Old Man," they prefer me to their fathers, whom they regard as too soft and lacking in principles. For more than a hundred years, the province of Saxony — located in the postwar era in the Communist "German Democratic Republic" — produced Germany's best workers. Since 1945, though, they have been lost. The situation is a little bit like Ireland. Just as, it is said, the best of the Irish emigrated to the United States, so did the best people in the GDR emigrate to western Germany. After 1945, the GDR lost three million people. With few exceptions, they were the most capable and ambitious. This did not include the painters of Saxony, who are far better than their western German counterparts. (Fine art is one of my special pleasures.) Moreover, many of the best who remained took positions in the Stasi [the secret police of the former GDR]. That's because the Stasi provided opportunities for those who didn't want to migrate to western Germany to do something professionally challenging. In a dictatorship, a rule to remember is that you must go to the center of power.

Recently, in an interview with the German paper Junge Freiheit, I said that trials of former Stasi officials are stupid, and that there should be a general amnesty for all former Stasi workers. You must build with the best and most talented people of the other side — the survivors of the old regime — and not with these stupid artists, police and ideologues.

Q: Are there any viable expressions of the "conservative revolution" in German politics today?

M: You know, I'm a friend of Franz Schönhuber [the leader of the Republikaner party], and I like him very much. We were friends when he was still a leftist. He has a typical Bavarian temperament, with its good and bad sides. And he says, "you know, it's too late for me. I should have begun ten years earlier." He is a good fellow, but I don't know if he is has the talents required of an effective opposition political leader. Furthermore, he has a major fault. Hitler had a remarkable gift for choosing capable men who could work diligently for him. Organization, speeches — whatever was needed, they could carry it out. In Schönhuber's case, however, he finds it virtually impossible to delegate anything. He does not know how to assess talent and find good staff people.

Thus, the Republikaner party exists almost by accident, and because there is so much protest sentiment in the country. Schönhuber's most outstanding talent is his ability to speak extemporaneously. His speeches are powerful, and he can generate a great deal of response. Yet, he simply doesn't know how to organize, and is always fearful of being deposed within his party. Another major weakness is his age: he is now 70.

Q: What do you think of Rolf Schlierer, the 40-year-old heir apparent of Schönhuber?

M: Yes, he's clever. He clearly understands something about politics, but he can't speak to the people, the constituents of this party. He is too intellectual in his approach and in his speeches. He often refers to Hegel, for example. In practical political terms, the time of theorists has gone. And he is seen to be a bit of a dandy. These are not the qualities required of the leader of a populist party.

Ironically, many of the new people active in local East German politics have gone over to the Republikaner because people in the former GDR tend to be more nationalistic than the West Germans.

Q: What about Europe's future and role of Germany?

M: I don't think that the two generations I have been describing are clever enough to be a match for the French and English, who play their game against Germany. While I like Kohl, and I credit him for bringing about German unification, what I think he wants most sincerely is Germany in Europe, not a German nation. His education has done its work with him. I fear that the Europe that is being constructed will be governed by the French, and that they will dominate the Germans. The English will side with the French, who are politically astute.

Q: That is the opposite of the perception in America, where much concern is expressed about German domination of Europe. And yet you think that the French and the English will predominate?

M: Thus far, they have not. Kohl hopes, of course, that he can keep power by being the best possible ally of America; but that is not enough.

Q: Do you think that the influence of America on German identity is still important, or is it diminishing?

M: Yes, it is still important, both directly, and indirectly through the process of "re-education," which has formed the Germans more than I had feared. Where have the special German qualities gone? The current generation in power wants to be, to borrow an English expression, "everybody's darling;" particularly to be the darling of America.

Those of the upcoming generation don't like their parents, whom they see as soft and lacking in dignity. In general, I think that younger Germans are not against Americans personally. They will be better off with Americans than with the English or French. In this I am not as anti-American as Alain de Benoist. The "American way of life" is now a part of us. And for this we have only ourselves to blame.

For my own part, I see a great affinity between Germany and America. When I was visiting a family in Chicago a few years ago, I felt right at home, even if it was a patrician family, and I am from the lower middle class. I felt something. For example, if I were to have an accident, I would prefer that it occur on the streets of Chicago rather than in Paris or London. I think that Americans would be more ready to help me than people in France or England.

During my travels in the United States, I encountered many taxi drivers, who were very friendly if they had an idea that I was from Germany. But when I would tell them that I am Swiss, they didn't respond in this positive way. In the case of Black taxi drivers, there is always the same scenario when they converse with Germans. They say, "you treated us as human beings when we were there."

Some would talk about those death camps on the Rhine for German prisoners run by Eisenhower, where American soldiers had orders not to give water or food to the Germans. 13 (You know, Eisenhower ordered that those who gave food or water to the Germans in those camps would be punished.) Blacks gave them water, though, and that had a great impression on them. To German soldiers they said: "We are in the same situation as you."

Q: You are saying that there is a camaraderie among victims?

M: Yes.

Q: How is it possible to throw off this domination, this cultural occupation, as it were?

M: I had the idea that we must have emigration — as the Irish have had — to make Germans more spontaneous. I have written on three different occasions about Ireland in Criticon.

It was not fair of me to judge Ireland during that first visit, because I did not know the country's history. Then I dug into the subject, and especially the 800-year struggle of the Irish against the English. I relied on the best study available, written by a German Jew, Moritz Julius Bonn. An archivist at the University of Dublin had given Bonn access to all the documents about the English colonization of Ireland.

In my second Criticon article I boosted Ireland as an example for the Germans of how to fight for their independence. I said that it was a war of 800 years against the English. At last they won. And the English genocide was a real genocide.

During my first visit to Ireland, I felt that there was something really different, compared to Germany. Last year, after two decades, I returned to Ireland. Writing about that trip, I concluded that I had been deceived earlier, because Ireland has changed. Europe has been a very bad influence. Every Irishman, when he saw that I was from Germany, asked me, "Do you vote for Maastricht?" [referring to the treaty of European unification]. When I replied that the German people are not allowed to vote on this matter, they seemed pleased. And to me, the Irish now seem very demoralized. Twenty years ago, when I arrived in a little Irish town in Castlebar, it was a quiet little town with one factory and some cars, some carts and horses. Now, all the streets were full of cars, one after the other. "Is there a convention in town," I asked. "No, no, it's normal." I then asked, "Are these cars paid for?" "Ah, no," was the answer I received.

Every person can have three days off a week, and then it's Dole Day on Tuesday. Their mountains are full of sheep. They don't need stables for them, because it's not necessary. The owners are paid a sum of money from the European Union for each sheep. Their entire heroic history is gone! It's like the cargo cult [in backwoods New Guinea]. For the Irish, the next generation will be a catastrophe. 14

Q: Returning to an earlier question: what does the future hold for German-American relations?

M: On one occasion when I was in America doing research on the Technocracy movement, I recall being the guest of honor at a conference table. At my side was a nationally prominent American scientist who was also a professor at a west coast university. Also with us was an internationally prominent Jew, a grey eminence in armaments who had an enormous influence. He was treated like a king by the president of the university. And at the other end of the table I sat next to this west coast professor, who told me that he didn't like the cosmopolitan flair of the East Coast. "You should come to western America," he said to me. "There you will not always hear stupid things about Germany." And he added that in his profession — he works in the forests and woods — are people who are friends of Germany. So I remember this fraternization between a visitor from Germany and someone from the American west coast.

Q: Are you suggesting that if it were not for the influence of certain powerful academic or political elites, there would be greater recognition of the compatibility of German and American values?

M: You see, this difficult relationship between Germans and Jews has had an enormous influence on public opinion in America. Jews would be stupid not to take advantage of this situation while they can, because I think Jewish influence in America is somewhat diminishing. Even with all the Holocaust museums and such, their position is becoming ever more difficult. This is partly due to the "multicultural" movement in the United States. Actually, the Germans and the Jews are a bit alike: when they are in power, they over-do it! New leaders in each group seem recognize that this is dangerous.

Dr. Mohler also spoke about the Historkerstreit ["Historians' dispute"], which he sees as a critical milestone on the road of enabling Germans to consider their own identity in a positive way. (For more on this, see Prof. Warren's interview with Dr. Ernst Nolte in the Journal, Jan.–Feb. 1994, and the review by M. Weber of Nolte's most recent book in the same issue.)

He expressed the view that many European leaders — particularly those in France and Britain — welcome an American President like Bill Clinton who does not seem expert at foreign policy matters.

With regard to developments in Germany, Mohler explained that he speaks as both an outsider and an insider, or as one who is "between stools" — that is, born and raised in Switzerland, but a resident of Germany for most of his adult life.

"With the Germans," he said, "you never know exactly what they will do the next day. You may become so involved in what is true at the moment that one thinks things will last for an eternity. People thought this about [Foreign Minister] Genscher." 15 In a closing comment, Dr. Mohler declared with wry humor: "In politics everything can change and the personalities of the moment may easily be forgotten."


  1. Mohler's most important work, Die Konservative Revolution in Deutschland 1918–1932, was first published in 1950 in Stuttgart by Friedrich Vorwerk Verlag. Second and third editions were published in Darmstadt. The revised, third edition was published in Darmstadt in 1989 in two volumes (715 pages), with a new supplement.
  2. See, for example: Ezra Pound, Impact: Essays on Ignorance and the Decline of American Civilization (Chicago: H. Regnery, 1960); Thorstein Veblen, The Theory of the Leisure Class (1899).
  3. Quote from Milan Kundera, "A Kidnapped West of Culture Bows Out," Granta, 11 (1984), p. 99. In his influential book Mitteleuropa, first published in 1915, Friedrich Naumann popularized the concept of a central European community of nations, dominated by Germany, that would be independent of Russian or British hegemony. Naumann, a liberal German politician and Lutheran theologian, sought to win working class support for a program combining Christian socialism and a strong central state.
  4. As one German intellectual puts it, "The renaissance of Mitteleuropa is first of all a protest against the division of the continent, against the hegemony of the Americans and the Russians, against the totalitarianism of the ideologies." Peter Bender, "Mitteleuropa — Mode, Modell oder Motiv?," Die Neue Gesellschaft/ Frankfurter Hefte, 34 (April 1987), p. 297.
  5. For a comprehensive discussion of the recent controversy over Mitteleuropa, See Hans-Georg Betz, "Mitteleuropa and Post-Modern European Identity," in The New German Critique, Spring/Summer 1990, Issue No. 50, pp. 173–192.
  6. Mohler, Die Konservative Revolution (third edition, Darmstadt, 1989), p. 13.
  7. Die Konservative Revolution (third edition), p. 6.
  8. Die fünfte Republik: Was steht hinter de Gaulle? (Munich: Piper, 1963).
  9. The movement known as Technocracy began in the United States and was especially active during the 1930s. It focused on technological innovation as the basis for social organization. Among other things, Technocracy held that major social-economic issues are too complicated to be understood and managed by politicians. Instead, society should be guided by trained specialists, especially engineers and scientists. While rejecting the Marxist theory of "class struggle,' it sought to create unity among workers, notably in the industrial heartland of the United States. Much of the popularity of Technocracy derived from widespread disgust with the obvious failure of the social-political order in the international economic crisis known as the Great Depression (approximately 1930–1940). See: Armin Mohler, "Howard Scott und die 'Technocracy': Zur Geschichte der technokratischen Bewegung, II," Standorte Im Zeitstrom (Athenaum Verlag, 1974).
  10. Vergangenheitsbewältigung, first edition: Seewald, 1968; second, revised edition: Krefeld: Sinus, 1968; third edition, Sinus, 1980. Mohler dedicated this book to Hellmut Diwald. See: "Hellmut Diwald, German Professor," The Journal of Historical Review, Nov.–Dec. 1993, pp. 16–17.
  11. Caspar von Schrenck-Notzing and Armin Mohler, Deutsche Identität. Krefeld: Sinus-Verlag, 1982. This book offers views of several leading figures in the movement to restore German national identity. See also von Schrenck-Notzing's book, Charakterwäsche: Die Politik der amerikanischen Umerziehung in Deutschland ("Character Laundering: The Politics of the American Re-education in Germany"). This book, first published in 1965, was reissued in 1993 in a 336-page edition.
  12. Armin Mohler, Der Nasenring: Im Dickicht der Vergangenheits bewältigung (Essen: Heitz & Höffkes, 1989). Revised and expanded edition published in 1991 by Verlag Langen Müller (Munich).
  13. Arnold Gehlen, Moral and Hypermoral. Frankfurt: Athenäum Verlag, 1969.
  14. See: James Bacque, Other Losses (Prima, 1991).
  15. Mohler recounted an anecdote about a German company that considered building a factory in Ireland. As the chief of the Irish branch of this company explained, "I can't run a factory with people about whom I can't be sure if they will arrive at 8:00 in the morning or 11:00 in the morning or if they arrive at all."
  16. The fall from power of Hans-Dietrich Genscher came suddenly and precipitously in the wake of the unification of the two German states in 1989. Mohler alludes here to suspicions that a number of West German Social Democratic party leaders may have been clandestine East Germany agents, whose national allegiance may have been mixed with some loyalty to international Marxism.

About the Author

Ian B. Warren is the pen name of Donald Warren, who for years was an associate professor of sociology at Oakland University in Rochester, Michigan, where he was also chairman of the university's department of sociology and anthropology. He received a doctorate in sociology from the University of Michigan. Among his writings were two books, The Radical Center: Middle Americans and the Politics of Alienation, published in 1976, and Radio Priest: Charles Coughlin, the Father of Hate Radio (1996). He died in May 1997, at the age of 61.

dimanche, 15 avril 2012

Laurent Ozon sur Tariq Ramadan et Alain Finkelkraut


Laurent Ozon sur Tariq Ramadan et Alain Finkelkraut

vendredi, 13 avril 2012

Intervista al Dr. Viaceslav Chirikba, Ministro degli Affari Esteri della Repubblica di Abkhazia

invIntervista al Dr. Viaceslav Chirikba, Ministro degli Affari Esteri della Repubblica di Abkhazia

Intervista al Dr. Viaceslav Chirikba,  Ministro degli Affari Esteri della Repubblica di Abkhazia

A cura di Filippo Pederzini

Ex: http://www.eurasia-rivista.org/

“Nella sostanza come secondo previsione l’incontro tra noi e i georgiani si è risolto con un nulla di fatto. Nella pratica però qualcosa abbiamo ottenuto, poco ma ugualmente importante: a livello internazionale si continua a parlare di Abkhazia, l’attenzione nei nostri confronti è elevata e questo oggi è fondamentale”. Nessun giro di parole, va subito al sodo il Dr. Viaceslav Chirikba, Ministro degli Esteri della Repubblica di Abkhazia, il 27-28 marzo scorsi protagonista a Ginevra, presso le Nazioni Unite per un nuovo incontro con i rappresentanti della Georgia riguardo l’indipendenza del suo Paese (indipendenza che i georgiani continuano a negare), mentre il 30 marzo e il 3 aprile è stato a Roma, per presentare il paese di cui è rappresentante agli organi di informazione italiani.

Il nuovo ‘round’ ha visto di fronte nuovamente abkhazi e russi da una parte e georgiani e statunitensi dall’altra. Sul piatto, il riconoscimento all’indipendenza dello stato caucasico che si affaccia sul Mar Nero, che di fatto lo è – dal momento della sua auto proclamazione risalente al 1992, e ribadita per altro nel 2008, dopo il tentativo di aggressione georgiana, sventata celermente dall’intervento russo, col conseguente riconoscimento di Russia, Venezuela, Nicaragua, Nauru, Vanuatu e Tovalu – nonostante l’ambigua posizione di Nazioni Unite ed Unione Europea. Nei panni queste ultime, ancora una volta e per chissà quanto tempo, di un arbitro sulla cui imparzialità si potrebbe discutere, considerando la propensione – è avvenuto in più di un’occasione – alla politica dei due pesi e delle due misure. È stato così per il Kosovo dal riconoscimento ‘indispensabile’, lo è oggi per quei territori definiti a status conteso come appunto l’Abkhazia, l’Ossezia del Sud, il Nagorno Karabagh, la Transnistria, sui quali si preferisce diplomaticamente sottrarsi alla considerazione della realtà attuale, o rimandare eventualmente il tutto a data da destinarsi. Senza dimenticare poi, utile ricordarlo, che nel caso specifico dell’Abkhazia ogni volta in cui sono in programma incontri presso le Nazioni Unite i georgiani non mancano mai di avanzare la richiesta di evitare di invitare al tavolo delle trattative i rappresentanti abkhazi.

Innanzitutto, signor Ministro, la ringraziamo per averci concesso questa intervista. È stato così anche questa volta, i georgiani non vi volevano come controparte? Quale è stato l’esito dei colloqui di Ginevra?

Negli incontri del 27-28 marzo con la Georgia, avvenuti alla presenza di Stati Uniti, Russia ed Unione Europea, non si è giunti ad alcuna soluzione. Con i Georgiani non siamo riusciti assolutamente a dialogare. L’impedimento è sorto anche dalla presenza a Ginevra dei rappresentanti dei Paesi Baltici e della Polonia che hanno esercitato una sorta di ostruzionismo nei nostri confronti come sempre. È noto che questi Paesi hanno sostituito l’anticomunismo con la russofobia, e tutto ciò come nel nostro caso rappresenta amicizia e rapporti di buon vicinato con la Russia, si trasforma in blocco, a prescindere dai contenuti. Come già le volte precedenti tengo a ribadire che è molto difficile arrivare ad un tipo di risoluzione che vada incontro alle esigenze di entrambi. Le posizioni sono diametralmente opposte. C’è comunque da parte dei georgiani ancora oggi, nonostante la figura del presidente georgiano si stia incrinando sempre di più anche in merito a questa vicenda, nessuna volontà di riconoscere l’indipendenza del nostro paese. Siamo due realtà completamente differenti. Questo però non esclude di istaurare, e ci stiamo impegnando ormai da anni a tal senso, un dialogo costruttivo finalizzato al riconoscimento dell’indipendenza dell’Abkhazia. Passo a cui seguirebbe una ripresa dei rapporti tra i due stati e di conseguenza alla riapertura del confine. Non siamo noi però a non volere il dialogo con i georgiani, tengo a sottolineare, ma loro, fermi su posizioni assolutamente controproducenti e condizionati da terzi.

Ma quali sono oggi appunto, le posizioni georgiane in merito alla vicenda abkhaza?

In primo luogo l’irrinunciabilità e la rivendicazione dell’intero territorio abkhazo, come parte integrante dello stato georgiano. Sono forti di questa posizione, sostenuta per altro dagli Stati Uniti, grazie al mancato riconoscimento dell’indipendenza dell’Abkhazia sia parte delle Nazioni Unite, come della stessa Unione Europea. La Georgia come ribadito in passato l’unica concessione che sarebbe eventualmente disposta a fare sarebbe quella di una sorta di autonomia culturale dell’Abkhazia. Una formalità semplicemente irrisoria priva di valore; molto meno di quanto è concesso per fare un paragone, dallo stato italiano, alle provincie autonome di Trento e Bolzano. Il sostegno degli Stati Uniti alla Georgia fa sì poi che molti paesi a livello internazionale evitando di analizzare ed approfondire le questioni inerenti alla situazione abkhaza, si allineano su posizioni filo georgiane. Posizione per altro che trovano schierati anche tanti media occidentali: nel 2008 ad esempio alla stregua degli osseti del sud siamo finiti da ‘aggrediti’ ad aggressori, quando è vero l’esatto contrario. Nemmeno il web a tal senso ci viene incontro. Nonostante l’impegno profuso da parte nostra, dei russi e di altri che contribuiscono alla circolazione di notizie vere relative alla realtà abkhaza, come pure l’attività condotta da Mauro Murgia e recentemente la rivista Eurasia, che intervistandolo ha fatto sì che si parlasse di Abkhazia in un trimestrale di studi geopolitici così autorevole e soprattutto degli abkhazi, molte informazioni veicolate su internet non solo non sono veritiere, ma rasentano il falso. Su wikipedia la libera enciclopedia multimediale ad esempio è riportato che l’indipendenza dell’Abkhazia va contro il diritto internazionale. Curioso vero? E quella del Kosovo, senza aver nulla contro i kosovari sia chiaro, invece no? È stato smembrato uno stato, la culla della Serbia, oltretutto per crearne uno, privo di radici storiche, culturali, senza tradizione alcuna, che non ha avuto particolari difficoltà ad essere riconosciuto dalla comunità internazionale…

L’indipendenza del Kosovo però, non avrebbe potuto costituire un precedente su cui fare leva, in sede delle Nazioni Unite?

Diciamo che non ci siamo mai fatti illusioni: nei nostri confronti, ci si è mossi e questo appare abbastanza evidente oggi, quasi esclusivamente in funzione antirussa. Come antirussa, col beneplacito dell’occidente continua ad essere la politica estera georgiana: l’ultima novità giusto perché gli esempi non mancano mai e sono sempre di varia natura è che a maggio prossimo la Georgia inaugurerà un monumento sul confine della Circassia a ricordo dei circassi che hanno resistito all’occupazione sovietica. Come la si vuol definire questo tipo di azione? Sono pronto a scommettere che non mancherà di trovare spazio su qualche organo di informazione europeo o statunitense di rilievo, con ovviamente il giusto risalto. Non trova però spazio se non in termini a noi avversi la nostra vicenda. Tornando al Kosovo e scusandomi per questa parentesi, tengo però a chiarire una cosa: rispetto alla ‘neo nazione europea’, l’Abkhazia, oltre a vantare due millenni di storia ha sempre goduto di uno statuto speciale già dai tempi dello Zar, rinnovato anche nel 1931 quando è entrata a far parte dell’Unione Sovietica (solo l’avvento di Stalin ha cambiato le cose: con la deportazione di migliaia di abkhazi e l’accorpamento del territorio alla Georgia). Se non altro storicamente e a livello di diritto internazionale qualche ragione in più pensiamo di averla e cerchiamo di farla valere. Già il fatto comunque che oggi, lo ribadisco si parli di Abkhazia a Ginevra, presso le Nazioni Unite, come è avvenuto a Roma nei giorni scorsi è un importante passo in avanti.

Queste resistenze a livello internazionale nei vostri confronti, paiono celare però anche altri argomenti al momento sottaciuti, sia dalla Georgia che dal loro primo sponsor, gli Stati Uniti. Ecco, non è che ci siano ragioni di natura economica alla base della ferma volontà di non riconoscere la vostra indipendenza, da parte dei georgiani come dei loro ‘alleati’?

Posso risponderle che l’Abkhazia oggi è tra i primi paesi al mondo per l’elevata quantità in suo possesso e qualità, di acqua dolce. Difficile pensarlo per uno stato di così piccole dimensioni, ma è così. Lo sfruttamento di questa ricchezza naturale, senza inquinamento alcuno ci permette di produrre energia di tipo idroelettrico in abbondanza. A parte quella utile al fabbisogno del nostro paese, il resto lo vendiamo alla Russia: una quantità tale che permette di soddisfare le esigenze di una larga fetta del territorio russo meridionale. È chiaro dunque che una risorsa naturale come l’acqua, guardando anche alle condizioni in cui cominciano a versare molti paesi causa siccità, mutamenti atmosferici e altro e per usare la nota frase “Che la prossima guerra si combatterà per l’acqua”, già adesso si rileva oltre che importante per la sopravvivenza, strategica per i paesi che ne possiedono in grandi quantità. Ma non è l’unico fattore. Ci sono ben altre risorse naturali su cui si concentra l’attenzione. A poche miglia nautiche dalla costa, in acque territoriali abkhaze a tutti gli effetti sono stati individuati nel sottosuolo marino enormi giacimenti di gas naturale e di petrolio. Sgombrando il campo da ogni sorta di equivoco e cioè che sono dell’Abkhazia e del suo popolo, il Governo non è attualmente e non lo sarà nemmeno in futuro interessato a sfruttare questo tipo di risorse. Puntiamo per altro invece ad uno sfruttamento maggiore dell’acqua come delle tante bellezze naturali di cui è ricco il paese. Il mare, i laghi, le montagne i parchi. Il fatto che ora già oltre 2 milioni di russi ogni anno trascorrono le vacanze presso di noi, indica che la via che siamo intenzionati a percorrere è quella dello sviluppo turistico, prima che industriale, dato che il territorio va preservato. Le Olimpiadi Invernali di Soci nel 2014 rappresentano anche per noi una seria e concreta opportunità di crescita. Molto a livello di riqualificazione e valorizzazione si sta già facendo, ma tanto ancora ci sarà da fare soprattutto a livello infrastrutturale. Per questo ci rivolgiamo agli investitori stranieri, italiani compresi, offrendo loro un regime fiscale molto agevolato per imprendere in Abkhazia.

Diceva dei russi. Che rapporto c’è attualmente con loro, al di là del fatto che molti media occidentali parlano espressamente di sudditanza?

Con l’avvento di Vladimir Putin, il rapporto è stato fin da subito costruttivo e di estrema collaborazione. Sono lontani ormai i tempi di Eltsin quando le relazioni con la Russia erano ridotte al lumicino. Basti pensare che dal suo primo insediamento al Cremlino Putin ha iniziato a guardare all’Abkhazia con occhi diversi. O meglio ha capito subito e trasmesso che il nostro stato non è parte integrante della Georgia, ma indipendente e come tale deve avere vita propria. La Federazione Russa inoltre dopo la crisi diplomatica coi georgiani non ha esitato solo un attimo a riconoscerci, contribuendo ad elevarci a nazione tra le nazioni. È venuta incontro alle esigenze della popolazione, in primo luogo mediante la concessione del passaporto russo, che consente ai cittadini abkhazi la libera circolazione al di fuori dei confini del proprio Stato, come avviene per i cittadini delle altre nazioni. Gli Abkhazi possono entrare liberamente nel territorio russo, così come in tutti quei Paesi che hanno riconosciuto l’Abkhazia. Non va dimenticato poi il sostegno in termini economici sociali e tecnici offerto dalla Federazione Russa all’Abkhazia, teso allo sviluppo dello Stato, come pure quello militare. Come potrebbe fare altrimenti la nazione abkhaza a difendere e monitorare le proprie acque territoriali, in mancanza di una marina propria? Non è passato molto tempo, è utile ricordarlo, da quando unità navali georgiane si frapponevano e bloccavano tutte le imbarcazioni che volevano approdare nei nostri porti, arrestandone addirittura gli equipaggi. Inoltre è sicuramente meglio che siano le unità russe a controllare il confine con la Georgia, al fine di evitare ulteriori tensioni. Soprattutto il supporto offertoci dalla Federazione Russa ha contribuito a far parlare gli abkhazi del loro paese e non altri, come purtroppo continua in larga parte ad avvenire.

Da ultimo, che bilancio trae da questa sua visita in Italia?

Mi sento di dire che si è trattato di un viaggio, il primo nel vostro paese, di assoluta importanza e che ha determinato un passo anche seppur piccolo, in avanti con l’Unione Europea. Sta passando, in Europa, la giusta logica del ‘Fare parlare l’Abkhazia’, iniziando ad emarginare il cosiddetto ‘Parlare dell’Abkhazia’, senza minimamente conoscere il Paese e più in generale i problemi del Caucaso. A Pesaro, San Marino e Roma, gli incontri effettuati, sia politici che economici, sono stati seguiti con estrema attenzione da molti soprattutto esponenti del mondo economico. A Roma poi in particolar modo: in occasione della conferenza presso la stampa estera con i giornalisti italiani e quando, accompagnato dal Senatore del Partito Radicale Marco Perduca, ho incontrato privatamente il Senatore Lamberto Dini, presidente della Commissione Esteri del Senato. Il piacere dell’affermazione da lui pronunciata, “L’Abkhazia ha diritto alla sua autodeterminazione, senza se e senza ma”, dimostra che il nostro lavoro inizia a dare frutti concreti, impensabili ed impossibili solo poco tempo fa.

mercredi, 04 avril 2012

Réponses de Robert Steuckers à la Table Ronde, “Quel avenir pour les peuples d’Europe?”


Réponses de Robert Steuckers à la Table Ronde, “Quel avenir pour les peuples d’Europe?” au colloque du Château Coloma, 3 mars 2012

Q.: Quelles réactions positives voyez-vous aujourd’hui parmi les peuples européens?

RS: Des réactions positives? Je n’en vois pas beaucoup. J’en retiens deux, marginales sur le plan géographique mais significatives, et, mutatis mutandis, dignes d’être imitées: la mobilisation populaire en Islande et la colère de la foule en Grèce. Il y a d’abord la réaction islandaise, celle de ce petit peuple insulaire de 350.000 habitants, qui a inventé une véritable représentation démocratique dès l’aube de son histoire et forgé la première littérature moderne et profane de notre continent. Dans ce pays, les responsables de la crise de 2008, les infects banksters qui ont commis l’acte abject et méprisable de spéculer, sont traduits en justice, de même que Haarde, le Premier Ministre qui a couvert leurs vilénies, tandis que notre “Commission Dexia” patine et qu’on ne verra pas de sitôt l’incarcération, pourtant dûment méritée, de Dehaene à Lantin ou à Jamioulx. En Islande, ses homologues ès-abjection sont derrière les barreaux ou devant les juges. Parallèlement à cette saine réaction, les Islandais ont refusé de rembourser les banques étrangères qui ont participé à la ruine de leur pays et se sont donné une constitution nouvelle où la spéculation est expressément décrite comme un délit et où tous les transferts de souveraineté sont d’emblée condamnés ou, éventuellement, soumis à référendum. Les Islandais ont fait montre de volonté politique: ils ont prouvé qu’un retour au politique était possible dans un monde occidental où règne la dictature subtile du “tout-économique”. Résultat: l’Islande connaît un redéploiement économique assez spectaculaire.

Dans le reste de l’Europe, c’est l’apathie.

En Grèce, nous avons vu, ces jours-ci, des émeutes plus violentes encore que celles qui ont secoué Athènes l’an passé. Le peuple refuse le diktat des banques, du FMI et de l’eurocratie. La RTBF comme la VRT ont interrogé des quidams dans la rue; trois de ceux-ci ont lancé: “C’est bientôt votre tour!”. C’est prophétique et réaliste tout à la fois. En effet, la faiblesse, la lâcheté et la veulerie du monde politique, qui n’ose faire cueillir les escrocs et les banquiers par la police dès potron-minet, en filmant la scène à titre de petite mise au pilori, ne peuvent avoir qu’une seule conséquence à moyen terme: la faillite totale de l’Etat et l’hellénisation/paupérisation de notre société. Malgré cette colère de la rue à Athènes, les Grecs, contrairement aux Islandais, ont dû accepter, tout comme les Italiens d’ailleurs, un gouvernement d’économistes, de banquiers, de technocrates qui n’ont aucun atome crochu avec la population et, forcément, aucune légitimité démocratique. La dictature a donc fait sa réapparition en Europe, non plus une dictature acclamative ou issue des urnes comme il y en a eu dans l’histoire récente de notre continent, mais une dictature sans acclamations populaires, sans légitimité électorale, qui s’apprête à ruiner toutes les familles grecques et italiennes. Mais où sont les protestataires anti-dictateurs, comme ceux qui s’agitaient contre Franco ou contre les Colonels grecs dans les années 60 et 70?

En France, les grandes leçons du gaullisme des années 60 sont bien oubliées. Aucune réaction saine n’est à attendre du sarközisme néo-libéral. En Espagne, le mouvement des indignés est certes fort sympathique, mais quelles seront ses suites? L’Espagne, vient de nous dire Jean David, compte aujourd’hui quatre millions de chômeurs, avec un nouveau gouvernement libéral, qui fera la politique du FMI, et préconisera des mesures anti-populaires comme le font déjà anticipativement, chez nous, un Decroo (le fils de son papa) ou un Reynders (qui, dit-on, brigue un haut poste à la BNP à Paris).

Le mouvement des indignés espagnols montre que toute contestation juvénile est désormais noyée dans ce que le regretté Philippe Muray nommait le “festivisme”. On transforme une protestation, dont les enjeux sont pourtant vitaux pour l’ensemble de la population, en un happening de style Woodstock, ce qui n’inquiète ni les banksters ni leurs serviteurs néo-libéraux. Le danger du “gauchisme”, comme on disait naguère, ne vient nullement de sa nature “contestataire”, antagoniste à l’égard des pouvoirs en place, mais de ses propensions au “festivisme”, tel qu’il a été défini par Muray. La culture festiviste, envahissante, tablant sur les émotions ou sur les désirs, tue de fait les réflexes politiques, basés sur le sérieux de l’existence, sur l’agonalité (Ernst Jünger, Armin Mohler) et sur la prise en compte, pessimiste et prévoyante, des risques et du pire (Clément Rosset). Les exemples abondent pour signaler le glissement des idées en apparence révolutionnaires de mai 68 dans la farce festiviste: l’itinéraire d’un Daniel Cohn-Bendit le prouve amplement, ce pseudo-révolutionnaire du Nanterre de 1968, qui avait mêlé verbiage pseudo-marxiste et obsessions sexuelles, est aujourd’hui un allié du néo-libéral thatchérien Guy Verhofstadt quand il s’agit, dans l’enceinte du Parlement européen, de vitupérer tout réflexe politique naturel, émanant du peuple réel; ou toute tentative de l’un ou l’autre ponte en place, comme Sarközy, d’utiliser un réflexe populaire naturel pour mener une politique quelconque, par pur calcul politicien et qui, si elle était réellement traduite dans la réalité, serait efficace ou écornerait les intérêts du banksterisme.

Le philosophe néerlandais Luk van Middelaar parlait, pour la France, d’une culture philosophique du “politicide”, qui s’est développée parallèlement à l’idéologie étatique rigide que la république a toujours tenté de faire triompher dans son propre pré carré. De Sartre aux contestataires de Mai 68, en passant par Michel Foucault ou par le néo-nietzschéanisme exigeant la libération joyeuse et immédiate des “machines à désirer”, par le nouveau néokantisme post-marxisant qui découvrait subitement l’horreur du goulag chez ses anciens alliés soviétiques dans les années 70 ou par l’hypermoralisme hystérique des médias dominants ou par la promotion médiatique d’une “république compassionnelle”, les intellectuels français ont perpétré en permanence un “assassinat du politique” qui ne peut mener qu’à une impasse. Celle dans laquelle nous nous trouvons (Luk van Middelaar, Politicide – De moord op de politiek in de Franse filosofie, van Gennep, Amsterdam, 1999).

Il faut par conséquent une bataille métapolitique pour éradiquer les affres du festivisme et contrer les effets délétères de l’apathie en laquelle somnolent la plupart de nos concitoyens.

Q.: A quels dangers serait soumise une Europe redevenue “populiste” au sens positif du terme?

RS: Dresser la liste des dangers qui nous menacent risque d’être un exercice fort long. Si nous prenons la spéculation en cours contre l’euro, phénomène emblématique de l’absence de souveraineté et de vigueur politiques au sein de l’Europe eurocratique, nous constatons que toutes les spéculations hostiles à la monnaie commune européenne ont une origine outre-Atlantique, proviennent du secteur bancaire spéculatif américain. J’en conclus que la spéculation contre les Etats et les monnaies, dont l’Asie avait connu un précédent en 1997, est un mode (relativement) nouveau de guerre indirecte. Saddam Hussein voulait facturer son pétrole en euro. Ahmadinedjad a envisagé de le faire à son tour pour le pétrole et le gaz iraniens. Les puissances du BRIC (Russie, Chine, Inde, Brésil) emboîtent le pas. L’euro constituait donc le danger le plus grave pour les Etats-Unis à court et à moyen termes, car il était sur le point de détrôner le roi-dollar. L’Europe, puissance civile et pacifique (Zaki Laïdi), aurait, sans coup férir, damé le pion à l’hegemon Il fallait dès lors frapper cet instrument de souveraineté européenne à son “ventre mou” méditerranéen. Les pays méditerranéens, ceux du groupe PIGS (Portugal, Italie, Grèce, Espagne), sont effectivement les plus fragiles, les plus aisés à faire basculer pour entraîner un effet domino et affaiblir simultanément les pays économiquement plus forts de l’ancienne zone mark (oui, la Belgique est menacée, on le sait; l’Autriche a perdu un “A” et les Pays-Bas sont inquiets car ils connaissent leurs points faibles, leurs éventuels talons d’Achille). L’Allemagne est encore en mesure de résister vu ses accords gaziers avec la Russie et les marchés qu’elle développe à grande échelle en Chine. L’Allemagne demeure forte parce qu’elle est davantage liée aux puissances du groupe BRIC, parce qu’elle a misé subrepticement sur une carte eurasienne sans renier avec fracas son option atlantiste officielle. Les anciens chanceliers Schmidt et Schröder se sont hissés à la position “catéchonique” de garants de cet axe énergétique Berlin/Moscou, avatar actuel des accords Rathenau/Tchitchérine, signés à Rapallo en 1922.

Pour revenir à la Grèce, aujourd’hui ruinée, on évoque fort souvent l’insouciance du personnel politique grec, qui a pratiqué une politique démagogique où l’Etat-Providence était particulièrement généreux et peu regardant (plusieurs centaines d’aveugles disposent de leur permis de conduire...) ou le gouffre financier qu’a constitué l’organisation des jeux olympiques de 2004 mais on omet curieusement de mentionner le coût exorbitant qu’ont entraîné les incendies de forêts et de garrigues que le pays a subi deux années de suite. Le feu a ravagé les campagnes et s’est avancé jusque dans les banlieues des villes dans des proportions hors du commun. De même, la Russie de Poutine, récalcitrante face aux diktats du “nouvel ordre mondial”, a subi sur son territoire des incendies de grande envergure, inédits dans l’histoire.

Ces incendies sont-ils dû à des hasards naturels, un peu vite mis sur le compte de l’hypothétique “réchauffement climatique”? Ou bien sont-ils les effets d’une nouvelle forme de “guerre indirecte”? La question peut être posée.

De même, on parle, avec le projet HAARP, de l’éventualité de provoquer artificiellement des catastrophes sismiques ou autres. Le tsunami qui a réduit à néant le nucléaire japonais l’an passé (et conduira à court terme au démantèlement total du secteur nucléaire de l’Empire du Soleil Levant) ou les tempêtes extrêmement violentes que la France a subies il y a quelques années, immédiatement après l’enthousiasme soulevé par la possibilité d’un Axe Paris/Berlin/Moscou, sont-ils des hasards ou non? Telles sont des questions à étudier avec toute l’attention voulue, comme le fait “Kopp-Verlag” en Allemagne.

L’arme de la grève sauvage a été utilisée contre Chirac en 1995, après des essais nucléaires à Mururoa. On sait que certains syndicats français, noyautés par des éléments trotskistes ou lambertistes, pendants économico-sociaux des “nouveaux philosophes” agissant dans l’espace médiatique, sont soutenus par la CIA (ou l’ont été par l’ex-OSS quand il a fallu mettre les anciens alliés communistes échec et mat). La France vit en permanence sous l’épée de Damoclès d’une paralysie totale, qui pourrait être due, par exemple, à une grève des routiers, qui bloquerait toutes les routes de l’Hexagone et toutes les voies d’accès à celui-ci. Dans de telles conditions, pas besoin de révolution orange en France...

Reste effectivement le danger des “révolutions colorées”, à l’instar de celle qui a réussi en Géorgie en 2003 et a porté Sakashvili au pouvoir. L’instrument des révolutions colorées est désormais connu et ne fonctionne plus de manière optimale, en dépit d’un personnel très bien écolé, recruté au départ du mouvement serbe OTPOR. En Ukraine, les conséquences de la “révolution orange” de 2004, soit un rapprochement du pays avec les structures atlantistes et eurocratiques, sont annulées sous la pression du réel géographique. L’Ukraine est liée aux espaces déterminés par les grands fleuves (Dniestr, Dniepr, Don) et par la Mer Noire. Elle est aussi liée territorialement à l’espace russe du Nord. La dernière tentative de “révolution orange” en Russie cet hiver, pour faire tomber Poutine, s’est soldée par un échec: les sondages créditent le Premier Ministre russe de 66% des intentions de vote! Pire pour les “occidentistes”, la majorité absolue des voix va non seulement vers le mouvement de Poutine mais aussi, au-delà des deux tiers de votes que les sondages lui attribuent, à des formations politiques d’inspiration communiste ou nationale (Ziouganov et Jirinovski) et non pas vers les tenants d’une ré-occidentalisation de la Russie, avec son cortège de “Gay-Prides” festivistes, d’oligarques et de politiciens véreux et falots.

Les “printemps arabes”, autre manière de mobiliser les foules pour libérer les marchés potentiels —que constituent les Etats arabo-musulmans—  des structures étatiques traditionnelles et des corruptions claniques, ont fonctionné en Tunisie et, partiellement seulement, en Egypte. En Syrie, cela n’a pas marché et on prépare au pays d’El-Assad un avenir libyen...

Les pays européens sont finalement à ranger parmi les Etats de faible personnalité politique. Outre la spéculation contre l’euro, quel instrument garde-t-on au placard pour la faire fléchir si jamais il lui prenait de branler dans le manche? L’ambassadeur américain Jeremy Rivkin a été trop bavard: il a révélé la nature de l’instrument dont on ferait usage pour déstabiliser les sociétés des Européens de l’Ouest, si ceux-ci devenaient trop récalcitrants. On leur balancerait les déclassés des banlieues dans les pattes. Jeremy Rivkin évoque, sans circonlocutions inutiles, la possibilité de mobiliser les masses immigrées des banlieues pour faire tomber ou pour désarçonner un gouvernement rebelle, surtout en France. Sarkozy doit savoir mieux que personne qu’il a été porté au pouvoir suite aux émeutes des banlieues françaises de novembre 2005. Elles avaient servi à éliminer Chirac, adepte de l’Axe Paris/Berlin/Moscou. Elles pourraient tout aussi bien servir à le faire tomber, lui aussi, s’il ne reste pas sagement dans le sillage de l’hegemon américain et fidèle à son alliance privilégiée avec la Grande-Bretagne de Cameron. Faye avait prédit, à la grande fureur du président français actuel, que la France ne pourrait pas se payer indéfiniment des émeutes de banlieues, surtout si elles éclataient simultanément dans plusieurs grandes agglomérations de l’Hexagone, non plus seulement dans le fameux département n°93, près de Paris, mais aussi à Lyon, Marseille et Lille. Les réseaux salafistes, comme les réseaux lambertistes, sont prêts à faire le jeu de l’hegemon, au détriment des Etats-hôtes, a fortiori si l’Arabie Saoudite, matrice financière wahhabite des mouvements salafistes, est une alliée inconditionnelle de Washington.

La méfiance à l’égard de certains réseaux salafistes ne relève donc pas du “racisme” ou de l’“islamophobie”, comme le vocifèrent les médias aux ordres ou le pensent certains magistrats croupions, dont la corporation est dénoncée comme inculte, à l’instar de tous les juristes modernes sans culture générale, par François Ost, ancien recteur des Facultés universitaires Saint-Louis de Bruxelles. Cette méfiance à l’égard des salafistes relève d’une simple analyse du terrain politique, où il faut établir l’inventaire des éléments en place: quelles sont les forces dangereuses qui pourraient, dans un avenir prévisible, disloquer la machine étatique, dont je suis citoyen, et plonger la société, en laquelle je vis, dans le chaos? Quelles sont les forces en présence dans ma société qui pourraient servir de levier, à toutes mauvaises fins utiles, à l’hegemon pour la déstabiliser ou l’affaiblir?

Q.: Quels sont les ennemis intérieurs et extérieurs des peuples européens dans le contexte actuel?

RS: Commençons par les ennemis extérieurs, les ennemis intérieurs n’étant que des instruments à leur service. L’ennemi extérieur est bien entendu l’hegemon qui refuse de nous élever à son rang, comme on le ferait en toute bonne logique avec des alliés fidèles à la façon romaine, et nous plonge en permanence dans l’assujetissement, brisant chaque fois, à l’aide d’instruments subtils propres aux nouvelles formes de guerre indirecte, tout nouvel élan économique ou politique de notre Europe. Cet hegemon est une thalassocratie, une puissance essentiellement maritime, une puissance qui domine les “res nullius” que sont les océans et l’espace circumterrestre, tout en imposant des règles internationales fluctuantes, chaque fois interprétées en sa faveur. Je veux bien évidemment parler des Etats-Unis d’Amérique, tels que les a décrits une figure comme Carl Schmitt. Ce n’est pas la place ici de rappeler les réflexions profondes et pertinentes que Carl Schmitt a émises sur la fabrication arbitraire et perfide de règles juridiques internationales floues et boiteuses car tributaires de l’esprit “wilsonien”, destinées à faire avancer les pions de l’impérialisme américain dans le monde ou sur le processus délétère de fluidification et de liquéfaction des certitudes et des traditions diplomatiques que ces règles perfides ont fait éclore. Plus accessibles me semblent les directives émises par un stratégiste américain, Nicholas J. Spykman, dans un bref vademecum en annexe de son ouvrage de 1942, America’s Strategy in World Politics.

Pour lui, l’Europe de son temps possède dix atouts qui la rendent supérieure aux Etats-Unis. Ces dix atouts, que j’énonce par ailleurs (cf. “Panorama théorique de la géopolitique”, in Orientations n°12, été 1990/hiver 1990-91), lui avaient été inspirés par un géopolitologue allemand de l’école de Haushofer, une certain Robert Strauss-Hupé, émigré aux Etats-Unis après la prise du pouvoir par les nationaux-socialistes parce qu’il avait quelque ascendance juive. Les atouts que doit avoir une superpuissance de l’acabit des Etats-Unis pour Spykman ou les atouts que possédait l’Europe sous hegemon germanique selon Strauss-Hupé sont notamment, je n’en cite ici que trois, l’excellence d’un système scolaire et universitaire, la cohésion ethnique et une économie plus ou moins autarcique (ou semi-autarcique auto-centrée comme le préciseront plus tard les Français François Perroux et André Grjébine) qui permet l’émergence et la consolidation d’un bloc économique concurrent des Etats-Unis et capable de conquérir et de conserver longtemps des marchés en Asie, en Afrique et en Amérique latine.

Pour démolir l’enseignement, il y a eu mai 68, avec son cortège de nouvelles pédagogies abracadabrantes et son laxisme implicite, suivi d’une offensive, classée à “droite”, du néo-libéralisme qui a imposé des schémas pédagogiques visant l’acquisition facile de savoirs purement utilitaires au détriment des humanités traditionnelles, totalement battues en brèche. Une fois de plus, ici, le festivisme gauchiste à la sauce 68 n’a jamais cessé de marcher de concert avec le néo-libéralisme utilitariste pour ruiner les acquis de notre civilisation et que leur antagonisme fictif, souvent médiatisé pour faire croire à des alternances démocratiques, ne servait qu’à leurrer les masses. Pour briser la cohésion ethnique, on a d’abord coupé l’Europe occidentale de ses réservoirs habituels de main-d’oeuvre supplétive en Europe orientale, on a ensuite freiné tous les processus d’intégration et d’assimilation avec l’aide des réseaux wahhabite/salafiste inféodés à l’allié saoudien (qui promettait aussi un pétrole bon marché à condition que l’Europe s’ouvre à toutes les immigrations musulmanes); on s’apprête, avec l’ambassadeur Rivkin, à inciter les nouveaux banlieusards déboussolés, toutes couleurs et toutes confessions confondues, à bloquer le fonctionnement total de l’Etat et de la société en générant des troubles civils dans les grandes agglomérations; en Allemagne, Erdogan et Davutoglu menacent de faire jouer, au détriment de l’Etat allemand, les “sociétés parallèles” turques, étant bien entendu que le néo-libéralisme a eu pour effet de favoriser, de “booster”, toutes les ‘économies diasporiques”, dont les réseaux turcs, axés, dans un premier temps, sur le trafic de l’héroïne; enfin, la pratique permanente du “politicide”, surtout en France, ne permet aucune restauration du “politique”, au sens où l’entendait le regretté Julien Freund. Sans restauration du politique, nous risquons le déclin total et définitif.

On s’aperçoit clairement que l’hegemon, qui entend freiner tous nos élans, aligne tout un éventail d’alliés circonstantiels, qui ne sont en aucun cas l’ennemi principal mais bien plutôt les instruments de celui-ci. La rébellion turque, mise en exergue par les médias depuis le “clash” entre Erdogan et son homologue israélien à Davos et depuis l’affaire de la flotille humanitaire turque amenant des médicaments aux Palestiniens de Gaza, est un “show”, destiné à gruger les masses arabo-musulmanes. Outre cette mise en scène, la politique turque n’a guère changé à l’égard de son environnement, en dépit du discours néo-ottoman de Davutoglu qui évoque les notions de “zéro problème avec les voisins” et de solidarité musulmane. En Syrie, depuis août 2011, la Turquie est bel et bien alignée sur l’hegemon américain: Erdogan, Gül et Davutoglu ont tenté de faire fléchir El-Assad, en lui suggérant de prendre dans son gouvernement des ministres appartenant aux “Frères Musulmans” et de ne plus favoriser les Alaouites, adeptes d’un islam à fortes connotations chiites, et de renoncer à la laïcité de l’Etat, préconisée par l’idéologie baathiste qui refuse toute discrimination entre musulmans (sunnites, chiites, alaouites, druzes, etc.) ou à l’égard des chrétiens arabes/araméens. Le pari baathiste sur la laïcité de l’Etat syrien, sans violence institutionnelle aucune à l’égard des communautés réelles composant la population syrienne, est plus souple que ne le fut le kémalisme turc, avant son éviction par l’AKP d’Erdogan. Aujourd’hui, c’est par la Turquie (par l’Irak et la Jordanie) que transitent les armes pour les opposants syriens et pour les mercenaires “afghans” ou “libyens” qui affrontent l’armée loyaliste syrienne. Par railleurs, la géopolitique implicite de la Turquie n’est pas assimilable à une géopolitique européenne cohérente: les “directions” qu’entend prendre la géopolitique turque sous-jacente ne vont pas dans le même sens qu’une bonne géopolitique européenne qui serait enfin devenue générale et cohérente: la Turquie, par exemple, entend reprendre indirectement pied dans les Balkans, alors que ceux-ci devraient constituer exclusivement un tremplin européen vers la Méditerranée orientale et le Canal de Suez. Enfin, l’actuel territoire turc constitue une zone de transit pour une immigration proche-orientale, moyen-orientale et asiatique tentant de s’introduire dans l’espace Schengen. La Turquie, en dépit des subsides considérables qu’elle reçoit de l’Europe eurocratique, ne garde pas ses frontières et laisse passer vers l’Europe des centaines de milliers de futurs clandestins. La police et la flotte grecques sont débordées. Les finances de l’Etat grec ont été déstabilisées par ce combat à la Sisyphe, tout comme par les incendies de grande ampleur que la Grèce a subi ces derniers étés, et non pas tant, comme veulent le faire accroire les médias véhiculant le discours néo-libéral dominant, par la mauvaise gestion des budgets olympiques de 2004 et par quelques milliers de pauvres grecs véreux et madrés qui escroquaient leur système national de sécurité sociale. Pour endiguer ce gigantesque flot de réfugiés, pire que ceux de Lampedusa aux portes de la Sicile et de Fuerteventura dans les Canaries, l’eurocratie ne débloque qu’un très petit budget pour l’envoi de 200 malheureux gendarmes qui doivent surveiller une frontière qui va des rives pontiques de la Thrace à toutes les îles de l’Egée jusqu’à Rhodes et à toutes les parties de l’archipel du Dodécannèse. L’agence Frontex, chargée en théorie de verrouiller les frontières extérieures de l’espace Schengen pour éviter tous les déséquilibres qu’apporterait une immigration débridée, ne reçoit en réalité aucun appui sérieux et se révèle une “coquille vide”.

On sait que toutes les menées salafistes ou wahhabites sont en dernière instance téléguidées par le tandem américano-saoudien et s’avèrent idéales pour perpétrer des opérations de guerre indirecte, dites de “low intensity warfare”, ou des actions “fausse-bannière” (false flag operations). On tue un Pim Fortuyn non pas tant parce qu’il serait “islamophobe” mais parce qu’il souhaitait supprimer la participation néerlandaise aux opérations en Afghanistan. On recrute un tueur dans la diaspora marocaine de Molenbeek pour éliminer le Commandant Massoud afin que ce combattant efficace ne prenne pas le pouvoir suite à la chute des talibans, programmée par le Pentagone. On envoie un Jordanien fondamentaliste pour prendre la direction de la rébellion tchétchène sur le tracé d’un oléoduc qui pourrait amener le brut russe et kazakh en Mer Noire, etc. La Russie, fournisseur principal d’hydrocarbures à l’Europe, est fragilisée dans la Caucase du Nord par les fondamentalistes tchétchènes et daghestanais mais aussi et surtout, comme le signale l’observateur allemand Peter Scholl-Latour, par une intervention wahhabite potentielle (et donc indirectement américaine) dans deux républiques musulmanes de la Fédération de Russie, le Tatarstan et le Baschkirtostan. Si ces deux républiques basculent dans le désordre civil ou si des fondamentalistes y arrivent au pouvoir, le territoire de la Fédération de Russie serait littéralement coupé en deux à hauteur de l’Oural, extrême nord excepté, soit au-delà de la limite méridionale de la zone des toundras. L’Europe serait réduite à ce qu’elle était au début du 16ième siècle, avant le déferlement des troupes d’Ivan le Terrible et de Fiodor I au 16ème siècle qui, parties de la région de Moscou, conquièrent tout le cours de la Volga et déboulent à Astrakhan en 1556. Kazan, la capitale tatar, était tombée en 1552. Peter Scholl-Latour rappelle que les Tatars ne sont que fort rarement séduits par le “wahhabisme” saoudien ou par l’idéologie égyptienne des Frères Musulmans d’Hassan al-Banna et de Sayyid Qutb et leur préfèrent une sorte d’islam modernisé, compatible avec la modernité européenne et russe, que l’on appelle le “yadidisme” ou la “voie tatar”, dont le penseur est actuellement Rafael Chakimov. Ce dernier s’insurge contre les volontés wahhabites de vouloir à tout prix imiter les moeurs et coutumes de l’Arabie des 7ème et 8ème siécles. Les adeptes de Chakimov sont peut-être majoritaires aujourd’hui au Tatarstan mais ils avaient dû prendre en compte les menées de la mosquée “Yoldiz Madrassa”, dans la ville industrielle de Naberechnié Khelny, animée par des enseignants tous issus du monde arabe. Ils ont été expulsés parce que certains de leurs étudiants avaient rejoint les rebelles tchétchènes. L’avenir est ouvert sur les rives de la Kama, affluent de la Volga qui prend ses sources loin au nord, à la limite de la toundra circumarctique. L’hegemon mondial et ses alliés saoudiens pourraient y semer le trouble en luttant contre le “yadidisme” tatar ou en réactivant une forme ou une autre de pantouranisme (pour connaître la question dans tous ses détails et en dehors de toute polémique politique, cf. L’islam de Russie – Conscience communautaire et autonomie politique chez les Tatars de la Volga et de l’Oural depuis le XVIIIe siècle, sous la direction de Stéphane A. Dudoignon, Dämir Is’haqov et Räfyq Möhämmätshin, éd. Maisonneuve & Larose, Paris, 1997; Peter Scholl-Latour, Russland im Zangengriff – Putins Imperium zwischen Nato, China und Islam, Propyläen Verlag, Berlin, 2006).

Passons maintenant aux ennemis intérieurs: j’en citerai trois. D’abord le système bancaire, totalement parasitaire et instaurateur d’une véritable ploutocratie (mot que réhabilitent à Paris Pierre-André Taguieff et Jean-François Kahn), qui n’a plus rien, mais alors plus rien de démocratique. A ce système bancaire s’ajoute d’autres instances parasitaires comme les chaînes de supermarchés, qui spéculent sur les denrées alimentaires et sont responsables de leur cherté, plus élevée que dans les pays voisins; pour bon nombre de produits de première nécessité, les prix varient du simple au double entre notre pays et l’Allemagne, par exemple. Le secteur énergétique, entièrement aux mains de la France, nous oblige à payer un gaz et une électricité à des prix incroyablement exagérés: chaque ménage hexagonale ne paie que 62% de notre facture énergétique, ou, autres chiffres, si le ménage hexagonal paie 100%, nous payons 160,97%!! Les déséquilibres provoqués par le gigantisme de ces structures privées, semi-privées ou para-étatiques doivent être impérativement corrigés par des moyens adéquats, si nous ne voulons pas voir s’effondrer définitivement les structures les plus intimes de nos sociétés. Le second ennemi est l’idéologie néo-libérale et ses relais, dont le premier animateur fut, rappellons-le, l’ancien premier ministre Guy Verhofstadt, qui dirigea le gouvernement “arc-en-ciel”, mélange de néo-libéralisme et de gauchisme festiviste. Cette idéologie est un ennemi intérieur dangereux dans la mesure où elle étouffe, en se parant d’un masque “boniste”, toutes les possibilités d’une révolte constructive. Ensuite, pour épauler la ploutocratie et le néo-libéralisme, nous avons, troisième ennemi, les diasporas manipulables. Elles sont telles parce qu’on les déclare telles, par la bouche de l’ambassadeur Rivkin ou par la voix du tandem Erdogan/Davutoglu.

L’objectif est donc de juguler le développement exponentiel du secteur parasitaire/ploutocratique en lui imposant des limites et des contrôles, en le soumettant à une fiscalité juste (le “mulcto” ou “multo” de la  République romaine) et à des directives à soubassement éthique, qu’il ne pourrait transgresser sans commettre automatiquement un délit punissable. Le néo-libéralisme et tout le cortège de  ses dérivés doit être perçu comme une idéologie “politicide”  et dès  lors dangereuse pour la sûreté de l’Etat et de l’Europe tout entière. Quant aux diasporas manipulables, elles sont, surtout depuis les menaces d’Erdogan et de Davutoglu, des “cinquièmes colonnes” passibles des juridictions d’exception. On ne sauvera pas notre civilisation sans des mesures drastiques.