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mercredi, 12 novembre 2014

The Fall of the Wall Almost Started WWIII

By

Ex: http://www.lewrockwell.com

Twenty-five years ago this week,  the Soviet empire in Eastern Europe was collapsing. The Berlin Wall had been breached. The Communist East German government was literally swept away by the storm tide of history.

It was also the most dangerous moment the world had faced since the 1963 Cuban missile crisis. What would the Soviet leadership do?   Just graciously give way or use its huge Red Army and KGB to crush the uprisings?

Interestingly,  in a raw exposure of shameful historical enmity, Britain’s prime minister Margaret Thatcher and France’s president Francois Mitterand both called Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev to urge him not to allow German reunification. 

The Soviet Union’s reformist leader could have stopped the uprisings in East Germany, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia. The mighty Group of Soviet Forces Germany (GSFG) based in East Germany had 338,000 crack troops in 24 divisions, with 4,200 tanks, 8,000 armored vehicles, 3,800 guns and rocket launchers and 690 combat aircraft.

NATO planners had long believed that GFSG could punch through western defenses on the North German plain and storm Antwerp and Rotterdam by D+8.  Other Soviet corps in Czechoslovakia, Poland and Hungary would strike west.  Switzerland’s defense planners foresaw a massive Soviet thrust through their nation and into the Rhone Valley, outflanking NATO defenses to the north.

General Secretary Gorbachev could have quickly used the iron fist. But true to his humanistic philosophy and his innate decency, the Soviet leader ordered the GFSG to stand down, pack up, and return to the Soviet Union even though there were no barracks or apartments for the returning Soviet legions.

The opening of the East German wall and subsequent fall of its Communist government mixed Karl Marx with Groucho and Harpo Marx. In a comedy of errors, the bumbling East German government became paralyzed as mobs tried to storm the wall and get to West Germany. No high official wanted to give the order to shoot. The gates of the wall were opened by mistake.

In the USSR, resistance among hardline Communists, the military brass and the KGB was intense. Gorbachev would have been unable to sound the retreat without the support of Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze.

He was a remarkable man: the tough former KGB boss of Georgia and Communist Party chief,  Shevardnadze seemed an improbable reformer. But he co-authored the liberating policy of glasnost and perestroika and forced its adoption by the unwilling Soviet hierarchy.

I twice interviewed Shevardnadze in Moscow: he was determined to sweep away the communist system and end the Cold War. We used to call him “Chevvy Eddy.” His quick wit and sardonic humor made him very likeable. I asked him if he might consider becoming president of an independent Georgia – which he later did until overthrown by the US-backed 2003 “rose revolution.”

Soon after the fall of the Berlin Wall, I walked through the just abandoned GFSG headquarters in Wünsdorf, near Berlin. It was a scene of utter desolation: broken windows, phones and plumbing ripped out of the walls, secret files blowing in the wind. The mighty Red Army had gone. As a veteran cold war warrior, I found it incredible that an empire could disappear so quickly. Just a few regiment of Soviet soldiers and tanks, I mused, could have stopped the East German uprising.

 

Murberlin.jpg

 

In secret, Gorbachev and Shevardnadze agreed to a deal with US President George H.W. Bush and his senior strategy officials:  the Soviet Union would pull out of Eastern Europe and the Baltic. In exchange, the US vowed not to advance NATO into Eastern Europe or anywhere near Russia’s borders.

Equally important, Gorbachev refused to use force to keep the USSR together.

The Soviet leaders believed they had an ironclad deal. They did not.

The next three US administrations – Clinton, Bush II, and Obama – violated the original sphere of influence accord and began advancing US power east towards Russia’s borders. The most recent NATO foray was the overthrow of Ukraine’s pro-Russian government, a ham-handed act that nearly sparked World War III.

For imperial-minded Washington, the temptation to kick Russia while it was down and gobble up its former dominion was irresistible.   Gorbachev was mocked in western power circles – and by many angry Russians – as a foolish idealist: “the Soviet Jimmy Carter.”

Today, 25 years after the fall of the Soviet imperium, US promises have been revoked.  Washington appears determined to undermine the Russian Federation and further dismantle it. Washington sees Russia as a has-been, a minor power unworthy of respect or amity.

The Russians have actually be told to stop complaining because the Gorbachev-Bush deal was not put in writing, only oral. A naïve oversight by the Russians?

From retirement, Gorbachev bitterly watches all he strove for turn to ashes as his countrymen blame him for destroying the Soviet Union. Shevardnadze died in Georgia last July. The Cold Ware is back, to the joy of the triumphant Republicans in Washington.

Soon after the wall fell, I recall writing that unless the western allies and the Soviets came to a firm agreement of spheres of influence and a neutral zone in Middle Europe and the Baltic

that a dangerous series of clashes was inevitable. We are now there.

 

dimanche, 09 novembre 2014

La révolution militaire et la naissance de la modernité

Laurent Henninger :

La révolution militaire et la naissance de la modernité

par webtele-libre

samedi, 08 novembre 2014

Donoso Cortés: La clave teológica de la historia

Donoso Cortés: La clave teológica de la historia

Kiko Méndez-Monasterio
Escritor y periodista (España).

Ex: http://www.revistalarazonhistorica.com

es0026a.jpgNació en 1809 en Valle de la Serena, Badajoz, donde su madre se refugiaba de las tropas napoleónicas. Político, diplomático, y filósofo, es uno de los mayores exponentes europeos del pensamiento conservador del siglo XIX. Su Ensayo sobre el catolicismo, liberalismo y socialismo es una premonición de lo que le esperaba al continente y un adelanto de la Rerum Novarum de León XIII.

 

En 1952 el parlamento de la Alemania del Oeste discutía la posibilidad de incorporarse a la OTAN. Para mostrar la necesidad de oponerse al bloque soviético, uno de los diputados se refirió al discurso de un español que, cien años antes, ya había vislumbrado esa hora de Rusia como la nación más propicia para expandir la herejía socialista y amenazar a occidente. Ese diputado, en fin, estaba citando las predicciones terribles que escribió Donoso Cortés, y que acertaron con profética exactitud el destino del continente.

No es extraño que el político alemán conociese la obra del pensador español. El mismo Metternich había sido uno de los grandes admiradores y de él afirmaba: “Después de lo que ha dicho Donoso Cortés ya se puede tirar la pluma, porque es imposible que alguien pueda tener puntos de vista más elevados”. Se refería el veterano canciller al Discurso sobre la situación general de Europa que enunciara el pensador y que resonó con muchísima fuerza en todo el continente, de Roma a Moscú y de Berlín a Londres.

La fama de Donoso superaba en mucho sus cargos diplomáticos, y aunque tuvo una dilatada carrera política su genio se muestra en el análisis perfecto que hace de su tiempo, todo un oráculo del siglo, y por eso de él -y de Balmes- Menéndez Pelayo escribiría: “Si pasaron por la escena política, fue como peregrinos de otra república más alta”. Cierto.

El siglo XIX es el de la Revolución, pero ni siquiera durante su militancia liberal Donoso cayó en la trampa del caos. Fue el suyo un liberalismo verdaderamente ilustrado, pero en el que la razón nunca llega a suprimir del todo a la fe. “Creo que si en el tiempo de mi mayor olvido de Dios me hubieran dicho: vas a hacer abjuración del catolicismo o a padecer grandes tormentos, me hubiera resignado a los tormentos”.

Se casó, tuvo una hija que murió al poco tiempo y no mucho después también perdió a su esposa. Pero curiosamente no serían estos dolores los que le empujan a su conversión definitiva, sino la muerte piadosa de uno de sus hermanos y a la vez la anarquía europea de las revoluciones del 48. “Mi conversión se debe a la misericordia divina y al estudio de las revoluciones, que son buenas como las herejías, porque confirman en la fe y la esclarecen”, le escribe a un amigo. Y a partir de entonces Donoso se convierte en una de las cabezas contrarevolucionarias más importantes de la época, pero tampoco le seducen los honores, así que cuando sus discursos se citan y se estudian en consejos y palacios él ya está pensando en retirarse, no para meditar en algún lugar solitario, sino para entrar en una combativa Orden religiosa. Ya había fijado su elección en la Compañía de Jesús cuando le sobrevino la muerte en París, a los cuarenta y tres años de edad. Días antes el Emperador, sabiendo de sus dolencias, había encargado que se le transmitiese su afecto y su deseo de una pronta recuperación. Donoso agradeció el gesto, pero alzó la mano para señalar el crucifijo y exclamó: “Que Éste se interese por mí es lo que importa”.

No es una anécdota, el planteamiento religioso es en Donoso Cortés piedra angular de su discurso. Es él quien entiende mejor que los errores políticos son errores teológicos, que la Europa (como le gustaba decir, por su gusto afrancesado) no se entiende sin la bicefalia del trono y el altar. Sus palabras hoy escandalizan «Sólo el sacerdote y el soldado representan aún las ideas de la inviolabilidad, de la autoridad, de la santidad, de la obediencia y de la divinidad del amor. Por eso son los representantes de la civilización europea», pero sus pronósticos se cumplieron, y se cumplen, y no son muy optimistas.

mardi, 04 novembre 2014

Nouvelle revue d'histoire n°75

NRH 75.jpg

 

La Nouvelle Revue d'Histoire est en kiosque

(n° 75, novembre - décembre 2014).

 

Le dossier central est consacré à l'impôt, à sa perception par l'état et aux réactions qu'il a pu suscité au fil de l'histoire. On peut y lire, notamment,  des articles de Emma Demeester ("Aux origines de l'impôt royal" ; "La dîme, un impôt millénaire"), de Philippe Conrad ("Soulèvements paysans contre l'impôt" ; "1789 : la tyrannie du fisc" ; "Juillet 1914 : naissance de l'impôt sur le revenu"), de Jean-Joël Brégeon ("Gabelle, faux-sauniers et gabelous"), de Martin Benoist ("La Dîme royale de Vauban"), de Jean Kappel ("Les fermiers généraux"), de Virginie Tanlay ("Napoléon et l'impôt") et de Philippe Parroy ("1953 : Poujade, le rebelle contre le fisc").

 

Hors dossier, on pourra lire, en particulier, deux entretiens, l'un avec Christian Harbulot ("La France détruit sa puissance") et l'autre avec Bernard Lugan ("Atlas des guerres africaines"), ainsi que des articles d'Emma Demeester ("Brantôme, de l'épée à la plume"), d'Henri Levavasseur ("Des Européens aux portes de la Chine"), de Rémy Porte ("1914 : la mêlée des Flandres"), de Tancrède Josseran ("1914 : l'impossible neutralité de l'Empire ottoman") et d'Aude de Kerros ("Conflits autour de l'art abstrait").

Die wirklichen Europäer sind die Russen

url_646.jpg

Die wirklichen Europäer sind die Russen

Vom Gibraltar bis zum Ural - oder wo endet Europa?

Von Eberhard Straub

Beitrag hören: http://www.deutschlandradiokultur.de/amputierter-kontinent-die-wirklichen-europaeer-sind-die.1005.de.html?dram:article_id=294917

Ein Europa, das "nur noch Westen" sein will, gibt sich auf, sagt der Historiker Eberhard Straub. Er warnt davor, Russland ausschließlich als Feind zu sehen. Die Lehre der Geschichte sollte eine andere sein, ist er überzeugt.

Die Einheit Europas zerbrach mit dem Ersten Weltkrieg. Sie war bis 1914 vom Konzert der fünf Großmächte aufrechterhalten worden. Zu dieser friedenstiftenden Staatengesellschaft gehörte ganz selbstverständlich Russland.

Im Gedenken der letzten Wochen beteuerten die Westeuropäer keine "Schlafwandler" mehr sein zu wollen. Viel Schrecken und Elend habe sie klug und weise gemacht, um nunmehr friedlich im wieder geeinten Europa zu leben - als der besten aller Welten. Von Russland war und ist dabei erstaunlicherweise nicht die Rede.

Immerhin kämpfte es unter großen Opfern als Verbündeter Englands und Frankreichs, um das Reich der Finsternis, damals das Deutsche Reich, daran zu hindern, das Licht der Freiheit in Europa zu ersticken. Es wurde als Mitglied der westlichen Wertegemeinschaft gefeiert, wie sonst nur noch einmal, als die Westmächte im verbündeten Stalin den russischen Lincoln würdigten, der alle Entrechteten befreit und ihre Menschenwürde ein für alle Male sichert.

Ausgerechnet Stalin! Aber davon möchten sie heute nichts mehr wissen, nicht an gemeinsame, unübersichtliche Vergangenheiten erinnert werden. Nichts mehr davon, dass Russland dazu verhalf, zwei Male sich siegreich zu behaupten und schließlich 1989 die Spaltung Europas in Ost und West zu überwinden.

Fernes, fremdes Reich des erlösungsbedürftigen Ostens

Dieses Russland, das mehrfach europäische Verantwortung getragen hat, ist nun wieder - wie 1917 oder 1947 - die antiwestliche Macht und damit der Feind schlechthin.

Es bleibt für Westler eben ein fremdes, fernes Reich des erlösungsbedürftigen Ostens, das seine Bewohner daran hindert, endlich Mensch zu werden, zum Wohlstand ebenso aufzuschließen wie zur Aufklärung, den Obrigkeitsstaat abzuschütteln. Selbst dessen Härte und Terror war keine russische Erfindung

So wurde der Kommunismus als genuin europäische und sehr deutsche Idee eingeführt, mit aller Kraft und viel Gewalt die Europäisierung Russlands zu vollenden. Schon vorher sind es französische Revolutionäre gewesen, welche die erstaunten Europäer – unter ihnen Russen – mit Schreckensherrschaft bekannt machten. Und nur mit russischer Hilfe gelang es nach langen Kriegen die französische Vormacht zu beenden.

1814 war Russland der Befreier. Damals gab es noch die Vorstellung eines Europa von Gibraltar bis zum Ural. Deshalb kam es auf dem Wiener Kongress zu einer europäischen Friedensordnung. Sie ging nach dem Ersten Weltkrieg unter, weil die westlichen Sieger kein Interesse mehr an ihr hatten.

galabolchoi1_badenbaden.jpgUrkatastrophe des alten Kontinents - Europa verlor sich

Sie schwärmten vom Westen, vom transatlantischen Bündnis unter Führung der USA. Damals verlor sich Europa, das seither überhaupt keine Vorstellung mehr davon hat, was es sein kann und will. Das ist die Urkatastrophe des alten Kontinents, wenn dies keine Redensart sein soll.

Ohne Russland ist Europa unvollständig, nicht geeint. Wenn es nur noch Westen sein will, gibt es sich auf. Davor möchte das europäische Russland das übrige Europa bewahren. Die wirklichen Europäer sind die Russen - wie 1814.

Denn sie halten weiterhin an dem überlieferten Grundsatz fest, das Übergewicht einer Macht zu verhindern. Darauf beruhte stets die Balance mehrerer, unterschiedlich verfasster Staaten in Europa, früher von der Sowjetunion auch "friedliche Koexistenz" genannt. Ohne Not haben sich die Staaten der EU von diesem Konzept verabschiedet.

Eberhard Straub, geboren 1940, studierte Geschichte, Kunstgeschichte und Archäologie. Der habilitierte Historiker war bis 1986 Feuilletonredakteur der Frankfurter Allgemeinen Zeitung und bis 1997 Pressereferent des Stifterverbandes für die Deutsche Wissenschaft. Heute lebt er als freier Journalist in Berlin. Buchveröffentlichungen u.a.: "Die Wittelsbacher", "Drei letzte Kaiser", "Das zerbrechliche Glück. Liebe und Ehe im Wandel der Zeit" und "Zur Tyrannei der Werte".

vendredi, 31 octobre 2014

Rencontre avec James McCearney sur Benjamin Disraeli

Rencontre avec James McCearney sur Benjamin Disraeli et l'impérialisme britannique

 
9782363710819FS.gifAuteur de la biographie : Benjamin Disraeli (Pierre-Guillaume de Roux, 2014)
 
C'est une véritable épopée humaine et politique que retrace James McCearney dans cette biographie consacrée à Benjamin Disraeli (1804-1881), le Premier ministre préféré de la reine Victoria. La vie sourd à chaque ligne, les formules sont ramassées et éclatent comme autant de feux d'artifice. On dirait que l'auteur a vécu dans l'ombre même de son héros. Romancier sans scrupule, criblé de dettes, celui qu'on appelle d'abord Ben, puis Dizzy, est sauvé par la politique. Orateur de talent, pragmatique, manœuvrier de génie, il force le destin. Considéré comme un parvenu juif, et le sachant, il ne s'en impose pas moins comme la « voix » du parti conservateur auquel il dessine un nouveau visage, national et populaire. Mieux : il le hisse au sommet en lui redonnant le pouvoir. Jamais abattu, Disraeli a marqué son siècle et l'Histoire. Il revit ici merveilleusement, dans cet ouvrage à lire d'urgence. Surtout par une droite en quête d'elle-même. (P. Maxence, Le Figaro)
 

Rencontre organisée par le Cercle Aristote

Paris, lundi 3 novembre à 20:00 (PAF : 5 €)

Café François Coppée (1er étage) 1 bvd du Montparnasse (métro : Duroc)

 

 

«Il mio amico Pound ha ragione»

«Il mio amico Pound ha ragione»


di Adriano Scianca 
Ex: http://augustomovimento.blogspot.com
 
«“Ma qvesto”,
disse il Duce, “è divertente”
afferrando il punto prima degli esteti».
 
L’incipit del canto 41 in cui Ezra Pound rievoca il suo incontro con Benito Mussolini (the Boss, nella versione originale) avvenuto esattamente 80 anni fa costituisce da sempre un vero rompicapo per gli storici e i letterati. Se la “v” in “qvesto” sembra alludere in parte alla romanità e in parte al marcato accento romagnolo di Mussolini (un particolare, quest’ultimo, che viene sottolineato proprio per segnare ulteriormente la natura popolare e popolana del capo del fascismo e la conseguente distanza tra lui e “gli esteti”), il giudizio si riferisce, come noto, alla lettura, da parte del Duce, dei primi 30 Cantos. Ma facciamo un passo indietro.
 
Informazioni di prima mano su Mussolini, al di là di ciò che il poeta leggeva nei giornali e vedeva per le strade, Pound le aveva avute da Olga Rudge, che già nel 1923 aveva suonato il violino per il leader fascista, riportandone un’opinione lusinghiera: il Capo di Stato appariva alla musicista americana come un uomo politico illuminato, amante dell’arte, che sapeva a sua volta suonare il violino e sembrava molto competente della materia per essere un profano. Tali racconti dovevano aver fatto grande presa su Pound, che da sempre auspicava una politica più attenta al mondo dell’arte e della cultura. Nei primi anni Trenta il poeta, come detto in precedenza, cominciò a muoversi per cercare di incontrare Mussolini. Anni dopo cercherà di fare altrettanto con Roosvelt, senza riuscirci. Con Mussolini dovette insistere un bel po’, ma alla fine lo incontrò (ulteriore conferma, ai suoi occhi, della superiorità dell’Italia fascista sull’America democratica), precisamente il 30 gennaio 1933, alle 17.30.
 
Il poeta portò a Mussolini una copia dei canti 1-30. Il Duce li sfogliò, lesse per un po’, poi esclamò: «È divertente». Il commento appare a prima vista naif, superficiale, quasi irridente. Tale, almeno, è sembrato negli anni ai soloni della cultura. Non così all’autore dei Cantos, che proprio a questo episodio dedicherà l’incipit del canto 41 che abbiamo già visto precedentemente. Come spiegare l’entusiasmo di Pound? I più propendono per l’accecamento puro e semplice del poeta di fronte al suo eroe, ma forse che le cose stanno diversamente. Secondo Tim Redman, infatti, Mussolini era rimasto colpito da un passaggio in cui un personaggio dei Cantos parla in dialetto e aveva chiesto di cosa si trattasse. Dopo la spiegazione, il Duce si mise a ridere e disse che la cosa era divertente. Pound rimase folgorato e il perché ce lo ha spiegato di recente la figlia Mary: «Solo pochi giorni prima Joyce si era lamentato con mio padre perché nessuno gli aveva detto che l’Ulysses era divertente. Bisogna conoscere i retroscena». Antonio Pantano, invece, ha ricondotto il divertimento di Mussolini alla comprensione del metodo poundiano per eliminare le imposte, tassando direttamente il denaro con il ben noto meccanismo della moneta prescrittibile. Eliminare le tasse: quale governante non riterrebbe questo “divertente”?
 
Nello stesso incontro, comunque, pare che Mussolini e Pound abbiano discusso di cultura cinese e del concetto confuciano del “mettere ordine nelle parole” per mettere ordine nelle idee. Al che Mussolini, evidentemente molto ben ispirato, quel giorno, chiese al poeta perché mai volesse mettere ordine nelle sue idee, confermando a Pound l’impressione di stare parlando con un uomo geniale. Idea che molti commentatori hanno giudicato ingenua, anche se uno studioso non certo fascisteggiante come Hugh Kenner ha potuto scrivere: «Nel 1933 sembrava possibile credere che Benito Mussolini comprendesse queste nozioni. Forse, in un certo senso, era così». Anche il fatto che Pound lo chiamasse “the Boss” (ma altre volte utilizzava nomignoli come “Mus” o “Ben” oppure, curiosamente, lo appellava “il toro”) non va trascurata: Pound, evidentemente, riconosceva nel capo del fascismo anche il proprio capo.
 
La convocazione dell’udienza venne appesa nello studio di Pound, mentre sulla carta da lettere finì la frase mussoliniana «la libertà è un dovere», liberty, a duty. Nel 1945, nei primi interrogatori con il comando militare americano, ricostruirà ancora una volta l’incontro con Mussolini, sbagliando la data ma aggiungendo ulteriori particolari: «Intorno al 1929, ho avuto un’udienza con Benito Mussolini che era a conoscenza del mio libro “Guido Cavalcanti” che gli avevo presentato l’anno prima. Lui pensava di discutere di quello, ma io invece gli ho sottoposto una serie di domande di argomento economico molto incalzanti». Altre richieste di colloquio finirono invece nel vuoto, spesso bloccate sul nascere dalla segreteria del Duce, decisamente poco a suo agio di fronte alla prosa creativa dei testi che il poeta continuava a inviare a Mussolini. Eppure il nome di Pound ricorre più di una volta in un testo centrale per la comprensione del pensiero del capo del fascismo: i Taccuini mussoliniani di Yvon De Begnac. Come noto si tratta della mole sterminata di appunti che il giovane giornalista conservò in occasione dei suoi colloqui con Mussolini avvenuti fra il 1934 e il 1943. Da questi taccuini avrebbe dovuto infine nascere una biografia del Duce che non vide mai la luce per le contingenze storiche, mentre gli appunti vennero in seguito pubblicati così come erano, con lunghi monologhi privi di domande sugli argomenti più disparati. E in tutto questo, come detto, compare più volte il nome di Pound. La citazione più importante recita, fra l’altro:
 
«Il mio amico Ezra Pound ha ragione. La rivoluzione è guerra all’usura. È guerra all’usura pubblica e all’usura privata. Demolisce le tattiche delle battaglie di borsa. Distrugge i parassitismi di base, sui quali i moderati costruiscono le loro fortezze. Insegna a consumare al modo giusto, secondo logica di tempo, quel che è possibile produrre. Reagisce alle altalene del tasso di sconto, che fanno la sventura di chi chiede per investire nell’industria, e aumenta il mondo del risparmio, riducendone il coraggio, contraendone la volontà di ascesa, incrementandone la sfiducia nell’oggi, che è più letale ancora della sfiducia nel domani. Allorché il mio amico Ezra Pound mi donò le sue “considerazioni” sull’usura, mi disse che il potere non è del danaro, o del danaro soltanto, ma dell’usura soltanto, del danaro che produce danaro, che produce soltanto danaro, che non salva nessuno di noi, che lancia noi deboli nel gorgo dalla cui corrente altro danaro verrà espresso, come supremo male del mondo. Aggiunse in quel suo italiano, gaelico e slanghistico, infarcito di arcaismi tratti da Dante e dai cronachisti del trecento, che il potere del danaro e tutti gli uomini di questo potere regnano su un mondo del quale hanno monetizzato il cervello e trasformato la coscienza in lenzuoli di banconote. Il danaro che produce danaro. La formula del mio amico Ezra Pound riassume la spaventosa condizione del nostro tempo. Il danaro non si consuma. Regge al contatto dell’umanità. Nulla cede delle proprie qualità deteriori. Contamina peggiorandoci in ragione della continua salita del suo corso tra i banchi e le grida della borsa nelle cui caverne l’umano viene, inesorabilmente, macinato. Il mio amico Pound ha le qualità del predicatore cui è nota la tempesta dell’anno mille, dell’anno “n volte mille” sempre alle porte della nostra casa di dannati all’autodistruzione. La lava del denaro, infuocata e onnivora, scende dalla montagna che il cielo ha lanciato contro di noi, mi ha detto il mio amico Pound; e nessuno, tra noi, si salverà. Il mio amico Pound ha continuato con voi, come mi avete detto, nella casa romana dello scrittore di cose navali Ubaldo degli Uberti, l’analisi di come il danaro produce soltanto danaro, e non beni che sollevino il nostro spirito dalla palude nella quale il suo potere ci ha immerso. Non è ossessione la sua. Nessun uomo saggio, se ancora ne esistono, ha elementi per dichiarare esito di pericolosa paranoia il suo vedere, tra i blocchi di palazzi di Wall Street e tra le stanze dei banchieri della City, le pareti indistruttibili dell’inferno di oggi. I Kahn, i Morgan, i Morgenthau, i Toeplitz di tutte le terre egli vede alla testa dell’armata dell’oro. Pound piange i morti che quell’esercito fece. E vorrebbe sottrarre a ogni pericolo tutti noi esposti alla furia del potere dell’oro. Con il vostro amico Pound ho parlato di quello che Peguy ha scritto contro il potere dell’oro. Conosce quasi a memoria quelle pagine. Ne recita brani interi, senza dimenticarne alcuna parola. Il suo francese risale agli anni parigini in cui la gente di New York, di Boston, emigrata a Parigi, pensava ancora che l’occidente fosse fra noi. Illusa, quella gente, che scegliendo Parigi, il potere dell’oro sarebbe andato per stracci, almeno per questi migranti della letteratura. È, quel francese di Pound, come un prodotto del passato, come una denuncia del troppo che stiamo dimenticando, tutti noi che corriamo il rischio, o che già lo abbiamo corso, di finire maciullati dal potere dell’oro».

 

El Imperio del Gran Japón y el Panasianismo – La geopolítica multipolar del Extremo Oriente

http://lupocattivoblog.files.wordpress.com/2013/03/japan-insel-mythologie.png?w=640


El Imperio del Gran Japón y el Panasianismo – La geopolítica multipolar del Extremo Oriente

por Tribulaciones Metapolíticas

Ex: http://adversariometapolitico.wordpress.com

Contenidos:

- Bakumatsu (etapa final del shogunato); de la época del sakoku (aislamiento) a la llegada de Perry y la apertura forzada; declive y corrupción del shogunato (empobrecimiento y expolio de la población), descontento popular, varias facciones (“aperturistas” y sonno joi, pro-Tokugawa y pro-restauración imperial)
– Guerra civil Boshin entre los partidarios del shogunato y los de la restauración del Emperador en su dimension política; revueltas samurai, sociedades secretas, shinsengumi e ishin-shishi, etc
– Restauración Meiji, comienzo de la paulatina modernización y occidentalización, pero también del rearme militar que convertiría a Japón en la única potencia digna de ese nombre en Asia oriental.
– Guerra Ruso-Japonesa y sus implicancias históricas y geopolíticas: El apoyo de los Rothschild (a través de Schiff) a Japón porque buscaban hundir a la Rusia de los Romanov. Los japoneses fueron usados. El imperialismo contra los Imperios, el cáncer plutocrático contra la autarquía y contra la soberanía nacional en el marco de los grandes espacios. Se pretendía eliminar a la Rusia zarista (apoyando simultáneamente a los bolcheviques) y de paso debilitar a Japón haciéndole luchar contra Rusia… y tentándole con el cebo del expansionismo (Corea, China…) lo que traería inestabilidad permanente en sus fronteras.
– Eurasiatismo y panasiatismo: Haushofer, Ikki Kita, Shumei Okawa.

- La IIGM vista desde Asia: La rebelión de los oficiales del 26 de febrero (inspirada por Ikki Kita, reprimida por Tojo, nostálgicamente homenajeada por Mishima con su Yukoku…) Conferencia Panasiatista de Tokyo organizada en 1943 por Tojo (con Chandra Bose entre otros), líder chino de Nanjing (Wang Jingwei); los japoneses rescataron a Sukarno en Indonesia de su encarcelamiento por los colonialistas holandeses.
– Panasiatismo tras la IIGM y la derrota de Japón: La Indonesia de Sukarno – Pancasila y Maphilindo (y los No Alineados, Bandung, Nehru…) Paralelismos de Sukarno con Nasser y Perón (y con Gaddafi).
– De Sukarno a la actualidad: el caso camboyano (Norodom Sihanuk y el agente de la CIA Pol Pot), el caso malayo (Mahatir Mohammad)  y el caso norcoreano (idea Juche, y la “interesante” opinión de Bryan Reynolds Myers). Paralelismos entre Japón y Corea (culturales y también etimológicos: Banzai/Manse, Shinto/Chondo…)
– Conclusión: Japón hoy. Los “nacionalismos” de la CIA de reminiscencias pravysektorianas y la alternativa nacional-revolucionaria del Issuikai (como agrupación heredera de los Tatenokai). Mitsuhiro Kimura, amigo de J.M. Le Pen y de Uday Saddam Hussein, promotor de un acercamiento a Rusia y huésped en la RPDC.

Introducción

El presente ensayo tendrá como finalidad exponer la concepción geopolítica panasiatista con el Imperio del Gran Japón (Dai Nippon Teikoku) como su motor y núcleo. Se analizará la evolución histórica del Estado japonés desde el bakumatsu (última etapa del shogunato Tokugawa o Edo bakufu) hasta la época contemporánea, pasando por la Guerra Ruso-Japonesa (1904-1905) y la II Guerra Mundial (1939-1945).

Antes y durante la IIGM Japón fue erradamente acusado de imperialista, cuando en realidad se trataba de una potencia Imperial, algo completamente diferente .El Imperio Japonés, cuyo proceder geopolítico estuvo inspirado por las ideas panasiatistas, intentó crear un bloque autárquico de comunidades nacionales asiáticas soberanas. Era lógico que bajo las circunstancias de aquella época, siendo Japón una importante e independiente potencia militar, fuera el Imperio Nipón el encargado de organizar y dirigir la estrategia para lograr la emergencia y el establecimiento del polo continental asiático.  La intención de los estrategas japoneses era emancipar a la Asia Oriental del colonialismo yanki-británico, y por ello antes de y durante la IIGM existió una intensa y solidaria cooperación entre los japoneses y los nacionalistas chinos, filipinos, indios, tailandeses o indonesios; lo cual la mayoría de los historiadores distorsiona u omite.

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Haushofer y Japón

Para el erudito profesor y militar (general veterano de la I Guerra Mundial) Karl Haushofer (1869-1946) era más importante el determinismo geográfico, y por tanto la geopolítica, que el racismo biológico de ciertos sectores en el seno del III Reich. No obstante, coincidía en muchas cosas con el NS, especialmente en lo económico. Compartía las ideas anti-usurarias y anti-especulatorias de Gottfried Feder, y promovía un socialismo nacional de carácter autárquico que se implementara en los “grandes espacios” (por ejemplo en el Kontinentalblock euroasiático) en el marco de un mundo multipolar; lo cual derrotaría tanto al sistema de rapiña del atlantismo globalista (los liberales, o capitalistas) como a la “disidencia controlada” encarnada en el marxismo apátrida y cosmopolita, dos caras de la misma moneda, ambos igual de globalistas y de materialistas.

Ya desde 1899 Haushofer había trabajado para lograr un acercamiento germano-nipón. En 1913 escribió en su libro “Dai Nihon” que una alianza entre Alemania, Rusia y Japón sería capaz de hacer frente al imperialimo anglosajón. En su libro “Mutsuhito emperador de Japón” escribe Haushofer que también en el país del Sol Naciente existía desde principios del siglo XX la intención de crear una alianza tripartita Alemania-Rusia-Japón. Pero en cada uno de esos países, saboteadores y oligarcas que se oponían y que hacían todo lo posible para impedirlo estaban enquistados en las altas esferas del poder. Haushofer señalaba las similitudes históricas y culturales entre Alemania, Rusia y Japón; y decía que éstas naciones debían defenderse mutuamente de las pretensiones hegemónicas de la talasocracia, encarnada por el Imperio británico y EEUU.

Hubo también cooperación entre Haushofer y sectores de la URSS. Sus escritos fueron traducidos al ruso y difundidos en la URSS ya durante los años ´20.

La alianza propuesta por Hausfofer entre Alemania, Rusia (luego URSS) y Japón no descartaba incluir también hasta cierto grado a la India y a China. Su colega el geopolítico Nidermayer decía que había que integrar también al mundo musulmán, heredero del Imperio Otomano. En lo que ambos estaban de acuerdo, era en que la inclusión de la URSS era “conditio sine qua non“. Pero en la URSS hubo agentes como Bujarin que trataron de sabotear esa cooperación a principios de los años ´30, acusando a Haushofer de “fascista”, agente de Hitler, etc… Haushofer por su parte sostenía que era necesario un pragmatismo geopolítico que estuviera más allá de las ideologías, para forjar así la alianza continental transcendente, el Kontinentalblock.

Haushofer también estaba muy interesado en China, y durante muchos años tuvo acceso a informaciones procedentes de ese país. Con el inicio de las hostilidades entre Japón y China en 1937, Haushofer no siguió solamente el punto de vista japonés. En 1931 Haushofer pensaba que Japón era el único capaz de garantizar el orden en Manchuria. Pero criticó duramente el ataque japonés a Shanghai. Después reconoció a Manchukuo como zona bajo influencia japonesa. Haushofer recalcaba que un conflicto entre la URSS y Japón iría contra los intereses de Alemania, puesto que beneficiaría a EEUU/Inglaterra, que tendrían vía libre en el Pacífico y el sudeste asiático para circundar al Heartland. Pero también en los primeros años ´30, Haushofer criticó la política internacional de la URSS, que se había puesto formalmente del mismo lado que las democracias liberales, yendo así contra sus propios intereses.

En los ´30 (debido a la hostilidad creciente entre el III Reich y la URSS), Haushofer se concentró en los paralelismos entre Japón y Alemania, así como Italia, señalando enfáticamente el aislamiento internacional de éstas naciones (El “Eje del Mal” de la época; como ahora son Irán, Siria, Corea del Norte…)

Haushofer dijo que Stalin, Chicherin y Witte estaban entre los políticos soviéticos que habían comprendido las ventajas de la teoría multipolarista del Kontinentalblock. El pacto Hitler-Stalin fue considerado por Haushofer como un paso muy positivo, y durante esa época publicó: “Der Kontinentalblock: Mitteleuropa-Eurasien-Japan“. Allí decía que muchos problemas, conflictos y guerras podrían haberse evitado entre 1901 y 1940 si se hubieran tomado decisiones más pragmáticas para fomentar la alianza continental Berlin-Moscú-Tokyo.

 

En Mein Kampf Hitler se pone del lado japonés en la guerra ruso-japonesa. Ya en los años ´20 veía a Alemania, Rusia y Japón “en peligro por el judaísmo internacional”. Hitler y Haushofer se conocieron a través de Rudolf Hess. En los escritos racialistas del NS, se hacía alusión a los japoneses y asiáticos orientales como “portadores de cultura” (las otras dos categorías eran “creadores” y “destructores”); tras la alianza formal con Japón los NS (incluídos Rosenberg y Hitler) hicieron hincapié en que el objetivo de las tesis raciales imperantes en el III Reich eran una medida proteccionista de la esencia étnica de propia población, y que esas tesis no buscaban en modo alguno ofender o denigrar a otras razas o naciones. Ambos resaltaban las diferencias entre las razas, y no (o ya no) su jerarquización en términos de superioridad o inferioridad (o en categorías de “creadores”, “portadores” y “destructores”), como antes. Haushofer contribuyó a que Hitler y los racistas en el seno del NS cambiaran algunas de sus concepciones en ese sentido, para evitar ofender a los japoneses y otros potenciales aliados de otras razas.

La invasión de la URSS en 1941 por parte de Hitler fue un shock para Haushofer. Tras ese evento, dejó de jugar cualquier rol en la política (exterior) alemana. Sus partidarios dentro del régimen, como Hess, ya no estaban en Alemania o habían perdido toda influencia.

Haushofer había visitado Japón en 1909, viajó por toda Asia y regresó a Alemania a través de Rusia en 1910. Durante la IGM obtuvo el rango de general. Louis Pauwels (autor de “El Retorno de los Brujos”) dijo de él que había sido discípulo de Gurdjieff , miembro de la Thule Gesellschaft y uno de los fundadores de la Sociedad Vril. Haushofer y su mujer supuestamente se suicidaron en 1946, pero existen indicios que apuntan a que fueron asesinados por los servicios secretos británicos; eso afirma el investigador inglés Martin Allen.

Chiseigaku (geopolítica)

El panasiatista japonés Takeo Kikuchi dijo en 1933 que las naciones asiáticas debían estar unidas, que en las circunstancias actuales sólo Japón podía contribuir a fomentar ésta unidad, y que era de gran importancia mantener buenas relaciones con China y con el resto de las naciones asiáticas.

En el periódico japonés Asahi Shimbun, Haushofer explicó que, guiado por las potencias del Eje, el mundo sería multipolar, quedando dividido en espacios continentales autárquicos: “América para los americanos, Asia para los asiáticos, Europa para los europeos”.

Risaburo Asano, geopolitógo japonés, periodista del Asahi, escribió un libro titulado “Proposición de un Pacto de No Agresión Ruso-Japonés: Por un bloque continental japo-soviético-alemán”

Saneshige Komaki (como antes Nobutaka Shioden), exponente de la Antropogeografía en la Universidad de Tokyo, advertía en Japón sobre el peligro sionista (que controlaba tanto al liberalismo anglosajón como al marxismo soviético) y mencionó que el sionismo tenía planes de crear una colonia judía en el Pacífico, en Nueva Caledonia, donde la explotación del niquel era manejada por los Rothschild.

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Mon (logotipo dinástico) del clan Tokugawa

Shogunato (o bakufu) Tokugawa (1603-1868)

A principios del siglo XVII, Japón fue unificado por el líder guerrero Ieyasu, del clan Tokugawa, que se convirtió en el primer shogun (dictador militar) de la nueva dinastía de gobernantes.

El shogun tenía el poder fáctico político y militar en el país (y vivía en Edo, actual Tokyo), mientras que el Emperador ostentaba el poder simbólico espiritual y religioso (y su residencia se encontraba en Kyoto).

Japón estaba unificado, pero el poder se encontraba descentralizado; pues la nación tenía una estructura feudal. Cada daimyo (señor feudal) regía de forma autónoma en sus dominios, teniendo que rendir cuentas tan solo ante el shogun.

A partir de la segunda mitad del siglo XVII se decretó una política de aislamiento (sakoku) para blindarse de la influencia extranjera.

Sin embargo el shogun Tokugawa Tsunayoshi (que reinó entre 1680 y 1709) padeció un cierto retraso mental, y sostuvo durante su mandato un acercamiento hacia occidente (probablemente bajo la influencia de sus “tutores”).

El shogun Ieyoshi (hijo de Ienari) recibió las naves del comodoro Perry, y poco después cayó enfermo… Murió en 1853, y le sucedió su hijo Iesada. Incapacitado mentalmente para gobernar (también éste!), Iesada tuvo que negociar la apertura de Japón con las naves de EEUU, lo que conllevó al fin del sakoku (aislamiento) y a la firma del tratado de Kanagawa, por el cual Japón se sometía en inferioridad de condiciones a la infiltración mercantil, subversiva y explotadora de “occidente”.

Le sucedió Iemochi (nieto de Ienari, primo del anterior), que tuvo que soportar los desórdenes y las agitaciones que siguieron a la llegada de Perry. Impulsó el movimiento Kobu-Gattai, que intentaba conservar la estabilidad del shogunato creando un linaje combinado entre el clan Tokugawa y la nobleza imperial. Pero murió prematuramente a los 20 años sin dejar heredero, otra “casualidad”…

Su sucesor Yoshinobu (el último shogún)  buscó asistencia militar francesa. Eso puso en alerta a los daimyo de Satsuma, Choshu y Tosha, que se aliaron contra el shogunato corrupto y occidentalizante para restituir el poder imperial, bajo el lema de Sonno Joi (inspirado por Yoshida Shoin), “Reverenciar al Emperador, expulsar a los bárbaros”. Eso desencadenó la Guerra Civil Boshin.

El shogunato, durante el sakoku, no tuvo intenciones de expandir sus territorios más allá de sus fronteras. Durante su aislamiento dejaron en paz a Corea y a la China Qing.

La Restauración Meiji de 1868 abolió los feudos y la clase samurai iniciando un proceso de modernización… y de expansión.

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Ikki Kita

Ideólogos del panasianismo

Ikki Kita (1883-1937), máximo ideólogo del panasianismo y del socialismo nacional japonés, se sintió atraído por la revolución china de 1911, colaboró con Sun Yat-Sen y fue miembro del Tongmenghui de Song Jiaoren. Ikki Kita y Shumei Okawa crearon la organización nacionalista Yuzonsha, que aspiraba a que Japón liderase un Asia libre en el marco del multipolarismo.

La obra más importante de Kita fue: “La Teoría de la política nacional de Japón y el socialismo puro“. Fue uno de los pocos civiles ejecutados en 1937 por participar en el intento de golpe de estado de febrero de 1936.

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Shumei Okawa, durante los juicios de Tokyo en 1946  – delante de él, Hideki Tojo

Shumei Okawa (1886-1957); experto en filosofía hindú, filosofía de las religiones, historia del Japón, colonialismo e Islam (tradujo el Corán al japonés, aunque no directamente del árabe). Exponente de la Filosofía Perenne. Rechazaba el calificativo de “derechista”. Estudió literatura védica y filosofía hindú clásica. Trabajó de traductor para el Ejército. Además de japonés sabía alemán, francés, inglés, sánscrito y pali. Se dió cuenta de que la solución a los problemas sociales de Japón debía lograrse mediante la alianza con otros movimientos asiáticos de liberación. Podría considerársele como una simbiosis japonesa de Guénon y Haushofer, pero la prensa angloamericana prefirió describirlo como “el Goebbels japonés”. Tras la derrota fue procesado en los juicios de Tokyo (el “Nurenberg” asiático) tras la ocupación del país. Pudo eludir una probable condena a muerte debido a su estado mental trastornado. Cuando en los años cincuenta el presidente de la India Jawarhalal Nehru visitó Japón quiso encontrarse con él, pero ya estaba muy enfermo y murió poco después.

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Sociedades secretas

Kokuryukai (Sociedad del Dragón Negro), grupo heredero de la Genyosha (Sociedad del Océano Profundo) de Mitsuru Toyama, continuador de Saigo Takamori.

Las sociedades secretas nacionalistas Genyosha y luego Kokuryukai (de Ryohei Uchida) apoyaron al panasianismo con tácticas de espionaje. Agentes de éstas organizaciones se encontraban dispersos en varios países, incluídos los EEUU. Allí, durante la IIGM, apoyaron a los negros (Nation of Islam, “Peace movement for Ethiopia”, etc).

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La Genyosha (Sociedad del Océano Oscuro), fue fundada por Kotaro Hiraoka, ex samurai, y sus miembros participaron en varios de los alzamientos samurai en las Eras Meiji y Taisho. Tuvieron participación en la Revolución china de 1911 y se enfrentaron allí a las tríadas, pero éstas también querían la caída de la dinastía Qing.

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Ryohei Uchida (teórico político, artista marcial y panasianista), 1873-1937, especialista en kyudo (tiro con arco), kendo, judo y sumo. Líder de la Genyosha. Ayudó a los campesinos rebeldes coreanos en la rebelión campesina de Donghak.

 

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Otro grupo secreto nacionalista fue el Futabakai (Sociedad de la Doble Hoja), que operó en los años ´20, influenciado por Ikki Kita y Shumei Okawa.

En China, las Tríadas (Tiandihui), y sociedades secretas antecesoras, ya querían derrocar a la dinastía Qing para restaurar la Ming.

Bakumatsu (1853-1868)

En el Bakumatsu, etapa final del shogunato (1853-1868), se acabó el sakoku (aislamiento).
Había una división entre los nacionalistas pro-restauración imperial (Ishin-shishi) y las fuerzas del shogunato que incluían al cuerpo de élite de los Shinsengumi. Las fuerzas pro-shogunato fueron derrotadas en la guerra Boshin.

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Mishima (segundo por la izquierda) en “Hitokiri” (1969)

Las milicias pro-shogunato de los Shinsengumi lucharon contra los Hitokiri de los Ishin-Shishi (pro- Sonno Joi). Los Hitokiri eran cuatro samurais de élite cuya historia fue llevada al cine en 1969 por el director Hideo Gosha, contando con la participación de Yukio Mishima como actor.

A partir de principios del siglo XIX, barcos occidentales llegaban a las costas japonesas y los japoneses comenzaron a aplicar medidas defensivas. La brigada británica Phaeton realizó agresivas demandas contra Japón.

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Expulsión de “los bárbaros”

En 1825 se promulgó un edicto para expulsar a los extranjeros a toda costa (en vigor hasta 1842). Los japoneses consiguieron armas de fuego a través de los holandeses. Tras la victoria de los británicos contra los chinos en la guerra del opio en 1840, los japoneses se dieron cuenta de que no sería posible derrotar a los extranjeros con los métodos tradicionales.

Algunos opinaban que para derrotar a los extranjeros había que utilizar sus propios medios. Uno de los que proponía ésto era Hidetatsu Egawa. Torii Yozo y otros querían por su parte emplear sólo métodos japoneses tradicionales. Egawa razonaba diciendo que tal y como el confucianismo y el budismo habían sido introducidos desde fuera, también sería útil introducir de fuera ciertas técnicas de defensa. Sakuma Shozan y Yokoi Shonan aplicarían el “controlar a los bárbaros aplicando sus propios métodos” pero a partir de 1839, los que querían utilizar los métodos occidentales fueron considerados “traidores” (Bansha no Goku), arrestados, forzados a cometer seppuku, o asesinados. La nefasta consecuencia fue que en 1853 llegaron los barcos de Perry y los japoneses no pudieron defenderse contra sus cañones.

Abe Masahiro era responsable de negociar con los americanos. Algunos consejeros querían llegar a un compromiso con los americanos, pero el Emperador quería echarlos y los daimyo querían la guerra. Abe accedió a negociar, abriendo Japón al comercio exterior, pero al mismo tiempo hizo preparativos militares. Se armaron con ayuda de los holandeses.
En 1858, el cónsul Townsend Harris obligó a Japón a aceptar la influencia extranjera.

Yoshida Shoin (1830-1859), fue un intelectual nacionalista anti-colonización que acuñó el término Sonno joi. Cuando el Bakufu se iba rindiendo a la dominación extranjera se hizo partidario de restablecer al Emperador en su dimensión política. Fue ejecutado.

A partir de 1859 los extranjeros llegaron masivamente como consecuencia de los tratados. Los samurai se resentían. Se produjeron muchos asesinatos de extranjeros y colaboracionistas. El primer ministro occidentalista Ii Naosuke fue eliminado en 1860.

La apertura forzada de Japón trajo gran inestabilidad económica. Algunos se hicieron muy ricos y otros muy pobres. Hambrunas azotaron a todo el país. Los extranjeros comenzaron a controlar la economía. Se produjo el colapso del sistema monetario de la era Tokugawa. Los extranjeros compraron masivamente oro, lo que obligó a las autoridades a devaluar la moneda. (Japón sufrió el expolio de su reserva: Sólo en 1870 Japón perdió 70 toneladas de oro).

Además de las hambrunas, los extranjeros también trajeron enfermedades como el cólera y otras nunca antes habidas en Japón (igual que los conquistadores en América). En 1862 llegó la primera embajada japonesa en Europa. De 1860 en adelante, se produjeron constantemente levantamientos campesinos y disturbios urbanos.

El shogunato se iba occidentalizando poco a poco. Ante lo insostenible de la situación, el Emperador Komei (Osahito) rompió la tradición de siglos que reducía al Soberano a la pasividad y a la función de mero símbolo. Tomando de nuevo la iniciativa política, decretó la orden de expulsar a los bárbaros.

El daimyo Mori Takachika desafió abiertamente al shogunato corrompido. Era el jefe del clan Choshu. Los japoneses hicieron saber que no deseaban más relaciones con los extranjeros, querían expulsarlos y cerrar los puertos. El coronel Edward Neale, británico, dijo que eso “equivalía a una declaración de guerra”.

La influencia americana, tan importante al principio, se debilitó debido a la guerra civil americana (1861-1865). Esa influencia fue reemplazada por británicos, franceses y holandeses. En julio de 1863 se produjo una intervención americana mediante el barco-bombardero USS Wyoming. En agosto de 1863 tuvo lugar una intervención británica (bombardeo de Kagoshima), y también en ese mes, una intervención francesa (bombardeo de Shimonoseki).

En 1864 estalló la rebelión de Mito (bajo el lema Sonno Joi), reprimida por el shogunato occidentalizante. Le siguieron otros levantamientos, como el de Choshu. Así se conseguía que los japoneses se matasen entre ellos: Los “dispuestos al compromiso” del shogunato ablandado y los rebeldes anti-occidentales, que querían restaurar al Emperador en su dimensión política.

En septiembre de 1864, nuevo bombradeo aliado de Shimonoseki (US, UK, Francia, Holanda); bombardearon los dominios del poderoso daimyo de Choshu Mori Takachika.

Los japoneses empezaron a darse cuenta de que expulsar a los extranjeros no era realista. Pero el shogunato ya estaba muy débil (los extranjeros habían logrado sembrar la cizaña entre los japoneses), entonces los nacionalistas japoneses decidieron concentrar el poder para tratar en la medida de lo posible de restablecer al Japón como país fuerte (aunque ineludiblemente sometido a la influencia extranjera). Había samurais en ambos bandos del conflicto (en la guerra Boshin).

Guerra Boshin (1868-1869)

Los clanes de Satsuma y Choshu se rebelaron contra el shogunato, grupos de ronin participaron. El 3 de enero de 1868 se produjo la restauración imperial. El shogún dimitió; el bakufu fue abolido. Los partidarios del shogunato siguieron resistiendo en Hokkaido donde establecieron la corta República de Ezo.

Ahora, cuando ambos bandos se estaban modernizando, iban ganando los partidarios de la Restauración imperial (Meiji).

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Foto del último shogun, Yoshinobu, con uniforme militar francés

El shogunato mandaba a sus hombres a estudiar tácticas militares fuera. El Emperador Komei murió en 1867 y fue sucedido por su hijo Mutsuhito (Meiji). Ese mismo año había muerto también el penúltimo shogun, Iemochi, el antecesor de Yoshinobu.

El bando imperial, ganador de la guerra Boshin, había abandonado la intención inicial de expulsar a los extranjeros, pero quería renegociar ciertas cláusulas para conservar la mayor soberanía posible, mientras seguía al mismo tiempo modernizándose tecnológica y militarmente. Al final se acabó imponiendo la idea de “controlar a los bárbaros con sus propios métodos”, pero lamentablemente los japoneses se percataron de ésto demasiado tarde. Si en lugar de perseguir y condenar a los que proponían esa estrategia décadas antes (aludiendo a que “Confucianismo y Budismo también habían sido importados desde fuera”) la hubiesen implementado entonces, se habrían ahorrado numerosos conflictos sangrientos y una catastrófica guerra civil. Si vis pacem para bellum; y la “bellum” sólo puede prepararse teniendo en cuenta los métodos y armamentos de los potenciales agresores. No es posible vencer a bombardeos de cañones a golpes de katana. Los japoneses tuvieron que pasar por la fratricida guerra Boshin para finalmente darse cuenta. Hoy hacen bien los coreanos del norte desarrollando la tecnología nuclear (de origen “bárbaro”) como recurso disuasorio frente a una agresión (de esos mismos “bárbaros”) que sin duda de otro modo haría ya tiempo que se habría producido. Véase Iraq o Libia, a modo de ejemplo.

En la guerra civil, el bando imperial recibió apoyo de Gran Bretaña y el Shogunal de Francia.

Tras la derrota del shogunato, la ciudad de Edo fue rebautizada como Tokyo. La residencia del Emperador fue trasladada de Kyoto a Tokyo. Progresivamente se eliminó del poder a los daimyo (señores feudales) y se centralizó el poder en torno al Emperador.

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Yasukuni

El famoso Santuario Yasukuni fue construído en 1869 para honrar a las víctimas de la guerra Boshin de ambos bandos. Tras la IIGM, esa especie de “Valle de los Caídos” japonés no ha dejado de levantar polémica (sobre todo fuera de Japón) por estar allí los restos de los “criminales de guerra” ejecutados tras los procesos de Tokyo, entre ellos los del ex-primer ministro Hideki Tojo. Cada vez que un político nipón de alto rango (como Junichiro Koizumi) va al Yasukini a presentar sus respetos, medios occidentales así como chinos y coreanos, se rasgan las vestiduras y ponen el grito en el cielo. Pero recordemos que allí yacen las cenizas no sólo de Tojo y los demás ahorcados por las fuerzas de ocupación en 1946, sino también (y sobre todo) las de los bushi (guerreros), samurais o militares, que cayeron en la fratricida Guerra Boshin unos 80 años antes – Tanto los de un bando como los del otro.

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Mutsuhito, Emperador Meiji

Restauración Meiji

Meiji (que significa “Brillante” o “Iluminado”) es el nombre póstumo por el que se conoce al Emperador Mutsuhito (1852-1912), y por extensión a la época de su reinado (1867-1912). Según estipula la tradición japonesa, al Emperador se le concede un nombre honorífico tras su fallecimiento. Por ejemplo, el Emperador Hirohito (un nieto de Mutsuhito/Meiji) es conocido como Emperador Showa (“Radiante”, “Glorioso”) desde que falleció en 1989. Ningún japonés se refiere a él por su nombre de pila Hirohito (hacerlo sería poco respetuoso); sino como Showa Tenno. Y por consiguiente, la época de su reinado (1926-1989) es la Era Showa.

La Restauración Meiji, acabó con el bakufu y provocó que Japón pasara (prácticamente de la noche a la mañana) de ser una sociedad feudal a tener una economía de mercado, con penetración occidental. La abrupta transición de una sociedad feudal a una de “libre mercado” provocó enorme inestabilidad, y las desigualdades sociales crecieron exponencialmente.

En el shogunato, las provincias tenían un cierto grado de autonomía y contaban con una administración independiente a cambio de jurar lealtad al shogun. Cada nivel de gobierno tenía su propio sistema de tasación.

Tras la restauración, se extendió el capitalismo y el aburguesamiento, algunos campesinos comenzaron a especular con tierras provocando la pobreza de otros y haciéndose ellos ricos, ésto no sucedía en el sistema de clases definidas (similar al de las castas) que existía en el Japón shogunal.

Kokutai (estructura/cuerpo nacional, identidad nacional, soberanía, esencia/carácter nacional) Concepto que tuvo su origen en el Edo bakufu, popularizado por Aizawa Seishisai (1782-1863), erudito neo-confuciano y lider de la Mitogaku (escuela de Mito) que pedía la restauración de la Casa Imperial. Fue uno de los pocos en percatarse de la amenaza que suponían los barcos de “occidente” (que venían del este, por cierto). La Mitogaku compiló la Dai-Nihon shi (Historia del gran Japón).

Una consecuencia de la Restauración Meiji fue la abolición de la clase samurai. Algunos de éstos orientales caballeros andantes se convirtieron en funcionarios y se adaptaron al nuevo régimen, pero muchos acabaron como ronin, se vieron abocados a la pobreza y se volvieron bandidos (dando así inicio el surgimiento de la Yakuza, con su ancestral y hermético código de honor característico de éstas sociedades secretas del crimen organizado).

Tras la Restauración Meiji hubo rebeliones samurai en Saga (1874) y Satsuma (1875)

El expolio occidental sobre Japón contribuyó a que Japón (privado de sus reservas y de sus recursos) se viera obligado a expandirse hacia Corea y China.

Guerra Ruso-Japonesa (1904-1905)

Fue iniciada por los japoneses, con la excusa de disputas territoriales. Financiados por Jacob Schiff, los japoneses fueron utilizados contra Rusia. Al mismo tiempo, Schiff también financiaba las actividades de los bolcheviques; el objetivo era la caída de los Romanov. El imperialismo no tiene “amigos”, tan sólo aliados temporales; por ello unas décadas más tarde también les llegaría a los japoneses el turno de ser “democratizados”. El “tratado de paz” que pondría fin a la guerra con victoria japonesa fue firmado en EEUU bajo el arbitraje de Theodore Roosevelt.

Japón quería “preservar su soberanía y ser reconocido como un igual por las potencias occidentales” (ardua tarea, hoy sabemos que eso nunca es posible: o se es un vasallo incondicional, una sumisa colonia; o por el contrario se es un “rogue state” del “Eje del Mal”). En 1902 Japón y Gran Bretaña habían firmado una alianza anglo-japonesa; los británicos querían evitar que los competidores rusos usaran sus propios puertos en Vladivostok. Gran Bretaña ayudó a Japón en la guerra. Antes de la guerra, inglaterra y Japón ya habían cooperado (léase conspirado) contra Rusia.

En la guerra, el agregado militar de la India británica (Ian Standish Monteith Hamilton) colaboró en Manchuria con el ejército japonés.

Una de las razones que Jacob Schiff arguyó para su apoyo económico a los esfuerzos bélicos nipones fue el “antisemitismo” del gobierno zarista.

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Isla Sajalin/Karafuto, disputada por Japón, Rusia y China. Tras el fin del sakoku, se extendió la división en ideologías políticas, el desorden y el caos.

El objetivo principal de la guerra ruso-japonesa era allanar el camino al derrocamiento de los Romanov, pero también (a más largo plazo) debilitar a Japón. Ésto no lo consiguieron, pues Japón creció en influencia, y se convirtió en la potencia más importante de Asia.

Poco después de la guerra, que los japoneses sólo pudieron ganar con la ayuda occidental, estalló la revuelta de 1905 en Rusia.

Como consecuencia de la guerra, Gran Bretaña engrandeció sus puertos en Auckland (Nueva Zelanda), Bombay (India británica), Fremantle (Australia), Hong Kong, Singapur y Sydney.

Por su parte a la muy debilitada Rusia la ayudó Francia.

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Ikki Kita como Sol Naciente

Incidente del 26 de febrero

El 26 de febrero de 1936 se ejecutó un intento de golpe de Estado por parte de jóvenes oficiales del Ejército japonés, contra la facción militar dominante. Pedían reformas sociales y simpatizaban con el Kodoha , organización que se oponía a nuevas conquistas en China y pedía en cambio el fortalecimiento de las fronteras en Manchukuo. Los de Kodoha eran nacionalistas que intentaron evitar una confrontación con China. Su líder era Sadao Araki.

Los rebeldes querían purgar a los “malos consejeros alrededor del Trono”, querían reestablecer la autoridad del Emperador. Las clases privilegiadas explotaban al pueblo, y los adherentes al Kodoha se inspiraban en el socialismo nacional de Ikki Kita. Tenían el apoyo de Yasuhito (príncipe Chichibu, hermano de Hirohito); pero no el de Tojo y el Emperador, quienes ordenaron que los rebeldes fueran aplastados. Ikki Kita sería ahorcado por su participación intelectual.

Los rebeldes del 26.2 habían creado el “Ejército de la Justicia” y su grito de guerra era Sonno Tokan! (Reverenciar al Emperador, Destruir a los Traidores). Mishima realizó el mediometraje Yukoku (Patriotismo) basándose en éste evento, e interpretando él mismo a uno de los oficiales rebeldes, que tras el fracaso de la operación comete el seppuku junto a su mujer.

El manifiesto ideológico Shinmin no michi (1941), –  “El sendero de los asuntos” – es una crítica japonesa del colonialismo occidental, de las ideas decadentes y el materialismo.

Conferencia de la Gran Asia Oriental, 1943

Fue organizada por Japón, con delegados de China, Birmania, Tailandia, Filipinas, India – etc.

Entre los participantes se encontraban Wang Jingwei (Nanjing, China), Zhang Jinghui (Manchukuo, China), José Paciano Laurel (Filipinas) Subhas Chandra Bose (India).

El objetivo de la conferencia era discutir los mutuos intereses en el marco de la Esfera_de_Coprosperidad_de_la_Gran_Asia_Oriental (término acuñado por Hachiro Arita), por una Asia autárquica

Japón ayudaba a los nacionalistas indios de Subhas Chandra Bose y a los indonesios de Sukarno.

Tenshin Okakura, Toten Miyazaki (aliado de Sun Yat-Sen) y Ryohei Uchida (Genyosha/Kokuryokai) apoyaron la emancipación de las naciones asiáticas.

Los japoneses fueron aislados económicamente porque no se les permitía entablar relaciones comerciales en los mercados chinos.

Se buscó establecer una cooperación económica y política de las naciones asiáticas contra el imperialismo occidental de los aliados.

Los japoneses, en la IIGM, apoyaron al Azad Hind (India Libre) de Chandra Bose, así como a los nacionalistas birmanos, malayos, camboyanos e indonesios.

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Sun Yat-Sen

Sun Yat-Sen (1866-1925) dijo que había que resistir al colonialismo unificando la Gran Asia.

Sun se exilió en Japón y entabló contactos con otros nacionalistas panasiatistas como el japonés Toten Miyazaki y el filipino Mariano Ponce. En un alzamiento de 1900 le ayudaron las sociedades secretas chinas conocidas como tríadas (hoy degeneradas en su mayor parte en organizaciones netamente criminales).

Discurso de Sun Yat-Sen sobre el Pan-Asiatismo en Kobe (Japón), 1924

En la Conferencia, Tojo se opuso a la civilización materialista de occidente.

Declaración conjunta: Algunas de las medidas sobre las cuales se discutió fueron las siguientes: Cooperación mutua, fraternidad de las naciones, soberanía e independencia, asistencia mutua. Respetar las tradiciones de cada nación, las facultades creativas de cada etnia, contra la discriminación racial, por la prosperidad económica.

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Corea del Norte

El autor Bryan Reynolds Myers, en su libro “The_Cleanest_Race” dice que la ideología de la RPDC es “un nacionalismo racial derivado del fascismo japonés” y saca a colación el hecho de que la constitución norcoreana del 2009 omite cualquier mención al comunismo. Desde una posición ideológica diametralmente opuesta a la de Myers (que obviamente critica la ideología norcoreana) tenemos, en cierto modo, que darle la razón.

Es obvio que la doctrina de Estado en la RPDC, idea Juche , es algo típicamente coreano que nada tiene que ver con el marxismo apátrida y cosmopolita del “paraíso de los trabajadores” y sí mucho con un meritocrático socialismo autárquico profundamente patriótico y de corte marcial, celoso de su ideosincrasia nacional y de sus tradiciones milenarias. La Corea del Norte “comunista” es mucho más coreana que la sureña parte americanizada y demo-liberal de la península. Siempre se habla, por cierto, de las huídas (supuestas o no) de coreanos del norte al sur, pero nunca difunden los grandes medios las noticias de coreanos del sur exiliándose al Norte; como es por ejemplo el caso de la señora Ryu_Mi-yong , que es hoy en la RPDC presidenta del Partido Chondoísta (El Chondoísmo es la religión nacional coreana, que fusiona el chamanismo ancestral con influencias confucianas; y es en cierto modo equivalente al Shintoísmo japonés).

Según una popular anécdota, el fallecido Kim Jong-Il en su época de estudiante montó en cólera al leer en uno de sus libros de teoría marxista aquello de que “el socialista no tiene patria”; inmediatamente tachó indignado esa línea y escribió en el margen: “Yo soy coreano y yo soy socialista, no veo ninguna contradicción”. Corea del Norte es un perfecto ejemplo de cómo el comunismo (usado inicialmente como herramiente subversiva para erradicar el patriotismo y los sentimientos tradicionales) a la larga ha servido paradójicamente para lo contrario; desarrollándose de manera diferente en cada país y fusionándose con sus características étnicas. Algo muy parecido a lo que sucedió muchos siglos antes con el cristianismo. Para acabar con el espíritu de los pueblos ha sido mucho más eficaz (y sigue siéndolo) la acción disolvente y destructiva del liberal-capitalismo; con su accionar más blando, imperceptible y sutil pero también mucho más dañino y pernicioso a la hora de corromper y subvertir definitivamente a todos los pueblos, anegándolos con su ponzoña. (Eso sí; siempre con su máscara “democrática” y “derecho-humanista”).

 

Al predicar y promover el individualismo extremo negando la carácterística orgánica de los pueblos y el carácter comunitario de las sociedades humanas, el liberal-capitalismo (doctrina socio-económica del mundialismo globalizante, y único sistema “políticamente correcto” hoy en día, pues todo lo demás no es “democrático”) impone la desestructuración de los pueblos en una masa amorfa y gris de “consumidores” (más bien de consumidos) y de esclavos; de seres atomizados, cada vez más solos en medio de la masa y por ello más manipulables; es la progresiva robotización del hombre, que avanza muy lentamente pero sin retroceder. Para simplificarlo metafóricamente, puede concluírse que “el comunismo” equivale a la rana que se introduce en la cazuela con agua hirviendo: La rana saltará inmediatamente al quemarse y se salvará. “El capitalismo”, en cambio, es la rana a la que se mete en la cazuela con el agua templada y cuya temperatura se va subiendo gradualmente, hasta que (sin que la rana se percate) termina cocida… Los arquitectos del globalismo plutocrático se dieron cuenta de que para “cocernos” es más eficaz “subir la temperatura gradualmente”; y por ello, tras la “Guerra fría” (un experimento para ver cual de los dos métodos funcionaba “mejor”), quisieron acabar con el bipolarismo e instaurar su “New World Order”, decantándose por la implementación a escala planetaria del liberal-capitalismo, el método más “eficaz” (para sus inconfesables objetivos).

Más allá de la curiosa similitud (también etimológica) entre el chondoísmo coreano y el shintoísmo japonés, existen otros interesantes paralelismos, como en el caso del grito “Banzai!” (Literalmente “Diez Mil Años!” que se pronuncia para desear larga vida a una persona venerada, generalmente al Emperador). En coreano, el mismo sentido tiene la expresión “Mansé!” ( y aquí ), con el que los coreanos (del norte) reverencian a sus Líderes. Además, Corea siempre fue conocida históricamente como “El Reino Ermitaño”; el aislamiento del que hoy hace gala la RPDC no es algo nuevo. Y recordemos el sakoku japonés, que durante la mayor parte del shogunato Tokugawa decidió cerrarse casi herméticamente a la decadente, mercantilista y colonizante influencia de los “bárbaros”.

Durante el sakoku (1633-1853); sólo había relaciones comerciales con Corea, China, los ainu de Hokkaido y los holandeses. Se trataba de evitar maniobras subversivas que comenzaban en el sur de Japón debido a la penetración jesuita procedente de España y Portugal. Según la Emperatriz Meisho (1624-1696), los japoneses querían evitar (siglo XVII) que los españoles y los portugueses hicieran lo mismo en Japón que habían hecho en América (o véase también lo que pasó más cerca de ellos, en Filipinas).

El hecho de que los japoneses veían a los españoles y portugueses con desconfianza fue aprovechado por los ingleses y los holandeses, cuya penetración mercantil (primero solamente comercial, luego netamente colonial) sería mucho más lenta y sutil (algo parangonable, una vez más, a la metáfora de la rana).

En el sur de Japón, concretamente en las cercanías de Nagasaki, no fueron pocos los daimyo (señores feudales) que se convirtieron al Cristianismo, y con ellos sus súbditos. Así estallaron rebeliones cristianas contra el shogunato como la de Shimabara, tras lo cual el shogunato acusó a los misioneros jesuitas de instigar la rebelión y decidió expulsarlos y proscribir el Cristianismo (como en la antigua Roma). El sakoku también quería mantener el comercio bajo control, para evitar la especulación mercantil.

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Sukarno

Indonesia

Ahmed Sukarno (1901-1970), pan-asiatista post-IIGM. Tercerposicionista. Durante la IIGM fue detenido y encarcelado por los holandeses por su activismo político nacionalista, pero luego sería liberado por los japoneses. En 1945 llegó al poder en Indonesia. Contemporáneo de Perón y de Nasser, defendió una concepción política muy similar a la de ellos, y trató igualmente de forjar alianzas con los países vecinos para formar así un bloque fuerte e independiente capaz de resistir al imperialismo. Trató de dar vida a la confederación Maphilindo (por Malasia-Filipinas-Indonesia), del mismo modo que Perón había intentado construir el ABC (Argentina-Brasil-Chile) mediante la alianza con Getúlio Vargas y Carlos Ibáñez del Campo; y Nasser la República Árabe Unida (RAU), juntando a Egipto y Siria.

Un golpe de estado le derrocó en 1967, impidiendo que el proyecto Maphilindo se concretara.

Promovió un socialismo nacional para el sudeste asiático, durante la IIGM fue aliado de Japón, luego en la Guerra Fría pasó a ser una de las cabezas del movimiento de los No Alineados.

Sukarno dijo en 1942: “La independencia de Indonesia sólo puede ser conseguida con Dai Nippon“. En 1943 estuvo en Japón, donde se encontró con Tojo y con Hirohito y fue condecorado por éste.

Su ideario era la Pancasila (“los cinco principios”): nacionalismo (soberanía y patriotismo), internacionalismo (en el sentido de solidaridad y cooperación con otras naciones), democracia (pero una democracia propia, popular, orgánica, nacional, meritocrática, indonesia, diferente a la liberal-globalista homogeneizante de occidente) y religiosidad (rechazo del ateísmo marxista, y también de los fanatismos). Su idea de la “Democracia Guiada” es equivalente a la idea de la Jamahiriya de Gaddafi (el Guía de la Revolución Libia de 1969).

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Cuando Sukarno inició la propagación e implementación de su ideario político, tanto grupúsculos islamistas como guerrillas comunistas (trotskistas) empezaron a provocar disturbios (no hace falta ser muy inteligente para adivinar por quién estaban teledirigidos). Entre los grupos islamistas, figuraba la secta “Darul Islam” (filial indonesia de los HHMM)

Como poco después Gaddafi al otro extremo del mundo islámico, Sukarno fusionaba Nacionalismo, Socialismo e Islam.

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Sukarno organizó en 1955 la conferencia de Bandung; “La iniciativa de los 5″: Sukarno, Nasser (Egipto), Nehru (India), Tito (Yugoslavia) y Nkrumah (Ghana).
Sukarno era aliado de la Camboya de Norodom Sihanuk, de la RPDC, de China y Vietnam.

Aplicó el concepto de la Trisakti: Soberanía política, autosuficiencia económica e independencia cultural.

Derrocado por la CIA (como Perón, Mossadegh, etc) mediante la importación de la estrategia de la tensión, con “guerrillas comunistas” como en Latinoamérica, e “islamistas” como en el mundo árabe. Las dos variedades en un sólo país: “comunistas” e “islamistas” como agentes subversivos contra el socialismo nacional de Sukarno.
El caos provocó que se produjera el “alzamiento militar” de Suharto, el “Pinochet” indonesio, después de que una supuesta guerrilla (“movimiento 30 de septiembre”) secuestrase y asesinase a seis generales (obviamente una “bandera falsa”). La facción reaccionaria del ejército comandada por Suharto (ayudado por los ulemas islamistas) ya tenían la excusa del “peligro comunista” para derrocar a Sukarno, quien como Isabelita Perón en Argentina “no había podido frenar el terrorismo”. Y tampoco podían faltar (durante 1966) las “manifestaciones de estudiantes” (como dos años después contra De Gaulle).

Una de las cosas de las que acusaban los islamistas a Sukarno era su carácter de playboy (moralina puritana de sepulcros blanqueados, como en EEUU con Clinton, etc)

Tras su destitución, pasó el resto de sus días bajo arresto domiciliario, condenado de facto a una muerte lenta, porque le privaron de los medicamentos que necesitaba.

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Sukarno en Indonesia, y Macapagal en Filipinas. Se proyectó en 1960 la confederación Maphilindo (Malasia-Filipinas-Indonesia). Los británicos provocaron una revolución colorada con golpe militar incluído para derrocar a Sukarno; así se acabó el pan-asianismo en el sudeste asiático.

Durante la guerra fría, las dos superpotencias se repartieron Asia (véase Corea y Vietnam), impidiendo cualquier proyecto pan-asiatista.

En los tiempos más recientes, un político inspirado por el pan-asianismo ha sido el ex-primer ministro malayo Mahathir Mohamad.

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Wang Jingwei

China

Wang Jingwei era un nacionalista chino, aliado de Sun Yat-Sen durante la revolución y luego líder de Nanjing y aliado de los japoneses. En China, los revolucionarios del Kuomintang (y de Sun-Yat-Sen) acusaban a la dinastía Qing de lo mismo que los Ishin-Shishi en Japón acusaban al Bakufu en su declive: de no resistir a la penetración occidental y de contribuir al debilitamiento del país. Wang se oponía a Chiang Kai Shek (aliado de los occidentales) y antes que a éste prefería a Mao.

Wang dijo que el imperialismo occidental era un peligro mucho mayor para China que Japón. Wang viajó a Alemania (foto). la intervención japonesa le dió la oportunidad de establecer un gobierno fuera del alcance de Chiang (marioneta de EEUU).
El Kuomintang, ahora bajo el dominio de Chiang, se apoderó de Nanjing tras la IIGM y destruyeron su tumba (así son los “demócratas”). Wang había intentado unir en China a nacionalistas y comunistas.

En la segunda guerra sino-japonesa (1937-1945); hubo una cooperación sino-germana hasta 1941.
En la primera guerra sino-japonesa de 1894-95 sucedió algo similar a lo que aconteció después con Rusia; los Qing (como los Romanov) estaban muy debilitados, había muchas revueltas, Japón se aprovechó de eso, y la península coreana jugó un papel importante. En Manchukuo Pu-yi, el último emperador, fue instalado como regente por los japoneses.

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Norodom Sihanuk

Camboya

Norodom Sihanuk (1922-2012), Rey de Camboya entre 1941-1955 y entre 1993-2005. Venerado como el “Rey Padre de Camboya”, entre otras cosas también era director de cine.

Su nombre de pila “Sihanuk” significa “Mandíbulas de León” en lengua jemer (camboyano). Norodom es el nombre de su dinastía, es decir, el apellido (que en la mayoría de las lenguas asiáticas va primero).

Cuando Japón ocupó Camboya (entonces parte de la Indochina francesa) en marzo de 1945, los japoneses disolvieron la administración colonial e hicieron que Sihanuk proclamara la independencia. Pero tras la derrota de Japón, los franceses volvieron a tomar el control de Indochina.

En los años siguientes a la IIGM, y durante los primeros años 50, Sihanuk comenzó a reclamar la independencia y se fue perfilando como líder nacionalista. En marzo de 1953 Sihanuk se exilió en Tailandia. porque los franceses habían puesto precio a su cabeza. Sólo volvió cuando la independencia fue finalmente concedida en noviembre de ese año. Sihanuk abdicó en favor de su padre, tomó el puesto de primer ministro y creó el Sangkum Reastr Niyum (Comunidad Socialista Popular). Ganó las elecciones en 1955.

Los sud-vietnamitas intentaban asesinar a Sihanuk y realizaban constantes agresiones contra Camboya. (Luego sería la Camboya de Pol Pot la que agredería al Vietnam socialista). Se produjo un intento de atentado con paquete bomba contra Sihanuk en 1959.

En septiembre de 1965, durante la guerra del Vietnam, Sihanuk hizo un pacto con los nor-vietnamitas y con China, para permitir bases permanentes en Camboya oriental y el tránsito de armas chinas para el Vietcong.

http://www.kancc.org/file/7%BF%F9%205%C0%CF/08-07-04-KE3/img/7-26.jpg

Kim Il Sung y Norodom Sihanuk

Sihanuk tenía excelentes relaciones con Kim Il-Sung. Ambos, junto a Sukarno, se oponían a las políticas de EEUU en Asia. Cuando se vió obligado a vivir en el exilio, Sihanuk residió a caballo entre Pekin y Pyongyang.

En 1970, mientras estaba de visita en Moscú, el primer ministro Lon Nol hizo un golpe de estado que lo depuso. El golpista Lon Nol fue inmediatamente reconocido por EEUU como nuevo “presidente legítimo”. Tras ser derrocado, Sihanuk huyó a Pekin y comenzó a apoyar a los Jemeres Rojos contra Lon Nol. En el exilio declaró el “Gobierno Real de Unidad Nacional de Kampuchea”. Al principio, los Jemeres Rojos eran campesinos que apoyaban al Rey, no al comunismo. Pero cuando los JR dirigidos por Pol Pot llegaron al poder, traicionaron al Rey. Lo arrestaron y le forzaron a deponer sus funciones políticas. Lo expulsaron del país y tuvo que exiliarse de nuevo.

En 1978 los vietnamitas (apoyados por la URSS) derrocaron a Pol Pot (apoyado por China y por EEUU). Sihanuk se congratuló de que Pol Pot hubiera sido derrocado, pero tampoco veía con buenos ojos al nuevo gobierno instalado en Pnohm Penh por los vietnamitas. Por eso pidió que la silla del representante de Camboya ante la ONU permaneciera vacante… pero los Jemeres Rojos de Pol Pot estuvieron representando oficialmente a Camboya ante la ONU hasta 1997!

Tras la ocupación vietnamita de 1978, los EEUU presionaban otra vez a Sihanuk para que colaborara con los Jemeres Rojos. Los vietnamitas se retiraron definitivamente en 1989. Sihanuk regresó al país en 1991 y fue coronado de nuevo en 1993. Volvió a abdicar en 2004 por motivos de salud.

Entre 1979 y 1997 los JR estuvieron cerca de la frontera con Tailandia, país que les prestaba cobertura.

También en 1965 Pol Pot intentó buscar apoyo en Vietnam contra el gobierno de Sihanuk, pero los vietnamitas lo denegaron, porque estaban negociando con Camboya. En 1969 Pol pot inició su carrera por el poder. (Por esa misma época derrocaron a De Gaulle, a Sukarno, envenenaron a Nasser…). Los JR se alzaron contra Sihanuk, y luego (cuando se trataba de derrocar a Lon Nol) simularon estar de acuerdo con él.

Los JR sólo pudieron llegar al poder después del golpe de estado contra Sihanuk ejecutado por Lon Nol, y gracias al apoyo público que el Rey (engañado) les había dado.

Lon Nol, agente de los americanos, llevó a cabo el golpe por órdenes de la CIA, pues los EEUU decidieron retirar del poder a Norodom por haber éste permitido bases norvietnamitas en Camboya. Los norteamericanos querían quitar las bases, y por eso hicieron que el militar Lon Nol derrocase al muy popular Sihanuk, usando la excusa de que “el Rey no era capaz de detener la guerrilla comunista” (Exactamente la misma estrategia empleada en Indonesia contra Sukarno o en Argentina contra Isabelita Perón). Luego engañaron a Sihanuk para que apoyase públicamente a los Jemeres Rojos, para que así, éstos a su vez derrocasen a Lon Nol. El pueblo camboyano, bajo la influencia del Rey, apoyó masivamente a los JR. Pero luego los JR traicionarían a Sihanuk. En realidad Lon Nol y los JR eran las dos caras de la misma moneda, para lograr el objetivo de apartar a Sihanuk del poder y fomentar una guerra civil en Camboya, y una guerra regional (contra Vietnam) en el sudeste asiático.

Primer paso – Jemeres Rojos agitan contra Norodom Sihanuk (públicamente), Lon Nol conspira contra NS (secretamente)
Segundo paso – LN derroca a NS / JR ya no agitan contra NS y simulan aliarse con él, hasta le proponen la “jefatura de estado” / NS es engañado así para apoyar a los JR
Tercer paso – Guerrilla JR (apoyada por NS) derroca a LN / Una vez en el poder, los JR traicionan a NS

Los vietnamitas querían recuperar las bases que les correspondían en Camboya, pero los JR en el poder fueron de facto más anti-vietnamitas que anti-USA. Gracias a Pol Pot y los JR, EEUU consiguió una nueva guerra en la región; entre Camboya y Vietnam.

El apoyo de USA a Lon Nol contribuyó y allanó el camino a que Pol Pot llegara al poder.

Pol Pot hizo purgas contra quienes tenían estudios universitarios o habían residido en el extranjero (paradójicamente éste era su propio caso); Pol Pot es en todos los sentidos el “talibán” del comunismo. Tanto por sus brutales métodos como por haber sido herramienta de EEUU.

Pot Pot (Saloth Sar), líder entre 1975 y 1979. Los JR tomaron Pnohm Pehm en abril de 1975. Para evacuar las ciudades, los JR dijeron a los camboyanos que “iban a producirse inminentemente bombardeos aéreos de EEUU” y que la evacuación sólo sería “por unos días”.

Los JR prohibieron todas las religiones y dispersaron a las minorías étnicas, prohibiéndoles su lengua y sus tradiciones.

Los JR destruyeron sistemáticamente todos los recursos alimentarios que no estuviesen sujetos a un estricto control estatal. Prohibieron la pesca, destruyeron cosechas. Cientos de miles de personas murieron de malnutrición durante la evacuación de las ciudades y los trabajos forzados de carácter esclavista a los que a continuación serían sometidos en los arrozales.

Todo lo que se producía, todos los recursos del país, fueron saqueados; las 150.000 toneladas de arroz que se produjeron en 1976 fueron exportadas.

Pnohm Pehn fue convertida en ciudad fantasma, mientras que centenares de miles de camboyanos morían de hambre en los campos.

Alrededor de dos millones de camboyanos murieron durante el régimen de Pol Pot, los propios JR lo reconocían, pero atribuían las muertes a la “invasión de los vietnamitas”.

Mientras Norodom, Sukarno, Ho Chih Min y otros intentaban integrar, crear bloques, fomentar la cooperación entre los países asiáticos, los JR practicaron una geopolítica de enfrentamiento, de desunión, de hostigamiento contra los países vecinos. No es difícil adivinar a quién convenía ésto. Los JR fueron instalados para evitar y sabotear cualquier intento panasiatista en la zona. Finalmente fueron expulsados del poder a causa de la intervención de los vietnamitas, conducidos por el General Vo Nguyen Giap, héroe de la guerra contra EEUU.

http://takemon.files.wordpress.com/2010/12/drmahathir.jpg?w=640

Mahathir Mohamad

Malasia

Mahathir Mohamad, conocido como “Doctor M” (1925-) Gobernó entre 1981 y 2003.

Durante su gobierno, Malasia experimentó un periodo de gran crecimiento económico y la rauda modernización de sus infraestructuras. Ganó cinco elecciones consecutivas. Se opuso a los intereses “occidentales” en la región y sus relaciones con EEUU e Inglaterra eran difíciles. Criticó la hipocresía occidental, durante un tiempo llegó a boicotear los productos británicos y construyó una estrategia económica de “mirar primero hacia Oriente”, buscando socios en otros países asiáticos.

En 1998, por medio de Al Gore y Madeleine Albright, EEUU intentó crear una revuelta colorada en Malasia, apoyando al candidato”de la oposición” Anwar Ibrahim, que “casualmente” era partidario de implementar las políticas ultraliberales del FMI. Mahathir bloqueó las acciones especulativas de Soros en el sudeste asiático, impidiendo así el desplome de la economía nacional.

En 1997, Mahathir condenó en un discurso la “declaración universal de los derechos humanos”, a la que consideraba un instrumento opresivo por medio del cual EEUU quería extender su hegemonía justificando la imposición de sus “valores universales” a los demás pueblos del mundo.

Mahathir condenó la invasión de Iraq de 2003 y siempre apoyó la causa palestina, hasta el punto de que personas con pasaporte israelí tienen prohibida la entrada en Malasia hasta el día de hoy (pues Malasia no reconoce la existencia del “estado de Israel”, y no mantiene relaciones diplomáticas con éste).

En una conferencia islámica el 16 de octubre de 2003 dijo que “Los judíos gobiernan al mundo a través de sus títeres. Logran que otros luchen y mueran por ellos (…) Para controlar a los pueblos inventaron el comunismo, los derechos humanos y la democracia (…) Esa minúscula minoría se ha convertido en el mayor poder mundial”. (Ver aquí )

Lógicamente su discurso fue condenado por los países occidentales, por su “antisemitismo”, su “intolerancia”, etc.

En numerosas ocasiones, Mahathir ha declarado que la versión oficial de los atentados del 11S es una patraña, y que el gobierno de EEUU está implicado en la destrucción de las Torres Gemelas.

El presidente kazajo Nursultan Nazarbayev (eurasiatista) ha elogiado en numerosas ocasiones a su admirado Mahathir y trata de emular en Kazajstán la exitosa fórmula económica de Malasia .

Japón hoy

 Desde 1945, el antaño orgulloso Imperio Japonés, Dai Nippon, es una colonia y los japoneses (si bien no han perdido completamente su ideosincrasia y su esencia – su yamato damashii – como es el caso de los europeos occidentales) se encuentran en sumo grado americanizados, imbuídos por el anti-espíritu de la modernidad materialista, consumista: Aún más que en occidente, la robotizada sociedad japonesa moderna da la impresión de que vive para trabajar, en lugar de trabajar para vivir.

Pocas corrientes de oposición que reivindiquen la soberanía nacional han logrado consolidarse. La mayor parte de los movimientos “nacionalistas” son de carácter exclusivamente xenófobo y chauvinista , anti-coreano, anti-chino; ello recuerda a la rusofobia de los nacionalistas otanescos de Ucrania, o del régimen lituano. Éstos movimientos carecen de cualquier programa político serio, descuidan los temas económicos (de vital importancia para lograr una genuina emancipación nacional), consideran a EEUU como “un aliado” (al país que les lanzó las bombas atómicas!! – Eso sí que es tener “complejo de Estocolmo”…), tienen nula visión geopolítica…

Sin embargo, existe un partido de características nacional-revolucionarias llamado Issuikai (la Sociedad del Primer Viernes), que se considera heredero de la Tatenokai (Sociedad del Escudo) creada por el escritor Yukio Mishima, a su vez fuertemente influenciado por el socialismo patriótico de Ikki Kita y el panasianismo de Shumei Okawa. Mitsuhiro Kimura, actual líder del Issuikai (amigo de Jean Marie Le Pen y de Uday Saddam Hussein), recoge el legado de Mishima y de sus precursores (los oficiales del alzamiento del 26 de febrero, del Kodoha, del Genyosha y la Sociedad del Dragón Negro), que es el al mismo tiempo el legado de los samurai, de los que siguen el sendero del guerrero o bushi-do.

Igual que en Ucrania y en los países del Báltico, a los „nacionalistas“ mainstream del Japón post-moderno se les ha inculcado que Rusia es igual a “comunismo“, y que por lo tanto hay que oponerse siempre a Moscú, y aliarse con el “mundo libre”, con los USA y la OTAN, que serían el “mal menor”… El gobierno de Japón se encuentra influenciado por esa corriente, y tras la re-incorporación de Crimea a su Madre Patria, rompió su cooperación militar con Rusia. Pero (igual que en la mayoría de los gobiernos) en Tokyo existen diferentes corrientes, y recientemente se anunció la intención de restablecer las relaciones militares.

http://gulfnews.com/polopoly_fs/1.668381!/image/3512405560.jpg_gen/derivatives/box_475/3512405560.jpg

Kimura con Le Pen en el Yasukuni

“Nuestros únicos enemigos son la ambición hegemónica americana y los políticos que apoyan a los Estados Unidos. Los problemas recurrentes que tenemos con China o Corea, son debidos a maniobras de los USA. Soy un nacionalista japonés, y, por ello, debo de respetar a todos los demás nacionalistas, incluyendo a los chinos o los coreanos. (…) Los estadounidenses nos hablan de democracia en Asia, pero ¿que hacen al mismo tiempo en Irak o en Kosovo?”- Mitsuhiro Kimura

Ver también -> Kimura: “El patrioterismo descerebrado sólo contribuye a la destrucción del Japón” (a la subordinación a los EEUU)

Poco antes, el Issuikai había solicitado al gobierno japonés cancelar las sanciones que (debido a la presión US-americana) el país del Sol Naciente había impuesto contra Moscú.   Y es que los patriotas del Issuikai no están dispuestos a caer de nuevo en la trampa que hace más de 100 años les tendieron los cosmopolitas banqueros neoyorkinos, cuando éstos (especialmente el financiador de los bolcheviques y amigo de Trotsky Jacob Schiff) empujaron al Imperio Japonés a la guerra contra la Rusia de los Romanov en 1904. Como ya había expuesto Haushofer, para la constitución de un mundo multipolar las buenas relaciones entre Rusia y Japón (y Alemania!) son de vital importancia. Pero como podemos observar (hoy más que nunca) los herederos de los Schiff se encargan todavía de sabotear por todos los medios a su disposición las buenas relaciones entre éstos tres países (Alemania-Rusia-Japón), así como la emergencia de cualquier proyecto continentalista.

 

Mitsuhiro Kimura ha visitado el estado de Abjasia, nación que como Osetia del sur, se separó de Georgia tras el conflicto del 2008 y que sólo ha sido reconocida por Rusia, Venezuela y Nicaragua. Además, el líder del Issuikai ha viajado nada menos que a la vecina (pero muy hermética) RPDC (Corea del Norte), algo impensable para los “nacionalistas del beneficio” a sueldo de la CIA, cegados por la coreofobia y el rancio “anticomunismo” trasnochado. (Igual que marxismo y capitalismo, “anticomunismo” y “antifascismo” son dos caras de la misma moneda). Oficialmente para lograr la repatriación de los restos de soldados japoneses caídos en Corea durante la IIGM, la visita de Kimura también buscó establecer relaciones bilaterales entre los nacional-revolucionarios nipones y la RPDC, que (como vimos) tienen bastantes características en común.

TM

 

 

mardi, 28 octobre 2014

Schotse SNP heeft fascistische wortels

Karl Drabbe

'De vijand van mijn vijand is mijn vriend'

Schotse SNP heeft fascistische wortels

SC-Fasc.jpgEen recente historische roman over Londen en nazi-Duitsland loodst willens nillens naar een recente historische studie over fascisme in Schotland. Ook de SNP heeft fascistische wortels en hoopte via een overwinning van nazi-Duitsland Schotse onafhankelijkheid te bekomen.

Met Mist over Londen schreef C.J. Sansom recent een historische thriller die een wereldwijd succes werd. Eerder schreef hij over een vroegmoderne advocaat in het door Cromwell verscheurde Engeland en een historische roman die zich afspeelde tegen de achtergrond van de Spaanse Burgeroorlog. Mist over Londen is een what-if-roman; geromaniseerde counterfactional history: wat als de Britten in 1940 een pact zouden hebben gesloten met Hitler-Duitsland? Een moeizaam lezend boek, dat door zijn historische setting toch enkele wetenswaardigheden opwierp. Zoals het feit als zou de Schotse Nationalistische Partij SNP – de drijvende kracht achter het referendum straks op 18 steptember – niet onwillig geweest zijn voor de verleidingen en verlokkingen van het nationaal-socialisme. Pardon, dat in zijn geschiedenis erg linkse, zelfs trotskistisch geïnspireerde SNP dat flirtte met nazi-Duitsland? Les extrêmes se touchent? Of is het à la Mark Grammens: ‘de vijand van mijn vijand is mijn vriend’?

Het enige niet-vaderlandstrouwe element dat je op Wikipedia leest over de SNP is dat de toen jonge partij (opgericht in 1934) tijdens Wereldoorlog II campagne voerde tegen de conscriptie, de verplichte legerdienst om het Empire te verdedigen en Herr Hitler te bestrijden. 

Maar wie wat verder zoekt, leert dat de SNP wel wat vaker ‘fout’ was, zoals dat heet. Nu goed, ook de pacifistische verkozenen van Labour en de appeasement-politici van de Tories – die Hitler zijn gang lieten met Sudetenland en de Oostenrijkse Anschluss – zou je kunnen verdenken van enige sympathieën met het nationaalsocialisme. Anderzijds hebben (kopstukken van) die partijen later uitdrukkelijk afstand genomen van en hun verontschuldigingen aangeboden voor hun politiek voor het feitelijke uitbreken van de Tweede Wereldoorlog. Het ging meer om het toegeven van inschattingsfouten.

Van vreemde smetten vrij

Echter, van de SNP nooit enig woord, nooit enige verontschuldiging. Was dat dan niet nodig? De tweede voorzitter van de partij, Andrew Dewar Gibb (1934-’36), kan nochtans op z’n minst fascistoïde genoemd worden. Niet echt een antisemiet, bij gebrek aan joden in Schotland. Hij viseerde vooral de katholieke Ieren die tijdens het interbellum voor een nieuwe influx van proleten zorgde, gevlucht voor het terrorisme in Ierland, op zoek naar werk in de machtige industriestaat Groot-Brittannië. Andrew Dewar Gibb vond zelfs dat die Ierse inwijkelingen hun stemrecht moest worden afgenomen, en niet enkel omdat ze massaal voor het socialistische Labour stemden, maar omwille van hun vreemde afkomst. Zijn antisemitisme botvierde hij op de Communistische Partij, die volgens hem van oorsprong véél te joods was.

Tot op vandaag heeft de SNP nooit afstand genomen van Gibb. Zoals de partij in haar tachtigjarig bestaan er ook nooit veel aandacht aan heeft besteed. – Overigens, ook in het (prachtige) nationale museum van Schotland herinner ik me niets gezien te hebben over fascisme of nationaalsocialisme. Nochtans heeft de Schotse emancipatiestrijd er een hele zaal gekregen.

De vijand van mijn vijand …

Professor Gavin Bowd doceert Frans aan de befaamde Schotse St Andrews Universiteit. Zijn recente boek Fascist Scotland (Birlinn, 2013) geeft niet alleen een mooie inkijk in de niche van het politieke fascisme in Schotland. Het geeft ook een plaats aan het fascisme binnen de SNP ‘which make uncomfortable reading for its members,’ volgens een recensent.

In de jaren 1930 was de SNP nog niet de socialistische partij die ze later – vooral in de jaren 1960-’70 – geworden is. Bowd beschrijft hoe vele van de eerste generatie partijkopstukken landeigenaars waren met een meer dan bijzondere belangstelling voor Mussolini en Hitler. In diezelfde jaren sloot de ‘Scottish Union of Fascists’ zelfs en bloc aan bij de SNP.

In Fascist Scotland wijst Gavin Bowd erop dat er wel meerdere ‘Scot Nats’ waren die uitkeken naar een overwinning van nazi-Duitsland als een soort ‘opportuniteit’ om Schotse onafhankelijkheid te realiseren. De vergelijking met het activisme in de Eerste en de collaboratie in de Tweede Wereldoorlog in Vlaanderen ligt voor de hand. 

In januari 1939 al schreef SNP-voorzitter Douglas Young (1942-1945): ‘If Hitler could neatly remove our imperial breeks somehow and thus dissipate the mirage of Imperial partnership with England etc he would do a great service to Scottish Nationalism.’ In augustus 1940 schreef Young: ‘The Germans will look around for aborigines to run Scotland and it is to be wished that the eventual administration consist of people who have in the past shown themselves to care for the interests of Scotland.’

Professor Bowd: ‘Young thus showed the ambivalent, to say the least, attitude of Scottish Nationalists towards Fascism. Hatred of the English led to the downplaying of the Fascist threat to freedom and peace, while more radical Nationalists could be attracted to the authoritarian and xenophobic solutions offered by the Führer and the Duce.’

In mei 1941 werd ene Arthur Donaldson opgepakt door de Britse autoriteiten. Donaldson werd beticht van pro-nazi-sympathieën. De man was lid van de SNP. Guilty by association? Ongetwijfeld. Elke partij heeft gekken rondlopen. Maar doorgaans, als zoiets bekend wordt, distantieert een partij zich, verontschuldigt ze zich. En ze excommuniceert het lid. Zo niet de SNP.

In het verslag van de MI5-agent die Donaldson ondervroeg is te lezen: ‘We must, he declared, be able to show the German Government that we are organised and that we have a clear cut policy for the betterment of Scotland; that we have tried our best to persuade the English Government that we want Scottish Independence and that we are not in with them in this war. If we can do that you can be sure that Germany will give us every possible assistance in our early struggle. The time is not yet ripe for us to start a virile campaign against England, but when fire and confusion is at its height in England, we can start in earnest. He then went on to tell them that he had an idea in his mind for fixing up a wireless transmitting set in a thickly populated district in Glasgow or Edinburgh, in order to give broadcasts to the public.’

In mei 1941 was er nog een mogelijke Duitse overwinning – Endsieg – in zicht. Niet helemaal onbegrijpelijk dat er dus ook in het VK pro-nazi’s rondliepen, zeker niet als de partijleider het ‘goede voorbeeld’ gaf.

Ware het niet dat diezelfde man negentien jaar later, in 1960 werd verkozen tot … voorzitter van de SNP. Die taak vervulde hij tot 1969, toen hij werd opgevolgd door William Wolfe.

Tot op vandaag is er tijdens het jaarlijkse SNP-congres een 'Arthur Donaldson lecture'. De partij heeft dus nog steeds geen afstand genomen van haar ‘Duitsvriendelijke’  voorzitter.

‘Van vreemde smetten vrij’ (2)

Enkele jaren later, in 1982, toen paus Johannes Paulus II Schotland aandeed tijdens een van zijn vele wereldreizen, vond oud-partijvoorzitter Billy Wolfe het nodig de Schotten in te lichten dat het katholicisme – in Schotland beleden door afstammelingen van Ierse immigranten uit het interbellum – een ‘vreemde’ religie was en katholieken nooit ‘true Scots’ kunnen worden. Een vreemde exclusieve visie op identiteit, geef toe. Toch voor een partij die zich vandaag heel internationalistisch, sociaaldemocratisch en inclusief opstelt. Amper dertig jaar geleden was dat nog anders.

Vergezocht?

De SNP werd in 1934 opgericht als een samensmelting van twee oudere Schots-nationalistische partijen: de Scottish Party en de National Party of Scotland.

De gevierde Schotse dichter Hugh MacDiarmid (née Christopher Murray Grieve) was een van de stichters van de NPS. In 1923, amper een jaar nadat Mussolini na zijn Mars op Rome de macht greep in Italië, schreef de dichter  twee artikels waarin hij opriep tot een Schots fascisme dat onderdeel moest vormen van ‘een Schotse national revival en radicale sociale gerechtigheid doorheen heel Schotland’.

Naar fascistisch voorbeeld van andere nationalistische bewegingen in Europa, richtte MacDiarmid een ‘ondergrondse’ militantenorde op, de Clann Albainn. MacDiarmid evolueerde van een radicaal fascisme naar een nationaal-bolsjevisme. Hij omarmde het Sovjet-communisme en werd daardoor uit de SNP gezet. Jaren later gooiden de Schotse Communisten hem uit hun partij … omwille van zijn nationalistische standpunten.

Ook MacDiarmid zag ‘opportuniteiten’ in de mogelijke nazi-invasie op de Britse eilanden. 

Oordeel

Hoe vaak valt niet te lezen dat het Vlaams-nationalisme een ‘rechtse’ uitzondering is op het ‘linkse’ nationalisme elders in Europa? Een cliché van jewelste, want de grootste nationalistische partijen in Catalonië en Baskenland zijn centrumrechts, conservatief of liberaal. Van de succesvolle nationalistische partijen is de Schotse SNP de grote uitzondering. Maar dat was niet altijd zo.

Ook de SNP heeft, zoals de Bretonnen, de Welsch, de Vlamingen, Kroaten, Slowaken en zovele andere volkeren in Europa gerekend op een momentum. In een Duits Rijk zouden ze over ‘hun autonomie’ kunnen beschikken. Dat een en ander anders uitdraaide is niet alleen het lot van de geschiedenis. Het is ook moreel wijfelbaar. Bij monde van Frans-Jos Verdoodt heeft de Vlaamse Beweging haar historisch pardon hierover al uitgesproken in 2000. De SNP heeft nog niet de spons over haar verleden geveegd … 

“Giambattista Vico and Modern Anti-Liberalism”

Counter-Currents Radio
Vico & the New Right

This is Greg Johnson's lecture

“Giambattista Vico and Modern Anti-Liberalism”

delivered at the London Forum on Saturday, September 27, 2014. 

 

Vico.jpgTo download the mp3, right-click here [2] and choose “save target or link as.”

To subscribe to our podcasts, click here [3].

 


 

Article printed from Counter-Currents Publishing: http://www.counter-currents.com

 

URL to article: http://www.counter-currents.com/2014/10/vico-and-the-new-right/

dimanche, 26 octobre 2014

Charismatische socialist en nationalist

Door: Dirk Rochtus

Charismatische socialist en nationalist

Bij de 150ste sterfdag van Ferdinand Lassalle

De stichter van de eerste Duitse socialistische partij was ook een Duits nationalist. Op 31 august is het precies 150 jaar geleden dat Ferdinand Lassalle ten gevolge van een duel omwille van een vrouw stierf.

 'Je vous présente le nouveau Mirabeau!' Met die verwijzing naar de Franse revolutionair en publicist stelde de Duitse dichter Heinrich Heine de bezoeker uit Duitsland voor aan zijn vrienden in Parijs. Amper twintig jaar was Ferdinand Lassalle (1825-1864) of hij werd al vergeleken met een van de coryfeeën van de Franse revolutie. Maar Lassalle straalde dan ook politiek talent en veel politieke ambitie uit. Op zijn omgeving oefende hij een charismatische aantrekkingskracht uit, op de arbeiders wier leider hij zou worden, maar ook op vrouwen. En dat laatste zou hem fataal worden.

Cruciale rol

De historische verdienste van Ferdinand Lassalle bestaat erin dat hij op 23 mei 1863 in Leipzig de eerste Duitse socialistische partij oprichtte, de Allgemeiner Deutscher Arbeiterverein (ADAV). Via een fusie met een later opgerichte socialistische partij ontstond zo in 1890 de Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (SPD), die een cruciale rol heeft gespeeld in de recente geschiedenis van Duitsland. De SPD beschouwt 23 mei 1863 dan ook als de datum van haar oprichting. Die dag hielden Lassalle en twaalf gedelegeerden uit heel Duitsland in het bijzijn van enkele tientallen arbeiders de ADAV in het 'Pantheon' in Leipzig boven de doopvont.

Barricaden

De ADAV was wellicht in de vergetelheid geraakt, mocht de charismatische Lassalle haar niet zijn stem hebben geleend. Maar wie is nu de man die als zoon van een Duits-joodse handelaar op 11 april 1825 in Breslau (het huidige Wrocław in Polen) werd geboren? Zelfbewust was hij alleszins en vastberaden om de wereld te redden. Als zijn vader de achttienjarige vraagt wat hij wil studeren, antwoordt de zoon: 'Das größte umfassendste Studium der Welt, das Studium, das am engsten mit den heiligsten Interessen der Menschheit verknüpft ist: das Studium der Geschichte'. (De meest omvattende studies ter wereld, de studies die het nauwst met de heilige belangen van de mensheid verbonden zijn: die van de geschiedenis). Met zijn studiegenoten in Breslau en Berlijn discuteert Ferdinand Lassalle over het opkomende socialisme. Als jood weet hij wat de strijd voor emancipatie van een gediscrimineerde bevolkingsgroep waard is, als inwoner van de Pruisische provincie Silezië (thans Pools grondgebied) hoezeer de sociale nood de arbeidersklasse raakt. Wanneer hij gravin Hatzfeldt leert kennen die in een scheidingsproces verwikkeld is, stort hij zich op de jurisprudentie. Verwikkelingen rond zijn inzet voor de gravin doen hem in 1848, het jaar van de revolutie in Frankrijk en de Duitstalige staten, zelfs in de gevangenis belanden. Een geluk bij een ongeluk. Doordat hij niet op de barricaden kan staan, ontsnapt hij aan het lot dat vele revolutionairen als bannelingen ten dele valt. Lassalle blijft in Düsseldorf en werkt zich in het arbeidersmilieu in het Rijnland in. De scheidingsaffaire van Gräfin Hatzfeldt wordt in 1854 beslecht. De gravin verwerft de helft van het vermogen van de graaf en geeft Lassalle een ruime donatie voor zijn juridische bijstand. Daarmee kan hij een leven voeren als onafhankelijk publicist en bijvoorbeeld de uitgave van zijn boek over de Griekse filosoof Herakleitos bekostigen. Een van de zonen van de gravin was Paul von Hatzfeldt, die als Duitse ambassadeur in Londen van 1885 tot 1901 tevergeefs een goede verstandhouding tussen Duitsland en Groot-Brittannië probeerde tot stand te brengen.

Zending

In die dagen vormt de arbeidersbeweging nog geen zelfstandige kracht, maar leeft ze onder de vleugels van de progressieve liberale Fortschrittspartei. In Londen daarentegen hebben Duitse emigranten, waaronder Karl Marx, de Bund der Kommunisten opgericht. In het staatkundig verbrokkelde Duitsland wil Lassalle in navolging van het Engelse voorbeeld de arbeidersbeweging losrukken uit de liberale burgerlijke bevoogding. In een redevoering in 1862, het zogeheten Arbeiterprogramm, pleit hij enerzijds voor het algemene geheime stemrecht en anderzijds voor de oprichting van Produktiv-Assoziationen, fabrieken met staatskredieten om 'den Arbeiterstand zu seinem eigenen Unternehmer [zu] machen.' Lassalle gelooft in de rol van de staat als middel tot emancipatie van de arbeiders. In 1863 zoekt hij zelfs contact met Otto von Bismarck, minister-president van Pruisen en later (vanaf 1871) de eerste kanselier van het Duitse Keizerrijk, om hem ertoe te bewegen het algemeen kiesrecht in te voeren. Hij is als tegenprestatie zelfs bereid om zijn arbeidersvereniging een toekomstige annexatie van de hertogdommen Sleeswijk en Holstein door Pruisen, de leidende macht in Duitsland, te laten steunen. Dat laatste is niet puur door opportunistische overwegingen ingegeven. Ferdinand Lassalle gelooft in de Duitse eenmaking. Hij deelt de opvatting van de filosoof Fichte dat de Duitse natie een 'hogere zending' te vervullen heeft, dat grote 'Kulturnationen' recht hebben op een eigen staatkundige gedaante en zo hun bijdrage leveren tot de verdere ontwikkeling en de vooruitgang van de mensheid.

Broedertwist

Op 23 mei 1863 is het dan zover met wat Karl Marx als de historische verdienste van Lassalle roemt: 'Nach fünfzehnjährigem Schlummer rief Lassalle – und dies bleibt sein unsterbliches Verdienst – die Arbeiterbewegung wieder wach in Deutschland.' Vijftien jaar na de mislukte revolutie van 1848 organiseert de socialistische beweging zich onder impuls van de flamboyante agitator als partij. De ADAV is gedacht als een strak georganiseerde 'Kadertruppe' die via het algemeen stemrecht de staat dient te veroveren. Socialisme volgens Lassalle is zodoende met zijn nadruk op Produktiv-Assoziationen en het belang van de staat respectievelijk coöperatief en Duits-nationalistisch georiënteerd. Met die opvatting vervreemdt hij van Karl Marx die internationalistisch denkt, de arbeiders de macht wil zien grijpen door middel van een revolutie en de staat als 'instrument van onderdrukking' door de bourgeoisie wil doen afsterven.

Trouw aan de opvattingen van Karl Marx en Friedrich Engels hebben socialisten als een August Bebel en een Wilhelm Liebknecht in 1869 in Eisenach de Sozialdemokratische Arbeiterpartei (SDAP) opgericht. De broedertwist tussen 'Lassalleaner' en 'Eisenacher' verdeelt de Duitse arbeidersbeweging. Ondertussen laait in het pas opgerichte Duitse keizerrijk de repressie op van alles wat naar socialisme ruikt. Daarom besluiten ADAV en SDAP in 1875 in Gotha te versmelten tot Sozialistische Arbeiterpartei (SAP). Nadat Leo von Caprivi, de opvolger van Bismarck, in 1890 het repressieve Sozialistengesetz opgeheven heeft, reorganiseert de SAP zich en neemt ze een nieuwe naam aan, die van Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (SPD). Die naam draagt de partij tot op de dag van vandaag.

Fataal

Ferdinand Lassalle heeft het allemaal niet meer mogen meemaken. In 1863 verliest hij zijn hart aan Helene von Dönniges. Die verbreekt voor hem haar relatie met de Roemeense vorst Janco Gregor von Racowitza. Haar vader, een diplomaat in dienst van het Koninkrijk Beieren, verzet zich tegen een huwelijk van Helene met Lassalle. Daarop daagt Lassalle vader Dönniges uit tot een duel. Nu springt Racowitza in de bres voor de diplomaat door het pistolenduel met Lassalle aan te gaan. Op 28 augustus 1864 verwondt de Roemeense vorst de Pruisische socialistenleider in het bos van Carouge bij Genève. Drie dagen later bezwijkt Lassalle aan zijn verwondingen. De grote hoopdrager van de Duitse arbeidersbeweging laat het leven omwille van een vrouw die hem ongewild 'fataal' is geworden.

Misschien was de geschiedenis van de Duitse sociaaldemocratie en van Duitsland zelf anders verlopen als Lassalle de partij door de woelige jaren van het keizerrijk had kunnen loodsen. Misschien had zijn programma, dat op hervormingen in plaats van op revolutie zette, de sociaaldemocratische partij niet zoveel haat opgeleverd vanwege het establishment. Misschien hadden de elites van Duitsland de sociaaldemocraten niet voor 'vaterlandslose Gesellen' uitgekreten indien Lassalle als nationalistisch denkende sociaaldemocraat aan het roer van de partij was blijven staan.

Het antwoord zullen we nooit weten. Lassalle heeft het meegenomen in zijn graf in Breslau. Of zoals de dominee Ludwig Würkert dichtte:

'In Breslau ein Kirchhof – ein Toter im Grab –, / Dort schlummert der Eine, der Schwerter uns gab.'

(In Breslau een kerkhof – een dode in het graf –, / Daar sluimert die ene, die zwaarden ons gaf.)

JAPON : LA LÉGITIME DÉSOBÉISSANCE DES 47 RÔNINS

JAPON : LA LÉGITIME DÉSOBÉISSANCE DES 47 RÔNINS - « Ce qu’ils ont fait de leur vivant résonne pour l'éternité.... »
JAPON : LA LÉGITIME DÉSOBÉISSANCE DES 47 RÔNINS
 
«Ce qu’ils ont fait de leur vivant résonne pour l'éternité....»

Rémy Valat
Ex: http://metamag.fr
 
L’histoire des 47 rônins dépasse le cadre d’une simple affaire de droit féodal : ce serait l’engagement de vassaux, fidèles à leur maître jusqu’au sacrifice de leurs vies. Le drame se déroule au début du XVIIIe siècle, période durant laquelle le Japon est réunifié et pacifié sous l’égide du Shôgun. Le port et l’usage des armes sont contrôlés ; il est l’apanage quasi-exclusif des samouraïs. Les samouraïs sont ceux qui « servent » (étymologie du nom vient du verbe « servir », saburaû) leurs maîtres, le Shôgun et le pays. Ils sont pour cela présentés comme des « modèles » pour la société : à la fois guerriers et administrateurs, leur éducation et l’étiquette qui régit leur vie sont rigides.

En 1701, deux Daimyos (seigneurs en charge d’une province et en relation directe avec le Shôgun) sont chargés d’organiser une cérémonie en l’honneur de l’Empereur. Asano Naganori du fief d'Akō (province de Harima) commet l’impair de blesser le maître des cérémonies, Kira Kōzuke-no-Suke-Yoshinaka (14 mars). Ce dernier est dépeint comme un être corrompu jusqu’à la mœlle et se serait, selon la tradition populaire, montré arrogant et méprisant envers ces deux seigneurs, insuffisamment généreux à son goût à rémunérer son talent et ses services. Perte du contrôle de soi, agression à main armée sur un haut fonctionnaire de l’ État : Asano doit, sur l’ordre du Shôgun Tokugawa Tsuyanoshi (1646-1709), procéder le jour même au suicide rituel (seppuku). Ōishi Kuranosuke Yoshio, principal conseiller de la famille d'Asano prend aussitôt en main la sécurité des membres et des biens du clan menacés de confiscation et mûrit un plan de vengeance. Les différents récits et le florès d’interprétations théâtrales ou cinématographiques sur les conditions des préparatifs clandestins et de l’assaut final ont, certes été enjolivés et idéalisés, mais quel souffle à la lecture de ce récit ! La mise en scène la plus connue, popularisée par le théâtre kabuki, est l’ œuvre principale de Takeda Izumo (1748). Il existe une traduction française de l’épopée des 47 rônins, traduite par George Soulié de Morant en 1927, et rééditée régulièrement. Nous y puisons cet extrait, révélateur de l’esprit idéal du guerrier japonais.

 
Ōishi vient de rassembler le clan, 300 guerriers stupéfaits par l’annonce de la mort de leur seigneur et dans l’attente d’instructions : « Venger notre seigneur, voilà notre devoir. Ce que je propose, le voici. Nous allons jurer de ne reculer devant aucun danger pour tuer Kira et sa famille. Si nous n’avons pas réussi dans un an, c’est que l’entreprise est impossible. Nous nous réunirons alors devant la porte de la forteresse, ceux du moins qui auront survécu aux combats et nous nous donnerons la mort, montrant à tous notre fidélité. [...] Je vais préparer un serment écrit avec notre sang. Revenez tous ici demain, à l’heure du Tigre, pour le signer. Pour aujourd’hui, nous allons nous partager le trésor du clan : il ne faut pas qu’il tombe aux mains de nos ennemis.»
 
[La séance terminée chaque samouraï reçoit 20 lingots d’or et l’assemblée se disperse. Le lendemain, seuls 63 rônins répondirent à l’appel et Ōishi de déclarer :]  « Les épreuves que nous allons subir sont telles qu’une âme ordinaire ne saurait les supporter sans défaillir. En reconnaissant eux-mêmes leur faiblesse, ils m’ont évité le plus difficile des choix : c’est bien. Pour vanner le blé, il suffit de le laisser tomber au souffle de la brise. Le bon grain s’entasse d’un côté, la balle et les fétus de l’autre. [Puis, les loyaux samouraïs signèrent de leur sang le serment scellant leur sort pour l’éternité]. » 

Ce geste symbolique et sacré revêt surtout une dimension politique : c’est aussi un acte de désobéissance. Cet engagement solennel n’est pas sans rappeler les contrats d’ikki : les ikki sont ces révoltes populaires conduites pour réparer une injustice commise par les autorités ou un seigneur, insurrections parfois organisées par des guerriers pour se faire justice eux-mêmes ; ces derniers étant trop fiers pour laisser le règlement de leurs différends entre les mains des pouvoirs publics, fussent-ils le gouvernement du Shôgun (lire sur ce sujet : Katsumata Shizuo, Ikki. Coalitions, ligues et révoltes dans le Japon d’autrefois, traduction parue aux éditions du CNRS en 2011).
 
La maison de Kira est prise d’assaut le matin du 14 décembre 1702 : le maître et les hommes des des lieux seront passés au fil de l’épée. Les rônins emportèrent la tête de Kira sur la tombe de leur seigneur au temple de Sengaku-ji. Les survivants offrirent leur reddition au Shôgun et mettent celui-ci dans l’embarras. Car si la vendetta été légitime sur le fond et respectueuse des règles et de la coutume du Bushidō, elle ne l’était plus sur la forme : les Sainte Vehme étaient prohibées par le shôgunat, le pouvoir rappelle que le droit de faire justice est une prérogative régalienne dans un pays récemment unifié. Le shôgun les fît condamner à mort tout en leur offrant une fin honorable. Le 4 février 1703, 46 rônins (le 47e , le plus jeune, aurait fait l’objet de la clémence des juges selon la tradition populaire) se donnent la mort par éventration, et selon leurs vœux, leurs corps reposent auprès de celui de leur maître au cimetière du temple de Sengaku-ji.

Les témoignages historiques dépeignent différemment les motivations de ces samouraïs : le seigneur Asano n’était guère apprécié par ses serviteurs, et ce serait 58 guerriers (sur les 308 du clan) qui auraient prêté serment, non pas par simple esprit de vengeance, mais par réprobation du traitement injuste réservé à Asano par le Shôgun. Ce dernier aurait dû sanctionner les deux parties, d’autant qu’il y eut un précédent survenu en 1684. Un guerrier, selon l’historien Nakayama Mikio, en aurait blessé un autre en ce même lieu. Le premier aurait été tué sur le champ par un maître-officier du gouvernement et le second exilé. Enfin, seuls les criminels étaient exécutés ou contraints de se suicider à l’extérieur de leur maison. Les conditions du suicide d’Asano ont été considérées comme un acte infamant. C’est pour ces motifs que les rônins ont souhaité laver l’affront fait à leur maître et à leur maison.
 
Cette froide et habile, vengeance a été vivement critiquée par Yamamoto Tsunetomo (l’auteur du Hagakure) qui estimait plus conforme au code de l’honneur un règlement rapide du contentieux. Yamamoto Tsunetomo, fidèle serviteur du Shôgun, mît peut-être en avant ce point de la coutume pour discréditer Ōishi et ses hommes qui n’auraient techniquement pas pu mettre au point leur riposte en de si brefs délais, au moment où Kira se trouvait sur ses gardes et bien protégé par ses hommes (rappelons que c’est par respect envers la réglementation shogunale que Yamamoto Tsunetomo ne put accompagner son seigneur dans la mort : le suicide par accompagnement lui a été formellement interdit). Le Shôgun a commis une maladresse, en ce sens qu’au Japon, les suicides rituels avaient pour but de limiter les vendettas : l’honneur des familles lavé, les désirs de vengeance devaient être étouffés et dans le cas de leur mise à exécution, celle-ci était sévèrement sanctionnée. C’est le contraire qui, dans cet affaire, s’est produit.

Cette histoire eut un retentissement immédiat. Si les Japonais du début du deuxième siècle du Shôgunat y ont trouvé un exutoire à la rigidité du régime (surtout en matière de mœurs), le succès intemporel de ce drame tient à son authenticité. Les Japonais sont peu-être plus sensibles que d’autres peuples à l’engagement et au don de soi. Les paroles n’ont de valeur à leurs yeux que si elles sont suivis par un acte sincère. Quelque puisse être les motivations de ces rônins, c’est bien un sentiment positif, l’esprit de justice, qui les animait. Leur désobéissance était légitime et ils ont agi en pleine connaissance du sort qui leur était réservé. Ils ont préféré mourir dans l’honneur que de vivre dans la honte dans une société, et c’est encore le cas aujourd’hui au Japon, où pèse lourdement le regard des autres. Un geste tragique de refus et de liberté qui résonne pour l’éternité, comme l’atteste les témoignages de respect et de dévotion encore porté par les Japonais sur les tombes des 46 rônins....

Illustration en tête d'article : Ancien château d’Edo (actuellement le parc attenant au palais impérial) : emplacement du bâtiment à l’intérieur duquel, Kira Kōzuke-no-Suke-Yoshinaka sera blessé par Asano Naganori le14 mars 1701.©R.Valat

jeudi, 23 octobre 2014

Luthers Türkenschriften

Martin_Luther_by_Lucas_Cranach_der_Ältere.jpeg

Luthers Türkenschriften

von Marc P. Ihle

Ex: http://www.blauenarzisse.de

Der Zeitgeist übt sich gerne in Kritik am vermeintlich intoleranten Martin Luther. Doch dessen „Türkenschriften“ zeigen, dass er auf eine bis heute aktuelle Bedrohung reagierte.

Die über den Balkan in Europa einfallenden Osmanen stellten für Karl V., den Kaiser des Heiligen Römischen Reiches, ein permanentes Problem dar. Der Fall Konstantinopels 1453, dreißig Jahre vor Luthers Geburt am 10. November 1483, war in lebendiger Erinnerung. 1529 stehen die Türken erstmals vor Wien. Luthers große Türkenschrift Heerpredigt wider die Türken wird ein Jahr später veröffentlicht. Bereits in den 1520er Jahren, nachdem die Rechtfertigungslehre als Kern der Reformation die Unterstützung vieler Fürsten gewonnen hatte, wendet sich Luther auch zeitpolitischen Fragen zu. Dies geschieht unter Eindruck seiner Interpretation der Geschichte als Heilsgeschichte. Mit voranschreitendem Alter neigte Luther jedoch zur Apokalyptik.

Luthers Angst: Eine Allianz zwischen den Türken und dem Papst

Historische Ereignisse werden ihm zum Gottesurteil über das eigene reformatorische Werk. Dessen Schicksal wird paradoxerweise durch den Türkeneinbruch begünstigt, da dieser den Kaiser bindet und zu Zugeständnissen an die protestantischen Stände zwingt. Denn auf deren militärische Unterstützung bleibt der Herrscher angewiesen. Luthers briefliche Bemerkung an den Reformator Philipp Melanchthon im Jahre 1530 über den Kampf gegen die „einheimischen Ungeheuer unseres Reiches“ zeigt, dass Luther vorerst den Hauptfeind nicht in den heranrückenden Türkenheeren, sondern im römischen „Antichristen“, dem Papst, sieht. Noch wenige Jahre vor seinem Tod ist Luther besessen von der Furcht vor einer antiprotestantischen Allianz von Papsttum und Türken. Eine Furcht, die in umgekehrter Konstellation auch der Kaiser teilte.

Luthers persönliche Haltung zum Islam hat eine ähnliche Entwicklung genommen, wie seine heute behauptete, angebliche Judenfeindlichkeit. Wie seine Zeitgenossen bezog er seine Kenntnisse über den Islam aus Sekundärquellen. Der Historiker Heinz Schilling unterstellt dem großen Reformator in seiner Anfang diesen Jahres erschienenen Biographie Martin Luther: Rebell in einer Zeit des Umbruchs eine grundsätzliche Toleranz gegenüber dem Islam. Das mag freilich bezweifelt werden. Zu Beginn seiner Auseinandersetzung mit Türken und Juden stellten diese für Luther potentiell zu missionierende Gruppen dar. Zugleich nimmt Luther aber die Türkengefahr nicht als realpolitische Bedrohung, sondern als „Zuchtrute Gottes“ wahr. In seinem heilsgeschichtlichen Verständnis wird der Türkeneinbruch als Strafe und Bußangebot Gottes gedeutet. Grund dafür seien die angeblichen Häresien der römischen Kirche.

Luther lehnte einen Kreuzzug ab

Der darin sich äußernde, beim späten Luther ganz verschwundene politische Optimismus gehört in die frühe Phase der rasanten Ausbreitung der Reformation. Luthers Weltbild verbaute dem Reformator zunächst den Blick auf die identitäre Bedrohung, die mit der Türkeninvasion verbunden war. Denn zu diesem Zeitpunkt bildete die Geschichte für Luther nur einen Austragungsort des Kampfes Gottes gegen die päpstliche Verfälschung des Evangeliums.

Einen Glaubenskrieg lehnte Luther ab, da religiöse Argumente in den geistlichen Kampf gehörten, nicht aber in den weltlichen Bereich des Schwertes. Das war bei weitem kein Pazifismus. Denn das Gewaltmonopol lag für Luther bei den Fürsten und dem Kaiser, die auf ihre Weise in der politischen Welt Ordnung schaffen sollten. Das betonte Luther auch ausdrücklich, als er sich gegen den Bauernaufstand von 1525 aussprach. Doch diese Aufteilung hinderte die Reformation einerseits an einem Missionierungskrieg gegen die Papsttreuen, zum anderen auch an einer Kreuzzugsidee gegen die Türken.

Luther hat drei große Türkenschriften verfasst: Vom Kriege wider die Türken (1528), Heerpredigt wider die Türken (1530), Versuchung zum Gebet wider die Türken (1541). 1529, zeitgleich mit der sogenannten „Protestation von Speyer“, als Anhänger Luthers sich auf dem Reichstag gegen seine Ächtung aussprachen, verdunkelt sich Luthers Sicht auf die Türken. Sie werden nun zu apokalyptischen Feinden des Christentums. Die Kreuzzugsidee lehnt der Reformator jedoch ab, da er dem Papsttum dafür jede Autorität, insbesondere die geistliche Autorität, und die Zuständigkeit im Allgemeinen abspricht. Gott allein muss nach Luther für die Sicherheit des Evangeliums in seinem Reich sorgen, der Kaiser aber für die territoriale Integrität.

Die Wende in Luthers Haltung zu den Türken

Die Türkenbelagerung Wiens 1529 jedoch zeigt auch Luther die Grenzen seiner politischen Zwei-​Reiche-​Lehre auf. Denn die Zukunft des Christentums wird durch den islamischen Konkurrenzanspruch zu einer politischen und religiösen Frage. Das geistliche Regiment kann, das hat Luther auch durch die landesfürstliche Protektion seiner protestantischen Landeskirchen erkennen müssen, nur durch militärische Macht geschützt werden.

Bei Luther scheint es vielmehr ab 1530 zu einer Vermischung heilsgeschichtlicher und politischer Motive zu kommen. Wie Schilling zutreffend sagt, wären die Türken nun für ihn „die Feinde der Deutschen und der Christen allgemein“, weil sie zu einer Bedrohung der kulturellen Identität Europas geworden sind. Diesen Gedanken hat Luther natürlich nicht formuliert, da es für ihn keinen Unterschied zwischen Geschichte, Heilsgeschichte, Europa und Glaube geben konnte. Doch seiner Begeisterung in der Heerpredigt mag eine Ahnung zugrunde liegen von der Korrelation politischer, ethnischer und kultureller Bedrohung und der Möglichkeit der eigenen Vernichtung. Die christlichen Soldaten sollten „die Faust regen und getrost dreinschlagen, morden, rauben und Schaden tun, so viel sie immer vermögen“, schreibt Luther fanatisch.

Luthers Lektion: Keine Toleranz für Eindringlinge

Diese Empfehlung Luthers unterscheidet sich unwesentlich von Kampfesreden universalistischer Kreuzritter unserer Tage. Es handelt sich zugleich aber auch um nichts anderes als eine realistische Beschreibung dessen, was eine Kultur in einem Abwehrkampf unternimmt. Denn dieser wurde ihr unfreiwillig von außen durch die Türken aufgezwungen. Dennoch wird Luther in der Gegenwart in einer eigenartigen, ahistorischen Perspektivlosigkeit unter Rubriken wie „Toleranz“ oder „Antisemitismus“ gelesen oder gar zum Fürsprecher eines aggressiven Kulturkampfes gemacht.

Doch heute, ebenso wie zur Zeit der Expansion der Osmanen, geht der Zusammenprall der Kulturen nicht von Europa, sondern eben vom Islam aus. Deshalb ist die Bewertung Luthers unter Kriterien der Politischen Korrektheit abwegig. Aber genau dies versuchen die Stellungnahmen der Evangelischen Kirche in Deutschland (EKD) zum Reformationsjubiläum. Und das ist auch der Tenor der Arbeiten eines sogenannten „Studierendenwettbewerbs“ zum Thema „Luther und Islam“, den das Bundesinnenministerium bereits 2013 ausgeschrieben hat. Namentlich der Beitrag von Marcus Meer mit seinem programmatischen Titel Martin Luther zum Islam. Ein frühneuzeitlicher Beitrag zur Toleranzdiskussion der Gegenwart? unterstreicht diese Tendenz. Meer erhebt zugleich Vorwürfe gegen Luthers Christologie, welche diesem in ihrem für den Autor verwunderlichen Wahrheitsanspruch die Einsicht in die „Wahrheit“ anderer Religionen verwehrt habe. Schließlich verhängt der Autor sein Verdikt gegen Luther: Mit dessen Toleranz sei es nicht weit her. In Fragen der „Anerkennung von Andersheit“ habe Luther dringenden Nachholbedarf gehabt.

Luthers Türkenschriften zeigen Perspektiven für das Zeitalter des erzwungenen Multikulturalismus auf. Wie damals gibt es heute keine freiwillige kulturelle Begegnung von Christentum und Islam, sondern eine auf Eroberung angelegte, feindliche und gewaltsame Landnahme. Diese führt stringent mindestens zu einer Relativierung der christlichen Kultur.

Der Antitoleranzvorwurf an Luther, der lediglich seine eigene Kultur verteidigte, mutet da absurd an. Nicht Luther, das Reich oder gar der Papst wünschten sich die Türkenpräsenz auf dem Kontinent. Die Osmanen drangen gewaltsam und mit klaren machtpolitischen Absichten in Europa ein, um Land zu rauben, Menschen zu unterwerfen und ihr Kulturmodell an die Stelle des Christentums zu setzen. In der Rückschau können wir Luther als aufrechten Streiter für abendländisches Christentum sehen – eine Rolle, die heute weder evangelische Bischöfe noch Päpste wirklich ausfüllen. Und Luther erteilt uns eine wichtige Lektion in Sachen Toleranz: Niemand ist zu Duldung gegenüber unerwünschten Eindringlingen verpflichtet. Zumindest niemand, der sich nicht selbst abschaffen möchte.

Bild: Martin Luther, Gemälde von Lucas Cranach d. Ä. (1529)

lundi, 20 octobre 2014

Sennacherib’s Return

 Lancaster_I_NG128_Dropping_Blockbuster_-_Duisburg_-_Oct_14_1944-300x264.jpg

Sennacherib’s Return

Advance to Barbarism, FJP Veale

The exclusion of non-combatants from the scope of hostilities is the fundamental distinction between civilized and barbarous warfare.

FJP Veale

Sennacherib, the great king,

And their small cities, which were beyond numbering I destroyed, I devastated, and I turned into ruins. The houses of the steppe, (namely) the tents, in which they lived, I set on fire and turned them into flames.

Over the whole of his wide land I swept like a hurricane. The cities Marubishti and Akkuddu, his royal residence-cities, together with small towns of their area, I besieged, I captured, I destroyed, I devastated, I burned with fire.

In the course of my campaign, Beth-Dagon, Joppa, Banaibarka, Asuru, cities of Sidka, who had not speedily bowed in submission at my feet, I besieged, I conquered, I carried off their spoil.

As for Hezekiah the Judahite, who did not submit to my yoke: forty-six of his strong, walled cities, as well as the small towns in their area, which were without number, by levelling with battering-rams and by bringing up seige-engines, and by attacking and storming on foot, by mines, tunnels, and breeches, I besieged and took them.

I captured their cities and carried off their spoil, I destroyed, I devastated, I burned with fire.

Furthermore, 33 cities within the bounds of his province I captured. People, asses, cattle and sheep, I carried away from them as spoil. I destroyed, I devastated, and I burned with fire.

The cities which were in those provinces I destroyed, I devastated, I burned with fire. Into tells and ruins I turned them.

…strong cities, together with the small cities in their areas, which were countless, I besieged, I conquered, I despoiled, I destroyed, I devastated, I burned with fire, with the smoke of their conflagration I covered the wide heavens like a hurricane.

Veale continues his examination of the Advance to Barbarism, focusing first on the World War II bombing of areas outside of the battlefield and culminating in the carpet bombing of German cities.  This bombing marked the complete repudiation of one of the cornerstones of the concept of civilized warfare: warfare should be the concern only of the armed combatants engaged; non-combatants should be left outside of the scope of military operations.  It marked the return, or advance as Veale puts it, to a form of warfare for which Sennacherib the Assyrian was well known.

May 11, 1940

churchill.jpgVeale introduces J. M. Spaight and his book “Bombing Vindicated.” Spaight describes the awesomeness of this day, the “splendid decision” to bomb German targets well outside of the area of military operations.  The next day, newspapers announced that “eighteen Whitley bombers attacked railway installations in Western Germany.”

Looked at from today’s eyes, there is nothing shocking in this statement; however, compared to what came before in European wars, this was news:

Western Germany in May 1940 was, of course, as much outside the area of military operations as Patagonia.

At the time the battle for France was in high gear, yet the pilots flew over these battlefields to reach their objective:

To the crews of these bombers it must have seemed strange to fly over a battlefield where a life and death struggle was taking place and then over a country crowded with columns of enemy troops pouring forward to the attack…Their flight marked the end of an epoch which had lasted for two and one-half centuries.

…against a background of prosaic twentieth railway installations we can imagine the grim forms of Asshurnazirpal and Sennacherib stroking their square-cut, curled and scented beards with dignified approval….

This was only the beginning, with the culmination to come in Dresden some five years later, but this is to get too far ahead in the narrative.

The entire reason for the development of Britain’s bomber command “was to bomb Germany should she be our enemy,” according to Spaight.  Philosophically, this concept was offered as early as 1923, by Air Marshal Sir Hugh Trenchard: “The Army policy is to defeat the enemy army; our policy is to defeat the enemy nation.”  Not very European.

Spaight points out that this was also obvious to Hitler, which is one reason Hitler was anxious to reach an agreement with Britain to confine “the action of aircraft to the battle zones.”  Spaight agrees that Hitler undertook civilian bombing only three months after the RAF began bombing the German civilian population.

Germany did not design its bombers for such use, instead designed to support ground troops:

“For Germany,” Mr. Spaight continues, “the bomber was artillery for stationary troops dug fast into the Maginot Line; for Britain, it was an offensive weapon designed to attack the economic resources of the enemy deep within his country.”

In order to establish the groundwork for this shift, in May, 1940 Churchill and his advisors extended the definition of military objectives to include…

…factories, oil plants, public buildings and any structure which contributed or was of use, if only indirectly, to the war effort of the enemy.

Railway installations, industrial zones, etc.  The British Cabinet argued that these are used to support the military, therefore are fair targets.  Of course, by this reasoning – and by including the word “indirectly” – virtually every resident of a warring nation could be a legitimate target.

However, even via this logic, bombing accuracy must be taken into account.  There is no such thing as “collateral damage” when bombing an actual war zone – there is no collateral to damage.  Even with modern accuracy, collateral damage is a given (and intended) – and with the technology of World War Two, collateral damage was more likely than damage of the purposeful sort.

May 14, 1940

…a date on which Hitler’s triumphal progress which, thanks to the outcome of events on that day he was able to continue for the following two years, came so near to being brought to an abrupt and final halt.

On May 10, the Germans invaded the West, in an offensive that stretched from the North Sea to Switzerland.  On May 12, German General von Kleist occupied Sedan in the Ardennes, and the next day established a beachhead on the other side of the Meuse River – four miles deep and four miles wide.

Meanwhile, British bombers were flying overhead, on their way to targets far from the battlefield.

While this great conflict was raging along the Meuse, another conflict of a different kind was raging between the French and British High Commands.

The breakthrough by the Germans had been so swift that no heavy artillery was moved into place – artillery that might have cut-off the bridgehead established by the Germans. The French, believing that the purpose of heavy bombers was for long-rage artillery (just as the Germans designed)…

…clamoured for an immediate concentration of bombers for a mass attack on the crossings of the Meuse.  They found however the chiefs of the R.A.F were reluctant to cancel the plans which they had made for large scale air attacks on German industrial centres in accordance with Air Marshal Trenchard’s conception of the role of the heavy bomber in warfare.

Whatever the merits of bombing German industrial centers, the French did not believe that the time to begin doing so was during the opening of a great land battle.

 

lancbomber11.jpg

 

On the night of the 13th, German troops frantically repaired the Gaulier Bridge over the Meuse; on the 14th, the heavy tanks of the 1st Panzer Division under General Guderian crossed the river and raced along a route toward the English Channel.

“Upon the destruction of the Gaulier Bridge depends victory or defeat,” declared General d’Astiere de la Vigerie imploring that every available bomber should be assigned this vital task.

About 170 British and French bombers were sent; German anti-aircraft proved quite accurate – about 85 were shot down.  Yet only one bomber needed to be successful; might the likelihood have improved with more thrown into the attack?

We now know that 96 heavy bombers were at this vital moment available to join the attack.  While this supreme effort was being made to cut the communications of the German tank spearhead advancing toward the English Channel, these 96 heavy bombers were waiting passively on nearby airfields in preparation for a mass attack on the factories and oil plants in the Ruhr which had been planned to take place on the evening of the following day.

This attack, far from the front line, took place as planned.  Ninety-six bombers took off, of which 78 were directed at oil plants.  Of these, only 24 crews claim to have found them.

One extra load of bombs on the crossing over the Meuse by Sedan – let alone ninety-six loads – might have made all the difference between victory and defeat as General Billote pointed out at the time.  Had the supplies of Guderian’s Panzers been cut off, he would soon have been brought to a halt from lack of petrol and then forced to surrender when his ammunition was exhausted.

Veale speculates that this might have brought the battle in the West to a rapid end: the German generals, hesitant to invade France in the first place, might have compelled Hitler’s retirement; the National Socialist party would have collapsed; Britain and France could have been in a position to dictate the terms of peace.

I cannot say if any of this would have happened – beyond the understanding that the German generals did not support this invasion.  One thing I suspect is true: if the British were successful in blowing the bridge, the war in the west would have been much different.

From the “Splendid Decision” to Terror Bombing

On December 16, 1940, 134 planes took off for a nighttime raid on the town of Mannheim, with the object of the attack – according to Air Chief Marshal Pierse – “to concentrate the maximum amount of damage in the centre of the town.”  So much for any semblance of military objectives.

From The Bansusan-Butt Report dated August 18, 1941:

The British Cabinet were horrified to learn that aerial photographs taken of the targets described as having been completely demolished disclosed that most of them showed no signs of damage; of all the aircraft credited with having bombed their targets, only one-third had, in fact, bombed within five miles of them.

Within five miles – a rather generous standard.  Only one-third – a rather criminal rate. Even this loose definition of “military objectives” was not enough:

…early in 1942 – the exact date, it now appears, was March 30th, 1942 – Professor Lindemann submitted a Minute to the War Cabinet in which he urged that bombing  henceforth should be directed against German working-class houses in preference to military objectives.

He estimated that 50% of the houses in German towns of 50,000 and more would be destroyed.

The first application of this plan was executed on March 28, 1942 (this presents some conflict in the dates), with the attack of Lilibeck by 234 aircraft.

The focus of the attack was the Altstadt composed of medieval houses with narrow, tortuous streets; some 30,000 people lived in an area of two square kilometres.

The climax, of course, was Dresden.

The climax of the offensive was reached on the night of February 13th, 1945 when a mass raid by several thousand heavy bombers was directed against Dresden.

The Associated Press at the time had no difficulty in calling it, according to Veale, a deliberate terror bombing…as a ruthless expedient to hasten Hitler’s doom.

From The Times, immediately after the bombings:

“Dresden, which had been pounded on Tuesday night by 800 of the 1,400 heavies sent out by the R.A.F. and was the main object of 1,350 Fortresses and Liberators on the following day, yesterday received its third heavy attack in thirty-six hours.  It was the principal target for more than 1,100 United States 8th Army Air Force bombers.”

The focus of the attack was the Altstadt – the beautiful center of the city so well-known to western travelers – palaces, art galleries, museums and churches.  No military objectives nearby.

With fires raging from the first wave, a second wave descended on the city.  No air raid shelters; the public buildings swollen with refugees stood between the falling bombs and the ground.  The city was covered with black smoke – making it difficult, I imagine, for the pilots to see even what they were bombing.  It mattered little, as the point wasn’t military.

The city burned for days.

The city was swollen by hundreds of thousands of women and children, escaping the horrors of Stalin’s armies from the east – escaping the murder, rape and arson.  Western reconnaissance planes certainly saw the dense crowds moving westward.

So enormous were the number of bodies that nothing could be done but to pile them on timber collected from the ruins and there to burn them.  In the Altmarkt one funeral pyre after another disposed of five hundred bodies or parts of bodies at a time.  The gruesome work went on for weeks.

Estimates of the dead range from 100,000 to 250,000.

The war, by now, had already been won.  The only military question left was where the line between east and west would be drawn.  Apparently it was desirous to aid Russia in the placement of the line.

I hope someday, through my work in my Timeline to War, to have a comprehensive picture of events leading up to the Second World War – I imagine this will be a never-ending task.  One of the puzzles to piece together as relates to German and British bombing of the other will be…who started it?  Not that it matters to me greatly, as two immoral wrongs cannot make a moral right.

Veale addresses this question:

In passing it may be observed that the question which air offensive was a reprisal for which has now long ceased to be a subject for dispute.

From the book “The Royal Air Force, 1939 – 1945,” Veale finds:

…the destruction of oil plants and factories was only a secondary purpose of the British air attacks on Germany which began in May 1940.  The primary purpose of these raids was to goad the Germans into undertaking reprisal raids of a similar character on Britain.  Such raids would arouse intense indignation in Britain against Germany and so create a war psychosis without which it is impossible to carry on a modern war.

Conclusion

Probably future historians will agree with the learned authors of the official history of the British strategic air offensive that the Second World War was not won by British terror bombing.  On the other hand, terror bombing, officially adopted in March 1942, was the only logical outcome of Churchill’s “Splendid Decision” of May 1940.

Future historians might also conclude that the “Splendid Decision” prolonged the war in the West by five years.

The lesson that could have been drawn from the Battle of Britain was that long range terror bombing offers a low likelihood of military advantage.  In this regard, General JFC Fuller wrote:

“This lesson was lost on the British Air Force which continued to hold that ‘strategic bombing’ was the be all and end all of air power.  This fallacy not only prolonged the war, but went far to render the ‘peace’ which followed it unprofitable to Britain and disastrous to the world in general.”

This lesson remains lost on those who choose air power over a distance of thousands of miles as the weapon of choice.

Reprinted with permission from Bionic Mosquito.

 

 

Copyright © 2014 Bionic Mosquito

dimanche, 19 octobre 2014

La battaglia sull’Istmo di Perekop

La battaglia sull’Istmo di Perekop

Autore:

Ex: http://www.centrostudilaruna.it

300px-Isthmus_of_Perekop_map.pngNell’autunno del 1920 la guerra civile russa era ormai avviata verso la sua inevitabile conclusione, con le armate bianche che cedevano, una dopo l’altra, davanti alla pressione dell’Armata rossa forgiata da Trotzkij e da lui diretta con spietata energia.

A parte le prime formazioni di Cosacchi antibolscevichi, come quella del generale Krasnov, che si appoggiava sull’aiuto dei Tedeschi (prima che la Germania uscisse sconfitta dalla prima guerra mondiale) e a parte l’esercito dei volontari cecoslovacchi, i quali, nell’estate del 1918, si erano impadroniti quasi senza colpo ferire di gran parte della ferrovia transiberiana e della regione degli Urali, tre furono le principali armate bianche che, nel corso del 1919, avevano costituito un serio pericolo per il potere bolscevico:

a) l’esercito siberiano dell’ammiraglio Kolčiak, autoproclamatosi “supremo reggitore” dello Stato russo e riconosciuto quale capo nominale di tutte le armate bianche, il quale, nei primi mesi dell’anno, si era spinto in direzione di Kazan’ e di Mosca. L’Armata rossa lo aveva però contrattaccato il 28 aprile e, in maggio, aveva sfondato le sue linee, dapprima respingendolo al di là degli Urali; poi, in agosto, dopo aver preso Celjabinsk ed Ekaterinburg, lanciando una nuova offensiva sul fronte Tobolsk-Kurgan e procedendo assai velocemente lungo la transiberiana, tanto da occupare Omsk già il 14 novembre. Kolčak venne consegnato, il 15 gennaio, dai Cecoslovacchi a un governo provvisorio filo-sovietico formatosi a Irkutsk e da questo processato e fucilato il 7 febbraio; il suo corpo venne buttato in un buco scavato nel ghiaccio del fiume Angara.

b) L’esercito bianco del generale Denikin, che nell’estate del 1919 aveva riportato successi spettacolari e, dalla regione del Kuban, aveva invaso l’Ucraina, spingendosi fino a Orel, sulla via adducente a Mosca da sud. Esso era stato a sua volta contrattaccato dall’Armata rossa a partire dal 10 ottobre e costretto a una precipitosa e drammatica ritirata. Alla fine dell’anno, i suoi resti erano tornati, assai mal ridotti, sulle posizioni di partenza della primavera, fra Kursk ed Ekaterinoslav; Denikin, sfiduciato, aveva passato le consegne al generale Wrangel, il quale aveva dedicato i mesi invernali a riorganizzare le truppe e i servizi logistici.

c) Il terzo attacco ai centri vitali del potere bolscevico era stato sferrato nell’autunno del 1919 dal generale Judenič il quale, con il sostegno della flotta inglese, era sbarcato nel Golfo di Finlandia e aveva marciato direttamente sulla vecchia capitale imperiale, Pietrogrado. La minaccia era stata seria, perché si era profilata contemporaneamente all’avanzata di Denikin dall’Ucraina, (mentre le forze di Kolčiak erano già in piena dissoluzione); ma anch’essa era stata affrontata e sventata con la massima energia dall’Armata rossa, che era passata decisamente al contrattacco, il 22 ottobre, e aveva costretto le forze di Judenič a interrompere la marcia su Pietrogrado e a reimbarcarsi in tutta fretta.

Così, all’inizio del 1920, a parte le bande degli atamani Semënov e Kalmykov, rispettivamente a Čita e Khabarovsk, al di là del lago Bajkal – ove era sorta, a fare da cuscinetto fra i Rossi e un corpo di spedizione di 70.000 soldati giapponesi, una effimera Repubblica dell’Estremo Oriente -; il piccolo esercito del barone Ungern-Sternberg nella Mongolia Interna; alcune forze cosacche nell’Asia centrale e nella regione del Caucaso; e alcune bande ucraine operanti nella zona di Kiev, restavano ora due soli avversari cospicui per l’Armata rossa: l’esercito polacco del maresciallo Pilsudski, pronto ad attaccare nella primavera del 1920, e quello dei Russi “bianchi” del generale Wrangel, attestato nell’Ucraina meridionale.

In Estremo Oriente, la guerriglia contro le ultime forze “bianche” e contro gli stessi Giapponesi venne condotta da bande di partigiani, sia bolscevichi che anarchici; mentre l’offensiva scatenata da Pilsudski nel maggio venne respinta e l’Armata rossa, passata a sua volta all’attacco, venne battuta in maniera decisiva sotto le mura di Varsavia, in agosto: sicché, il 18 marzo 1921, si giunse alla pace di Riga fra Polonia e Unione Sovietica. Abbiamo già narrato questi avvenimenti in due lavori precedenti: Trjapicyn in Siberia orientale: breve la vita felice di un “bandito” anarchico; e Chi ha voluto la guerra sovietico-polacca del 1920? Una questione storiografica ancora aperta.

Pertanto, nell’autunno del 1920, Trotzkij era ormai libero di concentrare le forze maggiori dell’Armata rossa contro l’ultimo esercito “bianco” ancora attestato in territorio russo e dotato di una buona capacità combattiva: quello del barone Wrangel. Anche le bande anarchiche di Machno, fino ad allora ostili ai bolscevichi, siglarono una tregua e accettarono anzi di passare sotto il comando del generale Frunze, in vista di una offensiva finale contro i Bianchi. Un ambasciatore inviato a Machno da Wrangel, per esplorare le possibilità di una alleanza tattica in funzione antibolscevica, era stato impiccato; il capo anarchico non sapeva, allora, che subito dopo la liquidazione dell’ultima armata “bianca” sarebbe venuta anche la sua ora.

wrangel

 

 

Pyotr Nikolayevich Wrangel (27 agosto 1878 – 25 aprile 1928)

Wrangel non godeva dell’appoggio delle popolazioni ucraine, per le stesse ragioni che avevano provocato la sconfitta di Kolčak, Denikin e Judenič: la diffidenza dei contadini e l’esiguità delle classi medie che, sole, avrebbero potuto costituire una base sociale determinante; e ciò nonostante che Wrangel, ammaestrato dalla disfatta degli altri generali “bianchi”, avesse promesso ai contadini una riforma agraria radicale, a spese della grande proprietà terriera.

I bolscevichi, con i loro metodi brutali di requisizioni forzate e con l’esercizio di una spietata dittatura, mascherata sotto l’apparenza di autonomia dei Soviet, avevano destato anch’essi notevoli diffidenze da parte dei contadini e suscitato malumori perfino tra i marinai e nella classe operaia (come si sarebbe visto nella rivolta di Kronstadt, repressa da Tuchacevskij nel marzo 1921). Essi erano però più abili a livello propagandistico, sfruttando slogan come «tutto il potere ai Soviet» e «la terra a chi la lavora»; e dipingendo tutti i Bianchi, senza alcuna sfumatura, come gli strumenti della restaurazione monarchica e aristocratica.

Una valutazione imparziale di quegli avvenimenti esige che si riconoscano a Wrangel delle capacità militari e organizzative veramente eccezionali: possedeva più costanza di Denikin e più senso politico di Kolčak; e, pur non facendosi illusioni sull’esito finale di una lotta così ineguale, era capace di infondere coraggio e determinazione ai suoi uomini, demoralizzati da tante sconfitte e ridotti a lottare con una crescente penuria di materiali da guerra ed equipaggiamenti; cui si aggiunsero – alla metà di ottobre – delle condizioni climatiche precocemente ed eccezionalmente rigide, che aumentarono le loro sofferenze.

Riteniamo si possa sostanzialmente concordare con il giudizio che di Wrangel ha dato lo storico inglese W. H. Chamberlin nella sua ormai classica Storia della Rivoluzione russa, 1917-1921 (titolo originale: The Russian Revolution, 1917-1921, 1935; traduzione italiana di Mario Vinciguerra, Torino, Einaudi, 1966, pp. 728, 740-42):

«Wrangel contribuì a infondere nuova energia nelle file dei Bianchi. Lavorando giorno e notte riorganizzò totalmente l’amministrazione militare e civile nella piccola zona sotto la sua autorità, e trasformò quelle truppe dalla massa informe di profughi cui s’erano ridotti a un’efficiente forza combattiva. Alcune delle misure prese a quello scopo dai suoi luogotenenti furono estremamente brutali. Ad esempio, il generale Kutepov fece impiccare in pubblico ufficiali e soldati colti in stato di avanzata ubriachezza nelle strade di Simferopol'; ma nel complesso questi provvedimenti raggiunsero il loro scopo. Lo spiriti bellicoso delle truppe, che era quasi svanito durante la lunga e tremenda ritirata da Orel a Novorossijsk, fu restaurato. Uno scrittore sovietico esprime il seguente apprezzamento sullo stato dell’esercito di Wrangel nella primavera e nell’estate del 1920: “Qualitativamente era la migliore forza combattente d cui avesse mai disposto la controrivoluzione russa e internazionale nella sua lotta contro le Repubbliche sovietiche”.

Questo giudizio è confermato dal corso delle operazioni militari. Le truppe di Wrangel non solo tennero a bada ma respinsero forze sovietiche considerevolmente superiori, e soccombettero solo quando, per effetto della pace conclusa con la Polonia, esse furono letteralmente schiacciate dal numero delle forze sovietiche […].

Wrangel fu l’ultimo capo del movimento bianco organizzato in Russia. Trovandosi fin da principio di fronte a una forte disparità di forze, la sua disfatta era quasi inevitabile. Pochi degli uomini di stato antibolscevichi più autorevoli ebbero voglia di entrare nel suo governo. Egli non fece miracoli. Con un piccolo esercito e una base di operazioni inadeguata, non poteva tener testa indefinitamente all’enorme esercito rosso, che attingeva i propri soldati da quasi tutta la Russia. Coi suoi precedenti di ufficiale aristocratico, non poteva superare il grande abisso di sospetto e di ostilità che sempre sussistettero tra il movimento e le masse dei contadini, e fu la causa fondamentale della sua disfatta.

Ma, tenuto conto di questi inevitabili fattori negativi, Wrangel si batté valorosamente. Aveva ereditato un relitto di esercito e seppe rifoggiarlo in forza combattente che inferse ai Rossi alcuni fieri colpi. Wrangel non poteva salvare quella vecchia Russia di cui s’era fatto campione e rappresentante, ma la sua attività militare, che tenne una quantità di truppe rosse impegnate in Ucraina e nel Kuban, non fu certo l’ultima ragione per cui l’esercito rosso mancò davanti a Varsavia di quella estrema riserva d’energia che avrebbe creato una Polonia sovietica ed esteso il bolscevismo molto oltre le frontiere russe. Visto da questo lato, l’epilogo del movimento bianco, impersonato da Wrangel, fu una fortuna per la Polonia e forse per altri stati di nuova formazione dell’Europa orientale come fu funesto per il governo sovietico e per l’Internazionale comunista».

Una prima offensiva contro le forze di Wrangel, lanciata l’8 gennaio 1920, aveva portato i reparti dell’Armata rossa fino a ridosso della Crimea, centro nevralgico dei Bianchi, con i suoi porti affollati di navi russe e delle potenze dell’Intesa. Sarebbe errato, tuttavia, vedere Wrangel come una semplice creazione degli Alleati; in realtà, dopo la sconfitta di Denikin, i governi di Londra e Parigi avevano rinunciato alla speranza di assistere a una caduta del regime sovietico in tempi brevi e, di fatto, avevano ritirato il loro appoggio militare e finanziario ai Bianchi, limitandosi solo a vaghe promesse e ad un certo sostegno logistico.

I Francesi, in particolare – che avevano investito grossi capitali in Russia prima e durante la prima guerra mondiale, avevano puntato quasi tutte le loro carte sulla Polonia di Pilsudski; e, dopo la vittoria di quest’ultimo davanti a Varsavia, si disinteressarono sostanzialmente del destino di Wrangel. Come se non bastasse, la loro flotta, stanziata a Odessa, era stata scossa dagli ammutinamenti degli equipaggi nel 1919, per cui il governo francese non si illudeva di poter prolungare la propria influenza politico-militare nell’area del Mar Nero.

Ci furono invece delle trattative interalleate che sembrarono sfociare in una spedizione militare italiana in Georgia, all’inizio dell’estate 1919; ma poi non se ne fece più nulla, specialmente a causa dell’instabilità dei governi italiani tra la fine della prima guerra mondiale e l’ascesa del fascismo. Nel caso specifico, fu l’opposizione di Nitti al progetto che lo fece cadere, e con esso cadde il ministero Orlando, che lo aveva preparato e si accingeva a porlo in atto.

Quanto agli Inglesi, essi avevano puntato su Kolčak, cui avevano fornito non solo abbondante materiale da guerra e ingenti risorse finanziarie, ma anche consiglieri militari; e, dopo la sua sconfitta, avevano rinunciato all’idea di poter rovesciare il regime sovietico mediante l’azione degli eserciti “bianchi”.

Sapendo di non poter più vincere la guerra civile sul campo, Wrangel – che era un uomo intelligente e che possedeva uno spiccato senso realistico – studiò il modo di ritardare l’investimento della sua cittadella crimeana e di intavolare eventualmente trattative coi bolscevichi, attraverso i buoni uffici delle potenze occidentali; ma, per poterlo fare, desiderava raggiungere una posizione strategica migliore, che rendesse più forte anche la sua posizione politica.

Pertanto, nell’estate, egli effettuò alcuni sbarchi sulla costa orientale del Mar d’Azov, investendo il territorio del Kuban e minacciando di congiungersi con il cosiddetto Esercito della rigenerazione russa, che si era stabilito nella regione settentrionale del Caucaso. Il collegamento non riuscì, nonostante le forze bianche riportassero, nel mese di agosto, una serie di successi inaspettati; per cui, in settembre, le truppe di Wrangel dovettero reimbarcarsi.

Aspettandosi ora una nuova, grande offensiva dell’Armata rossa, Wrangel attestò il suo esercito nella Tauride settentrionale e, intanto, provvide a fortificare potentemente l’istmo di Perekop, un vero e proprio “collo di bottiglia”, mediante il quale si accede, da nord-ovest a sud-est, alla penisola di Crimea.

In effetti, l’offensiva sovietica scattò il 28 ottobre, contemporaneamente alla fine delle grandi operazioni sul teatro polacco; e, dopo una lotta accanita, terminò com’era inevitabile: con l’irruzione dei Rossi fino agli accessi dell’istmo. In questa battaglia Wrangel aveva potuto mettere in linea non più di 35 uomini, contro circa 137.000 dell’Armata rossa.

Ai primi di novembre, dunque, le due armate si fronteggiavano sull’istmo, davanti a Perekop, dove i Bianchi era asserragliati dietro il cosiddetto Vallo Turco, una triplice linea di difesa munita di trincee, filo spinato, nidi di mitragliatrici e postazioni d’artiglieria. Molti consideravano le difese dell’istmo semplicemente imprendibili; ma, come vedremo, le forze della natura diedero ai Sovietici, che già godevano di una schiacciante superiorità numerica, anche un inatteso vantaggio strategico, allorché il vento rese transitabile il passaggio di terra dalla Penisola Čongar alla Penisola Lituana, respingendo le acque basse del mare; mentre le gelide temperature permisero al fondo fangoso di solidificarsi in una solida crosta di ghiaccio.

Scrive lo storico americano W. Bruce Lincoln nel suo libro I Bianchi e i Rossi. Storia della guerra civile russa (titolo originario: Red Victory, 1989; traduzione italiana di Francesco Saba Sardi, Milano, Mondadori, 1991, 1994, pp. 396-401):

Mikhail Frunze (2 febbraio 1885 – 31 ottobre1925)

Mikhail Frunze (2 febbraio 1885 – 31 ottobre1925)

«Solo lentamente i soldati di Wrangel cedettero terreno sotto l’enorme pressione dell’Armata Rossa durante la prima settimana di aspri combattimenti, e l’assalto finale di Frunze non fu coronato dal trionfo che si era atteso. Le forze di Bljücher e di Budënnyi erano avanzate di oltre 120 chilometri in tre giorni nel deciso tentativo di raggiungere la ferrovia in modo da tagliare la strada alla ritirata di Wrangel in Crimea, ma le unità rosse più a est dovettero disputare al nemico ogni pollice di terra e avanzarono assai più lentamente. “Sono stupefatto dell’enorme energia con cui il nemico resiste – comunicò Frunze a Mosca. – è indubbio che il nemico ha combattuto più validamente e tenacemente di quanto avrebbe fatto ogni altro esercito”. Fu così che i reparti di Wrangel in ritirata vinsero la corsa per la Crimea, e i disperati sforzi di allievi ufficiali e unità di seconda linea impedirono ai fucilieri di Bljücher di impadronirsi del Passo di Salkovo e di fare sfondare la prima linea di difesa a Perekop. Ma i Bianchi pagarono assai cari i loro momentanei successi. Aprendosi la strada nella Tauride settentrionale, le forze di Frunze catturarono quasi 20.000 prigionieri, un centinaio di pezzi da campo, un gran numero di mitragliatrici, decine di migliaia di granate e milioni di cartucce. “L’esercito rimase intatto – commentò in seguito Wrangel -, ma le sue capacità combattive non furono più quelle di prima”, né d’altra parte era riuscito a conservare quelle fonti alimentari per le quali aveva rischiato tanto: oltre 36.000 tonnellate di cereali del raccolto autunnale accantonate dalla sua sussistenza nei magazzini ferroviari di Melitopol e di Geničesk caddero nelle mani di Frunze.

Quesri aveva perduto l’occasione di riportare una vittoria decisiva non essendo riuscito ad accerchiare l’esercito di Wrangel prima che raggiungesse la Crimea; costretto pertanto a dare l’assalto alla fortezza peninsulare, aumentò le proprie forze e inviò i ricognitori che si erano di recente aggiunti ai suoi rafforzati reparti aerei a fotografare le linee nemiche. Alla fine della prima settimana di novembre, aveva ammassato 180.771 uomini appoggiati da quasi 3.000 mitragliatrici, oltre 600 pezzi d’artiglieria e 23 treni corazzati con cui affrontare i 26.000 regolari bianchi e le 16.000 male armate riserve che guarnivano le difese della Crimea.

Frunze decise di sferrare l’attacco principale contro il Vallo Turco, una barriera ottomana del XVIII secolo lungo la quale Wrangel aveva creato nidi ben protetti di mitragliatrici e piazzole di artiglieria, in modo da assicurare fuoco incrociato a complemento delle fitte barriere di filo spinato che costituivano la prima linea di Perekop, dietro la quale i residui treni corazzati dei Bianchi erano in grado di muoverei avanti e indietro lungo la recente diramazione ferroviaria Sebastopoli-Jušun-Amjansk, coprendo con i loro pezzi gli approcci del vallo. La 51a Divsione di Bljücher ebbe l’ordine di guidare l’attacco, e il suo comandante ne concentrò i fucilieri in ordine talmente serrato, che in certi punti aveva un uomo ogni metro e una mitragliatrice a sostegno di ogni 17 uomini. Alla sinistra di Bljücher, di fronte alle paludi salmastre di Sivaš e al ponte di Čongar un po’ più a est, Frunze schierò la Kornarmija di Budënnyi, la IV Armata Rossa e i partigiani di Machno, tenendo di riserva la maggior parte di tre armate. Stando ai resoconti sovietici, erano tutti reparti animati da alto spirito combattivo, decisi a celebrare il 7 novembre il terzo anniversario della rivoluzione bolscevica infliggendo una disfatta all’ultima cospicua forza bianca sul suolo russo.

Nonostante gli uomini e le armi che Frunze aveva radunato in vista della battaglia, i difensori della Crimea non si erano lasciati infettare dal sentimento di sconfitta che alla fine del 1919 aveva minato Denikin e i Bianchi a Novorossijsk. Wrangel aveva cominciato i preparativi per un’evacuazione in massa, ma così silenziosamente e in tempi così lunghi da mascherare l’intento. “Le misure da noi prese avevano placato le ansie che si erano qua e là manifestate”, commentò in seguito. “Dietro le linee, tutto restava tranquillo perché ciascuno credeva nell’imprendibilità delle fortificazioni di Perekop”, ed era una convinzione tutt’altro che infondata. I giornali di Crimea parlavano ancora in tono fiducioso delle difese dell’istmo di Perekop, del ponte di Čongar e della costiera intermedia. “Le fortificazioni di Sivaš e di Perekop sono talmente solide, che il Comando supremo rosso non dispone né degli uomini né delle macchine per sfondarle, assicurava il 4 novembre il foglio “Vremja” (“Tempi”). Tutte le forze armate del Sovdepja messe assieme non bastano a intimidire la Crimea”. Wrangel, forse ancora speranzoso di riuscire a bloccare Frunze, ma intento soprattutto a guadagnare il tempo necessario per portare a termine un’evacuazione ordinata, unificò la I e la II Armata sotto gli ordini del generale Kutepov, il migliore e il più tenace dei reparti combattenti che gli restassero. Universalmente noto per la feroce crudeltà nei confronti di bolscevichi e loro simpatizzanti, e ampiamente sospettato di di aver intascato colossali bustarelle in cambio di permessi di esportazione e importazione quando aveva comandato la guarnigione di Novoriossijsk, Kutepov continuava ciò nonostante a godere della piena fiducia di Wrangel quale ufficiale “in grado di affrontare qualsiasi situazione, un uomo dal grande valore militare e di eccezionale tenacia nella realizzazione dei compiti affidatigli.” Kutepov avrebbe difeso il Vallo Turco come nessun altro avrebbe potuto fare; e se non ci fosse riuscito, Wrangel avrebbe saputo senz’ombra di dubbio che la fine era giunta.

La mattina del 7 novembre, dopo aver impartito gli ultimi ordini per l’attacco, Frunze si recò al quartier generale di Budënnyi dove con questi e Vorošilov compilò un telegramma di congratulazioni a Lenin nel terzo anniversario della rivoluzione bolscevica, promettendogli la vittoria conclusiva a celebrazione della stessa. “In nome degli eserciti del fronte meridionale, ormai pronti a sferrare il colpo finale contro la tana della belva mortalmente ferita, e in nome delle rinnovate aquile delle grandi armate di cavalleria, salute – esordiva il testo. – La nostra ferrea fanteria, la nostra audace cavalleria, la nostra invincibile artiglieria e i nostri rapidi aviatori dalla vista acuta… libereranno quest’ultimo lembo di terra sovietica da ogni nemico”, si prometteva a Lenin. Forse più di ogni altra unità in azione nella Russia meridionale, la 51a Divisione di Bljücher meritava tutti quei superlativi, ed era sul suo assalto frontale contro il Vallo Turco che Frunze, Vorošilov e Budënnyi contavano per irrompere nel bastione crimeano di Wrangel. Ma ad aiutare la loro causa più di quanto avrebbe potuto fare ogni atto di valore, per quanto grande, furono l’imprevedibile e l’inaspettato. La natura, le cui forze avevano inflitto tanti tormenti al popolo della Russia bolscevica durante i due aspri inverni precedenti, questa volta si schierò dalla parte dei Rossi, aprendo loro nuove, insospettate vie d’attacco.

Forse solo due o tre volte nel corso di una generazione, un forte vento investe da nordovest la Crimea, spingendo verso est le basse acque che coprono i bassifondi salini del Sivaš e lasciando allo scoperto la sottostante, putrida fanghiglia. Il 7 novembre 1920, imperversò un vento talmente furioso, accompagnato da temperature così basse che la notte del 7-8 novembre il fondo melmoso del Sivaš, così di rado scoperto, si gelò formando una superficie tanto solida da reggere uomini e cavalli. Alle 22, mentre gran parte della 51a Divisione di Bljücher si apprestava ad assalire le posizioni di Kutepov lungo il Vallo Turco, la 15a e la 52a Divisione di fucilieri, in una con la 153a Brigata di fucilieri e di cavalleria della 51a Divisione, approfittando dell’insperato vantaggio. Una pesante nebbia grava sulla zona, impedendo alle sentinelle di Wrangel sulla Penisola Lituana di avvistare i reparti rossi impegnati nell’attraversamento dei sei chilometri del Sivaš. Ben presto, i piedi e gli zoccoli di uomini e cavalli trasformarono in gelida fanghiglia il fondo marino indurito, obbligando i reparti successivi a rallentare l’avanzata, in pari tempo aumentando le probabilità di scoperta; ciò nonostante, tutti i reparti raggiunsero la terraferma senza essere avvistati proprio mentre il vento cambiava direzione e l’acqua cominciava a crescere.

All’alba dell’8 novembre, gli infangati soldati di Frunze assalirono le deboli forze che Wrangel aveva lasciato sulla Penisola Lituana a difesa da un eventuale quanto improbabile attacco anfibio. Quello che i comandanti di entrambe le parti avevano immaginato essere un angolino dimenticato nella battaglia per la Crimea, ne divenne la chiave di volta allorché Kutepov ordinò contrattacchi a sostegno dei difensori della Penisola Lituana proprio mentre la 51a muoveva all’assalto del Vallo Turco. Per tutta la giornata, le sorti della battaglia rimasero incerte, e il destino dei Rossi e dei Bianchi parve ugualmente in bilico. Se l’assalto di Bljücher fosse fallito sarebbe stato facilissimo, per Kutepov, volgersi contro i ridotti reparti rossi che lo minacciavano alle spalle della Penisola Lituana e liquidarli, ora che le acque marine avevano rioccupato il Sivaš e Frunze non poteva né inviar loro rinforzi né richiamarli. D’altro parte, se l’attacco di Bljücher fosse stato coronato da successo, e i Rossi fossero avanzati oltre la Penisola Lituana, il grosso di Kutepov rischiava l’accerchiamento ad opera di un nemico assai più forte. Le sorti della battaglia dipendevano dallo sfondamento del Vallo Turco e dalla capacità delle truppe rosse sulla Penisola Lituana di resistere finché Bljücher ci fosse riuscito.

Dopo aver differito l’assalto per parecchie ore a causa della fitta nebbia, Bljücher aprì il bombardamento d’artiglieria contro il Vallo Turco proprio mentre le unità che avevano superato il Sivaš raggiungevano la Penisola Lituana. Quattro ore più tardi, le sue fanterie vennero avanti. In un primo momento il fuoco d’appoggio, per quanto pesante, non parve sufficiente a ridurre la tempesta di proiettili che artiglierie e mitragliatrici di Kutepov scagliarono addosso agli attaccanti: in alcuni reggimenti di Bljücher, le perdite ammontarono al sessanta per cento degli effettivi, e tre successive ondate di fanteria furono respinte dal fuoco nemico. Solo alle tre e mezza del mattino del 9 novembre, il quarto assalto condotto dalla 51a Divisione ebbe ragione del Vallo. “Fu come se una montagna mi cadesse dalle spalle – confessò poi Frunze. – Con la presa di Perekop scomparve il pericolo che le due divisioni tagliate fuori dalle acque refluenti del Sivaš venissero annientate.”

Il sollievo di Frunze accompagnò l’inizio delle più buie ore di Wrangel, il quale la sera del 9 novembre, alla notizia che il Vallo Turco era caduto, scrisse: “Il generale Kutepov mi riferì che, alla luce degli ultimi sviluppi, vale a dire la penetrazione del nemico nelle nostre posizioni di Perekop e il pericolo di un accerchiamento, aveva impartito l’ordine di ripiegamento sulla seconda linea fortificata… Eravamo sull’orlo del disastro… Erano già stati superati i limiti della capacità dell’esercito di resistere e le fortificazioni non potevano più bloccare il nemico. Erano necessarie urgenti misure per salvare l’esercito e la popolazione civile.” In netto contrasto con la ritirata di Denikin da Novorossijsk dell’anno prima, così malamente condotta, Wrangel, pur sperando nella vittoria, aveva elaborato precisi piani di evacuazione e disponeva pertanto di sufficienti riserve di carbone e nafta per tutte le navi in mano ai Bianchi. A questo punto diede fondo a tutte le sue risorse. “La minima esitazione, il più piccolo errore, potrebbe rovinare tutto”, ammonì. L’11 novembre ordinò che tutte le navi dei Bianchi accostassero alle zone di imbarco precedentemente scelte, vale a dire Evpatorija, Sebastopoli e Jalta, e altre ancora a Feodosija e a Kerč. Poi, mentre Kutepov conduceva azioni di retroguardia per rallentare l’avanzata rossa, Wrangel portò a termine i preparativi. Innanzitutto i malati e i feriti, poi i funzionari governativi, i civili e le forze armate, dovevano essere evacuati prima dell’arrivo dei Rossi. Il giorno dopo Wrangel impartì gli ultimi ordini. Le truppe dovevano rompere il contatto con il nemico e raggiungere i più vicini porti d’imbarco, lasciandosi alle spalle armamenti e materiali pesanti, mentre “tutti coloro che hanno partecipato con l’esercito a questa salita al Calvario – vale a dire i familiari dei soldati e quelli dei funzionari civili, nonché – chiunque altro possa correre pericolo se catturato dal nemico”, doveva avviarsi ai punti d’imbarco con i militari.

L’abilità di cui Wrangel diede prova nel mantenere il controllo di truppe e civili, fu brillantemente comprovata dal fatto che l’evacuazione ebbe luogo con panico e disordine minimi. Nel tardo pomeriggio del 14 novembre, Sebastopoli era ormai vuota e Wrangel, avuta notizia che anche l’evacuazione di Evpatorija era stata portata a termine, salì a bordo dell’incrociatore “Generale Kornilov” che l’avrebbe portato in esilio. A Jalta, la stessa scena si ripeté alle nove del mattino successivo e quello seguente ebbe luogo anche a Feodosija e, di lì a poche ore, a Kerč. Alle sedici del 16 novembre 1920, gli ultimi Bianchi, 145.693 uomini, donne e bambini erano a bordo di 126 navi in rotta verso Costantinopoli.»

Con l’evacuazione della Crimea e la scomparsa dell’ultimo consistente esercito antibolscevico, la sorte della guerra civile era definitivamente segnata. Uno dopo l’altro, l’Armata rossa spense gli ultimi focolai di resistenza nell’immenso territorio russo.

Le bande di Machno vennero spazzate via dall’Ucraina meridionale; l’ataman Petljura, che si era alleato coi Polacchi, vide infranto il suo sogno di una Ucraina occidentale indipendente; Ungern-Sternberg venne sconfitto e fucilato in Mongolia; le Repubbliche caucasiche furono riconquistate (Batum fu presa il 19 marzo 1921); i Giapponesi, preceduti dagli Americani, sgombrarono la Siberia e, nel 1922, la Repubblica dell’Estremo Oriente si sciolse e fu riassorbita dall’Unione delle Repubbliche Socialiste Sovietiche (che assunse tale denominazione nel dicembre 1922, in occasione del X Congresso panrusso dei Soviet).

Prima ancora della sconfitta finale di Wrangel, anche la regione russa settentrionale di Arcangelo e Murmansk era stata evacuata dagli Inglesi che avevano puntato sul generale Miller, ma la cui posizione era divenuta insostenibile dopo la sconfitta di Kolčak. Infine, nell’Asia centrale, venne infranto il sogno di Enver pascià, ex membro del triumvirato dei “Giovani Turchi” che aveva governato l’Impero ottomano durante la prima guerra mondiale (e che aveva personalmente deciso il genocidio degli Armeni nel 1915-16), di creare un vasto dominio delle genti turaniche e turche fra il Turkestan cinese e il bacino del Mar Caspio.

Così, con la sola eccezione della Finlandia e delle tre piccole Repubbliche baltiche (Estonia, Lettonia e Lituania), destinate a una effimera indipendenza sino allo scoppio della seconda guerra mondiale; e con la perdita, altrettanto temporanea, di alcune regioni di confine a favore della Polonia e della Romania, l’Unione Sovietica ritornò in possesso, entro la fine del 1922, di tutti i territori che avevano fatto parte del vecchio Impero zarista. Del quale ereditò automaticamente anche la politica espansionista, sia verso l’Europa che verso l’Asia; ma, questa volta, non sotto l’influsso della ideologia panslavista, bensì all’ombra della bandiera rossa e del credo internazionalista di Marx e Lenin.

samedi, 18 octobre 2014

Les États des peuples et l'empire de la nation

Archives - 2000
 
Les États des peuples et l'empire de la nation
 
par Frédéric KISTERS
 
Armee_arcConstantinSud.jpgIl existe une confusion permanente entre le mot « nation » qui désigne une association contractuelle de personnes liées à une constitution et la notion de « peuple » qui renvoie à une identité, c’est-à-dire un fait donné, une appréhension de soi résultant de l’histoire. Le peuple est donc le produit du déterminisme — nous ne décidons pas de notre appartenance —, tandis que la nation est le résultat volontaire d’un choix — nous élisons notre citoyenneté.
 
Peuples et Nation
 
Le peuple est un produit de l’histoire dont les membres ont le sentiment de partager un passé et des valeurs communes. Pour le définir, on utilise généralement 4 critères principaux : la langue, la culture, le territoire, les relations économiques. Isolé, aucun de ces critères ne semble suffisant. Si l’on octroyait le rôle principal à la langue, il faudrait en conséquence accepter que les Français, les Suisses romans, les Québécois ainsi que les francophones de Belgique et d’Afrique forment un peuple. Pareillement, les Flamands et les Néerlandais ne se sentent-ils pas de culture différente ? Dans la culture, nous intégrons la religion qui en est un des aspects. De plus, la culture influe sur la manière de vivre la religion : les Albanais et les Arabes saoudites ont des visions très différentes de la foi musulmane. La plupart des peuples occupent un territoire plus ou moins cohérent ; il est en effet difficile de maintenir des liens sans proximité. Il faut toutefois noter quelques exceptions telles que les Juifs avant la création d’Israël ou les tribus nomade. De même, les populations immigrées maintiennent un communauté et conservent des liens étroits avec leur patrie d’origine. Enfin, l’existence d’un peuple suppose des relations économiques privilégiées entre ses membres. L’ensemble de ces traits devrait permettre d’esquisser les linéaments de l’idiosyncrasie d’un peuple ; pourtant, son image apparaît souvent floue, parce que critères utilisés pour en préciser les contours ne sont pas assez formels. En réalité, un sujet qui a une histoire ne peut se définir, puisqu’il se modifie sans cesse.
 
Quant à la nation, selon la définition de Sieyès (1), elle est une communauté légale qui possède la souveraineté. Si l’expression « la nation est une et indivisible » signifie que l’ensemble de ses membres détient la souveraineté et que chacun se soumet aux mêmes lois, elle n’implique toutefois pas nécessairement que les citoyens habitent dans un territoire circonscrit ou aient des relations économiques. Les étrangers qui n’adoptent pas la citoyenneté de leurs pays d’accueil ne sont pas des citoyens à part entière, même s’ils jouissent d’une partie des droits civiques. Une communauté de langue et de culture n’induit pas non plus une citoyenneté partagée. Enfin, la nation a conscience de son existence et puise dans son histoire les éléments symboliques qui renforcent sa cohésion, expliquent ses avatars et justifient l’intégration d’individus ou de peuples étrangers.
 
Deux conceptions du nationalisme
 
Par conséquent, le terme nationalisme possède deux acceptions contradictoires selon qu’il se réfère à l’idée de peuple ou à la notion de nation. Dans le premier cas, il fait appel au sang, au sol, aux ancêtres, au passé, c’est un nationalisme de l’héritage qui se réduit souvent à un fallacieux sentiment de supériorité sur les autres et qui, de plus, porte sur un objet de taille limitée. Par ailleurs, peu de choses distinguent le nationalisme du régionalisme qui désigne un sentiment semblable projeté sur un objet plus restreint. Dans le second cas, il transcende l’individu et l’arrache au déterminisme de son milieu. On adhère de manière volontariste à la nation pour réaliser un projet en commun, mais on appartient au peuple de ses parents. Au contraire, la nation possède une faculté d’extension illimitée, car elle peut toujours accueillir de nouveaux membres en dehors des considérations de naissance. Notons enfin que ces deux formes de nationalisme peuvent plus ou moins se recouper et se renforcer au sein d’un même État.
 
État et Empire
 
Pour accéder à la souveraineté, le(s) peuple(s) doive(nt) constituer une nation et se donner une structure : l’État qui arbitre les intérêts contradictoires des citoyens, assure leur sécurité et rationalise le devenir de la société. Dans l’histoire, nous rencontrons deux grands types d’États ; d’une part, ceux issus d’un peuple qui avait une conscience subjective de sa réalité et qui se sont dotés d’une structure objective — l’État français par ex. ; d’autre part, les nations forgées au départ de peuples épars, tel que l’Autriche-Hongrie, qui portent souvent le nom d’Empire. Dans les deux situations, il faut à l’origine une volonté agrégative qui peut être incarnée par un monarque, une institution ou un peuple fédérateur.
 
En réalité, jamais l’État-nation n’a coïncidé dès son origine avec une exacte communauté de langue et de culture. Le préalable n’est pas l’unité culturelle ; au contraire, c’est la nation qui unit le(s) peuple(s) et non l’inverse. L’État, par l’action de son administration centralisée et de son enseignement, harmonise les idiomes et les comportements sociaux. L’existence d’un territoire unifié sous une même autorité facilite aussi les déplacements et donc les mélanges de populations hétérogènes. Des affinités culturelles peuvent inciter les hommes à se regrouper au sein d’une nation, mais cette dernière entreprend à son tour l’élaboration d’une nouvelle « identité nationale ». Surtout, l’histoire n’a jamais vu une nation se former sur base d’intérêts économiques, c’est pourquoi nous pensons que l’Union européenne emprunte un mauvais chemin.
 
aquilifer_16894_lg.gifL’État-nation, dont la France est l’archétype, désire l’égalité, l’uniformité, la centralisation ; il établit une loi unique sur l’ensemble de son territoire. Il ne reconnaît pas la diversité des coutumes et tend à la suppression des différences locales. Il suppose que tous les peuples sous son empire adoptent les mêmes mœurs et s’expriment dans sa langue administrative.
 
Au contraire, l’Empire doit compter avec les différents peuples qui le compose et tolère une relative diversité législative en son sein. De même, il ne jouira pas nécessairement d’une autorité égale sur chacune de ses provinces. Certaines d’entre-elles peuvent être presque indépendantes (comme par exemple les principautés tributaires de l’Empire ottoman), tandis que d’autres sont totalement soumises au gouvernement central. Parfois, l’on vit même des peuples érigés en nations cohabiter dans le même Empire (vers sa fin, l’Empire austro-hongrois comprenaient une nation « hongroise », une nation  « allemande » et divers peuples slaves). Notons enfin que, de notre point de vue, il n’existe pas actuellement de souverain européen, mais bien des institutions européennes qui agissent avec le consentement de plusieurs nations.
 
Droit de vote ou citoyenneté
 
Par ailleurs, se pose aujourd’hui la question du droit de vote des étrangers. Nos dirigeants disputent pour savoir si nous octroierons le droit de vote aux seuls Européens, et sous quelles conditions, ou si nous l’étendrons aux ressortissants non-européens. À notre avis, le problème est mal posé. En effet, le droit de vote, réduit aux communales qui plus est, n’est jamais qu’une part de l’indivisible citoyenneté, qu’on la dissèque ainsi en créant des sous-catégories dans la société nous semble malsain, car cela nuit à l’unité de la nation en dégradant le principe d’égalité des citoyens devant la Loi. De plus, la citoyenneté implique aussi des devoirs dont le respect garantit nos droits. Dans le débat, d’aucuns proposent d’accorder la citoyenneté belge plutôt que le droit de vote. Sans hésiter, nous allons plus loin en soutenant un projet de citoyenneté européenne. Dans cette entreprise, nous nous appuyons ; d’une part, sur l’œuvre majeure (2) d’un grand penseur politique, Otto Bauer, le chef de file de l’école austro-marxiste ; d’autre part, sur un précédent historique : le concept de double citoyenneté dans l’Empire romain.
 
Otto Bauer articulait sa thèse autour du concept de « communauté de destin » grâce auquel il donna une nouvelle définition de la Nation. Selon lui, la culture et la psychologie permettent de distinguer un peuple d’un autre, mais ces caractères sont eux-mêmes déterminés par l’Histoire. Suivant ses vues, le peuple ne se définit plus par une appartenance ethnique, une communauté de langue, l’occupation d’un territoire ou en termes de liens économiques, mais bien comme un groupe d’hommes historiquement liés par le sort. Dès lors, dans cet esprit, les habitants d’une cité cosmopolite, issus d’origines diverses mais vivant ensemble, peuvent fort bien, dans certaines circonstances historiques, former une nation. Évidemment, il existe une interaction permanente entre le « caractère » et le destin d’un peuple, puisque le premier conditionne la manière de réagir aux événements extérieurs, aussi la nation est-elle en perpétuel devenir.
 
Ainsi, Bauer justifiait le maintien d’un État austro-hongrois par la communauté de destin qui liait ses peuples depuis des siècles. Une législation fédérale aurait protégé les différentes minorités et garanti l’égalité absolue des citoyens devant la Loi qu’il considérait comme la condition sine qua non de la bonne intelligence des peuples au sein de l’État.
 
Dans cette perspective, la conscience du passé partagé n’exclut pas le désir d’un avenir commun. Pour notre part, nous aspirons à une nation européenne dans laquelle fusionneraient les peuples européens.
 
Dans l’Empire romain, il existait un principe de double citoyenneté. Jusqu’à l’édit de Caracalla (212 ap. JC), la citoyenneté romaine se surimposait à l’origo, l’appartenance à son peuple. Évidemment la première conservait l’éminence sur la seconde. Néanmoins, le Romain pouvait recourir, selon les circonstances, soit au droit romain soit aux lois locales. Lorsque l’empereur Caracalla donna la citoyenneté romaine à tous les hommes libres de l’Empire, ceux-ci conservèrent néanmoins leur origo (3). Aussi pensons-nous, qu’il serait possible de créer une citoyenneté européenne qui, durant une période transitoire, coexisterait avec les citoyennetés des États membres. En effet, l’homme n’appartient qu’à un seul peuple, mais il peut élire deux nations, du moins dans la mesure où leurs lois ne se contredisent point et à la condition qu’on établît une hiérarchie entre ses deux citoyennetés et que l’on donnât la prééminence à l’européenne.
 
► Frédéric Kisters, Devenir n°15, 2000.
 
◘ Notes :
  • [1] Sur l’abbé Sieyès, cf. BREDIN (Jean-Denis), Sieyès, La clé de la révolution française, éd. de Fallois, 1988.
  • [2] BAUER (Otto), Die Nationalitätfrage und die Sozialdemokratie, Vienne, 1924, (1er éd. 1907), XXX-576 p. (Marx Studien, IV). Edition française : ID. , La question des nationalités et la social-démocratie, Paris-Montréal, 1987, 2 tomes, 594 p.
  • [3] JACQUES (François) et SCHEID (John), Rome et l’intégration de l’empire (44 av. J.C. - 260 ap. J.C.), tome 1 Les structures de l’empire romain, Paris, 2e éd. 1992 (1er : 1990), p. 209-219 et 272-289 (Nouvelle Clio. L’Histoire et ses problèmes).
 

vendredi, 17 octobre 2014

Renverser des gouvernements : une pratique étasunienne bien rodée

 

Renverser des gouvernements: une pratique étasunienne bien rodée

Auteur : Washington's Blog & http://zejournal.mobi 

Énoncer l’ensemble des pays victimes de la politique étasunienne serait difficile en un seul article, cela serait plutôt sujet à écrire un livre, mais un résumé est toujours possible quand à quelques événements ayant eut lieu, car dans le domaine, ils sont très prolifiques, en France avec De Gaulle en Mai 68, c’était eux, en Ukraine avec les néo-nazis qui ont accédé au pouvoir, idem, en Tunisie, pareil, etc… Les Etats-Unis ont l’entrainement, les moyens financiers et les outils, et vous en avez quelques exemples ici:

Les USA ont déjà renversé les gouvernements de Syrie (1949), d’Iran (1953), d’Irak (par deux fois), d’Afghanistan (par deux fois), de Turquie, de Lybie et de bien d’autres pays riches en pétrole.

Syrie

Chacun sait que les USA et leurs alliés ont fortement soutenu les terroristes islamiques de Syrie, dans leur tentative de renverser le régime en place dans le pays.

Mais saviez-vous que les USA ont déjà exécuté un changement de régime en Syrie par le passé ?

La CIA a soutenu un coup d’état d’extrême droite en Syrie en 1949. Douglas Little, professeur au Département d’Histoire de la Clark University a écrit :

« Déjà, en 1949, cette nouvelle république arabe indépendante fut un important champ d’expérimentation pour les premières tentatives d’actions clandestines de la CIA. La CIA y a encouragé en secret un coup d’état d’extrême droite en 1949. »

La raison pour laquelle les USA ont initié ce coup d’état ? Little explique :

« Fin 1945, la Arabian American Oil Company (ARAMCO) a présenté ses plans pour la construction du Trans-Arabian Pipe Line (TAPLINE) qui devait relier l’Arabie Saoudite à la Méditerranée. Grâce à l’aide US, ARAMCO put obtenir des permis de passage de la part du Liban, de la Jordanie, et de l’Arabie Saoudite. Mais le permis pour faire passer le pipeline par la Syrie fut refusé par le parlement [syrien]. »

En d’autres termes, la Syrie était le seul obstacle à la construction d’un pipeline lucratif. (En fait, la CIA a mis conduit des actions de ce type depuis sa création.)

En 1957, le président américain et le premier ministre britanniques se mirent d’accord pour déclencher à nouveau un changement de régime en Syrie. Little, en bon historien, indique que le complot en vue de la réalisation du coup d’état fut découvert et stoppé :

« Le 12 aout 1957, l’armée syrienne encercla l’ambassade des USA à Damas. Après avoir annoncé qu’il avait découvert un complot de la CIA pour renverser le président Shukri Quwatly, de tendance neutre, et installer un régime pro-occidental, le chef des services de contre-espionnage syriens Abdul Hamid Sarraj expulsa trois diplomates US du pays…

C’est ainsi que le chef des services de contre-espionnage syriens, Sarraj, réagit avec rapidité le 12 aout, en expulsant Stone et d’autres agents de la CIA, en arrêtant leurs complices, et en plaçant l’ambassade des USA sous surveillance. »

Les néoconservateurs établirent à nouveau des plans en vue d’un changement de régime en Syrie en 1991.

Et comme le note Nafeez Ahmed :

« D’après l’ancien ministre des affaires étrangères français Roland Dumas, la Grande-Bretagne avait préparé des actions clandestines en Syrie dès 2009 : « J’étais en Angleterre pour tout autre chose deux ans avant que les hostilités ne commencent en Syrie » a-t-il confié à la télévision française, « j’ai rencontré des responsables anglais de premier plan [...] qui m’ont avoué qu’ils préparaient quelque chose en Syrie. C’était en Angleterre, et pas en Amérique. L’Angleterre préparait une invasion de rebelles en Syrie. »

Des courriels de la société privée d’investigation Stratfor qui avaient fuité et qui comprenaient des notes d’un meeting avec des représentants du Pentagone ont confirmé que, dès 2011, l’entrainement des forces de l’opposition syriennes par des éléments des forces spéciales américaines et britanniques était en cours. Le but était de provoquer « l’effondrement » du régime d’Assad « de l’intérieur ».

Irak

Chacun sait que les USA ont renversé Saddam Hussein lors de la guerre d’Irak.

Mais saviez-vous que les USA avaient déjà réalisé un changement de régime en Irak par le passé ?

Plus spécifiquement, la CIA a tenté d’empoisonner le dirigeant irakien en 1960. En 1963, les USA ont soutenu le coup d’état qui est parvenu à assassiner le chef du gouvernement irakien.

Récemment, l’Irak a commencé à se fracturer en tant que nation. USA Today note que « l’Irak est déjà séparé en trois états ». De nombreuses personnes affirment que les événements ont été forcés… qu’en tout cas, c’est une forme de changement de régime.

Iran

Chacun sait qu’un changement de régime en Iran est l’un des objectifs à long terme des faucons de Washington.

Mais saviez-vous que les USA avaient déjà réalisé un changement de régime en Iran en 1953… qui est directement responsable de la radicalisation du pays ?

Pour être précis, la CIA a admis que les USA ont renversé le premier ministre iranien en 1953, un homme modéré, portant costume et cravate, et démocratiquement élu (il a été renversé car il avait nationalisé les compagnies pétrolières iraniennes, qui étaient auparavant contrôlées par BP et d’autres compagnies pétrolières occidentales. La CIA a admis que pour parvenir à ses fins, elle avait engagé des iraniens pour qu’ils jouent le rôle de communistes et préparent des attentats en Iran, dans le but de retourner le pays contre son premier ministre.

Si les USA n’avaient pas renversé le gouvernement iranien modéré, les mollahs fondamentalistes n’auraient jamais pris le pouvoir dans le pays. L’Iran était connu depuis des milliers d’années comme un pays tolérant envers ses chrétiens et ses autres minorités religieuses.

Les faucons du gouvernement des USA cherchent à entrainer un nouveau changement de régime en Iran depuis des dizaines d’années.

Turquie

La CIA a reconnu avoir organisé le coup d’état de 1980 en Turquie.

Afghanistan

Il est évident que les USA ont, par leurs bombardements, contraint les talibans à se soumettre, durant la guerre d’Afghanistan.

Mais le conseiller à la sécurité nationale d’Hillary Clinton et celui du président d’alors, Jimmy Carter,ont admis en public que les USA avaient auparavant conduit un changement de régime en Afghanistan durant les années 1970, en soutenant Ben Laden et les moudjahidines… les précurseurs d’Al Qaida.

Libye

Non seulement les USA ont engagé une intervention militaire directe contre Kadhafi, mais, d’après un groupe d’officiers de la CIA, les USA ont également armé des combattant d’Al Qaida, afin qu’ils aident à renverser Kadhafi.

En réalité, les USA ont organisé des coups d’états et des campagnes de déstabilisations dans le monde entier… ne créant partout que le chaos.


- Source : Washington's Blog

mardi, 14 octobre 2014

L’Iran au-delà de l’islamisme, de Thomas Flichy

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Parution : L’Iran au-delà de l’islamisme, de Thomas Flichy

Publié par

 
Introduction (extrait) au nouvel ouvrage de Thomas Flichy
 
 
L’Iran au-delà de l’islamisme, qui vient de paraître aux Éditions de l’Aube. Reproduit avec l’aimable autorisation de l’auteur. Acheter sur Amazon : cliquez ici

L’Iran est aujourd’hui placé au centre de l’attention géopolitique mondiale pour trois raisons fondamentales. En premier lieu, ce pays constitue le coeur énergétique du monde, exploitant simultanément les réserves en hydrocarbures de la mer Caspienne et celles du golfe Persique. Les puissances du Moyen-Orient qui l’environnent constituent, à cet égard, des périphéries envieuses. Pour la Chine, un partenariat avec l’Iran permettrait l’indispensable sécurisation de ses approvisionnements énergétiques. Ceci explique la double poussée maritime et terrestre de l’Empire du Milieu vers l’Iran, sur les traces des routes de la soie de la dynastie Tang. En second lieu, le monde chiite représente le coeur historique de l’innovation musulmane. Ce foyer d’inventivité est confiné depuis très longtemps par le monde sunnite. Profitant aujourd’hui du basculement irakien et de l’instabilité syrienne, l’Iran pousse son avantage pour étendre son influence au coeur du Moyen-Orient. Mais sa créativité, décuplée par la puissance imaginative de la poésie persane, effraie. En troisième lieu, l’Iran, qui souffre d’un déficit énergétique malgré ses réserves prodigieuses de gaz, développe des activités atomiques de façon accélérée, suscitant les interrogations légitimes de ses voisins. Soucieux d’éviter l’affrontement, les États-Unis et leurs alliés ont exercé des pressions indirectes sur l’Iran afin que celui-ci renonce à l’enrichissement nucléaire. Ces actions ont été qualifiées, le 3 septembre 2001, de djang-e-naram, ou « guerre douce », par Hossein Mazaheri, professeur de droit à Ispahan. Cette nouvelle forme de guerre, intimement liée aux progrès technologiques de la dernière décennie, se présente en effet comme un conflit dans lequel chacun des adversaires, préservant le capital humain et matériel de ses forces armées, cherche à faire tomber l’ennemi par des actions masquées et déstabilisatrices telles que les sanctions financières, la manipulation médiatique, les cyber-attaques ou l’élimination ciblée des têtes de réseau adverses. Ce conflit dépasse de loin la simple réalité iranienne dans la mesure où les puissances asiatiques et continentales que constituent la Russie, la Chine et l’Iran ont connu, malgré des différends internes, un rapprochement spectaculaire au cours des dernières années. Face à cette conjonction, les États-Unis redoutent la formation d’un nouvel Empire mongol, capable de concurrencer leur puissance océanique.

(…)

Les incompréhensions entre Français et Iraniens s’enracinent en réalité dans une double fracture culturelle. Partageant un héritage indo-européen commun, la France et la Perse se sont brusquement éloignées à partir de la conquête islamique. Les grandes divergences s’expliquent en grande partie par la très longue période d’occupation qu’a connue l’Iran depuis lors. La culture aristocratique de la négociation menée par les hommes d’armes s’est effacée à cause du discrédit jeté sur les élites militaires persanes vaincues. La culture des marchands combinant ruse et sophistication s’est substituée aux modes antiques de négociation. Face aux envahisseurs, l’inertie s’est imposée comme la force des dominés. La déliquescence de l’État a favorisé la lenteur et la corruption de ses agents. Face à la suspension du droit commun, les courtiers se sont substitués aux gens de loi afin de dire le droit et régler les difficultés privées. Devant le despotisme des rois et la prodigieuse insécurité des personnes et des biens s’est développé un langage indirect et ambigu destiné à protéger les sujets de l’arbitraire du pouvoir. Incapables de maîtriser leur propre destin, les Iraniens ont attribué les malheurs du pays aux complots étrangers. Les longs siècles de domination ont par conséquent forgé une culture allant à rebours de la tradition française fondée sur le temps compté, la force de la loi, la bonne foi et le rayonnement. La seconde fracture est le fruit de la Révolution française. Les ambassadeurs français du XVIIème siècle avaient de nombreux atouts pour comprendre les ressorts secrets de la culture persane. Enracinés dans la transcendance et l’attente messianique d’un temps nouveau, ils servaient un État puissant. Conscients d’un héritage historique pleinement assumé et partie intégrante de leur identité, ils étaient non seulement capables de saisir les références faites à leur propre passé, mais également aptes à renvoyer leurs interlocuteurs à leurs propres contradictions historiques. Ils n’ignoraient ni l’art de la conversation, ni les références littéraires donnant tout son sens à leur culture. L’étiquette de la Cour avait façonné en eux une habitude de la courtoisie devenue une seconde nature. Aujourd’hui, la fracture révolutionnaire sépare ces improbables messagers de la culture persane. Si la fracture culturelle générée par les invasions de la Perse explique pour une large part notre inaptitude à comprendre l’Iran au-delà des mots, nous pouvons à l’évidence puiser dans notre culture classique les clefs d’un dialogue réinventé avec ce pays méconnu.

Professeur à l’Institut d’Études Politiques de Bordeaux, à l’École Navale puis à l’École Spéciale Militaire de Saint-Cyr, Thomas Flichy de La Neuville est spécialiste de la diplomatie au XVIIIème siècle. Ancien élève en persan de l’Institut National des Langues et Cultures Orientales, agrégé d’histoire et docteur en droit, ses derniers travaux portent sur les relations françaises avec la Perse et la Chine à l’âge des Lumières.

samedi, 11 octobre 2014

Northern Opposition to Lincoln’s War

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Debunking the Myth of “National Unity”: Northern Opposition to Lincoln’s War

Of course, there is never “national unity” about anything, especially war, democratic politics being what it is.  When is the last time you heard of a unanimous vote expressing national unity in the U.S. Congress about anything?  Even the vote to declare war on Japan after Pearl Harbor was not unanimous.

The myth of national unity during the “Civil War” was invented and cultivated by the history profession, the Republican Party, and the New England clergy in the post-war era to “justify” the killing of hundreds of thousands of fellow citizens in the Southern states; the plundering of the South during “Reconstruction;” the destruction of the voluntary union of the states and the system of federalism that was created by the founding fathers; and the adoption of Hamiltonian mercantilism as America’s new economic system.

Any serious student of the “Civil War” knows that this is all absurd nonsense.  In addition to myriad draft riots, there were massive desertions from the Union Army from the very beginning of the war (see Ella Lonn, Desertion During the Civil War); Lincoln did shut down hundreds of opposition newspapers and imprison thousands of Northern political dissenters without due process.  He did deport the most outspoken Democratic Party critic in Congress, Clement L. Vallandigham of Dayton, Ohio.  He did rig elections by having soldiers intimidate Democratic Party voters.  And he did send some 15,000 federal troops to murder the New York City draft rioters by the hundreds in July of 1863. All of this has been discussed for decades in “mainstream” history scholarship such as Constitutional Problems Under Lincoln by James Randall and Freedom Under Lincoln by Dean Sprague.  The history profession has, however, done a meticulous job in seeing to it that such facts rarely, if ever, make it into the textbooks that are used in the public schools.

But times are changing in the era of the internet and of independent scholarship on the subject by scholars associated with such organizations as the Abbeville Institute.  The Institute’s latest publication is entitled Northern Opposition to Mr. Lincoln’s War, edited by D. Jonathan White.  It includes essays by White, Brion McClanahan, Marshall DeRosa, Arthur Trask, Joe Stromberg, Richard Valentine, Richard Gamble, John Chodes, and Allen Mendenhall.  These nine scholarly essays destroy the nationalist myth of “national unity” in the North during the War to Prevent Southern Independence.

Marshall DeRosa’s opening essay on “President Franklin Pierce and the War for Southern Independence” goes a long way in explaining why the nationalists in American politics believed that it was imperative to invent the myth of national unity.  President Franklin Pierce of New Hampshire was a Democrat who opposed the invasion of the Southern states.   He was a Jeffersonian, states-rights president, which is why he was mercilessly smeared by Lincoln’s hatchet man, William Seward, who accused him of treason (re-defined by the Lincoln administration as any criticism of it and its policies).  The real objects of Seward and Lincoln’s wrath towards Pierce, DeRosa explains, were the ideas that President Pierce stood for and was elected president on, as illustrated in the Democratic Party Platform of 1852.

The main ideas of this platform, upon which Pierce ran for president were: a federal government of limited powers, delegated to it by the states; opposition to the form of corporate welfare known as “internal improvements”; free trade and open immigration; gradual extinction of the national debt; opposition to a national bank; and realizing that the Constitution would have to be amended as a means of peacefully ending slavery.  This latter position was the position of the famous nineteenth-century libertarian abolitionist, Lysander Spooner, author of The Unconstitutionality of Slavery.

It was because of these ideas that Pierce was libeled and smeared by the Republican Party of his day, with subsequent generations of historians merely repeating the smears disguised as “scholarship.”  Lincoln’s claim to fame, on the other hand, writes DeRosa, “is not that he adhered to the rule of law [as Pierce did], but that he had the audacity to disregard it.”  Thanks to the history profession, moreover, “Americans continue to pay homage to the villains that laid the tracks to our present sorry state of affairs.”

D. Jonathan White surveys the Northern opponents of Lincoln’s war that were slandered by the administration and its media mouthpieces as “copperheads” (snakes in the grass).  Among the “copperheads” were many prominent citizens of the North who, like President Pierce, were passionate defenders of the rule of law and constitutionally-limited government.  Their main complaints were against Lincoln’s suspension of the writ of Habeas Corpus and the mass arrest of Northern political opponents without due process; the draft law, which they considered to be a form of slavery; the income tax imposed by the Lincoln administration – the first in American history; and protectionist tariffs (the cornerstone of the Republican Party platform of 1860).  Because of these beliefs, hundreds, if not thousands of “copperheads” were imprisoned without due process by the Lincoln administration.

Allen Mendenhall contributes a very interesting article about how the famous U.S. Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, who was wounded three times in the war, became a sharp critic of Lincoln, his “mystical” union, and the war during the rest of his life.  Brion McClanahan’s essay describes in scholarly detail the Jeffersonian Democrats in the state of Delaware who opposed the war (the state gave its three electoral votes and 46 percent of the popular vote to Southern Democrat John Breckenridge in the 1860 election).  R.T. Valentine does essentially the same thing in his chapter on opposition to Lincoln’s policies in Westchester County, New York and the greater Hudson Valley.  He describes in detail how the residents of these areas, many of whom had family history in the area going back to the time of the founding, deeply resented the pushy, imperialistic, arrogant “Yankees” who were the base of Lincoln’s support and who had been moving into New York state from New England in droves.

Arthur Trask demonstrates that there was also a great deal of opposition to Lincoln’s war in Philadelphia, where many residents had long-lasting business and personal relationships with Southerners, while John Chodes writes of the horrible wartime governor of Indiana, Oliver P. Morton, who apparently fancied himself as a mini-Lincoln with his imprisonment of dissenters and other dictatorial acts.

Joe Stromberg and Richard Gamble contribute chapters that explain the role of the Northern clergy in instigating the war.  Stromberg writes of the impulse of many Northern clergymen to use the coercive powers of the state to try to create some version of heaven on earth.  Worse yet,  “[T]he war of 1861-1865, as preached by the clergy surveyed here, became a permanent template for subsequent American crusades, whatever their origins.  From the Free Soil argument of the 1850s, through two World Wars, Cold War, and down to Iraq and beyond.  American leaders insist that their latest enemy [ISIS?] is both inherently expansionist and committed to some form of slavery.  It is therefore the duty of the new enemy to surrender ‘unconditionally’ and undergo reconstruction and reeducation for the good of all mankind . . .”

Richard Gamble traces the transformation of “Old School Presbyterianism” to where it embraced “political preaching.”  For example, upon Lincoln’s election a national assembly meeting in Philadelphia issued a proclamation that was “a turning point in the history of American Presbyterianism”:  “That in the judgment of this Assembly, it is the duty of the ministry and churches under its care to do all in their power to promote and perpetuate the integrity of the Unite States [government], and to strengthen, uphold, and encourage the Federal Government.”  The Old School Presbyterians, writes Gamble, “enlisted their church on the Union side,” which is to say, the side that would soon be invading, murdering, raping, and plundering its way through the Southern states.  This, Gamble argues, is how war and imperialism became the keystone of America’s “civil religion.”  This bogus “religion” is illustrated a thousand times over in the Laurence Vance archives on LewRockwell.com.

The Abbeville Institute is to be congratulated for publishing this latest correction of the historical record regarding Lincoln’s war.  Northern Opposition to Mr. Lincoln’s War should be a part of the library of every American who resents having been lied to by his teachers, professors, film makers, and authors, and who seeks the truth about his own country’s history.

The Best of Thomas DiLorenzo 

jeudi, 09 octobre 2014

Corneliu Zelea Codreanu and the Legion of the Archangel Michael

 

Capitanul-Miscarii-Legionare-Corneliu-Zelea-Codreanu-655x1024.jpg

Corneliu Zelea Codreanu and the Legion of the Archangel Michael

 

by Christophe Dolbeau

 

 

                                               The legionary will rather judge man by his soul…

 

                                                                                              C. Z. Codreanu

 

             A few decades ago, Paris most influential daily, Le Monde, gave some reverberation to a statement from the local antiracist league (LICA) which protested against the coming meeting of « former Romanian fascists » around Archbishop Valerian Trifa who was one of their (alleged) leaders in America. Later on, in 1984, the same Valerian Trifa was back on the front pages as the media gave notice of his deportation from the US to Portugal (he was to die in Estoril in 1987). An American citizen since 1957, the prelate had chosen to forfeit his nationality in 1982 after the notorious Office of Special Investigation had taken proceedings against him, with much encouragement from the pro-communist orthodox patriarchate of Bucharest. In Horizons Rouges (1), general Ion Pacepa, the former head of Romanian intelligence, has since related in detail how the case was made up with fake photographs and manufactured evidence… In 1988, the famous historian and philosopher Mircea Eliade (1907-1986) became in turn an object for sorrowful remarks when his posthumous memoirs made it clear that he had also had « reprehensible sympathies » in his youth… (2).

 

            From these anecdotes, it results that both the clergyman’s and the scholar’s indelible mistake was simply that several decades ago they belonged to the Iron Guard. A great popular movement that overthrew the political scene in Romania, the Iron Guard constituted a peculiar and most controversial phenomenon which keeps a place apart in the history of fascism and still attracts the attention.

 

« Romanian awake ! » (3)

 

            The story began 87 years ago, on Friday June 24, 1927, when together with four   friends (Ion Moţa, Ilia Gârneaţă, Corneliu Georgescu and Radu Mironovici), Corneliu Zelea Codreanu, a young doctor of law from Moldavia, laid the foundation of the Legion of the Archangel Michael (Legiunea Arhanghelului Mihail). At that time, Codreanu, aged 28, was already a popular public figure in his country : according to Odette Arnaud (4), « physically he has all the features and traits of the local peasants : he is slim and muscular, sparing of words and gestures, and his bearing is stately. There is no doubt : he commands respect and attention ». Very similar is the description drawn by Jérôme and Jean Tharaud (5) : « In front of me », they write, « a man who is still young ; he is dressed in a rough homespun, his hair are wavy, he has got a high forehead, a blue and cold eyesight, classic features and his gestures are quiet and measured ». To this portrait, Bertrand de Jouvenel (6) adds a few details : « Never did I meet a character », he says, « who introduces himself with so little ostentation and makes such a strong impression. Imagine a very tall and lean man whose face would be a pattern of classical beauty if it were not for deep sockets where a pair of piercing eyes glint ».

 

            Born September 13, 1899, Corneliu Zelea Codreanu attended the Manastirea Dealului military school where he acquired his first patriotic convictions. Galvanized by his father’s red hot patriotism and even though he hadn’t finished school, he did not dither and volunteered to the front during the war (1916). Soon after registering as a law student at Jassy University, he joined the Guard of the National Conscience (1919) ; in May 1922, he founded the Christian Students Association and in March 1923, he joined a fiercely anti-Jewish party called the Christian National Defence League (Liga Aparirii Nationale Crestine)-(7). Eventually, in May 1925, he was prosecuted for the murder of a police commissioner (Constantin Manciu) and triumphantly acquitted (8). His action seemed so justifiable (self-defence)-(9) that 19.300 attorneys had volunteered to plead his cause and the day after he was acquitted, thousands of Romanians cheered at the train which brought the young man back to Jassy. A former French lecturer in this town, Emmanuel Beau de Loménie, throws an interesting light on the case : « Those who speak about the death of the commissioner neglect to say that the man in question was ruling by a system of oriental terror. Whenever he arrested some young anti-Jewish demonstrators, one of his favourite games consisted in hanging them head downwards and whipping their feet with a bullwhip until they fainted » (10).

 

            At that time and for most of his followers, Codreanu was already « a rock among the waves, a road opener, a sword drawn between two worlds » ; he was also the embodiment of new virtues : « thought, fortitude, action, bravery and life » (11).

 

A religious inspiration

 

            codreanu.jpgBased on the belief in God, the faith in a mission, mutual love and a fraternal sharing of emotion through choir-singing, the Legion of the Archangel was very different from a political party as we usually conceive it nowadays. « It is not a political movement », says V. P. Garcineanu, « but a spiritual revolution » (12). In Défense de l’Occident (13), Paul Guiraud shares a common sentiment : « This movement », he writes, « has got something unique : it aims at the spiritual and moral recovery of man, at the creation of a new man. This man won’t have anything in common with his democratic predecessor who was both individualistic and weak-minded ». This spiritual reference catches also the attention of Robert Brasillach (14) in Notre Avant-Guerre where he mentions the Legion : « To his legionaries », the young columnist writes, « Corneliu Codreanu directed a rough and variegated poetry ; he appealed to sacrifice, honour, discipline and called for that sort of collective impulse which people usually experience through religion and which he called national ecumenicity » (15). For C. Papanace and W. Hagen (W. Höttl), it was these high moral standards that distinguished the Legion from all other nationalist movements in Europe. According to C. Papanace, « fascism cares about the attire (i.e. the state organization), national-socialism about the body (i.e. racial eugenics) while the Legion attends to the soul (which means its strengthening through the practice of Christian virtues and its preparation with a view to its final salvation) » (16). For W. Hagen, the Legion « had nothing in common with the various copies of fascism and national-socialism that existed in other countries. The difference laid in its Christian religiosity and its mysticism » (17). An intense nationalism combined to a passionate faith made of the Legion an unusual phenomenon which some legionaries saw as the early beginnings of a vast spiritual awakening of the world : « With legionarism », Garcineanu says, « Romanians have created a unique phenomenon in Europe : a movement which possesses a religious structure associated to an ideological corpus that proceeds from Christian theology (…) This is a central fact because in the collective quest for God, it means that all other nations will have to follow us » (18).

 

Anti-Semitism

 

            For the leader of the Legion, Romania’s troubles were primarily due to the Jews. Almost a century later and in view of the wave of anti-Semitic crimes which occured during WWII, this extreme judeophobia seems altogether inadmissible. One should of course replace it in the context of the thirties and remember some enlightening statistics : according to a census of that time, which we borrow from F. Duprat (19), Jews were 10,8% in Bucovina, 7,2% in Bessarabia (and almost 60% of Chisinau’s inhabitants), 6,5% in Moldavia (with a total population of 102.000, Jassy was housing 65.000 Jews) and no less than 140.000 of them lived in the capital-city (which had a total population of 700.000). According to professor Ernst Nolte (20), « between the boyards and the serves, the Jews had formed an intermediate stratum. In some universities and several academic professions and although they did not make up more than 5% of the total population, they outnumbered Romanians. Seventy percent of the journalists and eighty percent of the textile engineers were of Jewish stock. In 1934, almost 50% of the students were non-Romanians (…) Unlike their coreligionists from Austria-Hungary, local Jews did not feel disposed to being assimilated, especially as the prorogation of their former community-status allowed them to secure considerable business advantages ».

 

            In Romania as everywhere else in Europe, Jews aroused the hostility of nationalist circles. It was not exactly a novelty : already in 1866 a bloody riot had broken out in Bucharest when French MP Adolphe Crémieux (21) had offered Romania a loan of 25 million francs in return for the emancipation of Jews. In a stormy atmosphere, members of Parliament had hence been forced to turn down the offer. Considering this past record, the anti-Semitism of the Legion was not so exceptional : after all Iorga’s and Cuza’s National Democratic Party, Marshal Averescu’s People’s Party and Octavian Goga’s National Christian Party (22) had taken the same stand… Besides one should notice that contrary to widely spread clichés, Codreanu never refered to any biological or religious anti-Semitism to justify his anti-Jewish trend. As in the days when Romania was fighting against Turks, Phanariots or Russians, the Legion only confined to an exclusive conception of Romanian national identity. There again one must look back on the crisis of 1866 and remember the words of geographer Ernest Desjardins who wrote : « I can affirm that no religious prejudice ever plaid any part in the government’s decisions nor in the hostility which natives display towards the Jews » (23). Former legionary Faust Bradesco says approximately the same : « Just as it was in the 19th century », he writes, « Legion’s anti-Semitism is nothing but national self-defence (…) Never did the Legion cause any physical harm to the Jews ; it took no notice of race and never damaged any synagogue » (24). Incidentally it appears that Codreanu’s official aims were rather peaceful : wasn’t his major ambition to free Romanians from their inferiority complex and compete with the Jews on their own ground ? An intention he quickly materialized by creating a « legionary trading battalion », cooperative stores, communal canteens, sewing shops, a « legionary market » and a « legionary workers’ corps ».

 

A noble ideal

 

            To bring national decline to an end and restore the ancient Dacian, the Legion was supposed to be « a school and an army more than a political party » (25). This essential interest for man, as opposed to the corruptible and cosmopolitan politico, was the cornerstone of the movement : « …A new man will rise », Codreanu foretold, « with the qualities of a hero. The Legion will be the cradle of the very best offspring our race can beget : our legionary school will nurture the proudest, noblest, frankest, wisest, purest, bravest and most industrious sons Romania ever had, the noblest souls she ever dreamt up » (26). In this slow process of national revival, woman – mother, daughter, sister or partner – was not forgotten : « In this fight for the better and for the renewal of the Romanian soul », Ion Banea writes (27), « a strong, beautiful and great role is allotted to women (…) We are today in a period of change and struggle. From this battle of honour the woman of our time cannot be absent. We want the woman of our age to be a fighter ; we want her to be a comrade. The times demand it ».

 

            Both in his writings and public speeches, Codreanu harked back again and again to these themes, tirelessly claiming for the restoration of moral requirements which were so stern and austere that F. Bradesco called them « anti-machiavellian » : « All talents », said Codreanu, « brains, education and breeding, are useless to a man who is committed to infamy. Teach your children not to use it either against a friend or even against their worst ennemy (…) In their fight against traitors of all sorts, tell them not to resort to the same disgraceful means. Should they eventually win, they would just exchange roles with their foes. Infamy would stay unchallenged (…) Basically il would carry on ruling the world. Only the light, which flashes out from the hero’s noble and loyal soul, will dispel the shades with which infamy darkened the world » (28).

 

Stringent ethics

 

            To ponder and practice these principles, legionaries were incorporated into a rather elaborate structure. In addition to the headquarters (the Green House or Casa Verde) it included the « brotherhoods of the Cross » (for children and teenagers), the « citadels » (for women and girls) and above all the « nests » where men could find « a moral milieu propitious to the birth and development of the hero ». In this frame, legionaries could complete their moulding by facing three kinds of ordeals : at first came small personal sacrifices (of time, money and energies), then missions that required heart (to cope with injustice, legal pettifogging and police brutality) and finally situations that necessitated an absolute faith so as to master misgiving, impatience and disillusion. « Only means to contend with human cowardice, hyper-materialism and an unquenchable craving for domination », Faust Bradesco says, « these ordeals allow man to fulfill himself as a person and to grow better as a member of the society » (29). All along that spiritual path, the legionary could be awarded congratulations, mentions, diplomas, ranks (e.g. instructor, vice-commander or commander) and medals (the White Cross for bravery and the Green Cross for deeds of valour). The movement possessed a few special units but globally it was based on a pyramidal organization (with a corresponding hierarchy) : above the « nest », there were the garrison, the district, the department (county) and the region. At the top and next to the Captain, the movement was headed by the Legion Senate (an assembly of wise men, older than 50) and the Council of Commanders (30).

 

            As an echo to the « collective state of mind » and the « national ecumenicity » which Codreanu often refered to and also as a symbol of unity, the Legion wore a uniform (a green shirt). Concurrently the Captain had set forth a series of eight points – moral purity, unselfishness, enthusiasm, faith, the stimulation of the moral forces of the Nation, justice, vitality and New Romania as a final goal – to which every new member personally adhered by taking an oath and solemnly receiving a small bag of Romanian earth. So as to ensure an harmonious development to the movement, this creed was of course associated to the consentaneous principles of order and discipline (31) without which no political action could ever suceed.

 

            Soon the Capitanul (a traditional title of Captain given to great defenders of the Nation) started to lead imposing rides through the country, with hundreds of horsemen wearing white tunics stamped with a Cross. He also opened large working-sites (« The work-camp », Garcineanu writes, « possesses the same beneficial influences upon the Romanian soul as the nest. Only it realizes them in larger proportions. The spiritual effort is deeper, the accomplished results greater, the legionaries in larger numbers. The work-camp, by its scope, is the place and the only modality of anticipating the great legionary life of tmorrow »). Everywhere in Romania, the ascendancy of the Captain grew bigger and bigger (32) : « I have been able to verify », says Odette Arnaud, « that in both Bucharest and Jassy, 80% of the students learn the Cărticica (the breviary of the Legion) by heart (…) I witnessed a pilgrimage of highlanders. They came to kiss the Captain’s hands after walking nearly a hundred leagues, barefoot, with a stick in one hand » (33). Apparently insensible to this new popularity, the leader of the Legion kept cool and collected : according to Beau de Loménie, « he kept perfectly unaffected, good-tempered and genuinely unassuming » (34).

 

            In June 1930, the Legion of the Archangel St Michael became the Iron Guard (Garda de Fier), a name which it was to keep in spite of several bans (June 11, 1931 ; March 1932 ; December 10, 1933). As an emblem it took a square of iron bars (or gard in Romanian language).

 

codreanu-oliver-ritter1a-n.jpgThe Iron Guard

 

            Faithful to the mission assigned to the Legion, Codreanu provided the Iron Guard with a consistent political doctrine which he set out in his book Pentru Legionari (For the Legionaries). He first advocated a ruthless fight against communism which had been successfully implanted by Jewish immigrants from Poland and Russia (between 1914 and 1938, the Jewish population of Romania had grown from 300.000 to 790.000). As a matter of fact, the Captain did not beat around the bush : « When I speak of anti-communist action », he wrote, « I do not mean anti-worker action : when I speak of communists I mean the Jews » (35).

 

            Although King Carol and his suite never ceased making trouble for him, he then stated that he remained a faithful monarchist and rejected any form of republican government. Quite as clearly he condemned democracy as a system which jeopardizes national unity, changes thousands of foreigners into Romanian citizens and proves together erratic, timorous and invariably compliant to great capitalism (36).

 

            Thoroughly scrutinizing the life of the Nation, the chief of the Iron Guard singled out « natural principles of death » and « natural laws of life ». Persuaded that the masses never had any spontaneous intuition of the latter, he suggested that in the future the people should be guided by an elite, that’s to say by « a type of native individuals who possess some special skills ». How will this elite be recruited ? Neither by the ballot-box nor by heredity but by the natural laws of « social selection ». As to the qualities required, the Captain mentioned pureness, working capacity, valour, a strong will to overcome, an ascetic life, faith in God and love. « One should remember », Codreanu said (November 11, 1937), « that the idea of an elite is intrinsically linked to the ideas of sacrifice, poverty and severe life. Whenever the idea of sacrifice is given up, the elite vanishes ».

 

            From a legionary point of view (as expressed by Codreanu himself), the individual is « subordinated to the national community over which the Nation predominates » (37). The Nation includes « all living Romanians as well as the souls of our dead, the graves of our ancestors and all those who will be born Romanian » (38). The Nation owns a physical and a biological patrimony, a material heritage and – as it is also for the Spaniard José Antonio Primo de Rivera (39) – a spiritual legacy which embraces « the way the Nation conceives God, life and the world, as well as the honour and the civilization of the Nation » (40). For the Captain, « the spiritual legacy is the most important » (41). As for the final goal of the Nation, it is the Resurrection (according to the Apocalypse which legionaries often refered to) : « The Nation is a community that will live in the hereafter. Nations are spiritual realities : they not only live here below but also in the reign of God » (42).

 

The Guard into action

 

            Concurrently to the great strides it organized inside Romania, the Iron Guard began looking forward to an international recognition : in December 1934, Ion Moţa (Codreanu’s brother in law) attended the international fascist meeting of Montreux (Switzlerland), showing thence that the Guard felt more attracted to Rome than Berlin. A couple of years later, when the Spanish War broke out, Codreanu stood up for the nationalists and sent them a symbolic deputation of seven volunteers (Ion Moţa, Father Ion Dumitrescu-Borşa, Prince Alecu Cantacuzeno, Bănică Dobre, Gheorghe Clime, Nicolae Totu and Vasile Marin) led by former general Gheorghe Cantacuzino-Grănicerul. These men left Bucharest on November 26, 1936, they met Francisco Franco and general Moscardo, and joined the Tercio (43). All of them being reserve officers, they were quickly posted (as simple rank and file) to the VIth Bandera and immediately took part in the battle at Las Rozas, Pozuelo and Majadahonda where Ion Mota and Vasile Marin got prematurely killed by an ennemy shell on January 13, 1937 (44).

 

            Within Romania, the conflict with the oligarchy became all the more relentless as the Guard grew more and more representative (from 5 MPs in July 1932, the movement, momentarily renamed Totul Pentru Ţară or Everything for the Country, won up to 60 seats at the elections of December 1937). Persecuted by a regime which went so far as to resort to gangs of thugs and set up a state of emergency in some areas, the Guard will suffer 5.000 deaths between 1927 and 1941. Yet it did not plunge the country into a civil war as it could have done it… It seems therefore particularly undue to picture the Guard as an essentially terrorist organization (which implies that it systematically resorted to violence as a legitimate mean to assume power). Actually when it was involved in violence, it nearly always took the form of limited and targetted actions, conceived as « punishments », whose perpetrators spontaneously surrendered to Justice.

 

            Three of these actions aroused a world wide interest : the execution of Prime Minister Ion Gheorghe Duca by the Nicadorii (at Sinaïa on December 29, 1933), that of Mihai Stelescu by the Decemvirii (on July 16, 1936) and that of Prime Minister Armand Călinescu by the Rasbunatorii (at Cotroceni on September 21, 1939). In the first case, the aim was to punish the man who had quashed the electoral campaign of the Guard and who was responsible for 11.000 arrests, 300 wounded and 6 dead… In the second case, the legionaries wanted to punish a former commander, one of the most brilliant, who had conspired against the Captain’s life, betrayed his oath and become the darling of the Jewish press. Happening at the right moment, this betrayal had had an appalling impact. According to F. Bradesco, « an uneasy feeling was growing among legionaries and a sense of shame was hanging over the Commanders’ Corps » (45). It was therefore decided to strike a spectacular blow (especially cruel, this action proved durably prejudicial. As a matter of fact, Stelescu was killed inside Brancobenesc Hospital where he had just been operated. According to the Tharaud brothers, the murderers shot 38 bullets at him and finished him off with an axe ; writer Virgil Gheorghiu says that they fired 200 bullets and then chopped the body with hatchets !). In the third case, the aim was to avenge the Captain by striking the main promoter of what legionaries usually called Prigoana cea mare or « the Great Persecution ».

 

            As far as terrorism is concerned, one should pay special attention to the case of that Călinescu who prided himself with being the fiercest ennemy of the Iron Guard. Totally subservient to King Carol and the business circles of Bucharest (especially to the king’s mistress Magda Wolf-Lupescu)-(46), he had been displaying a constant hate for the Guard since 1932. Appointed to the governement in December 1937, under foreign pressure and on the eve of new elections, he engaged at once in muzzling the Guard with the most radical means : people were arrested, the police closed some country-roads, meetings were banned, activists placed under forced residence, some of them assaulted, and several areas quarantined. Unfair as they might be, these measures did not prevent the Guard to come third at the poll with 16,09% of the votes. Then, at king’s palace and among power-holders, some disreputable people imagined to get rid of the Guard and its leader for good. Owing to his ferocious zeal, Călinescu was chosen to be the main tool of the plot. At first and after making sure that Patriarch Miron Cristea agreed, the king set up a dictature (February 12, 1938), suspended the Constitution, put off the elections, banned all political parties and declared a state of emergency. Suspecting a snare, Codreanu did not do anything to resist the coup : on his own initiative he dissolved his organization, freed the legionaries from their obligations and advised everyone to keep quiet and patient. When a referendum was called (February 28, 1938) to approve the new Constitution, he deliberately did not ask to vote against it so as not to offer any excuse to further repression. The main result of these tactics was of course to infuriate Călinescu whose provocations redoubled : more legal proceedings poured in, thousands of legionary civil servants were dismissed and all premises and companies of the Iron Guard were arbitrarily closed down. To the minister’s great disappointment this strong pressure proved unavailing as it did not meet the slightest sign of rebellion…

 

            In the end and as the Guard offered no resistance whatever, Călinescu was compelled to find a trivial pretext to engage in the second phase of his anti-legionary operation. On account of a private letter Codreanu had sent to professor Nicolae Iorga, king’s councellor, the latter was encouraged to lodge a complaint for outrage (March 30, 1938) and the Captain was immediately indicted. Arrested on April 17 together with several thousands legionaries (whose possible reaction made the government feel much anxious), Codreanu appeared before a military court (April 19) which sentenced him to a 6 month imprisonment (a maximal punishment for such an alleged offence) ! Incarcerated in Jilava, the leader of the Guard was henceforward at the mercy of his worst enemies. Isolated and seriously ill (from TB), his spirits were low : « Once again my mother is alone », he wrote, « Her son-in-law has died in Spain, leaving a widow and a couple of orphans. I am in jail. Four other children are already in prison or on the verge of being arrested. One of them has also got four children who stay without a crust of bread to eat. Before the holidays, my father went to Bucharest to draw his pension and he never returned. He was arrested, led to an unknown place and no one knows about his fate » (47).

 

            At this stage, it seemed that the government had reached its objective : the Iron Guard was paralyzed, its most active supporters were disqualified and its leader in gaol. Still Călinescu wanted to complete his work. With this aim in view, he initiated new proceedings (May 8, 1938) against Codreanu in order to have him sentenced for treason and armed rebellion. Appearing before Bucharest military court (May 23) after a quick investigation and whereas his lawyers had only had three days to prepare the plea, the Captain miraculously escaped the death penalty (just established on May 24…) but he however got ten years of hard labour (May 27, 1938) !

 

            The denial of justice was enormous, the masquerade patent, yet Călinescu’s employers were not satisfied. Neither the king nor his hidden abettors felt reassured as they perfectly knew that many legionary groups were still secretly at work (in 1937 there were 34.000 « nests »), that some commanders had escaped police raids and that their chief was still alive. Once more the Home Secretary set to work, more than ever determined to do in the Captain and his men. Throughout summer, the police went on arresting people so as to weaken the Guard a little more ; precautions were even taken in the army to prevent any outburst of temper from sympathizers. Eventually, in November, everything was ready and Călinescu gave the green light. In the night from November 29 to November 30, 1938, Codreanu and 13 other legionaries (the Nicadorii and the Decemvirii) were taken out from Râmnicu-Sarat jail and handed over to major Dinulescu and a company of gendarmes. The police vans took the road to Bucharest, they stopped on the edge of Tâncăbeşti Forest and there, the 14 prisoners were coldly strangled by their custodians who also riddled them with bullets to simulate an escape bid. Afterwards, the corpses were brought to Jilava, sprayed with sulfuric acid and burried in several tons of concrete (48) ; then, general Ioan Bengliu gave each killer a bonus of 20.000 lei.

 

            Călinescu had but a short while to jubilize. As expected he was not long to pay for his crime with his life (49) : on September 21, 1939, a group of avengers shot him dead in Cotroceni. As for the tragic death of Codreanu, at the age of 39, it highlights the message which the Captain used to address to his young supporters : « Fight but never be vile. Leave to others the ways of infamy. Better fall with honour than win uncreditably » (50).

 

War, Resistance and Exile

 

            The punishment inflicted to Călinescu (51) led to a stinging counterstroke : the executioners were immediately shot on the spot without any trial. Whereupon general Argeşanu gave the order to kill all legionary officers who happened to be incarcerated at the moment as well as five ordinary legionaries in each county (that is to say between 300 to 400 dead in 24 hours !)-(52). In spite of these repeated blows, the Iron Guard survived ; under the leadership of a new chief, Horia Sima (1907-1993), it even entered the governement in September 1940 (Horia Sima, Prince Sturdza, prof. Brăileanu, legionaries Nicolau and Iasinschi were appointed ministers). Thenceforth the settling of accounts began : on November 27, 1940, former minister Victor Iamandi, generals Gheorghe Argeşanu, Ioan Bengliu and Gabriel Marinescu were summarily executed in Jilava together with senior police officers Moruzov and Stefanescu (53) ; on the same day Nicolae Iorga, the man who had told the king to get rid of Codreanu, was assassinated in Strejnicu (54). On the other hand and contrary to the usual stereotypes, the legionary movement did not start any pogrom. According to the Black Book (Cartea Neagra) which Matatias Carp published in 1946 with a foreword by Chief Rabbi Alexandru Safran, « during the legionary government (from September 6, 1940, to January 24, 1941) casualties were as follows : 4 Jews killed in Bucharest in November ; 11 Jews killed in Ploeşti in the night of November 27 ; 1 Jew killed in Hârşova (Constanta) on January 17, 1941, and 120 Jews killed between January 21 and January 24, 1941, during the rebellion » (volume 1, p. 25). No doubt this balance of 136 victims is terrible (55) but as a comparison one should remember that up to 265.000 Jews died under Marshal Antonescu’s anti-legionary regime… [Is it necessary to add that the Legion took absolutely no part in the alleged pogroms of Jassy (June 27, 1941), Edinets (July 6, 1941), Cernăuţi (July 9, 1941), Chisinau (August 1, 1941) and Odessa (October 1941-January 1942) ? As explained below, the movement was dissolved and prohibited in January 1941. The pogroms if they ever happened were the sole responsability of Antonescu and his acolytes].

 

            The Iron Guard did not stay at the head of the state for long. On January 21, 1941 and by means of a large police operation backed by German Wehrmacht (general E. O. Hansen), Marshal Ion Antonescu tried to extirpate the legionaries for good (at least 800 of them were killed and 8000 arrested). Under German protection, the surviving commanders had no alternative but to flee to Germany where Himmler had them confined in Buchenwald, Dachau, Berkenbruck and Sachsenhausen (56). According to Walter Hagen (57), « the crushing of the legionary movement deprived the regime of any popular support. It became a “dead system“, very similar to the dictatorial government of Carol II. When danger came, nobody lifted a finger to defend it ». Arrested (August 23, 1944) and handed over to the Soviets by order of King Michael and Iuliu Maniu, the Conducător (Antonescu) ended his life facing a communist firing squad.

 

            Released on August 24, 1944, the day after Romania’s volte-face, the legionaries from Germany set up (December 10, 1944) a « Romanian National Government » (with Horia Sima, Prince Sturdza, general Chirnoagă) which settled in Vienna and later in Bad Gastein and Altaussee. They also formed a small anti-communist army which went to fight along river Oder. This Romanian unit was made of two Waffen-SS regiments (5.000 men) whose commanding officer was general Platon Chirnoagă (1894-1974). « In the circumstances », Horia Sima says (58), « the Iron Guard had no choice but to carry on the fight (…) Therefore I issued a proclamation to the country which was immediately broadcast. Then I began organizing the resistance with the scanty means we still had at our disposal ».

 

            As in most East European countries, the resistance began with a very poor equipment, in a territory which the Red Army had just ravaged and where all sorts of communist gangs were wreaking havoc (from March 6, 1945, these thugs became the senior executives of the new political police)-(59). At that time no support was to be expected from either the king or his friends (540.000 Romanian soldiers were now fighting against Germany together with the Soviets). Though he had just been awarded the Order of the Victory, King Michael (born 1921) was no more than a mere hostage in the hands of Vichinsky, P. Groza, Gheorghiu-Dej, V. Luca, Ana Pauker or Emil Bodnăraş, and he had no choice but to drain the cup to its dregs. On December 30, 1947 he nevertheless resolved to abdicate and leave the country. In spite of draconian measures of repression (arrests, mass deportations, shootings), guerillas sprang up in Oltenia, Banat, Transylvania and along the Carpathian Mountains ; led by former legionaries, these groups went on fighting until 1955-1956 almost without any help from abroad (60). Beyond their own ideas, this hard-line attitude was a question of life and death for the former members of the Iron Guard. Actually under a new law passed in May 1948, they were irrevocably destined for the hardest punishments, which meant that they would end up in some infamous death camps (such as Black Sea Canal, Cavnic, Peninsula, Aiud) and suffer the « unmaskings » or brainwashings to which all intellectuals were submitted at Piteşti, Gherla and Jilava special prisons (61).

 

         Codr1149611347.jpg   For the expatriates the fight went on as well (62) but in a less hostile environment. Well established in the Romanian emigration (in Germany, France, Spain, Brazil and the USA) they launched several publications, did their best to inform the Western public (63) and took an active part in various assemblies of captive nations. According to the declaration they issued in 1977 (50th aniversary of the Legion) their positions ensued from their former commitments. The Iron Guard in exile demanded that international communism should be eradicated, it rejected the UNO and the Helsinki Agreement, proposed to build a united Europe with a common spiritual denominator and to support East European resistance movements ; it also rejected any idea of « world government » and flatly repelled the concept of « spheres of influence ». Vis-à-vis the inner situation of Romania, it denied Ceauşescu any legitimacy, reaffirmed Romanian rights on Bucovina, Bessarabia and the Hertza region (annexed by the USSR), rejected collectivism and demanded religious freedom.

 

            As Corneliu Zelea Codreanu had predicted : « Legionaries do not die. Standing upright, steadfast and immortal, they victoriously gaze at the seething of ineffectual hates » (64). In 1989, after 45 years of communist rule, the survivors of the Guard had not changed : they were still faithful to their oath and sticked to their creed (social fraternity, distributive justice, inner perfection and creative revolution). After the fall of Ceauşescu, those who lived in Romania (mostly octogenarians) kept cautious and contented themselves with supporting the traditional right-wing parties. For them, the country was not yet fully safe : the late dictator’s henchmen were still powerful and the new democracy unsteady. Wasn’t it amazing to see the Romanians, totally messed up, cheer up King Michael (in February 1997), the very man who had abandoned them to Stalin and given up a good third of the country ? Writing about the ethnic quarrels which broke out in Transylvania, some journalists suggested that a new Iron Guard stood behind the nationalist movement Vatra Românească and the Association for a United Romania (65). Probably meant for the omnipotent western antifascist lobby, the allegation was immediately taken up by Petre Roman (March 21, 1990) ; it came at the right moment for a most controversial regime whose repressive policy it greatly contributed to justify. Obviously this was grossly overstated and at any rate much premature. Today, Romania is very different from what it used to be in the thirties or the fourties (66) and the Iron Guard is not a simple political party which disappears and reappears according to circumstances. It has a metaphysical dimension which cannot be so easily restored in a country that has been submitted for nearly 50 years to atheism, materialism and utilitarianism. If the legionary movement is ever to revive, it will be under the spur of a new elite (as Codreanu meant it)-(67) and it will need years to develop !

 

 

                                                                                                          Christophe Dolbeau

 

 

Notes

 

(1) Horizons Rouges, Paris, Presses de la Cité, 1988, pp. 217-221.

 

(2) For the same reason, criticisms were also directed at philosopher and poet Émile Cioran (1911-1995). In a letter dated March 4, 1975, the Romanian-French academician Eugène Ionesco (1909-1994) writes : « Towards the end of the inter-war years, most Romanians, especially young people and intellectuals, were members or sympathizers of the Romanian fascist party called the Iron Guard » – quoted by J. Miloe in La Riposte, Paris, Compagnie Française d’Impression, 1976, p. 309.

 

(3) Title of a famous poem by the Transylvanian Andreiu Muresianu (1816-1863).

 

(4) La Revue Hebdomadaire, March 2, 1935.

 

(5) L’Envoyé de l’Archange, Paris, Plon, 1939, p. 2. Both Jérôme (1874-1953) and Jean (1877-1952) Tharaud were novelists who belonged to the French Academy.

 

(6) The son of a Jewish mother, Bertrand de Jouvenel (1903-1987) was a famous fascist journalist who later became a much respected economist.

 

(7) The banner of the League was black and there was a white circle with a swastika in the middle. The League was presided over by professor Alexandru C. Cuza (1857-1947).

 

(8) According to Codreanu, « All the gentlemen of the jury wore a tricolour cockade with a swastika » – in La Garde de Fer, Grenoble, Omul Nou, 1972, p. 231. See https://archive.org/details/ForMyLegionariesTheIronGuard

 

(9) On October 25, 1924 C. Z. Codreanu was defending a young student at the tribunal of Jassy. All of a sudden and during the hearing, commissioner Manciu and a dozen policemen burst into the court room and rushed to Codreanu who seized his gun and fired to protect himself – See La Garde de Fer, p. 210.

 

(10) La Revue Hebdomadaire, December 17, 1938, vol. XII, p. 346.

 

(11) Ion Banea, Lines for our Generation, Madrid, Libertatea, 1987, p. 13-14.

 

(12) V. Puiu Gârcineanu, From the Legionary World, Madrid, Libertatea, 1987, p. 1.

 

(13) N° 81 (April-May 1969), p. 9-10.

 

(14) Born in 1909 in the South of France, Robert Brasillach was a promising poet but also a bestselling novelist and a brilliant journalist ; sentenced to death in January 1945 for « collaboration with the nazis », he was executed on February 6, 1945.

 

(15) Notre Avant-Guerre, Paris, Plon, 1973, p. 304.

 

(16) Introduction to the Livret du Chef de Nid (Handbook of the Nest Leader), Pământul Strămoşesc, 1978, s.l., p. VI.

 

(17) Le Front Secret, Paris, Les Iles d’Or, 1952, p. 234.

 

(18) V. Puiu Gârcineanu, op. cit., p. 14. The Christian inspiration of the movement attracted a great number of clergymen ; approximately 3.000 priests (out of 10.000) belonged to the Legion. In 1945, out of 12 bishops in the Synod, 7 were former legionaries.

 

(19) Revue d’Histoire du Fascisme, N° 2 (September-October 1972), p. 132.

 

(20) Les Mouvements Fascistes, Paris, Calmann-Lévy, 1991, p. 237.

 

(21) Adolphe Crémieux (1796-1880) was a Jew and a freemason ; from 1863 to 1880, he was the president of the Alliance Israélite Universelle (World Jewish Alliance).

 

(22) The symbol of the National Christian Party was the swastika.

 

(23) See Les Juifs de Moldavie, Paris, Dentu, 1867.

 

(24) Les Trois Épreuves Légionnaires, Prométhée, 1973, s. l., p. 69. This opinion is shared by Prince Mihail Sturdza who states that Codreanu « would have immediately expelled from the Movement any fool who had so much as broken a window in a Jewish-owned shop » (The Suicide of Europe, p. 233) and by Father Vasile Boldeanu who assures that « there was no room for anti-Semitism in the legionary programme » (quoted in La Riposte, p. 194).These opinions are perhaps a bit too « optimistic » and in any case they seem to be contradicted by the long series of outrages which the Jewish community suffered at that time (taking into consideration that all the attacks were not always due to legionaries and that they often occured as retaliatons to previous assaults by Jewish thugs as in Oradea, December 1927).

 

(25) La Garde de Fer, p. 283.

 

(26) Ibid, p. 283.

 

(27) Ion Banea, op. cit., p. 10-11.

 

(28) La Garde de Fer, p. 277.

 

(29) Les Trois Épreuves Légionnaires, p. 158.

 

(30) See F. Bradesco, Le Nid – Unité de Base du Mouvement Légionnaire, Madrid, Carpatii, 1973.

 

(31) See C. Z. Codreanu, Le Livret du Chef de Nid, Pamântul Stramosesc, 1978, and F. Bradesco, Le Nid, pp. 111-135.

 

(32) The Legion-Iron Guard had grown from an obscure little group into a large movement whose membership included generals (Gheorghe Cantacuzeno, Ion Macridescu, Ion Tarnoschi), scholars (Traian Brăileanu, Ion Găvănescul, Eugen Chirnoagă, Corneliu Şumuleanu, Dragoş Protopopescu), distinguished philosophers (Nichifor Crainic, Nae Ionescu) and brilliant poets (Radu Gyr, Virgil Carianopol). The masses were also enthusiastic : when Codreanu got married (June 13, 1925), a crowd of 80.000 to 100.000 flooded to Focşani and at the funerals of Moţa and Marin (February 13, 1937), the cortège (with a hundred priests) stretched out over 6 miles. In 1937 and according to S. G. Payne, the Iron Guard had a membership of 272.000 (i.e. 1,5% of the Romanian population).

 

(33) La Revue Hebdomadaire, March 2, 1935.

 

(34) La Revue Hebdomadaire, December 17, 1938, p. 348.

 

(35) La Garde de Fer, p. 353. Before WWII there were approximately 300.000 factory workers in Romania and the local Communist Party had no more than 1000 members. Indubitably most communist leaders – Dr Litman Ghelerter, Ilie Moscovici, Marcel and Ana Pauker (Hannah Rabinsohn), Avram Bunaciu (Abraham Gutman), Walter Roman (Ernö Neuländer), Teohari Georgescu (Burah Techkovich), Gheorghe Apostol (Aaron Gerschwin), Miron Constantinescu (Mehr Kohn), Leonte Răutu (Lev Oigenstein), Remus Kofler, Simion Bughici (David), Iosif Chişinevschi (Iacob Roitman), Gheorghe Stoica (Moscu Cohn), Stefan Voicu (Aurel Rotenberg), etc – were Jews.

See : http://en.metapedia.org/wiki/List_of_communist_Jews_in_Romania

 

(36) Ibid, pp. 386-388.

 

(37) Ibid, p. 396.

 

(38) Ibid, p. 398.

 

(39) See Horia Sima, Dos Movimientos Nacionales, José antonio Primo de Rivera y Corneliu Codreanu, Madrid, Ediciones Europa, 1960.

 

(40) La Garde de Fer, p. 398.

 

(41) Ibid, p. 398.

 

(42) Ibid, p. 399.

 

(43) The Tercio is the Spanish Foreign Legion.

 

(44) José Luis de Mesa, Los otros internacionales, Madrid, Barbarroja, 1998, pp. 165-172, and Los legionarios rumanos Motza y marin caidos por Dios y España, Barcelona, Bausp, 1978. The mortal remnants of the two legionaries were repatriated by train and the funerals took place in Bucharest on February 13, 1937. Legionaries Clime, Cantacuzeno, Dobre and Totu came back safe and sound but they were assassinated by the Romanian secret police in September 1939 ; Father Dumitrescu (1899-1981) received a 16-year sentence in 1948.

 

(45) F. Bradesco, La Garde de Fer et le Terrorisme, Madrid, Carpatii, 1979, p. 97.

 

(46) Born in a Jewish family from Jassy, Helen Wolf (1895-1977) became the king’s mistress in 1925 ; she later married Carol II (the marriage took place in 1947 in Rio de Janeiro) and from then onwards she was called Helen of Hohenzollern…

 

(47) C. Z. Codreanu, Journal de Prison (Prison Diary), Puiseaux, Pardès, 1986, p. 18-19.

 

(48) On December 6, 1940, they were transfered to the Green House in the presence of 120.000 legionaries.

 

(49) Unanimously decided by the Legionary High Command in Berlin, the operation was carried out by a group of nine volunteers led by young attorney Miti Dumitrescu.

 

(50) C. Z. Codreanu, Le Livret du Chef de Nid, p. 7 (Basic rule N° 6 of the « nest »).

 

(51) In a circular-letter (N° 145) dated February 11, 1928, C. Z. Codreanu had explicitly asked his friends to avenge him in case of a murder – See F. Bradesco, La Garde de Fer et le Terrorisme, p. 190.

 

(52) The sinister balance of these reprisals is far from acurate : according to V. Gheorghiu, 242 legionaries were killed whereas Father Boldeanu speaks of 1300 victims. Be it as it may, in absence of legal proceedings this massacre was mere state-terrorism.

 

(53) In a letter dated April 5, 1936, C. Z. Codreanu gave his legionaries the following advice : « Don’t confuse justice and Christian forgiveness with the right and the duty of a people to punish those who betrayed and those who dared opposing the Nation’s destiny. Don’t forget that you have girded on the sword of the Nation. You carry it in the name of the Nation. And in the name of the Nation you shall punish, mercilessly and without any pardon » – La Garde de Fer, p. 443.

 

(54) The authors of this merciless retribution were executed in their turn on December 4, 1940 and July 28, 1941.

 

(55) Once more the balance is uncertain : regarding the events of January 1941, F. Bertin speaks of 400 victims, F. Duprat of 680 and Father Boldeanu goes up to 1352 (122 Jews, 430 legionaries and 800 undetermined). For their part, some representatives of the Jewish community (different from M. Carp and Rabbi Safran) put forward a total of 5.000 to 6.000.

 

(56) Treated as Ehrenhäftlinge or honorary prisoners, many legionaries were apparently not interned with the other inmates but granted better conditions. At Buchenwald for instance several of them stayed in Fichtenheim barracks which housed the camp garrison.

 

(57) W. Hagen, op. cit. , p. 244.

 

(58) Interview by G. Gondinet in Totalité N° 18-19 (summer 1984), p. 20.

 

(59) See Reuben H. Markham, La Roumanie sous le joug soviétique (Rumania under the Soviet yoke), Paris, Calmann-Lévy, 1949.

 

(60) However a few parachute landings were organized by political emigrants and foreign secret services : for instance 13 young paratroopers of the Resistance (Ion Buda, Aurel Corlan, Ion Cosma, Gheorghe Dincă, Ion Golea, Ion Iuhasz, Gavrilă Pop, Mircea Popovici, Ion Samoilă, Alexandru Tănase, Erich Tartler, Ion Tolan and Mihai Vasile Vlad) were sentenced to death and executed in October 1953. All former legionaries did not choose to resist and a minority prefered to adapt and collaborate : such was the case of Father Constantin Burducea who became minister of religious affairs (from March 6, 1945 to April 1946) and Nicolae Petrescu (the last general-secretary of the Iron Guard) who reappeared on the political scene between 1945 and 1948.

 

(61) See D. Bacu, The Anti-Humans, Englewood, Soldiers of the Cross, 1971 and G. Dumitresco, L’Holocauste des Âmes, Paris, Librairie Roumaine Antitotalitaire, 1998.

 

(62) In 1947, the Instructing Commission of the International Tribunal of Nuremberg exculpated the Legion, the Romanian National Government and the Romanian National Army ; yet the Iron Guard decided to dissolve in 1948.

 

(63) Sometimes more spectacular actions were organized as in Bern where, between February 14 and February 16, 1955, the Romanian embassy was raided by political emigrants Stan Codrescu, Dumitru Ochiu, Ion Chirilă and Puiu Beldeanu who killed colonel Aurel Setu, head of the Romanian secret service in Switzlerland.

 

(64) La Garde de Fer, p. 4.

 

(65) See for instance the scholar magazine Hérodote, N° 58-59, p. 300.

 

(66) Today Romania belongs to the EEC, it is a much secular country where communism is only a bad memory and where the Jewish community is reduced to barely 20.000 persons (for a global population of 21,5 million).

 

(67) In 1996 a small group of neo-legionaries from Timisoara began to publish a magazine called Gazeta de Vest. On January 15, 2000 the French daily Le Monde reported that on November 8, 1999 a religious service had been celebrated in Jassy, in memory of the Moldavian dead legionaries ; according to the Paris newspaper this service marked the official rebirth of the Legion. In 2014, the Noua Dreaptă (New Right) claims that it carries on the legacy of the Legion ; it is not a political party but a philosophical movement which does not stand for elections (see http://nouadreapta.org).

 

Bibliography

 

        BACU D., The Anti-Humans, Englewood, Soldiers of the Cross, 1971.

 

        BANEA I., Lines for our Generation, Madrid, Libertatea, 1987.

 

        BERTIN F., L’Europe de Hitler, volume 3, Paris, Librairie Française, 1977.

 

        BRADESCO F., Antimachiavélisme Légionnaire, Rio de Janeiro, Dacia, 1963 ; Le Nid, unité de base du Mouvement Légionnaire, Madrid, Carpatii, 1973 ; Les Trois Épreuves Légionnaires, Paris, Prométhée, 1973 ; La Garde de Fer et le Terrorisme, Madrid, Carpatii, 1979.

 

        CABALLERO C. and LANDWEHR R., El Ejército Nacional Rumano. Romanian Volunteers of the Waffen SS 1944-45, Granada, García Hispán, 1997.

 

        CODREANU C. Z., Le Livret du Chef de Nid, Pamântul Stramosesc, 1978, s. l. ; La Garde de Fer, Grenoble, Omul Nou, 1972 ; Journal de Prison, Puiseaux, Pardès, 1986.

 

        DE MESA J. L., Los otros internacionales, Madrid, Barbarroja, 1998.

 

        DESJARDINS E., Les Juifs de Moldavie, Paris, Dentu, 1867.

 

        DUMITRESCO G., L’Holocauste des Âmes, Paris, Librairie Roumaine Antitotalitaire, 1998.

 

        GARCINEANU V. P., From the Legionary World, Madrid, Libertatea, 1987.

 

        GOLEA T., Romania beyond the limits of endurance, Miami Beach, Romanian Historical Studies, 1988.

 

        GUERIN A., Les Commandos de la Guerre Froide, Paris, Julliard, 1969.

 

        HAGEN W., Le Front Secret, Paris, Les Iles d’Or, 1952.

 

        MARCKHAM R. H., La Roumanie sous le joug soviétique, Paris, Calmann-Lévy, 1949.

 

        MILOE J., La Riposte, Paris, Compagnie Française d’Impression, 1976.

 

        NOLTE E., Les Mouvements Fascistes, Paris, Calmann-Lévy, 1991.

 

        PACEPA I., Horizons Rouges, Paris, Presses de la Cité, 1988.

 

        SBURLATI C., Codreanu e la Guardia di Ferro, Roma, Volpe, 1977.

 

        SIMA H., Destinées du Nationalisme, Paris, Prométhée, 1951 ; Dos Movimientos Nacionales, José Antonio Primo de Rivera y Corneliu Codreanu, Madrid, Ediciones Europa, 1960 ; Histoire du Mouvement Légionnaire, Rio de Janeiro, Dacia, 1972.

 

        SIMA H. (D. CRETU and F. BRADESCO), Le Semi-Centenaire du Mouvement Légionnaire, Madrid, 1977.

 

        STURDZA M., The Suicide of Europe, Boston-Los Angeles, Western Islands Publishers, 1968.

 

        THARAUD J. and J., L’Envoyé de l’Archange, Paris, Plon, 1939.

 

        XXX, Los legionarios rumanos Motza y Marin caídos por Dios y por España, Barcelona, Bausp, 1978.

 

 

        La Revue Hebdomadaire, March 2, 1935 and December 17, 1938.

 

        Nuova Antologia, February 1, 1938 (« Codreanu e il Legionarismo Romeno »)

 

        Défense de l’Occident, N° 81 (April-May 1969)

 

        Revue d’Histoire du Fascisme, N° 2 (September-October 1972).

 

        Totalité, N° 18-19 (Summer 1984).

 

        Le Choc du Mois, N° 28 (March 1990).

 

        Hérodote, N° 58-59 (1990).

 

        Quaderni di Testi Evoliani, N° 29.

 

French speaking readers will find a very complete set of texts about the ideology of the Iron Guard at http://vouloir.hautetfort.com/archive/2010/05/19/codreanu.html

                               

 

samedi, 04 octobre 2014

The CIA & the Construction of the Sixties Counter-Culture

Allen Dulles’ Lonely Hearts Club Band:
The CIA & the Construction of the Sixties Counter-Culture

By James J. O'Meara

Weird_Scenes1Ex: http://www.counter-currents.com

Dave McGowan
Weird Scenes Inside the Canyon: Laurel Canyon, Covert Ops & the Dark Heart of the Hippie Dream [2]
London: Headpress, 2014

“Oh the snot is caked against my pants,
it has turned into crystal.
There’s a bluebird sitting on a branch,
I guess I’ll take my pistol . . .”
— Arthur Lee and Love, “Live and Let Live” 

Everyone knows that today’s “pop” music is just manufactured crap — manufactured to make money for huge corporations, or perhaps for some more sinister purpose.[1] And the stories of ’50s teen idols and “rock and roll” songs written by Judaic hacks in sweatshops like the Brill Building of New York (Neil Sedaka, Neil Diamond, Carol King, Lieber and Stoller) — even, at the very tail end, the teenage Lou Reed, for at least a few weeks) are legendary.[2]

But there’s still an idea abroad, mostly among Boomers, that during their adolescence it was different, man — kids wrote their own music, and the words meant something, and it stopped the War, and changed the world, man!

Like most every Boomer notion, it’s a crock, and this book explains why. As the author says elsewhere:

To the extent that it has a central thesis, I would say that it is that the music and counterculture scene that sprung to life in the 1960s was not the organic, grassroots resistance movement that it is generally perceived to be, but rather a movement that was essentially manufactured and steered. And a corollary to that would be that for a scene that was supposed to be all about peace, love and understanding, there was a very dark, violent underbelly that this book attempts to expose.[3]

And why?

Hippie culture is now viewed as synonymous with the anti-war movement, but as the book points out, that wasn’t always the case. A thriving anti-war movement existed before the first hippie emerged on the scene, along with a women’s rights movement, a black empowerment/Black Panther movement, and various other movements aimed at bringing about major changes in society. All of that was eclipsed by and subsumed by the hippies and flower children, who put a face on those movements that was offensive to mainstream America and easy to demonize. And as you mentioned, a second purpose was served as well — indoctrinating the young and impressionable into a belief system that serves the agenda of the powers that be.

Needless to say, I found this all fascinating and was with the author all the way; or, as we shall see, most of the way. As I’ve mentioned before, I grew up in Detroit at a very salient point in time: the Boomer kids of the ’60s lived in a wealthy, highly developed Whitopia.[4] With union jobs that not only paid well, but were so plentiful you could quit and get re-hired at will (ensuring maximum leisure time),[5] our kids made their own damn culture, with no help needed form such “world capitols”[6] as New York, the home of the aforementioned Brill Building.[7]

McGowan’s book covers, he says, the time period when the music scene moved from New York to LA, and principally, as he’ll show, to Lauren Canyon, but this meant nothing to us in Detroit, where we had our own music scene (the MC5, the Stooges, who in turn took their inspiration from Sun Ra and John Coltrane). We found the more proletarian British bands of some interest, such as the Stones or Cream, and Detroit was, along with Cleveland, the only place in America that The Who were known — in fact, were almost local heroes. The saintly Beatles, however, were unknown — I first encountered the iconic Sgt. Pepper when George Burns sang “With a Little Help from My Friends” on my parent’s TV,[8] while it’s no surprise that the “Paul is Dead” rumor originated with a Detroit DJ.[9]

However, one thing that had mildly interested me over years was exactly McGowan’s subject: how did this group of dopey California losers form a “music scene” that came to dominate American popular culture in the ’60s-’70s and, to an extent even now.

As far as counter-culture conspiracy theories go, the usual story is:

What began as a legitimate movement was, at some point, co-opted and undermined by intelligence operations such a CoIntelPro . . . subjected to FBI harassment and/or whacked by the CIA.

McGowan has a decidedly different slant, asking:

What if the musicians themselves (and various other leaders and founders of the ‘movement’) were every bit as much a part of the intelligence community as the people who were supposedly harassing them?

What if, in other words, the entire youth culture of the 1960s was created not as a grass-roots challenge to the status quo, but as a cynical exercise in discrediting and marginalizing the budding anti-war movement and creating a fake opposition that could be easily controlled and led astray?[10]

Once look beyond the myth and you start asking questions, the whole period looks decidedly odd. Why, during the hottest days of anti-war protest, were none, absolutely none, of these musicians drafted? (Although, as we’ll see, Dave Crosby was in Viet Nam before anyone knew where it was.) Why was none of the Canadian and British musicians on expired, or no visas, deported? Why no major, and hardly any minor, drug busts? Why the remarkable aversion to political advocacy? And above all, did any of these people really have any musical talent?

This passage on “Papa” John Phillips, though a bit long, is worth quoting in full as it nicely displays McGowan’s case against every resident of Laurel Canyon in a nutshell; I’ll add some notes to make the insinuated memes[11] clear:

One of his first paying jobs was working on a fishing charter boat. As John later recalled it, the crew consisted of him, a retired Navy officer, and four retired Army generals. Sounds like a perfect fit for the future guiding light of the hippie movement.

[Military connections! A surprising number of the leading hippies came from military families, some tied up with Intelligence or Chemical Warfare (Zappa’s dad). And not low-level grunts, etiher; Jim Morrison’s dad, for example, was the captain of the boat involved in the Tonkin Bay “incident,”[12] though Jim never saw fit to mention it. Laurel Canyon itself was a hotbed of military skullduggery.]

John’s first wife was the aristocratic Susie Adams, a direct descendent of President John Adams

[Old WASP aristocracy is always good for a sinister touch]

and occasional practitioner of voodoo.

[See! The occult cryptocracy exposed!]

The couple’s first son, Jeffrey, was born on Friday the 13th

[More occult numerological symbolism, with, for those in “the know,” a Templar connection.]

Shortly after that, John found himself in, of all places, Havana, Cuba, just as the Batista regime was about to fall to the revolutionary forces of Fidel Castro.

[In addition to, or as part of, the military connection, the families of these musicians spend an awful lot of time in the oddest areas, usually right around a CIA-sponsored coup. In some cases, like Papa John here in Cuba or Dave Crosby in, believe it or not, Viet Nam -- before US troops arrived -- the kids are there themselves. As an added note, borders seem to mean nothing; Papa John travels to Havana with ease, while Neil Young and other from Canada live and work in the US illegally for years, at the height of the ’60s convulsions. John Kay of Steppenwolf -- son of a German officer, ’natch -- travelled with ease not only in post-War West Germany but even back and forth between East and West, finally settling in Toronto before joining the illegal immigrants in Laurel Canyon.]

According to Phillips, he and his travelling companions “were once whisked off the street . . .

[To jail? Deportation? Nope.]

. . . straight into a TV studio to appear in a live Havana variety show.” Many of you, I’m sure, have had a similar experience.

Indeed, McGowan notes a remarkable series of “coincidences” in the creation of many famous bands — Neil Young leaves Toronto for Los Angeles, because he thinks Dave Crosby is there, and on arrival, stuck in a traffic jam, sees Crosby in a car in the opposite lane; thus is born Buffalo Springfield), suggesting it wasn’t just The Monkees that were a carefully selected group of photogenic, non-musicians promoted as The Latest Thing. Even bands with one or two genuine musicians (Buffalo Springfield, The Byrds) tend to be topped off with handsome drones to please the female fans and receive mysterious gifts of brand new instruments, free studios, and friends who just happen to have the latest multi-track equipment in their basement.

Which leads to another point; unlike the myth of garage bands struggling on small, independent labels, every one of these bands was either signed by, or quickly signed away to, major-major labels, such as Atlantic, Columbia, and Elektra.

Puyting all this together, take . . . The Doors . . . for example:

Jim Morrison was indeed a unique individual, and quite possibly the unlikeliest rock star ever to stumble across a stage.

Before his sudden incarnation as a singer/songwriter, James Douglas Morrison had never shown the slightest interest in music. None whatsoever.

Why did Morrison, with no previous interest in music, suddenly and inexplicably become a prolific songwriter, only just as suddenly lose interest after mentally penning an impressive catalog of what would be regarded as rock staples?

How exactly did Jim “The Lizard King” Morrison write that impressive bunch of songs?

As for the band itself, there was no one with any band experience whatsoever; nor did the lineup ever change:

The Doors . . . arrive on the scene as a fully formed entity, with a name (taken from Aldous Huxley’s The Doors of Perception), a stable lineup, a backlog of soon-to-be hit songs . . . and no previous experience writing, arranging, playing of performing music.

Really more like a lab experiment than a rock band; perhaps a CIA sleeper cell, or an alien simulacrum? The Byrds, too, were “by any reasonable assessment, an entirely manufactured phenomenon”:

The first album in particular was an entirely engineered affair created by taking a collection of songs by outside songwriters and having them performed by a group of nameless studio musicians . . . after which the band’s trademark vocal harmonies, entirely a studio creation, were added to the mix.

The band got a lot of assistance from the media, with Time being among the first to champion the new band.[13]

With Laurel Canyon’s other bands as well, it was the major record labels, not upstart independents, that signed the new artists.

“Folk-rock was recorded and issued by huge corporations, and broadcast over radio and television stations owned for the most part by the same or similar pillars of the establishment” (quoting Untermeyer)

And who was behind the labels? McGowan says (without reference, a point to which we will return) that of the 1000 or so label started from 1950-’55, by the ’60s only 2 remained: Elektra and Atlantic. Along with Columbia, these labels would dominate the folk and psychedelic rock era.[14] (This also solves a puzzle that mildly interested me years ago: how did Elektra, which I associated with hippies, folk, folk-rock, and psychedelic rock, emerge, with Atlantic, as the surviving label conglomerate of Warner-Elektra-Atlantic?)

If the hippies and their “rock” was created by the government/military, using the news media and major record labels to create a false, controlled “opposition,” we can test McGowan’s thesis by looking at the contrary experience of Detroit’s true White youth bands. Both the MC5 and the Stooges were signed to major labels — and guess which ones? Surprise: Elektra, then Atlantic and Columbia. Elektra censored the Five’s “Kick Out the Jams” anthem, then dumped them when they dared to protest in the public prints. The Stooges were assigned to New York Velvet Undergrounder John Cale to try to smooth out and commercialize their sound; the Five moved to Atlantic where Jon Landau was assigned the same task. Iggy eventually would up on Columbia, where his Raw Power album would also be castrated, by Velvets emulator and supposed fan David Bowie. Then fade out.

Quite a reversal of the “the kids know what they’re doing” approach of the major labels when dealing with the Laurel Canyon future superstars.

To be fair to the era (which McGowan admits to being a fan of well into the ’90s) there are two chapters devoted to the two unquestionable White musical geniuses of the age: Brian Wilson and, I’m glad to see, Arthur Lee. The Beach Boys material seemed like nothing new — I vaguely recall most of it, such as father Murry’s use of the Bing Crosby Golf Club school of discipline, years ago, in Rolling Stone, no less. Lee and his band, the era-epitomizing Love,[15] were stable mates of, and as it turns out, musical icons to, Jim Morrison at Elektra. Although officially “black” or “African-American” as the era would have it, he was actually sort of a quadroon, and that soupçon of White blood no doubt explains his talent and imperious ways.[16]

The indescribable one-off Forever Changes — musically sounding like the Tijuana Brass stumbled into a Moody Blues recording session under Bert Bacharach’s baton,[17] with lyrics and song titles (“The Good Humor Man, He Sees Everything Like This,” “Andmoreagain,” “Maybe the People Would Be the Times, or Between Clark and Hilldale”) suggest not so much the cheap surrealism of post-Dylan rock as the genuine, Old Weird America of Harry Partch[18] — proved to be the one surviving relic of the Summer of Love that fails to evoke douche chills and may perhaps justify the whole era; [19] perhaps due to Lee’s undeviating sincerity; like a hippie Ayn Rand, he could only add “And I mean it.”[20]

 

histoire,cia,états-unis,ontre-culture,mouvement hippy,services secrets,services secrets américains

 

All this is presented in the usual portentous “conspiracy” style; in fact, the whole book is an exercise in what’s been called the Jim Garrison Guilt by Location method (Oswald had an office in the same building as Guy Bannister. Having established their connection . . . ).[21]

A typical day then in the late 1960s would find Watson crafting hairpieces for an upscale Hollywood clientele near Benedict Canyon, and the returning home to Laurel Canyon, while Sebring crafted hairpieces for an upscale Hollywood clientele near Laurel Canyon, and then returned home to Benedict Canyon. And then one crazy day, one of them became a killer and the other his victim. But there’s nothing odd about that, I suppose, so let’s move on.

Well, actually, there is nothing odd about that, really. That the victims and killers in the Sharon Tate murders were neighbors is hardly surprising — most killers know their victims, just as most Negro crime targets other Negroes, who live in the same ghettos.[22]

McGowan seems to be constantly amazed, and expects his reader to be as well, at how many Laurel Canyon musicians come from military families. But this, like the gun ownership, is simply an artefact of the times; their fathers served in WWII, like millions of others; duh![23]

But, it gets worse; dishing the dirt on overblown rock legends is not McGowan’s primary aim. Remember that that “corollary” he mentioned? Occult war and serial killer angles start intruding; already at the start of the “Papa” John Phillips chapter, the reader senses he’s being taken on a ride:

Thus far on this journey, we have seen how what are arguably the two most bloody and notorious mass murders in the history of the City of Angels [Manson of course, and the “Wonderland” or “Four on the Floor” drug dealer/porn star killings] were directly connected to the Laurel Canyon music scene. . . . Unlike the Manson and Wonderland murders, the mutilation of the Black Dahlia occurred some twenty years before Laurel Canyon’s glory days. There is, nevertheless, a possible connection.

About 2/3s of the way through — the 68% mark on my kindle — things spin off course entirely. There’s a chapter on Punk and New Wave (which the author calls a friendlier version of punk, much to my surprise), where basically everyone and everything finds itself connected to Stewart Copeland and, through his dad, US military intelligence. And then another chapter is devoted to untangling — or re-tangling — about 50 years’ worth of serial killers who may all be the same or related, none of whom I had ever heard of or cared about. It feels like one of those free kindle books that have about 50 pages of text and then 200 pages of excerpts from and ads for the author or publisher’s other books which you’re sure to love.[24]

Despite these drawbacks, I can still recommend this book to anyone who wants to learn more about the cultural manipulations of this decisive period in American “culture.”

Am I being inconsistent? Not at all. One must, as Aristotle pointed out, only expect the level of certainty appropriate to an area of inquiry. The idea of a centuries-old, world-wide Psy-Op War conducted by an Occult Cryptocracy is interesting but so outlandish as to require all but impossible levels of proof. To tie together various mass murders and serial killings might require the same level of “moral certainty” required by a criminal trial. McGowan doesn’t even come close to either.

But if all you want to do is smash a myth, break the hold it has on the popular imagination, then a relentless piling up of “evidence” of this that or the other level of certainty is enough. Our real Enemies — leaving aside McGowan’s putative occultists — do it all the time;[25] it’s the favorite technique of the trail lawyer who doesn’t have the law, or most of the facts, on his side.[26] The aim of propaganda is not logical proof but the stirring up of emotions; the reader will come away from this book with the feeling that these peace and love types were actually pretty creepy, and that’s a good thing.

To make matters worse, like too many “conspiracy theorists” McGowan seems to think, paradoxically, that he has so much information to impart that he needs to dispense with references, other than a bibliography. He does quote passages from published books and articles from time to time, but you’re on your own as far as verifying a quote, to say nothing of any of his more general claims. Of course, that renders my usual complaint about kindles not linking footnotes to text moot; ironically, his publisher does provide the luxury of an index with linked entries.

Speaking of publishers: Headpress may be unfamiliar to you; let’s say it’s a kind of British version of Adam Parfrey’s Feral House. McGowan’s acknowledgments give fulsome praise to his editor at Headpress, as well as the head honcho, David Kerkes, for conceiving of the project, suggesting material, etc.

I might suggest, however, that these folks may have done a disservice to the author, to say nothing of the reader, in encouraging the inflation of some blog posts into a “finished work.” It’s almost as if Kerkes and Co. wanted another occult war/serial killer tome, and bullied McGowan into converting his Laurel Canyon material into a General Conspiracy Theory centered around the Canyon — after all, with leads everywhere, the choice of a focus is rather arbitrary; like God, a vast enough conspiracy has its center everywhere and its circumference nowhere. Rather than encouraging the excessive padding I’ve noted, they might have leaned a little harder on the matter of documentation; more of the latter and less of the former would have been a distinct improvement.

What’s in it for CC readers? Well, it’s good to see the idols smashed and the machinations exposed. But it’s also a cautionary tale. McGowan is right to insist that an authentic protest movement, to say nothing of a revolution, would not be signed to major labels and promoted by the mass media. Don’t wait for the real alt-Right to appear on a newsstand or “reality” TV show. As the old Camel slogan put it, “Don’t look for coupons or special offers, as the quality of the tobaccos used in Camels precludes their use.”

Stop complaining, turn off the MSM, and make your own damn culture!

Notes 

1. See the periodic material published at Vigilant Citizen [3]: “The analyses of videos and movies on The Vigilant Citizen place a great importance on the “who is behind” the messages communicated to the public. The term “Illuminati” is often used to describe this small elite group covertly ruling the masses. Although the term sounds quite caricatured and conspiratorial, it aptly describes the elite’s affinities with secret societies and occult knowledge. However, I personally detest using the term “conspiracy theory” to describe what is happening in the mass media. If all the facts concerning the elitist nature of the industry are readily available to the public, can it still be considered a “conspiracy theory”? There used to be a variety of viewpoints, ideas and opinions in popular culture. The consolidation of media corporations has, however, produced a standardization of the cultural industry. Ever wondered why all recent music sounds the same and all recent movies look the same?”– Mind Control Theories and Techniques used by Mass Media [4], Apr 28th, 2010.

2. Take The Beatniks, a painfully unhip movie that tries to cash in on the tail end of the Beatnik craze by mashing together recycled juvenile delinquent and teen idol plot elements, but no actual beatniks (“If these are beatniks, my mom is a beatnik, and she’s not”). More amusing is the surrealistically hyperbolic Wild Guitar, which is itself teen exploitation, since it stars Arch Hall, Jr. in a story written and directed by Arch Hall, Sr. — also featuring the immortal Ray Dennis Steckler as the least menacing “enforcer” ever.

3. “Classic Rock Conspiracy Theory” at Dangerous Minds, here [5].

4. The Negro presence was there but still kept to heel; after the ’67 riots, Whites left for the suburbs, where their dispersion prevented any similar center of cultural power from coalescing. Another example of the Black Undertow, as Paul Kersey calls it.

5. The by now well documented steady decline of working class wages began in 1972, the peak of the Detroit Whitopia.

6. The Wall St. Journal at this period dubbed Detroit “The Paris of the Midwest.”

7. The recent season of Mad Men offered a story arc, from the said time period, in which the New York ad men grovel for GM’s business, flying in and out of Detroit, desperately currying favor, which the GM execs repay by shooting one of them in the face.

8. George Burns Sings. Buddah Records; Stereo 12″ 33 1/3 RPM LP; # BDS-5025; released 1969. Don’t believe me? Take a look here [6].

9. Wikipedia [7]: “On 12 October 1969, a caller to Detroit radio station WKNR-FM told disc jockey Russ Gibb [8] about the rumour and its clues. Gibb and other callers then discussed the rumour on the air for the next hour.” Gibb was also the promoter for The Grande Ballroom where the Five, Who, Cream, etc. made their home.

10. McGowan notes that the hippies had nothing to do with creating the anti-war movement, pointing out that the first “teach-in” occurred in March of 1968 at . . . the University of Michigan. And was not the SDS born there as well? Michigan, not New York or California, was the true center of Youth Rebellion.

11. Missing: the surprising interest in, and expertise in use of, guns by these peace and love types.

12. “About how America became involved in certain wars, many conspiracy theories have been advanced – and some have been proved correct. “ “Behind the Sinking of the Lusitania” by Patrick J. Buchanan, September 02, 2014, citing in general Eugene Windchy’s Twelve American Wars: Nine of Them Avoidable (Universe, 2014).

13. McGowan notes that the kids soon had their “own” media, in the form of Rolling Stone, a corporate mouthpiece originally presented, today’s readers may be interested to discover, in format which was a simulacrum of an “underground” newspaper.

14. Oddly enough, both Atlantic and Columbia were founded in that well known artistic hub, Washington DC (“Columbia,” get it?), the former by the music industry legend Ahmet Ertegun, son of the Turkish Ambassador. Unknown to McGowan is another interesting connection: “The Atlantic Recording Company’s history strangely parallels the Jewish-American elite’s cultural revolution after World War II. This elite promoted Frankfurt School teaching in an effort to weaken the middle classes — their political nemesis. Atlantic Records prides itself on plugging the same socially destructive behavior. This article explores a possible connection between Theodor Adorno and Atlantic Records. The connection: An unnamed German professor helped Atlantic Records devise its signature sound in 1947. When this professor could no longer work with Atlantic, he was replaced by a research assistant from the Manhattan Project. I argue that this professor was Theodor Adorno. The significance of this connection is that Atlantic Records was one of the most influential recording companies during the sexual revolution, the Civil Rights movement, and era of immigration reform. A connection with Adorno would suggest that the company at its origins was intent on tapping the expertise of one of the greatest propagandists of the 20th century.” Elizabeth Whitcombe: “The Mysterious German Professor,” Occidental Observer, September 3, 2009; here [9].

15. Though Lee, with typical perversity, refused to play at either Monterey or Woodstock.

16. Despite their legendary “rhythmic” abilities, black artists, at least in the rock era, require more than a little White or Native American blood to make any lasting impression, such as Lee’s sometime collaborator, Jimi Hendrix, or later artists like Prince or Michael Jackson; otherwise the easily bamboozled musician soon loses control of his work and fades away.

17. “You hear Dylan, Neil Young, Brian Wilson, The Byrds, mariachi and flamenco music, Memphis Blues, folk, and acid rock peek up here and there, but the overall sound and texture is pure Love.” — Amazon reviewer. “Musically, the album almost defies categorization. It’s part Mexican Mariachi band/Tijuana Brass, part baroque, part Spanish classical, part epic soundtrack and only a very small part “rock” — “Love’s “Forever Changes” Finally Gets Long Deserved First Class Vinyl Reissue” by Michael Fremer; December 2, 2012, analogplanet.com, here [10].

18. The quote at the top of this review could easily have come from Harry Smith’s Anthology of American Folk Music [11], perhaps wheezed out by Dock Boggs [12]. See my “Our Wagner, only Better Harry Partch, Wild Boy of American Music, Part 3,” here [13] and reprinted in The Eldritch Evola … & Others (San Francisco: Counter Currents, 2014), where I cite such representative titles as: “Visions Fill the Eyes of a Defeated Basketball Team in the Shower Room” and “The Cognoscenti Are Plunged into a Deep Descent While at Cocktails.”

19. “Lyrically Lee was singing to a great degree about his coming apart personally, but through that he predicts the disintegration of the hippie fantasy then in full flower during the “Summer of Love.” That’s why the somewhat dark, foreboding album could not possibly succeed when originally issued.” — Fremer, op. cit. In the 90s it seemed to compete with, or replace, “The Four Seasons” as the go-to soundtrack for brunch in Manhattan restaurants, but since I can no longer afford to eat out I can’t confirm its current status.

20. “Unlike any other album released in 1967, this one shows both sides of the coin that was the Summer Of Love: Hippie pride paired with nihilism, romance with despair, mind-expansion with paranoia.” — Amazon reviewer. “The album ends with a six minute epic that seamlessly links three songs (two years before Abbey Road) beginning with a section that simmers until the chilling, dramatic, urgently stated, idealistic anthem delivered with unabashed sincerity, wherein Lee declares “This is the time in life I’m living and I’ll face each day with a smile” and “everything I’ve seen needs rearranging.” Clearly a guy coming apart at the seams. The anthemic musical bravado filled with trumpet flourishes and strings waves Lee’s freak flag declaration high as the album fades out. It produces chills and watery eyes every play.” — Fremer, op. cit.

21. See False Witness: The Real Story of Jim Garrison’s Investigation and Oliver Stone’s Film “JFK” by Patricia Lambert (M. Evans and Company, 1999). Just as Garrison was overly impressed by the proximity of his suspects in what is, after all, a small town — where should their offices be, all over the bayou? — so McGowan seems overly impressed, as we’ve seen, by the military connections among men living during WWII, and his thesis that the musicians are “connected” to the military intelligence community is mostly just that they have parents in the military.

22. Ask a real (fictional) serial killer: “And how do we begin to covet, Clarice? Do we seek out things to covet? . . . No. We begin by coveting what we see every day.”

23. McGowan ominously notes the predilection of these hippie celebrities, such as Dave Crosby, for guns, but I suspect that, like their military backgrounds, it’s more an artefact of the times. Hippies, like the hillbillies who inspired folk-or-country-rock, were not shy about resorting to firearms to protect their stashes; one of many characteristics, such as clothing, facial hair, etc., that makes it hard to distinguish hippies from dirt farmers in Depression-era photos. Even today, Hollywood has astronomical levels of gun ownership, due partly to paranoid celebs but also due to the large population of ex-military special effects and stunt people.

24. Unlike The Who’s hip boutique label Track, their American distributor, a relic of the Shel Talmy days, was (American) Decca, an old-tyme outfit that was so clueless they included lp liners suggesting that “If you like The Who, you’re sure to enjoy The Irish Rovers.”

25. “With this and the rise of the National Socialists in Germany, it became clear that White ethnocentrism and group cohesion was bolstered by hierarchic social-Darwinian race theory, and that this was antithetic to Jewish ethnic interests. The overthrow of this theory (and the resultant diminution of white ethnocentrism and group cohesion) was, as Kevin MacDonald points out, an ethno-political campaign that had nothing to do with real science. The “shift away from Darwinism as the fundamental paradigm of the social sciences” resulted from “an ideological shift rather than the emergence of any new empirical data” (CofC, p. 21 [14]).” — “Jews and Race: A Pre-Boasian Perspective, Part 1” by Brenton Sanderson, The Occidental Observer, February 1, 2012, here [15].

26. For example, “Atticus Finch emerges as one very sleazy lawyer. He does not merely provide competent defense for Tom Robinson, he gratuitously defames the poor girl Mayella Ewell. With no real evidence at hand, he weaves a tale in which she lusted after a crippled black man, and seduced him into fornication. It’s a hair-raising, lurid tale, but it is completely unnecessary. As a fictional device it symbolically shifts the guilt from Tom Robinson to Mayella, but it adds nothing to Tom’s defense case.” Margot Metroland, “Y’all Can Kill That Mockingbird Now,” here [16].

 


Article printed from Counter-Currents Publishing: http://www.counter-currents.com

URL to article: http://www.counter-currents.com/2014/09/allen-dulles-lonely-hearts-club-band/

URLs in this post:

[1] Image: http://www.counter-currents.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/Weird_Scenes1.jpg

[2] Weird Scenes Inside the Canyon: Laurel Canyon, Covert Ops & the Dark Heart of the Hippie Dream: http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/1909394122/ref=as_li_tl?ie=UTF8&camp=1789&creative=390957&creativeASIN=1909394122&linkCode=as2&tag=countecurrenp-20&linkId=SPZN7PPL7SMUYFNK

[3] Vigilant Citizen: http://vigilantcitizen.com/

[4] Mind Control Theories and Techniques used by Mass Media: http://vigilantcitizen.com/vigilantreport/mind-control-theories-and-techniques-used-by-mass-media/

[5] here: http://dangerousminds.net/comments/classic_rock_conspiracy_theory_weird_scenes_inside_the_canyon

[6] here: http://www.discogs.com/George-Burns-Sings/release/3104899

[7] Wikipedia: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Paul_is_dead#Growth

[8] Russ Gibb: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Russ_Gibb

[9] here: http://www.theoccidentalobserver.net/2009/09/the-mysterious-german-professor/

[10] here: http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:6sFxLAyyHJQJ:www.nickdrake.com/talk/viewtopic.php%3Ft%3D5471%26sid%3D6a4783b42624cf330547908a25fae822+&cd=3&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us&client=firefox-a

[11] Anthology of American Folk Music: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anthology_of_American_Folk_Music

[12] Dock Boggs: http://www.folkways.si.edu/dock-boggs/legendary-singer-and-banjo-player/american-folk-old-time/music/album/smithsonian

[13] here: http://www.counter-currents.com/2013/07/our-wagner-only-betterharry-partch-wild-boy-of-american-music-part-3/

[14] CofC, p. 21: http://www..kevinmacdonald.net/chap2.pdf

[15] here: http://www.theoccidentalobserver.net/2012/02/jews-and-race-a-pre-boasian-perspective/

[16] here: http://www.counter-currents.com/2014/09/yall-can-kill-that-mockingbird-now/#comments

samedi, 27 septembre 2014

Civilized Warfare

Civilized Warfare

An oxymoron?  Bear with me….

ATB-frontcover-web.jpgAdvance to Barbarism: The Development of Total Warfare from Sarajevo to Hiroshima, by FJP Veale.

Veale describes the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries as a period, mostly, of civilized warfare in Europe or regions influenced by European culture.

I will point out only once that the complete contrast to warfare as practiced today – and certainly since at least the Second World War – by the West when compared to this code; to make mention of this at each possible opportunity will only serve to double the length of this post.  I hope even the most casual observer of today’s realities can see how far those in the several militaries of various western governments have fallen.

So, what is meant by “civilized warfare”?

…this code was based on one simple principle, namely that warfare should be the concern only of the armed combatants engaged.  From this follows the corollary that non-combatants should be left entirely outside the scope of military operations.

…it necessarily followed that an enemy civilian did not forfeit his rights as a human being merely because the armed forces of his country were unable to defend him.

The sufferings of civilians must never be made a means by which the course of hostilities can be influenced – for example, when, in accordance with the common practice of barbarous warfare, a country is deliberately laid waste to induce its rulers to surrender.

…a combatant who surrenders ceases to be a combatant and reacquires the status of non-combatant….a combatant who has become incapacitated through wounds or disease ceases to be a combatant….

…a prisoner of war should be treated by his captors as a person under military discipline transferred by his capture from the command of his own countrymen to the command of his captors.

…the code was safeguarded by the knowledge that violation, even if profitable at the moment, would bring ultimate retribution and the weakening of the general security enjoyed by all.

Veale does not ignore the exceptions to this type of civilized warfare during this period; many of the violations were committed by the British – safe in the security that, due to their superiority at sea, repercussions on the homeland were unlikely.  Veale also notes that this code did not mean that towns were off-limits, only that a direct military objective was necessary for the action to be justified.

As a counter-example, Veale offers France, Austria and Russia against Prussia during the Seven Years War; they could easily have overrun Prussia if barbarous methods were employed:

All that was necessary to bring about Frederick’s speedy downfall was to pour across the open and exposed frontiers of Prussia small units of Hungarian hussars and Russian Cossacks with instructions to destroy everything which could be destroyed by means of a torch or a charge of gunpowder.  The Prussian army would have been helpless in the face of such tactics, designed to turn Prussia into a desert.

The term Veale uses to describe this aspect of the culture is chivalry:

“Chivalry had two outstanding marks,” says Professor R.B. Mowat, “two that were as its essence: it was Christian and it was military.”

I can see the steam coming out of Laurence Vance’s ears even now.  But trust me, it will all come together into something meaningful.

Chivalry, as it ultimately developed, became a collective term embracing a code of conduct, manners, and etiquette, a system of ethics and a distinctive “Weltanschauung” (philosophy of life) as the Germans call it.  For our purpose, its principal importance is that, when the code of chivalry was adopted as the code of the military caste in all the European states, it provided a common bond between them.

The soldiers fought as (relatively speaking) gentlemen, as opposed to the experience in war proceeding this chivalrous age:

Sadism could no longer masquerade as moral indignation….

I like that line….

As the subtitle of this book suggests, this was all to change in the first half of the twentieth century.  Sadism put on its mask once again.

There were many aspects of this chivalrous nature evident during the Middle Ages:

…it can be said that the general acceptance of the ideals of chivalry had considerable influence on the conduct of warfare in the Middle Ages, although this influence was generally restricted in practice to dealings of the ruling classes with each other.

…the code of chivalry had been readily accepted throughout Europe because the ruling classes in all countries accepted the teaching of the Catholic Church and acknowledged the spiritual supremacy of the Pope.

As the wars in the Middle Ages were often conducted by and between the ruling classes, this distinction is of little consequence.

Civilians had little to fear from the dangers of war which were the concern only of professional soldiers.

This period of relative chivalry came to an end during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries; Veale points to the invasion of Italy by Charles VIII of France in 1494 as marking the beginning of the end of this relatively “civilized” period.  Italy was subject to foreign invaders – French, German, Swiss and Spanish, “who recognized no rules of warfare of any kind,” waging war “with the most primitive ferocity and resulting in enormous loss of life and causing irreparable damage.”

 

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The development (or re-discovery) of chivalrous behavior and civilized warfare can be traced to another French king, Louis XIV – or, more precisely, coincident to his reign: “no traces of it can be detected at the beginning of his reign in 1643, and it appears fully established at his death in 1715.  No credit for this development, however, can be attributed to Louis personally.”

On the contrary, one of the most deliberate and least excusable barbarities in European history was perpetrated by his armies as late as 1689 when the Palatinate was systematically devastated in order to create an Odlandsgürtel(waste-land-zone) along the French frontier.

In response to the capture by French forces of several German towns in the south and west, German princes mobilized the forces of northern Germany – in an attempt to recover what had been lost.  Louis responded with his scorched-earth policy:

Realising that the war in Germany was not going to end quickly and that the Rhineland blitz would not be a brief and decisive parade of French glory, Louis XIV and Louvois resolved upon a scorched-earth policy in the Palatinate, Baden and Württemberg, intent on denying enemy troops local resources and prevent them invading French territory.  By 20 December 1688 Louvois had selected all the cities, towns, villages and châteaux intended for destruction. On 2 March 1689 Count of Tessé torched Heidelberg; on 8 March Montclar levelled Mannheim. Oppenheim and Worms were finally destroyed on 31 May, followed by Speyer on 1 June, and Bingen on 4 June. In all, French troops burnt over 20 substantial towns as well as numerous villages.

Not very civilized.

The French general ordered to destroy Heidelburg reported to Louivois, the secretary of war, “I must represent to His Majesty the bad effect which such a desolation may make upon the world in respect to his glory and reputation.”  Such a thought would not have occurred to a general during the Thirty Years War, when such devastation was considered normal.

Condemnation of the devastation of the Palatinate was, indeed, general…

So why does Veale point to Louis XIV?  During this period, the ruling classes throughout Europe all became…French!  They had “become linked by a similar outlook – by similar tastes, manners and standards – originating at the Court of Louis XIV.”

To be a European gentleman meant to be a French gentleman.  The ruling classes of France, Germany, and Russia had more in common with each other than they did with their own countrymen.

From this it naturally followed that the officers of the various European armies, when they came in contact, should treat each other with elaborate courtesies in accordance with the manners of the time.

Veale offers several examples of such courtesies being extended: after the surrender of Lille by Marshal Bouffiers, by Frederick the Great toward the French engineer Gribeauval, by Admiral Keith toward Marshal Massena after the latter’s surrender at Genoa.

Veale contrasts these with the attitudes today:

Even if acts of courtesy took place in war to-day, the report of them would be suppressed for fear of outraging public opinion.

And public opinion means much in wars conducted by democracies; the other side must remain evil, such that the masses continue to support the fight.  Who would extend courtesy to evil?

While such gentlemen-officers were duty bound to support any war policy initiated by the politicians, the manner in which the war was conducted rested solely on the shoulders of those same officers:

…the manner of conducting a war, whether just or unjust, was recognized to be the sole concern of the professional soldiers conducting it.

This code was respected in wars between European powers; it did not apply always and everywhere.  For example, a British general, lent to the Chinese government in 1863, “[t]o his horror” witnessed the beheadings of a number of rebel leaders who had surrendered.

Then there was the matter of treatment of civilians and non-combatants:

Of more practical importance than the code of good manners which it imposed on the combatants was the security given to civilian life and property by the introduction of civilized methods of warfare.

No massacre of civilians; pillage replaced by requisition with payment.  The Austrians and Germans were quite strict about ensuring this discipline, for example:

In the Prussian Army, the regulations against looting were so strict that, after the disaster at Jena in 1806, it is recorded that the retreating Prussians endured without fires the bitter cold of an October night in central Europe rather than seize civilian stores of wood which lay to hand but for which they were unable to pay.

Civilized warfare reached its peak in the last half of the eighteenth century.  Veale notes a book by Emeric de Vattel of Switzerland, The Law of Nations, or the Principals of Natural Law as Applied to the Administration of National Affairs and of Sovereigns:

Not only does Vattel point out that, if barbarous methods of warfare are adopted, the enemy will do likewise, so that the only ultimate result will be to add to the horrors of war; not only does he argue that “harsh, disgraceful and unendurable peace terms” will only be fulfilled as long as the defeated enemy lacks the means to repudiate them; Vattel actually condemns the use by rulers at war of “offensive expressions indicating sentiments of hatred, animosity, and bitterness” since such expressions must ultimately stand in the way of a settlement on reasonable terms.

droit.jpgVattel points out that war as a means to settle disputes “can only serve this purpose if, in the first place, it be conducted by methods which do not leave behind a legacy of hatred and bitterness…”

Vattel did not write something unknown to the military leaders and politicians of the time and place; this was their practice.  Instead, he merely tried to boil these behaviors down to a concise code.  He could not conceive of the possibility that Europe might once again turn to the code of slaughter that was evident during the Thirty Years War – Magdeburg of 1631 returning in the form of Dresden in 1945.

Yet, we know it did.  In the next chapter, Veale begins to trace the history of this reversion, or – as he describes it – this “Advance to Barbarism.

 

Reprinted with permission from Bionic Mosquito.

vendredi, 26 septembre 2014

Sur la sainte Russie, l'idéologie eurasiste et le Général Wrangel

Général Wrangel

par Christopher Gérard

Ex: http://archaion.hautetfort.com

 

Wrangel_Pyot.jpgSpécialiste de l’histoire russe, N. Ross a notamment publié un essai sur Nicolas II (La Mort du dernier tsar, la fin du mystère, L’Age d’Homme). Il nous livre aujourd’hui un essai d’une grande clarté, illustré de photos inédites, sur l’état russe de Crimée, dirigé par le général Piotr Nikolaievitch Wrangel (1878-1928), dernier commandant en chef des Armées blanches et chef spirituel de l’émigration russe jusqu’à sa mort à Bruxelles, sans doute à la suite de l’inoculation par un agent soviétique du bacille de Koch. Issu d’une lignée germano-balte, le baron Wrangel, glorieux officier de la Garde, lutta dès le début contre les Rouges et, à partir du moment où il remplaça, en 1920, le général Dénikine à la tête de la résistance antibolchévique, fit preuve d’un sens de l’organisation et de visions politiques d’une rare ampleur, puisqu’il comptait reconstruire la Russie par le bas. Pragmatique, Wrangel tenta de développer un projet global pour une Russie libérée, notamment par le biais de réformes agraires et institutionnelles. L’état russe de Crimée (ou gouvernement de Tauride), qui fut de facto reconnu par la France, donne une idée d’un autre destin pour l’empire : presse libre, refus de l’antisémitisme, liberté religieuse… L’essai de N. Ross retrace tous les aspects de l’action du général Wrangel : opérations militaires, affaires économiques, réflexion spirituelle et politique (à laquelle prirent part B. Souvarine, S. Boulgakov et G. Vernadsky - futur théoricien de l’eurasisme). Wrangel parvint enfin à assurer l’exode de près de 150.000 réfugiés, civils et militaires, qui échappèrent ainsi au massacre.

Christopher Gérard 

Nicolas Ross, La Crimée blanche du général Wrangel, Editions des Syrtes, 224 pages, 15€

russie,émigration,venner

 

Sainte Russie

Pour célébrer le 90ème anniversaire de la révolution russe, les éditions du Rocher proposent une réédition augmentée de Les Blancs et les Rouges. Histoire de la guerre civile russe (1917-1921), passionnant essai que Dominique Venner, directeur de la Nouvelle Revue d’Histoire, a naguère consacré à un cataclysme qui engendra le plus terrifiant régime des temps modernes. D’une précision militaire, son récit de l’atroce guerre civile, des mutineries de 1917 aux ultimes révoltes populaires au bolchevisme, permet de comprendre à quel point « un soulèvement de millions de croquants hérissés de baïonnettes, conduits par une petite meute de fanatiques binoclards » fut la matrice d’un siècle de fer. Car la terreur instaurée par Lénine et Staline frappa durablement les esprits de l’époque par sa brutalité même et fut, plus tard, l’une des causes de l’avènement des dictatures mussolinienne et hitlérienne. Outre ce regard dans une perspective large, l’originalité de l’ouvrage réside dans l’étude comparée des Rouges et des Blancs : portraits et récits de campagnes alternent, illustrés par de nombreux témoignages à chaud longtemps occultés par une historiographie marxisante. De même, les insuffisances et les points forts de chaque camp sont analysés avec finesse : les Blancs comptèrent de valeureux chefs (Dénikine, Koltchak, sans oublier Wrangel, mort en exil à Bruxelles); quant aux Rouges, ils ne furent pas partout vainqueurs (Pologne, Finlande, Etats baltes). Bien des dogmes sont ainsi pulvérisés, notamment celui de « l’humanisme » de Lénine, qui ordonne sans hésiter des massacres d’une effroyable ampleur, ou celui du sens de l’histoire : en 1919 encore, les jeux n’étaient pas faits.

Après la prise du pouvoir par les bolcheviques, deux millions de Russes fuirent une Russie martyrisée. Dix mille d'entre eux trouvèrent refuge dans notre pays. C'est leur histoire, celle de l'émigration russe en Belgique durant l'Interbellum, qu'un jeune chercheur de l’Université de Louvain et du FNRS, W. Coudenys, a étudiée avec une minutie exemplaire (Leven voor de Tsaar. Russische ballingen, samenzweerders en collaborateurs in België,Davidsfonds). Tous ces exilés n'étaient pas nobles comme le général baron Wrangel, dernier chef des Armées blanches, mort (empoisonné?) à Uccle en 1928, mais nombre d 'officiers purent survivre grâce à l'aide de la Belgique, qui participa à l'intervention alliée contre les Rouges (voir les témoignages de l’écrivain belge Marcel Thiry). Le Roi Albert n'avait-il pas caché à l'époque son hostilité aux Soviets? W. Coudenys a dépouillé une masse impressionnante d'archives inédites - journaux de l'émigration, dossiers de la Sûreté, etc. - et nous offre ainsi un tableau très vivant de cette Russie de l'exil, tiraillée entre la fidélité et l'adaptation à un monde en crise. L'aspect culturel n'est pas négligé: cercles littéraires et groupes musicaux, sans oublier ce singulier courant eurasiste qui tint son premier congrès international à Bruxelles. Le rôle de l'épiscopat belge, comme celui de l'Université de Louvain, qui forma de nombreux cadres d'origine russe, bref, toute la vie d'un milieu caractérisé par une grande dignité, est retracée avec une précision d'entomologiste. L'émigration blanche étant un rarissime exemple d'armée en exil (pendant vingt ans), le chercheur s'est également penché sur les nombreuses associations militaires, surveillées et infiltrées avec une rare maestria par les services soviétiques. Voilà donc un éclairage fort utile sur l'histoire belge de l'entre-deux-guerres et de l'occupation, car une poignée de Blancs reprit le combat sous l'uniforme feldgrau, avec les déconvenues que l'on devine. Sur l’émigration russe, il faut remarquer que le dernier film d'E. Rohmer, Triple agent  (lire aussi Eric Rohmer, Triple agent, Petite bibliothèque des cahiers du cinéma), un chef-d'œuvre d'intimisme, narre l'histoire d'une trahison dans le Paris des Russes blancs, celle du colonel Skobline. Enfin, sur les associations militaires, lire, de Paul Robinson, The White Russian Army in Exile 1920-1941(Oxford University Press).

russie,émigration,venner

 

Zinaïda Hippius

Personnage clef du monde littéraire pétersbourgeois et figure éminente avec son mari l’écrivain Dimitri Merejkovski du symbolisme russe, Zinaïda Hippius (1869-1945) assista à la chute du tsarisme et à l’avènement du bolchevisme, après l’intermède Kerenski. Son  journal des années 1914-1920 (Journal sous la Terreur, Collection Anatolia, éditions du Rocher), en grande partie occulté par le régime soviétique durant 70 ans, paraît enfin, livrant un témoignage accablant sur l’asservissement de la Russie à une clique d’idéologues barbares. Aux insuffisances des élites traditionnelles, à l’aveuglement des intellectuels répondent la brutalité sans complexe des Rouges qui, en quelques jours, s’emparent du pouvoir à la pointe des baïonnettes. Les étapes de ce processus infernal sont décrites au jour le jour avec une effrayante lucidité : qu’elle évoque le musellement de la presse, les arrestations (« Chaque jour, on fusille quelqu’un dans chaque soviet d’arrondissement ») et les viols, l’esclavage déguisé et le marché noir, les rafles de « bourgeois » et la délation généralisée, les pillages et les soûleries, les retournements de veste ou les fuites sans gloire, Hippius se hausse au niveau des grands historiens romains. Nous assistons éberlués à la fin d’un monde certes imparfait mais civilisé, et à la naissance d’une tyrannie : « tout le monde meurt (sauf les commissaires, leurs valets et les bandits). Plus ou moins vite. »

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Idéologie eurasiste & "mythe aryen"

laruellle9782.gifSpécialiste des courants nationalistes russes, Marlène Laruelle s’était fait remarquer par une brillante thèse sur l’eurasisme (L’idéologie eurasiste russe ou comment penser l’Empire, L’Harmattan, 1999). Elle s’attaque dans Mythe aryen et rêve impérial dans la Russie du XIXème siècle, (CNRS éditions), au mythe aryen dans l’aire culturelle russe. Définissant ce mythe comme « une recherche romantique des origines » ou comme « mode de lecture du monde », M. Laruelle montre que, au contraire de l’allemand, l’aryanisme russe fut toujours étranger au racialisme. Il convient donc de distinguer l’aryanisme, fils du romantisme européen, du racialisme, fruit monstrueux du scientisme. Le premier n’est nullement prédestiné à devenir ce qu’il fut de 1933 à 1945. De même, la diabolisation des courants romantiques, présentés comme menant fatalement au nazisme, devient intenable, puisque la quête identitaire russe, ignorant l’antisémitisme et en fait tout racisme, cette quête impériale plutôt que nationale, fascinée par l’Asie blanche tout en affirmant une européanité plus complète, se distingue radicalement de l’allemande. Laruelle montre avec brio que l’aryophilie russe fut pensée comme une réconciliation de l’occidentalisme et du slavophilisme. La Russie comme autre Europe. Sa thèse étudie également l’instrumentalisation du mythe aryen par la politique tsariste  en Asie centrale : à l’époque du Grand Jeu (Kipling), les Slaves considéraient leur expansion dans ces régions stratégiques comme le « juste retour » des Aryens dans leur patrie originelle. Une thèse passionnante sur un sujet sensible, traité avec autant de tact que de probité.

 

jeudi, 25 septembre 2014

The Great and Unholy War

The Great and Unholy War

Review of Philip Jenkins, The Great and Holy War: How World War I Became a Religious Crusade (HarperOne, 2014), x + 438 pgs..

One would think that if there is any group of people that would be opposed to war it would be Christians. After all, they claim to worship the Prince of Peace. But such is not the case now, and such was not the case 100 years ago during the Great War that we now call World War I.

I have often pointed out how strange it is that Christians should be so accepting of war. War is the greatest suppressor of civil liberties. War is the greatest creator of widows and orphans. War is the greatest destroyer of religion, morality, and decency. War is the greatest creator of fertile ground for genocides and atrocities. War is the greatest destroyer of families and young lives. War is the greatest creator of famine, disease, and homelessness. War is the health of the state.

Just as it was easy for the state to enlist the support of Christians for the Cold and Vietnam Wars against “godless communism,” so it is easy now for the state to garner Christian support for the War on Terror against “Islamic extremists.” But World War I was a Christian slaughterhouse. It was Christian vs. Christian, Protestant vs. Protestant, Catholic vs. Catholic. And to a lesser extent, it was also Jew vs. Jew and Muslim vs. Muslim.

Although fought by nation states and empires, World War I was in a great sense a religious war. As Baylor historian Philip Jenkins explains in the introduction to his new book The Great and Holy War: How World War I Became a Religious Crusade:

The First World War was a thoroughly religious event, in the sense that overwhelming Christian nations fought each other in what many viewed as a holy war, a spiritual conflict. Religion is essential to understanding the war, to understanding why people went to war, what they hoped to achieve through war, and why they stayed at war.

Soldiers commonly demonstrated a religious worldview and regularly referred to Christian beliefs and ideas. They resorted frequently to biblical language and to concepts of sacrifice and redemptive suffering.

The war ignited a global religious revolution. . . . The Great War drew the world’s religious map as we know it today.

Not just incidentally but repeatedly and centrally, official statements and propaganda declare that the war is being fought for god’s cause, or for his glory, and such claims pervade the media and organs of popular culture. Moreover, they identify the state and its armed forces as agents or implements of God. Advancing the nation’s cause and interests is indistinguishable from promoting and defending God’s cause or (in a Christian context) of bringing in his kingdom on earth.

We can confidently speak of a powerful and consistent strain of holy war ideology during the Great War years. All the main combatants deployed such language, particularly the monarchies with long traditions of state establishment—the Russians, Germans, British, Austro-Hungarians, and Ottoman Turks—but also those notionally secular republics: France, Italy, and the United States.

Christian leaders treated the war as a spiritual event, in which their nation was playing a messianic role in Europe and the world.

Without appreciating its religious and spiritual aspects, we cannot understand the First World War. More important, though, the world’s modern religious history makes no sense except in the context of that terrible conflict. The war created our reality.

After the introduction, The Great and Holy War contains thirteen chapters, most of which don’t necessarily have to be read in order. Each chapter is divided into short sections and ends (with the exception of chapters 3, 12, & 13) with somewhat of a one-paragraph summary/conclusion. There are a number of maps, pictures, posters, and other images that greatly enhance the book. A conclusion caps the book. There are thirty-five pages of notes and an index, but no bibliography. The widely-published Jenkins, the Distinguished Professor of History and member of the Institute for Studies of Religion at Baylor University, is the well-known author of Jesus Wars, The Lost History of Christianity, and Hidden Gospels.

Although we may disagree with Jenkins’ contention that “we can in fact make a plausible case for German responsibility in starting the war,” his first chapter provides us with a brief and sobering overview of the Great War, which he subtitles “The Age of Massacre.” And indeed it was. On a single day in August of 1914, the French lost twenty-seven thousand men in battles in the Ardennes and at Charleroi. To put this in perspective, Jenkins says that “the French suffered more fatalities on the one sultry day than U.S. forces lost in the two 1945 battles of Iwo Jima and Okinawa combined.” And this was over a four-month period. He also points out that the French lost on that one single day “half as many lives as the United States lost in the whole Vietnam War.” But that’s not all. During the first two months of the war, 400,000 French soldiers perished. Both sides lost two million lives by the year’s end. The United States lost 114,000 soldiers, almost all of them in 1918, but all of them unnecessarily. The Battles of Verdun and the Somme killed over a million soldiers. A million German horses died during the war. Ten million soldiers died during the war. And as Jenkins reminds us: “Figures for the dead take no account of the many millions more left maimed, blinded, or otherwise gravely wounded in body or mind.” Seven million civilians died as well, not counting the millions who died in the postwar influenza epidemic.

Why should we support the troops? The government’s that send them to fight senseless wars don’t support them otherwise they wouldn’t send them in the first place. Soldiers are merely expendable pawns. As Jenkins says: “Nations were planning, calmly and rationally, on sacrificing multiple millions of their own people.” Attrition was the name of the game. Jenkins’ quote of France’s Marshal Joseph Joffre sums up the battle plan of each side in the Great War: “We shall kill more of the enemy than he can kill of us.”

There are so many themes of note in The Great and Holy War that I must limit this review to just mentioning a few of them.

Each side in the Great War undertook massive propaganda campaigns to demonize the other in order to convince neutral nations of the justice of their causes. A nation’s enemies were framed as evil, satanic, ungodly, and the Antichrist, or at least anti-Christian. The concepts of martyrdom and redemptive sacrifice pervaded wartime language. Christian soldiers became “identified with Christ himself, suffering torments for the salvation of the world.”  One pastor declared that “a man may give his life for humanity in a bloody trench as truly as upon a bloody cross.” This was a precursor to the modern blasphemy heard today in some American churches that as Christ died for our sins so soldiers die for our freedoms.

Both sides tried to starve each other. Atrocities were committed by both sides, as if the war itself was not one big atrocity. The Allies were more successful—the starvation blockade against Germany was not ended until months after the 1918 Armistice.

The war turned some Christians into “vocal, even fanatical, advocates” of their nation’s war effort. American Congregationalist minister Newell Dwight Hillis advocated the extermination of the German race. The Anglican bishop of London, Arthur F. Winnington-Ingram, preached that Germans should be killed “to save the world.” American Methodist minister George W. Downs said that he would have driven his bayonet “into the throat or the eye or the stomach of the Huns without the slightest hesitation.” Enthusiasm for war “transcended denominational labels.” German Catholic bishop Michael von Faulhaber was so enthusiastic “in his support for the country’s armies that in 1916 he was awarded the Iron Cross.”

The lack of separation between church and state resulted in “churches acting as agencies of their respective states.” Arguments relating to national interest, honor, and self-defense were presented in “highly religious forms.” And, “when religious leaders had a primary identification with a state—as most did—they not only abandoned words of peace and reconciliation but advocated strident doctrines of holy war and crusade, directed against fellow Christians.” Although Christians lived in two kingdoms—earthly and heavenly—“each had its own moral codes.” It was thought that the absolute demands of New Testament ethics were impossible to apply to the state. This meant that “even a nation made up almost entirely of devout Christians could never act politically according to strict Christian moral teachings.”

Because almost the whole of Africa was controlled by Europeans in 1914, “millions of ordinary Africans were drawn into the service of one of the various colonial powers, whether British, French, German, or Belgian.” The harsh treatment accorded the natives in the Belgian-controlled Congo was known at the time. Yet, one of the reasons that Britain was supposed to have entered the war was to protect Belgium. And in the United States, Americans were told by the government to “Remember Belgium” and buy war bonds.

Many Muslims, which made up a third of Britain’s Indian army, “were nervous about the prospect of being shipped to a battlefront where they could find themselves killing fellow Muslims.” Jenkins comments that “the war created the Islamic World as we know it today.” With the Ottoman Empire gone, “the resulting postwar search for new sources of authority led to the creation or revival of virtually all the Islamic movements that we know in the modern world.” The carving up of the Middle East by the victorious Allies still has repercussions today.

Although Jews suffered immeasurably during the Holocaust of World War II, they had no problem fighting on both sides during World War I. Writes Jenkins: “In their hundreds of thousands, Jews served in the respective armed forces, chiefly because every combatant power imposed compulsory military service. Perhaps half a million Jews served in Russian uniforms, a hundred thousand in Germany, and forty thousand in Britain.” Jews “were also prominent in the war leadership of the combatant nations.” The chemist Fritz Haber in Germany “devoted himself to pioneering modern techniques of chemical warfare in the German cause.”

One of the most important questions asked in The Great and Holy War relates to something that happened in Berlin in 1921. An Armenian killed Talaat Pasha, the reputed mastermind of the Armenian genocide that took place during the war. Jenkins relates that “Polish Jewish lawyer Raphael Lemkin was fascinated by the trial” and wondered why “did courts try a man for a single murder while no institutions existed to punish the murderers of millions?” The answer was succinctly given by Voltaire many years before the question was asked: “It is forbidden to kill; therefore all murderers are punished unless they kill in large numbers and to the sound of trumpets.”

Jenkins mentions that during the Great War there was never a shortage of “young men cut off in the prime of life.” That is truly the legacy of the war.

The Great and Holy War is not just a book for Christians. It doesn’t matter what your religion is or whether you have any at all. The religious aspects of World War I are unmistakable and essential for understanding the war. Philip Jenkins has written one of the most informative and important books about the Great War. If you read nothing else about World War I in this centennial year, read The Great and Holy War. Coupled with Christopher Clark’s The Sleepwalkers on the origins of the war, and both supplemented by anything Paul Gottfried has written on World War I, you will get quite an education.

 

 

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dimanche, 21 septembre 2014

Vídeo documental: El holocausto japonés

Vídeo documental:

El holocausto japonés

 

Durante la II Guerra Mundial, los campos de concentración en los Estados Unidos alojaron a unas 120.000 personas, en su mayor parte de etnia japonesa, más de la mitad de las cuales eran ciudadanos estadounidenses, en establecimientos diseñados a ese efecto en el interior del país, desde 1942 y hasta 1948. El objetivo fue trasladarlos desde su residencia habitual, mayoritariamente en la costa oeste, a instalaciones construidas bajo medidas extremas de seguridad; los campos estaban cerrados con alambradas de espino, vigilados por guardias armados, y ubicados en parajes alejados de cualquier centro poblacional. Los intentos de abandono del campo en ocasiones resultaron en el abatimiento de los reclusos.

Ex: http://paginatransversal.wordpress.com