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lundi, 30 avril 2012

Giorgio Agamben: Höchste Armut

Agamben_6190.jpeg

Giorgio Agamben: Höchste Armut
     

Geschrieben von: Timo Kölling   

Ex: http://www.blauenarzisse.de/

 

agamben.jpgDas Verdikt über das Unverständliche ist die Rache des Bürgertums an Autoren, von denen, wenn sie einer Erkenntnis folgen, es immer nur jenen Zipfel zu greifen bekommt, der als reine Bedeutung explizit wird. Die fetischisierten Bedeutungen markieren am deutlichsten das bürgerliche Desinteresse an jeder Form von réalisation. Schon dass es Erkenntnisse gibt, ist des Bürgers Sache nicht. Sie stören die Wonne seines Meinens. Die Rache pflegt desto grausamer auszufallen, je bunter der Zipfel war, den der Autor preisgab, je „schillernder“, je mehr zum interessierten Gespräch Anlass gebend, zum Skandal taugend.

Am wenigsten verzeiht der Bürger, dass das, was er liebt und wovon er lebt, das schier Augenscheinliche, sich letztlich doch ihm entzieht. Diese fundamentale Unsicherheit des Bürgers, Grund seiner zahlreichen „Nihilismen“, die in erster Linie nur der Rechtfertigung des Kitschs dienen, ist epochal geworden, keine phänomenologische Konstruktion von „Wesensgründen“ (die ihrerseits schon dem „Nihil“ aufruhen) hat daran etwas ändern können. Am Ende wird stets in Abrede gestellt werden, hinter dem erhaschten Zipfel habe je sich ein Kleid verborgen. Die beliebte Metapher des „Schillerns“ enthält sie bereits, diese Kritik. Alles kann in den Augen des Bürgers von jetzt auf gleich zu „schillern“ beginnen: Titel, Thesen, Begriffe, Charaktere, Gesten, Bedeutungen.

Die Existenz dessen aber, worauf das „Schillern“ verweist: der Autor wird sie sich allemal nur ausgedacht haben. Gewiss, er mag gut schreiben, die Lektüre stets „faszinierend“ sein. Unvorstellbar aber, dass er sich die Mühe gemacht hat, das zum Zipfel gehörige Kleid auch tatsächlich zu nähen. Seine Bücher: bloße Büchergesten, Intentionen ohne Realisierung, zum vielleicht größten Teil weiß er selbst nicht, was er eigentlich sagen, worauf er hinaus will. Der Autor ist und bleibt, was wir alle sind (und weshalb wir alle das Recht haben, kreativ zu sein und uns Gehör zu verschaffen): ein mehr oder weniger begabter Laberer. Agamben zumal, der raunende Philosoph, der italienische Sloterdijk: hangelt seine stilistisch gewiss bewundernswerte philosophische Belletristik sich nicht von bloßem Einfall zu bloßem Einfall, mit jedem weiteren Buch unfreiwillig den Blick des Lesers schärfend für die Maschen einer vergänglichen, da leeren und zwangsläufig sich selbst entzaubernden Verführungskraft?

„Dort, wo Gesten Worte werden, werden Worte Tatsachen.“ Herrschaft und Herrlichkeit (Homo sacer II.2)

Der Zipfel, mit dem der italienische Philosoph die gebildeten unter den deutschen Lesern zu verführen vermochte, ist bekannt: es war die These, das „Lager“ (Arbeits-, Straf-, Schutz-, Gefangenen-, Konzentrations-, Vernichtungslager) sei als biopolitischer Produzent des „bloßen Lebens“ das Paradigma der Moderne, und wir alle seien in einem mehr als nur symbolischen Sinne, nämlich wesenhaft, seine Insassen. Der Name, den Agamben seinem mehrteiligen Buchprojekt gegeben hat, Homo sacer, bezeichnete im römischen Recht ein Leben, das als heiliges zwar tötbar, aber nicht opferbar war. Es ist demzufolge das Heilige selbst, worin das nackte Leben, die tötbare Kreatur gerade als Gestalt der Profanität ihren Entstehungsgrund hat.

So erklärt sich Agambens Vorhaben, die These in einen großen religionsgeschichtlichen Zusammenhang zu stellen. Am Ende soll die Erkenntnis unabweisbar sein, was im Lager und als Lager sich manifestiere, sei kein inhaltlich bestimmter politischer Wille, sondern die Figur des Rechts als solche. Agamben schließt sich Benjamins radikaler Identifikation von Recht und Gewalt an. Hitlers rechtmäßiger Aufstieg zur Macht habe diese Identifikation nachträglich beglaubigt; der Ausnahmezustand, den Hitler ebenso rechtmäßig verkündete, sei als paradigmatische Figur des Rechts, welches den Ausnahmezustand allererst produziert, bis heute nicht beendet.

Das Zeitalter des Rechts aber: nach dem Willen Agambens vergeht es, in paulinischer Vergängnis. Das Recht zerstört sich in eben dem Maße, als es das Leben selbst zu seinem Gegenstand macht, das heißt: auf den Aspekt einer dirigierbaren Körperlichkeit reduziert, welche von ihm vernichtet wird, indem es vorgibt, sie zu erhalten. Was aber kommt, wenn das Zeitalter des Rechts (das in eins fällt mit der abendländischen Geschichte) endgültig vorbei ist? Wie wird sie aussehen, die „kommende Gemeinschaft“ dies-jenseits, jen-diesseits des Rechts und seiner Verpuppungen? Wie ist jene ursprüngliche Gerechtigkeit zu denken, die Agamben — darin freilich nicht originell — gegen die positiven Formen des Rechts ausspielt?

Diese Fragen sind so drängend, und Agamben beantwortet sie bislang so wenig konkret, dass jeder weitere Band des Homo sacer-Projekts von den Rezensenten im wesentlichen nur als „Überbau“ verstanden wird, welcher stets ein und dieselbe These, indem er sie mit historischem Material unterfüttert, zugleich verstellt und der Bewertung entzieht. Das wird sich auch mit dem vorliegenden Band IV,1 nicht ändern. Der Inhalt ist in seinen wesentlichen Zügen schnell zusammengefasst: anhand der Ordensregeln des mittelalterlichen Mönchtums entfaltet Agamben, der ausgiebig aus ihnen zitiert, die These, jenes „bloße Leben“, das in der Moderne in der Tatsache des Lagers seine unhintergehbare Faktizität gewann, habe historisch gesehen seinen Ursprung im „zönobitischen Projekt“ (25) des Mönchtums als dem Versuch, das Leben der Liturgie anzugleichen, die Liturgie im Leben dauerhaft zu machen.

Ergebnis dieses Versuchs sei ein „Leben, das mit seiner Form so innig verbunden ist, dass es von ihr nicht mehr unterschieden werden kann“ (9). „Was wird aus der Regel, wenn sie restlos mit dem Leben zu verschmelzen scheint? Und was aus einem Menschenleben, wenn es nicht mehr von der Regel zu unterscheiden ist?“ (17) Immer wieder wird in vorliegendem Buch diese Frage gestellt — so oft, dass oberflächliche Lektüre den Eindruck gewinnen mag, es komme Agamben im wesentlichen nur darauf an, die Frage zu stellen, nicht aber darauf, sie auch zu beantworten. Etwas „Drittes“ jedenfalls entstehe in der Zone der Verschmelzung, der Ununterscheidbarkeit von Regel (Gesetz) und Leben: etwas, das die untersuchten Texte unter den Syntagmen vita vel regula, regula et vita, forma vivendi, forma vitae „unermüdlich zu benennen suchen“ (123) und doch aufgrund der ungeheuren Neuheit dieser Entdeckung immer nur unzureichend benennen.

Es handelt sich eben um nichts geringeres als um die Entdeckung des „bloßen Lebens“ selbst in seiner nackten irreduziblen Faktizität. Dessen Eintreten ins menschliche Bewusstsein ist, so Agamben, die Folge davon, dass das zönobitische Projekt ein von Anbeginn utopisches gewesen ist. Die Angleichung des Lebens ans Gesetz konnte nicht mit der Unmöglichkeit dieses Unterfangens rechnen — einer Unmöglichkeit, die, als sie sich faktisch bereits erwiesen hatte, zudem nicht sogleich zu Bewusstsein kommen konnte aufgrund der alles bestimmenden Vorherrschaft der Liturgie. „Der Liturgisierung des Lebens entspricht eine integrale Verlebendigung der Liturgie.“ (160) Ergebnis aber sei ein zunächst sich selbst nicht begreifendes, auf nichts als die eigene Autonomie verwiesenes Leben, das sich durch seine „radikale Fremdheit“ (164) nicht nur gegenüber der Liturgie, sondern gegenüber schlechthin allen Formen des Rechts auszeichne.

Die Jahrhunderte sind der Prozess dieses Sich-selbst-begreifens. Es handelt sich für Agamben um eine „neue Konsistenzebene menschlicher Erfahrung“, die gegenüber der Liturgie, als die sie zunächst fälschlich sich begreift, „eine andere, noch unbestimmte Dimension des Seins und des Handelns erahnen lässt“ (122f.). Indes habe es einen in seiner Radikalität noch uneingeholten Vorstoß gegeben, an den gerade heute, im Zeitalter des Verendens des Rechts zu erinnern sei: den franziskanischen. In der franziskanischen Novitas erweist sich die fundamentale „Nichtanwendbarkeit des Rechts auf das mönchische Leben“ (48), das von Agamben geradezu definiert wird als Ideal einer „totalen Mobilmachung des Daseins durch die Zeit“ (41). Das „Leben“, an sich Gegenstand einer unbewussten Freisetzung, die erst nachträglich sich konstruieren lässt — die „alles entscheidende Frage“ (133) nach seiner Möglichkeit und Wirklichkeit ist bereits im Mittelalter von den Franziskanern gestellt worden. Für sie ging es nicht länger darum, „auf das Leben eine Form — oder eine Norm — anzuwenden, sondern darum, gemäß jener Form zu leben, d. h. um ein Leben, das sich in der Nachfolge selbst Form gibt, mit ihr zusammenfällt“ (137f.).

Es kann keine Rede davon sein, dass Agamben seine Thesen in Auseinandersetzung mit den historischen Quellen gewonnen hat. Die Quellen sind herbeigesucht, um die vorgängige Konstruktion der Thesen zu stützen. Für illegitim kann dies nur halten, wer nicht begreift, worum es Agamben in jedem seiner Bücher geht. Der Sinn seiner Konstruktionen ist die eschatologische Unwirksammachung der Tradition am Ende ihres Laufs, am Ende der Geschichte, am Ende aller Zeitalter. Das „Kommende“, der Zustand dies-jenseits, jen-diesseits des Rechts — das unterscheidet Agambens Vision allemal von der kommunistischen Utopie — wird kein aktiv zu ergreifendes, planhaft anthropotechnisch zu realisierendes historisch-epochales Geschick mehr sein, sondern das Ausmünden der Geschichte selbst in den Stand der eschatologischen Indifferenz.

Einzig so erklärt sich die Identifikation mit dem franziskanischen Spiritualismus und der ihm wesentlichen Unterscheidung von Eigentum und Gebrauch. Die naturrechtliche Lehre von der ursprünglichen Gütergemeinschaft ist der rechtsgeschichtliche Hintergrund, nicht aber ein zu reaktivierender Sinn der Unterscheidung. Denn Agamben zufolge geht es einzig „um die Möglichkeit, als Mensch außerhalb des Rechts zu existieren“ (151). Die franziskanische Novitas besteht in dem „Versuch, ein den Bestimmungen des Rechts völlig entzogenes menschliches Leben und Handeln zu verwirklichen“ (152).

Wenn Agamben diesen Versuch eine „noch immer ungedachte und im gegenwärtigen Zustand der Gesellschaft völlig undenkbare Neuheit“ nennt (152), so sind wir im Zentrum seiner geschichtsphilosophischen „Konstruktion der Gegenwart“ angelangt. Die Beschäftigung mit den Ordensregeln und der Lebensform des christlichen Mönchtums erweist sich als die Nahtstelle, wo am historischen Ursprung der Kategorie des „bloßen Lebens“ zugleich dessen erkenntnistheoretische Konfiguration kenntlich werden muss. Wird sie es? Die diesbezüglich zentrale Feststellung lautet: „Der Konflikt mit dem Recht — oder besser der Versuch, es durch den Gebrauch außer Kraft zu setzen und unwirksam zu machen — ist auf derselben existentiellen Ebene angesiedelt, auf der sich auch die Operativität des Rechts und der Liturgie entfaltet. Die Lebensform ist jenes reine Existenzial, das es von den Signaturen des Rechts und des Offiziums zu befreien gilt.“ (185)

Der Anspruch der Spiritualen habe zwar darin bestanden, „dass der Gebrauch nicht nur negativ im Verhältnis zum Recht definiert wird [...], sondern einen eigenen formalen Grund hat und in einer objektiv bestimmten Operation endet.“ (173) Faktisch aber habe die „Hartnäckigkeit, mit der die franziskanischen Theoretiker den Verzicht auf das Recht mit rechtlichen Begriffen zu formulieren versuchten“ (155), die Einlösung dieses Anspruchs verhindert. Für Agamben hängt also, wie mit diesem letzten Argument deutlich wird, die Herrschaft des Rechts an einer vorgängigen und auszuschaltenden Herrschaft der Sprache des Rechts, so wie für Heidegger die Herrschaft der Metaphysik an einer vorgängigen und auszuschaltenden Herrschaft der Sprache der Metaphysik hing. Das ist mehr als eine Analogie. Agamben und Heidegger operieren, wie in der Rede vom „reinen Existenzial“ deutlich wird, auf dem Boden ein und derselben erkenntnistheoretischen Konfiguration. Dieses Fundament ist schwach, ja hinfällig. Gegen es aufzubieten ist mit Scholem die Einsicht, dass „das absolut Konkrete [...] das Unvollziehbare schlechthin“ ist, und dass es sich bei der messianischen Idee, die Agambens Vision im verborgenen leitet, um „die eigentlich anti-existentialistische Idee“ handelt.

Damit ist die Tiefenschicht bezeichnet, in der Agambens Homo sacer-Projekt und Esoterik der Schrift konvergieren. In Tradition und Transzendenz ist dargestellt, dass die Heideggers Spätwerk bestimmende Kategorie einer „Überwindung“ der abendländischen Metaphysik einen Rückfall in die existenzphilosophischen Bestimmungen des Frühwerks darstellt, der seinen Grund im vorzeitigen Abbruch des Denkwegs der „Kehre“ hat. Denn gerade sie hätte Heidegger das Instrument an die Hand gegeben, die Begriffe der Metaphysik als Figuren dessen zu gewahren, was an ihnen —chôra der platonischen Idee — nicht metaphysisch ist. Analog wäre auch die Rede von einem „Gebrauch des Rechts“ auf den Ort der von Agamben selbst proklamierten eschatologischen Indifferenz hin zu modifizieren.

Die Logik der „Überwindung“ unterbietet ihn. Es gibt keine Sprache jenseits des Rechts, sondern der Grad ist zu bestimmen, in dem das Recht der Sprache immanent ist, um das Recht als sprachloses sich in der Stummheit seiner Gewalt verschließen zu lassen. Das wäre das Wahrheitsmoment der spiritualistischen Revolte, an die keine bürgerliche Kritik von Agambens Werk hinanreicht. Für Scholem und Benjamin konzentrierte es sich im Begriff der Schrift, den sie anlässlich von Kafkas Parabel Vor dem Gesetz diskutierten. Giorgio Agambens Interpretation dieser Diskussion (Homo sacer I, 60ff.) enthält alle Elemente seiner Verfehlung dieses Begriffs. Gerade in dieser Verfehlung aber ist Agamben ernst zu nehmen. Sie konstituiert die Intensität seiner Geste, den Keil des bloßen Lebens in das Herz der Tradition zu schleudern. Sie ist nahe daran, Wort zu werden.

Giorgio Agamben: Höchste Armut. Ordensregeln und Lebensform (Homo sacer IV,1). Aus dem Italienischen von Andreas Hiepko. S. Fischer (Frankfurt am Main) 2012. 208 Seiten. ISBN 978-3-10-000533-5.

Zuerst erschienen auf: http://timokoelling.wordpress.com/rezensionen/giorgio-agamben-hochste-armut/

Die Redaktion bedankt sich bei Timo Kölling für die Erlaubnis zur Übernahme dieses Beitrags.

vendredi, 27 avril 2012

Jonathan Bowden’s Kratos

In Remembrance of the Surrealist British Artist and Philosopher Jonathan Bowden

Jonathan Bowden’s Kratos

By John Michael McCloughlin

Ex: http://www.counter-currents.com/

kratos.jpgJonathan Bowden
Kratos and Other Works [2]
London: The Spinning Top Club, 2008

The book Kratos was published by the Spinning Top Club in very early 2008. It extends over 157 pages. It consists of four independent stories of around the same length.

The first (“Kratos”) deals with a Lombrosian tale about criminality and psychopathia. It delineates a Yorkshire axe-man called Billy-O or Dung Beetle whose intentions are fundamentally misread by an upper-class fop, Basildon Lancaster.

One might characterize it as an exercise in Degeneration theory from the late nineteenth century brought up to date — hence its debt to Cesare Lombroso’s Criminal Man from 1876, I believe. A highly filmic coloration befits this piece — almost in a lucid or paranormal light  and this lends it a dream-like or magical intention. Bowden’s pieces tend to be extremely visual, oneiric, outsider drawn or filmic in compass — he is definitely what could be called a Visualiser. There also, to this particular critic, seems to be a correlation between all of these fictions and the comics or graphic novels that he produced as a child. All of them have a violent, immediate and aleatory dimension, to be sure, yet I infer something more.

What I mean is that just like a film which is planned on a story-board, for example, these literary tales move simultaneously on many levels and with a visual candor. It is almost as if Mister Bowden split his creative sensibility in moving from boy to man: the verbal bubbles or lettering (as they are called) in the graphic novels split off to become fictions; while the images morphed into fine art-works. They became stand alone paintings in their own right.

Kratos deals with insanity but on distinct levels, some of which fast forward and back — while parallel dimensions, parts of the mind, stray visual eddies or prisms, and telescoped refractions all recur. This filmic quality proceeds throughout the piece akin to Hitchcock or Blatty, but a strong narrative impulse bestrides this magic realism. It lends the excoriation at the tale’s end something akin to the reverberation of Greek tragedy.

From a Right-wing or elitist perspective, I think that Bowden’s fictional trajectory works in the following manner. From the very beginning there is an exoteric dimension (much like the political trappings of a reasonably notorious political movement from early in the twentieth century). This deals with the artistry, story, structure, prism effect in terms of H. T. Flint’s Physical Optics, as well as the narratives dealt with above.

But, in my view, there is another hidden, buried, esoteric, occultistic, and numinous aspect. It is slightly and from a liberal perspective rather scandalously linked to a thesis in the book Nietzsche, Prophet of Nazism [3] by a Lebanese and Maronite intellectual [4]; together with the Occultistic text The Morning of the Magicians. This inner urge or poetic trope is an attempt to create the Superman via a manipulation of consciousness.

Most Western cultural standards, menhirs, sacred stones, or objects on the ground have been devastated or destroyed — even though the odd echo can be heard. (This might be said to be a small Classics department at a provincial university, for instance.) Nonetheless, Bowden preaches re-integration — beginning within oneself — and ending up with the maximalization of strength. One should remember or factor in that almost every other literary tendency is contrary or reverse-wise. Characters are chaotic, broken, stunted, uncertain, apolitical, non-religious, without any metaphysic whatsoever, chronically afraid, sexually and emotionally neurotic, tremulous about death, et cetera . . .  While Bowden’s Oeuvre intimates the re-ordination of the Colossus — both gradually and over time.

Hence we begin to perceive a glacial imprimatur in his work; in that characterization is non-Dual, beyond good and evil, semi-Gnostic, Power oriented in the manner of Thrasymachus, “demented,” furious, even non-Christian. It ennobles the prospect of Odin without the overlay of Marvel Comics and as a Trickster God . . . i.e., it’s the moral equivalent of Batman’s Joker as reviewed, via The Dark-Knight [5], elsewhere on this site. It also ramifies with the words of the anti-humanist intellectual, Bill Hopkins, who, in a cultural magazine close to the polymath Colin Wilson known as Abraxas, once remarked: “The purpose of literature is to create New Titans.”

One other cultural idea suffices here . . . this has to do with Joseph Goebbels’ answer to a question about his interpretation of the Divine. This should be seen as part of the frontispiece of his expressionist novel Michael, a third positionist work from the ‘twenties. He described “God” as a multi-proportioned or eight-limbed idol, replete with heavy jambs and rubiate eyes, and possibly constructed from orange sandstone. Such an effigy was associated with the following: flaming tapers or torches, brands, naked female dancers, and human sacrifice. To which the Herr Doktor’s interlocutor remarked: “It doesn’t sound very Christian to me!” The propaganda minister’s response came back as quick as a shot: “You’re mistaken; THAT IS CHRIST!”

I think that Jonathan Bowden believes much the same about the meta-ethic of his own literary output. The other stories in this volume were Origami Bluebeard” (a marriage, a murder, a threnody, a Ragman, a take on Thomas Carlyle’s Sartor Resartus); “Grimaldi’s Leo” (a lighter variant on Animal Liberation), and “Napalm Blonde.” This was an attempt at Greek Tragedy, configures a Tiresius who maybe alone but not in a wasteland, and happens to be radically heterosexualist after Anthony Ludovici’s analysis.

For those who have ears to hear — let them hear.

Note: Kratos can be read or purchased here [2].


Article printed from Counter-Currents Publishing: http://www.counter-currents.com

URL to article: http://www.counter-currents.com/2010/10/jonathan-bowdens-kratos/

URLs in this post:

[1] Image: http://www.counter-currents.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/10/kratos.jpg

[2] Kratos and Other Works: http://www.jonathanbowden.co.uk/publications.html

[3] Nietzsche, Prophet of Nazism: http://www.amazon.com/Nietzsche-Prophet-Nazism-Superman-Unveiling-Doctrine/dp/1420841211/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1286602280&sr=1-1

[4] a Lebanese and Maronite intellectual: http://www.counter-currents.com/tag/abir-taha/

[5] The Dark-Knight: http://www.counter-currents.com/2010/09/the-dark-knight/

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samedi, 14 avril 2012

Pour en finir avec la Françamérique

Pour en finir avec la Françamérique, par Jean-Philippe Immarigeon

 

 
Ex: http://www.europesolidaire.eu/

Nous avons plusieurs fois évoqué le rôle de Jean-Philippe Immarigeon dans la déconstruction du mythe américain et la lutte contre la soumission des Européens à l'influence atlantiste. Les précédents ouvrages de l'auteur, référencés ci-dessous, sont tous à lire à cet égard. Ils restent entièrement d'actualité. En quoi le nouvel essai de Jean-Philippe Immarigeon renouvelle-t-il son argumentaire?

C'est parce que l'auteur comprend de moins en moins, malgré les évènements récents ayant marqué l'histoire du monde, la persistance de la dépendance de la France, dans toutes ses composantes, au mythe d'une civilisation commune avec les Etats-Unis, qui nous empêche de nous décider enfin à prendre en mains nous-mêmes notre destin. 

L'auteur, excellent connaisseur des Etats-Unis, où il exerce une partie de son activité professionnelle, ne comprend pas l'aveuglement des Français à vouloir dans tous les domaines s'abriter sous la référence américaine, au lieu de faire appel à leurs propres ressources. Même ceux qui sont obligés par la force des choses de confesser une perte de puissance américaine n'en tirent pas arguments pour enfin rompre le lien affectif qui les unit à une Amérique dont ils se donnent une image largement fantasmée et inexacte. Même ceux qui veulent rompre ce lien n'osent pas le faire pleinement. La peur d'être condamnés comme anti-américaniste sommaires les empêchent de voir et d'évoquer les raisons qui devraient nous obliger à devenir enfin indépendants.

Nous n'allons pas ici reprendre les arguments de l'auteur. Le livre est suffisamment court et vivant pour mériter d'être lu par tous ceux qui ne souhaitent pas s'engager dans des considérations géopolitiques complexes. Bornons-nous à quelques questions.

* L'addiction à l'Amérique se limite-t-elle à la France? Ne faudrait-il pas envisager une « américanomanie européenne » qui paralyserait toute l'Europe? Elle culminerait au niveau des institutions européennes mais aussi dans chacun des gouvernements de l'Union. Elle ne se limiterait pas aux cercles dirigeants mais elle toucherait l'ensemble de la population. Partout, la peur de rompre le cordon qui relie l'Europe à une Amérique présentée comme légitimement en charge des affaires du monde paralyse les velléités de saisir les opportunités qui s'offrent désormais à l'Europe, lui permettant de jouer enfin sa partie dans un monde devenu multipolaire. Les perspectives présentées par Franck Biancheri, directeur du Laboratoire Européen d'Anticipation Politique (LEAP) n'éveillent encore qu'un faible écho. 1) Elles devraient pourtant dynamiser les énergies européennes, puisque celui-ci montre que, entre une Amérique déclinante et une montée en puissance du BRICS, un large créneau d'opportunité s'ouvre à l'Europe (et à l'euro) pour valoriser et développer des ressources qui restent considérables.

* Mais si c'est l'Europe toute entière qui est frappée d'impuissance par son américanomanie, ne faut-il pas s'attacher à mettre en évidence les processus par lesquels depuis la seconde guerre mondiale les Etats-Unis se sont faits, sous les apparences, l'ennemi délibéré de la construction d'une Europe-puissance indépendante d'eux. Il faudrait à cet égard parler d'une véritable entreprise coloniale, par laquelle les nouveaux colons américains se sont attachés à déposséder de leur culture propre les Européens, comme ils l'avaient fait précédemment des Indiens d'Amérique.

Or pourquoi les Européens se sont-ils soumis si facilement à la colonisation militaire, économique et culturelle américaine. La question a été souvent posée. Elle continue à l'être. La réponse la plus évidente paraît tenir au fait que les oligarchies financières, gouvernementales et médiatiques européennes trouvent beaucoup plus facile pour assurer leur pouvoir de se mettre sous la dépendance de leurs homologues américaines depuis longtemps dominantes plutôt que chercher leurs propres voies de développement. La dégradation lente de la puissance américaine n'est pas encore suffisamment affirmée pour qu'elles cherchent ailleurs des alliances de rechange.

* Quand on constate à cette égard la servilité avec laquelle les forces politiques et intellectuelles de nos voisins européens persistent à se rendre vassales d'une Amérique qui compense sa perte de puissance sur le monde en renforçant sa domination sur l'Europe, ne pourrait-on penser que la France, malgré ses abaissements consentis, n'est pas celle à qui il faudrait reprocher le plus grand esprit de capitulation. La défense de la souveraineté française eut d'abord ses grandes heures avec le Gaullisme, grâce auquel nous disposons encore de ressources technologiques que n'ont pas l'Allemagne et les pays européens du Nord pourtant réputés par leur puissance économique. Il n'en demeure malheureusement plus grand chose aujourd'hui du fait des efforts continus de l'actuel président de la République pour démobiliser ce qui restait d'indépendance dans la diplomatie et dans la défense française. Ceci s'est fait directement, notamment par le plein retour de la France dans l'Otan. La tentative se poursuit aussi indirectement, par exemple du fait de la pénétration dans notre potentiel industriel des capitaux du Qatar, eux-mêmes très proches des intérêts américains - ainsi que d'autres tout aussi dangereux. .

Il reste quand même en France quelques ressources qui pourraient, convenablement valorisées par un prochain gouvernement français, servir de base à une résurrection industrielle et diplomatique non seulement française mais européenne. L'exemple en est le Rafale, l'avion de combat français qui se révèle porteur de ce que sans excès d'enthousiasme on pourrait présenter comme une alternative civilisationnelle à celle que les Etats-Unis voulaient imposer à l'ensemble du monde et pour plus d'un demi-siècle en refusant toute alternative autre que l'acquisition obligée de leur Joint Strike Fighter F 35. Nous avons pour ce qui nous concerne suivi de près la montée et la chute d'un appareil qui se révèle aujourd'hui comme un concentré ingérable de technologies, véritable fer-à-repasser volant. Pour s'en convaincre, il fallait suivre la chronique extraordinairement documentée et inspirés qu'en a donnée depuis plus de 10 ans notre ami Philippe Grasset 1). Aujourd'hui cependant, comme le montre Philippe Grasset, le Rafale français, beaucoup plus réaliste au point de vue technique, semble en train de s'imposer, non seulement par ses qualités propres mais parce qu'incarnant une nouvelle forme de souveraineté politique, dont le Gaullisme avait été pour la France l'illustration, et qui est en train de gagner du terrain, sous des formes voisines, dans les Etats décidés à se libérer de l'emprise américaine. 3)

* L'abaissement de la France et avec elle de l'Europe devant l'Amérique, est-il irréversible? L'évolution actuelle des Etats-Unis, en mettant en évidence la fausseté des mythes par lesquels nous acceptions leur domination, suffira-t-elle à nous en prémunir dorénavant. On peut en douter car trop rares sont ceux qui comme Jean-Philippe Immarigeon décrivent l'Amérique comme elle apparaît dorénavant en profondeur: raciste, inégalitaire, obtue intellectuellement, en proie à des religions auxquelles l'islamisme n'a rien à envier en termes d'esprit de conquête et de refus du rationnel scientifique. L'Amérique reste encore très forte du fait de la puissance de son potentiel militaire et de ses capacités en termes de recherche technologique. Mais nous sommes bien placés ici pour montrer que ces potentiels sont désormais au service d'une volonté de contrôle total 4) ne laissant plus guère de place à nos conceptions républicaines et démocratiques.

Or faire ces constatations et recommander que l'Europe se ressaisisse, qu'elle exploite comme le propose Franck Biancheri les atouts potentiels importants dont elle dispose encore, est rejeté par les intérêts européens dominants, dont nous avons souligné une soumission à l'atlantisme qui leur parait la meilleure façon d'assurer le maintien de leurs pouvoirs. D'une façon générale, plus se renforceront les menaces pesant sur le monde, plus les Européens se sentiront paralysées à l'idée de se détacher d'une Amérique où ils continuent à voir un recours, sans se rendre compte que celle-ci, lorsqu'elle aura épuisé les ressources tirées jusqu'ici de ses vassaux européens, les rejettera comme inutiles et dangereux.

*Mais alors quelles voies Jean-Philippe Immarigeon proposerait-il pour permettre aux Français, voire aux Européens, de se déprendre de la Franceamérique? L'exhortation risque de ne pas suffire. A une époque où, de plus en plus, s'imposent des choix géostratégiques décisifs, à une époque où la France elle-même, malgré son refus de voir ces réalités en face, devra bien prendre des décisions lourdes de conséquences, on est un peu déçu de constater que l'auteur, malgré son expérience, ne se prononce pas clairement. Il court le risque de se voir reprocher la répétition de livre en livre du même message, en piétinant sur place faute de laisser entrevoir des solutions. Peut-être veut-il nous laisser devant nos propres responsabilités, une fois le mal dénoncé? Nous aimerions savoir pourtant, naïfs impénitents que nous sommes, pour quel candidat il va voter lors des prochaines élections présidentielles françaises.

Notes

1) Franck Biancheri, Crise mondiale. En route pour le monde d'après. France-Europe Monde dans la décennie 2010-2020. Anticipolis, 2010.
2) Sur son site DeDefensa.org (également pratiqué et apprécié par Jean-Philippe Immarigeon).
3) Jean-Luc Mélanchon, cas exceptionnel parmi les hommes politique français, a bien compris ce rôle emblématique du Rafale. A une journaliste qui lui reprochait récemment, sur le site Médiapart, de s'intéresser à un système d'armes français tel que le Rafale, plutôt qu'à un vague projet humanitaire, il a répondu qu'il ne faisait pas cela pour rendre service à la firme Dassault, mais parce que selon lui les Etats du monde doivent désormais choisir, en matière d'avions de combat, entre 3 ou 4 conceptions du monde, celle encore défendue par une Amérique de plus en plus régressive, la russe, la chinoise et la française. Il est triste de constater que la grande majorité des hommes politiques européens ne l'aient pas encore compris et ne voient aucun inconvénient à ce que l'Europe s'équipe en appareils américains ou se raccrochent à l'Eurofighter qui n'a d'européen que le nom.
4) Alain Cardon " Vers un système de contrôle total "

Ouvrage au format.pdf accessible en téléchargement gratuit
(publié sous Licence Creative Commons)

http://www.admiroutes.asso.fr/larevue/2011/121/controletotal.pdf


Jean Philippe Immarigeon nous écrit:
" Je suis monomaniaque (d'un livre à l'autre) parce qu'il ne sert à rien de penser un après tant qu'on est piègé dans l'hier. Dit plus simplement, j'ai compris en vivant aux Etats-Unis, en bossant avec eux également ensuite et en discutant toutes les semaines avec mon ami Rick (patron de Harper's Magazine) qui ne supporte plus son pays, ce que Tocqueville écrivait de l'étouffement de la pensée que pratique la civilisation américaine. Dit encore autrement, qu'il s'agisse de la réforme de l'OTAN ou du carcan idéologique atlantiste, il est vain et vaniteux de penser faire de l'entrisme et changer les choses de l'intérieur, par subversion. C'est sous-estimer la puissance américaine, les moyens de communication, l'importance des thinks tanks, le nombre incalculable de bureaucrates payés à faire de la propagande depuis 1945. On ne peut lutter à armes égales. Il faut donc d'abord sortir et faire de l'asymétrique, sinon c'est une perte de temps et d'énergie".

Pour en savoir plus
* Jean-Philippe Immarigeon blog http://americanparano.blog.fr/

* Avocat et docteur en droit Jean-Philippe Immarigeon est spécialiste de l'histoire des États-Unis et des questions de stratégie, il intervient depuis 2001 dans la Revue Défense nationale. Il a publié précédemment chez François Bourin Éditeur American parano (élu meilleur essai politique 2006 par le magazine Lire), Sarko l'Américain (2007) et L'Imposture américaine (2009). Voir http://www.bourin-editeur.fr/auteur/jean-philippe-immarigeon.html

Jean Paul Baquiast

vendredi, 13 avril 2012

Histoire des Berbères, des origines à nos jours

Drapeau-amazigh.jpg

Sortie du nouveau livre de Bernard Lugan :
Histoire des Berbères, des origines à nos jours. Un combat identitaire pluri-millénaire.
 
IMPORTANT : Ce livre édité par l'Afrique Réelle n'est pas disponible dans les librairies ou les sites de commandes en ligne. Seule l'Afrique Réelle le distribue.
 
Prix (frais de port compris) :
- 29 € pour livraison en France / Dom-Tom / Europe
- 38 € pour livraison dans le reste du monde (en recommandé avec AR)
- 25 € à partir de 5 livres
 
Pour le commander, 2 possibilités :
- Par carte bleue ou Paypal :
- Par chèque avec le bon de commande ci-joint à imprimer et à nous retourner
 

brertber.jpg

Présentation de l'ouvrage
 

Les Berbères ou Imazighen (Amazigh au singulier) constituent le fond ancien de la population de l’Afrique du Nord. Ils formaient à l’origine un seul Peuple peu à peu fragmenté par une histoire à la fois riche, complexe et mouvementée. Des dynasties berbères régnèrent  sur le Maghreb jusqu’au XVI° siècle.

Les partisans de l’arabo-islamisme affirment que les Berbères sont sortis de l’histoire, leur conversion à l’Islam les ayant inscrits de façon irréversible dans l’aire politico-culturelle de l’arabité. Dans les années 1950, la revue Al Maghrib alla ainsi jusqu’à écrire qu’ils ne peuvent accéder au Paradis que s’ils se rattachent à des lignées arabes. Quant auministre algérien de l’Education nationale, il déclara en 1962 qu’ils « sont une invention des Pères Blancs ».

 Aujourd’hui, les dirigeants arabo-islamiques nord africains doivent faire face au réveil berbère si fortement exprimé en 2004 par Mohammed Chafik au travers de sa célèbre question réponse: « Au fait, pourquoi le Maghreb arabe n’arrive-t-il pas à se former ? C’est précisément parce qu’il n’est pas Arabe ». Cette phrase était incluse dans un article dont le titre explosif était : « Et si l’on décolonisait l’Afrique du Nord pour de bon ! », intitulé signifiant qu’après avoir chassé les Français, il convenait désormais pour les Berbères d’en faire de même avec les Arabes…

Qui sont donc les Berbères ? Quelle est leur origine ? Comment furent-ils islamisés ? Quelle est leur longue histoire ? Comment se fait aujourd’hui la renaissance de la berbérité? Peut-elle être une alternative au fondamentalisme islamique ?

C’est à ces questions qu’est consacré ce livre qui n’a pas d’équivalent. Son approche est ethno historique et couvre une période de 10 000 ans. Il est illustré par de nombreuses cartes en couleur et par des photographies.

 

Table des matières

 

Première partie : La Berbérie jusqu’à la conquête arabe

 

Chapitre I : Une très longue histoire

A) L’état des connaissances
B) L’Egypte, une création berbère ?

 

Chapitre II : Les Berbères durant l’Antiquité classique

A) Les Peuples et les Etats
B) Les Berbères furent-ils romanisés ?

 

Chapitre III : Les Berbères, les Vandales et les Byzantins

A) L’intrusion vandale
B) L’échec de Byzance

 

Deuxième partie : Les Berbères se convertissent à l’islam mais ils résistent à l’arabisation (VI°-XV°siècle)

 

Chapitre I : Les Berbères face à la conquête et à l’islamisation

A) Les résistances à la conquête
B) La révolte berbère du VIII° siècle

 

Chapitre II : Le monde berbère du IX° au XII° siècle

A) La Berbérie au IX° siècle
B) Le Maghreb berbéro musulman du X° au XII° siècle

 

Chapitre III : Les  grandes mutations du monde berbère (XII°-XV° siècle)

A) Les Berbères almohades et l’arabisation du Maghreb (XII°-XIII°)
B) La question arabe
C) Le tournant des XIII°-XV° siècles

 

Troisième partie : Des Berbères dominés à la renaissance de la Tamazgha

 

Chapitre I : Les Berbères perdent la maîtrise de leur destin (XVI°-XIX° siècle)

A) Le Maroc entre Arabes et Berbères
B) Les Berbères et les Ottomans (XVI°-XIX° siècle)

 

Chapitre II : Les Berbères et la colonisation

A) Algérie : de la marginalisation à la prise de conscience
B) Maroc : les Berbères victimes du Protectorat ?

 

Chapitre III : La renaissance berbère aujourd’hui

A) Maroc : de la stigmatisation à la cohésion nationale
B) Algérie : entre berbérisme et jacobinisme arabo-musulman
C) Les autres composantes de la Tamazgha

 

- Bibliographie
- Index des noms de personnes
- Index des tribus et des peuples

 

jeudi, 12 avril 2012

Deutsche Meisterdenker

Der-Denker.jpg

Deutsche Meisterdenker

von Siegfried Gerlich

Ex: http://www.sezession.de/

Der Regin-Verlag hat eine glückliche Wahl getroffen, seine von Sebastian Maaß herausgegebene Gesprächsreihe »ad rem« mit Selbstportraits der besten Köpfe der radikalen Rechten zu eröffnen. Dabei wecken die Biographien Hans-Dietrich Sanders und Günter Maschkes den Verdacht, daß deren intellektueller Rang sich nicht unmaßgeblich ihren marxistischen Lehrjahren verdankt.

Der auf mecklenburgischem Land aufgewachsene »nationale Dissident« Sander stand als Theaterkritiker in der frühen DDR zunächst unter dem Einfluß Bertolt Brechts, bevor er in die BRD übersiedelte und sein politisches Denken an Carl Schmitt neu schulte. Von der Borniertheit der Rechten abgestoßen, bezog Sander stets einen parteiübergreifend gesamtdeutschen Standpunkt. So erwuchs mit dem jungen Mitarbeiter der Welt und späteren Herausgeber der Staatsbriefe nicht nur dem Establishment ein Störenfried, sondern auch dem nationalen Lager ein Konkurrent. Unermüdlich gegen die »postfaschistische Resignation« ankämpfend, verachtete Sander den Neuen Konservatismus Schrenck-Notzings und Kaltenbrunners als kraftlos und konformistisch.

Trotz seines Bekenntnisses zum Preußentum als der »Quintessenz des deutschen Geistes« macht Sander keinen Hehl daraus, daß ihm für die Wiederherstellung des Deutschen Reiches die Rückgewinnung der ostdeutschen wie der deutsch-österreichischen Gebiete noch immer als »nationaler Imperativ« gilt. Nur von dieser Höhe, wenn nicht Hybris, seines »ghibellinischen« Reichsnationalismus her wird Sanders Argwohn verständlich, die Alliierten hätten mit der Wiedervereinigung »die Endlösung der deutschen Frage« bezweckt. Selbstbewußt beansprucht Sander, seit Kriegsende wie kein anderer »den deutschen Geist verkörpert zu haben«. Mit seiner scharfen Kritik der den Untergang einer entorteten Welt beschleunigenden jüdischen Apokalyptik stemmte er zumal den deutschen Antijudaismus auf ein einsames philosophisches Niveau. Um so widersprüchlicher wirkt Sanders eigener apokalyptischer Ton, in dem er ein »schnelles Ende« des bestehenden Deutschland beschwört, da erst nach einer »restlosen Implosion des status quo« eine neue Reichsherrlichkeit anbrechen könne. Ernst Jünger jedenfalls quittierte die Zusendung von Sanders grandiosem Hauptwerk Die Auflösung aller Dinge mit den mahnenden Worten: »Wir haben unser Cannae hinter uns.«

Zu Sanders heimatlich wohlverortetem deutschen Geist bildet Maschkes abenteuerliches Herz und sein nachgerade französischer Esprit einen harten Kontrast. Die Jugendjahre vis-à-vis dem Geburtshaus von Karl Marx in Trier verlebend, zog es den philosophisch ambitionierten Studenten zu Ernst Bloch nach Tübingen, wo er eine führende Rolle in der dadaistischen »Subversiven Aktion«, der auch Rudi Dutschke und Bernd Rabehl angehörten, spielen sollte. Der von Dutschke als »Maschkiavelli« Titulierte despektierte diesen wiederum als »reinen Toren«, da sich in dessen Revolutionsromantik die Machtfrage nicht stellte.

Nach seiner Desertion aus der Bundeswehr 1965 floh Maschke nach Wien, um als Kommunarde Adorno und Marcuse zu propagieren, bis Bruno Kreisky ihn in Abschiebehaft nahm. Das rettende kubanische Asyl 1968/69 bewahrte Maschke indessen nicht vor der Desillusionierung über Castros Sozialismus, und seine Hilfsdienste für eine Umsturzpläne schmiedende oppositionelle Gruppe führten zu seiner Ausweisung. Nach der Heimkehr nach Deutschland trat Maschke seine ausstehende Haftstrafe an und nahm eine schmerzliche Grundrevision seiner ideologischen Überzeugungen in Angriff. Ab 1973 als freier Mitarbeiter bei der FAZ beschäftigt, wandte sich Maschke allmählich der Neuen Rechten zu. Besiegelt wurde seine Konversion durch die 1979 geschlossene Freundschaft zu Carl Schmitt, als dessen Herausgeber und profunder Kenner Maschke sich internationale Anerkennung erwarb.

In seinen wenigen, aber gewichtigen Büchern und Aufsätzen richtete »der einzige Renegat der 68er-Bewegung« (Habermas) sein »bewaffnetes Wort« zunehmend gegen die degenerierten Nachkriegsdeutschen als »Fellachen de luxe« und die USA als »Schurkenstaat Nr. 1«, und mit seiner Stilisierung Castros zum »Katechon« einer in den Abgrund rasenden globalisierten Welt erwies der »Kritiker des Guerilleros« diesem eine späte Reverenz. Wie ein »Partisan, der die Waffen nimmt, wo er sie kriegen kann«, schätzt Maschke den unverminderten diagnostischen Wert der marxistischen Theorie und verachtet die »Lesefaulheit und latente Theoriefeindschaft vieler Rechter, die glauben, mit ihren Affekten auszukommen.« Gerade am autoritären Marxismus imponiert dem Nationalrevolutionär der Anspruch einer »höheren Sittlichkeit«, wohingegen die libertäre Linke sich mit dem bourgeoisen Liberalismus arrangiert habe und dessen hedonistischen Verfall auch noch forciere und als Emanzipation feiere. In seinen erfrischenden Heterodoxien erweist sich Maschke als einer jener freien Geister, die in allen Lagern selten geworden sind: »Nichts korrumpiert das Denken so sehr wie die Angst vor dem Beifall von der falschen Seite.«

Hans-Dietrich Sander/Sebastian Maaß: »Im Banne der Reichsrenaissance«, Kiel: Regin 2011. 126 S., 14.95 €
Günter Maschke/Sebastian Maaß: »Verräter schlafen nicht«, Kiel: Regin 2011. 206 S., 16.95 €

dimanche, 08 avril 2012

Pequeño léxico del partisano europeo

Pequeño léxico del partisano europeo

Publicado por edicionesnuevarepublica

Pequeño léxico del partisano europeo

NOVEDAD

De G. Faye, P. Freson y R. Steuckers

Colección «El Partisano Europeo» /7

● 1ª edición, Barcelona, 2012

● 20×13 cms., 88 págs.

● Cubierta a todo color, con solapas y plastificada brillo

● PVP: 10 euros

Orientaciones:

El Petit lexique du partisan Européen (Pequeño léxico del partisano europeo) fue editado por primera vez en 1985. Sus autores, Guillaume Faye, Pierre Fresón y Robert Steuckers pertenecían —o habían pertenecido— a la deno­minada “Nueva Derecha”, etiqueta política muy al uso en Francia e Italia, pero incomprensible en España.

Su finalidad al escribir este léxico era la de dotar de un corpus doctrinal claro, eficaz y directo al “activista europeo”, proporcionarle una batería de ideas alternativas al discurso dominante de las ideologías de lo “políticamente correcto”, formarle y clarificarle en un léxico propio, un léxico para militantes de la Europa disidente.

[...] es el intenso compromiso político que distingue al partisano de otros combatientes. [...] el partisano lucha en un frente político, y precisamente el carácter político de su actividad revaloriza el sentido originario de la palabra par­tisano. La palabra se deriva de partido, e indica los vínculos con un partido o un grupo que lucha o hace la guerra o actúa políticamente de alguna forma. Y es en esta definición de Carl Schmitt donde encaja perfectamente el com­promiso del militante europeísta. Su carácter de soldado político le convierte en un Partisano, en un miembro de la resistencia europea contra el Nuevo Orden Mundial.

[del prólogo de Juan Antonio Llopart] 

Pedidos:

enrpedidos@yahoo.es

Tlf: 682 65 33 56

vendredi, 06 avril 2012

«El hombre político», de Arthur Moeller van den Bruck

«El hombre político», de Arthur Moeller van den Bruck

Publicado por edicionesnuevarepublica

 

«El hombre político», de Arthur Moeller van den Bruck

[Prólogo de Ángel Fernández Fernández]

● Colección «Europa Rebelde» / 24

● Barcelona, 2012

● 20×13 cms., 136 págs.

● Cubierta a todo color, con solapas y plastificada brillo

● PVP: 15 euros

Orientaciones

El libro que el lector tiene entre sus manos constituye una nove­dad editorial de primer orden en nuestro país. Se trata de un con­junto de artículos y escritos de variada temática donde se prefigu­ran muchos de los elementos que caracterizarían al movimiento intelectual, florecido durante la decadente república de Weimar, conocido como la “Konservative Revolution”. Si tuviésemos que personalizar los inicios de este movimiento en un autor, éste se­ría, sin duda, Moeller van den Bruck. El compendio de escritos que ofrecemos en esta obra abarcan un periodo que va desde 1916 hasta 1925, fecha en la cual, el autor alemán decidió quitar­se la vida ante el aislamiento ideológico en que se hallaba. Existe otra obra, más conocida y celebrada, titulada Das dritte Reich y publicada en 1923. No obstante, la edición original de la obra que nos ocupa, recogiendo el conjunto de escritos que la componen, no sería publicado hasta el año 1933, fecha en que tiene lugar el acceso de Hitler a la cancillería del Reich. De hecho la secuencia de artículos, y el orden con el que son presentados obedece a la lógica impuesta por Hans Schwarz, el editor, quien trató de estruc­turar de forma secuencial y unitaria el conjunto de textos siguien­do una coherencia en el desarrollo ideológico del autor.

[del prólogo de Ángel Fernández]

Índice

Prólogo, de Ángel Fernández Fernández

Capítulo I – El hombre político

Capítulo II – La generación

Las tres generaciones

El alemán en tierra extranjera

El “outsider” como vía hacia el Führer

Revolución, personalidad, Tercer Reich

Capítulo III – Preparatorios de futuro

Meditando sobre Friedrich List

La vuelta de Nietzsche

El retorno de Federico

Capítulo IV – El despertar de los jóvenes

Las ideas políticas de los jóvenes

El preludio heroico

Concepción económica

Indiferencia de Occidente

Mirando hacia el Oriente

enrpedidos@yahoo.es

Tlf: 682 65 33 56

Homo comicus : ou l'intégrisme de la rigolade par François L'Yvonnet

Homo comicus : ou l'intégrisme de la rigolade par François L'Yvonnet

Ce pamphlet est né d’un agacement, celui de voir parader sans vergogne, à longueur de médias, une ribambelle d’humoristes d’un nouveau genre, moins amuseurs que donneurs de leçons, moins « comiques » qu’agents autoproclamés du Bien. Ils éreintent mais sans risque, ils accusent, ridiculisent, frappent de dérision sans ménager la moindre possibilité de défense. Des procureurs hargneux, dans des procès joués d’avance. Le sérieux, voilà l’ennemi. Ils règnent à la radio, à la télévision, dans la presse écrite, publient des livres, font des films, achètent des théâtres… C’est une nouvelle féodalité, avec ses prébendes et ses privilèges. C’est un nouvel intégrisme, celui de la rigolade. Il faut rire de tout mais avec eux. Le rire, « leur » rire est la norme. À les écouter, ils seraient l’actuelle incarnation de la liberté d’expression et de toutes les valeurs réunies de la démocratie. On croit rêver… Leurs saillies sont pourtant d’une incroyable platitude et leurs prêchi-prêcha, troussés à la va-vite, épargnent les vrais puissants. Curieuse époque que la nôtre, qui voit le « bas-bouffon » tenir lieu de conscience et de pensée.

François L’Yvonnet est professeur de philosophie et éditeur (L’Herne et Albin-Michel). Derniers ouvrages parus : Regards sur le sport avec Benjamin Pichery (Le Pommier, 2010) ; Cahier « Michel Serres » avec Christiane Frémont (L’Herne, 2010) ; Louis Massignon, Écrits mémorables avec Christian Jambet et François Angelier, 2 volumes (Robert-Laffont, coll. « Bouquins », 2009).

François L'Yvonnet, Homo comicus : ou l'intégrisme de la rigolade, Mille et une nuits, 2012.
Commande possible sur Am

Trouvé sur: http://www.lepetitcelinien.com/

00:05 Publié dans Livre, Philosophie | Lien permanent | Commentaires (0) | Tags : livre, philosophie, rire | |  del.icio.us | | Digg! Digg |  Facebook

dimanche, 01 avril 2012

Martin van Crevelds neues Werk

Martin van Crevelds neues Werk „Kriegs-Kultur“ und die Frage, warum wir kämpfen      


Geschrieben von: Wolfram Wehl   

Ex: http://www.blauenarzisse.de/

 

Es spielt Marschmusik. Schwere Stiefel dröhnen auf dem Asphalt. Ein Offizier ruft Befehle. Langsam marschiert der Trauerzug im Gleichschritt die Straße entlang. Ähnlich wie viele Passanten, die innehalten, bin auch ich von der Zeremonie gebannt und vergesse das eigentliche Ziel meines Spaziergangs. Es ist die „Macht des Militärischen“, die den Menschen fasziniert und nach Meinung des Militärhistorikers van Creveld eine ganze Kultur ins Leben gerufen hat.

Martin van Creveld zählt zu den renommiertesten Militärhistorikern weltweit. Nach seinem umstrittenen Werk Kampfkraft, erschien vor kurzer Zeit eine neue Publikation. In: Kriegs-Kultur. Warum wir kämpfen: Die tiefen Wurzeln bewaffneter Konflikte beschreibt van Creveld den Krieg als kulturelles Phänomen.

Der Autor zeichnet in fünf Abschnitten ein detailliertes Bild verschiedener Kriegs-Kulturen. Diese reichen vom antiken Griechenland bis in die heutige Zeit. Nach van Creveld spiegelt sich eine Kriegs-Kultur vor allem in Bräuchen, besonderen Kriegs-Regeln (deren Überschreitung als schlimmstes Verbrechen galt), Kriegsspielen und dem Gedenken an den Krieg wieder.

Waffen als Phallus-Symbole

Zu Beginn stellt van Crefeld die These auf, dass Waffen nicht nur einfache Werkzeuge sind. Dies wird seiner Meinung nach bereits anhand der ausgewählten Namensgebung von Kriegsgeräten deutlich, wie beispielsweise die „Dicke Bertha“, ein Geschütz aus dem ersten Weltkrieg, oder die großen amerikanischen Flugzeugträger „Eisenhower“ und „McArthur“ bezeugen. Flugzeuge wurden häufig individuell angemalt, zeitweise auch mit leicht bekleideten Frauen. Lange Zeit war der Krieg schließlich eine reine Männerdomäne. Dies führt den Militärhistoriker zu einem spannenden Vergleich: Inwiefern können Kriegsgeräte als sexuelle Symbole wirken? So wird zum Beispiel bei Geschossen und Projektilen die Ähnlichkeit mit dem männlichen Geschlechtsteil dadurch verstärkt, dass ihre Spitzen oftmals einen hellen Farbanstrich erhalten. Gerade deswegen werden scharfe Waffen oft von Männern geschätzt, da sie nicht nur den Körper einer anderen Person zerreißen, sondern auch in ihn eindringen können.

Krieg ist allgegenwärtig und ein Bestandteil menschlichen Lebens

Dass der Krieg grausam und schrecklich ist, bestreitet van Creveld nicht. Dennoch übt er bis heute auf jeden Einzelnen eine persönliche Wirkung aus, wie sie in zahllosen Feldtagebüchern und Memoiren dokumentiert sind. Nicht nur in der Literatur (man denke an die Ilias), sondern vor allem in der Filmindustrie (Hollywood) hat das Thema Krieg einen festen Bestanteil. Die Regisseure wissen, dass man mit Filmstreifen wie Terminator oder Apocalypse Now ein breites Publikum begeistern kann.

An vielen Stellen weist der Autor darauf hin, dass Krieg und Kriegsspiele (als Vorläufer vom Krieg) Männersache sind. Das fängt bei Schach, dem klassischen Kriegsspiel, an und geht über Gladiatorenkämpfe bis hin zu den großen Feldzügen des 20. Jahrhunderts weiter. In diesem Zusammenhang benennt er den Krieg als „großes Spiel“, wo es um Leben und Tod geht. Dazu schreibt van Creveld: „Füllt der Geruch der Gefahr die Luft, werden Soldaten von teuren Nichtstuern zu sehr wertvollen Erzeugnissen verwandelt.“

Am Ende steht die Frage, ob eine Nation auch ohne eine Kriegskultur auskommen kann. Dieser Gedanke wird vom Autor schnell verneint, denn diesen Ländern drohe der gesellschaftliche Zerfall und ihre Streitkräfte seien allerhöchstens noch „wilde Haufen ohne Manneszucht, ohne soldatische Regeln, die kaum noch kämpfen, sondern höchstens Gräuel verursachen.“ Schlimmer allerdings sei es, wenn die Streitkräfte „Opfer des Feminismus“ würden. Dadurch leide die gesamte Kriegs-Kultur und somit auch „die Fähigkeit, einen Krieg zu führen.“

Clausewitz widerlegen

Das umfangreiche Werk Kriegs-Kultur ist aufgrund seiner Detailliertheit keine leichte Kost. Und doch liegt darin auch seine Stärke, da sich dem Leser aufgrund der Fülle des Materials völlig neue Zusammenhänge ergeben. So widerlegt van Creveld provokanterweise die These von Clausewitz, wonach Krieg lediglich ein Mittel zum Zweck sei, einen Gegner zu vernichten oder in die Handlungsunfähigkeit zu treiben. Der Autor zeigt nämlich vielmehr, dass der Krieg selber über die Jahrhunderte eine Faszination auf den Menschen ausgeübt hat, so sehr er sich auch dagegen wehren mag. Diese Begeisterung ist sowohl wichtiger Bestandteil wie auch Triebkraft der Kultur eines Krieges. In diesem Zusammenhang fügt er auch hinzu, dass jede Art „menschlicher Aktivität“ besser ausgeführt werde, wenn die Beteiligten bei ihrem Tun Vergnügen empfinden. Warum also sollte der Krieg davon eine Ausnahme bilden?

Martin van Creveld: Kriegs-Kultur. Warum wir kämpfen: Die tiefen Wurzeln bewaffneter Konflikte. 560 Seiten, mit zahlreichen Abbildungen. Ares-Verlag, Graz. 34,90 Euro.

samedi, 31 mars 2012

Wilhelm Stapel, théoricien de la “communauté cultuelle”

 

wilhel10.jpg

Wolfgang SAUR:

Wilhelm Stapel, théoricien de la “communauté cultuelle”

Le brillant essayiste allemand Sebastian Maass nous dresse un portrait de Wilhelm Stapel, publiciste politique de la révolution conservatrice

Armin Mohler garde surtout un grand mérite, et non des moindres: il a montré, dès 1950, comment l’héritage des idées de droite s’était transformé de manière originale pour produire un nouveau type révolutionnaire, immédiatement après la première guerre mondiale; il a baptisé ce processus de métamorphose “révolution conservatrice” et ouvert ainsi un formidable champ de recherches. Karlheinz Weissmann, pour sa part, a reformulé et réécrit le texte de base de l’ouvrage cardinal de Mohler en 2005; il souligne, dans la biographie qu’il a récemment consacrée à Armin Mohler, combien l’ouvrage “Die konservative Revolution in Deutschland - 1918-1932” a eu un “effet épocal”, tant sur les contemporains que chez ceux qui se réclament de sa postérité. Les retombées de l’ouvrage de Mohler se repèrent encore aujourd’hui.

Le travail d’un autre historien des idées, Sebastian Maass, qui appartient résolument à cette postérité de Mohler, s’inscrit bel et bien dans cette même veine. En peu de temps, Maass a exploré une part considérable des auteurs du filon “jeune-conservateur” (“jungkonservativ”) et a analysé leurs idées. L’une après l’autre, plusieurs monographies sont parues: sur Edgar Jung (2009), sur Arthur Moeller van den Bruck (2010) et sur Othmar Spann (2010). Aujourd’hui, Maass vient de sortir de presse un travail sur Wilhelm Stapel et sur son “Hamburger Kreis” (= “Cercle de Hambourg”).

Maass ne se contente pas d’évoquer la personnalité de l’auteur auquel il consacre une monographie ni d’exposer les seules idées qu’il a véhiculées. Outre une biographie, une analyse de l’oeuvre, une analyse détaillée des thèmes avancés et une insertion de l’oeuvre dans l’histoire générale des idées, les quatre volumes produits par Maass traitent également des collègues et disciples de l’auteur, ce qui permet de mettre bien en exergue le caractère collégial de ces producteurs d’idées nouvelles à une époque cruciale de l’histoire allemande. Cette manière de structurer les monographies se retrouve également dans le livre consacré à Stapel. En procédant de la sorte, Maass fait bien ressortir les principaux contours du paysage idéologique et intellectuel de la droite allemande au temps de la République de Weimar: ce paysage est structuré par des clubs et des associations comme le “Cercle de Hambourg” (autour de Stapel), le “Juni-Klub” et le cercle de la Motzstrasse à Berlin, le cercle regroupé autour de Jung à Munich, et le groupe de Othmar Spann à Vienne. Maass ajoute des documents pour compléter ses analyses. Ces documents sont importants comme par exemple l’apologie que prononce Stapel devant la “chambre de dénazification” en 1946 ou sa correspondance avec Armin Mohler.

L’angle d’attaque, que s’était choisi Mohler, était de nature herméneutique et fascine encore aujourd’hui bon nombre d’interprètes de la “konservative Revolution”. Cela vaut également pour Maass, qui reste fidèle aux leitmotive nietzschéens de Mohler comme l’image (plutôt que le concept – Bild statt Begriff), le cycle et la sphère (en lieu et place de la “linéarité”), le paganisme postchrétien. Ce regard nietzschéen s’avère parfois encombrant quand il faut aborder des auteurs qui ont un profil religieux (chrétien, catholique ou protestant). C’était d’ailleurs l’objet de la querelle épistolaire entre Mohler et Stapel dans l’immédiat après-guerre.

Malgré le nietzschéanisme mohlérien de Maass, celui-ci est malgré tout parvenu à rendre un formidable hommage à Stapel, figure importante de la “révolution conservatrice” d’inspiration protestante et auteur d’un ouvrage aujourd’hui oublié et méconnu, “Der christliche Staatsmann” (= “L’homme d’Etat chrétien”). Wilhelm Stapel (1882-1954) avait étudié l’histoire de l’art, la philosophie et l’économie politique. Il passe son doctorat en 1911 sous la houlette d’Edmund Husserl. Jusqu’en 1917, il occupe le poste de rédacteur-en-chef de la revue “Kunstwart”, un organe de “pédagogie populaire/folciste” créé par Ferdinand Avenarius et le “Dürerbund” (= la ligue Dürer). Après une querelle portant sur le patriotisme avec Avenarius, Stapel devient en 1917 rédacteur-en-chef du “Volksheim” de Hambourg, qui avait pour objet de former intellectuellement la jeunesse ouvrière; en 1919, il est rédacteur-en-chef du “Deutsches Volkstum”. Sous sa direction, cette revue, qui, à l’origine, véhiculait les idées des syndicalistes nationaux-allemands, s’est muée en un organe de la droite intellectuelle. Avec l’appui de Hans Bogner et des frères Albrecht-Erich et Gerhard Günther, Stapel inscrit la majeure partie de son travail éditorial dans le sillage d’une maison d’édition de la grande ville portuaire hanséatique, la “Hanseatische Verlagsanstalt”, qui édite de nombreux ouvrages dus à la plume de publicistes de droite. C’est dans cette maison d’édition que paraîtra d’ailleurs l’ouvrage principal de Stapel, “Der christliche Staatsmann” (1932).

C’est dans ce livre que Stapel va présenter et illustrer son concept de “Volksnomos”, de “nomos populaire/folciste”, en s’appuyant sur les idées que Hans Bogner avait élaborées sur la Polis antique des Grecs. Dans la figure mythologique du dieu de la Polis, affirmait Bogner, se trouve “l’esprit vital, la puissance unificatrice du peuple, qui doit être considéré comme une individualité concrète et centrée sur elle-même” et, par là même, une “personne”. Le nomos, c’est-à-dire l’ensemble des lois et des héritages, apparaît dès lors comme un “commandement divin” et le respect de ce que ce nomos exige, un devoir sacré. Le peuple est donc perçu comme ayant été, initialement, une “communauté cultuelle”. C’est dans une telle communauté cultuelle que s’enracine le nomos et c’est celui-ci qui fait le peuple. Chaque peuple a son nomos particulier et la pluralité des “nomoi” relève de la volonté divine. D’où la différence substantielle entre les cultures.

De cette façon, on peut classer la théologie du nomos, théorisée par le penseur de Hambourg, entre la pensée historique de Ranke et l’ethnopluralisme actuel. La théologie du nomos populaire/folciste a interpellé bon nombre d’adeptes du filon “jungkonservativ”, dont Max Hildebert Boehm, qui rédigera le livre le plus profond sur la question: “Das eigenständige Volk” (1932). Il s’agit bel et bien d’un développement de la notion de “Volkheit” chez Stapel.

Selon Boehm, la “Volkheit” n’est pas seulement une “forme typique” ou un “type” mais une norme tout à la fois éthique et esthétique. Elle englobe la polarité Etre/Vérité, relève d’une dimension tout à la fois ethnique et éthique et constitue, de fait, la puissance créatrice/génératrice d’histoire. Le peuple, en tant que sujet de l’histoire, est donc une “idée de Dieu”; l’on pourrait tout aussi bien dire: “une idée de la nature ou une apparition de la chose en soi” (dixit Stapel). Phrase qui souligne la philosophicité de l’idée de “nomos”. Celle-ci n’offre pas seulement un modèle pour définir l’identité mais se réfère à Kant et à ses antinomies tout en marquant la polarisation de l’expérience et de l’idée, de l’Etre et du devoir, des faits et des normes. Malgré la priorité accordée au “Volk”’ par rapport à l’Etat (c’est-à-dire l’auto-organisation politique d’une communauté), Stapel traite à fond du gouvernement (de la gouvernance) et des hommes politiques. Ce qui doit caractériser l’homme d’Etat, c’est la force qu’il irradie, celle qui crée l’ordre, soutient l’ardeur au combat et justifie l’autorité qu’il est amené à exercer.

Comment Stapel comprend-il le phénomène de la sécularisation? En y réfléchissant au départ de cette citation: “la domination des pères a été dissoute au profit de l’administration rationnelle”, ce qui signifie, par voie de conséquence, que la communauté guerrière, capable d’opérer des distinctions discriminantes au profit de la solidité communautaire, a cédé la place à une société civile pacifiste; en même temps, le charisme fécond de l’homme d’Etat a été aboli au profit du vote démocratique. Le libéralisme apparaît ainsi comme un contre-modèle fondé sur la critique dissolvante et sur un modèle anthropologique dont les représentants sont les produits d’une dégénérescence historique. L’homme libéral se pose comme “libéré du poids du passé et de la tâche de forger l’avenir”. Pour lui, “le passé est un chaos fumeux au-dessus duquel il s’est hissé” et “l’éternité n’est plus qu’une angoise de l’homme qui se sait créature”. Stapel s’est trompé quant au national-socialisme. En 1933, il a tenté, dans un premier temps, d’intervenir pour lui donner forme. Cette illusion s’est vite évanouie dès que des publicistes agressifs, inféodés au parti, lui ont rperoché ses “déficits” idéologiques, en l’occurrence l’absence de tout biologisme chez lui. Stapel s’est alors replié sur sa foi et a perçu Hitler comme “sotériologue” hostile aux vrais dieux de la Cité et porté par un orgueil déplacé.

Wolfgang SAUR.

(article-recension paru dans “Junge Freiheit”, Berlin, n°10/2012; http://www.jungefreiheit.de ).

Sebastian MAASS, Starker Staat und Imperium Teutonicum: Wilhelm Stapel, Carl Schmitt und  der Hamburger Kreis, Regin Verlag, Kiel, 2011 (190 S., 18,95 euro).

 

mercredi, 28 mars 2012

Gérard Romsée: mythe et réalité

Edwin TRUYENS:

Gérard Romsée: mythe et réalité

 

Recension: Evrard RASKIN, Gerard Romsée. Een ongewone man, en ongewoon leven, Hadewijch, Antwerpen-Baarn, 1995, 449 pages.

 

Gérard Romsée est né à Guigoven, dans la province du Limbourg, le 11 octobre 1901, fils de Joseph Romsée (1872-1933) et de Louise Boogaerts (1869-1928). Trois ans auparavant, un frère, Paul, était né dans le même foyer. Gérard Romsée descendait, par son grand-père paternel, d’une famille wallonne. Son père s’était inscrit au barreau des avocats mais n’e plaida que rarement. Il bénéficiait de riches émoluments comme intendant et, de plus, ses propres biens lui procuraient des revenus substantiels. La langue du foyer familial était le français.

 

A partir de septembre 1914, le jeune Gérard suit le curriculum des humanités gréco-latines au Collège Notre-Dame de Tongres, études suivies en grande partie en français. Lorsqu’éclate la guerre, il se révèle patriote passionné. Il est radicalement anti-allemand et s’oppose à l’activisme flamand. En 1916, il fonde une sorte de société secrète, la “Main Noire” (= “De Zwarte Hand”), dont les membres jurent de se porter volontaires dans l’armée belge dès l’âge de dix-huit ans, en passant par les Pays-bas pour rejoindre le front de l’Yser. En 1917, toutefois, Romsée se rend compte que le Mouvement Flamand défend pour l’essentiel une cause fondamentalement juste. C’est l’affaire Paul Vandermeulen qui a provoqué ce déclic. Cet aumônier limbourgeois aux armées plaidait la cause des soldats flamands sur le front de l’Yser. Il réagissait contre le fait que le corps des officiers était constitué, quasi intégralement, de francophones et que les soldats flamands étaient commandés exclusivement en français. Et lorsque Paul Vandermeulen, plus tard, se prononça en faveur d’une flamandisation de l’Université de Gand, l’armée lui infligea une sanction disciplinaire. On l’exila alors dans l’île française de Cézembre où l’armée belge avait organisé un camp pénitentiaire. Ces faits furent rapidement connus à l’arrière, y compris dans le Limbourg occupé: la jeunesse des collèges catholiques réagit avec fureur. Outre l’affaire Vandermeulen, il faut aussi mentionner l’influence patente du prêtre Eugeen Froidmont (1891-1957) qui fit évoluer Romsée du patriotisme belge à la cause flamande.

 

A l’automne de l’année 1920, Romsée s’inscrit à l’Université Catholique de Louvain. Il y étudie le droit et la philosophie thomiste. Il s’engage également dans les rangs de l’association catholique étudiante KVHV et dans l’association Saint Thomas. Dès l’année académique 1921-1922, le mouvement étudiant flamand se radicalise. Les 12, 13 et 14 avril 1924, ils organisent à Louvain le 19ème Congrès des Etudiants Grand-Néerlandais (“Grootnederlands Studentenkongres”). Ce congrès est ponctué de plusieurs bagarres; au cours de l’une d’entre elles l’étudiant wallon Gaby Colbacq tire trois coups de pistolet sur le Flamand Albert Vallaeys. Celui-ci survit mais les Flamands réagissent avec davantage de vigueur. A la suite de ces incidents, les autorités académiques interdisent le 3 mai 1924 toute activité future. Le KVHV n’a pas l’intention d’obéir à cette injonction. On avance la date des élections du praesidium. Paul Beeckman est élu nouveau président (praeses) et écrit aussitôt une lettre aux autorités académiques qui laisse bien entendre que le KVHV ne tiendra pas compte de la mesure prise par celles-ci. Beeckman est chassé de l’université. Romsée, qui avait été élu vice-président, prend la direction de l’association. Le débat avec les autorités académiques se poursuit mais, finalement, Romsée et Tony Herbert sont à leur tour chassés de l’université. Pour Romsée, c’est très grave: en représailles, son père lui interdit de pénétrer encore dans le foyer parental.

 

Comme Romsée ne peut plus étudier à l’université, il ne pourra pas devenir docteur en philosophie thomiste, car il s’agit là d’un diplôme scientifique. Mais il poursuit ses études de droit en toute indépendance et obtient son doctorat dès le 11 août 1926. Il s’installe comme avocat à Anvers. Quelque temps après, il se réconcilie avec son père et, peu après cette réconciliation, sa mère décède.

 

La 26 mai 1929, Romsée est élu député sur une liste du KVV (“Katolieke Vlaamse Volkspartij”; = “Parti Populaire Catholique Flamand”). Il est co-signataire du projet fédéral d’Herman Vos le 23 avril 1931. Le 10 décembre 1933, le KVV du Limbourg décide de s’adjoindre au VNV nationaliste. Le VNV pouvait alors être considéré comme l’organisation politique qui apportait l’unité parmi les formations nationalistes éparpillées. Mais cette unité demeurait fort fragile. A l’intérieur du VNV, on constatait une opposition assez tranchée, notamment entre Reimond Tollenaere, très radical, et Gérard Romsée, considéré comme “modéré”. Lorsque Tollenaire revient en 1940, après avoir été déporté dans le sud de la France en “train fantôme”, il exige que Romsée soit démis de ses fonctions au sein du “Conseil de Direction” du VNV (“Raad van Leiding”).

 

Pendant la seconde guerre mondiale, Romsée devient d’abord gouverneur du Limbourg, ensuite secrétaire-général pour les affaires intérieures en date du 31 mars 1941. L’Administration militaire allemande (“Militärverwaltung”) exige cependant que Romsée soit nommé secrétaire-général de la justice. Le Comité des secrétaires généraux ne veut pas satisfaire cette exigence allemande parce que Romsée n’a pas la confiance de la magistrature. En tant que secrétaire général, il s’efforce d’assurer le bon fonctionnement de l’administration. Il est toutefois isolé dans le comité des secrétaires généraux. Au sein de ce groupe, le VNV ne compte qu’un seul membre outre Romsée, en l’occurence Victor Leemans. Celui-ci manifeste aussi une nette indépendance d’esprit et n’apporte pas toujours son soutien à Romsée. On ne peut pas affirmer que Romsée soit un instrument des Allemands, dépourvu de toute volonté personnelle. Il se montre certes prêt à aller un peu plus loin dans la mise en oeuvre des ordonnances allemandes que ses collègues et la Militärverwaltung est très satisfaite de ses services. Le 6 février 1943, Romsée nomme Emiel Van Coppenolle commandant-en-chef de la gendarmerie.

 

A la fin de la guerre, Romsée fuit le pays. Il ne craint pas seulement la répression et sait aussi que Rex le vise car il s’est toujours montré réticent à nommer des rexistes à des postes importants. Son frère Paul est fusillé le 9 septembre 1944 par des membres du groupe “Partisans Armés”. Le 5 mai 1945, Romsée est à nouveau en Belgique et se constitue prisonnier. Il est jugé par l’Auditorat militaire de Bruxelles le 17 février 1947 et par le Conseil de Guerre le 27 mai 1948. La Cour le condamne à vingt ans de prison et à dix millions de francs de dommages et intérêts à l’Etat.

 

Romsée est libéré le 23 mars 1951. Il participe à la constitution du “Vlaamse Volksbeweging” en 1953 (= “Mouvement Populaire Flamand”), participe à quelques réunions mais se retire complètement de la politique en 1956. Il épouse sa nièce, Paule Romsée, le 18 mai 1955. Le mariage religieux est béni le 23 mai 1955. Il meurt le 14 avril 1976.

 

Cette brève notice biographique, qui se réduit à l’essentiel, induira plus d’un lecteur à se poser la question: cette biographie est-elle si intéressante qu’il a fallu lui consacrer tout un livre? Oui, car pour bien connaître l’histoire du nationalisme flamand pendant l’entre-deux-guerres et pendant la seconde guerre mondiale, il fallait absolument une étude scientifique sur Romsée. Pendant la seconde guerre mondiale, Romsée a entretenu des contacts jusqu’en juin 1943 avec la Cour, plus précisément avec Robert Capelle, secrétaire de Léopold III, qui ne condamnait pas la gestion de Romsée. Après sa  sortie de prison, Romsée ne s’est guère tu quant à ses activités du temps de guerre mais n’a jamais dit qui était sa personne de contact au Palais. En gardant le silence, il a, sans le vouloir, contribué à la naissance d’un mythe. Quoi qu’il en soit, c’est un fait évident: Romsée fut l’un des rares nationalistes qui, pendant une brève période, s’est retrouvé au coeur du pouvoir en Belgique. Ce membre du VNV du Limbourg était déjà accepté dans les salons avant la guerre.

 

Romsée n’a pas seulement été une figure importante du nationalisme flamand, il était aussi un personnage étonnant. Sa personnalité était très renfermée; manifestement, il avait des difficultés à nouer des relations affectives normales. Il était profondément croyant et a souvent cultivé l’idée de devenir prêtre ou de se retirer dans un couvent. Il avait un grand sens du devoir et une incroyable capacité de travail. Il était un homme raisonnable et érudit. On lui accorde encore et toujours la réputation d’avoir appartenu à l’aile démocratique du VNV, bien qu’un examen plus précis de la question permet de déduire que rien ne le confirme vraiment. On le compte parmi les modérés mais était problablement plus radical qu’il n’en donnait l’impression. On estime aussi qu’il appartenait à l’aile fédéraliste du VNV mais semble plutôt avoir été un “Grand-Néerlandais” convaincu. Evrard Raskin cite notamment un article de Romsée paru dans “De Bilzenaar”, le 18 août 1934: “On peut se représenter la Grande Néerlande comme un Etat fédéral des Flamands et des Néerlandais. Si un tel fédéralisme avec la Hollande se réalisait par la volonté exclusive du peuple flamand, alors ce fédéralisme pourrait être plus facilement mis en place que tout fédéralisme avec la Wallonie et il faudrait lui donner la préférence. Car les Flamands et les Hollandais forment ensemble la même communauté populaire et culturelle: le peuple néerlandais, lié par l’usage d’une seule et même langue néerlandaise” (p. 136).

 

Evrard Raskin, ancien député de la Volksunie, nous livre un travail bien fait, volumineux, agréable à lire et bien étayé. Il a comblé une lacune dans l’histoire du nationalisme flamand. Cet historien et ce jursite, né en 1935, a réussi à faire oublier cet arrière-goût désagréable que nous avait laissé la rédaction de ses mémoires politiques en 1980.

 

Edwin TRUYENS.

(recension parue dans “Kort Manifest”, n°84, sept.-oct. 1997).

jeudi, 08 mars 2012

Europe vs. the West

Europe vs. the West

Posted By F. Roger Devlin

Ex: http://www.counter-currents.com/

Pierre Krebs
Fighting for the Essence: Western Ethnosuicide or European Renaissance?
London: Arktos Media, 2012

This newest offering from Arktos is the first translation into English from the works of Pierre Krebs, a leading figure in the European New Right. Born in French Algeria (1946), Krebs studied law, journalism, sociology and political science in France, taking an active role in right-wing politics during the late 1960s. Later settling in Germany, he founded the Thule Seminar, a self-described “research society for Indo-European Culture,” in Kassel in 1980. The German Verfassungsschutz (Office for the Protection of the Constitution) appears to take considerable interest in his activities.

Besides the book under review, Dr. Krebs is the author of The European Rebirth, The Imperishable Inheritance: Alternatives to the Principle of Equality and a study on Valéry and Wagner. Fighting for the Essence was first published in German translation in 1996, with a revised French edition appearing in 2000.

Krebs’ nomenclature, original with him so far as I know, draws a sharp contrast between “Europe” and “the West.” “Europe” refers to the great racial and cultural tradition he wishes to defend; “the West” means today’s “Western community of values” that engages in humanitarian bombing campaigns, enforces tolerance at gunpoint on its subject populations, prefers the stranger to the kinsman, and wishes to erase even the distinction between men and women.

Prof. Krebs is good at pointing up the antinomies of this modern ideological abortion: its homogenization in the name of diversity and suppression of particularity in the name of tolerance. Multiculturalism and multiracialism, as he observes, are mystifying terms which function to conceal a culturicidal and raciophobic program of deracination and panmixia. “The doctrine of human rights should be seen for what it really is: the ideological alibi of the West in a battle to the death that it has declared on all the peoples of the world.”

Apologists for Western ideology rest their case upon a false dichotomy between assimilation and fearful isolation:

In fact, just as the self-defined individual who differentiates himself from the surrounding masses does not isolate himself from society, but on the contrary enriches it with his uniqueness, so also a people conscious of their difference do not isolate themselves any more from the human species, but come closer to it every time they endow it with their singularities and their peculiarities. The more a people becomes conscious of their difference, the more their opening up to the world has a chance of profiting others . . . and the more they are inclined to tolerate the differences of others.

The author distinguishes three stages in the development of “the egalitarian lie.” The first, political stage replaces organic democracy with a parliamentary procedure emptied of ethno-cultural content; the second, juridical phase, demands that all nations align their constitutions to this same model; the third, ideological stage breaks down the territorial integrity of nations through open immigration, which leads directly to the final biological abolition of human differences in universal panmixia.

All of this sounds consistent with what might be called the orthodox conservative narrative of Western decline since the Enlightenment. Nor does Krebs depart from that narrative in tracing the origin of egalitarianism to Christianity. In the view of many on the Christian right, modernism is a practical form of the Pelagian heresy, an attempt to bring heaven down to earth—“immanentizing the eschaton,” in Voegelin’s mellifluous words.

But Krebs names the heresiarch Pelagius as one of his heroes. In his view, the egalitarian lie is to be blamed not on any perversion of Christianity, but on Christianity itself—or, as he invariably writes, “Judeochristianity.” He cites Nietzsche’s observation that

Christianity, which has sprung from Jewish roots and can only be understood as a plant that has come from that soil, represents the counter-movement to every morality of breeding, race or privilege—it is the anti-Aryan religion par excellence.

From this Krebs infers that

every discourse which calls for a European Renaissance without separating itself from Judeo-Christian civilization, its dogmas and its rituals, is condemned to failure in advance, since it is enclosed within the very matrix of decline. . . . The monotheistic “Unique” and the egalitarian “Same” are, in fact, the front and reverse side of the same coin. . . . [The] continuity is flagrant between the Jewish will to reduce the polymorphic and polysemic figures of the divine to the univocal figure of the only God, an autocratic being, the absolute ‘I’ of the universe on the one hand; and the secularized monotheism of human rights on the other, informed by the same will to reduce all the racial and cultural polymorphism of the world to univocal figure of a globalized Homo occidentalis, a serial repetition of a Same detached from its identitarian affiliations.

The author also cites Nietzsche’s suggestion that monotheism, “the belief in a normal god next to whom there are only false pseudo-gods,” was a “consequence of the teaching of a normal human type.” Indo-European polytheism, on the other hand, “is fundamentally alien to the notion of messianism or proselytism, the natural sources of the intolerance and fanaticism that are characteristic of the three monotheistic religions.”

Finally, the author accuses “Judeochristianism” of “breaking the bond of friendship between men and nature” through its command to subdue the earth. Anyone with a genuinely European mentality, he says, would find incomprehensible the promise to Noah and his sons that “the fear and dread of you shall be upon every beast of the earth, and upon every fowl of the air: into your hand are they delivered.”

The look which [Westernized Europe] bestows on Nature is no longer the look of the living man who discovers and feels himself a partner of the world. It is the essentially venal, anonymous and cold look of techno-scientific inspection, a utilitarian look that no longer conceives the world as a dwelling in which man is the inhabitant, but as an object that men, endowed with the power of appropriation by Jehovah, have the duty to exploit.

The rejection of Christianity does not commit the author to reject all of post-classical European civilization, of course, or even all of its religious life. He emphasizes that Christianity never truly eradicated the pagan heritage, and claims to find the native spirit of Europe in many great figures of the Christian era, including Pelagius, John Scotus Eriugena, Meister Eckhart, Nicholas of Cusa, Giordano Bruno, Jacob Böhme, Goethe, Hölderlin, Beethoven, the dramatist Friedrich Hebbel, Theodor Storm, Rilke, Teilhard de Chardin, Saint-Exupéry and Heidegger. He also claims that Gothic architecture owed nothing to “Judeochristianity.”

Dr. Krebs’ treatment of Christianity and Western decline deserves a fuller treatment not only than I can give here but also than he himself offers in his slender volume. The issue is of the utmost practical importance, for it represents a rejection of the great majority of his potential political allies.

This reviewer is happy to agree that the rise of Christianity, with its promise of salvation to the world-weary, was closely bound up with the decline of Graeco-Roman civilization. Indeed, I suspect this historical context better accounts for what Krebs finds decadent in Christianity than does its racially alien origin. But does it make sense to blame Christianity also for the decadence of modern civilization?

There is surely considerable temerity in reducing the thirteen or fourteen centuries of European civilization between the conversion of Constantine and the Enlightenment to a list of fifteen personal favorite figures. And the temerity is increased by the implied claim to have understood several of these figures better than they understood themselves.

It is a familiar observation that enlightenment thought amounts to a secularized version of Christian doctrine, a displacement of its eschatology into the realm of politics. Erik von Kuehnelt-Leddihn is just one example of a Christian conservative who stressed this connection, citing the Latin proverb corruptio optimi pessima: “the corruption of the best is the worst.”

But Krebs the admirer of Pelagius cannot mean this; his explicit positions would force him to deny that the secularization of Christianity is the essential misstep. Instead he must hold that (1) Christianity itself is responsible for the specific way in which it was negated by the Enlightenment, and that (2) Europe has been in a state of decadence since at least the fourth century AD. This bold interpretation of European history may deserve consideration, but the author has hardly made a case for it in the brief manifesto under review.

Next to “Judeochristianity,” Krebs’ greatest scorn is reserved for “the putrid swamps of America,” with their fast food restaurants and comic-book literature. This, of course, is a common trope of European intellectuals across the political spectrum, easily made plausible by comparing American low culture with European high culture. As a long-time American expatriate in Europe, I often had cause to lament mindless lowbrow Americanization myself, but it is hardly a reflection on America that Europeans prefer McDonald’s to Melville. Wilsonian democratic messianism would also have got nowhere without striking a chord in other lands.

Dr. Krebs closes his work with some far more plausible reflections on culture, immigration and territory. He cites Heiner Geissler of Germany’s Christian Democratic Union party as a representative of contemporary elite opinion:

It is not the influx of foreigners but the incapacity for rejuvenation and adaptation of the Germans, combined with their aversion to immigration, that represents the real danger for our future. . . . In the future, Germans will not have to live with just five million foreigners—as today—but with seven, perhaps ten million.

The danger in such a mindset stems from its unfalsifiability. We have no reason to think Herr Geissler unacquainted with the problems connected to immigration; he may well have to deal with them every day. But he has a ready-made explanation for all of them, as well as any that may arise in the future: the “xenophobia” of his fellow countrymen. As long as he clings to this notion, no empirical evidence of immigration’s failure will ever give him cause to reconsider his commitment to it—not even a full-scale ethnic civil war. Such observations, writes Dr. Krebs, “allow one to measure to what a degree of stupidity and blindness the militants of multiracialism have sunk.”

All culture is regional, expressing the beliefs and sensibility of the people of a particular place and time. As such, it necessarily involves an element of exclusion, namely, the exclusion of what is foreign to those beliefs and sensibilities and to the way of life in accordance with them. For this reason, any serious defense of culture boils down to a defense of territory. Let us close with a fine observation Krebs takes from Irenäus Eibl-Eibesfeldt, the Austrian founder of the discipline of human ethology:

The best way to maintain peaceful cooperation between peoples consists in guaranteeing to each of them a territory that each people has the right to administer in its own way, and in which it is permitted to develop itself culturally as it sees fit. . . . To the degree that people accept the implantation of minorities in their territories, they open the door to inter-ethnic competition in their own house.


Article printed from Counter-Currents Publishing: http://www.counter-currents.com

URL to article: http://www.counter-currents.com/2012/02/europe-vs-the-west/

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jeudi, 26 janvier 2012

Revolution from Above

Revolution from Above

Alex KURTAGIC

Ex: http://www.alternativeright.com/

Kerry Bolton
Revolution from Above
London: Arktos Media, 2011

The popular imagination conceives Marxism and capitalism as opposing forces, imagining that—obviously—Marxists want the capitalists’ money and capitalists do not want Marxists to take it from them.

Kerry Bolton’s Revolution from Above disproves this notion.

revolution-from-aboveAs it turns out, and as many readers probably already know, the Marxist revolutions in the East succeeded in many places thanks to the ample funds supplied to them—consciously and voluntarily—by finance-capitalists in the West.

With access to all the money they could wish for and more, the finance-capitalists in Bolton’s narrative were, and are, primarily motivated by a desire for power, and their ultimate aim was not even more money per se, but the enduring ability to shape the world to their convenience, which translates into a collectivised planet of producers and consumers.

Marxism was useful in as much as it was a materialistic ideology that destroyed traditional structures and values and turned citizens into secular, deracinated wage slaves, irrespective of race, gender, age, creed, disability, or sexual orientation.

Capitalism was useful in as much as it made money the measure of all things and created a consumer culture that ultimately turned citizens into debt slaves, also irrespective of race, gender, and so on.

In this manner, Marxism and capitalism were seen as complementary, as well as a method of pacifying the citizenry: too busy labouring in the factory or in the cubicle, and too befuddled by daydreams of shopping and entertainment during their free time, the citizens of this global order, fearful of losing their jobs and not being able to buy things or satisfy their creditors, are left with little inclination to, or energy for, rebellion.

Bolton explains how the finance-capitalist oligarchy is the entity that truly runs our affairs, rather than the national governments. The latter are either financially dependent, or in partnership, with the financiers and the central bankers.

To illustrate this dependency he documents the United States’ government relationship with the Bolsheviks in Russia during the revolution, not to mention the similarity in their goals despite superficial appearances to the contrary and despite alarm or opposition from further down the hierarchy. Bolton shows how genuinely anti-communist efforts were frustrated during the Cold War. And he shows that the close relationship with communist regimes ended when Stalin decided to pursue his own agenda.

The book then goes on to describe the various mechanisms of plutocratic domination. Bolton documents the involvement of a network of prominent, immensely rich, tax-exempt, so-called ‘philanthropic’ organisations in funding subversive movements and think tanks. Marxism has already been mentioned, but it seems these foundations were also interested in promoting feminism and the student revolts of 1968.

Feminism was sold to women as a movement of emancipation. Bolton argues, and documents, that its funders’ real aim was to end women’s independence (from the bankers) and prevent the unregulated education of children: by turning women into wage-slaves they would become dependent on an entity controlled by the plutocrats, double the tax-base, double the size of the market, and create the need for children’s education to be controlled by the government—an entity that is, in turn, controlled by the plutocrats. Betty Friedan, who founded the second wave of feminism with her book The Feminine Mystique, and Gloria Steinem are named as having received avalanches of funding from ‘philanthropic’ foundations.

With regards to the university student revolts of 1968, the book highlights the irony of how, without the activists knowing it, they were backed by the same establishment they thought to be opposing. These students were but ‘useful idiots’ in a covert strategy of subversion and social engineering.

The subversion does not end there, for the plutocracy has global reach and is as actively engaged in global planning today as it ever was. Revolution from Above inevitably deals with George Soros’ involvement in the overthrow of governments or regimes not to his liking. According to Bolton’s account, the reader can take it for granted that any of the velvet or ‘colour revolutions’ we have seen in recent years have been funded in some way or another by George Soros through his extended network of instruments. ‘Regime-changes’ in Yugoslavia, Georgia, Ukraine (orange revolution), Kyrgyszstan (pink revolution), Tunisia (jasmine revolution), Egypt (white revolution), Lybia (red, green, black revolution), and Iran (green revolution) were not the result of spontaneous uprisings. Anti-government parties, think tanks, media, campaigns, demonstrations, and even training courses for political agitation—all and in all cases received vast funding from finance-capitalism overseas, not from local collections of petty sums.

In other words, many a modern revolution has not come from below, but from above. And in the context of governments being in a dependent relationship to the stratospherical plutocracy, this aggregates into a pincer strategy, with pressure coming secretly from above and from below, with the pressure from below—however spontaneous and ‘messy’ it may seem when it hits the headlines—being the result of years of careful planning, financing, and preparation by overseas elites.

The reader must ask himself how it is that whenever we see one of these ‘colour revolutions’ somehow someone is able, almost overnight, to overwhelm the streets with a tsunami of well designed, professionally printed, and colour-coordinated merchandise: flags, scarves, placards, posters, leaflets, balloons, headbands, t-shirts, face-paint, you name it, it all seems very slick, aesthetically consistent, and fashion-conscious for uprisings that are supposedly spontaneous demonstrations of popular rage.

Overall Bolton crams in an enormous mass of information within 250 pages. The lists of names and figures—and some of the sums involved are truly staggering—are endless, and the persistent torrent of footnotes considerably expand on parts of the main narrative. The plutocrats’ web of influence and deceit is immensely complicated, not only as a structure but also as a process, since it thrives in double meaning, double think, and ambiguity. Those interested in a detailed knowledge of the machinations behind current and recent events, or even twentieth-century political history, would do well to read this book more than once—at least if they have ambitions of explaining it all to an educable third party.

One aspect of Bolton’s narrative that seems quite amazing is the superficially inoffensive tone of some of the enemy quotes provided. Were it not because Bolton’s findings flow in the same direction as other books uncovering the machinations of the oligarchs and their partners in Western governments, or because the answer to cui bono is provided unequivocally by the unfolding of current and historical events, it would be easy to think that the statements quoted came from deluded idealists. It may be that some truly believe in the goodness of their cause, yet such selfless altruism is hard to believe given the known absence of ethics among our current elite of super-financiers—the banking system they engineered, not to mention many of the opaque financial instruments we have come to known through the still unfolding financial crisis in the West, is a deception designed to obscure a practice of legalised theft.

The lessons are clear: firstly, modern ‘colour revolutions’ are not instigated by public desires for more democratic or liberal governance, but by private desires for increased global power and control; secondly, subversive movements can be given a name and a face—a name and a face averse that hides behind generic institutional names and orchestrates world events at the end of a complex money trail; and thirdly, the those seeking fundamental change should first become proficient capitalists or learn how to gain access to them. These are all obvious, of course, but Revolution from Above is less about teaching those lessons than about documenting how the world is run, by whom, and for what purpose. In other words, this is material with which to back up assertions likely to be challenged by, or in front of, the unaware. Sober and factual in tone, it is also good gift material for those who may benefit from a bit of education.

mardi, 24 janvier 2012

How the British Constructed a New Woman’s Movement

How the British Constructed a New Woman’s Movement

A Book Review of Feminine Fascism

 

Julie V. Gottlieb
Feminine Fascism: Women in Britain’s Fascist Movement, 1923-1945
New York: I.B. Tauris, 2003.

“Feminine fascism” is a phrase that Julie V. Gottlieb uses to describe the forward-thinking, yet traditionally influenced, ideology embraced by Britain’s fascists. Their objective was not a return to the past, to a time when women were solely mothers and homemakers. Instead, the fascists in England combined traditional roles with the advances made in women’s suffrage and the workplace, and added a fascist bent of discipline and integrity.

Feminine Fascism: Women in Britain’s Fascist Movement is a chronological account of fascism in Britain, starting in 1923 with the country’s first fascist group, the British Fascisti, founded by Rotha Lintorn-Orman, a woman. The BF remained the predominant fascist organization until Sir Oswald Mosley’s British Union of Fascists (BU) was established in 1932. Feminine Fascism discusses the role of women in these two groups, details the unique form of feminism embraced by members, and ends with an account of the internment and trials of women fascists during World War II. The last quarter of the book provides brief biographies of the many women in fascist Britain.

Gottlieb, a senior lecturer in history at the University of Sheffield, has trouble wrapping her head around what attracted so many women to fascism, especially those who had campaigned for women’s suffrage. How could women embrace such seemingly different ideologies: women’s rights, on the one hand, and anti-democracy on the other? The answer is that fascism offered women the best of both worlds.

Britain’s fascists encouraged women to be traditional in many areas. Motherhood was valued and respected, as was homemaking. In fact, the Corporate State would include a Home Corporation, in which homemakers would have representation just like any other trade. An article in The Blackshirt explained, “only when women represent women will womankind attain its rightful influence.”

A primary goal of the fascist platform was allowing women to once again be homemakers, but they used forward-thinking methods to advance their ideology. Many British women were essentially forced into the workplace due to wage variances between the sexes. Employers preferred less costly female employees, which pushed many men out of jobs. All too many families experienced the trials of having a working mother, with the father at home tending the house and children, unable to secure a decent wage. The fascists knew that in the modern world, a platform that appeared to regress women’s rights would hold no sway. Thus, they supported equal wages for women, since equal pay would mean that more men could return to the workforce. As explained by Fascist Week:

Under Fascism women will not be compelled to resign, but encouraged to do so by the fact that, under Corporate State and the scientific methods of raising real wages, men will be able to afford to marry women—and women will not be compelled to earn their own living as they are at present. (125)

However, the fascists never insisted that career-minded women remain at home, recognizing that there were not only occupations suited to women, but also situations in which women would desire a career and need equal pay. Rosalind Raby, for example, claimed that fascism would allow the unmarried mother “to earn an honest living for herself and her child.”

March_2

But the biggest innovation in British fascism was its emphasis on character. Men were encouraged to have values of courage, strength, honour, and integrity. The aristocracy of money and class would be replaced in the Corporate State with a meritocracy. Likewise, British fascism presented an alternate form of femininity: one that included strength, courage, and fearlessness. During marches, women were not permitted to wear lipstick or wave at friends as if in a beauty pageant. These feminine fascists were described as healthy, attractive, charming, intelligent, and of strong character. They were motherly, but as wary of sentimentality as Julius Evola. A male writer described the women Blackshirts:

Nothing silly or soft about these women. They are nothing if not practical . . . and the happy carefree way in which they made themselves at home, was so refreshing after one has had their fill of the simpering little brats that democracy and Jewish films have produced. (95)

The combination of traditional and modern was seen in the BU women’s uniform of: a black blouse, grey skirt, and black beret. It was against regulations for women to wear trousers while on active duty.

Integrating Fascism into Everyday Life

 

British fascists grew in numbers, in part because they didn’t relegate their philosophy to just the political sphere, but participated in almost every aspect of members’ lives. Weddings included fascist regalia, and at some funerals a fascist flag was draped over the coffin. The Fascist Week printed the names of wedding guests just like the society pages of The Times.

wedding

Members of the BF organized Fascist Children’s Clubs, in which children were taught history, songs, patriotism, and given awards for homework. Other women had brooches designed with the BU lightning symbol, and made dolls dressed in the blackshirt for children. There also was a BU Women’s Choir. According to Gottlieb:

By celebrating each phase of life within a fascist framework, the BF in fact appropriated the functions once carried out by the Church and this substantiated their claim . . . that fascism was akin to a religion. (28)

In addition to the accolades given to real women, there were fascist heroines as well. The most notable was Queen Elizabeth, for her command of the nation and exemplary oratory skills. Another heroine was Lady Hester Stanhope, who worked as a housekeeper before traveling through the Middle East. E. D. Hart wrote:

Those women who, whether from choice or, as in the case of Lady Hester, from necessity, explore other walks of life, will find both assistance and encouragement. When, like her, they display the Fascist virtues of courage, self-reliance, and tenacity of purpose, we ascribe to them the honour which is their due. (97)

Blackshirts also banded together to disparage several less attractive types of women. One was the feminist with mannish, short hair, called the “bleating Bloomsbury.” Another was the “Mayfair Parasite,” who usurped the nation’s wealth and vitality by sleeping late and devoting her life to superficial pleasures. Being fit and healthy was considered a moral duty, for as one writer put it: “Far too many women consider it their privilege to be ill . . . just ill enough to pamper themselves and evade their share of the family work.” Communists often were referred to as “submen” and “subwomen.” Titled women did not escape criticism either. Those who earned money by advertising products were publicly chastised by BU members for degrading both themselves and their class.

Women’s Duties in Fascist Organizations

Women were involved in almost every area of Britain’s fascist groups, and made up about 25 percent of the membership. The Women’s Section of the BU was established in March 1933, under the leadership of Lady Maud Mosley. She said, “When my son married Lady Cynthia [Mosley’s first wife], she took her place by his side. Now she is dead and there must be someone to help him in this work and I am going to do my best to fill the gap” (52).

Mosley’s second wife, Diana, and her sister Unity Valkyrie Mitford became two of the best-known female fascists, but Feminine Fascism only lightly touches on their stories. Their aristocratic parents were extremely Right-wing and anti-Semitic, but when the 2nd Baron Redesdale supported England during the war, he and his Nazi-sympathizing wife permanently separated.

Diana_MitfordDiana was married to Bryan Guinness when she met Mosley, and soon became his mistress. Mosley’s wife died suddenly of peritonitis in 1933 (though he was plagued the rest of his life that infidelities and political stress might have been the cause). Mosley and Diana were married at the home of Joseph Goebbels in 1936, with Hitler as guest of honor.

Unity debuted the same year her older sister became Mosley’s mistress. The next year, Diana and Unity went to the 1933 Nuremberg Rally as part of the BU delegation, and saw Hitler for the first time. Unity returned to Germany the following year, eating at the same restaurant as the Führer for 10 months, until he finally asked her over. Unity wrote to her father of their meeting: “I am so happy that I wouldn’t mind a bit, dying. I'd suppose I am the luckiest girl in the world. For me he is the greatest man of all time.” Hitler, in turn, described Unity as “a perfect specimen of Aryan womanhood.” Their affections might have escalated, if not for a suicide attempt by Hitler’s mistress, Eva Braun. Though in love with Hitler, Unity devoted herself to making speeches, writing letters, distributing propaganda, and being one of Hitler’s intimate confidantes. On September 3, 1939, the day Britain declared war on Germany, Unity took a pearl-handled pistol (a gift from Hitler for protection) and shot herself in the head, unable to bear the thought of the two countries she loved at war. She survived and was eventually able to walk again, but never recovered her full mental capabilities.

While Unity was helping the cause on the continent, women Blackshirts in England spoke at meetings, organized children’s groups, sold newspapers, and participated in marches and canvassing. Study groups about fascism were established for women speakers, and women participated in public debates. But women did not forsake their traditional duties either: One woman reported that it was the fair sex who kept the BU headquarters clean and brewed tea for the men. Members who did not give five nights a week to the movement were denied the privilege of wearing the coveted blackshirt.

A relatively large number of women participated in local elections. In 1936, the BU ran 10 women candidates (10 percent of their parliamentary candidates), from a variety of backgrounds. (Six were unmarried, five were professionals, three were in their 20s, and two were from gentry families.) The various women received between 15 and 23 percent of the votes in their respective districts.

speaking

Women’s most valuable talents were said to be in public speaking, and numerous BU women were praised for their excellent oration and ability to move crowds. Other women were lauded for their ability to use personal stories in their speeches, which proved more powerful than simple recitations of facts. During a 1936–37 campaign, women decided to censor their speeches for tactical advantage. No speaker was allowed to use the word “Jew.” Instead, plain-clothed members were scattered throughout the audience to use the word instead, as the message was thought to be more rousing if coming from the public.

Women had roles to play in security and self-defense as well. Female members of several organizations were trained in ju-jitsu, for as Fascist Week reported, “no male member of the BU is permitted to use force upon any woman, and women Reds often form a highly noisy and razor-carrying section at fascist meetings. Thus we counter women with women” (66).

The Fallout During the War

As early as 1938, a division of MI5 was formed to place agents in subversive organizations. Three women agents provocateurs successfully infiltrated the popular fascist group, Captain Ramsay’s Right Club. After Britain entered WWII, the country started to resemble a totalitarian dystopia for fascist sympathizers. In October 1939, Anne Brock Griggs was charged with “insulting words and disturbing the peace” for saying in a speech: “If Germans don’t like Hitler they can get rid of him themselves. We do not need to send our sons to fight them. If ever a country wants a revolution now it is Great Britain” (236). She quit her BU post, but was still interned during the war.

Defense Regulation 18B(1A) went into effect in September 1939, and it allowed the Home Secretary to detain anyone suspected of being a threat to national security. That category included anyone who was a leader or member in a group that might be under foreign influence. Under 18B, 1,826 people were interned, including 747 BU members (96 of them women).

Sir Oswald Mosley was arrested in May 1940, the day after the Defense Regulations were passed. The BU was outlawed in June, and his second wife, Diana, was interned shortly after. She was denounced by both her sister Nancy (later a famous novelist and biographer) and her former father-in-law, and had to leave without her 11-week-old, still-nursing baby boy. Although the English public called for Unity Mitford to be interned as a traitor, she was allowed to return to the family home with her mother, since she was weak from her suicide attempt.

Interned women were given no special treatment in prison. When Miss L. M. Reeve was arrested, a group of armed guards came to take her from her home. One officer asked if he could have her dog, since she was “probably about to be shot.” One woman’s infant died while staying with her in prison, and another woman’s infant was pulled from her arms and placed in an institution. Part of the evidence against another woman was a photograph of her on vacation in Germany in 1939, seated at a table with bottles of German wine.

Fascists on the outside, though their organizations were banned, were still able to help their comrades via a registered charity founded specifically to help those interned under 18B. The charity helped pay for legal and medical services, provided assistance to detainees’ families, provided post-release counseling, and helped people find employment. Trials could only be held for those who could be charged with a tangible offense, so many men and women fascists were imprisoned for years.

The Impact of Feminine Fascism

 

The much-anticipated Corporate State never became a reality, and its philosophies and ideas were forced to the margins of history. Yet the lessons that can be learned from the events detailed in Feminine Fascism remain relevant to the leaders of future generations.

Eighty years ago, the fascists recognized that it would be impossible to shed the gains made in women’s rights. Rather than fighting against women’s “emancipation,” with which they ideologically disagreed, the fascists used it to their advantage. The result was a philosophy for women that honored the traditional, yet considered the needs of modern women. Fascists didn’t need to force women into the home or sell them on an ideology that contradicted the propaganda of the modern world; they realized that the moment women didn’t have to work the majority of mothers would return gladly to full-time homemaking. And given the precarious nature of homemaking as a profession, they planned ways for women to have representation and security in the Corporate State. The result was a platform that united women of various political persuasions, ages, and classes. Because it details the fascists’ unique outlook and strategy, Feminine Fascism makes a relevant handbook for those looking to learn from the successes and failures of history.

lundi, 09 janvier 2012

Interview with Leo Yankevich

Interview with Leo Yankevich

By Greg Johnson

Editor’s Note:

Recently, I interviewed leading formalist poet Leo Yankevich on poetry, politics, and his new Counter-Currents title Tikkun Olam and Other Poems [2].

What is formalist poetry? What is the new formalist movement?

Formalist poetry is essentially metrical poetry, whether it be rhymed or unrhymed. 99.99% of English-language poetry published up until 1900 was formalist. Even the early 20th century modernists, such as Ezra Pound, were highly competent formalists who, in addition to metrical poems, wrote free verse as a revolt against the stilted poetry of the 19th century Victorians. His famous motto “make it new” applies to both free and metrical verse.

The new formalist movement is a revolt against the amorphous post-modernist free verse that has been the dominant mode of poetic expression in the aftermath of World War II. It is formalism resurrected with a contemporary voice.

Which poets have inspired or influenced you the most?

W. B. Yeats, Ezra Pound, Roy Campbell, and Dylan Thomas.

Who do you think are the best living poets?

I’d place myself on the top of the list, of course, followed by Richard Wilbur, and Joseph S. Salemi.

Who are the best non-formalist poets?

Among the dead, Robinson Jeffers.

Among the living, I don’t know. There are millions of them. Besides, I don’t consider them poets. Rather, writers-of-prose chopped-up-into-lines.

Who are the best literary critics and historians? Have any critics influenced your work as a poet?

H. L. Mencken, T. S. Eliot, and Cleanth Brooks. I can’t say, though, that they have influenced my work.

What is the relationship of art and propaganda? Art and politics?

All art is propaganda whether its creator intends it to be or not. Most art today promotes decadence, homosexuality, and miscegenation. The art of the ancient Greeks and Romans, on the other hand, promoted health and a philosophy that aimed at perfection.

What is your view of Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn?

I hold Solzhenitsyn in very high esteem as a writer, soldier, and man. His books tell the truth of the inhuman Gulag and his long poem Prussian Nights depicts the barbaric behavior of Soviet rabble soldiers, who, inspired by the anti-German propaganda of Ilya Ehrenburg, raped and murdered their way through Prussia in 1945. As a young captain in the Red Army he witnessed the barbarity first hand and was later brave enough to write about it. Here I quote 5 lines:

The little daughter’s on the mattress,
Dead. How many have been on it?
A platoon, a company perhaps?
A girl’s been turned into a woman,
A woman turned into a corpse.

One of the central themes of your new book Tikkun Olam is the destructiveness of Jewish power. How did you become aware of this issue?

As early as I can remember, I knew who was behind the Katyn Massacre: the Soviets. However, in 2001 I began looking into who these “Soviets” were ethnically, and I discovered an article written by the late Dr. William Pierce on the topic. This led me to listen to his broadcasts. Week by week he removed the shutters from my eyes. Later, the writings of the superb prose stylist and classicist Revilo Oliver improved my vision on the matter.

What do you think of the writings of Count Potocki of Montalk?

Certainly Potocki was a character akin in many ways to myself. I, too, am descended from nobles (Polish-Lithuanian) on my father’s side. My paternal grandfather’s surname was Jankiewicz (Yankevich is a transliteration). And my paternal grandmother’s maiden name was Jetkiewicz. However, although I am theoretically a count, I make no claim to the Polish throne!

My good friend Joseph S. Salemi acquired a handful of Potocki’s books for me. I must admit that I am disappointed by the quality of his poetry, which is about a tenth as good as the poetry of fellow right-winger Roy Campbell.

Potocki, however, was a brave man and a good European. Although in 1943 the London Polish community was well aware of who was responsible for the Katyn massacre (the Soviets) it was the Count who brought it to light in the English-speaking world with the publication of his Katyn Manifesto, for which he was placed under surveillance by Scotland Yard.

What impact do you hope that Tikkun Olam will have on readers?

I hope the book will help them understand what has been inflicted on Europid man in the last 100 years and where our race and civilization are headed if we do not stop the darkening tide imposed upon us by the eternal enemy. After they understand this, I hope the book, through repeated readings, will fortify their desire for victory in the struggle for our people’s preservation.

What do you think will be necessary for Europeans around the world to regain control of our destinies?

First, we need to have our own all-pervasive media that gets the message out on a daily basis. Second, we need 10 thousand academics like Kevin MacDonald, and a thousand filmmakers like Mel Gibson, and 50 poets like myself. Thirdly, our people must be ready to sacrifice themselves and to suffer career assassination.

Which European nations have the best chance of doing so? Which ones have the least chance?

It is my belief that the European nations who have been battling with bordering non-white hordes for centuries have the best chance for survival. They include Russia, Ukraine, Poland, Croatia, Serbia, Romania, Greece, Italy, Portugal, and Spain. Germany, Switzerland, and Austria are capable of regaining their destinies. Alas, I cannot say the same for the UK, France, Belgium, Holland, and the Scandinavian countries. I foresee within the next 50 years, waves of whites moving into Eastern Europe to escape the ghettoes of London, Paris, Brussels, Amsterdam, Oslo, and Stockholm.

Thank you.

 


Article printed from Counter-Currents Publishing: http://www.counter-currents.com

URL to article: http://www.counter-currents.com/2011/12/interview-with-leo-yankevich/

* * *

New from Counter-Currents!
Tikkun Olam & Other Poems

Counter-Currents is proud to announce the publication of our eighth title:

Leo Yankevich
Tikkun Olam and Other Poems
Second Edition
San Francisco: Counter-Currents Publishing, 2011
104 pages

Read the title poem here 

Hardcover: $25

Paperback: $16

E-book: $5.99 (not available for pre-order)

Available January 16, 2012

Tikkun Olam and Other Poems collects 55 poems and one translation by leading formalist poet Leo Yankevich. Originally published as an E-book only, this is the first print edition.


Advance Praise for Tikkun Olam

Leo Yankevich’s Tikkun Olam is both devastating and heroic. The poems devastate with their unflinching depiction of the horror of the last one hundred years—the murders, the political lies, the cultural debasement, the degradation of European identity—and at the same time they are heroic in their open accusation of the force that ultimately lies behind it all: the insidious, self-serving impulse to “mend the world” in accordance with an anti-Western agenda. Yankevich’s book is unsparing in its vividness, but difficult to put down. He bravely directs our gaze at the infection that is killing us, and he does not allow us the comfortable option of turning away in forgetfulness.—Joseph S. Salemi, Editor, Trinacria

“Reading the powerful, ironic poems in Tikkun Olam—Hebrew for “the mending of the world”—in this new enlarged edition, visions of Goya’s Disasters of War come to mind.

“Leo Yankevich wants the truth—wants it out—and uses all his considerable power as a poet to get it out, bitter and bittersweet. “Those who do not know history are doomed to re-live it,” said, I believe, Santayana. Yankevich wants us to know history, so that we need not re-live it. Is this a futile dream? But someone must do something to halt or at least to slow our simian march to doom, and Yankevich does what he can in this dark true book.

“The murderous testosterone-drugged alpha-males portrayed in Tikkun Olam are not utter monsters. They are humans—husbands, sons, and brothers. They are us, or parts of us, and it is their residual humanity that is horrifying.

“This is especially clear when Yankevich takes on infamously unattractive personalities and manages to find in them the germ of humanity that is just alive enough to make stark and painful how much of their humanity has been cast off. His portrait of Rudolf Hess comes to mind. I think, too, of those menders of the world who begin their mending with the murders of the Czar, his wife and children.

Tikkun Olam is filled with characters—human, all too human, not quite human, alive and suffering in their various tragedies—brought painfully and beautifully to life by Leo Yankevich.”—E. M. Schorb

“Leo Yankevich’s rich formalist poetry sings while it mourns. His poems bring us face to face with powerful and provocative images from more than one of those darkest of modern times–times when a terrible inhumanity was unleashed upon a culture, a folk, a Heimat. In tones both eloquent and raw, it asks of its readers no more and no less than what is regarded as the sacred duty of all those who survive: Remember. Do not let this be forgotten. This too happened. Yankevich, like Percy Shelley and Roy Campbell before him, is a courageously outspoken poet, and one who is destined to be remembered as an important classic long after his politically-correct contemporaries have forever fallen out of popular, and poetic, favor.”—Juleigh Howard-Hobson

CONTENTS

Part One
1. Tikkun Olam [2]
2. Moscow, 1928
3. Holodomor, 1932–33
4. Red Star, 1933
5. Barcelona, 1936
6. Naftaly Aronovich Frenkel
7. Kolyma, 1937
8. Lorca’s Death

Part Two
9. Neighbors, Eastern Poland, 1940
10. December, 1942
11. Vengeance is Mine, Says the Lord, 1943
12. With Blood on his Hands . . .
13. Koniuchy, Eastern Poland, 1944
14. Saint Bartholomew’s Church
15. 1945
16. Gleiwitz, 1945
17. Somewhere over Germany, 1945
18. Veteran’s Hospital

Part Three
19. After the Explusions
20. Ezra Pound Enters the Tent [3]
21. Dissident, 1962
22. Poland, New Year’s Day, 1982
23. A Hater Learns About Love
24. The Loneliest Man
25. The Death of Communism
26. Bukovina, 1989

Part Four
27. Sarajevo Sonnet
28. Draza Bregovich
29. Butugychag
30. Gulag Burial Marker
31. The Abandoned Station
32. The Last Silesian
33. An Interview with the Oldest Man In Europe
34. The Łemko Steeple
35. Starless

Part Five
36. A Plurality of Worlds
37. Water
38. The Poet of 1912
39. Anonymous Rex
40. How to Get There

Part Six
41. Spreading Democracy
42. Jenin, 2002
43. The Terrorist
44. After the Old Masters
45. No Flowers, No Doves
46. Two Dates
47. On the Beheading of Eugene Olin Armstrong
48. The July Sun over Lebanon
49. On the Lynching of Saddam Hussein
50. Black Ops [4]

Part Seven
51. A Warning to Dissidents
52. Halloween, 2006
53. The Condemned House
54. Understanding the Holocaust
55. Vision
56. Monomatapa on the Detroit River

About the Author

Leo Yankevich was born into a family of Roman Catholic Irish-Polish immigrants on October 30, 1961. He grew up and attended high school in Farrell, Penn., a small steel town in the Rust Belt of middle America. He then studied History and Polish at Alliance College, Cambridge Springs, PA, receiving a BA in 1984. Later that year he traveled to Poland to begin graduate study at the centuries-old Jagiellonian University in Krakow. A staunch anticommunist, he played an active role in the dissident movement in that country, and was arrested and beaten badly on a few occasions by the communist security forces. After the fall of the Iron Curtain in 1989, he decided to settle permanently in Poland. Since that time he has lived in Gliwice (Gleiwitz), an industrial city in Upper Silesia.

Ordering Information

Hardcover: $25

Paperback: $16

E-book: $5.99 (not available for pre-order)

Available January 16, 2012

 


Article printed from Counter-Currents Publishing: http://www.counter-currents.com

URL to article: http://www.counter-currents.com/2011/12/tikkun-olam-and-other-poems/

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vendredi, 30 décembre 2011

Une grande transformation

chriscaldwell.jpg

Une grande transformation

par Georges FELTIN-TRACOL

 

En 2009, le journaliste Christopher Caldwell faisait paraître Reflections on the revolution in Europe, clin d’œil appuyé à l’ouvrage contre-révolutionnaire du Whig Edmund Burke publié en 1790. Les Éditions du Toucan viennent de sortir sa traduction française sous le titre d’Une révolution sous nos yeux. Alors que les maisons d’éditions institutionnelles se gardent bien maintenant de traduire le moindre ouvrage qui irait à l’encontre de la pesante pensée dominante, saluons cette initiative qui permet au public francophone de découvrir un point de vue divergent bien éloigné de l’agencement ouaté des studios de radio et des plateaux de télévision.

 

caldwell.jpgÉditorialiste au Financial Times (le journal officiel de la City) et rédacteur au Weekly Standard et au New York Times Magazine, Christopher Caldwell relève du courant néo-conservateur anglo-saxon. Il en remercie même William Kristol, qui en est l’une des têtes pensantes. L’édition française est préfacée par la démographe Michèle Tribalat qui, avec son compère Pierre-André Taguieff, semble ébaucher une sensibilité néo-conservatrice dans l’Hexagone plus charpentée que les guignols de la triste revue Le meilleur des mondes.

 

On pourrait supposer qu’Une révolution sous nos yeux est un lourd pensum ennuyeux à lire composé de douze chapitres réunis en trois parties respectivement intitulées « Immigration », « L’islam » et « L’Occident ». Nullement ! Comme la plupart des enquêtes journalistiques anglo-saxonnes, les faits précis et détaillés sont étayés et argumentés. Il faut avouer que le sujet abordé est risqué, surtout en France…

 

« Ce livre, avertit l’auteur, évitera l’alarmisme et la provocation vaine, mais il évitera aussi l’euphémisme et cette façon de se coucher (à titre préventif) qui caractérise tant d’écrits sur les questions relatives à l’ethnicité (p. 53). » Qu’aborde-t-il donc ? « Ce livre, répond Caldwell, traite de l’Europe, de comment et pourquoi l’immigration et les sociétés multi-ethniques qui en résultent marquent une rupture dans son histoire. Il est écrit avec un œil rivé sur les difficultés que l’immigration pose à la société européenne (p. 52). 

 

 

Partant des déclarations prophétiques en avril 1968 du député conservateur Enoch Powell au Midland Hotel de Birmingham consacrées aux tensions raciales à venir, l’auteur estime que « l’immigration n’améliore pas, ne valorise pas la culture européenne; elle la supplante. L’Europe ne fait pas bon accueil à ses tout nouveaux habitants, elle leur cède la place (p. 47) ». Pourquoi ?


Les racines du mal

 

Avant de répondre, Christopher Caldwell rappelle que « l’immigration de masse a débuté dans la décennie postérieure à la Seconde Guerre mondiale. […] En Grande-Bretagne, en France, aux Pays-Bas et en Scandinavie, l’industrie et le gouvernement ont mis en place des politiques de recrutement de main-d’œuvre étrangère pour leurs économies en plein boom (p. 25) ». Par conséquent, « l’Europe devint une destination d’immigration, suite à un consensus de ses élites politiques et commerciales (p. 25) ». Il insiste sur le jeu du patronat qui préfère employer une main-d’œuvre étrangère plutôt que locale afin de faire baisser les salaires… Il y a longtemps que l’immigration constitue l’arme favorite du capital (1). Or « les effets sociaux, spirituels et politiques de l’immigration sont considérables et durables, alors que ses effets économiques sont faibles et transitoires (pp. 69 – 70) ».

 

Il importe d’abandonner l’image du pauvre hère qui délaisse les siens pour survivre chez les nantis du Nord… « Pour Enoch Powell comme pour Jean Raspail, l’immigration de masse vers l’Europe n’était pas l’affaire d’individus “ à la recherche d’une vie meilleure ”, selon la formule consacrée. C’était l’affaire de masses organisées exigeant une vie meilleure, désir gros de conséquences politiques radicalement différentes (p. 31, souligné par l’auteur). » Dans cette « grande transformation » en cours, en raison du nombre élevé de pratiquants parmi les nouveaux venus, l’islam devient une question européenne ou, plus exactement, le redevient comme au temps du péril ottoman et des actes de piraterie maritime en Méditerranée jusqu’en 1830… Dorénavant, « l’immigration jou[e] un rôle aussi perturbateur que le nationalisme (p. 402) ».

 

Très informé de l’actualité des deux côtes de l’Atlantique, Christopher Caldwell n’hésite pas à comparer la situation de l’Europe occidentale à celle des États-Unis. Ainsi, les remarques politiques ne manquent pas. L’auteur estime par exemple que, pour gagner les électeurs, Nicolas Sarközy s’inspire nettement des méthodes de Richard Nixon en 1968 et en 1972.

 

À la différence de Qui sommes-nous ? de Samuel P. Huntington qui s’inquiétait de l’émergence d’une éventuelle Mexamérique, Caldwell pense que les Latinos, souvent catholiques et occidentalisés, peuvent renforcer et améliorer le modèle social étatsunien. L’auteur remarque même, assez justement, que « les Américains croient que l’Amérique, c’est la culture européenne plus l’entropie (p. 447) ». En revanche, l’Europe est confrontée à une immigration pour l’essentiel musulmane. L’Europe ne serait-elle pas dans le même état si l’immigration extra-européenne était principalement non-musulmane ? L’auteur n’y répond pas, mais gageons que les effets seraient semblables. Le problème majeur de l’Europe n’est pas son islamisation qui n’est qu’une conséquence, mais l’immigration de masse. Il serait temps que les Européens comprennent qu’ils deviennent la colonie de leurs anciennes colonies…

 

L’injonction morale multiculturaliste

 

Si cette prise de conscience tarde, c’est parce que « le multiculturalisme, qui demeure le principal outil de gestion de l’immigration de masse en Europe, impose le sacrifice des libertés que les autochtones européens tenaient naguère pour acquises (p. 38) ». L’imposture multiculturaliste (ou multiculturelle) – qui est en fait un monothéisme du marché et de la consommation – forme le soubassement fondamental de l’Union européenne et des « pays occidentaux [qui] sont censés être des démocraties (p. 435) ». Néanmoins, sans la moindre consultation électorale, sans aucun débat public véritable, « sans que personne ne l’ait vraiment décidé, l’Europe occidentale s’est changée en société multi-ethnique (p. 25) ».

 

À la suite d’Alexandre Zinoviev, d’Éric Werner et d’autres dissidents de l’Ouest, Christopher Caldwell observe la démocratie régresser en Occident avec l’adoption fulgurante de lois liberticides contre les hétérodoxies contemporaines. En effet, « l’Europe de l’après-guerre s’est bâtie sur l’intolérance de l’intolérance – un état d’esprit vanté pour son anti-racisme et son antifascisme, ou brocardé par son aspect politiquement correct (p. 128) ». Après la lutte contre l’antisémitisme, l’idéologie multiculturaliste de la tolérance obligatoire s’élargit aux autres minorités raciales et sexuelles et renforce la répression. Il devient désormais tout aussi grave, voire plus, de dénigrer un Noir, un musulman, un homo ou de nier des faits historiques récents que de violer une fillette ou d’assassiner un retraité ! « Peu à peu, les autochtones européens sont […] devenus moins francs ou plus craintifs dans l’expression publique de leur opposition à l’immigration (p. 38). » Rôdent autour d’eux de véritables hyènes, les ligues de petite vertu subventionnées grassement par le racket organisé sur les  contribuables. Et garde aux « contrevenants » ! Dernièrement, une Londonienne, Emma West, excédée par l’immigration et qui l’exprima haut et fort dans un compartiment de transport public, a été arrêtée, accusée de trouble à l’ordre public et mise en détention préventive. « Le journal Metro puis un journaliste de la chaîne américaine C.N.N. ont lancé un appel à la délation sur Twitter (2) ». La police des transports a même appelé à la délation sur Internet pour connaître l’identité de cette terrible « délinquante » ! Sans cesse soumis à une propagande « anti-raciste » incessante, « les Européens ont commencé à se sentir méprisables, petits, vilains et asexués (p. 151) ». Citant Jules Monnerot et Renaud Camus, Caldwell voit à son tour l’antiracisme comme « le communisme du XXIe siècle » et considère que « le multiculturalisme est presque devenu une xénophobie envers soi-même (p. 154) », de l’ethno-masochisme ! Regrettons cependant que l’auteur juge le Front national de Jean-Marie Le Pen comme un parti « fasciste », doctrine disparue depuis 1945…

 

La mésaventure d’Emma West n’est pas surprenante, car « l’État-nation multiculturel est caractérisé par un monopole sur l’ordre moral (p. 413) ». Les racines de ce nouveau moralisme, de ce néo-puritanisme abject, proviennent du traumatisme de la dernière guerre mondiale et de l’antienne du « Plus jamais ça ! ». « Ces dernières années, l’Holocauste a été la pierre angulaire de l’ordre moral européen (p. 356) ». Il était alors inévitable que « le repentir post-Holocauste devient le modèle de régulation des affaires de toute minorité pouvant exiger de façon plausible d’un grave motif de contrariété (p. 357) ». Être victime est tendance, sauf quand celle-ci est blanche.

 

Dans cette perspective utopique d’harmonie interraciale, il paraît certain qu’aux yeux des tenants du politiquement correct et du multiculturalisme, « l’Islam serait tout simplement la dernière catégorie, après le sexe, les préférences sexuelles, l’âge et ainsi de suite, venue s’ajouter au langage très convenu qu’ont inventé les Américains pour évoquer leur problème racial au temps du mouvement des droits civiques (pp. 234 – 235) ». Pour Christopher Caldwell, c’est une grossière erreur, lui qui définit l’islam comme une « hyper-identité ».

 

Le défi musulman

 

Le choc entre l’islam et l’Occident est indéniable : le premier joue de son dynamisme démographique, de son nombre et de sa vigueur spirituel alors que le second se complaît dans la marchandise la plus indécente et la théocratie absconse des droits de l’homme, de la femme, du travelo et de l’inter… Les frictions sont inévitables entre la conception traditionnelle phallocratique musulmane et l’égalitarisme occidental moderne. Allemands et Scandinaves sont horrifiés par les « crimes d’honneur » contre des filles turques et kurdes « dévergondées » par le Système occidental. Les pratiques coutumières de l’excision, du mariage arrangé et de la polygamie choquent les belles âmes occidentales qui exigent leur interdiction pénale. Mais le musulman immigré n’est-il pas lui même outré par l’exposition de la nudité féminine sur les panneaux publicitaires ou de l’homoconjugalité (terme plus souhaitable que « mariage homosexuel ») ?

 

Caldwell rappelle que le Néerlandais Pim Fortuyn combattait l’islam au nom des valeurs multiculturalistes parce qu’il trouvait la religion de Mahomet trop monoculturelle et donc totalitaire. Des mouvements populistes européens (English Defence League, Vlaams Belang, Parti du Peuple danois, Parti de la Liberté de Geert Wilders, etc.) commettent l’erreur stratégique majeur de se rallier au désordre multiculturel ambiant et d’adopter un discours conservateur moderne (défense de l’égalité homme – femme, des gays, etc.) afin d’être bien vus de la mafia médiatique. Par cet alignement à la doxa dominante, ils deviennent les supplétifs d’un système pourri qui reste l’ennemi prioritaire à abattre.

 

Pour l’auteur d’Une révolution sous nos yeux, l’islam est dorénavant la première religion pratiquée en Europe qui connaît l’immense désaffection des églises. L’homme étant aussi un être en quête de sacré, il est logique que la foi mahométane remplit un vide résultant de décennies de politique laïciste démente. Et ce ne seront pas les tentatives désespérées de Benoît XVI pour réévangéliser le Vieux Continent qui éviteront cette incrustation exogène parce que Caldwell démontre – sans le vouloir – le caractère profondément moderniste du titulaire putatif du siège romain : l’ancien cardinal Ratzinger est depuis longtemps un rallié à la Modernité !

 

Dans ce paysage européen de l’Ouest en jachère spirituelle, « les musulmans se distinguent par leur refus de se soumettre à ce désarmement spirituel. Ils se détachent comme la seule source de résistance au multiculturalisme dans la sphère publique. Si l’ordre multiculturel devait s’écrouler, l’Islam serait le seul système de valeur à patienter en coulisse (p. 423) ». Doit-on par conséquent se résigner que notre avenir d’Européen soit de finir en dhimmi d’un quelconque califat universel ou bien en bouffeur de pop corn dans l’Amérique-monde ?

 

Puisque Caldwell souligne que « l’immigration, c’est l’américanisation (p. 446) », que « l’égalité des femmes constitu[e] un principe ferme et non négociable des sociétés européennes modernes (p. 317) » et que « vous pouvez être un Européen officiel (juridique) même si vous n’êtes pas un “ vrai ” Européen (culturel) (p. 408) », il est temps que, hors de l’impasse néo-conservatrice, le rebelle européen au Diktat multiculturel occidental promeuve une Alter-Europe fondée sur l’Orthodoxie traditionnelle ragaillardie, un archéo-catholicisme antétridentin redécouvert et des paganismes réactivés, une volonté de puissance restaurée et des identités fortes réenracinées. « L’adaptation des minorités non-européennes dépendra de la perception qu’auront de l’Europe les autochtones et les nouveaux arrivants – civilisation florissante ou civilisation décadente ? (p. 45) » Ni l’une ni l’autre; c’est la civilisation européenne qu’il faut dans l’urgence refonder !

 

Georges Feltin-Tracol

 

Notes

 

1 : Pour preuve supplémentaire, lire la chronique délirante d’Ariel Wizman, « Pourquoi les immigrés sont les meilleurs alliés du libéralisme », dans L’Express, 7 décembre 2011.

 

2 : Louise Couvelaire, dans M (le magazine du Monde), 10 décembre 2011. Pour soutenir au moins moralement Emma West, on peut lui envoyer une carte postale à :

 

Mrs Emma West

co HMP Bronzfield

Woodthorpe Road

Ashford

Middlesex TW15 3J2

England

 

• Christopher Caldwell, Une révolution sous nos yeux. Comment l’islam va transformer la France et l’Europe, préface de Michèle Tribalat, Éditions du Toucan (25, rue du général Foy, F – 75008 Paris), coll. « Enquête & Histoire », 2011, 539 p., 23 €.

 


 

Article printed from Europe Maxima: http://www.europemaxima.com

 

URL to article: http://www.europemaxima.com/?p=2342

 

mercredi, 28 décembre 2011

Nel deserto dell’umano. Potenza e Machenschaft nel pensiero di Martin Heidegger

heidegger_3.jpgNel deserto dell’umano.
Potenza e Machenschaft nel pensiero di Martin Heidegger

di Salvatore Spina

Fonte: recensionifilosofiche

 

Lo studio di Gorgone, Nel deserto dell’umano. Potenza e Machenschaft nel pensiero di Martin Heidegger, ha come argomento centrale l’assunzione della questione della Machenschaft come «il tema fondamentale attorno a cui ruotano le meditazioni successive alla Kehre intorno alla tecnica, al nichilismo e alla storia dell’essere» (p. 22). La questione della Machenschaft è rintracciabile soprattutto in quei testi di fine anni Trenta, che Heidegger tenne segreti fino alla propria morte, precisamente Beiträge zur Philosophie e Besinnung; 

il termine, che in italiano viene reso – non senza problemi ermeneutici – come “macchinazione”, indica il modo in cui l’essere si dispiega nell’era della tecnica, ovvero nell’epoca del compimento della modernità. Il lavoro di Gorgone, prendendo come punto di partenza questi testi e muovendosi in modo trasversale all’interno della sterminata produzione heideggeriana, vuole essere un’analisi del pensiero del filosofo di Messkirch dopo la svolta, e nel contempo il tentativo di individuare nel concetto di Machenschaft la chiave di volta di tutta la riflessione heideggeriana, che, dopo il fallimento del progetto di Essere e tempo, subisce quella “svolta ontologica” che ne delinea i tratti caratteristici in maniera peculiare lungo tutto il percorso successivo.

I testi in cui Heidegger tratta della questione della Machenschaft sono molto importanti sia da un punto di vista squisitamente teorico, in quanto rappresentano i primi testi in cui la Kehre viene espressamente “tematizzata”, ma anche da una prospettiva più strettamente storico-politica. Essi vengono redatti alla fine degli anni Trenta – i Beiträge zur Philosophie tra il 1936 e il 1938 mentre Besinnung nel biennio 1938-39 –, periodo in cui l’assetto geopolitico dell’Europa stava mutando in maniera radicale; questi mutamenti nell’arco di pochi anni avrebbero generato nel Vecchio Continente la più grande devastazione che la storia abbia mai conosciuto.

Dopo l’iniziale illusione di una possibilità rivoluzionaria propugnata dal nazionalsocialismo, Heidegger individua il nesso fondamentale che intercorre tra tecnica, nichilismo e totalitarismo; il nazionalsocialismo, così come ogni fascismo (ivi compreso l’americanismo – ed è questo forse l’aspetto più rivoluzionario e attuale del pensiero “politico” di Heidegger), appare agli occhi del filosofo la realizzazione esplicita della volontà di potenza e dominio tipica della tecnica, che ha come parola d’ordine l’efficienza del fare [machen]. Ma coinvolti nell’estremo dominio della volontà di potenza sono anche quegli aspetti della vita che a prima vista sembrerebbero estranei alla logica del fare: le esperienze vissute [Erlebnisse]. Il divertissement e l’esperienza vissuta rappresentano agli occhi di Heidegger la maschera più appropriata che la Machenschaft indossa per nascondere la sua intima essenza violentemente nichilistica ed apparire così meno aggressiva e pervasiva. Lungi dall’essere il luogo del disincantamento del mondo, la modernità tecno-scientifica è il tempo della mistificazione per eccellenza.

Come evidenzia Gorgone nel proprio studio, l’interpretazione del reale secondo le categorie della Machenschaft ha come suo sostrato filosofico la coeva riflessione di Ernst Jünger, il quale agli inizi degli anni Trenta nel saggio Der Arbeiter (1932), attraverso un’implacabile indagine della modernità, parla di metafisica del lavoro, ovvero di riduzione di tutto l’ente a materiale utilizzabile e fattibile, e di mobilitazione totale, sostenendo – sulla scorta dell’esperienza della Grande Guerra – il generale coinvolgimento di tutto l’essente in quel movimento impetuoso ed inarrestabile che caratterizza il mondo tecnico, tanto che anche il bambino nella culla «è minacciato come tutti gli altri, se non addirittura di più». 

Quando nel 1945 Heidegger scrisse i Colloqui su un sentiero di campagna – testo decisivo all’interno del lavoro di Gorgone – le analisi della modernità e della tecnica non erano più mere profezie, ma erano diventate triste realtà con la scia di morte e distruzione che la Seconda guerra mondiale aveva lasciato dietro di sé. È proprio di fronte all’apocalittico scenario di una Germania in rovina e costretta alla resa che Heidegger individua nella metafora del deserto l’immagine più appropriata a descrivere la condizione dell’Europa devastata dal conflitto. Il deserto, eco di quel “debito impensato” che, come viene mostrato da Gorgone attraverso l’elaborazione di una “geofilosofia del deserto” (p. 157), legherebbe idealmente Heidegger alla tradizione ebraica, è da sempre il simbolo di morte e distruzione, ma anche e soprattutto dell’impossibilità della rinascita: non semplice disfacimento, secondo una ciclicità vita/morte/vita, ma più radicalmente annichilimento totale.

Ma desertica è anche l’essenza dell’uomo nell’era della Machenschaft: incapace di percepirsi come destinatario degli appelli dell’essere, l’uomo si fa trascinare dall’impetuoso fluire dell’impianto [Gestell] tecnico, correndo il massimo pericolo di essere ridotto ad ente tra gli altri enti, obliando così quella che è la sua massima dignità, ovvero essere il luogo di apertura dell’essere stesso. L’uomo ridotto ad una dimensione, quella tecnica, diventa così un mero impiegato (nel duplice senso del termine) dell’apparato tecnico, un esecutore funzionale della potenza della Machenschaft.

Machenschaft e desertificazione sono i due modi in cui l’essere si dona nell’epoca della tecnica dispiegata; a questi Heidegger contrappone – sebbene mai in maniera del tutto oppositiva, ma in una intima ed essenziale coappartenenza – da un lato la sovranità regale dell’essere [Herrschaft], cioè «la possibilità di fondazione non-violenta di ogni ente» (p. 28), un’im-potenza che precede (non cronologicamente, ma a livello ontologico) ed eccede ogni potere violento della metafisica e rivela quell’inesauribile ricchezza «di ciò che non può mai essere completamente dis-velato e che pure concede ogni possibilità di manifestazione» (p. 86); alla desertificazione, invece, fa da contraltare la vastità accogliente della radura [Weite], ovvero quel luogo aperto e libero «sottratto al fare e dis-fare della Machenschaft, in cui le cose e l’uomo possano essere raccolte nella semplicità della loro essenza» (p.163).

Il testo di Gorgone è diviso in quattro capitoli che, avendo una loro struttura compiuta, potrebbero sembrare a se stanti; tuttavia un’analisi più attenta rivela un’unitarietà di fondo che pervade l’intero lavoro dell’autore. Il primo capitolo è un’analisi della Machenschaft così come appare nei testi heideggeriani, ma anche il tentativo, ben compiuto, di individuare il sostrato filosofico di questo pensiero nella riflessione di Aristotele e nel dualismo classico dynamis-enérgheia. Il secondo capitolo, invece, identifica in Ernst Jünger il referente principale della riflessione heideggeriana intorno alla tecnica ed alla modernità, evidenziando anche la problematicità di questo rapporto ermeneutico che trova la sua forma “compiuta” nel volume 90 della Gesamtausgabe, testo ancora inedito in Italia e, per molti versi, poco conosciuto. Il terzo capitolo è il tentativo di trovare una concretizzazione storica del fenomeno della Machenschaft; attraverso l’esame di alcuni testi di Heidegger, come il famigerato Discorso al rettorato, Gorgone propone un’interpretazione disincantata e scevra da pregiudizi di quello che probabilmente è il problema più dibattuto tra gli studiosi heideggeriani: il rapporto tra Heidegger e il nazionalsocialismo. Giudicando l’adesione di Heidegger al partito nazionalsocialista una “colpa d’impazienza” (p. 131), l’autore vuole individuare le ragioni profonde che da un lato portarono Heidegger a intravedere nel movimento nazista un’autentica possibilità rivoluzionaria, e dall’altra lo convinsero, in seguito, dell’intimo carattere nichilistico del nazionalsocialismo stesso. L’ultimo capitolo, ripercorrendo alcuni dei temi trattati, individua un nesso essenziale tra la Machenschaft e quella condizione desertica, già profetizzata da Nietzsche, che caratterizza tanto la modernità nell’epoca del suo compimento quanto l’uomo che di quest’epoca è interprete; è proprio a partire da questa condizione di massima povertà e spaesamento che Heidegger propone delle strade alternative che non siano mere vie di fuga, quanto piuttosto dei percorsi di approfondimento che riaffermino quella che è la massima dignità dell’uomo: farsi portavoce del messaggio dell’essere.

Proprio in questo compito Gorgone individua quell’ “etica originaria” di cui parla Jean Luc Nancy a proposito del pensiero dell’essere di Heidegger; nell’introduzione al testo scrive Gorgone: «L’essenza dell’umanità a venire diviene, così, quel luogo primariamente etico di resistenza alle logiche totalitarie della macchinazione ed al contempo di corrispondenza al richiamo semplice ed essenziale della vastità desertica dell’essere, del suo inesauribile darsi-donarsi come senso nella storia» (p. 18).


Indice:
Introduzione
1. Potenza e mobilitazione
2. Machenschaft e metafisica del lavoro: Heidegger legge Jünger
3. Lo spirito e il totalitarismo
4. L’umanità nel deserto della Machenschaft
 
Milano, Mimesis, 2011, pp. 212, euro 18, ISBN 978-88-5750-454-4


Tante altre notizie su www.ariannaeditrice.it

lundi, 26 décembre 2011

Carl Schmitt et la théologie politique...

Carl Schmitt et la théologie politique...

Ex: http://metapoinfos.hautetfort.com

Les éditions du Cerf viennent de publier un recueil comportant quatre essais inédits du juriste et philosophe politique allemand Carl Schmitt. Le volume est présenté par Bernard Bourdin, professeur de philosophie et de théologie à l'université de Metz, et préfacé par Jean-François Kervégan, auteur récent d'un essai intitulé Que faire de Carl Schmitt ? (Gallimard, 2011).

 

Schmitt - quatre essais.jpg


"L'expression « théologie politique » n'a jamais été utilisée en tant que telle par les théologiens chrétiens. Elle n'apparaît pour la première fois que dans le titre d'un ouvrage majeur de la philosophie du XVIIe siècle, le « Traité théologico-politique » de Spinoza. L'intention de son auteur était de conjoindre la souveraineté et la liberté de pensée, et par là même de régler le « problème théologico-politique ». Il faut attendre l'anarchiste Bakounine, au XIXe siècle, pour « réhabiliter » la théologie politique à des fins révolutionnaires, puis pour dénoncer le déisme de Mazzini.

En 1922, en rédigeant son premier texte sur la théologie politique, Carl Schmitt prend le contre-pied de l'anarchisme révolutionnaire. Avec le juriste rhénan, la théologie politique est désormais identifiée à la théorie de la souveraineté. C'est par une formule lapidaire, devenue célèbre, qu'il commence son essai : « Est souverain celui qui décide de la situation exceptionnelle. » Dès la fin du IIe Reich, puis dans le context de la république de Weimar, tout le projet intellectuel de Schmitt est d'articuler sa théorie du droit et du politique à une structure de pensée théologico-politique. Le problème de la démocratie libérale est son incapacité à disposer dune véritable théorie de la représentation, en raison de l'individualisme inhérent à la pensée libérale. Face à cette impuissance, le catholicisme, par sa structure ecclésiologique, offre au contraire tous les critères de la représentation politique et de la décision.

Les textes que Bernard Bourdin présente dans ce volume, parus entre 1917 et 1944, sont des plus explicites s'agissant de ces aspects de la théorie schmittienne : institution visible de l'Église, forme représentative et décisionnisme. Ils mettent de surcroît en évidence la double ambivalence de la pensée de Schmitt dans son rapport au christianisme (catholique) et à la sécularisation. En raison de son homologie de structure entre Dieu, État et Église, la nécessité d'une transcendance théologico-politique plaide paradoxalement pour une autre approche d'une pensée politique séculière. Ambivalence qui ne sera pas non plus sans équivoque."

lundi, 05 décembre 2011

Patrick Buchanan’s Suicide of a Superpower

He Told Us So:
Patrick Buchanan’s Suicide of a Superpower

By Greg Johnson

Ex: http://www.counter-currents.com/

Patrick J. Buchanan
Suicide of a Superpower: Will America Survive to 2025? [2]
New York: Thomas Dunne Books, 2011

As a White Nationalist, my darkest political fear (for the short run, anyway) is that the United States might retain sufficient vestiges of political realism to pull itself together for an Indian Summer of Caesarism before the big cold sets in. Specifically, I fear that someone could put our present Jewish-dominated, multiracial system on firmer economic and political footing. All the instincts of our best conservative thinkers and politicians, like Patrick Buchanan, strain in this direction.

I speak of “Caesarism” because the existing democratic system produces politicians too beholden to special interest groups to serve the common good, thus it has become increasingly necessary to repose important political decisions in the hands of non-elected bodies, such as the commission that oversaw the closing of military bases. The logical extension of this trend is the emergence of a dictatorship, which at least would have a chance of saving America.

But a period of conservative Caesarism would be the worst possible outcome for our race, for no conservative would address Jewish power or the danger of whites being demographically swamped by non-whites who are already here legally. Thus a benevolent conservative dictator just might prolong the system’s life long enough for the forces of anti-white racial degradation and replacement to drive our people past the point of no return.

I agree that we need a time-out from immigration to give White Nationalists some extra time to get our act together. I wish all immigration restrictionists well. But the last thing I want is the present system to stabilize itself, for realistically the system’s collapse is our only hope for the creation of a White Republic—provided, of course, that White Nationalists develop into a viable political movement that can offer a credible alternative once the present system collapses.

Patrick Buchanan’s Suicide of a Superpower argues, with crushing persuasiveness, that the United States is headed toward a collapse. He is so convinced of this that he is even willing to venture an end date in his subtitle, albeit in the form of a question: Will America Survive to 2025? I found this striking, because when I first conceived of Counter-Currents in the Spring of 2010, I found myself thinking in terms of a 15-year make or break period for a North American New Right. At the very least, such a date focuses the mind wonderfully.

In Chapter 11, “The Last Chance,” Buchanan offers a slate of reforms that might actually prolong the life of the republic (if implemented by a dictator). But I see no reason to think that any of his proposals will be implemented given the generally low levels of intellect and courage among American conservatives. But ultimately, that is a good thing for whites.

Chapter 1, “The Passing of a Superpower,” summarizes America’s economic decline particularly vis-à-vis China. This chapter, like the rest of the book, is extremely well-documented. I will be returning to this book again and again for data, and for that reason alone, I recommend it to all white advocates.

Chapter 4, “The End of White America,” chronicles our race’s demographic and cultural decline in America because of low white fertility, high non-white fertility, and torrents of non-white immigration. Chapter 5, “Demographic Winter,” puts the American experience in global perspective. It seems that below replacement fertility is a characteristic of every First World society, including practically every white nation plus Japan, China, Singapore, Korea, and Jews in Israel.

The common denominator in is not modernity, or mere secularism, as Buchanan argues, because the Soviet bloc countries were modernist, materialist, and secularist yet had growing populations. Nor is it a Jewish conspiracy to suppress fertility, which could not explain the trends in Israel and the Far East.

Rather, the problem seems to be a form of modernity that stresses individualism and consumerism. We have created societies in which the people who should be having families instead restrict their fertility to pursue higher education, careers, hobbies, or ecological responsibility, allowing the stupid and ugly people to inherit the earth.

In the white nations, this problem is compounded with Jewish-engineered race replacement policies, primarily non-white immigration. Jews do not have the power to impose these handicaps on Asian nations, and they have no interest in imposing them on themselves.

Chapter 6, “Equality or Freedom?,” is a surprisingly frank and utterly devastating critique of egalitarianism. Chapter 7, “The Diversity Cult” and Chapter 8, “The Triumph of Tribalism” are similarly frank and crushing critiques of the idea that diversity is a strength. Tribalism, not globalism and universalism, are deeply rooted in human nature. Buchanan shows that despite economic globalization, political nationalism has been the dominant trend in the 20th and 21st centuries. Thus, by pursuing diversity, America and other white nations are betting against history and human nature.

Chapter 9, “‘The White Party,’” explains why the Republicans are the de facto party of white America, arguing that the party has no future if it refuses to represent the interests of the white majority. Beyond that, the party must work to preserve the white majority. Again, Buchanan presents a devastating case. But is there one Republican in a thousand with the moral courage necessary to explicitly represent white interests, much less act to preserve a white majority?

Chapter 10, “The Long Retreat,” is a critique of US foreign policy, arguing that the United States needs to downsize its international commitments and expenditures. Currently we maintain more than 1,000 military installations around the world. US troops are present in 148 countries and 11 territories. The United States is committed to intervene on behalf countries around the world, and to maintain our massive budget deficits, we are borrowing from our allies and their enemies alike. Again, Buchanan’s argument is carefully documented and quite compelling.

I saved the bad chapters for last. In Chapter 2, “The Death of Christian America,” Buchanan has the brazen effrontery to assert that Europe civilization is identical to Christianity, such that the decline of Christianity entails the decline of European civilization. Historically, this is of course false. European man existed before Christianity and will persist after Christianity disappears. Christianity, like Marxism, may be just a phase our people are going through, one of many in our long history since the Ice Ages.

Yes, religious people are currently more fertile than non-religious people, but religion is not the only factor that encourages fertility. During the baby boom of the Third Reich, Germans did not suddenly become more religious. Nor did Americans during the post-WW II baby boom. The common denominator was high national optimism. And even if people need an Imaginary Friend to tell them to have babies, Christianity is not the only pro-natal religion.

A White Republic should at least try to preserve freedom of religion (or irreligion) and work to create secular incentives for the best people to reproduce early and often. For example, why not encourage bright young women to have families before going to college by offering a free college undergraduate degree to every mother of three children who stays home with them to the age of six?

Buchanan also asserts that America is a Christian nation. This is false on the face of it, as the United States has never had an established church and the inhabitants of America have never been entirely Christian. That did not, of course, prevent Christians from thrusting their religion into the public square anyway. Over the last hundred years, there has been an attempt to push Christianity back out of the public square by atheists, agnostics, liberals, and members of other religious groups, including Jews. Buchanan sees this as a terrible decline. I am not entirely comfortable with the process [3], but overall, I consider it progress toward religious tolerance, which is a worthy ideal.

In Chapter 3, “The Crisis of Catholicism,” Buchanan discusses his own church’s decline from its post-WW II heyday due to Vatican II. He says nothing about how the Catholic Church became so large and influential in America before it committed suicide. He does, however, mention that there were only a few thousand Catholics in America at the time of the Founding. Given the strength of anti-Catholic sentiment in America, the rise of Catholicism was made possible only by the so-called separation of church and state, i.e., the refusal to allow an established church and the embrace of religious toleration, which is a product of the Enlightenment liberals, Freemasons, and deists whom Buchanan despises. It is a heritage worth defending from Muslims—and Christians—who would turn back the clock.

Now, some might be tempted to think that Buchanan is engaged in a cynical bait and switch routine: “Now that I have gotten your attention with the impending doom of the white race, can I interest you in a time-share . . . ?” But Buchanan sincerely believes the package deal of Christianity, the white race, and European civilization. (Let’s hope they hurry up and elect a black pope.) He puts his chapters on Christianity right near the beginning, where the foundations of an argument go. But Buchanan’s in-your-face Christian apologetics are quite unfortunate, for if our race is going to have a future on this continent, it is by uniting on the basis of deep roots of common identity, not by emphasizing highly divisive religious differences.

There are many ways in which it is true that America is committing suicide. But there is also a sense in which America is being murdered. Kevin MacDonald, among others, has chronicled how America is ruled by a hostile Jewish elite that has instituted many of the ideologies and trends decried by Buchanan as suicidal, including multiculturalism and massive non-white immigration. Jews, of course, more than any other people, are aware of the necessary conditions of collective survival. They are concerned to secure these conditions for their own people even as they deny them to us. The obvious conclusion is that they mean for us not to survive as a people. America is being corrupted, exploited, degraded, and murdered by the organized Jewish community.

Buchanan, of course, knows all this. But he has avoided saying so because it is not politic. He wishes to maintain his access to television and publishers. He wishes to maintain his credibility and connections. His friend Sam Francis felt the same way. He wanted to bide his time, preserve and augment his capital, keep his powder dry. But he fantasized about the day when he would finally whip it out, when he would drop the J-bomb. Unfortunately, Sam died with his credibility intact. And you can’t take it with you. You can only spend it while you are here. Patrick Buchanan is now 73 years old, sixteen years older than Sam was when he died. What is he saving himself for? There is so much more he could do for our people.

Suicide of a Superpower is a useful and important book. I recommend it to all White Nationalists. It is not a White Nationalist book, but it gets the reader almost all the way there. If we can’t close the deal with this kind of set-up, we aren’t worth our salt.

Suicide of a Superpower could save America, although it will not be heeded. And when America goes down, people will say that Patrick Buchanan told us so. That will be a nice epitaph for America—and for Buchanan.

But saving America is not the same thing as saving the white race. If our people have a future on this continent, it will only be by freeing ourselves of the wreckage of America and American conservatism. Conservatism is all well and good if one has something worth conserving. Once we have the White Republic, then we can dust off Buchanan’s proposals and put them to work conserving our system, not the enemy’s.

 


Article printed from Counter-Currents Publishing: http://www.counter-currents.com

URL to article: http://www.counter-currents.com/2011/11/he-told-us-so-patrick-buchanans-suicide-of-a-superpower/

dimanche, 04 décembre 2011

The End of Americanism

The End of Americanism

Pat Buchanan's Suicide of a Superpower

Alex KURTAGIC

Ex: http://www.alternativeright.com

Pat Buchanan’s Suicide of a Superpower is an apt follow-up to his 2002 volume, The Death of the West. Although the new book focuses on the United States, it restates and updates the narrative of the older book. It is no coincidence, therefore, that the former refers briefly to the latter early on.

Buchanan’s main thesis is this:

When the faith dies, the culture dies, the civilization dies, the people die. That is the progression. And as the faith that gave birth to the West is dying in the West, peoples of European descent from the steppes of Russia to the coast of California have begun to die out, as the Third World treks north to claim the estate. The last decade provided corroborating if not conclusive proof that we are in the Indian summer of our civilization.

Buchanan_Pat_-_Suicide_of_a_SuperpowerSuicide has stirred some controversy in the mainstream media for stating what for many is, or should be, known and obvious, but which for the majority is either not so or taboo: the negative consequences of immigration, diversity, and multiculturalism.

Yet, the book has obtained wide coverage and seems widely available—last month, while travelling in the United States, it saw it prominently displayed in the bookshops of major airports. This is a significant achievement that must not pass without notice, for there are others who have been advancing identical theses without the same level of exposure.

Suicide, however, is not without significant limitations, and these merit detailed discussion, for they stem from an outlook that will need to be overcome if we are ever to move forward with an effective solution to the suicide of America and the rest of the West.

The Pluses

With 428 pages of meat in it, Suicide is divided into 11 chapters, each of which is in turn divided into shorter sections with lapidary titles. The chapters are: The Passing of a Superpower, The Death of Christian America, The Crisis of Catholicism, The End of White America, Demographic Winter, Equality or Freedom, The Diversity Cult, The Triumph of Tribalism, The ‘White’ Party, The Long Retreat, and The Last Chance.

In none does Buchanan flinch from presenting the facts as they are. And where there are lacunae, Kevin MacDonald has already filled them with his Culture of Critique. The first chapter is in tone apocalyptic, yet the sheer rapidity of the United State’s decline as a superpower justifies that tone; Rome’s decline in wealth and capability may have taken longer, but America’s is comparable and, as Buchanan presents it, suggests familiar buildings and everyday objects one day becoming ruins and broken artefacts in a continent abandoned to a dark age. Buchanan proposes solutions in the final chapter, but, besides flawed (and I get to that further down), they are conditional, which lends the trajectory of decline traced throughout most of the volume an aura of inevitability. This is not an indulgence on pessimism, because all previous empires eventually collapsed, and all previous great civilisations in history came to an end.

In his detailed discussion of Christianity’s role in the United State, and of the crisis of Catholicism, Buchanan acknowledges the importance of the transcendent. Many of the ills that afflict the West in our age are linked to, if not the result of, a materialist conception of life, and of the consequent subjection to a secular economist criterion of all matters of importance to a nation and a people. The dispossession and loss of moral authority of the White race in their own traditional homelands was to a significant degree achieved through, or caused by, economic arguments. It was not the so-called ‘civil rights’ movement in the United States that turned Detroit into a ruin; what turned it into a ruin was the reliance on economic arguments—so characteristic of the materialist liberal outlook—that enabled the decision to purchase Black slaves in African markets and ship them to North America. Similarly, the loss of moral and spiritual vigour, which has so enfeebled the White race and sapped its will to live, can be traced to the rise of secularism, to the severing of the race’s link to the transcendent. ‘Where are the martyrs for materialism?’ he asks.

To this Buchanan adds a helpful discussion about equality and freedom. He explodes the liberal conception of them as concomitant concepts, and convincingly presents them as polar opposites in a dichotomy: greater equality means less freedom, greater freedom means less equality. Buchanan makes clear that the only possible way to see these two concepts as concomitant is by ignoring human biodiversity, for, where inborn differences in physiology impose upper limits to human plasticity, equality—the elimination disparities in outcome—cannot be achieved without handicapping the cause of those disparities. Thus, the freedom to choose among the best universities is limited for bright White students when entry requirements are relaxed among less able non-White students in the effort to achieve equal outcomes among all racial groups.

The chapters on the diversity cult and tribalism re-state arguments that have for years been advanced by Jared Taylor. Taylor has done it in much greater detail, but Buchanan will reach a much wider audience, so this is a gain. Buchanan also echoes the Sailer Strategy—‘the idea that inreach to its white base, not outreach to minorities, is the key to future GOP success’—in his discussion of his party’s prospects as Whites decline in the United States. And, like Taylor, he ridicules those who see this decline as a cause for celebration.

Also like Taylor, but in the economic area, Buchanan reveals some astonishing facts. Apparently, the United States military relies on equipment that cannot be made without parts manufactured by potential enemies and economic rivals. Did you know that?

Another helpful discussion is introduced in the final fourth of the book, where Buchanan, following Amy Chua, deals with the fatal design flaw that afflicts multiethnic nations that have embraced democracy and capitalism:

Free markets concentrate wealth in the hands of a market-capable ethnic minority. Democracy empowers the ethnic majority. When the latter begin to demand a larger share of the wealth, demagogues arise to meet those demands.

This is a reply to the economic argument for the state-sponsored policy of immigration, diversity, and multiculturalism in the West, repeated without proof and refuted by empirical studies everywhere, that supposedly boosts economic growth because diverse immigrants ‘bring in skills’ and foster greater creativity. In fact, said policy leads to Whites becoming dispossessed minorities, as they already did in a number of other former European colonies. Buchanan points out that people like Evo Morales, president of Bolivia, and Hugo Chavez, president of Venezuela, use ‘principles invented by white men—universal franchise and majority rule—to dispossess white men’. He also quotes 19th century Rightist Louis Veuillot to describe how democrats are dispossessed by non- (or ‘instrumental’) democrats: ‘When I am the weaker I ask you for my freedom because that is my principle; but when I am the stronger I take away your freedom because that is my principle’. He asks: ‘What does the future hold for the West when people of European descent become a minority in nations they created, and people of color decide to vote themselves proportionate or larger shares of the national wealth?’

In terms of solutions, Buchanan offers common sense advice: the United States should live within its means and actively take steps to cut its deficits. For him this means pruning government and government expenditure, including social security benefits and military bases overseas; and instituting a policy of economic nationalism, levying tariffs on imports and cutting corporation tax to zero, so as to revive manufacturing in the United States, attract overseas investment, and reduce reliance on imports. I do not think even economists will agree on whether this would yield the desired results, but at least Buchanan is making concrete policy proposals that place the interests of his country first, and is willing to accept that ethnonationalism is an inescapable reality of the human condition. 

The Minuses

There are fundamental flaws in Buchanan’s exposition.

Firstly, he equates European civilisation with Christianity. This is surprising, particularly coming from an American writer, advancing an Americanist position, given that some of the basic principles and practices upon which America was founded, such as the constitutional republic, originated or had their roots in Europe well before the dawn of Christianity. What about ancient Greece? What about ancient Rome? Were those not European civilisations? A more accurate statement is that the United States is a Christian country. This is defensible, even if the United States never had an established religion and even if not all Americans were Christian. Perhaps what Buchanan means is that Faustian civilisation—the civilisation of Northern Europe, of which North America is an extension—is a Christian civilisation.

Edward_GibbonBuchanan is correct to identify the decline of Christianity in America as one of the roots of its decline. In doing so, however, he has Edward Gibbon as his inverse counterpart, for Gibbon identified the rise of Christianity in Rome, that is, the decline of the Roman religion, as one of the causes of Rome’s fall. Gibbon would have sympathised, perhaps, with the statement, ‘When the faith dies, the culture dies, the civilization dies, the people die.’ Yet, given that the fall of Rome did not mean the end of European man, and that if the rise of Christianity was linked to Rome’s fall, the rise of Christianity was also linked to the rise of Faustian civilisation. All this tells us, therefore, is that we may be witnessing the end of a cycle involving Christianity. However, even if it is Christianity’s fate to pass, as have other religions, or to become a ‘Third World religion’, as Buchanan puts it, European man will still be there, at least for a while, and, provided he survives as a race, he will give rise to a new civilisation, traceable to the Greek, the Roman, and the Faustian, but founded on somewhat different principles. This will bring no comfort to Christians, nevertheless, and Buchanan, as a Christian, is justified in his alarm.

Gibbon would concede that Buchanan makes a powerful argument for Christianity. A monotheistic religion with a personal god can be a potent unifying force, eliciting much stronger commitments from its followers. The Roman pagans were easygoing, and vis-à-vis other religions, the pagan outlook, as expressed by Nehru in a conversation with the former Chilean Ambassador in India, Miguel Serrano, is generally ‘live and let live’. One can easily accept that it is not difficult to decimate a people with that outlook, for, in as much as it resembles the multiculturalists’ easygoing attitude to all religions except Christianity, it is proving daily in our society an agent of dissolution. It may well be that in a world of intense ethnic competition, a high-tension—even totalitarian and intolerant—religion is the more adaptive group evolutionary strategy. Buchanan’s discussion on the growth and endurance of evangelical Christianity, Orthodox Judaism, and militant Islam indicates he is of this view, and that is a plus consistent with his recognition of the importance of the transcendent. Yet he inadvertedly exposes a conundrum: if Christianity is a universal faith, accommodating every race and nationality, as he says, and if, as he also says, non-evangelical forms of Christianity have declined because they are accommodating, then, would this not suggest that Christianity will not survive in practice as the White man’s religion unless it becomes a non-accommodating faith?

Secondly, Suicide makes it clear that Buchanan cannot conceive of anything beyond the America of the 1950s. This is the most unfortunate aspect of this book. It is also the reason why Buchanan offers no real solutions, other than turning back the clock. Were his recommendations implemented in the United States, they would only retard the processes that are in place, achieving a temporary reprieve, a momentary stabilisation, before resuming their course, perhaps with renewed vigour and speed.

What Buchanan seems not to recognise is that, while the 1950s may have felt good for many, the conditions for the modern trends that he condemns were already in place then. They were simply masked by the transient prosperity, stability, and romanticism of the era. The 1950s led to the 1960s. And the upheavals of the 1960s had their roots in the academics of the 1930s, who in turn had their roots in Marxism, dating back to the 19th century, which in turn had its roots in liberalism and the Enlightenment in the 18th century. And this is not merely a question of there having always been a hostile faction within the American republic, seeking to undermine it with its insidious liberalism; the conservatives who opposed Marxism also had their intellectual roots in 18th-century liberalism. Buchanan makes it seem as if the United States has been hijacked by liberals, but the fact is that it has always been in the hands of liberals, right from the beginning: the United States was founded and is predicated on the ideas of liberal intellectuals, and its Founding Fathers were liberals. If the United States seems to be spearheading the process of Western decline, bringing everyone down with it, it is because liberalism took stronger root there than anywhere else, due to a lack of opposition to liberal ideas.

From this perspective it can be argued that Buchanan’s Suicide of a Superpower is not the result of the United States’ being ‘far off the course set by [the] Founding Fathers’, but rather of the United States’ being exactly on that course, even if the Founding Fathers never anticipated that it would lead where it has led.

As a conservative in a republic founded by liberals, Buchanan is by definition a liberal, defending a previous stage in the development of liberalism. Hence his failure to see beyond liberalism’s event horizon.

Liberals have a linear conception of history. Thus Buchanan hopes that by prescribing better liberal policies (what he would call conservative policies), the American republic can be set back on course and resume its trajectory of endless progress and economic growth. Unfortunately, treating the problem as if it were a disease in need of a cure is futile when the problem is a congenital defect. In such cases the best hope is genetic resequencing, a form of death and rebirth. Most likely it will mean certain death and a possible rebirth, elsewhere, as something else, perhaps in North America, but at first, if at all, only in a part of it. Concretely this means the break-up of the union into regions and the emergence among them of a dominant republic among weaker ones, with strength or weakness being a function of the dominant racial group in each case.

Similarly futile is the attempt to revert a civilisation to an earlier stage of development. In the Spenglerian view this would be like trying to turn an old dog back into a puppy, or an old tree back into a bush. Technology may make it possible one day to reverse the physical effects of ageing, but it will not erase the memories and conclusions of a lifetime, and therefore not rejuvenate the spirit. This applies even in the non-organic realm: we may be able to restore an old mechanical typewriter so that it looks and works like new, but it will still be obsolete technology, and its reason for being will shift from usable tool to unusable antique.

Unfortunately for those living today, reality is more in accord with the organic conception of history, whereby things go in cycles and slow build-ups lead to rapid changes in state. Following Spengler, Francis Parker Yockey argued that attempts to cause a reversion into an earlier state of development will at best yield temporary results, introducing distortions that will be magnified as the next stage of development indefectibly follows.

One can sympathise with the argument that it would be worse if the current political leadership in the United States managed to stabilise the economy and perform plastic surgery on the face of America, as this would buy said leadership more time and permit existing trends to remain in place until the possibility of a White rebirth in North America, even without United States, became extinct. A Spencerian collapse sooner may open up avenues that may be closed later.

Ruins_of_American_Civilization

Buchanan wonders whether the United States will implode by 2025. This was my own scenario in Mister, where the United States disintegrates in a hyperinflationary chaos. But it is difficult to predict with accuracy and I would not want to speculate beyond a possible dismemberment along regional lines sometime this century. When it happens, whenever it may happen, those who remember the America we know today and who did not know better until it was too late will be amazed that people thought the United States would go on forever. They will also be amazed that people ever thought as they do now, despite the final outcome being so blatantly obvious. Buchanan’s diagnosis is mostly accurate, but his treatment, well intentioned as it is, is part of the problem, not part of the solution.

The Balance

Despite its defects, there is no escaping it: Suicide of a Superpower is a punishing indictment of the United States’ post-war political leadership, authored by a prominent conservative who speaks as part of America’s mainstream establishment. Any White American fed up with the way things have been going in recent decades and looking for new politics beyond Democrat or Republican will find here solid justifications for going beyond convention and eventually adding his muscle to the struggle for fundamental change.

Suicide will not awaken the complacent, induce the fearful to speak up, or cause ideological enemies to change their views. The complacent is comfortable in his ignorance and does not want his world disrupted by inconvenient truths; in most cases he has the means to avoid them by insulating himself economically. The fearful, who knows but remains silent, will not be emboldened by Buchanan’s confirming him in his views; he will wait, as he has always waited, and then side with change once it looks like it is going to win. The ideological enemy is beyond convincing; the only solution is to crush him thoroughly.

Should you buy Suicide of a Superpower? The answer is yes. Not only is it brave, but it contains many helpful insights and bewildering facts to fuel a healthy debate. The fact that the book is everywhere has also infuriated the radical Left, who have renewed their efforts to have Buchanan fired by MSNBC. The radical Left does not want this kind of discussion to take place in a mainstream media forum. In fact, radical Leftists would like Buchanan to be banned from the networks, shunned by his publishers, phlebotomised by the taxman, prosecuted by the ICC, and sent to the gulags, to spend his old age in poverty, obscurity, and hard labour—surrounded, of course, by politically correct diversity. To his credit, Buchanan has not buckled in to criticism. Therefore, every copy that is sold is a kick to the radical Left, and added impetus for the book to reach more persuadables.

With enough manpower and talent it will be possible to survive the cataclysm and make it through to the other side. The other side is something entirely new; traditional, but different—it is not the White America of the 1950s, nor Reagan on steroids, nor is it a linear extrapolation of what is good about the 2010s minus what is bad. For Whites to survive in America, Americanism must end. Those who survive will be the architects of what comes after Americanism; they will not call themselves Americans—the designation may not even make sense for them. Viewed from the other side, with the old certainties gone and new ones in place, it will be impossible to think as we do today, even if future generations carry forward much of our knowledge, traditions, and cultural legacy.

mardi, 25 octobre 2011

Pierre Vial présente "Le loup-garou" d'Hermann Löns


Pierre Vial présente "Le loup-garou" d'Hermann Löns

samedi, 15 octobre 2011

Tacitus’ Germania

Tacitus’ Germania

By Andrew Hamilton

Ex: http://www.counter-currents.com/

Tacitus’ Germania, a short monograph on German ethnography written c. 98 AD, is of great historical significance. The transmission of the text to the present day, and certain adventures and tensions surrounding it, make for an interesting story.

Roman historian and aristocrat Cornelius Tacitus (c. 55–c. 117 AD) was the author of several works, more than half of which have been lost. What remains of his writings are divided into the so-called “major [long] works,” the Histories [2] and the Annals [2], jointly covering the period 14–96 AD, and the “minor [short] works”: The Dialogue on Orators, Agricola, [3]and [3] Germania [3]. Tacitus, a senator, is believed to have held the offices of quaestor in 79, praetor in 88, consul in 97, and proconsul or governor of the Roman provinces in “Asia” (western Turkey), from 112–13.

The Germania is a short work, not really a “book.” My copy, “Germany and Its Tribes,” is a mere 23 pages long—albeit in moderately small wartime print on thin paper containing no notes, annotations, maps, illustrations, or other editorial aids. It was translated from the Latin by Alfred Church and William Brodribb in 1876 and published in The Complete Work of Tacitus by Random House’s Modern Library in 1942.

The Agricola, about Roman Britain, is roughly the same length. Agricola, the general primarily responsible for the Roman conquest of Britain and governor of Britannia from 77–85 AD, was Tacitus’ father-in-law.

The Germania has been the most influential source for the early Germanic peoples since the Renaissance. Its reliable account of their ethnography, culture, institutions, and geography is the most thorough that has survived from ancient times, and to this day remains the preeminent classical text on the subject. The book signifies the emergence of the northern Europeans from the obscurity of archaeology, philology, and prehistory into the light of history half a millennium after the emergence of the southern Europeans in Homer and Herodotus.

Though Tacitus at times writes critically of the Germans, he also stresses their simplicity, bravery, honor, fidelity, and other virtues in contrast to corrupt Roman imperial society, fallen from the vigor of the Republic. (It has been said that no one in Tacitus is good except Agricola and the Germans.)

Tacitus’ book is based upon contemporaneous oral and written accounts. During the period knowledge of northern Europe increased rapidly. Roman commanders produced unpublished memoirs of their campaigns along the lines of Caesar’s Commentaries, which circulated in Roman literary circles. Diplomatic exchanges between Rome and Germanic tribes brought German leaders to Rome and Roman emissaries to barbarian courts. And Roman traders expanded traffic with the barbarians, generating, perhaps, more knowledge than the military men.

According to Jewish classicist Moses Hadas, Tacitus “never consciously sacrifices historical truth. He consulted good sources, memoirs, biographies, and official records, and he frequently implies that he had more than one source before him. He requested information of those in a position to know” and “exercises critical judgment.”

Other Ancient Accounts of the Germans

Prior to Tacitus’ narrative, a Syrian-born Hellenistic Greek polymath of the first century BC, Poseidonius, may have been the first to distinguish clearly between the Germans and the Celts, but only fragments of his writings survive.

Julius Caesar did not penetrate very far east of the Rhine, so his knowledge of the Germans, expressed in De Bello Gallico (On the Gallic War, c. 50 BC), was limited.

The Roman Pliny the Elder’s Bella Germaniae (German Wars, c. 60s–70s AD) probably contained the fullest account of the people up to Tacitus’ time, but it has been lost.

Pliny, the foremost authority on science in ancient Europe, had served in the army in Germany. When Mount Vesuvius destroyed Herculaneum and Pompeii, he was stationed near present-day Naples, in command of the western Roman fleet. Eager to study the volcano’s destructive effects firsthand, he sailed across the bay, where he was suffocated by vapors caused by the eruption.

Following the Germania, the most important ancient work discussing northern Europe was Ptolemy’s Geography, written in the 2nd century AD. Ptolemy is the Alexandrian astronomer best-known for positing the Ptolemaic System. The Geography named 69 tribes and 95 places, many mentioned by no other source, as well as major rivers and other natural features.

From late antiquity, no extensive study of the Germanic peoples has survived, if one was ever written, and no single writer treated the migrations in a coherent way.

Loss and Rediscovery

At some point during the collapse of classical civilization and the migrations of late antiquity the text of the Germania was lost for more than a thousand years. It resurfaced only briefly, in Fulda, Germany in the 860s, where it and the other short works were probably copied. A monk at Fulda quoted from it verbatim at the time. Subsequently it was lost again.

In 1425 rumors reached Italy that manuscripts of Tacitus survived in the library of Hersfeld Abbey near Fulda. One of these contained the shorter works. In 1451 or 1455 (sources differ) an emissary of Pope Nicholas V obtained the manuscript containing the lesser works and brought it to Rome. It is known as the Codex Hersfeldensis.

In Rome, Enea Silvio Piccolomini, later Pope Pius II, examined and analyzed the Germania, sparking interest in the work among German humanists, including Conrad Celtes, Johannes Aventinus, and Ulrich von Hutten.

Its first publication in central Europe occurred at Nuremberg in 1473–74; the first commentary on the text was written by Renaissance humanist Beatus Rhenanus in 1519.

[4]

The first page of Germania, the Codex Aesinas

The Codex Hersfeldensis was then lost again for half a millennium. (This time, of course, the content survived in published form.) Then, in 1902, a portion of the Codex Hersfeldensis was rediscovered by priest-philologist Cesare Annibaldi in the possession of Italian Count Aurelio Balleani of Iesi (Italian: Jesi), a town located in the Marches of central Italy. The manuscript had been in the family’s possession since 1457. This single text, the oldest extant version, became known as the Codex Aesinas. (I.e., the Aesinas is believed to consist of portions of the lost manuscript from Hersfeld.

One scholar has summarized the tremendous impact the text’s rediscovery in 1455 has had on European history:

The rediscovery of the Germania in the late fifteenth century was a decisive event in the study of the ancient Germanic peoples. Renaissance scholarship endowed Roman literary texts with outstanding authority, as well as making them more widely available. At the same time, a rise in German national feeling led to heightened interest in ancient texts which illuminated the Germanic past. . . . The Germania . . . was used to cement a link between the Germans of Tacitus and the Germans of the early modern period. From about 1500 onward the Germania was rarely far from serious discussion of German national identity, German history and even German religion. Fresh impetus was given to it in the nineteenth century and, of course, the racial purity, valour and integrity of the Germans as portrayed by Tacitus had immense appeal to the National Socialist hierarchy in the 1920s and 1930s. (Malcolm Todd, The Early Germans, 2d ed., Oxford: Blackwell, 2004, p. 7)

Among others, the Germania influenced Frederick the Great, Johann Fichte, Johann Gottfried von Herder [5], and Jakob Grimm.

Key to the rediscovery, preservation, transmission, and social and racial influence of the Germania over the past 500 years have been Renaissance humanism, modern (pre-21st century) scholarship, the invention of printing, liberalism, nationalism, and racial science.

A Dangerous Book

Since the Renaissance, the Germania has provided the most significant historical evidence of the early Germanic peoples.

The inevitable identification of the ancient Germans with their descendants commenced soon after the book’s discovery. Historians, philologists, and archaeologists all added pieces to the mosaic, so that by the time unification occurred in 1871 the early history of the Germans was firmly grounded.

The Germania influenced at least one 20th century leader decisively. Young Heinrich Himmler in September 1924 read Tacitus during a train ride and was captivated. At the time he was personal assistant to Gregor Strasser, leader of the National Socialist Freedom Movement (Nationalsozialistische Freiheitsbewegung).

In contemporaneous notes, Himmler wrote that Tacitus captured “the glorious image of the loftiness, purity, and nobleness of our ancestors,” adding, “Thus shall we be again, or at least some among us.”

In 1936, the year of the Berlin Olympics, Hitler personally requested of Mussolini that possession of the Codex Aesinas be transferred to Germany. Mussolini agreed, but changed his mind when the proposition turned out to be unpopular among his people.

A facsimile copy was made for the Germans and Rudolph Till, chairman of the Department of Classical Philology and Historical Studies at the University of Munich, and a member of the Ahnenerbe (a racial think tank co-founded by Heinrich Himmler in 1935), studied the manuscript in Rome in the months prior to the war. The Ahnenerbe published Till’s findings as Palaeographical Studies of Tacitus’s Agricola and Germania Along with a Photocopy of the Codex Aesinas in 1943.

German ideologist Alfred Rosenberg [6] and SS chief Heinrich Himmler both retained intense interest in the Codex. Mussolini’s government fell in 1943. In July 1944 Himmler dispatched an SS commando team to rescue the manuscript. The unit searched three Balleani family residences in Italy without success.

The Codex was in fact stored in a wooden trunk bound with tin in the kitchen cellar of one of the residences, the Palazzo on the Piazza in Jesi. (There is a 1998 online newspaper account in German [7] about this affair that relies upon Jewish writer Simon Schama’s 1996 Landscape and Memory for its authority.)

[8]

Palazzo Balleani in Jesi

The upshot was that possession of the manuscript remained in the hands of the Baldeschi-Balleani [9] family. After the war the family stored the Codex Aesinas in a safe deposit box in the basement of the Banco di Sicilia in Florence, Italy. In November 1966, the River Arno experienced its worst flooding [10] since the 1550s, causing damage to the Codex. Monks at a monastery near Rome skilled in preserving manuscripts succeeded in saving it, though permanent water damage could not be eliminated.

The Codex was sold by the family to the Biblioteca Nazionale in Rome in 1994, where it is currently cataloged as the Codex Vittorio Emanuele 1631.

Suppress That Classic!

Since WWII, as ideological imperatives took precedence over dispassionate scholarship, the Germania‘s capacity to instill self-awareness and collective identity has deeply disturbed proponents of anti-white policies and ideologies. The historical record is problematic, too, in not depicting the Germans as irredeemably evil, possibly scheming, say, to vaporize the extensive Jewish populations of Rome and Persia in clay kilns.

One feint such ideologues employ is to insinuate that ancient Germans and modern northern Europeans possess no biological or historical kinship. Though nonsensical, it is as easy to argue as is the assertion that biological race does not exist, or dozens of other counter-factual dogmas.

But many would no doubt prefer to ban the book Communist-style, removing all copies from circulation and restricting access to unpulped copies to a handful of approved “scholars” on a carefully monitored basis.

As long ago as 1954 Jewish historian Arnaldo Momigliano declared before “an important international classical conference” that the Germania was one of the most dangerous books ever written. (In 1938 Momigliano lost his job as professor of Roman history at the University of Turin after passage of the Fascist racial law. He moved to England, where he taught for the rest of his life.)

Today, Harvard University’s Christopher Krebs, author of A Most Dangerous Book: Tacitus’s Germania From the Roman Empire to the Third Reich (2011), trumpets Momigliano’s view [11] of the ancient text’s “insidious” nature to the applause of academic peers, literary critics, and journalists.

Krebs’ insincere declaration—gambit, really—that “Tacitus did not write a most dangerous book, his readers made it so,” doesn’t fool anyone. In societies committed to the proposition that speech and ideas constitute “hate,” there is unanimous, or at least undissenting, agreement on how to treat “dangerous” books and ideas.

In an interview, Krebs says that he is half German and half Swedish. But “Krebs” can be a Jewish name—e.g., biochemist Hans Krebs, formulator of the Krebs cycle. Scanning random passages from the book, it is hard to think that the author is not Jewish or part Jewish. If white, he has mastered their psychology to great profit.

Adam Kirsch, a Jewish book reviewer for Slate, the Washington Post-owned online magazine, quotes Krebs approvingly: “‘Ideas are viruses. They depend on minds as their hosts . . . The Germania virus . . . after 350 years of incubation . . . progressed to a systemic infection culminating in the major crisis of the twentieth century.’” (Yes, he means the “Holocaust.”) The title of Kirsch’s article is “Ideas Are Viruses [12].”

This is a characteristically Jewish, and totalitarian, way of thinking.

[13]

Adam Kirsch

Kirsch, a child of privilege, is the son of author, attorney, and newspaper columnist Jonathan Kirsch. A 1997 graduate of Harvard, Adam Kirsch writes regularly for Slate, The New Yorker, The Times Literary Supplement, and other magazines.

Wishing that the Germania had been lost during the Middle Ages, Kirsch concludes, “If the last surviving manuscript had been eaten by rats in a monk’s library a thousand years ago, the world might have been better off.”

Ah, liberal enlightenment! The world can never get enough of it.

 


Article printed from Counter-Currents Publishing: http://www.counter-currents.com

URL to article: http://www.counter-currents.com/2011/09/tacitus-germania/

dimanche, 09 octobre 2011

Stuff Our Betters Like

Stuff Our Betters Like

By James J. O'Meara

Ex: http://www.counter-currents.com/

Olivier Magny
Stuff Parisians Like: Discovering the Quoi in the Je Ne Sais Quoi [2]
New York: Berkley, 2011.

Chris Lehmann
Rich People Things: Real-Life Secrets of the Predator Class [3]
Chicago: Haymarket Books, 2011.

Considering how Christian Lander’s Stuff White People Like, first the blog, then the book, then the sequel, created more than a little frisson among the NPR crowd (see the Counter-Currents reviews here [4] and here [5]) it’s surprising we haven’t seen more knock-offs or outright parodies (along the lines of The Job of Sex or Bored of the Rings); in fact, as far as I know, these are the very first (not counting the rather differently intended but invaluable provocateur of White consciousness, Stuff Black People Don‘t Like [6]).

Stuff Parisians Like shares its title and numbered format with SWPL. Turns out, it’s an excellent format for studying le vie Parisiene, since “reaching a form of happiness in Paris” (the Parisiene is never just “happy” like an American — despite “the fact that all Parisians deliberately wear American clothes, watch American movies, listen to American music, use American words or fantasize about American celebrities . . . when hearing the phrase “Les Américains”, the Parisian will implacably … just be taken over by one overpowering thought . . . “Oui, mais les Américains, ils sont cons”) entails “internalizing certain codes and refusing certain habits” (p. 75).

But while Lander writes as a mildly cynical member of the group, establishing, as the more perceptive reviewers noted, his credentials precisely by gently mocking but never really challenging his group’s tastes and ideas (WASPs do love self-criticism and faux objectivity, after all!), Magny writes as a Parisian, oui, (apparently a restaurateur and oenophile no less, to judge from his website, where you can “Optimize your future interactions with Homo Parisianus [by] browsing the full list of Stuff Parisians Like [7]”), but with a difference; he disagrees heartily with his confreres, and seems to be something of a . . . well, conservative, I guess. Horreurs!

Which comes first, the dyspeptic view or the conservatism, is a toss up. Suffice to say, it makes for some very penetrating observations about an urban type that has not only fascinated Americans, but also seems remarkably like some of our own domestic species.

Thus while filled with cultural tidbits such as

  • Fans of “continental dining” should beware that the cheese course has given way to just coffee, although the addition of a little beurre sale [8] will make the sweetest concoction acceptably ascetic;
  • Wine, too is passé; lunch means water – San Pellegrino, or San-Pé [9], to the American’s amusement – dinner perhaps beer, a party definitely only hard liquor;
  • License plate numbers reveal the driver’s place of origin [10] as well as their character; the very best is 75 – Paris, of course – and the others ‘smell of mud’ or ‘depression’ in various numerical ratios, while also revealing their driving habits — “C’est ce con de 27 qui bloque tout le monde depuis deux heures.”

along with some surprises — the Parisian despises artists [11], who are perceived as lazy and un-credentialed (state-funded art degrees are almost unknown, a pretty good idea it seems to me) unlike the busy graduates of the grandes Ecoles [12]; the Parisian loves not art but his idea of France’s cultural heritage — and stuff you only need to have read an Edmund White to know — the L’ile Saint-Louis [13] is the place to be! The Luxembourg Gardens [14] are the place to be seen! — we also learn that

Parisians have an opinion about most things, thus making it clear they have a significant knowledge about most things in life.

Having theories takes this to the next level.

Theories prove that not only does the Parisian have more information and knowledge than other people, but he also processed that information through his own personal filter. The superiority filter. Parisians will use theory after theory but never warning that these are theories. Other people, including Parisians, will be fooled and will inevitably reach the conclusion that this Parisian is extremely cultivé and intelligent.

It is important to realize that very few Parisians form their own theories. Most Parisians repeat theories they heard on TV, or from their really smart uncle. No actual credit is ever given to the actual source. The actual source is always the Parisian. (pp. 89-90)

Theories, of course, are not facts; who needs facts when you have theories?

The Parisian, no matter how much he is into freedom of mind and against propaganda, rarely bothers to double-check his facts. He remains vastly foreign to elements that might otherwise feed and qualify his reflections. (p. 254)

While the American Leftist might have an opinion about, say, the Dalai Lama, the Parisian has a theory:

Le Dalai Lama is good. China is bad. Amen.

And that leads to some stuff those on the Alternative Right, or even non-Democrats, will recognize:

Worldwide, a fascist is a follower or an admirer of the pre-WWII Italian Fascist regime.

In Paris, a fascist is anyone who disagrees with a Parisian and makes a point.

The rarest use of the word facho is to define extreme right wing people. More common use of the word is to be found in situations when someone expresses beliefs and thoughts that are unacceptable to Parisians. The more brutally true the statement is, the more facho the person who says it is.

Calling someone a facho is a fantastic way for Parisians to win a conversation. [See “Winning Conversations [15]”]. When a Parisian’s dabbling is countered by superior, non-PC, implacable reasoning, the opponent will be called a facho. To seal the victory, the Parisian will say, “On peut pas discuter avec toi.” And walk away. Victory. (pp. 169-70)

Or, as Charlie Sheen would say, “Winning!”

Interestingly, both “Calling People Fachos” and “Le Dalai Lama” are not part of the “complete” list on his website; as he says himself:

If your opinion is susceptible to reach a significant number of people through a given media, Parisians will start a petition against you. It’s best to behave really . . .

One reviewer has suggested that the book’s disparaging remarks about Parisian nightlife and parties are a cheap attempt to drum up business for his wine bar. These more political passages, and his reticence about them, lead me to think he knows his Parisians too well.

Do not support small businesses — that will make you a fascist.

Dressed in black [16] and lacking testosterone ["There are three types of males in Paris: the gay-looking homosexuals, the gay-looking heterosexuals, and men over fifty"], the Parisian may seem familiar; didn’t we meet them that time in New York?

Calling people beaufs is a wonderful thing for Parisians. It allows them to assert conveniently their superiority while not going through the trouble of enduring a painstaking analysis that might lead them to interrogations about themselves or others.

But of course, it would be too easy to mock the beauf (the “redneck” if you will) for wearing white socks [17] or liking football.

Superior perceived social status is acquired by mocking habits and attitudes that are typical of upper class or even better – rich people. “He’s spending the weekend in Deauville? Can’t believe it, quel beauf!”; “Is he really driving a Hummer? Quel gros beauf!” By striking his audience with an unsuspected beauf designation, the Parisian scores serious social points: “Did he really take his nephew to Disney Land? Quel beauf!” The ultimate goal is to make all the people surrounding the Parisian wonder if, compared to him, they are not ultimately complete beaufs. (p. 7)

Le Beauf Americain

Yes, indeed, the New York State of Mind, and the feeling is mutual:

Paris is every Parisians’ wife. New York is their mistress. Parisians know how living with your wife gets old.

NY gear is very popular, especially amongst the younger generation of Parisians. The I Love New York T-shirt is a must. Worn properly, it is considered very chic in Paris. Less stylish people will opt for a NYPD T shirt. FDNY gear is exclusively reserved for the gay community in Paris. (p. 130)

Each section ends with a Helpful Tip (“When in doubt, just say putain”) and instructions on how to “Sound Like a Parisian” (which, I am sure, must contain its share of booby traps).

* * *

[18]Chris Lehmann’s Rich People Things, from its title to its cover to its number system, is clearly another SWPL title, but he and even his publishers make no mention of the earlier books; Lehmann claims his online column “began life as an afterthought title without any particular mission statement.” It’s a bit odd, considering his (well deserved) savaging of Chris Anderson (# 11. Wired Magazine) for mistaking his upstream rent-seeking for a new paradigm of free information.

Whatever. Lehmann seems part of what we might call the “unattached Left”; unattached, that is, to the conventional Democratic Party and its personality cult. No Obama-worshiping minion, he. (Unlike the Parisian, who very much likes Obama: his election proves the Parisian is right, there is no problem with immigrants, only racist fachos — see Magny‘s penultimate item.)

Thus, his targets and criticisms will be shared by many on the Alternative Right. He even quotes Steven Pinker — favorably! No paradox this; if one thinks of the traditional Left/Right field as a ping pong table, those not playing the game and just standing around share a space around it, and thus have more in common with each other than with either “player.”

He takes as his theme class analysis, not identity politics, and Americans’ peculiar lack thereof (boasted about, as Americans always find their limitations to be a source of perverse pride, as “our Exceptionalism;” Americans are proud to let everyone know they are very ‘special’ as they ride on the short bus of nations). And his targets are what takes the place — literally displaces, as a obscuring ideology — of class analysis: the “free markets and free men” mythology. So his topics tend to fall into two categories: economic myths (low taxes create jobs), and the mythical triumphant “individuals” (from Ayn Rand to Facebook and the aforementioned Wired) whose stories are thrown out by the system like squid ink.

Speaking of Rand, his chapter strikes me as one of the best objective (if you will) analyses of her work. His analysis hits the exact point where Rand gains her influence; starting out from the rather conventional standpoint of Nietzschean individualism (We the Living could even be filmed in Mussolini’s Italy) she hits the jackpot when she connects to the Horatio Alger myth of the Robber Baron era. By transposing individualism from the deterministic realm of nature to the marketplace of “free choice,” she allows her readers to vicariously imagine themselves (of course, who thinks of the Master Race without thinking oneself part of it?) being able, not so much to be heroes as to recognize them (most of us, after all, are mediocre but loyal Eddies not heroic Galts) and by serving them (buying their products and lowering their taxes) avoid the unforgivable sin of siding with the looters.

In general, Lehmann seems to be able to mouth the usual PC cliches, say, about the “genuine virtues of openness and diversity” while pointing out that:

These qualities form the basis of the twenty-first century’s corporate managerial mindset . . . a more diverse and culturally tolerant world is also a far more market-friendly world. It’s also, far from coincidentally, a world in which wealth and income disparity never seem to achieve the same vaunted status as cultural and gender diversity. (pp. 82-83)

This is not to say that Lehmann is a Traditionalist. For one thing, his good-thinking Liberal credentials show in an obsession with the Catholic Church as the citadel, or at least syneccdoche, of evil. The very first line reads:

American class privilege is very much like the idea of sex in a Catholic school — it’s not supposed to exist in the first place, but once it presents itself in your mind’s eye you realize that it’s everywhere.

My, what an original trope!

Later, he can’t even express his loathing and contempt for corporate (and, he fails to observe, Judaicly) backed frauds like Damien Hirst without making this outburst:

[W]e have entered an aesthetic universe every bit as blinkered and morally obtuse as that of the Catholic Church, when it elected to suppress classical composers in the wake of the Napoleonic Wars out of the conviction that they presented an urgent Jacobin threat to the established order of things. (p. 104)

[19]

This makes Lehmann think of Palestrina

I can’t be bothered to research this, but does anyone remember some papal bull condemning equal temperament? Myself, I get my history from fiction, and I remember Huysmans, in his Catholic phase, bemoaning the Church’s replacement of Gregorian chant with half-assed operatics by Gonoud and Faure (long before the LP-driven fashion for it, Huysmans was promoting the reconstruction work of the Abbey of Solesmes, which contributed to our more recent “early music” revival). One wants to say, like one of Lehmann’s landsmen, “from your mouth to God’s ear”; if only the Church had, successfully, stamped out that demonic manifestation known as “classical music”; see Evola in Ride the Tiger, or even Colin Wilson: passing from Mozart to Beethoven, one is wearied by all the table-pounding; or Delius: a preference for Mozart over Beethoven was his test of a new acquaintance’s cultural level.

If you can ignore the weird, unmotivated Catholic bashing, and the recurrent genuflection to PC orthodoxy, the reader on the Alternative or Traditionalist Right will be able to find much useful historical and critical discussion of our most contemporary economic and cultural busybodies and nuisances, from Malcolm Gladwell to Alan Greenspan to Frank Gehry.

However, it lacks any information on food and drink, and above all, don’t quote any of it to a Parisian.

Source: http://jamesjomeara.blogspot.com/ [20]

 


Article printed from Counter-Currents Publishing: http://www.counter-currents.com

URL to article: http://www.counter-currents.com/2011/10/stuff-our-betters-like/

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mardi, 27 septembre 2011

Le spectacle est devenu « la meilleure des polices »

Le spectacle est devenu "la meilleure des polices"

arton12570-aea95.jpg

Ex: http://ungraindesable.hautetfort.com/

En exergue de ce livre figurent deux belles citations de Guy Debord et Jean-Claude Michéa particulièrement bien choisies. L’auteur est très curieux à  voir l’abondante bibliographie (Jean-Pax Méfret, Murray, Michéa, Debord, Debray,Raymond Boudon, etc) ; ce livre est donc particulièrement intéressant car il s’attaque à de vrais sujets, de vrais problèmes.

Selon l’auteur, le lien est évident entre Murray et Debord ; « l’ordre spectaculaire et festif a pour conséquence (…) la disparition du réel . La " société hyperfestive " apparaît comme l’aboutissement de " la société du spectacle "».

Ce livre est une violente et véritable attaque contre le libéralisme mais sous un angle plutôt proche de Michéa que de Besancenot.
 

« (…) dans la société libérale, aucun vice ne doit en lui-même être à priori réprimé (…) Par ailleurs, et pour en revenir au présent , un taux relativement élevé de criminalité ne nuit pas au bon fonctionnement du « système libéral », au contraire. Prenons un exemple contemporain avec les émeutes urbaines : les voitures brûlées doivent être remplacées, les vitrines brisées réparées, etc. Et, comme le note avec ironie le philosophe Jean-claude Michéa dans L’emprise du moindre mal, le « système libéral «  dans sa grande ruse, a su aussi produire en parallèle toute « une industrie de l’excuse, voire de légitimation politique », se proclamant de gauche ou d’extrême gauche, mais en fait culturellement et politiquement libérale : « C’est le travail habituellement confié aux rappeurs, aux cinéastes « citoyens » et aux idiots utiles de la sociologie d’Etat. »

Il aborde ensuite le milieu du showbiz avec le politique et la corruption.

Il conclue ainsi « (…) Chaque époque a ses tabous et son idéologie dominante. Sous l’Ancien Régime, l’Eglise catholique » aujourd’hui « son influence a bien pâli » (…) le dieu caché du temps présent : la nouvelle religion spectaculaire et festive, diffuse, fluide et totalisante, avec ses prêtres et ses dévots de la médiasphère et du show-business (…) de nouvelles hiérarchies sociales, des tabous d’un genre nouveau, un conformisme inédit, tout un système dans lequel les troubadours jouent désormais les premiers rôles(d’anesthésistes). Car ainsi que le note Jean-claude Michéa, « il serait temps de reconnaître enfin que de nos jours, c’est le spectacle lui-même qui est devenu « la meilleure des polices » »

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samedi, 17 septembre 2011

Kampf und Tragödie des Barons Ungern-Sternberg"

Berndt Krauthoff: "Ich befehle! Kampf und Tragödie des Barons Ungern-Sternberg"

Eine Rezension

Götz KUBITSCHEK

Ex: http://www.sezession.de/

khan.jpgIm Regin-Verlag erscheint seit rund zwei Jahren ein ambitioniertes Programm, das sich – grob gesagt – dem traditionalen Gedankenkreis um Julius Evola, der Konservativen Revolution im weitesten Sinne sowie Figuren und Leitbildern einer Antimoderne widmet. Der Verleger bestückt also – salopp gesagt – die Nische in der Nische mit Büchern, und jeder, der sich ein bißchen mit dem Verlagsgeschäft auskennt, muß sich fragen, ob und wie man dort ein paar Mark verdienen will:

Denn der Regin-Verlag hat weder »Ever-Brauns« im Programm, noch legt er schlampiges Zeug vor, dem man ansieht, daß wirklich jeder Pfennig gespart wurde. Die Bücher sind vielmehr gut gesetzt, gut lektoriert, interessant und angemessen gestaltet. Ein Blick auf die stets aktuell gehaltene Internetseite www.regin-verlag.de lohnt sich.

In diesem Jahr erschienen ist der Nachdruck des Romans Ich befehle! von Berndt Krauthoff aus dem Jahr 1938 (hier einsehen und bestellen). Der Autor schildert darin Aufstieg und Fall des Barons Ungern-Sternberg, der als Befehlshaber einer bunt zusammengewürfelten, auf seine Person eingeschworenen Armee den Kommunisten vier Jahre lang schwer zusetzte. Er nahm den Kampf auf Seiten der »Weißen« unmittelbar nach der bolschewistischen Februarrevolution 1917 auf, hielt bis zur Niederlage Admiral Koltschaks seine sibirische Stellung und setzte danach auf eigene Faust, und ohne weiterhin in gegenrevolutionäre Strategien eingebunden zu sein, einen bereits vorbereiteten Plan um: Ungern-Sternberg überschritt im Oktober 1920 die Grenze der Äußeren Mongolei, eroberte im Februar die Hauptstadt Urga (das heutige Ulan Bator) und bis Mitte April 1921 das gesamte Gebiet. Allerdings überspannte er bereits im Sommer seine Kräfte und scheiterte bei dem Versuch, von der Mongolei aus Teile Sibiriens von den »Roten« zu säubern und seinen Einflußbereich auszuweiten. Am 15. September wurde Ungern-Sternberg, der auch die eroberten Teile der Mongolei wieder verloren hatte, gefangengenommen und erschossen.

Ich befehle! folgt insgesamt dem, was an historisch gesichertem Wissen über die kurze, aber intensive Führerschaft Ungern-Sternbergs vorhanden ist. Da die Darstellung – streng chronologisch und im Präsenz verfaßt – wie das unmittelbare Tagebuch eines Feldschreibers wirkt, ist es sogar als historisches Dokument wahrgenommen und verwendet worden. Das Nachwort des russischen Historikers Sergej Lwowitsch Kusmin zeigt allerdings, wie in der Darstellung des Lebens Ungern-Sternbergs stets biographische Exaktheit und Mythenbildung einander abwechseln: Natürlich gibt es Berichte über den Mut oder die Führungsgewalt des Barons, dessen geradezu unwiderstehliches Charisma ebenso belegt ist wie seine asiatische Grausamkeit in der Bestrafung seiner Untergebenen, wenn Befehle nicht ausgeführt oder Eide gebrochen wurden; aber die Quellenlage ist alles in allem doch dürftig, und so ist der Zugriff Berndt Krauthoffs eben vor allem eine gut erzählte historische Geschichte, die dem Faktenskelett sozusagen das Fleisch an die Knochen hängt. Manchmal gerät die Darstellung sogar zur Legende über eine dämonische Heiligenfigur: In ihm sah man einen Befreier, einen Retter, sogar die Inkarnation einer kriegerischen Gottheit der Mongolen. Krauthoff gelingt es, den Stoff nüchtern anzufassen und damit ein geradezu unwirkliches Leben in der Wirklichkeit zu halten.

Mit der »dramatischen Ballade« Kreuzzug 1921 von Michael Haupt ist ein zweiter literarischer Text im Buch enthalten. Dieses Drama ist viel weiter weg von der historischen Persönlichkeit als der Roman, aber es verdichtet wichtige Stationen und Szenen und ist, wie das Nachwort festhält, »ein Beispiel dafür, wie man das Ungernsche Epos in Europa verstand, kurz nachdem es bekannt wurde.« Die Widmung ist pathetisch, sie gilt »den wenigen Auserlesenen, die in der Welt zu führen verstehen«. Ist Haupts Drama je aufgeführt worden? Hier wünscht man sich mehr Auskunft über den Autor und über die Aufnahme seines Stückes.

Aber vielleicht ist das für das Ansinnen des Regin-Verlags auch zu sehr germanistisch gedacht. Hier geht es um die Bergung und Bewahrung verschütteten Schrifttums, und zwar aus gegebenem Anlaß. 2011 ist nämlich ein Gedenkjahr für alle Ungern-Sternberg-Verehrer: Er ist vor 125 Jahren geboren worden und wurde vor 80 Jahren füsiliert. Das ist auch der Grund, warum neben der literarischen Würdigung des Barons bereits im vergangenen Jahr in der »Anderen Bibliothek« (Eichborn) die Biographie Der blutige, weiße Baron aus der Feder James Palmers erschien (Sezession verwies im Februar-Heft dieses Jahres darauf). Auch dieses Buch hat keine Furore gemacht. Wer kennt schon Ungern-Sternberg, wer die literarischen Zeugnisse über ihn? Nun sind sie also wieder erhältlich, sind in der Welt und gut in Form gebracht.

Berndt Krauthoff: Ich befehle! Kampf und Tragödie des Barons Ungern-Sternberg mit Anhang: Michael Haupt: Kreuzzug 1921. Dramatische Ballade, Kiel: Regin-Verlag 2011. Hier bestellen.