William A. Galston
Anti-Pluralism: The Populist Threat to Liberal Democracy
New Haven: Yale University Press, 2018
“It is time for an open and robust debate on issues of immigration, identity politics, and nationalism that liberals and progressives have long avoided.”—William Galston
Galston is right. I will debate any liberal or progressive about these topics, and if they don’t want to debate me, I will help arrange a debate with whomever they prefer. Contact me at editor@counter-currents.com [2].
William Galston (born 1946) has had a long career spanning both political theory and practice. He received his Ph.D. in political theory from the University of Chicago and has strong Straussian credentials, although he aligns himself with the center-Left, not the neocons. (Arguably, this is a distinction without a difference.) Galston has taught in the political science departments of the University of Texas at Austin and the University of Maryland. He is now affiliated with the centrist Brookings Institution. Galston has worked for the presidential campaigns of John Anderson, Walter Mondale, Bill Clinton, and Al Gore. He was deputy assistant for domestic policy in the Clinton White House from January 1993 to May 1995.
Galston’s Anti-Pluralism: The Populist Threat to Liberal Democracy presents itself as a “liberal-democratic” centrist polemic against the populist Right, in much the same vein as Francis Fukuyama’s Identity: Contemporary Identity Politics and the Struggle for Recognition (2018, see my review here [3], here [4], and here [5]) and Mark Lilla’s The Once and Future Liberal: After Identity Politics (2017, see my review here [6]).
But Galston, like Fukuyama and Lilla, received a Straussian education, so chances are good that his arguments are not entirely straightforward. Indeed, all three books can also be read as polemics against the Left, since they argue that Left-wing excesses are the driving force behind the rise of Right-wing populism. Therefore, if the “liberal democratic” establishment wishes to take the wind out of the sails of Right-wing populism, it needs to rein in the excesses of the far Left.
Galston’s theoretical account of liberal democracy is pretty much standard centrist boilerplate. His theoretical account of populism depends heavily of Jan-Werner Müller’s extremely flawed book What Is Populism?, which I have reviewed [7] already.
For Galston, following Müller, liberal democracy is essentially “pluralist” and populism is “anti-pluralist.” By this, he does not mean that liberal democracies recognize that every healthy society balances the needs of the family, civil society, and the state. Nor does he mean that a healthy polity has differences of opinion that might express themselves in a plurality of political parties. Nor does he mean that a healthy society has different classes. Nor does he mean the separation of powers or the mixed regime. Populists can embrace all those forms of pluralism, but without liberalism.
Instead, for Galston and Müller, pluralism just means “diversity,” i.e., the presence of minorities, which he describes as “helpless” and in need of protection from the tyranny of the majority. By “minorities,” Galston doesn’t mean the people who lose a vote—a group that changes with every vote—but rather more fixed minorities, such as social elites and ethnic minorities.
But what if some minorities are not helpless but actually dangerously powerful? What if liberal democracy has long ceased to be majority rule + protection for minorities? What if liberal democracy has become, in effect, minority rule? What if these ruling minorities are so hostile to the majority that they have enacted policies that not only economically pauperize them, but also destroy their communities with immigration and multiculturalism, and, beyond that, seek their outright ethnic replacement? Liberal democracy is really just a euphemism for minority rule, meaning rule by hostile elites. Naturally, one would expect some sort of reaction. That reaction is populism.
Galston understands this. He recognizes the four major trends that Roger Eatwell and Matthew Goodwin argue are responsible for the rise of populism in their book National Populism: Revolt Against Liberal Democracy: popular distrust of elites, the destruction of communities by immigration and multiculturalism, the economic deprivation—falling largely on the working-class and middle-class—caused by globalization, and the consequent political dealignments in relation to the post-war center-Left/center-Right political establishment. (See my discussions of Eatwell and Goodwin here [8], here [9], and here [10].)
In his Introduction, Galston notes that “The people would defer to elites as long as elites delivered sustained prosperity and steadily improving living standards” (p. 2). Galston actually describes elitism as a “deformation” of liberal democracy: “Elitists claim that they best understand the means to the public’s ends and should be freed from the inconvenient necessity of popular consent” (p. 4).
People stopped trusting elites when economic globalization, immigration, and multiculturalism started making life worse, and not just economically but also in terms of culture and public safety (crime, terrorism): “A globalized economy, it turned out, served the interests of most people in developing countries and elites in advanced countries—but not the working and middle classes in the developed economies . . .” (p. 3). “Not only did immigrants compete with longtime inhabitants for jobs and social services, they were also seen as threatening long-established cultural norms and even public safety” (p. 3).
Galston outlines how our out-of-touch, hostile, increasingly panicked establishment can head off populism before it leads to genuine regime change:
. . . there is much that liberal democratic governments can do to mitigate their insufficiencies. Public policy can mitigate the heedlessness of markets and slow unwanted change. Nothing requires democratic leaders to give the same weight to outsiders’ claims as to those of their own citizens. They are not obligated to support policies that weaken their working and middle classes, even if these policies improve the lot of citizens in developing countries. They are certainly not obligated to open their doors to all newcomers, whatever the consequences for their citizenry. Moderate self-preference is the moral core of defensible nationalism. Unmodulated internationalism will breed—is breeding—its antitheses, an increasingly unbridled nationalism. (p. 5)
The Left, of course, has no problem using public policy to rein in markets, but they vehemently reject Galston’s “moderate self-preference,” which is what some people would call putting “America first.” The American Left is committed to open borders, which will pauperize the American middle and working classes as surely as Republican deindustrialization and globalization.
In chapter 6, “Liberal Democracy in America: What Is to Be Done?,” Galston recommends prioritizing economic growth and opportunity and making sure it is widely shared by everyone. The “second task requires pursuing three key objectives: adopting full employment as a principal goal or economic policy; restoring the link between productivity gains and wage increases; and treating earned and unearned income equally in our tax code” (p. 87). In effect, Galston proposes halting the decline of the American middle class that has been ongoing for nearly half a century by ensuring that productivity gains go to workers, not just capitalists. As a populist, these are policies that I can support.
Galston also suggests that a corrective to the decline in labor unions and worker bargaining power due to globalization can be offset by measures to “democratize capital through . . . worker ownership of firms, that share the gains more broadly” (p. 99).
Of course productivity can be raised in two ways: by making labor more productive through technological and organizational improvements—or simply by cost-cutting. Practically all the “productivity” gains of globalization are simply due to cost-cutting by replacing well-paid white workers with poorly paid Third Worlders, either by sending factories overseas or by importing legal and illegal immigrants. If public policy is to promote genuine economic growth, it needs to promote genuine increases in productivity, which means technological innovations, as well as better education and all-round infrastructure.
But technology doesn’t just make workers more productive. It also puts them out of work. However, if workers have no incomes, then they cannot purchase the products of automation. (Production can be automated, but consumption can’t.) So how can we maintain technological growth, a healthy middle class, and consumer demand at the same time? Galston points to a partial solution:
. . . the public should get a return on public capital the benefits of which are now privately appropriated. When the government funds basic research that leads to new medical devices, the firms that have relied on this research should pay royalties to the Treasury. When states and localities invest in infrastructure that raises property values and creates new business opportunities, the taxpayers should receive some portion of the gains. One might even imagine public contributions to a sovereign wealth fund that would invest in an index of U.S. firms and pay dividends to every citizen. (p. 99)
The key point is that when machines put us out of work, we should not fall into unemployment but rise into the class of people who live on dividends. A more direct route to the same outcome would be to adopt Social Credit economics, including a dividend or Universal Basic Income paid to every citizen. (For more on this, see my essay, “Money for Nothing [11].”)
Galston does not mention simple, straightforward protectionism, but there are sound arguments for it, and the arguments against it have been refuted. (See Donald Thoresen’s review [12] of Ian Fletcher’s Free Trade Doesn’t Work.)
The bad news for National Populists is that Galston’s proposals, if actually adopted, would significantly retard our political success. The good news is that Galston’s proposals are simply what Eatwell and Goodwin call “National Populism lite,” which means that Galston is abandoning globalism in principle. What he refuses to abandon is the existing political establishment, which he thinks will retain power only by abandoning globalism.
Another piece of good news is that the establishment will probably never listen to Galston. They are fanatically committed to their agenda. They are not going to drop their commitment to globalism in favor of nationalism, even if it is the only way to preserve themselves. Galston is trying to appeal to the rational self-interest of the existing elites. But they are not rational or even especially self-interested. Sometimes people hate their enemies more than they love themselves. But National Populists would implement Galston’s policies, and more. So perhaps he is rooting for the wrong team.
A third piece of good news is that Galston realizes that economic reforms are not enough. Galston also cites studies showing that populist Brexit and Trump voters were not motivated solely by economic concerns (pp. 76–77). They were also motivated by concerns about identity. Since Galston is talking primarily about white countries, National Populism is a species of white identity politics. Since Left-wing populism rejects nationalism and white identity politics (and only white identity politics), it can only address white voters on economic issues, which means that it has less electoral appeal than Right-wing populism.
As I never tire of pointing out, what people want is a socially conservative, nationalistic, interventionist state that will use its power to protect the working and middle classes from the depredations of global capitalism. The elites, however, want social liberalism and globalism both in politics and economics.
The two-party system is designed to never give the people what they want. The Republicans stand for conservative values and global capitalism. The Democrats stand for liberal values and the interventionist state. When in power, the parties only deliver what the elites want, not what the people want.
The consequence is neoliberalism: an increasingly oligarchical hypercapitalist society that celebrates Left-wing values. Galston offers interesting support for this thesis by quoting Bo Rothstein, “a well-known scholar of European social democracy” who argues (these are Rothstein’s words) that “The more than 150-year-old alliance between the industrial working class and the intellectual-cultural Left is over” (p. 103). Rothstein elaborates:
The traditional working class favors protectionism, the re-establishment of a type of work that the development of technology has rendered outdated and production over environmental concerns; it is also a significant part of the basis of the recent surge in anti-immigrant and even xenophobic views. Support of the traditional working class for strengthening ethnic or sexual minorities’ rights is also pretty low. (p. 103)
Since the Left’s values are the “exact opposite,” Rothstein proposes that the Left ally with the “new entrepreneurial economy.” Hence the marriage of some of the biggest corporations on the planet—Facebook, Apple, Amazon, Microsoft, Google—with trannies, POCs, Muslims, feminists, and global warming fantasists. This coalition thinks it will win through replacing the white working and middle classes with non-whites. Galston notes that Democratic Party circles in the US hold essentially the same views:
The best known have based their case on long-cycle demographic shifts. There is a “rising American electorate” made up of educated professionals minorities, and young people, all groups whose share of the electorate will increase steadily over the next two generations. These groups represent the future. The white working class, whose electoral share has dwindled in recent decades and will continue to do so, is the past. This does not mean that the center-left should ignore it completely. [For instance, on economic matters.] It does mean that there should be no compromise with white working-class sentiments on the social and cultural issues that dominate the concerns of the rising American electorate coalition. (p. 103)
This is a crystal-clear statement of the White Nationalist thesis that the Left is counting on—and promoting—the slow genocide of whites [13] through race-replacement immigration in order to create a permanent Left-wing majority. What could possibly go wrong? Galston drily notes that “This was the theory at the heart of Hillary Clinton’s presidential campaign.”
Obviously, there was going to be a reaction. The Left has been partying like whites are already a minority, but that’s not true yet. White demographic decline is obviously a serious threat if we do nothing about it. But there is nothing inevitable about white demographic decline. It is the product of particular political policies. Thus it can be reversed by different policies. And, as Eatwell and Goodwin argue in National Populism, we still have some decades to turn things around, although of course the time frame varies from country to country. Furthermore, National Populist political movements, once they break through, are highly competitive because, unlike the center-Left and center-Right, we will actually give the people what they want, for a change.
Galston is well aware that the center-Left cannot compete with National Populists on economic ground alone:
If concessions on cultural and social issues are ruled out, appeals to the white working class will have to be confined to economics. . . . The difficulty, as we have seen, is that the audience for this economic appeal cares at least as much about social and cultural issues. Immigration, demographic change, and fears of cultural displacement drove the Brexit vote, and they were the key determinants of Donald Trump’s victory. . . .
So the American center-left has a choice: to stand firm on social and cultural issues that antagonize populism’s most fervent supporters, or to shift in ways for which it can offer a principled defense. It is time for an open and robust debate on issues of immigration, identity politics, and nationalism that liberals and progressives have long avoided. (pp. 103–104)
Galston is absolutely correct here. The Left will not win by bread alone. It needs to address questions of values and identity. But it can’t really do so without abandoning its own values and identity. We really do need open and honest debate on immigration, identity politics, and nationalism, but the Left cannot permit this, because they know they’ll lose.
Galston also recognizes that tribal sentiments—meaning a preference for one’s own—are an ineradicable part of human nature. Because of this, “The issue of national identity is on the table, not only in scholarly debates, but also in the political arena. Those who believe that liberal democracy draws strength from diversity have been thrown on the defensive. Large population flows . . . have triggered concerned about the loss of national sovereignty” (p. 95).
Galston approvingly quotes Jeff Colgan and Robert Keohane’s statement that “It is not bigotry to calibrate immigration levels to the ability of immigrants to assimilate and to society’s ability to adjust” (p. 96). Of course, assimilation is the opposite of multiculturalism. Galston suggests that US immigration policies should shift toward meritocratic concerns about economic contribution, put increasing emphasis on English fluency, and demand greater knowledge of American history and institutions. The main virtue of these proposals is that they would dramatically decrease the numbers of immigrants (p. 96). I heartily agree with Galston’s final remarks on immigration:
One thing is clear: denouncing citizens concerned about immigration as ignorant and bigoted (as former British prime minister Gordon Brown did in an ill-fated election encounter with a potential supporter) does nothing to ameliorate either the substance of the problem or its politics. (p. 96)
But again, Leftists are unlikely to take Galston’s advice. If the Left moved away from moralistic condemnations of immigration skepticism and actually debated the topic, they would simply lose. Indeed, one of the reasons why the Left supports race-replacement immigration is because they have given up on convincing white voters and simply wish to replace them.
Galston also chides Leftists for their arrogance. One of the strongest predictors of Left-wing values is the amount of time people spend in higher education, especially the liberal arts and social sciences. This does not mean that such people are genuinely educated, of course, but they are flattered into thinking they are more enlightened and intelligent than ordinary people, which feeds into populism:
Put bluntly, if Americans with more education regard their less educated fellow citizens with disrespect, the inevitable response of the disrespected will be resentment coupled with a desire to take revenge on those who assert superiority. . . . elites have a choice: they can try to take the edge off status differences or they can flaunt them. . . . It is up to privileged Americans to take the first step by listening attentively and respectively to those who went unheard for far too long. (p. 102)
Galston is right, of course, but there is little likelihood that this recommendation—or any of his others—will be heeded. The pretense of intellectual superiority, no matter how hollow, is close to the core of Leftist identity. To win by abandoning one’s identity feels like losing to most people. Thus they will tend to hold fast to their identities and hope that somehow reality will accommodate their wishes.
William Galston is a perceptive, rational, and courageous writer. I can’t help but respect him, even though he is on the other side. He is a liberal democrat. I am an illiberal democrat. He wants to preserve the current establishment. I don’t. Given that the current establishment has fundamentally betrayed our people—with the Left openly pinning its hopes on the slow genocide of whites and the Right too stupid and cowardly to stop it—we need genuine regime change.
Even though Anti-Pluralism is a critique of National Populism, I find it a highly encouraging book. Rhetorically, the book was often cringe-inducing. Evidently Galston thinks that to communicate difficult truths to liberals, they need a great deal of buttering up. But in terms of its substance, Galston—like Fukuyama and Lilla—concedes many fundamental premises to National Populists, and the only way he can envision stopping National Populism and keeping the existing political establishment in power is by adapting National Populism lite. In short, he has all but conceded us the intellectual victory. Our task is now to achieve it on the political plane.
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S’il est difficile de se replacer derrière le voile d’ignorance tant nous sommes conditionnés par la place spécifique que nous occupons déjà dans la société, cette expérience de pensée permettra de nous orienter beaucoup plus sûrement vers un terrain d’entente. Il se peut que je consomme trop d’eau ou que je pollue, non pas parce que j’en tire un plaisir intrinsèque, mais parce que cela satisfait mon intérêt matériel : je produis plus de légumes, ou j’économise des coûts d’isolation, ou je me dispense de l’achat d’un véhicule plus propre. Et vous qui subissez mes agissements, vous les réprouverez.
D’une part, elle peut orienter le débat vers les objectifs incarnés dans la notion de bien commun en les distinguant des instruments qui peuvent concourir à leur réalisation. Car trop souvent, comme nous le verrons, ces instruments, qu’il s’agisse d’une institution (par exemple le marché), d’un « droit à » ou d’une politique économique, acquièrent une vie propre et finissent par perdre de vue leur finalité, allant alors à l’encontre du bien commun qui les justifiait de prime abord. D’autre part, et surtout, l’économie, prenant le bien commun comme une donnée, développe les outils pour y contribuer.
Dieses Buch enthält erstmals umfangreiche biografische Daten des Philoso-
Face à la manière dont le dit Traité de paix de Versailles a mis en opposition les peuples européens après 1919, préparant ainsi de nouveaux conflits militaires; dont l’Europe centrale a été démembrée et trois empires démantelés du jour au lendemain; dont l’Empire ottoman a été dépecé et des révolutions ont secoué la partie occidentale de l’Eurasie; dont, pour la première fois dans l’histoire de l’humanité, une nation s’est transformée en unique puissance mondiale. Donc face à l’envergure de ces bouleversements, il est étonnant de constater que peu d’impulsions de la part des cercles d’historiens n’aient été déclenchées au cours de cette année de commémoration susceptible à élaborer en profondeur un débat publique sur les causes et les effets de ces accords.
Le livre de Grégory Roose, Pensées interdites, est parfait pour celui qui n’a jamais ouvert un ouvrage de politique ou que rebute l’idée de se plonger dans de grandes dissertations philosophiques, bref, un ouvrage idéal pour le Millénial ou quiconque lit peu.
Het lijkt erop dat de Iraniërs over een sterke mentaliteit beschikken om met een wereldmacht de confrontatie op te zoeken. Is hiervoor een historische verklaring?
Hazony defines the nation-state in contradistinction to two alternatives: tribal anarchy and imperialism. Tribal anarchy is basically a condition of more or less perpetual suspicion, injustice, and conflict that exists between tribes of the same nation in the absence of a common government. Imperialism is an attempt to extend common government to the different nations of the world, which exist in a state of anarchy vis-à-vis each other.
Hazony argues that nationalism has a number of advantages over tribal anarchy. The small states of ancient Greece, medieval Italy, and modern Germany wasted a great deal of blood and wealth in conflicts that were almost literally fratricidal, and that made these peoples vulnerable to aggression from entirely different peoples. Unifying warring “tribes” of the same peoples under a nation-state created peace and prosperity within their borders and presented a united front to potential enemies from without.
The “mutual loyalty” at the heart of nation-states is a product of a common ethnicity. How does ethnic unity make free institutions possible? Every society needs order. Order either comes from within the individual or is imposed from without. A society in which individuals share a strong normative culture does not need a heavy-handed state to impose social order.
In fact, Hazony argues, imperialism is far more conducive to hatred and violence than nationalism.
The third principle is “government monopoly of organized force within the state” (p. 177), as opposed to tribal anarchy. A failed state is one in which different ethnic groups create their own militias.
The difference between good nationalism and bad nationalism is simple: Good nationalism is universalist. A good nationalist wants to ensure the sovereignty of his own people, but does not wish to deny the sovereignty of other peoples. Instead, he envisions a global order of sovereign nations, to the extent that this is possible. Hazony, however, wishes to stop short of the idea of a universal right to self-determination, which I will deal with at greater length later.
Aux débuts des années 1990, inquiète de la résistance nationale-patriotique en Russie contre Boris Eltsine, une certaine presse de caniveau fantasmait sur une hypothétique convergence « rouge – brun » en France. Sa profonde inculture l’empêcha de mentionner le national-bolchevisme allemand de l’Entre-deux-guerres, le souverainisme communiste réalisé en RDA et en Roumanie ou le national-communisme du philosophe Régis Debray à la fin des années 1970. Le philosophe français aurait certainement été surpris de savoir que son pays connut naguère un embryon national-communiste ou national-collectiviste six décennies plus tôt.
Acquis au racialisme scientifique, il popularisa le concept du Blut und Boden (Sang et Sol), espérant abolir une société industrielle fermée au monde des affaires afin de la remplacer par une société organique prenant sa base sur un système de nobilité agreste héréditaire.
Most widely held works 
Vous insistez beaucoup, pour l’efficacité de l’action métapolitique, sur la compréhension d’un contexte fait de l’emboîtement de trois éléments : l’Occident, le Système et le Régime. En quelques mots, que voulez-vous dire par là ?
R. R. Reno
La thèse n’est pas nouvelle. En 1984, le Club de l’Horloge sortait chez Albin Michel Socialisme et fascisme : une même famille ?. Ne connaissant pas ce livre, Frédéric Le Moal arrive néanmoins aux mêmes conclusions. Il se cantonne toutefois à la seule Italie en oubliant ses interactions européennes, voire extra-européennes (le péronisme en Argentine). Il circonscrit le fascisme en phénomène italien spécifique. Certes, il mentionne l’influence d’Oswald Spengler sur Mussolini, mais il en oublie le contexte international, à savoir l’existence protéiforme d’une révolution conservatrice non-conformiste. En outre, l’auteur ne souscrit pas à la thèse de Zeev Sternhell pour qui le fascisme italien a eu une matrice française. 
Pourtant, la question du conservatisme est complexe car le terme, lui-même, renvoie à des phénomènes – et des réalités – politiques différents, du parti conservateur britannique (les Tories, au pouvoir au Royaume-Uni en alternance démocratique avec le Labour travailliste) au monolithique ancien Parti communiste soviétique (PCUS), dont les caciques étaient qualifiés de « conservateurs », sans doute en partie en raison de leur âge… Une seule chose est sûre, l’absence pérenne – ou presque (l’exception Fillon vaincue par le très progressiste hebdomadaire Le Canard enchaîné) – du terme dans le débat français, depuis la fin de la Révolution française au moins jusqu’à récemment (puisque l’on parle de néo-conservateurs que la gauche morale n’hésite pas, d’ailleurs, à qualifier de « néo-cons » – le discrédit sémantique est toujours au cœur des débats et fonctionne d’ailleurs, mais s’agissant de cette tendance, il s’agit, le plus souvent, de « libéraux américains » – donc, la gauche américaine issue des démocrates – défendant des thèses conservatrices liées à la défense de la nation : identités fédérées réaffirmées, rejet du « politically correct », rejet du fiscalisme…).
En effet, originellement, l’esprit conservateur est de nature collective : il vise à préserver un ordre naturel préexistant alors que le libéralisme post-révolutionnaire naît du développement des besoins exprimés individuellement. Le conservatisme ne nie pas la liberté mais se rattache davantage à la liberté concrète, plus qu’abstraite, à la liberté collective, plus qu’individuelle. Le triomphe de l’individualisme, état suprême du libéralisme, s’oppose au conservatisme des systèmes normatifs. C’est ici, à mon sens, que le renouveau du conservatisme prend tout son sens : le développement de l’individualisme a contribué à l’effacement des repères collectifs, identitaires, religieux ou culturels. La fin du bien commun a rendu la modernité, expression d’un libéralisme fondé sur l’individu, exécrable pour les « oubliés » du Système. L’extension des droits individuels comme le droit à l’enfant, exalté par les « progressistes », vient à exclure ce bien commun qu’est le droit de l’enfant à vivre au sein d’une famille. Alexandre Soljenitsyne dénonçait déjà, en 1978, dans Le déclin du courage, le matérialisme occidental issu de la société de consommation. Le déracinement, fruit de ce conservatisme anglo-saxon, a touché d’abord les classes populaires souvent qualifiées d’« oubliées » par nos chercheurs sociologues. La France des oubliés, c’est d’abord l’expression d’une société qui a fait de l’individualisme libéral son étalon, son exigence. Or, le conservatisme, forme d’enracinement, aurait pu, pourrait, peut encore venir tempérer ce système économique certes nécessaire mais qui doit constituer un des piliers d’une société tridimensionnelle et non le pilier central.
En prenant sept cas d’école de la conduite du changement dans les armées, Michel Goya propose ainsi avec S’adapter pour vaincre une analyse des rouages de l’adaptation des grandes structures militaires sous la pression de leur époque : qu’il s’agisse de l’ascension de l’armée prussienne au XIXe siècle, de la métamorphose de l’armée française durant la Première Guerre mondiale, du déclin de la Royal Navy au cours de la première moitié du XXe siècle ou encore de la confrontation de l’US Army avec la guerre moderne à partir de 1945, l’animateur du blog La Voie de l’épée met à chaque fois en lumière les inducteurs de la mue de la Pratique (avec un grand « P » sous la plume de l’auteur) au sein de ces organisations complexes. Car, pour Michel Goya, « faire évoluer une armée, c’est faire évoluer sa Pratique », cette même Pratique étant « le point de départ et d’arrivée du cycle de l’évolution ».
Au-delà de la rétrospective historique, le principal intérêt de l’ouvrage est ainsi l’analyse percutante que livre Michel Goya sur les conditions d’apparition de cette innovation au sein d’une structure militaire. S’adapter pour vaincre montre comment les innovations de rupture ne viennent pas souvent de l’intérieur – contrairement à l’innovation dite « continue » – mais sont généralement imposées de l’extérieur, sous la pression de l’ennemi par exemple. On y voit également les viscosités et les biais cognitifs à l’œuvre, que ce soit l’effet générationnel des décideurs, la propension des armées à reproduire des modèles connus, la rivalité entre les services d’une même armée ou encore l’illusion de pouvoir piloter de manière centralisée le cycle du changement. Le rôle du politique pour faire passer les évolutions de rupture est également mis en avant, tout comme l’importance de créer les conditions de l’émergence d’un courant de pensée libre de réflexion non institutionnelle – que l’auteur considère d’ailleurs comme une forme indispensable de « réserve » opérationnelle pour les temps mauvais. On retiendra enfin l’importance pour une organisation militaire de pouvoir expérimenter, grâce à un surplus de ressources matérielles et de temps libre, comme ce fut le cas notamment dans les décennies qui précédèrent la Première Guerre mondiale : « Plus les unités disposent de temps libre et de moyens autonomes, et plus ce capital d’adaptation rapide est important. Inversement, plus les moyens sont comptés, surveillés et centralisés, et plus l’armée devient rigide. »
To his credit, Ryan does not spend much ink on critical analyses of the various presentations. That would make for a very fat and dreary book. In nearly every instance he’d have to tell us that the production was uneven and woefully miscast. I wondered if he was going to carp about the misconceived film adaptation of Keep the Aspidistra Flying (1997; American title: A Merry War). Not a bit of it; he leaves it to us to do the carping and ridicule. What he does provide is a rich concordance of Orwell presentations over the years, with often amazing production notes, technical details, and contemporary press notices. And if you don’t care to get that far into weeds, George Orwell on Screen is still an indispensable guidebook, pointing you to all sorts of bio-documentaries and dramatizations you might never discover on your own. This is particularly true of the many (mostly) BBC docos produced forty or fifty years ago, where you find such delights as Malcolm Muggeridge and Cyril Connolly lying down in tall grass and trading tales about their late, great friend.
« Pour une évidente clarté sémantique, écrit-il, il serait préférable de laisser au Flamby normal, à l’exquise Najat Vallaud-Belkacem et aux morts vivants du siège vendu, rue de Solférino, ce mot de socialiste et d’en trouver un autre plus pertinent. Sachant que travaillisme risquerait de susciter les mêmes confusions lexicales, les termes de solidarisme ou, pourquoi pas, celui de justicialisme, directement venu de l’Argentine péronisme, seraient bien plus appropriés. »
Certes, depuis une seconde rencontre à Hanoï en février 2019 qui fut un échec et une brève entrevue sur la ligne de démarcation de Panmunjom en juin dernier qui fit néanmoins de Donald Trump le premier président des États-Unis à fouler un instant le sol de la République populaire et démocratique de Corée (RPDC), les tensions reprennent entre Washington et Pyongyang en raison de la suffisance des États-Unis incapables de conclure le moindre compromis.
