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dimanche, 01 avril 2012

Martin van Crevelds neues Werk

Martin van Crevelds neues Werk „Kriegs-Kultur“ und die Frage, warum wir kämpfen      


Geschrieben von: Wolfram Wehl   

Ex: http://www.blauenarzisse.de/

 

Es spielt Marschmusik. Schwere Stiefel dröhnen auf dem Asphalt. Ein Offizier ruft Befehle. Langsam marschiert der Trauerzug im Gleichschritt die Straße entlang. Ähnlich wie viele Passanten, die innehalten, bin auch ich von der Zeremonie gebannt und vergesse das eigentliche Ziel meines Spaziergangs. Es ist die „Macht des Militärischen“, die den Menschen fasziniert und nach Meinung des Militärhistorikers van Creveld eine ganze Kultur ins Leben gerufen hat.

Martin van Creveld zählt zu den renommiertesten Militärhistorikern weltweit. Nach seinem umstrittenen Werk Kampfkraft, erschien vor kurzer Zeit eine neue Publikation. In: Kriegs-Kultur. Warum wir kämpfen: Die tiefen Wurzeln bewaffneter Konflikte beschreibt van Creveld den Krieg als kulturelles Phänomen.

Der Autor zeichnet in fünf Abschnitten ein detailliertes Bild verschiedener Kriegs-Kulturen. Diese reichen vom antiken Griechenland bis in die heutige Zeit. Nach van Creveld spiegelt sich eine Kriegs-Kultur vor allem in Bräuchen, besonderen Kriegs-Regeln (deren Überschreitung als schlimmstes Verbrechen galt), Kriegsspielen und dem Gedenken an den Krieg wieder.

Waffen als Phallus-Symbole

Zu Beginn stellt van Crefeld die These auf, dass Waffen nicht nur einfache Werkzeuge sind. Dies wird seiner Meinung nach bereits anhand der ausgewählten Namensgebung von Kriegsgeräten deutlich, wie beispielsweise die „Dicke Bertha“, ein Geschütz aus dem ersten Weltkrieg, oder die großen amerikanischen Flugzeugträger „Eisenhower“ und „McArthur“ bezeugen. Flugzeuge wurden häufig individuell angemalt, zeitweise auch mit leicht bekleideten Frauen. Lange Zeit war der Krieg schließlich eine reine Männerdomäne. Dies führt den Militärhistoriker zu einem spannenden Vergleich: Inwiefern können Kriegsgeräte als sexuelle Symbole wirken? So wird zum Beispiel bei Geschossen und Projektilen die Ähnlichkeit mit dem männlichen Geschlechtsteil dadurch verstärkt, dass ihre Spitzen oftmals einen hellen Farbanstrich erhalten. Gerade deswegen werden scharfe Waffen oft von Männern geschätzt, da sie nicht nur den Körper einer anderen Person zerreißen, sondern auch in ihn eindringen können.

Krieg ist allgegenwärtig und ein Bestandteil menschlichen Lebens

Dass der Krieg grausam und schrecklich ist, bestreitet van Creveld nicht. Dennoch übt er bis heute auf jeden Einzelnen eine persönliche Wirkung aus, wie sie in zahllosen Feldtagebüchern und Memoiren dokumentiert sind. Nicht nur in der Literatur (man denke an die Ilias), sondern vor allem in der Filmindustrie (Hollywood) hat das Thema Krieg einen festen Bestanteil. Die Regisseure wissen, dass man mit Filmstreifen wie Terminator oder Apocalypse Now ein breites Publikum begeistern kann.

An vielen Stellen weist der Autor darauf hin, dass Krieg und Kriegsspiele (als Vorläufer vom Krieg) Männersache sind. Das fängt bei Schach, dem klassischen Kriegsspiel, an und geht über Gladiatorenkämpfe bis hin zu den großen Feldzügen des 20. Jahrhunderts weiter. In diesem Zusammenhang benennt er den Krieg als „großes Spiel“, wo es um Leben und Tod geht. Dazu schreibt van Creveld: „Füllt der Geruch der Gefahr die Luft, werden Soldaten von teuren Nichtstuern zu sehr wertvollen Erzeugnissen verwandelt.“

Am Ende steht die Frage, ob eine Nation auch ohne eine Kriegskultur auskommen kann. Dieser Gedanke wird vom Autor schnell verneint, denn diesen Ländern drohe der gesellschaftliche Zerfall und ihre Streitkräfte seien allerhöchstens noch „wilde Haufen ohne Manneszucht, ohne soldatische Regeln, die kaum noch kämpfen, sondern höchstens Gräuel verursachen.“ Schlimmer allerdings sei es, wenn die Streitkräfte „Opfer des Feminismus“ würden. Dadurch leide die gesamte Kriegs-Kultur und somit auch „die Fähigkeit, einen Krieg zu führen.“

Clausewitz widerlegen

Das umfangreiche Werk Kriegs-Kultur ist aufgrund seiner Detailliertheit keine leichte Kost. Und doch liegt darin auch seine Stärke, da sich dem Leser aufgrund der Fülle des Materials völlig neue Zusammenhänge ergeben. So widerlegt van Creveld provokanterweise die These von Clausewitz, wonach Krieg lediglich ein Mittel zum Zweck sei, einen Gegner zu vernichten oder in die Handlungsunfähigkeit zu treiben. Der Autor zeigt nämlich vielmehr, dass der Krieg selber über die Jahrhunderte eine Faszination auf den Menschen ausgeübt hat, so sehr er sich auch dagegen wehren mag. Diese Begeisterung ist sowohl wichtiger Bestandteil wie auch Triebkraft der Kultur eines Krieges. In diesem Zusammenhang fügt er auch hinzu, dass jede Art „menschlicher Aktivität“ besser ausgeführt werde, wenn die Beteiligten bei ihrem Tun Vergnügen empfinden. Warum also sollte der Krieg davon eine Ausnahme bilden?

Martin van Creveld: Kriegs-Kultur. Warum wir kämpfen: Die tiefen Wurzeln bewaffneter Konflikte. 560 Seiten, mit zahlreichen Abbildungen. Ares-Verlag, Graz. 34,90 Euro.

samedi, 31 mars 2012

Wilhelm Stapel, théoricien de la “communauté cultuelle”

 

wilhel10.jpg

Wolfgang SAUR:

Wilhelm Stapel, théoricien de la “communauté cultuelle”

Le brillant essayiste allemand Sebastian Maass nous dresse un portrait de Wilhelm Stapel, publiciste politique de la révolution conservatrice

Armin Mohler garde surtout un grand mérite, et non des moindres: il a montré, dès 1950, comment l’héritage des idées de droite s’était transformé de manière originale pour produire un nouveau type révolutionnaire, immédiatement après la première guerre mondiale; il a baptisé ce processus de métamorphose “révolution conservatrice” et ouvert ainsi un formidable champ de recherches. Karlheinz Weissmann, pour sa part, a reformulé et réécrit le texte de base de l’ouvrage cardinal de Mohler en 2005; il souligne, dans la biographie qu’il a récemment consacrée à Armin Mohler, combien l’ouvrage “Die konservative Revolution in Deutschland - 1918-1932” a eu un “effet épocal”, tant sur les contemporains que chez ceux qui se réclament de sa postérité. Les retombées de l’ouvrage de Mohler se repèrent encore aujourd’hui.

Le travail d’un autre historien des idées, Sebastian Maass, qui appartient résolument à cette postérité de Mohler, s’inscrit bel et bien dans cette même veine. En peu de temps, Maass a exploré une part considérable des auteurs du filon “jeune-conservateur” (“jungkonservativ”) et a analysé leurs idées. L’une après l’autre, plusieurs monographies sont parues: sur Edgar Jung (2009), sur Arthur Moeller van den Bruck (2010) et sur Othmar Spann (2010). Aujourd’hui, Maass vient de sortir de presse un travail sur Wilhelm Stapel et sur son “Hamburger Kreis” (= “Cercle de Hambourg”).

Maass ne se contente pas d’évoquer la personnalité de l’auteur auquel il consacre une monographie ni d’exposer les seules idées qu’il a véhiculées. Outre une biographie, une analyse de l’oeuvre, une analyse détaillée des thèmes avancés et une insertion de l’oeuvre dans l’histoire générale des idées, les quatre volumes produits par Maass traitent également des collègues et disciples de l’auteur, ce qui permet de mettre bien en exergue le caractère collégial de ces producteurs d’idées nouvelles à une époque cruciale de l’histoire allemande. Cette manière de structurer les monographies se retrouve également dans le livre consacré à Stapel. En procédant de la sorte, Maass fait bien ressortir les principaux contours du paysage idéologique et intellectuel de la droite allemande au temps de la République de Weimar: ce paysage est structuré par des clubs et des associations comme le “Cercle de Hambourg” (autour de Stapel), le “Juni-Klub” et le cercle de la Motzstrasse à Berlin, le cercle regroupé autour de Jung à Munich, et le groupe de Othmar Spann à Vienne. Maass ajoute des documents pour compléter ses analyses. Ces documents sont importants comme par exemple l’apologie que prononce Stapel devant la “chambre de dénazification” en 1946 ou sa correspondance avec Armin Mohler.

L’angle d’attaque, que s’était choisi Mohler, était de nature herméneutique et fascine encore aujourd’hui bon nombre d’interprètes de la “konservative Revolution”. Cela vaut également pour Maass, qui reste fidèle aux leitmotive nietzschéens de Mohler comme l’image (plutôt que le concept – Bild statt Begriff), le cycle et la sphère (en lieu et place de la “linéarité”), le paganisme postchrétien. Ce regard nietzschéen s’avère parfois encombrant quand il faut aborder des auteurs qui ont un profil religieux (chrétien, catholique ou protestant). C’était d’ailleurs l’objet de la querelle épistolaire entre Mohler et Stapel dans l’immédiat après-guerre.

Malgré le nietzschéanisme mohlérien de Maass, celui-ci est malgré tout parvenu à rendre un formidable hommage à Stapel, figure importante de la “révolution conservatrice” d’inspiration protestante et auteur d’un ouvrage aujourd’hui oublié et méconnu, “Der christliche Staatsmann” (= “L’homme d’Etat chrétien”). Wilhelm Stapel (1882-1954) avait étudié l’histoire de l’art, la philosophie et l’économie politique. Il passe son doctorat en 1911 sous la houlette d’Edmund Husserl. Jusqu’en 1917, il occupe le poste de rédacteur-en-chef de la revue “Kunstwart”, un organe de “pédagogie populaire/folciste” créé par Ferdinand Avenarius et le “Dürerbund” (= la ligue Dürer). Après une querelle portant sur le patriotisme avec Avenarius, Stapel devient en 1917 rédacteur-en-chef du “Volksheim” de Hambourg, qui avait pour objet de former intellectuellement la jeunesse ouvrière; en 1919, il est rédacteur-en-chef du “Deutsches Volkstum”. Sous sa direction, cette revue, qui, à l’origine, véhiculait les idées des syndicalistes nationaux-allemands, s’est muée en un organe de la droite intellectuelle. Avec l’appui de Hans Bogner et des frères Albrecht-Erich et Gerhard Günther, Stapel inscrit la majeure partie de son travail éditorial dans le sillage d’une maison d’édition de la grande ville portuaire hanséatique, la “Hanseatische Verlagsanstalt”, qui édite de nombreux ouvrages dus à la plume de publicistes de droite. C’est dans cette maison d’édition que paraîtra d’ailleurs l’ouvrage principal de Stapel, “Der christliche Staatsmann” (1932).

C’est dans ce livre que Stapel va présenter et illustrer son concept de “Volksnomos”, de “nomos populaire/folciste”, en s’appuyant sur les idées que Hans Bogner avait élaborées sur la Polis antique des Grecs. Dans la figure mythologique du dieu de la Polis, affirmait Bogner, se trouve “l’esprit vital, la puissance unificatrice du peuple, qui doit être considéré comme une individualité concrète et centrée sur elle-même” et, par là même, une “personne”. Le nomos, c’est-à-dire l’ensemble des lois et des héritages, apparaît dès lors comme un “commandement divin” et le respect de ce que ce nomos exige, un devoir sacré. Le peuple est donc perçu comme ayant été, initialement, une “communauté cultuelle”. C’est dans une telle communauté cultuelle que s’enracine le nomos et c’est celui-ci qui fait le peuple. Chaque peuple a son nomos particulier et la pluralité des “nomoi” relève de la volonté divine. D’où la différence substantielle entre les cultures.

De cette façon, on peut classer la théologie du nomos, théorisée par le penseur de Hambourg, entre la pensée historique de Ranke et l’ethnopluralisme actuel. La théologie du nomos populaire/folciste a interpellé bon nombre d’adeptes du filon “jungkonservativ”, dont Max Hildebert Boehm, qui rédigera le livre le plus profond sur la question: “Das eigenständige Volk” (1932). Il s’agit bel et bien d’un développement de la notion de “Volkheit” chez Stapel.

Selon Boehm, la “Volkheit” n’est pas seulement une “forme typique” ou un “type” mais une norme tout à la fois éthique et esthétique. Elle englobe la polarité Etre/Vérité, relève d’une dimension tout à la fois ethnique et éthique et constitue, de fait, la puissance créatrice/génératrice d’histoire. Le peuple, en tant que sujet de l’histoire, est donc une “idée de Dieu”; l’on pourrait tout aussi bien dire: “une idée de la nature ou une apparition de la chose en soi” (dixit Stapel). Phrase qui souligne la philosophicité de l’idée de “nomos”. Celle-ci n’offre pas seulement un modèle pour définir l’identité mais se réfère à Kant et à ses antinomies tout en marquant la polarisation de l’expérience et de l’idée, de l’Etre et du devoir, des faits et des normes. Malgré la priorité accordée au “Volk”’ par rapport à l’Etat (c’est-à-dire l’auto-organisation politique d’une communauté), Stapel traite à fond du gouvernement (de la gouvernance) et des hommes politiques. Ce qui doit caractériser l’homme d’Etat, c’est la force qu’il irradie, celle qui crée l’ordre, soutient l’ardeur au combat et justifie l’autorité qu’il est amené à exercer.

Comment Stapel comprend-il le phénomène de la sécularisation? En y réfléchissant au départ de cette citation: “la domination des pères a été dissoute au profit de l’administration rationnelle”, ce qui signifie, par voie de conséquence, que la communauté guerrière, capable d’opérer des distinctions discriminantes au profit de la solidité communautaire, a cédé la place à une société civile pacifiste; en même temps, le charisme fécond de l’homme d’Etat a été aboli au profit du vote démocratique. Le libéralisme apparaît ainsi comme un contre-modèle fondé sur la critique dissolvante et sur un modèle anthropologique dont les représentants sont les produits d’une dégénérescence historique. L’homme libéral se pose comme “libéré du poids du passé et de la tâche de forger l’avenir”. Pour lui, “le passé est un chaos fumeux au-dessus duquel il s’est hissé” et “l’éternité n’est plus qu’une angoise de l’homme qui se sait créature”. Stapel s’est trompé quant au national-socialisme. En 1933, il a tenté, dans un premier temps, d’intervenir pour lui donner forme. Cette illusion s’est vite évanouie dès que des publicistes agressifs, inféodés au parti, lui ont rperoché ses “déficits” idéologiques, en l’occurrence l’absence de tout biologisme chez lui. Stapel s’est alors replié sur sa foi et a perçu Hitler comme “sotériologue” hostile aux vrais dieux de la Cité et porté par un orgueil déplacé.

Wolfgang SAUR.

(article-recension paru dans “Junge Freiheit”, Berlin, n°10/2012; http://www.jungefreiheit.de ).

Sebastian MAASS, Starker Staat und Imperium Teutonicum: Wilhelm Stapel, Carl Schmitt und  der Hamburger Kreis, Regin Verlag, Kiel, 2011 (190 S., 18,95 euro).

 

mercredi, 28 mars 2012

Gérard Romsée: mythe et réalité

Edwin TRUYENS:

Gérard Romsée: mythe et réalité

 

Recension: Evrard RASKIN, Gerard Romsée. Een ongewone man, en ongewoon leven, Hadewijch, Antwerpen-Baarn, 1995, 449 pages.

 

Gérard Romsée est né à Guigoven, dans la province du Limbourg, le 11 octobre 1901, fils de Joseph Romsée (1872-1933) et de Louise Boogaerts (1869-1928). Trois ans auparavant, un frère, Paul, était né dans le même foyer. Gérard Romsée descendait, par son grand-père paternel, d’une famille wallonne. Son père s’était inscrit au barreau des avocats mais n’e plaida que rarement. Il bénéficiait de riches émoluments comme intendant et, de plus, ses propres biens lui procuraient des revenus substantiels. La langue du foyer familial était le français.

 

A partir de septembre 1914, le jeune Gérard suit le curriculum des humanités gréco-latines au Collège Notre-Dame de Tongres, études suivies en grande partie en français. Lorsqu’éclate la guerre, il se révèle patriote passionné. Il est radicalement anti-allemand et s’oppose à l’activisme flamand. En 1916, il fonde une sorte de société secrète, la “Main Noire” (= “De Zwarte Hand”), dont les membres jurent de se porter volontaires dans l’armée belge dès l’âge de dix-huit ans, en passant par les Pays-bas pour rejoindre le front de l’Yser. En 1917, toutefois, Romsée se rend compte que le Mouvement Flamand défend pour l’essentiel une cause fondamentalement juste. C’est l’affaire Paul Vandermeulen qui a provoqué ce déclic. Cet aumônier limbourgeois aux armées plaidait la cause des soldats flamands sur le front de l’Yser. Il réagissait contre le fait que le corps des officiers était constitué, quasi intégralement, de francophones et que les soldats flamands étaient commandés exclusivement en français. Et lorsque Paul Vandermeulen, plus tard, se prononça en faveur d’une flamandisation de l’Université de Gand, l’armée lui infligea une sanction disciplinaire. On l’exila alors dans l’île française de Cézembre où l’armée belge avait organisé un camp pénitentiaire. Ces faits furent rapidement connus à l’arrière, y compris dans le Limbourg occupé: la jeunesse des collèges catholiques réagit avec fureur. Outre l’affaire Vandermeulen, il faut aussi mentionner l’influence patente du prêtre Eugeen Froidmont (1891-1957) qui fit évoluer Romsée du patriotisme belge à la cause flamande.

 

A l’automne de l’année 1920, Romsée s’inscrit à l’Université Catholique de Louvain. Il y étudie le droit et la philosophie thomiste. Il s’engage également dans les rangs de l’association catholique étudiante KVHV et dans l’association Saint Thomas. Dès l’année académique 1921-1922, le mouvement étudiant flamand se radicalise. Les 12, 13 et 14 avril 1924, ils organisent à Louvain le 19ème Congrès des Etudiants Grand-Néerlandais (“Grootnederlands Studentenkongres”). Ce congrès est ponctué de plusieurs bagarres; au cours de l’une d’entre elles l’étudiant wallon Gaby Colbacq tire trois coups de pistolet sur le Flamand Albert Vallaeys. Celui-ci survit mais les Flamands réagissent avec davantage de vigueur. A la suite de ces incidents, les autorités académiques interdisent le 3 mai 1924 toute activité future. Le KVHV n’a pas l’intention d’obéir à cette injonction. On avance la date des élections du praesidium. Paul Beeckman est élu nouveau président (praeses) et écrit aussitôt une lettre aux autorités académiques qui laisse bien entendre que le KVHV ne tiendra pas compte de la mesure prise par celles-ci. Beeckman est chassé de l’université. Romsée, qui avait été élu vice-président, prend la direction de l’association. Le débat avec les autorités académiques se poursuit mais, finalement, Romsée et Tony Herbert sont à leur tour chassés de l’université. Pour Romsée, c’est très grave: en représailles, son père lui interdit de pénétrer encore dans le foyer parental.

 

Comme Romsée ne peut plus étudier à l’université, il ne pourra pas devenir docteur en philosophie thomiste, car il s’agit là d’un diplôme scientifique. Mais il poursuit ses études de droit en toute indépendance et obtient son doctorat dès le 11 août 1926. Il s’installe comme avocat à Anvers. Quelque temps après, il se réconcilie avec son père et, peu après cette réconciliation, sa mère décède.

 

La 26 mai 1929, Romsée est élu député sur une liste du KVV (“Katolieke Vlaamse Volkspartij”; = “Parti Populaire Catholique Flamand”). Il est co-signataire du projet fédéral d’Herman Vos le 23 avril 1931. Le 10 décembre 1933, le KVV du Limbourg décide de s’adjoindre au VNV nationaliste. Le VNV pouvait alors être considéré comme l’organisation politique qui apportait l’unité parmi les formations nationalistes éparpillées. Mais cette unité demeurait fort fragile. A l’intérieur du VNV, on constatait une opposition assez tranchée, notamment entre Reimond Tollenaere, très radical, et Gérard Romsée, considéré comme “modéré”. Lorsque Tollenaire revient en 1940, après avoir été déporté dans le sud de la France en “train fantôme”, il exige que Romsée soit démis de ses fonctions au sein du “Conseil de Direction” du VNV (“Raad van Leiding”).

 

Pendant la seconde guerre mondiale, Romsée devient d’abord gouverneur du Limbourg, ensuite secrétaire-général pour les affaires intérieures en date du 31 mars 1941. L’Administration militaire allemande (“Militärverwaltung”) exige cependant que Romsée soit nommé secrétaire-général de la justice. Le Comité des secrétaires généraux ne veut pas satisfaire cette exigence allemande parce que Romsée n’a pas la confiance de la magistrature. En tant que secrétaire général, il s’efforce d’assurer le bon fonctionnement de l’administration. Il est toutefois isolé dans le comité des secrétaires généraux. Au sein de ce groupe, le VNV ne compte qu’un seul membre outre Romsée, en l’occurence Victor Leemans. Celui-ci manifeste aussi une nette indépendance d’esprit et n’apporte pas toujours son soutien à Romsée. On ne peut pas affirmer que Romsée soit un instrument des Allemands, dépourvu de toute volonté personnelle. Il se montre certes prêt à aller un peu plus loin dans la mise en oeuvre des ordonnances allemandes que ses collègues et la Militärverwaltung est très satisfaite de ses services. Le 6 février 1943, Romsée nomme Emiel Van Coppenolle commandant-en-chef de la gendarmerie.

 

A la fin de la guerre, Romsée fuit le pays. Il ne craint pas seulement la répression et sait aussi que Rex le vise car il s’est toujours montré réticent à nommer des rexistes à des postes importants. Son frère Paul est fusillé le 9 septembre 1944 par des membres du groupe “Partisans Armés”. Le 5 mai 1945, Romsée est à nouveau en Belgique et se constitue prisonnier. Il est jugé par l’Auditorat militaire de Bruxelles le 17 février 1947 et par le Conseil de Guerre le 27 mai 1948. La Cour le condamne à vingt ans de prison et à dix millions de francs de dommages et intérêts à l’Etat.

 

Romsée est libéré le 23 mars 1951. Il participe à la constitution du “Vlaamse Volksbeweging” en 1953 (= “Mouvement Populaire Flamand”), participe à quelques réunions mais se retire complètement de la politique en 1956. Il épouse sa nièce, Paule Romsée, le 18 mai 1955. Le mariage religieux est béni le 23 mai 1955. Il meurt le 14 avril 1976.

 

Cette brève notice biographique, qui se réduit à l’essentiel, induira plus d’un lecteur à se poser la question: cette biographie est-elle si intéressante qu’il a fallu lui consacrer tout un livre? Oui, car pour bien connaître l’histoire du nationalisme flamand pendant l’entre-deux-guerres et pendant la seconde guerre mondiale, il fallait absolument une étude scientifique sur Romsée. Pendant la seconde guerre mondiale, Romsée a entretenu des contacts jusqu’en juin 1943 avec la Cour, plus précisément avec Robert Capelle, secrétaire de Léopold III, qui ne condamnait pas la gestion de Romsée. Après sa  sortie de prison, Romsée ne s’est guère tu quant à ses activités du temps de guerre mais n’a jamais dit qui était sa personne de contact au Palais. En gardant le silence, il a, sans le vouloir, contribué à la naissance d’un mythe. Quoi qu’il en soit, c’est un fait évident: Romsée fut l’un des rares nationalistes qui, pendant une brève période, s’est retrouvé au coeur du pouvoir en Belgique. Ce membre du VNV du Limbourg était déjà accepté dans les salons avant la guerre.

 

Romsée n’a pas seulement été une figure importante du nationalisme flamand, il était aussi un personnage étonnant. Sa personnalité était très renfermée; manifestement, il avait des difficultés à nouer des relations affectives normales. Il était profondément croyant et a souvent cultivé l’idée de devenir prêtre ou de se retirer dans un couvent. Il avait un grand sens du devoir et une incroyable capacité de travail. Il était un homme raisonnable et érudit. On lui accorde encore et toujours la réputation d’avoir appartenu à l’aile démocratique du VNV, bien qu’un examen plus précis de la question permet de déduire que rien ne le confirme vraiment. On le compte parmi les modérés mais était problablement plus radical qu’il n’en donnait l’impression. On estime aussi qu’il appartenait à l’aile fédéraliste du VNV mais semble plutôt avoir été un “Grand-Néerlandais” convaincu. Evrard Raskin cite notamment un article de Romsée paru dans “De Bilzenaar”, le 18 août 1934: “On peut se représenter la Grande Néerlande comme un Etat fédéral des Flamands et des Néerlandais. Si un tel fédéralisme avec la Hollande se réalisait par la volonté exclusive du peuple flamand, alors ce fédéralisme pourrait être plus facilement mis en place que tout fédéralisme avec la Wallonie et il faudrait lui donner la préférence. Car les Flamands et les Hollandais forment ensemble la même communauté populaire et culturelle: le peuple néerlandais, lié par l’usage d’une seule et même langue néerlandaise” (p. 136).

 

Evrard Raskin, ancien député de la Volksunie, nous livre un travail bien fait, volumineux, agréable à lire et bien étayé. Il a comblé une lacune dans l’histoire du nationalisme flamand. Cet historien et ce jursite, né en 1935, a réussi à faire oublier cet arrière-goût désagréable que nous avait laissé la rédaction de ses mémoires politiques en 1980.

 

Edwin TRUYENS.

(recension parue dans “Kort Manifest”, n°84, sept.-oct. 1997).

jeudi, 08 mars 2012

Europe vs. the West

Europe vs. the West

Posted By F. Roger Devlin

Ex: http://www.counter-currents.com/

Pierre Krebs
Fighting for the Essence: Western Ethnosuicide or European Renaissance?
London: Arktos Media, 2012

This newest offering from Arktos is the first translation into English from the works of Pierre Krebs, a leading figure in the European New Right. Born in French Algeria (1946), Krebs studied law, journalism, sociology and political science in France, taking an active role in right-wing politics during the late 1960s. Later settling in Germany, he founded the Thule Seminar, a self-described “research society for Indo-European Culture,” in Kassel in 1980. The German Verfassungsschutz (Office for the Protection of the Constitution) appears to take considerable interest in his activities.

Besides the book under review, Dr. Krebs is the author of The European Rebirth, The Imperishable Inheritance: Alternatives to the Principle of Equality and a study on Valéry and Wagner. Fighting for the Essence was first published in German translation in 1996, with a revised French edition appearing in 2000.

Krebs’ nomenclature, original with him so far as I know, draws a sharp contrast between “Europe” and “the West.” “Europe” refers to the great racial and cultural tradition he wishes to defend; “the West” means today’s “Western community of values” that engages in humanitarian bombing campaigns, enforces tolerance at gunpoint on its subject populations, prefers the stranger to the kinsman, and wishes to erase even the distinction between men and women.

Prof. Krebs is good at pointing up the antinomies of this modern ideological abortion: its homogenization in the name of diversity and suppression of particularity in the name of tolerance. Multiculturalism and multiracialism, as he observes, are mystifying terms which function to conceal a culturicidal and raciophobic program of deracination and panmixia. “The doctrine of human rights should be seen for what it really is: the ideological alibi of the West in a battle to the death that it has declared on all the peoples of the world.”

Apologists for Western ideology rest their case upon a false dichotomy between assimilation and fearful isolation:

In fact, just as the self-defined individual who differentiates himself from the surrounding masses does not isolate himself from society, but on the contrary enriches it with his uniqueness, so also a people conscious of their difference do not isolate themselves any more from the human species, but come closer to it every time they endow it with their singularities and their peculiarities. The more a people becomes conscious of their difference, the more their opening up to the world has a chance of profiting others . . . and the more they are inclined to tolerate the differences of others.

The author distinguishes three stages in the development of “the egalitarian lie.” The first, political stage replaces organic democracy with a parliamentary procedure emptied of ethno-cultural content; the second, juridical phase, demands that all nations align their constitutions to this same model; the third, ideological stage breaks down the territorial integrity of nations through open immigration, which leads directly to the final biological abolition of human differences in universal panmixia.

All of this sounds consistent with what might be called the orthodox conservative narrative of Western decline since the Enlightenment. Nor does Krebs depart from that narrative in tracing the origin of egalitarianism to Christianity. In the view of many on the Christian right, modernism is a practical form of the Pelagian heresy, an attempt to bring heaven down to earth—“immanentizing the eschaton,” in Voegelin’s mellifluous words.

But Krebs names the heresiarch Pelagius as one of his heroes. In his view, the egalitarian lie is to be blamed not on any perversion of Christianity, but on Christianity itself—or, as he invariably writes, “Judeochristianity.” He cites Nietzsche’s observation that

Christianity, which has sprung from Jewish roots and can only be understood as a plant that has come from that soil, represents the counter-movement to every morality of breeding, race or privilege—it is the anti-Aryan religion par excellence.

From this Krebs infers that

every discourse which calls for a European Renaissance without separating itself from Judeo-Christian civilization, its dogmas and its rituals, is condemned to failure in advance, since it is enclosed within the very matrix of decline. . . . The monotheistic “Unique” and the egalitarian “Same” are, in fact, the front and reverse side of the same coin. . . . [The] continuity is flagrant between the Jewish will to reduce the polymorphic and polysemic figures of the divine to the univocal figure of the only God, an autocratic being, the absolute ‘I’ of the universe on the one hand; and the secularized monotheism of human rights on the other, informed by the same will to reduce all the racial and cultural polymorphism of the world to univocal figure of a globalized Homo occidentalis, a serial repetition of a Same detached from its identitarian affiliations.

The author also cites Nietzsche’s suggestion that monotheism, “the belief in a normal god next to whom there are only false pseudo-gods,” was a “consequence of the teaching of a normal human type.” Indo-European polytheism, on the other hand, “is fundamentally alien to the notion of messianism or proselytism, the natural sources of the intolerance and fanaticism that are characteristic of the three monotheistic religions.”

Finally, the author accuses “Judeochristianism” of “breaking the bond of friendship between men and nature” through its command to subdue the earth. Anyone with a genuinely European mentality, he says, would find incomprehensible the promise to Noah and his sons that “the fear and dread of you shall be upon every beast of the earth, and upon every fowl of the air: into your hand are they delivered.”

The look which [Westernized Europe] bestows on Nature is no longer the look of the living man who discovers and feels himself a partner of the world. It is the essentially venal, anonymous and cold look of techno-scientific inspection, a utilitarian look that no longer conceives the world as a dwelling in which man is the inhabitant, but as an object that men, endowed with the power of appropriation by Jehovah, have the duty to exploit.

The rejection of Christianity does not commit the author to reject all of post-classical European civilization, of course, or even all of its religious life. He emphasizes that Christianity never truly eradicated the pagan heritage, and claims to find the native spirit of Europe in many great figures of the Christian era, including Pelagius, John Scotus Eriugena, Meister Eckhart, Nicholas of Cusa, Giordano Bruno, Jacob Böhme, Goethe, Hölderlin, Beethoven, the dramatist Friedrich Hebbel, Theodor Storm, Rilke, Teilhard de Chardin, Saint-Exupéry and Heidegger. He also claims that Gothic architecture owed nothing to “Judeochristianity.”

Dr. Krebs’ treatment of Christianity and Western decline deserves a fuller treatment not only than I can give here but also than he himself offers in his slender volume. The issue is of the utmost practical importance, for it represents a rejection of the great majority of his potential political allies.

This reviewer is happy to agree that the rise of Christianity, with its promise of salvation to the world-weary, was closely bound up with the decline of Graeco-Roman civilization. Indeed, I suspect this historical context better accounts for what Krebs finds decadent in Christianity than does its racially alien origin. But does it make sense to blame Christianity also for the decadence of modern civilization?

There is surely considerable temerity in reducing the thirteen or fourteen centuries of European civilization between the conversion of Constantine and the Enlightenment to a list of fifteen personal favorite figures. And the temerity is increased by the implied claim to have understood several of these figures better than they understood themselves.

It is a familiar observation that enlightenment thought amounts to a secularized version of Christian doctrine, a displacement of its eschatology into the realm of politics. Erik von Kuehnelt-Leddihn is just one example of a Christian conservative who stressed this connection, citing the Latin proverb corruptio optimi pessima: “the corruption of the best is the worst.”

But Krebs the admirer of Pelagius cannot mean this; his explicit positions would force him to deny that the secularization of Christianity is the essential misstep. Instead he must hold that (1) Christianity itself is responsible for the specific way in which it was negated by the Enlightenment, and that (2) Europe has been in a state of decadence since at least the fourth century AD. This bold interpretation of European history may deserve consideration, but the author has hardly made a case for it in the brief manifesto under review.

Next to “Judeochristianity,” Krebs’ greatest scorn is reserved for “the putrid swamps of America,” with their fast food restaurants and comic-book literature. This, of course, is a common trope of European intellectuals across the political spectrum, easily made plausible by comparing American low culture with European high culture. As a long-time American expatriate in Europe, I often had cause to lament mindless lowbrow Americanization myself, but it is hardly a reflection on America that Europeans prefer McDonald’s to Melville. Wilsonian democratic messianism would also have got nowhere without striking a chord in other lands.

Dr. Krebs closes his work with some far more plausible reflections on culture, immigration and territory. He cites Heiner Geissler of Germany’s Christian Democratic Union party as a representative of contemporary elite opinion:

It is not the influx of foreigners but the incapacity for rejuvenation and adaptation of the Germans, combined with their aversion to immigration, that represents the real danger for our future. . . . In the future, Germans will not have to live with just five million foreigners—as today—but with seven, perhaps ten million.

The danger in such a mindset stems from its unfalsifiability. We have no reason to think Herr Geissler unacquainted with the problems connected to immigration; he may well have to deal with them every day. But he has a ready-made explanation for all of them, as well as any that may arise in the future: the “xenophobia” of his fellow countrymen. As long as he clings to this notion, no empirical evidence of immigration’s failure will ever give him cause to reconsider his commitment to it—not even a full-scale ethnic civil war. Such observations, writes Dr. Krebs, “allow one to measure to what a degree of stupidity and blindness the militants of multiracialism have sunk.”

All culture is regional, expressing the beliefs and sensibility of the people of a particular place and time. As such, it necessarily involves an element of exclusion, namely, the exclusion of what is foreign to those beliefs and sensibilities and to the way of life in accordance with them. For this reason, any serious defense of culture boils down to a defense of territory. Let us close with a fine observation Krebs takes from Irenäus Eibl-Eibesfeldt, the Austrian founder of the discipline of human ethology:

The best way to maintain peaceful cooperation between peoples consists in guaranteeing to each of them a territory that each people has the right to administer in its own way, and in which it is permitted to develop itself culturally as it sees fit. . . . To the degree that people accept the implantation of minorities in their territories, they open the door to inter-ethnic competition in their own house.


Article printed from Counter-Currents Publishing: http://www.counter-currents.com

URL to article: http://www.counter-currents.com/2012/02/europe-vs-the-west/

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jeudi, 26 janvier 2012

Revolution from Above

Revolution from Above

Alex KURTAGIC

Ex: http://www.alternativeright.com/

Kerry Bolton
Revolution from Above
London: Arktos Media, 2011

The popular imagination conceives Marxism and capitalism as opposing forces, imagining that—obviously—Marxists want the capitalists’ money and capitalists do not want Marxists to take it from them.

Kerry Bolton’s Revolution from Above disproves this notion.

revolution-from-aboveAs it turns out, and as many readers probably already know, the Marxist revolutions in the East succeeded in many places thanks to the ample funds supplied to them—consciously and voluntarily—by finance-capitalists in the West.

With access to all the money they could wish for and more, the finance-capitalists in Bolton’s narrative were, and are, primarily motivated by a desire for power, and their ultimate aim was not even more money per se, but the enduring ability to shape the world to their convenience, which translates into a collectivised planet of producers and consumers.

Marxism was useful in as much as it was a materialistic ideology that destroyed traditional structures and values and turned citizens into secular, deracinated wage slaves, irrespective of race, gender, age, creed, disability, or sexual orientation.

Capitalism was useful in as much as it made money the measure of all things and created a consumer culture that ultimately turned citizens into debt slaves, also irrespective of race, gender, and so on.

In this manner, Marxism and capitalism were seen as complementary, as well as a method of pacifying the citizenry: too busy labouring in the factory or in the cubicle, and too befuddled by daydreams of shopping and entertainment during their free time, the citizens of this global order, fearful of losing their jobs and not being able to buy things or satisfy their creditors, are left with little inclination to, or energy for, rebellion.

Bolton explains how the finance-capitalist oligarchy is the entity that truly runs our affairs, rather than the national governments. The latter are either financially dependent, or in partnership, with the financiers and the central bankers.

To illustrate this dependency he documents the United States’ government relationship with the Bolsheviks in Russia during the revolution, not to mention the similarity in their goals despite superficial appearances to the contrary and despite alarm or opposition from further down the hierarchy. Bolton shows how genuinely anti-communist efforts were frustrated during the Cold War. And he shows that the close relationship with communist regimes ended when Stalin decided to pursue his own agenda.

The book then goes on to describe the various mechanisms of plutocratic domination. Bolton documents the involvement of a network of prominent, immensely rich, tax-exempt, so-called ‘philanthropic’ organisations in funding subversive movements and think tanks. Marxism has already been mentioned, but it seems these foundations were also interested in promoting feminism and the student revolts of 1968.

Feminism was sold to women as a movement of emancipation. Bolton argues, and documents, that its funders’ real aim was to end women’s independence (from the bankers) and prevent the unregulated education of children: by turning women into wage-slaves they would become dependent on an entity controlled by the plutocrats, double the tax-base, double the size of the market, and create the need for children’s education to be controlled by the government—an entity that is, in turn, controlled by the plutocrats. Betty Friedan, who founded the second wave of feminism with her book The Feminine Mystique, and Gloria Steinem are named as having received avalanches of funding from ‘philanthropic’ foundations.

With regards to the university student revolts of 1968, the book highlights the irony of how, without the activists knowing it, they were backed by the same establishment they thought to be opposing. These students were but ‘useful idiots’ in a covert strategy of subversion and social engineering.

The subversion does not end there, for the plutocracy has global reach and is as actively engaged in global planning today as it ever was. Revolution from Above inevitably deals with George Soros’ involvement in the overthrow of governments or regimes not to his liking. According to Bolton’s account, the reader can take it for granted that any of the velvet or ‘colour revolutions’ we have seen in recent years have been funded in some way or another by George Soros through his extended network of instruments. ‘Regime-changes’ in Yugoslavia, Georgia, Ukraine (orange revolution), Kyrgyszstan (pink revolution), Tunisia (jasmine revolution), Egypt (white revolution), Lybia (red, green, black revolution), and Iran (green revolution) were not the result of spontaneous uprisings. Anti-government parties, think tanks, media, campaigns, demonstrations, and even training courses for political agitation—all and in all cases received vast funding from finance-capitalism overseas, not from local collections of petty sums.

In other words, many a modern revolution has not come from below, but from above. And in the context of governments being in a dependent relationship to the stratospherical plutocracy, this aggregates into a pincer strategy, with pressure coming secretly from above and from below, with the pressure from below—however spontaneous and ‘messy’ it may seem when it hits the headlines—being the result of years of careful planning, financing, and preparation by overseas elites.

The reader must ask himself how it is that whenever we see one of these ‘colour revolutions’ somehow someone is able, almost overnight, to overwhelm the streets with a tsunami of well designed, professionally printed, and colour-coordinated merchandise: flags, scarves, placards, posters, leaflets, balloons, headbands, t-shirts, face-paint, you name it, it all seems very slick, aesthetically consistent, and fashion-conscious for uprisings that are supposedly spontaneous demonstrations of popular rage.

Overall Bolton crams in an enormous mass of information within 250 pages. The lists of names and figures—and some of the sums involved are truly staggering—are endless, and the persistent torrent of footnotes considerably expand on parts of the main narrative. The plutocrats’ web of influence and deceit is immensely complicated, not only as a structure but also as a process, since it thrives in double meaning, double think, and ambiguity. Those interested in a detailed knowledge of the machinations behind current and recent events, or even twentieth-century political history, would do well to read this book more than once—at least if they have ambitions of explaining it all to an educable third party.

One aspect of Bolton’s narrative that seems quite amazing is the superficially inoffensive tone of some of the enemy quotes provided. Were it not because Bolton’s findings flow in the same direction as other books uncovering the machinations of the oligarchs and their partners in Western governments, or because the answer to cui bono is provided unequivocally by the unfolding of current and historical events, it would be easy to think that the statements quoted came from deluded idealists. It may be that some truly believe in the goodness of their cause, yet such selfless altruism is hard to believe given the known absence of ethics among our current elite of super-financiers—the banking system they engineered, not to mention many of the opaque financial instruments we have come to known through the still unfolding financial crisis in the West, is a deception designed to obscure a practice of legalised theft.

The lessons are clear: firstly, modern ‘colour revolutions’ are not instigated by public desires for more democratic or liberal governance, but by private desires for increased global power and control; secondly, subversive movements can be given a name and a face—a name and a face averse that hides behind generic institutional names and orchestrates world events at the end of a complex money trail; and thirdly, the those seeking fundamental change should first become proficient capitalists or learn how to gain access to them. These are all obvious, of course, but Revolution from Above is less about teaching those lessons than about documenting how the world is run, by whom, and for what purpose. In other words, this is material with which to back up assertions likely to be challenged by, or in front of, the unaware. Sober and factual in tone, it is also good gift material for those who may benefit from a bit of education.

mardi, 24 janvier 2012

How the British Constructed a New Woman’s Movement

How the British Constructed a New Woman’s Movement

A Book Review of Feminine Fascism

 

Julie V. Gottlieb
Feminine Fascism: Women in Britain’s Fascist Movement, 1923-1945
New York: I.B. Tauris, 2003.

“Feminine fascism” is a phrase that Julie V. Gottlieb uses to describe the forward-thinking, yet traditionally influenced, ideology embraced by Britain’s fascists. Their objective was not a return to the past, to a time when women were solely mothers and homemakers. Instead, the fascists in England combined traditional roles with the advances made in women’s suffrage and the workplace, and added a fascist bent of discipline and integrity.

Feminine Fascism: Women in Britain’s Fascist Movement is a chronological account of fascism in Britain, starting in 1923 with the country’s first fascist group, the British Fascisti, founded by Rotha Lintorn-Orman, a woman. The BF remained the predominant fascist organization until Sir Oswald Mosley’s British Union of Fascists (BU) was established in 1932. Feminine Fascism discusses the role of women in these two groups, details the unique form of feminism embraced by members, and ends with an account of the internment and trials of women fascists during World War II. The last quarter of the book provides brief biographies of the many women in fascist Britain.

Gottlieb, a senior lecturer in history at the University of Sheffield, has trouble wrapping her head around what attracted so many women to fascism, especially those who had campaigned for women’s suffrage. How could women embrace such seemingly different ideologies: women’s rights, on the one hand, and anti-democracy on the other? The answer is that fascism offered women the best of both worlds.

Britain’s fascists encouraged women to be traditional in many areas. Motherhood was valued and respected, as was homemaking. In fact, the Corporate State would include a Home Corporation, in which homemakers would have representation just like any other trade. An article in The Blackshirt explained, “only when women represent women will womankind attain its rightful influence.”

A primary goal of the fascist platform was allowing women to once again be homemakers, but they used forward-thinking methods to advance their ideology. Many British women were essentially forced into the workplace due to wage variances between the sexes. Employers preferred less costly female employees, which pushed many men out of jobs. All too many families experienced the trials of having a working mother, with the father at home tending the house and children, unable to secure a decent wage. The fascists knew that in the modern world, a platform that appeared to regress women’s rights would hold no sway. Thus, they supported equal wages for women, since equal pay would mean that more men could return to the workforce. As explained by Fascist Week:

Under Fascism women will not be compelled to resign, but encouraged to do so by the fact that, under Corporate State and the scientific methods of raising real wages, men will be able to afford to marry women—and women will not be compelled to earn their own living as they are at present. (125)

However, the fascists never insisted that career-minded women remain at home, recognizing that there were not only occupations suited to women, but also situations in which women would desire a career and need equal pay. Rosalind Raby, for example, claimed that fascism would allow the unmarried mother “to earn an honest living for herself and her child.”

March_2

But the biggest innovation in British fascism was its emphasis on character. Men were encouraged to have values of courage, strength, honour, and integrity. The aristocracy of money and class would be replaced in the Corporate State with a meritocracy. Likewise, British fascism presented an alternate form of femininity: one that included strength, courage, and fearlessness. During marches, women were not permitted to wear lipstick or wave at friends as if in a beauty pageant. These feminine fascists were described as healthy, attractive, charming, intelligent, and of strong character. They were motherly, but as wary of sentimentality as Julius Evola. A male writer described the women Blackshirts:

Nothing silly or soft about these women. They are nothing if not practical . . . and the happy carefree way in which they made themselves at home, was so refreshing after one has had their fill of the simpering little brats that democracy and Jewish films have produced. (95)

The combination of traditional and modern was seen in the BU women’s uniform of: a black blouse, grey skirt, and black beret. It was against regulations for women to wear trousers while on active duty.

Integrating Fascism into Everyday Life

 

British fascists grew in numbers, in part because they didn’t relegate their philosophy to just the political sphere, but participated in almost every aspect of members’ lives. Weddings included fascist regalia, and at some funerals a fascist flag was draped over the coffin. The Fascist Week printed the names of wedding guests just like the society pages of The Times.

wedding

Members of the BF organized Fascist Children’s Clubs, in which children were taught history, songs, patriotism, and given awards for homework. Other women had brooches designed with the BU lightning symbol, and made dolls dressed in the blackshirt for children. There also was a BU Women’s Choir. According to Gottlieb:

By celebrating each phase of life within a fascist framework, the BF in fact appropriated the functions once carried out by the Church and this substantiated their claim . . . that fascism was akin to a religion. (28)

In addition to the accolades given to real women, there were fascist heroines as well. The most notable was Queen Elizabeth, for her command of the nation and exemplary oratory skills. Another heroine was Lady Hester Stanhope, who worked as a housekeeper before traveling through the Middle East. E. D. Hart wrote:

Those women who, whether from choice or, as in the case of Lady Hester, from necessity, explore other walks of life, will find both assistance and encouragement. When, like her, they display the Fascist virtues of courage, self-reliance, and tenacity of purpose, we ascribe to them the honour which is their due. (97)

Blackshirts also banded together to disparage several less attractive types of women. One was the feminist with mannish, short hair, called the “bleating Bloomsbury.” Another was the “Mayfair Parasite,” who usurped the nation’s wealth and vitality by sleeping late and devoting her life to superficial pleasures. Being fit and healthy was considered a moral duty, for as one writer put it: “Far too many women consider it their privilege to be ill . . . just ill enough to pamper themselves and evade their share of the family work.” Communists often were referred to as “submen” and “subwomen.” Titled women did not escape criticism either. Those who earned money by advertising products were publicly chastised by BU members for degrading both themselves and their class.

Women’s Duties in Fascist Organizations

Women were involved in almost every area of Britain’s fascist groups, and made up about 25 percent of the membership. The Women’s Section of the BU was established in March 1933, under the leadership of Lady Maud Mosley. She said, “When my son married Lady Cynthia [Mosley’s first wife], she took her place by his side. Now she is dead and there must be someone to help him in this work and I am going to do my best to fill the gap” (52).

Mosley’s second wife, Diana, and her sister Unity Valkyrie Mitford became two of the best-known female fascists, but Feminine Fascism only lightly touches on their stories. Their aristocratic parents were extremely Right-wing and anti-Semitic, but when the 2nd Baron Redesdale supported England during the war, he and his Nazi-sympathizing wife permanently separated.

Diana_MitfordDiana was married to Bryan Guinness when she met Mosley, and soon became his mistress. Mosley’s wife died suddenly of peritonitis in 1933 (though he was plagued the rest of his life that infidelities and political stress might have been the cause). Mosley and Diana were married at the home of Joseph Goebbels in 1936, with Hitler as guest of honor.

Unity debuted the same year her older sister became Mosley’s mistress. The next year, Diana and Unity went to the 1933 Nuremberg Rally as part of the BU delegation, and saw Hitler for the first time. Unity returned to Germany the following year, eating at the same restaurant as the Führer for 10 months, until he finally asked her over. Unity wrote to her father of their meeting: “I am so happy that I wouldn’t mind a bit, dying. I'd suppose I am the luckiest girl in the world. For me he is the greatest man of all time.” Hitler, in turn, described Unity as “a perfect specimen of Aryan womanhood.” Their affections might have escalated, if not for a suicide attempt by Hitler’s mistress, Eva Braun. Though in love with Hitler, Unity devoted herself to making speeches, writing letters, distributing propaganda, and being one of Hitler’s intimate confidantes. On September 3, 1939, the day Britain declared war on Germany, Unity took a pearl-handled pistol (a gift from Hitler for protection) and shot herself in the head, unable to bear the thought of the two countries she loved at war. She survived and was eventually able to walk again, but never recovered her full mental capabilities.

While Unity was helping the cause on the continent, women Blackshirts in England spoke at meetings, organized children’s groups, sold newspapers, and participated in marches and canvassing. Study groups about fascism were established for women speakers, and women participated in public debates. But women did not forsake their traditional duties either: One woman reported that it was the fair sex who kept the BU headquarters clean and brewed tea for the men. Members who did not give five nights a week to the movement were denied the privilege of wearing the coveted blackshirt.

A relatively large number of women participated in local elections. In 1936, the BU ran 10 women candidates (10 percent of their parliamentary candidates), from a variety of backgrounds. (Six were unmarried, five were professionals, three were in their 20s, and two were from gentry families.) The various women received between 15 and 23 percent of the votes in their respective districts.

speaking

Women’s most valuable talents were said to be in public speaking, and numerous BU women were praised for their excellent oration and ability to move crowds. Other women were lauded for their ability to use personal stories in their speeches, which proved more powerful than simple recitations of facts. During a 1936–37 campaign, women decided to censor their speeches for tactical advantage. No speaker was allowed to use the word “Jew.” Instead, plain-clothed members were scattered throughout the audience to use the word instead, as the message was thought to be more rousing if coming from the public.

Women had roles to play in security and self-defense as well. Female members of several organizations were trained in ju-jitsu, for as Fascist Week reported, “no male member of the BU is permitted to use force upon any woman, and women Reds often form a highly noisy and razor-carrying section at fascist meetings. Thus we counter women with women” (66).

The Fallout During the War

As early as 1938, a division of MI5 was formed to place agents in subversive organizations. Three women agents provocateurs successfully infiltrated the popular fascist group, Captain Ramsay’s Right Club. After Britain entered WWII, the country started to resemble a totalitarian dystopia for fascist sympathizers. In October 1939, Anne Brock Griggs was charged with “insulting words and disturbing the peace” for saying in a speech: “If Germans don’t like Hitler they can get rid of him themselves. We do not need to send our sons to fight them. If ever a country wants a revolution now it is Great Britain” (236). She quit her BU post, but was still interned during the war.

Defense Regulation 18B(1A) went into effect in September 1939, and it allowed the Home Secretary to detain anyone suspected of being a threat to national security. That category included anyone who was a leader or member in a group that might be under foreign influence. Under 18B, 1,826 people were interned, including 747 BU members (96 of them women).

Sir Oswald Mosley was arrested in May 1940, the day after the Defense Regulations were passed. The BU was outlawed in June, and his second wife, Diana, was interned shortly after. She was denounced by both her sister Nancy (later a famous novelist and biographer) and her former father-in-law, and had to leave without her 11-week-old, still-nursing baby boy. Although the English public called for Unity Mitford to be interned as a traitor, she was allowed to return to the family home with her mother, since she was weak from her suicide attempt.

Interned women were given no special treatment in prison. When Miss L. M. Reeve was arrested, a group of armed guards came to take her from her home. One officer asked if he could have her dog, since she was “probably about to be shot.” One woman’s infant died while staying with her in prison, and another woman’s infant was pulled from her arms and placed in an institution. Part of the evidence against another woman was a photograph of her on vacation in Germany in 1939, seated at a table with bottles of German wine.

Fascists on the outside, though their organizations were banned, were still able to help their comrades via a registered charity founded specifically to help those interned under 18B. The charity helped pay for legal and medical services, provided assistance to detainees’ families, provided post-release counseling, and helped people find employment. Trials could only be held for those who could be charged with a tangible offense, so many men and women fascists were imprisoned for years.

The Impact of Feminine Fascism

 

The much-anticipated Corporate State never became a reality, and its philosophies and ideas were forced to the margins of history. Yet the lessons that can be learned from the events detailed in Feminine Fascism remain relevant to the leaders of future generations.

Eighty years ago, the fascists recognized that it would be impossible to shed the gains made in women’s rights. Rather than fighting against women’s “emancipation,” with which they ideologically disagreed, the fascists used it to their advantage. The result was a philosophy for women that honored the traditional, yet considered the needs of modern women. Fascists didn’t need to force women into the home or sell them on an ideology that contradicted the propaganda of the modern world; they realized that the moment women didn’t have to work the majority of mothers would return gladly to full-time homemaking. And given the precarious nature of homemaking as a profession, they planned ways for women to have representation and security in the Corporate State. The result was a platform that united women of various political persuasions, ages, and classes. Because it details the fascists’ unique outlook and strategy, Feminine Fascism makes a relevant handbook for those looking to learn from the successes and failures of history.

lundi, 09 janvier 2012

Interview with Leo Yankevich

Interview with Leo Yankevich

By Greg Johnson

Editor’s Note:

Recently, I interviewed leading formalist poet Leo Yankevich on poetry, politics, and his new Counter-Currents title Tikkun Olam and Other Poems [2].

What is formalist poetry? What is the new formalist movement?

Formalist poetry is essentially metrical poetry, whether it be rhymed or unrhymed. 99.99% of English-language poetry published up until 1900 was formalist. Even the early 20th century modernists, such as Ezra Pound, were highly competent formalists who, in addition to metrical poems, wrote free verse as a revolt against the stilted poetry of the 19th century Victorians. His famous motto “make it new” applies to both free and metrical verse.

The new formalist movement is a revolt against the amorphous post-modernist free verse that has been the dominant mode of poetic expression in the aftermath of World War II. It is formalism resurrected with a contemporary voice.

Which poets have inspired or influenced you the most?

W. B. Yeats, Ezra Pound, Roy Campbell, and Dylan Thomas.

Who do you think are the best living poets?

I’d place myself on the top of the list, of course, followed by Richard Wilbur, and Joseph S. Salemi.

Who are the best non-formalist poets?

Among the dead, Robinson Jeffers.

Among the living, I don’t know. There are millions of them. Besides, I don’t consider them poets. Rather, writers-of-prose chopped-up-into-lines.

Who are the best literary critics and historians? Have any critics influenced your work as a poet?

H. L. Mencken, T. S. Eliot, and Cleanth Brooks. I can’t say, though, that they have influenced my work.

What is the relationship of art and propaganda? Art and politics?

All art is propaganda whether its creator intends it to be or not. Most art today promotes decadence, homosexuality, and miscegenation. The art of the ancient Greeks and Romans, on the other hand, promoted health and a philosophy that aimed at perfection.

What is your view of Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn?

I hold Solzhenitsyn in very high esteem as a writer, soldier, and man. His books tell the truth of the inhuman Gulag and his long poem Prussian Nights depicts the barbaric behavior of Soviet rabble soldiers, who, inspired by the anti-German propaganda of Ilya Ehrenburg, raped and murdered their way through Prussia in 1945. As a young captain in the Red Army he witnessed the barbarity first hand and was later brave enough to write about it. Here I quote 5 lines:

The little daughter’s on the mattress,
Dead. How many have been on it?
A platoon, a company perhaps?
A girl’s been turned into a woman,
A woman turned into a corpse.

One of the central themes of your new book Tikkun Olam is the destructiveness of Jewish power. How did you become aware of this issue?

As early as I can remember, I knew who was behind the Katyn Massacre: the Soviets. However, in 2001 I began looking into who these “Soviets” were ethnically, and I discovered an article written by the late Dr. William Pierce on the topic. This led me to listen to his broadcasts. Week by week he removed the shutters from my eyes. Later, the writings of the superb prose stylist and classicist Revilo Oliver improved my vision on the matter.

What do you think of the writings of Count Potocki of Montalk?

Certainly Potocki was a character akin in many ways to myself. I, too, am descended from nobles (Polish-Lithuanian) on my father’s side. My paternal grandfather’s surname was Jankiewicz (Yankevich is a transliteration). And my paternal grandmother’s maiden name was Jetkiewicz. However, although I am theoretically a count, I make no claim to the Polish throne!

My good friend Joseph S. Salemi acquired a handful of Potocki’s books for me. I must admit that I am disappointed by the quality of his poetry, which is about a tenth as good as the poetry of fellow right-winger Roy Campbell.

Potocki, however, was a brave man and a good European. Although in 1943 the London Polish community was well aware of who was responsible for the Katyn massacre (the Soviets) it was the Count who brought it to light in the English-speaking world with the publication of his Katyn Manifesto, for which he was placed under surveillance by Scotland Yard.

What impact do you hope that Tikkun Olam will have on readers?

I hope the book will help them understand what has been inflicted on Europid man in the last 100 years and where our race and civilization are headed if we do not stop the darkening tide imposed upon us by the eternal enemy. After they understand this, I hope the book, through repeated readings, will fortify their desire for victory in the struggle for our people’s preservation.

What do you think will be necessary for Europeans around the world to regain control of our destinies?

First, we need to have our own all-pervasive media that gets the message out on a daily basis. Second, we need 10 thousand academics like Kevin MacDonald, and a thousand filmmakers like Mel Gibson, and 50 poets like myself. Thirdly, our people must be ready to sacrifice themselves and to suffer career assassination.

Which European nations have the best chance of doing so? Which ones have the least chance?

It is my belief that the European nations who have been battling with bordering non-white hordes for centuries have the best chance for survival. They include Russia, Ukraine, Poland, Croatia, Serbia, Romania, Greece, Italy, Portugal, and Spain. Germany, Switzerland, and Austria are capable of regaining their destinies. Alas, I cannot say the same for the UK, France, Belgium, Holland, and the Scandinavian countries. I foresee within the next 50 years, waves of whites moving into Eastern Europe to escape the ghettoes of London, Paris, Brussels, Amsterdam, Oslo, and Stockholm.

Thank you.

 


Article printed from Counter-Currents Publishing: http://www.counter-currents.com

URL to article: http://www.counter-currents.com/2011/12/interview-with-leo-yankevich/

* * *

New from Counter-Currents!
Tikkun Olam & Other Poems

Counter-Currents is proud to announce the publication of our eighth title:

Leo Yankevich
Tikkun Olam and Other Poems
Second Edition
San Francisco: Counter-Currents Publishing, 2011
104 pages

Read the title poem here 

Hardcover: $25

Paperback: $16

E-book: $5.99 (not available for pre-order)

Available January 16, 2012

Tikkun Olam and Other Poems collects 55 poems and one translation by leading formalist poet Leo Yankevich. Originally published as an E-book only, this is the first print edition.


Advance Praise for Tikkun Olam

Leo Yankevich’s Tikkun Olam is both devastating and heroic. The poems devastate with their unflinching depiction of the horror of the last one hundred years—the murders, the political lies, the cultural debasement, the degradation of European identity—and at the same time they are heroic in their open accusation of the force that ultimately lies behind it all: the insidious, self-serving impulse to “mend the world” in accordance with an anti-Western agenda. Yankevich’s book is unsparing in its vividness, but difficult to put down. He bravely directs our gaze at the infection that is killing us, and he does not allow us the comfortable option of turning away in forgetfulness.—Joseph S. Salemi, Editor, Trinacria

“Reading the powerful, ironic poems in Tikkun Olam—Hebrew for “the mending of the world”—in this new enlarged edition, visions of Goya’s Disasters of War come to mind.

“Leo Yankevich wants the truth—wants it out—and uses all his considerable power as a poet to get it out, bitter and bittersweet. “Those who do not know history are doomed to re-live it,” said, I believe, Santayana. Yankevich wants us to know history, so that we need not re-live it. Is this a futile dream? But someone must do something to halt or at least to slow our simian march to doom, and Yankevich does what he can in this dark true book.

“The murderous testosterone-drugged alpha-males portrayed in Tikkun Olam are not utter monsters. They are humans—husbands, sons, and brothers. They are us, or parts of us, and it is their residual humanity that is horrifying.

“This is especially clear when Yankevich takes on infamously unattractive personalities and manages to find in them the germ of humanity that is just alive enough to make stark and painful how much of their humanity has been cast off. His portrait of Rudolf Hess comes to mind. I think, too, of those menders of the world who begin their mending with the murders of the Czar, his wife and children.

Tikkun Olam is filled with characters—human, all too human, not quite human, alive and suffering in their various tragedies—brought painfully and beautifully to life by Leo Yankevich.”—E. M. Schorb

“Leo Yankevich’s rich formalist poetry sings while it mourns. His poems bring us face to face with powerful and provocative images from more than one of those darkest of modern times–times when a terrible inhumanity was unleashed upon a culture, a folk, a Heimat. In tones both eloquent and raw, it asks of its readers no more and no less than what is regarded as the sacred duty of all those who survive: Remember. Do not let this be forgotten. This too happened. Yankevich, like Percy Shelley and Roy Campbell before him, is a courageously outspoken poet, and one who is destined to be remembered as an important classic long after his politically-correct contemporaries have forever fallen out of popular, and poetic, favor.”—Juleigh Howard-Hobson

CONTENTS

Part One
1. Tikkun Olam [2]
2. Moscow, 1928
3. Holodomor, 1932–33
4. Red Star, 1933
5. Barcelona, 1936
6. Naftaly Aronovich Frenkel
7. Kolyma, 1937
8. Lorca’s Death

Part Two
9. Neighbors, Eastern Poland, 1940
10. December, 1942
11. Vengeance is Mine, Says the Lord, 1943
12. With Blood on his Hands . . .
13. Koniuchy, Eastern Poland, 1944
14. Saint Bartholomew’s Church
15. 1945
16. Gleiwitz, 1945
17. Somewhere over Germany, 1945
18. Veteran’s Hospital

Part Three
19. After the Explusions
20. Ezra Pound Enters the Tent [3]
21. Dissident, 1962
22. Poland, New Year’s Day, 1982
23. A Hater Learns About Love
24. The Loneliest Man
25. The Death of Communism
26. Bukovina, 1989

Part Four
27. Sarajevo Sonnet
28. Draza Bregovich
29. Butugychag
30. Gulag Burial Marker
31. The Abandoned Station
32. The Last Silesian
33. An Interview with the Oldest Man In Europe
34. The Łemko Steeple
35. Starless

Part Five
36. A Plurality of Worlds
37. Water
38. The Poet of 1912
39. Anonymous Rex
40. How to Get There

Part Six
41. Spreading Democracy
42. Jenin, 2002
43. The Terrorist
44. After the Old Masters
45. No Flowers, No Doves
46. Two Dates
47. On the Beheading of Eugene Olin Armstrong
48. The July Sun over Lebanon
49. On the Lynching of Saddam Hussein
50. Black Ops [4]

Part Seven
51. A Warning to Dissidents
52. Halloween, 2006
53. The Condemned House
54. Understanding the Holocaust
55. Vision
56. Monomatapa on the Detroit River

About the Author

Leo Yankevich was born into a family of Roman Catholic Irish-Polish immigrants on October 30, 1961. He grew up and attended high school in Farrell, Penn., a small steel town in the Rust Belt of middle America. He then studied History and Polish at Alliance College, Cambridge Springs, PA, receiving a BA in 1984. Later that year he traveled to Poland to begin graduate study at the centuries-old Jagiellonian University in Krakow. A staunch anticommunist, he played an active role in the dissident movement in that country, and was arrested and beaten badly on a few occasions by the communist security forces. After the fall of the Iron Curtain in 1989, he decided to settle permanently in Poland. Since that time he has lived in Gliwice (Gleiwitz), an industrial city in Upper Silesia.

Ordering Information

Hardcover: $25

Paperback: $16

E-book: $5.99 (not available for pre-order)

Available January 16, 2012

 


Article printed from Counter-Currents Publishing: http://www.counter-currents.com

URL to article: http://www.counter-currents.com/2011/12/tikkun-olam-and-other-poems/

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vendredi, 30 décembre 2011

Une grande transformation

chriscaldwell.jpg

Une grande transformation

par Georges FELTIN-TRACOL

 

En 2009, le journaliste Christopher Caldwell faisait paraître Reflections on the revolution in Europe, clin d’œil appuyé à l’ouvrage contre-révolutionnaire du Whig Edmund Burke publié en 1790. Les Éditions du Toucan viennent de sortir sa traduction française sous le titre d’Une révolution sous nos yeux. Alors que les maisons d’éditions institutionnelles se gardent bien maintenant de traduire le moindre ouvrage qui irait à l’encontre de la pesante pensée dominante, saluons cette initiative qui permet au public francophone de découvrir un point de vue divergent bien éloigné de l’agencement ouaté des studios de radio et des plateaux de télévision.

 

caldwell.jpgÉditorialiste au Financial Times (le journal officiel de la City) et rédacteur au Weekly Standard et au New York Times Magazine, Christopher Caldwell relève du courant néo-conservateur anglo-saxon. Il en remercie même William Kristol, qui en est l’une des têtes pensantes. L’édition française est préfacée par la démographe Michèle Tribalat qui, avec son compère Pierre-André Taguieff, semble ébaucher une sensibilité néo-conservatrice dans l’Hexagone plus charpentée que les guignols de la triste revue Le meilleur des mondes.

 

On pourrait supposer qu’Une révolution sous nos yeux est un lourd pensum ennuyeux à lire composé de douze chapitres réunis en trois parties respectivement intitulées « Immigration », « L’islam » et « L’Occident ». Nullement ! Comme la plupart des enquêtes journalistiques anglo-saxonnes, les faits précis et détaillés sont étayés et argumentés. Il faut avouer que le sujet abordé est risqué, surtout en France…

 

« Ce livre, avertit l’auteur, évitera l’alarmisme et la provocation vaine, mais il évitera aussi l’euphémisme et cette façon de se coucher (à titre préventif) qui caractérise tant d’écrits sur les questions relatives à l’ethnicité (p. 53). » Qu’aborde-t-il donc ? « Ce livre, répond Caldwell, traite de l’Europe, de comment et pourquoi l’immigration et les sociétés multi-ethniques qui en résultent marquent une rupture dans son histoire. Il est écrit avec un œil rivé sur les difficultés que l’immigration pose à la société européenne (p. 52). 

 

 

Partant des déclarations prophétiques en avril 1968 du député conservateur Enoch Powell au Midland Hotel de Birmingham consacrées aux tensions raciales à venir, l’auteur estime que « l’immigration n’améliore pas, ne valorise pas la culture européenne; elle la supplante. L’Europe ne fait pas bon accueil à ses tout nouveaux habitants, elle leur cède la place (p. 47) ». Pourquoi ?


Les racines du mal

 

Avant de répondre, Christopher Caldwell rappelle que « l’immigration de masse a débuté dans la décennie postérieure à la Seconde Guerre mondiale. […] En Grande-Bretagne, en France, aux Pays-Bas et en Scandinavie, l’industrie et le gouvernement ont mis en place des politiques de recrutement de main-d’œuvre étrangère pour leurs économies en plein boom (p. 25) ». Par conséquent, « l’Europe devint une destination d’immigration, suite à un consensus de ses élites politiques et commerciales (p. 25) ». Il insiste sur le jeu du patronat qui préfère employer une main-d’œuvre étrangère plutôt que locale afin de faire baisser les salaires… Il y a longtemps que l’immigration constitue l’arme favorite du capital (1). Or « les effets sociaux, spirituels et politiques de l’immigration sont considérables et durables, alors que ses effets économiques sont faibles et transitoires (pp. 69 – 70) ».

 

Il importe d’abandonner l’image du pauvre hère qui délaisse les siens pour survivre chez les nantis du Nord… « Pour Enoch Powell comme pour Jean Raspail, l’immigration de masse vers l’Europe n’était pas l’affaire d’individus “ à la recherche d’une vie meilleure ”, selon la formule consacrée. C’était l’affaire de masses organisées exigeant une vie meilleure, désir gros de conséquences politiques radicalement différentes (p. 31, souligné par l’auteur). » Dans cette « grande transformation » en cours, en raison du nombre élevé de pratiquants parmi les nouveaux venus, l’islam devient une question européenne ou, plus exactement, le redevient comme au temps du péril ottoman et des actes de piraterie maritime en Méditerranée jusqu’en 1830… Dorénavant, « l’immigration jou[e] un rôle aussi perturbateur que le nationalisme (p. 402) ».

 

Très informé de l’actualité des deux côtes de l’Atlantique, Christopher Caldwell n’hésite pas à comparer la situation de l’Europe occidentale à celle des États-Unis. Ainsi, les remarques politiques ne manquent pas. L’auteur estime par exemple que, pour gagner les électeurs, Nicolas Sarközy s’inspire nettement des méthodes de Richard Nixon en 1968 et en 1972.

 

À la différence de Qui sommes-nous ? de Samuel P. Huntington qui s’inquiétait de l’émergence d’une éventuelle Mexamérique, Caldwell pense que les Latinos, souvent catholiques et occidentalisés, peuvent renforcer et améliorer le modèle social étatsunien. L’auteur remarque même, assez justement, que « les Américains croient que l’Amérique, c’est la culture européenne plus l’entropie (p. 447) ». En revanche, l’Europe est confrontée à une immigration pour l’essentiel musulmane. L’Europe ne serait-elle pas dans le même état si l’immigration extra-européenne était principalement non-musulmane ? L’auteur n’y répond pas, mais gageons que les effets seraient semblables. Le problème majeur de l’Europe n’est pas son islamisation qui n’est qu’une conséquence, mais l’immigration de masse. Il serait temps que les Européens comprennent qu’ils deviennent la colonie de leurs anciennes colonies…

 

L’injonction morale multiculturaliste

 

Si cette prise de conscience tarde, c’est parce que « le multiculturalisme, qui demeure le principal outil de gestion de l’immigration de masse en Europe, impose le sacrifice des libertés que les autochtones européens tenaient naguère pour acquises (p. 38) ». L’imposture multiculturaliste (ou multiculturelle) – qui est en fait un monothéisme du marché et de la consommation – forme le soubassement fondamental de l’Union européenne et des « pays occidentaux [qui] sont censés être des démocraties (p. 435) ». Néanmoins, sans la moindre consultation électorale, sans aucun débat public véritable, « sans que personne ne l’ait vraiment décidé, l’Europe occidentale s’est changée en société multi-ethnique (p. 25) ».

 

À la suite d’Alexandre Zinoviev, d’Éric Werner et d’autres dissidents de l’Ouest, Christopher Caldwell observe la démocratie régresser en Occident avec l’adoption fulgurante de lois liberticides contre les hétérodoxies contemporaines. En effet, « l’Europe de l’après-guerre s’est bâtie sur l’intolérance de l’intolérance – un état d’esprit vanté pour son anti-racisme et son antifascisme, ou brocardé par son aspect politiquement correct (p. 128) ». Après la lutte contre l’antisémitisme, l’idéologie multiculturaliste de la tolérance obligatoire s’élargit aux autres minorités raciales et sexuelles et renforce la répression. Il devient désormais tout aussi grave, voire plus, de dénigrer un Noir, un musulman, un homo ou de nier des faits historiques récents que de violer une fillette ou d’assassiner un retraité ! « Peu à peu, les autochtones européens sont […] devenus moins francs ou plus craintifs dans l’expression publique de leur opposition à l’immigration (p. 38). » Rôdent autour d’eux de véritables hyènes, les ligues de petite vertu subventionnées grassement par le racket organisé sur les  contribuables. Et garde aux « contrevenants » ! Dernièrement, une Londonienne, Emma West, excédée par l’immigration et qui l’exprima haut et fort dans un compartiment de transport public, a été arrêtée, accusée de trouble à l’ordre public et mise en détention préventive. « Le journal Metro puis un journaliste de la chaîne américaine C.N.N. ont lancé un appel à la délation sur Twitter (2) ». La police des transports a même appelé à la délation sur Internet pour connaître l’identité de cette terrible « délinquante » ! Sans cesse soumis à une propagande « anti-raciste » incessante, « les Européens ont commencé à se sentir méprisables, petits, vilains et asexués (p. 151) ». Citant Jules Monnerot et Renaud Camus, Caldwell voit à son tour l’antiracisme comme « le communisme du XXIe siècle » et considère que « le multiculturalisme est presque devenu une xénophobie envers soi-même (p. 154) », de l’ethno-masochisme ! Regrettons cependant que l’auteur juge le Front national de Jean-Marie Le Pen comme un parti « fasciste », doctrine disparue depuis 1945…

 

La mésaventure d’Emma West n’est pas surprenante, car « l’État-nation multiculturel est caractérisé par un monopole sur l’ordre moral (p. 413) ». Les racines de ce nouveau moralisme, de ce néo-puritanisme abject, proviennent du traumatisme de la dernière guerre mondiale et de l’antienne du « Plus jamais ça ! ». « Ces dernières années, l’Holocauste a été la pierre angulaire de l’ordre moral européen (p. 356) ». Il était alors inévitable que « le repentir post-Holocauste devient le modèle de régulation des affaires de toute minorité pouvant exiger de façon plausible d’un grave motif de contrariété (p. 357) ». Être victime est tendance, sauf quand celle-ci est blanche.

 

Dans cette perspective utopique d’harmonie interraciale, il paraît certain qu’aux yeux des tenants du politiquement correct et du multiculturalisme, « l’Islam serait tout simplement la dernière catégorie, après le sexe, les préférences sexuelles, l’âge et ainsi de suite, venue s’ajouter au langage très convenu qu’ont inventé les Américains pour évoquer leur problème racial au temps du mouvement des droits civiques (pp. 234 – 235) ». Pour Christopher Caldwell, c’est une grossière erreur, lui qui définit l’islam comme une « hyper-identité ».

 

Le défi musulman

 

Le choc entre l’islam et l’Occident est indéniable : le premier joue de son dynamisme démographique, de son nombre et de sa vigueur spirituel alors que le second se complaît dans la marchandise la plus indécente et la théocratie absconse des droits de l’homme, de la femme, du travelo et de l’inter… Les frictions sont inévitables entre la conception traditionnelle phallocratique musulmane et l’égalitarisme occidental moderne. Allemands et Scandinaves sont horrifiés par les « crimes d’honneur » contre des filles turques et kurdes « dévergondées » par le Système occidental. Les pratiques coutumières de l’excision, du mariage arrangé et de la polygamie choquent les belles âmes occidentales qui exigent leur interdiction pénale. Mais le musulman immigré n’est-il pas lui même outré par l’exposition de la nudité féminine sur les panneaux publicitaires ou de l’homoconjugalité (terme plus souhaitable que « mariage homosexuel ») ?

 

Caldwell rappelle que le Néerlandais Pim Fortuyn combattait l’islam au nom des valeurs multiculturalistes parce qu’il trouvait la religion de Mahomet trop monoculturelle et donc totalitaire. Des mouvements populistes européens (English Defence League, Vlaams Belang, Parti du Peuple danois, Parti de la Liberté de Geert Wilders, etc.) commettent l’erreur stratégique majeur de se rallier au désordre multiculturel ambiant et d’adopter un discours conservateur moderne (défense de l’égalité homme – femme, des gays, etc.) afin d’être bien vus de la mafia médiatique. Par cet alignement à la doxa dominante, ils deviennent les supplétifs d’un système pourri qui reste l’ennemi prioritaire à abattre.

 

Pour l’auteur d’Une révolution sous nos yeux, l’islam est dorénavant la première religion pratiquée en Europe qui connaît l’immense désaffection des églises. L’homme étant aussi un être en quête de sacré, il est logique que la foi mahométane remplit un vide résultant de décennies de politique laïciste démente. Et ce ne seront pas les tentatives désespérées de Benoît XVI pour réévangéliser le Vieux Continent qui éviteront cette incrustation exogène parce que Caldwell démontre – sans le vouloir – le caractère profondément moderniste du titulaire putatif du siège romain : l’ancien cardinal Ratzinger est depuis longtemps un rallié à la Modernité !

 

Dans ce paysage européen de l’Ouest en jachère spirituelle, « les musulmans se distinguent par leur refus de se soumettre à ce désarmement spirituel. Ils se détachent comme la seule source de résistance au multiculturalisme dans la sphère publique. Si l’ordre multiculturel devait s’écrouler, l’Islam serait le seul système de valeur à patienter en coulisse (p. 423) ». Doit-on par conséquent se résigner que notre avenir d’Européen soit de finir en dhimmi d’un quelconque califat universel ou bien en bouffeur de pop corn dans l’Amérique-monde ?

 

Puisque Caldwell souligne que « l’immigration, c’est l’américanisation (p. 446) », que « l’égalité des femmes constitu[e] un principe ferme et non négociable des sociétés européennes modernes (p. 317) » et que « vous pouvez être un Européen officiel (juridique) même si vous n’êtes pas un “ vrai ” Européen (culturel) (p. 408) », il est temps que, hors de l’impasse néo-conservatrice, le rebelle européen au Diktat multiculturel occidental promeuve une Alter-Europe fondée sur l’Orthodoxie traditionnelle ragaillardie, un archéo-catholicisme antétridentin redécouvert et des paganismes réactivés, une volonté de puissance restaurée et des identités fortes réenracinées. « L’adaptation des minorités non-européennes dépendra de la perception qu’auront de l’Europe les autochtones et les nouveaux arrivants – civilisation florissante ou civilisation décadente ? (p. 45) » Ni l’une ni l’autre; c’est la civilisation européenne qu’il faut dans l’urgence refonder !

 

Georges Feltin-Tracol

 

Notes

 

1 : Pour preuve supplémentaire, lire la chronique délirante d’Ariel Wizman, « Pourquoi les immigrés sont les meilleurs alliés du libéralisme », dans L’Express, 7 décembre 2011.

 

2 : Louise Couvelaire, dans M (le magazine du Monde), 10 décembre 2011. Pour soutenir au moins moralement Emma West, on peut lui envoyer une carte postale à :

 

Mrs Emma West

co HMP Bronzfield

Woodthorpe Road

Ashford

Middlesex TW15 3J2

England

 

• Christopher Caldwell, Une révolution sous nos yeux. Comment l’islam va transformer la France et l’Europe, préface de Michèle Tribalat, Éditions du Toucan (25, rue du général Foy, F – 75008 Paris), coll. « Enquête & Histoire », 2011, 539 p., 23 €.

 


 

Article printed from Europe Maxima: http://www.europemaxima.com

 

URL to article: http://www.europemaxima.com/?p=2342

 

mercredi, 28 décembre 2011

Nel deserto dell’umano. Potenza e Machenschaft nel pensiero di Martin Heidegger

heidegger_3.jpgNel deserto dell’umano.
Potenza e Machenschaft nel pensiero di Martin Heidegger

di Salvatore Spina

Fonte: recensionifilosofiche

 

Lo studio di Gorgone, Nel deserto dell’umano. Potenza e Machenschaft nel pensiero di Martin Heidegger, ha come argomento centrale l’assunzione della questione della Machenschaft come «il tema fondamentale attorno a cui ruotano le meditazioni successive alla Kehre intorno alla tecnica, al nichilismo e alla storia dell’essere» (p. 22). La questione della Machenschaft è rintracciabile soprattutto in quei testi di fine anni Trenta, che Heidegger tenne segreti fino alla propria morte, precisamente Beiträge zur Philosophie e Besinnung; 

il termine, che in italiano viene reso – non senza problemi ermeneutici – come “macchinazione”, indica il modo in cui l’essere si dispiega nell’era della tecnica, ovvero nell’epoca del compimento della modernità. Il lavoro di Gorgone, prendendo come punto di partenza questi testi e muovendosi in modo trasversale all’interno della sterminata produzione heideggeriana, vuole essere un’analisi del pensiero del filosofo di Messkirch dopo la svolta, e nel contempo il tentativo di individuare nel concetto di Machenschaft la chiave di volta di tutta la riflessione heideggeriana, che, dopo il fallimento del progetto di Essere e tempo, subisce quella “svolta ontologica” che ne delinea i tratti caratteristici in maniera peculiare lungo tutto il percorso successivo.

I testi in cui Heidegger tratta della questione della Machenschaft sono molto importanti sia da un punto di vista squisitamente teorico, in quanto rappresentano i primi testi in cui la Kehre viene espressamente “tematizzata”, ma anche da una prospettiva più strettamente storico-politica. Essi vengono redatti alla fine degli anni Trenta – i Beiträge zur Philosophie tra il 1936 e il 1938 mentre Besinnung nel biennio 1938-39 –, periodo in cui l’assetto geopolitico dell’Europa stava mutando in maniera radicale; questi mutamenti nell’arco di pochi anni avrebbero generato nel Vecchio Continente la più grande devastazione che la storia abbia mai conosciuto.

Dopo l’iniziale illusione di una possibilità rivoluzionaria propugnata dal nazionalsocialismo, Heidegger individua il nesso fondamentale che intercorre tra tecnica, nichilismo e totalitarismo; il nazionalsocialismo, così come ogni fascismo (ivi compreso l’americanismo – ed è questo forse l’aspetto più rivoluzionario e attuale del pensiero “politico” di Heidegger), appare agli occhi del filosofo la realizzazione esplicita della volontà di potenza e dominio tipica della tecnica, che ha come parola d’ordine l’efficienza del fare [machen]. Ma coinvolti nell’estremo dominio della volontà di potenza sono anche quegli aspetti della vita che a prima vista sembrerebbero estranei alla logica del fare: le esperienze vissute [Erlebnisse]. Il divertissement e l’esperienza vissuta rappresentano agli occhi di Heidegger la maschera più appropriata che la Machenschaft indossa per nascondere la sua intima essenza violentemente nichilistica ed apparire così meno aggressiva e pervasiva. Lungi dall’essere il luogo del disincantamento del mondo, la modernità tecno-scientifica è il tempo della mistificazione per eccellenza.

Come evidenzia Gorgone nel proprio studio, l’interpretazione del reale secondo le categorie della Machenschaft ha come suo sostrato filosofico la coeva riflessione di Ernst Jünger, il quale agli inizi degli anni Trenta nel saggio Der Arbeiter (1932), attraverso un’implacabile indagine della modernità, parla di metafisica del lavoro, ovvero di riduzione di tutto l’ente a materiale utilizzabile e fattibile, e di mobilitazione totale, sostenendo – sulla scorta dell’esperienza della Grande Guerra – il generale coinvolgimento di tutto l’essente in quel movimento impetuoso ed inarrestabile che caratterizza il mondo tecnico, tanto che anche il bambino nella culla «è minacciato come tutti gli altri, se non addirittura di più». 

Quando nel 1945 Heidegger scrisse i Colloqui su un sentiero di campagna – testo decisivo all’interno del lavoro di Gorgone – le analisi della modernità e della tecnica non erano più mere profezie, ma erano diventate triste realtà con la scia di morte e distruzione che la Seconda guerra mondiale aveva lasciato dietro di sé. È proprio di fronte all’apocalittico scenario di una Germania in rovina e costretta alla resa che Heidegger individua nella metafora del deserto l’immagine più appropriata a descrivere la condizione dell’Europa devastata dal conflitto. Il deserto, eco di quel “debito impensato” che, come viene mostrato da Gorgone attraverso l’elaborazione di una “geofilosofia del deserto” (p. 157), legherebbe idealmente Heidegger alla tradizione ebraica, è da sempre il simbolo di morte e distruzione, ma anche e soprattutto dell’impossibilità della rinascita: non semplice disfacimento, secondo una ciclicità vita/morte/vita, ma più radicalmente annichilimento totale.

Ma desertica è anche l’essenza dell’uomo nell’era della Machenschaft: incapace di percepirsi come destinatario degli appelli dell’essere, l’uomo si fa trascinare dall’impetuoso fluire dell’impianto [Gestell] tecnico, correndo il massimo pericolo di essere ridotto ad ente tra gli altri enti, obliando così quella che è la sua massima dignità, ovvero essere il luogo di apertura dell’essere stesso. L’uomo ridotto ad una dimensione, quella tecnica, diventa così un mero impiegato (nel duplice senso del termine) dell’apparato tecnico, un esecutore funzionale della potenza della Machenschaft.

Machenschaft e desertificazione sono i due modi in cui l’essere si dona nell’epoca della tecnica dispiegata; a questi Heidegger contrappone – sebbene mai in maniera del tutto oppositiva, ma in una intima ed essenziale coappartenenza – da un lato la sovranità regale dell’essere [Herrschaft], cioè «la possibilità di fondazione non-violenta di ogni ente» (p. 28), un’im-potenza che precede (non cronologicamente, ma a livello ontologico) ed eccede ogni potere violento della metafisica e rivela quell’inesauribile ricchezza «di ciò che non può mai essere completamente dis-velato e che pure concede ogni possibilità di manifestazione» (p. 86); alla desertificazione, invece, fa da contraltare la vastità accogliente della radura [Weite], ovvero quel luogo aperto e libero «sottratto al fare e dis-fare della Machenschaft, in cui le cose e l’uomo possano essere raccolte nella semplicità della loro essenza» (p.163).

Il testo di Gorgone è diviso in quattro capitoli che, avendo una loro struttura compiuta, potrebbero sembrare a se stanti; tuttavia un’analisi più attenta rivela un’unitarietà di fondo che pervade l’intero lavoro dell’autore. Il primo capitolo è un’analisi della Machenschaft così come appare nei testi heideggeriani, ma anche il tentativo, ben compiuto, di individuare il sostrato filosofico di questo pensiero nella riflessione di Aristotele e nel dualismo classico dynamis-enérgheia. Il secondo capitolo, invece, identifica in Ernst Jünger il referente principale della riflessione heideggeriana intorno alla tecnica ed alla modernità, evidenziando anche la problematicità di questo rapporto ermeneutico che trova la sua forma “compiuta” nel volume 90 della Gesamtausgabe, testo ancora inedito in Italia e, per molti versi, poco conosciuto. Il terzo capitolo è il tentativo di trovare una concretizzazione storica del fenomeno della Machenschaft; attraverso l’esame di alcuni testi di Heidegger, come il famigerato Discorso al rettorato, Gorgone propone un’interpretazione disincantata e scevra da pregiudizi di quello che probabilmente è il problema più dibattuto tra gli studiosi heideggeriani: il rapporto tra Heidegger e il nazionalsocialismo. Giudicando l’adesione di Heidegger al partito nazionalsocialista una “colpa d’impazienza” (p. 131), l’autore vuole individuare le ragioni profonde che da un lato portarono Heidegger a intravedere nel movimento nazista un’autentica possibilità rivoluzionaria, e dall’altra lo convinsero, in seguito, dell’intimo carattere nichilistico del nazionalsocialismo stesso. L’ultimo capitolo, ripercorrendo alcuni dei temi trattati, individua un nesso essenziale tra la Machenschaft e quella condizione desertica, già profetizzata da Nietzsche, che caratterizza tanto la modernità nell’epoca del suo compimento quanto l’uomo che di quest’epoca è interprete; è proprio a partire da questa condizione di massima povertà e spaesamento che Heidegger propone delle strade alternative che non siano mere vie di fuga, quanto piuttosto dei percorsi di approfondimento che riaffermino quella che è la massima dignità dell’uomo: farsi portavoce del messaggio dell’essere.

Proprio in questo compito Gorgone individua quell’ “etica originaria” di cui parla Jean Luc Nancy a proposito del pensiero dell’essere di Heidegger; nell’introduzione al testo scrive Gorgone: «L’essenza dell’umanità a venire diviene, così, quel luogo primariamente etico di resistenza alle logiche totalitarie della macchinazione ed al contempo di corrispondenza al richiamo semplice ed essenziale della vastità desertica dell’essere, del suo inesauribile darsi-donarsi come senso nella storia» (p. 18).


Indice:
Introduzione
1. Potenza e mobilitazione
2. Machenschaft e metafisica del lavoro: Heidegger legge Jünger
3. Lo spirito e il totalitarismo
4. L’umanità nel deserto della Machenschaft
 
Milano, Mimesis, 2011, pp. 212, euro 18, ISBN 978-88-5750-454-4


Tante altre notizie su www.ariannaeditrice.it

lundi, 26 décembre 2011

Carl Schmitt et la théologie politique...

Carl Schmitt et la théologie politique...

Ex: http://metapoinfos.hautetfort.com

Les éditions du Cerf viennent de publier un recueil comportant quatre essais inédits du juriste et philosophe politique allemand Carl Schmitt. Le volume est présenté par Bernard Bourdin, professeur de philosophie et de théologie à l'université de Metz, et préfacé par Jean-François Kervégan, auteur récent d'un essai intitulé Que faire de Carl Schmitt ? (Gallimard, 2011).

 

Schmitt - quatre essais.jpg


"L'expression « théologie politique » n'a jamais été utilisée en tant que telle par les théologiens chrétiens. Elle n'apparaît pour la première fois que dans le titre d'un ouvrage majeur de la philosophie du XVIIe siècle, le « Traité théologico-politique » de Spinoza. L'intention de son auteur était de conjoindre la souveraineté et la liberté de pensée, et par là même de régler le « problème théologico-politique ». Il faut attendre l'anarchiste Bakounine, au XIXe siècle, pour « réhabiliter » la théologie politique à des fins révolutionnaires, puis pour dénoncer le déisme de Mazzini.

En 1922, en rédigeant son premier texte sur la théologie politique, Carl Schmitt prend le contre-pied de l'anarchisme révolutionnaire. Avec le juriste rhénan, la théologie politique est désormais identifiée à la théorie de la souveraineté. C'est par une formule lapidaire, devenue célèbre, qu'il commence son essai : « Est souverain celui qui décide de la situation exceptionnelle. » Dès la fin du IIe Reich, puis dans le context de la république de Weimar, tout le projet intellectuel de Schmitt est d'articuler sa théorie du droit et du politique à une structure de pensée théologico-politique. Le problème de la démocratie libérale est son incapacité à disposer dune véritable théorie de la représentation, en raison de l'individualisme inhérent à la pensée libérale. Face à cette impuissance, le catholicisme, par sa structure ecclésiologique, offre au contraire tous les critères de la représentation politique et de la décision.

Les textes que Bernard Bourdin présente dans ce volume, parus entre 1917 et 1944, sont des plus explicites s'agissant de ces aspects de la théorie schmittienne : institution visible de l'Église, forme représentative et décisionnisme. Ils mettent de surcroît en évidence la double ambivalence de la pensée de Schmitt dans son rapport au christianisme (catholique) et à la sécularisation. En raison de son homologie de structure entre Dieu, État et Église, la nécessité d'une transcendance théologico-politique plaide paradoxalement pour une autre approche d'une pensée politique séculière. Ambivalence qui ne sera pas non plus sans équivoque."

lundi, 05 décembre 2011

Patrick Buchanan’s Suicide of a Superpower

He Told Us So:
Patrick Buchanan’s Suicide of a Superpower

By Greg Johnson

Ex: http://www.counter-currents.com/

Patrick J. Buchanan
Suicide of a Superpower: Will America Survive to 2025? [2]
New York: Thomas Dunne Books, 2011

As a White Nationalist, my darkest political fear (for the short run, anyway) is that the United States might retain sufficient vestiges of political realism to pull itself together for an Indian Summer of Caesarism before the big cold sets in. Specifically, I fear that someone could put our present Jewish-dominated, multiracial system on firmer economic and political footing. All the instincts of our best conservative thinkers and politicians, like Patrick Buchanan, strain in this direction.

I speak of “Caesarism” because the existing democratic system produces politicians too beholden to special interest groups to serve the common good, thus it has become increasingly necessary to repose important political decisions in the hands of non-elected bodies, such as the commission that oversaw the closing of military bases. The logical extension of this trend is the emergence of a dictatorship, which at least would have a chance of saving America.

But a period of conservative Caesarism would be the worst possible outcome for our race, for no conservative would address Jewish power or the danger of whites being demographically swamped by non-whites who are already here legally. Thus a benevolent conservative dictator just might prolong the system’s life long enough for the forces of anti-white racial degradation and replacement to drive our people past the point of no return.

I agree that we need a time-out from immigration to give White Nationalists some extra time to get our act together. I wish all immigration restrictionists well. But the last thing I want is the present system to stabilize itself, for realistically the system’s collapse is our only hope for the creation of a White Republic—provided, of course, that White Nationalists develop into a viable political movement that can offer a credible alternative once the present system collapses.

Patrick Buchanan’s Suicide of a Superpower argues, with crushing persuasiveness, that the United States is headed toward a collapse. He is so convinced of this that he is even willing to venture an end date in his subtitle, albeit in the form of a question: Will America Survive to 2025? I found this striking, because when I first conceived of Counter-Currents in the Spring of 2010, I found myself thinking in terms of a 15-year make or break period for a North American New Right. At the very least, such a date focuses the mind wonderfully.

In Chapter 11, “The Last Chance,” Buchanan offers a slate of reforms that might actually prolong the life of the republic (if implemented by a dictator). But I see no reason to think that any of his proposals will be implemented given the generally low levels of intellect and courage among American conservatives. But ultimately, that is a good thing for whites.

Chapter 1, “The Passing of a Superpower,” summarizes America’s economic decline particularly vis-à-vis China. This chapter, like the rest of the book, is extremely well-documented. I will be returning to this book again and again for data, and for that reason alone, I recommend it to all white advocates.

Chapter 4, “The End of White America,” chronicles our race’s demographic and cultural decline in America because of low white fertility, high non-white fertility, and torrents of non-white immigration. Chapter 5, “Demographic Winter,” puts the American experience in global perspective. It seems that below replacement fertility is a characteristic of every First World society, including practically every white nation plus Japan, China, Singapore, Korea, and Jews in Israel.

The common denominator in is not modernity, or mere secularism, as Buchanan argues, because the Soviet bloc countries were modernist, materialist, and secularist yet had growing populations. Nor is it a Jewish conspiracy to suppress fertility, which could not explain the trends in Israel and the Far East.

Rather, the problem seems to be a form of modernity that stresses individualism and consumerism. We have created societies in which the people who should be having families instead restrict their fertility to pursue higher education, careers, hobbies, or ecological responsibility, allowing the stupid and ugly people to inherit the earth.

In the white nations, this problem is compounded with Jewish-engineered race replacement policies, primarily non-white immigration. Jews do not have the power to impose these handicaps on Asian nations, and they have no interest in imposing them on themselves.

Chapter 6, “Equality or Freedom?,” is a surprisingly frank and utterly devastating critique of egalitarianism. Chapter 7, “The Diversity Cult” and Chapter 8, “The Triumph of Tribalism” are similarly frank and crushing critiques of the idea that diversity is a strength. Tribalism, not globalism and universalism, are deeply rooted in human nature. Buchanan shows that despite economic globalization, political nationalism has been the dominant trend in the 20th and 21st centuries. Thus, by pursuing diversity, America and other white nations are betting against history and human nature.

Chapter 9, “‘The White Party,’” explains why the Republicans are the de facto party of white America, arguing that the party has no future if it refuses to represent the interests of the white majority. Beyond that, the party must work to preserve the white majority. Again, Buchanan presents a devastating case. But is there one Republican in a thousand with the moral courage necessary to explicitly represent white interests, much less act to preserve a white majority?

Chapter 10, “The Long Retreat,” is a critique of US foreign policy, arguing that the United States needs to downsize its international commitments and expenditures. Currently we maintain more than 1,000 military installations around the world. US troops are present in 148 countries and 11 territories. The United States is committed to intervene on behalf countries around the world, and to maintain our massive budget deficits, we are borrowing from our allies and their enemies alike. Again, Buchanan’s argument is carefully documented and quite compelling.

I saved the bad chapters for last. In Chapter 2, “The Death of Christian America,” Buchanan has the brazen effrontery to assert that Europe civilization is identical to Christianity, such that the decline of Christianity entails the decline of European civilization. Historically, this is of course false. European man existed before Christianity and will persist after Christianity disappears. Christianity, like Marxism, may be just a phase our people are going through, one of many in our long history since the Ice Ages.

Yes, religious people are currently more fertile than non-religious people, but religion is not the only factor that encourages fertility. During the baby boom of the Third Reich, Germans did not suddenly become more religious. Nor did Americans during the post-WW II baby boom. The common denominator was high national optimism. And even if people need an Imaginary Friend to tell them to have babies, Christianity is not the only pro-natal religion.

A White Republic should at least try to preserve freedom of religion (or irreligion) and work to create secular incentives for the best people to reproduce early and often. For example, why not encourage bright young women to have families before going to college by offering a free college undergraduate degree to every mother of three children who stays home with them to the age of six?

Buchanan also asserts that America is a Christian nation. This is false on the face of it, as the United States has never had an established church and the inhabitants of America have never been entirely Christian. That did not, of course, prevent Christians from thrusting their religion into the public square anyway. Over the last hundred years, there has been an attempt to push Christianity back out of the public square by atheists, agnostics, liberals, and members of other religious groups, including Jews. Buchanan sees this as a terrible decline. I am not entirely comfortable with the process [3], but overall, I consider it progress toward religious tolerance, which is a worthy ideal.

In Chapter 3, “The Crisis of Catholicism,” Buchanan discusses his own church’s decline from its post-WW II heyday due to Vatican II. He says nothing about how the Catholic Church became so large and influential in America before it committed suicide. He does, however, mention that there were only a few thousand Catholics in America at the time of the Founding. Given the strength of anti-Catholic sentiment in America, the rise of Catholicism was made possible only by the so-called separation of church and state, i.e., the refusal to allow an established church and the embrace of religious toleration, which is a product of the Enlightenment liberals, Freemasons, and deists whom Buchanan despises. It is a heritage worth defending from Muslims—and Christians—who would turn back the clock.

Now, some might be tempted to think that Buchanan is engaged in a cynical bait and switch routine: “Now that I have gotten your attention with the impending doom of the white race, can I interest you in a time-share . . . ?” But Buchanan sincerely believes the package deal of Christianity, the white race, and European civilization. (Let’s hope they hurry up and elect a black pope.) He puts his chapters on Christianity right near the beginning, where the foundations of an argument go. But Buchanan’s in-your-face Christian apologetics are quite unfortunate, for if our race is going to have a future on this continent, it is by uniting on the basis of deep roots of common identity, not by emphasizing highly divisive religious differences.

There are many ways in which it is true that America is committing suicide. But there is also a sense in which America is being murdered. Kevin MacDonald, among others, has chronicled how America is ruled by a hostile Jewish elite that has instituted many of the ideologies and trends decried by Buchanan as suicidal, including multiculturalism and massive non-white immigration. Jews, of course, more than any other people, are aware of the necessary conditions of collective survival. They are concerned to secure these conditions for their own people even as they deny them to us. The obvious conclusion is that they mean for us not to survive as a people. America is being corrupted, exploited, degraded, and murdered by the organized Jewish community.

Buchanan, of course, knows all this. But he has avoided saying so because it is not politic. He wishes to maintain his access to television and publishers. He wishes to maintain his credibility and connections. His friend Sam Francis felt the same way. He wanted to bide his time, preserve and augment his capital, keep his powder dry. But he fantasized about the day when he would finally whip it out, when he would drop the J-bomb. Unfortunately, Sam died with his credibility intact. And you can’t take it with you. You can only spend it while you are here. Patrick Buchanan is now 73 years old, sixteen years older than Sam was when he died. What is he saving himself for? There is so much more he could do for our people.

Suicide of a Superpower is a useful and important book. I recommend it to all White Nationalists. It is not a White Nationalist book, but it gets the reader almost all the way there. If we can’t close the deal with this kind of set-up, we aren’t worth our salt.

Suicide of a Superpower could save America, although it will not be heeded. And when America goes down, people will say that Patrick Buchanan told us so. That will be a nice epitaph for America—and for Buchanan.

But saving America is not the same thing as saving the white race. If our people have a future on this continent, it will only be by freeing ourselves of the wreckage of America and American conservatism. Conservatism is all well and good if one has something worth conserving. Once we have the White Republic, then we can dust off Buchanan’s proposals and put them to work conserving our system, not the enemy’s.

 


Article printed from Counter-Currents Publishing: http://www.counter-currents.com

URL to article: http://www.counter-currents.com/2011/11/he-told-us-so-patrick-buchanans-suicide-of-a-superpower/

dimanche, 04 décembre 2011

The End of Americanism

The End of Americanism

Pat Buchanan's Suicide of a Superpower

Alex KURTAGIC

Ex: http://www.alternativeright.com

Pat Buchanan’s Suicide of a Superpower is an apt follow-up to his 2002 volume, The Death of the West. Although the new book focuses on the United States, it restates and updates the narrative of the older book. It is no coincidence, therefore, that the former refers briefly to the latter early on.

Buchanan’s main thesis is this:

When the faith dies, the culture dies, the civilization dies, the people die. That is the progression. And as the faith that gave birth to the West is dying in the West, peoples of European descent from the steppes of Russia to the coast of California have begun to die out, as the Third World treks north to claim the estate. The last decade provided corroborating if not conclusive proof that we are in the Indian summer of our civilization.

Buchanan_Pat_-_Suicide_of_a_SuperpowerSuicide has stirred some controversy in the mainstream media for stating what for many is, or should be, known and obvious, but which for the majority is either not so or taboo: the negative consequences of immigration, diversity, and multiculturalism.

Yet, the book has obtained wide coverage and seems widely available—last month, while travelling in the United States, it saw it prominently displayed in the bookshops of major airports. This is a significant achievement that must not pass without notice, for there are others who have been advancing identical theses without the same level of exposure.

Suicide, however, is not without significant limitations, and these merit detailed discussion, for they stem from an outlook that will need to be overcome if we are ever to move forward with an effective solution to the suicide of America and the rest of the West.

The Pluses

With 428 pages of meat in it, Suicide is divided into 11 chapters, each of which is in turn divided into shorter sections with lapidary titles. The chapters are: The Passing of a Superpower, The Death of Christian America, The Crisis of Catholicism, The End of White America, Demographic Winter, Equality or Freedom, The Diversity Cult, The Triumph of Tribalism, The ‘White’ Party, The Long Retreat, and The Last Chance.

In none does Buchanan flinch from presenting the facts as they are. And where there are lacunae, Kevin MacDonald has already filled them with his Culture of Critique. The first chapter is in tone apocalyptic, yet the sheer rapidity of the United State’s decline as a superpower justifies that tone; Rome’s decline in wealth and capability may have taken longer, but America’s is comparable and, as Buchanan presents it, suggests familiar buildings and everyday objects one day becoming ruins and broken artefacts in a continent abandoned to a dark age. Buchanan proposes solutions in the final chapter, but, besides flawed (and I get to that further down), they are conditional, which lends the trajectory of decline traced throughout most of the volume an aura of inevitability. This is not an indulgence on pessimism, because all previous empires eventually collapsed, and all previous great civilisations in history came to an end.

In his detailed discussion of Christianity’s role in the United State, and of the crisis of Catholicism, Buchanan acknowledges the importance of the transcendent. Many of the ills that afflict the West in our age are linked to, if not the result of, a materialist conception of life, and of the consequent subjection to a secular economist criterion of all matters of importance to a nation and a people. The dispossession and loss of moral authority of the White race in their own traditional homelands was to a significant degree achieved through, or caused by, economic arguments. It was not the so-called ‘civil rights’ movement in the United States that turned Detroit into a ruin; what turned it into a ruin was the reliance on economic arguments—so characteristic of the materialist liberal outlook—that enabled the decision to purchase Black slaves in African markets and ship them to North America. Similarly, the loss of moral and spiritual vigour, which has so enfeebled the White race and sapped its will to live, can be traced to the rise of secularism, to the severing of the race’s link to the transcendent. ‘Where are the martyrs for materialism?’ he asks.

To this Buchanan adds a helpful discussion about equality and freedom. He explodes the liberal conception of them as concomitant concepts, and convincingly presents them as polar opposites in a dichotomy: greater equality means less freedom, greater freedom means less equality. Buchanan makes clear that the only possible way to see these two concepts as concomitant is by ignoring human biodiversity, for, where inborn differences in physiology impose upper limits to human plasticity, equality—the elimination disparities in outcome—cannot be achieved without handicapping the cause of those disparities. Thus, the freedom to choose among the best universities is limited for bright White students when entry requirements are relaxed among less able non-White students in the effort to achieve equal outcomes among all racial groups.

The chapters on the diversity cult and tribalism re-state arguments that have for years been advanced by Jared Taylor. Taylor has done it in much greater detail, but Buchanan will reach a much wider audience, so this is a gain. Buchanan also echoes the Sailer Strategy—‘the idea that inreach to its white base, not outreach to minorities, is the key to future GOP success’—in his discussion of his party’s prospects as Whites decline in the United States. And, like Taylor, he ridicules those who see this decline as a cause for celebration.

Also like Taylor, but in the economic area, Buchanan reveals some astonishing facts. Apparently, the United States military relies on equipment that cannot be made without parts manufactured by potential enemies and economic rivals. Did you know that?

Another helpful discussion is introduced in the final fourth of the book, where Buchanan, following Amy Chua, deals with the fatal design flaw that afflicts multiethnic nations that have embraced democracy and capitalism:

Free markets concentrate wealth in the hands of a market-capable ethnic minority. Democracy empowers the ethnic majority. When the latter begin to demand a larger share of the wealth, demagogues arise to meet those demands.

This is a reply to the economic argument for the state-sponsored policy of immigration, diversity, and multiculturalism in the West, repeated without proof and refuted by empirical studies everywhere, that supposedly boosts economic growth because diverse immigrants ‘bring in skills’ and foster greater creativity. In fact, said policy leads to Whites becoming dispossessed minorities, as they already did in a number of other former European colonies. Buchanan points out that people like Evo Morales, president of Bolivia, and Hugo Chavez, president of Venezuela, use ‘principles invented by white men—universal franchise and majority rule—to dispossess white men’. He also quotes 19th century Rightist Louis Veuillot to describe how democrats are dispossessed by non- (or ‘instrumental’) democrats: ‘When I am the weaker I ask you for my freedom because that is my principle; but when I am the stronger I take away your freedom because that is my principle’. He asks: ‘What does the future hold for the West when people of European descent become a minority in nations they created, and people of color decide to vote themselves proportionate or larger shares of the national wealth?’

In terms of solutions, Buchanan offers common sense advice: the United States should live within its means and actively take steps to cut its deficits. For him this means pruning government and government expenditure, including social security benefits and military bases overseas; and instituting a policy of economic nationalism, levying tariffs on imports and cutting corporation tax to zero, so as to revive manufacturing in the United States, attract overseas investment, and reduce reliance on imports. I do not think even economists will agree on whether this would yield the desired results, but at least Buchanan is making concrete policy proposals that place the interests of his country first, and is willing to accept that ethnonationalism is an inescapable reality of the human condition. 

The Minuses

There are fundamental flaws in Buchanan’s exposition.

Firstly, he equates European civilisation with Christianity. This is surprising, particularly coming from an American writer, advancing an Americanist position, given that some of the basic principles and practices upon which America was founded, such as the constitutional republic, originated or had their roots in Europe well before the dawn of Christianity. What about ancient Greece? What about ancient Rome? Were those not European civilisations? A more accurate statement is that the United States is a Christian country. This is defensible, even if the United States never had an established religion and even if not all Americans were Christian. Perhaps what Buchanan means is that Faustian civilisation—the civilisation of Northern Europe, of which North America is an extension—is a Christian civilisation.

Edward_GibbonBuchanan is correct to identify the decline of Christianity in America as one of the roots of its decline. In doing so, however, he has Edward Gibbon as his inverse counterpart, for Gibbon identified the rise of Christianity in Rome, that is, the decline of the Roman religion, as one of the causes of Rome’s fall. Gibbon would have sympathised, perhaps, with the statement, ‘When the faith dies, the culture dies, the civilization dies, the people die.’ Yet, given that the fall of Rome did not mean the end of European man, and that if the rise of Christianity was linked to Rome’s fall, the rise of Christianity was also linked to the rise of Faustian civilisation. All this tells us, therefore, is that we may be witnessing the end of a cycle involving Christianity. However, even if it is Christianity’s fate to pass, as have other religions, or to become a ‘Third World religion’, as Buchanan puts it, European man will still be there, at least for a while, and, provided he survives as a race, he will give rise to a new civilisation, traceable to the Greek, the Roman, and the Faustian, but founded on somewhat different principles. This will bring no comfort to Christians, nevertheless, and Buchanan, as a Christian, is justified in his alarm.

Gibbon would concede that Buchanan makes a powerful argument for Christianity. A monotheistic religion with a personal god can be a potent unifying force, eliciting much stronger commitments from its followers. The Roman pagans were easygoing, and vis-à-vis other religions, the pagan outlook, as expressed by Nehru in a conversation with the former Chilean Ambassador in India, Miguel Serrano, is generally ‘live and let live’. One can easily accept that it is not difficult to decimate a people with that outlook, for, in as much as it resembles the multiculturalists’ easygoing attitude to all religions except Christianity, it is proving daily in our society an agent of dissolution. It may well be that in a world of intense ethnic competition, a high-tension—even totalitarian and intolerant—religion is the more adaptive group evolutionary strategy. Buchanan’s discussion on the growth and endurance of evangelical Christianity, Orthodox Judaism, and militant Islam indicates he is of this view, and that is a plus consistent with his recognition of the importance of the transcendent. Yet he inadvertedly exposes a conundrum: if Christianity is a universal faith, accommodating every race and nationality, as he says, and if, as he also says, non-evangelical forms of Christianity have declined because they are accommodating, then, would this not suggest that Christianity will not survive in practice as the White man’s religion unless it becomes a non-accommodating faith?

Secondly, Suicide makes it clear that Buchanan cannot conceive of anything beyond the America of the 1950s. This is the most unfortunate aspect of this book. It is also the reason why Buchanan offers no real solutions, other than turning back the clock. Were his recommendations implemented in the United States, they would only retard the processes that are in place, achieving a temporary reprieve, a momentary stabilisation, before resuming their course, perhaps with renewed vigour and speed.

What Buchanan seems not to recognise is that, while the 1950s may have felt good for many, the conditions for the modern trends that he condemns were already in place then. They were simply masked by the transient prosperity, stability, and romanticism of the era. The 1950s led to the 1960s. And the upheavals of the 1960s had their roots in the academics of the 1930s, who in turn had their roots in Marxism, dating back to the 19th century, which in turn had its roots in liberalism and the Enlightenment in the 18th century. And this is not merely a question of there having always been a hostile faction within the American republic, seeking to undermine it with its insidious liberalism; the conservatives who opposed Marxism also had their intellectual roots in 18th-century liberalism. Buchanan makes it seem as if the United States has been hijacked by liberals, but the fact is that it has always been in the hands of liberals, right from the beginning: the United States was founded and is predicated on the ideas of liberal intellectuals, and its Founding Fathers were liberals. If the United States seems to be spearheading the process of Western decline, bringing everyone down with it, it is because liberalism took stronger root there than anywhere else, due to a lack of opposition to liberal ideas.

From this perspective it can be argued that Buchanan’s Suicide of a Superpower is not the result of the United States’ being ‘far off the course set by [the] Founding Fathers’, but rather of the United States’ being exactly on that course, even if the Founding Fathers never anticipated that it would lead where it has led.

As a conservative in a republic founded by liberals, Buchanan is by definition a liberal, defending a previous stage in the development of liberalism. Hence his failure to see beyond liberalism’s event horizon.

Liberals have a linear conception of history. Thus Buchanan hopes that by prescribing better liberal policies (what he would call conservative policies), the American republic can be set back on course and resume its trajectory of endless progress and economic growth. Unfortunately, treating the problem as if it were a disease in need of a cure is futile when the problem is a congenital defect. In such cases the best hope is genetic resequencing, a form of death and rebirth. Most likely it will mean certain death and a possible rebirth, elsewhere, as something else, perhaps in North America, but at first, if at all, only in a part of it. Concretely this means the break-up of the union into regions and the emergence among them of a dominant republic among weaker ones, with strength or weakness being a function of the dominant racial group in each case.

Similarly futile is the attempt to revert a civilisation to an earlier stage of development. In the Spenglerian view this would be like trying to turn an old dog back into a puppy, or an old tree back into a bush. Technology may make it possible one day to reverse the physical effects of ageing, but it will not erase the memories and conclusions of a lifetime, and therefore not rejuvenate the spirit. This applies even in the non-organic realm: we may be able to restore an old mechanical typewriter so that it looks and works like new, but it will still be obsolete technology, and its reason for being will shift from usable tool to unusable antique.

Unfortunately for those living today, reality is more in accord with the organic conception of history, whereby things go in cycles and slow build-ups lead to rapid changes in state. Following Spengler, Francis Parker Yockey argued that attempts to cause a reversion into an earlier state of development will at best yield temporary results, introducing distortions that will be magnified as the next stage of development indefectibly follows.

One can sympathise with the argument that it would be worse if the current political leadership in the United States managed to stabilise the economy and perform plastic surgery on the face of America, as this would buy said leadership more time and permit existing trends to remain in place until the possibility of a White rebirth in North America, even without United States, became extinct. A Spencerian collapse sooner may open up avenues that may be closed later.

Ruins_of_American_Civilization

Buchanan wonders whether the United States will implode by 2025. This was my own scenario in Mister, where the United States disintegrates in a hyperinflationary chaos. But it is difficult to predict with accuracy and I would not want to speculate beyond a possible dismemberment along regional lines sometime this century. When it happens, whenever it may happen, those who remember the America we know today and who did not know better until it was too late will be amazed that people thought the United States would go on forever. They will also be amazed that people ever thought as they do now, despite the final outcome being so blatantly obvious. Buchanan’s diagnosis is mostly accurate, but his treatment, well intentioned as it is, is part of the problem, not part of the solution.

The Balance

Despite its defects, there is no escaping it: Suicide of a Superpower is a punishing indictment of the United States’ post-war political leadership, authored by a prominent conservative who speaks as part of America’s mainstream establishment. Any White American fed up with the way things have been going in recent decades and looking for new politics beyond Democrat or Republican will find here solid justifications for going beyond convention and eventually adding his muscle to the struggle for fundamental change.

Suicide will not awaken the complacent, induce the fearful to speak up, or cause ideological enemies to change their views. The complacent is comfortable in his ignorance and does not want his world disrupted by inconvenient truths; in most cases he has the means to avoid them by insulating himself economically. The fearful, who knows but remains silent, will not be emboldened by Buchanan’s confirming him in his views; he will wait, as he has always waited, and then side with change once it looks like it is going to win. The ideological enemy is beyond convincing; the only solution is to crush him thoroughly.

Should you buy Suicide of a Superpower? The answer is yes. Not only is it brave, but it contains many helpful insights and bewildering facts to fuel a healthy debate. The fact that the book is everywhere has also infuriated the radical Left, who have renewed their efforts to have Buchanan fired by MSNBC. The radical Left does not want this kind of discussion to take place in a mainstream media forum. In fact, radical Leftists would like Buchanan to be banned from the networks, shunned by his publishers, phlebotomised by the taxman, prosecuted by the ICC, and sent to the gulags, to spend his old age in poverty, obscurity, and hard labour—surrounded, of course, by politically correct diversity. To his credit, Buchanan has not buckled in to criticism. Therefore, every copy that is sold is a kick to the radical Left, and added impetus for the book to reach more persuadables.

With enough manpower and talent it will be possible to survive the cataclysm and make it through to the other side. The other side is something entirely new; traditional, but different—it is not the White America of the 1950s, nor Reagan on steroids, nor is it a linear extrapolation of what is good about the 2010s minus what is bad. For Whites to survive in America, Americanism must end. Those who survive will be the architects of what comes after Americanism; they will not call themselves Americans—the designation may not even make sense for them. Viewed from the other side, with the old certainties gone and new ones in place, it will be impossible to think as we do today, even if future generations carry forward much of our knowledge, traditions, and cultural legacy.

mardi, 25 octobre 2011

Pierre Vial présente "Le loup-garou" d'Hermann Löns


Pierre Vial présente "Le loup-garou" d'Hermann Löns

samedi, 15 octobre 2011

Tacitus’ Germania

Tacitus’ Germania

By Andrew Hamilton

Ex: http://www.counter-currents.com/

Tacitus’ Germania, a short monograph on German ethnography written c. 98 AD, is of great historical significance. The transmission of the text to the present day, and certain adventures and tensions surrounding it, make for an interesting story.

Roman historian and aristocrat Cornelius Tacitus (c. 55–c. 117 AD) was the author of several works, more than half of which have been lost. What remains of his writings are divided into the so-called “major [long] works,” the Histories [2] and the Annals [2], jointly covering the period 14–96 AD, and the “minor [short] works”: The Dialogue on Orators, Agricola, [3]and [3] Germania [3]. Tacitus, a senator, is believed to have held the offices of quaestor in 79, praetor in 88, consul in 97, and proconsul or governor of the Roman provinces in “Asia” (western Turkey), from 112–13.

The Germania is a short work, not really a “book.” My copy, “Germany and Its Tribes,” is a mere 23 pages long—albeit in moderately small wartime print on thin paper containing no notes, annotations, maps, illustrations, or other editorial aids. It was translated from the Latin by Alfred Church and William Brodribb in 1876 and published in The Complete Work of Tacitus by Random House’s Modern Library in 1942.

The Agricola, about Roman Britain, is roughly the same length. Agricola, the general primarily responsible for the Roman conquest of Britain and governor of Britannia from 77–85 AD, was Tacitus’ father-in-law.

The Germania has been the most influential source for the early Germanic peoples since the Renaissance. Its reliable account of their ethnography, culture, institutions, and geography is the most thorough that has survived from ancient times, and to this day remains the preeminent classical text on the subject. The book signifies the emergence of the northern Europeans from the obscurity of archaeology, philology, and prehistory into the light of history half a millennium after the emergence of the southern Europeans in Homer and Herodotus.

Though Tacitus at times writes critically of the Germans, he also stresses their simplicity, bravery, honor, fidelity, and other virtues in contrast to corrupt Roman imperial society, fallen from the vigor of the Republic. (It has been said that no one in Tacitus is good except Agricola and the Germans.)

Tacitus’ book is based upon contemporaneous oral and written accounts. During the period knowledge of northern Europe increased rapidly. Roman commanders produced unpublished memoirs of their campaigns along the lines of Caesar’s Commentaries, which circulated in Roman literary circles. Diplomatic exchanges between Rome and Germanic tribes brought German leaders to Rome and Roman emissaries to barbarian courts. And Roman traders expanded traffic with the barbarians, generating, perhaps, more knowledge than the military men.

According to Jewish classicist Moses Hadas, Tacitus “never consciously sacrifices historical truth. He consulted good sources, memoirs, biographies, and official records, and he frequently implies that he had more than one source before him. He requested information of those in a position to know” and “exercises critical judgment.”

Other Ancient Accounts of the Germans

Prior to Tacitus’ narrative, a Syrian-born Hellenistic Greek polymath of the first century BC, Poseidonius, may have been the first to distinguish clearly between the Germans and the Celts, but only fragments of his writings survive.

Julius Caesar did not penetrate very far east of the Rhine, so his knowledge of the Germans, expressed in De Bello Gallico (On the Gallic War, c. 50 BC), was limited.

The Roman Pliny the Elder’s Bella Germaniae (German Wars, c. 60s–70s AD) probably contained the fullest account of the people up to Tacitus’ time, but it has been lost.

Pliny, the foremost authority on science in ancient Europe, had served in the army in Germany. When Mount Vesuvius destroyed Herculaneum and Pompeii, he was stationed near present-day Naples, in command of the western Roman fleet. Eager to study the volcano’s destructive effects firsthand, he sailed across the bay, where he was suffocated by vapors caused by the eruption.

Following the Germania, the most important ancient work discussing northern Europe was Ptolemy’s Geography, written in the 2nd century AD. Ptolemy is the Alexandrian astronomer best-known for positing the Ptolemaic System. The Geography named 69 tribes and 95 places, many mentioned by no other source, as well as major rivers and other natural features.

From late antiquity, no extensive study of the Germanic peoples has survived, if one was ever written, and no single writer treated the migrations in a coherent way.

Loss and Rediscovery

At some point during the collapse of classical civilization and the migrations of late antiquity the text of the Germania was lost for more than a thousand years. It resurfaced only briefly, in Fulda, Germany in the 860s, where it and the other short works were probably copied. A monk at Fulda quoted from it verbatim at the time. Subsequently it was lost again.

In 1425 rumors reached Italy that manuscripts of Tacitus survived in the library of Hersfeld Abbey near Fulda. One of these contained the shorter works. In 1451 or 1455 (sources differ) an emissary of Pope Nicholas V obtained the manuscript containing the lesser works and brought it to Rome. It is known as the Codex Hersfeldensis.

In Rome, Enea Silvio Piccolomini, later Pope Pius II, examined and analyzed the Germania, sparking interest in the work among German humanists, including Conrad Celtes, Johannes Aventinus, and Ulrich von Hutten.

Its first publication in central Europe occurred at Nuremberg in 1473–74; the first commentary on the text was written by Renaissance humanist Beatus Rhenanus in 1519.

[4]

The first page of Germania, the Codex Aesinas

The Codex Hersfeldensis was then lost again for half a millennium. (This time, of course, the content survived in published form.) Then, in 1902, a portion of the Codex Hersfeldensis was rediscovered by priest-philologist Cesare Annibaldi in the possession of Italian Count Aurelio Balleani of Iesi (Italian: Jesi), a town located in the Marches of central Italy. The manuscript had been in the family’s possession since 1457. This single text, the oldest extant version, became known as the Codex Aesinas. (I.e., the Aesinas is believed to consist of portions of the lost manuscript from Hersfeld.

One scholar has summarized the tremendous impact the text’s rediscovery in 1455 has had on European history:

The rediscovery of the Germania in the late fifteenth century was a decisive event in the study of the ancient Germanic peoples. Renaissance scholarship endowed Roman literary texts with outstanding authority, as well as making them more widely available. At the same time, a rise in German national feeling led to heightened interest in ancient texts which illuminated the Germanic past. . . . The Germania . . . was used to cement a link between the Germans of Tacitus and the Germans of the early modern period. From about 1500 onward the Germania was rarely far from serious discussion of German national identity, German history and even German religion. Fresh impetus was given to it in the nineteenth century and, of course, the racial purity, valour and integrity of the Germans as portrayed by Tacitus had immense appeal to the National Socialist hierarchy in the 1920s and 1930s. (Malcolm Todd, The Early Germans, 2d ed., Oxford: Blackwell, 2004, p. 7)

Among others, the Germania influenced Frederick the Great, Johann Fichte, Johann Gottfried von Herder [5], and Jakob Grimm.

Key to the rediscovery, preservation, transmission, and social and racial influence of the Germania over the past 500 years have been Renaissance humanism, modern (pre-21st century) scholarship, the invention of printing, liberalism, nationalism, and racial science.

A Dangerous Book

Since the Renaissance, the Germania has provided the most significant historical evidence of the early Germanic peoples.

The inevitable identification of the ancient Germans with their descendants commenced soon after the book’s discovery. Historians, philologists, and archaeologists all added pieces to the mosaic, so that by the time unification occurred in 1871 the early history of the Germans was firmly grounded.

The Germania influenced at least one 20th century leader decisively. Young Heinrich Himmler in September 1924 read Tacitus during a train ride and was captivated. At the time he was personal assistant to Gregor Strasser, leader of the National Socialist Freedom Movement (Nationalsozialistische Freiheitsbewegung).

In contemporaneous notes, Himmler wrote that Tacitus captured “the glorious image of the loftiness, purity, and nobleness of our ancestors,” adding, “Thus shall we be again, or at least some among us.”

In 1936, the year of the Berlin Olympics, Hitler personally requested of Mussolini that possession of the Codex Aesinas be transferred to Germany. Mussolini agreed, but changed his mind when the proposition turned out to be unpopular among his people.

A facsimile copy was made for the Germans and Rudolph Till, chairman of the Department of Classical Philology and Historical Studies at the University of Munich, and a member of the Ahnenerbe (a racial think tank co-founded by Heinrich Himmler in 1935), studied the manuscript in Rome in the months prior to the war. The Ahnenerbe published Till’s findings as Palaeographical Studies of Tacitus’s Agricola and Germania Along with a Photocopy of the Codex Aesinas in 1943.

German ideologist Alfred Rosenberg [6] and SS chief Heinrich Himmler both retained intense interest in the Codex. Mussolini’s government fell in 1943. In July 1944 Himmler dispatched an SS commando team to rescue the manuscript. The unit searched three Balleani family residences in Italy without success.

The Codex was in fact stored in a wooden trunk bound with tin in the kitchen cellar of one of the residences, the Palazzo on the Piazza in Jesi. (There is a 1998 online newspaper account in German [7] about this affair that relies upon Jewish writer Simon Schama’s 1996 Landscape and Memory for its authority.)

[8]

Palazzo Balleani in Jesi

The upshot was that possession of the manuscript remained in the hands of the Baldeschi-Balleani [9] family. After the war the family stored the Codex Aesinas in a safe deposit box in the basement of the Banco di Sicilia in Florence, Italy. In November 1966, the River Arno experienced its worst flooding [10] since the 1550s, causing damage to the Codex. Monks at a monastery near Rome skilled in preserving manuscripts succeeded in saving it, though permanent water damage could not be eliminated.

The Codex was sold by the family to the Biblioteca Nazionale in Rome in 1994, where it is currently cataloged as the Codex Vittorio Emanuele 1631.

Suppress That Classic!

Since WWII, as ideological imperatives took precedence over dispassionate scholarship, the Germania‘s capacity to instill self-awareness and collective identity has deeply disturbed proponents of anti-white policies and ideologies. The historical record is problematic, too, in not depicting the Germans as irredeemably evil, possibly scheming, say, to vaporize the extensive Jewish populations of Rome and Persia in clay kilns.

One feint such ideologues employ is to insinuate that ancient Germans and modern northern Europeans possess no biological or historical kinship. Though nonsensical, it is as easy to argue as is the assertion that biological race does not exist, or dozens of other counter-factual dogmas.

But many would no doubt prefer to ban the book Communist-style, removing all copies from circulation and restricting access to unpulped copies to a handful of approved “scholars” on a carefully monitored basis.

As long ago as 1954 Jewish historian Arnaldo Momigliano declared before “an important international classical conference” that the Germania was one of the most dangerous books ever written. (In 1938 Momigliano lost his job as professor of Roman history at the University of Turin after passage of the Fascist racial law. He moved to England, where he taught for the rest of his life.)

Today, Harvard University’s Christopher Krebs, author of A Most Dangerous Book: Tacitus’s Germania From the Roman Empire to the Third Reich (2011), trumpets Momigliano’s view [11] of the ancient text’s “insidious” nature to the applause of academic peers, literary critics, and journalists.

Krebs’ insincere declaration—gambit, really—that “Tacitus did not write a most dangerous book, his readers made it so,” doesn’t fool anyone. In societies committed to the proposition that speech and ideas constitute “hate,” there is unanimous, or at least undissenting, agreement on how to treat “dangerous” books and ideas.

In an interview, Krebs says that he is half German and half Swedish. But “Krebs” can be a Jewish name—e.g., biochemist Hans Krebs, formulator of the Krebs cycle. Scanning random passages from the book, it is hard to think that the author is not Jewish or part Jewish. If white, he has mastered their psychology to great profit.

Adam Kirsch, a Jewish book reviewer for Slate, the Washington Post-owned online magazine, quotes Krebs approvingly: “‘Ideas are viruses. They depend on minds as their hosts . . . The Germania virus . . . after 350 years of incubation . . . progressed to a systemic infection culminating in the major crisis of the twentieth century.’” (Yes, he means the “Holocaust.”) The title of Kirsch’s article is “Ideas Are Viruses [12].”

This is a characteristically Jewish, and totalitarian, way of thinking.

[13]

Adam Kirsch

Kirsch, a child of privilege, is the son of author, attorney, and newspaper columnist Jonathan Kirsch. A 1997 graduate of Harvard, Adam Kirsch writes regularly for Slate, The New Yorker, The Times Literary Supplement, and other magazines.

Wishing that the Germania had been lost during the Middle Ages, Kirsch concludes, “If the last surviving manuscript had been eaten by rats in a monk’s library a thousand years ago, the world might have been better off.”

Ah, liberal enlightenment! The world can never get enough of it.

 


Article printed from Counter-Currents Publishing: http://www.counter-currents.com

URL to article: http://www.counter-currents.com/2011/09/tacitus-germania/

dimanche, 09 octobre 2011

Stuff Our Betters Like

Stuff Our Betters Like

By James J. O'Meara

Ex: http://www.counter-currents.com/

Olivier Magny
Stuff Parisians Like: Discovering the Quoi in the Je Ne Sais Quoi [2]
New York: Berkley, 2011.

Chris Lehmann
Rich People Things: Real-Life Secrets of the Predator Class [3]
Chicago: Haymarket Books, 2011.

Considering how Christian Lander’s Stuff White People Like, first the blog, then the book, then the sequel, created more than a little frisson among the NPR crowd (see the Counter-Currents reviews here [4] and here [5]) it’s surprising we haven’t seen more knock-offs or outright parodies (along the lines of The Job of Sex or Bored of the Rings); in fact, as far as I know, these are the very first (not counting the rather differently intended but invaluable provocateur of White consciousness, Stuff Black People Don‘t Like [6]).

Stuff Parisians Like shares its title and numbered format with SWPL. Turns out, it’s an excellent format for studying le vie Parisiene, since “reaching a form of happiness in Paris” (the Parisiene is never just “happy” like an American — despite “the fact that all Parisians deliberately wear American clothes, watch American movies, listen to American music, use American words or fantasize about American celebrities . . . when hearing the phrase “Les Américains”, the Parisian will implacably … just be taken over by one overpowering thought . . . “Oui, mais les Américains, ils sont cons”) entails “internalizing certain codes and refusing certain habits” (p. 75).

But while Lander writes as a mildly cynical member of the group, establishing, as the more perceptive reviewers noted, his credentials precisely by gently mocking but never really challenging his group’s tastes and ideas (WASPs do love self-criticism and faux objectivity, after all!), Magny writes as a Parisian, oui, (apparently a restaurateur and oenophile no less, to judge from his website, where you can “Optimize your future interactions with Homo Parisianus [by] browsing the full list of Stuff Parisians Like [7]”), but with a difference; he disagrees heartily with his confreres, and seems to be something of a . . . well, conservative, I guess. Horreurs!

Which comes first, the dyspeptic view or the conservatism, is a toss up. Suffice to say, it makes for some very penetrating observations about an urban type that has not only fascinated Americans, but also seems remarkably like some of our own domestic species.

Thus while filled with cultural tidbits such as

  • Fans of “continental dining” should beware that the cheese course has given way to just coffee, although the addition of a little beurre sale [8] will make the sweetest concoction acceptably ascetic;
  • Wine, too is passé; lunch means water – San Pellegrino, or San-Pé [9], to the American’s amusement – dinner perhaps beer, a party definitely only hard liquor;
  • License plate numbers reveal the driver’s place of origin [10] as well as their character; the very best is 75 – Paris, of course – and the others ‘smell of mud’ or ‘depression’ in various numerical ratios, while also revealing their driving habits — “C’est ce con de 27 qui bloque tout le monde depuis deux heures.”

along with some surprises — the Parisian despises artists [11], who are perceived as lazy and un-credentialed (state-funded art degrees are almost unknown, a pretty good idea it seems to me) unlike the busy graduates of the grandes Ecoles [12]; the Parisian loves not art but his idea of France’s cultural heritage — and stuff you only need to have read an Edmund White to know — the L’ile Saint-Louis [13] is the place to be! The Luxembourg Gardens [14] are the place to be seen! — we also learn that

Parisians have an opinion about most things, thus making it clear they have a significant knowledge about most things in life.

Having theories takes this to the next level.

Theories prove that not only does the Parisian have more information and knowledge than other people, but he also processed that information through his own personal filter. The superiority filter. Parisians will use theory after theory but never warning that these are theories. Other people, including Parisians, will be fooled and will inevitably reach the conclusion that this Parisian is extremely cultivé and intelligent.

It is important to realize that very few Parisians form their own theories. Most Parisians repeat theories they heard on TV, or from their really smart uncle. No actual credit is ever given to the actual source. The actual source is always the Parisian. (pp. 89-90)

Theories, of course, are not facts; who needs facts when you have theories?

The Parisian, no matter how much he is into freedom of mind and against propaganda, rarely bothers to double-check his facts. He remains vastly foreign to elements that might otherwise feed and qualify his reflections. (p. 254)

While the American Leftist might have an opinion about, say, the Dalai Lama, the Parisian has a theory:

Le Dalai Lama is good. China is bad. Amen.

And that leads to some stuff those on the Alternative Right, or even non-Democrats, will recognize:

Worldwide, a fascist is a follower or an admirer of the pre-WWII Italian Fascist regime.

In Paris, a fascist is anyone who disagrees with a Parisian and makes a point.

The rarest use of the word facho is to define extreme right wing people. More common use of the word is to be found in situations when someone expresses beliefs and thoughts that are unacceptable to Parisians. The more brutally true the statement is, the more facho the person who says it is.

Calling someone a facho is a fantastic way for Parisians to win a conversation. [See “Winning Conversations [15]”]. When a Parisian’s dabbling is countered by superior, non-PC, implacable reasoning, the opponent will be called a facho. To seal the victory, the Parisian will say, “On peut pas discuter avec toi.” And walk away. Victory. (pp. 169-70)

Or, as Charlie Sheen would say, “Winning!”

Interestingly, both “Calling People Fachos” and “Le Dalai Lama” are not part of the “complete” list on his website; as he says himself:

If your opinion is susceptible to reach a significant number of people through a given media, Parisians will start a petition against you. It’s best to behave really . . .

One reviewer has suggested that the book’s disparaging remarks about Parisian nightlife and parties are a cheap attempt to drum up business for his wine bar. These more political passages, and his reticence about them, lead me to think he knows his Parisians too well.

Do not support small businesses — that will make you a fascist.

Dressed in black [16] and lacking testosterone ["There are three types of males in Paris: the gay-looking homosexuals, the gay-looking heterosexuals, and men over fifty"], the Parisian may seem familiar; didn’t we meet them that time in New York?

Calling people beaufs is a wonderful thing for Parisians. It allows them to assert conveniently their superiority while not going through the trouble of enduring a painstaking analysis that might lead them to interrogations about themselves or others.

But of course, it would be too easy to mock the beauf (the “redneck” if you will) for wearing white socks [17] or liking football.

Superior perceived social status is acquired by mocking habits and attitudes that are typical of upper class or even better – rich people. “He’s spending the weekend in Deauville? Can’t believe it, quel beauf!”; “Is he really driving a Hummer? Quel gros beauf!” By striking his audience with an unsuspected beauf designation, the Parisian scores serious social points: “Did he really take his nephew to Disney Land? Quel beauf!” The ultimate goal is to make all the people surrounding the Parisian wonder if, compared to him, they are not ultimately complete beaufs. (p. 7)

Le Beauf Americain

Yes, indeed, the New York State of Mind, and the feeling is mutual:

Paris is every Parisians’ wife. New York is their mistress. Parisians know how living with your wife gets old.

NY gear is very popular, especially amongst the younger generation of Parisians. The I Love New York T-shirt is a must. Worn properly, it is considered very chic in Paris. Less stylish people will opt for a NYPD T shirt. FDNY gear is exclusively reserved for the gay community in Paris. (p. 130)

Each section ends with a Helpful Tip (“When in doubt, just say putain”) and instructions on how to “Sound Like a Parisian” (which, I am sure, must contain its share of booby traps).

* * *

[18]Chris Lehmann’s Rich People Things, from its title to its cover to its number system, is clearly another SWPL title, but he and even his publishers make no mention of the earlier books; Lehmann claims his online column “began life as an afterthought title without any particular mission statement.” It’s a bit odd, considering his (well deserved) savaging of Chris Anderson (# 11. Wired Magazine) for mistaking his upstream rent-seeking for a new paradigm of free information.

Whatever. Lehmann seems part of what we might call the “unattached Left”; unattached, that is, to the conventional Democratic Party and its personality cult. No Obama-worshiping minion, he. (Unlike the Parisian, who very much likes Obama: his election proves the Parisian is right, there is no problem with immigrants, only racist fachos — see Magny‘s penultimate item.)

Thus, his targets and criticisms will be shared by many on the Alternative Right. He even quotes Steven Pinker — favorably! No paradox this; if one thinks of the traditional Left/Right field as a ping pong table, those not playing the game and just standing around share a space around it, and thus have more in common with each other than with either “player.”

He takes as his theme class analysis, not identity politics, and Americans’ peculiar lack thereof (boasted about, as Americans always find their limitations to be a source of perverse pride, as “our Exceptionalism;” Americans are proud to let everyone know they are very ‘special’ as they ride on the short bus of nations). And his targets are what takes the place — literally displaces, as a obscuring ideology — of class analysis: the “free markets and free men” mythology. So his topics tend to fall into two categories: economic myths (low taxes create jobs), and the mythical triumphant “individuals” (from Ayn Rand to Facebook and the aforementioned Wired) whose stories are thrown out by the system like squid ink.

Speaking of Rand, his chapter strikes me as one of the best objective (if you will) analyses of her work. His analysis hits the exact point where Rand gains her influence; starting out from the rather conventional standpoint of Nietzschean individualism (We the Living could even be filmed in Mussolini’s Italy) she hits the jackpot when she connects to the Horatio Alger myth of the Robber Baron era. By transposing individualism from the deterministic realm of nature to the marketplace of “free choice,” she allows her readers to vicariously imagine themselves (of course, who thinks of the Master Race without thinking oneself part of it?) being able, not so much to be heroes as to recognize them (most of us, after all, are mediocre but loyal Eddies not heroic Galts) and by serving them (buying their products and lowering their taxes) avoid the unforgivable sin of siding with the looters.

In general, Lehmann seems to be able to mouth the usual PC cliches, say, about the “genuine virtues of openness and diversity” while pointing out that:

These qualities form the basis of the twenty-first century’s corporate managerial mindset . . . a more diverse and culturally tolerant world is also a far more market-friendly world. It’s also, far from coincidentally, a world in which wealth and income disparity never seem to achieve the same vaunted status as cultural and gender diversity. (pp. 82-83)

This is not to say that Lehmann is a Traditionalist. For one thing, his good-thinking Liberal credentials show in an obsession with the Catholic Church as the citadel, or at least syneccdoche, of evil. The very first line reads:

American class privilege is very much like the idea of sex in a Catholic school — it’s not supposed to exist in the first place, but once it presents itself in your mind’s eye you realize that it’s everywhere.

My, what an original trope!

Later, he can’t even express his loathing and contempt for corporate (and, he fails to observe, Judaicly) backed frauds like Damien Hirst without making this outburst:

[W]e have entered an aesthetic universe every bit as blinkered and morally obtuse as that of the Catholic Church, when it elected to suppress classical composers in the wake of the Napoleonic Wars out of the conviction that they presented an urgent Jacobin threat to the established order of things. (p. 104)

[19]

This makes Lehmann think of Palestrina

I can’t be bothered to research this, but does anyone remember some papal bull condemning equal temperament? Myself, I get my history from fiction, and I remember Huysmans, in his Catholic phase, bemoaning the Church’s replacement of Gregorian chant with half-assed operatics by Gonoud and Faure (long before the LP-driven fashion for it, Huysmans was promoting the reconstruction work of the Abbey of Solesmes, which contributed to our more recent “early music” revival). One wants to say, like one of Lehmann’s landsmen, “from your mouth to God’s ear”; if only the Church had, successfully, stamped out that demonic manifestation known as “classical music”; see Evola in Ride the Tiger, or even Colin Wilson: passing from Mozart to Beethoven, one is wearied by all the table-pounding; or Delius: a preference for Mozart over Beethoven was his test of a new acquaintance’s cultural level.

If you can ignore the weird, unmotivated Catholic bashing, and the recurrent genuflection to PC orthodoxy, the reader on the Alternative or Traditionalist Right will be able to find much useful historical and critical discussion of our most contemporary economic and cultural busybodies and nuisances, from Malcolm Gladwell to Alan Greenspan to Frank Gehry.

However, it lacks any information on food and drink, and above all, don’t quote any of it to a Parisian.

Source: http://jamesjomeara.blogspot.com/ [20]

 


Article printed from Counter-Currents Publishing: http://www.counter-currents.com

URL to article: http://www.counter-currents.com/2011/10/stuff-our-betters-like/

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mardi, 27 septembre 2011

Le spectacle est devenu « la meilleure des polices »

Le spectacle est devenu "la meilleure des polices"

arton12570-aea95.jpg

Ex: http://ungraindesable.hautetfort.com/

En exergue de ce livre figurent deux belles citations de Guy Debord et Jean-Claude Michéa particulièrement bien choisies. L’auteur est très curieux à  voir l’abondante bibliographie (Jean-Pax Méfret, Murray, Michéa, Debord, Debray,Raymond Boudon, etc) ; ce livre est donc particulièrement intéressant car il s’attaque à de vrais sujets, de vrais problèmes.

Selon l’auteur, le lien est évident entre Murray et Debord ; « l’ordre spectaculaire et festif a pour conséquence (…) la disparition du réel . La " société hyperfestive " apparaît comme l’aboutissement de " la société du spectacle "».

Ce livre est une violente et véritable attaque contre le libéralisme mais sous un angle plutôt proche de Michéa que de Besancenot.
 

« (…) dans la société libérale, aucun vice ne doit en lui-même être à priori réprimé (…) Par ailleurs, et pour en revenir au présent , un taux relativement élevé de criminalité ne nuit pas au bon fonctionnement du « système libéral », au contraire. Prenons un exemple contemporain avec les émeutes urbaines : les voitures brûlées doivent être remplacées, les vitrines brisées réparées, etc. Et, comme le note avec ironie le philosophe Jean-claude Michéa dans L’emprise du moindre mal, le « système libéral «  dans sa grande ruse, a su aussi produire en parallèle toute « une industrie de l’excuse, voire de légitimation politique », se proclamant de gauche ou d’extrême gauche, mais en fait culturellement et politiquement libérale : « C’est le travail habituellement confié aux rappeurs, aux cinéastes « citoyens » et aux idiots utiles de la sociologie d’Etat. »

Il aborde ensuite le milieu du showbiz avec le politique et la corruption.

Il conclue ainsi « (…) Chaque époque a ses tabous et son idéologie dominante. Sous l’Ancien Régime, l’Eglise catholique » aujourd’hui « son influence a bien pâli » (…) le dieu caché du temps présent : la nouvelle religion spectaculaire et festive, diffuse, fluide et totalisante, avec ses prêtres et ses dévots de la médiasphère et du show-business (…) de nouvelles hiérarchies sociales, des tabous d’un genre nouveau, un conformisme inédit, tout un système dans lequel les troubadours jouent désormais les premiers rôles(d’anesthésistes). Car ainsi que le note Jean-claude Michéa, « il serait temps de reconnaître enfin que de nos jours, c’est le spectacle lui-même qui est devenu « la meilleure des polices » »

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samedi, 17 septembre 2011

Kampf und Tragödie des Barons Ungern-Sternberg"

Berndt Krauthoff: "Ich befehle! Kampf und Tragödie des Barons Ungern-Sternberg"

Eine Rezension

Götz KUBITSCHEK

Ex: http://www.sezession.de/

khan.jpgIm Regin-Verlag erscheint seit rund zwei Jahren ein ambitioniertes Programm, das sich – grob gesagt – dem traditionalen Gedankenkreis um Julius Evola, der Konservativen Revolution im weitesten Sinne sowie Figuren und Leitbildern einer Antimoderne widmet. Der Verleger bestückt also – salopp gesagt – die Nische in der Nische mit Büchern, und jeder, der sich ein bißchen mit dem Verlagsgeschäft auskennt, muß sich fragen, ob und wie man dort ein paar Mark verdienen will:

Denn der Regin-Verlag hat weder »Ever-Brauns« im Programm, noch legt er schlampiges Zeug vor, dem man ansieht, daß wirklich jeder Pfennig gespart wurde. Die Bücher sind vielmehr gut gesetzt, gut lektoriert, interessant und angemessen gestaltet. Ein Blick auf die stets aktuell gehaltene Internetseite www.regin-verlag.de lohnt sich.

In diesem Jahr erschienen ist der Nachdruck des Romans Ich befehle! von Berndt Krauthoff aus dem Jahr 1938 (hier einsehen und bestellen). Der Autor schildert darin Aufstieg und Fall des Barons Ungern-Sternberg, der als Befehlshaber einer bunt zusammengewürfelten, auf seine Person eingeschworenen Armee den Kommunisten vier Jahre lang schwer zusetzte. Er nahm den Kampf auf Seiten der »Weißen« unmittelbar nach der bolschewistischen Februarrevolution 1917 auf, hielt bis zur Niederlage Admiral Koltschaks seine sibirische Stellung und setzte danach auf eigene Faust, und ohne weiterhin in gegenrevolutionäre Strategien eingebunden zu sein, einen bereits vorbereiteten Plan um: Ungern-Sternberg überschritt im Oktober 1920 die Grenze der Äußeren Mongolei, eroberte im Februar die Hauptstadt Urga (das heutige Ulan Bator) und bis Mitte April 1921 das gesamte Gebiet. Allerdings überspannte er bereits im Sommer seine Kräfte und scheiterte bei dem Versuch, von der Mongolei aus Teile Sibiriens von den »Roten« zu säubern und seinen Einflußbereich auszuweiten. Am 15. September wurde Ungern-Sternberg, der auch die eroberten Teile der Mongolei wieder verloren hatte, gefangengenommen und erschossen.

Ich befehle! folgt insgesamt dem, was an historisch gesichertem Wissen über die kurze, aber intensive Führerschaft Ungern-Sternbergs vorhanden ist. Da die Darstellung – streng chronologisch und im Präsenz verfaßt – wie das unmittelbare Tagebuch eines Feldschreibers wirkt, ist es sogar als historisches Dokument wahrgenommen und verwendet worden. Das Nachwort des russischen Historikers Sergej Lwowitsch Kusmin zeigt allerdings, wie in der Darstellung des Lebens Ungern-Sternbergs stets biographische Exaktheit und Mythenbildung einander abwechseln: Natürlich gibt es Berichte über den Mut oder die Führungsgewalt des Barons, dessen geradezu unwiderstehliches Charisma ebenso belegt ist wie seine asiatische Grausamkeit in der Bestrafung seiner Untergebenen, wenn Befehle nicht ausgeführt oder Eide gebrochen wurden; aber die Quellenlage ist alles in allem doch dürftig, und so ist der Zugriff Berndt Krauthoffs eben vor allem eine gut erzählte historische Geschichte, die dem Faktenskelett sozusagen das Fleisch an die Knochen hängt. Manchmal gerät die Darstellung sogar zur Legende über eine dämonische Heiligenfigur: In ihm sah man einen Befreier, einen Retter, sogar die Inkarnation einer kriegerischen Gottheit der Mongolen. Krauthoff gelingt es, den Stoff nüchtern anzufassen und damit ein geradezu unwirkliches Leben in der Wirklichkeit zu halten.

Mit der »dramatischen Ballade« Kreuzzug 1921 von Michael Haupt ist ein zweiter literarischer Text im Buch enthalten. Dieses Drama ist viel weiter weg von der historischen Persönlichkeit als der Roman, aber es verdichtet wichtige Stationen und Szenen und ist, wie das Nachwort festhält, »ein Beispiel dafür, wie man das Ungernsche Epos in Europa verstand, kurz nachdem es bekannt wurde.« Die Widmung ist pathetisch, sie gilt »den wenigen Auserlesenen, die in der Welt zu führen verstehen«. Ist Haupts Drama je aufgeführt worden? Hier wünscht man sich mehr Auskunft über den Autor und über die Aufnahme seines Stückes.

Aber vielleicht ist das für das Ansinnen des Regin-Verlags auch zu sehr germanistisch gedacht. Hier geht es um die Bergung und Bewahrung verschütteten Schrifttums, und zwar aus gegebenem Anlaß. 2011 ist nämlich ein Gedenkjahr für alle Ungern-Sternberg-Verehrer: Er ist vor 125 Jahren geboren worden und wurde vor 80 Jahren füsiliert. Das ist auch der Grund, warum neben der literarischen Würdigung des Barons bereits im vergangenen Jahr in der »Anderen Bibliothek« (Eichborn) die Biographie Der blutige, weiße Baron aus der Feder James Palmers erschien (Sezession verwies im Februar-Heft dieses Jahres darauf). Auch dieses Buch hat keine Furore gemacht. Wer kennt schon Ungern-Sternberg, wer die literarischen Zeugnisse über ihn? Nun sind sie also wieder erhältlich, sind in der Welt und gut in Form gebracht.

Berndt Krauthoff: Ich befehle! Kampf und Tragödie des Barons Ungern-Sternberg mit Anhang: Michael Haupt: Kreuzzug 1921. Dramatische Ballade, Kiel: Regin-Verlag 2011. Hier bestellen.

vendredi, 02 septembre 2011

Aux sources de l'islamisme allemand contemporain

Wolfgang KAUFMANN:

Aux sources de l’islamisme allemand contemporain

 

L’islamisme allemand contemporain trouve ses racines chez les volontaires musulmans levés contre l’URSS de Staline

 

Depuis un discours controversé du Président fédéral Wulff, on discute de plus en plus intensément en Allemagne pour savoir si l’islam est propre à ce pays ou non. Les débatteurs ne sont à l’unisson que sur un point: l’islam est désormais présent en terre germanique. La même remarque vaut pour l’islamisme. Ce qui conduit tout naturellement à la question: comment l’islamisme est-il arrivé en Allemagne?

 

Vu l’immigration de plusieurs millions de Turcs musulmans, on peut supposer que l’islamisme présent aujourd’hui en terre allemande provient de cette vague migratoire. Toutefois, on doit bien constater que l’infiltration initiale d’un islamisme en Allemagne n’est pas un effet de l’immigration, après 1945, de travailleurs de confession musulmane. Deux livres publiés récemment le démontrent:

Stefan MEINING,

Eine Moschee in Deutschland. Nazis, Geheimdienste und der Aufstieg des politischen Islam im Westen, Verlag C. H. Beck, München, 2011, 316 pages, 19,95 euro.

 

&

 

Ian JOHNSON,

Die vierte Moschee. Nazis, CIA und der islamische Fundamentalismus, Verlag Klett-Cotta, Stuttgart, 2011, 360 pages, 22,95 euro.

 

Ces deux livres sont parus quasi simultanément, leurs titres se ressemblent fort et leurs couvertures également: ce qui pourrait faire penser à une action concertée. Cependant, à la lecture, on s’aperçoit quand même qu’il s’agit d’un hasard.

 

Les deux ouvrages décrivent le même phénomène. Stefan Meining, rédacteur du magazine politque “Report München”, dépendant de l’ARD, se concentre sur la responsabilité des services allemands dans l’émergence de l’islamisme, tandis que Ian Johnson, Prix Pulitzer, met surtout l’accent sur celle des services secrets américains. La lecture de ces deux ouvrages nous donne une belle image d’ensemble et nous permet de constater, en plus, que l’islamophilie peut prendre de multiples visages. La direction nationale-socialiste —rien moins!— fut la première a faire venir délibérément en Allemagne des représentants de la haute hiérarchie de l’islam politique, à commencer par Hadj Mohammed Amin al-Husseini, Grand Mufti de Jérusalem et chef religieux de la communauté musulmane de Palestine. Le motif de cette démarche se trouve dans la ferme résolution de Hitler lui-même, de son Ministre des affaires de l’Est Alfred Rosenberg, ainsi que des chefs de la Wehrmacht et de la Waffen-SS, d’utiliser et d’engager l’islam comme arme secrète contre l’URSS. Dans le cadre de cette politique, plusieurs centaines de milliers de musulmans du Caucase et d’Asie centrale ont été, jusqu’en 1945, enrôlés dans des unités de volontaires comme la “Division SS musulmane Nouveau Turkestan”. Ces unités avaient tout naturellement beoin d’un accompagnement politique et religieux.

 

La plupart de ces légionnaires musulmans, qui ont eu la chance, après la défaite de l’Allemagne, de ne pas avoir été rapatriés de force et d’avoir ainsi échapper à la mort par fusillade, se sont installés à Munich et ses environs. Parmi eux: quelques imams qui avaient auparavant servi dans les unités de la Wehrmacht ou de la Waffen-SS. Trois cents de ces “oubliés” fondèrent en 1953 la “Religiöse Gemeinschaft Islam” (“Communauté religieuse islamique”). Dès ce moment, le jeu a repris car le gouvernement fédéral allemand avait, lui aussi, l’intention d’utiliser à son profit les émigrants de confession musulmane. L’acteur principal de cette politique, côté allemand, fut le “Ministère fédéral des expulsés, réfugiés et victimes de la guerre”. A cette époque-là, ce ministère était placé sous la houlette de Theodor Oberländer (membre du parti “Gesamtdeutscher Block”/”Bund der Heimatvertriebenen und Entrechten” – “Bloc pour toute l’Allemagne”/”Ligue des Expulsés et Spoliés”). Pendant la guerre, Oberländer avait été le commandeur d’une unité spéciale de la Wehrmacht, la “Bergmann”, au sein de laquelle servaient d’assez nombreux volontaires musulmans venus du Caucase. L’objectif d’Oberländer était d’utiliser la “Religiöse Gemeinschaft Islam” pour faire éclater l’Union Soviétique en provoquant une révolte généralisée des peuples non russes, ce qui aurait entraîné, comme effet second, la réunification de l’Allemagne dans les frontières de 1937. C’est la raison pour laquelle, par l’entremise d’Oberländer, l’association musulmane de Munich a reçu le soutien financier du gouvernement fédéral allemand.

 

L’islam politique a été une arme pendant la Guerre Froide

 

Parallèlement aux tentatives ouest-allemandes d’enrôler l’association musulmane de Bavière, la CIA, et son organisation satellite, l’AMCOMLIB (“American Committee for Liberation from Bolshevism”) commencent, elles aussi, à s’intéresser aux exilés ex-soviétiques et musulmans de Munich et de sa grande banlieue. Or les Américains paient beaucoup mieux que les Allemands: les membres de la “Communauté Religieuse Musulmane”, fixés à Munich, vont progressivement se faire recruter pour agir dans le cadre de la guerre psychologique menée par les Etats-Unis. Ils vont commencer par une collaboration au micro de “Radio Liberty” où ils vitupèreront contre la politique soviétique à l’égard des nationalités et de la religion islamique. L’islam politique allemand s’est donc transformé en un instrument américain dans la Guerre Froide, chargé de “tordre le cou” au communisme athée, avec, pour corollaire, d’amener à une révision générale des conséquences de la seconde guerre mondiale.

 

Les ex-légionnaires anti-soviétiques, qui se laisseront embrigader dans les services allemands ou américains, ne se présenteront pas, à l’époque, comme des fondamentalistes musulmans, à l’instar de ceux que nous connaissons aujourd’hui: ces anciens soldats de la Wehrmacht ou de la Waffen-SS s’étaient assimilés au mode de vie allemand; ils aimaient boire de l’alcool et se livrer à de joyeuses libations; leurs femmes et leurs filles ignoraient délibérément les prescriptions vestimentaires islamiques; toutes les autres consignes religieuses n’étaient pas davantage prises au pied de la lettre. Chose curieuse et digne d’être rappelée: c’est justement cette liberté par rapport aux prescrits rigoureux de la religion musulmane qui va provoquer une mutation décisive de la situation. Elle a eu lieu à l’occasion de la première “conférence islamique d’Allemagne”, tenue le 26 décembre 1958 dans la salle paroissiale catholique Saint-Paul à Munich.

 

Lors de cette manifestation, pour la première fois, des étudiants très croyants et très rigoristes, venus des pays arabes, rencontrent les émigrés issus des régions islamisées de l’URSS. Au départ, il n’y a pas de confrontation directe entre les deux groupes: tous s’accordent pour que soit réalisé un premier objectif, celui de construire un lieu central de prière à Munich. Pour y parvenir, ils créent au début du mois de mars de l’année 1960, une “Commission pour la Construction de la Mosquée”. Le directeur de cette commission, que les participants ont élu, n’était pas un ancien légionnaire issu du Turkestan ou du Caucase mais l’Egyptien Said Ramadan, figure de proue du mouvement des “Frères musulmans” qui était aussi, à l’époque, secrétaire général du “Congrès islamique mondial”. La raison principale qui a justifié l’élection de Said Ramadan fut qu’on espérait qu’il ramènerait des subsides en provenance des pays arabes pour la construction de l’édifice religieux. C’est ce qu’il fit. Mais, simultanément, il entama une campagne de dénigrement des anciens légionnaires des armées allemandes, parce que leur mode de vie n’était plus “pur”, ce qui conduisit à leur marginalisation totale.

 

Au bout de ce processus d’éviction, qui se situe en mars 1962, les protagonistes arabes d’une interprétation pseudo-traditionaliste et rigide de l’islam ont pris le contrôle de la Commission, qui, quelques mois plus tard, allait se dénommer “Islamische Gemeinschaft in Süddeutschland” (“Communauté Islamique d’Allemagne du Sud”). Depuis le 4 décembre 1982, elle s’appelle, en bout de course, “Islamische Gemeinschaft in Deutschland”. Depuis lors, l’organisation établie à Munich a servi de plaque tournante à un réseau islamiste qui n’a cessé de croître à la manière d’un rhizome sur tout le territoire de la République fédérale, sans que les autorités allemandes ne s’en alarment outre mesure.

 

Celles-ci n’ont montré de l’intérêt pour ce réseau qu’à partir du 11 septembre 2001, lorsque le troisième président en fonction, le Syrien Ghaleb Himmat, fut soupçonné de terrorisme: d’après les renseignements fournis par le “Financial Crimes Enforcement Network”, une instance dépendant du Ministère américain des finances, il aurait fonctionné comme fournisseur de fonds pour al-Qaïda.

 

Wolfgang KAUFMANN.

(article paru dans “Junge Freiheit”, Berlin, n°35/2011; http://www.jungefreiheit.de ).

 

lundi, 08 août 2011

Il segreto dei padri fondatori

Il segreto dei padri fondatori

di Luca Leonello Rimbotti

Fonte: mirorenzaglia [scheda fonte]


 

hegger_fondo-magazine-306x450.jpgGli  Stati Uniti sono un groviglio che nasconde un intrigo. Il groviglio è la mentalità fanaticamente esclusivista che recarono con sé i Padri pellegrini che fondarono, all’inizio del Seicento, le prime comunità puritane del New England. Essi erano febbrilmente convinti di dover portare nel mondo la verità biblica, che fosse con le buone o con le cattive. L’intrigo è invece la congiura massonica di sovversione mondiale del potere, che ben presto si saldò al puritanesimo nel corso del Settecento, andando a costituire un’esplosiva miscela di intollerante invasività. Noi sappiamo che, da quei tempi lontani, un unico disegno fondamentalista muove all’azione gli eredi di quella duplice formula puritano-massonica: la conquista dichiarata del mondo, l’assoggettamento delle popolazioni del pianeta al potere degli “eletti” di Geova e del Grande Architetto, la costruzione del tempio universale di Salomone.

Cosa sia questo “tempio”, quanto di spirituale esso racchiuda, è ben detto dalla struttura del templarismo bancario cui appartengono, da sempre, le amministrazioni americane, a cominciare dalla potente loggia Skull and Bones, di cui erano membri i Bush. L’obiettivo del potere mondiale che queste sette si son date, sin dagli esordi, lo si raggiunge servendosi dell’infiammata parola di predicatori che agiscono in maniera martellante dai pulpiti mass-mediatici, quando basti. Quando non basti, ci si rivolge senza indugio alla soccorrevole intercessione della più brutale violenza, ad esempio elargendo ai popoli riottosi le note somministrazioni di napalm, il santo argomento che negli ultimi decenni numerose nazioni hanno potuto apprezzare in qualità di concreto sostegno al diritto, che una ristretta casta cosmopolita si riserva, di erigere una repubblica universale a sua misura.

Come ognuno sa, quando si parla degli Stati Uniti, non sono in ballo né la “democrazia” né la “libertà”, né tantomeno l’“uguaglianza”. Ciò che conta è l’imposizione di “diritti” concreti (accesso al denaro, al potere, alle risorse, al controllo sociale) veicolati sotto specie di “diritti” individuali di facciata, ma alla cui fruizione sono deputati soltanto i membri della setta mondialista. Nicholas Hagger, studioso inglese delle culture nazionali e storico affermato, ha recentemente scritto Il segreto dei padri fondatori. La nascita degli Stati Uniti fra puritani, massoni e la creazione del Nuovo Ordine Mondiale (Arethusa). Un libro che si inserisce in un filone, minoritario ma di valore, presente da svariati anni sul mercato delle idee ed inteso a strappare la maschera dalla faccia dello zio Sam, per presentarlo per quello che è: un impostore travestito da salvatore. Ricordiamo, solo a titolo d’esempio, libri come Il sistema per uccidere i popoli di Guillaume Faye o Un paese pericoloso di John Kleeves (entrambi pubblicati anni fa dalla Società Editrice Barbarossa), ma anche Gli eletti di Dio. Lo spirito religioso dell’America (Editori Riuniti) del giornalista Marco Nese. Proprio in quest’ultimo, ad esempio, si trova scritto in quale maniera la sindrome elettiva degli antichi e degli attuali puritani non abbia per nulla in vista una democrazia sociale, quanto piuttosto una “repubblica teocratica” su base oligarchica, strumento diretto di una ristretta minoranza di fondamentalisti, che si spacciano con virulenza come possessori di un mandato universale, intorno al quale veniamo assicurati che si tratta della diretta volontà del Geova biblico. Quella che normalmente la si direbbe una patologia da alienati è divenuta la giustificazione di un gigantesco potere che avanza pretese di universalità, e che ottiene incredibili riscontri di assuefazione e persino di condivisione, attraverso lo strumento della minaccia e dell’intimidazione, oppure dei beni materiali diffusi, col miraggio dei quali si registra l’ammorbidimento dell’opinione pubblica internazionale.

Che, per i Padri pellegrini, si trattasse di mentalità alienata di emarginati fanatizzati dal Libro, è cosa sulla quale gli studiosi paiono concordi. Un pugno di invasati, sfuggiti all’anglicanesimo nazionalista elisabettiano, è alle origini dell’insediamento sul territorio altrui nel Nuovo Mondo, attuato dopo una prima fase di oculato etnocidio locale. Un pugno, invece, di freddi e lucidi programmatori, i massoni sbarcati in America un secolo più tardi, è all’origine dell’organizzazione politica di quella volontà di dominazione mondiale, che i puritani, da soli e con la sola recita dei versetti biblici, mai sarebbero riusciti a trasformare in sonante realtà planetaria.

Hagger, a darci la misura di quanto profondi fossero e siano gli intrecci fra l’universalismo puritano e il cosmopolitismo massonico, scrive chiaro e tondo che «si può affermare che la filosofia puritana fosse in realtà rosacrociana». Fra il puritanesimo anglo-olandese, all’origine del millenarismo americano, e il ginepraio massonico e illuminista settecentesco (Illuminati di Baviera, Rosacroce, Giacobiti, Priorato di Sion, templarismi vari, neo-catarismi, etc.) correva un unico filo. Si trattava di erigere la Nuova Sion in terra vergine, dopo che il tentativo di sovvertire i poteri tradizionali in Europa (ad es. contro i Borbone o i Tudor) era per il momento fallito. Poiché: «L’ordine di Weishaupt fu finanziato dalla casa sionista dei Rothschild e da altri quattro ebrei» e il rabbino Adam Weishaupt – guida degli Illuminati – ebbe secondo Hagger una decisiva influenza sui puritani americani, entrò in contatto con lo stesso Benjamin Franklin e condizionò in chiave massonica l’afflato rivoluzionario dei coloni americani. Si preparò il terreno alla fase storica della rivoluzione. E di Franklin sappiamo, come scrive Hagger, che «dopo essere stato a lungo un sionista rosacroce, era stato inviato a Parigi nel dicembre 1776 come ambasciatore coloniale per chiedere aiuto militare e finanziario».

Legami stretti fra la massoneria illuminista e il puritanesimo. Legami ideologici, oltre che operativi. Il sogno massonico e quello biblista venivano fatti coincidere: il tempio di Salomone e la Nuova Sion potevano essere costruiti senz’altro nel Nuovo Mondo, ma ugualmente nel Vecchio si potevano organizzare le prime rivoluzioni, i primi sforzi per svellere lo Stato nazionale a forte tenuta e sostituirlo con lo Stato massonico a direttiva puritana. La coincidenza temporale fra la rivoluzione americana e quella francese parla da sola. Al culmine, il piano sovversivo mondiale: «Le direttive che Weishaupt ricevette furono quelle di unirsi con i templari, deporre i Borboni in Francia e dar forma alla Nuova Atlantide sionista baconiana nel Nuovo Mondo». Da allora anche i ciechi hanno potuto vedere che l’installazione del massonismo puritano negli USA e la sua alleanza con l’illuminismo francese hanno significato prima di tutto la lotta contro l’Europa, percepita come il primo, grande ostacolo al piano mondialista: guerra alla Spagna nel 1898, due guerre mondiali con utilizzo di massacro aereo scientifico e bomba atomica umanitaria, poi franca imposizione del modello cosmopolita ed etnopluralista, “patriottismo costituzionale”, sudditanza militare ed economica. Il tutto, sempre gestito in coppia dalla premiata agenzia internazionale America-Francia, con zelante succursale inglese: parliamo dell’Occidente atlantista, la rovina dell’Europa, la sua maledizione. Oggi, ad esempio nel caso della fasulla guerra anti-libica, con Obama e Sarkozy sembra di rivedere all’opera Franklin e Lafayette, e si ha la più plateale conferma che l’analisi di Hagger coglie nel segno.

Non si tratta, infatti, di vicende storiche che seguano vie casuali. Si tratta di un programma secolare di sovversione e di erezione di un potere unico mondiale, che liquidi le entità politiche solide e insedi il massonismo universale. Come ha scritto Carlo Marroni sul Sole-24 Ore, riferendosi proprio al libro di Hagger: «l’ascesa degli Stati Uniti non è stato un evento aleatorio ma un piano strategico progettato da un’élite massonica fin dagli albori della nuova Repubblica». Il “Grande Oriente d’America” guida la mano politica delle amministrazioni americane: e poco, anzi nulla importa che queste siano repubblicane o democratiche, nere o bianche o magari domani ispaniche o gialle. Ciò che importa è che l’unico obiettivo, quello fissato tra Seicento e Settecento, vada a compimento: repubblica mondiale gestita dall’oligarchia cosmopolita che, attraverso la gestione della finanza internazionale, si assicuri la “elezione divina” di governare il mondo.

L’unificazione di progetto puritano e progetto massonico in un unico piano poteva dirsi compiuta alla fine del secolo XVIII. Quei fanatici eversori vollero anche dare simboli eloquenti alla loro opera: la capitale Washington costruita con la planimetria templare della squadra e del compasso, ad esempio. Oppure la piramide e l’occhio del Grande Orologiaio, che ti fissa minaccioso dalla banconota da un dollaro. Tutto questo ha voluto significare una sfida essenzialmente anti-europea. Il Gran Maestro George Washington sapeva ciò che faceva. E con lui lo sapevano i suoi generali, i quali «praticamente tutti erano massoni templari», come attesta Hagger. Tirando le somme: era davvero tutta propaganda lo slogan dell’Asse sulla “congiura ebraico-massonico-plutocratica”? O non era invece, quella formula di lotta, uno sguardo profetico sull’abisso, la denuncia di un feroce piano di morte, il tentativo di salvare la nostra civiltà con la forza della disperazione? Ognuno, che non sia cieco e sordo, può rispondersi da solo.



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lundi, 25 juillet 2011

Storia della cultura fascista

Storia della cultura fascista

di Luca Leonello Rimbotti


Fonte: mirorenzaglia [scheda fonte]

image.jpgÈ appena uscito un libro eccellente sul Fascismo e la sua importanza come moderno movimento rivoluzionario: non esitiamo a considerarlo un vero e proprio manuale di base, in grado di rompere gli steccati del conformismo vetero-ideologico e di porsi come strumento di contro-cultura di qualità: su di esso può essere ricostruita pezzo a pezzo tutta la storiografia del nuovo Millennio sul Fascismo. E con esso si può finalmente buttarsi alle spalle la lunga e avvilente stagione in cui a dominare la scena erano gli intellettuali codardi e opportunisti, i gestori della menzogna storica, i grandi camaleonti allevati in gioventù dal Regime, da questo messi in pista e poi, alla prova dei fatti, rivoltatiglisi contro come un groviglio di serpi rancorose, subito asservite ai nuovi padroni del dopoguerra. L’eccezionale uscita editoriale si chiama Storia della cultura fascista (il Mulino) di Alessandra Tarquini, una giovane ricercatrice di scuola defeliciana che già conoscevamo come ottima storica di Gentile e del gentilianesimo. Di questo libro bisogna parlare alto e forte. Deve essere da tutti conosciuto, studiato, divulgato. Non foss’altro per quella compostezza ed equanimità che, a distanza di quasi settant’anni dalla fine del Fascismo, è il minimo che si possa richiedere ad uno studioso di oggi.

Fatti i conti con i vecchi rottami della faida ideologica, appartenenti a una stagione ingloriosamente trapassata, la Tarquini passa in rassegna tutte le componenti che hanno costituito l’anima del movimento e del Regime fascisti: l’uno e l’altro sono da lei giudicati essenzialmente come soggetti politici rivoluzionari portatori di modernità e di cultura innovatrice. Viene così rovesciato l’assunto propagandistico di quanti avevano per decenni irriso il Fascismo, dicendolo privo di una sua originale ideologia, di una sua peculiare cultura, di una sua spinta modernizzatrice. La studiosa – in questa che è propriamente una storia della storiografia sul Fascismo – precisa che, per la verità, negli ultimi decenni già si erano avuti i sintomi di un generale ripensamento degli storici in materia. I tempi dei Quazza, dei Bobbio, dei Santarelli, dei Tranfaglia e compagni, una volta crollato il comunismo sovietico e prontamente liquidata la sbornia marxista che aveva dettato legge soprattutto negli anni Settanta, ha lasciato campo a posizionamenti più seri. Le boutade sul Fascismo reazionario e sul Mussolini pagato dai padroni capitalisti, le pedestri generalizzazioni sugli incolti picchiatori, tutte cose che comunque rimangono a testimonianza di un’atmosfera italiana popolata da studiosi sovente di rara bassezza qualitativa, vengono sostituite con l’analisi che oggi «gli storici hanno capovolto i loro giudizi e sono passati dal negare l’esistenza della cultura fascista al ricostruire i suoi diversi e molteplici aspetti considerandoli non solo importanti, ma addirittura decisivi per capire il fascismo».

Quando, negli anni Sessanta, uscirono gli studi capitali di Mosse e De Felice, la canèa antifascista fece di tutto per spingerli ai margini. Poi, mano a mano, si aprivano spiragli, si notavano marce indietro. Poterono così aversi i libri, per dire, di Isnenghi, Turi, Zunino, che, pur non rinunciando alla polemica ideologica anche fuori posto, tuttavia dimostravano che la repubblica delle lettere si stava rendendo conto che il Fascismo era stato un fenomeno ben più complesso che non “l’orda degli Hyksos” immaginata da Croce e sulla cui traccia si era gettata la muta degli storici marxisti o di scuola azionista. Poi, soprattutto dall’estero, arrivarono in successione un Gregor, uno Sternhell, un Cannistraro, ma specialmente poi un Griffin, e su questa scia si è potuta avere in Italia la densa produzione soprattutto di Emilio Gentile, ma anche di tutta una serie di nuovi storici, che nell’insieme hanno prodotto con risultati notevoli indagini anche minute sul Fascismo come combinazione di mito e organizzazione, di totalitarismo e modernità.

Intendiamoci, il rigurgito passatista è sempre dietro l’angolo: e ogni tanto ancora escono libri che sembrano scritti, e male, quarant’anni fa, e pur sempre i vecchi Tasca o Salvatorelli continuano qua e là a far pessima scuola. Ma, in generale, le nebbie si stanno diradando e il Fascismo comincia a vedersi riconosciuti alcuni tratti fondamentali. Che, come la Tarquini ben precisa, furono essenzialmente la modernità, la centralità del popolo e la cultura. Il tutto, incardinato sul principio del primato della politica, dette vita ad una autentica rivoluzione. Anzi, come la storica puntualizza, si trattò proprio di una sorta di rivoluzione conservatrice, che se da un lato proteggeva quanto di buono vi era nel tessuto sociale tradizionale, dall’altro si presentava con un massimo di proiezione sul futuro. Ciò che la Tarquini, riferendosi ad esempio a Sternhell, ha sottolineato nel senso che il Fascismo fu un fenomeno politico «dotato di una propria ideologia rivoluzionaria non meno coerente del liberalismo e del marxismo, che aveva espresso la volontà di creare una nuova civiltà e un uomo nuovo». Fu infatti anche una rivoluzione antropologica, un tentativo di rifare l’uomo accentuandone le disposizioni alla socialità e al solidarismo, infrangendo così sia l’individualismo liberale che la massificazione collettivista marxista.

La Tarquini riassume gli ambienti che erano alla base della concezione politica fascista: i “revisionisti” (guidati da Bottai, con elementi di spicco come Pellizzi);  gli “intransigenti” (con Soffici, Maccari, Ricci come punte di lancia); e i “gentiliani” (Cantimori, Spirito, Carlini, Volpicelli, Saitta fra gli altri). Tra queste posizioni si muovevano uomini ai limiti dell’una o dell’altra cerchia e talvolta si avevano passaggi non contraddittori, trasversali, come ad es. un Malaparte o un Longanesi, vicini sia a “Strapaese” che a “900″ di Bontempelli.

Grazie a questi gruppi venne assicurata la centralità del popolo nella visione del mondo fascista, il popolo come “pura forza”, cioè «un soggetto depositario di valori positivi», per il quale, come scrive la Tarquini, gli scrittori politici «si impegnavano nella società del loro tempo sostenendo la costruzione di un nuovo Stato nazionale e popolare». Qualcosa che accendeva la modernità. Le veloci pagine della studiosa ricordano che il Fascismo fu cultura, e anzi alta cultura, sin dagli inizi del Regime vero e proprio, con il “Manifesto degli intellettuali fascisti” voluto da Gentile nel 1925 e che vedeva schierati alcuni pesi massimi della cultura italiana del Novecento, fra i quali Pirandello, Volpe, Codignola, Ungaretti, Soffici, che si andavano ad affiancare ai D’Annunzio, il “primo Duce del Fascismo”, ai Marinetti, ai Cardarelli, ai Papini, etc. E siamo in attesa di qualcuno che ci dica quale altro regime si sia mai avvalso di una così potente schiera di aperti sostenitori.

Ma la Tarquini è anche originale, laddove traccia percorsi nuovi: ricordando l’influenza che il filosofo Giuseppe Rensi (in anni recenti al centro di un processo di rivalutazione, dopo un lungo oblìo) ebbe sul Fascismo e sulla sua idea di autorità; oppure sulla figura di Emilio Bodrero, storico della filosofia e docente alla Scuola di Mistica Fascista, secondo il quale, sin dal 1921, il Fascismo doveva «mobilitarsi come forza rivoluzionaria, per conquistare il potere e dare vita a un nuovo ordine politico».

La Tarquini ricorda anche l’avanguardismo giovanile, fulcro incandescente di elaborazione ideologica e di spinta rivoluzionaria il cui programma, sin dagli esordi del 1920, esprimeva un massimo di moderna socialità, dato che proponeva di «adeguare i programmi scolastici alle esigenze professionali dei ragazzi» e di «abolire il voto in condotta, di sostenere gli studenti più poveri e di rendere obbligatorio l’insegnamento dell’educazione fisica». E poi c’erano le donne. E che donne…da Ada Negri (prima donna nominata all’Accademia d’Italia, nel 1940), alla Deledda (che partecipò alla stesura del testo unico per le scuole medie), fino alla Sarfatti, regina incontrastata del modernismo fascista in politica, in letteratura e nelle arti.

E, a proposito dell’arte e della sostanza del Fascismo come «politicizzazione dell’estetica» e volontà di «socializzazione degli intellettuali» (e in campo artistico basti ricordare la passione fascista di un Sironi, di un Severini, di un Primo Conti, di un Piacentini, di un Terragni, etc.), l’autrice rammenta la presenza massiccia di artisti e letterati di primo piano nello squadrismo (Rosai, Maccari, Malaparte-Suckert, ma potremmo aggiungere lo stesso Marinetti, oppure Lorenzo Viani, Gallian, etc.), così come non manca di scrivere che l’enorme fermento ideologico e culturale messo in moto e catalizzato dal Fascismo si presentò, come avevano già indicato i vari Nolte, Mosse e Del Noce, come «un fenomeno politico figlio della modernità», così da «esprimere una forte spinta alla modernizzazione dell’economia, della società e della cultura». Il senso della missione dei giovani, il progetto di un destino comune, l’esaltante prospettiva di un popolo unito e socialmente avanzato furono il cuore dello sforzo culturale messo in campo dal Fascismo, che poté usufruire di un vero e proprio esercito di intellettuali d’alto e non di rado altissimo livello: ad un impietoso confronto, l’odierna incolta e rozza liberaldemocrazia mondiale – priva di intellettuali che superino il quarto d’ora di celebrità mediatica – ne esce distrutta.



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mardi, 19 juillet 2011

Intellectuels faussaires: triomphe médiatique des experts en mensonge

faussaires.jpg

« Les Intellectuels faussaires : Le triomphe médiatique des experts en mensonge » de Pascal Boniface (entretiens)

 

Ex: http://www.polemia.com/

Directeur de l’Institut de relations internationales et stratégiques (Iris), engagé à gauche, Pascal Boniface décape des idoles médiatiques, qu’il appelle des « experts en mensonge ». Un réjouissant jeu de massacre.

On ne peut guère soupçonner Pascal Boniface d’avoir, lui aussi, retourné sa veste, comme tant de ces « intellectuels faussaires » qu’il décrypte avec alacrité dans son dernier ouvrage éponyme. Après sa thèse d’État en droit international public sur les sources du droit international du désarmement, il fait très tôt partie des jeunes conseillers en affaires stratégiques proches de Charles Hernu, le premier ministre de la Défense de François Mitterrand, après mai 1981. Expert pour les questions de défense auprès du groupe socialiste de l’Assemblée nationale, il travaille aussi sur ces sujets aux cabinets de Jean-Pierre Chevènement, ministre de la Défense, puis de Pierre Joxe, d’abord à l’Intérieur puis à nouveau à la Défense.

mensongesmédiatiques,manipulations mdiatiques,livre,pascal boniface,france,actualité,médias,presse,journauxBoniface est resté fidèle à cet engagement socialiste, tout en menant une brillante carrière d’universitaire (il est aujourd’hui enseignant à l’Institut d’études européennes de l’université Paris-VIII) et de consultant. Passé par l’université Paris-I, l’École spéciale militaire de Saint-Cyr Coëtquidan et l’Institut d’études politiques de Paris et de Lille, il crée en 1990 l’Institut de relations internationales et stratégiques (Iris), l’un des meilleurs think tanks français. Il en est le directeur. Auteur d’une quarantaine d’ouvrages, responsable de l’Année stratégique et du trimestriel la Revue internationale et stratégique, il est aussi, pour une autre passion, le secrétaire général de la Fondation du football.

On peut discuter son analyse du conflit israélo-palestinien : en 2003, son livre Est-il permis de critiquer Israël ? avait déjà suscité de vives controverses (lire dans Valeurs actuelles). Sa galerie des “experts en mensonge” est sans doute un peu polémique, parfois injuste. Sa liste – Bernard-Henri Lévy, Caroline Fourest, Alexandre Adler, François Heisbourg, Philippe Val et quelques autres – est sans doute incomplète. Mais les citations qu’il fait, les rappels de quelques énormités et de concepts creux assénés par tous ces intellectuels courtisés par tant de médias font mouche. Pascal Boniface s’est sans doute fait des ennemis pour longtemps. Il nous explique les raisons de cette charge, à gauche toute…

Frédéric Pons : Pourquoi avoir écrit ce livre maintenant sur les « intellectuels faussaires » ?

Pascal Boniface : Il est vrai qu’il aurait pu être écrit de puis longtemps. J’attendais que quelqu’un s’en charge. Cela n’est pas venu. J’étais de plus en plus agacé de voir ces mensonges et contre vérités défiler en boucle, ne pas être contredits. Voir ces faussaires triompher médiatiquement, alors que nombreux étaient ceux qui connaissaient leurs failles, devenait difficile à supporter ; je me suis donc attelé à la tâche. Les multiples réactions positives que je reçois montrent que, pour le public également, le moment était venu.

F.P. :Est-il exact que vous avez essuyé le refus de nombreux éditeurs ?

P.B. : Quatorze éditeurs ont rejeté le livre ; et encore, je ne l’avais envoyé ni à Grasset, ni à Denoël, ni à quelques autres dont je connaissais par avance la réponse, forcément négative. Cela montre bien le poids des connivences dans le milieu éditorial et, d’un certain côté, le non-respect du public auquel on dénie une variété de choix. Il y a là un vrai problème sur le plan démocratique.

F.P. Et dans les médias ?

P.B. : Si je ne peux pas parler d’un silence médiatique, il est vrai que je n’ai guère d’illusions sur les comptes-rendus de nombreux grands médias. Mais des journaux d’opinion à droite comme à gauche en font part et, surtout, le bouche à oreille fonctionne fort bien.

F.P. : N’êtes-vous pas vous-même, comme quelques journalistes de Valeurs actuelles, un habitué des plateaux de télévision ?

P.B. : Je suis en effet régulièrement invité dans des médias. Il y en a également où je suis interdit, uniquement sur la base de mes positions sur le conflit au Proche-Orient.

F.P. : Vous vous êtes aussi trompé…

P.B. : Mais je défie quiconque de me prendre en défaut de mensonges volontaires. Il a pu m’arriver de commettre des erreurs, comme tout un chacun, mais moins que certains que je cite en exemple. Cela me mortifie à chaque fois que je m’en rends compte. Mais je ne pourrais jamais émettre un argument auquel je ne crois pas, uniquement parce qu’il me permettrait de mieux convaincre le public.

F.P. : Homme de gauche, vous brisez des idoles qui sont pour la plupart issues de la gauche ou engagées à gauche. Ne tirez-vous pas contre votre propre camp, et peut-on être débatteur de droite sans être automatiquement un faussaire ?

P.B. : Je suis malheureusement parvenu à un âge où je n’ai plus d’illusions sur le fait que le monopole du coeur ou de la vertu serait à gauche. Je me sens toujours de gauche mais je connais des gens de droite d’une parfaite intégrité et animés par des convictions sincères et l’envie de servir l’intérêt général, et des gens qui se disent de gauche qui ne sont que des opportunistes sans foi ni loi et qui, au-delà des déclarations généreuses, ne pensent qu’à leur carrière personnelle.

F.P. : Qu’appelez-vous exactement « le bain amniotique de la pensée dominante » ?

P.B. : C’est le fait de croire que le monde occidental est supérieur aux autres civilisations, qu’il a le monopole de la vertu, qu’il serait en danger parce que justement il est plus vertueux, qu’Israël est la seule démocratie du Proche-Orient et que l'opposition à sa politique ne s’explique que par ce facteur, qu’il est l’avant-garde de la lutte contre le terrorisme islamiste, et que donc, au lieu de le critiquer pour sa politique à l’égard des Palestiniens, il faudrait plutôt le soutenir. Enfin, c’est aussi penser que l’islam en tant que tel est un danger. Et puis surtout, par rapport aux périls stratégiques, se concentrer sur la dénonciation des effets sans jamais réfléchir aux causes.

F.P. : Que reprochez-vous précisément à « l’entrée en force de la morale dans l’agenda international », phénomène que vous disséquez et qui permettrait à certains intellectuels de « nous faire avaler des couleuvres » ?

P.B. : Je serais ravi que la morale entre en force dans les relations internationales. Malheureusement, on l’évoque pour ne pas la mettre en pratique. Trop souvent son évocation conduit à un manichéisme qui divise le monde en deux : le bien d’un côté, le mal de l’autre. Par ailleurs, si on tranche les situations stratégiques au nom de la morale, on parvient vite à une situation où celui qui s’oppose à vous n’est pas un contradicteur mais un être immoral. Si votre opposant est contre la morale, pas la peine d’argumenter, il suffit d’excommunier. C’est une insulte à l’intelligence. Trop souvent, ceux qui se réclament d’une approche morale le font de façon sélective.

F.P. : Pourquoi dites-vous que BHL est de venu le « seigneur et maître des faussaires » ?

P.B. : Il a bâti autour de lui un réseau dont il est le centre. Membre du conseil de surveillance du Monde, président de celui d’Arte, actionnaire de Libération, proche d’Arnaud Lagardère et de François Pinault, il occupe une place médiatique absolument incroyable. Fort de cette position, il peut raconter n’importe quoi sans que jamais cela ne remette en question sa visibilité. Sur sa proximité avec le commandant Massoud, avec la famille de Daniel Pearl, il a multiplié les contrevérités. Par connivence ou par peur, on n’ose pas le contredire si on fait partie du milieu médiatique.

F.P. : Comment caractériseriez-vous le portrait type d’une « sérial-menteuse », telle que vous la décrivez sous les traits de Caroline Fourest ?

P.B. : Elle est la Marion Jones du débat public : apparence impeccable, bonnes performances, mais qui ne sont pas basées sur l’honnêteté. Simplement, la lutte antidopage est plus efficace dans le domaine du sport que la lutte antimensonges dans le domaine intellectuel. Sa caractéristique principale est d’attribuer à ses adversaires des propos qu’ils n’ont jamais tenus pour s’en offusquer.

F.P. : En êtes-vous sûr ?

P.B. : Encore récemment, pour répondre au portrait que je dresse d’elle, elle disait que j’avais toujours soutenu “des régimes peu recommandables” (ce qui est plutôt le cas de nombre de ses amis), que je combattais tous ceux qui défendaient la laïcité et le droit des femmes, et elle s’interrogeait par ailleurs de façon calomnieuse sur les financements de l’Iris (en clair, elle sous-entendait que j’étais financé par les pays arabes). Bien sûr elle ne répondait en rien sur le fond à ma démonstration, qu’elle confirmait plutôt par ses propos.

F.P. : Peut-on dire qu’Israël et l’islamisme sont devenus des facteurs clivants entre intellectuels, notamment à gauche, transformant certains en “faussaires” ?

P.B. : Je n’irai pas jusque-là. Il y a d’autres éléments, mais il est vrai que le soutien d’Israël et la stigmatisation de l’islam permettent une certaine impunité aux faussaires.

F.P. : Est-il possible, dans les médias, d’échapper aux «vents dominants » ou aux modes intellectuelles ?

P.B. : Malgré un battage médiatique digne des régimes autoritaires, Bernard-Henri Lévy n’aurait vendu que 3 500 exemplaires de son dernier livre. Cela prouve que le public est moins idiot que ne le pense une partie de ces élites faussaires. La connivence ne crée pas forcément le succès. En revanche, elle éloigne une grande partie de l’opinion de ces élites, ce qui est dangereux pour la démocratie.

Propos recueillis par Frédéric Pons
Valeurs actuelles 
30/06/2011

Pascal Boniface, Les Intellectuels faussaires : Le triomphe médiatique des experts en mensonge, Jean-Claude Gawsewich éditeur, mai 2011, 272 pages, 19,90 euros

Correspondance Polémia – 4/07/2011

dimanche, 15 mai 2011

G. Faye: Why we fight

Why We Fight

whywesmall_1_1.jpgGuillaume Faye
Why We Fight: Manifesto of the European Resistance
Translated by Michael O’Meara
Arktos Media, 2011

People

An ethnic ensemble — biological, historical, cultural — with a territory, its fatherland, in which it is rooted.

‘The people’ — the very term is suspect to the cosmopolitan Left, which sees it as bordering on the politically incorrect — is not any statistical ‘population’; it’s an organic community embracing a transcendent body made up of ancestors, the living, and their heirs. Though marked with a certain spirituality, a people is diachronically rooted in the past and projects itself into the future — it’s submerged in biological and genetic matter, but at the same time it’s a historical, and spiritual, reality.

It’s belonging to a specific people that distinguishes a man and makes him human. Though modern Western egalitarian doctrines reduce peoples to indifferent socioeconomic aggregates, peoples actually constitute the organic bases of the human race; similarly, such doctrines conceive of the ideal man as an individual ‘emancipated’ from his organic attachments — like an undifferentiated cell in a human magma.

It’s necessary to recall, especially for certain Christians, that a people’s attachment is incompatible with Christianity’s present cosmopolitanism. The claim, for example, that ‘I am closer to an African Catholic than I am to a non-Christian European’ is a universalistic claim that relegates a people’s nation to something of secondary significance. This is, indeed, the great drama of European Christianity, marked as it is by Pauline universalism. A Catholic attached to his people and conscious of the biological and cultural dangers threatening them might instead say, ‘I respect all the Christians of the world, but hic et nunc I fight for my people above all, whatever their religion’.

The Jesuit spirit might resolve the contradiction in reference to the Old Testament’s Hebraic tradition: ‘Babel — the mélange of disparate peoples — is a punishment from God, Who wants His peoples to be separate and diverse — humanity is one in Heaven, but multiple on Earth’.

Arab Islam has no difficulty reconciling the notion of people (the ‘Arab nation’) with that of its universalism. The Jews, on their side, have similarly reconciled a ferocious defence of their ethnicity — their singularity — with their religion, however theoretically monotheistic and universalist it may be. At no moment have Judaism and Islam, unlike the Christian Churches today, engaged in doubting, guiltstroking diatribes against ‘xenophobia’ and ethnocentrism. They are not masochistic . . .

* * *

Like every anthropological notion, ‘people’ lacks mathematical rigour. A people doesn’t define itself as a homogeneous biocultural totality, but as a relationship. It’s the product of an organic alchemy that brings various ‘sub-peoples’ together. The Bretons, Catalans, Scots, etc., can be seen thus as the sub-peoples of a larger people — the Europeans.

* * *

We ought to highlight the ambiguity that touches the notion of the people. The universalist ideology of the French Revolution confused the idea of the people with that of an ‘ensemble of inhabitants who jurisdictionally possess nationality’, whatever their origin. Given the facts of mass immigration and naturalisation, the notion of the French people has been greatly diluted (as have the British or German peoples, for the same reason). This is why (without broaching the unresolvable issue of what constitutes a ‘regional people’ or a ‘national people’), it’s advisable to dialectically transcend semantic problems — and affirm the historic legitimacy of a single, European people, historically bound, whose different national families resemble one another in having, for thousands of years, the same ethnocultural and historical origins. Despite national, linguistic, or tribal differences, haven’t African Blacks, even in Europe, been called on by Nelson Mandela or the Senegalese Mamadou Diop to ‘think like one people’? From Nasser to al-Qadhafi, by way of Arafat, haven’t Arabs been urged to see themselves as an Arab people? Why don’t Europeans have the same right to see themselves as a people?

As for ‘regional peoples’, it’s necessary to oppose Left-wing regionalists, self-professed anti-Jacobins and anti-globalists, who unhesitatingly accept the concept of French or American jus soli — who confuse citizens and residents, and who recognise as Bretons, Alsatians, Corsicans, etc., anyone (even of non-European origin) who lives in these regions and chooses to accept such an identity.

* * *

In belonging to a people, its members are emotionally inclined to define themselves as such, which implies political affiliation. For this reason, we say that a people exists at that point where biological, territorial, cultural, and political imperatives come together. But in no case does mere cultural or linguistic attachment suffice in making a people, if they have no common biological roots. Alien immigrants from people X who are installed on the territory of people Y — even if they adopt cultural elements of their host people — are not a part of Y. As De Gaulle thought, there might be minor exceptions for small numbers of compatible (White) minorities, capable of being assimilated, but this could never be the case for, say, French West Indians.

Similarly, in defining the notion of a people, territorial or geopolitical considerations must also be taken into account. A people is not a diaspora: the Jews felt obliged to reconquer Palestine as their ‘promised land’ because, as Theodor Herzl argued, ‘without a promised land, the Jews are just a religious diaspora, a culture, a union, but not a people’.

There’s a good deal of talk today, on the Left and the Right, about people being ‘deterritorialised’. In reality, there’s nothing of the kind. Every healthy people, even if they possess an important diaspora (Chinese, Arabs, Indians, etc.), maintains close relations with its fatherland.

* * *

Modernist gurus have long claimed that the future belongs not to peoples, but to humanity conceived as a single people. Again, there’ll be nothing of the kind. Despite globalisation and in reaction to it, the Twenty-first century will more than ever be a century of distinct peoples. Only Europeans, submerged in the illusions of their decadence, imagine that blood-based peoples will disappear, to be replaced by a miscegenated ‘world citizen’. In reality what is at risk of disappearing are Europeans. Tomorrow will be no twilight of peoples.

On the other hand, the twilight of several peoples is already possible. One often forgets that Amerindians or Egyptians have disappeared — hollowed out internally and overrun. For history is a cemetery of peoples — of weak peoples — exhausted and resigned.

* * *

A caution is necessary here: Right and Left-wing theoreticians of ‘ethnopluralism’, opposed to humanity’s homogenisation, speak of ‘the cause of peoples [3]’, as if every people must be conserved. In reality, the system that destroys peoples — the title of one of my books that was misunderstood by certain intellectuals — only threatens unfit peoples, i.e., present-day Europeans. It also threatens those residu peoples, whose fate is of interest only to museum-keepers. It seems perfectly stupid and utopian to believe that every people can be conserved in history’s formaldehyde. What a pacifistic egalitarian vision.

The main threat to the identity and existence of great peoples occurs, in contrast, through the conjunction of deculturation and the colonising invasion of alien peoples — which we’re presently experiencing. The Western globalist ‘system’ will never threaten strong peoples. Are Arabs, Chinese, or Indians threatened? On the contrary. It reinforces their identity and their desire to conquer, by provoking their reaction to it.

The people in danger — largely because of its own failings — is our people, for reasons as much biological as cultural and strategic. That’s why it’s necessary to replace the egalitarian ideology of ‘the cause of peoples’ with the ‘cause of our people’.

* * *

There are three possible positions: first, peoples don’t exist, or no longer exist — it’s an obsolete category — only humanity counts (the thesis of universalistic egalitarianism); second, all peoples ought to exist and be conserved (the utopian — also egalitarian — ethnopluralist position — completely inapplicable to our age); and third, only strong, wilful peoples can subsist for long historical periods — periods of selection in which only the most apt survive (the voluntarist, realist, inegalitarian thesis). We obviously support the third position.

What’s essential is reappropriating the term ‘people’ and progressively extending it to the entire Eurosiberian Continent. The present understanding of ‘European’ by the reigning ideology at Brussels is inspired by French Jacobin ideology. This ideology makes no reference to an ethno-historical Great European people, only to a mass of disparate residents inhabiting European territory. This tendency needs to be radically replaced.We propose that European peoples become historical subjects again and cease being historical objects. In the tragic century that’s coming, it’s especially crucial that Europeans become conscious of the common dangers they face and that, henceforth, they form a selfconscious community of destiny. This is well and truly a matter of forging a ‘new alliance’ that — through resurrection, metamorphosis, and historical transfiguration — will lead to a refounding of a Great European people and, in the midst of decline, succeed — not without pain, of course — in giving birth again to the phoenix.

Available from Arktos Media [4]


Article printed from Counter-Currents Publishing: http://www.counter-currents.com

vendredi, 06 mai 2011

The Coming Chinese Superstate

Richard HOSTE

Ex: http://www.counter-currents.com/

Review: Richard Lynn
Eugenics: A Reassessment
Westport, Conn.: Praeger Publishers 2001

eugenics.jpgOne of the only valid points made by the critics of Bell Curve was that if the science was accepted, then eugenics, which Hernstein and Murray refused to endorse, becomes the rational solution to society’s ills. Steven Pinker, the next major public thinker associated with the hereditarian position, likewise refused to follow his own logic far enough. One scholar who doesn’t flinch is psychologist Richard Lynn. Eugenics is not only right, but we have a duty to increase the frequency of genes for positive traits and reduce the frequency of genes for negative traits. Once you determine that something is a genetic problem it cries out for a genetic solution. Eugenics: A Reassessment looks at the history of eugenics, the ethical case for it and its future. Here Lynn goes beyond his role as a psychologist and gives us his own theory of the coming end of history.

The Rise and Fall of Eugenics

Eugenic ideas existed long before the publications of Darwin’s On the Origin of Species and The Descent of Man. In The Republic, Plato pictured a society where rulers, soldiers, and workers would be bred on the same principles of the breeding of plants and livestock, about which much must have been known in 380 B.C. Still, it was the discovery of evolution that was the catalyst of these ideas taking off in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Biologist, statistician, and psychologist Sir Francis Galton was the main prophet of eugenics. He spent his life forming organizations, writing, and spreading the word about humanity’s potential for improvement. He carried out the first studies that showed nature to be more important than nurture in determining intelligence and character.

By the early 1900s eugenics was endorsed by practically all biologists and geneticists, politicians such as Theodore Roosevelt, Herbert Hoover, Woodrow Wilson, and Winston Churchill, and thinkers across the political spectrum, including Bertrand Russell, H. L. Mencken, and George Bernard Shaw. Lynn makes the distinction between positive eugenics, encouragement given to society’s best to produce children, and negative eugenics, trying to set limits on the breeding of the inferior. It was the latter that was easier to legislate on.

The first American sterilization law was passed in Indiana in 1907 “to prevent the procreation of confirmed criminals, idiots, imbeciles, and rapists.” By 1913 similar acts had been passed in 12 states and a further 19 had laws on the books by 1931. The constitutionality of these laws was challenged in court and in 1927 Buck v. Bell went to the supreme court. The case centered around a mentally retarded woman who was born to a mentally retarded mother and gave birth to yet another retard. Her hospital applied to have her sterilized, and Christian groups protested. The court ruled 8-1 in favor of sterilization. Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes wrote the following in the famous decision.

We have seen more than once that the public welfare may call upon the best citizens for their lives. It would be strange if it could not call upon those who already sap the strength of the state for these lesser sacrifices . . . in order to prevent our being swamped with incompetence. It is better for all the world if, instead of waiting to execute the degenerate offspring of crime, or to let them starve for their imbecility, society can prevent those who are manifestly unfit for continuing their kind. The principle that sustains compulsory vaccinations is broad enough to cover cutting the Fallopian tubes. Three generations of imbeciles are enough.

Unfortunately, over the twentieth century only about 60,000 American sterilizations would take place, which amounted to less than 0.1 percent of mentally retarded and psychopathic people. Sweden did a little better, sterilizing the same amount, totaling one percent of the entire population. In Japan, 16,520 women met the same fate until their law was repealed in 1996. In Denmark, a third of all retards over a ten year span. Unsurprisingly, the all-time champions of sterilization were the Germans, who sterilized 300,000 people after their sterilization law was passed in 1933.

As Lynn points out, it’s not all that unusual for a scientific theory to be accepted and then rejected. What makes eugenics unique is that it’s a rejected theory that turned out to be true. While the importance of heredity in determining individual and group traits is well-established, by the end of the twentieth century to call something eugenic was to condemn it. The author blames horror at the crimes of Nazi Germany and the increasing value given to individual over social rights. In recent years courts in the US and Britain have said that parents can have retarded women in their care sterilized, ruling against civil liberties organizations who’ve joined with Christian groups in arguing that all people have a right to as many children as they can produce. While these legal decisions aren’t made on eugenic grounds, we should be thankful for the effect.

The arguments against eugenics don’t hold up. First is the claim that we can’t decide what positive and negative traits are. It’s hard to argue with Galton’s original three characteristics of intelligence, health, and character (close enough to conscientiousness in modern psychology) being desirable. Who would argue that disease could be preferable to health or stupidity to genius? It’s a case of moral relativism taken to the extreme.

Lynn looks at other characteristics we may select for but doesn’t find any beyond Galton’s original three. Society needs a wide range of people on the continuum of extraverted/introverted and neurotic/relaxed in a way that it doesn’t need a wide range of propensity to break the law or catch diseases. He also says that beauty provides no social good, and people have different definitions of it. Here is the only place I part ways with the author. Among environmentalists (people who care about the environment, not anti-hereditarians), beauty is seen as a legitimate reason to preserve certain forests and trees that provide no economic good. It’s why we save redwood trees but not swamps. As far as the lack of a universal standard, Peter Frost demolishes that as a PC myth. Even if everyone didn’t agree that blue eyes and white skin were the most beautiful, every race could select based on their own standards.

The idea that eugenics wouldn’t work is also answered here. If we determined that it wouldn’t be possible to select for certain traits in living organisms, then not only eugenics but horticulture, animal domestication and even evolution itself would all have to be rejected too. As a matter of fact, heritability of running speed among horses has been found to be between 15 and 35 percent heritable, lower than the lowest estimates for intelligence or psychopathy among humans. Any trait that is passed on genetically can be made more or less common or enhanced among a population.

Classical Eugenics

Lynn differentiates between classical eugenics and new eugenics, the use of biotechnology. A section is given to each.

The only country to practice classical positive eugenics in the modern world has been Singapore, under the leadership of Lee Kuan Yew. Higher earners were given tax breaks for children and a government unit was set up to bring college graduates together in social settings like dances and cruises to encourage relationships and procreation. In three short years, the results were impressive.

Births in Singapore

 

Education Level of Mother 1987   1990  
  Number Percent Number Percent
Below Secondary 26,719 61.3 26,718 52.3
Secondary and above 16,012 36.7 24,411 47.7

Between 1987 and 1990, births to college educated women went from 36.7 percent of all births to 47.7. Obviously, it’s not hopeless, and the problem of dysgenics can be corrected if a government sets its mind to it. In Nazi Germany, loans were given to couples determined to be of good genetic stock. For each child they produced, 25 percent of the loan would be written off. Whether such things can be done in a democracy, especially a multi-racial one, is a different question.

The biggest victory for negative eugenics has been the liberalization of abortion laws. Although justified as based on a “woman’s right to choose,” those who have unintended pregnancies are usually of low intelligence and those with anti-social tendencies. Thus, increasing the availability of abortion is eugenic. Those who are concerned about good breeding should support causes traditionally associated with the left like abortion on demand and making birth control freely available.

The Promise of Biotechnology

The most exciting part of this book is the section on the new eugenics, and how biotechnology may make all the questions raised here obsolete. Prenatal diagnosis can now screen for some of the most common genetic diseases, and the fetuses can be aborted. In the 1990s, this was estimated to reduce incidences of genetic disorders at birth by 5 percent. As the technology becomes better and more widely available we can expect the rate of genetic disease to drop. It’s a matter of time before embryos can be screened for other traits like beauty and intelligence.

Gene therapy is the attempt to help an individual by inserting genes for positive traits. These genes are then passed on to offspring. In the 1980s, this technology was used on mice to treat a heredity disease and by the 1990s was used to treat human disorders. Like prenatal screening, it’s only a matter of time before this technology can be used for the selection of whatever parents desire.

Embryo selection consists of taking a number of eggs from a woman, fertilizing them with the sperm of a partner in vitro, testing each for desirable traits and inserting the best embryo. The second, third, and fourth best can be saved for possible future use and the rest discarded. When Lynn’s book was written in 2001, it was possible to test for sex and thousands of genetic diseases.

In the twenty-first century it will become possible to test embryos for the presence of genes affecting numerous other characteristics, including late-onset diseases and disorders; intelligence; special cognitive abilities, such as mathematical, linguistic, and musical aptitudes; personality traits; athletic abilities; height; body build; and physical appearance. It will then be possible for couples to examine the genetic printouts of a number of embryos and select for implantation the ones they regard as having the most desirable genetic characteristics.

Before this happens some technical issues need to be addressed, such as identifying the desirable genes. That’s going to happen over the next few decades. Right now it’s possible to hormonally stimulate a woman to produce around 25 embryos at one time. With this technology, even parents of poor stock will be able to produce at least average children. Couples can be expected to produce embryos within a range of 30 IQ points; 15 over the parents‘ average to 15 below. With embryo selection the IQ of a population will have the potential to be raised 15 points in a single generation. Average intelligence can be expected to keep increasing until we hit our limit and new mutations pop up, the way average speed among thoroughbreds has been rising without the fastest times doing so in decades. In 2001, in vitro fertilization cost between $40,000 and $200,000 in the US and $3,000 to $4,000 in Britain, due to lower health care costs in general. Today, it’s a fraction of that. Like all technology, the quality can be expected to improve and the price to drop.

Western governments may outlaw all these technologies, but they will be legal somewhere, and as these options became cheaper and better known more couples will travel to take advantage of them. The situation will be similar to when abortion was only available in certain US states or European countries, and women desiring to have one would simply take a bus.

Not everybody will be able to afford biotechnology, and some ethicists reject it on those grounds. Of course, there are all kinds of things that rich people can afford that the poor can’t; we don’t outlaw them all. Lynn optimistically points out that no technology that can help humanity has ever been successfully suppressed. The inherent quality gap between the genetically engineered upper class and the ‘natural’ lower class will continue to grow until the former decides to sterilize the latter or forces them to use biotechnology themselves.

Why China is the Future

In 1994 China passed the Eugenic Law. All pregnant women were required to undergo embryo screening and abort fetuses with genetic disorders. This was a follow-up to the famous one-child policy introduced in 1979 that brought the birth rate down to 1.9 per woman.

Attitudes of elites and those who work in the relevant fields are likely to determine what technologies are accepted and how liberally they’ll be used. A survey was conducted between 1994 and 1996 asking geneticists and physicians around the world whether they agreed with the statement “An important goal of genetic counseling is to reduce the number of deleterious genes in the population.”

Country Percentage of Geneticists and Physicians Agreeing with Eugenic Goals
China 100
India 87
Turkey 73
Peru 71
Spain 67
Poland 66
Russia 58
Greece 58
Cuba 57
Mexico 52
Major 

 

Western

Democracies

<33

In addition to the negative attitudes of the elites towards anything eugenic, other reasons we can expect these ideas not to win fast acceptance in the West are the value placed on individual rights, democracy, and the existence of low IQ minorities who would be disproportionately affected by any measures aimed at improving the genetic quality of the population. While many countries in the third world might feel positively about eugenic measures, the attitudes in China are the most favorable and when that is combined with the advantages of an authoritarian government, a lack of dysgenic immigration, and a high IQ starting point it’s not hard to believe that the Chinese will continue to be the most enthusiastic and efficient users of biotechnology.

So how will this nation of a billion people treat the rest of the world after it’s raised its IQ to 150+? Lynn might be too optimistic here. He believes the Chinese will colonize the world and try to improve the IQs and living standards of their subjects. The Europeans will be kept around for their biological uniqueness and admired for their cultural accomplishments, the way that the Romans subjugated the Greeks but appreciated their philosophy and art. If the Chinese decide that the Europeans should be preserved they’d be doing more for them than whites are currently doing for themselves. A global eugenic superstate led by by the Chinese will be the “end of history.”

Lynn’s forecasts the next 100 years with a stone-cold detachment. The first government to utilize the power of biotechnology will take over the world. Thanks to third world immigration and egalitarianism, the decline of the West seems inevitable and eugenic policies unlikely. The future of humanity being in the hands of the dictators in Beijing may not be the most comforting idea in the world, but at least the reader of Eugenics may be convinced that intelligence and civilization will continue somewhere.

For a review of Richard Lynn’s Dysgenics see here.

jeudi, 05 mai 2011

The Fall of Man: Richard Lynn's "Dysgenics"

Richard HOSTE

Ex: http://www.counter-currents.com/

Review: Richard Lynn (photo)
Dysgenics: Genetic Deterioration in Modern Populations
Westport, Conn.: Praeger Publishers, 1996

rlynn-2s-300x282.jpgWhen it comes to population, quality matters more than quantity. While educated Westerners never tire of sprinkling their conversations with the word “overpopulation,” voicing concern about population worth is taboo. Put it this way: you have to spend the rest of your life in a city filled with Nigerians or Japanese. You can either pick the ethnic makeup or the amount of people in the city. Which would you choose? As it’s settled that genes influence character and intelligence, could these traits be declining in some or all populations? Has it to some extent? Anecdotes exist about single educated women and fertile welfare queens, but hard data is needed.

While support for eugenics has been around since the time of Plato, the first person to worry about genetic deterioration was French physician Benedict August Morel. He’s an obscure figure today and much better known is the more important Sir Francis Galton, who coined the term eugenics in 1883. He thought that more genes for lower intelligence and poor character were concentrated in the lower classes, whose higher fertility would lead to a decline in genetic quality. Galton spent his life working to reverse the trend. He eventually convinced Darwin himself of the danger. Biologist Alfred Russell Wallace wrote:

In one of my last conversations with Darwin he expressed himself very gloomily on the future of humanity, on the ground that in our modern civilisation natural selection had no play and the fittest did not survive.

It wasn’t until 1974 that Nobel prize winning physicist William Shockley called the process dysgenics. Darwin went on to despair over the excessive breeding of “the scum.” Data has always been needed on whether his fears had been justified. Richard Lynn brings together studies and data from the last 200 years dealing with the connection between fertility and intelligence/socioeconomic status from all over the world. How afraid should we be?

Selection throughout Time

The conditions that hunter-gatherers lived in insured an upkeep of genetic quality. Usually there was a chief who had to have a certain amount of intelligence to acquire and maintain his position. He had the most access to females, there would be relatively high ranking men who had one wife and many of the unfit never bred. Mutations that popped up which adversely affected health would be weeded out. Early nation-states continued with polygamy.

With Western man’s transition to civilization selection was weakened but not eliminated. The higher social classes enjoyed better nutrition so had better health and children more likely to survive into adulthood. Christianity struck a blow against the Western gene pool by enforcing celibacy among the priesthood but probably more than made up for it by prohibitions against adultery. Most who have children out of wed-lock then and now have/had lower intelligence and less self-control. Overall, the years 1500-1800 were good for Europe’s gene pool. In England from 1620-1624 the middle classes reported 4.4 children per woman compared to 2.1 for the working class. Part of the reason why is life expectancy. In Berlin from 1710-1799 the average life expectancy for the upper class was 29.8 years compared to 20.3 for the lower class. The numbers for Geneva, Rouen and Neuruppin in the 18th century are similarly tilted towards the former. This didn’t mean that everybody died when they were 20-30 years old but that more of the lower classes were dying in childhood before they could mate.

Lynn understands that for these numbers to mean anything it would have to be shown that there was social mobility. If everybody was stuck in their own class with no opportunity to rise or fall then we would expect different social classes to be similar and not worry about differences in fertility. Pitrim Sorokin looked at a wide range of societies and found that there has never been one with no social mobility at all. The closest thing has been the caste system in India, but even these classes weren’t absolutely closed. Economist historian S.J. Payling concluded that there was significant social mobility in Europe from at least the 14th century on.

Natural Selection Breaks Down: Health and Intelligence

Mutations occasionally pop up in any population. Since the vast majority are adverse, stable fertility for an entire population still means deterioration. The maintenance of the quality of the population requires not just a stable population at all levels but the active weeding out of the unfit. The results of the slacking of selection in our modern world is apparent in disease. Today, almost 1% of children born have a mutation for a common genetic disorder. Due to carriers of bad genes surviving and new mutations, it’s estimated that the rates of hemophilia, cystic fibrosis and phenylketonuria are increasing every generation by 26%, 120%, and 300% respectively. Humanity requires that we save children that can be saved but breeding for those with diseased genes needs to be restricted. Lynn hints that better genetic screening and selective abortion can offset some of the consequences of modern medicine.

American psychologist Theodore Lentz was the first to devise a method for finding the relationship between intelligence and fertility. He tested the IQs of children and found out how many siblings they had. Assuming that children have the same IQ as their parents, if those with lower IQs had more brothers and sisters than children with high IQs then it could be determined that dysgenics is happening. In 1927 Lentz calculated an IQ drop of 4 points per generation. Calculations in Britain found a drop of about 2 points per generation. These surveys didn’t include the childless but since they are disproportionately those with higher IQs the studies actually underestimate the extent of dysgenic fertility. Reviewing various studies and using findings from twin and adoption cases showing that IQ is 82% heritable, Lynn calculates a genotypic IQ decline of 5 points in Britain from 1890-1980. In the US he calculates a drop of 2.5 IQ points for whites and 6.2 for blacks over three generations. Interestingly, women are shown to universally have more dysgenic fertility than men. This is partly because low IQ men probably have a harder time finding mates than low IQ women.

The Fall of Greece

Greece is a particularly interesting example. Papavassiliou (1954) looked at IQ, socioeconomic status and fertitlity for men and came up with the following results.

Intelligence and Fertility in Greece, 1950s

Socioeconomic StatusNumber SurveyedMean IQNumber of Children
Professionals 41 117.2 1.78
Skilled Workers 80 100.9 2.66
Semi-skilled Workers 27 91 4
Unskilled Workers 67 82.2 5.56

My calculations give an IQ of 96.9 for the parent generation and an IQ drop of 4.9. Using a heritability of .82 for IQ puts the IQ of the children’s generation at 92.9 (IQ of parent generation – .82 x 4.9). Lynn has found elsewhere that the IQ of Greece is 95. This low (for Europe) figure is surprising considering the country’s historical accomplishments. Papavassiliou’s data may solve the puzzle.

Does the Flynn Effect Disprove Eugenics?

While science has shown that traits for IQ and socioeconomic status are heritable and those with poor genes are outbreeding those with good genes, actual performance on IQ tests in the industrialized world has risen over the last century. How can this be? This seeming paradox is called the Flynn effect, after the scientist who estimated IQ gains of about 3-4 points per decade over the 20th century.

We can rule out the effect of increased familiarity with written tests or better education because these gains are present in children as young as two years old. It is doubtful that it is due to increased stimulation because adoption studies show that the effect of shared environment is negligible; two biologically unrelated people raised in the same house are no more alike than any two random strangers. Lynn’s explanation is that the Flynn effect is due to better nutrition. This seems like the best explanation, as over the same time period height and brain size have increased by one standard deviation: the same as the increase in IQ.

So while genotypic intelligence, which can be seen as underlying genetic quality, has decreased, actual performance, phenotypic intelligence, has seen an increase. This increase can’t last forever and the evidence shows that in the developed world, with even the poorest suffering from obesity, the Flynn effect has hit its ceiling. We can now expect a decrease in observed intelligence in the developed even discounting low IQ third world immigration.

The Case of Character

Francis Galton and the early eugenicists weren’t only concerned with the decline in intelligence and health but what they called character: a moral sense, ability to delay gratification and work towards long term goals and sense of duty. Modern psychologists call this conscientiousness and Lynn gives a working estimate for it being 66% heritable. The news here is even worse than the data on intelligence.

Looking at criminals and psychopaths and their number of siblings yields a decline in consciousness that is twice the rate of the decline in intelligence. This has had real life consequences

The straightforward prediction is that the high fertility of criminals has led to an increase in the number of genes in the population responsible for crime and this will show up in increasing crime rates. These increasing crime rates have certainly occurred in most of the economically developed nations during the second half of the twentieth century. In the United States, crime rates approximately tripled between 1960 and 1990; in Britain they quadrupled, and similar increases have occurred in many other countries.

Rates of out-of-wedlock births tell a similar story. Western populations are morally worse than ever and we can expect the modern welfare state to continue to accelerate the decline. Unfortunately, most social scientists and policy makers are too steeped in the environmentalist dogma to deal with these problems.

Does the Universality of the Problem Mean It’s Hopeless?

While there are no direct studies for IQ and fertility in the third world we can check to see how socioeconomic status and education, both correlated with IQ, relate to number of children. Lynn calls the birth rate of the lowest class over the birth rate of the highest class the dysgenic ratio. For example, if those in the lowest class have 3 children per woman and the higher class have 2, the dysgenic ratio is 3/2 = 1.5. Anything over 1 indicates dysgenic fertility and anything under 1 indicates eugenic fertility. While a number over 2 is high for modern Western nations, ratios have been calculated at 3.1 for Columbia, 2.6 for Guatemala, 2.7 for Mexico and 3.1 for Brazil. Muslim and African countries have lower ratios, but only because even the highest classes have large numbers of children. In a worldwide survey the only exceptions are Bangladesh, Fiji and Indonesia who have ratios of 1.01, 0.93, and 0.86 respectively. The developing world can be expected to remain “developing” indefinitely.

So dysgenic fertility is found everywhere: among rich and poor and every race. Does that mean it’s hopeless? We won’t know until we at least acknowledge and try to deal with the problem. Communism once controlled half the planet and today its equivalent is globalization and the supposed triumph of liberal democracy. While communists can say that true communism “has never been tried” and continue to be liberals, the legacy of Nazism poisons the eugenics movement. Of course, blaming the ideas behind eugenics for the crimes of the Nazis is as silly as blaming the ideology of the welfare state for Soviet labor camps. So there is no rational reason why eugenics can’t capture the hearts and minds of policy makers the way it did 100 years ago. While the facts of differential fertility may discomfort our feminized elites we must never stop repeating that the cost of doing nothing is the end of civilization. There’s no virtue in ignoring that.

Source: HBD Books

vendredi, 25 février 2011

Democracy Needs Aristocracy

Democracy Needs Aristocracy, by Sir Peregrine Worsthorne

Democracy Needs Aristocracy
by Sir Peregrine Worsthorne
221 pages, Harper Collins, $15.

In the early pages of Democracy Needs Aristocracy the author mentions Alexis de Toqueville and his groundbreaking Democracy in America and not surprisingly, the newer work continues in the footsteps of that classic with a broad-reaching thesis on the nature of government that sides with the organic over the mechanistic.

Experienced writer Peregrine Worsthorne mixes his far-reaching thesis with personal narrative and precise examples in the form of contradictions that eliminate exceptions to his arguments. He writes in a hybrid style somewhere between relaxed academia and vivid popular non-fiction but with the logical thoroughness of a legal brief. Like the topic of the book itself, his style spans a vast breadth of knowledge and distills it into a single voice, like condensation turning mist to rain.

As a consequence, Democracy Needs Aristocracy is both one of those books that zooms by at light speed as massive ideas thrust the reader across time and space, and is also like a textbook an exacting read that requires the full attention of the reader. Each chapter drops important pieces into our understanding of history and how we arrived at the present time, not all of them controversial assertions so much as forgotten and decontextualized ones.

The style is not circular so much as it returns to core concepts after breaking them apart, bringing the forgotten but necessary counterpart to deconstruction, re-integration, to the reading process. As a result reading this book is like peeling an onion, with each layer revealing more of the big picture. It offers what few books can manage anymore: a vertiginous sense of discovery and concepts dropping into place that can explain the subtle mysteries of our present political climate.

Worsthorne’s thesis suggests that aristocracy, or an organic social order of the most qualified who enforce a balance that linear-thinking government cannot, not only arises naturally but if well-selected, provides an elite who are dedicated to public service more than themselves. It succeeds because it is decidedly non-mechanistic: he delights in the social aspects of an elite dedicated to stewardship, and illustrates how civility as a guiding principle ensures politics do not become abandoned to abstractions unrelated to life itself.

Finally, he contrasts society under rule by aristocracy, whose members are secure in their position and steeped in its tradition, with the “meritocratic” rise of the “classless society,” and points out in detail how the classless society fails to achieve its objectives and may achieve instead the inverse. As both an aristocrat and a journalist, Worsthorne describes the view from both sides of the bench on this issue.

A good part of the book addresses the necessary conditions of his thesis, including the most difficult to define parts such as “civility” and the notion of an organic, non-governmental caste who nonetheless provide the backbone to all governmental activities. For moderns, understanding caste is like trying to understand the use of a pressure cooker inside a black hole; Worsthorne elaborates slowly, but works up to his point:

“Aristocracy, however, is different because the bonds forged at birth and maintained at every subsequent stage in life, create a degree of loyalty between members as strong as, if not stronger than, those that bind together the members of a nation. The Old Etonian George Orwell tried to escape them but never wholly succeeded, concluding sadly, at the end of his life, that it was easier to change your party than change your class. Speaking personally, I cannot imagine life without class, which is not a passive condition but one that provides you with a general culture, a network to which you naturally belong, a stream of history in which you feel free and safe — almost a collective individuality.” (86)

In his retelling of history, the UK survived the time of the French Revolution because unlike the French, the English did not centralize their power into a single agency, but made government less efficient and instead cultivated a class of experts, united by a code of civility or “gentlemanly” conduct, such that they could conduct the appropriate circumventions of authority in smoke-stained lounges over glasses of cognac.

In this Worsthorne’s view is a hybridization of elitism and anarchy, in which the purpose of aristocracy is to avoid a powerful central government and its Boolean rules, and instead to cultivate a pool of talent that can organically and covertly address problems that are beyond the understanding of the electorate. His appeal to civility, the mode of aristocracy, is a call for a moral renovation to the modern state.

“For as a result of this method of selection, Britain’s political class had inherited enough in-built authority — honed over three centuries — and enough ancestral wisdom — acquired over the same period — to dare to defy both the arrogance of intellectuals from above and the emotions of the masses from below; to dare to resist the entrepreneurial imperative; to dare to try to raise the level of public conversation; to dare to put the public interest before private interests; to dare to try to shape the nation’s will and curb its appetites.” (50)

Bureaucracies, which he describes as the “natural enemies” of aristocrats, rely on rigid rules of a binary nature. When triggered, they must follow through blindly, causing periodic outrages so ludicrous they remind us of the rote actions of a machine out of control. In contrast, Worsthorne advocates the reliance on a class of people he describes as devoted to public duty, and their ability to intervene in place of blind rules.

As he reminds us, good leadership is unpopular because it does not pander to the arrogant intellectuals or emotional masses. In fact, it avoids special interests so that the nation as a whole can thrive. He describes it with a metaphor from his boarding school:

“I wanted the best of both worlds: authority figures who at one and the same time both protected me and left me alone; who came to my aid in emergencies but otherwise allowed me to mind my own business. Officious busybody prefects who kept an eye on one all the time were more a liability than an asset. But unofficious prefects who noticed what was going on from a corner of the eye were the opposite. Even more to be desired were the few older boys who turned down the office of prefect but were natural authority figures on the side of justice and order requiring, by virtue of strong individual character, no official badge of office.” (22)

This winding book, arcane like an ancient castle yet refreshing like finally finding the answer to your research in a footnote in the last book even tangential to your “official” topic, provides many such challenging ideas. Underlying every part of it is a distrust in the idea of a government that unites its public and private faces and thus is manipulable by special interests; Worsthorne argues for an older yet, if you look at it critically, more mature form of government, where rule by quality of people predominates under rule by book of rules.

Democracy Needs Aristocracy is a challenging and engrossing read, and even for those hostile to aristocracy, provides a thorough exploration of where our current systems of government fail. His thesis is flexible, and deliberately written from a liberal-friendly position, to show that democracy becomes anti-elitist mob rule without some mediating elite to keep anti-egalitarianism from becoming crowd revenge. As such, it is every bit as eternal as de Toqueville, and presents a vision of government that none can afford to fully ignore today.

You can find this book at Amazon for $15 or from Harper Collins UK for £9.