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samedi, 30 mars 2013

Stalin’s Fight Against International Communism

Stalin’s Fight Against International Communism

By Kerry Bolton stalin-the-enduring-legacy

Ex: http://www.counter-currents.com/

Editor’s Note:

This is the first chapter of Kerry Bolton’s new book Stalin: The Enduring Legacy [2] (London: Black House Publishing, 2012). The chapter is being reprinted as formatted in the book. Counter-Currents will also run a review of the book, which I highly recommend. 

The notion that Stalin ‘fought communism’ at a glance seems bizarre. However, the contention is neither unique nor new. Early last century the seminal German conservative philosopher-historian Oswald Spengler stated that Communism in Russia would metamorphose into something distinctly Russian which would be quite different from the alien Marxist dogma that had been imposed upon it from outside. Spengler saw Russia as both a danger to Western Civilisation as the leader of a ‘coloured world-revolution’, and conversely as a potential ally of a revived Germany against the plutocracies. Spengler stated of Russia’s potential rejection of Marxism as an alien imposition from the decaying West that,

Race, language, popular customs, religion, in their present form… all or any of them can and will be fundamentally transformed. What we see today then is simply the new kind of life which a vast land has conceived and will presently bring forth. It is not definable in words, nor is its bearer aware of it. Those who attempt to define, establish, lay down a program, are confusing life with a phrase, as does the ruling Bolshevism, which is not sufficiently conscious of its own West-European, Rationalistic and cosmopolitan origin.[1]

Even as he wrote, Bolshevism in the USSR was being fundamentally transformed in the ways Spengler foresaw. The ‘rationalistic’ and ‘cosmopolitan’ origins of Bolshevism were soon being openly repudiated, and a new course was defined by Zhdanov and other Soviet eminences.

Contemporary with Spengler in Weimer Germany, there arose among the ‘Right’ the ‘National Bolshevik’ faction one of whose primary demands was that Germany align with the Soviet Union against the Western plutocracies. From the Soviet side, possibilities of an alliance with the ‘Right’ were far from discounted and high level Soviet sources cultivated contacts with the pro-Russian factions of the German Right including the National Bolsheviks.[2]

German-Soviet friendship societies included many conservatives. In Arbeitsgemeinschaft zum Studium der Sowjetrussichen Planwirtschaft (Arplan)[3] Conservative-Revolutionaries and National Bolsheviks comprised a third of the membership. Bund Geistige Berufe (BGB)[4] was founded in 1931 and was of particular interest to Soviet Russia, according to Soviet documents, which aimed ‘to attract into the orbit of our influence a range of highly placed intellectuals of rightist orientation’.[5]

The profound changes caused Konstantin Rodzaevsky, leader of the Russian Fascist Union among the White Russian émigrés at Harbin, to soberly reassess the USSR and in 1945 he wrote to Stalin:

Not all at once, but step by step we came to this conclusion. We decided that: Stalinism is exactly what we mistakenly called ‘Russian Fascism’. It is our Russian Fascism cleansed of extremes, illusions, and errors.[6]

In the aftermath of World War II many German war veterans, despite the devastating conflagration between Germany and the USSR, and the rampage of the Red Army across Germany with Allied contrivance, were vociferous opponents of any German alliance with the USA against the USSR. Major General Otto E Remer and the Socialist Reich Party were in the forefront of advocating a ‘neutralist’ line for Germany during the ‘Cold War’, while one of their political advisers, the American Spenglerian philosopher Francis Parker Yockey, saw Russian occupation as less culturally debilitating than the ‘spiritual syphilis’ of Hollywood and New York, and recommended the collaboration of European rightists and neo-Fascists with the USSR against the USA.[7] Others of the American Right, such as the Yockeyan and Spenglerian influenced newspaper Common Sense, saw the USSR from the time of Stalin as the primary power in confronting Marxism, and they regarded New York as the real ‘capitol’ of Marxism.[8]

What might be regarded by many as an ‘eccentric’ element from the Right were not alone in seeing that the USSR had undergone a revolutionary transformation. Many of the Left regarded Stalin’s Russia as a travesty of Marxism. The most well-known and vehement was of course Leon Trotsky who condemned Stalin for having ‘betrayed the revolution’ and for reversing doctrinaire Marxism. On the other hand, the USA for decades supported Marxists, and especially Trotskyites, in trying to subvert the USSR during the Cold War. The USA, as the columnists at Common Sense continually insisted, was promoting Marxism, while Stalin was fighting it. This dichotomy between Russian National Bolshevism and US sponsored international Marxism was to having lasting consequences for the post-war world up to the present.

Stalin Purges Marxism

The Moscow Trials purging Trotskyites and other veteran Bolsheviks were merely the most obvious manifestations of Stalin’s struggle against alien Marxism. While much has been written condemning the trials as a modern day version of the Salem witch trials, and while the Soviet methods were often less than judicious the basic allegations against the Trotskyites et al were justified. The trials moreover, were open to the public, including western press, diplomats and jurists. There can be no serious doubt that Trotskyites in alliance with other old Bolsheviks such as Zinoviev and Kameneff were complicit in attempting to overthrow the Soviet state under Stalin. That was after all, the raison d’etre of Trotsky et al, and Trotsky’s hubris could not conceal his aims.[9]

The purging of these anti-Stalinist co-conspirators was only a part of the Stalinist fight against the Old Bolsheviks. Stalin’s relations with Lenin had not been cordial, Lenin accusing him of acting like a ‘Great Russian chauvinist’.[10] Indeed, the ‘Great Russians’ were heralded as the well-spring of Stalin’s Russia, and were elevated to master-race like status during and after the ‘Great Patriotic War’ against Germany. Lenin, near death, regarded Stalin’s demeanour as ‘offensive’, and as not showing automatic obedience. Lenin wished for Stalin to be removed as Bolshevik Party General Secretary.[11]

Dissolving the Comintern

The most symbolic acts of Stalin against International Communism were the elimination of the Association of Old Bolsheviks, and the destruction of the Communist International (Comintern). The Comintern, or Third International, was to be the basis of the world revolution, having been founded in 1919 in Moscow with 52 delegates from 25 countries.[12] Zinoviev headed the Comintern’s Executive Committee.[13] He was replaced by Bukharin in 1926.[14] Both Zinonviev and Bukharin were among the many ‘Old Bolsheviks’ eliminated by Stalin.

Stalin regarded the Comintern with animosity. It seemed to function more as an enemy agency than as a tool of Stalin, or at least that is how Stalin perceived the organisation. Robert Service states that Dimitrov, the head of the Comintern at the time of its dissolution, was accustomed to Stalin’s accusations against it. In 1937 Stalin had barked at him that ‘all of you in Comintern are hand in glove with the enemy’.[15] Dimitrov must have wondered how long he had to live.[16]

Instead of the Communist parties serving as agents of the world revolution, in typically Marxist manner, and the purpose for founding the Comintern, the Communist parties outside Russia were expected to be nationally oriented. In 1941 Stalin stated of this:

The International was created in Marx’s time in the expectation of an approaching international revolution. Comintern was created in Lenin’s time at an analogous moment. Today, national tasks emerge for each country as a supreme priority. Do not hold on tight to what was yesterday.[17]

This was a flagrant repudiation of Marxist orthodoxy, and places Stalinism within the context of National Bolshevism.

The German offensive postponed Stalin’s plans for the elimination of the Comintern, and those operatives who had survived the ‘Great Purge’ were ordered to Ufa, South of the Urals. Dimitrov was sent to Kuibyshev on the Volga. After the Battle of Stalingrad, Stalin returned to the issue of the Comintern, and told Dimitrov on 8 May 1943 to wind up the organisation. Dimitrov was transferred to the International Department of the Bolshevik Party Central Committee.[18] Robert Service suggests that this could have allayed fears among the Allies that Stalin would pursue world revolution in the post-war world. However, Stalin’s suspicion of the Comintern and the liquidation of many of its important operatives indicate fundamental belligerence between the two. In place of proletarian international solidarity, Stalin established an All-Slavic Committee[19] to promote Slavic folkish solidarity, although the inclusion of the Magyars[20] was problematic.

Stalin throughout his reign undertook a vigorous elimination of World Communist leaders. Stalin decimated communist refugees from fascism living in the USSR. While only 5 members of the Politburo of the German Communist Party had been killed under Hitler, in the USSR 7 were liquidated, and 41 out of 68 party leaders. The entire Central Committee of the Polish Communist Party in exile were liquidated, and an estimated 5000 party members were killed. The Polish Communist Party was formally dissolved in 1938. 700 Comintern headquarters staff were purged.[21]

Among the foreign Communist luminaries who were liquidated was Bela Kun, whose psychotic Communist regime in Hungary in 1919 lasted 133 days. Kun fled to the Soviet Union where he oversaw the killing of 50,000 soldiers and civilians attached to the White Army under Wrangle, who had surrendered after being promised amnesty. Kun was a member of the Executive Committee of the Comintern. A favourite of Lenin’s, this bloody lunatic served as a Comintern agent in Germany, Austria and Czechoslovakia during the 1920s. In 1938 he was brought before a tribunal and after a brief trial was executed the same day.[22]

Another action of great symbolism was Stalin’s moves against the ‘Old Bolsheviks’, the veterans of the 1917 Revolution. Leon Sedov, Leon Trotsky’s son, in his pamphlet on the Great Purge of the late 1930s, waxed indignant that Stalin ‘coldly orders the shooting of Bolsheviks, former leaders of the Party and the Comintern, and heroes of the Civil War’.[23] ‘The Association of Old Bolsheviks and that of the former political prisoners has been dissolved. They were too strong a reminder of the “cursed” revolutionary past’.[24]

In place of the Comintern the Cominform was established in 1947, for the purpose of instructing Communist parties to campaign against the Marshall Aid programme that was designed to bring war-ravished Europe under US hegemony. ‘European communism was to be redirected’ towards maintaining the gains of the Red Army during World War II. ‘Communist parties in Western Europe could stir up trouble’, against the USA. The Cominform was far removed from being a resurrection of the old Comintern. As to who was invited to the inaugural meeting held at a secluded village in Poland, ‘Stalin… refused a request from Mao Zedong, who obviously thought that the plan was to re-establish the Communist International’. The Spanish and Portuguese parties were not invited, nor were the British, or the Greek Communist Party, which was fighting a civil war against the royalists.[25]

The extent of the ‘fraternity’ between the USSR and the foreign Communists can be gauged from the delegates having not been given prior knowledge of the agenda, and being ‘treated like detainees on arrival’. While Soviet delegates Malenkov and Zhdanov kept in regular communication with Stalin, none of the other delegates were permitted communication with the outside world.[26]

Repudiation of Marxist Doctrine

The implementation of Marxism as a policy upon which to construct a State was of course worthless, and Stalin reversed the doctrinaire Marxism that he had inherited from the Lenin regime. Leon Sedov indignantly stated of this:

In the most diverse areas, the heritage of the October revolution is being liquidated. Revolutionary internationalism gives way to the cult of the fatherland in the strictest sense. And the fatherland means, above all, the authorities. Ranks, decorations and titles have been reintroduced. The officer caste headed by the marshals has been reestablished. The old communist workers are pushed into the background; the working class is divided into different layers; the bureaucracy bases itself on the ‘non-party Bolshevik’, the Stakhanovist, that is, the workers’ aristocracy, on the foreman and, above all, on the specialist and the administrator. The old petit-bourgeois family is being reestablished and idealized in the most middle-class way; despite the general protestations, abortions are prohibited, which, given the difficult material conditions and the primitive state of culture and hygiene, means the enslavement of women, that is, the return to pre-October times. The decree of the October revolution concerning new schools has been annulled. School has been reformed on the model of tsarist Russia: uniforms have been reintroduced for the students, not only to shackle their independence, but also to facilitate their surveillance outside of school. Students are evaluated according to their marks for behaviour, and these favour the docile, servile student, not the lively and independent schoolboy. The fundamental virtue of youth today is the ‘respect for one’s elders’, along with the ‘respect for the uniform’. A whole institute of inspectors has been created to look after the behaviour and morality of the youth.[27]

This is what Leon Sedov, and his father, Leon Trotsky, called the ‘Bonapartist character of Stalinism’.[28] And that is precisely what Stalin represents in history: the Napoleon of the Bolshevik Revolution who reversed the Marxian doctrinal excrescences in a manner analogous to that of Napoleon’s reversal of Jacobin fanaticism after the 1789 French Revolution. Underneath the hypocritical moral outrage about Stalinist ‘repression’, etc.,[29] a number of salient factors emerge regarding Stalin’s repudiation of Marxist-Leninist dogma:

  • The ‘fatherland’ or what was called again especially during World War II, ‘Holy Mother Russia’, replaced international class war and world revolution.
  • Hierarchy in the military and elsewhere was re-established openly rather than under a hypocritical façade of soviet democracy and equality.
  • A new technocratic elite was established, analogous to the principles of German ‘National Bolshevism’.
  • The traditional family, the destruction of which is one of the primary aims of Marxism generally[30] and Trotskyism specifically,[31] was re-established.
  • Abortion, the liberalisation of which was heralded as a great achievement in woman’s emancipation in the early days of Bolshevik Russia, was reversed.
  • A Czarist type discipline was reintroduced to the schools; Leon Sedov condemned this as shackling the free spirit of youth, as if there were any such freedom under the Leninist regime.
  • ‘Respect for elders’ was re-established, again anathema to the Marxists who seek the destruction of family life through the alienation of children from parents.[32]

What the Trotskyites and other Marxists object to was Stalin’s establishment the USSR as a powerful ‘nation-state’, and later as an imperial power, rather than as a citadel for world revolution. However, the Trotskyites, more than any other Marxist faction, allied themselves to American imperialism in their hatred of Stalinist Russia, and served as the most enthusiastic partisans of the Cold War.[33] Sedov continued:

Stalin not only bloodily breaks with Bolshevism, with all its traditions and its past, he is also trying to drag Bolshevism and the October revolution through the mud. And he is doing it in the interests of world and domestic reaction. The corpses of Zinoviev and Kamenev must show to the world bourgeoisie that Stalin has broken with the revolution, and must testify to his loyalty and ability to lead a nation-state. The corpses of the old Bolsheviks must prove to the world bourgeoisie that Stalin has in reality radically changed his politics, that the men who entered history as the leaders of revolutionary Bolshevism, the enemies of the bourgeoisie, – are his enemies also. Trotsky, whose name is inseparably linked with that of Lenin as the leader of the October revolution, Trotsky, the founder and leader of the Red Army; Zinoviev and Kamenev, the closest disciples of Lenin, one, president of the Comintern, the other, Lenin’s deputy and member of the Politburo; Smirnov, one of the oldest Bolsheviks, conqueror of Kolchak—today they are being shot and the bourgeoisie of the world must see in this the symbol of a new period. This is the end of the revolution, says Stalin. The world bourgeoisie can and must reckon with Stalin as a serious ally, as the head of a nation-state…. Stalin has abandoned long ago the course toward world revolution.[34]

As history shows, it was not Stalin to whom the ‘world bourgeoisie’ or more aptly, the world plutocracy, looked on as an ally, but leading Trotskyites whose hatred of Stalin and the USSR made them vociferous advocates of American foreign policy.

Family Life Restored

Leon Trotsky is particularly interesting in regard to what he saw as the ‘revolution betrayed’ in his condemnation of Stalinist policies on ‘youth, family, and culture’. Using the term ‘Thermidor’, taken from the French revolutionary era, in his description of Stalinism vis-à-vis the Bolshevik revolution, Trotsky began his critique on family, generational and gender relations. Chapter 7 of The Revolution Betrayed is worth reading in its entirety as an over-view of how Stalin reversed Marxism-Leninism. Whether that is ‘good’ or ‘bad’ is, of course, left to the subjectivity of the reader.[35]

The primary raison d’etre of Marxism for Trotsky personally seems to have been the destruction of religion and of family (as it was for Marx).[36] Hence, the amount of attention Trotsky gives to lamenting the return to traditional family relations under Stalin:

The revolution made a heroic effort to destroy the so-called ‘family hearth’ – that archaic, stuffy and stagnant institution in which the woman of the toiling classes performs galley labor from childhood to death. The place of the family as a shut-in petty enterprise was to be occupied, according to the plans, by a finished system of social care and accommodation: maternity houses, creches, kindergartens, schools, social dining rooms, social laundries, first-aid stations, hospitals, sanatoria, athletic organizations, moving-picture theaters, etc. The complete absorption of the housekeeping functions of the family by institutions of the socialist society, uniting all generations in solidarity and mutual aid, was to bring to woman, and thereby to the loving couple, a real liberation from the thousand-year-old fetters. Up to now this problem of problems has not been solved. The forty million Soviet families remain in their overwhelming majority nests of medievalism, female slavery and hysteria, daily humiliation of children, feminine and childish superstition. We must permit ourselves no illusions on this account. For that very reason, the consecutive changes in the approach to the problem of the family in the Soviet Union best of all characterize the actual nature of Soviet society and the evolution of its ruling stratum.[37]

Marxism, behind the façade of women’s emancipation, ridicules the traditional female role in the family as ‘galley labour’, but does so for the purpose of delivering women to the ‘galley labour’ of the Marxist state. The Marxist solution is to take the child from the parents and substitute parental authority for the State via childcare. As is apparent today, the Marxist ideal regarding the family and children is the same as that of big capitalism. It is typical of the manner by which Marxism, including Communism, converges with plutocracy, as Spengler pointed out soon after the 1917 Revolution in Russia.[38]

Trotsky states, ‘you cannot “abolish” the family; you have to replace it’. The aim was to replace the family with the state apparatus: ‘During the lean years, the workers wherever possible, and in part their families, ate in the factory and other social dining rooms, and this fact was officially regarded as a transition to a socialist form of life’. Trotsky decries the reversal by Stalin of this subversion of the family hearth: ‘The fact is that from the moment of the abolition of the food-card system in 1935, all the better placed workers began to return to the home dining table’. Women as mothers and wives were retuning to the home rather than being dragooned into factories, Trotsky getting increasingly vehement at these reversals of Marxism:

Back to the family hearth! But home cooking and the home washtub, which are now half shamefacedly celebrated by orators and journalists, mean the return of the workers’ wives to their pots and pans that is, to the old slavery.[39]

The original Bolshevik plan was for a new slavery where all would be bound to the factory floor regardless of gender, a now familiar aim of global capitalism, behind the façade of ‘equality’.  Trotsky lamented that the rural family was even stronger: ‘The rural family, bound up not only with home industry but with agriculture, is infinitely more stable and conservative than that of the town’. There had been major reversals in the collectivisation of the peasant families: they were again obtaining most of their food from private lots rather than collectivised farms, and ‘there can no longer be any talk of social dining rooms’. ‘Thus the midget farms, [were] creating a new basis for the domestic hearthstone…’[40]

The pioneering of abortion rights by the Leninist regime was celebrated as a great achievement of Bolshevism, which was, however, reversed by Stalin with the celebration instead of motherhood. In terms that are today conventional throughout the Western world, Trotsky stated that due to the economic burden of children upon women,

…It is just for this reason that the revolutionary power gave women the right to abortion, which in conditions of want and family distress, whatever may be said upon this subject by the eunuchs and old maids of both sexes, is one of her most important civil, political and cultural rights. However, this right of women too, gloomy enough in itself, is under the existing social inequality being converted into a privilege.[41]

The Old Bolsheviks demanded abortion as a means of ‘emancipating women’ from children and family. One can hardly account for the Bolshevik attitude by an appeal to anyone’s ‘rights’ (sic). The answer to the economic hardship of childbearing was surely to eliminate the causes of the hardship. In fact, this was the aim of the Stalinists, Trotsky citing this in condemnation:

One of the members of the highest Soviet court, Soltz, a specialist on matrimonial questions, bases the forthcoming prohibition of abortion on the fact that in a socialist society where there are no unemployed, etc., etc., a woman has no right to decline ‘the joys of motherhood’.[42]

On June 27 1936 a law was passed prohibiting abortion, which Trotsky called the natural and logical fruit of a ‘Thermidorian reaction’.[43] The redemption of the family and motherhood was damned perhaps more vehemently by Trotsky than any other aspect of Stalinism as a repudiation of the ‘ABCs of Communism’, which he stated includes ‘getting women out of the clutches of the family’.

Everybody and everything is dragged into the new course: lawgiver and litterateur, court and militia, newspaper and schoolroom. When a naive and honest communist youth makes bold to write in his paper: ‘You would do better to occupy yourself with solving the problem how woman can get out of the clutches of the family’, he receives in answer a couple of good smacks and – is silent. The ABCs of Communism are declared a ‘leftist excess’. The stupid and stale prejudices of uncultured philistines are resurrected in the name of a new morale. And what is happening in daily life in all the nooks and corners of this measureless country? The press reflects only in a faint degree the depth of the Thermidorian reaction in the sphere of the family.[44]

A ‘new’ or what we might better call traditional ‘morale’ had returned. Marriage and family were being revived in contrast to the laws of early Bolshevik rule:

The lyric, academical and other ‘friends of the Soviet Union’ have eyes in order to see nothing. The marriage and family laws established by the October revolution, once the object of its legitimate pride, are being made over and mutilated by vast borrowings from the law treasuries of the bourgeois countries. And as though on purpose to stamp treachery with ridicule, the same arguments which were earlier advanced in favor of unconditional freedom of divorce and abortion – ‘the liberation of women’, ‘defense of the rights of personality’, ‘protection of motherhood’ – are repeated now in favor of their limitation and complete prohibition.[45]

Trotsky proudly stated that the Bolsheviks had sought to alienate children from their parents, but under Stalin parents resumed their responsibilities as the guardians of their children’s welfare, rather than the role being allotted to factory crèches. It seems, that in this respect at least, Stalinist Russia was less a Marxian-Bolshevik state than the present day capitalist states which insist that mothers should leave their children to the upbringing of crèches while they are forced to work; and ironically those most vocal in demanding such polices are often regarded as ‘right-wing’.

Trotsky lauded the policy of the early Bolshevik state, to the point where the state withdrew support from parents

While the hope still lived of concentrating the education of the new generations in the hands of the state, the government was not only unconcerned about supporting the authority of the ‘elders’, and, in particular of the mother and father, but on the contrary tried its best to separate the children from the family, in order thus to protect them from the traditions of a stagnant mode of life.[46]

Trotsky portrayed the early Bolshevik experiments as the saving of children from ‘drunken fathers or religious mothers’; ‘a shaking of parental authority to its very foundations’.[47]

Stalinist Russia also reversed the original Bolshevik education policy that had been based on ‘progressive’ American concepts and returned authority to the schools. In speaking of the campaign against decadence in music,[48] Andrei Zhdanov, Stalin’s cultural adviser, recalled the original Bolshevik education policy, and disparaged it as ‘very leftish’:

At one time, you remember, elementary and secondary schools went in for the ‘laboratory brigade’ method and the ‘Dalton plan’,[49] which reduced the role of the teacher in the schools to a minimum and gave each pupil the right to set the theme of classwork at the beginning of each lesson. On arriving in the classroom, the teacher would ask the pupils ‘What shall we study today?’ The pupils would reply: ‘Tell us about the Arctic’, ‘Tell us about the Antarctic’, ‘Tell us about Chapayev’, ‘Tell us about Dneprostroi’. The teacher had to follow the lead of these demands. This was called the ‘laboratory brigade method’, but actually it amounted to turning the organisation of schooling completely topsy-turvy. The pupils became the directing force, and the teacher followed their lead. Once we had ‘loose-leaf textbooks’, and the five point system of marks was abandoned. All these things were novelties, but I ask you, did these novelties stand for progress?

The Party cancelled all these ‘novelties’, as you know. Why? Because these ‘novelties’, in form very ‘leftish’, were in actual fact extremely reactionary and made for the nullification of the school.[50]

One observer visiting the USSR explained:

Theories of education were numerous. Every kind of educational system and experiment was tried—the Dalton Plan, the Project Method, the Brigade Laboratory and the like. Examinations were abolished and then reinstated; though with a vital difference. Examinations in the Soviet Union serve as a test for scholarship, not as a door to educational privilege.[51]

In particular the amorality inherent in Marxism was reversed under Stalinism. Richard Overy sates of this process:

Changing attitudes to behaviour and social environment under Stalin went hand-in-hand with a changing attitude towards the family… Unlike family policy in the 1920s, which assumed the gradual breakdown of the conventional family unit as the state supplied education and social support of the young, and men and women sought more collective modes of daily life, social policy under Stalin reinstated the family as the central social unit, and proper parental care as the model environment for the new Soviet generation. Family policy was driven by two primary motives: to expand the birth rate and to provide a more stable social context in a period of rapid social change. Mothers were respected as heroic socialist models in their own right and motherhood was defined as a socialist duty. In 1944 medals were introduced for women who had answered the call: Motherhood medal, Second Class for five children, First Class for six; medals of Motherhood Glory in three classes for seven, eight or nine offspring, for ten or more, mothers were justly nominated Heroine Mother of the Soviet Union, and an average of 5,000 a year won this highest accolade, and a diploma from the Soviet President himself.[52]

No longer were husband and wife disparaged as the ‘drunken father’ and the ‘religious mother’, from whom the child must be ‘emancipated’ and placed under state jurisdiction, as Trotsky and the other Old Bolshevik reprobates attempted. Professor Overy states, rather, that ‘the ideal family was defined in socialist-realist terms as large, harmonious and hardworking’. ‘Free love and sexual licence’, the moral nihilism encouraged by Bolshevism during its early phase, was being described in Pravda in 1936 as ‘altogether bourgeois’.[53]

In 1934 traditional marriage was reintroduced, and wedding rings, banned since the 1920s, were again produced. The austere and depressing atmosphere of the old Bolshevik marriage ceremony was replaced with more festive and prolonged celebration. Divorce, which the Bolsheviks had made easy, causing thousands of men to leave their families, was discouraged by raising fees. Absentee fathers were obliged to pay half their earnings for the upkeep of their families. Homosexuality, decriminalised in 1922, was recriminalised in 1934. Abortion, legalised in 1920, was outlawed in 1936, with abortionists liable to imprisonment from one to three years, while women seeking termination could be fined up to 300 roubles.[54] The exception was that those with hereditary illnesses could apply for abortion.[55]


The antithesis between Marxist orthodoxy and Stalinism is nowhere better seen than in the attitudes towards the family, as related above, and culture.

Andrei Zhdanov, the primary theoretician on culture in Stalinist Russia, was an inveterate opponent of ‘formalism’ and modernism in the arts. ‘Socialist-realism’, as Soviet culture was termed from 1932,[56] was formulated that year by Maxim Gorky, head of the Union of Soviet Writers.[57] It was heroic, folkish and organic. The individual artist was the conveyor of the folk-soul, in contrast to the art of Western decline, dismissively described in the USSR as ‘bourgeoisie formalism’.[58]

The original Bolshevik vision of a mass democratic art, organised as ‘Proletkult’, which recruited thousands of workers to be trained as artists and writers, as one would train workers to operate a factory conveyor built, was replaced by the genius of the individual expressing the soul of the people. While in The West the extreme Left and its wealthy patrons championed various forms of modernism,[59] in the USSR they were marginalized at best, resulting in the suicide for example of the Russian ‘Constructivist’ Mayakovsky. The revitalisation of Russian-Soviet art received its primary impetus in 1946 with the launching of Zhdanovschina.[60]

The classical composers from the Czarist era, such as Tchaikovsky, Glinka sand Borodin, were revived, after being sidelined in the early years of Bolshevism in favour of modernism, as were great non-Russian composers such as Beethoven, Brahms and Schubert.[61] Maxim Gorky continued to be celebrated as ‘the founder of Soviet literature and he continued to visit the USSR, despite his having moved to Fascist Italy. He returned to Russia in 1933.[62] Modernists who had been fêted in the early days of Bolshevism, such as the playwright, Nikolai Erdman, were relegated to irrelevance by the 1930s.[63]

Jazz and the associated types of dancing were condemned as bourgeoisie degeneracy.[64]

Zhdanov’s speech to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolshevik) intended primarily to lay the foundations of Soviet music, represents one of the most cogent recent attempts to define culture. Other than some sparse references to Marx, Lenin and internationalism, the Zhdanov speech should rank alongside T S Eliot’s Notes Towards A Definition of Culture[65] as a seminal conservative statement on culture. The Zhandov speech also helped set the foundation for the campaign against ‘rootless cosmopolitanism’ that was launched several years later. Zhdandov’s premises for a Soviet music were based on the classical and the organic connexion with the folk, striving for excellence, and expressing lofty values, rejecting modernism as detached from folk and tradition.

And, indeed, we are faced with a very acute, although outwardly concealed struggle between two trends in Soviet music. One trend represents the healthy, progressive principle in Soviet music, based upon recognition of the tremendous role of the classical heritage, and, in particular, the traditions of the Russian musical school, on the combination of lofty idea content in music, its truthfulness and realism, with profound, organic ties with the people and their music and songs – all this combined with a high degree of professional mastery. The other trend is that of formalism, which is alien to Soviet art, and is marked by rejection of the classical heritage under the guise of seeming novelty, by rejection of popular music, by rejection of service to the people in preference for catering to the highly individualistic emotions of a small group of select aesthetes.[66]

While some in the Proletkult, founded in 1917 were of Futurist orientation, declaring like the poet Vladimir Kirillov, for example, that ‘In the name of our tomorrow, we will burn Raphael, we will destroy museums, we will trample the flowers of art’, the Proletkult organisation was abolished in 1932,[67] and Soviet culture was re-established on classical foundations. Khdanov was to stress the classical heritage combined with the Russian folk traditions, as the basis for Soviet culture in his address:

Let us examine the question of attitude towards the classical heritage, for instance. Swear as the above-mentioned composers may that they stand with both feet on the soil of the classical heritage, there is nothing to prove that the adherents of the formalistic school are perpetuating and developing the traditions of classical music. Any listener will tell you that the work of the Soviet composers of the formalistic trend is totally unlike classical music. Classical music is characterised by its truthfulness and realism, by the ability to attain to unity of brilliant artistic form with profound content, to combine great mastery with simplicity and comprehensibility. Classical music in general, and Russian classical music in particular, are strangers to formalism and crude naturalism. They are marked by lofty idea content, based upon recognition of the musical art of the peoples as the wellspring of classical music, by profound respect and love for the people, their music and songs.[68]

Zhdanov’s analysis of modernism in music and his definition of classic culture is eminently relevant for the present state of Western cultural degeneracy:

What a step back from the highroad of musical development our formalists make when, undermining the bulwarks of real music, they compose false and ugly music, permeated with idealistic emotions, alien to the wide masses of people, and catering not to the millions of Soviet people, but to the few, to a score or more of chosen ones, to the ‘elite’! How this differs from Glinka, Chaikovsky, Rimsky-Korsakov, Dargomyjsky and Mussorgsky, who regarded the ability to express the spirit and character of the people in their works as the foundation of their artistic growth. Neglect of the demands of the people, their spirit and art means that the formalistic trend in music is definitely anti-popular in character.[69]

Zhdanov addressed a tendency in Russia that has thrived in The West: that of the ever new and the ‘theoretical’ that is supposedly so profound as to be beyond the understanding of all but depraved, pretentious or commodity-driven artistic coteries in claiming that only future generations will widely understand these artistic vanguards. However, Stalinist Russia repudiated the nonsense; and exposed the emperor as having no clothes:

It is simply a terrible thing if the ‘theory’ that ‘we will be understood fifty or a hundred years hence’, that ‘our contemporaries may not understand us, but posterity will’ is current among a certain section of Soviet composers. If this altitude has become habitual, it is a very dangerous habit.[70]

For Zhdanov, and consequently for the USSR, the classics were a folkish manifestation arising from the soul of the Russian people, rather than being dismissed in Marxian manner as merely products of bourgeoisie culture. In fact, as indicated previously, it was modernism that was regarded as a manifestation of ‘bourgeois decadence’. Zhandov castigated the modernists as elitist, aloof, or better said, alienated from the folk. On the other hand the great Russian classicists, despite their class origins, were upheld as paragons of the Russian folk culture:

Remember how the classics felt about the needs of the people. We have begun to forget in what striking language the composers of the Big Five,[71] and the great music critic Stasov, who was affiliated with them, spoke of the popular element in music. We have begun to forget Glinka’s wonderful words about the ties between the people and artists: “Music is created by the people and we artists only arrange it.” We are forgetting that the great master did not stand aloof from any genres if these genres helped to bring music closer to the wide masses of people. You, on the other hand, hold aloof even from such a genre as the opera; you regard the opera as secondary, opposing it to instrumental symphony music, to say nothing of the fact that you look down on song, choral and concert music, considering it a disgrace to stoop to it and satisfy the demands of the people. Yet Mussorgsky adapted the music of the Hopak, while Glinka used the Komarinsky for one of his finest compositions. Evidently, we shall have to admit that the landlord Glinka, the official Serov and the aristocrat Stasov were more democratic than you. This is paradoxical, but it is a fact. Solemn vows that you are all for popular music are not enough. If you are, why do you make so little use of folk melodies in your musical works? Why are the defects, which were criticised long ago by Serov, when he said that ‘learned’, that is, professional, music was developing parallel with and independently of folk music, repeating themselves? Can we really say that our instrumental symphony music is developing in close interaction with folk music – be it song, concert or choral music? No, we cannot say that. On the contrary, a gulf has unquestionably arisen here as the result of the underestimation of folk music by our symphony composers. Let me remind you of how Serov defined his attitude to folk music. I am referring to his article The Music of South Russian Songs in which he said: ‘Folk songs, as musical organisms, are by no means the work of individual musical talents, but the productions of a whole nation; their entire structure distinguishes them from the artificial music written in conscious imitation of previous examples, written as the products of definite schools, science, routine and reflexes. They are flowers that grow naturally in a given locale, that have appeared in the world of themselves and sprung to full beauty without the least thought of authorship or composition, and consequently, with little resemblance to the hothouse products of learned compositional activity’. That is why the naivete of creation, and that (as Gogol aptly expressed it in Dead Souls) lofty wisdom of simplicity which is the main charm and main secret of every artistic work are most strikingly manifest in them.[72]

It is notable that Zhdanov emphasised the basis of culture as an organic flowering from the nation. Of painting Zhandov again attacked the psychotic ‘leftist’ influences:

Or take this example. An Academy of Fine Arts was organised not so long ago. Painting is your sister, one of the muses. At one time, as you know, bourgeois influences were very strong in painting. They cropped up time and again under the most ‘leftist’ flags, giving themselves such tags as futurism, cubism, modernism; ‘stagnant academism’ was ‘overthrown’, and novelty proclaimed. This novelty expressed itself in insane carryings on, as for instance, when a girl was depicted with one head on forty legs, with one eye turned towards us, and the other towards Arzamas. How did all this end? In the complete crash of the ‘new trend’. The Party fully restored the significance of the classical heritage of Repin, Briullov, Vereshchagin, Vasnetsov and Surikov. Did we do right in reinstating the treasures of classical painting, and routing the liquidators of painting?[73]

The extended discussion here on Russian culture under Stalin is due to the importance that the culture-war between the USSR and the USA took, having repercussions that were not only world-wide but lasting.


[1] Oswald Spengler, The Hour of Decision (New York: Alfred A Knopf, 1963), 61.

[2] K R Bolton, ‘Jünger and National-Bolshevism’ in Jünger: Thoughts & Perspectives Vol. XI (London: Black Front Press, 2012).

[3] Association for the Study of the Planned Economy of Soviet Russia.

[4] League of Professional Intellectuals.

[5] K R Bolton, ‘Jünger and National-Bolshevism’, op. cit.

[6] Cited by John J Stephan, The Russian Fascists (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1978), 338.

[7] K R Bolton, ‘Francis Parker Yockey: Stalin’s Fascist Advocate’, International Journal of Russian Studies, Issue No. 6, 2010, http://www.radtr.net/dergi/sayi6/bolton6.htm [3]

[8] K R Bolton, ‘Cold War Axis: Soviet Anti-Zionism and the American Right’’ see Appendix II below.

[9] See Chapter III: ‘The Moscow Trials in Historical Context’.

[10] R Service, Comrades: Communism: A World History (London: Pan MacMillan, 2008), 97.

[11] Ibid., 98.

[12] Ibid., 107.

[13] Ibid., 109.

[14] Ibid., 116.

[15] G Dimitrov, Dimitrov and Stalin 1934-1943: Letters from the Soviet Archives, 32, cited by R Service, ibid., 220.

[16] R Service, ibid., 220.

[17] G Dimitrov, op. cit., cited by Service, ibid., 221.

[18] R Service, ibid., 222.

[19] Ibid.

[20] Hungarians.

[21] Richard Overy, The Dictators: Hitler’s Germany and Stalin’s Russia (London: Allen Lane, 2004), 201.

[22] L I Shvetsova, et al. (eds.), Rasstrel’nye spiski: Moskva, 1937-1941: … Kniga pamiati zhertv politicheskii repressii. (‘The Execution List: Moscow, 1937-1941: … Book of Remembrances of the victims of Political Repression’), (Moscow: Memorial Society, Zven’ia Publishing House, 2000), 229.

[23] L Sedov, ‘Why did Stalin Need this Trial?’, The Red Book on the Moscow Trials, http://www.marxists.org/history/etol/writers/sedov/works/red/ch01.htm [4]

[24] . Ibid., ‘Domestic Political Reasons’.

[25] R Service, op. cit., 240-241.

[26] Ibid., 242.

[27] Ibid.

[28] Ibid.

[29] Given that when Trotsky was empowered under Lenin he established or condoned the methods of jurisprudence, concentration camps, forced labour, and the ‘Red Terror’, that were later to be placed entirely at the feet of Stalin.

[30] Karl Marx, ‘Proletarians and Communists’, The Communist Manifesto, (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1975), 68.

[31] K R Bolton, ‘The State versus Parental Authority’, Journal of Social, Political & Economic Studies, Vol. 36, No. 2, Summer 2011, 197-217.

[32] K Marx, Communist Manifesto, op. cit.

[33] See Chapter V.

[34] L Sedov, op. cit., ‘Reasons of Foreign Policy’.

[35] L Trotsky, The Revolution Betrayed, Chapter 7, ‘Family, Youth and Culture’, http://www.marxists.org/archive/trotsky/1936/revbet/ch07.htm

[36] K R Bolton, ‘The Psychopathology of the Left’, Ab Aeterno, No. 10, Jan,-March 2012, Academy of Social and Political Research (Athens), Paraparaumu, New Zealand. The discussion on Marx and on Trotsky show their pathological hatred of family.

[37] L Trotsky, The Revolution Betrayed, op. cit., ‘The Thermidor in the Family’.

[38] ‘There is no proletarian, not even a communist, movement that has not operated in the interests of money, in the directions indicated by money, and for the time permitted by money — and that without the idealist amongst its leaders having the slightest suspicion of the fact’. Oswald Spengler, The Decline of The West (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1971),Vol. II, 402.

[39] L Trotsky, op.cit.

[40] Ibid.

[41] Ibid.

[42] Ibid.

[43] Ibid.

[44] Ibid.

[45] Ibid.

[46] Ibid.

[47] Ibid.

[48] See below.

[49] A laudatory article on the ‘Dalton Plan’ states that the Dalton School was founded in New York in 1919 and was one of the most important progressive schools of the time, the Dalton Plan being adopted across the world, including in the USSR. It is described as ‘often chaotic and disorganized, but also intimate, caring, nurturing, and familial’. Interestingly it is described as a synthesis of the theories of John Dewey and Carleton Washburne. ‘Dalton School’, http://education.stateuniversity.com/pages/1902/Dalton-School.html [5]

Dewey along with the Trotsky apologist Sidney Hook (later avid Cold Warrior and winner of the American Medal of Freedom from President Ronald Reagan) organised the campaign to defend Trotsky at the time of the Moscow Purges of the late 1930s. See Chapter II below.

[50] A Zhandov, Speech at the discussion on music to the Central Committee of the Communist Party SU (Bolshevik), February 1948.

[51] Hewlett Johnson, The Socialist Sixth of the World (London: Victor Gollanncz, 1939), Book IV, ‘New Horizons’, http://www.marxists.org/archive/johnson-hewlett/socialistsixth/ch04.htm [6]

[52] R Overy, op. cit., 255-256.

[53] Ibid.

[54] Ibid., 257.

[55] Ibid., p. 258.

[56] Ibid., 352.

[57] Ibid., 353.

[58] Ibid.

[59] K R Bolton, Revolution from Above, op. cit., 134-143.

[60] Overy, op.cit., 361.

[61] Ibid., 366-367.

[62] Ibid., 366.

[63] Ibid., 371.

[64] Ibid., 376.

[65] T S Eliot, Notes Towards the Definition of Culture (London: Faber and Faber, 1967).

[66] Zhdanov, op. cit., 6.

[67] Encyclopaedia of Soviet Writers, http://www.sovlit.net/bios/proletkult.html [7]

[68] Zhdanov, op. cit., 6-7.

[69] Ibid., 7

[70] Ibid.

[71] The Big Five – a group of Russian composers during the 1860’s: Balakirev, Mussorgsky, Borodin, Rimsky-Korsakov, Cui.

[72] Zhdanov, op. cit., 7-8.

[73] Ibid., 12.


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[3] http://www.radtr.net/dergi/sayi6/bolton6.htm: http://www.radtr.net/dergi/sayi6/bolton6.htm

[4] http://www.marxists.org/history/etol/writers/sedov/works/red/ch01.htm: http://www.marxists.org/history/etol/writers/sedov/works/red/ch01.htm

[5] http://education.stateuniversity.com/pages/1902/Dalton-School.html: http://education.stateuniversity.com/pages/1902/Dalton-School.html

[6] http://www.marxists.org/archive/johnson-hewlett/socialistsixth/ch04.htm: http://www.marxists.org/archive/johnson-hewlett/socialistsixth/ch04.htm

[7] http://www.sovlit.net/bios/proletkult.html: http://www.sovlit.net/bios/proletkult.html

vendredi, 29 mars 2013

Jünger und Frankreich


Kloster Heiligkreuztal

Jünger und Frankreich – eine gefährliche Begegnung?

Symposium des Freundeskreises der Brüder Ernst und Friedrich Georg Jünger
Julien Hervier und Alexander Pschera diskutieren anläßlich ihres gleichnamigen Buches auf dem Symposium des Freundeskreises der Brüder Ernst und Friedrich Georg Jünger über »Jünger und Frankreich – eine gefährliche Begegnung?«
Kloster Heiligkreuztal
Am Münster 7
88499 Altheim-Heiligkreuztal
Alexander Pschera
Alexander Pschera: Jünger und Frankreich - eine gefährliche Begegnung?

lundi, 25 mars 2013

Guillaume Faye & the Battle of Europe

The very first book about Faye's work!

A must for all his friends, who remain tenderly true to him, who has been so many times betrayed, ruined and impoverished by some of his own political "friends"!

Many thanks to the British publisher of Michael O'Meara's study!

Guillaume Faye & the Battle of Europe

By Greg Johnson

Ex: http://www.counter-currents.com/

Michael O’Meara
Guillaume Faye and the Battle of Europe [2]
London: Arktos, 2013

fayebattle.jpgGuillaume Faye is a prolific and brilliant French social and political philosopher and polemicist who is one of the leading lights of the French New Right. Faye’s reputation as a visionary and iconoclast created a global interest in his writings long before they became available in translation. Thus, for the past decade, Michael O’Meara has earned the gratitude of many by serving as the principal interpreter of Faye’s writings for the English-speaking world and far beyond, now that English is the global lingua franca.

O’Meara’s new book Guillaume Faye and the Battle of Europe collects ten essays, reviews, and introductions dealing with Faye’s principal books. The volume also includes three short translations and a newly-written Introduction: “Why Read Guillaume Faye,” which succinctly explains the strengths and weaknesses of Faye’s writings. This slender anthology of 130 pages is an ideal introduction to Faye’s work, and it can easily be read in an afternoon.

Faye, like New Rightists and White Nationalists in European societies around the globe, is motivated by a sense of danger: the reigning system — liberal, democratic, capitalist, egalitarian, globalist — has set the white race in all of its homelands on the path to extinction through declining birthrates and race replacement through immigration and miscegenation. If we are to survive, we must understand this system, critique it, and frame an alternative that will secure the survival and flourishing of our race. Then we need to figure out how we can actually implement these ideas.

I like Faye’s approach for a number of reasons.

First, he thinks big. He wants to take all of Europe back for Europeans. Furthermore, to secure the existence of Europe against the other races and power blocs, he envisions the creation of a vast “Eurosiberian” Imperium, stretching from Iceland to the Pacific, with a federated system of government and an autarkic economy. Only such an imperium will be equal to the challenges posed by the other races in a world or burgeoning populations and shrinking resources.

Second, he thinks racially. His answer to the question “Who are we?” is ultimately racial, not cultural, religious, or subracial: white people are a vast, extended family descending from the original inhabitants of Europe after the last Ice Age. There are, of course, cultural and subracial identities that are also worth preserving within a federated imperium, but not at the expense of the greater racial whole.

Third, he is not an a luddite, primitivist, or Hobbit. He values our heritage, but he is attracted less to external social and cultural forms than to the vital drives that created them and express themselves in them. He also wishes to do justice to European man’s Faustian drive toward exploration, adventure, science, and technology. His “archeofuturism” seeks to fuse vital, archaic, biologically-based values with modern science and technology.

Guillaume-Faye.jpgFourth, Faye turns the idea of collapse into something more than a deus ex machina, a kind of Rapture for racists. We know a priori that an unsustainable system cannot be sustained forever and that some sort of collapse is inevitable. But Faye provides a detailed and systematic and crushingly convincing analysis of how the present system may well expire from a convergence of catastrophes. Of course, we need to be ready when the collapse comes. We need a clear metapolitical framework and an organized, racially conscious community to step into the breach, or when the present system collapses, it will simply be replaced with a rebranded form of the same ethnocical regime.

Fifth, Faye is a strong critic of Christianity as the primary fount of the moral universalism, egalitarianism, and individualism that are at the root of our decline.

O’Meara’s principal criticisms of Faye are fourfold.

First, O’Meara thinks that Faye is a bit too Faustian and futurist, specifically his interest in transhumanism, genetic engineering, and eugenics, which no longer take man’s nature as a fixed reality and standard, strikes O’Meara as nihilistic. (This is the argument of C. S. Lewis’s The Abolition of Man, for instance.) O’Meara also thinks Faye is too empiricistic in his approach to knowledge and too ready to dismiss traditional notions of the sacred. These are, of course, rather broad objections, too broad to be really satisfying, and I wish O’Meara would put his specific metaphysical and moral cards on the table. Is he a Christian, a dualist, a Traditionalist, a Platonist, or something else?

Second, O’Meara thinks that Faye focuses too narrowly on Islam as the enemy of Europe, thus downplaying the roles of globalist, liberal, American, and Jewish forces in opening Europe to Islamic colonization.

Third, because Faye thinks that Islam is the principal enemy, he has embraced Israel and global Jewry as an ally, which has had a devastating effect on his credibility in nationalist circles. He has also become softer on America, which is the citadel of globalism, capitalism, liberalism, and Jewish power.

Fourth, O’Meara is critical of Faye’s critique of Christianity, going so far as to claim that Christianity “created and civilized Europe” (as if Greece and Rome were not civilized) and “conserved much of the Greco-Roman tradition” (i.e., what it did not see fit to destroy outright or allow to perish through neglect).

I was recently rooting for a black pope so I would never again have to suffer Catholic apologists quoting Belloc’s preposterous claim that “Europe is the faith and the faith is Europe.” Christianity is a universalistic religion, not an ethnic religion. It was never confined solely to Europe. Most of its followers today are non-whites, and it is growing primarily in non-white countries.

Furthermore, European man existed before Christianity, and if we continue to exist after Christianity, it will be no thanks to Christianity itself, which is overwhelmingly and actively hostile to our race’s survival. Christianity is in desperate need of a racial Reformation.

So when racially-conscious Christians seek to muddle anti-Christian discourse on the Right by waxing nostalgic about that olde tyme religion, or to suppress it by dark predictions that we can’t afford to offend Christians, my response is twofold: (1) The existing churches, which are objectively anti-white, will not cease being anti-white unless they feel that their survival is threatened by sustained criticism from people like Faye and plenty more like him. Thus anti-Christian New Rightists are de facto allies of Christian New Rightists, provided that they really want to reform their churches. (2) Racially conscious Christians need to focus their energy on combating anti-white attitudes in their churches rather than anti-Christian attitudes among whites.

Pagans and neo-pagans do not lack a sense of the sacred. Nor do they lack an appreciation of Christianity’s contributions to white culture. One does not need to be a Christian to treasure Bach’s Saint Matthew Passion any more than one has to believe in Zeus to treasure Aeschylus and Sophocles. They are supreme expressions of our race’s genius, regardless of their associations with dead or dying religions. And Faye himself has said that he will fight the transformation of Europe’s cathedrals into mosques — even as the bishops are trying to hand over the keys. And aside from a few church-burning teenage hooligans, I think that most neo-pagans would do the same.

These quibbles aside, I highly recommend Guillaume Faye and the Battle of Europe. Long after Arktos has published translations of all of Faye’s books, prospective readers will be turning to O’Meara for an preliminary overview and orientation before plunging in. Every library should have this book.

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mercredi, 13 mars 2013

Sortie aujourd'hui en France du livre de Thilo Sarrazin

Sortie aujourd'hui en France du livre de Thilo Sarrazin qui fit scandale outre-Rhin...


Ce livre, sorti en Allemagne fin 2010 sous le titre « L’Allemagne court à sa perte », suscita un véritable tollé d’indignation au sein de la bobocratie d’outre-Rhin qui n’avait plus de mots assez forts pour hurler son courroux.

Certes, l’auteur, Thilo Sarrazin, ne pouvait pas être soupçonné de quelconques sympathies d’extrême droite puisque son CV pouvait suffire à lui seul à lui assurer la bienveillance de la bien-pensance institutionnalisée. Economiste réputé, il était en effet membre du directoire de la Banque fédérale allemande et adhérent du Parti social-démocrate… Que du clean !

Et pourtant, abondance de brevets de bonne conduite n’interdit pas clairvoyance subite… Ainsi, dans son livre, Thilo Sarrazin s’insurge à la fois contre la dénatalité catastrophique qui tue le peuple allemand et contre l’immigration musulmane qui ronge la civilisation européenne. Cet ouvrage révolta les chiens de garde de la pensée unique, ce dont nous ne nous plaindrons pas… surtout lorsque l’on sait qu’il fut vendu à plus de 2 millions d’exemplaires dans son pays ce qui correspond à un record exceptionnel.

Souhaitons que l’édition française remporte un même succès !

L'Allemagne disparait, Thilo Sarrazin, Les Editions du Toucan, 520 pages, 25,00 €, sortie 13 mars 2013.

lundi, 04 mars 2013

Lovecraft as Heideggerian Event


A General Outline of the Whole”
Lovecraft as Heideggerian Event

By James J. O'Meara

weird-realism Graham Harman

Weird Realism: Lovecraft and Philosophy [2]
Winchester, UK: Zero Books, 2012

A winter storm in NYC is less the Currier and Ives experience of upstate and more like several days of cold slush, more suggestive—and we’ll see that suggestiveness will be a very key term—of Dostoyevsky than Dickens.

On a purely personal level, such weather conditions I privately associate[1] with my time—as in “doing time”—at the small Canadian college (fictionalized by fellow inmate Joyce Carol Oates as “Hilberry College”[2]) where a succession of more or less self-pitying exiles from the mainstream—from Wyndham Lewis and Marshall McLuhan to the aforementioned Oates—suffered the academic purgatory of trying to teach, or even interest, the least-achieving students in Canada in such matters as Neoplatonism and archetypal psychology.[3]

One trudged to ancient, wooden classrooms and consumed endless packs of powerful Canadian cigarettes, washed down with endless cups of rancid vending machine coffee. No Starbucks for us, and no whining about second-hand smoke. We were real he-men back then! There was one student, a co-ed of course, who did complain, and the solution imposed was to exile her—exile within exile!—to a chair in the hallway, like a Spanish nun allowed to listen in from behind a grill.

Speaking of Spain, one of the damned souls making his rounds was a little, goateed Marrano from New York, via Toronto’s Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, no less, who was now attempting to explain Husserl and Heidegger, to “unpack” with his tiny hands what he once called, with an incredulous shake of the head, “that incredible language of his,” to his sullen and ungrateful students.[4]

I thought of this academic Homunculus, who played Naphta to another’s Schleppfuss[5] in my intellectual upbringing, when this book made its appearance in my e-mail box one recent, snowing—or slushy—weekend. For Harman wants to explain Husserl and Heidegger as well, or rather, his own take on them, which I gather he and a bunch of colleagues have expanded into their own field of Object Oriented Ontology (OOO) or Speculative Realism. And to do so, he has appropriated the work of H. P. Lovecraft, suggesting that Lovecraft play the same role of philosophical exemplar in his philosophy, as Hölderlin does in Heidegger’s [3].

“That incredible language of his” indeed!

Part One tries to explain this Object Oriented business, but only after he tries to justify or excuse dealing with someone still often regarded as a glorified pulp hack on the same level with the great Hölderlin. He tries to short-circuit the attacks of highbrow critics, still exemplified by Edmund Wilson’s, by denouncing their rhetorical strategy of paraphrase.

Paraphrase? What’s wrong with that? Perfectly innocent, what? Well, no. Drawing on Slavoj Žižek’s notion of the “stupidity of content”—the equal plausibility of any proverb, say, and its opposite—Harman insists that nothing can be paraphrased into something else—reality is not itself a sentence, and so it is “is too real to be translated without remainder into sentences” (p. 16, my italics). Language can only allude to reality.

What remains left over, resistant to paraphrase, is the background or context that gave the statement its meaning.[6] Paraphrase, far from harmless or obvious, is packed with metaphysical baggage—such as the assumption that reality itself is just like a sentence—that enables the skilled dialectician to reduce anything to nonsensical drivel.

Harman gives many, mostly hilarious, examples of “great” literature reduced to mere “pulp” through getting the Wilson treatment. (Perhaps too many—the book does tend to bog down from time to time as Harman indulges in his real talent for giving a half dozen or so increasing “stupid” paraphrases of passages of “great” literature.)[7]

Genre or “pulp” writing is itself the epitome of taking the background for granted and just fiddling with the content, and deserves Edmund Wilson’s famous condemnation of both its horror and mystery genres. But Lovecraft, contra Wilson, is quite conscious, and bitingly critical, of the background conditions of pulp—both in his famous essays on horror and, unmentioned by Harman, his voluminous correspondence and ghost-writing—and thus ideally equipped to manipulate it for higher, or at least more interesting, purposes.

The pulp writer takes the context for granted (the genre “conventions”) and concentrates on content—sending someone to a new planet, putting a woman in charge of a space ship, etc.[8] If Lovecraft did this, or only this, he would indeed be worthy of Wilson’s periphrastic contempt. But Lovecraft is interested in doing something else: “No other writer is so perplexed by the gap between objects and the power of language to describe them, or between objects and the qualities they possess” (p.3, my italics).

Since philosophy is the science of the background, Lovecraft himself is to this extent himself a philosopher, and useful to Harman as more than just a source of fancy illustrations: “Lovecraft, when viewed as a writer of gaps between objects and their qualities, is of great relevance for my model of object oriented ontology” (p. 4).

Back, then to Harman’s philosophy or his “ontography” as he calls it. I call it Kantianism, but I’m a simple man. The world presents us with objects, both real (Harman is no idealist) and sensuous (objects of thought, say), which bear various properties, both real (weight, for example) and sensuous (color, for example). Thus, we have real and sensuous objects, as well as the real and sensuous qualities that belong to them . . . usually.

All philosophers, Harman suggests, have been concerned with one or another of the gaps that occur when the ordinary relations between these four items fail. Some philosophers promote or delight in some gap or other, while others work to deny or explain it away. Plato introduced a gap between ordinary objects and their more real essences, while Hume delighted in denying such a gap and reducing them to agglomerations of sensual qualities.

Harman, in explicitly Kantian fashion this time, derives four possible failures (Kant would call them antinomies). Gaps can occur between a real object and its sensuous qualities, a real object and its real qualities, a sensuous object and its sensuous qualities, and a sensuous object and its real qualities. Or, for simplicity, RO/SQ, RO/RQ, SQ/SO, and SO/RQ.

Take SQ/SO. This gap, where the object’s sensuous qualities, though listed, Cubist-like, ad nauseam, fail, contra Hume, to suggest any kind of objective unity, even of a phenomenal kind—the object is withdrawn from us, as Heidegger would say. It occurs in a passage such as the description of the Antarctic city of the Elder Race:

The effect was that of a Cyclopean city of no architecture known to man or to human imagination, with vast aggregations of night-black masonry embodying monstrous perversions of geometrical laws. There were truncated cones, sometimes terraced or fluted, surmounted by tall cylindrical shafts here and there bulbously enlarged and often capped with tiers of thinnish scalloped disks; and strange beetling, table-like constructions suggesting piles of multitudinous rectangular slabs or circular plates or five-pointed stars with each one overlapping the one beneath. There were composite cones and pyramids either alone or surmounting cylinders or cubes or flatter truncated cones and pyramids, and occasional needle-like spires in curious clusters of five. All of these febrile structures seemed knit together by tubular bridges crossing from one to the other at various dizzy heights, and the implied scale of the whole was terrifying and oppressive in its sheer gigantism. (At the Mountains of Madness, my italics)

SQ/RO? This Kantian split between an object’s sensuous properties and what its essence is implied to be, occurs in the classic description of the idol of Cthulhu:

If I say that my somewhat extravagant imagination yielded simultaneous pictures of an octopus, a dragon, and a human caricature, I shall not be unfaithful to the spirit of the thing. A pulpy, tentacled head surmounted a grotesque and scaly body with rudimentary wings; but it was the general outline of the whole which made it most shockingly frightful. (“The Call of Cthulhu,” my italics)

SO/RQ? Harman admits it’s rare in Lovecraft, (and elsewhere, though he finds hints of it in Leibniz) but he finds a few examples where scientific investigation reveals new, unheard of properties in some eldritch or trans-Plutonian object.

In every quarter, however, interest was intense; for the utter alienage of the thing was a tremendous challenge to scientific curiosity. One of the small radiating arms was broken off and subjected to chemical analysis. Professor Ellery found platinum, iron and tellurium in the strange alloy; but mixed with these were at least three other apparent elements of high atomic weight which chemistry was absolutely powerless to classify. Not only did they fail to correspond with any known element, but they did not even fit the vacant places reserved for probable elements in the periodic system. (“Dreams in the Witch House”)

And RO/RQ? You don’t want to know, as Lovecraft’s protagonists usually discover too late. It’s the inconceivable object whose surface properties only hint at yet further levels of inconceivable monstrosity within. Usually, Lovecraft relies on just slapping a weird name on something and hinting at the rest, as in:

[O]utside the ordered universe [is] that amorphous blight of nethermost confusion which blasphemes and bubbles at the center of all infinity—the boundless daemon sultan Azathoth, whose name no lips dare speak aloud, and who gnaws hungrily in inconceivable, unlighted chambers beyond time and space amidst the muffled, maddening beating of vile drums and the thin monotonous whine of accursed flutes. (Dream Quest of Unknown Kaddath)

You can see, in each case, how the horrific effect, and the usability for Harman’s ontography, would entirely disappear if given a Wilsonian “paraphrase”: It was a squid with wings! The object, when analyzed, revealed new, hitherto unknown elements!

Confused yet? Bored? Don’t worry. The whole point of Harman’s book, to which he devotes the vast portion of the text, is analyzing passages from Lovecraft that provide vivid illustrations of one or more of these gaps. In this way Harman’s ontography acquires its Hölderlin, and Lovecraft is rescued from pulp purgatory.

While there is considerable interest in Heidegger on alt-Right sites such as this one,[9] I’m sure there is considerably more general interest in Lovecraft. But Harman’s whole book is clearly and engagingly written, avoiding both oracular obscurity and overly-chummy vulgarity; since Harman is admirably clear even when discussing himself or Husserl, no one should feel unqualified to take on this unique—Lovecraftian?—conglomeration of philosophy and literary criticism.

The central Part Two is almost 200 pages of close readings of exactly 100 passages from Lovecraft. As such, it exhibits a good deal of diminishing returns through repetition, and the reader may be forgiven for skipping around, perhaps to their own favorite parts. And there’s certainly no point in offering my own paraphrases!

Nevertheless, over and above the discussion of individual passages as illustrations of Speculative Realism, Harman has a number of interesting insights into Lovecraft’s work generally. It’s also here that Harman starts to reveal some of his assumptions, or biases, or shall we say, context.


Harman, who, word on the blogs seems to be, is a run-of-the-mill liberal rather than a po-mo freak like his fellow “European philosophers,”[10] tips his hand early by referring dismissively to criticism of Lovecraft as pulp being “merely a social judgment, no different in kind from not wanting one’s daughter to marry the chimney sweep” (“Preliminary Note”). And we know how silly that would be! So needless to say, Lovecraft’s forthright, unmitigated, non-evolutionary (as in Obama’s “My position on gay marriage has evolved”) views on race need to be disinfected if Harman is to be comfortable marrying his philosophy to Lovecraft’s writing.

His solution is clever, but too clever. Discussing the passage from “Call of Cthulhu” where the narrator—foolishly as it happens—dismisses a warning as coming from “an excitable Spaniard” Harman suggests that the racism of Lovecraft’s protagonists[11] adds an interesting layer of—of course!—irony to them. As so often, we the reader are “smarter” than the smug protagonist, who will soon be taken down a few pegs.

But this really won’t do. Lovecraft’s protagonists are not stupid or uninformed, but rather too well-informed, hence prone to self-satisfaction that leads them where more credulous laymen might balk. “They’s ghosts in there, Mister Benny!”

Unfortunately for Harman, Lovecraft was above all else a Scientist, or simply a well-educated man, and the Science of his day was firmly on the side of what today would be called Human Biodiversity or HBD.[12] Harman may, like most “liberals” find that distasteful, something not to be mentioned, like Victorians and sex—a kind of “liberal creationism” as it’s been called—but that’s his problem.

It would be more interesting to adopt a truly Lovecraftian theme and take his view, or settled belief, that Science, or too much Science, was bad for us; just as Copernicus etc. had dethroned man for the privileged center of the God’s universe, the “truth” about Cthulhu and the other Elder Gods—first, there very existence, then the implication that they are the reality behind everyday religions—has a deflationary, perhaps madness inducing, effect.

Consider this famous quotation from the opening of “The Call of Cthulhu” as quoted by Harman himself in Part Two:

The sciences, each straining in its own direction, have hitherto harmed us little; but someday the piecing together of dissociated knowledge will open up such terrifying vistas of reality, and our frightful position therein, that we shall either go mad from the revelation or flee from the deadly light into the peace and safety of a new dark age. 

Thus Harman could argue that HBD may be true but bad for us to know—something very like the actual position of such liberal Comstocks as Richard Lewontin.

Consider, to switch genres, Dr. No. Quarrel [4], the ignorant, superstitious but loyal native retainer, is afraid to land on Crab Key, due to the presence of a dragon. Bond and his American buddy Leiter mock his fear. (Leiter: “Hey Quarrel, if you see a dragon, you get in first and breathe on him. With all that rum in you, he’ll die happy.”) But of course the dragon—which turns out to be a flame-throwing armored tractor—incinerates Quarrel whilst Bond and the equally superstitious but much more toothsome Honey Ryder are taken prisoner. While in this genre we know that Bond is the heroic knight who will ultimately slay the dragon, for now he does seem to be what Dr. No calls him, “just another stupid policeman” who would have done well to listen to the native—not unlike any number of Lovecraft’s educated protagonists.[13]

This smug assumption that knowledge leaves us safe, and indeed safer, is what Lovecraft is satirizing when the narrator of “Call of Cthulhu” dismisses the warnings of the “excitable Spaniard,” not, as Harman would have it, lampooning “racism” on some meta-level.[14]

Also, Michel Houllebeq, an author Harman otherwise praises, has emphasized that Lovecraft is anything but self-assured, either as a White man, or for the White race itself.[15] If “racism” is able to play the self-debunking role Harman wants it to, this is only because of Lovecraft’s self-doubts, based on his horrific experiences in the already multi-culti New York City of the 1920s, that the White race would be able to survive the onslaught of the inferior but strong and numerous under-men. As Houellebecq says, Lovecraft learned to take “racism back to its essential and most profound core: fear.”

“Fascistic Socialism”

On a related point, Harman puts this phrase, from Lovecraft’s last major work, The Shadow out of Time (which he generally dislikes, for reasons we’ll dispute later), in italics with a question mark, and leaves it at that, as if just throwing his hands up and saying “well, I just don’t know!” Alas, this is one of Lovecraft’s most interesting ideas. Like several American men of letters, such as Ralph Adams Cram, Lovecraft concluded that Roosevelt’s New Deal was an American version of Fascism, but, unlike the Chamber of Commerce types who made the same identification, he approved of it for precisely that reason! [16]

More generally, “fascistic socialism” was essentially what Spengler and others of the Conservative Revolution movement in German advocated; for example [5]:

Hans Freyer studied the problem of the failure of radical Leftist socialist movements to overcome bourgeois society in the West, most notably in his Revolution von Rechts (“Revolution from the Right”). He observed that because of compromises on the part of capitalist governments, which introduced welfare policies to appease the workers, many revolutionary socialists had come to merely accommodate the system; that is, they no longer aimed to overcome it by revolution because it provided more or less satisfactory welfare policies. Furthermore, these same policies were basically defusing revolutionary charges among the workers. Freyer concluded that capitalist bourgeois society could only be overcome by a revolution from the Right, by Right-wing socialists whose guiding purpose would not be class warfare but the restoration of collective meaning in a strong Völkisch (“Folkish” or “ethnic”) state.

But then, Harman would have to discuss, or even acknowledge, ideas that give liberals nose-bleeds.

Weird Porn

Harman makes the important distinction that Lovecraft is a writer of gaps, who chooses to apply his talents of literary allusion to the content of horror; but gaps do not exclusively involve horror, and we can imagine writers applying the same skills to other genres, such as detective stories, mysteries, and westerns.[17] In fact,

A literary “weird porn” might be conceivable, in which the naked bodies of the characters would display bizarre anomalies subverting all human descriptive capacity, but without being so strange that the erotic dimension would collapse into a grotesque sort of eros-killing horror. (p. 4)

Harman just throws this out, but if it seem implausible, I would offer Michael Manning’s graphic novels as example of weird porn: geishas, hermaphrodites, lizards and horses—or rather, vaguely humanoid species that suggest snakes and horses, rather like Harman’s discussion of Max Black’s puzzle over the gap produced by the proposition “Men are wolves”—create a kind of steam punk/pre-Raphaelist sexual utopia.[18]


Speaking of Lovecraftian allusiveness not being anchored to horror or any particular genre or content, brings us to my chief interest, and chief disagreement, with Harman’s discussion of Lovecraft’s literary technique.

I knew we would have a problem when right from the start Harman adduces The Shadow out of Time as one of Lovecraft’s worst, since this is actually one of my favorites, and the one that first convinced me of his ability to create cosmic horror through the invocation of hideous eons of cosmic vistas. Harman first notes, in dealing with the preceding novella, At the Mountains of Madness, that while the first half would rank as Lovecraft’s greatest work if he had only stopped there, the second half is a huge letdown: Lovecraft seems to descend to the level of pulp content, as he has his scientists go on a long, tedious journey through the long abandoned subterranean home of the Elder Race, reading endless hieroglyphs and giving all kinds of tedious details of their “everyday” life.[19]

For Harman, “Lovecraft’s decline as a stylist becomes almost alarming here” (p. 225) and will continue—with a brief return to form with “Dreams in the Witch House,” where Harman makes the interesting observation that Lovecraft seems to be weaving in every kind of Lovecraftian technique and content into one grand synthesis— until it ruins the second half as well of Shadow.

In a series of articles here on Counter Currents—soon to be reprinted as part of my next book, The Eldritch Evola . . . & Others—I suggested that not only should Lovecraft’s infamous verbosity no more be a barrier to elite appreciation than the equally deplored but critically lauded “Late Style” of Henry James, but also, and more interestingly, that conversely, we could see James developing that same style as part of an attempt to produce the same effect as Lovecraft’s, which fans call “cosmicism [6]” but which I would rather call cosmic horror (akin to the “sublime” of Burke or Kant).[20] Or perhaps: Weird Realism.

While Harman has greatly contributed to a certain micro-analysis of Lovecraft’s style, he seems, like the critics of the Late James, to miss the big picture. Although useful for rescuing Lovecraft from pulp oblivion, he still limits Lovecraft’s significance to either mere literature, or illustrations of Harman’s ontography. I suggest this still diminishes Lovecraft’s achievement.

The work of Lovecraft, like James, has the not inconsiderable extra value, over and above any “literary” pleasure, of stilling the mind by its very longeurs, leaving us open and available to the arising of some other, deeper level of consciousness when the gaps arise.[21]

But this is not on the table here, because Harman, like all good empiricists (and we are all empiricists today, are we not?) rejects, or misconstrues, the very idea of our having access to a super-sensible grasp of reality that would leap beyond, or between, the gaps; what in the East, and the West until the rise of secularism, would be called intellectual intuition.[22]

Reality itself is weird because reality itself is incommensurable with any attempt to represent or measure it. Lovecraft is aware of this difficulty to an exemplary degree, and through his assistance we may be able to learn about how to say something without saying it—or in philosophical terms, how to love wisdom without having it. When it comes to grasping reality, illusion and innuendo are the best we can do. (p. 51, my italics)

As usual in the modern West, we are to shoulder on as best we can, in an empty, meaningless world, comforted only by patting ourselves on the back for being too grown up, too “smart,” to believe we can not only pursue wisdom, but reach it. As René Guénon put it, it is one of the peculiarities of the modern Westerner to substitute a theory of knowledge for the acquisition of knowledge.[23]


1. On such “private associations” see Hesse, The Glass Bead Game, (New York: Holt, 1969), pp. 70–71.

2. Whose biographer, Greg Johnson, is not to be confused with our own Greg Johnson here at Counter Currents—I think. For the fictionalized Hilberry see The Hungry Ghosts: Seven Allusive Comedies (Boston: Black Sparrow Press, 1974). Allusive—there’s that idea again!

3. Did they succeed? Judge for yourself: Thomas Moore: Care of the Soul: Guide for Cultivating Depth and Sacredness in Everyday Life (San Francisco: HarperCollins, 1992).

4. Eventually he would sink so low as to teach “everyday reasoning” to freshman lunkheads.

5. See Thomas Mann’s The Magic Mountain and Doktor Faustus, respectively.

6. The hero of this vindication of Rhetoric over Dialectic turns out to be . . . McLuhan! The medium is the message—don’t be hypnotized by the content, take a look at the all-important effects of the context. I’ve suggested before that my own work be seen, like McLuhan’s, less as dogmatic theses to be defended or refuted (dogmatism is for Harman the great sin of worshipping mere content) but rather as a series of probes for revealing new contexts for old ideas. See my Counter-Currents Interview in The Homo and the Negro as well as my earlier “You Mean My Whole Fallacy Is Wrong!” here [7]. Once more, we find that education at a Catholic college in the Canadian boondocks is the best preparation for grasping post-modernism, no doubt because it reproduces the background of Brentano and Heidegger. It was Canadian before it was cool!

7. The Wilson treatment is on display whenever some Judeo-con or Evangelical quotes passages from some alien religious work—usually the Koran these days—to show how stupid or bloodthirsty the natives are, while ignoring similar or identical passages in his own Holy Book. So-called “scholars” play the same game, questioning the authenticity of some newly discovered Gnostic work like the Gospel of Judas for containing, “absurdities” and “silliness” while finding nothing odd about the reanimated corpses—reminiscent of Lovecraft’s genuinely pulp hackwork Herbert West, Reaminator—of the “orthodox” writings. Indeed, some have suggested that Lovecraft’s Necronomicon is itself a parody of The Bible, its supposed Arab authorship a mere screen. This typically Semitic strategy of deliberately ignoring the allusive context of your opponent’s words while retaining your own was diagnosed by the Aryan Christ, in such well-known fulminations against the Pharisees as Matthew 23:24 : “You strain at a gnat, and swallow a camel” or Matthew 7:3: “And why beholdest thou the mote that is in thy brother’s eye, but considerest not the beam that is in thine own eye?”

8. Bad sci/fi hits rock bottom in the content-oriented department with the ubiquitous employment of the “space” prefix: space-food, space-pirates, space-justice, etc., frequently mocked on MST3K. David Bowie’s space-rock ode “Moonage Daydream” contains the cringe-worthy “Press your space face close to mine” but this is arguably a deliberate parody, while the rest of the song brilliantly exploits the Lovecraftian allusive/contextual mode of horror, moving from its straight-faced opening—“I’m an alligator”—through a series of Cthulhuian composites—“Squawking like a pink monkey bird”—ultimately veering into Harman’s weird porn mode—“I’m a momma-poppa coming for you.” Deviant sex and cut-up lyrics—another context-shredding technique—clearly points to the influence of William Burroughs, who created subversive texts based on various genres of boys’ books ranging from sci/fi (Nova Express) to detective (Cities of Red Night: “The name is Clyde Williamson Snide. I am a private asshole.”) to his alt-Western masterpiece The Western Lands trilogy.

9. Harman does a better job explaining Husserl and Heidegger than my little Marrano, but then he has had another three decades to work on it. He does, however, focus mainly on Heidegger’s tool analysis, and his own, somewhat broader formulation. For a wider focused, more objective, if you will, presentation of Heidegger, see Collin Cleary’s series of articles on this site, starting here [8].

10. Needless to say, he never notices that his liberalism is rooted in the ultimate dogma-affirming, context-ignoring movement, Luther’s “sola scriptura.” His liberalism is such as to allow him to tell a pretty amusing one-liner about Richard Rorty, but only by attributing it to “a colleague.” On the one hand, he cringes for Heidegger for daring to refer to a “Senegal Negro” (p. 59) but dismisses Emmanuel Faye’s “Heidegger is a Nazi” screed as a “work of propaganda” (p. 259). See Michael O’Meara’s review of Faye here [9].

11. “Not even Poe [another embarrassing “racist”, well what do you know?] has such indistinguishable protagonists” (p. 10).

12. Indeed, “racism” is one of those principles Baron Evola evoked in his Autodefesa [10], as being “those that before the French Revolution every well-born person considered sane and normal.”

13. Kingsley Amis has cogently argued that the key to Bond’s appeal is that he’s just like us, only a little better trained, able to read up on poker or chemin de fer, has excellent shooting instructors, etc. But if we had the chance . . . See Amis, Kingsley The James Bond Dossier (London: Jonathan Cape, 1965).

14. It might be interesting to apply Harman’s OOO to a film like Carpenter’s They Live. In my review of Lethem’s book on the movie [11], reprinted in The Homo and the Negro, I mentioned liking another point, also from Slavoj Žižek: contrary to the smug assumptions of the Left, knowledge is not necessarily something people want, or which is pleasant—hence the protagonist has to literally beat his friend into putting on the reality-revealing sunglasses. Here we have both Lovecraft’s gaps and notion that knowledge is more likely something you’ll regret: Lovecraft and Žižek, together again!

15. Michel Houellebecq [12], H. P. Lovecraft: Against the World, Against Life [13] (London: Gollancz, 2008). See more generally, and from the same period, Lothrop Stoddard, The Revolt Against Civilization: The Menace of the Under Man, ed. Alex Kurtagic, introduction by Kevin MacDonald (Shamley Green: The Palingenesis Project, 2011).

16. See my “Ralph Adams Cram: Wild Boy of American Architecture” here [14].

17. Again, just as Burroughs applied his cut-up technique to various pulp genres.

18. See my discussion of Manning in “The Hermetic Environment and Hermetic Incest: The True Androgyne and the ‘Ambiguous Wisdom of the Female’” here [15].

19. Everyday life of pre-Cambrian radiata with wings, of course.

20. My suggestion was based on some remarks of John Auchard in Penguin’s new edition of the Portable Henry James, that James’s work could be seen as part of the attempt to substitute art for religion, by using the endless accumulation of detail—James’s “prolixity” as Lovecraft himself chides him for—to “saturate” everyday experience with meaning.

21. Colin Wilson’s second Lovecraftian novel, The Philosopher’s Stone (Los Angeles: Tarcher, 1971)—originally published in 1969, republished in a mass market edition in 1971 at the request of, and with a Foreword by, Joyce Carol Oates, bringing us back to Hilberry—introduced me to the idea of length, and even boredom, as spiritual disciplines. One of the main characters “seemed to enjoy very long works for their own sake. I think he simply enjoyed the intellectual discipline of concentrating for hours at a time. If a work was long, it automatically recommended itself to him. So we have spent whole evenings listening to the complete Contest Between Harmony and Invention of Vivaldi, the complete Well Tempered Clavier, whole operas of Wagner, the last five quartets of Beethoven, symphonies of Bruckner and Mahler, the first fourteen Haydn symphonies. . . . He even had a strange preference for a sprawling, meandering symphony by Furtwängler [presumably the Second], simply because it ran on for two hours or so.” The book is available online here [16].

22. With the inconsistency typical of a Modern trying to conduct thought after cutting off the roots of thought, Harman advises us that “It takes a careful historical judge to weigh which [contextual] aspects of a given thing are assimilated by it, and which can be excluded” (p. 245). What makes a “careful” judge is, of course, intuition. Cf. my remarks on Spengler’s “physiognomic tact” and Guénon’s intellectual intuition in “The Lesson of the Monster; or, The Great, Good Thing on the Doorstep,” to appear in my forthcoming book The Eldritch Evola but also available here [17].

23. How one can transcend the limits of secular science and philosophy, without abandoning empirical experience as the Christian does with his blind “faith,” is the teaching found in Evola’s Introduction to Magic, especially the essay “The Nature of Initiatic Knowledge.” “Having long been trapped in a kind of magic circle, modern man knows nothing of such horizons. . . . Those who are called “scientists” today [as well as, even more so, “philosophers”] have hatched a real conspiracy; they have made science their monopoly, and absolutely do not want anyone to know more than they do, or in a different manner than they do.” The whole text is available online here [18].


Article printed from Counter-Currents Publishing: http://www.counter-currents.com

URL to article: http://www.counter-currents.com/2013/02/lovecraft-as-heideggerian-event/

URLs in this post:

[1] Image: http://www.counter-currents.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/weird-realism.jpg

[2] Weird Realism: Lovecraft and Philosophy: http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/1780992521/ref=as_li_ss_tl?ie=UTF8&camp=1789&creative=390957&creativeASIN=1780992521&linkCode=as2&tag=countercurren-20

[3] Hölderlin does in Heidegger’s: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/H%C3%B6lderlin%27s_Hymn_%22The_Ister%22#Part_three:_H.C3.B6lderlin.27s_poetising_of_the_essence_of_the_poet_as_demigod

[4] Quarrel: http://www.007james.com/characters/quarrel.php

[5] for example: http://www.counter-currents.com/2013/02/hans-freyer-the-quest-for-collective-meaning/#more-36698

[6] fans call “cosmicism: http://www.tumblr.com/tagged/cosmicism

[7] here: http://jamesjomeara.blogspot.com/2011/03/youve-misunderstood-my-whole-fallacy-i.html

[8] here: http://www.counter-currents.com/2012/06/heidegger-an-introduction-for-anti-modernists-part-1/

[9] here: http://www.counter-currents.com/2010/07/heidegger-the-nazi/

[10] Autodefesa: http://www.alternativeright.com/main/the-magazine/julius-evola-radical-traditionalism/

[11] my review of Lethem’s book on the movie: http://www.counter-currents.com/2011/09/they-live/

[12] Michel Houellebecq: http://www.goodreads.com/author/show/32878.Michel_Houellebecq

[13] H. P. Lovecraft: Against the World, Against Life: http://www.goodreads.com/work/quotes/3196799

[14] here: http://www.counter-currents.com/2012/09/ralph-adams-cram-wild-boy-of-american-architecture/

[15] here: http://jamesjomeara.blogspot.com/2010/12/hermetic-environment-and-hermetic.html

[16] here: http://lucite.org/lucite/archive/fiction_-_lovecraft/14047169-the-philosophers-stone-by-colin-wilson.pdf

[17] here: http://www.counter-currents.com/2011/02/the-lesson-of-the-monster-or-the-great-good-thing-on-the-doorstep/

[18] here: http://www.cakravartin.com/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2006/08/Julius-Evola-Introduction-to-Magic.pdf

samedi, 23 février 2013

Die Brüder Jünger

Die Brüder Jünger

von Till Röcke

Ex: http://www.blauenarzisse.de/  

Die Brüder Jünger

Es gilt, zwei gelungene Arbeiten über Friedrich Georg und Ernst Jünger in aller Kurzweil anzupreisen: zum einen „Brüder unterm Sternenzelt“ und andererseits „Schwert und Mohn“.

Jörg Magenau behandelt die Brüder Ernst und Friedrich Georg Jüngerin seiner Doppelbiographie Brüder unterm Sternenzelt. Was heißt behandeln? Er massiert und knetet, er herzt und tätschelt die Objekte seiner Begierde wohlmeinend und mit ganz viel Empathie in seinem ästhetischen Hinterstübchen. Magenau liefert beste Feuilleton-​Kunst, die Jüngers wirken durch seiner Schreibe Suggestionskraft plüschig wie nie. Mehr Mensch hat noch keiner aus beiden herausgedrückt. Vielleicht warFritz J. Raddatz Ghostwriter?

Nimm Zwei: Die Jüngers als Bonbon

Dennoch: Man muss die Nacherzählung Magenaus einfach mögen, muss schätzen, wie er liebevoll beider Lebensläufe in eins zwirbelt und das Knäuel anschließend in Bonbonpapier wickelt. Nimm Zwei für Ästheten. Die Jüngers waren nie schöner. Friedrich Georg – ein kauzig-​altgriechischer Spinner mit visionärem Öko-​Thrill. Ernst – ein ziviler Stahlhelm-​Bolide mit potenter Humanisierungsgabe. Beide spannend und ganz dolle außergewöhnlich.

Kurz noch der Hinweis des Biographen, dass Friedrich mal irgendwo „Neger“ geschrieben hatte – war früher aber erlaubt und okay. Überhaupt: Früher mal. Weit weg von allem Konkreten gelingt Magenau eine große Dichterhagiographie. Wer Geschichten mag, bekommt eine nach der anderen serviert. Das ist nicht wenig. Wer von Literatur und Literaten ein wenig mehr erwartet – Zeitgeist, Zeitbild, Zeitenläufe – der sollte zu Sebastian Maaß greifen.

„Schwert und Mohn“ bohrt tiefer

Maaß ist ganz Wissenschaftler, und das tut dem Stoff gut. Mit Schwert und Mohn hat er seinen Studienband über Friedrich Georg Jüngers politische Publizistik betitelt, und souveräne Kost abgeliefert. Er führt seinen Gegenstand nicht vor – geschweige, dass er ihn plastisch schilderte – vielmehr setzt er sich sachlich mit dem Wirken Friedrich Georgs auseinander. Mit diesem nüchternen Handgriff gelingt ihm ein kompaktes Stück historischer Zustandsbeschreibung – mehr darf der Leser nicht erwarten, das gibt der Gegenstand einfach nicht her.

Dieses Verfahren schafft natürlich Distanz, die unaufhebbar bleibt. Friedrich Georgs Mittun im Ringelreigen der Zwischenkriegszeit ist dem hartgesottenen Nostalgiker zu empfehlen. Mag er damit glücklich werden, das Individuum der Kristallisation, die Gestalt 2013, wird es nicht. Warum? Man nehme nur die Schlagworte der beigefügten Texte aus jener Zeit: „Kampfbünde“, „Revolution“, „Diktatur“, „Staat“. Sogar „Persönlichkeit“ taucht auf. Begriffe mit Bezug. Weltanschauung. Politische Begriffe, an jemanden gerichtet, der kein Einzelner ist, sondern Teil eines – horribile dictu – politischen Bezugsrahmens. Das meint dann doch etwas mehr als Kindergeldanspruch und Freibetragsgrenze. Wohlan: die Gestalt 2013 ist damit doch in Anspruch genommen. Vollumfänglich. Und deshalb liest auch keiner mehr die Jüngers.

Jörg Magenau: Brüder unterm Sternenzelt. 322 Seiten, Klett Cotta 2012. 22,95 Euro.

Sebastian Maaß: Schwert und Mohn. Friedrich Georg Jünger. Eine politische Biographie. 144 Seiten, Telesma Verlag 2012. 16,80 Euro.

vendredi, 22 février 2013

Eindelijk aandacht voor diversiteit Arabische Lente

'Het Midden-Oosten': eindelijk aandacht voor diversiteit Arabische Lente


'Het Midden-Oosten': eindelijk aandacht voor diversiteit Arabische Lente

Sami Zemni (red.), Het Midden-Oosten · The times they are a-changin’. Uitgeverij EPO i.s.m. Middle East and North Africa Research Group, Universiteit Gent · - 375p. · prijs: € 29.50

Het boek 'Het Midden-Oosten. The times they are a-changin' onder redactie van Sami Zemni biedt een leerrijk overzicht van het veelkleurige caleidoscoop van de Arabische Lente in de landen van het Midden-Oosten. Dit is broodnodig tegengif tegen de eenzijdige berichtgeving van de massamedia over deze boeiende periode in het leven van miljoenen Arabieren.

De redacteur en de auteurs

Sami Zemni is professor aan de Universiteit Gent bij de vakgroep Conflict- en Ontwikkelingsstudies. Hij leidt er de Middle East and North Africa Research Group MENARG, die zich buigt over de politieke veranderingsprocessen in Noord-Afrika en het Midden-Oosten. Hij onderzoekt ook de rol en plaats van de islam in Europa.

In dit boek, waarin hij zelf ook auteur is, presenteert hij de bijdragen van 14 auteurs die hun specifieke expertise en kennis toepassen op één van de landen waar de Arabische Lente in zijn diverse verschijningsvormen aanwezig is. Negen van deze auteurs zijn zelf ook professor of doctoraatsstudent bij de MENARG. De andere vier namen deel vanuit hun specifieke landenkennis.

Zo komt de Arabische Lente in de eerste plaats in Tunesië aan bod, waarna Egypte, Marokko, Libië, Syrië, Jordanië, Palestina, Jemen, Irak, Israël, Bahrein en Libanon volgen. Het boek sluit af met een terugblik op twee jaar Arabische Lente en een algemene analyse die de strijd van de Arabische volkeren in de ruimere globale wereldcontext plaatst.

Een andere kijk op het Midden-Oosten

De diverse bijdragen zijn zeer verscheiden qua stijl en inhoud, gaande van academische politiek-wetenschappelijke analyses tot betrokken journalistiek werk. Die verschillende aanpak van de auteurs stoort echter niet. Integendeel, dit is een zeer leerrijk boek dat aandacht besteed aan de diversiteit van het politieke, sociale, economische, culturele en religieuze landschap van het Midden-Oosten.

De eerste les die je leert is dat de weergave van de Arabische Lente in de grote media schromelijk tekort is geschoten. Daar werd deze recente evolutie steevast geportretteerd als een plots en nieuw fenomeen, waarbij het ene land het andere aanstak. Alles zou draaien om het omverwerpen van dictaturen en het herstellen van - of eerder, installeren van - de democratie.

Dat laatste was zeker het geval, maar slechts een deel van een groter geheel. Daarbij werd volledig voorbij gegaan aan de voorgeschiedenis van de protesten. Dit komt helemaal niet uit de lucht vallen. Protesten tegen dictatuur en economische uitbuiting hebben een traditie van tientallen jaren, meestal reeds van bij het begin van de onafhankelijkheid van deze Franse/Britse ex-kolonies. Bovendien werd in de berichtgeving voorbij gegaan aan een essentieel gegeven, namelijk dat de protesten zich richtten tegen dictaturen die door het westen werden ondersteund, eveneens vanaf de eerste dag van de dekolonisatie.

De sociale dimensie

Heel wat klassieke commentatoren zetten de rol van de religieuze partijen in de verf. Nochtans waren zij nooit de drijvende kracht achter de Arabische Lente. Meestal keken ze afwachtend toe. Zij konden als enige reeds bestaande structuren wel het eerst in de bres van de oude machtstructuren springen. Zo maken zij de nabije toekomst van de Arabische Lente onzeker.

De revoltes die tot de Arabische Lente leidden waren zeker en vast gedreven door jongeren, de grootste bevolkingsgroep in de Arabische landen, die hun frustratie met de oude machthebbers vooral vorm gaven door acties te voeren met behulp van de nieuwe sociale media.

Een factor die echter steevast door de grote media werd veronachtzaamd is de sociale strijd. De Arabieren kwamen niet zomaar op straat voor meer democratie, zij eisten vooral sociale rechtvaardigheid, betere lonen, sociale rechten, gezondheidszorg. Dit zijn stuk voor stuk rechten die ze waren verloren tijdens de door IMF en Wereldbank opgedrongen neoliberale saneringen van de jaren '80 en '90. Die sociale rechten waren weliswaar niet te vergelijken met de sociale welvaartsstaat in Europa maar maakten voor miljoenen Arabieren wel het verschil tussen een leven in de lagere middenklasse en desolate armoede.

Bij het verzet tegen sociale uitbuiting speelden de vakbonden een cruciale rol. Niet de top die meestal volledig in de machtselite was opgenomen maar de lokale afdelingen toonden zich strijdbaar en gebruikten hun ervaring met sociaal protest en tegen repressie om de manifestaties van de Arabische Lente vorm te geven.


Irak, Marokko en Jordanië, de 'vergeten landen'

Alle hoofdstukken van dit boek bieden nieuwe informatie of een andere kijk op bestaande informatie. Vooral de hoofdstukken over Irak, Marokko en Jordanië zijn echter boeiend, omdat zij drie landen behandelen waar de Arabische Lente in de media nauwelijks aan bod komt.

Zo leer je dat de protesten in Irak niet moeten onderdoen voor de protesten op het Tahrir Square in Caïro, Egypte. Toch hoor of zie je daar amper iets over in de grote westerse media. Het door ons 'bevrijde' Irak is blijkbaar niet zo tevreden met de neoliberale rooftocht die westerse bedrijven voor het ogenblik plegen op de Iraakse bodemrijkdommen.

Marokko is een apart verhaal in dit geheel, evenals Jordanië. In beide landen poogt het staatshoofd de rol te spelen van bemiddelaar tussen de economische elite en de bevolking. Ze slagen er voorlopig in zich voor te stellen als neutrale observatoren. De kritiek dat zij zelf integraal deel uitmaken van het machtssysteem wordt echter steeds luider. Wordt dus zeker vervolgd.

Libië en R2P

Het hoofdstuk over Libië is het enige dat wat tegenvalt. Dat is onverwacht, want het werd geschreven door de oprichter van de MENARG, professor emeritus Ruddy Doom. Hij doet een poging om te analyseren hoe het principe Responsibility To Protect (R2P) al dan niet van toepassing was op de NAVO-interventie. Hij komt echter niet tot een duidelijk besluit.

Het helpt ook niet om een twijfelachtig figuur als Gareth Evans te citeren. Deze man was, voor hij voorzitter werd van de International Crisis Group (ICG) en vurig verdediger van R2P, in een vorig leven minister van buitenlandse zaken van Australië, het enige land ter wereld dat de annexatie van Oost-Timor door Indonesië erkende. Als minister tekende hij het compleet illegale Timor Gap Treaty met bezetter Indonesië om de olievoorraden in de Timorese zee te verdelen.  

Hij was ook de man die er als de kippen bij was om de slachting van 1991 op het kerkhof van Santa Cruz in de Timorese hoofdstad Dili te minimaliseren en er op te wijzen dat kleine landjes zich nu eenmaal te schikken hebben naar de wensen van de 'groten'. R2P in de praktijk.


Ook in Israël bleven de sociale protesten in de buurlanden niet onopgemerkt. Ze haalden daar echter meer de mosterd bij de Occupy-bewegingen in de VS en Europa. De strijd van de Israëlische bevolking tegen de neoliberale afbraak van de sociale welvaartstaat werd echter vergiftigd door de onmacht of onwil om te erkennen dat die strijd niet los kan gezien worden van de strijd van de Palestijnse Israëli's voor gelijke rechten en van de strijd tegen de bezetting en de kolonisatie van Palestina.

Het boek eindigt met een beknopte analyse van Koenraad Bogaert waarin de Arabische Lente in het kader van het wereldwijd verzet tegen de neoliberale aanval wordt geplaatst. De Arabische Lente is niet alleen voor de Arabieren belangrijk, deze strijd gaat ons allen aan.

Het is een beetje jammer dat er een hoofdstuk ontbreekt over Saoedi-Arabië en over Algerije. Ook over die landen is immers niet zoveel geweten, hoewel ook daar een en ander broeit. Dat vermindert geenszins de waarde van dit boek. Wie beter wil begrijpen waar de Arabische Lente vandaan komt en wat zijn potentiëlen en de gevaren zijn, komt met dit boek aan zijn trekken. Food for thought.

Deze bespreking verscheen eerder in De Wereld Morgen

mercredi, 13 février 2013

Two, Three, Many McCarthyisms

Two, Three, Many McCarthyisms

Review of: Manufacturing Hysteria: A History of Scapegoating, Surveillance, and Secrecy in Modern America, Jay Feldman, Anchor, 416 pages

Governo Globale

Governo Globale

La storia segreta del Nuovo Ordine Mondiale

Autore: Enrica Perucchietti  Gianluca Marletta 

Prezzo: € 10,03 (invece di €11,80)


Vuoi scoprire cos'è il Nuovo Ordine Mondiale?

Crisi economiche, rivoluzioni, guerre. Che cosa si cela dietro il rischio di crollo dell’Eurozona, la cosiddetta “Primavera Araba”, l’uccisione di Osama bin Laden, la guerra in Libia, i cablogrammi di Wikileaks, l’attentato di Oslo e Utoja e l’insediamento del governo Monti? Che cosa lega l’omicidio di John Kennedy all’assassinio di Olof Palme? Come fanno eventi in apparenza così diversi e distanti ad avere un’origine comune?

In questo saggio si svela per la prima volta in modo chiaro, completo e documentato, la storia segreta del Nuovo Ordine Mondiale, dalle sue origini a oggi: la genesi, l’ideologia e le tappe storiche, dalle origini della modernità all'attuale sfida militare che vede come terreno di battaglia il Medio Oriente. Chi ha coniato il termine e chi perpetua in segreto il disegno di instaurazione di un governo globale? Quali interessi si nascondono dietro questo progetto? Che ruolo hanno i membri di affiliazioni e gruppi occulti che riuniscono i protagonisti della vita politica, economica e finanziaria globali? Quale disegno si nasconde dietro la diffusione della tossicodipendenza di massa, fenomeni inquietanti e criminali come il satanismo, certi movimenti “culturali”, o di “controcultura”, come la “rivoluzione” psichedelica? In questo gioco di equilibri, quale obiettivo nasconde il progetto di instaurazione di un Governo Globale che lungo il suo cammino assoggetta i Popoli, fa cadere nazioni e governi come pedine di un complesso domino di cui non si riesce a vedere il disegno complessivo?

Anteprima - Governo Globale - Libro

Sull'ondata della profezia Maya in merito all'imminente fine dei tempi, la sensazione che la fine della nostra civiltà possa coincidere con l'instaurazione di un governo globale di stampo totalitario si è trasmessa a gran parte della popolazione mondiale. Le catastrofi naturali, le crisi economiche e il disincanto delle masse nei confronti della politica hanno insinuato il dubbio che qualcosa di tremendamente drammatico stia per accadere. I segni di una trasformazione generale della società e del mondo, così come lo conosciamo, vengono di volta in volta individuati nei più disparati settori.

Continua a leggere: > Anteprima - Governo Globale - Libro



  • Che cos’è il Nuovo Ordine Mondiale?

Parte Prima

  • Alle radici di un’idea: dalla Riforma protestante alla “missione” della stirpe anglosassone
  • Messianismo e Nuovo Ordine Mondiale
  • La questione dei “poteri occulti”
  • Dal popolo alla “massa”: tecniche e strategie per un dominio globale
  • La creazione del Mondo Nuovo: droga, sesso, de popolazione e “nuova spiritualità”

Parte Seconda

  • Come abbattere un regime: da Wikileaks alla “Primavera araba”, il sogno di un Nuovo Medio Oriente
  • Signoraggio e crisi economica: da Kennedy a Obama
  • Il “trattamento” Milosevic e le guerre dell’Impero: dalla Serbia alla Libia
  • 11 settembre 2001: le menzogne dell’Impero e la dottrina della guerra “preventiva”
  • Guerra al terrorismo, ovvero gli interessi delle lobby in Iraq e in Afghanistan
  • Le nove vite dello Sceicco del terrore: Osama bin Laden
  • False flags e scandali di corte: dalla strage norvegese all’Eliseo
  • Italia, Stato di banchieri: dalle profezie di Tremonti al tecnogoverno Monti
  • L’ombelico del Nuovo Mondo: USA o Cina?



acquista online su MacrolibrarsiAcquista online su Macrolibrarsi

lundi, 11 février 2013

The Map to Power

The Map to Power

The Revenge of Geography: What the Map Tells Us About Coming Conflicts and the Battle Against Fate, Robert D. Kaplan, Random House, 432 pages

Illustration by Michael Hogue
Illustration by Michael Hogue


Winston Churchill noted the symbiotic relationship between space and human action with the remark that “we shape our buildings, and afterwards our buildings shape us.”

On a much greater scale, consider how the physical world and its contours shape human development, just as humanity adapts the environment to its needs. The obvious faded from view in recent decades, however: globalization set the tone for the post-Cold War idea that old limits mattered little in a very new world. Grand, transformative projects sought to recast societies and institutions. Disappointment ensued with the failure of nation-building in the Middle East and the collapse of economic prosperity throughout the developed world.

In The Revenge of Geography, Robert Kaplan draws upon many thinkers, some unjustly neglected, to sketch a guide through the wreckage of these lost hopes. Far from creating the flat world Thomas Friedman described in his eponymous (and ephemeral) bestseller, globalization brings distant threats closer to home and draws differences into sharper relief. The future requires a new map.

Constructing the map to encompass geography in its fullest sense—embodying demographics, climate, and resources along with topography—highlights the factors that drive world trends. History and anthropology take the analysis further by providing context and showing how trends work over time. Geography, Kaplan argues persuasively, sets the framework within which contingency operates. International politics makes little sense without it.

Kaplan brings a reputation along with his point of view. His reporting from benighted regions during the 1990s drew criticism from liberal internationalists who objected to his pessimistic tone and caution about democracy-promotion. Deploying what John Ruskin called the innocent eye—an observer’s ability to see what lies before him rather than what he expects to see—Kaplan ignored the triumphalism of democratic capitalism to sketch a more complex and often bleak vista. Disdain for frivolous preoccupations among civilian elites drew Kaplan closer to the U.S. military, whose Spartan, practical ethos won his respect.

Experience—including with the Hobbesian nightmares of Afghanistan and Somalia, along with Saddam Hussein’s totalitarian experiment in Iraq—led Kaplan to back nation-building after 9/11. He joined the consensus behind the Iraq War and spent periods embedded with U.S. troops. While some commentators praised Kaplan as a latter-day Rudyard Kipling, others attacked him as a cheerleader for American empire. Kaplan himself admitted to having come too close to his subject and fallen prey to excessive zeal, even though he never took up the polarizing rhetoric of the Bush era. The Revenge of Geography marks a search for new perspective.

The way in which geographers, historians, and strategists traced their maps frames Kaplan’s discussion of geopolitics. He takes their ideas—particularly where diverging opinions raise conflicts—to pose questions rather than providing answers. Herodotus, whose account of the wars between the Greeks and Persia balanced geographic determinism with the decisions of men, represents the sensibility Kaplan seeks to recover. Environment sets a context, not least by shaping culture and custom, for decisions often made in the grip of passion. Dynamics shaping politics in the fifth century B.C. still operate today. Indeed, the region Herodotus describes between the eastern Mediterranean and the Iranian-Afghan plateau remains a critical area of conflict.

William McNeill, author of the 1963 landmark The Rise of the West, also looked to that area linking three continents for insight into the interaction between civilizations. Isolation along a fertile river surrounded by desert shaped Egypt by keeping outsiders at bay, while Mesopotamia remained vulnerable to predation. Both developed authoritarian, bureaucratic regimes, but Iraq had a more brutal political culture forged by insecurity. McNeil describes Greece, India, and China—all three developed unique civilizations, but distance kept China on a separate path while the ebb and flow of frontiers between Hellenistic, Middle Eastern, and Indian civilizations made for a delicate cultural balance in Greece, India, and the lands between. McNeill’s focus on interaction challenged the view of civilizations as developing separately, familiar from Oswald Spengler’s Decline of the West and Arnold Toynbee’s more optimistic account. McNeill’s idea of history as a study in fluidity gives Kaplan a starting point to consider geography’s impact upon social and political development in Eurasia.

The fact that Nazi Germany turned geopolitics to the service of conquest tainted the reputation of the field’s founding father, Halford Mackinder, but the continuing relevance of his ideas is undeniable. Geography, Mackinder argued, operates as the pivot of history by setting the context in which men and societies act. It forms barriers of desert, mountain, and tundra along with pathways of river valley and steppe. The seas acted as both, alternately providing a sheltering impasse and a highway transit.

Far from being an environmental determinist, however, Mackinder thought that understanding geographical limits pointed to ways of overcoming them. Indeed, Kaplan argues that his vision of geography’s role had a dynamic quality exactly opposed to the static assumptions of determinism. Technology, a form of human initiative, modified environments. Railways had a decisive impact by opening land to inexpensive transport of bulk goods. What began as a feeder to ocean or river transport eventually became a means of connecting Eurasia. Controlling its heartland would confer a decisive strategic advantage. Mackinder sought to chart trends rather than strategize conquest, but his analysis had an obvious appeal to the evil empires of Hitler’s Germany and Soviet Russia.

Where Mackinder and Nazi theorists like Karl Haushofer focused on the Eurasian heartland, the Dutch-born American Nicholas Spykman argued that projecting maritime power from the rimland built on advantages geography provided the United States. The combination of temperate climate and rich resources with effective hegemony over the Western Hemisphere gave the U.S. power to spare for adjusting the balance of power in the Eastern Hemisphere. The United States’ location provides access to Europe that South America lacks, while the Amazon and Arctic create secure buffers. Kaplan cites Spykman’s analysis as a way to see past the immediate press of events and discern basic geostrategic truths. His approach matters more than his conclusions themselves.

Earlier, Alfred Thayer Mahan offered in 1890 an historical account of sea power that still resonates among Chinese and Indian strategists. It influenced Spykman, along with Theodore Roosevelt and Germany’s Wilhelm II. Britain’s ability to control the seas by defeating enemy fleets during the 18th-century wars Mahan narrates ensured that maritime commerce would operate on British terms and rendered France vulnerable to coastal attack. Mahan’s contemporary Julian Corbett refined the analysis by arguing that a weaker fleet could effectively contest a numerically stronger foe by attacking bases and controlling vital choke points. Such leverage suited powers, like early 20th-century Britain, forced to meet widespread commitments with limited means. Maritime coalition building—and a presence in littoral spaces to affect land operations—offers an alternative to matching high seas fleets.

What do these ideas mean for understanding present discontents? Kaplan applies insights from these thinkers to sketch possibilities in key regions. Spykman warned that a united Europe would be a staunch competitor to the United States and perhaps the dominant outside power in equidistant parts of South America. Geography, however, has divided Europe to facilitate a balance of power since Roman times, as Edward Gibbon pointed out. Kaplan notes the appeal Mitteleuropa holds as a tolerant cultural zone dating from the Habsburg Empire, which joined pluralism with the impartial rule of law. The geographic space Central Europe occupies, however, serves as a crush zone between maritime and continental Europe. Peace might allow it to flourish, especially with Germany’s turn from war and Russia’s relative weakness.

Indeed, the search for peace has driven Europe’s efforts to rearrange itself since the 1950s. European integration, particularly in its post-Cold War phase, aims to transcend limits of history and geography to end conflict. Defying those limits, however, made the single currency a transmission mechanism for fiscal strain rather than a unifying force. Greece, as the weakest link in the project, offers a guide to the health of European integration. Its weakness derives from a history torn between Europe and the Middle East that left it politically and economically underdeveloped.

Gravity in the Middle East seems likely to shift toward Turkey and Iran, with Ankara providing a check on its rival. History and geography give logical frontiers to both, along with avenues of influence throughout the region. Other states lack such clear borders, making civil disorder in Syria a danger to Iraq and Jordan.

Geography also sets the terms for the problem China’s rise presents. A continental power like Russia, China also holds a large oceanic frontage onto the Pacific with good harbors. The combination provides strategic reach enhanced by decades of economic growth. Kaplan deftly notes the interaction between human initiative and geography over China’s history and how those factors shape its current ambitions.


But geographic factors also mitigate its advantages. Vietnam and Japan look to the United States for help in balancing China, while Korea’s unstable division presents a problem on its doorstep. The weakness of neighboring powers can trouble China no less than their strength. Sea power allows the United States to balance China without forcing a confrontation. Kaplan suggests that a struggle between them will be more stable than the Cold War rivalry with Russia was. Geopolitics shapes a subtle dynamic to influence other states while avoiding war.

Sketching geostrategic possibilities is a more useful exercise than making predictions. Kaplan articulates a realism focused on consequences that marks a welcome change from the fads and theories of the past 20-odd years. Instead of narrowing vision through a theoretical lens that hides facts out of line with theory, he draws upon those facts to press questions, and he thereby offers a more nuanced view. Seeing the world as it is, rather than as we might wish it to be, helps navigate the rapids of the turbulent era in which we live.

William Anthony Hay is a historian at Mississippi State University.

vendredi, 08 février 2013

La planète disneylandisée

A propos de : Sylvie Brunel :
La planète disneylandisée (Editions Sciences Humaines)

Ex: http://zentropaville.tumlblr.com/

Le tourisme de masse est l’image la plus visible de la mondialisation, il suffit de vivre à proximité d’un hôtel de quelque importance pour en convenir. En France, notamment, première destination mondiale avec 85 millions de visiteurs, on voit concrètement les effets de la montée des classes moyennes dans les pays émergents et l’apparition concomitante du temps libre. Après les Chinois, de plus en plus nombreux à visiter notre pays, ce sont désormais les Indiens qui promènent en groupes serrés leurs yeux écarquillés en quête de dépaysement. Alors qu’ils n’étaient que 25 millions en 1950 et essentiellement occidentaux, les touristes sont aujourd’hui un milliard de par le monde et probablement deux en 2020… Autant dire qu’il s’agit de la première industrie planétaire, 12% du PIB mondial, presque autant en termes d’emplois, avec une croissance de 15% par an. Impossible dans ces conditions que le tourisme n’ait pas d’effet sur les territoires, lui qui contribue par ailleurs, à lui seul, à 5% des émissions de gaz à effet de serre.

C’est ce que Sylvie Brunel, géographe de son état et voyageuse devant l’éternel, appelle la disneylandisation du monde, la propension à créer un peu partout des enclaves protégées, balisées, destinées à ces populations itinérantes dans un temps limité, afin de leur offrir l’aventure en toute sécurité, la nature authentique au plus près du parking, la rencontre avec l’Autre assigné à résidence culturelle. « Nous rêvons, dit-elle, d’animaux sauvages mais gentils, de forêts vierges mais aménagées, de peuples primitifs mais accueillants ». Ce monde réduit et circonscrit, intégralement organisé, le modèle en vient évidemment des parcs à thèmes, avec leurs infrastructures intégrées, leurs agglomérations hôtelières, leur accessibilité maximale et leurs liaisons aériennes spécifiques. Mais surtout le simulacre qu’ils proposent d’un monde recomposé, comme dans cette attraction de Disneyland Paris, laquelle attire à elle seule autant de visiteurs que la Tour Eiffel, et qui vous propose un circuit en bateau et en musique sur tous les continents et dans toutes les civilisations du monde, plus exactement leurs stéréotypes éprouvés, les Mexicains avec sombrero et cactus, les Tahitiennes dansant le tamouré, les Japonaises en kimono et à Paris le Moulin-rouge et les danseuses du Crazy Horse… Le tout réalisé par des automates. Mutatis, mutandis, la matrice de l’industrie mondialisée du tourisme est là, qui donne forme à ce que l’anthropologue Rachid Amirou, dans son livre sur l’imaginaire touristique, désignait comme la métaphore de l’objet transitionnel de Winnicot, la réalité visée étant ici l’image du paradis perdu plutôt que la présence rassurante de la mère. « La disneylandisation consiste à transformer le monde en décor. Parfois le décor prend tellement de place qu’il oublie même qu’il est censé reconstituer une réalité : un mois dans l’année, on peut ainsi profiter d’une « plage » à Paris », ajoute Sylvie Brunel. Qui ne dit mot des automobilistes autochtones ni de leur estivale résignation à voir le bitume recouvert de sable fin sur une voie rapide et pompidolienne, sorte d’inversion paradoxale et lancinante du slogan soixante-huitard « sous les pavés, la plage ». Une zone centre « à éviter » nous répètent désormais tous les ans à même époque les panneaux du boulevard périphérique.

Car s’il est vrai que certains peuples comme les Aborigènes australiens ou les Maoris néo-zélandais, les chamanes de Mongolie ou les Amérindiens doivent en partie au tourisme et à l’audience qu’il leur a donné d’avoir recouvré certains droits sur leurs territoires ancestraux, s’il est vrai que parmi les 50 pays les plus pauvres, les 4/5ème tirent l’essentiel de leurs ressources des flux touristiques, la disneylandisation produit la plupart du temps des effets pervers sur les populations concernées. En Afrique, par exemple, des parts croissantes du territoire sont affectées à des parcs naturels au nom de la protection d’animaux qui finissent par proliférer, se concentrer sur les rares points d’eau au détriment des pâturages et saccager les récoltes de ceux qui se voient ainsi exclus de leurs terrains de chasse, de culture ou de nomadisme. Au Gabon, 13 parcs nationaux ont été créés depuis 2004, qui dépossèdent de leur terre un nombre croissant de sociétés paysannes, un tiers de la superficie de la Zambie et de la Tanzanie en est couverte, ainsi que de réserves de chasse, un quart du territoire ougandais. Au Kenya, où l’on a reconstitué des villages masaïs « typiques », seul 1% des recettes touristiques reviennent à ceux qu’on a figé dans leur « authenticité » au milieu de réserves destinées à protéger la biodiversité, un argument avancé pour séduire le tourisme vert, écolo-responsable mais qui fait l’impasse sur la spoliation subie par ceux qui se refusent à jouer le rôle qu’on leur impose et sont chassés, du coup, de leurs meilleurs lieux de vie. Comme dit encore Rachid Amirou : « le tourisme de développement durable peut être un frein durable au développement des populations, comme si elles étaient assignées à résidence identitaire car, dans notre imaginaire, elles sont censées ne pas changer ».

C’est cette réalité ambivalente que Sylvie Brunel décrit aussi dans le périple qui fait la matière de son livre, « un tour du monde d’une durée inférieure de moitié à celui de Phileas Fogg », soit en quarante jours, et avec mari et enfants… Du geyser néozélandais qui jaillit à 10h15 pétantes au paradis sous perfusion de Bora Bora, en passant par le pays des kangourous écrasés, où l’abondance de pâtés d’animaux servis hachés le long des routes a définitivement rendu sa fille aînée végétarienne, les parcmètres au beau milieu de la nature sauvage des parcs naturels canadiens, l’ascension du Corcovado à Rio en escalator ou l’entrée en chaussettes sur le territoire américain pour cause de sécurité anti-terroriste, le récit réjouissant de son voyage offre un saisissant tableau de la planète Mickey.

Jacques Munier

La Grande Muraglia

La Grande Muraglia

Ex: http://lagrandemuraglia.wordpress.com/


Il libro è composto da 4 capitoli generali, ognuno dei quali si suddivide in quattro o cinque paragrafi dettagliati e articolati per un totale di 220 pagine. Lo scopo principale di questa pubblicazione è quello di fornire da un punto di vista estraneo ai pregiudizi e alla propaganda occidentale, il quadro di tutte le peculiarità e le direttrici politiche, economiche e geopolitiche della Repubblica Popolare Cinese. L’opera parte da una disamina storico-teoretica del pensiero politico che ha animato le principali trasformazioni del socialismo cinese, per proseguire con un’attenta fase di ricerca e osservazione in merito alle questioni e alle istanze interne di maggior risalto in ambito internazionale quali le complesse vicende relative alle regioni del Tibet, dello Xinjiang e di Taiwan, e poi concludere con uno sguardo generale alla strategia globale di Pechino e al fondamentale contributo della Cina all’interno dell’Organizzazione per la Cooperazione di Shanghai.


PUBBLICAZIONE: ottobre 2012
PAGG.: 220
ISBN: 9788890737954


Il fenomeno di rapidissima crescita rappresentato dalla Repubblica Popolare Cinese è sempre più sulla bocca di tutti. Spesso, però, lo è a sproposito o in modo del tutto improprio. E’ infatti evidente come l’approccio economicista tipico di gran parte del mondo dell’informazione occidentale sia assolutamente insufficiente al fine di affrontare un’attenta e profonda analisi della nazione asiatica, fornendo descrizioni distorte, volutamente tendenziose o previsioni che poi vengono regolarmente sconfessate. Il cosiddetto “socialismo con caratteristiche cinesi” difatti incarna non soltanto un modello di sviluppo strettamente economico e finanziario ma anche un preciso e determinante passaggio storico nell’evoluzione della civiltà cinese e nella ricostruzione di un suo spazio di coprosperità, condiviso da tutti i popoli che da secoli risiedono nei suoi territori geografici. La Grande Muraglia è, in questo senso, un ambizioso tentativo a carattere saggistico-scientifico nella ricerca di quei criteri storici, politici e geopolitici spesso tralasciati in Occidente, tuttavia fondamentali per comprendere lo scenario cinese del presente e del futuro.


Capitolo 1
Le radici del presente: Maoismo e via cinese al socialismo (di Marco Costa)
1. L’eredità del Maoismo nella Cina di oggi
2. Dalla dialettica marxista alla contraddizione maoista
3. La via cinese al socialismo: questione nazionale, crisi dei rapporti sino-sovietici, sovranità economica
4. Conclusioni: il Maoismo, primo passo della via cinese al socialismo
Bibliografia Mao Zedong
Bibliografia generale


Capitolo 2
La questione del Tibet (di Alessandro Lattanzio)

1. Il ripristino dei rapporti Lhasa-Pechino
2. La CIA sul “Tetto del Mondo”
3. Tibet S.p.A.
4. Modernizzazione e sviluppo
Bibliografia generale


Capitolo 3
Xinjiang e Taiwan: “inseparabili parti” della Repubblica Popolare Cinese (di Andrea Fais)

1. Xinjiang: una panoramica storica e geopolitica
2. Lo Xinjiang sotto la Repubblica di Cina: tra influenze sovietiche e islamismo
3. L’integrazione nella Repubblica Popolare e la modernizzazione dello Xinjiang
4. ETLO, ETIM e le ONG: al-Qaeda e l’Occidente minacciano la stabilità dello Xinjiang
5. La Cina è “una sola” e arriva fino a Taiwan
Bibliografia generale


Capitolo 4
La Cina nell’Organizzazione per la Cooperazione di Shanghai (di Andrea Fais)

1. La missione sino-russa: difendere la stabilità in Asia Centrale
2. La Convenzione contro il terrorismo, il separatismo e l’estremismo
3. L’asse Cina-Pakistan e l’integrazione dell’Afghanistan come sfide al terrore globale
4. Margini di integrazione tra la politica difensiva cinese e il comando unificato della RATS
Bibliografia generale

mercredi, 06 février 2013

Comprendre la mondialisation en dix leçons

Géopolitique en livres: "Comprendre la mondialisation en dix leçons" par Philippe Conrad sur realpolitiktv

00:05 Publié dans Actualité, Livre | Lien permanent | Commentaires (0) | Tags : actualité, globalisation, mondialisation, livre, économie | |  del.icio.us | | Digg! Digg |  Facebook

mardi, 05 février 2013

2013 L'apocalypse économique

« 2013 L'apocalypse économique : L'hyper classe mondiale à l'assaut de l'économie et de la démocratie » de Jean Michel Groven

par André POSOKHOV

Ex: http://www.polemia.com/

Jean Michel Groven est économiste et assistant parlementaire au Sénat. Son livre 2013, l’apocalypse économique mérite de retenir l’attention car il ouvre en réalité un espace de réflexion sur l’émergence des nouvelles élites mondiales et sur la mondialisation. Il s’exprime très clairement et très courageusement sur des sujets censurés comme la subversion démographique, le libre échange ou le Politiquement correct. Si l’auteur dit à haute voix dans les couloirs du Sénat ce qu’il écrit dans son livre il doit faire sensation. A.P.


L’émergence d’une nouvelle classe sociale : les supériorisés

L’auteur fait le constat de deux évolutions sociologiques convergentes.

Depuis la fin de la guerre le nombre de personnes qui sont passées par l’enseignement supérieur a explosé. On assiste ainsi à l’émergence d’une nouvelle classe sociale, celle des « supériorisés ». Cette classe n’éprouve pas le besoin d’un destin collectif : nation, socialisme, etc. Ses membres ont une vision idéalisée d’eux-mêmes qui leur font croire qu’ils sont des individus uniques. Le « supériorisé » cherche à ne fréquenter que ses semblables dans les mêmes espaces et a acquis une mentalité d’essence individualiste et hédoniste. Tous les thèmes politiques de ce mode de pensée se trouvaient déjà en filigrane dans les slogans de mai 68. Selon Groven cette mentalité se retrouve toute entière dans la formule : « jouir sans entraves ». Narcissisme (Face Book), destruction de l’institution du mariage, jeunisme caractérisent cette évolution aujourd’hui très avancée. Celle-ci aboutit à la volonté de s’approprier par tous les moyens et immédiatement ce qui fait envie sans qu’une morale ne soit là pour l’empêcher. C’est l’ l’Homo spontaneus qui n’est animé que par ses désirs et ses pulsions qui sont érigés en principes de base du comportement individuel et qui peuvent déboucher sur la violence.

Profondément individualiste, cette mentalité est essentiellement inégalitaire ne serait-ce que par le regard que les « supériorisés » jettent sur le peuple et même sur de moins diplômés qu’eux-mêmes. C’est le grand retour et la légitimation des inégalités en termes de revenus et de patrimoines économiques comme sociaux. L’image des classes populaires est déclassée voire symbolisée par le terme de « beauf ». Cette image négative rejaillit également sur l’image qu’ont les Français d’eux-mêmes telle qu’elle est renvoyée par les élites du type Jacques Attali pour qui il n’est d’horizon pour la France que la dilution dans l’Europe et la dilution de l’Europe dans la mondialisation. L’auteur évoque le PS devenu un parti de cadres supérieurs qui se donnent bonne conscience en discutant du sort des immigrés sans papiers ou du mariage unisexe mais oublient le sort de 70 à 80% de la population qui sont leurs compatriotes.

Ainsi est née une oligarchie qui présente trois caractères :

  • -elle prélève une part de plus en plus importante de la valeur ajoutée produite par les travailleurs grâce au libre-échange. C’est à cela que servent la mondialisation et le libre-échange,
  • -elle préfère les membres des oligarchies des pays voisins plutôt que son propre peuple dont le sort l’indiffère,
  • -elle est parvenue à tenir son pouvoir d’une morale faite par elle et pour elle : le Politiquement correct qui a pour objectif de trouver dans la société des bourreaux et des victimes afin que l’élite puisse s’ériger en « juge arbitre ».

Ce sont ces élites donneuses de leçons qui ne payent jamais les pots cassés de la mondialisation car elles sont planquées derrière leurs capitaux ou leur statut : énarques, universitaires, journalistes.

Basculement millénaire du pouvoir de Dieu vers le pouvoir de l’individu

Le deuxième constat revêt un caractère historique. Pour faire court la démocratie a été une étape dans le lent basculement millénaire du pouvoir de Dieu vers le pouvoir de l’individu. Le Peuple est devenu Dieu. Puis la déité est passée de l’Homme à l’individu : Or cet individu demeure un animal social. Celui-ci se tourne vers sa communauté afin d’assurer ses besoins et sa propre sécurité. Il en résulte un repli sur soi et une atomisation de la société Ainsi peut s’expliquer le fractionnement des nations actuelles en autant de communautés qui se regardent en chiens de faïence, voire en ennemies.

C’est la conjonction de ces deux évolutions sociologiques qui permet la prise du pouvoir économique et politique par l’hyper classe nationale comme mondiale.

La stratégie de l’hyper classe : des coupables et des victimes

Le fractionnement de la population qui est organisée de manière presque consciente par les élites et la mise en place de la tyrannie du Politiquement correct s’effectuent en quatre étapes :

  • -la désignation de victimes : immigrés, femmes, homosexuels. La victime absolue est la personne d’origine juive. La désignation de nouvelles victimes est souvent univoque. SOS racisme ne s’intéresse pas à ce que l’on appelle le racisme anti blanc, terme impropre d’ailleurs,
  • -la désignation de coupables. Un contestataire du réchauffement climatique est un coupable absolu. La France, désignée comme responsable du génocide des Juifs est mise en accusation d’une manière permanente,
  • -l’élite intervient par le biais des lois anti-discrimination et surtout mémorielles qui sont le socle de la tyrannie des associations notamment antiracistes. L’insécurité sous les trois formes de la délinquance, de la précarité économique et de la précarité familiale, constitue également l’épine dorsale du monde nouveau de l’oligarchie. Elle entraine une judiciarisation des relations entre individus et une « cancerisation » des relations humaines par une méfiance généralisée et la guerre de tous contre tous. La nouvelle classe sociale profite de cet état de choses pour imposer sa loi en se posant comme le juge arbitre de tous les conflits qu’elle a elle-même créés,
  • -la création d’une « compétition victimaire » en suscitant du ressentiment chez d’autres victimes.

Les passages du livre sur ces thèmes sont particulièrement éloquents et percutants. L’auteur souligne que « ce qui est terrifiant avec cette nouvelle doxa, c’est sa capacité à transposer n’importe quel sujet sous un angle moralisateur avec, à chaque fois, l’éternelle trilogie juge/victime/coupable ». Il souligne que dans certains pays l’idéologie du politiquement correct est devenue folle comme au Royaume uni.

Au bout du compte la nation et les grandes idéologies collectives s’effacent au profit de micro et de macro-tribus. Cette tribalisation et ce communautarisme se retrouvent dans les ghettos géographiques : banlieues mais aussi centres villes et cités pavillonnaires des classes moyennes.

Cette situation délétère est porteuse de chaos social qui ne peut que profiter à un futur régime qui, au nom du rétablissement de la concorde nationale (qu’il aura lui-même brisée..) imposera de plus en plus ses lois afin de contrôler une démocratie vacillante, voire même demandera sa suppression.

L’évolution actuelle.

2013 présente trois types de mondialisation : la mondialisation des cultures, celle de la finance et des biens et services et enfin celle des travailleurs.

Concernant les biens et services l’auteur se livre à une critique économique virulente du libre-échange promu par l’ensemble des milieux qui sont protégés par leur statut de la concurrence extérieure ou qui font partie des secteurs qui en profitent, ce qui ne constitue pas l’originalité de l’ouvrage.et sur laquelle il ne sera pas insisté :

En revanche les conséquences sociales et politiques sont lourdes.

  • -les industries américaines puis européennes ont subi de plein fouet la concurrence des dragons asiatiques ce qui a entrainé les délocalisations et la baisse du niveau de vie des classes populaires,
  • -l’écart entre les riches et les pauvres est généralement grandissant,
  • -Un processus de paupérisation s’est accentué avec l’entrée en scène des pays émergents et touche les classes moyennes,
  • -l’endettement des classes moyennes grâce à la bulle immobilière et des classes populaires grâce aux crédits à la consommation,
  • -l’effondrement à venir des monnaies : le dollar comme l’euro.

« 2013 l’apocalypse économique » prévoit qu’au terme, proche, de ce processus l’économie occidentale connaitra un effondrement économique, financier et social Ce sera particulièrement le cas des USA qui perdront leur statut de leader mondial.

Ces prédictions sinistres ne sont pas invraisemblables et JM.Groven n’est pas le seul à les formuler. On peut même avancer que les évolutions récentes de l’économie occidentale les rendent vraisemblables. Cependant les présenter comme certaines avec une date précise affaiblit le propos de l’ouvrage. A titre d’exemple JM. Groven prévoyait la chute de l’euro en 2011 et 2012 ce qui n’est pas arrivé.

Pour ce qui concerne la France, l’arrivée de la nouvelle hyper classe mondiale conduit à disloquer le système politique classique basé sur la démocratie et l’Etat nation. Il faut à tout prix éliminer celui-ci en invoquant des motifs nobles et d’intérêt général. L’Union européenne est l’espace au sein duquel la Nation française qui a déjà perdu ses prérogatives étatiques est censée se fondre.

En conclusion l’auteur a exprimé l’espoir que son livre apportera quelques « cartouches intellectuelles à tous ceux qui se rebellent contre ce monde qui s’annonce triste et fatigué à l’image et à la dimension de la nouvelle élite ». Il est loisible de penser que ce but, grâce à de nombreuses pages fortes et courageuses, a été atteint et que la lecture de ce livre peut être recommandée à ceux qui souhaitent découvrir les ressorts de la prise du pouvoir par l’oligarchie mondiale comme nationale.

André Posokhov

Voir aussi :

L'Idéologie de la superclasse mondiale (1re partie)
« Au bord du gouffre / La faillite annoncée du système de l'argent » d'Alain de Benoist
Quel est l'ennemi ? La superclasse mondiale ou la puissance américaine ?
Dix thèses sur le libéralisme (1/3)
La généalogie de la superclasse mondiale (Première partie)
Essor de la « superclasse globale » (ou hyperclasse) et crise des classes moyennes.

Correspondance Polémia : 1/01/2013

00:05 Publié dans Actualité, Economie, Livre | Lien permanent | Commentaires (0) | Tags : actualité, économie, livre | |  del.icio.us | | Digg! Digg |  Facebook

Martin Mosebach entdecken


Martin Mosebach entdecken,

Teil I

von Frank Marten

Ex: http://www.blauenarzisse.de/



Der Sammelband „Stilleben mit wildem Tier“ beinhaltet 13 Erzählungen des Georg-​Büchner-​Preisträgers (2007) Martin Mosebach. Äußerst lesenswert, findet BN-​Autor Frank Marten.

Um vorab Klarheit zu schaffen: Die Genialität des Buches Stilleben mit wildem Tier basiert nicht auf dem Inhalt der Kurzgeschichten. Diese werden aus der Perspektive eines dem Leser unbekannten Protagonisten in der Ich-​Form erzählt. Sie handeln beispielsweise von der Beerdigung einer Baronin („Tote begraben“), vom Besuch auf einem Weingut („Weinprobe“) oder schlicht von einem einzigen Zimmer („Sein Zimmer“).

Mosebach wirft erzählerische Fangnetze nach dem Leser aus

Wenn der Fokus jedoch nicht auf dem Inhalt ruht, wo dann? Wo manifestiert sich der Geist des Autors? Mosebachs Schaffen beruht auf der einfachen wie genialen Beschreibung des Alltäglichen, das heißt, auf den Handlungen und Gegenständen, welche unser Dasein tagtäglich prägen und dessen Sein wir des Öfteren nicht wahrnehmen. Ein Paradebeispiel stellt eben die Erzählung „Sein Zimmer“ dar: In dieser beschreibt der Ich-​Erzähler ein vollkommen normales, durch nichts auffallendes Zimmer, wie es in jeder Wohnung vorzufinden ist. Doch nach kaum zwei Seiten intensiven Lesens ist der Leser in der Lektüre gefangen, die Buchstaben und Sätze bestimmen seine Umwelt, die Wortkonstellationen lassen in ihm ein Gefühl des Beschenkt-​werdens aufsteigen – kurzum, der Leser versinkt in der Erzählung.

Nach dem Ende der Erzählung wird der Leser sein Zimmer und dessen Räumlichkeit einerseits im neuen Licht der Offenbarung wahrnehmen und andererseits wird er es beginnen zu lieben. Nun ist es sein Zimmer, sein persönliches Eigentum und dementsprechend höchster Ausdruck seiner Individualität. Neben den im Text herausstechenden Wortkonstellationen, die das Herz des anspruchsvollen Lesers höher schlagen lassen und Mosebachs tiefsinnigen Beschreibungen der unterschiedlichsten Objekte, besticht das Sammelwerk Stilleben mit wildem Tier ferner durch seinen Humor und seine Ironie. So wird ein 14- ​jähriger Knabe in der Geschichte „Weinprobe“ von den Inhabern des Weingutes zur Weinverköstigung motiviert und in der Erzählung „Tote begraben“ zerstört der Neffe der Toten deren Marmorurne und zerstreut ihre Asche in alle Winde. An dieser Stelle sei jedoch der intellektuelle und tiefgreifende Humor des Schriftstellers betont, welcher sich vom „proletarischen“ Witz der deutschen Massenmedien durch seine Weisheit und Flexibilität abhebt. Große Kunst also.

Ein neuer Thomas Mann

Martin Mosebach wird zu Recht als neuer Thomas Mann gefeiert. Anhänger und begeisterte Leser des aus Lübeck stammenden Schriftstellers werden auch die Erzählungen Mosebachs lieben. Aber auch all denjenigen, die auf der Suche anspruchsvollen Büchern und Erzählungen sind und sich in den geschriebenen Geschichten verlieren möchten, sei dieses Sammelbuch ans Herz gelegt. Durch die Ich-​Perspektive fühlt sich der Leser als integraler Teil der Erzählungen, es kommt ihm so vor, als wäre er selbst der Hauptprotagonist. Durch die herausragenden Fähigkeiten des Autors verfliegt die Zeit beim Lesen der Lektüre wie im Fluge. Gerade dies kennzeichnet einen großen Schriftsteller aus, zu denen der Leser Martin Mosebach nach der Lektüre von Stilleben mit wildem Tier definitiv zu zählen wird.

Martin Mosebach: Stilleben mit wildem Tier. 176 Seiten. Bloomsbury Verlag, 2012. 8,99 Euro.

Martin Mosebach entdecken,

Teil II

von Kaplan Thomas Jäger



Warum Martin Mosebachs Buch so erfolgreich wurde und heute zum traditionell-​katholischen Standardwerk gehört, liegt daran, dass hier kein Priester und Theologe schreibt, sondern ein Laie.

Kurz nach dem Erscheinen des Buches 2002 lud ich den Schriftsteller Mosebach, den ich durch mein Studium in Frankfurt kannte, zu einer Lesung auf unser Verbindunghaus der KDStV Badenia ein. Die Akademiker unserer Verbindung waren mit der Thematik der lateinischen Liturgie nur peripher vertraut, so dass ich froh war, dass selbst ein Pater und Dozent unserer Jesuitenhochschule den Weg aufs Haus fand.

Mosebach tritt für eine traditionelle Liturgie ein

Mosebachs Buch, das in Kennerkreisen nur kurz „Die Häresie“ genannt wird, ist eines der wenigen, nach dessen Lektüre ich ohne schlechtes Gewissen sagen konnte, dass ich mich im Innersten meiner Seele verstanden fühlte. Aber noch wichtiger war mir die Vertrautheit mit der Einstellung der Umwelt zu einem „Tradi“ (also einem Gläubigen, der die Messe im ausserordentlichen lateinischen Ritus bevorzugt), die der Büchner-​Preisträger von 2010 erlebt und beschreibt hat: „Diese Messe sei ein besonderes seelsorgerisches Entgegenkommen für einen eher problematischen Kreis von Gläubigen. Der normale Katholik gehöre da nicht hin.“

Zum Glück hat unser Papst Benedikt XVI. mit seinem Motu Proprio, das die Feier der lateinischen Messe wieder uneingeschränkt zulässt, gezeigt, dass diese Messe zum katholischen „Normalsein“ dazugehört.

Das Buch polarisiert

Der meistgemachte Vorwurf, den Mosebach zu seinem Buch zu hören bekommt, ist der, dass er Ästhetizist sei. Hier hat bereits Michael Karger in der Tagespost vom 2. August 2012 klare Worte gegen die Rezension des Buches durch die Literaturwissenschaftlerin Claudia Stockinger gefunden, die in den Stimmen der Zeit (8÷2012 Herder Verlag Freiburg) erschien.

Mangels theologischer Kompetenz und in einer Reihe mit anderen „Häresie“-Kritikern, unterstellt Stockinger Mosebach, dass er die Liturgie der Kirche unter dem Gesichtspunkt ihrer Schönheit verteidigt und sich zugleich gegen den Vorwurf des Ästhetizismus zur Wehr setzt. Wobei es sich doch nach Ansicht von Stockinger beim Thema Liturgie so verhält, „dass theologisch gesehen, die Liturgie Instrument des Gottesdienstes ist, für sich selbst aber nichts gilt“.

Zur Stützung dieser merkwürdigen These wird nun der heilige Benedikt herangezogen: “Nichts soll dem Gottesdienst vorgezogen werden, heisst es in der Regel des heiligen Benedikts, auch nicht die Liturgie.” Würde diese rein spiritualistische Interpretation der Benediktsregel tatsächlich gelten, müsste man sich fragen, warum überhaupt noch jemand in der Morgenfrühe zum Stundengebet erscheint, wenn man doch den Gottesdienst auch vollziehen kann, ohne am Gottesdienst teilzunehmen. Mit dieser dialektischen Argumentation macht die Verfasserin jede liturgische Handlung zum Ästhetizismus überflüssig.

Mosebach: „Ich bin Animist.“

In ähnlich dilettantischer Weise versucht Frau Stockinger dem Autor der „Häresie“ noch Animismus zu unterstellen, was dieser wohl auch gar nicht leugnen würde, sondern ja selbst bekennt „… höre ich das Lied der Amsel am Abend, das bekanntlich gar kein Lied, sondern eine die Evolution begünstigende Geräuschentfaltung ist, und den fernen Klang der Kirchenglocke, bei der eine Maschine den Klöppel auf ein Stück Bronze haut, als eine mir bestimmte, wenn auch unentschlüsselbare Nachricht.“ Daraus folgert Mosebach: “Ich stehe auf der tiefsten Stufe der Menschheitsgeschichte. Ich bin Animist.“

Wie sich die Mittelaltersehnsucht der Romantiker nicht auf eine reale Geschichtsepoche bezog, sondern auf die Wiedergewinnung all dessen, was mit der anbrechenden Moderne verloren zu gehen drohte, so ist das Anliegen dieses „parakatholischen Eleganzphänomens Mosebach“ (Peter Sloterdijk), die Kirche auf schwerwiegende Verluste aufmerksam zu machen, die seiner Meinung nach ihr Wesen und damit ihre Sendung in der Welt gefährden. Es wäre fatal, würde die Kirche – und hierzu gehört nicht nur die sogenannte „Amtskirche“, sondern die Gemeinschaft aller Getauften – nicht auf diese wichtige aufweckende Stimme Mosebachs hören. Es gilt hier mehr denn je, sich wieder auf die altehrwürdige Messe – mehr noch – auf die Tradition der katholischen Kirche in Wort, Ritus und Selbstbewusstsein zu besinnen.

Martin Mosebach: Häresie der Formlosigkeit. Die römische Liturgie und ihr Feind. 248 Seiten, DTV 2012. 9,90 Euro.

samedi, 19 janvier 2013

Pour une Europe iconoclaste


Pour une Europe iconoclaste

par Bastien VALORGUES

Depuis octobre 2006 paraît tous les deux mois la revue politique et culturelle, nationale et identitaire, Synthèse nationale dirigée par Roland Hélie. Disposant d’un site Internet et tenant une manifestation annuelle de rencontres, d’échanges, de discussions et de réflexions dans la capitale, voilà qu’elle dispose dorénavant d’une maison d’éditions. Celle-ci vient de publier un ouvrage collectif d’auteurs français, espagnols, belges et hongrois. « Ce livre, écrit Roland Hélie, publié à l’occasion de la VIe Journée nationale et identitaire organisée par Synthèse nationale le 11 novembre 2012 à Paris » rassemble les réponses à quatre principales questions que leur pose le directeur du bimestriel.

La palette des intervenants est large. Elle témoigne de la diversité, de l’hétérogénéité même, du courant national et identitaire. On a la surprise de ne compter que 28 signatures, mais trente est un nombre rond plus satisfaisant. En plus, il faut prendre en compte l’introduction de Roland Hélie et le trentième point de vue est nécessairement celui du lecteur. Si l’on établit une typologie – sommaire et un peu grossière – des tendances qui s’y expriment, on remarque que le royalisme n’a qu’un seul représentant : Franck Abed. Les nationaux sont cinq (Francis Bergeron, Pierre Descaves, Bruno Mégret, Martin Peltier et Jean-Claude Rolinat), huit proviennent de la « nébuleuse néo-droitiste » (Gabriele Adinolfi, Patrick Parment, Philippe Randa, Gilbert Sincyr, Robert Spieler, Pierre Vial et deux rédacteurs réputés d’Europe Maxima, Pierre Le Vigan et Georges Feltin-Tracol), neuf du nationalisme sous toutes ses facettes (Serge Ayoub, Thibaut de Chassey,  André Gandillon, Olivier Grimaldi, Pieter Kerstens, Luc Pécharman, Alain Renault, Hervé Van Laethem et Gabor Vona, le président du Jobbik hongrois) et cinq sont hors-catégorie (Lionel Baland, Nicolas Gauthier, Dr Bernard Plouvier, Enrique Ravello) ainsi qu’un conservateur naïf, Marc Rousset, qui plaide pour l’espéranto comme langue de la construction européenne !
Comme il est habituel dans ce genre de livre, les réponses sont variées et inégales tant par leur pertinence que par leur qualité. On est en revanche heureusement surpris par la volonté de tous de remédier à la panne (à l’impasse ?) européenne. Si, pour Alain Renault, « la question “ européenne ” n’est plus seulement géographique mais avant tout biologique » du fait de l’immigration de peuplement, Patrick Parment constate que « les partis sont des gestionnaires de carrière », donc les premiers responsables de la nullité politique, alors que Franck Abed affirme avec justesse que « la République en France est le parti de l’étranger ».
Immigration et domination des formations politiciennes favorisent dans les faits un « désarmement moral, énonce Francis Bergeron, [qui] se juxtapose ou se confronte à l’expansionnisme idéologique (islam), territorial (immigration extra-européenne), démographique (forte natalité d’un côté, valorisation de l’avortement et de l’homosexualité de l’autre), moral (vision optimiste et dynamique, volonté entrepreneuriale d’un côté, et le “ tous fonctionnaires ”, de l’autre) ». Plus qu’économique, le mal qui frappe l’Europe est surtout existentiel. Notre continent « se trouve aujourd’hui au bas de l’échelle, dominée par n’importe quel État d’Asie, tout juste bonne à servir de musée et de parc d’entertainment aux touristes du monde, s’indigne Martin Peltier ». « Une civilisation meurt, ajoute Pierre Le Vigan, quand ses élites ne comprennent pas la nature d’un processus en cours, ou quand elles en sont complices – ce qui est le cas. Les élites sont le moteur du productivisme effréné, de la mondialisation capitaliste, de la consommation et consumation de la planète par l’homme. »
Par ailleurs, « l’Europe de Bruxelles, qu’il faut considérer comme illégitime car elle ne correspond pas à la volonté des peuples européens, bernés et domestiqués par un conditionnement mental permanent, subit les conséquences de sa dépendance à l’égard des forces mondialistes, estime Pierre Vial. Elle paie le prix de la perte de sa liberté ». Plus définitif encore, Enrique Ravello affirme que « l’actuelle Union européenne est le plus grand ennemi de l’Europe ainsi que des peuples et des pays qui la constituent : elle est mondialiste, néo-libérale et soumise aux États-Unis ». Cette américanisation des esprits lobotomisés fait dire à Nicolas Gauthier qu’« en tant qu’Européen de l’espèce maurrassienne, je me sens plus chez moi à Téhéran qu’à New York ».
Paradoxalement pourtant, la crise actuelle de l’Europe est plus que nécessaire, elle est même salutaire. « Par “ crise ”, rappelle Gabriele Adinolfi, nous entendons ce que le mot signifie au sens étymologique, c’est-à-dire passage, transformation, ou si vous voulez, un changement radical guidé du haut. » Le sursaut réclamé se traduira par une « Reconquête, prévient Robert Spieler, [qui] sera, sur tous les plans, européenne ou ne sera pas ». « L’Europe que nous voulons, déclare pour sa part Gilbert Sincyr, pourrait se définir en trois mots : identitaire, autonome et solidaire. » Le Vigan confirme le propos en prévenant qu’« il est temps de réhabiliter le local car l’universel qui prétendrait se passer du local tuerait la vie elle-même de sa chair ». « La fin de l’État-nation et de la démocratie (Adinolfi) » favorise la renaissance du local. « Face à la restructuration dirigiste, mondialiste, esclavagiste, classiste, supranationale, il est possible seulement de recréer l’organicité sociale à la base et d’agir pour que le changement en cours soit ancrée dans le local et encore pour que le local fasse aussi fonction de freinage dans la course culturelle et politique permettant qu’une souveraineté continentale, expression d’identités locales, surgisse à la place de la dimension cosmopolite (Adinolfi). »
Les contraintes du réel invitent à procéder par paliers successifs. « Le souverainisme national ne me paraît pas tenable à long terme, mais il peut être une étape avant de construire une Europe autocentrée, un protectionnisme européen, une maîtrise européenne des frontières, un souverainisme européen en d’autres termes, pense Le Vigan. » Si le cadre de l’État-nation fait défaut, agissons autrement. Pour Serge Ayoub, « Troisième Voie se concentre essentiellement sur la formation d’une communauté des travailleurs aptes à faire face à la crise. La B.A.D. (Base autonome durable), la pénétration syndicale, l’autonomisation économique par rapport au système, voilà des réponses adéquates à la situation économique que la France va affronter ».
L’action doit prendre de nouvelles formes. Gabriele Adinolfi nous suggère de « procéder dans un esprit néo-sorelien, mais aussi néo-gibelin, à la création de coopératives liées à des territoires donnés et aux catégories sociales. Il faut envisager la création de caisses d’épargne ou de banques de secours mutuel qui financent la production par les investissements des classes productives elles-mêmes. » L’objectif doit tendre vers « une Europe identitaire et solidariste (aux bons sens des termes) [qui] est la seule solution pour pouvoir sortir de cette crise », affirme Hervé Van Laethem qui juge que « seule une troisième voie économique entre le libéralisme sauvage et le dirigisme socialiste pourra nous sauver de ce qui s’annonce comme une tragédie sociale. Et seule une idéologie profondément anticapitaliste, comme l’est le solidarisme, permettra de mettre en place une telle politique ». Cette troisième voie est aussi défendue par Georges Feltin-Tracol qui assure que « notre Europe saura concilier la puissance et la décroissance et s’inspirera de l’expérience de Fiume avec Gabriele d’Annunzio, du modèle suisse et de l’exemple de la Corée du Nord ! ».
Ce livre impose finalement une « certitude, croit Roland Hélie : la fin de notre civilisation et de notre identité ne sont pas une fatalité ». Espérons que nos compatriotes européens prendront conscience des périls et riposterons le moment venu.

Bastien Valorgues
Sous la direction de Roland Hélie, Face à la crise : une autre Europe ! 30 points de vue iconoclastes, Les Bouquins de Synthèse nationale (116, rue de Charenton, F – 75012 Paris), 2012, 163 p., 18 €.



Article printed from Europe Maxima: http://www.europemaxima.com


URL to article: http://www.europemaxima.com/?p=2897

lundi, 14 janvier 2013

Réflexions autour d’un petit livre bien fait sur la crise

Réflexions autour d’un petit livre bien fait sur la crise

par Jacques GEORGES

crise9782213671598.jpgFrançois Lenglet est un journaliste économique compétent, honnête et de bon sens. Arrêtons-nous pour bien peser, car le phénomène ne court pas les rues : entre les spécialistes (ceux qui savent tout sur l’inessentiel et ramènent tout à leurs marottes), les mercenaires (ceux qui vendent leur salade), les demi-savants (ceux qui en savent un peu plus que les autres, sans tout à fait dominer leur sujet), les idéologues (ceux qui ont la réponse avant la question) et les Guignols de l’Info, la place est mince pour ceux qui se contentent de dire simplement, honnêtement, modestement, des choses de bon sens sur des sujets compliqués. Ceci, en ayant des idées. À ce titre, soit dit en passant, François Lenglet, journaliste économiste, est un peu le frère jumeau de Christian Saint-Étienne, économiste communicant.

François Lenglet vient de commettre un petit livre intitulé Qui va payer la crise ? dans lequel il développe avec des mots simples des idées  fortes, qui peuvent plaire ou ne pas plaire, qu’on peut à loisir étiqueter « de droite » ou « de gauche », mais qui en tout cas méritent réflexion. La thèse centrale du livre est assez simple et peut se résumer comme suit :

— la crise de l’euro met aux prises épargnants et contribuables, dissimulant une opposition entre générations et modèles de société,

— le sauvetage de l’euro s’apparente de plus en plus à un désastre annoncé, les pays du Sud s’épuisant comme des hamsters dans leur cage,

— la solution fédéraliste européenne, à base notamment d’euro-bonds, est surtout une échappatoire pour les politiques et une ruse des financiers et donc de leurs commettants épargnants pour différer le règlement de leurs turpitudes; de toute façon, elle ne marche et ne marchera pas à horizon prévisible,

— les souverainistes de gauche ou de droite s’apparentent à des vendeurs de repas gratuits et ne sont au final que des marchands de sable,

— le plus grand risque pour la zone euro, voire pour les  pays du Sud eux-mêmes, et la France en tout cas, réside dans la sortie de l’Allemagne et de quelques économies fortes et bien gérées qui en ont les moyens (Finlande…),

— il n’existe aucune solution-miracle, mais seulement une panoplie de remèdes techniques (à fortes implications politiques et sociétales, bien sûr) à organiser et mettre en œuvre de façon pragmatique et aussi juste que possible,

— une ébauche de solution pourrait être la suivante : après avoir organisé au mieux l’inévitable sortie de la Grèce de l’euro, prononcer un moratoire temporaire des dettes donnant aux États et à la société le temps de souffler, en mettant à contribution banques, financiers et épargnants trop épargnés jusqu’à présent.

On  peut discuter diagnostic, grille de lecture et esquisses de remèdes, mais on doit reconnaître à cette thèse sa solidité, son honnêteté et sa neutralité idéologique et trans-partisane. Voici quelques réflexions et questions proposées à votre réflexion.

Ce livre vaut d’abord comme dénonciation de l’incompétence technique, des partis-pris idéologiques ou partisans, ou de la simple bêtise des simplificateurs de tous bords : de gauche, bien sûr, puisque c’est souvent leur marque de fabrique, mais de droite dite de conviction aussi : souverainistes et marino-mélenchonnistes gagneraient à s’en inspirer.

Les causes et la genèse de la crise sont décrites à grands traits de façon techniquement solide, mais on aurait aimé en annexe un rappel chronologique détaillé qui aurait ajouté à la solidité de la démonstration.

L’interprétation de la crise comme la résultante d’un conflit de générations entre soixante-huitards, ex-braillards gauchistes devenus rentiers égoïstes forcenés, identifiés de façon paradoxale mais convaincante comme la « génération libérale », et le reste de la société (entrepreneurs et jeunes notamment), est  séduisante, et d’ailleurs pas nouvelle (c’est l’une des marottes de l’auteur du présent article depuis 68 ou presque…).

Les remèdes ne sont qu’esquissés (pp. 201 – 202), ce qui est inévitable compte tenu de la complexité du sujet et de la nature de l’ouvrage. Ils tournent tous autour de la notion de moratoire de dettes : prolongation de toutes les échéances de trois ans pour les pays les plus endettés avec suspension des intérêts, rééchelonnement de la dette sur vingt ans, etc. Certaines conséquences sont citées, notamment le rétablissement du contrôle des capitaux et des changes aux frontières de l’Union, mais presque rien n’est dit sur les dépôts bancaires, l’assurance-vie et la veuve de Carpentras. Il est vrai que, sur de tels sujets, on tangente immédiatement l’incitation à la panique bancaire, péché pas du genre de l’auteur, d’ailleurs plus immédiatement nuisible que d’autres incitations pénalement répréhensibles,

In fine, ce livre est un plaidoyer raisonnable pour l’Europe et pour l’euro, expurgé de ses vices de construction les plus rédhibitoires. En tant qu’Européens de destin, dans la lignée des Drieu, des Jünger, voire des Denis de Rougemont, we can live with it.

Jacques Georges

• François Lenglet, Qui va payer la crise ?, Fayard, 2012, 216 p., 11,90 €.

Article printed from Europe Maxima: http://www.europemaxima.com

URL to article: http://www.europemaxima.com/?p=2832


vendredi, 11 janvier 2013

"Egobody" de Robert Redeker

"Egobody" de Robert Redeker

Homo novus festivusque


egobody---.jpgProfesseur de philosophie et écrivain, R. Redeker se lance dans une virulente polémique: il entend "passer au scanner" l'homme contemporain – baptisé "Egobody"– que nous serions tous devenus "à des degrés divers". Il dissèque cet homme nouveau en l'opposant à l'ancien, disparu selon lui, dans les années 1970. Les riches références philosophiques et religieuses, évitant l'écueil de la déploration moralisante, visent à nous convaincre que nous vivons une "véritable révolution anthropologique": celles du "des-humain", du "neg-humain". Toutes les valeurs, idéaux et interdits qui liaient les hommes et donnaient du sens à l'existence individuelle et collective ont disparu : les 18ème et 19ème ont annoncé la mort de Dieu, du diable et du péché originel; le 20ème celle de l'homme et des idéologies politiques... Face à cet horizon amputé de toute verticalité, de toute métaphysique, la publicité, les industries du divertissement, les nouvelles technologies ont eu le champ libre pour "fabriquer" Egobody: ayant perdu son "âme" – son for intérieur –, il ne distingue plus son "moi" de son corps: ego=body.
   • Le philosophe Redeker ramène l'homme moderne à un organisme biologique consommateur et soucieux de sa seule apparence; à un "noeud de connexions" relié par des prothèses (téléphones portables, internet). Son intelligence se réduit à son "mental", asservie à des objectifs productivistes dans l'entreprise, utilitaristes dans l'enseignement. Conditionné à consommer aliments et divertissements industriels, Egobody a perdu toute conscience du temps et de l'espace et ne vit que dans le présent, éternel "adolescent aux cheveux gris"
 tumblr_lcgyzwvfTM1qc01tho1_500.jpg  • Prenons du recul! Pour nous alerter, Redeker nous provoque: il cultive l'excès, multiplie les généralisation hâtives et sans nuances, se fait pamphlétaire; toutefois le propos mérite réflexion. "Je suis mon corps" croit Egobody; publicité, champions, mannequins en donnent à voir une image standard: chacun tente de s'y conformer car notre corps constitue notre horizon – limité – : notre projet ne serait que de le garder jeune, séduisant et quasi-immortel. Redeker nous met en garde: cette dictature de l'apparence, les nouvelles technologies, exterminent l'intériorité de l'homme. Convaincus que l'on ne peut plus changer le monde ni se changer soi-même, nous en serions venus à n'avoir pour idéal que notre "épanouissement" personnel, dès que s'interrompt le stress du "labeur" qui, à l'inverse du travail, nous transforme en boule d'énergie sans projet. Or, se prendre soi-même pour fin ne signifie pas être heureux souligne l'auteur. Matérialiste et narcissique, consommateur d'événements festifs propres à combler son vide intérieur, Egobody ne sait plus lutter contre ses travers ni leur résister. Il s'épanouit donc au détriment d'autrui; ainsi le sport est-il dangereux qui, en développant un mental de "gagnant", transforme les partenaires en autant d' ennemis.
   Egobody ploie sous "les" soucis, mais n'a plus conscience "du" souci; il s'éparpille dans "les" loisirs, mais ignore "le" loisir. Il n'entend plus sa voix intérieure qui rappelait à l'homme ancien que la vie est souci, gravité, détresse métaphysique, car permanente conscience de notre mortelle condition. Egobody ignore la valeur du silence et de l'ennui, terreau de la liberté de pensée.
   • Cette mutation anthropologique du 21ème siècle aboutit à une négation de l'homme occidental devenu planétaire: désormais tout en corporéïté, en apparence, Egobody n'est plus qu'un "sac de peau" vide.
   Le lecteur balance entre rire et irritation. Certes, exagérer l'impact des tendances contemporaines aide à prendre conscience des risques encourus; mais le propos de Redeker tend à la caricature tant il nie systématiquement toute avancée bienfaitrice de la modernité: on s'interroge lorsqu'il déplore que le pouvoir politique, à défaut d'idéal, ait fait de la santé son objectif, ou que l'on cherche à supprimer la douleur... Mais c'est là aussi le regard nécessaire d'un philosophe sur notre temps: sans doute oublions-nous trop souvent que l'homme n'est, selon Pascal, qu'un "roseau", un corps faible et mortel; mais un "roseau pensant": sa force, propre à lui seul, c'est son "âme", sa voix intérieure, qui lui permet de trouver du sens à son passage sur cette terre.

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Egobody: la fabrique de l'homme nouveau


Robert Redeker : Egobody

La fabrique de l’homme nouveau

par François-Xavier Ajavon

Ex: http://www.actu-philosophia.com/

Depuis plusieurs dizaines d’années le philosophe Robert Redeker frappe de sa sagacité des sujets aussi divers que le sport [1] ou le progressisme [2], et n’hésite pas à explorer des thématiques singulières telles que le sens d’un gimmick électoral (le « Yes we can » d’Obama) [3] ou la question du rapport entre philosophie et état dépressif [4]. Ecrivant de longue date dans Les Temps Modernes (la revue fondée par Sartre et dirigée par Claude Lanzmann), le philosophe s’est toujours inscrit dans une démarche humaniste et voltairienne, particulièrement cohérente, qui l’a conduit en 2006 à dénoncer – dans les colonnes du Figaro à travers une tribune vitriolée [5] - les intimidations islamistes récurrentes visant à atteindre le principe de laïcité qui fonde notre République. La suite est connue et a fait, contre son gré, de Redeker une figure médiatique : un débat public passionné autour de la libre parole sur les religions, une hystérie médiatique inextinguible [6], et surtout l’efflorescence nauséabonde de maintes menaces de mort à l’encontre du philosophe. Frappé d’une « fatwa » prise très au sérieux par les autorités, Redeker a été placé depuis le début de l’ « affaire » sous constante surveillance policière. Ayant été contraint de renoncer à son poste d’enseignant, Redeker poursuit son travail philosophique solitaire dans le contexte du CNRS. Dans les colonnes du journal régional La Dépêche du Midi il expliquait en mai dernier ses conditions de vie : « Pendant mes vacances dans le Gard, l’été dernier, trois policiers m’ont accompagné dans tous mes déplacements privés (…) Je travaille beaucoup chez moi. J’ai un bracelet électronique. S’il m’arrive quelque chose, cela se sait immédiatement… » [7] C’est dans ces révoltantes conditions de vie et de travail que le philosophe traqué, vivant comme un fugitif, a rédigé la matière de son piquant essai Egobody, la Fabrique de l’homme nouveau paru chez Fayard. Raison de plus pour s’y intéresser. Prolongeant le propos énoncé dans un article publié par Le Monde dès 2009 [8], Robert Redeker a l’ambition dans cet ouvrage de donner le portrait le plus exact de l’homme moderne, tel qu’il le perçoit dans la plus appréciable des lucidités : l’egobody, confondant son âme et son moi avec son corps. La démarche de l’auteur, s’intéressant aux multiples facettes de la vie contemporaine qui sont susceptibles de forger le nouvel « homme nouveau » (par l’alimentation, le sport, la publicité, les médias, etc.), s’inscrit dans un projet intellectuel ayant pour ambition de « reconstruire l’anthropologie philosophique » [9]. Redeker constatant que depuis trop longtemps la philosophie, « honteuse d’elle-même » [10], ne s’approprie plus directement la question de l’homme en la laissant à la science, estime qu’elle doit reprendre la main, et en revenir à l’horizon des Lumières et de Kant, pour qui l’interrogation « Qu’est-ce que l’homme ? » était centrale.

Pour Redeker, répondre à cette question, c’est d’abord comprendre quelles mutations ont pu conduire au développement d’egobody et à sa fulgurante multiplication, sous toutes les latitudes et longitudes du globe, du fait de l’horreur artificielle et presque industrielle de sa reproductibilité universelle et absolue. L’egobody (dont Redeker « scanne » [11] bien des aspects dans son essai et en livre maints visages : depuis la quinquagénaire obsédée par son apparence, ivre de jeunisme et refusant de vieillir, jusqu’aux interchangeables créatures du showbiz, ultra-formatées, en passant par les sportifs ayant renoncé à l’âme pour un vulgaire « mental »…) n’obéit pas à une logique politique, mais purement industrielle. En ce sens il n’y a pas de lien entre ce pathétique egobody, et le sinistre « homme nouveau » tel que les théoriciens du III ème Reich, par exemple, le rêvaient. « Le corps nouveau contemporain n’est pas sculpté par le volontarisme politique, mais s’est développé à l’écart du politique » [12]. La « dictée du corps », selon la belle expression de Redeker ne vient plus d’une église imposant des normes, des interdits, ou bien de l’idéologie d’un parti, projetant le déploiement de cohortes unifiées d’individus-objets ; cette dictée vient de la publicité (entendue en ces termes par l’auteur : « Tout ce qui est mis en scène devant un public dans un espace collectif ouvert (sport, télévision, show-business, érotisme commercial, cinéma) » [13]). Redeker nous fait donc le portrait d’un homme nouveau vivant à travers le « miroir » des écrans. Non seulement dépendant des productions médiatiques, mais puisant dans cet imaginaire souvent formaté par le marketing et le langage des annonceurs, des clés pour mener sa propre barque dans le monde : « le téléspectateur est un pervers narcissique téléchargeant son logiciel comportemental. En regardant ces écrans, il se donne inconsciemment un objectif : je dois coller à mon image, telle qu’elle apparaît sur ces écrans » [14]. Ailleurs, et sur la base d’une analyse parfois moins pertinente, l’auteur voit egobody comme prisonnier de l’informatique (et spécifiquement d’Internet) et de leurs logiques de flux informationnels traversant perpétuellement les individus. En tant qu’homo numericus [15], l’homme moderne se croit hyper-connecté à une vie sociale qui est en réalité absente : « Dans les cybercafés, il décline son identité collective comme geek. On le voit rivé à des écrans, relié, même dans la rue, à des câbles dont il paraît un prolongement, pianotant des SMS, communiquant partout et toujours » [16]. Egobody, dont le corps a englouti l’âme, et dont le corps même est réduit à un petit tas d’octets [17] trouve son existence ultime – et la moins consistante - sous la forme d’un avatar de réseau social. Redeker analyse même en détail, sur tout un chapitre, le phénomène Facebook : « (ceci) cristallise la révolution anthropologique dont traite ce livre » [18]. Egobody tombe dans le piège que lui tend la cybernétique et feint de croire que l’informatique est un simple outil, à la neutralité inoffensive, alors que – d’après l’auteur – ces nouvelles technologies réorganisent en profondeur nos façons de penser, et influent sur nos grilles de lectures du monde.


Mais egobody est avant tout transformé directement dans sa chair, et doit se saisir comme un individu qui a presque muté. Un individu devenu OGM par l’effet, d’abord, de la nourriture qu’il ingère : « Par le biais de la nourriture, le monde industriel a pénétré, par capillarité, dans notre moi biologique, a pris possession de notre corps et l’a transformé » [19]. Les aliments modernes, à la fois sur-contrôlés sur le plan des risques sanitaires, aseptisés, comportent aussi un certain nombre d’additifs chimiques dont ne connaît pas toujours les effets à long terme ; et qui« maçonnent » [20] savamment le corps d’egobody, sans que ce dernier en ait toujours conscience. Enfermé dans un culte délirant de son enveloppe charnelle, l’homme nouveau exige que la santé apporte à ce corps sacralisé une jeunesse éternelle. La santé rêvée par egobody doit – en somme – abolir la perspective de la maladie, du vieillissement, de la déchéance et de la mort. « Dangereuse santé qui voudrait jeter aux oubliettes notre condition humaine, qui voudrait nous faire oublier que nous ne sommes que des hommes » [21]. A travers sa mystique de la santé, egobody en rupture avec le christianisme, ne vise pas une immortalité post mortem par la voie de la résurrection, mais une forme « d’immortalité ante mortem » [22] matérialiste.

pt.jpgDès lors, débarrassé du souci fondamental de vivre, c’est-à-dire essentiellement de se préparer à l’idée de mourir, egobody, réduit à un corps formaté par les écrans, n’a plus qu’à simplement jouir. Jouir par le divertissement qui est son « tropisme principal » et l’enfonce toujours plus dans un quotidien « lunaparkisé » [23], hyperfestif et faussement joyeux. Jouir aussi par la sexualité, dont egobody est sommé d’en faire un « étendard » [24]. Redeker se moque des dernières déclarations de l’Abbé Pierre, se sentant obligé de révéler que malgré sa grande fidélité à Dieu, et à ses vœux de jeunesse, il avait cédé dans la fraîcheur nécessairement positive de son adolescente au plaisir de faire l’amour [25]. « Dernier substitut trouvé au Salut, la sexualité a en effet été récupérée par le discours hygiéniste, qui le présente comme un facteur de santé ». Fini, donc, pour egobody, ce délicieux et inégalable sentiment de se perdre dans la luxure… Egobody ne croit plus en Dieu, ni au diable, ni au péché originel. Il n’est plus qu’une enveloppe corporelle, et la sexualité ne devient pour lui qu’une simple fonction possible de ce corps-outil.

Se dégage de ce parcours le constat de l’émergence au XXème siècle d’un « homme planétaire » (chapitre XIX), uniformisé, standardisé, co-produit par les médias et les logiques de la société de consommation. Loin de l’idéal d’homme universel rêvé par les Lumières dans le contexte d’un authentique « projet » politique ou philosophique, cet homme planétaire « (résulte) du maillage médiatico-technologique (radio, télé, internet), industriel et commercial, recouvrant toute la terre » [26]. L’homme planétaire – reproductible et interchangeable – ne vit donc même plus pour vivre, mais pour simplement consommer. Mieux, pour faire consommer son corps. Et cela dans la perspective d’une obsessionnelle vie sans fin – inspirée par les médias et veillée par la santé - où les différences individuelles se lisseraient progressivement en un seul et unique type humain. Certainement le dernier de tous [27].

De l’art de dépeindre la modernité. Montaigne décrivait son propre style – et sa façon de faire cheminer sa pensée – comme étant « à sauts et à gambades ». On peut regretter que le fil de la pensée de Robert Redeker soit parfois difficile à suivre par une tendance à la versatilité, quand ce n’est même au papotage. L’auteur a parfois tendance à embarquer dans le flot de sa pensée (dont l’élan est toujours extrêmement stimulant) un nombre abondant de notions et de références hétéroclites – issues d’horizons très divers [28]- qui ne sont pas toujours clairement définies, et dont l’emboitement parfois artificiel pourrait conduire les grincheux à n’être pas convaincus.

Mais c’est là une tendance propre à l’ « essai » d’aller par sauts et gambades, même quand les grands écarts et les entrechats ne sont pas exécutés avec la grâce stylistique d’un Montaigne. Le cheminement que propose Redeker n’en demeure pas moins extrêmement stimulant : le philosophe s’engage dans une démarche parfaitement nécessaire de critique de la modernité, et du modèle humain qu’il engendre, egobody. C’est en ceci que la référence à Philippe Muray inscrite un peu crânement sur l’accroche de la quatrième de couverture se justifie pleinement ; Redeker – sans l’humour et la truculence de l’auteur du XIXème siècle à travers les âges, mais avec des intuitions singulièrement brillantes – fait un salutaire effort de compréhension de l’homme moderne qui, en rupture avec une forme de négativité archaïque, en guerre contre la mort, en révolte contre la vie intérieure, formaté par le sport et les modèles d’humanité inconsistante véhiculées par le show-business, se vautre dans le bonheur artificiel d’une vie sous assistance festive, et dans le fantasme d’une humanité réduite à sa seule vie corporelle. Espérons que Redeker pourra poursuivre avec bonheur sa réflexion plutôt lucide sur le monde moderne, lui qui – ne l’oublions pas – vit comme un fugitif pour avoir cru qu’il était encore possible d’exprimer une opinion libre sur tous les sujets.


[1] Robert Redeker, Le sport contre les peuples, Editions Berg International, 2002 ; Le sport est-il humain ? Editions du Panama, 2008.

[2] Robert Redeker, Le Progrès ou L’Opium de l’histoire, Editions Pleins Feux, 2004.

[3] « Yes we can », Slogan électoral, Editions Pleins Feux, 2009.

[4] Robert Redeker, Dépression et philosophie : Du mal du siècle au mal de ce siècle, Editions Pleins Feux, 2007.

[5] « Face aux intimidations islamistes, que doit faire le monde libre ? », Le Figaro, 19 septembre 2006.

[6] Dans une « Chronique de la philosophie médiatique » publiée ici même en 2008 nous nous étions intéressé à la pression médiatique pesant sur Redeker « Robert Redeker devant le tribunal du people » : http://www.actu-philosophia.com/spi...

[7] « Redeker : ‘Je vis comme un semi-clandestin’ », La Dépêche du Midi, 12 mai 2010.

[8] « Le nouveau corps de l’homme entre sport, publicité et pornographie », Le Monde, Mercredi 19 août 2009.

[9] Robert Redeker, Egobody, La fabrique de l’homme nouveau, 2010, Fayard, p. 58.

[10] Ibid. p. 57

[11] Le mot est de l’auteur. Ibid. p. 158. Un travail de synthèse rendu obligatoire par ce constat (p. 8) : « Depuis trois décennies s’est imposée l’image d’un homme éparpillé en mille tessons épars ».

[12] Ibid. p. 22

[13] Ibid. p. 23

[14] Ibid. p. 92

[15] Ibid. p. 159

[16] Ibid. p. 86

[17] Malraux parlait de sa vie intime comme d’un « petit tas de secrets ».

[18] Ibid. p. 161

[19] Ibid. p. 16

[20] Ibid. p. 19

[21] Ibid. p. 130

[22] Ibid. p. 114

[23] Ibid. p. 87

[24] Ibid. p. 45

[25] Ibid. p. 46

[26] Ibid. p. 185

[27] A l’appui de sa démonstration concernant « l’homme planétaire » on peut regretter la tentative de réhabilitation opérée par Redeker à propos de l’œuvre de Gobineau, auteur du fameux Traité sur l’inégalité des races humaines (1853), qu’il voit (p. 189) comme un « grand et beau livre ». Difficile de le suivre dans son invitation à « ôter le substrat racialiste hiérarchisant de sa pensée », même si cette dernière permet d’illustrer la question du métissage. Une figure du métis que Redeker illustre d’ailleurs de manière un peu irritante – à plusieurs reprises – par la figure du président américain Barak Obama. (par exemple p. 30)

[28] Que les âmes sensibles se préparent d’ailleurs, dans l’exploration de l’horizon d’egobody à rencontrer ce que l’on pourrait appeler des « gros bouts » de réalité triviale parfois pénibles tels que : « les Ken et les Barbie » (le mot est de l’auteur) des chaînes d’info continue (p. 29) ; la télé-réalité, Loft-Story « zoo humain » (p. 37) ; la série télé Plus belle la vie (p. 88) ; l’insipide « Cerise » de la pub Groupama (p. 90) ; la série Desperate Housewives (p. 119) et même le film Le grand bleu de l’insupportable Luc Besson, convoqué pour illustrer le sentiment d’ « extase régressive » (p. 155) provoqué par une séance de « surf » sur Internet. Mais c’est peut-être au prix de ces références là que l’on s’approche au plus près de l’univers infernal d’egobody.

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jeudi, 10 janvier 2013

Mythes et manipulations de l'histoire africaine


Un nouveau livre de Bernard Lugan :

L’indispensable outil de réfutation des mythes qui alimentent la repentance.

Depuis un quart de siècle les connaissances que nous avons du passé de l’Afrique et de l’histoire coloniale ont fait de tels progrès que la plupart des dogmes sur lesquels reposait la culture dominante ont été renversés. Cependant, le monde médiatique et la classe politique demeurent enfermés dans leurs certitudes d’hier et dans un état des connaissances obsolète : postulat de la richesse de l’Europe fondée sur l’exploitation de ses colonies ; idée que la France devrait des réparations à l’Algérie alors qu’elle s’y est ruinée durant 130 ans ; affirmation de la seule culpabilité européenne dans le domaine de la traite des Noirs quand la réalité est qu’une partie de l’Afrique a vendu l’autre aux traitants ; croyance selon laquelle, en Afrique du Sud, les Noirs sont partout chez eux alors que, sur 1/3 du pays, les Blancs ont l’antériorité de la présence ; manipulation concernant le prétendu massacre d’Algériens à Paris le 17 octobre 1961 etc. Le but de ce livre enrichi de nombreuses cartes en couleur, est de rendre accessible au plus large public le résultat de ces travaux universitaires novateurs qui réduisent à néant les 15 principaux mythes et mensonges qui nourrissent l’idéologie de la repentance.

Mythes et manipulations de l'Histoire africaine, Bernard Lugan, L'Afrique réelle, 28 € cliquez ici

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mercredi, 09 janvier 2013

Le roman de Charette

Philippe de Villiers:

le roman de Charette


« Combattu souvent, battu parfois, abattu jamais » : la vie de François-Athanase Charette de la Contrie est à l’image de sa devise. Vendéen comme lui, Philippe de Villiers nourrit depuis longtemps un attachement tout particulier pour ce héros dont le destin fait écho à sa propre histoire familiale. Au point de s’identifier à lui et de ressusciter, sous forme de mémoires imaginaires, la vie aventureuse de cet homme aussi séduisant qu’intrépide, fidèle envers et contre tout à une cause : « la Patrie, la Foi, le Roi ».

De sa brillante carrière dans la Marine royale, intégrée à l’âge de quatorze ans, à ce jour de 1793 où, à la tête d’une troupe de paysans du Marais breton, Charette part à l’assaut de la République, Philippe de Villiers ressuscite la flamboyante épopée d’un homme dont l’audace et le courage, la personnalité singulièrement libre et moderne, n’ont pas fini de fasciner.

Le roman de Charette, Philippe de Villiers, Albin Michel, 2012, 480 pages, 22,00 €.

mardi, 08 janvier 2013

Introduction to Guillaume Faye’s book Convergence of Catastrophes

Introduction to Guillaume Faye’s book Convergence of Catastrophes, published by Arktos Media

An Explosive Cocktail

The modern world is like a train full of ammunition ­running in the fog on a moonless night with its lights out.’ (Robert Ardrey[1])

GFcoc_1.jpgFor the first time in its history, humanity is threatened by a convergence of catastrophes.

A series of ‘dramatic lines’ are approaching one another and converging like a river’s tributaries with perfect accord (between 2010 and 2020) towards a breaking point and a descent into chaos. From this chaos — which will be extremely painful on the global scale — can emerge the new order of the post-catastrophe era and therefore a new civilisation born in pain.

Let us briefly summarise the nature of these lines of catastrophe.

The first is the cancerisation of the European social fabric. The colonisation of the Northern hemisphere for purposes of permanent settlement by the peoples of the global South, which is increasingly serious despite the reassuring affirmations of the media, is pregnant with explosive situations; the failure of the multiracial society, increasingly full of racism of all kinds with different communities becoming more and more tribal; the progressive ethnic and anthropological metamorphosis of Europe, a true historical cataclysm; the return of poverty to Western and Eastern Europe; the slow but steady growth of criminal activity and drug use; the continual disintegration of family structures; the decline of educational infrastructure and the quality of academic programs; the disruption of the transmission of cultural knowledge and social disciplines (barbarisation and loss of needed skills); the disappearance of popular culture and the increasing degrading of the masses by the culture of spectacles.[2] All this indicates to us that the European nations are moving toward a New Middle Ages.[3]

But these factors of social breakdown in Europe will be aggravated by the economic and demographic crisis which will only get worse and end by producing mass poverty. By 2010 the number of active workers will not be large enough to finance the retirements of the ‘grandpa boomers’. Europe will collapse under the weight of old people; then its ageing countries will see their economies slowed and handicapped by payments for healthcare and retirement benefits for unproductive citizens; in addition, the ageing of the population will dry up technical and economic dynamism. In addition to these problems, the economy will increasingly resemble the Third World because of the uncontrolled immigration of unskilled populations.

Modernity’s third dramatic line of catastrophe will be the chaos of the global South. By displacing their traditional cultures with industrialisation, the nations of the South, in spite of a deceptive and fragile economic growth, have created social chaos that is only going to get worse.

The fourth line of catastrophe, which has recently been explained by Jacques Attali,[4] is the threat of a world financial crisis, which will be much more serious than the crisis of the 1930s and will bring about a general recession. The harbinger of the crisis will be the collapse of the stock markets and currencies of the Far East, like the recession that is striking this region.

The fifth line of catastrophe is the rise of fanatical religious cults, principally Islam. The rise of radical Islam is the backlash to the excesses of the cosmopolitanism of modernity that wanted to impose on the entire world the model of atheist individualism, the cult of material goods, the loss of spiritual values and the dictatorship of the spectacle. In reaction to this aggression, Islam has radicalised, just as it was already becoming once again a religion of domination and conquest, in conformity with its traditions.

The sixth line of catastrophe: a North-South confrontation, with theological and ethnic roots, will appear on the horizon. It is increasingly likely to replace the risk of an East-West conflict, which we have so far avoided. No one knows what form it will take, but it will be serious, because it will be based on collective challenges and sentiments much stronger than the old and artificial partisan polarity of the USA and USSR, capitalism and Communism.

The seventh line of catastrophe is the uncontrolled increase of pollution, which will not threaten the Earth (which still has four billion years to look forward to and can start evolution over again from zero), but the physical survival of humanity. This collapse of the environment is the fruit of the liberal and egalitarian myth (which was once also a Soviet myth) of universal industrial development and a dynamic economy for everyone.

We can add to all this the probable implosion of the contemporary European Union, which is increasingly ungovernable, the risks involved with nuclear proliferation in the Third World, and the probability of ethnic civil war in Europe.

The convergence of these factors in the heart of a globalised and very fragile civilisation allows us to predict that the Twenty-first century will not be the ‘progressive’ continuation of the contemporary world, but the rise of another world. We must prepare ourselves for this tragic possibility with lucidity.

Believing in Miracles

We are dealing with a general prejudice inherited from the egalitarian and humanitarian utopias, like the philosophy of Progress, according to which ‘we can have everything at the same time’ and that reality never has negative consequences.

People believe they can have their cake and eat it too. They imagine, according to the liberal faith, that an ‘invisible hand’ will spontaneously restore a harmonious equilibrium. I shall mention a few examples of believing in miracles:

•    Imagining that the dogma of the unlimited economic development of every nation is possible without massive pollution and ecological catastrophes that will destroy this very development. This is the illusion of indefinite development.

•    Believing that a permissive society will not produce a social jungle, and that you can obtain at the same time libertarian emancipation and self-disciplined harmony. We see this drama being acted out in the shipwreck of our schools, where violence, insecurity, ignorance, and illiteracy are arising out of the illusion of progressive education, an educational method which rejects any form of discipline for its students.

•    Believing that it will be possible to preserve retirement systems and social and medical entitlements while remaining faithful, in a period of demographic decline, to the ideal of ‘solidarity of distribution’. This is the illusion of the Communist conception of solidarity.

•    Believing that large-scale alien immigration is compatible with the ‘values of the French Republic’ and the preservation of the civilisation of the nations and peoples of Europe; and that Islam can become secular and blend in with republican values. Believing also that we can renew the working population by importing immigrants, when these immigrants are unskilled welfare recipients and our responsibility. Imagining also that by regularising the status of masses of illegal immigrants, it will be possible to assimilate them and avoid the arrival of new masses, although we observe exactly the opposite. This is the illusion of the benefits of immigration.

•    Extolling the assimilation and integration of aliens while wanting to preserve and maintain their special characteristics, their original cultures, their memories and native mores. This is the communitarian illusion, one of the most harmful of all, which is particularly cherished by ‘ethno-pluralist’ intellectuals.

•    Imagining that by cancelling Third World debt we can encourage their economic growth and prevent new indebtedness in the future. This is the Third Worldist illusion.

•    Demanding at one and the same time that we abandon nuclear energy programs and replace them with power plants using natural gas, coal and petroleum, while advocating the reduction of polluting gases. This is the ecologist’s illusion.

•    Thinking that a world economy founded on short term speculation based on computerised markets and replacing monetary policies with the caprice of financial markets will guarantee a lasting ‘new growth’. This is the illusion of the new economy.

•    Believing that democracy and ‘republican values’ will be reinforced by eliminating ‘populism’, that is, the direct expression of the will of the people.

I could make the list longer. In all these matters, believing in miracles can be explained by the incorrigible optimism of the secular religion of egalitarian progressivism, but also by the fact that, although it has reached an impasse, the dominant ideology does not dare deny its dogmas or make heartbreaking revisions, while clinging to the idea that ‘the storm will never come’. The whole thing is explained by the sophisms of bogus experts, whose conclusions are always that everything is going well and getting better and that we have the situation under control. They are like a driver who speeds through a red light and justifies it by explaining that the faster he drives, the less time he spends in the intersection and therefore reduces the risk of a collision.

Man, a Sick Animal

Paul MacLean,[5] Konrad Lorenz,[6] Arthur Koestler,[7] and Jean Rostand[8] have sensed that man is a sick animal, endowed with a brain that is too large. Conscience is perhaps, on the evolutionary scale, an illness and intelligence a burden. Man has lost touch with his natural survival instincts. We have not been on the Earth for a long time and it may be that, from life’s point of view, or Gaïa’s,[9] we are a failed species, an abortive experiment; and that, especially by destroying the ecosystem that supports it, the suicidal human race is hastening its own disappearance.

Our neocortex, which some biologists compare to a tumour, does not function sufficiently in symbiosis with our reptilian brain. This is ‘cerebral schizo-physiology’, the source of a chaotic and self-destructive culture: wars, religious fanaticisms, frenzied exploitation of nature, aberrant demographic proliferation or, on the other hand, catastrophically low birth levels, frustrating natural selection, etc.: Homo sapiens sapiens does not deserve the name he has given himself. He is not ‘wise’, only intelligent. But he will perhaps perish from this excessive intelligence, which is pushing him to excess, hybris[10], and is making him lose every instinct of collective survival and all capacity to ‘feel’ the dangers that are piling up.

The Golem Parable, or the Machine that Went Mad

Humanity has lost control of the forward rush of the technological and globalised civilisation born in the Nineteenth century. We should remember the parable of the Golem, the Jewish allegory from Prague, in which a mud figure brought to life by magic escapes its maker, becomes an autonomous and out of control entity, and then starts spreading terror.

Today’s little Jules Vernes[11] are mistaken. Optimistic and short-sighted mechanics, they are only making the situation worse. More than that, they are not in control of the machine and have no idea where it is heading. There really is a pilot in the airplane, but he is convinced that he is driving a locomotive.

Among the inescapable trends at work today, there are other risks that are unforeseeable today but which will make things worse (or perhaps better, but this is less likely), or else create new tendencies or new earth-shattering phenomena. At any rate, it is hard to see any positive signs. All the indictors are flashing red.

In futurology, there are only two types of extrapolation from current trends that one can make with a high degree of probability: the weak and the strong. Today predictions are typically based on weak extrapolations. These latter are, for example, the pursuit of economic growth, linear and continuous technological progress, scientific civilisation, the affirmation of democracy everywhere in the world (who is telling us that Europe will be ‘democratic’ in 2030?); the lasting character of the United Nations; the effectiveness of antibiotics in the next century, and so on.

We are less concerned with strong extrapolations, which have a good chance of being realised in the next twenty years: the demographic disequilibrium of North and South that will grow massively; the unavoidable ageing of the indigenous European population; the growth of mass immigration into rich countries; the worsening of pollution, atmospheric warming and the exhaustion of resources, which is growing worse regardless of what measures may be taken today on a global level (and they are not being taken); the rising power of Islam; the worsening of social disintegration in Europe along ethnic lines, etc. All these strong extrapolations are headed in the direction of the system’s breakdown, and are what we might call ‘pessimistic’.

The ‘Billiard Ball’ Theory

The current implicit ideology that dominates the world, especially in the West, still continues to profess, officially, the utopia inherited from the egalitarian philosophy of the Enlightenment (Eighteenth century), positivism[12] and scientism (Nineteenth century): to create a situation where, in a few decades from now, some eight billion people will live on the planet with a good standard of living and democracy for all. All this resembles the billiard player who imagines that after four or five rebounds his ball will automatically fall into the hole. These professors of ballistics are playing golf, but they do not know it.

It is a quasi-certainty that this persistent belief in progress and modernity, concepts which the political classes of the West are always jabbering about and which are totally obsolete, will never see its objectives occur. The dream will shatter into pieces. Constraining forces, a physical wall, makes this ideology resemble a mass of intellectual stupefaction and belief in miracles.

The demanding parameters, mentioned above, based upon the assumption that current realities will persist and that current projections for the future will be realised, are not taken into account. No one is looking at the dashboard or the fuel gauge. Only the short-term counts, but for how much more time? The majority of the elites do not concern themselves with the long term, or even the middle term, in this civilisation of the here and now. The fate of future generations does not interest the decision-makers at all. They care only about their own careers.

*  *  *

They are helped by the experts in every field, who practice constant disinformation and censorship of pessimism, taking advantage of the good old Coué method of optimistic autosuggestion:[13] ‘Everything is going badly, so, to reassure myself, I say that everything is going well.’ Actually pessimism would be more convincing, since it incites people to improve matters and to try to cure the disease. Alas, I think that is already too late. We have passed the point of no return.

The majority of intellectuals, media people, politicians and businessmen maintain a language of utopian optimism, clinging to their dogmas and making a gross travesty of reality: ‘republican assimilation is making progress and will continue to make progress in France’; ‘we are on the path to control massive illegal immigration’; ‘Islamism is in decline’; ‘we are on track to win the war on terror’; ‘economic growth will resume next year and, because of the economic recovery, unemployment will go down’ (when tomorrow comes, erasing it will cost nothing); ‘we are going to establish democracy in the Near East’; ‘we can stop using nuclear power and reduce pollution by making more efficient use of other resources, even if we go back to power plants that use petroleum, natural gas and coal’; ‘we are going to find the money to pay for the costs of healthcare insurance without increasing public borrowing’; and so on.

We go forward each time either by lying and misrepresenting the objective situation, or by deliberately ignoring the parameters and changes that are taking place.

If elites of all different kinds pretend to believe this nonsense, public opinion (once upon a time we used to say, ‘the people’) subscribes to it less and less. Pessimism is present everywhere, like a sort of presentiment of a coming apocalypse. Already in 1995, an IFOP[14] poll published in the Leftist newspaper Libération revealed that to the question, ‘In ten years will we live in a better world?’ 64 % of those polled responded in the negative. They were not mistaken.

‘Catastrophe Theory’ and ‘Discrete Structural Metamorphoses’

In his ‘catastrophe theory’ French mathematician René Thom[15] explained that a ‘system’ (whether physical-chemical, mechanical, climatic, organic, social, civilisational, etc.) is an always fragile ensemble that can suddenly lurch into chaos, without anyone anticipating it, as a result of an accumulation of factors. It is the famous ‘drop of water that causes the cup to overflow’. Every system is unstable and every civilisation is mortal, like everything in the universe. But sometimes the collapse is violent and sudden. For a long time a system can be worn away from inside by an endemic crisis; it holds out for a long time and then, suddenly, everything tips over. We find here the law of viral and bacterial biology: incubation is slow, but the final attack is as fast as lightning. A tree, apparently in good health, falls down during the first storm, although no one suspected that its insides were eaten away.

History offers us examples of sudden and unforeseen collapses: the Amerindian civilisation after the Spanish invasion, or else the Egyptian empire facing the assault of the Romans. I am defending the thesis that this is what awaits today’s global civilisation in the next twenty years. We are going to hit a very sudden breaking point arising from the simultaneous convergences of great crises. It is easy to envisage spectacular and rapid historical reversals.

*  *  *

It is always necessary to beware of surprises, these unforeseen and sometimes discrete transformations, which turn everything upside down. They radically modify a system’s structure, without making a loud noise and suddenly, their consequences explode and change everything. That is what is heading for us today. They are ‘discrete structural metamorphoses’.

We believe that we are still living in world X, when we are already in world Y, and the house of cards of the old world collapses without warning. These metamorphoses do not always make the front pages of newspapers; they take place without making a fuss. They constitute history’s infrastructure, not its ephemeral surface.

The founding of the Fifth Republic,[16] the fall of Communism, the results of American elections, etc., are events that depend on the superstructure. On the other hand, what we have called the ‘discrete structural metamorphoses’ will have incalculable consequences. For a generation they have been increasingly frequent and rapid. They are transforming the face of our civilisation.

Let us mention some cases. In France and Belgium, and soon in other countries, the number of active practitioners of Islam is soon going to surpass that of the Christian churches; the depopulation of Europe has begun as the radical ethnic modification of its population; the Spanish language has already equalled and even surpassed English in the American Southwest; some twenty nations possess the technology for making nuclear weapons; in a number of Western countries the traditional family is collapsing and a demographic coma is in place; the ‘casino economy’, purely speculative and unregulated, stretches over the entire world, especially in China, which still calls itself ‘Communist’; antibiotics are less and less effective against bacterial epidemics, and so on.

We are in control of none of these structural metamorphoses. And very few people are aware of the power of their interaction.

We Must Stop Believing in Sorcerers: Techno-science Gone Mad

The elites who direct the Western world, the over-credentialed ‘experts’, are pulling the wool over our eyes. They possess neither strategy nor mastery of analysis and are satisfied with tactics. The real problems are never investigated. The solutions are rhetorical or electoral. The good apostles, bureaucrats with MBAs from prestigious schools, are only masters of words. No improvement is in sight. The Golem’s inexorable march continues.

The burden of ‘doing nothing’ is the heaviest. But the experts and specialists (once called ‘savants’) are consoling us. They play the role sorcerers played in ancient societies.

*  *  *

No one is directing science and technology any longer and, far from improving the human condition as they used to, they are making it worse, notably by exhausting resources and destroying the environment. The modern myth of ‘development’, which is venerated more than ever all over the world, leads to its opposite, a gigantic regression, a race to the bottom. No authority, no international planning has emerged. Globalisation is anarchy. The backdrop of this fatal movement is generalised individual consumerism, the search for the highest possible standard of living, unbridled enthusiasm for the free market, the speculative economy and the cult of ‘taking each day as it comes’.

Similarly, democracy has to be seen as an aggravating factor, for this type of regime removes any central authority that can, when it sees the storm appearing, react in an emergency. Liberal democracy favours improvidence, the law of the market, and short-term calculation by individuals or corporations. If once upon a time this type of regime was efficient, today it seems incompetent, as it shows every day, to stem the rise of dangers.

International conferences on the environment are a futile waste of time. Just as there is no control over mass immigration, so the destruction of fish reserves and our forest heritage, the increased emission of greenhouse gases, the demographic gap between North and South, etc., are out of control. Even the authorities who arise to reverse the catastrophic course of events, whether they represent countries or the United Nations, do not succeed in correcting the direction of the cargo ship that is going full sail, faster and faster, towards the reefs.

*  *  *

But we are reassured by the ‘experts’ and are still fascinated by techno-science, believing that it will solve all our problems using some new form of magic. Computers, the electric or low-polluting engines, organic agriculture, and pharmaceutical research will not prevent the return of famines and epidemics or the exponential growth of pollution. It is too late. The machine is racing. Intellectuals and ‘philosophers’ have been telling us over and over again for decades that ‘the myth of Progress’ is dead. On the contrary, it has never been in such good shape, especially in the developing countries of the South. We are victims of the psychological condition of derealisation, a loss of the sense of reality of what is happening. Our contemporaries have persuaded themselves that ‘catastrophe cannot happen’ and that this civilisation is at the same time eternal and continually getting better and better, that it will never experience a reversal, and a fortiori[17] not a collapse. Not only is this a possibility, but it will happen, and very soon.

What comforts us in this gloomy illusion is our techno-scientific environment, which we consider to be indestructible, when on the contrary this global civilisation is a colossus with feet of clay. The politicians and the experts, who possess neither audacity nor imagination, reject every radical solution. They always prefer little solutions, tactical or rigged, compromises that please an electorate with cold feet, always respecting the status quo. They believe, like King Arthur, that ‘the fortress is impregnable’ when no one is guarding the walls.[18]

The groundswell — or rather the different groundswells arriving at the same time, demographic, strategic, sociological, economic, environmental — is arrogantly ignored. In France we even use the surreal expression ‘sustainable development’! The dominant ideology, which calls itself rationalist, is really magical. In every area it plays the role of an ‘ideology of sleep’.

*  *  *

We must not forget — and it is one of the central theses of this work — that mini-catastrophes reinforce one another, multiplying their effects among one another to produce a global mega-catastrophe. An accident (of an airplane, for instance) is the result of a series of causes and never just one: for example, the conjunction of a technical problem in the controls, bad weather and pilot error.

It is the same with the situation we are living through, or rather that we are soon going to be living through. For example, the natural calamities produced by global warming aggravate the famines caused by other economic and demographic causes and thus make the economic situation even worse and push the populations of the South to emigrate to the North, thus destabilising the West still more. Growing poverty in certain countries feeds religious fanaticism that, in turn, complicates political instability. And so on.

The system is holistic and interactive, which explains the acceleration of the arrival of the breaking point, since a multitude of crises converge at the same moment, without anyone being able to treat them separately.

[1]     Robert Ardrey (1908-1980) was a widely read and discussed author during the 1960s, particularly his books African Genesis (1961) and The Territorial Imperative (1966). Ardrey’s most controversial hypothesis, known as the ‘killer ape theory’, posits that what distinguished humans’ evolutionary ancestors from other primates was their aggressiveness, which caused them to develop weapons to conquer their environment and also leading to changes in their brains which led to modern humans. In his view, aggressiveness was an inherent part of the human character rather than an aberration. Ardrey’s ideas were highly influential at the time, most notably in the ‘Dawn of Man’ sequence of 2001: A Space Odyssey, and also in the writings of GRECE, in which Ardrey was frequently cited.

[2]     Presumably a reference to ‘society of the spectacle’, a term coined by Guy Debord (1931-1994), a French Marxist philosopher and the founder of the anarchist Situationist International. The spectacle, as described in his principal work, The Society of the Spectacle, is one of the means by which the capitalist establishment maintains its authority in the modern world — namely, by reducing all genuine human experiences to representational images in the mass media, thus allowing the powers-that-be to determine how individuals experience reality.

[3]     This is a concept developed by the French author Alain Minc, in which he predicts a coming time of chaos and hardship resembling the Middle Ages, which will end in the development of a much smaller, but more sustainable, global economy. He discusses this idea in Le Nouveau Moyen-âge (Paris: Gallimard, 1993).

[4]     Jacques Attali (b. 1943) is a French economist who was an advisor to Mitterrand during the first decade of his presidency. Many of his writings are available in translation. Faye may be referring to Attali’s article ‘The Crash of Western Civilisation: The Limits of the Market and Democracy’, which appeared in the Summer 1997 issue of the American journal Foreign Policy. In it, Attali claimed that democracy and the free market are incompatible, writing: ‘Unless the West, and particularly its self-appointed leader, the United States, begins to recognise the shortcomings of the market economy and democracy, Western civilisation will gradually disintegrate and eventually self-destruct.’ In many ways his arguments resemble Faye’s.

[5]     Paul D. MacLean (1913-2007) was an American neuroscientist who developed the triune theory of the human brain, postulating that, over the course of its evolution, the brain was actually made up of three distinct elements: the reptilian complex, the limbic system, and the neocortex. As a result, human behavior is the product of all three tendencies.

[6]     Konrad Lorenz (1903-1989) was an Austrian ethologist who won the Nobel Prize in 1973. He was a member of the National Socialist Party during the Third Reich. He speculated that the supposed advances of modern life were actually harmful to humanity, since they had removed humans from the biological effects of natural competition and replaced it with the far more brutal competition inherent in relations between individuals in modern societies. After the war, his books on popular scientific and philosophical topics earned him international fame.

[7]     Arthur Koestler (1905-1983) was a Hungarian writer who, in his 1967 book The Ghost in the Machine, speculated that the triune model of the brain as described by Paul MacLean was responsible for a failure of the various parts to fully interconnect with each other, resulting in a conflict of desires within each individual leading to self-destructive tendencies.

[8]     Jean Rostand (1894-1977) was a French biologist who was a proponent of eugenics as a means for humanity to take responsibility for its own destiny.  He was also a pioneer in the field of cryogenics.

[9]     Gaïa is the Ancient Greek name for the goddess of the Earth. In recent decades, the name has been adopted by ecologists, who use it to depict the combined components of the Earth as a living organism with its different parts acting in symbiosis with one another, rather than as a resource merely intended to be exploited by humans.

[10]    Latin: ‘pride’.

[11]    Jules Verne (1828-1905) was a French novelist who is regarded as the inventor of the science fiction genre. Several of his books are notable for their predictions of future technological developments.

[12]    Positivism holds that the only knowledge which can be considered reliable is that which is obtained directly through the senses and via the (supposedly) objective techniques of the scientific method.

[13]    Émile Coué (1857-1926) was a French psychologist whose method involved repeating ‘Every day, in every way, I am getting better and better’ at the beginning and end of each day in a ritualized fashion, believing that this would influence the unconscious mind in a manner that would allow the practitioner to be more inclined toward success.

[14]    The Institut français d’opinion publique, or French Institute of Public Opinion, is an international marketing firm.

[15]    René Thom (1923-2002) was a French mathematician who made many achievements during his career, but is best remembered for his development of catastrophe theory. The theory is complex, but in essence it states that small alterations in the parameters of any system can cause large-scale and sudden changes to the system as a whole.


[16]    The Fifth Republic began after the collapse of the Fourth Republic in 1958 as a result of the crisis in Algeria, bringing Charles de Gaulle to power and resulting in the drafting of a new constitution. It has remained in effect up to the present day.

[17]    Latin: ‘an argument with a stronger foundation’.

[18]    King Arthur’s Camelot was frequently left unguarded while his knights were engaged in lengthy quests.

Boganmeldelse af Guillaume Fayes ‘Mon programme’

Boganmeldelse af Guillaume Fayes ‘Mon programme’


Vi bringer en boganmeldelse, som blev bragt i Den Danske Forenings blad Danskeren nr. 4, 2012. (Ikke online før næste nummer udkommer)

Et ægte systemskifte

Guillaume Faye:
Mon programme.
(Les Éditions du Lore, 2012. 221 sider. 20 euro).

Faye,%20Guillaume%20-%20Mon%20Programme.jpgEt yndet argument mod dem, der ønsker befolkningsudskiftningen og globalismen tilbagerullet, er, at det er urealistisk eller ganske enkelt ikke kan lade sig gøre. Det har derfor stor værdi, at den franske filosof Guillaume Faye nu for sit eget lands vedkommende har skrevet et meget konkret og udførligt program for national genopretning med undertitlen: ”Et revolutionært program, der ikke skal ændre spillets regler, men ændre selve spillet.”

Faye ser økonomien som nøglen til en nations magt, men den er dog kun noget sekundært i forhold til den nationale overlevelse, som afhænger af nationens ”antropo-biologiske germen” – dens demografiske kim eller kerne – samt af kvaliteten og videreførelsen af dens kultur.

Men ikke mindst i Frankrig har socialismen og bureaukratiseringen gået sin sejrsgang i en sådan grad, at kampen mod dette kvælertag på et frit samfund har høj prioritet. Som Faye påpeger, er venstrefløjens kritik af de borgerliges ”ultraliberalisme” og ”kommercialisering” jo helt ude af proportioner i et land, hvor skattetryk og administrationens dødvægt kun slår nye rekorder. Krisen er fremkaldt af bl.a. for lidt økonomisk liberalisme, ikke af for meget. Globaliseringen er et ideologisk valg, for så vidt som 70 % af de firmaer, der er flyttet ud af Frankrig, ville være blevet, hvis der havde været en mere fornuftig skattepolitik. Socialstaten udspringer i bund og grund af misundelse, ikke af seriøs økonomisk analyse. Og den støtter kun, den hjælper ikke grundlæggende. Den lammer og fratager folk modet (også nationalt), og den har skabt en arbejdsløshedskultur, som derpå skaber ”behov” for indvandring: Alene i Frankrig kan man ikke finde indfødte ansøgere til en halv million job. Lediggang er mere indbringende. Det samme er paradoksalt nok kommet til at gælde for de indvandrere, man angiveligt har lukket ind for at løse problemet. Muslimerne i Frankrig (og hele Vesteuropa) forfordeles jo ikke eller holdes som slaver, tværtimod har de fået mere støtte end nogen indfødt gruppe. Sammen med de indfødte bureaukrater i beskyttede stillinger udgør muslimerne (som i bogen kaldes et nyt fødselsaristokrati) i Fayes øjne nutidens udbyttende klasse eller ”parasitter”, som han maner til klassekamp imod på vegne af det produktive folk og de marginaliserede indfødte franskmænd.

Faye foreslår derimod et system, der giver franskmænd incitament til at arbejde, og samtidig giver indbyggere med ikke-europæisk baggrund incitament til at udrejse – altså så lidet tiltrækkende vilkår, at de ikke har grund til at blive i landet. Statslige ydelser såsom børnepenge begrænses til franskmænd, og så snart ikke-vestlige i landet ophører med at være selvforsørgende, skal de ud uanset tidligere status. Illegale indvandrere kan aldrig nogensinde legaliseres og skal selvfølgelig altid udvises umiddelbart.

Desuden er det mht. indvandringen nødvendigt at gå til ondets rod, hvilket de i dag anerkendte ”internationale forpligtelser” ikke muliggør. Derfor må retten til at søge asyl ophæves. Udgifterne til den tvangsmæssige behandling af disse for det meste grundløse sager er jo uhyre. Ej heller kan asylsøgere, der er godkendt andetsteds i EU, få indrejsetilladelse til Frankrig. Flygtninge skal kun anerkendes som en absolut undtagelse via et særlig, personligt dekret fra præsidenten. Endelig overskygges princippet om, at love ikke må have tilbagevirkende kraft, af national nødret.

Faye gør op med den herskende misforståede læsning af Montesquieu, hvorefter domstolene skulle udgøre en ”tredje magt” i samfundet på linje med regering og parlament. Af denne forfejlede læsning udspringer nutidens juristvælde, hvor politikerne angiveligt er magtesløse. Ideen var dog oprindelig, at domstolene kun skulle være en myndighed med en bestemt autoritet, underlagt folkesuveræniteten.

I kriminalitetsbekæmpelsen slagter Faye flere hellige køer. Betingede straffe afskaffes. Enten straffes man eller ej. Og straffens formål skal ikke være ”resocialisering”, men netop straf. Det modsatte fører logisk set i sidste instans til ophævelse af enhver straf, fordi alle ugerninger kan forklares psyko-socialt. Et enkelt og inappellabelt straffesystem har i USA ført til mere end en halvering af kriminalitet på få måneder, og samme resultat kan selvfølgelig nås i Europa. I modsætning til i USA vil Faye dog ikke bruge dødsstraf, men total isolation på livstid som højeste straf. Som alternativ til denne frygtelige skæbne kan den dømte så vælge frivillig eutanasi.

Udenrigspolitisk ønsker Faye, at Frankrig kun blander sig, når landets interesser, borgere eller territorium er direkte truede. Han ser de forskellige ”krige mod terrorisme” diverse steder i verden som direkte kontraproduktive, alt imens befolkningsudskiftningen herhjemme kun fortsætter. Det franske forsvar bør derimod indrettes efter den eventualitet, at massive udvisninger af visse befolkningsgrupper eller etnisk borgerkrig i Frankrig fører til straffeforanstaltninger fra fx USA, hvilket franskmændene så må være i stand til at værge sig mod. NATO må derfor gradvist erstattes af et forsvarssamarbejde mellem nationalt sindede europæiske regeringer. Pirat-uvæsnet mod vestlige skibe vil Faye løse på kort tid ved hjælp af hær og flåde uden at tage fanger.

For Faye at se er ulandene ikke ofre for et ”neoliberalt” udbytningssystem. De er derimod deres egne værste fjender. Ulandshjælp-ideologien er den sande nykolonialisme, som må undsiges, fordi den altid har slået fejl. Han afviser, at ulandshjælp kan ses som et forsøg på at hindre indvandringen til Europa. Den har virket modsat, og i sin bog viser han udførligt, at masseindvandringen netop udmærket kan standses uden ulandshjælp som værktøj. Faye påpeger, at man aldrig i historien har set, at en invasion er standset ved, at man har ”stimuleret” aggressoren til ikke at invadere, kun ved at man har forbudt invasionen med trussel om brug af magt.

Principperne i Fayes program udspringer af hans retsfilosofiske grundanskuelse, som han kalder aristotelisk. Den forkaster formalisme og evige principper og ser udelukkende på realiteten og dens konkrete krav (efter den græske filosof Aristoteles’ modsætningsforhold til Platons idealisme). Faye erkender med Aristoteles, at enhver form for politik har en bagside. Enhver god afgørelse er samtidig problematisk. Det afgørende er bare, at det positive med tiden overskygger det negative. Det moderne ønske om at kunne tilfredsstille alle parter er en illusion. Trods ulemperne for nogle må Faye derfor kalde sit program for ”plan A”, den fornuftige løsning. For plan B, hvor lidenskaberne uundgåeligt på et tidspunkt tager over, kender hverken ”elegance, respekt eller nåde”.

Peter Neerup Buhl

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samedi, 05 janvier 2013

War of the Worlds

War of the Worlds


Jure Vujić's new book War of the Worlds – Euroasianism versus Atlantism ( Zagreb, Croatia )

On Thursday, December 20, 2012, the promotion of Jure Vujić's book War of the Worlds – Euroasianism versus Atlantism (with a foreword by Dr. Robert Steuckers) took place at the Cultural Information Centre in Zagreb. With the author the event was also attended by historian Toni Abramović and H.E. DSc Robert Markaryan, the Ambassador of the Russian Federation. The moderator was Petar Bujas.

To date, Jure Vujić has published the books Fragmenti geopolitičke misli (2004) and Intelektualni terorizam (2007) in Croatian and the book “ LA MODERNITÉ À L'ÉPREUVE DE L'IMAGE L'obsession visuelle de l'occident in French. This is the fourth book of the prominent Croatian political scientist and geopolitical expert.
In 1919, Sir Halford John Mackinder published the book on Democratic Ideals and Reality: A Study in the Politics of Reconstruction presenting the thesis statement about the heartland: the power that managed to control Eastern Europe would also dominate Euroasia, and whoever dominated Euroasia should rule the world.
The book 'War of the Worlds – Euroasianism versus Atlantism' is a true and the first synthesis in the Croatian language that elaborates on the idea of Euroasia or the heartland as the key geostrategic area in which opposed geopolitical and economic interests come to play. The author approached the subject as a topical metapolitical, philosophical and cultural conceptual matrix that represents a real alternative to Atlantism. The rivalry relation between Atlantism and Euroasianism is symbolically represented by the illustration of Behemoth, the mythical monster of the land, and sea monster Leviathan.

The Ambassador of the Russian Federation to the Republic of Croatia, His Excellency Robert Markaryan, conveyed to the audience the thought of Vladimir Putin that 'whoever has no feeling for the disintegration of the Soviet Union has no heart, and whoever believes it will come together again has no brain.' He also mentioned that Vujić's book was pioneer work in this area and a great scientific contribution to the development of Russian-Croatian relations.

Historian Toni Abramović noted that Europe and Russia are parts of one and the same body, the so-called Big Island or Euroasia. Croatia shares more than just its Slavic roots with Russia. Juraj Križanić (17th c.) played an important role in the creation of the  'Memorandum of Peter the Great'. Croatia is geographically and politically situated at the divide between two global interests, and its future should be perceived as identical to the future of Eurasia.

vendredi, 30 novembre 2012

Prußen - die ersten Preußen

Sehr geehrte Damen und Herren,
liebe Kollegen,
wir möchten Ihnen eine Neuerscheinung unseres Verlages vorstellen:
Beate Szillis-Kappelhoff
Prußen - die ersten Preußen
Geschichte und Kultur eines untergegangenen Volkes
395 Seiten, 123 Abbildungen, gebunden, fester Einband
ISBN 978-3-937820-00-2
Erscheinungstermin: soeben druckfrisch eingetroffen und ab sofort lieferbar!
Preis: 19,80 Euro
Beate Szillis-Kappelhoff widmet sich in dieser ersten umfassenden Darstellung der Geschichte und Kultur der Prußen, jenem geheimnisvollen Volk, das dem späteren Staat Preußen seinen Namen gab.

Über viele Jahrhunderte verteidigten die Prußen, die zur baltischen Sprachfamilie gehörten, tapfer und zäh ihr Siedlungsgebiet zwischen der Weichsel und der Minge, also dem späteren West- und Ostpreußen. Schon zu Beginn des 11. Jahrhunderts hatten sich die Prußen stetig zunehmender Übergiffe der Polen zu erwehren, die eine Verbindung zur Ostsee suchten. Als sie zu Beginn des 13. Jahrhunderts aus der reinen Verteidigung zu Vergeltungsschlägen gegen das nordpolnische, masowische Gebiet übergingen, rief der polnische Herzog Konrad von Masowien den Deutschen Orden um Hilfe. Im Laufe des 13. Jahrhunderts gelang es den Rittern des Deutschen Ordens in einem besonders brutal geführten Eroberungskrieg, die Prußen zu besiegen und schließlich zu christianisieren. Aber es dauerte noch Jahrhunderte, bis die Sprache und Kultur der Prußen durch Unterdrückung, Missionierung und Assimilation verloren gingen.

Dieses Buch begibt sich auf die Spurensuche nach der versunkenen Kultur des einst so kämpferischen und stolzen Volkes der Prußen.

Wir möchten Sie bitten, dieses wichtige Werk über eine bedeutende und identitätsprägende Epoche der deutschen Geschichte in Ihr Verkaufssortiment aufzunehmen.

Vielen Dank!

Mit freundlichen Grüßen

Heiderose Weigel

Bublies Verlag - Bergstr. 11 - D-56290 Schnellbach

Tel. 06746 / 730046, Fax: 06746 / 730048

Internet: www.bublies-verlag.de

E-Brief: bublies-verlag@t-online.de



Vorwort /

Geografische Lage /

Die Prußen /

Eigenname, Fehlschreibungen und Aussprache /

Besetzungen durch den Deutschen Orden /

Sonderrolle Memelgebiet /

Unterwerfung /

Freiheitskämpfe /

Lage der ländlichen Bevölkerung /

Fischerei /

Wildnis /

Waldbienenzucht /

Häusliches Leben /

Angebliche Ausrottung /

Schrift der Prußen /

Sprache, Sprachdenkmäler, Namen /

Musik /

Die zwölf Prußenstämme /

Die Sage von Bruteno und  Widewuto und  Brutenos Nachfolger  /            

Barta (Barten) /

Chelmo (Kulmerland) mit Lubawa (Michelauer Land) /

Lubawa (Löbau, Michelauer Land) /

Galindo (Galindien) /

Nadruwa (Nadrauen) /

Notanga (Natangen) /

Pagude (Pogesanien) /

Pamede (Pomesanien) /

Same (Samland) /

Sasna (Sassen) /

Skalwa (Schalauen) /

Suduwa (Sudauen/ Jatwingen) /

Warme (Ermland) /

Religion der Prußen /

Die Naturreligion /

Göttinnen, Schlangen und Kröten /

Götter, Pferde und Ziegenbock /

Romowe /

Geburt und Taufe /

Verlobung /

Hochzeit /

Totenfeier /

Christenzeit /

Die Prußen und ihr nachbarliches Umfeld /

Die Kuren /

Sprachdenkmäler /

Die Karschauer /

Die Žemaiten und die Litauer /

Die Kaschuben, Masovier, Kujavier und Polen /

Prußen heute /

Einige Orts- und Gewässernamen /

Königsberger Stadtteile /

Liste baltischer Götter, Göttinnen und Gottheiten /

Zeittafel /

Literatur /

Weblinks /