In his new book Identity, Francis Fukuyama seeks to forestall the rise of white identity politics. Nevertheless, as I argue in “Fukuyama on Identity Politics [2],” Identity is a very useful book for White Nationalists because it concedes many of our most important premises. In “Fukuyama on Diversity [3],” I argue that Fukuyama admits that diversity is a problem and offers only very weak reasons to value it at all. Here I examine Fukuyama’s alternative to white identity politics, namely a conservative form of color-blind civic nationalism.
Making the European Union Work
Fukuyama focuses on the European Union rather than individual European states because he clearly wants to make the EU work.
The EU, he says, was created because “exclusive ethnic definitions of national identity had been at the root of the two world wars that Europe experienced” (p. 143). “The founders of the European Union deliberately sought to weaken national identities at the member-state level in favor of a ‘postnational’ European consciousness, as an antidote to the aggressive ethno-nationalism of the first half of the twentieth century” (p. 143).
It is astonishing that the modern EU project is founded on an almost perfect inversion of historical truth. The First World War was not a clash of ethnostates but of Empires: the British, French, and Russian vs. the German, Austro-Hungarian, and Ottoman Empires. The war broke out because of the Austro-Hungarian Empire’s clash with the kingdom of Serbia—itself a multinational state—over the multinational territory of Bosnia, as they scrambled to divide the carcass of the multinational Ottoman Empire in the Balkans. The entire war could have been avoided, though, if ethnonationalism rather than imperialism had been the guiding policy of Europe, moving borders and people to create homogeneous sovereign homelands for all peoples.
The Second World War could have been avoided in the same way if, in the aftermath of the First World War, the principle of national self-determination had been actually practiced as opposed to merely preached. But instead of dividing multiethnic empires into homogeneous states wherever possible, the victors divided countries like Germany and Hungary and created new multiethnic states like Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia.
The European Union, in short, is built on lies. The World Wars were not caused by nationalism. They were caused by the suppression of the legitimate nationalist aspirations of European peoples by multinational imperial bodies—just like the European Union.
How does Fukuyama propose to make the EU work? According to Fukuyama, the main failures of the EU were (1) not creating a “strong sense of pan-European identity that supersedes the identities of its member states” (p. 153) and (2) not creating “democratic accountability” which left the citizens of EU states feeling “little sense of ownership or control over the institutions governing Europe as a whole” (p. 144). Thus the solution is to intensify the EU’s existing drive to destroy the national identities of the member states, but to make the process more democratic, so the technocrats can tell protesters that “You are doing it to ourselves.” (Of course this democracy would have to be a sham, otherwise Europeans will vote to stop the destruction of their homelands.) As Fukuyama puts it:
The European agenda must start with redefinitions of national identity embodied in its citizenship laws. Ideally, the EU should create a single citizenship whose requirements would be based on adherence to basic liberal democratic principles, one that would supersede national citizenship laws. . . . It would help if the EU democratized itself by shifting powers from the Commission to the Parliament and tried to make up for lost time by investing in European identity through the creation of appropriate symbols and narratives that would be inculcated through a common educational system. . . . Those laws of EU member states still based on jus sanguinis [the right of blood, i.e., citizenship through descent] need to be changed to jus soli [the right of soil, i.e., the idea that one has the right of citizenship simply by being born on a given country’s soil, what Vox Day mocks as “magic dirt”] so as not to privilege one ethnic group over another. (p. 167)
Let’s pause for a minute, take a deep breath, and reflect on the strange decay of language that allows such overheated Jacobin fantasies to be called a form of conservatism.
These proposals, if adopted, would spell the death of the white race and all of its distinct nations in Europe. Every European nation has below-replacement levels of fertility. Redefining European identity in inclusive liberal democratic terms will lead inevitably to open borders. (Face it, that’s really the whole point in redefining European identity as openness.) Open borders and granting citizenship to anyone born within Europe’s territory will lead to the replacement of Europeans with non-Europeans within a few generations. Basically, for whites, liberal democratic openness amounts to openness to collective suicide. And Fukuyama proposes making openness to demographic annihilation the defining value of European identity.
Ironically, Fukuyama himself realizes that “diversity cannot be the basis for identity in and of itself; it is like saying that our identity is to have no identity . . .” (p. 159). But making an identity of liberal democracy, defined as being essentially open to diversity, has the exact same problem. As a concept, it is vacuous, and when put into practice it can lead only to destruction.
But won’t our replacements be “Europeans” if they are assimilated to the new European identity—which is to be maximally open to demographic replacement? Of course not.
First of all, it might be the case that only white people are stupid enough to adopt a collective suicide pact as an identity.
Second, why would any healthy population wish to emulate the value system of a race that built the richest civilization in world history—then went mad and gave it all away?
Third, it would be far more advantageous for immigrant populations to merely pretend to accept liberal democratic openness while practicing strict preferences for their own tribes. Liberal democratic true believers would blind themselves to this form of cheating, so there is little danger of being found out and punished. And even if cheaters were caught, liberals would just blame themselves (or retrograde xenophobic whites) for failing to be sufficiently open.
Fourth, Fukuyama envisions a democratized European Union, which means that once the white population is too small and weak to maintain the hegemony of its suicidal value system, the newcomers will simply vote to replace it with something more to their liking, most probably an Islamic state. It is the height of naivete to think that once non-whites are the majority, they will continue to take orders from white liberals.
Fukuyama has a few specific proposals for EU member states. He praises Emanuel Macron trying to break France’s unions and “liberalize” its labor laws to make it possible for more blacks and Muslims to find jobs (p. 172). In short, migrant employment should be paid for by falling French wages and living standards.
He also suggests destroying the Dutch system of state-supported parochial schools and replacing it with a single state education system with a standardized curriculum of liberal democratic swill—again, to better integrate Muslims (pp. 151, 171). As if Dutch schoolboys and schoolgirls don’t have enough problems with Muslim youths outside of school hours.
These are very real threats to the well-being of countless Europeans. Yet Fukuyama airily reassures us that “The region [a sinisterly generic term for Europe] is not threatened by immigrants so much as by the political reaction that immigrants and cultural diversity create” (p. 153). In fact, the deepest threat to Europe is liberal democracy. The pauperization of French workers; the bullying and rape of Dutch schoolchildren; the Bataclan massacre, the Nice massacre, and countless other terrorist attacks on European soil—these events do not threaten the plans of people like Fukuyama and the EU leadership. Pauperization, cultural annihilation, and race replacement are parts of the plan. They are small prices to pay — for other people to pay — for the realization of the European Dream. What threatens the EU is Europeans awakening to the fact that the EU’s dream is their nightmare, then rejecting their destruction.
Are any of Fukuyama’s suggestions likely to be adopted? Of course not. Even the most Left-wing and ethnomasochist EU member states would reject these schemes. To his credit, Fukuyama himself recognizes that his proposals have no realistic chance of being implemented by the EU. At best, they can only be implemented by particular member states. Which means on his own terms that liberal democracies will be increasingly polarized between identity politics of the Left and the Right. Fukuyama warns that, “Down this road lies, ultimately, state breakdown and failure” (p. 165).
But the breakdown and failure Fukuyama envision is of multicultural, multiracial liberal democracies that do not adopt assimilationism and the construction of a liberal democratic “identity” to unify them. There is, however, another solution: the preservation, restoration, or creation of racially and ethnically homogeneous states by moving borders and people—and I will never tire of repeating that Fukuyama admits that these processes can be carried out in a wholly non-violent and ethical manner.
Making Multicultural America Work
Fukuyama’s proposals for making a multicultural America work are no more plausible. Basically, he argues for a “liberal democratic” multicultural civic nationalism, which consists of a creed and a minimally “Protestant” culture. First the creed:
[The] creedal understanding of American identity emerged as the result of a long struggle stretching over nearly two centuries and represented a decisive break with earlier versions of identity based on race, ethnicity, or religion. Americans can be proud of this very substantive identity; it is based on belief in the common political principles of constitutionalism, the rule of law, democratic accountability, and the principle that “all men are created equal” (now interpreted to include all women). These political ideas come directly out of the Enlightenment and are the only possible basis for unifying a modern liberal democracy that has become de facto multicultural. (p. 158)
Fukuyama deserves praise for conceding that the “creedal” civic nationalist concept of American identity was contested from the start and only became dominant in the 20th century—in fact in the 1960s with the success of the black civil rights movement and the abandonment of America’s immigration laws that aimed at maintaining a white supermajority.
Fukuyama argues that a creedal identity is not enough. It is a necessary condition to make a multicultural liberal democracy work. But it is not a sufficient condition. The other necessary condition is . . . a common culture, including a set of virtues. But this common culture has to be vacuous enough to somehow include multiculturalism, and it has to be detached from any fixed biological categories like race and, I presume, sex. Fukuyama’s answer is the Anglo-Protestant culture, stripped of anything exclusively Anglo and Protestant, i.e., retaining only those aspects of Anglo-Protestant identity that make it a collective suicide pact.
The only specific Anglo-Protestant virtue that Fukuyama mentions is, of course, the “work ethic.” Americans, after all, work hard. Not as hard as Asians, Fukuyama reminds us, but certainly harder than those effete Europeans. Americans respect hard work and economic competition (and low wages) so much that we have repeatedly debased the ethnic homogeneity of our society to bring in hard-working and cheap (or just plain cheap) immigrants. And if white Americans are displaced by non-white immigrants, well that’s fair. You didn’t mistake this economic zone for a homeland did you?
In the end, there’s nothing specifically Anglo or Protestant about the economy. As producers and consumers, we are all fungible. Who works hard in America these days? Fukuyama’s answer is: “It is just as likely to be a Korean grocery-store owner or an Ethiopian cab-driver or a Mexican gardener as a person of Anglo-Protestant heritage living off dividends in his or her country club” (p. 161).
This point is problematic in a number of ways.
First, it proves too much, for if there’s nothing specifically Anglo-Protestant about the marketplace, there is nothing specifically American about it either. The market and its virtues are global. Thus in what sense are we talking about anything American at all?
Second, the proper reaction of an American identitarian to this concept of identity is simply to reject it. We reject any universal, non-exclusive identity that makes all men fungible. The whole point of a national identity is to be exclusive. The whole point of a homeland is to enjoy it as a birthright and to pass it on to one’s posterity—and only one’s posterity. The whole point of a homeland is that it belongs to us, and we belong to it, unconditionally. We don’t have to earn it. We don’t have to compete with foreigners to keep it. Why shouldn’t Americans have that kind of homeland, that kind of security—especially if we do not begrudge others the right to their own homelands?
The only reason anyone will ask you to replace an exclusive form of national identity with an inclusive one is because he envisions replacing you in your homeland. Once you define yourself as replaceable, someone will replace you.
Third, to claim that a Korean, an Ethiopian, a Mexican, and a WASP are “just as likely” to be hard-working is implicitly to reject biological race differences and to embrace social constructivism, which Fukuyama hints at elsewhere. But biological race differences are real, which means that taken at random, WASPs and Koreans are far more likely than Mexicans and Ethiopians to be successful in the American economic system. And Fukuyama implicitly recognizes this, since if race did not matter, why is his hypothetical Korean not a gardener and his hypothetical Mexican not a grocery-store owner?
Finally, note the lazy, sloppy language. No WASP “lives off dividends in his or her country club.” Nobody lives in country clubs at all. This anti-WASP canard has become so hackneyed that people can’t even be bothered to make it sound plausible.
Will Fukuyama’s proposals save liberal democracy in America? The answer is no.
First of all, although Fukuyama advertises his book as an attempt to stave off Trumpian identity politics, his outlook and policy proposals are essentially indistinguishable from Trumpian civic nationalism. So liberal democrats will simply reject Identity as a disingenuous attempt to advance Trumpism while bashing Trump.
Second, demanding that immigrants assimilate, even to an almost vacuous liberal creed and Protestant culture, is still “racism” and “cultural imperialism” as far as the Left is concerned. Is Fukuyama really going to challenge the taboo against racism? I doubt he is willing to pay that price, which means that his proposals are a dead letter.
White Nationalists, by contrast, have no problem taking heat for “racism”: we unapologetically take our own side in ethnic conflicts. We aim to create or restore white homelands by moving people and borders. But we have no desire to assimilate non-whites—or be assimilated by them. We simply want to go our separate ways. That’s the whole point of having separate homelands where different peoples can practice different ways of life without outside interference.
Third, even if Fukuyama’s ideas were adopted, they would not be enough to save America from white identity politics. White identity politics is not simply being driven by Left identity politics, so that if one turned off Left identity politics, white identity politics would dry up. Rather, white identity politics is being driven by one of the consequences of Left identity politics, namely white dispossession. But even if the Left halted identity politics, white dispossession is still “baked in” to Fukuyama’s scheme, since the borders would remain open, white birthrates would remain low, and non-white birthrates would remain high. But as the white majority continues to decline, white ethnocentrism will continue to rise, feeding white identity politics.
Fourth, even if we implemented all of Fukuyama’s policies, only whites are likely to actually believe in and practice multicultural civic nationalism—because only whites do so today. There is nothing in Fukuyama’s plan to prevent non-whites from cheating: outwardly professing liberal democratic universalism and demanding to be treated accordingly, while covertly practicing preferences for their own tribes. Thus Fukuyama’s solution would simply intensify the ongoing process of white dispossession. At best it might slow down the backlash, by blinding people to what is happening. But it might also ensure that the backlash is far more severe when it actually arrives.
In their hearts, I think many civic nationalists believe that America and Europe took a wrong turn when they opened their borders and embraced diversity. But they are unwilling to contemplate actually rolling back the Left’s social engineering, specifically the catastrophic demographic and cultural trends of the last half-century. It is a gigantic failure of imagination and nerve.
For example, consider Fukuyama’s comments on the millions of illegal aliens in America:
It is . . . ridiculous to think that the United States could ever force all these people to leave the country and return to their countries of origin. A project on that scale would be worthy of Stalin’s Soviet Union or Nazi Germany. (p. 176)
First, if it is possible for people to enter the United States, it is possible for them to leave. What’s truly ridiculous is thinking that the turnstile at the border only turns one way. Second, the United States has forced millions of Mexicans to return to Mexico twice in the 20th century, and in neither case did it turn into genocide. (We need a wall, so we don’t have the deport them a fourth time.) Third, didn’t Fukuyama himself, on page 142 of the very same book, claim that ethnic cleansing can take place in an entirely non-violent and ethical fashion?
Because of this failure of nerve and imagination, writers like Fukuyama are driven to the makeshift ideology of “liberal democratic” multicultural civic nationalism. If you believe that Leftism and diversity are destroying civilization, but you are too scared to contemplate actually reversing the damage, your only hope is to halt the decline by imposing a sham unity on ethnic diversity—by synthesizing an inclusive creed and culture, then demanding people assimilate it.
Another reason why a color-blind civic nationalism appeals to Fukuyama is simply because he is not white. No matter how convinced he might be that multiculturalism and immigration have catastrophic consequences, he will never contemplate an alternative that does secure his presence and upward mobility.
To defeat civic nationalists like Fukuyama, we must not only demonstrate that their solutions are unworkable, but also show that the creation of racially and ethnically homogeneous homelands is both moral and practical. The Left is destroying white civilization, and neocons like Fukuyama can’t save it. It is time for them to step aside and let ethnonationalists take over.
Afterthoughts
Fukuyama makes three other noteworthy points that are useful to White Nationalists.
First, he argues that dual citizenship is a “rather questionable practice” if “one takes national identity seriously.” “Different nations have different interests that can engender potentially conflicting allegiances” (p. 168). I don’t know what percentage of neocons have dual US-Israeli citizenships, but it is certainly above the national average, and Fukuyama knows it. So this is a rather gutsy position to take.
Second, Fukuyama points out a crucially important distinction that globalists stubbornly refuse to acknowledge, namely the distinction between human rights and civil rights (pp. 173-74). Human rights are universal. Civil rights are particular. We are morally obligated to respect the human rights of all people. We are not morally obligated to give civil rights to all people. Ethnonationalists can recognize that all people have basic human rights, but we can still say that they are not good fits for our particular societies.
Third, Fukuyama points out an important implication of the distinction between human rights and civil rights (p. 175). We all have human rights, but simply having human rights does not entitle us to enter other people’s countries and demand to participate in their political life, which is what civil rights entitle us to do. Nations still have the right to control their borders and determine who may and may not become “naturalized” parts of their body politic.
One human right that we need to respect is the right of refugees to safe harbor. After all, any people can suffer misfortune. (Although obviously dumber and more quarrelsome peoples are more “accident prone” than others.) But the United Nations has already drawn up reasonable laws about refugees. A refugee has the right to take refuge in the closest safe country, for instance Syrians fleeing to Turkey or Lebanon. (This makes sense in terms of moral reciprocity, given that in different circumstances, Turks and Lebanese might wish to take refuge in Syria.) But once a person leaves the closest safe place for better pay and benefits, he is no longer a refugee, he is a migrant, and other countries have the absolute right to bar his entry.
Afterword
Identity is a poorly written book. It is repetitive, padded, and poorly organized. There are also a number of places where I actually laughed out loud. To end on a light note, I will share a few.
In his Preface, Fukuyama writes: “Megalothymia thrives on exceptionality: taking big risks, engaging in monumental struggles, seeking large effects, because all these lead to recognition of oneself as superior to others. In some cases, it can lead to a heroic leader like a Lincoln or a Churchill or a Nelson Mandela. But in other cases it can lead to tyrants like Caesar or Hitler or Mao who lead their societies into dictatorship and disaster” (pp. xiii-xiv).
On page 34, Fukuyama writes: “Rousseau’s assertion that pride emerged only at a certain stage of social evolution is curious; it begs the question of how such an intrinsic human feeling could spontaneously appear in response to an external stimulus.” “Begs the question” refers to a logical fallacy, which is clearly inapplicable here. Fukuyama means “raises the question.” This is a very common error in spoken English, but it seldom gets into books by reputable publishers.
On page 70, Fukuyama writes of jihadis: “When they showed up in Syria with a long beard and toting an AK-47 or staged a murderous attack on their fellow Europeans, their families always professed surprise and incomprehension at the transformation.” First, most jihadis carry American-made weapons. Second, “fellow Europeans.” Third, taking Muslim professions of surprise and incomprehension at face value when their religion teaches them to lie to infidels as a weapon of jihad.
But the best laugh appears on page 176: “. . . the United States now hosts a population of 11–12 million undocumented aliens. . . . The idea that they are all criminals because they violated U.S. law to enter the country is ridiculous.” If you are ever on trial, you should suggest that your lawyer use Fukuyama’s argument: “Your honor, the idea that my client is a criminal just because he violated the law is ridiculous.”
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Savatore Babones is an America academic with an appointment in Sociology and Social Policy at the University of Sydney. Unusually for someone in such a position, he has a few good things to say about Donald Trump—or at least about the fact of his election. Trump himself he describes as crass, a boor and lacking in qualifications. But, he writes, “there are reasons to hope that we will have a better politics after the Trump Presidency than we could ever have had without it.”
En résumé, La classe dominante est étrangère au peuple autochtone et lui est ouvertement hostile. De plus, elle ne manque pas de maladroitement instrumentaliser les immigrés pour contrer le réveil autochtone (le « populisme ») et conserver ainsi sa domination culturelle et politique (Guilluy : « A ce titre, l’instrumentalisation de l’immigré et des pauvres par la classe dominante, le show- biz et une partie du monde intellectuel apparaît pour ce qu’il est : une mise en scène indécente… »). Ajoutons que l’Etat est un outil au service de la classe dominante et nous aurons un tableau qui correspond assez bien à ce que nous décrivons depuis quatre ans dans ce blog.
Dans vos deux premiers romans, Le Songe d’Empédocle et Maugis (L’Age d’Homme), vos personnages sont en quête de sacré, à rebours d’une époque anémique. Dans Le Prince d’Aquitaine, le procédé semble différent, même si le lecteur n’en sort pas indemne. Qu’en est-il ?
Faszination eines Trugbildes (The Fascination of an Illusion) by Tarmo Kunnas is an unusual book in several respects. It sets out to examine what in the subtitle to the book is described as “the European intellectual and the fascist temptation, 1919-1945.” “Here,” Kunnas explains, “the tragedy of fascism is seen through the opera glasses of the person it has captivated, and my book for its part is intended to complete a picture of the fascist movements.” (p. 9) In his Foreword, Kunnas tells us that his book deals with the relationship of more than seventy European intellectuals from fifteen nations who were “tempted” by fascism.
In his Foreword, Kunnas says his objective is to examine “why fascism in the inter-war years held such attraction for the European intelligentsia and on the people of the time.” In fact, this study does not look at the attraction fascism held for people in general; it focuses exclusively on writers. The organization of the book is unusual. Instead of covering his ground with chapters devoted to specific writers or nations, Kunnas works through chapters which revolve around given themes, and then scrutinizes in each an array of writers in relation to its theme. Here are the titles of a few of the many chapters: “Exactness is not Truth,” “Mistrust of the Good in People,” “Social Darwinism,” “Puritanism,” “The Weakness of Parliamentarianism,” and “Against Faith in Progress.” For each of these, Kunnas provides the reader with an abundance of examples of how, within the perspective of the given theme, many intellectuals inclined towards fascism and a fascist solution, or towards an interpretation of the theme. This unusual approach has the advantage that it shifts focus from a biographical account to a philosophical and theoretical one so that the reader is compelled to think about the matter at hand firstly, and about the writers and thinkers drawn to it secondly; that is to say, he looks at the subject in respect of the theme itself and how fascist thinkers and fascist thought approached and evaluated each given theme. This is an original alternative to the standard presentation in critical assessments of the relation of writers to certain themes, as in potted biographies and the organization of such books into the intellectual, political, and literary career of one writer per chapter.
Kunnas is good at highlighting contradictions and paradoxes which abound in fascist theory. How does an avowed Roman Catholic like Giovanni Papini, for example, reconcile his religious faith with the evident amoralism and ruthlessness of the militaristic foreign policy enacted by the Fascist government which he so ardently supported? By way of answer, according to Kunnas (p. 358), Papini’s early work Il tragico quotidiano (The Daily Tragic) accepts the notion that evil is a necessary part of God’s creation, and that without sin, there could be no poets, artists, or philosophers; indeed, no leaders of a people and no heroes. Vice may be the necessary condition of virtue, and evil may need to exist in order for good to do so likewise. Kunnas does not go far down the thorny and well-trodden theological path of speculation which he opens here. However, he is well aware of this and other conundra and contradictions within fascist thought, including in the writings of those intellectuals who were attracted by fascism, especially the notion that the warring poles of good and evil, war and peace, and pain and pleasure constitute the very fabric of life.
Following the collapse of the Warsaw Pact in 1989 and, two years later, of the Soviet Union itself, there was a widespread sense in the West that the free market had conclusively vindicated itself and that socialism had been just as conclusively relegated to the scrapheap of history. But the political outcome of this period, surprisingly, was not continued electoral triumph for conservative cum classical liberal politicians of the Reagan/Thatcher type who had presided over victory in the Cold War. Instead, an apparent embrace of “markets” by center-Left parties in the West was followed by the rise of “new Democrat” Bill Clinton in the US (1993) and “new Labourite” Tony Blair in the UK (1997). Asked in 2002 what her greatest achievement was, Thatcher replied, “Tony Blair and New Labour. We forced our opponents to change their minds.”
It’s not difficult to understand why, however, given that for a long time, Traditionalists have been operating under the guise of being purely concerned with religion and mysticism, remaining silent about the fact that Traditionalism in its complete form is one of the most – if not the most – reactionary current of thought that exists in the postmodern world. This is of course a consequence of the fact that most Traditionalist thinkers today have opted for the safety of academic careers (something which Evola noted already in the 1950s and for which he expressed his contempt), and thus want to avoid being called fascists. Their cover has been somewhat blown, however, as a result of Steve Bannon’s claim that Guénon was a crucial influence on him, which has in turn led to some superficial and ill-informed propaganda from journalists using Traditionalism as a branding iron with which to mark both Bannon and Trump (by association) as fascists, by bringing attention to the connection between Evola and Guénon. (And Evola had the audacity to call himself a “superfascist,” so by the logic of the average half-witted journalist of today, that makes Bannon and Trump really fascist!) It remains to be seen what the long-term consequences of this will be in terms of Traditionalism’s reception in the mainstream, although I’ve noticed that it’s become harder to find Evola and Guénon’s books on bookstore shelves these days. It may have the beneficial effect of forcing Traditionalists out of the realm of pure scholasticism and into putting their beliefs into practice, if academia ultimately becomes a hostile environment for them – which it inevitably will, if present trends continue. Time will tell.
Pero, ¿en qué consiste semejante cosa? ¿Crecer? Tú ves que tus hijos crecen, física y mentalmente. Eso es lo normal, la lógica de la vida siempre incluye una dinámica del crecimiento. No confundas crecimiento con aumento del tamaño. Este aspecto físico y espacial tan solo es una manifestación externa de las cosas, que con toda lógica y bajo fines que se nos escaparán siempre, constituyen la vida y el universo. Pero en tus hijos, o si no los tienes, en los niños en general, se observa que desde su etapa de simples células, desde su estado embrionario, como bebés o como mozalbetes, en ellos acontece un sinfín de variaciones en su cuerpo y en su alma. Se transforman drásticamente antes de que tú, como observador externo, te llegues a dar cuenta de tales cambios continuos. La cantidad se transforma en cualidad. Crecer es cambiar en cualidad, regenerarse bajo la forma de un ser nuevo. Crecer es tomar el camino de la mutación, ser más amplio, mutación de uno mismo en nuevas especies y nuevos géneros. Mutación desde uno mismo, para uno mismo.
Georges Feltin–Tracol rappelle d’abord les origines du socialisme avec Pierre Leroux, qui critiquait à la fois les restaurationnistes de la monarchie (une illusion), et le libéralisme exploiteur (une réalité). Un socialisme non marxiste qui préfigure une troisième voie. Puis, Georges Feltin–Tracol souligne ce qu’a pu être le socialisme pour Jean Mabire : une éthique de l’austérité et de la camaraderie, « au fond des mines et en haut des djebels ». Ce fut le contraire de l’esprit bourgeois. Ce fut un idéal de justice et de fraternité afin de dépasser les nationalismes pour entrer dans un socialisme européen. Avec un objectif : « conjoindre tradition et révolution ». Critiquant ce que le communisme peut voir de bourgeois, Jean Mabire lui préférait le « communisme des conseils », libertaire (mais certes pas libéral-libertaire). Pour les mêmes raisons que le tenait éloigné du communisme productiviste et embourgeoisé, Mabire ne s’assimilait aucunement au fascisme, non seulement parce qu’il était mort en 1945, mais parce qu’il n’avait été ni socialiste, ni européen. Il se tenait par contre proche de la nébuleuse qualifiée de « gauche réactionnaire » par Marc Crapez. Une gauche antilibérale et holiste. Georges Feltin–Tracol évoque aussi le curieux « socialisme » modernisateur, technocratique, anti-bourgeois et anti-rentier de Patrie et progrès (1958-60). Dans son chapitre « Positions tercéristes », Georges Feltin–Tracol évoque les mouvements de type troisième voie de l’Amérique latine, du monde arabe, du Moyen-Orient, d’Afrique.
Le gaullisme n’est pas si éloigné de cette conception de l’économie et du social. Pour les gaullistes de conviction, la solution à la question sociale est la participation des ouvriers à la propriété de l’entreprise. C’est le pancapitalisme (ou capitalisme populaire, au sens de « répandu dans le peuple ») de Marcel Loichot. Pour de Gaulle, la participation doit corriger l’arbitraire du capitalisme en associant les salariés à la gestion des entreprises, tandis que le Plan doit corriger les insuffisances et les erreurs du marché du point de vue de l’intérêt de la nation. Participation et planification – ou planisme comme on disait dans les années trente – caractérisent ainsi la pensée du gaulliste Louis Vallon. D’autres personnalités importantes du gaullisme de gauche sont René Capitant, Jacques Debû-Bridel, Léo Hamon, Michel Cazenave (1), Philippe Dechartre, Dominique Gallet… L’objectif du gaullisme, et pas seulement du gaullisme de gauche, mais du gaullisme de projet par opposition au simple gaullisme de gestion, est, non pas de supprimer les conflits d’intérêts mais de supprimer les conflits de classes sociales. La participation n’est pas seulement une participation aux bénéfices, elle est une participation au capital de façon à ce que les ouvriers, employés, techniciens, cadres deviennent copropriétaires de l’entreprise. Le capitalisme populaire, diffusé dans le peuple, ou pancapitalisme, succèderait alors au capitalisme oligarchique. Il pourrait aussi être un remède efficace à la financiarisation de l’économie.
Entre le milieu des années 1980 et la première Coupe du Monde de rugby en 1995, l’Afrique du Sud faisait souvent l’ouverture des journaux de 20 h. Sur les ondes, le groupe britannique Simple Mindschantait « Mandela Day » tandis que le supposé « Zoulou blanc » Johnny Clegg braillait « Asimbonanga » ! Cette surexposition médiatique ne facilitait pas la compréhension précise des événements, ce qui favorisait la large désinformation de l’opinion européenne.
Avec le recul, malgré sa jeunesse, le Président Le Pen pense qu’il aurait dû se présenter contre le Général De Gaulle. En dépit d’une défaite certaine face au président sortant, « nous aurions eu les cent mille militants. Gagné des années. Changé Mai 68. Réussi l’union des patriotes qui a toujours été mon objectif. Lancé quinze ans plus tôt, et dans une société beaucoup plus saine, l’aventure qui a produit le Front National (p. 347) ». Par conséquent, au moment des événements, « s’il y avait eu un vrai parti de droite avec une organisation militante en ordre de bataille, la face du monde, ou au moins de la France, aurait pu s’en trouver changée (p. 347) ». Prenant parfois des accents dignes d’Ivan Illich d’Une société sans école en des termes bien plus durs, il dénonce « ce rêve fou d’hégémonie scolaire [qui] est le fruit paradoxal de la “ révolution ” de Mai 68, qui vouait la fonction enseignante au nettoyage des WC. La Salope n’est pas crevée, tel un moloch femelle qui se renforce des armes tournées contre elle. L’Alma Mater affermit la Dictature des pions (p. 379) ». Cette scolarisation programmée de l’ensemble du corps social constitue une retombée inattendue du résistancialisme dont « le pire legs […] fut […] l’inversion des valeurs morales (p. 132) ». Il ne faut donc pas s’étonner que « le résistancialisme […] a perpétué la guerre civile pour pérenniser ses prébendes et son pouvoir. Et qui le perpétue toujours (p. 131) ». L’auteur sait de quoi il parle puisqu’il en a été la cible principale quarante ans durant d’une rare diabolisation avec plusieursprocès intentés à la suite d’infâmes lois liberticides.
Les éditions Allia publient cette semaine un essai de Friedrich-Georg Jünger intitulé La perfection de la technique. Frère d'Ernst Jünger. Auteur de très nombreux ouvrages, Friedrich-Georg Jünger a suivi une trajectoire politique et intellectuelle parallèle à celle de son frère Ernst et a tout au long de sa vie noué un dialogue fécond avec ce dernier. Parmi ses oeuvres ont été traduits en France un texte écrit avec son frère, datant de sa période conservatrice révolutionnaire, 
Mr. Wilson begins his “inquiry into the nature of the sickness of mankind in the twentieth century” at the effective point of the writers who have most influence in the present intellectual world. They are mostly good writers; they are not among the writers catering for those intellectuals who have every qualification except an intellect. They are good, some are very good: but at the end of it all what emerges? One of the best of these writers predicted that at the end of it all comes “the Russian man” described by Mr. Wilson as “a creature of nightmare who is no longer the homo sapiens, but an existentialist monster who rejects all thought”, As Hesse, the prophet of this coming, put it: “he is primeval matter, monstrous soul stuff. He cannot live in this form; he can only pass on”. The words “he can only pass on” seem the essence of the matter; this thinking is a chaos between two orders. At some point, if we are ever to regain sanity, we must regard again the first order before we can hope to win the second. It was a long way from Hellas to “the Russian man”; it may not be so far from the turmoil of these birth pangs to fresh creation. It is indeed well worth taking a look at the intellectual situation; where Europeans were, and where we are.
This union of mind and will, of intellect and emotion in the classic Greek, this essential harmony of man and nature, this at-oneness of the human with the eternal spirit evoke the contrast of the living and the dying when set against the prevailing tendencies of modern literature. For, as Mr. Wilson puts it very acutely: when “misery will never end” is combined with “nothing is worth doing”, “the result is a kind of spiritual syphillis that can hardly stop short of death or insanity”. Yet such writers are not all “pre-occupied with sex, crime and disease”, treating of heroes who live in one room because, apparently, they dare not enter the world outside, and derive their little satisfaction of the universe from looking through a hole in the wall at a woman undressing in the next room. They are not all concerned like Dostoievsky’s “beetle man” with life “under the floor boards” (a study which should put none of us off reading him as far as the philosophy of the Grand Inquisitor and a certain very interesting conversation with the devil in the Brothers Karamazof, which Mr. Wilson rightly places very high in the world’s literature). Many of these writers of pessimism, of destruction and death have a considerable sense of beauty. Hesse’s remarkable Steppenwolf found his “life had become weariness” and he “wandered in a maze of unhappiness that led to the renunciation of nothingness”; but then “for months together my heart stood still between delight and stark sorrow to find how rich was the gallery of my life, and how thronged was the soul of wretched Steppenwolf with high eternal stars and constellations . . . this life of mine was noble. It came of high descent, and turned, not on trifles, but on the stars.” Mr. Wilson well comments that “stripped of its overblown language,” “this experience can be called the ultimately valid core of romanticism — a type of religious affirmation”. And in such writing we can still see a reflection of the romantic movement of the northern gothic world which Goethe strove to unite with the sunlit classic movement in the great synthesis of his Helena. But it ends generally in this literature with a retreat from life, a monastic detachment or suicide rather than advance into such a wider life fulfilment. The essence is that these people feel themselves inadequate to life; they feel even that to live at all is instantly to destroy whatever flickering light of beauty they hold within them. For instance De Lisle Adam’s hero Axel had a lady friend who shot at him “with two pistols at a distance of five yards, but missed him both times.” Yet even after this dramatic and perfect illustration of the modern sex relationship, they could not face life : “we have destroyed in our strange hearts the love of life . . . to live would only be a sacrilege against ourselves . . .” “They drink the goblet of poison together and die in ecstasy.” All of which is a pity for promising people, but, in any case, is preferable to the “beetle man”, “under the floor boards”, wall-peepers, et hoc genus omne, of burrowing fugitives; “Samson you cannot be too quick”, is a natural first reaction to them. Yet Mr. Wilson teaches us well not to laugh too easily, or too lightly to dismiss them; it is a serious matter. This is serious if it is the death of a civilisation; it is still more serious if it is not death but the pangs of a new birth. And, in any case, even the worst of them possess in some way the essential sensitivity which the philistine lacks. So we will not laugh at even the extremes of this system, or rather way of thinking; something may come out of it all, because at least they feel. But Mr. Wilson in turn should not smile too easily at the last “period of intense and healthy optimism that did not mind hard work and pedestrian logic.” He seems to regard the nineteenth century as a “childish world” which presaged “endless changes in human life” so that “man would go forward indefinitely on ‘stepping stones of his dead self’ to higher things.” He thinks that before we “condemn it for short-sightedness”, ” we survivors of two world wars and the atomic bomb” (at this point surely he outdoes the Victorians in easy optimism, for it is far from over yet) “would do well to remember that we are in the position of adults condemning children”. Why? — is optimism necessarily childish and pessimism necessarily adult? Sometimes this paralysed pessimism seems more like the condition of a shell-shocked child. Health can be the state of an adult and disease the condition of a child. Of course, if serious Victorians really believed in “the establishment of Utopia before the end of the century”, they were childish; reformist thinking of that degree is always childish in comparison with organic thinking. But there are explanations of the difference between the nineteenth and the twentieth century attitude, other than this distinction between childhood and manhood. Spengler said somewhere that the nineteenth century stood in relation to the twentieth century as the Athens of Pericles stood in relation to the Rome of Caesar. In his thesis this is not a distinction between youth and age — a young society does not reach senescence in so short a period — but the difference between an epoch which is dedicated to thought and an epoch which has temporarily discarded thought in favour of action, in the almost rhythmic alternation between the two states which his method of history observes. It may be that in this most decisive of all great periods of action the intellectual is really not thinking at all; he is just despairing. When he wakes up from his bad dream he may find a world created by action in which he can live, and can even think. Mr. Wilson will not quarrel with the able summary of his researches printed on the cover of his book : “it is the will that matters.” And he would therefore scarcely dispute the view just expressed; perhaps the paradox of Mr. Wilson in this period is that he is thinking. That thought might lead him through and far beyond the healthy “cowboy rodeo” of the Victorian philosophers in their sweating sunshine, on (not back) to the glittering light and shade of the Hellenic world — das Land der Griechen mit der Seele suchen — and even beyond it to the radiance of the zweite Hellas. Mr. Wilson does not seem yet to be fully seized of Hellenism, and seems still less aware of the more conscious way of European thinking that passes beyond Hellas to a clearer account of world purpose. He has evidently read a good deal of Goethe with whom such modern thinking effectively begins, and he is the first of the new generation to feel that admiration for Shaw which was bound to develop when thought returned. But he does not seem to be aware of any slowly emerging system of European thinking which has journeyed from Heraclitus to Goethe and on to Shaw, Ibsen and other modems, until with the aid of modern science and the new interpretation of history it begins to attain consciousness.
He is acute at one point in observing the contrasts between the life joy of the Greeks and the moments when their art is “full of the consciousness of death and its inevitability”. But he still apparently regards them as “healthy, once born, optimists,” not far removed from the modern bourgeois who also realises that life is precarious. He apparently thinks they did not share with the Outsider the knowledge that an “exceptional sense of life’s precariousness” can be “a hopeful means to increase his toughness”. The Greeks, of course, had not the advantage of reading Mr. Toynbee’s Study of History, which does not appear on a reasonably careful reading to be mentioned in Mr. Wilson’s book.
But Mr. Wilson moves far beyond Sartre in regarding the thinkers of an earlier period; notably Blake. At this point he recovers direction. The reader will find pages 225 to 250 among the most important of this book, but he must read the whole work for himself; this review is a commentary and an addendum, not a précis for the idle, nor a primer for those who find anything serious too difficult. The author advances a long way when he considers Blake’s “skeleton key” to a solution for those who “mistake their own stagnation for the world’s”. Here we reach realisation that the “crises of’living demand the active co-operation of intellect, emotions, body on equal terms”; contact is made here with Goethe’s Ganzheit, although it is not mentioned. “Energy is eternal delight” takes us a long way clear o the damp caverns of neo-existentialism and
No men ever had a deeper sense of the human tragedy than the Greeks; none ever faced it with such brilliant bravery or understood so well not only the art of grasping the fleeting, ecstatic moment, but of turning even despair to the enhancement of beauty. Living was yet great; they understood dennoch preisen; they did not “leave living to their servants”. Mr. Wilson in quoting Aristotle in the same sense as the above lines of Sophocles — “not to be born is the best thing, and death is better than life” — holds that “this view” lies at one extreme of religion, and that “the other extreme is vitalism”. He does not seem at this point fully to understand that the extremes in the Hellenic nature can be not contradictory but complementary, or interacting. The polarity of Greek thought was closely observed and finely interpreted by Nietzsche in diverse ways. But it was left to Goethe to express the more conscious thought beyond polarity in his Faust: the Prologue in Heaven:
May we end with a few questions based on that doctrine of higher forms which has found some expression in this Journal and in previous writings? Is it not now possible to observe with reason and as something approaching a clearly defined whole, what has hitherto only been revealed in fitful glimpses to the visionary? What are the means of observation available to those who are not blessed with the revelation of vision? Are they not the thoughts of great minds which have observed the working of the divine in nature and the researches of modern science which appear largely to confirm them?
At some point the spirit, the soul — call it what you will — is ignited by some spark of the divine and moves without necessity; yet, again it is a matter of common observation that this only occurs in very advanced types. In general it is only the “challenge” of adverse circumstance which evokes the “response” of movement to a higher state. Goethe expressed this thought very clearly in Faust by his concept of evil’s relationship to good; he also indicated the type where the conscious striving of the aspiring spirit replaces the urge of suffering in the final attainment of salvation: wer immer strebend sich bemüht, den können wir erlösen. In the early stages of the great striving all suffering, and later all beauty must be experienced and sensed; but to no moment of ecstasy can man say, verweile doch, du bist so schön until the final passing to an infinity of beauty at present beyond man’s ken. Complacency, at any point, is certainly excluded. So must it be always in a creed which begins effectively with Heraclitus and now pervades modern vitalism. The philosophy of the “ever living fire”, of the ewig werdende could never be associated with complacency. Still less can the more conscious doctrine of higher forms co-exist with the static, or with the illusory perfections of a facile reformism. Man began very small, and has become not so small; he must end very great, or cease to be. That is the essence of the matter. Is it true? This is a question which everyone must answer for himself after studying European literature which stretches from the Greeks to the vital thought of modern times and, also, the world thinking of many different climes and ages which in many ways and at most diverse points is strangely related. He should study, too, either directly or through the agency of those most competent to judge, the evolutionary processes revealed so relatively recently by modern biology and the apparently ever increasing concept of ordered complexity in modern physics. He must then answer two questions: the first is whether it is more likely than not that a purpose exists in life? — the second is whether despite all failures and obscurities the only discernable purpose is a movement from lower to higher forms? If he comes at length to a conclusion which answers both these questions with a considered affirmative, he has reached the point of the great affirmation. The new religious impulse which so many seek is really already here. We need neither prophets nor priests to find it for ourselves, although we are not the enemies but the friends of those who do. For ourselves we can find in the thought of the world the faith and the service of the conscious and sentient man.
Although the (French-revolutionary) orientation and (heraldic-traditional) colours of the Belgian flag are historically predictable for anybody acquainted with the unique genesis of the Belgian state, it still is very unusual in one respect. Perhaps its strange - nearly square (13:15) - proportions reflects the historical particularity of Belgium’s geopolitical configuration: effectively, Belgium represents a cultural-historical restgebied, or ‘left over’, that was legally established as a sovereign ‘buffer zone’ for the sake of the early-19th Century ‘balance of power’ compromise between Britain, France and Prussia. Only in terms of its colours can the Belgian flag claim an authentically traditional (i.e. doubly historical and symbolic) pedigree. Between the blood red colour of the land provinces of Luxembourg, Hainaut and Limburg and the sable black colour of the mighty coastal province of Flanders, it shows the gold yellow of the prosperous province of Brabant with its capital Brussels, which has been the administrative seat of pan-European power from pre-modern Burgundian state up to the post-modern European Union. The Belgian red and black have the same heraldic-symbolic charge as the Eurasian red and black: in both, red is the colour of worldly power (Nobility, army) and black is the colour of other-worldly power (Church, clergy). In the holistic vision of Traditionalist Eurasianism, these colours necessarily complement each other: together they represent the intimidating combination of the approaching storm (divinely ordained Deluge) and war (divinely ordained Holy War). Right up to this day, everyone knows that the red-and-black flag represents revolution, even if Social Justice Warrior ideologues fail to recognize the true - back-ward and up-ward - direction of every authentic re-volution (in casu: the Archaeo-Futurist Revolution). Between the Belgium blood red and sable black is found the colour that may be said to be in virtual ‘occultation’ in Eurasianism: the gold yellow that has the heraldic-symbolic charge of the heavenly light and the Golden Dawn - and thus of Traditionalism itself. A tiny ray of that light comes to us from Brabant in Steuckers’ Europa.
The French Revolution - ironically directly caused by the French state bankruptcy that followed the French naval revenge on Britain during the American Revolution (1775-83) - marks the point at which thalassocratic Modernity manages to create a substantial ‘bridgehead’ on the European continent. As a focal point of revolutionary upheaval and anti-Eurasianist geopolitics, France subsequently functions as a continental ‘wedge’ for the forces of thalassocratic Modernity all throughout the 19th and 20th Centuries.
Almost immediately after the fall of the communist dictatorship in Eastern Europe (the Soviet Union abolished itself in 1991), a globalist dictatorship was introduced in Western Europe (the European Union was established in 1992): the ‘Eastern Bloc’ was replaced by a ‘Western Bloc’. This new Western Block, characterized by an extreme anti-traditional ideology and a matriarchic-xenophile culture in which all forms of authentic authority and identity are being dissolved as in acid, is now threatening the physical survival of the European peoples in a much more direct manner than the old Eastern Bloc ever did. Whereas the Eastern Bloc insisted, at least theoretically, on an ‘anagogic’ supersession of European nationalism and on a balanced ‘brotherhood’ of separate nations, the Western Bloc insists on a physical deconstruction of the European peoples by means of anti-natalism (through social implosion) and ethnic replacement (through mass immigration). The ex-Eastern Bloc states of Central Europe that were absorbed into the Western Bloc after 2004 now recognize this difference - this is the deeper cause of the militant resistance of the Visegrad states against the Brussels Diktat of ‘open borders’. It is ironic, however, that European ‘narrow nationalism’ is actually assisting the Brussels bureaucracy in the implementation of its anti-European policy: short-sighted and artificially magnified ‘neo-nationalist’ conflicts of interest between the European peoples are distracting them from their much more substantial common interest, viz. the preservation of Western civilization. Examples of such artificial ‘conflicts’ are the north-south divide after the ‘European Sovereign Debt Crisis’ of 2010, the west-east divide after the Russian absorption of the Crimea in 2014 and the continental-insular divide after the ‘Brexit’ of 2016. In these instances, ‘narrow nationalist’ divisions are actually ‘engineered’ - and ruthlessly exploited by media propaganda - in the artificial setting of a carefully disguised but all-out globalist offensive against the greater conglomerate of all European nation-states and all European peoples together.
Even if the most visible application of the Neocon arsenal takes place outside of the West and outside of the Western-allied world (flexibly defined as an malleable Orwellian ‘International Community’), the strategy of the Neocon trotskyists vis-à-vis Europe is basically the same. In this regard, Steuckers points to the crucial role of Germany: to maintain their New World Order it is vitally important for the Neocons to control and restrain Europe’s geographically, demographically and economically dominant nation-state. The military destruction of the Third Reich was followed by permanent military occupation, systematic ‘denazification’, pacifist indoctrination and permanent tributary status (Wiedergutmachung, Euro monetary union, ‘development aid’). The Neocons ...considèrent l’Europe comme un espace neutralisée, gouverné par des pitres sans envergure, un espace émasculé que l’on peut piller à mieux mieux... (p.14) [...regard Europe as a neutralized space, nominally ruled by clown without any real authority, a castrated region that can be plundered at will]. But still, there remains a ‘German danger’ in the heart of Europe: despite its slavish economic tribute, its humble foreign policy and its subservient political correctness, Germany remains a permanent potential threat to the Neocons’ unipolar globalism due to its unmatched economic productivity, its remarkable social cohesion and its indomitable intellectual tradition. Neither the stupendous cost of the Wiedervereinigung, nor the monstrous expense of the Euro, nor the colossal weight of the ‘Eurozone Crisis’ has been able to substantially slow down Germany’s socio-economic powerhouse. It is with this reality in mind that the globalist strategy of Umvolkung can be understood: only the physical replacement of the German people offers a realistic ‘hope’ for the permanent elimination of the ‘German danger’. The fact that this program of wholesale ethnic replacement - historically unprecedented in scale - is conceivable at all can only be properly understood against the specific background of the deep psycho-historical trauma and the decades’ long politically correct preconditioning of Germany. The contemporary reality of the physical violation of Germany - presently realized through taḥarruš jamā‘ī en jihād bi-ssayf (systematic rape en ritual slaughter) - can only be truly understood in view of its preceding psychological violation.
Against this background, the full significance of Steuckers’ geopolitical analysis sinks in: L’Europe-croupion, que nous avons devant les yeux, est une victime consentante de la globalisation voulue par l’hegemon américain. ...En ce sens, l’Europe actuelle, sans ‘épine dorsale’, est effectivement soumise aux diktats de la haute finance internationale (p.17). [The ‘rump-Europe’ that we presently see before our eyes is the willing victim of the globalism that is imposed by American hegemony. ...In this sense, the present ‘spineless’ Europe is effectively subject to the dictates of international ‘high finance’]. Steuckers gives a clear analysis of what is required to escape from the clutches of the globalist bankers’ regime: nothing less than a new European Renaissance, based on a restoration of maximal economic autarky (systematic re-industrialization, strategic trade treaties, de-privatized monetary supply), a re-introduction of socio-economically balanced forms of ordo-liberalism (Rhineland Model, Keysenian Socialism) and a geopolitical re-orientation towards multipolarity (Eurasian Confederacy, Boreal Alliance). A new geopolitical course in the face of the globalist storm requires not only a unified European effort but also a shrewd European navigation strategy between new geopolitical power poles: ....[P]our se dégager des tutelles exogènes... [l’Europe faut] privilégier les rapports euro-BRICS ou euro-Shanghaï, de façon à nous dégager des étaux de propagande médiatique américaine et du banksterisme de Wall Street, dans lesquels nous étouffons. La multipolarité pourrait nous donner l’occasion de rejouer une carte contestatrice... en matière de politique extérieure (p.18). [To liberate itself from alien rule... [Europe must] prioritize Euro-BRICS or Euro-Shanghai,
Thus, in Belgium 25% of the population is ‘in treatment’, 10% uses antidepressants and the number of children and adolescents that is forced to take ritaline in the region of Flanders alone has doubled between 2005 and 2009 and Flanders is now the second highest listed European region in terms of suicide frequency...] It should be added, that in the northern regions of the Low Countries the same trend is perhaps even more pronounced: the Dutch public sphere is now characterized by infantile regression, narcissist aggression and commercially-sponsored ‘idiocracy’ (phenomena promoted by television ‘celebrities’ such as ‘motivation coach’ Emile Ratelband, ‘model personality’ Paul de Leeuw and ‘morality anaesthetist’ Jeroen Pauw).
Hoewel de (Frans-revolutionaire) oriëntatie en (heraldiek-traditionele) kleuren van de Belgische vlag historisch voorspelbaar zijn uit het specifieke wordingsproces van de Belgische staat, is zij toch zeer ongewoon in één opzicht. Wellicht reflecteert haar vreemde – bijna vierkante (13:15) – proportionaliteit de historische uniciteit van de Belgische staatkundige configuratie: België is feitelijk een cultuur-historisch ‘restgebied’ dat als ‘bufferzone’ soeverein werd verklaard ter wille van een vroeg-19
Steuckers wijst erop dat de dertien eeuwen Europese geschiedenis sinds het verlies van het Indo-Europese machtsmonopolie op de Euraziatische Steppe – gemarkeerd door de opkomst van het Hunnen Rijk onder Attila (406-453) – in feite kan worden beschreven als één gigantische strijd om het initiatief te heroveren op concurrerende Turks-Mongoolse volkeren die westwaarts stormen vanuit de steppe. Vanuit die optiek markeert de nederlaag van de Hunnen op de Catalaunische Velden (451) niet zozeer een Europese overwinning als wel de (dusver) diepste laagwaterstand van de Europese beschaving, dan teruggedrongen tot nauwelijks 300 kilometer van de Atlantische kust. Het is pas gedurende de 16
Steuckers wijst op de ideologisch-propagandistische rode draad die loopt door de triomfale campagne van de Modernistische thalassocratie tegen het Traditionalistische Eurazië: het constante gebruik van verschillende soorten 
Onderdelen van het Tradionalistische wereldbeeld dat de Eurazianistische visie op ‘ras’ en ‘etniciteit’ voedt kan men terugvinden in het werk van Johann Herder (‘idealistisch nationalisme’) en Julius Evola (‘spiritueel ras’). Dat gezegd zijnde, is het belangrijk te onderstrepen dat de Traditionalistische ‘kleuring’ het Eurazianisme een 
De enige Traditionalistisch legitieme vorm van supra-nationaal gezag berust op het geval van wat Carl Schmitt het 
Recente ‘separatistische’ tendensen binnen bestaande Europese staten (de afscheiding van Kosovo in 2008, het Schotse onafhankelijkheid referendum van 2014, de Catalaanse ‘onafhankelijkheidsverklaring’ van 2017) onderstrepen de actueel acute relevantie van het ‘nationalisme’ vraagstuk. De dubbele last van het achterhaalde internationale staatsrecht (‘Westfalen’ – ongedifferentieerde staatssoevereiniteit) en de achterhaalde territoriale afbakeningen (‘Versailles’ – kunstmatige staatsgrenzen) versterkt de politieke tendentie naar de ‘kleinste nationalistische deler’. Steuckers wijst op het effect van de globalistische 
De meest zichtbare toepassingen van dit 
Net zoals de Tweede Punische Oorlog, eindigde de Tweede Wereld Oorlog met een nog draconischer ‘vrede’: in beide gevallen is er sprake van nog grotere territoriale amputaties en nog drastischer herstelbetalingen. Zoals Carthago na de Tweede Punische Oorlog, zo komt Duitsland na Tweede Wereld Oorlog onder directe militaire, politieke en economische curatele van de overwinnaars – een curatele die door de overwinnaar als een vanzelfsprekend en permanent recht wordt opgevat. In beide gevallen ziet de overwinnaar de overwonnen aartsvijand als een permanent wingewest met beperkte interne autonomie dat nooit meer een bedreiging mag worden. Toch vertegenwoordigen het fysiek voortbestaan en de socio-economische veerkracht van de overwonnene voor de overwinnaar een – deels latente maar permanente – bron van onzekerheid en angst. De Romeinse politiek van groteske inmenging in de interne aangelegenheden van het na de Tweede Punische Oorlog overgebleven romp-Carthago vertoont opmerkelijke overeenkomsten met de globalistische politiek van socio-economische manipulatie van het na de Tweede Wereld Oorlog overgebleven romp-Duitsland. In beide gevallen vertegenwoordigen de natuurlijke rijkdom, hoge productiviteit en culturele eigenheid van de gekortwiekte aartsvijand een blijvende bron van ambitie, afgunst en angst: 
Steuckers voorziet weliswaar een einde van de globalistische Nieuwe Wereld Orde en de eraan ten grondslag liggende 
