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dimanche, 31 juillet 2011

The NewDark Age: The Frankfurt School and "Political Correctness"

The New Dark Age: The Frankfurt School and 'Political Correctness'

Michael Minnicino

Ex: http://www.wermodandwermod.com/

The people of North America and Western Europe now accept a level of ugliness in their daily lives which is almost without precedent in the history of Western civilization. Most of us have become so inured, that the death of millions from starvation and disease draws from us no more than a sigh, or a murmur of protest. Our own city streets, home to legions of the homeless, are ruled by Dope, Inc., the largest industry in the world, and on those streets Americans now murder each other at a rate not seen since the Dark Ages.

At the same time, a thousand smaller horrors are so commonplace as to go unnoticed. Our children spend as much time sitting in front of television sets as they do in school, watching with glee, scenes of torture and death which might have shocked an audience in the Roman Coliseum. Music is everywhere, almost unavoidable—but it does not uplift, nor even tranquilize—it claws at the ears, sometimes spitting out an obscenity. Our plastic arts are ugly, our architecture is ugly, our clothes are ugly. There have certainly been periods in history where mankind has lived through similar kinds of brutishness, but our time is crucially different. Our post-World War II era is the first in history in which these horrors are completely avoidable. Our time is the first to have the technology and resources to feed, house, educate, and humanely employ every person on earth, no matter what the growth of population. Yet, when shown the ideas and proven technologies that can solve the most horrendous problems, most people retreat into implacable passivity. We have become not only ugly, but impotent.

Nonetheless, there is no reason why our current moral-cultural situation had to lawfully or naturally turn out as it has; and there is no reason why this tyranny of ugliness should continue one instant longer.

Consider the situation just one hundred years ago, in the early 1890's. In music, Claude Debussy was completing his Prelude to the Afternoon of a Faun, and Arnold Schönberg was beginning to experiment with atonalism; at the same time, Dvorak was working on his Ninth Symphony, while Brahms and Verdi still lived. Edvard Munch was showing The Scream, and Paul Gauguin his Self-Portrait with Halo, but in America, Thomas Eakins was still painting and teaching. Mechanists like Helmholtz and Mach held major university chairs of science, alongside the students of Riemann and Cantor. Pope Leo XIII's De Rerum Novarum was being promulgated, even as sections of the Socialist Second International were turning terrorist, and preparing for class war.

The optimistic belief that one could compose music like Beethoven, paint like Rembrandt, study the universe like Plato and Nicolaus of Cusa, and change world society without violence, was alive in the 1890's—admittedly, it was weak, and under siege, but it was hardly dead. Yet, within twenty short years, these Classical traditions of human civilization had been all but swept away, and the West had committed itself to a series of wars of inconceivable carnage.

What started about a hundred years ago, was what might be called a counter-Renaissance. The Renaissance of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries was a religious celebration of the human soul and mankind's potential for growth. Beauty in art could not be conceived of as anything less than the expression of the most-advanced scientific principles, as demonstrated by the geometry upon which Leonardo's perspective and Brunelleschi's great Dome of Florence Cathedral are based. The finest minds of the day turned their thoughts to the heavens and the mighty waters, and mapped the solar system and the route to the New World, planning great projects to turn the course of rivers for the betterment of mankind. About a hundred years ago, it was as though a long checklist had been drawn up, with all of the wonderful achievements of the Renaissance itemized—each to be reversed. As part of this "New Age" movement, as it was then called, the concept of the human soul was undermined by the most vociferous intellectual campaign in history; art was forcibly separated from science, and science itself was made the object of deep suspicion. Art was made ugly because, it was said, life had become ugly.

The cultural shift away from the Renaissance ideas that built the modern world, was due to a kind of freemasonry of ugliness. In the beginning, it was a formal political conspiracy to popularize theories that were specifically designed to weaken the soul of Judeo-Christian civilization in such a way as to make people believe that creativity was not possible, that adherence to universal truth was evidence of authoritarianism, and that reason itself was suspect. This conspiracy was decisive in planning and developing, as means of social manipulation, the vast new sister industries of radio, television, film, recorded music, advertising, and public opinion polling. The pervasive psychological hold of the media was purposely fostered to create the passivity and pessimism which afflict our populations today. So successful was this conspiracy, that it has become embedded in our culture; it no longer needs to be a "conspiracy," for it has taken on a life of its own. Its successes are not debatable—you need only turn on the radio or television. Even the nomination of a Supreme Court Justice is deformed into an erotic soap opera, with the audience rooting from the sidelines for their favorite character.

Our universities, the cradle of our technological and intellectual future, have become overwhelmed by Comintern-style New Age "Political Correctness." With the collapse of the Soviet Union, our campuses now represent the largest concentration of Marxist dogma in the world. The irrational adolescent outbursts of the 1960's have become institutionalized into a "permanent revolution." Our professors glance over their shoulders, hoping the current mode will blow over before a student's denunciation obliterates a life's work; some audio-tape their lectures, fearing accusations of "insensitivity" by some enraged "Red Guard." Students at the University of Virginia recently petitioned successfully to drop the requirement to read Homer, Chaucer, and other DEMS ("Dead European Males") because such writings are considered ethnocentric, phallocentric, and generally inferior to the "more relevant" Third World, female, or homosexual authors.

This is not the academy of a republic; this is Hitler's Gestapo and Stalin's NKVD rooting out "deviationists," and banning books—the only thing missing is the public bonfire.

We will have to face the fact that the ugliness we see around us has been consciously fostered and organized in such a way, that a majority of the population is losing the cognitive ability to transmit to the next generation, the ideas and methods upon which our civilization was built. The loss of that ability is the primary indicator of a Dark Age. And, a new Dark Age is exactly what we are in. In such situations, the record of history is unequivocal: either we create a Renaissance—a rebirth of the fundamental principles upon which civilization originated—or, our civilization dies.

I. The Frankfurt School: Bolshevik Intelligentsia

The single, most important organizational component of this conspiracy was a Communist thinktank called the Institute for Social Research (I.S.R.), but popularly known as the Frankfurt School.

In the heady days immediately after the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia, it was widely believed that proletarian revolution would momentarily sweep out of the Urals into Europe and, ultimately, North America. It did not; the only two attempts at workers' government in the West— in Munich and Budapest—lasted only months. The Communist International (Comintern) therefore began several operations to determine why this was so. One such was headed by Georg Lukacs, a Hungarian aristocrat, son of one of the Hapsburg Empire's leading bankers. Trained in Germany and already an important literary theorist, Lukacs became a Communist during World War I, writing as he joined the party, "Who will save us from Western civilization?" Lukacs was well-suited to the Comintern task: he had been one of the Commissars of Culture during the short-lived Hungarian Soviet in Budapest in 1919; in fact, modern historians link the shortness of the Budapest experiment to Lukacs' orders mandating sex education in the schools, easy access to contraception, and the loosening of divorce laws—all of which revulsed Hungary's Roman Catholic population.

Fleeing to the Soviet Union after the counter-revolution, Lukacs was secreted into Germany in 1922, where he chaired a meeting of Communist-oriented sociologists and intellectuals. This meeting founded the Institute for Social Research. Over the next decade, the Institute worked out what was to become the Comintern's most successful psychological warfare operation against the capitalist West.

Lukacs identified that any political movement capable of bringing Bolshevism to the West would have to be, in his words, "demonic"; it would have to "possess the religious power which is capable of filling the entire soul; a power that characterized primitive Christianity." However, Lukacs suggested, such a "messianic" political movement could only succeed when the individual believes that his or her actions are determined by "not a personal destiny, but the destiny of the community" in a world "that has been abandoned by God [emphasis added-MJM]." Bolshevism worked in Russia because that nation was dominated by a peculiar gnostic form of Christianty typified by the writings of Fyodor Dostoyevsky. "The model for the new man is Alyosha Karamazov," said Lukacs, referring to the Dostoyevsky character who willingly gave over his personal identity to a holy man, and thus ceased to be "unique, pure, and therefore abstract."

This abandonment of the soul's uniqueness also solves the problem of "the diabolic forces lurking in all violence" which must be unleashed in order to create a revolution. In this context, Lukacs cited the Grand Inquisitor section of Dostoyevsky's The Brothers Karamazov, noting that the Inquisitor who is interrogating Jesus, has resolved the issue of good and evil: once man has understood his alienation from God, then any act in the service of the "destiny of the community" is justified; such an act can be "neither crime nor madness.... For crime and madness are objectifications of transcendental homelessness."

According to an eyewitness, during meetings of the Hungarian Soviet leadership in 1919 to draw up lists for the firing squad, Lukacs would often quote the Grand Inquisitor: "And we who, for their happiness, have taken their sins upon ourselves, we stand before you and say, 'Judge us if you can and if you dare.' "

The Problem of Genesis

What differentiated the West from Russia, Lukacs identified, was a Judeo-Christian cultural matrix which emphasized exactly the uniqueness and sacredness of the individual which Lukacs abjured. At its core, the dominant Western ideology maintained that the individual, through the exercise of his or her reason, could discern the Divine Will in an unmediated relationship. What was worse, from Lukacs' standpoint: this reasonable relationship necessarily implied that the individual could and should change the physical universe in pursuit of the Good; that Man should have dominion over Nature, as stated in the Biblical injunction in Genesis. The problem was, that as long as the individual had the belief—or even the hope of the belief—that his or her divine spark of reason could solve the problems facing society, then that society would never reach the state of hopelessness and alienation which Lukacs recognized as the necessary prerequisite for socialist revolution.

The task of the Frankfurt School, then, was first, to undermine the Judeo-Christian legacy through an "abolition of culture" (Aufhebung der Kultur in Lukacs' German); and, second, to determine new cultural forms which would increase the alienation of the population, thus creating a "new barbarism." To this task, there gathered in and around the Frankfurt School an incredible assortment of not only Communists, but also non-party socialists, radical phenomenologists, Zionists, renegade Freudians, and at least a few members of a self-identified "cult of Astarte." The variegated membership reflected, to a certain extent, the sponsorship: although the Institute for Social Research started with Comintern support, over the next three decades its sources of funds included various German and American universities, the Rockefeller Foundation, Columbia Broadcasting System, the American Jewish Committee, several American intelligence services, the Office of the U.S. High Commissioner for Germany, the International Labour Organization, and the Hacker Institute, a posh psychiatric clinic in Beverly Hills.

Similarly, the Institute's political allegiances: although top personnel maintained what might be called a sentimental relationship to the Soviet Union (and there is evidence that some of them worked for Soviet intelligence into the 1960's), the Institute saw its goals as higher than that of Russian foreign policy. Stalin, who was horrified at the undisciplined, "cosmopolitan" operation set up by his predecessors, cut the Institute off in the late 1920's, forcing Lukacs into "self-criticism," and briefly jailing him as a German sympathizer during World War II.

Lukacs survived to briefly take up his old post as Minister of Culture during the anti-Stalinist Imre Nagy regime in Hungary. Of the other top Institute figures, the political perambulations of Herbert Marcuse are typical. He started as a Communist; became a protégé of philosopher Martin Heidegger even as the latter was joining the Nazi Party; coming to America, he worked for the World War II Office of Strategic Services (OSS), and later became the U.S. State Department's top analyst of Soviet policy during the height of the McCarthy period; in the 1960's, he turned again, to become the most important guru of the New Left; and he ended his days helping to found the environmentalist extremist Green Party in West Germany.

In all this seeming incoherence of shifting positions and contradictory funding, there is no ideological conflict. The invariant is the desire of all parties to answer Lukacs' original question: "Who will save us from Western civilization?"

Theodor Adorno and Walter Benjamin

Perhaps the most important, if least-known, of the Frankfurt School's successes was the shaping of the electronic media of radio and television into the powerful instruments of social control which they represent today. This grew out of the work originally done by two men who came to the Institute in the late 1920's, Theodor Adorno and Walter Benjamin.

After completing studies at the University of Frankfurt, Walter Benjamin planned to emigrate to Palestine in 1924 with his friend Gershom Scholem (who later became one of Israel's most famous philosophers, as well as Judaism's leading gnostic), but was prevented by a love affair with Asja Lacis, a Latvian actress and Comintern stringer. Lacis whisked him off to the Italian island of Capri, a cult center from the time of the Emperor Tiberius, then used as a Comintern training base; the heretofore apolitical Benjamin wrote Scholem from Capri, that he had found "an existential liberation and an intensive insight into the actuality of radical communism."

Lacis later took Benjamin to Moscow for further indoctrination, where he met playwright Bertolt Brecht, with whom he would begin a long collaboration; soon thereafter, while working on the first German translation of the drug-enthusiast French poet Baudelaire, Benjamin began serious experimentation with hallucinogens. In 1927, he was in Berlin as part of a group led by Adorno, studying the works of Lukacs; other members of the study group included Brecht and his composer-partner Kurt Weill; Hans Eisler, another composer who would later become a Hollywood film score composer and co-author with Adorno of the textbook Composition for the Film; the avant-garde photographer Imre Moholy-Nagy; and the conductor Otto Klemperer.

From 1928 to 1932, Adorno and Benjamin had an intensive collaboration, at the end of which they began publishing articles in the Institute's journal, the Zeitschrift fär Sozialforschung. Benjamin was kept on the margins of the Institute, largely due to Adorno, who would later appropriate much of his work. As Hitler came to power, the Institute's staff fled, but, whereas most were quickly spirited away to new deployments in the U.S. and England, there were no job offers for Benjamin, probably due to the animus of Adorno. He went to France, and, after the German invasion, fled to the Spanish border; expecting momentary arrest by the Gestapo, he despaired and died in a dingy hotel room of self-administered drug overdose.

Benjamin's work remained almost completely unknown until 1955, when Scholem and Adorno published an edition of his material in Germany. The full revival occurred in 1968, when Hannah Arendt, Heidegger's former mistress and a collaborator of the Institute in America, published a major article on Benjamin in the New Yorker magazine, followed in the same year by the first English translations of his work. Today, every university bookstore in the country boasts a full shelf devoted to translations of every scrap Benjamin wrote, plus exegesis, all with 1980's copyright dates.

Adorno was younger than Benjamin, and as aggressive as the older man was passive. Born Teodoro Wiesengrund-Adorno to a Corsican family, he was taught the piano at an early age by an aunt who lived with the family and had been the concert accompanist to the international opera star Adelina Patti. It was generally thought that Theodor would become a professional musician, and he studied with Bernard Sekles, Paul Hindemith's teacher. However, in 1918, while still a gymnasium student, Adorno met Siegfried Kracauer. Kracauer was part of a Kantian-Zionist salon which met at the house of Rabbi Nehemiah Nobel in Frankfurt; other members of the Nobel circle included philosopher Martin Buber, writer Franz Rosenzweig, and two students, Leo Lowenthal and Erich Fromm. Kracauer, Lowenthal, and Fromm would join the I.S.R. two decades later. Adorno engaged Kracauer to tutor him in the philosophy of Kant; Kracauer also introduced him to the writings of Lukacs and to Walter Benjamin, who was around the Nobel clique.

In 1924, Adorno moved to Vienna, to study with the atonalist composers Alban Berg and Arnold Schönberg, and became connected to the avant-garde and occult circle around the old Marxist Karl Kraus. Here, he not only met his future collaborator, Hans Eisler, but also came into contact with the theories of Freudian extremist Otto Gross. Gross, a long-time cocaine addict, had died in a Berlin gutter in 1920, while on his way to help the revolution in Budapest; he had developed the theory that mental health could only be achieved through the revival of the ancient cult of Astarte, which would sweep away monotheism and the "bourgeois family."

Saving Marxist Aesthetics

By 1928, Adorno and Benjamin had satisfied their intellectual wanderlust, and settled down at the I.S.R. in Germany to do some work. As subject, they chose an aspect of the problem posed by Lukacs: how to give aesthetics a firmly materialistic basis. It was a question of some importance, at the time. Official Soviet discussions of art and culture, with their wild gyrations into "socialist realism" and "proletkult," were idiotic, and only served to discredit Marxism's claim to philosophy among intellectuals. Karl Marx's own writings on the subject were sketchy and banal, at best.

In essence, Adorno and Benjamin's problem was Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz. At the beginning of the eighteenth century, Leibniz had once again obliterated the centuries-old gnostic dualism dividing mind and body, by demonstrating that matter does not think. A creative act in art or science apprehends the truth of the physical universe, but it is not determined by that physical universe. By self-consciously concentrating the past in the present to effect the future, the creative act, properly defined, is as immortal as the soul which envisions the act. This has fatal philosophical implications for Marxism, which rests entirely on the hypothesis that mental activity is determined by the social relations excreted by mankind's production of its physical existence.

Marx sidestepped the problem of Leibniz, as did Adorno and Benjamin, although the latter did it with a lot more panache. It is wrong, said Benjamin in his first articles on the subject, to start with the reasonable, hypothesizing mind as the basis of the development of civilization; this is an unfortunate legacy of Socrates. As an alternative, Benjamin posed an Aristotelian fable in interpretation of Genesis: Assume that Eden were given to Adam as the primordial physical state. The origin of science and philosophy does not lie in the investigation and mastery of nature, but in the naming of the objects of nature; in the primordial state, to name a thing was to say all there was to say about that thing. In support of this, Benjamin cynically recalled the opening lines of the Gospel according to St. John, carefully avoiding the philosophically-broader Greek, and preferring the Vulgate (so that, in the phrase "In the beginning was the Word," the connotations of the original Greek word logos—speech, reason, ratiocination, translated as "Word"—are replaced by the narrower meaning of the Latin word verbum). After the expulsion from Eden and God's requirement that Adam eat his bread earned by the sweat of his face (Benjamin's Marxist metaphor for the development of economies), and God's further curse of Babel on Nimrod (that is, the development of nation-states with distinct languages, which Benjamin and Marx viewed as a negative process away from the "primitive communism" of Eden), humanity became "estranged" from the physical world.

Thus, Benjamin continued, objects still give off an "aura" of their primordial form, but the truth is now hopelessly elusive. In fact, speech, written language, art, creativity itself—that by which we master physicality—merely furthers the estrangement by attempting, in Marxist jargon, to incorporate objects of nature into the social relations determined by the class structure dominant at that point in history. The creative artist or scientist, therefore, is a vessel, like Ion the rhapsode as he described himself to Socrates, or like a modern "chaos theory" advocate: the creative act springs out of the hodgepodge of culture as if by magic. The more that bourgeois man tries to convey what he intends about an object, the less truthful he becomes; or, in one of Benjamin's most oft-quoted statements, "Truth is the death of intention."

This philosophical sleight-of-hand allows one to do several destructive things. By making creativity historically-specific, you rob it of both immortality and morality. One cannot hypothesize universal truth, or natural law, for truth is completely relative to historical development. By discarding the idea of truth and error, you also may throw out the "obsolete" concept of good and evil; you are, in the words of Friedrich Nietzsche, "beyond good and evil." Benjamin is able, for instance, to defend what he calls the "Satanism" of the French Symbolists and their Surrealist successors, for at the core of this Satanism "one finds the cult of evil as a political device ... to disinfect and isolate against all moralizing dilettantism" of the bourgeoisie. To condemn the Satanism of Rimbaud as evil, is as incorrect as to extol a Beethoven quartet or a Schiller poem as good; for both judgments are blind to the historical forces working unconsciously on the artist.

Thus, we are told, the late Beethoven's chord structure was striving to be atonal, but Beethoven could not bring himself consciously to break with the structured world of Congress of Vienna Europe (Adorno's thesis); similarly, Schiller really wanted to state that creativity was the liberation of the erotic, but as a true child of the Enlightenment and Immanuel Kant, he could not make the requisite renunciation of reason (Marcuse's thesis). Epistemology becomes a poor relation of public opinion, since the artist does not consciously create works in order to uplift society, but instead unconsciously transmits the ideological assumptions of the culture into which he was born. The issue is no longer what is universally true, but what can be plausibly interpreted by the self-appointed guardians of the Zeitgeist.

"The Bad New Days"

Thus, for the Frankfort School, the goal of a cultural elite in the modern, "capitalist" era must be to strip away the belief that art derives from the self-conscious emulation of God the Creator; "religious illumination," says Benjamin, must be shown to "reside in a profane illumination, a materialistic, anthropological inspiration, to which hashish, opium, or whatever else can give an introductory lesson." At the same time, new cultural forms must be found to increase the alienation of the population, in order for it to understand how truly alienated it is to live without socialism. "Do not build on the good old days, but on the bad new ones," said Benjamin.

The proper direction in painting, therefore, is that taken by the late Van Gogh, who began to paint objects in disintegration, with the equivalent of a hashish-smoker's eye that "loosens and entices things out of their familiar world." In music, "it is not suggested that one can compose better today" than Mozart or Beethoven, said Adorno, but one must compose atonally, for atonalism is sick, and "the sickness, dialectically, is at the same time the cure....The extraordinarily violent reaction protest which such music confronts in the present society ... appears nonetheless to suggest that the dialectical function of this music can already be felt ... negatively, as 'destruction.' "

The purpose of modern art, literature, and music must be to destroy the uplifting—therefore, bourgeois — potential of art, literature, and music, so that man, bereft of his connection to the divine, sees his only creative option to be political revolt. "To organize pessimism means nothing other than to expel the moral metaphor from politics and to discover in political action a sphere reserved one hundred percent for images." Thus, Benjamin collaborated with Brecht to work these theories into practical form, and their joint effort culminated in the Verfremdungseffekt ("estrangement effect"), Brecht's attempt to write his plays so as to make the audience leave the theatre demoralized and aimlessly angry.

Political Correctness

The Adorno-Benjamin analysis represents almost the entire theoretical basis of all the politically correct aesthetic trends which now plague our universities. The Poststructuralism of Roland Barthes, Michel Foucault, and Jacques Derrida, the Semiotics of Umberto Eco, the Deconstructionism of Paul DeMan, all openly cite Benjamin as the source of their work. The Italian terrorist Eco's best-selling novel, The Name of the Rose, is little more than a paean to Benjamin; DeMan, the former Nazi collaborator in Belgium who became a prestigious Yale professor, began his career translating Benjamin; Barthes' infamous 1968 statement that "[t]he author is dead," is meant as an elaboration of Benjamin's dictum on intention. Benjamin has actually been called the heir of Leibniz and of Wilhelm von Humboldt, the philologist collaborator of Schiller whose educational reforms engendered the tremendous development of Germany in the nineteenth century. Even as recently as September 1991, the Washington Post referred to Benjamin as "the finest German literary theorist of the century (and many would have left off that qualifying German)."

Readers have undoubtedly heard one or another horror story about how an African-American Studies Department has procured a ban on Othello, because it is "racist," or how a radical feminist professor lectured a Modern Language Association meeting on the witches as the "true heroines" of Macbeth. These atrocities occur because the perpetrators are able to plausibly demonstrate, in the tradition of Benjamin and Adorno, that Shakespeare's intent is irrelevant; what is important, is the racist or phallocentric "subtext" of which Shakespeare was unconscious when he wrote.

When the local Women's Studies or Third World Studies Department organizes students to abandon classics in favor of modern Black and feminist authors, the reasons given are pure Benjamin. It is not that these modern writers are better, but they are somehow more truthful because their alienated prose reflects the modern social problems of which the older authors were ignorant! Students are being taught that language itself is, as Benjamin said, merely a conglomeration of false "names" foisted upon society by its oppressors, and are warned against "logocentrism," the bourgeois over-reliance on words.

If these campus antics appear "retarded" (in the words of Adorno), that is because they are designed to be. The Frankfurt School's most important breakthrough consists in the realization that their monstrous theories could become dominant in the culture, as a result of the changes in society brought about by what Benjamin called "the age of mechanical reproduction of art."

II. The Establishment Goes Bolshevik:
"Entertainment" Replaces Art

Before the twentieth century, the distinction between art and "entertainment" was much more pronounced. One could be entertained by art, certainly, but the experience was active, not passive. On the first level, one had to make a conscious choice to go to a concert, to view a certain art exhibit, to buy a book or piece of sheet music. It was unlikely that any more than an infinitesimal fraction of the population would have the opportunity to see King Lear or hear Beethoven's Ninth Symphony more than once or twice in a lifetime. Art demanded that one bring one's full powers of concentration and knowledge of the subject to bear on each experience, or else the experience were considered wasted. These were the days when memorization of poetry and whole plays, and the gathering of friends and family for a "parlor concert," were the norm, even in rural households. These were also the days before "music appreciation"; when one studied music, as many did, they learned to play it, not appreciate it.

However, the new technologies of radio, film, and recorded music represented, to use the appropriate Marxist buzz-word, a dialectical potential. On the one hand, these technologies held out the possibility of bringing the greatest works of art to millions of people who would otherwise not have access to them. On the other, the fact that the experience was infinitely reproducible could tend to disengage the audience's mind, making the experience less sacred, thus increasing alienation. Adorno called this process, "demythologizing." This new passivity, Adorno hypothesized in a crucial article published in 1938, could fracture a musical composition into the "entertaining" parts which would be "fetishized" in the memory of the listener, and the difficult parts, which would be forgotten. Adorno continues,


The counterpart to the fetishism is a regression of listening. This does not mean a relapse of the individual listener into an earlier phase of his own development, nor a decline in the collective general level, since the millions who are reached musically for the first time by today's mass communications cannot be compared with the audiences of the past. Rather, it is the contemporary listening which has regressed, arrested at the infantile stage. Not only do the listening subjects lose, along with the freedom of choice and responsibility, the capacity for the conscious perception of music .... [t]hey fluctuate between comprehensive forgetting and sudden dives into recognition. They listen atomistically and dissociate what they hear, but precisely in this dissociation they develop certain capacities which accord less with the traditional concepts of aesthetics than with those of football or motoring. They are not childlike ... but they are childish; their primitivism is not that of the undeveloped, but that of the forcibly retarded. [emphasis aded]

This conceptual retardation and preconditioning caused by listening, suggested that programming could determine preference. The very act of putting, say, a Benny Goodman number next to a Mozart sonata on the radio, would tend to amalgamate both into entertaining "music-on-the-radio" in the mind of the listener. This meant that even new and unpalatable ideas could become popular by "re-naming" them through the universal homogenizer of the culture industry. As Benjamin puts it,


Mechanical reproduction of art changes the reaction of the masses toward art. The reactionary attitude toward a Picasso painting changes into a progressive reaction toward a Chaplin movie. The progressive reaction is characterized by the direct, intimate fusion of visual and emotional enjoyment with the orientation of the expert.... With regard to the screen, the critical and receptive attitudes of the public coincide. The decisive reason for this is that the individual reactions are predetermined by the mass audience response they are about to produce, and this is nowhere more pronounced than in the film.

At the same time, the magic power of the media could be used to re-define previous ideas. "Shakespeare, Rembrandt, Beethoven will all make films," concluded Benjamin, quoting the French film pioneer Abel Gance, "... all legends, all mythologies, all myths, all founders of religions, and the very religions themselves ... await their exposed resurrection."

Social Control: The "Radio Project"

Here, then, were some potent theories of social control. The great possibilities of this Frankfurt School media work were probably the major contributing factor in the support given the I.S.R. by the bastions of the Establishment, after the Institute transferred its operations to America in 1934.

In 1937, the Rockefeller Foundation began funding research into the social effects of new forms of mass media, particularly radio. Before World War I, radio had been a hobbyist's toy, with only 125,000 receiving sets in the entire U.S.; twenty years later, it had become the primary mode of entertainment in the country; out of 32 million American families in 1937, 27.5 million had radios — a larger percentage than had telephones, automobiles, plumbing, or electricity! Yet, almost no systematic research had been done up to this point. The Rockefeller Foundation enlisted several universities, and headquartered this network at the School of Public and International Affairs at Princeton University. Named the Office of Radio Research, it was popularly known as "the Radio Project."

The director of the Project was Paul Lazersfeld, the foster son of Austrian Marxist economist Rudolph Hilferding, and a long-time collaborator of the I.S.R. from the early 1930's. Under Lazersfeld was Frank Stanton, a recent Ph.D. in industrial psychology from Ohio State, who had just been made research director of Columbia Broadcasting System—a grand title but a lowly position. After World War II, Stanton became president of the CBS News Division, and ultimately president of CBS at the height of the TV network's power; he also became Chairman of the Board of the RAND Corporation, and a member of President Lyndon Johnson's "kitchen cabinet." Among the Project's researchers were Herta Herzog, who married Lazersfeld and became the first director of research for the Voice of America; and Hazel Gaudet, who became one of the nation's leading political pollsters. Theodor Adorno was named chief of the Project's music section.

Despite the official gloss, the activities of the Radio Project make it clear that its purpose was to test empirically the Adorno-Benjamin thesis that the net effect of the mass media could be to atomize and increase lability—what people would later call "brainwashing."

Soap Operas and the Invasion from Mars

The first studies were promising. Herta Herzog produced "On Borrowed Experiences," the first comprehensive research on soap operas. The "serial radio drama" format was first used in 1929, on the inspiration of the old, cliff-hanger "Perils of Pauline" film serial. Because these little radio plays were highly melodramatic, they became popularly identified with Italian grand opera; because they were often sponsored by soap manufacturers, they ended up with the generic name, "soap opera."

Until Herzog's work, it was thought that the immense popularity of this format was largely with women of the lowest socioeconomic status who, in the restricted circumstances of their lives, needed a helpful escape to exotic places and romantic situations. A typical article from that period by two University of Chicago psychologists, "The Radio Day-Time Serial: Symbol Analysis" published in the Genetic Psychology Monographs, solemnly emphasized the positive, claiming that the soaps "function very much like the folk tale, expressing the hopes and fears of its female audience, and on the whole contribute to the integration of their lives into the world in which they live."

Herzog found that there was, in fact, no correlation to socioeconomic status. What is more, there was surprisingly little correlation to content. The key factor — as Adorno and Benjamin's theories suggested it would be — was the form itself of the serial; women were being effectively addicted to the format, not so much to be entertained or to escape, but to "find out what happens next week." In fact, Herzog found, you could almost double the listenership of a radio play by dividing it into segments.

Modern readers will immediately recognize that this was not a lesson lost on the entertainment industry. Nowadays, the serial format has spread to children's programming and high-budget prime time shows. The most widely watched shows in the history of television, remain the "Who Killed JR?" installment of Dallas, and the final episode of M*A*S*H, both of which were premised on a "what happens next?" format. Even feature films, like the Star Wars and Back to the Future trilogies, are now produced as serials, in order to lock in a viewership for the later installments. The humble daytime soap also retains its addictive qualities in the current age: 70% of all American women over eighteen now watch at least two of these shows each day, and there is a fast-growing viewership among men and college students of both sexes.

The Radio Project's next major study was an investigation into the effects of Orson Welles' Halloween 1938 radioplay based on H.G. Wells' War of the Worlds. Six million people heard the broadcast realistically describing a Martian invasion force landing in rural New Jersey. Despite repeated and clear statements that the show was fictional, approximately 25% of the listeners thought it was real, some panicking outright. The Radio Project researchers found that a majority of the people who panicked did not think that men from Mars had invaded; they actually thought that the Germans had invaded.

It happened this way. The listeners had been psychologically pre-conditioned by radio reports from the Munich crisis earlier that year. During that crisis, CBS's man in Europe, Edward R. Murrow, hit upon the idea of breaking into regular programming to present short news bulletins. For the first time in broadcasting, news was presented not in longer analytical pieces, but in short clips—what we now call "audio bites." At the height of the crisis, these flashes got so numerous, that, in the words of Murrow's producer Fred Friendly, "news bulletins were interrupting news bulletins." As the listeners thought that the world was moving to the brink of war, CBS ratings rose dramatically. When Welles did his fictional broadcast later, after the crisis had receded, he used this news bulletin technique to give things verisimilitude: he started the broadcast by faking a standard dance-music program, which kept getting interrupted by increasingly terrifying "on the scene reports" from New Jersey. Listeners who panicked, reacted not to content, but to format; they heard "We interrupt this program for an emergency bulletin," and "invasion," and immediately concluded that Hitler had invaded. The soap opera technique, transposed to the news, had worked on a vast and unexpected scale.

Little Annie and the "Wagnerian Dream" of TV

In 1939, one of the numbers of the quarterly Journal of Applied Psychology was handed over to Adorno and the Radio Project to publish some of their findings. Their conclusion was that Americans had, over the last twenty years, become "radio-minded," and that their listening had become so fragmented that repetition of format was the key to popularity. The play list determined the "hits"—a truth well known to organized crime, both then and now—and repetition could make any form of music or any performer, even a classical music performer, a "star." As long as a familiar form or context was retained, almost any content would become acceptable. "Not only are hit songs, stars, and soap operas cyclically recurrent and rigidly invariable types," said Adorno, summarizing this material a few years later, "but the specific content of the entertainment itself is derived from them and only appears to change. The details are interchangeable."

The crowning achievement of the Radio Project was "Little Annie," officially titled the Stanton-Lazersfeld Program Analyzer. Radio Project research had shown that all previous methods of preview polling were ineffectual. Up to that point, a preview audience listened to a show or watched a film, and then was asked general questions: did you like the show? what did you think of so-and-so's performance? The Radio Project realized that this method did not take into account the test audience's atomized perception of the subject, and demanded that they make a rational analysis of what was intended to be an irrational experience. So, the Project created a device in which each test audience member was supplied with a type of rheostat on which he could register the intensity of his likes or dislikes on a moment-to-moment basis. By comparing the individual graphs produced by the device, the operators could determine, not if the audience liked the whole show — which was irrelevant—but, which situations or characters produced a positive, if momentary, feeling state.

Little Annie transformed radio, film, and ultimately television programming. CBS still maintains program analyzer facilities in Hollywood and New York; it is said that results correlate 85% to ratings. Other networks and film studios have similar operations. This kind of analysis is responsible for the uncanny feeling you get when, seeing a new film or TV show, you think you have seen it all before. You have, many times. If a program analyzer indicates that, for instance, audiences were particularly titilated by a short scene in a World War II drama showing a certain type of actor kissing a certain type of actress, then that scene format will be worked into dozens of screenplays—transposed to the Middle Ages, to outer space, etc., etc.

The Radio Project also realized that television had the potential to intensify all of the effects that they had studied. TV technology had been around for some years, and had been exhibited at the 1936 World's Fair in New York, but the only person to attempt serious utilization of the medium had been Adolf Hitler. The Nazis broadcast events from the 1936 Olympic Games "live" to communal viewing rooms around Germany; they were trying to expand on their great success in using radio to Nazify all aspects of German culture. Further plans for German TV development were sidetracked by war preparations.

Adorno understood this potential perfectly, writing in 1944:

Television aims at the synthesis of radio and film, and is held up only because the interested parties have not yet reached agreement, but its consequences will be quite enormous and promise to intensify the impoverishment of aesthetic matter so drastically, that by tomorrow the thinly veiled identity of all industrial culture products can come triumphantly out in the open, derisively fulfilling the Wagnerian dream of the Gesamtkunstwerk—the fusion of all the arts in one work.

The obvious point is this: the profoundly irrational forms of modern entertainment—the stupid and eroticized content of most TV and films, the fact that your local Classical music radio station programs Stravinsky next to Mozart—don't have to be that way. They were designed to be that way. The design was so successful, that today, no one even questions the reasons or the origins.

III. Creating "Public Opinion": The "Authoritarian Personality" Bogeyman and the OSS

The efforts of the Radio Project conspirators to manipulate the population, spawned the modern pseudoscience of public opinion polling, in order to gain greater control over the methods they were developing.

Today, public opinion polls, like the television news, have been completely integrated into our society. A "scientific survey" of what people are said to think about an issue can be produced in less than twenty-four hours. Some campaigns for high political office are completely shaped by polls; in fact, many politicians try to create issues which are themselves meaningless, but which they know will look good in the polls, purely for the purpose of enhancing their image as "popular." Important policy decisions are made, even before the actual vote of the citizenry or the legislature, by poll results. Newspapers will occasionally write pious editorials calling on people to think for themselves, even as the newspaper's business agent sends a check to the local polling organization.

The idea of "public opinion" is not new, of course. Plato spoke against it in his Republic over two millenia ago; Alexis de Tocqueville wrote at length of its influence over America in the early nineteenth century. But, nobody thought to measure public opinion before the twentieth century, and nobody before the 1930's thought to use those measurements for decision-making.

It is useful to pause and reflect on the whole concept. The belief that public opinion can be a determinant of truth is philosophically insane. It precludes the idea of the rational individual mind. Every individual mind contains the divine spark of reason, and is thus capable of scientific discovery, and understanding the discoveries of others. The individual mind is one of the few things that cannot, therefore, be "averaged." Consider: at the moment of creative discovery, it is possible, if not probable, that the scientist making the discovery is the only person to hold that opinion about nature, whereas everyone else has a different opinion, or no opinion. One can only imagine what a "scientifically-conducted survey" on Kepler's model of the solar system would have been, shortly after he published the Harmony of the World: 2% for, 48% against, 50% no opinion.

These psychoanalytic survey techniques became standard, not only for the Frankfurt School, but also throughout American social science departments, particularly after the I.S.R. arrived in the United States. The methodology was the basis of the research piece for which the Frankfurt School is most well known, the "authoritarian personality" project. In 1942, I.S.R. director Max Horkheimer made contact with the American Jewish Committee, which asked him to set up a Department of Scientific Research within its organization. The American Jewish Committee also provided a large grant to study anti-Semitism in the American population. "Our aim," wrote Horkheimer in the introduction to the study, "is not merely to describe prejudice, but to explain it in order to help in its eradication.... Eradication means reeducation scientifically planned on the basis of understanding scientifically arrived at."

The A-S Scale

Ultimately, five volumes were produced for this study over the course of the late 1940's; the most important was the last, The Authoritarian Personality, by Adorno, with the help of three Berkeley, California social psychologists.

In the 1930's Erich Fromm had devised a questionnaire to be used to analyze German workers pychoanalytically as "authoritarian," "revolutionary" or "ambivalent." The heart of Adorno's study was, once again, Fromm's psychoanalytic scale, but with the positive end changed from a "revolutionary personality," to a "democratic personality," in order to make things more palatable for a postwar audience.

Nine personality traits were tested and measured, including:

  • conventionalism—rigid adherence to conventional, middle-class values
  • authoritarian aggression—the tendency to be on the look-out for, to condemn, reject and punish, people who violate conventional values
  • projectivity—the disposition to believethat wild and dangerous things go on in the world
  • sex—exaggerated concern with sexual goings-on.

From these measurements were constructed several scales: the E Scale (ethnocentrism), the PEC Scale (poltical and economic conservatism), the A-S Scale (anti-Semitism), and the F Scale (fascism). Using Rensis Lickerts's methodology of weighting results, the authors were able to tease together an empirical definition of what Adorno called "a new anthropological type," the authoritarian personality. The legerdemain here, as in all psychoanalytic survey work, is the assumption of a Weberian "type." Once the type has been statistically determined, all behavior can be explained; if an anti-Semitic personality does not act in an anti-Semitic way, then he or she has an ulterior motive for the act, or is being discontinuous. The idea that a human mind is capable of transformation, is ignored.

The results of this very study can be interpreted in diametrically different ways. One could say that the study proved that the population of the U.S. was generally conservative, did not want to abandon a capitalist economy, believed in a strong family and that sexual promiscuity should be punished, thought that the postwar world was a dangerous place, and was still suspicious of Jews (and Blacks, Roman Catholics, Orientals, etc. — unfortunately true, but correctable in a social context of economic growth and cultural optimism). On the other hand, one could take the same results and prove that anti-Jewish pogroms and Nuremburg rallies were simmering just under the surface, waiting for a new Hitler to ignite them. Which of the two interpretations you accept is a political, not a scientific, decision. Horkheimer and Adorno firmly believed that all religions, Judaism included, were "the opiate of the masses." Their goal was not the protection of Jews from prejudice, but the creation of a definition of authoritarianism and anti-Semitism which could be exploited to force the "scientifically planned reeducation" of Americans and Europeans away from the principles of Judeo-Christian civilization, which the Frankfurt School despised. In their theoretical writings of this period, Horkheimer and Adorno pushed the thesis to its most paranoid: just as capitalism was inherently fascistic, the philosophy of Christianity itself is the source of anti-Semitism. As Horkheimer and Adorno jointly wrote in their 1947 "Elements of Anti-Semitism":


Christ, the spirit become flesh, is the deified sorcerer. Man's self-reflection in the absolute, the humanization of God by Christ, is the proton pseudos [original falsehood]. Progress beyond Judaism is coupled with the assumption that the man Jesus has become God. The reflective aspect of Christianity, the intellectualization of magic, is the root of evil.

At the same time, Horkheimer could write in a more-popularized article titled "Anti-Semitism: A Social Disease," that "at present, the only country where there does not seem to be any kind of anti-Semitism is Russia"[!].

This self-serving attempt to maximize paranoia was further aided by Hannah Arendt, who popularized the authoritarian personality research in her widely-read Origins of Totalitarianism. Arendt also added the famous rhetorical flourish about the "banality of evil" in her later Eichmann in Jerusalem: even a simple, shopkeeper-type like Eichmann can turn into a Nazi beast under the right psychological circumstances—every Gentile is suspect, psychoanalytically.

It is Arendt's extreme version of the authoritarian personality thesis which is the operant philosophy of today's Cult Awareness Network (CAN), a group which works with the U.S. Justice Department and the Anti-Defamation League of the B'nai B'rith, among others. Using standard Frankfurt School method, CAN identifies political and religious groups which are its political enemies, then re-labels them as a "cult," in order to justify operations against them.

The Public Opinion Explosion

Despite its unprovable central thesis of "psychoanalytic types," the interpretive survey methodology of the Frankfurt School became dominant in the social sciences, and essentially remains so today. In fact, the adoption of these new, supposedly scientific techniques in the 1930's brought about an explosion in public-opinion survey use, much of it funded by Madison Avenue. The major pollsters of today—A.C. Neilsen, George Gallup, Elmo Roper—started in the mid-1930's, and began using the I.S.R. methods, especially given the success of the Stanton-Lazersfeld Program Analyzer. By 1936, polling activity had become sufficiently widespread to justify a trade association, the American Academy of Public Opinion Research at Princeton, headed by Lazersfeld; at the same time, the University of Chicago created the National Opinion Research Center. In 1940, the Office of Radio Research was turned into the Bureau of Applied Social Research, a division of Columbia University, with the indefatigable Lazersfeld as director.

After World War II, Lazersfeld especially pioneered the use of surveys to psychoanalyze American voting behavior, and by the 1952 Presidential election, Madison Avenue advertising agencies were firmly in control of Dwight Eisenhower's campaign, utilizing Lazersfeld's work. Nineteen fifty-two was also the first election under the influence of television, which, as Adorno had predicted eight years earlier, had grown to incredible influence in a very short time. Batten, Barton, Durstine & Osborne — the fabled "BBD&O" ad agency—designed Ike's campaign appearances entirely for the TV cameras, and as carefully as Hitler's Nuremberg rallies; one-minute "spot" advertisements were pioneered to cater to the survey-determined needs of the voters.

This snowball has not stopped rolling since. The entire development of television and advertising in the 1950's and 1960's was pioneered by men and women who were trained in the Frankfurt School's techniques of mass alienation. Frank Stanton went directly from the Radio Project to become the single most-important leader of modern television. Stanton's chief rival in the formative period of TV was NBC's Sylvester "Pat" Weaver; after a Ph.D. in "listening behavior," Weaver worked with the Program Analyzer in the late 1930's, before becoming a Young & Rubicam vice-president, then NBC's director of programming, and ultimately the network's president. Stanton and Weaver's stories are typical.

Today, the men and women who run the networks, the ad agencies, and the polling organizations, even if they have never heard of Theodor Adorno, firmly believe in Adorno's theory that the media can, and should, turn all they touch into "football." Coverage of the 1991 Gulf War should make that clear.

The technique of mass media and advertising developed by the Frankfurt School now effectively controls American political campaigning. Campaigns are no longer based on political programs, but actually on alienation. Petty gripes and irrational fears are identified by psychoanalytic survey, to be transmogrified into "issues" to be catered to; the "Willy Horton" ads of the 1988 Presidential campaign, and the "flag-burning amendment," are but two recent examples. Issues that will determine the future of our civilization, are scrupulously reduced to photo opportunities and audio bites—like Ed Murrow's original 1930's radio reports—where the dramatic effect is maximized, and the idea content is zero.

Who Is the Enemy?

Part of the influence of the authoritarian personality hoax in our own day also derives from the fact that, incredibly, the Frankfurt School and its theories were officially accepted by the U.S. government during World War II, and these Cominternists were responsible for determining who were America's wartime, and postwar, enemies. In 1942, the Office of Strategic Services, America's hastily-constructed espionage and covert operations unit, asked former Harvard president James Baxter to form a Research and Analysis (R&A) Branch under the group's Intelligence Division. By 1944, the R&A Branch had collected such a large and prestigeous group of emigré scholars that H. Stuart Hughes, then a young Ph.D., said that working for it was "a second graduate education" at government expense. The Central European Section was headed by historian Carl Schorske; under him, in the all-important Germany/Austria Section, was Franz Neumann, as section chief, with Herbert Marcuse, Paul Baran, and Otto Kirchheimer, all I.S.R. veterans. Leo Lowenthal headed the German-language section of the Office of War Information; Sophie Marcuse, Marcuse's wife, worked at the Office of Naval Intelligence. Also at the R&A Branch were: Siegfried Kracauer, Adorno's old Kant instructor, now a film theorist; Norman O. Brown, who would become famous in the 1960's by combining Marcuse's hedonism theory with Wilhelm Reich's orgone therapy to popularize "polymorphous perversity"; Barrington Moore, Jr., later a philosophy professor who would co-author a book with Marcuse; Gregory Bateson, the husband of anthropologist Margaret Mead (who wrote for the Frankfurt School's journal), and Arthur Schlesinger, the historian who joined the Kennedy Administration. Marcuse's first assignment was to head a team to identify both those who would be tried as war criminals after the war, and also those who were potential leaders of postwar Germany. In 1944, Marcuse, Neumann, and Kirchheimer wrote the Denazification Guide, which was later issued to officers of the U.S. Armed Forces occupying Germany, to help them identify and suppress pro-Nazi behaviors. After the armistice, the R&A Branch sent representatives to work as intelligence liaisons with the various occupying powers; Marcuse was assigned the U.S. Zone, Kirchheimer the French, and Barrington Moore the Soviet. In the summer of 1945, Neumann left to become chief of research for the Nuremburg Tribunal. Marcuse remained in and around U.S. intelligence into the early 1950's, rising to the chief of the Central European Branch of the State Department's Office of Intelligence Research, an office formally charged with "planning and implementing a program of positive-intelligence research ... to meet the intelligence requirements of the Central Intelligence Agency and other authorized agencies." During his tenure as a U.S. government official, Marcuse supported the division of Germany into East and West, noting that this would prevent an alliance between the newly liberated left-wing parties and the old, conservative industrial and business layers. In 1949, he produced a 532-page report, "The Potentials of World Communism" (declassified only in 1978), which suggested that the Marshall Plan economic stabilization of Europe would limit the recruitment potential of Western Europe's Communist Parties to acceptable levels, causing a period of hostile co-existence with the Soviet Union, marked by confrontation only in faraway places like Latin America and Indochina—in all, a surprisingly accurate forecast. Marcuse left the State Department with a Rockefeller Foundation grant to work with the various Soviet Studies departments which were set up at many of America's top universities after the war, largely by R&A Branch veterans.

At the same time, Max Horkheimer was doing even greater damage. As part of the denazification of Germany suggested by the R&A Branch, U.S. High Commissioner for Germany John J. McCloy, using personal discretionary funds, brought Horkheimer back to Germany to reform the German university system. In fact, McCloy asked President Truman and Congress to pass a bill granting Horkheimer, who had become a naturalized American, dual citizenship; thus, for a brief period, Horkheimer was the only person in the world to hold both German and U.S. citizenship. In Germany, Horkheimer began the spadework for the full-blown revival of the Frankfurt School in that nation in the late 1950's, including the training of a whole new generation of anti-Western civilization scholars like Hans-Georg Gadamer and Jürgen Habermas, who would have such destructive influence in 1960's Germany. In a period of American history when some individuals were being hounded into unemployment and suicide for the faintest aroma of leftism, Frankfurt School veterans—all with superb Comintern credentials — led what can only be called charmed lives. America had, to an incredible extent, handed the determination of who were the nation's enemies, over to the nation's own worst enemies.

IV. The Aristotelian Eros: Marcuse and the CIA's Drug Counterculture

In 1989, Hans-Georg Gadamer, a protégé of Martin Heidegger and the last of the original Frankfurt School generation, was asked to provide an appreciation of his own work for the German newspaper, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung. He wrote,


One has to conceive of Aristotle's ethics as a true fulfillment of the Socratic challenge, which Plato had placed at the center of his dialogues on the Socratic question of the good.... Plato described the idea of the good ... as the ultimate and highest idea, which is supposedly the highest principle of being for the universe, the state, and the human soul. Against this Aristotle opposed a decisive critique, under the famous formula, "Plato is my friend, but the truth is my friend even more." He denied that one could consider the idea of the good as a universal principle of being, which is supposed to hold in the same way for theoretical knowledge as for practical knowledge and human activity.

This statement not only succinctly states the underlying philosophy of the Frankfurt School, it also suggests an inflection point around which we can order much of the philosophical combat of the last two millenia. In the simplest terms, the Aristotelian correction of Plato sunders physics from metaphysics, relegating the Good to a mere object of speculation about which "our knowledge remains only a hypothesis," in the words of Wilhelm Dilthey, the Frankfurt School's favorite philosopher. Our knowledge of the "real world," as Dilthey, Nietzsche, and other precursors of the Frankfurt School were wont to emphasize, becomes erotic, in the broadest sense of that term, as object fixation. The universe becomes a collection of things which each operate on the basis of their own natures (that is, genetically), and through interaction between themselves (that is, mechanistically). Science becomes the deduction of the appropriate categories of these natures and interactions. Since the human mind is merely a sensorium, waiting for the Newtonian apple to jar it into deduction, humanity's relationship to the world (and vice versa) becomes an erotic attachment to objects. The comprehension of the universal—the mind's seeking to be the living image of the living God—is therefore illusory. That universal either does not exist, or it exists incomprehensibly as a deus ex machina; that is, the Divine exists as a superaddition to the physical universe — God is really Zeus, flinging thunderbolts into the world from some outside location. (Or, perhaps more appropriately: God is really Cupid, letting loose golden arrows to make objects attract, and leaden arrows to make objects repel.) The key to the entire Frankfurt School program, from originator Lukacs on, is the "liberation" of Aristotelian eros, to make individual feeling states psychologically primary. When the I.S.R. leaders arrived in the United States in the mid-1930's, they exulted that here was a place which had no adequate philosophical defenses against their brand of Kulturpessimismus [cultural pessimism]. However, although the Frankfurt School made major inroads in American intellectual life before World War II, that influence was largely confined to academia and to radio; and radio, although important, did not yet have the overwhelming influence on social life that it would acquire during the war. Furthermore, America's mobilization for the war, and the victory against fascism, sidetracked the Frankfurt School schedule; America in 1945 was almost sublimely optimistic, with a population firmly convinced that a mobilized republic, backed by science and technology, could do just about anything. The fifteen years after the war, however, saw the domination of family life by the radio and television shaped by the Frankfurt School, in a period of political erosion in which the great positive potential of America degenerated to a purely negative posture against the real and, oftentimes manipulated, threat of the Soviet Union. At the same time, hundreds of thousands of the young generation—the so-called baby boomers—were entering college and being exposed to the Frankfurt School's poison, either directly or indirectly. It is illustrative, that by 1960, sociology had become the most popular course of study in American universities. Indeed, when one looks at the first stirrings of the student rebellion at the beginning of the 1960's, like the speeches of the Berkeley Free Speech Movement or the Port Huron Statement which founded the Students for a Democratic Society, one is struck with how devoid of actual content these discussions were. There is much anxiety about being made to conform to the system—"I am a human being; do not fold, spindle, or mutilate" went an early Berkeley slogan—but it is clear that the "problems" cited derive much more from required sociology textbooks, than from the real needs of the society.

The CIA's Psychedelic Revolution

The simmering unrest on campus in 1960 might well too have passed or had a positive outcome, were it not for the traumatic decapitation of the nation through the Kennedy assassination, plus the simultaneous introduction of widespread drug use. Drugs had always been an "analytical tool" of the nineteenth century Romantics, like the French Symbolists, and were popular among the European and American Bohemian fringe well into the post-World War II period. But, in the second half of the 1950's, the CIA and allied intelligence services began extensive experimentation with the hallucinogen LSD to investigate its potential for social control. It has now been documented that millions of doses of the chemical were produced and disseminated under the aegis of the CIA's Operation MK-Ultra. LSD became the drug of choice within the agency itself, and was passed out freely to friends of the family, including a substantial number of OSS veterans. For instance, it was OSS Research and Analysis Branch veteran Gregory Bateson who "turned on" the Beat poet Allen Ginsberg to a U.S. Navy LSD experiment in Palo Alto, California. Not only Ginsberg, but novelist Ken Kesey and the original members of the Grateful Dead rock group opened the doors of perception courtesy of the Navy. The guru of the "psychedelic revolution," Timothy Leary, first heard about hallucinogens in 1957 from Life magazine (whose publisher, Henry Luce, was often given government acid, like many other opinion shapers), and began his career as a CIA contract employee; at a 1977 "reunion" of acid pioneers, Leary openly admitted, "everything I am, I owe to the foresight of the CIA." Hallucinogens have the singular effect of making the victim asocial, totally self-centered, and concerned with objects. Even the most banal objects take on the "aura" which Benjamin had talked about, and become timeless and delusionarily profound. In other words, hallucinogens instantaneously achieve a state of mind identical to that prescribed by the Frankfurt School theories. And, the popularization of these chemicals created a vast psychological lability for bringing those theories into practice. Thus, the situation at the beginning of the 1960's represented a brilliant re-entry point for the Frankfurt School, and it was fully exploited. One of the crowning ironies of the "Now Generation" of 1964 on, is that, for all its protestations of utter modernity, none of its ideas or artifacts was less than thirty years old. The political theory came completely from the Frankfurt School; Lucien Goldmann, a French radical who was a visiting professor at Columbia in 1968, was absolutely correct when he said of Herbert Marcuse in 1969 that "the student movements ... found in his works and ultimately in his works alone the theoretical formulation of their problems and aspirations [emphasis in original]." The long hair and sandals, the free love communes, the macrobiotic food, the liberated lifestyles, had been designed at the turn of the century, and thoroughly field-tested by various, Frankfurt School-connected New Age social experiments like the Ascona commune before 1920. (See box.) Even Tom Hayden's defiant "Never trust anyone over thirty," was merely a less-urbane version of Rupert Brooke's 1905, "Nobody over thirty is worth talking to." The social planners who shaped the 1960's simply relied on already-available materials.

Eros and Civilization

The founding document of the 1960's counterculture, and that which brought the Frankfurt School's "revolutionary messianism" of the 1920's into the 1960's, was Marcuse's Eros and Civilization, originally published in 1955 and funded by the Rockefeller Foundation. The document masterfully sums up the Frankfurt School ideology of Kulturpessimismus in the concept of "dimensionality." In one of the most bizarre perversions of philosophy, Marcuse claims to derive this concept from Friedrich Schiller. Schiller, whom Marcuse purposefully misidentifies as the heir of Immanuel Kant, discerned two dimensions in humanity: a sensuous instinct and an impulse toward form. Schiller advocated the harmonization of these two instincts in man in the form of a creative play instinct. For Marcuse, on the other hand, the only hope to escape the one-dimensionality of modern industrial society was to liberate the erotic side of man, the sensuous instinct, in rebellion against "technological rationality." As Marcuse would say later (1964) in his One-Dimensional Man, "A comfortable, smooth, reasonable, democratic unfreedom prevails in advanced industrial civilization, a token of technical progress." This erotic liberation he misidentifies with Schiller's "play instinct," which, rather than being erotic, is an expression of charity, the higher concept of love associated with true creativity. Marcuse's contrary theory of erotic liberation is something implicit in Sigmund Freud, but not explicitly emphasized, except for some Freudian renegades like Wilhelm Reich and, to a certain extent, Carl Jung. Every aspect of culture in the West, including reason itself, says Marcuse, acts to repress this: "The totalitarian universe of technological rationality is the latest transmutation of the idea of reason." Or: "Auschwitz continues to haunt, not the memory but the accomplishments of man—the space flights, the rockets and missiles, the pretty electronics plants...."

This erotic liberation should take the form of the "Great Refusal," a total rejection of the "capitalist" monster and all his works, including "technological" reason, and "ritual-authoritarian language." As part of the Great Refusal, mankind should develop an "aesthetic ethos," turning life into an aesthetic ritual, a "life-style" (a nonsense phrase which came into the language in the 1960's under Marcuse's influence). With Marcuse representing the point of the wedge, the 1960's were filled with obtuse intellectual justifications of contentless adolescent sexual rebellion. Eros and Civilization was reissued as an inexpensive paperback in 1961, and ran through several editions; in the preface to the 1966 edition, Marcuse added that the new slogan, "Make Love, Not War," was exactly what he was talking about: "The fight for eros is a political fight [emphasis in original]." In 1969, he noted that even the New Left's obsessive use of obscenities in its manifestoes was part of the Great Refusal, calling it "a systematic linguistic rebellion, which smashes the ideological context in which the words are employed and defined." Marcuse was aided by psychoanalyst Norman O. Brown, his OSS protege, who contributed Life Against Death in 1959, and Love's Body in 1966—calling for man to shed his reasonable, "armored" ego, and replace it with a "Dionysian body ego," that would embrace the instinctual reality of polymorphous perversity, and bring man back into "union with nature." The books of Reich, who had claimed that Nazism was caused by monogamy, were re-issued. Reich had died in an American prison, jailed for taking money on the claim that cancer could be cured by rechanneling "orgone energy." Primary education became dominated by Reich's leading follower, A.S. Neill, a Theosophical cult member of the 1930's and militant atheist, whose educational theories demanded that students be taught to rebel against teachers who are, by nature, authoritarian. Neill's book Summerhill sold 24,000 copies in 1960, rising to 100,000 in 1968, and 2 million in 1970; by 1970, it was required reading in 600 university courses, making it one of the most influential education texts of the period, and still a benchmark for recent writers on the subject. Marcuse led the way for the complete revival of the rest of the Frankfurt School theorists, re-introducing the long-forgotten Lukacs to America. Marcuse himself became the lightning rod for attacks on the counterculture, and was regularly attacked by such sources as the Soviet daily Pravda, and then-California Governor Ronald Reagan. The only critique of any merit at the time, however, was one by Pope Paul VI, who in 1969 named Marcuse (an extraordinary step, as the Vatican usually refrains from formal denunciations of living individuals), along with Freud, for their justification of "disgusting and unbridled expressions of eroticism"; and called Marcuse's theory of liberation, "the theory which opens the way for license cloaked as liberty ... an aberration of instinct." The eroticism of the counterculture meant much more than free love and a violent attack on the nuclear family. It also meant the legitimization of philosophical eros. People were trained to see themselves as objects, determined by their "natures." The importance of the individual as a person gifted with the divine spark of creativity, and capable of acting upon all human civilization, was replaced by the idea that the person is important because he or she is black, or a woman, or feels homosexual impulses. This explains the deformation of the civil rights movement into a "black power" movement, and the transformation of the legitimate issue of civil rights for women into feminism. Discussion of women's civil rights was forced into being just another "liberation cult," complete with bra-burning and other, sometimes openly Astarte-style, rituals; a review of Kate Millet's Sexual Politics (1970) and Germaine Greer's The Female Eunuch (1971), demonstrates their complete reliance on Marcuse, Fromm, Reich, and other Freudian extremists.

The Bad Trip

This popularization of life as an erotic, pessimistic ritual did not abate, but in fact deepened over the twenty years leading to today; it is the basis of the horror we see around us. The heirs of Marcuse and Adorno completely dominate the universities, teaching their own students to replace reason with "Politically Correct" ritual exercises. There are very few theoretical books on arts, letters, or language published today in the United States or Europe which do not openly acknowledge their debt to the Frankfort School.

The witchhunt on today's campuses is merely the implementation of Marcuse's concept of "repressive toleration"—"tolerance for movements from the left, but intolerance for movements from the right"—enforced by the students of the Frankfurt School, now become the professors of women's studies and Afro-American studies. The most erudite spokesman for Afro-American studies, for instance, Professor Cornell West of Princeton, publicly states that his theories are derived from Georg Lukacs. At the same time, the ugliness so carefully nurtured by the Frankfurt School pessimists, has corrupted our highest cultural endeavors. One can hardly find a performance of a Mozart opera, which has not been utterly deformed by a director who, following Benjamin and the I.S.R., wants to "liberate the erotic subtext." You cannot ask an orchestra to perform Schönberg and Beethoven on the same program, and maintain its integrity for the latter. And, when our highest culture becomes impotent, popular culture becomes openly bestial. One final image: American and European children daily watch films like Nightmare on Elm Street and Total Recall, or television shows comparable to them. A typical scene in one of these will have a figure emerge from a television set; the skin of his face will realistically peel away to reveal a hideously deformed man with razor-blade fingers, fingers which start growing to several feet in length, and—suddenly—the victim is slashed to bloody ribbons. This is not entertainment. This is the deeply paranoid hallucination of the LSD acid head. The worst of what happened in the 1960's is now daily fare. Owing to the Frankfurt School and its co-conspirators, the West is on a "bad trip" from which it is not being allowed to come down.

The principles through which Western Judeo-Christian civilization was built, are now no longer dominant in our society; they exist only as a kind of underground resistance movement. If that resistance is ultimately submerged, then the civilization will not survive—and, in our era of incurable pandemic disease and nuclear weapons, the collapse of Western civilization will very likely take the rest of the world with it to Hell.

The way out is to create a Renaissance. If that sounds grandiose, it is nonetheless what is needed. A renaissance means, to start again; to discard the evil, and inhuman, and just plain stupid, and to go back, hundreds or thousands of years, to the ideas which allow humanity to grow in freedom and goodness. Once we have identified those core beliefs, we can start to rebuild civilization.

Ultimately, a new Renaissance will rely on scientists, artists, and composers, but in the first moment, it depends on seemingly ordinary people who will defend the divine spark of reason in themselves, and tolerate no less in others. Given the successes of the Frankfurt School and its New Dark Age sponsors, these ordinary individuals, with their belief in reason and the difference between right and wrong, will be "unpopular." But, no really good idea was ever popular, in the beginning.

Source: http://tinyurl.com/lkbrg6

samedi, 30 juillet 2011

Wyndham Lewis' The Apes of God

Wyndham Lewis’ The Apes of God

by Jonathan Bowden

Ex: http://www.counter-currents.com/

Wyndham Lewis
The Apes of God [2]

apes-of-god.jpgThe Apes of God happens to be one of the most devastating satires to be published in the English language since the days of Dryden and Pope. It appeared in a Private Press edition [3] (prior to general release), and at over 600 pages it was the size of your average London telephone directory.

The Apes deals, in ultra-modernist vein, with a catalog or slide-show of dilettantes from the London of the inter-war period. It is, in reality, a gargantuan satire against the Bloomsbury Group and all of its works. The historical importance of the Bloomsbury Group is that they were the incubator for all the left-liberal ideas which have now hardened to a totalitarian permafrost in Western life. This is the real and crucial point of this gargantuan effort — an otherwise neglected work.

To recapitulate some of the detail: the novel concerns the sentimental education of a young idiot (Dan Boleyn) in the ways of Bloomsbury (apedom). During this prologue he meets a great galaxy of the millionaire bohemia so excoriated by Lewis. The chapters and sub-headings basically deal with his education in ideological matters (not that the simpleton Dan would see it in that way), and he is assisted in his insights by Pierpoint (a Lewis substitute), the Pierpointian ventriloquist and contriver of ‘broadcasts’, Horace Zagreus, as well as Starr-Smith. The latter is Pierpoint’s political secretary, a Welsh firebrand, who dresses as a Blackshirt for Lord Osmund’s fancy-dress or Lenten party which makes up a quarter to a third of the book.


Wyndam Lewis' portrait of Edith Sitwell

The liberals who are dissected are James Julius Rattner (a Semitic version of James Joyce), Lionel Kien and family, Proustians extraordinaire, various poseurs and Bullish lesbians, as well as the Sitwell family group who are depicted as the Finnian Shaws. The Sitwells are all but forgotten today, but they were highly influential in the world between the Wars — as is witnessed in John Pearson’s masterly biography Facades: Osbert, Edith and Sachaverell Sitwell. It is no accident to say that this satire has kept the Sitwells in contemporary culture, despite the fact that they are the butt of Lewis’ ferocious wit.

Throughout this odyssey through Apedom various themes are disentangled. The first is a penchant for the class war — in a parlor Bolshevik manner — from those who superficially have the most to lose from it. This leads to an active collaboration between masters and servants ahead of time. The next “war” to which these pacifists hook their star is the age-war between the generations which is best illustrated by the Sitwells’ attitude to their aged Patriarch, Cockeye in the novel.

Other cults or pseudo-cults of the lower thirties (i.e., the twenties) were the cult of the child, feminism of various kinds, the glorification of the negro (witness the work of Firbank, for instance), and the ever-present cult of homosexuality. As Horace Zagreus — one of Lewis’ voices in the novel — acidly points out: as far as Bloomsbury was concerned, heterosexuality was the love that dare not speak its name.

All of these putative forms of political correctness were held together by a rising generation whose most ‘advanced’ adherents were determined to let their hair down during the roaring ’20s. Indeed, the cloying, ormolu tainted facade of the super-rich — anatomized in this novel — only came to an end with the Great Crash, which burst at about the time of the novel’s appearance in 1930.

The semantics of the radical bourgeoisie have largely taken over the world — and what was anathema to mass or philistine opinion is now the normal chit-chat of the semi-educated to educated. Revolutionary bohemia — according to Lewis — proceeds in three stages. First you have the aristocratic version of it during the 1890s — the “naughty nineties,” the breaking of Oscar Wilde, etc., only for this stage to be followed by a mass bourgeois version of la Decadence in the 1920s. This makes way for the mass proletarianized version of bohemia which hits the world in the 1960s, after a few beatnik preliminaries the decade before. Lewis never lived to see this period, having died in 1957.

Another very interesting feature about Lewis’ prescience is his understanding of revolutionary ideology and its after-effects. For, as early as The Art of Being Ruled in 1926, Lewis was positing the notion that the emancipation of women to work would kill off the family far more effectively than all the feminist route-marches put together.

One of Lewis’ most extraordinary judgments is that many Marxian values, floating freely and slip-streaming their historical source, could make use of market capitalism to achieve their ends. This was an insight of such penetration and Chestertonian paradox in 1926 that it must have appeared half-insane.

Other ancillary positions which were part of this Super-structuralist ramp (sic) were the cult of the exotic and the Primitive in art, Child art and children’s rights, Psycho-analysis, and hostility to all prior forms.

The revolutionary thinker Bill Hopkins once said to me that one of the reasons for the obsession with primitivism in early modernism was a reaction to Western thought’s compartmentalization in the late nineteenth century. This led to a desire to kick against the pricks and develop contrary strategies of pure energy in the Arts. Whatever the truth about this, a hostility towards the martial past, nationalism, imperialism, race and empire — the entire rejection of Kipling’s Britain — was part-and-parcel of the Bloomsbury sensibility.

Nonetheless, it goes without saying that Lewis, the founder of the Vorticist movement inside modernism, saw modern art as a weapon in his battle against The Apes of God. In this regard Lewis was that very rare animal — a thoroughgoing modernist and a right-wing transvaluator of all values.

Interestingly, the idea of The Apes comes from the dilettantist perquisite of thousands of amateur painters, poets, sculptors, writers and the rest, themselves all part of a monied bohemia, who crowd out the available space for genuine creatives like himself. The cult of the amateur, however, would soon be replaced by the general melange of entertainment and the cultural industry which has probably stymied a great deal of post-war creation that Lewis never lived to see.

Article printed from Counter-Currents Publishing: http://www.counter-currents.com

URL to article: http://www.counter-currents.com/2011/07/wyndham-lewis-the-apes-of-god/

vendredi, 29 juillet 2011

Le "Manifeste" de Behring Breivik est un grossier plagiat


Attentats à Oslo : le « manifeste » de Behring Breivik est un grossier plagiat de Théodore Kaczynski

Ex: http://www.egeliteetreconciliation.fr/

Le « manifeste » d’Anders Behring, intitulé « 2083, une déclaration d’indépendance européenne », reprend mot à mot des pans entiers du manifeste de Théodore Kaczynski, « La société industrielle et son avenir », mais en détournant l’œuvre originale pour lui donner un sens principalement raciste, teinté d’une sorte de mysticisme maçonnique.

Théodore Kaczynski

Theodore Kaczynski est plus connu sous le nom d’Unabomber. Mathématicien et militant écologiste, il a fait l’objet de la chasse à l’homme la plus coûteuse de l’histoire du FBI après avoir, entre 1978 et 1995, envoyés des colis piégés artisanaux à diverses personnes construisant ou défendant la société technologique, faisant trois morts et 23 blessés avec 16 bombes envoyées. Auteur de plusieurs textes et ouvrages, il est également considéré comme un philosophe.

Les idées de Kaczynski

Les postulats principaux de Théodore Kaczynski, principalement théorisés dans son manifeste, « La société industrielle et son avenir » peuvent se définir en quatre points :

1. Le progrès technologique nous conduit à un désastre inéluctable ;

2. La gauche politique est la première ligne de défense de la Société technologique contre la révolution ;

3.Ce qu’il faut, c’est un nouveau mouvement révolutionnaire, voué à l’éradication de la société technologique, et qui prendra des mesures pour tenir à l’écart tous les gauchistes et consorts.

Selon Kaczynski, la révolution industrielle conduit nécessairement à un ordre économique et politique de plus en plus contraignant qui détruit la nature vierge, réduit la liberté individuelle, transforme l’homme en simple rouage du système technologique, et à court terme détruira l’espèce humaine elle-même. « Ce système n’existe pas pour satisfaire les besoins des hommes, et n’en est pas capable. Les désirs et le comportement des hommes doivent en fait être modifiés pour satisfaire aux besoins de ce système », écrit-t-il dans « La société industrielle et son avenir ».

Le détournement d’Anders Behring

Anders Behring reprend plusieurs chapitres entiers de « La société industrielle et son avenir », en modifiant quelques mots. Ainsi, le terme « gauchiste » est transformé en « marxiste », « culture marxiste » ou « multiculturalisme », comme le démontre les exemples que nous plaçons ci-dessous. L’ensemble est teinté d’une sorte de mysticisme maçonnique. D’ailleurs, à la fin de son « manifeste » Anders Behring place des photos de lui en tenue maçonnique ainsi que dans un uniforme militaire portant des symboles templiers.

Exemples du plagiat de Behring Breivik :

Extrait de « La société industrielle est son avenir », de Théodore Kaczynski :

« 6. Tout le monde ou presque reconnaîtra que nous vivons dans une société profondément troublée. Une des manifestations les plus répandues de la folie de notre monde est le gauchisme, donc une discussion de la psychologie du gauchisme peut servir d’introduction à la discussion des problèmes de la société moderne en général.

7. Mais qu’estce que le gauchisme ? Pendant la première moitié du 20ème siècle le gauchisme aurait pratiquement pu être identifié avec le socialisme. Aujourd’hui le mouvement est fragmenté et il n’est pas clair de définir qui peut correctement être appelé un gauchiste. Quand nous parlons des gauchistes dans cet article nous entendons principalement les socialistes, les collectivistes, les gens « politiquement corrects », les féministes, les activistes gays et du handicap, les activistes des droits des animaux et tout ce genre de gens. Mais ceux qui sont associés avec un de ces mouvements ne sont pas tous des gauchistes. Ce que nous essayons de décrire dans la discussion du gauchisme n’est pas tant un mouvement ou une idéologie qu’un type psychologique, ou plutôt une collection de types associés. Ainsi, ce que nous entendons par « le gauchisme » apparaîtra plus clairement au cours de notre discussion de la psychologie gauchiste »

Extrait de « 2083, une déclaration d’indépendance européenne », de Behring Breivik :

« Une des manifestations les plus répandue de la folie de notre monde est le multiculturalisme, donc une discussion sur la psychologie des multiculturalistes peut servir d’introduction à la discussion sur les problèmes de l’Europe occidentale en général.

Mais quel est le multiculturalisme ou le communisme culturel ? Le mouvement est fragmenté et il n’est pas clair de définir qui peut correctement être appelé culturels marxiste. Quand nous parlons des gauchistes dans cet article nous entendons principalement des individus qui appuient le multiculturalisme : socialistes, collectivistes, les gens « politiquement correct », les féministes, les militants homosexuels et les défenseurs des droits des animaux animaux, environnementaliste, etc. Mais ceux qui sont associés avec un de ces mouvements ne soutiennent pas tous le multiculturalisme. Ce que nous essayons de décrire dans la discussion du marxisme n’est pas tant un mouvement ou une idéologie qu’un type psychologique, ou plutôt une collection de types associés. »

Extrait de « La société industrielle est son avenir », de Théodore Kaczynski

« 8. Même ainsi, notre conception du gauchisme restera beaucoup moins claire que nous ne le souhaiterions, mais il ne semble y avoir aucun remède à cela. Tout que nous essayons de faire est d’indiquer d’une façon grossière et approximative les deux tendances psychologiques dont nous croyons qu’elles sont la principale motivation du gauchisme moderne. Nous n’affirmons en aucun cas donner TOUTE la vérité sur la psychologie gauchiste. De plus, notre discussion est censée ne s’appliquer qu’au gauchisme moderne. Nous laissons ouverte la question de la mesure dans laquelle notre discussion pourrait s’appliquer aux gauchistes du 19ème et du début du 20ème siècle.

9. Nous appelons les deux tendances psychologiques qui sont à la base du gauchisme moderne « le sentiment d’infériorité » et « la sursocialisation ». Le sentiment d’infériorité est une caractéristique du gauchisme moderne dans son ensemble, tandis que la sursocialisation est caractéristique seulement d’un certain segment du gauchisme moderne ; mais ce segment est hautement influent. »

Extrait de « 2083, une déclaration d’indépendance européenne », de Behring Breivik

« Notre conception des marxistes culturels restera beaucoup moins claire que nous ne le souhaiterions, mais il ne semble y avoir aucun remède à cela. Tout que nous essayons de faire est d’indiquer d’une façon grossière et approximative les deux tendances psychologiques dont nous croyons qu’elles sont la principale motivation du multiculturalisme moderne. De plus, notre discussion est censée ne s’appliquer qu’aux deux tendances du marxisme moderne.

Nous n’affirmons en aucun cas donner TOUTE la vérité sur la psychologie culturelle marxiste. Aussi, notre discussion est signifié deux appliquer deux marxistes modernes culturel uniquement, que nous appelons « sentiments d’infériorité » et « sur-socialisation. »

Le sentiment d’infériorité est une caractéristique de la culture marxiste dans son ensemble, tandis que la sursocialisation est caractéristique d’un seul segment de la diversité culturelle du marxisme, mais ce segment est très influent. »

De Gladio aux attentats d'Oslo

De Gladio aux attentats d’Oslo : Terrorisme ou protection de l’Etat


Ex: http://www.egeliteetreconciliation.fr/

oslo.jpgDepuis le début de cette année, nous sommes confronté à une difficulté croissante à analyser la masse d’information sur des évènements de toute nature – des révolutions arabes à la mort de Ben Laden en passant par Fukushima – qui nous parviennent sur un mode exponentiel, et pour lesquels le temps et l’intelligence ne peuvent que faire défaut. Aussi, comme l’écrivait Edgar Poe, « dans des investigations du genre de celle qui nous occupe, il ne faut pas tant se demander comment les choses se sont passées, qu’étudier en quoi elles se distinguent de tout ce qui est arrivé jusqu’à présent. »

Dès les premières heures qui ont suivi l’attentat d’Oslo, le portrait du suspect fait par les médias, alimentés essentiellement par des informations policières, n’était pas un instant vraisemblable. Anders Behring Breivik, « chrétien fondamentaliste d’extrême droite et islamophobe » aurait déposé une bombe devant le siège du gouvernement et commis un assassinat de masse sur l’ile d’Utøya afin de faire connaître son « manifeste » intitulé « 2083, une déclaration d’indépendance européenne » (1), sorte de plaidoyer contre le multiculturalisme teinté de mysticisme crypto-maçonnique (2). Le texte semble pourtant avoir été écrit à la hâte, puisqu’il s’agit en fait d’un plagiat de l’œuvre principale de Théodore Kaczynski, plus connu sous le nom d’Unabomber (3).

On notera que cet « islamophobe d’extrême droite » aura soigneusement évité que ses victimes soient d’origines étrangères ou de confession musulmane. On soulignera aussi que l’attentat a eu lieu un jour férié en Norvège, limitant ainsi les victimes collatérales et ciblant uniquement des partisans du Parti Travailliste.

De même il est intrigant d’apprendre que, comme lors des évènements du 11 septembre 2001, les forces de sécurité d’Oslo étaient, 48 heures avant l’explosion devant le siège du gouvernement, en train d’effectuer un « exercice d’attentat à la bombe ». On pourrait continuer à énumérer sans fin la liste des invraisemblances tellement elles sont nombreuses.

Le premier ministre Norvégien, Jens Stoltenberg, semblait lui aussi pour le moins sceptique, lorsqu’il a déclaré dimanche dernier : « J’ai un message à adresser à celui qui nous a attaqués et à ceux qui sont derrière cela : personne ne nous réduira au silence avec des bombes, personne ne nous réduira au silence avec des armes à feu. » (4)

« CELUI qui nous a attaqué et CEUX qui sont derrière cela »

On aura beau nous dire que nous voyons des « conspirations » partout (alors que d’autres ne les voient que lorsque ça les arrange), le terrorisme d’Etat est une réalité et, en l’occurrence, dans ces attentats d’Oslo, les similarités avec l’Histoire récente de l’Europe sont surprenantes.

Il est bien sûr encore trop tôt pour pouvoir démontrer qui se cache derrière ces évènements, mais la version officielle, telle qu’elle est présentée par les responsables gouvernementaux, par les médias, par les forces de polices et par le terroristes lui-même contre ses adversaires déclarés, les « marxistes », le « multiculturalisme » et « l’Islam », n’est pas un instant crédible. Son objectif n’est d’ailleurs pas de l’être, mais d’occuper la totalité du terrain de l’information.

Ainsi, les nouvelles conditions qui prédominent actuellement dans la société écrasée sous le talon de fer de l’ordre mondialiste, le terrorisme d’Etat se trouve placé dans une autre lumière, en quelque sorte tamisée. Comme il y a beaucoup plus de fous qu’autrefois – ce qui est infiniment plus commode – on peut compter sur les médias pour en parler « follement ».

Autrefois, on ne conspirait jamais que contre l’ordre établit. Aujourd’hui, conspirer en sa faveur est un nouveau métier en grand développement. Sous la domination de l’ordre mondialiste, on conspire pour le maintenir, et pour assurer que lui seul contrôle sa bonne marche. Cette conspiration fait partie de son fonctionnement même.

On a déjà commencé à mettre en place quelques moyens d’une guerre civile préventive, adaptés à différentes projection de l’avenir calculé. Ce sont des « organisation spécifiques », chargées d’intervenir sur quelque point selon les besoins de l’ordre mondialiste.

Le précédent de Gladio

Gladio, a été mis en place dès le lendemain de la Seconde Guerre Mondiale sous l’égide de la CIA et du MI6, comme structure clandestine de l’OTAN, dirigée directement par la CIA. Ces réseaux fonctionnaient que les gouvernements nationaux en aient connaissance.

Selon un document émis en 2000 par des parlementaires italiens, Gladio aurait participé en Italie à la « stratégie de la tension », avec l’aide de la loge maçonnique P2, affiliée à l’obédience du Grand Orient d’Italie, à « empêcher le Parti communiste (PCI) à accéder au pouvoir exécutif ». Perpétré par les Brigades rouges, l’assassinat du leader de la Démocratie chrétienne (DC), Aldo Moro, en mai 1978, a en effet mis fin à tout espoir d’un compromis historique entre la DC et le PCI.

En mars 2001, le général Gianadelio Maletti, ancien chef des services de renseignement italiens, a déclaré que la CIA avait favorisé le terrorisme en Italie. De même, le général Nino Lugarese, chef des services secrets militaire de 1981 à 1984, a témoigné de l’existence d’un « Super Gladio » de 800 hommes responsables de l’« intervention intérieure » contre des cibles politiques nationales.

En 2008, le documentaire Les Derniers jours d’Aldo Moro réalisé propose les témoignages de Steve Pieczenik, ancien membre du département d’État américain, et de Francesco Cossiga, ministre italien de l’Intérieur de l’époque, qui affirment que Gladio et la CIA ont été impliqués dans l’enlèvement d’Aldo Moro via la manipulation des Brigades Rouges. Pour compléter ce sujet, voir notre document vidéo L’Orchestre Noir.

Etat et Mafia

L’histoire du terrorisme est écrite par l’Etat, elle est donc éducative. Les populations ne peuvent certes pas savoir qui se cache derrière le terrorisme, mais elles peuvent toujours en savoir assez pour être persuadées que, par rapport à ce terrorisme, tout le reste devra leur sembler plutôt acceptable, en tout cas plus rationnel et plus démocratique.

On se trompe chaque fois que l’on veut expliquer quelque chose en opposant la Mafia à l’Etat : ils ne sont jamais en rivalité. La théorie vérifie avec efficacité ce que toutes les rumeurs de la vie pratique avaient trop facilement montré. La Mafia n’est pas étrangère dans ce monde ; elle y est parfaitement chez elle, elle règne en fait comme le parfait modèle de toutes les entreprises commerciales avancées.

La Mafia est apparue en Sicile au début du XIXe siècle, avec l’essor du capitalisme moderne. Pour imposer son pouvoir, elle a dû convaincre brutalement les populations d’accepter sa protection et son gouvernement occulte en échange de leur soumission, c’est-à-dire un système d’imposition directe et indirecte (sur toutes les transactions commerciales) lui permettant de financer son fonctionnement et son expansion.

Pour cela, elle a organisé et exécuté systématiquement des attentats terroristes contre les individus et les entreprises qui refusaient sa tutelle et sa justice. C’était donc la même officine qui organisait la protection contre les attentats et les attentats pour organiser sa protection. Le recours à une autre justice que la sienne était sévèrement réprimé, de même que toute révélation intempestive sur son fonctionnement et ses opérations.

Malgré ce que l’on pourrait croire, ce n’est pas la Mafia qui a subvertit l’Etat moderne, mais ce sont les Etats qui ont concocté et utilisé les méthodes de la Mafia. Tout Etat moderne contraint de défendre son existence contre des populations qui mettent en doute sa légitimité est amené à utiliser à leur encontre les méthodes les plus éprouvées de la Mafia, et à leur imposer ce choix : terrorisme ou protection de l’Etat.

Clovis Casadue, pour FLASH n°72

Publié sur Mecanopolis avec l’aimable autorisation de Jean-Emile Néaumet, directeur de la rédaction.

Notes :

(1). « 2083, une déclaration d’indépendance européenne » est disponible sur le site Mecanopolis (article du 24 juillet 2011)

(2). Lire « Le suspect des attentats d’Oslo serait un Franc-Maçon norvégien de 32 ans », Mecanopolis, le 23 juillet 2011

(3). Theodore Kaczynski, alias Unabomber, mathématicien et militant écologiste, a fait l’objet de la chasse à l’homme la plus coûteuse de l’histoire du FBI après avoir, entre 1978 et 1995, envoyés des colis piégés artisanaux à diverses personnes construisant ou défendant la société technologique, faisant trois morts et 23 blessés avec 16 bombes envoyées. Auteur de plusieurs textes et ouvrages, il est également considéré comme un philosophe.

(4). 20minutes.fr, le 24 juillet 2011

Il nazifondamentalista...amico di Israele


Il nazifondamentalista… amico di Israele

di Giuseppe Spezzaferro

Fonte: Rinascita [scheda fonte]

Del norvegese che ha fatto una strage ne sono state dette di tutti i colori. Come sempre accade quando succede un fattaccio, le grandi corazzate dell’informazione di casa nostra riempiono pagine e pagine cercando di sopperire alla mancanza di notizie verificate con quello che un tempo si chiamava “colore”, cioè annotazioni di contorno che corredavano il pezzo forte, l’articolo di prima pagina. Ci mancava poco che non fossero tirati in ballo “sospetti legami con la mafia” e/o “strani rapporti con un imprenditore televisivo”. La lettura dei quotidiani da venerdì in poi dà un quadro desolante dello stato dell’informazione. Colonne di terrorismo islamico, di fanatismo neonazista, di fondamentalismo cristiano, di massoneria… in un minestrone con mille ingredienti mescolati senza criterio. A dirla tutta, non c’è soltanto la necessità di confezionare pagine e pagine. C’è anche una convinzione ideologica che s’è diffusa dal 1996, da quando cioè cominciò a circolare il libro di un politologo americano, Samuel Phillips Huntington, intitolato “Lo scontro delle civiltà e il nuovo ordine mondiale”. La tesi dello “scontro di civiltà” è diventata un grosso corpo contundente, che però non è stato ancora possibile trasformare in un’arma seria. Ogni volta che Washington (ovviamente il toponimo va allargato a Wall Street, al Pentagono, a Tel Aviv…) ha provato a lanciare una crociata contro l’Islam in difesa dell’Occidente, la Chiesa di Roma (Karol Wojtyla prima e Joseph Ratzinger dopo) ha negato che fosse in atto uno “scontro di civiltà”. Senza un Pontefice che accusi l’Islam di terrorizzare il mondo al fine di islamizzarlo è difficile pure per le teste d’uovo di Washington (allargata…) mettere in piedi una crociata alla quale poter arruolare l’Occidente, Giappone incluso. Si son dovuti accontentare di una strategia di antiterrorismo globale. Come questo influisca sugli opinionisti, commentatori ed esperti distribuiti fra le più “autorevoli” testate nazionali lo si è visto anche per la strage norvegese. Dietro il folle sparatore c’era nientedimeno che al-Qaida, la centrale terroristica del fondamentalismo islamico. Come mai in Norvegia? Perché lì c’è una organizzata e nutrita colonia di immigrati musulmani. Nella capitale, Oslo, su mezzo milione di abitanti si contano circa quarantamila muslim e per loro i minareti chiamano ogni giorno alla preghiera e lanciano l’invocazione “Allah akbar”, Dio è grande. Essendo fedeli debbono per forza fare la guerra agli infedeli e se pensiamo che proprio a Oslo la federazione degli atei aveva chiesto di poter diffondere dai tetti il messaggio “Dio non esiste”, si capisce come i muslim fossero arrabbiati. Pagine e pagine sugli insediamenti in Norvegia di immigrati provenienti da Paesi “pericolosi” quali il Pakistan e l’Iraq. Pagine su pagine della “nuova” strategia del terrorismo made in al-Qaida. E giù stampando. D’un tratto, il contrordine. Qui il vecchio cronista ricorda una famosa vignetta del “Candido” di Guareschi che raffigurava una schiera di comunisti armati di coltello e a pantaloni calati. Sul disegno campeggiava un urlo: “Contrordine compagni, dovete scaglionarvi lungo il fiume…”. Il contrordine stavolta ha sorpreso “il Giornale” di Sallusti: ha dovuto cambiare la prima pagina che accusava al-Qaeda con una prima pagina intitolata alla “pista politica” della strage. In alcune zone del Paese gli italiani hanno letto che l’autore era il terrorismo islamico ed in altre che si indagava su una pista politica. Roba da ridere, se non facesse piangere per come stiamo combinati. Eliminato il fondamentalismo islamico, su quale conosciuta e ben collaudata spiaggia approdare? Un documento diffuso sul web dal trentaduenne Anders Behring Breivik, dall’omicida cioè, fotografa una “educazione” politica vagante tra la massoneria, il fondamentalismo cristiano, il neonazismo e non si sa bene che altro. Sono 1.500 pagine intitolate “2083 – Una dichiarazione d’indipendenza europea” che, secondo l’autore, comporrebbero il “manuale per i futuri adepti di un nuovo Ordine dei Templari che dovrà opporsi alla jihad islamica”. Ciò che traspare, sottolinea il sociologo Massimo Introvigne, è “l’entusiasmo per gli ebrei che – secondo una vecchia teoria ottocentesca – sarebbero etnicamente affini ai popoli del Nord Europa”. In quel documento-testamento si cita anche l’Italia dove ci sarebbero “60mila patrioti pronti alla battaglia” e dove ci sono molte raffinerie di petrolio facili da colpire (il Corsera ripesca, indovinate un po’, il sabotaggio del 1972 alla raffineria di Trieste…) e il ministro degli Esteri, Franco Frattini, batte per l’ennesima volta Catalano, il trombettista di “Quelli della notte”. Ha auspicato, l’attuale inquilino della Farnesina, che le idee di Breivik siano “estirpate non solo arrestando questo assassino ma anche tutti i suoi seguaci”. E’ un “obbedisci al forcaiolo che è in te”, onde per Frattini andrebbero arrestati tutti i seguaci del Ku Klux Klan che, invece, gli americani lasciano in pace finché non commettono un reato, perché da quelle parti la libertà d’opinione è una cosa seria. E, a proposito di cose serie, l’attentatore rischia il massimo della pena che in Norvegia è di 21 anni di carcere. Come mai? Perché in un Paese civile la galera è strumento rieducativo e si presuppone che dopo tanti anni dietro le sbarre una persona cambi. Il portavoce della polizia norvegese, Henning Holtaas, ha spiegato che se dopo 21 anni il criminale è rimasto pericoloso la pena potrà essere allungata. Se il detenuto non è rieducato e pronto a tornare alla vita civile, le porte del carcere restano chiuse. Che ne pensano i manettari nostrani? E quelli che invocano la pena di morte? Torniamo alla “dichiarazione” di Breivik per annotare che era stata postata su internet il 23 luglio da un membro (tale Kevin Slaughter) della Chiesa di Satana operante in California ma che ha il massimo numero di fedeli nei Paesi scandinavi. Introvigne, però, punta il microscopio su un altro elemento e scrive: “Mi colpisce la fotografia di Breivik che lo rappresenta con tanto di grembiulino massonico come un membro di una loggia di San Giovanni, cioè di una delle logge che amministrano i primi tre gradi nell’Ordine Norvegese dei Massoni, la massoneria regolare della Norvegia”. Il sociologo riporta anche che “secondo la stampa norvegese Breivik farebbe parte della Sǿilene, una delle logge che praticano il cosiddetto rito svedese, che richiede ai membri la fede cristiana”. Tuttavia è il collegamento al nazismo quello che mette d’accordo tutti e fa disegnare lo stesso identikit da Oslo a Londra, da Mosca a Pechino. I più “dotti” usano il composto “nazifondamentalista cristiano”, ma più di questo non si può fare senza finire nel ridicolo. Restano fuori la massoneria e la simpatia per gli ebrei, ma tant’è. C’è un’inezia: Breivik nel suo scritto mette sullo stesso piano marxismo, islamismo e nazismo. C’è anche il piccolo particolare che i giovani presi di mira da Breivik stessero manifestando a favore dei Palestinesi, ma poco importa. Gli esperti scrivono lunghissimi articoli su quanto nazista fosse stata la Norvegia ai tempi di Quisling e come la “purezza razziale” delle norvegesi le avesse fatte scegliere da Himmler per accoppiarle con giovani ariani tedeschi e generare esseri razzialmente superiori. Sono annotazioni storiche che c’entrano poco con Breivik, ma lo spettro nazista spazza via qualunque residuo di raziocinio. La prova regina è che l’omicida fin dal 2009 risulta registrato su “Nordisk”, un forum tenuto sul web da nazionalisti svedesi. Viviamo tempi di grande confusione, con ex marxisti che sono più liberalizzatori di ex liberali, con nazioni liberiste che nazionalizzano le banche, con bombardamenti umanitari e missioni di pace affollate di morti, con magistrati che contestano le leggi invece di applicarle, con studenti che si autodefiniscono giovani laureati a 30 anni e passa, con Israele che occupa impunemente le terre palestinesi e l’Ue che si occupa delle dimensioni delle carote, con la Cina che sfrutta i lavoratori all’insegna della via comunista cinese al capitalismo… è un elenco lunghissimo nel quale può lecitamente trovare posto un neonazista simpatizzante di Israele, un razzista himmleriano amico degli ebrei, un massone cristiano nemico degli arabi. Non c’è limite. Gli schemi inventati a metà dello scorso secolo sono duri a morire. Invano la realtà si incarica di smentirli quotidianamente. E’ così facile servirsi di schemi, invece di pensare! Che diamine, si troverà pure un intellettuale che a tanto al chilo saprà sfornare tonnellate di spiegazioni delle “apparenti” contraddizioni.

Tante altre notizie su www.ariannaeditrice.it


jeudi, 28 juillet 2011

Oslo: les zones d'ombres...


Oslo : les zones d'ombres...

Par Marc Noé

Source Le Gaulois cliquez ici

Le Gaulois n’est pas un enquêteur, certes. Mais comme tout un chacun il regarde, observe, écoute et tente de faire le tri dans ce que les médias nous jettent en pâture pour nous distraire de l’essentiel.

À l’évidence, cet attentat d’Oslo présente un certain nombre de points pour le moins bizarres. Des zones d’ombres.

1. On nous dit qu’il s’agit d’un attentat à la voiture piégée… or, sur toutes les images (photos et vidéos), aucun cratère dans la chaussée intacte n’apparaît. Néanmoins, on nous montre en permanence une voiture renversée et calcinée qui suggère l’hypothèse retenue. Quand on songe aux dégâts provoqués induisant une forte puissance de l’engin explosif, on ne peut qu’être étonné qu’il n’y ait aucun cratère, ni même une plaque de goudron arrachée. S’il y en avait un, nous aurions eu droit aux gros plans. Par ailleurs, la voiture sensée avoir été bourrée d’explosifs conserve des pneus apparemment intacts… surprenant !

Voiture piégée ? Chaussée intacte

2. S’il s’agit d’un attentat à la voiture piégée, comment se fait-il qu’un incendie se soit déclaré dans les étages de l’immeuble gouvernemental et pas dans les boutiques proches de la « fameuse » voiture renversée ? L’explosion se serait-elle donc produite dans les étages ? Et n’y en a-t-il eu qu’une seule ?

3. Selon des sources norvégiennes, la rue touchée par l’explosion était barrée au public pour cause de travaux sur le réseau d’égouts. Alors, pourquoi les médias français occultent-ils ce fait en nous affirmant que la rue était presque déserte en raison des vacances ? En tout cas, très mauvais calcul de la part d’un terroriste sensé avoir préparé son affaire de longue date.

Incendie dans les étages

4. « On » nous dit que le tueur s’était récemment fait livrer plusieurs tonnes d’engrais chimiques ayant pu contribuer à la confection de LA bombe. Soit : certains produits permettent ce genre de choses… mais pour obtenir le résultat constaté sur les images, il en faudrait une sacrée quantité intransportable discrètement par un seul homme. Ou alors, l’engin explosif n’était pas confectionné à base d’engrais chimiques mais avec « autre chose ». Et là, les possibilités ne manquent pas.

5. Peu de temps après l’explosion, l’attentat a été revendiqué par un certain groupe djihadiste intitulé « Helpers of Global Jihad » (voir ici). Très rapidement, cette revendication a curieusement disparu de la circulation.

6. Dans l’île, pendant que le tueur sulfatait ses victimes, la Police aurait mis deux heures pour intervenir alors que, des témoins affirment l’avoir appelée immédiatement. Quelle réactivité !

7. Toujours sur l’île, pendant que ça camphrait, aucune tentative de réaction (bon, passe encore) et plus de 80 personnes abattues… 80 en deux heures, alors que ça courait dans tous les sens et que c’était donc du tir sur cibles mouvantes… avec quel(s) type(s) d’arme(s) ?… Combien de chargeurs ?… et graillés à combien de cartouches ?… Pour un tel résultat, le tueur était-il vraiment tout seul ?

Le tueur… vraiment seul ?

8. Et puis, qui sont réellement les victimes ? Tous les témoins interrogés sur l’île et dont les propos ont été largement diffusés ne sont pas franchement de type nordique. Par contre, toutes les personnes venues déposer des fleurs sur les lieux de l’explosion, elles, le sont. Alors, de quoi s’agit-il ?… de quoi et de qui parle-t-on ?

9. Le tueur se serait finalement rendu sans résistance… bizarre tout de même comme comportement après avoir dézingué « calmement » 80 personnes… Soit, là cela peut dépendre des tempéraments.

10. Pourquoi la page “Facebook” du tueur diffusée par les médias est-elle un faux ?

Toutes ces questions ont forcément leurs réponses… mais ce ne sont certainement pas celles données par les médias qui défient toute logique. Tout le monde a désormais bien conscience que ces mêmes médias sont passés maîtres dans l’art de nous présenter des images tout en nous racontant autre chose. Alors, quelle est la « vraie » vérité ? Et à qui profite ce crime ?

En tout cas, une chose est sûre maintenant : le portrait-type du terroriste qui circule dans le monde entier est celui d’un « grand, blond, les yeux bleus, chrétien, d’extrême droite, islamophobe, anti-marxiste ». Peu importent les attentats quotidiens perpétrés par les islamistes qui massacrent allègrement tout ce qui bouge partout dans le monde. Seul compte aujourd’hui celui d’Oslo.

Là, l’objectif médiatique est bien atteint !

Attentat d'Oslo: ce qu'il cache et dévoile


Attentat d’Oslo : ce qu’il cache et dévoile

par Claude BOURRINET


Le double attentat d’Oslo, du 22 juillet 2011, qui a fait près d’une centaine de morts, et a touché le centre du pouvoir norvégien ainsi que le Parti travailliste, soutien du gouvernement, n’a pas fini de provoquer des ondes, qui ne seront pas toutes policières. En effet, l’identité du terroriste, celle du pays visé et l’imbroglio politique dans lequel l’Europe s’emmêle actuellement, du fait de l’impuissance des États à affronter les périls de l’heure, et de celui, concomitant, de la montée des populismes, notamment dans les pays du Nord, vont susciter des bouleversements probablement considérables.


On notera tout d’abord que le type de massacre perpétré par Anders Behring Breivik est différent que certains qui ont marqué les esprits occidentaux récemment. Certes, il y eut bien, aux U.S.A., l’attentat d’Oklahoma City, perpétré en 1995 par un militant d’extrême droite, mais, finalement, il est différent (si l’on excepte également, mais c’est une autre histoire ! le 11 septembre) de toute une série de tueries, tant en Amérique qu’en Europe, qui ont été commises par des individus isolés. Celui de septembre 2007, par exemple, dont l’auteur était un Finlandais de 18 ans, Pekka-Eric Auvnen, s’était conclu par un suicide, fin assez fréquente pour ce genre d’action destructrice, et on avait souligné combien ce jeune homme était « normal », comme bon nombre de cas identiques : bon élève, sans histoire, très « branché », blanc, intégré dans une société assez austère.



On pourrait mettre en parallèle, dans la plupart de ces cas, la dilection pour le virtuel, Internet, les jeux vidéo. Il est certain que l’expression par ces médias virtuels encourage le narcissisme, la paranoïa ou la mégalomanie, dans l’impression qu’il donne d’être le centre du monde et de détenir une puissance surdimensionnée. D’autre part, Facebook permet de s’expliquer, de « faire passer des messages », ce qui peut faciliter une expansion d’un moi, qui aurait peut-être été tenu dans des proportions raisonnables autrement. C’est sans doute cette sensation de dilatation de l’ego qui se produit lorsqu’on s’adonne aux jeux vidéo ultraviolents. On tue des dizaines de personnes sans qu’une inhibition jugule la jouissance destructrice. Il n’est parfois qu’un pas pour passer du virtuel au réel, ce dernier d’ailleurs prenant subrepticement les caractéristiques du premier, un mort n’ayant plus, in fine, les attributs de la vraie mort.


Ce qui frappe au demeurant, dans ce genre d’action effroyable, c’est l’absence de sens moral, de compassion pour les victimes et leurs proches. Les témoins soulignent souvent le sang froid, la rigueur méthodique avec lesquels ils perpétuent leurs crimes. Un pilote de bombardier doit éprouver, sans doute, le même état d’esprit, à 15 000 mètres de hauteur.


Aussi, le jeune Norvégien qui vient de massacrer plusieurs dizaines de personnes, préparait-il son geste depuis deux ans. Tout était calculé, il en avait donné les raisons dans un document de 1500 pages datant de l’automne 2009. Il avait aussi réalisé une vidéo de propagande d’une dizaine de minutes.


Ce qui différencie cependant ce massacre de certains autres, ce sont les motivations idéologiques. Anders Behring Breivik, qui se présente, sur une photographie, vêtu d’une panoplie de franc-maçon, se réclame du fondamentalisme chrétien, et revendique un combat radical contre le multiculturalisme, l’islam, l’immigration. Il appartient donc à cette mouvance émergente, appelée populiste, qui, des Pays-Bas de Geert Wilder à la Suisse d’Oscar Feysinger, est l’événement politique majeur de ces dernières années. Cette « extrême droite » s’affiche volontiers comme libérale, pro-sioniste, antimusulmane, identitaire, atlantiste, occidentaliste.


Étrangement, la police, qui doit en savoir assez sur le coupable, n’évoque nullement Israël dans les motivations qui auraient pu l’inciter à commettre son geste. Pourtant, il est essentiel de rappeler ce que représente la Norvège par rapport au problème palestinien.


En 2009, l’opération « Plomb fondu », menée criminellement par les forces d’occupation contre le camp de concentration de Gaza, a suscité l’indignation dans la population norvégienne, au point que 40 % de celle-ci étaient favorables à une grève générale de soutien aux Palestiniens.


Le 5 septembre de la même année, la ministre norvégienne des Finances, Kristin Halvorsen, prend la décision de retirer les investissements norvégiens de la société israélienne Elbit Systems à cause de « son implication intensive dans la construction de la barrière de séparation ».


Le 1er octobre 2010, la Norvège interdit des exercices de sous-marins israéliens : les deux sous-marins israéliens qui devaient démarrer une série d’exercices au sud de la Norvège ne pourront pas stationner à la base navale de Markiva comme c’était prévu initialement. Ce refus norvégien intervient après une décision des autorités de suspendre les exportations de matériel militaire vers l’État hébreu.


Le 18 février 2001, l’ambassade Israélienne à Oslo a reçu une notification officielle du gouvernement norvégien, formulant que l’ambassade devait trouver un autre site d’ici 2012. En effet, elle perturbe les riverains qui craignent pour leur sécurité. Un membre du ministère des Affaires étrangères a déclaré que les « autorités norvégiennes avaient capitulé devant l’opinion public hostile à Israël ».


Le 24 juillet 2011, le professeur Alan Dershowitz, avocat américain qui enseigne le droit à l’université d’Harvard, invité par le I.C.E.J. (International Christian Embassy in Jerusalem) a essuyé un refus lorsqu’il a demandé de rencontrer les dirigeants norvégiens. Il n’a pas été non plus autorisé à donner une conférence dans les universités d’Oslo et de Trondheim, en raison de ses prises de position en faveur d’Israël. Il a lu en public une pétition rédigée par des professeurs norvégiens, appelant au boycott d’Israël.


Le 24 juillet, la Norvège, par la voix du Premier ministre Jens Stoltenberg, juge « inacceptable » l’assaut de l’armée israélienne et réclame une enquête internationale indépendante, ajoutant que l’ambassadeur israélien à Oslo a été convoqué.


Le 18 juillet, le ministre norvégien des Affaires étrangères avait estimé lundi que la candidature de la Palestine aux Nations unies était « tout à fait légitime ».


Évidemment, ces faits et prises de positions ne sont ni des preuves d’implication, ni même des éléments de suspicion, bien qu’on puisse les voir comme des indices concordants.


Maintenant, il est évident que les gouvernements européens en place vont profiter de l’aubaine pour accroître le contrôle et la répression des mouvements contestataires. C’est de bonne guerre. On ne regardera pas de trop près les différences entre les diverses sensibilités qui les constituent, entre ceux qui combattent pour une Europe authentique, libérée du joug atlantiste, et ceux qui mènent un autre combat, plus que douteux.


Claude Bourrinet

Article printed from Europe Maxima: http://www.europemaxima.com

URL to article: http://www.europemaxima.com/?p=2101

Terroranschläge in Norwegen unter falscher Flagge


Terroranschläge in Norwegen unter falscher Flagge

Webster G. Tarpley


Die tragischen Terroranschläge in Norwegen weisen einige verräterische Merkmale einer Provokation unter falscher Flagge auf. So wird – trotz des Versuchs der Medien aus aller Welt, Anders Behring Breivik als Einzeltäter in der Tradition des Kennedy-Mörders Lee Harvey Oswald darzustellen – berichtet, dass viele Augenzeugen übereinstimmend ausgesagt haben, an dem Massaker in dem Jugendsommercamp Utøya außerhalb von Oslo sei ein zweiter Schütze beteiligt gewesen. Weitere Nachforschungen ergeben, dass US-Geheimdienste ein Programm verfolgt haben, pensionierte norwegische Polizeioffiziere zu rekrutieren, angeblich, um Beobachtungsoperationen im Land durchführen zu können. Dieses Programm, das als SIMAS Surveillance Detection Units bekannt ist, lieferte der NATO ein perfektes Instrument für Infiltration und Subversion der norwegischen Polizei.


Mehr: http://info.kopp-verlag.de/hintergruende/europa/webster-g-tarpley/terroranschlaege-in-norwegen-unter-falscher-flagge-nicht-nur-ein-schuetze-auf-der-insel-anti-terro.html

Claves clasicas de la obra de Jorge Luis Borges





CONSIDERAMOS UNA OPCIÓN VÁLIDA para acercarnos a la esencia de América, internarnos por el sendero de su literatura. En este contexto, dos aproximaciones complementarias se visualizan con perfecta nitidez, y que de manera convencional podemos denominar "urbana" y "telúrica", es decir, la visión de América desde la ciudad y desde su geografía potente. Entre los escritores que podríamos ubicar en la perspectiva "urbana", es decir, que miran América y el Mundo desde la ciudad, nos parecen dos buenos ejemplos Jorge Luis Borges y Manuel Mujica Laínez; a su vez, entre aquellos que prefieren situar si obra en el corazón geográfico de América, en la selva húmeda o en la fría serranía, destacan Gabriel García Márquez y Mario Vargas Llosa. Por cierto, esta dicotomía, como todas, es arbitraria y discutible. No obstante, nos parece sosteniblc, como expresión de aquellas fuerzas o mentalidades que, unas veces en pugna y otras en armonía, han contribuido a modelar la arquitectura de nuestra cultura americana.

En el presente artículo, nos centramos en la obra literaria de Jorge Luis Borges, desarrollando una hipótesis precisa, a saber: que en los escritos del argentino, viven claves del mundo clásico, entendido este como el universo de la cultura Greco-Romana, tributario a su vez del horizonte cultural de los pueblos indoeuropeos, y en consecuencia pre-cristiano y pre-moderno, o en otras palabras, tradicional.

Tales claves se plasmarían en las nociones que Borges tiene del tiempo, de la inmortalidad, del destino y del héroe.

A partir de tales claves, y de acuerdo a nuestra lectura –y no la de Borges necesariamente, quiza sólo un mero vehículo depositario de ideas fundamentales-, América representaría un tercer intento (después del original y del Romano-Germánico) para re-crear, en un medio más salvaje y despiadado que el europeo, un nuevo Mundo "Clásico". Para tal empresa, además, tales hombres. Los americanos vendrían a ser los últimos clásicos, los descendientes postreros de Ulises, los argonautas del más recóndito confín del mundo, arrojados por la marea a las inhóspitas playas americanas. Ellos son los últimos sobrevientos del mundo clásico, y por ende, del mundo tradicional, ajeno por completo a la modernidad. Partimos del supuesto, que la realidad parece confirmar y no desmentir, que en los tiempos que corren, de planetarizacion, nihilismo y desacralización, sólo en América puede fundarse un Nuevo Orden, Clásico y Tradicional, periclitada tal posibilidad en Europa hace media centuria. En otras palabras, el viejo espíritu premoderno (y en cierta medida postmoderno), al cual se unió el catolicismo en su mejor época (la del románico y del gótico, creaciones europeas, ajenas por completo al judaismo y por tanto al cristianismo), perviviría únicamente en nuestras tierras, y sólo en ellas cabría una re-fundación, un restablecimiento de un orden trascendente y una nueva emergencia del homo religiosus, el hombre resacralizado.

La idea que Borges tiene de la Historia y del tiempo constituye un fiel reflejo de la concepción solar del eterno retorno, y escapa por consiguiente de la concepción escatológica y lineal propia del Judaismo y del cristianimo. Especialmente nítido es lo anterior en "El inmortal", primera narración de su volumen titulado El Aleph. En ella, el tema de la vida eterna se presenta más como un infierno que una bienaventuranza: "Ser inmortal es baladí; menos el hombre, todas las criaturas lo son, pues ignoran la muerte; lo divino, lo terrible, lo incomprensible, es saberse inmortal. He notado que, pese a las religiones, esa convicción es rarísima. Israelitas, cristianos y musulmanes profesan la inmortalidad, pero la veneración que tributan al primer siglo prueba que sólo creen en él, ya que destinan todos los demás, en número infinito, a premiarlo o a castigarlo. Más razonable me parece la rueda de ciertas religiones del Indostán; en esa rueda, que no tiene principio ni fin, cada vida es efecto de la anterior y engendra la siguiente, pero ninguna determina el conjunto".

En la Ciudad de los Inmortales (imagen del cielo y del infierno quizá), todos sólo ansian morir. Finalmente, que si "existe un río cuyas aguas dan la inmortalidad, en alguna región habrá otro río cuyas aguas la borren". Pero el deseo de morir también implica el ansia por re-nacer, por recomenzar tras fundirse con el regazo terrenal. Ello es válido tanto en la escala cósmica como en la personal. Estamos aquí en el meollo de la concepción trágica de la vida, inherente al mundo griego y que posteriormente hacen suya Séneca y sus discípulos. En efecto, si la Historia no tien un fin, un sentido, tampoco hay un juicio postrero en el cual responder, ante un juez omnipotente y cuya sentencia es inapelable, por culpas originales. El hombre, en consecuencia, no debe atar a su cuello el pesado yugo del "consuelo metafísico".

La vida es por tanto un laberinto, cuyo centro jamás alcanzaremos ("insoportablemente soñé con un exiguo y nítido laberinto: en el centro había un cántaro; mis manos casi lo tocaban, mis ojos lo veían, pero tan intrincadas y perplejas eran las curvas que yo sabía que iba a morir antes de alcanzarlo"). Nótese que el agua (del río de la inmortalidad o del cántaro), que simboliza al bautismo, o la "salvación", es inalcanzable para Borges, escéptico y trágico.

En el relato al que aludimos, Borges llega a encontrarse (y a identificarse) con otro poeta ciego, nada menos que el propio Homero, uno de los trogloditas que habitan en la Ciudad de Los Inmortales. Ambos son uno solo, de la misma manera como Borges y su universo literario también se funden, al punto que éste resulta efectivamente vivido y es por lo tanto más real que la vida misma, cobra mayor consistencia que los acontecimientos cotidianos, Borges pretende quizá ser una imagen, reflejada en un espejo (otro símbolo al que recurre tan asiduamente como el laberinto), del propio Homero, a modo de un rapsoda contemporáneo que renueva con cierta ironía escéptica y fatalista (trágica en consecuencia) el mundo de los relatos fantásticos y mágicos, heroicos y donde el destino ha de cumplirse irremisi-blemente. Así, más allá de un interés objetivo por aquel mundo, que lo lleva a no ocultar su admiración por H.P. Lovecraft y E.A. Poe, hay en Borges una implicación subjetiva que creemos es producto de su concepción del tiempo y de la Historia. Borges, puesto que vive en tal Mundo, realmente se siente militando en las huestes de un caudillo normando en la batalla del puente de Stamford, en 1066, o como calígrafo en un arrabal de Bulaq, en el séptimo siglo de la Héjira, transcribiendo "con pausa caligrafía, en un idioma que he olvidado, en un alfabeto que ignoro, los siete viajes de Simbad y la historia de la ciudad de Bronce". La historia, entonces, asi como nuestra existencia, no tienen un sentido o una finalidad metafísicos, así como tampoco existe el pasado y el futuro, sino sólo un presente eterno, reflejo de múltiples existencias, que se superponen, superando el tiempo.

Que esta percepción es clásica y ajena al universo cristiano, pareciera tornarse aún más explícita en el símbolo del laberinto, al que ya aludíamos, que veladamente Borges opone al símbolo de la cruz: "Agustín había escrito que Jesús es la vía recta que nos salva del laberinto circular en que andan los impíos", escribe en su relato "Los teólogos"; Borges se sabe "impío", y de ahí que acepte adentrarse en el laberinto, en la Casa del Minotauro, sin esperanzas, pero también, reiteramos, sin remordimientos. Creemos ver aquí una posición familiar a la Escuela Estoica, trasuntándose una sugerente hilación, directa y sin interferencias judeo-cristianas, que se origina en el pretérito mundo Greco-Romano, de ahí hasta Séneca (depositario e interprete ya "intelectualizado" del mundo clásico) y finalmente al mismo Borges, es decir, desde la Roma hispánica hasta la América románica. Así, la rueda solar y la cruz cristiana conforman los polos de un enfrentamiento cósmico que Borges explicita cautelosamente: "Cayó la rueda ante la Cruz", escribe, pero nada en sus palabras nos hace pensar que tal derrota haya sido definitiva. Por lo demás, agrega: "En las cruces rúnicas los dos emblemas enemigos conviven entrelazados". Es decir en la cruz celta el mundo clásico y tradicional, representado por la rueda solar, encierra, como en un círculo mágico diseñado por el mismísimo Merlín, a las líneas perpendiculares de su enemiga mediterránea. No hay por tanto tal derrota, sino un repliegue, una inmersión hacia las capas profundas de nuestro inconsciente individual y colectivo, que cada cierto tiempo se manifiesta históricamente, visiblemente, usando una expresión de C.G. Jung, como explosiones de "Wotanismo".

América se presenta a su vez como un mundo en creación, indómito, cuya naturaleza es a tal punto poderosa que empequeñece al hombre (ver CIUDAD DE LOS CÉSARES N° 13, entrevista a Miguel Serrano). En este medio, los nuevos Argonautas, los últimos descendientes de Ulises, arrojados a las playas de la "Terra Australis Incógnita", combaten con denuedo, intentando forjar un Nuevo Mundo que, si somos fieles a nuestro origen, no debería ser sino una recreación del Mundo más antiguo entre los mundos antiguos. No está demás precisar que tal combate, por el momento, no es sino personal o a lo más grupal, en un esfuerzo por hacer "rectangular" nuestra Alma, como nos pediría Nietzsche, y no una tarea de masas, dada la contingencia epocal que atravesamos.

En este contexto, Borges parece obsesionado con la imagen trágica de los descendientes de nórdicos o europeos septentrionales, que se ven devorados, subsumidos por el mundo indígena y telúrico de América, perdiendo casi por completo todo rasgo de la cultura de sus ancestros, todo gesto civilizado. Tal ocurre con el destino de los hermanos "Nelson", protagonistas del cuento "La intrusa": "En Turdera los llamaban "los Nilsen". El párroco me dijo que su predecesor recordaba, no sin sorpresa, haber visto en la casa de esa gente una gastada Biblia de tapas negras, con caracteres góticos; en las últimas páginas entrevió nombre y fechas manuscritas. Era el único libro que había en la casa. La azarosa crónica de los Nilsen, perdida como todo se perderá". La misma imagen simbólica de la Biblia que trajeron los olvidados antepasados y que nadie entiende, aparece en el magnífico relato "El Evangelio según Marcos", de sobrecogedor final. El relato se sitúa en una estancia hacia 1928. En ella viven los "Cutres" apellido con reminiscencias germánicas. Se trata del capataz y de su familia: "Los Cutres eran tres: el padre, el hijo, que era singularmente tosco, y una muchacha de incierta paternidad. Eran altos, fuertes, huesudos, de pelo que tiraba a rojizo, y de caras aindiadas. Casi no hablaban. La mujer del capataz había muerto hace años". A la estancia, llega en plan de vacaciones un estudiante eterno de medicina, proveniente de Buenos Aires, que "veneraba a Francia pero menospreciaba a los franceses; tenía en poco a los americanos, pero aprobaba el hecho que hubiera rascacielos en Buenos Aires". Los Cutres eran analfabetos, primordiales y sombríos. El huésped, explorando la casa de aquellos, se topa un día con una Biblia en Inglés: "En las páginas finales los Guthrie –tal era su nombre genuino- habían dejada escrita su historia. Eran oriundos de Inverness, habían arribado a este continente sin duda como peones, a principios del siglo diecinueve, y se habían cruzado con indios. La crónica cesaba hacia mil ochocientos setenta y tantos; ya no sabían escribir. Al cabo de unas pocas generaciones habían olvidado el inglés: el castellano (...) les daba trabajo". El visitante hojeó el volumen y se topó con el Evangelio según Marcos, que comienza a leer a los Cutres más por afán literario que proselitista. Trabajosamente, intenta explicarles quién fue Cristo, por qué murió, como murió y qué es el infierno; así transcurren los días. En las últimas líneas del relato, el visitante, aterrorizado y aturdido, alcanza a comprender que para "salvarse", los Cutres han decidido crucificarlo igual que a ese extraño personaje llamado Cristo, mientras los elementos se desatan con la lluvia, la tormenta y el río desbordado.

En América, entonces, los descendientes de los olvidados celtas, remontando la rueda hacia atrás, se han descristianizado, y las viejas e incomprensibles Biblias góticas olvidados en un rincón polvoriento.

En Borges, también está presente la lucha permanente que libran en América el mundo de la ciudad y el mundo de la naturaleza, que alternativamente se entremezclan y se repelen. Presenciamos el entrechocar bullente del universo americano urbano, por lo general pegado al litoral, con su espalda protegida por el Océano, a modo de cordón umbilical que lo une a la "civilización", y el universo americano agreste y feraz, selvático, exuberante e imponente, que termina por infiltrarse en la ciudad o en la parodia o fallida imitación de la ciudad, como en el mundo de García Márquez.

Ambos mundos están presentes en Borges, pero desde la perspectiva del primero, de la ciudad: "Yo creí, durante años, haberme criado en un suburbio de Buenos Aires, un suburbio de calles aventuradas y de ocasos visibles. Lo cierto es que me crié en un jardín, detrás de una verja con lanzas, y en una biblioteca de ilimitados libros ingleses. Palermo del cuchillo y de la guitarra andaba (me aseguran) por las esquinas, pero quienes poblaron mis mañanas y dieron agradable horror a mis noches fueron el bucanero ciego de Stevenson, agonizando bajo las patas de los caballos, y el traidor que abandonó a su amigo en la luna y el viajero del tiempo, que trajo del porvenir una flor marchita, y un genio encarcelado durante siglos en el cántaro salomónico y el profeta velado del Jorasán que detrás de las piedras y de la seda ocultaba la lepra. ¿Qué había, mientras tanto, del otro lado de la verja con lanzas? ¿Qué destinos vernáculos y violentos fueron cumpliéndose a unos pasos de mí en el turbio almacén o en el azaroso baldío?".

América es también un país "nuevo", y por tanto, epopéyico, mitológico, saturado de historia heroica y trágica: "Yo afirmo –sin remilgado temor a un novelero amor de la paradoja- que solamente los países nuevos tienen pasado; es decir, recuerdo autobiográfico de él; es decir, tiene historia viva. Si el tiempo es sucesión, debemos reconocer que donde densidad mayor hay de hechos, más tiempo corre y que el más caudaloso es el de este inconsecuente lado del mundo. La conquista y colonización de estos reinos –cuatro fortines temerosos de barro prendidos en la costa y vigilados por el pendiente horizonte, arco disparador de malones- fueron de tan efímera operación que un abuelo mío, en 1872, pudo comandar la última batalla de importancia contra los indios, realizando, después de la mitad del siglo diecinueve, obra conquistadora del dieciséis".

Finalmente, en la figura del héroe y de su destino fatal, al que es imposible escapar, y donde antes que el libre albedrío pareciera imponerse la impronta de Edipo, percibimos arquetipos tradicionales que en Borges son tema recurrente. En este punto, el escritor argentino piensa y escribe como un discípulo de Sófocles (en palabras de dos autoras chilenas. "El destino, la Moira o Parca, es un poder que ordena lo que tiene que ser y lo que debe ser, es decir también lo justo. Por ello, es también amo de los dioses, quienes no pueden transgredirlo intentando salirse de sus límites". Nota al Canto VI de la Ilíada, Gabriela Andrade y María Luisa Vial).

A cada hombre, entonces, le espera su destino, tejido por las diosas, a veces incluso para toda una estirpe. En el universo literario de Borges, ello tiene validez tanto para el compadrito que cae acuchillado en un sórdido arrabal bonaerense a principio de siglo, como al gaucho que finalmente se encuentra, bajo la luna que ilumina la vastedad de la pampa, con su enemigo de toda la vida, o al caudillo normando que cae atravesado por una lanza en las frías playas de Bretaña. Por lo demás, la misma noción del héroe se entrelaza con la del destino. No debemos olvidar que el héroe es aquel fiel a la palabra empeñada y que en consecuencia enfrenta su destino. En tal perspectiva, entendemos a cabalidad la siguiente frase de Borges: "Cualquier destino, por largo y complicado que sea, consta en realidad de un solo momento: el momento en que el hombre sabe para siempre quien es".


*Pseudónimo de Juan Andrés Orrego Acuña. Publicado en CIUDAD DE LOS CÉSARES N° 17, Enero/Febrero de 1991.

mercredi, 27 juillet 2011

Oswald Spengler ed il senso metapolitico del declino occidentale

 Oswald Spengler ed il senso metapolitico del declino occidentale

Luca Valentini

Ex: http://www.centrostudilaruna.it/

La crisi morale, oltre che economica e finanziaria, che attualmente attanaglia l’Italia, le farsesche vicende dell’attuale cricca di potere al governo, spesso conducono anche i più acuti osservatori a smarrire quella visione d’insieme e di lontani orizzonti che dovrebbe sempre caratterizzare una visione del mondo e della vita autenticamente tradizionale, cioè fondata e determinata su principi dall’Alto.

E’ importante tale precisazione, perché, al di là delle giuste analisi sociologico-politiche, delle doverose battaglie per il benessere del Popolo Italiano, mai si dovrebbe dimenticare che l’ampiezza della crisi va ben oltre il nostro Paese e che le radici sono ben più profonde di ciò che ai nostri occhi si manifesta, essendo il piano finanziario solamente una risultante di un processo degenerativo, che interessa, nelle sue profondità abissali, i caratteri più interni dell’intera civilizzazione occidentale, nel suo spirito, nella sua moderna involuzione, nelle imboscate e nei tradimenti che essa ha subito.

Riferirsi a Oswald Spengler ed a ciò che ha espresso nelle sue opere, particolarmente nel Il Tramonto dell’Occidente, come noi faremo sinteticamente in questo articolo, ha proprio la determinata volontà di mettere in risalto codesto piano d’osservazione, un orizzonte che va ben oltre la semplice narrazione storicistica o i lineari ed apparentemente confusi e contradditori accadimenti del quotidiano, ma che vuole riaprire una riflessione, un ragionamento all’interno della nostra comunità sull’essenzialità di un approfondimento metapolitico che è e deve essere un approfondimento sulla nostra civiltà, sulla decadenza secolare che la caratterizza, nel rapporto della Tradizione Europea – che dal nostro punto di vista è essenzialmente Tradizione elleno-romano-germanica – con la sfera del Sacro, con l’esplicitazione nell’istituzione statuale, fino alle più ramificate e secondarie sezioni dello sviluppo produttivo e sociale: “Le civiltà sono degli organismi. La storia mondiale è la loro biografia complessiva” (da Il Tramonto dell’Occidente).

Un’analisi che valorizzi e ridesti il senso nascosto, occulto, quella terza dimensione della storia che molti smarriscono, insieme con quei punti di riferimento che unici possono stabilire un preciso quanto indispensabile percorso di autoriconoscimento identitario per la nostra comunità, per chi ricerca nell’impegno politico e culturale l’Uomo Nuovo e Differenziato dalla modernità, dalla pandemia inarrestabile che conduce oramai da diversi secoli l’intero Occidente – e con esso tutto il resto del mondo – verso un baratro di cui non si riescono a vedere vie d’uscita o possibilità di risalita. Per riferirci direttamente a Oswald Spengler, si rammenti come affermasse esserci un ciclo vitale per ogni singola civiltà, quasi fosse la stessa un vero e proprio ente animico, con una precisa contezza di se stesso. In riferimento all’Occidente sarebbe esistita prima la civiltà greco-romana, sorta grazie alle migrazioni indoeuropee in Grecia e nella penisola italica, che lo stesso ha definito “apollinea”, seguita da una civiltà germanica o detta “faustiana”. Entrambe queste Kultur hanno in sé un simbolo esprimente il proprio spirito vitale: Apollo, divinità della forma e della misura, dell’equilibrio interno, spirituale ed estetico; Faust, il personaggio creato da Goethe, come aspirazione perpetua che tenta di colmare lo iato tra l’esistenza parziale e limitata dell’Uomo e le altezze metafisiche della Divinità Trascendente. L’odierna società, pertanto, è il prodotto dell’esaurimento di tale forza originaria, di tale spirito ancestrale, lo spegnimento progressivo di ogni slancio oltre l’umano, di ogni classica forma interna: “Ognuna ha la sua fanciullezza, la sua gioventù, la sua età virile e la sua senilità (da Il Tramonto dell’Occidente)”.

A tal punto, partendo proprio da questa presa di coscienza, che dovrà risultare quanto più profonda e lucidamente attiva, si può accennare a ciò può e deve essere il senso di una militanza, di un impegno politico-culturale. Nella fase finale di questo ciclo, in questa umanità parodistica, l’unica via da percorrere è quella che conduce alla fedeltà nel proprio essere, alla costruzione di una comunità di uomini e di donne, conscia delle proprie radici e fiera della propria diversità dal resto del mondo. La lotta interna per la nascita di uomo che tragga da sé la legge da osservare, che sia impassibile ed inattaccabile di fronte alla marea che tutto corrompe, un uomo che con il suo essere sia esempio e trasmissione di Tradizione, questa la via d’onore che i nostri cuori hanno il diritto di percorrere. Il nostro ed unico scopo è quello, pertanto, anche grazie a questo giornale, di mettere a disposizione di quanti possano e vogliano le nostre umili  conoscenze di studio e di ricerca tradizionali, per “fare ciò che deve essere fatto”, come Evola ci ricorda, e per rimanere fedeli all’Idea, che può essere valorosamente servita solo se da Spengler si assume la consapevolezza del mondo in cui siamo stati destinati a vivere:…civiltà crepuscolare che è – scrive su La Vita italiana Evola riferendosi agli scritti di Spengler – una civiltà delle masse, civiltà antiqualitativa, inorganica, urbanistica, livellatrice, intimamente anarchica, demagogica, antitradizionale”.

* * *

Pubblicato sul periodico d’informazione politica Il Megafono, anno 2011.

mardi, 26 juillet 2011

Marc Laudelout sur Louis-Ferdinand Céline


Céline, bulletin celinien, un homme, un destin,

Marc Laudelout sur Louis-Ferdinand Céline

Hugo Pratt: gli occhi blu ferro dell'avventura

Hugo Pratt: gli occhi blu ferro dell'avventura

di Roberto Alfatti Appetiti

Fonte: Roberto Alfatti Appetiti (Blog) [scheda fonte]


Adulatori in vita e millantatori dopo la morte. Ogni grande attira su di sé questo esercito invisibile e minaccioso. Pronti a giurare: io c’ero. Amici (presunti tali), testimoni (per sentito dire), figure marginali che si reinventano protagonisti. Ombre in cerca di luce riflessa. Biografi di professione. Così, quando vieni a sapere che è in arrivo un libro su Hugo Pratt, pensi: un altro? C’è ancora qualcosa da sapere sul creatore di Corto Maltese – ti domandi - che non sia stato già ampiamente riferito, scandagliato nei programmi cosiddetti di approfondimento e soprattutto che non abbia raccontato egli stesso con quella sua straordinaria capacità affabulatoria?
La risposta, dopo aver letto Con Hugo (Marsilio, pp. 247 € 16,00), da pochi giorni nelle librerie italiane, è sì. Perché a scriverlo è Silvina Pratt, figlia del maestro. Perché sin da quando aveva diciotto anni ne ha tradotto le opere. Non per un favoritismo paterno. Certe espressioni dialettali veneziane per chiunque altro sarebbero risultate incomprensibili. Perché è la testimonianza autentica di chi ha conosciuto (bene) e amato (molto) l’altro Pratt, l’uomo.
Hugo? «Uno che parte, uno che appartiene agli altri» – letteralmente, visto che ai figli sono stati strappati i diritti d’autore – ma che rimane pur sempre un genitore. Affettuoso, certamente, ma anche inquieto. Scostante, di un’allegria che sa essere contagiosa quanto la tristezza. Di una vitalità dirompente, alternata a cupezze improvvise. «Con lui sembra di essere sulle montagne russe. Con i suoi occhi blu di ferro, acuti come scalpelli, riesce a far abbassare lo sguardo altrui. È consapevole del suo ascendente sugli altri – scrive Silvina – e non se ne rallegra, anzi a volte ne è furioso e triste». Meno longilineo ed elegante del suo alter ego “spirituale, di quel suo figliuolo di carta spedito in giro per il mondo all’alba del Novecento, ma – se possibile – persino più carismatico. «Sul palmo sinistro della mano – ha scritto Alberto Ongaro, curatore della prefazione del libro, parlando di Corto – ha ancora la cicatrice che indica una falsa linea della fortuna. In realtà, di fortuna ne ha avuto poca. Le cose che conquista gli sfuggono dalle mani così regolarmente che si ha il sospetto che sia proprio lui a lasciarsele sfuggire apposta. In realtà, l’unica cosa che gli importi è di recitare una parte nel mondo dell’avventura».
Quale migliore definizione anche per Pratt? Sempre con la valigia pronta e in fuga da se stesso, allergico ai legami e nient’affatto venale, innamorato, in fondo, soprattutto dell’avventura. «Mio padre era sempre pronto ad abbellire la verità. Voleva trasformare e correggere ogni cosa, il suo nome, il suo passato, la sua famiglia. La realtà doveva apparirgli troppo scialba». Troppo spesso distante: quando è lontano e quando c’è, immerso nei suoi sogni. Persino nella casa di famiglia a Malamocco, villaggio di pescatori all’estremità del Lido di Venezia, seduto per ore in silenzio a osservare il gioco delle onde che si infrangono sugli scogli. Tanto da far scrivere a Silvina: «Il più doloroso dei ricordi è la sua assenza».
Eppure non c’è traccia di amarezza nei confronti di Hugo, come lo ha sempre chiamato. Mai papà. «Nessuno dei suoi figli l’ha chiamato “papà”. Ci ho provato verso i quattro o cinque anni. Lui non dice niente, ma si volta di scatto, come se avesse preso la scossa. Per un “figlio della lupa”, nipote del fondatore del movimento fascista a Venezia, probabilmente è meglio diventare un “duro” il più presto possibile. Figlio unico, Hugo nutriva una grandissima ammirazione per gli uomini di famiglia. Soldato adolescente, partito per la guerra in Africa, ha visto suo padre Rolando, fascista, imprigionato e poi, malato, morire in un campo di prigionia sotto il sole d’Africa».
Silvina racconta anche di sua nonna Lina, la mamma di Hugo: «Conservava tanti ricordi della “sua” Africa, della “sua” Italia. Sopra il letto era possibile ammirare la foto in bianco e nero di suo marito in uniforme...». Del resto, anche il piccolo Hugo, arruolato dal padre nella polizia coloniale a soli quattordici anni, subirà il fascino di quelle divise. «Sono stati i soldati – spiega Silvina – a conferirgli la sua forma mentis. Gli anni trascorsi in un accampamento miserabile e sporco. Verso le sette di pomeriggio squillavano le trombe africane, mentre i colori della bandiera francese calavano dall’asta. Hugo aveva voglia di piangere. Al posto del blu, avrebbe voluto vedere il verde».
Per la guerra, comunque, nessuna nostalgia: «Ha distrutto la mia famiglia – ha raccontato lo stesso Pratt – come potrei amarla? Ho visto il dolore di mia madre, ho perso amici, come Sandro Gerardi, che si erano messi con i fascisti e sono stati uccisi dai partigiani. La guerra mi ha fatto maturare, comprendere cosa c’è dietro la politica e le ideologie, l’assurdità dei nazionalismi e dell’imperialismo». Con la fine delle ostilità, «finalmente arrivò la pace – ha ricordato in seguito Pratt con feroce ironia – e con la nuova generazione arrivò l’obbligatorio impegno per l’impegno. La parola avventura fu messa al bando. Non è mai stata ben vista, né dalla cultura cattolica, né da quella socialista. È un elemento perturbatore della famiglia e del lavoro, porta scompiglio e disordine. L’uomo di avventure, come Corto, è apolide e individualista, non ha il senso del collettivo. Bisognava rispolverare Marx ed Engels, autori che mi annoiarono immediatamente. Venni subito accusato di infantilismo, di fascismo e di edonismo, ma soprattutto di essere evasivo, inutile come quegli scrittori che mi piacevano e che avrei dovuto dimenticare. Non ci riuscii e mi accorsi che c’erano parecchi altri che leggevano i narratori contestati. Alla fine ci riconoscemmo come una elite desiderosa di essere inutile».
Eppure quell’etichetta di fascista gli era rimasta appiccicata. Non che se ne facesse un cruccio. «Hugo mi diceva – riferisce Silvina – che i fascisti a quell’epoca, prima di Hitler, erano diversi». Rientrato in Italia, aveva aderito alla Rsi. E, ragazzetto, aveva assistito all'epopea della Decima Mas - dove pure aveva pensato di andare per “avventura” nel battaglione Lupo - e all'arrivo degli anglo-americani come alla resistenza antitedesca vicina agli alleati. Per poi seguire la sua vera e grande vocazione: il fumetto. A soli diciotto anni è tra i fondatori de l’Asso di Picche. A ventidue è già in Argentina, dove rimarrà per tredici anni, collaborando tra gli altri con Hector G. Oesterheld, futuro sceneggiatore dell’opera di fantascienza L’eternauta. Qui conosce la giovanissima Anne Frognier, di origine belga, che sposerà e diventerà madre di Silvina (e gli ispirerà “Anna della giungla”, la protagonista dell’omonima serie). Seconde nozze dopo quelle con Gucky Wogerer, la mamma di Lucas e Marina. E poi il Brasile, San Paolo. Londra. Il ritorno in Italia. La collaborazione con il Corriere dei piccoli. E alla fine degli anni Sessanta, dopo la chiusura di Sgt. Kirk – la rivista aperta nel 1967 con il genovese Florenzo Ivaldi, su cui pubblicherà i lavori argentini, la serie de Gli scorpioni del deserto, ambientata in Africa durante la seconda guerra mondiale, e la prima avventura di Corto Maltese, Una ballata del mare salato – il trasferimento a Parigi.
Su Pif, popolare settimanale francese di fumetti, pubblica ventuno storie brevi di Corto Maltese ma la collaborazione si interrompe bruscamente nel 1973, perché – lo racconta anche Silvina – «le tendenze libertarie di Corto non collimano con le direttive che orientano la rivista verso un’obbedienza di stampo comunista». Hugo preferisce lasciare e accettare le proposte della concorrenza: Casterman, l’editore di Hergé e del settimanale Tintin. Finalmente arriva il successo. Dalla Francia e ovunque cresce il mito di Corto Maltese e lo stesso Pratt diventa personaggio. Milo Manara – che del veneziano è stato amico e allievo – lo trasforma nel protagonista della serie H.P. e Giuseppe Bergman. Di lui dirà: «La sua capacità evocativa è talmente coinvolgente che il suo continuo avvicinarsi all’essenzialità grafica riesce addirittura ad aggiungere nuove suggestioni al disegno, invece di toglierne. In un disegno di Pratt si può stabilire l’ora in cui si svolge l’azione, l’intensità della luce, la violenza del sole, se c’è fresco, se c’è caldo».
L’ultima storia di Corto, Mu, è del 1988. «Non morirà – aveva dichiarato Hugo Pratt – se ne andrà perché in un mondo dove tutto è elettronica, è calcolato, tutto è industrializzato, non c’è posto per un tipo come Corto Maltese». Un po’ come ha fatto Pratt, quando – a metà anni Ottanta – si è ritirato a Grandvaux, presso Losanna, in una casa abbastanza grande da ospitare la sua infinita libreria e con una vista sul lago Lemano. Poco prima di morire – nell’agosto del 1995 a 68 anni – ha fondato insieme alla colorista Patrizia Zanotti la casa editrice Lizard, che edita l’intera opera del maestro, oltre a libri e saggi su Hugo Pratt, su Corto e i luoghi cari alla sua letteratura. E sempre la Zanotti, l’anno scorso, ha annunciato il possibile ritorno di Corto Maltese – in Francia – con storie nuove, forse già dal Natale 2009.
La realizzazione delle nuove avventure sarà affidata a autori “di grande personalità”. Sapranno restituire le stesse atmosfere di Pratt? Sarebbero piaciuti al maestro? Chissà. Per fortuna, sinora, ci è stata risparmiata una trasposizione cinematografica. Tempo fa la proposero a Gabriele Salvatores, l'autore di Mediterraneo, che declinò l’invito: «Ho rifiutato – ha spiegato il regista napoletano – perché il produttore voleva farlo diventare una specie di Indiana Jones. Preferisco lasciarlo navigare su quella sottile linea d’inchiostro e sognare un film su Corto Maltese scritto da Hugo Pratt e diretto da Sergio Leone. E forse, da qualche parte, quei due ci stanno lavorando».


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Atlantis & the Death of the American Myth


Atlantis & the Death of the American Myth


Ex: http://www.counter-currents.com/

On Friday, July 8, 2011, the 135th and last-ever space shuttle mission, carried out by the shuttle Atlantis, is being launched. What many Americans don’t seem to realize yet is that this effectively marks the end of a half-century of America’s adventure into space which began with John F. Kennedy’s call for America to land men on the Moon in his famous 1961 speech.

Since that time NASA carried out the Mercury, Gemini and Apollo programs, the last of which successfully completed 6 astronaut landings on the Moon. This was followed closely by the shuttle program, which began in 1981 and lasted for 30 years. So after this illustrious record, what’s next?

The answer is: nothing. NASA had a Constellation program in development which was intended to replace the shuttle, and which it was hoped would eventually return men to the Moon and perhaps eventually go on to Mars. But last year President Obama declared that the program was hopelessly behind schedule and over-budget, and killed it, over the protests of many of the Apollo astronaut veterans. After all, when you’re engaged in two wars (four these days, counting Libya and Yemen) and trying to create and fund a lot of ambitious social programs while being trillions of dollars in debt, space travel seems a bit extravagant.

This means that from now on, if America ever wants or needs to send astronauts into space, such as to the international space station, it will have to hitch a ride with its former competitors, the Russians. (If there is any greater indicator of declining American power and wealth than that, I don’t know what it is.) And the Russians are still using the same old Soyuz rockets that they’ve been building since the 1960s. It makes you think that maybe the U.S. should have kept around a few of its Saturn V rockets from the Apollo days.

Not that manned American spaceflight is completely dead. After killing the Constellation project, Obama’s people came up with a plan by which NASA may eventually build some sort of capsule that can be attached to existing commercial satellite launchers, rockets that are built and owned by private companies rather than by NASA itself. So the dream of space travel has officially been privatized. How far off can “Planet Starbucks” be, to quote Fight Club?

I can’t get too worked up about the fate of the shuttle itself. Its technology is antiquated by today’s standards. And it was never really inspiring, since all it ever did, and all it was ever capable of doing, was to make short excursions into low-earth orbit and then come home. As an American kid growing up in the 1980s, I remember the shuttle was kind of a bummer after the previous generation had been able to experience the thrill of landing men on the Moon.

But still, the shuttle was cool. It could land like a plane rather than splashing down in the ocean as the old space capsules had done. It could be re-used many times, unlike all previous rockets. And it at least showed that we were doing something in space.

In the ’80s many of us were convinced that the shuttle was just part of a larger plan to bring the world of 2001: A Space Odyssey into reality, with routine flights to the Moon, manned missions to other planets, and Hiltons in orbit, all within our lifetimes.

Looking back after 30 years and 135 missions, it now seems that NASA was just marking time. Atlantis is the end of an era, and an indicator of the dangerous new era that America is entering.

Like any healthy civilization, America, since its birth, has always had a motivating myth to inspire its people, westward expansion being the most prominent one. In the 1960s, when American confidence was flagging in the face of apparently unstoppable Soviet expansionism and the ongoing humiliation of the Vietnam War, the goal of landing a man on the Moon helped to inspire Americans.

Yes, I’m well aware that the Apollo program was not really about the grandeur of space exploration or the desire to go there “in peace for all mankind,” but was just intended to pay the Soviet Union back for Sputnik. And I think most Americans must have known that at the time.

But still, it was exciting, and it was a good reason to do well in school or read a book or care about your country. And as a myth, it continues to be effective — “landing a man on the Moon” has been a rallying cry for defenders of America and Western civilization ever since.

While space travel was inspiring to me as a boy, in my adult years other things inspire me now. A great book or a great piece of music, or a spiritually advanced individual, or someone dedicated wholeheartedly to a good cause, mean a lot more to me these days than do astronauts or space flights.

I’ve also grown quite negative in my view of America’s role in the world, as well as of science’s ability to solve humanity’s genuine problems (and still more about scientism, or science’s elevation to the same status that rightfully belongs to religion). But in spite of all that, if America landed astronauts on the Moon or Mars, I haven’t grown so cold that it wouldn’t warm my heart.

Every great civilization has a motivating myth that gives its citizens a sense of purpose and meaning. And the United States did have that once, even when those myths were occasionally bad ones, such as “making the world safe for democracy.” But what myth can America offer today? The only myths that we have are not those which spark the imagination, one’s enthusiasm and the will, but only those by which America is trying desperately not to lose what it already has, such as the “war on terror,” which is really just a clumsy attempt to reverse America’s declining geopolitical power and grab the last of the cheap oil resources.

I really don’t know what inspires young minds today. At the risk of sounding like a young fogey (I’m only 37), perhaps that’s why the younger generation seem so materialistic and self-centered, since there’s never been much in terms of social idealism to capture their imaginations. What can America offer as something to inspire its young people? National health care? Multiculturalism? Imposing democracy by force of arms upon people who don’t want it? Bringing down the deficit? No wonder the young are more interested in worrying about their careers and their bank accounts.

I think the most frightening aspect of the end of American manned spaceflight has been the apparent lack of public outcry about it. Either people are ignorant of what’s afoot, or they are simply too jaded or worried about more immediate problems to care. Whatever the case may be, the end of the shuttle program marks the end of the last vestiges of the American myth.

I generally tend to shy away from apocalyptic collapse scenarios. Still, it cannot be denied that the United States, while it may continue to coast in some form for decades to come, has already seen its best days. The task now is not to mourn but to construct an alternative which can inspire our people for the age that will come after the American age. And I think we can do better.

Article printed from Counter-Currents Publishing: http://www.counter-currents.com

URL to article: http://www.counter-currents.com/2011/07/atlantis-and-the-death-of-the-american-myth/

lundi, 25 juillet 2011

Storia della cultura fascista

Storia della cultura fascista

di Luca Leonello Rimbotti

Fonte: mirorenzaglia [scheda fonte]

image.jpgÈ appena uscito un libro eccellente sul Fascismo e la sua importanza come moderno movimento rivoluzionario: non esitiamo a considerarlo un vero e proprio manuale di base, in grado di rompere gli steccati del conformismo vetero-ideologico e di porsi come strumento di contro-cultura di qualità: su di esso può essere ricostruita pezzo a pezzo tutta la storiografia del nuovo Millennio sul Fascismo. E con esso si può finalmente buttarsi alle spalle la lunga e avvilente stagione in cui a dominare la scena erano gli intellettuali codardi e opportunisti, i gestori della menzogna storica, i grandi camaleonti allevati in gioventù dal Regime, da questo messi in pista e poi, alla prova dei fatti, rivoltatiglisi contro come un groviglio di serpi rancorose, subito asservite ai nuovi padroni del dopoguerra. L’eccezionale uscita editoriale si chiama Storia della cultura fascista (il Mulino) di Alessandra Tarquini, una giovane ricercatrice di scuola defeliciana che già conoscevamo come ottima storica di Gentile e del gentilianesimo. Di questo libro bisogna parlare alto e forte. Deve essere da tutti conosciuto, studiato, divulgato. Non foss’altro per quella compostezza ed equanimità che, a distanza di quasi settant’anni dalla fine del Fascismo, è il minimo che si possa richiedere ad uno studioso di oggi.

Fatti i conti con i vecchi rottami della faida ideologica, appartenenti a una stagione ingloriosamente trapassata, la Tarquini passa in rassegna tutte le componenti che hanno costituito l’anima del movimento e del Regime fascisti: l’uno e l’altro sono da lei giudicati essenzialmente come soggetti politici rivoluzionari portatori di modernità e di cultura innovatrice. Viene così rovesciato l’assunto propagandistico di quanti avevano per decenni irriso il Fascismo, dicendolo privo di una sua originale ideologia, di una sua peculiare cultura, di una sua spinta modernizzatrice. La studiosa – in questa che è propriamente una storia della storiografia sul Fascismo – precisa che, per la verità, negli ultimi decenni già si erano avuti i sintomi di un generale ripensamento degli storici in materia. I tempi dei Quazza, dei Bobbio, dei Santarelli, dei Tranfaglia e compagni, una volta crollato il comunismo sovietico e prontamente liquidata la sbornia marxista che aveva dettato legge soprattutto negli anni Settanta, ha lasciato campo a posizionamenti più seri. Le boutade sul Fascismo reazionario e sul Mussolini pagato dai padroni capitalisti, le pedestri generalizzazioni sugli incolti picchiatori, tutte cose che comunque rimangono a testimonianza di un’atmosfera italiana popolata da studiosi sovente di rara bassezza qualitativa, vengono sostituite con l’analisi che oggi «gli storici hanno capovolto i loro giudizi e sono passati dal negare l’esistenza della cultura fascista al ricostruire i suoi diversi e molteplici aspetti considerandoli non solo importanti, ma addirittura decisivi per capire il fascismo».

Quando, negli anni Sessanta, uscirono gli studi capitali di Mosse e De Felice, la canèa antifascista fece di tutto per spingerli ai margini. Poi, mano a mano, si aprivano spiragli, si notavano marce indietro. Poterono così aversi i libri, per dire, di Isnenghi, Turi, Zunino, che, pur non rinunciando alla polemica ideologica anche fuori posto, tuttavia dimostravano che la repubblica delle lettere si stava rendendo conto che il Fascismo era stato un fenomeno ben più complesso che non “l’orda degli Hyksos” immaginata da Croce e sulla cui traccia si era gettata la muta degli storici marxisti o di scuola azionista. Poi, soprattutto dall’estero, arrivarono in successione un Gregor, uno Sternhell, un Cannistraro, ma specialmente poi un Griffin, e su questa scia si è potuta avere in Italia la densa produzione soprattutto di Emilio Gentile, ma anche di tutta una serie di nuovi storici, che nell’insieme hanno prodotto con risultati notevoli indagini anche minute sul Fascismo come combinazione di mito e organizzazione, di totalitarismo e modernità.

Intendiamoci, il rigurgito passatista è sempre dietro l’angolo: e ogni tanto ancora escono libri che sembrano scritti, e male, quarant’anni fa, e pur sempre i vecchi Tasca o Salvatorelli continuano qua e là a far pessima scuola. Ma, in generale, le nebbie si stanno diradando e il Fascismo comincia a vedersi riconosciuti alcuni tratti fondamentali. Che, come la Tarquini ben precisa, furono essenzialmente la modernità, la centralità del popolo e la cultura. Il tutto, incardinato sul principio del primato della politica, dette vita ad una autentica rivoluzione. Anzi, come la storica puntualizza, si trattò proprio di una sorta di rivoluzione conservatrice, che se da un lato proteggeva quanto di buono vi era nel tessuto sociale tradizionale, dall’altro si presentava con un massimo di proiezione sul futuro. Ciò che la Tarquini, riferendosi ad esempio a Sternhell, ha sottolineato nel senso che il Fascismo fu un fenomeno politico «dotato di una propria ideologia rivoluzionaria non meno coerente del liberalismo e del marxismo, che aveva espresso la volontà di creare una nuova civiltà e un uomo nuovo». Fu infatti anche una rivoluzione antropologica, un tentativo di rifare l’uomo accentuandone le disposizioni alla socialità e al solidarismo, infrangendo così sia l’individualismo liberale che la massificazione collettivista marxista.

La Tarquini riassume gli ambienti che erano alla base della concezione politica fascista: i “revisionisti” (guidati da Bottai, con elementi di spicco come Pellizzi);  gli “intransigenti” (con Soffici, Maccari, Ricci come punte di lancia); e i “gentiliani” (Cantimori, Spirito, Carlini, Volpicelli, Saitta fra gli altri). Tra queste posizioni si muovevano uomini ai limiti dell’una o dell’altra cerchia e talvolta si avevano passaggi non contraddittori, trasversali, come ad es. un Malaparte o un Longanesi, vicini sia a “Strapaese” che a “900″ di Bontempelli.

Grazie a questi gruppi venne assicurata la centralità del popolo nella visione del mondo fascista, il popolo come “pura forza”, cioè «un soggetto depositario di valori positivi», per il quale, come scrive la Tarquini, gli scrittori politici «si impegnavano nella società del loro tempo sostenendo la costruzione di un nuovo Stato nazionale e popolare». Qualcosa che accendeva la modernità. Le veloci pagine della studiosa ricordano che il Fascismo fu cultura, e anzi alta cultura, sin dagli inizi del Regime vero e proprio, con il “Manifesto degli intellettuali fascisti” voluto da Gentile nel 1925 e che vedeva schierati alcuni pesi massimi della cultura italiana del Novecento, fra i quali Pirandello, Volpe, Codignola, Ungaretti, Soffici, che si andavano ad affiancare ai D’Annunzio, il “primo Duce del Fascismo”, ai Marinetti, ai Cardarelli, ai Papini, etc. E siamo in attesa di qualcuno che ci dica quale altro regime si sia mai avvalso di una così potente schiera di aperti sostenitori.

Ma la Tarquini è anche originale, laddove traccia percorsi nuovi: ricordando l’influenza che il filosofo Giuseppe Rensi (in anni recenti al centro di un processo di rivalutazione, dopo un lungo oblìo) ebbe sul Fascismo e sulla sua idea di autorità; oppure sulla figura di Emilio Bodrero, storico della filosofia e docente alla Scuola di Mistica Fascista, secondo il quale, sin dal 1921, il Fascismo doveva «mobilitarsi come forza rivoluzionaria, per conquistare il potere e dare vita a un nuovo ordine politico».

La Tarquini ricorda anche l’avanguardismo giovanile, fulcro incandescente di elaborazione ideologica e di spinta rivoluzionaria il cui programma, sin dagli esordi del 1920, esprimeva un massimo di moderna socialità, dato che proponeva di «adeguare i programmi scolastici alle esigenze professionali dei ragazzi» e di «abolire il voto in condotta, di sostenere gli studenti più poveri e di rendere obbligatorio l’insegnamento dell’educazione fisica». E poi c’erano le donne. E che donne…da Ada Negri (prima donna nominata all’Accademia d’Italia, nel 1940), alla Deledda (che partecipò alla stesura del testo unico per le scuole medie), fino alla Sarfatti, regina incontrastata del modernismo fascista in politica, in letteratura e nelle arti.

E, a proposito dell’arte e della sostanza del Fascismo come «politicizzazione dell’estetica» e volontà di «socializzazione degli intellettuali» (e in campo artistico basti ricordare la passione fascista di un Sironi, di un Severini, di un Primo Conti, di un Piacentini, di un Terragni, etc.), l’autrice rammenta la presenza massiccia di artisti e letterati di primo piano nello squadrismo (Rosai, Maccari, Malaparte-Suckert, ma potremmo aggiungere lo stesso Marinetti, oppure Lorenzo Viani, Gallian, etc.), così come non manca di scrivere che l’enorme fermento ideologico e culturale messo in moto e catalizzato dal Fascismo si presentò, come avevano già indicato i vari Nolte, Mosse e Del Noce, come «un fenomeno politico figlio della modernità», così da «esprimere una forte spinta alla modernizzazione dell’economia, della società e della cultura». Il senso della missione dei giovani, il progetto di un destino comune, l’esaltante prospettiva di un popolo unito e socialmente avanzato furono il cuore dello sforzo culturale messo in campo dal Fascismo, che poté usufruire di un vero e proprio esercito di intellettuali d’alto e non di rado altissimo livello: ad un impietoso confronto, l’odierna incolta e rozza liberaldemocrazia mondiale – priva di intellettuali che superino il quarto d’ora di celebrità mediatica – ne esce distrutta.

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Le déni des réalités, la clé du mystère de notre décadence...



Le déni des réalités, la clé du mystère de notre décadence...

par Marc ROUSSET

Ex: http://synthesenationale.hautetfort.com/

Le déni des réalités par nos sociétés sous l’emprise des médias politiquement corrects et des politiciens pratiquant l’art de plaire et du mensonge avec pour seule fin d’être réélus, est l’explication principale de notre décadence.

Le libre échange mondialiste comme l’a très bien démontré Maurice Allais n’est rien d’autre que le suicide économique des pays occidentaux, l’Allemagne, au-delà des apparences, ne devant être que le dernier pays à connaitre à son tour ce sort peu enviable. Alors que le discours dominant du journalisme proclame depuis trois  décennies que le protectionnisme européen est le mal absolu, les travaux de Paul Bairoch à Genève et de nombreuses universités américaines (industrialisation de l’Asie, Tariff Growth factories...) aboutissent à un résultat inverse. Quant à la théorie de Ricardo, elle ne vaut que dans un monde stable et figé du XVIIIème siècle faisant abstraction des mouvements internationaux de capitaux de notre monde actuel, des taux de change qui peuvent varier de 50% et de la mise en œuvre  des technologies de pointe dans les pays à bas salaire. La désindustrialisation et  le chômage structurel tant aux Etats-Unis (17% au-delà du taux officiel de 9,1%°) qu’en Europe témoignent enfin du déni des conséquences catastrophiques pour les peuples du libre échangisme mondialiste qui ne fait que le bonheur des sociétés multinationales. Enfin le symbole même de la ligne Maginot qui a parfaitement joué son rôle est un déni historique des réalités ; par là même on instille dans nos esprits l’idée fausse qu’il est inutile de réagir et de  songer à se défendre ! La seule erreur en 39-40 a pourtant été de ne pas continuer la ligne Maginot jusqu’à Dunkerque et de ne pas avoir de divisions mécanisées blindées. Les Allemands avaient la ligne Siegfried qui  elle aussi a magnifiquement fonctionné et coûté de nombreuses vies aux Alliés fin 1944-début 1945 !

De même nos élites nient les réalités de la disparition programmée de la langue française qu’ils trahissent, comme Valérie Pécresse et tant d’autres, du matin jusqu’au soir, d’une façon éhontée. Selon Claude Hagège, du Collège de France, avant un demi-siècle, les langues autres que l’anglais auront disparu en Europe ou, alors, se seront provincialisées ». Les réalités, c’est le stupide accord de Londres signé sous la Présidence de Nicolas Sarkozy qui fait de l’anglo-américain la langue des Brevets de l’Europe. Les réalités, c’est qu’en 1945, 95% des jeunes Italiens étudiaient le français ; ils représentent moins de 30% aujourd’hui et le français n’est même plus enseigné comme première langue en Italie ! La réalité, c’est que la langue française est envahie par les armées du sabir anglo-américain qui la ravagent comme les armées anglaises ravageaient la France pendant la Guerre de Cent Ans et  que, si rien ne change, l’on se dirige à terme vers une nouvelle Louisiane !

Il m’a fallu attendre un grand nombre de printemps pour apprendre que, contrairement à tout ce que j’ai pu voir depuis que je suis sur cette Terre, selon la théorie du « gender », autre énormité qui nous arrive directement des Etats-Unis, la masculinité et la féminité ne seraient pas déterminées par le sexe de la personne, mais par la culture : bref, on ne naîtrait pas homme ou femme, mais on le deviendrait ! Cette folle théorie heurte le sens commun le plus élémentaire et son grand ennemi est la nature, la loi naturelle que l’on veut bizarrement nier tant il est facile de jongler et de dire n’importe quoi dans le monde virtuel  des  Idées...

Que l’on songe également aux cocoricos démographiques français, soi-disant  champions d’Europe de la natalité qui nient la réalité, à savoir la perte du caractère blanc et européen du peuple de France avec un taux de fécondité des femmes européennes de 1,7 enfants par femme, soit moins que le taux de reproduction d’une population à l’identique qui doit être de 2,1, tandis que l’invasion en cours continue avec un  taux de natalité des populations immigrées  d’origine extra-européenne de 3, 4. Les médias en ne publiant que des chiffres globaux, nient les catastrophiques réalités démographiques.

En matière d’immigration, les bien-pensants à l’humanisme exacerbé, comme le remarque Jean Raspail, déclinent à l’infini les valeurs républicaines oublieux que la France est une « patrie charnelle » qui existait déjà bien avant 1789, avec des frontières ; ils n’arpentent pas assez souvent les couloirs parisiens du métro ou du RER pour constater l’invasion en cours ! La réalité, c’est que les naissances d’origine extra-européennes représentent 17% des naissances aujourd’hui et qu’elles atteindront 30% en 2030 et 50% en 2050, si rien ne change ! La réalité, c’est que la France  compte plus de 550 000 immigrés en situation irrégulière dont le coût annuel est de 4,6 milliards d’euros tandis que le coût global des 7,8 millions immigrés légaux et illégaux est de 35 milliards d’euros par an ! Il y a là des premières économies bien réelles à faire, quitte à donner l’ordre de tirer pour défendre nos frontières ou rétablir l’ordre dans nos banlieues criminelles, comme l’auraient fait tout naturellement et sans états d’âmes  nos pères depuis la nuit des temps, après sommation !

La crise de l’endettement public et de l’euro fait penser à ce qu’a connu l’Argentine. Tout allait très bien dans ce pays jusqu’à ce que l’on reconnaisse subitement que c’est la faillite généralisée. L’ex-ministre des Finances d’Argentine Robert Lavagna, lors d’une rencontre début Juillet 2011 à Aix en Provence, qui était aux manettes peu après que son pays ait répudié sa dette souveraine en 2001-2002 a pu dire : « Il y a d’abord un refus de la réalité. Puis un retard à reconnaitre la crise au fur et à mesure que les déséquilibres s’accroissent : on continue de dire qu’il s’agit d’un problème de liquidités alors que le pays n’est plus solvable ni compétitif ». La réalité, c’est que l’Europe traverse une crise profonde car elle gère ses finances en s’inspirant des idées socialistes irresponsables de Madame Aubry (surnombre de fonctionnaires, 35 heures, âge de la retraite, endettement inconscient et sans fin  pour relancer la consommation au lieu de consacrer, comme l’Allemagne ces mêmes ressources pour muscler, créer et développer l’offre, c'est-à-dire investir dans  les entreprises !) La réalité, c’est que la France présente des comptes en déficit depuis trente ans quelle que soit la conjoncture économique, qu’elle croule sous 1600 milliards euros de dettes  et qu’avec des taux d’intérêts aujourd’hui très faibles, elle consacre déjà 50 milliards au paiement de ses seuls intérêts, soit davantage qu’au budget de fonctionnement de l’Education nationale ! Merci Monsieur Mitterrand, Merci Monsieur Chirac, sans oublier notre Président actuel légèrement moins irresponsable sur le seul  plan économique ! Quant à la Grèce, on a réussi à faire passer pour solvable un pays techniquement en faillite. L’UE, Messieurs Sarkozy, Trichet, Strauss-Kahn, toutes les banques françaises et allemandes, et la béni oui-oui  Madame Lagarde avec sa brillante carrière consistant à plaire  dans l’air du temps anglo-saxon, insistaient pour sauver un pays ruiné, avec un déficit budgétaire qui représente 10% du PIB et une dette de 350 milliards qui dépasse de 150% la richesse produite en un an ! Telle la Cigale de La Fontaine, après avoir chanté pendant plus de 30 ans, voilà venu le temps pour les Européens (tout comme pour les Américains) de rembourser les dettes abyssales bien réelles. Et lorsque les Agences de Notation font enfin leur travail, en décrivant les tristes réalités, les mêmes bien-pensants hypocrites qui leur avaient reproché de ne pas avoir dévoilé l’escroquerie des « subprime » crient au scandale en souhaitant casser ce thermomètre inflexible, froid et accusateur qui leur fait si peur ! L’Allemagne, elle est revenue aux 40 heures, va faire passer l’âge de la retraite à 67ans et a des charges salariales pour ses fonctionnaires qui représentent 7,2% du PIB contre plus de 13% du PIB pour la France ! Redresser  la France et les comptes français n’est donc pas compliqué ; il suffit d’avoir l’estomac et la volonté d’un De Gaulle : combattre effectivement l’immigration extra-européenne avec une immigration zéro, la politique du retour et une aide nataliste pour les seules familles européennes, passer aux 40 heures, revenir à l’âge de la retraite à 65 ans de l’avant catastrophe mitterrandiste, diminuer le nombre des fonctionnaires d’une façon drastique pour gagner 6% du PIB, augmenter le budget de la défense à 3%du PIB, faire preuve d’autorité et demander aux jeunes lycéens irresponsables, endoctrinés  qui manifestent pour la retraite à 60 ans de revenir à leurs chères études, ce dont ils ont bien besoin, vu le niveau  actuel du baccalauréat… et, sans même parler de l’Allemagne, voyons comment la Suède et le Canada ont réalisé leur spectaculaire redressement en s’attaquant en particulier à l’inefficacité de la fonction publique, exit donc les énarques carriéristes, technocrates prétentieux, ne songeant qu’à pantoufler dans le privé, avides de privilèges cachés par les nuages de fumées protectrices du service public, aux beaux discours lénifiants, mais irréalistes et incapables depuis la création de l’ENA en 1945 de mettre en place des structures administratives légères, compétitives et efficaces...

En matière de défense, au-delà  des rodomontades sarkoziennes, la réalité, c’est que la France, avec un effort insuffisant de 1.5% du PIB (5,1% sous le général De Gaulle), des régiments qui fondent comme neige au soleil, et des équipements militaires prototypes, devient une puissance militaire de second ordre, un  valet  de l’OTAN ! La réalité, suite à l’intervention en Libye, c’est que l’amiral Pierre Forissier, chef de la Marine, a insisté publiquement le 10 juin 2011 sur les contraintes de « régénération » des équipements et des hommes. Elles feront que si l’opération libyenne dure jusqu’à la fin de 2011, il faudra se passer de l’unique porte-avions français en 2012. Il est en effet du devoir d’un chef militaire de dire les choses telles qu’elles sont quand il y va du maintien des capacités opérationnelles dans la durée et de la vie des hommes et des femmes qui sont sous ses ordres. Quant à la défense européenne qui devait être la contrepartie de la réintégration de la France dans   l’OTAN, la réalité c’est que le Président  Nicolas Sarkozy, après son passage  en force devant le Parlement pour faire avaler la pilule, nous a illusionné une fois de plus, que le sujet est enterré, suite à l’éternelle opposition britannique, et que la cellule de planification opérationnelle du QG européen à Cotenbergh dans les environs de Bruxelles qui comprend en tout et pour tout 8 personnes, n’a jamais été utilisée , même pour l’intervention au Tchad !

En ce qui concerne la folie droit de l’hommiste propre à notre époque, en opposition totale avec l’histoire vécue depuis  qu’il y a des hommes sur terre, nous citerons seulement le très réaliste Joseph de Maistre : « J’ai vu dans ma vie des Français, des Italiens, des Russes. Je sais même grâce à Montesquieu qu’on peut être persan ; mais quant à l’homme, je déclare ne l’avoir rencontré de ma vie ; s’il existe, c’est bien à mon insu » (1)

Nous vivons donc la folie de « l’IrrealPolitik » avec les pertes des valeurs de la  famille, de la  patrie, de l’effort, du dépassement de soi, du travail, de l’autorité, du devoir, bref tout ce qui a fait la Grandeur de la France depuis les débuts de son histoire jusqu’à la perte de son Empire ! A ce déni des réalités salvatrices des valeurs traditionnelles et des faits, ont succédé l’individualisme, l’hédonisme matérialiste, l’irresponsabilité, la repentance, le droit de l’hommisme, les envolées lyriques humanistes, style Bernard Henri Levy,  qui nous conduisent à la décadence. Les Européens occultent délibérément les réalités ethniques, géographiques, identitaires, démographiques, économiques, historiques, considérées comme des résidus du passé. De Gaulle parlait de « la lampe merveilleuse qu’il suffirait de frotter pour voler au-dessus du réel ». Cioran, lui, au-delà du déni des réalités, dans deux ouvrages écrits en 1956 et 1964, avec des sentiments prémonitoires,  nous aide à mieux réaliser le malaise existentiel de l’Européen : « Pauvre Occidental ! La civilisation, son œuvre, sa folie, lui apparaît comme un châtiment qu’il s’est infligé et qu’il voudrait à son tour faire subir à ceux qui y ont échappé jusqu’ici (2) (...) Les traces du barbare qu’il fut, on les chercherait en vain : tous ses instincts sont jugulés par sa décence. Au lieu de le fouetter, d’encourager ses folies, ses philosophes l’ont poussé vers l’impasse du bonheur (3) (...). Nous nous illusionnons à propos de l’idéal du bien vivre qui n’est que la manie des époques déclinantes » (4).


1 -Joseph de Maistre, Considérations sur la France, 1790

2 - Cioran, La Chute dans le temps-Paris-Gallimard, 1964, p. 36

3 - Cioran, La Tentation d’exister-Paris-Gallimard, 1956, p. 30

4 - Cioran, Ibid,  p.27


dimanche, 24 juillet 2011

Krantenkoppen - Juli 2011 (8)


Juli 2011 (8)
De joodse professor Jacques Brotchi beschuldigt de vrijmetselaarsuniversiteit ULB van 'antisemitisme' voor een paar onbenulligheden:
http://www.standaard.be/artike ​l/detail.aspx?artikelid=DMF201 ​10719_007
Interesting article about the huge lies of the Western media on Libya, the structure of the Libyan society, the NATO war on Libya as an effort to 'remodel' Africa and the strong resistance of the Libyan people against NATO:
"U verkoopt uw huis en trekt u bescheiden terug in een uiterst eenvoudige huurwoning om maar eens wat te noemen. U bouwt uw verdere verplichtingen af tot een kinderlijk niveau waarbij uw huisbankier u zal vragen of alles nog wel goed met u gaat.
Op die manier loopt u vooraan in de keiharde internationale sanering die ons allen nog te wachten staat. Een betere wereld begint bij u zelf, is daarbij het motto. Verder regeert u vanuit belegd vermogen, hoe bescheiden dat ook mag zijn. ...Uw leven is verworden tot een ‘debt free environment’. U bent onderweg van uw krantenwijk naar uw villawijk op deze manier, zonder dat u het beseft. U bent geen slaaf meer van onbetrouwbare regeringspartners of duistere financiële instellingen die u van alles proberen aan te smeren. U bent baas in eigen buik":
 http://www.ftm.nl/followleader ​/baas-in-eigen-buik.aspx
‎"Toen Bill Clinton zijn presidentschap in 2001 overdroeg aan George Bush was het budget min of meer in evenwicht. Maar 2 dure oorlogen, belastingsverminderingen voor de rijken en de recessie maakten daar snel een eind aan":
http://www.express.be/business ​/nl/economy/de-schuldenkwestie ​-amerika-speelt-russische-roul ​ette/149341.htm
"Des policiers pourraient surveiller ces salariés regroupés dans des camps et affectés à de gros projets d’infrastructure. Principale cible de ce programme : les Roms dont le taux de chômage avoisine les 50 %":
http://fr.myeurop.info/2011/07 ​/13/la-hongrie-met-en-place-de ​s-camps-de-travail-obligatoire ​-2956
Hongarije snoeit drastisch in het aantal erkende godsdiensten: "De nieuwe wet bepaalt dat maar 14 godsdiensten een officiële erkenning kunnen krijgen van de Staat, maar laat de deur echter open voor andere religieuze gemeenschappen. Tevoren waren er meer dan 300 religieuze gemeenschappen erkend":
http://www.rorate.com/nieuws/n ​ws.php?id=67203
Interesting interview with French journalist Thierry Meyssan about the US war on 2 fronts in Libya and Syria:
De boete van Mgr. Williamson voor negationisme werd in beroep verlaagd van 10.000 euro naar 6.500 euro.
http://www.rorate.com/nieuws/n ​ws.php?id=67174
"DSK aurait eu la preuve que le stock d'or de fort Knox est manquant et qu'il ne pouvait donc plus l'utiliser pour venir soutenir une monnaie mondiale basée sur les DTS (Droits de Tirage Spéciaux) voulus par le FMI pour répondre à la crise":
http://www.cameroonvoice.com/n ​ews/article-news-3906.html#.Th ​qg2oXiiQl.facebook
"Putin, Russia's most powerful politician, will have the decisive say in determining who will serve as president for the next 6 years. Once his choice is made sometime this year, the ruling elite will support the chosen candidate. The outcome of his informal choice will most likely be formalized in the March election":
http://www.themoscowtimes.com/ ​news/article/news-analysis-vla ​dimir-putins-2012-dilemma/4403 ​76.html
"Nous envisageons de créer une association puissante qui pourrait et devrait devenir l'un des pôles de l'économie mondiale":
http://fr.rian.ru/economic_new ​s/20110712/190126199.html
"La Coalition des volontaires était venue en Libye pour sauver la population civile de la répression du tyran Kadhafi. Quatre mois plus tard, les foules libyennes ont déserté le territoire libéré de Benghazi et se massent dans de gigantesques manifestations anti-OTAN":
http://www.voltairenet.org/L-O ​TAN-face-a-l-ingratitude-des

L. F. Céline: nouvelles parutions italienne et néerlandaise

Louis-Ferdinand Céline: nouvelles parutions italienne et néerlandaise

Ex: http://lepetitcelinien.blogspot.com/ 

Parution aux éditions Il Settimo Sigillo de lettres de Céline à la presse collaborationniste entre 1940 et 1944. Un choix d'Andréa Lombardi, préfacé par Stenio Solinas, traduit du français par Valeria Ferretti. http://lf-celine.blogspot.com

Presentiamo qui, per la prima volta in italiano, le discusse lettere e gli scritti di Louis-Ferdinand Céline alla stampa collaborazionista francese e apparse su “Je suis partout”, “Au Pilori”, “Germinal”, “La Gerbe”...
I temi toccati da Céline in queste lettere “maledette”, vanno dalla disfatta del 1940 e Vichy, gli ebrei, il razzismo, la guerra, la collaborazione franco-tedesca e gli intellettuali, alla polemica letteraria contro Proust, Cocteau e Peguy. Nel volume sono anche riprodotte le pagine originali delle ormai introvabili riviste e quotidiani dove apparvero gli scritti tradotti, mentre le appendici comprendono la risposta di Céline alle accuse della Procura francese, un ricordo di Céline scritto da Karl Epting, direttore dell’Istituto Tedesco di Parigi, un breve saggio sulla cultura politicizzata della Sinistra in quegli stessi anni e uno sui rapporti tra gli intellettuali francesi e tedeschi, e numerose fotografie.

Un livre de Nico Keuning paraît en néerlandais sur la période de l'exil danois, De laatste reis, De Deense jaren van Céline in ballingschap 1945 - 1951, aux éditions Aspekt.

Louis-Ferdinand Céline (1894-1961) heeft als soldaat, (onder zijn werkelijke naam Destouches), arts en schrijver een turbulent leven geleid. Als avonturier en gelukzoeker zocht hij zijn heil in Afrika en in zijn functie als hygiënist van de Volkenbond reisde hij onder andere naar Amerika, Engeland, Duitsland, Denemarken...

Met zijn roman Reis naar het einde van de nacht (1932) bracht hij een vernieuwing in de Europese literatuur teweeg. ‘Ik heb de emotie weer in de schrijftaal gebracht.’ In Nederland vond hij bewonderaars onder schrijvers als Gerard Reve en W.F. Hermans. Wellicht ook door zijn misantropie, paranoia en eigenzinnigheid. Eind jaren ’30 neemt zijn carrière een dramatische wen- ding als hij in antisemitische pamfletten openlijk sympathiseert met ideeën van het nationaal-socialisme en het Franse volk waarschuwt tegen de joden en de dreiging van een Tweede Wereldoorlog. Uit angst geëxecuteerd te worden, slaat Céline in juni 1944 op de vlucht.

De laatste reis laat een andere Céline zien: een schrijver in het plunje van een zwerver op de vlucht door Duitsland, ondergedoken in Kopenhagen, opge- sloten in de Vestre Fængsel, de gevangenis in Kopenhagen, onder huisarrest in Klarskovgaard op het Deense eiland Seeland. Een kankerende Céline, een hatende Céline een wanhopige Céline, maar vooral een schrijvende Céline. Tijdens zijn Deense ballingschap (1945-1951) schreef hij naast een aantal romans zo’n vierduizend brieven, waarvan honderden aan zijn advovaat Thorvald Mikkelsen die in een ministerie van Justitie de slepende rechtszaak uiteindelijk wist te winnen.

Nico Keuning bezoekt de adressen in Kopenhagen, Korsør en Klarskovgaard, komt in contact met Céline-kenners, vindt nieuwe documenten, ontdekt een ‘pleitrede’ van Céline uit 1946 en werpt een ander licht op de Deense jaren van zowel de persoon Destouches als de schrijver Céline, die nu vijftig jaar geleden, op 1 juli 1961 in Meudon overleed.

Indiolateinamerika und Eurasien: Die Säulen des neuen multipolaren Systems

Indiolateinamerika und Eurasien: Die Säulen des neuen multipolaren Systems


Ex: http://www.eurasia-rivista.org/

Das US-Abenteuer in Georgien sowie die eklatante Wirtschafts- und Finanzkrise, die das westliche System derzeit heimsucht, zeigen, daß die Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika an diesem Punkt in der Geschichte nicht in der Lage sind, die Führungsrolle zu übernehmen. Auf Grundlage beispielsweise der Dichotomien Ost—West, Nord—Süd, Mitte—Peripherie etc. scheinen keinerlei künftige geopolitische Szenarien von Bedeutung herauszuarbeiten zu sein. Betrachten wir die kontinentalen sowie multikontinentalen Gemeinsamkeiten und Unterschiede der globalen Akteure, so zeigen sich uns die Säulen, auf denen ein neues internationales System für Indiolateinamerika und Eurasien ruhen kann.

Von der Regierungsunfähigkeit der USA

Die jüngste Diskussion um Georgien setzt dem Gerede um die sogenannten „unipolaren“ Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika und vor allen Dingen der Behauptung, diese hätten ein wirkungsvolles geopolitisches System — das heißt ein multipolares System — geschaffen, endlich ein Ende.

Dies sehen nicht nur die meisten jener Beobachter und Berichterstatter so, die — während sich der Niedergang der „unverzichtbaren Nation“ (so ein Syntagma der US-Außenministerin Madeleine Albright) vollzieht — im Zuge der Herbstkrise zwischen Moskau und Tiflis wiederholt eine neue Bipolarität beschworen und Formulierungen aus der Zeit des „kalten Krieges“ entstaubt haben. In Wahrheit sind wir von einem erneuten Aufleben des alten bipolaren Systems weit entfernt; die Nachkriegszeit von 1945 bis 1989 ist von einem ideologischen Widerstreit gekennzeichnet gewesen (nämlich zwischen den Antithesen Kapitalismus—Kommunismus und Totalitarismus—Demokratie), der nun aber nicht so sehr an den lymphatischen Knotenpunkten des bipolaren Gleichgewichtes aufgelöst, sondern vielmehr dadurch entschieden worden ist, daß die heutigen großen Nationen mit kontinentalen Ausmaßen, wie zum Beispiel China, Indien und Brasilien, die aufgrund ihrer wirtschaftlichen Entwicklung und dank des geopolitischen Bewußtseins, das sie unter ihrer jeweiligen politischen Führung rund ein Jahrzehnt lang kultiviert haben, gediehen sind und heute danach streben, auf der weltweiten Bühne in politischer, wirtschaftlicher und sozialer Hinsicht verantwortungsvolle Rollen zu übernehmen.

Wir müssen sogleich hinzufügen, daß das Ende der US-dominierten unipolaren Hegemonie keineswegs die militärische Vorherrschaft berührt, die Washington in weiten Teilen der Welt besitzt. Doch Washingtons Macht in geopolitischer Hinsicht ist heute geringer als noch vor einigen Jahren. Ich möchte allerdings darauf hinweisen, daß diese Hegemonie heute für die internationale Stabilität vielleicht noch gefährlicher ist, als dies in der Vergangenheit der Fall war, gerade weil sie wackelig und empfindlich ist und Washington und das Pentagon leicht aus dem Gleichgewicht geraten können, wie die georgische Krise ja auch gezeigt hat.

Die tiefe Strukturkrise der US-Wirtschaft1 [1] hat nur dazu beigetragen, den Prozeß der Machteinbuße des „westlichen Systems“, der seit Mitte der 90er Jahre zu beobachten ist, zu beschleunigen. Mit den Auswirkungen, die dieser Prozeß auf die Vereinigten Staaten haben wird, auf die „einzige Weltmacht“, haben sich in den ersten Jahren unseres Jahrhunderts Autoren wie Chalmers Johnson2 [2] und Emmanuel Todd3 [3] in ihren jeweiligen Analysen befaßt; hierin zeigen die Verfasser auf, wohin dieser Prozeß bald führen wird und wie die Zersetzung des US-Systems vonstatten geht.

Johnson, ein profunder Kenner Asiens im allgemeinen und Japans im besonderen, meint, daß die USA in den Jahren 1999/2000 nicht in der Lage gewesen seien, ihre Beziehungen mit den Ländern Asiens souverän aufrechtzuerhalten, während man doch deutlich „die fortgesetzten Bemühungen ihres Landes, die ganze Welt zu beherrschen“4 [4] verfolgen konnte. Zu den Veränderungen, die sich bereits sichtbar abzeichnen und die geopolitische Situation der nahen Zukunft erahnen lassen, zählt Johnson auch „Chinas zunehmende Orientierung am Vorbild der asiatischen Staaten mit hohem Wirtschaftswachstum“.5 [5] Der gleiche Autor weiß von der mitleidslosen Analyse David P. Calleos zu berichten,6 [6] der bereits im Jahre 1987 die Auflösung des internationalen Systems schilderte und die Ansicht vertrat, daß die Vereinigten Staaten am Ende des 20. Jahrhunderts eine „raubgierige Hegemonialmacht“ seien „mit wenig Sinn für Ausgewogenheit“.

Sowohl der Franzose Todd als auch der Amerikaner Johnson sind der Ansicht, daß die USA aufgrund der Kriege im Mittleren Osten und in Jugoslawien zu einem Unsicherheitsfaktor für das gesamte internationale System geworden sind; Todd zufolge wirken sich unter anderem die ökonomischen Verflechtungen der Vereinigten Staaten deutlich nachteilig aus, wie ja auch das negative Wirtschaftswachstum des letzten Jahrzehnts unzweifelhaft zeigt.

Einige Jahre später, im Januar 2005, wird ein so aufmerksamer und brillanter Beobachter wie Michael Lind von der New America Foundation („Stiftung Neues Amerika“) in einem wichtigen Artikel in der Financial Times argumentieren, daß einige eurasische Länder (in erster Linie China und Rußland) sowie Südamerika „in aller Stille“ Maßnahmen in die Wege leiten, die den nordamerikanischen Einfluß „verringern“ sollen.7 [7]

Luca Lauriola hat sich dem erst kürzlich — 2007 — im wesentlichen angeschlossen;8 [8] in den Worten Claudio Muttis: „Lauriola bringt einige Argumente vor, die man wie folgt zusammenfassen kann: 1.) Die USA stellen nicht mehr die große Weltmacht dar; 2.) die technologische Großmacht Rußland ist heute mächtiger, als die die USA es sind; 3.) die strategische Verständigung zwischen Rußland, China und Indien bietet eine geopolitische Alternative zu den USA; 4.) die USA stecken mitten in einer schweren Finanz- und Wirtschaftskrise, die den Auftakt zu einem veritablen Kollaps bildet; 5.) in dieser Lage steht die US-Macht so ‚einsam und verlassen‘ da, daß Moskau, Peking und Neu-Delhi versucht sein werden, Reaktionen zu provozieren, die zu globalen Katastrophen führen können; 6.) die Administration Bush schreitet beharrlich auf den Abgrund zu, während die Regierung der Welt vorgaukelt, alles sei in bester Ordnung; 7.) die Lebensbedingungen der Mehrzahl der US-Bürger sind mit denen in manchen Entwicklungsländern vergleichbar; 8.) das Bild, das sich uns heute von den USA bietet, ist keineswegs eine historische Ausnahme, vielmehr zeigt sich in der US-Geschichte eine klare Kontinuität (vom Völkermord an den native Americans bis zum Terrorismus, wie er in Vietnam praktiziert wurde); 9.) in den USA hält die gleiche messianische Lobby die politischen Zügel in Händen, die schon früher in der Sowjetunion die Nomenklatura gestellt hat.“9 [9]

Aber warum steht die Supermacht USA nicht einmal mehr sagen wir zwanzig Jahre vor ihrem Kollaps? Warum soll ein globaler Akteur wie die Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika nicht in der Lage sein, sich weiter an der Macht zu halten und seine offen verkündete „Neue Ordnung“, seine New Order, in demokratischer und liberaler Manier durchzusetzen?

Die Antworten auf diese Fragen sind im großen und ganzen nicht nur einfach in den Untersuchungen von Wirtschaftswissenschaftlern und/oder in politischen Widersprüchen des westlichen Systems zu finden. Sie sind meiner Meinung nach vielmehr in der Auslegung und Anwendung geopolitischer Lehrsätze durch die US-Macht zu suchen. Die Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika — eine thalassokratische Weltmacht — waren schon immer bestrebt, ihre Einflußsphäre auch auf den südamerikanischen Subkontinent auszudehnen. Es ist dies eine geopolitische Praxis, die ich bereits an anderer Stelle als „chaotisch“ bezeichnet habe;10 [10] darunter ist eine Geopolitik der „fortwährenden Störung“ empfindlicher Territorien zu verstehen, um diese dem eigenen Einfluß zu unterstellen und sie schlußendlich dem eigenen Hoheitsgebiet einzuverleiben. Dieses Vorgehen zeugt allerdings von der Unfähigkeit, jene wahrhaft gegliederte internationale Ordnung zu verwirklichen, die diejenigen durchsetzen müssen, deren Trachten auf eine weltweite Führerrolle, eine globale leadership, gerichtet ist.

Zwei italienische Geopolitiker, Agostino Degli Espinosa (1904–1952) und Carlo Maria Santoro (1935–2002), haben in ganz verschiedenen Epochen und mit großem zeitlichen Abstand voneinander — der erste in den 1930ern, der zweite in den 1990ern — den USA übereinstimmend einen wichtigen Zug attestiert, nämlich die Unfähigkeit zu regieren und zu verwalten.

Vor vielen Jahrzehnten, im Jahre 1932, schrieb Agostino Degli Espinosa: „Amerika will gar nicht regieren, es will vielmehr auf die einfachste Art und Weise herrschen, die man sich denken kann, nämlich mittels der Dollar-Herrschaft“, und er fährt fort, „das bedeutet nicht nur, daß seine Gesetze oktroyiert und sein Wille durchgesetzt wird; sondern das bedeutet das Diktat eines Gesetzes, dem der Geist der Menschen oder der Völker in solcher Weise anhaftet, daß Regierende und Regierte ein spirituelle Einheit bilden.“11 [11]

Carlo Maria Santoro hat vor über sechzig Jahren noch einmal unterstrichen, daß die US-Amerikaner sich die „maritime Macht […] überhaupt nicht ausmalen, ja nicht einmal konzeptionell vorstellen können, nicht Eroberung und Verwaltung noch die hierarchische Unterteilung, wie die großen Kontinentalreiche“ sie aufwiesen.12 [12]

Die thalassokratische Besonderheit der USA, die Santoro hervorgehoben hat, und die Unfähigkeit zum Regieren, die schon Degli Espinosa so meisterhaft erläuterte, weisen deutlicher als jede andere Analyse auf den künftigen Niedergang amerikanischer Macht hin. In diesem Zusammenhang müssen natürlich weitere kritische Elemente bezüglich der Expansion des US-Imperialismus berücksichtigt werden: Militäreinsatz, öffentliche Ausgaben, geringe diplomatische Kompetenz.

Der historische Tag, an dem die Führungsunfähigkeit der USA offen zutage trete, sei nun gekommen, behauptete der französische Wirtschaftswissenschaftler Jacques Sapir jüngst. Dem Direktor der Hochschule École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales (EHESS) zufolge habe sich bereits in der Krise von 1997 bis 1999 gezeigt, „que les États-Unis étaient incapables de maîtriser la libéralisation financière internationale qu’ils avaient suscitée et imposée à nombreux pays“13 [13]. Sapir sieht in der Globalisierung selbstverständlich einen Aspekt der US-Expansion, denn er versteht die Anwendung der amerikanischen Politik im großen Maßstab als eine Politik der freiwilligen finanziellen und merkantilen Öffnung.14 [14] Zu diesem Zeitpunkt, da nun das liberale US-amerikanische Süppchen mittels des Diktats des Internationalen Währungsfonds weiteren Patienten eingeflößt werden soll — obwohl dies doch schon in Indonesien mißlang und sich auch Kuala Lumpur nachdrücklich dagegen gewehrt hat —, unterstreicht Sapir, daß es Pekings verantwortungsvolle Wirtschaftspolitik ist, die die Stabilität im Fernen Osten garantiert.

Es sei hier festgehalten, daß die Beschleunigung des ökonomischen und politischen Schrumpfungsprozesses der USA (2007/08) in eine Zeit fällt, da die Führung der Nation nach wie vor in Händen einer Machtclique liegt, die sich auf die Ideen des neokonservativen think tank beruft. Die Neocons haben bekanntlich Washington in den letzten Jahren — spätestens seit 1998, dem Jahre des Beginns der „Revolution in Military Affairs“ — soweit wie möglich zu einer aggressiven und expansionistischen Außenpolitik gedrängt; es war dies eine Politik, die sich eng an die Prinzipien des Alten Testamentes (— der messianische Impuls bildet einen festen Bestandteil des US-Patriotismus wie auch eine Konstante des US-Nationalcharakters —) sowie an die trotzkistische Theorie von der „permanenten Revolution“ gehalten hat, wobei letztere allerdings eine besondere — nämlich konservative — Beugung hat hinnehmen müssen. Diese Theorie ist nicht nur gewissermaßen das theoretische Substrat der Strategie des permanent war, des „beständigen Krieges“, welche Vizepräsident Dick Cheney lanciert und welche die Bush-Administration im Laufe der letzten beiden Legislaturperioden (2000–08) so eifrig umgesetzt hat, weshalb in Washington die „Geopolitik des Chaos“ aufgeblüht ist.


Indiolateinamerika und Eurasien

Die USA empfinden sich von der Notwendigkeit der geostrategischen Ordnung (über die in Eurasien Rußland und China die Kontrolle ausüben, in der südamerikanischen Hemisphäre dagegen Brasilien, Argentinien sowie die Karibik) und einer grundlegenden Wirtschafts- und Finanzkrise eingeengt; sie scheinen verwirrt und schwanken einerseits zwischen einer Außenpolitik noch aggressiverer Art und mit noch mehr Muskelspiel als in der jüngsten Vergangenheit und andererseits einer realistischen Neueinschätzung ihrer eigenen globalen Rolle. Derweil werden sich die größten eurasischen Nationen — allen voran Rußland und China — und die wichtigsten südamerikanischen Nationen — Argentinien und Brasilien — ihres wirtschaftlichen, politischen und geostrategischen Potentials in immer stärkerem Maße bewußt.

Dies setzt voraus, daß politische Analytiker und Entscheidungsträger neue Paradigmen zur Anwendung bringen, um die Gegenwart zu interpretieren. Die Auslegungsschemata der Vergangenheit, die auf der Grundlage der Dichotomien Ost—West, Nord—Süd, Zentrum—Peripherie fußen, scheinen keine Gültigkeit mehr zu haben. Eine Analyse der Gegenwart wird von Nutzen sein, um alle notwendigen Elemente zu erfassen, um die geopolitischen Szenarien der Zukunft zu umreißen, um sich einer kontinentalen wie auch multipolaren Sichtweise zu befleißigen, um Bündnisse wie auch Spannungen zwischen den globalen Akteuren auszumachen; hier richten wir unsere Aufmerksamkeit auf die interkontinentalen Achsen zwischen beiden Hemisphären unseres Planeten.

Die BRIC-Achse (Brasilien, Rußland, Indien und China), die neue geoökonomische Achse zwischen Eurasien und Indiolateinamerika, ist mittlerweile eine wohldefinierte, attraktive Tatsache und wird in naher Zukunft verschiedene eurasische und südamerikanische Nationen verbinden. Wenn sich diese Achse nicht kurz- bis mittelfristig konsolidiert, wird der britische „westliche“ Traum von einer euroatlantischen Gemeinschaft, „von der Türkei bis Kalifornien“15 [15], weitergeträumt werden, und die Weltmacht USA — als Kopf der Triade Nordamerika, Europa und Japan — wird weiterhin herrschen.

Auf dem jüngsten Gipfeltreffen der Außenminister der BRIC-Staaten (im Mai 2008 in Jekaterinburg/Rußland) wurde die Absicht bekräftigt, die wirtschaftlichen und politischen Beziehungen zu den neuen aufstrebenden Ländern enger zu gestalten; in den USA faßte man dies als veritablen Affront auf. Man sollte das Treffen der „Großen Fünf“ (Brasilien, Indien, China, Mexiko und Südafrika) in Sapporo auch in Verbindung mit dem G8-Gipfel in Tōyako im Juli 2008 sehen.

Mit dem Amtsantritt von Ministerpräsident Wladimir Putin in Rußland im August 1999 begannen sich zwischen Rußland und einigen südamerikanischen Ländern dauerhafte wirtschaftliche Beziehungen anzubahnen, die in den letzten Jahren intensiviert wurden und eine gewisse politische Dimension angenommen haben.

China zeigte sein Interesse an Südamerika bereits im April 2001 mit dem historischen Besuch von Staatspräsident Jiang Zemin in mehreren südamerikanischen Nationen auf dem Subkontinent. China, stets auf der Suche nach Rohstoffen und Energieressourcen für die industrielle Entwicklung, ist der Auffassung, daß es in seinen bevorzugten und strategischen Partner-Staaten Brasilien, Venezuela und Chile erheblichen Investitionsbedarf gibt, damit die grundlegende Infrastruktur geschaffen werden kann (heute gibt es rund 400 bis 500 Handelsvereinbarungen zwischen Peking und den wichtigsten südamerikanischen Ländern einschließlich Mexikos).

Das Interesse Rußlands und Chinas an Südamerika wächst daher von Tag zu Tag. Die russische Gasprom (und mit ihr Eni)16 [16] hat im September 2008 Verträge mit Venezuela über die Erforschung des Gebietes Blanquilla Est und der Karibikinsel La Tortuga, etwa 120 Kilometer nördlich von der Hafenstadt Puerto La Cruz (im Norden Venezuelas) gelegen, unterzeichnet, und Moskau hat einen Plan zur Schaffung eines Ölkonsortiums in Südamerika verabschiedet. Während der russische Mineralölkonzern Lukoil nach Gesprächen mit der Erdölgesellschaft Petróleos de Venezuela S. A. (PDVSA, auch „Petroven“) eine Punktation verfaßte, reiste ferner Staatspräsident Hugo Chávez im September 2008 nach Peking, um ein Dutzend Handelsabkommen über die Lieferung landwirtschaftlicher, technologischer und petrochemischer Erzeugnisse mit dem chinesischen Staatsoberhaupt Hu Jintao zu unterzeichnen; überdies verpflichtete sich Chávez, bis 2010 fünfhunderttausend Barrel Öl pro Tag zu liefern und hernach eine Million bis zum Jahre 2012.

Darüber hinaus sind Peking und Caracas nach intensiven Verhandlungen von Mai bis September 2008 übereingekommen, die notwendigen Voraussetzungen für die Errichtung einer im gemeinschaftlichen Besitz befindlichen Raffinerie in Venezuela zu schaffen und gemeinsam in China eine Flotte von vier gigantischen Öltankern zu bauen, um die erhöhten Öl-Lieferungen zu bewältigen.

Die Karibik und Südamerika scheinen nicht mehr zu sein als der „Hinterhof“ Washingtons. Washingtons Sorgen vergrößern sich angesichts Nikaraguas Anerkennung der Republiken Südossetien und Abchasien, angesichts Venezuelas Auftreten als Gastgeber für russische strategische Bomberpiloten auf Fernaufklärung und vor allem angesichts der Beschleunigung des Prozesses der südamerikanischen Integration durch das enge Bündnis zwischen Buenos Aires und Brasília. Die Beziehungen zwischen den beiden größten Ländern des amerikanischen Subkontinentes, Argentinien und Brasilien, haben es jüngst (Oktober 2008) gestattet, das Sistema de Pagos en Monedas Locales (SML)17 [17] für den wirtschaftlich-kommerziellen Austausch ins Leben zu rufen. Die Umgehung des US-Dollars durch den SML ist ein erster echter Schritt in Richtung auf eine währungspolitische Integration in den Gemeinsamen Markt „Mercosur“ und der Beginn der Schaffung einer „regionalen Drehscheibe“, die wohl vor allem auf die im wirtschaftlich-kommerziellen Bereich bereits soliden Beziehungen zu Rußland und China wird bauen können, die sich in der unmittelbar nächsten Zeit prächtig entwickeln werden.

Washingtons Nervosität wächst noch angesichts von Pekings und Moskaus Ausweitung ihres Einflusses in Afrika und angesichts der Unterhaltung ihrer Beziehungen mit dem Iran und Syrien.

Aber so wichtig und notwendig solche ökonomischen, kommerziellen und politischen Vereinbarungen auch sein mögen, damit sich das neue multipolare System, dessen beide Säulen Eurasien im Nordosten und Indiolateinamerika im Südwesten sind, richtig entwickeln kann, müssen letztere unbedingt ihre Seeküsten kontrollieren und ihre (oft künstlich von Washington und London hervorgerufenen) internen Spannungen im Zaum halten, die ihre wahre Achillesferse darstellen.

China und Rußland sollten allerdings, wenn sie den USA gegenübertreten, beachten, daß die einstige Hypermacht derzeit zwar mit Sicherheit eine „verlorene“ Nation ist, sie aber immer noch ein geopolitisches Gebilde von kontinentalen Ausmaßen und Herrin ihrer eigenen Küsten ist und noch immer eine starke Flotte besitzt,18 [18] die auf jedem Kriegsschauplatz des Planeten auftauchen kann; das heißt, es gilt vernünftige und ausgewogene Lösungen zu suchen, damit der Grad der Störungen auf globaler Ebene nicht noch zunimmt. Jüngst haben wir daran erinnert, daß Washington nun seine Vierte Flotte reaktiviert hat (bestehend aus elf Schiffen, einem Atom-U-Boot und einem Flugzeugträger), um in bedrohlicher Weise die Verpflichtung zu demonstrieren, die man für mittel- und südamerikanischen „Partner“ habe. Die furchteinflößende Macht, die die USA Eurasien und vor allem Rußland gegenüber zur Schau stellen, bildet den Ausgangspunkt für eine Politik der Integration oder der verstärkten Zusammenarbeit des Subkontinents mit Europa und Japan — auch mit China. In ebendiesem Zusammenhange müssen wir die neue Politik von Rußlands Präsident Dmitri A. Medwedew in bezug auf die Entwicklung der russischen Streitkräfte betrachten, insbesondere die Modernisierung der Marine.19 [19] Obwohl wir im Zeitalter der sogenannten „Geopolitik des Raumes“ und der geostrategischen Raketenwaffen sowie der Strategischen Verteidigungsinitiative (SDI) leben, bilden doch Schiffe auf den Weltmeeren auch heute noch den Prüfstein der Macht, an dem globale Akteure ihre Strategien zu beweisen eingeladen sind; dies gilt noch mindestens das nächste Jahrzehnt hindurch sowohl für „Binnenmeere“ (Mittel- und Schwarzes sowie Karibisches Meer) als auch in den Ozeanen.

Um völlig zu verstehen, in wessen Händen in Übersee die Macht liegt und — nach dem Willen der USA — auch künftig liegen soll, täten Peking und Moskau gut daran, der Worte Henry Kissingers eingedenk zu sein, der vor Jahren schrieb:

Geopolitisch betrachtet, ist Amerika eine Insel weitab der riesigen Landmasse Eurasiens, dessen Ressourcen und Bevölkerung die der Vereinigten Staaten bei weitem übertreffen. Und nach wie vor ist die Beherrschung einer der beiden Hauptsphären Eurasiens — Europas also und Asiens — durch eine einzige Macht eine gute Definition für die strategische Gefahr, der sich die Vereinigten Staaten einmal gegenübersehen könnten, gleichviel, ob unter den Bedingungen eines Kalten Krieges oder nicht. Denn ein solcher Zusammenschluß wäre imstande, die USA wirtschaftlich und letztlich auch militärisch zu überflügeln, eine Gefahr, der es selbst dann entgegenzutreten gälte, wenn die dominante Macht offenkundig freundlich gesinnt wäre. Sollten sich deren Absichten nämlich jemals ändern, dann stieße sie auf eine amerikanische Nation, deren Fähigkeit zu wirkungsvollem Widerstand sich erheblich vermindert hätte und die folglich immer weniger in der Lage wäre, die Ereignisse zu beeinflussen.“20 [20]

Das zu Eurasien Gesagte gilt, nahezu perfekt gespiegelt, in gleicher Weise auch für Indiolateinamerika. Aus evidenten geostrategischen Gründen muß Indiolateinamerika — und das heißt derzeit Brasilien, Argentinien und Venezuela — die Spannungen niedrig halten, die die Instabilität einiger an die Andenkette angrenzenden Länder schüren;21 [21] hier kommt Bolivien eine Vorrangstellung zu, das als Binnenstaat die Westküste des amerikanischen Subkontinents mit seinem Osten verbinden könnte. Brasília, Buenos Aires, Santiago de Chile und Caracas mußten nun gezwungenermaßen ihre politischen wie militärischen Beziehungen ankurbeln — unter der Vormundschaft der USA, wenn man so will — und haben dabei ihr besonderes Augenmerk auf den Ausbau ihrer Hochseeflotten, sowohl zivile wie militärische, gelegt. Die gegenwärtigen Entwicklungen scheinen Indiolateinamerika, dank des „fernen Freundes“ — der eurasischen Macht —, in die Hände zu spielen. Die gegenwärtigen Entwicklungen, das muß gesagt werden, nutzen auch Europa und Japan.

Für das Gleichgewicht des Planeten jedoch bleibt nur zu hoffen, daß die Macht der USA auf ein rechtes Maß zurückschrumpft und daß sich die Vereinigten Staaten danach keiner unbesonnenen Revanchestrategie verschreiben.

Aus dem Italienischen von D. A. R. Sokoll

1 [22] Die derzeitige Wirtschafts- und Finanzkrise geht nach Meinung einiger Experten, unter diesen Jacques Sapir, auf die drei Jahre 1997 bis 1999 zurück. (Jacques Sapir. Le Nouveau Siècle XXI.: Du siècle „américaine“ au retour des Nations. Paris: Seuil, 2008. S. 11.) Hier sei daran erinnert, daß die USA — in der Überzeugung, die „einzige Weltmacht“ (Zbigniew Brzezinski) zu sein — „[u]ngefähr von 1992 bis 1997 […] eine ideologische Kampagne [führten], die auf die Öffnung aller nationalen Märkte für den freien Welthandel und den ungehinderten Kapitalverkehr über nationale Grenzen hinweg abzielte“ (Chalmers Johnson Ein Imperium verfällt: Wann endet das Amerikanische Jahrhundert? übers. v. Thomas Pfeiffer u. Renate Weitbrecht. München: Karl-Blessing-Verlag, 2000. S. 269).

2 [23] Chalmers Johnson. Ein Imperium verfällt: Ist die Weltmacht USA am Ende? übers. v. Thomas Pfeiffer u. Renate Weitbrecht. München: Goldmann, 2001.

3 [24] Emmanuel Todd. Weltmacht USA: Ein Nachruf. übers. v. Ursel Schäfer u. Enrico Heinman. München: Piper, 2003.

4 [25] Johnson, a. a. O., S. 55.

5 [26] Johnson, a. a. O., S. 54.

6 [27] „Das internationale System zerbricht nicht nur, weil schwankende und aggressive neue Mächte versuchen, ihre Nachbarn zu dominieren, sondern auch weil zerfallende alte Mächte, statt sich anzupassen, versuchen, ihre ihnen aus den Händen gleitende Überlegenheit in eine ausbeuterische Vormachtstellung auszubauen.“ (David P. Calleo. Die Zukunft der westlichen Allianz: Die NATO nach dem Zeitalter der amerikanischen Hegemonie. übers. v. Helena C. Jadebeck. Stuttgart: Bonn Aktuell, 1989. S. 218.

7 [28] Michael Lind. „How the U.S. Became the World’s Dispensable Nation.“ In: Financial Times, 26. Januar 2005.

8 [29] Luca Lauriola. Scacco matto all’America e a Israele: Fine dell’ultimo Impero. Bari: Palomar, 2007.

9 [30] Claudio Mutti in seiner Rezension von: Lauriola, Scacco matto all’America e a Israele, a. a. O. — Veröffentlicht auf: www.eurasia.org, am 27. Januar 2008.

10 [31] Tiberio Graziani. „Geopolitica e diritto internazionale nell’epoca dell’occidentalizzazione del pianeta.“ In: Eurasia: Rivista di studi geopolitici, 4/2007, S. 7.

11 [32] Agostino Degli Espinosa. „Imperialismo USA.“ In: Augustea. Nr. 10. Rom/Mailand, 1932. S. 521.

12 [33] Carlo Maria Santoro. Studi di Geopolitica 1992–1994. Turin: G. Giappichelli, 1997. S. 84.

13 [34] Auf Deutsch: „daß die Vereinigten Staaten unfähig gewesen sind, mit der internationalen finanziellen Lossagung fertigzuwerden, zu denen sie unsere Länder selbst getrieben und die sie uns auferlegt haben“. — Sapir, a. a. O., S. 11 f.

14 [35] Ebd., S. 63 f.

15 [36] Mit diesen Worten hat Sergio Romano in zwei Briefen in der Tageszeitung Corriere della Sera die britische Anti-Europa-Politik kommentiert: „Das Ziel der Briten ist die Schaffung einer großen atlantischen Gemeinschaft, von der Türkei bis Kalifornien, und London mittendrin wäre natürlich der Dreh- und Angelpunkt.“ (Sergio Romano. „Perché è difficile fare l’Europa con la Gran Bretagna.“ In: Corriere della Sera, 12. Juni 2005. S. 39.)

16 [37] Das Akronym steht für Ente Nazionale Idrocarburi und bezeichnet den Erdöl- und Energiekonzern, der das größte Wirtschaftsunternehmen Italiens darstellt. 1999 hat Eni mit Gasprom eine Vereinbarung über den Bau der Blue-Stream-Pipeline unterzeichnet, die Rußland über das Schwarze Meer mit der Türkei verbindet. — Anm. d. Übers.

17 [38] Zahlungssystem in lokaler Währung. Zwischenstaatliche Geschäfte werden direkt in Brasilianischen Reais und Argentinischen Pesos abgerechnet, ohne Umweg über die Weltwährung Dollar. — Anm. d. Übers.

18 [39] Alessandro Lattanzio weist darauf hin, daß „die US-Marine vor zehn Jahren noch vierzehn Flugzeugträger sowie Trägerkampfgruppen gehabt hatte. Jetzt besitzt sie auf dem Papier noch zehn [Flugzeugträger], aber nur fünf, sechs stehen im Einsatz“. (Alessandro Lattanzio. „La guerra è finita?“ Vortrag anläßlich des FestivalStoria zu Turin am 16. Oktober 2008.)

19 [40] Alessandro Lattanzio. „Il rilancio navale della Russia.“ In: www.eurasia-rivista.org (Stand: 1. Oktober 2008).

20 [41] Henry A. Kissinger. Die Vernunft der Nationen: Über das Wesen der Außenpolitik. übers. v. Matthias Vogel u. a. Berlin: Siedler, 1994. S. 904.

21 [42] Bekanntlich haben Analysten Südamerika in zwei Bogenbereiche untergliedert: einerseits den Andenbogen, bestehend aus Venezuela, Kolumbien, Ecuador, Peru, Bolivien, Paraguay, und andererseits den Atlantikbogen, bestehend aus Brasilien, Uruguay, Argentinien und Chile.

Summoning the Gods: Essays on Paganism

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Summoning the Gods:
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Summoning the Gods:
Essays on Paganism in a God-Forsaken World

Edited with an Introduction [2] by Greg Johnson
San Francisco: Counter-Currents, 2011
220 pages


Hardcover limited edition of 100 numbered and signed copies: $35 (Pre-order special: $30)

Release date: July 14, 2011

Note: All books ordered before July 14, 2011 will be personalized by Collin Cleary.

Neo-paganism is the attempt to revive the polytheistic religions of old Europe. But how? Can one just invent or reinvent an authentic, living faith? Or are modern neo-pagans just engaged in elaborate role-playing games?

In Summoning the Gods, Collin Cleary argues that the gods have not died or forsaken us so much as we have died to or forsaken them. Modern civilization—including much of modern neo-paganism—springs from a mindset that closes man off to the divine and traps us in a world of our own creations. Drawing upon sources from Taoism to Heidegger, Collin Cleary describes how we can attain an attitude of openness that may allow the gods to return.

In these nine wide-ranging essays, Collin Cleary also explores the Nordic pagan tradition, Tantrism, the writings of Alain de Benoist, Karl Maria Wiligut, and Alejandro Jodorowsky, and Patrick McGoohan’s classic television series The Prisoner. Cleary’s essays are models of how to combine clarity and wit with spiritual depth and intellectual sophistication.

Summoning the Gods establishes Collin Cleary as one of the leading intellectual lights of contemporary neo-paganism.

Advance Praise for Summoning the Gods

“The writings of Collin Cleary are an excellent example of the way in which old European paganism continues to question our contemporaries in a thought-provoking way. Written with elegance, his work abounds in original points of view.”

—Alain de Benoist, author of On Being a Pagan

“Jung compared the absence of the gods to a dry riverbed: their shapes remain, but devoid of the energy and substance that would make them live among us as they used to. What we await is the energy and substance to flow once more into the forms. The words of Collin Cleary, his thoughts and ideas, constitute the kind of fresh and vital energy that is needed to effect the renewal of the gods in our contemporary world.”

— Dr. Stephen E. Flowers, author of The Northern Dawn

“Collin Cleary’s Summoning the Gods is one of the most important books in its field.  Unlike those who would speak for the gods, he shows us how to bring the gods into our lives by letting Them speak for themselves. Perhaps most importantly, Cleary has given serious followers of pagan religions the philosophical tools to defend their beliefs against the most erudite critics.”

— Stephen A. McNallen, Asatru Folk Assembly

“Collin Cleary is a rare breed: a scholar of the mystical, and at the same time a mystic whose probing visions are informed by rigorous study. These are more than just eloquent and thought-provoking essays on myth, religion, or art; at their best, they resonate with the august and ancient tradition of the philosophical dialogue. Time and again, Cleary offers insights that powerfully orient the reader toward archaic ways of thinking, knowing, and seeing vividly—as if through newly opened eyes.”

—Michael Moynihan, co-editor, TYR: Myth—Culture—Tradition

“I have admired Collin Cleary’s work in TYR and Rûna for years, and I am delighted that this volume of nine essays has arrived in the world. Cleary possesses the admirable ability to write with a frank ‘openness to the divine’ (to use his own phrase). He does so both clearly and profoundly, on a number of inter-related subjects. The essay ‘Philosophical Notes on the Runes’ ought to be required reading for all serious students of the runic systems. This book belongs in every radical Traditionalist library.”

—Juleigh Howard-Hobson, author of Sommer and Other Poems

“Collin Cleary’s Summoning the Gods is a landmark publication in the intellectual side of the Heathen revival. By applying modes of analysis ranging from Heideggerian phenomenology to Hegelian dialectic, Cleary manages to penetrate deep into the core of polytheistic religiosity. Attracting a thinker of Cleary’s stature is an indicator of the vibrancy and health of modern Heathen thought. This book should be a welcome addition to any thinking Heathen’s book shelf.”

—Christopher Plaisance, editor of The Journal of Contemporary Heathen Thought


Introduction [2] by Greg Johnson



1. Knowing the Gods
2. Summoning the Gods: The Phenomenology of Divine Presence
3. Paganism without Gods: Alain de Benoist’s On Being a Pagan

Nordic Paganism

4. What God Did Odin Worship? [3]
5. Philosophical Notes on the Runes
6. The Missing Man in Norse Cosmogony
7. Karl Maria Wiligut’s Commandments of Gôt

Among the Ruins

8. Patrick McGoohan’s The Prisoner
9. The Spiritual Journey of Alejandro Jodorowsky

About the Author

Collin Cleary, Ph.D. is an independent scholar living in Sandpoint, Idaho. He is one of the founders of TYR: Myth—Culture—Tradition, the first volume of which he co-edited. A fellow of the Rune-Gild, his writings have appeared in TYR and Rûna. This is his first book.

Ordering Information

Hardcover limited edition of 100 numbered and signed copies: $35
(Pre-order special: $30)

Release date: July 14, 2011

Note: All books ordered before July 14, 2011 will be personalized by Collin Cleary.


Article printed from Counter-Currents Publishing: http://www.counter-currents.com

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Archeological Cultures

Archaeological Cultures


Ex: http://www.counter-currents.com/

In the attempt to understand who we are and where we came from, history takes us only so far. Once the written record thins and ends—not far back in time, evolutionarily speaking—we are left primarily with archaeological evidence and inferences from linguistics.

Prehistory is a world of few facts and much guesswork. In the early historical period, when archaeological evidence and spotty written records at least complement one another, existing knowledge is extended. But when the historical record ends completely and archaeologists take over, the situation becomes much more opaque.

The unit of prehistorical analysis is the “culture,” characterized by a defined range of material artifacts. Cultures may be named after particularly rich geographical sites, after unique artifacts, or after regions in which sites of a certain type frequently occur. For each culture a geographical distribution can be mapped and radiocarbon dating pinpoint an estimated date and duration. A series of prehistorical maps can be drawn showing sequences of cultures analogous to sequences of peoples and states on historical maps.

Therefore, cultures should be visualized both “horizontally” and “vertically.” The horizontal dimension is a culture’s geographic distribution, the vertical its development, persistence, and disappearance across time, as well as the sequential succession of different cultures.

Thus, cultural change in prehistoric Europe can be envisioned as a shifting mosaic of different cultures (white ethnic groups or “populations”) moving across the continental landscape in both time and space.

Kossinna’s Law

gustaf_kossina.jpgThe term “culture” entered archaeology through 19th century German ethnography, where the Kultur of tribal groups and rural peasants was distinguished from the Zivilisation of urbanized peoples. Kultur was used by German ethnologists to designate the distinctive ways of life of a particular people or Volk.

The idea of archaeological cultures became central to the discipline in the 20th century thanks to the work of Gustaf Kossinna (1858–1931) of the University of Berlin, the most famous archaeologist in the German-speaking world of his day (he was also a linguist).

Kossinna perceived the archaeological record as a mosaic of clearly defined cultures (Kultur-Gruppen or culture groups) that were strongly associated with race. He was particularly interested in reconstructing the movements of direct prehistoric ancestors of Germans, Slavs, Celts and other Indo-European ethnic groups in order to trace the Aryan race to its homeland or Urheimat.

Kossinna developed the theory that regionally delimited ethnic groups can be defined by the material cultures identified by archaeologists. A unified set of archaeological artifacts, a culture, was the sign of a unified ethnicity: “Sharply defined archaeological cultural areas correspond unquestionably with the areas of particular people or tribes.”

This statement is known as “Kossinna’s law.” The only objection to it is the imputation of an invariable identity between archaeological cultures and ethnic or racial groups (populations). The science is more complicated than that.

Kossinna’s law applies best to Neolithic and subsequent eras. The advent of agriculture was accompanied by a population explosion—the Neolithic Demographic Transition. By contrast, in the earliest human era, the Paleolithic, distinct cultural groups and differences are less readily discernible in the archaeological record.

Kossinna’s ideas have made him anathema to guardians of the racial Zeitgeist. Symptomatic of the dumbing down of academia, he is invariably depicted as a proto-Nazi.

Unfortunately, Kossinna’s “academic racism” is warm tap water compared to the poisonous brew of any of the hundreds of professors of Jewish Studies, Holocaust Studies, “Whiteness Studies,” Asian Studies, African Studies, Native American Studies, and Latino Studies active in universities today. Kossinna and other white academics routinely vilified as “racists” are sorry contenders for the mantle. For real hate you must examine today’s academy.


The Linear Pottery Culture

Kossinna’s concept of archaeological culture was introduced into the English-speaking academy by Australian-born, English-descended Stalinist archaeologist V. Gordon Childe, who stated in The Danube in Prehistory (1929):

We find certain types of remains—pots, implements, ornaments, burial rites, house forms—constantly recurring together. Such a complex of regularly associated traits we shall term a “cultural group” or just a “culture.” We assume that such a complex is the material expression of what today would be called a people.

Noted for synthesizing archaeological data from a variety of sources, Childe was the first academic to construct a prehistory of the entire European continent (The Dawn of European Civilization, 1925). He also wrote The Aryans: A Study of Indo-European Origins (1926), a cause for discomfort among the politically correct today.

Examples of very early Neolithic cultures in Europe include the Starčevo-Kőrös-Criş culture [3] (Serbia-Hungary-Romania) and the Karnavo culture of Bulgaria.

The first agrarian society in central and eastern Europe was the Linear Pottery culture (Linearbandkeramik, LBK), formerly known as the Danubian culture after V. Gordon Childe’s book. Starting around 5500 BC from the middle Danube (Bohemia, Moravia, Hungary) it expanded northward along the Rhine and the other rivers going north through the German and Polish plains toward the North Sea.

According to McEvedy’s hypothesis in 1967,

Given that the Danubians were a genuine people and remained so until provincial differences began to appear among them a millennium after they had expanded across central Europe, it is difficult to avoid the view that their movement created an Indo-European heartland which must be postulated for roughly this time and place on purely linguistic grounds. Therefore the Danubian culture represents the arrival and establishment of the Indo-Europeans in Central Europe. (Colin McEvedy [5], The Penguin Atlas of Ancient History, 9)

Limitations of the Culture Concept

By definition, a prehistory in racial and ethnic terms remains hypothetical. Despite its popularity as a means of organizing the archaeological record, a simple correlation between peoples and distinctive archaeological cultures is not always warranted.

Nevertheless, as Colin McEvedy observed 45 years ago, “We are not so helpless in this matter as the puritans pretend.” And Indo-Europeanist archaeologist J. P. Mallory adds, “While one may deny the necessity of assuming an invariable one-to-one correlation between an archaeological [culture] and a linguistic entity, it is equally perverse to assume that there can be no correlation between the two.” (In Search of the Indo-Europeans: Language, Archaeology and Myth, 1989, 164. Emphasis added.)

It will likely soon be possible to make well-founded inferences about the genotypes of ancient populations from DNA analyses of human remains. To a limited extent this is already occurring.

It is perfectly acceptable to make reasonable predictions and assumptions about white prehistory based upon archaeological, linguistic, anthropological, and genetic evidence. Archaeologists and prehistorians formulate analogous hypotheses and assumptions about scores of matters all the time.

What is not acceptable is to deny prehistoric evidence due to racist-ideological dogmas motivated by the determination that whites must and will be denied a sense of collective identity.

People so motivated are keenly aware that the development of identity among whites akin to that enjoyed by Jews and non-whites could derail the genocidal policies upon which contemporary politics and the culture war are predicated.

Article printed from Counter-Currents Publishing: http://www.counter-currents.com

URL to article: http://www.counter-currents.com/2011/07/archaeological-cultures/

samedi, 23 juillet 2011

La pourpre et le croissant, identité nationale et armée en Turquie


La pourpre et le croissant, identité nationale et armée en Turquie

par Tancrède Josseran


Ex: http://www.scriptoblog.com/

La République turque est indissociablement liée à l’institution militaire. En 1923, l’armée pose les fondements de l’Etat, et l’Etat engendre la nation. Les élites militaires se sentent naturellement investies de l’identité nationale. La désintégration pitoyable de l’Empire ottoman a conforté en eux une profonde défiance envers les ensembles cosmopolites. L’armée est politique puisqu’elle est l’Etat. Contre les antagonismes religieux, ethniques, sociaux, elle assure la continuité de l’Etat et sa sauvegarde à travers le temps.

Avec un contingent de 700 000 hommes, en additionnant la gendarmerie, l’institution militaire occupe une place déterminante dans la vie du pays. Preuve de cet enracinement en août 1999, le ministre turc de la culture, Istemihan Talay, (membre du Parti d’Action Nationaliste) déclarait à l’issue d’une conférence de presse : « la nation turque est une nation armée. La figure du soldat renvoie au fondement de notre identité nationale. Tout turc naît soldat » (1).

Pour comprendre le rôle de l’armée dans la société turque, il faut commencer par renverser les stéréotypes mentaux en cours en Occident. Les sociétés développées ont supprimé tout sens tragique à la vie. La quête d’un bien être artificiel et l’individualisme exacerbé ont évacué le dépassement de soi. La mort synonyme d’anéantissement y est devenue une infamie. Conséquence, elles repoussent dans une commune aversion les deux termes de l’existence : elles ne veulent plus mourir mais refusent également de donner la vie. Le sacrifice est incompris. C’est justement la finalité des armées, qui pour mener à bien leur mission, c’est à dire la défense de l’honneur national, de l’intégrité du territoire, doivent en échange accepter l’effort, la souffrance, la mort. Or les motifs pour lesquels les armées sont rejetées dans les sociétés occidentales sont précisément celles pour lesquelles elles sont respectées en Turquie, parce qu’elles rendent constamment présente l’idée du don ultime de soi.

La guerre notre mère

Les nations se construisent par le glaive, et par ce même glaive oeuvrent à la conservation de la paix et du bien commun. L’organisation de la violence source de mort est en même temps l’outil de perpétuation de la vie. La guerre est la genèse du monde sans laquelle il n’y a pas d’avancées. Pour Suat Ilhan, maître à penser de la géopolitique turque et titulaire de la chaire de géostratégie de l’Académie de sécurité nationale (Milli Güvenlik Akademesi) : « La guerre, spécialement les grands conflits sont l’occasion d’emprunter un certain nombre de traits culturels. La guerre est un produit culturel, l’innovation technologique en découle, elle est cause et conséquence de la modernisation et de l’adhésion aux normes de la civilisation» (2). En outre, souligne Ilhan, la guerre est aussi révélatrice de l’altérité, de l’essence profonde d’une civilisation. Il cite le discours de Mustapha Kemal commémorant l’anniversaire de la guerre d’indépendance et la libération de l’Anatolie des forces de l’Entente en 1922: « Au final, ce n’est pas uniquement la force physique, c’est aussi nos ressources morales et culturelles qui assurentnotre prééminence» (3).

Les guerres font l’Histoire. Elles sont selon Ilhan, le « meilleur moyen d’appréhender» l’histoire turque (4). Elles sont consubstantielles au nomadisme des Turcs d’Asie Centrale. Ces migrations s’organisent à l’ origine vers quatre directions distinctes :

-­‐La Chine et l’Inde

-­‐La Mer Caspienne, et le nord de Mer Noire

-­‐Les Balkans et l’Europe Centrale

-­‐Le Moyen-Orient

Ces régions ont été en même temps le théâtre géographique des guerres turques. Celles-­‐ci ne sont pas encore terminées et leurs conséquences se font encore sentir. La guerre entre Chinois et peuplades turques remonte aux Huns. C’est contre eux que la dynastie des Shi-Huangdi commence à construire la Grande muraille. Aujourd’hui, un conflit de faible intensité se poursuit au Turkestan Oriental avec les Ouighours. Il est selon Ilhan l’épilogue d’une lutte commencée « depuis 2000 ans» (5). En Inde, ce conflit a commencé avec les Huns Blancs et s’est poursuivi avec l’arrivée des Moghols. L’Islam s’est répandu pendant ces guerres. Les tensions récurrentes entre Dehli et Islamabad seraient donc la conséquence de ces invasions.

Mais dans l’imaginaire turc, les guerres les plus importantes restent celles livrées contre l’Europe : «Elles sont dans notre histoire, les luttes les plus longues et les plus usantes» (6). Pour Ilhan, l’Europe a fortifié son identité contre cette menace extérieure. L’identité occidentale a « trouvé l’autre» (7). Dans un raccourci saisissant, Ilhan observe que si entre 632, date la mort de Mahomet, et 1071 année de l’arrivée des Turcs en Anatolie, la figure de l’autre chez les Européens est celle de l’arabe, elle reste avant et après ces deux dates à travers les Huns et les Ottomans, celle du turc...

Les croisades constituent un événement fondamental de cet affrontement. En 1056 Thugri Beg et les Turcs Seldjoukides poursuivant leur migration vers l’Ouest s’emparent de Bagdad. Le chef turc reçoit le titre de Sultan du dernier Calife abbasside. Charge à lui de protéger et de propager l’Islam. C’est sur cet épisode que s’appuient les tenants de la synthèse turco­islamique, véritable idéologie d’Etat mise en place par l’armée après l’intervention militaire de septembre 1980, pour affirmer l’idée d’une destinée manifeste intrinsèque aux Turcs. Dans un contexte de fortes tensions internationales et sociales, où terrorismes de droite et de gauche se répondent mutuellement, l’armée voit en l’Islam la force susceptible de stabiliser la société et d’unifier la nation autour d’un socle commun. Les Turcs à l’époque des «Seldjoukides ...ont fait face en Anatolie, en Syrie, en Palestine, à la Première croisade. A l’époque ottomane dans les Balkans, ils ont arrêté la Deuxième croisade. Le troisième temps de la guerre entre Européens et Turcs prend la forme d’un affrontement avec les Russes» (8).

Au lendemain de la Première Guerre mondiale, le traité de Sèvres prévoit le partage des dépouilles de l’empire vaincu entre les puissances de l’Entente. C’est le début de la guerre d’indépendance « Istiqlal Harbi ». Elle est dans le récit national turc simultanément et paradoxalement « le précurseur des mouvements d’émancipations du monde islamique de l’Occident» et la condition à l’édification « d’un Etat indépendant préalable à la modernisation de la société» (9). Dès lors, il s’agit en s’appropriant ce qu’il y a de meilleur dans le corpus culturel occidental, « de parvenir par étape à la société contemporaine en mêlant ces acquis à la culture turque »(10).

L’armée des steppes

Le bulletin de liaison de l’armée de terre fait remonter la première force organisée au règne de Mete Han, chef hunnique du Ier siècle av. JC (11). Cavaliers réputés, les Turcs inventent la selle et l’étrier. Ils sont de redoutables archers. La distance et l’éloignement dans l’espace en Asie Centrale empêchent la création de fortes entités étatiques. Aussi la condition première à la survie d’un groupe organisé réside dans l’utilisation du cheval. Dans l’histoire turque, la domestication du cheval est capitale.

Elle est la deuxième qualité la plus importante après la fonction guerrière. Ilhan remarque qu’« en raison des menaces qui ont pesé dans l’histoire turque, le soldat est un élément essentiel, ses qualités sont primordiales» (12). Si l’empire ottoman est cosmopolite et multiculturel, son armée en revanche est nationale et musulmane. Seuls les musulmans sont astreints à faire leur service militaire. Par conséquent, l’armée est l’une des rares institutions impériales où l’élément turc domine sans partage. Les militaires se sentent naturellement les dépositaires de l’identité nationale et de sa défense à travers les aléas du temps. Les fondateurs de la République, Mustapha Kemal et Ismet Inönü, sont des hommes d’arme. Au début du XXème siècle, cette aspiration nationale est confuse. Elle ne commence réellement à pénétrer les esprits qu’avec le Premier conflit mondial. Les soldats du Sultan sont partis à la guerre Ottomans, ils en reviennent Turcs. Sous l’effet des épreuves, des trahisons, un embryon de conscience collective émerge. L’homogénéité contre l’hétérogénéité, tel est l’enjeu du processus de construction initié par les militaires. Laïcité et intégrité du territoire sont les deux piliers du nouvel Etat. Sans laïcité, pas de lien national possible, mais sans unité, pas de cohésion politique, et par conséquent pas de laïcité.

La laïcité est la religion civique de la République dans la mesure où elle substitue aux allégeances communautaires de la théocratie ottomane un lien national.

Paradoxalement, si la laïcité reste la valeur cardinale, l’armée a su jeter des ponts avec la foi du Prophète. Elle est le socle identitaire sur lequel la République a déterminé l’appartenance à la nation turque au moment des échanges de population après la guerre d’indépendance. Cet islam scientiste et national est organisé dans le cadre d’une laïcité concordataire. Les desservants du culte dépendent du ministère des Affaires religieuses, le Dinayet. En d’autres termes, comme le souligne Ilhan, si « l’islam n’est pas l’idéologie de la République, il est le système de croyance de la majorité des citoyens turcs » (13).

La mission des militaires est la défense de l’Etat, or pour de nombreux Turcs, la préservation de l’Etat est la condition essentielle à la sauvegarde de l’Islam. Les navires de la marine ont tous obligatoirement un exemplaire du Coran à leur bord. Les soldats turcs sont appelés «Mehmetcik» (soldat de Mahomet). Ils montent à l’assaut au cri de Allah, Allah. Avant d’ouvrir le feu, l’invocation islamique bismillah est prononcée. L’armée est considérée comme le cœur du Prophète (Peygamber Oçagi). Chaque soldat tombé au champ d’honneur est déclaré martyr (sehit). Dans un sens plus large, ce terme désigne celui tombé pour l’Islam au cours du Djihad. Le nom de guerre de Mustapha Kemal, Ghazi, a lui-même une connotation religieuse puisqu’il désigne les guerriers musulmans dans leur guerre sainte contre les chrétiens. Le drapeau écarlate frappé du croissant blanc reflète ce balancement permanent entre tradition et modernité.

Un homme nouveau

En Turquie, deux ministères utilisent le terme de « national » dans leur intitulé. Les ministères de la Défense et de l’Education. Si le premier assure la sauvegarde de la République et l’intégrité du territoire, le second en revanche a pour mission d’éduquer le futur citoyen dans l’obéissance aux préceptes de la révolution kémaliste, et d’assurer son épanouissement moral dans la turcité.

Pour reprendre les mots d’un officiel turc: « L’armée est une école et l’école est une armée» (14). Il s’agit donc d’une guerre sur deux fronts. A terme, la propédeutique kémaliste doit accoucher d’un homme nouveau, viril, vertueux, héroïque. Ce processus de construction nationale repose sur le soldat et l’instituteur :

« Durant la guerre d’indépendance, tandis que l’armée combattait les Grecs sur le front, une armée de professeurs préparaient à Ankara l’assaut final contre l’obscurantisme. La guerre et l’éducation sont jumelles; le soldat chasse l’occupant du pays, l’enseignent en extirpe l’ignorance» (15).

Dès lors, dans le discours identitaire et civique turc, l’aspect militaire est déterminant. La figure du soldat est l’extension naturelle du caractère national et son accomplissement ultime. Le manuel d’éducation civique en vigueur dans les lycées du pays expose ainsi les traits inhérents à la race turque :

«-­‐Les Turcs sont la race la plus ancienne, la plus noble et la plus héroïque du monde.

-­‐La civilisation turque commence avec l’Histoire, elle est parmi les plus anciennes et les plus développées. Elle est à l’origine de la civilisation contemporaine.

-­‐Le turc est combattant, fort, plein de fougue, intelligent, brave, magnanime, exemple de morale et de vertu pour le reste de l’humanité.

-­‐La femme et l’homme turcs sont fidèles et vertueux. Quand ils fusionnent, ils forment une force indestructible.

-­‐ Les victoires des Turcs commencent avec l’Histoire. Les armées turques ont donné naissance à la gloire et l’honneur.

-­‐Les Turcs sont dévoués à leurs pays et vigilants quant à leur indépendance et à leur souveraineté. Ils n’hésitent pas à défier la mort pour la protéger.

-­‐En définitive, le turc est un être supérieur qui a une place à part sur terre» (16).

Cette éthique se retrouve également au sein des écoles militaires. Plus que des soldats, elles ont reçu pour mission de former les cadres de la nation. A partir du jour où ils franchissent le seuil de l’école, les élèves officiers s’entendent répéter qu’ils sont l’élite de la nation et sa conscience éveillée. Maintenus à l’écart des vicissitudes de la vie civile, ils conçoivent rapidement un mépris prononcé pour la médiocrité du monde extérieur. Leur serment reflète cet engagement qui implique l’idée du sacrifice ultime car selon leurs paroles, « un pays n’existe que si on peut mourir pour lui» (17). Le patriotisme s’identifie naturellement au Kémalisme et aux principes qui en découlent : souveraineté nationale, unité de l’Etat, laïcité. Les cadets sont encouragés à prendre modèle sur Atatürk et à sentir sa prés en ce dans leur service quotidien. Cette immanence est particulièrement forte certains jours de l’année. Chaque 13 mars est célébré le jour d’entrée de Kemal à l’école militaire. A l’appel matinal, les élèves officiers figés au garde-­‐ à-­‐ vous dans l’air froid du matin répondent présent à l’appel du nom du père de la nation. La commémoration de sa mort tous les 10 novembre et la visite de son mausolée, immensité de marbre aux lignes austères qui dominent Ankara, sont un moment de recueillement collectif. Le soir, dans leur chambrée, les élèves officiers sont invités à prendre comme livre de chevet le Nutuk. Texte fondateur du kémalisme, ce discours fleuve prononcé en 1927, résume l’œuvre de redressement national. Il a valeur d’écriture sainte.

Les objectifs de l’armée recoupent les trois finalités dévolues au politique, la conservation de l’intégrité du territoire et de son indépendance dans la concorde intérieure et la sécurité extérieure. L’article 35 du règlement interne de l’armée établit que le devoir des forces armées est de protéger la patrie, la République et la Constitution, « si besoin par les armes contre l’extérieur et l’intérieur» (article 85) (18). Une lecture large de ces articles donne un droit d’intervention dans le cours des affaires politiques. L’urgence politique n’admet pas de répit, elle exige une décision ferme, nette et rapide. En clair, l’institution militaire considère qu’ « est souverain celui qui décide de la situation exceptionnelle» (19). C’est la puissance, « les armes» qui créent les conditions d’application du droit. La force est le moyen essentiel et sinon le seul capable de restaurer l’unanimité nationale fêlée. Le glaive tranche le nœud de la discorde et rétablit l’harmonie perdue.

Tancrède JOSSERAN.

1 ) Hürriyet, 11 aout 1999

2 ) Suat Ilhan, Türk olmakzordur, ( Il est dur d’être turc), Alfa, Istanbul, 2009 .

3 ) Ibid.p.44.

4 ) Idem.

5 ) Ibid.p.320.

6 ) Ibid. p. 319.

7 ) Ibid.p.322.

8 ) Ibid.p.328.

9 ) Ibid.p.693.

1 0) Ibid.p.673.

1 1) Kara Kuvvetleri Haber Bulletin, «Kara Kuvetlerinin 2206’nci yildonumu kutlandi », (2206 eme anniversaires de la fondation de l’armée de terre), juillet 1997.

1 2 ) Op.cit.(2).p.610.

1 3) Ibid.p.728.

1 4) Ayse Gül, The myth of the military-nation, Palagrave-macmillan, London,

2004.p.119. 1 5) Idem.p.122. 16)Idem.p.126. 1 7) Gareth Jenkins, Context and circumstance : The Turkish military and politics, The

international Institute for Strategic Studies,London, 2001, p.32.

1 8) Vural Savas, AKP çoktan kapatilmaliydi, (L’AKP aurait du être interdit), Bilgi Yayinevi, Istanbul, 2008, p.153.

1 9)Carl Schmitt, Théologie politique, Gaillimard, Paris, 1988,p.123.

Mediterraneo e Asia Centrale: le cerniere dell'Eurasia

Mediterraneo e Asia Centrale: le cerniere dell’Eurasia


Ex: http://www.eurasia-rivista.org/

 La transizione dal sistema unipolare a quello multipolare genera tensioni in due particolari aree della massa eurasiatica: il Mediterraneo e l’Asia Centrale. Il processo di consolidamento del policentrismo sembra subire una impasse causata dall’atteggiamento “regionalista” assunto dalle potenze eurasiatiche. L’individuazione di un unico grande spazio mediterraneo-centroasiatico, quale funzionale cerniera della massa euroafroasiatica, fornirebbe elementi operativi all’integrazione eurasiatica.

Nel processo di transizione tra il momento unipolare e il nuovo sistema policentrico si osserva che le tensioni geopolitiche si scaricano principalmente su aree a forte valenza strategica. Tra queste, il bacino mediterraneo e l’Asia Centrale, vere e proprie cerniere dell’articolazione euroafroasiatica, hanno assunto, a partire dal primo marzo del 2003, un particolare interesse nell’ambito dell’analisi geopolitica riguardante i rapporti tra gli USA, le maggiori nazioni eurasiatiche e i Paesi del Nord Africa. Quel giorno, si ricorderà, il parlamento della Turchia, vale a dire il parlamento della nazione-ponte per eccellenza tra le repubbliche centroasiatiche e il Mediterraneo, decise di negare l’appoggio richiesto dagli USA per la guerra in Iràq1. Questo fatto, lungi dal costituire solamente un elemento di negoziazione tra Washington e Ankara, come in un primo momento poteva apparire (e certamente lo fu anche, a causa di due elementi contrastanti: la fedeltà turca all’alleato nordamericano e la preoccupazione di Ankara per l’effetto che l’ipotizzata creazione di un Kurdistan, nell’ambito dell’allora probabile progetto d tripartizione dell’Iràq, avrebbe avuto sulla irrisolta “questione curda” ), stabilì tuttavia l’inizio di una inversione di tendenza della cinquantennale politica estera turca2. Da allora, con un crescendo continuo fino ai nostri giorni, la Turchia, tramite soprattutto l’avvicinamento alla Russia (facilitata dalla scarsa propensione dell’Unione Europea ad includere Ankara nel proprio ambito) e la sua nuova politica di buon vicinato, ha cercato di praticare una sorta di smarcamento dalla tutela statunitense, rendendo di fatto scarsamente affidabile un tassello fondamentale per la penetrazione nordamericana nella massa eurasiatica. Oltre gli ostacoli costituiti dall’Iràn e dalla Siria, gli strateghi di Washington e del Pentagono devono oggi tener conto infatti anche della nuova e poco malleabile Turchia.

Il mutamento di condotta della Turchia è avvenuto nel contesto della più generale e complessa trasformazione dello scenario eurasiatico, tra i cui elementi caratterizzanti sono da registrare la riaffermazione della Russia su scala continentale e globale, la potente emersione della Cina e dell’India nell’ambito geoeconomico e finanziario e, per quanto concerne la potenza statunitense, il suo logoramento sul piano militare in Afghanistan e in Iràq.

Quello che, a far data dal crollo del muro di Berlino e dal collasso sovietico, sembrava apparire come l’avanzamento inarrestabile della “Nazione necessaria” verso il centro della massa continentale eurasiatica, seguendo le due seguenti predeterminate direttrici di marcia:

 - una, procedente dall’Europa continentale, volta all’inclusione, a colpi di “rivoluzioni colorate”, nella propria sfera d’influenza dell’ex “estero vicino” sovietico, prontamente ribattezzato la “Nuova Europa”, secondo la definizione di Rumsfeld, e destinata strategicamente, nel tempo, a “premere” contro una Russia ormai allo stremo;

- l’altra, costituita dalla lunga strada che dal Mediterraneo si protrae verso le nuove repubbliche centroasiatiche, volta a tagliare in due la massa euroafroasiatica e a creare un permanente vulnus geopolitico nel cuore dell’Eurasia;

si era arrestato nel volgere di pochi anni nel pantano afgano.

Falliti gli ultimi tentativi di “rivoluzioni colorate” e sommovimenti telediretti da Washington nel Caucaso e nelle Repubbliche centroasiatiche, rispettivamente a causa della fermezza di Mosca e delle congiunte politiche eurasiatiche di Cina e Russia, messe in atto, tra l’altro, attraverso la Organizzazione della Conferenza di Shanghai (OCS), la Comunità economica eurasiatica e il consolidamento di relazioni di amicizia e cooperazione militare, gli USA al termine del primo decennio del nuovo secolo dovevano riformulare le proprie strategie eurasiatiche.


La prassi egemonica atlantica


L’assunzione del paradigma geopolitico proprio al sistema occidentale a guida statunitense, articolato sulla dicotomia Stati Uniti versus Eurasia e sul concetto di “pericolo strategico”3, induce gli analisti che lo praticano a privilegiare gli aspetti critici delle varie aree bersaglio degli interessi atlantici. Tali aspetti sono costituiti comunemente dalle tensioni endogene dovute in particolare a problematiche interetniche, disequilibri sociali, disomogeneità religiosa e culturale4, frizioni geopolitiche. Le soluzioni approntate riguardano un ventaglio di interventi che spaziano dal ruolo degli USA e dei loro alleati nella “ricostruzione” degli “stati falliti” (Failed States) secondo modalità diversificate (tutte comunque miranti a diffondere i “valori occidentali” della democrazia e della libera iniziativa, senza tenere in alcun conto le peculiarità e le tradizioni culturali locali), fino all’intervento militare diretto. Quest’ultimo viene giustificato, a seconda delle occasioni, come una risposta necessaria per la difesa degli interessi statunitensi e del cosiddetto ordine internazionale oppure, nel caso specifico degli stati o governi che l’Occidente ha valutato, preventivamente e significativamente, in accordo alle regole del soft power, “canaglia”, quale estremo rimedio per la difesa delle popolazioni e la salvaguardia dei diritti umani5.

Considerando che la prospettiva geopolitica statunitense è tipicamente quella di una potenza talassica, che interpreta il rapporto con le altre nazioni o entità geopolitiche muovendo dalla propria condizione di “isola”6, essa identifica il bacino mediterraneo e l’area centroasiatica come due zone caratterizzate da una forte instabilità. Le due aree rientrerebbero nell’ambito dei cosiddetti archi di instabilità come definiti da Zbigniew Brzezinski. L’arco di instabilità o di crisi costituisce, come noto, una evoluzione ed un ampliamento del concetto geostrategico di rimland (margine marittimo e costiero) messo a punto da Nicholas J. Spykman7. Il controllo del rimland avrebbe permesso, nel contesto del sistema bipolare, il controllo della massa eurasiatica e dunque il contenimento della sua maggiore nazione, l’Unione Sovietica, ad esclusivo beneficio della “isola nordamericana”.

Nel nuovo contesto unipolare, la geopolitica statunitense ha definito come Grande Medio Oriente la lunga e larga fascia che dal Marocco giunge fino all’Asia Centrale, una fascia che andava secondo Washington “pacificata” in quanto costituiva una ampio arco di crisi, a causa delle conflittualità generate dalle disomogeneità sopra descritte. Tale impostazione, veicolata dagli studi di Samuel Huntington e dalle analisi di Zigbniew Brzezinski, spiega abbondantemente la prassi seguita dagli USA al fine di aprirsi un varco nella massa continentale eurasiatica e da lì premere sullo spazio russo per assumere l’egemonia mondiale. Tuttavia alcuni fattori “imprevisti” quali la “ripresa” della Russia, la politica eurasiatica condotta da Putin in Asia Centrale, le nuove intese tra Mosca e Pechino, nonché l’emersione della nuova Turchia (fattori che messi in relazione alle relative e contemporanee “emancipazioni” di alcuni paesi dell’America Meridionale delineano uno scenario multipolare o policentrico) hanno influito sulla ridefinizione dell’area come un Nuovo Medio Oriente. Tale evoluzione, emblematicamente, venne resa ufficiale nel corso della guerra israelo-libanese del 2006. In quell’occasione, l’allora segretario di Stato Condoleeza Rice ebbe a dire: «Non vedo l’interesse della diplomazia se è per ritornare alla situazione precedente tra Israele ed il Libano. Penso sarebbe un errore. Ciò che vediamo qui, in un certo modo, è l’inizio, sono le doglie di un nuovo Medio Oriente e qualunque cosa noi facciamo, dobbiamo essere certi che esso sia indirizzato verso il nuovo Medio Oriente per non tornare al vecchio»8. La nuova definizione era ovviamente programmatica; mirava infatti alla riaffermazione del partenariato strategico con Tel Aviv ed alla frantumazione – indebolimento dell’area vicino e medio orientale nel quadro di quello che alcuni giorni dopo la dichiarazione di Condoleeza Rice venne precisato dal primo ministro israeliano Olmert essere il “New Order” in “Medio Oriente”. Parimenti programmatico era il sintagma “Balcani eurasiatici” coniato da Brzezinski in riferimento all’area centroasiatica, giacché utile alla formulazione di una prassi geostrategica che, attraverso la destabilizzazione dell’Asia Centrale sulla base delle tensioni endogene, aveva (ed ha) lo scopo di rendere problematica la potenziale saldatura geopolitica tra Cina e Russia.

Negli anni che vanno dal 2006 alla operazione “Odyssey Dawn” contro la Libia (2011), gli USA, nonostante la retorica inaugurata dal 2009 dal nuovo inquilino della Casa Bianca, hanno di fatto perseguito una strategia mirante alla militarizzazione dell’intera striscia compresa tra il Mediterraneo e l’Asia Centrale. In particolare, gli USA hanno messo in campo, nel 2008, il dispositivo militare per l’Africa, l’Africom, attualmente (aprile 20011) impegnato nella “crisi” libica, finalizzato al radicamento della presenza statunitense in Africa in termini di controllo e di pronto intervento nel continente africano, ma anche puntato nella direzione del “nuovo” Medio Oriente e dell’Asia Centrale. In sintesi, la strategia statunitense consiste nella militarizzazione della fascia mediterranea-centroasiatica. Gli scopi principali sono:

  1. creare un cuneo tra l’Europa meridionale e l’Africa settentrionale;

  2. assicurare a Washington il controllo militare dell’Africa settentrionale e del Vicino Oriente (utilizzando anche la base di Camp Bondsteel presente nel Kosovo i Metohija), con una particolare attenzione all’area costituita da Turchia, Siria e Iràn;

  3. tagliare” in due la massa eurasiatica;

  4. allargare il cosiddetto arco di crisi nell’Asia Centrale.

Nell’ambito del primo e del secondo obiettivo, l’interesse di Washington si è rivolto principalmente verso l’Italia e la Turchia. I due paesi mediterranei, per motivi diversi (ragioni eminentemente di politica industriale ed energetica per l’Italia, ragioni più propriamente geopolitiche per Ankara, desiderosa di ricoprire un ruolo regionale di primo livello, peraltro in diretta competizione con Israele) hanno negli ultimi anni tessuto rapporti internazionali che, in prospettiva, poiché forti delle relazioni con Mosca, potevano (e possono) fornire leve utili per una potenziale exit strategy turco-italiana dalla sfera di influenza nordamericana. Il tentativo oggettivo di aumentare i propri gradi di libertà nell’agone internazionale operati da Roma e Ankara cozzavano contro non solo gli interessi generali di natura geopolitica di Washington e Londra, ma anche contro quelli più “provinciali” dell’Union méditerranéenne di Sarkozy.


Il multipolarismo tra prospettiva regionalista e eurasiatica


La prassi applicata dal sistema occidentale guidato dagli USA volta, come sopra descritto, ad ampliare le crisi in Eurasia e nel Mediterraneo al fine non della loro stabilizzazione, bensì del mantenimento della propria egemonia, mediante militarizzazione dei rapporti internazionali e coinvolgimento degli attori locali, oltre ad individuare altri futuri e probabili bersagli (Iràn, Siria, Turchia) utili al radicamento statunitense in Eurasia, pone alcune riflessioni in merito allo “stato di salute” degli USA e alla strutturazione del sistema multipolare.

Ad una analisi meno superficiale, l’aggressione alla Libia di USA, Gran Bretagna e Francia, non è affatto un caso sporadico, ma un sintomo della difficoltà di Washington di operare in maniera diplomatica e con senso di responsabilità, quale un attore globale dovrebbe avere. Esso evidenzia il carattere di rapacità tipico delle potenze in declino. Il politologo ed economista statunitense David. P. Calleo, critico della “follia unipolare” e studioso del declino degli USA, osservava nel lontano 1987 che «…le potenze in via di declino, anziché regolarsi e adattarsi, cercano di cementare il proprio barcollante predominio trasformandolo in un’egemonia rapace»10. Luca Lauriola nel suo Scacco matto all’America e a Israele. Fine dell’ultimo Impero11, sostiene, a ragione, che le potenze eurasiatiche, Russia, Cina e India trattano la potenza d’oltreatlantico, ormai “smarrita e impazzita”, in modo da non suscitare reazioni che potrebbero generare catastrofi planetarie.

Per quanto invece riguarda il processo di strutturazione del sistema multipolare, occorre rilevare che quest’ultimo avanza lentamente, non a causa delle recenti azioni statunitensi in Africa Settentrionale, ma piuttosto per l’atteggiamento “regionalista” assunto dagli attori eurasiatici (Turchia, Russia e Cina), i quali stimando il Mediterraneo e l’Asia Centrale solo in funzione dei propri interessi nazionali, non riescono a cogliere il significato geostrategico che queste aree svolgono nel più ampio scenario conflittuale tra interessi geopolitici extracontinentali (statunitensi) ed eurasiatici. La riscoperta di un unico grande spazio mediterraneo-centroasiatico, evidenziando il ruolo di “cerniera” che esso assume nell’articolazione euroafroasiatica, fornirebbe elementi operativi per superare l’ impasse “regionalista” che subisce il processo di transizione unipolare-multipolare.

 * Tiberio Graziani è direttore di “Eurasia” e presidente dell’IsAG.

1 Elena Mazzeo, “La Turchia tra Europa e Asia”, “Eurasia. Rivista di Studi Geopolitici”, a. VIII, n.1 2011.

2 La Turchia aderisce al Patto Nato il 18 febbraio 1952.

3 «Geopoliticamente l’America è un’isola al largo del grande continente eurasiatico. Il predominio da parte di una sola potenza di una delle due sfere principali dell’Eurasia — Europa o Asia — costituisce una buona definizione di pericolo strategico per gli Stati Uniti, una guerra fredda o meno. Quel pericolo dovrebbe essere sventato anche se quella potenza non mostrasse intenzioni aggressive, poiché, se queste dovessero diventare tali in seguito, l’America si troverebbe con una capacità di resistenza efficace molto diminuita e una incapacità crescente di condizionare gli avvenimenti», Henry Kissinger, L’arte della diplomazia, Sperling & Kupfer Editori, Milano 2006, pp.634–635.

«Eurasia is the world’s axial supercontinent. A power that dominated Eurasia would exercise decisive influence over two of the world’s three most economically productive regions, Western Europe and East Asia. A glance at the map also suggests that a country dominant in Eurasia would almost automatically control the Middle East and Africa. With Eurasia now serving as the decisive geopolitical chessboard, it no longer suffices to fashion one policy for Europe and another for Asia. What happens with the distribution of power on the Eurasian landmass will be of decisive importance to America’s global primacy and historical legacy.» Zbigniew Brzezinski, “A Geostrategy for Eurasia,” Foreign Affairs, 76:5, September/October 1997.

4 Enrico Galoppini, Islamofobia, Edizioni all’insegna del Veltro, Parma 2008.

5 Jean Bricmont, Impérialisme humanitaire. Droits de l’homme, droit d’ingérence, droit du plus fort?, Éditions Aden, Bruxelles 2005; Danilo Zolo, Chi dice umanità. Guerra, diritto e ordine globale, Einaudi, Torino 2000; Danilo Zolo, Terrorismo umanitario. Dalla guerra del Golfo alla strage di Gaza, Diabasis, Reggio Emilia 2009.

6 «Un tipico descrittore geopolitico è la visione degli USA come una “isola”, non troppo diversa geopoliticamente dall’Inghilterra e dal Giappone. Tale definizione esalta la loro tradizione di commercio marittimo ed interventi militari oltremare e, ovviamente, di sicurezza basata sulla distanza e l’isolamento.» Phil Kelly, “Geopolitica degli Stati Uniti d’America”, “Eurasia. Rivista di Studi Geopolitici”, a. VII, n.3 2010.

7 Nicholas Spykman, America’s Strategy in World Politics: The United States and the Balance of Power, Harcourt Brace, New York 1942.

8 «But I have no interest in diplomacy for the sake of returning Lebanon and Israel to the status quo ante. I think it would be a mistake. What we’re seeing here, in a sense, is the growing — the birth pangs of a new Middle East and whatever we do we have to be certain that we’re pushing forward to the new Middle East not going back to the old one», Special Briefing on Travel to the Middle East and Europe, US, Department of State, 21 luglio 2006

9 Tiberio Graziani, “U.S. strategy in Eurasia and drug production in Afghanistan”, Mosca , 9-10 giugno 2010 (http://www.eurasia-rivista.org/4670/u-s-strategy-in-eurasia-and-drug-production-in-afghanistan )

10 David P. Calleo, Beyond American Hegemony: The future of the Western Alliance, New York 1987, p. 142.

11 Luca Lauriola, Scacco matto all’America e a Israele. Fine dell’ultimo Impero, Palomar, Bari 2007.

Article printed from eurasia-rivista.org: http://www.eurasia-rivista.org

URL to article: http://www.eurasia-rivista.org/mediterraneo-e-asia-centrale-le-cerniere-delleurasia/9539/

Carl Schmitt: Total Enemy, Total State & Total War

Total Enemy, Total State, & Total War


Ex: http://www.counter-currents.com/

 Translated by Simona Draghici

Editor’s Note:

The following translation from Carl Schmitt appears online for the first time in commemoration of Schmitt’s birth on July 11, 1888. The translation originally appeared in Carl Schmitt, Four Essays, 1931–1938, ed. and trans. Simona Draghici (Washington, D.C.: Plutarch Press, 1999).


cs.jpgIn a certain sense, there have been total wars at all times; a theory of the total war, however, presumably dates only from the time of Clausewitz who would talk of “abstract” and “absolute” wars.”[1] Later on, under the impact of the experiences of the last Great War, the formula of total war has acquired a specific meaning and a particular effectiveness. Since 1920, it has become the prevailing catchword. It was first brought out in sharp relief in the French literature, in book titles like La guerre totale. Afterwards, between 1926 and 1928, it found its way into the language of the proceedings of the disarmament committee at Geneva. In concepts such as “war potential” (potentiel de guerre), “moral disarmament” (désarmement moral) and “total disarmament” (désarmement total). The fascist doctrine of the “total state” came to it by way of the state; the association yielded the conceptual pair: total state, total war. In Germany, the publication of the Concept of the Political has since 1927 expanded the pair of totalities to a set of three: total enemy, total war, total state. Ernst Jünger’s book of 1930 Total Mobilization made the formula part of the general consciousness. Nonetheless, it was only Ludendorff’s 1936 booklet entitled Der Totale Krieg (The Total War) that lent it an irresistible force and caused its dissemination beyond all bounds.

The formula is omnipresent; it forces into view a truth whose horrors the general consciousness would rather shun. Such formulas, however, are always in danger of becoming widespread nationally and internationally and of being degraded to summary slogans, to mere gramophone records of the publicity mill. Hence some clarifications may be appropriate.

(a) A war may be total in the sense of summoning up one’s strength to the limit, and of the commitment of everything to the last reserves.[2] It may also be called total in the sense of the unsparing use of war means of annihilation. When the well-known English author J. F. C. Fuller writes in a recent article, entitled “The First of the League Wars, Its Lessons and Omens,” that the Italian campaign in Abyssinia was a modern total war, he only refers to the use of efficacious weapons (airplanes and gas), whereas looked at from another vantage point, Abyssinia in fact was not capable of waging a modern total war nor did Italy use its reserves to the limit, reach the highest intensity, and lead to an oil blockade or to the closing of the Suez Canal, because of the pressure exerted through the sanctions imposed by the League of Nations.

(b) A war may be total either on both sides or on one side only. It may also be deliberately limited, rationed and measured out, because of the geographical situation, the war technique in use, and also the predominant political principles of both sides. The typical 18th-century war, the so-called “cabinet war,” was essentially and deliberately a partial war. It rested on the clear segregation of the soldiers participating in the war from the non-participant inhabitants and non-combatants. Nevertheless, the Seven Years War of Frederick the Great was relatively total, on Prussia’s side, when compared with the other powers’ mobilization of forces. A situation, typical of Germany, showed itself readily in that case: the adversity of geographical conditions and the foreign coalitions compelled a German state to mobilize its forces to a higher degree than its more affluent and fortunate bigger neighbors.[3]

(c) The character of the war may change during the belligerent showdown. The will to fight may grow limp or it may intensify, as it happened in the 1914–1918 world war, when the war trend on the German side towards the mobilization of all the economic and industrial reserves soon forced the English side to introduce general conscription.

(d) Finally, some other methods of confrontation and trial of strength, which are not total, always develop within the totality of war. Thus for a time, everyone seeks to avoid a total war which naturally carries a total risk. In this way, after the world war, there were the so-called military reprisals (the 1923 Corfu Conflict, Japan-China in 1932), followed by the attempts at non-military, economic sanctions, according to Article 16 of the Covenant of the League of Nations (against Italy, autumn 1935), and finally, certain methods of power testing on foreign soil (Spain 1936–1937) emerged in a way that could be correctly interpreted only in close connection with the total character of modern warfare. They are intermediate and transitional forms between open war and true peace; they derive their meaning from the fact that total war looms large in the background as a possibility, and an understandable caution recommends itself in the delineation of the conflictual spaces. Likewise, it is only from this point of view that they can be grasped by the science of international law.


The core of the matter lies in warfare. From the nature of the total war one may grasp the character and the whole aspect of state totality; from the special character of the decisive weapons one may deduce the peculiar character and aspect of the totality of war. But it is the total enemy that gives the total war its meaning.[4]

The different services and types of warfare, land warfare, sea warfare, air warfare, they each experience the totality of war in a particular way. A corresponding world of notions and ideas piles on each of these types of warfare. The traditional notions of “levée en masse” (levy), “nation armée” (nation in arms), and “Volk in Waffen” (the people in arms) belong to land warfare.[5] Out of these notions emerged the continental doctrine of total war, essentially as a doctrine of land warfare, and that thanks mainly to Clausewitz. Sea warfare, on the other hand, has its own strategic and tactical methods and criteria; moreover, until recently, it has been first and foremost a war against the opponent’s trade and economy, whence a war against non-combatants, an economic war, which by its laws of blockade, contraband, and prizes, drew neutral trade into the hostilities, as well. Air warfare has not so far built up a similar fully-fledged and independent system of its own. There is no doctrine of air warfare yet that would correspond to the world of notions and concepts accumulated with regard to land and sea warfare. Nonetheless, as a consequence of air warfare, the overall configuration sways in the main towards a three-dimensional total war.

The “if” of a total war is beyond any doubt today. The “how” may vary. The totality is perceptible from opposite vantage points. Hence the standard type of guide and leader in a total war is necessarily different. It would be too simple an equation to accept that the soldier will step into the centre of this totality as the prevailing type in a total war to the same extent as in other kinds of wars previously.[6] If, as it has been said, total mobilization abolishes the separation of the soldier from the civilian, it may very well happen that the soldier changes into a civilian as the civilian changes into a soldier, or both may change into something new, a third alternative. In reality, it all depends on the general character of the war. A real war of religion turns the soldiers into the tools of priests or preachers. A total war that is waged on behalf of the economy becomes the tool of economic power groups. There are other forms in which the soldier himself is the typical model and the ascending expression of the character of the people. Geographical conditions, racial and social peculiarities of all kinds, are factors that determine the type of warfare waged by great nations. Even today it is unlikely that a nation could engage in all the three kinds of warfare to a degree equal to the three-dimensional total war. It is probable that the centre of gravity in the deployment of forces will always rest with one or the other of the three kinds of warfare and the doctrine of total war will draw on it.[7]

Until now the history of the European peoples has been dominated by the contrast of the English sea warfare with the Continental land warfare. It is not a matter of “traders and heroes” or that sort of thing, but rather the recognition that any of the various kinds of warfare may become total, and out of its own characteristics generate a special world of notions and ideals as its own doctrine and also relevant to international and constitutional law, particularly in the assessment of the soldier’s worth and of his position in the general body of the people. It would be a mistake to regard the English sea warfare of the last three centuries in the light of the total land warfare of Clausewitz’s theory, essentially as mere trade and economic but not total warfare, and to misinterpret it as unconnected with and markedly different from totality. It is the English sea warfare that generated the kernel of a total world view.[8]

The English sea warfare is total in its capacity for total enmity. It knows how to mobilize religious, ideological, spiritual, and moral forces as only few of the great wars in world history have done. The English sea warfare against Spain was a world-wide combat of the Germanic and Romance peoples, between Protestantism and Catholicism, Calvinism and Jesuitism, and there are few instances of such outbursts of enmity as intense and final as Cromwell’s against the Spaniards. The English war against Napoleon likewise changed from a sea war into a “crusade.” In the war against Germany between 1914 and 1918, the world-wide English propaganda knew how to whip up enormous moral and spiritual energies in the name of civilization and humanity, of democracy and freedom, against the Prussian-German “militarism.” The English mind had also proved its ability to interpret the industrial-technical upsurge of the 19th century in the terms of the English worldview. Herbert Spencer drew an extremely effective picture of history that was disseminated all over the world, in countless works of popularization, the propagandistic force of which proved its worth in the 1914–1918 World War. It was the philosophy of mankind’s progress, presented as an evolution from feudalism to trade and industry, from the political to the economic, from soldiers to industrialists, from war to peace. It portrayed the soldier essentially as Prussian-German, eo ipso “feudal reactionary,” a “medieval” figure standing in the way of progress and peace. Moreover, out of its specificity, the English sea warfare evolved a full, self-contained system of international law. It asserted itself and its own concepts held on their own against the corresponding concepts of Continental international law throughout the 19th century. There is an Anglo-Saxon concept of enemy, which in essence rejects the differentiation between combatants and non-combatants, and an Anglo-Saxon conception of war that incorporates the so-called economic war. In short, the fundamental concepts and norms of this English international law are total as such and certainly indicative of an ideology in itself total.

Finally, the English constitutional regulations turned the subordination of the soldiers to the civilians into an ideological principle and imposed it upon the Continent during the liberal 19th century. By those standards, civilization lies in the rule of the bourgeois, civilian ideal which is essentially unsoldierly. Accordingly, the constitution is always but a civil-bourgeois system in which, as Clemenceau put it, the soldier’s only raison d’être is to defend the civilian bourgeois society, while basically he is subject to civilian command. The Prussian soldier state carried on a century-long political struggle on the home front against this bourgeois constitutional ideal. It succumbed to it in the Autumn of 1918. The history of Prussian Germany’s home politics from 1848 to 1918 was a ceaseless conflict between the army and parliament, an uninterrupted battle which the government had to fight with the parliament over the structure of the army, and the army budget necessary to make ready for an unavoidable war, that were determined not by the necessities of foreign policy but rather by compromises regarding internal policy. The dictate of Versailles, which stipulated the army’s organization and its equipment to the smallest detail, in an agreement of foreign policy, was preceded by half a century of periodical agreements of internal policy between the Prussian-German soldier state and its internal policy opponents, in which all the details of the organization and the equipment of the army had been decided by the internal policy. The conflict between bourgeois society and the Prussian soldier state led to an unnatural isolation of the War Office from the power of command and to many other separations, consistently rooted in the opposition between a bourgeois constitutional ideal imported from England either directly or through France and Belgium, on the one hand, and the older constitutional ideal of the German soldiery, on the other.[9]

Today Germany has surmounted that division and achieved a close integration of its soldier force.[10] Indeed, attempts will not fail to be made to describe it as militarism, in the manner of earlier propaganda methods, and to hold Germany guilty of the advent of total war. Such questions of guilt too belong to the totality of the ideological wrangles. Le combat spirituel est aussi brutal que la bataille d’hommes (spiritual combat is as brutal as the battles of men). Nonetheless, before nations stagger into a total war once more, one must raise the question whether a total enmity truly exists among the European nations nowadays. War and enmity belong to the history of nations. But the worst misfortune only occurs wherever the enmity is generated by the war itself, as in the 1914–1918 war, and not as it would be right and sensible, namely that an older, unswayed enmity, true and total to the Day of Judgment, should led to a total war.

Translator’s Notes

Originally published in Völkerbund und Völkerrecht, vol. 4, 1937, this essay was reproduced in Posirionen und Begriffe im Kampf mit Weimar-Gent-Versailles, 1929–1939, (Hamburg, 1940), pp. 235–239.

1. General Carl von Clausewitz (1780–1831) is best known for his book Vom Kriege, never finished and published posthumously, which incidentally has been translated into English under the title On War. There are numerous versions available in print.

2. Carl Schmitt’s own political principles of “will” and “energy,” components of his qualitative concept of total state, derive from this characteristic feature of “total war”: collective determination to assume a cause considered worthwhile and unreserved commitment to its fulfillment. As a generalized rallying around and enthusiasm for a cause and a particular course of action, it is a frequent phenomenon of social psychology, yet its usually ephemeral character makes it unfit as a durable basis of any social structure. I remember the enthusiasm with which in 1982, to a man, the Argentines, for instance, rallied to the idea of going to war to free the Maldives and hurried to put it into practice, and the accompanying hatred which grew against the British. The enthusiasm cooled off quickly, but not the hatred, which lingered on. To perpetuate the enthusiasm, a plethora of other factors have to be brought in, of which, in the case of Germany at the beginning of the ’thirties, Carl Schmitt actually had not a clue.

3. The “lesson” is in keeping with the Hitlerite Frederician cult and legitimating tradition and does not claim to be historically accurate. Although a digression that seems out of place, it has a certain significance for the time it was made. In the autumn of 1936, Hitler circulated a memorandum revealing his expansionist intentions. Then in 1937, the organization of the nation to serve those intentions began, a process which coincided with the rise of the SS state. In November of the same year the German media were ordered to keep silent about the preparations for a “total war.” Bearing all that in mind, Schmitt’s short digression reads more as a warning of danger than a point of military strategy.

4 . What is interesting here is his insistence on the existential essence of the phenomenon, which is consonant with his earlier definition of the political and at the same time renders the distinction between the professional soldier and the civilian meaningless. Moreover, total enmity with its implicit elimination of the adversary excludes any prospect of a peace treaty, as the war is to go on until one of the belligerents is annihilated.

5. Das Volk in Waffen (The Nation in Arms) happens to be the title of a work on total war by Colmar von der Goltz (1843–1916), published in 1883, and which is an important stepping stone in the reflection on modern warfare that led to Ludendorff’s book.

6. At the beginning of February 1938, Adolf Hitler became commander in chief of the German armed forces, appointing General Keitel his assistant at the head of the High Command of the Armed Forces, as the War Ministry was dissolved.

7. Eventually only the Soviet Union came closest to Carl Schmitt’s expectations, while the United States waged a fully-fledged three-dimensional war, dictated by its geographical position and sustained by its vast economic and technical resources most of which remained outside the battle zone.

8. For a broader treatment of the subject-matter see Carl Schmitt’s Land und Meer, which as Land and Sea is available in an English translation (Washington, D.C.: Plutarch Press, 1997).

9. The conflict between the civil society and the military in Germany was the subject-matter of a longer essay by Carl Schmitt, published in Hamburg in 1934 under the title Staatsgefüge und Zusammenbruch des Zweites Reiches. Der Sieg des Burgers über den Soldaten (The State Structure and the Collapse of the Second Reich. The Burghers’ Victory Over the Soldiers).


10. Röhm, the ideological soldier, had been eliminated in 1934, at the same time as the political soldiers, the Generals von Schleicher and von Bredow. Furthermore, as already mentioned in note 6 above, the War Ministry ceased to exist at the beginning of 1938, while the Commander in Chief, Field Marshal Werner von Blomberg was removed from his post for having compromised himself by marrying a “lady with a past,” and his prospective successor, General von Fritsch was forced to resign on a trumped-up Charge of homosexuality. At the same time, sixteen other generals were retired and forty-four were transferred. Göring who had been very active in carrying out this “integration” got for it only the title of field marshal, as Hitler kept for himself the supreme military command.


Article printed from Counter-Currents Publishing: http://www.counter-currents.com

URL to article: http://www.counter-currents.com/2011/07/total-enemy-total-state-and-total-war/

US-Regierung gibt offen zu, mexikanische Drogenbanden mit Waffen beliefert zu haben


US-Regierung gibt offen zu, mexikanische Drogenbanden mit 30.000 Waffen beliefert zu haben

Mike Adams

Nun wurde endlich ausführlich darüber berichtet, dass unter der Regierung Obama amerikanische Bundesagenten aktiv daran beteiligt waren, mehr als 30.000 voll funktionsfähige Waffen in die Hände mexikanischer Drogenbanden gegeben zu haben. Sie stellten alle Überwachungs- und Verfolgungsaktivitäten überall dort ein, wo diese Waffenverkäufe abliefen.


Es handelt sich hier nicht um eine Verschwörungstheorie oder einen Kriminalroman. Es wird offen zugegeben, dass diese Operation vom BATFE (Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, besser bekannt als »ATF«, eine amerikanische Bundesbehörde mit polizeilichen Befugnissen, die dem Justizministerium untersteht) auf Befehl Washingtons durchgeführt wurde. Das Programm trug den Namen »Fast and Furious«.

Mehr: http://info.kopp-verlag.de/hintergruende/geostrategie/mik...

vendredi, 22 juillet 2011

Le Tribunal de l'histoire ne reconnaît que les vainqueurs finaux


Le Tribunal de l’histoire ne reconnaît que les vainqueurs finaux

par Marc ROUSSET

Julien Freund, dans L’essence du politique, remarquait que la morale, domaine du privé, ne peut interférer avec le politique, domaine de l’espace public, de l’histoire et de la survie politique. L’histoire est le domaine  de la loi du plus fort  et de la « Realpolitik » quel que soit le camouflage dont on l’habille. L’« Irrealpolitik » du politiquement correct et des droits de l’hommistes se refuse de penser la conflictualité, ce qui est un déni des réalités. Et selon l’ancien chancelier Bismarck, cité par Vladimir Poutine, « l’important n’est pas l’intention, mais le potentiel ». Quant à Joseph S. Nye, ancien vice-Secrétaire à la Défense, « la puissance militaire est à la sécurité ce que l’oxygène est à la respiration : on n’y prête guère attention, sauf lorsqu’on vient à  manquer », comme en Libye, où les forces  aérienne françaises et anglaises manquent de munitions et  ne peuvent se passer des A.W.A.C.S. et de l’aide américaine pour mettre en place la zone d’exclusion aérienne. À quand la sortie de l’O.T.A.N., une véritable défense européenne avec un noyau dur franco-allemand et un budget de défense double pour ces deux pays, soit 3 % minimum du P.I.B., permettant de mettre en place les bases d’une véritable défense européenne ? Le général de Gaulle avait porté l’effort de défense  militaire de la France jusqu’à 5,1 % du P.I.B. !

Guillaume Faye, dans La nouvelle question juive, remarque combien il est rigoureusement impossible qu’Israël, qu’il se fasse faucon ou colombe, puisse un jour vivre en paix avec les Arabes dans une zone de co-prospérité comme le souhaite l’O.N.U. Le droit sur une terre invoqué par les Juifs comme par les Arabes, ne vaut rien face aux faits car seuls comptent la force, la fécondité et la capacité de se maintenir. Personne n’a jamais raison face au Tribunal de l’histoire qui ne reconnaît que les vainqueurs finaux.

Quant au royaume franc de Jérusalem, né de la première Croisade  et de la prise de Jérusalem, le 15 juillet 1099 par Godefroy de Bouillon, il ne dura que deux siècles. Après de nombreuses péripéties et malgré une troisième Croisade conduite par Philippe II Auguste et Richard Cœur de Lion, tout comme une croisade de Saint Louis qui gouverna le royaume de 1250 à 1254, le sultan mamelouk Baybars reprit petit à petit les différentes places fortes du royaume. La dernière place forte franque fut Saint-Jean d’Acre qui tomba le 28 mai 1291.

À Montréal, dans les années 1970, il était complètement illusoire d’espérer pouvoir garder Montréal bilingue. Soit Montréal devenait anglophone, soit Montréal devenait francophone. Dans le pseudo-équilibre bilingue de l’époque, les anglophones grignotaient en fait les francophones car les immigrants, au nom de la liberté du père de famille, envoyaient leurs enfants  dans les écoles anglophones. Seule la Loi 101, suite à l’action terroriste  du Front de libération du Québec (F.L.Q.) et politique du Parti Québécois, a fait triompher dans l’immédiat les francophones qui se sont inspirés de la maxime de Lacordaire  comme quoi « c’est la liberté qui opprime et l’intervention qui libère ».

De même pendant la Guerre de Cent Ans des Français d’Amérique, les « coureurs des bois » gagnèrent de magnifiques batailles (Fort-Duquesne en 1754, Fort-Carillon en 1758); ils occupèrent les terres vides en se mariant parfois avec les Indiens, menacèrent d’encerclement complet les colonies anglaises, mais perdirent la guerre car les Anglais s’étaient établis plus au Sud, beaucoup plus attractif pour le peuplement et l’activité économique grâce à des apports britanniques, hollandais, suédois et allemands. Par la suite, les colonies anglaises, plus fortement peuplées, n’eurent de cesse d’éliminer par la force les possesseurs français. En 1763, suite au traité de Paris, l’Amérique du Nord était définitivement perdue pour la France.

Imaginons également un instant ce que seraient aujourd’hui nos sociétés, notre droit, nos valeurs si l’Allemagne avait gagné la Seconde Guerre mondiale, ce dont il s’en est fallu de peu. Toutes les valeurs qui paraissent aujourd’hui évidentes et indiscutable dans nos démocraties seraient inversées et la majeure partie des populations y adhérerait, tout comme la quasi-totalité des Allemands jusqu’au 8 mai 1945. On a pu dire que la France jusqu’à la Libération comptait quarante millions de pétainistes ! Malheur aux vaincus… (Vae victis !). Nos sociétés seraient aujourd’hui officiellement racistes, pratiqueraient la préférence communautaire, ne connaîtraient pas le libre-échange mondialiste, l’immigration extra-européenne, vivraient le culte des héros, d’un pouvoir central  fort, du dépassement de soi, de l’abnégation totale pour son pays, d’un holisme sacré proche des valeurs traditionnelles de l’Antiquité et de celle nos pères à Verdun… en lieu et place…  du droit de l’hommisme, de l’individualisme hédoniste matérialiste, du métissage, du culte de l’argent, de l’antiracisme, de la démocratie… avec des lois qui seraient exactement le contraire des lois liberticides Pleven et Gayssot.

Le  tribunal de Nuremberg, s’il fut effectivement le lieu de justice des droits de l’homme, fut avant tout le lieu de justice unilatéral des vainqueurs finaux envers les vaincus. Les prétentions à une justice universelle comme on le voit de nos jours avec le « Deux poids, deux mesures » pour la Syrie et la Libye ou les Serbes et les Albanais du Kosovo, relèvent de l’utopie. Staline, le « mangeur d’hommes », le tyran rouge, le responsable du massacre de plus de quatre mille officiers polonais « nationalistes et contre-révolutionnaires » en 1940 dans la forêt de Katyn, l’un des plus grands criminels de l’Histoire avec sept millions de morts suite à la famine planifiée en Ukraine en 1932 -1933 et onze millions d’ennemis de classe emprisonnés, fusillés, torturés ou envoyés au Goulag, avait aussi sa place devant le tribunal de Nuremberg, alors qu’il en était  juge .


Au lendemain du jugement de Nuremberg, le général américain Curtis Lemay, commandant des forces alliées en Europe, responsable de l’opération « Pointblank », l’un des stratèges des bombardements qui rasèrent les villes allemandes a pu dire : « Si Hitler avait gagné, c’est moi qui aurais été jugé pour crimes de guerre ». De leur côté, les Britanniques, en particulier le chef du « Bomber Command » Arthur Harris que les Allemands considèrent comme un criminel de guerre, prétendaient dresser la population  par ce « moral bombing » contre Hitler, mais la Gestapo et la guillotine travaillaient sans relâche en Allemagne. Les bombardements de terreur sur la population civile allemande furent un échec, mais constituaient de crimes de guerre car ils visaient expressément des populations civiles pour faire capituler des militaires. De nombreux prisonniers et travailleurs étrangers remplaçaient dans les ateliers les Allemands mobilisés et les villes étaient peuplées surtout de femmes, d’enfants et de vieillards; le but recherché était donc bien de tuer les familles des soldats pour les démoraliser. Les 135 millions de tonnes de bombes anglo-américaines lâchées sur l’Allemagne (à comparer avec  les seulement 0,58 millions de tonnes sur la France et  20 000 morts français) ont fait plus de 600 000 victimes en Allemagne. En février 1945, une attaque sur la petite ville d’horlogers de Pforzheim tua 20 000 des 60 000 habitants. On avait testé les bombes incendiaires sur Lübeck en mars 1942. L’opération Gomorrhe sur Hambourg en août 1943 se solda par 40 000 tués, asphyxiés ou brûlés vifs dans un incendie de 20 km2 (44 % des immeubles détruits). Cologne, Brême, Würzbourg, Fribourg et bien d’autres cités furent rasées. En août 1944, ce fut l’opération Tonnerre contre Berlin : 20 000 bombardiers tuèrent ou blessèrent 220 000 habitants. En février 1945, ce fut le tour de la ville de Dresde qui était bourrée de réfugiés en provenance de l’Est, avec des bombes au phosphore pour transformer les êtres humains en torches vivantes et les égouts en feu ! Dans les nuits du 13 au 15 février 1945, les bombes lâchées par 800 bombardiers alliés sur Dresde font 135 000 morts et détruisent 80 % de la ville. Le chef du « Bomber Command » Arthur Harris avait donc aussi sa place devant le Tribunal de Nuremberg. Et que dire du crime de guerre, relancé par le roman du Prix Nobel Günter Grass, sur le torpillage du Wilhelm-Gustloff plein à craquer de civils dans la Baltique par un sous-marin soviétique, tout comme la vitrification d’Hiroshima et de Nagasaki ou des bombardements au Viêtnam ou en Irak qui resteront à jamais impunis par cette  soi-disant  justice universelle à sens unique.

Et il en sera de même pour le sort que connaîtra le colonel  Mouammar Kadhafi, suite à l’agression d’un pays souverain par l’O.T.A.N. au nom d’une pseudo-morale occidentale ainsi que celui des différentes parties prenantes, après le retrait programmé de l’Occident et la nouvelle stratégie en Afghanistan. In fine, tout dépend du verdict des armes. Rien n’a changé depuis l’ordre de destruction du premier temple par Nabuchodonosor en 587 av. J.-C., du second Temple par Titus en 70 et les fables de la Fontaine : « La raison du plus fort est toujours la meilleure ». Georges  Gusdorf, lui, nous rappelait que « tout n’est que force et rapport de force ».

Marc Rousset

Article printed from Europe Maxima: http://www.europemaxima.com

URL to article: http://www.europemaxima.com/?p=2048

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