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dimanche, 01 mars 2020

Een aantal woorden en begrippen waarmee u dit jaar geconfronteerd zal worden

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Een aantal woorden en begrippen waarmee u dit jaar geconfronteerd zal worden
 
Francis Van den Eynde
Ex: Nieuwsbrief Knooppunt Delta, nr. 145, Februari 2020

Het leidt geen twijfel dat u ook dit jaar overspoeld zal worden door de politiek correcte “new speak”  die ons langs alle mogelijke kanalen door de heersende ideologie zal opgedrongen worden. Dat jargon zal zoals altijd bestaan uit een aantal woorden en begrippen waarvan sommigen al een tijdje in gebruik zijn, andere pas recent ontstaan zijn en een aantal andere in de komende maanden nog zullen uitgevonden worden. Maar wat er ook van zij: begrijpen wat er precies mee bedoeld wordt, kan best van pas komen. We vonden het dan ook nodig u er nu al enkele voor te stellen. Dit gebeurt in alfabetische volgorde en uiteraard worden ze stuk voor stuk van een summiere uitleg voorzien.
 
Allochtoon: een term die al een tijdje meegaat en waarop stilaan sleet komt. Ondertussen mag hij wel beschouwd worden als het voorlopig einde van een lange evolutie die bij ‘vreemdeling’ startte. Die ‘vreemdeling’ werd na een tijdje een ‘gastarbeider’, daarna een ‘migrant’, een ‘mede-Vlaming’, dan iemand uit een ‘etnisch culturele minderheid’ en is dus nu voorlopig een ‘allochtoon’. Want vermits al die benamingen na een tijdje vervangen werden omdat ze mogelijkerwijze ‘pejoratief’ konden overkomen, is er geen reden om te denken dat dit uiteindelijk ook voor’ allochtoon’ niet het geval zou zijn. In Gent is het al zover, vermits die term verbannen werd uit de woordenschat van de stedelijke administratie. Het woord werd zelfs door burgemeester in het Baudelopark officieel begraven. Het stadsbestuur  heeft het vervangen door  ‘Gentse Turk’, ‘Gentse Noord-Afrikaan’, enz. Het vergat echter mede te delen of het woord ‘allochtoon’ toch nog gebruikt wordt wanneer het mensen betreft die niet in Gent wonen. Maar gezien de universele roeping van het huidig bestuurscollege van de Arteveldestad zal hieraan wel binnenkort een mouw worden gepast.

Antipolitiek: Een woord dat plots ontstond na de verrassende verkiezingsoverwinning van het VB op 24 november 1991. Niemand wist van waar het kwam of wie het had uitgevonden, maar in de eerste jaren na  “zwarte zondag” (ook new speak) werd er zowel  in de politiek als in de media veelvuldig gebruik van gemaakt. Daarna geraakte het stilaan onder de radar. De laatste tijd duikt het echter regelmatig weer op. Als u zou denken dat het woord betrekking heeft op mensen die met politiek niets willen te maken hebben, bent u volledig verkeerd. Antipolitiek is een terminologie die voorbehouden is voor mensen die een politieke mening huldigen die afwijkt van deze van de heersende ideologie, dit met de bedoeling ze uit het democratisch debat te bannen. In kerkelijke termen zouden ze ketters zijn.

Belgische djihadist: er is geen ontkomen aan, een radicale moslim die vanuit ons land vertrokken is om in Syrië of Irak aan de kant van IS te gaan vechten, mag alleen zo genoemd worden. Van zijn oorspronkelijke nationaliteit mag absoluut geen gewag worden gemaakt. Of hij de Belgische nationaliteit verkregen heeft of niet, is ook van geen enkel belang. Hij is van hier vertrokken en dus is hij Belg en uiteraard nooit een allochtoon.

Burgerbeweging: gewone burgers die spontaan samen een politieke agenda op stellen en hiermee het stelsel van de politieke partijen willen vervangen. Er zijn nogal wat mensen waaronder een aantal journalisten die, vaststellend dat de politieke partijen de huidige crisis niet aan kunnen, erop rekenen dat burgerbewegingen hierin wel zullen slagen. Ze zien hierbij over het hoofd dat van zodra die bewegingen aan verkiezingen zullen deelnemen, ze niets anders zullen zijn dan partijen zoals alle anderen.

Child free: dit epitheton definieert mensen uit Europa die bewust kinderloos willen blijven omdat… de overbevolking van de Derde Wereld een ernstige bedreiging voor het leefmilieu vormt.

Culturele accaparatie: een misdrijf waaraan westerlingen zich vaak schuldig maken wanneer zij gebruik maken van voorwerpen, kledij e.d. die oorspronkelijk bij een niet-blank (excuseer: wit) volk horen. De voetbalploeg AA Gent werd door een instelling van de Verenigde  Naties van culturele accaparatie beschuldigd, toen die vernam dat de club een Indiaan met een veren hoofddeksel als symbool gebruikte. Opgelet! Culturele accaparatie kan slechts in één richting gebeuren. Een zwarte Afrikaan in drieledig pak en met een stropdas om de nek pleegt geen culturele accaparatie. Een Vlaamse vrouw die op het strand een zijden sari boven haar badpak draagt, doet dat wel.

Dekoloniseren: U dacht dat de tijd van het kolonialisme al lang achter ons lag, Kongo is tenslotte al zestig jaar onafhankelijk. Fout dus. Volgens de huidige generatie bobo’s en culturo’s is het nog nooit zo actueel geweest. Ze zijn namelijk tot de ontdekking gekomen dat we in onze geest nog altijd kolonialen zijn en dit onder meer omdat we nog steeds niet bezwijken onder de schuldcomplexen m.b.t. wat onze voorouders allemaal zouden uitgespookt hebben. Er wordt dan ook geprobeerd ons die op te dringen via toneel (een specialiteit van de KVS in Brussel en de NTG in Gent), film, literatuur, radio, TV en een paar kranten (De Standaard, De Morgen…).  Hier bestaat een naam voor: hersenspoelen… Opgelet: argumenteren dat wij toch niet verantwoordelijk kunnen worden gesteld voor wat de generaties die ons vooraf gingen al dan niet hebben uitgespookt, heeft totaal geen zin. De kleur van uw huid volstaat om uw schuld onomstotelijk aan te tonen.

Duurzaam: Een epitheton dat bij alles past dat positief moet worden voorgesteld. Er bestaat in Gent zelfs een lagere school die zich als duurzaam voorstelt. Het is niet duidelijk of hiermee bedoeld wordt dat de leerlingen geacht worden er langer dan zes jaar les te volgen.

Eye rape: een neologisme dat maar zeer recent ontstaan is. Een linkse feministische vrouw die te lang en te nadrukkelijk aangestaard werd door een man die niet in haar smaak zou kunnen vallen, zal beweren het slachtoffer van “eye rape” te zijn. Andere vrouwen zouden zoiets ook best gênant en vervelend vinden maar het daarom nog niet verkrachting noemen.

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Fascisme: een evergreen van het zuiverste water. Het woord werd zo vaak gebruikt dat het helemaal geen betekenis meer heeft. Er mag trouwens van uitgegaan worden dat zij die het overal menen te zien opduiken, weinig of niets van het historisch fascisme afweten. Een Franse denker zei ooit dat iedereen wel eens de fascist van iemand anders is geweest. M.a.w. het is gewoon een scheldwoord dat intellectueler klinkt dan andere en dat net zoals de “reductio ad Hitlerum” een ultieme redding biedt voor wie over geen enkel ernstig argument beschikt om een politieke tegenstander de mond te snoeren.

Femicide: Vrouwen zouden naar verluidt vaker dan mannen het slachtoffer zijn van passionele moorden en van uit de hand gelopen verstoorde relaties. Er kan hier gerust worden uit geconcludeerd dat mannen brutaler zijn en zichzelf minder onder controle hebben dan vrouwen. Maar dat volstaat niet voor linkse feministen. Ze zijn van mening dat vrouwen vooral vermoord worden omdat ze vrouw zijn en noemen dit femicide, naar analogie met genocide … (commentaar overbodig). Wat er ook van haar: er is verbetering op komst want zowel in Parijs als in Brussel werd de laatste maanden tegen femicide betoogd en dat zal zeker helpen…

Islamofobie: deze term is niet nieuw maar zal ongetwijfeld nog lange tijd in zwang blijven. Het woord werd een decennium terug in Teheran naar aanleiding van een radicaal islamitisch congres uitgevonden. Het werd zeer snel gretig overgenomen door al wie zich in het westen links progressief noemt om het naar het hoofd te slingeren van al wie de lef heeft om zich kritisch over de islam uit te laten. Zij die dat doen, beseffen niet dat een fobie een psychiatrische ziekte is en dat ze zich hiermee op het pad begeven van de vroegere communistische Sovjet-Unie waar dissidenten in psychiatrische instellingen werden opgesloten.

Omstreden: een woord dat voornamelijk door de VRT wordt gebruikt en alleen maar betekent dat de persoon van wie het gezegd wordt niet in de smaak valt van de redacties van de openbare omroep. Salvini, Viktor Orban, Theo Francken, Boris Johnson zijn omstreden, J.M. Le Pen was dat jarenlang maar de leiders van de communistische totalitaire staten China, Cuba en Vietnam waren dit nooit en de theocratische dictatuur die het in Iran voor het zeggen hebben, werd ook nooit zo genoemd.


Dit is, geachte lezer, een eerste lijst van begrippen die u de komende maanden vaak zal horen of lezen.
Volgende maand leggen wij u een andere voor.
 
 
Francis Van den Eynde

samedi, 29 février 2020

Les Etats-Unis et les traités internationaux ou «Pourquoi se gêner?»

par Gérard Chesnel*

Ex: https://geopragma.fr

Le 31 janvier dernier, la Maison Blanche a publié un communiqué annonçant que « le Président Donald Trump avait annulé la politique de l’administration Obama interdisant aux forces militaires américaines d’employer des mines antipersonnel en dehors de la péninsule coréenne », en utilisant un argument assez fallacieux : les restrictions imposées par l’administration Obama pouvaient occasionner un « désavantage sévère » pendant un conflit. Dans un deuxième paragraphe, comme pour s’excuser, le communiqué précise que ces mines seraient à durée de vie limitée et qu’on s’efforcerait de réduire les dommages involontaires causés aux populations civiles et aux forces alliées.

Cette décision entre en conflit frontal avec la Convention d’Ottawa sur l’interdiction de ce type d’armes. Elle n’a toutefois fait l’objet d’aucun commentaire à Berlin ou à Londres. La France, elle, a réagi par le truchement de la Commission Nationale pour l’élimination des mines antipersonnel, où le Ministère de l’Europe et des Affaires Etrangères est représenté par un Ambassadeur. La CNEMA souligne qu’il s’agit d’un « grave recul sur un sujet qui fait le plus large consensus dans la communauté internationale, la Convention d’Ottawa ayant été ratifiée par 164 pays. Les Etats-Unis (qui ne l’avaient pas signée), la respectaient de fait et, en particulier depuis l’élection du Président Trump, avaient fortement augmenté leur contribution aux opérations de déminage dans le monde. Les Etats-Unis, dont les forces sont exposées comme les nôtres, en particulier au Moyen-Orient et au Sahel, à la prolifération des engins explosifs improvisés, ne devraient en aucun cas courir le risque d’affaiblir la lutte contre ces engins de mort, en justifiant leur utilisation quels que soient les précautions et les dispositifs imaginés pour protéger les populations civiles, qui inspirent les plus grands doutes ». Le communiqué de la CNEMA poursuit : « Cette décision est d’autant moins justifiée qu’un consensus s’est désormais établi dans la communauté militaire sur le peu d’intérêt militaire des mines antipersonnel, dont les dégâts pour les populations civiles sont sans commune mesure avec l’utilité opérationnelle ».

Alors pourquoi ? En fait, cette décision, même si elle vise au premier chef l’administration Obama, s’inscrit dans une longue tradition de non-engagement des Etats-Unis dans le moindre traité, la moindre convention qui pourrait limiter en quoi que ce soit leur liberté d’action. Cela remonte aux origines du pays. Dans son message d’adieu au Congrès en 1796, George Washington déclarait déjà : « Notre véritable politique doit être d’éviter des alliances permanentes avec quelque partie que ce soit du monde étranger ». Suivit peu après, en 1823, la fameuse « doctrine Monroe » et, près d’un siècle plus tard, le retentissant refus du Sénat de ratifier la convention créant la Société des Nations, dont pourtant le père était le président américain Woodrow Wilson.

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Ce refus de s’engager touche tous les domaines, du plus important au plus modeste.

  • Dans le domaine stratégico-militaire, certes les Etats-Unis ont accepté de signer, en 1972, le traité SALT I sur la limitation des armements stratégiques, mais ils avaient affaire à un interlocuteur de même force qu’eux, l’URSS. Ils ont signé également en 1972 le traité ABM interdisant les missiles anti-missiles mais l’ont dénoncé 30 ans plus tard. Et le traité SALT II (1979), même s’il a été respecté par les deux parties, n’a jamais été ratifié par Washington. De même, le traité START I sur la réduction des armes stratégiques a bien été signé en 1991 (et ratifié seulement en 1994) mais START II (1993) n’a jamais été ratifié. Le traité New START, signé en 2010 par les Présidents Obama et Medvedev, arrive à son terme en 2021 et le Président Trump a déjà fait savoir qu’il ne serait pas reconduit. Quant au traité INF sur les armes nucléaires à portée intermédiaire, il a bien été signé en 1987 mais il vient d’être dénoncé par Washington en août dernier, au prétexte que Moscou aurait accru ces dernières années ses capacités de manière incompatible avec le traité. Enfin, rappelons que les Etats-Unis n’ont signé ni la Convention d’Ottawa sur l’interdiction des mines antipersonnel (1997), ni la Convention d’Oslo sur l’interdiction des armes à sous-munitions (2008). C’est pourtant Washington qui, dans les années 1970, a déversé sur le Laos des quantités phénoménales de ces « bombelettes » qui tuent encore aujourd’hui, en temps de paix, plus d’enfants que pendant la guerre.
  • Dans le domaine économique, les Etats-Unis ont refusé de signer la Convention de Montego Bay sur le Droit de la Mer (1973) qui crée notamment une zone économique exclusive de 200 milles autour des îles et au large des continents. Cela leur permet de continuer à piller nos ressources halieutiques notamment dans l’océan Pacifique, mais aussi dans l’océan Indien (dont le quart sud est en principe inclus dans notre ZEE).
  • Que dire de l’OMC ? Les Etats-Unis certes y ont adhéré lors de sa création en 1995 mais l’administration Trump bloque depuis deux ans la nomination de juges au tribunal d’arbitrage, entraînant sa paralysie et menaçant l’existence même de l’organisation.
  • Dans le domaine social, l’OIT a fait la liste des conventions non ratifiées par les Etats-Unis : il y en a 66. Parmi celles-ci, la convention sur le travail des enfants n’a pas, elle non plus, trouvé grâce aux yeux de Washington.
  • Pour couronner le tout, le Président Trump a dénoncé dès son élection l’accord sur le climat atteint lors de la COP 21 à Paris en 2015.

Hyper-puissance confite dans son égocentrisme, les Etats-Unis usent et abusent de leur force et de leurs monopoles. En français, on appelle cela « abus de position dominante ». Pour un Américain moyen, peu habitué aux termes juridiques même les plus simples, cela se traduit par : « Pourquoi se gêner ? »

*Gérard Chesnel, trésorier de Geopragma

Le coronavirus, une épidémie qui tombe à point !

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Le coronavirus, une épidémie qui tombe à point !

Ex: http://www.geopolintel.fr

La menace de pandémie mondiale qui affole les peuples et les gouvernements doit nous rappeler l’histoire du virus ayant frappé le Mexique. Presque dix ans plus tard, le même scénario se profile avec la peur d’une hécatombe comme celle de la grippe espagnole du début du vingtième siècle...


Il faut se méfier de ces effets de communication dont on peut suspecter qu’ils cachent la fabrication d’armes bactériologiques et peut-être leur utilisation. Les activistes écologistes qui se battent pour l’arrêt du nucléaire devraient plutôt s’inquiéter de ces laboratoires et assiéger l’OMS pour demander des comptes. Mais ils préfèrent harceler les bouchers coupables de vendre de la viande et ne se soucient pas des décès des ouvriers africains causés par l’extraction du lithium.


La pollution la plus meurtrière n’est pas celle que l’on nous montre, mais celle qui tue en dehors des circuits de communications officielles.


Il est grand temps de légiférer pour interdire ces armes bactériologiques bien plus puissantes et dangereuses que nos arsenaux nucléaires.

La grippe mexicaine, une épidémie qui tombe à point !

Un nouveau virus, qui serait une combinaison improbable de plusieurs souches de grippes, animales et humaine, adapté à l’homme, sévit depuis un mois sur le continent américain.

Le virus est apparu dans trois foyers, en milieu urbain, au Mexique, dont la situation a rapidement évolué vers l’état d’urgence, et a déjà atteint les États-Unis. D’autres cas sont suspectés à travers le monde.


Trois conditions sont requises pour qu’une pandémie puisse se déclencher : il faut qu’un nouveau virus émerge contre lequel la population n’a pas développé d’immunité, il doit être virulent, c’est-à-dire capable de provoquer une maladie grave, éventuellement mortelle et la contagiosité doit être réelle, ce qui exige la transmission directe entre humains.

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Ce nouveau virus semble remplir ces conditions et aurait donc un potentiel pandémique. Il est de type A, sous-type H1N1, le même qui fut responsable de la grippe espagnole, pandémie d’ampleur historique qui fit des dizaines de millions de morts à travers le monde. Cette nouvelle souche contient une combinaison jamais vue d’ADN de quatre virus : deux porcins, un aviaire et un humain.


« Ces événements sont très inquiétants […] en raison de l’étendue géographique des différentes apparitions ainsi que l’âge inhabituel des groupes atteints », a expliqué l’OMS dans un communiqué diffusé sur son site Internet. Cependant, le nombre encore relativement peu élevé de victimes, pas plus de 200 en un mois au Mexique, incite à relativiser. En effet, une pandémie, comme la grippe espagnole, lorsqu’elle se produit, est explosive. Elle fit plusieurs millions de morts en à peine trois mois au cours de l’hiver 1918-19 et fut une cause non négligeable de la cession des combats de la Première Guerre Mondiale.

Comme de 2003 à 2006, lors du pic de l’épizootie de grippe aviaire, les services en charge de la santé communiquent beaucoup. Remarquons que curieusement, ils ne prennent toujours pas, à l’heure actuelle les mesures coercitives nécessaire en cas de danger épidémique immédiat tels que l’arrêt des transports aériens. Commerce et libre échange obligent sans doute…

Drôle de siècle qui a débuté avec le SRAS, curieuse maladie pulmonaire aussi vite disparue qu’elle était apparue, puis qui nous a apporté l’épizootie de grippe aviaire dont la cause la plus probable réside dans les méthodes d’élevage concentrationnaires de l’industrie avicole, et maintenant une grippe porcine qui se serait soudainement adapté à l’homme et qui sévit dans les villes où la promiscuité avec les porcs est plutôt rare. D’ailleurs, il faut noter que ce virus est inconnu dans les élevages de porc et qu’aucune contamination du porc à l’homme n’a été identifiée pour expliquer l’apparition de cette épidémie, le terme de grippe « porcine » est donc impropre. A ce jour, l’apparition soudaine de ce nouveau virus est une énigme.

Au final, quelle que soit sa gravité et son étendue, cette nouvelle maladie tombe à point pour affoler les populations, qui s’étaient un peu lassées de ces vaines alertes à la grippe aviaire trop souvent réitérées, et inciter les décideurs nationaux à renouveler les réserves stratégiques d’anti-viraux qui parvenaient dans de nombreux pays à leur date de péremption. Ce qui accessoirement a dopé les actions des laboratoires pharmaceutiques sur les places boursières… Crise financière et crise sanitaire font de ce point de vue, bon ménage !

« Le Tamiflu*, médicament à base d’oseltamivir utilisé contre la grippe aviaire, est efficace pour ce virus. » a déclaré l’OMS. Cela tombe bien, les pays ont de vastes stocks à écouler, constituées lors de la psychose du poulet. Il devenait opportun de les renouveler.

Il est cependant remarquable de constater que les virus grippaux mutent sans arrêt mais que le Tamiflu resterait immuablement valable pour tous. D’où la divine surprise d’une soudaine envolée des actions des firmes pharmaceutiques produisant anti-viraux et vaccins.... Après nous avoir vanté le Tamiflu pour lutter contre le virus aviaire, l’OMS récidive avec ce nouveau virus. L’Organisation Mondiale de la Santé semble s’occuper surtout de la santé financière des firmes pharmaceutiques.Cette crise est en tous cas un excellent dérivatif pour faire – momentanément – oublier l’effondrement économique et social qui affecte de plus en plus le monde occidental.

* En 1976, une épidémie de grippe porcine s’est déjà déclarée à Fort Dix, dans le New Jersey. Du fait qu’il existait des similarités entre ce virus et celui de la pandémie de 1918, une autre catastrophe était prédite. En réaction aux inquiétudes croissantes du public, le président des Etats-Unis de l’époque, Gerald Ford, commanda l’établissement d’un programme national d’immunisation. Donald Rumsfeld, alors secrétaire à la Défense, fut à l’initiative du plan de vaccination et 47 millions d’américains furent vaccinés avec un vaccin expérimental produit par Merck & Co. A la fin de 1976, la grippe n’était pas pandémique, elle ne s’était pas propagée à l’extérieur de Fort Dix et n’était pas la meurtrière annoncée.

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Gilead Sciences a breveté en 1996 le Tamiflu préconisé par l’OMS dans toute forme de grippe et en cède les droits d’exploitation à Roche contre 10% des ventes. Selon CNN Money, Rumsfeld, détiendrait entre 5 et 25 millions de dollars d’actions Gilead Sciences, qu’il présidait en 2001 lorsqu’il fut nommé secrétaire à la Défense de Bush Jr. Alors que ce dernier annonçait sa stratégie nationale à 7 milliards de dollars contre une éventuelle pandémie de grippe aviaire, Rumsfeld dut démissionner du conseil d’administration de Gilead pour éviter des accusations de conflit d’intérêt. Après consultation du comité d’éthique, il conserva toutefois ses actions.

La rédaction Geopolintel

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L’Europa come rivoluzione

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L’Europa come rivoluzione

Lorenzo Disogra, L’Europa come rivoluzione. Pensiero e azione di Jean Thiriart, Edizioni all’insegna del Veltro, Parma 2020, 116 pp., € 15,00

LEuropa-come-rivoluzione-Prima-di-copertina-290x420.jpgIl titolo di questa recensione della tesi di laurea di Lorenzo Disogra, pubblicata dalle Edizioni all’insegna del Veltro con una prefazione del Professor Franco Cardini, potrebbe sembrare inutilmente altisonante. La qualità del testo è indubbia: un lavoro rigoroso e documentato come si addice ad una tesi di laurea, impreziosito dal dono della sintesi e da una prosa scorrevole. L’autore riesce in un centinaio di pagine a ricostruire, percorrendo in parallelo la vicenda militante e la produzione teorica di Jean Thiriart, il “pensiero e l’azione” di una delle figure più incomprese e trascurate della Politica europea. Politica con l’iniziale maiuscola, a significare quel raro connubio di idee e di azione, di cultura e prassi, di lucidità e passione che caratterizzano la figura del militante belga.

E allora, che bisogno c’è di definire questa biografia politica e intellettuale un “breviario per i patrioti europei”?

L’opera di Disogra ha un pregio rarissimo: unisce alla lucidità del rigore le vibrazioni di una passione politica autentica. Restituisce la genuinità e l’entusiasmo di un figlio del Novecento ricostruendo la passione e lo slancio che dalla militanza nell’estrema sinistra belga lo portarono a schierarsi con i Tedeschi durante il secondo conflitto mondiale, quindi a solidarizzare coi coloni europei in Africa per approdare infine a sostenere la causa palestinese ed antimperialista, in un percorso che solo superficialmente può essere etichettato come incoerente.

Jean Thiriart una stella polare la ebbe sempre: l’Europa. Egli si distanziò nettamente dalle idee e dalla prassi dell’estrema destra postbellica, disprezzando ogni nostalgismo e condannando come antieuropea ogni forma di sciovinismo, nel nome di una “più grande patria”, quella continentale. Senza curarci di quello che possano pensare di un pensatore simile le tribù dei “progressisti” e dei “sovranisti” (due facce della medesima medaglia americanista), crediamo che sbagli anche chi confonde il pensiero di Thiriart come una forma di grande-europeismo neo-destrista. Il pensiero di Thiriart è genuinamente geopolitico e autenticamente antimperialista, e il suo grande-europeismo è da un lato difensivo nei confronti dell’imperialismo americano e del messianismo anglosassone, ma è anche lealmente proattivo e solidale nei confronti di Asia, Russia e Africa: su questo le opere e le azioni del Thiriart più maturo non lasciano spazio ad errori interpretativi, e il lavoro di Disogra lo chiarisce in modo inequivocabile.

Di fronte all’elaborazione thiriartiana – che lungi dall’essere ingenua e sognante è invece lucida, pragmatica e disincantata – le obiezioni antieuropeiste sull’impossibilità di “fare l’Europa unita” per le mille incompatibilità culturali tra Europei ereditate dal passato diventano deboli balbettii che evaporano dinanzi ad una constatazione: la politica è volontà, i popoli non sono prigionieri del passato ma autori del futuro. Ecco dunque che l’Europa è e deve essere Azione e soprattutto Rivoluzione: il pensiero di Jean Thiriart non è una fumosa filosofia spiritualista, ma un attivismo rivoluzionario vero e proprio. Non è filosofico, non è solo metapolitico: è politico, convintamente.

Non è del resto un maestro del pensiero conservatore europeo, Ortega y Gasset, a spiegarci che è lo Stato a creare la Nazione e non viceversa? E ciò sia detto con buona pace di sciovinismi, razzismi e micronazionalismi vari, oggi spacciati per sovranismi, i quali, frantumando gli Stati e le integrazioni tra Stati, finiscono per agevolare una e una sola vera sovranità: quella del più forte, quella dell’imperialista di Oltreoceano. Il pensiero di Thiriart è presentato dunque per ciò che è: l’ultimo dei grandi volontarismi rivoluzionari del XX secolo, pregno di sapienza politica. Thiriart detestava l’Europa dei trattatelli, dei mercantucoli e dei burocrati eretta a Bruxelles da politicanti, finanzieri e bottegai; eppure non solo la considerava coraggiosamente e generosamente un “meglio di nulla”, ma prevedeva anche che essa avrebbe liberato capacità economiche e comunanze di intenti tali da superare in forza la miopia dei suoi creatori: così è stato, la libertà di movimento e commercio nell’Europa di oggi sono un dato di fatto.

LM.GEOPOL-Genèse-neoeurasisme-I-thiriart-2018-03-28-FR-4.jpgNon è stato privo di impatto per l’autore di questa recensione leggere il libro di Lorenzo Disogra nelle stesse ore in cui ne divorava un altro: Essere e Rivoluzione. Ontologia heideggeriana e politica di liberazione di Daniele Perra per i tipi di Nova Europa. In quelle pagine si ricorda infatti la risposta degli intellettuali tedeschi della Rivoluzione Conservatrice al lamento spengleriano sul “tramonto dell’Occidente”, al quale si indicava l’alternativa di una grande alleanza dei popoli “bianchi” contro quelli “di colore” (quasi un preludio ad Huntington). Il concetto di Occidente non solo non riguarda i rivoluzionari – che si interessano a cose ben più profonde come la Nazione (europea) o la Classe (lavoratrice e antiusuraia); ma se proprio un Occidente esiste, il suo tramonto è un’ottima notizia. Se infatti i popoli sono autori e non vittime della propria storia, essi potranno approfittare della fine dell’Occidente capitalista, positivista e antitradizionale, realizzando la Nazione Europea oppure la lotta dei lavoratori e degli sfruttati. È proprio al tramonto dell’Occidente americanista e liberista, protestante e imperialista, individualista e mercantile che i rivoluzionari del pianeta devono farsi trovare pronti, da Lisbona a Vladivostok, da Teheran a L’Avana.

L’opera di Lorenzo Disogra segna un momento importante in un percorso che parte dagli alunni di Thiriart come Claudio Mutti a Franco Cardini: il thiriartismo italiano è stato prolifico ed ha figliato una rivista – “Eurasia” – attorno alla quale molti giovani sotto i 35 e i 30 anni si raccolgono o dalla quale hanno mosso i primi passi. L’eco del pensiero di un “geopolitico militante” nato nel 1922 continua a risuonare ad un secolo esatto di distanza, e il livre de chevet di Disogra ne è la prova.

 
Laureato nel 2011 in Economia all'Università Bocconi di Milano con una tesi di storia della Finanza, collabora con diverse riviste di strategia e politica internazionale su temi di economia, storia contemporanea e geopolitica, con particolare interesse per il Vicino Oriente e l'area ex-sovietica.
 
 

L’association FRANCE – RUSSIE – CONVERGENCES Organise une Conférence, Dîner-Débat

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L’association FRANCE – RUSSIE – CONVERGENCES

Organise une Conférence, Dîner-Débat

 

Le Samedi  21 Mars 2020  à 12h30

Pour la Conférence  seule, La participation aux frais est libre

 

Hôtel-Restaurant Les Coulondrines

72,Rue des Érables 34 980 Saint Gély du Fesc, Tél.: 04.67.84.30.12

 

Prix 25 Euros, réservation avant le 17 Mars, envoyer un chèque rédigé à l'ordre ''Les Coulondrines'' à :

Hôtel-Restaurant, Golf Les Coulondrines,

72 Rue des Érables,

34980 Saint Gely du Fesc

Contact pour la Conférence: Tel.  06 60 58 27 57

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De la Première Rome

à la Troisième Rome
(ou de Joseph d’Arimathie

à Dostoïevski)
par notre conférencier  : Laurent JAMES

"Laurent James est un écrivain et physicien lyonnais installé à Marseille depuis 2000. Il a fondé le Comité Jean Parvulesco en 2016 à Bucarest et co-organisé le premier Colloque de Chisinau (Moldavie) avec Iurie Rosca et Alexandre Douguine en 2017. Le projet du Comité Jean Parvulesco est l'union des peuples de l'Eurasie dans la reviviscence de la foi chrétienne civilisatrice de Lisbonne à Vladivostok.

Nous l'avons accueilli en 2019 en compagnie d'Anna Gichkina pour une présentation du Roman Russe d'Eugène-Melchior de Vogüé dans une brillante conférence qui fut fort appréciée.

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Cette fois-ci, partant du principe que l'Eglise est l'unique héritière de l'Empire de Rome, le conférencier s'attachera à préciser l'articulation entre la légende des saints de Provence, Constantinople vécue comme deuxième capitale d'un Empire universel et les noces d'Ivan III sous l'égide de l'Aigle à deux têtes, afin de mettre en lumière les liens métaphysiques entre les peuples du continent eurasiatique.

L’accès de l'hôtel-restaurant est facile. Nord de Montpellier, prendre la direction Saint Gély du Fesc (D986 route de Ganges). C’est une route à 4 voies. Avant d’entrer à St Gély prendre la direction, sur la droite : « Toutes directions,  Domaine de St Sauveur ». Vous êtes maintenant sur une voie de contournement du village, attention au radar. Après 1,5 km environ, sur la droite, prenez la direction Golf de Coulondres, D112E. Quand vous arriverez à l’entrée du village, tout de suite après le panneau Saint Gély, vous tournez à droite et vous êtes au parking du restaurant.

 

www.francerussie-convergences.org

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vendredi, 28 février 2020

Itinéraire posthume de l’antilibéralisme schmittien. Un héritage incontournable ?

Itinéraire posthume de l’antilibéralisme schmittien. Un héritage incontournable ?

Une critique de Tristan Storme
Ex: https://www.raison-publique.fr

arton276-c1eeb.jpgEditeur : Armand Colin
Collection : Le Temps Des Idées
Nb. de pages : 400 pages
Prix : 21 euros.

Référence : Critique publiée dans Raison publique, n° 8, avril 2008, pp. 153-165.

- Jan-Werner Müller, Carl Schmitt : Un esprit dangereux, trad. par Sylvie Taussig, Paris, Armand Colin, coll. « Le temps des idées », 2007, 400 p.

Publié à l’origine en anglais il y a cinq ans, l’ouvrage de Jan-Werner Müller, Carl Schmitt : Un esprit dangereux, aujourd’hui traduit en français dans la collection « Le temps des idées » dirigée par Guy Hermet, tombe à point nommé dans le monde universitaire et intellectuel francophone, où il n’est pas rare d’entendre que ce « Hobbes du vingtième siècle » [1] n’aurait plus rien à nous livrer. Schmitt, un esprit à la fois brillant et dangereux — ou, pourrait-on dire, dangereux en raison de son talent indéniable — a connu la crise de la république de Weimar, les deux guerres mondiales, la séparation de l’Allemagne et la Guerre froide ; son œuvre vieille de soixante-dix ans est, quelque part, le parangon des meurtrissures que porta le siècle récemment écoulé [2]. En mai 1933, le juriste rhénan adhérait à la NSDAP, donnant du crédit au régime hitlérien au travers de nombreux textes rédigés durant cette période. S’il prend néanmoins ses distances à l’égard du Führer dès 1936, il ne reniera jamais son antisémitisme philosophique, comme l’atteste avec virulence le recueil de ses journaux publié après sa mort, en 1991. C’est cette compromission qui fait d’ailleurs question ; les commentateurs se sont interrogés, en vue de savoir jusqu’à quel point un tel ralliement se répercuta sur les écrits schmittiens ultérieurs. Certains exégètes ont aussi pris le parti d’affirmer que les prémisses analytiques de l’adhésion de Schmitt au nazisme se découvraient à la lecture de ses livres de jeunesse. Depuis quelques années, semblables questionnements ont été au cœur des débats français. Mais force est de reconnaître qu’en dépit de son passé funeste, Carl Schmitt semble avoir suscité l’intérêt d’auteurs très différents et joué un rôle particulièrement influent dans l’évolution des discussions politico-philosophiques contemporaines. Dans son ouvrage, Jan-Werner Müller, professeur à l’université de Princeton, s’attèle à examiner de près la réception essentiellement européenne (surtout allemande) de l’œuvre du juriste rhénan ou, comme il le dit si bien lui-même, à « constituer une histoire critique de "ce que Schmitt a signifié" pour le vingtième siècle. » [3]

Dans une première partie, intitulée « Un juriste allemand au vingtième siècle », Müller retrace chronologiquement, et avec érudition, le parcours biographique et intellectuel de Carl Schmitt, depuis la rédaction de ses deux thèses de doctorat jusqu’au retranchement du savant dans son village natal du Sauerland, au lendemain du procès de Nuremberg. Pointant du doigt les contradictions et les arguments forts de la pensée de Schmitt, l’auteur compose le portrait d’un jeune publiciste qui, dès l’amorce de sa carrière, s’employa à forger et à affûter un arsenal théorique destiné à mettre à mal le libéralisme bourgeois, le parlementarisme dominé par les intérêts d’une frange sociétale non représentative. La doctrine libérale, qui refuse de discerner ses ennemis et de reconnaître le primat de la décision, participerait du phénomène d’envahissement de l’État par la société dont serait responsable la prolifération des associations économiques. À la lecture des premiers chapitres, on comprend rapidement qu’aux yeux de Müller, l’antilibéralisme constitue la pierre angulaire, le motif central de la pensée politique de Schmitt, telle qu’elle s’est déployée durant les années vingt. Le philosophe de Weimar s’est évertué à rendre la mass democracy compatible avec l’autoritarisme, par l’intermédiaire d’une théorie de la représentation à même de rendre publiquement présent le peuple rassemblé. Il oppose sa définition particulière de la démocratie aux conceptions libérales de la notion qui l’identifient à une simple addition des voix des individus esseulés dans l’isoloir. Müller n’aurait pas pu procéder autrement qu’en restituant le contexte d’énonciation des philosophèmes schmittiens, dans la mesure où l’examen de l’impact de cette pensée représente le centre névralgique de son étude. Puisqu’il opère de la sorte, il peut éminemment tenter, dans la suite du récit, de répondre à la question de savoir ce qui, en dehors de la conjoncture contextuelle, est susceptible d’être extirpé et de survivre à son fondateur.

Depuis les travaux de Dirk van Laak [4], Carl Schmitt : Un esprit dangereux est certainement, à ce jour, l’examen le plus exhaustif qui a trait à la réception allemande, et plus largement européenne, des idées schmittiennes. Müller sillonne l’héritage du juriste, auteur par auteur, tout en évitant soigneusement le travers qui consisterait à débusquer des « schmittiens » partout, au détour de la moindre citation ; il rapporte en substance les nombreux débats pointus et spécialisés qui animèrent l’histoire des idées politiques de l’après-guerre, livrant des tendances, des filiations qu’il ne cherche nullement à plaquer sur une typologie embarrassante. Les arguments des successeurs et des interlocuteurs intellectuels de Carl Schmitt sont livrés dans toute leur singularité discursive. Si bien qu’il est difficile qu’échappe au lecteur le fait que Schmitt ait pesé de manière considérable sur les raisonnements de nombre de ses contemporains. Au sortir de la Seconde Guerre mondiale, quoique privé d’enseignement et écarté des universités, Carl Schmitt, ayant refusé de se soumettre à la dénazification, reçoit furtivement dans sa demeure à Plettenberg une minorité influente de penseurs qui participèrent à la mise sur pied de la nouvelle structure étatique ouest-allemande : Nicolaus Sombart, Hanno Kesting, Reinhart Koselleck, Roman Schnur, Armin Mohler ou encore Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde, pour ne citer que quelques noms. Il n’est donc pas faux d’affirmer, avec Habermas, que « l’histoire de cette influence a[urait] une valeur fondatrice pour l’État allemand. » [5] L’ombre de l’auteur de La notion de politique a effectivement plané sur les controverses d’après la guerre et accompagné le façonnage théorique du paysage juridico-polititque de la RFA. Devant le triomphe de l’adversaire américain, Schmitt, qui refusa de faire contrition et de consacrer la mise au ban de l’unité politique allemande, a permis d’assurer « la continuité d’une tradition allemande qui aurait été mise en cause. » [6] Tenu en dehors du « système », à l’écart des lieux déterminants, il est devenu une figure d’inspiration emblématique pour toute une série de jeunes théoriciens qui n’hésitèrent aucunement à puiser, dans son œuvre, des conceptions plutôt mal perçues à l’époque. Ses réflexions, conservatrices et autoritaires, furent relayées ; elles alimentèrent les discussions relatives à la rédaction d’une Constitution pour l’Allemagne de l’Ouest, exhumant l’option d’une protection de la démocratie renaissante contre ses ennemis antidémocratiques. L’idéal d’un État fort fut puissamment reconduit dans les écrits d’Ernst Forsthoff, schmittien devant l’Éternel, bien décidé à remettre l’État au-dessus de la société et des intérêts conflictuels qui animeraient cette dernière.

9783428159802.jpgMais l’œuvre du publiciste de Weimar n’a pas seulement eu écho à travers les travaux d’auteurs plus ou moins conservateurs : la réception de la pensée du juriste a pour spécificité d’être étonnamment polarisée. Jürgen Habermas lui-même, l’un des plus farouches contempteurs du théoricien du politique, n’a pas manqué de reconnaître l’exactitude du constat de Schmitt qui conclut à une déliquescence de la logique parlementaire. L’histoire de l’ « espace public » suit, en effet, à la lettre l’analyse que soumet Carl Schmitt de la transformation progressive du parlementarisme [7]. Dans son ouvrage, Müller rapporte que Henning Ritter, le fils de Joachim Ritter, avait déjà laissé sous-entendre qu’il existerait « une relation entre la pensée de Habermas et celle de Schmitt » [8] ; plus récemment, et en France qui plus est, Philippe Raynaud a défendu la thèse suivant laquelle la pensée du défenseur du patriotisme constitutionnel serait particulièrement redevable de celle du juriste allemand, « dans la mesure même où elle s’est constituée contre le décisionnisme de Schmitt » [9]. Phénomène plus curieux encore, une partie des doctrinaires libéraux prit l’initiative de libéraliser la pensée « du plus brillant ennemi du libéralisme qu’ait vu le siècle. » [10] Certains envisagèrent de composer un libéralisme amendé, capable de répliquer aux défis lancés par le juriste rhénan. Schmitt aurait diagnostiqué avec précision et acuité les failles et les faiblesses de la doctrine libérale, formulant des « questions percutantes » qui tourmentèrent les orthodoxies libérales ; il demeurerait entièrement envisageable de remédier aux problèmes de la neutralité et de la stabilité politique, deux béances qui fragiliseraient les théories libérales, en redéployant différemment les concepts du juriste — à se confronter aux anamnèses du philosophe conservateur, le libéralisme en ressortirait grandi. Parmi d’autres, Odo Marquard et Hermann Lübbe « s’efforcèrent de libéraliser des pans entiers de sa pensée pour la mettre au service de la démocratie libérale, c’est-à-dire pour la fortifier et lui donner de meilleurs outils pour qu’elle soit à même de relever des défis antilibéraux. » [11] Il en résulte « un mélange instable de priorités libérales et de moyens non libéraux. » [12] Lübbe s’est notamment risqué à prélever la méthode décisionniste chez Schmitt, dans l’optique assumée de renforcer la démocratie libérale. Cependant, comme l’indique Müller, une pareille entreprise dévoile avec clarté les limites d’une compatibilité des concepts schmittiens avec la pensée libérale, vu que Lübbe, par exemple, se voit contraint de délier la stabilité politique du principe de justification publique. Mais l’extrême droite ne demeure pas en reste ; elle s’est, elle aussi, penchée sur les arguments avancés par le juriste. En effet, sur une autre case de l’échiquier politique, la Nouvelle Droite française, menée par Alain de Benoist, a pour sa part multiplié les références à Schmitt afin de préserver la particularité des peuples contre l’universalisme libéral abstrait [13].

Au bout de chaque avenue, détaillée par Müller, qu’empruntèrent les nombreux « héritiers » de Carl Schmitt, aussi divers fussent-ils, émerge l’antilibéralisme pérenne du savant de Plettenberg. D’autres exégètes ont également émis une semblable hypothèse, sans toutefois l’étayer avec force détails comme l’a fait Jan-Werner Müller [14]. La tangibilité patente de la mondialisation socio-économique qui, d’autre part, s’étend au nom de principes éthiques (l’exportation des Droits de l’Homme), « ranime en permanence la tentation de reprendre la critique que Schmitt a dirigé contre un libéralisme tour à tour impuissant ou hypocrite » [15] — de la reprendre ou de s’en inspirer, de l’amender et de la prolonger. Les questions posées par le penseur conservateur ainsi que les diagnostics qu’il énonce ont connu une prorogation considérable au vu de la chronologie qu’a bâtie Müller. Il y a d’ailleurs fort à parier que les thèses et les outils conceptuels forgés par Schmitt en son temps n’ont pas terminé de nous livrer leurs vertus heuristiques, qu’elles demeurent susceptibles de nous révéler leur « actualité » potentielle.

En filigrane, Müller met le doigt sur deux phénomènes majeurs, qu’il analyse pour partie, et qui touchent de très près à l’héritage des théories politiques de Carl Schmitt. Ces deux questions ont trait à l’usage on ne saurait plus actuel — souvent polémique — des idées du juriste rhénan. Incontestablement, elles attestent de l’actualité manifeste de certains pans importants de la pensée de Schmitt, elles témoignent du caractère indéniable de l’héritage schmittien. D’un côté, à l’heure de la mondialisation, le post-marxisme semble éprouver toutes les difficultés du monde à se (re)définir : pour pallier un « manque » conceptuel, des théoriciens de la gauche radicale ont vu en Schmitt une formidable source d’inspiration disposée à redorer un blason obsolescent. D’autre part, bien qu’il est (ou qu’il fût) coutumier de dépeindre l’auteur du Nomos de la Terre comme le héraut de la cause statonationale, il semblerait que celui-ci ait pu léguer un attirail systématique habilité à penser positivement l’intégration macro-régionale, et plus particulièrement européenne, ainsi que moult arguments à même de souligner les faiblesses potentielles de toute construction continentale.

LES TOURMENTS THÉORIQUES DU POST-MARXISME : LE CONFLIT EN GUISE DE POLITISATION

Après la chute du mur de Berlin, Müller le répète à plusieurs endroits de son livre, une certaine gauche post-marxiste devait redécouvrir la pensée politique de Carl Schmitt. Les accointances de la gauche avec les concepts du théoricien conservateur ne relèvent toutefois pas d’une situation entièrement inédite. Depuis les années soixante, plusieurs auteurs ou mouvements radicaux se sont intéressés de près aux écrits du juriste, à commencer par Joachim Schickel, maoïste de son état. La Théorie du partisan, publiée en 1962, et l’optimisme général que purent inspirer à Schmitt les luttes anticoloniales n’y sont pas pour rien dans l’intérêt de la gauche qui essaie de penser le rôle de la guérilla dans les limites d’une idéologie révolutionnaire [16]. Peu de temps plus tard, toujours en Allemagne, Johannes Agnoli ressuscitait la critique schmittienne du parlementarisme, arguant que l’organe représentatif aurait développé une structure profondément oligarchique qui, de fait, ne représenterait plus le peuple mais l’État [17]. À la même période, en Italie, Mario Tronti et les « Marxisti Schmittiani » empruntaient le syntagme de l’ami et de l’ennemi — critère spécifique du politique —, l’interprétant sous la forme d’une compréhension renouvelée de l’antagonisme de classes [18]. On le voit, les récents emprunts à gauche ne sont pas sans posséder quelques antécédents de marque. C’est probablement chez Antonio Negri et Giorgio Agamben que le recyclage équivoque de concepts schmittiens pour une analyse ou pour une résolution normative des problèmes politico-philosophiques contemporains s’avère le plus frappant. Alors qu’Agamben mobilise le paradigme de l’ « état d’exception », Negri réfléchit le « pouvoir constituant » en s’appuyant notamment sur La dictature [19]. La visibilité retentissante des thèses et des prescriptions de ses deux auteurs a fait prendre conscience de l’ampleur d’un phénomène d’actualité, celui d’un « schmittianisme » (ou d’un « schmittisme ») de gauche. Selon Yves Charles Zarka, qui persiste a pensé que Schmitt est l’auteur de documents et non d’une œuvre, si l’extrême droite en vient à faire appel à Carl Schmitt, ce serait là « une chose naturelle », puisqu’elle ne ferait que « revendiquer ce qui lui appartient et selon une rhétorique habituelle », mais que la gauche radicale « prenne le même chemin », voilà un phénomène quelque peu incongru qui, d’après le spécialiste français de Hobbes, témoignerait d’une « crise idéologique » profonde du post-marxisme [20]. Pourquoi donc — car il est vrai qu’une telle inspiration ne semble pas aller de soi — une partie de la gauche actuelle s’est-elle empressée de recourir aux philosophèmes d’un conservateur aguerri qui, par surcroît, se compromit un temps avec le Reich hitlérien ?

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Dans un ouvrage publié il y a peu, Jean-Claude Monod tente d’apporter une première explication à ce curieux syndrome, en précisant que « les lectures marxistes de Schmitt pourraient faire l’objet d’une étude en soi » [21]. Il existerait sinon une réelle connexité, du moins une connivence notable, entre la pensée marxiste et celle du publiciste de Weimar : elles consacreraient, toutes les deux, l’existence d’une distinction conceptuelle originale. À la fois sanctifiée par Schmitt et par les théories marxistes, « la dissociation du libéralisme et de la démocratie » légitimerait un certain type de violence — celle de la classe ouvrière dans le cas des épigones de l’auteur du Capital. Mais, d’un autre côté, « la dissociation du politique et de l’étatique », constat malheureux dans La notion du politique, permettrait à l’extrême gauche actuelle de libérer le peuple — le pouvoir constituant — du joug de la souveraineté du prince [22]. Cette proximité analytique aurait rendu possible un emploi réfléchi (et infléchi) des thèses de l’ancien partisan du Troisième Reich. Les outils empruntés par « les schmittiens de gauche ou d’extrême gauche » leur auraient surtout permis de dénoncer l’un des travers de l’ordre libéral, à savoir le sapement de l’État de droit par le biais de procédures d’exception totalement banalisées [23]. La traduction en français du livre de Müller met à la portée du lectorat francophone un constat qui, quoique formulé quelques années auparavant, s’apparente grandement à celui de Monod. Néanmoins, le professeur de Princeton insiste plus particulièrement sur le fait que la gauche aurait trouvé chez Schmitt une réponse, qu’elle juge sans doute déterminante, dans l’objectif de pallier le besoin d’une repolitisation de la lutte contre le libéralisme triomphant ; c’est-à-dire le besoin d’une constitution de l’unité politique face à l’adversaire capitaliste. « En particulier, nous dit Müller, la pensée de Schmitt est censée compenser l’absence du politique et, plus encore, l’absence d’une théorie de l’État dans le marxisme. » [24] Partant du théoricien du politique, la gauche d’inspiration schmittienne finirait par célébrer le retour du conflit international ouvert, afin de s’opposer à l’universalisme libéral qu’elle calomnie pour cause de son hypocrisie. Plutôt que de concevoir « un modèle d’action politique à proprement parler », elle se borne à « réaffirmer la nature inévitablement conflictuelle du politique » (soit qu’elle estime cela comme une nécessité véritable, soit qu’un engagement dans une telle direction lui paraît préférable au triomphe du marché mondial) [25]. Dans tous les cas, il semble pour Müller que le post-marxisme souffre d’insuffisances théoriques, dans son combat contre le libéralisme, et qu’à ce titre, la pensée du plus fidèle détracteur de la doctrine libérale a pu tenir lieu d’expédient.

9782707149701.jpgSi en Allemagne ou en Italie, les emprunts contemporains aux théories de Schmitt peuvent prendre appui sur de véritables précédents, Zarka souligne qu’il s’agit en réalité d’un « phénomène assez nouveau en France » [26] — l’étude de Müller se cantonne d’ailleurs principalement aux deux premiers pays cités, et l’auteur ne cache pas que le « terme » de son parcours introspectif ne soit que « tout provisoire » [27]. Daniel Ben Saïd et Étienne Balibar ont, entre autres, eu recours à la pensée du juriste, ce dernier soutenant pour sa part que « pour connaître l’ennemi, il faut aller au pays de l’ennemi. » [28] Les réflexions de Balibar, ancien élève d’Althusser, nous apparaissent comme une piste conséquente, dans l’optique de concilier le « schmittianisme de gauche » (antilibéral) avec le refus de consacrer l’avènement du conflit comme mode d’être du politique. L’exigence d’une politisation — ou, plus simplement, d’une définition d’un « état » politique — peut déboucher, en dernière instance, sur « une résistance à la violence » [29]. Le philosophe français reconnaît sans ambages que le juriste rhénan a pesé sur l’histoire des idées politiques ; il n’a du reste pas hésité à affirmer, dans sa préface à la traduction du Der Leviathan de Schmitt, que la pensée de celui-ci était « l’une des pensées les plus inventives » [30] du vingtième siècle. C’est en s’adossant à la théorisation schmittienne de la souveraineté, qui lui apparaît « indispensable » pour comprendre l’ensemble des discours ayant trait « aux limites d’application » d’un tel concept [31], que Balibar a pu développé « la thèse d’un extrémisme du centre », taxant l’État de droit libéral d’être doté d’une « face d’exception » qui participerait à l’exclusion des anormaux et des déviants [32]. Mais cette prise en considération des arguments antilibéraux du juriste, que Balibar actualise et façonne, ne l’a pas empêché de questionner les « effets destructeurs de la violence, y compris de la violence révolutionnaire. » [33] La violence détruirait la possibilité même de la politique dont le maintien nécessiterait « un moment propre de civilité », c’est-à-dire un moment à l’issue duquel serait introduit l’impératif de l’anti-violence. À bien lire Balibar, il n’est pas certain que schmittianisme et post-marxisme soient incapables d’avancer de concert vers la génération d’une action politique de gauche.

LA CONSTRUCTION EUROPÉENNE OU L’OUBLI DE L’ÉLÉMENT PROPREMENT « POLITIQUE »

Il peut sembler inadapté, à première vue, de formuler l’hypothèse d’un rapprochement plausible entre la pensée politique de Carl Schmitt et les considérations théoriques actuelles autour de la construction européenne. Nicolas Sombart, qui a fréquenté le juriste déchu à Plettenberg, a réprouvé le fait que la plupart des lecteurs du publiciste découvraient, selon lui, « le faux Schmitt », à savoir le « concepteur de cette machine célibataire qu’est l’ "État" » [34], alors que l’auteur du Nomos de la Terre avait surtout su diagnostiquer le déclin de la forme étatique moderne qui serait parvenue à son terme. Avec le passage à l’ère globale, les Européens devraient songer à remplacer l’État, vieilli et poussiéreux, « par des formes d’ "unité politique" substantielles, véritablement souveraines. » [35]

41YfDNAAdOL.jpgDepuis une dizaine d’années, les études schmittiennes se sont élargies à la question d’un prolongement continental et européen de la notion du « politique ». Ce phénomène naissant, encore à l’état d’un décantage initial, fut impulsé, pour l’essentiel, par les recherches de Christoph Schönberger et d’Ulrich K. Preuss [36]. Au lendemain de la Seconde Guerre mondiale, le penseur conservateur s’était effectivement donné pour objectif de réfléchir sur l’avenir du Vieux Continent, désormais pris en étau entre les deux puissances dominantes. La « reconstruction » européenne, telle qu’il la voyait se dessiner, lui apparaissait comme une entreprise menée à l’encontre des Allemands vaincus et qui manquait, par ailleurs, de se pourvoir des attributs du politique. À la vue d’une Europe « kidnappée par des esclaves » [37] et soumise au dictat des vainqueurs, Schmitt conçoit un équilibre mondial reposant sur l’instauration d’un pluriversum de « grands espaces ».

Après 1945, le juriste rhénan revoit sa théorie du Großraum qu’il avait mise, dans un premier temps, au service du régime nazi. Celle-ci prévoit la suppression des entités étatiques en tant que lieux de souveraineté et leur incorporation au sein d’un espace « aux limites indéterminées, ou plutôt flexibles » [38], où chacun des peuples phagocytés disposerait de droits différentiels. Sous l’impulsion d’un « centre », du Reich allemand, un grand espace européen unifierait le Vieux Continent sur la base d’un critère d’appartenance christique (ou chrétien), constituant de fait une réponse appropriée au dépérissement progressif du concept d’État. Carl Schmitt n’a de cesse d’identifier l’Europe à la chrétienté ; cette dernière représenterait une solide alternative au bloc soviétique et au bloc libéral — marxisme et libéralisme étant tous deux la conséquence d’un noyau métaphysique athée et de croyances immanentistes. Se composerait, dès lors, un ordre mondial fondé sur la coexistence de plusieurs blocs autonomes — les grands espaces — qui permettrait ainsi un rééquilibrage des puissances. Tomas Kostelecky, en particulier, s’autorise à interpréter la notion de Großraum comme l’analyse intéressante d’un effacement tendanciel des frontières [39]. Schmitt aurait pressenti le déplacement progressif du lieu de la souveraineté depuis les entités étatiques vers un grand espace européen, préfigurant de ce fait l’avènement d’une construction d’échelle continentale.

L’élargissement des frontières géographiques s’accompagne, dans la théorie du penseur conservateur, d’une révision des limites « nationales » : la théorisation d’un Großraum passe inévitablement par une redéfinition du concept de nation. « Une Europe démocratique avait d’abord besoin d’un peuple européen homogène » [40], ce que la croyance en Jésus-Christ était toute disposée à fournir. Schmitt estime qu’un pacifisme morne ne peut, en aucun cas, prodiguer les propriétés vertueuses du politique. Dans sa construction de l’après-guerre, l’Europe aurait omis de fonder le patriotisme européen sur l’identification d’un autre, d’un ennemi, de se fonder sur l’homogénéité du peuple chrétien à même d’édifier une forme authentiquement politique pour le continent. Le savant de Plettenberg bat en brèche l’idéal du refus de la puissance ; il souhaite faire de l’Allemagne le « pôle impérial » d’une nation chrétienne, refusant d’un même geste la sanction des triomphateurs et l’élaboration d’une formule politique « neutre ».

Les questions de l’État-nation — et des relations internationales —, de la souveraineté, de l’ordre juridique européen, soulevées par Schmitt à son époque, sont actuellement consubstantielles au problème de l’intégration européenne. C’est assez logiquement que les raisonnements de ce dernier paraissent susceptibles, au jour d’aujourd’hui, de trouver une utilité particulièrement éloquente dans le cadre des discussions théoriques relatives à l’idée d’Europe. Si les écrits du juriste permettent d’attaquer systématiquement les thèses « néo-cosmopolitiques » et de nourrir l’ensemble des discours « souverainistes », nous rejoignons Müller sur le fait qu’il est également tout à fait pensable que de tels textes puissent peser sur les réflexions des néo-kantiens et des libéraux, dans l’optique bien différente de solidifier le modèle cosmopolitique. Il semble que s’il souhaite prendre effet, le cosmopolitisme y gagnerait beaucoup à prendre en compte « la dialectique schmittienne de la souveraineté et de l’unité politique forgée à peine de vie et de mort » [41], en vue d’envisager, en fin de compte, d’y échapper complètement. Müller formule, en filigrane, l’hypothèse suivante : probablement que ceux qui relèvent le défi de réfléchir à de nouvelles identités supranationales devront, d’une manière ou d’une autre, se mesurer aux philosophèmes de Carl Schmitt, afin d’imaginer les moyens nécessaires au dépassement de l’homogénéité et de l’hostilité [42]. Le penseur conservateur pourrait, semble-t-il, nous aider, a contrario, à penser (à renforcer ?) le domaine du métanational. Existerait-il une thématique plus actuelle en théorie politique ?

CONCLUSION

Yves Charles Zarka a tout récemment précisé la distinction qu’il avait opérée entre les œuvres et les documents, lorsque dans un article paru dans Le Monde au lendemain de la publication en français du Der Leviathan de Schmitt, il avait affirmé que les textes du juriste allemand appartenaient à la catégorie des documents [43]. Il écrit que « ce qui fait le caractère particulier du document est d’être inscrit dans un moment historique dont il est un témoignage, d’en être d’une certaine manière inséparable. En revanche, une œuvre nous interpelle au-delà de son temps, en dehors du contexte où elle a été écrite pour nous parler aussi bien de son temps que du nôtre. En ce sens, […] Schmitt est l’auteur de documents. » [44] Durant l’espace d’un demi-siècle, Carl Schmitt a influé sur l’ensemble du spectre politique, de l’extrême gauche italienne à la Nouvelle Droite française — et il continue de le faire de manière posthume. Il reste à espérer que la traduction en langue française de l’ouvrage de Jan-Werner Müller fera prendre conscience du poids et de l’importance qu’ont pu prendre les diagnostics et les anamnèses souvent judicieuses de l’adversaire le plus virulent du libéralisme — ce qui n’a jamais contraint ses lecteurs de partager les suggestions normatives qui corroborent l’analyse. S’obstiner à discréditer à tout prix la pensée du savant de Plettenberg au point de refuser que les écrits de ce dernier constituent une œuvre, au motif qu’entachés par le nazisme, ils n’auraient plus rien à nous dire d’actuel, est un tour de passe-passe plutôt difficile à réaliser.

Une critique de Tristan Storme

 
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Notes

[1] L’expression est de George D. Schwab, « un chercheur de l’université de New York » qui, écrit Müller, fut « à l’origine de la redécouverte américaine de Schmitt » (Carl Schmitt : Un esprit dangereux, p. 302).

[2] Nous paraphrasons ici la formule d’Étienne Balibar : « Carl Schmitt est le plus brillant et donc [nous soulignons] le plus dangereux des penseurs d’extrême droite » (BALIBAR, Étienne [entretien avec], « Internationalisme ou barbarie », propos recueillis par Michael Löwy et Razmig Keucheyan, SolidaritéS, n° 30, mercredi 2 juillet 2003, p. 22, texte disponible sur : http://www.solidarites.ch/index.php... ).

[3] Op. cit., p. 9.

[4] Cf. surtout VAN LAAK, Dirk, Gespräche in der Sicherheit des Schweigens : Carl Schmitt in der politischen Geistesgeschichte der frühen Bundesrepublik, Berlin, Akademie Verlag. 1993.

[5] HABERMAS, Jürgen, « Le besoin d’une continuité allemande. Carl Schmitt dans l’histoire des idées politiques de la RFA », trad. par Rainer Rochlitz, Les Temps Modernes, n° 575, juin 1994, p. 31.

[6] Ibid., p. 32.

[7] Schmitt a développé sa compréhension de l’évolution du régime parlementaire dans Die geistesgeschichtliche Lage des heutigen Parlamentarismus (Parlementarisme et démocratie, trad. par Jean-Louis Schlegel et préface de Pasquale Pasquino, Paris, Seuil, coll. « Essais », 1988).

[8] Carl Schmitt : Un esprit dangereux, p. 369.

[9] RAYNAUD, Philippe, « Que faire de Carl Schmitt ? », Le Débat, n°131, septembre – octobre 2004, p. 165.

[10] Carl Schmitt : Un esprit dangereux, p. 13.

[11] Ibid., p. 169. C’est nous qui soulignons.

[12] Ibid., p. 184.

[13] « 13. L’intégrisme européen et l’essor de la (des) nouvelle(s) droite(s) européennes », in ibid., pp. 288-303.

[14] Claire-Lise Buis affirme, parmi d’autres, que « l’antilibéralisme est bien un élément fondamental de regroupement des fidèles schmittiens » (« Schmitt et les Allemands », Raisons politiques, n°5, février 2002, p. 151).

[15] Carl Schmitt : Un esprit dangereux, p. 29.

[16] « 8. Le Partisan dans le paysage de la trahison : la théorie de la guérilla de Schmitt — et ses partisans », in ibid., p. 204-219.

[17] « La critique du parlementarisme », in ibid., pp. 240-248.

[18] « Schmitt et la haine de classes : les Marxisti Schmittiani », in ibid., pp. 248-253.

[19] Cf. notamment AGAMBEN, Giorgio, État d’exception. Homo sacer, II, 1, trad. par Joël Gayraud, Paris, Seuil, coll. « L’ordre philosophique », 2003 ; NEGRI, Antonio, Le pouvoir constituant. Essai sur les alternatives de la modernité, trad. par Étienne Balibar et François Matheron, Paris, PUF, coll. « Pratiques théoriques », 1997.

[20] ZARKA, Yves Charles, « Carl Schmitt, après le nazisme », Cités, n°17, 2004, p. 148.

[21] MONOD, Jean-Claude, Penser l’ennemi, affronter l’exception. Réflexions critiques sur l’actualité de Carl Schmitt, Paris, La Découverte, coll. « Armillaire », 2007, p. 21.

[22] « Les usages opposés de Schmitt : une longue histoire », in ibid., pp. 21-31.

[23] Ibid., p. 107.

[24] Carl Schmitt : Un esprit dangereux, p. 302.

[25] Ibid., p. 310 ; pp. 321-322.

[26] ZARKA, Yves Charles, Un détail nazi dans la pensée de Carl Schmitt, suivi de deux textes de Carl Schmitt traduits par Denis Trierweiler, Paris, PUF, coll. « Intervention philosophique », 2005, p. 92.

[27] Carl Schmitt : Un esprit dangereux, p. 343.

[28] BALIBAR, Étienne (entretien avec), loc. cit., p. 22.

[29] Cf. BALIBAR, Étienne, « Violence et civilité. Sur les limites de l’anthropologie politique », in GÓMEZ-MULLER, Alfredo, La question de l’humain entre l’éthique et l’anthropologie, Paris, L’Harmattan, coll. « Ouverture philosophique », 2004. Le texte est disponible sur : http://ciepfc.rhapsodyk.net/article... .

[30] « Le Hobbes de Schmitt, le Schmitt de Hobbes », préface à : SCHMITT, Carl, Le Léviathan dans la doctrine de l’État de Thomas Hobbes, p. 8.

[31] BALIBAR, Étienne, « Prolégomènes à la souveraineté : la frontière, l’État, le peuple », Les Temps Modernes, n°610, septembre – octobre – novembre, 2000, p. 50.

[32] « Le Hobbes de Schmitt, le Schmitt de Hobbes », préface à : SCHMITT, Carl, op. cit., p. 11. C’est l’auteur qui souligne.

[33] BALIBAR, Étienne (entretien avec), « Internationalisme ou barbarie », propos recueillis par Michael Löwy et Razmig Keucheyan, SolidaritéS, n° 30, mercredi 2 juillet 2003, p. 23.

[34] « Promenades avec Carl Schmitt », in SOMBART, Nicolaus, Chroniques d’une jeunesse berlinoise (1933-1943), trad. par Olivier Mannoni, Paris, Quai Voltaire, 1992, p. 324.

[35] Carl Schmitt : Un esprit dangereux, p. 342.

[36] Cf. WAGNER, Helmut, « La Notion juridique de l’Union européenne : une vision allemande », trad. par Pascal Bonnard, Notes du Cerfa, n°30(a), février 2006, pp. 1-13. Le texte est disponible sur : http://www.ifri.org/files/Cerfa/Not... .

[37] Carl Schmitt : Un esprit dangereux, p. 203.

[38] KERVÉGAN, Jean-François, « Carl Schmitt et "l’unité du monde" », Les études philosophiques, n° 1, janvier 2004, p. 13.

[39] Cf. KOSTELECKY, Tomas, Aussenpolitik und Politikbegriff bei Carl Schmitt, München, Neubiberg-Institut für Staatwissenschaften, 1998.

[40] Carl Schmitt : Un esprit dangereux, p. 14. C’est nous qui soulignons.

[41] Ibid., p. 337.

[42] « Une ère post-héroïque ? Après la nation, l’État — et la mort politique », in ibid., pp. 336-338.

[43] ZARKA, Yves Charles, « Carl Schmitt, nazi philosophe ? », Le Monde, n° 17998, vendredi 6 décembre 2002, p. VIII.

[44] ZARKA, Yves Charles, « Carl Schmitt ou la triple trahison de Hobbes. Une histoire nazie de la philosophie politique ? », Droits – Revue française de théorie, de philosophie et de culture juridiques, n° 45, 2007, p. 177.

Le droit des peuples réglé sur le grand espace de Carl Schmitt

us-in-world-war-i-8-728.jpg

Le droit des peuples réglé sur le grand espace de Carl Schmitt

par Karl Peyrade

Ex: https://www.lerougeetlenoir.org

Avec Le droit des peuples réglé sur le grand espace (1939-1942), Carl Schmitt commence à s’intéresser, dans le cadre de son analyse juridique et géopolitique, à la question de l’espace. Le droit international public est désigné par le juriste allemand comme le droit international des gens, c’est-à-dire ceux qui appartiennent à un Etat territorialement délimité dans un pays homogène. Le concept de grand espace apparaît au XIXe siècle avec l’idée de territoires équilibrés. Dans la tradition juridique française initiée par Jean Bodin puis reprise par les jacobins, ce sont plutôt les frontières naturelles qui ont servi à justifier l’expansion gallicane. A l’opposé, la logique de grand espace valide le droit des peuples à forte population à dominer sur les autres. La conception française s’articule sur un schéma géographique tandis que la notion de grand espace est liée à un déterminant démographique.

41Slx8ar6bL._SX328_BO1,204,203,200_.jpgCe paradigme spatial apparaît très explicitement dans la doctrine Monroe de 1823. Cette théorie américaine revendique l’indépendance de tous les Etats américains, interdit leur colonisation par des Etats tiers et défend à ceux-ci d’intervenir en leur sein. Elle crée donc un corpus de règles ayant vocation à s’appliquer à un grand espace qui est l’espace américain. La difficulté réside dans le fait que la doctrine Monroe a évolué avec le temps. Elle est passée d’un non-interventionnisme catégorique à un impérialisme intransigeant, d’une neutralité à une position morale donnant le droit de s’ingérer dans les affaires des pays du monde entier. « L’aversion de tous les juristes positifs contre une telle doctrine est bien compréhensible ; devant pareille imprécision du contenu normatif, le positiviste a le sentiment que le sol se dérobe sous lui », ironise l’auteur. En fait, les américains ont modifié leur interprétation de la doctrine Monroe au fil du temps et de leurs intérêts. La raison d’Etat se passe facilement des débats juridiques car contrairement à ce que de nombreux juristes pensent, dans la lignée du positivisme juridique, le droit ne créé rien. Il est simplement le reflet d’un rapport de forces. Les marxistes le désigneraient comme étant une superstructure.

D’après Talleyrand, l’Europe est constituée de relations entre Etats. Monroe est le premier à parler de grand espace. Le grand espace repose sur l’idée d’inviolabilité d’un espace déterminé sur lequel vit un peuple avec un projet politique. Il suppose aussi l’absence d’intervention dans les autres espaces. Au départ, ce principe était donc interprété dans un sens continentaliste. Mais à l’arrivée, on débouche sur un interventionnisme capitaliste et universaliste avec le triomphe de l’interprétation britannique. Le passage de la neutralité à l’impérialisme américain s’incarne particulièrement en la personne du président Wilson (1917). Ce dernier a fait du principe local du droit des peuples à disposer d’eux-mêmes un principe à valeur universelle. Carl Schmitt critique cette « réinterprétation de la doctrine Monroe, au départ idée concrète du grand espace, géographiquement et historiquement déterminée, en principe général d’inspiration universaliste, censé valoir pour la Terre entière et prétendant à l’ubiquité ».

Le principe de sécurité des voies de communication britanniques constitue un bon exemple de notion universaliste au profit de l’impérialisme anglo-saxon. Contrairement aux Etats-Unis et à la Russie, il n’existe pas de continuité spatiale dans l’empire britannique qui est une addition de possessions émiettées sans espace déterminée et sans cohérence. Afin de justifier la sécurité des voies de communication, les anglais ont adopté des principes universalistes permettant d’assimiler l’empire britannique au monde. En effet, les anglais régnaient sur la mer. Ils avaient donc intérêt à ce que les voies maritimes soient sécurisées au nom de leur principe de sécurité des voies de communication leur permettant d’intervenir partout et de dominer les espaces maritimes des pays neutres. A titre d’exemple, ils ont empêché le monopole français sur le Canal de Suez en invoquant le principe de droit naturel des peuples à disposer d’eux-mêmes. Cela n’a en revanche pas fonctionné à Panama où les américains leur ont justement opposé la doctrine Monroe.

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Philosophiquement, la vision universaliste du monde trouve sa source dans la théorie du droit naturel du XVIIe siècle qui trouve son apogée dans le concept de liberté commerciale forgée au XIXe siècle. Il ne faut pas confondre la loi naturelle qui vient de Dieu et le droit naturel selon lequel les hommes naissent tous avec des droits inhérents à leur personne humaine. Ainsi, au-delà des caractéristiques ethniques, culturelles ou religieuses, l’homme parce qu’il est homme dispose de certains droits fondamentaux. L’avènement des droits de l’homme constitue l’aboutissement suprême de la théorie du droit naturel.

A l’inverse de cette théorie, la logique des grands espaces n’a pas de portée universaliste. Elle intègre l’évolution historique des grandes puissances territoriales ayant de l’influence sur des pays tiers. Le paradigme n’est donc plus national mais spatial. Au sein de l’espace dominé par une grande puissance règne la paix en raison de l’exigence de non-intervention. Mais en dehors de cet espace, l’intervention redevient possible. Carl Schmitt reprend le concept allemand d’empire pour l’adapter aux particularités de son époque. L’impérialisme répond au contraire à une vision supra ethnique, capitaliste et universaliste. L’auteur plaide pour le Reich allemand contre les deux universalismes de son temps : l’URSS socialiste et la révolution mondialo-libérale occidentale. Il faut rappeler que la pensée schmittienne n’est en aucun cas une pensée racialiste ce que les membres de la SS n’ont pas manqué de lui reprocher. Elle s’appuie en revanche sur un peuple constitué historiquement et ayant conscience de lui-même. Pour Schmitt, le concept d’empire est traversé par les mêmes idées, la même philosophie, ancré dans un grand espace et soutenu par un peuple.

« Les autres concepts de l’espace, désormais indispensables, sont en premier lieu le sol, à rattacher au peuple par une relation spécifique, puis celui, corrélatif au Reich, débordant l’aire du peuple et le territoire étatique, du grand espace de rayonnement culturel, mais aussi économique, industriel, organisationnel […] L’empire est plus qu’un Etat agrandi, de même que le grand espace n’est pas qu’un micro-espace agrandi. L’Empire n’est pas davantage identique au grand espace ; chaque empire possède un grand espace, s’élevant par là au-dessus de l’Etat spatialement déterminé par l’exclusivité de son domaine étatique, au-dessus de l’aire occupée par un peuple particulier. »

Plusieurs conceptions peuvent découler de cette notion de grand espace. Une acception purement économiste pourrait le voir uniquement comme le lieu de l’échange commercial avec d’autres grands espaces. La vision impériale, et non impérialiste, aboutirait à des relations entre empires basés sur des grands espaces. Au sein de ces grands espaces, des relations interethniques pourraient voir le jour. Sous réserve de non-ingérence de puissances étrangères, des relations interethniques pourraient même naître entre empires différents. La notion d’empire permet, contrairement à l’universalisme des droits de l’homme, de conserver les Etats et les peuples.

Juridiquement, l’espace est traditionnellement abordé par le droit de la manière suivante : le droit privé l’appréhende à travers l’appropriation d’une terre tandis que le droit public le considère comme le lieu d’exercice de la puissance publique. Les théories positivistes voient le droit comme « un ordre intimé par la loi ». Or, « les ordres ne peuvent s’adresser qu’à des personnes ; la domination ne s’exerce pas sur des choses, mais sur des personnes ; le pouvoir étatique ne peut donc se déterminer que selon les personnes ». Le positivisme juridique n’admet donc l’espace que comme un objet relevant de la perception, déterminé selon le temps et l’espace. Au fond, il s’agit d’un espace vide sur lequel s’exerce le pouvoir étatique. A l’inverse, Carl Schmitt part de l’espace pour fonder tout ordre juridique. L’auteur note l’influence juive au sein du droit constitutionnel allemand sur le concept d’espace vide : « Les rapports bizarrement gauchis qu’entretient le peuple juif avec tout ce qui touche au sol, à la terre et au territoire découlent du mode singulier de son existence politique. La relation d’un peuple à un sol façonné par son propre travail d’habitation et de culture, et à toutes les formes de pouvoir qui en émanent, est incompréhensible pour un esprit juif. » Le juriste allemand conclue son ouvrage en insistant sur le vocable juridique du Moyen-Âge qui avait une dimension spatiale (Stadt = site, civitas = cité, Land = terre etc.) et en constatant que la négation de l’espace conduit à la négation des limites ce qui aboutit à l’universalisme abstrait.

« Ces considérations ne visent certes pas à prôner le retour vers un état de choses médiéval. Mais on a bien besoin de subvertir et d’éliminer un mode de pensée et de représentation regimbant à l’espace, dont le XIXe siècle marque l’avènement, et qui gouverne encore la conceptualisation juridique tout entière ; en politique internationale, il va de pair avec l’universalisme déraciné, négateur de l’espace et par là sans limite, de la domination anglo-saxonne des mers. La mer est libre au sens où elle est libre d’Etat, c’est-à-dire libre de l’unique représentation d’ordre spatial qu’ait pu penser le droit d’obédience étatique. »

nomos.jpgOuvrage court mais très exigeant, Le droit des peuples réglé sur le grand espace constitue une bonne introduction à l’ouvrage majeur Le nomos de la terre qu’écrira par la suite Carl Schmitt. Ecrit dans un style toujours clair sans être universitaire, le livre présente le grand mérite d’être en avance sur son temps. A une époque où l’on réfléchissait encore en termes de nation, il anticipe largement les grandes évolutions du monde. Aujourd’hui, comment nier que le monde est traversé par une logique de blocs animés par une puissance dominante. L’espace américain est dominé par les Etats-Unis, l’espace asiatique par la Chine et l’espace eurasiatique par la Russie. Il n’y a guère que l’Europe qui ne suit pas cette évolution. En effet, au lieu de s’ancrer dans son espace culturel et religieux, elle a préféré se dissoudre dans un système technico-économique abstrait sous-tendu par les inévitables droits de l’homme. A trop nier l’espace, on finit par nier l’homme comme produit d’un enracinement culturel pour aboutir à l’homme-marchandise.

Karl Peyrade

2015-2020: Gewalt, Terror, Spaltung – Wie ein Land zerstört wird

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Stefan Schubert

2015-2020: Gewalt, Terror, Spaltung – Wie ein Land zerstört wird

Ex: https://kopp-report.de

Die Sicherheitslage in Deutschland ist seit dem Jahr 2015 geradezu implodiert. Warnungen vor den aktuellen Zuständen gab es zuhauf, diese wurden jedoch ignoriert und als Populismus stigmatisiert. Ob die elf Morde von Hanau die Amoktat eines Wahnsinnigen oder ein Terroranschlag waren, spielt im Gesamtbild eine marginale Rolle. Hanau reiht sich ungeachtet in die Welle schwerster Gewalttaten des öffentlichen Raumes ein. Nach einer Sicherheitsanalyse der vergangenen Jahre kann man nur zu dem Ergebnis gelangen, dass die Gewalt und der Terror von allen Seiten weiter eskalieren wird.

51QqrlGzSxL._SX318_BO1,204,203,200_.jpgDie von den Berliner Eliten weiterhin negierte oder verspottete »Destabilisierung Deutschlands« ist in vollem Gange und wir alle befinden uns inmitten dieser gesellschaftlichen Verwerfungen.

Doch Hanau, eine Stadt mit knapp 100 000 Einwohnern, lässt sich bei weitem nicht mehr als »hessische Idylle« bezeichnen, wie es von den Mainstreammedien derzeit verbreitet wird. Der Kontrollverlust durch die Flüchtlingswelle und die Gewalt von muslimischen Männerbanden hat auch hier zugeschlagen. »Gewalt-Brennpunkt: In Hanau kann es jeden treffen«, lautete der Titel eines Welt-Artikels über die Stadt.

Anlass der Berichterstattung war eine Häufung von brutalen Massenschlägereien mitten in der Stadt. Afghanische Flüchtlinge trugen in der Innenstadt gewaltsame Revierkämpfe mit Türken aus. Die verfeindeten Mobs bestanden aus bis zu 150 aggressiven jungen Männern, die regelmäßig Großeinsätze der Polizei auslösten und die Hanauer Bevölkerung verunsicherten. Der SPD-Sozialdezernent Axel Weiss-Thiel äußerte sich folgendermaßen dazu:

»Migrations- und Zuwanderungsbewegungen spielen eine Rolle. Dadurch tritt eine Verschärfung auf. Da sind zum Beispiel auch junge Flüchtlinge ohne Perspektive involviert, die auf andere Gruppen treffen, die unterschiedlich sozialisiert sind.«

Die in der Innenstadt herumlungernden (meist) afghanischen Flüchtlinge beschrieb der Sozialdezernent als gewaltbereite junge Männer.

Darüber hinaus kam es zu willkürlichen Gewalttaten gegen Einheimische, die schwer verletzt ins Krankenhaus eingeliefert werden mussten. Ein 38-jähriger Hanauer wurde beispielsweise Zufallsopfer dieser Gewalt. Der 38-Jährige musste sogar befürchten, sein Augenlicht durch die Schläge zu verlieren. Das Regionalblatt Kreisbote berichtet über eine ganze Reihe von willkürlichen Gewalttaten gegen Einheimische im Februar 2020. Einer der flüchtigen Täter wird beschrieben als etwa 1,75 Meter großer Mann mit schwarzen lockigen Haaren.

Hanau zu einem idyllischen Städtchen zu verklären, in dem alle Bevölkerungsgruppen und Asylbewerber friedlich miteinander leben, ist somit schlichtweg nicht zutreffend.

»Verwerfungen« durch Flüchtlingswelle werden durch globale Strippenzieher einkalkuliert

Den Eliten war und ist die Gewaltwelle durch die Zusammensetzung des Flüchtlingsstroms bewusst. Dieser besteht bekanntlich aus mehrheitlich alleinreisenden Männern im wehrfähigen Alter, die zudem eine islamische Sozialisation in ihren Herkunftsländern durchlaufen haben. Am 20. Februar 2018 äußerte sich der Harvard-Politologe Yascha Mounk in den Tagessthemen dazu wie folgt:

» … dass wir hier ein historisch einzigartiges Experiment wagen, und zwar eine monoethnische, monokulturelle Demokratie in eine multiethnische zu verwandeln.  Das kann klappen, das wird, glaube ich, auch klappen, dabei kommt es aber natürlich auch zu vielen Verwerfungen.«

Auch im Spiegel äußerte sich Mounk ähnlich, hier sogar mit einer weiteren Forderung: »In Westeuropa läuft ein Experiment, das in der Geschichte der Migration einzigartig ist: Länder, die sich als monoethnische, monokulturelle und monoreligiöse Nationen definiert haben, müssen ihre Identität wandeln.« Im Prinzip hat Mounk hier den Begriff des Bevölkerungsaustausches in einer pseudowissenschaftlich-globalistischen Sprache wiedergegeben und ungeheuerliche Forderungen aufgestellt. Doch sobald Bürger dieses Landes über den Begriff des Bevölkerungsaustausches debattieren möchten, werden diese sofort zu »Nazis« und »Verschwörungstheoretikern« stigmatisiert, und laufen Gefahr, in einem Verfassungsschutzbericht an den Pranger gestellt und so gesellschaftlich vernichtet zu werden. Betrachtet man die Morde von Hanau hinsichtlich der Äußerungen von Mounk sowie unter Einbezug der Tatsache, dass zahlreiche Gewalttaten durch muslimische Flüchtlinge gegen einheimische Hanauer verübt wurden, ergibt sich ein differenzierteres Gesamtbild.

Warnungen vor diesen Zuständen bereits im Jahr 2015

Die Kausalitäten der Spaltung unserer Gesellschaft sowie der Entstehung von Gewalt und Terror sind offensichtlich, jedoch weigern sich Politik und Medien, diese zu benennen, da ihre Agenda diese Destabilisierungen maßgeblich verursacht hat. Über die Gewalt- und Verbrechenswelle, die seit den Grenzöffnungen 2015 über Deutschland hinweggebrochen ist, weigern sich die Mainstreammedien, ausführlich zu berichten.

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Darüber hinaus werden die Gewalttaten in keinen Zusammenhang zur Masseneinwanderung gestellt: Der Kölner Sex-Mob an Silvester, Mädchenmorde wie in Freiburg und Kandel, Gruppenvergewaltigungen, der Axtmord von Limburg, der Schwertmord von Stuttgart, willkürlich erstochene Menschen, Passanten, die vor einfahrende Züge gestoßen werden, die islamistischen Terroranschläge auf den Berliner Weihnachtsmarkt, der Hamburger Messeranschlag eines IS-Terroristen, der Ansbacher Sprengstoffanschlag durch einen muslimischen Selbstmordattentäter, der Angriff mit Stichwaffen im Würzburger Regionalzug und die Messerattacke in Hannover auf einen Polizeibeamten durch eine IS-Anhängerin, seien hier nur stichwortartig aufgeführt.

Viele der Täter sind mit dem Flüchtlingsstrom unkontrolliert über Deutschlands offene Grenzen eingewandert. Dieser Fakt wird auf Nachfrage von Behördenseiten bestätigt, nur weigert sich der Mainstream, darüber zu berichten. Sei es über die eine Million Straftaten durch Flüchtlinge aus meist muslimischen Herkunftsstaaten, die das BKA in den Lagebildern »Kriminalität im Kontext der Zuwanderung« seit 2015 ausweist, oder auch die 2645 islamistischen Terrorverfahren des Generalbundesanwaltes im gleichen Zeitraum, all diese epochalen Fehlentwicklungen werden von Politik und Medien negiert.

51dcltXKZTL._SX318_BO1,204,203,200_.jpgMenschen, die die Politik der offenen Grenzen und eine unkontrollierte Einwanderung kritisieren oder auch nur öffentlich darüber debattieren möchten, werden pauschal als »Nazis« und »Rassisten« diffamiert. Selbst Wahlen, wie die demokratische Wahl des FDP-Ministerpräsidenten in Thüringen, müssen auf Zuruf der Kanzlerin rückgängig gemacht werden. Gleichzeitig werden hunderttausende Facebook- und YouTube-Konten gesperrt oder sogar ganz gelöscht, wodurch versucht wird, die Meinungsfreiheit immer weiter einzuschränken. So wird dem unzufriedenen Teil der Bevölkerung keinerlei Raum mehr zugestanden, den eigenen Unmut zu äußern. Dieses totalitäre Gebaren verursacht Wut und Hass, der sich in immer kürzeren Abständen gewaltsam entlädt. Vor genau diesen Entwicklungen haben Sicherheitsexperten, wie der verstorbene Udo Ulfkotte und der Autor dieses Artikels, bereits im Jahr 2016 in ihrem Spiegel-Bestseller Grenzenlos kriminell gewarnt.

Auch hohe Sicherheitsbeamte des BKA, BND, der Bundespolizei und des Verfassungsschutzes haben intern davor gewarnt. Im Buch Grenzenlos kriminell zitiert der Autor aus einem Geheimpapier der Behörden, dort heißt es:

»Der Zuzug von Menschen aus anderen Weltteilen wird zur Instabilität unseres Landes führen«. Die Integration Hunderttausender Einwanderer sei unmöglich, stattdessen »importieren wir islamischen Extremismus, arabischen Antisemitismus, nationale und ethnische Konflikte anderer Völker sowie ein anderes Rechts- und Gesellschaftsverständnis«. Auch auf die Polarisierung der Gesellschaft sowie die Unterdrückung der Mehrheitsmeinung der Bevölkerung, die diese millionenfache Einwanderung klar ablehnt, geht das Papier ein: »Wir produzieren durch diese Zuwanderung Extremisten, die bürgerliche Mitte radikalisiert sich, weil sie diese Zuwanderung mehrheitlich nicht will und ihr dies von der politischen Elite aufgezwungen wird.«

Die Schlussfolgerung des Spitzenbeamten ist nachvollziehbar. Jeder hat sie in der einen oder anderen Form auch schon bei sich selbst festgestellt: »Wir werden eine Abkehr vieler Menschen von diesem Verfassungsstaat erleben.« Um die Zukunft dieses Landes ist es nicht gut bestellt, und es droht schlimmer zu werden, als bisher befürchtet. Es folgen realistische Einschätzungen über bevorstehende Unruhen, die erschrecken und wehmütig werden lassen:

»Die deutschen Sicherheitsbehörden sind und werden nicht in der Lage sein, diese importierten Sicherheitsprobleme und die hierdurch entstehenden Reaktionen aufseiten der deutschen Bevölkerung zu lösen.«

Diese Feststellung eines Spitzenbeamten der Sicherheitsbehörden beinhaltet nichts Geringeres als die Prophezeiung eines nahenden Bürgerkrieges.

416TSdsmaJL._SX318_BO1,204,203,200_.jpgBestellinformationen:

» Stefan Schubert: Die Destabilisierung Deutschlands, 336 Seiten, 22,99 Euro – hier bestellen!

» Ulfkotte/Schubert: Grenzenlos kriminell, 318 Seiten, 19,95 Euro 9,99 Euro – hier bestellen!

» Stefan Schubert: Sicherheitsrisiko Islam, 318 Seiten, 22,99 Euro – hier bestellen!

Dienstag, 25.02.2020

Entre le marteau islamiste et l’enclume gendériste

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Entre le marteau islamiste et l’enclume gendériste

par Georges FELTIN-TRACOL

Ex: http://www.europemaxima.com

L’« affaire Mila » démontre une nouvelle fois que la soi-disant « Droite nationale » aime se fourvoyer avec ses pires ennemis au risque d’en perdre sa singularité dès qu’elle entend le couplet éculé de l’« unité nationale ».

Mila est cette lycéenne de 16 ans vivant à Villefontaine en Isère. Le 18 janvier dernier, elle insulte l’islam sur le réseau social Instagram. Habituée à étaler sa vie privée sur cette place publique virtuelle, elle repousse ce jour-là les lourdes avances d’un pitoyable dragueur probablement de confession musulmane. Touché dans sa fierté, celui-ci la tance vertement. Mila réplique en vilipendant la religion musulmane. Elle suscite en réaction une vague de commentaires haineux, de menaces de mort et d’appels au viol. Déscolarisée quelques semaines, Mila et ses proches vivent maintenant sous protection policière. Si la police cherche à identifier les auteurs des menaces, le Parquet a finalement décidé un non-lieu concernant une supposée incitation à la haine raciale. On ignorait que les mahométans appartinssent à une race…

Des politiciens (et surtout des politiciennes !) se distinguent par leur condamnation explicite des propos de l’adolescente. Les viragos du féminisme, si promptes d’habitude à dénoncer le premier Gabriel Matzneff venu, se font pour l’occasion bien discrètes. D’autres, en particulier ceux du Rassemblement ex-national, lui apportent un soutien médiatique et s’alignent sur la « gauche Charlie ». Ainsi l’avocat de l’hebdomadaire satirique, Richard Malka, la défend-il. Marine – Malka, même combat ? Un cauchemar…

Outre le rôle délétère des réseaux sociaux dans la construction psychique des enfants mineurs qui ne devraient pas les utiliser avant leur majorité légale, cette affaire prouve la nocivité de cinq décennies d’immigration extra-européenne avec l’inévitable islamisation qui en découle. Ce phénomène inquiétant profite de l’anomie grandissante d’une société soumise aux lubies minoritaires inclusives, multiculturalistes et gendéristes à tel point que l’intersectionnalité tant vantée en fac atteint ici ses limites conceptuelles.

En effet, invitée le 3 février sur TMC dans l’émission de l’ineffable Yann Barthès « Quotidien », Mila relate ce qui déclencha la colère de son soupirant éconduit et le torrent de critiques virulentes à son encontre. Elle discute alors sur le réseau social, suivie en direct par des dizaines d’internautes, – ce qui ne correspond donc pas à une conversation privée -, avec une abonnée qui l’interroge sur ses préférences sexuelles. Eh oui ! À 16 ans, on s’exhibe volontiers au risque d’être impudique. Déjà bien dévergondée, Mila dévoile sa vie intime : « Je lui ai dit que j’étais lesbienne. Elle m’a demandé quel était mon style de fille, m’a dit qu’elle, personnellement, n’aimait pas particulièrement les Rebeus et les Noires. Je lui ai dit que c’était pareil pour moi (Libération des 8 et 9 février 2020). »

1524635a2e2f58f75ef62a45b03c6090.jpgToujours prêt à réagir, Barthès reste coi. Ne pas apprécier des Beurettes et des Africaines, n’est-ce pas une preuve flagrante de discrimination ? Mila n’avoue-t-elle pas un désir de ségrégation ? Refuserait-elle le paradis multiracial arc-en-ciel ? La lycéenne iséroise ne serait-elle pas une sympathisante cachée du nationalisme queer ? C’est une nouvelle manifestation du gendérisme.

Cette approche se retrouve dans la proposition de loi constitutionnelle déposée par 41 députés LR – UDI et non-inscrits. Le texte prévoit d’ajouter dans l’article 4 de la Constitution de 1958 la laïcité et d’inscrire dans l’article 1er que « nul individu ou nul groupe ne peut se prévaloir de son origine ou de sa religion pour s’exonérer du respect de la règle commune », c’est-à-dire du Diktat franç-maçon. Les partis dits « communautaristes » ne bénéficieraient plus du financement public et pourraient se voir dissoudre pour provocation à la discrimination, à la haine ou à la violence. Le mouvement national-catholique Civitas ou des formations favorables à la préférence nationale et à « la France aux Français » seraient les premiers ciblés. En revanche, un dîner annuel hautement communautaire auquel sont conviées toutes les autorités du Régime se poursuivra sans aucun problème.

Le code pénal comporte vingt-trois critères de discrimination (l’âge, le sexe, l’origine, l’appartenance ou non à une race, à une nation ou à une ethnie, la grossesse, l’état de santé, le handicap, les caractéristiques génétiques, l’orientation sexuelle, l’identité de genre, les opinions politiques, syndicales et philosophiques, les croyances ou l’appartenance ou non à une religion, la situation de famille, l’apparence physique, le nom, les mœurs, le lieu de résidence, la perte d’autonomie, la vulnérabilité économique, la glottophobie et la domiciliation bancaire). Pourquoi cette restriction aux seules origine et religion ? Un intersexuel non binaire ou un chauve à forte surcharge pondérale pourraient-ils, eux, y déroger légalement ?

Pis, cette proposition de loi constitutionnelle stipule que tout agent public avant de prendre sa fonction devrait prêter serment d’« adhérer loyalement à la République, à ses valeurs de liberté, d’égalité et de fraternité et à la Constitution ». « En cas de parjure, explique ce texte affligeant, l’agent serait automatiquement démis de ses fonctions car nul ne peut servir la République sans adhérer aux valeurs de celle-ci et de ses textes fondateurs ». On notera l’occultation complète de la France par rapport à la sinistre « Ripoublique », validant notre thèse gallovacantiste.

Créature échappée de la ménagerie chiraquienne, le président de la commission des Lois du Sénat, Philippe Bas, justifie l’initiative de ses collègues par un argument invraisemblable : « Comme en 1789, nous avons besoin de renouer notre accord sur le principe du vivre-ensemble (Le Figaro du 3 février 2020). » Philippe Bas (d’esprit) ne cache pas son ignorance presque révisionniste de l’histoire…

La République française devient sous couvert d’un vivre-ensemble infernal une nouvelle divinité laïque. Viendront bientôt l’interdiction de l’Action Française et de la Nouvelle Action Royaliste, l’expulsion de la Maison d’Orléans et la déchéance de nationalité des princes Louis de Bourbon, Napoléon et Sixte-Henri de Bourbon-Parme tandis qu’un islamisme fomenté depuis Riyad, Doha et Ankara s’implante durablement dans les banlieues de l’immigration sans cesse renouvelée. L’islamisme tue des vies tandis que le gendérisme massacre des âmes. Le Boréen du XXIe siècle doit combattre ces deux menaces équivalentes au nom d’une troisième voie décente.

Dans ces circonstances difficiles, n’espérons rien du Rassemblement ex-national. Celui-ci préférera toujours traduire devant son conseil de discipline sa tête de liste à Guînes dans le Pas-de-Calais, Laurent Marécaux, trente ans de militantisme au Front national. Sa faute ? Avoir proposé sur sa page Facebook, le 26 janvier dernier, « l’instruction des adultes et des enfants au tir de défense, face aux menaces islamistes présentes et futures ». Scandale au Carré de Nanterre !

Cette suggestion légitime ne va pourtant pas assez loin. À l’instar de la préparation militaire obligatoire en Russie, c’est toute la jeunesse albo-européenne de France qui devrait recevoir de véritables cours martiaux, y compris la post-binaire Mila, grande amie d’une partie seulement du genre humain, qui découvrira enfin le maniement des gros calibres.

Georges Feltin-Tracol.

• « Chronique hebdomadaire du Village planétaire », n° 160, mise en ligne sur TV Libertés, le 17 février 2020.

jeudi, 27 février 2020

Historian of the Future: An Introduction to Oswald Spengler’s Life and Works for the Curious Passer-by and the Interested Student

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Historian of the Future:
An Introduction to Oswald Spengler’s Life and Works
for the Curious Passer-by and the Interested Student

By Stephen M. Borthwick
Ex: https://europeanheathenfront.wordpress.com

There have been two resurgences in the popularity of Oswald Spengler since the initial blooming of his popularity in the 1920s; the first in the 1980s and the second most recently, with almost ten major books dealing directly with him or his thought published in the last ten years, and more articles in various academic journals. It is a resurgence in the popular mind that may yet be matched in the academy, where Spengler has hardly been obscure but nevertheless an unknown—a forbidden intellectual fruit for what was, in the words of Henry Stuart Hughes, his first English-language biographer, “obviously not a respectable performance from the standpoint of scholarship” calling Decline of the West, in form typical to Hughes’ species “a massive stumbling block in the path to true knowledge”.[1] This is a pervasive attitude amongst academics, whose fields, especially history, are dominated by a specialisation that Spengler’s history defies with its broad perspective and positivist influences. As such when Spengler’s magnum opus first appeared, it was immediately subject to what in popular parlance can only qualify as nit-picking, which did not cease when the author corrected what factual errors could be found in his initial text. Nevertheless, in the popular mind Spengler has remained an influential if obscure author. Most recently, his unique, isolated civilisations encapsulated in their own history has been observed in Samuel Huntington’s Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the World Order, though the development of civilisations from Mediterranean to Western that he paints resembles the dominant theory posited by William McNeill in his Rise of the West rather than Spengler’s Decline of the West. Nevertheless, Spengler’s theory of encapsulated cultural organisms growing up next to one another, advanced by subsequent authors like Toynbee, remains a stirring line of thought, growing more relevant in the rising conflict between Western countries and the resurging Islamic world.

T9780195066340_p0_v1_s550x406.jpgo understand this adversity that Spengler’s ideas struggle against in the academic establishment, and therefore to know why his ideas have filtered through the decades but left his name and book behind, it is necessary to do what very few academics dare to do: to explore and openly discuss the significance of Spengler’s thought. This is the project of this essay; to explain to any who have recently discovered Spengler, especially if they are a college student or college graduate, why they have never heard the name “Spengler” before, and what his thought entails at its most basic level. This discussion will deal not just with Spengler’s most famous work, Der Untergang des Abendlandes (“The Downfall of the Occident”, popularly known as Decline of the West, after C.F. Atkinson’s translation) but also with his numerous political pamphlets and subsequent works of philosophy and history. His philosophical texts include, chiefly: Man and Technics, a specialised focus expanding on the relationship of the human being and the age of technology in which we live already mentioned in Decline, The Hour of Decision, which foresees the overthrow of the Western world by what today would be called the “Third World”, or what Spengler refers to as the “Coloured World”, and Prussianism and Socialism, his first major political text, prescribing the exact form of political structure needed, in his view, to save Germany immediately after the First World War. Numerous other texts, published by C.H. Beck in Munich, also exist, compiled in two primary collections, Politischen Schriften (“Political Writings”) of 1934 and posthumous Reden und Aufsätze (“Speeches and Essays”) of 1936; these are joined by Gedanken (“Reflections”), also of 1936. His unfinished works, posthumously collected and titled by chief Spengler scholar Anton Koktanek in the 1960s, Urfragen and Frühzeit der Weltgeschichte, will not be touched upon in this brief introduction, since they are not available in the English language, but readers fluent in German are encouraged to explore them as well as Koktanek’s other works.

On the assumption that without understanding a man, one cannot grasp his thought, it seems most appropriate to begin any exploration of Spengler the philosopher with Spengler the man. Spengler was a conservative first, then a German nationalist, then a pessimist (though he regarded himself as a consummate realist). Further, he was one of the few men (if not the only man) to meet Adolf Hitler and come away completely unmoved by the demagogue and future dictator of Germany. He openly attacked National Socialism as “the tendency not to want to see and master sober reality, but instead to conceal it with... a party-theatre of flags, parades, and uniforms and to fake hard facts with theories and programmes” and declared that what Germany needed was “a hero, not merely a heroic tenor.”[2] Nevertheless, when voting in the 1932 elections, Spengler, along with some 13.5 million other Germans, cast his ballot for the National Socialist ticket; he explained his choice to friends by saying enigmatically “Hitler is an idiot—but one must support the movement.”[3] At the time people speculated what he meant, and have subsequently continued to speculate to what he was referring when he said “the movement”, especially after his sustained criticisms of National Socialism well into what other Germans were experiencing as “the German Rebirth” in the years between 1933 and his death in 1936.

Spengler’s sustained pessimism about the National Socialist future (he remarked sarcastically shortly before his death that “in ten years the German Reich will probably no longer exist”) is reflective of a realism he had well before the beginning of the First World War, when the idea that would become Decline of the West were first conceived shortly after the Agadir crisis in 1911. Spengler lived and wrote largely in unhappy times; his chief contributions were made in Germany’s darkest hours of the interwar period, dominated by an unstable, incompetent government, extraordinary tributes exacted by the victorious allies, and as a result unrivalled poverty, inflation, and unemployment while the former Allied Powers (save for Italy) were experiencing the so-called “Roaring ‘20s”. He was born and he died, however, in times when things were looking bright. Few regular Germans in 1936 could or did foresee the barbarity of Hitler’s reign, five gruelling years of World War and the planned extermination of non-“Aryans” in conquered territories as well as at home, just as Wilhelmine Germany was oblivious to the consequences of the First World War almost right through it. All that the Germans saw was Germany, their Germany, was on the rise! In 1880, when the young Oswald was born to Bernhard Spengler and his wife Pauline, the German Empire was led by Kaiser Wilhelm I and his Iron Chancellor Bismarck, and the German Reich was still celebrating its formation and the unification of the German nation. Aside from the tribulation of the “year of three emperors” when the young Oswald was eight, there was no reason for the average German to worry about catastrophe: the kindly old Kaiser Wilhelm was replaced by his young, virulent grandson, Wilhelm II, who promised his people “a place in the Sun”. Later, in 1936, when the now established scholar died in his sleep of a heart-attack, the German people were again in good spirits; from the popular perspective, all they could see was that they at last had jobs again, inflation no longer loomed as so painful a memory, their shattered Reich was being rebuilt, and someone had finally reasserted German control over the Rhineland and the Saar—where the memory of the insulting use of colonial occupation forces by the French, and the various abuses civilians suffered during the occupation, still lingered in the German mind.

Early Life (From Youth to Decline, 1880-1917)

All of this blithe cheerfulness and celebration, though, did not affect either the young or the old Oswald Spengler. The opening chapter of Koktanek’s biography of him is titled “Ursprung und Urangst” – “Origin and Original Anxiety”, and not without good reason. Throughout his life, Spengler suffered a nervous affliction and anxiety, leading to chronic headaches in later years so bad that they caused minor short-term memory loss. He would later reflect in his planned autobiography that in his youth he had “no friends, with one exception, [and] no love: a few sudden, stupid [infatuations], fearful of the bond [of relationship]. [I had] only yearning and melancholy.”[4] His home life was similarly dismal. John Farrenkopf characterises it as the typical bourgeois home of the period; his father, a former copper miner turned civil servant, was proud of the Fatherland, conservative in social attitudes, and generally took for granted his loyalty to the Prussian State. It was, in Spengler’s own eyes, a cold place, and an unhappy one. Spengler remarked that his parents were “unliterarisch”—“unlettered, unliterary”—and they “never opened our bookcase nor bought a book”; he himself developed an early love for reading, which earned him ire from his father, of whom he wrote was characterised by a “hatred for all recreation, most of all books”.[5] Despite his newspaper reading and bourgeois sensibilities, though, Bernhard Spengler rarely raised the topic of politics in the household, and young Oswald was only exposed to the workings of the State by outside influences. He would break from this aloofness of politics only once in his life, shrinking after his failure back into scholastic and theoretical efforts to influence the political climate.

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Spengler’s mother led an unhappy life; she married Bernhard, it would seem, out of convenience rather than deep feeling, and bitter about her lot. Originally from the famous Grantzow clan of ballerinas and ballet masters, Pauline Spengler was prevented from ballet and the stage because of her figure, and then forced to leave her beloved home town, the quiet hamlet of Blanckenburg in the Harz mountains, for the bustling Hessian city of Halle-an-der-Saale when young Oswald was ten and her husband changed his trade from mining to postal work (a change he was not especially excited about, either). She displayed her dissatisfaction by brooding over her painting (an effort to cling to what artistry she could maintain in competition with her sisters) and playing petty tyrant over her children.

The young Spengler escaped this life through fantasy and fiction, inventing imaginary kingdoms and world-empires and writing childish theatre-plays with echoes of Wagner. He found further escape after he began his schooling at the Latina, administered by the Franckean Foundation in Halle, where he formally studied Greek and Latin, but in his free time devoured Goethe and Schiller, the first of literary influences that would later be joined by such eclectic writers as William Shakespeare, Gerhart Hauptmann, Henrik Ibsen, Maksim Gorky, Honoré de Balzac, Heinrich von Kleist, E.T.A. Hoffmann, Friedrich Hebbel, Heinrich Heine, Leo Tolstoy, Fyodor Dostoevsky, Émile Zola, Gutave Flaubert, and others.[6] Spengler complained of the Franckean focus on Greek and Latin that prevented him from learning “practical languages”, and he was forced as a result to teach himself French, English, Italian, and, later, during his university days, Russian, through reading authors in those languages. His fluency in the languages was astounding to many, but he himself never felt comfortable enough with them to correspond with many of the authors he would later read and who would bring to bear influence on his own magnum opus in their own languages. Anton Koktanek blames this anxiety and lack of formal training in modern foreign languages for Spengler remaining “a German phenomenon”.[7]

Spengler’s interest in world history and contemporary history also began here, and added to the fiction he wrote, including a short story set in the Russo-Japanese War titled Der Sieger as well as poetry, librettos, dramatic sketches, and other notes and such, most of which he would commit to the flames in 1911.[8] At University, he read the entirety of Goethe’s corpus and discovered two men who would bear tremendous influence on his later writing: Arthur Schopenhauer, and Friedrich Nietzsche. He would also become a devotee of Richard Wagner during this time, declaring his favourite work to be Tristan and Isolde.[9] His interest in Nietzsche especially would have great bearing on his choice of thesis topic, the pre-Socratic philosopher Heraclitus.

Spengler’s father died in 1901, just as Oswald was beginning University studies. He was by and large emotionally unaffected by the loss, and began all the more focusing on his studies. Like most students at University in those days, Spengler matriculated at several Universities while formally enrolled at the University of Halle. First, he travelled to Munich, a city with which he would fall in love and later make his home. Subsequently he would also study at the University of Berlin and then returned to Halle to complete his dissertation topic, entitled “Heraklit: eine Studie über den energetischen Grundgedanken seiner Philosophie” (“Heraclitus: A Study of the Energetic Fundamental Thought of his Philosophy”). It was, as Klaus Fischer observes, “a daring subject for a young scholar because Heraclitus had only left a few and highly cryptic fragments of his thought.”[10] Spengler, however, dared, and presented the first form of his thesis in 1903, but failed the oral defence. Despite his own typically depressed personality, however, he was not downtrodden at the failure; rather, he agreed with almost every criticism that was offered against his work—in his autobiography he called himself “naïve”. He had not, as most biographers observe, consulted any professors on his thesis before submitting it, and therefore had made errors and omissions that one only really avoids from consultation and discussion of one’s work.[11] The primary complaint was his lack of citations. He would repeat this mistake with the first edition of Decline of the West in 1917, writing the book entirely alone and isolated from the outside world—after initial criticism of the book he would revisit and largely revise the text, such that when it arrived in second edition in 1922 he had fixed most of his errors, but did not, as the academics insisted he should, increase the number of citations.

Spengler received his Ph.D. in 1904 and immediately went on to pass State examinations in a number of subjects that allowed him to become a Gymnasium teacher. His first assignment was a major turning point in his life, when he resolved not to be a teacher after stepping off the train in the little town of Lüneburg, taking a glance about at the town and the school and realising how terribly provincial his life would be. Spengler promptly boarded a train for his home town of Blankenburg and had a nervous breakdown. From this point forward he resolved to use teaching as a support for his true passions of study and writing. He recovered from his breakdown and took a different assignment, this time in Saarbrücken, happy to be so close to the French border that would allow him to take several holidays in France.[12] After a year there, he moved on to Düsseldorf, where he taught for another year before taking on a permanent (or so it appeared at the time) position in Hamburg.

Spengler flourished in these cities of big industry and metropolitan life—despite his writings criticising money power and the soul-stealing metropolis, Spengler remained a cosmopolitan urbanite throughout his life. An attestation to this aspect of his personality is his behaviour while teaching. Spengler remembered his days in the Franckean Latina with mixed disdain for the parochial moralists he had as teachers and gratitude for the training he received. He resolved, in the words of Klaus Fischer, “to avoid the foibles commonly attributed to schoolteachers: pedantry, narrow provincialism, and incivility” and made an effort to keep himself fully attuned to the petty culture of fashion and the latest advances in his scholarly fields (he taught German, mathematics, and geography). He would also frequent the theatre (where he would weep easily at especially moving plots and concertos) and local museums—in Düsseldorf he was even spotted frequently in the casino, a place quite foreign to most schoolteachers![13] His time in teaching, however, was short-lived. By almost all accounts Spengler hated Hamburg, not for itself, nor because he disliked the people, his colleagues or his students—indeed in all these respects he was well-respected and well-loved and returned these feelings of affection—but because of the weather. The cold, wet north German city terrorised him, increasing the acuteness and the frequency of his chronic headaches to such a degree that he took a year sabbatical in 1911 from which he would never return. His immediate plans were a holiday in Italy, where he would sojourn frequently in imitation of Goethe.[14]

His complete departure from teaching, much to the disappointment of both colleagues and students, who regarded him as a superlative teacher and amicable fellow, was by and large decided by his mother’s death in 1910. He had little regard for his mother, who psychologically tortured his sister Gertrude, disdained his other sister Hildegard, and was no kinder to his beloved sister Adele.[15] While he marked his father’s passing in 1901 with reflections of the latter’s loyalty to Prussia, his mother’s death was marked only with his inheritance and departure from his childhood home, leaving his sister Adele to dissolve the household.[16] Adele, a frustrated bohemian and largely talentless aspiring virtuoso, quickly spent the 30,000DM she inherited and committed suicide in 1917. Oswald’s inheritance, on the other hand, was wisely invested and used with some measure of thrift, giving him a comfortable lifestyle in Munich and allowing him to pursue his desire to be a writer.

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At first, Spengler hadn’t the slightest idea what to write about. In Heraklit he displayed some of the budding thought which came to fruition as his magnum opus, to be sure. In one of the thicker sections of notes for Eis Heauton, the author proclaims that “my great book, Untergang des Abendlandes, was already emotionally conceived in my twentieth year” (four years before he would submit his doctoral thesis).[17] Farrenkopf observes that Spengler’s dissertation bears the marks of Decline as well, declaring that “what Spengler later attempted as a philosopher of history is analogous to what he claimed Heraclitus had accomplished in Greek philosophy”.[18] The true inspiration for Decline, however, came not from Heraclitus nor from Goethe or Nietzsche; nor did it come to him, as it did with Gibbon and Toynbee, from a physical visit to any landmarks. Rather, the genesis of Decline of the West was in a much different, political work titled Liberal and Conservative, which Spengler began writing in response to the Agadir Crisis of 1911.

Agadir, briefly put, was an attempt on the part of Kaiser Wilhelm II to imitate the American support of the Panamanian rebellion against Columbia, which was accomplished by placing the American fleet off the coast of Panama to prevent Columbian intervention. When Moroccans rebelled against the puppet Sultan Abdelhafid after years of allowing his country to be exploited by European powers, the French offered to support Fez by sending in troops. Wilhelm attempted to assert German interests in the region by sending the gunboat Panther to the harbour of Agadir, much to the chagrin of the French, who would later take over Morocco as part of their colonial Empire, and the British, who viewed the act as a challenge to their own power and a threat to peace in Europe. The end result of the whole event was a strengthened Entente cordiale that would eventually become the Allied Powers in the First World War.

Spengler was keenly aware of the situation at the time, and took on the task of writing a book on the subject that would contrast German and British world-aims and national spirits. The general thrust of this work would become his later work Prussianism and Socialism of 1919, but as he worked on Liberal and Conservative, he found his topic broadening more and more, to the point where he was taking into account not the national rivalries of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, but the great trials and tribulations of entire civilisations over the course of millennia. Thus the work transformed into the first volume of his Decline of the West, the title of which he probably derived from discovering Otto Seeck’s Geschichte des Untergangs der antiken Welt (“History of the Downfall of the Ancient World” or The History of the Decline of Antiquity) in a store-front window.[19] He would complete the work over the next few years, well into the World War, about which he maintained a positive outlook, to the extent that his introduction to the first volume of Decline, appearing in 1917, bore the hope of the author (omitted in Atkinson’s translation) that “this book might not stand entirely unworthy next to the military achievements of Germany.”[20]

The book that took shape was sweeping in scale, painting the picture of a broad history of mankind as the life cycle(s) of massive organisms to which Spengler gave two names: Kultur and Zivilisation, each representing the youth and the adulthood of the organism. These organisms passed through four seasons of life—(as Kultur) Spring, Summer, (as Zivilisation) Autumn, and Winter—before passing from existence and leaving the soil to which it is tied to give rise to a new organism. A more detailed discussion of the theory may be required before departing into Spengler’s life after the War and the publication of Decline.

Decline of the West and its Influences

Der Untergang des Abendlandes occurs as a part of a long tradition of German historical writing, dating from the early nineteenth century and in which the giants of the field, both famous and infamous, stand: G.W.F. Hegel, Karl Marx, Heinrich von Treitschke, Leopold von Ranke, Heinrich Friedjung, among others. It also occurs as a part of a long tradition of German philosophy and social thought, dating even further into history and starting, not with the rational Kant, but with the intuitive and romantic, sometimes quasi-mystical writings of Goethe, following to Nietzsche, Ferdinand Tönnies, Max Weber, and still more. More can be said of Spengler’s influences, and has been said in the works of Farrenkopf and Fischer on the subject, but a brief discussion of chief influences will be sufficient for our purposes.

osimagep.jpgIf Spengler was the first to propose a World-Historical view, as he claims in the early pages of Decline, Leopold von Ranke preceded him by for the first time proposing a European-Historical view in his two-volume Deutsche Geschichte im Zeitalter der Reformation (“German History in the Age of Reformation”) of 1845/47.[21] Ranke wrote a history which belongs to a very specific school of historical inquiry, dependent on objectivity and a slice of historical fact drawn from primary source work with bearing only on that exact moment in history, showing things wie es eigentlich gewesen, as he proclaims in his 1824 work Geschichte der romanischen und germanischen Völker von 1494 bis 1514 (“History of the Latin and Teutonic Peoples, 1494-1514”). For all his efforts at objectivity in history, he was a firm believer in the balance of power of nation-states, and his loyalty to this state philosophy bleeds through in his writing. He is significant to Spengler in that both men sought to broaden historical inquiry into an objective rather than national project, and that Spengler was certainly beholden to the school of narrative historicism that Ranke would found, inasmuch as his project was heavily criticised by more loyal Rankeans than himself.

Spengler’s other major historical inheritance was G.W.F. Hegel, who stood with Ranke in his typical nineteenth century fascination with the nation-state but was completely opposed to Ranke’s objective, slice-of-history approach, demanding a broader view, and the ability to see the future in the past. Hegel was also a dedicated Prussian, much like Spengler’s father and Spengler himself—so much so, in fact, that he is among several German historians of preceding centuries who are mentioned by Shirer in his fumbling, attempt to link National Socialism and the Prussian state in Rise and Fall of the Third Reich. His declaration in Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts (“Elements of the Philosophy of Right”) that “the course of God in the world—that is the State—and its foundation is the mighty force of Reason actualising itself as Will” is reflected in Spengler’s own firm belief in the role of fate in the lifespan of Kultur-Zivilisation organisms.[22] Furthermore, like Hegel, Spengler’s history is a designated march to a designated end: for Hegel, the “end of history” is a progressive, linear movement from antiquity to modernity and the pinnacle of mankind’s development—a belief that has earned Hegel accusations of arrogance and stubbornness, among other things, from detractors. He would pass this view onto his student Karl Marx, who proclaimed the same progression, but from a strictly economic view, of modes of production through history, culminating in the elimination of alienation and the realisation of Species-being in Communism. The difference between the Hegelian and Marxian view of history and Spengler, however, is two-fold: while the given lifespan of a Kultur-Zivilisation organism can be viewed as linear, it is a downward motion rather than the upward motion Hegel and Marx see; further, there is no single linear history of all mankind, the way Hegel and Marx see it. Quite the contrary, Spengler echoes Goethe, declaring that “‘Mankind’ is a zoological concept or merely an empty word.”[23]

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It seems contradictory, of course, that Spengler would reject that “mankind” exists while attempting very earnestly to write a “world-history.” As much as Spengler reflects Hegel and Ranke as historical predecessors, his views of the organism of society bear the marks of Ferdinand Tönnies, whose famous work Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft would practically found the discipline of sociology, influencing both Max Weber’s seminal The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism as well as Emile Durkheim’s functional theories of society.[24] Tönnies summarises his project in Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft in the very first page, saying “The connexion will be understood either as real and organic – this being the nature of the Gemeinschaft – or in an ideological and mechanistic form – this being the notion of Gesellschaft” and further summarising the difference between the two by saying that, “all that is familiar, private, living together exclusively (we find) is understood as life in a Gemeinschaft. Gesellschaft is the public sphere, it is the World”.[25]

Spengler’s structure of the communal, agrarian Kultur passing into individualised, urban Zivilisation has much in common with Tönnies’ conception of the organic Gemeinschaft and its artificial counterpart Gesellschaft. It is also important to bear in mind that the key to the Gemeinschaft/Gesellschaft schema is two-fold—both the contrast of the private with the public spheres as well as the organic with the artificial—when considering Spengler’s own contrast of the representative of Kultur, which is the “country-town” with the representative of Zivilisation, which is the megalopolis. As Spengler says himself, “long ago the country bore the country-town and nourished it with her best blood. Now the giant city sucks the country dry, insatiably and incessantly demanding and devouring fresh streams of men, till it wearies and dies in the midst of an almost uninhabited waste of country.”[26]

The contrast of the organic with the artificial, the personal with the impersonal, and the village with the city runs throughout Spengler’s whole structure. Spengler’s vision is two-fold: both the binary progression of Kultur crystallising and stagnating into Zivilisation as well the four-phase life cycle that all Kultur-Zivilisation structures (or, more properly, organisms) follow. Describing this, Spengler uses two sets of terms: organic terms, describing the actual birth, growth, decline, and death of the Kulture-Zivilization organism as a life form, and the fatalistic language for which he has been so criticised: he declares “the Civilisation is the inevitable destiny of a Culture… Civilisations are… a conclusion, the thing-become succeeding the thing-becoming, death following life”.[27] The central concept there—Werden and Gewordene, “becoming” and “become”—are ideas for which Spengler is deeply indebted (as he admits) to Goethe, and play strong role in the contrast he makes between the vivacious, developing Kultur and the stagnant, crystallised Zivilisation.[28]

These Kultur-Zivilisation organisms are detailed in three tables he includes in his work: the first details the passage of Spring-Summer-Autumn-Winter, which for the Occident begins in 900, after the Carolingian period and the final death of Antiquity, and ends (or begins to end) with modernity, completely the roughly thousand-year lifespan which Spengler assigns to his Kultur-Zivilisation organisms (except those of the far east). Each Kultur-Zivilisation organism has a symbol which accompanies it in the Kultur phase; for the West it is infinite space; for the Egyptian, the long corridor; the Semitic, the cavern; the Greeks, the idealised statue, etc. Spengler also specifically names three of the “souls” of these organisms with especial bearing on the Occident. The West itself is “Faustian” defined by Goethe’s own character and his constant outward-reaching for knowledge and more; Antiquity, which the West has replaced, is “Apollonian”, a term readily borrowed from Nietzsche, defined by the Nietzschean Apollonian rationality and thirst for worldly perfection; finally, the Semitic, being Jewish, Arabic, etc. is a sort of mixed Kultur-Zivilisation organism called “Magian”, after the mystics who visited the birth of the Christ-child, and is defined by the preoccupation with essence rather than space.

9200000078648382.jpgThe Magian requires some further discussion, since it represents for Spengler a different “mutation” (to keep with the biological sense of an organism) of the main species of Kultur-Zivilizationen. This is because of a process Spengler describes in the second volume of Decline called “pseudomorphosis”. He asserts in the first volume that the “Arabian soul was cheated of its maturity—like a young tree that is hindered and stunted in its growth by a fallen old giant of the forest,” but after critiques of the work began to circulate back to him, realised that this was inadequate to explain the unique situation that the Magian Kultur-Zivilisation finds itself.[29] He therefore suggests a parallel with mineralogy, pointing the phenomenon of “pseudomorphosis”, by which volcanic molten rock flows into spaces left by washed away minerals in the hollows of rocks; likewise, since the Arabian culture’s pre-historical period is encompassed by Babylonian Civilization, and later as it develops it is stunted by Antiquity with the Roman conquest of Egypt.[30] Spengler sees a similar occurrence with the Russian Kultur-Zivilisation, which is pressed between the Faustian Kultur-Zivilisation and the Asiatic hordes which repeatedly conquer it. He maintains even in his last work, Jahre der Entscheidung, that the Bolshevist revolution represented a part of this pseudomorphosis that Russia is experiencing: “Asia has conquered Russia back from “Europe” to which it had been annexed by Peter the Great”.[31]

This is the structure within which the subject of Spengler’s title exists. Spengler remarked on his title at length in an essay titled “Pessimismus?” (“Pessimism?”) appearing in the Preußischer Jahrbücher in 1921:

But there are men who confuse the downfall [literally “going under”] of Antiquity with the sinking of an ocean liner. The notion of a catastrophe is not contained in the word. If one said—instead of downfall—completion, an expression that is linked in a special way with Goethe’s thought, the “pessimistic” side is removed without the real sense of the term having been altered.[32]

He is not, therefore, discussing a cataclysmic event that would bring about the end of Western civilisation, though no doubt much of the appeal of his work was the recent catastrophe of the Great War. What he sees instead is a general inadequacy in the trends coming out of his contemporary West, which the Great War only compounded. Faustian civilisation had come to stagnate with the rise of bourgeois economists; as he says, “through the economic history of every Culture there runs a desperate conflict waged by the soil-rooted tradition of a race, by its soul, against the spirit of money”.[33] The capitalism and industrialisation of liberal Europe represents the bleeding dry of the soul of Faustian Kultur; it, too, however, shall pass in the coming Ceasarism of the Faustian Winter that Spengler predicts. He speaks of “the sword” being triumphant over money-power and finance capital, bringing about the final period of where violence of spirit triumphs and is marked by the rise of the “Caesars”, demagogues who will bring about a Western World Imperium that Spengler envisioned being headed by Germany. It is worth noting that John Farrenkopf believes this to remain an accurate prediction for America, which Spengler himself discounted, as most Europeans at the time, as an adolescent child of Europe, hardly capable of contributing to Faustian Zivilisation in any great way.

It is, at last, important to note that while Spengler offers this structure that explains history, it is not his intent to “save” the Occident. He participated in politics that would, in his view, further the progression of Faustian Zivilization out of its Autumn and into Winter, but, in true Nietzschean fashion, he encourages his readers to adopt an amor fati toward the decline of their Kultur-Zivilisation. Indeed, the hope one retains after reading Spengler is of a peculiar kind—since all Kultur-Zivilisationen are destined to wither and die, the Faustian man should embrace the destruction of the Occident with an eye to the subsequent Kultur-Zivilisation organism that will take its place, which Spengler predicts will be Russian, a society which due to close contact to both the Occidental and Asian Kultur-Zivilisation organisms has not been able to come into itself—in short, it is not yet Werden, existing in the historyless period that marks the beginning and end of every Kultur-Zivilisation organism.

The Conservative Revolutionary (Political Writings and Speeches, 1919-1924)

The Decline of the West marks a high-point in Spengler’s life, and also a turning point for both his own life and the life of Germany as a whole. Decline appeared complete in two volumes in 1922, four years after Germany’s defeat in the First World War and in the midst of the Weimar Republic struggling to get on its feet. As mentioned above, this contributed greatly to the book’s circulation, though it is unclear how many enthusiasts made an effort to read the entire text. Spengler found himself now ushered into higher intellectual circles, battling with intellectual greats over the value of his work, and once again able to enjoy the delicacies he had to go without for the duration of the War (he wrote that much of the work he did on Decline was done by candlelight). In 1919 he joined such famous names as Hermann Alexander Graf Keyserling (for his seminal work Reisetagebuch eines Philosophen, “Travel-Diary of a Philosopher”) and distinguished Kant scholar Dr. Hans Vaihinger (for his work Philosophie des Als Ob, “The Philosophy of As-If”) in being awarded the Nietzsche Archives’ “Distinguished Scholar Award” with an academic diploma and the sum of 1,500.00DM (roughly $45.00 in 1919).[34]

Despite his acute sense of the depressing reality of his work, Spengler was materially well-off and led a generally comfortable life because of its popularity. He moved from the small flat where he had written Decline during the war to a spacious apartment that overlooked the Isar River. He decorated it with a variety of fine paintings, Chinese and Greek-styled vases, and other pieces obtained at auctions or gifted to him by admirers, and shocked visitors with his vast library, which literally lined the walls of his new home. He covered the fine hard-wood floors with even finer rugs, most markedly a strikingly red carpet in his office upon which he was known to pace endlessly in the night while he worked.[35] He was, though, of relatively modest tastes, and was frugal with his money. He took holidays to Italy frequently, but otherwise only left Germany when another party could pay for his travel; his tastes at home included trips to the theatre, fine wines, and a regular supply of dark cigars. He never hired a housekeeper or married, and his sister Hildegard, widowed by the World War, would keep house for him. He rarely entertained and continued to devote himself to work. His work now, though, was not strictly scholarly.

41-idJ1g3nL._SX339_BO1,204,203,200_.jpgA well-known name now, Spengler began to take a greater interest in politics than he had hitherto. He wrote to Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz in 1920 regarding the recovery of the flag from the SMS Scharnhorst, which was sunk in the Battle of the Falkland Islands in 1914, taking Admiral Maximillian Graf von Spee to the bottom with it; the flag, Spengler wrote, had fallen into the hands of an anti-German party who wished to send it to Britain to be a trophy of war, something offensive to Spengler as a German nationalist.[36] Admiral von Tirpitz replied that he would refer the matter to the admiralty, but the flag was undoubtedly not that from the Scharnhorst’s main post, which went down flying, and therefore the value of the demands of the original owners for the flag (50,000-60,000DM) was probably not equal even to its sentimental value. The admiral added, probably much to Spengler’s satisfaction, that he had thoroughly enjoyed reading Prussianism and Socialism, and wrote “I only wish that your ideas could find response in the Marxist-infected working classes.”[37]

The work Admiral Tirpitz praised so highly was Spengler’s second attempt to reflect on the Agadir crisis and the significance of German and British relations. Prussianism and Socialism appears in English translation by Donald O. White with a number of other shorter articles that Spengler penned in the early 1920s. The work appears in White’s 1967 collection Selected Essays, which is roughly a translation of Politischen Schriften, but making some omissions and drawing also from Rede und Aufsätze. The overall collection gives a decent introductory glance at Spengler’s social and political thought, which merits it some exposition here. Other works included in it are “Pessimism?”, which was written as a response to the charge levelled against Decline, his two speeches “The Two Faces of Russia and Germany’s Eastern Problems” (delivered to a conference of influential Ruhr industrialists in 1922) and “Nietzsche and his Century” (delivered at a conference hosted by the Nietzsche Archive in 1924 before Spengler severed ties with Elizabeth Förster-Nietzsche because of her alignment with Hitler ten years later), another short essay titled “On the German National Character”, published in 1927, and finally a brief response given by Spengler to a query posited internationally by Hearst International’s The Cosmopolitan, titled “Is World Peace Possible?”, which was published in what White calls “barely adequate translation” in 1936 alongside answers from Mohandas K. Gandhi, Eleanor Roosevelt, General Billy Mitchell, and Lin Yu-tang.[38]

Prussianism and Socialism abandons Spengler’s earlier, less informed political alignment with the Kaiser, but beyond this minor change it expresses and sets the tone for almost all of Spengler’s other political writings before and after, including his final major work, Hour of Decision. It is also the work that initiated Spengler’s name into the collection of intellectuals and aristocrats that formed the “Conservative Revolution” movement in Weimar Germany. The names he is included with range from the completely obscure to the internationally famous. Among them are obscure authors like Arthur Moeller van den Bruck, for his work, later appropriated by the Nazis, Das Dritte Reich (1923—available in English as Germany’s Third Empire) and Edgar Julius Jung, who is seen as the leader of the movement, for his work Die Herrschaft der Minderwertigen (“The Reign of the Mediocre”, 1927), and more famously for Franz von Papen’s “Marburg Speech”, the last open condemnation of Nazism made in Weimar Germany. However, members of the movement also included men like the internationally acclaimed Ernst Jünger, for his famous memoir of the World War, In Stahlgewittern (first published in 1920 and having been revised by the author 7 times, it is now available in very good translation by Michael Hoffmann as Storm of Steel), Der Kampf als inneres Erlebnis (“Battle as Inner Experience”, 1922), Das Wäldchen 125 (“Copse 125”, 1925) and Feuer und Blut (“Fire and Blood”, 1925) as well as the famous and widely translated Carl Schmitt, now well known for his works Die Diktatur (1921—now available in translation as On Dictatorship), Politische Theologie (1922—available as Political Theology), Die geistesgeschichtliche Lage des heutigen Parlamentarismus (1923—now available in a good translation by Ellen Kennedy titled The Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy), and his extremely significant Der Begriff des Politischen (1926—now available as The Concept of the Political). The unifying feature of the movement was a desire to bridge the gap between nationalist conservatism and socialism, though another major factor was the distaste that all the men had for Adolf Hitler and his, in the words of Moeller van den Bruck, “proletarian primitiveness”.[39]

Spengler’s interactions with other conservatives were largely done through his involvement in the Juniclub (“June Club”) a gathering of Conservatives and Monarchists who shared Spengler’s hatred of the Versailles Treaty (commonly known in Germany as the Versailles Diktat because of the lack of input allowed from the German delegation). Among the group’s founding members was Arthur Moeller van den Bruck, with whom Spengler had many encounters from 1919 until Moeller’s suicide in 1925 through lectures that both gave to the Juniclub. At the Juniclub he also had the opportunity to meet and begin correspondence with Crown Prince Rupprecht of Bavaria, Walther Rathenau, Erich Ludendorff, Hans von Seeckt, and create friendships and lasting ties to major industrialists like Paul Reusch, Roderich Schlubach, Alfred Hugenberg, Karl Helfferich, and Hugo Stinnes.[40] Aside from Moeller, however, his encounters with the other major thinkers of the Conservative Revolutionary movement seemed few; he had some contact later with Jung, who wrote him on several occasions. However, his major inclination during his years of involvement with the Juniclub was toward becoming actively involved in conservative politics, not merely being a theoretician. His ambitions during this time were as disparate and far-flung as leading German intellectuals into politics and founding a newspaper cartel in imitation of William Randolph Hearst.[41]

SpenglerAD.jpgSpengler’s letters during this time are often brief (owing to his preference for meeting people rather than writing them) and to a wide variety of people, including invitations to tea with Erich Ludendorff and his wife, which he maintained as a regular affair until Ludendorff’s involvement in the Beer Hall Putsch in 1923. There was also an extended correspondence with the German government regarding interaction with General Jan C. Smuts, who had invited General Paul von Lettow-Vorbeck (with whom Spengler also corresponded) to a dinner for African commanders of the war.[42] He also met semi-regularly, it would seem, with the Prussian royal family; Crown Prince Wilhelm wrote him a number of times, and Spengler sent copies of his magnum opus to Huis Doorn. He also managed to elicit a positive response from Gregor Strasser, a prominent rival of Hitler’s in the National Socialist party who was murdered in the Night of the Long Knives.[43]

Spengler, however, remained primarily a theoretician; he met many men with whom he had lasting friendships, but he was not a man of political action and he was acutely aware of that. Throughout his brief political career, he was advised by friends not to waste his genius on petty affairs of state, and he eventually gave in and retreated from public life in 1924 after five years of immense popularity and prolific writing. In addition to the one or two speeches and articles in the White collection, in 1924 alone Spengler published Frankreich und Europa (“France and Europe”), Aufgaben des Adels (“Tasks of the Nobility”), Politische Pflichten der deutschen Jugend (“Political Duties of the German Youth”), Neubau des deutschen Reiches (“Reconstruction of the German Reich”), Neue Formen der Weltpolitik (“New Forms of Global Politics”) all of which were derived from speeches and lectures he had given at the Juniclub or at various Industrial clubs and conferences during his involvement there. Some of them, including Politische Pflichten and Neubau would appear in Spengler’s Politischen Schriften of 1932, the others would only be published together in 1937 in the posthumous Reden und Aufsätze collection. The works, all expressing a common theme of the necessity to “reclaim socialism” from Marx and bring about a new birth of “Prussianism” in the German population, brought Spengler immense notoriety in Germany while Decline was making its way through foreign circles. Other presentations included his Das Verhältnis von Wirtschaft und Steuerpolitik seit 1750 (“The Relationship of Economy and Tax Policy since 1750”, 1924). His lectures drew tremendous crowds and he participated in a number of public debates between 1919 and 1924.

Prussianism and Socialism: A Brief Glance

Of all Spengler’s political writings and speeches, both from his public career and after, the most detailed and the most significant remains Prussianism and Socialism. In the work, Spengler makes two arguments, one unique to his own time and one with far-reaching relevance. The work’s principal argument surrounds the “true German spirit” with “the German Michel”, which Spengler declares “the sum of all our weaknesses: our fundamental displeasure at turns of events that demand attention and response; our urge to criticise at the wrong time; our pursuit of ideals instead of immediate action; our precipitate action at times when careful reflection is called for; our Volk as a collection of malcontents; our representative assemblies as glorified beer gardens.”[44] The thrust of the work is a contrast between “English” parliamentarianism and liberalism, which the “German Michel” typifies, the Marxist socialist movement of the Sparticists, which at least has the integrity that the “German Michel” lacked, and real “German” socialism, which Spengler ties to Prussian military spirit and civic duty to create the “Prussian socialism” that he insists is the only way to bring about a rebirth of the German Reich.

The opening of Prussianism and Socialism declares the same sense of destiny found in Decline, quoting Seneca's aphorism ducunt volentem fata, nolentem trahunt (“Fate leads along the willing soul and drags the unwilling”).[45] He declares that “the spirit of Old Prussia and the socialistic attitude, at present driven by brotherly hatred to combat each other, are in fact one in the same”, defining “socialism” itself, which he claims “everyone thinks… means something different”.[46] Spengler’s hero of socialism is August Bebel, the Marxist founder of the SPD who was famously born in a Prussian army barracks. He praises Bebels’ party for its “militant qualities…the clattering footsteps of workers’ battalions, a calm sense of determination, good discipline, and the courage to die for a transcendent principle” and damns the SPD in power in the Weimar Republic for abandoning the revolution and throwing in its lot with the “foe of yesteryear” and encouraging the Freikorps to crush the Spartacists, who Spengler felt “retained a modicum of integrity”.[47] It is not the Marxism of the Social Democrats Spengler admires, however; rather, it is their integrity and their dedication to their beliefs—something that simply does not exist for the “German Michel”, the contemporary parliamentarian.

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He goes on to condemn the “so-called German Revolution” that took place in November, saying that the Germans “produced pedants, schoolboys, and gossips in the Paulskirche and in Weimar, petty demonstrations in the streets, and in the background a nation looking on with faint interest”—not at all what a real revolution entails, but something feeble, something belonging to the parliamentarian and the “German Michel”.[48] Spengler establishes the foundation of Prussian Socialism with “the real German Socialist Revolution” which he says happened in 1914—a real revolution because it involved “the whole people: one outcry, one brazen act, one rage, one goal”.[49] He further asserts that the revolution is not over—a notion he expands on in later speeches and essays. The Revolution of the German people cannot come to full fruition for Spengler and his fellow conservatives, until the German nation is truly born—for 1918 in Germany was not 1789 in France; the nation and the revolution were not the same.

He concludes that “Socialism is not an instinct of dark primeval origin… it is, rather, a political, social, and economic instinct of realistically-minded peoples, as such it is a product of one stage of our civilisation—not of our culture.”[50] He asserts a thoroughly modern origin and a thoroughly modern role for socialism: the realistic, the enemy of the dictatorship of money and capitalism, defined in socialistic form by a sense of duty to the whole, that whole being the German nation. It is in this way that “all Germans are workers”, so that the failing of Marx, he asserts, is his inability to grasp anything more in Hegel, “who by and far represented Prussianism at its best” than mere method.[51] Marx misleads socialism by creating class antagonism when in reality the bourgeois is a meaningless term, Spengler asserts—and the real enemy is the English spirit of mercantilism and parliamentarianism of the feeble “German Michel”; it is not worker against burgher, nor burgher against elite, but German against the Englishman in himself. This is why the German Revolution is incomplete: because the national revolution that unites and brings about the birth of the German nation has not been achieved.

Perhaps the most significant aspect of this and subsequent political texts is the complete absence of any mention of Germany’s Jews. Spengler did not believe, as many of his day did, that the Jewish people had any connexion to parliamentarianism or Marxism or Capitalism or any other distinctly Western phenomenon; rather Western man was at war with himself and himself alone in the conflict between Prussian Socialism and English Mercantilism, between Revolution and Cowardice. He calls Marx “an exclusively English thinker”, unable to see beyond mere economics and ignoring the notion of everyone working for the whole, but each in his own destined place—the King for Spengler’s socialist is “the first servant of the state”, in the highest place among the rest of the nation serving a single, national goal. It is such a different picture than the typical anti-Bolshevik stance in Germany that never tired of reminding the world of Marx’s Jewish origins (his grandfather was a rabbi). This, for Spengler, was as much a simplification as Marx’s class antagonism, because it directed anger and action toward an invented foe instead of directing it toward corrective measures in the West itself.

The Hermit-Scholar (Return to Private Life 1924-1930)

After he retreated from public life, Spengler returned to the lonely life of the hermit scholar, and rededicated himself to work on the theories put forth in Decline. His re-entry into politics was prevented both my deteriorating health as well as a decrease in opportunity with the rising tide of National Socialism. Of all the Conservative Revolutionary thinkers, only Jünger and Schmitt would live to see the Second World War, and their literary lives were even shorter; Spengler was silenced by the Nazi state as early 1933, Jung was murdered, along with several of Spengler’s friends, in the Night of the Long Knives in 1934, and Moeller van den Bruck had a nervous breakdown and committed suicide as early as 1925. Others, like Hugo von Hofmannsthal and Stefan George (especially famous for his Das Neue Reich of 1928), died of natural causes, Hofmannsthal of a stroke in 1929, George four years later of old age. It is indubitable with his voracious appetite for the latest works that Spengler encountered these men through their writing, but no correspondence between them exists. This is not terribly surprising—Spengler wrote letters when he felt the passion to do so (such as to Admiral Tirpitz), or when it furthered his studies (such as the many letters to academics and professors). This was not out of a dislike of people; rather, it was because he detested the task of writing letters and preferred to grant an interview or meet with friends in person, something he did frequently—his sister, Hilde, who became primary caretaker of his estate after his death, remarked that “he always disliked writing letters, even when he was a child.”[52] Those political letters he did write he wisely burned in 1933 to protect himself and others from the National Socialist state.

The return to private living gave Spengler a tremendous opportunity to begin scholarly work again after some years of pamphleteering (something he himself hated, remarking to a friend in 1919, referring to Prussianism and Socialism that “I am not a born journalist and consequently I wrote out 500 pages of rough draft in four weeks and then started paring to get 100 pages of readable German. I realise now how I ought to work and shall never again accept any assignment that carries a deadline with it”).[53] He never ceased his correspondences with high-level academics and contributors in almost every field of study, but after 1924 he was able to begin to write more widely. He wrote frequently to Elizabeth Förster-Nietzsche and it was in 1924 after his departure from public life that he presented his paper “Nietzche and His Century”.

From 1925 onward his time was dominated by lectures, correspondences, and his old reading habits. He took several holidays in Italy and elsewhere, and as early as 1925 was in correspondence with Benito Mussolini, who would write a review of Hour of Decision in 1933 for Il Popolo d’Italia in December of that year. The Italian dictator, it would seem, was somewhat reserved about Spengler, who he felt tread close to Fascism but was not close enough.[54] He was not alone; after Spengler’s retreat from politics, was when his works came under heaviest fire from popular political personalities. His correspondence with Gregor Strasser in 1925 displays the chief dispute with Spengler, which seems to be his dislike of “popular movements”, like National Socialism, which he regarded as vulgar and mob-driven.[55] Aside from these, however, the bulk of his letters are not with political men but with academics.

lelivr_R240137969.jpgThe reason for this likely had much to do with Germany’s growing stability after 1925. Arthur Helps, who translated Spengler’s letters, suggests that Spengler left the public sphere precisely because of this; however, it is more likely that Spengler simply tired of the time he spent in the public eye—the constant assault of attention from both enthusiastic supporters and detractors of all stripes wore on the man whose sensitivity was well-known only to his sister and perhaps very close friends. He was a man who throughout his life was soft-hearted and sympathetic, ever striving to overcome the little boy whose nightmares in his bedroom in Halle haunted him vividly until he was well into his forties; the image he had inadvertently created of the hard-hearted, iron-willed prophet of doom was not an easy persona for him to fulfil on a constant basis, and put tremendous stress on his body. Fischer observes in his biographical sketch that “he agonised about his weaknesses with the same honesty as Rousseau did in the Confessions, with the difference that Spengler rarely tried to project his shortcomings on society… [he] believed that, in the final analysis, the individual has to assume responsibility for his own weaknesses”.[56]

Spengler’s physical weaknesses became acute during his time in politics, as the stress increased his headaches and other ailments. In 1925, rarely does a letter mention an illness or time of sickness—he seemed to recover from his ailments from getting away from stress of politics and the dismal state in which he perceived his beloved German Reich to be. He took cures in the sun of Italy, writing in February of 1925 from Palermo, after which he travelled to Rome and elsewhere.[57] In 1926, deep in the scholarly world once again, Spengler was invited by the Philosophical Congress in the United States to travel to America and conduct a lecture tour (C.F. Atkinson’s translation of the first volume of Decline appeared that very year). His excuse for declining the offer was that he felt America would leave too deep an impression on him that would disrupt the work he was conducting on his latest book (still unfinished at his death), Urfragen (“Primordial Questions”). His letters are strewn with questions to experts and professors of ancient history after information about Babylonian tablets and other Middle Eastern interests.

These interests, as a preparation for Urfragen, had begun as early as 1924, when Spengler appeared before the Oriental Institute in Munich with a lecture titled “Plan eines neuen Atlas Antiquus” (“Plan for a new Atlas Antiquus”), which detailed the need of a new cartographic project to map the ancient world within the scope of the Apollonian Kultur-Zivilisation organism.[58] The general thrust of his work, whether this lecture or the later letters to colleagues, is a collaborative effort that would overcome the increasing specialisation of history already in its adolescence in Spengler’s day and still increasing in contemporary academic history. During subsequent years he also became first enthralled and then embroiled with the famous archaeologist and ethnographer of Africa, Leo Frobenius, whose initial agreement with cyclical history caught Spengler’s attention, but his argued proofs for slow, gradual development of civilisations drew the censure of the author of Decline, who believed in epochal moments rather than gradual evolution (he detested all forms of Darwinism). His correspondence took him in more positive directions with the famous Assyriologist Alfred Jeremias, who took an immense interest in Spengler’s work.

Most striking about Spengler’s time as a private scholar in the late 1920s was the vast amount of interest being generated in his works abroad. 1927 saw contacts coming from The New York Times attempting to solicit an article from him; the paper had featured him in full-page articles twice before, and after including him in an article “Will our Civilization Survive?” of 1925, hoped he might appear in print with them—they even offered a sum of $100, which was no small sum of money in Germany at the time.[59] No response to their inquest ever came, however, and it does not appear Spengler showed any interest in taking up any journalistic venture. A query that Spengler felt did merit response came from André Fauconnet, a professor at Poitiers whose Un philosophe allemeand contemporain Oswald Spengler. Le prophète du déclin de l'Occident (“A Contemporary German Philosopher: Oswald Spengler, the Prophet of the Decline of the Occident”) appeared in 1925. He also received an invitation to speak at the University of Saragossa, which promised he could speak in German and translations of his speech would be distributed beforehand.[60] Spengler accepted the engagement, spending the entire month of April of 1928 on holiday in Spain; he loved the climate and found the place to have a profoundly positive affect on his demeanour—he even did some mountain climbing. He wrote his sister Hilde from Granada (where he stayed for about a week), “Grenada is beautiful beyond all description… I could live here”, and, later that week, that “here every day pleases me better”.[61]

lelivr_R240137968.jpgDuring all of his touring and international correspondence, Spengler did manage to make one or two forays back into political life; the first occasion was a speech in Düsseldorf before the Industry-Club titled “Das heutige Verhältnis zwischen Weltwirtschaft und Weltpolitik” (“The Contemporary Relationship between World Economics and World Politics”) in 1926, and was solicited by Edgar Julius Jung a year later to make a speech before the German Student Union, historically a hotbed for right-wing politics. 1927 also saw him begin writing on the topic again, with “Zur Entwicklungsgeschichte der Deutschen Presse” (“Toward a Developmental History of the German Press”) appearing in the Der Zeitungsverlag and “Vom Deutscher Volkscharakter” (“On the German National Character”) appearing in Deutschland the same year. After some time of soliciting his attention, Richard Korherr also finally convinced Spengler to write a brief introduction to his thesis “Über den Geburtenrückgang” (“Regarding the Decline of Birthrates”) of two years previous, which the author had dedicated to Spengler. Korherr hounded Spengler with information of the thesis, especially when it was translated into Italian by deputies of Mussolini’s in 1928.[62] Spengler regarded the young student well, and congratulated him on his success; he would probably not have had so positive a view of the young Dr. Korherr twelve years later, when he became one of Heinrich Himmler’s most loyal lieutenants in executing the “Final Solution”.[63]

Cassandra (Last Writings and Death, 1930-1936)

The years of 1929 and 1930 were eventful for Germany, but for Spengler much of the same that he had experienced in the second half of the 1920s. His pessimism was beginning to be proven true, with the stock market crash in 1929 and the swift rise of National Socialist and German Communist party power in the shattered Weimar Republic. In September 1930, the results gave the Nazis 107 seats in the Reichstag, and increased the Communist seats from 54 to 77. When the Reichstag took its seats, no business could be conducted, with the National Socialist “delegates” showing up in full uniform, sometimes with flags, interrupting the proceedings with chants, shouts, and songs; the Communists, not to be outdone, followed suit, and together they made a mockery of what was left of Weimar democracy.[64] Spengler was generally not disappointed with the turn of events, and, having put his Urfragen project on hold, wrote a prolegomena to his planned work titled Der Mensch und die Technik (“Man and Technics”) in 1931.

The work can hardly be said to be of the same calibre as Decline or even of Prussianism and Socialism—but then, it was never meant to be. The most important introductory note that can be given on Man and Technics is that it is fundamentally meant to be a primer for planned works. It is, by and large, a restatement of things said in Decline, and an expansion on the relationship between human beings and the tools they create. Fischer describes the book by saying “Spengler tried to show that primitive man was a magnificent predatory animal who possessed two major advantages over other beasts of prey: a superior brain and ambidextrous hands.”[65] The work is a true experiment in Nietzschean psychology by Fischer’s estimate: a tragic conflict between a naturally savage and predatory human being with the moral codes he makes to contain his savagery, but he cannot flee from it, for as he develops his technology, he also develops his means of savagery, and therefore his savagery itself.[66]

In greater detail, the book develops themes of conflict between man and external nature as well. Farrenkopf highlights that Spengler sees a religious grounding for this conflict—a suggestion not lost on several subsequent environmentalists—declaring that Spengler “claims to have uncovered the ‘religious origins’ of Western technical thought in the meditations of early Gothic monks, who in their prayers and fastings wrung God’s secrets from Him.”[67] Farrenkopf, working at the turn of the twenty-first century, attempts to make Spengler the prophet of “climate change” and “ecological disasters”, and points to a thesis in his own work—that Spengler’s thought changed from Decline to his later works—to say that Spengler was arguing for the inevitable failure of mankind’s struggle against nature. Whether his thesis has merit or not is not really a line of inquiry this introduction need undertake, but the conflict and eventual failure of humankind because of its own “progress” is certainly present in the work. A line from Decline of the West, quoted above, accurately encapsulates the entire purpose of Man and Technics: “the giant city sucks the country dry, insatiably and incessantly demanding and devouring fresh streams of men, till it wearies and dies in the midst of an almost uninhabited waste of country.”[68]

The urban sprawl and disappearance of the “green belt” that contemporary commentators, especially in America, where there is so much of the “green belt”, have witnessed is somewhat captured in this picture. The dangers of an industrial dystopia and plea for an agrarian Reich was one also being preached by the National Socialists at this time—Walther Darré’s 1928 pamphlet “Das Bauerntum als Lebensquell der nordischen Rasse” (“The Peasantry as the Life-source of the Nordic Race”) stands as a testament to that. The Nazis, though, were better at selling their message than Spengler was his own, primarily because of what each promised the German people. Spengler promised that the path of Western civilisation was destined and irreversible, and the coming destruction guaranteed by the very nature of Faustian man of his home-soil should be greeted with a Nietzschean amor fati. The Germans in 1931 were in no mood to hear that they were themselves to blame for their situation, and that it was an inescapable destiny.

The Nazis, on the other hand, gave the Germans an enemy—the Jews—that were causing this industrialisation and destruction of the nation, and if they could just get rid of them, there was a bright hope and future for Germans. The German people declared which message they preferred with dismal sales for Man and Technics, and subsequent tremendous victories at the ballot for the National Socialists. Hitler’s biographer, Lord Bullock gives a deep insight into the exact state of affairs; “taking 1928 as a measuring rod,” he declares, “the gains made by Hitler – close on thirteen million in four years – are still more striking,” adding that by early 1932, “with a voting strength of 13,700,000 electors, a party membership of over a million and a private army of 400,000 S.A. and S.S., Hitler was the most powerful political leader in Germany, knocking on the doors of the Chancellery at the head of the most powerful political party Germany had ever seen.”[69]

Spengler was shocked, if not a little appalled, by this turn of events. To Spengler, as he had been to Moeller, Adolf Hitler was an idiot in the scientific sense of the word: a vulgar proletarian clown shouting and flailing his arms and playing about in the muck, not a statesman who could lead Germany to her rebirth or a realistic forward-thinker. For the time being, though, there were few other options, and Spengler was willing to give the Führer the benefit of the doubt before meeting him—a meeting at which he hoped that his stature as one of Germany’s leading conservative intellectuals might moderate the Austrian firebrand somewhat.[70] He was dreadfully wrong.

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Spengler met with Hitler in 1933 at the invitation of the National Socialist Party, hoping to make use of Spengler’s sustained popularity. Fischer describes the meeting, of which little account exists on either side. It was Hitler, characteristically, who did most of the talking when the two men met, and used all of his well-accounted-for charm. Spengler was sufficiently fooled that Hitler, though a clown, was a well-meaning clown who basically wanted what was best for Germany. He nevertheless would remark later that “sitting next to him one did not gain the slightest inkling that he represented anything significant”—the jobless Austrian post-card painter may have built himself up into a powerful and captivating demagogue, but in the end he remained the disaffected young delinquent who wandered the streets of Munich and Vienna building a fantasy world in which he was important.[71] According to a popular anecdote, when the men had finished their encounter, Hitler asked Spengler for advice, to which the scholar enigmatically replied “watch your Praetorian guard!” a comment many have taken to be a bit of advice Hitler acted on in the Night of the Long Knives, when he purged his “praetorian guard” and replaced it—the S.A.—with a new one, the S.S. There is no evidence that this is accurate, but if it is, as Fischer asserts, it would be the first time Spengler had any direct influence on a public leader.[72]

It was not long, however, before the spell of Hitler’s charm over coffee wore off. The Nazis went on to preach a proletarian utopian future founded fundamentally in scapegoating the Jews and answering Germany’s problems with “party-theatre” of mass rallies and a well-tuned propaganda machine. It was in answer to the delusions of the National Socialist political machine that Spengler wrote his final book, Jahre der Entscheidung (“Years of Decision”, more popularly known in translation as Hour of Decision) in 1933. This work, largely considered Spengler’s most overtly political and explicit in its message, was banned by the Nazis as soon as they figured out what was in it—which took them a full year, even after one of their own published a critique of the book (Arthur Zweininger’s Oswald Spengler im dritten Reich), by which time the book had already made it into English translation and had received extensive comment by The New York Times.[73] Spengler also, naïvely, sent a signed copy directly to Hitler, accompanied by an expression of hope that the two might meet and discuss the work in the future.[74] Hitler consented to meet, but disparaged Spengler’s pessimism in what he was selling as Germany’s brightest hour.

Jahre der Entscheidung
deserves some specific attention to be paid to it. The first thing worth mention is that it was originally intended to be the first volume of a several-volume work, but after it was banned in 1934, Spengler abandoned the work, writing Goebbels that he would only write the conclusions of his own mind and that he would “not write books for confiscation”.[75]

The press was especially cruel to the new work, evoking (despite Fischer’s claims to the opposite) a number of highly sympathetic letters to Spengler from old conservative colleagues like Alfred Hugenburg, Crown Prince Wilhelm, Carl Friedrich Goerdeler (later executed as a resistance leader), as well as some new names, including Grand Duke Joseph Franz von Habsburg, who was enthralled by the new work, and Rudolf Graber, a professor of Theology and later Bishop of Regensburg. Despite the press and the Nazis, however, the book was initially a tremendous success, especially compared with Man and Technics. Heinrich Beck wrote to Spengler in November of 1933 that “the success of your Jahre der Entscheidung already surpasses, at least as far as tempo is concerned, The Decline of the West. You will certainly be pleased and I am proud also of publishing such a book.”[76] The Roman Curia was also impressed, and allowed the book to be placed by the Cardinal Hayes Literature Committee in the “First Circle” of their “White List” for Roman Catholics in America; the section was named for the First Circle of Hell in Dante’s inferno, where honest pre-Christian thinkers who were valuable to Christianity resided—on the White List proper for that year were titles like Essays in History by Pope Pius XI.[77]

l_9783938176153.jpgThe contents of the book are significant not just for Spengler’s life, but to his overall philosophy as well. Spengler frequently uses what critics have called “fetishistic” terms in his works like “blood”, “race”, “soul”, etc. The accusations of critics were left largely unanswered until Jahre der Entscheidung, which saw Spengler for the first time seriously take on the task of defining what he meant by “race” especially. Benito Mussolini, at the time still in his virulent anti-racist stage, received a copy of the work almost immediately after it was published, and wrote a review of the work highlighting that “Spengler clearly wishes to differentiate his views from the vulgar, materialistic Darwinism now fashionable among anti-Semites in Europe and America” (words he was in fact borrowing from Spengler) and points to Spengler’s declaration that “ ‘racial unity’ is a grotesque phrase considering that for centuries all types and kinds have mixed.”[78]

Spengler does indeed use the word “race”; however, he defines against the biological racial theories of Chamberlain, Gobineau and the various authors of National Socialism. “Race” to Spengler was captured in a spiritual feeling or will of a culture—thus in Jahre der Entscheidung, even the Russians find themselves included in Spengler’s “Coloured World”. The Faustian soul—and the Faustian will—that is the Faustian “race”. Farrenkopf observes from reading Spengler’s unpublished political writings that “Race for Spengler meant having ‘strong instincts’”, something reflected in Gedanken, where Spengler says “Men without race are without Will. Indeed, the more of a “race” one has, the more resolute is his sense of self”.[79] Spengler references this notion in Man and Technics as well, concluding with the exemplary of a man with “strong race”, the legionary who kept his post in Pompey as Vesuvius erupted because his superiors had forgotten to relieve him; “It is greatness, namely to have race”.[80] This sort of conception of race is one that has fled the English and German languages (and most other languages, really) in the wake of the biological racialist movements of the early twentieth century, but is still present in English when one says “the human race”—but for Spengler, there is no “human race”, there are different spiritual types of humans. Farrenkopf quotes him “There are not any noble races. There are only noble specimens of all races.”[81]

With this sense of “race” in mind, Spengler portrays two revolutions taking place in the coming decades and centuries: a White World-Revolution and a Coloured World-Revolution, the former of which will be a class revolution, and the latter will be a racial revolution. As he suggested in Decline, the Occident is failing, and some other Kultur-Zivilisation organisms must come into itself in order to replace the dying Faustian Zivilisation. This is what is meant in the “Coloured World-Revolution”; a collapse of the Western direct control over the rest of the world and the beginning of a new birth. The “White World-Revolution”, on the other hand, will be one of class: not because of Bolshevism, but because of the liberalism that destroyed the social structure of the West in the Autumnal season and brought about the new sense of egalitarianism. These combined “World-Revolutions” must ultimately arise from a great World War which Spengler foresees in the near future; it is his hope that the War will set the West back on its path toward Ceasarism, and begin the final phase of decay which has been prevented, be believes, by the defeat of the “Prussian Spirit” in the First World War; he therefore proclaims at the end of the work that, “Only the militarist Prussian spirit remains as a shaping force, not only for Germany, but everywhere.”[82]

Farrenkopf offers the critique that Spengler does not sufficiently “probe” into “how geopolitical competition among non-Western powers will interact with the conflict between the West and the non-West”.[83] Nevertheless, for a German in a time of when the general feeling of the nation was one of peace and plenty, to foresee a world-shattering global conflict that would bring about a post-colonial age is hauntingly astute, and speaks to the significance of Spengler’s overall corpus to contemporary political and historical study. Another testament to his skills of prophecy is the very military power gained by the United States subsequent to the Second World War; Farrenkopf also observes that Spengler discounted America but nevertheless may be applied in an American paradigm.

With all the talk of “race” and the “militaristic Prussian spirit” and Spengler’s relationship to National Socialism, it seems fitting that a special word be said of Spengler’s relationship to the Jewish community. He himself found anti-Semitism especially abhorrent, and recognised it for exactly what it was: namely, social and political scapegoating. As Fischer observes, “Spengler observed that the character of the Jew was moulded by his position as an outsider…[who is] generally forced to adopt attitudes that are inimical to the mainstream of society,” which is why they are viewed as threats; the only solution Spengler could see for the Jews to escape this inevitable situation was to assimilate or, though Spengler never suggests it, to leave.[84] A similar conclusion was reached by Theodor Herzl, the founder of Zionism, in his 1896 Der Judenstaat, which proposed the second option: that the Jews remove themselves from European society physically to escape anti-Semitism.

After his name was officially banned from the press and his book taken off the shelves in German bookstores, Spengler once again retreated from the public eye, this time never to return. Unlike other intellectuals of the day, he declined offers to university jobs, including the rectorship of the University of Leipzig’s Institute for Cultural and Universal History and a professorship at the University of Marburg. He was, nevertheless, honoured in 1933 with membership in the Senate of the German Academy, which he maintained even after his work was officially censored by the Nazi state. He was encouraged by friends to flee Germany and emigrate to America or England and continue his studies, but he refused to leave. He did, however, continue his work on Urfragen and his other unfinished book, Frühzeit der Weltgeschichte. He still received some attention from other countries, and in 1935 wrote an article entitled “Zur Weltgeschichte des zweiten vorchristlichen Jahrtausends” (“Toward a World History of the Second Millennium BC”) in the journal Die Welt als Geschichte.

9783902475435xxl.jpgSpengler’s final contribution while he was alive was a reply to a cable from Hearst International Cosmopolitan magazine, which at the time was still a respectable publication that gave attention to serious global political issues. The work, entitled Ist Weltfriede moeglich? (“Is World Peace Possible?”) was translated by editors of the magazine and published in January of 1936. This last work is largely ignored by Spengler biographers, but is rather his last real political offering, in which he expressed that the question was one that “can only be answered by someone familiar with world history… [which] means to know most humans as they have been and always will be.”[85] His next words encapsulate his “strong pessimism”, when he says that “there is a vast difference… between viewing the history of the future as it shall be and as one might like it to be. Peace is the wish, war is an actuality”: he echoes his introduction to Jahre der Entscheidung, “it is the great task of the connoisseur of history to understand the actualities of his age and, using them, to sense the future, to indicate and to sketch out what will come, whether we desire it or not.”[86] He follows it saying that, ultimately, man will always resort to violence in some form or another. He declares that a man may “be branded a criminal, a class can be called revolutionary or traitorous, a people bloodthirsty, but that does not alter the actuality” that violence is in escapable.[87]

He then repeats a his message to the Western world, hoping perhaps for an audience in liberal America where he had lost his in Germany: “It is a deadly reality that today only the white peoples speak of ‘world peace’, not the many coloured peoples. As long as individual thinkers and idealists do this—and they have done it in all ages—it is ineffective. When, on the other hand, entire peoples become pacifistic, it is a symptom of senility. Strong and unspent breeds do not do it: it is abandonment of the future, because the pacifist ideal is a terminal state that contradicts the reality of life.”[88] Spengler would go to his grave convinced that half of the Occident had adopted this very abandonment of the future, and the other half had gone mad on the drunkenness of National Socialism. Fischer observes that “convinced of the truth of his ideas, Spengler seems to have resigned himself to a life of quiet desperation.”[89] His desperation ended before the dawn of the 8th of May 1936, when a sudden heart attack mercifully took him from the world before he could witness his most recent predictions of death and doom become reality.

Eleven days after Spengler’s death, his closest friend, August Albers, who Fischer calls his “philosophical sounding board”, which he had been since Decline in 1917, threw himself in front of a train, unable to cope with the absence of his mentor and friend. His sister collected his papers and would spend the rest of her life handling the publication of his remaining papers; her daughter would devote most of her academic life to studying and publicising his contributions to history, politics, and philosophy. Paul Reusch chose and paid for the grave marker, a simple block of polished black granite with SPENGLER etched across it in stark white letters. Beneath it Spengler rests holding a copy of Nietzsche’s Thus Spoke Zarathustra and Goethe’s Faust.



[1] H. Stuart Hughes, Oswald Spengler: A Critical Estimate (New York: Charles Scribner Sons, 1952), 1.

[2] Anton Mirko Koktanek, Oswald Spengler in Seiner Zeit (Munich: C.H. Beck, 1968), 435.

[3] Koktanek, Spenger in Seiner Zeit, 427.

[4] Oswald Spengler, Ich beneide jeden, der lebt, ed. Gilbert Merlio and Hilde Kornhardt (Munich: C.H. Beck, 2007), 16. The original title of the text was to be Eis heauton, in imitation of Marcus Aurelius, and the manuscript was originally edited by Spengler’s niece and her mother, both named Hilde Kornhardt.

[5] Spengler, Ich beneide, 14.

[6] John Farrenkopf, Prophet of Decline, (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University, 2001), 9.

[7] Koktanek, Spengler in Seiner Zeit, 19.

[8] Farrenkopf, Prophet, 7-8.

[9] Farrenkopf, Prophet, 8-9.

[10] Klaus P. Fischer, History and Prophecy: Oswald Spengler and the Decline of the West (New York: Peter Lang, 1989), 34.

[11] Fischer, History and Prophecy, 35.

[12] Fischer, History and Prophecy, 36.

[13] Fischer, History and Prophecy, 36.

[14] Farrenkopf, Prophet, 11.

[15] Fischer, History and Prophecy, 28.

[16] Fischer, History and Prophecy, 37.

[17] Spengler, Ich beneide, 73.

[18] Farrenkopf, Prophet, 15.

[19] Fischer, History and Prophecy, 45.

[20] Oswald Spengler, Der Untergang des Abendlandes, (Munich: C.H. Beck, 1969), x.

[21] Thomas A. Brady, German Histories in the Ages of Reformations (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 2009), 3.

[22] G.W.F. Hegel, Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts (Leiden: A.H. Adriani, 1902), 238.

[23] Oswald Spengler, Decline of the West, trans. C.F. Atkinson (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1928), 21. He derives this notion from Goethe, who says in a letter to Heinrich Luden (†1847), “‘Die Menschheit’? Das ist ein Abstraktum. Es hat von jeher nur Menschen gegeben und wird nur Menschen geben.(“‘Mankind’? It is an abstraction. There have only ever been men and will only ever be men.”) (p 281)

[24] The proper rendering of Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft in English is highly disputed among translators; the former is often translated as “community” but may also be understood (perhaps more clearly) as “communion”, while the latter is rendered both as “society” and “association,” with the latter being favoured in recent scholarship. Cf. Ferdinand Tönnies: A New Evaluation, ed. Werner J. Cahnman (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1973).

[25] Ferdinand Tönnies, Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft (Berlin: Karl Curtius, 1912), 3-4.

[26] Spengler, Decline, 109.

[27] Spengler, Decline, 31.

[28] Spengler, Decline, 53.

[29] Spengler, Decline, 212.

[30] Spengler, Decline, 191-192.

[31] Oswald Spengler, Jahre der Entscheidung (Munich: C.H. Beck, 1933), 43. He doesn’t, however, make clear what the implications of Stalin’s “modernisation” policies and the five-year plan might be.

[32] Oswald Spengler, “Pessimismus?” in Rede und Aufsätze (Munich: C.H. Beck, 1937), 63-64.

[33] Spengler, Decline, 485. N.B. The notion of “race” here should not be understood as the restrictive biological concept but retaining its nineteenth-century use as a term for a broad cultural unit.

[34] Oswald Spengler, Letters 1913-1936, trans. Arthur Helps (London: George Allen Unwin, 1966), 87.

[35] Fischer, History and Prophecy, 68.

[36] Spengler, Letters, 92.

[37] Spengler, Letters, 93.

[38] Donald O. White, Introduction to Selected Essays, by Oswald Spengler, trans. and ed. Donald O. White (Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1967), xiii.

[39] Timothy Ryback, Hitler’s Private Library (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2008), 112.

[40] Fischer, History and Prophecy, 61.

[41] Fischer, History and Prophecy, 61.

[42] Spengler, Letters, 133-138.

[43] Spengler, Letters, 181.

[44] Spengler, Selected Essays, 7.

[45] Spengler, Selected Essays, 3.

[46] Spengler, Selected Essays, 1, 3.

[47] Spengler, Selected Essays, 10-11.

[48] Spengler, Selected Essays, 13.

[49] Spengler, Selected Essays, 13.

[50] Spengler, Selected Essays, 29.

[51] Spengler, Selected Essays, 92.

[52] Spengler, Letters, 11.

[53] White, Introduction, xi.

[54] Benito Mussolini, “Anni decisive di Osvaldo Spengler”, Il Popolo d’Italia, 15 December 1933, p. 16.

[55] Spengler, Letters, 184.

[56] Fischer, History and Prophecy, 71.

[57] Spengler, Letters, 180.

[58] Cf. Oswald Spengler, Reden und Aufsätze (Munich: C.H. Beck, 1937), 96.

[59] Spengler, Letters, 211; “Will Our Civilization Survive?” New York Times, 24 May 1925, SM1; “Doom of Western Civilization,” New York Times, 2 May 1926, BR1. 

[60] Spengler, Letters, 222.

[61] Spengler, Letters, 229.

[62] Spengler, Letters, 203, 204, 219-220, 235.

[63] Spengler, Letters, 2031.

[64] Fischer, History and Prophecy, 73.

[65] Fischer, History and Prophecy, 66.

[66] Fischer, History and Prophecy, 66.

[67] Farrenkopf, Prophet, 202.

[68] Spengler, Decline, 109.

[69] Alan Bullock, Hitler: A Study in Tyranny (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), 217-218.

[70] Fischer, History and Prophecy, 74.

[71] Fischer, History and Prophecy, 74.

[72] Fischer, History and Prophecy, 74.

[73] William McDonald, “Spengler’s New Challenge” New York Times, 11 February 1934.

[74] Fischer, History and Prophecy, 78.

[75] Farrenkopf, Prophet, 238.

[76] Spengler, Letters, 291.

[77] “June ‘White List’ of Books Issued” New York Times, 26 May, 1934, p. 15.

[78] Spengler, Jahre der Entscheidung, 157.

[79] Farrenkopf, Prophet, 256; Oswald Spengler, Gedanken, (Munich: C.H. Beck, 1941), 23.

[80] Spengler, Der Mensch und die Technik (Munich: C.H. Beck, 1931), 89.

[81] Farrenkopf, Prophet, 256.

[82] Spengler, Jahre der Entscheidung, 165.

[83] Farrenkopf, Prophet, 258.

[84] Fischer, History and Prophecy, 76.

[85] Spengler, Reden und Aufsätze, 292.

[86] Spengler, Reden und Aufsätze, 292; Spengler, Jahre der Entscheidung, vii.

[87] Spengler, Reden und Aufsätze, 292.

[88] Spengler, Reden und Aufsätze, 292-293.

[89] Fischer, History and Prophecy, 68.

Philosophy as a Way of Life

1 7Oo-Kdhfv8C5Vtek5-QJVA.jpeg

Philosophy as a Way of Life

Natella Speranskaya
Ex: https://medium.com

The Philosophy has long ceased to be a way of life, a manner of being, it has become a field of research, a “philosophical speech”; it no longer thinks of the basic principles, it no longer deals with the transformation of thinking, the formation of the mind and soul, the inner transformation of man. The ancient Greek was engaged in philosophy, which was for him an existential choice, a form of life, a way of thinking. And reading the works of Heraclitus, Pherecides, or Empedocles was for him a “spiritual exercises” (Pierre Hadot), a strong-willed personal practice.

The philosophical writings of thinkers of the Hellenistic and Roman era were not aimed at informing, but at forming and transforming the thinking of readers. Pythagoras, Plato, and Aristotle did not philosophize in front of their students to provide them with as much information as possible, they were engaged exclusively in the formation of minds, opening up to their listeners other ontological levels, other modes of being they pushed them to an internal transformation comparable to that experienced by initiates in the mysteries.

9782253943488-475x500-1.jpgAs Pierre Hadot rightly points out, the texts of early thinkers were not a statement of a certain system (for the first time the idea of systematic philosophy will appear only in the medieval scholar Francisco Suarez), they were “spiritual exercises” aimed at transforming the individual. Philosophy in Antiquity was a mode of existence that required the philosopher to be internally transformed and personally involved in every moment of his life. Spiritual exercises involved the whole Mind. Nevertheless, modern historians of philosophy continue to approach the philosophy of Antiquity with the standards of the Middle Ages and Modern times, i.e. they persist in seeing it as a theoretical and abstract activity, but not as a practice. Philosophy has ceased to be thought of as a way of life. Hadot believed that this was a consequence of the absorption of philosophy by Christianity.

In the scholastics of the Middle Ages, theology and philosophy were at a considerable distance from each other, and philosophy was relegated to the rank of “the Handmaid of Theology”. It was only during the Renaissance that we rediscovered Seneca, Epictetus, and later Marcus Aurelius, and then also Cicero, and Epicureanism, and realized that philosophy can be a way of life. Andre van der Braak also writes that philosophy ceased to be a way of life with the rise of Christianity. He points out that Nietzsche sought to revive the Greek approach to philosophizing as a way of life. We can add that the same goal was pursued by Michel Foucault and Ludwig Wittgenstein.

When we begin to read the texts of ancient thinkers, we should once and for all abandon the habit of applying to them the value system of modernity. “Before that, I considered philosophical texts — whether they are texts of Aristotle, or St. Thomas, or Bergson-as if they are timeless and words always have the same meaning that does not depend on the epoch. I realized that we need to take into account the evolution of thoughts and mentalities over the centuries, “ admits Pierre Hadot. The texts of ancient philosophy and the texts of modern philosophy cannot be perceived in the same way. Hadot believes that the philosophical texts of Antiquity were always intended for limited public and had very specific recipients-either a group of students or a specific follower to whom they were written. For example, according to the testimony of Porphyry, Plotinus wrote his work in response to the questions asked by the audience. The teaching of philosophy for three centuries, that is, from Socrates to the first century, was almost always presented in a question-and-answer scheme. Dialogue as a philosophical genre has almost disappeared today, replaced by systematic treatises. Hadot himself is very skeptical about the possibility of reviving the Dialogic character of ancient philosophy in our days.

PH-philo.jpgTo know that Pierre Hadot means by “spiritual exercises”, need to find out what he invests in the concept of “Spirit.” Spirit he calls what Plotinus called Intellect, Nous, the Highest Reality. Nous is that which is between the One and the plurality. Pierre Hadot: “I would define spiritual exercises as voluntary, personal practices intended to bring about a transformation of the individual, a transformation of the self.” Before to stop the choice on the epithet of “spiritual”, he considered various options: intellectual exercises, ethical exercises, mental exercises, soul exercises, and finally, in his intention to talk about the philosophical tradition in Greco-Roman antiquity, Hadot stopped at «spiritual exercises». Then he explained at length than these spiritual exercises are not exactly (for example, they are not synonymous with “theological” or “religious”, since the latter are no more than a part of them).

If Pierre Hadot had stopped at the adjective “ethical”, he would have had to go into lengthy explanations. How do we interpret the word “ethics”? Commonly it is believed that ethics is a doctrine of morality, of virtue, however, let’s turn our attention to the Greek word ἦθος, ethos (“character”, “disposition”, “temper”), and especially to the famous dictum of Heraclitus: ἦθος ἀνθρώπῳ δαίμων (which can be translated as: “A man’s character is his daimon”). Daimon, i.e. the intermediary between the divine world and the human world (without the negative connotations that appeared in the post-antique era). The word ἦθος also has the meaning of “whereabouts”. And what are these whereabouts, if not the intermediate midpoint where a person and a deity meet/merge and/or collide? The middle, according to Aristotle, is that which always chooses virtue. This is her whereabouts. When the immoralist Nietzsche attacked modern morality, he did it in the name of “virtue in the Renaissance style, virtù, virtue free of moralic acid.”

71sddGtqu+L.jpgAccording to the Hadot, the formation of minds was the basis of the Humanities. Can philosophy be attributed to the Humanities? Andrii Baumeister emphasizes that the term “Humanities” appeared in the Renaissance, in the XV century, but the philosophy is much older. In this case, can philosophy be considered a humanitarian science? The Humanities focus on man, on an anthropocentric understanding of the world, while philosophy can act as a path that leads beyond the “ Human, All Too Human”. (Nietzsche).

The philosopher Peter Kingsley was able to revive the Greek approach to philosophy as a way of life. “As I was drawn back into the world of the Presocratics, as I became absorbed into the ancient Greek texts they had left behind, I soon started discovering something different. These so-called philosophers weren’t theoretical thinkers or speculators, and they were nothing like rationalists in the modern sense. Many of them were immensely powerful spiritual beings. Greek texts which I was soon to realize had been misunderstood and mistranslated for centuries reveal when the distortions and mistaken interpretations are blown away, extraordinary spiritual teachings and extremely potent meditation techniques that can still be applied and practiced nowadays. I practiced them myself and was transformed. I had been brought into direct contact with the lineage and teachings of the ancient Masters who, at the dawn of our civilization, helped shape the Western world and bring our culture into being, “ says Peter Kingsley.

“He recounts a conversation in the Classics Department at UCLA after a talk on Parmenides. A faculty member complained that Kingsley is too dogmatic, that his interpretation is no better than anyone else’s. Kingsley responded: “But you and I are not the same. You read Parmenides so that you can change his meaning to suit yourself. I read Parmenides so that he can change me,” John Bussanich writes.

PH-citadelle.gifThe very concept of “philosophy” should receive a different meaning. Remember Nietzsche’s words: “The very fact that Dionysus is a philosopher, and that therefore Gods also philosophize, seems to be a novelty which is not unensnaring”? It is known that Nietzsche called himself a disciple of the philosopher Dionysus. It is certain that by philosophizing, the man enters into the sphere of the divine. Much earlier, in the Renaissance, Pico della Mirandola had said something similar: “The sacred names of Apollo, if anyone examines their meanings and hidden mysteries, will sufficiently show that that god is no less philosopher than prophet.”

You can only be a philosopher if you are the one who carries out the action, for thought is action. Get rid of the misconception that a philosopher is a boring know-it-all who communicates with the world through endless scientific studies. Similarly, we should banish the other idea that the mindless fuss that most people produce is an action.

Philosophy implies active intervention in an endlessly lasting cosmogonic act by transforming the external world, subtly influencing it by identifying the paradigmatic structures that underlie the universe; philosophy is an attempt to transfer “archetypal images” from mundus imaginalis to the material world, the world of forms.

A philosopher is not a profession, it is impossible to become one. This is a kind of ontological task that a person either implements or allows it to fade away. There is an old beautiful legend about the Angel of Death, whose wings are dotted with countless eyes. When an Angel arrives too early, it only touches the person with its wing and, so that the person does not forget about this meeting, gives him an additional pair of eyes. An eye that looks into pre-being. So, philosophy is such a “gazing” into pre-being. The philosopher receives his second pair of eyes at the same time as the first, but these eyes do not open immediately. Sometimes this requires a teacher, a book, a sudden shock, a collision with death, an experience of the numinous. In ancient times, Mysteries were used for this purpose.

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Russian philosopher, cultural scientist, a specialist in Antiquity, curator of Janus Academy.

mercredi, 26 février 2020

Les routes de la soie, la mondialisation à la chinoise et les révolutions de l'espace

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Les routes de la soie, la mondialisation à la chinoise et les révolutions de l'espace

Irnerio Seminatore

Ex: http://www.ieri.be


TABLE DES MATIÈRES

- Chine et États-Unis. Préservation du "statu quo" ou inversion de prééminence

- Contestation chinoise du "statu quo" normatif américain

- Le bouleversement de perspective, la dominance continentale et  l'inversion des politiques

- Mouvements stratégiques de l'Occident et antinomies d’alliances en Eurasie

- Le "déclin d’Hégémon". Alternance hégémonique ou "révolution systémique"?

- ONE BELT, ONE ROAD, l'ordre apparent et la ruse. Sur les répercussions stratégiques et militaires de la nouvelle Route de la Soie

- La mondialisation à la chinoise, "un Cheval de Troye"?

- La prépondérance de la terre sur la mer et du mythe révolutionnaire sur le commandement des forces

- Sur les "révolutions de l'espace"

- Le rôle de l'Europe, l'inversion stratégique et Yalta 2

- Recomposition civilisationnelle de l'espace euro-russe

- Le paradigme de l'inversion stratégique de l'Occident

- Un bilan conceptuel

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Chine et États-Unis. Préservation du "statu quo" ou inversion de prééminence

La montée en puissance  de la Chine, depuis la fin de la guerre froide, en termes économiques, politiques, diplomatiques et militaires,fera de celle-ci, selon nombre d' observateurs ,le plus grand protagoniste de l'histoire mondiale.

Cette émergence est susceptible de produire une inversion du rapport de prééminence entre les États-Unis, puissance dominante établie et  premier empire global de l'histoire et la Chine," Empire du milieu" ou État-civilisationnel, vieux de trois mille cinq cents ans et fort d'un milliard-quatre cents millions d'hommes.

A ce sujet, Chalmers Johnson, spécialiste de l'Asie, a soutenu la thèse d'une antinomie conceptuelle  entre "expansion impériale" et "adaptation régionale" et il a précisé, quant à  la conception de l'ordre mondial: "qu'on l'appelle "consensus de Washington", "soft power", ou "nation indispensable", cela aboutit toujours à la nécessité de maintenir un ordre mondial, inspiré, financé,et dirigé par les États-Unis."

Les tentatives américaines pour établir une hégémonie sur la Chine tendent vers des futurs explosifs et sont, en tous cas, vouées à l'échec."

En effet il n'y a pas de place dans le monde pour deux empires.

Contestation chinoise du "statu quo" normatif américain

Or, dès à présent, la contestation chinoise du "statu-quo" normatif, imposé par les États-Unis après la fin de la guerre froide, a déjà pris corps avec le rejet de l'universalité des  valeurs occidentales et de  la première menace ressentie par Béijin, qui est la menace idéologique du "regime change" et donc le défi intérieur de libéralisation du pouvoir et du pluralisme  politique, identifiés à la démocratie occidentale. (ex.Hong Kong)

Quant à l'Europe, le destin de celle-ci se jouera en Eurasie, tant sur le plan diplomatique que militaire. Quant au  premier, dans la capacité de la diplomatie européenne de dissocier la Russie de la Chine, quant au deuxième, par le rôle accru du Pacifique et de l'Indo-pacifique dans l'échiquier stratégique global.

Puisque le modèle de la stratégie dominante des deux derniers siècles a été celui de Clausewitz, la puissance de la terre qu'est Chung Kuo' se prépare à une politique d'affrontement  par une logistique, qui peut adopter Clausewitz sur terre, en cas de guerre conventionnelle, Mahan, sur les deux Océans, Pacifique et Indo-Pacifique, et Sun Tzu dans l'hypothèse d'un double front de combat, terrestre et maritime .

Dans ce contexte la logistique du système One Belt, One Road  devient l'élément décisif de l'épreuve de force probable entre les puissances de la terre et les puissances de la mer, au Nord, au Sud et à l'Ouest du continent européen.

Au même temps , la "limite" du conflit, entre guerre d'alternance hégémonique et guerre d'alternative civilisationnelle, deviendra la variable des ambitions et du combat des  acteurs aux prises,

Le bouleversement de perspective, la dominance continentale et  l'inversion des politiques


Un rappel peut éclairer ce point non négligeable.

Si l'Europe et l' Asie appartiennent géographiquement à un même espace continental, l'Eurasie, un seul pays tache de les rapprocher par un immense réseau d'infrastructures routières, portuaires et numériques.

Ce pays est le Chung Kuo', l'héritier de l'Empire du milieu, dominant "tout ce qui est sous le ciel".

Puissance de la terre, la Chine, rivalisant avec la puissance de la mer, entend manœuvrer, en cas de conflit, par les lignes intérieures du continent, sans dépendre de la logique des flux et des reflux de la "société liquide".

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En Eurasie,marquée par la diversités des Etats et des institutions, la dominance continentale est passée de la Russie à la Chine et le resserrement des alliances prendra la forme d'une activation du réseau des routes de la soie,  modifiant le rapport des forces global.
 

En effet la guerre, selon Sun Tzu,  ne se gagne pas principalement à la guerre ou sur le terrain des combats, mais dans sa préparation.

Les risques  de conflit instaurent une politique ambivalente, de rivalité-partenariat et d'antagonisme.

Il s’agit d’une politique qui a pour enjeu le contrôle de l’Eurasie et de l’espace océanique indo-pacifique, articulant les deux stratégies complémentaires du Hearthland (1) et du Rimland.(2).

Les rivalités, qui secouent aujourd’hui l'Eurasie, ont forcé l’Est et l’Ouest à s’interroger sur un nouveau projet de sécurité en Europe, de stabilité stratégique et d’unité  de l’espace européen.

Mouvements stratégiques de l'Occident et antinomies d’alliances en Eurasie

Dans tout système international, le déclin de l’acteur hégémonique se signale par un resserrement des alliances militaires autour du leader.

Ainsi, dans la conjoncture actuelle, deux mouvements stratégiques rivaux s’esquissent au niveau planétaire :

– l’alliance sino-russe, assurant l’autonomie stratégique du Hearthland, en cas de conflit et promouvant, en temps de paix, la coopération intercontinentale en matière de grandes infrastructures, (projet OBOR -One Belt, One Road - avec la participation d’environ 70 pays)

– la stratégie du « containement» des puissances continentale, par les puissances maritimes du « Rimland » (Amérique, Japon, Australie, Inde, Europe etc.), comme ceinture péninsulaire extérieure à l’Eurasie.

Rappelons que les deux camps sont en rivalité déclarée et que  leurs buts stratégiques respectifs,ne sont pas de cerner des équilibres, fondés sur les concepts d’échanges et de coopération, mais de prévoir les ruptures stratégiques, sous la surface de la stabilisation apparente.

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Ainsi la  fin de la bipolarité, avec l’effondrement de l’empire soviétique, a engendré une source de tensions, entre les efforts centrifuges mis en œuvre par les États de proximité, « les étrangers proches », visant à s’affranchir  du  centre impérial et la réaction contraire de Moscou, pour reprendre son autorité à la périphérie, par une série d’alliances enveloppantes. (OTSC, OCS)

A l’Ouest c'est l’Alliance atlantique, aujourd'hui en crise,  qui a vocation à opérer la soudure de l’intérêt géopolitique d'Hégémon, dans l' immense étendue continentale entre l’Amérique et la Russie

Le "déclin d’Hégémon". Alternance hégémonique ou "révolution systémique" ?

La question qui émerge du débat en cours  est de savoir si la "stabilité hégémonique" (R.Gilpin), qui a été assurée pendant soixante-dix ans par l’Amérique, est en train de disparaître, entraînant le déclin de l'Empire et de la civilisation occidentale, ou si nous sommes confrontés à une alternance hégémonique et à un monde post-impérial dans le cadre toutefois, d'un système planétaire

L’interrogation connexe peut être formulée de manière plus abrupte et intempestive : "Quelle forme prendra-t-elle, cette transition ?"

La forme, déjà connue, d’une série de conflits en chaîne, selon le modèle de Raymond Aron, calqué sur le XXe siècle, ou bien, la forme d’un changement d’ensemble de la civilisation, de l’idée de société et de la figure de l’homme, selon le modèle des "révolutions systémiques", de Stausz-Hupé, embrassant l’univers des relations ,socio-politiques du monde occidental et couvrant les grandes aires de civilisations connues?

ONE BELT, ONE ROAD, l'ordre apparent et la ruse.                                                                                                                                                

Sur les répercussions stratégiques et militaires de la nouvelle  Route de la Soie

Pour mieux inscrire dans la géographie eurasienne, l’ambiguïté de la relation de rivalité-partenariat existante entre l'Empire du milieu et le reste du monde,sous la forme redoutable  d'une politique de coopération multilatérale, Xi Jinping a promus, en 2013 à Astana, la construction d'un ensemble de liaisons maritimes et de voies ferroviaires rappelant les anciennes "voies de la soie",dans le but de rapprocher la Chine, l'Afrique et l'Europe, en traversant les pays d'Asie centrale

La mondialisation à la chinoise. Un "Cheval de Troie"?

Dans la perspective d'un ordre  global et à la recherche de formes d' équilibre et de stabilité à caractère planétaire, la Chine, poursuivant une quête d’indépendance stratégique et d'autosuffisance énergétique étend sa présence et sa projection de puissance vers le Sud-Est du Pacifique, l’Océan Indien, le Golfe et l'Afrique, afin de contrer les goulots d’étranglement de Malacca et échapper aux conditionnements extérieures maritimes, sous contrôle américain.

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Elle procède par les lignes internes, par la mise en place d'un corridor économique et par une route énergétique Chine-Pakistan-Golfe Persique, reliant le Port de Gwaidar, au pivot stratégique de Xinjiang.

Beijing adopte la gestion géopolitique des théâtres extérieures et resserre ses liens continentaux avec la Russie. L'influence chinoise est concrétisée par la construction d'une gigantesque "Route de la Soie", reliant le nord de la Chine à l'Europe, via le Tadjikistan, le Kazakhstan et le Turkménistan.

Rien de semblable,depuis l'époque pré-impériale (VIIème siècle avant J.C.), lorsque commença la construction de la Grande Muraille, achevée par Quin (en 221 avant J.C.), après avoir conquis un à un l'ensemble des Royaumes combattants et avoir unifié ainsi  la Chine.

La similitude n'est pas pour dérouter, car l'idée d'unifier l'Eurasie n'est pas lointaine de l'esprit de Xi-Jinping.

Or Obor rassemble à un véritable "Cheval de Troie" de l'âge moderne, destiné à faire basculer l'Histoire du côté de l'Orient Chinois.

Cette entreprise colossale pourrait avoir  pour principe un précepte de Maître Sun Tzu: dans la guerre,"trompe l'ennemi sur tes intentions!" .

Ainsi, en  détournant l'attention des  ennemis de  la conquête de l'Eurasie,le plan de bataille du nouveau Qin Shi Huang consisterait à vaincre sans combattre, "sans ensanglanter la lame!".

La transition d'un système international  à l'autre ne peut comporter une dissertation sur la morale, ni sur la licéité de la guerre, juste ou inique, car la guerre est une réalité primordiale et il faut l'accepter comme un ensemble de confrontations , préparées de longue haleine.

La recherche de l'avantages par la ruse, ou par l'ordre apparent, ne peut cacher que nous combattons hors limites,et que  l'apparence de l'ordre , comme l'apparence du chaos est une conséquence de la force montante, dont dispose aujourd'hui l'Empire du milieu.

Obor, le nom des nouvelles routes de la soie, ne peut être autre chose que l'apparence de l'ordre, face au désordre  de l'Otan, dénoncé par Macron, à l'extrémité occidentale de l'Eurasie.

Un grand dessein non -militaire, destiné à faire capituler l'Occident

Avec Obor, la Chine entend manoeuvrer,à l'intérieur des terres, rivalisant dans tous les domaines, y compris les plus sophistiqués ( les numériques), avec la puissance thalassocratique dominante dans l'Océan Pacifique et indo-pacifique.

Or ce projet de modernisation et de mondialisation, présente l’entreprise de la Chine comme  pacifique, une "Initiative" et pas comme une "grande stratégie", pour éloigner toute allusion à la guerre.

En revanche cet immense vecteur d'hommes et de biens, constitue un incomparable outil de gains stratégiques et logistiques pour la mobilité des théâtres  et le transfert des forces.

Le transfert des forces du front de l"Est au front de l'Ouest par l'Allemagne, pendant la première et deuxième guerre mondiale a été rendu possible par un réseau ferroviaire moderne, à l'époque, et d'une redoutable efficacité militaire.

En Eurasie les fronts sont multiples et il n'y a plus une seule ligne de front, à alimenter en permanence, d'où la valeur accrue du transport multimodal

La prépondérance de la terre sur la mer et du mythe révolutionnaire sur le commandement des forces

Ainsi,en départageant les deux grandes  stratégies de Chung Kuo', terrestre et  maritime, Obor exprime la prépondérance décisionnelle, en cas de crise, de l'armée populaire sur le groupe dirigent, sur le comité centrale du parti et son  primat stratégique sur les  hauts commandements  des armées de terre, de mer et du ciel  , car elle influence  la liaison du peuple et des élites et rappelle l'épopée mythique de la "longue marche".

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En forte expansion par tonnage annuel ,la marine chinoise aura pour but le"dénis d'accès" des puissances de la mer vers le littoral et, plus loin vers le coeur des terres, le Hearthland de Halford MacKinder, pivot de l'Histoire, car l'empire du milieu, n'a pas vocation à passer d'une existence terrestre à une existence maritime et veut maintenir sur une base continentale la suprématie de Chung -Kuo'.

En réalité, "le jeu politique qui concerne les mers est déterminé par les États terriens." (Julien Freund, in "Terre et Mer" Carl.Schmitt, postface)

Par son tracé, en volutes de dragons, la nouvelle route de la soie  concrétise la géopolitique des partenariats que dessinent les sept corridors de ce grand " boa constrictor" et, par conséquent, la désignation des théâtres et les formes de combats coordonnés dans les trois continents, l'Asie, l'Afrique et l'Europe, afin qu'ils soient  soudés par un réseau de couloirs routiers et maritimes, serrés par une seule main.

Pour atteindre la victoire un État doit avoir la possibilité d'occuper tout ou partie du territoire ennemi et seul la Chine est à la hauteur de cet exploit.

Sur les "révolutions de l'espace"

L'initiative chinoise est elle en train  de susciter une nouvelle révolution de l'espace, comparable, pour ses répercussions, à celles qui l'ont précédées?

Après l'âge de la mondialisation(1980-2019),menée par la logique de l'échange,ainsi que  par l'idéologie des droits de l'homme et d'un monde sans frontières, la Chine inaugure-t-elle une nouvelle phase historique, celle de la "continentalisation" du monde autour de l'Eurasie et d'une autre stabilisation  du pouvoir et  de l'économie?

L"élargissement des horizons du monde, provoqués par l'effondrement du système soviétique, a provoqué une mutation culturelle profonde et donné à l'Asie centrale  une vision "déterritorialisée" de l'univers socio-politique, aux possibilités illimités.

Avec les nouvelles routes de la soie, une autre conception de l'espace s'affirme, par laquelle la terre éclipse la mer et la contourne.

C'est un tournant, dans lequel l'humanité se déplace et un autre rapport s'instaure, plus autonome,  dans la relation entre villes et campagnes du monde, marquant la dépendance de certaines régions d'un moteur plus souple de planification, sous forme de partenariat, de projets de co-développement et d'autres maillage d'affaires

Ce ne sont plus "les écumeurs des mers" (pirates, corsaires, boucaniers et flibustiers), à la recherche d'aventures individuelles et lucratives, mais de vagues de terriens , en quête d'une autre stabilisation et existence sociétale.

La nouvelle dimension  de l'espace exige une autre organisation des terres, à l'échelle planétaire, et cette réorganisation sera naturellement belliqueuse.

Or, si la mer avait rendu possible le rêve de l'Amiral Mahan, d'une unification  des peuples de la mer (Grande Bretagne et États-Unis en 1904), et si les Hollandais à la fin du XVIème siècle,devinrent les "transporteurs" des autres pays d'Europe, par les perfectionnements apportés à un nouveau type de navire, pourvu de vergues, de quoi seront ils porteurs les chinois, si non d'un autre type de transports et de parcours terrestres irradiants.

Pourra-t-on encore faire la distinction entre étrangers et locaux, lorsque des dizaines de millions d'hommes , embarqués sur les rails, feront de l'Asie, de l'Afrique et de l'Europe, un univers sinisé et une "République de Confucius", par une  prise de terre, massive, pacifique et commerçante ?

Au rétrécissement de l'espace européen, fera suite une conscience globale plus éveillée. qui donnera naissance à une nouvelle race, métissée, biologiquement et politiquement, où se confondront blancs, mongols et noirs, gardes rouges fanatiques, ultra-démocrates honkongais, hommes des triades, geishas européennes et arabo-musulmanes, progressistes  trans-gendres, trafiquants  violents et militaires aguerris, pour se disputer le butin de la croissance et le droit à une parole plus libre?

Le rôle de l'Europe, l'inversion stratégique et Yalta 2

Xi-Jinping veut reprendre l'hégémonie géopolitique du monde sur la base de la puissance terrestre et de la vieille tradition des Empires,par la voie des partenariats et non des alliances, qui seules permettent la constitution de blocs homogènes.

Or, le caractère terrestre a pris en Chine une signification culturelle et historique, à laquelle  les autres pays ne peuvent pas prétendre,celle de se percevoir au mileu du monde et de devoir régner "sur tout ce qui est sous le ciel".

Rien de semblable depuis l'Empire de Rome, lorsque les voies impériales et consulaires conduisaient toutes à Rome, "Caput Mundi" et règne du pouvoir  et de la loi.

La maîtrise de la logistique impressionnante d'Obor, dont la clé appartient à la Chine, s'imposera aux forces combattantes et dictera les formes de l'affrontement de demain, autrement dit , les conditions de la paix et de la guerre entre"Orient et Occident".

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Quel sera-t-il, dans ce cas, unique dans l'histoire, le rôle de l'Europe, en ce choc de continents et de civilisations?

Dans une période de mutations profondes et globales, quel espace d'autonomie et de manœuvre, culturel et civilisationnel restera-t-il à l'Europe, par rapport à la puissance extérieure dominante, au sein d'une Eurasie sinisée et d'un Rimland américanisé?

La liberté d'action de l'Europe ne pourra  se définir que par une inversion stratégique à l'Est, autrement dit, par le passage de l'isolement continental de la Russie à celui de la Chine.

C'est pourquoi ce résultat ne peut être obtenu par l'Otan, qui demeure une alliance défensive euro-atlantique, visant la Russe. dans un contexte global d'affrontement.

Si Obor représente la logique d'une ouverture atlantique de la Chine, atteignant  l'Europe, en réponse à la stratégie adverse d'isolement , l'esquisse géopolitique de Macron, concernant les blocages de l'Otan et la reprise du dialogue avec la Russie, laisse présager une ouverture euro-russe du Hearthland et une manœuvre diplomatique de désarticulation du partenariat chino-russe.

A terme, un" Yalta 2 ", influant sur le système international du XXIème siècle, sous espèce d'une "Doctrine Monroe" de l'Eurasie, comme zone d'influence européenne, entre l'Europe,la Russie et la Chine, aura pour but de maintenir le pluralisme étatique et non seulement démocratique en Asie centrale, afin qu'il ne se constitue pas un bloc hostile aux intérêts européens.

Ce plan déterminera aussi  la liberté des Océans Pacifique et Indo-Pacifique et libérera l'accès à  l"extrême Orient, de la part de  l'Australie et du Cône sud des Amériques.

Une nouvelle alliance euro-russe, en défense des intérêts des "grands espaces" schmittiens, sur les frontières de l'ancienne Union Soviétique, replacera l'affrontement hégémonique au cœur de l'Asie centrale,de manière à ne pas être pensé encore sur le modèle la guerre froide à l'Est du continent.

Le partenariat stratégique entre la Russie et la Chine au plan géopolitique, a eu pour but de jouer un rôle d’équilibrage et de contre-poids, au cœur de la masse continentale eurasienne et de repartir les zones d'influence entre les deux puissances dominantes, dans le cadre de la multipolarité.

Cette double poussée, virtuellement antinomique, est corrélée à l'Organisation de Coopération de Shanghai (OCS), qui fait fonction de stabilisateur régional

Recomposition civilisationnelle de l'espace euro-russe

La stratégie de la future (et encore hypothétique armée européenne) devrait adopter une politique de recomposition civilisationnelle de l'espace euro-russe ( de Lisbonne à Vladivostock) et passer de la tentative de roll-back et d'isolement de la Russie ( par l'Otan), à une doctrine inversée du Hearthland, en isolant  la Chine qui représente la menace majeure pour la puissance thalassocratique extérieure.

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Celle-ci, comme Athènes dans les guerres du Péloponnèse,  ne pourra gagner au même temps et conjointement la Russie et la Chine, provoquant à l'Ouest l'effondrement définitif de  l'Europe et l'écroulement de la civilisation Occidentale.

La mort d'Athènes et de Rome ne grandiront point l'image créatrice et chaotique de l'Amérique post-impériale, comme héritière du berceau culturel de l'Occident.

Le paradigme de l'inversion stratégique de l'Occident

Le repositionnement des ambitions du triangle États-Unis, Russie et Chine, rééquilibrant la multipolarité actuelle, aurait pour but de rendre limité le règlement d'un conflit éventuel entre les États-Unis et la Chine, évitant une guerre discriminatoire , élargie à l'ensemble de la planète. 


L'affrontement à prévoir aurait alors pour limite l'alternance entre "peer competitors" ou candidats à l'hégémonie et non la structure générale du système international

Il laisserait  subsister les vieilles nations, leurs peuples et leurs mémoires,  dans une position subalterne,  donnant lieu à des métissages inconnus de liberté et de la soumission, au lieu de précipiter le dilemme d'une opposition existentielle entre l'Orient et l'Occident.

Cette limite aurait pour signification essentielle ,la préservation d'un"statu quo" civilisationnel entre les deux hémisphères,  évitant, entre-autre, une invasion des peuplades désordonnées  de l' hémisphère Sud vers  le Nord  de la planète, où une  seule civilisation, continentale et blanche, a promu les grandes découvertes et a fait évoluer le genre humain.

Un bilan conceptuel


Au moment où le Royaume Unis, avec le Brexit, embrasse à nouveau son insularité  et se tourne vers le grand large, les pays du continent voient réapparaître les figures protectrices des États-Nations (souverainisme  et populisme).  Dans ce cadre, l'Europe  considère qu'une conversion du continent à la mer et au libre-échange intégral, est impossible. Ses citoyens gardent la fidélité à leur habitat, essentiellement terrien et prétendent  le préserver et l'améliorer (campagnes écologiques)

En effet l'arcanum des réflexes européens est constitué par la terre et par l'ordre de l’État, le Léviathan.continental.

L'Europe ne garde pas le réflexe côtière de ses anciennes républiques maritimes (Gênes ou Venise), mais l"attachement des paysans, désormais périphériques, à leur terroir et à leur système de vie (Gilets Jaunes).

Dans ce contexte, dans lequel l'état de nature hobbesien ne peut être arbitré que par la violence et par le spectre du conflit, la conception thalassocratique de la guerre, visant le libre commerce, repose sur l'ubiquité du danger, désigné  par la puissance maritime, par le biais d'une alliance  océanique illimitée, l'Otan

C'est dans ce contexte que l'intervention de Macron sur la "mort cérébrale" de l'Alliance Atlantique, éclaire sur la conscience globale de la nouvelle conjoncture historique.

Face à la discorde sur la désignation de l'ennemi, il prend le parti de la terre (Russie) contre la mer (bloc thalassocratique) et sutout contre l'interventionnisme "illimité"et universel de la puissance de la mer (hégémon).

L'Iran, la Chine et la Corée du Nord n'obéissent pas aux figures obsidionales du"Mal", contre lesquelles une violence totale est justifiée et légitime, mais à des figures de "justi hostes", disposant des mêmes droits et des mêmes raisons de faire appel  à la guerre et contre lesquelles une violence illimitée est injustifiée.

En effet le "juste ennemi" est celui que l'on ne peut identifier à la figure du Mal , au nom d'un exclusivisme ou d'une intransigeance morales et dont on peut comprendre l'hostilité et les objectifs politiques, puisque demain il sera peut être un allié.

Puisque l'Eurasie occupe l'espace  historique de l'Allemagne et de la Russie réunies,  la lutte entre la puissance de la mer et la puissance de la terre prend la forme actuelle d'un affrontement entre l'atlantisme de certains pays européens et l'eurasisme de certains courants de pensée russes.

Ainsi, compte tenu de la double impossibilité, d'une domination mondiale unipolaire  et d'un État de l'humanité pacifié, qui suppose une neutralisation et une dépolitisation totale du monde, l'évolution planétaire va dans la direction d'un pluralisme des grands espaces (C.Schmitt), autrement dit, vers des sphères d'influence et des zones culturelles homogènes (Yalta 2), dont la cartographie  obéit , en large partie aux oppositions binaires de la terre et de la mer.

L'échec de la tentative d'instaurer un unipolarisme dominant et la montée en puissance des anciens empires  historiques comme, l'Inde, l'Iran, la Russie et la Chine, justifie la démarche de Macron vers  un nouveau pluralisme du monde autour d'une mère civilisationnelle commune à la Russie et l'Europe, l'Occident romain - orthodoxe.

Le caractère identitaire et irrévocable de cette distinction est au fond la reconnaissance d'une faille profonde entre l'Orient Russe et le grand Orient Chinois, dont les voies de la soie constituent les tentacules puissantes d'un dragon, tiré de son histoire et doué d'un feu existentiel et spirituel  trente cinq fois séculaire.

BRUXELLES le 23 Décembre 2019

Le symbolisme de la colonne vertébrale

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Le symbolisme de la colonne vertébrale

Ex: https://lemondeduyoga.org

La colonne vertébrale est porteuse d’un symbolisme plurimillénaire. Les croyances les plus anciennes accordent des vertus surnaturelles aux os qui la composent, et un sens transcendant à sa verticalité. La tradition judéo-chrétienne, notamment, insiste sur sa valeur d’axis mundi et de catalyseur des énergies.

[…] [Le] squelette semble ce qu’il y a de moins personnel. Qu’est-ce qui ressemble plus à un squelette qu’un autre squelette (au bassin près, qui diffère sensiblement selon le sexe…?) Qu’est-ce qui ressemblerait moins à l’être vivant que je suis, que mon squelette.
Et pourtant… il est le dernier élément visible à demeurer après la mort, donc le dernier témoignage sensible de la personne et de son corps. Ce vestige traverse les siècles et vient témoigner aujourd’hui de l’homme préhistorique.

D’ou cette croyance, enracinée dans l’inconscient, qu’en l’os siège l’âme immortelle, qui le quitte à la mort, mais vient le réhabiter en cas de résurrection. Chez certains peuples, cette croyance, liée à l’espoir d’une reviviscence des corps, fonde le refus de l’incinération et un respect scrupuleux de l’intégralité des restes par la momification ou la mise en bière (Égypte, judéo-christianisme). Inversement, on dispersait les os des criminels ou on les jetait dans la fosse commune où ils se mélangeaient, perdant ainsi tout moyen de ressusciter.

Si le squelette est intègre, l’âme peut revenir l’animer. Yahvé le donne à entendre au prophète Ezéchiel, lors de la vision des ossements desséchés qui se recouvrent de chair, de nerfs, de peau et redeviennent des corps vivants. Cette vision annonce le retour d’exil du peuple décimé, mais rien n’aurait pu renaître si les os, c’est-à-dire les restes de la tradition, avaient été dispersés.

Dans ce même monde biblique et bien que, paradoxalement, les os ne soient même pas mentionnés dans la création de l’homme, l’os représente la substance, l’essence de la personne. Pour dire moi-même, toi-même…, on peut dire mon os, ton os… C’est d’ailleurs bien ce que dit Adam en découvrant Eve: « Elle est l’os de mes os », réaffirmant ainsi leur origine unique. Le mot etsem, l’os, se construit sur la racine ets, l’arbre symbolique que nous retrouverons rapidement.
L’os, réceptacle de l’âme dans ce qu’elle a de plus profond, c’est-à-dire du principe d’animation en deçà de la différenciation en sentiments, volonté, raison, a des facultés très particulières du fait de ce lien privilégié. […]

Le symbolisme des éléments de la colonne

ll faudrait parler longuement du pied, dans la mesure ou il constitue notre prise de terre. Les mythes lui accordent un grand intérêt : citons le talon d’Achille, le pied bot d’Oedipe, le pied à l’envers d’Hermès « , mais aussi le lave-ment des pieds des disciples par le Christ, le rite préislamique d’hospitalité et le déchaussement à l’entrée dans le sanctuaire musulman. Le pied représente à la fois la fermeté et la nature charnelle qui devient ou appui ou obstacle l’élévation spirituelle.

On regrettera aussi de ne pas évoquer le genou lié à l’humilité, c’est-à-dire la juste perception de soi par rapport à l’univers ou dans la société : le vaincu « tombe à genoux », le vassal met un genou en terre et le croyant « s’agenouille ».

LE BASSIN, LES AINES ET LES HANCHES: LES CINQ VERTÈBRES SACRÉES ET LES CINQ VERTÈBRES LOMBAIRES

Le bassin, selon l’axe vertical, présente deux orientations, vers le bas et vers le haut.
Vers le bas, il préside à la naissance biologique: l’enfant naît en orientant sa tête vers la terre et en passant entre les deux hanches, les deux aines, qui deviennent le symbole de l’entrée effective dans l’existence marquée par la dualité. Les noms que l’on donne au bassin dans différentes traditions en rendent compte: il est la Porte des hommes dans la spiritualité biblique, il contient et protège svâdhisthâna, le « pôle-espèce » ou « pôle-génétique ».


Vers le haut, le bassin devient – car il ne l’est pas chez l’animal à quatre pattes – la base sur laquelle va se construire la colonne. Dans cette perspective, il contient, pour les Indiens, mûladhâra, le « pôle de base », le « pôle qui fonde » et kundalinî, l’énergie latente, prête à monter. Pour les kabbalistes, il est yesod, le fondement, mais aussi tsedek, la justesse ou l’équilibre. Quelques exemples bibliques de ces fonctions du bassin seront ici proposés:

• Le songe de Jacob
(Genèse 28, 10-19)

Ce songe peut être lu à plusieurs niveaux, en particulier en fonction d’une architecture subtile du corps dans laquelle la ville de Luz, base de l’axis mundi, est identifiée au bassin, l’échelle à la colonne et les anges qui montent et descendent, aux énergies subtiles reliant l’homme à Dieu. Or, luz veut dire « ce qui est caché  » ou enveloppé, l’amande, le noyau, thème qui se retrouve dans une autre dénomination du bassin. Sod, le « secret » ou le « lieu du secret ». Si nous cherchons la traduction de sod en latin, nous trouvons sacer dont le neutre est sacrum. Le sacrum est donc le lieu du secret. […]

• L’Arche de Noé, le passage de la Mer Rouge

Dans le premier sens, celui de la naissance biologique, le bassin s’identifie à l’arche qui contient les espèces, dans le deuxième sens, celui de la naissance spirituelle, l’homme doit fendre la mer (sa nature biologique) pour « passer  » (la Pâque) vers un autre niveau. Dans cette perspective, Annick de Souzenelle rapproche les dix vertèbres sacrées et lombaires des dix plaies d’Égypte, les dix épreuves auxquelles l’homme doit se confronter pour assurer ses bases.

A l’évidence, après la Porte d’Égypte, on voit se multiplier les signes de verticalité: la marche dans le désert, le mont Sinai comme « axis mundi », la colonne de nue le jour et de feu la nuit comme guide, l’érection du serpent d’airain dont la contemplation guérit.

Dans ce sens de l’épreuve, du passage et de la remontée, l’homme commence à se rassembler du deux (les deux hanches) vers le un (la colonne). Cela ne veut pas dire pour autant qu’il soit debout, il a seulement pressenti le sens – signification et direction.

• La lutte de Jacob avec l’Ange

La suite de l’histoire de Jacob montre bien la difficulté à se tenir debout, même lorsqu’on éprouvait une expérience comme celle du Songe. En effet, Yahvé demande à Jacob de revenir à sa nature originelle « Retourne au pays de tes pères, dans ta patrie et je serai avec toi (Genèse 31,3). Jacob part donc et, à un endroit appelé le gué de Yabboq, il fait passer toute sa famille, restant à l’arrière lui-même; la nuit tombe. Et toute la nuit, il lutte avec un être surhumain qui lui laisse deux signes: un « déboîtement » ou une ouverture de la hanche et un nouveau nom : Israel, celui qui a lutté avec Dieu.

C’est un texte absolument extraordinaire, d’une profondeur incalculable. Pour notre propos, la hanche est-elle déboîtée, l’ange signifiant ainsi à Jacob que la blessure ou la boiterie de l’humain demeure et ne doit pas être oubliée, effacée sur son évolution, qu’il doit en garder une conscience aiguë? Ou la hanche est-elle ouverte, libérant le bassin qui peut s’horizontaliser et instituant ainsi la verticalité? Peut-être y a-t-il là une ambiguïté très voulue…

LES DOUZE VERTÈBRES DORSALES

Elles balisent une voie qui va, à peu de choses près, de l’ombilic la parole articulé en passant par le cour. C’est la grande triade des centres subtils : manipura – anâhata – vishuddha. D’autres équivalences traditionnelles se proposent comme:
– les douze mois de l’année
– les douze signes du zodiaque
– les douze travaux d’Hercule
Le chiffre douze indique une totalité, une perfection ; avec lui, donc, un cycle se clôt et un autre niveau d’être se dévoile comme lieu d’un nouveau travail intérieur.

LES SEPT VERTÈBRES CERVICALES

Le cou est isthme, détroit, étranglement; il est le col supérieur, analogue au col de l’utérus, mais orienté vers la tête, vers le haut. Ce segment de la colonne se trouve sous le signe de vishuddha et des centres de la parole : il est accès au Verbe créateur, le « verbe qui s’est fait chair » et sans lequel il n’y a pas de compréhension possible de l’incarnation. Les sept cervicales sont les sept cieux (le septième ciel), les sept dvipa ou étages de la création, « enfilés » sur l’axe du Mont Meru audelà desquels il y a le monde des dieux. […]

LIBRATION, CAPACITÉ D’ÉVOLUTION

La main, la marche, sont les deux grandes acquisitions de la verticalité. On peut dire, sur le plan de l’histoire des idées et des civilisations, que la verticalité crée l’outil et la technologie. C’est évident. Par contre, on oublie souvent de remarquer que le bassin et la tête, dans cette verticalisation, changent d’orientation, deviennent des coupes, des lieux récepteurs. Or ceci est absolument fondamental et détermine symboliquement les relations entre l’homme et le divin, relations où l’homme se fait pur abandon, lâcher-prise, acceptation de l’énergie d’en–haut. A ce point de vue, des mutilations rituelles comme le scalp ou des coupes de crânes, comme dans le shivaïsme, s’expliquent: c’est l’ouverture du crâne qui en fait un vase dans lequel Shiva ou la Shakti versent le nectar divin.

AXE DU MICROCOSME, LIEU DE SON IDENTITÉ AVEC LE MACROCOSME

La colonne vertébrale, dans la Bible et la Kabbale, était identifiée à l’échelle de Jacob, avec ses degrés de la terre au ciel, et sur laquelle montent et descendent les anges, c’est-à-dire les différentes énergies. Ce qui permet à l’homme de se sentir apparent ou analogue au cosmos, c’est sa colonne. Comment s’appelle la colonne du corps subtil en Inde? Le Mérudanda, le « bâton Méru », Méru étant la montagne cosmique ; en Chine? le « Pilier céleste ».

Comment s’habillaient les Grecs et les Romains? À partir d’un rectangle de tissu qu’ils drapaient selon un rite immémorial. « L’enroulement de l’himation ou de la toge autour du corps humain se fait exactement selon le même processus que la révolution du ciel autour de la terre et il est défini relativement au corps humain tout comme la révolution du ciel l’est relativement à la terre ».

Quand on sait, de plus, que les Pythagoriciens comparaient le ciel au vêtement de la divinité, on n’a plus qu’à admirer la parfaite cohérence de ce symbolisme. Toute une civilisation, même dans ses actes les plus concrets comme l’habillement, se construit sur les mêmes harmoniques. […]

Dans les ensembles symboliques où arbre et homme se superposent, les pieds deviennent racines, pôles terrestres et la chevelure, frondaison captant par capillarité les énergies célestes, Carl Gustav Jung a longuement analysé ces représentations dans « Les Racines de la conscience » (Editions Albin Michel). Il les rattache à un archétype fondateur dans lequel l’arbre, image de vie, est pris comme l’analogue d’une croissance psychique, puis spirituelle. Bien évidemment, la Posture de l’Arbre, dans le Yoga classique, active ces dimensions cachées et, en particulier, la circulation entre des pôles qui, autrement, resteraient irrémédiablement séparés. La Chine ancienne use des mêmes données, en attribuant à l’homme le chiffre trois, pour être l’intermédiaire entre le un et le deux, l’impair et le pair, le yang et le yin, le ciel et la terre.

Arbre, l’homme l’est aussi en Islam où le cyprès représente le musulman parfait, qui porte à partir des racines de la méditation les fruits de « l’Esprit ». Il doit avoir un tronc solide, résistant aux tentations, s’élevant droit vers le ciel. Mais en même temps, le cyprès sert de modèle « en raison de sa soumission (Islam) au vent « . N’est-ce pas être à la fois le roseau et le chêne de la fable, être sthira, ferme, et sukha, souple comme dans les Yogasûtras de Patanjali? […]

Les carnets du yoga, n°224, août-septembre 2003, pp. 2-14.

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The Two Faces Of Russia And Germany’s Eastern Problems

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Oswald Spengler:

The Two Faces Of Russia And Germany’s Eastern Problems

An address delivered on February 14, 1922, at the Rhenish-Westphalian Business Convention in Essen

First published in Spengler, Politische Schriften (Munich, 1932).

Ex: https://europeanheathenfront.wordpress.com

In the light of the desperate situation in which Germany finds itself today -- defenseless, ruled from the West by the friends of its enemies, and the victim of undiminished warfare with economic and diplomatic means -- the great problems of the East, political and economic, have risen to decisive importance. If from our vantage point we wish to gain an understanding of the extremely complex real situation, it will not suffice merely to familiarize ourselves with contemporary conditions in the broad expanses to the east of us, with Russian domestic policy and the economic, geographic, and military factors that make up present-day Soviet Russia. More fundamental and imperative than this is an understanding of the world-historical fact of Russia itself, its situation and evolution over the centuries amid the great old cultures -- China, India, Islam, and the West -- the nature of its people, and its national soul. Political and economic life is, after all, Life itself; even in what may appear to be prosaic aspects of day-to-day affairs it is a form, expression, and part of the larger entity that is Life.

One can attempt to observe these matters with "Russian" eyes, as our communist and democratic writers and party politicians have done, i.e., from the standpoint of Western social ideologies. But that is not "Russian" at all, no matter how many citified minds in Russia may think it is. Or one can try to judge them from a Western-European viewpoint by considering the Russian people as one might consider any other "European" people. But that is just as erroneous. In reality, the true Russian is basically very foreign to us, as foreign as the Indian and the Chinese, whose souls we can likewise never fully comprehend. Justifiably, the Russians draw a distinction between "Mother Russia" and the "fatherlands" of the Western peoples. These are, in fact, two quite different and alien worlds. The Russian understands this alienation. Unless he is of mixed blood, he never overcomes a shy aversion to or a naïve admiration of the Germans, French, and English. The Tartar and the Turk are, in their ways of life, closer and more comprehensible to him. We are easily deceived by the geographic concept of "Europe," which actually originated only after maps were first printed in 1500. The real Europe ends at the Vistula. The activity of the Teutonic knights in the Baltic area was the colonization of foreign territory, and the knights themselves never thought of it in any other way.

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Soviet architecture, 1920s

In order to reach an understanding of this foreign people we must review our own past. Russian history between 900 and 1900 A.D. does not correspond to the history of the West in the same centuries but, rather, to the period extending from the Age of Rome to Charlemagne and the Hohenstaufen emperors. Our heroic poetry, from Arminius to the lays of Hildebrand, Roland, and the Nibelungs, was recapitulated in the Russian heroic epics, the byliny, which began with the knights at the court of Prince Vladimir (d. 1015), the Campaign of Igor, and with Ilya Muromets, and have remained a vital and fruitful art form through the reigns of Ivan the Terrible and Peter the Great, the Burning of Moscow, and to the present day. [1] Yet each of these worlds of primeval poetry expresses a very different kind of basic feeling. Russian life has a different meaning altogether. The endless plains created a softer form of humanity, humble and morose, inclined to lose itself mentally in the flat expanses of its homeland, lacking a genuine personal will, and prone to servility. These characteristics are the background for high-level politics in Russia, from Genghis Khan to Lenin.

(1. Cf. my The Decline of the West, II, 192ff.)

Furthermore, the Russians are semi-nomads, even today. Not even the Soviet regimen will succeed in preventing the factory workers from drifting from one factory to another for no better reason than their inborn wanderlust. [2] That is why the skilled technician is such a rarity in Russia. [3] Similarly, the home of the peasant is not the village or the countryside into which he was born, but the great expanses. Even the mir or so-called agrarian commune -- not an ancient idea, but the outgrowth of administrative techniques employed by the tsarist governments for the raising of taxes -- was unable to bind the peasant, unlike his Germanic counterpart, to the soil. Many thousands of them flooded into the newly developed regions in the steppes of southern Russia, Turkestan, and the Caucasus, in order to satisfy their emotional search for the limits of the infinite. The result of this inner restlessness has been the extension of the Empire up to the natural borders, the seas and the high mountain ranges. In the sixteenth century Siberia was occupied and settled as far as Lake Baikal, in the seventeenth century up to the Pacific.

(2. Cf. several stories of Leskov, and particularly of Gorki.)

(3. Except perhaps in the earlier arteli, groups of workers under self-chosen leaders, which accepted contracts for certain kinds of work in factories and on estates. There is a good description on an artel’ in Leskov’s The Memorable Angel.)

Even more deep-seated than this nomadic trait of the Russians is their dark and mystical longing for Byzantium and Jerusalem. It appears in the outer form of Orthodox Christianity and numerous religious sects, and thus has been a powerful force in the political sphere as well. But within this mystical tendency there slumbers the unborn new religion of an as yet immature people. There is nothing Western about this at all, for the Poles and Balkan Slavs are also "Asiatics."

The economic life of this people has also assumed indigenous, totally non-European forms. The Stroganov family of merchants, which began conquering Siberia on its own under Ivan Grozny [4] and placed some of its own regiments at the tsar’s disposal, had nothing at all in common with the great businessmen of the same century in the West. This huge country, with its nomadic population, might have remained in the same condition for centuries, or might perhaps have become the object of Western colonial ambitions, had it not been for the appearance of a man of immense world-political significance, Peter the Great.

(4. Grozny means "the terrifying, just, awe-inspiring" in the positive sense, not "the terrible" with Western overtones. Ivan IV was a creative personality as was Peter the Great, and one of the most important rulers of all time.)

There is probably no other example in all of history of the radical change in the destiny of an entire people such as this man brought about. His will and determination lifted Russia from its Asiatic matrix and turned it into a Western-style nation within the Western world of nations. His goal was to lead Russia, until then landlocked, to the sea -- at first, unsuccessfully, to the Sea of Asov, and then with permanent success to the Baltic. The fact that the shores of the Pacific had already been reached was, in his eyes, wholly unimportant; the Baltic coast was for him the bridge to "Europe." There he founded Petersburg, symbolically giving it a German name. In place of the old Russian market centers and princely residences like Kiev, Moscow, and Nizhni-Novgorod, he planted Western European cities in the Russian landscape. Administration, legislation, and the state itself now functioned on foreign models. The boyar families of Old Russian chieftains became feudal nobility, as in England and France. His aim was to create above the rural population a "society" that would be unified as to dress, customs, language, and thought. And soon an upper social stratum actually formed in the cities, having a thin Western veneer. It played at erudition like the Germans, and took on esprit and manners like the French. The entire corpus of Western Rationalism made its entry -- scarcely understood, undigested, and with fateful consequences. Catherine II, a German, found it necessary to send writers such as Novikov and Radishchev into jail and exile because they wished to try out the ideas of the Enlightenment on the political and religious forms of Russia. [5]

(5. "Jehova, Jupiter, Brahma, God of Abraham, God of Moses, God of Confucius, God of Zoroaster, God of Socrates, God of Marcus Aurelius, God of the Christians -- Thou art everywhere the same, eternal God!" (Radishchev).)

And economic life changed also. In addition to its ages-old river traffic, Russia now began to engage in ocean shipping to distant ports. The old merchant tradition of the Stroganovs, with their caravan trade to China, and of the fairs at Nizhni-Novgorod, now received an overlay of Western European "money thinking" in terms of banks and stock exchanges. [6] Next to the old-style handicrafts and the primitive mining techniques in the Urals there appeared factories, machines, and eventually railroads and steamships.

(6. Cf. Decline of the West, II, 480f., 495.)

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German architecture, 1920s, "Chilehaus" in Hamburg and Berlin Tempelhof

Most important of all, Western-style politics entered the Russian scene. It was supported by an army that no longer conformed to conditions of the wars against the Tartars, Turks, and Kirghiz; it had to be prepared to do battle against Western armies in Western territory, and by its very existence it continually misled the diplomats in Petersburg into thinking that the only political problems lay in the West.

Despite all the weaknesses of an artificial product made of stubborn material, Petrinism was a powerful force during the two hundred years of its duration. It will be possible to assess its true accomplishments only at some distant future time, when we can survey the rubble it will have left behind. It extended "Europe," theoretically at least, to the Urals, and made of it a cultural unity. An empire that stretched to the Bering Strait and the Hindu Kush had been Westernized to the extent that in 1900 there was hardly much difference between cities in Ireland and Portugal and those in Turkestan and the Caucasus. Travel was actually easier in Siberia than in some countries in Western Europe. The Trans-Siberian Railway was the final triumph, the final symbol of the Petrinist will before the collapse.

Yet this mighty exterior concealed an internal disaster. Petrinism was and remained an alien element among the Russian people. In reality there existed not one but two Russias, the apparent and the true, the official and the underground Russia. The foreign element brought with it the poison that caused that immense organism to fall ill and die. The spirit of Western Rationalism of the eighteenth century and Western Materialism of the nineteenth, both remote and incomprehensible to genuine Russian thought, came to lead a grotesque and subversive existence among the intelligentsia in the cities. There arose a type of Russian intellectual who, like the Reformed Turk, the Reformed Chinese, and the Reformed Indian, was mentally and spiritually debased, impoverished, and ruined to the point of cynicism by Western Europe. It began with Voltaire, and continued from Proudhon and Marx to Spencer and Haeckel. In Tolstoy’s day the upper class, irreligious and opposed to all native tradition, preened itself with blasé pretentiousness. Gradually the new world view seeped down to the bohemians in the cities, the students, demagogues, and literati, who in turn took it "to the people" to implant in them a hatred of the Western-style upper classes. The result was doctrinaire bolshevism.

At first, however, it was solely the foreign policy of Russia that made itself painfully felt in the West. The original nature of the Russian people was ignored, or at least not understood. It was nothing but a harmless ethnographic curiosity, occasionally imitated at bals masques and in operettas. Russia meant for us a Great Power in the Western sense, one which played the game of high politics with skill and at times with true mastery.

What we did not notice was that two tendencies, alien and inimical to each other, were operative in Russia. One of these was the ancient, instinctive, unclear, unconscious, and subliminal drive that is present in the soul of every Russian, no matter how thoroughly westernized his conscious life may be -- a mystical yearning for the South, for Constantinople and Jerusalem, a genuine crusading spirit similar to the spirit our Gothic forebears had in their blood but which we hardly can appreciate today. Superimposed on this instinctive drive was the official foreign policy of a Great Power: Petersburg versus Moscow. Behind it lay the desire to play a role on the world stage, to be recognized and treated as an equal in "Europe." Hence the hyper-refined manners and mores, the faultless good taste -- things which had already begun to degenerate in Paris since Napoleon III. The finest tone of Western society was to be found in certain Petersburg circles.

At the same time, this kind of Russian did not really love any of the Western peoples. He admired, envied, ridiculed, or despised them, but his attitude depended practically always on whether Russia stood to gain or lose by them. Hence the respect shown for Prussia during the Wars of Liberation (Russia would have liked to pocket Prussian territory) and for France prior to the World War (the Russians laughed at her senile cries for revanche). Yet, for the ambitious and intelligent upper classes, Russia was the future master of Europe, intellectually and politically. Even Napoleon, in his time, was aware of this. The Russian army was mobilized at the western border; it was of Western proportions and was unmistakably trained for battle on Western terrain against Western foes. Russia’s defeat at the hands of Japan in 1905 can be partly explained by the lack of training for warfare under anything but Western conditions.

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Such policies were supported by a network of embassies in the great capitals of the West (which the Soviet government has replaced with Communist party centers for agitation). Catherine the Great took away Poland, and with it the final obstacle between East and West. The climax came with the symbolic journey of Alexander I, the "Savior of Europe," to Paris. At the Congress of Vienna, Russia at times played a decisive role, as also in the Holy Alliance, which Metternich called into being as a bulwark against the Western revolution, and which Nicholas I put to work in 1849 restoring order in the Habsburg state in the interest of his own government.

By means of the successful tradition of Petersburg diplomacy, Russia became more and more involved in great decisions of Western European politics. It took part in all the intrigues and calculations that not only concerned areas remote from Russia, but were also quite incomprehensible to the Russian spirit. The army at the western border was made the strongest in the world, and for no urgent reason -- Russia was the only country no one intended to invade after Napoleon’s defeat, while Germany was threatened by France and Russia, Italy by France and Austria, and Austria by France and Russia. One sought alliance with Russia in order to tip the military balance in one’s favor, thus spurring the ambitions of Russian society toward ever greater efforts in non-Russian interests. All of us grew up under the impression that Russia was a European power and that the land beyond the Volga was colonial territory. The center of gravity of the Empire definitely lay to the west of Moscow, not in the Volga region. And the educated Russians thought the very same way. They regarded the defeat in the Far East in 1905 as an insignificant colonial adventure, whereas even the smallest setback at the western border was in their eyes a scandal, inasmuch as it occurred in full view of the Western nations. In the south and north of the Empire a fleet was constructed, quite superfluous for coastal defense: its sole purpose was to play a role in Western political machinations.

On the other hand, the Turkish Wars, waged with the aim of "liberating" the Christian Balkan peoples, touched the Russian soul more deeply. Russia as the heir to Turkey -- that was a mystical idea. There were no differences of opinion on this question. That was the Will of God. Only the Turkish Wars were truly popular wars in Russia. In 1807 Alexander I feared, not without reason, that he might be assassinated by an officers’ conspiracy. The entire officers’ corps preferred a war against the Turks to one against Napoleon. This led to Alexander’s alliance with Napoleon at Tilsit, which dominated world politics until 1812. It is characteristic how Dostoyevsky, in contrast to Tolstoy, became ecstatic over the Turkish War in 1877. He suddenly came alive, constantly wrote down his metaphysical visions, and preached the religious mission of Russia against Byzantium. But the final portion of Anna Karenina was denied publication by the Russian Messenger, for one did not dare to offer Tolstoy’s skepticism to the public.

As I have mentioned, the educated, irreligious, Westernized Russians also shared the mystical longing for Jerusalem, the Kiev monk’s notion of the mother country as the "Third Rome," which after Papal Rome and Luther’s Wittenberg was to take the fulfillment of Christ’s message to the Jerusalem of the apostles. This barely conscious national instinct of all Russians opposes any power that might erect political barricades on the path that leads to Jerusalem by way of Byzantium. In all other countries such political obstacles would simply disturb either national conceit (in the West) or national apathy (in the Far East); in Russia, the mystical soul of the people itself was pierced and profoundly agitated. Hence the brilliant successes of the Slavophil movement, which was not so much interested in winning over Poles and Czechs as in gaining a foothold among the Slavs in the Christian Balkan countries, the neighbors of Constantinople. Even at an earlier date, the Holy War against Napoleon and the Burning of Moscow had involved the emotions of the entire Russian people. This was not just because of the invasion and plundering of the Russian countryside, but because of Napoleon’s obvious long-range plans. In 1809 he had taken over the Illyrian provinces (the present Yugoslavia) and thus became master of the Adriatic. This had decisively strengthened his influence on Turkey to the disadvantage of Russia, and his next step would be, in alliance with Turkey and Persia, to open up the path to India, either from Illyria or from Moscow itself. The Russians’ hatred of Napoleon was later transferred to the Habsburg monarchy, when its designs on Turkish territory -- in Metternich’s time the Danubian principalities, and after 1878 Saloniki -- endangered Russian moves toward the south. Following the Crimean War they extended their hatred to include Great Britain, when that nation appeared to lay claim to Turkish lands by blockading the Straits and later by occupying Egypt and Cyprus.

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Finally, Germany too became the object of this hatred, which goes very deep and cannot be allayed by practical considerations. After 1878, Germany neglected its role as a Russian ally to became more and more the protector and preserver of the crumbling Habsburg state, and thereby also, despite Bismarck’s warning, the supporter of Austro-Hungarian intentions in the Balkans. The German government showed no understanding of the suggestion made by Count Witte, the last of the Russian diplomats friendly to Germany, to choose between Austria and Russia. We could have had a reliable ally in Russia if we had been willing to loosen our ties to Austria. A total reorientation of German policy might have been possible as late as 1911.

Following the Congress of Berlin, hatred of Germany began to spread to all of Russian society, for Bismarck succeeded in restraining Russian diplomacy in the interest of world peace and maintaining the balance of power in "Europe." From the German point of view this was probably correct, and in any case it was a master stroke of Bismarckian statesmanship. But in the eyes of Petersburg it was a mistake, for it deprived the Russian soul of the hope of winning Turkey, and favored England and Austria. And this Russian soul was one of the imponderables that defied diplomatic treatment. Hostility to Germany kept on growing and eventually entered all levels of Russian urban society. It was diverted momentarily when Japanese power, rising up suddenly and broadening the horizons of world politics, forced Russia to experience the Far East as a danger zone. But that was soon forgotten, especially since Germany was so grotesquely inept as to understand neither the immediate situation nor the future possibilities. In time, the senseless idea of the Berlin-Baghdad Railway came up; Germany now seemed intent on capturing full control of this path to Constantinople, a move which would have benefitted neither German politics nor the German economy.

Just as in the field of politics, the economic life of Russia was divided into two main tendencies -- the one active and aggressive, the other passive. The passive element was represented by the Russian peasantry with its primitive agrarian economy; [7] by the old-style merchants with their fairs, caravans, and Volga barges; by Russian craftsmen; and finally by the primitive mining enterprises in the Urals, which developed out of the ancient techniques of pre-Christian "blacksmith tribes," independent of Western mining methods and experience. The forging of iron was invented in Russia in the second millennium B.C. -- the Greeks retained a vague recollection of the beginning of this art. This simple and traditional form of economy gradually found a powerful competitor in the civilized world of Western-style urban economy, with its banks, stock exchanges, factories, and railroads. Then it was money economy versus goods economy; each of these forms of economic existence abhors the other, each tries to attack and annihilate the other.

(7. On the contrast between agrarian and urban economy, see Decline of the West, II, 477ff.)

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The Petrinist state needed a money economy in order to pay for its Westernized politics, its army, and its administrative hierarchy, which was laced with primitive corruption. Incidentally, this form of corruption was habitual public practice in Russia; it is a necessary psychological concomitant of an economy based on the exchange of goods, and is fundamentally different from the clandestine corruption practiced by Western European parliamentarians. The state protected and supported economic thinking that was oriented toward Western capitalism, a type of thinking that Russia neither created nor really understood, but had imported and now had to manage. Furthermore, Russia had also to face its doctrinary opposite, the economic theory of communism. Communism was in fact inseparable from Western economic thinking. It was the Marxist capitalism of the lower class, preached by students and agitators as a vague gospel to the masses in the Petrinist cities.

Still, the decisive and truly agitating factor for Russia’s future was not this literary, theoretical trend in the urban underground. It was, rather, the Russians’ profound, instinctively religious abhorrence of all Western economic practices. They considered "money" and all the economic schemes derived from it, socialistic as well as capitalistic, as sinful and satanic. This was a genuine religious feeling, much like the Western emotion which, during the Gothic centuries, opposed the economic practices of the Arabic-Jewish world and led to the prohibition for Christians of money-lending for interest. In the West, such attitudes had for centuries been little more than a cliché for chapel and pulpit, but now it became an acute spiritual problem in Russia. It caused the suicide of numerous Russians who were seized by "terror of the surplus value," whose primitive thought and emotions could not imagine a way of earning a living that would not entail the "exploitation" of "fellow human beings." This genuine Russian sentiment saw in the world of capitalism an enemy, a poison, the great sin that it ascribed to the Petrinist state despite the deep respect felt for "Little Father," the Tsar.

Such, then, are the deep and manifold roots of the Russian philosophy of intellectual nihilism, which began to grow at the time of the Crimean War and which produced as a final fruit the bolshevism that destroyed the Petrinist state in 1917, replacing it with something that would have been absolutely impossible in the West. Contained within this movement is the orthodox Slavophils’ hatred of Petersburg and all it stood for, [8] the peasants’ hatred of the mir, the type of village commune that contradicted the rural concept of property passed down through countless family generations, as well as every Russian’s hatred of capitalism, industrial economy, machines, railroads, and the state and army that offered protection to this cynical world against an eruption of Russian instincts. It was a primeval religious hatred of uncomprehended forces that were felt to be godless, that one could not change and thus wished to destroy, in order that life could go on in the old-fashioned way.

(8. "The first requirement for the liberation of popular feeling in Russia is to hate Petersburg with heart and soul" (Aksakov to Dostoyevsky). Cf. Decline of the West, II, 193ff.)

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The peasants detested the intelligentsia and its agitating just as strongly as they detested what these people were agitating against. Yet in time the agitation brought a small clique of clever but by and large mediocre personalities to the forefront of power. Even Lenin’s creation is Western, it is Petersburg -- foreign, inimical, and despised by the majority of Russians. Some day, in some way or other, it will perish. It is a rebellion against the West, but born of Western ideas. It seeks to preserve the economic forms of industrial labor and capitalist speculation as well as the authoritarian state, except that it has replaced the Tsarist regime and private capitalist enterprise with an oligarchy and state capitalism, calling itself communism out of deference to doctrine.

It is a new victory for Petersburg over Moscow and, without any doubt, the final and enduring act of self-destruction committed by Petrinism from below. The actual victim is precisely the element that sought to liberate itself by means of the rebellion: the true Russian, the peasant and craftsman, the devout man of religion. Western revolutions such as the English and French seek to improve organically evolved conditions by means of theory, and they never succeed. In Russia, however, a whole world was made to vanish without resistance. Only the artificial quality of Peter the Great’s creation can explain the fact that a small group of revolutionaries, almost without exception dunces and cowards, has had such an effect. Petrinism was an illusion that suddenly burst.

The bolshevism of the early years has thus had a double meaning. It has destroyed an artificial, foreign structure, leaving only itself as a remaining integral part. But beyond this, it has made the way clear for a new culture that will some day awaken between "Europe" and East Asia. It is more a beginning than an end. It is temporary, superficial, and foreign only insofar as it represents the self-destruction of Petrinism, the grotesque attempt systematically to overturn the social superstructure of the nation according to the theories of Karl Marx. At the base of this nation lies the Russian peasantry, which doubtless played a more important role in the success of the 1917 Revolution than the intellectual crowd is willing to admit. These are the devout peasants of Russia who, although they do not yet fully realize it, are the archenemies of bolshevism and are oppressed by it even worse than they were by the Mongols and the old tsars. For this very reason, despite the hardships of the present, the peasantry will some day become conscious of its own will, which points in a wholly different direction.

The peasantry is the true Russian people of the future. It will not allow itself to be perverted and suffocated, and without a doubt, no matter how slowly, it will replace, transform, control, or annihilate bolshevism in its present form. How that will happen, no one can tell at the moment. It depends, among other things, on the appearance of decisive personalities, who, like Genghis Khan, Ivan IV, Peter the Great, and Lenin, can seize Destiny by their iron hand. Here, too, Dostoyevsky stands against Tolstoy as a symbol of the future against the present. Dostoyevsky was denounced as a reactionary because in his Possessed he no longer even recognized the problems of nihilism. For him, such things were just another aspect of the Petrinist system. But Tolstoy, the man of good society, lived in this element; he represented it even in his rebellion, a protest in Western form against the West. Tolstoy, and not Marx, was the leader to bolshevism. Dostoyevsky is its future conqueror.

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There can be no doubt: a new Russian people is in the process of becoming. Shaken and threatened to the very soul by a frightful destiny, forced to an inner resistance, it will in time become firm and come to bloom. It is passionately religious in a way we Western Europeans have not been, indeed could not have been, for centuries. As soon as this religious drive is directed toward a goal, it possesses an immense expansive potential. Unlike us, such a people does not count the victims who die for an idea, for it is a young, vigorous, and fertile people. The intense respect enjoyed over the past centuries by the "holy peasants" whom the regime often exiled to Siberia or liquidated in some other way -- such figures as the priest John of Kronstadt, even Rasputin, but also Ivan and Peter the Great -- will awaken a new type of leaders, leaders to new crusades and legendary conquests. The world round about, filled with religious yearning but no longer fertile in religious concerns, is torn and tired enough to allow it suddenly to take on a new character under the proper circumstances. Perhaps bolshevism itself will change in this way under new leaders; but that is not very probable. For this ruling horde -- it is a fraternity like the Mongols of the Golden Horde -- always has its sights set on the West as did Peter the Great, who likewise made the land of his dreams the goal of his politics. But the silent, deeper Russia has already forgotten the West and has long since begun to look toward Near and East Asia. It is a people of the great inland expanses, not a maritime people.

An interest in Western affairs is upheld only by the ruling group that organizes and supports the Communist parties in the individual countries -- without, as I see it, any chance of success. It is simply a consequence of Marxist theory, not an exercise in practical politics. The only way that Russia might again direct its attention to the West -- with disastrous results for both sides -- would be for other countries (Germany, for instance) to commit serious errors in foreign policy, which could conceivably result in a "crusade" of the Western powers against bolshevism -- in the interest, of course, of Franco-British financial capital. Russia’s secret desire is to move toward Jerusalem and Central Asia, and "the" enemy will always be the one who blocks those paths. The fact that England established the Baltic states and placed them under its influence, thereby causing Russia to lose the Baltic Sea, has not had a profound effect. Petersburg has already been given up for lost, an expendable relic of the Petrinist era. Moscow is once again the center of the nation. But the destruction of Turkey, the partition of that country into French and English spheres of influence, France’s establishment of the Little Entente which closed off and threatened the area from Rumania southwards, French attempts to win control of the Danubian principalities and the Black Sea by aiding the reconstruction of the Hapsburg state -- all these events have made England and, above all, France the heirs to Russian hatred. What the Russians see is the revivification of Napoleonic tendencies; the crossing of the Beresina was perhaps not, after all, the final symbolic event in that movement. Byzantium is and remains the Sublime Gateway to future Russian policy, while, on the other side, Central Asia is no longer a conquered area but part of the sacred earth of the Russian people.

In the face of this rapidly changing, growing Russia, German policy requires the tactical skill of a great statesman and expert in Eastern affairs, but as yet no such man has made his appearance. It is clear that we are not the enemies of Russia; but whose friends are we to be -- of the Russia of today, or of the Russia of tomorrow? Is it possible to be both, or does one exclude the other? Might we not jeopardize such friendship by forming careless alliances?

Similarly obscure and difficult are our economic connections, the actual ones and the potential ones. Politics and economics are two very different aspects of life, different in concept, methods, aims, and significance for the soul of a people. This is not realized in the age of practical materialism, but that does not make it any less fatefully true. Economics is subordinate to politics; it is without question the second and not the first factor in history. The economic life of Russia is only superficially dominated by state capitalism. At its base it is subject to attitudes that are virtually religious in nature. At any rate it is not at all the same thing as top-level Russian politics. Moreover, it is very difficult to predict its short and long-range trends, and even more difficult to control these trends from abroad. The Russia of the last tsars gave the illusion of being an economic complex of Western stamp. Bolshevist Russia would like to give the same illusion; with its communist methods it would even like to become an example for the West. Yet in reality, when considered from the standpoint of Western economics, it is one huge colonial territory where the Russians of the farmlands and small towns work essentially as peasants and craftsmen. Industry and the transportation of industrial products over the rail networks, as well as the process of wholesale distribution of such products, are and will always remain inwardly foreign to this people. The businessman, the factory head, the engineer and inventor are not "Russian" types. As a people, no matter how far individuals may go toward adapting to modern patterns of world economics, the true Russians will always let foreigners do the kind of work they reject because they are inwardly not suited to it. A close comparison with the Age of the Crusades will clarify what I have in mind. [9] At that time, also, the young peoples of the North were nonurban, committed to an agrarian economy. Even the small cities, castle communities, and princely residences were essentially marketplaces for agricultural produce. The Jews and Arabs were a full thousand years "older," and functioned in their ghettos as experts in urban money economy. The Western European fulfills the same function in the Russia of today.

(9. Cf. Decline of the West, II, Chapters XIII and XIV, "The Form-World of Economic Life.")

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Machine industry is basically non-Russian in spirit, and the Russians will forever regard it as alien, sinful, and diabolical. They can bear with it and even respect it, as the Japanese do, as a means toward higher ends, for one casts out demons by the prince of demons. But they can never give their soul to it as did the Germanic nations, which created it with their dynamic sensibility as a symbol and method of their struggling existence. In Russia, industry will always remain essentially the concern of foreigners. But the Russians will be able to distinguish sensitively between what is to their own and what is to the foreigners’ advantage.

As far as "money" is concerned, for the Russians the cities are markets for agricultural commodities; for us they have been since the eighteenth century the centers for the dynamics of money. "Money thinking" will be impossible for the Russians for a long time to come. For this reason, as I have explained, Russia is regarded as a colony by foreign business interests. Germany will be able to gain certain advantages from its proximity to the country, particularly in light of the fact that both powers have the same enemy, the financial interest-groups of the Allied nations.

Yet the German economy can never exploit these opportunities without support from superior politics. Without such support a chaotic seizure of opportunities will ensue, with dire consequences for the future. The economic policy of France has been for centuries, as a result of the sadistic character of the French people, myopic and purely destructive. And a serious German policy in economic affairs simply does not exist.

Therefore it is the prime task of German business to help create order in German domestic affairs, in order to set the stage for a foreign policy that will understand and meet its obligations. Business has not yet grasped the immense economic significance of this domestic task. It is decidedly not a question, as common prejudice would have it, of making politics submit to the momentary interests of single groups, such as has already occurred by means of the worst kind of politics imaginable, party politics. It is not a question of advantages that might last for just a few years. Before the war it was the large agricultural interests, and since the war the large industrial interests, that attempted to focus national policy on the obtaining of temporary advantages, and the results were always nil. But the time for short-range tactics is over. The next decades will bring problems of world-historical dimensions, and that means that business must at all times be subordinate to national politics, not the other way around. Our business leaders must learn to think exclusively in political terms, not in terms of "economic politics." The basic requirement for great economic opportunity in the East is thus order in our politics at home.

mardi, 25 février 2020

Oswald SPENGLER: Nietzsche And His Century

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Oswald SPENGLER:

Nietzsche And His Century

An address delivered on October 15, 1924, Nietzsche’s eightieth birthday, at the Nietzsche Archive, Weimar

First published in Spengler, Reden und Aufsätze (Munich, 1937).

Ex: https://europeanheathenfront.wordpress.com

Looking back at the nineteenth century and letting its great men pass before the mind’s eye, we can observe an amazing thing about the figure of Friedrich Nietzsche, something that was hardly noticeable in his own time. All the other outstanding personages, including Wagner, Strindberg, and Tolstoy, reflect to a certain degree the color and shape of those years. Each of them was somehow bound up with the shallow optimism of the progress-mongers, with their social ethics and utilitarianism, their philosophy of matter and energy, pragmatism and "adaptation"; each of them made sacrifice after sacrifice to the spirit of the time. Only one person represents a radical departure from this pattern. If the word "untimely," which he himself coined, is applicable to anyone at all, then it is Nietzsche. One searches in vain throughout his whole life and all of his thought for any indication that he might have yielded inwardly to any vogue or fad.

In this respect he is the antithesis of, and yet in some ways profoundly related to, the second German of modern times whose life was one great symbol: Goethe. These are the only two notable Germans whose existence has profound significance apart from and in addition to their works. Because both were aware of this from the beginning and continually gave utterance to this awareness, their existence has become a treasure for our nation and an integral part of its spiritual history.

It was Goethe’s good fortune to be born at the high noon of Western culture, at a time of rich and mature intellectuality which he himself eventually came to represent. He had only to become the epitome of his own time in order to achieve the disciplined grandeur implied by those who later called him the "Olympian." Nietzsche lived a century later, and in the meantime a great change had occurred, one which we are only now able to comprehend. It was his fate to come into the world after the Rococo period, and to stand amid the totally cultureless 1860’s and 1870’s. Consider the streets and houses he had to live in, the clothing fashions, furniture, and social mores he had to observe. Consider the way people moved about in social circles in his day, the way they thought, wrote, and felt. Goethe lived at a time filled with respect for form; Nietzsche longed desperately for forms that had been shattered and abandoned. Goethe needed only to affirm what he saw and experienced around him; Nietzsche had no recourse but to protest passionately against everything contemporary, if he was to rescue anything his forebears had bequeathed to him as a cultural heritage. Both of these men strove during their whole lives for strict inner form and discipline. But the eighteenth century was itself "in form." It possessed the highest type of society that Western Europe has ever known. The nineteenth century had neither a distinguished society nor any other kind of formal attributes. Apart from the incidental customs of the urban upper class it possessed only the scattered remains, preserved with great difficulty, of aristocratic and middle-class tradition. Goethe was able to understand and solve the great problems of his time as a recognized member of his society, as we learn in Wilhelm Meister and Elective Affinities; Nietzsche could remain true to his task only by turning his back on society. His frightful loneliness stands as a symbol over against Goethe’s cheerful gregariousness. One of these great men gave shape to existing things; the other brooded over nonexisting things. One of them worked for a prevailing form; the other against a prevailing formlessness.

Aside from this, however, form was something very different for each of them. Of all the great German intellectuals, Nietzsche was the only born musician. All the others -- thinkers, poets, and painters alike -- have either been shapers of material or have taken material apart. Nietzsche lived, felt, and thought by ear. He was, after all, hardly able to use his eyes. His prose is not "written," it is heard -- one might even say sung. The vowels and cadences are more important than the similes and metaphors. What he sensed as he surveyed the ages was their melody, their meter. He discovered the musical keys of foreign cultures. Before him, no one knew of the tempo of history. A great many of his concepts -- the Dionysian, the Pathos of Distance, the Eternal Recurrence -- are to be understood quite musically. He sensed the rhythm of what is called nobility, ethics, heroism, distinction, and master morality. He was the first to experience as a symphony the image of history that had been created by scholarly research out of data and numbers -- the rhythmic sequence of ages, customs, and attitudes.

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He himself had music, just as he walked, spoke, dressed, experienced other people, stated problems, and drew conclusions. What Bildung had been for Goethe, was for Nietzsche tact in the broadest sense: social, moral, historical, and linguistic tact, a feeling for the proper sequence of things, made all the keener by his suffering in an age that had very little of this feeling. Like Zarathustra, Goethe’s Tasso was born of suffering, but Tasso succumbed to a feeling of weakness when challenged by a contemporary world which he loved and which he regarded as superior to himself. Zarathustra abhorred the contemporary world, and fled from it to distant worlds of the past and future.

The inability to feel "at home" in one’s own time -- that is a German curse. Because of the guilt of our past we came into bloom too late and too suddenly. Beginning with Klopstock and Lessing, we had to cover in eighty years a distance for which other nations had centuries. For this reason we never developed a formal inner tradition or a distinguished society that could act as guardian of such a tradition. We borrowed forms, motifs, problems, and solutions from all sides and struggled with them, whereas others grew up with them and in them. Our end was implicit in our beginning. Heinrich von Kleist discovered -- he was the first to do so -- the problematics of Ibsen at the same time that he strove to emulate Shakespeare. This tragic state of affairs produced in Germany a series of outstanding artistic personalities at a time when England and France had already gone over to producing literati -- art and thought as a profession rather than a destiny. But it also caused the fragmentation and frustration expressed in much of our art, the thwarting of final aims and artistic thoroughness.

Today we use the terms "Classical" and "Romantic" to denote the antithesis that appeared around 1800 everywhere in Western Europe, literary Petersburg included. Goethe was a Classic to the same extent that Nietzsche was a Romantic, but these words merely designate the predominant hues in their essential natures. Each of them also possessed the other potentiality, which at times urged its way to the foreground. Goethe, whose Faust-monologues and West-Eastern Divan are high points of Romantic sensibility, strove at all times to confine this urge for distance and boundlessness within clear and strict traditional forms. Similarly, Nietzsche often suppressed his acquired inclination for the Classical and rational, which held a twofold fascination for him by reason of temperament and philological profession, to what he termed the Dionysian, at least when he was evaluating. Both men were borderline cases. Just as Goethe was the last of the Classics, Nietzsche was, next to Wagner, the last of the Romantics. By their lives and their creations they exhausted the possibilities of these two movements. After them, it was no longer possible to render the meaning of the ages in the same words and images -- the imitators of the Classical drama and the latter-day Zarathustras have proved this. Moreover, it is impossible to invent a new method of seeing and saying like theirs. Germany may well bring forth impressive formative minds in the future; however, fortunate for us, they will nonetheless be isolated occurrences, for we have reached the end of the grand development. And they will always be overshadowed by the two great figures of Goethe and Nietzsche.

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An essential characteristic of Western Classicism was its intense preoccupation with the contemporary world. While seeking to control human drives that tend in opposite directions, it attempted to make the past and the future coalesce in the contemporary situation. Goethe’s dictum about the "Demands of the Day," his "cheerful present," imply after all that he called upon various kinds of past figures and events -- his Greeks, his Renaissance, Götz von Berlichingen, Faust, and Egmont -- in order to infuse them with the spirit of his own time. The result is that when reading such works as Tasso or Iphigenia we are not at all mindful of historical precedent. Just the opposite is the case with the Romantics; their proper domain was remote places and times. They longed for withdrawal from the present to distant and foreign realms, to the past and future of history. None of them ever had a profound relationship with the things that surrounded him.

The Romantic is enticed by whatever is strange to his nature, the Classic by what is proper to his nature. Noble dreamers on the one hand, noble masters of dreams on the other. The one type adored the conquerors, rebels, and criminals of the past, or ideal states and supermen of the future; the other type construed statesmanship in practical, methodical terms or, like Goethe and Humboldt, even practiced it themselves. One of Goethe’s great masterpieces is the conversation between Egmont and William of Orange. He loved Napoleon, for he was witness to his deeds in his own time and locality. He was never able to recreate artistically the violent personalities of the past; his Caesar went unwritten. But that is precisely the type of personality that Nietzsche worshipped -- from a distance. At close range, as with Bismarck, he was repelled by them. Napoleon would also have repelled him. He would have seemed to him uncouth, shallow, and mindless, like the Napoleonic types that lived around him -- the great European politicians and the rough-and-ready businessmen whom he never even saw, much less understood. He needed a vast distance between the Then and the Now in order to have a genuine relationship with a given reality. Thus he created his Superman and, almost as arbitrarily, the figure of Cesare Borgia.

These two tendencies are tragically present in the most recent German history. Bismarck was a Classic of politics. He based his calculations entirely on things that existed, things he could see and manipulate. The fanatical patriots neither loved nor understood him until his creative work appeared as a finished product, until he could be romantically transfigured as a mythic personage: "The Old Man of the Saxon Forests." On the other hand, Ludwig II of Bavaria, who perished as a Romantic and who never created or even could have created anything of enduring value, actually received this kind of love (without returning it), not only from the people at large, but also from artists and thinkers who should have looked more closely. Kleist is regarded in Germany with, at best, a reluctant admiration that is tantamount to rejection, particularly in those instances where he succeeded in overcoming his own Romantic nature. He is inwardly quite remote from most Germans, unlike Nietzsche, whose nature and destiny were in many ways similar to the Bavarian king’s, and who is instinctively honored even by those who have never read him.

Nietzsche’s longing for remoteness also explains his aristocratic taste, which was that of a completely lonely and visionary personality. Like the Ossian-type Romanticism that originated in Scotland, the early Classicism of the eighteenth century began on the Thames and was later taken across to the Continent. It is impossible to consider it apart from the Rationalism of the same period. The Classicists engaged in the act of creativity consciously and deliberately; they replaced free imagination with knowledge, at times even with scholarly erudition. They understood the Greeks, the Renaissance, and inevitably also the world of contemporary active affairs. These English Classicists, all of them of high social standing, helped create liberalism as a philosophy of life as it was understood by Frederick the Great and his century: the deliberate ignoring of distinctions that were known to exist in the practical life but were in any case not considered as obstacles; the rational preoccupation with matters of public opinion that could neither be gotten rid of nor hushed up, but that somehow had to be rendered harmless. This upper-class Classicism gave rise to English democracy -- a superior form of tactics, not a codified political program. It was based on the long and intensive experience of a social stratum that habitually dealt with real and practicable possibilities, and that was therefore never in danger of losing its essential congeniality.

Goethe, who was also conscious of his social rank, was never an aristocrat in the passionate, theoretical sense -- unlike Nietzsche, who lacked the habituation to regular practical experience. Nietzsche never really became familiar with the democracy of his time in all its strength and weakness. To be sure, he rebelled against the herd instinct with the wrath of his extremely sensitive soul, but the chief cause of his anger was to be found somewhere in the historical past. He was doubtless the first to demonstrate in such radical fashion how in all cultures and epochs of the past the masses count for nothing, that they suffer from history but do not create it, that they are at all times the pawns and victims of the personal will of individuals and classes born to be rulers. People had sensed this often enough before, but Nietzsche was the first to destroy the traditional image of "humanity" as progress toward the solution of ideal problems through the agency of its leaders. Herein lies the immense difference between the historiography of a Niebuhr or a Ranke, which as an idea was likewise of Romantic origin, and Nietzsche’s method of historical vision. His way of looking into the soul of past epochs and peoples overcame the mere pragmatic structure of facts and events.

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Yet such a technique required detachment. English Classicism, which produced the first modern historian of Greece in George Grote -- a businessman and practical politician -- was quite exclusively the affair of higher society. It ennobled the Greeks by regarding them as peers, by "present-ing" them in the truest sense of the word as distinguished, cultivated, intellectually refined human beings who at all times acted "in good taste" -- even Harner and Pindar, poets whom the English school of classical philology was the first to prefer over Horace and Virgil. From the higher circles of English society this Classicism entered the only corresponding circles in Germany, the courts of the small principalities, where the tutors and preachers acted as intermediaries. The courtly atmosphere of Weimar was the world in which Goethe’s life became the symbol of cheerful conviviality and purposeful activity. Weimar was the friendly center of intellectual Germany, a place that offered calm satisfaction to a degree unknown by any other German writer, an opportunity for harmonious growth, maturing, and ageing that was Classical in a specifically German sense.

Next to this career there is the other, which likewise ended in Weimar. It started out in the seclusion of a Protestant pastor’s home, the cradle of many if not most of Germany’s great minds, and reached its height in the sun-drenched solitude of the Engadin. No other German has ever lived such an impassioned private existence, far removed from all society and publicity -- though all Germans, even if they are "public" personalities, have a longing for such solitude. His intense yearning for friendship was in the last analysis simply his inability to lead a genuine social life, and thus it was a more spiritual form of loneliness. Instead of the friendly "Goethe house" on Weimar’s Frauenplan, we see the joyless little cottages in Sils-Maria, the solitude of the mountains and the sea, and finally a solitary breakdown in Turin -- it was the most thoroughly Romantic career the nineteenth century ever offered.

Nevertheless, his need to communicate was stronger than he himself believed, much stronger at any rate than Goethe’s, who was one of the most taciturn of men despite the social life that surrounded him. Goethe’s Elective Affinities is a secretive book, not to speak of Wilhelm Meister’s Years of Wandering and Faust II. His most profound poems are monologues. The aphorisms of Nietzsche are never monologues; nor are the Night Song and the Dionysus Dithyrambs completely monologues. An invisible witness is always present, always watching. That is why he remained at all times a believing Protestant. All the Romantics lived in schools and coteries, and Nietzsche invented something of the sort by imagining that his friends were, as listeners, his intellectual peers. Or again, he created in the remote past and future a circle of intimates, only to complain to them, like Novalis and Hölderlin, of his loneliness. His whole life was filled with the torture and bliss of renunciation, of the desire to surrender and to force his inner nature, to bind himself in same way to something that always proved to be foreign to himself. Yet that is how he developed insight into the soul of epochs and cultures that could never reveal their secrets to self-assured, Classical minds.

This organic pessimism of his being explains the works and the sequence in which they appeared. We who were not able to experience the great flourishing of materialism in the mid-nineteenth century should never cease to be amazed at the audacity that went into the writing, at such a tender age and contrary to the opinions of contemporary philological scholarship, of The Birth of Tragedy. The famous antithesis of Apollo and Dionysus contains much more than even today’s average reader can comprehend. The most significant thing about that essay was not that its author discovered an inner conflict in "Classical" Greece, the Greece that had been the purest manifestation of "humanity" for all others except perhaps Bachofen and Burckhardt. More important still was that even at that age he possessed the superior vision that allowed him to peer into the heart of whole cultures as if they were organic, living individuals. We need only read Mommsen and Curtius to notice the tremendous difference. The others regarded Greece simply as the sum of conditions and events occurring within a certain span of time and space. Our present-day method of looking at history owes its origin, but not its depth, to Romanticism. In Nietzsche’s day, history, as far as Greece and Rome were concerned, was little more than applied philology, and as far as the Western peoples were concerned little more than applied archival research. It invented the idea that history began with written records.

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The liberation from this view came out of the spirit of music. Nietzsche the musician invented the art of feeling one’s way into the style and rhythm of foreign cultures, aside from and often in contradiction to the written documents. But what did written documents matter anyway? With the word "Dionysus" Nietzsche discovered what the archaeologists eventually brought to light thirty years later -- the underworld and the undersoul of Classical culture, and ultimately the spiritual force that underlies all of history. Historical description had become the psychology of history. The eighteenth century and Classicism, including Goethe, believed in "culture" -- a single, true, mental and moral culture as the task of a unified humanity. From the very beginning Nietzsche spoke quite unforcedly of "cultures" as of natural phenomena that simply began at a certain time and place, without reason or goal or whatever an all-too-human interpretation might wish to make of it. "At a certain time" -- the point was made clear from the very first time in Nietzsche’s book that all of these cultures, truths, arts, and attitudes are peculiar to a mode of existence that makes its appearance at one certain time and then disappears for good. The idea that every historical fact is the expression of a spiritual stimulus, that cultures, epochs, estates, and races have a soul like that of individuals -- this was such a great step forward in historical depth-analysis that even the author himself was at the time not aware of its full implications.

However, one of the things the Romantic yearns for is to escape from himself. This yearning, together with the great misfortune of having been born in that particular period in history, caused Nietzsche to serve as a herald for the most banal form of realism in his second book, Human, All-Too-Human. These were the years when Western Rationalism, after abandoning its glorious beginnings with Rousseau, Voltaire, and Lessing, ended as a farce. Darwin’s theories, together with the new faith in matter and energy, became the religion of the big cities; the soul was regarded as a chemical process involving proteins, and the meaning of the universe boiled down to the social ethics of enlightened philistines. Not a single fiber of Nietzsche’s being was party to these developments. He had already given vent to his disgust in the first of his "Untimely Meditations," but the scholar in him envied Chamfort and Vauvenargues and their lighthearted and somewhat cynical manner of treating serious topics in the style of the grand monde. The artist and enthusiast in him was perplexed by the massive sobriety of an Eugen Dühring, which he mistook for true greatness. Priestly character that he was, he proceeded to unmask religion as prejudice. Now the goal of life was knowledge, and the goal of history became for him the development of intelligence. He said this in a tone of ridicule that served to heighten his own passion, precisely because it hurt to do so, and because he suffered from the unrealizable longing to create in the midst of his own time a seductive picture of the future that would contrast with everything he was born into.

While the ecstatic utilitarianism of the Darwinian school was extremely remote from his way of thinking, he took from it certain secret revelations that no true Darwinist ever dreamed of. In The Dawn of Day and The Gay Science there appeared, in addition to a way of looking at things that was meant to be prosaic and even scornful, another technique of examining the world -- a restrained, quiet, admiring attitude that penetrated deeper than any mere realist could ever hope to achieve. Who, before Nietzsche, had ever spoken in the same way of the soul of an age, an estate, a profession, of the priest and the hero, or of man and woman? Who had ever been able to summarize the psychology of whole centuries in an almost metaphysical formula? Who had ever postulated in history, rather than facts and "eternal truths," the types of heroic, suffering, visionary, strong, and diseased life as the actual substance of events as they happen?

That was a wholly new kind of living forms, and could have been discovered only by a born musician with a feeling for rhythm and melody. Following this presentation of the physiognomy of the ages of history, a science of which he was and will always be the creator, he reached to the outer limits of his vision to describe the symbols of a future, his future, which he needed in order to be cleansed of the residue of contemporary thought. In one sublime moment he conjured the image of Eternal Recurrence, as it had been vaguely surmised by German mystics in the Middle Ages -- an endless circling in the eternal void, in the night of immeasurable eons, a way to lose one’s soul utterly in the mysterious depths of the cosmos, regardless of whether such things are scientifically justifiable or not. Into the midst of this vision he placed the Superman and his prophet, Zarathustra, representing the incarnate meaning of human history, in all its brevity, on the planet that was his home. All three of these creations were completely distant, impossible to relate to contemporary conditions. For this very reason they have exerted a curious attraction on every German soul. For in every German soul there is a place where dreams are dreamed of social ideals and a finer future for mankind. Goethe lacked such a corner in his soul, and that is why he never became a truly popular personage. The people sensed this lack, and thus they called him aloof and frivolous. We shall never overcome this reverie of ours; it represents within us the unlived portion of a great past.

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Once having arrived at this height, Nietzsche posed the question as to the value of the world, a question that had accompanied him since childhood. By doing so he brought to an end the period of Western philosophy that had considered the types of knowledge as its central problem. This new question likewise had two answers: a Classical and a Romantic answer or, to put it in the terms of the time, a social and an aristocratic answer. "Life has value to the same degree as it serves the totality" -- that was the answer of the educated Englishmen who had learned at Oxford to distinguish between what a person stated as his considered opinion and what the same person did at decisive moments as a politician or businessman. "Life is all the more valuable, the stronger its instincts are" -- that was the answer given by Nietzsche, whose own life was delicate and easily injured. Be that as it may, for the very reason that he was remote from the active life he was able to grasp its mysteries. His ultimate understanding of real history was that the Will to Power is stronger than all doctrines and principles, and that it has always made and forever will make history, no matter what others may prove or preach against it. He did not concern himself with the conceptual analysis of "will"; to him the most important thing was the image of active, creative, destructive Will in history. The "concept" of will gave way to the "aspect" of will. He did not teach, he simply pointed matters out: "Thus it was, and thus it shall be." Even if theoretical and priestly individuals will it a thousand times differently, the primeval instincts of life will still emerge victorious.

What a difference between Schopenhauer’s world view and this one! And between Nietzsche’s contemporaries, with their sentimental plans for improving the world, and this demonstration of hard facts! Such an accomplishment places this last Romantic thinker at the very pinnacle of his century. In this we are all his pupils, whether we wish to be or not, whether we know him well or not. His vision has already imperceptibly conquered the world. No one writes history any more without seeing things in his light.

He undertook to evaluate life using facts as the sole criteria, and the facts taught that the stronger or weaker will to succeed determines whether life is valuable or worthless, that goodness and success are almost mutually exclusive. His image of the world reached its culmination with a magnificent critique of morality in which, instead of preaching morality, he evaluated the moralities that have arisen in history -- not according to any "true" moral system but according to their success. This was indeed a "revaluation of all values," and although we now know that he misstated the antithesis of Christian and master-morality as a result of his personal suffering during the 1880’s, nonetheless the ultimate antithesis of human existence lay behind his statement; he sought it, and sensed it, and believed that he had captured it with his formula.

If instead of "master morality" we were to say the instinctive practice of men who are determined to act, and instead of "Christian morality" the theoretical ways in which contemplative persons evaluate, then we would have before us the tragic nature of all mankind, whose dominant types will forever misunderstand, combat, and suffer from each other. Deed and thought, reality and ideal, success and redemption, strength and goodness -- these are forces that will never come to terms with one another. Yet in historical reality it is not the ideal, goodness, or morality that prevails -- their kingdom is not of this world -- but rather decisiveness, energy, presence of mind, practical talent. This fact cannot be gotten rid of with laments and moral condemnations. Man is thus, life is thus, history is thus.

Precisely because all action was foreign to him, because he knew only how to think, Nietzsche understood the fundamental essence of the active life better than any great active personality in the world. But the more he understood, the more shyly he withdrew from contact with action. In this way his Romantic destiny reached fulfillment. Under the force of these last insights, the final stage of his career took shape in strict contrast to that of Goethe, who was not foreign to action but who regarded his true calling as poetry, and therefore restrained his actions cheerfully.

Goethe, the Privy Councillor and Minister, the celebrated focal point of European intellect, was able to confess during his last year of life, in the final act of his Faust, that he looked upon his life as having attained fulfillment. "Tarry now, thou art so fair!" -- that is a phrase expressive of the most blissful satiety, spoken at the moment when the active physical work is completed under Faust’s command, to endure now and forevermore. It was the great and final symbol of the Classicism to which this life had been dedicated, and which led from the controlled cultural education of the eighteenth century to the controlled exercise of personal talent of the nineteenth.

Yet one cannot create distance, one can only proclaim it. Just as Faust’s death brought a Classical career to an end, the mind of the loneliest of wanderers vanished with a curse upon his age during those mysterious days in Turin, when he watched the last mists disappear from his image of the world and the highest peaks come ever clear into view. This puzzling final episode of his life is the very reason Nietzsche’s existence has had the stronger influence on the world ever since. Goethe’s life was a full life, and that means that it brought something to completion. Countless Germans will honor Goethe, live with him, and seek his support; but he can never transform them. Nietzsche’s effect is a transformation, for the melody of his vision did not end with his death. The Romantic attitude is eternal; though its form may at times be unified and complete, its thought never is. It will always conquer new areas, either destroying them or changing them radically. Nietzsche’s type of vision will pass on to new friends and enemies, and these in turn will hand it down to other followers and adversaries. Even if someday no one reads his works any longer, his vision will endure and be creative.

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His work is not a part of our past to be enjoyed; it is a task that makes servants of us all. As a task it is independent of his books and their subject matter, and thus a problem of German destiny. In an age that does not tolerate otherworldly ideals and takes vengeance on their authors, when the only thing of recognized value is the kind of ruthless action that Nietzsche baptized with the name of Cesare Borgia, when the morality of the ideologues and world improvers is limited more radically than ever to superfluous and innocuous writing and speech-making -- in such an age, unless we learn to act as real history wants us to act, we will cease to exist as a people. We cannot live without a form of wisdom that does not merely console in difficult situations, but helps one to get out of them. This kind of hard wisdom made its first appearance in German thought with Nietzsche, despite the fact that it was cloaked in thoughts and impressions he had gathered from other sources. To the people most famished for history in all the world, he showed history as it really is. His heritage is the obligation to live history in the same way.

La soumission de l’Allemagne à la repentance coloniale

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La soumission de l’Allemagne à la repentance coloniale

 
 
par Bernard Lugan
Ex: http://www.zejournal.mobi

Outre-Rhin, bien que la parenthèse coloniale n’ait duré que deux décennies, l’exigence de repentance atteint en ce moment des sommets inégalés. Même en France où, pourtant, il n’est pas possible de parler de la colonisation sans avoir préalablement revêtu le cilice de pénitence, l’exigence de soumission au dogme de la culpabilité coloniale n’a pas (encore ?) une telle ampleur.

En Allemagne, il est aujourd’hui impossible, tant elle est longue, de dresser la liste des rues, des places, des squares, des musées, des instituts et des casernes débaptisés au seul motif qu’ils ont un rapport avec la période coloniale ou avec des personnages ayant un lien avec cette dernière. Dirigé par la gauche, le Land de Berlin a même fait de la repentance coloniale un de ses principaux axes politiques, comme si la ville n’avait pas de problèmes plus urgents et plus concrets à régler…

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Ici, il n’est pas un jour sans qu’il soit demandé aux habitants transformés en chiens de Pavlov de l’auto-flagellation, de psalmodier la liste des péchés ultramarins de leurs grands-parents et de « regarder en face les crimes coloniaux allemands ainsi que le génocide des Herero et des Nama » commis en Namibie, l’ancien Sud-Ouest africain.

Or, dans cette affaire, l’acte d’accusation contre l’Allemagne est un montage datant de la Première Guerre mondiale, quand Français et Britanniques qui avaient besoin d’arguments « moraux » pour s’emparer de ses colonies, accusèrent l’Allemagne d’avoir « failli » à son « devoir de civilisation ». Fut alors constitué le dossier à charge de la guerre des Herero réutilisé aujourd’hui par la gauche allemande.

Ce dossier passe totalement sous silence les actes atroces commis par les Herero : familles de colons massacrées, torturées, les femmes dépecées vivantes sous les yeux de leurs enfants, les hommes émasculés puis éventrés... Quand elles tombaient entre leurs mains, et après avoir été violées, les femmes allemandes étaient suspendues par les pieds à un arbre, jambes écartées, puis éventrées et éviscérées, comme des bêtes de boucherie…

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Or, ce furent à ces mêmes arbres, qu’après les avoir jugés, les Allemands pendirent ceux des Herero qui s’étaient rendus coupables de ces meurtres abominables. Mais, alors que nous n’avons que des témoignages concernant les premiers crimes, les exécutions judiciaires furent quant à elles photographiées et ces clichés furent ensuite utilisés par la propagande alliée pour « démontrer » la « culpabilité coloniale allemande ». Aujourd’hui, ce sont ces mêmes photos qui alimentent la campagne de repentance nationale.

Pour la gauche allemande et pour les Églises qui soutiennent naturellement, et même avec gourmandise, son combat, tous ceux, civils et militaires qui participèrent, de près ou de loin, à la guerre des Herero sont donc par définition des criminels.

En premier lieu Paul Emil von Lettow-Vorbeck (1870-1964), légendaire officier colonial qui devrait pourtant figurer au Panthéon des gloires allemandes pour sa campagne de l’est africain (1914-1918) [1].

Or, tout au contraire, bien qu’il ait été un adversaire du III° Reich, présenté aujourd’hui comme l’archétype du « criminel colonial », il est donc devenu une des principales cibles de ce politiquement correct qui achève d’émasculer une Allemagne étouffée sous ses complexes. Les rues et les casernes von Lettow-Vorbeck sont ainsi débaptisées pour recevoir les noms de déserteurs ou de militants de gauche, comme à Brême, à Bad Segeberg, à Hambourg-Jenfeld et à Leer. Quant au conseil municipal de Sarrelouis, sa ville natale, il s’est déshonoré en débaptisant l’avenue qui portait son nom et en lui retirant la citoyenneté d’honneur de la ville. Il en fut de même à Wuppertal, Brême, Cuxhaven, Mönchenglabach, Halle, Radolfzell et même à Graz, en Autriche. Des ouvrages indigents et d’une rare malhonnêteté intellectuelle sont également publiés afin de salir sa mémoire.

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Mais, face au Mythe, que pèsent les pelotes fécales roulées par les bousiers de la repentance ? Ces derniers pourront toujours débaptiser, interdire, détruire, condamner, vociférer et finalement trépigner. Ils ne parviendront jamais à faire oublier la dévotion que les Askaris vouaient au général Paul von Lettow-Vorbeck, un chef qu’ils admiraient et auquel ils avaient donné, avec amour et respect, le nom de « Bwana mukubwa ya akili mingi » (le grand homme qui peut tout).

Ils ne pourront également jamais, ces coprophages, empêcher les jeunes européens rebelles de chanter le Heia Safari [2] durant leurs randonnées et lors de leurs veillées. Cet hymne à la liberté et aux grands espaces qui résonne encore du Kilimandjaro à la Rufidji porte, avec les échos lointains des fifres et des caisses plates, les rêves d’une Europe en dormition dont le réveil sera douloureux aux hypnotiseurs vicieux qui pensaient la tenir définitivement en leur pouvoir…

Notes:

[1] Voir à ce sujet ma biographie du général von Lettow-Vorbeck intitulée « Heia Safari ! Du Kilimandjaro auxcombats de Berlin (1914-1920) ».

[2] En français « La petite piste ». Mélodie composée à la veille du premier conflit mondial par Robert Götz, également l’auteur du très célèbre Wildgänse (Les Oies sauvages). Dans mon livre, Heia Safari, je retrace l’origine de ce chant et je donne ses paroles en swahili, telles que les chantaient les askaris du général von Lettow-Vorbeck.

Nemrod et la Tour de Babel

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Nemrod et la Tour de Babel

 
Réflexions autour de l'épisode biblique de la tour de Babel et du personnage de Nemrod qui en dit long sur les sociétés humaines arrivées en fin de cycle.
 
 

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lundi, 24 février 2020

A Renaissance Human in the Digital Age

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A Renaissance Human in the Digital Age

Ex: https://medium.com

THE MAIN PROBLEMS OF MODERN HUMAN

I want to start with the question: “Is it possible to become Renaissance Man in the Digital Age?»

The problem of modern human living in the era of Big Data is that he is drowning in the flow of information. The human of Antiquity, the Middle Ages, the Renaissance, had a particular amount of knowledge. Today, we can’t even determine what we need to know. Most often, this is determined by our profession and the direction of our activity. Given the fact that the modern world is still dominated by the tendency to narrow specialization, we can come to disappointing conclusions. A modern human needs to be able to find in a massive flow of unstructured information, the one that will serve for its comprehensive and harmonious development.

Nowadays, only a few people know how to work with information. It is not chaotic to absorb, not to be satisfied with an incomplete acquaintance, but to be selective, to show the art of separating important from secondary, necessary from casual. There are two opposite approaches to knowledge: simple accumulation of information and transformation by knowledge. These two approaches are based on two principles — forma formanta and forma informanta. The first is inherent in a person initially. The forma formanta action is directed from the center to the periphery. We can say that this is the inner Logos or axis of the soul. This principle conditions all internal transformations that we experience. Forma formanta is related to “vertical knowledge”. Forma informanta is an external force that acts from the periphery to the center. It determines all other people’s influences (especially the importance of society). This is “horizontal knowledge”. I realized very early on that our entire educational system is based on forma informanta. In educational institutions, we are informed at best, but we are not formed in any way. In the twenty-first century, we have to synthesize these two principles.

There are other problems faced by the modern human, who can no longer imagine his life without digital assistants. According to research conducted by cognitive neurobiologists, people barely read texts. They don’t read anymore; they just scan them. Scattered attention, fragmentary perception of information, search for keywords, “surfing” rather than reading — this is the result. Of course, many people have decided to abandon paper books altogether and wholly switched to electronic ones. The skill of reading is increasingly lost. It is no secret that many people are no longer able to read Hesse’s “The Glass Bead Game “, much less Schelling’s” Philosophy of mythology”. How can we counter the trend outlined here? One of the ways today is called slow read. For this purpose, reading groups are created all over the world. They allow you to experience time differently and reopen text that is not scanned but is slowly read, parsed, discussed, and commented on.

41tNS4DFN8L._SX335_BO1,204,203,200_.jpgAnother problem with a modern human is poor memory. Why remember something if you can find all the information on the Internet? Xenophon reports that Athenian politician and general Nicias forced his son Niceratus to memorize by heart the works of Homer. Now no one even tries to set such a task for themselves. It has reached the point that today not everyone is also able to finish reading the epic of Homer to the end. Alberto Manguel writes in “Homer’s The Iliad and The Odyssey: A Biography” that memory training in the Byzantine educational system was given considerable attention: after several years of practice, students had to know the Iliad by heart.

CREATION A WORLDVIEW

Creation a worldview is a complex and lengthy process. We often meet people who do not have any worldview. At best, they have a particular set of opinions (in most cases, not their own) and incomplete knowledge, based on which they draw conclusions and make decisions. If there is no worldview, then there is no internal axis, center, or reference point around which a separate world is formed. A person “just lives”, unaware of the values, views, and desires imposed on him. The inability to cope with the massive flow of information that today threatens to wash away any truth from the face of the earth leads it to a chaotic capture, senseless accumulation. He does not know how to choose the most important thing from this inexhaustible stream. If he had a worldview, a particular coordinate system, then approaching the bookshelves or looking at a series of links and headlines in his news feed, a person would instantly make the right decision: “take” or “put aside”. To build your worldview, you need to be a good architect.

In the process of forming ourselves, we always lose sight of the fact that human is a process, as the act of creation. It is in constant development and transformation. There is an ontological gap between the human of Antiquity and the human of the Middle ages. And those who naively believe that humans are always the same, that we are the same today as we were hundreds of years ago, make an unforgivable mistake. When we talk about the “ancient Greek,” “medieval European,” “Renaissance human,” “Modern human,” “postmodern individual,” we are talking about entirely different and, I would venture to say more radically, diametrically different human types. Changing paradigms always means a fundamental change that can be correlated with a “re-creation of the world.” Everything changes the ontological status of a human, his view of life, death and the afterlife, time and space, the divine; his ideals, his values, etc. change. The understanding of these changes dictates the division into historical periods.

41k4XMEZqKL._SX326_BO1,204,203,200_.jpgJoel Barker, in his book “Paradigms: Business of Discovering the Future”, emphasizes that he does not agree with Thomas Kuhn, who believed that paradigms exist only in science. I always emphasize that I use the word “paradigm” without any reference to Kuhn’s paradigm theory, and take its original meaning (from Greek. παράδειγμα, “example, model, sample”). So, Barker is convinced that the new paradigm comes sooner than there is a need for it. The paradigm is always ahead of demand. And, of course, the apparent reaction to this is rejection. Who is changing the paradigm, according to Barker? It’s always an outsider. The one who breaks the rules turns them — at the same time improving the world. “What is defined as impossible today is impossible only in the context of present paradigms,” says Barker. Let’s put the question again: “is it Possible to become Renaissance human in the digital age? This is not possible only in the context of the old paradigm. But that paradigm could disappear by tomorrow.

PARADIGM SHIFT: A REVOLUTION IN HUMAN THINKING

The type of personality that appeared in the pre-Socratic period delighted Friedrich Nietzsche, who wrote about the Republic of Geniuses, where the philosopher was a magician, a king, and a priest. This type of personality will still manifest itself in the Middle ages — in the person of the philosopher, scientist, and theologian Albert the Great (Doctor Universalis), the Arab scientist Ḥasan Ibn al-Haytham and the philosopher and naturalist Roger Bacon. And in the Renaissance — as homo univeralis, the most striking embodiment of which will be Leonardo da Vinci: painter, sculptor, architect, inventor, musician, writer, and scientist, ahead of his time. Then it will be replaced by another type-a a scientist of narrow specialization. It’s no longer a microcosm that reflects the entire universe (macrocosm). The world becomes too vast for him, so the specialist decides to confine himself to a small island, where he spends the rest of his days in the eternal scientific studies, to come to results that can easily be refuted by a new generation of such scientists. E. R. Dodds wrote:

The sort of specialisation we have today was quite unknown to Greek science at any period, and some of the greatest names at all periods are those of nonspecialists, as may be seen if you be seen if you look at a list of the works of Theophrastus or Eratosthenes, Posidonius, Galen, or Ptolemy.

In the age of Antiquity, the idea of a perfect human necessarily included the concept of “kalokagathos” (Ancient Greek: καλὸς κἀγαθός). It was a symbol of the harmonious union of external and internal virtues. Another idea that will become the basis of the system of classical education — “Paideia” (παιδεία), that is, the formation of a holistic personality, it was closely related to “kalokagathos.” The harmonious system of ancient (classical) education laid the foundation for the future educational system of Europe.

For the ancient Greeks, the human was not just an individual but an idea. And this idea included all stages of the spiritual and intellectual development of society.

In the Middle Ages, the concept of the ideal human changes significantly, and in place of harmony between external and internal comes the realization of the original sinfulness of the human being; between God and human, an abyss appears, forcing the latter to take the path of redemption to restore the lost harmony. The flesh begins to be thought of as sinful and despicable, the earthly world as a place that must to reject and devote all your thoughts to the service of God. Knowledge gives way to faith. An ascetic monk takes the place of the ancient Greek. The fundamental idea of” imitating God” remains unchanged, only God and the nature of the imitation itself change. If the ancient Greeks imitated the Olympian gods and heroes, the medieval human imitated Christ. The changes in human perception of the world during the transition from Antiquity to the Middle Ages are so radical that at the time we are talking not just about two different ideas about the “perfect human”, but also about two different ontological levels: “the level of the Mystery” and “the level of baptized”. In both cases, the person experienced profound changes, after which his life was strictly divided into “before” and “after”. It is no coincidence that Hans Sedlmayr begins the periodization of Western culture from the Middle ages (skipping Antiquity) — it was another world, another human, another ideal, another look at the choice of life, a different view of death. And another way of looking at philosophy. For a medieval human, philosophy was “the handmaiden of theology.”

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Philosophia et septem artes liberales, the seven liberal arts

It was in the middle ages that the first universities began to appear, which immediately acquired the status of centers of philosophy and culture, science, and education. As a rule, the medieval University consisted of three higher faculties: theology, medicine, and law. Before entering one of these faculties, the student was trained at the artistic (preparatory) faculty, where he studied seven Liberal arts. And only after receiving the title of bachelor or master, he had the right to enter one of the three faculties, were at the end of the training, he won the title of doctor of law, medicine or theology. The seven Liberal arts were divided into two cycles: trivium (grammar, dialectics (logic), rhetoric) and quadrivium (arithmetic, geometry, astronomy, music, or harmonica). Despite the fact that the origins of the seven Liberal arts go back to the Hellenistic era (the Sophist Hippias), in the Middle ages this system was in the service of religion: grammar was intended for the interpretation of Church books, dialectics was used for polemics with heretics, rhetoric was necessary as a tool for creating religious sermons, etc.

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Only in the Renaissance age (which was primarily the Renaissance of Antiquity) does the medieval idea of a sinful being give way to the idea of homo universalis, a harmonious and holistic personality; inevitably this means a return to the fundamental principles of the Ancient idea of the perfect human — “kalokagathos”, “paideia”, “arete”. After Thomas Aquinas and Saint Augustine of Hippo come to Georgius Gemistus, Marsilio Ficino and Pico Della Mirandola. Classical education, based on the study of ancient languages as a way to comprehend the cultural heritage of Antiquity, was founded in this era. As the Russian poet and playwright Vyacheslav Ivanovich Ivanov rightly remarked: “European thought constantly and naturally returns for new stimuli to the genius of Greece.”

In the Renaissance, a paradigm shift occurs again: appear is a gap between the medieval worldview and the worldview of the Renaissance human. The same gap to separate the person of the Renaissance from the individual of the New time when there was a break with the classical model of education. One of the embodiments of the anti-classical approach to education was the French sociologist Jean Fourastie (1909–1990), who insisted that we should discard the classical humanitarian culture and focus on the new ideal of an educated person — a specialist of a narrow profile who has the ability to quickly adapt to the constantly changing realities of the modern world. This specialist was not required to have a high level of culture since the range of his tasks was reduced to the effective service of the world, the values of which were now determined not by homo universalis, but by homo economicus.

REINVENTION OF HUMAN

Today it is common to talk about the collapse of humanism, but we still use the word “humanitarian” out of habit. What is humanitas, and does the range of modern Humanities correspond to its original purpose? Why do we observe how the very “idea of human” is lost? “The Fatigue from human”, “the overthrow of the human”, “the destruction of the human”, “the disappearance of the human” arise in all spheres of our existence.

The latest trends in modern thought reduce a person to the level of an object, depriving him of his prior ontological status. A toothpick and a Buddhist monk, a Hummer and a Heidegger, a nail file, and a talented painter are placed on the same line. One is equal to the other. Object-oriented thinking that puts a THING at the center of being. Metaphysics of things. Being is no longer hierarchical. The same tendency can be found in modern theater and in contemporary painting, which is looking for an opportunity to free themselves from a human finally. Objects and things are increasingly taking the place of the human. The human himself, sometimes installed in work, turns into an object. The human image “disintegrates”, is dismembered, disassembled into parts, like a mechanism. In painting, there has long been a fragmentation of the human image (from distortion of proportions and emphasis on bodily ugliness to the dismemberment of the body). At Norwegian artist Odd Nerdrum, the focus on painful and damaged bodies becomes constant. American artist and sculptor Sarah Sitkin is engaged in splitting the human image, deliberately distorting it. We can see the same thing in the works of other artists: Marcello Nitti, Radu Belchin, Christian Zucconi, Berlinde de Bruyckere, Emil Alzamora, João Figueiredo.

The human is almost banished. But in his place did not come, neither a Superman nor a Godman. Rare attempts to put a different anthropological formation in the position of the disappearing human can be noticed even among European symbolists: Jean Delville, Simeon Solomon, Fernand Khnopff, Emile Fabry, and others. But this was instead a warning of the” new human,” his barely perceptible breath, a secret call. Science fiction writers (for example, Herbert Wells) managed to anticipate the phenomenon of its complete opposite — Digital Human. Who is he, this child of the network century, communicating through tags and tweets — a harbinger of the end of humanity or the Creator of a new “Digital God” — Artificial Intelligence? All attempts by inhumanists, speculative realists, “space pessimists”, etc. to solve the problem of “Lost Centre” and learn to think beyond the limits of human are initially doomed to failure. They do not create breakthroughs in the field of thought; all they do is reveal the symptoms of a dangerous disease called “death of the idea of human”.

I am convinced that the crisis of the Humanities is connected with the plight of the “idea of the human.” And only a return to the “idea of human”, to the spiritual dimension of human existence, but at a new stage, can lead to the revival of the Humanities. In this and only in this case will humanitas regain its original meaning. However, it is not enough just to go back to the old definition of human, today we have to “reinvention of human”. Redefine its meaning, redefine its purpose and place in the world, and understand its advantages over Artificial Intelligence.

9780520288133.jpgTobias Rees is the founding Director of the Institute’s Transformations of the Human Program. He suggests that fields such as Artificial Intelligence and synthetic biology should be seen as philosophical and artistic laboratories where new concepts of human, politics, understanding of nature, and technology are formed. What was traditionally associated with the main tasks of the Humanities, which were centered on human, has now moved to the fields of natural and technical sciences. The Humanities have stopped answering the question: “What is a human?” But this is the fundamental and critical issue today. Specialists who are closed within the boundaries of their disciplines are not able to answer it. Tobias Rees sends philosophers and artists to the world’s largest corporations to work with engineers and technologists to form a new idea of the human.

At the same time, we must clearly understand that rethinking the idea of the human will undoubtedly entail a rethinking of the entire corpus of Humanities. What is it like to be a human being in the age of intelligent machines? What is the fundamental advantage of a human? What will never, under any circumstances, be impossible to automate, calculate, and turn into Algorithms? Futurologist Gerd Leonhard, contrary to Yuval Harari, who is obsessed with Algorithms, puts forward the idea of androrithms, that is, specific non-enumerable attributes that make us humans. These attributes are exclusively human and can never be assigned by a machine. To androrithms, Leonhard includes empathy, intuition, compassion, emotional intelligence, imagination, and Dasein (Heidegger). Leonhard writes:

«Leonardo Da Vinci’s ‘Vitruvian Man’ depicted the ideal proportions of the human body — maybe now we need a ‘neoluvian man’ describing the future relationship of humans and technology?».

In the article “2020 Will Bring A New Renaissance: Humanity Over Technology”, Gerd Leonhard argues that we will soon witness a resurgence of humanism and the Humanities. Undoubtedly, this trend is gradually gaining influence in the Western world. It is enough to read the book “Sensemaking: The Power of the Humanities in the Age of the Algorithm” by Christian Madsbjerg to see how modern world leaders and corporate heads are rediscovering the Humanities and applying its methods to solve critical problems in their industry. Madsbjerg himself is a well-known business consulting specialist and founder of ReD Associates. He founded a consulting company when he was only 22 years old and developed an innovative approach to business thinking (his company specializes in strategic consulting based on the foundation of the Humanities). He is a genuine Polymath that has a dominant intellectual (theoretical and practical) foundation in the field of philosophy, Ethnography, anthropology, sociology, literary studies, history, discursive analysis, business management, etc.

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The ‘Neoluvian’ Man

You might be surprised to find that more than a third of Fortune 500 CEOs have degrees in the Humanities. The illusory idea that only a narrow specialization in STEM will give us a guarantee of building a successful career is a thing of the past. Even the Israeli historian Yuval Harari was forced to admit that the development of AI can displace many people from the labor market. Still, at the same time, there will be new jobs for philosophers. It is their skills and knowledge that will suddenly be in high demand. And American billionaire Mark Cuban believes that “In 10 years, a liberal arts degree in philosophy will be worth more than a traditional programming degree.”

We live in the age of Big Data, but we need to remember that Big Data will never replace Big Ideas. It is the absence of Big Ideas that can be considered the main characteristic of the modern era. Big Ideas always carry transformational potential, imply radical transformations, and those who dare to express them, as a rule, are tested by distrust on the part of a society that is not ready for changes. But only these people have had and will continue to have an impact on the course of human history — Renaissance human, polymath — the Big Idea that underlies the new paradigm of thinking. If you need to define this type of thinking, the most appropriate epithet for it is “integrative”. Roger Martin limits it’s as “the ability to face constructively the tension of opposing ideas and, instead of choosing one at the expense of the other, generate a creative resolution of the tension in the form of a new idea that contains elements of the opposing ideas but is superior to each.” Most people are used to thinking in the “or-or” mode; it is difficult for them to keep two mutually exclusive ideas in their heads at the same time and, without throwing either of them away, to generate a new one (and this process involves intelligence, intuition and every time a unique human experience).

They also find it challenging to create a synthesis of knowledge and skills from different disciplines, and the implementation of integration of various industries seems almost fantastic to them.

I want to emphasize that this is not just about one type of thinking. It is a critical meta-skill that is a human advantage and will never be mastered by a machine, despite the development that Artificial Intelligence will soon achieve.

Strictly speaking, today, we can distinguish three main types of thinking: algorithmic (machine), traditional and integrative (holistic). In the age of Algorithms, only integrative thinking can withstand the battle with AI. The struggle is not just for resources, power, or influence, but for a human.

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Russian philosopher, cultural scientist, a specialist in Antiquity, curator of Janus Academy.

Dekonstruktion, Fragmentierung und Schizophrenie – zur Psychopathologie des Genderwahnes

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Dekonstruktion, Fragmentierung und Schizophrenie – zur Psychopathologie des Genderwahnes

Wie Genderwahn und Schizophrenie Hand in Hand gehen

Einzelne Menschen können psychisch erkranken. Es gibt aber auch soziale Pathologien. Diese können Analogien und Verwandtschaften mit den Gesetzmäßigkeiten und Verwandtschaften des Individuellen haben.[1]

So ist  dem Psychotherapeuten Prof. Stavros Mentzos (1930-2015) die bemerkenswerte Korrespondenz zwischen der Selbst-Fragmentierung in der Psychose und der Dezentrierung und Inkonsistenz in der Postmoderne aufgefallen. Unter Postmoderne versteht Mentzos den Oberbegriff auf über diejenigen philosophischen Strömungen, die unter anderem als Dekonstruktivismus und Genderismus in bestimmten Milieus an Boden gewinnen. Eine strukturelle Homologie zwischen der Fragmentierung des Ichs in der Schizophrenie und der Dekonstruktion sozialer Zusammenhänge wie im Genderismus ist unübersehbar. Sie wirft die Frage nach der Psychopathologie eines Teils unserer Gesellschaft auf.

Beim schizophrenen Menschen fragmentiert die basale Persönlichkeit sich, gerade so wie wir in der Gesellschaft unserer Abspaltungen und Fragmentierungen antagonistischer Milieus beobachten können. Wenn die Psychatrie die Entpersönlichung des Schizophrenen mit dem Bild einer in viele Sandkörner zerfließenden Sandburg beschreibt, erleben wir einen analogen Verlust der gesamtgesellschaftlichen Bindungskräfte: Früher gemeinschaftliche Sinnstiftungen, Wertüberzeugungen und Identitäten rinnen uns wie Sand durch die Finger.

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Die Persönlichkeit des Schizophrenen zerbricht in Fragmente, die sich abspalten.
(Gemälde des Künstlers Alen Kopera)

Kranke Gesellschaft?

Im engeren Sinne kann nur eine Person erkranken, keine Gesellschaft.[2] Die Zerfallserscheinungen der Psyche in der Schizophrenie haben aber ihre Entsprechung in gesellschaftlichen Auflösungserscheinungen. Diese bestehen in einem drastischen Verlust der sozialen Gestaltwahrnehmung. Ideologien wie der Genderismus halten soziale Einheiten wie Familien und Völker nicht für reale Gegebenheiten. Diese beruhten lediglich auf Konventionen und seien konstruiert, vermutlich, um bestimmte Minderheiten zu unterdrücken. Selbst die Existenz zweier verschiedener Geschlechter wird geleugnet. Wer so denkt, muß sich die Frage nach seiner geistigen Gesundheit gefallen lassen.

Der Psychiater Burkhard Voß hat in seinem 2015 erschienenen Buch “Deutschland auf dem Weg in die Anstalt” das Thema aufgegriffen und stellt fest:

„Die Auflösungsprozesse innerhalb der schizophrenen Psychose und innerhalb der postmodernen Gesellschaft sind nicht nur nahezu deckungsgleich, sondern sie haben auch die gleichen schwerwiegenden Folgen“[3]

Burkhard VOß, Deutschland auf dem Weg in die Anstalt, Münster 2015, S. 135.

Psychiater sprechen eine für Laien oft schwer verständliche Fachsprache, ebenso wie Philosophen und Politologen ihre eigenen Fachbegriffe haben. Die Begrifflichkeien der verschiedenen Wissenschaften decken sich nicht. Darum haben Philosophie und Psychiatrie bisher nicht genug voneinander Kenntnis genommen. Dem soll hier abgeholfen werden.

Der 2015 verstorbene Psychiater Prof. Mentzos hat die Frage aufgeworfen:

“Sind vielleicht diese beschriebenen Gestaltähnlichkeiten und Analogien zwischen psychotischen und Borderline-Vorgängen und bestimmten geschichtlichen oder gesellschaftlichen Prozessen bloß interessant, aber eigentlich nur zufällig, oder weisen sie doch auf eine dahinterstehende, ebenfalls analoge Dynamik oder Problematik oder sogar auf eine gemeinsame Ursache hin?”[4]

Stavros MENTZOS, Die bemerkenswerte Korrespondenz zwischen der Selbst-Fragmentierung in der Psychose und der Dezentrierung und Inkonsistenz in der Postmoderne, in: Günter Lempa und Elisabeth Troje (Hrg.), Gesellschaft und Psychose, Göttingen 2002, S.50-67 (58).

Diese Frage läßt sich beantworten, wenn man die strukturellen und funktionalen Parallelen zwischen postmoderner Philosophie und Symptomen psychischer Erkrankungen wie Borderline und Schizophrenie genauer betrachtet.

Fragmentierung und Auflösung der Person in der Schizophrenie

Anke Engel, eine der zentralen Figuren der „Queer“-Bewegung in Deutschland, führte einen Verein an, dem Susanne Baer ihr GenderKompetenzZentrum übergeben hat. Sie bezieht sich in ihrer Dissertation auf Judith Butler, die Nestorin des Genderismus. Man müsse die „Binarität“, also die Zweigeschlechtlichkeit, „denaturalisieren“, indem man „auf die Konstruiertheit und Kontingenz geschlechtlicher und sexueller Identitäten“ verweist.

»Ziel dieser Arbeit ist es, VerUneindeutigung und Destabilisierung als Strategien in einem zu entwickelnden Konzept der Repräsentationspolitiken plausibel zu machen. Es geht nicht darum, Ambiguität, Instablität und Kontingenz als Abbild oder Annäherung an eine geschlechtliche „Wahrheit“ zu behaupten, sondern VerUneinheitlichung und Destabilisierung als kontextuelle Praktiken in historisch und kulturell spezifischen Machtverhältnissen vorzustellen.«

Anke Engel, Wider, die Eindeutigkeit, 2002

Wie das praktisch funktionieren soll, schilderte René Pfister (im SPIEGEL 1/2007) am Beispiel eines Vereins “Dissens” für eine „aktive Patriarchatskritik”:

»So spielten Dissens-Mitarbeiter bei einer Projektwoche mit Jungs in Marzahn einen “Vorurteilswettbewerb”, an dessen Ende die Erkenntnis stehen sollte, daß sich Männer und Frauen viel weniger unterscheiden als gedacht. Es entspann sich eine heftige Debatte, ob Mädchen im Stehen pinkeln und Jungs Gefühle zeigen können, Sätze flogen hin und her. Am Ende warfen die beiden Dissens-Leute einem besonders selbstbewußten Jungen vor, “daß er eine Scheide habe und nur so tue, als sei er ein Junge”, so steht es im Protokoll.

Einem Teenager die Existenz des Geschlechtsteils abzusprechen ist ein ziemlich verwirrender Anwurf, aber das nahmen die Dissens-Leute in Kauf, ihnen ging es um die “Zerstörung von Identitäten”, wie sie schreiben. Das Ziel einer “nichtidentitären Jungenarbeit” sei “nicht der andere Junge, sondern gar kein Junge.“«.

René Pfister (im SPIEGEL 1/2007)

Hier ist Zerstörung der angeborenen Geschlechtsidentität eine aktiv induzierte Depersonalisation. Phänomene einer solchen Selbstentfremdung, also ein Sich-selbst-Fremdwerden im weiteren Sinn, sind charakteristisch für psychische Krankheiten.[5] Zu ihnen zählen die Borderline-Störung und schlimmstenfalls die Schizophrenie. Darüber schreibt der Psychiater Thomas Fuchs:

“Für ein Verständnis dieser Erkrankung, das über die bloße Symptombeschreibung hinausgeht, ist daher eine philosophisch  fundierte  Psychopathologie  unabdingbar.  Umgekehrt  müssen  die  schizophrenen Störungen des Selbsterlebens für jede Philosophie der Subjektivität von zentralem Interesse sein, die ihre Konzepte von Selbstbewußtsein, Personalität oder Intersubjektivität an empirischen Phänomenen überprüfen will.
Die zentrale Rolle des Selbsterlebens für die schizophrenen Psychosen war von Psychiatern bereits zu Beginn des 20. Jahrhunderts betont worden. Kraepelin (1913, 668) charakterisierte die Schizophrenie als „eigenartige Zerstörung des inneren Zusammenhanges der psychischen Persönlichkeit“  und  als  „Zersplitterung  des  Bewußtseins“  („Orchester  ohne  Dirigent“). Bleuler, der der Krankheit den heutigen Namen gab, sah ihre „[…] elementarsten Störungen in  einer  mangelhaften  Einheit,  in  einer  Zersplitterung  und Aufspaltung  des  Denkens,  Fühlens und Wollens und des subjektiven Gefühles der Persönlichkeit“ (Bleuler 1983, 411).”

Thomas Fuchs, Selbst und Schizophrenie, DZPhil, Akademie Verlag, 60 (2012) 6, 887.

Auf solche Störungen des Selbsterlebens deutet es hin, wenn jemand ernsthaft bestreitet, es gebe objektiv Männer und Frauen, Familie oder Völker. Seine Meinung über andere widerspiegelt nämlich sein eigenes Selbsterleben: Er schließt von sich auf andere. Sein basales Selbsterleben dürfte gestört sein:

“Die phänomenologisch orientierte Psychopathologie der letzten Jahrzehnte hat diese Konzepte durch subtile Analysen des basalen, präreflexiven Selbst- und Welterlebens erweitert, das bei den Patienten meist schon vor dem Ausbruch der Krankheit in der akuten Psychose tiefgreifend verändert ist (Blankenburg 1971, Saß u. Parnas 2003, Stanghellini 2004, Fuchs 2000, 2005). Entscheidend für das Verständnis der Erkrankung ist demnach aus phänomenologischer  Sicht  weniger  die  so  genannte  „produktive“  Symptomatik  der  akuten  Phase  (das heißt Wahnideen und Halluzinationen) als vielmehr die schleichende Aushöhlung des leiblichen Selbsterlebens, Wahrnehmens und Handelns, die in unauffälligen Vorstadien häufig bis in die Kindheit der Patienten zurückreicht.”[6]

Fuchs S.888

Die Psychiatrie unterscheidet das basale Selbsterleben der eigenen Person vom darauf aufbauenden Selbstkonzept. Dieses Selbstkonzept bildet das kleine Kind

“durch die Fähigkeit, andere als intentionale Agenten zu verstehen und ihre Perspektive nachzuvollziehen (Perspektivenübernahme); –    durch ein höherstufiges Bewußtsein der eigenen Zustände und Erlebnisse (introspektives oder reflexives Selbstbewußtsein); –    des weiteren durch die Fähigkeit, die eigenen Erfahrungen zu verbalisieren und zu kohärenten Geschichten zu verknüpfen (narrative Identität); –    schließlich  durch  ein  begriffliches  und  autobiographisches  Wissen  von  sich  selbst.”[7]

Fuchs S.890

Schizophrenie ist eine tiefgreifende Störung des basalen Selbsterlebens. Nur  ein  Wesen  mit  einem  primären  Selbsterleben  ist  in  der  Lage,  sich selbst  auch  aus  der  Sicht  der  anderen  zu  sehen,  Geschichten  von  sich  zu  erzählen  und  ein Selbstkonzept zu entwickeln. Dieses Selbstkonzept bildet seine Identität in Abgrenzung zu anderen Personen. Analog dazu gibt es Selbstkonzepte ganzer Familien und Völker. Das Selbstkonzept der Deutschen ist zur Zeit hart umkämpft.

Bei einer basalen Störung des individuellen Selbsterlebens löst sich das Selbstkonzept auf:

“Es kommt zu einer Entfremdung selbstverständlicher Handlungsvollzüge und Wahrnehmungen, die sich auch als pathologische Explikation bezeichnen läßt (Fuchs 2001, 2011).   Die Explikation des Selbstverständlichen ist an sich eine häufige Erfahrung. Wenn man eine Wahrnehmungsgestalt in ihre Einzelelemente auflöst, also diese Elemente expliziert, sieht man sozusagen den Wald vor lauter Bäumen nicht mehr. Betrachtet man zum Beispiel die Merkmale eines Gesichts einzeln oder aus zu großer Nähe, so geht die Wahrnehmung des Gesichtsausdrucks  insgesamt  verloren. “[8]

Fuchs S.692

Die gestörte Gestaltwahrnehmung, bei der man vor lauter Bäumen den Wald nicht sieht, ist auch eines der zentralen Merkmale des philosophischen Dekonstruktivismus. Die Parellelen sind drastisch:

“In der Wahrnehmung manifestiert sich die Entfremdung der Leiblichkeit in einer Störung der  Fähigkeit,  vertraute  Gestalten  und  Muster  zu  erkennen,  verbunden  mit  einer  Fragmentierung des Wahrgenommenen und einer Überfülle von Details. Auch hier kommt es also zu einer pathologischen Explikation: […]
Die Auflösung von Gestaltzusammenhängen resultiert in einem Verlust vertrauter Bedeutsamkeiten und führt so zu einer grundlegenden Fragwürdigkeit der wahrgenommenen Welt.”[9]

Fuchs S.694

Der Betroffene verliert auch das Gefühl für grundlegende soziale Sinnbezüge:

“Die  Grundstörung  der  Schizophrenie  läßt  sich  als  eine  Schwächung  des  basalen  Selbstgewahrseins beschreiben, die zunächst das präreflexive, selbstverständliche In-der-Welt-Sein erfaßt. […] Integrale Wahrnehmungsgestalten lösen sich auf, störende Details treten in den Vordergrund, und die wahrgenommene Welt verliert zunehmend ihre vertrauten Sinnbezüge. Schließlich werden auch die Beziehungen zu den anderen fragwürdig, und die fraglose Teilnahme an der gemeinsamen Lebenswelt und ihrem „Common Sense“ mißlingt.

Fuchs a.a.O.

Zu diesem Common Sense gehört zentrale die Wahrnehmung der übrigen Menschen, sozialen Gemeinschaften wie einer Familie oder einem Volk anzugehören.

382x215xbrain-and-identity-1920x1080.jpg.pagespeed.ic.03_hogascF.jpg

Fragmentierung und Auflösung sozialer Einheiten im Dekonstruktivismus

Wie sich die einzelne Person in der Schizophrenie auflöst, fragmentiert und teile von sich abspaltet, lösen sich gesellschaftliche Zusammenhänge im Dekonstruktivismus auf. Der Zusammenhalt geht durch Fragmentierung verloren. Teile spalten sich ab. Intrasystemische Konflikte werden durch Schuldzuweisungen nach außen, durch Schuldzuweisung und Kultivierung von Feindbildern gelindert.[10] Wie ein kranker Einzelner quasi einen Teil seiner Persönlichkeit von sich abspaltet, um die Integrität des basalen Selbst zu retten, vermag die Gesellschaft insgesamt emnen ihrer Teile Schuld zuzusprechen und ihn abzuspalten, zum Beispiel indem jener Teil zu Ketzern, Parias, Untermenschen oder Nazis erklärt wird.

Was in einer funktionierenden Gesellschaft als unverzichtbarer Funktionsteil des Ganzen galt, wird dekonstruiert. Statt einer Synthese gesellschaftlicher Teile findet eine „Zertrümmerung durch Angriffe“ statt, die

„alles, was vorher als organisiertes Ganzes gedacht werden konnte (Person, Geschichte, Natur) in Teile oder Fragmente, die nicht mehr in notwendigen Beziehungen zueinander standen,“[11]

Panajotis KONDYLIS, Der Niedergang der bürgerlichen Denk- und Lebensform, Weinheim 1991, S.66 f.

verwandelt. Der Philosoph Kondylis (1943-1998) erklärt,

„Während in der bürgerlichen Harmonievorstellung der Teil immer Teil des Ganzen war und von dieser Beziehung zum ganzen lebte, welches seinerseits erst durch den Vielfalt und den Reichtum seiner Teile zum wahren Ganzen wurde, verselbständigen sich nun der Teil und das Fragment.“[12]

Kondylis S.67

Die Fragmentierung des Wahrgenommenen und die Überfülle von Details beim Schizophrenen haben wir oben schon erläutert. Die analoge Erscheinung tritt gesellschaftlich auf unter Geltung der analytischen Denkfigur, die dem Dekonstruktivismus zugrundeliegt:

„Eine Einzelheit, ein isoliertes Ereignis, ein Augenblick, ein Eindruck werden zu würdigen Gegenständen gründlicher Betrachtung, wobei man immer wniger nach dem notwendigen Einordnungsrahmen und immer mehr nach der ureignen Tiefe und Bedeutung des jeweiligen Teils oder Fragmnts fragt oder wenigstens be ihm verweilt, selbst wenn man den Verlust des Ganzen beklagt.
Die Auflösung der bürgerlichen Normenhierarchie […] gestattete es zudem, daß Gegensätze, die früher als unüberbrückbar empfunden wurden (Gutes und Böses, Schönes und Häßliches, Rationales und Irrationales, Notwendiges und Zufälliges, Männliches und Weibliches etc.) nun als Sprosse aus derselben Einen Wurzel betrachtet werden konnten.“[13]

Kondylis S.67

So verfällt der Blick für das Prägende jeder sozialen Gestalt, ja sogar der biologischen Identität in Mann und Frau,

„auf jeden Fall durften sie als gleichberechtigte Größen nebeneinander auf den Plan trten, deren jede sich gegebenenfalls in ihr Gegenteil verwandeln ließe.“[14]

Kondylis S.67

So besagt der auf dem Konstruktivismus basierende Genderismus, daß „alle Menschen oberhalb des Halses alle gleich sind“, wie der Engländer Douglas Murray spottet:

 „Die Lehre unserer Zeit besagt, daß alle Menschen gleich sind und daß Rasse und Geschlecht und vieles mehr nichts weiter sind als soziale Konstrukte; und daß jeder werden kann, was immer er sein möchte.“[15]

Douglas MURRAY, Wahnsinn der Massen, Wie Meinungsmache und Hysterie unsere Gesellschaft vergiften, 2019.S.223.

Konstruktivist ist, wer sprachliche Begriffe und die von ihnen bezeichneten sozialen Phänomene als bloße gesellschaftliche Konstruktionen bezeichnet, letztlich als Resultate sprachlicher Konvention. Begriffen wie Familie, Mann, Frau oder Nation wird ihr realer Gehalt abgestritten, indem sie als bloße gesellschaftliche Konstruktion – Hirngespinst gewissermaßen – bezeichnet werden. Dekonstruktion ist eine

„Strategie der Subversion und Destabilisierung gegenüber den Geltungsansprüchen traditioneller – einschließlich kritischer – Theorien, Disziplinen und Paradigmen.“[16]

Nieter NOHLEN, Dekonstruktion, in: Lexikon der Politikwissenschaft, 2010, Spalte 131.

Studiengänge wie „Black Studies“, Womans Studies“ oder „Queer Studies“ schossen in den USA aus dem Boden.

„In den vergangenen Jahrzehnten war es die oberste Priorität dieses akademischen Fachbereichs, […] alles anzugreifen, zu unterminieren und letzten Endes niederzureißen, was zuvor als sichere Erkenntnis galt, und dazu zählte auch biologisches Wissen. Aus dem Wissen, daß es zwei verschiedene Geschlechter gibt, wurde die These, daß es zwei verschiedene Geschlechtsidentitäten – neudeutsch: Gender – gibt. Von diesem Punkt war es nur noch ein kleiner Schritt zu einer – zumindest an den Universitäten – weit verbreiteten Schlußfolgerung, die da lautete, daß es gar kein Gender gibt. Gender ist folglich nichts Reales, sondern ein ‚soziales Konstrukt‘.“[17]

Murray S.76

Damit stimmen für Genderisten ihre Paradigmen überein mit der Realität – ihrer „Realität“. Sie schaffen sich ihre eigene, höchst individuelle und private Realität und leugnen die Existenz einer objektiven, alle Menschen überspannenden Wirklichkeit.

Leider bemerken sie in ihrem Jubel nicht den Unterschied zwischen einem realen Phänomen und dem Begriff, den wir ihm verpassen. Daß alle abstrakten Begriffe bequeme Etiketten sprachlicher Verständigung und wie soziale Paradigmen nur gedankliche Konstruktionen sind, abstrakte Leitplanken unseres Denkens, Hilfslinien auf unseren geistigen Landkarten, ist ein so alter Hut, daß er rund 600 Jahre in die Geschichte der Metaphysikkritik zurückreicht. Auch wenn ein Dekonstruktivist das Wort Hund dekonstruiert und klarstellt, daß Hund nur ein Hauch der Stimme ist, ein abstrakter Begriff, kann Nachbars Hund Lumpi ihn trotzdem kräftig beißen. An Begriffen und Paradigmen kann man dekonstruieren, soviel man will: Man wird die realen Phänomene nicht los. Die Mitglieder einer Familie laufen nicht in alle Welt davon, weil man ihnen erzählt, daß das Paradigma des Familienzusammenhalts bloß auf gesellschaftlicher Konvention beruht und nichts als ein Konstrukt ist.

Zu den realen Phänomenen gehören vielerlei Gesamtheiten: Es gibt nicht nur einzelne Bäume, sondern auch Wälder. In einem Wald stehen viele Bäume miteinander in wechselseitiger Beziehung, auch durch die Wurzeln in physischer. Dekonstruktivisten vermögen vor lauter Bäumen keinen Wald zu sehen.

Ein Ganzes ist oft mehr als die Summe seiner Teile. Es hat eine ganz eigene Gestalt und gehorcht eigenen Gesetzmäßigkeiten. Diese gehen oft kategorial über die Gesetze hinaus, die für seine Bestandteile gelten. So besteht zwar ein menschlicher Körper aus Einzelteilen wie Atomen. Diese lassen sich mit den Gesetzmäßigkeiten der Chemie beschreiben. Als ganzer Mensch ist er aber auch höheren Gesetzmäßigkeiten wie denen der Biologie unterworfen.

Wer komplexe Gebilde nicht mehr als solche wahrnimmt, erkennt auch nicht die Gesetzmäßigkeiten, denen solche Gbilde in ihrer Komplexität unterliegen. Ein Vogelschwarm gehorcht weitergehenden Gesetzen als ein Vogel, eine Brücke anderen physikalischen Gesetzen als ein einzelner Stein und eine Gruppe anderen als ein einzelner Mensch.

Alle solche Gesetzmäßigkeiten treten erst auf einer jeweils höheren Organisationsstufe auf. Sie sind dabei objektiv vorhanden und unabhängig von menschlicher Konvention. Menschen mit gestörter Gestaltwahrnehmung nehmen soziale Gesamtheiten nicht wahr und behaupten, diese seien nur sozial konstruiert.

fragmentation.png

Die Destruktion der Gesellschaft

Wie bei einem psychisch Erkrankten die Persönlichkeit sich auflöst und ihr Zusammenhalt verlorengeht, werden im Konstruktivismus soziale Zusammenhänge dekonstruiert, fragmentiert und aufgelöst. Das Verständnis für den Sinn sozialer Einheiten geht verloren. Der Psychiater Mantzos resümiert, hier werde nicht das Subjekt von seinen Ketten befreit, sondern von der „Last des Subjektseins“:

„Suche nach Konsistenz, Sinn und innerer Übereinstimmung erweist sich als Hindernis auf dem Weg zu neuartigen Synthesen von Subjekt und Gesellschaft. Das Subjekt ist der Gesellschaft gewissermaßen zu altmodisch, zu wenig plural, zu langsam und nicht flexibel genug, um den modernen Anforderungen gerecht zu werden.“[18]

Mentzos S.52

Am Ende stehe ein Subjektivismus als Glaube, „die Wirklichkeit würde nicht unabhängig vom Betrachter bestehen.“[19] Der Genderismus formuliert das so: Geschlechter bestünden nur in der Vorstellung des gesellschaftlichen Betrachters, der sie konstruiere und sich mit anderen konventionell darauf einige, sie als verschieden zu betrachten.

So zerfällt die objektiv vorhandene Welt in nicht mehr kohärente Einzelteile.

„Mangel an Kohärenz und Fragmentierung in gleichwertige und austauschbare Größen bedeutet aber unbegrenzte Kombinierbarkeit dieser letzten miteinander, also beliebige Konstruierbarkeit der Welt. Wird nun das, was früher als Ganzes und Synthese erschien, einmal fragmentiert und zerstückelt, so muß es schließlich in Atome zerlegt werden.“[20]

Kondylis S.67

Diese gesellschaftlichen „Atome“ sind die einzelnen Menschen als wahllos austauschbare Grundbausteine der Massengesellschaft – wie die einzelnen Sandkörner einer Sandburg. Sie verlieren ihre Identität als Angehörige übergeordneter sozialer Einheiten wie Familien und können wie ein beliebiges Flickwerk („Patchwork-Familie“) zusammengwürfelt werden. Verloren geht mit den höheren sozialen Einheiten wie „Volk“ auch der Teil der persönlichen Identität als Angehöriger eines Volkes, eingebettet in eine identitätsstiftende Heimat. Verloren geht jeder historische Bezug, denn die fragmentierten und abgespaltenen Menschen-Atome haben für sich genommen keine Geschichte.

Wenn die Fragmentierung, Abspaltung und Auflösung einer Person in der Schizophrenie eine Erkrankung ist, wovon Psychiater überzeugt sind, hat diese auf sozialer Ebene ihre Entsprechung: Wenn hinreichend große Teile des sozialen Ganzen sich abspalten, das Ganze auflösen, sich in Szenen und Milieus fragmentieren und den anderen Fragmenten grimmig gegenüberstehen, darf von einer Psychopathologie dieser Gesellschaft gsprochen werden.


[1] Stavros Mentzos, Die bemerkenswerte Korrespondenz zwischen der Selbst-Fragmentierung in der Psychose und der Dezentrierung und Inkonsistenz in der Postmoderne, in: Günter Lempa und Elisabeth Troje (Hrg.), Gesellschaft und Psychose, Göttingen 2002, S.50-67 (59).

[2] Mentzos a.a.O. S.50.

[3] Burkhard Voß, Deutschland auf dem Weg in die Anstalt, Münster 2015, S. 135.

[4] Mentzos a.a.O. S.58.

[5] Thomas Fuchs, Selbst und Schizophrenie, DZPhil, Akademie Verlag, 60 (2012) 6, 887.

[6] Fuchs a.a.O. S.888.

[7] Fuchs a.a.O. S.890.

[8] Fuchs a.a.O. S.692.

[9] Fuchs a.a.O. S.694.

[10] Mentzos S.58.

[11] Panajotis Kondylis, Der Niedergang der bürgerlichen Denk- und Lebensform, Weinheim 1991, S.66 f.

[12] Kondylis a.a.O. S.67.

[13] Kondylis a.a.O. S.67.

[14] Kondylis a.a.O. S.67.

[15] Douglas Murray, Wahnsinn der Massen, Wie Meinungsmache und Hysterie unsere Gesellschaft vergiften, 2019.S.223.

[16] Nieter Nohlen, Dekonstruktion, in: Lexikon der Politikwissenschaft, 2010, Spalte 131.

[17] Murray (2019), S.76.

[18] Mentzos a.a.O. S.52.

[19] Mentzos a.a.O. S.53 nach Klaus Leferingk, Sympathie mit der Schizophrenie, in: M. Zaumseil und K. Leferingk (Hrg.), Schizophrenie in der Moderne, Bonn, S.27-82 (78)

[20] Kondylis a.a.O. S.67.

Hommage à Oswald Spengler

spengler_360x450.jpg

Hommage à Oswald Spengler

Armin Mohler
 
Extrait du numéro 1 de la revue Orientations (1982)
Ex: https://philippedelbauvre.blogspot.com
 
Il y a plusieurs façons d’ignorer les pensées des grands hommes et de vivre comme si ces pensées n’avaient jamais été émises. En 1980, c’est ce que tout observateur a pu constater en Allemagne Fédérale. On y célébrait le centenaire de la naissance d’Oswald Spengler. Même dans les hommages rendus au philosophe, on doit, objectivement, constater des lacunes. Les uns ont souligné l’importance de la philosophie spenglérienne de l’Histoire, dont les prophéties auraient été confirmées par les événements ; mais, ainsi, ils ont évité d’aborder les affirmations politiques de l’auteur du Déclin de l’Occident. D’autres ont voulu “sauver” le Spengler politicien, en faisant de lui un antifasciste et en n’étudiant que très superficiellement les liens qui ont existé entre Spengler, Hitler et le national-socialisme. Je ne dirais rien des “brillants” essayistes, qui se sont prodigieusement acharné à l’étude de Spengler pour en tirer très peu de choses.
 
Le Spengler total
 
Ce fut un autre vénérable grand homme, Herbert Cysarz (né 16 ans après Spengler) qui put vraiment saisir l’œuvre de Spengler dans sa totalité. L’hommage qu’il lui rend, dans le numéro de janvier 1980 de la revue Aula, éditée à Graz en Autriche, commence par ces mots : « Aucun historien contemporain n’a connu une aussi grande gloire qu’Oswald Spengler. Aucun n’a été, de son vivant, aussi incontestablement original. Cet homme, hostile à toute littérature et à tout idéalisme, totalement étranger au monde abstrait des livres, a fait entrevoir les grands thèmes et les multiples imbrications de l’Histoire et a souligné, comme cela n’avait jamais auparavant été fait, l’intensité qui réside dans le vouloir et l’agir. Il a donné au monde une nouvelle manière de concevoir la politique, ainsi qu’un style particulier de voir, de penser et de présenter l’Histoire ». Bien évidemment, Cysarz sait que Spengler est plus qu’un historien ; à propos de son œuvre, il écrit qu’elle reste un signe du destin qui s’est manifesté au tournant de notre temps.
Un homme de la même génération que Cysarz, Ernst Jünger avait déjà écrit des choses de ce genre dans les années vingt, même si le ton était plus mesuré, moins pathétique. Dans un très important article politique de l’époque (dont, bien entendu, on ne prévoit pas la réédition dans les œuvres complètes de Jünger), il exprimait une opinion partagée par beaucoup de contemporains : pour un cerveau de la trempe de celui de Spengler, ils donneraient bien tout un Parlement.
 
41CdU-U0i7L._SX352_BO1,204,203,200_.jpgLes faiblesses de l’œuvre de Spengler
 
Une acceptation aussi enthousiaste de la totalité de l’œuvre de Spengler ne signifie toutefois pas qu’on en avalise tous les détails, sans formuler aucune critique. Spengler n’est pas un surhomme ; il a, lui aussi, ses faiblesses. À coté des prophéties qui se sont effectivement réalisées, il y a celles qui n’ont eu aucune suite. Les études approfondies de Spengler sur les diverses cultures de l’Histoire, nous obligent à constater que tous les domaines de l’activité créatrice de l’homme ne lui sont pas également familiers. Par exemple, le style littéraire de Spengler n’est pas toujours à la hauteur de ses sujets ; il n’y a pas lieu de s’en étonner, car ces textes suscitent de trop fortes émotions. Les ennemis de Spengler se plaisent d’ailleurs à citer les phrases où transparaît un certain “kitsch”. De plus, Spengler accuse une faiblesse, comme bon nombre de visionnaires : ce qui est tout immédiat lui échappe. Ainsi, selon lui, le grand poète de sa génération n’est ni Stefan George ni Rainer Maria Rilke, mais Ernst Droem, qui est, à juste titre, resté inconnu.
 
Très révélatrice est la réaction de l’auteur du Déclin de l’Occident à l’envoi, par un jeune écrivain, d’un livre capital de notre siècle. En 1932, en effet, Ernst Jünger fit envoyer à Spengler, accompagné de tous ses respects, son livre intitulé Der Arbeiter (Le Travailleur). Spengler s’est contenté de feuilleter le livre et écrivit : « En Allemagne, la paysannerie est encore une force politique. Et lorsque l’on oppose à la paysannerie — prétendument moribonde — le “Travailleur”, c’est-à-dire l’ouvrier des fabriques, on s’éloigne de la réalité et l’on s’interdit toute influence sur l’avenir… ». Comme Spengler n’a pas lu le livre, il ne peut savoir que Jünger ne parle pas de l’ouvrier des fabriques. Mais il est fort étonnant qu’il surévalue les potentialités politiques d’une paysannerie qui, quelques années plus tard, allait être complètement annihilée.
 
Le barrage intérieur
 
Ni ces quelques aveuglements ni les aspects bizarres de la vie de Spengler ne doivent détourner notre attention de l’ensemble de son œuvre. Cet homme susceptible se mit un masque, prit un style qu’il ne faut pas prendre tel quel. Ainsi, les admirateurs de Spengler éviteront de confondre sa personnalité véritable avec ce “masque césarien” qu’il affichait lors de ses nombreuses apparitions publiques (1).
 
Les détracteurs de Spengler, de leur côté, s’efforceront de ne pas le décrire, à la lumière de sa vie privée, comme une sorte de totem bizarre de la bourgeoisie déclinante.
 
978841517778.JPGBien sûr, la vie recluse de Spengler permet de telles suppositions. Il est né le 29 mai 1880, fils d’un haut fonctionnaire des postes, à Blankenburg dans le Harz (2). Ce n’était pas le père, homme paisible, qui dominait la vie familiale mais la mère, une créature à moitié folle, dévorée d’ambitions pseudo-artistiques. Elle remplissait leur grand appartement d’une telle quantité de meubles que le jeune Oswald et ses trois sœurs devaient loger dans des débarras, sous le toit !
 
Après avoir soutenu une dissertation sur Héraclite, Spengler devint professeur de mathématiques et de sciences naturelles, dans un lycée (Gymnasium). Ensuite, le décès de sa mère ne lui laissa pas d’héritage consistant, mais lui permit quand même de vivre sans travailler ; de 1911 à la mortelle crise cardiaque du 7 mai 1936, il vivra retiré, en chercheur indépendant, à Munich, dans un appartement immense de style “Gründerzeit” (le style des années 1870-1880), bourré de meubles massifs et situé dans la Widenmayerstraße. Une des ses sœurs le soignait.
 
Il voyageait peu et n’entretenait qu’un cercle restreint de relations. Il a refusé les postes de professeur qu’on lui offrait. Il a été réformé lors de la Première Guerre mondiale. Cette vie semble dominée par un refus farouche de tous contacts humains. On ne sait rien d’éventuelles relations érotiques. Dès le départ, il y a repli vers l’intériorité. Et seul, chez Spengler, nous intéresse le résultat qu’a produit cet isolement dès 1917. La chasteté de cette existence n’est nullement un argument contre l’œuvre de Spengler. Comme, du reste, l’isolement dans une cellule monacale ne saurait être un argument contre Augustin.
 
Au-delà de l’optimisme et du pessimisme
 
Dans l’histoire des idées, la signification de l’œuvre de Spengler réside en ceci que, dans une situation de crise, il ramène à la conscience les fondements “souterrains” de la pensée, avec une vigueur qui rappelle celle d’un Georges Sorel. Mais quel fut cette situation de crise ? L’effondrement, à cause de la Première Guerre mondiale, du Reich allemand qui, pendant des siècles, avait été le centre de l’Europe. Et quels sont ces fondements “souterrains” ? C’est la pensée résolument réaliste amorcée par Héraclite et l’école du Portique (Stoa). C’est une pensée qui renonce, depuis toujours, aux fausses consolations et aux mirages des systèmes fondés sur de pseudo-ordres cosmiques. De manière magistrale, Spengler confronte la génération de la guerre à cette pensée. Son style était un curieux mélange de “monumentalité” classique et d’expressionnisme, fait de couleurs criardes. Et ce sont précisément ceux qui, le plus profondément, avaient expérimenté l’effondrement du monde bourgeois (celui de la “Maison de Poupée”) (3), qui entendirent son appel.
 
Cette pensée se situe au-delà de l’optimisme et du pessimisme. Le titre que l’éditeur choisit pour l’œuvre majeure de Spengler (Le Déclin de l’Occident) trompe. Il est possible, qu’en privé, Spengler ait déploré l’effondrement d’un monde qui lui était cher. Mais son œuvre ne déplore rien ; elle nous apprend bien plutôt que l’Histoire est un unique mouvement d’émergence et de déclin et qu’il ne reste rien d’autre à l’homme que de faire face, avec contenance, à cette réalité, dans le lieu que le destin lui a désigné. C’est ce qui a empêché Spengler de s’identifier au IIIe Reich et qui l’a amené, en 1933, dans son dernier ouvrage, Jahre der Entscheidung (Années décisives), à reprocher au NSDAP son aveuglement en politique extérieure. Pour Spengler, la politique extérieure, parce qu’elle est combat, est primordiale par rapport à la politique intérieure qui, elle, insiste davantage sur le bien-être. Ainsi le caractère hybride du national-socialisme apparaît clairement : en tant que socialisme, il recèle une forte tendance à l’utopie, même s’il connaît aussi la fascination de la mélodie héraclitéenne.
 
Sans doute, aucune praxis politique n’est possible sans une certaine dose d’espérance et sans allusions à un ordre (cosmique) doté de sens (téléologique). Seule une minorité d’individus soutient le regard de la Gorgone. Dans cette minorité, le pourcentage des hommes d’action est plus élevé que celui des intellectuels, des prêtres et des autres fabricants d’opinions. De toutes façons, les disciples d’Héraclite disposent de leur propre consolation, qu’ils tirent précisément de ce qui constitue, pour les autres, une source de terreur. La lecture de Spengler nous démontre le double aspect de la pensée héraclitéenne.
 
71rj2J5LdWL.jpgL’inflexibilité
 
C’est avec pertinence que Herbert Cysarz a cité les deux phrases qui montrent le plus implacablement ce qui sépare Oswald Spengler tant de la société libérale que de toute espèce de dictature du bien-être (qu’elle soit rouge ou brune) (4). La première de ces phrases dit : « Les faits sont plus importants que les vérités ». La seconde : « La vie n’est pas sainte ». C’est là le rude côté de la philosophie spenglérienne et c’est dans L’Homme et la Technique (1931), un livre épuré de toute ambiguïté, que Spengler la souligne tout particulièrement, par défi contre tous les bavardages de notre siècle.
Heinz Friedrich, dans son article de Die Welt, rédigé pour le centenaire du philosophe, a eu des formules plus concises encore. Il part du fait que Spengler lui-même se déclare disciple de Goethe et de Nietzsche. Cysarz, lui, disait que la notion spenglérienne de destin révélait davantage d’affinités électives avec les sagas germaniques et l’héroïsme tragique de Shakespeare qu’avec l’humanisme classique. Heinz Friedrich écrit, dans un langage qui n’a rien de spenglérien (il parle des “vérités” !) : « À la fin de ce siècle de chaos, les citoyens doivent s’habituer à ne pas seulement prendre connaissances des vérités, mais aussi à les vivre et à vivre avec elles. Comme le disait Goethe, il n’y a pas que la Nature qui soit insensible, il y a aussi l’Histoire car, pour paraphraser Spengler, on peut dire qu’elle détient plus de caractéristiques naturelles que nous voulons bien l’admettre. En conséquence, c’est avec indifférence qu’elle ignore nos espoirs et nos craintes ».
 
Pour Heinz Friedrich, ce qu’il y a de nietzschéen dans cela, c’est le diagnostic qui pose la décadence comme faiblesse vitale : « L’agent de la vie, le facteur favorisant l’éternel devenir, c’est, pour Nietzsche, la Volonté de Puissance ». Friedrich ajoute un avertissement : « La Volonté de Puissance, reconnue par Nietzsche comme principe vital, est tout autre chose que l’orgueil biologique et musculaire qu’aujourd’hui encore, l’on veut entendre par là ». Cette conception vulgaire des choses est partagée par les adeptes de Nietzsche comme par ses adversaires). Cela signifie tout simplement que toute vie a la pulsion de s’affirmer. Spengler est plus qu’un disciple de Nietzsche : il le complète et le transforme. La contribution personnelle de Spengler à cette école de pensée est qu’il réalise quelque chose, qu’il a trouvé, chez Nietzsche, sous la forme d’un appel.
 
Les couleurs de la vie
 
Celui qui résiste au regard de la Gorgone, n’est pas détourné du monde. Bien au contraire, il voit le monde de manière plus intense, plus plastique, plus colorée. C’est cela la réalité paradoxale. Le regard des espérances, en revanche, ne veut voir que des cohérences, des lois et, de ce fait, détourne l’attention du particulier pour se perdre dans le général : il désenchante le monde.
 
Il faut se rendre compte combien les Weltanschauungen dominantes, qui sont un piètre mélange de la fade idéologie des Lumières et de christianisme sécularisé, ont, pour l’homme moyen, transformé le monde en un ensemble de schémas tristes. C’est le résultat d’une vision bien déterminée de l’Histoire (dans l’Histoire, l’homme décrypte le monde pour le comprendre). Dans cette vision, d’où la vie tient-elle sa valeur ? De quelque chose qui sera atteint dans un lointain futur après une longue évolution et après notre mort. Rien n’est soi-même ; chaque chose n’existe qu’à partir du moment où elle signifie quelque chose d’autre, qui se trouve “derrière” elle.
 
978841795067.JPGLa vie se voit alors réduite à une rationalité moyenne, qui interdit toutes ces grandes effervescences qui entraînent soit vers le haut soit vers le bas ; l’homme se meut alors dans un cadre étroit qui ne lui propose rien de plus que la satisfaction de ses besoins physiques. Au-dessus de ce cadre, souffle un tiède ventelet d’éthique behavioriste. Arnold Gehlen appelait cela « l’eudémonisme de masse ». Les masses sont constituées d’individus isolés, qui ne s’enracinent dans rien de solide, qui ne sont insérés dans aucune structure concrète, qui errent sans but dans le “général”.
 
C’est placé devant un tel arrière-plan que le cyclone spenglérien doit être compris: il brise la monotonie de ce qui prétend s’appeler “moderne” et réinjecte, dans le monde, de vibrantes tonalités. Dans la vision spenglérienne, l’homme n’incarne plus une quelconque “généralité”, qu’il partageait avec tous ses semblables. Bien au contraire, il appartient à une culture spécifique, qui ne peut être ramenée à quelque chose d’autre mais qui a son propre sens. Chaque culture est de nature totalement cultuelle, parce que, dans tout ce qu’elle produit, ressort le symbole particulier auquel elle s’identifie et par lequel elle se distingue. Spengler voit vivre ces cultures comme vivent des plantes, avec leurs phases de croissance et de décomposition. Chacune de ces phases de croissance occupe son propre rang. Quelle puissante mélodie résonne dans son évocation de la fin d’une culture ou du césarisme ! On citerait à plaisir des pages entières du premier volume du Déclin :
« Une vie véritable se mène. Elle ne se détermine pas par l’intellect. Les vérités se situent au-delà de l’Histoire et de la vie. (…) Les peuples de culture sont des formes jaillies du fleuve de l’existence. (…) Pour moi, le peuple (Volk) est une unité d’âme (Seele). (…) Le regard libère des limites de l’éveil. (…) Ce qui confère de la valeur a un fait singulier, est tout simplement la grande ou la faible puissance ce son langage formel, la force de ses symboles. Au-delà du bien et du mal, du supérieur et de l’inférieur, du nécessaire et de l’idéal ».
Il faut encore ajouter un dernier mot à propos de l’Allemand que fut Oswald Spengler. Celui-ci n’a pas évoqué la pluralité des cultures pour se sublimer dans l’exotisme. Il a écrit ses livres pour les Allemands qui vivaient l’effondrement du Reich. Spengler ne traîne pas les Allemands devant un quelconque tribunal de la “généralité”, mais les confronte à leur spécificité, dans le miroir de leur histoire. Dans tous les écrits de Spengler, on sent sa conviction que les Allemands ont joué, dans le passé, un rôle particulier et que les Prussiens en joueront un, dans l’avenir. Ces convictions de Spengler dérangent évidemment tous ceux qui veulent maintenir la mentalité de frustrés qui règne aujourd’hui.
 
► Armin Mohler, Orientations n°1, 1982.
(traduction française : Robert Steuckers)
 
Cet article d’Armin Mohler a paru dans Criticón n°60-61, octobre 1980. Ce numéro était intégralement consacré à la question allemande. Il célébrait également le dixième anniversaire de la revue et voulait, de ce fait, axer ses réflexions sur l’histoire nationale.
 
◘ Sur l’auteur : Armin Mohler est l’auteur d’un ouvrage capital : Die Konservative Révolution in Deutschland, 1918-1932 (2ème édition, Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, Darmstadt, 1972). Il a été le secrétaire de l’écrivain Ernst Jünger et correspondant de plusieurs journaux allemands ou suisses alémaniques à Paris. Né à Bâle en 1920, il s’est fixé à Munich en 1961 (où il décède le 4 juillet 2003). À partir de 1964, il dirige la Fondation Friedrich von Siemens de Munich et, en tant que tel, organise plusieurs colloques dont les actes ont été publiés. En outre, Armin Mohler est l’auteur de plusieurs livres sur la politique allemande. Armin Mohler morigène sans cesse nos voisins de l’Est, à cause de leur défaitisme politique.
 
91evIAsVKNL.jpgNous ne saurions achever cette introduction au dossier Spengler sans mentionner un ouvrage récent et remarquablement bien fait sur sa pensée. Il s’agit de Spengler heute, Sechs Essays (Spengler aujourd’hui, six essais), préfacé par Hermann Lübbe, sous la direction de Peter Christian Ludz. Cet ouvrage est paru aux éditions CH Beck de Munich. Il comprend des textes de Hermann Lübbe (Historisch-politische Exaltationen : Spengler wiedergelesen = Exaltations historico-politiques : Une relecture de S.), d’Alexander Demandt (Spengler und die Spätantike = Spengler et la Haute-Antiquité), de Horst Möller (Oswald Spengler : Geschichte im Dienste der Zeitkritik = O.S. : L’Histoire au service de la critique du temps), de Tracy B. Strong (O.S. : Ontologie, Kritik und Enttäuschung = S. : Ontologie, critique et déception), du spécialiste français Gilbert Merlio (S. und die Technik = S. et la technique) et de G.L. Ulmen (Metaphysik des Morgenlandes - S. über Russland = Métaphysique de l’Orient, S. et la Russie). La lecture de cet ouvrage est indispensable pour pouvoir comprendre et utiliser Spengler aujourd’hui.
 
Notes :
  • 1. On pourra, bien sûr, discuter du bon goût de publier la photo de Spengler sur son lit de mort. Cette photo prouve toutefois que ce masque n’a pas, de façon durable, imprégné la physionomie de Spengler.
  • 2. Un autre protagoniste de la Konservative Révolution, issu de cette ville, est August Winnig. Il est né deux ans avant Spengler, en 1878, et est le fils du fossoyeur.
  • 3. Puppenspiel, le mot qu’employé Armin Mohler, signifie “guignol”, “théâtre de marionnettes”. Nous avons traduit par “Maison de Poupées”, en voulant faire allusion à la pièce d’Ibsen. Cet auteur norvégien ne s’est jamais lassé de critiquer le monde bourgeois. Et dire du monde bourgeois qu’il est une “Maison de Poupées”, c’est souligner son souci d’échapper aux vicissitudes du monde et de l’Histoire. (n.d.t.)
  • 4. En Allemagne, la couleur rouge, en politique, est attribuée aux partis d’inspiration marxiste, communiste ou sociale-démocrate. La couleur brune aux nationaux-socialistes. La couleur noire aux partis confessionnels. Elle symbolise la soutane des prêtres. Aujourd’hui, une nouvelle couleur politique est née : la verte des écologistes. Le bleu est attribué aux libéraux. (n.d.t.)

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dimanche, 23 février 2020

La manipulation mentale, une arme de destruction massive de notre démocratie directe et participative

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La manipulation mentale, une arme de destruction massive de notre démocratie directe et participative

Par PD. Dr. méd. Dominique Schwander

Ex: https://www.lesobservateurs.ch

Les manipulateurs pervers narcissiques représentent 2 à 3 % de la population occidentale et les psychopathes 1%. Ils sont parmi nous. Des élus, des politiques et, évidemment, des spécialistes en communication, des meneurs de campagne électorale nous manipulent, sans être nécessairement des pervers narcissiques ou des psychopathes. Tous ces gens, les mass médias et leur intelligentsia journalistique qui a trahi sa mission de leader informateur, font des efforts conscients pour manipuler de manière éhontée l’opinion publique et les électeurs. Nous sommes tous plus ou moins manipulés car nous sommes tous humains et donc manipulables.

Les techniques et stratégies de manipulation mentale sont exercées individuellement, par exemple dans une famille ou sur le lieu de travail. Sun Tzu, Mahomet, Pavlov, Schopenhauer, Goebbels, Bernais, Chomsky, Bush, Obama, le couple Clinton, Merkel, Erdogan, Macron, Leuthard, Sommaruga, Berset, Darbellay, etc, étaient/sont des adeptes de la manipulation de masse. Les techniques de manipulations de masse sont exercées sur une population à des fins politiques, idéologiques, religieuses, économiques ou militaires. Depuis Sun Tzu, les armées et les dictatures ont toutes leur manuel de manipulation et de diversion, par exemple l’armée des USA: « Silent weapons for quiets wars". Operations Research Technical Manual TW-SW7905.1.1979. Et bien sûr tant de gouvernements, pas seulement de pays musulmans et de dictatures, ont peur de laisser un libre penseur, un individu critique, voir une partie du peuple Souverain développer leurs propres sphères d’influence, ce qui risque de remettre en question les fondements de la société et leur pouvoir mais surtout créerait des changements sociaux remettant en cause la légitimité, le statut et les avantages d’élus carriéristes et de hauts fonctionnaires.

Les autorités qui manipulent un peuple ne mènent pas une vie exemplaire sur le plan moral, bien au contraire. A force d’être manipulé, tôt ou tard, le peuple  laisse un régime autoritaire puis une dictature être instaurés. Les supporters de cette dictature manipulent à loisir, profitent de la situation, la corruption se généralise et contamine toute la société, de bas en haut. Ils oublient vite que, dès que la classe dominante cesse d’être un symbole des valeurs éthiques, sa chute devient inévitable, même si cela prend beaucoup de temps. Finalement, comme on peut l’observer en Afrique et en Amérique latine, les entrepreneurs et les élus font l’apologie de la corruption en affirmant que grâce à elle l’économie est florissante et le produit national brut augmente chaque année. Promus dans la caste aux côtés d’oligarques enrichis ou rêvant de le devenir, ils ne voient plus que, sauf quelques exceptions semblables à eux, la classe moyenne s’appauvrit, le pouvoir d’achat baisse plus que le PIB augmente, les pauvres augmentent, sont prêts à  écouter un groupe d’aristocrates de l’esprit communistes et à les soutenir afin de rompre sciemment avec le démocratisme ploutocrate, corrompu et exploiteur.

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Ci-après une liste non-exhaustive de comportements, de stratégies, de tactiques et de techniques de manipulation mentale, dénommée aussi sujétion psychologique, dont l’objectif est toujours de contrôler notre perception de la réalité en prenant le contrôle psychique du sujet manipulé, qu’il est plus juste de nommer la victime:

    • Le gas lighting est une tactique de manipulation mentale qui consiste à déformer ou à fausser le récit des évènements de manière à faire douter la victime de sa mémoire, de sa perception et de son équilibre psychique, par exemple l’électeur, une femme maltraitée ou un Donald Trump. Cette tactique s’appuie sur la dissonance cognitive, c’est-à-dire le conflit entre deux différentes informations, entre deux pensées contraires, entre deux opinions. Le déni de la réalité et du contenu intolérant, meurtrier et impératif du coran et des autres textes musulmans « sacro-saints » est une telle manipulation mensongère entretenue par des élus islamo-collabos, angéliques ou idiots utiles. Pour ces derniers en déni, l’islam-idéologie est une religion de paix, de tolérance et de bonheur. Pour les autres, qui ont pris connaissance du coran, des hadiths, etc, et qui observent la réalité quotidienne autour d’eux, c’est une idéologie guerrière, militante, envahissante, d’une autre temporalité et irrationnelle.
    • Manipulation du langage: les idéologues et les politiques doctrinaires manipulent le langage. Par exemple l’islam-idéologie est très proche du communisme et du socialisme par leur manipulation du langage.
    • Jouer sur l’émotion est une technique classique pour empêcher toute analyse rationnelle d’une situation. On fait appel à l’émotionnel plutôt qu’à la réflexion. C’est ce que font quotidiennement les présentateurs à la télévision, des élus, des imams, plutôt que d’essayer d’apporter des faits, des explications objectives, une observation  impartiale et d’encourager les spectateurs et les gens à analyser et à raisonner avant qu’ils choisissent ou décident par eux-mêmes. Manipuler ou susciter des émotions permet d’accéder à l’inconscient et au moi narrateur des individus, à influencer les gens dans leurs idées, leurs peurs individuelles ou collectives, leurs désirs, par exemple le paradis pornographique de Allah et de sa superstar Mahomet. Ce faisant les manipulateurs nous suggèrent des comportements et des décisions que nous croyons venir du plus profond de  notre être, alors que ce n’est pas le cas.
    • La stratégie de la diversion et de la distraction est très utilisée et très efficace. Elle détourne l’attention du public des vrais problèmes pour lui imposer à la place du superflu insignifiant que l’on met savamment en scène dans les émissions d’actualité traitées dans les mass médias. Le réchauffement climatique, la possession légale d’armes, « panem et circenses » de la Rome antique, les manifestations sportives actuelles, les rituels de l’islam-idéologie, le pas d’amalgame, en sont des exemples quotidiens.
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    • La stratégie de l’homme de paille ou sophisme de l’épouvantail est très utilisée en politique et en islam. Elle représente de manière fausse ou exagérée, de façon absurde ou irrationnelle, vos propres pensées et sentiments. Cela finit par invalider totalement notre droit à avoir ou à exprimer des pensées, des émotions, une opinion ou un vote et finalement nous avons des doutes, culpabilisons et changeons d’avis. Les pervers narcissiques, les psychopathes essayent de représenter nos opinions, nos émotions et nos expériences vécues de manière fausse, absurde ou irrationnelle afin de convaincre les autres que nous avons nous des défauts de caractère et sommes irrationnels.
    • Traiter les gens comme des enfants: des émissions grand public ou de la publicité s’adressent à nous comme à des enfants, ce qui génère des réactions émotionnelles « cool » du public confronté en réalité à de graves problèmes qui sont ainsi minimisés, vu qu’ils suscitent bien peu de réactions.
    • Maintenir les gens dans l’ignorance sous prétexte que les gens qui savent sont dangereux, menacent l’équilibre du système en place, de l’établissement politico-économique, religieux ou idéologique. Toute dictature, tout gouvernement autoritaire et/ou théocratique maintiennent l’instruction publique et l’éducation à un niveau très bas. Cela fait partie des techniques pour que des systèmes autoritaires, (Inquisition par exemple), idéologiques (islam-idéologie par exemple) ou corrompus (nation africaine ou sud-américaine), perdurent. C’est attristant. En réalité, l’instruction publique et les mass médias sont les deux secteurs à partir desquels le monde pourrait devenir, sans corruption ni violence, renouvelé et élevé moralement. L’instruction publique nourrit ou empoisonne l’esprit de l’enfant. Les mass médias nourrissent ou empoisonnent l’esprit de l’adulte. De nos jours, l’école et les mass médias sont tous deux aux mains d’une gauche dénuée d’esprit: les remettre aux mains de l’esprit et de la raison serait la plus haute tâche de toute politique idéale, de toute révolution idéale
    • Encourager la médiocrité en érigeant au rang de valeurs, la bêtise, la vulgarité, la sexualisation de tout, l’ignorance, voir un rap idiot, grossier et sexuel ou les émissions de télé-réalité. Plus la chanteuse est vulgaire, sexualisée et désinhibée, plus elle est adulée et considérée une superstar. On encourage le public à se complaire dans la médiocrité puis à élire des médiocres.
    • La stratégie du différé ajourne une mesure impopulaire en la présentant comme une concession équitable, le port du voile islamique ou du burkini, la viande halal. On nous fait accepter finalement telle mesure parce qu’elle ne nous affecterait pas directement ou dans l’immédiat.
    • La stratégie du problème/solution clé en main consiste à faire croire au public que beaucoup de situations ou événements présentés comme aléatoires ou liés au hasard (par exemple le réchauffement climatique), répondent à une logique implacable. Cette manœuvre fait que la  solution apportée qui serait parfaitement inacceptable en temps normal, est non seulement acceptée mais également plébiscitée par ceux-là mêmes qui en feront les frais. Par exemple, en brûlant des cierges et en diminuant les libertés l’une après l’autre, suite à un acte terroriste musulman, en ayant du lait dans nos veines et pas du vitriol comme le terroriste musulman, nous transformons petit à petit une démocratie en une démocrature.
    • Le manipulateur emploie différentes formes de menaces, de chantage et d’abus mental pour prendre un ou des individus en otage. Il essaye de vous terrifier pour que vous soyez toujours en accord avec lui. C’est ce qui se passe dans les zones de non-droit dites aussi zones islamisées de France, de Suède, etc. Dans le monde des manipulateurs, les pervers narcissiques sont les seules personnes à avoir raison, et tout autre avis ou menace pour leur supériorité entraîne leur rage.
    • Culpabiliser l’esprit de révolte ou d’indignation: en inversant les valeurs dans un Etat-nation, en culpabilisant le révolté et l’indigné, en les tenant pour responsables de leurs peines ou malheur, en leurs faisant accepter progressivement une mauvaise image de soi, les manipulateurs dépriment et inhibent toute nouvelle action. La révolte et l’indignation sont alors remplacées par la culpabilité.
    • Si le manipulateur n’arrive pas à modifier la manière dont vous vous percevez vous-même et vous vous exprimez en public, il cherche, par des campagnes de rabaissement public, de diffamation et d’harcèlement à contrôler et à changer la manière dont les autres personnes vous perçoivent. La diabolisation ad hiltlerum ou traiter d’extrême droite un élu de droite, Christophe Blocher ou Donald Trump, est devenue, depuis Staline, une pratique émotionnelle courante de la politique guerrière que mène la gauche et les partis qui lui sont soumis. Depuis des années, de telles frappes préventives manipulatrices sont faites quotidiennement contre le Front national français et les partis populistes de droite.
    • La triangulation est une technique très utilisée par de nos élus avant les votations concernant une initiative, Elle consiste à faire intervenir l’opinion réelle ou supposée, voire la menace d’une tierce personne, faiseur d’opinion, relais d’opinion, ancien élu, professeur d’université, guide religieux, etc, ou même le public lors d’un débat publique ou télévisé, tout en invalidant en même temps la réaction légitime des  victimes face à l’abus.
    • Le manipulateur est toujours obsédé à maintenir un contrôle permanent des moindres petits aspects de votre vie et de vos émotions. A ce faire, il va même inventer des situations de conflit, afin de vous déstabiliser et de vous affaiblir. Ainsi l’islam-idéologie gère chaque facette de la vie du musulman pratiquant, ne lui laisse aucun espace de liberté, condamne tout individualisme et glorifie son oumma.
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    • La projection mentale est un mécanisme de défense des manipulateurs. Ainsi depuis XIV siècles les musulmans utilisent les juifs et Israel comme bouc émissaire et recourent à leur victimisation expiatoire pour justifier leurs razzias, leurs attaques, leurs guerres asymétriques ou hybrides et leurs actes terroristes. Ce faisant, les musulmans manipulateurs déplacent leurs responsabilités, refusent de reconnaître leurs torts et d’assumer leurs actes.
    • Attaqué le manipulateur, par exemple tel Tariq Ramadan, utilise des stratagèmes élaborés, employant des biais cognitifs, des sophismes, des arguments fallacieux et la taqyia de la nébuleuse musulmane, soit une conversation absurde et irrationnelle. Ces stratagèmes lui permettent de crier au complot, de gagner le débat, de manipuler et de vaincre l’adversaire, d’avoir toujours le dernier mot, même en ayant complètement tort. Nombres de manipulateurs dans les débats, plutôt que de prendre le temps d’examiner attentivement différentes perspectives, généralisent tous vos propos et arguments en faisant des discours généralisants qui ne reconnaissent pas les nuances.
    • Le conditionnement destructeur pratiqué par le manipulateur nous conditionne lentement et durablement parce que, en particulier, il craint tout ce que nous aimons d’autre, à part lui qui s’estime le meilleur. Nos élus eurolâtres et nos bruxellisés s’adonnent à ce travers manipulateur
    • La stratégie du dégradé est classique; quand l’addition est trop lourde, on fait plusieurs tickets. Voyez Berset avec l’AVS, les retraites vieillesse et l’assurance maladie et accident ou les revendications et exigences croissantes des immigrants musulmans.
    • Créer des problèmes, puis offrir des solutions. Le problème peut être par exemple une « false flag operation ». Les raisons données par les Français et leurs alliés pour s’ingérer militairement en Iraq et en Syrie furent des manipulations mensongères bien pires que celles données par les USA de Bush pour s’ingérer militairement en Iraq.
    • Finalement la stratégie et la technique de l’avenir: connaître les gens mieux qu’ils ne se connaissent eux-mêmes. Les techniques de pointe en algorithmes, en intelligence artificielle, en biologie, en neurobiologie, en génétique, en psychologie appliquée, par exemple concernant le moi narrateur, toutes exploitées par face de plouc, WhatsApp et autres réseaux « sociaux » scrutinateurs-surveilleurs-contrôleurs-espions apporteront tant de connaissances nouvelles sur la femme, l’homme, la société et leurs fonctionnements, que l’individu lui même ne se connait pas aussi bien que ceux qui ont accès à ce savoir, tout particulièrement aux puissants algorithmes nous concernant. Si nous ne réagissons pas, si nous ne faisons pas de meilleurs choix, ce nouveau savoir représentera un pouvoir et un outil de contrôle puissants et autoritaires pour tous ceux qui ont un intérêt à manipuler les autres et se seront donnés ces nouveaux moyens. Avant une prochaine votation, vous aurez dans votre inconscient, qui face de plouc a décidé que vous choisissiez. Comme l’a écrit en 1925  le visionnaire Comte autrichien R. N. Coudenhove-Kalergi dans son livre « Idéalisme pratique, noblesse, technique, pacifisme »:  « La technique sans l’éthique mène aussi bien à des catastrophes que l’éthique sans la technique. L’éthique et la technique doivent se compléter, doivent avancer ensemble, se réfléchir et se conscientiser ensemble. »Actuellement, chez nous, c’est la télévision, puis l’islam-idéologie, puis les élus eurolâtres et autres bruxellisés, qui contribuent le plus à la manipulation mentale de masse. C’est pourquoi, nos élus de gauche se félicitent que nos chaînes nationales accaparent la quasi totalité, soit beaucoup plus que 1 milliard de CHF, des redevances que tous les citoyens suisses payons ; une bonne raison de voter oui à l’initiative NO BILLAG, de libéraliser et de privatiser le marché de la télévision et de la radio. Notre télévision nationale coûte très cher au peuple et est vraiment mauvaise. Pour le prix que paie chaque famille et même (!) nos entreprises notre télévision est une misère. Les Espagnols et les latino-américains ont deux termes imagés et métaphoriques pour qualifier une télévision comme notre nationale: « telebasura » soit téléordure ou mieux encore « TV chatarra » soit TV ferraille ou TV débris, la « comida chatarra » étant la malbouffe. Nos coûteuses chaînes de télévision nationales ne sont-elles pas une fort coûteuse TV malbouffe contre laquelle nous devons réagir avec fermeté et indignation. 

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    •  
  • Notre télévision suisse pollue notre mental et celui de nos enfants avec des émissions de plus en plus bêtes et addictives. Elle suggère des idées pauvres, des façons de penser irrationnelles, une inculture, un faux savoir et un tas de choses à consommer. Elle est devenue si mauvaise qu’elle n’incite pas à la réflexion.
  • Il n’y a pas de vrais débats à la télévision. Les débats ne sont plus présidés et dirigés par une personne impartiale et cultivée.
  • Les invités sont toujours des soit-disants experts qui débitent et débitent comme des journaux pisses-copie, de façon mal dissimulée, une vérité dictée par l’idéologie, une tendance politique le plus souvent de gauche, l’argent, ou le pouvoir, mais bien évidemment jamais discutable.
  • Notre télévision nationale est devenue l’art de perdre du  temps; moins pour les entrepreneurs qui sont eux beaucoup plus axés sur la lecture que la classe ouvrière et les enfants et moins pour les jeunes devenus accrocs au réseaux sociaux et à l’internet.
  • Notre télévision, comme notre presse quotidienne, est un flot ininterrompu d’informations inutiles, sur lesquelles le téléspectateur/lecteur n’a pas d’influence, contrairement aux sites web de réinformation qui publient les nombreux commentaires des internautes. Donald Trump, disant ce qu’il pense et faisant tant d’efforts pour faire ce qu’il a promis avant d’être élu, est passé par là: les journaux quotidiens tel le poubelliste, le liberticide, autres bidonneurs et canards aux accroches, angles, scoops, audience douteux et équivoques, qui ont rien d’interactif, parce que leur redac’chef qui se met en photo en première page refuse de publier les lettres d’opinion et même les articles de lecteurs qui lui paraissent politiquement incorrects, prendront un bouillon puis feront faillite et seules les futures chaînes de télévision privées qui seront vraiment interactives survivront. Réjouissons-nous, la chaîne CNN manipulatrice et tellement menteuse a perdu 30 % de ses annonceurs, les finances du New York Times et du Chicago Tribune, que nos quotidiens copient fidèlement le lendemain matin, vont mal.
  • L’information est tronquée, et manipulée parce que quelques oligarques, la caste pseudo-aristocratique de l’argent, détiennent la très grande majorité des mass médias du monde entier, tous supports confondus. Si bien que ceux qui gobent cette  « info » ne savent plus ce qui se passe réellement dans leur canton, dans leur pays et dans le monde. Ils vivent dans le récit d’un monde factice qui désigne ses gentils et ses méchants au gré des intérêts politiques, idéologiques, économiques et militaires du moment.
  • Notre télévision nationale est la reine de la désinformation. Pour être désinformé rien de rien de tel qu’écouter quotidiennement « les infos » et les « nouvelles ».
  • Notre télévision rend étroit d’esprit et ramollit le cerveau. L’information est déversée tel quelle dans notre cerveau. Nous ingurgitons tout ce que les journaleux ripeurs nous versent. Nous entendons tout le temps les mêmes choses et à longueur de journée (chômage, précarité, immigrés, catastrophes et tant de futilités) à tel point que nous pensons que c’est le seul point de vue viable, que c’est la vérité et finalement nous ne mettons même pas en doute ce que nous entendons et voyons ni ne nous viendrait à l’esprit de soupçonner l’existence d’autres points de vue.
  • A la télévision, la publicité est toujours présente, importante et primordiale. Ce neuromarketing nous fait consommer d’avantage et mal. En outre, toutes ces émissions de télévision subventionnées par les citoyens-contribuables sont pensées et choisies pour mettre le téléspectateur-consommateur dans la meilleure disposition mentale possible pour avaler tant les messages publicitaires que les affirmations et conclusions partiales de journalistes de gauche, de la caste à la Soros et de dits experts.
  • Des études ont montré que l’obésité augmente même chez les enfants à mesure des heures quotidiennes passées devant la télévision et que la télévision est mauvaise pour la santé.Succomber au pouvoir de séduction, de suggestion, de persuasion et de soumission volontaire ou non, des manipulateurs mentaux est facile; c’est même inévitable si nous n’y prêtons pas une attention soutenue et quotidienne. Bien informés, nous sommes des citoyens; mal informés, nous devenons des sujets puis des soumis. Citoyens du peuple Souverain suisse, reprenons tous le contrôle de notre propre vie et de notre cerveau pour revendiquer un monde meilleur, tout simplement; pour cela, le 4 mars prochain, ne nous laissons plus être manipulés par nos dispendieuses chaînes TV malbouffe, leurs bien trop nombreux employés qui luttent pour leur juteux fond de commerce et leurs supporters.

PD. Dr. méd. Dominique Schwander

»Gegen die moderne Welt« Ellen Kositza empfieht Mark Sedgwick

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»Gegen die moderne Welt«

Ellen Kositza empfieht Mark Sedgwick

 
Ellen Kositza, Literaturredakteurin der Zeitschrift »Sezession«, bespricht Mark Sedgwicks »Gegen die Moderne Welt«.
 
Bestellen kann man den Titel hier: https://www.antaios.de
 

The Revolutionary Conservative Critique of Oswald Spengler

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The Revolutionary Conservative Critique of Oswald Spengler 

Ex: https://motpol.nu

Oswald Spengler is by now well-known as one of the major thinkers of the German Conservative Revolution of the early 20th Century. In fact, he is frequently cited as having been one of the most determining intellectual influences on German Conservatism of the interwar period – along with Arthur Moeller van den Bruck and Ernst Jünger – to the point where his cultural pessimist philosophy is seen to be representative of Revolutionary Conservative views in general (although in reality most Revolutionary Conservatives held more optimistic views).[1]

To begin our discussion, we shall provide a brief overview of the major themes of Oswald Spengler’s philosophy.[2] According to Spengler, every High Culture has its own “soul” (this refers to the essential character of a Culture) and goes through predictable cycles of birth, growth, fulfillment, decline, and demise which resemble that of the life of a plant. To quote Spengler:

A Culture is born in the moment when a great soul awakens out of the proto-spirituality of ever-childish humanity, and detaches itself, a form from the formless, a bounded and mortal thing from the boundless and enduring. It blooms on the soil of an exactly-definable landscape, to which plant-wise it remains bound. It dies when the soul has actualized the full sum of its possibilities in the shape of peoples, languages, dogmas, arts, states, sciences, and reverts into the proto-soul.[3]

There is an important distinction in this theory between Kultur (“Culture”) and Zivilisation (“Civilization”). Kultur refers to the beginning phase of a High Culture which is marked by rural life, religiosity, vitality, will-to-power, and ascendant instincts, while Zivilisation refers to the later phase which is marked by urbanization, irreligion, purely rational intellect, mechanized life, and decadence. Although he acknowledged other High Cultures, Spengler focused particularly on three High Cultures which he distinguished and made comparisons between: the Magian, the Classical (Greco-Roman), and the present Western High Culture. He held the view that the West, which was in its later Zivilisation phase, would soon enter a final imperialistic and “Caesarist” stage – a stage which, according to Spengler, marks the final flash before the end of a High Culture.[4]

Perhaps Spengler’s most important contribution to the Conservative Revolution, however, was his theory of “Prussian Socialism,” which formed the basis of his view that conservatives and socialists should unite. In his work he argued that the Prussian character, which was the German character par excellence, was essentially socialist. For Spengler, true socialism was primarily a matter of ethics rather than economics. This ethical, Prussian socialism meant the development and practice of work ethic, discipline, obedience, a sense of duty to the greater good and the state, self-sacrifice, and the possibility of attaining any rank by talent. Prussian socialism was differentiated from Marxism and liberalism. Marxism was not true socialism because it was materialistic and based on class conflict, which stood in contrast with the Prussian ethics of the state. Also in contrast to Prussian socialism was liberalism and capitalism, which negated the idea of duty, practiced a “piracy principle,” and created the rule of money.[5]

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Oswald Spengler’s theories of predictable culture cycles, of the separation between Kultur and Zivilisation, of the Western High Culture as being in a state of decline, and of a non-Marxist form of socialism, have all received a great deal of attention in early 20th Century Germany, and there is no doubt that they had influenced Right-wing thought at the time. However, it is often forgotten just how divergent the views of many Revolutionary Conservatives were from Spengler’s, even if they did study and draw from his theories, just as an overemphasis on Spenglerian theory in the Conservative Revolution has led many scholars to overlook the variety of other important influences on the German Right. Ironically, those who were influenced the most by Spengler – not only the German Revolutionary Conservatives, but also later the Traditionalists and the New Rightists – have mixed appreciation with critique. It is this reality which needs to be emphasized: the majority of Conservative intellectuals who have appreciated Spengler have simultaneously delivered the very significant message that Spengler’s philosophy needs to be viewed critically, and that as a whole it is not acceptable.

The most important critique of Spengler among the Revolutionary Conservative intellectuals was that made by Arthur Moeller van den Bruck.[6] Moeller agreed with certain basic ideas in Spengler’s work, including the division between Kultur and Zivilisation, with the idea of the decline of the Western Culture, and with his concept of socialism, which Moeller had already expressed in an earlier and somewhat different form in Der Preussische Stil (“The Prussian Style,” 1916).[7] However, Moeller resolutely rejected Spengler’s deterministic and fatalistic view of history, as well as the notion of destined culture cycles. Moeller asserted that history was essentially unpredictable and unfixed: “There is always a beginning (…) History is the story of that which is not calculated.”[8] Furthermore, he argued that history should not be seen as a “circle” (in Spengler’s manner) but rather a “spiral,” and a nation in decline could actually reverse its decline if certain psychological changes and events could take place within it.[9]

md30309192093.jpgThe most radical contradiction with Spengler made by Moeller van den Bruck was the rejection of Spengler’s cultural morphology, since Moeller believed that Germany could not even be classified as part of the “West,” but rather that it represented a distinct culture in its own right, one which even had more in common in spirit with Russia than with the “West,” and which was destined to rise while France and England fell.[10] However, we must note here that the notion that Germany is non-Western was not unique to Moeller, for Werner Sombart, Edgar Julius Jung, and Othmar Spann have all argued that Germans belonged to a very different cultural type from that of the Western nations, especially from the culture of the Anglo-Saxon world. For these authors, Germany represented a culture which was more oriented towards community, spirituality, and heroism, while the modern “West” was more oriented towards individualism, materialism, and capitalistic ethics. They further argued that any presence of Western characteristics in modern Germany was due to a recent poisoning of German culture by the West which the German people had a duty to overcome through sociocultural revolution.[11]

Another key intellectual of the German Conservative Revolution, Hans Freyer, also presented a critical analysis of Spenglerian philosophy.[12] Due to his view that that there is no certain and determined progress in history, Freyer agreed with Spengler’s rejection of the linear view of progress. Freyer’s philosophy of culture also emphasized cultural particularism and the disparity between peoples and cultures, which was why he agreed with Spengler in terms of the basic conception of cultures possessing a vital center and with the idea of each culture marking a particular kind of human being. Being a proponent of a community-oriented state socialism, Freyer found Spengler’s anti-individualist “Prussian socialism” to be agreeable. Throughout his works, Freyer had also discussed many of the same themes as Spengler – including the integrative function of war, hierarchies in society, the challenges of technological developments, cultural form and unity – but in a distinct manner oriented towards social theory.[13]

41KpKuhd2tL._SX322_BO1,204,203,200_.jpgHowever, Freyer argued that the idea of historical (cultural) types and that cultures were the product of an essence which grew over time were already expressed in different forms long before Spengler in the works of Karl Lamprecht, Wilhelm Dilthey, and Hegel. It is also noteworthy that Freyer’s own sociology of cultural categories differed from Spengler’s morphology. In his earlier works, Freyer focused primarily on the nature of the cultures of particular peoples (Völker) rather than the broad High Cultures, whereas in his later works he stressed the interrelatedness of all the various European cultures across the millennia. Rejecting Spengler’s notion of cultures as being incommensurable, Freyer’s “history regarded modern Europe as composed of ‘layers’ of culture from the past, and Freyer was at pains to show that major historical cultures had grown by drawing upon the legacy of past cultures.”[14] Finally, rejecting Spengler’s historical determinism, Freyer had “warned his readers not to be ensnared by the powerful organic metaphors of the book [Der Untergang des Abendlandes] … The demands of the present and of the future could not be ‘deduced’ from insights into the patterns of culture … but were ultimately based on ‘the wager of action’ (das Wagnis der Tat).”[15]

Yet another important Conservative critique of Spengler was made by the Italian Perennial Traditionalist philosopher Julius Evola, who was himself influenced by the Conservative Revolution but developed a very distinct line of thought. In his The Path of Cinnabar, Evola showed appreciation for Spengler’s philosophy, particularly in regards to the criticism of the modern rationalist and mechanized Zivilisation of the “West” and with the complete rejection of the idea of progress.[16] Some scholars, such as H.T. Hansen, stress the influence of Spengler’s thought on Evola’s thought, but it is important to remember that Evola’s cultural views differed significantly from Spengler’s due to Evola’s focus on what he viewed as the shifting role of a metaphysical Perennial Tradition across history as opposed to historically determined cultures.[17]

In his critique, Evola pointed out that one of the major flaws in Spengler’s thought was that he “lacked any understanding of metaphysics and transcendence, which embody the essence of each genuine Kultur.”[18] Spengler could analyze the nature of Zivilisation very well, but his irreligious views caused him to have little understanding of the higher spiritual forces which deeply affected human life and the nature of cultures, without which one cannot clearly grasp the defining characteristic of Kultur. As Robert Steuckers has pointed out, Evola also found Spengler’s analysis of Classical and Eastern cultures to be very flawed, particularly as a result of the “irrationalist” philosophical influences on Spengler: “Evola thinks this vitalism leads Spengler to say ‘things that make one blush’ about Buddhism, Taoism, Stoicism, and Greco-Roman civilization (which, for Spengler, is merely a civilization of ‘corporeity’).”[19] Also problematic for Evola was “Spengler’s valorization of ‘Faustian man,’ a figure born in the Age of Discovery, the Renaissance and humanism; by this temporal determination, Faustian man is carried towards horizontality rather than towards verticality.”[20]

Finally, we must make a note of the more recent reception of Spenglerian philosophy in the European New Right and Identitarianism: Oswald Spengler’s works have been studied and critiqued by nearly all major New Right and Identitarian intellectuals, including especially Alain de Benoist, Dominique Venner, Pierre Krebs, Guillaume Faye, Julien Freund, and Tomislav Sunic. The New Right view of Spenglerian theory is unique, but is also very much reminiscent of Revolutionary Conservative critiques of Moeller van den Bruck and Hans Freyer. Like Spengler and many other thinkers, New Right intellectuals also critique the “ideology of progress,” although it is significant that, unlike Spengler, they do not do this to accept a notion of rigid cycles in history nor to reject the existence of any progress. Rather, the New Right critique aims to repudiate the unbalanced notion of linear and inevitable progress which depreciates all past culture in favor of the present, while still recognizing that some positive progress does exist, which it advocates reconciling with traditional culture to achieve a more balanced cultural order.[21] Furthermore, addressing Spengler’s historical determinism, Alain de Benoist has written that “from Eduard Spranger to Theodor W. Adorno, the principal reproach directed at Spengler evidently refers to his ‘fatalism’ and to his ‘determinism.’ The question is to know up to what point man is prisoner of his own history. Up to what point can one no longer change his course?”[22]

MOM-ND.jpgLike their Revolutionary Conservative precursors, New Rightists reject any fatalist and determinist notion of history, and do not believe that any people is doomed to inevitable decline; “Decadence is therefore not an inescapable phenomenon, as Spengler wrongly thought,” wrote Pierre Krebs, echoing the thoughts of other authors.[23] While the New Rightists accept Spengler’s idea of Western decline, they have posed Europe and the West as two antagonistic entities. According to this new cultural philosophy, the genuine European culture is represented by numerous traditions rooted in the most ancient European cultures, and must be posed as incompatible with the modern “West,” which is the cultural emanation of early modern liberalism, egalitarianism, and individualism.

The New Right may agree with Spengler that the “West” is undergoing decline, “but this original pessimism does not overshadow the purpose of the New Right: The West has encountered the ultimate phase of decadence, consequently we must definitively break with the Western civilization and recover the memory of a Europe liberated from the egalitarianisms…”[24] Thus, from the Identitarian perspective, the “West” is identified as a globalist and universalist entity which had harmed the identities of European and non-European peoples alike. In the same way that Revolutionary Conservatives had called for Germans to assert the rights and identity of their people in their time period, New Rightists call for the overcoming of the liberal, cosmopolitan Western Civilization to reassert the more profound cultural and spiritual identity of Europeans, based on the “regeneration of history” and a reference to their multi-form and multi-millennial heritage.

Lucian Tudor 

 

Notes

[1] An example of such an assertion regarding cultural pessimism can be seen in “Part III. Three Major Expressions of Neo-Conservatism” in Klemens von Klemperer, Germany’s New Conservatism: Its History and Dilemma in the Twentieth Century (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1968).

[2] To supplement our short summary of Spenglerian philosophy, we would like to note that one the best overviews of Spengler’s philosophy in English is Stephen M. Borthwick, “Historian of the Future: An Introduction to Oswald Spengler’s Life and Works for the Curious Passer-by and the Interested Student,” Institute for Oswald Spengler Studies, 2011, <https://sites.google.com/site/spenglerinstitute/Biography>.

[3] Oswald Spengler, The Decline of the West Vol. 1: Form and Actuality (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1926), p. 106.

[4] Ibid.

[5] See “Prussianism and Socialism” in Oswald Spengler, Selected Essays (Chicago: Gateway/Henry Regnery, 1967).

[6] For a good overview of Moeller’s thought, see Lucian Tudor, “Arthur Moeller van den Bruck: The Man & His Thought,” Counter-Currents Publishing, 17 August 2012, <http://www.counter-currents.com/2012/08/arthur-moeller-van-den-bruck-the-man-and-his-thought/>.

[7] See Fritz Stern, The Politics of Cultural Despair (Berkeley & Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1974), pp. 238-239, and Alain de Benoist, “Arthur Moeller van den Bruck,” Elementos: Revista de Metapolítica para una Civilización Europea No. 15 (11 June 2011), p. 30, 40-42. <http://issuu.com/sebastianjlorenz/docs/elementos_n__15>.

[8] Arthur Moeller van den Bruck as quoted in Benoist, “Arthur Moeller van den Bruck,” p. 41.

[9] Ibid., p. 41.

[10] Ibid., pp. 41-43.

[11] See Fritz K. Ringer, The Decline of the German Mandarins: The German Academic Community, 1890–1933 (Hanover: University Press of New England, 1990), pp. 183 ff.; John J. Haag, Othmar Spann and the Politics of “Totality”: Corporatism in Theory and Practice (Ph.D. Thesis, Rice University, 1969), pp. 24-26, 78, 111.; Alexander Jacob’s introduction and “Part I: The Intellectual Foundations of Politics” in Edgar Julius Jung, The Rule of the Inferiour, Vol. 1 (Lewiston, New York: Edwin Mellon Press, 1995).

[12] For a brief introduction to Freyer’s philosophy, see Lucian Tudor, “Hans Freyer: The Quest for Collective Meaning,” Counter-Currents Publishing, 22 February 2013, <http://www.counter-currents.com/2013/02/hans-freyer-the-quest-for-collective-meaning/>.

[13] See Jerry Z. Muller, The Other God That Failed: Hans Freyer and the Deradicalization of German Conservatism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987), pp. 78-79, 120-121.

[14] Ibid., p. 335.

[15] Ibid., p. 79.

[16] See Julius Evola, The Path of Cinnabar (London: Integral Tradition Publishing, 2009), pp. 203-204.

[17] See H.T. Hansen, “Julius Evola’s Political Endeavors,” in Julius Evola, Men Among the Ruins: Postwar Reflections of a Radical Traditionalist (Rochester: Inner Traditions, 2002), pp. 15-17.

[18] Evola, Path of Cinnabar, p. 204.

[19] Robert Steuckers, “Evola & Spengler”, Counter-Currents Publishing, 20 September 2010, <http://www.counter-currents.com/2010/09/evola-spengler/> .

[20] Ibid.

[21] In a description that applies as much to the New Right as to the Eurasianists, Alexander Dugin wrote of a vision in which “the formal opposition between tradition and modernity is removed… the realities superseded by the period of Enlightenment obtain a legitimate place – these are religion, ethnos, empire, cult, legend, etc. In the same time, a technological breakthrough, economical development, social fairness, labour liberation, etc. are taken from the Modern” (See Alexander Dugin, “Multipolarism as an Open Project,” Journal of Eurasian Affairs Vol. 1, No. 1 (September 2013), pp. 12-13).

[22] Alain de Benoist, “Oswald Spengler,” Elementos: Revista de Metapolítica para una Civilización Europea No. 10 (15 April 2011), p. 13.<http://issuu.com/sebastianjlorenz/docs/elementos_n__10>.

[23] Pierre Krebs, Fighting for the Essence (London: Arktos, 2012), p. 34.

[24] Sebastian J. Lorenz, “El Decadentismo Occidental, desde la Konservative Revolution a la Nouvelle Droite,”Elementos No. 10, p. 5.

samedi, 22 février 2020

Antaios, spiritual sources of Europe

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Antaios, spiritual sources of Europe

Interview with “New Antaios” (Thor E. Leichhardt)

(interview taken by Robert Steuckers, late spring 2011).

(http://www.new-antaios.net)

Who are you? What’s the main purpose of your “New-Antaios” project? And why do you refer to the mythological figure of Antaios? Is it a revival of Jünger’s and Eliade’s Antaios or an English counterpart of the former Antaios journal of the Belgian novelist Christopher Gérard?

I was born in Agram (a German name for the city of Zagreb) in Croatia just over 42 years ago. I have lived in Zagreb during the times while my country was occupied by Yugoslav communist regime led by dictator Josip Broz Tito. There I have studied Political Sciences at the University of Zagreb and later on Philosophy and Psychology at Hrvatski Studiji, University of Zagreb. I have studied as well at Universities in Scandinavia, United Kingdom and Germany. I am coming from a family which is of an ethnic German heritage.

Antaios is uniting Earth and Sea, soil and water without whom both there is no life. Antaios father was Poseidon, the God of Sea and mother Gaia of the Earth. Antaios or Antaeus in Greek means as well ‘’against’’ so in this way ‘’The New Antaios’’ is in cultural and philosophical terms set to make an intellectual bulwark against that what is destroying Our European culture, tradition, heritage, folklore and with that ultimately our roots.

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Journal ‘’The New Antaios’’ is the continuation of the original ‘’Antaios’’ Journal of Mircea Eliade and Ernst Jünger so we can say it is a revival albeit the Journal will/is as well reflecting on all that is happening in these postmodern times. Hence Journal represents what I call ‘’Postmodern European thought’’ and as such serves primarily as an outlet for the postmodern philosophers and thinkers.

I do respect and highly admire Christopher Gerard and his work on Antaios in years from years 1992 to 2001. Like Gerard I dislike New Age teachings and don’t have any interest in TraditionalistSchool. The New Antaios is made of four sections which are making the whole Journal. First part is ‘’Plethon’’ the name I gave after the Byzantine Hellenistic philosopher George Gemistos Plethon and articles in that section are related to Hellenism, Heathenism in a scholarly way. Contributions will be made as well by certain authors from Asatru background. Heathenism and Heithni comes from the Old Norse word heiðni which was used to describe the pre-Christian spiritual beliefs and practices of the Northern European peoples. The word Heithinn (or Heathen) comes from the Old Norse word heiðinn, an adjective to describe the ideals of Heithni (ex. Heithinn ethics – those ethics which conform to Heithni), or as a noun to describe those who live by the ethic and world-view of Heithni (ex. He is Heithinn, those people are Heithnir [plural]). Heiðni also means ‘high, pure, clear’ in Icelandic language. Word also describes person who is a dweller in place in the nature. Postmodern Heathens are those people who are reviving and revitalizing the tradition through serious study, research and dedication combined with the worship of the Gods and Goddesses or just simply in a way of their thinking without the ritual worship part. Personally I am keen of combining the two in a proper and balanced way. Second section is ‘’Aesthetic Vedanta’’ named after the book by Swami Bhaktivedanta Tripurari Maharaja, Western teacher of ancient tradition of Gaudiya Vaishnavism. Aesthetic Vedanta section deals with Hindutva, Hinduism,Vaishnavism and Gaudiya Vaishnavism exclusively. Third section is ‘’Suncovrat’’ a Croatian archaic word for the Solstice and deals with pre-Christian cultures which existed prior to Christianization of what makes nowadays Republic of Croatia. Fourth section is the main section of the Antaios Journal.

I would further like to point out that Christopher Gerard has no input whatsoever and isn’t in any way associated or affiliated with this new Journal. That is why the journal has prefix ‘’The New’’ to clearly mark difference with previous two journals. As far as I know Gerard’s Journal ceased to exist just on the turn of the century hence prefix ‘’The New’’ is completely appropriate here. While it will preserve and retain the original idea and concept with due respect to previous editors and directors of the Journal, it will be updated with short blog style texts, proper academic articles and essays which reflect on and take a critical eye of current state of affairs in different areas of philosophy, politics, culture, art, tradition, science and these postmodern times .

What was the maturation process of your worldview? Has it to do with Croatian politics or not?

I would say that I have spiritual and political Weltanschauung complementing each other. I was brought up in a family whose background is Christian albeit my late grandfather and my late father were both reading authors like Nietzsche and Jünger and considere themselves to be Pagans. I was brought up on stories from ancient Greece and Old Norse and Germanic tales whom my friends in school didn’t even hear about. My own father was a Heathen. He wrote small and up until now unpublished treatise on what he calls ‘’Raan’’. In this book Raan is knowledge of the Gods and Goddesses who once in previous Yugas did visit our planet. In this work he is influenced by Nietzsche’s and Heidegger’s philosophy.

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After spending years at the University in Croatia studying Political sciences in Zagreb I went to become a monk in Gaudiya Vaishnava tradition. The reason for that was again in the Family. During the mid to late 80es my family got interested in Gaudiya Vaishnavism so I started reading and studying different books of Vedic knowledge like Upanishads, Puranas and Bhagavad Gita. I have discovered in mid 90es about Traditionalist School, Rene Guenon and Julius Evola. In years to come I have been reading and studying about diverse cultures, traditions of Europe and parallel with that I got initiated in the Traditional Gaudiya Vaishnavism while travelling to one of my spiritual pilgrimages to India.

Hence as a result, my own spiritual belief system would be Traditional Gaudiya Vaishnavism, while I permanently study and read about Indo-European beliefs of our ancestors, Ostrogothic pre-Christian beliefs, Old Norse, Hellenic and Germanic pre-Christian belief systems and Mithraism. Vedic knowledge in my opinion is very important key to unlock many secrets of the European tradition itself. In line with that I very much admire Hindutva writers such as Sita Ram Goel and Ram Swarup, Indian historian Bal Gangadhar Tilak , contemporary scholar from Belgium Dr. Koenraad Elst as well as Alain Danielou who are all big influence. Next influence would be primarily my own teacher Sri Ananta das Babaji Maharaja by whom I was directly initiated in Parivar or Traditional line which goes back many centuries ago, then authors such as: Sri Kunjabihari das Babaji Maharaja (who is the direct teacher of my own teacher Ananta das Babaji Maharaja), Kundali das, Binode Bihari das Babaji and Sripad Bhaktivedanta Tripurari Swami Maharaja whose certain books and teachings are in my opinion the Gaudiya Vaishnava answer to Traditionalist school. There should be veneration of our ancestors together with the firm belief in divine origins of Our Ancestral lines, veneration of Nature and veneration of the Gods and Goddesses which are part of our European Identity. Perhaps it would be the best to quote here another great influence of mine, Dominique Venner: ”To live according to tradition is to conform to the ideal that incarnates, to cultivate excellence according to its standard, to rediscover its roots, to transmit its heritage, to be in solidarity with the people who uphold it. ”

Croatian politics were influential to my worldview and perhaps it would be better to give a bit of background explanation from the not so well known Croatian history. Certain people would like such knowledge to remain hidden as such. In my opinion Croatian people have a unique position in Europe. There are people who label Croatia Western Balkans which is a complete nonsense. According to what I was reading from diverse sources Croats aren’t only just Slavs and are mixture of Slavenized Germanic tribes, Celtic tribes, Illyrians, ancient Romans, ancient Greeks and Indo-Persians. Over the span of more than half a century Croat academics and researchers who were proclaiming such theories were executed or ‘’disappeared’’. Persecutions started in times of the monarchist Yugoslavia up to late 80es of 20th century in the communist regime. Names like Haraqwati and Haraxvati which paleographic expert Dr. Kalyanaraman has found were names of the tribes, etnonymes which clearly show how early we can find about Croatian origins. Places where such names were found were part of Bharata Varsha or what is today India. Archaeologists have found along names emblems and coats of arms which look very much similar to Croatian coat of arms with the twenty – five field “chessboard”. In a similar way the remnants and artefacts were also found when those tribes have moved from what is today India to Persia and those names can be found in 6th century before Christ in places like Bagistan and Persepolis and also with ancient peoples like Hurrwuhé. Ancestors of today’s Croats were worshippers of Saraswati Goddess of Vedic India (Goddess of learning, arts and music) and from her name comes originally name Hrvati. Croats are therefore known as Hrvati, Haravaitii, Arachosians or Sarasvatians, descendants of the ancient inhabitants of the Harauti province & the Haravaiti or the Sarasvati River. The recent hravati /hrvati [sic] hence comes from haraxvaiti and earlier spelt as haraquati (arachotos, arachosia, araxes). Sarasvati is the river and Arachosia being the region.” Their mention is as well on the legendary inscriptions of Darius the Great. Early Croatian pre-Christian religion was derived from primordial Persian Sun-worship. Even the Croatian word for tie is kravat(a) which is again another connecting word.

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Furthermore, the name of the Croatian capital, Zagreb, is related to the Zagros mountain range of Iran. The Dinara mountains in Dalmatia may be connected to Mount Dinar (Dene) of Iran. When the tribes came to what is nowadays Croatia they have mingled with the numerous local Slavic (or Slavenized Germanic tribes) tribes and adopted the Slavic language from them. Meanwhile after the collapse of the Hunnic Empire Croats organized the local Slavs into a state and gave them their national name. Before the invasion of the Avars ca. 560 the White or Western Croats created along with the Antes a great state extending north of the Carpathians from the upper Elbe to the upper Dniester. (35: Niederle, 263-266; Dvornik, The Slavs, 277-297) R. Heinzel is of the opinion that the Carpathians of the old Germanic Hervarsaga took their name from the Croats who called them the Harvate mountains i.e. Croatian mountains. (36: Heinzel, 499; Dvornik, op. cit., 284, sq.)” (Mandic 1970, Ch.1)

There are similarities in folklore as well. “There are old Croatian customs and national poems that have been cited as evidencing lingering traces of the fire and sun worship of the Persians. Fire, the essence of human origin, the sun, and the great boiling cauldron around which the warriors spring in the age old kolo or circle dance, all these are ingredients in the national lore of the Croatian nation. The Croat vilas or fairy witches resemble the peris of Iranian mythology. Then there is the legendary Sviatozov, the personification of strength, a being almost too huge for the earth to bear. He is strongly reminiscent of the “elephant-bodied” Rustum of Persian legend.” (Guldescu 1964, pt.1.II) “It should be noted that only the thesis of the Iranian origin of the Croats can explain the name “Horvath”, the title of a Croat dignitary Banus, the names “White” and “Red Croatian”, and the Bogumile phenomenon (like Cathars in Occitania). According to this theory, the Croats were a branch of the Caucasian Iranians, who lived somewhere in the western Caucasus during the era of the Roman Emperors. The Caucasian Anten were another branch of this group.” (Dobrovich 1963)

Research shows clearly everything what I have written and quoted above to be the truth although some oppose that theory as they want to preserve artificial Panslavism , idea of Yugosphere ( the idea for the 3rd united Yugoslavia without Slovenia and with Albania) under the guise of ‘’Western Balkans’’. In Croatian language there is an excellent word I really like: ‘’Samosvojnost’’. Samosvojnost means Identity in Croatian language. In my opinion Croatian identity should and must be preserved only through the independent republic of Croatia or as it is now. Hence Croatia does not need any new unions. Friendship yes, but union definitely not.

Serbia on the other hand would like to establish themselves as a regional leader. They play with naive Croatian government and Croatian president Josipović while behind their back they lobby in EU to make what was once war in ex-Yugoslavia look as a ‘’civil war’’ and accuse Croatia who were defending themselves . They do have some allies and friends in Europe who would like to see them as the leaders in the region. Those allies on the other hand actually don’t consider Serbia as a friend but as a tool for their own means and nothing else. It is a travesty of justice to see Croatian generals such as Gotovina and Markač to be sitting in Hague so just that Croatia can get a green light for EU so that bureaurocrats in EU they can say that ‘’all sides’’ were equally responsible. I would like to ask the question then. What about the people and country of Croatia which was invaded, whose homes are burned and destroyed? According to that ‘’theory’’ Croatians should not have been defending themselves as they were supposed just to sit and wait to be erased from the face of this planet.

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Croatia has been suffering since demise of Austria-Hungary. It wasn’t good for Croatians either to be in any previous unions but union with Serbs has proven to be so far the worst one. Union with Austria-Hungary was far from perfect but at least we were in a monarchy which had culture and tradition. Croatian people don’t need anything anymore other than their own independence and peace with the neighbouring nations.

How the time is passing by I am less and less interested in Croatian politics. As a result I won’t be writing in Croatian language anymore since there is no purpose for it. I will rather use and invest my energy, effort and time for something I think will yield certain results than to write constantly for something what will anyway reach just a handful of people or just completely wither away. I have learned that from an example of the members of the ‘’Croatian Historical Revolution’’. Over the years I have read articles by leading Croatian intellectuals and scholars such as Dr. Tomislav Sunić then Dr. Jure Georges Vujić, prof. Amir Riđanović, prof. Petar Bujas (all members of Croatian group similar to G.R.E.C.E. – Arhelinea – www.arhelinea.com ) Dr. Zoran Kravar, then Croat republican conservatives such as: Tomislav Jonjić, Mario Marcos Ostojić, Hrvoje Hitrec, Croatian scientists such as : Dr. Vitomir Belaj, prof. Tomo Vinšćak, Dr. Radoslav Katičić, and prof. Mario Kopić and Dr. Hrvoje Lorković (of whom we can’t hear these days what is a real tragedy since Dr. Lorković is one of Croatian important intellectuals). Croatians should be happy to have such giants of free thinking yet many in Croatia don’t even know about some of them. That is for me completely bizarre. If one is carefully reading articles and books by above mentioned intellectuals and scholars one can only see that many of them are actually disillusioned with the current state of Croatia altogether. That is evident even from their articles. Hence as a result of that Zoran Kravar is not interested in any kind of politics neither he wants to be or get involved (yet he is one of authorities on Ernst Jünger in Croatia) same is with prof. Tomo Vinšćak as well, while others like Mario Kopić and Dr. Tom Sunić are publishing their new books outside of Croatia because there is hardly any interest in their ideas in Croatia. It seems that Dr. Jure Georges Vujić will publish his new books as well outside of Croatia. That is unavoidable since Croatians are lethargic in finding new solutions in political dialogue or any kind of new political ideas. They would rather stick to something what is completely falling apart while thinking that ‘’it would get better’’. I have a best friend in Croatia whose political ideas are in minority and while he wants betterment in any spheres of Croatian life (including politics and his fight against corruption) he doesn’t have as much support as he actually would and should get. It is the apathy and lethargy which are deeply rooted in certain parts of Croatian nation (thankfully not all of it) with its roots in the fear of change and political and historical lower self-esteem (which is really uncalled for, since Croats have such rich history, tradition and culture of whom they should be absolutely proud of) . The question they often ask themselves is: ‘’ What would happen if things change? ‘’ and because of constantly repeating that question they are indeed unable to make any significant change. I believe firmly that in the forthcoming parliamentary elections Croats will elect again some party or coalition of parties which will not bring nothing new to already stagnating Croatian political scene. In the right as well as left and centre there is nobody who could potentially have a quality for the deep changes Croatia needs desperately. In the right side of spectrum and as well on centre and left one can just see political opportunists in Croatia who long for their seat in parliament (called Sabor in Croatia) or certain position. That is their goal before anything else I am afraid, of course my humble bow to those politicians who aren’t like that and are in significant, significant minority.

My own political interests nowadays evolve around Eurocontinentalism and European Identitarian Communitarianism. Even though I do speak Croatian language I consider myself first and foremost an ethnic German with Prussian mentality, after that I am an European.

Eurocontinentalism in this case represents strong continental Europe which stands between USA and Great Britain on one and Russia on the other side. The question of Europe here is not just a matter a blood; it is spiritual, historical and cultural phenomenon.
This further quote actually explains some of my thinking on the matter: ‘’Implicit in this view is the assumption that the body is inseparable from the spirit animating it, that biological difference, as a distinct vitality, is another form of spiritual difference, and that the significance of such differences (given that man is a spiritual being, not merely an animal) is best seen in terms of culture and history rather than nineteenth-century biological science. American “white racialists” with their materialist-technical conceptions of race actually diminish the significance of the Racial Question by reducing it to a simple matter of genes, biology, equations….’’ ( Mladikov – The Phora Forum)

2013_05_Venner.jpgDominique Venner is in my opinion the greatest influence for the Eurocontinentalism and my own political Weltanschauung with his writings, articles and books. In Croatia some of his books are available as well.

His thoughts describe the best what I think further:

‘’ The idea that is made of love is no more frivolous than the tragic sense of history that characterizes the European spirit. It defines the civilization, its immanent spirit, and each person’s sense of life, in the same way the idea shapes one’s work. Is the sole point of work to make money, as they believe across the Atlantic, or, besides ensuring a just return, is it to realize oneself in a job well done, even in such apparently trivial things as keeping one’s house. This idea urged our ancestors to create beauty in their most humble and most lofty efforts. To be conscious of the idea is to give a metaphysical sense to “memory.”

To cultivate our “memory,” to transmit it in a living way to our children, to contemplate the ordeals that history has imposed on us–this is requisite to any renaissance. Faced with the unprecedented challenges that the catastrophes of the twentieth century have imposed on us and the terrible demoralization it has fostered, we will discover in the reconquest of our racial “memory” the way to respond to these challenges, which were unknown to our ancestors, who lived in a stable, strong, well-defended world.

The consciousness of belonging to Europe, of Europeanness, is far older than the modern concept of Europe. It is apparent under the successive names of Hellenism, Celticness, Romanism, the Frankish Empire, or Christianity. Seen as an immemorial tradition, Europe is the product of a multi-millennial community of culture deriving its distinctness and unity from its constitutive peoples and a spiritual heritage whose supreme expression is the Homeric poems. ‘’

To read further perhaps I would recommend this article (and as well all other articles by Dominique Venner) : http://www.counter-currents.com/2010/06/europe-and-europeanness/#more-881

What were your main sources of inspiration?

I have mentioned some of them above. I would say that Ernst Jünger, Dominique Venner and Nicolás Gómez Dávila are the most significant and important influence for me personally simply because they complement each other perfectly and in my own opinion they represent the true European Tradition which Ram Swarup, Sita Ram Goel, Alain Danielou and Koenraad Elst represent in Hindu Tradition. Apart from them other authors, thinkers and philosophers I would say first of all I feel especially close regarding ideas and Weltanschauung are : Croatian thinkers and members of the ‘’Croatian Historical Revolution’’, Classical philosophers such as : Emperor Julian the Apostate, Porphyry, Celsus, Platonis Sallustius, Libanius, Julius Firmicus Maternus, Iamblichus, Gemistus Pletho(n) and other such philosophers, Erik von von Kuehnelt – Leddihn, Croatian philosopher prof. Mario Kopić, prof. Robert Steuckers, certain ideas of Alain de Benoist, certain ideas of Dr. Guillaume Faye, Dr. Georges Dumezil, Dr. Jan Assmann, Mircea Eliade, Emile Cioran, Alain Danielou, German greatest living poet Rolf Schilling, Oswald Spengler, Carl Schmitt, German Romanticism period authors and artists, Felix Dahn, Antoine Saint du Exupery, certain ideas of Julius Evola, Norwegian composer Geirr Tveitt, composers Arvo Part and Johannes Brahms, Felix Mendelssohn, Sibelius, Ralph Vaughan Williams, postmodern musical projects such as Triarii, Arditi, In Slaughter Natives and new project Winglord, artists such as Ludwig Fahrenkrog, Karl Wilhelm Diefenbach, Fidus, Caspar David Friedrich, Hermann Hendrich, Franz von Stuck, Carl Larsson, John Atkinson Grimshaw, Jean Béraud and others.

Who are the main Croatian thinkers according to you and that are completely ignored in the rest of the world? How could we discover them?

6891271.jpgMain and most influential Croatian thinkers were: Dr. Milan von Šufflay (picture), Dr. Ivo Pilar, Dr. Vinko Krišković, Dr. Filip Lukas, Dr. Julije (Julius) von Makanec, Dr. Stjepan Buć and authors involved with journal ‘’Spremnost’’ : prof. Tias Mortigjija, Dr. Milivoj Magdić, Dr. Ante Ciliga & Dr. Vilko Rieger (Dr. George W. Cesarich) . Influential are also early works of prof. Ivan Oršanić, Dr. Ivo Korsky, then author Ivan Softa (Croatian Knut Hamsun), national poet Jerko Skračić and a few others. It is very hard for somebody in Europe to discover them as their works were burned, destroyed and left to be forgotten by Yugoslavian and Serbian communist regime. Back in 1970es of 20th century for just reading the works of these authors, philosophers and thinkers one could get a lengthy prison term and that would be of course if you did find their books somewhere. I am collecting their works wherever I can find them and that is in most cases extremely hard and on top of that some of their books command very high prices. Situation is not like with authors of Conservative Revolution whose works remain saved and translated to many languages now. Most of the above mentioned people were brutally murdered by either Serbian Monarchist regime who ruled the first Yugoslavia or by communist regime who ruled Yugoslavia and occupied Croatia after the year 1945.

At this point in time there is no translated literature in any of other languages except the book ‘’Southslav question’’ written by Dr. Ivo Pilar (under pseudonym Dr. Leon v. Südland) which was printed at the beginning of the 20th century in Vienna originally in German language. Book was never reprinted again either in German or English (or any other foreign language) and was translated in Croatian language and has since been in print only twice. Copies of both editions are virtually impossible to find. Books of other authors are not being reprinted at all. I really don’t know if that is because of the economic crisis in Croatia since many members of Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) turned out to be crooks and thieves who were stealing money from their own country and country’s resources. It has been going on like that for a long time and no government (even the coalition of liberals and social democrats which lasted for 4 years) didn’t make situation any better or because there is no interest in those books and those authors at all. It is partially because of many Croatians were killed and murdered from 1944 to early 1950es by communist regime (and in years after that up to 1990 just prior to war in Croatia) and because of the mentality which became a norm since 1918, after Croats lost the war as part of Austria-Hungary. Dr. Ivo Pilar did warn Croatians about those kinds of problems especially in two of his books. One of those books was above mentioned ‘’Southslav question’’.

I am afraid that the only way to discover them will be through book I am currently writing and subsequently I will translate some of the most important works by Šufflay, Pilar, Lukas, Krišković, Makanec, Mortigjija and Magdić. I will start with works of Dr. Ivo Pilar and Dr. Milivoj Magdić whose works I am collecting at the present time. I am putting together Dr. Milivoj Magdić’s and dr. Ivo Pilar’s articles and smaller important works and will include one very informative article about Milivoj Magdić’s life done by one Croatian historian. Dr. Pilar’s book ‘’Southslav question’’ will be most likely the first one to surface followed by Dr. Magdić’s collected works. It is very interesting to mention that Dr. Ivo Pilar and Dr. Milivoj Magdić had both the biggest private libraries in the city of Zagreb and most likely in Croatia at that time. I have heard that currently Alain de Benoist has one of the biggest private libraries.

So we can talk about a genuine Croatian “Conservative Revolution”?

Croatian Historical Revolution was a German Conservative Revolution’s and France’s Ordre Nouveau’s counterpart. It strikes me how there wasn’t anybody in Croatia trying to compare German Conservative Revolution with all these authors we have had. My guess is that certain levels of academia in Croatia have some sort of inferiority complex and lower self-esteem. Except post modern Croatian intellectuals and academics I have mentioned above (and most in this group were living, studying and teaching for some time outside of Croatia) other Croatian intellectuals constantly behave in a way which has ruined indescribably reputation of Croatia. Members of Croatian Historical revolution were totally opposite. Partially that is because they grew up in Austria- Hungary and partially because up until year 1918 influence of Balkan ‘’culture’’ wasn’t predominant in Croatia and our gene pool wasn’t almost destroyed as it is the case today (holocaust of Croats and ethnic Germans from years 1944 -1950es). Most of the people who today want any kind of communism to be back in Croatia are leftovers of previous regime and they are not even Croats by their genes or in spirit.

05224baf72f642bd03aea467e8abd40d.jpgMembers of CHR (Croatian Historical Revolution) have had experience with different ideologies and transformations as the ones in Germany. They rallied for the Croatia as an integral part of Europe and how some of them called it at the time ‘’Bieli Zapad’’ (White West). Like authors in German counterpart they have produced diverse works such as philosophical treatises, political journalism, manifestoes which have outlined their ideas for the transformation of Croatia and role of Croatia in Central Europe and Europe altogether. They were strongly opposing liberalism and even liberal democracy and they have rejected despiritualization and commercial culture. They advocated new conservative thought which was inspired by Croatian national patriotism. I find their ideal very much connected with ideals of German Conservative Revolution members and nowadays with prof. Dominique Venner.

How could we connect Croatian authors with their other European counterparts? Who are the Croatian authors that should be read together, beyond every language barrier?

My opinion is that all the works of the above mentioned members of the Croatian Historical revolution are very much worth exploring, studying and reading. They all do come highly recommended albeit due to totalitarian and primitive backwards communist regime headed by Josip Broz Tito and his blind followers lots of original writings are lost , destroyed or are very rare to that extent that only Croatian National Library may have only one copy or original of each of the original works of the members of the Croatian Historical Revolution. None of those works were translated in any languages (as I have mentioned above) except Dr. Pilar’s ‘’Southslav question’’ which was originally written in German and then translated to Croatian. Dr. Ivo Pilar was speaking and writing as Dr. Milan v. Šufflay and many other members of CHR, in several languages. In those times after the I WW it was quite normal for people of Croatia to speak German as a second and in many cases as their mother language together with Croatian language. Hopefully in time through my own ‘’ Hyperborea Press’’ which is the part of Somnium Media all the main works of the members of the Croatian Historical Revolution will surface and be translated in English language. As always one has to be realistic, as with any of such efforts good will isn’t enough, I will have to invest money and time into this project in a balanced manner.

Do you see original viewpoints or bias by these Croatian authors that you cannot find back in the works of their other European counterparts?

I know that I risk now sounding a bit vague but most of their viewpoints are similar or identical with their German and French counterparts, although one of their main focal points or focus was naturally fight against the repressive Serbian monarchist regime and its imperialistic hegemony. I have written recently some articles about this topic. I believe that I will answer much broader to this question in my book about Croatian Historical Revolution.

What are your projects for the near future?

The New Antaios Journal’s further development is my priority and alongside with TNAJ there is ‘’Eurocontinentalism Journal’’ and my own ‘’Somnium Media’’ website which offers music, merchandise and books which are serving as an alternative to world of mass consumerism we live in. Great help in that effort is my dear friend mr. Zvonimir Tosic who is an editor in chief and managing webmaster of The New Antaios Journal and Somnium websites. The New Antaios and Eurocontinentalism Journal will both have some interesting interviews and articles in months to come. Somnium Media imprint ‘’Hyperborea Press’’ will publish most significant works of members of the Croatian Historical revolution and hopefully some works by Nicolas Gomez Davila.

Further related to ‘’Hyperborea Press’’ I have plans for the three books and three translations. First one is above already mentioned book about Croatian Historical Revolution and its members and it will be an overview of the significance of Croatian Historical Revolution and works of its members and authors not only for Croatia but for Europe and European thought as well. Another book is ‘’ Gaudiya Vaishnavism – The Living and Timeless Tradition ‘’ which will explain how important Traditional Gaudiya Vaishnavism is (a belief in Hinduism) not only for Hinduism but for the resurgence of Indo – European thought in general. I know that Dr. Alexander Jacob has written extensively on the topic of resurgence of Indo-European thought but his emphasis is not like in authors such as Georges Dumezil , Jan de Vries, or Ram Swarup, Sita Ram Goel and Alain Danielou in Hinduism or ancestral pre-christian beliefs. Rather he uses as an example for restoration of Indo –European thought resurgence of European Medieval Christian noble spirit of ‘’archaic and brave’’ and Prussian noble spirit. In my own opinion the best starting point for such study would be a Saxon epic ‘’Heliand’’.

Picture: Dr. Ivo Pilar

220px-Ivo_Pilar.jpgTraditional Gaudiya Vaishnava thought in this book will serve as an alternative for the Traditionalist thought which was espoused by Guenon, Schuon and other Traditionalists. Third book deals with Croatian pre-Christian and pre-Slavic legends and it delves in times of the heroic Croatian past. I have contacted one still living Croatian author who gave me information on stories and its characters which obviously have roots in pre-Christian and pre-Slavic times of Croatia. It is quite a work and a huge challenge to reconstruct those tales and to find out and connect certain characters. Some shortened versions of those stories I will be presenting at certain Storytelling Fairs in Ireland during the summer. Three translations will be my most likely first translation work on the new book by Dr. Jure Georges Vujic (which will be his first book in English language) followed by translations of two books of the members of the Croatian Historical Revolution, Dr. Ivo Pilar’s ‘’Southslav question’’ and Dr. Milivoj Magdić’s best and collected works complete with my own explanations and commentaries. I will also continue writing for Brett Stevens’s Journal on line www.amerika.org which is with Europa Synergon one of the most interesting journals to be found on line.

Thank you very much Robert for the opportunity you gave me with this interview and as well thank you for your influence on my own thought which is indispensable and very important. I would also like to thank to anybody who has read this interview and found it interesting or just thought provoking.

(interview taken by Robert Steuckers, late spring 2011).

William Galston’s Anti-Pluralism

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William Galston’s Anti-Pluralism

William A. Galston
Anti-Pluralism: The Populist Threat to Liberal Democracy
New Haven: Yale University Press, 2018

“It is time for an open and robust debate on issues of immigration, identity politics, and nationalism that liberals and progressives have long avoided.”—William Galston

Galston is right. I will debate any liberal or progressive about these topics, and if they don’t want to debate me, I will help arrange a debate with whomever they prefer. Contact me at editor@counter-currents.com [2].

William Galston (born 1946) has had a long career spanning both political theory and practice. He received his Ph.D. in political theory from the University of Chicago and has strong Straussian credentials, although he aligns himself with the center-Left, not the neocons. (Arguably, this is a distinction without a difference.) Galston has taught in the political science departments of the University of Texas at Austin and the University of Maryland. He is now affiliated with the centrist Brookings Institution. Galston has worked for the presidential campaigns of John Anderson, Walter Mondale, Bill Clinton, and Al Gore. He was deputy assistant for domestic policy in the Clinton White House from January 1993 to May 1995.

Galston’s Anti-Pluralism: The Populist Threat to Liberal Democracy presents itself as a “liberal-democratic” centrist polemic against the populist Right, in much the same vein as Francis Fukuyama’s Identity: Contemporary Identity Politics and the Struggle for Recognition (2018, see my review here [3], here [4], and here [5]) and Mark Lilla’s The Once and Future Liberal: After Identity Politics (2017, see my review here [6]).

But Galston, like Fukuyama and Lilla, received a Straussian education, so chances are good that his arguments are not entirely straightforward. Indeed, all three books can also be read as polemics against the Left, since they argue that Left-wing excesses are the driving force behind the rise of Right-wing populism. Therefore, if the “liberal democratic” establishment wishes to take the wind out of the sails of Right-wing populism, it needs to rein in the excesses of the far Left.

Galston’s theoretical account of liberal democracy is pretty much standard centrist boilerplate. His theoretical account of populism depends heavily of Jan-Werner Müller’s extremely flawed book What Is Populism?, which I have reviewed [7] already.

For Galston, following Müller, liberal democracy is essentially “pluralist” and populism is “anti-pluralist.” By this, he does not mean that liberal democracies recognize that every healthy society balances the needs of the family, civil society, and the state. Nor does he mean that a healthy polity has differences of opinion that might express themselves in a plurality of political parties. Nor does he mean that a healthy society has different classes. Nor does he mean the separation of powers or the mixed regime. Populists can embrace all those forms of pluralism, but without liberalism.

Instead, for Galston and Müller, pluralism just means “diversity,” i.e., the presence of minorities, which he describes as “helpless” and in need of protection from the tyranny of the majority. By “minorities,” Galston doesn’t mean the people who lose a vote—a group that changes with every vote—but rather more fixed minorities, such as social elites and ethnic minorities.

But what if some minorities are not helpless but actually dangerously powerful? What if liberal democracy has long ceased to be majority rule + protection for minorities? What if liberal democracy has become, in effect, minority rule? What if these ruling minorities are so hostile to the majority that they have enacted policies that not only economically pauperize them, but also destroy their communities with immigration and multiculturalism, and, beyond that, seek their outright ethnic replacement? Liberal democracy is really just a euphemism for minority rule, meaning rule by hostile elites. Naturally, one would expect some sort of reaction. That reaction is populism.

Galston understands this. He recognizes the four major trends that Roger Eatwell and Matthew Goodwin argue are responsible for the rise of populism in their book National Populism: Revolt Against Liberal Democracy: popular distrust of elites, the destruction of communities by immigration and multiculturalism, the economic deprivation—falling largely on the working-class and middle-class—caused by globalization, and the consequent political dealignments in relation to the post-war center-Left/center-Right political establishment. (See my discussions of Eatwell and Goodwin here [8], here [9], and here [10].)

In his Introduction, Galston notes that “The people would defer to elites as long as elites delivered sustained prosperity and steadily improving living standards” (p. 2). Galston actually describes elitism as a “deformation” of liberal democracy: “Elitists claim that they best understand the means to the public’s ends and should be freed from the inconvenient necessity of popular consent” (p. 4).

People stopped trusting elites when economic globalization, immigration, and multiculturalism started making life worse, and not just economically but also in terms of culture and public safety (crime, terrorism): “A globalized economy, it turned out, served the interests of most people in developing countries and elites in advanced countries—but not the working and middle classes in the developed economies . . .” (p. 3). “Not only did immigrants compete with longtime inhabitants for jobs and social services, they were also seen as threatening long-established cultural norms and even public safety” (p. 3).

Galston outlines how our out-of-touch, hostile, increasingly panicked establishment can head off populism before it leads to genuine regime change:

. . . there is much that liberal democratic governments can do to mitigate their insufficiencies. Public policy can mitigate the heedlessness of markets and slow unwanted change. Nothing requires democratic leaders to give the same weight to outsiders’ claims as to those of their own citizens. They are not obligated to support policies that weaken their working and middle classes, even if these policies improve the lot of citizens in developing countries. They are certainly not obligated to open their doors to all newcomers, whatever the consequences for their citizenry. Moderate self-preference is the moral core of defensible nationalism. Unmodulated internationalism will breed—is breeding—its antitheses, an increasingly unbridled nationalism. (p. 5)

The Left, of course, has no problem using public policy to rein in markets, but they vehemently reject Galston’s “moderate self-preference,” which is what some people would call putting “America first.” The American Left is committed to open borders, which will pauperize the American middle and working classes as surely as Republican deindustrialization and globalization.

In chapter 6, “Liberal Democracy in America: What Is to Be Done?,” Galston recommends prioritizing economic growth and opportunity and making sure it is widely shared by everyone. The “second task requires pursuing three key objectives: adopting full employment as a principal goal or economic policy; restoring the link between productivity gains and wage increases; and treating earned and unearned income equally in our tax code” (p. 87). In effect, Galston proposes halting the decline of the American middle class that has been ongoing for nearly half a century by ensuring that productivity gains go to workers, not just capitalists. As a populist, these are policies that I can support.

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Galston also suggests that a corrective to the decline in labor unions and worker bargaining power due to globalization can be offset by measures to “democratize capital through . . . worker ownership of firms, that share the gains more broadly” (p. 99).

Of course productivity can be raised in two ways: by making labor more productive through technological and organizational improvements—or simply by cost-cutting. Practically all the “productivity” gains of globalization are simply due to cost-cutting by replacing well-paid white workers with poorly paid Third Worlders, either by sending factories overseas or by importing legal and illegal immigrants. If public policy is to promote genuine economic growth, it needs to promote genuine increases in productivity, which means technological innovations, as well as better education and all-round infrastructure.

But technology doesn’t just make workers more productive. It also puts them out of work. However, if workers have no incomes, then they cannot purchase the products of automation. (Production can be automated, but consumption can’t.) So how can we maintain technological growth, a healthy middle class, and consumer demand at the same time? Galston points to a partial solution:

. . . the public should get a return on public capital the benefits of which are now privately appropriated. When the government funds basic research that leads to new medical devices, the firms that have relied on this research should pay royalties to the Treasury. When states and localities invest in infrastructure that raises property values and creates new business opportunities, the taxpayers should receive some portion of the gains. One might even imagine public contributions to a sovereign wealth fund that would invest in an index of U.S. firms and pay dividends to every citizen. (p. 99)

The key point is that when machines put us out of work, we should not fall into unemployment but rise into the class of people who live on dividends. A more direct route to the same outcome would be to adopt Social Credit economics, including a dividend or Universal Basic Income paid to every citizen. (For more on this, see my essay, “Money for Nothing [11].”)

Galston does not mention simple, straightforward protectionism, but there are sound arguments for it, and the arguments against it have been refuted. (See Donald Thoresen’s review [12] of Ian Fletcher’s Free Trade Doesn’t Work.)

The bad news for National Populists is that Galston’s proposals, if actually adopted, would significantly retard our political success. The good news is that Galston’s proposals are simply what Eatwell and Goodwin call “National Populism lite,” which means that Galston is abandoning globalism in principle. What he refuses to abandon is the existing political establishment, which he thinks will retain power only by abandoning globalism.

Another piece of good news is that the establishment will probably never listen to Galston. They are fanatically committed to their agenda. They are not going to drop their commitment to globalism in favor of nationalism, even if it is the only way to preserve themselves. Galston is trying to appeal to the rational self-interest of the existing elites. But they are not rational or even especially self-interested. Sometimes people hate their enemies more than they love themselves. But National Populists would implement Galston’s policies, and more. So perhaps he is rooting for the wrong team.

A third piece of good news is that Galston realizes that economic reforms are not enough. Galston also cites studies showing that populist Brexit and Trump voters were not motivated solely by economic concerns (pp. 76–77). They were also motivated by concerns about identity. Since Galston is talking primarily about white countries, National Populism is a species of white identity politics. Since Left-wing populism rejects nationalism and white identity politics (and only white identity politics), it can only address white voters on economic issues, which means that it has less electoral appeal than Right-wing populism.

As I never tire of pointing out, what people want is a socially conservative, nationalistic, interventionist state that will use its power to protect the working and middle classes from the depredations of global capitalism. The elites, however, want social liberalism and globalism both in politics and economics.

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The two-party system is designed to never give the people what they want. The Republicans stand for conservative values and global capitalism. The Democrats stand for liberal values and the interventionist state. When in power, the parties only deliver what the elites want, not what the people want.

The consequence is neoliberalism: an increasingly oligarchical hypercapitalist society that celebrates Left-wing values. Galston offers interesting support for this thesis by quoting Bo Rothstein, “a well-known scholar of European social democracy” who argues (these are Rothstein’s words) that “The more than 150-year-old alliance between the industrial working class and the intellectual-cultural Left is over” (p. 103). Rothstein elaborates:

The traditional working class favors protectionism, the re-establishment of a type of work that the development of technology has rendered outdated and production over environmental concerns; it is also a significant part of the basis of the recent surge in anti-immigrant and even xenophobic views. Support of the traditional working class for strengthening ethnic or sexual minorities’ rights is also pretty low. (p. 103)

Since the Left’s values are the “exact opposite,” Rothstein proposes that the Left ally with the “new entrepreneurial economy.” Hence the marriage of some of the biggest corporations on the planet—Facebook, Apple, Amazon, Microsoft, Google—with trannies, POCs, Muslims, feminists, and global warming fantasists. This coalition thinks it will win through replacing the white working and middle classes with non-whites. Galston notes that Democratic Party circles in the US hold essentially the same views:

The best known have based their case on long-cycle demographic shifts. There is a “rising American electorate” made up of educated professionals minorities, and young people, all groups whose share of the electorate will increase steadily over the next two generations. These groups represent the future. The white working class, whose electoral share has dwindled in recent decades and will continue to do so, is the past. This does not mean that the center-left should ignore it completely. [For instance, on economic matters.] It does mean that there should be no compromise with white working-class sentiments on the social and cultural issues that dominate the concerns of the rising American electorate coalition. (p. 103)

This is a crystal-clear statement of the White Nationalist thesis that the Left is counting on—and promoting—the slow genocide of whites [13] through race-replacement immigration in order to create a permanent Left-wing majority. What could possibly go wrong? Galston drily notes that “This was the theory at the heart of Hillary Clinton’s presidential campaign.”

Obviously, there was going to be a reaction. The Left has been partying like whites are already a minority, but that’s not true yet. White demographic decline is obviously a serious threat if we do nothing about it. But there is nothing inevitable about white demographic decline. It is the product of particular political policies. Thus it can be reversed by different policies. And, as Eatwell and Goodwin argue in National Populism, we still have some decades to turn things around, although of course the time frame varies from country to country. Furthermore, National Populist political movements, once they break through, are highly competitive because, unlike the center-Left and center-Right, we will actually give the people what they want, for a change.

Galston is well aware that the center-Left cannot compete with National Populists on economic ground alone:

If concessions on cultural and social issues are ruled out, appeals to the white working class will have to be confined to economics. . . . The difficulty, as we have seen, is that the audience for this economic appeal cares at least as much about social and cultural issues. Immigration, demographic change, and fears of cultural displacement drove the Brexit vote, and they were the key determinants of Donald Trump’s victory. . . .

So the American center-left has a choice: to stand firm on social and cultural issues that antagonize populism’s most fervent supporters, or to shift in ways for which it can offer a principled defense. It is time for an open and robust debate on issues of immigration, identity politics, and nationalism that liberals and progressives have long avoided. (pp. 103–104)

Galston is absolutely correct here. The Left will not win by bread alone. It needs to address questions of values and identity. But it can’t really do so without abandoning its own values and identity. We really do need open and honest debate on immigration, identity politics, and nationalism, but the Left cannot permit this, because they know they’ll lose.

Galston also recognizes that tribal sentiments—meaning a preference for one’s own—are an ineradicable part of human nature. Because of this, “The issue of national identity is on the table, not only in scholarly debates, but also in the political arena. Those who believe that liberal democracy draws strength from diversity have been thrown on the defensive. Large population flows . . . have triggered concerned about the loss of national sovereignty” (p. 95).

Galston approvingly quotes Jeff Colgan and Robert Keohane’s statement that “It is not bigotry to calibrate immigration levels to the ability of immigrants to assimilate and to society’s ability to adjust” (p. 96). Of course, assimilation is the opposite of multiculturalism. Galston suggests that US immigration policies should shift toward meritocratic concerns about economic contribution, put increasing emphasis on English fluency, and demand greater knowledge of American history and institutions. The main virtue of these proposals is that they would dramatically decrease the numbers of immigrants (p. 96). I heartily agree with Galston’s final remarks on immigration:

One thing is clear: denouncing citizens concerned about immigration as ignorant and bigoted (as former British prime minister Gordon Brown did in an ill-fated election encounter with a potential supporter) does nothing to ameliorate either the substance of the problem or its politics. (p. 96)

But again, Leftists are unlikely to take Galston’s advice. If the Left moved away from moralistic condemnations of immigration skepticism and actually debated the topic, they would simply lose. Indeed, one of the reasons why the Left supports race-replacement immigration is because they have given up on convincing white voters and simply wish to replace them.

Galston also chides Leftists for their arrogance. One of the strongest predictors of Left-wing values is the amount of time people spend in higher education, especially the liberal arts and social sciences. This does not mean that such people are genuinely educated, of course, but they are flattered into thinking they are more enlightened and intelligent than ordinary people, which feeds into populism:

Put bluntly, if Americans with more education regard their less educated fellow citizens with disrespect, the inevitable response of the disrespected will be resentment coupled with a desire to take revenge on those who assert superiority. . . . elites have a choice: they can try to take the edge off status differences or they can flaunt them. . . . It is up to privileged Americans to take the first step by listening attentively and respectively to those who went unheard for far too long. (p. 102)

Galston is right, of course, but there is little likelihood that this recommendation—or any of his others—will be heeded. The pretense of intellectual superiority, no matter how hollow, is close to the core of Leftist identity. To win by abandoning one’s identity feels like losing to most people. Thus they will tend to hold fast to their identities and hope that somehow reality will accommodate their wishes.

William Galston is a perceptive, rational, and courageous writer. I can’t help but respect him, even though he is on the other side. He is a liberal democrat. I am an illiberal democrat. He wants to preserve the current establishment. I don’t. Given that the current establishment has fundamentally betrayed our people—with the Left openly pinning its hopes on the slow genocide of whites and the Right too stupid and cowardly to stop it—we need genuine regime change.

Even though Anti-Pluralism is a critique of National Populism, I find it a highly encouraging book. Rhetorically, the book was often cringe-inducing. Evidently Galston thinks that to communicate difficult truths to liberals, they need a great deal of buttering up. But in terms of its substance, Galston—like Fukuyama and Lilla—concedes many fundamental premises to National Populists, and the only way he can envision stopping National Populism and keeping the existing political establishment in power is by adapting National Populism lite. In short, he has all but conceded us the intellectual victory. Our task is now to achieve it on the political plane.

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URL to article: https://www.counter-currents.com/2020/02/william-galstons-anti-pluralism/

URLs in this post:

[1] Image: https://www.counter-currents.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/GalstonAntiPluralism.jpg

[2] editor@counter-currents.com: mailto:editor@counter-currents.com

[3] here: https://www.counter-currents.com/2019/01/fukuyama-on-identity-politics/

[4] here: https://www.counter-currents.com/2019/01/fukuyama-on-diversity/

[5] here: https://www.counter-currents.com/2019/01/fukuyama-on-civic-nationalism/

[6] here: https://www.counter-currents.com/2018/10/the-identitarian-dispensation/

[7] reviewed: https://www.counter-currents.com/2018/12/what-populism-isnt/

[8] here: https://www.counter-currents.com/2018/12/beyond-the-alt-right-toward-a-new-nationalism/

[9] here: https://www.counter-currents.com/2019/07/national-populism-is-here-to-stay-2/

[10] here: https://www.counter-currents.com/2019/11/uppity-white-folks-and-how-to-reach-them/

[11] Money for Nothing: https://www.counter-currents.com/2012/01/money-for-nothing/

[12] review: https://www.counter-currents.com/2015/09/free-trade-doesnt-work/

[13] genocide of whites: https://www.counter-currents.com/2015/09/white-genocide/