Auteur de huit recueils poétiques d’inspiration parnassienne, Rodenbach est surtout connu pour ses romans dont le style est aux antipodes du réalisme et du naturalisme. Trois personnages, une intrigue simple, une temporalité romanesque concentrée en un semestre, de novembre à mai : tels sont les ingrédients de Bruges-la-Morte.
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The role as world reserve currency is something no financial hegemon in history has willingly surrendered. It took two world wars for the City of London and Bank of England to reluctantly concede hegemony of the Pound Sterling to the Dollar. As Henry Kissinger is said to have remarked decades ago, “If you control the money, you can control the entire world.” Whether or not Kissinger ever said that publicly, he and his patron, David Rockefeller, certainly believed it. Now, with US government debt shooting past $19 trillion and the true state of the American economy and its infrastructure at its worst since the Great Depression, with most Americans living on the brink of financial disaster, the brilliant financial engineers of Wall Street and Washington have once again come up with a scheme to prolong the role of Dollar as King in the world economy.
The recent Panama Papers revelations by a select group of Western mainstream media including the New York Times, BBC and Süddeutsche Zeitung, were notable as a brazen attempt to attack foreign leaders such as Russia’s Vladimir Putin and China’s Xi Jinping for alleged corruption. Notably, the leaked files of the Panama law firm, Mossack Fonseca, so far have failed to leak even one significant name of a US citizen hiding money in offshore accounts of the Panama facilitators.
While the world’s eyes were on the identities of alleged offshore money holders, they failed to consider the longer-term consequence of the huge revelations. The one country so far to benefit from the Panama Papers revelations is the country that is rapidly becoming the new “Panama” or better, the new Switzerland, namely the United States of America, the initiator of attacks on other hot money havens offshore over the past two decades.
Golden Dollar Era
Over the past seventy two years ever since the US and select wartime allied governments met in Bretton Woods, New Hampshire in 1944 to decide the shape of the postwar monetary order, the US dollar has reigned supreme in the world economy. By end of the War in 1945 the US Federal Reserve held the overwhelming bulk of world monetary gold.
As war erupted in Europe in September 1939 with Hitler’s and Stalin’s dismemberment of Poland, European gold was flooding into the United States. In 1935 US official gold reserves had been valued at just over $9 billion. By 1940 after the onset of war in Europe, they had risen to $20 billion. As desperate European countries sought to finance their war effort, their gold went to the United States to purchase essential goods. By the time of the June 1944 convening of the international monetary conference at Bretton Woods, the United States controlled fully 70% of the world’s monetary gold, an impressive advantage. That 70% did not even include calculating the captured gold of the defeated Axis powers of Germany or Japan, where exact facts and data were buried in layers of deception and rumor.
For the following quarter century, the gold-backed US dollar reigned supreme as the rest of the world, especially war-ravaged Western Europe, scrambled to find dollars to pay US imported goods to rebuild their industrial base. The dollar was literally “as good as good,” much as the Pound Sterling had been a century earlier.
Yet by the end of the 1960’s the dollar world had undergone significant change. The economies of France and especially of West Germany had emerged with a new state-of-the-art industrial base and was rapidly becoming an export power challenging American obsolescent industrial goods. The US industrial base had last undergone substantial modernization some three decades before. Europe and later Japan, were posing a competitive challenge to US industry. More alarming for Wall Street banks like David Rockefeller’s Chase Manhattan, Citibank or JPMorgan, as US trade dollar earnings of German companies like Mercedes, VW or BMW or Siemens were accumulating in the coffers of the German Bundesbank or Bank of France during the 1960’s an alarming change in policy emerged.
French President Charles de Gaulle, acting on advice of his conservative financial adviser, Jacques Rueff, ordered the Bank of France to begin to redeem its rapidly accumulating trade surplus dollars for gold, something then legal under the rules of Bretton Woods. The conservative German Bundesbank followed in demanding US gold for dollars. In 1968 in one of the first crude versions of their Color Revolutions, the CIA and US State Department toppled President de Gaulle in the events known as the May 1968 student revolt. Despite the replacement of de Gaulle by former Rothschild banker, Georges Pompidou, the foreign demand for Federal Reserve gold redemptions increased as Washington budget deficits to finance the ill-conceived Vietnam War exploded.
By August 1971, President Nixon was advised by his Assistant Treasury secretary, Paul Volcker, a former executive at Rockefeller’s Chase Manhattan Bank, to essentially tear up the Bretton Woods Treaty and declare the US dollar a free-floating paper no longer redeemable in gold. The Federal Reserve’s gold reserves over the previous several years had been drained by foreign central banks fearful of the import of US dollar inflation as Washington refused pleas to devalue the dollar to re-stabilize the system. Rueff and France were calling for a 100% dollar devaluation against the Franc or Deutschmark.
Petrodollar era is born
By 1973, in developments I describe in detail in my book, A Century of War, as well as in Myths, Lies & Oil Wars, Wall Street and the Federal Reserve “solved” the problem of a dollar in free-fall—it had devalued some 40% against the Franc, D-mark and Yen after August, 1971—by orchestrating, with the skillful and deceitful diplomacy of then-Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, an OPEC oil price embargo following outbreak of the October, 1973 Yom Kippur War. By early 1974 the price of OPEC oil had been set some 400% above that of 1971. The dollar value soared against other major currencies as Germany, France and the rest of the oil-hungry world scrambled to find 400% more dollars to import their oil. Kissinger at the time wrote about “recycling petrodollars.” The dollar would be backed, not by gold, but by oil.
To be certain that the petrodollar system held, and that OPEC, led by Saudi Arabia, would never be tempted to sell for D-marks, Francs or Yen as those countries tried, Washington took special measures. On June 8 1974, US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger signed an agreement establishing a US-Saudi Arabian Joint Commission on Economic Cooperation. Its official mandate was co-operation in the field of finance.”
By December 1974 the US Treasury had signed an agreement in Riyadh with the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency, whose mission was, “to establish a new relationship through the Federal Reserve Bank of New York with the (US) Treasury borrowing operation. Under this arrangement, SAMA will purchase new US Treasury securities with maturities of at least one year,” explained Assistant Secretary of the U.S. Treasury, Jack F. Bennett, later to become a director of Exxon. Wall Street banker, David Mulford of Credit Suisse-FirstBoston was sent by Washington to SAMA in to seal the deal.
Bennett’s memo was addressed to Secretary of State Kissinger, dated February 1975, explaining the arrangements agreed two months before. As part of the secret agreements between Washington and Riyadh negotiated by Bennett, Saudi Arabia, in return for generous US defense equipment purchases and guarantees of its military security, agreed that OPEC would accept only US dollars for their oil, not German Marks despite their clear value, not Japanese Yen nor French Francs or even Swiss Francs, but only American dollars.
That was the essence of the petrodollar system which over the past decade or more has been eroding as Russia, China, Iran and even the EU challenge the role of the dollar as reserve currency. Russia and China, in a defensive move have agreed to energy trade for oil and gas paid not in dollars but in own currencies. Iran recently announced it will accept only Euros for its oil. More and more the days of the dollar demise are being proclaimed.
A new Narco-dollar system?
Now, however, it appears the financial wizards of Wall Street and the US Treasury have come up with a new life-extension idea.
In what must be termed at least a clever attempt to solve the looming crisis of the dollar, a new role of the dollar is emerging from the rubble of the offshore banking crisis triggered by the suspicious hacking of the Panama Papers. The under-regulated United States is rapidly becoming the “new Switzerland” in attracting “hot money” which includes everything from narco dollars from the international drug traffic to hiding of funds offshore by corrupt politicians.
For the past decade or more the US Government and revenue agency have pressured discreet offshore banking centers from Switzerland to the Cayman Islands to British Virgin Islands and beyond allegedly to clamp down on US tax-evading citizens hiding money abroad from the IRS or terrorists moving money to finance Al Qaeda and the likes. But the US government itself has rigidly refused to abide by the new international money reporting rules it caused to be created.
Now, according to a January report in the Bloomberg financial magazine, the result is that the United States itself, in places like Reno, Nevada or South Dakota or Wyoming, are fast becoming the “new Switzerland” hot or secret money havens.
Bloomberg quotes a Zurich attorney, Peter A. Cotorceanu, a lawyer at Anaford AG, “The USA, which has been so sanctimonious in its condemnation of Swiss banks, has become the banking secrecy jurisdiction du jour…That ‘giant sucking sound’ you hear? It is the sound of money rushing to the USA.”
The attraction of secrecy havens inside the US comes from the fact that a very strict money reporting standard set out by the Paris-Based OECD in 2014 has not been signed by four countries: Bahrain, Nauru, Vanuatu—and, guess who…the United States.
In the last months, taking advantage of the Washington hypocrisy, some of the world’s largest private banking managers including Rothschild Trust North America LLC. based in Reno, Nevada. Geneva-based Cisa Trust Co. SA, which advises wealthy Latin Americans, is applying to open in Pierre, South Dakota to “serve the needs of our foreign clients,” said John J. Ryan Jr., Cisa’s president.
Trident Trust Co., one of the world’s biggest providers of offshore trusts, moved dozens of accounts out of Switzerland, Grand Cayman, and other locales and into Sioux Falls, South Dakota in December, ahead of a January 1 disclosure deadline. Commenting on the new phenomenon, Andrew Penney of Rothschild & Co. stated that the US “is effectively the biggest tax haven in the world.”
Making the process even more positive for the dollar, a 2010 USA law, the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act, or Fatca, requires financial firms to disclose foreign accounts held by US citizens and report them to the IRS or face steep penalties. With the US refusing to sign the OECD disclosure rules, US offshore dollars are also flooding back into Reno and other new US banking secrecy havens.
Further, to make other offshore banking centers unattractive, a law implemented in 2011 requires Panama-registered agents to provide client information when requested on all new incorporations, and the British Virgin Islands has adopted restrictions on due diligence. In an investors’ conference recently in San Francisco, Rothschild’s Penney stated in remarks cut from the published version of his remarks, that the US Government lacks “the resources to enforce foreign tax laws and has little appetite to do so.” ix
Now with one of the largest international offshore money facilitators, Panama’s Mossack Fonseca, admitting it is being forced to wind down, the way is clear to make the USA the new Switzerland or Panama. Drug cartels of the world are already clearly informed and a good share of the estimated $1.6 trillion of criminal funds annually are searching new safe havens in Reno and other US hot money havens. From a golden dollar to a petro dollar to now a narco dollar. It’s pretty pathetic for the country that was once the world’s leading industrial technology leader.
F. William Engdahl is strategic risk consultant and lecturer, he holds a degree in politics from Princeton University and is a best-selling author on oil and geopolitics, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook”
http://journal-neo.org/2016/05/09/from-golden-dollar-to-p...
Here is where German intellectuals come into the story. Journalists and academics have had a hard time understanding why the Pegida movement emerged when it did and why it has attracted so many people in Germany; there are branches of the Pegida movement in other parts of Europe, but they have gathered only marginal support thus far. Those who suggest it is driven by “anger” and “resentment” are being descriptive at best. What is remarkable, though, is that “rage” as a political stance has received the philosophical blessing of the leading AfD intellectual, Marc Jongen, who is a former assistant of the well-known philosopher Peter Sloterdijk. Jongen has not only warned about the danger of Germany’s “cultural self-annihilation”; he has also argued that, because of the cold war and the security umbrella provided by the US, Germans have been forgetful about the importance of the military, the police, warrior virtues—and, more generally, what the ancient Greeks called thymos (variously translated as spiritedness, pride, righteous indignation, a sense of what is one’s own, or rage), in contrast to eros and logos, love and reason. Germany, Jongen says, is currently “undersupplied” with thymos. Only the Japanese have even less of it—presumably because they also lived through postwar pacifism. According to Jongen, Japan can afford such a shortage, because its inhabitants are not confronted with the “strong natures” of immigrants. It follows that the angry demonstrators are doing a damn good thing by helping to fire up thymos in German society.
Like in Nietzsche’s On the Genealogy of Morality—a continuous inspiration for Sloterdijk—these re-descriptions are supposed to jolt readers out of conventional understandings of the present. However, not much of his work lives up to Nietzsche’s image of the philosopher as a “doctor of culture” who might end up giving the patient an unpleasant or outright shocking diagnosis: Sloterdijk often simply reads back to the German mainstream what it is already thinking, just sounding much deeper because of the ingenuous metaphors and analogies, cute anachronisms, and cascading neologisms that are typical of his highly mannered style. 
Sloterdijk is not the only prominent cultural figure who willfully reinforces a sense of Germans as helpless victims who are being “overrun” and who might eventually face “extinction.” The writer Botho Strauβ recently published an essay titled “The Last German,” in which he declared that he would rather be part of a dying people than one that for “predominantly economic-demographic reasons is mixed with alien peoples, and thereby rejuvenated.” He feels that the national heritage “from Herder to Musil” has already been lost, and yet hopes that Muslims might teach Germans a lesson about what it means to follow a tradition—because Muslims know how to submit properly to their heritage. In fact, Strauβ, who cultivates the image of a recluse in rural East Germany, goes so far as to speculate that only if the German Volk become a minority in their own country will they be able to rediscover and assert their identity. 
Like at least some radicals in the late Sixties, the new right-wing “avant-garde” finds the present moment not just one of apocalyptic danger, but also of exhilaration. There is for instance Götz Kubitschek, a publisher specializing in conservative nationalist or even outright reactionary authors, such as Jean Raspail and Renaud Camus, who keep warning of an “invasion” or a “great population replacement” in Europe. Kubitschek tells Pegida demonstrators that it is a pleasure (lust) to be angry. He is also known for organizing conferences at his manor in Saxony-Anhalt, including for the “Patriotic Platform.” His application to join the AfD was rejected during the party’s earlier, more moderate phase, but he has hosted the chairman of the AfD, Björn Höcke, in Thuringia. Höcke, a secondary school teacher by training, offered a lecture last fall about the differences in “reproduction strategies” of “the life-affirming, expansionary African type” and the place-holding European type. Invoking half-understood bits and pieces from the ecological theories of E. O. Wilson, Höcke used such seemingly scientific evidence to chastise Germans for their “decadence.” 
Heel wat politici, filosofen en gewone burgers eisen van de overheid meer transparantie in het politiek bedrijf. Het lijkt wel het tovermiddel om onze democratie sterker en efficiënter te maken. En de politiek speelt daar ook op in. Nieuwe parlementsgebouwen worden gebouwd met grote glaspartijen als figuurlijk, maar ook letterlijk symbool van de gezamenlijke wil om te komen tot transparantie. Burgers krijgen zo bijna letterlijk inzage in de parlementaire werking en de verkozenen van het volk zien als het ware hoe de burgers op hen toekijken. Dus geen beslissingen meer in duistere achterkamertjes maar openbare debatten die dan via televisie en het internet gevolgd kunnen worden door al wie interesse heeft. Transparantie wordt ook geëist van zowat alle burgers om aan te tonen dat ze ‘niets te verbergen hebben’ en daarom figuurlijk doorzichtig moeten zijn. Leve de transparantie dus. Maar tegen die trend in schreef de Nederlandse hoogleraar Bestuurskunde Paul Frissen het boek Het geheim van de laatste staat waarin hij kritiek geeft op de transparantie en pleit voor het fundamentele recht van de burger op geheimen als één van de waarborgen van zijn vrijheid.
Gewalt, Wut und Zorn sind ohnehin Schlüsselbegriffe in der Welt des Marc Jongen. «Wir pflegen kaum noch die thymotischen Tugenden, die einst als die männlichen bezeichnet wurden», doziert der Philosoph, weil «unsere konsumistische Gesellschaft erotozentrisch ausgerichtet» sei. Für die in klassischer griechischer Philosophie weniger bewanderten Leserinnen und Leser: Platon unterscheidet zwischen den drei «Seelenfakultäten» Eros (Begehren), Logos (Verstand) und Thymos (Lebenskraft, Mut, mit den Affekten Wut und Zorn). Jongen spricht gelegentlich auch von einer «thymotischen Unterversorgung» in Deutschland. Es fehle dem Land an Zorn und Wut, und deshalb mangle es unserer Kultur auch an Wehrhaftigkeit gegenüber anderen Kulturen und Ideologien.
Giono, c’est autre chose. Sa correspondance avec Gallimard, qui vient de paraître, nous montre un personnage d’une duplicité peu commune. Dès 1928, Gaston lui propose de devenir son éditeur exclusif dès qu’il sera libre de ses engagements avec Grasset. Grand écrivain mais sacré filou, Giono n’aura de cesse de jouer un double jeu, se flattant d’être « plus malin » que ses éditeurs. Rien à voir avec Céline, âpre au gain, mais qui se targuait d’être « loyal et carré ». Giono, lui, n’hésitait pas à signer en même temps un contrat avec Grasset et un autre avec Gallimard pour ses prochains ouvrages. Chacun des deux éditeurs ignorant naturellement l’existence du traité avec son concurrent. But de la manœuvre : toucher deux mensualités (!). La mèche sera vite éventée. Fureur de Bernard Grasset qui voulut porter plainte pour escroquerie et renvoyer l’auteur indélicat devant un tribunal correctionnel. L’idée de Giono était, en théorie, de réserver ses romans à Gallimard et ses essais à Grasset. L’affaire ira en s’apaisant mais Giono récidivera après la guerre en proposant un livre à La Table ronde, puis un autre encore aux éditions Plon. En termes mesurés, Gaston lui écrit : « Comprenez qu’il est légitime que je sois surpris désagréablement. » Et de lui rappeler, courtoisement mais fermement, ses engagements, ses promesses renouvelées et ses constantes confirmations du droit de préférence des éditions Gallimard. En retour, Giono se lamente : « Avec ce que je dois donner au percepteur, je suis réduit à la misère noire. » Et en profite naturellement pour négocier ses nouveaux contrats à la hausse. Ficelle, il conserve les droits des éditions de luxe et n’entend pas partager avec son éditeur les droits d’adaptation cinématographiques de ses œuvres. Tel était Giono qui, sur ce plan, ne le cédait en rien à Céline. On peut cependant préférer le style goguenard de celui-ci quand il s’adresse à Gaston : « Si j’étais comme vous multi-milliardaire (…), vous ne me verriez point si harcelant… diable ! que vous enverrais loin foutre ! ² ».
Le préfixe dys de dystopie renvoie au grec dun qui est l’antithèse de la deuxième acception étymologique d’utopie (non pas u mais eu, “lieu du bien”). On fait remonter l’origine du mot “dystopie” tantôt au livre du philosophe tchèque 
C’est en 1920 avec la parution de Nous autres que la fiction dystopique naît véritablement. Cette œuvre phare de l’ingénieur russe Evguéni Ivanovitch Zamiatine donne ainsi ses “lettres de noblesses” au genre. Son ouvrage influença considérablement bon nombre de récits analogues tels que Le Meilleur des mondes d’Huxley et 1984 d’Orwell, publiés respectivement douze et vingt-huit ans plus tard.
Ces œuvres voient donc dans l’utopie non pas une chance pour l’humanité, mais un risque de dégénérescence terriblement inhumaine qu’il faut empêcher à tout prix. Le but n’est pas de réaliser des utopies, mais au contraire d’empêcher qu’elles se réalisent. C’est l’avertissement du philosophe existentialiste 
Net als Carl Schmitt (1888-1985) voert Chantal Mouffe de differentia specifica van het politieke terug op het onderscheid tussen vriend en vijand; oftewel tot de altijd aanwezige mogelijkheid van vijandelijkheid in intermenselijke relaties. Mouffe zegt niet dat alle sociale relaties noodzakelijk antagonistisch zijn, maar dat de mogelijkheid van conflict en vijandigheid in elke relatie op elk moment aanwezig is. Het politieke heeft altijd te maken met conflict en antagonisme, het gaat altijd gepaard met de formatie van een ‘wij’ versus een ‘zij’. In de discourstheorie van Laclau en Mouffe heet dit equivalentielogica: het opdelen van de sociale ruimte door betekenissen en identiteiten te comprimeren tot twee antagonistische polen.
Wat een radicale democratie à la Laclau en Mouffe onderscheidt van de moderne politieke projecten, is dat ze niet van een realiseerbare telos uitgaat, maar van het besef dat elk sociaal project onvolmaakt en conflictueel zal blijven. Het streven naar een volledig democratische maatschappij, waarin alle mensen volledig vrij zijn omdat ze volledig gelijk zijn, en vice versa, veronderstelt een volledige transparantie. Het veronderstelt een samenleving zonder spanningen en repressie, die dus alle conflicten onderdrukt. [11] Zo’n harmonieuze democratie zou een totalitaire nachtmerrie zijn. Bij Laclau en Mouffe wordt de mogelijkheid om het finale doel te realiseren verlaten, zelfs als louter regulatief idee. Er is trouwens geen reden om dat te betreuren. Integendeel, het is de garantie dat het democratisch-pluralistisch proces aan de gang blijft. Het is door de liberale rechten samen met volkssoevereiniteit te articuleren, dat we vermijden dat de democratie tiranniek wordt. Een ideale, vrije en gelijke democratische samenleving is er noodzakelijk een zonder pluralisme, want pluralisme veronderstelt dat de sociale orde en haar machtsrelaties kunnen worden gecontesteerd. Een samenleving zonder machtsrelaties (het einde van de politiek) is evenmin mogelijk, want het zijn precies de machtsrelaties die de sociale orde constitueren. Laclau en Mouffe vertrekken dus van een niet-reduceerbare, pluralistische sociale orde; en dit betekent dat de finale sociale orde nooit bereikt wordt. Niet alleen de individuen verkeren in de onmogelijkheid om hun identiteiten te finaliseren; ook de samenleving als zodanig is nooit af.
De ideologische tegenstellingen tussen de gevestigde partijen is in de loop van het laatste decennium alsmaar kleiner geworden, waardoor het steeds moeilijker is om partijen en politici in hun optreden en standpunten te onderscheiden. Ideologische beginselen boeten aan belang in, terwijl politiek pragmatisme en consensuspolitiek op de voorgrond treden. In de consensuspolitiek van het centrum, zegt ook de Sloveense filosoof Slavoj Zizek, moet elke fundamentele belangentegenstelling plaats ruimen voor een vrijmoedig geloof in een politiek zonder ware tegenstanders, en zonder enige subversiviteit. [12] Eens beyond left and right lossen sociale tegenstellingen vanzelf op en bieden er zich politieke oplossingen aan die kennelijk voor iedereen goed zijn. Bij gebrek aan een reële politieke strijd, onderscheiden politieke partijen zich enkel nog door culturele attitudes. De politieke strijd wordt herleid tot een belangencompetitie op neutraal terrein, met als enige doel het bereiken van compromissen en het aggregeren van voorkeuren. Om fundamentele belangenconflicten te omzeilen, weigert men om duidelijke politieke grenzen te trekken. Daarmee wordt de integratieve rol van conflict in de moderne democratie genegeerd. [13]
Dienen we de kritiek van Chantal Mouffe op te vatten als een ultieme oproep om het cordon sanitaire in Vlaanderen dan toch maar op te doeken? Dat valt te betwijfelen. Waar het Mouffe om te doen is, is laten zien wat het ons heeft opgeleverd, om daaruit conclusies te trekken. Het probleem is overigens niet dat mensen uit zijn op conflict omwille van het conflict. Het probleem is dat, door het gebrek aan een sociale horizon, bepaalde sentimenten geen uitdrukking vinden binnen het democratisch spectrum. Deze sentimenten moeten democratisch gemobiliseerd worden; en daarvoor moeten de democratische partijen een sociale horizon projecteren die mensen uitzicht biedt op een andere en betere toekomst.
Mouffe: I think that criticizing an agonistic perspective for not being critical enough of capitalism is basically a difference of strategy and again this is where the strategy of ‘engagement with’ or, using a term of Gramsci - ‘a war of position’ - is what is the one I propose. I imagine that the person that you have in mind is Slavoj Žižek because he's the one who is criticising the agonistic approach for being a liberal one. But his position is a rhetorical revolutionary one which does not propose any strategy. We want the end of capitalism, sure, but how are we going to do it, with whom? It's very rhetorical to say: the end of capitalism. I think the question is to engage with existing institutions, and this requires a long process. Some people still would say we need a revolution like the Soviet revolution. If we are to learn something from the experience, the tragic experience of really existing socialism, is precisely that this strategy of making a complete new start doesn’t work. You can't just end a society in one move and start from scratch - it’s not possible. It’s only possible by using terror. ‘A war of position’ is better strategy; we need to target specific institutions in order to transform them. For me at the moment the most important task is to end the hegemony of neoliberalism and of financial capitalism. Of course that's not going to be the end of capitalism. The aim is to create a society that will not be submitted to the logic of the market. They might still remain some sectors which are going to be organised by capitalists but the main society will not be one in which the market controls everything. But that cannot be done one day. There are of course proposals in the line of Hardt and Negri who believe that the development of the self-organisation of the multitude is going to make capitalism completely irrelevant. They accept that it is going to be a process and they do not advocate any kind of Jacobin form of revolution but they believe that the state will disappear and I don't believe that. Some of those experiences of new forms of living are important but they are not enough. The power of capitalism is not going to disappear because we have a multitude of self-organizing outside the existing institutions. We need to engage with those institutions in order to transform them profoundly. I saw a few years ago a film called Was tun? (What is to be done). It was about the anti-globalization movement and the role of Hardt and Negri’s strategy. At the end of the film they asked them “what should we do?” And Negri answered “wait and be patient” and Hart answered “follow your desire.” That’s their strategy. They believe that there is some kind of law of history that is necessarily going to lead to ‘absolute democracy’. It's very similar to the traditional Marxist view that capitalism is its own gravedigger but I don't think that's the case. Capitalism is not going to disappear simply by us being patient and waiting, we need to engage with it, and that is the strategy of agonistic engagement. It's not a total revolution, that’s not possible, it's ‘a war of position’ in order to transform the existing institutions.
La guerre d’Irak a tellement accaparé l’attention du public que le changement de régime en train de s’accomplir chez nous est resté dans l’ombre. On a peut-être envahi l’Irak pour y apporter la démocratie et renverser un régime totalitaire, mais, ce faisant, notre propre système est peut-être en train de se rapprocher de ce dernier et de contribuer à affaiblir le premier. Le changement s’est fait connaître par la soudaine popularité de deux expressions politiques autrefois très rarement appliquées au système politique américain. « Empire » et « superpuissance » suggèrent tous les deux qu’un nouveau système de pouvoir, intense et s’étendant au loin, a pris naissance et que les anciens termes ont été supplantés. « Empire » et « superpuissance » symbolisent précisément la projection de la puissance américaine à l’étranger, mais, pour cette raison, ces deux termes en obscurcissent les conséquences domestiques.
Et c’est vrai qu’il manque deux choses essentielles à un (très) bon roman : finesse et substance, tant dans les personnages (qui manquent vraiment de profondeur) que dans l’avènement du système totalitaire.
Le livre récent de Christian E. Roques
Il y a une volupté singulière – triste et douce – à évoquer ce dont on ne parle quasiment jamais, à penser des dimensions de la réalité que l’idéalisme ignore. Comme le laissé pour compte, le renié, les objets déchus. Autrement dit le rebut, ce qui gît au grenier, à la cave, dans les tombeaux ou dans un coin de la mémoire. C’est autour de ce que ce rebuté ou ce révolu disent de nous, de l’excessive solitude de l’exclu mais aussi de la construction de notre imaginaire, que gravitent la centaine de courts textes réunis dans Le Sommeil des objets.
Durante estos años, y bajo el influjo permanente de los escritos de 
Evola mantiene un discurso constante en el que asocia todas las formas de 
El otro gran representante de la Tradición Romana es Guido De Giorgio, el principal discípulo del pensamiento de René Guénon en Italia, un hombre oscuro, tanto en su trayectoria vital como en aquella intelectual, de una moral espartana, y definido por el propio Evola como un «iniciado en estado salvaje». Su principal obra, La Tradición Romana, fue publicada póstumamente, en el año 1973, y todavía a día de hoy existen obras inéditas del autor, que no han visto la luz todavía. Las premisas del pensamiento de Giorgio, como ocurre con Guénon, parten de un punto de vista absoluto, metafísico, sacro y Tradicional. No obstante su visión de la Tradición como tal cuenta con la confluencia de muy variadas influencias, entre las cuales podemos encontrar a los neoplatónicos, cristianos, hinduistas y musulmanes. A las citadas fuentes que nutren su pensamiento podemos añadir una peculiar forma de escribir, muchas veces teñida de una cierta iluminación, de una intuición muy sutil, y lo enigmáticos que resultan muchos de los pasajes de su obra. Un ejemplo de esta confluencia de ideas y doctrinas la vemos en sus consideraciones, de matiz claramente cristiano, en las que habla de la fe como la base de la Tradición por excelencia, al tiempo que contempla la concepción no dualista del Principio Supremo en lo que es un concepto de impronta hinduista. Sin embargo, la perspectiva islámica es la que toma mayor protagonismo en el conjunto de sus ideas, y es precisamente en base a esta