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mercredi, 07 janvier 2015

Les courants de la Tradition païenne romaine en Italie

Renato del Ponte:

Ex : http://www.archiveseroe.eu/romanitas-a114141076

 

samedi, 20 décembre 2014

La tradición como contracultura

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La tradición como contracultura

DALMACIO NEGRO

por Dalmacio Negro

Ex: http://culturatransversal.wordpress.com

Es un lugar común que no se puede hacer nada creador sin la tradición. Eugenio d Ors decía, refiriéndose a la literatura, «lo que no es tradición es plagio». Y en el plano individual, en frase del filósofo alemán Nicolai Hartmann «nadie empieza con sus propias ideas». Se podrían citar innumerables opiniones al respecto como la famosa del economista Keynes de que, a la larga, todos somos herederos de algún economista difunto, que alguien retocó cambiando la palabra economista por la palabra filósofo. Siendo esto cierto, hace mucho tiempo que sucede lo contrario en el campo de la cultura en general. En el arte y en la literatura el credo dominante es la oposición a la tradición, habiéndose impuesto el prurito de la originalidad consciente y de la innovación por la innovación, equivalente al del cambio por el cambio en lo social.

Puesto que en la cultura cada momento todo se interrelaciona, esa actitud se traduce en los demás ámbitos de la vida en sans cullotisme, en un adanismo muy escasamente o nada creador. Así no hay estilos sino, a lo sumo, modas, casi siempre tan fugaces que la mayoría de las veces ni siquiera son modas, sino ocurrencias más o menos extravagantes que buscan el éxito mediante el «escándalo» moral, intelectual o estético, equivalente a las «liberaciones» en la vida social. «La cultura de lo efímero». No es raro que la política actual adolezca escandalosamente de estilo y que en ella, generalmente en manos de gente joven, demasiado inexperta y advenediza, la confusión sea cada vez mayor. Lo cual es muy grave, porque en esta época la política ha desplazado a su par dialéctico que la delimita, la religión, privatizándola en el mejor de los casos y, si se mira bien a la misma cultura al convertirse la política en una de sus fuentes principales invirtiendo la relación natural, con lo que está en todas partes. La política determina incluso la conciencia, las ideas acerca del bien y del mal. Es lo que se llama politización. La politización es la degeneración totalitaria de la política y de la cultura. Se ha llegado a ella interpretando la democratización como racionalización, concediéndosele al Estado la autorización para entremeterse en todo. Y como el Estado es lo Político, politiza todos los ámbitos de la vida. Casi todos los días hace algo que se opone a la tradición, a los usos, a las formas y a las maneras, a las costumbres, en definitiva a las creencias que constituyen y configuran lo social, creando una nueva moralidad y una nueva cultura de cuño estatal. Se desintegran así las sociedades, un fenómeno bastante visible, pero el estatismo aparece como liberador. Sin embargo, opera en contra de la libertad. Esta no es una propiedad del Estado sino del hombre concreto, por lo que constituye una necesidad lo Político a fin de proteger las libertades, no para liberar a los hombres de sí mismos, de sus libertades, que enraízan en las tradiciones de la conducta.

Lo Político adoptó en la época moderna la figura del Estado. Y como el Estado es una forma política artificial, una máquina de poder, es antitradicional por definición. Su antitradicionalismo estuvo relativamente contenido hasta que la revolución francesa lo revolvió contra la Nación histórica politizando la Nación.

Hasta entonces, las naciones eran simplemente unidades diferenciadas que formaban parte de la tradición europea común, que incluye, por supuesto, una tradición de la política. Pero al politizarse fundiéndose con el Estado, que es de suyo particularista, para consolidar la unidad política y aumentar la potencia nacional, los Estados nacionales resultantes empezaron a pervertir las propias tradiciones, «las tradiciones patrias», al tratarlas como culturas separadas, particulares, inoculando en ellas el nacionalismo sirviéndose muy principalmente de la historia, ciencia desde entonces en auge. Se llegó así en el siglo XIX a la oposición entre las Grandes Potencias nacionales que constituye el origen próximo de los desastres del siglo XX y del estatismo de nuestros días.

Frente a la prevaleciente cultura estatista, que es por definición nihilista, la auténtica tradición europea puede ser todavía una poderosa contracultura.

Fuente: conoze.com

00:05 Publié dans Traditions | Lien permanent | Commentaires (0) | Tags : tradition, dalmacio negro pavon, espagne, contre-culture | |  del.icio.us | | Digg! Digg |  Facebook

vendredi, 19 décembre 2014

René Guénon, Roma, Convegno

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samedi, 08 novembre 2014

Virgilio ed Enea: l’etica dell’origine che è destino

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Virgilio ed Enea: l’etica dell’origine che è destino
 
Valerio Benedetti
 
Ex: http://www.ilprimatonazionale.it

mercredi, 05 novembre 2014

Le temps qualifié ou la réorientation du monde

 

"Le temps qualifié ou la réorientation du monde"

par Laurent JAMES

Conférence de Laurent JAMES au séminaire de la COBEMA du 28 mars 2010. Il y traite du "Temps qualifié, ou la ré-orientation du monde". Très intéressant moment de tradition primordiale partagée par l'Humanité entière depuis toujours.

00:05 Publié dans Traditions | Lien permanent | Commentaires (0) | Tags : tradition, traditionalisme, laurent james | |  del.icio.us | | Digg! Digg |  Facebook

lundi, 27 octobre 2014

Jean Parvulesco, visionnaire d'Empire

Jean Parvulesco, visionnaire d'Empire

dimanche, 26 octobre 2014

JAPON : LA LÉGITIME DÉSOBÉISSANCE DES 47 RÔNINS

JAPON : LA LÉGITIME DÉSOBÉISSANCE DES 47 RÔNINS - « Ce qu’ils ont fait de leur vivant résonne pour l'éternité.... »
JAPON : LA LÉGITIME DÉSOBÉISSANCE DES 47 RÔNINS
 
«Ce qu’ils ont fait de leur vivant résonne pour l'éternité....»

Rémy Valat
Ex: http://metamag.fr
 
L’histoire des 47 rônins dépasse le cadre d’une simple affaire de droit féodal : ce serait l’engagement de vassaux, fidèles à leur maître jusqu’au sacrifice de leurs vies. Le drame se déroule au début du XVIIIe siècle, période durant laquelle le Japon est réunifié et pacifié sous l’égide du Shôgun. Le port et l’usage des armes sont contrôlés ; il est l’apanage quasi-exclusif des samouraïs. Les samouraïs sont ceux qui « servent » (étymologie du nom vient du verbe « servir », saburaû) leurs maîtres, le Shôgun et le pays. Ils sont pour cela présentés comme des « modèles » pour la société : à la fois guerriers et administrateurs, leur éducation et l’étiquette qui régit leur vie sont rigides.

En 1701, deux Daimyos (seigneurs en charge d’une province et en relation directe avec le Shôgun) sont chargés d’organiser une cérémonie en l’honneur de l’Empereur. Asano Naganori du fief d'Akō (province de Harima) commet l’impair de blesser le maître des cérémonies, Kira Kōzuke-no-Suke-Yoshinaka (14 mars). Ce dernier est dépeint comme un être corrompu jusqu’à la mœlle et se serait, selon la tradition populaire, montré arrogant et méprisant envers ces deux seigneurs, insuffisamment généreux à son goût à rémunérer son talent et ses services. Perte du contrôle de soi, agression à main armée sur un haut fonctionnaire de l’ État : Asano doit, sur l’ordre du Shôgun Tokugawa Tsuyanoshi (1646-1709), procéder le jour même au suicide rituel (seppuku). Ōishi Kuranosuke Yoshio, principal conseiller de la famille d'Asano prend aussitôt en main la sécurité des membres et des biens du clan menacés de confiscation et mûrit un plan de vengeance. Les différents récits et le florès d’interprétations théâtrales ou cinématographiques sur les conditions des préparatifs clandestins et de l’assaut final ont, certes été enjolivés et idéalisés, mais quel souffle à la lecture de ce récit ! La mise en scène la plus connue, popularisée par le théâtre kabuki, est l’ œuvre principale de Takeda Izumo (1748). Il existe une traduction française de l’épopée des 47 rônins, traduite par George Soulié de Morant en 1927, et rééditée régulièrement. Nous y puisons cet extrait, révélateur de l’esprit idéal du guerrier japonais.

 
Ōishi vient de rassembler le clan, 300 guerriers stupéfaits par l’annonce de la mort de leur seigneur et dans l’attente d’instructions : « Venger notre seigneur, voilà notre devoir. Ce que je propose, le voici. Nous allons jurer de ne reculer devant aucun danger pour tuer Kira et sa famille. Si nous n’avons pas réussi dans un an, c’est que l’entreprise est impossible. Nous nous réunirons alors devant la porte de la forteresse, ceux du moins qui auront survécu aux combats et nous nous donnerons la mort, montrant à tous notre fidélité. [...] Je vais préparer un serment écrit avec notre sang. Revenez tous ici demain, à l’heure du Tigre, pour le signer. Pour aujourd’hui, nous allons nous partager le trésor du clan : il ne faut pas qu’il tombe aux mains de nos ennemis.»
 
[La séance terminée chaque samouraï reçoit 20 lingots d’or et l’assemblée se disperse. Le lendemain, seuls 63 rônins répondirent à l’appel et Ōishi de déclarer :]  « Les épreuves que nous allons subir sont telles qu’une âme ordinaire ne saurait les supporter sans défaillir. En reconnaissant eux-mêmes leur faiblesse, ils m’ont évité le plus difficile des choix : c’est bien. Pour vanner le blé, il suffit de le laisser tomber au souffle de la brise. Le bon grain s’entasse d’un côté, la balle et les fétus de l’autre. [Puis, les loyaux samouraïs signèrent de leur sang le serment scellant leur sort pour l’éternité]. » 

Ce geste symbolique et sacré revêt surtout une dimension politique : c’est aussi un acte de désobéissance. Cet engagement solennel n’est pas sans rappeler les contrats d’ikki : les ikki sont ces révoltes populaires conduites pour réparer une injustice commise par les autorités ou un seigneur, insurrections parfois organisées par des guerriers pour se faire justice eux-mêmes ; ces derniers étant trop fiers pour laisser le règlement de leurs différends entre les mains des pouvoirs publics, fussent-ils le gouvernement du Shôgun (lire sur ce sujet : Katsumata Shizuo, Ikki. Coalitions, ligues et révoltes dans le Japon d’autrefois, traduction parue aux éditions du CNRS en 2011).
 
La maison de Kira est prise d’assaut le matin du 14 décembre 1702 : le maître et les hommes des des lieux seront passés au fil de l’épée. Les rônins emportèrent la tête de Kira sur la tombe de leur seigneur au temple de Sengaku-ji. Les survivants offrirent leur reddition au Shôgun et mettent celui-ci dans l’embarras. Car si la vendetta été légitime sur le fond et respectueuse des règles et de la coutume du Bushidō, elle ne l’était plus sur la forme : les Sainte Vehme étaient prohibées par le shôgunat, le pouvoir rappelle que le droit de faire justice est une prérogative régalienne dans un pays récemment unifié. Le shôgun les fît condamner à mort tout en leur offrant une fin honorable. Le 4 février 1703, 46 rônins (le 47e , le plus jeune, aurait fait l’objet de la clémence des juges selon la tradition populaire) se donnent la mort par éventration, et selon leurs vœux, leurs corps reposent auprès de celui de leur maître au cimetière du temple de Sengaku-ji.

Les témoignages historiques dépeignent différemment les motivations de ces samouraïs : le seigneur Asano n’était guère apprécié par ses serviteurs, et ce serait 58 guerriers (sur les 308 du clan) qui auraient prêté serment, non pas par simple esprit de vengeance, mais par réprobation du traitement injuste réservé à Asano par le Shôgun. Ce dernier aurait dû sanctionner les deux parties, d’autant qu’il y eut un précédent survenu en 1684. Un guerrier, selon l’historien Nakayama Mikio, en aurait blessé un autre en ce même lieu. Le premier aurait été tué sur le champ par un maître-officier du gouvernement et le second exilé. Enfin, seuls les criminels étaient exécutés ou contraints de se suicider à l’extérieur de leur maison. Les conditions du suicide d’Asano ont été considérées comme un acte infamant. C’est pour ces motifs que les rônins ont souhaité laver l’affront fait à leur maître et à leur maison.
 
Cette froide et habile, vengeance a été vivement critiquée par Yamamoto Tsunetomo (l’auteur du Hagakure) qui estimait plus conforme au code de l’honneur un règlement rapide du contentieux. Yamamoto Tsunetomo, fidèle serviteur du Shôgun, mît peut-être en avant ce point de la coutume pour discréditer Ōishi et ses hommes qui n’auraient techniquement pas pu mettre au point leur riposte en de si brefs délais, au moment où Kira se trouvait sur ses gardes et bien protégé par ses hommes (rappelons que c’est par respect envers la réglementation shogunale que Yamamoto Tsunetomo ne put accompagner son seigneur dans la mort : le suicide par accompagnement lui a été formellement interdit). Le Shôgun a commis une maladresse, en ce sens qu’au Japon, les suicides rituels avaient pour but de limiter les vendettas : l’honneur des familles lavé, les désirs de vengeance devaient être étouffés et dans le cas de leur mise à exécution, celle-ci était sévèrement sanctionnée. C’est le contraire qui, dans cet affaire, s’est produit.

Cette histoire eut un retentissement immédiat. Si les Japonais du début du deuxième siècle du Shôgunat y ont trouvé un exutoire à la rigidité du régime (surtout en matière de mœurs), le succès intemporel de ce drame tient à son authenticité. Les Japonais sont peu-être plus sensibles que d’autres peuples à l’engagement et au don de soi. Les paroles n’ont de valeur à leurs yeux que si elles sont suivis par un acte sincère. Quelque puisse être les motivations de ces rônins, c’est bien un sentiment positif, l’esprit de justice, qui les animait. Leur désobéissance était légitime et ils ont agi en pleine connaissance du sort qui leur était réservé. Ils ont préféré mourir dans l’honneur que de vivre dans la honte dans une société, et c’est encore le cas aujourd’hui au Japon, où pèse lourdement le regard des autres. Un geste tragique de refus et de liberté qui résonne pour l’éternité, comme l’atteste les témoignages de respect et de dévotion encore porté par les Japonais sur les tombes des 46 rônins....

Illustration en tête d'article : Ancien château d’Edo (actuellement le parc attenant au palais impérial) : emplacement du bâtiment à l’intérieur duquel, Kira Kōzuke-no-Suke-Yoshinaka sera blessé par Asano Naganori le14 mars 1701.©R.Valat

vendredi, 24 octobre 2014

Alain Daniélou’s Virtue, Success, Pleasure, & Liberation

Alain Daniélou’s Virtue, Success, Pleasure, & Liberation

By Collin Cleary 

Ex: http://www.counter-currents.com

Alain Daniélou
Virtue, Success, Pleasure, and Liberation: The Four Aims of Life in the Tradition of Ancient India [2]
Rochester, Vermont: Inner Traditions, 1993.

danndex.jpgOne hears a great deal today about “multiculturalism,” and the multicultural society. We (i.e., we Americans) are told that ours is a multicultural society. But, curiously, multiculturalism is also spoken of as a goal. What this reveals is that multiculturalism is not simply the recognition and affirmation of the fact that the U.S.A. is made up of different people from different cultural backgrounds. Instead, multiculturalism is an ideology which is predicated on cultural relativism. Its proponents want to convince people that (a) all cultures are equally good, rich, interesting, and wholesome, and that (b) a multicultural society can exist in which no one culture is dominant. The first idea is absurd, the second is impossible.

The apostles of multiculturalism are moved less by a genuine desire to “celebrate diversity” than by a hatred for Northern European culture, which is the semi-official, dominant culture of America. Indeed, multiculturalists generally nurture the most naive and simplistic ideas of what a culture is. Their conception of “culture” is fixated at the perceptual level: culture is costume,music, dance, decoration, food. What is essential to culture, however, is a certain Weltanschauung: a view of the world, and of human nature. It is in their response to these world views that multiculturalists reveal their true colors, for they tolerate and permit only those elements of a culture’s world view that do not conflict with liberal ideology.

Out of one side of their mouths, the multiculturalists tell us that one cannot judge a culture, that morality is culturally relative, that cultures are not better or worse, just “different,” and that we must revel in these differences. Thus, the English do not drive on the “wrong” side of the road, merely the left side. But when it’s not a matter of traffic laws, but a matter of severed clitorises, then the other, louder side of the multiculturalists’ mouths open, and they tell us that this sort of thing isn’t just different, it’s evil. In addition to this, one also sees that multiculturalism involves a relentless trivialization of important cultural differences. Thus, college students are encouraged to see religion almost as a matter of “local color.” Isn’t it wonderful that the Indians cook such spicy food, and worship such colorful gods! Isn’t it all terribly charming? They are further encouraged to view religion as a thoroughly irrational affair. Rather than encouraging an appreciation for different faiths, what this produces is a condescending attitude, and resistance to taking the claims of religion seriously when they conflict with the “rational” agenda of modern liberalism.

Indeed, multiculturalism is so anti-cultural that one is tempted to see behind it an even deeper, more sinister agenda. Perhaps the whole idea is to deliberately gut the world’s cultures, reducing their differences to matters of dress and cuisine, and to replace those earthborn guts with a plastic, Naugahyde culture of secularism, scientism, and egalitarianism. Why? Because real, significant cultural differences make it very hard for our corporations to do business overseas and to sell their wares. Solution: homogenization masquerading as “celebration of diversity.” The multiculturalists are right when they declare that de facto, the United States is a multicultural society. But there has never been a multicultural society in the history of the world in which there was not one dominant culture which provided a framework allowing the others to co-exist. To the multiculturalist, the unacknowledged framework is modern liberalism. I will assume that I do not have to rehearse for my readers the many arguments for why modern liberalism is untenable as a long-term societal framework.Where should we look, then, for a framework for a multicultural society? Why not look to the Indian caste system? It was the caste system that allowed Aryan and non-Aryan to co-exist peacefully in India for centuries.

The liberals will immediately object that the caste system is oppressive and unjust. In Virtue, Success, Pleasure and Liberation, however, Alain Daniélou argues that the caste system is actually a supremely just and peaceful arrangement. It is just because it is built on a recognition of real human difference; a “celebration of diversity,” if you will. Aristotle held that justice is treating equals equally, and unequals unequally. If people are not the same, then it is a mistake to treat them as if they are. The caste system is built on the idea that some human beings are born to work, others to fight and lead, and others to pray. The caste system gives to each human being a place, a community, a code of ethics, and a sense of identity and pride. Daniélou points out that although the system involves hierarchy, each level of the hierarchy is regarded as intrinsically valuable and as essential. Each plays a role that is regarded as important and indispensable. Thus, it is the caste system which truly affirms that different groups are merely different, not better or worse.

Is Daniélou whitewashing the caste system? Consider the words he quotes from the Mahabharata: “There is no superior caste. The Universe is the work of the Immense Being. The beings created by him were only divided into castes according to their aptitude.” But what of individuals born to the wrong caste? For example, what of a child born to the merchant class who shows aptitude to be a priest or scholar? Such things happen. Daniélou tells us that exceptional individuals are allowed to live “outside” the caste system, and are accepted as valuable members of the society as a whole. Modern society is structured on the premise that everyone is exceptional and can make up his mind what he wants to do. Given that sort of freedom, most people get lost — as witness the modern phenomenon of the “slacker,” or the flotsam and jetsam going in and out of psychiatrists’ offices every day.

Despite what I have said, this book is not a treatise on the caste system, but on the four things that all human lives must possess or achieve in order to be complete. In discussing virtue, success, pleasure, and liberation, Daniélou quotes extensively from ancient Indian texts, offering us an abundance of excellent advice about how to understand life and to live well. Indeed, this is really a book about how to lead a truly human life. Daniélou places the four aims in a cosmic context, showing how the same fourfold division is present in all levels of reality. It is present, of course, in the four castes (worker/artisan, producer/merchant, warrior/aristocrat, priest/scholar), and in the four stages of biological development (childhood, youth, maturity, old age), the four seasons, the four elements, the four races of humanity (black, yellow, red, white), the cycle of ages (yugas), the four bodily functions (digestion, assimilation, circulation, excretion), and the four points of the compass (in this order, significantly: south, east, west, north).

This is an excellent companion volume to Daniélou’s The Myths and Gods of India [3].

Source: Tyr, vol.. 1 (Atlanta: Ultra, 2002).

 


Article printed from Counter-Currents Publishing: http://www.counter-currents.com

URL to article: http://www.counter-currents.com/2014/10/virtue-success-pleasure-liberation/

URLs in this post:

[1] Image: http://www.counter-currents.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/Virtue.jpg

[2] Virtue, Success, Pleasure, and Liberation: The Four Aims of Life in the Tradition of Ancient India: http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/B005IQ6AVY/ref=as_li_tl?ie=UTF8&camp=1789&creative=390957&creativeASIN=B005IQ6AVY&linkCode=as2&tag=countecurrenp-20&linkId=2SMLM6Q3BGWZDR7W

[3] The Myths and Gods of India: http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/B005PQUZ3G/ref=as_li_tl?ie=UTF8&camp=1789&creative=390957&creativeASIN=B005PQUZ3G&linkCode=as2&tag=countecurrenp-20&linkId=7R45BK5EQM4HKVC3

Alain Daniélou’s The Myths & Gods of India

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Alain Daniélou’s The Myths & Gods of India

By Collin Cleary

Ex: http://www.counter-currents.com

Alain Daniélou
The Myths and Gods of India [2]
Rochester, Vermont: Inner Traditions, 1991.
(Originally published as Hindu Polytheism by Bollingen Foundation, New York, 1964.)

Typically, those who profess an interest in what might be called “Indo-European spirituality” gravitate toward either the Celtic or Germanic traditions. The Indian tradition tends to be ignored. In part, this is because present-day Indians seem so different from us. We think of their culture and philosophy as “Eastern,” as alien. Physically, the Indians look very different from those of European descent (though higher caste Indians tend to look very European, right down to lighter skin and hair, and sometimes blue eyes). But if we wish to rediscover the religion and traditions of our ancestors, what better place is there to begin than with India? The oldest Indo-European texts are the Vedas, after all. To be sure, it is hard to separate what comes from the ancient Aryans in Indian religion, myth, and mysticism, and what was contributed by the indigenous peoples conquered by the Aryans. But the same problem exists with respect to the Celtic and Germanic traditions. In addition, we know far more about the culture and religion of the ancient Aryans who invaded India, than we do about the culture and religion of the Celts and the Vikings. For one thing, more ancient texts survive in India. Therefore, anyone wishing to re-construct the “old ways” must become deeply immersed in all things Indian.

It is a cliche to state this in a review, but I write the following with total sincerity: if you read only one book on Hinduism, it must be Daniélou’s Myths and Gods of India. Indeed, it is hard to imagine why one would need to read any other. Danielou’s account of Hinduism is exhaustive, profound, and detailed. The book contains, first of all, cogent arguments on behalf of polytheism.

It details the Indian cosmogony and cosmology; the nature of Space, Time, and Thought; the nature of Brahman and Maya. Daniélou gives a complete description of every major Hindu divinity in terms of his or her function, myths, and symbolism. He details the minor gods and genii. He discusses the theory behind Mantras and Yantras. There is even extensive coverage of ritual, and the manner in which the gods must be worshiped. Alain Daniélou was born in 1907 in Paris. He was a true Renaissance man, trained in music, painting, and dance. He gave recitals and exhibited his paintings. Daniélou was also an avid sportsman: a canoeing champion, and an expert race-car driver.

He was also homosexual. Daniélou and his gay lover ventured to India, traveling around in a deluxe, Silverstream camper imported from southern California, photographing erotic sculpture. They later settled down in a Maharajah’s estate on the banks of the Ganges and devoted themselves to Sanskrit, Hinduism, music, and entertaining. Daniélou gradually “went native” and stayed in India many years. In time, he became known throughout the world as an authority on Indian music and culture. He published works dealing with Hindu religion, society, music, sculpture, architecture, and other topics. It was Daniélou, more than anyone else, who was responsible for popularizing Indian music in the West (among other things, he was the “discoverer” of Ravi Shankar). Daniélou died in 1994.

The Myths and Gods of India is a delight to read, but it can also be treated as a reference work for those needing a clear and accurate account of various gods or Hindu religious concepts. For the student of Inda-European culture, the book is a treasure trove. Indeed, those who are familiar with the Inda-European comparativist school of Georges Dumézil, Jaan Puhvel, and others, will get the most out of this book. I will offer a few brief examples here.

Daniélou writes on page 27 that “Human beings, according to their nature and stage of development, are inclined toward . . . different aspects of the Cosmic Being. Those in whom consciousness is predominant worship the gods (deva); those in whom action or existence predominates worship genii (yaksha) and antigods (asura); and those in whom enjoyment or sensation predominates worship ghosts and spirits (bhuta and preta).” This suggests, of course, the Inda-European tripartition identified by Dumézil. On page 66 we learn that Soma was “brought to earth by a large hawk,” just as Odin, in the form of an eagle, brought mead to the JEsir. On page 87 we are told that “The earth is also represented as a goddess, or as a cow that feeds everyone with her milk. She is the mother of life, the substance of all things.” What can this remind us of, except the Norse Audumla?

There also seem to be parallels between Agni (the god of fire) and Loki. Like Loki, Agni is an outcast among the gods. Daniélou tells us further that, “The fire of destruction, Agni’s most fearful form, was born of the primeval waters and remains hidden under the sea, ever ready to destroy the world” (p. 89). This is reminiscent of the Midgard Serpent, the progeny of Loki. Page 151:
“When Vishnu sleeps, the universe dissolves into its formless state, represented as the causal ocean. The remnants of manifestation are represented as the serpent Remainder (Sesa) coiled upon itself and floating upon the abysmal waters.”

Daniélou tells us (p. 92) that “the sun . . . is envisaged [by the Hindus] under two aspects. As one of the spheres, one of the Vasus, the physical sun is the celestial form of fire, of agni. As the source of light, of warmth, of life, of knowledge, the solar energy is the source of all life, represented in the twelve sons-of-the-Primordial-Vastness (Adityas), the twelve sovereign principles.” In Futhark (pp. 51-52), Edred Thorsson tells us that “The sun was known by two special names in the North . . . Sol represents the phenomenon, while sunna is the noumenon, the spiritual power residing in the concept.” Also, the “twelve sons-of-the-Primordial-Vastness” immanent within the solar energy must remind us of the twelve sig-runes that make up the Wewelsburg “sun-wheel” of Karl Maria Wiligut.

Page 99: “When the gods were receiving the ambrosia of immortality, the Moon [Soma; equivalent to Mead] detected the anti-god Rahu disguised as a god. Because of the Moon Rahu had to die, but although his head was severed from his body, he could not truly die, for he had tasted the ambrosia. His head remained alive.” Mimir?

Page 103: “Rudra, the lord of tears, is said to have sprung from the forehead of the Immense-Being (Brahma) and, at the command of that god, to have divided himself into a male form and a female form . . . “Athena?

Page 103: “The Maruts (immortals) are a restless, warlike troupe of flashy young men, transposition in space of the hordes of young warriors called the marya (mortals). . . . They are the embodiment of moral and heroic deeds and of the exuberance of youth.” Maruts = Einherjar; Marya = Indo-European Männerbünde. Page 104: “The Maruts are the friends of Indra, the wielder of the thunderbolt . . .” Thor? Page 110: Indra’s thunderbolt is “shaped like a mace … ”

Page 111: “Indra had been the deity worshiped among the pastoral people of Vraja.” Again, just as Thor was.

Page 118: Varuna “is the ruler of the ‘other side,’ of the invisible world.” He is “said to be an antigod, a magician.” Odin? Page 119: “He catches the evildoers and binds them with his noose.” Criminals sacrificed to Odin were hung. Varuna also “knows the track of birds in the sky,” just as Odin knows the track of Huginn and Muninn.

Page 132: The god of death is named Yama, which means “Twin” (Ymir). “Yama’s brother is the lawgiver, Manu, who shares with him the title of progenitor of mankind.” Yama “owns two four-eyed dogs with wide nostrils . . . They watch the path of the dead.” What can this remind us of except the Greek hellhound, Cerberus?

Page 138: “In contrast to the gods, the antigods [asura] are the inclinations of the senses which, by their nature, belong to the obscuring tendency, and which delight in life, that is, in the activities of the life energies in all the fields of sensation.” This is an accurate description of the Norse Vanir. Asura is cognate with Aesir, so, oddly enough, the term shifts meaning either in the Norse or the Indian tradition.

Page 159: The four ages (yugas) are represented as white (the golden age), red, yellow, and black (the dark age). The stages of the alchemical process (as represented in the West) are black, white, yellow, and red.

Pages 243-45 detail the Upanishadic account of creation out of the primal man Purusha: “He desired a second. He became as large as a woman and man in close embrace. He divided himself into two. From him arose a husband and a wife. Hence it is that everyone is but half a being. The vacant space is filled by a wife.” This is extraordinarily similar to the account of the creation of
men and woman given by Aristophanes in Plato’s Symposium. The world is then created out of Purusha’s body-just as the world is created out of Ymir’s body in Norse myth. “The virile member was separated; from this virile member came forth semen and from semen the earthly waters.” This is identical to the account of the creation of the ocean in the Greek myth of the sacrifice of Ouranos by Kronos.

The account of the hero Kumara/Skana (pp. 297-300) is strikingly like the saga of Sigurd, and also similar in some respects to the Parzival of Wolfram von Eschenbach. The “essences” (apsaras; pp. 304-305) are “water nymphs, eternally young women who are the courtesans and dancers of heaven.” Rhine Maidens? “They are depicted as uncommonly beautiful, with lotus eyes, slender waists, and large hips. By their languid postures and sweet words they rob those who see them of their wisdom and their intellect.” Sirens? “One can master them by stealing their clothes while they bathe. They choose lovers among the dead fallen on the battlefield.” Valkyries?

The above merely scratches the surface of this immensely rich text, which demands careful study and multiple readings.

 


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jeudi, 23 octobre 2014

Paganism & Christianity, Nietzsche & Evola

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Paganism & Christianity, Nietzsche & Evola

By Jonathan Bowden 

Ex: http://www.counter-currents.com

Editor’s Note:

This text continues the transcript by V. S. of Jonathan Bowden’s interview at the Union Jack Club in London on Saturday, November 21, 2009, after his lecture/performance on Punch and Judy [2]. The title is editorial. 

Q: When did you decide to convert to paganism and why?

B: Well, I never really converted to paganism. I mean, there are some orthodox pagans, if you can have such a thing, who probably think I am not one. But I’m a Nietzschean and that’s a different system. Somebody made this for me. [Points to odal rune pendant.] And I like Odinic paganism sort of as an objectification of my sort of sensibility. Does one believe the gods objectively exist in another realm? Well, you see, religion is a philosophy about life which is sacristic and has rituals in which you partly act out, therefore it’s more important because it’s made slightly more concrete than ideas or it’s really just based upon ideas. There are relatively simple but powerful ideas at the crux of all the big religious systems. Most people are born in a system and just accept that and go along with it as long as it’s not too onerous or they feel like they live their life through it properly.

I just agree with the ethics of that type of Nordic paganism, which is really how the Vikings lived and how they behaved. I’m less concerned with small groups, which I respect. I like the Odinic Rite, but I personally believe that those sorts of things will only ever activate post-modern minorities and very small ones at that.

I think people should identify with what they think they are and the values that they hold. This symbol really means strength or courage or masculinity or the first man or the first principle of war or the metaphysics of conflict. So, I just think it’s a positive system of value.

I never really was a Christian. Culturally, I have great admiration for elements of Christian art. More so than most people who are pagan who have violently reacted against it. I don’t really share that emotionalism. But I don’t agree with Christian ethics. Deep down, they’ve ruined the West, and we’re in the state that we are because of them.

Q: Just added on to that: How do we create more Nietzscheans? How do we spread Nietzscheanism as a religion, as an idea?

B: You’ve got to get people quite young. I think you’ve got to introduce alternative value systems to them. This is a society that says weakness is good, weakness should be pitied, the ill are weak, the disabled are weak, people who’ve got various things wrong with them (too fat, too thin, bits dropping off) they need help. They may need help. But the value system that lies behind that desire to help worships the fact of weakness and the fact that people are broken. If you worship the idea of strength and tell the weak to become stronger, which is a reverse idea for helping them essentially. You help them in order to get stronger. You totally reverse the energy pattern and you’ve reversed the system of morals that exists in this culture now. You’ve reversed the sort of things that Rowan Williams or his predecessor or his likely successor always says, basically. I think that’s what you have to do.

I personally think it’s a moral revolution, not anything political, that will save the West, because all the technology is here, all the systems of power are here. You only have to change what’s in people’s minds. It’s very difficult though.

Q: So, to a young person watching this video, never heard of you before, where would he go to find out about Nietzscheanism?

B: Just go to the Wikipedia page, surprisingly, although it’s a bit trivial, is actually quite accurate in a tendentious way. Although some of the philosophical debates about him and the genealogy of his works might confuse people because it views it in an academic way. And you don’t need to put his name to it. There’s a cluster of power-moral, individualistic, elitist, partly antinomian, partly gnostic, partly not, partly pagan, vitalist and other ideas which go with that sort of area.

Strength is morality. Weakness is sin. Weakness requires punishment. If you’re weak, if you’re obese, if you’re a drug addict, become less so. Become stronger. Move towards the sun. Become more coherent. Become more articulate. Cast more of a shadow. It’s almost a type of positive behaviorism in some ways. But it’s not somebody wagging their finger and so on, because you’re doing it for yourself. It comes from inside.

Q2: Do you not think though that Nietzscheanism doesn’t have a transcendental element to it?

B: That’s why I’m wearing this [rune pendant], you see, because I probably think there ought to be such a thing. Many people need to go beyond that. If his thinking before he went mad, probably because he had tertiary syphilis, it’s up to sort of 1880, so we’re talking about thinking that’s 130 years old.

I think in some ways he’s an anatomist of Christianity’s decline, because Christianity been declining mentally and in some ways extending out into the Third World where it’s real catchment area now is. I mean, there will be a non-White pope soon. Christianity will begin to wear the face of the south very soon. It’s the ideal religion for the south. It’s pity for those who fail, for those who are weak, for those who are hungry, for those who are broken. Have pity on your children, O Lord. It’s an ideal religion. Don’t take it through violence or fear or aggression. Submit and be thankful for what He will give you in His wisdom.

But it’s ruining us. For centuries we were strong even despite that faith, but of course we made use of it. The part that fits us is the extreme transcendence of Christian doctrine. That’s what Indo-Europeans like about that faith. The enormous vaulting cathedrals, the Gothic idea that you can go up and up and up. It’s that element in it that we like, and we made into ourselves. But we forgot the ethical substratum. We forgot the sort of troll-like ethical element that there is no other value but sympathy, there is no other value than compassion, that love is the basis of all life. And ultimately that is a feminine view of civilization which will lead to its collapse in masculine terms.

Q2: How would you view the works of Julius Evola?

B: Yes, they’re the counter-balance to Nietzsche. There is a lot of religious elements in there of a perennialist sort that a lot of modern minds can’t accept. You see, Nietzsche is a switchblade, and nearly all people in this society are modern even if they think they’re not. Nietzsche is a modern thinker. Nietzsche is a modernist. Nietzsche can reach the modern mind. Nietzsche’s the most Right-wing formulation within the modern mind that people can accept.

My view is that people who accept Evola straight out aren’t living in the modern world. That’s not a criticism. It’s a description of where they are. I think for people to become illiberal they have to become illiberal first within the modern world. Some people would say you have to go outside of it. You know, the culture of the ruins and the revolt against the modern world, per se. But I personally think that we’re in modernity.

But there will be people who go to Nietzsche and Thus Spake Zarathustra, which is really a semi- or pseudo-religious text, is not enough and they’ll want to go beyond that and they’ll want a degree and a tier of religiosity. The dilemma always in the West is what to choose. Back to Christianity or on to paganism? Which system do you choose?

Evola said he was a Catholic pagan, didn’t he? One knows what he means. But I see paganism peeping out of everything. I see paganism peeping out of Protestantism, the most Jewish form of Christianity, through its power-individualism and its extremist individuality (Kierkegaard, Carlyle, Nietzsche). I see paganism saturating Catholicism and peeping out of it at every turn, aesthetically, artistically, the art of the Renaissance, the return of the Greco-Roman sensibility, the humanism of the ancient world. Some of the greatest classicists were Medieval Popes and so on. I see it just looming out. The whole structure of the Catholic Church is a Roman imperial structure, Christianized. So, I see it peeping out.

Our law is Roman. All of our leaders were educated and steeped in the classical world to provide a dialectical corollary to Christianity without them being told that’s what is happening. The decline of the classics is partly because people don’t want to go back there, basically. So, you don’t teach it to anyone apart from tiny little public school elites, which are .2% of the population who read a few authors who no one else even knows exist. You know, big deal.

The difficulty with Evola is that it’s a very great leap for the modern mind. Although in his sensibility, I agree with his sensibility, really. I agree with him going out amidst the bombings, not caring. I agree with that sort of attitude towards life, which is an aristocratic attitude towards life. But we’re living in a junk food, liberal, low middle class society. You’ve got to start where you are. I think Nietzsche is strong enough meat for most people and is far, far, far too strong for 80% now.

Today, the mentally disabled have been allowed into the Paralympics. So, you will have the 100 yard cerebral palsy dash at the next Olympics in London in 2012. This is the world we’re living in. Nietzsche would say that’s ridiculous and so on. And that is a shocking and transgressive and morally ugly attitude from the contemporary news that we see. So, it’s almost as if Nietzsche’s tough enough for this moment.

But I’m interesting in that he said, “God is dead in the minds of men.” That doesn’t necessarily mean, of course, although he was a militant atheist, he’s living open the idea that . . . [God objectively exists—Ed.]. You see, the Christian idea of God was dying around him, mentally, and it has died. I mean, hardly anyone really, deep down, believes that now. Even the people who say that they do don’t in the way that they did 100 years ago or their predecessors did.

So, it has died, but I think there are metaphysically objectivist standards outside life. Whether our civilization can revive without a return to them is very open. It’s very questionable. Where that discourse is to come from is . . . The tragedy would be if Christianity sort of facilitated our greatness, but ended up ruining us, which of course might be the true thesis.

Now we’re getting into deep waters.

Q: What is your view of Abrahamic religions?

B: I think religion is a good thing. The Right always supports the right of religion to exist. Religion does cross ethnic and racial boundaries. Afghanistan was Buddhist once. I prefer people to have some sort of religious viewpoint, even the most tepid sort of thing, but none at all, because at least there is a structure that is in some sense prior.

But, personally, I prefer tribally based religions. I prefer religions that are about blood and genetics and honor and identity and are nominalist and that are specific. But I think people will adopt different systems because they’re physiologically different even within their group. You can see that about certain people. Certain people, Christianity suits them very well and they can be quite patriotic and quite decent people and so on in that system and there we are. But for me? No.

I’m a barbarian in some ways. People can worship what gods they want within the Western tradition, and that’s all right.

 


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mercredi, 22 octobre 2014

Kemi Seba/Laurent James : "Le pérénialisme global ou l'union ésotérique des dissidences"

Kemi Seba/Laurent James :

"Le pérénialisme global ou l'union ésotérique des dissidences"

lundi, 20 octobre 2014

Jean Parvulesco, les aventuriers de l'Esprit

Jean Parvulesco, les aventuriers de l'Esprit

jeudi, 16 octobre 2014

Julius Evola e la donna crudele

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Julius Evola e la donna crudele

Ex: http://romeocastiglione.wordpress.com

Si annida il mistero tra le impalcature dell’imponente opera evoliana Metafisica del sesso. Nei capitoli ammalianti è celato un particolare erotismo evocativo; le tematiche affrontate nel volume brillano di un’immortale e remota luce. L’archetipo femminile è denso di sacralità e spiritualità arcana. La donna è inquadrata in un’ottica tradizionale, ancestrale: è sospesa nella perenne immutabilità ed è legata in modo preponderante alla terra, alla luna, ai ritmi ciclici del mondo. È un libro spiazzante, intrigante, coinvolgente. Le righe si sovrappongono nell’immaginario. Julius Evola esalta l’aspetto segreto della femmina, il lato nero, demoniaco. Secondo l’autore la donna riesce a far coesistere dentro di sé la disposizione alla pietà e quella alla crudeltà. In virtù di ciò egli rielabora alcune convinzioni di Lombroso e Ferreno. Particolarmente pone all’attenzione un prototipo di femmina violenta e spietata; tale modello si esalta nelle rivoluzioni e nei linciaggi. L’autore argomenta le supposizioni e riporta i passaggi più improntati del volume lombrosiano La donna delinquente. Credo che sia di ausilio il lungometraggio Malena: le donne del paese si accaniscono con perfida violenza sulla bellissima protagonista del film. La sfigurano pubblicamente. È un atto di giustizia sommaria. Malena abbatte i tabù. Di conseguenza provoca un’invidia assurda. È l’altra faccia della medaglia; rappresenta l’evasione. E deve essere distrutta.

Le donne crudeli di Tornatore sono simili alla perfida Emma Smael del lungometraggio Johnny Guitar di Nicholas Ray. Come il fuoco Emma Smael avvampa la nuda pelle. Ella sprigiona nell’atmosfera un aroma tragico intriso di dolore; ha un carisma esasperato, uno charme lugubre e impersonale. Porta i segni della rabbia oscura e antisolare. È vestita di nero, non cura il suo corpo. All’apparenza è un essere insignificante e indesiderabile. Ma sotto la scorza alberga un’anima inquieta, crudele, mesta. Luccica di cattiva luce quest’antieroina lunare. Emma fomenta il popolo, aizza le masse. Combatte la crociato contro i diversi, i forestieri, i fuorilegge. È puritana: disprezza le tentazioni dei sensi. Nello stesso tempo desidera ardentemente il bandito Ballerino Kid. Nel suo corpo si affrontano gli istinti contrastanti. Questa donna vorrebbe addirittura uccidere la sua segreta passione per far allontanare i bollenti spiriti. «Desideri Kid, ti vergogni e vorresti vederlo impiccato». Ribecca così Vienna, la nemica acerrima, la rivale assoluta.

Evola tenta di mettere insieme come un puzzle i richiami evocativi. In modo particolare è dedicato alla crudeltà della donna un intero capitolo. Così denocciola una carrellata di aneddoti storici: si sovrappongono le saghe della Tradizione. I persiani intravidero nell’universo femminile una particolare dualità. Fuoco e neve, durezze e dolcezza formano la donna. Ebbene sorge un collegamento tra crudeltà e sessualità: il tipo della baccante e della mènade è un esempio lampante. Nelle pieghe affiora un prototipo femminile afroditico ambiguo. La Dolores di Swinburne, la cosiddetta Nostra signora dello Spasimo è il vessillo del peccato, del piacere, della perdizione, della crudeltà latente. E il filosofo coglie alcune sottili sfumature. Ridisegna l’eroina Mimi della Boheme di Murger in un modo diverso; in sostanza inquadra la ragazza in una dimensione perfino “brutale e selvaggia”.

Ebbene il fascino muliebre è associato alla magia e alla stregoneria. Circe, Calipso e Brunhilde rappresentano l’esasperazione, l’estremizzazione, l’attrazione malefica. Tale tipologia di donna attrae l’uomo come una calamita famelica; la fascinazione è gravida di richiami alla negromanzia, all’occultismo. È la lagnanza della terra, lo spirito del peccato, la rottura. Perfino Ulisse è incantato dalle sirene: ascolta l’eco d’estasi legato a un palo. È una lotta tra il bene e il male. Anche il valoroso Gerardo Satriano nel romanzo L’eredità della priora è sedotto dalle fattucchiere lucane. Smarrisce la concezione del tempo e annulla la sua individualità. Così come perde la cognizione del tempo il giudice salentino protagonista del film Galantuomini di Winspeare. L’uomo prova una strana attrazione nei confronti di una donna legata al mondo della malavita. Per tale ragione perde tutte le certezze e confonde il bene e il male.

La letteratura, la poesia e il cinema hanno esaltato diverse volte le donne crudeli, in altre parole quelle dotate di un fascino antisolare, demoniaco. Per alcune strane similitudini elogio Giulia Venere, la domestica del libro Cristo si è fermato a Eboli di Carlo Levi. Leggo, annoto i passi del racconto. Ed elaboro il pensiero. Penso che sia un accostamento intrigante; tramite poche righe il lettore è catapultato in un anfratto antimoderno. «Giulia era una donna alta e formosa – scrive Levi – doveva aver avuto, nella gioventù una specie di barbara e solenne bellezza. Il viso era ormai rugoso per gli anni e giallo per la malaria, ma restavano i segni dell’antica venusità nella sua struttura severa, come nei muri di un tempio classico, che ha perso i marmi che l’adornavano, ma conserva intatta la forma e le proporzioni. […] Questo viso aveva un fortissimo carattere arcaico, non nel senso del classico greco, né nel romano, ma di una antichità misteriosa e crudele, cresciuta sempre sulla stessa terra senza rapporti e mistioni con gli uomini, ma legata alla zolla e alle eterne divinità animali. Vi si vedevano una fredda sensualità, una oscura ironia, una crudeltà naturale, una protervia impenetrabile e una passività piena di potenza che si legavano in un’espressione insieme severa, intelligente, malvagia». Con molta probabilità anche Levi ha subìto il fascino distruttivo della maga lucana. Emerge un ritratto sensuale, erotico, spietato.

Tale donna è un archetipo, un modello evoliano. Il filosofo della tradizione nella sua Metafisica del sesso rimarca gli oscuri aspetti. E appare con prepotenza la “dimensione fredda” evocata perfino da uno scrittore progressista come Carlo Levi. «È questa la dimensione fredda della donna – scrive Evola – quale incarnazione terrestre della Vergine, di Durgâ e in quanto essere yin. […] Che la donna sia connessa più dell’uomo alla terra, all’elemento cosmico – naturale è cosa dimostrata. […] Ma nell’antichità questa connessione si riferiva piuttosto all’aspetto yin della natura, dal dominio sovrasensibile notturno e inconscio, irrazionale e abissale, delle forze vitali. Di qui, nella donna certe disposizioni veggenti e magiche in senso stretto».

Nella rappresentazione cinematografica del libro Irene Papas veste i panni di Giulia. Avvertiamo nelle pieghe delle scene un velato erotismo colmo di allusioni estatiche. La donna nasconde il suo copro con le vesti. Soltanto i piedi sono scoperti: pertanto codesta forma di pudore primordiale si differenzia da quello delle donne orientali. Le cinesi considerano i piedi l’elemento primitivo da nascondere; le arabe, invece, coprono la bocca. E Giulia cammina scalza fra le macerie derelitte. In uno spezzone lascia intravedere una gamba nuda; la copre subito con un’aria sensuale. Magnetizza così l’uomo. Quest’ultimo è attratto dal gesto insolito della megera, dai movimenti furtivi, dal sensualismo impersonale. Proprio Evola dedica al pudore taluni passaggi coinvolgenti. «Si sa fin troppo bene quanto spesso la donna usa le vesti per produrre un maggior effetto eccitante allusivo alle promesse della sua nudità. Montaigne ebbe a scrivere che ci sono cose che si nascondono per meglio mostrarle».  Giulia Venere si è cristallizzata nelle sembianze di Irene Papas ed è difficile scindere le due figure. Il gesto insolito dell’attrice greca è un frammento penetrante e ipnotico. Con pochissime e calde movenze è riuscita a descrivere i sentieri tracciati nel libro evoliano.

mardi, 14 octobre 2014

L’uomo come potenza

L’uomo come potenza

Ex: http://romeocastiglione.wordpress.com

L'uomo-come-potenza-Evola

Sfoglio con calma le pagine del libro L’uomo come potenza di Julius Evola. Tolgo i petali di una malefica rosa e lascio cadere sul pavimento infiniti aneliti di spasimo. Leggo, rifletto. Dinanzi a me compare una realtà incontaminata: accolgo in silenzio la magia dei Tantra. E soffermo il mio sguardo su un rigo ipnotico. «Evocare una immagine. Fissarvisi, perdersi, per così dire in essa. Bruscamente, sostituirla con un’altra». Chiudo gli occhi e vedo con la mente una ragazza in una stanza. La luce penetra attraverso i buchi delle persiane. È un pomeriggio estivo. Avverto un desiderio di distruzione; l’Inquietudine assale il mio corpo. Così cambio figurazione. Sorge all’improvviso un oceano di ghiaccio. Non si avverte nessun rumore. Il desiderio è atrofizzato. È fuggita la sofferenza.

Resto attonito. Ebbene rileggo il testo altre volte. Sottolineo, scopro. Tra le mani ho un dardo infuocato. E questo idealismo magico è paurosamente meraviglioso: è la vittoria totale dell’individuo. È il superamento dell’idealismo hegeliano. È l’abbraccio mortale del romanticismo tedesco di Novalis e Fichte con il metallico pensiero di Nietzsche. È la negazione della dualità cristiana; conseguenzialmente è il rifiuto del rapporto di dipendenza tra l’Individuo e il Dio trascendente ritenuto fondamentale da Schleiermacher. L’Io è il signore assoluto.

L’uomo come potenza raccoglie nelle pagine l’impetuosa unione della migliore filosofia occidentale con le dottrine orientali. Evola porta all’attenzione del lettore un Oriente remoto e distante dagli stereotipi. Con codesto saggio è stata confutata la distinzione tra i due poli. Non alberga certamente in questo luogo l’Oriente del buddismo arcano e delle primordiali Upanishad. Non occorre fuggire dal mondo; bensì bisogna dominarlo. Proprio per siffatto motivo l’autore ha esaltato il sistema tantrico, in altre parole il sistema orientale con più assonanze con lo spirito del moderno occidente. Nell’età buia, nell’epoca del Kali Yuga non c’è spazio per la conoscenza: soltanto la potenza brutale libera l’individuo.

Quindi è possibile dominare il mondo tramite la potenza liberatrice. L’Io deve diventare un Dio. Propriamente occorre recuperare l’immensa e grandiosa signoria di sé. L’individuo è sovrano ed è una “super monade”. La via dell’azione è salvifica. L’individuo è come un nero cavallo demoniaco libero dai lacci e dalle leggi morali. È il nero cavallo dell’auriga di Platone; è il dionisiaco puledro dalle sembianze tenebrose. È il sole, è la potenza distruttiva. Agire unicamente per l’azione è l’obiettivo. Di conseguenza si oltrepassa la soglia del bene e del male. Non c’è più il bene, non c’è più il male. L’individuo decide ciò che è bene e ciò è male. «Non si tratta cioè – dice Evola – né di violare le leggi, né di conformarvisi, bensì di elevarsi al livello di ciò per cui ogni legge e condizione non ha senso alcuno». Orbene le cupe e ipnotiche parole sembrano vampe immaginifiche. Cerca Dio chi è debole. L’individuo che cerca la libertà diventa Dio.

Proprio con la pratica dei Tantra (precisamente del ҫakti – tantra) l’individuo si libera nel mondo. La potenza divina proietta lungo un avvallamento magico. La naturale realizzazione di sé trova la sua suprema origine nel principio femminile della Shakti. Pertanto lo shaktismo mantiene talune importantissime attinenze con gli antichi culti del mondo mediterraneo pelasgico. Kali è una dea nera e nuda. La sua sagoma sprigiona una mistica sessualità intrisa di disintegrazione; ed è nera anche la Diana d’Efeso. Così come la Madonna Nera del Tindari in Sicilia. Tramite i Tantra è possibile affermare la priorità della potenza sull’esistenza. Al Principio c’è un potere e l’essere è subordinato a esso. Nella scala gerarchica tutti gli esseri vengono dopo e anche Dio viene dopo. Allora la potenza è libera e non è soggetta alle leggi razionali e a quelle morali. In pratica non ha un Dharma, un ordine più su di lei. Con il mondo c’è un rapporto di potenza e la potenza è soltanto la manifestazione. La potenza in azione è la coincidenza del desiderio e della liberazione. Proprio il mondo è il luogo materiale della liberazione. Insomma, bisogna porsi «faccia a faccia con la legge, resisterle e non esserne spezzati ma dominarla e spezzarla; osare di strappar via i veli con la realtà originaria e prudentemente coperta, osare di trascendere la forma per mettersi a contatto con l’atrocità originaria di un mondo in cui bene e male, divino e umano, giusto e ingiusto non hanno alcun senso. […] Ostacoli uno solo: paura. È una lotta terribile. Vi può essere vittoria e vi può essere catastrofe». L’autore individua nei Tantra un titanismo indomito e velato di allusioni nietzschiane. Evola rivendica la possibilità di «poter vivere tragicamente».

Bisogna mantenere la schiena dritta fino al momento di lasciare sé. Per farlo serve la potenza di distrazione, la rinuncia, l’auto crudeltà, la durezza, e la pratica occulta. Per di più bisogna essere coerenti e lineari. Il pentimento è vietato: non esiste alcun rimorso. Una “colpa” voluta non è una reale colpa. È necessario evitare il piacere; in linea di massima la strada maestra è quella della maggior resistenza. Non bisogna giustificare le proprie azioni. Non sussiste la condotta morale: soltanto nel dualismo la morale ha un’importanza. Per il superamento dei paҫa, in altre parole dei legami affettivi è fondamentale mantenere una dura condotta. La pietà, la delusione, il peccato, il disgusto, la famiglia e le convenzioni non hanno alcun valore. È una lotta atroce. Spunta tra i riflessi dell’opera un crepuscolare catastrofismo. Si dipanano le tenebre della perversa realtà. L’Individuo sfida il Dharma, il cosmos. Raccoglie dentro di sé il caos e sprigiona la volontà di potenza. Si arrampica a mani nude sopra una rocciosa parete; il senso di vertigine minaccia la stabilità. Sotto c’è il vuoto. Egli può soltanto andare avanti. Le pietre si sbriciolano intorno a lui. Soltanto in cima c’è la libertà.

In pratica nel volume il tantrismo è spiegato alla stregua di una “scienza positiva”. E l’idealismo magico di Evola è un frullato robusto e ammaliante. Nell’idealismo di Evola, in altre parole nell’idealismo “magico” l’Io si mette in rapporto diretto con le cose. Supera così la conciliazione astratta di spirito e mondo, di soggetto e oggetto figurata da Hegel. Codesto idealismo trae linfa da Novalis: il pensatore romano, in un certo senso, enfatizza ancor di più l’individuo. L’uomo come potenza rientra nel novero delle opere evoliane a carattere filosofico speculativo. L’autore con la successiva Teoria dell’individuo assoluto esaspera ulteriormente la “tragica dimensione dell’esistenza”. Il Superuomo di Nietzsche è oltrepassato sul filo del rasoio. La potentissima “vettura” evoliana percorre una strada stregata. Il singolo sceglie un eccezionalissimo percorso e procede a velocità elevate. Pertanto il poetico “solipsismo” non incute nessun timore. L’individuo assoluto determina ciò che è vero e ciò che è falso. Pare Humpty Dumpty, il personaggio ideato da Lewis Carroll che incontra Alice; Humpty cambia dispoticamente il significato delle parole poiché si sente un padrone. E nell’epoca della dissoluzione, nell’ultima epoca il corpo cerca la sua liberazione. Non è più il tempo della conoscenza. L’ascetismo non alberga fra le righe del libro. Ebbene non subire il fascino distruttivo del volume equivale a non scottarsi i piedi sui carboni ardenti: è impossibile. Di là dai Tantra è possibile scorgere un codice crittografato dal sapore robusto. L’uomo come potenza potrebbe diventare una sorta di nuovo “manuale di sopravvivenza” per gli uomini estranei al proprio tempo. Ma è un manuale algido, rigido, severo. È la vittoria di Dioniso è la consequenziale sconfitta di Apollo; è la vittoria del disordine sull’ordine morale devastatore della potenza dell’individuo. Dopo aver letto L’uomo come potenza il mondo non sarà più lo stesso e i problemi saranno analizzati con distacco. È un libro per pochi eletti. È un libro elegantemente antidemocratico.

E nei nostri giorni esiste l’individuo assoluto. Ad esempio le frange estreme del pianeta ultras corrono lungo una linea invisibile e peccaminosa. Nel cinema ho ritrovato diverse volte tale figura. Il Principe del film Ultrà è un individuo assoluto; così come Jena Plissken di Fuga da New York. È un individuo assoluto Saverio lo skinhead del lungometraggio Teste Rasate. Ebbene anche il generale Kurtz di Apocalypse Now è un individuo assoluto. Chi domina il mondo e chi non riconosce le leggi morali è un Dio. È un Dio chi obbedisce soltanto a sé stesso. Oggi codesti pensieri fanno male. Pesano come frammenti di roccia gravidi di rabbia.

lundi, 13 octobre 2014

MIRCEA ELIADE'S 'TRADITIONALISM': APPEARANCE AND REALITY

 

 
Timotheus Lutz
Ex: http://www.hyperion-journal.net
 

Relatively recently, certain academics with an interest in those who admit a perennial tradition and expound esoteric doctrines have profiled what they call the ‘traditionalist school’. In their characterization, some individuals have been assimilated wrongly to this category, most notably the famous scholar of ‘comparative religion’, Mircea Eliade. Others, who should be aware of the fundamental differences in outlook between Eliade and modern exponents of traditional metaphysics, have seen him as a sort of sympathetic ‘Trojan horse’ who would subtly alter the course of his field of study in academia, by way of a ‘phenomenological’ view of spirituality in human history, contrasted with the sterile, purely analytical outlook that predominates in the universities.  
 
Eliade’s encounter with the works of René Guénon and Julius Evola certainly had a significant, or perhaps even a primary influence on his methods of research and ways of interpreting what he called ‘archaic’ systems, but, as he himself stated frankly in his journals, he always kept his distance and was apprehensive about endorsing the views of the latter.
 
It should be made clear that clarifying Eliade’s position is not necessarily a condemnation, as, obviously, one can accept some ideas of a given thinker without accepting all. However, given the importance and the rarity of the ideas of Guénon and Evola, and the incomprehension of some major ones displayed by Eliade, a firm appraisal is called for, since some are eager to assume an identity of substance in the thought of the former and the latter, where it is really only an appearance.
 
He states his position most directly in a journal entry on 11 November 1966:
 
What Guénon and the other ‘hermetists’ say of the tradition should not be understood on the level of historical reality (as they claim). These speculations constitute a universe of systematically articulated meanings: they are to be compared to a great poem or a novel. It is the same with Marxist or Freudian ‘explanations’: they are true if they are considered imaginary universes. The ‘proofs’ are few and uncertain – they correspond to the historical, social, psychological ‘realities’ of a novel or of a poem.
 
All these global and systematic interpretations, in reality, constitute mythological creations, highly useful for understanding the world; but they are not, as their authors think, ‘scientific explanations’. [1]
 
The classification of Guénon as a ‘hermetist’ is rather strange since, in his writings, he rarely discussed the hermetic doctrines. Since his main focus was metaphysics (a domain not subject to becoming), it is incorrect to classify him with a title pertaining to cosmological doctrines (which pertain to the domain of becoming). Comparing the formulations of Guénon and those similar in outlook to poems and novels is completely wrong: in poetic creations the subjective is primary, while in Guénon’s writings (as in those of Aristotle, Plotinus or Proclus) a precise objectivity is evident. As far as proofs, in this domain there cannot be empirical demonstration, only support by way of logic and analogy on one end, and identifying principles within oneself on the other. One either understands or does not. That this is a major obstacle for many is apparent. We assume the term ‘scientific explanations’ was not taken from Guénon or another’s writing, but used to imply erroneously that they would describe their interpretations as scientific; this is also an error since none of them would claim their interpretations could be explained scientifically.
 
We can assume this is Eliade’s basic view, since by 1966 his outlook was more or less fully developed, and since he shows similar opinions later on. This was also an opinion he had long held, as shown in an entry from 1947:
 
Only after you’ve studied Coomaraswamy’s writings in detail do you discover, suddenly, the poverty, the ‘elementarism’ [rom. primarism], of René Guénon’s œuvre. And the insufferable self-importance with which he hides, so often, his ignorance! [2]
 
We are not sure what he means here by ‘elementarism’, but perhaps it is Guénon’s focus on principial reality, which is the whole point of his works, contrasted with Ananda Coomaraswamy’s much greater emphasis on factual analysis and use of citations and academic sources. Although Coomaraswamy was indeed a (celebrated) academic, he was in agreement with nearly all of Guénon’s fundamental positions. If this is what Eliade means, it is simply another instance of his incomprehension of the primacy of metaphysics over confirming individual facts. We have found that Coomaraswamy’s writings do not reveal any significant ‘poverty’ in Guénon’s works, but instead complement them nicely.
 
Incomprehension of some major ideas is also apparent much later. In the early 1980s he writes: ‘Like René Guénon, Evola presumed a ‘primordial tradition’, in the existence of which I could not believe; I was suspicious of its artificial, ahistorical character’ [3]. To modern ears, the term ‘primordial tradition’ is likely to evoke visions of some perfect civilization in the sky, but first and foremost it is to be understood as atemporal (and thus, also, correctly described by Eliade as ahistorical) principles on which all genuinely traditional cultures are based. These principles are superior to, but are as immutable, in a similar manner, as the laws of logic or mathematics. To call them artificial is to demand that they be intelligible only as a particular, empirical example, and so displays, again, his incomprehension.
 
Worth quoting is his admission of a use for these authors:
 
I try once again, but I don’t succeed: Yeats’ ‘occultism’, over which so much fuss is made, doesn’t interest me. It’s cheap, ‘literary’, suspect – and, ultimately, uninteresting. Out of all the modern occultist authors whom I have read, only R. Guénon and J. Evola are worthy of being taken into consideration. I’m not discussing here to what extent their assertions are ‘true’. But what they write makes sense. [4]
 
And another, a response to a student of his interested in occultism: ‘. . . if one is truly attracted to hermetism, he ought to read the ‘authorized’, if not Cardanus, at least Coomaraswamy and René Guénon’ [5]. Clearly he still thought highly of some of their formulations, if only as comprehensible reference points for what is often and wrongly passed off as ‘esotericism’.
 
The critical attitude appears again in his dismissive appraisal of Evola’s intellectual autobiography. Eliade’s instinct to privilege academic authorities and those who have received wide acceptance is revealed clearly here:
 

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I’m reading the intellectual autobiography of J. Evola, Il Cammino del mercurio [the title written is wrong: it is cinabro (cinnabar), not mercurio –ed.], with much melancholy. The chapter in which he presents and discusses the idealistic ‘university philosophy’, represented by Croce and Gentile: he speaks about his two theoretical volumes in which he supposedly destroyed those ‘professors,’ etc. etc. The naïveté (full of resentment) with which he situates himself in the history of contemporary thought – even though he states repeatedly that his volumes have not been reviewed and have not evoked any response . . .
 
There must be, indeed, several tons of printed paper in Italy alone on which the philosophy of Croce and Gentile has been discussed. Of what use, then, has Evola’s ‘radical criticism’ and ‘destruction’ been? And abroad, poor J. Evola is viewed as an ultra-fascist. The copy of the English translation of his book on Buddhism in Swift Library is disfigured with polemical annotations (written in indelible lead!): they say (even on the cover) that Evola is a fascist and a ‘racist’, that his theories about ‘Aryans’ were borrowed from A. Rosenberg, etc. I remember the brief, harsh review in Journal asiatique written by J. Filliozat in the same vein: J. E. is a racist, ultra-fascist, etc.
 
Evola tries to appear indifferent to such criticisms, although he prefers them to the ‘conspiracy of silence’ of which he claims he has suffered all his life. And yet, what a melancholic spectacle to see him talking about what he has done, how he has ‘destroyed’ and ‘surpassed’ everyone, even Nietzsche and Heidegger (whom he claims, moreover, to have anticipated . . .). [6]
 
Eliade does not admit that the soundness and truth of arguments are more important than how widely read, received and reviewed they are. The quantity of inferior and false ideas that are celebrated in the universities, then and now, is very high. Many are unable to comprehend, nevertheless, how curtly and effectively false ideas, however celebrated they are or however voluminously they are presented, can be dismissed. Of the mass of writings discussing the thought of Croce and Gentile, only Evola’s had looked at these philosophies from the traditional perspective, which is of use, simply, because it is the only one not subject to the movement of opinion and history. Mention of the idiotic slurs applied to him by those who have misunderstood his perspective are not relevant; if one does not take the time to adequately understand a given idea or formulation, his opinion does not matter. It is clear that Eliade is displaying a historicist prejudice; because his writings have been ignored (apparently, at least) and since no admission of the soundness of his criticisms has manifested visibly, the value of the writings in themselves, as formulations to be judged solely by their truth-value, is ignored, and Evola’s observation of this is considered a ‘spectacle’, the judgment of the history of ideas being obviously the decisive factor for Eliade. We might also add, like Eliade did when he compared Coomaraswamy and Guénon vis-à-vis other ‘occultists’ above, that, unlike Heidegger’s and much of Nietzsche’s writing, what Evola writes makes sense.
 
Despite praise of some aspects of his work, on at least one occasion he engaged in rather irresponsible gossip about Evola. In 1958, in a letter to the poet and former Iron Guard member Vasile Posteucă, regarding a request for information about Evola’s encounter with Corneliu Codreanu, Eliade warned him that Evola was a ‘racist’ and a ‘Nazi’, and liable to generate confusion if used as a source [7]. Never mind that he made it clear that his ‘racism’ was of a type quite different from that of the National Socialists, from whom he explicitly distanced himself ideologically, even during the war, and that several mainstream and semi-mainstream publishers in Europe found his works fit to print! A man of Eliade’s sophistication should have known better than to describe Evola so falsely and simplistically. One would not have thought that, being himself the target of similar slurs by certain elements in academia, he would engage in this kind of rumor-mongering. If the account of the exchange is not a fabrication or an exaggeration, then our opinion of Eliade is lowered considerably.
 
Evola demonstrated quite well the limits of Eliade’s formulations in a review of the latter’s book on Yoga:
 
Our fundamental opinion of Eliade’s work on Yoga may be expressed by saying that it is the most complete of all those that have been written on this subject in the domain of the history of religions and of Orientalism. One cannot mention another that for wealth of information, for comparisons, for philological accuracy, for the examination and utilization of all previous contributions, stands on the same level. But when once this has been admitted, some reservations have to be made. In the first place it would seem that the material he handles has often got the better of the writer. I mean to say that in his anxiety to make use of all, really all, that is known on the several varieties of Yoga and on what is directly or indirectly connected therewith, he has neglected the need of discriminating and selecting so as to give importance only to those parts of Yoga that are standard and typical, avoiding the danger that the reader lose track of the essential features by confusing them with the mass of information on secondary matters, variations, and side products. Looking at it from this standpoint, we are even led to wonder whether Eliade’s previous book Yoga, essai sur les origines de la mystique indienne (Paris, 1936), is not in some respects superior to this last one, which is a reconstruction of the former. In the first book the essential points of reference were more clearly outlined, they were less smothered by the mass of information brought together, and the references to less-known forms of Yoga, such as the Tantric and others, were more clearly pointed out [ . . . ]
 
After this glance at the contents of Eliade’s new book we are tempted to inquire of him a somewhat prejudicial question: to whom is the book addressed? As we have openly declared, it is a fundamental work for specialists in the field not only of Oriental research, but also in that of the history of religions. But in his introduction Eliade states that the book is addressed also to a wider public and he speaks of the importance that a knowledge of a doctrine such as that of Yoga may have for the solution of the existential problems of the modern Westerner, confirmed as that doctrine is by immemorial experience.
 
Here complications arise. To meet such a purpose it would be necessary to follow a different plan and to treat the matter in a different way. A Westerner who reads Eliade’s book may be able to acquire an idea of Yoga as ‘la science intégrale de l’homme [the integral science of man]’, he may acquire knowledge of a teaching that has faced in practice as well as in theory the problem of ‘deconditioning’ man; he will thus add yet one other panorama to the list of the many modern culture has provided him with. His interest will perhaps be more lively than the ‘neutral’ interest of the specialist; he may flirt with the aspects of a ‘spiritualite virante’. But on the existential plane the situation will be pretty much the same as it was before, even if the information available be deeper, more accurate, better documented. The possibility of exercising a more direct influence could only be looked for from a book addressed to those who have shown an interest in Yoga and similar sciences not because they seek for information but because they are seeking for a path; a book that in this special field would remove the misunderstandings, the popular notions, the deviations, and the delusions spread by a certain kind of literature to which we referred at the beginning of this article; a book displaying the accuracy and knowledge that we find in this work of Eliade, in as far as it is an exposition kept within the limits of the history of religions. Such a book has perhaps still to be written. But even so the essential need would not be met, for it is the unanimous opinion of the true masters of Yoga that the key to their science cannot be handed on by the written word. [8]
 
It could be said figuratively that if one who comprehends and adopts the traditional perspective can be said to have a view from the peaks that allows the most complete survey, then Eliade could be described as not having completed the ascent, his vision being obscured by clouds above or enamored by objects on the path to the summit. If he could see individual rocks on the path more closely, we must remember that the view from summit is still the most important one.
 
SOURCES
 
[1] Eliade, Mircea. No Souvenirs: Journal 1957-1969, p. 291.
 
[2] Eliade. Jurnal, 26 August 1947, M.E.P., box 15/2 (trans. Mac Linscott Ricketts). *
 
[3] Eliade. Autobiography, Volume II, p. 152.
 
[4] Eliade. Jurnal, 5 September 1964, M.E.P., box. 16/6 *
 
[5] Ibid., 4 March 1969, box 15/4 *
 
[6] Ibid., 20 December 1964, box. 16/6, pp. 2640-2641 *
 
[7] Posteucă, Vasile. Jurnal, in: Gabriel Stănescu (ed.), Mircea Eliade în conştiinna contemporanilor săi din exil, Norcross: Criterion, [2001], pp. 272-277 (275 – entry of 28 October 1958). *
 
[8] Evola, Julius. Yoga, Immortality & Freedom. East and West, vol. 6, no. 3, 1955.

* Quotes and citations from: Bordas, Liviu. The difficult encounter in Rome: Mircea Eliade’s post-war relation with Julius Evola – new letters and data. International Journal on Humanistic Ideology, IV, no. 2, Autumn-Winter 2011, pp. 125-158. Retrieved from: Academia.edu

dimanche, 12 octobre 2014

Il sapere tradizionale di Evola e la scienza ermetica di Hegel

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Il sapere tradizionale di Evola e la scienza ermetica di Hegel

Il sapere tradizionale di Evola e la scienza ermetica di Hegel

Giandomenico Casalino

Ex: http://www.ereticamente.net

La comparazione di natura filosofica tra Julius Evola e Giorgio F. G. Hegel, pensatori di natura sapienziale tanto lontani nel tempo e, quindi, apparentemente, così differenti, sia nel lessico da loro adottato che in relazione al contesto storico-culturale in cui hanno vissuto ed operato, impone rigorosamente la ricerca di ciò che realmente abbia significato per gli stessi la Cosa del pensiero, l’oggetto di cui e su cui hanno tematizzato, al di là delle modalità e cioè delle divergenze attraverso le quali, tutto ciò, loro malgrado, si è espresso. Quindi il lavoro deve essere caratterizzato da un approccio di natura ermeneutica, che privilegi non tanto la dimensione filologica quanto quella teoretica che, data la sua natura, abbia l’ambizione di varcare i limiti del tempo e delle stagioni culturali e, per dirla con il Kerenyi, entri in Idea nel cuore del Pensiero, che, nella sua inten­zionalità, li ha guidati nel percorso dello Spirito. Quanto dedotto vuol significare che, come intorno ad Evola il discorso deve superare la “vulgata” del suo preteso “abbandono” della Filosofia, con la co­siddetta “chiusura” del periodo ad essa dedicato e l’ “apertura” nei confronti di ciò che tout court si è definito Tradizione, così per lo Hegel è necessario emendare radicalmente quanto certa critica pigra e conformista ha dedotto sulla sua pretesa modernità e sul concetto di razionale confuso e mistifi­cato con quello cristiano e/o moderno di razionalismo individualistico e quindi astratto. At­tesa la complessa vastità del tema, faremo in modo di esaminare e di indicare sinteticamente alcuni nodi essenziali comuni alla prospettiva sia di Evola che di Hegel, al fine di offrire quelli che, secondo noi, pos­sono essere i percorsi di ricerca e di studio relativi alla quaestio sollevata.

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L’autentica “svolta” spirituale esperita da Evola alla fine degli anni venti del Novecento non è con­sistita, a ben riflettere, in un “abbandono” della Fi­losofia e del suo orizzonte di ricerca e di visione, del suo oggetto di amore e dei suoi itinerari aristo­telicamente dovuti, ma bensì in un lasciare al suo destino di impotenza gnoseologica e di inefficacia spirituale la Filosofia moderna o meglio il concetto moderno della stessa (che è poi quello cristiano…). La frase di Lagneau sulla Filosofia considerata una sorta di “…riflessione tesa a riconoscere la sua propria insufficienza e la necessità di un’azione assoluta che conduca al di là della medesima…” (Rev. de Met. et de Mor., Mars 1898, p. 127), posta da Evola come “incipit” ai Saggi sull’idealismo ma­gico (1925), in concreto vuol significare che per realizzare il suo logos, la sua ragione, la Filosofia nel momento attuale, deve superare, andare al di là, effettuare un salto di natura ontologica per collo­carsi nel luogo dello spirito che, e qui sta l’autenticità ermeneutica del percorso evoliano, è il luogo di pertinenza da sempre della Filosofia nel suo unico e autentico significato che è quello premo­derno e cioè greco: percorso spirituale, di natura iniziatica, in un télos che è l’omòiosis theò! Ciò è quanto Evola ha compiuto nella sua azione realiz­zativa e di paidéia dei fondamenti della Scienza dello Spirito, sin dalla costituzione del Gruppo di UR, la cui natura, nel significato di essenza e quindi la sua virtus come finalità, è alquanto simile a ciò che è stata l’Accademia Platonica dagli inizi sino a Proclo: palestra rigorosa del Sapere che è ascesi filosofico-rituale e non cerimoniale, la cui finalità, pertanto, è l’assimilazione al Divino. Tutto ciò cosa ha a che fare con il concetto e la prassi moderni della Filo­sofia? Cosa ha a che fare la vera ricerca del sapere che è essere con, al di là di rare eccezioni, un sedicente “insegnamento” di natura sterilmente nozionistica e stupida­mente specialistica, da “dotti ignoranti”, come si esprime lo stesso Evola, vera caricatura mistificante di quanto l’uomo cerca sin dall’alba del suo spirito? Nulla, desolatamente nulla! Tale concetto moderno e quindi degradato di ciò che Aristotele afferma essere l’atteggiamento più naturale per l’uomo, cosa ha in comune con la definizione espressa dallo Hegel sull’essere la Fi­losofia “… la considerazione esoterica di Dio…”? (Enc. Scienze Fil.) e con il principio di Platone che il filosofo è solo colui il quale vede il Tutto, confermato dallo stesso Hegel quando insegna che “il Vero è l’Intero”?Assolutamente niente, ma le affermazioni hegeliane come quella di Platone hanno tutto in comune invece con quanto Evola enuncia in quella autentica e maestosa professione di fede platonica che è l’inizio di Rivolta contro il mondo moderno, quando edifica tutta la sua opera sul Sapere intorno alle due nature del Mondo, la naturale e la sovrannaturale, come medesime dimensioni e dello Spirito e della Phýsis, tanto che, platonicamente, in Evola la Fisica è Teologia in quanto il Mondo “è pieno di Dei!” E la Teologia in quanto Teosofia, Sapere intorno al Divino, è la stessa Logica che ha per oggetto il Nous come intelletto che è il Dio dormiente nell’uomo e quindi nel cosmo: l’intero Logos evoliano ha per fine, in guisa esclusiva, la rimozione attiva di quel “quindi” in quanto impedimento effettuale all’oscuramento dello Spirito; è, pertanto, opera di realizzazione del Sé, perseguita ed indicata come Via iniziatico-solare, di natura platonico­apollinea e non nientificazione orfico-dionisiaca dell’Io che, avendo la natura spirituale del pathèin e non del  mathéin (Aristotele, Perì philosophias, fr. 15), non è conoscenza dell’autentica essenza dello Spirito in quanto realtà Divina trascendentemente immanente che è come dire la realtà dell’Individuo Assoluto, vera sublimazione dell’Io; “…la filosofia ha lo scopo di riconoscere la verità, di conoscere Dio, poiché Dio è la verità assoluta…”, afferma Hegel nelle Lezioni sulla filosofia della religione; (vol. II).  Allora è d’uopo affermare, senza alcun timore, che sia in Evola che in Hegel, riappare, in piena modernità, il senso e il significato greco della Filosofia, stru­mento per il conseguimento del Risveglio, che è la rinascita, dopo la caduta-oblio, in quanto anàmnesi di ciò che si è e lo si è sempre stati pur  non avendone scienza (ignoranza come avidya), quindi riconquista di un Sa­pere che coincide con l’Essere in senso ontologico. Talché la Filosofia, nel suo vero ed unico significato, che è quello platonico-iniziatico (Lettera VII), nocciolo esoterico della stessa esperienza spirituale dei Misteri (Fedone, 69c-d), è quindi  Scienza Sacra in senso eminente e autentica Tradizione, avente ad “oggetto” solo ed esclusivamente il Divino, che è la Verità in quanto essenza e dell’uomo e del Mondo, come Cosmo; è pertanto Sapere per pochi, è gnosi, è Teosofia, conoscenza del Dio che si rivela, nella completezza del percorso rituale-filosofico, come theopoìesis (deificatio) (Platone, Teeteto, 176 b 1; Repubblica, 613 a b; Timeo, 90 d; Leggi, 716 c s; Plotino, Enneadi, I, 2, 6, 25; Proclo, Elementi di Teologia, 127; 112, 31; Corpus Hermeticum, I, 26; 16, 12), significando ciò il rammemo­rare la consapevolezza quale Sapere, aldilà ed oltre sia il Mito che il Simbolo (livelli di conoscenza sa­pientemente riconosciuti, sia da Evola che da Hegel, inefficaci ai fini della Scienza, in relazione allo stato intellettivo-noetico puro che è l’apolli­neo), che il Dio è “oggetto” da superare, da negare,  andando oltre il dualismo soggetto-oggetto per “osare” essere Lui! Tale identificazione, sia in Hegel che in Evola, è la stessa autoconoscenza del Sé quale Assoluto nella sua natura solare, in totale estraneità, pertanto, ad ogni confusione panteistica e ad ogni vedantino acosmismo spirituale. In tale guisa, pertanto, anche se mediante linguaggi diffe­renti e in contesti storico-culturali lontani, Evola ed Hegel dicono il Medesimo e la Filosofia, quindi, nella loro opera non è più quell’insulsa propaggine della teologia dogmatica (cristiana), né quella serva ti­mida delle cosiddette scienze moderne, cioè della concezione parziale, riduttiva e quindi irreale, in quanto galileiana, della natura, ormai desacraliz­zata e ridotta ad oggetto di calcolo matematico e ciò al di là della autentica rivoluzione epistemologica operata nel XX secolo dalla fisica dei quanti e dalla sua meccanica che, invece, ritornando ad una visione platonica del reale (vedi Heisenberg ed il suo concetto della chòra platonica…) non fa che confermare, tutto sommato, il sapere sia di Evola che di Hegel. La Filosofia torna così ad essere ciò che non può non essere, consistendo, secondo Aristotele, nel Destino che gli Dei hanno affidato all’uomo; non “fede”, non “credenza”, ma Sapere che è esposizione del Mondo in quanto Pensiero puro, sono “le idee di Dio prima della “creazione” del mondo e di ogni oggetto finito” (Hegel); è speculazione (da specu­lum) dove il Pensiero si specchia nel Mondo, in senso oggettivo e vede se stesso come Idea e quindi Unità (Hegel); è la realtà dell’Oro ermetico, che è la Cosa più vicina e nel contempo più lontana (Evola), è la certezza sen­sibile, è il concreto esistente che è da sempre Spirito, solo che non lo sa, (medesimo concetto esprime Plotino in riferimento all’esperienza del “toccare”  il Dio [Enneadi, VI, 9, 7]); l’Oro si trova infatti nella più oscura Tenebra o Feccia (Ermetismo) da cui l’uomo fugge, proprio perché non sa che l’Opera deve iniziare da quello stato come riconquista eroica che corporizza lo Spirito e spiritualizza il corpo, ed è la grande fatica del concetto (Hegel). Tutto ciò Evola lo rende manifesto nella sua opera  La Tradizione ermetica che è la summa circolare del viaggio iniziatico (dal Corpo come impietramento del principio Fuoco allo stesso Corpo però rinato come rosso Cinabro, solfuro di mercurio) simile alla circolarità triadica della Scienza della Logica di Hegel: il Logos qui non è una conoscenza astratta e quindi profana cioè falsa ma, come per gli antichi maestri neoplatonici, è l’apertura dell’occhio dello Spirito sul Mondo come è, e quindi come appare, ciò significando che  essenza ed esistenza sono il Medesimo che è l’Essere, nel “momento”, che non è temporale, ma logico cioè ontologico, in quanto riguarda la natura profonda dell’uomo, in cui lo stesso, acquisito il medesimo livello di essere-conoscenza, è nella capacità di vedere, attesa la natura epoptica della filosofia evoliana. La veneranda Tradizione Platonica, a cui appartengono sia Hegel che Evola, è il filone aureo che da Plotino, Proclo ed Eckhart sino a Nicola da Cusa, Giorgio Gemisto Pletone, Marsilio Ficino, Benedetto Spinoza e Jacob Boehme, non è altro che Introduzione alla Scienza dell’ Io, come spirito Universale, come Atto puro, proprio nel significato dell’autoctisi gentiliana che è poi il causa sui di Spinoza, che, nel Sapere Assoluto, che è filosofico, realizza il Sapere del Dio, dove quel “del” è tanto il Sapere che ha il Dio come “oggetto” che il Sapere che appartiene al Dio stesso.

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Il situarsi sia di Evola che di Hegel nella Tradizione Platonica, ci conduce in immediato nella evidenza relativa ad una fondamentale verità presente nel loro orizzonte sapienziale: la polare identità tra Pensiero ed Essere, intesi in senso cosmico e quindi oggettivo e non certo nel significato individuale e soggettivo che è come dire cartesiano e quindi moderno; identità che è da costruire, con fatica eroica, in quanto cammino catartico (Feno­menologia dello Spirito in Hegel; Rivolta contro il mondo moderno in Evola) per la riacquisita co­scienza che è poi Inizio dell’altro percorso, avente il Fine della identificazione plotiniana, che è il mònos pros mònon, come mutamento della propria natura (metànoia), principio noetico ormai desto, non più e non mai “esterno” all’Io ma Sé autentico che è al contempo (e da sempre) il Lògos del mondo (Tradizione Ermetica in Evola; Scienza della Logica in Hegel). Il Sapere (Nous) che coin­cide anzi è l’Essere (Phýsis) è ciò che, in guisa auro­rale, afferma la sapienza indoeuropea, ad iniziare da Parmenide e dai Veda (Atman è Brahman). Il Mi­stero di tale verità è l’Inesprimibile del Pensiero che si riconosce nel Tutto come i Molti che è visto nell’Istante- exàiphnes come Uno (Platone, Parmenide, 156, c) ed è il fondamento della conoscenza comune sia ad Evola che ad Hegel: ad uno stadio di consape­volezza, che è un “momento” (“temporale” ma che non si svolge nel tempo…) della coscienza e quindi un essere della stessa, in senso ontologico, corri­sponde uno stadio o livello di conoscenza-sapere che è il vivere-essere lo stadio o livello equiva­lente e corrispondente nel Mondo; tale processo spirituale in Evola è da situare in guisa manifesta dopo la catarsi dialettica che certamente coincide con la fase del suo pensiero preparatoria della teoresi dell’Idealismo magico che è il salto nella gnosi platonica. La realtà dello spirito che, come qui appare evidente, è circolare, e va dall’io al mondo e dal mondo all’io vuol significare che si conosce ciò che si è e si è ciò che si conosce e, quindi, si conosce ciò che si diviene, equivalendo ciò al ritorno anamnestico verso l’Inizio, dove si è sempre stati, nella natura in cui si è sempre consistiti ma della quale si è presa coscienza, solo dopo aver perfezionato l’Opera filosofica. Evola ed Hegel, nel solco del platonismo, ci inducono pertanto a meditare sulla dimensione dello Spirito, nel “momento” in cui il Pensiero, pensando il suo “passato” (l’Anima, il suo sonno…), si riconosce tale ed il Mondo, gli Dei (l’oggetto) appare quello che è sempre stato, cioè il Pen­sato, la dimensione dell’Anima, il movimento, la Vita, la dialettica (essere-non essere; vita-morte; dolore-gioia…). Evola lo afferma in tutta la sua opera: se si è forma, si vede la forma, che è sempre, ma anche colui che “ora” la vede lo è sempre stato solo che lo aveva dimenticato. Secondo Evola ed Hegel, ovviamente, non è questione di ideologie o di modi di vedere il mondo, cioè di stati soggettivi, poiché di soggettivo, nel senso di personale o individuale-psicologistico, qui non è dato parlare, ma di stati molteplici, differentemente gerarchici, dell’Essere (sia in senso microcosmico che macrocosmico, cioè quello che ignorantemente chiamiamo ancora tanto “soggetto” quanto “oggetto”)!

Hegel, infatti, nella Scienza della Logica, quando parla di meccanicismo, chimismo, organicismo, non sta enunciando determinate visioni del mondo o punti di vista, ma sta dicendo che una natura, in senso ontologico, meccanicistica conosce solo il meccanicismo o meglio il livello o “momento” meccanicistico del mondo e quindi sta trattando filosoficamente degli stati della coscienza, come li­velli del pensiero a cui corrispondono gli stessi stati della natura poiché questa è il medesimo Pensiero uscito da sè (proodòs plotiniana); essi sono pertanto il percorso del Sapere come Idea a cui corrispondono stati equivalenti della natura poiché la Verità cioè il Divino è l’Intero cioè l’Uno (e questo non è lo stesso principio di corrispondenza magica tra uomo e Metalli-Mondo cioè Astro-Nume-Metallo tanto in senso microcosmico quanto macrocosmico che è il fondamento della Tradizione sia nella forma Er­metica che in quella Platonica?). Evola dice il medesimo quando afferma che Inferno e Paradiso, esotericamente, sono stati della coscienza nei quali e attraverso i quali si conoscono le tenebre infernali o le luminosità celesti che sono livelli o dimensioni dell’Essere dello stesso mondo o dimensioni del Tutto, il chiuso Athanòr, che una natura corrispondente andrà a co­noscere o tenebroso come assenza di Luce o luminoso. Pertanto un essere che è, come spiritualità autentica, o il primo o il se­condo, può conoscere solo o uno o l’altro, cre­dendo, nel momento ingenuo (mitico, secondo Evola), intellettivo-astratto (direbbe Hegel), del percorso di conoscenza, che si tratti di un “altro” mondo a sé medesimo opposto e definito dualisticamente non-Io. Gli Dei non esistono a priori per fede… se non si cono­scono e si conoscono solo esperimentando e quindi essendo lo stato corrispondente. Se in Evola tutto ciò è definito identificazione iniziatico-­solare in cui è manifesto che Io sono Te, ricono­scendo pertanto l’irrealtà dello stato religioso-devozionale, in Hegel è il percorso dello Spirito che supera l’oggettivazione del Sé (Dio), come Altro e, con la semplificazione filosofica ed il suo Sapere apicale, è l’Assoluto che conosce se stesso, “accadendo” come evento logico, cioè fuori dal tempo, “dopo” lo stato-essere spirituale rappresentativo che è il religioso-dualistico. È la realizzazione della conoscenza che il soggetto è l’oggetto, il Pensiero come Atto puro cosmico è l’Essere che è il Dio, e si ritorna ad Aristotele, al Pensiero di Pensiero, al Pensiero che pensa Se stesso ed è poi l’Autarca di Evola! In sostanza ed in termini filosofici, cioè concettuali, è il Risveglio buddistico (vedi La dottrina del risveglio) che in Evola è la realizzazione della vera natura  dell’uomo, rendendo manifesta quella occulta o incosciente (Aristotele, Etica nicomachea, 1177b 33) idea di origine platonica (Timeo, 90c) che è l’athanatìzein di Proclo, cioè il rendersi immortali in quanto si assume piena consapevolezza e quindi Sapere di esserlo sempre stati. Corollario di tale Tradizione gnosica è, in Evola, La Scienza dell’Io che si riconosce, quale atto magico di anamnesi, come Idea eterna del Sé: “…Io alla seconda persona, alter ego celeste dell’uomo: è ancora l’uomo ma nello stesso tempo non è più solo l’uomo…” (Henry Corbin) ed è l’affermazione che la conoscenza del Dio è l’autoconoscenza del Dio come Divino nell’uomo e dell’uomo: il Dio si conosce e si vede nell’uomo, come l’uomo, nel doversi conoscere, conosce Se medesimo quale il Divino stesso. È il sapere di natura apollinea, di cui enigmaticamente parla Platone nell’Alcibiade Maggiore (133 c)…!

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In riferimento a tale Sapere Pavel Alexandrovic Florenski ne Le radici universali dell’Idealismo rileva la natura primordiale dello stesso e trae la conclusione che il Platonismo è la Conoscenza originaria presente nelle Tradizioni religiose e sapienziali di tutti i popoli del Mondo, cioè a dire, nella sue essenza metafisica, la Tradizione Unica di tutte le Civiltà, nella forma tanto mitico-religiosa nei primordi delle stesse, quanto magica ed unitivo-sapienziale al tramonto del ciclo.

Pertanto il Sapere, la Gnosi, di cui non solo parlano o scrivono sia Evola che Hegel, ma che sono e realizzano come mutamento della natura, essendo lo stesso Sapere, è in virtù di “qualcosa” di arcaico, di ancestrale, di originario, di non classificabile nelle e con le comuni categorie dello Spirito non solo di questo tempo ma di ogni tempo; “qualcosa” che è una realtà vivente, un fuoco che brucia nella continuità della loro vita, nel loro athanòr, come fiamma che consuma tutti i residui, le scorie, le impurità tanto che “magicamente” loro appaiono quello che sono in quanto Essere come identità di essenza ed esistenza; dai contemporanei sono infatti veduti come autentici maghi, nel significato arcaico e quindi vero del termine, chiarito, quasi nello stesso periodo di tempo, sia da Florenski che da Evola in questi termini: natura attiva dello Spirito nei confronti delle Forze e dei Numi cosmici e tanto intensa da apparire quasi naturale, come innata identificazione con gli stessi, mediante riconoscimento anamnestico!

Allora il Sapere tradizionale, che equivale a dire metafisico e che stiamo tentando di delineare per brevi cenni, è di natura magico-sacrale!

E non può essere diversamente, atteso il fatto che Evola non è lo scrittore, lo studioso o l’erudito, figlio di una sclerotica civilizzazione ma è frutto di una Kultur che, proprio nel senso spengleriano, è qualcosa di vivente che emerge maestosa e luminosa, vasta e complessa nella sua cosmica valenza, da tutta la sua opera che è principalmente ed in guisa essenziale, la sua stessa presenza e la sua vita come Simbolo e Mito. Non si può negare la presenza della Luce di questa forza magico-sacrale, quasi sciamanica, in uomini, in Sapienti Solfurei, autentiche trasparenze della doxa omerica, cioè della gloria del Pensiero, inteso in senso Vivente e Divino, in tutti coloro i quali, con linguaggi diversi ed in tempi storico-culturali oltremodo differenti,  hanno osato dire, vivere ed essere Verità, autenticamente rivoluzionarie e destabilizzanti per tutte le Chiese, i Dogmi e le Istituzioni dominanti, quasi come Vie della mano destra di ogni epoca, Verità che hanno sempre incusso paura, tremore e financo terrore nell’uomo, inducendo e provocando mistificazione del loro Dire, calunnie sul loro Fare, negazione del loro Essere e tentativi, peraltro vani, di oscuramento della Verità da loro eroicamente difesa. È la vicenda, non solo di un Evola, criminalizzato e mistificato o di un Hegel, incompreso e pertanto trasferito tout court, nonostante la geniale intuizione di un Feuerbach sull’essere il sapiente Svevo “…il Proclo tedesco…”, nel positivismo e nel laicismo immanentista o nel soggettivismo postcartesiano, ma è la storia umana anche di Eckhart, di Giorgio Gemisto Pletone, di Boehme, di Spinoza, cioè è il destino comune, la risposta, la reazione di chi, in buona sostanza, rifiuta, ne ha paura e non comprende insegnamenti come questi di Plotino: “…Il compito non è essere virtuosi o buoni ma essere Dei!…”; “…Non devo andare io agli Dei ma gli Dei venire a me…!”; che equivalgono a ciò che dice Eckhart nei Sermoni: “…Dio ed io siamo una cosa sola…!”; a quanto afferma Hegel: “…Si crede usualmente che l’Assoluto debba trovarsi molto al di là mentre è invece proprio ciò che è del tutto presente e che, in quanto pensanti, anche senza averne espressamente coscienza, portiamo sempre con noi…!” o a ciò che rivela Boehme nel De Signatura rerum: “…tra la Nascita Eterna, la Redenzione dalla Caduta e la scoperta della Pietra dei Filosofi non c’è alcuna differenza…!”.

Si tratta, quindi, di un Sapere primordiale, è la Tradizione iniziatica regale, è la originaria via indoeuropea agli Dei, nel senso spirituale e realizzativo del Risveglio del Re che dorme nel profondo dell’anima, ed è, innanzitutto ed essenzialmente il Rito filosofico quotidiano e costante onde realizzare il Katèchon che, difendendo il principio superiore della coscienza e quello animico ad esso orientato, costituisca invalicabili barriere nei confronti delle potenze tenebrose provenienti dal basso; al fine di “ricostruire” eroicamente la natura autentica dell’uomo: la libertà dello Spirito, nella divinificazione che è l’Eghemonicòn stoico, di cui parla Evola, la liberazione dell’uomo dalle catene invisibili con cui egli stesso si è reso prigioniero di sé medesimo! Tale Conoscenza suprema che è di una semplicità fanciullesca (gli antichi Ermetisti parlano di “gioco di bambini”) mai come nella fase presente, di palese e drammatica decadenza spirituale da fine di un ciclo di civiltà, come rivela Aristotele (Metafisica, XII, 8,1074a, 38-b 14), è di straordinaria ed inattuale attualità, poiché, essendo la Conoscenza della maturità avanzata di un epoca, proprio come precisa Aristotele nel passo su citato, è l’ultima àncora di salvezza sia per coloro che vogliono percorrere tale unica ed ineludibile Via dello Spirito, per tornare ad essere, come precisa Evola, quanto meno e come base di partenza, uomini, sia per la conservazione e la trasmissione dei Fondamenti della stessa da “tràdere” cioè consegnare a coloro i quali saranno i protagonisti del ciclo successivo: non altro concetto ha, infatti, espresso lo stesso Hegel quando ha definito la filosofia il Sapere del meriggio che nasce quando s’invola la nottola di Minerva!

Ci chiediamo, alla fine di questa nostra riflessione, la ragione per cui la Tradizione magico-arcaica, la Sapienza antica, il Platonismo come eterno Idealismo, il Logos di Evola come quello di tutti i Sapienti che nei secoli e nei millenni hanno rivelato sempre e soltanto la medesima Cosa, avente ad “oggetto” il Pensiero pensante che è già e da sempre Pensiero pensato e cioè il Divino come Mondo che ritorna ciclicamente e liberamente, in quanto sapientemente, in se stesso, appaiono tanto irrimediabilmente inattuali da essere invece così indiscutibilmente attuali; la risposta a tale domanda risiede nella natura protervamente materialista e quindi antiumana di questa epoca in cui dello Spirito nulla si sa e si deve sapere, dell’Anima non se ne deve parlare  più, affidando il suo semantema residuo ed umbratile a forme di stregonerie e ciarlatanerie definitesi, molto appropriatamente, “psicoanalisi” (vedi J. Evola, L’infezione psicanalista, Quaderni della Fondazione Evola, Napoli 2012); il corpo  è ignorato in quanto “pensato” come un assemblaggio di pezzi meccanici da riparare e, nel caso, da sostituire; epoca in cui, infine, ci si è fatti convincere che l’uomo non sia e non debba essere altro che un “tubo digerente” avente solo una finalità: il disciplinato e silenzioso consumo planetario, in quanto “naturalmente”  privo di idee, sentimenti e passioni,  che pericolosamente abbiano o conservino qualcosa che ricordi l’umano; nessun Discorso, religioso o filosofico contemporaneo, che può pur apparire radicale e liberatorio lo può mai essere, in verità e nella dimensione universale, così come lo è manifestamente e dall’eternità la Luce della Tradizione, per la semplice ragione che tutti i “discorsi” che non appartengono alla sua Verità, appartengono alla Modernità, come categoria dello Spirito; e non si può nemmeno tentare di superare l’effetto coniugandolo con la sua causa!

Solo la Scienza dello Spirito, l’atto supremo ineludibile di Rivolta contro il mondo moderno, può aprire gli occhi,  prima dell’anima e poi dello Spirito, dell’uomo della presente età, sì da fargli riacquistare la stazione eretta che, come insegna Platone, gli consente di guardare il Cielo e quindi gli Dei!

Di una sola cosa, comunque, siamo certi e serenamente consapevoli e quindi convinti: il potere unico della Chiesa dogmatica tecno-finanziaria del capitalismo mondialista, apparentemente trionfante al crepuscolo del presente ciclo, ha di fronte, alle spalle ed intorno a sé medesimo, una sola ed invincibile nonché semplice e luminosa Verità, espressa da Julius Evola nei termini seguenti: “…Tutto si potrà fare sull’uomo e nell’uomo ma mai strappare dal fondo del suo animo la presenza del Divino!…”.

Giandomenico Casalino

 

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Lugarini L., Hegel e la tradizione arcaica, Il Pen­siero, voI. XXXII, 1992.

Magee G.A., Hegel e la Tradizione Ermetica, Roma 2013.

Plotino, Enneadi, VI, 9,40.

Platone, Lettera VII

Platone, Alcibiade Maggiore.

Ponsetto A., L’anima religiosa della filosofia, Lecce 2000.

Proclo, Teologia Platonica.

Ruggenini M., Il Dio assente. La filosofia è l’espe­rienza del Divino, Milano 1997.

 

The Differentiated Man

The Differentiated Man

Ex: http://aryan-myth-and-metahistory.blogspot.com

10857064-l-39-homme-de-vitruve-sous-les-rayons-x-isole-sur-noir.jpgIn the days when I used to post on white nationalist websites one of the most recurring themes that people would argue about is the declining levels of Aryans vis a vis other races. I argued then as I argue now ratios are not relevant. Lower animals and races of men will breed at a faster rate than higher species or races. Often the reason for this is the higher mortality rate in such species and races. This fact may also be observed amongst the soci-economic classes which are a bastardised and commercialised version of the ancient traditional Aryan caste system (the two are not to be confused or even compared!).  Individuals of lesser education (not merely formal education but general awareness and ability) tend to breed without restraint and with no consideration as to whether they (or the tax payer) can afford such indiscriminate coupling!

Of course I am not here referring to that tiny and select minority of individuals who are spiritually and racially aware who may breed in large numbers with suitable mates for the right reasons. The people I am referring to in the previous paragraph are those who live entirely by instinct and whose days are spent gratifying their every bodily need or desire. Such people are little better than the beasts of the field and I would not expect them to read blogs such as this so forgive me for lecturing to the converted! These belong to von Liebenfels' Affenmenschen (apelings) referred to in his Theozoology. The move from the rural economies of the past to the Industrial Revolution which began in the 18th century in England caused a migration of part of the rural population to the emerging industrial towns and cities to become nothing more than factory wage slaves. The new capitalist bougeoisie needed as many men (and women) as they could find to work in their sweat shops. The same impulse that drove forward the Industrial Revolution was also responsible for the creation of the British Empire which benefitted no one apart from the wealthy (and certainly not the conquered natives!).

The populations of the industrial towns and cities bred like rats but they needed to as the infant mortality rate was extremely high. Their poorly paid labour was needed by the capitalists of the day (nothing much has changed). The problem with having an expanding proletariat is that the individual monetary worth of the worker is reduced proportionately. This is why countries like Britain welcome immigrant labour because their expectations are low and this creates economic competition for British workers. Employers can pick and choose and pay a pittance for a person's toil. For this reason despite the government's protestations they have done abolutely nothing to stem the flow of immigration (legal and otherwise) and indeed the problem has got worse over the last 4 years (if such a thing were possible). Low paid workers and cannon fodder for illegal wars will always be in demand by this corrupt system.

Thus a capitalist economy relies for the production of ever increasing wealth for the 1% on a large mass of labour. Capitalism encourages and fuels population explosions. Babies are born destined to become unimportant cogs in this monstrous and inhuman machine. This and only this is the value of the 'family', much lauded by the government's MPs as women become nothing but battery hens for future workers. Nothing else is of importance. With these thoughts in mind we come to the writings of Julius Evola:

"The differentiated man cannot feel part of a 'society' like the present one, which is formless and has sunk to the level of purely material, economic, 'physical' values, and moreover lives at this level and follows its insane course under the sign of the absurd. Therefore, apoliteia requires the most decided resistance to any social myth. Here it is not just a matter of its extreme, openly collectivist forms, in which the person is not recognised as significant except as a fragment of a class or party or, as in the Marxist-Soviet area, is denied any existence of his own outside the society, so that personal destiny and happiness distinct from those of the collective do not even exist. We must equally reject the more general and bland idea of 'sociability' that today often functions as a slogan even in the so-called free world, after the decline of the ideal of the true state. The differentiated man feels absolutely outside of society, he recognises no moral claim that requires his inclusion in an absurd system; he can understand not only those who are outside, but even those who are against 'society'-meaning against this society." (Ride the Tiger. A Survival Manual for the Aristocrats of the Soul)

vendredi, 10 octobre 2014

Bhagavad-Gîtâ - Le Chant du Bienheureux

bhagavad-gita-le-chant-du-bienheureux.jpg

Bhagavad-Gîtâ: le Chant du Bienheureux

108 pages. Traduit du sanskrit par Emile Burnouf et présenté par le Pr. Jean Haudry.

Elément central du Mahâbhârata, connu pour être la plus grande épopée de la mythologie hindoue, la Bhagavad-Gîtâ (« Chant du Bienheureux ») est un des écrits fondamentaux de l’Hindouisme qui s’inscrit dans la tradition héroïque indo-européenne.

Il s’agit d’un dialogue dans lequel le Seigneur Krishna, 8e avatar de Vishnou, tend à dissiper le doute chez le kshatriya Arjuna au moment d’une bataille qui risque de faire nombre de morts parmi ceux que ce dernier aime.

Composé de 18 chapitres et vraisemblablement rédigé entre les Ve et IIe siècles av. J.-C., l’intérêt capital de ce texte sacré tient du fait qu’il invite à dépasser le brahmanisme sans le répudier pour autant.

Au-delà de toutes les sensibilités spirituelles, la Bhagavad-Gîtâ nous enseigne avant tout la dévotion et le détachement pour lesquels le verset II.38 semble parfaitement convenir : « Tiens pour égaux plaisir et peine, gain et perte, et sois tout entier à la bataille : ainsi tu éviteras le péché . »

Pour commander auprès des Editions du Lore: http://www.ladiffusiondulore.fr/antiquite/379-bhagavad-gita-le-chant-du-bienheureux.html

lundi, 22 septembre 2014

The End of American History

The End of American History

By Alexander Jacob

Lecture delivered at the IV Encontro Internacional Evoliano, Sao Paulo, Brazil, September 10, 2014.

francis-fukuyama-end-history.jpgFrancis Fukuyuma, the Japanese-American intellectual spokesman for the Jewish American Neoconservative movement, proclaimed in his 1992 book The End of History and the Last Man that liberal democracy was the final socio-political form since earlier alternatives such as Fascism and Communism had proven to be ideological failures, and liberty and equality had now been established as universal norms. 

Fukuyama’s view of history moving in progressive political phases was of course first popularized in the nineteenth century by German thinkers like Hegel, Marx, and their followers, who sought to discern historiographical patterns in the vagaries of military and economic fortune and to either celebrate or revolt against the current political status of their own nation, in their case Germany.

To be sure, Hegel was somewhat more elevated than Marx in supposing the course of history to be the varying manifestations of a developing Weltgeist, or world-spirit, whereas Marx’s historiography was ruled by mere economic alterations. Nevertheless, the falsehood of even Hegel’s philosophy of history is made clear to anyone who considers the history of the country which is actually promoting liberal democracy now as a universal norm, America.

In America there has been, from its inception as an independent nation, hardly any deviation from liberal democratic goals, and Communism and Fascism have not only been absent there in their European forms but are, if ever they emerge, quickly absorbed into the unchanging liberal democratic framework of the nation. Actually what American society represents is a sort of ahistoric, shadow-communist utopia, where private individuals strive ever more strenuously to possess the means of production and to resist the interference of the state in public affairs. There is little also to distinguish the Communist ideal of equality from the Liberal.

When Fukuyama suggests that we have come to the “end of history,” therefore, what he means is that the world that has undergone genuine historical changes has now been conquered by a country that began and continues as a utopia that is as little capable of historical change as of real progress, that is, progress understood not in the technological but in the traditional sense of the development of the spiritual, intellectual and social attitudes of a people.

The “end of history” is indeed a phenomenon that is peculiar to America as a British colony that has had tenuous connections with the naturally developing history of the Old World. While most countries founded by colonial settlement manage to maintain and develop the culture of their mother nation to a certain extent — as Australia, for example, has done — America began and developed at a time of Protestant and Puritan revolt against the ancient Catholic monarchical traditions of Britain.

It is important therefore to consider the phenomenon of Puritanism which provoked the English Civil War during which America was settled and to notice also the close connection between Christian Puritanism and Judaism. We may recall in this context that the Jews, who had been officially expelled from England in 1290 by Edward I, were allowed by the Puritan dictator Cromwell in the 1650s to return from Holland, where they had been conducting a flourishing financial business, and throughout the Commonwealth the Jews were held in high esteem by the Puritans.

The similarity of the capitalist ethics developed by the Puritans and that of the Jews was noted already in 1911 by the German sociologist Werner Sombart in his work Die Juden und das Wirtschaftsleben. Sombart maintained that the “Protestant” ethic that Max Weber had focused on in his 1905 work, Die protestantische Ethik und der Geist des Kapitalismus, was indeed to be identified specifically as a Puritan one that should be equated to Judaism. For, as Sombart explained, “In both will be found . . . the close relationship between religion and business, the arithmetical conception of sin, and, above all, the rationalization of life.”

With the American Civil War of 1861-65, the last links with monarchical England that had persisted in the pro-English Confederate South were cut by the victory of the Federalist North. Then, in the aftermath of the Civil War, in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, the Christian religious aspect of the original Puritan work-ethic of the Americans was seriously damaged by the large-scale influx of Jews from Central and Eastern Europe who succeeded in modulating the philo-Semitic Puritan character of American capitalism into a fully Jewish one.

As Sombart pointed out, the Jews had indeed been active in American economic life already from the seventeenth century and had gradually come to monopolize many branches of American commerce such as the wheat, tobacco, and cotton trade. But we must note that with the increased immigration of eastern Jews at the end of the nineteenth century and the promotion of Jewish finance capitalism, what remained of the original Puritan work-ethic and concomitant frugality in the American economy was soon dissipated, while the only vestige of the dissident Puritanical religiosity that survived was its stubborn anti-clericalism.

With the replacement of the Puritan veneration of industry by the parasitical reign of finance, the Jewish tendency to economic utopianism which manifested itself in the twentieth century as totalitarian Communism in Russia, Eastern Europe and the Far East was transformed in the new “promised land” of the Jews into the totalitarian liberalism of the “American Dream.” The capitalism promoted by the Jews steadily strengthened the nation’s commitment to individualistic freedom and material aggrandizement rather than to the civilizational aims of the old monarchies and empires. Such a nation could naturally not evolve or even acquire a human history. Instead of producing examples of human greatness it could only boast of a certain number of tycoons and millionaire entertainers, and instead of historical development it could only experience periodic economic booms and recessions.

Fukuyama himself attempts, in his book, to introduce a Nietzschean question into his glorification of liberal democracy by raising the specter of the “last man,” or the average American-like man whose life is materially sated and spiritually meaningless. But with naïve optimism he maintains that such an intolerably vacuous life will certainly be mastered in a liberal democracy by man’s spiritedness, a human characteristic that will inevitably rebel against such a monotonous existence. This spiritedness is the same as what Plato called the middle part of the tripartite soul, between the rational and the animal parts of it. In Fukuyama’s view, in the liberal democratic system, instead of its reappearance in violent strife, as in the case of nationalist or imperialistic states, there will be an absorption of this passionate energy into sports, business and political shows like election campaigns.

Fukuyama’s belief in such social engineering as liberal democracy universally aims at ignores the vast difference between the states of the Old World and the American. Indeed, the Neoconservative enterprise propagated by Fukuyama serves as a timely reminder of the incompatibility of American with genuinely European systems of political thought. The American social values that are being imposed on Europe and the rest of the world through economic and military means are essentially alien ones and are neither likely to take root easily nor endure. For, unlike the American nation, European and other older nations have a historical vitality that cannot be suffocated by American avarice. In order to illustrate this fact I shall survey here the characteristic political traditions of the Indo-Europeans and the contradictory intellectual movements that have distorted these traditions in the course of modern history.

To understand the traditional Indo-European social ethos, I may begin with the paradigmatic Āryan conception of society discernible in ancient India. The famous ‘caste system’ of the Indians is, unlike the modern western ‘class system’, an entirely spiritual one and men are recognized not by their economic status but by their hereditary spiritual capacity. The four Indian social orders are represented symbolically as the head, arms, thighs and feet of the primordial cosmic anthropomorphic form of the divine Soul. This Cosmic Man, or Purusha, was itself formed, first ideally and then manifestly, through the spiritual desire, the Soul, of the godhead, or the One.

The manifestation of the Soul in Indian religious philosophy is said to be due to its three inherent forms of energy, sattva, rajas and tamas, the first  representing pure existence, the second  motion and the third inertia (Brahmānda Purāna I,i,3,12). Since there is an intimate and unavoidable correspondence between the macrocosm and the human microcosm, these three energies appear embodied in differing degrees among humans too, the sattvic element most fully in the brāhmans, the rājasic in the warriors or kshatriyas,  and the tāmasic in the vaisyas and shudras, particularly the latter. This is the original spiritual and psychological basis of all hierarchy. The brāhman owes his preeminent position in society to his superhuman spiritual power. The name “Brahman” of the deity who represents the Intellectual light of the cosmos, itself derives from a word denoting creative power and it is the privilege and duty of the brāhman to represent this creative power while the kshatriyas, or political rulers and warriors, only serve to maintain this creative power both within the land and also in the universe. The brāhman and kshatriya thus constitute the paradigmatic Indo-European polity centered on the dual organs of what in European politics are called Church and State.

If we turn to the Greek philosophers, we find that in Plato and Aristotle the state is again constantly conceived of in terms of the constitution of the universal and individual soul. According to Plato, the soul is “that which moves itself” (Phaedrus 246a) and is naturally prior to body since it “is what governs all the changes and modifications of bodies” (Laws 892a).

Just as in ancient India, the soul, or psyche, in Plato’s Republic, Bk.IV, is divided into three parts, a higher rational or spiritual part (called logistikon) corresponding to the Indian sattva, a middle passionate one (called thymoeides) correspondng to rajas, and a lower sensual part (called epithymetikon) corresponding to tamas. Since society is as organic a phenomenon as the individuals of which it is composed, in a state too the more the rational aspect predominates over the passionate the closer it approximates to the ideal political form. But the discipline of the lower desires by the dictates of reason is to be found only in a few and these are the “best born and the best educated” men (Republic, IV), whereas the untrained and untamed passions are to be found in abundance among children, women and the lower classes, which form the most numerous section of society. The aristocratic “guardians” of Plato’s ideal republic are therefore required to be true philosophers and will not be drawn from the inferior classes.

Aristotle continues Plato’s spiritually oriented political theory in his Ethica Nichomachea, where he declares that the main aim of politics is the attainment of the good of the nation. The higher classes of a nation will comprise the full citizens who will assume the military and administrative, including priestly, offices of the land. The legislators must govern with a clear knowledge of the spiritual constitution of man, that is, the rational and passionate elements that Plato had discerned in the individual soul. And it is the duty of the legislators to ensure the predominance of the higher aspect of the soul over the lower.

Platonic principles reappear in the European Renaissance in the writings of aristocratic thinkers like Francesco Guicciardini and Jean Bodin. According to Guicciardini — who offered a critique of Machiavelli in one of his works, Considerations on the Discourses of Machiavelli – the chief reason of the superiority of a prince and an aristocracy to the people is that they are not subject to pernicious passions, such as, notably, envy. The French Renaissance philosopher, Jean Bodin — who is notable for his championing of monarchical absolutism — also based his defence of the latter on a similar Platonic basis. For genuine monarchy is, according to him, derived from the Divine Law and the monarch is the earthly image of God. Care should be taken that the religious foundation of the state is never brought into doubt and religious leaders must act as censors of the state in order to maintain moral discipline in it.

It is at this juncture in the history of the world that the revolutionary anti-monarchical ideas of the English Civil War, the American Revolution and the French Revolution appear. If we study the American Bill of Rights of 1789 we realise that it was based largely on the English Bill of Rights of 1689 promulgated by the (originally Puritan) English Parliament after the “Glorious” Protestant Revolution of 1688 in order to curb the powers traditionally invested in the formerly Catholic monarchs of England.

One of the most influential English thinkers of the seventeenth century and one generally considered to be the father of liberal democracy, John Locke, was also a Puritan. Locke was a champion of the separation of the Church and State and had a profound influence on the American ‘Founding Fathers’ such as Thomas Jefferson. The American Bill of Rights, based on the British parliamentarian one, is especially notable for its dissociation (in the First Amendment) of the American state from any official religion. What had begun in England as a rejection of Catholicism was thus turned in America into a rejection of all official religion. Combined with this fear of theocracy was the Puritanical devotion to individual freedom and industry which caused the Americans to view citizenship as a status defined primarily by liberty and citizens as economic units of production not unlike those of the later Communist utopia of Marx.

A little later, in the middle of the eighteenth century, Jean-Jacques Rousseau propagated in France the Lockean conception of government as a social “contract” directed  by the “volonté générale” of the people which would reduce the inequalities springing from subservience to the state. However, a robust answer to Rousseau’s doctrine of the “social contract” was offered immediately after the fateful French Revolution by the English political philosopher Edmund Burke in his Reflections on the Revolution in France (1790), where he pointed out that “the state ought not to be considered as nothing better than a partnership agreement in a trade of pepper and coffee, calico or tobacco, or some such low concern . . .”

And since the people cannot be relied upon to follow any “general will” towards the attainment of the good of the nation, Burke proposed a natural aristocracy as the only viable government of a nation. A strong nation is also necessarily a religious one for, as Burke said, all politicians indeed act on behalf of “the one great Master, Author and Founder of society,” namely God.

This vital role of religion in the conduct of states was reiterated in post-revolutionary France too by the French monarchist Count Joseph de Maistre who noted in his “Essai sur les principes generateurs des constitutions politiques et des autres institutions humaines” (1809) that “the duration of empires has always been proportionate to the degree of influence the religious element gained in the political constitution.” Indeed, the truly political laws of a land are synonymous with the religious feelings of the people and the “instant [man] separates himself from God to act alone . . . he does not lose power . . . but his activity is negative and leads only to destruction.” To follow the doctrines of Enlightenment thinkers like Rousseau and Voltaire would thus result in a return to a state of anarchy and degeneracy.

In Germany around the same time philosophers like Kant and Fichte were beginning to point to the crucial significance of the ‘State’ as the means of enforcing an enlightened government. Kant took as his point of departure the excellence of Divine Law in relation to Natural Law, so that Reason, or the Moral Law, was elevated far above the mindless workings of Nature. To establish this rule of the Moral Law on earth, Kant proposed a supremely powerful state that would control all religious and commercial offices in the land.

The leader of the state can never be a democratic representative of the people since democracy inevitably results in a despotism. While Kant favored a monarchical republic, Johann Fichte advocated a Platonic philosopher-statesman who is at once a political and religious leader of his nation. Like a Platonic “guardian,” such a statesman, “in his estimate of mankind looks beyond that which they are in the actual world to that which they are in the Divine Idea . . .” (The Nature of the Scholar, Lecture VIII). The monarch will bear the responsibility of the realization of the inner freedom of the individuals within his nation. It is important to note in this context Fichte’s emphasis that the aim of all society is “ever-increasing ennoblement of the human race, that is, to set it more and more at liberty from the bondage of Nature,” just as the aim of all culture is “to subject Nature . . . to Reason.” In order to counteract the spurious freedom that especially the young hanker after, Fichte insists that a new system of education must be developed which “essentially destroys the freedom of will . . . and produces on the contrary strict necessity in the decisions of the will” (Addresses to the German Nation, Address II).

The state continues to be glorified in the Idealistic philosophy of Hegel, for whom the state, and especially the Prussian state, is the “embodiment of rational freedom realizing and recognizing itself in an objective form” (Lectures on the Philosophy of History). And in the Prussian nationalism of Heinrich von Treitschke, the state is glorified to an extent that it becomes a sort of substitute for God. Treitschke takes care to stress that “the consciousness of national unity is dependent on a common bond of religion, for religious sentiment is one of the fundamental forces of the human character.” (Politics, I) Unfortunately the interference of Jewish elements in German politics had disturbed the traditional spiritual ordering of society by encouraging “the coexistence of several religions within one nationality, involving an irreconcilable and ultimately intolerable difference of outlook upon life.”

Directly opposed to these several statist doctrines of the German Idealists and nationalists is the doctrine of Communism which was propounded in the middle of the nineteenth century by the Jewish political economist Karl Marx. The radical difference between the Marxist view of the world and the Indo-European is already evident in the fact that Marx’s system was based on an atheistic materialism that totally denied the existence of any spiritual reality whatsoever, and all metaphysics in general, in favour of a dialectical socio-economics that attempted to understand the transformations of society according to its changing modes of production. Unlike Hegel who had justified history as the changing manifestations of a quasi-divine world-spirit, Marx wished to ‘create’ history by focusing on what he considered its essential economic activities. As he put it in The German Ideology (Ch.1):

Morality, religion, metaphysics, all the rest of ideology and their corresponding forms of consciousness . . . have no history, no development; but men, developing their material production and their material intercourse, alter, along with their real existence, their thinking and the products of their thinking.

However, the Communist system, for all its apparent evolutionary aspirations, is an anti-scientific, utopian construct aiming at an anti-human classless and stateless society based on the common ownership of the means of production. In this delusional sociological experiment Marx focused especially on class-struggle, or the conflict between capital and labor, as the primary instrument of historical change. By granting economic, social and political equality to all citizens Marx believed that the social awareness and discipline of every individual would naturally be increased. And, while he tolerated a representative parliamentary political system as a transitional stage, his Communist utopia aimed at a final dissolution of the state apparatus (which is what induces hierarchy and inequality) at the most advanced state of Communism, when the people would become fully self-governing.

Marxism is thus the fullest expression of a world-view that is diametrically opposed to the traditional Indo-European ordering of society according to spiritual character which we have observed in ancient India, Greece and the rest of Europe until the advent of philo-Judaic Puritanism in the middle of the seventeenth century. Marxism is naturally also opposed to the state structure that supports the religious and warrior aristocracy that founded, constitute and preserve the nation. It may be noted here that although modern liberal democracies pretend to abhor the Communist ideology, the arrogation of political authority in the West by the legislature and its prime ministerial or presidential leader represents a major step towards the same dissolution of the concepts of state and sovereignty that Communism too strives for.

Marx’s political economic theories were strongly criticized at the turn of the century by many notable German thinkers like Eugen Dühring and Oswald Spengler, but I should like to highlight here one of the most metaphysically structured political philosophical responses to Marxism – namely, the system of the Italian Fascist philosopher, Giovanni Gentile. According to Gentile, the basis of evil, exactly as in Plato and Plotinus, is Matter, or Nature, which is opposed to Spirit and represents as it were, “not merely moral and absolute nullity [but] the impenetrable chaos of brute nature, mechanism, spiritual darkness, falsehood and evil, all the things that man is forever fighting against” (Genesis and Structure of Society).

Gentile points out that the economic life focused on by Marx is marked by a utilitarianism akin to the instinctual life of animals and is a life of slavery to matter, whereas politics should be a means to spiritual freedom. While Marxism aimed at the worst sort of social organization, “the utilitarian, materialistic and hence egoistic conception of life understood as a realm of rights to be vindicated, instead of as an arena of duties to be performed by sacrificing oneself to an ideal,” Gentile’s own ideal of Fascism is based on a metaphysical understanding of society as emerging from a Kantian ideal of a “transcendent society” which is produced by the interaction of the ego and its pure object, the alter ego. It is this conception of a ‘transcendent society’ which makes man a ‘political animal’, as Aristotle had earlier suggested. The gradual self-realization of an individual necessarily entails the enlightenment of his objective counterparts, the other members of society, so that the nation as a whole begins to approach the ideal “transcendent society.”

Indeed, for Gentile, as for Fichte, the proper intellectual activity of the enlightened individual is the comprehension of the whole of mankind or of the Idea of it. And the ‘State’ is the objective embodiment of the personality of the individuals constituting it or the “universal common aspect” of their will. True political liberty is therefore possible only when the individuals that constitute the state become free through the realization of the universal aspect of their personality.

The State in its universal aspect is indeed an image of the Divine Will and the laws of the State must ever be in consonance with the Divine Law. Religion naturally is not an external aid to the will of the state but the constitutive element of it. The prime task of the state is to foster the dual development of individuals and of the society. Gentile’s project of state education is therefore governed by a keen awareness of the essentially moral nature of all education. Those concerned with culture as the self-development of the individuals constituting a state must, he says, be “critical of all knowledge that man does not need for the actual realization of his human nature and for the growth and health of his moral character” (Genesis and Structure of Society). In short, they must be critical of all knowledge that is not genuinely human.

Gentile interestingly also distinguishes between two kinds of treatment of political history. True history is not that which observes the “brute fact” but rather “the inward act of the spirit” always considered from the point of view of the “transcendent state,” the “higher ideal that operates as an end in the actual life of the state” (Ibid.). This transcendent state is indeed the divine model of an earthly state and therefore a constant unchanging norm to which the temporal changes of a state approximate in varying degrees throughout its history.

In this Fascist view of history and of the philosophical significance of the state we finally obtain a corrective to the historiographical errors of Hegelians like Fukuyama who raise the political status quo to an ideal after superficially surveying the external changes of a state as also to the errors of the Marxists who conjure up utopias from these same changes. All of these thinkers ignore the transcendent or divine aspect of statecraft, which, as we have observed in our initial survey of ancient Indian and Greek philosophy, starts with the constitution of the psyche or soul itself and aims, through a sacred kingship or an enlightened autocracy, at the psychological improvement of the individuals that comprise the state. Materialistic societies governed by economically oriented political doctrines, whether Puritan or Marxist, are incapable of any real historical development because the spiritual element of man which alone is capable of movement and development is either poorly understood or wholly dismissed.

Fukuyama’s historiographic thesis is thus merely a description of the abortive state of America itself, which has through its history gradually substituted materialistic and economic principles of statecraft for the spiritual ones that originally governed all European monarchies, including the British. In considering this American problem, we cannot afford to ignore the fateful role that Jewry have played in the history of the West, for the re-entry of the Jews into England during the Puritan revolution is linked, psychologically, to the capitalist career of the new American state just as the Jewish economic utopia of Karl Marx lurks behind the liberal democratic dreams of contemporary Americans. Indeed, all modern political theories that aim at a dissolution of the state or of the leading religious institution of a nation — whether these theories are called Libertarian or Anarchist — must be recognized as derivatives of the defective Jewish economic mentality.

This mentality can, and should, be fully replaced by genuinely Indo-European political doctrines that begin not with contractual promises to the masses of liberty and equality and plenty but rather with the obligations of the leaders of a nation and of the State to actually improve the human psychological condition, or culture, of these masses. Both the State and its leading religious institution — in the case of the West, the Church — must therefore be strengthened in their national role and their alliance must be consolidated. This will naturally entail the exclusion of all anti-statist and anti-clerical elements from national government and education. The philosophical guidelines for the urgently required regeneration of nations are clearly available in the long tradition of European conservative philosophy that I have pointed to and particularly in the most recent example of Gentile. Of course, I am aware that Monarchism, Fascism and the Church are all equally abhorrent to those who today follow Judaized America in its various utopian adventures, but it is well to bear in mind that the price of utopianism is the end of history.


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dimanche, 14 septembre 2014

Henry Corbin: Eurasia como concepto espiritual

Henry Corbin: Eurasia como concepto espiritual

Ex: http://culturatransversal.wordpress.com 

Por Claudio Mutti*

Desde Irlanda a Japón

corbin.jpg“Subrayar y enfatizar las conexiones, las líneas de fuerza en las que se sustenta la trama del concepto espiritual de Eurasia, desde Irlanda a Japón” (1): a esta preocupación de P. Masson Oursel, que se inspira en un programa esbozado en 1923 en la Philosophie comparée y proseguido en 1948 en La Philosophie en Orient (2), Henry Corbin (1903-1978) le atribuye un “valor especial” (3). Trascendiendo el nivel de las determinaciones geográficas e históricas, el concepto de Eurasia viene a constituir “la metáfora de la unidad espiritual y cultural que recompondrá al final de la era cristiana en vista de la superación de los resultados de ésta” (4). Estas son, al menos, las conclusiones de un estudioso que en la obra corbiniana ha descubierto las indicaciones idóneas para fundar: “aquella gran operación de hermenéutica espiritual comparada, que es la búsqueda de una filosofía – o mejor dicho: de una sabiduría – eurasiática” (5). En otras palabras, la misma categoría geofísica de “Eurasia” no es más que la proyección de una realidad geosófica vinculada a la  Unidad originaria, puesto que “Eurasia” es, en la percepción interior, en el paisaje del alma o Xvarnah (“Luz de Gloria”, en el léxico mazdeo), la Cognitio Angelorum, la operación  autológica del Anthropos Téleios, o incluso, por último, la unidad entre el Lumen Naturae y la Lumen Gloriae.   De aquí la posibilidad de acercar a Eurasia con el conocimiento imaginal de la Tierra como un Ángel” (6).

Es el mismo Henry Corbin quien evoca la experiencia visionaria del filósofo alemán Gustav Theodor Fechner, que identificó con la figura de un Ángel el rostro de la tierra envuelta de luz gloriosa, y para citar el pasaje concordante de un ritual avéstico: “Celebramos esta liturgia en honor de la Tierra, que es un ángel ” (7). De hecho, según la doctrina mazdeísta, a la Tierra se la percibe en la “persona” de su Ángel, cuando el alma, proyectando la imagen de sí misma, crea una Imago Terrae que la refleja. La angelología mazdeísta traduce el misterio de esta proyección de la siguiente manera: Spenta Armaiti, Arcángel femenino de la existencia terrenal, es la madre de Daena, el Ángel femenino que sustancia a la Alma caelestis,  el Cuerpo de Resurrección.  De esta manera, “la formulación misma de la categoría geofísica de “Eurasia” pertenece al proceso de palingenesia, que es la Resurrección a la luz de la Transfiguración ” (8).

La geosofía mazdeísta, íntimamente vinculada con la esencial característica sofiánica de Spenta Armaiti , se refiere principalmente a una Tierra celeste; aplicada al espacio terrestre, se nos presenta un kyklos, un orbis, similar a lo que Homero ha simbolizado en el escudo de Aquiles y Virgilio en el de Eneas (9), es decir, para permanecer en el ámbito iránico, con ese atributo del Hombre Universal (insân-e kâmil) que es la Copa de Jamshid.  En esta representación, la Tierra está rodeada del océano cósmico y dividida en siete zonas (Keshvar) (10); en el centro de la zona central, llamada Xvaniratha (“rueda luminosa”), “se encuentra Airyanem Vaejah (pahlavi Erân-Vêj), la cuna o germen de los Arios (= Iránicos).  Es allí donde se crearon los Kayanidi, los héroes legendarios; es ahí donde fue fundada la religión mazdeísta, desde donde se difunden a los otros Keshvar; es allí donde nacerá el último de los Saoshyant quién reducirá a Ahriman a la impotencia y llevará a cabo la resurrección y la existencia venidera”(11).  Situado al centro de la superficie de la tierra, Irán se nos presenta por lo tanto, como “bisagra, no sólo geográfica, sino también y sobre todo espiritual” (12), de la ecúmene eurasiática.

La representación mazdeísta, posteriormente reelaborada, pasó a formar parte del legado cultural que Irán le trasmitió al Islam.  En el Kitab al-Tafhîm de Abû Rayhân Mohammad ibn Ahmad Bîrûnî (362 / 973 – 421 / 1030) (13) se encuentra un esquema en el cual el círculo central, Irán, está rodeado de otros seis círculos, tangentes entre sí, que corresponden a otras tantas regiones: India, Arabia y Abisinia, Siria y Egipto, la zona bizantino-eslava, el Turquestán, China y el Tíbet.

Oriente y Occidente

 

Según la perspectiva islámica, el centro del mundo terrestre se encuentra en la Kaaba, el más antiguo de los templos de Dios, inicialmente construido en la época de Adán, después edificado por Abraham en su forma actual. En la planta y la estructura de este santuario primordial y central meditó Qâzî Sa‘îd Qommî (1042/1633 – 1103/1691- 92) en el primer capítulo de la Kitâb asrâr al-Hajj (“El sentido esotérico de la Peregrinación”), que constituye el objeto de un minucioso estudio de Henry Corbin (14). “Siempre entra en juego – dice éste último – el mismo principio: las formas de luz (sowar nûrîya), las figuras superiores se imprimen en las realidades de abajo que son sus espejos (subrayemos que, geométricamente las consideraciones elaboradas aquí seguirían siendo válidas sí se tomara como objeto de meditación la forma del templo griego)” (15). Ahora, en el plano superior de las Realidades-arquetipos […] encontramos cuatro “límites metafísicos” (16), dos de las cuales (la Inteligencia Universal y el Alma Universal) se encuentran al este de la realidad ideal, mientras que las otras dos (la Naturaleza Universal y la Materia Universal) se encuentran hacia el oeste. La ley rigurosa de las correspondencias exige que en el plano de la Ka’ba terrestre, los ángulos estén igualmente dispuestos según el mismo orden de relación: “Dos de estos ángulos están hacia el oriente: el ángulo en el que está encajada la Piedra Negra (el ángulo iraquí) y el ángulo yemenita; los otros dos están al occidente: el ángulo occidental y el ángulo sirio “(17).  Son estos dos orientes (mashriqayni) y los dos occidentes (maghribayni) los que alude el versículo 17 de la sura del Misericordioso, puntualmente citado por Corbin.

El versículo coránico llama a otro, el que comienza con las palabras: “A Dios pertenece el Oriente y el Occidente” (sura de la Vaca, 115).  “Gottes ist der Orient! – Gottes ist der Okzident!”: es la forma en que la reconstruye Wolfgang Goethe, a quien Corbin nos muestra más de una vez la convergencia con la sabiduría islámica.  Pero la pareja “Oriente-Occidente ” retorna en el versículo de la Luz, en parte reportado en el epígrafe al primer capítulo de su estudio sobre El hombre de luz en el sufismo iranio: ”… una lámpara que arde con un aceite de olivo que no es ni de Oriente ni Occidente, inflamándose sin necesidad siquiera de que el fuego la toque… Y es luz sobre luz.

“Entre Oriente y Occidente, como entre Norte y Sur, recorren líneas ideales de las cuales dependen no sólo la orientación geográfica, sino también la categoría antropológica. En la perspectiva del simbolismo espiritual, estas direcciones horizontales asumen un sentido en base al modo en que el ser humano experimenta la dimensión vertical de su presencia en el espacio y en el tiempo; y es una orientación de este género lo que constituirá uno de los principales temas del sufismo iranio: “es la búsqueda de Oriente, pero se nos advierte, por si acaso no lo comprendamos desde el primer momento, que se trata de un Oriente que no se encuentra en nuestros mapas geográficos ni puede ser situado en ellos. Este Oriente no está incluido en ninguno de los siete climas (los keshvar); es, de hecho, el octavo clima. Y la dirección en que este “octavo clima” debe ser buscado no está en la horizontal sino en la vertical. Este Oriente místico suprasensible, lugar del Origen y el Retorno, objeto de la búsqueda eterna, está en el polo celeste; es el Polo, un extremo norte, tan extremo como el umbral de la dimensión del más allá” (18).  La geografía sagrada de Irán hace corresponder a este Polo celeste a la montaña cósmica de Qâf, donde comienza aquel mundo de Hûrqalyâ que es iluminado por el sol de medianoche. Es la tierra de los Hiperbóreos (19), los cuales “simbolizan al hombre cuya alma ha alcanzado tal perfección y armonía que está libre de negatividad y de sombra; no es ni de Oriente ni de Occidente” (20).

Ishraq, nombre verbal, que en árabe significa el irradiar del sol desde el punto del cual surge, es un término peculiar de la sabiduría islámica de Irán.  Ishrâqîyûn o Mashriqîyûn (“Orientales”) son los sabios de la antigua Persia, llamados así “ciertamente no sólo por su ubicación geográfica, sino porque su conocimiento era oriental, en el sentido que se fundamentaba sobre la revelación interior (kashf) y la visión mística (moshâhadat) “(21).  Sin embargo, el significado del Oriente como un Oriente iluminativo, dirección que conduce al Polo espiritual, no es un concepto que caracteriza exclusivamente al pensamiento tradicional iranio. “Esta orientación se daba ya a los mistagogos del orfismo. Se la encuentra en el poema de Parménides donde, guiado por las hijas del sol, el poeta emprende un viaje hacia Oriente. El sentido de las dos direcciones, derecha e izquierda, Oriente y Occidente del cosmos, es fundamental en la gnosis valentiniana. (…) Ibn ‘Arabi (1240) eleva a símbolo su propia partida a Oriente; del viaje que de Andalucía le lleva hacia La Meca y Jerusalén hace su Isra’, homologándolo a un ékstasis que repite la ascensión del Profeta de cielo en cielo hasta el “Loto del límite”. Aquí el Oriente geográfico, “literal”, se convierte en símbolo del Oriente “real”, el polo celeste” (22).

Umbilicus Terrae

En la geografía sagrada resultante de las exploraciones espirituales de Henry Corbin, el extremo occidental de Eurasia está representado por las Islas Británicas. Aquí los fieles de la iglesia celta primitiva fueron designados en irlandés como céle Dé: denominación que equivale a Amici Dei, “se encuentra en la gnosis islámica (Awliyâ’ Allâh) y en la mística renana (Gottesfreunde)” (23).  Estos Coli Dei, “establecidos en York (Inglaterra), en Iona (Escocia), en el país de Gales y en  Irlanda, su símbolo fundamental era la paloma, como símbolo femenino del Espíritu Santo.  Desde esta perspectiva, no resulta extraño encontrar el druidismo mezclado a su tradición y los poemas de Taliesin integrados a sus corpus.  Igualmente, la epopeya de la Mesa Redonda y la Demanda del Santo Graal han sido también interpretadas en relación con los ritos de los Coli Dei” (24). A esta misma hermandad espiritual es reconducida la existencia del santuario de Kilwinning, sobre la montaña de Heredom, desde donde se irradió aquel Orden Real por el cual el rey Robert I Bruce se habría afiliado a los Templarios, realizando la convergencia entre el celtismo y el templarismo.

En la otra extremidad de Eurasia se extiende la China “el límite del mundo humano, del mundo que puede ser explorado por el hombre en las condiciones de la conciencia común” (25).  Por otra parte, influencias taoístas se habrían ejercido sobre la hierocosmologia del sufismo centroasiático y sobre algunas técnicas de recitación del dhikr adoptadas por la escuela de Najm Kobra (26). Entre los templos que se levantan en los confines de China hay uno, descrito en el siglo X por el historiador árabe Mas‘ûdî (27), que en su estructura obedece al paradigma arquitectónico de los templos sabeos; el mismo Mas‘ûdî había visto aquel de Harrán (la antigua Carrhae), y pudo todavía leer en el umbral la inscripción de tenor platónico: “Aquél que se conoce a sí mismo es deificado” (Man ‘arafa nafsahu ta’allaha). “Inscripción de tenor platónico” (28), cierto, en el que “el término técnico árabe es el equivalente de la theosis de los místicos bizantinos” (29), pero también la explicación del precepto délfico, que finalmente será validado en el hadîth qudsî: “Quién se conoce a sí mismo conoce a su Señor ” (Man ‘arafa nafsahu ‘arafa rabbahu). Mientras tanto, los hermetistas sabeos de Harrán aportarán en dote al Islam su herencia, derivada de una antigua sabiduría siríaca o siriobabiloniense reinterpretada a la luz del neoplatonismo.

Equidistante de Escocia y China está Al-Quds, “la ciudad santa” por antonomasia. En el lugar donde inició la Asunción el Mensajero de Dios – según Corbin un verdadero Umbilicus Terrae – “asume ahí una función homóloga a la de la Piedra Negra en el templo de la Ka’ba” (30), la Cúpula de la Roca (Qubbat al-Sakhrat). Este edificio, comúnmente llamado la Mezquita de Omar, “tiene la forma de un octógono regular culminado por una cúpula; fue el prototipo de las iglesias templarias construidas en Europa, y la cúpula fue el símbolo de la Orden y figuraba en el sello del Gran Maestre” (31). Este entrelazamiento de líneas espirituales diferentes hace de Jerusalén el simbólico edificio microcósmico, en el que se refleja la multiplicidad tradicional del macrocosmos eurasiático, aquella multiplicidad de formas que Henry Corbin nos presenta en su unidad esencial.

La oposición radical entre Jerusalén y Atenas, identificadas como polos emblemáticos respectivamente del monoteísmo y el politeísmo, es el punto donde convergen entre ellos los zelotas de las supuestas “raíces judeo-cristianas” de Europa y algunos defensores de un malentendido “paganismo” griego.  Sostener una posición de este tipo, queriendo reducirle a un esquema ideológico a una relación más bien profunda, compleja y articulada de cuanto no se imaginan los “judeo-cristianos” y “neopaganos”, significa ignorar cómo la más rigurosa doctrina metafísica de la Unidad (el Tawhid integral de la metafísica islámica) no excluye de hecho la multiplicidad relacionada a la jerarquía de los Nombres Divinos. Entre los que han entendido perfectamente lo anterior, está justamente Henry Corbin, quien, mediante el establecimiento de una ideal “comparación, por una parte entre Ibn ‘Arabî  (…) y Proclo, por otra” (32) y recordando el comentario del jefe de escuela de Atenas al Parménides platónico, evoca el encuentro de los físicos de la escuela jónica con los metafísicos de la Escuela Itálica, unos y otros se encuentran en la ciudad-símbolo de Atenas para participar en las Panateneas. “Celebrar esta fiesta – él escribe- es encontrar en la escuela ática de Sócrates y Platón la mediación que eleva los dos extremos a un nivel superior” (33).

 

1. Henry Corbin, L’Iran e la filosofia, Guida, Napoli 1992, p. 62.

2. P. Masson-Oursel, La Philosophie en Orient, in Histoire de la philosophie, a cura di É. Bréhier, Paris 1948, 1° fasc. suppl.

3. Henry Corbin, L’Iran e la filosofia, cit., ibidem.

4. Glauco Giuliano, Nitartha. Saggi per un pensiero eurasiatico, La Finestra, Lavis 2004, p. 14

5. Glauco Giuliano, Nitartha, cit., p. 221

6. Glauco Giuliano, Nitartha, cit., p. 16.

7. Sîrôza, vigésimo octavo día, op. cit.: Henry Corbin, Cuerpo espiritual y Tierra Celeste. Del Irán mazdeísta al Irán chiíta, Ediciones Siruela, Madrid, 1996, p. 37.

8. Glauco Giuliano, Nitartha, cit., p. 16, n. 25.

9. Ilíada, XVIII, 478-608; Eneida, VIII, 626-728.

10. La división septenaria del espacio terrestre que se repite en otras culturas tradicionales: cf. Claudio Mutti, Gentes. Popoli, territori, miti, Effepi, Genova 2010, pp. 19-20.

11. Henry Corbin, Cuerpo espiritual y Tierra Celeste, cit., p. 51.

12. Glauco Giuliano, Nitartha, cit., p. 22.

13. Henry Corbin, Historia de la Filosofía. Del mundo romano al Islam Medieval, vol. 3. Siglo veintiuno editores, México DF, 1990, pp 307-308.

14. Henry Corbin, Templo y contemplación, Editorial Trotta, Madrid, 2003, pp. 181-257.   Sobre Qâzî Sa’îd Qommî, cf. Henry Corbin, Historia de la Filosofía. La Filosofía en Oriente, vol. 11. Siglo veintiuno editores, México DF, 1990, p. 154-157

15. Henry Corbin, Templo y contemplación cit., p. 206.

16. Henry Corbin, Templo y contemplación cit., p. 207.

17. Henry Corbin, Templo y contemplación, cit., p. 207.

18. Henry Corbin, El hombre de luz en el sufismo iranio, Ediciones Siruela, Madrid, 2000, p. 20.

19. Sobre la Hiperbórea y similares representaciones tradicionales de la septentrional “Tierra de luz”, cf. Claudio Mutti, op. cit., pp 15-23.

20. Henry Corbin, El hombre de luz en el sufismo iranio, cit., p. 56.

21. Henry Corbin, Storia della filosofia islamica, cit., p. 211.

22. Henry Corbin, El hombre de luz en el sufismo iranio, cit., págs. 73-74.

23. Henry Corbin, Templo y contemplación, cit., p. 342 n. 217.

24. Henry Corbin, Templo y contemplación, cit., p. 342.

25. Henry Corbin, Templo y contemplación, cit., p. 132.

26. Henry Corbin, El hombre de luz en el sufismo iranio, cit., pp. 72 y 77 y ss.

27. Mas’ûdî, Les prairies d’or, ed. e trad. Barbier de Maynard, Paris 1914, vol. IV, p. 52.

28. Henry Corbin, Templo y contemplación,  cit., p. 133.

29. Henry Corbin, Templo y contemplación, cit., p. 133, n 7.

30. Henry Corbin, Templo y contemplación, cit., p. 351.

31. Henry Corbin, Templo y contemplación, cit., p. 334.

32. Henry Corbin, La paradoja del monoteísmo, Editorial Losada, Madrid, 2003, p. 22.

33. Henry Corbin, La paradoja del monoteísmo, cit., p. 30.

 

* Claudio Mutti es licenciado en Filología Finohúngara por la Universidad de Bolonia. Se ha ocupado del área cárpato-danubiana desde un perfil histórico (A oriente di Roma e di Berlino, Effepi, Genova 2003), etnográfico (Storie e leggende della Transilvania, Oscar Mondadori, Milano 1997) y cultural (Le penne dell’Arcangelo. Intellettuali e Guardia di Ferro, Società Editrice Barbarossa, Milano 1994; Eliade, Vâlsan, Geticus e gli altri. La fortuna di Guénon tra i Romeni, Edizioni all’insegna del Veltro, Parma 1999). Entre sus últimas publicaciones están Gentes. Popoli, territori, miti, (Effepi, Genova 2010), L’unità dell’Eurasia (Effepi, Genova 2008), Imperium. Epifanie dell’idea di Impero (Effepi, Genova 2005).

mercredi, 03 septembre 2014

Congreso Internacional “Maestros del tradicionalismo hispánico"

Congreso Internacional “Maestros del tradicionalismo hispánico de la segunda mitad del siglo XX”

 

CONSEJO ESTUDIOS HISPANICOS FELIPE II

El Consejo de Estudios Hispánicos Felipe II tiene el honor de invitar al Congreso Internacional

 

MAESTROS DEL TRADICIONALISMO HISPÁNICO DE LA SEGUNDA MITAD DEL SIGLO XX

 

que tendrá lugar (D.m.) en Madrid el sábado 13 de septiembre de 2014, en su sede de la calle José Abascal (ant. General Sanjurjo), 38, bajo izquierda, con el siguiente programa:

 

10:00. Introducción.

 

Presidencia de Miguel Ayuso
Presidente del Consejo de Estudios Hispánicos Felipe II

 

  • Piedad y desarraigo: una pesquisa sobre los tradicionalismos,
    José Antonio Ullate, Universidad Antonio de Nebrija de Madrid.
  • Libertades concretas y libertad cristiana en el pensamiento de los maestros del tradicionalismo (Francisco Elías de Tejada, Rafael Gambra y Álvaro d’Ors),
    Jacek Bartyzel, Universidad de Toruń.

 

11:30. Segunda parte: Maestros peninsulares.

 

Presidencia de Consuelo Martínez-Sicluna
Vicedecana de la Facultad de Derecho de la Universidad Complutense de Madrid

 

  • Vegas Latapie (1907-1985) contra el «propagandismo católico»,
    Andrés Gambra, Universidad R. Juan Carlos de Madrid.
  • El «divinismo» de Leopoldo Eulogio Palacios (1912-1981),
    José Miguel Gambra, Universidad Complutense de Madrid.
  • La «hispanidad» en Jesús Evaristo Casariego (1913-1990),
    Luis Infante, Círculo Cultural Juan Vázquez de Mella de Asturias.
  • Schmitt y Álvaro d’Ors (1915-2004): una inspiración ad modum recipientis,
    Juan Fernando Segovia, Universidad de Mendoza.
  • Elías de Tejada (1917-1978) y el tradicionalismo napolitano,
    Maurizio Di Giovine, Congresos Tradicionalistas de Civitella del Tronto.
  • Libertad civil, subsidiariedad y foralismo en Vallet de Goytisolo (1917-2011),
    José Joaquín Jerez, Universidad Pontificia Comillas de Madrid.
  • La comunidad no «comunitarista» de Rafael Gambra (1920-2004),
    Juan Manuel Rozas, Universidad Antonio de Nebrija de Madrid.
  • La teología de la historia de Francisco Canals (1922-2009),
    Javier Barraycoa, Universidad Abad Oliva de Barcelona.

 

17:00. Tercera parte: Maestros ultramarinos.

 

Presidencia de Juan Cayón
Secretario General del Consejo de Estudios Hispánicos Felipe II

 

  • Osvaldo Lira (1904-1996), tradicionalista hispánico,
    José Díaz Nieva, Universidad Santo Tomás de Santiago de Chile.
    Cristián Garay, Universidad de Santiago de Chile.
  • El tradicionalismo político de José Pedro Galvão de Sousa (1912-1992),
    José Albert, Universidad de Córdoba.
  • La teología de la historia de Rubén Calderón Bouchet (1918-2012),
    Luis María De Ruschi, Universidad Católica Argentina de Buenos Aires.
  • Frederick D. Wilhelmsen (1923-1996), un carlista estadounidense,
    Miguel Ayuso, Universidad Pontificia Comillas de Madrid.

 

19:00. Santa Misa en el aniversario de la muerte de S.M.C. Don Felipe II (+1598).

lundi, 18 août 2014

Miyamoto Musashi’s Dokkodo

bfc0b424ad0dbb183444d9be56a5db69.jpg

Miyamoto Musashi’s Dokkodo

Dokkodo (獨行道), roughly translated means  “The Path of Walking Alone,”  “The Path of Independence,” or “The Lone Path”/  Although the English translation does not give the title much justice, it is should be noted that this refers not to a path of nihilistic abandon, nor a path of misanthropy.  Misanthropes who have crossed beyond a certain point will not be able to adhere to it unless they have the discipline and fortitude for it.  It is a demanding way and requires that the person choosing the path be able to endure its precepts, including those such as being in the world, without being of it in the sense of being drowned in ‘worldliness.’  Such a concept is paralleled the Christian injunctions that “Whosoever therefore will be a friend of the world is the enemy of God” (James 4:4) and “Denying ungodliness and worldly lusts, we should live soberly, righteously, and godly, in this present world” (Titus 2:12).  Similar concepts exist in the Qur’an, namely, “Do not let your wealth or your children distract you from the remembrance of God”.  When the “Eastern” Daoist and Buddhist veneers are stripped away, we find something not at all that different from monotheistic teachings.  It is worth examining this code for relevance to augment understanding of the world.

Musashi_ts_pic

A woodblock print depicting Miyamoto Musashi (1584-1645) wielding two bokken.

1. Do not go against the traditions that have been handed down from the generations (世々の道をそむく事なし)

The first principle is a bit difficult to translate directly into English.  The phrase 世々 (yoyo) refers roughly to “previous generations,” while 道 (michi) refers to “the way”; そむく (somoku) means “oppose,” and 事なし (kotonashi) is the negation of a verb.  It has variously been translated as, “Accept things as they are” or “Do not go against the way of the world”.

In “accepting things as they are,” one is not asked to tolerate evil or be passive, but is in an active mental struggle to realize our true place in the world and how small we are.  It is a battle against the ego to accept our mistakes, to bury the past, and live in the now instead of in the future.  Often things we resist are in the past: not accepting that someone has died or being angry over events that have occurred previously. These are things we simply can not change and that is why it makes no sense to resist what has happened.

By respecting the traditions, one “traverses time from the past to the future”. According to Imai Masayuki, this sentence indicates a man who is independent, yet, acting freely conforms to a truth of human nature.

71aZweq6IbL__SL1092_.jpg2. Do not seek pleasure for its own sake (身にたのしみをたくます)

The most direct application here is to refrain from engaging in behavior that gives one temporary satisfaction, without understanding the consequences.  For instance, it may be more pleasurable to spend one’s spare time with wine, woman and song, rather than in serious study.  In a hedonistic, decadent, narcissistic world one can get easily distracted in the sights and sounds even though temporary.  It is important to be aware of how harmful these things can be once they become so imbued into our characters as to become a ‘raison d’etre.’  The addiction to flesh, drink, substances, and even music has been studied and found to be folly.  Hence the reasonable parameters imposed by society and The Divine.

3. Do not rely upon any half-hearted prejudices. (よろすに依枯の心なし)

Sometimes, it is necessary to take a step back and make a better assessment of the situation.  A true warrior, sage, or gentleman is not impulsive or hot-headed, and should strive to uphold justice in all situations.  This also means that in dealing with other people, one does not take sides with a certain party without good reason, nor does he harbor indifference towards others.

4. Think humbly of yourself, but deeply of the world (身をあさく思、世をふかく思ふ)

This means to be humble and to think of one’s superficiality.  Musashi is telling us here that one should not overestimate one’s importance in the world.  Such a self-centered view is dominated by egocentricity and selfish desires.  One must evolve beyond such delusions, but at the same time accept that each person has their own limits.

This can also mean to not take excessive pride in one’s own accomplishments and possessions:  Do not think that your entire self-worth is in your job or your possessions, rather than in your character or your good deeds. You are not what you own.  This is difficult when people gauge worth with material success; your car is not you, your house is not you, your Rolex is not your soul, Gucci has no dominion over your heart.

5. Be detached from desire your whole life long (一生の間よくしん思わす)

This ties in with the fourth precept.  Eliminate the driving need for wanting instead of a want for needing.  Then, you will have less fear and be unfettered by worldly cares.  If you are removed from your own desires, then it is easier to follow a path of right conduct.  Eliminate the lusts for material desires, and one already has enough.  The concept of wu wei, or mushin ties into this as your lack of hindrances like too much fear in an endeavor will give you success.

6. Do not regret your past (我事におゐて後悔をせす)

There are times when one has to make decisions.  Decisions, even if weighed carefully, are not always successful.  However, if you tried your best, and you put your best efforts into achieving the right outcome, that is good enough.  Of course, this does not apply to someone who is reckless and stubborn.  However, those who have the right intent need not dwell on the past that they cannot fix.  Instead repent, move on, and become better.

7. Never have bad intentions or envy in your heart (善惡に他をねたむ心なし)

Jealousy clouds the heart with envy; envy poisons the mind with anger and despair.  What seems to be someone else’s treasure may be a great burden.  With selfish desires in the heart, we cannot truly live a fulfilling life or be at peace with ourselves or others.  That lifestyle of those you envy may earn them an early death and debts for generations.  It is nothing to be jealous about.

8. Never let yourself be saddened by a separation (いつれの道にもわかれをかなします)

According to the Buddha, attachment is the source of all suffering.   Meister Eckhart says, “He who would be serene and pure needs but detachment”.  Separation can apply to losing a partner, a pet, money, possessions or anything of the sort.  Things will come and go.  People will enter and leave.  Let them go.  The Divine will is going to decide who is going to be with whom and how. 

4352501395_ef41725cbb_z.jpg9. Complaining and bearing grudges are appropriate neither for oneself or others (自他共にうらみかこつ心なし)

Our selfish desires may lead us to complain about others.  For instance, if a person is unsatisfied with another person, he may spread rumors or complain about the other behind his back.  He may also hold a grudge against such a person.  This is not the behavior of a wise person.  Deal with it, it will make you stronger. 

10. Do not let yourself be guided by the feeling of lust or love (れんほの道思ひよるこゝろなし)

In the context of Buddhism, In Buddhism there are five different kinds of desires based on desire for money, lust, appetite, desire for fame, desire for sleep.  Out of these, lust, being a biological drive, is very hard to avoid.  Control yourself and use logical thought when going down that path.  To be at the whim of emotion is to be a slave and then to be attached to most temporary of material possessions: a mortal body.  It will not even withstand the wind like the mountain, or show the same splendor for aeons like the stars.  These too are material objects which will have their death as The Giver and Taker ordains.

11. In all things, have no preferences (物毎にすきこのむ事なし)

Again, this does not mean to become a nihilist.  On the contrary, it means to not be obsessed over small and inconsequential matters.  Do not be driven or guided by what you cannot control.

12. Be indifferent to where you live (私宅におゐてのそむ心なし)

Where you live is not a matter of importance when you follow this way.  As you are already trying to depart from these cares, you should be able to be steadfast and thrive anywhere.

13. Do not pursue the taste of luxurious food (身ひとつに美食をこのます)

The purpose of eating is to nourish oneself.  Luxurious food does not accomplish this any better than simple food.  In his life, Musashi was a warrior who at times faced levels of extreme privation.  However, in the worldview of the bushi, life itself is preparation for war.  Avoiding that which is unnecessary is better than indulging in it.

14. Do not become attached to old possessions you no longer need (末々代物なる古き道具を所持せす)

Nothing in the world remains ours forever.  Upon death, one’s personal items typically become the property of another.  Removing clutter from your life with generosity allows you to live a more unhindered existence and also be aware that you need little.  You came into the world with nothing, you travel lightly in the world, and you will leave it with nothing.

15. Do not act following customary beliefs (わか身にいたり物いみする事なし)

Although this seems to contradict the first principle, all this is saying is that there are times in which what is popular will not always be right.  For instance, what use is it to worship celebrities, to bury oneself in pursuit of that extolled?  It just wastes time and time is what you will never have enough of.  Walk the way and live guided by what is ever-enduring.  It will be there after this society has faded into the sands of history.

16. Do not collect weapons or practice with weapons beyond what is useful (兵具は格別よの道具たしなます)

What is the utility of engaging in hours practicing or acquiring that which you do not need?  For the warrior, weapons are not merely possessions to be owned and collected in the same manner that a merchant may collect trinkets.  Today we may not need swords, but instead must use other objects for defense of person, loved ones, and property.  Are these tools, worth much pursuit?

17. Don’t spend your entire life being preoccupied with death (道におゐてハ 死を いとわす 思ふ)

Death will happen just as you have been born.  As a warrior, to live without the fear of death is paramount.  For a sage or scholar, one who lives a proper life and death does not need to fear death.  For someone who has lived properly, physical death is not an end, but the hand which will lift the veil of life separating him from The Compassionate Sustainer.  Death is as natural as life; life indeed by its nature is the purchase of death.  What is better? To depart with a good record, or choose a legacy of iniquity?

18. Do not seek to possess either goods or fiefs for your old age (老身に財寳所領もちゆる心なし)

Millions try to save up all their lives for their dreams: to retire wealthy, to have fun, to own a house of their own.  Usually this money goes instead for their care as the world of work has taken its toll.  Have no illusions.

19. Revere the Divine but do not demand assistance (佛神は貴し佛神をたのます)

Although this can be viewed as an atheistic sentiment, it can also be interpreted to mean not to be arrogant in the face of the Divine, by demanding certain things.  One should not have the illusion that one’s own desires are a manifestation of the divine will.  As that immortal essence which transcends everything, God in its own driving of the greater forces which become the laws of reality will determine the necessity of your supplications.  The Divine decides everything and has the best answer for particular petitions.  Nevertheless, without reverence and sincerity, one cannot be in harmony with the Godhead.  Regardless of what is given, it is duty of the believer to believe in, love, and worship.

20. You may discard your own body, but you must preserve your honour (身を捨ても名利はすてす)

There are worse things than dying.  There are situations when dying is the most noble and preferable action to take.

21. Never abandon the Eternal Way (常に兵法の道をはなれす)

The purpose of the Dokkodo is to bring out a form of active asceticism – the warrior’s asceticism of action, as Evola would have put it.  Whatever happens, stay on the path: when the purpose become enlightenment, the Way becomes of paramount of importance.

Regardless of the external trappings of culture and the differences made manifest in it, there are universal ideals and beliefs within religious and martial traditions.  These doctrines give a sense of civility, sophistication, moral understanding, and examples to people and nations who are flawed.  Being flawed is the nature of the human being.  Flawed beings are always in need of Divine Guidance and its implementation.  As above, so below.

dimanche, 10 août 2014

Sao Paulo: IV Encontro Internacional Evoliano

dousor.jpg

lundi, 28 juillet 2014

DE PIE SOBRE LAS RUINAS

DE PIE SOBRE LAS RUINAS

de Juan Pablo Vítali

 

De Pie Sobre las Ruinas
 

POR
 
JUAN PABLO VÍTALI
 
 
Diseño: Fernando Lutz
Maquetación y correciones: Manuel Q.
Colección: Minnesänger
Papel blanco 90gr.
Páginas: 152
Tamaño: 21 x 15 cm
Edición en rústica (cosido) con solapas de 8 cm
P.V.P.: 15 €
(Gastos de envío no incluidos)
 
ISBN: 978-84-940846-8-3 
 
 
Sabadell-CAM:
 
0081 3176 22 0006048819
 
 
 
 “Los poetas no están para interpretar poderes circunstanciales ni superficiales ideologías. Ellos expresan lo sagrado de los mundos auténticos e irrumpen como un rayo para alumbrar fugazmente la edad oscura. El poeta no es un dios, pero suele hablar por los dioses…..”
 
“El hombre moderno se ha colocado a sí mismo fuera de toda comprensión poética. Esa es acaso, la mejor definición de la edad oscura...”
 
“Lo poético no reside en el verso ni en la rima, sino en la tensión espiritual y épica del texto, en la sucesión simbólica que crece y se eleva hacia el objetivo, como la flecha de un arquero zen...”
 
“Los símbolos poéticos convocan a la percepción del hombre lo que está más allá de la percepción material. La poesía es la voluntad de plasmar un lenguaje simbólico no como la excepción, sino como la regla de un Orden Nuevo…..”
 
“La poesía es un mundo de dioses, que tiene por naturaleza la eternidad de los ciclos, el eterno retorno. Poeta y guerrero abren ciertas puertas a riesgo de sus vidas, para que otros pasen por ellas hacia la eternidad. Tal es su trágico destino…...”
 
 
Juan Pablo Vítali

dimanche, 27 juillet 2014

L’écologie selon Hildegarde

L’écologie selon Hildegarde

Écologie. Vous avez dit écologie…

La mode est à l’écologie. Soigner son environnement, protéger sa planète s’impose comme une obligation morale, surtout depuis qu’on interdit aux religions de prononcer ce gros mot. Mais de quoi parle-t-on au juste ? Parler de planète, ce n’est pas la même chose que parler de monde ; parler de la nature ne dit pas ce qu’est cette nature, dans sa… nature profonde, même lorsqu’on l’écrit avec un « N » majuscule. Les anciens vivaient dans un monde ; nous, nous vivons sur une planète, perdus dans une immensité sans frontières…

Sainte Hildegarde appartient au passé, non parce qu’elle aurait aujourd’hui 916 ans ou parce qu’elle ne connaît rien à l’économie, mais parce qu’elle nous parle d’un monde qui ne ressemble plus du tout au nôtre. Tandis que nous construisons des mondes nouveaux, des cieux nouveaux, que nous sautons de progrès en découvertes, elle nous révèle ingénument les secrets d’un univers où les cieux peuplés de créatures chantent la gloire de Dieu, où la terre glorifie le Créateur dans toutes ses fibres, des plantes aux anges, en passant par les astres, le sexe, la vie, la souffrance…

C’est à peine si nous reconnaissons la nature qu’elle nous décrit dans ses visions et dans ses chants, tant le visage qu’elle en montre a changé depuis lors ! Comme si ses visions nous transportaient de l’autre côté de la toile, nous faisant découvrir avec stupeur qu’il y a un envers à ce que nous voyons, et que cet envers est en réalité l’endroit des choses. Nous qui croyions invinciblement et définitivement voir les choses à l’endroit, nous apprenons que cette perception a quelque chose d’illusoire. Elle ne dit pas que nos sens nous trompent, comme le pense M. Descartes, mais qu’ils ne nous disent pas tout, tant s’en faut, que ce qu’ils disent est plutôt vrai, mais à l’envers.

Ce défaut de perception, placé à la racine même de l’homme depuis la chute d’Adam, ne dit lui-même pas tout de l’homme : celui qui en dit tout, c’est le Verbe incarné, nouvel Adam, homme restauré dans sa dignité première, parfaitement à l’endroit, lui. En Lui, le microcosme est renouvelé, et sa vision du macrocosme peut enfin retrouver son vrai sens.

En effet, chez notre visionnaire – comme chez tous les Pères de l’Église d’ailleurs -, l’homme ressemble à l’univers parce qu’il en rassemble tous les règnes : corps, âme et esprit, d’où le terme de microcosme, c’est-à-dire petit-monde. Ainsi, le grand-monde trouve-t-il son sens dans le Verbe fait chair, et l’homme sa vraie place dans ce monde per ipsum et cum ipso et in ipso, par Lui, avec Lui et en Lui. Le Verbe est la clef de lecture du monde.

Le statut ontologique de l’homme fait que tout ce qu’il accomplit sur terre concerne aussi les cieux, qu’il aime, qu’il mange, qu’il dorme ou qu’il marche. S’il ne doit pas faire n’importe quoi, c’est que d’une certaine manière ses actes résonnent dans tout l’univers. Sa conscience est une conscience d’abord religieuse, une conscience qui le relie, via le Verbe, à l’univers créé et au Créateur, la conscience morale n’étant que le reliquat de cette conscience plus vaste.

Le monde hildegardien est un monde de nature symbolique, où ce qui est en bas ressemble à ce qui est en haut, où le supérieur fonde l’inférieur, où les êtres circulent. Et la musique d’Hildegarde ressemble à ce monde, avec ses effets de miroir, ses ascensions fulgurantes, ses résonances multiples. La grâce et la beauté y sont la parure de toutes choses, Marie le miroir où partout se reflète le verbe créateur : « C’est pourquoi tu as été couronnée de la Sagesse de Dieu qui t’a établie comme son miroir ». Chez Hildegarde, nous regardons la nature et c’est Dieu qui paraît, nous tournons nos regards vers Marie, et c’est le Verbe qui se montre…

Si notre monde moderne consentait à regarder sa planète comme un miroir, qui sait, peut-être y verrait-il Dieu ?

La Nef