Everyone has heard about Jean Piaget’s (1896-1980) theory of the cognitive development of children. But no one knows that his theory placed Europeans at the top of the cognitive ladder with most humans stuck at the bottom — unless Europeans taught them how to think.
Piaget is widely recognized as the “greatest child psychologist of the twentieth century.” Unlike many other influential figures, Piaget’s discoveries have withstood the test of time. His argument that human cognition develops stage by stage, from sensorimotor, through preoperational and concrete operations, to formal operations, is generally endorsed in psychology and sociology texts as a “remarkably fruitful” model. This is not to deny that aspects of his theory have been revised and supplemented by new insights. One important criticism is that his fixed sequence of clear-cut stages does not always apprehend the overlapping and uneven process in the development of cognition. But even the strongest critics admit that his observations accurately show that substantial differences do exist between the cognitive processes (linguistic development, mental representations of concrete objects, logical reasoning) of children and adults.
Suppression of Piaget’s Cross Cultural Findings
What the general public does not know, and what the mainstream academic world is suppressing, is that many years of cross-cultural empirical research by Piaget and his followers have demonstrated that the stages of mental development of children and adolescents reflect the stages of cognitive evolution “humankind” has gone through from primitive, ancient, and medieval, to modern societies. The cognitive processes of humanity have not always been the same, but have improved over time. The civilizations of the world can be ranked according to the level of cognitive development of their populations. The peoples of the world differ not only in the content of their values, religious beliefs, and ways of classifying things; they differ in the cognitive processes they employ, their capacity to understand, for example, the relation between objects and concepts, their awareness of objective time, their ability to draw inferences from data, and to project these inferences into the hypothetical realm of the future. Most humans throughout history have been “childlike” in their cognitive capacities; they are not able, for example, to recognize contradictions between belief and experience, or to conceive multiple causes for individual events. Europe began to produce adolescents capable of reaching the stage of formal operational reasoning before any other continent, whereas to this day some nations barely manage to produce adults capable of formal operations.
This aspect of the cross-cultural comparative research conducted by Piaget and his associates has been suppressed. Critics interpreted the lack of formal reasoning among adolescents in many non-Western societies as evidence that his model lacked universal application, rather than as further confirmation that his theory of child development, first developed through extensive research on children in the West, could be applied outside the West. Because many critics erroneously assumed that Piaget’s theory was about how all children naturally maturate into higher levels of cognition, they took this lack of cognitive development in pre-modern cultures as a demonstration that different cultural contexts produce different modes of cognitive development. Piaget’s stages, however, should not be seen as stages that every child goes through as they get older. They are not biologically predetermined maturational stages. While there is a teleological tendency in Piaget’s account of cognitive stages, with each of the four stages in a modern environment unfolding naturally as the child ages, this criticism ignored the implications of his cross-cultural studies, which were carried in his later years, and which made it evident that the ability to reach the stage of formal operations depended on the type of science education children received rather than on a predetermined maturation process.
It can be argued, actually, that Piagetian cross-cultural studies made his theory all the more powerful in offering a precise and orderly account of the cognitive psychological development of humankind in world history from hunting and gathering societies through agrarian societies to modern societies. This was not just a theory about children but a grand theory covering the cognitive experience of all peoples throughout history, from primitive peoples with a preoperational mind, to agrarian peoples with a concrete operational mind, to modern peoples with a formal operational mind. One of the rare followers of this cross-cultural research, the German sociologist Georg W. Oesterdiekhoff, observes that “thousands of empirical studies across all continents and social milieus, from the 1930s to the present” (2015, 85) have been conducted demonstrating that, depending on the level of cultural scientific education, the nations of the world in the course of history can be identified as preoperational (which is the stage of children from their second to their sixth or seventh year of life), concrete operational (which is the stage from ages seventh until twelfth years) and formal operational (which is the stage of cognition from twelve years onward).
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Adults living in a scientific culture are more rational (and intelligent) than adults living in pre-modern cultures. For example, according to studies conducted in the 1960s and 1970s, even educated adults living in Papua New Guinea did not reach the formal stage. Australian Aborigines who were still living a traditional lifestyle barely developed beyond a preoperational stage in their adult years. Without a population that has mentally developed to the level of formal operations, which entails a capacity to think about abstract relationships and symbols without concrete forms, a capacity to grasp syllogistic reasoning, comprehend algebra, formulate hypotheses, there can be no modernization
However, despite all the studies confirming Piaget’s powerful theory, from about 1975-1980 a “wave of ideological attacks” was launched across the Western academic world against any notion that the peoples of the Earth could be ranked in terms of their cognitive development. According to Oesterdiekhoff, “nearly all child psychologists of the first two generations of developmental psychology knew about the similarities between children and pre-modern man,” but “due to anti-colonialism, student revolt, and damaged self-esteem of the West in consequence of the World Wars this theory as the mainstream spirit of Western sciences and public opinion declined gradually” (2014a, 281). As another author observed in 1989, “any suggestion that the cognitive processes of the older child might posses any similarities to the cognitive processes of some primitive human cultures is regarded as being beneath contempt” (Dan Le Pan, 1989).
I came across Oesterdiefkhoff’s research after a long search through Piagetian theory. I was wondering what his stage theory might have to say about the cognitive development of peoples in history. But I could find only sources of Piaget as a cognitive psychologist of children as such, not as a grand theorist of the cognitive development of humanity across world history — until I came to Oesterdiefkhoff’s many publications, which draw on pre-1975 Piagetian research and current research. This research, as Oesterdiefkhoff notes, “no longer belong to the center of attention and research interests. Most social scientists have never heard about these researchers and have only a very scanty knowledge of them” (2014a, 280).
Oesterdiefkhoff is very blunt and ambitious in his arguments. It is about why Piagetian theory is “capable of explaining, better than previous approaches, the history of humankind from prehistory through ancient to modern societies, the history of economy, society, culture, religion, philosophy, sciences, morals, and everyday life” (2014a). He believes that the rise of formal operational thinking among Europeans was the decisive factor in the rise of modern science, enlightenment, industrialism, democracy, and humanism in the West. The reason why India, China, Japan, and the Middle East did not start the Industrial Revolution “lies in their inability to evolve the stage of formal operations” (2014a).
Primitive and pre-modern peoples cannot be described as having a similar rational disposition as modern peoples because they are at the preoperational and concrete operational stages of cognition. Primitive adults share basic aspects of the preoperational thinking of children no more mature than eight years old. Adults in pre-modern civilizations share the concrete operational thinking of 6-12 year olds.
Children and premodern adults share the same mechanisms and basic understandings of physical dimensions such as length, volume, time, space, weight, area, and geometric qualities. Both groups share the animistic understanding of nature and regard stones, mountains, woods, stars, rivers, winds, clouds, and storms as living beings, their movements and appearances as expressions of their will, intentions, and commitment. Premodern humans often manifest the animistic tendencies of modern children before their sixth year. Fetishism and natural religion of premodern humans reside in children’s mentality before concrete operational stage . . . The biggest parts of ancient religions are based on children’s psychology and animism before the sixth year of life (2016, 301).
It is not that adults in primitive and pre-modern cultures are similar to children in modern cultures in their emotional development, experience, and ability to survive in a hostile environment. It is that the reasoning abilities of adults in pre-modern cultures are undeveloped. As Lucien Lévy-Bruhl (1857-1939) had already observed in Primitive Mentality (1923), a work which was recently released (2018) as part of Forgotten Books [4], the primitive mind is devoid of abstract concepts, analytical reasoning, and logical consistency. The objective-visible world is not distinguished from the subjective-invisible world. Dreams, divination, incantations, sacrifices, and omens, not inferential reasoning and objective causal relations, are the phantasmagorical doors through which primitives get access to the intentions and plans of the unseen spirits that they believe control all natural events.
The visible world and the unseen world are but one, and the events occurring in the visible world depend at all times upon forces which are not seen . . . A man succumbs to some organic disease, or to snake-bite; he is crushed to death by the fall of a tree, or devoured by a tiger or crocodile: to the primitive mind, his death is due neither to disease nor to snake-venom; it is not the tree or the wild beast or reptile that has killed him. If he has perished, it is undoubtedly because a wizard had “doomed” and “delivered him over”. Both tree and animal are but instruments, and in default of the one, the other would have carried out the sentence. They were, as one might say, interchangeable, at the will of the unseen power employing them (2018, 438).
I have reservations about the extent to which the rise of operational thinking on its own can explain the uniqueness of Western history (as I will explain in Part II), but I agree that without children or adolescents reaching the stage of operational thinking, there can be no modernization. The study of the geographical, economic, or cultural factors that led to the rise of science and the Industrial Revolution are not the matters we should be focusing on. The rise of a “new man” with psychogenetic capacities — psychological processes, personality, and behavior — for formal operational reasoning needs direct attention if we want to understand the rise of modern culture.
Cultural Relativism
But first, it seems odd that Oesterdiefkhoff holds two seemingly diametrical outlooks, “cultural relativism and universality of rationality,” responsible for the discrediting of Piagetian cross cultural theory. He does not explain what he means by “universality of rationality.” We get a sense that by “cultural relativism” he means the rejection of the unreserved confidence in the superiority of Western scientific rationality. Social scientists after the Second World War did become increasingly ambivalent about setting up Western formal thinking as a benchmark to judge the cognitive processes and values of other cultures, even though the non-Western world was happily embracing the benefits of Western science and technology.
The pathological state to which this relativism has affected Western thinking can be witnessed right inside the otherwise hyper-scientific field of cognitive psychology today. Take the very well known textbook, Cognitive Psychology [5] (2016), by IBM Professor of Psychology at Yale University, Robert Sternberg; it approaches every subject in a totally scientific and neutral manner — except the moment it touches the subject of intelligence cross-culturally, when it immediately embraces a relativist outlook informing students that intelligence is “inextricably linked to culture” and that it is impossible to determine whether members of “the Kpelle tribe in Africa” have less intelligent concepts than a PhD cognitive psychologist in the West. Intelligence is “something that a culture creates to define the nature of adaptive performance in that culture and to account for why some people perform better than others on the tasks that the culture happens to value.” It is “so difficult,” it says, to “come up with a test that everyone would consider culture-fair — equally appropriate and fair for members of all cultures” (503-04).
If members of different cultures have different ideas of what it means to be intelligent, then the very behaviors that may be considered intelligent in one culture may be considered unintelligent in another (504).
This textbook pays detailed attention to the scientific achievements of Piaget, but portrays him as someone who investigated the “internal maturation processes” of children as such, without considering his cross-cultural findings, which clearly suggest that children in less developed and less scientific environments do not mature to the formal stage. Pretending that such findings do not exist, the book goes on to criticize Piaget for ignoring “evidence of environmental [cultural] influences on children’s performance.”
I am not suggesting that cultural relativism has not taken over Western sciences in the way it has the humanities, sociology, history, and philosophy. But there is no denying this relativism is being effectively used by scientists against any overt presumption by Western scientists that their knowledge is “superior” to the knowledge of African tribes and Indigenous peoples. No cognitive psychologist is allowed to talk about the possible similarities between the minds of children and the minds of adult men in pre-modern cultures.
Cultural Universals
Oesterdiefkhoff does not define “universality of rationality,” but we can gather from the literature he uses that he is referring to other anthropologists who argue that all humans are rationally inclined; primitive and pre-modern peoples are not “illogical” or “irrational.” The “actual structures of thought, cognitive processes, are the same in all cultures.” What differs are the “superstructural” values, religious beliefs, and ways of classifying things in nature. Primitive peoples, Islamic and Confucian peoples, were quite rational in the way they went about surviving in the natural world, making tools, building cultures, and enforcing customs that were “adaptive” to their social settings and environments. They did not develop science because they had different priorities and beliefs, and were less obsessed with mastering nature and increasing production.
The anthropologist Claude Lévi-Strauss, and the sociologist Émile Durkheim, were the first to argue that the primitive mind is “logical in the same sense and same fashion as ours” and that the only difference lies in the classification systems and thought content. George Murdock and Donald Brown, in more recent times, came up with the term “cultural universals” (or “human universals [6]“) to refer to patterns, institutions, customs, and beliefs that occur universally in all cultures. These universals demonstrated, according to these anthropologists, that cultures differ a lot less than one might think by just examining levels of technological development. Murdock and Brown pointed to strong similarities in the gender roles of all cultures, the common presence of the incest taboo, similarities in their religious and healing rituals, mythologies, marriage rules, use of language, art, dance, and music.
This idea about the universality of rationality and “cultural universals” was subsequently elaborated in a more Darwinian direction by evolutionary psychologists. Evolutionary psychology is generally associated with “Right wing” thinking, in contrast to cultural relativism, which is associated with “Left wing” thinking. Evolutionary psychologists like E. O. Wilson and Steven Pinker hold that these cultural universals are naturally selected, biologically inherited behaviors. They believe that rationality is a naturally inherited disposition among all humans, though they don’t say that the levels of knowledge across cultures are the same. Humans are rational in the way they go about surviving and co-existing with other humans. These universals were selected because they enhanced the adaptability of peoples to their environments and improved the group’s chances of survival. Some additional cultural universals observed in all human cultures are bodily adornment, calendars, cooperative labor, cosmology, courtship, divination, division of labor, dream interpretation, food taboos, funeral rites, gift-giving, greetings, hospitality, inheritance rules, kin groups, magic, penal sanctions, puberty customs, residence rules, soul concepts, and status differentiation.
Evolutionary psychologists are convinced that the existence of cultural universals amount to a refutation of the currently “fashionable” notion that all human behaviors, including gender differences, are culturally determined. But if the West is very similar to other cultures, why did modern science develop in this civilization, including liberal democratic values? Evolutionary psychologists search for general explanations — the notion of cultural universals meets this criteria, Western uniqueness does not; therefore, they either ignore this question or reduce Western uniqueness to a concatenation of historical factors, varying selective pressures, and geographical good luck. They point to how modern science has been assimilated by multiple cultures, from which point they argue that science is not culturally exceptional to the West but a universal method that produces universal truths “for humanity.”
Can one argue that universalism is a cultural attribute uniquely Western and therefore relative to this culture?
Piagetian Universalism and IQ Convergence
Piagetian theory is also universalist in maintaining that all cultures are now reaching the stage of formal operational thinking. The West merely initiated formal reasoning. More than this, according to Oesterdiefkhoff, this cognitive convergence is happening across all the realms of social life, because changes in the cognitive structures of humans bring simultaneous changes in the way we think about politics and institutional arrangements. The more rational we become, the more we postulate enlightened conceptualizations of government in opposition to authoritarian forms. Drawing on the extension of Piagetian theory to explain the moral development of humans (initiated by Piaget and elaborated by Lawrence Kohlberg), Oesterdiefkhoff writes that once humans reach stage four, they start to grasp “that rule legitimacy should follow only from a correct rule installation, that is, from the choices of the players involved” (2015, 88).
Thus, they regard only rules correctly chosen as obliging rules. Only democratic choices install legitimate rules. Youth on the formal stage surmount therefore the holy understanding of rules by the democratic understanding. They replace an authoritarian understanding of rules, laws, and customs by a democratic one. Thus, they invent democracy in consequence of their cognitive maturation (2015, 88-9).
The emergence of the adolescent stage of formal operations gave birth not only to the new sciences after 1650 but also to philosophers such as Locke, Montesquieu, and Rousseau, who formulated the basic principles of constitutional government, representative institutions, and religious tolerance. Extensive cross-cultural research has shown that “children do not understand tolerance for deviating ideas, liberty rights for individuals, rights of individuals against government and authority, and democratic legitimacy of governments and authorities” (2015, 93). They are much like the adults of premodern societies, or current backward Islamic peoples, who take “laws and customs as unchangeable, eternal, and divine, made by god and not modifiable by human wishes or choices” (2015, 90).
This argument may seem similar to Francis Fukuyama’s thesis that modernizing humans across the world are agreeing that liberal-democratic values best satisfy the longing humans have for a state that recognizes the right of humans to pursue their own happiness within a constitutional state based on equal rules. The difference, a crucial one, is that for Fukuyama the rise of democracy came from the articulation and propagation of new ideas, whereas for Oesterdiefkhoff psychogenetic maturation is a precondition of democratic rule. Adults who were raised in a pre-modern culture and have a concrete operational mind can “never surmount” this stage, no matter how many books they read about the merits of liberal democracy. These adults will lack the appropriate ontogenetic development required for a democratic mind.
The absence of stimuli and forces of modern culture during early childhood in premodern cultures prevents later psychological development from going beyond certain stages . . . Unused developmental opportunities in youth stop the development of the nervous system, thus preventing psychological advantages in later life. This explains why education and enlightenment, persuasion and media programs could not draw adult premodern people out of their adherence to magic, animism, ordeal praxis, ancestor worship, totemism, shamanism, and belief in witches. Such people, moving in adulthood to modern milieus, cannot surmount their anthropological structures and their deepest emotions and convictions (2016, 306-7).
Moreover, according to Oesterdiefkhoff, with the attainment of higher Piagetian stages come higher IQ levels. Psychogenetic differences, not biological genetic differences, are the decisive factor. “All pre-modern peoples stood on intelligence levels of 50 to 70 [IQ points] or on preoperational or concrete operational levels, no matter from what race, culture or continent they have come” (2014b, 380).
Not only the Western nations, but all modernizing nations have raised their scores. The rises in stage progression and IQ scores express the greatest intelligence transformations ever in the history of humankind and stem solely from changes in culture and education. When Africans, Japanese, Chinese and Brazilians have raised their intelligence so dramatically, where is the evidence for huge genetic influences? Huge genetic influences might be assumed if Europeans had always had higher intelligence and if African, Indians, Arabs and Vietnamese had been unable to raise their intelligence to levels superior to that of Europeans 100 years ago. But Latin Americans and Arabs today do have higher IQ scores than Europeans had 100 years ago . . . Where is the leeway for genetic influences to affect national intelligence differences? (Ibid).
IQ experts would counter that only psychometric data about levels of heritable general intelligence can explain the rise of formal operational thinking. But even if we agree that a gap in IQ scores between American blacks and American whites has remained despite the Flynn effect [9] and similar levels of education and income, it is very hard to attribute the remarkable increases in IQ identified over the last century to heredity. Oesterdiefkhoff’s argument that “all modernizing nations have raised their IQ scores,” and that operational thinking has been central to this modernization, is a strong one.
Formal Reasoning is not a Cultural Universal
The stage of formal operations cannot be said to be a biologically primary ability that humans inherit genetically. They are secondary biological abilities requiring a particular psycho-cultural context. Formal thinking came to be assimilated by other nations (most successfully in east Asian nations with an average high IQ, but far less so in sub-Saharan nations where to this day witchcraft prevails [10]). The abilities associated with the first two stages (e.g., control over motor actions, walking, mental representation of external stimuli, verbal communication, ability to manipulate concepts), have been acquired universally by all humans since prehistorical times. These are biologically primary qualities that children across cultures accomplish at the ages and in the sequence more or less predicted by Piaget. They can be said to be universal abilities built into human nature and ready to unfold with only little educational socialization, explainable in the context of Darwinian evolutionary psychology. These cognitive abilities can thus be identified as “cultural universals.”
The concrete-operational abilities of stage three (e.g., the “ability to conserve” or to know that the same quantity of a liquid remains when the liquid is poured into a differently shaped container) are either lacking in primitive cultures or emerge at later ages in children than they do in modern cultures. These cognitive abilities may also be described as biologically primary, as skills that unfold naturally as the child matures in interaction with adult members of the society. In modern societies, all individuals with a primary education acquire concrete operational abilities. The aptitudes of this stage can be reasonably identified as universally present in all agrarian cultures.
This is not the case at all with formal operational skills. The skills associated with this stage (inductive logic, hypothesis testing, reasoning about proportions, combinations, probabilities, and correlations) do not come to humans naturally through socialization. There is abundant evidence that even normally intelligent college students with a long background in education have great difficulties distinguishing between the form and content of a syllogism, as well as other types of formal operational skills. Oesterdiefkhoff acknowledges that
Only when human beings are exposed to forces and stimuli typical of modern socialization and culture do they progress further and develop the adolescent stage of formal operations (2016, 307).
But, again, as it has been observed by critics of Piaget, even in modern societies where children inhabit a rationalized environment and adolescents are taught algebra and a variety of formal operational skills, many students with a reasonable IQ find it difficult to think in this way. According to P. Dasen (1994), only one-third of adults ever reach the formal operational stage. Evolutionary psychologists have thus disagreed with the idea that this stage is bound to unfold among most humans as they get older as long as they get a reasonably modern education. There are many “sub-stages” within this stage, and the upper stages require a lot of schooling and students with a keen interest and intelligence in this type of reasoning. This lack of universality in learning formal operational skills has persuaded evolutionary psychologists to make a distinction between the biologically primary abilities of the first three stages and the biological secondary abilities of stage four. Formal reasoning is principally a “cultural invention” requiring “tedious repetition and external motivation [11]” for students to master it.
If the ability to engage in formal thinking is so particular, a biologically secondary skill in our modern times, would it not require a very particular explanation to account for the origins of this cognitive stage in an ancient world devoid of a modern education? If the rise of “new humans” with a capacity for formal thinking was responsible for the rise of the modern world, and the existence of a modern education is an indispensable requirement in the attainment of this stage among a limited number of students, how did “new humans” grow out of a pre-modern world with a lower average IQ?
In the second part of this article, it will be argued that Europeans reached stage four long before any other people on the planet because Europeans began an unparalleled intellectual tradition of first-person investigations into their conscious states. This is a type of self-reflection in which European man began to ask who he is, how does he know that he is making truthful statements, what is the best life, and if he is being self-deceived in his beliefs and intentions. This is a form of self-knowledge that was announced in the Delphic motto “know thyself.” It would be an error, however, to describe the beginnings of this self-consciousness as a relation to something in oneself (an I or an ego) from which a predicate, or an outside, to which the subject relates, is derived. The emergence of the first-person consciousness of Europeans did not emerge outside the being-in-the world of the aristocratic community of Indo-Europeans. Europeans began a quest for rationally justified truths, for objective standards of justification, and for the realization of the good life in a reflective self-relation, coupled with socially justified reasons about what is morally appropriate.
References
Brown, Donald (1991). Human Universals. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.
Dasen, P. (1994). “Culture and cognitive development from a Piagetian perspective.” In W. J. Lonner & R. S. Malpass (Eds.), Psychology and culture. Boston: Allyn and Bacon.
Genovese, Jeremy (2003). “Piaget, Pedagogy, and Evolutionary Psychology.” Evolutionary Psychology, Volume 1: 217-137.
LePan, Donald. (1989). The Cognitive Revolution in Western Culture. London: Macmillan Press.
Lucien Lévy-Bruhl (2018). Primitive Mentality [1923]. Forgotten Books.
Oesterdiekhoff, Georg W. (2014a). “The rise of modern, industrial society. The cognitive developmental approach as key to disclose the most fascinating riddle in history.” The Mankind Quarterly, 54, 3/4, 262-312.
Oesterdiekhoff, Georg W. (2016). Child and Ancient Man: How to Define Their Commonalities and Differences Author(s). The American Journal of Psychology, Vol. 129, No. 3, pp. 295-312.
Oesterdiekhoff, Georg W. (2012). Was pre-modern man a child? The quintessence of the psychometric and developmental approaches. Intelligence 40: 470-478.
Oesterdiekhoff, Georg W (2014b). “Can Childlike Humans Build and Maintain a Modern Industrial Society?” The Mankind Quarterly 54, 3/4, 371-385.
Oesterdiekhoff, Georg W (2015). “Evolution of Democracy. Psychological Stages and Political Developments in World History” Cultura: International Journal of Philosophy of Culture and Axiology 12 (2): 81-102.
Stenberg, Robert (2003). Cognitive Psychology. Nelson Thompson Learning. Third Edition.
This article was reproduced from the Council of European Canadians [12] Website.
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L’ouvrage est essentiel car depuis le délire a débordé des campus et gagné la société occidentale toute entière. En même temps qu’elle déboulonne les statues, remet en cause le sexe de Dieu et diabolise notre héritage littéraire et culturel, cette société intégriste-sociétale donc menace le monde libre russe, chinois ou musulman (je ne pense pas à Riyad…) qui contrevient à son alacrité intellectuelle. Produit d’un nihilisme néo-nietzschéen, de l’égalitarisme démocratique et aussi de l’ennui des routines intellos (Bloom explique qu’on voulait « débloquer des préjugés, « trouver du nouveau »), la pensée politiquement correcte va tout dévaster comme un feu de forêt de Stockholm à Barcelone et de Londres à Berlin. On va dissoudre les nations et la famille (ou ce qu’il en reste), réduire le monde en cendres au nom du politiquement correct avant d’accueillir dans les larmes un bon milliard de réfugiés. Bloom pointe notre lâcheté dans tout ce processus, celle des responsables et l’indifférence de la masse comme toujours.
« Les aventuriers sexuels comme Margaret Mead et d'autres qui ont trouvé l'Amérique trop étroite nous ont dit que non seulement nous devons connaître d'autres cultures et apprendre à les respecter, mais nous pourrions aussi en tirer profit. Nous pourrions suivre leur exemple et nous détendre, nous libérer de l'idée que nos tabous ne sont rien d'autre que des contraintes sociales. »
Bloom enfin a compris l’usage ad nauseam qu’on fera de la référence hitlérienne : tout est décrété raciste, fasciste, nazi, sexiste dans les campus US dès 1960, secrétaires du rectorat y compris ! Mais lui reprenant Marx ajoute que ce qui passe en 1960 n’est ni plus ni moins une répétition comique du modèle tragique de 1933. Les juristes nazis comme Carl Schmitt décrétaient juive la science qui ne leur convenait pas comme aujourd’hui on la décrète blanche ou sexiste.
Lecteur autant des néo-libéraux Ludwig von Mises et Friedriech von Hayek que de Carl Schmitt et de Julien Freund, ce Lombard approuve très tôt le fédéralisme italien et européen. Il juge en effet que l’État moderne sous sa forme d’État-nation entre dans un déclin inéluctable. Dans un rare texte de Gianfranco Miglio disponible en français, « Après l’État-nation » (mis en ligne le 17 novembre 2017 sur le site Le grand continent), il considère que « les villes sont de véritables communautés politiques, de fait toujours plus affranchies des États, entretenant parfois des relations étroites (ou des rivalités) les unes avec les autres. Elles sont toujours moins en harmonie avec leurs États respectifs qui leur imposent plutôt des limites ». Son inspiration politique s’appelle le Saint-Empire romain germanique et la Ligue hanséatique. Au soir de sa vie, il reconnaissait volontiers que « l’Empire était une structure multinationale qui servait aux Reichsstädten, aux Cités de l’Empire, à régler les conflits qui surgissent aux niveaux locaux. Mais pour le reste les communautés urbaines ou locales avaient la liberté de s’auto-gouverner, à promulguer leurs propres lois. L’autorité impériale les laissait en paix, au contraire de ce que fait Bruxelles aujourd’hui (dans La Padania du 15 juin 2000, repris dans Nouvelles de Synergies Européennes, n° 48, 2000) ».
Dostojewski: National-religiöse Überwindung des Nihilismus
Danilewski: Der russische Spengler
Im Zuge der ukrainischen Krise geriet auch Dugin ins Visier der westlichen Öffentlichkeit; etablierte deutsche Zeitungen, darunter Die Welt und die Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, porträtierten den vermeintlichen „rechtsradikalen Guru“ und „Einflüsterer Putins“29. Dugins Stern scheint jedoch zu sinken. Im Mai dieses Jahres wurde er als Soziologieprofessor an der staatlichen Moskauer Lomonossow-Universität vom Rektor entlassen. Grund waren unter anderem sein Aufruf, die Opfer des Massakers von Odessa vom Mai 2014 mit dem Blut der „Kiewer Junta“ zu rächen, sowie eine sich anschließende Unterschriftensammlung gegen ihn. Als aktuell bedeutendster Vertreter der langen Tradition russischer Großreichsideen dürfte seine Stimme jedoch nicht leiser werden. Europas Patrioten und Konservative sollten diesen Gegenpol zur ideologischen Dominanz des Westens zu schätzen wissen. Aber sie sollten auch nicht vergessen: Die Ideen dieses wichtigen Verbündeten stehen in einer langen Tradition russischen Reichsbewußtseins. Sie verkörpern nicht mehr und nicht weniger als den ideologischen Überbau nationaler Interessen.
Gumplowicz nennt für den Aufbau des Staates eine Reihe von Folgeerscheinungen. Dabei verschwand die Rassentrennung nicht ganz. Vielmehr wird sie in die staatliche Ordnung eingebettet und tritt als eine staatlich gewährleistete Rangfolge auf. Gumplowicz erklärt: „Denn schließlich ist Herrschaft nichts anderes als eine durch Übermacht geregelte Teilung der Arbeit, bei der den Beherrschten die niedrigeren und schweren, den Herrschenden die höheren und leichteren (oft nur das Befehlen und Verwalten) zufällt. Wie aber ohne Teilung der Arbeit keinerlei Kultur denkbar ist, so ist ohne Herrschaft keine gedeihliche Teilung der Arbeit möglich, weil sich, wie gesagt, freiwillig niemand zur Leistung der niedrigeren und schwereren Arbeit hergeben wird.“ Dieser Punkt ist wichtig: Obwohl die „Vergesellschaftung der Sprache und Religion“ zu einer „amalgamierten“ Gesellschaft führt, wirkt die Staatenbildung gleichzeitig darauf hin, eine Herrschaftsordnung mit einer Trennung von Herrschern und Beherrschten zu festigen.
Gumplowicz bringt seine brutalen Grundsätze aber nicht vor, um Blutvergießen zu rechtfertigen oder die Herrschenden zum Krieg aufzustacheln. Ihm geht es darum, auf die blutige Voraussetzung jeder Staatswerdung aufmerksam zu machen. Er distanziert sich von der Gefühlsduselei, die schon zu seiner Zeit die Darstellungen der internationalen Beziehungen prägten. Und nicht zuletzt versucht er, menschliche Erfahrungen und Errungenschaften ohne die übliche Weichzeichnung darzustellen. Die Wechselwirkung von Rassenstreitigkeiten und dem nachfolgenden Amalgamierungsdrang stellt Gumplowicz nochmals in „Rasse und Staat. Eine Untersuchung über das Gesetz der Staatenbildung“ (1875) dar: „Ohne Rassengegensätze gibt es keinen Staat und keine staatliche Entwicklung, und ohne Rassenverschmelzung gibt es keine Kultur und keine Zivilisation.“ 
A l’époque la SF nous rassure. Les martiens ne peuvent être que comme nous. Le caustique auteur de S/Z Seraphita ajoute :
Quel est donc le génie d’un Semmelweis ? Exerçant dans une clinique où la fièvre puerpérale ravage les femmes en couche, surtout lorsque celles-ci sont tripotées par des étudiants ayant plus tôt effectué des dissections, Semmelweis comprend que cette mortalité massive est directement liée à la propagation de miasmes cadavériques dans les organes génitaux féminins. Déjà persuadé que la cause de ces décès se trouve au sein de la clinique même, son déclic survient le jour où son ami Kolletschka, souffrant d’une blessure au scalpel contractée lors d’une dissection, meurt des suites de symptômes similaires à ceux de la fièvre puerpérale. 
Se rangeant derrière l’initiateur du renouveau mitteleuropéen, le Triestin Claudio Magris, Milo Dor résume cette culture centre-européenne comme un fait rendu possible par deux facteurs : « la présence de population juive et l’emploi de la langue allemande comme moyen de communication universellement reconnu ». À l’heure du triomphe étouffant de l’anglais et de la fin de ce pénible XXème siècle — siècle qui, pour Magris, se résume dans l’affrontement entre les éléments juif et allemand —, cette culture est résolument morte. La Cacanie de Musil n’est qu’un vague souvenir et n’excite guère plus que les initiés. Stefan Zweig est adulé en raison de ses nouvelles pour femmes et son touchant exil, alors que sa nostalgie euro-habsbourgeoise est habilement passée sous silence. Berlin est sur toutes les lèvres, Vienne n’est plus rien. Anecdotique ? Non, toute la matière historique des deux derniers siècles est là : Berlin est une anomalie, elle marque le triomphe de la vulgarité belliciste des Hohenzollern sur le prestige pacificateur des Habsbourg — fait historique amorçant le début des convulsions allemandes pour Istv
Neben diesen Riesen nimmt sich der spanische Beitrag zu der Sache „Liberalismus“ recht mickrig aus. Allein der Name geht auf spanische Geschehnisse „von vor zweihundert Jahren“ zurück.
Der Liberalismus brachte einen Jahrhundertbrand für Spanien
Seit dem 1812 – zur Zeit der napoleonischen Besetzung Spaniens – in der freien Hafenstadt Cádiz vollzogenem Verfassungsexperiment, standen die Anhänger des Absolutismus denen des Liberalismus feindlich gegenüber. Erstere wurden von den Verfechtern von Volkssouveränität und Parlamentarismus „Servile“ geschimpft, diese wiederum nannten jene abschätzig „Liberale“. Von Cádiz und aus dem Spanischen fanden „liberal“, „Liberaler“ und, endlich, „Liberalismus“ schnell Eingang in den modernen europäischen Wortschatz.
So schnell, wie die Liberalen die Chance ergriffen hatte, die ihnen die Kriegswirren – inklusive scheußlichsten Thronstreitigkeiten, an deren Ende die Gefangennahme der gesamten Königsfamilie durch Napoleon, stand – geboten hatten, genau so schnell formierte sich die absolutistische Opposition: Nicht wenige der 1812 nach Cádiz berufenen gewählten Abgeordneten waren geschworene Feinde des Liberalismus.
Mit dieser ihrer Bitte rannten die deswegen später von den Liberalen auch als „Perser“ verschrienen Absolutisten bei Ferdinand, der nur allzugern den Monarchen von Gottes Gnaden abgeben wollte, offene Türen ein. Trotzdem: mit dem Cádizer Verfassungsexperiment war ein Jahrhundertbrand gelegt. Für Spanien brach eine neue Zeit der Verfassungskämpfe und Bürgerkriege an, welche im Bürgerkrieg (1936-1939) ihren vorerst letzten Gipfelpunkt fand.
Ein gottesleugnerischer Humanismus
Im Zuge der Restauration des Ancien Régime, die in Spanien den Charakter einer regelrechten Rückgängigmachung von Französischer und liberaler Revolution annahm, kam es zu Liberalenverfolgungen solchen Ausmaßes, dass sich selbst das legitimistische Europa, mit Metternich an der Spitze, darüber entrüstete. Tatkräftig unterstützt wurde die Reaktion in Spanien vom Klerus.
Der Klerus hatte gute Gründe, den Liberalismus, der ein direkter Erbe von Aufklärung und Revolution war, zu verfolgen. Der aufrichtige Katholizismus vieler Liberaler änderte nämlich nichts daran, dass ausnahmslos jeder Liberalismus, sei es theoretisch, sei es praktisch, ein gottesleugnerischer Humanismus ist: „Menschenrechte“, „Philanthropie“, „Humanität“, „Volkssouveränität“, „Rationalismus“, „Selbstbestimmung des Individuums“, „Fortschritt“, verstanden als irdische Vervollkommnung und moralische Höherentwicklung des Menschengeschlecht, standen und stehen in einem unvereinbaren Gegensatz zu Gott, seiner Vorsehung sowie seiner Weltordnung.
Ihre Ideologie machte die Liberalen politisch gefährlich
Auch politisch war der Liberalismus bei weitem nicht so harmlos, wie es auf den ersten Blick, d.h. noch zu Cádiz, 1812, geschienen hatte: Von Anfang an sorgten für seine Verbreitung Geheimgesellschaften, allen voran die Freimaurerei. Es war geradezu eine Spezialität spanischer Liberaler und Freimaurer, überall Verschwörungen, wie z.B. die, welche 1820 im unteritalienischen Bruderkönigreich Neapel-Sizilien die Revolution auslöste, anzuzetteln.
Auch war es nicht unüblich, dass dieselben Verwaltungseliten des Absolutismus gleichzeitig ebenfalls Anhänger der liberalen Sache waren. So war es unvermeidlich, dass der letzte monarchische Absolutismus in Spanien über kurz oder lang den Liberalismus befördern würde, wenn auch unfreiwillig. Aus diesem Grunde auch scheinen alle späteren Tatsachen das liberale Selbstbewusstsein zu bestätigen, die von der Geschichte als „richtig“ vorgestellte Richtung, wenn nicht gar denselben Sinn der Geschichte, zu repräsentieren.
Der Liberalismus hatte für die Liberalen unzweifelhaft auf seiner Seite das geschichtliche „Recht des Neuen“ gegenüber dem Alten und Verbrauchten. In diesem Sinne das Neue und deshalb wirklich Rechtmäßige zu verkörpern, trieb die liberale Ideologie zur politischen Handlung an.
Die spanische Revolution von 1820 und die Heilige Allianz
Im bereits genannten Jahre 1820 gelang es den Liberalen, sich mit Hilfe des von ihnen unterwanderten Militärs für drei Jahre an der Macht zu halten. Während dieses sogenannten „liberalen Trienniums“ (Trienio Liberal) ging es hoch her in Spanien. Es kam zu den ersten antiklerikalen Gräueltaten – in Madrid war eine Gruppe Geistlicher auf offener Straße ermordet worden –, zu „Privatisierungen“ sowie zu unpopulären „kapitalistischen Reformen“.
Alarmiert von den Vorgängen in Spanien und Neapel beschloss die Heilige Allianz unter der Führung der Großmächte Russland, Österreich und Preußen, dem revolutionären Treiben in Südeuropa ein Ende zu setzen. Eine Intervention war so oder so unumgänglich. Namentlich die neapolitanischen Vorgänge hatten gezeigt, welche Kreise eine Revolution in Spanien ziehen konnte: Nicht ganz zufällig hatte die neapolitanische Verfassung die spanische von 1812 zum Vorbild und war auch sonst unter Mitwirkung bedeutender spanischer Liberaler zustande gekommen.
Nach der Intervention der Heiligen Allianz in Neapel-Sizilien wussten die spanischen Liberalen, dass sie als nächstes dran sein würden. Deshalb versuchten sie, sich auf ihre eigene doktrinäre und ideologische Weise in „Europa“ – worunter sie vornehmlich ihren imaginären Verbündeten Frankreich verstanden – Gehör zu verschaffen, was natürlich misslang.
Das real existierende Europa war restaurativ, das System der internationalen Politik das der Legitimität und des „Gleichgewichts der Kräfte“, nicht das der „Solidarität zwischen freien Völkern“ wie die spanischen Liberalen genauso trotzig wie verzweifelt verlautbaren ließen. Überhaupt machten Trotz und Verzweiflungsgeheul auf die Heilige Allianz nicht den geringsten Eindruck.
Auf dem Veroneser Kongress (1822) wurde Frankreich damit beauftragt, ein Expeditionsheer unter der Führung des Herzogs von Angouleme nach Spanien zu entsenden, um König Ferdinand als absoluten Herrscher wieder einzusetzen. Die Franzosen, die 1823 in Spanien eindrangen, um die Rechte des Thrones und des Altars wieder herzustellen, wurden als die „hunderttausend Söhne des heiligen Ludwig“ vom spanischen Volk als Befreier, und zwar vom Liberalismus, umjubelt.
Im Schatten des Absolutismus wuchs der Liberalismus
Mit dem unrühmlichen Ende des „Liberalen Trienniums” setzte eine extreme Reaktionsperiode ein (1823-1833), die von den Liberalen das „abscheuliche Jahrzehnt“ getauft wurde. Trotz der Schwere der Verfolgungen sowie zahlreicher Hinrichtungen konnten die Liberalen weiterhin an ihrer Revolution arbeiten: Als Untergrund standen sie in ständigem Kontakt mit ihren politischen Weggefährten im französischen und englischen Exil.
Auch die Solidarität unter Freimaurern leistete ihnen gute Dienste. Und dank der Änderung des internationalen politischen Klimas sowie der anhebenden kapitalistischen Entwicklung Europas konnten sie nun doch Unterstützung, und zwar von England und Frankreich, erwarten. Der ultraabsolutistischen „Kamarilla“ um Ferdinand – von daher stammt übrigens auch des deutsche Wort – zum Trotz war ab 1830 sogar der Hof liberal durchsetzt: Königin Marie Christine, selbst liberalen Reformen nicht abgeneigt, legte ihr gewichtiges Wort für liberalisierende, später offen liberale, Räte und Minister ein.
Es darf also nicht wundern, dass, als Ferdinand VII. 1833 starb, den Liberalen Spanien wie eine reife Frucht in die Hände fiel. Eine erneute Thronstreitigkeit – diesmal mit dem Bruder Ferdinands, Don Carlos, dem absolutistisch-legitimistischen Thronanwärter – bot den Liberalen einen Rechtsvorwand, sich der Krone zu bemächtigen: Angeblich im Sinne des traditionellen kastilischen Erbfolgerechts hielten die Liberalen die „Rechte“ der kaum den Windeln entschlüpften Tochter Ferdinands, Isabella, hoch.
(Bild: Verfassunggebende Versammlung, Cádiz 1812)